

**The London School of Economics and
Political Science**

*From 20th Century Troubles to 21st Century International
Terrorism: Identity, Securitization, and British
Counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011*

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the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of
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Declaration

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To my parents, Kris and John Fisher

Abstract

This thesis is an exploration into the consequential interrelation of official British discourse, identity, securitization, and counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. Through a relational-securitization approach, the thesis narrative explains how discourse is both constitutive and causal for outcomes in a particular case. It is a relational mechanism based analysis that investigates how observed rhetorical commonplaces came together to influence intersubjective understanding and security practice. The ways that identities were temporarily stabilized across discourse through particular configurations was essential to how British counterterrorism emerged, was maintained, and became normalized.

The thesis does not argue that possible insecurities categorized as “terrorism” do not exist, or that a security response is in itself surprising. However, how this response unfolded was not predetermined, and instead depended upon a securitization of terrorism along distinctive patterns of us/them construction. These patterns influenced the trajectory of counterterrorism by enabling certain outcomes to arise over others.

Collective understandings of identity shape the conditions of possibility for political action. As such, discourses of securitization have a causal impact over intersubjective understanding and counterterrorism practice. Historical moments, such as the 1974 Birmingham pub bombings or 11 September 2001 attacks, can facilitate a more rapid passage of exceptional measures. But the maintenance and normalization of these powers depends upon us/them and inside/outside boundary markers. Violent acts may thus influence outcomes, but they do not determine their substance or direction. Reasserted and/or reconfigured perceptions of distance and danger stabilizing the threat and referent in particular ways played a key role in counterterrorism’s transition from emergency response to permanent practice.

Through a relational-securitization approach, analysis can better map out how processes of identity construction were essential to the securitization of terrorism, and contributed to the emergence, legitimation, and normalization of British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011.

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Selected Abbreviations

AIA	Anglo-Irish Agreement
AQ	Al Qaeda
AQAP	Al Qaeda Arab Peninsula
AQI	Al Qaeda Iraq
BMG	Baader Meinhoff Gang
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear [weapons]
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
CLMC	Combined Loyalist Military Command
Con	Conservative Party
CONTEST	The UK's Strategy for Countering (International) Terrorism ¹
CS	Copenhagen School
DAAD	Direct Action Against Drugs
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EConvHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECourtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EOKA	Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston
EPA	Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act
ETA	Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GCA	Geneva Convention (Amendments) Act
GFA	Good Friday Agreement
HC	House of Commons, UK Parliament
HL	House of Lords, UK Parliament
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRB	Irish Republican Brotherhood
IRSP	Irish Republican Socialist Party
Lab	Labour Party

¹ "International" taken out of the title in CONTEST 2011.

LD	Liberal Democratic Party
LVF	Loyalist Volunteer Force
NORCID	Irish Northern Aid Committee
OIRA	Official Irish Republican Army
OV	Orange Volunteers
PC	Plaid Cymru
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PSF	Provisional Sinn Féin
PSNI	Police Service Northern Ireland
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
RAF	Red Army Faction
RAForce	Republican Action Force
RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
SAS	Special Air Service
SDLP	Social Democratic and Labour Party
SF	Sinn Féin
SP	Scottish Parliament
SPA	Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 1922
TA	Terrorism Act 2000
UAC	Ulster Army Council
UDA	Ulster Defence Association
UDR	Ulster Defence Regiment
UFF	Ulster Freedom Fighters
UKIP	UK Independent Party
UUC	Ulster Unionist Council
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party
UVF	Ulster Volunteer Force
UWC	Ulster Workers Council
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Chapter 1

Introduction

Political violence is a phenomenon that knows no spatial or temporal boundaries. It has no historical starting point we can research “back to”, and no future endpoint to confidently work toward. It is a constant of social and political relations, ebbing and flowing in different intensities. How we identify particular threats of political violence is, however, more discriminatory and consequential. These processes of identification depend upon changing contexts, power relations, and knowledge structures that delimit how we respond to such phenomena over time. In a relatively short period, the terrorist label and evolving derivatives, such as “domestic” and “international” terrorism, have become unquestioned terms used to categorize political violence, and justify exceptional security practice.

Labels of terrorism may come across as value-neutral or self-evident. However, such rhetorical means of identification are not predetermined. They are instead tied to self/other intersubjective understandings that result from social and political practices of meaning making. The way terrorism is securitized depends upon particular, and consequential, relational configurations of threat/referent identity construction. These constructions influence collective understanding and material outcomes of counterterrorism, affecting security and insecurity. In order to better explain and understand *how* social constructions influence outcomes, the use of a relational mechanism approach to discourse analysis holds significant analytic potential. A critical sensibility drawn from terrorism studies and political sociology further develops securitization theory’s conceptual logic and empirical application. Elaborated in chapter three but put simply here, securitization is the acceptance of an issue as a security issue

through the construction of an existential threat as risking the survival of a referent object, enabling action “outside the normal bounds of political procedure”.²

As explained by Jef Huysmans in the context of Copenhagen School (CS) research, “it may be useful for the School to find a way to open its agenda to changes in the logic of security so that the logic itself becomes an object of research in the empirical study of security dynamics”.³ Huysmans goes on to state that:

A cultural-historical interpretation of the rhetorical structure would reduce a tendency to universalize a specific logic of security. There is no internal limitation in the Copenhagen agenda which would prevent an introduction of this question of the cultural specificity of the rhetorical structure. Delving deeper into the specific characteristics of the logic of security, e .g. by means of genealogy of security practices or a comparative anthropology, would be a major contribution to security studies.⁴

The relevance of this call remains a challenge for inquiries into how language, structure, and security, are consequentially interwoven over time. This thesis provides one response by mapping out how discourse, identity and practice are mutually constituted and causally interrelated in the context of British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011.

I. Setting the scene

In an effort to clarify types of terrorism, Paul Wilkinson distinguished international terrorism as involving “the citizens or jurisdiction of more than one country”, and domestic terrorism as “confined within the borders of a single state and involves no foreign citizens or property”.⁵ This distinction based on political boundaries at first glance provides a useful starting point. But when viewed with a deeper historical

² Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1998), 24.

³ Jef Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 4 (1998): 501.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Paul Wilkinson, “Introduction”, in *Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack Since 9/11*, ed. Paul Wilkinson (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 6-7.

lens and a critical eye, this inside/outside boundary making becomes problematic. Wilkinson in fact goes on to acknowledge possible overlaps between domestic and international dimensions.⁶ However, acknowledgement does not clarify this terminological blurring, or remedy its possibly negative consequences. Definitional indeterminacy is not just a question of theoretical coherence, but influences broader understandings and counterterrorism practice. The implications are significant in areas of counterterrorism law where material power is particularly dependent on language.

Legal moves are a useful source to identify the way discourse is both constitutive and causal for outcomes over time. The substance of new state powers is established through acts of law, and the connected discourses of legitimation surrounding these material moves reassert certain intersubjective understandings over others. As of 20 September 2012, since the first law with terrorism in its title was introduced in 1974 (the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA)), there have been 177 UK legal measures with terrorism in their title. This includes 156 statutory instruments, 13 public general acts, 6 Scottish statutory instruments, and 2 Northern Ireland statutory rules.⁷ The increase in such legal measures along titles of “terrorism” is demonstrated by the graph below, with each legal act considered one unit on the y axis:

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/all?title=terrorism> (Search performed 20 September 2012).




Figure 1.0 – UK Legislation with “Terrorism” Explicitly in the Title of the Measure, 1950-2012⁸

Counterterrorism laws became permanent twenty-seven years after being introduced and renewed as temporary powers. From 1974 to 2012, legal moves with terrorism in their title, including UK Statutory Instruments, UK Public General Acts, Scottish Statutory Instruments, and Northern Ireland Statutory Rules, increased at a rate of 1.59 acts per year. By starting in 1950, the recent growth is put into a broader perspective considering a history without any measures titled with “terrorism”. Identifying a quantitative shift in the terminology of terrorism in legal acts is not itself conclusive in terms of a sense of how shifts in counterterrorism discourse and practice led to normalization. However, it does set a useful parameter with which to identify significant time periods and specific texts that call for a detailed relational discourse analysis.⁹ Alongside new counterterrorism laws were new strategies and policies, and exceptional measures formed and justified through an explicit language of “terrorism” became normalized.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Though further theorization on “the quantification of words” is needed, this is a starting response to the important question “What should we draw as implications from such quantitative data?” (Stuart Croft, 14 December 2012).

This legal permanence alongside ambiguous definitions of terrorism makes identifications of future success over terrorism or a use of security measures that are not constituted by the discursive construction of “terrorist” others elusive, if not impossible. Though the intensity of extraordinary legal power is justified as acting within the rule of law, the “rule of law” is itself a contested concept. There is no predetermined guide to lawmaking, with even “basic rights” often under intense debate. Social and political processes reinforce and/or reconstruct modes of legality, borders of control, and dominant (or dominating) norms of behaviour. Counterterrorism and national security practices modify rule of law guidelines over time, reconfiguring the parameters of accepted state power. New legal measures can be activated during moments of crisis. But, as explained by Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, they are also “*constitutive of sovereignty, modern law and political communities*” [emphasis added].¹⁰ Thus new powers are not just reflective of reality, but contribute to the content of that reality itself through new understandings and material practices. As new counterterrorism laws are implemented, the benchmark for subsequent lawmaking and legitimate levels of state power is continually recalibrated. Measures formed through the rule of law but going beyond normal politics expand the very meaning of the “rules” by which they are legitimized. Through their very formation, counterterrorism laws change democratic rules of state security practice by reconfiguring the rule of law itself.

As Joseba Zulaika points out, exceptional practices contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy of counterterrorism and terrorism, of security and insecurity.¹¹ The impossibility for an objective definition of terrorism builds a perception of terrorist danger as a “known unknown”.¹² When paired with the political goal of eradicating terrorism, this perception reinforces preemptive measures as unquestionable necessity. A self-perpetuating cycle of discourse and practice then normalizes exceptional security practice even if there are no acts of violence or measures are considered to be counterproductive. The case of Britain from 1968 to 2011 provides an instructive

¹⁰ Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, “Exceptionalism and the ‘War on Terror’: Criminology Meets International Relations,” *British Journal of Criminology* 49 (2009): 689.

¹¹ Joseba Zulaika, *Terrorism: The Self-fulfilling Prophecy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

¹² Christopher Daase and Oliver Kessler, “Knowns and Unknowns in the ‘War on Terror’: Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger,” *Security Dialogue* 38 (2007): 411-434.

empirical study. This case helps illustrate how counterterrorism became normalized through a particular securitization of terrorism crossing different groups, spaces, and temporal moments. Identity is at the heart of securitization in theory and in practice. As explained by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever:

To the extent that securitisation is rooted in the identity politics of Self and Other, similarity and difference are at the heart of the matter. But it is the particular nature of similarity or difference that matters most, not the mere fact of it.¹³

Buzan and Waever highlight how identity is not based solely on objective facts but is a relational component to the “deep understandings of processes of securitisation”.¹⁴ In 1998, Buzan, Waever, and Jaap de Wilde wrote “the exact *definition* and *criteria* of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects”.¹⁵ But how can analysis better understand and explain this “particular nature of similarity or difference,” and the way that intersubjectivity is established? Identity is and has been central to securitization theory and its development, as seen in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*.¹⁶ However, identity remains a site of conceptual tension demanding further theoretical and empirical analysis.

It is this focus on identity that situates this thesis: *how* threat/referent labels come to be relationally situated and temporarily stabilized across discourse and time to influence counterterrorism outcomes. Counterterrorism law emerged in 1973 with the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA), and became permanent in 2000 with the Terrorism Act (TA 2000). The way that British counterterrorism law was legitimized and normalized was not inevitable, but depended upon particular patterns of identity construction. The Irish threat dominated official counterterrorism discourse and practice to the 1990s. But by the 21st century, even as Irish insecurity remained, the label

¹³ Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, “Macrosecritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory,” *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (2009): 261.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 257.

¹⁵ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, 25.

¹⁶ Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Printer Publishers Ltd, 1993).

“international terrorism” established a new category distinct from Irish and domestic threats. From the mid-1980s on, international terrorism was constructed along geographic and cultural assumptions of distance separate from the core referent identity and other terrorist others. “International” did not indicate actors from multiple citizenships or transnational operations as in Wilkinson’s definition mentioned earlier. Rather, the term international was based on persistent patterns of externalization irrespective of political boundaries.

International terrorism was positioned as non-domestic and non-British, an enemy from outside. “International” represented a foreign other distinct from Irish and domestic terrorists. Framings demarcated enemies “within” from enemies “without” even as the distinction between international and domestic terrorism was dubious, as concluded by Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle.¹⁷ As will be discussed throughout this thesis, the *way* that terrorism was constructed in official discourse had a causal influence over the trajectory of counterterrorism practice. This trajectory cannot be explained simply as in line with an empirical pattern of rising international terrorism and declining Irish terrorism. Insecurity in Northern Ireland continued after the peace process in 1998, and in fact was on the rise through the early 21st century. This could have pointed to a need for maintained exceptionality targeting Northern Ireland instead of the de-escalation of practice and discourse targeting the “Irish” threat. At the same time, when “international terrorism” was deployed in official discourse during the mid-1980s and then with more force during the mid- to late-1990s, the threat from international terrorism was minimal relative to other possible insecurities at the time. Measures could have reverted to existing criminal law, or counterterrorism could have been formed through processes of securitization that did not rely upon particularizing types of terrorist others. “International terrorism” is not a pre-existing or natural category. The vague yet polarizing assumptions of what international terrorism “is” then exacerbated perceptions of international terrorists as more difficult to understand than other threats.

¹⁷ Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca and Luis de la Calle, “Domestic Terrorism: The Hidden Side of Political Violence,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 32.

Governments do face a duty to act when actual (or perceived) threats to security present themselves. But, the way that this action is formed and legitimized is not predetermined and still depends upon actors making choices within certain structures of meaning. This thesis narrative will help lay out how the particular way that British counterterrorism and discourse developed relied upon processes of threat/referent construction based on varying degrees of danger and distance. By externalizing the international other as more foreign than other types of terrorists, official discourse was able to maintain and normalize exceptional measures even if they were seen to be counterproductive. Without exceptional counterterrorism, the perceived threat of Islamic extremist terrorism from outside Britain was presented as wreaking havoc on the British self and democratic society. It is not that material aspects of possible threats do not matter. Rather, that the way “Irish” or “international” threats depends upon how labels of identification that resonate with certain meanings over others irrespective of the “actual” threat. As stated by Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde:

it is neither politically nor analytically helpful to try to define “real security” outside of the world of politics...Such rationalist universalism will easily be “right” on its own terms, but it will be of very little help in political analysis. It is more relevant to grasp the processes and dynamics of securitization¹⁸

They continue by explaining how securitization theory “has the basic merit of conceptualizing security as a labeling for which actors can be held responsible rather than an objective feature of threats”.¹⁹ In this thesis discourse analysis brings value to existing literature by discussing *how* consequential self/other intersubjective understandings arose during the securitization of terrorism to affect outcomes by tracing relational configurations of identity. In so doing, the thesis provides a new account of how observed relational transactions in a particular case influences identity and counterterrorism more broadly.

¹⁸ Buzan *et al.* *Security*, 31.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 212.

As terrorism continued to be securitized over time, rhetorical packages of identity construction contributed to evolving “degrees of Otherness”²⁰ by differentiating the threat along labels of Irish, domestic, and international. Processes of othering were not themselves new to the Irish-British context. As stated by D.G. Boyce with relation to the early 20th century, “As far as Liberal and Labour men were concerned Unionist Ulster had been, still was, and undoubtedly always would be the *bête noire* of Irish politics – bigoted, self-assertive, and, above all, aggressive.”²¹ In 1422 in Oxford, the English legislated against “wild Irishmen”.²² In the late 1400s, laws were made against Gaelic “style” and fashion.²³ During parliamentary debate around the *British Nationality Act 1948*, Irish was explicitly categorized as “alien”.²⁴ Interestingly at the same time it was said “the people of Eire and the people of Britain should not be foreign to one another”.²⁵ Perceptions of difference separating Irish and British (and English) in the context of counterterrorism has slowly minimized over time through social and political change. With respect to terrorism, Irish related threats were always constructed as a type of other. But by the late 20th century, reference to “international terrorism” provided a new threat image that was perceived as more foreign, and more dangerous.

By establishing types of terrorist others, exceptional powers introduced as temporary measures were normalized into everyday practice. The threat was constructed along physical and ideational assumptions of distance. Foreign international terrorists were positioned as threatening western civilization and a particular way of life. This distance and separation justified a suspension of civil liberties and alienation of marginalized groups. As pointed out by Cerwyn Moore and Stuart Croft, following 11

²⁰ This is an important conceptual and empirical point made by Lene Hansen (*Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, 2006), 37).

²¹ D. G. Boyce, *Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy, 1918-1922* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1972), 107.

²² T. W. Moody and F. X. Martin, *The Course of Irish History. 4th ed.* (Lanham: Roberts Rinehart Publishers, 2001), 131.

²³ *Ibid.*, 134-135.

²⁴ Clement Attlee (PM, Lab): 11 March 1949, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, col.1855 (Cited in “Northern Ireland: political developments since 1972,” 11 May 1998, HC Research Paper 98/57, p. 20). In the footnotes all parliamentary debates include the title first. For the purpose of utility in the list of references they are organized chronologically.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

September 2001 there was a failure of agreement on “the name of the enemy”.²⁶ A variety of Islamic-related threat identifiers were deployed, but in the context of official British discourse these identifiers were all funneled into the category of “international terrorism”. Events such as the 2005 London bombings contradicted notions of international as foreign, but the construction of international terrorism as from outside had taken on a consequential durability. An overarching aim of this thesis is to analytically demonstrate that the *way* that terrorism was securitized in official discourse was essential to how British counterterrorism emerged, was justified, and became normalized. The research is focused on how relational processes of threat/referent construction enabled, limited, and/or constituted particular discourses and practice, and thus had a causal significance for outcomes. It is one empirical illustration of how security and identity are co-constituted over time in a specific case.

At first glance securitization may seem to be a straightforward logic. “Utterances” and speech acts matter. But claiming that discourse “matters” is an assumption, not an explanation.²⁷ Thus discourse matters for understanding and action, but how? To better answer this demands an attentive analytic deconstruction of the relational complexities surrounding “threat” and “referent” construction. According to the social constructionist view of John Shotter:

the utterances of dialogic speech constituted a two-way, psychological ‘flow’ or ‘movement’ in which a prosthetic outflow of activity for one speaker constitutes the resulting, inflowing, responsive activity for the other, and the speakers, in their utterances, in the ‘movement’ between their sense of what they want to achieve in their utterance and their use of particular words, attempt successively to develop suitable expressions.²⁸

This sits well with securitization theory’s focus on intersubjectivity, but it also points to the need for further development in how securitization in practice is analytically explained. If intersubjective understandings are what establish threat and referent

²⁶ Stuart Croft and Cerwyn Moore, “The evolution of threat narratives in the age of terror: understanding terrorist threats in Britain,” *International Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2010): 823.

²⁷ With thanks to Patrick Jackson on this distinction.

²⁸ John Shotter, *Cultural Politics of Everyday Life* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 24.

identities to securitize an issue and legitimize exceptional practice, how is such intersubjectivity formed? Again with reference to Shotter, “How can an expression be ‘developmentally’ formulated in a more or less routine way, word by word, and checked in the course of its ‘construction’ for its appropriateness?”²⁹

The thesis begins in large part through guidelines established by Lene Hansen. Empirics are based in official discourses that are widely read (publicly accessible), authored by those in a position of authority (political elites), provide observable articulations of identity (explicit constructions around “terrorism”), and contribute to a comparative study (spanning space, time, and events).³⁰ Sources were specified by focusing on an explicit terminology of “terror”, institutional power shifts, historical context, and attention to intertextuality.³¹ As explained by Vincent Pouliot, “intertextual” represents the web-like nature of meaning making and role of interpretation over intentionality.³² Primary sources consist of legal acts, policy strategies, reports and reviews, parliamentary debates, and official websites.³³ Different temporal moments led to a prioritization of different sources for analysis. The first two empirical chapters rely heavily on legal acts and official reports in light of the newness of counterterrorism during these periods. By contrast, the latter three empirical chapters incorporate a wider range of material considering the institutionalization of counterterrorism and growth in sites whereby terrorism explicitly referenced.

Securitization is the starting logic for conceptualizing the consequential interrelation of discourse, identity, and security practice. But the empirical narrative is in some ways dominated by a discussion of relational configurations. Securitization should not be interpreted as “dropping out” of analysis. But the investigation of securitization as

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 73-92.

³¹ Ibid., 55 (with reference to Julia Kristeva).

³² Vincent Pouliot, “‘Subjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology,” *International Studies Quarterly* 51, no. 2 (2007): 366.

³³ The largely untapped potential of parliamentary debates has recently been explored by Andrew Neal (Andrew Neal, “Legislative Practices,” in *Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction*, ed. Mark B. Salter and Can E. Mutlu (New York: Routledge, 2012); Andrew Neal, “Normalization and legislative exceptionalism: counterterrorist lawmaking and the changing times of security emergencies,” *International Political Sociology* 6, no. 3 (2012): 260-276.

a practice and as a theory is explored through a relational mechanism based empirical illustration. British counterterrorism outcomes over the past forty-three years were not predictable to arise in the way that they did. Measures were passed in the aftermath of significant events and in times of relative calm, led by Conservative and Labour governments, and continued along a similar path despite repeated miscarriages of justice and counterproductive consequences. By problematizing identity and the securitization of terrorism across official discourse and counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011, we can better explain how particular threat and referent constructions were causally consequential for the way that British counterterrorism unfolded.

Processes of securitization were *causally consequential* in that discourses and practices of counterterrorism both delimited, and were delimited by, particular constructions of identity. These constructions established temporarily stabilized parameters of us/them understanding through particular processes of boundary making. It is not that such structures determined the decisions of actors, and in terms of actors making choices agency still has a role to play in outcomes. However, processes of identity construction do have limiting and enabling influences on the spaces of possible agency considering how threat/referent identities come to influence particular perceptions of illegitimate versus legitimate action. This enabling/limiting effect of structures of identity is not necessarily an indication of persuasive intent, and in this way the relationality of securitization discourse can have consequences on outcomes irrespective of individual actor motivations.

This is in line with views of “meanings and identities” as playing “a constitutive role in social ties and networks,” but diverges from notions of structural determinism.³⁴ For this thesis causally consequential does not imply causally deterministic, as seen through “constraints” and “opportunities” as discussed by Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen Guenca.³⁵ Agency is not removed from a relational-securitization analysis of

³⁴ Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious conflict, dynastic empires and international change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 44-45.

³⁵ Gabriel A. Almond with Stephen Guenca, “Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics”, in *A Discipline Divided: Schools and sects in political science* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), 35.

official counterterrorism discourse and practice, and actors are not physically coerced into an “aye” or a “no” vote during parliamentary debate. However, particular threat/referent identity configurations associated with terrorism constituted the legitimizing discourses of exceptional counterterrorism practice, and as such imparted a significant impact on intersubjective structures of meaning and spaces for agency.

The danger associated with “terrorists” was intensified by boundary constructions that reasserted distinctive and polarized self/other binaries. Even as the definition of terrorism remained ambiguous, the term came “to constitute the epistemological space that acts as a gatekeeper of which ideas may appear”.³⁶ To better explain the development of terrorism as a conceptual gatekeeper demands a historically informed and theoretically guided inquiry to question notions that the way things are today is the way they *have* to be.³⁷ Real risks of violence may lie behind some actors associated with terrorism. But in line with securitization theory, this thesis narrative does not identify which threats are “real” or which policies are “correct”.³⁸ Rather, the focus is on how observable patterns in discourse contributed to the stabilization of particular identities, thereby influencing intersubjective understanding and security practice. Terms of “terrorism” delimit what political responses are “politically possible”.³⁹ As explained by Judith Butler, frames of terror work “to preclude certain kinds of questions, certain kinds of historical inquiries, and to function as a moral justification for retaliation”.⁴⁰ These frames also decide “what we can hear”.⁴¹ Because of how we have allowed perceptions of terrorism to evolve, counterterrorism discourse has changed the rules of the game. By situating terrorists as morally reprehensible and non-negotiable others, the potential for research and practice has become increasingly restrained.

³⁶ Zulaika, *Terrorism*, 23.

³⁷ For this thesis such a critique of the present does not translate into a specific normative argument. For such a direct engagement see Claudia Aradau, “Security and the democratic scene: desecuritization and emancipation,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 7 (2004): 388-413, and Rita Floyd, “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis? Towards a just securitization theory,” *Security Dialogue* 42 (2011): 427-439.

³⁸ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, 31.

³⁹ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the invention of the West* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 132.

⁴⁰ Judith Butler, “Explanation and Exoneration, or What We Can Hear,” *Theory and Event* 5, no. 4 (2002): paragraph 3.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

II. Discourse, security, and IR: Why identity matters

In 2007, the journal *Foreign Affairs* hosted an article by Tony Blair called, “A Battle for Global Values”. In this article, Blair writes:

We have to show that our values are not Western, still less American or Anglo-Saxon, but values in the common ownership of humanity, universal values that should be the right of the Global Citizen...The answer to terrorism is the universal application of global values...They represent humanity’s progress throughout the ages. At each point we have had to fight for them and defend them. As a new age beckons, it is time to fight for them again.⁴²

Though this language comes after 9/11, the reference to universal values is tied to broader discourse and policy from earlier “western” discourse.⁴³ By the time this article was published, terrorist threat construction had instilled a palpable and unquestioned fear of pending future risk.⁴⁴ While British counterterrorism laws from the early 1970s were framed in terms of public order against hooliganism, the securitization of terrorism evolved to construct terrorists as brute facts, the ultimate enemy-other. Counterterrorism transcends traditional security boundaries by connecting military with law enforcement, and national identity with Western civilization. Such overlap encourages a continuance of approaches that both broaden and deepen security studies.⁴⁵

Specific events can influence security measures, as seen with the British Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001) passed within two months of 11 September 2001. But it takes more than events to sustain exceptional practice over time. Combined

⁴² Tony Blair, “A Battle for Global Values,” *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 1 (2007): 79-90.

⁴³ Ronald R. Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz, “The sound of silence: Rhetorical coercion, Democratic acquiescence, and the Iraq War,” in *American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat inflation since 9/11*, eds. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer (London: Routledge, 2007), 117-134; Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005).

⁴⁴ Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster, “Governing Terrorism Through Risk: Taking Precautions, (un)Knowing the Future,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 1 (2007): 89-115.

⁴⁵ This “broadening and deepening” comes largely from Barry Buzan, *People, States & Fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*, 2nd. Ed. (Essex: ECPR Press, 2007).

with “historical punctuation marks” such as 11 September 2001 or 7 July 2005 are patterns of threat/referent construction embedding particular understandings of the other.⁴⁶ Securitizing discourse enables the extraordinary to become the ordinary, so that what forty years ago was referred to as a temporary response is now accepted as everyday necessity. Identities are not just socially constructed or historically contingent, but materially constitutive and consequential. Mapping these relational connections helps form a better understanding of how terrorism was securitized to influence a distinctive set of outcomes for a specific case. Terrorism is not a singular truth or atemporal essence, but a term whose stickiness depends upon negotiated and renegotiated social and political practices that categorize risk and violence as terrorism-related.

Historical analysis reveals the boundaries around types of terrorism as indeterminate markers of identification. But the meanings connected to labels such as “Irish” and “international” continue to exert formidable influence on intersubjective understanding and counterterrorism practice. These labels are viewed as “rhetorical commonplaces”, defined as “those vague notions that command more or less general assent in the abstract but which stand in need of detailed specification before they can be determinately linked to specific courses of action”.⁴⁷ As explained by Patrick Jackson, “what is of interest is how actual arguments produced relatively stable boundaries of acceptable action, by drawing on the common stock of rhetorical commonplaces making up the relevant social environment”.⁴⁸

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, official British discourse positioned terrorism as internal disorder from rioters and hooligans threatening the peace. As measures were renewed throughout the 1970s and 1980s the threat was criminalized, distinguished from

⁴⁶ George Lawson, “Introduction: the ‘what’, ‘when’ and ‘where’ of the global 1989,” in *The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics*, ed. George Lawson, Chris Armbruster and Michael Cox (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2010), 11.

⁴⁷ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 2006: 236 (with reference to Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes (“Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 2 (1997): 209), Erik Ringmar (*Identity, interest and action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden’s intervention in the Thirty Years War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 74), and John Shotter (*Cultural Politics*, 65-69, 170-171).

⁴⁸ Jackson, *Ibid.*, 31.

ordinary criminality and political grievance. In the mid-1980s, there was an introductory use of the international terrorist label. The 1990s brought a growing peace process, and Irish actors formerly associated with terrorism were connected to legitimate politics. Post-Cold War security dynamics devoid of a common threat to the West renewed attention to other sources of insecurity. Terrorism as an explicit threat was presented as new to this era despite being a part of social and political relations for hundreds of years.⁴⁹ Late 1990s official British discourse was no longer dominated by the Irish question, with framings instead differentiating “Irish”, “international”, and “domestic” terrorist labels. International terrorism was constructed as more foreign and more dangerous than other threats, enabling an amplification of 21st century measures.

The international label lengthened presumed physical and cultural distances between types of terrorism and the referent in need of protection. Associated temporal and spatial understandings were essential to stabilizing notions of the terrorist enemy. Inside/outside generalizations exacerbated existing tensions. The danger of international terrorism was interwoven with boundary drawing along issues of race, religion, and ethnicity, further alienating already marginalized groups. Cycles of security and insecurity were intensified through patterns of inclusion and exclusion. It is not that processes of identity construction are structurally determining. Rather, it is that these routines limit and/or enable certain understandings and actions over others. Language does not itself dictate behavior, but particular discourses do influence the politically acceptable spaces within which decisions are made and legitimized. By linking threats of terrorism to spatial and symbolic boundaries of difference, the securitization of terrorism enabled exceptional counterterrorism practice, and situations of *insecurity*, to become increasingly normalized.

The overarching approach guiding this thesis is of agents and structures as mutually constituted, identity and interests as subject to change, and the collective knowledge underpinning counterterrorism as from processes of social construction and

⁴⁹ Ian Lustick, “NO: Why terrorism is a much smaller threat than you think,” in *Contemporary Debates on Terrorism*, ed. Richard Jackson and Samuel Justin Sinclair (London: Routledge, 2012), 74.

material influences.⁵⁰ Power is physical and ideational, with certain configurations of behavior “a result of material or economic power working in concert with ideological structures, social practices, institutionalized norms, and intersubjective webs of meaning”.⁵¹ With respect to identity and discourse “the theoretical—and ontological—core assumption is that representations and policy are mutually constitutive and discursively linked”.⁵² This encourages a processual view of counterterrorism and identity that does not ignore substance. Self/other dichotomies constitute and justify exceptional practice by demarcating acceptable action in light of perceived threats to survival. We cannot fully understand security without investigating the role of identity, and we cannot fully understand the role of identity without investigating the interdependence of knowledge, discourse, and practice.

The influence of identity labels depends upon an allocation of boundaries based on socially constructed categories of understanding. These boundaries are a cause and effect of labeling, and provide a sense of structure to reality’s complexity. This points to how the co-constitutive nature of identity and policy relies on political perspectives based in terms of difference. Regardless of how secure we believe self/other tags to be, identities are temporary stabilizations that are always open to renegotiation. Acknowledging identity labels as open to renegotiation, however, does not imply a hollowness of meaning or lack of substance. Identities in practice, such as “civilizational identity”, reinforce the durability of materially consequential boundary structures over time.⁵³ The substance of counterterrorism law is constituted by phrases like “terrorist offenses”, “terrorist activity”, and “suspected international terrorist”. Thus sources of intersubjective understanding and political legitimacy are also sources of material power.

⁵⁰ This is compatible with the “sociological turn” as discussed by Stefano Guzzini in “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 2 (2000): 149.

⁵¹ Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in IR Theory,” *International Security* 23, no. 1 (1998): 199.

⁵² Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 28.

⁵³ Martin Hall and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, eds., *Civilizational Identities: The production and reproduction of “civilizations” in International Relations* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).

The securitization of terrorism and associated patterns of threat/referent construction contribute to rule-making structures, with “modern life disciplined by discourses that tell us what to fear”.⁵⁴ Discourse analysis underlines how state identity is “tenuously constituted in time”, reinforced as a particular entity through “*a regulated process of repetition*”.⁵⁵ A goal of the thesis is not to locate a universal law connecting identity and policy. Rather it is through the use of relational mechanisms, to demonstrate how processes of identity construction influence British counterterrorism in particular ways over time. The thesis is a narrative that links to sites of interpretation and reinforces a “perspectival” view of social science research.⁵⁶ The influence from such a perspective begins with the methodological decision to incorporate rhetorical commonplaces. Tracing observed commonplaces helps identify patterns of threat/referent construction through shifting or stabilizing identity signposts. This helps map out how, where, and when threat/referent identities are constituted in securitization. It is a type of textual ethnography guided by a mechanism-based approach to enable an empirical discussion of how identity and counterterrorism interrelate for one particular case, from one particular vantage point.

Some may not be convinced by this argument to problematize threat/referent labels of identity underlying the securitization of terrorism. They may claim that a relational-securitization framework is based in an unhelpful postmodern relativity. Or they may declare that any story of identity and counterterrorism is misguided because, quite simply, terrorists “exist” and so must counterterrorism. However, while a security response to possible insecurity is unsurprising, the substance of such measures, how they were introduced, and the way they were legitimized, was neither predetermined nor fixed. The definition of terrorism remains imprecise, and counterterrorism’s efficacy continues to be questioned.⁵⁷ Some attacks have indeed been thwarted, such as the

⁵⁴ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* Revised ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 70.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁶ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Foregrounding ontology: dualism, monism, and IR theory,” *Review of International Studies* 34 (2008): 131.

⁵⁷ Owen Bowcott, “Ben Emmerson QC: abuse of human rights policies increases terrorism,” *The Guardian*, 22 May 2012 [cited 24 May 2012]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/may/22/ben-emmerson-human-rights>.

copycat attempt following the 2005 London bombings and the 2006 plot to explode multiple trans-Atlantic passenger jets. However, other plots such as Nicky Reilly's failed Exeter bombing in 2010, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's failed underpants bombing in 2009, were halted by actor ineptitude, not counterterrorism. During times where violence was reduced, this was due largely to political negotiations, an approach discouraged by the contemporary militarization of counterterrorism.⁵⁸

While some measures are passed in light of specific violence, the normalization of preemptive counterterrorism required a forceful "language of legitimation" in addition to material evidence of risk.⁵⁹ The way rhetorical constructions were accepted, or not, did not depend on individual actor preferences, motivation, or intentionality. These individual influences hold limited explanatory potential considering how intersubjective understanding is established through public sites of interpretation. Thus identity, language, and discourse matters for security practice, but *how* do they matter in particular cases? How can we best explore this causally consequential interrelation empirically?

III. Explaining the case

The time period from 1968 to 2011 and the focus on British official counterterrorism discourse were chosen for specific reasons. One reason was to investigate the official public discourses and counterterrorism practices of a state with international influence. Calls to go beyond state centric analysis are important for the development of IR, but considering the national level of most counterterrorism, a focus on state measures in this context remains vital. Domestic counterterrorism has bolstered state purpose, power, and identity despite international initiatives for cooperation or interdependent consequences of globalization. Jurisdictions and resources have blurred

⁵⁸ Jonathan Powell, "Security is Not Enough: Ten Lessons for Conflict Resolution from Northern Ireland," *The Lessons of Northern Ireland*, IDEAS reports - special reports, Kitchen, Nicholas, ed., LSE IDEAS, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK [cited 1 June 2012]; available from <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR008/powell.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 13-45.

military and law enforcement authority, underscoring a distinctive power emanating from the state.

It was also important to have a case that included temporal moments before and after major 21st century events such as 11 September 2001. This event and the “post-9/11” environment are of significant consequence for security measures and terrorism studies. But we must not overemphasize this event considering the lineage of exceptional state security practice and political violence going back many years. Tendencies for historic forgetfulness and amnesia are obstacles to greater understanding in theory and in practice.⁶⁰ As explained by David Campbell, events can silence prior views by squeezing them “to the margins of recent history”.⁶¹ The broader contextual lens of this thesis contributes then to a more historical approach to terrorism studies, helping to provide a dynamic rather than static research framework.⁶² Single case studies can in fact provide a comparative and deep account by investigating varied temporalities and spatialities of violence, shifts in political leadership, and challenges to identity.

The choice to start the thesis in 1968 is due to a 5 October march led by the Derry Housing Action Committee (DHAC) in Derry/Londonderry that was supported by the recently formed Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA, est. 1967).⁶³ Ensuing violence between communities and police around this event is often cited as the start of the most recent Troubles. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was formed in 1969, and internment was reinstated in 1971. As security operations escalated, the tragedy of Bloody Sunday on 30 January 1972 provided for a surge in recruitment for the PIRA and use of violence.⁶⁴ In 1973 and 1974 the first laws formed through an

⁶⁰ Richard English, *Terrorism: How to respond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 56-117. “Amnesia” was also a key discussion point at the “Belfast International Terrorism Workshop” (Queens University Belfast, January 2009), and at the British Academy Conference “9/11 Ten Years On” (British Academy, London, September 2011).

⁶¹ David Campbell, “Time Is Broken: The Return of the Past In the Response to September 11,” *Theory and Event* 5, no. 4 (2002): paragraph 8.

⁶² Martha Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,” *Political Psychology* 21, no. 2 (2000): 415.

⁶³ The city is officially Londonderry and the county is Derry, but controversy over the name continues.

⁶⁴ Richard English, *Irish Freedom: A history of nationalism in Ireland* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2006), 370; Adrian Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System* (London: Tauris Publishers, 1995), 52.

explicit language of “terrorist” threat were introduced, the EPA and PTA. Indeed exceptional state practice is not itself new, as documented by Laura Donohue, Gerard Hogan, and Clive Walker.⁶⁵ In the context of British and Ireland, the British had used special powers for centuries, a history well known to counterterrorism lawmakers:

Acts to suspend habeas corpus (Coercion Acts) were regular features in the 18th and 19th centuries, and the law was virtually codified in the Criminal Law and Procedures (Ireland) Act 1887, which was aimed primarily at "agrarian outrages". This was insufficient to deal with the rebellions of 1916 and 1918, for which powers under the Defence of the Realm Act 1914 and 1915 were used. Next came the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act 1920. Stormont, when it was set in place, passed an equivalent to the 1887 Act, which was never implemented; reliance for years was placed instead on the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 1922 and Regulations made under it, until the advent of the Emergency Provisions Act 1973. It must therefore be conceded that "normality" in the rule of law, as it is enjoyed in the rest of the UK, has never been quite the same in Northern Ireland. I can readily understand why there is a concern about human rights; and many nationalists would say that I have not gone far enough into history.⁶⁶

However, while the history of such powers is long, the formation of measures along explicit terms of terrorism is more recent. It is this formation and normalization of special powers along an explicit terminology of terrorism that stands in need of explanation. This empirical analysis unfolds in chapters four through eight, but as an overview, each chapter is summarized as follows.

Chapter four, “1968-1979: Troubling times, temporary laws”, marks a period of civil rights marches, cycles of violence and counterterrorism practice, recruitment in groups using political violence, and spread of the Troubles to mainland Britain. Early laws constituted by an explicit language of terrorism (EPA and PTA) were formed and justified through a securitization of terrorism that constructed hooligan gangs and

⁶⁵ Laura Donohue, “Regulating Northern Ireland: The Special Powers Acts, 1922-1972,” *The Historical Journal* 41, no. 4 (1998): 1089-1120; Laura Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism: Power, politics, and liberty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Gerard Hogan and Clive Walker, *Political Violence and the Law in Ireland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989); Walker, Clive, *Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

⁶⁶ “Review of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Acts 1978 and 1987,” Chairman: The Viscount Colville of Culross, July 1990, Cm. 1115, section 1.4.

brutality as threats to the referent of domestic order, peace, and rule of law. The dominant discourse was initially connected to historic notions of public order more than terrorists as enemy-entities in their own right. Divergent political actors were brokered through similar framings during debate, establishing ties that reinforced particular identity understandings over others. The securitization of terrorism asserted a view of ordinary law as inadequate considering the ruthless criminality of terrorist actors. Special category status was removed from prisoners suspected of terrorism, and counterterrorism practice was bolstered.

The next chapter, “1980-1989: Criminalizing terrorism, maintaining emergency measures”, was a moment of heightened domestic tension. A building criminalization fueled protests and hunger strikes. Officials interpreted ongoing violence as a failure of counterterrorism *and* a reason to keep such measures in force. As throughout history terrorism and political violence were evident beyond Northern Ireland. The reference to an “international” threat was newly apparent, but the securitization of terrorism in official discourse during the 1980s remained largely focused on Northern Ireland. The frequency of terms based on a terrorist terminology continued to increase alongside commonplaces of criminality. This encouraged EPA and PTA renewals despite domestic protest, continuing violence, and bilateral political commitments, such as the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement. Terrorists were differentiated from “ordinary criminals” and from political dissidents.

Chapter six, “1990-1999: A change in legal course, from temporary status to permanent feature”, marks the beginning of a major shift in British counterterrorism and identity construction. Negotiations in Northern Ireland linked previous “terrorists” with British politicians, creating new boundary structures of legitimate and illegitimate actors. In 1998, the Good Friday Agreement promised peace even as the Omagh attack represented the single most fatal act of violence throughout the Troubles. Despite years of political promises to remove EPA and PTA measures, after the 1997 Labour election, these laws were collapsed into the single, and permanent, TA 2000. This change in policy was made politically possible due to the securitization of terrorism along three

threat labels, or “forms”: Irish, domestic, and international. Though similar threat distinctions had been made in earlier years, these forms were hardened from the late-1990s on. Intersubjective understandings basing each threat label represented perceived degrees of otherness, distance, and danger.

The following chapter, “2000-2006: Amplifying 21st century exception”, discusses the first six years of the 21st century following this shift to permanent counterterrorism. This period not only introduced the TA 2000, but also the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCS 2001), Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA 2005), Terrorism Act 2006 (TA 2006), and CONTEST, “The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Combating International Terrorism” (formed in 2003, made public in 2006). There was a building language of evil international terrorist threat opposing a democratic civilizational referent in official discourse. This led to the introduction, constitution, and legitimation of expanded powers. For example, 28 day pre-charge detention, stop and search powers without reasonable suspicion, indefinite detention of “suspected international terrorists”, control orders, and new offenses such as the glorification of terrorism. The international threat was framed as a foreign other opposed to a value-based way of life. Events such as 11 September 2001 were presented as confirmation of a distinct “international terrorist essence”. However, just under four years later, the 7 July 2005 London attacks underscored the reality of “international terrorism” as much from within as from without. Despite this event, assumptions surrounding inside/outside boundaries of identification had become remarkably durable, and continued to influence the maintenance of exceptional measures.

The final empirical chapter, “2007-2011: A plateau of exceptionality”, discusses how counterterrorism became normalized. New offices (Office for Security and Counterterrorism 2007), strategies (National Security Strategy 2008/2009, CONTEST 2009/2011), and laws (Counterterrorism Act 2008, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures 2011) ensured that exceptional measures were institutionalized. Even as violence linked to international terrorism in Britain could be interpreted as decreasing, counterterrorism measures that just a few decades earlier were positioned as

temporary were a part of daily security practice. There remained no decisive understanding of what terrorism was, or what counterterrorism success would mean. Miscarriages of justice, international human rights concerns, and the alienation of Muslim suspect communities garnered more attention, but did not significantly redirect counterterrorism trajectory.

The proposal for 42-day pre-charge detention was opposed in 2008, but the CT 2008 was still passed. CONTEST underwent two revised versions, and though “international” was removed from the 2011 title, a securitization of terrorism based in perceptions of inclusion/exclusion persisted. Official reviews of counterterrorism did lead to a reduction of pre-charge detention and removal of some powers. Control orders that were introduced through the 2005 Prevention of Terrorism Act lapsed in 2010, but they were quickly replaced by similar “Terrorism Prevention Investigatory Measures” in 2011, and detention remained at 14 days. A self-perpetuating cycle of threat/referent construction and extraordinary measures ensured that terrorism and counterterrorism remained prominent parts of 21st century discourse and practice. By 2011, exceptional counterterrorism was resting on a kind of atemporal plateau of normalized exception.

IV. Introducing targeted audiences

The thesis has three specific audiences in mind in addition to issues of identity and security more generally: terrorism studies, securitization, and relationalism. Stemming from CS peace research during the 1980s and Barry Buzan’s seminal work *People, States, and Fear*, securitization was introduced in 1995 and developed significantly in 1998.⁶⁷ Securitization theory lays out “a conceptual framework for security analysis which is then used as a universal tool to categorize different security dynamics in different regions”.⁶⁸ Processes of securitization legitimize exceptional measures because something is accepted by the necessary audience as “posing an

⁶⁷ Ole Waever, “Securitization and desecuritization,” in *On Security*, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 46-86; Buzan *et al.*, *Security*.

⁶⁸ Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen,” 490.

existential threat to a designated referent object”.⁶⁹ Both official and unofficial audiences are important depending on the context. But for this investigation into the changing dynamics of British counterterrorism practice from 1968 to 2011, it is essential to focus on official discourse, speakers, authors, and audiences.⁷⁰

Perception plays a key role in processes of securitization, and physical proof is not necessary for an issue to be securitized.⁷¹ To incorporate a securitization logic is to:

open up difficult and complex questions not only of method, but also of the relationship of theory to practice, and of the constitutive place of particular forms of knowledge and conceptions of identity in the political constitution of modern societies⁷²

This thesis builds upon securitization by relationally unpacking the under-examined notions of referent object and existential threat through empirical illustration. This problematizes the position of identities as entities in their own right. In so doing, the thesis draws on critical terrorism studies by underlining how social and political practices of labeling are essential for the securitization of terrorism.⁷³

The way that this unpacking takes place in research practice leads us to the second audience, relationalism. Securitization supports discourse analysis, but there is room for methodological development and a specification of methods. The use of relational mechanisms, explained in chapter three, attends to the dynamics of identity observed in micro level transactions and broader boundary shifts. This helps take into account both the material and the symbolic consequences of identity in areas of security. For example, by examining how particular legal moves and an overarching normalization are connected to interrelations of identity, discourse, and security. The

⁶⁹ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, 21.

⁷⁰ For excellent studies into the role of identity in unofficial security discourse see Richard Jackson (*Writing the War on Terrorism*) and Croft (*Securitizing Islam, Culture, Crisis*).

⁷¹ Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen,” 491-492.

⁷² Michael C. Williams, “Modernity, identity and security: a comment on the ‘Copenhagen controversy,’” *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998): 439.

⁷³ Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning, eds., *Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda* (London: Routledge, 2009); Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, Jeroen Gunning and Marie Breen-Smyth, *Terrorism: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

focus on securitization and British counterterrorism then provides relational studies with new theoretical and empirical tools based in IR scholarship.

The resulting relational narrative of securitization, identity, and British counterterrorism brings us to the third targeted audience, terrorism studies. The case of Britain from 1968 to 2011 links historical analysis to 21st century issues and brings a useful temporal frame to terrorism studies. Using a relational-securitization framework provides a new theoretical and methodological starting point, and compliments existing initiatives from critical terrorism studies in particular. Following George Lawson's configurational approach, attention is paid to "how historically specific outcomes are the results of processes which are, in turn, drawn from the interaction between event and plural contexts", acknowledging that "alternative readings are always available and always present".⁷⁴ Such a relational perspective is analytically inclusive of contingency, process, and substance, and adds a useful contribution to existing debates on security as both being and doing. In sum, a relational-securitization approach to terrorism studies underscores how the way threats and referents are identified is of causal consequence for collective meanings and material outcomes of counterterrorism.

V. Causality and constitutiveness in discourse and in practice

As mentioned earlier, a core starting assumption is that the way terrorism was securitized along particular constructions of identity, and the security practices that arose from these constructions, was not predetermined. In order to better explain the normalization of exceptional counterterrorism in Britain then, it is essential to trace the way relational configurations in discourse enabled certain intersubjective understandings and outcomes to arise over others. If identities had not been constructed in the way that they were across official British discourse, terrorism would not have been securitized in the way that it was: things today would have been different. Counterfactual logics such as this do not pinpoint alternative possibilities, and may be interpreted as a rather large

⁷⁴ George Lawson, *Anatomies of Revolution* (forthcoming), chapter 2, p. 9

jump in logic. However, when the historical context under investigation (the normalized plateau of exceptional counterterrorism reached by 2011), has become so embedded, even a generalized observation that “things could have been otherwise” is of analytical significance. Tracing discursive process is not solely a descriptive exercise, but a causal explanatory account of how things happened in the way that they did. Though in disagreement with Alexander Wendt’s 1998 distinction of constitution from causation, the thesis approach can be interpreted as what he would refer to as a set of “how possible” questions.⁷⁵ *How was it possible* for identity labels such as “international terrorism” to become temporarily stabilized and become unquestioned resources for the securitization of terrorism? *How was it possible* for British counterterrorism to emerge, be legitimized, and become normalized in the way that it did? It is not that

This thesis is not an account of deterministic structure, or a formalization of language “doing” in a type of grammatical vacuum. Nor is it an attempt to convince the reader of unobservable forces that teleologically connect discourse and practice in “some” way. The thesis builds largely upon a Copenhagen School (CS) approach to securitization but incorporates relational mechanisms as a means to further develop the theory, as well as discourse analysis as methodology. CS scholars have worked to interpret the “specific interplay between these threats and vulnerabilities, on the one hand, and the constitution of society and cultural identity as a referent object (that is threatened), on the other hand”,⁷⁶ investigating the “mutually constitutive dynamic between identity and security”.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Alexander Wendt, “On constitution and causation in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 5 (1998): 104-105. A comparison here noted by Sherrill Stroschein is the notion of chess as discussed by Friedrich Kratochwil (*Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)). In chess “the meaning of the move [“check”] and its explanation crucially depend upon the knowledge of the rule-structure” (p. 26). But with respect to securitization and counterterrorism, identity “rule-structures” have become so normalized as to be of causal consequence beyond the formal institutions of counterterrorism lawmaking.

⁷⁶ Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen”, 489 (with reference to Wæver *et al.*, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, 23).

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 494.

The position of this thesis is then distinct both from a notion of securitization as a “strategic (pragmatic) practice” as well as interpretations of securitization as a “conventional procedure” of language and grammatical rules (Balzacq 2005: 172). At the same time, this thesis also works to move away from views of securitization that may be interpreted as “fixing the rhetorical structure of security”.⁷⁸ Instead, securitization can be successful when discourses of threat/referent construction are accepted by an audience irrespective of conscious intention or motivation. This is not to say that some actors may not have a strategic or pragmatic motivation, but that individual intentionality is not necessary for securitization to unfold with consequence. Securitization as a process is relational and complex, and language does not “do” on its own, but relies upon back and forth negotiations and renegotiations of meaning to stabilise certain intersubjective understandings over others.

The perspective taken in this thesis is thus distinct from Thierry Balzacq’s interpretation that the CS is premised on a philosophy of language based on a ““social magic” power” of discourse.⁷⁹ Poststructural-inspired accounts by leading CS scholars such as Lene Hansen and Wæver are not based on relativistic assumptions. Rather, they attentively investigate the structured (consequential) aspects of discourse while also questioning the inevitability of outcomes and possibility for change. This form of poststructuralism is explained by Wæver as “structured poststructuralism”, whereby structuralism is a kind of science of the sign, and poststructuralism is a critique of the sign.⁸⁰ As argued throughout *Security* by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, a language of security matters, but so do the speakers’ positions, audience acceptance, and intervening contextual influences. However, it is not enough to say that intersubjective understanding contributes to security practice, or that identities are “relational”. These are all necessary assumptions for a relational inquiry, but they do not adequately clarify the status of causality for a particular case and set of outcomes.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 500.

⁷⁹ Thierry Balzacq, “A theory of securitization: Origins, core assumptions, and variants,” in *Securitization Theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve*, ed. Thierry Balzacq (London: Routledge, 2011), 1.

⁸⁰ Ole Wæver, “Identity, communities and foreign policy: discourse analysis as foreign policy theory,” in *European integration and national identity: The challenge of the Nordic states*, ed. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2002), 44, note 15.

The relational mechanism approach of this thesis advances securitization's framework of existential threats, referent objects, and facilitating conditions. This relational inquiry of securitization, far from being based on an unobservable transcendental logic, is anchored by observed transactions of identity construction that link actors and textual sites in particular ways. It is not that there is *nothing* outside of language. Rather, that this "outside" can only come to make sense to affect understandings and action *through* discourse. Entities surely exist in the physical sense, but the way we understand this material existence depends upon labels of identification and the intersubjective meanings through which such labels are stabilized. This "monist" perspective of the "outside" world as intertwined with our practices of meaning making is frequently misunderstood, but has been helpfully clarified as follows:

The charge of relativism is, however, misdirected on at least two counts, both of which amount to continued misunderstandings of the mind-world monist position. The first misunderstanding mistakes a set of *logical* claims for *ontological* claims and misreads monist authors as claiming that no world outside of our ways of referring to and talking about the world actually exists. However, the monist claim is not that no such external world exists, but that no sense can be made of the idea of such an external world either as existing or as putting objective limits on our production of knowledge—at least, no sense that would suffice to assuage dualist doubts.⁸¹

Thus it is not that threat/referent identities in securitization are "fluid all the way down". The way we identify ourselves and others along identity labels is inherently open to (re)interpretation, but this does not imply that there is no material ground whatsoever.

Though the thesis does not explicitly draw on Max Weber, causality in this project is in many ways aligned with Patrick Jackson's Weberian explanation of causal efficacy. He explains that Weber works to "direct our analytical attention to the social context out of which policy outcomes arise, rather than to the reductionist causal mechanisms characteristic of much contemporary social science".⁸² In this way the use

⁸¹ Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of science and its implications for the study of world politics* (London: Routledge, 2011), 135.

⁸² Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 21.

of relational mechanisms is not based on a view of mechanisms as naturally existing forces. Rather, they are ideal-typical tools used to help map out recurring or shifting patterns:

Causality in this conception involves the concatenation of causal mechanisms: the contingent coming-together of processes and patterns of social action in such a way as to generate outcomes (McAdam et al. 2001: 13). The explanation of outcomes thus naturally divides into two linked but analytically distinct stages: the analytical delineation of a set of causal mechanisms deemed likely to matter in particular cases, and the careful empirical tracing of that case or cases to illustrate the particular way in which these mechanisms came together.⁸³

In this way, the thesis is an example of *analyticist* inquiry based in “singular causal analysis”, explained as when “scientific researchers trace and map how particular configurations of ideal-typified factors come together to generate historically specific outcomes in particular cases”.⁸⁴ In this way the thesis starts from an analytical view of counterterrorism in the UK from 2011 as one of normalized exception. Empirical analysis then works back to engage in an analyticist tracing and mapping to better understand the constitutive and causal role of identity, discourse, and securitization that contributed to this “historically specific outcome”.⁸⁵

Particular identity labels are not indicative of some objective essence, a point made by critical terrorism scholars such as Richard Jackson and relational sociologists such as Andrew Abbott. The securitization of terrorism instead depends upon configurations of discourse in order for actors to “stabilize the commonplace and produce the effect of an intrinsic essence”.⁸⁶ The collective meanings established through socially constructed labels enable and limit spaces for agency. In this sense the thesis is in line with Benjamin R. Banta’s recent conclusion that “we can measure causation as directionality, as enablement or constraint on agents’ desires and

⁸³ Ibid., 43.

⁸⁴ Jackson, *Conduct of Inquiry*, 114.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 44.

practices”.⁸⁷ However, the thesis approach departs from Banta with respect to how we methodologically investigate such causality in practice. Through a relational account that is constructionist rather than critical realist, analysis identifies how structures of intersubjective understanding are formed through *observable* discourse and practice.

Causality is “mechanistic rather than nomothetic”, and identifying causal linkages between discourses of identity, the securitization of terrorism, and outcomes of security practice is not based on law-like generalizations.⁸⁸ The causal influence of discourse for outcomes is perhaps best visualized as explained below:

A situation is produced as the situation that it is by the deployment of a particular configuration of rhetorical claims and commonplaces. The deployments in question shape the flow of events much like the shape of a riverbed shapes the flow of a river; shifts may occur over time, but the general relationship of significance is indisputable (Wittgenstein 1969: 93-97)...But precisely which commonplaces are implicated, and how their deployment and interaction contributed to the policy outcome in question, is a matter for empirical investigation. The perspective adopted here maintains only that some such commonplaces are implicated, and that their deployment is causally relevant.⁸⁹

The content and direction of British counterterrorism would have been decidedly different if the securitization of terrorism had developed along different sets of commonplaces and processes of identity construction than was observed. This thesis is a relational-securitization account that endeavors to help tease out some of the ways that discourse, identity, and security are causally interrelated with respect to one particular case study.

VI. Introductory conclusions and thesis structure

Discourses of identity have causal influence for intersubjective understandings and for material counterterrorism practice, and broader social and political meanings.

⁸⁷ Benjamin R. Banta, “Analysing Discourse as a Causal Mechanism,” *European Journal of International Relations* Online First (23 April 2012): 13-14

⁸⁸ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 32.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 41-42.

Processes of identity construction propelling the securitization of terrorism are not isolated to official policy-making vacuums. Us/them boundary structures “dehumanising” the terrorist enemy influence the everydayness of security and insecurity, as discussed by Croft with respect to the War on Terror and the United States.⁹⁰ For counterterrorism implementation, the mistaken killing of Jean Charles de Menezes by London police in 2005 is one acute example. A more latent example is the continued promotion of civic “vigilance” through an encouragement of societal surveillance, increasing the alienation of those already marginalized.⁹¹

To interpret the killing of de Menezes as a one-off mistake, or alienation as a temporary consequence, would be to neglect the durability of discriminatory boundary structures that can influence knowledge and practice.⁹² Competing notions of inclusivity and exclusivity are exacerbated by security practices that draw heavily on boundary drawing related to religion, class, race, and gender.⁹³ In the case of securitizing terrorism, state sovereignty, authority, identity, and power is both redefined and reasserted in particular ways. As the state is bolstered in position and purpose, domestic counterterrorism reinforces terrorist others as identifiable enemies in their own right, irrespective of whether or not they engage in violence. Such patterns of threat construction normalize exceptional counterterrorism as an unquestioned necessity, with discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism then positioned beyond the bounds of sustained critique.

This thesis is organized along three parts. The first part sets the scene for the thesis as a whole, with chapter two introducing a brief historical backdrop of terrorism and discusses some trends of terrorism studies, and chapter three discussing the theoretical and methodological framework. Part two consists of the empirics, a relational discourse analysis that spans forty-three years divided along five chapters. Part three

⁹⁰ Stuart Croft, *Culture, Crisis and America's War on Terror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 286.

⁹¹ Louise Amoore, “Vigilant Visualities: The Watchful Politics of the War on Terror,” *Security Dialogue* 38 (2007): 215-232.

⁹² Charles Tilly, *Durable Inequality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

⁹³ Cathy Schneider, “Police Power and Race Riots in Paris,” *Politics and Society* 36, no. 1 (2008): 133-159.

then concludes the thesis by summarizing the case and presenting how this thesis narrative has aimed to bring added value to terrorism studies, securitization, and relationalism.

Chapter 2

Terrorism in context

As argued in the previous chapter, terrorist threat labels attributed to possible sources of political violence do not exist independently from social and political practices of meaning making. Risks of violence from state and non-state actors or groups associated with terrorism may exist, but their categorization as “terrorist” instead of another label is open to interpretation.¹ This chapter provides some historical context and temporal perspective. This is not to introduce new historical material and is thus somewhat of a descriptive departure from subsequent chapters. However, the following does provide temporal parameters that better situate the relational analysis in chapters four through eight. Discussion is organized along two parts. The first part presents terrorism as a historical constant. This demonstrates how terrorism, while always evolving, is in essence nothing new. In light of the chosen case study, a significant focus here is on British and Irish history. Following this part is an introduction to trends observed in studies of terrorism to better position the thesis focus on identity, discourse, and security amongst existing literature.

I. Terrorism as a historical constant

A search for “history of terrorism” in the London School of Economics university library catalogue returned 789 hits, on Amazon returned 5,966 hits, and in

¹ An engagement with “state terrorism” is not explicitly investigated in this thesis. However, the explicit argument of terrorism as a threat identifier being a product of process and practice rather than static categories such as state or non-state does not eliminate the consideration of state actors in studies of political violence associated with terrorism.

Google Books returned “about 1,980,000 results”, in just 0.23 seconds.² The relatively recent growth of terrorism studies despite a long history of terrorizing political violence has not gone unnoticed.³ While, as observed by Walter Laqueur, “[t]o write a “world history” or provide a “general theory” of political terrorism is a hopeless undertaking”, this does not preclude a historical discussion of political violence to add some depth.⁴ A longer time horizon provides essential perspective on the socially constructed, materially consequential, and “historically embedded” nature of terrorist threat construction.⁵

The terminology of terror and functional equivalents

The use of an explicit terminology of terrorism has become commonplace even as a specificity of definition remains elusive. As “terrorist” has come to represent the most illegitimate form of political violence, its usage in official discourse and practice can limit both academic research as well as effective practice by establishing prematurely narrowed conceptual parameters of understanding. Research on actors engaged in terrorism has pointed to how terrorists “are generally remarkable for their sheer ordinariness”,⁶ but the intersubjective understandings that reassert terrorists as particular others in their own right continue to depend upon a variety of particular myths, such as all terrorists as fanatical “madmen” or psychopaths.⁷ When contemporary terrorism is constructed along such irrational characteristics, it becomes simple to accept terrorism today as unlike “negotiable” terrorists of the past. Thus the view on terrorism as “new” is as much an issue of threat perception as it is of some objective novelty

² Search of the LSE catalogue via <https://catalogue.lse.ac.uk/Search/Results?lookfor=history+of+terrorism&type=AllFields&submit=Find>, Amazon via http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=history+of+terrorism&x=0&y=0, and Google Books via <http://www.google.com/search?q=history+of+terrorism&btnG=Search+Books&tbm=bks&tbo=1> (All searches performed 6 December 2011).

³ Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Leena Malkki, “NO: The fallacy of the new terrorism thesis,” in *Contemporary Debates*, ed. Jackson and Sinclair, 36.

⁴ Walter Laqueur, *A History of Terrorism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 6.

⁵ Gabe Mythen and Sandra Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk and International Security: The Perils of Asking ‘What If?’,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 2-3 (2008): 222.

⁶ Charles Townshend, *Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 20.

⁷ Michael Stohl, “Old myths, new fantasies and the enduring realities of terrorism,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 1, no. 1 (2008): 5-16.

linked to contemporary threats. As questioned by Croft and Moore, “is there a new and immediate threat—or is that which is new the nature of our own fears?”⁸ A consequence of accepting myths of terrorism is the silencing of historical dimensions related to terrorism and political violence from state and non-state actors well before 21st century events. “Terrorism” is a constant of history; it is the way we have chosen to identify and communicate this insecurity and violence that has changed over time.

Examples of political violence, or prevented acts of political violence, may now be referred to in terms of terrorism, but at the time that they happened they were not. For example, a 2005 article today may state “in the Bush-and-Blair language of our own day, the foiling of the Gunpowder Plot [led by Guy Fawkes] was thus an outstandingly successful pre-emptive strike against what would now be described as the forces of organised, fanatical, religiously-motivated terrorism”, but in 1605 discussions, explicit terms of terrorism were not the norm.⁹ The initial reference to terrorism as an explicit threat identifier was during the late 1700s. State violence was identified as terrorism considering “the reign of terror in post-revolutionary France”¹⁰ from those “hell-hounds called terrorists”.¹¹ Just over two hundred years later, terrorism came to be understood by many (if not most) as illegitimate *non*-state violence. This inconsistency enabled an open-endedness of terrorist threat construction to the point of conceptual and practical impracticality. To contextualize terrorism beyond 21st century assumptions, it is necessary to include terrorism’s “functional equivalents” as well as acts or actors explicitly identified as linked to “terrorism”. “Functional equivalents” refers to acts and actors referenced in studies on terrorism even if those references were not explicitly labeled “terrorist” during their respective historical moments. The goal in this section is not to claim that terrorism has not become more lethal or evolved over time. Rather, it is to reorient perspectives from a view of terrorism as new on its own terms, to a view of terrorism as a constant of political violence throughout history. Though not a “history

⁸ Croft and Moore, “The evolution of threat narratives,” 823.

⁹ David Cannadine, “Halloween v Guy Fawkes Day”, *BBC News*, 4 November 2005 [cited 25 January 2013]; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4408078.stm>.

¹⁰ Adrian Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism*, 3.

¹¹ Conor Gearty, *Terror* (London: Faber and Faber, 1991), 20.

of” terrorism, the following section is compatible with a historical emphasis by presenting:

the continuity of violence in human affairs, with the result that what may at first sight seem novel in modern terrorism appears to his eye merely as a long familiar beast which startled us for a moment only because the colour of its new spots was different.¹²

There are a series of movements often cited in studies on the history of terrorism, including “the Sicarii from ancient times, the Assassins from the medieval period, the protagonists of the French Terror of 1793-4, and the Irish nationalists and Russian anarchists of the late nineteenth century”.¹³ The *sicarii* of the first century was an offshoot of the Zealots who fought against Roman rule in Palestine to try to be free from Roman control.¹⁴ They were one of the first known groups to utilize violence in a subversive form, revolting against the Roman Empire’s decision for a census as that would highlight the minority status of the Jewish population. “Echoes” of subversive activity related to philosophies of political violence have diffused across political and geographic borders for hundreds of years, albeit without an explicit terminology of terrorism as is in use today.¹⁵ In the Middle East during the 12th and 13th centuries, the Assassins stemming from the Ismaeli sect of Shia Islam became famous for their assassinations against the Crusaders.¹⁶ Both the Sicarii and the Assassins depended upon individual efforts and strategic targets, a strategy not dissimilar to those labeled terrorist today.¹⁷ Also similar to contemporary terrorism and political violence, these groups were “exceptional not because they were ‘terrorists’ but because they employed methods which were highly unorthodox for their day”.¹⁸ Thus, exceptional methods do not necessarily indicate a “new” terrorism, but represent a continuity of terror-causing

¹² Noel O’Sullivan, “Introduction,” in *Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution*, ed. Noel O’Sullivan (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), ix.

¹³ Gearty, *Terror*, 19.

¹⁴ Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, “Zealots and Assassins,” in *The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda*, ed. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 55-78.

¹⁵ Gearty, *Terror*, 19-20.

¹⁶ Robert Pape, *Dying to win: The strategic logics of suicide terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), 11-13.

¹⁷ Chaliand and Blin, “Zealots and Assassins,” in *The History of Terrorism*, 55.

¹⁸ Gearty, *Terror*, 20.

political violence going back through history.¹⁹ Terrorist methods will always be viewed as unorthodox and changing in scale and nature, albeit to different degrees relative to one's historical frame of reference.

The 19th century brought about technological shifts through evolutions in agricultural chemicals and the use of dynamite, influencing anarchists and Russian Revolutionaries. "Propaganda by the deed" was born during this period, and different groups continued to share similar philosophies with respect to the use of violence to communicate political messages. Targeted uses of violence such as assassinations link to tyrannicide and ancient Greek philosophy whereby individuals targeted political leaders considered *tyrants* to try and effect political change. But shifting technologies in more recent centuries, such as an evolving "mass media", provided for a growing potential audience to these acts. As today, earlier movements maintained influence despite changing environments by looking "to different tactics".²⁰ Assassinations similar to contemporary targeted killings intensified. The 1878 Narodnaya Volya movement killed Tsar Alexander II in 1881,²¹ and the Social Revolutionary Party murdered Dmitrii Sipiagin in 1902.²² In some references, the Crna [Ruka] is even said to have sparked World War I by assassinating the Archduke Franz Ferdinand,²³ though more in depth discussions of the social and historical context at the time point to a more complex situation, including not just the role of the Black Hand movement but also the Serbian government.²⁴ These references are not to conflate "movements" with "terrorism", as variations in how collective and individual uses of violence for political ends are identified in research and in practice underline important nuances across actors and

¹⁹ See Alejandra Bolanos, "YES: The 'new terrorism' or the 'newness' of context and change" (29-34) and Duyvesteyn and Malkki, "NO: The fallacy of the new terrorism thesis" (35-42) in *Contemporary Debates*, ed. Jackson and Sinclair.

²⁰ Gearty, *Terror*, 21-22.

²¹ Guelke, *Age of Terrorism*, 23; Richard Bach Jensen, "Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 1 (2004): 125.

²² Norman M. Naimark, "Terrorism and the fall of Imperial Russia," in *Terrorism: Critical Concepts in Political Science*, ed. David C. Rapoport (Routledge: Abingon, 2006), 282.

²³ Chaliand and Blin, "The Invention of Modern Terror," in *The History of Terrorism*, 96.

²⁴ Barbara Jelavich, "What the Habsburg Government Knew about the Black Hand", *Austrian History Yearbook* 22 (1991): 131-150.

events.²⁵ The referencing here is rather a simplified effort at underlining how a range of tactics similar to what may be considered terrorism have been in use well before 21st century counterterrorism that is constituted by a now normalized explicit articulation of “terrorist” others.

