LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Beyond 'The Soldier and the State'

-The Theoretical Framework of Elite Civil-Military Relations

Dissertation submitted to the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

London, August 2013

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD Degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Abstract

Though the civil-military relations field has seen a lot of theoretical work in recent years, the field still lacks consistent overarching theories. This dissertation argues that the field requires a new and better theoretical framework. Scholars do not agree about how to define key concepts or how these concepts affect one another. They therefore have a tendency to talk past one another when debating and developing theories of civil-military relations.

This dissertation develops a new and more sophisticated theoretical framework for elite civil-military relations. The field's current theoretical framework was developed by Samuel Huntington in *The Soldier and the State*. This dissertation uses his framework as a starting point for a larger conceptual analysis, where political and military sociology, international relations, political theory, and military science are used to define the key concepts of civil-military relations.

There are two heterogeneous types of civil-military relations that should be studied separately: societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations. Political science approaches to civil-military relations, such as this dissertation, typically focus on the latter type. Elite civil-military relations consist of two separate fields of study: civilian control and military effectiveness. Elite civil-military relations function as a system that essentially depends on civilian overall preferences, the mutual trust between soldiers and civilians, the institutional set-up of the state, and the actual skills of civilian and military elites.

The dissertation challenges several of the field's established truths. It shows that one cannot claim that one civilian control policy is superior *a priori.* Instead, the choice of policy depends on the situational circumstances. It also shows that military professionalism plays a less significant role than commonly thought. It clarifies that civilian control depends on both the internal norms of the officer corps and the external control institutions of the state. Finally, it demonstrates that Samuel Huntington's work, though clearly impressive for its time, lacks the sophistication needed of a modern social science theory and theoretical framework. It therefore argues that the civil-military relations field should move beyond *The Soldier and the State.*

Acknowledgements

The embryonic idea for this dissertation was born in California in the spring of 2007. I would like to thank the many remarkable people who have supported me throughout the more than six years that have passed since then. Of course, I alone bear all responsibility for any inaccuracies or mistakes.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Christopher Coker. Professor Coker has been a rock of support since I first approached him at a conference in Copenhagen in 2009 with a vague idea about a project on civil-military relations. He has been a harsh critic of my incoherent ramblings, but he has always allowed me to seek my own way, even when it was not clear for anyone (least of all me) that it would ever lead anywhere. At one of our first meetings, he recommended that I should pause, have a drink, and watch Wimbledon for a couple of days, whenever I lost my way. I can safely say that I have followed this piece of advice from time to time.

Several outstanding academics have gone out of their way to help me throughout the past years. I owe a debt of gratitude to Aaron Belkin, Richard K. Betts, Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch, Patricia Digeser, Roger Eatwell, Spyros Economides, Michael Freeden, Anders Henriksen, Rune Henriksen, Chris Hughes, Robert Jervis, Henrik Jedig Jørgensen, Richard H. Kohn, Kristian Søby Kristensen, George Lawson, Margot Light, Anthony Lopez, Mark Manger, Rose McDermott, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, and Vibeke Tjalve. I am also thankful for the generous support I have received from the Economic and Social Research Council, Bikubenfonden, Danmark-Amerika Fonden, the American-Scandinavian Foundation, the Helen Lee and Emil Lassen Fund, the ScanDesign Foundation by Inger & Jens Bruun Fund, the LSE Research Studentship Scheme, Augustinusfonden, Knud Højgaards Fond, Reinholdt W. Jorck og Hustrus Fond, Frimodt-Heineke Fonden, Politikenfonden and the Anglo-Danish Society. I must also thank Jay Merrick, who proofread this work.

I want to thank the many amazing LSE graduate students, who made the years I spent around Houghton Street a time of intellectual challenges and crooked smiles. I especially have to thank Benedetta Voltolini, Philipp Lamprecht, Curtis Ohlers, Jacob Parakilas, Maja K. Rasmussen and the Q building crew (Natali Bulamaciouglu, Richard Campanaro, Zeynep Kaya, Outi Keranen, Hadi Makarem, Roberto Orsi, and Yaniv Voller). Our many facetious chats supplied me with enough dirt to ensure that none of them will ever seek public office.

My immediate family – Gerd, Poul, Thea, Troels, Christopher, Davide, and Mira – has, of course, been my biggest support. They have reminded me that there is a life beyond the academy. I would also like to thank my Danish friends, especially Søren and Henrik, who, though not always physically present, goaded me on by their example alone. My London friends – especially Giovanni, Natsuko, and the Football Radar crowd – were always patient when I began on yet another rant about war. I fear I would never have finished my dissertation had Columbia University not accepted me as a visiting PhD scholar at the Department of Political Science. This allowed me to meet a host of inspiring people – at Columbia, AGH, and elsewhere – whose ambitions and spirit motivated me to finish my work.

Finally, I could not have completed this project without Helene Mark. Helene's presence – her warmth, drive, and all-round insanity - has been a much needed refuge. She bore the brunt of my doubts and reset my priorities when needed. I am forever thankful for this. Though probably not much of a gesture, I can do nothing but dedicate this dissertation to her.

- 1 -

Introduction

This dissertation is about civil-military relations theory. It examines how much we know about the way soldiers and civilians interact in advanced, Western democracies and – perhaps more importantly – what we do not know, and why we do not know it.[1] After a wave of new theoretical work on civil-military relations, the development of new theory has come to a halt. From the mid-1990s and for the next decade, the field saw a blossoming of studies that tried to develop a new theoretical view of the fundamental problems associated with civil-military relations. There was a willingness to use new methods to develop more consistent theories that questioned some of the established assumptions made by the field's founders.[2] These new theories criticized past scholars, who had established the field in the 1950s and -60s. However, as will be described more thoroughly later in this dissertation, though the new theories gave new attention and vigor to the field and presented alternatives to past theories, the field remains caught up in some of the same debates that have characterized it since its beginning. Though we now have more detailed perspectives on how soldiers and civilians interact, one could claim that we are hardly closer to a definitive theory.

This dissertation explores why this is so, and what to do about it. How do we develop better theories of civil-military relations? What are the barriers for developing better overall theories of civil-military relations? The fundamental issue is that the civil-military relations field lacks a coherent theoretical framework – that is, a coherent system of definitions and causal relations concerned with all inquiry within a scientific field. Most civil-military relations theories focus on studying different sub-processes and are derived from careful empirical analyses of historical cases. Yet, none of these present these many dimensions in one coherent framework. The one exception was Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State,* which became the field's fundamental theoretical framework. However, his framework does not adequately define the field's key concepts. Developing a theoretical framework was just one of the many things that Huntington set out to accomplish in that work. It also contained a treatise on Western military history, a theory of military sociology, and a theory of civilian control of the military. Alas, the theoretical framework got buried beneath these many purposes. The categories that Huntington defined were not explained

[1] I follow the precedence within the literature and focus on the relationship between the officer corps and various dimensions of civilian society. I use different synonyms for officer (such as "military man", "soldier", "general" and "warrior") to refer to the officer corps for the sake of style. I use the terms properly when the distinction between officers and lower ranks is relevant.

[2] Feaver, Peter D. (1999): *Civil-Military Relations,* in *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol. 2, pp. 213 & 230-33.

adequately and he never mapped out the various fault lines within the field. Consequently, when future scholars operated within his framework, they found it difficult to use his categories to describe the phenomena they were studying.

Having established that the lack of clear concepts and causal maps is the main barrier for new theories, this dissertation then develops an alternative theoretical framework. This is a task akin to the one Kenneth Waltz faced, when he wrote *Man, the State and War.* Dissatisfied with the basic international relations categories – especially the ones used to study the possibility of a durable peace - Waltz asked himself how one should think about war and peace.[3] Understanding *how* to think was a prerequisite for understanding *what* to think. He shied away from making yet another empirical analysis of different dependent and independent variables. Instead, he ventured into the realm of conceptual analysis, from which he developed a theoretical framework for international relations. The cause of war and peace, he ventured, had to be identified on at least one of three conceptual planes: they were either found within human nature (the first image), the nature of society (the second image), or the relationship between states (the third image), with the latter factor being the most likely cause.[4] Waltz' taxonomy seemed simple. However, before its publication, international relations scholars did not always talk about the same phenomena. Once Waltz' framework was presented, its clarity seemed obvious and it soon became influential within the study of international affairs. Today, when presented with a new theory of international relations, scholars will typically begin by asking if it provides a first, second, or third image explanation for war and peace.

This dissertation attempts to accomplish the same feat, albeit within the much smaller civil-military relations field. I make a conceptual analysis of civil-military relations, thus hoping to provide a clearer language through which to talk about the relationship between war and politics. The conclusions presented in this dissertation may seem obvious. However, like Waltz' three images, I would venture that stating them explicitly provides a starting point for theoretical research currently missing within the field. It is my hope that summarizing our entire stock of knowledge and showing how different theorists relate to one another can create a foundation for more focused, and revealing research.

The first step in doing so is to define civil-military relations as such. The term "civil-military relations" is rarely defined and often misunderstood. There is no set consensus about what "civil-military relations" actually means. Strictly speaking, as Vladimir Rukavishnikov and Michael Pugh correctly note, civil-military relations simply refer to "the relationship between civilians ('people

[3] Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959): *Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis,* New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 2 & 12.
[4] Waltz (1959).

without arms'), the society at large, and the military ('the people with arms)".[5] Civil-military relations encompass every aspect of social life, where people who are defined as soldiers or warriors have something to do with people who are defined as civilians. Scholars, however, use the term to mean different things. Some use it to mean the relationship between elite actors. Others use it to mean the cooperation between civilian and military institutions aimed at implementing solutions to military problems – what is commonly known as civil-military cooperation (or CIMIC). Some use it to mean the relationship between the military and civil society groups.

In this dissertation, I will distinguish between societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations. Societal civil-military relations describe how the military plays a functional role in enabling society to survive. Societal civil-military relations therefore cover at the role of military power in society in general and how it interacts with grand scale societal transformations over time. It also includes the relationship between the military and members of civil society. Elite civil-military relations, by contrast, describe the interaction between soldiers and civilians *within* the state – relations between the members of the executive and legislative branch and the most senior members of the officer corps. The state is the primary directive component in society.[6] The processes that go on within the state differ significantly from the processes that characterize society at large. It therefore makes sense to distinguish between them. The two are intermingled and influence one another. However, they operate according to separate logics. "Civil-military relations" is an umbrella term that encompasses both societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations.

The distinction between societal civil-military and elite civil-military relations also highlights a disciplinary difference between sociology and political science.[7] Military sociologists study the nature of military identity and the patterns of social interaction within the armed forces. Soldiers commonly define themselves, and their activities, by contrasting them with civilian life. In other words, civil-military relations are a fundamental part of military identity. Sociologists are therefore primarily interested in societal civil-military relations.

By contrast, political science approaches to civil-military relations focuses on elite civil-military relations. Political scientists study the role of power in society. The main power mechanism in contemporary society is the state. When political scientists talk about civil-military relations, they

[5] Rukavishnikov Vladimir O. & Michael Pugh (2003): *Civil-Military Relations*, in Caforio, Guiseppe (2003): *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, New York: Kluwer Academic, p. 131.

[6] I follow Anthony Giddens by defining the state as "a political organization whose rule is territorially ordered and which is able to mobilize the means of violence to sustain that rule" (Giddens, Anthony (1987): *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. Volume 2: The Nation-State and Violence,* Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 20). The state should be distinguished from society, which is a system of social relationships based on a shared culture. The state is thus an institution within society.

[7] Feaver (1999), pp. 212-13.

often implicitly mean elite civil-military relations. To be sure, societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations are intertwined and political scientists have to understand societal civil-military relations to understand elite civil-military relations. The power relations within the state can only be understood by looking at how power is generated outside of the state and by grasping the requirements the state have to fulfill in order to survive. For instance, part of the military's power stems from its general acceptance and popularity within civil society. Understanding how this power is generated is therefore a precondition for understanding elite civil-military relations. Political scientists cannot examine elite civil-military relations in isolation, but should include societal civil-military relations in their models. However, for a political scientist, these processes are only interesting because they influence the state's ability to generate resources. Societal civil-military relations are of secondary importance.[8]

This dissertation is essentially a political science study. It focuses on elite civil-military relations and aims to produce a theoretical framework that emphasizes the main questions that theorists should ask themselves. It highlights the main variables and causal relations that shape elite civil-military relations. However, the study does not examine elite civil-military relations in isolation. In order to explore the mechanisms that shape elite civil-military relations, it also examines societal civil-military relations in depth to see how these relations affect the elite level. This involves including sociological and anthropological analytical models that uncover how war interacts with large-scale societal trends to shape the nature of society. The model of societal civil-military relations claims to uncover all the main societal civil-military processes that have a political impact on the elite level. In other words, the study does not provide a comprehensive model of societal civil-military relations. Instead, it produces a model of societal civil-military relations with a political impact. The resulting theoretical framework is therefore a comprehensive model of the of elite civil-military relations (in advanced, Western nation-state democracies) that includes a model of societal civil-military relations with a political impact. It is a comprehensive political science framework, but not a comprehensive framework for sociologists, anthropologists or other social scientists that study civil-military relations.

This is a brief overview of the theoretical framework of civil-military relations. The central question within the study of elite civil-military relations is which policy the civilian government should use to

[8] Civil-military relations are sometimes taken to mean the same as civilian control of the military. In this dissertation, I argue that this is not the case. Civilian control is an important dimension of civil-military relations and can be studied as an independent topic. However, there is more to civil-military relations than just the question of the civilian leadership being capable of controlling the military.

control its armed forces. Political leaders face a choice between either direct or institutional policies. There are essentially three types of direct civilian control policies available to policymakers: they can allow the military autonomy over tactical and operational details (*objective control*); they can meddle in these details (*assertive control*); or they can interfere in the very organizational structure of the military and make it more like a civilian agency (*subjective control*). Subjective control is rare in modern democracies. Instead, policymakers typically decide between objective and assertive control. Institutional policies involve establishing external control institutions that allow the civilians to detect and punish military shirking. Neither of these options is optimal *a priori*. Instead, the choice of policy depends on the health and consistency of elite civil-military system.

A society's elite civil-military relations constitute a complex system of factors.[9] Five key variables are central to how the system functions: the priorities of the civilian government, the civilian trust of the military, the military trust of the civilians, the external institutions that define their mutual interaction, and the actual skills of the military and civilian elites. These variables are mutually related and thus constitute a system. The purpose of the system is to maximize the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state. However, its ability to achieve these goals depends both on the elite civil-military system *per se* and on a plethora of exogenous factors that determine the health and strength of the system: the general legitimacy of the government, state, and constitution; the civilian strategic culture; the values defining military culture; administrative reforms; popular militarism; the skills and personalities of individual leaders; the general level of threat; and the character of the conflicts in which the state engages. The choice of policy should be tailored to the state of the fundamentals of the elite civil-military system.

The relationship between soldiers and civilians is, in essence, a classic example of an information asymmetry caused by delegation. The civilians delegate the implementation of military policy to the armed forces. However, because the officer corps knows more about the details of military policy, it then becomes difficult for the government to ensure that the military is implementing their intended policies. These problems are exacerbated by certain specific features of defense policy. Defense policy is characterized by a high degree of secrecy, which makes it difficult for certain civilian institutions, for instance the media, to detect any potential problems. Furthermore, the military has a comparatively high degree of informal power, which it can use to resist any changes that do not suit its preferences. Thus, the system is shaped by both formal and informal power relations. The civilian leadership typically wields extensive formal power, mandated by the constitution. However, the military often holds various forms of informal power, which allows

[9] This claim is implicitly present in much of the existing literature, but I am – to my knowledge – the first to formulate this argument explicitly and place it within a comprehensive framework.

it to influence government policies, either directly or indirectly. This power is typically used in a convoluted and unreported manner, which makes it difficult to trace.

Elite civil-military relations studies typically look at one of two analytically distinct topics. Civilian control is the civilian leadership's ability to control the armed forces. Military effectiveness is defined as the capacity to generate military force from a state's basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital. Neither civilian control nor military effectiveness is accomplished through one particular civilian control policy. Instead, they each depend on the circumstances.

Civilians control the military through a combination of external and internal mechanisms. External mechanisms refer to the use of institutions to monitor and punish military actors. Institutions essentially influence the payoffs of behaving in one or another manner. Institutions can delimit the incentive to act against the will of the government by making it easier for the government to detect and punish such behavior. Internal mechanisms are defined as the creation of a military culture of loyalty. The soldier is more easily controlled if he feels loyal to the democratic institutions of the state. [10]

Military effectiveness depends on the balance between need for a division of labor between soldiers and civilians and the need for strategic coherence. Soldiers are professional experts in warfare, while civilian politicians are experts in politics. This division of expertise informs the division of labor between soldiers and civilians. However, the civilian leadership has to ensure that there is strategic coherence – that is, that the military bureaucracy gathers information and implements decision in a way that reflects overall national strategy. This can only be done by meddling in decisions within the armed forces' purview.

The dilemmas of elite civil-military relations originate in the fundamental problems of societal civil-military relations. One of the defining features of modern, democratic society is the general need for accountability. Accountability means that political leaders are believed to be responsible to the people they govern and that they are thought to govern in the interest of all members of society.[11] The state must give the impression that it pursues the interests of the population in order to ensure the loyalty, taxes, and manpower needed to secure its survival. This relationship between state and population is largely unique to modern, democratic societies. In both

[10] In this dissertation, I define "culture" as "the stock of knowledge from which [actors] supply themselves with interpretations as they come to an understanding about something in the world" (Habermas, Jürgen (1987): *The Theory of Communicative Action. Volume 2: The Critique of Functionalist Reason,* Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 138). "Norms" are specific cultural entities that prescribe normative action. "Institutions" are formal organizations. One of the purposes of institutions is typically to socialize individuals into a specific culture.

[11] This definition is largely inspired by, yet not similar to, the one provided by Francis Fukuyama (Fukuyama, Francis (2011): *The Origins of Political Order. From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution,* New York: Farrar, Straus and Geroux, p. 321).

pre-modern societies and contemporary undemocratic societies, the need for accountability, albeit present, is less pronounced. This feature of modern society explains the need for civilian control. Modern society is built up around a notion of accountability, which makes the government the agent of the people and the civil service the agent of the government. The government has to control the military because it is part of the accountability principle, from which it derives its legitimacy.[12]

All societies have to find a balance between a societal and a functional imperative. The state has to stay legitimate, while ensuring that it wields military force effectively. Accountability influences the societal imperative. The societal imperative is the degree to which domestic features of society may obstruct the state from pursuing an optimal political course. If the ideas, the institutions, or special interests within a society diminish its ability to counter military threats, we ascribe these problems to the societal imperative. Simply put, is the understanding of military threats in accordance with the actual threats facing the state? Ideological currents within society can either under- or overestimate the need for military force. The degree to which elite decisions are influenced by societal currents is also significant. In modern societies, the accountability principle generally means that elite thinking may be influenced by currents within the populace at large.

The functional imperative is the material requirements that a society has to fulfill in order to survive. Simply put, the state needs to accumulate power to ensure that enemy societies do not cut off its access to material resources. This grows out of the general competition between states in the international realm and military force is one of the power accumulation tools available to the state. Depending on the level and nature of the threats facing it, the state may need to be able to employ military force effectively. Most modern states – at least the United States – are in a situation, where military force is only of secondary importance.

This dissertation provides a new starting point for political science-based research in civil-military relations. The field's existing theoretical framework, which was developed and presented in *The Soldier and the State*, lacks the accuracy needed for a mature social scientific field. Many of the concepts within this work are not defined accurately. Furthermore, its causal logic is vague, or even contradictory at times. Huntington's work has played an important role in defining the civil-military relations field. However, the lack of an adequate theoretical framework has become a stumbling block for the theoretical development of the field. Too many theoretical studies are critiques of Huntington's categories. By providing a comprehensive study that mines Huntington's work for

[12] To use the definition developed by Jean-Marie Coicaud, "[l]egitimacy is the recognition of the right to govern" (Coicaud, Jean-Marie (2002): *Legitimacy and Politics. A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Political Responsibility,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 10).

valuable terms and corrects ambiguities within his framework, I hope this thesis provides a foundation for more accurate theoretical work. This dissertation thus introduces the policy choice facing the civilians into a wider theoretical framework and presents a causally consistent model of elite civil-military relations; a better understanding of the dynamics of civilian control and military effectiveness; a more accurate description of the military expertise; and an improved model of societal civil-military relations. A theory derived correctly from this theoretical framework will, I believe, be more sensitive to the problems and debates within contemporary civil-military relations.

This is the first comprehensive study of civil-military relations theory in its entirety.[13] Others have explored the history of the field or tried to give an overview of one or a few of its essential fault lines. However, no-one has provided a framework that encapsulates the field's core fissures and debates. Unlike other meta-studies, this dissertation combines the study of the debate with an investigation of the fundamental nature of civil-military relations. Indeed, it argues that we have never clarified the very nature of civil-military relations. This has affected not only our theories, but also the existing meta-analyses. Simply put, one cannot explore how others debate an issue, if one does not have a clear grasp of the nature of the issue itself. In lieu of a clear understanding of the nature of civil-military relations, meta-theorists have focused on the key debates of the moment and erroneously promoted them as being the essential debate within the field. For instance, most meta-analyses claim that the theoretical core split runs between Huntingtonians, who argue that military professionalism leads to good civil-military relations, and Janowitzians, who, though they cherish professionalism, argue that perfect professionalism is impossible.[14] However, this view does not capture the fundamental debate within the field. Huntington and Janowitz wrote on different analytical levels and essentially explored different topics. Huntington was a political scientist who mainly investigated how civil-military relations influenced political government. Janowitz was a sociologist who focused primarily on military identity. Huntington's argument contained an argument about military identity, which Janowitz challenged. Yet the latter did not confront the entirety of Huntington's argument. Indeed, the civil-military relations field consists of several topics that rarely communicate with one another. Each of these topics is structured around a debate between different theories. The debate between Huntingtonians and Janowitzians is perhaps the

[13] Feaver (1999) presents an excellent overview of the history and some of the fault lines of the field. However, he does not give a comprehensive description of its debates and causal dynamics.

[14] See for instance, Feaver (1996), pp. 157-67; Burk, James (2002): *Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,* in *Armed Forces and Society,* vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 7-29; Nielsen, Suzanne C. (2005): *Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness,* in *Public Administration and Management,* vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 61-84; Cohn, Lindsey (2003): *Civil-Military Relations in the U.S.,* in Callaghan, Jean M. & Franz Kernic (2003): *Armed Forces and International Security. Global Trends and Issues,* Münster: LIT Verlag, pp. 65-72. Notable exceptions include Johnson, Douglas and Steven Metz (1995): *Civil-Military Relations in the United States. The State of the Debate,* in *Washington Quarterly,* vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 195-213.

most obvious example of these many debates. The standard meta-theoretical analyses therefore fail to capture the nub of the debate within the field. By providing a coherent theoretical framework, this dissertation seeks to ensure that fundamental misunderstandings can be avoided. By defining what we are talking about, it essentially allows us to ask the right questions.

Why civil-military relations, and why theory? Is it really worth our while to look at how different scholars study how soldiers and civilians interact? The relationship between those who carry arms, and the rest of us, touches something fundamental in society. The separation between warriors and civilians has puzzled thinkers since the beginning of political philosophy. Even in our modern and complex society, understanding how civilians and the military can develop a good relationship to one another is vital. The end of the Cold War led to a more peaceful and prosperous world, but it did not lead to a world without war. The past two decades have been awash with armed conflicts. The international system has changed, societies have changed, the character of war has changed, and consequently, the rules for civil-military relations are in a state of change. Political scandals and tensions – the ambiguous evidence that led to the Iraq war, the debates about inclusion in the American armed forces, the alleged insubordination or indiscretion of officers in the public debate - followed in the slipstream of the new wars. Being able to judge who is right and who is wrong, and to which extend these civil-military conflicts are politically problematic, is of the utmost importance.

Why is it necessary to have good theories about civil-military relations? The civil-military relations field is largely empirical and non-theoretical.[15] Developing coherent theories furthers our knowledge and helps both scientific scholarship and practical policymaking. Theories summarize our knowledge into a more useful and coherent concentration of causal statements. They enable us to access the big picture of a specific phenomenon quickly without having to know all the small details. When we condense our knowledge into causal statements, we naturally evaluate the strength of each factor. Thus, theory helps us predict future events and better understand how practitioners should go about handling real-life policy-problems. When we face new situations – as we did from 1989 onward - having a more holistic theoretical guide helps us to understand how these phenomena have functioned, or are likely to function.[16] The international system is constantly in flux and it is likely that we will soon face new threats and problems. A better general understanding of how these problems create civil-military challenges is essential if we are to grasp how to react to them. Though one should be hesitant to echo John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt's assertion that "the creation and refinement of theory is the most important activity in [the scientific] enterprise", it

[15] Feaver (1999), p. 217.
[16] Mearsheimer, John J. & Stephen M. Walt (2012): *Leaving Theory Behind: Why Hypothesis Testing has become Bad for IR,* Cambridge: John F. Kennedy School Working Paper, pp. 16-20.

seems safe to say that good theories are the backbone of any healthy scientific field, and necessary for sound decision-making.[17]

The Cold War theories of civil-military relations were of little help in the new, post-1989 security environment. For instance, the Cold War theories focused mainly on the concept of professionalism. They implicitly assumed that making the military more professional would diminish civil-military tensions. This focus on professionalism was less relevant when discussing many of the new civil-military problems. For example, the military's resistance to the legalization of homosexual soldiers could not be explained as a matter of only professionalism. Other mechanisms had to play a role. The Cold War theories were middle-range theories that tended to focus on the conditions at the time of writing. They did not seek to generalize beyond the Cold War to describe how civil-military relations work, as such; or how new conditions might create quite different challenges. The wave of new theories from the mid-1990s should be seen as a reaction to the limitations of the classical theories. However, in retrospect, the new theories did not replace the Cold War masters. Instead, the field became more fragmented and revolved around a patchwork of old and new theories. By investigating how we can develop better theories of civil-military relations, this dissertation hopes to plant the seed that will one day turn facilitate better guides for civil-military relations. Without them, the debate about the appropriate amalgamations of civilian and military behavior will continue to be relatively random and without useful points of reference.

The structure of the dissertation's argument is molded around the distinction between societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations. It consists of three parts, each of which focuses on one of the three components of the overall argument. The first part – contained in chapter 2 - is a meta-theoretical analysis of the existing theories of civil-military relations. The civil-military relations field is characterized by many different theories, each of which explores a different sub-dimension of civil-military relations. Only a few authors address what civil-military relations are *per se*. Indeed, only Samuel Huntington has made a comprehensive theory of the entire topic.[18] Consequently, the theoretical framework underpinning Huntington's theory is also the only one of its kind and later scholars tend to operate within this framework. Several authors have uncovered significant theoretical inconsistencies in his theoretical framework. Huntington's theory has been shown to be empirically inadequate and it has generated unfulfilled predictions. These weaknesses originate in his theoretical framework.

[17] Mearsheimer& Walt (2012), p. 5.
[18] A comprehensive theory is a theory that aims to explain an entire field of study.

Having identified the meta-theoretical conundrum that haunts the field, this dissertation then seeks to find a theoretical answer in the second and third parts. It aims to develop a theoretical framework for civil-military relations. It does so by emulating Huntington's general methodology. He combined insights from political and military sociology with military history and military science to arrive at a theoretical framework. Yet where Huntington rather rushed along, exploring his many other purposes, I have paused at every theoretical intersection to describe the various conundrums and fissures in a landscape of ideas that is still *terra incognita*. Flagging what we have yet to explore may be just as important as the act of charting the known.

The second part – which consists of chapters 3 and 4 – examines societal civil-military relations. All societies balance between a functional and a societal imperative. Chapter 3 explores how states generate power to fend off rivals - what Huntington called the functional imperative. It argues that military power is just one of the power generation tools available to the modern state. In chapter 4, I explore how features within domestic society may obstruct the state's ability to adapt to outside threats – what Huntington called the societal imperative. This involves exploring both how society has changed to include a wider set of groups within the decision-making process and how ideas can inhibit the state's ability to adapt to threats.

The third part, which comprises of chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, focuses on elite civil-military relations – this dissertation's main topic. Chapter 5 focuses on the military. It argues that the modern officer is defined as being an expert in warfare. It explores how the role of the officer changed from being defined by specific physical characteristics to becoming mainly defined by access to abstract systems of technical military knowledge. Chapter 6 and 7 consider civilian control. Chapter 6 gives an overview of the mechanisms that define civilian control, which are divided into external and internal mechanisms. I show that external control alone cannot fully explain how civilians control the military. Our knowledge of internal control, by contrast, is fragmented and we lack a coherent conceptual language for understanding how these norms and cultures are created. To remedy this, the causal factors shaping military culture are presented in chapter 7, which concludes that internal control mechanisms alone cannot explain how civilians control the military. The overall conclusion of chapter 6 and 7 is that civilian control is achieved through a combination of external and internal mechanisms. Chapter 8 explores the role of military effectiveness, which is created by combining a division of labor between soldiers and civilians with centralized political control of the decision-making process. Finally, chapter 9 collects all the threads woven in the previous four chapters and describes how elite civil-military relations function as a system.

I would emphasize three caveats before I venture on. Firstly, this dissertation focuses on civil-military relations in advanced, Western democracies. Civil-military relations is an enormous topic that covers all imaginable political units, from the smallest primordial tribe over the vast empires of antiquities to today's failed states and advanced liberal democracies. Developing a total framework for all these different political units is beyond the scope of a single dissertation. Most civil-military relations theory has been developed by focusing on liberal democracies, in particular on the United States during and after the Cold War. It makes most sense for this dissertation to stay within this pattern. I will bring in experiences from other societies, epochs, and political units whenever I need to address phenomena that have not occurred in the United States, or need to show the historical background of a specific condition. However, the dissertation's core focus is on the civil-military interaction in relation to the political governance of advanced, Western democracies.

Secondly, the present study focuses on civil-military relations in modern nation-states. It examines the historical trajectory that allowed the development of this type of political unit and highlights the preconditions and social processes that still today have to be satisfied in order for the nation-state to exist. One could argue that this focus on the nation-state is out-dated and that it fails to capture the basic reality of modern political life. Some scholars claim that the nation-state era is over, and that we are moving towards a period of post-sovereign governance, where sub- and supra-units organize social and political life. Others emphasize that many societies are organized around political units that do not fit into the nation-state model. I do not examine civil-military relations in the post-sovereign era or in other political units in this dissertation. The purpose of the present study is to provide an ideal-type of elite civil-military relations – that is, a model of contemporary civil-military relations that are isolated from the specificities of each individual case. Such an ideal-type requires that one explores civil-military relations in the most pervasive contemporary political unit. For better or for worse, the nation-state has proven itself to be perhaps *the* most competitive type of political form. Most contemporary societies are organized as variances of the nation-state. To be sure, other studies can widen our understanding of contemporary civil-military relations by examining how these relations play out in the post-sovereign era or in non-nation-states. They would benefit from having the present study as a mainstream model that can be used in comparative analyses. They would be able to capture the richness of the political units they explore by criticizing the nation-state model provided in this dissertation.

Thirdly, this dissertation will use an abstract notion of war. Clausewitz argued that the nature of war is constant, but that the character of war is changing. He used more cryptic terms to describe this feature of war, when he argued that "[w]ar is more than a true chameleon that slightly

adapts its characteristics to the given case."[19] By this he meant that all wars contain universal features, which allow us to distinguish war from other types of human activity. However, no two conflicts will ever be the same and their differences are not just a matter of appearance. Different wars are fought under different premises. There is a vast difference between the counterinsurgency wars fought in the past decade and the massive, near-absolute wars, like the massive *Materialschlacht* of the First World War, where states strike at each other with their entire material and industrial potential. I will not investigate how different types of war change civil-military relations. Including this variable would add one layer of complexity too many and probably make a fairly complicated dissertation well-nigh unreadable. I will follow Martin Shaw in seeing war as "the systematic and extensive use of violence as a means of policy by an organized social group claiming (but not necessarily exercising) legitimate control over a given territory, against another such group (or groups)."[20] War changes from time to time, but largely varies with the severity of the threat involved.

Fourthly, this dissertation focuses on descriptive, rather than normative, theory. The purpose of the present work is facilitate the creation of models that allow us to *predict* how civil-military relations play out in advanced, Western democracies. I am mainly interested in understanding the processes that drive civil-military relations. The ethics of civil-military relations – to which extent patterns of civil-military relations are conducive for the good life - are of only secondary importance. To be sure, there is no such thing as entirely value-free descriptive science. Descriptive studies implicitly assume that some states of affairs are more desirable than others. The present study, for instance, assumes that liberal democracy is a normatively defendable political model and that liberal democracies have a right to wage war to protect themselves against enemy aggression.[21] It implicitly assumes that understanding how this is best done without infringing on the domestic political structures of the state is a justifiable and reasonable endeavor.

Fifthly, this study does not engage in theory testing and it only uses empirical data for illustrative purposes. Instead, it focuses on exploring the theoretical coherence of the conceptual language of civil-military relations. The purpose of this study is to develop a theoretical framework – but not a theory - of civil-military relations. Developing a theoretical framework is a substantial task – turning the theoretical framework into a theory as well would be a task that went beyond what one can expect to do in a single dissertation. The choice to only do a theoretical framework shapes

[19] von Clausewitz, Carl (1976): *On War,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 89.
[20] Shaw, Martin (1991): *Post-Military Society. Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century,* Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 10.
[21] My descriptive focus does not mean that I argue that social actors are motivated by instrumental reasons only. In fact, I make the opposite argument. Military and political actors are largely driven by normative concerns and one cannot understand civil-military relations without grasping the ethical motives that drive actors to sacrifice themselves for others.

my choice of empirical data. Theories and theoretical frameworks require different types of data. I will examine the distinction between theories and theoretical frameworks further in chapter 2, where I also provide exact definitions of the two terms. Basically, a theoretical framework is a coherent set of definitions and causal relations concerned with all inquiry within a scientific field. Theoretical frameworks specify *the questions* with which scholars within a specific scientific field concern themselves. They define the most important variables and give an overview of how these variables affect one another. Theories, by contrast, provide answers to those questions. They aim to *explain* and *predict* a class of phenomena. Doing so entails showing that variable B is more important than variables A and C, even though the latter may also influence the phenomenon in question. They develop hypotheses and test whether these hypotheses are empirically true. This requires that cases are chosen in a rigorous manner to ensure that they allow the scholar to weigh the value of variable B against variables A and C. In comparison, theoretical frameworks do not have to unpack the strength of variables A, B, and C. Instead, they only have to show that these variables all have crucial causal effect on the phenomenon in question. Doing so does not require the same systematic approach to the choice of cases. The empirical data only needs to show that a causal relationship exists and that it is important – not that it is the most important one. In this dissertation, I only use empirical cases to illustrate the value of certain factors and that certain causal relations exist.

Finally, I will be criticizing Samuel Huntington's work throughout this dissertation. It may sound as if I am trying to denigrate his academic reputation or make light of his scholarly accomplishments. Nothing could be further from my intentions. Huntington's achievements are impressive by any standards. He defined an entirely new field of study, which forced him to explore many different topics. He could probably do nothing but rush through these many tasks. Furthermore, he was also hampered by the incompleteness of the sociological models of his time. Many conclusions have been made within the fields of political and military sociology in the past fifty-odd years. Standing on the shoulders of the recent political and sociological thinkers, who have explored the relationship between society and warfare in the last decades, allows me to arrive at more precise and consistent definitions - to move forward, where Huntington had to hold back. The more complex and coherent recent theories of military and political sociology permit me describe the basic mechanisms of civil-military interaction in more detail. Doing so, I argue, will allow us to move the civil-military relations field beyond *The Soldier and the State.*

Part I: Theories of civil-military relations

- 2 -

The past and present of civil-military relations theory

This dissertation explores how we can develop better theories of civil-military relations. The first step is, of course, to look at our present theories. This chapter explores the fundamental theoretical debates within the civil-military relations field. To what extent, it asks, do the existing theories explore the nature of civil-military relations?

The existing theories do not capture the core nature of civil-military relations. The field is structured around a theoretical framework developed by Samuel Huntington in *The Soldier and the State.* Huntington's work moved the field from largely idiographic, historically minded scholarship towards more general, nomothetic social science theories. He developed a theoretical framework for the field by marrying insights from political sociology with military science and history and used this framework to generate a theory of civil-military relations. Later studies have shown that Huntington's theory was unable to predict the outcome of civil-military interaction. They have also uncovered fundamental inaccuracies in various sub-dimensions of his theoretical framework. However, no theorist has provided overarching alternatives to Huntington's theory or theoretical framework. Instead, scholars focus on exploring these sub-dimensions in greater detail. The field is therefore dominated by an inaccurate overarching theory and an inadequate theoretical framework. The main obstacle blocking the development of a better overarching theory is the lack of an accurate theoretical framework.

The argument of the chapter consists of three sections. The first section explores the nature of theory. The second section looks at how the civil-military relations field came into being, while the third section examines civil-military relations theory after Huntington.

What is a theory?

Debates about the nature of theory do not take up much space in the social sciences. Many social scientists simply use the word theory for any general statement about a relationship between two entities. For the purpose of this thesis, however, a firmer grasp of what it means for something to be a theory is needed. Ernest Nagel defined theory as

> "a set of statements, organized in a characteristic way, and designed to serve as partial premisses [sic] for explaining as well as predicting an indeterminately large (and usually varied) class of … phenomena."[22]

Theories should be distinguished from laws and theoretical frameworks. Laws are defined as "relationships between things or features of things that are commonly said to be themselves observable".[23] For instance, the fact that water evaporates when heated above a certain threshold temperature is a law.[24] A certain law-like relationship can be observed between a cause (placing an open container over a flame) and an effect (the water in the container boiling and evaporating).

By contrast, theories explain laws. They provide a causal story that explains why we see that specific pattern and predicts how the same object would react in a different, often hitherto not observed, context. To use our example from before, the theory of thermodynamics employs our general ideas of the molecular consistency of water to explain the evaporation processes.[25] It allows us to predict how water would react in circumstances that have not been observed. Based on these explanations, one can pinpoint the exact causal relationship that compels water to boil, and make predictions about how the same fluid would react to different experiments. Theories develop causal stories by marrying empirically observable laws with a system of definitions and causal relations that specify the nature of the object of study. To develop a theory of how and when water boils, one must ask the basic question, what is water? This necessarily involves more than just simple observations of the object of study. Each theory thus has a speculative element that goes beyond mere observation. Developing a theory involves knitting together different concepts through careful considerations of the nature of the concepts. It is by coming to terms with the very essence of the thing that the scholar develops a theory that can explain why an empirical incident occurs and how it will occur under different preconditions.[26] For instance, the theory of thermodynamics depends on a set of definitions of water, molecules, and heat. These definitions must be internally consistent in order to explain one another. All the concepts have to be defined and the causal relationship between each concept has to be unpacked.

A coherent system of definitions and causal relations concerned with all inquiry within a specific scientific field – the very thing that separates theories from mere laws - is referred to as a theoretical framework. These frameworks depend on a criterion of internal coherence. A theoretical framework examines and defines the nature of the object of study. Based on its fundamental

[22] Nagel, Ernest (1963): *Assumptions in Economic Theory,* in *The American Economic Review,* vol. 53, no. 2, p. 212.
[23] Nagel, Ernest (1979): *The Structure of Science. Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation*, Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing, p. 79.
[24] Nagel (1979), p. 79.
[25] Nagel (1979), p. 79.
[26] Nagel (1979), p. 85-86.

definition of the basic unit of study, it is then capable of defining all concepts within the specific field. For instance, the notion of atoms and molecules serve as the starting point for the theoretical framework behind the theory of thermodynamics. From the basic idea that molecules are made up of atoms, scientists are able to understanding the process that occurs when water is heated. This simple observation allows us to understand and define notions like pressure, fluid, and steam that are central to understanding the heating process.

Theoretical frameworks are not just lists of definitions. They also sketch the main causal relations driving a phenomenon. However, these causal stories are not as exact as the ones provided by theories. Whereas theories identify the most important causal relations amongst a large set of relations, a theoretical framework simply describes the main lines of causality present without passing judgment about their importance. It is agnostic about the matter, so to speak.

Theoretical frameworks are mainly judged by the internal coherence of their definitions and causality. Laws are mainly evaluated by the *correspondence* between a statement (for instance, that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius) and empirical observations. Theories are assessed by their ability to square observable laws with a coherent causal story. They have to satisfy both a correspondence and a coherence criterion. Theoretical frameworks, by contrast, are mainly judged by their ability to create a coherent causal story. To be sure, they cannot be entirely disconnected from empirical observations of the object in question. For instance, the notions of atoms and molecules were crafted through careful interaction between a speculative effort and careful experiments. But the empirical requirement asked of a theoretical framework is less substantial than the requirement asked that are asked of laws and theories. A theoretical framework only needs to show that certain processes occur. It does not have to determine which process is the most important one.

The move from law to theory involves asking questions about the nature of the object of study. To develop a theory of how and when water boils, one must ask the basic question, what is water? This necessarily involves more than just simple observations of the object of study. Each theory thus has a speculative element that goes beyond mere observation. Developing a theory involves knitting together different concepts through careful considerations of the nature of the concepts. Experimentation ensures that each concept somehow reflects a reality beyond mere theory. However, it is by coming to terms with the very essence of the thing that the scholar develops a theory that can explain why an empirical incident occurs and how it will occur under different preconditions.[27] For instance, Newton's theory of gravity consists of careful observations of the revolution of planets and falling objects on Earth. However, it was only through abstract mathematical speculation that Newton could arrive at a revolutionary theory that could explain why

[27] Nagel (1979), p. 85-86.

objects behave in a certain manner, and that would predict how they would behave under different conditions. Of course, Newton's theory left a lot of questions un-answered. No theory explains everything. However, for certain aspects of physical reality, it provided explanations and predictive power.

The speculative dimension of theoretical frameworks is developed through carefully refined logical tools that capture the essence of phenomena. One of the most prominent innovations within theory development is the concept of a system. Systems are notoriously hard to define. As Robert Jervis points out, most academics think of systems in the same way Justice Potter Stewart defined pornography in *Jacobellis vs Ohio*: "I know it when I see it."[28] Indeed, most theorists need not define this concept, but focus on employing it intuitively. However, for our purposes, a more accurate definition is in order. Jervis provides such a definition:

> "We are dealing with a system when (a) a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other parts of the system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts."[29]

Behind that notion is the basic insight that every object can be broken into components, but that the object itself is more than the sum of its parts.[30] For instance, the solar system is made up of a star, planets, and various minor celestial objects. The system is more than just the collection of planets – their effect on one another creates something bigger than themselves. Gravity keeps these bodies together in the sense that a sudden change in the trajectory of one planet (for example Jupiter) may affect the course of the remaining planets.[31] Similarly, the human body can be said to consist of the mutual relationship between various organs and body parts. Together, they form an entity that is different than themselves. Remove one organ (for instance the heart) and the entire system breaks down.

Both laws and theories make claims that are generalizable beyond the specific context of an observation. For instance, the law that water boils when heated would be true at any given time under the same conditions. Laws and theories that can be generalized beyond the specific observed occurrence are normally said to be *nomothetic*. Conversely, statements that specifically

[28] Jervis, Robert (1997): *System Effects. Complexity in Political and Social Life*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 5.
[29] Jervis (1997), p. 6.
[30] von Bertalanffy, Ludwig (1972): *The History and Status of General Systems Theory*, in *Academy of Management Journal*, vol. 15, no. 4, p. 407.
[31] Parsons, Talcott & Edward A. Shils (1951): *Values, Motives, and Systems of Action,* in Parsons, Talcott & Edward A. Shils (1951): *Toward a General Theory of Action. Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences,* New Brunswick: Transaction Publishing, pp. 107-08.

refer to one-time occurrences are *idiographic*. For instance, "Napoleon I was the emperor of France" is an ideographic statement, because there was only one Napoleon I. The claim cannot be generalized beyond the specific context. The social sciences are an odd mix of nomothetic and idiographic elements.[32] They often strive for general theories, but are constantly limited by the impossibility of subsuming a vast and complex reality under the rubrics of one specific theory.

The early history of general sociology illustrates how theories are developed, and the role they play in the furthering of our understanding of the world around us. Of course, the development of social science began before social scientists became aware of themselves as something other than political philosophers. As Gabriel Almond emphasized, social science reasoning was always implicitly present in political philosophy.[33] However, in the late 18th and early 19th century, thinkers became aware of the possibility of developing a scientific approach to society. Henri Saint-Simon and August Comte began to advocate that social phenomena were investigated with methods resembling those found in the natural sciences.[34] As Jon Elster has recently argued, Alexis de Tocqueville's work was so dedicated to identifying causal mechanisms that he could be seen as the most sophisticated social scientist of his generation.[35] By the end of the 19th century, the social sciences, most notably sociology, had branched off from philosophy. This transformation was largely driven by the development of modern, industrial society. As Anthony Giddens has argued, the purpose of sociology (and arguably social science as such) was to understand why and how a modern society of constant change replaced traditional society.[36]

The development of the social sciences was not complete by the middle of the 20th century. The early social scientists focused on methodology and on uncovering idiographic trends. That is, they focused on studying specific trends in their own right without connecting them to a larger, universal social science theory about societies.[37] Consider an eminent scholar like Max Weber: Weber correctly identified key trends in the society of his time. He explored the notion of rationalization and provided meticulous definitions of concepts like the state, bureaucracy, and politics that became canonical within the social sciences. He did not, however, define how societies

[32] Nagel (1979), pp. 546-51.
[33] Almond, Gabriel A. (1988): *Separate Tables: Schools and Sects in Political Science,* in Almond, Gabriel A. (1990): *A Discipline Divided. Schools and Sects in Political Science,* Newbury Park: Sage Publishing, p. 24.
[34] Gordon, Scott (1991): *The History and Philosophy of Social Science,* London: Routledge, p. 281; Almond, Gabriel A. (1996): *Political Science: The History of the Discipline,* in Goodin, Robert E. & Hans-Dieter Klingemann (1996): *The New Handbook of Political Science,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 61-62.
[35] Elster, Jon (2009): *Alexis de Tocqueville, The First Social Scientist,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. vii & 1-10. For de Tocqueville's position on the idiographic-nomothetic scale, see pp. 2 & 184.
[36] Giddens, Anthony (1986): *What do Sociologists do?*, in Giddens, Anthony (1987): *Social Theory and Modern Sociology,* Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 15 & 18-19.
[37] Wearne, Bruce C. (1989): *The Theory and Scholarship of Talcott Parsons to 1951*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 56-57.

work in various settings.[38] Weber's line of thinking began with the individual and explored how society functions by understanding how the individual thought about social life. To speak in systems terms, he focused on the components that make up society, rather than on society as such.

Talcott Parsons' writings marked a shift towards a more nomothetic line of reasoning.[39] Parsons tried to develop a general definition of society by understanding it as a system.[40] The result was a labyrinthic – almost incomprehensible – system of definitions and causal relations. According to Uta Gerhardt, "students at Harvard in the 1950s who were required to know two foreign languages as an entrance requirement for sociology are said to have inquired whether 'Parsonese' could be one of the two."[41] However, Parsons' work drove the expansion of social theory further. He pulled together different lines of reasoning, showing how seemingly contradictory positions, like those held by Weber and Durkheim, could be combined with insights from anthropology and ethnology under one theoretical umbrella. An overly simplistic summary of his basic argument might run something like this: all societies consist of individuals, cultures, and institutions. Society is made up of individuals who need food, shelter and security. It is surrounded by a material environment, which it has to interact with in order to produce the material necessities required for its survival. This poses a functional pressure from the outside that society must handle.[42] Conversely, however, as a system, society also depends on the internal relationship between its components.[43] As society is nothing but the concerted action of individuals - in principle it can only exist as long as the individuals feel like being involved. Crudely put, the basic tension in society is between the need for economic efficiency, and a sense of community based on normative agreements. Parsons then went on to show how institutions and cultural systems help alleviate this basic tension.[44]

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[38] Parsons, Talcott (1937): *The Structure of Social Action. A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers*, New York: McGraw Hill, pp. 640 & 685-86.

[39] Parsons' work developed in specific periods that often contradict one another. The development described in this section happened in Parsons' early and middle period (Alexander, Jeffrey (1984): *The Modern Reconstruction of Classical Thought: Talcott Parsons*, London: Routledge; Habermas (1987), pp. 199-300; Barber, Bernard (1998): *Parsons's Second Project: The Social System – Sources, Developments, Limitations,* in Trevino, A. Javier (2001): *Talcott Parsons today. His Theory and Legacy in Contemporary Sociology,* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 79-84). The civil-military relations field was developed around what is commonly called Parsons' middle period. This period stretches from 1938 to 1951 and includes his empirical essays collected in *Essays in Sociological Theory*, *The Social System*, and the essays in *Toward a General Theory of Action.*

[40] Parsons, Talcott (1948): *The Position of Sociological Theory*, in *American Sociological Review,* vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 157-58 & 164.

[41] Gerhardt, Uta (2002): *Talcott Parsons. An Intellectual Biography,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. x.

[42] Parsons, Talcott (1951): *The Social System*, New York : The Free Press, p. 28; Alexander (1984), p. 51.

[43] Parsons (1951), p. 33.

[44] Parsons, Talcott, Edward A. Shils, Gordon W. Allport, Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry A. Murray, Robert R. Sears, Richard C. Sheldon, Samuel A. Stouffer & Edward Tolman (1951): *Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory of Action: A General Statement*, in Parsons, Talcott & Edward A. Shils (1951): *Toward a General Theory of Action. Theoretical Foundations for the Social Sciences,* New Brunswick: Transaction Publishing, pp. 20-22;

By weaving the different intellectual strings together to form a single conceptual fabric, Parsons hoped to develop a single theoretical framework for the social sciences that could make scholarly discussions clearer.[45] Parsons did not accomplish this goal. Although his model of society represents an enormous scientific advancement, it has certain crucial blind spots that made it vulnerable to attacks. To this day, there is no overarching social theory. There were two reactions to this failure. One group of scholars, most notably C. Wright Mills, argued that the search for a general theory obfuscated the true purpose of sociology, which was to uncover structures of power and abuse in society.[46] Other scholars continued Parsons' project beyond the realm of mainstream sociology. There is a large line of literature that still tries to use the notion of systems to tease out an even more accurate description of the fundamental processes of society.[47] This literature, however, is largely isolated from most of the social sciences - and perhaps rightly so, given its complexity and lack of empirical applicability.

Though he did not arrive at a definitive description of society, Parsons' work had an important influence on the social sciences. As William Buxton argues, early political science was, in fact, Parsons-inspired political sociology.[48] By importing Parsons' theoretical vocabulary to their own sub-disciplines, social scientists suddenly had a ready-made framework that they could use to develop coherent theories. For instance, a study of the political system no longer had to develop concepts for adjacent areas of study. Instead, the scientist could implicitly turn to Parsons for a general idea of the causal mechanics of modern society. In the 1950s and -60s, the nascent discipline of political science took a quantum leap in terms of theoretical coherence, in part inspired by Parsons' work.[49] Many of the field's early classic ideas used his model of society as a theoretical framework for developing their own theories.[50] For instance, Gabriel Almond - a great pioneer in the study of political culture – openly identified himself with "the Weber-Parsons tradition in social theory". Among other things, Almond argued that systems analysis was a superior analytical tool,

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Münch, Richard (1982): *Talcott Parsons and the Theory of Action. II. The Continuity of the Development*, in *American Journal of Sociology,* vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 777-79; Schmid, Michael (1992): *The Concept of Culture and Its Place within a Theory of Social Action: A Critique of Talcott Parsons's Theory of Culture,* in Münch, Richard & Neil J. Smelser (1992): *Theory of Culture,* Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 90-92.