As explained in detail by scholars such as Hogan, Walker, and Donohue mentioned in chapter one, the Northern Irish conflict and related state security practices that precipitated counterterrorism go back hundreds of years. In referencing the 1652 Act of Settlement that awarded land to Protestants, Martha Crenshaw notes how “The genealogy of the IRA must be seen in the light of historical Irish antipathy toward British authority and toward the Protestant settler “ascendancy”, dating principally from the time of Cromwell’s conquest.”²⁶ During the 1820s in Ireland there was a surge in agrarian uprisings that heightened tensions related to property and citizen rights around Irish-English relations. This historical point is especially noteworthy considering its reference in contemporary official discourse.²⁷ The 1867 failed Fenian (IRB) bombing of London’s Clerkenwell jail to release Irish prisoners mistakenly killing civilians was an early example of how Irish-related terrorism was never limited to local territory.²⁸

Other connections going beyond local and domestic borders can be seen through the Clan de Gael’s and Skirmishers’s links to the United States and Ireland.²⁹ One of the most frequently referenced acts of terrorism during the 19th century was the 1882 assassination of Lord Frederick Cavendish and Mr. T.H. Burke in Phoenix Park, Dublin by the Invincibles. However, perhaps the most cited act connecting historical events and contemporary issues related to the Northern Irish conflict is the Easter Rising of 1916, when republicans challenged British rule through physical force rebellion. An

²⁵ A wide range of literature on social movements, mobilization, and revolution, for example, provide useful contextual distinctions in researching specific moments and actors in greater detail (cf. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*; Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1978)).

²⁶ Martha Crenshaw, “The Persistence of IRA Terrorism,” in *Terrorism in Ireland*, ed. Alan O’Day and Yonah Alexander (London: St. Martin’s, 1984), 251.

²⁷ Colville Report, 1990, Cm. 1115.

²⁸ Charles Townshend, “The Process of Terror in Irish Politics,” in *Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution*, 88-111.

²⁹ Gearty, *Terror*, 22; Guelke, *Age of Terrorism*, 109.

independent Ireland was declared in 1918, the Irish Republican Army was formed in 1919, and the Anglo-Irish war took place from 1919-1921. The Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 established the state of Ireland, but left the six counties of Northern Ireland under British rule. This dissatisfied both republicans determined to achieve a fully united Ireland, and unionists in the North who felt left behind. The republican movement subsequently divided between those based in Belfast dedicated to the use of force and those based in Dublin focused on nonviolence.³⁰ Though the thesis empirics are focused on Britain, it is essential to not forget that the history of terrorist-related violence was not limited to the British and Irish Isles. The next section provides a descriptive overview of the broader context related to political violence and terrorism.

The Sixties onwards

From the late 1960s, the 20th century order transitioned from World War, inter-war, and isolationist patterns, to Cold War political and security relations. Actors challenged imperial occupiers in places such as India and Kenya. Groups drew inspiration from each other irrespective of political borders. In Latin America there was a rise in left wing guerrilla groups, but these movements were largely rural and disconnected from urban guerrilla activities. European groups include the Red Brigades, the Red Army Faction (RAF), the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the PIRA. Actors influenced each other through similar philosophies and strategies irrespective of political boundaries, geographic borders, or physical (prison) walls. Accounts have presented Northern Irish hunger striker Bobby Sands “immersing himself in the writings of Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara, George Jackson, and Camilo Torres, revolutionaries who called for the empowerment of the downtrodden, the wretched, the forgotten”.³¹

³⁰ Kathryn Gregory, “Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) (aka, PIRA, “the provos,” Oglai gh na hEireann) (U.K., separatists),” Council on Foreign Relations [cited 2 February 2011]; available from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/9240>.

³¹ Padraig O’Malley, *Bit ing at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), 47.

During the latter half of the 20th century as the “international terrorism” commonplace gained prevalence, there were the beginning whispers of a “new” age of terrorism. Such newness is frequently explained as due to religious characteristics, despite religion playing a part in political violence for hundreds of years.³² Somewhat paradoxically, this generalized newness has been explained with reference to the specificity of events. The June 1967 Six Day war in Israel-Palestine, October 1967 death of Che Guevara, May 1968 student revolts in France, and 1968 clashes between police and demonstrators in Northern Ireland, have all been referenced as indicative of a late 1960s temporal rupture with the past.³³ Acts of violence were interpreted as indicative of a new international terrorism by discourse differentiating actors rather than methods, for example, “a contagion of mindless Palestinian brutality”.³⁴ Discussions of a new age are not in and of themselves surprising, but dependence of this newness on inconsistent distinctions underscores terrorism as a label stemming from social practices. Terrorism is not and has never been a brute fact irrespective of intersubjective processes of meaning making.

In Northern Ireland, the late 1960s marked a significant shift for terrorism and counterterrorism. Violent clashes following a civil rights march in 1968 Londonderry/Derry were followed by the formation of the PIRA, the reintroduction of internment, the sending of the British Army to Ulster, and the suspension of the Northern Irish government (Stormont) by Westminster.³⁵ Similar to other movements at the time outside the Irish and British Isles, the Provisionals represented the conflict as “a classical anti-colonial liberation struggle in which the enemy was British imperialism”.³⁶ The goal of radical republicans was to end British occupation of the North and to alleviate the “systematic discrimination against northern Catholics”.³⁷ Issues of power,

³² David C. Rapoport, “The four waves of modern terrorism,” in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a grand strategy*, ed. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 46-73; for an alternative view see Jeroen Gunning and Richard Jackson, “What’s so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 4, no. 3 (2011): 369-388.

³³ Guelke, *Age of Terrorism*, 52; Chaliand and Blin, “From 1968 to Radical Islam,” in *The History of Terrorism*, 221.

³⁴ Gearty, *Terror*, 45.

³⁵ Guelke, *Age of Terrorism*, 107.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 109.

³⁷ Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 88.

injustice, and identity were foundational to the conflict.³⁸ As explained by Adrian Guelke, “nowhere were political strains over the question of national identity more apparent than in Northern Ireland with the onset of intercommunal violence in 1968 and 1969”.³⁹

Special powers had been in use for hundreds of years, but in the early 1970s a new language was deployed that securitized terrorism and legitimized exceptional measures. Internment reactivated on 9 August 1971 created an “explosion of Catholic anger and resentment, resulting in a massive increase in support for the Provisional IRA in the ghettos and a sharp jump in the level of violence”, and loyalist groups established the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF).⁴⁰ The EPA (1973) and PTA (1974) marked a hardened security approach and a “disappearance of any equivocation in applying the term ‘terrorism’ to political violence taking place in Northern Ireland or emanating from the province”.⁴¹ A building global attention to 20th century terrorism established new links between domestic policing, national security, and international relations, but counterterrorism remained dominated by state level practices. These practices were anchored in new laws based on explicit discourses of “terrorism” that often depended upon a suspension of liberty and increase in insecurity to be implemented.⁴²

Starting in the early 1970s, national legal codes were substantially amended with respect to such matters as police custody, house searches, and so on. In Great Britain, for example, where freedoms had always been jealously defended, the law was adapted to the new realities of terrorism, especially Irish terrorism. The U.K. Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1976 legalized extended police custody, the invasion and search of homes, the expulsion of suspects, and so forth.⁴³

³⁸ Brian Graham, “The Past in the Present: The Shaping of Identity in Loyalist Ulster,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 3 (2004): 483-484.

³⁹ Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism*, 66.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 110; English, *Irish Freedom*, 369.

⁴¹ Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism*, 15.

⁴² Gearty, *Terror*, 1-2.

⁴³ Chaliand and Blin, “From 1968 to Radical Islam,” in *The History of Terrorism*, 246-247.

Security practices were not confined to Cold War politics or conventional threats, but were reconfigured to target nontraditional risks such as terrorism and criminality, with the boundaries between law enforcement and military responsibilities experiencing growing overlap.

The securitization of terrorism repositioned intersubjective understandings of political violence, terrorist threat construction, and acceptable state force. These powers were increasingly aligned with explicit references to “international” dimensions, despite much terrorism and political violence having an international element throughout history. The growth in us/them boundary-drawing associated with the “international” commonplace was not predetermined, and is, from many perspectives, historically inconsistent. Earlier examples of cross-border communications, transactions, and information sharing among actors engaged in terrorist related violence go back many years. The temporal separation of past from present through the use of “international” was consequential for late 20th century collective understandings and material outcomes. Not only did discourse establish international as “new”, but those labeled “international terrorists” were dominated by non-western references of identification. In agreement with Aradau and Van Munster, “the international cannot be separated from the national in as far as domestic expressions of the enemy often rely upon international representations of modernity and progress that separate the West from the rest of the world—and vice versa”.⁴⁴ Inside/outside assumptions of identity and belonging linked to terrorist threat labels laid the groundwork for exceptional counterterrorism well before 21st century events.

The following section discusses some trends in literature on terrorism and political violence to situate how a relational focus is an advantageous way to better understand and explain the emergence, legitimation, and normalization of British counterterrorism.

⁴⁴ Aradau and Van Munster, “Exceptionalism”, 698.

II. Studying research on terrorism

The field of terrorism studies is a relatively recent development that experienced significant growth from the 21st century on. It is also an extremely broad field, with one recent article categorizing “the top 150 books in the field” along seventeen issue-areas.⁴⁵ These ranged from “using the social, behavioral, and economic sciences to study terrorism”, to “journalistic case studies” and “terrorism on the internet”.⁴⁶ Similar to security studies more broadly, terrorism studies can be organized along a spectrum from “orthodox” to “critical”. Orthodox studies frequently target policy, defense, and traditional security audiences. The dominant lens in this area is one that takes notions of identity and discourse as types of “givens” that do not require analytic unpacking. Such research is often based in rational choice reasoning, cost/benefit analyses, and practice-oriented prescriptions. At the other end of the spectrum are critical studies on terrorism. This scholarship embraces a distinctively cautious analytic and conceptual scrutiny and demands that taken for granted aspects of terrorism studies and practice be problematized. Neither approach ignores the real possibility of insecurity or political violence. But they go about investigating such risks from distinct ontological and epistemological starting points. The assumptions basing this thesis may be interpreted as along a critical vein. But the resulting analysis speaks to both orthodox and critical scholarship.

Existing literature in terrorism studies has provided highly instructive material with which to pursue further research. Richard English, Adrian Guelke, and Charles Townshend have all brought an invaluable historical lens to their respective analyses.⁴⁷ Critical scholarship on issues of language by Richard Jackson has brought important insight into the consequential interrelation of discourse and practice for

⁴⁵ Joshua Sinai, “Terrorism Bookshelf: Top 150 Books on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism,” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 6, no. 2 (2012) [journal online] [cited 4 June 2012]; available from <http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/sinai-terrorism-bookshelf>.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Richard English, *Radicals and the Republic: Socialist Republicanism in the Irish Free State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); English, *Armed Struggle*; English *Irish Freedom*; Guelke, *The Age of Terrorism*; Townshend, *Terrorism*.

counterterrorism.⁴⁸ Also investigating discourse and security is Croft, who has comprehensively researched how discourses around the War on Terror intersect with culture across levels of U.S. politics and society.⁴⁹ Complimenting these works is scholarship by Didier Bigo, Anastassia Tsoukala, and Vivienne Jabri that challenge the illiberalism of liberal state security practices.⁵⁰ Similar to these critical inclinations are work by Jef Huysmans, Alessandra Buonfino, Aradau, and Van Munster, who in different but not incompatible ways have all investigated the politics of exception as relates to counterterrorism.⁵¹ Providing additional legal depth to these approaches in the context of civil rights and liberties is work as that by Conor Gearty, Leonard Weinberg, and Walker.⁵²

Thesis research draws insight from these works and hopes to build upon such literature in two overarching ways. One way is through a new relational-securitization framework drawing on IR and sociological theories (securitization and relationalism). The second way is to discuss how discourse is causally consequential for ideational and material outcomes through an empirical illustration that bridges the artificial temporal divide separating pre- and post-11 September moments. In response to Jeroen Gunning's convincing call for theoretical development in terrorism studies, this discussion underlines how the thesis fits within existing literature.⁵³ This section is loosely organized along the definition of terrorism, solving the problem of terrorism, the "international", and, terrorism, society, and insecurity.

⁴⁸ Jackson, *Writing the War*.

⁴⁹ Croft, *Culture, Crisis*.

⁵⁰ Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, eds., *Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal practices of liberal regimes after 9/11* (London: Routledge, 2008); Vivienne Jabri, "War, Security and the Liberal State," *Security Dialogue* 37, no. 1 (2006): 47-64.

⁵¹ Aradau and Van Munster, "Exceptionalism"; Jef Huysmans and Alessandra Buonfino, "Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK," *Political Studies* 56, no. 4 (2008): 766-788.

⁵² Conor Gearty, "11 September 2001, Counter-terrorism, and the Human Rights Act," *Journal of Law and Society* 32, no. 1 (2005): 18-33; Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism*; Clive Walker, "Know thine enemy as thyself: Discerning friend from foe under anti-terrorism laws," *Melbourne University Law Review* 32 (2008): 275-301; Leonard Weinberg, ed. *Democratic Responses to Terrorism* (London: Taylor & Francis, 2008).

⁵³ Jeroen Gunning, "A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?" *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 365-367.

Definitional issues

From policy reports to academic analyses, the definitions debate maintains a dependable presence in terrorism studies. Different aspects of this debate resonate for different audiences, but a general attention to “defining terrorism” is fairly consistent.⁵⁴ This presence is not itself surprising, and social phenomena demand categorization to be communicated in practice and in theory. We search for definitions in the same way that we search for identities: to try to make sense of and provide order to complex relations. Definitions are interwoven with context, and the way that specific terms are positioned in the broader discourse at a particular time influences their common meanings. Practices of labeling come to make distinctions in the identification of overlapping processes, and the way that we categorize acts of violence more generally is a contentious conversation.⁵⁵ With respect to terrorism in particular, while the definition of terrorism is in many ways ambiguous, an explicit terminology of terrorism evokes significant consequences for ideational and material outcomes that a terminology of sectarianism, for example, may not. The question of definition is here an empirical one, requiring a theoretical perspective that accounts for stability and change in particular contexts of terrorism and political violence.

A relational approach to understanding how terrorism is securitized brings a useful framework to how this stabilization and change unfolds over time by viewing discourse as causally consequential. A direct engagement with “the definitions debate” is not pursued here. But the elusiveness of establishing any one definition of terrorism and related identities encourages the use of a relational-securitization approach. By tracing how explicit articulations unfold across discourse, the thesis narrative can better

⁵⁴ Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 4 (2004): 777-794; Igor Primoratz, “What is Terrorism?” *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 7, no. 2 (1990): 129-138; Alex P. Schmid, “Frameworks for conceptualising terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 2 (2004): 197-221; Jenny Teichman, “How to Define Terrorism,” in *Terrorism*, ed. Conor Gearty (Dartmouth: Alershot, 1996): 3-15 (originally published in *Philosophy* 64 (1989): 505-517).

⁵⁵ See Tilly *From Mobilization to Revolution* on political violence as relates to collective movements.

explain how the causal influence of discourse contributed to the development of counterterrorism in particular ways for a specific case.

Problem solving, attending to practice

Problem solving arenas of research focus are frequently dominated by a particular set of concerns, which Lee Jarvis identifies as “efforts (i) to capture their object of knowledge – the problem of definition; (ii) to explain that object’s conditions of existence – the problem of causation; and (iii) to offer possible pathways for preventing or combating terrorism – the problem of response”.⁵⁶ Such research frequently endeavors to “fix” terrorism without questioning the terms with which they have identified the perceived problem. Approaches often focus on “why” questions of individual versus group dynamics to try and answer questions like why certain people “walk away from terrorism”.⁵⁷ This research is linked to behavioral sciences, working to identify individuals who are at risk of “becoming” terrorists. These approaches depend upon actor-based research frameworks. Conclusions such as “terrorists tend to think and act more as social solidarity maximizers” are then used to guide policy recommendations.⁵⁸ Political efforts to figuratively and literally locate high-risk individuals are framed in such a way as to require such approaches, and can become aligned with misguided racial, religious, and ethnic assumptions.⁵⁹

Other research takes variable and actor-based approaches to a level close to formal modeling. For example, “a time-series, cross-national negative binomial analysis of 197 countries” to determine what states are “more likely to host terrorist groups”, or more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorists.⁶⁰ Network analysis has added

⁵⁶ Lee Jarvis, “The Spaces and Faces of Terrorism Studies”, *Security Dialogue* 40, no. 1 (2009): 7.

⁵⁷ Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism”; John Horgan, *Walking Away from Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2009).

⁵⁸ Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want,” *International Security* 32, no. 4 (2008): 104.

⁵⁹ Gillian Youngs, “The ‘new home front’ and the war on terror: ethical and political reframing of national and international politics,” *International Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2010): 925-937.

⁶⁰ James A. Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?” *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 3 (2008): 469.

another angle to actor based approaches. Research in this area has investigated organizational and transactional aspects of organized crime, intelligence operations, structural rearrangements, resource allocation, and information sharing.⁶¹ Problem solving approaches can hold potential, but the methodological restrictions of variable-based analyses can lead to over-generalization. Accepting the language of terrorism as unproblematic is an obstacle to analysis as such a perspective unnecessarily limits politically acceptable options for security practice. This, in turn, can silence alternatives to militarized preemption or counter-radicalization, measures that counterproductively depend on identifying actors as terrorists even if they have not engaged in political violence.

One development linked to problem solving research is in fact a growth in critical analyses of how counterterrorism can exacerbate insecurity. For example, by reviewing how “integration” and “counterradicalization” have become pervasive parts of contemporary practice despite areas of ineffectiveness.⁶² The issue of counterterrorism success is another area of problem solving research that can open up theoretical and empirical perspectives. Notions of winning justify exceptional practice even as what it means to win remains deceptively vague. By identifying this paradox, new approaches may be realized. For example, the sobering but perhaps more realistic goal of learning to live with terrorism.⁶³ Studies that incorporate a relational perspective to investigate how terrorism is securitized would provide a broader and more dynamic account of how identity and practice interrelate to influence counterterrorism. “Disastrous” effects such as “one-sided curfew in Catholic Belfast in 1970” and “introduction of equally one-sided

⁶¹ Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Calvert Jones, “Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks,” *International Security* 33, no. 2 (2008): 7-44; Ronald J. Deibert and Janice Gross Stein, “Hacking Networks of Terror,” *Dialog-IO* (2002): 1-14; Philip H. K. Davies, “Intelligence culture and intelligence failure in Britain and the United States,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 3 (2004): 495-520; Martha Crenshaw, “Mapping Terrorist Organizations,” Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University (September 2010) [cited 20 May 2012]; available from http://iis-db.stanford.edu/res/2779/mapping_terrorist_organizations.pdf.

⁶² Shane Brighton, “British Muslims, Multiculturalism and UK foreign policy: ‘integration’ and ‘cohesion’ in and beyond the state,” *International Affairs* 83, no. 1 (2007): 1-17; Jonathan Githens-Mazer, “Islamic Radicalisation among North Africans in Britain,” *British Journal of Political and International Relations* 10, no. 4 (2008): 550-570; Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, “Why conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: the persistence of a failed discourse,” *International Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2010): 889-901.

⁶³ English, *How to Respond*; Barry Buzan, “Will the “Global War on Terrorism” be the New Cold War?” *International Affairs* 82, no. 6 (2006): 1117.

and clumsy internment in 1971” underscore how threat identification is both an endemic and problematic part of preventive security practice.⁶⁴ Counterterrorism is constituted by discourses of “who” is perceived to be a terrorist threat, with the use of preventive security practices then reinforcing these perceptions since those perceptions guide counterterrorism implementation. Similar policies continue to underpin 21st century research and practice through “a kind of political amnesia about the failures and lessons from other counter-terrorist campaigns”.⁶⁵ Research to tackle how such outcomes arise and are maintained is more useful when critical sensibilities and a historical approach are explicit parts of analysis.

Instructive analytical development around counterterrorism practice is seen in traditional studies on “how terrorism ends”⁶⁶ and critical investigations of shifting temporalities of risk.⁶⁷ Aradau and Van Munster explain “the emergence of a ‘precautionary’ element [that] has given birth to new configurations of risk that require that the catastrophic prospects of the future be avoided at all costs”.⁶⁸ They further discuss how policies “*actively* seek to prevent situations from becoming catastrophic at some indefinite point in the future”.⁶⁹ This normalization of preemptive exceptionality encourages the logic of “not *if*, but *when*” terrorist attacks will occur.⁷⁰ Identifications of terrorist suspects are “no longer the juridical decision for which careful consideration of evidence is necessary”, but an administrative decision “where the rule of zero-risk takes precedence”.⁷¹ This observation demands further inquiry into *how* such a situation arose in the way that it did to eventually dominate much counterterrorism discourse and practice.

⁶⁴ English, *Irish Freedom*, 370.

⁶⁵ Jackson, *Writing the War*, 91.

⁶⁶ Audrey Kurth Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).

⁶⁷ Joseba Zulaika, “Drones, witches and other flying objects: the force of fantasy in US counterterrorism,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 5, no. 1 (2012): 51–68; Lee Jarvis, *Times of Terror* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).

⁶⁸ Aradau and Van Munster, “Governing Terrorism,” 91.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁷⁰ Zulaika, *Terrorism*.

⁷¹ Aradau and van Munster, “Exceptionalism”, 106.

Investigating the “politics of unease” and the “politics of exception” around contemporary security practices sheds light on the way normalized measures can become ordinary and exacerbate insecurity.⁷² Didier Bigo and Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet have explored unease, suspicion, exception, and radicalization in the case of Northern Ireland to argue how we must not decontextualize cases or ignore the failures of “success stories”.⁷³ As such, an attention to specificity is essential and it would be misguided to establish generic “how-to guides” for security and conflict resolution. An acknowledgement of specificity in time and place, however, does not mean that we cannot build stronger understandings through a historical lens. More critical problem solving approaches to address “how we seem unable to escape feed-back loops of bad intelligence, bureaucratic thinking, and failed imagination” provide greater potential than perspectives turned away from history.⁷⁴ It is possible to balance an attention to context with comparative evaluations that are done with a high level of analytical scrutiny.

Positioning “the international”

Historical and problem solving work in terrorism studies are linked to the changing role of “the international” in research and in practice. Though a seemingly value-neutral or pre-existing term, the use of “international” as a threat identifier was not predetermined to be part of how terrorism was securitized. As referenced in the introduction chapter, scholars such as Paul Wilkinson distinguish international terrorism through political boundaries, or the assumed citizenship of actors. But in practice such distinctions are increasingly problematic. Terrorism and counterterrorism are “not easily classified into neatly differentiated domestic or international components”.⁷⁵ In the

⁷² Huysmans and Buonfino, “Politics of exception”; Anastasia Tsoukala, “Democracy in the light of security: British and French political discourse on domestic counter-terrorism policies,” *Political Studies* 54, no. 3 (2006): 607-27.

⁷³ Didier Bigo and Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, “Northern Ireland as Metaphor,” *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 6 (2011): 483-498.

⁷⁴ James Der Derian, “The War of Networks,” *Theory and Event*, 5, no. 4 (2002): paragraph 29.

⁷⁵ Peter J. Katzenstein, “Same War – Different Views: Germany, Japan, and Counter-terrorism,” *International Organization* 57 (2003): 735.

context of British counterterrorism, “Irish terrorism” is not considered “international terrorism” despite a history of international involvement. “International terrorism” is not considered “domestic terrorism” despite domestic actors planning “international” terrorist attacks. “Domestic terrorism” is not considered “Irish-related” or “international”, despite both Irish and international forms depending on domestic actors and territory. The burgeoning reference to “homegrown” or “lone wolf” threats provides another set of definitional problems. The implications of these overlaps have not yet been sufficiently analyzed, and this area of inquiry forms a significant part of the thesis analysis.

The way that such labels have been differentiated along geographic assumptions of belonging is thus far under problematized. Each term has evolved along different degrees of danger and distance from the referent and other types of terrorist threats during securitization. The continued making and remaking of these threat identities in the securitization of terrorism is consequential for intersubjective understanding and counterterrorism practice. Exceptional measures were constituted and justified through particular sets of commonplaces. If these relational configurations had not been deployed, there would have been a different set of outcomes. British counterterrorism depended upon an externalization of the other to maintain extraordinary measures by distancing the referent from any notions of terrorist danger. The interweaving of structure and agency in this respect is both highly nuanced and highly consequential. Security and political officials had a consequential role in formulating what policies were possible. But they did so through a distinctive structure of threat/referent identity construction that delimited what us/them perceptions were the most influential in guiding understanding and action with respect to changing counterterrorism practice.⁷⁶

“International” is also indicative of how different perceptions of “levels” come into terrorism studies research. While an “era of global terrorist threats” demands “an unprecedented level of international cooperation between intelligence and police

⁷⁶ Gabriel A. Almond with Stephen Guenca, “Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics”, in *A Discipline Divided: Schools and sects in political science* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990): 32-65.

agencies”, such cooperation is limited by a reassertion of inside/outside boundaries that bolster state authority.⁷⁷ Despite globalization and economic interdependence that assert structures of international governance, for counterterrorism the state remains significant. The stickiness of national policies and identity helps legitimize exceptional domestic security practices. Self/other assumptions of belonging tied to the domestic/international divide. This can provoke consequences of insecurity through notions of inclusion/exclusion cross-cutting domestic and international social relations. References to “homegrown terrorism” and the blurring of foreign and domestic areas complicate notions of “belonging”.⁷⁸ In terms of threat construction, perceptions of danger, and counterterrorism, the “international” commonplace hardens inside/outside divisions.

Highlighting the persistence of national counterterrorism is not to negate international efforts at cooperation. Advances have been made through bilateral, regional, and international initiatives. At the international level, the United Nations has been drafting counterterrorism reports and strategies from the mid-1990s.⁷⁹ Research on European counterterrorism by Cornelia Beyer presents how regional institutional developments encouraged multilateral responses to events such as 11 September.⁸⁰ Even as broader strategies were formed, problems of resource coordination, the weakness (or absence) of enforcement mechanisms, persistence of national identity concerns, and attention to state sovereignty, continue to stall international cohesion.⁸¹ Inconsistencies and incompatibilities remain in how state governments “conceive of the use of violence, how publics perceive and interpret insecurity, and how threats are constructed politically”.⁸² As noted by Marieke de Goede, European counterterrorism is not so much

⁷⁷ Bradley W. C. Bamford, “The United Kingdom’s “War Against Terrorism”,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 4 (2004): 745.

⁷⁸ Dan Bulley, “Foreign’ Terror? London Bombings, Resistance and the Failing State,” *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 10 (2008): 380; Croft and Moore, “The evolution of threat narratives”; Youngs, “The ‘new home front’.”

⁷⁹ “UN Action to Counter Terrorism” [cited 5 July 2012]; available from <http://www.un.org/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml>.

⁸⁰ Cornelia Beyer, “The European Union as a Security Policy Actor: The Case of Counter-terrorism,” *European Foreign Affairs Review* 13, no. 3 (2008): 304.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 306-307; Jörg Monar, “Common Threat and Common Response? The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Problems,” *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 292–313.

⁸² Katzenstein, “Same War – Different Views,” 734.

a supra-state balance for exceptional national policies, as it is a similar preemptive trajectory to existing state policies.⁸³

Debates on “new” terrorism are another way that “international” contributed to the hardening of borders separating within from without. Crenshaw approached the subject of “new terrorism” with caution over a decade ago by arguing that “research on terrorism has not yet fully considered the implications of recent claims that a “new” terrorism has developed”.⁸⁴ More recent debates have given the topic greater critical attention, as seen in Alexander Spencer’s 2011 response to people “sick” of those critiquing the use of “new terrorism”.⁸⁵ As the “new” terrorism terminology developed in discourse international terrorism was increasingly securitized along framings of Islam. These framings positioned international Islamic extremist terrorism as from specific actors such as AQAP and from exceptionally broad categories like “Jihadi” groups. As noted by Croft, the “securitization of Islam” involves both differential practices of othering and a generalization of Islam that negates specificities across and within groups. Actors associated with Islam are then distanced from the referent as foreign and dangerous outsiders, even if they are part of the self and unconnected to terrorist activity.

Tony Blair approached notions of an international collective identity by referring to “a clash about civilization”.⁸⁶ But, this expanded referent was matched by bolstered state counterterrorism and a reassertion of British identity. The civilized versus barbarian trope has an entrenched history, but its usage in the context of counterterrorism and discourse provided for a particular good versus evil framing that prioritized state authority. The international label became entrenched in securitizations of terrorism and asserted misguided inside/outside borders in official British discourse and practice.

⁸³ Marieke de Goede, “The Politics of Preemption and the War on Terror in Europe,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (2008): 161-185.

⁸⁴ Crenshaw, “The Psychology of Terrorism”, 405-406.

⁸⁵ Alexander Spencer, “Sic[k] of the ‘new terrorism’ debate? A response to our critics,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 4, no. 3 (2011): 459-467.

⁸⁶ Blair, “A Battle for Global Values,” 81.

Terrorism and society

An intersubjective understanding of international terrorism as external to the national referent was reinforced by framing terrorism “as being (partly) a problem of controlling both foreigners entering British territory and those already living in the United Kingdom”.⁸⁷ By politicizing, and securitizing, issues such as immigration, failed states, and Islam, the “international terrorist” label evolved to represent a foreign threat that is culturally and physically distanced from the British self. This externalizing frame silenced historical dimensions of the international across earlier terrorism and political violence. For example the Fenian Brotherhood that was formed in the United States in 1857 and had an arm in Ireland called the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB).⁸⁸ Or the Clan na Gael, also known as the United Irishmen, that was “well established” in the United States from 1873.⁸⁹ American actors and connected groups were essential support. As explained by Lindsay Clutterbuck, “The attacks took place in major cities in England and Scotland, not in Dublin or Belfast, whilst the bombers themselves came from the United States of America, the country that also provided them with explosives, detonators, and financial support.”⁹⁰ Despite these international connections, due to the way that “international terrorists” have been constructed through the securitization of terrorism, past terrorist action is not “international” unless it is linked to “Islamic”.

The “international” played a significant role in terrorism and political violence before “international terrorism” became a dominating threat label. One way this role can be seen is through a discussion of method. Strategic targeting such as attacking “the financial heart of London and carrying out the attacks by the use of massive ‘lorry

⁸⁷ Huysmans and Buonfino, “Politics of exception,” 768.

⁸⁸ Lindsay Clutterbuck, “Countering Irish Republican Terrorism in Britain: Its Origin as a Police Function,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, no. 1 (2006): 98.

⁸⁹ Lindsay Clutterbuck, “The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or Extreme Irish Republicans?” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16, no. 1 (2004): 160.

⁹⁰ Clutterbuck, “Countering Irish Republican Terrorism,” 100.

bombs” is not dissimilar to methods used by later groups in other locations.⁹¹ The actual materials used were also indicative of the international dimension. Whether through Semtex transferred between the Czech Republic, Libya, and Northern Ireland, financial and moral support from NORAID in the US to republicans in Ulster, or the presence of Northern Irish actors alongside FARC members training in Columbia, Irish related terrorism could also be argued as a type of international terrorism.⁹² In light of such overlaps, how have structures from discourses of securitization stabilized particular labels to differentiate otherwise overlapping threat identities and influenced outcomes?

One way was through the assertion of religion. Despite the presence of religion in violent conflict for centuries, it was given a new priority in 21st century securitizations through framings of Islamic extremism.⁹³ International Islamic terrorism as a type of boundary category, or particular “site of difference”,⁹⁴ was presented as the most dangerous threat to Western society, despite the vast majority of associated attacks targeting non-western areas and populations. In addition, the perpetrators of international terrorism were frequently part of the domestic western self. But, older threats were explained as primarily secular with contemporary risks “linked to religious fanaticism”.⁹⁵ While there are new *aspects* of religion in movements using political violence, of which changing interpretations of Islam is one, the presence or not of religion does not itself make terrorism today essentially new. The Irish and British case, for example, has a significant history of religious influence. This role of religion is bolstered through enduring myths, communal segregation, and the role of religious officials. Militant groups drew upon religious grievances to garner support, and helped cement the Irish cause with Catholicism for generations.⁹⁶ Loyalist campaigns also incorporated religious motivation through Protestant influence in groups such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters and Ulster Volunteer Force. It is not only Northern Irish groups

⁹¹ Clutterbuck, “The Progenitors of Terrorism,” 174.

⁹² Hogan and Walker, *Political Violence*, 161.

⁹³ Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse,” *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2002): 394–426.

⁹⁴ Andrew Abbott, *Time Matters: On Theory and Method* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 269.

⁹⁵ Alexander Spencer, “Questioning the Concept of ‘New Terrorism’,” *Peace Conflict and Development* 8 (2006): 9.

⁹⁶ English, *Irish Freedom*, 241.

that have had religious ideological influence, with Irgun in Israel and Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) in Cyprus two additional examples.⁹⁷

The consequences for theory and for practice from these inconsistent and divisive patterns of threat construction demand research that rejects static perspectives of identity and discourse. By engaging in a processual relational approach to securitization, we can better account for how security practices based on stationary generalizations of identity emerged in the way that they did to have particular consequences for social relations and material practice.⁹⁸ Studies on immigration and security provide extra insight into the effects of counterterrorism's reliance on self/other constructions. A "rhetoric of exclusion and fear of foreigners" linking immigration and counterterrorism points to the broader consequences from interrelations of identity, security, and discourse.⁹⁹ Studies investigating the War on Terror have also highlighted the social consequences of counterterrorism as relates to discourse and knowledge production. As explained by Richard Jackson, "Any large-scale project of political violence – such as war or counter-terrorism – requires a significant degree of political and social consensus, and consensus is not possible without language".¹⁰⁰ This brings us back to the way securitization theory provides an instructive framework with which to investigate the interrelation of identity, discourse, and security in the context of counterterrorism. The securitization of terrorism justifies practices that rest on consequences of insecurity for society. At the same time, it is society's acceptance that helps legitimize the need for such measures in the first place. Exceptional counterterrorism thus not only has effects *on* society, but depends upon an acceptance *by* society of how threat/referent identities are positioned.

Terrorists were embedded in mainstream understanding as "kooks, crazies, demented" actors before events such as 11 September 2001.¹⁰¹ Through intertextuality,

⁹⁷ Spencer, "Questioning the Concept," 14.

⁹⁸ Githens-Mazer, "Islamic Radicalisation", 552.

⁹⁹ Huysmans and Buonfino. "Politics of exception," 766.

¹⁰⁰ Jackson, *Writing the War*, 1.

¹⁰¹ William Douglas and Joseba Zulaika, *Terrorist Taboo: The follies, fables, and faces of terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 1996), x.

high politics are connected with everyday relations, and terrorists are reasserted as the “new barbarians”: enemy-others representing the ultimate savages threatening Western society.¹⁰² Terms such as “evil” have come to play a normalizing role for exceptional domestic and foreign security practices.¹⁰³ Counterterrorism increases the alienation of marginalized groups within domestic societies by relying upon us/them divisions to identify possible risk. Even as exceptional measures were accepted as necessary, the implementation of these measures can pose a threat to liberal democracy by shifting the balance between security and liberty.¹⁰⁴ Through discursive constructions of the terrorist as an essentialized enemy-other “out there”, counterterrorism and discourse on terrorism became a never-ending cycle where we are always “waiting for terrorism”.¹⁰⁵ If there is a terrorist attack it means the threat still exists, and we must continue exceptional measures. If there is no terrorist attack it means these measures are working and thus also must be continued.

III. Going forward with terrorism studies and history

The normalization of a permanent state of exception in the name of preempting future catastrophe stems from a securitization of terrorism positioning terrorists as inherently indefinable yet politically unarguable. The need to interrogate how terrorism is stabilized through negotiated discourses of identity to normalize exceptional measures supports a relational-securitization approach to inquiry. This framework prioritizes processes of identity construction and self/other structures to explain how discourse is causally consequential for outcomes. Research has pointed to the complexity of identity by observing how individuals resist “identity hybridization[s]”, that “individuals born in Britain may carry British passports, but do not feel English (or Scottish or Welsh)”.¹⁰⁶ In this context of competing identities, grievances linked to historic identity tensions can

¹⁰² Ibid., 156.

¹⁰³ Ty Solomon, “Social Logics and Normalisation in the War on Terror,” *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 38 (2009): 269-294.

¹⁰⁴ Jessica Wolfendale, “Terrorism, Security and the Threat of Counterterrorism,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006): 753-770.

¹⁰⁵ Zulaika, “Drones, witches,” 57.

¹⁰⁶ Graham, “The Past in the Present,” 491; Githens-Mazer, “Islamic Radicalisation,” 555.

“become ‘prisms’, interpretative mechanisms”.¹⁰⁷ These identity prisms affect contemporary perceptions of threat and feelings of insecurity. Previous injustices are reproduced over generations. These become exacerbated by preventive counterterrorism practices based on exclusionary us/them boundary drawing.

This thesis inquiry aims to complement existing work through a new empirical and conceptual narrative formed along a securitization logic that is applied with a relational mechanism based analysis. Through this approach, the thesis will better explain how British counterterrorism emerged, was legitimized, and became normalized from 1968 to 2011 along particular discourses of identity construction. The next chapter will discuss issues of identity and security, securitization, relationalism, and research design to lay out the theoretical framework before the empirical analysis begins.

¹⁰⁷ Githens-Mazer, *Ibid.*, 557.

Chapter 3

Problematizing Identity: A relational interrogation of securitization theory

“The Caterpillar and Alice looked at each other for some time in silence: at last the Caterpillar took the hookah out of its mouth, and addressed her in a languid, sleepy voice.

“Who are *you*?” said the Caterpillar.

This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice replied, rather shyly, “I—I hardly know, Sir, just at present—at least I know who I *was* when I got up this morning, but I think I must have been changed several times since then.”

“What do you mean by that?” said the Caterpillar, sternly.

“Explain yourself!”

“I ca’n’t explain *myself*, I’m afraid, Sir,” said Alice, “because I’m not myself, you see.”

“I don’t see,” said the Caterpillar.

“I’m afraid I ca’n’t put it more clearly,” Alice replied, very politely, “for I ca’n’t understand it myself, to begin with; and being so many different sizes in a day is very confusing.”

“It isn’t,” said the Caterpillar.

“Well, perhaps you haven’t found it so yet,” said Alice; “but when you have to turn into a chrysalis...”¹

Alice has not been accused of being a terrorist by the Caterpillar or detained under Wonderland counterterrorism law. But this snapshot does provide one illustration of the tension surrounding the situatedness of “identity” between process and substance. As Alice struggles to claim one identity, the Caterpillar fails to understand anything but a simple singular response to whom one “is”. Responses to the questions “Who are

¹ Lewis Carroll, *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass* (New York: Barnes and Nobel Classics, 2004), 55 (*Adventures in Wonderland* first published 1865, *Through the Looking-Glass* first published 1871).

you?” or “Who are they?” are not finite, and can become durable or be renegotiated. The possibility for identity’s reconfiguration competes with the seized nature of self/other labels in discourse. How does a set of relations around identification come to be accepted as a bounded entity?² How does the “making [of] an entity” and establishment of “thingness” influence the securitization of terrorism over time?³ As highlighted in chapter one, securitization is based on issues of threats and referents. But the way that these identities are constructed to temporarily stabilize intersubjective understandings to influence outcomes has not been sufficiently theorized. Waever explains securitization as “a particular way of handling a particular issue, processing a threat through the security format”.⁴ He continues by stating “the security quality does not belong to the threat but to its management”.⁵ These explanations point to securitization’s processual nature and open the door for a relational sociological approach in order to better understand the consequential interrelation of identity and security in practice.

Despite moments of stability derived from labels of identity, processes of identification are always open to reinterpretation. This demands that we untangle the interrelation of the social and the material, not privilege one over the other. It is not controversial to endorse a theme of agents and structures as mutually constituted or open to change. But how that relationship is theoretically guided and empirically demonstrated is open to debate.⁶ Different theoretical positions embrace divergent assumptions of social relations, and certain logics are prioritized over others. Rational versus reflective debates,⁷ intertextual and postmodern perspectives,⁸ history and/in IR,⁹

² Mustafa Emirbayer, “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 2 (1997): 311.

³ Abbott, *Time Matters*, 271.

⁴ Ole Waever, “Politics, security, theory,” *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 472.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ cf. Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (2008): 259-294.

⁷ Friedrich Kratochwil, “Looking back from somewhere: reflections on what remains ‘critical’ in critical theory,” *Review of International Studies* 33 (2007): 25-45.

⁸ Michael C. Williams, “Identity and the Politics of Security,” *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 2 (1998): 204-225; James Der Derian and Michael Shapiro eds., *International/intertextual relations: postmodern readings of world politics* (Lexington: Lexington Books Maxwell Macmillan International, 1989).

⁹ Barry Buzan and Richard Little, “Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do About it,” *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 30 (2001): 19-39; John M. Hobson and

constructivist approaches challenging realist and liberal tones,¹⁰ and typologies of how we “conduct” inquiry,¹¹ have all provided for significant reflection in IR more generally. Sensibilities such as processual relationalism that challenge interest and identity as fixed variables open underexplored paths of inquiry. This approach views agents and structures as flexible and consequential, ebbing and flowing rather than representing fixed points. Through this approach, assumptions of objective atemporality or essence are subject to theoretical unpacking and empirical investigation.

Knowledge construction around identity establishes boundaries of collective understanding that delineate perceptions of reasonable versus unreasonable action. But these boundaries do not determine structure, agency, or outcomes. Labels such as “terrorist” are not indicative of a natural terrorist essence but are representations of collective meaning. Intersubjective understandings of identity are constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed through social and political practice. Securitization is one process by which such collective meaning making unfolds to influence outcomes. Interrogating threat/referent construction through empirical inquiry reveals the foundationless and causally consequential role of identity. This does imply that identity is hollow in meaning. Rather, it underscores how processes of identification are unavoidably connected to relations of power and interpretations of meaning. No framework can fully elucidate how tensions between process and substance are best navigated.

The choice of approach is indelibly linked to wagers of the researcher. Theory is “always *for* some one and *for* some purpose”, albeit in varying ways considering differences in how researchers interpret “purpose”.¹² Tracing identity construction is a

George Lawson, “What is History in International Relations?” *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 37 (2008): 415-435; Friedrich Kratochwil, “History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the ‘Second’ Great Debate and Assessing its Importance for Social Theory,” *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 5 (2006): 5-29.

¹⁰ Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism”; Friedrich Kratochwil, “Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of International Politics’ and the Constructivist Challenge,” *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 1 (2000): 73-101.

¹¹ Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry*.

¹² Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond IR Theory,” *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981): 128.

type of critical investigation. As explained by Jackson with reference to Shotter, by identifying “rhetorical commonplaces” we can analyze how stability in language over time consists of historically developed “topological resources”.¹³ A genealogical mapping of identity, securitization, and counterterrorism is based on the assumption that the way things turned out for a particular case is not the way they were destined to be: things could have been different. Distinct sets of rhetorical signposts guide different processes of identification.¹⁴ In line with Shotter, the ontological focus is on “conditions of possibility”, enabling us to ask, “Could it be otherwise?”¹⁵ Definitional overlaps between “citizen” and “democratic” ensure no definitive meaning. Particular configurations of commonplaces lead to some intersubjective understandings and outcomes to arise in prominence over others.

I. Positioning identity for the context of this thesis

This thesis explains how the specific ways that terrorism was securitized along particular threat/referent configurations was of causal consequence for the way that British counterterrorism emerged, was legitimized, and became normalized. Even though relational mechanisms can be observable in the sense of tracing how explicit articulations of identity connect different sites or actors, relational mechanisms are not representative of “really existing natural forces”, like gravity. In this sense they are interpretive tools for discourse analysis as much as they are representations of a particular transaction. One example is the mechanism of yoking, defined as:

when a social space is already filled with entities, when a division of a social space into entities is already established and institutionalized in some way...the only ways to radically change arrangements in a social space are to delegitimize old differences or to emphasize new ones. The former strategy yokes entities together, the latter divides them¹⁶

¹³ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 28; Shotter, *Cultural Politics*, 170-71.

¹⁴ Charlotte Epstein, “Who Speaks? Discourse, the Subject and the Study of Identity in International Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 2 (2011): 327-350.

¹⁵ Shotter, *Cultural Politics*, 35.

¹⁶ Abbott, “Things of Boundaries,” 871-872.

Mechanisms like yoking help the researcher make sense of the discourses under analysis by helping to identify how certain processes may come together in a distinctive way to influence the allocation of consequential boundary structures. Through yoking, we can see how issues and actors move from legitimate to illegitimate positions during securitization, such as the movement of communists and homosexuals during the McCarthy era, and Irish republicans and dissidents in the 21st century.¹⁷ Investigating shifts in boundary-marking and legitimacy allows us to better understand how identity is consequential for material outcomes. With identity “[w]e are not dealing with a false consciousness opposed to a true one—which would be waiting for us as a teleologically programmed destiny—but with the contingent construction of a consciousness tout court”, demanding inquiry that is contextually conscious and relationally-informed throughout analysis.¹⁸

The way that identities were deployed across official British discourse has enabled a normalization of exceptional counterterrorism in a relatively short period of time. Extraordinary security measures were passed on the heels of political violence and during times of relative historic calm. The terrorist threat transitioned from a risk to peace and order when counterterrorism laws were introduced in the early 1970s, to a dangerous criminal as these measures were renewed through the eighties. By the late 1990s terrorism was repositioned along “Irish”, “domestic”, and “international” threat labels. This presumed the existence of identifiable terrorist essences positioned along varying assumptions of danger and distance. Actions from particular groups, such as bombings by the PIRA and hijackings by the PLO, were referenced. But the successful construction of threat identities had to be established through processes of securitization *before* attacks took place. With counterterrorism essentially a preventive and preemptive security strategy, it was, and is, impossible for official discourse to rely upon material evidence of what threats “are” to securitize terrorism. In order for British counterterrorism to have emerged in the way that it did to eventually be normalized,

¹⁷ Mark Salter, “Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11 (2008): 324-325.

¹⁸ Ernesto Laclau, “Why Constructing a People Is the Main Task of Radical Politics,” *Critical Inquiry* 32 (2006): 651.

language had to transition from perceptions of possible risk to articulations of politically unarguable us/them oppositional identities.

At first glance labels such as Irish, domestic, and international seem to align with objective boundaries of identification. However, such boundaries are in fact problematic because meaning was tied to assumptions of inclusion and exclusion, not clear-cut political or geographic boundaries of belonging as “domestic” and “international” would seem to imply. Despite evidence of the “international” in terrorism and political violence throughout history, contemporary terrorism was securitized as “newly” international. From the mid-1980s “international terrorism” was asserted as from foreign others. Over time, this foreignness became synonymous with an Islamic other in opposition to a British referent. At the same time, terrorism associated with Northern Ireland was increasingly aligned with a language of “dissident”. This enabled different approaches to “Irish” versus “international” threats even if their methods were similar, and insecurity from the former continued.¹⁹ Exploring such trends depends upon analyses of securitization that do not “freeze the dynamic of identification itself”.²⁰ Processual relationalism is a useful way to untangle this causal dynamics of identity underlying securitization itself. This approach provides more comprehensive insight than a discourse analysis without the use of mechanisms.

During the Troubles the meaning of terrorism was dominated by reference to almost day-to-day realities of insecurity and violence. On the other hand, the meaning of “international terrorism” is derived largely from processes of securitization that constructed a threatening entity-other before violence take place or international terrorists “appear”. As explained in critical terrorism studies scholarship:

Terrorism is not a self-evident, exceptional category of political violence. Rather, it is a social construction – a linguistic term or label that is applied to certain acts through a range of specific political, legal and academic processes. This is not the same thing as saying terrorism is not real; there are real people causing real

¹⁹ On the recent violence in Northern Ireland, see John Horgan and John F. Morrison, “Here to Stay? The Rising Threat of Violent Dissident Republicanism in Northern Ireland,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 23, no. 4 (2011): 642-669.

²⁰ Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen,” 489.

harm and death to other real people. Instead, it is to say that the meaning of (and subsequent responses to) those real acts of violence is determined by a complex series of social and political practices that contribute to the labeling and categorization of events.²¹

Interrogating threat labels is not to say one thing “is” a terrorist and one thing “isn’t”. Rather, it is to investigate the causal consequences of difference discourses on terrorism for intersubjective understanding, securitization, and outcomes.

Identity labels and associated understandings influence what are considered legitimate laws and levels of state power. Destabilizing threat/referent constructions empirically helps reveal alternative readings of assumptions that have come to dominate many discourses and practices of counterterrorism. Structures of language and discourse do not determine agency, but acceptable action is constrained by rhetorical moves that frame issues in particular ways. This restraint does not remove accountability or responsibility, but refocuses attention on the causal interlinking of agency and structure at different moments over time. Durable structures of identity enable suspensions of liberty and can exacerbate social tension even if the collective aim is greater security. Analyzing how identities are stabilized to securitize terrorism in a particular way is essential to understanding how counterterrorism developed over time.

In the context of Northern Ireland, borders around Catholic suspect communities during internment led to repeated miscarriages of justice. Extraordinary powers of law enforcement included internment and the “five techniques” of interrogation: hooding, sleep deprivation, restricted diet, leaning against a wall for a long time with just their fingertips, and disorientating ‘white noise’.²² Internment was eventually withdrawn in February 1972 and replaced with detention. In January 1978 the ECourtHR declared these techniques inhuman degrading treatment, but not torture. Internment resulted in a surge of recruitment for the Provisional Irish Republican Army and was implemented

²¹ Jackson *et al.*, *Terrorism*, 3.

²² Adrian Guelke, “The Northern Ireland Peace Process and the War against Terrorism: Conflicting Conceptions?” *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 279.

despite officials being advised not to use such tactics.²³ The link between counterterrorism, suspect communities, and alienation has been present since the earliest uses of security measures based on a language of terrorism.²⁴ A relational inquiry into how terrorism is securitized helps us better understand how security practices continue to be legitimized and normalized despite repeated consequences that are counterproductive.

The thesis is a type of textual genealogy, investigating how identity influenced the formation, constitution, legitimation, and normalization of exceptional counterterrorism through developing a relational-securitization approach. This responds to the observation that:

There is no internal limitation in the Copenhagen agenda which would prevent an introduction of this question of the cultural specificity of the rhetorical structure. Delving deeper into the specific characteristics of the logic of security, e.g. by means of a genealogy of security practices or a comparative anthropology, would be a major contribution to security studies.²⁵

Securitization is thus an instructive conceptual guide for genealogical studies of identity, discourse, and security. The focus of speech acts and security “doing” complements critical studies on terrorism focused on the social construction of threat labels in areas of terrorism studies and practice. Publicly accessible official discourse including legal acts, parliamentary debates, official reports, official research papers, government websites, and official speeches, help illustrate how particular identities arise through securitization to influence counterterrorism outcomes in the case of Britain from 1968 to 2011. To advance securitization theory and understandings of how exceptional counterterrorism is normalized in practice, discourse analysis is engaged through a relational mechanism-based unpacking of identity. This approaches labels such as “international terrorism” as

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Mary J. Hickman, Lyn Thomas, Sara Silvestri, and Henri Nickels, “‘Suspect Communities’? Counterterrorism policy, the press, and the impact on Irish and Muslim communities in Britain.” Report of a research project: A comparative study of the representations of ‘suspect’ communities in multi-ethnic Britain and of their impact on Muslim and Irish communities 1974-2007,” ESRC, RES-062-23-1066 (2011) [cited 10 July 2011]; available from <http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/research-units/iset/projects/esrc-suspect-communities.cfm>.

²⁵ Huysmans, “Revisiting Copenhagen,” 501.

decipherable “only in terms of its ‘place’ in relation to the other concepts in its web”.²⁶ Through a mechanism –based approach, the thesis is an investigation of how identity and security are enmeshed in mutually constitutive, and causally consequential, dialogic relations.²⁷

Referent and threat are not accepted as finite physical veracities. Rather, they are identified through observed textual linkages that connect supporting characteristics through particular configurations. These configurations led to an acceptance of certain collective self/other meanings over others. Characteristics such as “Western” and “democratic” influence intersubjective understandings so that subsequent articulations, such as “British”, evoke a delimited notion of the self. The question is not whether something labeled “terrorism” is an objective threat, but how social processes that temporarily stabilize such a label build certain understandings of dangerous others and enable exceptional state power. By interrogating identity, the thesis speaks with literature in securitization, relationalism, and terrorism studies, examining:

more thoroughly and systematically the discourses and representational practices of terrorism, and the ontological-discursive foundations – the ideological, conceptual, and institutional underpinnings – which make both Terrorism Studies, and the practices of terrorism and counterterrorism, possible in the first place²⁸

This chapter is organized into four parts that lay out the thesis theoretical framework. The first presents conceptual issues related to identity and security. The second discusses the benefit from using securitization theory in studies on discourse and practice. The third argues for a relational mechanism-based analysis to investigate

²⁶ Emirbayer, “Manifesto,” 300.

²⁷ For some debates over mechanisms see Mark Irving Lichbach, “Modeling Mechanisms of Contention: MTT’s Positivist Constructivism, Symposium on McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s “Measuring Mechanisms of Contention”,” *Qualitative Sociology* 31 (2008): 345–354; Charles Tilly, “To Explain Political Processes,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 100, no. 6 (1995): 1594-1610; Charles Tilly, “Mechanisms in Political Processes,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 21-41.

²⁸ Richard Jackson, “Critical Terrorism Studies: An Explanation, a Defence and a Way Forward,” Paper prepared for the BISA Annual Conference (University of Leicester, United Kingdom, 14-16 December 2009), 17.

securitization through empirical application. The fourth builds upon the first three then by laying out the research design.

II. Identity and Security – Material and Social

The ultimate reason to study the concept of identity in IR is that “we” fight against and make peace with “others”...But for one reason or many – or, as we seem forced to relearn in every generation, for no reason at all – they come to be recognized as the “other”: the barbarian, infidel, heretic, savage, revolutionary, traitor; the racist, sexist, lunatic, alien cyborg. In turn, our collective identity – citizens, patriots, believers – becomes dependent upon these differences. These historic encounters of identity and difference have created fundamental physical, metaphysical and representational boundaries in and of IR.²⁹

Identity and boundaries are intimately tied to international relations in practice and in theory. The social construction of particular identities has significance for intersubjective understanding and material outcomes. Security practices are not isolated from broader social and political relations, and official discourses of identity contribute to collective meanings across public and private spheres. While identities are open to renegotiation, this does not mean they are devoid of substance. Boundaries distinguishing self/other identities establish walls of difference that enable illiberal practice by becoming “manifest in every instance of violence, every instance of control, every instance of practices targeted against a constructed other, the enemy within and without”.³⁰ The growing normalization of extraordinary counterterrorism has been described as a “politics of exception” and “permanent state of emergency”.³¹ This alludes to analyses of government as in the “business of selling protection”,³² and is connected to research on the politics of fear in governmentalities of risk management.³³ Securitizing actors essentialize identity to justify exceptional measures, representing an:

²⁹ James Der Derian, “Critical encounters in IR,” *International Social Science Journal* 191 (28 January 2009): 72.

³⁰ Jabri, “War,” 48.

³¹ Huysmans and Buonfino, “Politics of Exception”; Bigo and Tsoukala, eds., *Terror, Liberty, Insecurity*.

³² Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 175.

³³ Mythen and Walklate, “Terrorism, Risk and International Security.”

exceptionalism inside liberalism, a logic of exclusion resting upon the construction of profiles that frame who is ‘abnormal’, and upon the imperative of freedom transformed into a normalization of social groups whose behaviours are monitored for their present and their future³⁴

How do particular constructions of identity and associated relations of power make this “logic of exclusion” a dominant guide for policy-making? How do routines change or stabilize over time, and what consequences does this have for counterterrorism outcomes? The notion of boundaries as flexible and durable echoes observations that what is needed is “a way of conceptualizing those moments of fixity *and* transformation in a foundationless world”.³⁵ This thesis works to balance the fixity (substance) and transformation (process) of securitizing terrorism by teasing out the processual underpinnings of identity. Theory is a philosophically informed and practically useful tool for research practice and communication, but it is not a guide to universal truth. Theoretical approaches help us simplify, but not negate, the complexities of socio-political relations:

Theories are like mushrooms: they can be classified into three categories – ‘edible’, ‘poisonous’ and ‘indifferent’. The criteria for good or sound theory are evident enough: it should be conceptually clear and rigorous, historically aware, able to yield substantive analysis and research agenda, and, where appropriate, able to engage with ethical issues.³⁶

Theories are thus not naturally pre-existing guides to knowledge claim-making, but different lens with which to approach particular empirical and philosophical inquiries. In agreement with the above, and in conjunction with the view that “[t]he role of theory is to structure analysis,” this chapter presents securitization and relationalism as two complementary approaches with which to empirically investigate the interlinking of identity and security.³⁷

³⁴ Didier Bigo and Anastassia Tsoukala, “Understanding (in)security,” in *Terrorism, Liberty, and Insecurity*, 2.

³⁵ Jarvis, *Times of Terror*, 7.

³⁶ Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in IR: Power, Politics and Ideology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 21.

³⁷ Waeber, “Politics, security, theory”, 468.

Identity as a concept “is most simply explained as “collective answers to the question “Who are you?” “Who are we?” and “Who are they?” offered by participants in such claim making”.³⁸ As explained by Buzan, Waever, and Lemaitre, “At its most basic, [social] identity is what enables the word ‘we’ to be used.”³⁹ By positioning identity as a response to a question, its contingent and relational character is brought to the forefront of analysis by considering:

a substantial part of social reality consists of transactions among social units, that those transactions crystallize into ties, that they shape the social units involved, that they concatenate into variable structures. Identity will then become not an essential feature of an individual or a group but a characteristic and consequence of social interaction.⁴⁰

Identities as sources of knowledge are reasserted and reconstructed through continuous interaction. In the context of counterterrorism, national policies reinforce the state as a particular entity, while threats to national identity reinforce the need for these policies. It is co-constitutive cycle of identity and practice. Charles Tilly’s notion of a shared story usefully conceptualizes identity as “an experience” of shared transactions that continually renegotiate understanding.⁴¹ More specifically for IR, David Campbell’s work on the role of danger and identity in U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War,⁴² Lene Hansen’s analysis of discourse and identity informing foreign and security policy during the Bosnian war,⁴³ Patrick Jackson’s work on the creation of the West and post-war German reconstruction,⁴⁴ Iver Neumann’s work on the way constructions of eastern (in particular Russian and Turkish) others affect “Europeanness”,⁴⁵ Richard Jackson’s research on language constructing an “Islamic other” informing the U.S. war on terrorism,⁴⁶ Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney’s work on East/West othering and

³⁸ Charles Tilly, *Stories, Identity and Political Change* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2002), 6.

³⁹ Waever *et al.*, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda*, 17

⁴⁰ Tilly, *Stories*, 75.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Campbell, *Writing Security*.

⁴³ Hansen, *Security as Practice*.

⁴⁴ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*.

⁴⁵ Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

⁴⁶ Jackson, *Writing the War*.

entrenched constructions of difference normalize repression and oppression,⁴⁷ and Stuart Croft's investigation of the interrelation between securitized Islamic others (Radical and Orientalized) and Britishness,⁴⁸ are some highly instructive analyses into how issues of identity and practice interrelate.⁴⁹ The thesis aims to build upon this existing literature on consequential self/other construction by incorporating a new theoretical framing and empirical illustration that brings relational aspects of identity and practice to the forefront of analysis.

To help conceptualize boundary drawing, identity, and security, the experience of going through immigration at London Heathrow is a useful, if simple, example. By entering the "Non-EU/UK Citizen" line at immigration, I publicly confirm that I am officially "outside" EU and UK borders of belonging. In presenting my passport to the official, I reassert this inside/outside boundary marker by accepting their identity as the British Self, and myself as a foreign Other. If we saw each other again in the future, and I had since obtained British citizenship, the official would in all likelihood still categorize me as outside the bounds of Britishness. Transactions that assert particular identities at one time can inform how we order our relations in the future, regardless if changes in identity have occurred. Explained in detail through the work of Mark Salter, such bordering experiences shed light on some of the everyday interrelations of identity and security.⁵⁰

The "state" and state actors depend upon processes of boundary maintenance to maintain sovereignty and legitimize the use of force. Security policies are supported by both self/other perceptions of identity and evidence of material risk, with state purpose

⁴⁷ Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney, *International Relations and the Problems of Difference* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

⁴⁸ Stuart Croft, *Securitizing Islam: Identity and the Search for Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁴⁹ See also Bially Mattern, Janice, *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force* (New York: Routledge, 2005); Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Ringmar *Identity, Interest*.

⁵⁰ Mark B. Salter, *Rights of passage: the passport in international relations* (London: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2003); Mark B. Salter, "When the exception becomes the rule: borders, sovereignty, and citizenship," *Citizenship Studies* 12, no. 4 (2008): 365-380.

reinforced through national security policy and discourse.⁵¹ Power relations along identity lines are central to the rules of engagement. As explained by Judith Butler, “to understand identity as a practice, and as a signifying practice, is to understand culturally intelligible subjects as the resulting effects of a rule-bound discourse”.⁵² In this vein “there need not be a “doer behind the deed”: the “doer” is constructed “in and through the deed” itself.⁵³ From a similar perspective but in the context of the War on Terror, Richard Jackson links identity and practice by explaining how “the terms, assumptions, labels, categories and narratives used to describe and explain terrorism” have become “largely unquestioned”.⁵⁴ The linking up of particular phrases forms influential narratives and inscribes particular knowledges.⁵⁵ What methods can help us better clarify and communicate relational transactions to “reveal the temporal and contingent groundlessness of this “ground”” underlying identity?⁵⁶

Language does not have complete power over agency, postmodern approaches are not out of touch, and it is not that there is *no* ground. Rather, the argument is that the *representations* of that ground are encapsulated by identity labels that are in essence always open to change. This requires research to “understand how current forms of knowledge have been naturalized through time and discursive practice”.⁵⁷ This is a “form of critical theorizing”, viewing:

an understanding of language as constitutive or productive of meaning; an understanding of discourse as structures of signification that construct social realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational positions within a system of signification; an understanding of discourse as being productive of subjects authorized to speak and act, legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices and importantly, common sense within particular social groups and historical settings; an understanding of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of

⁵¹ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel H. Nexon, “Relations Before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (1999): 291-332.

⁵² Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, 2nd. Ed (New York: Routledge, 1999), 184.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 181.

⁵⁴ Jackson, “Constructing Enemies,” 394.

⁵⁵ Janice Bially Mattern, “The Power Politics of Identity,” *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 3 (2001): 364.

⁵⁶ Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 179.

⁵⁷ Jackson, “Constructing Enemies,” 398.

representation; and an understanding of discourse as historically and culturally contingent, intertextual, open-ended, requiring continuous articulation and re-articulation and therefore, open to destabilization and counter-hegemonic struggle⁵⁸

In reflecting on the critical theorizing above, discourse is thus not just a descriptive component of socio-political relations, but a constitutive and consequential part of decision-making. Discourse is not deterministic, but the establishment of common practices and perceptions of legitimacy around who speaks and what is said can lead to embedded structures with significant impact on understanding and outcome. Certain rhetorical packages of identity enable, limit, and constitute counterterrorism to enable certain outcomes over others. In this way, discourse is of causal impact. Linguistic practices are not teleologically driven forces of nature, but they do establish temporarily stabilized structures. These structures in turn guide collective understanding and rule-making. Language and discourse cannot be isolated from the historical contexts within which relational practices take place. Nor does language establish structures dissolving individual or collective capacities for agency.

Discourses of identity exhibit intersubjective power by shaping the spaces within which agency is engaged. This is not due to independent properties of grammar. Rather, to how rhetorical structures form intersubjective understandings that establish certain rules that in turn limit conditions of possible agency. Processual-relational accounts acknowledge the role of interpretation for outcomes of legitimation struggles and endorse a view of causality that does not depend upon “unanswerable questions about actors’ true motives”.⁵⁹ Causality is an indication of how certain practices can contribute to the constitution of evolving collective meaning and material outcomes in an observed way for a particular case: “causality” does not imply a universal law that can be applied across multiple cases. Through relational mechanisms, analyses of securitization hone in

⁵⁸ Ibid., 395-396, with reference to Jennifer Milliken (“The Study of Discourse in IR: A Critique of Research and Methods,” *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 2 (1999): 225-254) and Roxanne Doty (“Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (1993): 297-320).

⁵⁹ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Ronald Krebs, “Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 1 (2007): 36.

on complex practices of social construction without ignoring the role of substance.⁶⁰ More specifically, securitization theory enables analysis to both investigate the processual side of identity construction and boundaries while incorporating how the very constitution of these us/them identifiers is of causal significance for subsequent material practice and collective meaning.

III. Securitization as a gateway

Securitization provides a view of security as being and doing, and is thus representative of a product and a process. Speech acts *securitizing* an issue enable action beyond normal politics “[i]f by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by”.⁶¹ Securitization theory supports empirical analyses into the social and material in that “security is neither objective (threats in themselves) nor subjective (a matter of perceptions), but intersubjective and political”.⁶² CS approaches go beyond traditional “strategic studies” but do not ignore the importance of military developments or state level practice. It is explained that “the exact *definition* and *criteria* of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects”.⁶³ More specifically, “to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed?”⁶⁴

⁶⁰ On the debates over “relativism” see David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith (“We’re All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32 (2009): 292–302) and Tarak Barkawi, Adam Roberts, and Richard Jackson (“Responses,” *International Affairs* 83, no. 1 (2007): 165–186).

⁶¹ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, 25.

⁶² Carsten Bagge Laustsen and Ole Waever, “In Defence of Religion: Sacred Referent Objects for Securitization,” *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 3 (2000): 708.

⁶³ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, 25.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

However, it is not just the “when” that is important, but *how* particular labels gain an observable intersubjective salience over material outcomes. Securitization is based along an analytic apparatus including the referent object as what is in need of protection, existential threat as what is risking the referent’s survival, and three facilitating conditions that contribute to successful securitizations. These conditions are defined as:

- (1) The demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security,
- (2) The social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor—that is, the relationship between speaker and audience and thereby the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt, and
- (3) Features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitization.⁶⁵

They are here interpreted as related to, but distinct from, John L. Austin’s speech act theory based in grammatical issues known as “felicity conditions”. Speech acts are elaborated in one way as follows:

In security discourse, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus, by labeling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. For the analyst to grasp this act, the task is not to assess some objective threats that “really” endanger some object to be defended or secured; rather, it is to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utterance itself that is the act. By saying the words something is done (like betting, giving a promise, naming a ship).⁶⁶

Thus in the context of counterterrorism and securitization, for this relational analysis into the power of language and discourse for material and ideational outcomes it is not essential to first clarify what terrorism “is” or “who” terrorists may be. Explicit articulations of “terror” have distinctive influences over outcomes depending on how those articulations are positioned and how terms have evolved in collective meaning.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 33.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 26, with reference to Ole Waever (“Security, the Speech Act,” Unpublished manuscript (1988)) and J. L. Austin (*How To Do Things With Words*, 2nd Ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 98ff).

But the causal “something is done” is not from formal properties of language. Language by itself does not “do”, and there is more to the constitutive consequence of discourse than grammatical rules. The causal influence of discourse for securitization depends upon relationality, contingency, and context.⁶⁷ Though the thesis does not systematically engage with Bourdieu,⁶⁸ his discussion of Austin below is a useful interpretation:

to gauge the magnitude of the error in Austin’s and all other strictly formalist analyses of symbolic systems, it suffices to show that the language of authority is only the limiting case of the legitimate language, whose authority does not reside, as the racism of social class would have it, in the set of prosodic and articulatory variations which define distinguished pronunciation, or in the complexity of the syntax or the richness of the vocabulary, in other words in the intrinsic properties of discourse itself, but rather in the social conditions of production and reproduction of the distribution between the classes of the knowledge and recognition of the legitimate language⁶⁹

This distinction on causality as outside the walls of strict grammatical structure helpfully reprioritizes the historical, social, and political conditions related to how language influences understanding and outcome. In this thesis words do not matter in and of themselves, but in terms of how they have come to represent certain perceptions of legitimate and illegitimate identities and actions. Facilitating conditions thus are not seen as determining outcomes in a type of deductive or sequential means of evaluating some set of relations and outcomes. But they do provide a way to focus research by helping to logically identify empirical sources and structure the methods of discourse analysis in a transparent way.

With respect to identity, securitization research has carved out specific space for further research by noting “the character of the referent object makes a difference”.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Thierry Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context,” *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 2 (2005): 171-201.

⁶⁸ Bourdieu’s notions of *field* and *habitus* have been noted by Stroschein (13 December 2012) as a possible entryway into the role of boundaries. Future work in this area may be useful in terms of theorizing how structure and agency interconnect with respect to social entities.

⁶⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 113.

⁷⁰ Ole Waever, “Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies,” *Journal of International Affairs* 48, no. 2 (1995): 403-404; Laustsen and Waever, “In defence of religion,” 706.

One way securitization has been developed around issues of identity is through ideal-typical sectors of analysis.⁷¹ Disaggregated social and political relations are identified across distinguished sectors (and their referents) before reassembling components into a comprehensive analysis. Recent work on functional differentiation has usefully refined this sectoral approach without negating relational dynamics.⁷² For identity, the mutual constitution of different referents across sectors enables certain constructions of identity to achieve institutional durability over others. For example, a British “way of life” referent in the societal sector justifies legal measures in the political referent that are justified in the name of preserving this “way”. The formation and enactment of these laws reinforce the British state (political sector referent) through institutions that reassert authority and sovereignty. These institutions then cycle back to the societal sector referent by reasserting “democracy” and “the rule of law”. A societal “we” is interwoven with the political state. Societal and political sector boundaries are not necessarily “coterminous”, but their referents can still be mutually constituted and causally consequential for outcomes.⁷³

Most scholarship does not disagree with securitization but works to expand its potential in different ways. As stated by Stefano Guzzini, “securitization does a lot: it is a conceptual move, a framework of analysis, an empirical theory and a political theory of security. A lifetime job!”⁷⁴ Similar to work on sectors, there has been a range of work to develop the theory further. For example, by expanding on “facilitating conditions”,⁷⁵ examining where securitization has failed,⁷⁶ paying more attention to visuality,⁷⁷ or

⁷¹ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*.

⁷² Mathias Albert and Barry Buzan, “Securitization, sectors and functional differentiation,” *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 413-425.

⁷³ Waever *et. al.*, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda*, 24.

⁷⁴ Stefano Guzzini, “Securitization as a causal mechanism,” *Security Dialogue* 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 332.

⁷⁵ Mark Salter, “Securitization and desecuritization: a dramaturgical analysis of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 11 (2008): 323.

⁷⁶ Mark Salter, “When securitization fails: the hard case of counter-terrorism programs,” in *Securitization Theory*, ed. Balzacq.

⁷⁷ Lene Hansen, “Theorizing the image for Security Studies: Visual securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon Crisis,” *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 1 (2011): 51-74; Michael C. Williams, “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics,” *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (2003): 511-531.

incorporating feminist scholarship.⁷⁸ Bringing a relational-sociological methodology contributes to these efforts by developing securitization's processual dynamics related to political sociology. Counterterrorism studies benefit from securitization through the theory's attention to issues of social construction *and* materiality surrounding identity and security. At the same time, terrorism studies bring new empirical questions to securitization by investigating how "securitization reflects the complex constitution of social and political communities" in the context of counterterrorism.⁷⁹ Though securitization theory is based on threats and referents, research on *how* these threats and referents become temporarily stabilized notions of identity is under-investigated. A view of discourse and materiality as "shaping each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic" underlines the relational aspect of securitization, and points to space for genealogical studies of identity and security practice.⁸⁰

Acknowledging the processual nature of identity underlying securitization connects to broader sociological concerns of "whether to conceive of the social world as consisting primarily in substances or in processes, in static "things" or in dynamic, unfolding relations".⁸¹ However, there is no reason to have to decide "whether"/"or". Pairing securitization with relational sociology encourages a beneficial focus on how substance and process work together. For empirical investigations of securitization, processual-relational accounts help us to more comprehensively interrogate the interrelation of boundaries, identity, and security.⁸² Articulations of referent and threat identities result from social and political practice, but entail material consequences. A relational methodology based along mechanisms of analysis brings research design specification and methodological clarity to securitization. Applying this approach to the historical development of British counterterrorism contributes a new narrative for broader IR concerns, terrorism studies, and relational scholarship.

⁷⁸ Lene Hansen, "The little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma," *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2000): 285-306.

⁷⁹ Salter, "Securitization and desecuritization," 324.

⁸⁰ Jackson *et al.*, eds., *Critical Terrorism Studies*, 223 (with reference to Harmonie Toros and Jeroen Gunning, "Exploring a Critical Theory Approach to Terrorism Studies," in *Critical Terrorism Studies*, Jackson *et al.*, ed.).

⁸¹ Emirbayer, "Manifesto," 281.

⁸² Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Yosef Lapid, *Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking IR Theory* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2001), 3.

IV. Enter relationalism

Securitization's attention to speech acts and intersubjective understanding encourages critical inquiries of the security-identity nexus. To best capture this interweaving demands empirical interrogations of threat/referent construction in practice. In line with Guzzini, this thesis aims to develop securitization not just as a conceptual move or theoretical framework, but also as an "empirical theory" connected to a "social ontology of discourses and practices".⁸³ The "post-structural realist" perspective of securitization encourages the use of a relational approach.⁸⁴ Securitization is inherently relational, but work has not sufficiently engaged with relational scholarship in IR and sociology. Recent work has engaged more with aspects of securitization and methodology,⁸⁵ but space remains for further explorations into securitization research design. The use of relational mechanisms and a processual approach of this thesis aims to provide one such exploration.

Relationalism has been explained as treating "social interaction, social ties, communication, and conversation not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, or culture but as active sites of creation and change".⁸⁶ This compliments critical terrorism studies research and poststructuralism more generally by approaching notions of identity with a certain analytic scrutiny. Particular identities arise from transactional negotiations within and amongst social relations, even if resulting patterns appear to confirm identities as "objective truths". Individuals are not "neatly bounded" or "self-propelling" but are constantly "renegotiating who they are, adjusting the boundaries they occupy, modifying their actions in rapid response to other people's reactions, selecting among and altering available scripts": structures of identity and

⁸³ Guzzini, "Securitization as a causal mechanism", 332.

⁸⁴ Rita Taureck, "Securitisation Theory- The Story So Far (Part one): Theoretical inheritance and what it means to be a post-structural realist," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California (22 March 2006) [cited 15 June 2009]; available from www.allacademic.com.

⁸⁵ Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory*.

⁸⁶ McAdam *et al.*, *Dynamics of Contention*, 22.

actors' agency are mutually reinforcing components of relational transactions that are never "arrested" in time.⁸⁷

Entities are "embedded in process and relation, so that there is no internal 'core' which was separate from social process".⁸⁸ Individuals are "inseparable from the transactional contexts within which they are embedded".⁸⁹ Relational research does not aim to find universal laws, but to understand how observed social and political practices lead to stabilities of identity and influence outcomes. Relational mechanisms target actor-level transactions without ignoring broader boundary shifts of identity, providing for a more comprehensive analysis.⁹⁰

A relational sensibility tailors research narratives that analyze and communicate how specific factors come together in a case with particular outcomes, with language and discourse playing a central role in establishing structures of meaning. At the same time, these understandings and structures are always open to (re)interpretation. Discourse is both structured (relatively fixed and consequential) and post-structural (relatively fluid and open to reconstruction).⁹¹ A relational perspective of securitization necessarily navigates both of these spectrums. By investigating the webs of relations underlying explicitly identified threat/referent identities, relational approaches identify repeated rhetorical practices over time. These patterns have been referred to in a variety of ways, one of which is as *repertoires*:

[actors] do not simply invent an efficient new action or express whatever impulses they feel, but rework known routines in response to current circumstances...Performances within repertoires do not usually follow precise scripts to the letter; they resemble conversation in conforming to implicit

⁸⁷ Ibid., 131.

⁸⁸ Jackson and Nexon, "Relations Before States," 298.

⁸⁹ Emirbayer, "Manifesto," 287.

⁹⁰ An attention to different levels of relational interaction has been instructively examined by Sherrill Stroschein in the context of ethnic mobilization. She investigated "specific patterns of interaction between elites and masses" to enable a more comprehensive analysis of broader patterns between leaders and publics than instrumentalist or structuralist accounts on their own ("Microdynamics of Bilateral Ethnic Mobilization," *Ethnopolitics* 10, no. 1 (2011): 2).

⁹¹ Waever, "Identity, communities and foreign policy," in *European integration and national identity*.

interaction rules, but engaging incessant improvisation on the part of all participants⁹²

Thus known routines and structures of identity have significance for subsequent action, but this significance does not strip an individual of their capacity to act as agents as “improvisation” and choice is never made obsolete. This tension between language as establishing durable structures and language as open to reinterpretation is of key significance for studies of securitization and how practices change or stay the same over time.

While patterns may encourage a (mis)perception of certain identities as representing “universal truth”, they are in fact open to reconfiguration through changing contexts and interpretations. Relational narratives help explain how sets of commonplaces come to represent specific entities. For example, how the “stateness” of a state is produced through a particular web of relational processes.⁹³ Process in this sense is “a causally or functionally linked set of occurrences or events which produce a ‘change in the complexion of reality’”.⁹⁴ A configuration is an aggregation of processes, to be “studied as systems of meaning, using hermeneutical or ‘interpretivist’ techniques”.⁹⁵ For this thesis, the “techniques” are based in relational mechanisms of analysis. This connection between meaning-making, stabilized threat/referent forms, and counterterrorism practice harmonizes relational approaches with studies on securitization.

V. Research design

A relational-securitization framework is a genealogical discourse analysis tracing the way threat/referent identities are constructed across official British discourse. Specifically, how such processes influenced the emergence, legitimation, and

⁹² McAdam *et al.*, *Dynamics of Contention*, 138.

⁹³ Jackson and Nexon, “Relations Before States,” 316.

⁹⁴ Jackson and Nexon, *Ibid.*, 302; Tilly, *Stories*, xii.

⁹⁵ Jackson and Nexon, *Ibid.*, 305-306.

normalization of counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. Genealogical indicates an attention to temporality, power and social construction. This complements genealogical analysis by viewing social actors as always “embedded in space and time”.⁹⁶ Such a perspective asks how things today have evolved to become accepted in the particular way that they have. Building on research by Milliken and Hansen in areas of discourse analysis, a relational-securitization approach enables an attentive focus on one particular case without ignoring broader debates.⁹⁷ By using relational mechanisms to harness and interpret how commonplaces come together in particular ways, we can better understand and explain the causally and co-constitutive relationship of identity and security.

Each empirical chapter is organized into two sections. A first section provides historical context by outlining key events and policy developments. A second section then provides the detailed relational analysis of official discourse, counterterrorism, and identity. The overarching investigation of how terrorism is securitized, and assumptions of securitization theory, is what anchors the thesis. But relational mechanisms are what provide the dominant tools of analysis across each empirical chapter. This analysis is implemented along some general guidelines. One is to follow Jackson’s assessment that explaining outcomes involves “the analytical delineation of a set of causal mechanisms deemed likely to matter in particular cases, and the careful empirical tracing of that case or cases to illustrate the particular way in which these mechanisms came together”.⁹⁸ Another is to use securitization’s facilitating conditions as an aid to empirical source identification. Facilitating conditions are not binding but help to logically identify primary sources from the expansive selection of possible material. For this thesis they are interpreted as follows:

Condition 1, “grammar of security” = the counterterrorism genre of texts (legal acts, parliamentary debates, reviews/reports, and other official discourse explicitly drawing on a language of “terror”);

⁹⁶ Emirbayer, “Manifesto,” 307.

⁹⁷ Milliken, “The Study of Discourse”; Hansen, *Security as Practice*.

⁹⁸ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 43.

Condition 2, “authority of securitizing actor” = discourses written/spoken by official British political actors, audience and “reach” strengthened by a focus on publicly accessible discourse;

Condition 3, “features of the threat to bolster or hinder securitization” = consistent and explicit attention to temporal contexts, contingency, history.

Complimenting the above is Hansen’s advice that texts should be chosen if “they are characterized by the clear articulation of identities and policies; they are widely read and attended to; and they have the formal authority to define a political position”.⁹⁹ For this thesis, these guidelines translate into discourses that are selected from searches for explicit “terrorism-related” language, are public official discourses whose audience is those making decisions on counterterrorism who must report these decisions to their constituents, and are elite-authored in the sense that they are official sources of knowledge that constitute identity. This final point refers to legal acts that put terms of terrorism on the books and in so doing simultaneously reassert British sovereignty and identity through the rule of law. The selection of texts relate to (a), legal acts with explicit articulations of “terror” in their policy substance; (b), searches in Hansard for terror, terrorist, and terrorism more generally as well as specific texts identified in background reading (i.e. “Prevention of Terrorism Act”) to include broader discourses on terrorism; and (c), supplementary discourses dependent upon terms of terror that influence intersubjective understanding and counterterrorism (i.e. official reports or speeches on the operation of a particular measure).

An explanation of the mechanisms incorporated into the analysis as “interpretive devices” is essential to explain the research design and relational approach. From existing literature, four specific mechanisms stood out as holding particular potential for this thesis tracing threat/referent construction in the securitization of terrorism and development of counterterrorism. Their definitions and some examples are as follows:

Framing

⁹⁹ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 85.

“a collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social construction” going “well beyond how a movement’s goals are strategically formed to a much broader set of interpretive processes” that “result in attribution of new threats and opportunities by one or more parties”¹⁰⁰

Example: The way immigration is politicized along framings of a “Mexican wave of illegals” into the U.S. reasserts particular identity boundaries to support particular policy goals even as immigration from Mexico has decreased.

Brokerage

“the linking of two or more currently unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with each other and/or with yet another site ...Brokerage creates new boundaries and connections among political actors”¹⁰¹

*Example: A U.S. Tea Party candidate and a green party candidate both frame Mexican immigration in their respective political discourse as “waves of illegals” to establish a new network tie. In this sense brokerage can take place in terms of a new tie that connects specific discursive sites as well as individual actors.*¹⁰²

Yoking¹⁰³

“when a social space is already filled with entities, when a division of a social space into entities is already established and institutionalized in some way...the only ways to radically change arrangements in a social space are to delegitimize old differences or to emphasize new ones. The former strategy yokes entities together, the latter divides them”¹⁰⁴

Example: Through the election of a Mexican-American immigrant to political boundaries of “acceptable” immigrants sharing a boundary with the self while reasserting illegal immigrants as criminal aliens.

¹⁰⁰ McAdam *et al.*, *Dynamics of Contention*, 41, 48.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 142-143; Stacie E. Goddard, “Brokering change: networks and entrepreneurs in international politics,” *International Theory* 1, no. 2 (2009): 249–281.

¹⁰² The dominant perspective on “brokerage” as a relational mechanism is that it entails a human or physical dimension. For example, an academic that acts as an actual broker between two opposition parties to establish a new coalition, a useful example from Sherrill Stroschein. However for this thesis brokerage is seen not only as a relational tie connecting two physical persons but a relational tie connecting previously unconnected discursive or textual “sites”. In this case sites range from specific legal texts to parliamentary debate discourse.

¹⁰³ See Nexon (*The Struggle for Power*, 48) for an analytical use of yoking in a relational historical institutionalist approach to larger scale international continuity and change.

¹⁰⁴ Abbott, “Things of Boundaries,” 871-872.

Rhetorical Coercion

“While claimants may deploy arguments in the hope that they will eventually persuade, their more immediate task is, through skillful framing, to leave their opponents without access to the rhetorical materials needed to craft a socially sustainable rebuttal. Rhetorical coercion occurs when this strategy proves successful: when the claimant’s opponents have been talked into a corner, compelled to endorse a stance they would otherwise reject.”¹⁰⁵

Example: By combining framings of Mexican immigration as a threat to national security and to national identity, official U.S. discourse can rhetorically coerce actors into accepting illiberal policies toward border control even if the actors “believe in” or would prefer a different approach.

These relational mechanisms aid the identification, analysis, and communication of how threat/referent forms are constructed through securitization to influence counterterrorism. They are ideal-types to structure and communicate discourse analysis in a particular way. Do embedded or historical rhetorical maneuvers provide stability during decision-making? Do discourses break from earlier configurations to reconstruct threat/referent entities in the face of shifting events and power structures? Is agency able to dissolve certain identities despite structural barriers, thereby opening alternative conditions of possible action? Or is agency restricted by durable structures of us/them understandings? Agents are not dissolved of their capacity to make a choice, however, structures of us/them identity that position a threat in contradistinction to a referent in need of protection do pose political and conceptual obstacles to how agency can be engaged.

A brief illustration of each mechanism in the context of British counterterrorism helps further explain the utility of a relational approach to securitization. To begin, a simple instance of framing as observed across some official discourses is cited here:

The aim of the UK Government’s counterterrorism strategy is to reduce the risk we face from international terrorism so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence...

¹⁰⁵ Jackson and Krebs, “Twisting Tongues,” 36.

Keeping the UK and its people safe is the Government's first priority.¹⁰⁶

This language frames the existential threat as from “international terrorism”, not “terrorism” generally. This externalizes the other in opposition to the “UK and its people,” not “British”. Framing holds a significant causal influence by establishing the intersubjective boundaries within which an audience interprets threat/referent entities. Different arrangements of different commonplaces have varied consequences for outcomes. These configurations contribute to the contextual situatedness of threat/referent construction during securitization. Brokerage helps us better understand the salience of particular framings by highlighting the connection of previously unconnected sites and/or actors through new linkages.

A dominant perspective on “brokerage” as a relational mechanism in existing literature is that it entails a distinctive physical or human dimension. For example, as explained by Sherrill Stroschein, how a specific academic (actor) can be the broker between two opposition parties (actors) to establish a new political coalition. Though not in disagreement with this position depending on the context under inquiry, brokerage in this thesis departs from being a mechanism that encompasses a strictly physical dimension. Brokerage is an observed relational transaction, but this observation need not be associated solely with physical actors or humans as “the brokers”. Rather, two discursive sites can be “brokered” through a specific framing that is shared across space and time, with the framing itself becoming a type of intertextual broker. As divergent sites and actors are brokered through specific threat/referent framings, certain intersubjective understandings arise over others to influence how terrorism is securitized and how outcomes unfold.

An example is how “murder” was used during the early years of the Troubles to broker agreement on the criminality of terrorist violence across party lines:

1971, Reginald Maudling (Con): “The battle against murder and terrorism has to be pursued in the interests of all parties.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶ CONTEST 2, Public Leaflet, UK Home Office (2007).

1972, Frederick Elwyn Jones (Lab): “That such men and women exist and that they have reaped and are reaping a grim harvest of murder and violence in Northern Ireland are basic facts which must be faced and dealt with.”¹⁰⁸

1972, Ian Paisley (DUP): “the escalation of murders of a most brutal and dastardly nature”¹⁰⁹

1974, Merlyn Rees (Lab, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland): “crimes of murder and extreme bestiality”¹¹⁰

1974, Gerry Fitt (SDLP): “murderers who have been involved in the most heinous crimes...brutal, callous assassinations and murders”¹¹¹

In the case above, the criminalization of terrorism would not necessarily have developed as it did to enable a maintenance of exceptional counterterrorism law without similar framings of “murder” being brokered through the discourses of differentiated political elites.

Yoking represents the reallocation of broader legitimate and illegitimate boundaries. This mechanism helps us identify how categories are formed through new sites of difference. For example, how the yoking of previous terrorist others in Northern Ireland to legitimate politics in the late 1990s established new boundaries of difference between former, current, and new types of terrorism. Yoking was also observed in 21st century reconstructions of identity by further differentiate Irish threats from international threats:

Terrorism is not new to the UK. There is a continuing domestic threat from dissident Irish republican groups. But the most serious threat we face is from international terrorism...Al Qa’ida and similar groups are the main international

¹⁰⁷ Northern Ireland (Compton Committee’s Report), 16 November 1971, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 826, col. 221.

¹⁰⁸ Northern Ireland (Detention of Terrorists), 11 December 1972, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 848, col. 54.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, col. 71.

¹¹⁰ Northern Ireland, 4 April 1974, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 871, col. 1475.

¹¹¹ Northern Ireland (Emergency Powers), 5 December 1974, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 882, col. 2094.

terrorist threat to the UK...motivated by a violent extremist ideology, which wrongly uses religion to justify violence.¹¹²

By deploying framings of dissident Irish republicanism instead of “Irish terrorism”, boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate actors were allocated. This enabled a less hardline approach to Northern Ireland and increasingly exceptional approach to international terrorism even as Irish-related insecurities were on the rise. While multiple threat labels coexist and overlap, each terrorist “other” is established along different perceptions of risk. By yoking Irish related threats to “dissident” and reframing the international threat as “motivated by a violent extremist ideology”, former Irish terrorists were aligned with boundaries closer to the self. The new threat of “international” terrorism was externalized, positioned as more dangerous and further from the referent.

Rhetorical coercion is in many ways the most useful mechanism to help explain how exceptional British counterterrorism became normalized. This mechanism captures how political agency and sustainable political argumentation can be constrained “even when one’s opponents have not internalized the promoted values”.¹¹³ One example of rhetorical coercion is through the deployment of “real” as a commonplace during 2005 debate:

2005, Charles Clarke (Lab, Home Secretary): It is that vigilance against a real and substantial terrorist threat that is my responsibility to carry through, and I will.¹¹⁴

2005, Hazel Blears (Lab, Home Office Minister): During the recent debates on the new legislation the majority of the House of Commons recognised the threat is real and serious and different in character.¹¹⁵

2005, Michael Howard (Con): We all agree that terrorism is a real and current threat, and that special powers are needed to deal with it.¹¹⁶

¹¹² CONTEST 2, Public Leaflet.

¹¹³ Jackson and Krebs, “Twisting Tongues,” 36.

¹¹⁴ Prevention of Terrorism, 22 February 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 431, col. 162.

¹¹⁵ Hazel Blears, “The Tools to Combat Terrorism” (Speech by Hazel Blears, Home Office Minister, to the Royal United Services Institute, February 2005) [cited 16 January 2011]; available from <http://tna.europarchive.org/20061101012820/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speeches-archive/sp-tools-combat-terrorism-0205>.

2005, Lord Carlile (LD): There is a real and present threat of continuing al-Qaeda-connected terrorism within the United Kingdom.¹¹⁷

Who can politically sustain a rebuttal to arguments for continuing exceptional counterterrorism law with so many accepting the threat as so “obviously real”? Without repeated usages of “real”, a vague and yet politically unarguable reference point, proposed measures would face greater scrutiny and would not necessarily have resulted in new legal powers. Rhetorical coercion helps analysis identify the way certain structures of identity and intersubjective understanding limit spaces for agency. While not explicitly referred to as “rhetorical coercion”, reference to a similar effect is observed by Donohue, albeit discussed in a different terminology: “Couched in terms of patriotism, failure to back the government becomes seen as support for terrorist entities – a dynamic notable in successive debates in the United Kingdom on the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act.”¹¹⁸ Rhetorical coercion causally influences outcomes by delimiting, not determining, spaces of political action.

These relational mechanisms help analysis map out how patterns in discourse and securitization influence intersubjective understanding and material outcomes. Framing highlights how a threat is rhetorically described and contextually positioned; brokerage represents how previously unconnected actors or sites become newly connected through similar framings; yoking redraws broader boundaries separating legitimate and illegitimate categories of actors; and rhetorical coercion captures the way particular configurations constrain and limit agency to make alternative measures politically unsustainable.

Following this explanation of relational mechanisms for this thesis, it is helpful to present how analysis will be “done” to map out how processes of threat/referent

¹¹⁶ Prime Minister (Engagements), 23 Feb 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 431, col. 300 (part no. 41).

¹¹⁷ Terrorism Bill, 21 November 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, vol. 675, col.1434 (part no. 64).

¹¹⁸ Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism*, 13.

construction. This discourse analysis is an inductive rather than deductive or hypothesis testing approach, with the steps that help to structure analysis, loosely, as follows:

- 1.) After establishing the temporal beginning and end for the case and chapters, build background knowledge of the case through secondary literature. Establish a chronological matrix of key events.
- 2.) Identify official discourses (laws, policy strategies, reports, reviews, and debates) linked to counterterrorism during the period under analysis as determined by step 1. Further narrow this selection through the frequency of explicit articulations such as “terror”, “terrorist”, and “terrorism”.
- 3.) Engage in an interpretive and historical analysis of the discourses. Prioritize substantive shifts in material power and discursive shifts in observed identity markers. Trace observed relational configurations of commonplaces around threat/referent construction.
- 4.) Use steps 1-3 alongside searches of explicit articulations in Hansard¹¹⁹ to identify parliamentary debates related to counterterrorism law and broader discourses on terrorism for sources of legitimation struggle.
- 5.) Re-read notes taken during steps 1 through 4, paying attention to how commonplaces are positioned across discourses considering mechanisms of framing, brokerage, yoking, and rhetorical coercion. Identify relational configurations and causal patterns.
- 6.) Structure the analytic narrative in each chapter along two interrelated layers: (1) historical summary and positioning of events and counterterrorism, and (2), relational discussion of identity and securitization underlying shifts or stabilizations of threat/referent forms across discourse.

These steps are an effort to present a more transparent methodological design. The above is not a rigid template, but enables back and forth movement between and out of step(s) during analysis. Each step involves the researcher prioritizing what material is used and how analysis is done. The way a researcher *researches* is a consequence of decision, not inevitability: “our very *experience* of the world is inescapably mediated by the conceptual and linguistic apparatus that we bring to bear when producing knowledge *of the world*”.¹²⁰ A more detailed discussion of methodological decision-making would

¹¹⁹ Hansard is the online database of UK Parliamentary debates.

¹²⁰ Jackson, “Foregrounding ontology,” 130.

add further clarification. But presenting these guidelines helps provide at minimum a more explicit ownership considering the role of the researcher and interpretation influencing the formation of an analytic narrative.

This presentation of the relational-securitization research design is best followed by way of illustration: a simple exploration of “the stranger” from childhood experience. As outlined below, this example will help make clear the way that narrative process can establish particular threat identities and justify exceptional measures to influence conditions of possibility, agency and outcomes.

VI. Concluding by way of the stranger

As a child, the stranger was constructed as a specific threat posing a direct risk to my survival. My understanding and acceptance of this stranger identity depended upon rhetorical constructions deployed by people in authority that I trusted to know what they were talking about: Mom, dad, teacher, police. They all constructed the stranger as a risk to my security, each of them using similar language to *frame* the threat, *brokered* by shared “repertoires of stranger construction” that reasserted particular boundaries around this specific threatening other. Similar to the construction of the terrorist other, threat construction of the stranger had taken place before the threat would necessarily come into real physical “existence”. Processes of securitization simultaneously enabled and affirm preventive security practices. Whether or not a physical “stranger entity” ever presented her or himself to me was irrelevant for a successful securitization of the stranger and formation of exceptional measures. Due to patterns of identity construction brokering parents, police, and teachers into a strengthened relational network through similar framings of stranger threat construction, I accepted this other as “really existing”.

My agency was constrained by structures establishing the stranger’s identity that directed me to abide by rules I would not tolerate if there had been no articulation of the stranger threat. For example, rules like only walking home from school a certain way,

only talking to certain people, justifying suspicion of others, and in general, limiting my independent actions to those delineated by authorities as necessary. The stranger was successfully securitized as an objective threat without imminent material evidence of risk. This securitization led to a change in how I walked home through collective meanings of identity that justified an extension of security measures beyond “normal” rules.

The construction of the stranger illustrates how a mechanism-based approach can help elucidate the way identity and discourse build intersubjective understanding and influence outcomes. The role of perception is essential to justifying exceptional measures, and is of particular importance for the securitization of terrorism considering counterterrorism’s base in prevention and preemption. The use of relational mechanisms as method, relationalism as methodological sensibility, and securitization as theoretical logic, provide a useful way to engage in an analysis of official British discourse, identity, securitization, and counterterrorism. This relational-securitization framework enables a better understanding and explanation of how identity, discourse, and securitization contributed to the emergence, legitimation, and normalization of exceptional counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. The next chapter starts the empirical narrative of this thesis, beginning in 1968, the start of the most recent Troubles.

Chapter 4

1968 – 1978

Troubling times, temporary laws

The conflict is about permanent identity-in-opposition, requiring every occasion to splice itself, like some feat of genetic engineering, into its tribal components, precluding a shared sense of grieving, the rhetoric of exclusion accommodating only a mutual sense of betrayal.¹

This chapter begins the empirically grounded relational-securitization analysis of identity, official British discourse, and counterterrorism. Constructions and perceptions of identity going back decades were a core part of the more recent conflict in Northern Ireland that precipitated counterterrorism law and a building discourse of “terrorist” threat.² Relational configurations of us/them identities in opposition were essential to the securitization of terrorism during the mid to late 20th century in official British discourse. These processes of securitization were, in turn, of causal significance for how counterterrorism emerged, was legitimized, and became normalized from 1968 to 2011. Historical issues of nationalism and competing notions of “Britishness” were highly significant for how terrorism was securitized during these years. In one account of identity and the Peace Process, “While 72% of the people of Northern Ireland preferred to remain part of the UK in 1992, only 30% of the British people saw the identity of Northern Ireland in the same light.”³

¹ O’Malley, *Biting at the Grave*, 259.

² English, *Radicals and the Republic*, 120.

³ Bill McSweeney, “Security, Identity and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland,” *Security Dialogue* 27, no. 2 (1998): 172.

In one account going back to the early 20th century, “Englishmen” were explained as regarding the Irish to be “hostile natives”.⁴ Myths about the Irish as menacing others continue to inform divisions within Northern Ireland. An example is one account of a childhood story. It was told that since Ireland was neutral during WWII and did not have operating “blackouts”, by using electricity at night the Irish were purposefully “pointing” to Northern Ireland for German bombers.⁵ Notions of the Irish other played a role in British security practices going back well beyond late 20th century Troubles. But it was the formation of laws based on an explicit language of terrorism and the resulting construction of *terrorist* others that began processes of othering that enabled a normalization of 21st century counterterrorism practice. For this chapter from 1968 to 1979, identity divisions within Northern Ireland as well as between Northern Ireland and the British “mainland” were central to discourses and practices of counterterrorism. Since it was the conflict out of Northern Ireland that sparked the introduction of special powers formed through an explicit language of “terrorism”, it is with the Northern Irish context that analysis begins.

This temporal starting point may be seen by many readers as too recent to fully understand issues of security, identity, and Northern Ireland. In many ways they would be right, and indeed the history of British-Irish relations, conflict, and “special powers” goes back hundreds of years. As stated in his seminal study of Irish nationalism Richard English convincingly establishes that “it is clear that these late-nineteenth-century issues have cast a shadow into the twenty-first century”.⁶ In acknowledging this influential history well before 1968, starting analysis from the late sixties should not be seen as ignoring historical precedent. Rather, this more recent temporal beginning underscores the newness of counterterrorism and the focus of this thesis on exceptional security measures based in an explicit language of terrorism. The emergence of special powers formed by and through an explicit terminology of “terrorism” and “terrorist” began with the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (EPA), and Prevention of

⁴ Robert Kee, *The Green Flag: A History of Irish Nationalism* (London: Penguin Books, 1972), 688.

⁵ “Conversation between the author and a former Loyalist paramilitary”, September 2012, United Kingdom.

⁶ English, *Irish Freedom*, 236.

Terrorism (Temporary Orders) Act 1974 (PTA). To understand how permanent 21st century counterterrorism became normalized, discourse analysis must begin by investigating how these acts were introduced and justified through an evolving securitization of terrorism. The EPA was explained as:

An Act to make provision with respect to the following matters in Northern Ireland, that is to say, proceedings for and the punishment of certain offences, the detention of terrorists, the preservation of the peace, the maintenance of order and the detection of crime and to proscribe and make other provision in connection with certain organisations there, and for connected purposes. [25th July 1973]⁷

Out of a total 35 pages there are 21 matches for “terror”. The ability of a constable to “arrest without warrant any person whom he suspects of being a terrorist” directly constructed the threat as *being* a terrorist, not methods of violence.⁸ In the EPA, terrorism and terrorist are defined as follows:

"terrorism" means the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear; "terrorist" means a person who is or has been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in directing, organising or training persons for the purpose of terrorism;⁹

The PTA 1974 comprises 16 pages and 12 matches for “terror”. If including the act’s title, appearing on each page, there are 28 matches of “terror”.¹⁰ The PTA is explained as:

An Act to proscribe organisations concerned in terrorism, and to give power to exclude certain persons from Great Britain or the United Kingdom in order to prevent acts of terrorism, and for connected purposes. [29th November 1974]¹¹

⁷ EPA, 1973, c. 35.

⁸ Ibid., part 2, section 10.

⁹ Ibid., part 4, section 28.

¹⁰ PTA, 1974, c. 56.

¹¹ Ibid..

Similar to the EPA, a terminology of terrorism constituted the legal substance of this act through explicit articulations of “terror”. A distinct shift from the EPA to the PTA was the goal of *preventing terrorism* positioned in the PTA’s title. This set a significant new legal precedent for legitimate state power in the form of specific counterterrorism measures.

Political violence and special state powers associated with Irish-British relations go back for many years. But it was the late 1960s and first years of the 1970s where a particular securitization of terrorism enabled the reconfiguration of us/them identities necessary to form and justify EPA and PTA measures. Relational configurations in official discourse stabilized certain intersubjective understandings of a terrorist other. These understandings securitized terrorism in a distinctive way to reconstruct what insecurity out of Northern Ireland became collectively accepted as “being”. As will be demonstrated through this chapter, the emergence of new counterterrorism laws constituted with a language of terrorism was possible because of how terrorism was securitized. The aim to prevent terrorist violence before it occurs, combined with the elusive definition of terrorism, required that the threat be convincingly established in discourse irrespective of actual events. This co-constitution of identity and practice began a causally interrelated cycle of securitizing discourse and material counterterrorism.

This self-fulfilling cycle would provide a baseline for collective meaning around terrorism and legitimize specific counterterrorism outcomes for the next thirty-seven years. As argued in the earlier chapters, securitization literature has yet to sufficiently problematize the constitutive and causal aspects of how identity and discourse interrelate over time. By tracing the way that terrorism was securitized through relational configurations of identity, analysis can better explain British counterterrorism’s emergence, legitimation, and normalization. The next five chapters provide one empirical account of how the intersubjectivity necessary for terrorism to be securitized was established. In so doing, discussion endeavors to map out how particular

interrelations of identity, discourse, and practice delimited what actions were politically possible at different times, thereby influencing observed outcomes of counterterrorism.

The securitization of terrorism during this period enabled a continued re-authorization of temporary measures. Similar framings such as “brutal murders” linked previously unconnected actors and sites with particular discourses of securitization then acting as a kind of broker, strengthening certain collective meanings over others. Without these framings observed across different sites, terrorism would not have been securitized in the way that it was and the observed outcomes of how new counterterrorism laws emerged and were maintained would have been different. Yoking reallocated broader boundaries of identification by distinguishing terrorists from “other” illegitimate others. This yoking also differentiated terrorist actors from political movements and the British referent. Despite miscarriages of justice and a lack of consensus on counterterrorism effectiveness, certain configurations of threat/referent construction rhetorically coerced actors into limited positions of agency. Through the distinctive way that terrorism was securitized from 1968 to 1979, opposition to renewing new counterterrorism laws and exceptional security practice was politically unsustainable.

I. Contextualizing 1968

The early 20th century of Irish-British relations brought intensified activity related to self-determination and anti-colonial struggle. The foundations of these movements go back hundreds of years. But it is the Easter Rising of 1916 preceding the 1918 election of Sinn Fein in Dublin that is often seen as the beginning of Irish-related political violence linked with the late 20th century Troubles. Following the Anglo-Irish War, the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty established the Republic of Ireland, but left the six Northern counties under British control. The republican movement divided between those pursuing non-violent political paths and those committed to armed struggle for a

fully united Ireland.¹² The political and territorial situation in Ireland and the United Kingdom shifted along terms of national self-determination. At the same time, the international arena was also undergoing varied transformations. The Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War reconfigured international dynamics, with each historical moment introducing new security and political challenges. Inter- and intra-state conflicts associated with decolonization forced dominant powers to reconsider their perceptions of legitimate and illegitimate violence. As explained by English, “Between Indian independence in 1947 and the handover in 1997 of Hong Kong to the Chinese, the British empire died. It was not only in the aftermath of the Second World War that it showed cracks. But it was in the wake of that conflict that the map began strikingly and emphatically to change colour, as Britain gradually lost its empire.”¹³

A fear of nuclear annihilation cemented a bipolar international order, while new technologies and communications redesigned political and social relations. International interconnectedness grew even as local issues remained prominent. Cold War campaigns from Latin America to Afghanistan, increased degrees of economic interdependence, and political violence by Middle Eastern groups all influenced international relations and state practices. Terrorist organizations were not limited to political boundaries or hierarchical structures. Technology continued to develop, and attacks involved greater lethality. The Six-Day war of 1967 and the 1972 Munich Olympics attack were not just interpreted as politically motivated events related to the issue of Palestine. Rather, they enabled a generalization of “Middle Eastern” terrorism that helped build intersubjective understanding around perceptions of a “new international” terrorism years later.

The Munich attacks contributed to the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, but the vast majority of counterterrorism remained at the state level.¹⁴ The use of airline hijackings and targeting of symbolic targets represented a shift in tactics. But such a shift on its own does not provide evidence of a “new age” of

¹² English, *Radicals and the Republic*.

¹³ English, *Armed Struggle*, 365.

¹⁴ Paul Wilkinson, *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*, 2nd Edition (London: Routledge, 2006), 88.

terrorism. From 1960 to 1969 there were nine attacks against civilian aircraft, resulting in 286 deaths.¹⁵ From 1980-1989 there were 12 attacks, resulting in 1,144 deaths.¹⁶ Although the overall numbers went up, the use of civilian aircraft as a method was not new to the late 20th century or post-September 11th era of “international terrorism”. State and non-state actors engaged in terrorism and political violence always search for bolder and more effective strategies, regardless of the historical period within which they are positioned. In light of these international developments, the “international” commonplace could have been deployed to construct an “international terrorist” in official British discourses around domestic counterterrorism during the early 1970s. International acts of violence such as those in Munich could have been referenced as a threat to democratic society and legitimized domestic counterterrorism. Instead, the focus was on counterterrorism laws as *temporary* measures to combat insecurity out of Ulster.

In Britain and Ireland, there continued to be security issues linked with republicanism. Even though mid-20th century events such as a 1950s border campaign were largely unsuccessful, there was a latent presence of actors open to using violence for political ends. At the same time, the growing dissatisfaction related to social inequalities in areas such as housing and employment contributed to new social activism. Civil rights movements precipitated new organizations and action, such as the earlier mentioned NICRA formed in 1967. These movements challenged the physical and figurative walls that fostered unequal patterns of inclusion, access, and participation. In 1968 and with the support of the NICRA, the DHAC organized a 5 October 1968 march in Londonderry/Derry. As news of this march spread, a Loyalist group – the Apprentice Boys – planned a parade for the same day. Anticipating conflict, the Northern Ireland Stormont government reacted by banning the march. However, the DHAC march went ahead and marchers were quickly met with force by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Violent clashes with security officers and rioting ensued, with many citing this event as the start of the most recent Troubles.

¹⁵ Ibid., 124.

¹⁶ Ibid..

The government's response was largely defensive and RUC actions were for the most part excused. In 1969 the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Terrence O'Neil, said:

Enough is enough. We have heard sufficient for now about Civil rights, let us hear a little about civic responsibility. For it is a short step from the throwing of paving stones to the laying of tombstones and I for one can think of no cause in Ulster today which will be advanced by the death of a single Ulsterman.¹⁷

Such responses were interpreted by many as neglecting injustices experienced by the minority Catholic community. Excessive force by the authorities exacerbated the situation, and helped fuel engagement with militancy. The late sixties are a period defined by cycles of violence connecting British security practice, insecurity, and paramilitarism. As new measures based in a language of terrorism emerged, a self-sustaining cycle of discourses and practices of counterterrorism was launched. Patterns of threat identification were in a process of transition from historic notions of public order to a securitization of terrorism that stabilized particular notions of terrorist others.

Alongside intensified state security practices was the heightening of contemporary grievances linked with historic injustice. The civil rights movement splintered. The Derry Citizens Action Committee (DCAC) took a moderate route, while the People's Democracy out of Queen's University took a more militant stance. The PIRA split from the Official IRA (OIRA) in 1969. The former reinvigorated "physical force" traditions linked with earlier movements.¹⁸ State force was also bolstered, with British troops arriving in August 1969 in the name of maintaining peace and order. Communities initially welcomed the forces, but this reception quickly went cold through growing mistrust and insecurity. The army would not officially leave until 2007, almost thirty-eight years later. This departure, however, did not mark an end to the insecurity, and violence continued to face Northern Irish communities.

¹⁷ "Statement by Terence O'Neill, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 5 January 1969," *Belfast Telegraph*, 6 January 1969 [cited 17 July 2010]; available from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/ton5169.htm>.

¹⁸ "Physical force" is used to reference non-parliamentary action.

Exceptional power and repressive security practice reached a peak on 9 August 1971 with the reinstatement of internment. Indefinite detention was last used during the Irish Civil War under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) (SPA) 1922. This gave the Minister of Home Affairs for Northern Ireland the power “to take all such steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving the peace and maintaining order”.¹⁹ In 1971, an overnight raid detained over 300 civilians, the vast majority being Catholic. Consequences from the practice of internment hardened boundaries along Republican/Nationalist and Loyalist/Unionist lines, and recharged the centuries-long conflict. Direct Rule was implemented in 1972 and aggravated notions of colonial rule that had been percolating for decades. As explained by Audrey Kurth Cronin, “terrorism is about justice—or, at least, someone’s perception of justice, whether its source is human or divine”, and the Irish conflict is no exception.²⁰ Despite consequences such as alienation that worsened communal grievances, the EPA and PTA provided a baseline from which subsequent measures were formed and legitimized. Contemporary policies such as proscription and pre-charge detention are not a post-11 September invention, but are based in measures going back much further in history.

One of the most dramatic examples of violence between security forces and civilians during this period was the Bloody Sunday of 30 January 1972. Fourteen civilians were killed and many more wounded. Contrary to eye-witness accounts, authorities said they fired after being fired upon, with the Widgery Report excusing the actions.²¹ In 1971, Secretary of State for the Home Department, Reginald Maudling, said:

The Compton Committee found no evidence of physical brutality by the British Army or the R.U.C., still less of torture or brainwashing. In the course of the arrest of 342 men on 9th August a small number of them suffered what the

¹⁹ Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism*, 36.

²⁰ Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Introduction: Meeting and Managing the Threat,” in *Attacking Terrorism*, Kurth Cronin and Ludes, ed., 3.

²¹ In 2011 it was concluded that soldiers did fire upon civilians “unjustifiably”, despite attempts to justify such firings on a “culture” that encouraged soldiers to “fire with impunity” (The Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry (Saville Inquiry), HC 29-I - HC 29-X, Volumes 1-10, June 15th 2010, TSO, volume 1, section 4.7).

Committee describe as a measure of ill-treatment or hardship. I think the House, on studying the report, will conclude that the operation, which was one of considerable difficulty and danger, was accomplished in a highly creditable manner...Very difficult issues are involved in judging what methods of interrogation are permissible in the protection of the lives of the civil population and the security forces against a ruthless and deliberate campaign of terror and murder.²²

Excessive force was furthering the wedge between communities. But articulations such as a “ruthless” enemy encouraged a distinctive securitization of terrorism that continued to justify exceptional practice regardless of the consequences. Domestic reports and the European Court of Human Rights (ECourtHR) concluded that interrogation did not amount to torture. However, the use of “posture on the wall, hooding, noise, deprivation of sleep, [and] diet of bread and water” did constitute “physical ill-treatment”.²³ Such measures were questioned by some in parliament. For example, Labour MP James Callaghan asking in 1971 “how far is a democratic assembly entitled to sanction the ill-treatment of those committed to the custody of soldiers or police in order to save the lives of others”?²⁴ But the following years brought a continuance of exceptional security practice and insecurity. In 1972 there was the burning of the British Embassy in Dublin, and 1974 there were the Birmingham and Guildford pub bombings.

As explained special powers were not themselves new, but earlier measures did not rely on explicit discourses of “terrorist” threat. This terminology entailed specific consequences for material practice and intersubjective understanding. As state counterterrorism was formed, the boundaries between military and law enforcement were increasingly blurred. Institutional responsibilities merged in the name of fighting terrorist others, even as the definition of terrorism remained vague. When certain powers were deemed counterproductive, new powers different in name more than in kind took their place. When internment was removed, detention was instated. The replacement of

²² Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 November 1971, 5th ser., vol. 826, col. 216-217.

²³ “Report of the enquiry into allegations against the Security Forces of physical brutality in Northern Ireland arising out of events on the 9th August 1971,” Chairman Sir Edmund Compton, November 1971, Cmnd. 4823.

²⁴ Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 November 1971, 5th ser., vol. 826, col. 218.

controversial powers with “new” measures that continued a similar security trajectory would indeed become a recurring theme.

Terrorism was positioned as a broad category of reprehensible action that was also linked with particular types of actors. Initially framed as “rioters” and “hooligans” threatening public order, the securitization of terrorism would over time draw upon commonplaces such as “brutal murderers”. This criminalized terrorism and bolstered enhanced policing in the name of protecting “the public” referent:

The aims of the I.R.A. are to intimidate the population by brutal terrorism and so to prevent any co-operation with the Government, the police and the courts of law; to inhibit normal political activity and constitutional progress; and to cause the public in Great Britain to become so sickened by the ceaseless bloodshed and destruction that the Army’s withdrawal will come to be seen as the lesser of two evils. No responsible Government can afford to yield to pressures of this kind.²⁵

In December of that same year, debate over detention was framed along a similar rhetorical path, with William van Straubenzee (Minister of State for NI, Con) stating:

brutality and bloodshed...have sadly become only too prevalent in parts of Northern Ireland...for the safety and protection of the public it is our duty to see that terrorists are taken off the street, but we can do that only by providing alternative provisions²⁶

Though internment was ended, detention, search and seizure, and interrogation maintained exceptional state practice. Though introduced as temporary, exceptional counterterrorism measures were justified by a securitization of terrorism that positioned terrorists as entities distinct from “other” others.

Political violence and public emergencies demand a security response. But the content of that response and how measures are legitimized is not predestined to take one particular form and direction over another. The continuance of exceptional counterterrorism measures in Britain, especially during times without violence,

²⁵ Compton Report, 1971, Cmnd. 4823, iv.

²⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1972, 5th ser., vol. 848 col. 53.

demanded a convincing assertion of identity to legitimize state security practice. It is important to not ignore that those targeted by counterterrorism were also evaluating state legitimacy, albeit from different perspectives:

The state had no legitimacy in the communities from which the IRA sprang. They saw themselves as victims of state violence, the army's incursions as forms of assault, the security forces as the armed technicians of repression and injustice...In this void of legitimacy, the IRA was given a measure of moral as well as political acceptance, especially when it assumed its primary role as defender of the Catholic community. The more aggressive and offensive the presence of the security forces, the more likely was the community to give allegiance to the IRA.²⁷

Policies such as internment and pre-charge detention alienated communities. Miscarriages of justice such as the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four, and Maguire Seven only served to reinforce sentiments of insecurity. Officials understood that measures like internment were counterproductive and ensured "continuous enlistment in the IRA".²⁸ But similar measures were maintained through a building focus on terrorism as types of others linked with specific communities on the margins of the British referent rather than a method of violence.

Recent efforts to look back on the way this conflict was managed and determine "lessons learned" have provided helpful analyses in different contexts, for example contemporary counterinsurgency in Afghanistan.²⁹ But research has yet to explore in detail what role the securitization of terrorism played in stabilizing certain identity assumptions in particular ways to influence outcomes. "Terrorist" is not a self-evident category existing outside practices of labeling. Thus for new measures to be formed through a language of terrorism, official discourse has to engage in securitizations that stabilize a terrorist other as threatening the survival of the referent. A search of Hansard's online repository of parliamentary debates for "terrorist" from 1803 to 2005

²⁷ O'Malley, *Biting at the Grave*, 107.

²⁸ Brice Dickson, "The Detention of Suspected Terrorists in Northern Ireland and Great Britain," *University of Richmond Law Review* 43, no. 3 (2009): 937.

²⁹ Thomas H. Johnson and Richard English, "Rethinking Afghanistan: echoes of Ulster and the IRA?," *Policy Options* 29, no. 6 (2008): 14-22.

resulted in 11 hits for the 19th century, 26,049 hits for the 20th century, and 7814 hits for the years 2000-2005. Though 19th century data may be a less representative sample, the difference in how many times “terrorist” appears as an explicit enemy identifier is still significant. Going by decade for the 20th century, the rate of change for the number of times that “terrorist” appears in Hansard debates is shown below:




Figure 1.1 – Number of times “terrorist” appears during Parliamentary debate during the 20th century³⁰

This simple chart illustrates the noticeable increase of observed references to “terrorist” even considering the possibility for a margin of error as relates to “actual” documented articulations. Terrorizing political violence has gone on as long as history, but a terminology explicit identifying “terrorist” others experienced a sharp increase as counterterrorism laws (EPA and PTA) were introduced and maintained. It is true that there was a growth in violence from the late 1960s onwards. But the existence of violence and insecurity does not determine what discourses are used to label or identify that violence and insecurity. A number of events throughout the 20th century could have warranted a discourse of “terrorist threat” that would have presented a completely different data set. However, the frequency of “terrorist” arose with the onset of counterterrorism security practice. Through discourses of securitization, “terrorism”

³⁰ <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/> (Search performed 12 September 2012).

came to constitute and legitimize exceptional security practices in particular and consequential ways over time.

II. Relational positionings, beginning counterterrorism, and disorder

During the late 1960s, unrest was associated with hooligans, rioters, and disorder. By the early-mid 1970s, however, explicit terms of terror played a growing role in forming and justifying exceptional policies. The 1970s reference to “terrorists” as connected to Northern Ireland diverged from earlier official discourse that linked “terrorism” to overseas threats. Through a search of “terrorism” and “terrorist” in the National Archives database, during earlier 20th century debates, “terrorism” was dominated by associations with external threats. During one search of “terrorism” in Hansard, “terror” appeared to be most frequently associated with Ireland in the 19th century, but areas in Africa and Asia during the early and mid 20th century. Though this observation demands further empirical study, the initial assessment seems to present terms of “terror” as linked to insecurity from those already perceived as dangerous and foreign others. For example, how “If the conflicting territorial claims in the Gulf were to lead to local wars, or even only to terrorism and sabotage, it would become difficult to maintain the free flow of oil”.³¹ Or how “serious economic consequences” could lead “Africans in Rhodesia to turn to terrorism”.³²

Other discourse securitized terrorism by identifying terrorists in the context of withdrawal from “southern Arabia”, claiming “A terrorist was indistinguishable from an innocent bystander until he showed his colours by flinging a grenade or pistolling a victim”.³³ Before the EPA or PTA but after 19th century conflicts with Irish groups, terrorism was frequently securitized in official British discourse by yoking “terrorists” to geographic areas south and east of Britain. These perceptions of physical and cultural

³¹ “Foreign Policy, Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,” 23 February 1968, CAB/129/136/5, p. 30.

³² “SECRET, Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.I. on Tuesday, 8th October 1968, at 10 a.m.,” January 1969, CAB/128/43/40.

³³ “Cabinet Statement on the Defence Estimates, 1968,” 29 January 1968, CAB/129/135/29.

distance aligned with degrees of danger and otherness seem to align with empirical discussion in later chapters and the observed externalization of terrorist threat. Such historical patterns of securitizing types of terrorism along spatial boundary assumptions of belonging provided a kind of dormant collective meaning that would be reactivated during future securitizations that differentiated types of terrorist others. Securitizations could have reasserted terrorism as a method without spatial assumptions of belonging to minimize problematic patterns of alienation. But the securitization of terrorism continued to depend upon inside/outside boundary assumptions.

Official discourse and temporary counterterrorism laws from 1973 through the 1990s focused on the Irish threat. But the externalization of non-Irish related threats would eventually lead to significantly expanded counterterrorism by the end of the 20th century through the new label of “international terrorism”. From 1968 to 1978, the securitization of terrorism drew upon commonplaces of criminality, brutal murder, public order (community/hooligan gangs), gangsterism, ruthless, and murder. The way these commonplaces came together in particular configurations repositioned the threat from an issue of public order to one of non-negotiable terrorist enemy-others. Relational mechanisms of framing, brokerage, yoking, and rhetorical coercion point to the way configurations of identity built intersubjective understanding through relational connections to enable and limit what outcomes were possible for political actors. Counterterrorism laws and strategies, official reviews and reports, and parliamentary debate reinforced certain identity discourses over others through a causally consequential intertextuality of official discourse. The way that terrorism was securitized led to overall support for EPA and PTA renewals. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees framed the referent as a “peaceful and orderly society”³⁴ founded on a “rule of law”.³⁵ In the words of Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson, survival was under threat from “lawless” terrorists who “brutally murdered” innocent civilians.³⁶

³⁴ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 April 1974, 5th ser., vol. 871, col. 1470.

³⁵ Northern Ireland, 4 November 1975, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 899 col. 242-243.

³⁶ Northern Ireland (Security), 12 January 1976, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 903, col. 39.

Democratic institutions and society were being undermined by “terrorist organisations”.³⁷

Criminality

Framings of terrorism were increasingly based on notions of *criminality*. This lengthened the distance between legitimate politics and those associated with terrorism by silencing the *political* nature of the violence: “I do not, never have and never will regard murder, maiming, kneecapping, bank robbery and intimidation as politically motivated. They are criminal offences and those who engage in them are criminals”.³⁸ As explained by Hansen, “when studying the way in which identity is constituted in discourse it is important that we look at the intricate ways in which subjects are formed”.³⁹ She goes on to point out that “Political discourse often does not operate in a way where “the threatening Other” is explicitly constituted as such. Rather such processes of Othering take place through more complex articulations of boundaries, distinctions and agency.”⁴⁰ Tracing how rhetorical commonplaces of “criminal” are brokered across a range of political actors is one way to analyze how these “complex articulations of boundaries, distinctions and agency” unfold. By identifying the way terrorism was securitized through terms of criminality, we can see how terrorist actors were constructed as having no acceptable political cause:

1975, Lord Donaldson (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (NIO)): It [Special Category Status] is impossible clearly and legally to define, and hence is arbitrary and open to wide abuse in its application. It is greatly **resented by the ordinary criminals** and many crimes committed for the most sordid self-interest are subsequently coated with the veneer of so-called political motivation, so that some gullible members of the public are induced to regard **the criminals** as “our boys”, when they are in reality nothing more than the perpetrators of **callous crimes** motivated only by greed or vanity.⁴¹

³⁷ “Cabinet Northern Ireland: Paper for Discussion, Note by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,” 13 October 1972, CAB/129/165/8.

³⁸ Gerry Fitt (SDLP), Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions), 11 December 1975, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 902, col. 793.

³⁹ Lene Hansen, “Images, Identity and Security: bringing together international politics and media research,” *Nordicom Review* 29, no. 2 (2008): 55.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) (Amendment) Bill, 29 July 1975, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 363 col. 895.

1975, Merlyn Rees (Secretary of State for NI, Lab): “senseless descent into **criminality**”⁴²

1979, Lord Elton (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (NIO), Con): But a line can and must be drawn **between political and criminal acts**. There can be no doubt that, by its admitted involvement in terrorism, INLA has crossed that line.⁴³

Counterterrorism law’s implementation depended upon a criminalization of terrorism to strip terrorists from political purpose irrespective of historical precedence or known grievances. Government explanations of emergency measures were based on a securitization of terrorism as unarguable criminality. The arrest, detention, and prosecution of “ruthless criminals” were the only ways to protect the referent.

Brutal

Repeated framings of the threat as a “ruthless” other engaged in “brutal murders” brokered different actors through specific similarities of discourse. This reinforced a particular criminality and rhetorically coerced actors into EPA and PTA support. The securitization of terrorism was transitioning to threat/referent constructions drawing upon characteristics of the actors rather than just acts of violence. It was not only that murder was part of the violence, but that this murder was of a *brutal* nature:

1972, William van Straubenzee (Minister of State for NI, Con): Members in all parts of the House will have read of persons **brutally** murdered in front of their families, of young people, young women, being tarred and feathered, and of other sadistic practices; and they will recognize only too well the **nature of the person** one is dealing with and the risks incurred in giving evidence against the perpetrators of **terrorism** in Northern Ireland.⁴⁴

⁴² Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1975, 5th ser., vol. 902, col. 772.

⁴³ Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (Amendment) Order 1979, 24 July 1979, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 401, col. 1857.

⁴⁴ Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1972, 5th ser., vol. 848, col. 47.

1974, Gerard Fitt (SDLP): Only recently, one of its [UDA] members, a Mr. Baker, was convicted in a court in Northern Ireland of four **brutal and callous murders**.⁴⁵

1975, Airey Neave (Con): “emergency powers are still needed in Northern Ireland. It is horrifying to think that 1,400 people have been killed since 1969 in circumstances of **great brutality**”⁴⁶

1976, Harold Wilson (Prime Minister, Lab): Murder and violence there [Northern Ireland] reached a new peak in the first few days of this year. No fewer than 15 people were **brutally murdered** in the first week of January.⁴⁷

1976, Kevin McNamara (Lab): the specific problem of people who can come over the border, commit a **brutal murder** and then slip back over the border... all the forces of law and order—the armed forces, the constabulary, my right hon. Friend and all concerned—are determined to root out and punish terrorism⁴⁸

Through these framings, different actors and discursive sites were brokered to securitize terrorism in a way that dehumanized those associated with terrorist activities while connecting a range of political actors who were then rhetorically coerced into positions of support. It was politically impossible to “reasonably” argue against measures aimed at preventing “brutal” murder.

It was not necessarily surprising to observe threat/referent framings based in terms of criminality. But unsurprising does not imply unproblematic or predetermined. These framings enabled a threat construction of terrorists as dangerous others in their own right rather than “others engaged in terrorizing methods”, a perception with significant consequences for future security practice. Alongside framings of brutal murder and ruthless criminality were framings of inside/outside boundary drawing on assumptions of geographic and territorial belonging. Phrases like “this side of the water” established a clear separation between Britain and the “other side of the water”:

⁴⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 April 1974, 5th ser., vol. 871, col. 1554.

⁴⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1975, 5th ser., vol. 902, col. 773.

⁴⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 12 January 1976, 5th ser., vol. 903, col. 27.

⁴⁸ Ibid., col. 35.

1972, John Loveridge (Con): It might even be a precedent for **this side of the waters** if the spread of terror comes closer to this House, as it might well do⁴⁹

1972, Merlyn Rees (Sec State NI, Lab): We must face the facts of the situation and we must not close our eyes in a nice liberal fashion to the realities of the situation on the **other side of the water**.⁵⁰

Boundaries separating Ulster from “the mainland” were maintained, with the referent in need of protection not a fully inclusive political or cultural identity. In 1975, Labour Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees stated, “Not only is Northern Ireland different politically from the rest of the United Kingdom; it is very different indeed in the nature of its violence.”⁵¹ The securitization of terrorism rested on hardening perceptions of natural belonging and difference rather than methods or acts of violence on their own terms.

The British self was reasserted through institutional and political moves related to counterterrorism. Through the way that terrorism was securitized, it was as much a British political referent as a British societal referent that was in need of protection. This empirical observation lines up with Waever’s assessment of social and the political referents:

Societal security is about those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. This identity is distinct from, although often entangled with, the explicitly political organizations concerned with government.”⁵²

For British counterterrorism, legal measures were the only way to ensure the referent’s survival as both a political unit (legitimate sovereign and state power) and democratic society (based on “rule of law” norms). As argued by Antje Wiener, “socially constructed norms have a structuring aspect on political processes,” but “political

⁴⁹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1972, 5th ser., vol. 848, col. 85.

⁵⁰ Ibid., col. 93.

⁵¹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1975, 5th ser., vol. 902, col. 762.

⁵² Waever, “Identity, Integration and Security,” 405.

practices equally influence the construction of norms and institutions”.⁵³ In this sense, the way counterterrorism law was formed and legitimized altered legal institutions while reinforcing democratic norms around a rule of law and social order. By looking at the securitization of terrorism, we can see how issues of identity played into mutually-constitutive consequences of discourse and practice.

Earlier discourse around the SPA drew on similar notions of democratic order as a function of state and social identity. Discourses positioned exceptional measures as necessary because they enabled “certain authorities of the Government of Northern Ireland to take steps for preserving the peace and maintaining order in Northern Ireland”.⁵⁴ Not just specific steps articulated in security practice, but “*all* such steps and issue *all* such orders as may be necessary” [emphasis added]:⁵⁵

2... (4) If any person does any act of such a nature as to be calculated to be prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in Northern Ireland and not specifically provided for in the regulations, he shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against the regulations.⁵⁶

A focus on law and order constituted the referent in need of protection and the counterterrorism practices formed to do the protecting. What changed with the EPA and PTA was a move beyond public order to explicit articulations that securitized terrorism in a way that stabilized “terrorists” as threatening others in their own right. The securitization of terrorism positioned the rule of law as a political and institutional source of legitimacy, and power. This bolstered counterterrorism based on new legal measures as the way to respond:

1974, Nicholas Ridley (Con): Until that political solution is found this is a state where normal peacetime Queensberry rules as enunciated by some Labour Members are less important than the maintenance of law and order and the

⁵³ Antje Wiener, “Crossing the Borders of Order: Democracy beyond the Nation-State?” in *Identities, Borders, Orders*, Albert *et al.* ed., 183.

⁵⁴ Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland), 1922 [cited 12 July 2010]; available from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmsso/spa1922.htm>.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Section 1.1.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Section 2.4.

protection to whatever extent is possible of innocent people from being maimed, murdered and blown up.⁵⁷

In the early securitization of terrorism, language around criminal terrorist activity justified exceptional powers through the official “determination to re-create a peaceful and orderly society”.⁵⁸ There was some reference to consequences of security implementation as related to issues of identity. But extraordinary measures based on preventive practice continued.

Security practice connected army operations and law enforcement, but remained focused on policing. Counterterrorism based in legal acts reinforced the connection between policing, the rule of law, and British self. This strengthened a perceived natural connection between the moral authority of a law-abiding British referent and the use of law-based security practice.⁵⁹ The “increasing tendency of a minority to flout the law, undermine authority and create anarchy” securitized the terrorist other as in direct opposition to the referent as a moral, democratic, and rule of law-bound society.⁶⁰ The inclusion of a moral/immoral dimension in the securitization of terrorism played a growing role in how exceptional practices were continued.

Community and religion

Framings of community and religion were a growing part of how terrorism was securitized with respect to both threat and referent identities. The Cameron Report explained:

No doubt, religion is a deeply divisive force, but in addition there is the conflict of political loyalties which sometimes transcends the religious cleavage in the

⁵⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 5 December 1974, 5th ser., vol. 882, col. 2098.

⁵⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 April 1974, 5th ser., vol. 871, col. 1470.

⁵⁹ “Report of The Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland,” Chairman: Baron Hunt, October 1969, Cmnd. 535.

⁶⁰ Ibid., paragraph 9.

population. There is division also in the segregation of race, real or imagined as it may be.⁶¹

Framings of religion did not completely silence historical issues. Religion had played a part in the Irish conflict going back far into history. As discussed by English in his account of socialist republicanism from 1925 to 1937, “the claim to be fighting for Ireland was tied to the claim to be fighting for God”.⁶² Despite the awareness of divisions around religion, and race, the securitization of terrorism and implementation of counterterrorism exacerbated feelings of injustice. Social cleavages were presented as almost “inherent” to Northern Ireland. Militant republicanism was even framed as a kind of annoyance: It was “[A] more or less permanent irritant in the relationship between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic”,⁶³ with the civil rights movement described as “bound to attract opposition from many Protestant Unionists who saw or professed to see its success as a threat to their supremacy, indeed, to their survival as a community”.⁶⁴ Discourse securitized terrorism along commonplaces of “left wing extremists”, “rioters”, and “hooligan elements” that required a hardline security response, not political engagement.⁶⁵

Particular communities were identified in a way that did not position them as completely outside of the referent. However, they were, like Muslim communities today, still established in a way that maintained a certain exclusion from full belonging. Thus the securitization of terrorism was from the start dependent on categories of identity associating terrorizing political violence with particular social groups:

We particularly hope that in these new conditions more **Roman Catholics** will wish to join the ranks of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and will offer themselves for service in the new part-time forces, the setting up of which we also envisage.⁶⁶

⁶¹ “Disturbances in Northern Ireland Report of the Commission appointed by the Governor of Northern Ireland,” Chairman: The Honourable Lord Cameron, September 1969, Cmnd. 532.

⁶² English, *Radicals and the Republic*, 62.

⁶³ “Northern Ireland: Paper for Discussion,” 13 October 1972, CAB/129/165/8.

⁶⁴ Cameron Report, 1969, Cmnd. 532, paragraph 12.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, paragraph 24, 35.

⁶⁶ Hunt Report, 1969, Cmnd. 535, paragraph 181.

There should be a Police Authority for Northern Ireland, whose membership should reflect the proportions of **different groups in the community**.⁶⁷

Vigorous efforts should be made to increase the number of **Roman Catholic** entrants into the force.⁶⁸

Activities in the field of **community and youth relations** should be stepped up.

Framings of community and religious affiliations provided intersubjective material for the political legitimization of exceptional state security practice going back many decades. Whether referencing the UK military's 1950s hearts and minds campaign in "Malaya" or the current Prevent strategy, "winning over" certain communities has been a consistent focus of how exceptional security practices such as counterterrorism are formed and legitimized.⁶⁹

From 1968 to 1979, the situation in Northern Ireland was framed as two communities where "the normal conventions of majority rule will not work".⁷⁰ Grievances associated with communal lines of division were exacerbated not just through the existence of exceptional powers, but how these measures were implemented. Instead of an attention to communities encouraging more political engagement, framings of the threat as criminal hooliganism joined notions of social groups to encourage a continued focus on counterterrorism:

"hooligan gangs in Londonderry constituted a special threat to security"⁷¹

"daily breaches of law and order in the face of the security forces", officially legitimizing the specific task **"to conduct a scoop-up operation of as many hooligans and rioters as possible"**⁷²

⁶⁷ Ibid., paragraph 183, section 2.

⁶⁸ Ibid., section 27.

⁶⁹ Clutterbuck, "Law enforcement," in *Attacking Terrorism*, 152.

⁷⁰ "Report of a Committee to consider, in the context of civil liberties and human rights, measures to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland," Chairman: Lord Gardiner, January 1975, Cmnd. 5847, ch. 1, section 4c.

⁷¹ "Report of the Tribunal appointed to inquire into the events on Sunday, 30 January 1972, which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry on that day," Rt. Hon. Lord Widgery, April 1972, H.L. 101, H.C. 220, 14.

⁷² Widgery Report, 1972, H.L. 101, H.C. 220, paragraph 20.

In the beginning, the threat was securitized from hooligans threatening order. Over time, the threat was constructed as a “ruthless” and vicious other. This expanded to include suspects even if they did not engage in political violence. In 1972, the Diplock Report was commissioned to evaluate internment and evaluate other options to:

deal more effectively with terrorist organisations by bringing to book, otherwise than by internment by the Executive, individuals involved in terrorist activities, particularly those who plan and direct, but do not necessarily take part in, terrorist acts⁷³

This report hardened the threat’s association with “terrorist crime”, adding legitimacy to aggressive prosecutorial moves.⁷⁴ Even though the utility of counterterrorism law is exceptionally difficult to measure or assess, legal conviction was from the beginning positioned as counterterrorism success. For example, when Labour Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees stated that “1292 terrorists have been charged with criminal offences”.⁷⁵ There is no sure way to measure the efficacy of counterterrorism law, but the way that terrorism was securitized along criminal framings bolstered a legal approach.

Framings based on maintaining peace and order reminiscent of historical power relations continued. But the EPA also opened up a new focus, with the securitization of terrorism justifying counterterrorism laws through a new language that constituted the substance of the measures themselves. A legal language, such as “the detention of *terrorists*” [emphasis added], began a new era of discourse and practice based on an explicit terminology of terrorism and patterns of othering.⁷⁶ The EPA reinforced this terminology, with search and seizure powers formed and justified “if that person is suspected of being a terrorist”, “concerned in terrorism or in promoting or encouraging it

⁷³ “Report of the Commission to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in Northern Ireland,” Chairman: Lord Diplock, December 1972, Cmnd. 5185, ch. 1, paragraph 1.

⁷⁴ Ibid., ch. 1 paragraph 3.

⁷⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 April 1974, 5th ser., vol. 871, col. 1469.

⁷⁶ EPA, 1973, c.53, part 2 section 10.

[terrorism]”,⁷⁷ or using information of “such a nature as is likely to be useful to terrorists”.⁷⁸ Terms “terrorist” and “terrorism” were used without detailed explanation as to what those terms meant.

Terrorism was constructed in as a distinct threat that simultaneously lacked a specific definition. This ambiguity was both a cause and effect of how terrorism was securitized. Counterterrorism was directly linked to the executive. State identity and purpose was strengthened through the formation of counterterrorism and when the Secretary of State implemented such powers in practice. In determining if it appeared that “a person is suspected of having been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in the direction, organization or training of persons for the purpose of terrorism”, state actors engaged in a type of security practice that reasserted the legitimacy of these practices by reasserting certain perceptions of terrorist others and the discourse by which such perceptions were constituted.⁷⁹ The public referent alongside the power of detention was represented as a particular peace and order: unarguable institutional norms.⁸⁰

In 1974, the PTA resulted from and contributed to an particular development of how terrorism was securitized through the phrase “prevention of terrorism”. Led by Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, this emergency legislation was passed following the Birmingham pub bombings of 1974 that killed 21 and injured 182. The PTA provided for widened proscription policies and exclusion orders. This enabled a stronger state control of individual movement and intensified border controls since “the hand of the police in examining both incoming and outgoing travelers should be strengthened in order to deal with the movement of terrorists in and out of Great Britain”.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Ibid., part 2, section 10.1. The offense of “encouraging terrorism” was made permanent with the TA 2006.

⁷⁸ Ibid., part 3, section 19.4.

⁷⁹ Ibid., part 2, section 11.1.

⁸⁰ Parl. Deb, H.L., 29 July 1975, 5th ser., vol. 363, col. 895.

⁸¹ “I.R.A. Terrorism in Great Britain, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Home Department,” 24 November 1974, CAB/129/180/14.

These practices reasserted explicit inside/outside demarcations of belonging that were in turn bolstered by the earlier referenced framings of geographic boundary assumptions: for example, “this side of the water” or “that side of the water”. The PTA allowed the Secretary of State to exercise powers “in such a way as appears to him expedient to prevent acts of terrorism”.⁸² A constable could arrest a person without warrant “whom he reasonably suspects to be...concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”.⁸³ This legitimized exceptional powers by and through the way terrorism was securitized along self/other labels associated with assumed physical boundaries of identification. Threat/referent construction increased perceptions of terrorist danger by linking the threat to those already encompassing a role as “the other” distinct from the core British referent.

Gangster

An interesting observation in this period building upon the earlier mentioned configurations of “criminality” were framings of a ruthless and lawless gangsterism. This attention to commonplaces of gangster securitized terrorism as stemming from others much more organized and dangerous than hooligan rioters or ordinary criminals. Lausten and Waever explain, “meaning is given in a web of signifiers which can be combined and recombined in a potentially unlimited number of ways”.⁸⁴ The way such “signifiers” were brokered across party lines was vital to stabilizing meanings of terrorists as nonnegotiable criminals:

1974, W. F. Deedes (Con): “They are engaged in **mass murder, thuggery and gangsterism,**” it is a “marriage of extremes and what at worst could become a **gangsters’** federal Ireland”⁸⁵

1975, Merlyn Rees (Secretary of State NI, Lab): This is **gangsterism.** There is no other word for it. It can and will be dealt with by effective policing with the full support of the Army.⁸⁶

⁸² PTA, 1974, c. 56, part 2, section 3.1.