[45] Geertz, Clifford (1971): *After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New States,* in Barber, Bernard & Alex Inkeles (1971): *Stability and Social Change*, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, pp. 371-72.

[46] Mills, C. Wright (1967): *The Sociological Imagination,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25-49.

[47] Bausch, Kenneth C. (2001): *The Emerging Consensus in Social Systems Theory,* New York: Kluwer Academic.

[48] Buxton, William (1985): *Talcott Parsons and the Capitalist Nation-State. Political Sociology as a Strategic Vocation,* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 165-235.

[49] Easton, David (1985): *Political Science in the United States: Past and Present,* in *International Political Science Review,* vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 135-39.

[50] Almond, Gabriel A. (1966): *Political Theory and Political Science,* in *American Political Science Review,* vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 875-77. The conception of theory advocated here was widely criticized by traditional political theorists, who felt that the descriptive investigation of political phenomena as a purely empirical field overlooked the truly critical nature of political science (Wolin, Sheldon S. (1969): *Political Theory as a Vocation*, in *American Political Science Review,* vol. 63, no. 4, pp. 1062-82; Almond (1996), pp. 78-88).

and he used a Parsonian understanding of culture in developing his theories.[51] Likewise, Parsons' notion of the social system was of immense importance for Seymour Lipset's ground-breaking work on values and politics.[52] His famous notion that legitimacy was essentially a matter of belief clearly had roots in Weber's and Parsons' thought.[53] Other great scholars inspired by Parsons include Karl Deutsch, Stein Rokkan, David Easton, Giovanni Sartori and – as will be shown below – Samuel Huntington.[54] To be sure, many political scientists became dissatisfied with the general and generic character of Parsons' concepts.[55] However, the refined concepts that they developed in reaction to Parsons already contained a common meaning in the social science community that ensured a certain amount of homogeneity within the discipline.

To sum up, theories allow us to summarize and systematize knowledge and apply it in new and innovative settings. They consist of a theoretical framework that defines the crucial concepts within a field and the causal relations between them and of laws that map out regularities between objects. From its origins in political philosophy, social science has generally moved in a more nomothetic direction and has developed increasingly sophisticated theories.

The birth of the scientific study of civil-military relations

The civil-military relations field has developed from an idiographic to a nomothetic field of study. To be sure, civil-military relations theory does not lend itself to precise causal arguments that can be proved with total certainty. The factors involved are too numerous and the cases too few to allow scholars to pinpoint universally valid laws. In his introductory course at Northwestern University, Charles Moskos - perhaps the leading military sociologist of his generation - would paraphrase Winston Churchill's famous quip about democracy to describe his own seminal theory. "It is the

[51] Almond, Gabriel A. (1956): *Comparative Political Systems*, in *Journal of Politics,* vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 393-94; Almond, Gabriel A. & Sidney Verba (1989): *The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations,* Newbury Park: Sage Publishing, pp. 13-14; Buxton (1985), pp. 192-205.
[52] Buxton (1985), p. 223.
[53] Lipset, Seymour M. (1983): *Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 64.
[54] Almond (1996), p. 73; Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. (1972): *Karl Deutsch and the Study of Political Science,* in *The Political Science Reviewer,* vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 91-92; Allardt, Erik (2001): *Party Systems and Voter Alignment in the Tradition of Political Sociology*, in Karvonen, Lauri& Stein Kuhle (2001): *Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited,* London: Routledge, pp. 16-17; Sartori, Giovanni (2007): *Chance, Luck, and Stubbornness: An Autobiographical Essay,* in Collier, David & John Gerring (2009): *Concepts and Methods in Social Science. The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori*, London: Routledge, pp. 335-37; Smith, Rogers M. (1960): *Still Blowing in the Wind: The American Quest for a Democratic, Scientific Political Science,* in *Daedalus*, vol. 126, no. 1, pp. 259-60.
[55] See for instance, Sartori, Giovanni (1969): *From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology,* in *Government and Opposition,* vol. 4, no. 2, p. 199; Lipset (1983), pp. 3-4.

worst system possible", he would remark with a grin, "except for all the others."[56] What he meant, of course, is that theories within military sociology and civil-military relations are not perfect. It is impossible to make general laws about civil-military relations.

The contemporary study of civil-military relations arose in the United States after 1945.[57] It was shaped by two historical trends: the changing international security environment after the Second World War, and the development of modern social science in the 20th century. The contemporary civil-military relations field was born out of the American anxiety about military affairs after 1945. In the late 19th and early 20th century, America was shielded from foreign threats by two oceans. Consequently, in the decades following the First World War, it could contently follow a policy of neutrality and isolation. However, with the European empires crumbling under the weight of two world wars, the United States had to fill the power vacuum and become a major military power on the world scene. This meant that George Washington's well-meaning advice "to have with [foreign nations] as little political connection as possible[,] (…) to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world" could no longer be followed.[58] This gave civil-military relations a certain urgency. Policymakers, and the public, sought to understand if this development would impede American democracy. Would a strong military be "inauspicious to liberty" as Washington had predicted?[59] The United States had long prided itself by its isolation from the affairs of the continent. Its special strand of liberalism was born out of the individual's quest for wealth and security within a capitalist society, with minimal state control. Could this ideology survive the increased spending necessary to retain a large military? Could democratic institutions survive the pressure from an institution that was in many respects the upholder of the law?

In previous societies and eras, such questions would have been tackled by philosophers and public intellectuals. In the middle of the twentieth century, social scientists, rather than philosophers, took up the gauntlet of understanding the relationship between military affairs and political order. As Ira Katznelson has argued, post-war social science was largely driven by normative concerns for the future of political life. The horrors of wars and genocide had not been prevented by discussions of ethics and morality. Instead, these scholars thought that social scientific studies of the conditions of political life could serve as a rough guide to the new and unexpected events that modernity seemed to have in store for humanity.[60] The post-war study of war and international

[56] Frank, Nathaniel (2009): *Unfriendly Fire. How the Gay Ban Undermines the Military and Weakens America,* New York: Thomas Dunne Books, pp. xvii-xviii.
[57] For an eloquent summary of the early history of the field, see Feaver (1999), p. 212.
[58] Washington, George (1810): *Farewell Address to the People of the United States*, Baltimore: John L. Cook, pp. 15 & 16.
[59] Washington (1810), p. 9.
[60] Katznelson, Ira (2003): *Desolation and Enlightenment. Political Knowledge after Total War, Totalitarianism, and the Holocaust,* New York: Columbia University Press.

relations can be seen as a way of understanding the implications of the new situation for American democracy.[61] Arguably, the literature on civil-military relations was part of this wave.

The early social scientific study of civil-military relations was built on an existing body of work. The study of the relationship between war and politics goes far back, beyond the limits of recorded history. As some commentators note, the Homeric epics can be read as metaphorical discussions of the relationship between war and political order.[62] For Plato – the first philosopher whose treatises on politics we have access to in full – the relationship between war and politics was of the outmost importance. He saw war as a necessary evil that disturbs the virtue and tranquility of the just state. For instance, in *The Laws*, the last of his major works, he went to great lengths to argue against the standard Greek position (represented by the Cretan Cleinias in the dialogue) that society and the state exists for the sake of war.[63] These discussions recurred throughout the subsequent history of ideas, where political philosophers tried to capture how political life and war are related to one another.

We can see the first faint glimmers of a scientific study of civil-military relations in the work of the early proto-social scientists of the late 19th and early 20th century. De Tocqueville, for instance, dedicated several sections of the second volume of *Democracy in America* to keen observations on the role of military affairs for the new democracy.[64] Towards the turn of the 19th century, early political sociologists, primarily in Germany, explored how society and military organization were mutually constitutive in the 19th century.[65] The early literature was largely idiographic, drawing much of its strength from military history. The scholars did not attempt to create a theory that would explain civil-military relations in all cases. Instead, they focused on looking at how civil-military relations functioned in the specific tumultuous setting in which they found themselves.

Even though the first American civil-military relations scholars identified themselves as social scientists, they largely followed this idiographic tradition. Harold Lasswell's *The Garrison State*, a 1941 article in the *American Journal of Sociology*, was the most important work of this period.[66] An

[61] Tjalve, Vibeke S. (2009): *Realist Strategies of Republican Peace. Niebuhr, Morgenthau and the Politics of Patriotic Dissent,* London: Palgrave Macmillian; Williams, Michael C. (2009): *Waltz, Realism, and Democracy,* in *International Relations,* vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 328-40.
[62] Coker, Christopher (2001): *Humane Warfare,* London: Routledge, p. 108.
[63] Plato (1970): *The Laws,* New York: Penguin Books, pp. 47-51.
[64] de Tocqueville, Alexis (1945): *Democracy in America. Volume 2,* London: Everyman's Library, pp. 264-86.
[65] Joas, Hans & Wolfgang Knöbl (2013): *War in Social Thought. Hobbes to the Present,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 116-55. See for instance Hintze, Otto (1975): *Military Organization and the Organization of the State*, in Gilbert, Felix (1975): *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 178-215.
[66] Lasswell, Harold D. (1941): *The Garrison State*, in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 455-68. Other prominent names include Alfred Vagts and Stanisław Andreski (Vagts, Alfred (1959): *A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military,* Revised edition, Toronto: Free Press Paperback*;* Andreski, Stanisław (1954): *Military Organization and Society*, London: Routledge& Paul). However, although these authors attempted to

outstanding scholar, most famous for his seminal definition of politics as "who gets what, when and how", Lasswell developed several key concept that were instrumental in informing the nascent discipline of political science. Writing before the American entrance to the Second World War, Lasswell explored how an increased emphasis on military affairs would affect the status of democracy in the United States. He projected contemporary trends into the future to see how society would turn out.[67] He argued that warring societies are held together by a culture of fear. War was becoming an increasingly technological endeavor, based on industrial production, and the entire production apparatus of society – and thereby the civilian population – was becoming part of the war machine. He predicted that civilians would make up the bulk of the victims of future wars. Fear would be even more widespread, resulting in the increasing homogeneity of social sentiment and the loss of the right to dissent. The "garrison state" –a semi-dictatorial society where "the specialists on violence are the most powerful group" – would be the result.[68] This society would be held together by a mix of fear and propaganda orchestrated by the military-political elite, thus marking an end to American liberalism.

Lasswell's approach exemplifies the idiographic, non-theoretical mode of analysis characteristic of his era. He did not situate himself within a larger theoretical model of society. Instead, he defined key concepts, and the causal relations driving society, anew. *The Garrison State* was awash with undefined concepts and claims that were not backed up with supporting theory. For instance, his framework for understanding social change seems to be developed *ad hoc* and disconnected from the literature on social cohesion within political sociology. In overall terms, Lasswell's theoretical framework resulted in a theory, whose predictions diverged from actual events.[69]

Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* marked a nomothetic turn in civil-military relations theory.[70] Huntington - a precocious academic and Army veteran from the Northeast, who

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make general claims about civil-military relations, based on an implicit notion of social science methodology, their attempts were not as consistent as was Huntington's approach. Feaver & Seeler describe the trends in pre-Huntingtonian theory more thoroughly (Feaver, Peter D. & Erika Seeler (2009): *Before and After Huntington: The Methodological Maturing of Civil-Military Relations,* in Nielsen, Suzanne C. & Don M. Snider (2009): *American Civil-Military Relations. The Soldier and the State in a New Era,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 76-79).

[67] Lasswell (1941), pp. 456-47.

[68] Lasswell(1941), p. 455.

[69] For an analysis of the correctness of Lasswell's garrison state thesis, see Friedberg, Aaron L. (1992): *Why didn't the United States become a Garrison State*, in *International Security,* vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 109-42; Aron, Raymond (1979): *Remarks on Lasswell's 'The Garrison State',* in *Armed Forces and Society,* vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 347-59; Lasswell, Harold D. (1962): *The Garrison State Hypothesis Today,* in Stanley, Jay (1997): *Essays on The Garrison State,* New Brunswick: Transaction Publishing, pp. 77-116.

[70] Feaver & Seeler (2009). To be sure, Huntington's *oeuvre* did not contain just one argument about civil-military relations. He developed new arguments about civil-military relations in later years, which differed from the one he made in *The Soldier and the State*. For instance, as Richard Betts points out, he presented a

graduated with a BA from Yale age 18 and a PhD from Harvard age 23 -was one of those towering, eclectic figures one found in the early years of American social science. Moving between the academy and the Beltway – his career included a spell as advisor to Zbigniew Brzezinski during the Carter years – he was driven by his interest in the salient policy issues of the day. He moved from discipline to discipline, writing about whatever topic caught his eye, often defining a new field of study along the way. His *oeuvre* would contain defining, yet often controversial works within virtually all subfields of political science. *The Soldier and the State,* a reworked version of his doctoral dissertation, was one such defining work.[71] Having witnessed the changes that followed the Second World War, he was dissatisfied with Lasswell's theory, and with the state of civil-military relations theory in general:

> "The study of civil-military relations has suffered from too little theorizing. The only theory of civil-military relations in the United States [Lasswell's *The Garrison State*, JRC] is a confused and unsystematic set of assumptions and beliefs derived from the underlying premises of American liberalism."[72]

Huntington rightly recognized that Lasswell lacked a theoretical framework for evaluating the social changes that follow military activism. In lieu of a framework, Lasswell implicitly used the predominant ideology in society – liberalism – as his baseline for analyzing the normative desirability of that change. Consequently, he was incapable of understanding the finer distinctions between different types of change. For him, all changes that were not in accordance with liberalism posed a threat to democracy as such.[73]

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richer and more complex take on military policy in his 1961 *The Common Defense* (Betts, Richard K. (2009): *Are Civil-Military Relations Still a Problem?,* in Nielsen, Suzanne C. & Don M. Snider (2009): *American Civil-Military Relations. The Soldier and the State in a New Era,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 40). The polyphonic nature of Huntington's work makes it difficult to claim anything coherent about his take on civil-military relations. One cannot analyze his work without determining what defines his authoritative theory. However, I primarily focus on Huntington's work in *The Soldier and the State* in this dissertation. This work was his only work dedicated solely to civil-military relations and has become the canonical starting point for all theoretical work within the field. It is the theories presented in *The Soldier and the State* that have come to shape civil-military relations. Huntington's later pieces on the topic are largely ignored by civil-military relations theorists. I am thereby following the precendence established by Peter Feaver (Feaver, Peter D. (2003): *Armed Servants. Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 7n8). I draw on some of Huntington's other work, when it supports or clarifies points made in *The Soldier and the State*.

[71] Feaver, Peter D. (2009): *In Memoriam. Samuel P. Huntington,* in *Armed Forces and Society,* vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 625-27; Zanin, Toby (2009): *Samuel P. Huntington and the Ambiguities of American Power,* in *International Journal,* vol. 64, no. 4, pp. 1109-16; Hodgson, Godfrey (2009): *Obituary: Samuel Huntington: US Political Scientist who Foresaw Future Conflict arising from a Clash of Cultures*, in *The Guardian*, 1/1 2009, p. 32.

[72] Huntington, Samuel P. (1957b): *The Soldier and the State: the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. vii.

[73] Huntington (1957b), pp. 346-50.

Huntington contributed to civil-military relations by developing a theoretical framework, from which he derived a theory of civil-military relations. This theory led him to make policy recommendations for the United States government. Huntington aimed to avoid Lasswell's mistakes by developing the much needed theoretical framework for civil-military relations.[74] As he wrote in the preface of *The Soldier and the State*,

> "this book does not attempt an historical description of civil-military relations in general nor of any particular aspect of civil-military relations in particular. It is, rather, an effort to develop a way of looking at and thinking about civil-military relations, in short, a theoretical framework."[75]

The overall puzzle was to figure out if democracy could survive the new emphasis on military affairs. Huntington realized that answering this question required a theoretical framework that was founded in political and social theory. Only by having theoretically coherent concepts and a thorough understanding of causality could the study of civil-military relations seriously explore the many changes that military engagement would mean for modern society.

In spite of his overt goal of developing a theoretical framework, the result remains rather obtuse. The theoretical framework of civil-military relations is not exactly obvious from the pages of *The Soldier and the State.* In fact, as we shall see later on, my argument is that Huntington's theoretical framework was incomplete. The following is therefore an interpretation of his hidden framework. One has to tease it out of the scattered remarks in that work, attempting to add clarity where he left only ambiguity.

Simply put, compared to Lasswell's work, Huntington's theoretical framework provides a more nuanced understanding of five key aspects of civil-military relations. Firstly, he developed an overview of the civilian control policies available to civilian politicians.[76] He argued that civilian leaders essentially have two ways of controlling the military. One option is to politicize the military organization by making promotion dependent on political contacts with the dominant party in society – what Huntington labeled "subjective control". This type of control involves "civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state".[77] The second option, "objective control", involves allowing the military a certain amount of autonomy. By permitting military control over tactical and operational details and making promotion dependent on merit, it will necessarily be more conducive

[74] Feaver & Seeler (2009), p. 80.
[75] Huntington (1957b), p. vii
[76] By "civilian control policy" I mean the policy civilian politicians use to ensure that they have control over the armed forces.
[77] Huntington (1957b), p. 83.

to civilian control.[78] It is important to notice that Huntington did not consider the possibility that civilians could meddle in tactical and operational details, yet leave the military organization untainted – what civil-military relations theorists call "assertive control". Subjective control, the policy that Huntington criticized, is rarely considered an option in modern, advanced democracies. In that sense, Huntington did not analyze the key policy dilemma facing modern elite civil-military relations. We shall return to this point in chapter 6.

Subjective and objective control are difficult to understand without the remaining parts of his theoretical framework. The second component of the framework was a general model for social change. Huntington basically focused on elite civil-military relations, arguing that the interaction between military and civilian elites is the main factor leading to political outcomes.[79] However, although he only gave societal civil-military relations scant attention, he recognized that one cannot explore the interaction between civil and military actors within the state without having a grasp of the conditions for societal survival and the demands that society places upon the state. Thus, elite civil-military relations are not simply the result of a power game between civilian and military actors: elite actors have, at the very least, to ensure that society can survive militarily, if they want to remain in power. Societal civil-military relations are therefore crucial for explaining elite civil-military relations. Huntington borrowed a model for social change from Talcott Parsons' political sociology and tailored it to handle how military threats influence society. In his later work – most notably in *Political Order in Changing Societies,* arguably his *magnum opus* - Huntington would develop a theory of modernization that criticized Parsons' views.[80] However, Parsons' general model of society provided a good starting point for Huntington's model of societal civil-military relations. In essence, he combined Parsons and Clausewitz to form a theoretical framework for how societal civil-military relations function. He followed Parsons in seeing societies as systems of institutions, interests, and cultures. These factors are dynamically related, meaning that they generally adapt to change.[81] Societies are caught between a societal imperative arising from the institutions, interests, and ideologies that define society and a functional imperative of military competition from the outside. Societies that face a military threat have to adapt by building up conventional military forces that

[78] Huntington (1957b), pp. 80-85. The notions of objective and subjective civilian control are often used to cover several different phenomena. Sometimes, as here, they are taken to mean the degree to which civilian leaders meddle in military affairs. However, they can also be taken to mean the social mechanisms by which the state controls the military. Huntington did not draw a distinction between these two meanings. However, I would argue that this is, in fact, one of the sources of the confusion that sometimes marks the field. For the sake of clarity, I will therefore use the terms "objective control" and "subjective control" (and the notion of "assertive control") to refer to the policies followed by the civilian leadership, and the notions "internal control" and "external control" to refer to the social mechanisms through which control is established.

[79] Huntington (1957b), p. 3.

[80] Fukuyama, Francis (2006): *Foreword,* in Huntington, Samuel P. (2006): *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. xi-xiv; Fukuyama (2011), pp. 458-60.

[81] Huntington (1957b), pp. viii, 1-3, 85-97, 163-64 & 456-57.

can meet that threat. This can only happen if the ideologies within society and the political institutions allow this change.

Thirdly, Huntington's main thrust against Lasswell was an argument about the nature of military culture. Lasswell presumed that military elites would use the tools at their disposal to maximize their share of power: when the military became more important, the top brass would necessarily use their enhanced power to institute a garrison state. Huntington had a more benign understanding of military culture. He argued that the officer corps, by virtue of its professional creed, is inherently loyal to the civilian government:

> "The officer['s] (…) behavior in relation to society is guided by an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state. While the primary responsibility of the physician is to his patient, and the lawyer to his client, the principal responsibility of the military officer is to the state."[82]

Against Lasswell, Huntington argued that the officer will not use his military expertise to assume political power. Loyalty to the civilian government, he argued, is an inherent part of the professional's psychology. Furthermore, professionalism will also generate much needed military effectiveness. The professional culture is destroyed when civilian politicians meddle in military promotions to ensure that the generals share the values of the government. Objective control therefore leads to military loyalty and effectiveness. Only when the military is left alone will it develop a professional culture and stay out of politics.[83]

Having established that civilian meddling is detrimental to military professionalism, Huntington then became interested in the factors that shape the civilian leaders' military policy. When would civilian leaders meddle in military affairs, and when would they adopt a less interfering objective control policy? He identified two key factors that determine the government's civilian control policy. The first of these factors is the constitutional arrangement. Some constitutional structures, such as the British constitutional arrangement, collect the civilian supremacy over the military in the government. This enables the government to remove political squabbling from the elite civil-military relations and thus facilitates professionalism. Conversely, other arrangements, such as the American constitution, divide civilian power between multiple parties. This makes civil-military policy a slave of potentially conflicting ideologies, which may eventually erode military professionalism.[84] The only way to facilitate military professionalism in such societies is to ensure that all members of the ruling elite are committed to a military-friendly ideology.

[82] Huntington (1957b), pp. 15-16.
[83] Huntington (1957b), p. 84.
[84] Huntington (1957b), pp. 177-92.

Finally, unlike Lasswell, Huntington argued that ideological changes in society do not necessarily lead to a breakdown of democracy. Huntington acknowledged that there was a tension between contemporary civilian ideology and military culture. Like Lasswell, he saw liberalism as the dominant ideology in American society and recognized its inherently anti-military dogma.[85] However, he did not see this ideology as tantamount to the democratic culture that defines the American political system. Instead, he suggested that conservatism poses a viable democratic alternative. By conservatism, Huntington meant a Burkean ideology of preservation, which emphasizes the goodness of the present and the risk inherent in change.[86] This type of conservatism does not strive for an abstract ideal society. Instead, it contains an appreciation of the immanent, which leads it to fear sudden change.[87] It stresses the factors that pose risks to the preservation of society – power, war, and the inherent evil of man. Because of its fear of change and its embrace of the possibility, Huntington stressed, "conservatism is basically similar to the military ethic."[88] He implicitly argued that conservatism, when employed in a democratic society, would strive to preserve the democratic institutions of that society, making it a democratic ideology. As he put it in an article written specifically about conservatism,

> "Today (…) the greatest need is not so much the creation of more liberal institutions as the successful defense of those which already exist. This defense requires American liberals to lay aside their liberal ideology and to accept the values of conservatism for the duration of the threat. Only by surrendering their liberal ideas for the present can liberals successfully defend their liberal institutions for the future."[89]

In spite of his stated intention to develop a theoretical framework, Huntington did not limit himself to this task. Instead, he expanded his theoretical framework into a *theory* of civil-military relations and made predictions about how American Cold War civil-military relations would develop. Furthermore, he also provided a substantial historical and sociological treatise on the military profession in America, including smaller comparative studies of the military profession in other developed countries. This treatise was necessary to prove his statement that the American officer corps was a profession. However, though probably necessary to establish civil-military relations as a social scientific field, this scholarly multitasking meant that the theoretical framework got lost

[85] Huntington (1957b), p. 145. Here, Huntington followed Louis Hartz' famous thesis that the United States was inherently liberal (Hartz, Louis B. (1955): *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution,* New York: Harcourt Brace). For a critique of Hartz' assertion, see Pocock, J. G. A. (2003): *The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 506-13.
[86] Huntington (1957b), p. 93n.
[87] Huntington, Samuel P. (1957a): *Conservatism as an Ideology*, in *American Political Science Review,* vol. 51, no, 2, p. 458.
[88] Huntington (1957b), p. 93.
[89] Huntington (1957a), pp. 472-73.

among the 500-odd pages of *The Soldier and the State*. Instead, the book turned out to be more a theory than a theoretical framework.

Huntington put the concept of professionalism at the core of his theory of civil-military relations (see figure 2.1. below). A professional officer corps, he argued, will necessarily be loyal and effective and professionalism will thus minimize the tensions between officers and politicians, while maximizing the state's ability to handle conventional military threats.[90] Objective control facilitates military professionalism. The main barrier lies in the civilian world. Professionalism cannot develop, if liberal forces in society hold the government back from objective control. A liberal political establishment will be hostile to military affairs and, unless restricted by the constitution, politicize the military organization, thus undermining its professional culture. Huntington's theory duly leads to two policy options. Firstly, political leaders can stay aloof and allow military autonomy, which would lead to military professionalism and, thus, to maximal military effectiveness and civilian control. Secondly, the civilian leadership can choose to politicize the armed forces at the price of diminished military effectiveness. If faced with a substantial threat, a society that insists on continuing this political course will be militarily overwhelmed.

This theory led Huntington to fairly extensive recommendations regarding the United States' Cold War policy. He advised that a conservative culture, permissive of military independence, should develop in American society.[91] He argued that a constitutional change was unrealistic. The state essentially faced two options: become conservative and allow military professionalism, or stay liberal and face the Soviet Union with an ineffective military. The latter option, he argued, would necessarily lead to the demise of the United States. The only viable option was the development of a conservative political culture. Only a conservative society would allow the military the autonomy necessary to become a truly professional. If American society continued to be characterized by liberalism, the United States would be unable to exert the military force necessary to push back the threat from the Soviet Union. Instead,

> "The requisite for military security is a shift in basic American values from liberalism to conservatism. Only an environment which is sympathetically conservative will permit American military leaders to combine the political power which society thrusts upon them with the military professionalism without which society cannot endure."[92]

America would either become conservative or succumb in the military race against the USSR.

[90] Huntington (1957b), p. 73.
[91] Huntington (1957b), pp. 456-66.
[92] Huntington (1957b), p. 464.

Figure 2.1. Huntington's theory of civil-military relations



To sum up, the relationship between soldiers and civilians has been studied since the earliest political philosophers. However, it is only recently that civil-military relations have become the object of study for social scientists. Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* marked a nomothetic turn in the field's history. Huntington combined political sociology with military science and history to develop a coherent theoretical framework. This allowed him to produce a rigorous theory that sees military professionalism as the key to good civil-military relations. His theory led him to predict that the United States would either become more conservative, or would be unable to compete militarily with the USSR.

Civil-military relations after Huntington

The decades after the publication of *The Soldier and the State* witnessed a wave of new theoretical work on civil-military relations. Several authors picked up the new emphasis placed on civil-military relations by Huntington. Several of them were critical of Huntington's theory, which many found to be too simplistic. The criticism was driven both by an empirical dissatisfaction with Huntington's ability to predict actual events and a theoretical criticism of his definition of various concepts. Many

authors found that his notions and causal relations made little sense. His work became the focal point to which many academics and commentators reacted.[93]

The bulk of the early criticism focused on his concept of professionalism. Morris Janowitz spearheaded the sociological study of military identity. Though he essentially agreed with Huntington that professionalism is the key to understanding contemporary military identity, he found that the picture painted by Huntington brushed over key problems: military professionalism is not only more complex than Huntington portrayed it, but the profession was undergoing severe changes. The traditional boundaries between soldiers and civilians were becoming blurred, as military officers took on tasks akin to those handled by civilian managers. The military virtues that Huntington argued were creating harmonious civil-military relations were eroding.[94] Consequently, Janowitz argued, civil-military relations would be riven by ambiguities and conflicts, when old roles broke down and new ones were defined.[95]

Samuel Finer echoed some of the same points of criticism against Huntington. Not only were contemporary militaries not characterized by a complete, unambiguous professionalism, but the notion that professionalism automatically leads to loyalty is logically incoherent. He pointed out that there is little logical relationship between the feeling of being a member of a profession and loyalty to the civilian government. Instead, he showed that professional norms within the military can lead to a military coup. Looking specifically at examples of coups and military disobedience, he showed

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93 Nielsen, Suzanne C. (2012): *American Civil-Military Relations Today. The Continuing Relevance of Samuel P. Huntington's The Soldier and the State*, in *International Affairs*, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 369-76. See for instance, Feaver (2003), pp. 7-10; Feaver (1996), p. 158; Feaver (2009), p.626; Kümmel, Gerhard (2002): *The Military and its Civilian Environment: Reflections on a Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, in *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, vol. 1, no. 4, p. 65; Strachan, Hew (2006): *Making Strategy: Civil–Military Relations after Iraq*, in *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 3, p. 66; Cohen, Eliot A. (1997): *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations; The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 5, pp. 220-221; Cohen, Eliot A. (2003): *Supreme Command. Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime*, New York: Anchor Books, p. 242; Coffman, Edward M. (1991): *The Long Shadow of The Soldier and the State*, in *Journal of Military History*, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 59-82; Albright, David E. (1980): *A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations*, in *World Politics*, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 555-56.

94 Janowitz, Morris (1957): *Soldiers, Scholars, Liberals,* in *The Antioch Review,* vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 397-98; Janowitz, Morris (1960): *The Professional Soldier. A Social and Political Portrait,* New York. The Free Press, pp. 5-6, 215-31 & 343.

95 Other sociologists identified even more radical changes. Charles Moskos argued that the American military was moving from a norm-driven mentality towards a higher degree of individualization and of contractual thinking (Moskos, Charles C. (1977): *From Institution to Occupation. Trends in Military Organization*, in *Armed Forces and Society,* vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 41-50; Moskos, Charles C. et al (2000): *Armed Forces after the Cold War,* in Moskos, Charles C. et al (2000): *The Postmodern Military. Armed Forces after the Cold War,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 4; Moskos, Charles C. (2000): *Toward a Postmodern Military: The United States as a Paradigm,* in Moskos, Charles C. et al (2000): *The Postmodern Military. Armed Forces after the Cold War,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 14). To Morris Janowitz' consternation, Moskos rejected the notion of a military profession outright without justifying this move (Janowitz, Morris (1977): *From Institutional to Occupational. The Need for Conceptual Continuity*, in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 51-54). Though not a civil-military relations theorist, Moskos' theory is often used to make arguments about modern civil-military relations.

that many of these were performed by soldiers who were seemingly acting in accordance with the norms of professionalism.[96]

After a decade-long hiatus in the 1980s, civil-military relations began to attract new attention after the end of the Cold War. From the mid-1990s and for a further decade, the field saw a surge of new theoretically minded work, much of which was produced by Huntington's former students.[97] Like his earlier critics, the new theorists highlighted both empirical and theoretical problems with his work. The most important point of criticism focused on the prediction power of Huntington's theory. Peter Feaver, a former student of Huntington's, points out that his simple prediction of the Cold War development in civil-military relations – that the United States would either become more conservative or cease to exist as the Cold War continued – had been contradicted by actual events. The United States did not become significantly more conservative, nor did it lose the Cold War. Instead, based on analyses of extensive polling data, Feaver concludes that the "divergence in civilian and military preferences, which Huntington identified as troubling in 1957, endured throughout the Cold War".[98] Ideally, theories should be able to predict actual events. The fact that Huntington's theory was fundamentally unable to do so was a terrible blow and it showed that the field's dominant theory has little predictive power.

Feaver combines this empirical criticism with a theoretical critique of Huntington's concept of ideology. Huntington understood ideology as a discrete variable. Democratic polities essentially only have two ideological options: liberalism or conservatism. However, we normally do not think of ideology or political culture as a discrete variable. Instead, most cultures can brush over contradictions to produce various compromising forms. Huntington's schema of political cultures seems too simplistic. As Feaver correctly notes,

[96] Finer, Samuel E. (1962): *The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics,* London: Pall Mall Press, pp. 24-60.

[97] Feaver (1999), pp. 213 & 230-33; Desch, Michael C. (1999): *Civilian Control of the Military. The Changing Security Environment,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 2.This theoretical wave included a crucial debate about the applicability of social science methods for the study of civil-military relations (Bacevich, Andrew (1998): *Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver*, in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 447-54; Burk, James (1998): *The Logic of Crisis and Civil-Military Relations Theory: A Comment on Desch, Feaver, and Dauber*, in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 455-62; Desch, Michael C. (1998): *A Historian's Fallacies: a Reply to Bacevich*, in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 589-94; Feaver, Peter D. (1998): *Modeling Civil-Military Relations: A Reply to Burk and Bacevich*, in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 595-602).

[98] Feaver (2003), p. 36. For a full discussion of Huntington's Cold War predictions, see Feaver (2003), pp. 16-53.

> "nowhere in *Soldier and the State* did Huntington suggest that Americans could simply become 'liberal hawks', or liberals in everything but military policy – people who voted for an expansion of individual liberty *and* an expansion of the defense budget."[99]

If liberalism can become hawkish, then a heightened military threat will not necessarily make society more conservative. Liberal hawks can make room for individual and social rights, while allowing the military the autonomy necessary to tackle military threats. This would explain how the United States was able to survive the Cold War in spite of its continued liberalism. However, Huntington's schematic understanding of ideologies as discrete entities – that a society was either liberal or conservative - prevented him from exploring this option.[100]

Focusing on the way that policy-makers make strategic decisions, Eliot Cohen criticizes the way Huntington – his former supervisor at Harvard - understood the strategic process. Huntington was surprisingly silent about matters of strategy. He seemed to argue that the relationship between civilian and military leaders should be a harmonious division of labor, with the civilians setting the overall political goals and the military devising the means necessary to achieve these goals. Surveying the strategic processes in the wartime administrations of four successful wartime leaders, Cohen shows that harmony is rarely the father of achievement. Instead, these war-leaders constantly meddled in the strategic and tactical details and drove their generals to the brink of exhaustion. Consequently, Cohen argues, we should not see civil-military relations at the elite level as a division of labor. Instead, it is more of an Unequal Dialogue – a constant and often messy discussion between soldiers and civilians, where the civilian leader retains the final authority to decide the political course.[101]

Although they are impressive theoretical criticisms, none of the post-Huntingtonian theoretical work has resulted in a new overarching theory of civil-military relations. These authors show that Huntington was unable to predict empirical occurrences and that certain sub-dimensions of his framework are incoherent, but none have developed overarching theories of civil-military relations or challenged his theoretical framework *in toto*. These authors focused on developing only one dimension of civil-military relations. They used more refined methodologies to explore these dimensions empirically and typically showed that they worked differently from the portrayal of them in *The Soldier and the State.* They consequently developed better theories of one dimension of civil-military relations, yet left the rest of Huntington's theoretical framework alone.

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[99] Feaver (2003), p. 19.
[100] Tellingly, when Huntington evaluated his original predictions in a later work, he did so with a more thorough understanding of ideology (Feaver (2003), p. 22).
[101] Cohen (2003), pp. 208-224.

For instance, Morris Janowitz and his followers primarily focused on criticizing Huntington's account of professionalism. Interviews with military professionals showed that modern soldiers did not conform to Huntington's simple model. However, the Janowitzians did not provide a framework for social change that illuminates how transformations of different grand scale factors can change civil-military relations. Instead, they were content to point to observations that contradicted Huntington's notion of military identity. Without a general framework that explains social change, the observations and predictions made by Janowitz and his followers are merely projections of present trends into the future. These scholars did much to show the deeper complexities involved in the study of civil-military relations, yet they did not present an overarching theory that can compete with Huntington's. They wrote on a different analytical level.

It is often claimed that Huntingtonians and Janowitzians constitute the two fundamental approaches that define civil-military relations. This is not correct. Huntingtonians see the military profession as relatively constant, while Janowitzians argue that the military profession is changing and becoming steadily more similar to civilian identity. However, this debate focuses only on military identity, not on civil-military relations. Janowitz was a theorist of military identity, who only touched upon civil-military relations when they affected the formation of military culture. He did not produce a theory that explained how different factors affect civil-military relations.

Samuel Finer probably provided the closest thing to a complete alternative to Huntington's theory. Having rejected Huntington's professionalism-centric approach, for empirical and theoretical reasons, Finer argued that military encroachment on civilian domains followed simply from the values held within the military, and the legitimacy of the civilian state. Simply put, the military would only grab power if it felt motivated to do so. If that was the case, it could only be successful if the state lacked the legitimacy to resist the military's intrusion.[102] Based on these insights, Finer developed a typology of various forms of civil-military tensions, ranging from violence and a military putsch in societies where the state has only little legitimacy, to indirect influence in societies, where the state is highly legitimate.[103]

Finer's theoretical framework never became accepted as a viable alternative to Huntington for several reasons. Firstly, and most importantly, his overall claim was simply too broad and insubstantial. Simply saying that civil-military tensions arose from the motivation of the military and the degree of legitimate power of the civilian government was not enough to guide Cold War policymakers. His theory lacked a description of how these motivations and civilian power were created. Which factors would make the military less motivated to intervene? How could the civilian government generate legitimate power? Secondly, his end-result was more of a typology, which

[102] Finer (1962), pp. 6-164.
[103] Finer (1962), p. 168.

could be used to "rubricate" civil-military relations in a large number of cases, rather than a systematic theory that explained how civil-military relations worked in specific cases. His work lacked the rigorous connection to political sociology that was the advantage of Huntington's model. Though Finer did define many crucial concepts in his model, he was not entirely clear when it came to describing their causal relations. In some sense, Finer lacked a strong theoretical framework. Finally, Finer did not give special attention to American civil-military relations. Civil-military relations in the United States had become the field's paradigmatic case, on which every civil-military relations theory focus. By emphasizing other examples, it was not entirely clear how Finer stood vis-à-vis the dominant American approaches. In the end, though highly influential within coup studies, Finer never became part of the civil-military relations canon.

Peter Feaver shows that Huntington's theory was unable to predict United States' Cold War civil-military relations, and that his conception of ideology was imprecise. Using rational choice theory, Feaver presents an alternative theory of civilian control that focuses on how elite civil-military relations are shaped by the institutional environment of the state and past strategic behavior. In other words, his theory emphasizes that elite civil-military relations are mainly caused by factors intrinsic to the elite civil-military system. Though he recognizes the importance of variables outside this system, for instance the polarity of the international system, he does not explain how they work. He tests this theory empirically, using American Cold War and post-Cold War civil-military interaction as his cases.[104] However, he does not present a theory that allows one to analyze societal civil-military relations or how these relations affect elite civil-military relations. His framework only focuses on elite relations. It therefore ignores how other factors in society may affect these relations. As we shall see in chapter 3, one has to unpack the concept of power and redefine the role of military force for societal survival to explain how the United States managed to prevail in the Cold War without giving up liberalism. By only analyzing elite relations, Feaver shies away from looking at these other key dimensions of civil-military relations. Furthermore, as we shall see later on, civilian control is just one of the two dimensions of elite civil-military relations. By focusing specifically on this dimension, Feaver loses sight of some of the elite civil-military problems that are unrelated to the question of control. Though it is an impressive analysis of civilian control on the elite level, Feaver's approach does not present an alternative overarching theory of civil-military relations.

Eliot Cohen focuses on how military effectiveness is related to elite civil-military relations. He pinpoints a significant weakness in Huntington's framework by showing that effective civil-military relations are born out of discord rather than harmony. However, his Unequal Dialogue

[104] Feaver (2003).

approach does not present an alternative overarching theory of civil-military relations. It essentially contains two limitations. Firstly, it assumes that the military accepts the principle of civilian control. Cohen looks at empirical cases where all actors accepted the overall principle of civilian control. His studies do not explore why the military can be controlled by the civilians – instead, he looks at how the civilians use their power to maximize military effectiveness.[105] Civilian control is one of the key dimensions of civil-military relations. No overarching theory can be developed without addressing the question of civilian control.

Furthermore, Cohen's exploration of the dynamics driving military effectiveness needs further elaboration. Cohen focuses on showing that civil-military relations on the elite level are more complex than one might think. He shows, meticulously, that effective civil-military relations cannot be reduced to a division of labor. However, he does not fully explore the full complexity of the relationship between civilian involvement and the division of labor. He does not look at cases where civilian meddling was counterproductive, or where a division of labor would have been a more fruitful approach. Because of these limitations, Cohen's theory is not a final theory of military effectiveness, and therefore not an overarching theory of civil-military relations.

Michael Desch – another former Huntington supervisee - presents a theory of civil-military relations that focuses on how the domestic and international threats facing a government shape elite civil-military relations. His basic argument is that civilian control is affected by the existence of external and internal threats. Surveying some 20-odd cases from the 20th century, Desch shows that civilian control is weakened by the existence of internal threats, while external threats may – under the right circumstances – strengthen the civilian governments hold on power: civilian control is strongest, when the government is stable, yet faces an external threat.[106]

Though clearly a systematic and generally impeccable study of the causal relations between threats and civilian control, Desch's work does not constitute a rival theory of civil-military relations. Like Feaver, Desch focuses solely on civilian control, while leaving other aspects of the field unexplored. In his introduction, Desch acknowledges that civilian control is but one of the topics of civil-military relations.[107] Furthermore, even within the narrower study of civilian control, showing that external and internal threats affect patterns of control falls well short of a conclusive theory. Threat patterns may be a crucial factor in shaping civilian control, yet one could argue that they are hardly the only influential factor. Internal threats also depend on other issues, including the general legitimacy of the state. Additionally, Desch's theory says very little about how civilian control functions within these more general patterns. For instance, how can domestic factors enhance

[105] Cohen (2003), p. 10.
[106] Desch (1999), pp. 19-21 & 114-20.
[107] Desch (1999), p. 4.

civilian control within a society that faces no external and internal threats? Desch explores an important dimension of civil-military relations, yet he does not cover civil-military relations as such.

Rebecca Schiff's concordance theory tries to develop an overall theory of civil-military relations, yet does so by following an idiographic rather than nomothetic route. Schiff argues that it is the ability of the military, the political elite, and the citizenry to arrive at a cultural agreement that determines the health of civil-military relations. This cultural agreement is measured by the ability to agree on four key variables: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, military recruitment methods, and military style.[108] In other words, if actors share cultural values, significant conflict between them will not occur.

Concordance theory contains a number of problems that makes it closer to a law than a theory. Firstly, it does not provide a definition of culture, the theory's key variable.[109] Secondly, culture is treated as a black box that cannot be compared in general terms, or used to make general claims of causality.[110] Instead, the "study of civil-military relations (…) requires an empirical and ethnographic understanding of politics, history, and culture."[111] Thirdly, Schiff does not explain why these four indicators show the crucial cultural agreement that determines the state of civil-military relations. Fourth, and related to this, Schiff argues that concordance theory has predictive, but no explanatory, value:

> "the causal statement that concordance prevents domestic military intervention does not explain why it is that some nations can or have achieved concordance. … The major reasons for the theory's causal limitation results from the cultural aspect of the methodology".[112]

In other words, concordance theory can only identify when a society will have harmonious civil-military relations. It cannot explain why this happens, or how it might change in the future. Schiff's fundamental problem is that she does not operate with a consistent theoretical framework. In that sense, concordance theory is not so much a theory as the empirical observation of a law.[113]

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[108] Schiff, Rebecca L. (2009): *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations*, New York: Routledge, pp. 12-13, 32-34 & 43-47. For a definition of these variables, see Schiff, Rebecca L. (1995): *Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance*, in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 14-16.

[109] Schiff provides a list of cultural factors ("cultural factors include the values, attitudes, and symbols informing not only the nation's view of its military's role, but also the military's view of its own role") but not a clear definition of culture(Schiff (1995), p. 11). In her later work, Schiff seems to be comprehending culture as "the inner mental states and daily constructions of human beings", but is not explicit as to whether this serves as her definition (Schiff (2009), p. 15).

[110] Schiff (2009).

[111] Schiff (2009), p. 16.

[112] Schiff (2009), p. 13. See also Schiff (2009), pp. 42-43.

[113] For more encompassing critiques, see Wells, Richard S. (1996): *The Theory of Concordance in Civil-Military Relations: A Commentary*, in *Armed Forces & Society* vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 269–75 and Cohen (2003), p. 247. Schiff

In general, then, post-Huntingtonian theorists have criticized the empirical correctness and theoretical coherence of Huntington's theory. They have convincingly shown that his theory failed to predict actual events, and that several of the dimensions of his theoretical framework were overly simplistic. However, no theorist has presented an alternative overall theory or a more accurate theoretical framework.

Conclusion

Civil-military relations developed as a social scientific field of study in the middle of the 20th century. Thinkers had studied the relationship between war and politics for millennia, yet it was only in post-war America that scholars begun to formulate rigorous social science theories. Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* marked a turn towards a more nomothetic approach. Unlike previous scholars, Huntington presented a coherent theoretical framework, developed by combining political sociology with military sociology and military science. Though he focused on elite civil-military relations, he rightly understood that these relations cannot be understood without grasps how they are affected by societal civil-military relations. This led him to a theory that emphasized the professionalism of the officer corps as the key factor in civil-military relations. He predicted that the United States would either become more conservative or unable to keep up militarily with the Soviet Union.

Over the more than half a century since its original publication, civil-military relations scholars have shown that Huntington's theory and theoretical framework suffer from significant empirical and theoretical weaknesses. Empirically, it has been shown that Huntington was unable to predict how American Cold War civil-military relations would conclude. Theoretically, scholars have uncovered significant problems in his description of various sub-dimensions of civil-military relations. Some of the newer theories have provided richer explanations of sub-dimensions of Huntington's framework, yet none of them have presented an alternative overall theory or a new theoretical framework. Thus, Huntington's theory and theoretical framework still define the field well into the second decade of the 21st century. The remainder of this dissertation focuses on developing a better theoretical framework for the political science study of elite civil-military relations. It can benefit from recent advances in civil-military relations, and political and military sociology to arrive at a more coherent understanding of the role of military power in social change. The framework defines the core concepts of civil-military relations, and outlines the most important causal links shaping elite civil-military relations. The new theoretical framework will be presented in the coming chapters.

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has responded to these points of criticism (Schiff, Rebecca L. (1996): *Concordance Theory: A Response to Recent Criticism*, in *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 277-83 & Schiff (2009), pp. 37-43).

Part II: Societal civil-military relations

- 3 -

The functional imperative

Civil-military relations consist of two dimensions: societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations. A theory of elite civil-military relations only makes sense when it is combined with a theory of societal civil-military relations and *vice versa*. A comprehensive theory must necessarily engage with both societal civil-military relations and elite civil-military relations. The present dissertation is about the study of civil-military relations within political science and its main focus is consequently on elite civil-military relations. However, these relations cannot be studied in isolation. They are affected by processes that occur in society at large. A theoretical framework of elite civil-military relations must necessarily outline the societal civil-military relations processes that affect the elite level.

The following two parts each look at one of these fields of study. The present part (which consists of chapters 3 and 4) explores societal civil-military relations. This is not meant to be a comprehensive study of societal civil-military relations. Instead, the chapters outline the societal processes that influence elite civil-military relations. Societal civil-military relations are shaped by two fundamental imperatives: the societal and the functional imperative. Chapter 4 explores the societal imperative – that is, how the state interacts with civil society to generate the resources necessary to build up an effective military. The present chapter looks at the functional imperative – that is, how the state handles outside military threats.

In *The Soldier and the State,* Samuel Huntington argued that the United States would be destroyed by the functional imperative if it did not grow more conducive to the needs of its military. This, he claimed, could only be achieved by abandoning liberalism and adopting a more conservative posture. However, as we saw in chapter 2, history produced a different outcome. The United States stayed liberal, yet still managed to prevail in the Cold War. This failure to predict the outcome of the Cold War highlights a hole in his theory. In this chapter, I argue that this inconsistency was caused by an incomplete definition of the functional imperative: Huntington did not fully explore how conventional military force supports the modern state.

The functional imperative comprises the material requirements that a society must fulfill in order to survive. Huntington understood this mainly as the threat posed by conventional warfare. The key task in the Cold War, he argued, was to ensure that America had a ferocious fighting force that could fend off a conventional Soviet invasion. I argue that conventional military force plays a different role for modern societies. For most states in the modern era, military security is not

achieved solely by increasing their conventional military force. Instead, their main deterrent is their stock of nuclear weapons. Conventional force is but one of many tools available for the state. Diplomacy, economic strength, and technological innovation also play a significant role. When we look how the United States prevailed in the Cold War, we notice that its conventional military forces only played a marginal role. The United States was never forced to mobilize its entire society to maximize its short-term conventional military force. Consequently, it was never forced to make the choice between a pro-military conservatism and an anti-military liberalism.

My argument progresses in three steps. In the first section, I explore the nature of the functional imperative in highly abstract terms. I look at the state's power accumulation strategies in the second section. Finally, I use the power accumulation framework to analyze how the United States won the Cold War in the last section.

The functional imperative and the state

The functional imperative is one of the two main forces, which, Huntington argued, shape societal civil-military relations. "The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces", he wrote in the introduction of *The Soldier and the State*, "a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. … The interaction of these two forces is the nub of the problem of civil-military relations."[114] Huntington did not explain the functional imperative beyond these cursory remarks. However, it played a crucial role in the theoretical framework that came out of his work. When he applied his framework to analyze American Cold War civil-military relations he clearly understood the functional imperative as a conventional military threat. Professional soldiers were necessary for handling the functional imperative.[115] An unprofessional military would not have the skills necessary for fighting the wars that were required to keep America secure. Therefore, society had to adapt to the need for a professional military and adopt a posture that tolerated conventional warfare. This entailed giving up liberalism and replacing it with a more conservative attitude.[116] "The tension between the demands of military security and the values of American liberalism", he wrote in the concluding chapter of *The Soldier and the State,* "can, in the long run, be relieved only by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism."[117]

[114] Huntington (1957b), p. 2.
[115] Huntington (1957b), pp. 345-46. It is remarkable that Huntington did not recognize the implications of the introduction of nuclear weapons. Nowhere did he discuss if military expertise would be applicable when it came to the use of nuclear weapons. Instead, he emphasized that diplomacy had played a fairly limited role in handling the post-war functional imperative (Huntington (1957b), p. 345).
[116] I look specifically at the societal imperative in chapter 4.
[117] Huntington (1957b), p. 456.