⁸³ Ibid., part 3, section 7.1.

⁸⁴ Lausten and Waever, “In Defense of Religion,” 727.

⁸⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 April 1974, 5th ser., vol. 871, col. 1507.

⁸⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 November 1975, 5th ser., vol. 899, col. 234.

1975, Gerry Fitt (SDLP): They are engaged in **mass murder, thuggery and gangsterism**. From that point of view, I do not regret seeing the end of political status.⁸⁷

1975, Merlyn Rees (Secretary of State NI, Lab): a council workman—a Protestant who volunteered to assist in the repair of bomb-damaged homes in the Catholic Lower Falls—was beaten to death by a Provisional IRA **gang**⁸⁸

1975, John Biggs-Davison (Con): “the success of the RUC in bringing political and sectarian **gangsters** and common thugs to book”⁸⁹

1975, Stanley Orme (Minister of State NIO, Lab): many of the people who commit atrocities are involved not in political activity but in sheer **gangsterdom**...almost impossible to attribute any motive to them for these deeds⁹⁰

With officials like MP Biggs Davison (Con) claiming there is “nothing that terrorists detest more than a coming together of the law-abiding”, criminal framings established the threat as in unquestionable opposition to British law and order.⁹¹ Political, historical, and social backdrops that may have motivated actors engaged in violence were silenced. As stated by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Labour MP Rees, “The more policemen the better. The quicker we can get back to the normal processes of law—although it cannot be done overnight—the better.”⁹²

1974, Merlyn Rees (Sec State NI, Lab): between 1st April 1973 and 1st April 1974 the security forces searched over 4 million cars and removed from terrorists’ hands nearly 1.600 weapons and over 35 tons of explosives, 19 tons found before it was made into bombs and 16 tons found in made-up bombs...1292 terrorists have been charged with criminal offences, almost all of them of a very serious nature ranging from murder to armed robbery...we believe that in the long term it must be the **community** itself and **normal police activities**, not military operations alone, which will finally defeat the terrorist.⁹³

⁸⁷ Ibid., col. 257.

⁸⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1975, 5th ser., vol. 902, col. 763.

⁸⁹ Ibid., col. 810.

⁹⁰ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 November 1975, 5th ser., vol. 899, col. 289.

⁹¹ Ibid., col. 286.

⁹² Parl. Deb, H.C., 5 December 1974, 5th ser., vol. 882, col. 2102.

⁹³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 April 1974, 5th ser., vol. 871, col. 1469.

Even though the definition of terrorism was ambiguous, the political acceptance of terrorist enemy-others was unequivocal. Threatening democratic peace was the ruthless terrorist, an enemy-other not to be underestimated in danger or to be dealt with through political negotiations. The powers housed by exceptional counterterrorism demanded that the UK derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights (EconvHR).

Ruthless

This departure from international institutional norms was made possible by a securitization of terrorism based in brutal and ruthless terrorist others contrary to democratic society. By allocating commonplaces of ruthless, threat construction bolstered intersubjective understandings of terrorism as connected with *types of individuals* rather than *types of violent methods*:

1971, Reginald Maudling (Sec State Home Department, Con): The Government do not regard the findings of the Committee as in any way reflecting adversely on the responsibility and discipline with which the security forces in Northern Ireland are conducting their fight against a vicious and **ruthless enemy**.⁹⁴

1975, James Molyneaux (UUP): “For some time we have discussed murders and shootings in terms of tit for tat. I do not think we have ever clearly specified who is tit, and who is tat, and I suggest that tat is that element in the violence with which we ought to be concerned and which must first be eliminated, because that **ruthless, guerrilla force** which we know as the Provisional IRA is the root cause from which all the subsidiary and subordinate violence sprang.”⁹⁵

1975, John Farr (Con): It has become apparent that these people live by the most bloody methods. They are completely **ruthless**, and six or seven years’ of platitudes in this House have got us nowhere.⁹⁶

In the words of Secretary of State for the Home Department Reginald Maudling (Con), the threat was from “a ruthless and deliberate campaign of terror and murder”.⁹⁷ Exceptional security practices were maintained because “[t]errorism, violence and

⁹⁴ Compton Report, 1971, Cmnd. 4823, paragraph 18.

⁹⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 November 1975, 5th ser., vol. 899, col. 252.

⁹⁶ Ibid., col. 268.

⁹⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 November 1971, 5th ser., vol. 826, col. 217.

general lawlessness are still prevalent in Northern Ireland.”⁹⁸ Political initiatives like the Sunningdale Agreement were unsuccessful, in this particular case due largely to the 1974 Unionist Workers Strike. Direct rule was enforced alongside an intensified securitization of the threat and reassertion of counterterrorism practice.

The Gardiner Report supported the continuance and expansion of security powers.⁹⁹ The continued securitization of terrorism along morally reprehensible commonplaces, such as ruthless and brutal, helped alleviate concerns over excessive force in counterterrorism implementation:

The British Government has acted legitimately, and consistently with the terms of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in restricting certain fundamental liberties in Northern Ireland.¹⁰⁰

Debate around this report supported Gardiner’s recommendations, removing responsibility from the government by stating “If detention has to be used again, responsibility will lie clearly at the door of the terrorists.”¹⁰¹ By the mid-1970s, discourse had combined intensified securitizations of terrorism as nonnegotiable and the British referent as beyond the bounds of critique, even if security practice put international human rights norms in question. Statistically, the number of bombings and killings had gone down from 1,382 explosions in 1972, to 973 in 1973, and to 648 during the first eleven months of 1974. But, unsurprisingly considering the security approach taken, political progress was “erratic”.¹⁰² The Gardiner Report framed terrorism as based in an organizational strategy whereby “arms, money and terrorist skills can cross frontiers”, with evolving technologies such as mass communications “facilitating and glamourizing violence”.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Regulations, 18 December 1975, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 366, col. 1631-1632.

⁹⁹ “Conclusion”, 25 November 1974, CAB/128/55/24.

¹⁰⁰ Gardiner Report, 1975, Cmnd. 5847, ch. 1, n. 4, paragraph 13.

¹⁰¹ Lord Donaldson (Lab), Parl. Deb, H.L., 18 December 1975, 5th ser., vol. 366, col. 1631.

¹⁰² Gardiner Report, 1975, Cmnd. 5847, ch. 1 paragraph 3.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, ch. 1, paragraph 7.

A consequence of identity framings that brokered different discursive sites, thereby reinforcing certain intersubjective understandings over others, was the way that yoking reallocated broader boundaries of legitimate and illegitimate actors by redesigning threat/referent categories. Terrorism was yoked to boundaries of new and greater risks, with terrorism “today” explicitly differentiated from prior historical experience:

The greater ease with which terrorism and subversion can now be organized, and the degree of fear it can generate in an otherwise peaceful society like Northern Ireland, make it unwise to compare the present emergency with similar troubles in Ulster in the inter-war years or in the 1950s.¹⁰⁴

This temporal silencing of the past is not a dissimilar pattern from 21st century moves that differentiated “new international terrorism” from “old” terrorism. From the mid-1970s as counterterrorism laws were maintained, the threat was presented as impossible to compare with prior experience. As explained by Rees, “The year 1975 has faced us with a totally different set of security problems.”¹⁰⁵ Terrorism put “ordered democratic government in jeopardy”, and demanded that “the Rule of Law must therefore be maintained in Northern Ireland not only for the sake of its people, but for the sake of all those in the United Kingdom and beyond who want freedom and peace instead of anarchy”.¹⁰⁶ Threat/referent framings securitizing terrorism during the mid-seventies repositioned identity boundaries and were causally influential for the continuous renewals of counterterrorism legal measures. Focus remained on actors from within, but evolving securitizations of terrorism increased the perception of terrorist risk by expanding the referent beyond Britain:

The presence of influential communities of Irish descent in many parts of the English-speaking world means that a number of Britain’s allies and Commonwealth partners have a keen interest in the stability of communal relations in Northern Ireland. Yet some of these same Irish communities have themselves helped to sustain violence there by their support for the paramilitary organisations.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., ch. 1, paragraph 12.

¹⁰⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 November 1975, 5th ser., vol. 899, col. 234.

¹⁰⁶ Gardiner Report, 1975, Cmnd. 5847, ch. 1 paragraph 14.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., ch. 1 paragraph 11.

This reference to the *international* dimension of the Irish conflict is a significant historical reminder and counterpoint to later assumptions of “international terrorism” as a new in its own right. It also underscores how the securitization of terrorism was always built upon a practice of distancing based on certain communities distinguished from the referent as more likely to be terrorists. The nature of British counterterrorism law and the securitization of terrorism as a particular threat have always involved international and non-British actors from “outside”. Actors from the United States played a significant role in Irish-related terrorism since at least the 19th century. During the late 20th century, officials in the Republic of Ireland and the United States were essential for the peace process. International actors, locations, resources, and activities have been a part of Irish-related terrorism throughout history.

Commonplaces of law and order stabilized intersubjective understandings that established the referent as an uncontroversial democratic self. This influenced what were considered to be reasonable legal responses to terrorism considering democratic institutions and the rule of law. In opposition to this democratic self was the terrorist criminal and “terrorist organizations [that] reject the democratic process”. Such framings bolstered exceptional measures through reference to the democratic institutions within which those very measures were housed. The official removal of special category status from those associated with terrorism in 1976 yoked the threat to brutal and ruthless others distinct from “more legitimate” ordinary criminals and political dissidents. This reconfigured broader understandings of identity, carved out what was politically possible, and influenced outcomes of counterterrorism law:

They cannot bludgeon the British out of Ireland and, as the events of November 1974 have proved, the extension of terrorism to Britain simply increases the resolution of the British. They can offer no gifts to the people of Northern Ireland by way of greater freedom, security, or prosperity which the people cannot now attain by legal and democratic means. Moreover, they command the support of only a small fraction of either the minority or the majority community in Northern Ireland. Because they are attempting to destroy Northern Ireland as a political society, terrorists who break the law – which in Northern Ireland gives greater protection to the accused than in most disturbed communities – are not

heroes but criminals; not the pioneers of political change but its direst enemies.¹⁰⁸

Building criminalization during the mid-1970s foreshadowed the approaches that were taken by Margaret Thatcher's government after the 1979 election of a Conservative government. Suspending liberty in the name of security is not itself a new phenomenon. But the ways this suspension plays out in discourse and in practice, and the extent to which freedoms are suspended, is nuanced and historically specific. In 1975, Lord Gardiner explained "Detention can only be tolerated in a democratic society in the most extreme circumstances".¹⁰⁹ It was stated that a "person should be detained only if his freedom would seriously endanger the general security of the public".¹¹⁰ Such statements reasserted the referent in need of protection while simultaneously justifying extraordinary measures.

Murder

From 1968 to 1979 the securitization of terrorism evolved from focusing on issues of peace and order to the construction of terrorists as illegitimate criminal others. Commonplaces of murder were one way that this transition was successful in how it focused on the most serious instances of violence rather than the overarching issues of communal division, historic grievance, and contemporary inequality. Through repeated framings of a ruthless and brutal criminal other engaged in murder a range of different political actors were brokered through similar securitizations of terrorism:

1971, Reginald Maudling (Sec State Home Dept., Con): The battle against **murder and terrorism** has to be pursued in the interests of all parties.¹¹¹

1972, Frederick Elwn Jones (Lab): That such men and women exist and that they have reaped and are reaping a **grim harvest of murder and violence** in Northern Ireland are basic facts which must be faced and dealt with.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Gardiner Report, 1975, Cmnd. 5847, ch. 1 paragraph 8.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., ch. 7, no. 37.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., ch. 7, no. 42.

¹¹¹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 November 1971, 5th ser., vol. 826, col. 221.

¹¹² Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1972, 5th ser., vol. 848, col. 54.

1972, Ian Paisley (DUP): “the escalation of **murders of a most brutal and dastardly nature**”¹¹³

1974, Merlyn Rees (Sec State NI, Lab): “crimes of **murder and extreme bestiality**”¹¹⁴

1974, Francis Pym (Con): There is no logic about it except the expression of **murderous hatred**.¹¹⁵

1974, Gerry Fitt (SLDP): “**murderers** who have been involved in the most heinous crimes...**brutal, callous assassinations and murders**”¹¹⁶

Associated intersubjective understandings relating to these framings enabled a continuance of counterterrorism law despite miscarriages of justice, increased community division, and growing paramilitary support, all of which could have been interpreted as counterproductive consequences of existing measures. Brokerage reinforced the securitization of terrorism along specific framings and discursive patterns of meaning-making. This does not imply an absence of contention, for example over “who killed who”. But in the end such disagreements were overshadowed by a collective struggle against “terrorism” that led to the legitimization of otherwise unacceptably exceptional state powers. Through particular processes of securitization and relational configurations of identity, new security practices based on a language of terrorism emerged and were maintained.

III. Concluding 1968 to 1978

This period saw the beginning of the most recent Troubles and the formation of new laws as new sources of material state power that were constituted and legitimized by an explicit language of terrorism. Despite a justification of the EPA and PTA from 1968 to 1978 as largely dependent on their position as temporary measures, these laws in

¹¹³ Ibid., c71.

¹¹⁴ Parl. Deb, H.C. Deb, 4 April 1974, 5th ser., vol. 871, col. 1475.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., col. 1482.

¹¹⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 5 December 1974, 5th ser., vol. 882, col. 2094.

fact foreshadowed a future expansion and normalization of exceptional measures. Though internment was removed, similar powers of detention were instated. Interim Custody Orders and warrantless arrests continued alongside new counterterrorism laws and a building criminalization of terrorism as based in dangerous others distinct from the referent. Brokerage emboldened certain identity framings over others. Actors were then rhetorically coerced into positions of counterterrorism acceptance considering politically unarguable threat/referent configurations:

1975, John Biggs-Davison (Con): Those who urge on Ministers courses of surrender to the IRA and scuttle from Northern Ireland fall broadly into ‘two categories—the subversive and the confused. The former, the subversive, betray deliberate and callous indifference. The latter, the confused, betray an unwitting indifference to the lives of our citizens, overwhelmingly peaceable and law abiding as they are, overwhelmingly and democratically committed to the Union and entitled to look to the Government of that Union for protection.’¹¹⁷

Not unlike 21st century discourse, the formation and maintenance of exceptional counterterrorism from 1968 to 1979 depended upon processes of securitization that positioned the threat as a non-negotiable other constantly evolving in danger. Terrorism was securitized through particular self/other perceptions of difference. More importantly, terrorism was established as *terrorists* and illegitimate *people*, not just *terrorism* and illegitimate *methods*.

Phrases like “We are living in serious times in Northern Ireland. We now face the new threat of rockets, which are being used against British troops, and which originate behind the Iron Curtain” intensified the perceived danger from terrorist actors.¹¹⁸ Three years later, Rees explained, “Britain was “faced with crimes against society which cannot be justified on the grounds of any political cause”.¹¹⁹ Though counterterrorism laws were constructed by the rule of law, the very boundaries of those rules were reconfigured to accommodate expanding state power. Counterterrorism laws thus established a new benchmark for subsequent lawmaking and acceptable levels of

¹¹⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1975, 5th ser., vol. 902, col. 810.

¹¹⁸ Paisley (DUP), Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 December 1972, 5th ser., vol. 848, col. 75.

¹¹⁹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 November 1975, 5th ser., vol. 899, col. 235.

state force. Security practices, through their formation and legitimation, reasserted Britain as a political and societal referent.

Counterterrorism law was introduced as a temporary response to maintain order. How were such measures maintained during the following decade considering new political leadership, longevity of the conflict, and changing international security dynamics? Hunger strikes with significant public support demanded a return to special category status, and the attempted assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher put pressure on the government's hardline approach. But these events did not spark a change in counterterrorism. Existing trajectories were continued and reasserted alongside Thatcher's (in)famous phrase that "Crime is crime is crime". Exceptional security practices based in counterterrorism laws remained the core strategy. *How* this continuance was maintained through a securitization of terrorism along particular relational configurations of threat/referent identities is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 5

1979 – 1989

Criminalizing terrorism, maintaining emergency measures

I turn to the renewal of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976. It cannot be said too often that the powers contained in this Act are exceptional. I have always accepted—as, indeed, has the House since the Act's first introduction after the tragic consequences of the bombings of 1974, culminating in Birmingham—that the Act represents a temporary infringement of civil liberties, but I believe equally firmly that it was, and remains, a necessary infringement. A clear responsibility is placed upon me and upon Parliament to ensure that the police have adequate powers to deal with a savage and dangerous minority who have no respect for the life or civil liberties of others.

Secretary of State for the Home Department, Merlyn Rees (Lab), 1979¹

In the United Kingdom the emergency measures shared a common initial perception: they represented extraordinary moves designed to meet the needs of a passing emergency. Over time, however, they became standard and unexceptional, a baseline from which further extraordinary powers could be introduced.

Donohue, August 2000²

As remarked above by Labour Secretary of State for the Home Department Merlyn Rees in 1979 and counterterrorism law expert Laura Donohue in 2000, British counterterrorism laws have always been viewed as exceptional. The previous chapter analyzed how these exceptional measures emerged. This chapter examines how exceptional measures were maintained considering a shifting political environment and consistent impossibility of finding a secure definition of the threat. During the 1980s, the securitization of terrorism continued some trends from the previous decade

¹ Prevention of Terrorism (Shackleton Report), 21 March 1979, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser, vol. 964, col. 1517.

² Laura K. Donohue, "Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from the United Kingdom," BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-05, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2000-01, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (August 2000), 40.

distinguishing terrorists from political dissidents and ordinary criminals in a domestic context focused on criminalization more generally. As explained by Guzzini, securitization is both a theoretical approach and an empirical process.³ This duality is central to each empirical chapter: securitization helps us conceptualize how the construction of intersubjective understandings around identity both organizing terrorist others as particular threats and in so doing delimit what outcomes are possible. Whether under Labour or Conservative governments, during moments following terrorist attack or periods of relative calm, exceptional counterterrorism was continued.

In 1979 a Conservative government was put back in power. Blanket and dirty protests that began following the 1976 removal of special category status culminated in a significant hunger strike effort. Counterterrorism laws were consistently renewed throughout the eighties with the PTA replacing its five-year sunset clause with annual renewal in 1989. Though it was still a temporary law, this move foreshadowed the possibility of permanency. The securitization of terrorism drew upon commonplaces of criminality introduced earlier. But official discourse also began to rework how threat/referent identities were constructed. There was a newly observed reference to “international” terrorism. But “international” was not used in the legal definition of terrorism,⁴ nor was it clearly defined.⁵ Irish-related terrorism had an international element going back through history. But the explicit use of “international” as a threat label to continue securitizing terrorism was associated with “foreign others” from outside Britain.⁶ During the 1980s, the international commonplace remained less significant than framings associated with Northern Ireland. This inattention to international terrorism as a particular threat was noted by Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson, who explained:

It is hardly surprising that this understandable preoccupation with terrorism related to Northern Ireland diverted the attention of Britain’s intelligence

³ Guzzini, “Securitization as a causal mechanism”.

⁴ PTA 1984, c. 8, section 12.3a-12.3b.

⁵ Lord Glenarthur (Con): Terrorism, 4 March 1986, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 6th ser., vol. 472, col. 90. On the phrase “international terrorism” in academic research, see Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988).

⁶ Terrorism, 1 February 1979, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 961 col. 1660.

agencies away from international terrorism. Until 7 July 2005 the only significant international terrorist attack on the UK homeland which MI5 and MI6 and the police had to deal with was the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie in December 1988.⁷

How was it that international acts of terrorism and political violence had been taking place throughout history, but the “international terrorist” label just recently arose as a threat identifier? The answer is not that a bounded entity called “international terrorism” just appeared, but that discourse started using the international terrorist label to organize certain intersubjective understandings of boundaries, danger, and belonging. This inclusion of a new international label during the securitization of terrorism began during the 1980s, but became influential during the late 1990s. By the 7 July 2005 attacks, violence could be perpetrated by domestic actors on domestic soil but be categorized as international terrorism. The externalization of some terrorist others was essential to the eventual normalization of exceptional measures. During the 1980s Northern Ireland continued to dominate discourse and policy. But the reference to an “international” other mid-way through this decade hinted at a future shift in threat perception.

Labour introduced the PTA in 1974, but it was the Conservatives who maintained these powers by criminalizing terrorism through the 1980s.⁸ The domestic situation was increasingly tense. Events such as the defeated Miner’s Strike in 1985 reinforced the Government’s hardline approach beyond strict security issues. Conventional forces geared toward the Soviet threat continued to influence security strategy, with some controversy over policies growing.⁹ The 1979 Iranian revolution altered geopolitics in the Middle East and weakened Britain’s strongest ally, the U.S. Though foreign intervention was not a dominating feature of 1980s British policy, the Falklands War of 1982, and (reluctant) support of the 1986 U.S. airstrike on Libya are

⁷ Frank Gregory and Paul Wilkinson, “Riding Pillion for Tackling Terrorism is a High-risk Policy,” in *Security, Terrorism and the UK*, ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/01 (Chatham House, July 2005), 2.

⁸ On criminalization generally, see Criminal Justice Bill [Lords], 18 January 1988, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 125, col. 681-767.

⁹ Christoph Bluth, “The use of force,” in *British Security Policy: The Thatcher Years and the End of the Cold War*, ed. Stuart Croft (London: Harper Collins, 1991), 47; Colin McInnes, “Conventional forces,” in *British Security Policy*, 45-46.

two examples of external engagements.¹⁰ This decade brought a thawing of Cold War politics. But unresolved complexities continued to influence local, regional, and international relations. The decade long Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had led to significant western support of Mujahadeen rebels, including Osama Bin Laden and future Al-Qaida (AQ) operatives. But when the Soviets left, so did the West. The immediate post-Cold War environment left a significant threat vacuum within which to redefine security policies and interests in more nontraditional terms.¹¹ Nontraditional threats such as human security or terrorism were not “new” as much as they were newly acknowledged with greater attention.

Leading up to this shift in overarching security dynamics, exceptional British counterterrorism continued to be renewed throughout the 1980s. The previous chapter explained how new counterterrorism emerged through an explicit discourse of terrorist threat departing from historical notions of public order. This chapter discusses how the securitization of terrorism through the 1980s bolstered processes of criminalization by building on earlier commonplaces while reasserting particular notions of threat/referent identity.

I. An eighties turn

From 1979 to 1989, the “international terrorism” label was introduced as a means to identify non-Irish related insecurity, but the legitimization of counterterrorism law remained tied to issues linked with Northern Ireland. Internationally, the security and political environment was faced with shifts including the U.S. led War on Drugs, controversial foreign involvement in Latin America, Iranian hostage crisis, national-separatist activity in Europe, 1984 Beirut bombings, and first Palestinian intifada. Threats to state sovereignty and democratic order were no longer dominated by fears

¹⁰ Bluth, “The use of force,” 56.

¹¹ Analyses of “1989” point to a vast amount of research, the most compelling being George Lawson, Chris Armbruster, and Michael Cox, eds., *The Global 1989: Continuity and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

associated with communism and traditional military response, but range of possible risks. Despite some calls for greater cooperation considering the “nature of modern international terrorism”, initiatives such as the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (ECST) were overshadowed by state level practice.¹²

British actors did not openly refute international efforts. But material and symbolic powers connected to counterterrorism remained tied to national practice. Britain derogated from the EconvHR citing Article 15 and “times of emergency” to maintain the international legality of domestic counterterrorism. This move reasserted state sovereignty and international norms by reinforcing the former through engagement with international institutions. Patterns of identity construction focused on Northern Ireland securitized terrorism to maintain EPA and PTA legitimacy even when due process and civil liberties were suspended. Institutional moves such the Diplock Court system that did not use juries were another way that counterterrorism law was altering the institutional norms that guided British legal process. One debate even cited up to 40% of Diplock Cases as non-terrorist related, alluding to consequences of exceptional counterterrorism power beyond strict issues of terrorism.¹³ Securitizing terrorism along terms of criminality maintained the distinction between terrorist criminals and ordinary criminals, legitimizing extraordinary counterterrorism as necessary:

We must guard against extraordinary judicial processes being applied to those who are accused of committing crimes that have no terrorist or political motive. We should take care not to include what we used to call the ODC—the ordinary decent criminal.¹⁴

Processes of criminalization and exceptional legal measures were not limited to the UK but were a growing international norm.¹⁵ At the same time, there was increased reference to international aspects of the Northern Irish conflict. But these international

¹² Baroness Ewart-Biggs (Lab): Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (Continuance) Order 1982, 8 July 1982, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 6th ser., vol. 432, col. 962.

¹³ Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (Continuance) (No. 2) Order 1985, 12 July 1985, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 466, col. 454-455.

¹⁴ Don Concannon (Lab): Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, 30 June 1982, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 26, col. 948.

¹⁵ Donohue, “Civil Liberties, Terrorism, and Liberal Democracy,” 32.

links did not lead to a construction of all terrorism within one umbrella even though it was clear that the Troubles were not isolated to the northern six counties:¹⁶

1979, Viscount Brookborough (UUP): It has been said time and time again that in this particular battle we are fighting for the minds of people. I was interested to see that the Irish Ambassador in Washington drew attention to this matter. His remarks were not very widely reported in the British Press but what he said was that immense damage would be done by the misrepresentation of the Bennett Report in America and that it would increase the flow of funds from America to the IRA...I think that the situation in America is extremely serious. We have very bad publicity there on these issues of H Block and interrogation.¹⁷

Despite significant international components, the Irish threat was never identified as “international” in official discourse or practice. It could be assumed that the U.S. role as a major ally precluded more substantial inquiries into its relationship to violence in Northern Ireland, thus silencing the identification of Irish terrorism as international terrorism. However, even when international connections to non-allied states were referenced, such as Libya, the way terrorism was securitized still distinguished Irish-related insecurity from other types of terrorism. From the beginning usage of the “international” commonplace in the securitization of terrorism, this label was allocated to foreigners external to Britain: outsiders.

For the securitization of terrorism transitioning into the eighties, criminalization was more significant for outcomes of identity and practice than externalization. The 1981 election of lead hunger striker Bobby Sands was a clear reminder of the social and political backdrop to terrorist violence. But terrorist others continued to be framed as immoral and illegal, not political. Terrorist suspects were yoked to dangerous others distinct from politics and ordinary crime. Terrorism was far beyond issues of public order from earlier years. In the words of Secretary of State for the Home Department Douglas Hurd (Lab), terrorism was “an exceptional crime, directed at the heart of

¹⁶ Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen, eds., *A Farewell to Arms: Beyond the Good Friday Agreement*, 2nd Ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).

¹⁷ Prevention of Terrorism (temporary provisions) Act 1976 (continuance order) 1979, 22 March 1979, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 399, col. 1346.

society”.¹⁸ However, most scheduled offenses in counterterrorism law were already present in existing legislation.¹⁹ Thus the maintenance of counterterrorism measures going beyond existing laws demanded a securitization of terrorism that established *terrorists* as threatening others in their own right.

This stabilization of threat identity was made possible by particular relational configurations across discourse, for example by framing terrorist acts as “the most violent and revolting crimes”.²⁰ Terrorists were essentialized as the ultimate illegitimate others, and represented “the degeneration of civilized beings to an all-time low in our democratic society”.²¹ With part of this referent democratic society constituted by “rule of law” norms, the formation and implementation of counterterrorism, security practice and threat/referent identities were mutually reinforcing. Efforts to repress violence through intensified security practice led to the detention of 279 persons under the PTA in the first quarter of 1979 alone, but did not lead to agreement on counterterrorism law effectiveness.²² Labour politicians claimed that “the draconian response to the use of armed violence in political issues has not succeeded”.²³ Almost ten years later in 1988, Labour politicians alluded to counterterrorism as counterproductive, stating that “the Act [PTA] is draconian and creates terrorism”.²⁴ A strong view was that counterterrorism, at least as it stood, was not working:

1988, Seamus Mallon (SDLP): The second fundamental question is: can amending or bending the law lead to a solution? Let us look at the rake’s progress on that. We have had internment without trial, the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984, the Diplock courts, the brutal interrogation techniques verified by Lord Justice Bennett and supergrass trials. We have had all these

¹⁸ Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill, 6 December 1988, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 143, col. 208.

¹⁹ For example, Offences against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100), Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c.3), Aviation Security Act 1982 (aircraft) 1982 (c.36), Nuclear Material (Offences) Act 1983 (c.18). Later acts include the Computer Misuse Act 1990 (c.18), and Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c.31).

²⁰ David Howell (Con): Parl. Deb., H.C., 21 March 1979, 5th ser, vol. 964, col. 1526.

²¹ William Craig (UUP): Ibid., col. 1543.

²² “Statistics on the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 1974 & 1976, letter from private secretary, home office, Chilcot,” 20 April 1979, PREM 16/2085.

²³ Tom Litterick (Lab): Parl. Deb., H.C., 21 March 1979, 5th ser, vol. 964, col. 1602-1603.

²⁴ Martin Flannery (Lab): Prevention of Terrorism, 16 February 1988, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 127, col. 942.

abuses of the law, but, 20 years on, none of them has ended terrorism. This legislation, whether permanent or temporary, will not end violence.²⁵

However, despite such views exceptional legal measures were renewed rather than reconfigured.

At the same time that politicians expressed doubts over counterterrorism effectiveness in Northern Ireland, there were also doubts about the severity of “international terrorism”. Statistics associated with international terrorism as a specific threat led most to doubt “whether the level of international terrorism in Britain warranted any special powers”.²⁶ As demonstrated in the below table taken from a 1987 debate on “Terrorism”, the numbers associated with incidents of “international terrorism” were noticeably small compared with Irish-related acts of political violence:

	1981	May—December 1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	January—June 1987
Shooting incidents	—	1	—	3	2	3	—
Bombing incidents exploded	9	3	4	6	2	2	—
Neutralised or failed to explode	1	2	1	4	4	—	5
Arson attacks	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
Kidnappings	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
Hi jacking of aircraft	—	1	—	—	—	—	—

Figure 1.2 – “Incidents of international terrorism,” 1981-1987²⁷

Thus, while the international commonplace was introduced, the focus remained largely on the Irish-related terrorism in the securitization of terrorism necessary to maintain

²⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 February 1988, 6th ser., vol. 127, col. 938-939.

²⁶ Clive Walker, “Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984,” *The Modern Law Review* 47, no. 6 (1984): 705.

²⁷ HC Deb 13 July 1987 v119 cc361-3w, Terrorism, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1987/jul/13/terrorism#S6CV0119P0_19870713_CW A_404 (Accessed 10 October 2010).

counterterrorism in practice. Securitization helped overcome doubts of legal ineffectiveness by bolstering the criminalization of terrorism more generally:

Anyone who shows affinity towards communism, that's common sense, the IRA the PLO and I would say anyone who's decrying marriage, family life, trying to break that up, pushing drugs, homosexuality, indiscipline in schools, weak penalties for anti-social crimes . . . a whole gamut of things that could be pecking away at the foundations of our society and weakening it.²⁸

Threats were not situated in traditional security terms but included ideological and subjectively determined risks. Terrorism did not just threaten law and order through violence, but the *morality* of the referent through drugs and homosexuality. The referent was not just a political state, but a societal we that was based on certain values. The shifting securitization of terrorism from terms of public order in the early 1970s, to processes of criminalization identifying terrorist others through the 1980s, entailed particular consequences for identity and practice. Insecurity was reframed from one of literal survival considering physical violence or disorder, to one of moral or ideational survival. As explained by Buzan *et al.*, a part of whether or not an issue is securitized depends on the answer to the question:

Does a referent object hold general legitimacy as something that *should* survive, which entails that actors can make referent to it, point to something as a threat, *and* thereby get others to follow or at least tolerate actions not otherwise legitimate?²⁹

For the British self in the case of counterterrorism, this “should survive” is supported by security practices formed through a “rule of law”. This enabled and legitimized exceptional counterterrorism while also reaffirming the referent as a morally legitimate entity based in uncontroversial democratic norms.

²⁸ Joe Sim and Philip A. Thomas, “The Prevention of Terrorism Act: Normalising the Politics of Repression,” *Journal of Law & Society* 10, no. 1 (1983): 80 (with reference to Harold Salisbury, former Chief Constable of York).

²⁹ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, 31.

Issues of identity and belonging were further exacerbated as authorities were susceptible to “political pressure in regard to whom they should arrest”.³⁰ Similar to earlier years, by securing law and order, citizens would be able to go about their business and daily lives without fear.³¹ The securitization of terrorism as a threat to society was bolstered by a “criminalization of dissent” directed at those unrelated to terrorist activity.³² A consequent interrelation of security practice, alienated communities, and insecurity was apparent to lawmakers, but did not redirect securitization discourse or counterterrorism practice:

1987, Lord Mishcon (Lab): I can do no better than quote from the report on the operation in 1986 of this Act by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, of his scrutiny. I quote from page 36, paragraph 7.2: The PTA is extremely unpopular with the Irish community in Great Britain, and, as with all the emergency legislation, in Northern Ireland too. I heard from one staunch Republican who denies the right of Westminster to legislate for the Province at all. Others denounce terrorism whether domestic or international but say that the legislation has cast a blight over the Irish population in Great Britain and is counterproductive in Northern Ireland, because, among other things, it alienates the population and discourages the public from any attempt to help in rooting out terrorism. It creates martyrs and tends to cause misplaced sympathy for people who on any rational view have committed terrible crimes. It is not for me to advise whether it would be possible to abolish all emergency legislation in Northern Ireland, and rely on the ordinary criminal law; but it is a suggestion seriously made to me. The EPA has just been renewed in January 1987 with all party support.³³

Counterproductive effects of insecurity were acknowledged but counterterrorism still received “all party support”. This support was given even though measures increased the alienation of communities and failed to prevent some of the most fatal attacks of this period. This included the 1982 bombing of a disco in Ballykelly, killing over a dozen and injuring fifty, the 1984 Conservative Conference bombing in Brighton that used over 100 pounds of explosives and required significant planning, and the 1987

³⁰ Walker, “Prevention of Terrorism,” 706.

³¹ Lord Boston of Faversham (Minister of State Home Office, Lab): Parl. Deb, H.L., 22 March 1979, 5th ser., vol. 399, col. 1334.

³² Paddy Hillyard, “London Letter: Britain's Riot Response Echoes 1969 in Ulster,” *Fortnight* 228 (November 1985): 15.

³³ Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (Continuance) Order 1987, 19 February 1987, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 484, col. 1243.

Enniskillen bombing that killed eleven. In 1988, the Lockerbie bombing was a reminder of how international relations and security were interconnected and not separated by political borders.

Despite the overarching maintenance of counterterrorism measures during this period, there were areas of increased scrutiny. One 1979 cabinet paper referencing the Shackleton Report stated that proscription had not made “more than a marginal contribution to the defeat of terrorism”.³⁴ During debate, opposition concerns were voiced:

1979, Joan Maynard (Lab): The Prevention of Terrorism Act has not prevented terrorism and it has not even been effective in detecting it. Its real effect and purpose have been to deter legitimate political activity and discussion on Ireland and the British role there.³⁵

1986, Gerald Kauffman (Lab): In terms of preventing terrorism, this Act is a failure. Terrorism continues horrifically. The presence of the Prevention of Terrorism Act on the statute book, most unhappily, prevented neither the atrocity at Harrods nor the abomination at Brighton.³⁶

Political efforts were not completely absent. The Anglo-Irish Agreement passed in 1985 strengthened commitments to an eventual political settlement. It also reaffirmed that Northern Ireland’s political status would only be determined by majority rule.³⁷ However, counterterrorism law remained the dominant trajectory despite continued issues of effectiveness. Government statistics published in 1986 going back to 1974 cite that 92% of those detained had not been subject to any charge, and that only 3% of those charged were with counterterrorism offenses.³⁸ A third of those charges were due to failed cooperation during port examinations, and in the end only 2% of those charged were found guilty.³⁹ By way of comparison, a drop in serious crime conviction rates to

³⁴ “Statistics,” 20 April 1979, PREM 16/2085, 50.

³⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 21 March 1979, 5th ser., vol. 964, col. 1606.

³⁶ Prevention of Terrorism, 19 February 1986, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, 6th ser., vol. 92, col. 420.

³⁷ Anglo Irish Agreement, November 1985, Article 1 (Cited in ‘Northern Ireland,’ 1998, HC Research Paper 98/57, page 9).

³⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 19 February 1986, 6th ser., vol. 92, col. 420.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

less than 10% in the year 2006 was viewed by Attorney General Lord Goldsmith as “out of control”.⁴⁰ The low rate of conviction for terrorist offenses and growing “concern about the impact of this Act [PTA] on community relations” during the 1980s thus could have prompted reassessments of counterterrorism.⁴¹ However, any reassessment was foreclosed by a securitization that stabilized the knowledge of terrorists as so dangerous and nonnegotiable that consequences from counterterrorism were “less bad” than possible attack.

Security and insecurity were linked by counterterrorism laws that suspended due process, and implementation procedures that established suspect communities. Despite miscarriages of justice, such as the Birmingham Six, or the decision in *Brogan v. the UK* that officials violated Article 5(1)⁴² of the European Convention on Human Rights, EPA and PTA measures continued to be renewed.⁴³ As early as 1983, criminalization targeted “problem groups such as gays, nuclear disarmament campaigners, welfare recipients, nationalists, blacks and the Irish”:⁴⁴

Blacks in Britain share the same animosity towards the police and the lack of confidence in the rule of law as Catholics in Northern Ireland. The British police are seen as partisan and racist to wide sections of the black and Asian communities.⁴⁵

These broader trends of exclusion were exacerbated by the way counterterrorism was implemented. The 1979 Bennett Report indeed affirmed Amnesty International’s observation that British authorities mistreated suspected terrorists during interrogation, stating “in some of the cases investigated by Amnesty International there was prima

⁴⁰ “Convictions too few – Goldsmith,” *BBC News*, 28 May 2006 [cited 9 July 2012]; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5025924.stm>.

⁴¹ Lord Hylton (Crossbench): Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (Continuance) Order 1985, 21 February 1985, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 460, col. 737.

⁴² See Appendix A for Article 5(1) in full.

⁴³ *Brogan and Others v. United Kingdom*, European Court of Human Rights, 29 November 1988, Ser. A, No. 145-B, 11 EHRR 117 [cited 9 November 2010]; available from, <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=brogan&sessionid=61924160&skin=hudoc-en>.

⁴⁴ Sim and Thomas, “The Prevention of Terrorism Act,” 71.

⁴⁵ Hillyard, “London Letter,” 15.

facie evidence that ill-treatment had taken place”.⁴⁶ Medical evidence revealed that injuries “were not self-inflicted and were sustained in police custody”.⁴⁷ This could have prompted a reassessment of counterterrorism practice, but subsequent government reviews such as the Jellicoe Report reaffirmed existing measures.⁴⁸ The maintenance of EPA and PTA laws marked a creeping normalization of extraordinary measures. They also marked a building acceptance of the illiberal consequences that stemmed from counterterrorism practice that relied upon us/them boundary making processes for preventive action. The justification of such insecurity can be interpreted as an effect of the “politics of exception” and “politics of unease” that surrounded how terrorism was securitized.⁴⁹ The referent was legitimate, the terrorist was not. Each identity’s position was stabilized in discourse and practice through a relational reassertion of both.

As explained earlier, events and materiality are far from unimportant. But it takes more than acts of violence to sustain exceptional powers over time. Processes of threat/referent construction through securitization are essential to legitimize exceptional practice in the absence of attack, and presence of counterproductive consequence. Counterterrorism laws drawing upon the Special Powers Act were initially framed in terms of public order, but transitioned to construct terrorists as entity-others in their own irrespective of actual violence. Due to the securitization of terrorism demanding preventive action, terrorist suspects were as dangerous as those engaged in violence.

II. Configurations, counterterrorism, and the Thatcher administration

Through the 1980s, counterterrorism was maintained through relational configurations of identity dominated by commonplaces of “campaign”, “community”, “civilization/democratic society”, and “war against terrorism”. Terrorism was reinforced as a threat in its own right distinct from ordinary crime and political dissidence.

⁴⁶ “Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland,” Chairman: His Honour Judge H. G. Bennett, March 1979, Cmnd. 7497, ch. 19, section 404, p. 16.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Sim and Thomas, “The Prevention of Terrorism Act,” 72.

⁴⁹ Buonfino and Huysmans, “Politics of exception.”

Contributing to this shift was a new attention to the “international” as a means to securitize terrorism along inside/outside assumptions of identification. The way “international terrorism” was positioned in official British discourse ignored the international aspect of Irish-related terrorism and the international element of terrorism going back in history. This established a misplaced perception of “international terrorism” as a self-evident other that would become increasingly problematic. The illegality and immorality of terrorist activity reinforced the legitimacy of British security practice.

Campaign

The danger of terrorism was asserted above all other threats to British security. The use of “campaign”, though not new, was particularly prevalent in the securitization of terrorism during this period. Through framings of “campaign” that brokered different sites, discourse intensified the risk of terrorism as an organized wave of criminality. Whether or not elites viewed current measures as working, notions of campaign bolstered the perceived scale of Irish-related terrorism:

1979, William Craig (UUP): Recently reports in the newspapers—whether or not they are to be believed—suggest that another **campaign** is envisaged in Great Britain. I find it a sad reflection on Parliament and Government that, after all the years of violence, we have to admit that our citizens are still at risk.⁵⁰

1979, Gerry Fitt (SDLP): I have never supported the terrorist **campaign** being waged by the IRA. However, those in charge of security in Northern Ireland should not allow themselves to lower their standards and engage in practices which have already been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights and Compton.⁵¹

1987, Cecil Walker (UUP): They have endured such **campaigns of terror** for the past 15 years, 15 years of inefficient colonial rule. During that time, they have suffered about 2,500 deaths and another 29,000 injured in the process. If such diabolical acts were carried out in any other part of the United Kingdom, the population would rise against the Government. However, over in Northern Ireland there is a belief that we are now considered to be second-class citizens.⁵²

⁵⁰ Parl. Deb., H.C., 21 March 1979, 5th ser., vol. 964, col. 1546.

⁵¹ Ibid., col. 1535.

⁵² Northern Ireland (Security), 6 May 1987, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 115, col. 772.

1988, Douglas Hurd (Sec of State Home Department, Con): The past 20 years have seen in the United Kingdom a terrorist **campaign** unparalleled in the western world, aimed ostensibly at the goal of a united Marxist Ireland. This **campaign** has caused the death of almost 3,000 men, women and children, more than three quarters of them Irish men and women. It has also been responsible for the deaths of more than 400 soldiers. This year alone 91 people have been killed in Northern Ireland.⁵³

“Campaign” framed terrorism as an “enemy of society” connected to notions of war, army, and soldier that were a part of constructing the Irish republican threat throughout history. This bolstered terrorism as a network of illegitimate violence, not lone criminals or isolated cells. Though commonplaces of campaign could have linked to the political grievances underlying terrorist violence, they were instead linked to framings of criminality:

The main threat to civil liberty comes from the criminal, the wrongdoer and the terrorist. Anyone who cares for liberty must therefore seek to defeat the criminal, the law-breaker and the terrorist....⁵⁴

By securitizing terrorism as an especially serious other, the “only” politically legitimate response was to maintain hardline security measures based in the law. Brokered notions of criminality softened political disagreement even if measures did not seem to be especially effective. This rhetorically coerced the majority of actors into supporting a continuance of existing measures. Political negotiations, though taking place privately, were not a part of official *public* discourse, and the “existential” nature of terrorism established through processes of securitization was maintained.

Community

In addition to “campaign” was a growing reference to “community”. Through these framings, certain groups were positioned as sharing an identity boundary with both terrorists and the referent. The focus on communities foreshadowed later securitization

⁵³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 6 December 1988, 6th ser., vol. 143, col. 207.

⁵⁴ Eldon Griffiths (Con): Parl. Deb., H.C., 21 March 1979, 5th ser , vol. 964, col. 1576.

discourse and practice, providing another example of exclusionary boundary formation as central to how counterterrorism was formed and implemented. Those associated with certain communities were presented as victims and risks. Both of these perceptions had the effect of further marginalizing those already positioned on the borders of the referent. Rhetorical packages such as “two communities”, “minority community”, “trust from the community”, winning “hearts and minds” in the community, and “recruiting security service officers” from “the community”, reinforced unequal and problematic relations between authorities and social groups. These power dynamics were reminiscent of earlier colonial history as well as contemporary tension with the “Muslim community”.⁵⁵ These framings established consequential perceptions of “the other” by brokering an increased number of actors and textual sites through particular securitizations of terrorism, even if the speaker’s intention was not a full endorsement of existing measures:

1979, Bennett Report: Effective policing of a **community** can only be achieved with the consent and support of the overwhelming majority of **that** community.⁵⁶

1979, Martin Flannery (Lab): Injustices flow from the essential nature of the Prevention of Terrorism Act as sure as rain comes from a rain cloud. It exacerbates and inflames the already difficult situation with which we are trying to grapple. It is applied basically to one section of the **community**—the minority in Northern Ireland.⁵⁷

1985, Lord Hylton (Crossbench): My Lords, in previous years, in common with other noble Lords, I have expressed concern about the impact of this Act on **community** relations.⁵⁸

1985, Douglas Hurd (Sec State NI, Con): This policy can provide the **community** with the service they need only if the security forces can be sure of the support of all those within the **community** who obey the law...We must continue to look for ways of winning the confidence and securing the support of the **whole community**...It is up to the whole **law-abiding community** and its political leaders to show that they hold to the basic principles that underlie our

⁵⁵ Cf. Rachel Biggs, “Community engagement for counterterrorism: lessons from the United Kingdom,” *International Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2010): 971–981.

⁵⁶ Bennett Report, 1979, Cmnd. 7497, ch. 1, paragraph 19.

⁵⁷ Parl. Deb., H.C., 21 March 1979, 5th ser., vol. 964, col. 1587.

⁵⁸ Parl. Deb., H.L., 21 February 1985, 5th ser., vol. 460, col. 737.

system of law and order and that they are prepared to support and sustain those who duty is to protect us all.⁵⁹

1985, Lord Prys-Davies (Lab): A law that is perceived by a large sector of the **community** to be unfair may help to fuel discontent, lawlessness and violence. There is a feeling that the EPA may be counter-productive.⁶⁰

1987, Eldon Griffiths (Con): When such a surveillance is being conducted, the police must be sensitive to the situation in the local **community**.⁶¹

1988, Jim Marshall (Lab): We are driven to the conclusion that security policy alone will not defeat terrorism. If we are to defeat it, both **communities** in the North must feel secure in the knowledge that the practice of rule of law will be objective and even-handed...⁶²

1990, Colville Report: There is universal agreement that the struggle to eradicate terrorism in Northern Ireland must be conducted with the widest possible support from the **community**...The Central **Community** Relations Unit and the Northern Ireland **Community** Relations Council are engaged in cross-**community** contact and co-operation, mutual understanding and respect, as well as equal opportunities and equity of treatment, and a respect for the cultural roots of both **communities**, including the use of Gaelic.”⁶³

Framings of community provided a discursive gateway to broker divergent political parties through seemingly uncontroversial assumptions of threat and vulnerability. The securitization of terrorism increasingly depended upon such patterns of boundary differentiation. Linking terrorist suspects to particular communities institutionalized suspicion and justified increased surveillance:

1979, James Kilfedder (UUP): An example of antagonism has already been given in tonight’s debate of the policeman at Gatwick who looks upon all travellers to Northern Ireland as terrorists or suspected terrorists. That is the message that television programmes and press comments give to people in Britain. The message is that the people of Northern Ireland are second-class

⁵⁹ Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978, 26 June 1985, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 81, col. 1029.

⁶⁰ Parl. Deb., H.L., 12 July 1985, 5th ser., vol. 466, col. 454-455.

⁶¹ Ministry of Defence Police Bill [Lords], 24 February 1987, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 111, col. 181.

⁶² Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions), 1 March 1988, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 128, col. 913.

⁶³ Colville Report, 1990, Cm. 1115, ch. 1, 1.13.

citizens who are not worth the moral support that we believe the United Kingdom should give them.⁶⁴

Even as concerns were raised, the construction of terrorist suspects along reprehensible terms such as “brutal murderers” and “ruthless criminals” outweighed arguments such as above. Through the way terrorism was securitized and threat/referent identities were stabilized, actors were rhetorically coerced into continuing more of the same. Through framings of community, official discourses of securitization reinforced and legitimized divisive boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.

Civilization and democracy

Exacerbating situations of alienation from commonplaces of community were references to “civilization” and “democracy”. These framings reasserted us/them differences based on perceptions of good versus bad. As explained by Croft, terms of civilization are a means to raise the stakes of the struggle.⁶⁵ As such, these configurations escalated earlier discourses of criminality and bolstered the threat as not only due to violent action, but politically unarguable framings of actors’ moral disposition.

1979, John Biggs-Davison (Con): In view of both British and Spanish reports that members of the Provisional IRA have operated with terrorists of the Basque separatist organisation ETA...are the Government satisfied with the co-operation between European and other western countries against the **common enemy of Western civilisation?**⁶⁶

1979, William Craig (UUP): we have been unable to cope successfully and adequately with the problem of terrorism. We are talking of a matter of life and death. We are discussing horrible mutilation. These are no ordinary crimes. They represent the **degeneration of civilised beings** to an all-time low in our **democratic society**⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Northern Ireland (Appropriation), 7 March 1979, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 963 cc1320-415, col. 1390.

⁶⁵ Croft, *Culture, Crisis*, 283.

⁶⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 1 February 1979, 5th ser., vol. 961 col. 1660.

⁶⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 21 March 1979, 5th ser, vol. 964, col. 1542-1543.

By the mid-1980s, temporary counterterrorism laws had been in practice for over a decade. Terrorism was no longer an effect of rioting hooligans, but was securitized to represent nonnegotiable immorality and criminality. It is here that the role of securitization in effecting outcomes becomes particularly salient. The justification of maintained exceptionality is possible irrespective of material evidence.

The audience must accept the terrorist other as “real” before an actor engages in terrorist violence. This fits in line with securitization theory and speech acts more generally,⁶⁸ as well as the question “What, though, if the ‘objective’ nature of a threat was only the last stage of a process that is much more social in its character?”⁶⁹ It is not that the objective aspects of insecurity are insignificant. However, the impossibility of objectively defining “terrorism” and the policy objective of prevention demand that terrorism be successfully securitized even if the environment is devoid of objective reference points such as an attack. The 1980s continuance of exceptional measures would not necessarily have taken place, or taken place in the way that it did, if terrorism had not been formed through discourses of “civilization” and “democracy”. Counterfactual arguments are not always the most convincing. Nonetheless, they are a helpful reminder for an analysis “from” the present that alternatives were possible.

“International”?

The expansion of the referent beyond Britain to “civilization” was met by the use of an “international” commonplace. Though infrequent, when the international label was deployed it was positioned as an indication of foreigners from outside. International was an externalizing commonplace that marked those who were using British territory to plan attacks outside Britain, against non-British actors, related to non-British disputes. Though it was not all of a sudden in the mid-1980s that such acts may have been taking place, this new threat construction did contribute to a shift in outcomes: For example, by bolstering securitization to help justify the PTA’s 1989 renewal, fifteen years after its

⁶⁸ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, 30.

⁶⁹ Croft, *Culture, Crisis*, 9.

first appearance and without a five-year sunset clause. Through assumptions of foreignness, new physical and cultural distances not only separated terrorist others from the referent, but types of terrorists from each other. “International” did not help provide a clear means of threat identification. However, this commonplace did establish what Hansen has referred to as “degrees of othering” by establishing different degrees of identity and difference.⁷⁰ This spatial trend was not predetermined, and the presumed essence separating international from Irish demanded social and political practices of labeling to be established as such. Over time by the end of the following decade, such processes of securitization would lay the foundation for an unexpected shift to permanent counterterrorism.

The “international terrorist” as a foreigner was supported through intertextual linkages to immigration. For example, by connecting counterterrorism with deportation powers housed in the Immigration Act 1971.⁷¹ However, despite these moves, during the 1980s the international threat identity remained marginal relative to Irish-related terrorism.⁷² While contemporary discourse connects international terrorism with events from the 1980s, such as the Salmon Rushdie affair and tensions in Bradford, this association was not apparent during actual 1980s discourse. International terrorism was a threat in its own right, differentiating non-Irish from Irish related terrorism. The international component of Irish groups could have encouraged a transition in securitization to one terrorist threat label:

1987, Tom King (Sec of State for Northern Ireland, Con): It [the IRA] may possibly have support from President Gaddafi; it may have associations with other groups around the world; but it does not enjoy the support of any decent, civilised country in the world.⁷³

1988, Kenneth Hind (Con): “Many terrorists, and especially those in the IRA, are trained in Northern Ireland and some of them have experience of camps in Syria

⁷⁰ Hansen, *Security as Practice*, 37.

⁷¹ Walker, “The Prevention of Terrorism,” 707.

⁷² Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Bill, 8 May 1987, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 487, col. 377.

⁷³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 6 May 1987, 6th ser., vol. 115, col. 737.

and the Lebanon. They are trained by the PLO or by other Palestinian organisations”⁷⁴

1988, Ian Stewart (Lab): “the terrorists have received substantial supplies of arms and explosives from Libya and elsewhere”⁷⁵

However, rather than merge all terrorism into a category defined by methods of violence, official discourse securitized terrorism as types of others based on geographic boundary assumptions. Interestingly, despite some references to international terrorism, many seemed unconvinced that this international other was threatening enough to demand counterterrorism, and the risk was said to be inflated.⁷⁶ Reports were also cited as in fact failing to acknowledge the successful police operations against “foreign” terrorists that did *not* use counterterrorism.⁷⁷

Attention to some opinions of international terrorism during this period as minimal is not to ignore threats from outside the UK. But it does provide important perspective in light of how much attention the term “international terrorism” received in later years. Even as Irish and international labels constructed separate types of others in securitization, an overlap of definition continued. For example, how in 1988 Ken Maginnis (UUP) referred to Father Ryan from Northern Ireland as “a man who has acquired a reputation as an **international terrorist**”.⁷⁸ The overlap was not interpreted as a contradiction because international was positioned as a type of foreign other based on particular geographic assumptions of belonging and difference. More specifically when it came to the “international”, this terrorist other was constructed as “non-British”, “non-domestic”, and frequently, non-western identities:

1986, Lord Molloy (Lab): Is there not some justification that animates these [international] loathsome terrorists who slay innocent people on aircraft or at

⁷⁴ Parl. Deb, H.C., 6 December 1988, 6th ser., vol. 143, col. 253.

⁷⁵ Ibid., col. 267

⁷⁶ Walker, “The Prevention of Terrorism,” 705.

⁷⁷ Clive Walker, “The Jellicoe Report on the Prevention of Terrorism (temporary provisions) Act 1976,” *Modern Law Review* 46 (1983): 485.

⁷⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 6 December 1988, 6th ser., vol. 143, col. 229.

airports; primarily, the occupation of their homeland, whether by the **Russians** in Afghanistan, others in the **Middle East** or CIA agents in South America?⁷⁹

1988, James Molyneux (UUP): My second point is brief. As the order is based on a Bill that extends mainly to Great Britain, which originated only in Great Britain and which now refers to **international terrorism** and not solely to Irish terrorism, I wonder whether someone in authority could tell us whether the **Libyan** or **Iranian Government** have had the same facility for consultation as the Irish Government.⁸⁰

1988, Douglas Hurd (Secretary of State Home Department, Con): There is still a threat of terrorism hanging over the citizens of this country, including Northern Ireland. That arises not just out of the affairs of Northern Ireland but, as the right hon. Gentleman said, from the **middle east and the sub-continent**... As the right hon. Gentleman said, the original Act [PTA] did not cover international terrorism at all, but the world has changed for the worse since then. During 1987, there were six murders in Great Britain, which the police attributed to international terrorism. Those who died were three members of an **Indian** religious group at a service, two opponents of the **Khomeini regime**, and a **Palestinian** journalist.⁸¹

1988, Kenneth Hind (Con): We are dealing not only with international terrorism, or only with domestic terrorism, but with a mixture: the **IRA**, the **Libyans**, the **Iranians**—all kinds of **terrorists who come to this country** bearing its people no good will. Those are the people whom we must exclude, and this Bill will exclude them.⁸²

The international commonplace broadened securitization to include threats coming *in* to the UK from beyond Ireland. This would set an important intersubjective precedent for later perceptions of international terrorism. But for the 1980s, these new others were outshadowed by what Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Con) referred to as the “evil of terrorism” out of Northern Ireland.⁸³

Violent acts from actors connected to Northern Ireland, such as the 1984 Conservative Party conference bombing, were more times than not strategic uses of violence for political ends. Terrorism was not an existential fanaticism based on a

⁷⁹ Parl. Deb, H.L., 4 March 1986, 6th ser., vol. 472, col. 89.

⁸⁰ Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 February 1988, 6th ser., vol. 127, col. 925.

⁸¹ Ibid., col., 925.

⁸² Ibid., col. 940.

⁸³ Prevention of Terrorism Act, 25 July 1989, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 157, col. 600w.

ruthless brutality, but an instrumental use of violence for political ends. When considered alongside terrorism as a constant of history, terrorism is a method of violence irrespective of geographic identity markers not an entity-other in its own right. However, the securitization of terrorism reinforced processes of threat identification based on spatial assumptions of belonging, not the way actors engaged in violence:

Many of these terrorists are trained by the Red Brigades and Baader-Meinhof and middle eastern [*sic*] terrorist groups and they come to Ulster to do their worst. We must prevent them from doing their worst on the mainland.⁸⁴

The Irish have always been distanced from the core British self, but Irish security threats were “closer” to the British referent than “other” others, such as international terrorism connected to the Middle East. The Irish threat was yoked closer to the British referent than dangerous foreigners from areas south or east of the British Isles. As mentioned earlier, the international label contributed to the replacement of the PTA’s five-year sunset clause with annual renewal considering the reduction of Irish-related violence at the time of the Act’s renewal:

1988, Earl Ferrers (The Minister of State Home Office, Con): It is a fact that more than three years have now elapsed since the last outrage was committed by Northern Irish terrorists on the mainland. That is a tribute to the vigilance of the police. But the sombre threat remains undiminished. It comes from any and all parts of the world...However, in recognition of the exceptional nature of the powers, we propose that the new legislation should be renewed and reviewed annually so that it will be the subject of regular scrutiny. It will require a deliberate decision by Parliament each year to retain it. It will remain possible to discontinue any part of it at any time.⁸⁵

It was over fifteen years since the EPA and PTA were introduced as temporary measures. Though non-Irish terrorism and political violence had been in “existence” well before the late 1980s, it was only during this period that the securitization of

⁸⁴ Kenneth Hind (Con): Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Bill (Allocation of Time), 23 January 1989, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 145, col. 712.

⁸⁵ Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (Continuance) Order 1988, 16 February 1988, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 493, col. 565.

terrorism explicitly referenced possible insecurity from without in discourse on security practice within.

While this shift in securitization to include possible insecurity beyond the UK is important, the influence of the “international” commonplace during this particular period should not be overstated. Even during the debate referenced above that directly referenced the possible insecurity from non-Irish groups, in the discourse, “Irish” outnumbered “international” 5 to 1.⁸⁶ Arguments referencing the previous five years cited only *six* deaths from international terrorism, compared to 83 from “internal” activity.⁸⁷ Political actors were unconvinced by the actual risk posed by international terrorism, and focused more heavily on continuing insecurity out of Northern Ireland:

1988, Roy Hattersley (Lab): The Act [PTA] must be judged by its effects on terrorism in Northern Ireland and our success in combating it. The Home Secretary now wants to broaden its scope and tries to defend that action by saying that we live in an age of international terrorism. But everybody knows that this measure was introduced to deal explicitly with the Northern Ireland situation as an immediate and temporary expedient and necessity. Without the tragedy of Northern Ireland—indeed, without the specific tragedy of the Birmingham pub bombings—the Act would never have been passed.⁸⁸

In the late 1980s, despite a reference to international terrorism, officials were not fully convinced that this particular threat was a big enough risk to justify the maintenance of domestic legal exceptionalism.

Thus the securitization of terrorism remained dominated by Irish-related threats while reconstructing the relational configurations of threat/referent construction. One way discourse was reconfigured was through commonplaces of “war”. This reference to “war” blurred the boundaries between law enforcement and defense and changed the rules of what were acceptable levels of state force. Terrorism was securitized as more threatening than disorder or brutality in earlier years, and framings of war legitimized continuing practices based on prevention. While contemporary research around “war”

⁸⁶ Ibid., col. 565-85.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid., col. 932.

and counterterrorism often focuses on the post-September 11th era, in the case of Britain “war” contributed to the securitization of terrorism over a decade earlier.

War against terrorism

1979, Cyril Townsend (Con) “asked the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland if he will make a statement on the **war against terrorism** in Northern Ireland”⁸⁹

1979, Harold McCusker (UUP): “despite some of the favourable trends that have been seen in the **war against terrorists**, seven young uniformed soldiers were killed in South Armagh last year”⁹⁰

1987, Eldon Griffiths (Con): The third task that the RUC is asked to undertake is unlike that of any other British police force—to fight **Europe’s most difficult and prolonged counter-insurgency war**. It is not in the Basque region of Spain or in Greece that the casualties of terrorism are at their highest; it is in the United Kingdom.⁹¹

1987, James Kilfedder (UUP): It is not the duty of the police, which is a civil organisation, to engage in **war with the IRA**...the Army, not the police, should be used in such areas.⁹²

Rather than an example of a 21st shift, “war” represents a continuity around how terrorism is securitized and exceptional measures were legitimized. Framings of war escalated perceptions of terrorist danger beyond the notion of “campaign”, though the consequence of both was an expansion of perceived scale. Terrorism was not just a brutal criminality but a much “bigger” source violence and insecurity. From 1979 to 1989, “criminal” and “war” commonplaces reinforced the illegitimacy of terrorist suspects and legitimacy of exceptional state force. These discourses and the intersubjective understandings upon which they relied were causally consequential for the consistent maintenance of exceptional measures. The politically unarguable nature of these framings limited the conditions of possibility for alternative security responses. Terrorism continued to be securitized as an illegitimate other whose essence as such was increasingly unquestioned.

⁸⁹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 1 February 1979, 5th ser., vol. 961, col. 1658.

⁹⁰ Ibid., col. 1659.

⁹¹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 6 May 1987, 6th ser., vol. 115, col. 769-770.

⁹² Ibid., col. 786.

Reasonable

Actors were rhetorically coerced into an acceptance of counterterrorism not just because of the terrorist danger but because of the British self that was based on politically unarguable democratic values. The term “reasonable” came to play a legal and legitimating role in how measures were constituted and the referent was constructed. This cemented the referent as a distinctive self whose legitimacy was formed by and through the rule of law itself. In the first instance, “reasonable” is recognizable as a legal term of technical use for British lawmaking.⁹³ However, underlying this usage are influential assumptions of moral superiority beyond technicalities of law. “Reasonable” positions those who are part of the official referent as those who can exert subjective judgment in order to implement exceptional counterterrorism. Measures such as extended detention were guided by whether or not the “examining officer...has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person examined is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”.⁹⁴

The decision of whom was a possible terrorist or what was suspicious depended upon an authority’s interpretation of risk. Considering the demands of preemptive counterterrorism, material evidence is frequently unavailable. Actors depend upon intersubjective understandings of the other formed through processes of securitization in implementing security practice. Determining reasonable suspicion is indelibly linked to interpretation and judgment by actors who are part of the referent, with this determination linked with preexisting repertoires along terms of “community”, “campaign”, and “war”. “Reasonable” is thus part of counterterrorism law’s substance as well as the legitimation process justifying such substance in the first place: the referent and counterterrorism practice were mutually reinforcing.

“constable may enter and search any premises or other place where that person is or where the constable has **reasonable** grounds for suspecting him to be”⁹⁵

⁹³ Hogan and Walker, *Political Violence*, 64.

⁹⁴ PTA, 1989, c. 4, schedule 5, part 4.a.

⁹⁵ EPA 1987, c.30, section 6.11.

“wears any item of dress...wears, carries or displays any article...to arouse **reasonable** apprehension that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organization, is guilty of an offence”⁹⁶

“a constable may arrest without warrant a person whom he has **reasonable** grounds for suspecting to be...concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”⁹⁷

To view “reason” or “reasonable” as solely a technical component of law making or an objective mechanism of implementation, would be an analytic and historical misreading. There are broader implications at play through terms of reason because through terms of reasonable, state officials are bestowed with a type of unquestioned legitimacy.⁹⁸

Counterterrorism law implementation depended upon individual judgment by state actors and a convincing construction of the terrorist enemy. The British referent was reasserted as the ultimate source of legitimacy and terrorist suspects were delegitimized. This mutual constitution of self and other brings back broader issues within security studies more generally. Buzan and Hansen explain how CS scholarship, like Realism and Poststructuralism, is confronted by questions including “Does the state rely upon enemies to maintain identity/control over its population?”⁹⁹ In the case of maintained counterterrorism law in Britain through the 20th century discussed here, a securitization lens enables at least a preliminary and context-specific response that would be in the affirmative. CS scholarship cannot *not* take on the assumption of self/other identities as essential to the way a state functions (or, survives) both as a political and as a societal referent. Whether or not “others” are explicitly labeled as “enemies” is an empirical question, but the role of the state does depend upon an establishment of singularity and purpose based on terms of difference. In this sense, the way terrorism was securitized to maintain counterterrorism law during 1980s Britain

⁹⁶ PTA, 1989, c. 4, part 1, section 3.1a-b.

⁹⁷ Ibid., part 4, section 1.1-2.

⁹⁸ Lord Lyell (Parliamentary Under Sec State NIO, Con): Parl. Deb, H.L., Deb 8 May 1987, 5th ser., vol. 487, col. 356.

⁹⁹ Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 216.

depended upon particular configurations of identity for legitimation. The referent was yoked to boundaries of reason, and the threat to boundaries unreason.

Framings of “criminal”, “campaign”, “community”, “international”, “war”, and “reason” were strengthened in how their position in discourse brokered previously unconnected actors and textual sites, thereby delegitimizing terrorist others while bolstering the legitimacy of the British referent. Exceptional counterterrorism was maintained, with a normalization of exceptional EPA and PTA powers lurking on the horizon. Public order issues associated with hooligan activity from the early 1970s had transitioned to nonnegotiable criminality distinct from ordinary criminals and political dissidents. The new reference to an “international” commonplace depended upon a disregard of the international element connected to Irish terrorism, beginning a process of securitization based on spatial assumptions of belonging. The referent’s moral capacity and civilization bolstered the threat to limit politically possible response aside from the maintenance of existing counterterrorism. The 1980s began the causally significant trend of securitizing terrorism along geographic perceptions of inclusion and exclusion that would become hardened over time.

III. Summarizing 1979 – 1989

Despite the 1990 Colville Report concluding that exceptional counterterrorism was in many ways counterproductive, British counterterrorism renewals through the next decade would reassert existing measures. Though the introduction of an international label did not play as significant a role during the 1980s as it would in the late 1990s, the beginning securitization of terrorism(s) along perceptions of geographic and cultural distance foreshadowed future practices of labeling that hold significant consequence for outcomes. The longer counterterrorism laws were maintained, the more the securitization of terrorism asserted degrees of externalization separating types of terrorist others from the referent in need of protection. International terrorism was associated with foreign, non-western threats, while Irish-related terrorism encompassed

a different degree of danger from “across the water”. Both threat constructions relied upon an establishment of suspect communities that shared a boundary with the referent but were not fully included.

Processes of securitization based on degrees of otherness and danger outweighed concerns over insecurity or ineffectiveness linked to EPA and PTA measures. International terrorism was from the beginning a foreign threat with no connection to western civilization or the British referent, distinguished from domestic and Irish terrorism:

After reading the summary of Lord Shackleton’s report on the operation of the Acts, the Prime Minister has commented that although these issues are naturally viewed in terms of the terrorist threat in and from Ireland, we should not exclude the **Iraqis**, and **Arabs in general**, from our minds in considering the recommendations in Lord Shackleton’s report.¹⁰⁰

The international threat label, while seemingly value-neutral, was in fact always linked to intersubjective assumptions of foreignness, non-belonging, and non-Britishness. International and Irish terrorists were both positioned as external to the British referent, albeit along different degrees of distance and foreignness.

The term “international terrorism” was introduced alongside a new connection between counterterrorism and immigration:

1985, David Waddington (Con): The enforcement of the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 is principally for the police. As part of their training **Immigration Officers** (and customs officers employed as immigration officers under the Immigration Act 1971) are made **aware of their powers of examination** under the 1984 Act have instructions to bring to the attention of the police any matter which might involve **international terrorism**.¹⁰¹

1987, Clare Short (Lab): Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the extension of the Prevention of Terrorism Act to include **international terrorism** is new? Secondly, will he explain exactly on what grounds those people were

¹⁰⁰ Cartledge comments from 28 July 1978 in “Statistics,” 20 April 1979, PREM 16/2085, 68.

¹⁰¹ Prevention of Terrorism, 21 October 1985, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 84, col. 35.

detained, so that we may judge whether they could have been detained under **other powers in the criminal law or in immigration legislation**? My belief is that the Government have extended the Act to international terrorism to justify legislation that does not stand up in its own right.¹⁰²

1987, Minister of State Home Office (Earl of Caithness, Con): It has been suggested by those who believe the Prevention of Terrorism Act is unnecessary in the fight against terrorism that the **Immigration Act 1971 provides sufficient powers for the authorities to proceed against international terrorists**.¹⁰³

From its nascent references in official British discourse, international terrorism was linked with concerns over “a greater flow of international terrorists *into* Britain” [emphasis added].¹⁰⁴ While all terrorism was positioned as in need of exceptional counterterrorism, international terrorism was also placed as requiring powers of deportation. “International terrorism” and fighting a “war” against terrorism broadened the scope of terrorist threat even as the majority of securitization discourse focused on Northern Irish related instability. Despite the inconsistency of separating terrorist others along geographic boundary patterns, the stage was set for a long-term securitization of terrorism based on spatial assumptions of belonging.