The concept of the functional imperative has deep sociological roots that were not explicitly explored by Huntington. The term was borrowed from functionalist sociology – a theoretical wave that dominated American sociology in the first two decades after the Second World War. To state what may seem obvious, societies consist of people with biological needs that have to be met. The state depends on the cooperation of the populace, which it can only get by ensuring that people are fed, clothed, and have access to other basic necessities.[118] National security is thus the matter of ensuring that the state has enough resources to meet these demands.[119] The functional imperative describes all the phenomena – domestic as well as international – that may destroy a population and which may erode the state's legitimacy. In other words, the functional imperative comprises the material requirements that a society must fulfill in order to survive. To be sure, the threats that a state faces may be man-made or have natural causes. War, however, is one of the most important threats that modern societies face. Hostilities with other societies is one of the four exterior factors - the others being environmental problems, climate change, and loss of trading partners - that Jared Diamond identifies as causing societal collapse.[120]

In *Guns, Germs, and Steel*, Diamond uses the story of the Moriori - a small unwarlike tribe "with simple technology and weapons, and without strong leadership or organization" who inhabited the Chathams, 800 kilometers off the coast of New Zealand - to illustrate how the inability to handle war may cause the obliteration of a society.[121] When their existence was discovered by New Zealand's bellicose and ferocious Maori in 1835, the result was near-annihilation:

> "500 Maori armed with guns, clubs, and axes arrived, followed [weeks later] by … 400 more Maori. Groups of Maori began to walk through Moriori settlements announcing that the Moriori were now their slaves, and killing those who objected. An organized resistance by the Moriori could have defeated the Maori, who were outnumbered two to one. However, the Moriori had a tradition of resolving disputes peacefully. … Before the Moriori could deliver [a peace offer], the Maori attacked en masse. Over the course of the next few days, they killed hundreds of Moriori, cooked and ate many of their bodies, and enslaved all the others, killing most of them too over the next few years as it suited their whim."[122]

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[118] Parsons & Shils (1951), pp. 197-98.

[119] Lake, David A. (1996): *Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,* in *International Organization,* vol. 50, no. 1, p. 5.

[120] Diamond, Jared (2005): *Collapse. How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive,* New York: Penguin Books, pp. 11-15.

[121] Diamond, Jared (1997): *Guns,Germs, and Steel. The Fates of Human Society*, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 53-54; Endicott, Kirk (2013): *Peaceful Foragers. The Significance of the Batek and Moriori for the Question of Innate Human Violence,* in Fry, Douglas P. (2013): *War, Peace, and Human Nature: The Convergence of Evolutionary and Cultural Views,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 250-55. Technically speaking, the Moriori are a Maori sub-tribe. The incident can therefore be labeled as a case of intra-Maori warfare. However, I distinguish between the Moriori and the Maori for the sake of clarity.

[122] Diamond (1997), p. 53.

The story of the Moriori's fatal demise illustrates what may be at stake in warfare, *in extremis*. To be sure, modern societies rarely end with the total eradication of an entire population. The defeated state is usually dismantled and the occupying state takes over the administrative control of the territory, either directly or by proxy. The victorious state typically tries to engage in a new social contract with the population to gather the taxes and support that is necessary to make a society stronger.

The history of human civilization can be cast as the development of steadily more sophisticated institutions, designed to handle the functional imperative.[123] Some scholars suggest that violence was prevalent among pre-civilizational societies.[124] This is contested by other researchers, who question the archeological evidence and argue that warfare was an evolutionary inferior strategy for scattered groups who were not necessarily in direct competition with one another.[125] This debate is mainly of interest for archeologists and anthropologists. If it were not a steady feature of social and political life already, military competition between groups became so when tribes and bands were replaced by more complex political units. These units were more adept at handling the functional imperative. Whereas a tribe could be vulnerable to environmental changes, sudden natural disasters, or surprise attacks from other tribes, organized states could build granaries and other storages to handle the cycles of nature, and develop armies and fortifications to diminish military threats.[126]

The state secures the population by ensuring that they cooperate to produce the necessities of life. Pre-state societies were of course also dependent on cooperation. These societies were built around activities that were organized face-to-face, such as hunting, gathering, simple farming, and warfare. However, in more complex societies, the greater range of needs require advanced institutions that coordinate, without necessarily needing to convince everyone about every detail. Thus, decision power largely was removed from the immediate, everyday experience of ordinary people. The need for complete popular understanding would require massive resources, and that would put a brake on the complexity of coordinated communal action. Simply put, getting everyone in a group to understand a problem and to agree about the most pertinent course of action can be a cumbersome and inefficient way of organizing social life. In state-based societies, decision power

[123] Parsons, Talcott (1964): *Evolutionary Universals in Society*, in *American Sociological Review,* vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 339-57.
[124] Keeley, Lawrence (1996): *War before Civilization,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25-39; Gat, Azar (2006): *War in Human Civilization.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 11-145; Gat, Azar (1999): *The Pattern of Fighting in Simple, Small-Scale, Prestate Societies,* in *Journal of Anthropological Research,* vol. 55, no. 4, pp. 563-83.
[125] Haas, Johnathan & Matthew Piscitelli (2013): *The Prehistory of Warfare. Misled by Ethnography,* in Fry, Douglas P. (2013): *War, Peace, and Human Nature: The Convergence of Evolutionary and Cultural Views,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 168-90.
[126] Gat (2006), pp. 149-442.

therefore became delegated to rulers and their bureaucracies.[127] As Charles Tilly has shown, the early states were little more than protection rackets akin to modern day organized crime: a group of loosely coordinated men, who used their superior organization and military skills to strike terror in a population within a given territory to pay tribute. However, this largely self-interested behavior increasingly solved coordination problems within society and gave rise to steadily more complex societal forms. Thus, the state's largely self-interested behavior had positive, unanticipated consequences.[128]

The state's control of a territory depends on its ability to use power to fend off rival states. Power is one actor's ability to influence the actions of other actors. Kenneth Waltz argues that power is a capability held by states, which may not be used, but the presence of which can be traced by looking at the behavior of other states. In his words, "an agent is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him"[129] Potential force and violence make up the core of power, yet power is something more than just acts of force.[130] Power can also be the tacit acceptance that others have a greater potential for violence. Power is relative. The absolute size of a state's army and arsenal does not matter *per se*. Instead, it matters if the state has a greater arsenal than its neighbors and if this is enough to force them to do its bidding.

The international realm is anarchic and thus states can only rely on themselves for their security. One of the great insights in international relations is that states face a security dilemma: a state's accumulation of power may create insecurity for other states. If a state acquires additional weaponry to secure itself against an assault by its neighbor, it implicitly enhances its own ability to make offensive attacks against other states.[131] The best way to understand this is to see the international system as a political counterpart to the economic system. Whereas firms compete in the marketplace for profit, states compete for power in the international realm.[132]

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[127] Habermas (1987), pp. 153-97. This functionalist argument has to be mirrored by an argument that explores the justification of political power from the viewpoint of the individual. I do that in chapter 4, where I look at the societal imperative.

[128] Tilly, Charles (1985): *War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,* in Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer & Theda Skocpol (1985): *Bringing the State Back In,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 169-91.

[129] Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): *Theory of International Politics,* New York: McGraw-Hill, p. 192).

[130] By force, I mean the ability to manipulate physical matter. By violence I mean force directed at living beings. For a discussion of the difference, see Arendt, Hannah (1969): *On Violence,* New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., pp. 44-47.

[131] Jervis, Robert (1978): *Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,* in *World Politics,* vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 167-86 & 199-214; Herz, John D. (1950): *Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,* in *World Politics,* vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 157-80; Mearsheimer, John J. (1995b): *The False Promise of International Institutions,* in *International Security,* vol. 19, no. 3, p. 10.

[132] Waltz (1979), pp. 89-91. For non-realist versions of the analogy between the economy and the international system, see North, Douglass C. (1981): *Structure and Change in Economic History*, New York: W. W. Norton; Lane, Frederic C. (1979): *Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises*, Albany: State University of New York Press. This description of the international system was made famous by

The international system contains what international relations scholars refer to as "structural modifiers" that minimize the competition between states.[133] The two most important structural modifiers are geography and the offense-defense balance. Firstly, the use of force – and thus power itself - has a price. To enact force over long distances or across geographical barriers, such as seas or mountains, require additional manpower, supply lines, and fortifications. These have to be protected from enemy assaults and the wrath of the elements, and often require costly transport over deserts, oceans, and mountains. Similarly, conquered territory only becomes beneficial when it is under control, which requires police institutions and state legitimacy. All in all, this ensures that states generally refrain from major ventures into enemy territories.[134]

Secondly, the difference between the cost of offensive weapons and the cost of defensive weapons – the so-called offense-defense balance - also affects the stability of the system. Winning an offensive campaign becomes significantly more costly when defensive weapons are cheaper to deploy than offensive ones. A great example of this is the First World War, where the use of trenches, the introduction of the Maxim gun, and the immobility of communications technology gave defenders a significant advantage. In spite of the belief among pre-war generals that offensive action would be rewarded, these conditions reduced what should have been a display of daring offensive action to a grueling four-year trench nightmare.[135] The security dilemma is thus diminished if policymakers and military leaders acknowledge the advantage of defensive capabilities. States do not have to fear a sudden surprise attack, because even relatively modest defensive capabilities will be sufficient to discourage an assault.[136]

Kenneth Waltz. However, it is important to emphasize that the description given here does not necessarily lead to a structural realist theory. Waltz' description of the international system has since become the theoretical framework of international relations. All rival theories react to Waltz' theory and use – at least implicitly – the notion of the international system. The way the Waltzian system is described in this section corresponds to the standard usage in international relations as such.

[133] Snyder, Glenn (1996): *Process Variables in Neorealist Theory,* in *Security Studies,* vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 169-71; Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (2001): *Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,* in *International Security,* vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 136-41. Snyder defines structural modifiers as "system-wide influences that are structural in their inherent nature but not potent enough internationally to warrant that designation. They modify the effects of the more basic structural elements on the interaction process, but they are not interaction itself" (Snyder (1996), p. 169).

[134] Jervis (1978), pp. 194-99; Buzan, Barry & Ole Wæver (2003): *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27-28 & 45-46; Mearsheimer, John J. (2001): *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* New York: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 44, 83-84 & 114-28; Kaplan, Robert D. (2012): *The Revenge of Geography. What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate,* New York: Random House, pp. 28-37.

[135] Jervis (1978), 187 & 191-92; Keegan, John (1998): *The First World War*, London: Hutchinson, pp. 22-23 & 338-41; van Evera, Stephen (1984): *The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,* in *International Security,* vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 58-107.

[136] Jervis (1978) pp. 186-210; Lynn-Jones, Sean M. (1995): *Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics,* in *Security Studies,* vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 660-91; Hopf, Ted (1991): *Polarity, the Offense-Defense Balance, and War,* in *American Political Science Review,* vol. 85, no. 2, pp. 475-93; van Evera, Stephen (1999): *Causes of War*. *Power and the Roots of Conflict*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 117-92, Mearsheimer (2001), pp. 20-21.

To sum up, the functional imperative is the material requirements that a society has to fulfill in order to survive. States strive to become secure from enemy aggression by acquiring power resources that enable them to control other actors. The competition for power constitutes the international system, the structure of which rewards power accumulating behavior and punishes waste of resources.

Power accumulation strategies

Grand strategy is the purposeful employment of a state's power resources to ensure its security.[137] The state's core activity is to make sure that it has enough power to secure itself against an enemy attack. Much like a firm, the state uses its current stock of power to pursue opportunities that will generate even more power. Theorists generally emphasize four potential strategies for acquiring power: military build-up, economic growth, war, and diplomacy. Broadly speaking, the first two are created domestically, while the latter two are directed towards other societies.[138] One gets a clear idea of how the functional imperative arises and how the state counteracts it by looking at how each these power generation mechanisms work.

Internal Measures: Military Capabilities and Economic Growth

At the core of power is force, and the ultimate determinant of power is the state's stock of military capabilities. However, the production of military capabilities is not simply a matter of investing in weaponry. The state has a finite amount of resources and it must choose between investing directly in general military capabilities, which give a short-term boost in power, or in more long-term prospects, such as military innovation or economic growth.[139]

The most basic way to build up military capabilities is to increase the means of force directly through purchase of equipment or recruitment. Generally speaking, capability purchases expand the power of the state linearly. A state with 10 armored divisions can boost its capabilities by 10 percent if it invests in yet another division. This increases the state's ability to handle a short-term threat. However, states can also make investments that do not increase their stock of power in the short

[137] This definition is derived from Hart, Basil Lidell (1967): *Strategy,* London: Faber & Faber, p.322. See also, Morison, Samuel E. (1958): *Strategy and Compromise. A Reappraisal of the Crucial Decisions Confronting the Allies in the Hazardous Years, 1940-1945,* Boston: Little, Brown and Company, pp. 5-6.

[138] Waltz (1979), p. 118.

[139] In this section, I ignore the fact that the state can increase its extractive capabilities. For instance, as we shall see in chapter 4, one of the significant advantages held by revolutionary France was its ability to extract large swaths of dedicated conscripts from its population – a feat that was unavailable to its rivals. In the present analysis I assume that the state has a finite amount of resources, which it distributes among competing short- or long-term investments. In the following section on the Cold War I will implicitly be aware of the possibility of increased extractive capabilities.

term, but which yield a significant increase in power in the long term. Understanding these choices involves assessing the importance of technology and the market economy in modern society.[140]

One of the main characteristics of modern war is the important role played by technology. To be sure, technology has always been a game-changer in warfare. For instance, in his seminal *A History of Warfare,* John Keegan emphasized how the invention of the chariot in the second millennium BC skewed the balance of power radically towards societies that mastered this technology. It allowed warriors to increase their speed of movement tenfold, thus creating a highly mobile killing machine when bands of chariots, carrying bowmen, fought together in battle. The ancient empires – the Egyptians, the Indians, and the Mesopotamians - were soon overrun by hitherto obscure tribes who mastered the art of chariot warfare. In ungoverned corners of the globe, such as China, charioteers were able to use their competitive advantage to concentrate enough power to set up new states. However, despite these impressive feats, military victories were rarely driven by technology. Military technological innovation was uncommon and often the result of a sophistication process that spanned over millennia.[141]

Modern society, by contrast, is characterized by an extreme degree of innovation that allows new technologies to appear within the span of a few years. Investment in new military technologies can therefore be a way of developing more capabilities in the long run by sacrificing short-term gains. The nuclear bomb, for instance, increased military firepower by a factor of thousands, yet the expense of Manhattan Project and related production projects only account for slightly more than one percent of American defense outlays in the same period.[142] The total cost of the 70,000 nuclear warheads that the United States developed and produced between 1945 and 1990 amounted to less than three percent of total defense outlays.[143] In other words, technological investments entail

[140] Knorr, Klaus E. (1956): *The War Potential of Nations,* Westport: Greenwood Press, pp. 22-28; Milward, Alan (1977): *War, Economy and Society 1939-1945,* New York: Penguin Books, pp. 19-23.
[141] Keegan, John (1993): *A History of Warfare.* London: Hutchinson, pp. 155-69.
[142] My calculations, based on data from O'Neill, Kenneth (1998): *Building the Bomb,* in Schwartz, Stephen I. (1998): *Atomic Audit. The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,* Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, p. 63 and Executive Office of the President of the United States of America (2011): *Budget of the US Government. Fiscal Year 2012. Historical Tables,* Washington D.C.: Office of Management and Budgets, pp. 131-38. The numbers have been deflated using table 10.1 on pp. 211-12. These numbers do not include the hidden costs of the project, such as the costs of gaining control of territory with sufficient supplies of uranium and training nuclear scientists. However, the total expenses would not have skyrocketed, even if these costs were added.
[143] My calculations, based on data from O'Neill (1998), p. 33 and Executive Office of the President of the United States of America (2011), pp. 131-38. The numbers have been deflated using table 10.1 on pp. 211-12. This only includes the cost of the development and production of the actual warheads. Stephen Schwartz argues that the total expenses of the US nuclear program between 1940 and 1996, including related expenses, such as the cost of delivery systems, defensive systems, weapons dismantling, and nuclear waste management, corresponds to 29 percent of total defense expenditure (Schwartz, Stephen I. (1998): *Introduction,* in Schwartz, Stephen I. (1998): *Atomic Audit. The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons Since 1940,* Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. xxii & 3).

foregoing a short-term increase in capabilities, when resources are used for the development process instead. However, in the long term this may be a sensible investment if the increase in capability effectiveness outweighs the loss of resources.

Technological innovation is not the only way of acquiring more formidable weapons. First-movers rarely get to keep their innovations for themselves. Rival powers can often rapidly emulate the new technology. Because powers that are "catching up" do not have to invest as much on research and development, they tend to acquire the same increase in military strength at a much lower cost. For example, this was largely the pattern in military innovation during the Cold War. The United States generally came up with new technologies, which were quickly usurped by the Soviet Union.[144] It caused a furor when Moscow conducted its first successful nuclear test in August 1949, little more than four years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. American strategists had expected that the USSR would go nuclear eventually, but no one had imagined it would catch up so soon. Being second-movers gave the Soviets several advantages that helped them develop the bomb cheaply. Stalin only realized the strategic importance of the bomb after having witnessed the attacks on Japan. Furthermore, the Soviets could rely on open source information and, more importantly, on secret intelligence, most notably from Klaus Fuchs, a physicist who spied for the USSR from inside the Manhattan Project.[145]

So far, I have focused solely on the ways in which the state is capable of building capabilities directly. Yet, one of the key characteristics of modern society is the existence of a capitalist market economy. To understand how the economy works as a power generation devise, one has to bring in lessons and concepts from economic theory.[146] The modern economy functions as a system on par with the international system. Whereas the unit in the international realm is the state, the unit in the economy is the firm or the corporation. It faces competition over consumer capital (which is finite at any given time) and it ceases to exist once it is unable to provide its laborers with the wages they require. This forces the firm to constantly seek the most effective solutions. Firms are forced to develop new technologies if they are to retain their competitive edge. The economic system therefore creates and enhances technological innovation. Together with expansion of labor and

[144] Evangelista, Matthew (1988): *Innovation and the Arms Race. How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 7-8; Thee, Marek (1986): *Military Technology, Military Strategy and the Arms Race,* London: Croom Helm, p. 14.

[145] Holloway, David (1994): *Stalin and the Bomb. The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939-56,* New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 114-15, 220-23 & 364-71; Zubok, Vladislav M. (1999): *Stalin and the Nuclear Age,* in Gaddis, John L., Philip Gordon, Ernest May & Jonathan Rosenberg (1999): *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb. Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 40-49.

[146] Of course, the following presentation of the power accumulation potential of the market economy is scant and somewhat superficial. However, this is essentially a dissertation on civil-military relations – not on the relationship between economics and military power. The conceptual framework presented here represents the mainstream view within economics and political economy and captures the debates within these fields.

capital, economists argue that it is the level of technological innovation that determines the rate of economic growth.[147]

One of the key tenets of classical economic theory is that international trade increases the effectiveness of the economic system. The law of comparative advantage – introduced by David Ricardo - famously argues that if two states can trade freely, each can do what they do best and sell their excess production to the other, thus making both states better off. This is the case even if one of the states has an advantage in all industries. Most economists therefore emphasize that free trade enhances the growth potential in the market significantly.[148] However, it is largely impossible to estimate the exact net effect of international trade for economic growth.[149] International trade has an important political dimension, which limits it significantly in spite of the mutual benefits involved. The state has a significant influence over international trade. Trade requires a legal framework that helps the parties trust each other. However, when trade goes beyond borders, this framework requires state cooperation through international institutions. The state can also put restrictions on international trade by setting up trade barriers.[150] All in all, the key question concerns the state's interest in international trade. Evidence suggests that concerns about the relative balance of power do not necessarily impede on trade.[151]

The capitalist economy can generate military capabilities for the state in three ways. Firstly, innovation in military technology can occur in the market economy instead of within the state. A market economy has certain structural advantages over a purely state-based system. Competition on the free market forces companies to innovate to keep prices low or quality high. This pushes innovation forward at a comparatively higher pace.[152] In the long run, the anonymous pressure of the market rewards companies that develop effective solutions. This often provides local managers

[147] Gilpin, Robert (2001): *Global Political Economy. Understanding the International Economic Order,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 109-12.
[148] Gilpin (2001), pp. 196-233.
[149] Rodriguez, Francisco & Dani Rodrik (2001): *Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Skeptic's Guide to the Cross-National Evidence,* in Bernanke, Bernard & Kenneth Rogoff (2001): *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15,* Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 261- 325; Hsieh, Chang-Tai (2001): *Comment,* in Bernanke, Bernard & Kenneth Rogoff (2001): *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15,* Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 325-30; Jones, Charles I. (2001): *Comment,* in Bernanke, Bernard & Kenneth Rogoff (2001): *NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15,* Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 330-37.
[150] Gilpin (2001), pp. 80-102.
[151] Morrow, James D. (1997): *When Do 'Relative Gains' Impede Trade?,* in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 12-37; Liberman, Peter (1996b): *Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains,* in *International Security,* vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 147-75. Michael Mastanduno has shown that geopolitical considerations make up but one of the factors determining at least American trade policy (Mastanduno, Michael (1998): *Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship,* in *International Organization,* vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 825-54).
[152] Evangelista (1988), pp. 29-33. As Evangelista notes, a state-directed system has one advantage over the market-based model: when a decision to push innovation in one direction has been made, state-based systems can gather resources behind the decision more efficiently.

with the autonomy needed to generate innovation. For instance, observers of the Soviet weapons industry noted that the system was highly formalized, and tended to stifle innovation by not allowing research teams the organizational freedom necessary to develop long-term technological solutions.[153]

Secondly, private investments lead to economic growth, which is then directed back to the state through the tax system. A larger GDP provides the state with more resources that can be invested in military capabilities, or used to create alliances.[154] For example, as we shall see below, the outcome of the Cold War was largely determined by the greater effectiveness of the American economy. The American capitalist system generated a higher economic growth than its Soviet counterpart. In the long term, this allowed America to buy and develop more military capabilities, and to invest in new military technologies.[155]

Finally, relatively secure financial markets give the state access to credit at lower interest rates. The ability to borrow capital for investments in military capabilities can give states a significant strategic advantage. The ability to loan at a relatively low interest rate gives states the opportunity to make massive investments in the short term that may provide the tipping point in an actual conflict. This gives the state a flexibility that allows them to increase their short term investments in weaponry and political alliances.[156] For instance, the Confederacy generated significant amounts of capital during the American Civil War by issuing bonds that were guaranteed in future yields of cotton. Ironically, cotton – and thereby also cotton bonds - was in high demand as markets worried about the supply from the South due to the very same war as the bonds were helping to pay for. The South thus generated significant short-term resources for the war by taking advantage of the financial system.[157] In that sense, access to financial markets, whether domestic or foreign, can be a significant advantage.

The development of capitalism has fundamentally changed the way international relations work. In the premodern period, war was generally decided by the courage, strength and skill of the fighting force and the tactical and strategic nous of commanders.[158] An invasion by highly specialized and motivated warrior tribes from the surrounding ungoverned territories was a real threat for most ancient societies. The Roman Empire, for instance, was a largely agricultural society, where the potential for innovation was relatively low. Historians estimate that their average long-term real

[153] Evangelista (1988), pp. 38-49.
[154] Milward (1977), pp. 19-23.
[155] Friedberg, Aaron L. (2000): *In the Shadow of the Garrison State, America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 340-50.
[156] Tilly, Charles (1992): *Coercion, Capital, and European States,* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 83-84.
[157] Ferguson, Niall (2008): *The Ascent of Money. A Financial History of the World*, New York: Penguin Books, pp. 92-97.
[158] Keegan, John (1987): *The Mask of Command,* New York: Penguin Books, pp. 113-26 & 304-10.

economic growth was approximately 0.1 percent per annum.[159] Constant foreign campaigns were necessary to replenish the coffers of the empire and the pockets of the standing army. For instance, when Carthage faced fiscal ruin after its defeat in the First Punic War, new military adventures were the easiest way to bring balance to the empire's finances. Hamilcar Barca, the father of the famous Hannibal, led a campaign in Spain, where he gained control of the rich mines of the Sierra Morena.[160] As one historian summarizes the vicious circle of constant warfare, "the tranquility of nations was impossible without armies, armies without soldiers' wages, or wages without tribute".[161] The Roman state was constantly forced to engage in warfare, yet the Roman state held very few advantages over the barbarian tribes beyond its borders. As Edward Luttwak point out, the Roman army was not characterized by markedly superior technology or tactics nor was the Roman legionnaire famous for his courage.[162]

The nexus of technology and the market economy changed that. The increase in wealth within capitalist economies meant that modern states can develop power by investing less in military force and more in private industry. Advanced societies are capable of generating more resources, which in turn can enhance military capabilities. The development of capitalism meant that the state became increasingly dependent on another institution – the firm – for the production of power. Market and state solve problems of coordination in tandem.[163] Contemporary society is characterized by a steady growth of its economic output due to the innovation-creating potential of the market economy. The power resources available to society steadily increase, making its state capable of deterring enemy attacks. *Ceteris paribus*, over the long haul, the state cannot withhold its position vis-à-vis other states if it has a lower GDP growth. The market economy allowed the state to reap the fruits of innovation and gain a long term advantage over non-capitalist states. The power of the state made freelancing bands relatively less potent. Whereas savage tribes had once derived their power from the courage, strength, and excellence that comes from being accustomed to war, contemporary society derives its power from the innovation which can only arise in a society that is at relative peace. The martial values - courage, strength, and excellence - that characterized the pre-modern warrior lost some of its importance for the outcome of war.

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[159] Scheidel, Walter (2008): *In Search of Roman Economic Growth,* Palo Alto: Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics, pp. 19-20.
[160] Miles, Richard (2010): *Carthage Must be Destroyed. The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization,* London: Allen Lane, pp. 212-20.
[161] Molho, Anthony (1995): *The State and Public Finance: A Hypothesis based on the History of Late-Medieval Florence,* in *The Journal of Modern History,* vol. 67, supplement, p. S97.
[162] Luttwak, Edward N. (1975): *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire. From the First Century A.D. to the Third,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 1-5.
[163] Modern society thus resembles what Philip Bobbitt calls "the market state" (Bobbitt, Philip (2002): *The Shield of Achilles. War, Peace, and the Course of History,* New York: Anchor Books, pp. 213-42).

This evolution has a long history, but it came into decisive fruition with the Industrial Revolution. The changing balance between savagery and civilization was not lost on the early political economists. As Adam Smith observed in *The Wealth of Nations*:

> "In modern war the great expense of firearms gives an evident advantage to the nation which can best afford that expense; and consequently to an opulent and civilized over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the poor and barbarous nations. In modern times the poor and barbarous nations find it difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized."[164]

It is important to keep in mind that the relationship between the state and the economy is a two-way street. Just as the state needs the economy to develop its power, so does the economy require the state to manage what economists call public goods. In simple terms, public goods are those which everyone benefits from, but where it is difficult to ensure that everyone pays for their usage, making it impossible for a private firm to profiteer from producing the good.[165] Public goods are therefore commonly produced by the state. The existence of these goods, and their necessity for the continuation of capitalism has been known since the first political economists. When Adam Smith described the basic conditions of the new capitalist system in *The Wealth of Nations*, he recognized that the production of public goods were "duty of the sovereign or commonwealth".[166] He stressed that the conditions for private property, defense and a judicial system, and the production of public goods that enhanced the welfare of all citizens, such as infrastructure, should be handled by the state.[167]

Economists still debate where the optimal balance between the market and the state lies. In fact, most socio-economic debate is concerned with how many other functions are public goods that should be handled by the state. This dissertation is not about political economy *per se* and finding the right balance between these two systems is well beyond our scope. The key conclusion is that the co-existence of the state and the market are necessary conditions for modern political life. The state protects capitalism, while capitalism provides the state with the resources needed to offer self-protection. While mutually dependent, capitalism and the state simultaneously exist in continuous conflict with each other. Each of the systems requires resources to exist and they therefore try to acquire these at the expense of one another. The optimal government interference in the market

[164] Smith, Adam (1976): *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Volume 2*, Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 230-31.
[165] Economists define public goods as goods where "any individual's consumption (…) does not affect (decrease) consumption of the good by others, and that no one can be prevented from consuming the good whether or not he or she has paid for it" (Gilpin (2001), p. 100).
[166] Smith (1976), p. 213.
[167] Smith (1976), pp. 213-340.

depends on the amount of public goods required. However, identifying these public goods is a complex empirical process, which public debate is only partially effective in promoting.[168] Capitalism and the state will therefore continuously try to crowd out certain of the other's aims.

International Measures: Diplomacy and War

The security of states does not only depend on their ability to summon inner strength. Their external actions can also help them stock up on power. States can either use persuasion or brute force to accumulate power in the international realm. Diplomacy is a state's use of persuasion in the international realm. Although states sometimes try to forge alliances with non-state actors – insurgent or opposition groups, NGOs and the like - their primary cooperative partners are other states. Interstate cooperation occurs through the establishment of institutions. Institutions function like inter-state contracts where states promise to abide to certain rules. States engage in this type of cooperation because it helps them achieve common goals.[169]

Institutions come in many forms. Some international institutions are little more than *ad hoc* statements of intent between a few states. Others, such as the UN, are highly formalized and involve the creation of an independent bureaucracy and formal decision-making procedures. In a security perspective, alliances are the most important type of institutions. An alliance "is a commitment for mutual military support against some external actor(s) in some specified set of circumstances."[170] They typically have a narrow military focus and include a limited number of states.

International cooperation is difficult as the competition for power makes states wary about conceding any advantage to their rivals. The notion of common goals is therefore not unproblematic. Because states are concerned about their stock of power vis-à-vis potential invaders, states base their decisions to cooperate on calculations of both the absolute and relative gains of the cooperation. When two states – state A and state B - collaborate with one another they are motivated by the prospect of both states increasing their security in absolute terms. However, state A also worries that state B will benefit more from the cooperation, thus making B stronger than A. State B will, of course, have the same concerns. This makes cooperation difficult as both state A and B try to maximize their individual gains from the alliance at the other's expense. Under some

[168] Habermas (1987), pp. 345-46.

[169] Scholars of course disagree about the importance of international institutions. For a good example of how this debate fits into the framework outlined above, contrast Ikenberry, G. John (2001): *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars,* Princeton: Princeton University Press with Schweller, Randall L. (2001): *The Problem of International Order Revisited: A Review Essay,* in *International Security,* vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 161-86.

[170] Walt, Stephen M. (1997): *Why Alliances Endure or Collapse*, in *Survival,* vol. 39, no. 1, p. 157.

circumstances, cooperation is possible.[171] Generally speaking, states collude as long as they have a shared interest. States look out for their own security first when faced with a devastating threat. They will therefore shirk from their commitment to the security of other states if that engagement risks putting their own security at jeopardy.[172] For instance, citing legal technicalities, Italy famously decided not to join Germany and Austria-Hungary – with whom it had had a defensive military pact since 1882 – at the eve of the First World War. Instead it joined the Triple Entente against its former allies the following year. Rome estimated that the Entente would most likely win the war and secure Italy significant land-gains from Austria-Hungary. Had Italy fought on the losing side of the war, the internal cohesion of the young Italian state could have been at risk. As it turned out, the expected victory came at a steep price and not even land gains could prevent the Italian state from being thrown into disarray.[173]

War, the mirror-opposite of diplomacy, is "the systematic and extensive use of violence as a means of policy by an organized social group claiming (but not necessarily exercising) legitimate control over a given territory, against another such group (or groups)."[174] War is an activity that can be used to acquire an advantage in military capabilities, economic wealth or diplomatic cooperation. It is therefore typically the tool used by states that are losing ground in one of the three other dimensions of power.

Wars are fought for many different reasons, yet when we understand them in terms of power accumulation, the aim of war is to use short-term advantages to avoid long-term disadvantages.[175] In other words, war may become a superior power accumulation strategy when the relative balance of power between one or more states shifts, making one state relatively weaker than the other in the long term. As Jack Levy puts it, there may be

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[171] Axelrod, Robert & Robert O. Keohane (1985): *Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,* in *World Politics,* vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 226-54. Even ardent realists, like John Mearsheimer, concede that cooperation is a feasible practice in world politics (Mearsheimer, John J. (1995a): *A Realist Reply,* in *International Security,* vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 82-83). For the conditions of cooperation under realist premises, see Jervis, Robert (1985): *From Balance to Concert: a Study of International Security Cooperation,* in *World Politics,* vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 58-79 and Oye, Kenneth A. (1985): *Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,* in *World Politics,* vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 1-24.

[172] Jervis (1978), pp. 168-70; Grieco, Joseph M. (1988): *Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,* in *International Organization,* vol. 42, no. 3, pp. 485-507.

[173] Gooch, John (1989): *Army, State and Society in Italy, 1870-1915,* Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 156-70; Bosworth, R. J. B. (1996): *Italy and the Wider World, 1860-1960,* London: Routledge, pp. 31-35; Kennedy, Paul (1989): *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000,* New York: Vintage Books, pp. 203-06.

[174] Shaw (1991), p. 10.

[175] van Evera (1999), pp. 73-104. As Blainey noticed, such wars always entail at least some element of miscalculation. They occur when two or more states disagree about the distribution of power (Blainey, Geoffrey (1988): *The Causes of War,* Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 112-19. See also, van Evera (1999), pp. 14-34). In Blainey's words, "[w]ar is a dispute about the measurement of power" (Blainey (1988), p. 114).

> "an apprehension that this decline will be accompanied by a weakening of one's bargaining position and a corresponding decline in the political, economic, cultural, and other benefits that one receives from the status quo; and further, that one might be faced with a future choice between a dangerous war and the sacrifice of vital national interests. The temptation is to fight a war under relatively favorable circumstances now in order to block or retard the further rise of an adversary and to avoid both the worsening of the status quo over time and the risk of war under less favorable circumstances later."[176]

States can thus use wars to increase their stock of power if their relative power advantage is larger in the present than it will be in the future. One of the crucial features of war is its unpredictability, so the state's decision to fight also depends on its access to information, and its acceptance of risk.[177]

The purpose of power accumulation warfare is to increase the state's relative stock of military, economic, or diplomatic power resources. War can enhance the power of a state by conquering the military capabilities of other states. Of course, conquering military capabilities are generally difficult as the weapon in question can usually be used against the aggressor. Conquest is therefore more commonly oriented towards sources of wealth – such as means of production, skilled labor, or scarce or particularly valuable resources – instead. Though often forgotten, the first states probably began as plundering bands of warriors who discovered that it was easier to exert a regular annual tribute instead of raiding a territory. The early state could increase its absolute stock of power by conquering resources and peoples from other states.[178] This, however, only worked as long as the cost of war was lower than the gain.

As the state grew more potent, its force potential steadily increased over the past centuries, making war increasingly expensive. As Peter Liberman has shown, modern industrial states can still conquer enemy economic and military resources and use them to their own advantage.[179] For instance, the taxes, resources, and manpower that Nazi Germany mobilized from occupied Western Europe vastly exceeding the funds it spent on quelling local resistance.[180] However, the costs of the entire operation commonly surpass the absolute gain available for conquest. Conquest is no longer an avenue for absolute wealth, but it may increase the state's stock of power, relative to that of

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[176] Levy, Jack S. (1987): *Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,* in *World Politics,* vol. 40, no. 1, p. 87.

[177] For a technical deciphering of the different factors, including the risk factor, that may make war a superior power accumulation strategy, see Kim, Woosang& James D. Morrow (1992): *When do Power Shifts Lead to War?,* in *American Journal of Political Science,* vol. 36, no. 4, pp.896-922 and Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1985): *The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected Utility Model,* in *The American Political Science Review,* vol. 79, no. 1, pp. 156-77.

[178] Lane, Frederic (1958): *Economic Consequences of Organized Violence*, in *The Journal of Economic History,* vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 410-12.

[179] Liberman, Peter (1996a): *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 4-5.

[180] Liberman (1996), pp. 36-68.

other states. If a state can destroy the military capabilities of another state at a relatively low loss, a state will typically be better off, even though both states suffered a military set-back.

This development culminated with the invention of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in the second half of the 20th century. These weapons essentially increased the costs of war to almost absolute terms. An attack would surely provoke a counterattack, thus destroying vast sections of both the aggressive and the defensive society. However, because there was still a relative advantage to be won, war could not be discounted as a rational strategy, even in the nuclear age.[181] For example, Herman Kahn - a nuclear strategist on whom Stanley Kubrick based the title character of *Dr. Strangelove* - argued that even nuclear weapons could be used strategically to achieve political ends. The key thing was to secure that America would be lose fewer people and resources than the Soviet Union in a nuclear exchange.[182] His work was therefore ripe with calculations of fatalities, weighing the loss of millions against the loss of tens of millions, discussing the acceptable level of genetic mutation caused by radioactivity, and even drawing up plans that would distribute contaminated food to elderly people who would not have time to die from radiation-related illnesses before they died of "natural" causes.[183] Even nuclear war is essentially political, as the relative power stock of the state can be increased, if another state's stock of power is decreased by a larger percentage. Hypothetically speaking, a situation may arise where the state becomes more secure by decreasing the power stock of other states, thus potentially making nuclear aggression a superior strategy.

War can also be used to create fertile grounds for cooperation with other parties, or to destroy or disrupt enemy alliances. For example, the United States decided to fight the Vietnam War – "the single greatest error the United States made in fighting the Cold War", according to John Lewis Gaddis – because it believed that a communist take-over in Saigon would show that Washington lacked the commitment to keep its grand alliance together.[184] Although Vietnam was geopolitically insignificant, the symbolism of losing yet another partner state was viewed as a serious threat to the American system of alliances.[185] The theory behind this strategy may have been based on misperception, yet the war was still an example of a state fighting a war mainly out of alliance concerns.

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[181] Jervis, Robert (1988): *The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment,* in *International Security,* vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 80-90.
[182] Kahn, Herman (1961): *On Thermonuclear War. Three Lessons and Many Suggestions*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 22 & 46; Ghamari-Tabrizi, Sharon (2005): *The Worlds of Herman Kahn. The Intuitive Science of Thermonuclear War,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 41-42, 209-35 & 274-80.
[183] Kahn (1961), pp. 40-95; Ghamari-Tabrizi (2005), pp. 209-35.
[184] Gaddis, John L. (1997): *We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 189; Gaddis, John L. (2005): *Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 238-41.
[185] Gaddis (2005), pp. 238-41 & 262-71.

A framework for state interests

The state's power accumulation strategies can be summarized by categorizing them based on the length of the perspective and whether they are directed internally or externally, as it is done in table 3.1. To survive, the state must, first and foremost, avoid a destructive attack against its own territory. This is done by ensuring that any act of force against the state can either be physically rebuffed, or that massive retaliation will severely damage the attacker in a way that surpasses the relative damage caused by the attack. The state therefore has to ensure that its force stockpiles are large enough. Military build-up and actual war are the mechanisms whereby a state ensures that it does not face short-term destruction.

Table 3.1: The power accumulation strategies of the modern state

	Short-term	**Long-term**
Internal	Military build-up	Innovation or growth
External	War	Diplomacy

If the state has more or less secured itself against an immediate assault, its secondary interest is to avoid the threat of a similar attack in the future. The state is therefore not only interested in building capabilities that can be used immediately – it also uses long-term strategies to ensure that it also has enough power in the future. This involves diverging resources into its domestic economy, investing in innovation in weapons technology, and evolving diplomatic relations with other states. As we saw above, economic growth and diplomacy are related to one another as the trading system requires diplomatic cooperation between states. This two-tiered framework is highly theoretical. However, it helps us to understand the processes that led to the end of the Cold War.

How the United States prevailed in the Cold War

So far, we have only looked at the functional imperative in the abstract. Yet Huntington connected his description of the functional imperative with an empirical prediction: America would either become more conservative, or it would succumb to the functional imperative. With the benefit of hindsight, we can evaluate Huntington's assertion. By looking at how the United States fared in the Cold War, we can determine if Huntington's prediction was correct and, if not, if he understood the nature of the functional imperative.

Huntington argued that a society's ability to handle the functional imperative is determined by its constitution and its domestic ideology. If one of these two variables allows a professional

military, then the military will be capable of handling the functional imperative. He argued that the American constitution was unlikely to change and that, therefore, the only way the United States could survive the threat of war was to choose an ideology that was more conducive to supporting military effectiveness – that is, by making conservatism the dominant ideology in society.[186]

Peter Feaver has, as mentioned in chapter 2, tested the empirical accuracy of Huntington's predictions in his seminal work on civil-military relations. Surveying different indicators of the general attitudes in the populace, Feaver shows that Americans did not become significantly more conservative throughout the period. As we also described in chapter 2, Feaver finds part of the explanation in the way Huntington understood ideology and political culture.[187] I look specifically at this problem in chapter 4, where I show that Huntington's conception of ideology had significant weaknesses.

The problem with Huntington's framework, however, goes beyond the question of ideology in politics. His model simply did not capture the nature of the functional imperative. Conventional military force – the type of force administered by Huntington's professional soldiers – is actually one of the lesser factors ensuring the security of the modern state. The immediate security of the modern great powers is ensured mainly by their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Their long-term security also depends on other factors, such as economic performance and diplomatic relations – variables which Huntington did not explore in depth. Furthermore, states that are leaders in the international system have different priorities from states that challenge the status quo.

This becomes clear when we examine how the United States won the Cold War. America's geography, access to advanced technology, economic system, and its massive head-start in economic and military resources at the onset of the Cold War played a crucial role. Washington's ability to safeguard its homeland against an imminent military attack, guaranteed mainly by its nuclear stockpile and its favorable geographical location, allowed it the elbow room necessary to let its capitalist economy build up a power gap. The Soviet Union could not match this disparity in the long run and eventually collapsed. Two limitations of Huntington's framework stand out when one compares it with the outcome of the Cold War. Firstly, he overestimated the conventional military threat posed by the USSR. Secondly, he did not grasp how the functional imperative works when a full-scale conventional military attack is not looming. The first of these weaknesses was empirical – the latter was theoretical.

We can analyze the American Cold War strategy, using the power accumulation framework presented above. The United States' interests can be grouped in a primary and a secondary cluster. Firstly, the American state's primary interest was to avoid being violently overturned through a

[186] Huntington (1957b), pp. 345-46 & 456-65.
[187] Feaver (2003), pp. 16-53.

military attack. This entailed that the United States had to build up military resources that could repel an attack or at least ensure that an attack would be so costly that it would be deemed futile by enemy states. It is crucial, for our purposes, that the United States did not secure itself against military devastation primarily by building up conventional military force. It was its nuclear arsenal, rather than its conventional forces, that ensured the United States against an all-out attack.

At the end of the Second World War, the United States was the most powerful state in the international system. The combination of geographical isolation, significant military forces, including a potent navy and a significant nuclear arsenal, ensured that a Soviet attack would be either rebuffed or at least met with a counter-attack so powerful that a conquest of the American homeland would be impossible.[188] In the early period of the Cold War, the Soviet and American nuclear stockpiles were relatively small and the means of transportation fairly unsophisticated. A superpower war would be fought with at least some conventional forces. The Pacific and Atlantic Oceans functioned as effective barriers that made an attack on the United States costly and difficult. As nuclear stockpiles grew in size and potency, and ballistic missile technology became more sophisticated, the oceans and conventional force became less significant for an all-out attack. This gave each superpower the capabilities necessary to fully destroy its opponent.[189] An all-out strike on the United States was not impossible, but it would certainly be a self-defeating policy. Moscow could not use war to alter the balance of power between the two states, because such a move would have led to the near-destruction of both societies. The superpowers had a shared interest in the perpetuation of the status quo, rather than a disruption of the balance of power system, because a breakdown of this system might have spelled the end of both societies. In that sense, except in extraordinary circumstances, a full-scale war was no longer a rational strategic means for achieving a power advantage. Instead, it would arise as the result of a system failure.[190] A Soviet invasion would most likely have failed to achieve its primary objective: the destruction or surrender of the United States and Soviet survival and dominance. The United States' nuclear capabilities effectively secured it against a power accumulation war.

Having secured itself against an enemy attack the United States' secondary foreign policy goal was to ensure that the Soviet Union did not acquire a power advantage in the long term. A change in the balance of power could remove the barriers that made an imminent attack unlikely

[188] Art, Robert J. (1991): *A Defensible Defense. America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War*, in *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 18-23; Layne, Christopher (2006): *The Peace of Illusions. American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 51 & 54-58.

[189] For the feasibility of strategic defense in the early Cold War, see Long, Austin (2008): *From Cold War to Long War: Six Decades of RAND Deterrence Research,* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, pp. 23-24; Freedman, Lawrence (2003): *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy,* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 117-30 & 147-61.

[190] Freedman (2003), pp. 458-63; Coker, Christopher (2009): *War in an Age of Risk,* Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 32-42.

and thereby jeopardize the American homeland. Its menu of choices essentially ranged in two dimensions. Firstly, the United States had to choose if it wanted to counter the Soviet Union militarily, or if it wanted to use its economy to gain a long-term advantage. In other words, it had to choose between investing in military capabilities, or in civilian and economic growth. Secondly, it had to choose if it wanted to build up alliances and institutions abroad or if it wanted to isolate itself behind its ocean barriers. Of course, these choices were related to one another. For instance, the decision to pursue a growth-oriented strategy based on civilian economic performance could produce a stronger presence in Eurasia to secure more markets overseas.

The United States had to find the right balance between military spending and civil consumption. Aaron Friedberg argues that Washington did not make an either/or choice between these two alternatives. Instead, the United States built up some military capabilities – nuclear as well as conventional – that allowed it to deter an attack on the American homeland and to fight limited conventional wars abroad.[191] Contemporary strategists, like Bernard Brodie, recognized that limited conventional war would continue to play a significant role for the overall grand strategy. The Korean War was an example of a limited war, where the great powers tested each other's commitment to their alliances.[192]

The United States did not invest all its resources directly into the military. After its zenith at around 38 percent of GDP in 1944, and a slight spike during the Korean War, the national defense outlay settled at a level around, or below, 10 percent of GDP (see figure 3.1. below). For the entire Cold War period, defense spending averaged at 7.6 percent of GDP.[193] The labyrinthic nature and secrecy of the Soviet system makes it very difficult to arrive at any conclusive numbers, but most estimates indicate that Soviet military spending as a share of GDP was between 50 to 150 percent above the American level.[194] Military spending could either be used to buy nuclear or conventional capabilities, yet for each of these options Washington chose to use less than the maximal resources available. In Friedberg's words,

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[191] Friedberg (2000), pp. 66-72. Peter Feaver rejects the suggestion that Friedberg's argument has implications for mainstream civil-military relations theory (Feaver (1996), p. 163n35). However, he focuses solely on the deterrence dimension of Friedberg's claim. He fails to analyze how the combination of economic resources, geographical location, and nuclear deterrence provides the United States with a unique protection against conventional, military threats. To be fair, Feaver reacts to an early and less comprehensive version of Friedberg's argument.

[192] Brodie, Bernard (1959): *Strategy in the Missile Age,* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, pp. 305-57. See also, Freedman (2003), pp. 89-100.

[193] My calculations, based on Executive Office of the President of the United States of America (2011), table 6.1., pp. 131-36. See also, Friedberg (2000), p. 84.

[194] Steinberg, Dmitri (1992): *The Growth of Soviet GNP and Military Expenditures in 1970-1989: An Alternative Assessment,* in Wolf, Charles, Jr. & Steven W. Popper (1992): *Defense and the Soviet Economy: Military Muscle and Economic Weakness,* Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, pp. 35-36; Harrison, Mark (2008): *Secrets, Lies, and Half-Truths. The Decision to Disclose Soviet Defense Outlays,* Warwick: PERSA Working Paper.

> "the United States would field sufficient conventional (and tactical nuclear) forces to deal with at least some types of limited aggression without resorting to unrestricted use of nuclear weapons. But it would not invest in the types of forces or in the mobilization measures necessary to conduct an all-out conventional war, still less an unlimited nuclear and conventional one."[195]

The secondary power accumulation mechanisms explain the final outcome of the Cold War. Mutually assured destruction meant that neither of the superpowers could defeat the other solely through military means. It explains why the Cold War never became hot, but not why one of the two powers – the United States – managed to prevail in the long run. Deterrence was thus a facilitating - but not a decisive - cause. As Friedberg argues, the crucial factor that allowed an American victory in the Cold War was the effectiveness of its economic system.[196] Washington chose a relatively limited strategy, where only some resources were used on military spending. This meant that more resources could be invested in the private economy, which led to a relatively high level of growth. As we argued before, in the long run, well-managed private capitalism economy makes the overall economy more effective. The planned economy of the Soviet Union had several endogenous defects that curbed the long-term efficiency of the system. As Anders Åslund has argued, the system's only principle of organization was political decision-making, which made "[p]olitical obedience … more important than work performance."[197] The economy duly lost impetus because lack of competition meant that producers were not spurred to innovate, or demand improvements from their suppliers. Information about consumer preferences did not apply in the Soviet command system as it did in market economies.[198] The Soviet economy performed well in its first decades, during its recovery from the world war, and it could generate growth simply through "catching-up" effects. It utilized its main advantages – the ability to mobilize resources to back long term strategies and its financial stability – to produce astonishing growth rates. However, after these low-hanging fruits had been picked, the internal flaws of the system meant that the USSR could not keep up with the United

[195] Friedberg (2000), p. 69.
[196] Friedberg (2000), pp. 340-51.
[197] Åslund, Anders (2011): *The Demise of the Soviet Economic System,* in *International Politics,* vol. 48, no. 4/5, pp. 548-59.
[198] Gregory, Paul & Robert Stuart (2001): *Russian and Soviet Economic Performance and Structure,* Boston: Addison Wesley Longman, pp. 179-209; Hanson, Philip (2003): *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy. An Economic History of the USSR from 1945,* London: Pearson Longman, pp. 16-21.

States in the long run.[199] As Darren Acemoglu and James Robinson put it, "[b]y the 1970s, economic growth had all but stopped."[200]

Figure 3.1. American defense outlays in percent of GDP, 1940-1991[201]



As part of its propaganda effort, the Soviet Union did not publish reliable economic data, so we have to rely on estimates to illustrate the long-term performance of the American and Soviet economies. Figure 3.2. depicts the development in United States and USSR GDP per capita between 1950 and 1989, as measured in deflated purchase power adjusted prices as reported by the OECD. The numbers for the Soviet Union are largely based on estimates made by the CIA.[202] Because the numbers have been adjusted for purchasing power, they generally illustrate the standard of living, rather than the ability to purchase military hardware. The Soviet Union would most likely have access to fewer economic resources when it came to acquisition of military hardware. The figure shows how the United States kept a significant economic advantage over the Soviet Union over the course of the Cold War. From 1950 to 1989, the two societies had a somewhat similar average per annum growth rate (1.8 percent for the United States and 1.9 percent for the USSR). However, the Soviet economy largely stagnated after 1975, growing only 0.9 percent per year, while the American

[199] This is a simplistic analysis of the many causes behind the Soviet slump in growth. For a more complete analysis, see Hanson (2003), pp. 241-54.
[200] Acemoglu, Darren & James A. Robinson (2012): *Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty,* New York: Crown Publishing, p. 128.
[201] Executive Office of the President of the United States of America (2011), table 6.1., pp. 131-36.
[202] Maddison, Angus (2006): *The World Economy. Volume 2: Historical Statistics*, Paris: OECD, p. 93.

economy boomed at 2.3 percent through the latter period. The disparity between the two societies can be illustrated by projecting when the Soviet Union would reach the GDP per capita level that the United States achieved in 1946. If the post-1975 growth rate is projected into the future, average Soviet citizens would to wait until 2017 to get a purchasing power on par with the one found in Truman's America.[203]

Figure 3.2. American and Soviet GDP per capita 1950-89 in 1990 international Geary-Khamis USD[204]



Over the course of the period, this gave Washington significant leeway to pursue alternative policies to pressure the Soviets. When oil prices declined in the late-1980s, the USSR lost additional fiscal sustainability.[205] In the long run, the USSR could not maintain its high military spending *and* provide a viable level of welfare for its citizens. To be sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union was not inevitable. Many non-economic causes, including decisions made by the ruling nomenklatura, and the development of Soviet ideology, played a part in its demise.[206] Yet these factors only played out

[203] My calculations, based on Maddison (2006), table 2c and 3c on pp. 88-89 and 100-01. The growth rates generally correspond to estimates made by a group of Russian economists (Gregory & Stuart (2001), pp. 208-09).
[204] Maddison (2006), table 2c and 3c on pp. 88-89 and 100-01.
[205] Åslund (2011), pp. 554-56.
[206] For arguments that emphasize non-material factors, see Nau, Henry R. (2011): *Ideas have Consequences: the Cold War and Today,* in *International Politics,* vol. 48, no. 4/5, pp. 460-81; Risse, Thomas (2011): *Ideas,*

because the USSR faced terminal long-term structural problems. The imbalance between military and civilian spending certainly forced the USSR into a corner where it could not compete with the United States in the long run.

Friedberg also emphasizes that the existence of a free market economy gave the United States an additional advantage: The United States could purchase its arms and equipment from private contractors and outsource its technology development to private enterprises. The Soviet Union lacked both these possibilities because of its planned economy. The competition in the American private sector meant that companies strove to innovate, which increased the amount of military force gained per dollar spent. In the long run, this helped to increase America's power accumulation, as the same amount of force could be acquired at a relatively lower prize. The resources saved through these operations could then be spent on additional military capabilities or be directed to the civilian economy, where it would yield higher returns in the long run.[207]

It is important to emphasize that the American economic system only became a decisive factor because the military factors allowed it to flourish freely. The United States held a distinct advantage in economic resources, and sophistication of military technology, from the outset of the Cold War. In terms of power resources, the United States simply began at a higher level than did the Soviet Union. This allowed the United States to secure itself from an imminent Soviet attack. Perhaps Moscow would have decided to attack the United States, had it had the upper hand when it came to military resources. If so, the American advantage in the long-term production of capabilities could have been off-set by the Soviet force superiority. One should be careful with counterfactual history, but it is possible that Soviet leaders would have chosen this route, had it been available to them and had they understood the long-term economic trends. Capitalism only secured victory to the United States because alternative routes were coincidentally blocked for the USSR. To be sure, deterrence in itself did not lead to American victory. Deterrence was a facilitating factor, which allowed the eventual decisive factor – American capitalism – to win the day.

The United States' relations to lesser powers – most importantly its system of alliances – also played a crucial role in ensuring that the economy could tip the balance in the end. Washington essentially had two options – internationalism or isolationism - each of which could have ensured that the two goals described above, securing the American homeland against a destructive attack and preserving its capitalist economy, could be achieved.[208] In the end, Washington chose to pursue

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Discourse, Power and the End of the Cold War: 20 Years On, in *International Politics,* vol. 48, no. 4/5, pp. 591-606; English, Robert (2011): *'Merely an Above-Average Product of the Soviet Nomenklatura'? Assessing Leadership in the Cold War's End,* in *International Politics,* vol. 48, no. 4/5, pp. 607-26.

[207] Friedberg (2000), pp. 292-95 & 334-39.

[208] Gaddis, John L. (1971): *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947,* New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 341-43. John Mueller shows that three other options were floated in American public

the former course of action. The goal of American diplomacy was containment: to ensure that the USSR could not expand its share of the global military and industrial power by forcing other states into its system of alliances. Many of Washington's key allies possessed plentiful reserves of military manpower, and an industrial production apparatus. As George Kennan told an audience at the National War College in 1948, America's key goal was to ensure that it controlled the bulk of the global "centers of industrial and military power": the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union.[209] At the time of the address, the United States held four of these five centers. Great Britain, Germany, and Japan were key allies that had to be protected from Soviet encroachment, as a shift in the possession of these centers would make the American homeland more liable to a military attack. This strategy had both a military and an economic rationale. Building up alliances and institutions abroad could enhance American force posture should a military encounter with the Soviets become imminent. More importantly, Soviet control of the natural resources and production apparatus available in Eurasia would enable them to increase their production and development of arms, giving them a long-term advantage. To avoid this outcome, the United States consequently got involved in disputes in areas that were deemed of strategic importance, always supporting anti-Soviet forces, beginning with the anti-communist governments of Greece and Turkey in 1947.[210]

The internationalist strategy was not the only feasible option. In a retrospective analysis of the American Cold War plans, Robert Art argues that isolationism was a viable, yet suboptimal, grand strategy. The American nuclear strike force would have been enough to secure the American homeland from an enemy invasion, even if the Soviets had controlled all of Eurasia. The United States would have been able to intercept a Soviet invasion armada, Art argues, either with conventional or nuclear means. Furthermore, the presence of vital strategic resources on the American continent meant that the American economy could have retained enough strength to be able to build the nuclear capabilities necessary to deter a Soviet attack.[211] Losing Great Britain, Japan, and Germany would not have spelled the end of the United States. However, it would have made it more insecure. In addition, by protecting other key states, Washington kept its number of trading partners high, thus enhancing its potential for economic growth.

To be sure, the internationalist strategy had its downsides. Militarily, the United States risked overextending its engagements abroad, generating security promises that could be kept only

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discourse. The United States could also have subdued the Soviet threat through the use of international institutions, the threat of war, or through outright military hostilities (Mueller, John (1988): *Retreat from Doomsday. The Obsolescence of Major War,* New York: Basic Books, pp. 108-10). However, these options were simply subtypes of internationalism.

[209] Gaddis (2005), p. 29.

[210] Gaddis (2005), pp. 28-31; Mueller (1988), pp. 103-08.

[211] Art (1991), pp. 19-23.

at the price of blood and treasure. By getting entangled in conflicts abroad, so the argument goes, the United States wasted military and economic resources and actually lost economic potential, which could have been used to out-compete the USSR.[212] In Art's words,

> "[h]ad the United States been concerned only with its own security, and not that of Western Europe and Japan, it would have needed only: (1) a relatively small strategic nuclear force, a reasonable portion of it invulnerable to destruction by a Soviet first strike; (2) a modest air force and navy able to sink any Soviet surface ships that attacked across the Pacific; and (3) a small army to deal with any minor border incursions from hemispheric neighbors or other states."[213]

Instead, Washington's internationalist strategy entailed a much larger strategic nuclear force, a large stock of tactical nuclear weapons, which were deployed in Europe, a formidable navy and air force that were capable of controlling the seas and projecting power into all corners of the world, and a standing army of more than 750,000 men.[214] In other words, the American commitment to Japan and Western Europe removed some of the dynamism out of the economic system by investing resources in additional military capabilities.

When all the pros and cons are considered, it seems evident that isolationism was a viable, yet suboptimal, grand strategy. The loss of the Eurasian industrial centers would surely have changed the entire Cold War gambit, making the United States the underdog to a threatening and powerful USSR. The United States won the Cold War because it was stronger at the outset of the conflict, which enabled it to deter a devastating military attack. Furthermore, its economy was much more dynamic than that of the Soviet Union, which enabled it to retain its lead over the course of the struggle. These advantages could have been lost had the United States had followed an isolationist strategy. The cost of its commitments to its allies did not surpass the importance a potential loss of the industrial capital of Japan, Germany and the UK.[215]

To summarize, the United States' victory in the Cold War was primarily caused by the economic dynamism of its capitalist economy. Although conventional military force played a crucial role in keeping its global alliance together, it was not *the* crucial power generation tool. This also explains why Huntington's prediction of Cold War societal civil-military relations did not fit the outcome of the conflict. Huntington erroneously anticipated that the Cold War would be decided by the state that was able to generate the maximum amount of military force. Instead, the liberalism that he dreaded actively helped fuel the dynamism that led to the American victory.

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[212] Layne (2006), pp. 127-33.
[213] Art (1991), p. 19.
[214] Art (1991), p. 18.
[215] For a critique of the rationale that underpins my analysis, see Layne (2006), pp. 120-33.

Conclusion

Samuel Huntington understood the functional imperative as the threat of conventional war. This led him to argue that states that face a functional imperative will either become conducive to their militaries or succumb to an enemy invasion. The purpose of this chapter was to explore Huntington's assertion examining the nature of the functional imperative. More specifically, I asked how warfare threatens modern advanced societies and how they counter this threat. States have many different tools for handling threats, including diplomacy, economic growth, and technological innovation. Conventional military force is thus just one of these means. For instance, the United States used a multi-faceted strategy to handle the threat of the Soviet Union. In the short-term, the United States was secure from a sudden attack from the Soviet Union, because of the combination of its geographical location and its significant nuclear deterrent. This allowed it to pursue a long-term strategy, where the superiority of its economic system and the large head start in terms of military and economic resources that it enjoyed at the onset of the Cold War enabled it to exhaust the USSR. It was thus the combination of military and non-military factors that enabled the United States to prevail over the Soviet Union.

This illustrates an important point about societal civil-military relations, which has hitherto been ignored in the literature. Securing the state is not only a matter of maximizing its conventional military force. Power is a multi-dimensional concept that also includes economic and diplomatic means. The importance of the conventional military depends on whether or not war is an immediate option, or if the state is engaged in a long-term struggle for dominance. Furthermore, even if war is immediate, the nuclear revolution means that conventional force has become less decisive for absolute warfare. Diplomacy, economic dynamism, and technological innovation – factors that are generated outside of the military - are just as significant in ensuring the long-term survival of the state.

- 4 -

The societal imperative

In chapter 2, we saw that Huntington's theory made an extensive prediction of the outcome of the Cold War, but that events did not unfold as he expected. Chapter 3 showed that the main reason for this problem was his understanding of the functional imperative: he underestimated that liberal societies are capable of using other power generation mechanisms, which give them a competitive advantage under certain structural conditions. Having explored the functional imperative, we still need to unpack the societal imperative – the second component of his framework for societal civil-military relations. Interestingly, apart from a couple of cursory remarks, Huntington never defined the societal imperative nor did he explicitly identify the social factors behind it in *The Soldier and the State*.[216] He used the societal imperative to derive his predictions of American Cold War civil-military relations, but he did not explain how it functions in depth.

This is done in the present chapter. How, it asks, is the state's ability to fend off external enemies hampered by domestic factors? The societal imperative is the degree to which domestic features of society obstruct the state from pursuing an optimal political course. It is shaped by a society's ideologies, institutions, and special interests. Does the population understand the threats faced by the state? Are they willing to make the necessary sacrifices to meet threats? Are they capable of influencing the state's policies?

In modern society, the state is thought to be accountable to the population. Broadly speaking, this principle grew out of a legitimacy vacuum left by the breakdown of religious authority at the end of the Middle Ages. The societal imperative becomes problematic if the ideology dominating the government elite does not reflect the threats facing the state. They may either underestimate or overestimate the importance of military force. Furthermore, popular militarism may erode the civilian government's position of authority vis-à-vis the armed forces.

This chapter progresses in three sections. The first section presents the basic building blocks of political sociology. It argues that all societies rests on the consent of the individual members of society, mechanisms of repression and social control, and socialization through various institutions. The second section then uses this framework to briefly describe how modern society developed. The societal imperative is then analyzed in the final section.

The building blocks of society

[216] Huntington (1957b), pp. 2-3.

Richard Feynman, the Nobel Prize winning physicist, once argued that all of science can be summarized in one sentence: "all things are made of atoms".[217] If we were to do the same for the social sciences, the corresponding dictum would be: "all societies consist of individuals". Societies only exist because groups of individuals are willing to act in concert to pursue common goals. Of course, this insight is hardly a social theory. Understanding that a star simply consists of atoms tells us little about the intricacies of their celestial life. Likewise, useful knowledge about society cannot simply be derived from the individual. Stars and societies are both more than the sum of their parts.

Three social mechanisms hold society together: consent, control, and socialization. Unpacking each of these mechanisms help us to understand how societies change over time and, indeed, why soldiers are willing to serve, fight, and die in the state's service.

1. *Consent* is perhaps *the* fundamental building block of any society. All societies rest on an implicit agreement between the ruler and those who have to consent to his rule. The individual's agreement depends on the reciprocal obligations of the state. This reciprocal relationship is commonly understood as the social contract – that is, the implicit or explicit belief that a person's political obligations to the state depend on reciprocal obligations from the state. All societies have been based on some notion of consent and reciprocity between the state and the individual.[218] We can recognize an implicit principle of reciprocity as early as Plato's *Crito*. Socrates, sentenced to death by the Athenian assembly, refused to escape to save his own life because it would violate the tacit agreement that he had made with the city. By enjoying the fruits of communal life, Socrates argued, he could not abandon the rule of the laws now that its judgment went against him.[219] He would have known about war and the sacrifices it entails as he, according to Plato, fought for Athens at the battles of Delium, Amphipolis, and Potidaea during the Peloponnesian War.[220] To be sure, Plato's notion of reciprocity was never formulated into an explicit notion of a social contract. Many of the distinctions that we would draw – for instance, the basic distinction between community and the state – are entirely lacking from his treatment of the topic.[221] However, some notion of consent goes back to the beginning of political philosophy.

Thomas Hobbes was one of the first thinkers who described the relationship between the individual and the state as a contract. As is illustrated by the famous frontispiece of his *The Leviathan* – which depicts the monarch as a giant composed of a collection of individuals – Hobbes

[217] Feynman, Richard P. (1963): *Six Easy Pieces*, Philadelphia: Basic Books, p. 4.
[218] Parsons & Shils (1951), p. 220; Coicaud (2002), pp. 11-14.
[219] Plato (2002a): *Crito*, in Reeve, C.D.C. (2002): *The Trials of Socrates. Six Classic Texts,* Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing, p. 74.
[220] Plato (2002b): *The Apology of Socrates*, in Reeve, C.D.C. (2002): *The Trials of Socrates. Six Classic Texts,* Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing, p. 43.
[221] See for instance, Plato (2002a), pp. 72-74.

recognized that the state is an artificial institution, created by men.[222] Hobbes stripped society of everything but the core of the social contract: the relationship between state and individual. Basing his theory of the state on the assumption that people are selfish utility-maximizers, Hobbes constructed an elaborate scheme that explains why these purely self-interested individuals can still found a state based on the fear of one another. If man is indeed "homo homini lupus" - a wolf against his fellow man - a state-less society will be in a constant state of war, where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short".[223] Hobbes argued that rational egoists will recognize that the lack of a state make them worse off. They will subsequently install an all-powerful state, as gruesome as the Leviathan - a biblical monster from the Book of Job - with absolute power to punish anyone who steps outside of the law.[224] Without a state to punish those who try to get an unfair advantage, society will degenerate under the constant competition and breaking of promises to "a meere warre of all against all".[225]

War was one of the crucial soft spots in Hobbes' notion of the social contract.[226] It illustrates the importance of other factors not included in the notion of a self-interested and rational individual. In war, the state, according to Hobbes, asks the individual to step into a situation of danger. However, he could not explain why someone who is solely interested in his own well-being will be willing to fight - and perhaps die - for the state. The individual only owes the state his loyalty because it offers him protection from death. To die in order not to die is, of course, an absurd idea. If a person follows Hobbes' individualistic assumptions, he should either run away or shift allegiances as soon as he finds himself faced with the terrors of the battlefield.[227]

The solution to the Hobbesian problem is that people are not rational egoists. The standard textbook version of the history of political ideas would highlight Rousseau's contribution to this debate. Reviving and reformulating an idea that had its origins in classical Greece, Rousseau famously reversed Hobbes' ideas and argued that people are naturally good and only corrupted by civilization.[228] Thus, "nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state (…). [H]e is restrained by

[222] Skinner, Quentin (2002a): *Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State,* in Skinner, Quentin (2002): *Visions of Politics. Volume 3: Hobbes and Civil Science,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 177-208; Skinner, Quentin (2002b): *The Context of Hobbes' Theory of Political Obligation,* in Skinner, Quentin (2002): *Visions of Politics. Volume 3: Hobbes and Civil Science,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 281-86.
[223] Hobbes, Thomas (1996): *Leviathan*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 84.
[224] Hobbes (1996), pp. 111-22.
[225] Hobbes, Thomas (1983): *De Cive. Philosophicall Rudiments concerning Government and Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 34; Parsons (1937), p. 91.
[226] For an overview of the general problems regarding Hobbes' conception of war and international relations, see Joas & Knöbl (2013), pp. 19-20.
[227] Walzer, Michael (1970): *The Obligation to Die for the State*, in Walzer, Michael (1970): *Obligations. Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 80-88.
[228] Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1992): *Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequalities among Men,* in Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1992): *The Collected Works of Rousseau. Volume 3: Discourse on the Origins of*

Natural pity from harming anyone himself and nothing leads him to do so even after he has received harm."[229] Being member of a group or a community is a fundamental part of being human, and creates bonds for which people are willing to die. These bonds, Rousseau argued, are still the foundation of modern society – in a society, however, that punishes goodness and rewards vice.

Later sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and psychologists - even Rousseau's contemporaries – would hesitate from making an either/or assertion about the benevolence or malice of human nature. According to David Hume, the discussion about human nature was a "vulgar dispute … which is never likely to have any issue".[230] Instead, Hume began with the empirical observation that people sometimes act altruistically, and sometimes act to further their own ends; and he focused on exploring the former while bracketing the latter.[231] This notion of a dual nature of man is the same model we see in most modern social theory. Most scholars hold that people are concurrently self-oriented and collectivity-oriented. Talcott Parsons, for instance, argued that this choice between individual needs and those of the community was one of the fundamental questions facing every human being.[232] People are neither complete egoists nor perfect altruists. Most of us carry both propensities.

Philosophers and social scientists have generally accepted that people are social beings, but refrained from exploring why this is so. It makes intuitive sense that taking care of one's own needs would offer one an advantage in life. Explaining why people become oriented to collectivities is more challenging. Recent research within the biological sciences may help us to understand the origins of our orientation towards communities. In pre-modern society, cooperation and the formation of affectionate bonds towards others, this research argues, was a superior evolutionary strategy, which favored individuals who were disposed to form such bonds. For instance, cooperation between close relatives is a superior evolutionary strategy. Biologists believe that genetic survival - and not simply the survival of a specific individual - is the primary mechanism driving evolution. The survival of a specific individual does not matter for evolution – it only awards those who spread as large a percentage of their genes as possible. In other words, individual sacrifice can be an evolutionary superior strategy if it allows other, genetically similar individuals to continue breeding. Following that logic, it makes sense for individuals to help others with whom they share a large percentage of their DNA. We typically share half of our genes with our siblings. Helping

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Inequality (Second Discourse). Polemics and Political Economy, Hanover: University Press of New England, pp. 43-54; Hoffmann, Stanley (1963): *Rousseau on War and Peace,* in *The American Political Science Review,* vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 318-20.

[229] Rousseau (1992), p. 48.

[230] Hume, David (1998): *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morality,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 73-74.

[231] Hume (1998), p. 74.

[232] Parsons & Shils (1951), pp. 76-88, especially pp. 80-81.

them to procreate thus spreads a quarter of our own genes. Similarly, helping a first cousin spreads one eighth of our DNA.[233]

Scholars find it more difficult to explain why we form affectionate relationships with people to whom we are not genetically related. There is generally no consensus about the origins of non-genetic altruism. The most convincing explanation also finds its origins in evolution and the long-term survival of pre-modern groups. Having a propensity for developing friendships and for giving to our friends, so the argument goes, is a superior strategy both for group and individual. Friendship result in closely knitted social groups and these social groups are more likely to survive in the long run. People without the propensity for friendship would be excluded or killed and thus unable to procreate. The propensity for cooperation and affection towards non-relatives, it is argued, is still hard-wired into our brain, even though civilization has disconnected us from evolution.[234]

As we shall see in later chapters, the notion of collectivity-orientation is essential for understanding the notion of military sacrifice. On the battlefield the soldier fights for his comrades in arms, his friends, his family, and his community. While it seems nonsensical to sacrifice oneself for a society which is based solely on one's own, personal benefit, sacrificing oneself for the good of others is a another matter. Although the social contract is essentially between two parties – the state and the individual – it cannot be understood unless a third party, the community, is included in the equation, as illustrated in figure 4.1. If we look narrowly at the relationship between the state and the individual, we will notice its instrumental nature. The individual only submits to the state because he gains something – protection and services – from this exchange. Similarly, the state requires loyalty, taxes and manpower from the individual. This instrumental relationship cannot force the individual to sacrifice himself, as that would contradict the utility principle upon which it is based. It is only when we add the third party – the community – that the social contract becomes more than a purely instrumental relationship. The state can now pay some of its dues to the community, which the individual reciprocates by providing loyalty, taxes and manpower. Because communities can persevere beyond the death of the individual, this enables individual sacrifice. The individual may die on the battlefield, but his family, community, or nation lives on.

[233] Dawkins, Richard (1976): *The Selfish Gene,* Oxford: Oxford University Press; Fukuyama (2011), pp. 29-48.
[234] Trivers, Robert (1971): *The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,* in *The Quarterly Review of Biology,* vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 35-57; Wilson, Edward O. (2012): *The Social Conquest of Earth,* New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, pp. 241-54.

Figure 4.1. The social contract



Not all groups or individuals are necessarily part of the same social contract. Sometimes, the state requires more from a specific group than from others. In those cases, it makes sense to create a separate social contract with that specific group. When different groups and classes are given different rights and obligations for administrative or socio-economic purposes, we can say that society is characterized by a dual social contract. For example, the aristocracy typically functioned as an administrative middle layer between the ruler and the people prior to the modern age. An illustrative example – to which we shall return again in later chapters – is the social contract in Frederician Prussia, where the nobility held special privileges, for instance a near monopoly on military commissions, by virtue of their birth. The aristocracy had one social contract with the king, which demanded fairly extensive sacrifices and discipline from the nobles in exchange for generous social advantages. The population at large, though relatively heavily taxed, had fewer burdens in terms of services for the state, but also had fewer social and political rights.[235]

[235] Mączak, Antoni (1996): *The Nobility-State Relationship,* in Reinhard, Wolfgang (1996): *Power Elites and State Building,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 189-206; Descimen, Robert (1996): *Power Elites and the Prince: The State as Enterprise,* in Reinhard, Wolfgang (1996): *Power Elites and State Building,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 106-10; Fukuyama (2011), pp. 328-29; Giddens (1987), pp. 202-03; Mann, Michael (1986): *The Sources of Social Power. Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A. D. 1760,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 458-61.

2. The social contract is only one of three clusters of mechanisms around which modern society is based. Some groups – voluntary or involuntary - fall outside of the social contract. The state uses *social control* - mechanisms of isolation, violence, coercion, and surveillance - to repress these groups and incentivize members of the social contract to stay within its bounds.[236] Some groups are forcibly held outside of the social contract, and, in some cases, enslaved for labor. For example, ancient Sparta based its economy on the wide-scale repression of the helots, a slave class which probably consisted of conquered peoples. It was only the citizens of Sparta who had an agreement with the state, guaranteeing certain benefits in return for their consent to its rule. The helots, by contrast, had no claim to anything whatsoever, not even the right to life.[237] According to Plutarch, Spartan youngsters, who excelled in their military education, would engage in *krypteia*, an annual ritual where they were allowed to assault and kill any helot they met at night.[238] Sometimes, members of the social contract voluntarily decide to leave it. The state typically then uses social control mechanisms to incentivize them to return to the fold. Wars of secession are examples of large groups trying to abandon society. On a smaller scale, we can refer to deserters or tax evaders.

Social control can never totally replace the need for consent. The use of instruments of violence and repression requires someone to organize and implement the oppression. As Hannah Arendt put it,

> "Even the totalitarian ruler, whose chief instrument of rule is torture, needs [consent from] the secret police and its net of informers. … Even the most despotic domination we know of, the rule of master over slaves, who always outnumbered him, did not rest on superior means of coercion as such, but on … the organized solidarity of the masters."[239]

Even in a slave state like Sparta, where the repression of some groups reached an almost unimaginable level, the social structure depended on a social contract between the city and its citizens. A great example is the painful and prolonged destruction of Nazi Germany in the final years of the Second World War. Puzzled by why Germany managed to keep on fighting even after it was obvious that the war could not be won, Ian Kershaw has explored the intricate processes that yielded this surprising outcome. By late 1944, Kershaw argues, the German population was no longer driven by a broad support of Hitler's course. If possible, it was ready to denounce its

[236] Parsons &Shils (1951), pp. 220-21.
[237] Cartledge, Paul (2003): *The Spartans. The World of the Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, From Utopia to Crisis and Collapse,* Woodstock: Overlook Press, p. 29; Forrest, W. G. (1968): *A History of Sparta, 950-192 B. C.,* London: Hutchinson University Library, p. 31.
[238] Plutarch (1914): *Lycurgus,* in Page, T. E. & W. H. D. Rouse (1914): *Plutarch's Lives. Volume 1: Theseus and Romulus, Lycurgus and Numa, Solon and Publicola,* London: William Heinemann, pp. 289-93 (chapter 28); Cartledge, Paul (2001): *Spartan Reflections,* London: Duckworth, pp. 87-88.
[239] Arendt (1969), pp.50-51.

leadership in order to end the war. In other words, the social contract had broken down. However, two domestic factors held German society together.[240] Firstly, the extensive use of government terror – the ultimate mechanism of social control – meant that individual citizens could not voice their opposition, nor act in concerted defiance against the government. The courts penalized dissenters without hesitation. Deserters and disruptive elements within the ranks were punished severely: 20,000 German soldiers were executed by the state during the Second World War, by contrast to only 150 Germans who suffered the same fate during the previous world war.[241] The population's best chance was to wait out the war and hope that the Allies would prove more merciful than the Nazis. Secondly, select groups still consented to the state's course of action. These groups typically controlled the various bureaucratic branches of the state. Members of the Nazi party knew well that they would have no future in an occupied Germany. They therefore had no choice but to fight on. Military officers and government bureaucrats were also driven by a type of consent, but theirs was often a consent based on blind loyalty rather than active political agreement. Kershaw concludes that, without these consenting groups, the German state would never have been able to fight on for so long as it did.[242]

To be sure, social control is costly and the state prefers to avoid using it whenever possible. It is the last resort, to which it may turn if the normal mechanisms of agreement do not suffice. When societies break down, the social contract is narrowed down and left to cover fewer and fewer people. As this process occurs, the state can no longer count on the voluntary participation of the populace. Instead, it has to dedicate resources to isolate and punish non-conformists. In these extreme cases, the relationship between the state and the individual becomes parasitical rather than symbiotic, as the state enslaves the population to ensure its own survival.

3. The social contract and social control do not tell the whole story of how society stays together under the threat of war. *Socialization* – that is, the individual's adoption of norms or culture - also plays a crucial role in this process. Communities are not formed in isolation. The state has access to powerful institutions that can facilitate the creation of communities, and can help shape them in a way that is opportune to the state.[243] For instance, in ancient Greece the phalanx was a splendid venue for the creation of social bonds. It required that the fighters formed an impenetrable wall of shields by standing shoulder to shoulder. It needed enormous discipline from every warrior as a hole in the formation could be used to break the barrier of shields down. Greek warriors were

[240] International factors, such as Allied strategic and tactical mistakes and a general fear of the Red Army, also played a crucial role.
[241] Kershaw, Ian (2011): *The End. Hitler's Germany 1944-45,* London: Allen Lane, p. 220.
[242] Kershaw (2011), pp. 386-400.
[243] Parsons (1951), pp. 205-43 & 297-325.

therefore disciplined to stay put and to enjoy the results of communal effort.[244] Without these institutions, it is doubtful if the ancient city-states would have been able to generate the solidarity needed to establish neutral laws for a common good. For Aristotle, the relationship between hoplite tactics and democracy was almost self-evident. As he put it in *The Politics,* "as city-states grew larger and hoplite weapons became a stronger force, more people came to participate in the constitution."[245] Here, we see that the relationship between war and political order is dialectical. The military root of citizenship is evident from the Greek word for it - "polites" - which literally meant "defender of the citadel".[246] Similarly, in modern society, the state has access to various institutions which it uses to socialize the population into a distinct national sense of community. For instance, as Pierre Bourdieu argued, the state uses different institutions to shape the categories that individuals develop to make sense of the world. The state uses the education system to socialize the individual into a specific cultural frame of mind. This process is enhanced by the control of language and even through the categories developed within social science.[247]

These mechanisms focus not only on people who find themselves within the social contract. For example, as Michel Foucault has famously shown, the prison allows the state to discipline delinquents to submit to the social order. The state has gone from making the punishment of non-conformists a violent spectacle of torture, which was meant to scare off potential dissenters, to using the prison to socialize the individual to accept his role as a member of a larger community.[248]

To sum up, society is held together by consent, control, and socialization. Members of society engage in a social contract with the state, in which the latter commits to providing protection and services to them and their primary communities in exchange for loyalty, taxes and manpower. Those who choose to violate the social contract are repressed through various social control mechanisms, such as isolation, violence, coercion, and surveillance. Finally, the state continuously uses various mechanisms of socialization to create communities that make them susceptible to supporting the state.

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[244] Lynn, John A. (2003): *Battle. A History of Combat and Culture,* Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 9-12; McNeill, William H. (1995): *Keeping Together in Time. Dance and Drill in Human History,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 116-19; Dawson, Doyne (1996): *The Origins of Western Warfare. Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World,* Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 50-51; Hanson, Victor D. (1989): *The Western Way of War. Infantry Battle in Classical Greece,* Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 27-36.

[245] Aristotle (1998): *Politics,* Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing, p. 124.

[246] Coker, Christopher (2002): *Waging War without Warriors. The Changing Culture of Military Conflict,* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, p. 35.

[247] Bourdieu, Pierre (1994): *Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,* in *Sociological Theory,* vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1-18.

[248] Foucault, Michel (1995): *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison,* New York: Vintage Books.

The birth of modern society

Understanding how our present society works is best illustrated by looking at how it grew out of other, less complex types of social formation. The constellation of consent, control, and socialization changes from epoch to epoch. Different eras have had their own unique conditions for each of these mechanisms. Societies have changed as various factors have made one or more of these mechanisms more salient. [249]

Gathering the various driving forces of history together, we can understand the development of modern society as going through three stages.[250]

1. *Theocratic society* was characterized by a divine principle of legitimacy and a weak state, which had to rule via various middle-men, mainly the nobility and clergy. The social contract was fairly complex and reflected both the religious understanding of legitimacy and the socially layered nature of society. The state's legitimacy was bestowed by God. It may be difficult for modern people to understand, but the theocratic state rested on the belief that the king's rule was divinely ordained.[251] Contemporaries rarely questioned this belief, but if one did so, one would notice an implicit incentive structure that made authority legitimate, even if one did not accept the need for submission *prima facie*. The expedient and the divine overlapped in complex ways. Firstly, God was the ultimate source of morality and the individual had to follow His representative insofar as he felt compelled by his conscience. Secondly, this moral imperative was combined with a personal incentive to submit. To obey the state was to do God's bidding, which would eventually secure the individual a place among the righteous, come Judgment Day. Finally, the state's legitimacy was secured even without appeals to the individual's conscience and belief in heaven. As God's representative on Earth, the king was seen as having Providence on his side in politics. God's support simply translated into good luck, which secured a good harvest and success on the battlefield. Even if one did not believe that disobedience would get one sent to hell, God intervened on the side of the king in secular matters as well, thus giving him a superior ability to rule in this life.[252] These forms of authority were of course intertwined, so that the skills of the king signaled his connection to God

[249] Mann, Michael (1993): *The Sources of Social Power. Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-21, 24-35, 45-47 & 723-39; Giddens (1987), pp. 22-34; Habermas (1987), pp. 332-73.

[250] This division is inspired by the one made by Philip Bobbit in *The Shield of Achilles,* his masterful *magnum opus*. To be sure, the approach used here differs from Bobbitt's by unpacking how history is driven by specific micro- and macro trends. Unlike Bobbitt, who divides history into relatively discrete periods, the present approach stresses continuity as much as it emphasizes change.

[251] Descimen (1996), pp. 102-06.

[252] Of course, this analysis does not do justice to the complex ways in which the role of the divine and the expedient overlapped in Medieval and Renaissance political discourse. For an extensive examination of this question, see Pocock (2003), pp. 31-80.

as well. The more potent the king, the stronger the authority bestowed by God.[253] In certain periods, this even led to the belief that the king had personal healing powers. In Shakespeare's *Macbeth,* for instance, the righteous legitimacy of the English king (in contrast to Macbeth, who has usurped the Scottish throne) is illustrated by his ability cure scrofula through touch. As Malcolm says to Macduff,

"A most miraculous work in this good king;
Which often, since my here-remain in England,
I have seen him do. How he solicits heaven,
Himself best knows; but strangely-visited people,
All swoll'n and ulcerous, pitiful to the eye,
The mere despair of surgery, he cures,
Hanging a golden stamp about their necks,
Put on with holy prayers, and 'tis spoken,
To the succeeding royalty he leaves
The healing benediction. With this strange virtue,
He hath a heavenly gift of prophecy,
And sundry blessings hang about his throne,
That speak him full of grace"[254]

The belief that good fortune reflected divine blessing was so powerful that when Charles I saw his power base crumble during the English Civil War, the royal touch was a significant tool used to shore up support for the royalists. Similarly, when Charles II, his son and heir, tried to reestablish the Stuart monarchy during the Restoration, massive displays involving the royal touch was one of the mechanisms used to shore up support. So frequent were these events that historians estimate that Charles II touched around 100,000 patients during his 24-year reign.[255]

The theocratic state was weak and had a very loose control of its own territory. Social organization and technology did not allow the king to personally oversee many of the affairs of his realm and he was therefore forced to rely on the conscience of middlemen to ensure that his bidding was followed.[256] The result was a type of double social contract, where the king had one agreement with the administrative layer and another with the population at large. The state bestowed expanded privileges to the nobility in exchange for the services that it provided.[257] Commoners lived in a local world, with their village or township at the center. They probably cared more about the rule of their specific local liege than about the rule of the king.

[253] Walzer, Michael (1974): *Regicide and Revolution. Speeches at the Trial of Louis XVI,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 14-21.
[254] Shakespeare, William (2010b): *MacBeth,* San Francisco: Ignatius Press, pp. 98-99. Editor's footnotes removed, JRC.
[255] Bloch, Marc (1973): *The Royal Touch. Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France,* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, pp. 208-13.
[256] Giddens (1987), pp. 88-89; Tilly (1992), pp. 99-107.
[257] Walzer (1974), pp. 47-53.

Theocratic society's complex divine principle of legitimacy depended on governmental control of a near-duopoly on information, which allowed the power-holders to use propaganda and social control to cover tensions.[258] The church and the state controlled all the key sources of information and the main seats associated with legitimate government. Furthermore, the sword, stake, and rack enabled them to strike down dissenters and non-conformists, who were not convinced by the arguments of the authorities. The spectacle of the *auto-da-fé* was often enough to deter potential opposition forces.[259] The inconsistencies in religious doctrine were therefore not allowed to feed into rival interpretations that destabilized the divine source of legitimacy - the fates of the Hussites, Lollards, and Huguenots serve as a case in point.[260] In spite of the infighting between church and state, this nexus of control proved surprisingly stable over the course of centuries.

The sources of the transformation of the principle of legitimacy are many, yet surely the invention of movable types and the printing press around 1450 played a pivotal role. A highly trained scribe could produce a few manuscripts a day – the same time as it would take a fully functioning late-16th century printing press to manufacture more than 3,000 copies of the same manuscript. In 1500, some historians estimate, there were already more than 20,000,000 printed volumes in circulation all over Europe. A century later, that number had increased tenfold.[261] Information and learning began to dissipate into the population at large. Jürgen Habermas argues that expanding trade networks and the spread of commercial information and general mail created the foundation for journals and newspapers.[262] This meant that the authorities' near-duopoly on information was broken. A steady decline in religious authority and a separation of earthly and religious matters followed. This was exacerbated by the wars of religion and the rise of Protestantism.[263] The massive influence of religion in politics took centuries to unravel, yet slowly principles of secularism were introduced in political life. Religious belief gradually became a personal matter and detached from the state's legitimacy. Although people continued to believe that God intervened directly in the world, they little by little stopped seeing Him as the source of government legitimacy.[264] These changes are perhaps best illustrated by the 1755 Lisbon earthquake – an event that happened fairly late in the process, where these ideas had fermented and grown popular, at least among the

[258] Giddens (1987), pp. 75-76.
[259] Anderson, James M. (2002): *Daily Life during the Spanish Inquisition,* Westport: Greenwood Press, pp. 61-85.
[260] McSheffrey, Shannon (2005): *Heresy, Orthodoxy and English Vernacular Religion 1480–1525*, in *Past and Present,* no. 186, pp. 47-80.
[261] Febvre, Lucien& Henri-Jean Martin (1976): *The Coming of the Book. The Impact of Printing 1450-1800*, London:Verso, pp. 248-49 & 262.
[262] Habermas, Jürgen (1991): *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society,* Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 15-26; Giddens (1987), pp. 209-21.
[263] Febvre& Martin (1976), pp. 287-319.
[264] Habermas (1987), pp. 87-92.

intelligentsia. Lisbon, at the time, was one of the leading trading hubs of the continent and the capital of one of the great powers of Europe – a state renowned for its religious zeal and devout Catholicism. Striking on the morning of All Saints' Days, the quake and the ensuing tsunami and fire destroyed most of the city's buildings, killing roughly a fifth of its population. According to Walter Benjamin, the disaster "was roughly equivalent to the destruction of London and Chicago today."[265] The fact that it happened on a Catholic holiday, destroying the majority of the churches in the capital of a country devoted to the papacy – while largely sparing the city's red light district – contradicted the doctrine of Providence. The Lisbon earthquake was hardly the first calamity of its size to hit Europe in a way that contradicted official doctrine. However, the slow speed of communications and the distribution of information by non-government or church sources prevented a full incorporation of the events into a religious worldview. Recalling his boyhood reaction to the news of the quake, Goethe remembered feeling

> "not a little perplexed. God, creator and upholder of heaven and earth … had, by delivering up to destruction alike the just with the unjust, shown Himself not at all fatherly. In vain the young mind struggled against these insinuations, but with little success, because theologians and intellectuals could not agree about the way one must regard such a phenomenon."[266]

According to Theodor Adorno, it was the destruction of Lisbon that led Voltaire to write *Candide,* a 1759 satirical novella that lampooned the notion that we live in the best of all possible worlds.[267] Candide, a naïve and impressionable youngster, travels from disaster to disaster with his teacher Pangloss, who explains their many mishaps – war, torture, venereal disease, and the Lisbon Earthquake to name a few - as part of God's plan.[268] The acceptance of events – and with them social hierarchies – as a given was breaking down. Though widely banned, *Candide* became an instant bestseller, hence illustrating and cementing the loss of authority and transformation of legitimacy that occurred in that period.[269]

2. In *nobility society,* the legitimacy of the state was no longer justified solely in religious doctrine. Instead, securing the happiness and freedom of each individual was steadily becoming the purpose of the state. This is perhaps best exemplified by Thomas Hobbes' contractarian view of the

[265] Benjamin, Walter (1999): *The Lisbon Earthquake,* in Benjamin, Walter (1999): *Selected Writings, Volume 2, Part 2, 1931-34,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 536.
[266] Brooks, Charles B. (1994): *Disaster at Lisbon. The Great Earthquake of 1755,* Long Beach: Shangton Longley Press, pp. 161-62.
[267] Adorno, Theodor W. (1973): *Negative Dialectics*, New York: Seabury Press, p. 361.
[268] Voltaire (1991): *Candide*, Mineola: Dover Publications.
[269] Mason, Haydn T. (1988): *Candide: Optimism Demolished,* New York: Twayne Publishers, pp. 14-15.

relationship between state and individual. Without the belief that God would reward or punish the citizenry – in this realm or the next - for their submission to the state, Hobbes could only appeal to the individual's earthly interests.[270] As we have already seen, he developed an argument based on a highly individualistic view of people as pure utility-optimizers, who care only for their own, personal needs. Based on these assumptions, he argued that the king acquires his authority from his administrative prowess. By protecting the citizens from one another, the king is recognized as a legitimate ruler.[271] Ordinary individuals gain a weak protection against arbitrary power, which is considered a basic prerequisite for the legitimacy of the state.

Contemporary thinkers and practitioners began to recognize that the king owed his legitimacy to the population. For example, Frederick the Great's *Anti-Machiavel*, published anonymously with Voltaire's help almost a century after Hobbes' work, described the king as the steward of the people's interests. As the work's title betrays, Frederick, an autocratic ruler to be sure, followed the Enlightenment *Zeitgeist* and took offense with Machiavelli's separation of the normative and the expedient. Instead, he argued, the virtuous prince could stabilize his power base by being concerned with the interests of his people.[272]

The weakness of the state meant that it still depended on an aristocratic class for local administration. The state's legitimacy emanated from the people, but had to filter through a layer of noblemen. For a ruler who depended mainly on his administrative proficiency, the king's powers were surprisingly weak. The mechanisms of power were still too crude to allow the state to control its territory directly and the nobility was therefore indispensible as middlemen between king and people.[273] Again, the solution was a double contract, which on the one hand regulated the relationship between king and nobility, while concurrently installing a relationship of weak duties and obligations between the state and the population at large.

To be sure, the disappearance of religious authority was a continuous process, which only slowly spread throughout society. Superstition and religious beliefs still played a crucial role in keeping society together. The British Queen Anne still claimed she could cure illnesses through touching as late as 1714.[274] As religious unity disappeared, it was replaced by the nation as the primary community. In his seminal study of modern nationality, Benedict Anderson argues that the nation is an "imagined community" - that is, a feeling of fraternity, delimited from other

[270] Joas & Knödl, p. 17.
[271] Hobbes (1996), pp. 111-22.
[272] Frederick of Prussia (1981): *The Refutation of Machiavelli's* Prince *or Anti-Machiavel,* Athens: Ohio University Press, pp. 73 & 108-111; Ritter, Gerhard (1968): *Frederick the Great. A Historical Profile,* Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 66-72; Fraser, David (2000): *Frederick the Great. King of Prussia,* London: Allen Lane, pp. 51-55.
[273] Tilly (1992), pp. 104-07.
[274] Bloch (1973), p. 220.

communities, among large groups of people, based on an imagined communality between them.[275] As Craig Calhoun highlights, an imagined community is an indirect extension of the individual's everyday life. Everyday life is the individual's immediate experience of the world and it is therefore normally based on the local phenomena that surround him. However, through books, newspapers and other media, the individual experiences phenomena that are physically removed from him – most importantly the presence of others - which then becomes part of his everyday reality. He mirrors himself in people who are not physically present and comes to see them as his brethren.[276] Technology meant that the individual's ability to form communities expanded, allowing him to become part of the groups of millions that we call nations. The phenomena which led to improved arenas for debate and discussion thus also caused the extension of communities. The individual came to see himself as sharing certain common traits with others, when he read about other people acting independently, yet simultaneously being part of the same story.[277]

3. *National society* was characterized by a popular principle of legitimacy, based on the sense of community emanating from the nation, and an increasingly powerful state, which had now become capable of controlling its territory without help from the aristocracy. National society saw the end of the dual social contract. The individual was given increased legal and democratic rights, but also increased duties vis-à-vis the state. He was motivated by the new rights that gave him protection against arbitrary power and allowed him a voice in decision-making through the steadily growing democratic institutions. This allowed him to secure protection and services for the communities that he cherished.

Welfare became a means for buying the loyalty of the citizenry. Furthermore, it increased the quality of soldiers. As Michael Howard points out, many of the welfare mechanisms that are today assumed as natural part of the state's portfolio of responsibilities, originated because they had military value. For instance, the spread of public health initiatives and universal education in the 19th century partly came into being because the state needed healthy, literate soldiers to engage in the increasingly complex activities of war.[278]

The development of the nation as a crucial community was a precondition for this new societal form. The state depended on the dedication of its population – a dedication that erupted

[275] Anderson, Benedict (1991): *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* London: Verso, pp. 6-7.
[276] Calhoun, Craig (1991): *Indirect Relationships and Imagined Communities: Large-scale Social Integration and the Transformation of Everyday Life,* in Bourdieu, Pierre & James S. Coleman (1991): *Social Theory for a Changing Society,* Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 100-14.
[277] Anderson (1991), pp. 9-46; Pinker, Steven (2011): *The Better Angels of Our Nature. A History of Violence and Humanity*, New York: Penguin Books, pp. 211-13.
[278] Howard, Michael (1976): *War in European History,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 107.

onto the world stage with the French *Levée en masse* during the Revolution - to field the massive armies that characterized 19th and 20th century warfare. The individual would only face the horrors of Spotsylvania, Somme, and Stalingrad because he felt he fought to better the conditions for his family, local communities and nation.[279] This was only possible because new communications technologies and the general spread of information allowed each individual citizen to understand government policies and form an opinion about them.[280]

The state had become steadily more powerful through the eighteenth and nineteenth century. This was in part due to new social and material technologies that allowed the state to control and survey large territories directly. The development of the nation and the incorporation of the population at large also created bonds of solidarity that made it easier to control individual behavior. There was no longer a need for indirect rule. The aristocracy therefore lost its importance as the middlemen between state and individuals. The state and the nation became mutually reinforcing. Not only did the new national principle enable stronger government institutions, these institutions also allowed the state to shape the individual's community allegiance by interfering in the socialization process. Schools, prisons, the military, and even social science became venues, where the state could mould the individual's sense of group membership.[281]

Modern national society, Jürgen Habermas argues, is characterized by a "Janus-faced" tension between the principles of citizenship and nationality - two necessary, yet incommensurable, understandings of the individual. Citizenship refers to the status of the individual as a rational person, whose rights to autonomy is protected by the state. This view reflects the simple Hobbesian notion of the social contract between state and individual, where society is but a voluntarily established entity comprising of freely consenting citizens.

In national society – where much is asked of the individual – he is also bestowed with extensive rights. He has a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Furthermore, his rights are not limited to these private interests alone. He also has a right to have a say in public matters through the democratic process. This perspective contains a cosmopolitan dimension, in that most people are rational (or have the potential to become rational) and therefore have the right to the same protection. If one follows this line of reasoning to its end, human rights are not limited to members of one specific society, but should – in principle at least – be extended to all of mankind.

Nationality, on the other hand, establishes the individual as a member of the nation. In this view, people are products of society, because they owe their identity to communal socialization

[279] Keegan, John (1976): *The Face of Battle*, New York: Penguin Books, p. 220.
[280] Giddens (1987), pp. 172-81.
[281] Giddens (1987), pp. 181-92; Dandeker, Christopher (1990): *Surveillance, Power and Modernity. Bureaucracy and Discipline from 1700 to the Present Day,* Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 66-109.

processes. They cannot be understood as independent, rational individuals in the sense described above, because their identity is formed by their membership of a specific society. This identity is inherently particularistic, because the individual is a member of just one of many nations. It cannot be squared with the cosmopolitanism inherent in the citizenship principle.

Habermas argues that both of these ideas are fundamental to modern society. Without the nationality principle, society would lack the fundamental solidarity that enables smooth social interaction. People are only willing to contribute to common social mechanisms because they appreciate the other members of the community. Furthermore, no-one would be willing to make the sacrifices characteristic of modern warfare. Conversely, social and political rights are necessary for mooring the nation in the state. Only when the people have a say in political decision-making could the state truly claim to represent the nation. Both of these principles are shaped by the improvement of the conditions for debate, supported by the inventions, such as the printing press, that arose as the influence of religious dogma reduced and the conditions for rational debate were improved.[282]

In that sense, our exploration of the origins of modern society is complete. The conditions of modern society developed over centuries, as the way the state was legitimized and the creation of communities changed. The Medieval religious legitimacy was replaced by a state that was legitimized by its claim to represent the people. Modern society is thus characterized by a principle of accountability. It is only by claiming to represent civil society that the state can draw significant sacrifices from it. Together with the institutions of social control and socialization controlled by the state, this principle forms a nexus of mutually reinforcing mechanisms that shore up support for the state, based on national community. However, accountability is built upon a seemingly intractable tension between the universal principle of citizenship and the particularistic principle of nationality.

Ideologies and the societal imperative

The societal imperative depends on the ideologies, institutions, and special interests dominant in society.[283] It becomes a problem for the survival of the state if elites are driven, either by conviction or acquiescence, to advocate ideas that lead to policies that diminish the state's ability to wield power. As we saw in chapter 3, faulty ideas can be lethal for society. The Morioris failed to stand up to the Maori invaders, not for want of material, military capabilities, but partly because they lacked a

[282] Habermas, Jürgen (1990a): *Citizenship and National Identity*, in Habermas, Jürgen (1994): *Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy,* Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 492-500.
[283] Friedberg (2000), p. 64.

strategic culture that allowed them to realize the danger they faced. The cultural values of Moriori society led to its demise.

In modern complex societies, state elites are somewhat isolated from the population at large. Ideas are the driver of policies, but it matters where the ideas come from, and if institutions and special interests allow them to influence policy. It not only matters if the ideas in society are in accordance with the challenges facing the state – it also matters if these ideas actually influence the government. The population may possess a rudimentary understanding of international relations, but this need not be problematic if it does not influence the government's course of action. Consequently, one can imagine three types of societal imperatives that may put the state at risk. Firstly, the population and elite may both hold an erroneous understanding of international relations. Secondly, the government elites may hold a dangerous notion of international politics and may be isolated from the population at large. The population will then be incapable of correcting the state's policies. Finally, the elite may hold a correct view of international politics, while the population is influenced by a flawed conception of the international realm. If the government depends wholly on the whims of the population, it may feel forced to follow policies which are not beneficial in the long run. In other words, does the population at large understand the threats faced by the state and, if so, is it willing to work for the continued existence of the state? Furthermore, do the political institutions allow the population to have a say in shaping policy? Is it possible for it to voice its opinion and shape it through a public debate? Are there informal channels that allow special interests to claim excessive influence over the course of the state?

The key question is whether the ideas dominating the government elite reflect the needs arising from the functional imperative. Basically, these ideas can either underestimate or overestimate the importance of military force. Huntington explored the former of the two problems extensively, looking at how ideas in society can make it less likely to develop essential military capabilities. In democratic societies, he argued, groups can be liberal or conservative – two categories which, he implied, saturate the spectrum of possibilities. He treated democratic ideology as a discrete, binary variable – a democratic polity can either be liberal or conservative, but no such thing as an intermediate version is possible.[284] Huntington's distinction between liberalism and conservatism basically corresponds to an idealist form of individualism, or a realist acceptance of the need to defend status quo through violent and possibly immoral means. Crudely put, liberalism focuses on an abstract goal, conservatism on finding effective means. Conservatism allows using the

[284] To be sure, Huntington also argued that societies can be defined by non-democratic ideologies by being either fascist or Marxist (Huntington (1957b), pp. 91-93). In that sense, ideology is actually a quaternary variable. However, for the sake of clarity – and since the focus of this dissertation is democratic societies – I concentrate on the two democratic ideologies: liberalism and conservatism

military means necessary to defend the state; liberalism lets its choice of means be colored by its ideals and thus possibly endangering the state.[285]

Liberalism, in Huntington's view, is essentially individualism writ large. It arises from an Enlightenment notion of human emancipation that defines individual freedom as the purpose of society. In that sense, it is a transcendental philosophy aimed at creating a society that maximizes individual freedom. The goal of politics is to ensure that universally acceptable moral principles are spread, thus ensuring the freedom and dignity of the individual. Society shall only pursue policies that do not violate every individual's right to personal freedom. This, Huntington argued, creates a tension between liberalism and military thinking. What is war but a violation of the individual liberty of those who fight? Whereas liberalism is critical towards policies that do not directly strive towards human emancipation, military thought focuses mainly on the protection of society and is willing to sacrifice the lives of others to achieve that goal. Liberalism, according to Huntington, is naturally hostile to military affairs. Liberals will tend to shy away from making the *Realpolitik* choices that have become the core of international relations.[286]

Conservatism, by contrast, seeks to secure society against threats without looking at whether or not the social order is morally impeccable. Curiously, Huntington equated conservatism with pure immanence – an absolute appreciation of the present – rather than a longing for the past. Conservatism is not a return to the past, but rather a change of focus from morality to expediency. Conservatism, in his sense of the term, cannot contain any ideal – not even an idealized past - beyond an appreciation of the present. It does not strive to shape society to reflect a specific morality, but rather appreciates the present society, and consequently makes the defense of the present the primary goal of political action.[287] "[C]onservatism, unlike the other three ideologies, is not monistic and universalistic", Huntington wrote. "It does not attempt to apply the same ideas to all problems and human institutions."[288] Huntington's version of conservatism is essentially immanence taken to its logical extreme.