Would exceptional counterterrorism continue during the 1990s as the peace process got under way, international terrorist acts remained minimal, and political leadership changed? As will be discussed in the next chapter, Labour began the 1990s with the direct conviction that counterterrorism law was not working.¹⁰⁵ Yet by 1998, it would be Labour that would introduce the first permanent act of counterterrorism built upon EPA and PTA strategies. This act was formed on the heels of the Good Friday Agreement, and during an era of relative calm with respect to violence. The way terrorism was securitized and threat/referent identities were stabilized along particular configurations thus continued to be essential to counterterrorism outcomes. It is how such relational configurations unfolded to stabilize us/them perceptions of danger and

¹⁰² Prevention of Terrorism, 10 February 1987, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 110, col. 265.

¹⁰³ Parl. Deb, H.L., 19 February 1987, 5th ser., vol. 484, col. 1236.

¹⁰⁴ Andrew Hunter (Con): Parl. Deb, H.C., 6 December 1988, 6th ser., vol. 143, col. 248.

¹⁰⁵ Colville Report, 1990, Cm. 1115, ch. 1, 1.3.

continue securitizing terrorism despite a substantially altered social environment and political leadership that is the focus of the next chapter leading to 21st century permanent counterterrorism law.

Chapter 6

1990 to 1999

A change in legal course, from temporary status to permanent feature

As the House will be aware, the Government propose the introduction of permanent counter-terrorist legislation, which we hope will do away with the need for the annual renewal of temporary provisions.

*That approach recognizes the sad but incontrovertible reality that even a lasting peace in Northern Ireland—something that we all pray and hope will be firmly established soon—would not of itself remove the need for counter-terrorist legislation. Terrorism, and the threat of terrorism from a range of fronts, is likely to continue to exist for the foreseeable future.
(Jack Straw, Secretary of State for the Home Department, 16 March 1999)¹*

*The anti-terrorism laws have led to some of the worst human rights abuses in this country over the past 25 years, contributed to miscarriages of justice and have led to the unnecessary detention of thousands of innocent people, most of them Irish. Only a tiny percentage of those detained have ever been charged and almost without exception they could have been detained under ordinary criminal laws...
(Wadham 14 December 1999)²*

As discussed in the previous chapter, despite controversy over counterterrorism law effectiveness, exceptional measures continued to be renewed throughout the 1980s. There was a building distinction in official discourse between Irish and international terrorism even as the general definition of terrorism remained vague. Counterterrorism laws in the early 1970s emerged along framings of public order reminiscent to special powers used in Ireland going back to at least the early 20th century. But through the

¹ Prevention of Terrorism, 16 March 1999, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 327, col. 999.

² John Wadham, Reply to Straw. “No, you’re turning us all into criminals” *The Guardian*, 14 December 1999 [cited 31 December 2010]; available from <http://archive.guardian.co.uk/Repository/getFiles.asp?Style=OliveX...in-custom&Path=GUA/1999/12/14&ChunkNum=-1&ID=Ar01503&PageLabel=15>.

seventies and eighties, terrorism was securitized along framings of criminality leading not just to the securitization of “terrorism”, but the construction of “terrorists” as others in their own right. Individuals could be labeled terrorist suspects even in the absence of violence. By the late 1990s, this identification of terrorist others in official discourse reinforced a securitization of terrorism that established types of others rather than types of terrorizing violence. These discourses bolstered Labour’s proposal to replace temporary legislation with the Terrorism Bill, a UK-wide, permanent act. The referent was not just domestic order, as seen immediately following the Troubles, but democratic civilization. This shift in discourse broadening the referent and reinforcing different terrorist threat labels activated a beginning normalization of exceptional counterterrorism.³

This chapter analyzes how terrorism came to be securitized as a general risk of violence and as specific others through practices labeling Irish, domestic, and international terrorist threats.⁴ Intersubjective understandings linked to us/them identities constructed during the securitization of terrorism were essential to lawmakers’ acceptance that “international terrorism” was so threatening as to justify permanent counterterrorism. The securitization of terrorism was especially important considering the relative historic calm of terrorist violence at the time and aims of prevention: perceptions of possible future risk were more important than verifying known danger. The securitization of terrorism along Irish, domestic, and international labels reinforced particular collective meanings based on degrees of distance, difference, and danger. Prior threats were yoked to legitimate politics, for example Gerry Adams and Sinn Fein to John Hume and the SDLP. This emphasized “new” boundaries of illegitimacy around international terrorism. Though the peace process was under way, insecurity in Northern Ireland remained. The Omagh 1998 attack was the single most deadly bombing of the troubles, killing 29 and injuring over 200. At the same time, the international threat did not necessarily pose such an imminent danger as to require making measures permanent that had in earlier years brought significant counterproductive consequences.

³ Neal, “Normalization”.

⁴ “The Terrorism Bill,” 13 December 1999, Research Paper 99/101; “Legislation against Terrorism: A Consultation Paper,” December 1998, Cmnd. 4178.

It may seem that, quite simple, counterterrorism hardens when threats harden, and policies weaken when threats weaken. However, this perspective would ignore issues of consequence for the empirical case that are drawn out by a relational-securitization framework. First, the threat of Irish terrorism, increasingly referred to as “dissident republicanism”, was not necessarily diminishing at the time that the peace process began. The full cessation of violence by the PIRA was not declared until 2005, and republican splinter groups in fact joined forces under one operational umbrella during the summer of 2012. Secondly, it was unclear what “international terrorism” actually *was*. A number of specific groups were mentioned, such as the PLO or AQ. But the threat was also positioned as a generalized danger stemming from the broader Middle East. In addition, the number of deaths from international terrorists was far less than the close to 3,000 killed by Irish related acts.

The argument is not that a threat did not exist from groups such as AQ, or that the formation of security measures against nontraditional uses of terrorist violence was a surprise. However, the way that these measures formed along particular labels of identification was not predetermined. These labels and the intersubjective understandings upon which they were stabilized in turn caused certain outcomes to be made possible over others. These outcomes led to specific consequences including repeated patterns of alienation and insecurity, the establishment of new legal precedents for a higher threshold of legitimate state power, and a beginning normalization of preemptive security practice. Thus the perspective is not that rising and falling threats corresponded with rising and falling levels of counterterrorism exception. Rather, that rising and falling levels of counterterrorism corresponded with patterns of identity construction that were based on particular sets of intersubjective understandings. These understandings were of significant consequence for what outcomes of security and insecurity were deemed to be politically acceptable.

This construction of particular identity labels was not determined by the nature of objective security threats but a result of negotiated and renegotiated political and

social practice. These practices had consequences for intersubjective understanding around self/other identity perceptions, and material security outcomes such as counterterrorism law.

I. Situating the nineties

The last two chapters explained how counterterrorism emerged and was maintained during the 1970s and 1980s. When introduced in 1973 and 1974, counterterrorism laws were accepted as emergency responses to establish peace and order that were “unprecedented in peacetime in Great Britain”.⁵ As stated by Roy Jenkins, these measures were necessary to “enable preventive action to be taken against people who appear to the Secretary of State to be involved with terrorism (i.e. concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism) but against whom it is not possible to bring charges under the present law”.⁶ The justification of these new laws rested in “the defeat of terrorism and the extension of normal policing”.⁷ The view was that these measures would not be indefinite. Though internment was only used for a few years during the Troubles, exceptional measures and the consequences on state-community relations were long lasting. Interim Custody Orders and extended detention continued to target and alienate suspect communities. This was legitimized by securitizing terrorist others as more threatening than ordinary criminals. Terrorism was “an exceptionally serious threat to society...not merely more serious than other forms of violent crime, but different in kind.”⁸

Over time the construction of terrorism expanded and was positioned as uncivilized fanatics that threatened a way of life in addition to the right to life as such: “Something about terrorism makes its threat inflate, genie-like, way beyond its actual

⁵ “I.R.A. Terrorism in Great Britain,” 24 November 1974, CAB/129/180/14.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ “Northern Ireland: Security Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and the Secretary of State for Defence,” 30 August 1979, CAB/129/207/4.

⁸ “The Terrorism Bill,” 1999, Research Paper 99/101, Section 5.10-5.11.

physical scale...”⁹ Securitization is a never-ending process of renegotiated meanings and demands regular reassertions of identity. This constant (re)securitization of terrorism was necessary to justify the maintenance of counterterrorism in the face of opposition concerns during the early to mid nineties:

1991, Roy Hattersley (Lab): The Act creates the illusion of a campaign against terrorism...Today, the Home Secretary read a tragic and terrible list of the death and destruction caused in this country in the past year. That can be interpreted in two fashions: as the need for the prevention of terrorism Act to continue in its present form, or as evidence of the Act’s failure and the need to reconsider the whole issue.¹⁰

This continued ambiguity of effectiveness required that official discourse elevate terrorist risk to overcome opposition and continue policies. To successfully securitize terrorism and legitimize a continuance of exceptional law, the threat had to be formed along politically unarguable threat/referent constructions irrespective of material evidence. Whether or not there “really” was an international other at the doors of Britain was, to a point, irrelevant for whether or not the securitization of terrorism was successful.

As explained by Buzan *et al.*, “Our approach [to securitization] has the basic merit of conceptualizing security as a labeling for which actors can be held responsible rather than an objective feature of threats.”¹¹ This nuanced view is a key part of how securitization theory complements critical terrorism studies and genealogical investigations of counterterrorism. It is not that the objective is unimportant, but that for causally consequential interrelations of discourse, identity, and practice, the material on its own is not sufficient in affecting outcomes. Leading up to the nineties, the criminalization of terrorism differentiated terrorists from ordinary criminals and political dissidents. The removal of special category status connected protests from prison with the street and bolstered support for the republican cause. The Thatcher government remained committed to “tough” uses of power despite events such as the 1979

⁹ Townshend, *Terrorism*, 2.

¹⁰ Prevention of Terrorism, 4 March 1991, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 187, col. 32.

¹¹ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, 212.

assassination of Conservative MP Airey Neave, 1984 Brighton bombing at the Conservative Party conference, and increased scrutiny of state security practices. Opposition to continuing counterterrorism was not entirely absent, with Labour MP Roy Hattersley arguing that “the record of the past 13 years shows that the Tory Government have been no more successful in their battle against terrorism than in their fight against crime”.¹² But exceptional laws continued to be renewed.

Counterterrorism discourse reconstructed the terrorist threat while the peace process reconfigured other identities and interests.¹³ These processes bolstered a yoking of former Irish-related terrorists to legitimate politics and asserted new actors as terrorists. While U.S. support of the IRA came up in earlier discourse around counterterrorism, in the 1990s the U.S. was a broker of peace, not part of the problem. Over time, transnational components of Irish-related terrorism were given far less scrutiny than issues around “international terrorism”. The role of U.S. actors in Irish political violence was well known. But the U.S. as a key British ally may very well have helped silence this role over time.¹⁴

During the 1990s, reforms in Eastern Europe were referenced as successes over terror, and tensions in Iraq were referenced as risks of terror.¹⁵ The terrorist suspect was increasingly constructed as external, non-western others. Following the bombing of the New York World Trade Centers in 1993 and the attacks on US embassies in East Africa in 1998, AQ took on a new resonance. But the threat was still low on most radar screens. The 1995 sarin gas attack by Aum Shinrikyo on the Tokyo subway highlighted the possibility of CBRN weapons-use by non-state groups. But terrorizing political violence was not “new”, and such acts represented a continuity of political violence and shifting scale that had gone on before and after 1989.¹⁶ What did change was the sense of

¹² Terrorism, 24 February 1992, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 204, col. 696.

¹³ McSweeney, “Security, Identity and the Peace Process.”

¹⁴ With thanks to Barry Buzan on this point.

¹⁵ A Wider Europe: Council of Europe’s Role, 29 October 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 522 col. 1741-59; The Gulf, 21 January 1991, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 525, col. 10-68.

¹⁶ Conor Gearty, “Terrorism and Morality,” *European Human Rights Law Review* 4 (2003): 379.

uncertainty that the Cold War “balance of terror” had avoided.¹⁷ In the context of British counterterrorism, the decade following the end of the Cold War marked two decades since counterterrorism law was introduced. The peace process was underway and there had been no significant international terrorist attacks against Britain. But exceptional counterterrorism was on the verge of being made permanent.

In 1998, the year of the Omagh attack, parliament passed the Criminal Justice (Terrorism Conspiracy) Act. This expanded state power by restricting right to innocence until proven guilty in two ways. A police officer’s opinion on membership of a proscribed organization (rather than material evidence of membership), and a suspect’s silence during questioning (previously a protected right), could now be used as evidence of guilt.¹⁸ Neither of these on their own would enable a conviction, but this shift in burden of proof and due process was significant. At the same time, the UK passed the 1998 Human Rights Act (implemented in 2000), strengthening a commitment to civil liberties and international human rights. However, there was a simultaneous derogation from the EcourtHR:

There have been in the United Kingdom in recent years campaigns of organised terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland which have manifested themselves in activities which have included repeated murder, attempted murder, maiming, intimidation and violent civil disturbance and in bombing and fire raising which have resulted in death, injury and widespread destruction of property. As a result, a public emergency within the meaning of Article 15(1) of the Convention exists in the United Kingdom.

...

To the extent that the exercise of these powers [counterterrorism measures] may be inconsistent with the obligations imposed by the Convention the Government has availed itself of the right of derogation conferred by Article 15(1) of the Convention and will continue to do so until further notice.¹⁹

This legal reinforcement of a continued emergency situation was necessary to justify the maintenance of exceptional practice despite a building peace process. Reconfigured

¹⁷ Gerald Howarth (Con): Defence Estimates, 19 June 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 174, col. 852.

¹⁸ “The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Bill, Bill 244 of 1997-98,” 2 September 1998, Research Paper 98/87.

¹⁹ Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42, Schedule 3 Part I.

identities were important to continue counterterrorism practice and to sustain policies of negotiation in Northern Ireland.²⁰ The 1993 Downing Street Declaration recognized “the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or British, or both, as they may so choose”, while security practices broadened threat construction beyond Irish-related terror.²¹ Executive decision continued to trump judicial authority in counterterrorism law, for example as related to EPA “Detention orders”:

8.—(1) After receiving a report made by an Adviser under paragraph 7(1), the *Secretary of State* shall consider the case of the person to whom it relates and, if he is satisfied—

- (a) that the person has been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism, or in directing, organizing or training persons for the purpose of terrorism, and
- (b) that the detention of that person is necessary for the protection of the public, the *Secretary of State* may make a detention order for the detention of that person. (emphasis added)²²

The conditions legitimizing executive power were similar to earlier laws. Terms of “reasonableness” reinforced state authority in discerning if a suspect is “concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism, or in directing, organizing or training persons for the purpose of terrorism”.²³ As discussed in the previous chapter, “reasonable” was not particular to the 1990s but a consistent legal and rhetorical means of reasserting state authority. The addition of “reasonable” was intended as a check on excessive power, but to “reasonably” believe was still more open-ended than to “absolutely” believe, a point that was brought up by the European Commission.²⁴

²⁰ Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 9.

²¹ “Northern Ireland,” 1998, HC Research Paper 98/57, 6.

²² EPA 1996, c. 22, Schedule 3.

²³ EPA, 1996, c. 22.

²⁴ Hogan and Walker, *Political Violence*, 64.

Counterterrorism through the 1990s expanded law enforcement powers as well as the executive, for example through a stop and search clause in the PTA (Additional Powers) 1996:²⁵

1 Power to stop and search pedestrians

(f) In the 1989 Act insert, after section 13A—

“13B Power to stop and search pedestrians

- (1) Where it appears to a police officer of the rank mentioned in subsection (1)(a), (b) or (as the case may be) (c) of section 13A above that it is expedient to do so in order to prevent acts of terrorism to which that section applies, he may give an authorization that the powers to stop and search persons conferred by this section shall be exercisable at any place within his area or a locality in his area which is specified in the authorization.
- (2) This section confers on any constable in uniform power to stop any pedestrian and search him, or anything carried by him, for articles of a kind which could be used for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts of terrorism.”²⁶

There were some efforts to moderate existing powers, in part connected to international law. This was noticeable with the Human Rights Act 1998 mentioned earlier, as well as through initiatives such as the Geneva Convention (Amendments) Act of 1995 including protection for individuals from “acts of terrorism”.²⁷ Elements of due process relevant to domestic counterterrorism were reinforced, such as Article 75’s “Fundamental guarantees”:

- (d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law;
- (e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his presence;
- (f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt; (36)²⁸

This final clause is especially important for counterterrorism. The 1979 Amnesty International Report had cited that 94% of cases before Diplock Courts resulted in conviction, and that 70-90% of those convictions were based on admissions of guilt

²⁵ PTA (Additional Powers) Act, 1996, c. 7.

²⁶ Ibid., Section 1(2).

²⁷ Geneva Conventions (Amendments) Act 1995, c. 27, part II.

²⁸ Ibid.

during interrogation: “Only in a minority of cases is other evidence – forensic evidence, intelligence evidence, or testimony of witnesses – produced in court to secure a conviction”.²⁹ The consequence of this report combined with the 1979 Bennett Report was significant, and 1990s human rights initiatives started legal protections for terrorism suspects. However, to be enacted, these protections in fact reinforced a securitization of terrorism based on the threat as from terrorist others rather than terrorist methods.

The Northern Ireland Arms (Decommissioning) Act 1997 and the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 were significant institutional moves. As prisoners were released former terrorists were incorporated into political negotiations, yoking previously illegitimate others to legitimate actors. Discursive space opened up to redefine who “terrorists” were. Despite work on human rights and political efforts, however, the state of counterterrorism through the 1990s was one of maintained exception. This continuance transformed into a permanency of counterterrorism law through a securitization of terrorism across particular “forms” (labels) as observed in the “Legislation Against Terrorism – A consultation paper”.³⁰

By the 1990s, a terrorist terminology newly prevalent from early 1970s discourse was routinized. The intensification of words connected with terror in parliamentary debate grew alongside broadening state powers. The below screenshot of how many times “terrorism” appeared in parliamentary debate records during the 20th century shows this increased usage in the blue bars above each decade:³¹

²⁹ “Amnesty International activity in Northern Ireland, 1 January 1978 – 31,” December 1978, FCO/87/821.

³⁰ “Legislation Against Terrorism,” 1998, Cmnd. 4178.

³¹ <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/terrorism?century=C20> (search performed 2 January 2011).




Figure 1.3 – Search of “terrorism”, UK Parliamentary debates 1900-2000

We see in this screenshot the top five speakers using terms of terrorism, the total number of hits for terrorism, and the “most relevant” record for the 20th century. There were 21,415 results for terrorism in the 20th century compared to 3265 hits in the 19th century, and 9457 hits for the years 2000 to 2005 alone.³² During the 1990s alone, “terrorism” appeared 6300 times, and “terrorist” 6218 times.³³

While these results are a helpful frame of reference, it is not merely the number of times a word appears that influences intersubjectivity, securitization, and outcomes. However, the presence of terrorism-specific language and growing reference to terrorists as specific entity-others. If discourse had not constructed “terrorists” but focused on methods of violence, the intersubjective understandings around terrorism and counterterrorism outcomes would have been different. The construction of “terrorism” as a morally reprehensible other enabled certain discourses to arise that changed what was considered legitimate security practice. An increase in explicit articulations around terrorism restricted possibilities of response. The intersubjective power residing in discourses of terrorism marginalized dissenters as being “soft” on terrorism. The unquestioned immorality of terrorists reinforced the trump card morality of state actors

³²<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/terrorism?century=C19> (search performed 20 January 2011); <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/terrorism?decade=2000s> (search performed 2 January 2011).

³³ <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/terrorism?decade=1990s> (search performed 2 January 2011); <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/terrorist?decade=1990s> (search performed 2 January 2011).

and limited spaces for agency during lawmaking. While it was not new for terrorism to be understood as unethical, this immorality grew in influence through 1990s securitization. The threat was no longer just brutal, but evil; the referent not just Britain, but civilization and democratic society.

The broader 1990s context did not necessarily point to a continuance of emergency counterterrorism or their transition to permanence. Though it was Labour who introduced the PTA in 1974 and the TA 2000, it was also Labour who had largely voted against PTA and EPA renewals:³⁴

1.3 There is a direct challenge, in the representations made to me, to a continuation of the EPA. The Labour Party puts it thus:-

"The Labour Party continues to believe that emergency legislation cannot resolve the problems which exist in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the grievances to which the operation of emergency powers give rise are in themselves one of the causes of the continuing violence. They also lend credence to the claims of the paramilitaries by giving them a status they would not otherwise have. We believe that the basic task of government in Northern Ireland is to ensure that the Province is administered on the basis of the rule of law. It is an extremely dangerous fallacy to believe that the absence of political stability justifies deviations from the rule of law. On the contrary, precisely because the political institutions lack legitimacy, the negative effects of deviations from the rule of law are magnified."³⁵

Exceptional powers are not easily relinquished once obtained, but power did not have to be maintained through counterterrorism. Instead, government could have emboldened political power by fulfilling earlier promises of returning to normalcy alongside the peace process, reinforced existing criminal laws, or focused on being a global leader in balancing security and human rights. These political directions would not have removed power or ignored insecurity. But they would have reallocated where power came from by recalibrating security practice. The inconsistency of Labour's position was not unnoticed, with Conservative MP James Gray asking "Will the Home Secretary take this opportunity to feel the slightest twinge of embarrassment at the fact that, from 1983 to

³⁴ "I.R.A. Terrorism," 1974, CAB/129/180/14.

³⁵ Colville Report, 1990, Cm. 1115.

1995, the Labour party consistently opposed renewal of the prevention of terrorism Act?”³⁶ He continued by asking Labour officials if they would “apologise to the nation for getting it wrong for 12 years?”³⁷

Combined with this unpredictable political climate, historical events at the time did not necessarily present a picture of imminent emergency threatening the life of the nation. The Downing Street Declaration, paramilitary ceasefires (inconsistent but significant), and Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, all provided for public talks aimed at peace. Though Omagh was a tragedy, reactions to the attack made it clear that the vast majority were committed to nonviolence. The British Government reaffirmed in the Declaration that “they have no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland”.³⁸ With respect to non-Irish threats, while officials referenced 80 “international terrorist incidents” in Britain over the past 20 years,³⁹ such numbers were minimal when compared to the 71 deaths caused by Irish-related terror in 1990 alone.⁴⁰ The de-escalation of rhetoric around Irish related terrorism considering political initiatives was not itself puzzling. But the expansion of exceptional counterterrorism laws that were formed in response to this threat in light of such de-escalation was. It is this disjuncture that opens up space to more adequately conceptualize the way securitization built upon discourses around new threat labels. Instead of categorizing all terrorists under an umbrella of “terrorism”, securitization distinguished types of others. It was through these threat/referent constructions that a path to 21st century normalization of exceptional counterterrorism was enabled.

As in the prior decade, most international attacks referenced in official discourse were not directly against Britain. The 1994 car bomb outside the Israeli embassy and Balfour House in London, the 1998 Johannesburg restaurant bombing, the 1997 Luxor attack, and the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa were indeed linked with

³⁶ James Gray (Con): Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 March 1999, 6th ser., vol. 327, col. 1003-1004.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ “Northern Ireland,” 1998, HC Research Paper 98/57, 9.

³⁹ Straw (Lab): Counter-terrorism Legislation, 30 Oct 1997, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, col. 1027.

⁴⁰ Peter Brooke (Con): Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Bill, 19 November 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 181, col. 23.

British interests. But they could have been interpreted as one-off strategic incidents, not as events demanding exceptional domestic laws that permanently reconfigured the British rule of law itself. While the 1998 East African bombings were officially referenced as an early example of “international” terrorism, according to the American Federal Bureau of Investigation these attacks were also linked to British citizens.⁴¹ Irish actors carrying out attacks in the Netherlands and Germany were referred to as “Irish”, not “international”. What made the examples in Africa demand a different securitization? Even though the non-Irish threats were presented as not necessarily against Britain, international terrorism justified exceptional measures:

1995, Michael Howard (Con): with the growth of Islamic radicalism, we need to remain vigilant against the possibility that Britain will be used as a base for plotting acts of violence overseas and raising money for terrorist purposes⁴²

1998, Jack Straw (Secretary of State for the Home Department, Lab): We have to send the clearest message to international terrorist groups that we in the United Kingdom will not allow this country to be used as a base for plotting and supporting terrorist operations abroad.⁴³

International terrorism, as in earlier discourse, was understood as foreign and external. This reinforced the degrees of distance and difference separating the referent in need of protection from each identified type of terrorism. This identification of terrorist risk along patterns of inclusion/exclusion and labels based on geographic perceptions of belonging was problematic from the start. As seen with the 7 July 2005 London bombings, international terrorism was committed by domestic actors from within as much as foreign others from without.⁴⁴

The 1990s could have refocused efforts on existing criminal law and international cooperation, but initiatives such as the Euro Directive were interpreted as

⁴¹ Bamford, “‘War Against Terrorism’,” 743.

⁴² Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, 8 March 1995, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 256, col. 352.

⁴³ Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Bill, 2 September 1998, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 317, col. 736.

⁴⁴ Bulley, “‘Foreign’ Terror?”.

having “no effect on our right and determination to combat the evils of terrorism”.⁴⁵ As argued by Townshend, international cooperation is “always limited by the absence of consensus on the justifications for political violence”.⁴⁶ Expanding powers of search and seizure, shifting burdens of evidentiary proof, and broadened jurisdictions outside Britain against non-British interests, pointed to a significant expansion of state counterterrorism. When a measure was repealed, it was either replaced by a new measure or accompanied by reminders of other powers. For example, though exclusion orders were removed, the Secretary of State followed this removal by stating “Of course our ability, under the Immigration Act 1971, to deport, or deny entry to, suspected international terrorists will remain unchanged”.⁴⁷ This reasserted international terrorism as non-British and from outside the UK and bolstered the legitimacy of exceptional state power.

It is not just that a shift to permanent counterterrorism law took place, but *how* this move occurred. With political developments holding, it was not predetermined for counterterrorism to continue:

1997, Jack Straw (Sec State Home Dept, Lab): In Northern Ireland, there has of course been a very welcome change for the better. The IRA and a number of loyalist groups have declared ceasefires. Currently those are holding. Substantive talks between the parties have begun. There is real cause for optimism that a lasting peace may be achieved in Northern Ireland.⁴⁸

The threat from splinter groups and an incomplete decommissioning of arms remained, but progress was being made. “International terrorism” was not clearly defined and “international terrorist” incidents were far fewer in number than Irish terrorism ever was. Arguments referencing changes in technology as evidence of growing terrorist danger are not incorrect, but they should be interpreted relative to the context within which

⁴⁵ Peter Lloyd (Parl. Under Sec of State for the Home Dept, Con), European Community (Right of Residence), 8 February 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 166, col. 1102).

⁴⁶ Townshend, *Terrorism*, 128.

⁴⁷ Straw (Sec State Home Dept, Lab), Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 March 1999, 6th ser., vol. 327, col. 1002.

⁴⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 30 Oct 1997, col. 1027.

these changes occur.⁴⁹ The risk of CBRN demanded attention, but the possible use these weapons was not itself a new danger, whether by state or non-state actors. In addition, experts continue to disagree about the risk such weapons pose.⁵⁰ These factors underscore the causally consequential role of how terrorism was securitized in that certain patterns of identity construction enabled some outcomes over others.

The following relational analysis explains this role of securitization by tracing how observed patterns of threat/referent construction through the 1990s led to the permanent TA 2000.

II. Late 20th century relationalities and types of terrorist others

Terrorism as a specific threat must be securitized in a way that is at once ambiguous *and* incontestable. To legitimize exceptional practice, the threat had to be established as real in a physical sense before it was actually witnessed, reminding us of the stranger example from chapter three. While events may provide initial support for certain practices, the maintenance and normalization of these measures required legitimation beyond acts of violence. Officials had to successfully securitize terrorism in a way that positioned exceptional practice as the “only” political option. Though “[t]he revulsion of feeling in the country and in Parliament” following the 1974 Birmingham pub bombings helped the speed at which the PTA was passed, the renewal of this act for more than two decades depended upon an evolving securitization of terrorism as an exceptional threat in its own right.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Robert Hughes (Con): Expenses incurred in improving security, 5 March 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 168, col. 619.

⁵⁰ Natividad Carpintero-Santamaria, “YES: WMD terrorism: a potential threat to international security” (76-83) and John Mueller, “NO: WMD terrorism: the prospects” (84-89) in *Contemporary Debates*, ed. Jackson and Sinclair.

⁵¹ “Conclusion,” 25 November 1974, CAB/128/55/24.

The securitization of terrorism depended upon social and political practices constructing understandings of terrorists as particular others to overcome questions of effectiveness:

1993, Kevin McNamara (Lab): The original emergency legislation was passed 20 years ago, yet according to a recent European Community report the murder rate in Northern Ireland is about five times the European average. Only the Calabria region in southern Italy, stronghold of the Mafia, ranks higher.⁵²

Debates compared the danger of Northern Ireland with other places of insecurity. But attempts to provide statistical assessments along international versus Irish-related categories were confusing:

1993, Peter Robinson (DUP): The death statistics for Northern Ireland show that 3,053 people have been murdered as a result of terrorist campaigns...Outside the 3,053 people who have been killed in Northern Ireland, 100 have been killed in the Republic of Ireland, 118 have been killed in Great Britain, and 18 have been killed in other parts of Europe directly as a result of the terrorist campaigns from Northern Ireland...the fact is that, if the Northern Ireland community of some 1.5 million people is considered in ratio to the population of Great Britain, one would be envisaging the murder of some 125,000 people on the mainland. One would be talking about more than 1.25 million people on the mainland having been maimed and mutilated as a result of violence.⁵³

Irish terrorism was international, but not considered “international” in how it was identified. Despite counterterrorism laws having been in force for almost two decades, they did not stop the violence. Conservative MP Ian Gow was assassinated in 1990, a PIRA bomb in Bishopsgate in 1993 killed two and resulted in over £350 million in damages, a 1996 Canary Wharf bombing killed 2, injured 39, and caused about £85 million damage, and a Manchester city centre bombing injured over 200. The single most fatal incident was the earlier mentioned 1998 attack in Omagh, the same year as the GFA.

Failure

⁵² Northern Ireland (Prevention of Terrorism), 8 June 1993, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 226, col. 168.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, col. 176-177.

Views on whether or not to continue counterterrorism as it stood varied. A range of parties including Lab, SDLP, and Con MPS were brokered through references to the ineffectiveness of exceptional measures:

1990, Ken Livingstone (Lab): Of those people who were actually detained under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974, **only one in 100 was successfully prosecuted.**⁵⁴

1990, Seamus Mallon (SDLP): **One cannot defeat terrorism by the use of more stringent law.**⁵⁵

1990, Roy Hattersley (Lab): At no time did he [Home Secretary] relate the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act to the battle against terrorism. At no time did he tell us **how the Act was helping** in that campaign.⁵⁶

1993, Edward Heath (Con): I must ask myself this question: at a time when other countries in Europe—to limit ourselves to that particular geographical area—have been able to deal with the problem, **why have we failed...**One has to be cleverer in intelligence, cleverer in action and cleverer politically. Again, to be perfectly blunt, **we have failed in all three.**⁵⁷

Others highlighted not just ineffectiveness, but counterproductiveness. This included Labour officials whose party would in fact champion the TA 2000 years later:

1991, Barry Sheerman (Lab): We shall vote against the prevention of terrorism Act not merely because it does not work and because it undermines the quality of justice in this country—justice which we have always been proud of—but **because it feeds terrorism and gives terrorists ammunition** with which to win support at home and abroad—support which we must cut off.⁵⁸

1992, Martin Flannery (Lab): There was no bluffing about what happened to the Guildford Four, the Birmingham Six, the Maguires and others. Not only does the Act not prevent terrorism; it does terrible things to people and thus **encourages terrorism.**⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Proceedings, 11 May 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 172, col. 549.

⁵⁵ Punishment for Murder of a Police Officer, 17 December 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 183, col. 83.

⁵⁶ Prevention of Terrorism, 6 March 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 168, col. 822.

⁵⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 8 June 1993, 6th ser., vol. 226, col. 169.

⁵⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 March 1991, 6th ser., vol. 187, col. 62.

⁵⁹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 24 February 1992, 6th ser., vol. 204, col. 710.

1993, Lord Monkswell (Lab): It is worth remembering the draconian provisions of the Act...The fundamental reason why I stand here year after year arguing against the provisions of the Act is because I feel that in fact **it contributes to terrorism**.⁶⁰

1999, Lembit Öpik (LD): We have to be scrupulously clear and careful not to undermine the very values that we are attempting to uphold with legislation. In that sense, **replacing terrorism with injustice is not an equitable trade**.⁶¹

Despite such statements around how existing measures had failed, EPA and PTA laws were renewed and the Terrorism Act 2000 continued a similar trajectory.

Alienation

With peace talks under way at the time, to continue exceptional counterterrorism targeting Irish-related risks could have been viewed as a political risk of sending the wrong signal. In particular considering the repeated consequences of alienation that negatively affected community relations:

1990, Roy Hattersley (Lab): reason why the Government reject the idea of internment is that it would **alienate** many men and women in Northern Ireland...the Government are prepared to risk that **alienation**...it makes their policy a liability in the real political battle against terrorism.⁶²

1993, Kevin McNamara (Lab): one in 10 Irish males living in Britain have been detained under or affected by the prevention of terrorism [*sic*] Act. This harassment only adds to the sense of **alienation** felt by the Irish community in Britain...80 per cent of the Irish in Britain **doubted that they would receive a fair trial** for a terrorist-related offence.⁶³

1994, Seamus Mallon (SDLP): In 1993, 1,641 people were detained, and 379 people were charged. That means that 1,262 people were not charged and were released in the terms of the law of this country that they were innocent until

⁶⁰ Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (Continuance) Order 1993, 11 March 1993, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 543, col. 1206.

⁶¹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 March 1999, 6th ser., vol. 327, col. 1012.

⁶² Parl. Deb, H.C., 6 March 1990, 6th ser., vol. 168, col. 824.

⁶³ Prevention of Terrorism, 10 March 1993, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 220, col. 993.

proven guilty...They have **the stigma of detention** on them when they return home, and we know what that can mean in Northern Ireland terms.⁶⁴

1996, Dennis Canavan (Lab, SP): **the prevention of terrorism [sic] Act has succeeded in alienating many innocent people**, their families and their communities. It has caused hostility between communities and the police, particularly among young people, who are often arrested and detained—their only crime being their Irish accent, Irish name or Irish family connections.⁶⁵

1996, Lord Monkswell (Lab): I believe that the Prevention of Terrorism Act effectively discriminates against Irish people and acts as **a recruiting sergeant for violent Irish nationalists**, and that is the reason why I take a principled stand against it.⁶⁶

1998, Elfin Llwyd (PC): The great danger is that the very intention of the Bill, to defeat terrorism, will be completely subverted, and that it **will fan the flames and create martyrs** once again.⁶⁷

Despite an acknowledgement of insecurity stemming from exceptional practices that targeted minority communities, counterterrorism's trajectory was more of the same, not a reconfiguration of approach. This outcome of being willing to risk the alienation of some groups depended upon a securitization of the threat in such a way that was politically unarguable. As explained by Sherrill Stroschein, "minority groups may find themselves consistently on the losing side".⁶⁸ Though the context of this research was in democracy and majority rule, a similar outcome arises in contexts of the liberty-security balance around exceptional counterterrorism. Being on the losing side was a consistent consequence for Irish and Muslim minority groups.⁶⁹ The particular way that threat

⁶⁴ Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, 9 March 1994, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 239, col. 326.

⁶⁵ Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, 14 March 1996, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 273, col. 1163.

⁶⁶ Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (Continuance) Order 1996, 19 March 1996, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 570, col. 1240.

⁶⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 2 September 1998, 6th ser., vol. 317, col. 832-833.

⁶⁸ Sherrill Stroschein, "Territory and the Hungarian Status Law: Time for New Assumptions?" in *Beyond Sovereignty: From Status Law to Transnational Citizenship?* ed. Osamu Ieda (Budapest: Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Legal Studies, and the Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan, 2006) [cited 12 September 2012]; available from http://src-home.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no9_ses/04_stroschein.pdf, 55.

⁶⁹ Hickman *et al.*, "'Suspect Communities?"; Mark McGovern and Angela Tobin, "Countering Terror or Counter-Productive? Comparing Irish and British Muslim Experiences of Counter-insurgency Law and Policy Report," (Lancashire: Edge Hill University, July 2010).

construction unfolded targeting certain groups of individuals rather than methods of violence led to a normalization of counterterrorism. It also led to a normalization of the insecurities that resulted from such measures in practice.

Creating types, blurred boundaries

The division of terrorism across threat forms of Irish, international, and domestic encouraged a misguided perception that it was possible to objectively categorize terrorist risk along geographic boundary assumptions of belonging. Rather than being value-neutral means of identification, the allocation of these labels depended upon negotiated configurations of us/them construction. Even if actors used similar methods (strategic bombing) or had similar philosophies of self-legitimation (anti-colonial liberation), processes of securitization distinguished degrees of physical and cultural distance between terrorist threat labels (Irish, domestic, international) and the referent in need of protection. Inclusive/exclusive borders of positioning and belonging became the base of securitization. These assumptions overshadowed historical inconsistency and definitional overlap. Croft is right in stating that, “Over time, discourses decay under the weight of internal contradictions and external alternative narratives.”⁷⁰ But for the securitization of terrorism and externalizing discourses of threat construction, that time had yet to come.

Whether in references to arms shipments linking Libya, the Czech Republic and Northern Ireland,⁷¹ South Africa-Northern Ireland connections,⁷² American financial and moral support of Northern Irish terror groups,⁷³ or two Australians killed in the Netherlands by Northern Irish actors because they were driving a car with British license

⁷⁰ Croft, *Crisis, Culture*, 12.

⁷¹ Townshend, *Terrorism*, 28; Rev Martin Smyth (UUP): Adjournment (Easter and Monday 7 May), 27 March 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 170, col. 244.

⁷² Kevin McNamara (Lab): Northern Ireland (Prevention of Terrorism), 10 June 1992, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 209, col. 382.

⁷³ Lord Harris (LD): Carlton Club: Bomb Incident, 26 June 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 520, col. 1459.

plates,⁷⁴ Irish-related threats could have been securitized as “international”, but were not:

1990, Lord Harris of Greenwich (LD): It is deplorable that after attacks on innocent citizens in this country a **fund-raising organisation remains in existence in the United States** and is generously supported by many American citizens. Is the Leader of the House aware of our strong approval of the words of the United States ambassador in describing as contemptible the acts of the Mayor of New York who has seen fit to **name a street in New York after a convicted IRA terrorist?**⁷⁵

1990, John Butcher (Con): When he gives them [Dutch counterparts] our thanks for helping to preserve the lives of British service men abroad, will he also offer his full support to the necessity for proper co-ordination, functional and organisational, in attacking **terrorism in mainland Europe, whether it comes from Northern Ireland or elsewhere?**⁷⁶

1990, Stuart Randall (Lab): It is important to recognise that the **problems of terrorism, particularly the IRA, extend to other member states**, rather than being associated only with the United Kingdom.⁷⁷

As seen above, not classifying Irish-related terrorism as international could have been viewed as contradictory. But instead, through particular patterns of externalization, Irish and international threats were distanced from each other in discourse and practice.

Not unlike contemporary policies such as those housed at Guantanamo Prison, the lineage of British counterterrorism was always based on an acceptance (if even reluctant) of the exception. Such exceptionality was documented in the Bennett Report and underlined the 1970s Amnesty International Report on mistreatment during interrogation:

Physical methods alleged included: beatings, attempted strangulation, pressure to sensitive points of the body, bending of limbs, prolonged standing or squatting in awkward positions, prolonged physical exercises, and burning with cigarettes. Mental pressures alleged included: prolonged oppressive questioning by teams,

⁷⁴ Lord Lyell (Con): The Defence Estimates 1990, 17 July 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 521, col. 823.


⁷⁵ Parl. Deb, H.L., 26 June 1990, 5th ser., vol. 520, col. 1459.

⁷⁶ Dutch Defence Minister, 19 June 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 174, col. 792.

⁷⁷ Weapons, 29 November 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 181, col. 1076.

threats of death and imprisonment, and threats to the family of the suspect, stripping, and verbal abuse and humiliation.⁷⁸

Though the ECourtHR concluded that these practices did not amount to torture, they did represent cruel and degrading treatment. This exceptionality was not unaddressed by officials. Detailed attention was paid to the language around security action in such an unrestrained environment. For example, as seen in one official document discussing Amnesty International’s work in Northern Ireland:⁷⁹



armed robbery. Furthermore in 1977 there were 1448 attacks including shooting bombing and physical assaults on members of the RUC. The job of the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the face of this violence is to defend the public and themselves against a reckless and indiscriminate campaign by the terrorists.

Figure 1.4 – UK cabinet paper on what “Line to take” for security forces

Terrorism was from the beginning emphasized as violent sophistication (*careful* as opposed to reckless, *targeted* as opposed to indiscriminate), distinguished from ordinary criminal behavior. It was not a threat based in particular methods but in particular actors, “the terrorists”. This securitized terrorism as not just as an act of violence or source of public disorder, but a specific enemy other. The perceived danger, illegitimacy, and immorality of the terrorist led to the justified use of interrogation tactics needing a glossary as below to be described:⁸⁰

⁷⁸ “Amnesty International,” 1978, FCO/87/821, Image Reference 14.

⁷⁹ Ibid., Image Reference 8.

⁸⁰ Ibid., Image Reference 25.

paraesthesias - "pins and needles"
parasympatolytic - drug affecting one part of the autonomous nervous system
parietal - area of the head above the temple towards the midline of the skull
penbritin - an antibiotic
perineum - area between the genitals and the anus
phenothiazines - strong tranquillizers
pinna - ear lobe
premastoidal - the area just behind the external ear
proteinuria - presence of protein in the urine
proximal interphalangeal joint - the finger joint closest to the knuckle
psychosis - major mental disorder characterized by derangement of the personality and loss of contact with reality
quadrant - area of the abdomen
reactively depressed - depressed for some evident reason in contrast to depressions for no obvious reason
regio mastoidei - the areas behind the external ears
regio occipitalis - the back of the head

Figure 1.5 –Terms of Reference, Amnesty International Investigation into the Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects in Northern Ireland

This snapshot demonstrates the extent to which counterterrorism departed beyond the bounds of normal law. To continue such measures, the securitization of terrorism continued to assert terrorist suspects as entity-others in their own right.

Thugs and gangsters

Drawing upon earlier discourses, processes of securitization were built on framing the terrorist actor as a thuggish gangsterism and callous brutality:

1990, John Cope (Minister of State Northern Ireland Office, Con): The ordinary law may be sufficient on its own to deal with individual criminals or small gangs of the sort with which we are familiar **on this side of the water**, but it does not provide the police and Army with the full statutory armament that they need if their work in protecting the whole community from the menace of **terrorist gangsters**⁸¹

1991, Kenneth Baker (Secretary of State for the Home Department, Con): Members of those organisations [IRA and INLA] are **criminals, murderers and**

⁸¹ Northern Ireland (Terrorism), 12 March 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 169, col. 66.

thugs who callously use violence in all its forms—death, brutality and destruction.⁸²

1993, David Alton (LD): We know that many of them are involved in **thuggery and gangsterism** of the worst sort —not unlike that of the **Mafia**.⁸³

1997, Baroness Blatch (Minister of State Home Office, Con): Within our midst, a **callous, murderous** minority remains determined to use violence to achieve its ends.⁸⁴

1998, Lord Cope (Con): The whole difficulty of the talks is that unless the **terrorists and their godfathers** accept whatever agreement can be reached, peace will not result.⁸⁵

In addition to this amplification of criminal framings from earlier years, the non-Irish international terrorist was increasingly constructed as non-western. This linked to identity tropes separating the terrorist within from the terrorist without, normalizing exceptional measures along east/west assumptions well before any post September 11th discourse.

Evil

In the 1990s, commonplaces such as evil were essential to stabilizing certain threat/referent identity understandings in the securitization of terrorism. Terrorism did not represent disorder but threatened a democratic way of life. Such framings rhetorically coerced actors into counterterrorism acceptance. Whether members of parliament were for or against a measure, they were increasingly brokered in terms of how threat and referent were constructed. This maintained a particular securitization of terrorism that, in turn, enabled a creeping normalization of exceptional practice.

1990, James Kilfedder (UUP): There can be no trimmers in the **fight between good and evil**.⁸⁶

⁸² Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 March 1991, 6th ser., vol. 187, col. 22.

⁸³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 8 June 1993, 6th ser., vol. 226, col. 191.

⁸⁴ Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (Continuance) Order 1997, 10 March 1997, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 579, col. 10.

⁸⁵ Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Bill, 12 January 1998, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 584, col. 905.

1991, Lord Belstead (Con): It makes a serious attempt to ensure that the police, armed forces and the courts have at their disposal the means to protect society in Northern Ireland from the **evils of terrorism**.⁸⁷

1992, Eddie McGrady (SDLP): I want to illustrate **the evil**, illogicality and fallacy of the position and policies of those trying to indoctrinate communities.⁸⁸

1993, Kevin McNamara (Lab): the Labour party does not want simply to hold up the prevention of terrorism Act as some kind of talisman to **ward off evil terrorists**.⁸⁹

1996, David Wilshire (Con): The third thing we must do when we decide where we go from here is to **stop pandering to these evil people**. The time really has come to call a halt to our dealings with Sinn Fein-IRA.⁹⁰

1998, Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD): It is the indiscriminate nature of terrorism which points up **the evil**.⁹¹

1998, Jack Straw (Lab): Our commitment to the rule of law is one of the crucial differences between the principles of democracy and the **evil dogma of the terrorists**.⁹²

1998, John Major (Con): our determination to get at the **evil people** whom **all of us want to see safely behind bars**.⁹³

Framings of a democratic and civilized referent brokered across different actors and discourses were positioned in opposition to the immoral and evil terrorist, reinforcing particular identity binaries and boundaries. Discourses put significant emphasis on the rule of law and reinforced the referent as law-abiding citizens.

Democratic society

⁸⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 12 March 1990, 6th ser., vol. 169, col. 32.

⁸⁷ Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Bill, 19 April 1991, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 527, col. 1665.

⁸⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 24 February 1992, 6th ser., vol. 204, col. 725.

⁸⁹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 10 March 1993, 6th ser., vol. 220, col. 992.

⁹⁰ Northern Ireland, 19 June 1996, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 279, col. 959.

⁹¹ Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (Partial Continuance) Order 1998, 10 March 1998, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 587, col. 201.

⁹² Parl. Deb, H.C., 2 September 1998, 6th ser., vol. 317, col. 748.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, col. 771.

By positioning the referent as democratic society, discourse raised the stakes of the fight against terrorism. These configurations built upon earlier framings as discussed in the previous chapter, but combined with the threat as an evil other provided for more intensified practices of threat/referent construction:

1990, David Waddington (Sec State Home Dept, Con): Whether it strikes at military or civilian targets, barracks or private homes, it is **attacking democracy itself**...⁹⁴

1992, Michael Mates (Con): Terrorist organisations are criminal conspiracies, representing perhaps the **most dangerous threat to the fabric of any democratic society**.⁹⁵

1994, David Winnick (Lab): the terrorists—**the enemies of democracy and of Britain**⁹⁶

1997, Jack Straw (Lab): terrorist crime is seen as an **attack on society as a whole, and our democratic institutions**. It is akin to an act of war. Those are powerful words, but they accurately define **the nature of terrorism and the threat that it poses to our society**.⁹⁷

Commonplaces of democracy reasserted a political referent (“democratic institutions”) and a societal referent (“civilized society”) in need of protection.

Civilized

Threat construction also relied on unarguable oppositional terms such as “civilized”. This established a set of rules that limited alternative lawmaking practice and led to accusations of those that challenged counterterrorism as themselves “uncivil”:

1990, Peter Brooke (Secretary of State NI, Con): For terrorism, by its very nature, represents a relapse into barbarism and savagery that unites the entire **civilised world** in determined and unquenchable opposition.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ Parl. Deb, H.C., 26 June 1990, 5th ser., vol. 520, col. 185.

⁹⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 10 June 1992, 6th ser., vol. 209, col. 414.

⁹⁶ Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, 9 March 1994, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 239, col. 293.

⁹⁷ Prevention of Terrorism, 5 March 1997, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 291, col. 927.

⁹⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 19 November 1990, 6th ser., vol. 181, col. 24.

1991, Lord Belstead (Con): The actions of the terrorist have no place in a **civilised society**.⁹⁹

1992, Alex Carlile (LD): I share the right hon. Gentleman's aspiration to achieve convictions in terrorist cases where guilt can be established by proper and **civilised standards**.¹⁰⁰

1992, Ivor Stanbrook (Con): It is appalling that the Labour party has made no sensible, **civilised** contribution to the argument.¹⁰¹

1995, Mo Mowlam (Lab): In a **civilised society**, Governments cannot ignore the rule of law; otherwise, by their very actions, they destroy what they are trying to protect and defend.¹⁰²

1996, Andrew Hunter (Con): There is no place in a **civilised society** for Sinn Fein-IRA, let alone in negotiations seeking to create in Northern Ireland new relations based exclusively on non-violence and democracy.¹⁰³

These framings heightened the ideological stakes of not maintaining exceptional measures. This reasserted terrorists as the uncivil counterpart to western civility, reinforcing perceptions of east/west belonging.

East/West

Accompanying patterns in discourse asserted divisive east-west perceptions of difference exacerbated inclusive/exclusive boundaries by implying a particular savagery of outsiders coming “in” to the west.

1990, Keith Speed (Con): The **security of our nation and, indeed, of the west** demands substantial resources to safeguard it...It is important to consider the threat out of areas, notably in the **middle east**.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Parl. Deb, H.L., 19 April 1991, 5th ser., vol. 527, col. 1662.

¹⁰⁰ Parl. Deb, H.C., 24 February 1992, 6th ser., vol. 204, col. 698.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., col. 718.

¹⁰² Parl. Deb, H.C., 8 March 1995, 6th ser., vol. 256, col. 390.

¹⁰³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 19 June 1996, 6th ser., vol. 279, col. 951.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., col. 833.

1990, Stuart Bell (Lab): Yasser Arafat during the last few days has said that in the event of a war the **PLO would unleash upon the west** a terrorist campaign the likes of which we had never seen before¹⁰⁵

1999, Terrorism Bill: The risk that terrorists (in the widest sense of the word) might follow the example of the Aum Shinrikyo and deploy chemical, biological and nuclear materials presents a serious challenge to **western governments**.¹⁰⁶

1999, Ken Maginnis (UUP): For the next 20 or 30 years, terrorism will mean the nuclear device that is loaded on to a ship and sailed up the Thames and into London docks, or into Boston, or the nuclear device that is placed in the back of a container lorry and driven **from eastern Europe** to this country, or somewhere else.¹⁰⁷

These framings were observed from a range of speakers and in acting as a type of discursive broker enabled a hardening of perceptions of “Eastern others” as linked with distinct geographic regions connected with historically embedded practices of othering in Europe more broadly.¹⁰⁸

Middle Eastern, Arab, Islamic

Even as Irish related violence was a more realistic threat to everyday insecurity in Britain, discourse securitizing terrorism was frequently dependent upon commonplaces of a Middle Eastern or Islamic threat as the most uncivilized terrorist other.

1996, Ivan Lawrence (Con): Terrorism is being used at the moment to undermine the peace in the **middle east**, with the most horrific acts of violence in Jerusalem and in Tel Aviv and other parts of Israel. We have to play our part in helping to defeat **international terrorism**.¹⁰⁹

1998, Tony Benn (Lab): It does not help to launch a cold war against **Islam**, or to whip people up into believing that there is only one way to deal with violence, which is more and more violence.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ The Gulf, 6 September 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 177, col. 811.

¹⁰⁶ “The Terrorism Bill,” 13 December 1999, Research Paper 99/101, section 5.13.

¹⁰⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 March 1999, 6th ser., vol. 327, col. 1013.

¹⁰⁸ Neumann, *Uses of the Other*.

¹⁰⁹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 14 March 1996, 6th ser., vol. 273, col. 1153.

¹¹⁰ Parl. Deb, H.C., 2 September 1998, 6th ser., vol. 317, col. 813.

1999, John Taylor (UUP): What is the potential for **extreme Islamist terrorism** within the United Kingdom? There are links with the United Kingdom in the case in **Yemen**. Is there a growing threat within our own territory?¹¹¹

1999, Jack Straw (Lab): The problem is **middle eastern terrorism** based on territorial challenges and on tribalism, which seeks to justify itself by reference to Islam...I make that point at some length because it is a real issue of sensitivity for the **British Muslim community**, which is entirely lawful.¹¹²

Even if referenced acts of violence in the Middle East were local events with domestic actors, in official British discourse such acts and actors were *still* positioned as “international terrorism”. As stated by Alan Krueger, “88 percent of the time, terrorist attacks occur in the perpetrators’ country of origin. This finding implies that most international terrorism is in fact local”.¹¹³ By the late 1990s, intersubjective understandings associated with certain identity characteristics and threat labels were increasingly problematic. Instances of alienation for Muslim communities were compared to the experiences of Irish communities.¹¹⁴ The association of “evil international terrorist” with “Eastern” other increased insecurity in ways that were not dissimilar to Northern Ireland.

War

Though 1990s securitizations drawing on the international terrorist threat were increasingly prominent, issues in Northern Ireland were not ignored. The securitization of terrorism also drew upon earlier framings by continuing to reference the situation as one of “war”, linking to 1980s discourse while also foreshadowing post-September 11th securitizations:

1990, Nicholas Bennett (Con): We have responsibilities not only in Europe but across the world. In addition, our other big responsibility is fighting a **war against terrorism** in Northern Ireland.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 16 March 1999, 6th ser., vol. 327, col. 1001.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Alan B. Krueger, *What makes a terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 71.

¹¹⁴ Hickman *et al.*, “‘Suspect Communities’?”; McGovern and Tobin, “Countering Terror”

¹¹⁵ Opposition Policies, 19 January 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 165, col. 550.

1990, Peter Robinson (DUP): Our security forces are left to operate against a **wartime** situation under peacetime conditions.¹¹⁶

1992, Barry Sheerman (Lab/Co-op): Getting round a table to discuss a more effective way to stop death, misery and bloodshed seems a good starting point in the **war against terrorism**.¹¹⁷

1996, Roy Mason (Lord Mason of Barnsley, Lab): We are now back in a **terrorist-war situation**.¹¹⁸

The reference to war, commonplaces of civilized versus evil, and reassertion of types of terrorism, bolstered the rhetoric to a height where extraordinary counterterrorism entered a path of normalized exception. Actors who may have voiced opposition during the first two decades of temporary counterterrorism laws were brokered through threat/referent framings to securitize terrorism in such a way that made exceptional counterterrorism the “only” choice. The perception of terrorism was not just a physical threat to disorder but an immoral threat to western society.

Tough versus soft

Framings of war rhetorically coerced actors into a space without sustainable rebuttal. Those that did oppose were faced with the charge of being “soft on terrorism”:

1991, Seamus Mallon (SDLP): I am critical of the legislation, and shall vote against it for the reasons that I have consistently given and will continue to give. That does not mean that I have any sympathy for terrorism or that I am in any way **soft on terrorism**.¹¹⁹

1993, Roy Hattersley (Lab): It [*voting against PTA renewal*] is not because we are **soft on terrorism** but because we are rational about it.¹²⁰

1994, Tony Blair (Lab): we should engage in discussions without rancour, or accusing each other of being **soft on terrorism**.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 12 March 1990, 6th ser., vol. 169, col. 64.

¹¹⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 24 February 1992, 6th ser., vol. 204, col. 729.

¹¹⁸ Parl. Deb, H.L., 19 March 1996, 5th ser., vol. 570, col. 1237.

¹¹⁹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 March 1991, 6th ser., vol. 187, col. 48.

¹²⁰ Parl. Deb, H.C., 10 March 1993, 6th ser., vol. 220, col. 985.

¹²¹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 9 March 1994, 6th ser., vol. 239, col. 309.

1995, Andrew Robathan (Con): The message that he and the Labour party are sending today by voting against the prevention of terrorism Act, I regret to say, is that the Labour party is **soft on terrorism and soft on the causes of terrorism**.¹²²

Tough-versus-soft discourse in a national security context is not surprising. However, a critical analysis of this framing reveals the extent to which such discourse exponentially limited spaces for action over time. By the 1990s it was close to impossible to politically challenge policies proposed along the securitization of terrorism.

Terrorism as disease

Framings and new metaphors of danger intensified how terrorism was securitized. For example, through new metaphors of public health:

1992, Giles Shaw (Con): Terrorism has become an **international cancer**...¹²³

1992, Menzies Campbell (LD): Why do I believe that the powers are justified and that the order should be renewed? It can only be because the **cancer of terrorism** still stands at the heart of life in Northern Ireland. It can only be because I believe that the powers provide a means of containing **that cancer**.¹²⁴

1993, David Alton (LD): We must build on the things that we hold in common as Europeans. That is how to combat this **terrorist plague** and to get our relationships right. Unless we do that, we shall come back here year after year into infinity to renew orders of this kind.¹²⁵

1996, Jack Straw (Lab): Terrorism is a **modern plague**.¹²⁶

1997, David Rendel (LD): It [counterterrorism law] is a **powerful antibiotic to the bacteria of terrorism**, but it must be administered only as long as is necessary.¹²⁷

¹²² Northern Ireland, 12 June 1995, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 261, col 541.

¹²³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 24 February 1992, 6th ser., vol. 204, col. 721.

¹²⁴ Parl. Deb, H.C., 10 June 1992, 6th ser., vol. 209, col. 403.

¹²⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 8 June 1993, 6th ser., vol. 226, col. 191.

¹²⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 14 March 1996, 6th ser., vol. 273, col. 1134.

¹²⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 5 March 1997, 6th ser., vol. 291, col. 947.

The securitization of terrorism as a type of modern and new disease presented an image of the threat as a lethal mass spreading throughout the democratic civilized world. Such a framing went beyond notions of “campaign” and demanded exceptional counterterrorism to “stop the cancer”. These metaphors increased the perceived scale of terrorism and reasserted terrorism as an entity that embodied a danger that had to be eradicated at all costs.

Discourse reinforced terrorism as specific enemy-others who would become terrorists if western counterterrorism did not stop this modern-day monster. Though Irish and international were the dominant threat labels, a third type of terrorism, “domestic terrorism”, was also asserted during this period. This threat was defined as “terrorism by indigenous groups prepared to engage in serious violence to further their cause”, with “indigenous” excluding “Irish” and “international” actors from having any link to “domestic”.¹²⁸ The Irish threat underwent a type of discursive reconstruction. On the one hand, actors recently described as callous and brutal murderers were yoked to legitimate politics through the peace process. At the same time, the securitization of terrorism could not completely disregard continuing insecurity in Northern Ireland. Irish-related terrorism was referenced as “dissident” in addition to “terrorism”. Irish-related insecurity remained a concern, but was over time positioned as less dangerous than other types of terrorism in official discourse:

1998, Following the Belfast Agreement and its endorsement by the people of Northern Ireland, the Government hopes and expects that **the threat of Irish terrorism will diminish** to the point where no additional special powers are necessary to combat it.¹²⁹

...the Government believes that **there exists now** a clear and present terrorist threat to the UK from a number of fronts and that a terrorist threat is likely to continue to exist for the foreseeable future even when a lasting peace in Northern Ireland is achieved.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ “Legislation Against Terrorism,” 1998, Cmnd. 4178, section 1.5.

¹²⁹ Ibid., Section 1.3.

¹³⁰ Ibid., Section 2.7.

Through the 1990s, terrorism was newly securitized as a threat facing the entire civilized world, even as security practice remained a state-level affair that reinforced national sovereignty and identity. Notions of Britishness remained important, but official discourse also focused on a referent constructed through broader characteristics such as democracy and civilization.¹³¹ Terrorism was securitized as a risk beyond a risk, and no “sane” person could deny exceptional counterterrorism because such denial would result in inevitable catastrophe.¹³²

1990, Geoffrey Tordoff (LD): No one in his **right mind** would stand in the way of legislation which was properly designed to reduce the fear of terrorism, whether in the air, on land or on the sea.¹³³

1991, Roy Hattersley (Lab): the Government and the Opposition are united in their determination to destroy terrorism, and to defeat it in this country. **No sensible person** doubts that.¹³⁴

1991, David Waddington (Con): Quite frankly, **it would be madness** to drop the Act at this time.¹³⁵

Terrorism was defined as “the use of violence for political ends” including “any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear”.¹³⁶ A terrorist was defined as “a person who is or has been concerned in the commission or attempted commission of any act of terrorism or in directing, organizing or training persons for the purpose of terrorism”.¹³⁷ The substance of actual counterterrorism practice contributed to the expanded securitization of terrorism.

Through the TA2000, the definition of terrorism was broadened to include ideological or religious motivations. The referent as “civilization” then necessitated state powers to protect a referent beyond the UK and not just including actors but property:

¹³¹ Croft, *Securitizing Islam*, in particular chapter 4.

¹³² Aradau and Van Munster, “Governing Terrorism,” 102.

¹³³ Aviation and Maritime Security Bill, 5 April 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 517, col. 1592.

¹³⁴ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 March 1991, 6th ser., vol. 187, col. 30.

¹³⁵ Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 (Continuance) Order 1991, 5 March 1991, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 526, col. 1339.

¹³⁶ “The Terrorism Bill,” 1999, Research Paper 99/101, section 3.13, p. 18.

¹³⁷ EPA, 1991, c. 24, part IXX, section 66.

1. - (1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, of action which-
 - (a) involves serious violence against any person or property,
 - (b) endangers the life of any person, or
 - (c) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public.
- (2) In subsection (1)-
 - (a) "action" includes action outside the United Kingdom,
 - (b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, and
 - (c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom.
- (3) In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation.¹³⁸

These shifts were consequential for intersubjective understandings of terrorism and for what were perceived as acceptable material security practices. The general risk of terror was intensified and “terrorist” characteristics such as religion were made explicit despite a possibility for implementation along these lines to exacerbate existing tension and insecurity. But religion and ideology have played a role in political violence throughout history, and to position them as “new” was historically inconsistent.

Such processes of securitization represented a causally consequential interrelation of discourse and practice that established certain us/them understandings over others. Knowing why Labour leaders initiated the transition to permanent counterterrorism does not help us understand how that proposal was accepted and constituted particular outcomes. This relational analysis helped identify how certain threat/referent positionings made it politically difficult to propose alternative policies. Through the securitization of terrorism, identity framings were situated in terms of exceptional future risk and geographic boundaries of identification. This contributed to a perception of terrorism as a seemingly natural and pre-existing other outside of social and political practices of labeling. Goals to “destroy terrorism”, as phrased by Secretary of State for the Home Department Jack Straw (Lab), were then not viewed as

¹³⁸ “The Terrorism Bill,” 1999, Research Paper 99/101, section 3.13, p. 18.

impossible, but necessary.¹³⁹ The international threat label hardened inside/outside boundaries of assumed physical and cultural distance. International terrorists were in no way connected to the British self, but were outsiders using the UK “to plan terrorist acts abroad”.¹⁴⁰ The historic longevity of terrorizing political violence was silenced by statements asserting that terrorism was “not *now* a temporary phenomenon anywhere in the world” [emphasis added], and by presenting non-Irish as a new threat.¹⁴¹

While internment was viewed as a mistake, measures legitimized in the name of international terrorism continued similar strategies. Though “international” was presented as a value-neutral commonplace, the unquestioned notion of international as “non-western”, foreign, and from outside Britain was problematic. Building notions of civic vigilance underpinning counterterrorism encouraged “us” to always be on the look out for “them”. This reinforced an identification of terrorist risk along racial, ethnic, and religious boundaries of inclusion and exclusion formed through securitizations and othering going back many years. By associating terrorism with Irish, domestic, and international labels, threat identification was based on a conflation of perceptions linking degrees of distance with degrees of danger. The further a terrorist other was positioned from the self, the easier it was to justify a suspension of “their” liberties in the name of “ours”. While Irish-related threats have always been viewed as external to the British “mainland”, they were closer to the referent than international non-western foreigners. An interpretation of this movement over time can be seen across the following two images:¹⁴²

¹³⁹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 4 March 1991, 6th ser., vol. 187, col. 30.

¹⁴⁰ ‘The Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Bill’, 2 September 1998, Research Paper 98/87, section 3B.

¹⁴¹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 30 Oct 1997, col.1029.

¹⁴² The effort to provide some kind of visual representation of the dynamics of securitization is thought to have been influenced by earlier training in geography and spatial representation as well as the scholarship and teaching of Patrick T. Jackson.




Figure 1.6 – Views of an isolated enemy and territory, early-mid 1970s – mid-1980s




Figure 1.7 – Negotiated geography and externalized others from the mid-1980s




Figure 1.8 – Civilization under threat from international terrorism, late 20th century onwards¹⁴³

¹⁴³ “Civilization” as a commonplace was not new to this period, but its position in opposition to the “international terrorist” marked a new trajectory alongside pending permanent counterterrorism law.

As international terrorism was constructed as an externalized other beyond British or Irish Isles, the danger level was heightened, and exceptional measures began to be normalized. As simplified in the above visualization, the international was constructed largely as a vast space east and south of the British Isles. Identity oppositions corresponded to historically embedded civilized-barbarian polarizations. In 1990s discourse the Irish-related sphere of risk was in more manageable than, and distinct from, the international. The domestic threat was coterminous with contours of the British referent, this “indigenous” threat constructed as from presumably less evil groups, such as animal rights activists. Despite the risk posed by domestic actors such as right wing extremists, domestic terrorism was almost constructed as an afterthought. It was a possible source of insecurity, but less threatening than Irish dissidents and far less dangerous than international terrorists.

By the turn of the century, the construction of terrorist others along differentiated physical and symbolic distances redirected how terrorism was securitized to enable the shift to permanent counterterrorism law. Yoking former Irish-related terrorist others to legitimate actors enabled public negotiations with those who were recently constructed as brutal terrorist gangsters. The danger of Irish related terrorism was as a reduced category of intensity, even as violence in Northern Ireland continued. At the same time, international terrorism was aligned with a non-western others and drew upon associations from discourse years earlier, such as “Arab terrorism”.¹⁴⁴ Self/other boundaries can become durable structures of maintained inequality and division.¹⁴⁵ Embedded historical lineages around “orientalized others” provided a source of “knowledge” for years to come.¹⁴⁶ Threat identification and policy formation were based along assumptions of terrorist entity-others as those who “by their **nature**, do not obey the law”[emphasis added].¹⁴⁷ Indeterminate borders around forms of terrorism were

¹⁴⁴ “Conclusions,” 1974, CAB/128/53/25.

¹⁴⁵ Tilly, *Durable Inequality*.

¹⁴⁶ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, 25th Ed. (New York: Vintage Books Random House, 1979); Croft, *Securitizing Islam*, 213.

¹⁴⁷ Lord Brain: Border Control of People, ECC Report, 5 April 1990, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 517, col. 1572.

reified as value-neutral means with which to bound possible future risk and identification of who was and who was not “a terrorist”.¹⁴⁸

III. A new century?

The 1990s shift in domestic political leadership, desecuritization of some Northern Irish threats during the peace process, and minimal incidents of international terrorism influencing Britain, did not necessarily point to making exceptional counterterrorism law permanent. Terrorism could have been securitized as based in method instead of assumptions of geography, religion, or ideology. There could have been a renewed focus on existing criminal law while targeting specific others such as Al Qaeda. In short, the way it turned out with a normalization of previously temporary measures was not a predetermined outcome, or the way things *had* to be. Rather, such outcomes were caused by a particular set of discourses and relational connections that enabled certain intersubjective understandings to arise over others, securitizing terrorism in a way that entailed particular consequences.

Irish related terrorism has consistently had an international dimension and international terrorism is not “new”. The identification of terrorism across labels of Irish, international, and domestic rested in social and political practices, not objective identity essence. By the turn of the century, these identifications became an unquestioned means to securitize terrorism as a threat, constituting and legitimizing exceptional security practice. As will be seen in the following chapter, the 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005 attacks were not so much a turning point for British counterterrorism as much as they provided support for an expansion of existing discourse and practice. Discourse securitizing terrorism during the 1990s along inside/outside processes of identity and set the stage for a beginning normalization of permanent exceptional counterterrorism through the 21st century.

¹⁴⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 10 March 1993, 6th ser., vol. 220, col. 955-99.

Chapter 7

2000-2006

Amplifying 21st century exception

Liberty's general conclusion is that the UK already has some of the most draconian anti-terrorism measures anywhere in the Western World and further measures are likely to violate fundamental principles, be counter-productive in the long term and at the same time are unlikely to be effective.

(Sally Broadbridge 2001)¹

We are supposed to be acting against terrorism and reassuring young people, whether they are Muslim or Catholic, about the fairness of British society and the things that we stand for, but the notion of internment without trial runs clean contrary to the idea of an effective war against terrorism.

(Diane Abbott 2001)²

If, however, the Government insist [sic] on rushing these measures through, I fear that they may do the opposite of what they want. They will create a sense of injustice among many British citizens, and do what I warned when we first discussed this: for every known terrorist that the Home Secretary confines, he may create 10 unknown terrorists, free to do harm to our people and to our nation. That would be more than a mistake; it would be a tragedy.