The purpose of politics is to protect the status quo, regardless of the morality of the current situation. In a democratic state – like the United States – conservatism is also a democratic force. It seeks to protect the status quo, which, in this case, means defending the democratic institutions. However, unlike liberalism, it does not refrain from actions that may be amoral in isolation, if it serves the wider purpose of protecting the state. To defend the status quo is to defend the current

[285] Huntington (1957b), pp. 90-91 & 93-94.
[286] Huntington (1957b), pp. 90-91. For an updated version of this argument, see Desch, Michael C. (2008): *America's Illiberal Liberalism. The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy,* in *International Security,* vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 7-43.
[287] Huntington (1957a), pp. 456-61.
[288] Huntington (1957b), p. 93.

nation-state. Society must be defended, even if it involves acts that infringe on the personal liberty and dignity of certain groups. It is therefore a *Realpolitik* ideology. This focus on continuity, Huntington argued, makes conservatism compatible with the military's core ideas.[289] Conservatism, in his view, is thus the appropriate response to the functional imperative.

There are two problems with the way Huntington understood ideas and ideologies. The first is a rather technical problem concerning his conception of ideologies as discrete options. A democratic society, he argued, could either be liberal or conservative, but no such thing as an intermediate version was possible.[290] As Peter Feaver has correctly highlighted, it seems peculiar that Huntington did not allow intermediate versions of the two ideologies, such as "liberal hawks" or "idealist conservatives".[291] Ideologies never form discrete alternatives. Instead, as ideology scholar Michael Freeden has shown, they are malleable and can brush over logical contradictions. They infer meaning around certain core concepts, yet are not capable of capturing all of social reality. Consequently, they naturally contain tensions that destabilize them, yet need not be solved.[292] To use one of Huntington's ideologies, liberalism strives to enhance individual liberty. However, in some situations, the defense of liberty requires that one violates liberty itself. War, for instance, commonly entails committing horrible acts for the defense of the state, which can be detrimental to liberty itself. Liberalism does not necessarily offer an answer to this conundrum, nor does it necessarily need to do so. War is a relatively rare occurrence. Only when an ideology is placed under great pressure will tensions and inconsistencies come to the fore.[293]

Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, Huntington was too obsessed with the danger of underestimating the need for military action. He failed to explore the opposite danger: the possibility that society would come under the sway of militarism. This was partly caused by his misconceived understanding of the functional imperative. Because he ignored the wide palette of power generation tools available to the state, and argued that the functional imperative is simply a matter of generating military force, he did not grasp the possibility that too much emphasis on military force can be a liability to the state.

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[289] Huntington (1957b), pp. 93-94.
[290] Huntington (1957b), pp. 89-94.
[291] Feaver (2003), p. 19.
[292] Freeden, Michael (1996): *Ideologies and Political Theory. A Conceptual Approach,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 47-54.
[293] Freeden (1996), pp. 92-96. One of the key debates within the discourse theory field is whether or not discursive systems, of which ideologies are a subtype, are disconnected from a non-discursive reality. Some theorists argue that there are no such relationship (Torfing, Jacob (1999): *New Theories of Discourse. Laclau, Mouffe and Žižek,* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 90-93). Following Freeden, I find this position to be logically incoherent. Ideology theories that accept a causal relationship between a non-discursive reality and ideological systems must logically accept at least a weak form of functionalism.

Militarism is an exaggerated emphasis of military power or appreciation of the military institution. There is no standard definition of militarism and the term is often used colloquially as a slur in political discourse. This colloquial usage has detached the study of militarism from mainstream war studies. As Martin Shaw has observed, militarism "is academically marginal: strategists, and with them many historians, eschew the term because of its association with political opposition to military power as such."[294] Consequently, both academic and political debates tend to be characterized by a confusion of terms.[295] One should distinguish between two types of militarism, each of which is problematic for different reasons. *Elite militarism* occurs, when government elites overestimate the importance of military force for the survival of the state. This may occur either because the elites are convinced that a militarist policy is the best course of action or because the power constellations of the state only permit them to retain power by following a militarist policy. In other words, elite militarism may be the result of deeply felt conviction, or pragmatic acquiescence. It is the mirror image of the problem explained above: whereas some individualist ideologies risk overlooking the need for military force, elite militarism leads to policies that overemphasize military force and marginalize other power generation tools. Militarism generally relies on some degree of *Realpolitik* thinking. It only makes sense to advocate for military solutions if one believes that society should be defended, and that one is allowed to kill to achieve this goal. However, what separates elite militarism from other strains of *Realpolitik* thinking, is the failure to see, indeed often the refusal to even consider, that the threats facing the state may be handled by non-military means. Elite militarism is thus a type of misperception that affects the actions of government elites.[296]

[294] Shaw, Martin (2013): *Twenty-First Century Militarism. A Historical Sociological Framework,* in Stavrianakis, Anna & Jan Selby (2013): *Militarism and International Relations,* London: Routledge, p. 19.

[295] Some authors, like Alfred Vagts or Andrew Bacevich, do not distinguish between elite and popular militarism (Vagts (1959), p. 12; Bacevich, Andrew J. (2005): *The New American Militarism. How Americans are Seduced by War,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 2n4). Instead, they see militarism as permeating society. By contrast, Gerhard Ritter sees militarism primarily as an elite phenomenon (Ritter, Gerhard (1969): *The Sword and the Scepter. The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Volume 1: The Prussian Tradition 1740-1890,* Coral Gables: University of Miami Press). Chalmers Johnson understands militarism as "the phenomenon by which a nation's armed services come to put their institutional preservation ahead of achieving national security or even a commitment to the integrity of the governmental structure of which they are part" (Johnson, Chalmers (2004): *The Sorrows of Empire. Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic,* New York: Metropolitan Books, pp. 23-24). For Johnson, militarism is thus an attitude within the military and not, as I define it, a set of cultural currents within society. Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby use a very wide definition of militarism. They define it simply as "the social and international relations of the preparation for, and conduct of, organized political violence" (Stavrianakis, Anna & Jan Selby (2013): *Militarism and International Relations in the Twenty-First Century,* in Stavrianakis, Anna & Jan Selby (2013): *Militarism and International Relations,* London: Routledge, p. 3). They see all phenomena related to defense, thus rejecting the widely held distinction between reasonable and problematic military practices (for a presentation of this distinction, see Vagts (1959), pp. 13-17). The literature prefers to reduce militarism to a single phenomenon. To my knowledge, none of the many definitions of militarism follows me in seeing it as two related, yet different, phenomena.

[296] Vagts (1959), pp. 13-17.

For instance, Gerhard Ritter showed that elite militarism was particularly prevalent in Austria-Hungary before the First World War. Faced with the centrifugal forces of nationalism, the multi-national empire was confronted by the risk of imminent disintegration. Powerful circles within the Austrian elite, most importantly Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, came to believe that only military victories against its enemies could save the Habsburg state. Most importantly, the destruction and dismemberment of Serbia would remove an influence that inspired hopes of independence among the empire's five million South Slavs.[297] Ritter points out that these ideas were almost ludicrously incoherent:

> "[W]as the military power that stood behind such plans really impressive enough for such audacious ventures? None knew Austria's weaknesses better than Conrad. What inspired him was political ambition rather than a realistic assessment of his resources. His confidence was obsessive rather than soundly based. Added to this was a grave lack of clarity with respect to political goals. How could the problem of South Slavic nationalism really be solved by the military subjugation of Serbia? Was that not bound to lead to protracted military rule and rebellion after rebellion?"[298]

The belief in the expediency of military means was prevalent in several European states at the time.[299] However, the errors of this belief are blatantly obvious in Austria-Hungary, where the fundamental threats against the state were clearly of a political nature. It was based on a fundamentalist, almost mystical, belief in the normative goodness of the Austro-Hungarian state. This entity could only be defended with military means.[300] Ritter argued that the Austrian militarist movement contributed significantly to Vienna's exaggerated reaction to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. It thus became one of the many causes of the First World War.[301]

A second, yet related, ideological issue is the problem of *popular militarism.*[302] Popular militarism is the belief, held in civil society, that military force is the most expedient way of ensuring the survival of the state, and that the military institution, rather than the civilian government, possesses the best judgment of when and how to use it. For instance, during the First World War, a veritable Hindenburg cult developed amongst Germans after the commander's victories on the Eastern front at Tannenberg, Masurian Lakes, and Lodz. The Field Marshall's popularity was soon increased by government propaganda that used him as the figurehead for various war programs. For

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[297] Ritter, Gerhard (1970): *The Sword and the Scepter. The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Volume 2: The European Powers and the Wilheminian Europe 1890-1914,* Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, pp. 227-34.
[298] Ritter (1970), p. 233.
[299] Mann (1993), pp. 754-57. For a critical perspective on the salience of pre-1914 militarism, see Ferguson, Niall (1998): *The Pity of War*, New York: Penguin Books, pp. 1-30.
[300] Sondhaus, Lawrence (2000): *Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf: Architecht of the Apocalypse,*Boston: Humanities Press, pp.82-85.
[301] Ritter (1970), pp. 227-75.
[302] Finer (1962), pp. 80-83.

example, the government's 1916 program of industrial mobilization was called the Hindenburg program.[303] Unlike elite militarism, which is politically important because it guides the actions of political elites, popular militarism is defined by being a sentiment held in civil society. Whereas elite militarism is problematic because it may lead to erroneous or often dangerous policies, popular militarism may cause problems if it affects the constitutionally guaranteed civilian control of the armed forces. It may thus destabilize the democratic process. It affects elite civil-military relations, the relationship between civilian and military elites, by giving the military another way of exerting counter-punishment against the civilian government (the concept of counter-punishment is introduced, defined, and discussed in chapter 6). If politicians and generals differ about the overall strategy, the military may use its popularity in the population at large to pressure the government to accept its point of view. For instance, the German high command used Hindenburg's popularity to accumulate power at the expense of the civilian institutions of government. In strategic disagreements between the civilian politicians and the general staff, the latter held the upper hand, as any threat of resignation by Hindenburg or Ludendorff, his deputy, was met with horror by Wilhelm II and his advisors. In time, the generals' influence eclipsed even that of the Kaiser and led to the Silent Dictatorship. At the zenith of its power, the High Command was capable of bringing about the downfall of Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor.[304] Even after the war, Hindenburg's popularity meant that he could walk out of a potentially incriminating Reichstag commission hearing on the failure of the wartime leadership without repercussions.[305]

Unlike elite militarism, popular militarism is not necessarily a type of misperception. Elite militarism is defined by being strategically problematic. Popular militarism is interesting because it affects the constitutional relationship between generals and politicians, regardless of whether or not it is true. It does not have to be erroneous to be democratically dubious. Even if the generals are right, the fact that they have the option of forcing their views upon the civilian government is democratically problematic.

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[303] von der Golz, Anna (2009): *Hindenburg. Power, Myths, and the Rise of the Nazis,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 14-42; Craig, Gordon A. (1978): *Germany, 1866-1945,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 299-326; Ritter, Gerhard (1970), pp. 93-104. Most historians argue that Lodz was not, strictly speaking, a German victory. However, government propaganda encouraged that impression within the German population (Keegan (1998), pp. 181-82). Some scholars argue that the Hindenburg cult was built upon a deeply seated popular militarism that had its origins in the militarism of Hohenzoller Prussia and the importance of the victories of 1870-71 for German unification (Mann (1993), pp. 311 & 752; Elias, Norbert (1996): *The Germans. Power, Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,* New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 14-15, 63-64 & 118).

[304] Ritter, Gerhard (1972): *The Sword and the Scepter. The Problem of Militarism in Germany. Volume 3: The Tragedy of Statesmanship: Bethmann-Hollweg as War Chancellor,* Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, pp. 457-87; Craig (1978), pp. 373-86; Craig, Gordon A. (1955): *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 322-30.

[305] von der Golz (2009), pp. 67-69.

Popular militarism is a sentiment that is present in nearly all societies. There will almost always be groups who distrust their politicians, and who advocate that the military acts as political guardians. Popular militarism may be present, and indeed cause elite civil-military problems, even in societies where civilian elites have a correct conception of the importance of military force. I will return to these issues when I discuss elite civil-military relations in part III.

Recently, several scholars and commentators have argued that elite and popular militarism have become prevalent – and potentially democratically problematic – forces in American civil-military relations.[306] Whether or not this assertion is correct is largely an empirical question. Theoretically, the fundamental problem is that Huntington's lack of a concept of militarism meant that this debate has become an aside in the civil-military relations literature. The two types of militarism pose a risk for any democratic society and, as we shall see in chapter 6, it affects the relationship between civilian and military elites.

In summary, the societal imperative is shaped by the ideologies, institutions, and special interests dominant in society. It clashes with the functional imperative if elites are driven, either by conviction or acquiescence, to advocate ideas that lead to policies that diminish the state's ability to wield power. There are two types of dangerous societal imperatives. On the one hand, excessive individualism and utopianism may make government elites reluctant to make the necessary investments in military capabilities. On the other hand, elite militarism may make government elites invest too much in military capabilities, thus crowding out investments in other power generation tools. Finally, popular militarism increases the power of the military and may affect elite civil-military relations.

Conclusion

This chapter explored the nature of the societal imperative – the second of the two forces that shape societal civil-military relations. The societal imperative is shaped by the interaction of the ideology, political institutions, and special interests in society. Understanding accountability is a precondition for grasping the nature of civil-military relations. The accountability principle came to the fore as a replacement for the divine principle of legitimacy that disappeared in the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance. The development of better conditions for public debate, stronger state

[306] Johnson, Chalmers (2003): *American Militarism and Blowback,* in Boggs, Carl (2003): *Masters of War and Blowback in the Age of American Empire,* London: Routledge, pp. 119-28; Johnson (2004); Bacevich (2005); Bacevich, Andrew J. (2013): *Wilsonians Under Arms,* in Stavrianakis, Anna & Jan Selby (2013): *Militarism and International Relations,* London: Routledge, pp. 117-30; Hossein-Zadeh, Ismael (2006): *The Political Economy of US Militarism,* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Martin, Geoff & Erin Steuter (2010): *Pop Culture Goes to War. Enlisting and Resisting Militarism in the War on Terror,* Plymouth: Lexington Books, pp. 3-6. For a Cold War perspective on American militarism, see Mills, C. Wright (1956): *The Power Elite,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 198-224.

institutions, and national consciousness created a new foundation for society. Modern society is thus built on a double foundation, where the principle of citizenship and the principle of nationality are in contest with one another. The societal imperative may undermine the security of the state, if the ideas dominating the government elite do not reflect the needs arising from the functional imperative. Simply put, these ideas can underestimate the need for military power, thus preventing the state from making the necessary investments in military capabilities. Conversely, they can also overestimate the need for military force, thus crowding out other power generation tools. Finally, the state also faces the democratically problematic danger of popular militarism. This dissertation can now turn to elite civil-military relations – its primary topic of concern - having defined the functional and societal imperative that frame these relations.

Part III: Elite civil-military relations

- 5 -

Military expertise

The previous part focused on societal civil-military relations – that is, the relationship between the military and society, including the relationship between the military and civilian actors who are not members of the political elite. The final part of the dissertation – which is comprised of chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 – focuses on elite civil-military relations. Elite civil-military relations denote the interaction between soldiers and civilians *within* the state: relations between members of the executive and legislative branch and leading members of the officer corps.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the fundamental building blocks of elite civil-military relations. It focuses especially on military expertise, which I argue is perhaps *the* basic feature that defines that relationship. In *The Soldier and the State,* Samuel Huntington argued that the modern officer corps is a professional group of experts on par with doctors or lawyers. This notion was central to Huntington's general argument. As James Burk has recently shown, the status of the military is closely connected to its claim to a scientific expertise.[307] As long as military experts hold a privileged access to the military expertise, it is easy to argue that a clear division of labor between soldiers and civilians is the preferable pattern of elite civil-military relations.[308] In this chapter, I argue that the military man's expertise is less predictable than Huntington claimed. The modern military man is an expert in warfare. However, because of the unpredictability of war, military expertise is, to a large extent, a type of creative judgment. Consequently, as we shall see in later chapters, elite civil-military relations cannot be an unproblematic division of labor.[309]

This chapter progresses in three stages. I give an overall outline of the structure of elite civil-military relations in the first section. In the second section, I provide a historical overview of the appearance of military expertise. Having shown that military expertise came to define officership in the post-Medieval period, I explore the limits of this expertise by looking at Carl von Clausewitz' conception of war as both an art and a science in the final section.

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[307] Burk, James (2005): *Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession,* in Snider, Don M. & Lloyd J. Matthews (2005): *The Future of the Army Profession,* Boston: Custom Publishing, pp. 39-60.

[308] Huntington (1957b), pp. 11-18 & 70-74.

[309] James Burk argues that professionalism is an essentially contested concept that cannot be defined in any objective manner. Consequently, he argues that one should study the ways in which professionalism is articulated as an indicator of the general attitude of society towards professionalism and the general articulatory power of different professional groups (Burk (2005), pp. 39-41). However, although I would recognize the validity of Burk's approach, I would argue that civil-military relations theory cannot advance without a thorough understanding of the exact, universal nature of military science. We can only understand the power that the military holds vis-à-vis civilian groups by grasping the functional nature of the military science. I therefore focus on analyzing the universal nature of the military science in the following chapters.

Structure of elite civil-military relations

Turning to elite civil-military relations involves a change of scale and analytical lens. When we explored societal civil-military relations, we looked at grand scale historical trends and phenomena, the tectonic shifts of societies over centuries, and the changes of material and ideational forces. Elite civil-military relations, by contrast, are processes between elite individuals within the state. These individuals strive for various political goals and are limited by their incomplete understanding of reality.

Our cognitive abilities are infused with culture. The way we see the world is colored by our tacit knowledge of reality. Adapting to outside threats depends on the cultural categories one uses to understand the world. In chapter 3, we used the story of the Moriori tribe to illustrate how the functional imperative can lead to the destruction of an entire society. The story also shows that the military's ability to adapt depends on the sophistication of their culturally embedded ideas about warfare and strategy, what we normally term "strategic culture".[310] As Colin Gray has noticed, strategy is permanent and universal, but the way that each society thinks about strategy is influenced by cultural assumptions.[311] War has a real existence that punishes cultural conceptions of strategy that are out of tune with it. Because New Zealand was ravaged by almost permanent warfare, Maori strategic culture was more attuned to the real nature of war.[312] In comparison, the strategic culture of the peaceful Moriori was so underdeveloped that they did not understand that they held a potential military advantage over the Maori.

The moment we move into the state – as we are doing in this third part of the dissertation – everything becomes colored by strategic culture. All decisions are made by individuals who perceive the world through culturally infused lenses. The key strategic question is: do we have understood reality correctly?[313] It is important to stress that strategic culture is colored by the society it protects. The military's ability to develop a culture that can handle warfare rationally depends on the sophistication of the culture that characterizes society at large.

Elite civil-military relations are caught between two imperatives that grow out of the functional and societal imperatives. The elite civil-military system has to produce legitimacy for the state, while ensuring that the armed forces remain effective. As we saw in chapter 4, the modern

[310] Johnston, Alistair I. (1995): *Thinking about Strategic Culture,* in *International Security,* vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 32-64. As Johnston highlights, strategic culture is not incompatible with the notion of rationality (Johnston (1995), pp. 34-36).
[311] Gray, Colin S. (1999): *Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back,* in *Review of International Studies,* vol. 25, no. 1, p. 57.
[312] Mishkin, Bernard (1937): *The Maori of New Zealand,* in Mead, Margaret (1937): *Cooperation and Conflict Among Primitive Peoples,* New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 450 & 453-56.
[313] Klein, Yitzhak (1990): *A Theory of Strategic Culture,* in *Comparative Strategy,* vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 5-9.

state is based on an accountability principle, whereby it gains legitimacy by being responsive to the wishes of the population. The state asks the citizenry for taxes and loyalty, and it reciprocates by providing services and protection. This means that all government policies, in principle at least, should reflect the interests of civil society. Elite civil-military relations play a part in this process by ensuring that the military is accountable to the government, which is in turn accountable to the population. The civilian government's legitimacy decreases whenever it loses control of the military.

In chapter 3, we saw that conventional military force is one of the tools used by the state to handle outside threats. Civilian and military elites are meant to ensure that the military is capable of using force effectively and that it is used for politically beneficial purposes. In simple terms, the arm of the state should be strong and used for tasks that increase the security of the state. As we shall see later on, determining and implementing political goals necessarily involves elite civil-military interaction. Civilians need military advice to determine if the goals they set are attainable. They rely on the military to collect information before a decision is made and to implement it afterwards. Well-functioning elite civil-military relations secure military effectiveness.

Legitimacy and effectiveness generally overlap. An effective state capable of rebuffing outside threats will typically be more legitimate than a state that struggles to defend its own territory. *Vice versa*, a legitimate state will often be more effective, because it does not have to spend as many resources on securing the acquiescence of its population. However, this relationship is not always valid. Sometimes additional legitimacy is bought at the price of diminished effectiveness. The state may find itself in a situation where the expedient course of action involves actions that are considered illegitimate in the wider population.

The legitimacy and effectiveness imperatives define the structure of elite civil-military relations. The need for effectiveness means that the state allows the existence of an independent military institution that is specialized in maximizing the state's potential for political violence. It is simply more effective for the state to delegate some decisions to an independent organization. Conversely, the need for legitimacy is perhaps the primary reason why the military is placed under civilian control. The state is only legitimate because civil society determines the goal of policies via its elected representatives.

The study of elite civil-military relations contains two analytical perspectives: civilian control, and military effectiveness. Studies look either at how civilian leaders control the military, or at how different patterns of elite civil-military interaction make the state militarily effective. This separation is based on the assumptions made about actor motives. Civilian control explores if the military is motivated to accept civilian supremacy. Civilian control is basically a study of military *incentives*. It looks at the many factors that ensure that officers feel motivated to allow civilian supremacy. As we

shall see in the coming chapters, two clusters of mechanisms influence the officer's motives. External control mechanisms are institutions that allow the civilians to monitor military behavior and punish shirking. They influence the military man's motives by raising the price of military shirking. Internal control mechanisms affect the military man's norms and values directly. Civilian control is ensured by using a combination of those factors. Civilian control focuses on the processes through which decisions are made, but pays less attention to the consequences of these decisions. Open, democratic and well-functioning processes are one of the cornerstones of legitimacy. Consequently, civilian control studies will typically focus on questions of legitimacy, while effectiveness is of only secondary importance.

Military effectiveness, by contrast, is the study of the *effect* of elite civil-military relations. Military effectiveness studies do not look at how military actors become motivated to accept civilian supremacy. They assume that the military and civilians have at least a minimal degree of shared interests and explore the effects of the way in which they interact. Whereas civilian control studies focus on explaining behavior, military effectiveness studies focus on the consequences of that behavior. Whereas civilian control studies mainly focus on one actor (the military), military effectiveness studies focus on two actors (the military and the civilians). As we shall see later on, military effectiveness involves a choice between creating a division of labor between soldiers and civilians and ensuring strategic coherence by allowing civilians to meddle and dictate details of military policy. These policies are evaluated on the basis of whether or not they maximize the state's ability to exert force. Military effectiveness studies do not *a priori* assume that civilian supremacy is a superior organizational principle. In principle at least, military effectiveness studies should be open for the possibility that military influence over policy may be more effective under some circumstances. Legitimacy is of secondary importance for military effectiveness studies. It is typically included by these studies, because illegitimate behavior often diminishes the effectiveness of the state.

The distinction between civilian control and military effectiveness is mainly of analytical importance. Civilian control and military effectiveness largely reinforce one another. That is, states where the civilian governments are able to control the military will typically also be highly effective at exerting military force. Analytically, however, it is difficult, if not impossible, to design a study that concurrently explores these two topics, because each topic makes different analytical assumptions about the motives and interests of civilian and military actors.

To sum up, the study of elite civil-military relations contains two incommensurable analytical perspectives: civilian control and military effectiveness. I explore elite civil-military relations using this distinction in the following chapters. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on civilian control, while chapter 8

looks at military effectiveness. When I look at civilian control in chapters 6 and 7, I bracket the question of how the system is meant to generate military effectiveness. I only look at the mechanisms the civilian leadership employs to ensure that the military follows its bidding. Of course, when I look at military effectiveness in chapter 8, I reverse this procedure. I collect these thoughts to support a comprehensive description of the elite civil-military system in chapter 9.

The military skill

The military is one of the two poles in elite civil-military relations. The military has had a unique status in political theory since the discipline developed in ancient Greece. In *The Republic,* Plato famously argued that society should be based on a natural division of labor between three core groups, one of which was a class of military guardians.[314] The military fulfills a function that is essential to most societies. The military man has a unique skill that makes it functionally expedient to allow him to occupy a separate institution in society.

If we look narrowly at the functional requirements for participating in warfare, the story of the modern military is the story of how an abstract system of knowledge became the key determinant in conflict. In premodern society, warriors were defined by their mastery of the technique of warfare. Today, the prototypical officer is an expert. Modern militaries are large bureaucracies that fight using advanced and potent technology. The officer is an expert in management and engineering, which he uses to enhance his ability to project force in combat.

The development of the modern military occurred after the end of the Middle Ages. The competition for power and security forced states to develop steadily more effective militaries. As war became more complex, it required more drill and training, and understanding of technology. Concurrently, the states also became more proficient in controlling their own territory without interference from domestic rivals. Over the course of centuries, the nobility and the church were gradually phased out as challengers to the state.[315] The military no longer had to play a part in domestic conflicts for power and could therefore dedicate more resources to interstate war.[316]

The functional dimension of the modern military was thus shaped by both a transformation of warfare and of society as such. The development of large bureaucracies dedicated to violence led to separation of the different functions of warfare. In early warfare, the ideal officer was a "doer" who led by example. In modern warfare, bureaucratization and the increased potency that follows from new technology enabled a separation of the functions of strategizing, organization, and actual combat. The ideal officer is an expert in the abstract systems of military knowledge.

[314] Plato (1992): *Republic,* Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing, pp. 8-156.
[315] Tilly (1992), pp. 103-07.
[316] Mann (1993), pp. 409-12.

The military officer could only become an expert because knowledge became accepted as a separate reality from mythology, and because rational enquiry became seen as an expedient practice. Sir Francis Bacon may, in fact, not be the father of the phrase, but "scientia potentia est" certainly summed up the Renaissance and Enlightenment *Zeitgeist* in which the modern military was born.[317] The material power of the state flourished through science, which was concurrently reinforced by an increased cultural acceptance of science and expertise.

Pre-modern society was largely based on untheorized practices. Knowledge steadily became problematized during the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Suddenly, norms and values had to be justified with the use of arguments. Hitherto tacit knowledge about the world was articulated into theoretical terms and debated in public discourse. Knowledge about the world was divorced from morality and theology and led to the first primitive science. All in all, with the economic and cultural transformation of society "it became", in Keith MacDonald's words, "possible for individuals to develop an area of learning and expertise and to become repositories of knowledge in their own right and … to form groups of specialists."[318]

The essential difference between pre-modern and modern society is the latter's ability to formulate explicit theories. In modern society we formulate explicit theories of how strategy works. Simple societies, such as the Moriori and the Maori, did not developed theories. They did not formulate axioms or identify chains of causality. Strategic thought took the form of untheorized practices that worked primarily on an intuitive level of thought.[319]

To be sure, knowledge was always part of the military skill, even for the pre-modern warrior.[320] Our term "strategy" has its origins in the ancient world, where it is derived from the Greek *"strategos"*, which meant "general".[321] It only became an abstract system of knowledge in the modern age. It is the invention of writing, anthropologist Jack Goody argues, that separates the pre-modern frame of mind from ours. Writing allows societies to rationalize the way they analyze physical phenomena and to develop a more complex understandings.[322] Warfare was one of the

[317] Vickers, Brian (1992): *Francis Bacon and the Progress of Knowledge,* in *Journal of the History of Ideas,* vol. 53, no. 3, p. 512n47.
[318] MacDonald, Keith M. (1995): *The Sociology of the Professions*, London: Sage Publishing, p. 159.
[319] It is important to highlight that this lack of strategic sophistication is in no way an indication of the inferiority of this line of thinking. Sophistication requires resources that are often better spent for other purposes. Primordial societies lack the resources necessary for more developed military strategy. For instance, strategy often requires a developed military organization, the members of which have time to engage in drills. In primordial societies, where the warriors are often also farmers or hunters, developing this type of military organization would be a waste of resources (Keeley (1996), pp. 42-48).
[320] Van Creveld, Martin (1985): *Command in War,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 8 & 264.
[321] Luttwak, Edward N. (1987): *Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 239-40.
[322] Goody, Jack (1986): *The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-18.

areas in which this transformation occurred, we might add, as writing and theoretical knowledge allowed societies to develop strategic thought. In primordial society, knowledge of the physical world was intertwined with religious myths that established a social and normative order.[323] The development of modern thought was thus a disentanglement of the descriptive from the normative sphere of thought. Postulates had to formulated and supported by various sub-claims, which could then be scrutinized and tested through empirical observation and critical thought. Goody emphasizes two features of writing that sparked this process. Firstly, writing allows one to store information, which "permits communication over time and space, and provides man with a marking, mnemonic and recording device."[324] Before writing, information was stored in oral tradition and resided in the "wetware" of the human brain. The human brain is a relatively unstable medium for information storage, and important lessons were easily forgotten. Secondly, writing allows one to formalize logical statements in a way that it is not possible in oral transmission. One can easily identify ambiguities in writing, and it thus becomes feasible to develop more sophisticated paradigms for understanding the social world. To illustrate this point, Goody invites us to consider how an oral presentation of a complex philosophical text – in this case Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* - would function:

> "Imagine … Kuhn's book as an oral discourse. No listener, I suggest, could ever spot the twenty-one different usages of the word 'paradigm'. The argument would flow from one usage to another without anyone being able to perceive any discrepancy. Inconsistency, even contradiction, tends to get swallowed up in the flow of speech … [. T]he oral form is intrinsically more persuasive because it is less open to criticism."[325]

Taken together, the oral storage of knowledge placed a significant barrier on simple societies' abilities to examine knowledge through testing. Instead, they either "make it or break it", as it is difficult to decipher which elements of an experiment caused the failure.[326]

Primordial strategy was untheorized. To theorize, one must detach oneself from the specificity of current context and elicit axioms and explicit chains of causality that are applicable beyond the current moment. In lieu of these logical categories, planning and strategy rarely becomes a formalized process, whereby explicit knowledge and principles are applied to a situation. Instead, primordial strategic thinking is rooted in a context and takes the form of standardized ruses and tricks that change the context of the encounter. Anthropologists tell us that simple war-bands

[323] Goody (1986), pp. 34-35.
[324] Goody (1986), p. 78.
[325] Goody (1986), pp. 49-50.
[326] Goody (1986), pp. 112-120 & 142-43.

display an impressive tactical sophistication and increase their killing efficiency by using ambushes and surprise attacks.[327]

Warfare in ancient Greece provides an example of pre-theoretical strategy. Greece was a literate society that had developed frames of thought more complicated than the ones found in primordial society, but which had yet to attain the level of complexity found in modern society. The Greeks were definitely capable of acting strategically in their military endeavors. The second Persian invasion of Greece in 480 B.C. was perhaps the "finest hour" of Greek military thinking. After the Greek defeat at Thermopylae - where the Spartan king Leonidas famously delayed the enemy's advance with only a small force – the Persian army now threatened the independence of the Greek city states. According to Herodotus, Xerxes, the Persian king, brought with him an army of more than 2.5 million warriors.[328] Modern historians estimate that the number of men was significantly lower.[329] Greek warfare traditionally consisted of two infantry-based hoplite armies in a phalanx position meeting each other head on in a pitched battle. Historians emphasize how this type of warfare was deeply ingrained in Greek culture, which celebrated the communal being-together-as-one as the cultural basis for both the phalanx and for life in the *polis*.[330] This time, the Greeks, led by Athens, realized that they could not use this strategy against the overwhelming Persian force. Through strategic ingenuity, they managed to break with several cultural practices, whereby they changed the conditions of the battle. In the end, this led to the remarkable victory at Salamis.

Firstly, the Athenian population was evacuated to Salamis, an island off the coast of Attica, leaving Athens to be taken by the Persians. This strategy diverged from Greek cultural norms, which saw the city as the basic gathering principle of the community. Secondly, the Greeks relied on their navy defeating the Persians. The Persian were thought to have an advantage at sea, as they could field a larger fleet and depend on the rich sea-faring tradition of their Phoenician and Egyptian vassals. The Greek strategy was therefore seen as daring, if not highly risky. To off-set their superior numbers, Themistocles, the Athenian commander, set up a ruse to lure the Persians into the narrow straits northeast of Salamis. He sent an envoy to Xerxes, telling him that he planned to surrender. Eager to destroy the Greeks once and for all, Xerxes split his forces to block all escape routes and entered the waters where the Greeks were waiting. Caught by surprise and by the narrowness of the

[327] Gat (1999), pp. 565-73; Keeley (1996), p. 48.
[328] Herodotus (1998): *The Histories,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 470.
[329] Ferrill, Arthur (1966): *Herodotus and the Strategy and Tactics of the Invasion of Xerxes,* in *The American Historical Review,* vol. 72, no. 1, p. 105; Gabriel, Richard A. (1990): *The Culture of War. Invention and Early Developments,* New York: Greenwood Press, p. 73.
[330] Dawson (1996), pp. 47-62; Lendon, J. E. (2005): *Soldiers and Ghosts. A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity,* New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 39-57. Some historians even claim that pitched battles were not driven by military necessity, but that it too was deeply ingrained in Greek culture (Hanson, Victor D. (1998): *Agriculture and War in Classical Greece*, Berkeley: University of California Press).

straits of Salamis, the Persians suffered a massive defeat.[331] Historians claim that more than 40,000 Persians lost their lives. If these numbers can be trusted, the Battle of Salamis is one of the bloodiest sea battles in history, eclipsing the defeat of the Spanish Armada and the battles of Lepanto, Trafalgar, Jutland, and Midway.[332] It stopped the Persian advance and precipitated the battles of Plataea and Mycale the following year, where the weakened Persian force suffered its final defeat.

The Battle of Salamis reveals the sophistication of Greek strategic thought. Carl von Clausewitz would later argue that the essence of warfare was to identify and hit the enemy's center of gravity. This was essentially what the Greeks did at Salamis. Faced with almost insurmountable obstacles, the Greeks redefined the conditions of the war to turn their weak spots into strengths. They broke with cultural norms and changed the entire scope of thinking about themselves and their surroundings. Abandoning their city and resorting to naval warfare were fundamental breaks with their tradition. They were capable of reading the terrain and the intensions of the enemy, predicting where his weak spot was and striking at the right time.

The Greeks possessed an ingenious sense of strategy, which they developed in early written tracts on war. This separated them from their more primordial predecessors.[333] They did not, however, develop a theory of warfare and strategy as such. Their lessons of war were stored in historical and epic narratives, or as practical advice that did not separate the eternal nature of war from the concrete skills needed in Greek war. Herodotus' *Histories* was a mixture of historiography and epic prose. As one modern historian argues, *The Histories* was ripe with tactical and strategic mistakes and flawed analyses, which illustrates the immaturity of Greek military thought.[334] In his *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides tried to correct what he saw as the flaws of Herodotus' method by focusing squarely on the report of events and the analysis of the forces underpinning them.[335] In that sense, his work is much closer to our understanding of theory. Indeed, one commentator notices that Thucydides did comprehend the fundamental paradoxical nature of strategy and he has been a source of inspiration for the development of the modern study of

[331] Green, Peter (1996): *The Greco-Persian Wars,* Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 153-200.
[332] Hanson, Victor D. (2001): *Carnage and Culture. Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power*, New York: Doubleday, pp. 29-30.
[333] For the role of trickery in Greek thinking, see Wheeler, (1988): *Strategem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery,* Leiden: E. J. Brill, pp. 25-49. For strategic thought during the Peloponnesian War, see Ober, Josiah (1996): *The Athenian Revolution. Essays on Ancient Greek Democracy and Political Theory,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 72-85. For examples of Greek military writers, see Campbell, Brian (2004): *Introduction. Warfare in the Greek and Roman World,* in Campbell, Brian (2004): *Greek and Roman Military Writers. Selected Readings,* London: Routledge, pp. 13-17.
[334] Ferrill (1966),pp. 102-15.
[335] Lebow, Richard N. (2003): *The Tragic Vision of Politics. Ethics, Interests and Orders,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 133.

international relations.[336] However, Thucydides did not develop a theory of international relations or war in any modern sense of the word. His insights were woven into a historical narrative about a single event. It lacked the coherence, the scope, and the interest of general laws, normally consistent with theoretical thinking. As Michael Clark puts it,

> "Thucydides' disposition at every point seems to be very nearly the opposite of what good theory requires. Beyond his refusal to express his views in the form of empirical laws, there is a complementary and systematic refusal to appeal to any level of abstraction; a palpable absence of system, though not of structure; and an ascetic and steadfast disinterest in (except to depreciate) any parallel events outside of his chosen case. Nor is this all. There is, in fact, a rather inescapable, if endlessly interesting, irresolution to the work as a whole. The work is riven with impasses (between structural and decisional explanation, for example), omissions (most notoriously, of almost anything having to do with finance or tribute), narrative breaks and stylistic unevenness".[337]

Of course, the Greeks also provided the first Western tracts dedicated solely to warfare. For instance, Aeneas Tacticus – probably the most interesting military thinker in ancient Greece– wrote several pieces dedicated to the technique of warfare. However, the fragments of his thought that we have access to gives us a picture of a military thinker who focused on practical recommendations instead of developing a theoretical analysis of warfare.[338]

Although the late classical and Medieval period definitely saw refinements in military thought, it was not until the so-called military revolution that we see the slow birth of a scientific approach to warfare.[339] Military historians disagree about the origins of the military revolution and the exact periods in which it happened: some identify the 16th and 17th century as crucial, while others claim that it happened as late as 1660-1760.[340] The military revolution led to a need for efficiency on the battlefield, to which the commanders of the period responded by building complex military bureaucracies. Technology and social organization became ways of enhancing army

[336] Coker, Christopher (2010): *Barbarous Philosophers. Reflections on the Nature of War from Heraclitus to Heisenberg*, London: Hurst and Company, pp. 66-76; Bagby, Laurie M. J. (1994): *The Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations,* in *International Organization,* vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 131-53.
[337] Clark, Michael C. (1993): *Realism Ancient and Modern: Thucydides and International Relations,* in *PS: Political Science and Politics,* vol. 26, no. 3, p. 492.
[338] Whitehead, David (1990): *Introduction* in Aineias The Tactician (1990): *How to Survive Under Siege,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 34-42.
[339] Van Doorn, Jacques (1975): *The Soldier and Social Change,* Beverly Hills: Sage Publishing, pp. 32-34; Mann (1986), pp. 453-58.
[340] For an overview of the debate, see Eltis, David (1995): *The Military Revolution in 16th Century Europe*, London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, pp. 6-43 and Rogers, Clifford J. (1995): *The Military Revolution in History and Historiography*, in Rogers, Clifford J. (1995): *The Military Revolution Debate. Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 1-12.

efficiency, and thus crucial determinants for victory.[341] From this followed a period of a rationalization, exemplified by the introduction of drill and discipline by Maurice of Oranje and Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden.[342] According to David Eltis, the changes in warfare included

> "a marked increase in the scope of warfare, reflected in a corresponding increase in the normal size of the armies of the major powers … . Hand in hand with the new larger armies went standardisation of weapons, the introduction of uniforms, the creation of standing armies with a fixed hierarchy of ranks, military academies and more burdensome financial levies to pay for it all."[343]

In general, the military revolution marked the beginning of the modern military, that is, a bureaucratic organization dedicated to fighting wars. In Jacques van Doorn's words,

> "for the first time in Western European history a well-organized and well-disciplined large scale army was formed. 'The army no longer was to be a brute mass, in the Swiss style, nor a collection of bellicose individuals, in the feudal style, it was to be an articulated organism of which each part responded to impulses from above.'"[344]

The need for lengthy training drove up the costs of war.[345] The large armies required an officer who was proficient in the complex knowledge of social organization, and who understood the new, complex weaponry used on the 17th century battlefield. It was a precondition for developing an actual abstract system of knowledge about warfare. Science came to play an increasingly central role in warfare during the 17th and 18th centuries. Of course, the development was gradual. At the turn of the seventeenth century, the focus was on still on drill and training. As John Keegan argued, efficient social organization of armies was *the* competitive edge until the 19th century, when technology and industrial output took over.[346] This process was being systematized, but war had not yet become an abstract system of knowledge.

Science first played a role in the warfare through adjacent disciplines such as management and engineering. For example, in 1742, Benjamin Robins – a mathematician and engineer who would later be known as the Newton of gunnery - published *New Principles of Gunnery,* a scientific work that married Newtonian physics, Boyle's Law of thermodynamics, and meticulous observations of swinging pendulums to outline the basic principles behind artillery ballistics. The 1745 German

[341] Boëne, Bernard (1990): *How Unique should the Military be? A Review of Representative Literature & Outline of a Synthetic Formulation,* in *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 33-37.
[342] Eltis (1995), p. 8-9.
[343] Eltis (1995), p. 9.
[344] Van Doorn (1975), pp. 32-33. Van Doorn is quoting the military historian Michael Roberts, the inventor of the term "military revolution".
[345] Palmer, Alan (1974): *Frederick the Great*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 51.
[346] Keegan (1987), pp. 168-77.

version– translated by Leonard Euler, the great mathematician - included a table that outlined how projectiles could reach their target under certain conditions, which made Robins' theory accessible to most gunnery officers.[347] Using these tables required that gunners underwent scientific training that allowed them to understand the basic conditions under which different settings should be used.[348] War was fought using science. Military schools were introduced all over Europe, mainly as engineering schools.[349] However, technology was mainly useful for lower officers and the military academy therefore had yet to become a mark of prestige for the officer class as such.[350]

The Enlightenment also saw the first attempts to develop a science of warfare. Inspired by the importance of science for the increase of force, these thinkers believed that the true essence of war was cognitive – that war could be reduced to a set of scientific principles. By systematizing this knowledge, war would become predictable, because every great general would follow the same superior scientific formula. As the emblematic thinker of the time, Heinrich von Bülow, put it, "[w]ar will no longer be called an art, but a science[.] … [T]he sphere of military genius will at last be so narrowed, that a man of talents will no longer be willing to devote to this ungrateful task".[351] For von Bülow, war could be reduced to calculations of force ratios, and the superior force would always win an engagement.[352]

Carl von Clausewitz' *On War* – published posthumously in 1832 – was in many ways a reaction to the early Enlightenment thinkers' belief in science, and it essentially marks the beginning of modern military science. For Clausewitz, combat was the essence of war – "a strand that runs through the entire web of military activity and really holds it together."[353] War consists of many different activities and is essentially a subpart of another sphere – the political realm.[354] However, unlike normal politics, the essential military quality is combat. As he put it in a crucial passage of *On War*:

> "Fighting is the central military act; all other activities merely support it. … The object of fighting is the destruction or defeat of the enemy. … [T]he concept of the engagement lies at the root of all strategic action, since strategy is the use of force, the heart of

[347] Ferguson, Niall (2011): *Civilization. The West and the Rest*, London: Allen Lane, pp. 83-84; Steele, Brett D. (1994): *Muskets and Pendulums: Benjamin Robins, Leonhard Euler, and the Ballistics Revolution,* in *Technology and Culture,* vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 348-82.
[348] Steele (1994), p. 377.
[349] Keegan (1987), pp. 177-82.
[350] Huntington (1957b), pp. 25-26; Craig (1955): 24-29.
[351] Gat, Azar (2001): *A History of Military Thought. From the Enlightenment to the Cold War,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 84.
[352] Aron, Raymond (1983): *Clausewitz. Philosopher of War,* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 178-83.
[353] von Clausewitz (1976), p. 110.
[354] von Clausewitz (1976), pp. 98-110.

> which, in turn, is the engagement. So in the field of strategy we can reduce all military activity to the unitary concept of the single engagement".[355]

By defining fighting as the core activity in war, Clausewitz found a seed from which an entire theory of warfare could grow. He realized that war in its essence is a type of politics, yet it is a type of politics fought with force rather than words. Whereas the earlier Enlightenment thinkers reduced war to force only, Clausewitz saw that war depended on visions and ideas, yet was fought with force. Generalship required knowing how to maximize force, yet it also required that one understood the motives of one's opponents and the desires of one's men. Consequently, war could never be reduced to calculations of the use of force only. It had to be an art *and* a science. [356]

All in all, the story of the modern military is about how an abstract system of knowledge became the key determinant in conflict. As social organization and technology became more important, a military expertise of how these forces worked became crucial. Clausewitz was the first thinker to understand the nature of warfare. He grasped that war could not be reduced to either a science or an art. Understanding how war is concurrently a science and an art is the key to understanding the modern military expertise. That is the topic of the next section.

Military expertise as both an art and a science

One of Huntington's most important observations was that officers, qua the function they fulfill in society, tend to view the world through a realist lens. Because their work revolves around the maximization and use of violence, they are likely to have a fairly unsentimental approach to power. As a servant of the state, the officer's ideological range is inherently somewhat communitarian. It does not make much sense to sacrifice oneself for the state, if one does not think that it plays a benevolent role.

This does not, of course, mean that the officer is not driven by normative concerns. As we have already seen, care for various groups, if not humanity as such, is crucial for motivating most military men. The crucial thing is that the officer's concern with normative questions is balanced against a constant concern with expediency. The state is largely seen as a force for good. It is because of this conception that the soldier remains loyal to the state, even when pressured by the strain of war. The long-term cause can justify short-term actions that, in isolation, would be seen as immoral. Killing can be justifiable if it secures the state. Power is a means to an end. The officer's realism is also grounded in the fact that he, more than anyone else, bears the brunt of unwise military adventures. The military man is therefore reluctant to use military force to pursue minor

[355] von Clausewitz (1976), p. 268.
[356] Bassford, Christopher (1994): *Clausewitz in English. The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 21; Aron (1983), pp. 44-45; von Clausewitz (1976), pp. 148-50.

foreign policy objectives. Force should be used to pursue goals that matter.[357] He is an opponent of adventurism. To quote Huntington, the "military man contributes a cautious, conservative, restraining voice to the formulation of state policy."[358]

When the decision to use force has been made, the question of *how* to do it – the essentially military question – comes to the fore. This is where the military man's expertise becomes crucial. To understand how this expertise functions, we must examine the Clausewitzian notion of war as an art *and* a science.[359] Clausewitz was a child of the Enlightenment who understood the importance of knowledge and the scientific outlook as a tool in war. War essentially consists of a plethora of factors and it can, in principle at least, be predicted scientifically. If one had perfect knowledge of all these factors, one would be able to predict war with scientific precision. Military expertise is cognitive – it is about possessing a set of categories and being able to recognize which cases fall within each category. A doctor is a medical expert, because of his knowledge of the mechanics of the human body. Similarly, an officer is a military expert because he knows the factors that shape warfare.[360]

Expertise, however, is not unproblematic. Because of the Popperian falsification principle, we can never know if our knowledge is correct or if it has yet to be falsified. We can never know if there is some so far hidden factor that disqualifies an expert's judgment. For instance, a medicine may have side-effects that have yet to be discovered. Our knowledge in everyday life thus always depends on a high degree of trust.[361] Furthermore, as Anthony Giddens argues, expertise has generally become ambiguous in modern society. The steadily rising complexity of social life has meant that experts have become unable to comprehend an entire field of knowledge. Disagreement between experts, and divergent expert advice, have become commonplace. Individual medical studies, for instance, do not agree about the sources of cancer – instead, studies often contradict one another. When laymen, who have no chance of seeing past scholarly debates, are presented with diverging views, their trust in the medical expertise is eroded.[362]

Military expertise is even less secure than other types of expertise. Like other types of expertise, it is riddled with the aforementioned problems. However, the characteristics of war add

[357] Huntington (1957b), pp. 62-70 & 79.
[358] Huntington (1957b), p. 69.
[359] Here, I use the term "science" to describe the systematic search for certain knowledge and "art" to describe the use of imaginative thinking for practical purposes (for Clausewitz' description of this distinction, see von Clausewitz (1976), p. 148). An activity is typically an art, when one is guided not by scientific certainty, but by leaps of imagination. Following Clausewitz, I argue that war is an art in the sense that it involves imagination to grasp the intangibles of war (von Clausewitz (1976), pp. 148-50). However, this activity is partly informed by scientific certainties. Military expertise thus entails both artistic and scientific abilities.
[360] Huntington (1957b), pp. 11-18.
[361] For the role of trust in modern knowledge, see Giddens, Anthony (1991b): *The Consequences of Modernity,* Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 29-36.
[362] Giddens, Anthony (1991a): *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late-Modern Age*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 14-23, 29-34, 119-24 & 139-43.

complex challenges to military expertise. In Clausewitz' writings, one can find three reasons why military expertise is even more problematic than the expertise of other professions. Firstly, warfare generally contains more uncertain factors, compared to other fields of knowledge. Furthermore, military organizations do not react smoothly. Instead, because of accidents and wrongful information – what Clausewitz calls "friction" – military maneuvering is an uncertain business. Sheer chance also obfuscates the predictability of war.[363] War's complexity makes it impossible for the general to know all the factors involved. He cannot predict the weather, for instance, nor have a total overview of the morale of his men. Sometimes a simple coincidence has enormous consequences for a campaign. Because of his general understanding of warfare, the general is capable of reducing this element of uncertainty, but certainty is a luxury that he is never allowed.

Secondly, war is essentially a social activity – it always involves the interaction between at least two conscious opponents. As Clausewitz put it, "unlike in any other science or art, in war the object reacts".[364] War is not a simple game like chess, where the rules are agreed upon beforehand. Instead, the combatants define the rules of war, thereby changing its very character. War is not the simple application of a universal strategic science to a concrete case, because each party adapts to the strategy of the other. Instead, the scientific facts of war are just one element in a larger creative exercise where each commander tries to understand his opponent's way of thinking. The rationality of the opponent becomes a factor in the commander's strategic thinking.[365] War thus contains a feedback loop, whereby certain factors change depending on one's own actions.

Finally, war cannot be separated from its political purpose. As Clausewitz famously observed, war is "a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means."[366] By this he meant that war is a type of politics that cannot be wholly separated from the political purpose for which it is fought. In principle at least, even the smallest military decision has a political side to it. As we shall see later on, the border between a purely political and military judgment is indistinct. Unlike other spheres of expertise, where the expert can have a purely advisory role, the military man's decisions always overlap with the domain of the political principal. Soldiers are forced to take the logic of politics into consideration. [367]

The limits of military expertise are a result of the plethora of factors shaping war. There are simply so many different variables affecting the situation that any complete mapping of them would be impossible. In *On Exactitude in Science,* one of his famous short-stories, Jorge Luis Borges told the

[363] Beyerchen, Alan (1992): *Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War,* in *International Security,* vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 74-82.
[364] Gat, Azar (1992): *The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 12.
[365] Beyerchen (1992), p. 67.
[366] von Clausewitz (1976), p. 731.
[367] Burk (2005), p. 46.

tale of empire that revered exact mapping. Finally, a map was produced, "whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it."[368] Given that the map actually filled the entire territory it was supposed to depict, it was soon recognized as useless and abandoned. The morale of Borges' story is that any map –indeed, any scientific understanding – must be a simplification. It cannot contain all the variables that influence the outcome. Some factors must be abandoned, lest one's comprehension should become too complex for actual use. War functions like that. In principle, it can be mapped scientifically if every factor – the features of the land, the psychology of the opponent, the force of his army, the morale of every single soldier serving under one's flag – and the causal relationship between them could be meticulously measured. However, this is impossible in practice. Only some of the features can be determined in a scientific manner. These, however, engage in a complex context which shapes the war beyond the planning capacity of any general.

This is why Clausewitz argued that war was both an art *and* a science.[369] The military man has to be a scientist who measures the measurables of war. Concurrently, he has to be like an artist, who uses his intuition to predict what he cannot measure. When scientific cognition fails, we have to turn to other senses to guide us through practical life. Imagination, Immanuel Kant argued, is the faculty we use when we cannot measure reality exactly, using steadfast categories. When we stand in the midst of events, we do not have the luxury of the casual spectator, who can gather an overview of the situation from afar. We have to be able to create categories that can guide our action.[370] Kant argued that our imagination allows us to create these categories out of insufficient data.[371] The imagination is particularly helpful in social interaction. We can never know the motives of others for certain, but we can imagine how we would react if we were in their place. This allows us to approximate how they will react and predict their future behavior.

Although everyone has a common sense and a sense of taste, we do not all share the same sensory reactions. The ultimate judgment will therefore be individual. Coming to a final strategic analysis of a situation is an individual practice, although it is embedded in discussion. Furthermore, developing a strategy that breaks with the present categories and changes the situation beyond current thinking requires a genius. In *The Critique of Judgment,* Kant defined genius as "a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given; it is not a mere aptitude for what can be learnt by a rule. Hence originality must be its first property."[372] The genius is an unusual individual who can not only understand situations for which there is no general rule – he can also create

[368] Borges, Jorge L. (1999): *On Exactitude in Science,* in Borges, Jorge L. (1999): *Collected Fictions,* New York: Penguin Books, p. 325.
[369] Bassford (1994), p. 21. Aron (1983), pp. 44-45; von Clausewitz (1976), pp. 148-50.
[370] Arendt, Hannah (1982): *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 55, 65-68 & 76-77.
[371] Arendt (1982), pp. 65-68 & 79-85.
[372] Kant, Immanuel (1914): *Critique of Judgment,* London: Macmillan and Co., p. 189.

something new that breaks with the categories held by other commanders. In war, it is this ability to break with the predictable that allows him to turn the tables and destroy a superior enemy.[373]

This argument might seem overly abstract, but it is within the limits of cognition and the faculties of the imagination that we find the reason why the individual general is still admired and why there is no easy formula for elite civil-military relations. The nub of the matter is that military superiority cannot be achieved solely through organizational practices or perfect institutions. Strategy is sometimes an individual practice, which depends on the skills of the general in question. Having a genius – a Themistocles at Salamis, a Hannibal at Cannae, a Mannstein in the Ukraine – in command is a significant advantage. But even without the presence of genius, military leadership depends on the imagination and intellect of the general. It requires the ability to imagine the motives and thought patterns of enemy generals and to innovative ruses that may catch him by surprise. There is no *a priori* optimal institutional solution to it. It is unavoidably messy and complicated.

In conclusion, the modern military man is an expert in the science and art of war, which is an abstract system of knowledge about the strategic use of force for political purposes. He uses scientific knowledge as an element in a strategy judgment, which is fundamentally creative in nature. Military expertise is not universal. The officer has privileged access to the judgments involved in war, but this judgment is as much a result of individual genius and creativity as it is a universal scientific expertise.

Conclusion

In *The Soldier and the State,* Huntington claimed that the professional soldier is a scientific expert on par with for instance doctors or lawyers. In this chapter, I have presented views that largely support Huntington's conclusions, yet add nuances to our understanding of military expertise. The military became professionalized over a century-long process, caused by various factors, the most important of which is probably the steadily increasing competition between states. Scientific understanding of technology and social organization became increasingly important for the officer, who thus became an expert. The military expertise, however, is more fickle than other types. War involves a high degree of uncertainty. It is necessarily competitive and intricately connected to politics. This means that military expertise is both an art and a science. It necessarily involves the use of individual intuition. Two officers confronted with the same situation will not necessarily arrive at the same conclusions. Consequently, we cannot see military expertise as an apolitical sphere of pure knowledge. Instead, military expertise will often be contested.

[373] War is not just a matter of creativity and cognition. Clausewitz emphasized a whole range of personal characteristics that favored commanders in war (von Clausewitz (1976), pp. 100-112).

- 6 -

Civilian control

In this and the following chapter, we turn our attention to civilian control – one of the two core topics of elite civil-military relations. We look at civilian control, while temporarily bracketing the issue of military effectiveness. How, I ask, does the executive branch of government generally control the military? What are the basic variables determining civilian control? Is the literature up to speed with the basic problems of civilian control? I answer these questions with an integrative reading of the existing theories of civilian control. Civilian control is established by using two tools. External control mechanisms entail building institutions that make military disobedience difficult and costly. Conversely, internal control mechanisms refer to the creation of norms of loyalty and political neutrality within the military personnel. By making the military feel loyal to the government, the civilian leadership can relax their use of external mechanisms.

This analysis entails a critique of the existing civilian control literature. I show that most theories of civilian control fall into either the externalist or internalist modes. I argue that civilian control cannot be reduced to either of these tools. Civilian control is generally established through a combination of external and internal means.

The chapter consists of four sections. I define civilian control in the first section, where I explain how it springs out of the need for accountability, and how the fundamental problem is one of delegation and information asymmetry. The second section looks at the different civilian control policies that the civilian government may employ. These policies affect the various social mechanisms that ensure civilian control. I then examine these mechanisms in the last two sections. In the third section, I look specifically at external mechanisms for control, while I explore internal mechanisms for control in the final section.

Structure of civilian control

Civilian control is a subpart of elite civil-military relations concerned with the civilian leadership's ability to control the armed forces.[374] The need for civilian control grows out of the legitimacy imperative. In chapter 4, we saw that accountability is the core of modern democratic society. The state shores up legitimacy by being responsive to the wishes of civil society.

[374] Kohn, Richard H. (1997): *How Democracies Control the Military,* in *Journal of Democracy,* vol. 8, no. 4, p. 141.

The state is of course not a unitary actor. It consists not only of a leadership, but also of an administrative branch that implements the policies decided through civilian institutions. The political leadership delegates the implementation of its policies to the bureaucracy. In principle, the administrative branch will be an apolitical tool in the hands of the civilian leadership that will implement the policies decided by the civilian government without demurring. However, public administration does not run this smoothly in real life. The bureaucracy may have its own policy preferences, and the delegation process gives it the power to ensure that at least some of its administrative energy is used to pursue these alternative policies.[375]

One of the many strengths of Peter Feaver's rational choice approach to elite civil-military relations is that it provides an overview of the delegation problem that constitutes the crux of elite civil-military relations. Rational choice theory assumes that actors have fixed preferences. By assuming that norms and culture are irrelevant and that actors essentially try to maximize their own utility through strategic interaction, rational choice theory allows us to isolate the different processes that shape civilian control.[376] In essence, the relationship between civilian and military elites is a principal-agent relationship. The civilian government is the principal by virtue of the accountability principle. The principal delegates the implementation of a policy to an agent. This delegation occurs because the agent has functionally important knowledge and skills, to which the principal does not have access.[377] The effectiveness imperative makes delegation necessary. Delegating the implementation of the policy is therefore the optimal policy-choice for both parties.

The agent has some leeway to pursue policies that differ from the ones preferred by the civilian principal. This divergence in policy preferences need not be the result of malign intent. Of course, the agent may wish to pursue different policies because it is interested in maximizing its own utility. It may also think that the principal's policies will not lead to a greater good, or it may have misunderstood the government's policies. There are many types of shirking. It ranges from simply slacking off over misinterpreting orders to pursuing a different course of action to outright disobeying orders. The most extreme type of shirking is of course a military *coup d'état*.[378] Needless to say, the principal prefers to minimize the effects of any divergent preferences, regardless of their source. However, the government has no way of controlling everything that its agent does, because the agent has more knowledge of what the job entails than the principal. This is the fundamental reason for delegating the implementation of the task in the first place. This information asymmetry allows the agent to pursue its own interests, to some degree, at the expense of the principal. The

[375] Feaver (2003), p. 55
[376] Feaver (2003), pp. 54-55, Snidal, Duncan (1985): *The Game Theory of International Relations,* in *World Politics,* vol. 38, no. 1, p. 40.
[377] Feaver (2003), pp. 54-58
[378] Feaver (2003), pp. 58-60; Feaver (1999), p. 218.

task for the principal is therefore to control the acts of the agent to ensure that it pursues the principal's preferences.[379]

Civilian control constitutes a special type of principal-agent interaction. Firstly, the civilian principal is not a unitary actor. Civilian decision-making is divided between the executive and the legislative body in most democracies. Each of these is elected by the population to make sure that the state acts in accordance with their wishes. For instance, in the American system, civilian decisions are made by the President and Congress in tandem. Though he does serve strictly under the executive, the military man should first and foremost be loyal to the Constitution. Congress and the President are ultimately agents of the people. In that sense, the executive is the military's principal, yet it is also the agent of the legislature. Both executive and legislature are the people's agents. The military thus works for several principals, who do not always share the same interests.[380] Most European societies, such as the United Kingdom, place less emphasis on checks and balances between the executive and the legislature. Authority over military policy is typically held by the executive branch only. The military consequently has less room to use the legislature to counter-punish the executive. However, as Deborah Avant points out, civilian mistakes are typically more costly in such systems, as there are no rival parties to force the government back on track.[381]

Secondly, the information asymmetry between civilian and military actors is greater than in most other policy areas, because of the necessary secrecy in national security affairs. Many of the normal information channels that the government would use to monitor the bureaucracy are closed off, thus exacerbating the information asymmetry.[382]

Finally, unlike most principal-agent relations, the relationship between civilians and soldiers contains what we could call counter-punishment. When social scientists use the principal-agent model to analyze delegation, they normally assume that the principal has the authority and power to punish shirking. When it comes to civilian control, though, the military is nominally more powerful than the civilian government. The armed forces control the main power resources in society and can, in principle, overthrow the government if it so wishes.[383] This does not, of course, happen often in well-developed democracies. The nub of the matter is, as we shall see later on, that this only happens because of factors that are outside of the principal-agent relationship. The military

[379] Feaver (2003), pp. 54-58 & 68-69.
[380] Avant, Deborah D. (1994): *Political Institutions and Military Change. Lessons from Peripheral Wars,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 21-23; Avant, Deborah D. (1996): *Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? Why the U.S. Military is Averse to Responding to Post-Cold War Threats,* in *Security Studies,* vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 59 & 87-90; Betts, Richard K. (1977): *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 43-49; Kohn (1997) p. 147.
[381] Avant (1994), pp. 10-12 & 22.
[382] Feaver (2003), pp. 70-71.
[383] Feaver (1999), p. 226.

essentially refrains from turning against its civilian masters because it shares the bulk of their values and policy-preferences. These internal mechanisms are not included in the principal-agent relationship. The military can essentially use four types of counter-punishment.

1. The most extreme type of counter-punishment is a military putsch. The military has, as described above, the tools necessary for dismantling the civilian government.[384] This is what Peter Feaver calls "the civil-military problematique": the military can only protect society by being powerful enough to dismantle the civilian government of the state.[385] Under extreme circumstances, where the military is dissatisfied with the punishments laid upon it by the civilian government, the armed forces may choose to use these options to remove the civilian government and take over the executive reins. Though some scholars have warned against the possibility of a military coup in the United States, there are many reasons why this is an unlikely event in modern society.[386] However, it still represents the most extreme version of counter-punishment and shadows the entire framework of civilian control.[387] The remaining three options are less extreme, but also more common in modern democracies. Two of them involve the military allying with a civilian party, who is then either empowered, or convinced to punish the government.

2. The military may ally itself with the civilian opposition, typically in the legislature, to damage the government. This option goes to the heart of the accountability principle that underpins the need for civilian control. Civilian decision-making is, as we saw above, divided between the executive and legislature. In the American system, the military man has obligations to both Congress and the President, and they are typically enshrined in formalized duties. A crucial aspect of this system is Congress' ability to hold hearings to investigate the policies of the executive. These hearings often make the civilian decision-makers more attentive to military affairs, because they make them accountable for decisions made by the military. Furthermore, they are a useful tool in the system of checks and balances within the civilian government. Simply put, they allow Congress to be up to speed with the White House's policies.

[384] Feaver (1999), p. 226.
[385] Feaver (1996), p. 150. As Feaver points out, the civil-military problematique should not be confused with the societal and functional imperatives (Feaver (1996), p. 159n24). The former describes a character trait of the military institution – the latter describes a fundamental paradox within society as such. As Huntington correctly observed, it is the tension between the functional and societal imperatives – and not the civil-military problematique – which constitutes the fundamental problem within civil-military relations.
[386] Dunlap, Charles J., Jr. (1992): *The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012,* in *Parameters,* vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 2-20.
[387] Feaver (1999), p. 218.

This system depends on the military man's conscience. Will he testify truthfully, or will he use the opportunity to destabilize the executive branch? We cannot assume that the military invariably does what is right. It may choose to pursue its own narrow interests. In that case, Congressional hearings function as powerful weapons for counter-punishment.[388]

The military can, of course, ally itself with the legislature in a more clandestine manner by establishing informal contacts to its leading members. This allows it to feed information to the opposition in a way that does not compromise its observable loyalty to the government in public. This practice involving informal influence is generally thought to be a legitimate part of the democratic process. It provides the opposition with information that allows it to ask more accurate questions of the government. However, the line between informing and advocacy is very fine. Furthermore, the moment the opposition draws the military's critique into the public light, and uses it to score political points against the government, the relationship becomes a democratic liability by discrediting the military's loyalty.[389] For example, such a confusion of roles happened during the Korean War, when Representative Joseph Martin, the GOP House Minority leader and avid Truman critic, publicized a letter written to him by General MacArthur, in which the UN commander-in-chief lambasted Truman's handling of the Korean War. By publishing MacArthur's critique, Martin was borrowing some of his clout to back up his own critique of Truman. The general was fired within days. To be sure, Truman and MacArthur had previously clashed over the general's use of the press, and his meddling in what were considered political matters. The publication of the letter was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back.[390] The point of the matter is that having a general's direct critique of a sitting President read aloud in Congress was widely seen as illegitimate. It is one thing for a general to correspond with members of Congress, but quite it yet another to get openly entangled in the political contest for power.[391]

3. The military can also use its popularity within civil society at large to punish civilian leaders. The military is not detached from society. It consists of the sons and daughters of members of civil society. Insofar as the military has been effective in its previous missions, it may have a reputation for competence and efficiency. Popular militarism – which we explored in chapter 4 - may thus allow

[388] Brooks, Risa A. (2009): *Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies*, in Nielsen, Suzanne C. & Don M. Snider (2009): *American Civil-Military Relations. The Soldier and the State in a New Era,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 220.
[389] Brooks (2009), pp. 223-24.
[390] Historians discuss if MacArthur's letter was meant for publication. The general claimed, *ex post facto*, that it was for private eyes only. Yet it was not marked as confidential.
[391] Flint, Roy K. (1991): *The Truman-MacArthur Conflict: Dilemmas of Civil-Military Relations in the Nuclear Age,* in Kohn, Richard H. (1991): *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989,* New York: New York University Press, pp. 230-59; Previdi, Robert (1988): *Civilian Control Versus Military Rule,* New York: Hippocene Books, pp. 49-65.

the military the power necessary to punish the government. For example, it may weaken the civilian government if it chooses to speak out against it. Public criticism from serving, high-level generals is, however, generally considered to be illegitimate. For instance, during the tumultuous months of conflict with the President, Douglas MacArthur made several public statements that stepped outside the boundaries of a general's jurisdiction. The democratic decision-making process contains several checks on the behavior of the executive. The legislative branch and the media scrutinize the policies of the executive. It is therefore not the responsibility of serving officials to criticize their own government. If generals disagree with the policies put in place by the executive and they do not think that the normal democratic checks are fulfilling their role, they should resign.[392]

The armed forces have more furtive ways available to influence the public at large. Military officers can express their dissatisfaction with the government policies anonymously or leak information about internal dissent. Leaks are often impossible for the government to trace – it is not even necessary that they can be traced back to the military, let alone the specific officer responsible. For instance, when the Army disagreed with President Eisenhower's grand strategy, which emphasized nuclear deterrence rather than conventional, land-based force, it began to use anonymous sources to criticize him. Army opposition was leaked through various channels – via articles authored under pseudonym and in public speeches, through doctrinal documents and as anonymous sources in the media – and these leaks caused severe problems for the White House.[393]

Officers can also use resignations – or the explicit or implicit threat of resignations – to pressure the government. Resigning is in of itself a perfectly reasonable practice, which cannot be abandoned altogether. It is expected that officers who vehemently disagree with government policies resign to leave their posts to officers who believe in the cause. However, resigning necessarily involves a political signal that can hurt the government.[394] An officer who resigns in protest against a political or strategic decision sends a fairly clear political indicator about his opinion about that policy. Even a "quiet" resignation can weaken a government, either because it is interpreted as a discreet but significant political signal by the press or because the specific officer has widely admired military skills, the lack of which may harm the state's ability to implement its policies. For instance, during the First World War, it was the fear of both of these effects that kept the civilian German government from accepting Hindenburg's many resignation offers. Even if the

[392] Brooks (2009), pp. 218-20.

[393] Bacevich, Andrew J. (1997): *The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-55,* in *The Journal of Military History,* vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 322-29.

[394] Kohn, Richard H. (2009): *Building Trust: Civil-Military Behaviors for Effective National Security*, in Nielsen, Suzanne C. & Don M. Snider (2009): *American Civil-Military Relations. The Soldier and the State in a New Era,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 282; Kohn, Richard H. (2002): *Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today*, in *Navy War College Review,* vol. 55, no. 3, p. 32; Brooks (2009), pp. 220-21.

Kaiser and his advisors had not appreciated the importance of Hindenburg's skills as a commander, they surely feared the anger that the resignation of the popular field marshal would have triggered in the German population.[395]

Furthermore, criticism from retired officers can severely weaken a government politically. Generals are widely recognized as experts on military matters, and any significant concern of theirs will be seen as a critique of the sitting administration. Again, this is a tool of power that can hardly be removed without accepting severe restrictions on officers' right to follow their consciences. Retired officers have a right to free speech, like everyone else in a democratic society. One can hardly expect them to sit idly by and watch the government pursue a policy which they believe to be hazardously erroneous. The main problem, of course, is that it is impossible to distinguish earnest political opposition from critique motivated by more narrow concerns. There is always the possibility that the retired officers will act as surrogate voices for the current military brass. For instance, in 2006, during the final days of Donald Rumsfeld's tenure at the Pentagon, six retired generals criticized the way he had handled the Iraq War and called for his resignation.[396] One can debate if the generals were violating the code of their profession, but the fact of the matter is that it did not prevent them from issuing the criticism, or the public from accepting it as a valid and legitimate point of view.[397] It demonstrates how retired generals can wield significant power over defense policy, even if the legitimacy of this instrument is debated.

4. The military can also affect government policies by refraining from implementing them precisely and effectively. When a decision has been made and a policy is to be implemented, the military can choose to execute it in a counterproductive manner, either by implementing the policy at a slower pace than it is capable of, or by following a different course of action. The information asymmetry between the executive and the armed forces and the former's vulnerability to domestic opposition often give officers the opportunity to use these strategies. Hitler, for instance, clashed with some of his commanders over the priorities of Operation Barbarossa. A group of officers, which included Halder, Bock, and Guderian, argued for a massive push by Army Group Center towards Moscow to destroy the heart of the Red Army and gain control of an essential center of Soviet industry. When Hitler decided to go against this advice and use Army Group Center to support the German advances around Leningrad and in the Ukraine instead, he was met by opposition. Guderian, hoping that events would lead Hitler to see the folly of this endeavor, delayed his move

[395] von der Golz (2009), pp. 14-42; Craig (1978), pp. 299-326; Ritter, Gerhard (1970), pp. 93-104.
[396] Desch, Michael C. (2007): *Bush and the Generals,* in *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 86, no. 3, pp. 97-108.
[397] Cohen, Eliot A. (2006): *Honor in Discretion,* in *Wall Street Journal,* April 22nd 2006, p. A9; Kohn (2009), p. 283.

away from Moscow by deliberately seeking an unnecessary battle at Roslavl.[398] The execution of Hitler's decision was thus made more difficult by deliberately poor implementation. Guderian used veiled insubordination to further a strategic change.

The military thus holds significant power resources, which it can use to influence the civilian leadership. It does not have to actually use these resources – sometimes even the possibility that it may do so will be enough. The civilian leadership will typically try to accommodate the armed forces to avoid a potential conflict. For instance, according to Bob Woodward, President Obama and his staff went to great lengths to ensure that its new surge strategy for Afghanistan had the military's support before it was announced in December 2009.[399]

In summary, the need for civilian control grows out of the accountability principle that defines modern society. Simply put, ensuring that political leaders control the military is part of the social contract. However, civilian control becomes difficult because of the structural relationship between the government and the armed forces. The military has its own preferences and it can use its access to information conduits to pursue policy goals that differ from those favored by the government.

Civilian control policies

Having outlined the basic structural features of the relationship between soldiers and civilians, we can now turn to the policies that the civilians use to maximize their control of the armed forces. As we saw in chapter 2, Samuel Huntington presented two policies for controlling the military in *The Soldier and the State*. "Subjective control" entails ensuring that top officers share the values of the civilian faction in charge, typically by firing and replacing officers who have different values, or who are loyal to opposition factions. The military necessarily becomes political, because appointments depend upon political affiliation. The entire military organization becomes significantly civilianized. "Objective control", conversely, involves making the armed forces independent of political struggle. Instead, the military is allowed to handle an autonomous area of expertise, typically tactical and operational decisions, without civilian interference. Promotions are determined by officers' success in handling these issues correctly. By disconnecting promotions from political squabbling, so Huntington's argument goes, the military will refrain from becoming involved in the political sphere. The military will become both effective and controllable.[400]

[398] Keegan, John (2005): *The Second World War,* New York: Penguin Books, pp. 192-94.
[399] Woodward, Bob (2010): *Obama's Wars,* New York: Simon & Schuster.
[400] Huntington (1957b), pp. 80-85.

However, the distinction between subjective and objective control does not fully describe the fundamental policy dilemma facing political leaders in most advanced democracies. One must add two nuances to capture the policy choice. Firstly, as Peter Feaver has shown, subjective and objective control constitute the two extremes on a continuum of different degrees of civilian meddling in military policy (see figure 6.1.).[401] Objective control (which he prefers to call "delegative control") involves very little interference. Civilians are involved in strategic and grand strategic decisions, but leave tactical and operational decision-making to the armed forces. Subjective control involves extensive meddling: the civilians interfere in all areas of military policy and effectively civilianize the entire military organization.

Civilians have one more policy option, Feaver argues, that falls between the extremes of subjective and objective control. *Assertive control* is defined as "direct civilian supervision over the military, particularly over military operations [and tactics]."[402] Whereas objective control allows the military autonomy with regards to tactical and operational decisions, an assertive control policy involves civilians meddling in these details. However, this meddling only focuses on policy and does not involve appointments or organizational structures. Thus, whereas subjective control involves civilianizing the military organization, assertive control permits the continued existence of an independent military organization, where appointments are based on merit rather than political connections.[403]

Figure 6.1. Direct civilian control policies based on degree of civilian meddling



In most modern democracies, civilians have to decide between objective and assertive control. Though certainly an option, subjective control is rarely used as a control policy in modern democracies. Instead, it is more common in non-democratic societies. The highly inefficient Soviet political commissar system is a modern example of subjective control.[404] Therefore, when scholars

[401] Feaver, Peter D. (1992): *Guarding the Guardians. Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 10-11.
[402] Feaver (1992), p. 9.
[403] For the entire definition of the continuum of control, see Feaver (1992), pp. 7-12.
[404] Feaver (1992), p. 8.

discuss elite civil-military relations in modern democracies, they typically focus only on the use of objective and assertive control.

Civilian meddling has generally become easier since the Industrial Revolution and the ensuing spread of steadily more sophisticated communications technology. Traditionally, civilian leaders could only interfere in tactics by setting out general rules of engagements. However, even when doing so, civilian leaders had little opportunity to establish if the rules were actually followed. The civilian leader and the head of the military was either one and the same person - like Napoleon at the height of his power. Or the civilian leader simply trusted the judgment of his commanding general and gave him discretion to make tactical, operational and sometimes even strategic decisions as he saw fit. The British Prime Ministers Portland, Perceval, and Liverpool did just this with the Duke of Wellington.[405] The development of new communications technology now allows civilians to assess and direct even tactical decisions. Cohen emphasizes that the invention and spread of the telegraph "transformed the role of high-level political authority in monitoring events on the battlefield."[406] Control of tactical operations has therefore not only become possible, but also more important.[407]

Secondly, these policy options are only concerned with the direct meddling in military policy. However, civilian control policy can also take an institutional form. Policymakers have the option of creating additional external institutions for control. As we shall see in this chapter, external control institutions are one of the main mechanisms for civilian control. Adding institutions allow civilians to survey military policy and punish any wrong-doing by the military. They typically do not involve meddling directly in military policy. In that sense, they are different from the policy choice between subjective, objective, and assertive control. They will be presented in more details below.

Abraham Lincoln, for instance, developed alternative channels of information, when he began to distrust the honesty and nous of his generals. He consulted not only his commanding generals, but also lower-ranking officers who imparted a second opinion on strategic matters. He also used former high-ranking officers as impartial advisors. For instance, when Lincoln suspected that George McClellan, the General-in-Chief, had left Washington insufficiently protected (thus going against a direct order from the White House), he consulted major general Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a retired field commander and veteran from the Mexican-American War, who served as a special advisor to the War Department. When Hitchcock confirmed Lincoln's suspicions, it fuelled his dissatisfaction with McClellan and eventually led to his dismissal.[408]

[405] Keegan (1987), pp. 114-15
[406] Cohen (2003), p. 27.
[407] Dandeker (1990), pp. 73-75.
[408] Cohen (2003), p. 42.

The civilian control policies affect two types of social mechanisms that ensure civilian control.[409] Firstly, external control describes the use of external institutions to monitor and punish military actors. Civilians can try to minimize the information asymmetry by acquiring more information about the military's course of action and by punishing what it sees as erratic behavior. By surveying its behavior, the civilian leadership diminishes the military's room for shirking. By punishing it for shirking, the civilian leadership makes it less profitable to step out of the narrow confines of the original agreement. These mechanisms ignore the military's policy preferences and focus on correcting its behavior.

Secondly, internal control refers to the creation of a military culture of loyalty. The civilian government can create civilian control by ensuring that the military has the same preferences as itself. The information asymmetry inherent in the principal-agent relationship only becomes problematic, if the military has different policy preferences that it wants to pursue. If the civilian leadership can ensure that the officer corps values loyalty to the state as a policy-goal, building elaborate monitoring and punishment mechanisms becomes superfluous. The key task is to identify the mechanisms that ensure that the officer corps feels loyal towards the civilian government. These mechanisms focus on affecting the soldier's core beliefs.

Theories of civilian control have tended to focus on either external or internal tools for control. Peter Feaver is the most prominent external control theorist. He uses rational choice theory to explain how civilian and military actors are driven by the external pay-offs. Though his theory is not a purely externalist model, it does highlight how external institutions shape civilian control.[410] Samuel Huntington, by contrast, is the most prominent exponent for internal control. Huntington argued that if officers felt fully professional, they would automatically also be loyal towards the civilian leadership. He implicitly argued that internal mechanisms were enough to establish civilian control.[411]

To sum up, theories of civilian control typically emphasize how it is secured through either external institutions or internal norms within the military. My overall argument is that civilian control cannot be reduced to either external institutions, or by internal norms. Instead, civilians rely on different combinations of external and internal control mechanisms. In the following pages, I will therefore present the main tenets of both external and internal control and show that neither of these mechanisms can, alone, secure civilian control of the military. Theories of civilian control

[409] An embryonic version of the distinction between external and internal mechanisms was first presented by Samuel Finer, who distinguished between the military's motive and opportunity for intervention (Finer (1962), pp. 23-85). Arthur Larson introduced the notions of external and internal mechanisms to the study of civil-military relations (Larson, Arthur D. (1974): *Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations,* in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology,* vol. 2, no. 1, p. 65.
[410] Feaver (2003), pp. 12-14 & 54-95.
[411] Huntington (1957b), pp. 7, 15 & 57.

should therefore focus on when and how civilian policymakers combine internal and external mechanisms of control.

External control

External control refers to the ability of civilians to control the military through institutions that detect and punish erratic behavior. This approach assumes that actors pursue their own narrow interests. Institutions essentially influence the payoffs of behaving in one or another manner. How these preferences are developed is an entirely different matter that cannot be included in a purely externalist approach. If an externalist approach has to include matters of preference formation in its causal explanation, it stops being purely externalist. Rational choice theory, for instance, assumes that actors pursue their own strategic interests. The formation of those interests is outside of the model. The only way of affecting the behavior of the actors is to change the institutional set-up, or the strategic behavior of the other actors in the game.[412]

External control tools have generally played a somewhat confusing role in the civilian control literature. External mechanisms for control only played a scant role in Samuel Huntington's theory of civilian control. Instead, he focused mainly on internal control mechanisms, and he chiefly wrote about external institutions to highlight how they diminish the prospect for this type of control.[413] Samuel Finer highlighted this problem and provided an alternative framework, which include reflections on how external institutions play an important role in securing civilian control over the military.[414] More recently, Deborah Avant has used more systematic tools that focus on external pay-offs to analyze elite civil-military relations.[415] However, it was only with Peter Feaver's *Armed Servants* that theories of external control became a serious competitor to internalist theory. Feaver uses rational choice theory to analyze civilian control as the strategic interaction between two utility-maximizing parties. He provides a couple of simple assumptions about civil and military preferences, and then map out the most rational strategies for each actor. This enables him to outline how external mechanisms for control function in very clear terms. He then validates his model empirically by showing that it is largely in line with patterns of civilian control in the United States during and after the Cold War.[416] Examining his insights shows us how external control functions, and whether civilian control can be explained by looking at these mechanisms only.

[412] Feaver (2003), pp. 54-55; Snidal (1985), p. 40.
[413] Huntington (1957b), pp. 86-89.
[414] Finer (1962).
[415] Avant, Deborah D. (1993): *The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars,* in *International Studies,* vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 409-30.
[416] Feaver (2003), pp. 96-282

Tools of external control

As we saw above, the military agent is able to shirk because of the information and power asymmetries between principal and agent. Military slack can be prevented if the civilian leadership can detect and punish shirking. External control therefore focuses on institutions that allow the civilian leadership to monitor and punish the military. Through effective punishment, the civilians are able to discourage military shirking. In *Armed Servants,* Feaver provides a list of five tools of external control available to the civilian principal, ranging from the subtle to the highly intrusive.[417] The first tool is screening and selection – that is, surveying military personnel and selecting only those who display the right preferences for entrance and promotion. In the United States, for instance, Congress votes on all officer promotions in the military, determining the worth of each candidate through hearings. This gives Congress a tool – albeit an imperfect one – to detect and block candidates who do not display the appropriate preferences for civilian control. This creates an incentive structure for approving of civilian control.[418]

Secondly, the military is also controlled through the use of external groups for monitoring – what rational choice theorists refer to as "fire alarms". Allowing third parties to explore the behavior of the military is a way of circumventing the information asymmetry between civilians and the armed forces. For instance, the media generally function as a fire alarm. The institutional interest of the media is to present better and more sensational stories about government slack and they are often capable of finding information of which the civilian leadership may not immediately be aware. Similarly, think tank experts generally also have an interest in exposing bureaucratic failings. Independent experts often have an extensive knowledge of military affairs that rivals that of the military. Finally, interservice rivalry may also function as a fire alarm. Because the military services compete for the same resources, individual services will generally seek to expose the failures of other services whenever possible. They will also generally sound a fire alarm if they detect that one of the other services is scheming.[419]

The third external tool is institutional checks. An institutional check is an actor who can block or veto a policy through legal or physical means. Whereas fire alarms function by making civilians aware of irregularities, an institutional check can block the policy without alerting the principal. Strictly speaking, the difference between a fire alarm and an institutional check revolves around the punishing power of the monitoring actor. Institutional checks not only detect problems – they also have the means to block any irregular behavior. For example, if branches of the armed forces

[417] I am not presenting all the tools highlighted by Feaver. In accordance with the externalism-internalism distinction I advocate in this chapter, I only include those that can be said to be purely externalist.
[418] Feaver (2003), pp. 78-79.
[419] Feaver (2003), pp. 80-81.

decided to rise against their civilian masters, the existence of several services and the National Guard function as institutional checks that can prevent a *coup d'état* through force.[420]

Fourthly, the principal may also monitor the agent by establishing offices that direct investigations of the actions of the military. In rational choice theory, this is called "police patrolling". Among Feaver's many examples are audits, reporting requirements, hearings, committees, and government offices, like the Congressional Budget Office and the General Accounting Office. These mechanisms collect information from the bureaucracies under the threat of legal prosecution.[421]

Finally, the most intrusive type of monitoring is direct civilian micromanagement of military action – that is, the effective displacement of military commanders with civilians, who then take over all military planning on the strategic, tactical, and operational level. This type of monitoring means that the principal-agent relationship is moved further down the ranks. Even when the principal makes the tactical and operational decisions, it still faces an information asymmetry between itself and soldiers who have to implement its policies on the ground. In that respect, the principal-agent-relationship still exists under these extreme circumstances.[422]

Principal-agent problems are not solved solely by ensuring that the principal discovers the agent's shirking. The principal also has to be capable of punishing the agent. This approach assumes that actors solely aim to maximize their own political preferences. It is only when shirking causes a loss of utility that the agent will change behavior. By punishing the agent, the principal decreases the utility of slacking, thus making it less advantageous than loyalty. Standard principal-agent theory commonly assumes that the principal is capable of punishing the agent. However, as we saw above, this picture is radically different in elite civil-military relations. The military can retaliate against the government by using its own channels for counter-punishment. [423]

This does not mean that civilian punishment is impossible. Though acknowledging that counter-punishment diminishes the civilians' scope for punishment, Feaver highlights that the civilian government has five types of punishment tools. Most of these target the head of an agency either directly - by demoting, halting promotions, firing, prosecuting, or political purging – or indirectly by diminishing the power of his agency. Firstly, the military is averse to the various types of monitoring techniques mentioned above. Avoiding intrusive surveillance mechanisms may therefore create an incentive for the military to stay within bounds. For instance, erratic behavior may lead the government to reform the structure of a military agency in order to ease surveillance. This gives the

[420] Feaver (2003), pp. 81-82.
[421] Feaver (2003), pp. 84-85.
[422] Feaver (2003), pp. 85-87.
[423] Feaver (2003), pp. 87-90.

agency director less room to excel and thus makes his road to promotion more cumbersome. Secondly, the civilians may also decide to cut the budgets of agencies that have acted outside of the given boundaries. Likewise, they may also halt promotions of the agency head. Both of these mechanisms are obviously unpleasant for the leader of the agency. Thirdly, the civilians may go as far as firing the leading individuals of an agency. Fourthly, in extreme cases, the civilians may use the military justice system to prosecuting the head of an agency who has stepped outside of the law. Finally, the civilians can use political means to rebuke the head of a department. This ranges from telling off the person privately, to political purges.[424]

External institutions have one significant downside. They typically involve a significant waste of resources. For instance, interservice rivalry – one type of external institution – wastes administrative energy, when different departments are concurrently doing the same work. Furthermore, strategizing may be buried in competition for resources. For instance, in his meticulous analysis of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the early Vietnam War, H.R. McMaster highlights how interservice rivalry was one of the most important reasons why the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not fulfill their role properly. In one instance – the July 1964 decision to increase the American presence from sixteen to twenty-two thousand troops – interservice struggle meant that the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented its recommendations three days *after* President Johnson had approved the troop increase.[425] External institutions thus increase civilian control, but diminish the military effectiveness of the state.

All in all, civilian decision-makers have a wide palette of tools for monitoring and punishing the military. However, these tools are never perfect. The civilian government never has complete information about the military's behavior, which leaves the military with some room for action, which may allow it to act against the interests of the civilian leadership. This problem is exacerbated by the possibility of counter-punishment.

The theoretical limits of externalism

External mechanisms cannot stand alone as a civilian control paradigm. The military controls the means of violence in a society. If the military's only preference is to maximize its own utility – if it does not have a shared interest with the civilian government - it could do so by simply seizing power through a military coup. It is only because the military – or at least parts of the military – sees civilian supremacy and the survival of the state as beneficial that this does not occur. We cannot explain

[424] Feaver (2003), pp. 87-94

[425] McMaster, H. R. (1997): *Dereliction of Duty. Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that led to Vietnam,* New York: HarperPerennial, pp. 112-13 & 327-28.

civilian control without exploring the preferences of the military. An externalist model has to be paired with an internalist approach.

This is obvious from Peter Feaver's theory of civilian control. Feaver explicitly situates himself within a rational choice approach, where he uses a principal-agent model to explain civilian and military behavior. He cannot stay within this explanatory mode, though. Instead, he has to add identity factors to his model to explain military preferences. He stresses that "[w]hereas economic agents may generally prefer shirking to working, political agents are likely to be motivated (at least in part) by a substantive interest in the policy itself."[426] He then adds three assumptions about military preferences, which he argues capture the difference between the military and a standard economic agent. He argues that the military is driven by a preference for effective national security policies, a need for personal honor and recognition, and an appreciation of autonomy.[427] This is a violation of the assumptions underpinning any purely externalist approach to civilian control. A purely externalist model assumes that actors have exogenous preferences. They want to maximize their preferences given the actions of the other party and the institutional framework of their situation. Outcomes are predicted based on the strategic interaction between actors only. Pure externalism cannot include the preferences of the actor. Feaver does include such internal factors in his explanation, because it is impossible to explain civilian control based only on strategic interaction. Pure externalism is therefore impossible. A theoretical framework of civilian control has to add an internalist dimension that explains how military preferences are created.

Feaver would argue that this is not a problem for his specific theory, because he has never claimed to use a purely externalist model. He has simply mixed rational choice theory with simple assumptions about military preferences in order to predict elite civil-military interaction. His theory stands up to the empirical record. When he tests it on elite civil-military interaction during the Cold War, he is able to explain most of the behavior.[428] Feaver is correct to defend his theory on these grounds. However, his need to add assumptions about military preferences illustrates the limits of externalism. Feaver never explains why the military has these, and not other, preferences. Why does the military value national security over the utility acquired by shirking? Why does honor define the military man? Feaver cannot answer these questions without adding an internalist dimension that explains how military preferences are formed. The fact that he draws them in as assumptions, without explaining why these assumptions are reasonable, leaves his model with a theoretical

[426] Feaver (2003), pp. 63.
[427] Feaver (2003), pp. 63-64.
[428] Feaver (2003), pp. 118-80.

gap.[429] Adding assumptions about actor preferences is a perfectly legitimate practice if, as Feaver does, one develops middle-range or case-specific theories. However, it detracts from the generalizability of the theory. Feaver's theory cannot trace changes in these preferences. It cannot be used in contexts where military actors may have other preferences. Though Feaver's theory explains large patterns of civilian control within the United States, it cannot stand alone. It has to be supplemented by a model of internal control.

In sum, civilian control is secured through the use of external institutions of surveillance and punishment. It cannot, however, fully explain why the military does not simply use its structural advantages to overthrow the civilian government. This can only be done by examining the internal norms and preferences that govern the military man. Externalism has to be supplemented by an internalist theory of civilian control.

Internal control

The internal norms of the military are the second factor that enables civilian control. The supporting argument behind this is fairly simple: civilian control need not be a product only of government institutions. Instead, it can be established if the military feels loyal to the civilian leadership. There will be little need for establishing institutions to control the military if it is already loyal to the civilian leadership.

This was essentially the logic behind Samuel Huntington's approach to civilian control. Huntington provided the most important internalist model. [430] His basic argument, as presented in *The Soldier and the State*, is summarized in figure 6.2. The core of Huntington's argument was the causal chain between civilian control policy, military professionalism, and political neutrality. Basically, he claimed that neutrality follows automatically from military professionalism. Professional soldiers, he argued, are neutral and loyal because they see themselves as professionals. The professional soldier is "imbued with the ideal of service to the nation" – "an awareness that his skill

[429] Feaver makes one important argument why this is not a fundamental problem for him, when he points out that "[t]raditional civil-military relations theory relies extensively on honor (also called the "ethic of subordination" and "professionalism") to explain civilian control" (Feaver (2003), p. 64). Feaver's point is that the existing internalist theories – essentially Huntington and Janowitz' theories – do not explain the nature of this subordination. Theoretically, it is therefore just as valid to simply assume that this factor shapes military preferences as it is to develop an internalist model. Internalism can only become a competitor to Feaver's approach if it provides a more coherent causal explanation of how internal military norms are created. Part of the point of this dissertation is to provide a richer explanation for exactly this problem. In the following section, I present an internal model that provides a better explanation of how military norms are created. This model is therefore not vulnerable to Feaver's criticism.

[430] Other internalist arguments - like the one presented by Morris Janowitz - focus less on explaining the causal logic behind civilian control. Though more detailed and attentive to factors that change military identity, these arguments did little to explain how the general trends in elite civil-military relations came about and under which conditions they could be altered in the future (Janowitz (1960)). It is therefore from Huntington that we would expect to get the best attempt at a coherent internalist argument.

can only be utilized for purposes approved by society by its political agent, the state."[431] Simply put, military professionalism leads to political neutrality, which then allows internal civilian control.

Figure 6.2. Huntington's political neutrality argument



Huntington argued that civilian policy-makers have a chance to foment internal control. The civilian control policy can affect military professionalism, and thereby increase internal control. The key is to give the military autonomy to act like professionals. A professional military does not want to be involved in politics, and prefers to stay neutral in political matters.[432] If the government pursues an objective control policy and allows the military autonomy to handle operational and tactical matters, he argued, the military can retain its professionalism and become loyal to the government. A civilian control policy that allows the military a free space to develop professionalism will therefore maximize civilian control.[433]

The civilian control policy is not the only condition for developing internal control. Huntington emphasized that professionalism is a strictly modern condition. In addition to the civilian control policy, he listed four factors that helped explain the long-term development of professionalism: functional specialization of distinct groups within society in general; the

[431] Huntington (1957b), pp. 15 & 35.
[432] Huntington (1957b), pp. 83.
[433] Huntington (1957b), pp. 80-85.

development of the nation-state; the development of democracy; and the destruction of the nobility and the unification of authority in the state.[434] Firstly, war had become a specialized activity, where it was impossible for one person to master all the activities involved. This was a function of a large-scale transformation of society stemming from technological innovation, industrialization, and urbanization. As Huntington put it,

> "[w]ar, like everything else, was no longer a simple, uncomplicated affair. Armies were larger, and, more important, were composed of increasingly diverse elements. Once, all the men in a military force had performed the same function: engaging the enemy with spears or swords as the case might be. Now armies and navies became complex organisms, embodying hundreds of different specialities, creating the need for still another type of specialist: the specialist in coordinating and directing these diverse parts to their assigned goals."[435]

The growth of the nation-state is a second precondition for internalism. Only the nation-state needed an independent, professional officer corps, and only the nation-state had the resources to finance such a corps. The inter-state military competition forced each state "to create a corps of permanent experts devoted to the interests of military security. The loss or threatened loss of that security by war … was for each nation the immediate road to professionalization."[436]

Thirdly, democracy also spurred the development of professionalism. The early democrats, Huntington argued, were vehemently opposed to any class differentiation. They therefore tore down the traditional aristocratic principles that had long governed the military. They tried in vain to replace it with citizen militias and democratic principles of election to military posts. This first wave of democratization was destined to fail. However, instead of a backlash to aristocratic privilege, the military became organized along professional lines.[437]

Finally, Huntington emphasized that "the existence of a single recognized source of legitimate authority over the military forces" was conducive to the development of political neutrality.[438] It is easier for the soldier to be politically neutral, he argued, when he can "be loyal to some single institution generally accepted as embodying the authority of the nation. Where there are competing authorities, or competing ideas as to what ought to be the authority, professionalism becomes difficult if not impossible to achieve."[439] One of the factors hindering civilian control in the United States, he claimed, was that authority was divided between different institutions. The checks

[434] Huntington (1957b), pp. 30-37.
[435] Huntington (1957b), pp. 32.
[436] Huntington (1957b), pp. 32.
[437] Huntington (1957b), pp. 33-35.
[438] Huntington (1957b), p. 35
[439] Huntington (1957b), p. 35.

and balances system set forth by the nation's founders, which divided power between President and Congress, was detrimental to internal control.[440]

Huntington thus provided a causal model that explained how various factors led to the development of political neutrality within the ranks. He emphasized military professionalism as the crucial variable that facilitates the development of political neutrality. This factor, in turn, depends on certain historical and social factors that have allowed the conditions for internal control to develop in the modern era only.

The limits of Huntingtonian internalism

When it was first developed, Huntington's model signified an immense leap in our understanding of civilian control. However, one could argue that it lacks consistency by modern theoretical standards. Though more rigorous than the models developed by other internalist scholars, Huntington's model suffers from three limitations.

1. Huntington never defined professionalism. Although it was the cornerstone of his argument, professionalism remains an elusive entity that changes meaning from section to section. Sometimes it is a habit of thought or a specific culture.[441] In other passages, it is a product of certain institutions and organizations.[442] Sometimes it is a vocation.[443] In other instances, it is a "functional group".[444] Huntington identified several characteristics of professionalism – it involves a specific expertise, sense of responsibility, and corporate membership – but he never pinpointed its very nature. Definitions are supposed to describe the nature of an object succinctly. This involves breaking the object down into component parts, not just identifying some of its empirical characteristics. For instance, claiming that an apple is red and spherical does not amount to a satisfactory definition. By that definition, one could confuse it with a tomato, a red ball, or the planet Mars. To define an apple, we would have to say that it is a fruit, a type of living organism, which consists mainly of carbon and water. We would have to try to describe its very nature. To define professionalism, we would have to establish if it is a type of culture, a personal attitude, a behavioral pattern, an

[440] Huntington (1957b), pp. 163-64. Huntington stressed that the vertical division of labor between the states and the federal government and the governmental division of labor between the Commander in Chief and the secretaries also played an important role in hampering the development of political neutrality. However, he concluded that "[t]he real constitutional stumbling block to [objective] civilian control is the separation of powers." (Huntington (1957b), p. 191).
[441] Huntington (1957b), pp. 14 & 61.
[442] Huntington (1957b), p. 16.
[443] Huntington (1957b), pp. 8 & 11.
[444] Huntington (1957b), p. 7.

institution, or an organization. We would have to fit it within the basic building blocks of all social theory. By these standards, Huntington's main variable was left undefined.

The background for this theoretical limitation can be found within the sociology of the professions. The professions were an object of study from the earliest moments of sociology. They for instance played a crucial role in Herbert Spencer's hyper-functionalist 19th century conception of society.[445] The modern sociology of the professions developed as a separate sub-discipline in the 1920s and -30s with the works of Alexander Carr-Saunders and Paul Wilson and, later, Talcott Parsons. The professional was seen as providing a clue into the nature of modernity. The sub-discipline was driven by the curious empirical observation that many different professions came into being during the early industrial era and seemed to embody somewhat similar traits and develop along similar patterns. Max Weber had warned that modernity could cause the universal spread of selfish individualism. The capitalist businessman seemed to fit this stereotype. Yet the professional expert seemed to work diligently, without the need for monetary compensation. This man of modernity was as rational as any other "type", yet seemed to embody communal, unselfish norms.[446]

The sociology of the professions, however, always suffered from one fundamental problem: it could not explain why anyone would become unselfish, and focus on communal values simply as a result of scientific training. This kept the professions from becoming a theoretically valid concept – one that could be adopted in macro-sociological explanations of modernity. Sociologists could observe that the professions existed, yet professionalism alone could not explain why the professionals would be motivated to act unselfishly. In the 1970s and -80s, this problem led to a surge of critical studies that exposed how professionals gain monetary and non-monetary privileges. The unselfishness of the professional was questioned empirically and the ideal of the unselfish expert was duly shattered.[447] Yet, for a brief while – in the 1950s and early -60s, when Huntington

[445] Dingwall, Robert & Michael D. King (1995): *Herbert Spencer and the Professions: Occupational Ecology Revisited,* in *Sociological Theory,* vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 19-20.

[446] Parsons, Talcott (1952): *A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession*, in Parsons, Talcott (1954): *Essays in Sociological Theory,* New York: The Free Press, p. 372; Carr-Saunders, A. M. & P. A. Wilson (1933): *The Professions,* Oxford: Clarendon Press; Parsons, Talcott (1939): *The Professions and Social Structure,* in Parsons, Talcott (1954): *Essays in Sociological Theory,* New York: The Free Press, p. 34; Turner, Brian S. (1993): *Talcott Parsons, Universalism and the Educational Revolution: Democracy versus Professionalism,* in *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 14-15; Barber, Bernard (1985): *Beyond Parsons's Theory of the Professions*, in Alexander, Jeffrey (1985): *Neofunctionalism. Key Issues in Sociological Theory,* Beverly Hills: Sage Publishing, pp.212& 215-17; Holmwood, John (2006): *Economics, Sociology, and the 'Professional Complex': Talcott Parsons and the Critique of Orthodox Economics*, in *American Journal of Economics and Sociology,* Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 133-34.