(David Davis 2005)³

The end of the 1990s left us with Labour's initiative combining the PTA and the EPA into a permanent UK-wide act.⁴ On 20 July 2000, the Terrorism Bill became the

¹ "The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: Introduction and Summary, Bill 49 of 2001-2002," 19 November 2001, HC Research Paper 01/101, 31.

² Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, 21 November 2001, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 375, col. 395 (part no. 56).

³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 22 February 2005, vol. 431, col. 158 (part no. 40).

⁴ The TA (Northern Ireland) 2006 extended Northern Ireland-specific provisions for a "limited period", reinforcing the two-track approach to terrorism depending on whether a terrorist was considered Irish or international.

Terrorism Act 2000.⁵ This set the tone for a range of subsequent laws through 2006, including the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001), Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005), and Terrorism Act (2006).⁶ On a material level each act emboldened state security power, with CONTEST 2006 documenting that “annual spending on counter-terrorism, intelligence, and resilience will reach £2bn, which is double what it was prior to 9/11 with the annual budget for”.⁷ On a symbolic level, the continued creation of laws based on an explicit language of “terrorism” reinforced terrorist others as dangerous others in their own right. This may not seem surprising if viewed only with a post-11 September 2001 lens. But with a wider historical perspective that acknowledges terrorism as a historical constant and the possible ineffectiveness of existing measures, such outcomes give reason for pause.

Events such as 11 September 2001 or 7 July 2005 are referenced to justify normalized exception, with the suspension of civil liberties and human rights accepted as necessary sacrifices. The immediate shock of a terrorist attack can help governments pass new laws quicker than normal. However, the maintenance of exceptional counterterrorism depends upon a regular reassertion of threat/referent identities in order to securitize an issue during times without violence. The broad definition of terrorism enables a constant rearticulation of who “are” terrorists, alluding to a possible state of indefinite counterterrorism exception. It is impossible to fully succeed over terrorism since there will always be another terrorist other to fill the place of those who were defeated. *How* terrorism has been securitized to differentiate threat identities depends upon different sets of intersubjective understanding delineating degrees of otherness. The assertion of an international terrorist other enabled a distinctive shift separating perceptions of terrorist danger from Northern Ireland, the UK mainland, and outside Britain. Even though some terrorists from within could be categorized as international, discourses and practices of counterterrorism from 2000 reinforced the view that the most dangerous terrorist others were from beyond Britain. The events of 11 September 2001 then provided key historical reference points with which earlier perceptions of us/them

⁵ TA, 2000, c.11.

⁶ ACTS, 2001, c. 24; PTA, 2005, c.2; TA, 2006, c.11.

⁷ CONTEST, 2006.

identity were further embedded through a consequential and largely unquestioned acceptance of what “terrorist” meant.

From 2000 to 2006 violence continued in Belfast and in London. The assumption of international terrorists as Muslim outsiders contributed to the alienation of Muslim communities in British society and miscarriages of justice. Three British men, dubbed “the Tipton Three”, were released from Guantanamo in 2004 after being detained there for over two years.⁸ Jean Charles de Menezes was fatally shot at the Stockwell Tube station in London 2005 after police mistakenly identified him as a terrorist. Not unlike earlier incidents during the Troubles, preemptive counterterrorism was implemented along presumed boundaries of the other. As explained by Croft, securitization discourse around terrorism and Islam has reinforced perceptions of “Orientalized” and “Radical” others.⁹ Increased insecurity for marginalized Muslim groups was similar to how 20th century security practice increased insecurity for Irish groups. It was not long ago that counterterrorism led to the wrongful imprisonment of the Birmingham Six and the Guildford Four.¹⁰ Corruption, collusion, and excessive force in counterterrorism was documented by official reports such as the Stevens Enquiry and Cory Report.¹¹

However, the focus on preventing future risk at any cost maintained exceptional measures despite counterproductive consequences from their implementation, or questions like “Does the Minister recall that on 15 October, over a month after the terrible attack on New York, the Home Secretary said that there was no immediate threat to this country's security?”¹² Relational configurations of identity developed in prior decades distinguished Irish, international, and domestic others. Despite international some cooperation, the securitization of terrorism in official British discourse reasserted

⁸ The lead actors from *The Road to Guantanamo* (2006), a film based on the Tipton Three, were themselves detained under terrorism legislation at Luton Airport after the Berlin Film Festival.

⁹ Croft, *Securitizing Islam*, 245.

¹⁰ “Life of Crime Part 3: Examining injustice in the UK”, *BBC News* [cited 11 November 2011]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/uk/2001/life_of_crime/miscarriages.stm.

¹¹ For access to these and other reports see Martin Melaugh, “Key Issue - Collusion between Security Forces and Paramilitaries”, *CAIN Ulster Services*, available from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/index.html>.

¹² Norman Baker (LD): Human Rights, 19 November 2001, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 375, col. 146 (Part No. 54, bound volume).

national identity and practice. European coordination was “weakened by significant differences in perceptions of the national threat”.¹³ From 2000 to 2006 the securitization of terrorism did not ignore Irish related violence, but the focus was on the “foreign” threat of international terrorism. Though the 7/7 attacks underlined how the international as also domestic, intersubjective understandings of international terrorism as Muslim outsiders had become embedded in collective meaning. A two-track approach to counterterrorism based on distinguishing Irish from international reinforced particular practices of labeling and a counterterrorism trajectory of normalized exception.

I. Contextualizing 2000-2006

During these years, international terrorism was the dominant label that propelled the securitization of terrorism and expansion of counterterrorism. Intersubjective understandings had moved from a focus on Northern Ireland to the “new” international threat. Republican leaders publicly denounced 11 September 2001, despite the IRA being labeled by some as “part of that international terrorist network”, in large part considering the various transnational ties of the IRA within and beyond the UK.¹⁴ This event reasserted perceptions of the “international terrorist’s” existence. But, as discussed earlier, it was before 11 September that a specific label of international terrorism began to help maintain extraordinary measures. This is not to say that there was no risk of violence during the early 21st century. But, it is to highlight that the *way* official discourse securitized terrorism as international terrorism had specific consequences for material outcomes (a normalization and expansion of exceptional domestic laws) and intersubjective understandings (an externalization and alienation of others based on degrees of distance and danger).

¹³ Stuart Croft, “Introduction”, *Government and Opposition* 42, no. 3 (2007): 269 (with reference to Jörg Monar).

¹⁴ This statement was, however, taken with a grain of salt (“IRA statement branded ‘cynical’”, 20 September 2001, *BBC News* [cited 10 September 2011]; available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1553850.stm).

This securitization along types of terrorists enabled a two-track approach to counterterrorism even as insecurity in Northern Ireland continued, and the risk of international terrorism was relatively minimal. From 1998 to 2005, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism recorded 26,455 terrorist-related fatalities.¹⁵ But only 6,447, or 24%, were from international terrorism (including the over 3000 from 9/11).¹⁶ Irish-related terrorism was presented as less dangerous than international terrorists, despite the IMC reporting a “worsening picture” in Ulster, the suspension of devolved government in 2002, and a significant drop in optimism around the peace process.¹⁷ This “worsening” was differentiated from other types of terrorism by referring to Northern Irish related insecurity as paramilitarism and dissidence. In this way, reports could acknowledge the violence without delegitimizing the peace process. Splinter groups were positioned as less serious than international terrorism that demanded a national security response to protect western civilization.¹⁸

Threat differentiation was also strengthened through resource reallocation. Total spending for local, regional, and London Metropolitan police forces went from 63£ million in 2006-2007, to 110£ million in 2007-2008, an increase of almost double in one year.¹⁹ Troop levels in Northern Ireland were reduced from 18,200 in 1992 to 13,000 in 2003, the Castlereagh, Strand Road and Gough Holding Centres were closed, and 102 cross-border roads were re-opened.²⁰ For international terrorism, by contrast, new policies at Belmarsh prison enabled detainees to be held in solitary confinement every day for up to 22 hours.²¹ Jurisdiction was extended to include if a terrorist offense was committed outside the UK by a UK national or resident, or if the offence was committed

¹⁵ Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks”, *The Journal of Politics* 70 (2008): 447 (cited in Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, “Domestic Terrorism”, 32).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Adrian Guelke, “Whither the peace process in Northern Ireland?” ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/01 (Chatham House, July 2005).

¹⁸ Horgan, *Walking Away*, 23.

¹⁹ Terrorism, 10 March 2006, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 443, col. 1781W (written answers).

²⁰ “Responding to a Changing Security Situation, The Government’s Approach,” Updated October 2003, Northern Ireland Office (NIO) [cited 20 May 2012]; available from <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/nio/nio1003security.pdf>.

²¹ “Detention of suspected international terrorists – Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act”, 16 September 2002, Research Paper 02/52, 54.

by a non-UK national or resident to a UK national or resident.²² From 2000 to 2006, the securitization of international terrorism enabled a beginning normalizing of exceptional practice even as clear definitions of terrorism and success remained elusive.

In one official statement in 2004, “international terrorist” was mentioned four times as Home Secretary Charles Clarke referenced the attacks of 11 September 2001 and later incidents in Spain (Madrid train bombings 2004), Saudi Arabia (al-Khobar shooting as well as the U.S. consulate attack in Jeddah), Indonesia (Australian embassy), and Egypt (an Israeli-owned hotel). These attacks were presented as evidence that international terrorism presented “a public emergency threatening the life of the nation”.²³ However, concerns over consequences of policies related to international terrorism were voiced years earlier. Just three days after 11 September 2001 during a debate titled “International Terrorism”, Labour MP Tom Dalyell said:

In 1998, with the former Taoiseach Albert Reynolds, I went to Baghdad. We were invited one evening to the house of Tariq Aziz, who said rather movingly, "You may think that Saddam and I are extremists. We are as nothing to what will follow if these sanctions and this bombing continue..." I have one concrete suggestion, which may be very unpalatable: I ask the Foreign Secretary to look again at the whole Iraq policy...I simply ask the Foreign Secretary this: for God's sake, look at 10 years of bombing of Iraq and sanctions.²⁴

This call to consider longer term British (and western) policy in the Middle East in light of 21st century counterterrorism highlighted the awareness of the complex interrelation of identity, securitization, and material outcomes. Regardless of how one judged another’s feeling of injustice, conflicting inside/outside perceptions of belonging played

²² International Terrorism, 12 December 2001, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 376, col. 868 (part no. 70, bound volume); Crime (International Co-operation) Act, 2003, c. 32, part II, section 52. On expanding police jurisdiction, see “The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: Parts X: Police powers,” 16 November 2001, Research Paper 01/97 (2001-2002).

²³ Charles Clarke, Oral Statement, “Measures to Combat Terrorism – powers in part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001,” January 2005 [cited 5 March 2009]; available from <http://tna.europarchive.org/20061101012820/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speeches-archive/st-combat-terrorism-0105>.

²⁴ International Terrorism, 14 September 2001, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 372, col. 629.

a significant role in political violence. This was especially apparent with respect to counterterrorism and Islam:

For UK Muslims who become involved in terrorist activity, this identification is with Palestinian victims of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, victims in Iraq or the conflict in Kashmir. In Khan's video testimony, he placed responsibility for his behaviour on the US and UK for the: 'bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Though Khan came from Yorkshire, in northern England, he identified with the suffering of Muslims worldwide.²⁵

The interrelation of foreign policy and domestic insecurity reinforced negative consequences from using domestic and international as labels as threat identities. Connections linking domestic citizens to multiple "homelands" made the attempt at stabilizing single identity labels, and boundaries, inherently problematic.²⁶ Possible insecurity related to multiple self-identifications, exceptional security practice, and notions of historic grievance, can be observed in an AQ video from Ayman Al Zawahiri. This video, with a background collage "featuring the attacks on New York, Madrid, and London, as well as jihad in Iraq, Palestine, and Chechnya", referred to the London attacks as "a slap to Blair, the arrogant crusader".²⁷ Despite these linkages between foreign policy, history, international relations, and insecurity, such references did not significantly alter counterterrorism substance or direction. By 5 December 2001 efforts had expanded to Afghanistan in the "war against international terrorism", the invasion of Iraq was sixteen months away, and a beginning normalization of exceptional counterterrorism faced Britain domestically.²⁸

Foreign interventions intensified a militarized approach to counterterrorism, and domestic counterterrorism was further normalized through the new CONTEST strategy, "The UK Strategy for Countering International Terrorism". Drafted in 2003, and made

²⁵ Horgan, *Walking Away*, 12.

²⁶ On varieties of nationalism as relate to various "homelands" see Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*.

²⁷ Gilles Kepel, *Beyond Terror and Martyrdom: The Future of the Middle East* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008), 124-125.

²⁸ Tony Blair, 5 December 2001, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, col. 324-5 (cited in "The Campaign against International Terrorism: prospects after the fall of the Taliban", 11 December 2001, Research Paper 01/112, p. 29-30).

public in 2006, CONTEST would become the cornerstone of UK counterterrorism. New government offices institutionalized counterterrorism, for example the Joint Counterterrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) established in 2003 and the National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU) in 2004. The former's objective was to assess "intelligence relating to international terrorism"²⁹ and the latter's objective was to combat "domestic terrorism".³⁰ UK state powers were expanded through the ATCS 2001. This act again required that Britain derogate from the EConvHR. Britain was "the only European state to do so (Spain, despite the March 11, 2004, Madrid bombings that left 191 dead and 1824 injured, did not derogate; neither did Germany, even after it became clear that active al Qaeda cells had been operating within the state)."³¹

This derogation from the EConvHR by the UK and reassertion of state sovereignty over international norms and institutions was not unnoticed. In 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated "In their fight against terrorism, Council of Europe members should not provide for any derogations to the European Convention on Human Rights."³² Human rights concerns over the ATCS 2001's section 4 powers around "suspected international terrorists" eventually necessitated a change in the law. A December 2004 Law Lords decision concluded that section 4 was incompatible with the EConvHR as well as the UK Human Rights Act.³³

b) in the light of the evidence so far presented to Parliament, the Committee continues to doubt whether the powers under Part 4 are strictly required by the exigencies of the situation to deal with a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, and so continues to doubt whether the derogation from ECHR Article 5 is justified (paragraphs 33 to 34);

c) even if the courts were ultimately to decide that the derogation from Article 5 is justified, the Committee would still consider an indefinite derogation from the

²⁹ "Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre," Security Service MI5 [cited 2 September 2012]; available from <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/organisation/joint-terrorism-analysis-centre.html>.

³⁰ In 2011 the NETCU merged with the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) and the National Domestic Extremism Team (NDET) to become the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) (see <http://www.netcu.org.uk/de/default>).

³¹ Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism*, 58.

³² Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Resolution 1271, 24 January 2002 (cited in Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism*, 58).

³³ Powers of detention were held to be incompatible with the EConvHR's Article 5 (liberty and security of the person) and Article 14 (freedom from discrimination) (Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism*, 59).

important right to liberty under Article 5 to be deeply undesirable (paragraph 34);

d) the Committee remains of the view that there is a significant risk that the powers under Part 4 violate the right to be free of discrimination under ECHR Article 14 because they have a particular impact on only one part of the resident community of the United Kingdom (namely those who are not nationals of the United Kingdom) on the ground of nationality (paragraph 35);³⁴

The exceptionality of these measures was presented in a context of the threat as foreign and highly dangerous. As explained by Home Secretary Charles Clarke, “It is true that the part 4 powers apply only to foreign nationals”, but this was necessary because of “the very real threat that we faced from international terrorism in the immediate aftermath of the terrible events of 9/11” considering the “small number of foreign nationals resident here who posed a particular danger to us”.³⁵ The international terrorist was a foreigner from outside Britain, a danger to “us”.

Though the section 4 decision was linked to human rights, the PTA 2005 replaced this measure with some of the most exceptional powers to date, “control orders”. A control order was an order “against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.”³⁶ Control orders were positioned as alleviating incompatibility between the ATCS 2001 section 4 powers and human rights by including both UK and non-UK citizens. A person could be detained for up to four days before a control order was made.³⁷ Counterterrorism substance was thus not significantly reassessed, and counterproductive consequences from implementation continued. A renewal of derogating control orders could be made “on as many occasions as the court thinks fit” as long as “the court considers that the obligations to be imposed by the renewed order are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that person in terrorism-related activity”.³⁸ As stated by Walker:

³⁴ Newton Report findings, cited in David Blunkett, “Counter-Terrorism Powers: Reconciling Security and Liberty in an Open Society: A Discussion Paper,” February 2004, Cmnd. 6147.

³⁵ Clarke, “Measures to Combat Terrorism”.

³⁶ For control orders in full, see Appendix C.

³⁷ PTA, 2005, c.2, Section 5.4.

³⁸ Ibid., Section 4.10, 4.10d.

Whilst rounding up alien suspects had popular appeal in 2001, the factual threat of terrorism was not confined to foreign bogeymen....In short, continued support for foreigner detention without trial ignores the inconvenient truths which persist today as they did in December 2004 when the House of Lords took its fateful decision.³⁹

Despite the securitization of terrorism enabling an expansion of exceptional measures, the contradictions of identifying types of terrorist others with labels such as “Irish”, “international”, or “domestic” was clear.

On 7 July 2005, less than four months after the PTA2005 was passed, four bombers targeted the London transport system and killed 56, injuring over 700. After over three decades of some of the most exceptional counterterrorism in the world, these attacks were not prevented. Due to the nature of intelligence and the preemptive nature of counterterrorism it is hard to conclusively identify when attacks are clearly prevented from happening. Authorities halted a copycat attempt weeks later, but the 7 July 2005 attack left substantial damage. The identity of the attackers as British but the labeling of the attack as international terrorism contradicted discourse and practice that depended upon separating internal and external others. International terrorism proved to be as much British as foreign and as much from inside as from outside.

After 7 July 2005, there was a renewed focus on risk management through prosecution. Though counterterrorism law enabled the control of a suspected terrorist’s movement, offenses were often already established in existing criminal law, as discussed in chapter five. The TA 2006 introduced new offenses that explicitly targeted “terrorists”, such as the encouragement and glorification of terrorism, dissemination of terrorist publications, attendance at a terrorist training camp, and withholding of information that may be of use in a terrorist investigation.⁴⁰ The “encouragement of terrorism” was defined as:

³⁹ Clive Walker, “The Fate of Control Orders”, *Public Law* (2010): 5.

⁴⁰ TA, 2006, c.11.

a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences⁴¹

A person commits an offence not just if they *intentionally* encouraged the public but if they were “reckless” as to whether the public would be “encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate such acts or offences”.⁴² Offences are frequently vague in definition, and without clear guidelines for assessment. For example, an offence identified as “the act of terrorism to which an intention relates is a particular act of terrorism, an act of terrorism of a particular description or an act of terrorism generally”.⁴³ “Glorification” is referred to in similarly expansive terms, meaning “any form of praise or celebration” including “sounds or images or both”.⁴⁴

The TA2006 framed terrorism as an ambiguous threat and as specific illegal acts. The Terrorism Bill 2006’s initial proposal of 90-day detention was unsuccessful. But the continuance of 28-day detention⁴⁵ represented how exceptional counterterrorism was already normalized. Opposition was not silent, as seen below. But the years 2000 to 2006 did not rebalance security practice in favor of liberty:

2000, Jeremy Corbyn (Lab): Draconian legislation is proposed... It is a permanent, not a temporary provision...I fear that, if the Bill is enacted in its present form, we will return to the miscarriages of justice of yesteryear, which we hoped to have left behind us, with the changes in attitude and legislation following the release of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four and others. We may want to deal with the problems of people who place bombs that kill innocent people, but this is not the way to do it. We are being urged to convict the innocent along with the guilty. That prejudices the entire judicial process.⁴⁶

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., part 1, sec. 2.

⁴³ TA, 2006, c. 11.

⁴⁴ Ibid., part 1, section 20.2.

⁴⁵ The house voted 323 to 290 to remain at 28-day detention (Terrorism Bill, 9 November 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 439, col. 386 (part no. 62)).

⁴⁶ Repeals, 15 March 2000, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 346, col. 435.

Dissenting voices curtailed counterterrorism expansion at particular moments, as with 90 day pre-charge detention. But this curtailment resulted in a maintained normalization of “draconian” measures introduced years earlier.

CONTEST is based on four strands, Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. The 2006 version encompassed less than forty pages, but established a foundation for subsequent counterterrorism. The guiding aim was to “reduce the risk from international terrorism, so that people can go about their daily lives freely and with confidence”.⁴⁷ International terrorism was positioned alongside a discourse of “Islamist terrorists”. Reference to Northern Ireland was noticeably infrequent, in particular considering insecurity that continued. While the ATCS2001 and the TA2006 were passed in light of specific events, the TA2000 and PTA2005 were passed in relative isolation from major attacks against Britain. Though 11 September 2001 is often considered “the” event that sparked preemptive counterterrorism, such measures are rooted in securitization discourse before “international terrorism” became represented by the Twin Towers, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, or Mohammad Sidique Khan.

II. Maintaining permanency through the “international”

Particular processes of threat/referent construction securitized terrorism in a way that enabled the institutionalized of counterterrorism from 2000 to 2006. This institutionalization is what enabled a particular normalization of exceptional measures to gain traction. Particular configurations of commonplaces influenced the parameters of decision-making. As discussed earlier, it is not that language determines outcomes. But intersubjective understandings formed through discursive practice *delimit* spaces for agency, and thus have a causal effect on what outcomes are possible. The construction of international terrorism as a new threat was reinforced by the physical incarnation of “international terrorists” after 9/11. This encouraged a historical amnesia that separated past violence from current perceptions of terrorist risk. Repeated consequences of

⁴⁷ CONTEST, 2006.

insecurity were outweighed in the name of preventing future terrorist catastrophe. Language expanded the danger of international terrorism while broadening the referent to encompass timeless democratic values:

There will be many different analyses of the history but my own view is that the 1945-89 Cold War was succeeded by the period to 9/11 in 2001 when democracy became better entrenched and now after 2001 all that democratic progress is under attack from AQ [Al Qaida] and their allies.⁴⁸

To frame security policy in terms of core values is not a novel 21st century shift.⁴⁹ But the way these framings evolved alongside a discourse of inside/outside boundaries, terrorism, and identity helped to normalize exceptional counterterrorism.

An increased presence of terms explicitly connected to “terror” reinforced 21st century associations of international terrorist as from outside. Framing Irish-related terrorism along “non-terrorist” language such as “dissident” legitimized differences in security approach whether the threat was Northern Irish or international.⁵⁰ Two ways of visualizing an observed frequency of “terror” in language are presented below.

⁴⁸ Charles Clarke, “Contesting the Threat of Terrorism,” Speech by Charles Clarke (Home Secretary) to the Heritage Foundation, October 2005 [cited 16 January 2011]; available from <http://tna.europarchive.org/20061101012820/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speeches-archive/10-05-heritage-foundation>.

⁴⁹ Arnold Wolfers, “National Security as Ambiguous Symbol,” *Political Science Quarterly* LXVII, no. 4 (1952): 484.

⁵⁰ Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Bill, House of Commons, Standing Committee E, 8 November 2005.




Figure 1.9 – Searching for “terrorism” in UK parliamentary debates, 2000-2005⁵¹

This is a screenshot from a search of “terrorism” in Hansard’s online database from 2000 to 2006. This resulted in over 9,000 hits compared to 6,300 during the 1990s.⁵² Terrorism was spoken on average 4.3 times per day (if parliament met 365 days a year) from 2000 to 2006, compared to being spoken on average 1.7 times per day (again if parliament met 365 days a year) from 1990 to 1999. While numbers do not tell the whole story of how discourse is causally consequential for outcomes, a more than doubling of terror’s presence in parliamentary debate is significant. The top five speakers associated with “terrorism” are listed below the years, and include the Home and Foreign Secretaries and the Prime Minister. Over six years there are 9,457 hits for terrorism, averaging about 1,576 hits per year. To put this in perspective, a similar search of Hansard for the entire 20th century resulted in 34,127 hits. This averaged just

⁵¹ <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/terrorism?decade=2000s> (Search performed 18 April 2011).

⁵² <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/terrorism?decade=1990s> (Search performed 18 April 2011).

over 341 hits per year.⁵³ Even considering differences in sample representation and size over time depending on access, source collection, and database compilation, this difference is notable. These numbers indicate “terror” was spoken an average of four times per day in the 21st century, and less than once per day during the 20th century, despite terrorizing events throughout the 1900s.

From another perspective, the below represents how many times “terror” occurs per page of five major counterterrorism laws during this period, a legal-linguistic rate of terror:




Figure 2.0 – The “linguistic rate of terror” per page of key counterterrorism laws, 2000-2006

⁵³ <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/terrorism?decade=2000s> (Search performed 18 April 2011).

While it is important to remark how many acts have “terrorism” in their title, it is also important to note how many times “terror” appears per page of each act to measure intensity. In other words, how many times one is faced with a term of terror in reading each of these acts.

Equally important to the number of times “terror” appears in discourse is how identities associated with terrorism were relationally positioned. How particular configurations of commonplaces framing threat/referent identities was configured affected conditions of possible action. Different intersubjective understandings establish different rules. From 2000 to 2006 we see an increased frequency of terror in discourse and a divergence in approaches depending on whether the threat was Irish or international. Violence in Northern Ireland continued to terrorize communities, with one reference from 1999 citing over 3,600 killed and over 40,000 injured.⁵⁴ But from 2000 to 2006 official discourse reconstructed this insecurity to include non-terroristic framings of threat construction. References to “terror” were not silenced,⁵⁵ but commonplaces such as dissident and paramilitary increased:

2005, Baroness Amos (Lord President of the Council, Lab): It is inconceivable, in my view, that members of Sinn Fein could again hold ministerial office while the issue of paramilitary activity and criminality on the part of the Provisional IRA remained unresolved.⁵⁶

Despite the reassertion of Irish terrorism and international terrorism as essentially different, the ambiguity surrounding this differentiation was difficult to ignore:

2001, Lord Selsdon (Con): In discussions, Libyans asked me why it was wrong for them to fund the IRA when the **United States provided 75 per cent of the IRA's financial resources** through NORaid.⁵⁷

2001, Jeffrey M. Donaldson (DUP): With regret, we also note that Irish terrorism is not covered in the definition of international terrorism. That is difficult to

⁵⁴ Terrorism Bill, 14 December 1999, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 6th ser., vol. 341, col. 167.

⁵⁵ Gregory Campbell (DUP): Division No. 110 (Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Bill) 30 Nov 2005, vol. 440 col. 300-301 (part no. 75, bound volume).

⁵⁶ Northern Ireland, 22 February 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, vol. 669, col. 1118 (part no. 41).

⁵⁷ International Terrorism, 14 September 2001, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 627, col. 70.

understand, as the definition of an international terrorist group is that it is "subject to the control or influence of persons outside the United Kingdom"...**Is it not also the case that the Real IRA and indeed the Provisional IRA have been engaged in international terrorism?**⁵⁸

2001, Lembit Öpik (LD): Why have the Government **failed to understand the contradiction** between the judgments they make about Northern Ireland, which can lead to informed and consensual solutions, such as this Bill, and the unjoined-up approach that they take to international terrorism as a whole?⁵⁹

2005, Lembit Öpik (LD): It is unacceptable to suggest that **Northern Ireland terrorism** is in some way understandable, manageable and sane, whereas **international terrorism is in some way motiveless and insane.**⁶⁰

Despite these challenges the securitization of terrorism continued to be based on a separation of Irish and international forms. De-escalating security practices in Northern Ireland was a priority. Associating continuing insecurity as paramilitary, dissident, or criminal as much as, if not more than, terrorism supported this redirection:

2005, Paul Murphy (Sec of State for Northern Ireland): The issue that is holding up political progress in Northern Ireland is **criminal activity** on the part of **paramilitary** organisations—in this case, particularly the Provisional IRA.⁶¹

2005, Ian Pearson (Lab): We want to see not only decommissioning, but an end to **paramilitary and criminal** activities on the part of the Provisional IRA.⁶²

2005, Peter Hain (Lab): As I have said, I am confident that we are seeing an end to **paramilitarism**, and it is extremely unlikely that control orders will prove to be necessary in a normalised environment in Northern Ireland.⁶³

These framings reinforced assumptions of geographic division between types of threats and the core referent that were observed in earlier discourse. While it was in the 20th

⁵⁸ Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill, 19 November 2001, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 375, col. 86 (part no. 54, bound volume).

⁵⁹ Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Bill, Order for Second Reading, 31 October 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 438, col. 651 (part no. 56, bound volume).

⁶⁰ Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Bill, House of Commons, Standing Committee E, 8 November 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, col. 15.

⁶¹ Sinn Féin, 23 February 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 431, col. 297 (part no. 41, bound volume).

⁶² *Ibid.*, col. 298.

⁶³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 31 October 2005, vol. 438, col. 635 (part no. 56).

century that we saw the separation of Irish, domestic, and international labels, it was through the 21st century that these markers became durable. Identity labels were presented as objective, with a consequent hardening of threat boundaries alienating communities.

During this period, the internet came to play a growing role in the securitization of terrorism and resulting collective meaning around who are terrorist threats. MI5 website headings such as “How the threat has developed,” “Domestic extremism,” “Other groups,” “Autonomous Islamist extremists,” “Al Qaida’s history,” “Al Qaida’s ideology,” “Pakistan-based Sunni extremist groups,” and “The nature of the [international terrorist] threat”, provided additional public official securitizations. This last page, “the *nature* of the threat” [emphasis added], stated that a “number of British nationals and foreign citizens resident in the UK are known to be linked to or sympathetic with Al Qaida”. The below image of “terrorists” was the only example or picture of terrorist others, no other images of “domestic” or “Irish” terrorists could be found on the website at the time:⁶⁴




Figure 2.1 – MI5 website, 2011, “The Nature of the Threat”

⁶⁴ “The nature of the threat”, MI5 [cited 31 March 2011]; available from <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/the-nature-of-the-threat.html>. This page was part of the background description into presenting to the public what they should understand as being the terrorist threat.

This contributed to the focus, even if unintentional, on the perception of international terrorists as identifiable by racial and ethnic boundaries.

Despite some apprehension about expanding counterterrorism law, that “before we legislate further we should consider whether those [TA2000 and RIPA2001] are not enough”, between 2000 and 2006 the government passed three new laws putting terms of “terror” on permanent footing: the ATCS 2001, PTA 2005, and TA 2006.⁶⁵ Other acts increasing state security power included the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, Criminal Justice Act 2003, and Terrorism Act (Northern Ireland) 2006. RIPA put warrants on a basis of individuals rather than addresses (similar to the U.S. PATRIOT Act’s roving wiretaps).⁶⁶ Terrorism maintained a privileged position in security practice:

the broader information made public tells us little about the powers specifically related to terrorism and national security – an exception permitted by Article 8(2) of the ECHR. The ICC, for instances, does not disclose the number of warrants issued by either the Foreign Secretary or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland⁶⁷

In Northern Ireland efforts were under way to put security practice on a normal footing. Former “terrorists” continued to be yoked with legitimate politics, and insecurity from splinter groups was framed as paramilitarism and dissident activity. In the Seventh Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission for Northern Ireland, for example, there were 8 hits for “terrorist” compared to 12 for “dissident” and 97 for “paramilitary”.⁶⁸ While security policy in Northern Ireland was downgraded despite continuing insecurity, counterterrorism targeting international terrorists was moving in the opposite direction. While the TA 2000 was formed with more deliberation time than

⁶⁵ Simon Hughes (LD): Parl. Deb, H.C., 19 November 2001, vol. 375, col. 56 (part no. 54).

⁶⁶ Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism*, 196.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 198-199.

⁶⁸ “Seventh Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission,” 19 October 2005, HC 546 [cited 15 July 2011]; available from <http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/JELR/IMCRpt7.pdf/Files/IMCRpt7.pdf>.

earlier acts, its sixteen schedules and 131 sections set the stage for a normalization of exceptional counterterrorism.⁶⁹

- 1.—(1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—
 - (a) the action falls within subsection (2),
 - (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and
 - (c) the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.
 - (2) Action falls within this subsection if it—
 - (a) involves serious violence against a person,
 - (b) involves serious damage to property,
 - (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,
 - (d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
 - (e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.
 - (3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied.
 - (4) In this section—
 - (a) “action” includes action outside the United Kingdom,
 - (b) a reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated,
 - (c) a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of a country other than the United Kingdom, and
 - (d) “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom.
- (TA2000 c.11 section 1)

This definition newly included religious and ideological causes, and offenses expanded to include action against property and electronic systems in addition to action against persons. The referent was also broadened to incorporate publics, persons, property, and jurisdictions beyond UK borders.

The TA2000 extended detention and expanded stop and search powers, the public’s most frequent encounter with counterterrorism law.⁷⁰ As in earlier discourse

⁶⁹ Neal, “Normalization”; “New Anti-Terrorist Measures Announced By David Blunkett Home Office Press Notice 236/2001 3 October 2001,” in “The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill: Parts IV & V: immigration, asylum, race and religion, Bill 49,” 16 November 2001, HC Research Paper 01/96.

and practice, “reasonable” was a key implementation guide and source of referent legitimacy. The field of possible suspects was broadened, and a constable could detain a person “for such time as is reasonably required to permit the search to be carried out at or near the place where the person or vehicle is stopped”.⁷¹ “Examining officers” could question a person “for the purpose of determining whether they appear to be a ‘terrorist’.”⁷² For this act a person commits an offence if “he possesses an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism”,⁷³ or “collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism”.⁷⁴ Broad barometers of “reasonable” and “likely” guided threat assessment and counterterrorism implementation. Walker observed five patterns around section 44 stop and search powers from 2000 to 2006, “a sustained increase in the use of this power, a low rate of consequent terrorist arrests, a higher rate of non-terrorist arrests, a disproportionate impact on Asian ethnic minorities and an uneven geographical delivery”.⁷⁵ Intersubjective understandings of identity based on a particular securitization of terrorism allocating boundary structures in particular ways influenced security and insecurity.

The ATCS 2001 provided new powers of financial asset freezing and the indefinite detention of *foreigners* suspected of terrorism under the heading “Suspected International Terrorism”. Despite just “two and a quarter hours to destroy a principle [habeas corpus] that has underpinned British law for 500 years”,⁷⁶ the house voted 334 to 213 in favor of the ATCS2001. While suspensions of habeas corpus are not themselves new, in the context of preventive counterterrorism that was fast being normalized such suspensions held different consequences. The ATCS 2001’s language

⁷⁰ Walker, “Know Thine Enemy,” 283.

⁷¹ TA, 2000, c. 11, sec. 45.4.

⁷² Walker, “Know Thine Enemy,” 278.

⁷³ TA, 2000, c. 11, sec. 57.1.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, sec. 58.1.

⁷⁵ Walker, “Know Thine Enemy,” 283.

⁷⁶ Douglas Hogg (Con): Parl. Deb, H.C., 21 November 2001, vol. 375, col. 330 (part no. 56).

of immigration, asylum, race, and religion reinforced assumptions of identity boundaries around international terrorism through exclusionary inside/outside divisions:⁷⁷

Where an appeal has failed [to the Special Immigration Appeals Court, or SIAC], my intention is to streamline the process for **removal**. Those who have no right to stay must leave the country immediately. [Interruption.]

We currently have 1,900 detention places, which we will have increased to 2,800 by the spring of next year. I intend that we should expand the capacity by a further 40 per cent. [*sic*] to 4,000 places. Those will become secure removal centres. [Interruption.] Asylum seekers will no longer be held in mainstream prison places; I can confirm that from January next year that practice will cease. [Interruption.] (24-25, citing HC Deb 29 October 2001 Col 628-9)⁷⁸

The link between “Immigration and Asylum” and “*suspected international terrorists*” hardened us/them distinctions securitizing terrorism in earlier discourse. The need to derogate from the EConvHR considering the ATCS powers was given just a few hours debate:

PART 4 (ATCS 2001)

IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM

Suspected international terrorists

21 Suspected international terrorist: certification

- (1) The Secretary of State may issue a certificate under this section in respect of a person if the Secretary of State reasonably –
 - (a) believes that the person’s presence in the United Kingdom is a risk to national security, and
 - (b) suspects that the person is a terrorist.
- (2) In subsection (1)(b) “terrorist” means a person who—
 - (a) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism,
 - (b) is a member of or belongs to an international terrorist group, or
 - (c) has links with an international terrorist group.⁷⁹

The legal association of “suspected international terrorists” with “immigration and asylum” connected international terrorism and foreign others. The international terrorist

⁷⁷ One study reported that 85% of European elites saw immigration as a greater problem than in the past, with a rise in xenophobic and nationalist political groups (Gallya Lahav, *Immigration and Politics in the New Europe, Reinventing Borders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 143, 179, 189).

⁷⁸ “The Anti-Terrorism,” 2001, Research Paper HC 01/96.

⁷⁹ ATCS, 2001, c. 24, part 4.

label was unquestioned as being representative of outsiders who could be legitimately “removed”:

Part 4 allows the detention of those the Secretary of State has certified as threats to national security and who are suspected of **being international terrorists** where their removal is not a realistic option within a reasonable period of time, excludes substantive consideration of asylum claims by suspected terrorists where the Secretary of State certifies that their removal would be conducive to the public good, and allows for ten years’ retention of fingerprints taken in asylum and certain immigration cases.⁸⁰

This reinforced repertoires of inside/outside identity constructions from earlier discourse that externalized international terrorism by distancing international others from the referent. It was in many ways a “return of the past”, reminiscent of 20th century exclusion orders that enabled authorities to identify others within mainland Britain and send them back where they were “from”.⁸¹ The charge to be suspected of international terrorism was broad, stating only that an actor must “be concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism...is a member of or belongs to an international terrorist group...[or] has links with an international terrorist group”.⁸² This widened the net of possible international terrorists by establishing conditions of guilt whether or not violent action was taken.

The securitization of terrorism through this period along forms of terrorism was successful in part due to the greater frequency of “terror” in discourse. This was not because of the intrinsic properties of language, but the way that this frequency played out along relational configurations of identity. Framings increased intensity, drama and danger, brokering a range of political actors and textual locations. There was agreement that exceptional measures were necessary to protect the democratic, Western, and civilized referent from an evil, international, Islamist, barbaric, and ruthless terrorist other:

⁸⁰ “The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill,” 2001, HC Research Paper 01/101, 23.

⁸¹ A similar observation was made by Campbell who compared 21st century issues around immigration and terrorism with Cold War era exclusion policies (Campbell, “Time Is Broken”, paragraphs 23-24).

⁸² ATCS, 2001, c. 24, sec. 4.

2001, Tony Blair (Lab, PM): We must also make common cause with decent, law-abiding peoples in the Islamic world in combating the threat of terrorism, of which they, too, are the victims...It was a **barbaric** act, and action must be taken...⁸³

2005, Louise Ellman (Lab/Co-op): Does the Home Secretary accept that, in contrast to the society that he has just described, the terrorism that threatens this country is based on the fascist-type ideology of hatred and an obsessive wish to **destroy the west and modernity**?⁸⁴

The presence of “civilized” built on earlier discourse and stabilized a moral superiority of the referent. It also enabled an increasingly aggressive preemption that included foreign military intervention. “Civilisational” commonplaces were particularly significant following 11 September 2001. This reinvigorated relational configurations from 1990s discourse and reasserted the international terrorist-entity-other:

Tony Blair (Prime Minister, Lab): By their acts, these terrorists and those behind them have made themselves the enemies of the entire **civilised** world.⁸⁵

Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary, Lab): The attacks were not just on the United States; they were on humanity, on **civilisation** and on us all.⁸⁶

Michael Ancram (Con): It was an attack not just on America but on the whole free world—the whole **civilised** world.⁸⁷

These “civilizational” framings brokered different political actors in a common construction of the referent in direct opposition to the international terrorist other. Notions of incivility, fanaticism, and barbarism intensified 20th century framings beyond ruthless criminals and brutal murderers. The scale of 9/11 was interpreted as proof that AQ terrorism was impossible to “understand” and represented a far more reprehensible enemy than “callous” republican or loyalist murderers from Belfast.

Fanaticism

⁸³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 14 September 2001, 6th ser., vol. 372, col. 615.

⁸⁴ Terrorism Bill (2006), 26 October 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 438, col. 325 (part no. 53, bound volume).

⁸⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 14 September 2001, 6th ser., vol. 372, col. 605.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 620.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

The securitization of terrorism as senseless and evil fanatics reasserted intersubjective understandings of international terrorists as insane and nonnegotiable. This narrowed spaces for agency, and actors were rhetorically coerced into an acceptance of exceptional counterterrorism as the only “sane” way to combat international terrorism. Rhetorical coercion does not imply a complete stripping of all agency, but the spaces within which agents could act considering the political context were significantly limited by certain structures of identity:

2001, Lord Selkirk (Con): After all, the contrast between the **fanatics** who perpetrated these crimes against humanity and the representatives of the democratic nation they attacked could not be more substantial.⁸⁸

2005, Gordon Banks (Lab): What about the human rights of people in this country not to be victims of terrorism—not to be maimed by suicide bombers, or killed by religious **fanatics** who want to destroy our very way of life?⁸⁹

2005, Baroness Ramsay (Lab): We are facing **fanatics** aiming to kill and maim as many people as possible and to sacrifice themselves in the process.⁹⁰

2001, Michael Ancram (Con): I offer the full support of Her Majesty's Opposition to the Government in their chosen path as a leader in the international community and a staunch ally to our American friends in the fight against this terrorist **evil**...⁹¹

2001, Jack Straw (Foreign Secretary, Lab): We have shown that the determined will of the international community can defeat the **evil** that seeks to destroy us and that destroyed the lives of so many people on 11 September. We have shown that action to enforce universal values is a powerful force for good.⁹²

2005, Lord Kalms (Con): Terrorism is pure **evil**. It is unadulterated **evil**. It is **evil** from every angle and perspective.⁹³

2005, Mark Hendrick (Labour/Co-op): Again we face an **evil** ideology from abroad, a perverse extremist form of Islam...⁹⁴

⁸⁸ Parl. Deb, H.L., 14 September 2001, 5th ser., vol. 627, col. 67.

⁸⁹ Terrorism Bill, Order for Third Reading, 10 November 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 439, col. 501 (part no. 63, bound volume).

⁹⁰ Parl. Deb, H.L., 21 November 2005, vol. 675, col. 1408 (part no. 64).

⁹¹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 14 September 2001, 6th ser., vol. 372, col. 622.

⁹² Parl. Deb, H.C., 12 December 2001, vol. 376, col. 846 (part no. 70).

⁹³ Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 1 March 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, vol. 670, col. 181 (part no. 45).

Commonplaces of “evil” and “fanatic” were politically unarguable tags of illegitimacy and immorality allocated to terrorist others. These constructions securitized terrorism in a particular way that limited outcomes with respect to knowledge “of” terrorism and responses to the threat.

Immigration

Discourses linking immigration to international terrorism furthered assumptions of this particular threat as from outside Britain and from non-British actors. The reformed Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill added a requirement “of good character” to all applicants for British citizenship.⁹⁵ This move was explicitly linked to the 2005 “Counterterrorism Progress Report” explicitly connected immigration to (counter)terrorism.⁹⁶ Commonplaces of immigration and asylum were increasingly prominent:

2001, James Butterfill (Con): We need to regain control over the **immigration** process if we are to protect ourselves from international terrorism.⁹⁷

2001, Lord Howell (Con): It seems also—this is more controversial—that young terrorists or young fundamentalists determined even to commit suicide in their **mad** cause are still coming too easily into this country. I am afraid that we shall yet again have to revisit the issue of the **asylum** entrants.⁹⁸

2005, A. J. Beith (LD): That power [executive decision basing criminal offense and incarceration] has been imported from **immigration** legislation, which was the original basis of the decisions on the Belmarsh detainees⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Parl. Deb, H.C., 26 October 2005, vol. 438, col. 405 (part no. 53).

⁹⁵ Those relying on a 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness provision were exempt.

⁹⁶ Charles Clarke, “Counter-terrorism progress report – Written ministerial statement,” 15 December 2005 [cited 16 January 2011]; available from <http://tna.europarchive.org/20061101012820/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speeches-archive/15-12-05-st-ct-progress-report>.

⁹⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 14 September 2001, 6th ser., vol. 372, col. 629.

⁹⁸ Parl. Deb, H.L., 14 September 2001, 5th ser., vol. 627, col. 16.

⁹⁹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 22 Feb 2005, vol. 431, col. 163 (part no. 40).

Along with commonplaces of “immigrant” were framings similar to 1990s discourse that highlighted “non-western” characteristics. Even when suspects were British citizens, effort was made to clarify the “origins” of such individuals. This reinforced their position as not wholly included with the core referent identity, but on the margins:

In November 2000, police discovered 70 kg (154 lb) of home-made explosives in a suburban "bomb factory" in Birmingham. Although the intended target was unclear, it is likely that the explosives were meant to be used to carry out terrorist attacks in the UK. Moinul Abedin, a British citizen of Bangladeshi origins, was later sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for his role in the plot.¹⁰⁰

Abedin, while a “British citizen”, was explicitly positioned as “of Bangladeshi origins”. This implied that even if the internal/external identity divider was imprecise, at their “essence”, international terrorists are outside traditional notions of the self. This external othering around perceived native/foreign boundaries was apparent in earlier discourse, but was intensified in the post-11 September 2001 environment.

Islam

One way that these borders were reinforced was through framings around “Islam” and “Muslim”:

2000, Baroness Cox (cross-bench): a rapidly growing **Islamist** movement which constitutes the gravest threat to global security in the world today...On 12th November in London, a meeting addressed by Sheikh Omar Bakhri Mohammed called for a **jihad** against Russia and raised money to support fighters in Chechnya... Elsewhere in England, the Afghan war veteran, Abu Hamza, an imam in north London, was shown teaching recruits terror tactics such as methods of bringing down aircraft flying into Heathrow airport...each recruit was told to devise similar terrorist activities, for this is a war, a **jihad**, in which blood will be shed here in Britain.¹⁰¹

2001, John Butterfill (Con): “common cause between **Islam** and all the western world”¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ “How the threat has developed,” MI5 [cited 31 March 2011]; available from <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/how-the-threat-has-developed.html>.

¹⁰¹ The International Situation, 12 January 2000, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 608, col. 697.

¹⁰² Parl. Deb, H.C., 14 September 2001, 6th ser., vol. 372, col. 628.

2005, Lord Pearson (UKIP): The Bill is largely a laudable attempt to arm ourselves as best we can against the new evil of **Islamist** terrorism.¹⁰³

Positioning actors such as Abu Hamza and Sheikh Omar Bakhri alongside framings of “Islam” generalized historical relations and actors without allowing for contingency or context. It is not that these actors or associated groups were innocuous. But, the way that international terrorism was constructed conflated Islam with terrorism and enabled a response that ignored consequences of *insecurity*. Bakhri indeed responded to the question “why the ‘radical Jihadis’ achieved such prominence” by stating:

I believe the new laws of terrorism, in Europe, were a big mistake. I am now far away from them, but I honestly believe this is the biggest mistake committed by Western powers. Before the London bombings, before the Madrid bombings, and to a certain extent before September 11, I think the strictness of the rules started to [contribute to] the uprising.¹⁰⁴

Regardless if one *agrees* with the grievances underlying those engaged in terrorism and political violence, issues of historical oppression, Western foreign policy, us/them boundary assumptions, counterterrorism practice, and feelings of injustice hold significant influence for identity and security. However, the long history of problematic East/West division and complexity of identity-security relations was not taken seriously:

2001, Lord Selsdon (Con): In many of those countries, the British, who were once a friend and partner, were for a long time treated as an enemy. I shall give a couple of the stupid sort of jokes that were heard. "Why does the sun never set on the British Empire?" "Because the Arabs do not trust the British after dark." "What is wrong with the Middle East?" "Hashish, baksheesh, malish (meaning, 'tomorrow') and the British; and the worst is the British because they invented the rest." We were somehow regarded as a corrupt, foreign, colonial power that had exploited the resources of a country and brought it no benefit.¹⁰⁵

When discourse did link perceptions of injustice to historical imperialism and colonialism, it was not given consideration as a legitimate grievance or factor of

¹⁰³ Parl. Deb, H.L., 21 November 2005, vol. 675, col. 1477 (part no. 64).

¹⁰⁴ Horgan, *Walking Away*, 124.

¹⁰⁵ Parl. Deb, H.L., 14 September 2001, 5th ser., vol. 627, col. 70.

insecurity. Distinctions among risks were brushed aside, often asserting a simplistic “two-world” view separating Islam and the West.

Similar to earlier discourse targeting Irish groups, 21st century discourse provided a dual set of images around communities linked to suspected terrorists. On the one hand, the threat of terrorism was linked to a particular community and religion. On the other hand, some actors within this group were constructed as “law-abiding Muslims”, establishing a kind of communal vulnerability. Neither construction positioned members of this community as equal to the core referent, whether or not they were engaged in violence. Everyday aspects of this paradoxical (non)belonging can be interpreted as an example of what Der Derian has called “a mimetic war of images”:

A mimetic war is a battle of imitation and representation, in which the relationship of who we are and who they are is played out along a wide spectrum of familiarity and friendliness, indifference and tolerance, estrangement and hostility. It can result in appreciation or denigration, accommodation or separation, assimilation or extermination. It draws physical boundaries between peoples as well as metaphysical boundaries between life and the most radical other of life, death. It separates human from god. It builds the fences that make good neighbors; it builds the wall that confines a whole people. And it sanctions just about every kind of violence.¹⁰⁶

Within this are implicit yet significant aspects of emotion and affect that come into play through processes of identity and boundary construction. Us/them “bordering” practices around “Islamist extremism” and “decent, law-abiding Muslims” reinforced inside/outside assumptions of difference in a way that was both “tolerant” and “hostile”. The construction of “suspect communities” versus “good” communities from discourse securitizing terrorism, both marginalized from the referent. This represented how “knowledge of the other [is] inflected by the equation of difference and inferiority” and can lead to “the physical destruction, enslavement, or cruel exploitation of the other”.¹⁰⁷ Identity distinctions such as “law-abiding” are a type of othering practice with the potential to increase social tension and insecurity:

¹⁰⁶ Der Derian, “The War of Networks,” paragraph 20.

¹⁰⁷ Inayatullah and Blaney, *International Relations*, 11.

2001, Tony Blair (PM, Lab): We do not yet know the exact origin of this evil. But if, as appears likely, it is so-called **Islamic fundamentalists**, we know that they do not speak or act for the vast majority of **decent law-abiding Muslims** throughout the world.

...

those who truly follow the religion of **Islam are decent, peaceful and law-abiding people**. Like us, they have often been victims of terrorism and, like us, they want it stamped out.¹⁰⁸

2001, John Hume (SDLP): majority of **decent, law-abiding Muslims** throughout the world¹⁰⁹

The focus on Islam and explicit discussions of “decent, law-abiding *Muslims*”, instead of just “decent, law-abiding *people*” or “decent, law-abiding *societies*”[emphasis added], bolstered Muslim/non-Muslim categories of difference. Embedded practices of othering maintained exceptional counterterrorism even if the perceived boundaries of separation were blurred:

2001, Khalid Mahmood (Lab): Above all, I am British—and, in fact, a Brummie, having been brought up in Birmingham and having lived there...It was not long ago that people in the north of the country were trying to divide the community on the basis of skin colour and religion. Those very people will now have another opportunity to carry out such activities. It has already started in Birmingham. I was at a radio station yesterday morning when I learned that such people were ringing up mosques and other institutions leaving abusive messages and putting excrement through doors. I spoke to a member of the Sikh council. He is not a Muslim but ignorant people do not recognise the difference. **They lump everybody together.**¹¹⁰

2005, Lord Ahmed: Your Lordships will be aware that many of the people stopped, searched and arrested under the current anti-terrorist legislation are mostly from the Muslim community. Since 9/11 more than 1,000 have been arrested under the anti-terrorism laws. Seventeen were found guilty and among those six were Irish, two were Sikhs, five Muslims and the remainder unknown. **Yet the common perception is that these are all Muslims** who want to destroy our democracy and our way of life. In the mean time, my community has been isolated, Islamophobia has increased, and there is a popular belief that allegations about Muslims must be true.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 14 September 2001, 6th ser., vol. 372, col. 606, 612.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., col. 613.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., col. 648-649.

¹¹¹ Prevention of Terrorism, 22 Feb 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, vol. 670, col. 199 (part no. 45).

Us/them boundary construction along assumptions of race and religion increased insecurity for those associated with suspect communities, further linking Islam with international terrorism:

2005, Robin Cook (Lab): I worry gravely that the powers, in particular the power of house arrest, could be counterproductive in the fight against terrorism...Let us be frank. We all know that the control orders are most likely to be applied against citizens of Britain who are British Muslims.¹¹²

Despite the Joint Committee on Human Rights noting “mounting evidence that the powers under the Terrorism Act 2000 are being used disproportionately against members of the Muslim community in the United Kingdom,” alternative counterterrorism approaches were not engaged.¹¹³ By the early 21st century these self/other dichotomies were entrenched sources of intersubjective knowledge supporting a particular securitization of terrorism and normalization of exceptional counterterrorism. Despite the 7 July 2005 attack underlining the international terrorist as from within, internal/external discourses were durable seeds of alienation justified by an official securitization of terrorism that had been unfolding for decades. The effect of counterterrorism on broader social relations and identity, and the contradictions of a two-track approach to Irish versus international threats, was noticed by the public:¹¹⁴

When other nations fight for their rights you call them **LOYALIST** and **FREEDOM FIGHTERS** but when a **Muslim** fights for his/her rights you label them a **TERRORIST**...how can you justify this?
Imteyaz Azmi, London

These **Islamic** terrorists, and they are Islamic terrorists despite Tony Blair's insistence to the contrary, have one objective: To bring the US in particular, and the **West** in general, to its knees...
If these people wish to live in **our country**, then they should adopt the principle of 'doing in Rome as the Romans do'.

¹¹² Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 28 Feb 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 431, col. 714 (part no. 44).

¹¹³ Terrorism Bill, 20 December 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, vol. 676, col. 1635 (part no. 82).

¹¹⁴ “Your comments on Britain on the Brink [forum],” 1 October 2001, *BBC News* [cited 11 May 2009]; available from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/1573310.stm>.

Richard, Cardiff

It's ironic to see Blair helping to organise the hunt for **Bin Laden** in the mountains of Afghanistan. It's a pity he hasn't shown the same enthusiasm in hunting down the murderers of the people in Omagh. But then again he might have offended **Gerry bin Adams** and that would never do.

Alan, Banbridge

I am proud to live in this country and am grateful to the people who died in the wars to give us **freedom**. Do not let **our country** go down the drain even further! We need laws now to stop the **fanatics**.

Stan Francis, Birmingham

Inside/outside assumptions stemming directly from the securitization of terrorism influenced broader perceptions of who belongs, who terrorist others are, and who is dangerous. Magnifying the international terrorist as an evil, alien other enabled official discourse to justify an expansion of exceptional counterterrorism. This expansion caused extraordinary security practices to begin a trajectory of normalized exception.

Democracy, way of life

Combined with shifts in threat identity were alterations in referent construction. Discourse had moved away from 1970s and 1980s notions of law and order by establishing the referent as western democracy and a British way of life built upon 1990s discourse:

2005, Charles Clarke (Home Secretary, Lab): **Democracy** and the need to protect our **democracy** is at the heart of the Bill.¹¹⁵

2001, Baroness Symons (Minister of Trade, Lab): This enemy has no respect for **our way of life**, nor for our values.¹¹⁶

2005, David Davis (Con): Global terrorism is an attack on those very things—**our way of life**, our beliefs, our liberties, and our lives.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 26 Oct 2005, vol. 438, col. 324 (part no. 53).

¹¹⁶ Parl. Deb, H.L., 14 September 2001, 5th ser., vol. 627, col. 12.

¹¹⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 26 Oct 2005, vol. 438, col. 347 (part no. 53).

2005, Charles Clarke (Home Secretary, Lab): We face foes who seek to destroy our **way of life** and everything we stand for.¹¹⁸

As explained by Richard Johnson, the phrase “way of life” takes on a distinctive significance in the context of counterterrorism. It is positioned as “a potential victim that reveals itself as a source of strength”.¹¹⁹ Distinguishing international from other terrorisms alongside this uncontroversial referent was essential to downgrading security in Northern Ireland while bolstering counterterrorism more broadly. As the threat was amplified as an immoral foreign other opposing a democratic way of life, actors were brokered and consequently rhetorically coerced into positions of exceptional policy acquiescence. Who in a position of political authority could argue against security measures if they were necessary to protect liberal democracy when “No one can doubt the threat that we face from international terrorism”?¹²⁰

Through rhetorical coercion, the audience’s conditions of possibility were limited by particular identity framings and the meanings that they came to represent. Regardless of belief or motivation, it was politically impossible to take a position one could interpret as disregarding the referent’s well being, the number one priority of government.¹²¹ Even when actors acknowledged a proposed measure as draconian, in the end they voiced support:

2001, Graham Allen (Lab): The House should not mince its words. The Executive are in effect suspending habeas corpus and ending trial by jury, a right that can be traced back more than 700 years to the Magna Carta. We are bringing in indefinite internment and introducing to the English mainland something that we never did even at the height of the IRA offensive. As with internment, the normal burden of proof will be reversed: people will be treated as guilty unless they can prove their innocence. Those who are detained will not be able to see the evidence gathered against them, and will therefore not be able to challenge its accuracy...**None the less, the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister say**

¹¹⁸ Parl. Deb, H.C., 10 Nov 2005, vol. 439, col. 502 (part no. 63).

¹¹⁹ Richard Johnson, “Defending Ways of Life: The (Anti-)Terrorist Rhetorics of Bush and Blair,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 19 (2002): 215.

¹²⁰ Parl. Deb, H.L., 21 November 2005, vol. 675, col. 1384 (part no. 64).

¹²¹ CONTEST, 2006.

that they believe the measure is necessary to combat terrorism, and I will trust their judgment.¹²²

A similar phrasing of support came from Labour MP Kevin McNamara who first claimed that “the Bill does not meet the requirements of the European convention on human rights”, but followed this by stating “I regret that the Bill is necessary, but I will not divide the House on it.”¹²³ Rhetorical coercion does not dissolve agency – this would wrongly imply a removal of accountability and responsibility from lawmakers. Even in the rhetorical political stakes following 11 September, “The ‘war on terror’ was [still] a deliberate political choice taken by western political leaders, and they could have fashioned other responses.”¹²⁴ But the spaces for politically possible agency were limited by specific patterns of threat/referent construction. An example similar to the above is seen during debate preceding the TA2000.

Real

One commonplace that contributed to rhetorical coercion and counterterrorism outcomes from 2000 to 2006 was “real”. “Real” was a rhetorical trump card that outweighed dissent. Even without detailed explanation, the threat was constructed as undeniably “real”:

2001, David Blunkett (Home Secretary, Lab) “**real** dangers that exist”¹²⁵

2005, Hazel Blears (Home Office Minister, Lab): During the recent debates on the new legislation the majority of the House of Commons recognised the threat is **real** and serious and different in character.¹²⁶

2005, Michael Howard (Con): We all agree that terrorism is a **real** and current threat, and that special powers are needed to deal with it.¹²⁷

¹²² Parl. Deb, H.C., Deb 19 November 2001, vol. 375, col. 136.

¹²³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 15 March 2000, 6th ser., vol. 346, col. 465-467.

¹²⁴ Croft and Moore, “The evolution of threat narratives,” 821.

¹²⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 19 November 2001, vol. 375, col. 25 (part no. 54).

¹²⁶ Blears, “The Tools to Combat Terrorism.”

¹²⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 23 February 2005, vol. 431, col. 300 (part no. 41).

2005, Lord Carlile (Lab): There is a **real** and present threat of continuing al-Qaeda-connected terrorism within the United Kingdom.¹²⁸

We can see the effects of rhetorical coercion when lawmakers have to publicly answer the rare opposition stance. In a speech regarding disagreement over policy in Afghanistan, Browne claimed that those who disagreed did so “not because they question whether the mission is important, or indeed legitimate, but because they think it is impossible”.¹²⁹ Those in favor of counterterrorism here framed dissent not as fundamental disagreement over policy legitimacy or substance, but as a lack of faith that such measures would be successful. A consequence of such language was the simultaneous reassertion of existing counterterrorism and silencing of alternative views.

The durable position of identity framings deployed by various actors and the intersubjective understandings that they engendered were of causal consequence for intersubjective understanding and material counterterrorism practice. In Britain from 2000 to 2006 we saw an expansion and normalization of exceptional counterterrorism despite an incoherence of the threat identity labels that were used to securitize terrorism. Though violence continued in Northern Ireland, in official discourse this was framed as “paramilitary” and “dissident”. Terms of terrorism were privileged in discourse around the international threat from outside Britain. At the same time, acts of violence such as 7/7 connected the international terrorist label with domestic actors. In official discourse, inside/outside boundaries of identity that underpinned the continued securitization of terrorism along different forms were increasingly blurred and reasserted as essentially different categories of the other.

III. From 2006 onwards

The real risk is that, if we detain and then release one suspected terrorist without charge, we radicalise 100 further people—the terrorists of the future. The Bill is

¹²⁸ Parl. Deb, H.L., 21 November 2005, vol. 675, col. 1434 (part no. 64).

¹²⁹ Desmond Henry (Des) Browne, Speech by Defence Secretary, Des Browne, at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 19 September 2006 [cited 10 January 2010]; available from <http://ukingermany.fco.gov.uk/en/news/?view=Speech&id=4617094>.

dangerous in that respect. The proposal is simply wrong: it will damage liberties, rights and a system of justice fundamental to the British way of life.
2005, David Davis¹³⁰

On his last day in parliament in 2005, itself perhaps how he could breach the rhetorically coercive discourse, Brian Sedgemore (Lab) said:

As this will almost certainly be my last speech in Parliament, I shall try hard not to upset anyone. However, our debate here tonight is a grim reminder of how the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary are betraying some of Labour's most cherished beliefs. Not content with tossing aside the ideas and ideals that inspire and inform ideology, they seem to be giving up on values too. Liberty, without which democracy has no meaning, and the rule of law, without which state power cannot be contained, look to Parliament for their protection, but this Parliament, sad to say, is failing the nation badly. It is not just the Government but Back-Bench Members [*sic*] who are to blame. It seems that in situations such as this, politics become incompatible with conscience, principle, decency and self-respect. Regrettably, in such situations, the desire for power and position predominates.¹³¹

This discourse used framings similar to those in favor of expanded measures (“rule of law”, “democracy”), and pointed to the consequential power of brokerage by referencing Government and Back-Bench Members. From 2000 to 2006, the securitization of terrorism reinforced internal/external boundaries of identity from earlier discourse. The referent was British, but also global. It was a value-based democratic identity building upon 1970s discourse of a British public represented by peace, law and order. International labels differentiated types of terrorism and material response from insecurity in Northern Ireland. These processes of identity (re)construction constituted and justified the transition to permanent legislation with the TA2000, and expanded measures through the ATCS2001, PTA2005, and TA2006.

Framings from 2006 “to win the battle of hearts and minds” underscored terrorism not just as a threat to life, but as a threat to British values:

¹³⁰ Parl. Deb, H.C., 9 November 2005, vol. 439, col. 356 (part no. 62).

¹³¹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 23 February 2005, vol. 431, col. 365 (part no. 41).

2005, Lord Judd (Lab): As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, has reminded us, we are dealing with a very sinister and dangerous threat. To be able to deal with that effectively, the battle for **hearts and minds** is crucial.¹³²

2005, John Denham (Lab): It is in our policing, our intelligence, the development of community support, and crucially, in **winning the hearts and minds** of people at home and abroad. The key battle is for **hearts and minds**.¹³³

2005, Lord McNally (LD): there is a need to win **hearts and minds**. We have to ensure that all our fellow citizens, from every community, see the war against terror as their war too. As the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, said, the lesson from Northern Ireland and other areas of conflict is that laws or methods that do not win **hearts and minds** inflame problems¹³⁴

Through framing counterterrorism along value-based arguments of winning “hearts and minds”, early 21st century discourse rhetorically coerced actors into positions whereby it would be politically difficult to disagree. By 2006, counterterrorism was no longer just a temporary measure, but a normalized part of domestic security practice. Actors espousing different views on counterterrorism were using similar discourses in securitizing the threat, with a spectrum of political positions contributing to an overarching construction of identity.

The next chapter from 2007 to 2011 is a period of changing political leadership, reduced international terrorism, continuing Irish related insecurity, and maintained counterterrorism. By 2011, counterterrorism practice had reached a plateau of exception. With extraordinary counterterrorism permanent and embedded in everyday practice and the terrorist other an unquestioned entity existing in “its” own right, discourses that securitized terrorism and extraordinary counterterrorism measures were a self-sustaining cycle of identity and practice.

¹³² Prevention of Terrorism Bill, 3 March 2005, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, vol. 670, col. 382 (part no. 47).

¹³³ Parl. Deb, H.C., 26 October 2005, vol. 438, col. 369 (part no. 53).

¹³⁴ Parl. Deb, H.L. 21 November 2005, vol. 675, col. 1394 (part no. 64).

Chapter 8

2007-2011

A plateau of exceptionality

Regimes...differ momentarily in which kinds of organization, identity, and collective interaction they prescribe, tolerate, and forbid. But all of them create procedures for public screening of acceptability in these regards; those procedures crystallize as laws, registers, surveillance, police practice, subsidies, organizations of public space, and repressive politics.

(McAdam et. al 2001)¹

The risk level is at “severe”. We face threats from a whole range of people. When I was Prisons Minister, I visited some of our prisons and I saw some of the terrorists who had been prosecuted, and they really are scary people. Next year, a large number of them will be released on license, and they will be back in society, so the threat is always there.

(Gerry Sutcliffe (Lab), 23 June 2011)²

The best place for a terrorist is a prison cell; I think we all agree on that.

(James Brokenshire (Con), 30 June 2011)³

This chapter discusses how particular relational configurations of identity securitizing terrorism sustained a normalization of exceptional counterterrorism from 2007 to 2011. Measures continued despite no major attacks and the weakening of AQ. Known failed attempts were thwarted by actor ineptitude as much as, if not more than, counterterrorism. New reviews and the 2010 shift to a Liberal Democrat-Conservative

¹ McAdam et. al, *Dynamics of Contention*, 147.

² “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill,” 23 June 2011, Clause 1, Abolition of control orders, Public Bill Committee [cited 29 May 2012]; available from <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmtoday/cmstand/output/pbc193/pb110623a-01.htm>.

³ Committee Debate - 7th sitting, Public Bill Committee, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, 30 June 2011, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, col. 228.

coalition government held initial promise of a redirection of counterterrorism approach.⁴ The 2007 discovery of unexploded car bombs in London and the 2007 Glasgow airport attack were instances of insecurity. But they also represented the unreliability of counterterrorism to stop attacks. Reviews begun in 2009 were positioned as a reevaluation of the liberty-security balance, and some powers were removed. A snapshot of the Government's objectives in the review stated in 2011 are as follows:




Figure 2.2 – “Key Elements” of the 2011 UK Government Counterterrorism Review⁵

But in the end as will be seen through this chapter, the overarching trajectory of counterterrorism as extraordinary state power was maintained: counterterrorism was on a plateau of normalized exception.

As discussed in the previous chapter, 21st century official discourse and practice introduced new commonplaces. But they also reinforced existing patterns of identity

⁴ “Review of counter-terrorism and security powers - Terms of reference,” 29 July 2010 [cited 31 March 2011]; available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/ct-terms-of-ref/counter-terrorism-terms-of-ref?view=Html>.

⁵ Review of Counter-terrorism and Security Powers, Review Findings and Recommendations, January 2011, Cm. 8004.

construction from earlier discourse. The securitization of terrorism continued to draw on domestic, Irish, and international identity assumptions. Historically rooted us/them understandings linked to framings of good/evil, civilized/barbarian, and East/West remained influential. As demonstrated in chapter six, it was not that “international” or “Irish” labels were absent prior to the 1990s. Rather, that the way these terms became temporarily stabilized through particular configurations in discourse influenced outcomes of intersubjective understanding and material practice. The 21st century shift to permanent counterterrorism law set the foundation for a normalization of exceptional counterterrorism through new laws, offices, and strategies.

From 2007 to 2011, the securitization of terrorism continued along identity labels based on geographic assumptions of identification. Processes of identity construction securitizing terrorism were interlinked through websites (OSCT and MI5), national strategies (NSS, CONTEST), laws (CT2008 and TPIM2011), parliamentary debates, and reviews. This chapter discusses how a mutual constitution of securitizing discourse, identity construction, and counterterrorism enabled a plateau of normalized exception with no end in sight.

I. Positioning the recent past

From 2007 to 2011, counterterrorism became institutionally entrenched through the Office of Security and Counterterrorism (est. 2007), National Security Strategy (2008,⁶ 2009),⁷ Counterterrorism Act 2008,⁸ CONTEST (2009, 2011), and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (2011).⁹ The latest version of CONTEST covered “all forms of terrorism”, acknowledging “there is very often no clear distinction

⁶ “The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world,” 2008, Cmnd. 7291.

⁷ “The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Update 2009 Security for the Next Generation,” 2009, Cmnd. 7590.

⁸ CT Bill, 2008, c. 28.

⁹ Terrorism, Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, 2011, c. 23 (TPIMs were also more expensive than control orders (Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, 5 Sept 2011, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 532, col. 64 (part no. 193)).

between international and what is sometimes called ‘home grown’ terrorism”.¹⁰ However, “home-grown” was mentioned only one other time out of 125 pages.¹¹ Compared to 980 instances of “terror” this was somewhat surprising. CONTEST 2011 references “lone-wolves”, but just twice, one of which referred to the title of a book.¹² Though notions such as “home grown” have played a role in establishing conventional wisdom around the terrorist threat, this term was conspicuously absent from official discourse on counterterrorism law and policy.¹³ In the 2009 version of CONTEST (176 pages), “terror” appears 230 times but “homegrown” only once. This minimal reference reasserted perceptions of international terrorism as external, and non-British:

Terrorist incidents in this country usually have an overseas connection: the term ‘home-grown’ terrorism, though often used, can be misleading. Planning for attacks in the UK takes place overseas as well as at home.¹⁴

In CONTEST 2009 “international” appears 189 times, “Irish” 6 times, “domestic” 34 times, and “terror” 1,060 times. In the NSS 2008 (64 pages), terror appears 104 times, but homegrown not once. This infrequency does not contest the influence of these phrases more broadly. But it does underscore a stubborn durability of threat framings begun in earlier years. There was a new attention to internal sources of insecurity. However, a securitization of terrorism drawing upon geographic boundary assumptions associated with differentiated degrees of danger and otherness continued.

Interestingly, the most recent CONTEST from 2011 removed “international” from its title. But upon greater investigation, the content of this version maintains the use of earlier threat labels, for example as seen through its section “The Strategic Context”. There was a more explicit acknowledgment of continuing insecurity in Northern Ireland, but there was also a continued use of international to categorize almost all non-domestic and non-Irish related threats.

¹⁰ CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, July 2011.

¹¹ Ibid., 89.

¹² Ibid., 6, 26.

¹³ This should not be interpreted as in disagreement with Croft (*Securitizing Islam*, 187-189). Rather, it is an indication of a different empirical focus.

¹⁴ CONTEST, 2009, part 3, sec 14.17.




Figure 2.3 – “Arrests on suspicion of terrorism in the UK,” 2009-2010¹⁵

Though Irish-related terrorism was distinguished from other threats in Britain, “international” remained a catchall phrase. This threat identifier grouped all varieties of AQ inspired terrorism (domestic and “international”) together, even as the AQ network itself has become significantly less centralized. Similar to Croft’s analysis of how Islam is securitized, discourse around the normalization of exceptional counterterrorism positioned all Islamic-related security issues under one general umbrella.¹⁶

A 2010 report on the TA2000 framed terrorism in a way that continued intersubjective understandings established in earlier discourse through practices of labeling international, Irish, and domestic threats. The report explained “Prosecutions currently are focused on three strands of terrorism offences – (i) extremism claimed to have its foundations in Islam [international], (ii) Northern Ireland based dissidents

¹⁵ CONTEST, 2011, 27.

¹⁶ Croft, *Securitizing Islam*.

[Irish], and (iii) right-wing violent extremism [domestic].”¹⁷ From 2007 to 2011, the securitization of terrorism continued to align different threats with issues of race and religion. A decade after the TA 2000 was passed and thirty-seven years after the first counterterrorism laws were introduced, the issue of suspect communities made its way into an official review:¹⁸

Most Muslims had direct experience of being stopped and searched, had close friends or family who had been stopped and searched or had witnessed stops in their local area...The impact of counter-terrorism law and policies are experienced and felt more acutely and directly amongst Muslims than non-Muslims. Non-Muslims were less likely to have direct or indirect experiences of any measures and were generally more supportive of the measures that were being taken as necessary.¹⁹

Research around the issue of Muslim suspect communities provided insight into how policies such as counter-radicalization were linked to issues of *insecurity* rather than security:

The exaggeration of the ‘Muslim threat’ and an increasing sense of scrutiny and surveillance were viewed as contributing towards a growing sense of isolation for many within Muslim communities. This was also seen as exacerbating existing internal community fragmentation (given the diversity of cultures and countries of origin within and amongst Muslim communities). The Prevent strand of the Contest II strategy, directed at the ‘prevention of radicalisation’, was seen as producing particular problems in this regard.²⁰

Though the alienation of Muslim suspect communities stemming from counterterrorism was apparent in academic and policy reports, these reviews did not result in a significant reevaluation of counterterrorism trajectory. In addition, none of these reports discussed the possible link between suspect communities and how “international terrorism” as a threat label was based on inside/outside assumptions of belonging irrespective of

¹⁷ “Report on the Operation in 2009 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006,” Lord Carlile of Berriew, July 2010, p. 7 sec. 24.

¹⁸ Hickman *et. al.*, “Suspect Communities?”; McGovern and Tobin, “Countering Terror”.

¹⁹ “Review of Counter-terrorism and Security Powers Equality Impact Assessment,” January 2011, Cmnd. 8006, p. 10.

²⁰ McGovern and Tobin, “Countering Terror,” 5.

whether or not actors engaged in violence. In 2007, an independent report by Human Rights Watch in 2007 stated:

Counterterrorism measures that violate human rights undermine the UK's moral legitimacy at home and abroad, damaging its ability to win the battle of ideas that is central to long-term success in countering terrorism. They erode public trust in law enforcement and security services, and alienate communities whose cooperation is critical in the fight against terrorism.²¹

The above is reminiscent of experiences during the Troubles, and repeated consequences of alienation. It also demonstrates the continued mutual constitution of Britain as a political and societal referent. However, there was no problematization of how the way terrorism was securitized enabled a stabilization of certain us/them understandings to arise over others. It is by unpacking securitization that this thesis narrative brings added value to existing debates. By identifying how relational configurations of identity came together in particular ways at particular times, we can see how discourse is causally consequential for outcomes. As discussed in earlier chapters, securitization theory provides an important starting point for investigating the interrelation of discourse, identity, and practice. But in order to better explain the causal impact of language for outcomes, analysis has to disentangle the relational configurations that enable certain identities to arise over others. Collective understandings linked to these threat/referent identities enabled and limited different possibilities of response. Due to distinctive patterns of identity externalization in the securitization of terrorism across British discourse, exceptional measures were eventually normalized.

In one debate around the TPIM it was stated “We know that there have been miscarriages of justice, as the hon. Gentleman has mentioned, but these are never mentioned in any reviews.”²² Thus even as actors are aware of consequences from counterterrorism that go back in some shape or form for decades, the outcome was a

²¹ Human Rights Watch, “Hearts and Minds: Putting Human Rights at the Center of United Kingdom Counterterrorism Policy,” Number 3 (June 2007): 1-22 (available from <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/06/21/hearts-and-minds-putting-human-rights-center-united-kingdom-counterterrorism-poli>).

²² David Davis (Con): Parl. Deb, H.C., 5 Sept 2011, vol. 532, col. 69 (part no. 193).

maintenance of existing approach. The intersubjective understanding of international terrorism as synonymous with Islam, unparalleled in danger, and opposing a civilized way of life was embedded in official discourse. Terrorism was not an issue of “public order” or serious criminality, as during 1970s and early 1980s. It was a threat to western democracy and civilized British values, whose “common purpose is to condemn Western society and its value systems”.²³

Forming counterterrorism through the “the rule of law” and “democratic procedure” led to material outcomes of counterterrorism law, and in the process reasserted a British democratic self. This strengthened the self-fulfilling interrelation of discourse, identity, and practice over time. Statements like “the British are strong and free people, and their laws should reflect this” simultaneously legitimized exceptional counterterrorism law and the British referent.²⁴ Focusing on the rule of law also ensured that if powers were removed, they could be legitimately replaced with similar measures through subsequent practices of lawmaking. The removal of powers was not a de-escalation of exception as much as it was a recalibration of what that exception entailed. Just as the 2004 Law Lords decision against the indefinite detention of “suspected international terrorists” spawned new control orders, the 2010 removal of control orders spawned new, and similarly exceptional, TPIMs.²⁵ The Equality and Human Rights Commission (TPIM 03) and Liberty (TPIM 04) gave the following assessments of the proposed TPIM regime:

TPIM 03 (EHRC)

“...we consider that as a whole the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) regime lacks sufficient safeguards to adequately protect the right to liberty and the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights... (5)
- The Commission believes, as a matter of principle, restrictions on individual liberty should occur on the basis of what someone has done, not what they are

²³ “The Definition of Terrorism,” A Report by Lord Carlile, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 2007, Cmnd. 7052, 24.

²⁴ “Review of Counter-terrorism and Security Powers,” A Report by Lord MacDonald, January 2011, Cmnd. 8003, p. 2 sec. 5.

²⁵ See Appendix D for an example of TPIMs in detail.

suspected of doing and that those suspected of terrorist offences should be prosecuted...the Bill departs from this principle... (5-6)

-...the Commission is concerned that overall the proposed TPIMs regime may still fail to comply with Convention rights, in particular the right to liberty and security (Article 5), the right to a fair trial (Article 6), the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), freedom of expression (Article 10) and prohibition of discrimination (Article 14).”²⁶

TPIM 4 (Liberty)

“the TPIM regime essentially mirrors the control order system in all of its most offensive elements including:

- abrogation of the constitutional safeguards which protect the right to a fair trial, in particular the process will continue to be executive led, with judicial interventions remaining weak and shrouded with secrecy;
- creation of an impediment to prosecution of those genuinely involved in terrorist activity who are tipped off and then prevented from doing the very things which would allow evidence to be gathered;
- imposition of punitive and potentially unending restrictions on individuals in the absence of criminal due process;
- furtherance of a system which is as unsafe as it is unfair ruining the lives of the innocent and allowing potentially dangerous people to evade prosecution; and
- retention of a system which creates huge costs liabilities at a time of financial strife”²⁷

Despite these views and an environment without major terrorist attack, the TPIM 2011 received royal assent 14 December 2011. Over the past almost forty years, different speakers and textual sites were brokered through repeated framings that asserted politically unarguable threat/referent identities rhetorically coerced actors into accepting exceptional counterterrorism as the “only” option:

2011, Bob Stewart (Con): I very much support most of what the right hon. Lady is saying. None of us in this House wants control orders or TPIMs, but we do not have a choice. ... The people concerned are very dangerous—or apparently very dangerous: we cannot prove it, but we do not want to take the risk—and I am afraid that we have to put up with this lack of liberty.²⁸

²⁶ “Public Bill Committee Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, Written Evidence,” July 2011, HC Official Report General Committees, PBC (Bill 193), 6.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

²⁸ Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, 29 Nov 2011, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 536, col. 866 (part no. 232).

This focus on preventing future risk, even if very dangerous is “apparently very dangerous”, encouraged the logic of “not if, but when” terrorist catastrophe will occur.²⁹ This limited spaces for agency and silenced alternatives that could be interpreted as ignoring perceptions of inevitable doom.

As mentioned, the years 2007 to 2011 mark a relative calm with respect to major terrorist events targeting Britain. This is not to negate the Glasgow airport attack of 2007, violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, drone attacks in Yemen and Pakistan, insecurity in Northern Ireland including “40 attacks on national security targets in 2010”,³⁰ or failed attacks such as those by Nicky Reilly and Umah Farouk Abdulmutallab. But it is to highlight how even if violence was seen to be decreasing, exceptional measures continued along a preemptive path begun in the late 1960s. Terrorist violence outside Britain continued, but actors such as those in Iraq were frequently identified as “suicide bombers” rather than “terrorists”. The 2008 Mumbai attack was a stark reminder of the planning that can go in to non-state violence. But the June 2010 killing of AQ leaders Sheikh Sa'id al-Masri³¹ and May 2011 killing of Osama Bin Laden significantly weakened AQ. A 2009 Manchester arrest of multiple individuals demonstrated ongoing domestic operations, but a conclusive means of identifying threats or more clear definition of “terrorism” remained elusive.

New counterterrorism reviews from 2009 led to the removal of TA 2000 stop and search without reasonable suspicion, PTA 2005 control orders, and reduction of pre-charge detention to 14 days.³² Though this influenced counterterrorism implementation, with 9,645 stops in 2010/2011 compared to 102,504 the year before,³³ it was not a major reduction of exceptionality. TPIMs replaced control orders with similar powers, and pre-

²⁹ Zulaika, *Terrorism*, 3-4.

³⁰ “Review of Counter-terrorism and security powers, review findings and recommendations,” January 2011, Cmnd. 8004, p. 16 sec. 7.

³¹ AQ number three in command at the time, also known as Mustafa Abu al-Yazid.

³² Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism, The Terrorism Act 2000 (Remedial) Order, 16 March 2011, Statutory Instruments, 2011 No. 631.

³³ Alan Travis, “Terrorism arrests in UK show steep fall,” 13 October 2011, *The Guardian* [cited 10 May 2012]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/oct/13/terrorism-arrests-uk-steep-fall>.

charge detention at 14 days was still significant. The overall trajectory of counterterrorism was unchanged. Patterns of threat construction continued to demarcate AQ and “like-minded” groups under the international terrorist label:

The current threat level to the UK from international terrorism is severe. The most significant international terrorism threat to the UK remains violent extremism associated with and influenced by Al Qa'ida.

First, Prevent will remain an integral part of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST.

Second, Prevent will address all forms of terrorism, including the extreme right wing. However, it is clear that Prevent work must be targeted against those forms of terrorism that pose the greatest risk to our national security. Currently, the greatest threat comes from Al Qa’ida, its affiliates and like-minded groups.³⁴

In the end, counterterrorism reviews reasserted CONTEST and counterterrorism approach. The years 2007 to 2011 reveal the extent to which securitizing discourse along particular identity assumptions had become embedded in collective knowledge and in practice.

These processes stabilized exceptional practice along a seemingly inoffensive plateau of exceptionality, even as discourse from 2011 touched upon “all forms of terrorism”.³⁵ After over two decades of aligning international with “external” foreigners associated with assumed racial and religious characteristics, perceptions of the most dangerous other had taken on a consequential durability. From 2007 to 2011, the international commonplace continued to dominate: the “revised Prevent strategy will continue to address the most significant security risk that we face: the risk from international terrorism”.³⁶ The international other remained the most dangerous threat. It was a violent Islamic extremism too barbaric for negotiation and too dangerous for

³⁴ “The Prevent Strategy,” OSCT [cited 20 May 2012]; available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/review-of-prevent-strategy/>.

³⁵ CONTEST, 2011.

³⁶ “The Prevent Strategy,” OSCT.

ordinary criminal laws. Official discourse referenced other types of terrorism but the international label maintained a certain prominence.³⁷




Figure 2.4 – Geographic perceptions of belonging and relational configurations of meaning

This visual representation of securitizing terrorism from 2007 to 2011 aims to capture the way labels of identification had evolved, or stayed the same, in terms of intersubjective understanding. The blurred boundary between domestic and other threat labels was increasingly acknowledged, as demonstrated by the porous referent border and two-way arrow movement above. But commonplaces remained tied to earlier boundary assumptions linked with Irish, domestic, and international labels. Thus while official discourse *began* to reorient priorities to “all forms” of terrorism, it still relied on “forms” in the plural rather than “terrorism” in the singular. Intersubjective understandings of terrorist threat established through securitizations of terrorism that relied upon geographic and cultural borders of difference remained.

The risk from Northern Ireland continued to be constructed as “Northern Irish-related terrorism”, “dissident republicanism”, and “paramilitary activity”. Despite

³⁷ CONTEST, 2011, Introduction.

growing insecurity in Northern Ireland during this period, Irish-related threats were seemingly less dangerous than international terrorists:

My observations in relation to TA2000 in 2009 and throughout the past eight years have confirmed the **shift of emphasis towards international terrorism, as the process of normalisation in Northern Ireland has become more evident.** However, 2009 and early 2010 have demonstrated that there is a paramount need for continuous vigilance in Northern Ireland, despite the progress of recent years. **The number of terrorism incidents in Northern Ireland has increased, as has the evidence of the existence of determined and dangerous groups of dissident republicans with the ability to manufacture and deploy lethal explosive devices.**³⁸

Despite the acknowledgement of Irish-related insecurity, British troops left in 2007 after a thirty-eight year presence, and Diplock Courts were removed through the Justice and Security (Northern Ireland) Act.³⁹ This contributed to the reduction of exceptional measures in Northern Ireland, but powers targeting other types of terrorism were maintained. The construction of international terrorism as violent extremism revalidated existing measures even as efforts such as 42-day detention were defeated in 2008. When compared to other detention policies at the time (one day in Canada, two days in South Africa and New Zealand, seven days in Ireland), halting 42-day detention by continuing 28-day detention reinforced exceptionality.

At the same time, counter-radicalization continued to target suspect communities and bring consequences of insecurity.⁴⁰ Muslim suspect communities did not just include those suspected of terrorism, but “extremist” opinions on foreign and security policy.⁴¹ The risk of terrorism as threatening a British way of life and democratic civilization continued to securitize terrorism as a terrorist entity—other someone embodies, not as a method of political violence. As explained in Prevent, this “strategy, launched in 2007 seeks to *stop people becoming terrorists* or supporting terrorism both

³⁸ “Report on the Operation in 2009,” Carlile, July 2010: p 5, sec 17.

³⁹ “The purpose of the Act is to deliver a number of measures which are necessary to deliver a commitment to security normalisation in Northern Ireland.” (JSA 2007 c. 6, explanatory notes).

⁴⁰ “Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation,” June 2011, p. 8 [cited 14 May 2012]; available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-summary-consultation?view=Binary>.

⁴¹ McGovern and Tobin, “Countering Terror,” 27.

in the UK and overseas.”⁴² [emphasis added]. This reinforced the future-oriented and actor-based approach, even as preemptive policies that exacerbated racial, religious, and ethnic categorizations led to situations of insecurity.⁴³

Broader policy moves (OSCT, NSS, CONTEST) and new laws (CT2008, TPIM2011) were mutually reinforcing. By 2011 exceptional counterterrorism had been in use for over four decades. Counterterrorism outcomes did not depend upon terrorist attacks to be justified, with a 3.5 billion £ spending plan for counterterrorism by 2011.⁴⁴ Though there were parliamentary calls to limit state power since “**TPIMs are an extraordinary departure from ordinary principles of criminal due process** [bold in original]”, TPIMs were passed and counterterrorism continued along a trajectory formed years earlier.⁴⁵ To understand how we have arrived at this plateau of normalized exception, we must interrogate *how* relational configurations of identity came to securitize terrorism in particular ways. Threat/referent identities stabilized by collective meanings established through social and political practice delimited what kinds of response were politically possible, causing certain outcomes to arise over others.

II. Normalizing discourse and practice

As established by securitization theorists, intersubjective understanding is essential to any successful securitization. In doing an analysis of securitization as both a conceptual tool to investigate the power of discourse and an empirical process shaping material outcomes, it is essential to keep in mind that “the exact *definition* and *criteria*

⁴² “Review of the Prevent strategy,” OSCT [cited 30 March 2011]; available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/review-of-prevent-strategy/>.

⁴³ Afua Hirsch, “Lotfi Raissi case proves need for human rights: Lotfi Raissi’s case is a disastrous example of the government trying to circumvent human rights protection,” 25 April 2010, *The Guardian* [cited 10 May 2012]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/henryporter/2010/apr/25/lotfi-raissi-human-rights>.

⁴⁴ NSS, 2009, 80. The defence budget was expected to remain fourth largest in the world (“Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review,” October 2010, Cmnd. 7948, HMSO, 3).

⁴⁵ “House of Lords, House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (second Report), Twentieth Report of Session 2010–12,” 19 October 2011, HL Paper 204, HC 1571, p. 10, sec 1.27.

of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects”.⁴⁶ This “intersubjective establishment” is formed in large part through framings “of interpretive processes” in language.⁴⁷ Thus language does not “do” or “cause” in a predictable way, but by tracing the way that observable relational configurations connect different actors and sites we can better understand how some discourses link to some outcomes. However, as demonstrated through the previous four chapters, the unfolding of certain relational configurations at different times and in different positions has a causal impact on outcomes. This last empirical chapter explains how commonplaces such as freedom, rule of law, community, way of life, ruthless, hearts and minds, and Britishness hardened perceptions of the other through politically unarguable framings of the self, and led to a normalization of exceptional counterterrorism.

From 2007 to 2011, fundamental British freedoms were positioned in direct opposition to the international threat. A renewed focus on Britishness reinforced the domestic referent. In the words of Home Secretary Jacqui Smith (Lab), “there is no greater individual liberty than the liberty of individuals not to be blown up on British streets or in British skies”.⁴⁸ Despite a threat positioned as global in nature, similar to earlier years, the referent was strengthened as a distinctive domestic self that was intertwined with the British state. New institutions such as the OSCT, strategies such as the NSS, and policy aims as stated by Prime Minister Gordon Brown (Lab) that “The first priority of any Government is to ensure the security and safety of the nation”, asserted a British political and societal referent.⁴⁹

The fight against international terrorism was housed within the Home Office, whose agenda was to “cut crime, provide effective policing, secure our borders and

⁴⁶ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, 25.

⁴⁷ McAdam *et. al*, *Dynamics of Contention*, 41.

⁴⁸ Jacqui Smith, “Home Secretary’s statement on the counter-terrorism bill, Counter-terrorism bill: response to the House of Lords,” 13 October 2008 [cited 16 January 2011]; available from <http://tna.europarchive.org/20061101012820/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/counter-terrorism-bill-statement>.

⁴⁹ CONTEST, 2009, foreword.

protect personal identity”.⁵⁰ Though this referent was bolstered through national repertoires of identity, commonplaces of democracy and civilization from earlier discourse still played a role:

This is the first time the Government has published a single, overarching strategy bringing together the objectives and plans of all departments, agencies and forces involved in protecting our national security. It is a significant step, and the latest in a series of reforms bringing greater focus and integration to our approach.⁵¹

Strategies linked to relational configurations combining “confidence” and “fundamental freedoms” reminiscent of 1970s discourse justified counterterrorism “so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence”.⁵² Government legitimacy was enhanced through commitments that “Providing security for the nation and for its citizens remains the most important responsibility of government”.⁵³ This intertextually linked CONTEST, the OSCT, and the NSS by connecting national security with domestic counterterrorism. Statements by Home Secretary Smith “to keep our citizens safe and secure, and to protect the freedoms we all enjoy” depended upon framings of national identity and freedom, not maintaining peace and order.⁵⁴ Without these particular relational configurations, counterterrorism outcomes would not have unfolded as they did.

Freedom

Identity assumptions were strengthened in the way that similar framings brokered actors with different policy opinions. Thus both the general securitization of terrorism and particular us/them discourses were reinforced despite being deployed for seemingly different ends. The commonplace of freedom provides one example of this brokerage:

⁵⁰ “Our objectives and values,” Home Office [cited 20 May 2009]; available from <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/purpose-and-aims/index.html>.

⁵¹ NSS, 2008, 4.

⁵² CONTEST, 2009, foreword; CONTEST, 2011, 6.

⁵³ NSS, 2008, p. 1, sec 1.1.

⁵⁴ CONTEST, 2009, foreword.

2008, David Davis (Con): The Government can and should do much more to protect this country from the terrorist threat that we face, before resorting to draconian measures that sacrifice our **fundamental freedoms**.⁵⁵

2008, Dominic Grieve (Con): “battle will be won by sticking to our principles of a liberal, **free**, pluralist democracy”⁵⁶

2008, Andrew Dismore (Lab): Each erosion of the normal process is, in itself, a result for the terrorist, who would undermine our **freedoms and way of life**.⁵⁷

Notions of freedom were politically unarguable and essentially undefinable, yet able to be used by different actors for different purposes.

Rule of law

Similar to framings of freedom was the historically embedded notion of “rule of law” observed in discourse from the very start of empirical analysis and counterterrorism law’s emergence. From 2007 to 2011, the rule of law continued to play a role in reasserting the legitimacy of the referent as well as counterterrorism practice’s foundation as a preventive, legal approach:

2008, Jacqui Smith (Home Sec, Lab): “Terrorism has changed, is changing, and will continue to change. We have no option other than to respond if we are to remain constant and true in our defence of British liberties and British security... We rely on the law and we need to be sure that the law evolves as the threat changes in a way consistent with our rights and freedoms.”⁵⁸

2009, CONTEST: “response to terrorism based on the rule of law”⁵⁹

2010 Theresa May (Home Sec, Con): “The first is that our response to terrorism across the police, the agencies and across all government Departments must be

⁵⁵ Counterterrorism Bill, 1 April 2008, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 474, col. 663 (part no. 76).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 731.

⁵⁷ Counterterrorism Bill, 11 June 2008, *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 477, col. 355 (part no. 108).

⁵⁸ Jacqui Smith, “Home Secretary’s speech on the threat of international terrorism,” Institute for Public Policy Research Commission on National Security, 15 October 2008 [cited 16 January 2011]; available from <http://tna.europarchive.org/20061101012820/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/speech-to-ippr>.

⁵⁹ CONTEST, 2009, p. 12 (section 0.18).

based on the rule of law – and not only on the rule of law but on the rule of the right law.”⁶⁰

Such framings asserted the British referent through a “belief in the rule of law” supporting “a rules-based approach” to international affairs.⁶¹ Illiberal expansions of that very rule of law paradoxically accommodated accommodate the legitimization of exceptional counterterrorism. Policy went beyond focusing on specific offenses such as “attending a place used for terrorist training” to include non-terrorist-related charges.⁶² These initiatives were largely a response to the durable perception of the most dangerous terrorists as foreign others:

It is “not always possible to prosecute people...terrorist-related activity: for this reason the Government has developed a range of alternative non-prosecution actions to protect the public...include control orders...**exclusion of foreign nationals** from entering the UK...revocation of citizenship...deportation”⁶³

The government could remove actors from their temporary and partial inclusion with the referent (“revocation of citizenship”) by identifying views that “fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardize community cohesion”.⁶⁴ What had been hinted at in earlier discourse and practice was now explicitly laid out: to be identified or convicted as a “terrorist”, you do not have to necessarily engage in political violence.

Community

There was an intensification of government control and power to determine who was and who was not a part of the British referent irrespective of violence. Counterterrorism discourse and practice continued to simultaneously shape and defend

⁶⁰ Teresa May, “Our response to the terrorist threat,” speech was given by the Home Secretary to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), 3 November 2010 [cited 16 January 2011; available from <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/media-centre/speeches/terrorist-response>].

⁶¹ NSS, 2008, p. 6, sec 2.1; NSS, 2009, p. 6, sec. 8.

⁶² CONTEST, 2009, p. 12 (section 0.25).

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 14.

the British referent's cultural (societal referent) and institutional (political referent) identity. Patterns of inclusion and exclusion remained poignant parts of how terrorism was securitized as the national referent was strengthened. As explained in one Chatham House Briefing Paper, Muslim groups tended to "feel excluded during discussions of 'British' and 'English' people".⁶⁵ These trends were asserted through framings of community:

2008, Lord West (Parliamentary Under-Sec of State, Home Office, Lab): "new funding to support communities and organisations who are taking on and disrupting those who promote violent extremism"⁶⁶

2011, CONTEST: "Communities who do not (or in some cases feel they cannot) participate in civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalization; a stronger sense of belonging and citizenship makes communities more resilient to terrorist ideology."⁶⁷

2011, Kris Hopkins (Con): I want to concentrate on the impact of terrorism and anti-terrorism law on the relationship between the Muslim community and the non-Muslim community and between the Muslim community and the state... There must be a question about what incited young British Muslim men to blow themselves up in British streets.⁶⁸

Commonplaces of "community" harking back to the Troubles continued to play part in counterterrorism formation and justification despite consequences of "community" to increase the insecurity of those already on the margins of full political or social inclusion. Framings of community were dependably ambiguous. Overlapping notions of victim and threat were a continuing trend, while articulations of communities reinforced the marginalization of particular groups.

Way of life, core values

⁶⁵ John Maule, Peter Stratton, Lynne Cameron, Zazie Todd, Robert Maslen, Tracy Sandberg and Neil Stanley, "How UK Muslims and non-Muslims think about terrorist risk," in "Islam, Politics and Security in the UK," ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 07/01 (Chatham House, October 2007), 8.

⁶⁶ Counterterrorism Bill, 8 July 2008, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, vol. 703, col. 633 (part no. 122).

⁶⁷ CONTEST, 2011, p. 61, sec 5.17.

⁶⁸ Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, 7 June 2011, *Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 529, col. 80 (part no. 164).

Aligned with notions of community were framings of a “way of life”. This connected prior discourse of civilization and western democracy with a distinctive Britishness. Security practice aimed to “safeguard the nation, its citizens, our prosperity and *our way of life*”[emphasis added]:⁶⁹

2008, Jacqui Smith (Lab): International terrorism presents one of the greatest threats to the UK. In this country we will always respond to terrorism through the rule of law and the criminal justice system. We task our police, our prosecutors and our courts with bringing to justice those who **threaten British lives and our way of life** through terrorism.⁷⁰

2008, “It [international terrorism] now represents an attack on our values and our way of life of a completely different order to the terrorist threats we have faced in the past.”⁷¹

Terrorism, in particular international terrorism, was a threat to “values on which our society depends” such as “human rights, the rule of law, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all”.⁷²

2007, Jacqui Smith (Home Secretary, Lab): terrorism is a serious threat to us all. We must ensure our resources, capability and legislation support our common endeavour to defend the **shared values of this country** from terror⁷³

2007, NSS: “**Our approach to national security is clearly grounded in a set of core values [bold in original]...** human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance, and opportunity for all. **Those values define who we are** and what we do. They form the basis of our security, as well as our well-being and our prosperity.”⁷⁴

⁶⁹ NSS, 2008, p. 3 sec 1.4.

⁷⁰ Parl. Deb, H.C., 1 April 2008, vol. 474, col. 662 (part no. 76).

⁷¹ Jacqui Smith, “Countering Terrorism in a Democracy,” Smith Institute and the Centre for the Study of Terrorism, 3 June 2008 [cited 16 January 2011]; available from <http://tna.europarchive.org/20061101012820/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/countering-terrorism-democracy>.

⁷² NSS, 2008, p. 28 sec 4.14.

⁷³ Jacqui Smith, “Statement to the House of Commons regarding the terrorist incidents in Haymarket, London and Glasgow airport,” 2 July 2007 [cited 16 January 2011]; available from <http://tna.europarchive.org/20061101012820/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/terrorist-incidents-0707>.

⁷⁴ NSS, 2008, p 6 sec 2.1.

2008, Jacqui Smith (Home Secretary, Lab): The long-term challenge – the one you are addressing today – is preserving both **our security and the values on which our society** depends by preventing terrorism in the UK.⁷⁵

2008, Lord Sheikh (Con): “Terrorism has to be fought...extolling **the values and virtues that bind us together as a society**”⁷⁶

Discourses on British values *constituted* domestic practices such as the NSS 2008 and CONTEST 2011 and thus were *causally* implicated in counterterrorism outcomes. The enactment of these practices reasserted the very referent these policies were designed to protect:

2009, CONTEST: “is based on principles that reflect our core values...and the broader security principles set out in the National Security Strategy.”⁷⁷

2011, Gerry Sutcliffe (Lab): There is a need to look at the context of some of the fundamental liberties that we uphold and believe to be important in our society—what defines us as a country, and what defines our values [*in support of the TPIM2011*].⁷⁸

Not wholly distinct from intersubjective understandings around “values” were notions of “reasonable” similar to earlier years. Through the CT 2008, the court could order forfeiture of property not only for clear “purposes of terrorism” but if the court had “*reasonable cause* to suspect would or *might* be used for those purposes” [emphasis added].⁷⁹ Repeated framings of “reasonably believe” reinforced the role of counterterrorism legal powers and the authority of British officials, in particular non-judicial officials, to identify terrorist risk.⁸⁰ For example, how “A constable may use reasonable force, if necessary, for the purpose of exercising a power conferred on the

⁷⁵ Jacqui Smith, “Prevent strategy: background and next steps - speech to the BCU Commanders Conference,” 16 April 2008 [cited 16 January 2011]; available from <http://tna.europarchive.org/20061101012820/http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/bcu-conference-speech>.

⁷⁶ Parl. Deb, H.L., 8 July 2008, vol. 703, col. 663 (part no. 122).

⁷⁷ CONTEST, 2009, part 2, section 7.

⁷⁸ “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, Clause 1, Fourth Sitting,” 23 June 2011, Public Bill Committee.

⁷⁹ CT, 2008, part 3, sec. 34.23(2b).

⁸⁰ CT, 2008, Schedule 7, part 1, sec 1.

constable by virtue of this Schedule”.⁸¹ Some shifts in types of reasonableness did indicate an increased scrutiny – “that the Secretary of State must now reasonably believe, rather than reasonably suspect, that an individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity”⁸² – but new TPIM 2011 powers remained dependent upon expansive barometers beyond normal legal processes and implementation.

As acknowledged earlier, though “reasonable” has a legal-technical role for lawmaking, it also conveys a broader meaning of state officials as inherently sensible and in an unquestionable position to adjudicate exceptional practice. The vagaries basing counterterrorism law continued through new formulations. For example, the new phrase “terrorist connection”. This was explained as existing “if the offence – (a) is, or takes place in the course of, an act of terrorism, or (b) is committed for the purposes of terrorism”.⁸³ Through such legal shifts, the spaces of interpretation for security officials enabled by commonplaces of reasonable were significant for state power.⁸⁴

Consequential legal terminology was accompanied by the now cemented notion of international terrorists as entity-others in their own right. This threat was positioned as “wholly different in type, as well as extent, from the threat we faced twenty years ago...a wholly new form of terrorism – so different in motivation, complexity and reach, in fact, that it might as well have a different name”.⁸⁵ The analytic take away is not just noticing the association of “international” as “different”, but *how* this difference was established in discourse along particular us/them framings to influence outcomes.

Ruthless, different in scale and nature

Similar to earlier discourse before the 21st century, framings of evil and barbaric were associated with terms of ruthlessness, violent extremism, Islam, and activity in the

⁸¹ TPIM, 2011, Schedule 5, sec. 4.

⁸² Teresa May (Home Sec, Con): Parl. Deb, H.C., 7 June 2011, vol. 529 col. 72 (part no. 164).

⁸³ This was used 63 times in the CT 2008.

⁸⁴ CT, 2008, part 8, sec. 93.

⁸⁵ Jacqui Smith, “Home Secretary’s speech on the threat of international terrorism,” 15 October 2008.

broader Middle East.⁸⁶ “Ruthless” was observed in the 1970s and 1980s around temporary laws, but its position alongside non-western characteristics framed as essentially different kinds of danger normalized permanent 21st century practice.

2008, Jacqui Smith (Home Secretary, Lab): The threat we face from terrorism today...is **more ruthless**...It is **international, drawing upon loosely affiliated networks** across the globe...a new and sustained level of activity by those who wish to kill and maim and to undermine the values that we all share in **this country**.⁸⁷

2008, Lord West (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Home Office, Lab): The terrorists are more **ruthless** than those we have faced in the past...⁸⁸

To differentiate from past terrorists that were also considered brutal and ruthless, international terrorism was also different in “scale and nature”. But as explained earlier, terrorism and political violence have always been different in scale and nature relative to the historical context within which they are situated. Though by 2011 CONTEST hints at a repositioning of scale with “scale and nature” appearing only once, it is too early to evaluate if this is a hiccup in securitization discourse or a more significant redirection. Overall, from 2007 to 2011, discourse on issues of scale, nature, and future catastrophe still provided an influential groundwork that maintained counterterrorism exceptionality.

2007, Lord Carlile (LD): We agree that enhanced sentencing for terrorist and terrorist-related offences might be appropriate given the potential and **real nature and scale** of terrorist attacks.⁸⁹

2008, Jacqui Smith (Lab): As you know, the terrorist threat is very different from any we have faced in the past. It is less predictable and more international in nature, and it is of an **unprecedented scale**.⁹⁰

2009, CONTEST: “different in **scale and nature**”⁹¹

⁸⁶ CONTEST 2011, sec 1.09; See also the MI5 website on “international terrorism”, <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/international-terrorism.html>.

⁸⁷ Parl. Deb, H.C., 1 April 2008, vol. 474, col. 647 (part no. 76).

⁸⁸ Parl. Deb, H.L., 8 July 2008, vol. 703, col. 632 (part no. 122)

⁸⁹ “The Government Reply to the Report by Lord Carlile of Berriew Q.C. Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation The Definition of Terrorism,” June 2007, Cmnd. 7058.

⁹⁰ Smith, “Prevent strategy,” BCU, 16 April 2008.

⁹¹ CONTEST, 2009, foreword Brown.

2011, Hazel Blears (Home Secretary, Con): However, it does something to us, as human beings, when **we see the scale and nature of the problem and how dangerous these people are**. We then see how far we are prepared to move away from a pure principle of liberty so that we do our very best to protect normal, **ordinary people in the country** as they go about their everyday lives.⁹²

Framings of scale and nature magnified the danger of international terrorism even when there were no major acts of international terrorism, and it was Irish-related violence that was on the rise. Despite headlines such as “Northern Ireland bomb attempt ‘threatened mass murder’” through a 500lb (227kg) van bomb, issues of scale and nature were almost always associated with the international label.⁹³ Escalating violence in Northern Ireland could have encouraged a new discourse removing international, Irish, and domestic labels altogether. But a plurality of labels dependent upon intersubjective understandings separating degrees of distance between types of terrorism and the referent persisted.⁹⁴

Violent extremism

The 1990s yoking of former Irish-related terrorist to legitimate politics, reconstruction of Irish-related threats as “dissident republicans engaged in terror” rather than just “terrorists”, and framings of international terrorism as violent (Islamic) extremism furthered the normalization of counterterrorism through the 21st century.

⁹² Committee Debate - 3rd sitting, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, Clause 1, 23 June 2011, col. 67.

⁹³ “Northern Ireland bomb attempt ‘threatened mass murder’: Police say bomb found in van on main Belfast to Dublin road could have resulted in huge devastation and loss of life,” 9 April 2011, *The Guardian* [cited 13 April 2011]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/apr/09/northern-ireland-bomb-attempt>.

⁹⁴ CONTEST, 2011: Henry McDonald, “Seven in court after Northern Ireland swoop on alleged dissident republicans,” 19 May 2012, *The Guardian* [cited 20 May 2011]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/may/19/northern-ireland-court-dissident-republicans>; American supporters of the PIRA such as Peter King saw “no parallel between the IRA and violent Islamist extremism, which he describes as a foreign enemy or a foreign-directed enemy” (Peter Finn, “As Rep. Peter King’s Muslim hearings approach, his past views draw ire,” 5 March 2011, *Washington Post* [cited 6 March 2011]; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/04/AR2011030405855_pf.html.

2008, NSS: “United Kingdom faces a serious and sustained threat from violent extremists, claiming to act in the name of Islam”⁹⁵

2008, Jacqui Smith (Home Sec, Lab): “We have redoubled our efforts to prevent violent extremism from taking hold, because our long-term challenge is to **stop people becoming**, or supporting, **terrorists** in the first place. With new funding to support **communities** and organisations tackling those who promote **violent extremism**, we will take on the ideologues and disrupt their efforts to radicalise individuals at risk in our society.”⁹⁶

2008, Jacqui Smith (Home Sec, Lab): “And I will set out the solutions we’ve developed – and are continuing to develop – within our legal and democratic framework to protect our citizens and to **prevent violent extremism from taking hold in our communities**.”⁹⁷

2009, CONTEST: “stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism”⁹⁸

By 2011, “violent extremism” was less noticeable in discourse, though “extremism” and “radicalization” remained prevalent.⁹⁹ The intersubjective understandings formed by linking violent extremism, international terrorism, and Islam in the securitization of terrorism established durable boundaries of what, or who, the threat was. Despite this differentiation of Irish and international terrorist others, the negative consequences for those aligned with such labels irrespective of violent action demonstrated more similarity than difference:

A shared history of ‘colonial policy and colonial exploitation’ was noted by a number of participants and here too language and the denial of historical perspective was seen to be important in ‘framing issues and limiting the possibility of alternative readings’ of both past and present. The Contest 2 strategy was also seen by some as trying to reframe who and what Muslims are through the language and definitions of ‘extremism’. This again was closely associated with the feeling that identification with Muslim people or causes internationally, most obviously in terms of Palestine, was being presented as evidence of ‘extremism’.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ NSS, 2008, p. 10, sec 3.2.

⁹⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 1 April 2008, vol. 474, col. 648 (part no. 76).

⁹⁷ Jacqui Smith, “Countering Terrorism in a Democracy,” 3 June 2008.

⁹⁸ CONTEST, 2009, part 2, sec 9.

⁹⁹ CONTEST, 2011.

¹⁰⁰ McGovern and Tobin “Countering Terror,” 38.

The NSS referenced 1990s terrorism in the “Middle East, north and east Africa, south Asia, east Asia, mainland Europe, and the United States”, but situated Irish-related threats as less threatening others. “Dissident Irish republican activists” were positioned alongside “animal rights extremists” and differentiated from the violent extremism of international terrorism associated with Islam.¹⁰¹

The narrative used to explain the history of terrorism in official discourse did not expand upon experience in Northern Ireland but focused on the Middle East. For example, militant Palestinian groups or organizations in Egypt that had “an explicitly religious agenda and claimed to justify violence on religious grounds”.¹⁰² “Sites of difference” based on spatial assumptions of belonging continued to distinguish types of terrorism, and enabled different types of response.¹⁰³ The foreign, non-British, and more times than not, non-Western, assumption of international terrorist others distanced anyone associated with perceptions of who were likely terrorists from the referent. Framings of violent extremism differentiated old from “new” terrorism by positioning international terrorism “outside” Britain, connected to geographies to the south and east.¹⁰⁴

As observed by Aradau and Van Munster, even though “the colonial/racial constitution of the international/internal would appear to be disputable for the governance of terrorism,” through counterterrorism legal practice “these elements get reinscribed upon the technologies of governance”.¹⁰⁵ This thesis provides a partial account of *how* that reinscription unfolded in one case through a relational-securitization analysis. Evolving legal practices, security policies, and official discourse differentiated types of terrorist others along such inside/outside racial and colonial lines. This extended the distance between new threats and the referent, and new threats and previous threats. While acknowledging that “over 3,500 people died in the UK itself as a result of Irish-

¹⁰¹ NSS, 2008, 11.

¹⁰² CONTEST, 2009, part 1, sec 1.

¹⁰³ Abbott, “Things of Boundaries”.

¹⁰⁴ CONTEST, 2009, part 1 sec 5; See also CONTEST 2011, “Global Stress Zones”, p. 33.

¹⁰⁵ Aradau and Van Munster, “Exceptionalism,” 694.

related terrorism”, the “history of international terrorism” in CONTEST 2009 is explained as how “a new form of terrorism emerged overseas in the late seventies and early eighties, initially with little connection to the UK, when terrorist organisations in Egypt tried to overthrow the Egyptian Government and establish what they regarded as an Islamic state”.¹⁰⁶ Policy pinpointed the “first modern international terrorist incident” as occurring in 1968 when “a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) hijacked an Israeli commercial flight from Rome”.¹⁰⁷ Additional references were then made to Egypt, Algeria, Afghanistan, and Libya, with international or “modern” terrorism reinforced as “non-British”. While on the surface this may seem unproblematic, this externalization of terrorism and unquestioned assumptions of extremism and othering around “Islam” increased alienation and insecurity.

Though religion has played a part in terrorism and political violence throughout history, 21st century references to religion contributed to misguided perceptions of terrorism today as different from terrorism in the past.¹⁰⁸ As noted by Martha Crenshaw:

It is reasonable to propose that just as one would not hold Christianity accountable for the terrorism of the IRA, Protestant paramilitaries, or American right extremists and anti-abortionists, one should not blame Islam for Shi’ite inspired terrorism in the contemporary Middle East. The legends of the Assassins of medieval Islam and the history of Shi’ism as a source of revolt against dominant political elites notwithstanding, religion acquired its modern relevance under specific political conditions.¹⁰⁹

Thus religion can easily be accepted as a constant of history and political violence, not a novel 21st century feature. Instead, however, official discourse increased a focus on religion, specifically as relates to Islam. In CONTEST 2009 alone, a document of 176 pages, “Islam” appeared 120 times.¹¹⁰ Rather than working to identify motivations of extremism for more effective strategies, it was assumed that violent extremists aiming “to undermine our democratic society” have “no negotiable agenda, unlike our

¹⁰⁶ CONTEST, 2009, p. 9, part 1.2, 1.4.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., part 1.06

¹⁰⁸ Jackson and Gunning, “What’s so religious.”

¹⁰⁹ Martha Crenshaw, “The Subjective Reality of the Terrorist: Ideological and Psychological Factors in Terrorism,” in *Current Perspectives*, 23.

¹¹⁰ CONTEST, 2009, p. 14, sec 0.36.

experience of Welsh nationalists and even the IRA”.¹¹¹ Even if Irish-related terrorism was also a threat to democratic society, the two-track approach to Irish versus international terrorism maintained these threats as different in name, kind, belonging, and rationality.

As discussed earlier, different actors were joined through similar framings of identity that acted as kinds of discursive brokers, even if these actors supported different policy views. On the one hand this was a new display of agency. But, on the other hand, the way this agency was structured pointed to how certain intersubjective understandings of identity had become hardened through years of securitization. Though certain powers were questioned, the way terrorism was securitized along fears of people “becoming” terrorists was almost unequivocally accepted. Statements that increased detention would “drive young Muslim men into the arms of extremists” were outweighed by a discourse of danger around extremism and Islam.¹¹² The securitization of terrorism remained dependent upon problematic, and consequential, us/them patterns of inclusion and exclusion that in the end maintained existing exceptionality.

For and against

Actors that articulated different positions on what direction counterterrorism should take in fact used similar framings to make their respective arguments. Similar patterns of securitization brokered divergent actors and sites even if when the presumed intention of such framings was political opposition rather than alignment. This added to the incoherence and contradiction of counterterrorism. Some argued for alternative practices because people posing “a risk to the state” had increased to 2,000.¹¹³ Others used the same statistic to argue why exceptional measures must be maintained.¹¹⁴ Whether for or against particular measures, a values-based argument necessitating the role of identity had taken hold:

¹¹¹ Lord Young (Lab), Parl. Deb, H.L., 8 July 2008 vol. 703, col. 721 (part no. 122).

¹¹² David Davis (Con): Parl. Deb, H.C., 1 April 2008, vol. 474, col. 669 (part no. 76).

¹¹³ Ibid., col. 670.

¹¹⁴ Jacqui Smith (Home Sec, Lab): Ibid., col. 647.

In favor of extended detention:

2008, Keith Vaz (Lab) “The **common cause among all parties**, regardless of their views on the extension of the period of detention, is the acknowledgement that **terrorists want to destroy our way of life, our liberty and our democracy.**”¹¹⁵

2008, Jacqui Smith (Lab): “**Terrorism is an assault on our civil liberties, on our democracy and on our values.** Our response to terrorism must continue to be based on those values and liberties, ardently pursued through our democratic framework, primarily through our criminal justice system.”¹¹⁶

Opposition to extended detention:

2008, Baroness Kennedy (Lab): “the **best answer to terrorism is a louder assertion of the values** that are embedded in our system and of which we should be proud”¹¹⁷

2008, Baroness Neville-Jones (Con): “**united society based on shared liberal values** and the mutual trust of a free, responsible citizenry”¹¹⁸

Different positions were brokered through similar threat/referent framings of politically unarguable values. The consequence was not a different approach but more of the same. The securitization of terrorism had reached a type of consensus over what terrorism “was” despite the still elusive definition of terrorism and continuing consequences of insecurity from alienating practice. The TPIM 2011, the continuance of 14-day pre-charge detention, the maintenance of expanded offenses such as “the glorification of terrorism”, and the reinforced intertextual linkages between domestic policies (OSCT, CONTEST) national security (NSS), and everyday practices normalized extraordinary counterterrorism. The way that terrorism was securitized was of causal significance for these observed outcomes by hardening politically unarguable threat/referent identities.

Hearts and minds

¹¹⁵ Ibid., col. 683.

¹¹⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 June 2008, vol. 477, col. 328 (part no. 108).

¹¹⁷ Parl. Deb, H.L., 8 July 2008, vol. 703, col. 684 (part no. 122).

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

A similar example of “brokerage-in-disagreement”, whereby two actors with different views depend upon the same discourses of identity, comes from the phrase “hearts and minds” that was referenced to conclude the previous chapter and link into the current discussion. Those for *and* against extending detention based their arguments on the “need to win hearts and minds”, because “the most decisive conflicts are on the home front and in the hearts and minds of our fellow citizens”.¹¹⁹ Relational configurations like “hearts and minds” reasserted the referent as a particular Britishness that was connected to, but distinct from, earlier commonplaces of civilization and Western democracy. Growing references to historic and traditional notions of the British nation brokered actors regardless of their view on specific measures. This hardened the boundaries around an essential British self differentiated from a range of “others”:

2008, Robert Marshall-Andrews (Lab): In the past six months, we have heard a great deal about **Britishness**...Civil liberties are not an attribute of being British. They are the defining characteristic of our nation. **They are what we are.**¹²⁰

2008, Frank Dobson (Lab): In recent times, a lot of attention has been paid to what it means to be **British**. Well, one thing it means is that we do not allow the police or politicians to lock people up for a long time without charge. That is not some trendy, fashionable bit of political correctness; it was laid down in **Magna Carta in 1215 AD**, and it has been followed in the English-speaking, common-law democracies ever since.¹²¹

2008, David Davis (Con): For almost 800 years, we have built on the right of habeas corpus, founded in that **ancient** document [Magna Carta]: the **fundamental freedom from arbitrary detention** by the state. The liberty of the person is in our blood, part of our history, part of our way of life; Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, Democratic Unionists—all parties. **Liberty is the common strand that binds us together, and we have shed blood to protect it, both abroad and at home.**¹²²

2008, Lord Dear (Crossbench): It has been a fundamental right of the UK citizen not to be detained arbitrarily without charge... traced all the way back to **Magna Carta in the 13th century**, of course, and probably arguably to the earlier great reforms of Henry II at the end of the 12th century...it is a principle that runs in

¹¹⁹ Lord Goldsmith (Lab): Ibid., col. 656; Lord Howarth (Lab): Ibid., col. 671.

¹²⁰ Parl. Deb, H.C., 1 April 2008, vol. 474, col. 723 (part no. 76).

¹²¹ Ibid., col. 694.

¹²² Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 June 2008, vol. 477, col. 329 (part no. 108).

parallel to habeas corpus, that we introduced to the civilised world, and that we have defended as a fundamental right for centuries.¹²³

2011, Lord Morgan (Lab): How ironic that we are commemorating **Magna Carta** by trampling on the **fundamental freedoms of free-born British citizens**.¹²⁴

Different from earlier discourse where the referent transitioned from public order to democratic civilization, from 2007 to 2011 we see a stabilized British self rooted in ancient tradition. Core values were connected across actors and policy texts: “CONTEST is based on principles that reflect our core values, the lessons we and others have drawn from experiences of terrorism to date, and the broader security principles set out in the National Security Strategy”.¹²⁵ The Magna Carta was a salient commonplace brokering particular framings of British identity in need of protection from terrorism *and* counterterrorism. Even as international terrorism was linked to British actors, temporally situated framings going back hundreds of years reasserted cultural and physical differences between possible terrorists and the referent.

Another framing shared by political actors espousing different arguments was that extending detention would “do the terrorists’ job for them”. Though some deployed this framing to oppose new powers, the structure of this opposition was similar to those in favor of the measures. Such framings reinforced all terrorists and suspected terrorists as of a nonnegotiable nature in unarguable opposition to British values:

2008, John Baron (Con): “to detain someone on the basis of suspicion alone is a fundamental breach of liberty...**we risk doing the terrorists’ job for them**”¹²⁶

2008, Baroness Neville-Jones (Con): Terrorists want to undermine our freedoms and way of life by provoking the state into putting in place repressive measures. **We therefore risk, in effect, doing their job for them.**¹²⁷

¹²³ Parl. Deb, H.L., 8 July 2008, vol. 703, col. 657 (part no. 122).

¹²⁴ Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill, 5 October 2011, *Parliamentary Debates*, Lords, vol. 703, col. 1193 (part no. 199).

¹²⁵ NSS, 2008, 11.

¹²⁶ Parl. Deb, H.C., 11 June 2008, vol. 477, col. 391 (part no. 108).

¹²⁷ Parl. Deb, H.L., 8 July 2008, vol. 703, col. 638 (part no. 122).

2008, Baroness Mallalieu (Lab): Terrorists seek to destroy our freedom, so **why are we being asked to do the job for them?**¹²⁸

2008, David Davis (Con): “we will not sacrifice our fundamental freedoms...**That would do the terrorists’ job for them.** This country does not buckle, bend or bow to terror. It is not in our history, it is not in our character and it is certainly not written in what the Prime Minister calls the “next chapter of British liberty”¹²⁹

Temporally situated borders of identification continued to influence securitization even as they exacerbated boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Official discourse established Muslim communities as both victims of counterterrorism and as risks of violent extremism. Even when actors were viewed as “allies in the struggle against ‘extremists’”, they were also “under suspicion as they may be harbouring or supporting ‘extremists’”.¹³⁰ Britain’s history of multiculturalism had played a role in UK domestic and foreign policy since the mid-20th century to preserve cultural difference.¹³¹ But in the context of international terrorism, difference was a sign of suspicion. Statements like “I have a large Muslim population in my constituency and I have come to be very fond of those fine people” did not position the Muslim community as guilty. But “they” were still positioned on the borders of being a full part of the traditional British referent.¹³² The phrase “law-abiding Muslims” was seen in earlier 21st century discourse. But by 2007 attention to the threat as from a single Muslim community made up of a “law-abiding majority” and a “criminal minority” was an unquestioned means to implement exceptional practice.¹³³ As explained by Gutkowski, the boundaries between “community development” and “security objectives” were increasingly blurred.¹³⁴

Alienation

¹²⁸ Ibid., col. 704.

¹²⁹ Parl. Deb, H.C., 1 April 2008, vol. 474, col. 672 (part no. 76).

¹³⁰ Hickman *et. al.*, “Suspect Communities”, 3.

¹³¹ Brighton, “British Muslims”.

¹³² Steve Baker (Con): Parl. Deb, H.C., 7 June 2011, vol. 529, col. 119 (part no. 164).

¹³³ Smith, “Countering Terrorism in a Democracy,” 3 June 2008.

¹³⁴ Stacey Gutkowski, “Secularism and the Politics of Risk: Britain's Prevent Agenda, 2005-2009,” *International Relations* 25, no. 3 (2009): 358.

Opposition to 42-day detention referenced alienation in Northern Ireland. But framings of identity securitizing terrorism remained tied to boundaries distancing British Muslims and British non-Muslims.

2008, Patrick Mercer (Con): “[contemporary terrorist groups] will use it [detention] in exactly the same way as the IRA did—to suggest that this is a **racist or anti-religious Act** directed purely and simply at the **Muslim community**. In the same way, the IRA suggested that internment was directed purely at Roman Catholics”¹³⁵

2008, Mark Durkan (SDLP): “The fact remains that counter-terrorism legislation alienated lawful people; law-abiding and decent **communities** were made to feel like **suspect communities** and were fundamentally alienated.”¹³⁶

Actors across party lines referenced alienation as a way to oppose extended detention, but in so doing hardened community divisions. This added to perceptions of distance separating types of others, with both Irish and Muslim groups separated from the British referent, albeit in different degrees at different times.

Through explicit references to British history and identity, framings around ancient freedom and tradition did limit some expansions of state power through an increased significance as similar patterns brokered different actors and sites. But the way that terrorism was securitized enabled the overall maintenance of existing measures, leading to a plateau of normalized exception.

III. Looking back from 2011

By 2011 there had been some shifts in discourse and practice, such as the removal of international from CONTEST 2011’s title and reduction of pre-charge detention to 14 days. But the overarching substance of exceptional counterterrorism begun years earlier remained largely intact. The referent was not incompatible with

¹³⁵ Parl. Deb, H.C., 1 April 2008, vol. 474, col. 707 (part no. 76).

¹³⁶ Ibid., col. 674.

earlier commonplaces of Western democracy or civilization. But new historic references, like the Magna Carta, reasserted a traditional Britishness that made certain inside/outside assumptions of belonging durable features of collective meaning. Counterterrorism laws were intertextually linked to national security policies to reinforced state identity, purpose, and power. Commonplaces associated with an external Islamic other distanced the threat from this national referent, even as domestic and international labels of identification were increasingly indistinguishable.

There was a continuance of policies based on preemptive identifications of risk that depended upon boundary assumptions formed and stabilized through particular processes of securitization. British values constituted the referent in need of protection *and* the policies aimed at doing the protecting. International violent extremism was positioned as fundamentally different from dissident terrorist threats in Northern Ireland, despite Irish-related insecurity during these years increasing. Exceptional counterterrorism and constructions of Britishness were mutually constituted through particular patterns of threat/referent construction. This propelled a securitization of terrorism based on perceived degrees of otherness, distance, and danger, enabling the normalization of exceptional counterterrorism.

While opposition to 42-day detention represented a curtailment of proposed power, the CT 2008's passage itself continued the existing counterterrorism trajectory. A logic of "not *if*, but *when*"¹³⁷ terrorism would occur continued to legitimize preemptive counterterrorism. The pervasiveness of intersubjective understandings bolstering threat/referent constructions in the securitization of terrorism have in this thesis been investigated through an analysis of official discourse. But consequences of such us/them boundary drawing and threat identification around knowledge of "the other" extended beyond these official sites. The below snapshot of comments following an article on control orders provide one example:¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Zulaika, *Terrorism*.

¹³⁸ Mark Townsend, "Britain's anti-terror control orders condemned as 'trademark of despots': Human rights groups across the world attack one of the 'most serious violations' of natural justice in developed

Svistz, 2 January 2011 3:53AM

“Control orders are an authoritarian measure, but what's the alternative? Do nothing and wait until known Jihadi ideologues kill someone? No thanks, couldn't really give a toss about the freedoms of someone who wants to deny many others of their most essential freedom, to live.

The eight terror suspects with the orders are fucking odious characters; they aren't your average Mohammad taken off the street for simply criticising the government. I'd be all for removing their controls orders though; I'd be for booting them out of the country.”

Zhubajie, 2 January 2011 4:43AM

"The eight terror suspects with the orders are fucking odious characters;"
If being odious is all it takes, then why are so many politicians walking around free?

"they aren't your average Mohammad taken off the street for simply criticising the government"

I'm not so sure of that.”

This exchange by no means represents a totality of views, not least considering highly influential discourse and practice around human rights and civil liberties. But it does highlight significant consequences of securitization related to perceptions of the other that even if there have not been serious acts of international terrorism in Britain for six years. Efforts were made to acknowledge the alienation of Muslim communities. But historically rooted inside/outside boundary structures and the collective meanings upon which they were based had taken on a consequential durability.

From 2007 to 2011, the securitization of terrorism led to an overall maintenance of exceptional measures despite no major attacks, significant reviews, and parliamentary defeat of certain proposals. Counterterrorism did not become normalized through of a barrage of violent attacks or the presentation of irrefutable material evidence during lawmaking. Rather, exceptional security practices were entrenched because of how the

democracies,” 2 January 2011, *The Observer* [cited 1 January 2011]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jan/02/control-orders-human-rights-coalition-review/print>.

securitization of terrorism constructed politically unarguable threat/referent identity understandings. Without the observed relational configurations underlying how terrorism was securitized, counterterrorism would not have emerged in the way that it did to enable exceptional measures for “the foreseeable future”:

2011, Theresa May (Home Secretary, Con): As the Coalition Programme for Government makes clear, national security is the primary duty of Government. We will not put that security at risk. The review has taken place in the context of a threat from terrorism which, as the Prime Minister has said, is as serious as we have faced at any time and will not diminish in the foreseeable future.¹³⁹

Despite “a widespread perception, apparently transcending political ideologies and different political parties, that the boundary between freedom and security may have started to shift in the wrong direction”, the TPIM2011 was passed and broader strategies such as CONTEST were reasserted.¹⁴⁰ Constructions of differentiated entity-others associated with spatial assumptions of belonging continued even as counterterrorism newly addressed “all forms” of terrorism. Distinguished from the extremist and radical other was a British referent, reasserted through framings of ancient British tradition, freedom, and values. Similar identity framings acted as a broker between different sites and actors irrespective of views on specific measures or party position.

By 2011, institutionalized counterterrorism practice and the everydayness of counterterrorism discourse had become entrenched in a co-constitutive cycle of material and intersubjective consequence: extraordinary counterterrorism had settled onto an atemporal plateau of exceptionality.

¹³⁹ “Review of Counter-terrorism,” 2011, Cmnd. 8004, 3.

¹⁴⁰ “Review of Counter-terrorism and Security Powers,” January 2011, Cmnd. 8003.

Chapter 9

Conclusions

The way that particular relational configurations of threat and referent construction unfolded across official British discourse securitizing terrorism from 1968 to 2011 enabled a distinctive set of outcomes. A causally consequential interrelation of discourse and practice led to exceptional counterterrorism's emergence, justification, and normalization. It is not that structures of identity determined how actors spoke or decided to act with respect to counterterrorism lawmaking or legitimation. Structural effects from securitization do not remove agency. However, the dominant understandings that emerged from particular threat/referent configurations were limiting and enabling in terms of what spaces for agency were "politically possible".¹ The way that exceptional security practices were maintained and legitimized would not have been possible if official discourses had not securitized terrorism in the way that they did. The securitization of terrorism along "Irish", "domestic", and "international" threat labels based on assumptions of geographic belonging was not inevitable. Nor was it predictable that temporary measures introduced in the early 1970s would lead to a 21st century normalization of counterterrorism based on a range of new domestic legal measures.

A distinctive combination of official discourse, historic events, and material policy in the case of Britain from 1968 to 2011 enabled certain outcomes of intersubjective understanding and security practice to arise over others. As explained by Jackson, "the configuration of the boundaries of acceptable action, produced and

¹ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 132.

reproduced in the course of ongoing political struggle over policy outcomes, are central to the explanation of those outcomes”.² Through the way that terrorism was securitized, specific identity labels were brokered along politically unarguable framings. The collective meanings resulting from such configurations constrained the conditions of possibility for counterterrorism practice.

Special security powers have existed for decades, and terrorist political violence has been around as long as history. However, it was during the early 1970s that an explicit language of “terrorism” came to constitute and justify specific security measures in Britain. Counterterrorism laws were initially positioned as an emergency and temporary response to violence in Northern Ireland. Just over forty years later, even as the definition of terrorism remained contested and what it would mean to be successful over terrorism was uncertain, exceptional counterterrorism became a normalized fixture of contemporary security practice. By 2011, logic underlying state counterterrorism has become a self-sustaining cycle of securitization discourse and preventive policy. The 1974 Birmingham pub bombings and 2001 attacks in New York and Washington provided support for a more rapid introduction of extraordinary state powers. But it was the salience of politically unarguable discourses on identity that enabled the entrenchment of such powers over time even in the absence of violence. Us/them structures of understanding delimit spaces for agency. As explained in chapter one, language does not cause outcomes in a linear or generalized sense. However, particular patterns of discourse are causally consequential in that they alter what discourses and actions are “politically possible”.³

This chapter first briefly reviews the status of causal claims made through this thesis and the overarching value added. A summary of the case study is then presented, followed by a more detailed discussion of how the thesis builds upon existing literature in terrorism studies, securitization, and relationalism.

² Ibid., 25.

³ Ibid., 132.

I. Reviewing relational-securitization claim-making

This thesis is not an evaluation of what threats are “real” or an analysis of which policies are “right”. Rather, the relational-securitization research framework helped illustrate how specific patterns of identity construction were constitutive and consequential for a distinct set of material outcomes. As explained in chapter one, language on its own does not do in some kind of ““social magic” power”, part of Balzacq’s recent discussion of CS securitization theory with respect to methodological approach.⁴ CS securitization theory is not limited to views of grammar and linguistic structure as sufficient to affect outcomes, but nor is it an account by which “anything goes”. Such assumptions would misrepresent scholars such as Waeber and Hansen who draw upon poststructural approaches to discourse while investigating material aspects of security practice. The thesis contributes to CS literature by developing the theory along a specific relational sociological sensibility. “Explanation” and “understanding” are not mutually exclusive, and a relational-securitization approach helps us better understand outcomes by better explaining the way discourse and materiality interrelate over time. A notion of relational causality is helpfully explained by Jackson with reference to McAdam *et al.* as involving “the concatenation of causal mechanisms: the contingent coming-together of processes and patterns of social action in such a way as to generate outcomes”.⁵ The thesis narrative evolved along such an approach through a two-part strategy involving “the analytical delineation of a set of causal mechanisms deemed likely to matter in particular cases, and the careful empirical tracing of that case or cases to illustrate the particular way in which these mechanisms came together”.⁶

This interpretation of discourse as having a causal capacity to influence outcomes draws upon poststructural inclinations in critical terrorism studies, securitization, and relationalism. In this way the thesis aims to build upon poststructural conceptual clarifications and empirical engagements from Buzan *et al.*, Jackson (P),

⁴ Balzacq, “A theory of securitization,” in *Securitization Theory*, 1.

⁵ McAdam *et al.*, *Dynamics of Contention*, 13 (as cited in Jackson *Civilizing the Enemy*, 43).

⁶ Jackson *Civilizing the Enemy*, 43.

Jackson (R), and Waever and Hansen.⁷ In one helpful description and ontological clarification, poststructuralism is defined as “a form of structural analysis, albeit not identical to those essentialist forms of structuralism that place their analytical bets on “objectively” existing parameters constraining social action”.⁸ A similar perspective is advanced through Waever’s 2002 discussion on foreign policy, Nordic identity and European integration. He explains what he refers to as “structured poststructuralism”: structuralism representing a type of science of the sign, and poststructuralism representing a critique of the sign.⁹

In this sense, poststructural accounts are not relativist interpretations. Rather they are grounded studies investigating how observed social processes shape intersubjective meaning and material outcomes. “Science of the sign” is interpreted here as a genealogical tracing of discourse, while “critique of the sign” is viewed as an analytic exercise that underlines how the way things *are* is not the way they were predetermined to be. The thesis narrative traced how existential threats and referent objects were articulated across official British discourse and practice over time (the science of discursive signs). In so doing, the way exceptional counterterrorism emerged, was justified, and became normalized was analytically and historically problematized (critique of the sign).

In consideration of the above position viewing discourse as having a causal influence on outcomes, the thesis aimed to contribute to existing debates in securitization, relationalism, and terrorism studies in the following ways:

- (1) *Securitization*: Instead of taking threat and referent identities as given, investigating how these labels become stabilized in discourse to securitize an issue in a particular way; further a view of security as *being* and *doing* by analyzing securitization as formed by relational practices of identity construction (*being*), and leading to particular outcomes (*doing*); investigate how agency is

⁷ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*; Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*; Jackson, *Writing the War*; Waever and Hansen, ed., *European integration and national identity*.

⁸ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 15, footnote 6.

⁹ Waever, “Identity, communities and foreign policy”, in *European integration and national identity*, 44, note 15.

enabled and/or limited by structures that position certain understandings of us/them identity over others;

(2) *Relationalism*: Incorporating relational mechanisms of framing, brokerage, and yoking from relational sociology to advance the explanatory potential of securitization theory; investigating an empirical case study on identity, securitization, and counterterrorism to interrogate how threat/referent forms and discursive structures are constitutive, consequential, and causal;

(3) *Terrorism studies*: Building on critical terrorism studies by questioning assumptions of terrorist threat labels through a genealogical analysis of British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011; using a new framework based in securitization and relationalism to analyze the processual and substantive aspects of how counterterrorism can emerge, be legitimized, and become normalized.

Through a “singular causal analysis” that “trace[s] and map[s] how particular configurations of ideal-typified factors come together to generate historically specific outcomes in particular cases”, the thesis contributes to IR by examining how identities became temporarily stabilized and causally influence material outcomes in a specific case.¹⁰ British counterterrorism and understandings of terrorism were not just influenced by acts of violence, but were intertwined with historically rooted structures of identity, discourse, and practice. Concerns related to situations of insecurity encouraged a thesis focus on identity and counterterrorism. But the immediate task was to analytically unpack how the securitization of terrorism contributed to a normalization of exceptional security practice. The project is an empirical narrative interpretation of how counterterrorism measures came to be formed and legitimized in the way that they were, not how things *should* have been. However, in exposing that the way things turned out was not the way it *had* to be, analysis does, if implicitly, encourage a critical reassessment of counterterrorism practice.

If the 1990s peace process had not spurred the yoking of former terrorists to legitimate politics, would official discourse have constructed three forms of terrorism, distinguishing Irish, domestic, and international threat labels? If permanent counterterrorism law had not been formed along a securitization that externalized an

¹⁰ Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, 114.

“international” other, would exceptional measures such as 28-day pre-charge detention or control orders have been legitimized? There was a growing consensus during the 20th century that a consolidation of counterterrorism was perhaps needed. However, the permanent state of exception reached by 2011 was only possible due to particular ways that terrorist threats were securitized to explicitly distance us from them by asserting inside/outside boundaries of identification. Identifying the international threat as foreign outsiders from areas “south” and “east” of Britain was based on an external othering that led to different outcomes than would have been the case if the threat was constructed to include internal others.

The transition to permanent counterterrorism would have been significantly more difficult if the threat did not explicitly exclude members of the core referent when permanent laws were first passed. The international threat label was from the beginning established as non-British, and non-western. This hardened intersubjective understandings of danger salient enough to justify exceptional measures even if there was no terrorist violence. Events such as 11 September 2001 reinforced *preexisting* perceptions of international terrorists as external to the British referent and special state powers, not new perceptions of the other. The normalization of counterterrorism rests on historically developed securitizations of terrorism that distinguish types of terrorists along inside/outside boundaries of danger and difference.

The causal linkage between knowledge construction, identity, and security is of particular influence for counterterrorism where the secretive and preventive nature of counterterrorism demands that lawmaking draw upon polemic rather than evidence. Political discourse must convincingly establish the “real” existence of terrorism to an audience whether or not an act of violence takes place. When identities become temporarily stabilized they help translate perception of possible risk into an acceptance of guaranteed threat. Interestingly, though “threats” and “referents” are a foundational part of securitization theory, research has not yet satisfyingly unpacked the “arrestation” of some threat and referent labels over others.¹¹ How identities become stabilized as

¹¹ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 31.