[447] Abbott, Andrew (1988): *The System of Professions. An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 3-8; MacDonald (1995), pp. 157-86; Larson, Magali S. (1977): *The Rise of Professionalism. Monopolies of Competence and Sheltered Markets,* Berkeley: University of California Press,

wrote *The Soldier and the State* – these problems had yet to surface. Huntington followed the sociology of professionalism as it had developed at his time of writing.[448] He asserted that the military officer is diligent, unselfish, and first and foremost preoccupied with the needs of his community. In view of the later problems associated with the sociology of the professions, this claim needs further theoretical investigation.

2. The lack of a definition means that Huntington never fully explained how military professionalism leads to neutrality. Why does professionalism necessarily make soldiers more neutral in political matters? Huntington stated, rather simplistically, that professional men are necessarily loyal – the professional soldier had a "sense of social obligation" and "must always be subordinate to the statesman".[449] Yet he never provided a satisfactory explanation for why this is so. As Bengt Abrahamsson points out, Huntington's argument was circular at times, confusing the dependent and independent variable:

> "a 'professional' officer corps is one which exhibits expertise, responsibility and corporateness. 'Professionalism', however, to Huntington also involves political neutrality; as a result, 'professionalism' and 'objective control' are inseparable as theoretical concepts. The immediate consequence of this is to rule out the empirical possibility of establishing the relationship between the *degree* of professionalism and the *degree* of political neutrality. … In other words, professional officers never intervene; because if they do, they are not true professionals."[450]

Huntington's argument became tautological, because he did not separate the characteristics of professionalism from the political neutrality it is supposed to explain. Of course, without a definition of professionalism it is also impossible to define how that variable might affect other variables. In that sense, the missing causal explanation behind political neutrality within military culture was a consequence of the lack of a definition of professionalism.

Thus, the assertion that professionalism necessarily leads to loyalty is empirically dubious. For instance, even Clausewitz, surely a diligent and conscientious officer if there ever was one, experienced bouts of mixed loyalties that ultimately led him to fight against his parent government. The Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806 made him *hors de combat*, and Prussia a forced ally of Napoleon.

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pp. x-xviii & 208-44; Brante, Thomas (1988): *Sociological Approaches to the Professions*, in *Acta Sociologica,* vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 119-42; Burk (2005), pp. 42 & 47.

[448] Segal, David R. & Karen De Angelis (2009): *Changing Conceptions of the Military as a Profession,* in Nielsen, Suzanne C. & Don M. Snider (2009): *American Civil-Military Relations. The Soldier and the State in a New Era,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 197.

[449] Huntington (1957b), pp. 15 & 57.

[450] Abrahamsson, Bengt (1972): *Military Professionalization and Political Power,* Beverly Hills: Sage Publishing, p. 159.

In 1812, Clausewitz - then already a seasoned soldier and erstwhile *aid-de-camp* to one of Frederick the Great's brothers - decided to go into Russian service. By switching sides, he could continue to fight Napoleon, even if it meant that he would eventually be opposed to his own fatherland.[451] Loyalty to the Prussian state involved asking complex questions, and going against the official authorities of the Prussian state. The soldier's sense of obligation is certainly not simple and unquestionable.

Similarly, as Andrew Bacevich has shown, the US Army's resistance to Eisenhower's deterrence-focused grand strategy was largely motivated by military professionalism. Faced with the costs of increased military competition and an electorate averse to tax increases, Eisenhower decided to pursue a more cost-effective grand strategy. "Massive Retaliation" emphasized the deterrence of nuclear weapons over conventional force. It demanded large cuts in the Army and new investments in the Air Force. General Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff, publicly and privately espoused the values of military loyalty and the ethos of professionalism. However, because he believed that Eisenhower's policy was strategically wrong and morally detestable – in his view, the policy would not only lead to a weakening vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it would also make nuclear war more probable - Ridgway's professionalism led him to resist the President's policies in ways that were at least democratically questionable.[452] His professional conscience led him to the brink of disloyalty. Eventually, the White House forced him into early retirement. Professionalism is not, in and of itself, a guarantee for loyalty.

Tellingly, at one point, Huntington likened the professional officer to "Shakespeare's soldier in *Henry V,* [who] believes that the justice of the cause is more than he should 'know' or 'seek after'. For if the king's 'cause be wrong, our obedience to the King wipes the crime of it out of us.'"[453] Huntington argued that a professional identity, and the sense of duty within this identity, could prescribe normative loyalty. However, he refrained from quoting King Henry's reply to the soldier in the very same scene: "Every subject's duty is the king's; but every subject's soul is his own."[454] One cannot understand loyalty without understanding why the soldier finds this allegiance normatively appropriate. A sense of duty alone cannot explain the motives of men.[455] I will return to this issue in chapter 7.

[451] Paret, Peter (1986): *Clausewitz,* in Paret, Peter, Gordon A. Craig & Felix Gilbert (1986): *Makers of Modern Strategy. From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 189-92; Aron (1983), pp. 28-31.
[452] Bacevich (1997).
[453] Huntington (1957b), p. 74.
[454] Shakespeare, William (2010a): *Henry V*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 87.
[455] For the best in-depth evidence for inconsistency of Huntington's conception of the relationship between loyalty and professionalism, see Burk, James (2009): *Responsible Obedience by Military Professionals. The*

3. The causal chain that leads to professionalism is also unclear. As we saw above, Huntington identified several factors which, he argued, cause professionalism. Firstly, and most importantly, professionalism grows out of the civilian leadership's ability to allow the military to act like apolitical professionals. Curiously, Huntington never explored the relationship between civilian involvement and the development of a professional military.[456] He only looked at subjective and objective control – the two extreme options facing policymakers. Furthermore, he did not explicitly describe how these policies affect the degree of military culture. Nor did he analyze how assertive control, a much more common civilian control policy, could influence the development of political neutrality within the ranks. Why does civilian meddling have any influence on the development of military culture? Developing a model that explains the relationship between assertive and objective control and the degree of political neutrality in military culture is a precondition for making internal explanations a viable supplement to external theories.

Huntington also identified four large-scale factors, which he argued are necessary for developing professionalism. However, this connection of his model to the general political sociology of the modern state is haphazard and incomplete. Besides listing these four factors on five pages of the historical background section of *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington provided no general analysis of these trends nor did he fully explain how they are related to one another and to general political trends within society. If we are to know if professionalism will continue to create political neutrality, we need a more complete understanding of how the causal factors that allow this development are related to one another. Society is constantly being transformed and we must explore if these grand scale changes are facilitating or impeding internal control. However, without a profounder understanding of the link between the mechanisms that create political neutrality and the wider grand-scale factors of society, we cannot identify these trends. Besides this list of seemingly randomly chosen factors, Huntington unfortunately did not explain this causal logic in more detail.

In summary, the theoretical consistency of Huntington's internalist model is limited. It lacked a definition of professionalism, an explanation for why professionalism led to political neutrality, why professionalism depended on the civilian control policy, and a clear overview of the external factors that led to the development of professionalism. We therefore need to explore the motives that drive the military man. I will return to this matter in the next chapter.

Discretion to do what is Wrong, in Nielsen, Suzanne C. & Don M. Snider (2009): *American Civil-Military Relations. The Soldier and the State in a New Era,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 149-71.

[456] Huntington (1957b), pp. 80-85.

Conclusion

Civilian control is one of the two general problems in elite civil-military relations. The state has to be accountable to civil society and, thus, it has to control the actions of the military. However, as in all bureaucracies, the information asymmetry between soldiers and civilians allows the military some discretion, which it can used to pursue its own policy goals. The need for secrecy in national security affairs exacerbates this condition. Furthermore, the military also has some additional leverage vis-à-vis the government, because it has the opportunity to counter-punish the civilian leadership. Two sets of social mechanisms secure civilian control. External control mechanisms are institutions that allow the civilians to monitor the military and punish erratic behavior. Internal mechanisms, by contrast, aim to shape the military's preferences in a way that makes it avoid erratic behavior. Internal control is essentially established by creating norms that makes the military politically neutral.

Neither of these mechanisms is sufficient for creating civilian control. External control alone cannot make the military loyal. The dominant model of internal control does not allow us to reach the same conclusion for internalism. This, however, is not because internal control is a panacea. Instead, the theories of internal control are too unsophisticated to allow us to analyze internalism systematically. I will explore internalism more thoroughly in chapter 7.

- 7 -

Military values and political neutrality

Chapters 6 and 7 outline civilian control – one of the fundamental topics of elite civil-military relations. In chapter 6, I showed that the available theories are based upon either external or internal mechanisms. My overall argument is that neither of these models is a panacea and that civilian control is typically established through a combination of external and internal mechanisms. In chapter 6, I showed that externalism could not explain civilian control in and of itself. I could not demonstrate the same thing for internalism, because the theories in this field lack the theoretical sophistication necessary to make such a claim. Samuel Huntington's theory from *The Soldier and the State* is the best internalist theory available. However, I showed that his model lacks a coherent causal story that explains how different factors create internal norms of loyalty within the military. Theoretical frameworks are meant to provide an overview of the causal processes that influence a specific phenomenon. They need not specify which of these causal links is the most important one, but they must provide a summary of the potential causal chains. The lack of a coherent causal story is therefore a significant weakness in Huntington's framework.

I explore the factors causing political neutrality within military culture in this chapter. To what extent, I ask, is the development of norms of political neutrality within military culture caused by professionalism and the government's civilian control policy? In essence, I make two arguments. Firstly, that professionalism does not singlehandedly cause political neutrality. To be sure, professionalism is an important factor, and the arrival of professional institutions shaped the norms of political neutrality within military culture. However, it is only one of several factors in this causal chain. Secondly, I show that although an objective control policy may facilitate the development of political neutrality within the armed forces, it cannot fully eradicate the patrimonialism that erodes civilian control. Consequently, internal factors cannot ensure civilian control, but must be supplemented by external control mechanisms.

The argument progresses through three stages. I explain the notion of political neutrality in the first section. The second section contains a historical overview of the development of the modern military. Based on the insights from the first two sections, the final section looks at the motivation systems that make the military man serve and fight. It focuses particularly on the role of professionalism and the government's civilian control policy within this causal chain.

Neutrality

The core of internalism is the claim that the armed forces can be controlled by developing a culture of political neutrality within its ranks. The first step is to unpack the concept of neutrality and the motivation that drives people to stay neutral. Political neutrality is the practice of refraining from taking a stance in a political dispute. It involves abnegating one's right to express one's opinion about a matter. As Max Weber once pointed out, we must understand a person's actions from the motives that drive him.[457] People are motivated to stay neutral, when neutrality serves a good that exceeds the good that would come out of winning the argument. For instance, Sweden remained neutral for almost two centuries, because doing so diminished the chance of Swedish involvement in a destructive great power war. Leaders in Stockholm was opposed to Nazism and Communism in principle, but valued the diminished risk of destruction on Swedish soil over the positive contribution that Sweden might have achieved in the fight against these ideologies. Neutrality was not an end in itself, but rather a mean to achieve the end of preserving Sweden as an independent democratic state.

Similarly, a bureaucrat's neutrality is an expression of his ideological appreciation of the state. A bureaucrat is neutral, not because he values neutrality *per se*, but because he appreciates the benefits of having a neutral state administration. He becomes neutral because neutrality has a positive effect for himself personally, and for the groups he cares about. Neutrality allows the state to develop more efficient administrative processes and to garner legitimacy from the population. Being neutral is thus a way of strengthening the state. Political neutrality is a transposed appreciation of the state, and of the democratic process by which it is governed.

The soldier becomes politically neutral when he appreciates that the democratic state – and not a specific political party - provides protection and services for him and his groups of identification. However, it is important to stress that allegiance to the state alone is not enough. The officer must also appreciate and respect the democratic process by which civilian leaders gain authority. As Samuel Finer has highlighted, appreciation of the state alone can lead to illegitimate disobedience.[458] If the soldier appreciates the state, yet believes that only one particular group can protect the state, he might become motivated to intervene in politics.

The soldier has few reasons to respect civilian supremacy if he is driven only by an appreciation for the state. Here, we have to add an additional distinction between the appreciation of the state, and the appreciation of the democratic process. The military man becomes politically neutral, when he believes that it is the democratic process that secures services and protection. If he recognizes that a neutral process that allows different factions to compete peacefully creates more wealth and thus more services and protection, the soldier will adopt this neutral attitude. Genuine

[457] Weber, Max (1947): *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* Glencoe: The Free Press, pp. 95-105.
[458] Finer (1962), pp. 22-23

political neutrality arises from an appreciation of the democratic process, rather than the loyalty to any specific faction within society.[459]

The military can only exist because individual soldiers and officers decide to serve and, if they find themselves on the battlefield, fight bravely.[460] The military system therefore depends on being generally in sync with the values and experiences of the individuals who serve and fight. The military has to *integrate* the individual wills of the soldiers into a consistent pattern that corresponds with its institutionally required strategies. War involves sacrifices. In many instances, it is indeed solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. It only occurs because the individual soldiers and officers see this endeavor as meaningful, and the military as a legitimate institution.

As we saw in chapter 4, when sociologists explore individual motivation, they generally distinguish between the orientation to the individual's own interests (self-orientation) and orientation to the interests of others (collectivity-orientation). The military uses three techniques to motivate its personnel. Firstly, it may simply offer rewards that satisfy the person's individual interests. Material rewards - such as wages or the opportunity to plunder - have always been a key motivational tool. Etymologically, the English word "soldier" comes from the French "soudier" - a term derived from the Latin name of a specific Roman coin ("solidus") - which means one who serves in the army for pay.[461] Furthermore, war can also be individually satisfying in of itself. Some scholars have highlighted how war can be a life-affirming activity, and how some soldiers use warfare to prove their own worth to themselves. Works like Ernest Jünger's *Storm of Steel* convey the satisfaction that these warriors experience during war.[462] People like Jack Churchill - a decorated Second World War commando, whose fondness of pre-modern tools of war led him to charge German positions armed with a claymore and a longbow – seems to have relished the excitement of war.[463] However, this is true only of a small group of men. For most soldiers, material rewards are the most important individualistic motivation tool.

It is difficult to have a military that is driven purely by material rewards, because material enjoyment requires life, but the cost of military service may be death. Why would anyone "march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach, where he is almost sure to perish" (to borrow a

[459] This notion of legitimacy based on an appreciation of the democratic process (compared to an appreciation of society or individual interests) was first developed by Jürgen Habermas (Habermas, Jürgen (1994): *Three Normative Models of Democracy,* in *Constellations,* vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1-10).

[460] For the difference between serving and fighting, see Newsome, Bruce (2003): *The Myth of Intrinsic Combat Motivation,* in *Journal of Strategic Studies,* vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 24-46.

[461] Onions, C. T. (1966): *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 844.

[462] Coker, Christopher (2007): *The Warrior Ethos. Military Culture and the War on Terror,* London: Routledge, pp. 3-12; Henriksen, Rune (2007): *Warriors in Combat – What Makes People Actively Fight in Combat?* in *The Journal of Strategic Studies,* vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 187-223; Henriksen, Rune (2008): *Does the West Still Need Warriors?,* London: London School of Economics and Political Science, pp. 96-105.

[463] Parker, John (2000): *Commandos. The Inside Story of Britain's Most Elite Fighting Force*, London: Headline Publishing, pp. 41, 133-34 & 136-39.

phrase from John Locke) if he was only motivated by a desire to acquire possessions?[464] As Hegel once noted, pure materialistic individualism comes with a

> "disinclination for military service, because this service is the opposite of the universal wish for quiet and uniform enjoyment. It brings with it hardships and even death, the loss of the chance to enjoy anything. (…)Therefore, to (…) [expose oneself] to the danger of death would have been to do something ridiculous, since the means, death, would have forthwith annulled the end, property and enjoyment."[465]

However, Michael Walzer shows that purely materialist motivation carries a significant weight in explaining the soldier's decision to serve and fight. A rational individual may want to increase his risk of dying if the compensation - or what economists would call the "risk premium" - is large enough. Death is a risk in many activities. A rational person therefore takes the risk of dying involved into account, when he calculates the compensation he needs in order to perform an activity. However, in spite of this, pure hedonists rarely make good soldiers. Faced with actual danger, they are likely to jump ship to increase their pleasure elsewhere.[466] Militaries that primarily use individualistic tools for integration therefore face significant principal-agent problems when they engage in battle.

Secondly, the military can also use what military sociologists call "primary group identification" within its own ranks. Soldiers can be driven by an orientation towards a specific collective within the military: his comrades in arms. In a seminal article, Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz argued that *Wehrmacht* units were held together by the individual solder's affection towards his comrades in arms.[467] In their words, "as long as [the German soldier] felt himself to be a member of his primary group and therefore bound by the expectations and demands of its members, his soldierly achievement was likely to be good."[468] Primary group identification requires selective recruitment or an extensive socializing effort by the military's institutions. To use an esoteric example, in Ancient Greece, primary group identification was developed in the Theban army by recruiting homosexual lovers to fight side by side.[469] By contrast, in modern militaries, these bonds are created between men who are strangers when they enter the force. Through military training, and the experience of warfare, bonds of affection and friendship are created within the

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[464] Locke, John (1821): *Two Treatises on Government*, London: Butler, p. 310.
[465] Hegel, G. W. F. (1948): *The Positivity of the Christian Religion*, in Hegel, G. W. F. (1948): *Early Theological Writings*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 164-65.
[466] Walzer (1970), pp. 80-90.
[467] Shils, Edward A. & Morris Janowitz (1948): *Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II,* in *Public Opinion Quarterly,* vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 280-315.
[468] Shils & Janowitz (1948), p. 284.
[469] Leitao, David (2002): *The Legend of The Sacred Band,* in Nussbaum, Martha C. &JuhaSihvola (2002): *The Sleep of Reason. Erotic Experience and Sexual Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 143-169. Leitao points out that the accuracy of the story of The Sacred Band is generally disputed.

unit, which then become the soldier's primary group. Primary group identification does not necessarily lead to military integration. If soldiers are driven purely by their affection towards their primary group, they may only fight for the good of that group. This would lead to a principal-agent problem, where units pursue other goals – for instance, their own survival – rather than those required by the military.[470]

Thirdly, the military may claim to represent extra-military collectivities, such as family, society, or humankind.[471] By fending off an enemy invasion, the soldier may be protecting his family, or local groups, indirectly. Similarly, a wish to protect more abstract communities plays a significant role in motivating soldiers, even under strenuous and inhuman conditions. For instance, recent scholarship has shown that many soldiers in the First World War continued to fight for abstract ideals – the nation, democracy, religion, or humankind – even after years of abhorrent experiences in the trenches.[472]

Grasping the relationship between the soldier and his primary groups is thus the first step towards understanding their political neutrality. The soldier is integrated into the armed forces through a combination of a concern for himself, and for various groups, for whom he is willing to work, fight and, in many instances, die. There are essentially three such groups. Firstly, the military man serves and fights for his comrades in arms, with whom he forms a bond within the ranks, through their shared experience of the toils of training and fighting. Secondly, he is driven by a concern for local groups, such as his family, friends, and local community. Finally, he is driven by a concern for broad and abstract groups that are outside his immediate sphere of experience, such as his nation or humanity in general. It is in these three types of concerns that we must find the soldier's appreciation of the democratic state.

Parochialism – the overriding concern with narrow personal interests - is detrimental to political neutrality. If a soldier looks out for other groups before he looks out for the interests of the democratic state, the chances of him acting in a way that undermines the principle of civilian control will increase. However, in most advanced democracies these tendencies are kept in check by the fact that soldiers are not asked to make the hard choice between their faction, the military bureaucracy and the state. In most modern societies, the state takes care of the military by providing it with generous pay and good conditions. Similarly, it secures most, if not all, its citizens and provides extensive benefits and services for them. The military man does not have to choose between his

[470] Kier, Elizabeth (1998): *Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness*, in *International Security,* vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 15-17.
[471] Newsome (2003), pp. 25-33 & 37-41.
[472] Watson, Alexander & Patrick Porter (2010): *Bereaved and Aggrieved: Combat Motivation and the Ideology of Sacrifice in the First World War,* in *Historical Research,* vol. 83, no. 219, pp. 146-64.

state and his faction. By serving the state, he is also serving himself, his community, and the military bureaucracy.[473]

To sum up, political neutrality is but transposed appreciation of the democratic state. The state develops this appreciation by bettering the conditions for the soldier and his primary communities. In that sense, the line between political neutrality and parochialism is very fine.

The road to the modern military

Having outlined the military officer's main interests, we can now see how these interests have been used to make the military loyal to the state over the course of recent history. A quick look at late- and post-Medieval military history reveals three military ideal-types: the mercenary, aristocratic, and popular military.[474]

1. During the late Middle Ages and the early modern period, most Western militaries were made up of mercenary forces. For instance, wars amongst the Italian Renaissance city-states were mainly fought between rival bands of *condottieri* (literally "contractors"). Obviously, the mercenary soldier was driven mainly by personal rewards. During the military revolution, mercenary forces became increasingly advanced as they adopted the principles of drill and complex organization. This changed the integration principle of the army. As William McNeill has pointed out, repetitive drilling resulted in stronger social bonds within the mercenary military.[475] In his words,

> "when a group of men move their arms and legs in unison for prolonged periods of time, a primitive and very powerful social bond wells up among them. … Drill, dull and repetitious though it may seem, readily welded a miscellaneous collection of men, recruited often from the dregs of civil society, into a coherent community, obedient to orders even in extreme situations when life and limb were in obvious and immediate jeopardy. … Military units became a specialized sort of community, within which new standardized face-to-face relationships provided a passable substitute for the customary patterns of traditional social groupings[.]"[476]

Drilling had a strong psychological effect that created a bond of affection between soldiers. The mercenary soldier fought for his own livelihood, but also for the comrades that he made within the

[473] This loyalty may be put to the test if the state faces an immense threat that can only be handled through a strenuous endeavor. If the state diverts all its resources towards one specific threat, it has fewer resources for buying loyalty. As we saw in chapter 4, the state may become parasitical and suck energy out of civil society. This puts military loyalty to the test. The soldier will then have to choose between his different loyalties.
[474] Huntington (1957b), pp. 19-55. Charles Tilly operates with a similar distinction, although he calls the three periods "brokerage", "nationalization" and "specialization" (Tilly (1992), p. 122).
[475] McNeill (1995), pp. 131-32.
[476] McNeill, William H. (1982): *The Pursuit of Power*. *Technology, Armed Forces, and Society Since A. D. 1000*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 131-132.

ranks. An important side-effect of professionalization was primary group identification within the force. The military continued to rely largely on mercenary units well into the 17th century.[477] In 1632, the armies of Gustavus Adolphus – known by the epithet "the father of modern war" – consisted of more than 90 % foreign mercenaries.[478] These units were increasingly held together by primary group identification rather than by individualistic motivation. Here we see the curious relationship between professionalization and military integration for the first time: professionalism creates primary group identification within the corps.

Charles Tilly highlights two overarching problems that eventually led to the mercenary military's demise. First, mercenaries' loyalty to the state was fickle, as it was driven only by monetary concerns. This led to several principal-agent problems. Mercenaries would commonly try to fulfill their contracts using as few resources as possible. They could also decide to suddenly terminate their contract if they saw other more profitable business opportunities, either through rebellion or shifting allegiances. For instance, in *The Prince,* Machiavelli complained that

> "Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless and dangerous (…). [T]hey have no affection for you or any other reason to induce them to fight for you, except for a trifling wage, which is not sufficient to make them want to risk their lives for you. They are very glad to be in your service as long as you do not wage war, but in time of war they either flee or desert. (…) [T]he present ruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than the reliance over so many years on mercenary armies."[479]

A large mercenary army could also decide to depose the government and take over the state. Many mercenaries began to plunder their host nation, if they did not receive their pay or if the state terminated their contract at the end of a conflict. Second, the mercenary system was a relatively costly way of recruiting troops, and placed a substantial fiscal burden on the state. This burden was exacerbated when the cost of war rose as a consequence of the military revolution and when the rise of other industries made manpower relatively expensive.[480]

2. Through a complex process, which began in the late Middle Ages, the state slowly became more advanced and acquired more sophisticated tools for motivating its soldiers. By the 18th century, the state had become able to shift the balance away from mercenaries towards local groups motivated by more idealist reasons for fighting. The state needed to replace the self-sufficiency of the mercenary with a corps to whom dedication to a collective end was perceived as higher than

[477] Tilly (1992), p. 81.
[478] Thomson, Janice E. (1996): *Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 30.
[479] Machiavelli, Niccolò (1988): *The Prince,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 43.
[480] Tilly (1992), pp. 83-84.

personal gain. The aristocratic military was defined by an officer corps consisting mainly of nobles, characterized by a strong idealistic belief system, and swathes of regular troops recruited from the lower classes for pay. By developing an officer corps driven by idealist motivations, the early-modern state could diminish the two evils that had afflicted the mercenary military. Firstly, it was more likely that an idealist military man could be made loyal to the state. Secondly, a soldier driven by abstract goals would be cheaper, compared to a mercenary who demanded a risk premium that outweighed the dangers of war.

Most states had had standing armies for centuries. When the Hundred Years' War ended in 1453, European states found their territories plagued by their disbanded armies. Soldiers who had never known any other occupation than violence and war would roam the countryside in search for plunder. The states followed the advice given by the merchant Jacques Coeur to Charles VII of France: the king should hire a small nucleus of soldiers to force the disorganized masses into civilian life.[481] This strong corps soon became a standing force that the king could rely on. As Alfred Vagts notes, "[t]he first standing army was thus, paradoxically, the outcome of the idea that armies should not be permanent."[482] The nobility soon came to lead the standing army, which thus formed the core of what became the aristocratic military.[483]

Perhaps Frederick the Great's dynastic Prussian state represents the most advanced attempt at developing an aristocratic military.[484] The Prussian officer corps consisted almost solely of nobles - when Frederick died in 1786, only six of 732 senior officers were commoners.[485] This reliance on just one societal segment permeated the entire society. It consisted of three estates that each had a unique function to fulfill to uphold the state. Just as a body consists of distinctive organs, each necessary for the body's survival, so the three estates were kept separate from one another: the nobility administered the agriculture system, and held a near-monopoly on the bureaucracy and the officer corps; the bourgeoisie generated national income by dedicating itself to commerce, trade, and education; and the peasantry farmed the land and filled up the lower echelons of the military. None could exist without the other. Each individual acquired his status within this system from birth rather than on merit. The nobility was not allowed to engage in trade, while the bourgeoisie, in most

[481] Vagts (1959), p. 45-46.
[482] Vagts (1959), p. 46.
[483] Vagts (1959), p. 45-49.
[484] Cohen, Eliot A. (1985): *Citizens and Soldiers. The Dilemmas of Military Service,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 45-46. Of course, Frederick's armies consisted largely of foreign mercenaries. However, the key thing in this context is Frederick's attempt to develop a culture of loyalty among the officer corps – a venture that had also been tried by his predecessor, the Grand Elector, in the 17th century (Craig (1955), pp. 2-7).
[485] Carsten, F.L. (1989): *A History of the Prussian Junkers,* Aldershot: Scolar Press, pp. 36-37.

cases, was prevented from acquiring noble lands and entering the officer corps.[486] The nobility functioned as a middle layer between the king and his subjects, and were responsible for carrying out his orders. As Charles Tilly has argued, the king ruled indirectly through the nobility.[487]

The key difference between the mercenary and aristocratic military system was that the officers in the latter were partly driven by honor and dedication to the state. In Frederician society, the king focused on serving the interests of the nobility class, while generally claiming to serve the interests of the population at large. If we focus on the latter part first, it was clear that this was a divergence from the dynastic principles that had characterized feudal monarchies. Unlike the feudal king, who was appointed by God and held the state as his personal property, Frederick had a social contract with his subjects, through which he owed his subjects to pursue the best possible policies for the state, just like they owed him their allegiance. The Prussian state, though not in any way a modern democracy, was based on a proto-popular principle of legitimacy, where the state, at least in principle, represented the good of the people.[488]

The nobility had a strong sense of honor that kept individual officers from stepping outside the boundaries of appropriate behavior. Honor is a feeling of self-respect, supported by the external recognition of one's peers.[489] The Prussian officer was driven by a need for recognition by the aristocracy at large. Curiously, the culture among the officers defined that service to the state was of primary importance for honor. Loyalty to the state became a necessary condition of being member of the nobility. The aristocratic officer was loyal to the state not because it was good in of itself, but because it was seen as a crucial part of being an aristocrat. The nobleman's honor code resembled primary group identification. The officer identified with his peers because they all were members of the same social group. Primary group identification was not created by the military's institutions. It was, rather, formed among noblemen in society and imported into the military through selective recruitment.[490] The Frederician state gave special privileges to the nobility. During Frederick's reign, the aristocracy had several privileges, including the abovementioned near-monopoly on military positions and noble lands, tax breaks, and direct financial support from the state. Furthermore, the state refrained from acquiring noble estates.[491] These policies ensured that the officer had a clear class interest in the continuation of the *status quo*. Even officers who were motivated by strictly personal motives had an interest in preserving this state of affairs.

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[486] Ritter (1968), pp. 159-61.
[487] Tilly (1992), pp. 96-103.
[488] Ritter (1968), pp. 69-73.
[489] Stewart, Frank H. (1994): *Honor,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 9-29; Krause, Sharon R. (2002): *Liberalism with Honor,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 2-8.
[490] Mann (1993), pp. 419-20 & 422.
[491] Ritter (1968), pp. 159-61.

However, honor was not a completely stable principle for creating loyalty to the state. The requirements of honor could lead to disobedience. During the Seven Years War against Austria, for instance, Prussian Colonel J. F. A. von der Marwitz was ordered to sack a hunting lodge as revenge for a similar crime perpetrated by Prussia's enemies. Von der Marwitz, touting the honor of his corps, refused, claiming the task unsuitable "for the commandant of His Majesty's Gendarms".[492] His career was halted, but he stood his ground. His famous epitaph - "He chose disgrace when obedience brought no honor" – was chiseled as a sign of esteem.[493] For von der Marwitz, obeying the King would lead to disgrace in the eyes of the nobility. When forced to choose between his loyalties, his bond to the aristocracy outweighed his allegiance to the state.

3. The aristocratic military met its demise with the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. On August 23rd 1793, pressured by internal uprisings, and war with the European great powers, the French National Assembly extended the national levy, which had been introduced just months before. The *levée en masse* not only installed general conscription for all men aged 18-25, but called upon contributions from all citizens:

> "Young men will go to fight, husbands will forge weapons and manage the transport services; wives and daughters will make tents and uniforms and will serve in the hospitals; old men taking their stand in public places will inflame the bravery of our soldiers and preach hatefulness of kings, the unity of the Republic."[494]

The army more than trebled in size, compared to pre-levy numbers, to roughly 750,000 serviceable men at arms.[495] In part spurred on by proto-nationalism and concern for the Revolution, the haphazardly trained forces rebuffed France's enemies during 1793 and -94, proving that a significant change had occurred in military organization.[496] The bourgeoisie, previously excluded from the military, suddenly flooded in. In 1804, just three of the 18 marshals in the French army were former nobles.[497] This transformation was one of the main explanations for Napoleon's successful

[492] Carsten (1989), pp. 38-39. Muth, Jörg (2011): *Command Culture*. *Officer Education in the US Army and the German Armed Forces 1901-1940 and the Consequences for World War II,* Denton: University of North Texas Press, p. 170.
[493] Muth (2011), p. 170.
[494] Best, Geoffrey (1982): *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770-1870,* Bungay: Fontana, p. 87.
[495] Best (1982), pp. 85 & 87; Strachan, Hew (1983): *European Armies and the Conduct of War,* London: Unwin Hyman, p. 39.
[496] Howard (1976), pp. 80-81. The civilian effort, driven by the revolutionary spirit, increased the strength of the army, for instance by almost doubling the pieces of cutting-edge field artillery (McNeill (1982), p. 194n23).
[497] Mann (1993), p. 426.

campaigns across the European continent.[498] The ability to muster massive forces under arms gave the citizen republic a competitive advantage over the dynastic states of the *Ancient Regime.*

The events of 1789 marked the birth of the modern, liberal-democratic nation-state – the political unit which we still live in today. The military that slowly took form during the *levée en masse* had the same basic features as today's military. The nobility gradually became redundant as the middlemen between the state and the general public. The indirect rule of the previous era was replaced by direct rule.[499] The military stopped being an organization dedicated to preserve the interests of a single class – the aristocracy – and slowly became a tool embedded in the larger ideals of national society. The social contract placed more burdens on both citizenry and the state. More loyalty, taxes and duties were now required from the citizenry. In exchange, the state increased their political, and eventually social, rights.

The notion of universal rights for all citizens, secured by the state, now became society's defining principle.[500] The armed forces, however, did not become a democratic institution. Instead, it became a meritocratic organization, where position was determined by skill rather than birth.[501] This process did not happen overnight. Around 90 percent of the German generals were drawn from the nobility until the 1890s. Noblemen made up more than half of the German officer corps at the eve of the First World War.[502] However, the general trend turned towards militaries that allowed commoners to become members of the officer corps.

In many ways, the popular military resembled its aristocratic predecessor. The system was held together by a combination of appeals to the individual's personal incentives, and his orientation to various collectives. The essential difference was that new social classes were drawn into the military, and the mechanisms used to attract and cajole prospective military men were adjusted accordingly.[503] The military still used appeals to the officer's collective orientation to ensure his loyalty. Each officer could, of course, be oriented towards many different groups. As we saw in chapter 4, by the early 19th century, the nation was becoming a steadily more important point of identification. Furthermore, the state extended its claim to other groups besides the nation. If the

[498] Howard (1976), pp. 80-86.
[499] Tilly (1992), pp. 107-21.
[500] Tilly (1992), p. 120. It took more than a century of constitutional haggling to ensure universal suffrage. However, it seems fair to see the age of revolutions as a transitional phase where the relationship between citizens and the state – which would eventually become the liberal democracy - was being perfected. For an analysis of how conscription continued to affect the bestowment of political rights well into the 20th century, see Burk, James (2007): *The Changing Moral Contract for Military Service,* in Bacevich, Andrew J. (2007): *The Long War. A History of U.S. National Security Policy since World War II,* New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 405-55.
[501] Mann (1993), p. 427.
[502] Mann (1993), p. 432. The military remained stooped in certain values and in some instances a tool of repression for the state (Mann (1993), pp. 432-36).
[503] Mann (1993), pp. 425-28.

individual was oriented to other groups – for instance his family, or civil society – the state also claimed to look after their interests via the universal principles of citizenship. Because every person was a citizen, and therefore the responsibility of the state, there was no group that the state did not protect. To serve the state was to serve for one's family, friends and community at large.

Besides bonds between the officer and societal groups, the state could create bonds of affection within the military. As had been the case in previous militaries, the experience of drilling, training, and fighting together forged a bond of comradeship between soldiers. Belonging to a band of brothers was a salient part of the military experience. As several studies have shown, these bonds were then instrumental for the state when units engaged in combat. Even when disaffected by the greater cause of the war, soldiers would fight for their comrades in arms.[504]

One important difference between the aristocratic and the popular military was that these bonds were largely forged within the military. Whereas the aristocratic military had recruited officers from one specific class who felt a strong attachment to that class, the popular military gathered its officers from the population at large and installed a sense of military community in them afterwards.[505] The key factor that allowed the military to forge these bonds was the increased importance of military institutions. As described above, war was becoming an increasingly scientific matter, and dedicating oneself to military education at the academy and staff college became an indispensable part of every officer's career. These institutions presented a unique setting for forging bonds between military men.[506]

Stronger military institutions also allowed the state to develop a unique military culture that accentuated the importance of loyalty. The military academy was the perfect venue for socializing the officer into this culture.[507] Disobedience was seen as unprofessional. To be sure, this professional ideal was a social construction that covered the aforementioned tensions. The professionalization of warfare had forced the officer into the professional institutions, which were now instrumental in creating a feeling of loyalty within him. In that sense, loyalty was an instrumentally important *side-effect* of professionalization.

To sum up, the loyalty of the soldier was increasingly influenced by large-scale social currents and specific changes within the military. Within the military, military institutions created a professional military culture and bonds between bands of brothers, which both ensured

[504] Siebold, Guy L. (2007): *The Essence of Military Group Cohesion,* in *Armed Forces and Society,* vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 287-90.
[505] Huntington (1957b), p. 54.
[506] Howard (1976), pp. 95-96; Nuciari, Marina (2003): *Military Academies, Cadets, and Officer Training,* in Callaghan, Jean M. & Franz Kernic (2003): *Armed Forces and International Security. Global Trends and Issues,* Münster: LIT Verlag, pp. 287-89.
[507] Dornbusch, Sanford M. (1955): *The Military Academy as an Assimilating Institution,* in *Social Forces,* vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 316-21

comradeship and loyalty. Outside of the military, loyalty was created as the state became the legitimate protector of the communities that the individual was oriented towards. Professionalism was important because the professional institutions enabled the military to forge intra-military bonds, and to socialize its officers in a military culture of loyalty.

The military motivation system

The outline of the history of the modern military showed that professionalism was only one of the factors shaping the soldier's loyalty to the state. However, we still need to reach a more detailed understanding of the motives that drive the modern soldier. Only by mapping these motives can we see how professionalism and the government's civilian control policy create political neutrality within military culture. This is the purpose of this final section. It takes the perspective of the soldier and tracks the main factors that cause political neutrality to be a meaningful attitude to the state. To be sure, the purpose of this section is to provide a theoretical framework of political neutrality within the ranks. The section only sketches the most important causal links that determine whether or not the military man is politically neutral. Determining which of the causal links is the most important one would be tantamount to developing a *theory* of political neutrality – a task that is well-beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, the section unpacks the rather complex causal chain that generates the military man's loyalties - a task that may be somewhat tedious at times. But describing this dry causal chain is an absolute necessity if we are to understand the importance and causes of political neutrality.

In the following description, the causal chain is broken up into three manageable components. The first subsection describes the professional-bureaucratic nexus and how it causes political neutrality. The second subsection looks at how other factors – the civilian government's control policy and the constitutional set-up of the state – facilitates, or hampers, the professional-bureaucratic nexus. The final subsection explores how military trust – an alternative chain of causality – also shapes the military man's loyalties. The causal chain is illustrated in figure 7.1., which can be found in the end of this section. Each step of the causal chain is assigned a letter, allowing the reader to follow the description of the causal map in the figure.

The professional-bureaucratic nexus

As was evident from the historical outline, professionalization and bureaucratization both helped to shape the military man's loyalties. Professionalization and bureaucratization did not appear simultaneously, but once the conditions for both were in place a synergy effect was created that permitted the creation of a military culture that values political neutrality. The professional-

bureaucratic nexus is the co-development of bureaucratic organization based on meritocracy and the professionalization of the officer corps (A). It covers three separate processes – bureaucratization, professionalization, and meritocratization – that support one another and facilitates political neutrality within military culture.[508]

Bureaucratization is the spread of hierarchical organizations that use division of labor between skilled experts to generate administrative effectiveness. As some sociologists have highlighted, the military was indeed the first bureaucracy.[509] Max Weber argued that bureaucratic principles of organization were used by pre-modern states, including ancient China and Egypt.[510] Yet it was only in the modern nation-state that a single bureaucracy gained a monopoly on administrative power. In prior eras, the administrative power had been shared with local nobles, who competed with the state for power. This had ensured that command in battle was as much a tricky game of coalition management as it was about military efficiency.[511] At the battle of Bosworth Field in 1485, for instance, the Earl of Northumberland held back his troops when Richard III signaled for his assistance. This effectively isolated the king from a third of his force, driving him to make a bold attack on his opponent's center. He lay slain on the ground within hours. Historians discuss whether Northumberland's maneuver may have been a political ruse, designed to give the earl an advantageous position in post-Yorkist society.[512] The important insight for our purpose is that such treachery was not only possible, it was commonplace. In the modern era, by contrast, the nation-state has a full monopoly of power without being dependent on the aristocracy. A commander would never be able to play politics on the battlefield, let alone get away with it. The state recruits its men directly, and their allegiance is to the government, not a regional liege. This means that the public administration was controlled by only one principal that could serve as a supervisor, and judge each member of the administration based on his worth.

The development of bureaucratic organization was thus driven by large-scale societal transformations – the competition between states through warfare, the increased strength of the state, and the development of a national political culture – which were highlighted in previous chapters. It also depended on the development of a professional officer corps. A professional is a person who uses his expertise, which he has learned through specialized training, to accomplish a job for pay. Professionalism is the spread of professionals within a given sector. Military professionalism is the spread of officers, who are experts in military science through specialized

[508] It is important to emphasize that bureaucratization and professionalization are two separate, yet causally interlinked, variables (Dandeker (1990), pp. 67-68 & 80-101).
[509] Mann (1993), p. 445.
[510] Weber (1947), p. 343.
[511] Howard (1976), p.63.
[512] Horrox, Rosemary (1989): *Richard III. A Study in Service*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 319-20.

training at military academies and staff colleges, throughout the armed forces. Formal and hierarchical bureaucracies needed professional personnel who are capable of managing such organizations. The military bureaucracy requires professional personnel who possess an expertise that allows them to judge the specifics of various situations and to think out of the box when faced with unexpected situations. Professionalism and bureaucratic organization thus developed hand-in-hand. As these professional bureaucracies showed their worth on the battlefield, the demand for further bureaucratization and professionalization grew. Military academies sprang up and became essential parts of the officer's career trajectory.[513]

Like bureaucratization, professionalism depended on grand-scale factors. As we saw in chapter 5, military expertise could only be professionalized when war required scientific skills. The transformation of the character of war – a grand-scale trend related to the development of strong nation-states and national consciousness – therefore caused professionalism.[514] Professionalism also required strong bureaucracies to develop. If the military had not been a bureaucracy, there would have been a lesser need for organizational training and fewer resources for organizing military academies.

Meritocracy is an organizational promotion principle that rewards individuals for their abilities and achievements. Before the development of the modern nation-state, the career soldier owed his fortune not only to his skills, but also to his association with a distinct political faction. Promotion depended on political contacts and/or wealth. The soldier did not depend on his abilities, but rather on whatever political faction held power at the time. The purchase and patronage system was common in most European militaries before the French Revolution. For example, the purchase of military offices was standard practice – and even governmentally regulated through a decree by George III - in Britain until the system was abolished in 1871. In 1856, for instance, the rank of lieutenant-colonel – the highest position attainable through purchase – could be procured for the lavish sum of £7,000.[515]

In the 19th century, purchase and patronage were replaced by a system based on merit. The state was able to summon the loyalty of the officer corps by ensuring that promotion was based on fairly unquestionable metrics, rather than political contacts. As long as the soldier owed his career to his contacts with political parties, he could never be trusted to be neutral in political affairs. By developing a military meritocracy, the state ensured that the individual officer did not need to develop political contacts to be promoted. The personal reward system came to depend on non-

[513] Mann (1993), pp. 419-26.
[514] Huntington (1957b), pp. 32-33.
[515] Huntington (1957b), p. 47;Allen, Douglas W. (2005): *Purchase, Patronage, and Professions: Incentives and the Evolution of Public Office,* in *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,* vol. 161, no. 1, p. 60; Erickson, Arvel B. (1956): *Abolition of Purchase in the British Army,* in *Military Affairs,* vol. 23, p. 66.

political metrics. Skill had to be measurable – otherwise it would be impossible to facilitate a system of promotion around it.[516]

Bureaucracy, meritocracy, and professionalism were mutually constitutive. Max Weber stressed that bureaucracies reached their final *telos* when they adopted a meritocratic incentive structure that rewards actions, based on their merit rather than on political contacts.[517] In simple terms, working for merit generally makes bureaucratic organizations more efficient, as the carrot of promotion spurs the bureaucrat to maximize his output. Conversely, meritocracy could only come into being because all the other features of the bureaucratic organization were in place. Without formalized, hierarchical organizational structures, a system based on merit would hardly have been possible. The synergy effect between meritocracy and bureaucracy strengthened each dynamic.[518]

Secondly, meritocracy required a measurable metric for merit, on which promotions could be assessed (B). It is not possible to establish a meritocracy if one cannot measure the skills of a bureaucrat in a reasonably standardized way. If merit becomes too dependent on immeasurable or intangible metrics, then promotion once again becomes entangled in politics, as it becomes impossible to separate personal and political favors from un-biased evaluations. As we saw in chapter 5, the military skill is essentially the use of the art and science of warfare. The officer needs a sphere of activities, where he can be evaluated by the outcomes of his judgment. If he cannot be assessed, using relatively standardized metrics, he will be forced to engage in bureaucratic politicking to gain promotion.

In chapter 5, we also saw that military expertise is never perfect. The military skill is both an art and a science, which means that skill necessarily differs from person to person. This places a limit on the certainty of the meritocracy. Although the military expertise is largely shared by almost all soldiers, it can never be totally universal. Merit is never entirely unquestionable, and the use of political contacts can never be eradicated from the promotion process. Though some organizations are more meritocratic than others, a military can never become fully meritocratic.

The professional-bureaucratic nexus creates two of the three types of military loyalty that was (C). Firstly, the meritocratic system produces personal rewards for the military man by paying him a wage. To state the seemingly obvious, the military man is loyal to the state because it pays him wages, which he can use to sustain himself and to support the communities that matter to him. Secondly, the institutions of the modern armed forces create communities within the military. Drilling and training create bonds between people who would otherwise be strangers. Soldiers forge

[516] Mann shows that the development of a true meritocracy happened after the development of bureaucratic organization (Mann (1993), p. 472). See also, Dandeker (1990), p. 99.
[517] Weber (1947), pp. 329-337.
[518] Mann (1993), pp. 444-75.

friendship with their fellow soldiers when they work together to achieve a purpose. J. Glenn Gray - the soldier-philosopher who was inducted into the Army the same day as he received his Columbia diploma – describes military comradeship as an experience of becoming part of a community that gives individual life meaning.[519] Furthermore, military institutions also allowed the state and the military to socialize their members. The state could shape military culture, as military life became centered around bureaucratic practices and training in the military academy.[520] Bureaucracies, unlike other forms of organization, can influence the cultural values of the individual. The military academy – one of the primary venues for socialization - depended on the development of bureaucratic structures of organization. Large-scale socialization only became possible when bureaucratic organization had become commonplace.[521]

The factors that cause political neutrality, however, also facilitate the development of parochialism within the armed forces (D). Firstly, it is an unanticipated consequence of the meritocratic system. When the system rewards individual soldiers for their merit in the field, it also creates an incentive to ensure that the bureaucratic system has enough resources to create additional paths of promotion. An officer's career not only depends on his performances in the field – it also depends on the armed forces' resource situation. If the military is starved for resources, it may cut down on its number of colonels, thus decreasing the likelihood that such a position opens up for majors. The officer will therefore have an incentive to ensure that the military has enough resources. He will no longer necessarily be politically neutral, though he might stay out of the struggle between political parties. Instead, he will work for the interests of the military bureaucracy.

Secondly, intra-military bonds – the comradeship that develops between men in the ranks– may work against political neutrality because it binds men to one another, rather than to the state. The military man also cares about his own security and the safety of his comrades in arms. The military is held together by forming bonds between soldiers, yet these ties also mean that the military man has an interest in keeping the armed forces out of harm's way. The military man is reluctant to fight, because he knows that fighting may involve the killing or maiming of him, and his

[519] Gray, J. Glenn (1970): *The Warriors. Reflections on Men in Battle,* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 43-49; Arendt, Hannah (1970): *Introduction*, in Gray, J. Glenn (1970): *The Warriors. Reflections on Men in Battle,* Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, p. viii.

[520] Stevens, Gwendolyn, Fred M. Rosa & Sheldon Gardner (1994): *Military Academies as Instruments of Value Change*, in *Armed Forces and Society,* vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 477-82. Military sociologists debate if the gap in values held by soldiers and civilians is caused by self-selection (the fact that people holding certain values are more prone to enter the military) or socialization. The consensus seems to be that both factors play a significant role (Bachman, Jerald G., Lee Sigelman& Greg Diamond (1987): *Self-Selection, Socialization, and Distinctive Military Values: Attitudes of High-School Seniors,* in *Armed Forces and Society,* vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 169-97; Bachman, Jerald G., Peter Freedman-Doan, David R. Segal & Patrick O'Malley (2000): *Distinctive Military Attitudes among US Enlistees, 1976-1997: Self-Selection versus Socialization,* in *Armed Forces and Society,* vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 561-85).

[521] Dandeker (1990), pp. 70-71.

military comrades. He simply makes a trade-off between the purpose of the mission and the personal losses that he might experience. All soldiers need to feel that their mission has a purpose. Without a purpose, war becomes a senseless slaughter - the meaningless loss of comrades without a gain in security for society.

Civilian control policy and the professional-bureaucratic nexus

The professional-bureaucratic nexus largely depends on the existence of an independent military expertise, which is largely the result of grand-scale factors, such as the development of the nation-state, the increased military competition between states, and the increased importance of social organization and technology in warfare. However, more easily manipulated factors also affect the development of the military expertise. Most importantly, the degree of civilian meddling in military policy may erode, or sustain, the objectivity of this expertise (E).

Of the three direct policy options facing governments, objective control is most conducive to the creation of military expertise. This policy allows military autonomy over tactical and operational decisions. Officers thus have a sphere of activities where they can excel without political involvement. It becomes possible to distinguish the military expertise from political nous.

Conversely, subjective control, a fairly rare policy choice in advanced democracies to be sure, erodes the meritocratic dimension of the professional-bureaucratic nexus. A government pursuing a subjective control policy meddles in military appointments to ensure that the officer corps shares the government's values. Political or factional loyalties, rather than merit, determine an officer's chances of promotion. Meritocracy, one of the constitutive institutions of the professional-bureaucratic nexus, is thus removed. The purpose of subjective control is to control the military by making it loyal to a specific political faction. It is the opposite of political neutrality.

Finally, assertive control, one of the typical control policies in advanced democracies, also diminishes political neutrality. This policy involves civilian meddling in tactical and operational decisions, but leaves the military organization, as such, alone. Though the general meritocratic principle is largely preserved, it is somewhat diminished by civilian meddling in military expertise. There cannot be a purely military expertise, if civilian leaders constantly overrule the military and problematize the details of military processes. If that happens, political maneuverability once again eclipses military expertise as the most important promotion route. He will be rewarded not for his sound advice or military judgment, but for his politicking skills.

The government's choice of civilian control policy depends on the nature of the conflict in question, and the strategic decisions of the civilian leadership (F and G). As we shall see in chapter 8, civilian interference in tactical and operational details may make the military more efficient in some

circumstances. Consequently, the civilian leadership cannot always delegate authority over tactical and operational details to the military. If the military leadership has proven unable to understand the situation in question, such a policy may threaten the security of the state. In that case, the civilian leadership has to retain control over decisions, even though it is detrimental to the development of norms of neutrality within the military. These requirements depend on the functional imperative – that is, the character and intensity of the conflicts facing the state (G). Some conflicts are driven mainly by the rules of diplomacy and require extensive political meddling. As we shall see in chapter 8, the Cuban Missile Crisis is an instructive example of this type of conflict.