“things” or “entities” has been a topic for relational scholars such as Emirbayer and Abbott, but has yet to be engaged with IR studies of securitization. Specific identities do not arise from unquestionable essences “out there”, but are products of contingent relational processes that harden certain boundaries and collective meanings over others.

While there are real risks of political violence linked with some groups and individuals associated as terrorist, patterns of labeling are not indicative of unproblematic veracity, a point made convincingly by critical terrorism studies scholarship.¹² Though structures of identity can exert significant influence over what spaces for agency are more politically possible than others, actors still have a choice to make in determining which acts and actors warrant labels of terrorism, and which do not. This choice is highly consequential considering the significant difference between calling someone a “terrorist” versus calling them a “criminal” or a “dissident”.¹³ Inconsistently used commonplaces such as “Western” and “civilized” come to be accepted as essential characteristics of the democratic referent. “Barbaric”, “ruthless”, “evil”, and “fanatic” come to represent an unquestioned terrorist nature. Whether in the continued dependence on suspect communities, increased 21st century Islamophobia, or persistent “terrorist taboo”, patterns of identity construction and the policies that these practices legitimize can lead to insecurity rather than security.¹⁴

Identity labels establish unequal boundaries separating us from them, inside from outside, and good from bad. An awareness of consequences stemming from us/them practices of identification is not new. Work by Inayatullah and Blaney, Lapid *et al.*, Neumann, and Tilly have all provided important discussion around boundaries and associated relational dynamics.¹⁵ A relational-securitization framework focused on shifts in exceptional counterterrorism builds on these analyses of identity through a new empirical focus and research framework. A securitization framework drawing on

¹² Jackson *et al.*, *Critical Terrorism Studies*; Jackson *et al.*, *Terrorism*.

¹³ The Breivik trial is one recent example (Jonathan Freedland, “Anders Breivik is a terrorist, so we should treat him like one,” 20 April 2012, *The Guardian* [cited 20 April 2012]; available from <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/20/breivik-terrorist-like-al-qaida>.

¹⁴ Hickman *et al.*, “Suspect Communities”; McGovern *et al.*, “Countering Terror”.

¹⁵ Inayatullah and Blaney, *International Relations*; Lapid *et al.*, ed., *Identity, Borders, Orders*; Neumann, *Uses of the Other*; Tilly, *Durable Inequality*.

poststructural and relational approaches to inquiry brings the causal consequences of discursive structures to the forefront of analysis without viewing language as deterministic, removing responsibility from actors, ignoring substance, or negating future change. Even as relations can form seemingly consistent repertoires of understanding or concatenations of structure, to use the language of Tilly, such durability is not atemporal objectivity. Identities are social and political constructions, materially powerful, but constructions nonetheless.

II. Case summary

As explained in detail by legal scholars such as Walker and Donohue, special powers in Britain are not themselves a new phenomenon, and instead go back hundreds of years in the context of Ireland. However, emergency measures framed and legitimized through an explicit language of terrorism in the early 1970s was a departure from existing security practices. Counterterrorism laws were enacted to provide order and maintain peace in response to a specific context of violence surrounding the most recent Troubles. Initially, their temporary nature was itself a source of political legitimation. But by the year 2000, this temporal position reversed to be based on a future time horizon of permanent prevention, providing for an atemporality of exceptional counterterrorism.

Through the 1970s, temporary laws were renewed through discourses that provided a brokerage of specific framings to connect previously divergent actors and sites, transitioning from “hooligan gangs” to constructions of terrorists as “completely ruthless”. Terrorism was increasingly criminalized into the 1980s, which stripped any political purpose from those connected to terrorism. Terrorist actors were established as distinct from both ordinary criminals and political dissidents. Terrorism was not presented as a method of violence, but was securitized as particular enemy-others, “terrorists”. Despite growing domestic protest, the election of hunger striker Bobby Sands, and increased international attention, hardline counterterrorist measures

continued to be renewed through the 1980s. It was close to impossible for political divergence from counterterrorism practice when these measures were based on discourses of eradicating “brutal murderers” and protecting “democratic society”. Actors involved in the policymaking process were rhetorically coerced into policy acquiescence as politically viable alternatives became increasingly limited. From the mid-1980s, an “international” commonplace became a noticeable threat identifier in official discourse. Reference to Northern Ireland remained dominant, but the new “international” reference was deployed with greater frequency.

The late 20th century was a period of significant shifts in identity and practice, with the broader security environment itself transitioning from Cold War struggles to an array of “new” threats. In the context of British counterterrorism, official discourse newly securitized terrorism along “Irish”, “domestic”, and “international” threat labels, with international terrorism framed as a new and dangerous foreign other. At the same time, the peace process helped yoke former terrorists in Northern Ireland to legitimate politics even as insecurity in Ulster remained. As these new threat constructions unfolded, the referent transitioned to include commonplaces of civilization and democracy. The self was a British societal and political referent, embodying the undeniably “good” counterpart to terrorism’s “evil” nature. The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, 1993 Downing Street Declaration, and 1998 Good Friday Agreement pointed to a growth in political efforts in the Northern Irish conflict. These political overtures did not, however, point to a departure from existing counterterrorism. The new Labour government elected in 1997 did not refocus attention to criminal law, but collapsed PTA and EPA measures into a single UK-wide permanent act, the TA 2000. Elites are indeed hesitant to relinquish powers once achieved. But, the way that powers were continued through a consolidation of emergency measures into one permanent law at the turn of the century was not inevitable. This outcome resulted from an externalization of the “new” international threat in contradistinction to seemingly less dangerous domestic and Irish actors. The securitization of terrorism redirected the trajectory of counterterrorism outcomes from temporary response to permanent necessity by establishing new us/them intersubjective understanding.

Dissent was frequently out-manuevered by processes of identity construction that rhetorically coerced actors into tight political corners. Similar threat/referent framings brokered different political positions, as seen through discourses of foreignness: the perceived danger level of international terrorism initially positioned as coming from outside was increased even as acts of violence compared to other security risks were minimal. The externalization of the other positioned exceptional and illiberal powers as targeting “them”, not “us”. Official discourses securitizing terrorism differentiated degrees and distances of terrorist others along socially constructed labels of identification. By 2000, the stage was set for a 21st century normalization of exceptional counterterrorism as identity labels along geographic assumptions of difference became increasingly durable.

The attack of 11 September 2001 was viewed as proof of the “international terrorist” that had been constructed through earlier securitizations. Characteristics of the attackers reinforced generalized assumptions of terrorists related to race (not white), religion (Muslim), and nationality (Middle Eastern). These were not new perceptions but processes of othering that had been a part of how terrorism was securitized and counterterrorism was legitimized years earlier. A perception of international terrorists as foreign Muslim others as “the” international terrorists helped launch new legal measures (e.g. ATCS 2001), broader counterterrorism strategies (e.g. CONTEST), and a continued focus on the threat as from outside Britain. But by 2004 human rights concerns directly questioned the legality of British counterterrorism. This resulted in the removal of the ATSC 2001’s detention of “suspected international terrorists”. In 2010, control orders in the PTA 2005 were allowed to lapse following similar concerns. However, despite having some kind of institutional response to issues of proportionality, both powers were quickly replaced by new measures that were different in name more than in kind (control orders in 2005 and TPIMs in 2011). Such moves indicated a recurring cyclical theme whereby exceptional measures were maintained even as reviews or recommendations pointed to a need for reassessment. Through 21st century discourse and practice, counterterrorism reached a plateau of normalization.

The maintenance of exceptional counterterrorism depended upon a securitization of terrorism along distinctive threat labels. This allocation of identity borders was often historically inconsistent, for example considering the role of international actors in terrorist violence affecting Britain going back decades. In addition, inside/outside boundary assumptions contributed to the continued alienation of marginalized groups along racial and religious lines, observed with respect to both Irish and Muslim suspect communities. Despite these results of insecurity, the securitization of terrorism remained tied to intersubjective understandings based on ideological, cultural, and geographic boundaries. Borders around labels of threat identification became durable knowledge structures separating us (insiders) from them (outsiders) even as these borders were increasingly blurred. Violence from Irish-related groups increased. But insecurity in Northern Ireland was positioned along framings of dissident activity and paramilitarism as much, if not more so, than “terrorism”. Terrorism as a threat identifier was increasingly positioned as synonymous with “Islamic extremism”. The risk of violence from non-Muslim groups, such as far right extremists, remained on the margins of official discourse. As demonstrated by Croft, counterterrorism practice became heavily reliant upon both a generalized category of “Islam” and reasserted perception of what it means to be British.¹⁶

The most recent CONTEST referenced “*all* forms of terrorism” (emphasis added). But exclusionary patterns of identity construction along degrees and distances of othering connected with Irish, international, and domestic labels were by then entrenched in collective meaning. Despite a lack of major international attacks against Britain from 2007 to 2011, extraordinary counterterrorism was institutionally embedded through policy strategies, bureaucratic offices, and legal acts. This included two new CONTEST strategies (2009, 2011), the first ever NSS (2007, 2008), formation of the OSCT (2007), CB (2008), and TPIM (2011). From 2011 official discourse seemed to be charting a new securitization of terrorism that did not rely upon the “international” commonplace. But the durability of intersubjective understandings formed through years


¹⁶ Croft, *Securitizing Islam*.

of securitization discourse had by then enabled a self-sustaining cycle of inclusive/exclusive identity assumptions, and exceptional counterterrorism practice.


Following this summary of the empirical case, it is useful to reference images from earlier chapters to provide an interpretive visualization of securitization and British counterterrorism. This can help us better capture how boundaries and threat/referent perceptions shifted over time:

Figure 2.5


An interpretive visualization of identity, securitization, and British counterterrorism over time




Views of an isolated enemy and territory, early-mid 1970s – mid-1980s



Negotiated geography and externalized others from the mid-1980s




Civilization under threat from international terrorism, late 20th century onwards¹⁷



Geographic perceptions of belonging and relational configurations of meaning

¹⁷ "Civilization" as a commonplace was not new to this period, but its position in opposition to the "international terrorist" marked a new trajectory alongside pending permanent counterterrorism law.



Blurred boundaries between threat(s) and referent(s)

Though simplified, this series of images is one way to try and clarify the spatial underpinnings of securitization in the context of the official British discourses and security practices that were analyzed through this thesis. Observed categories of threat/referent identification temporarily stabilized particular assumptions of distance and danger, contributing to the constitution and legitimation of identity and practice over time.

Constructing the externalized threat of international terrorism as a fanatical evil in opposition to democratic civilization and a British way of life delimited what security options were politically possible. The way that terrorism was securitized established a type of unending exception with no clear path to resolution that was different from other “long wars” such as the Cold War.¹⁸ Over the past four decades, official British discourse and counterterrorism practice led to a distinctive temporal perspective whereby “political leaders constantly remind us we are in this [fight] for the long haul, but it’s a long haul beyond their horizons”.¹⁹ The temporal outlook basing

¹⁸ Buzan, “Will the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?”

¹⁹ Campbell, “Time is Broken”, paragraph 11.

counterterrorism shifted from one of temporary response to one of forever preventing future catastrophe. The vagueness of defining terrorism provided for an indefinite possibility of threatening terrorist others, and exceptional counterterrorism settled onto a plateau of exception with no redirection in sight.

III. Studies on terrorism

Terrorism and counterterrorism are often studied through a misguided 21st century lens. However, as demonstrated through this thesis, elements associated with recent policies such as a “war against terrorism” were in place before 21st century events. International political violence, and exceptional state powers, have “existed” long before the explicit articulation of an “international terrorist” threat in discourse. This is not to negate the specificity of this particular case, and the thesis narrative has endeavored to place a premium on the role of context and contingency throughout analysis. However, it is to point out that our studies on terrorism and counterterrorism should not artificially close the door to past experience. Not unlike Bigo and Guittet’s 2011 discussion, the thesis does not present the “Irish case” as a gold standard of conflict resolution.²⁰ But this relational-securitization narrative does respond to experts such as English, Gearty, Guelke, and Townshend who all advocate that terrorism studies pay greater attention to history.²¹

With a longer historical perspective, analysis was able to highlight how 21st century events were not responsible for the association of international terrorism as a non-western Islamic other. Rather, these events reinforced existing us/them intersubjective understandings, and trajectories of exceptional security practice. “International” terrorists such as the 7 July 2005 attackers were also “domestic” actors. Implementing security measures along inside/outside perceptions of belonging was increasingly both counterproductive and institutionally entrenched. From fatal mistakes

²⁰ Bigo and Guittet, “Northern Ireland as metaphor”.

²¹ English, *How to Respond*; English, *Armed Struggle*; English, *Irish Freedom*; Gearty, *Civil Liberties*; Guelke, *Age of Terrorism*; Townshend, *Terrorism*.

such as the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes to wider reports of alienation, minority groups continued to be disproportionately targeted similar to earlier decades. The normalization of counterterrorism in Britain by 2011 was matched by a longevity and normalization of problematic inside/outside identity structures.

The thesis builds upon existing terrorism studies on the interrelation of discourse, identity, and counterterrorism, such as Richard Jackson and Stuart Croft. By unpacking how patterns of identity construction securitized terrorism in a particular way, the thesis narrative underlined how unquestioned self/other understandings contributed to counterterrorism outcomes of normalized exception. Securitization as outlined by Buzan *et al.* in 1998 provided the theoretical starting point, but the under investigated role of threat/referent components in the theory itself called for further development. An attention to identity responds to calls from critical terrorism studies scholars such as Gunning to further the conceptual development of terrorism studies.²² Analyses of securitization that investigate threat/referent labels as temporarily stabilized effects of social practice build conceptual depth without ignoring the substantive side of counterterrorism practice. In this way the thesis brings a new theoretical framework to advance part of the critical terrorism studies agenda by combining securitization and relationalism in an investigation of British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011.

In line with Jackson *et al.*, though the risk of violence from groups associated with terrorism is in some cases real, the *labels* of identification allocated to these groups are a result of social and political process.²³ The thesis does not ask why security responses were taken, but asks how these responses were formed, justified, and normalized through processes securitizing terrorism in a particular way. The core research question became, “How was this normalization of counterterrorism in Britain made possible in the way that it was?” Though there are some examples of securitization and terrorism studies coming together in research practice, space remains for further analytic collaboration. Terrorism is in a sense “always already” securitized. But the *way*

²² Gunning, “A case for critical”, 366-367.

²³ Jackson *et al.*, *Terrorism*.

that this securitization unfolds entails different consequences depending on how threats and referents are constructed to strengthen certain intersubjective understandings over others.

The thesis built upon work on British counterterrorism law by scholars such as Donohue, Gearty, and Walker by adding a securitization and relational focus.²⁴ This thesis also brought a temporal position that included discourse and practice from before and after major 21st century events. This attention to temporality was in large part inspired by the work of scholars such as Jarvis and Croft who each bring temporality into their analyses of counterterrorism.²⁵ By only going back to 1968 the thesis is itself limited by a short temporal focus. As discussed by Hogan and Walker, with respect to Ireland and Britain exceptional state powers go back hundreds of years.²⁶ However, even acknowledging that the thesis is not a “history”, the resulting narrative still provides a helpful historical account for terrorism studies in IR that are frequently dominated by a 21st century lens.

Connected with this historical element is the under-examined role the “international” commonplace in existing literature. This is not to ignore the influence of “Irish-related” and “domestic” labels, but to underscore how the “international” commonplace was essential for the transition to permanent counterterrorism law. Despite international elements being present throughout the history of terrorism, from American financing of republican campaigns in the late 19th century to AQ support of domestic actors more recently, the securitization of terrorism deployed an “international” label in a distinctive way at particular times. Without this externalization of terrorist others through an international commonplace, it would have been significantly more difficult to legitimize a permanent entrenchment of exceptional powers. This genealogical problematization of “international terrorism” speaks to critical scholarship connected with counterterrorism practice. For example Hickman *et*

²⁴ Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism*; Conor Gearty, *Civil Liberties* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Walker, *Blackstone’s Guide*.

²⁵ Jarvis, *Times of Terror*; Croft, *Securitizing Islam*; Croft, *Culture, Crisis*.

²⁶ Hogan and Walker, *Political violence*, 16.

al.'s study on suspect communities, Aradau and Van Munster's research on governmentalities of risk management, and works by Bigo and Tsoukala and Jabri that take the illiberal nature of liberal security practices to task.²⁷ But an analytic critique of the "international" commonplace has yet to be interrogated. This thesis merely scratched the surface of how "international terrorism" became a consequential and unquestioned resource for research and practice, and further research in this area would potentially provide important insight for security studies in IR more generally.

Our understanding of British counterterrorism law and practices of lawmaking have been developed by Donohue and Neal, respectively. This thesis adds to such research by honing in on *how* discourses of identity are causally consequential for British counterterrorism outcomes in both practices of lawmaking and the resultant measures such practices enable. Through a securitization framework engaged with relational mechanisms, identity is brought to the foreground of analysis. This established a new narrative account to existing terrorism studies by discussing the constitutive, consequential, and causal ways identity and discourse influenced the emergence, justification, and normalization of British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011.

IV. Securitization

Securitization as developed by Buzan *et. al* and CS scholarship more generally provided the theoretical starting point for this thesis aimed at challenging, broadening, and deepening security studies.²⁸ The logic of securitization supported the research question of how counterterrorism developed in the way that it did from 1968 to 2011 in Britain considering the interrelation of discourse, identity, and practice. The theory is a useful framework for investigations into security as both being and doing, an essential conceptual advance that was most helpfully advanced by Buzan through *People, States*

²⁷ Hickman *et al.*, "Suspect Communities"; Aradau and Van Munster, "Governing Terrorism"; Bigo and Tsoukala, eds., *Terror, Liberty, and Insecurity*; Jabri, "War".

²⁸ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*; Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, eds., *Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research* (London: Routledge, 2004).

and Fear.²⁹ Though this text is not on “securitization”, the challenge it leveled at unquestioned concepts such as “the state” and “security” contributed to securitization’s theoretical development and empirical potential. Through securitization’s attention to “speech acts”, broadly defined, the theory complements terrorism studies literature that investigates how language matters for counterterrorism practice.³⁰ By incorporating poststructural developments by scholars such as Hansen, Waever, and Campbell, securitization is further strengthened as a useful research pairing for critical terrorism studies in particular.

A plethora of theoretical and empirical works on securitization have emerged over the years, from edited volumes on research methods to the broadening of “speech act” to include political cartoons.³¹ However, no work in securitization has yet satisfyingly unpacked the relational processes underlying threat/referent construction despite these identity components being foundational to the theory itself. Significant development has taken place through areas of normative research by Aradau and Floyd, context by Stritzel, and audience by Salter.³² But space remains with respect to how we understand the way particular identities become stabilized representations of knowledge to influence intersubjective understanding over time.

It is in this vein that this thesis most directly contributes to existing literature in securitization. By incorporating aspects of relational scholarship from McAdam *et al.*, Andrew Abbott, Patrick Jackson and Ronald Krebs, to name a few, securitization theory gains new explanatory potential.³³ Processual-substantive tensions highlighted by Emirbayer, Nexon and Patrick Jackson add an important conceptual layer to

²⁹ Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*.

³⁰ Cf. Jackson, *Writing the War*.

³¹ Balzacq, ed., *Securitization Theory*; Lene Hansen, “The politics of securitization and the Muhammad cartoon crisis: A post-structuralist perspective,” *Security Dialogue*, 42, no. 4-5 (2011): 357-369.

³² Aradau, “Security and the democratic scene”; Floyd, “Can securitization theory be used in normative analysis?”; Holger Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” *European Journal of International Relations*, 13, no. 3 (2007): 357-84; Mark B. Salter, “When securitization fails,” in *Securitization Theory*.

³³ McAdam *et al.*, *Dynamics of Contention*; Abbott, “Things of Boundaries”; Jackson and Krebs, “Twisting Tongues”.

securitization theory by no longer taking identity-entities as given.³⁴ Though securitization has always had a relational sensibility, the potential from combining securitization and relational sociology remains underexplored. A burgeoning synthesis between relationalism and securitization is observed in Guzzini's 2011 article "Securitization as causal mechanism". But his focus was tied to the level of a securitization, and did not go into the processual dynamics of threat and referent construction preceding securitization as an outcome.

Thus while there is useful overlap in theoretical conceptualization between Guzzini's article and the thesis, each approach rests on different levels of analysis. Rather than accepting the articulation of existential threats and referent objects as unproblematic givens, this thesis unpacked observed identity commonplaces through a genealogical relational-mechanism based discourse analysis. Through this approach, the analytic tracing of identity commonplaces demonstrated "how historical actors have sought to stabilize the commonplace and produce the effect of an intrinsic essence", even as no such essence actually exists.³⁵ By investigating British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011, the thesis helped disentangle the processual undercurrents of identity foregrounding securitization.

Innovative efforts have recently been made to develop securitization as theory through *Security Dialogue's* 2011 special issue on the politics of securitization. Developing a discourse analysis research design that draws on the analytic potential of relational mechanisms builds on such initiatives to further the theory as a conceptual and empirical process.³⁶ The vast majority of works, including this thesis, continue to cite Hansen's book *Security as Practice* as the rare example of research design clarification. Inspired by her work, the thesis has introduced a mechanism-based analysis as one way to use securitization theory in empirical investigations of discourse, identity, and practice. Through a relational-securitization approach influenced by Buzan *et al.*, and by Wæver's version of structured poststructuralism, the thesis narrative traced specific

³⁴ Emirbayer, "Manifesto"; Jackson and Nexon, "Relations Before States".

³⁵ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 44.

³⁶ Guzzini, "Securitization as a causal mechanism".

patterns of language in ideal-typical fashion in order to address transactions among actors and broader identity shifts.³⁷ The key was not just to identify when and where certain threats or referents arose as rhetorical tags to securitize terrorism. Rather, it was to use framing, brokerage, yoking, and rhetorical coercion to help identify *how* terrorism was securitized along particular relational configurations of identity to build intersubjective understanding and exert causal impact on outcomes.

V. Relationalism

Instructive research has been done in areas of historical sociology by drawing on relational approaches to analysis, for example through McAdam *et al.*'s focus on the dynamics of contention and George Lawson's development of "anatomies of revolution".³⁸ This thesis builds upon such efforts by using securitization as a distinctive grounding logic for a mechanism-based analysis of identity and counterterrorism. This task adds value to relationalism by providing a new illustration of how a relational research design can be engaged in a study of identity, discourse, and security. Through this thesis I have demonstrated that relational mechanism based analyses can help us better understand *how* threat/referent identities are established in securitization to influence the substance, justification, and normalization of exceptional counterterrorism. For this thesis, relational mechanisms are not perceived as having been "found" by the researcher in the course of doing analysis. Mechanisms such as brokerage or framing do not constitute independently existing entities or forces "out there". Rather, they are ideal-typical means to more effectively identify consequential patterns and configurations of how identities are constructed and thereby affect outcomes.³⁹

The relational approach of this thesis is a narrative based in securitization but resting on an analyticist inquiry. This type of inquiry is described as "a strategy involving

³⁷ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*; Waever, "Identity, communities and foreign policy", in *European integration and national identity*.

³⁸ McAdam *et al.*, *Dynamics of Contention*; Lawson, *Anatomies of Revolution*.

³⁹ Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 43.

the instrumental oversimplification of complex, actual situations...to form case-specific “analytic narratives” that explain particular outcomes”, with the explanation largely coming from a breaking down of these outcomes rather than a building up.⁴⁰ Relational scholars Emirbayer and Abbott provide conceptual starting points on how to problematize securitization’s “threat” and “referent” identity components by posing questions of “entity-creation” and “thingness”.⁴¹ This advances research that has identified the fluid-fixed spectrum of identity, but has not gone into more detailed empirical analysis on how that spectrum operates in practice to influence outcomes.⁴² Relational studies frequently depend upon discourse analysis as a methodology generally. But how discourse analysis is “done” remains open to interpretation. Relational scholarship, like securitization, continues to face methodological obstacles of how to design inquiry. From source selection to the researcher’s choice of methods, there are no theoretical or empirical guides on how to actually do research. Pairing relational sociology with securitization theory helped launch a useful analytic apparatus with which to engage in an empirical analysis of how observable structures of identity and instances of agency came together in different ways to influence outcomes.

All dynamic accounts rely on some kind of *relationality*, broadly understood. But they rarely go into further explanation of how that relationality plays out in practice or in analysis itself. Thus to develop relational research and add value to IR it was necessary to specify the way relationalism could be used to investigate identity, securitization, and British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. Securitization’s facilitating conditions as presented by Buzan *et al.* were a helpful starting point considering the vast amount of research material and need for a pragmatic logic to source collection.⁴³ However, this did not delineate in any way what methods would be used to then engage in discourse analysis itself. Notions such as “linking and differentiation” by Hansen or “repertoires of

⁴⁰ Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, 142. With thanks to Sherrill Stroschein on the conceptualization of this inquiry as “breaking down”.

⁴¹ Emirbayer, “Manifesto”; Abbott, “Things of Boundaries”.

⁴² Cf. Bill McSweeney, “Interests and Identity in the Construction of the Belfast Agreement,” *Security Dialogue* 29, no. 3 (1999): 303-314.

⁴³ Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, 33.

contention” by McAdam *et al.* continue to be helpful.⁴⁴ But relational mechanisms of framing, brokerage, yoking, and rhetorical coercion provided a particular set of interpretive methods to analyze how patterns of discourse came to exhibit a sense of structure and have causal influence for British counterterrorism.

Through a mechanism-based approach to securitization, the thesis narrative was able to capture how patterns of threat/referent construction enabled and limited what was politically possible for the path of counterterrorism. These conclusions complimented observations by Campbell and Hansen who discuss the mutual constitution of discourse and practice in areas of foreign policy formation.⁴⁵ A relational methodology added to poststructural approaches by enabling new empirical illustrations of how discourse not only describes policy shifts but can constitute the very substance of those policies themselves. Analyzing identity, securitization, and British counterterrorism without relational mechanisms would have provided an interesting and useful description. But this would not have demonstrated the causal impact of discourse considering how relational configurations of threat and referent construction securitize terrorism in distinctive ways and influence material outcomes.

The use of relational mechanisms in a genealogical, analyticist account made for a robust analysis by acknowledging process and substance. Through this thesis, relational mechanisms have contributed to a new relational research design that better accounts for the causal aspects of identity than would have been the case by engaging with securitization theory on its “own”.

VI. Moving forward

The thesis provided a detailed empirical discussion on the causal interrelation of identity, securitization, and British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011. A relational

⁴⁴ Hansen, *Security as Practice*; McAdam *et al.*, *Dynamics of Contention*.

⁴⁵ Campbell, *Writing Security*; Hansen, *Security as Practice*.

mechanism based approach to identity and securitization facilitated an analysis that foregrounded the socially constructed and materially consequential nature of identity, discourse, and security practice. Us/them structures provided for certain substantive knowledge claims to arise over others, thereby delineating which spaces for agency were deemed as more or less politically legitimate. In this way, discourses of identity construction played an essential role in how counterterrorism measures emerged, were justified, and became normalized. By tracing commonplaces across official British discourse, this narrative demonstrated that the way counterterrorism evolved was not predetermined. Rather, outcomes rested on particular discourses of identity that securitized terrorism in particular ways at different moments.

In the case of British counterterrorism from 1968 to 2011 and the discourses under investigation in this thesis, consequential identity structures led to a normalization of counterterrorism practices irrespective of policy effectiveness or incidents of violence. The securitization of terrorism depended upon, and exacerbated, inclusive/exclusive boundaries of difference based on varying degrees of danger and distances of externalization. State power, purpose, and identity were constructed and reconstructed through co-constitutive cycles of us/them discourse and practice. Historical events provided support for certain measures. But it was the power of intersubjective understandings from threat/referent identity structures that enabled a continuance, maintenance, and normalization of such measures over time.

Though this thesis narrative helps explicate some nuances of causality, discourse, process, substance, structure, and agency, limitations and tensions remain. In particular, further work is needed on the interweaving of structure and agency as relates to identity and security practice in the context of relational theorizing and empirical analysis. The thesis is a step forward for inquiry into the consequential interrelation of identity, discourse, and practice. But there is significant space for continued inquiry in order to better clarify core conceptual assumptions and analytical narratives. As stated by Patrick Jackson, “ideal-types are used to generate knowledge only when we—paradoxical though this may sound—acknowledge their *limitations*” [emphasis in original], and the

preceding relational discourse analysis is no exception to this observation of the limitations from certain methodological choices.⁴⁶ At the same time, however, the thesis is an important start to developing the relational undertones of securitization through a detailed case study of historical and contemporary significance. By analytically confronting the (mis)perception that the way things are today is the way they “must” be, unnecessarily binding perceptions can be more fully interrogated, conceptual tensions can be addressed empirically, and theoretical frameworks can continue to be developed.

⁴⁶ Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, 154.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Article 5 (1), European Convention on Human Rights, “Right to liberty and security”¹

“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

- (a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
 - (b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law;
 - (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority of reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
 - (d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority;
 - (e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts, or vagrants;
 - (f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition.”
-

¹ European Convention on Human Rights [cited 15 April 2012]; available from <http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Basic+Texts/The+Convention+and+additional+protocols/The+European+Convention+on+Human+Rights/>.

Appendix 2: Control Orders²

1 Power to make control orders

- (1) In this Act “control order” means an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism.
- (2) The power to make a control order against an individual shall be exercisable –
 - (a) except in the case of an order imposing obligations that are incompatible with the individual’s right to liberty under Article 5 of the Human Rights Convention, by the Secretary of State; and
 - (b) in the case of an order imposing obligations that are or include derogating obligations, by the court on an application by the Secretary of State.
- (3) The obligations that may be imposed by a control order made against an individual are any obligations that the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) the court considers necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that individual in terrorism-related activity.
- ...
- (4) Those obligations may include, in particular—
 - (a) a prohibition or restriction on his possession or use of specified articles or substances;
 - (b) a prohibition or restriction on his use of specified services or specified facilities, or on his carrying on specified activities;
 - (c) a restriction in respect of his work or other occupation, or in respect of his business;
 - (d) a restriction on his association or communications with specified persons or with other persons generally;
 - (e) a restriction in respect of his place of residence or on the persons to whom he gives access to his place of residence;
 - (f) a prohibition on his being at specified places or within a specified area at specified times or on specified days;

² Prevention of Terrorism Act, c.2, 2005: section 1.

(g) a prohibition or restriction on his movements to, from or within the United Kingdom, a specified part of the United Kingdom or a specified place or area within the United Kingdom;

(h) a requirement on him to comply with such other prohibitions or restrictions on his movements as may be imposed, for a period not exceeding 24 hours, by directions given to him in the specified manner, by a specified person and for the purpose of securing compliance with other obligations imposed by or under the order;

(i) a requirement on him to surrender his passport, or anything in his possession to which a prohibition or restriction imposed by the order relates, to a specified person for a period not exceeding the period for which the order remains in force;

(j) a requirement on him to give access to specified persons to his place of residence or to other premises to which he has power to grant access;

(k) a requirement on him to allow specified persons to search that place or any such premises for the purpose of ascertaining whether obligations imposed by or under the order have been, are being or are about to be contravened;

(l) a requirement on him to allow specified persons, either for that purpose or for the purpose of securing that the order is complied with, to remove anything found in that place or on any such premises and to subject it to tests or to retain it for a period not exceeding the period for which the order remains in force;

(m) a requirement on him to allow himself to be photographed;

(n) a requirement on him to co-operate with specified arrangements for enabling his movements, communications or other activities to be monitored by electronic or other means;

(o) a requirement on him to comply with a demand made in the specified manner to provide information to a specified person in accordance with the demand;

(p) a requirement on him to report to a specified person at specified times and places.

(5) Power by or under a control order to prohibit or restrict the controlled person's movements includes, in particular, power to impose a requirement on him to remain at or within a particular place or area (whether for a particular period or at particular times or generally).

(6) The reference in subsection (4)(n) to co-operating with specified arrangements for monitoring includes a reference to each of the following—

(a) submitting to procedures required by the arrangements;

- (b) wearing or otherwise using apparatus approved by or in accordance with the arrangements;
 - (c) maintaining such apparatus in the specified manner;
 - (d) complying with directions given by persons carrying out functions for the purposes of those arrangements.
- (7) The information that the controlled person may be required to provide under a control order includes, in particular, advance information about his proposed movements or other activities.
- (8) A control order may provide for a prohibition, restriction or requirement imposed by or under the order to apply only where a specified person has not given his consent or approval to what would otherwise contravene the prohibition, restriction or requirement.
- (9) For the purposes of this Act involvement in terrorism-related activity is any one or more of the following—
- (a) the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;
 - (b) conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so;
 - (c) conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so;
 - (d) conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed to be involved in terrorism-related activity; and for the purposes of this subsection it is immaterial whether the acts of terrorism in question are specific acts of terrorism or acts of terrorism generally.
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Appendix 3: Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures, 2011³

The Measures:⁴

“Overnight residence measure

1 (1) The Secretary of State may impose restrictions on the individual in relation to the residence in which the individual resides.

³ TPIM, 2011, c. 23.

⁴ *Ibid.*, schedule 1, section 1.

- (2) The Secretary of State may, in particular, impose any of the following—
- (a) a requirement to reside at a specified residence;
 - (b) a requirement to give notice to the Secretary of State of the identity of any other individuals who reside (or will reside) at the specified residence;
 - (c) a requirement, applicable overnight between such hours as are specified, to remain at, or within, the specified residence.
- (3) The specified residence must be—
- (a) premises that are the individual's own residence, or
 - (b) other premises provided by or on behalf of the Secretary of State that are situated in an appropriate locality or an agreed locality.
- (4) An "appropriate locality" is—
- (a) a locality in the United Kingdom in which the individual has a residence;
 - (b) if the individual has no such residence, a locality in the United Kingdom with which the individual has a connection;
 - (c) if the individual has no such residence or connection, any locality in the United Kingdom that appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate.
- (5) An "agreed locality" is a locality in the United Kingdom which is agreed by the Secretary of State and the individual.
- (6) If the specified residence is provided to the individual by or on behalf of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State may require the individual to comply with any specified terms of occupancy of that residence (which may be specified by reference to a lease or other document).
- (7) A requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(c) must include provision to enable the individual to apply for the permission of the Secretary of State to be away from the specified residence, for the whole or part of any applicable period, on one or more occasions.
- (8) The Secretary of State may grant such permission subject to either or both of the following conditions—
- (a) the condition that the individual remains overnight at other agreed premises between such hours as the Secretary of State may require;
 - (b) the condition that the individual complies with such other restrictions in relation to the individual's movements whilst away from the specified residence as are so required.
- (9) "Agreed premises" are premises in the United Kingdom which are agreed by the Secretary of State and the individual.
- (10) Sub-paragraph (8) is not to be read as limiting—

(a) the generality of sub-paragraph (7) of paragraph 13 (power to impose conditions when granting permission), or

(b) the power to impose further conditions under that sub-paragraph in connection with permission granted by virtue of sub-paragraph (7) of this paragraph.

(11) In sub-paragraph (7) “applicable period” means a period for which the individual is required to remain at the specified residence by virtue of a requirement of the kind mentioned in sub-paragraph (2)(c).”

(This above ‘Overnight measure’ is just one of twelve Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures, including ‘Exclusion measure’, ‘Movement directions measure’, ‘Financial services measure’, ‘Property measure’, ‘Electronic communication device measure’, ‘Association measure’, ‘Work or studies measure’, ‘Reporting measure’, ‘Photography measure’, and ‘Monitoring measure’.)

***The Secretary of State can impose TPIM measures if the following conditions are met:*⁵**

“3 Conditions A to E

(1) Condition A is that the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity (the “relevant activity”).

(2) Condition B is that some or all of the relevant activity is new terrorism-related activity.

(3) Condition C is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, for terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual.

(4) Condition D is that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, for the specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual.

(5) Condition E is that—

(a) the court gives the Secretary of State permission under section 6, or

(b) the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the urgency of the case requires terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed without obtaining such permission.

(6) In this section “new terrorism-related activity” means—

⁵ Ibid., section 3, parts A-E.

- (a) if no TPIM notice relating to the individual has ever been in force, terrorism-related activity occurring at any time (whether before or after the coming into force of this Act);
- (b) if only one TPIM notice relating to the individual has ever been in force, terrorism-related activity occurring after that notice came into force; or
- (c) if two or more TPIM notices relating to the individual have been in force, terrorism-related activity occurring after such a notice came into force most recently.”

Temporary power for imposition of enhanced measures:⁶

“(3) An enhanced measure is a requirement, restriction or other provision which is of any of the following kinds—

(a) a restriction on an individual in relation to the residence in which the individual resides, including—

(i) a requirement to reside at a specified residence in the United Kingdom;

(ii) a requirement not to allow others to reside at that residence without the permission of the Secretary of State;

(iii) a requirement, applicable between specified hours, to remain at, or within, that residence;

(b) a restriction on an individual in relation to leaving a specified area;

(c) a requirement, restriction or other provision which corresponds to provision within any of these paragraphs of Schedule 1—

(i) paragraphs 2 to 6;

(ii) paragraph 7(1) and (2) and (4) to (6);

(iii) paragraphs 9 to 12;


(d) a requirement, restriction or other provision which corresponds to provision within paragraph 8(1) of Schedule 1 (as read with paragraph 8(3) of that Schedule), including—

(i) a requirement not to associate or communicate with other persons without the permission of the Secretary of State, which includes provision allowing the individual (without seeking permission) to associate and communicate with such persons or descriptions of persons as the Secretary of State may specify;

⁶ Ibid., section 26.

- (ii) a requirement to give notice to the Secretary of State before associating or communicating with other persons, which includes provision allowing the individual (without giving notice) to associate and communicate with such persons, or descriptions of persons, as are specified;
- (iii) a requirement of the kind referred to in sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 1, which may in particular relate to association or communication which is allowed by virtue of provision of the kind referred to in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii) above;
- (e) provision which corresponds to provision within Part 2 of Schedule 1; and for this purpose “specified” means specified by the Secretary of State in an enhanced TPIM notice.”
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Appendix 4: Securitization’s life cycle, an interpretation



Appendix 5: Chronological Matrix, 1968-2011⁷

	Institutional: Legislative, judicial, organizational, electoral	Domestic: Action taking place in UK territory	International: Involving more than one national territory or citizenship
1967	- Formation of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA)		
1968		- 5 October: Civil Rights March in Derry/Londonderry - 9 October: People's Democracy formed	
1969	- 14 August: British troops deployed in Northern Ireland (28 December) - 9 September: "peace line" constructed between Catholic and Protestant areas of Belfast - 12 September: Cameron Report - 10 October: Hunt Report - 28 December: IRA split, PIRA and OIRA (public on 11 January 1970) - 3 July: Falls Road curfew in Belfast, house searches by British Army of predominantly Catholic area; two killed by British Army - 21 August: SDLP formed	- 1 January: start of People's Democracy March from Belfast to Derry/Londonderry - 30 March, and 4, 20, 24, 26 April: Loyalist (UVF, UPV) bombs at key water sources (pipelines, reservoir) for Belfast and an electric source - 12-14 August: Battle of the Bogside (clashes between Apprentice Boys, Irish nationalists, and RUC forces in Derry/Londonderry)	
1970	- 1 April: UDR to replace 'B-Specials', disbanded on 30 April - 18 June: Conservative Edward Heath elected UK PM, Reginald Maudling appointed Home Secretary		- April: customs officers Dublin airport seize a consignment of arms secretly imported from the Continent for by republicans in NI
1971	- 6 February: first soldier killed by IRA - 9 August: reinstatement of internment via the Civil Authority (Special Powers) Act 1920 (internment previously used in used in 1922, 1939 and 1956); 342 people arrested and 17 killed - Formation of the UDA - November: Compton Report	- 4 December: Tramore (McGurk's) Bar Loyalist (UVF) bomb kills 15	
1972	- Internment until 30 March - 24 March: Direct Rule imposed - 18 April: Widgery Report released (inquiry into Bloody Sunday) - 20 June: Secret meeting PIRA, British officials - 9 July: end of truce between government and PIRA - 31 July: Operation Motorman: Biggest British military operation since Suez crisis, 12,000 British troops brought to Northern Ireland - 20 December: Diplock Report	- 30 January: Bloody Sunday in Londonderry /Derry kills 14 - July 21: Bloody Friday, 22 bombs set off by PIRA in Belfast, 9 killed, 130 civilians injured - 22 February: OIRA bomb at Aldershot army barracks kills seven - 29 May: OIRA ceasefire	- 2 February: British Embassy in Dublin destroyed following a march coinciding with funerals of those killed on Bloody Sunday - 1 December: two bombs in Dublin kill two and injure 127 <i>Broader international Context:</i> - September Munich Olympic attacks
1973	- EPA 1973 - 9 December: Sunningdale Agreement - 10 December: Ulster Army Council (UAC) formed, umbrella group for UDA and UVF	- Two IRA car bombs in London, over 200 injured	
1974	- 28 May: collapse of power-sharing NI Executive following UWC strike - Sunningdale Agreement collapses - 5 March: Labour Party Harold Wilson becomes PM, Merlyn Rees appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland	- 4 February: IRA bomb on a coach in England, 11 killed - attacks on National Defence College, Latimer, coach on the M62, Tower of London, Guilford, Woolwich - 14 May: start of Ulster Workers Council	- 17 May: Dublin and Monaghan bombings by Loyalist paramilitaries kill 33

⁷ These events are compiled from media sources, the MI5 website (<https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/the-threats/terrorism.html>), and the CAIN Web Service (<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron.htm>).

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PTA 1974 - 9 July: End of Internment announced 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strike - 5 October: Guildford bombings by IRA, 5 killed, 54 injured - 21 November: Birmingham bombings by IRA, 21 killed. 	
1975	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10 February: IRA truce, new ceasefire - 22 October: 'Guildford Four' found guilty (released on 19 October 1989) - 5 December: Internment officially ended, 1,981 were detained (1,874 were Catholic/Republican and 107 Protestant/Loyalist) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 31 July: UVF gun and bomb attack on Miami Showband, multiple deaths - 2 October: 12 killed in UVF attacks across NI - 19 December: Five killed by RHC bomb in Dundalk 	
1976	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 March: End of Special Category status - 3 March: 'Maguire Seven' convicted - 26 March: PTA extends to Northern Ireland - 2 September: European Commission on HR says interrogation amounts to torture, sends Britain to ECourHR 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 5 January: ten killed by RAForce - 26 May: UVF ceasefire - 14 September: start of Blanket protest 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 21 July: British Ambassador to Ireland, Christopher Ewart Biggs, killed <p><i>Broader international Context:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - TREVI group formed to facilitate counterterrorism coordination with policing (Secret until 'Palma Document' 1989)
1977		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 3 May: start of United Unionist Action Council Strike (13 days) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 19 June: New Zealand PM Robert Muldoon attends Belfast peace talks - 30 August: US President Jimmy Carter gives speech on US support for NI, asks Americans to stop aiding the violence
1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 18 January: ECourHR decides interrogation was ill treatment but not torture - 13 June: Amnesty International Report on ill-treatment of Castlereagh detainees - Suppression of Terrorism 1978 (put 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism into effect) - August: Shackleton Report - Ireland v. the UK (1977), European Court of Human Rights (interrogation did not amount to torture) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 17 February: La Mon bombing planed by IRA kills 12, injures 23 	
1979	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 3 May: Conservative Margaret Thatcher elected UK PM - Maze Prison Hunger Strikes - 16 March: Bennett Report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 20 February: Shankill Butchers (11 Loyalists) sentenced to life imprisonment - 30 March: INLA car bomb kills Con MP Airey Neave in London - 27 August: 18 British soldiers killed by 500 pound IRA bomb near Warrenpoint, 12 soldiers killed by bomb near Gate Lodge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 27 August: Lord Mountbatten assassinated along with three others in County Sligo <p><i>Broader international context:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Iranian Revolution - Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - Rhodesian Elections (frequently discussed by Parliament in a language of "terrorism")
1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 26 March: Announced end of Special category status 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 30 April-5 May: Iranian embassy seige in London - Maze Prison Hunger Strikes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 8 December: UK-Irish summit in Dublin
1981	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Five year anniversary of end to Special Category Status - 9 April: Bobby Sands elected MP - 1 September: first integrated secondary school in Northern Ireland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Multiple attacks in London (Chelsea barracks, car bomb Lieutenant-General Steuart Pringle, two bombs Oxford Street, home of Attorney General bombed, and toy pistol found filled with explosives) - 1 March-3 October: Bobby Sands starts Second Hunger Strike, ten deaths - 5 May: Sands Dies after 66 days on hunger strike - 7 May: 100,000 estimated to have attended Sands' funeral in Belfast - 14 November: Rev Robert Bradford (UUP MP) killed by IRA in Belfast 	
1982	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Jellicoe Report, mention of international terrorism - Northern Ireland Assembly reestablished (dissolved in 1986) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 20 July: IRA bombs in Hyde Park and Regents Park kill 11 British Soldiers, over 50 injured - 24 November-12 December: Shoot to kill allegations (led to Stalker-Sampson report on RUC action) - 6 December: INLA bomb at Ballykelly disco kills 17, injures 30 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Falklands War (contributes to a halt in Irish-UK rapprochement)

		- 3 June: attempted assassination of Israeli ambassador Argov in London by Abu Nidal	
1983	- 9 June: Conservatives reelected with increased majority - 11 April: first 'supergrass' trial, 14 UVF members sentenced to 200 years based on one person's testimony	- 13 July: Four UDR members killed by IRA - 25 September: 38 members of the IRA escape from Maze prison - 17 December: London Harrod's bombing, six killed	
1984	- 24 May: Stalker Inquiry begins - 14 December: first soldier convicted of murder (released in 1987 and resumed service)	- 12 October: Brighton Conservative conference Bombing, five killed	- June: US President Reagan visits Ireland, asserts US policy of noninterference with issues in NI - 19 November: Anglo-Irish Summit
1985	- 30 July: BBC documentary featuring Martin McGuinness (SF) banned - 15 November: AIA signed	- 11 November: Chelsea barracks INLA attempted attack - 28 February: nine RUC officers killed by IRA - 23 November: Unionist rally (100,000 plus) in Belfast to protest Anglo Irish Agreement	- 16 February: Gerry Adams refused visa to US - 20 February: PM Thatcher gives speech in US urging Americans not to support organizations such as NORAID
1986	- 5 June: Stalker replaced with Sampson on shoot-to-kill inquiry - 23 June: NI Assembly dissolved - 18 September: International Fund for Ireland (£36 million), mostly by US	- 10 November: Ulster Resistance Formed	- 7 August: 500 Loyalists march with DUP leader Robinson into Ireland, assault Garda officers <i>Broader international context:</i> - British support of US Libyan airstrikes
1987	- 12 February: 400,000 sign Unionist petition against AIA delivered to Buckingham Palace - 11 June: UK General election, Conservatives returned to power	- 8 November: bombing in Enniskillen kills 11 and injures 63 - May: eight IRA men killed during attack on Loughgall Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Station in County Armagh	- 150 tons of arms/explosives from Libya to Ireland discovered off French coast
1988	- 11 January: John Hume (SDLP) and Gerry Adams (SF) meet - 14 October talks in Duisburg, West Germany with UUP, DUP, SDLP, and APNI - 19 October: Broadcasting ban on all proscribed organizations	- 16 March: Loyalist gunman attack during funeral, three killed and 50 injured - 19 March: two soldiers killed - 15 June: IRA bomb kills six British Army officers in Lisburn - 20 August: eight soldiers killed by IRA bomb at Ballygawley, 28 soldiers injured - 21 December: Pan Am flight 103 from Heathrow to New York crashes over Lockerbie, kills 259 on aircraft, 11 on the ground.	- 6 March: three unarmed IRA members shot by SAS officers in Gibraltar - 5 July: Patrick Ryan (Catholic priest from Ireland) arrested in Brussels (deported to Ireland 25 November) - Brogan v. UK, ECourtHR, Reaffirms the PTA powers of detention as in line with Article 5 of the EConvHR
1989	- PTA 1989 – Five year sunset clause removed, replaced with annual renewal - Security Service Act 1989 (MI5 on statute, broader powers) - 19 October: 'Guildford Four' released from prison after 14 years	- 12 February: Patrick Finucane (Belfast Solicitor) murdered, UFF (UDA) claim responsibility - 22 September: IRA explode bomb in Kent, kill eleven musicians from Royal Marine band - 8 October: 28 members of UDR arrested following Steven's inquiry into collusion of security forces	
1990	- 17 May: Steven's Inquiry: collusion between Loyalist paramilitaries and state security forces - 9 November: Sec State for NI Peter Brooke declares Britain has no selfish strategic or economic interest in NI - Colville Report - 22 November: Thatcher resigns, Conservatives elect John Major PM	- 20 July: IRA bomb London stock exchange - Carlton Club bombed by PIRA in London, over 20 injured - 30 June: PIRA assassinates Conservative MP Ian Gow - 30 September: two teenagers shot by British Army in Belfast, officer released early and back into regiment - 24 October: IRA attacks three Army check points	- Two Australians killed by PIRA in the Netherlands (mistaken identity due to British license plates) - 1 June: British Army Major shot in West Germany (Dortmund) by PIRA - Hundreds of homes destroyed in Ballymena and Castlederg, Northern Ireland - 11 April: visit by Charles Haughey (Irish PM) to NI <i>Broader international context:</i> - Beginning of first Gulf War
1991	- 14 March: 'Birmingham Six' released from prison after 16 years. - 17 June 3 July: official Brooke-Mayhew talks - 26 June: 'Maguire Seven' convictions thrown out	- 7 February: PIRA attacks Downing Street with mortar bombs during Cabinet meeting - Series of bombs put along rail stations by PIRA around London - 29 April-4 July: CLMC Ceasefire - 18 June: 500 British Army soldiers arrive in	- 14 April: Bishop Desmond Tutu says SF should be invited to talks - 28 July: UFF explode seven devices in shops in Ireland

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 23 July: UDR merges with the Royal Irish Rangers (RIR) to be the Royal Irish Regiment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NI, total numbers at 11,000 - 1 September: US fact-finding delegation to NI, calls for Americans to stop support for NORAID - 4 December: PIRA bomb (estimated 1,200 pounds) in Belfast 	
1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - October: intelligence effort on UK mainland transferred from the Metropolitan Police to the Security Service - 10 November: Brooke-Mayhew talks stall, restart 22 April - 9 April: UK Gen election won by Conservatives, John Major PM 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10 April: PIRA bombs in City of London day after British general election - 4 January: 800 pound bomb Belfast by PIRA - 17 January: PIRA bomb kills eight Protestants in NI - 4 February: off duty RUC kills three in Falls Road SF office, then himself - 5 February: UFF kills five Catholics in Belfast bookshop - 5 March: two 1,000 pound PIRA bombs in NI - 12 August: 12 tons of explosives found in London (PIRA) - 23 September: PIRA bomb (2,000 pounds) at NI forensic science laboratory in Belfast 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10 March: Garda uncover 3,500 pounds of explosives in County Donegal, Ireland - 5 April: Bill Clinton speech to American-Irish Presidential Forum in NY promises (if elected) to reverse ban on Gerry Adams and appoint peace envoy to NI <p><i>Broader international context:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maastricht Treaty refers to terrorism as a "serious crime" - Single European Act: terrorism, drug trafficking, illegal trading in art/antique.
1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10 March: HC vote 329-202 to renew PTA, Labour Party votes "no" after previously abstaining - 24 April John Hume (SDLP) and Gerry Adams (Sinn Féin) issue first joint statement - 27 May: Queen Elizabeth meets Irish President Mary Robinson, first official contact between an Irish president and a British monarch - 15 December: John Major and Albert Reynolds joint statement, "Downing Street Declaration" 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 20 March: PIRA bombs in Warrington, England, two killed, 56 injured - 24 April: PIRA bomb (over 1,000 pounds) in Bishopsgate, London, killing one, injuring over 30, estimate £350-£1,000 million in damages - 23 October: Shankill Road PIRA bombing kills 10, injures 57 - 30 October: UFF kill seven in County Derry, 13 injured - First year since 1968 the Security Services are not responsible for any deaths in Northern Ireland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 24 November: British intercept UVF arms shipment originating in Poland (300 assault rifles, bullets, 4,400 pounds explosives, thousands of bullets) <p><i>Broader international context:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - First World Trade Center bombing, Al Qaida takes responsibility
1994	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - January: PIRA incendiary devices Oxford Street London - August 31: PIRA declares a "cessation of military operations", Sinn Féin enters talks - 13 October: UDA, UFF, UVF, RHC call ceasefire - 28 August: fourth Hume-Adams statement - 31 August: PIRA cease military operations - 16 September: British broadcasting ban from October 1988 lifted - 13 October: CLMC announce ceasefire 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 17 February: RUC officer killed, two injured, by PIRA rocket attack in Belfast - 26 July car bomb outside Israeli embassy London, second car bomb outside Jewish charity at Balfour House - 9 March: first PIRA mortar attack outside Heathrow, two other attacks 11 and 13 March - multiple UVF shootings - 22 December: Christmas parole granted to 97 paramilitary prisoners, in Ireland to 30 prisoners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 29 January: US visa to Adams (against advice of British government and US State Department) - 10 February: former leader of INLA, Dominic McGlinchey, killed in Ireland - 24 July: Sinn Féin conference in County Donegal - 24 September: Adams' second visit to US - 27 September: European Parliament calls for all paramilitary groups to cease fire - 1 November: Clinton promises \$30 million per year in aid for NI - 1 December: George Mitchell appointed US special advisor to NI - 7 December: European Commission promises £ 230 million aid over three years - British citizen Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh arrested by Indian forces after kidnapping four tourists (later involved in 2002 kidnapping and murder of David Pearl)
1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 12 January: announcement of end to British Army daylight patrols of Belfast housing estates - 22 February: launch of Framework Documents by British and Irish governments - 1 March: British Army end patrols east Belfast and city center - 11 December: Mayhew announces redirection of £100 million from security budget if ceasefires hold 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - sectarian clashes around parades throughout the year - 14 March: UVF prisoners riot, subsequent attacks on homes of prison officers - March: 51 Republican punishment beatings and 39 Loyalist punishment beatings since the 1994 ceasefires - 14 April: RUC finds 40 weapons and hundreds of ammunition rounds for Loyalist group - 3 July: release of Clegg (British Army paratrooper convicted of killing Catholic teen 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 7 February: 8,000 rounds of ammunition found by Garda in Ireland - March: Mayhew and Adams in Washington - 27 September: ECourTHR rules 6 March 1988 killing of three PIRA in Gibraltar breached Human Rights Convention right to life - 10 November: Garda arrest two men with 1,500 pounds explosives - 30 November: First Clinton visit

		in 1993) sparks rioting; Clegg back into Army and promoted	to NI - December: International Body on Arms Decommissioning meet in Dublin <i>Broader international context:</i> - 20 March: Aum Shinrikyo Tokyo subway sarin gas attack, 13 killed, thousands injured (sickened) - 19 April: Oklahoma City bombing kills 168, injures over 680
1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 24 January: Mitchell Report on decommissioning - ECourtHR found UK emergency legislation infringed on EConvHR - 10 June: Stormont talks US, Ireland, UK, NI representatives - UVF dissidents split into militant LVF (1996) - PIRA ceasefire ends 9 February - 10 June start of multi-party negotiations - 9 July: British government send 1,000 extra troops to NI - 29 August: announcement for SF to enter talks by Mo Mowlam - 6 November: SF split - 11 December: SF delegation at Downing Street, first time in 76 years 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 January: DAAD kill one in Lurgan - 9 February: end of PIRA ceasefire with Docklands London lorry bomb, kills 2, injures 39, £85 million damage - 24 April: PIRA plant two bombs Hammersmith Bridge London (300 pounds Semtex, detonators went off, but charges failed) - 7 July: Drumcree Orange Order parade stopped by RUC - 13 July: CIRA bomb in Enniskillen, 1,200 pounds explosives, 17 injured - London raids by the Met find bomb-making material - 7 October: two PIRA bombs (800 pounds each), British Army Headquarters in NI, 31 injured - multiple Catholic families leave homes due to intimidation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 7 June: Garda detective Jerry McCabe killed by PIRA in Ireland - 20 June: PIRA bomb factory found in Ireland, Irish Government stops talks with SF - 27 June: over 100 pounds explosives in Ireland found - 28 June: PIRA attack on British Army barracks in Osnabreck, Germany - September: Adams fundraising visit to the US for SF
1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NI (Sentences) Act (prisoner release scheme) - NI Decommissioning Act 1997 - 20 July resumptions PIRA ceasefire. - 1 May: Labour Tony Blair, elected to PM - 3 June: first Nationalist Mayor elected to Belfast - 20 July: PIRA declares second ceasefire 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - January: multiple bombs defused NI - 6 January: PIRA rocket attack Belfast Royal Courts of Justice - 10 January: 20 bomb alerts in Belfast - 13 January: PIRA rocket attack RUC in Belfast - 12 February: PIRA kill Restorick (last soldier killed until March 2009 RIRA killings) - 26 March: 2 PIRA bombs at Windsor Railway, England - 29 March: 1,000 pound bomb left by PIRA outside British Army Base, County Down - 5 April: Grand National cancelled due to hoax bomb threat - numerous arson attacks, PIRA rail and motor way bombs planted in England, sectarian attacks by Loyalists - 16 June: two RUC officers killed by PIRA - 31 July: 500-1,000 pound bomb by CIRA, NI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Luxor, Egypt attack, 58 killed including British tourists
1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 31 March: UN Commission on HR accuse RUC of intimidating lawyers defending paramilitaries - 10 April: GFA announced - 22 May: referenda endorse GFA - UK Human Rights Act (implemented in full the 2 October 2000). - 7 May: formation of RIRA (Óglaigh na hÉireann) - 15 May: LVF ceasefire - August: INLA ceasefire - September: RIRA ceasefire - 11 September: first prisoners released - 19 November: Northern Ireland Act - 10 December: Hume (SDLP) and Trimble (UUP) receive Nobel Peace Prize 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 6 January: CIRA car bomb County Down - January: RUC blame UDA/UFF for multiple killings despite ceasefire - sectarian violence continues in mixed areas and against specific targets (i.e. churches) - 15 August: Omagh bombing, Real IRA takes responsibility, 29 killed, over 200 injured. - December: NIO report says intimidation forcing families to leave homes is the highest since 1973 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 16 February: all-party talks in Dublin - 24 February: Garda discover 250 pound car bomb destined for NI - 3 March: Garda discover 600 pound car bomb (believed to be for CIRA) - Garda and police in England arrest nine who were planning a London fire-bombing campaign <p><i>Broader international context:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 7 August: U.S. Embassies bombed Tanzania and Kenya, Al Qaida vehicle bombs, killing over 200, injuring 1,000s
1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2 July British and Irish governments Joint Statement - 15 July: UUP boycotts - 6 September: start of Mitchell review - 9 September: Patten Report on policing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - January: CIRA shoot at RUC - multiple Loyalist pipe bomb attacks on Catholic homes - 27 January: Eamon Collins (former PIRA and informer) killed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - July: Garda investigate plot smuggling guns from the US to PIRA - 25 October: Garda find weapons cache including RPG 18 believed to

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2 December: End of direct rule, transfer of powers, AIA replaced by British-Irish Agreement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - multiple sectarian and punishment attacks - David Copeland attacks against gay and ethnic minorities London, killing three, injuring 129 - 15 March: Rosemary Nelson (human rights lawyer) assassinated by loyalists in NI 	belong to RIRA
2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 11 February suspension of NI Executive following failure of PIRA decommissioning - 9 May: announce closure of five military installations - 30 May restoration devolved government to NI - 26 June first inspection PIRA arms dumps - 28 July 2000: last paramilitary prisoners released from Maze Prison, 428 total released since GFA - TA 2000 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 June RIRA bomb Hammersmith Bridge London - 22 September RIRA fire RPG at MI6 HQ in London - pipe bombing of homes and sectarian attacks continue 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 12 January: Adams meets with Clinton on decommissioning - 13 December: Clintons to Belfast - 10 May: Cyril Ramaphosa (former sec gen of African National Congress) and Martti Ahtisaari (former President of Finland) arrive in NI for Independent International Commission on Decommissioning - The Greek terrorist group November 17 assassinates Brigadier Stephen Saunders, the British military attaché to Greece.
2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 12 October Reid specified UDA-UFF and LVF ceasefires over - 22 October: Adams asks the PIRA to decommission - 23 October IIRC confirmed PIRA disposal of arms - 4 November: RUC changed to Police Service of NI (PSNI) - 28 November dissolution of UDA's political wing UDP - ATCS 2001 - Lord Carlile appointed official reviewer of counter terrorism legislation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 6 January : George Legge (former UDA) killed - Loyalist feuds lead to multiple killings - February: RUC find Loyalist bomb factory in north Belfast - 4 March: RIRA bombing outside London BBC - 14 April, 6 May: post office bomb in London by RIRA - 20 June: start of Loyalist protest at Holy Cross Catholic Primary School - serious rioting in Belfast throughout the year - 2 August: RIRA bomb in Ealing, West London - 26 October: Loyalist paramilitaries throw pipe bomb at group of soldiers, Belfast - November: 200 pound car bomb found by PSNI (dissident republicans) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - September 11 attacks U.S. (NY, DC, PA, over 100 British killed) - Richard Reid Shoe bomber attempt plane from London to Miami - 13 August: arrest of three Irish PIRA suspects in Colombia <p><i>Broader international context:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Britain enters military action in Afghanistan
2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - January: report on 4,800 households finds segregation between communities and violence increased - 8 April: second PIRA decommissioning - 5 June Alex Maskey of SF elected mayor of Belfast - 14 October suspension of NI institutions, restoration of direct rule from Westminster 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - further attacks of schools in NI by Loyalist paramilitaries, subsequent rioting and violence with Nationalists - continued sectarian violence pipe bombs and car bombs in NI - 27 February: Moinul Abedin sentenced to 20 years in prison for making large amounts of detonators and HMTD explosives in Birmingham 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 5 January: Garda arrest seven dissident republican suspects in Ireland - March: St Patrick's day celebrations in the U.S. with Adams, Ahern (Irish Taoiseach), Trimble (Paisley refused to attend) - planned attack on US and UK naval ships in Straits of Gibraltar thwarted <p><i>Broader international context:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 12 October Bali disco bombing, kills 202, Al Qaeda linked attack (24 British)
2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 21 October 3rd PIRA decommissioning - 26 November election victories for radical parties (DUP over UUP and Sinn Fein over SDLP) - CONTEST (<i>not public</i>) - Criminal Justice Act 2003: pre-charge detention from 7 to 14 days - Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) created - Stevens Report/Inquiry confirms collusion between security forces and loyalist paramilitaries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 February murder of John Gregg (loyalist feud) - Brahim Benmerzouga and Baghdad Merziane from Leicester sentenced to 11 years in prison for AQ fundraising 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - U.S. invades Iraq, British support - Istanbul, AQ suicide bombers attack British Consulate and HSBC killing 27 including 3 British citizens - April George Bush visits NI <p><i>Broader international context:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - May: 5 bombs in Casablanca kill 44 - August Marriott Hotel Jakarta kill 12
2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - ATCS 2001 Section 4 powers of detention incompatible with the HRA and the EConvHR - Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) establish National Extremism 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - June: BBC crew attacked by AQ in Riyadh, kill cameraman and injure reporter - September: British national killed by AQ in Riyadh shopping center

	Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU) (domestic extremism)		- October: British engineer murdered by AQI <i>Broader international context:</i> - Madrid Train bombing kills 191 injures more than 1,500.
2005	- Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 - PIRA official decommissioning, confirmed by General de Chastelain	- July 7 attacks on London Transport System, killing 56 injuring 700 - 21 July copycat attempt thwarted - London security services mistakenly shoot and kill Jean Charles de Menezes	<i>Broader international context:</i> - British teacher killed in car bomb Doha - Further bombings in Bali
2006	- TA 2006 - 90 day detention opposed in UK Parliament - CONTEST published	- thwarted 2006 transatlantic aircraft liquid explosives plot, arrest of 24, 8 on trial, 3 guilty - 28 September: Talbot Street bomb facility - February 7: Abu Hamza convicted incitement to murder, sentenced to seven years - November 7: AQ operative Dhiren Barot sentenced to 30 years after admitting to plotting UK/US attack	
2007	- British army leave Ulster - Loyalist decommissioning	- January-February: UK letter bombs - March 1: Saajit Badat admits plotting with Richard Reid - 30 June Glasgow International Airport attack - 29 June: unsuccessful nightclub attack plot with fertilizer-based explosives, five imprisoned for life, two acquitted - June 15: Seven jailed for total of 136 years for involvement with Dhiren Barot's plot - July 5: three imprisoned up to 10 years after convicted of using Internet to promote terrorism - July 26: five students convicted intention to attend terrorist training camps	- Delhi bombings kill 61 injure 188
2008	- Counterterrorism Bill 2008: 42 day detention opposed	- 22 May: Mohammed Abdul Aziz Rashid Saeed (Nicky Reilly) Exeter restaurant attack - February 18: five convicted of plot to kidnap/behead British soldier	- December 17: Bilal Abdulla, Iraqi citizen working in Paisely, Scotland hospital, sentenced 32 years in prison for role in Glasgow International Airport and London 2007 attacks <i>Broader international context:</i> - November Mumbai Attacks kill 195 injure 290
2009	- CONTEST version 2 - Monitoring body report dissident republicans more active than at any time in last four and a half years - IMC 20th report saying dissidents directing efforts to kill PSNI officers - NIA (beginning devolution of policing and justice to NI officials)	- Patrick Azimkar and Mark Quinsey killed at Massereene Barracks (March) (Brian Shivers convicted January 2012) - Dissidents blamed for 400 pound car bomb outside Belfast Policing Board's headquarters - Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD) shoot 27 year old in Londonderry - Bomb explodes under police car east Belfast - Bomb explodes inside Territorial Army base north Belfast - 600 pound bomb in south Armagh - RIRA claim responsibility for placing two explosives near police relative's homes in NI - Dissident republicans suspected in bomb attack home of SF member McLaughlin - First policeman murdered in NI since 1998 killed in Craigavon, Stephen Carroll - SF blame Real IRA for Belfast rioting, arson attack on Murphy (SF) home in south Armagh - RIRA shoot convicted rapist in Londonderry - One of NI's highest profile judges moves out of Belfast home over fears of dissident republican threat	- Armed and masked men set up a roadblock in Meigh handing out leaflets warning people of cooperation with security forces on either side of the border

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - September 2009: three plotting 2006 liquid explosive transatlantic flight attacks jailed for life 	
2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Call for review of counterterrorism - 24 September, Home Secretary Theresa May says attack on Britain by “Irish-related” terrorists a “strong possibility”. - IMC report 26 May states dissidents are “highly active and dangerous” - Police chiefs say the threat from dissident republicans higher than any time since Omagh - Real IRA and Continuity IRA said to have increased cooperation and recruitment - Policing and justice powers transferred to Northern Ireland (12 April) - publication of Bloody Sunday inquiry 2 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Car bomb explodes on Londonderry’s Culmore Road (4 October) - Three children suffer injuries after bomb explodes in a bin in Lurgan (14 August) - Booby trap partial explosion under former policeman car County Tyrone (10 August) - Bomb found under car of Catholic policewoman in Kilkeel (8 August) - Booby trap found under soldier’s car in Bangor (4 August) - Car exploded outside police station in Londonderry (200 pounds of explosives) - pipe bombs and punishment shootings continue - Shots fired at Crossmaglen PSNI station (2 July) - Car bomb outside Newtownhamilton police station injuring two - Bomb in hijacked taxi explodes outside Palace Barracks in Holywood (12 April) - July 8: Ibrahim Savant, Arafat Khan and Waheed Zaman convicted sentenced to life - Roshonara Choudhry (East London student) convicted attempted murder MP Stephen Timms - Rioting on the 11, 12, 13, 14 July in south and north Belfast, Lurgan and Londonderry - Dissidents blamed for alerts in Belfast, Londonderry, and railway south Armagh - In Belfast 40 families moved from homes - 12 April, Real IRA leave no-warning car bomb outside MI5’s Northern Ireland headquarters Holywood County Down - Bomb at Newry courthouse - RIRA opened fire on police station County Armagh 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ten arrested after Irish police find weapons and bomb-making material in Wexford and Waterford - McCaugherty guilty of attempting to import weapons and explosives - Dermot Declan Gregory guilty of making Portuguese property available for purpose of terrorism (sentenced to four years) - Five men arrested after stop and search of cars near Omeath (10 July), suspected of moving explosives across the border - In Cork money, drugs, imitation guns, seized during raid targeting dissident republican militaries
2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government review counterterrorism released January 2011 - Pre-charge detention lapses to 14 days (January) - CONTEST version 3 - Control orders lapsed, replaced with TPIMs December 14 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 23 January: PSNI find two bombs during security alert north Belfast - Dissident republicans take responsibility for masked gang attack in north Belfast - March: Marian Price charged with connection of two Antrim soldier murders - 2 April: Constable Ronan Kerr killed after bomb explodes under his car in Omagh, County Tyrone - 9 May: grenade thrown at police officers Londonderry, two children were talking to officers when thrown - July: Five men arrested investigation of Constable Ronan Kerr murder, raids involve 200 officers and three counties - 14 September: RIRA blamed for two bomb attacks County Londonderry - 12 October: Bomb explodes outside the City of Culture offices in Londonderry - 26 September: Car bomb stopped Londonderry - Discovery of machine guns, rifles south Armagh, more weapons in east Tyrone - Mortar bomb north Belfast results in seventy families moved from homes (July) - 500 pound bomb in van, Belfast to Dublin road, other bomb near Londonderry courthouse - discovery of a “bomb factory” on a farm in County Kildare 	<p><i>Broader international context:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2 May Osama Bin Laden killed by US special forces in Abbottabad, Pakistan

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