Furthermore, the effects of the government's policies also depend on the external institutions used to control the military (H). We already highlighted this point in chapter 6. Civilian authority is divided between several actors in most modern democracies. As a government agency, the military is typically run by the executive, under the supervision of the legislature. Both the executive and legislature owe their positions to the authority bestowed by civil society. Therefore, the military has additional obligations to civil society, and to the legislature. Many democratic systems contain supervision procedures, such as hearings and commissions. Here, the military is confronted with a split authority. When the military has several principals, it becomes difficult for it to decipher who determines the system of promotions. It risks becoming politicized by being sucked into the political struggle between legislature and executive.[522]

Military trust

The military man's decision to remain politically neutral also depends on a causal chain that is largely independent of the professional-bureaucratic nexus. The military also becomes politically neutral if it can trust the skills, motives, and priorities of the civilian government (I). Trust is the expectation of future regular, honest, and cooperative actions of others that affect the trusting actor's future actions.[523] It is concerned both with the skills and the motives of the opposite party.[524] In other words, the officers trust that the civilians have their own interests and the interests of their primary communities in mind. They also trust that the civilians can secure those interests effectively. The state thus gains the officers' trust by handling threats and problems effectively (J). The state shores up support simply by creating security for the military man's essential communities. Trust and legitimacy are thus closely related.

[522] Huntington (1957b), pp. 177-84.
[523] This definition is derived from Francis Fukuyama and Piotr Sztompka's work on trust (Fukuyama, Francis (1995): *Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity,* New York: Free Press, p. 26; Sztompka, Piotr (2000): *Trust. A Sociological Theory,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 25-26).
[524] Sztompka (2000), pp. 53-54.

The relationship between military trust and the functional imperative is relatively complicated. Firstly, *ceteris paribus*, the existence of an outside threat makes the military man trust the state (K). When one's significant communities are threatened, one of course turns to the institutions that are most likely to handle said threat, in most cases the state. Issues and divisions that used to seem important suddenly fade into the background.[525] As some scholars have highlighted, defining an issue as a security threat is generally an effective rhetorical strategy.[526]

Secondly, however, the state risks losing that trust, if its strategies and tactics are not militarily effective. Inefficient policies put not only the soldier, but also his comrades in arms and his friends, family, and nation, at risk. The military loses trust in the government, if its policies lead to unnecessary loss of lives and to a heightened threat to the survival of the state. Effectiveness and civilian control are thus intimately intertwined. The threat no longer makes the state more trustworthy, if it is unable to handle that threat effectively. All in all, outside threats may be a double-edged sword for the state.

Of course, the military's trust and the professional-bureaucratic nexus do not exist independently of one another. They are each conducive to the other (M). The professional and bureaucratic institutions that define the professional-bureaucratic nexus allow the state to socialize officers into a military culture that stresses loyalty to the state and the nation. Conversely, a government that enjoys the trust of the officer corps faces less resistance and building these institutions is therefore for easier.

Soldiers become politically neutral, when they trust the democratic state (N). Trust is of course never easy. There is always a tension between the individual soldier's loyalty to his family, community, nation, and state. If hard-pressed, the soldier may be forced to choose between these entities – a choice which may not favor the state. In that sense, the process that leads to political neutrality – the creation of communities – may lead to parochialism instead (O).

For instance, the motives that drove the French military to intervene in domestic politics during the Algerian War illustrate the general relationship between trust and political neutrality. Algeria was considered to be more than a French colony at the outset of the conflict – it was a part of metropolitan France. Algerian insurgents fought for independence against the French state and the organizations of the *pieds-noirs,* the Europeans living in Algeria.[527] However, as the conflict prolonged and soured, it became clear that keeping Algeria would be too morally and fiscally

[525] Desch (1999), p. 13; Stein, Arthur (1976): *Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature,* in *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 143-72.
[526] Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde (1998): *Security. A New Framework for Analysis,* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 23-26.
[527] Kelly, George A. (1965): *Lost Soldiers. The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962,* Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 143-65.

expensive. The state somehow had to give Algeria its independence and get the *pieds-noirs* to accept their fate.

The officer corps played a key role in the complex struggle that followed. It was of course highly professional.[528] The government refrained from affecting the promotional structures of the military and the professional-bureaucratic nexus was largely left untouched by the government's policies. The government mostly pursued a policy of objective control, permitting that local theater commanders control over tactical and operational (and sometimes even strategic and political) details.[529] It is remarkable that the officer corps still decided to rise up against its civilian masters. This allows us to use this case to tease out the independent importance of trust for the military's motives.

The legitimacy of the French system of government was relatively low. Its tumultuous political history included more than ten constitutional regimes since the Revolution. The officers, most of whom had lived through at least the fall of the Third Republic, the shameful Vichy period, and the establishment and dysfunctions of the Fourth Republic, could not blindly trust the system of government. Contemplating that it could and should be influenced by the military not that far off.[530] The government's poor results against the insurgents in the early stages of the war meant that its legitimacy reached its nadir. [531]

The key question was for whom the officer felt motivated to fight. It was not entirely clear who the state was supposed to protect. The officer corps was torn between its loyalty to democracy, the government, the state, the French nation, and the *pieds-noirs.* Many officers were of course loyal to the government either out of a genuine devotion to the democratic principles, statist nationalism, or, after 1958, out of personal loyalty to de Gaulle. However, other officers saw the government's policies as hurting their primary communities or institutions. They therefore resisted these policies with democratically dubious means, even when they were convinced that the consequences of failure would be execution. Some saw the Algerian conflict as a battle in a larger conflict against the Soviet Union, which could eventually mean the destruction of the French state. Others refused to accept the government's argument that the Algerian population was not part of the French nation. Abandoning Algeria would be a blow against the cohesion of France. Finally, some were indignated by how the government was willing to abandon the *pieds-noirs* and were driven by a concern for their fate. These motives drove officers to seek the fall of the Fourth Republic and de Gaulle's return to power in 1958 and to several failed coup attempts - the most important of which

[528] Ambler, John S. (1966): *The French Army in Politics 1945-1962,* Columbus: Ohio State University Press, pp. 277-78.
[529] Desch (1999), p. 87; Ambler (1966), pp. 208 & 216-18.
[530] Desch (1999), p. 80; Kelly (1965), pp. 3-6; Ambler (1966), pp. 3-89 & 208.
[531] Ambler (1966), pp. 207, 212.16 & 229-30.

were the 1960 “week of barricades” and the 1961 “generals’ putsch” – when the new government did not live up to their expectations.[532] In that sense, the case illustrates the causal chain explained above: an otherwise professional, bureaucratically organized military was driven to interfere in politics due to the low legitimacy of the system of government, the incompetence of the government, and ambiguities of the constitutive community of the state. The officer corps intervened in politics because it could not trust that the government would take of its primary communities.

Motivation and political neutrality

Figure 7.1. gives an overview of the main causal links shaping political neutrality within military culture. Here, the coloring of the different boxes reflects the nature of the various factors. The two possible outcomes of the causal process – political neutrality or parochialism – are indicated by a thick box with white background. Factors that can easily be manipulated by civilian leaders – civilian control policy and general strategy and tactics – are marked by a light grey background. Factors that are largely shaped by grand-scale factors (but can be influenced by civilian decisions to some extent) are marked by a dark grey background.

The relatively complicated causal map leaves us with some fairly clear predictions for the degree of political neutrality within military culture. Firstly, it shows that political neutrality can never be complete. The factors that shape political neutrality also cause parochialism. Unlike what Huntington predicted, the military will never become completely neutral in politics.

Secondly, this also shows that professionalism, though a significant factor in shaping military culture, is one of several factors in this causal relationship. It only becomes significant when it is supported by other factors, such as bureaucratic organization of the military and meritocracy. Other factors, notably the military’s trust of the civilians, are also crucial.

Thirdly, the government’s choice of civilian control policy also influences the degree of political neutrality. Generally speaking, civilian meddling in military policy decreases political neutrality within military culture. If the government pursues a subjective control policy, the positive influence of the professional-bureaucratic nexus is largely destroyed and the officer corps gets an incentive to get involved in politics. Even a less intrusive policy, such as assertive control, also affects the degree of political neutrality. Assertive control still devalues the military expertise and forces the

[532] Desch (1999), p. 84; Ambler (1966), pp. 337-57, Kelly (1965), pp. 147-49. John Ambler rejects that some officers were driven by democratic motives and argues that French military culture was overwhelmingly anti-liberal, if ideologically coherent at all, and that many soldiers followed suit simply out of personal loyalties (Ambler (1966), pp. 278-80 & 327). He also highlights how more personal motives, such as low wages and status may have contributed to the French military’s dissatisfaction with the government (Ambler (1966), pp. 93-127). For a detailed overview of the entire conflict, see Horne, Alistair (2006): *A Savage War of Peace. Algeria 1954-62,* New York: New York Review of Books.

officers to engage in politicking to ensure that their ideas are followed. Objective control largely facilitates political neutrality within the ranks. However, it is important to emphasize that the armed forces never become completely neutral, even when an objective control policy is being followed. The model shows that political neutrality depends on the strength of an independent military expertise and the military effectiveness of the state. None of these factors are necessarily fully achieved, even when the government pursues an objective control policy. As we saw in chapter 5, the military expertise is not completely given. Debates about military interpretations may politicize the officer corps. Furthermore, even officers who do not fear for their promotion may intervene in politics, if the state is unable to develop effective strategies and tactics.

Finally, the functional imperative has a complicated relationship to political neutrality. On the one hand, military threats increase the legitimacy of the state. On the other hand, the state may experience a significant loss in legitimacy if it is unable to handle these threats effectively. Furthermore, some threats may force the government to meddle in operational and tactical details and thus make it unable to pursue an objective control policy.

Figure 7.1. The main causal links shaping political neutrality



Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explore the role of professionalism and the government's civilian control policy for the development of norms of neutrality within the military. I showed that although both of these factors are important, they are only two of several variables that facilitate the development of political neutrality. Professionalism supports the development of political neutrality, especially when combined with bureaucratic and meritocratic organizational structures. The government's civilian control policy facilitates political neutrality within the armed forces. Generally speaking, the degree of political neutrality decreases, the more civilians meddle in tactical and operational details. However, the government's civilian control policy cannot fully guarantee political neutrality. Furthermore, military culture will never become completely politically neutral. The factors that facilitate political neutrality also create parochialism. Consequently, internal mechanisms of control must be supplemented with external mechanisms.

The model presented in this chapter diverges from Huntington's description of military identity. The soldier is not necessarily a stoic warrior, born politically neutral and dedicated to fighting for the purpose of the state. Instead, though he is largely loyal to the government, state, and constitution, he is also driven by other motives that complicate his loyalty. One cannot simply say that the civilians decide the mission and that it is the soldier's obligation to complete the mission. The purpose and success of the mission influence the soldier's perception of the state, and thus the likelihood that he will continue to stay politically neutral. Professional officers may act against the interests of the government even in highly legitimate and advanced democracies. Consequently, civilian control cannot be ensured through internal means only. They must be supplemented by external control mechanisms. Civilian control thus depends on a combination of internal and external control mechanisms.

- 8 -

Military effectiveness

Civilian control – which was described in chapter 6 and 7 - is only one half of the elite civil-military relations package. I explore military effectiveness – the other core topic of elite civil-military relations – in this chapter. I analyze how elite civil-military processes influence the military effectiveness of the state. I argue that military effectiveness is generated by striking the right balance between civilian control on the one hand and a division of labor between soldiers and civilians on the other. Soldiers and civilians are experts in military and political affairs respectively. Military effectiveness develops when each group focuses on the area they know best. However, the system also needs a large degree of strategic coherence – that is, military operations and tactics must reflect the overall strategy. Civilians can only secure strategic coherence by meddling in these details, thus diminishing the division of labor. The right balance, I argue, depends on the actual skills of civilian and military elites and the character of the threats the state faces.

The chapter consists of three sections. The first section briefly examines how military decision-making functions. The second section explores how civilian control increases military effectiveness. The last section looks at how civilian and military expertise functions as a division of labor and shows how this division of labor has to be balanced against the need for civilian control.

Strategy and military decision-making

Military effectiveness is "the capacity to generate military [force] from a state's basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital."[533] Military effectiveness is created largely through planning. However, even an apparently perfect plan may not yield a successful outcome. Uncertainty is always a key ingredient of war. One never knows if a truly random occurrence – like the heavy rain that some historians argue prevented Suleiman I from attacking Vienna with his full force – prevents one from realizing an otherwise sound and achievable war goal.[534] Furthermore, the strategies and tactics of one's opponents, which are always opaque to some degree, may make a good plan obsolete. Clausewitz likened war with a gamble and asserted that each action only could be achieved within a range of probability. "No other human activity", he wrote in *On War,* "is so

[533] Brooks, Risa A. (2007b): *Introduction. The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions, and International Forces on Military Effectiveness,* in Brooks, Risa A. & Elizabeth A. Stanley (2007): *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness*, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, p. 9.
[534] Rabb, Theodore (1999): *If Only It Had Not Been Such a Wet Summer,* in Cowley, Robert (2000): *What If? The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Could Have Been,* New York: Berkley Books, pp. 107-20.

continuously or universally bound up with chance."[535] Good plans do not always lead to good outcomes.

However, strategy, though difficult and often defeated by events, is often the only way of managing conflicts. Richard Betts has reviewed the many criticisms of strategy and concludes that although they highlight the difficulty of planning, none of them warrants the full disavowal of strategy. As he puts it, "there is no alternative but to engage in strategy unless one is willing to give up the use of force as an instrument of policy."[536] Strategy does not yield a perfect solution, yet planning to control the situation is the state's best option. It cannot see what may be hidden underneath the cloak of events, but it can only try to control events as best it can.

Strategic policy-making is, simply put, a four-stage process as illustrated in figure 8.1. Political discussions and decisions take center stage. Sociologists emphasize that open-minded group deliberation has a strong rationalizing potential. Jürgen Habermas claims that what he has termed "the peculiar forceless force of the better argument" weeds out bad information and poorly structured arguments and creates a better conception of a situation, and what to do about it.[537] Civilian and military actors engage in discussions and thereby confront one another with additional information and alternative interpretations. Their discussion will tend to uncover the assumptions beneath every argument and test their validity. This allows them to discard erroneous information and faulty interpretations in their own analysis. Deliberation thus brings more perspectives and facts to the table and produces an answer that is closer to reality. In essence, the actors move back and forth between analysis and deliberation and by repeating this exercise in different forums, analysts can crystallize a gradually improved perception of reality.

[535] von Clausewitz (1976), p. 96.
[536] Betts, Richard K. (2000):*Is Strategy an Illusion?,*in *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 2, p. 47.
[537] Habermas, Jürgen (1990b): *Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences,* in Habermas, Jürgen (1990): *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action,* Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 23; Habermas, Jürgen (1993): *Remarks on Discourse Ethics,* in Habermas, Jürgen (1993): *Justification and Application,* Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 56.

Figure 8.1. The four stages of policy-making



The forceless force of the better argument is only effective to a certain point. After a while, deliberations have to generate a final decision about which policies to pursue. Deliberation does not automatically result in a perfect policy, mainly because it would require an unfeasibly long and costly time-span to debate every single assumption of every single possible course of action. The material and human costs of an erroneous policy – loss of civilian and military lives, physical destruction and depletion of resources and legitimacy - may be piling up while decision-makers seek a perfect strategy. In practice, the deliberation phase ends when the commander-in-chief stops the discussion and makes a policy-decision, based on the views that have been presented through the debate. As Clausewitz put it in *On War*,

> "Circumstances vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable, that a vast array of factors has to be appreciated – mostly in the light of probabilities alone. The man responsible for evaluating the whole must bring to his task the quality of intuition that perceives the truth at every point. Otherwise a chaos of opinions and considerations would arise, and fatally entangle judgment."[538]

Deciding requires that the discussion is moved away from the group and developed into a coherent judgment. This can only be done by one individual. The authority to be the decider has to be vested in just one person. The decision is essentially the decider's analysis, which he has formed through participation in the earlier discussion.

These political discussions depend on the military bureaucracy for information and implementation. Topics can only be discussed if a problem can be detected and if relevant information can be brought to the table. Intelligence is therefore an essential component of efficient

[538] von Clausewitz (1976), p. 112.

decision-making. The military bureaucracy survey the situation and gathers intelligence which is then used to get an overview of the situation on the ground. Intelligence failures can be crucial. For example, during the early stages of the Korean War, various branches of the American bureaucracy detected signs of a Chinese intervention in the months before it actually occurred. Military intelligence services repeatedly reported that China was concentrating troops north of the Yalu.[539] After the invasion had occurred, UN units – still unaware of the Chinese intervention - began to count Chinese-speakers among their prisoners and noticed that enemy bodies wore Chinese uniforms.[540] These early warning signs of a Chinese invasion of Korea were largely ignored by the higher echelons. The possibility of a Chinese intervention was discussed, but brushed aside, in CIA briefs only weeks before it happened. The UN forces, which had seemed poised to victory in early October, were wholly unprepared for a Chinese intervention and were soon overrun and forced to retreat.[541] The American failure to detect and react to the invasion prolonged the conflict with almost three years.

Similarly, when a decision has been made, the different wings of the government bureaucracy – the military, the diplomatic corps and other parts of the civil service – implement it. Here, the question is no longer: "When should we engage with the enemy and allies to maximize our power?" The question becomes: "How should these engagements be run to maximize their force?"

In summary, military strategies are always incomplete attempts to grasp events. Strategies are decided by a political leader, based on deliberations between political and military elites. This in turn relies on the military bureaucracy's ability to gather intelligence, and implement decisions once they are made. The primary problem of elite civil-military relations is the question of how much civilians should meddle in implementation and intelligence gathering.[542] Should they interfere in the way the military performs these tasks, or should they allow it autonomy to handle these issues independently? As the following sections will show, effectiveness is generated by finding the optimal balance between two mutually exclusive principles. On the one hand, the civilian leadership has to meddle in operational and tactical details within the military's sphere of expertise to ensure that policies are implemented according to the overall strategy. On the other hand, there has to be a

[539] Ovodenko, Alexander (2007): *(Mis)interpreting Threats: A Case Study of the Korean War,* in *Security Studies,* vol. 16, no. 2,pp. 261-69.
[540] Hastings, Max (1987): *The Korean War,* London: Pan Books, pp. 183-93.
[541] Ovodenko (2007), pp. 272-77.
[542] This dissertation generally focuses on the problem of implementation and civilian meddling. The problem of deliberation and decision-making, though an interesting dynamic, is of secondary importance in the contemporary debates. It is therefore bracketed in this dissertation.

division of labor between soldiers and civilians.[543] The remainder of this chapter will be spent on exploring these principles.

Civilian control and military effectiveness

As Eliot Cohen has shown, civilian control is crucial for the military effectiveness of the state. Cohen explored the practices of the four successful wartime leaders – Lincoln, Clemenceau, Churchill, and Ben-Gurion – and shows that each of these leaders interfered in tactical and operational details.[544] They were all driven by the need for strategic coherence. It was not enough that they made the key overall decisions – they also had to ensure that the operational and tactical implementation followed their overall strategy. They did not allow their generals to handle intelligence and implementation independently. They had to ensure that their decisions came into fruition.

Operations and tactics should be shaped by strategy. A tactical defeat may be a strategic victory. The assault on Fort Sumter, which precipitated the American Civil War, is a case in point. With tensions rising between the secessionist states and the central government, each party tried to gather as many military resources as possible for a possible future confrontation. Among the most valuable prizes were the many forts, erected along the coastline as a potent defense barrier against a European invasion. One of the Southern forts under Union control was Fort Sumter in South Carolina. Hoping to force the Union to give up the fort, rebel troops isolated it, thus making the matter of supply a contentious issue.

Lincoln faced a dilemma. On the one hand, failing to resupplying Fort Sumter would eventually cost the Union a precious fort to the enemy. On the other hand, if the government decided to supply the fort by force, the North would appear to be the aggressor, thus losing legitimacy, which was needed to keep the Union together. The so-called Border States – Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri – were still sitting on the fence and might have seceded if Lincoln

[543] These two civil-military principles mirror the general problems emphasized in the literature on military effectiveness. In their recent edited volume, Risa Brooks and Elizabeth Stanley provides the most comprehensive theory of military effectiveness. They argue that four variables – integration, responsiveness, skill, and quality – determine the effectiveness of a military (Brooks (2007b), pp. 9-13). These four variables reflect the two types of elite civil-military cooperation emphasized in this chapter. Integration (or "the degree to which different military activities are internally consistent and mutually reinforcing" (Brooks (2007b), p. 10) is the same as strategic coherence. The three remaining variables cover matters where the essential problem is whether or not the person in charge has the right expertise – basically, the founding principle behind the division of labor. Responsiveness (or "the ability to tailor military activity to a state's own capabilities, its adversaries' capabilities, and its environment" (Brooks (2007b), p. 11) is increased when military matters are handled by experts in military science and political matters by civilian experts. Similarly, both skill and quality (or "[the] ability to achieve particular tasks and to carry out orders" and "[the] ability to provide … highly capable weapons and equipments" respectively (Brooks (2007b), pp. 12-13)) are both tasks where military expertise is *the* crucial determinant for efficient task completion. Any other principle than a division of labor would be detrimental for success. In that sense, the division of labor and strategic coherence saturates the range of possibilities for how interaction between civilian and military elites can lead to effectiveness.

[544] Cohen (2003), pp. 4- 5 & 209

seemed to be the instigator of the conflict. Their secession would weaken his ability to force the South back into the Union. Disregarding standard military tactics, Lincoln solved the dilemma by attempting to supply the fort without the use of force. He publicly stated that the Union would resupply the fort, yet not fire lest under attack. The Confederates decided to prevent the supplies from reaching Sumter by force and took the fort after a 33 hour bombardment. In tactical terms, the Fort Sumter debacle was a fiasco for the North. The fort was lost and with it the Union's ability to enact force appeared to be diminished. Tactically, the optimal solution would have been to use force to rebuff the rebels and resupply the fort. Strategically, however, Lincoln's course of action was a masterstroke. By forcing the South to fire the first shot, Lincoln avoided being characterized as a warmonger. He thus kept the Union together. The loss of the Border States, or legitimacy in the population at large, would have been a bigger blow to the Union's cause than the loss of Fort Sumter. A tactical advantage was lost for the sake of strategic gains.[545] As Cohen puts it, Lincoln "chose an act of military imprudence (…) to achieve a broader political effect."[546]

Generals may pursue purposes that do not overlap with the overall strategic goals. Firstly, as we have already covered in chapters 6 and 7, military leaders may pursue bureaucratic or particular interests that do not mesh with the interests of the government. Secondly, their strategic understanding of the situation may differ from that of the government. In some cases, they may have misunderstood the true purpose envisioned by the commander-in-chief.

An example is Lincoln's constant struggle to ensure that field commanders did not follow their own independent strategies. Many Union officers – including the infamous McClellan, the North's erstwhile General-in-Chief – believed that the best strategy was to fight a limited war that did not seek to punish the South. This involved minimizing the strain put on the armies of both the North and South and focusing on outmaneuvering, rather than crushing, the Confederate forces. By taking Richmond, the Confederate capital, the generals believed, a politically symbolic victory could be won, followed by a political compromise at the negotiation table. Lincoln came to believe the opposite. The South's armies had to be crushed and its population punished until they surrendered. When his strategy was finally implemented, it involved General Grant's bloody Overland Campaign, an attack on General Lee's Army of Northern Virginia through a series of horrendous battles – including the Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor - where the casualty rates anticipated the horrors of the First World War. The Union campaign also included General Sherman's burning of Atlanta, and his destructive March to the Sea, for which he is still loathed in the South.

[545] Keegan, John (2009): *The American Civil War*, London: Vintage Books, pp. 33-35;Cohen (2003), pp. 17-18.
[546] Cohen (2003), p. 18.

The way McClellan and the other wayward officers implemented the government's policies reflected their different strategic approach. They followed a rather defensive strategy and failed to pursue a course that would crush the Confederate army and the rebel spirit with it. Lincoln had to constantly watch and penalize officers, who did not pursue his strategy.[547] For example, as a demonstration, he personally sacked Major John Key – a brave, competent, and politically influential commander – because he had argued in private that the war was fought as a game, the purpose of which was to reach "a compromise and save slavery."[548]

Meddling in tactics and operations require knowledge of the minutiae of military affairs. Lincoln, for instance, immersed himself in the study of weaponry and new technology, which enabled him to confront and question his officers. For example, he personally ensured that breech-loading weapons were mass-produced.[549] It is simply not enough, as some scholars argue, that the civilian leadership makes the decision to go to war and then leaves the details of that endeavor to the generals.[550]

Civilian control also increases the effectiveness of the state by reducing bargaining costs.[551] It takes time to reach an agreement, during which the bargainers have to be paid and the organization may lose focus on implementing the agreed policy. Bargaining always entails the risk of reaching a sub-optimal agreement. Simply put, elite civil-military disagreement is costly and reduces the effectiveness of the state. Bargaining involves the possibility of military counter-punishment, which typically decreases the military effectiveness of the state. As we established in chapter 6, the military has significant power resources, which it may employ to influence national security policy. Civilian control creates military effectiveness by diminishing the use of these resources. Military resistance may cause political commotion, thus weakening the government. An extreme example is the 1944 July plot to kill Hitler and overthrow the Nazi regime, staged by officers who were disgruntled with the overall strategy. Had the putsch succeeded, it would have been detrimental to the established interests of the government. The coup failed owing to a combination of unfortunate circumstances. However, irrespective of its outcome, the ensuing officer purges – more than 200

[547] Cohen (2003), pp. 18-23, 38-47 & 50-51. For a critique of this take on the relationship between Lincoln and McClellan, see Weigley, Russell F. (1993): *The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell,* in *The Journal of Military History,* vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 31-39.
[548] Cohen (2003), pp. 38-40.
[549] Cohen (2003), p. 25.
[550] Cohen (2003), pp. 4-7.
[551] Economists use the term "bargaining costs" to describe "the costs associated with multilevel bargaining, competitive bidding, and other voluntary mechanisms for determining a mutually acceptable agreement. Bargaining costs include not only the wages paid to the bargainers or the opportunity costs of their time but also the costs of monitoring and enforcing the agreement and any losses from failure to reach the most efficient agreement possible in the most efficient fashion" (Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts (1990): *Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic Activity*, in Alt, James E. & Kenneth A. Shepsle (1990): *Perspectives on Positive Political Economics,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 59).

officers were executed and many more, including Erwin Rommel and Günther von Kluge, the commander of the German forces in the West, were imprisoned or forced to commit suicide– severely inhibited the German state's ability to wage war.[552] Similarly, Risa Brooks has compared the performance of the Egyptian military in the 1967 Six-Day War (where elite civil-military discord was rampant) and the 1973 Yom Kippur War (where elite civil-military relations were harmonious), and shown that military effectiveness increased significantly in the latter war. Thus, military resistance entails a loss of military effectiveness.[553]

This is where civilian control and military effectiveness overlap. *Ceteris paribus,* civilian control increases strategic coherence and diminishes bargaining costs. Lincoln essentially used an assertive control policy, where he constantly meddled directly in the details of military policy. He also set up external control institutions, which allowed him to ensure that the generals were following his overall strategy.

Expertise and effectiveness

The degree of civilian control is not the only factor making the state militarily effective. The expertise of both soldiers and civilians also play a crucial role. Soldiers and civilians each bring in a distinct type of expertise, which ideally makes decisions more attentive to the realities on the ground. Civilian decision-makers are experts in politics – the ability to understand the preferences of other actors and to use this knowledge to influence their decisions. Officers are experts in military science – how to maximize force within a given time and area to achieve a strategic objective.[554] The state becomes more militarily effective when a division of labor is established, where each group gets to handle the problems that their expertise equip them to handle. This division of labor, however, requires that civilians refrain from meddling in the details of military policy. In other words, it puts a break on civilian control.

Both political and military expertise concurrently contains scientific and artistic dimensions. In chapter 5, we saw that modern fighting involves the scientific analysis of distinct factors, and the causal relationship between them. For instance, shelling the enemy involves knowledge of ballistics, being able to analyze the battlefield to arrive at an estimate of the requirements in the particular engagement, and the ability to operate the equipment effectively. In that sense, military expertise is

[552] Kershaw, Ian (2000): *Hitler. 1936-45: Nemesis*, New York: Penguin Books, p. 693; Fest, Joachim (1996): *Plotting Hitler's Death*, London: Weidenfeld& Nicolson, pp. 290-91.
[553] Brooks, Risa A. (2007a): *Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars,* in Brooks, Risa A. & Elizabeth A. Stanley (2007): *Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness,* Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, pp. 106-35.
[554] The expertise of every individual is shaped by that person's life story, his education, experience and personality. However, in crude terms, institutional affiliation and educational background goes a long way to explaining the expertise of each person.

a type of scientific knowledge. However, there must also be an understanding of how the shelling will affect the enemy's behavior and whether or not the enemy is likely to dig in or regroup elsewhere. This judgment involves taking in a lot of factors whose exact value cannot be known precisely. Furthermore, it involves anticipating equally imprecise causal mechanisms. Even a tactical operation, like shelling, must involve intuition and imagination – artistic skills – that are not uniform from person to person. When one moves to the strategic level, this uncertainty factor becomes more important.

Similarly, political expertise is a science in the sense that it depends on knowledge about political affairs, and on a causal map of how different factors interact. For instance, a civilian decision-maker would most commonly know how a foreign power acts by knowing factual knowledge about the constitution and the political factions of that country, and how they affect its ability to act. This map of knowledge and causality can never be complete. As we saw was the case for military expertise in chapter 5, political expertise is burdened by an overabundance of factors and variables. It is impossible to map out all these factors completely, and to fully understand their mutual relationship. A brilliant political scientist is not necessary a great politician. To maneuver in the political landscape, political leaders have to fill in the gaps. They do this by using their imagination to close the holes in their knowledge. Furthermore, devising a political strategy entails exploiting expertise strategically to predict how an opponent, or potential ally, might act in the future. This necessarily involves a leap of imagination.

All in all, expertise – be it military as well as political – involves both scientific and artistic skills. One can study political science at a university, but one surely cannot become a great politician through studies alone.[555] In the end, both military and political expertise requires scientific and artistic skills, yet the latter are more important for the politician. Scientific knowledge – ballistics, mechanics, meteorology, and the like – plays a significant part in the military man's training. Conversely, political science involves less tangible, scientific knowledge. Though both military and political expertise contains both scientific and artistic dimensions, military expertise is closer to the former and political expertise to the latter.

War is never entirely separate from politics. War is always fought for political means and every military act must therefore be judged by its political purpose.[556] As Clausewitz wrote in *On War,*

[555] Oakeshott, Michael (1962): *The Study of Politics in a University*, in Oakeshott, Michael (1991): *Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays,* Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, pp. 184-218.
[556] von Clausewitz (1976), pp. 90 & 98-100.

> "it is apt to be assumed that war suspends [political] intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own. We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something completely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise? … Is war not just another expression of their thoughts, another form of speech and writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic."[557]

In other words, war is a type of politics – it is fought for political purposes and it interacts with political considerations. To be sure, though war is a type of politics, it operates in a different way compared to other political activities. This is what Clausewitz meant when he stated that war has its own grammar. Where politics is the use of cunning and argumentation to convince or compromise, war is the use of raw force to coerce other parties. Knowledge about the use of force naturally differs from political expertise.

There are essentially two reasons – one political and one functional - why war and politics are intimately interlinked. Firstly, as we saw in chapters 6 and 7, modern society is based on the accountability principle. Civilian control of the military helps to secure civil society's support. The citizenry is willing to provide taxes, loyalty and manpower to the state as long it pursues policies for their greater good. Military expertise should be wholly subservient to the civilian leadership, if we interpret the relationship between war and politics following only this accountability principle. The civilian leadership represents the will of the people and the military is the tool by which this will is implemented. When militaries take complete control of the state, they often aim to preserve the political structure of the country to allow it to borrow its legitimacy. For instance, when the German high command seized *de facto* power during the First World War, it retained the civilian structure of the government to harvest the legitimacy of the *Kaiser*. If we bracket the fact that ousting the Emperor would have gone against the royalist and nationalist ideology of the German generals, such a move did not make sense even from a pure power perspective. Wilhelm II still served as a potent symbol of legitimacy, and keeping him as a figurehead helped the military to shore up the support of the population at large. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the real heads of the German government, retained civilian chancellors – Georg Michaelis and Georg von Hertling – to uphold the illusion of a constitutional, civilian government.[558]The civilian government, though in many respects, to use Arthur Rosenberg's apt phrase, "no more than a constitutional cloak thrown over Ludendorff's

[557] von Clausewitz (1976), p. 731.
[558] Craig (1955), pp. 326-37.

dictatorship", was still able to place a minor restraint on the military's political maneuverability.[559] For instance, during the negotiations of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Soviet Union, a rift appeared between the Foreign Office and the High Command. The civilians and several lower-ranking officers worried that overambitious territorial demands would pose a problem for post-war Germany. Ludendorff and Hindenburg argued that the Soviets should be forced to give up large areas of rich agricultural lands in Poland, the Ukraine, and the Baltics. The Kaiser's overt support of the Foreign Office caused much consternation within the High Command. Concurrently, Chancellor von Hertling emphasized that the generals were interfering in an area outside of their constitutional purview. Only after an extensive campaign against the civilian authorities did the High Command prevail.[560] Although Ludendorff and von Hindenburg effectively had absolute control of the German state, they kept on taking the wishes of Wilhelm II into account.

Secondly, effective war-fighting requires both military and political insight. The inclusion of both types of expertise is thus functionally expedient. The military provides knowledge of how the state can deliver the maximal use of force. Political experts provides knowledge of how other political actors in the war – the enemy, the state's allies or civil society - can be influenced in a way that is helpful to the state. War is a contest between political entities. Understanding when the enemy state would be willing to compromise, or assessing the opportunity to split his alliance on political grounds, is a functional requirement for any modern state. Effective decision-making therefore requires both types of expertise.[561]

The balance between political and military expertise varies at different stages of the policymaking process. At the stages of discussion and decision, military actors primarily serve as advisors, who bring a military perspective to the debate. However, all decisions cannot be made at these stages. Some decisions have to be made at the sharp end, so to speak, during the intelligence or implementation phases. Constraints of time and space make it almost impossible for one actor to make all the decisions at once. The division of labor allows the military to handle these late-stage decisions more or less autonomously. The division of labor between soldiers and civilians follows the distinction between grand strategy, strategy, operations, and tactics. Grand strategy is made by

[559] Craig (1955), p. 334n5

[560] Craig (1955), pp. 334-37; Kitchen, Martin (1976): *The Silent Dictatorship. The Politics of the German High Command under Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918,* New York: Holmes and Meier Publishing, pp. 157-84.

[561] Expertise is not entirely static. As Christopher Gibson and Don Snider have shown, since the 1960s, more military officers have undergone some sort of training in political-military affairs (Gibson, Christopher & Don M. Snider (1999): *Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process,* in *Armed Forces and Society,* vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 206-09). These officers will therefore be more proficient in the political language of diplomacy and domestic politics. The same pattern becomes visible, if one compares contemporary top-officers, like Admiral Mike Mullen, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Cold War counterparts, like Curtis LeMay.

civilians with some military involvement; strategy requires both civilian and military expertise; while operations and tactics – the implementation of strategic decisions - is primarily a military matter.[562]

The command structure of the Soviet Army during the Second World War illustrates the need for military autonomy on the tactical and operational level, and the perils of excessive civilian control. Stalin had famously purged large swathes of his officer corps to remove any threats to his own position. The remaining officers then showed little initiative and followed civilian orders slavishly.[563] This damaged Soviet effectiveness in the early stages of the war. Erhard Raus, an Austrian general famed for his exploits on the Eastern front, noticed that

> "Russian elements that broke through our lines could remain for days behind the front without recognizing their favorable position and taking advantage of it. The Soviet small-unit commander's fear of doing something wrong and being called to account for it was greater than the urge to take advantage of a situation. … [T]here was a pronounced spirit of blind obedience that had perhaps been carried over from the regimented life into the military field. This lethargy and reluctance to assume responsibility was a serious drawback to the Red Army, completely neutralizing a great many good points of the Russian soldier at the outset of the campaign."[564]

The Soviets had previously experienced similar problems during the Winter War, where the dual command system (where military decisions had to be approved by a political officer) diminished military effectiveness significantly, causing tactical blunders and eventually contributing to the heavy Russian losses in that conflict.[565]

The need for a division of labor is not constant. Instead, it depends on two additional factors: the skills of the specific civilian and military elites who control the state at the time and the character of the threat that the state faces. Firstly, if the government has an inferior understanding of the threat and the tactical, operational and strategic policy options, the policies that are pushed through may decrease the military effectiveness of the state. This loss of efficiency may even outweigh the positive outcome that follows from the increase in strategic coherence. Simply put, if the government has a better understanding of strategy, operations and tactics than the military, then a policy of assertive control will undoubtedly enhance the military effectiveness of the state. However, if that is not the case, objective control may be the correct policy, depending on the significance of strategic coherence.

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[562] For a succinct definition of strategy, operations, and tactics, see Morison (1958), p. 8.
[563] Glantz, David M. &Johnathan M. House (1995): *When Titans Clashed. How the Red Army Stopped Hitler*, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, p. 33.
[564] Raus, Erhard (2003): *Panzer Operations. The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941-1945,* Cambridge: Da Capo Press, pp. 7-8.
[565] Edwards, Robert (2006): *White Death. Russia's War on Finland, 1939-40,* London: Weidenfeld& Nicolson, pp. 188-90.

The crucial factor is the abilities of individual leaders. Cohen provides a tentative list of qualities of a good civilian leader, based on his survey of historical cases. The good military leader has a strong intuition – an instinct that allows him to sort good advice from bad advice. He must be what Isaiah Berlin called "a fox". Berlin distinguished between "hedgehogs" and "foxes". A hedgehog is a person who tries to reduce all contradictions to a few overarching principles. A fox, by contrast, does not try to systematize everything into a tidy system, but accepts the contradictory nature of reality and uses his intuition to guide his way through this complexity.[566] Furthermore, the good leader knows that thinking outside the box may lead to new strategic options, which may enable him to strike the enemy at an unforeseen weak spot. He has good judgment, moderation, and is aware of the moral compromises required of a military leader. All of these qualities only become meaningful if the leader is immersed in military details; this enables him to unpick and question the advice of his military commanders intelligently.[567]

However, one cannot assume that the civilian leader has all these qualities. Cohen's choice of cases betrays the limits of his argument. By looking at four successful cases, he essentially uses a most-similar framework for analysis, which allows him to distill the core qualities of a good leader. Though he does touch upon cases where civilian strategizing led to defeat – for instance, Lyndon Johnson's management of the Vietnam War - he does not analyze those cases systematically. This framework does not allow him to say anything about the many cases where political leaders were not up to the task. Cohen contrasts Lincoln with Jefferson Davis. In spite of possessing more military experience, gained through his years at West Point, as an officer in the Mexican campaign, and as Secretary of War, Davis was Lincoln's inferior as commander-in-chief. Cohen argues that Davis lacked the personal qualities – the patience, charisma, decisiveness, and ambition – that Lincoln possessed in abundance.[568] What might have happened if Davis had been the Union's president? Could he have organized an unequal dialogue or would it have been better had his commanders isolated an area – consisting mainly of tactical decisions – where they reigned supreme without civilian interference? In other words, if the civilian leader is unable to provide leadership, should the strategic process then focus more on the division of labor? If that is the case, then civilian control may indeed hamper the development of military effectiveness.

It is impossible to describe universally valid rules for leadership. In many ways, it depends on personality and intangible individual skills that cannot be identified *a priori*. The comparison of

[566] Cohen (2003), pp. 211-12; Berlin, Isaiah (1953): *The Hedgehog and the Fox. An Essay on Tolstoy's View of History,* Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks. Interestingly, as Philip Tetlock has famously shown, foxes are generally better at predicting political events, which may explain why being a hedgehog is such an important leadership quality (Tetlock, Philip E. (2005): *Expert Political Judgment. How good is It? How Can We Know?*, Princeton: Princeton University Press).
[567] Cohen (2003), pp. 212-224.
[568] Cohen (2003), pp. 18-19.

Lincoln and Davis is a case in point. *Ex ante*, one would think that Davis, the seasoned war veteran with decades of political and military practice, would eclipse Lincoln, who had little legislative and military experience. However, Lincoln's personal qualities – his common sense, strength, and cunning – outmatched Davis', making him a superior war leader.[569] It would have been impossible to determine these facts beforehand. The problem of finding a good leader cannot be solved by setting up elaborate screening mechanisms or general requirements for the experience needed to fulfill that role. Instead, it has to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Civilian leaders must be judged by their actions in a concrete situation. However, this insecurity about the abilities of the political leadership means that assertive control would entail some costs in terms of military effectiveness under some circumstances.

Secondly, the importance of each type of expertise differs from conflict to conflict. The admixture of expertise depends on the character of the conflict. Some conflicts are highly political, while others are grand-scale contests of force. Civilian knowledge is more important in conflicts where other parties have to be convinced to cooperate with the state. The Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of a conflict, where the state had to try to convince another party – in this case the enemy - to cooperate, and where diplomatic procedures superseded the military logic of brute force. Albeit still crucial, conventional military expertise was of less importance than an understanding of the subtle rules of diplomacy. The American government faced a dilemma between the use of force and the use of diplomacy. The military solution would be to bomb the Soviet rockets, thus ensuring that they would not be used in a first strike against the American homeland. The disadvantages of this course of action were many. A military strike – which would certainly kill USSR personnel and be an affront to Moscow – would surely lead to a Soviet reaction elsewhere, most likely in Berlin, and possibly ignite a grand-scale war. Furthermore, the Americans could not be sure of destroying all the missiles, thus risking a nuclear second-strike from Castro, or local Soviet commanders. In fact, it has later been revealed that the Soviets indeed had stationed tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba, without American knowledge, which could have been used in a retaliatory strike. A diplomatic solution would have fewer negative consequences – possibly a deal that entailed some sort of minor military weakening of the Western alliance. However, Washington could not be sure that a diplomatic solution was possible. If the White House pressed for a diplomatic solution in vain, the Soviets missiles might become operational in the meantime, which would have constituted a significant military gain for Moscow. Each strategic choice, therefore, came at a cost. The White House decided to install a blockade (which was labeled a quarantine for diplomatic reasons) to hinder further supplies to Cuba. Despite being on the brink of an all-out nuclear war, the Joint Chiefs of Staff

[569] Cohen (2003), pp. 18-19.

staunchly recommended a military solution. Air Force Chief Curtis LeMay was adamant in his view that only an all-out strike on the Soviet missiles in Cuba would allow the United States to make it through the debacle. Instead, the civilian leadership pursued a diplomatic policy that paid off when Moscow finally relented and pulled its missiles out of Cuba. The civilians correctly saw that the conflict was governed by a political logic of signaling, rather than force. Following that logic, the conflict should be handled as a negotiation, where each party should get something out of an eventual deal. Movements of military platforms were a way of communicating resolve and openness to the Soviets. Ultimately, this resulted in a compromise, which averted a nuclear clash.[570] Ironically, of course, the civilians also drove home the idea that all future conflicts would be governed by a signaling logic. This misperception would cause catastrophe in Vietnam.[571]

Conversely, in conflicts that resemble Clausewitz' concept of absolute war, understanding how to exert force effectively is more important than the processes of diplomacy. The First World War, for instance, was perhaps the closest we have come to a truly absolute war in the Clausewitzian sense. It was largely a war of technical planning, of railroad timetables, and marching schedules. The great armies on the Western front were locked in a competition of brute strength. Once the decision to engage in warfare had been made, political matters became of only secondary importance. This allowed situations, like the aforementioned Silent Dictatorship, where the war was largely run by the generals.[572] Of course, neither of these extremes is ever possible and warfare will always require an admixture of civilian and military expertise.

In summary, both civilian and military expertise has functional value for the state. Military effectiveness is generated by ensuring that civilian and military expertise is brought into political discussions, and by ensuring that tactical and operational decisions can be made by military experts. The correct admixture of political and military expertise depends on the character of the conflict in question.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explore how military effectiveness is created through elite civil-military interaction. Military effectiveness is one of the two core topics of elite civil-military

[570] Scott, Len (2007): *The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War. Lessons from History,* London: Continuum, pp. 60-61, 70, 88 & 127-28; Previdi (1988), pp. 77-86; Lebow, Richard N. (1987): *Nuclear Crisis Management. A Dangerous Illusion,* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 79; Allison, Graham (2012): *The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50. Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today,* in *Foreign Affairs,* vol. 91, no. 4, pp. 11-16.

[571] Bacevich, Andrew J. (2007): *Elusive Bargain. The Pattern of U.S. Civil-Military Relations since World War II,* in Bacevich, Andrew J. (2007): *The Long War. A History of U.S. National Security Policy since World War II,* New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 232-38.

[572] To be sure, the generals did not yield the same amount of power on all sides. Eliot Cohen, for instance, has shown how Clemenceau retained control of the French war effort, eventually coining the phrase that "war is too important to be left to the generals" (Cohen (2003), pp. 54 & 56).

relations. The state becomes militarily effective by striking the right balance between civilian control, and a division of labor between soldiers and civilians. The need for strategic coherence means that the civilians have to ensure that tactics and operations support the overall strategy. This can only be done through civilian control. However, this need for civilian control has to be balanced against a division of labor. Soldiers are experts in the art and science of warfare, while civilians are experts in the art and science of politics. Military effectiveness is generated when the military handles tactical and operational affairs, while matters of diplomacy and grand strategy are left to the civilians. This thus requires that the military is allowed to handle details of military policy autonomously. The meddling that ensures strategic coherence thus compromises the division of labor and *vice versa.* The need for a division of labor depends on the skills of civilian and military leaders and the character of the conflict in question.

- 9 -

The elite civil-military system

Having explored how civilian control and military effectiveness function in isolation in the past three chapters, I can now describe the main processes that define elite civil-military relations in this final chapter. To repeat a point that has already been made several times in this dissertation, theoretical frameworks require an overview of the main causal relations that shape a specific phenomenon. They do not determine which of these links is the most crucial determinant of the phenomenon in question. That is the domain of theories, not theoretical frameworks. In the present chapter, I provide such an overview for elite civil-military relations. I present a rather complex framework that outlines the main causal links driving elite civil-military relations, based on my results from the previous chapters. This framework helps me make theoretical predictions of the drivers and outcomes of elite civil-military relations. In other words, I map how different exogenous factors shape elite civil-military relations.

The elite civil-military relations are defined by a set of largely interrelated variables. These variables constitute a system, by which I mean that changes in one factor affect all other factors. The system is meant to make the state legitimate and militarily effective. The key variables are the political priorities of the civilian government, the mutual trust between soldiers and civilians, the external control mechanisms available to the government, and the actual skills of soldiers and civilians. One cannot say that one civilian control policy is superior *a priori.* Instead, the choice of policy depends on the circumstances under which the decision to pursue a policy is being made. The stability of the system depends on a host of different exogenous factors. Elite civil-military relations in the United States, for instance, are relatively stable. However, this situation may change. A change in the relations between the great powers may put American elite civil-military relations under pressure.

The chapter progresses in three steps. The first section presents the main causal links driving elite civil-military relations. This rather complex model allows me to analyze how various exogenous factors shape elite civil-military relations and how they affect the civilian control policies pursued by civilians, the degree of civilian control, and the system's ability to create legitimacy and military effectiveness. This is done in the second section. The final section illustrates how this framework works by giving an overview of American elite civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era.

Causality and elite civil-military relations

The first step in this analysis is to get an overview of the causality chains that drive elite civil-military relations. In this section, I will therefore present a rather complex causal model akin to the one developed in chapter 7. The model sketches the main processes that define elite civil-military relations, but it does not show which of these causal links is the most important one. Elite civil-military relations, I argue, function as a system, by which I mean that changes in one variable have rippling effects that influence all other elite civil-military variables.[573] Most of the system's processes have been described in previous chapters. This allows me to give a rather basic description of each variable and instead focus on the overall dynamics of the system. Five of the many components that make up the elite civil-military system are especially important for the way in which the system works: the civilian priorities, the civilian trust of the military, the military trust of the civilians, the strength of external institutions of surveillance and punishment, and the actual skills of soldiers and civilians. [574]

The relationship between civilian and military trust and the external institutions of the state is rather complex. The entire framework is presented in figure 9.1. below. It explains how the interaction between trust, priorities, and external institutions shape the government's civilian control policy and the degree of civilian control. It also shows that the outcome of the civilian control policy - legitimacy and military effectiveness – also depends on the actual skills of the civilian and military elites. Reading a piece of text dedicated only to causality is rather difficult. Each step in the causal chain is therefore assigned a letter in the text that corresponds to similar link in the model. I break the framework into three sub-sections for the sake of style. Firstly, I present the drivers of the government's choice of civilian control policy. I then present the factors that determine if the policy leads to civilian control in the second sub-section. In the final sub-section I present how these factors lead to legitimacy and military effectiveness.

Civilian control policy

As we saw in chapter 6, the civilian government has to determine how much it wants to meddle in the details of military policy. Bracketing the option of subjective control (which is very rare in advanced democracies), the government has to decide if it wants to determine tactical and

[573] This idea was first introduced by Samuel Huntington (Huntington (1957b), p. viii).

[574] This argument is implicitly present in much of the existing literature. Both Richard Kohn and Matthew Moten argue that trust is the centerpiece of elite civil-military relations (Moten, Matthew (2009): *A Broken Dialogue: Rumsfeld, Shinseki, and Civil-Military Tension,* in Nielsen, Suzanne C. & Don M. Snider (2009): *American Civil-Military Relations. The Soldier and the State in a New Era,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 70; Kohn (2009)). Similarly, Mackubin Owens uses the concept of "the civil-military bargain" to describe civil-military relations (Owens, Mackubin T. (2007): *U.S. Civil-Military Relations after 9/11. Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain,* New York: Continuum, p. 1). However, none of these authors have used trust to develop a theoretical framework of elite civil-military relations. I am – to my knowledge – the first to formulate this theoretical argument explicitly.

operational details (assertive control) or if it wants to leave those decisions to the discretion of the military (objective control). It also has to decide if it wants to focus primarily on affecting military policy directly or if it wants to create additional institutions to control the military. The government's choice of policy depends on its motivation and on the feasibility of each policy option.

Two variables determine if the government becomes motivated to pursue a certain civilian control policy: the government's overall priorities and its trust in the abilities of the military. Firstly, the government's motives also depend on its overall priorities (A). It has to choose if there are any exogenous political considerations that override its concern for elite civil-military relations and if it prioritizes military effectiveness or legitimacy. As chapter 5 showed, effectiveness and legitimacy, although mutually constitutive, constitute two separate outputs of the elite civil-military system. The civilian government's choice of policy is shaped by whether it wants to increase its legitimacy or its military effectiveness. To be sure, in most advanced democracies, effectiveness and legitimacy typically are so intertwined that it is well-nigh impossible to determine if the government's policies are meant to increase one or the other. However, occasions where such a choice must be made may occur even in stable and advanced democracies.

Secondly, the civilian choice of policy depends on whether or not the government trusts the military's judgments (B). As we saw in chapter 8, the civilian government needs to ensure that there is strategic coherence between its overall strategy and the operations and tactics employed on the ground. Civilians trust that the military is capable of giving sound advice and implementing policies effectively. They also trust that the military does not pursue their own narrow goals but rather have the national interest in mind. The civilian government becomes motivated to pursue an objective control policy and stay out of military affairs, if it can trust the judgment and loyalty of the officer corps. *Vice versa,* it interferes in tactical and operational details, when it does not believe that the military will implement its policies effectively. If the civilian leadership doubts that the military offers expedient advice, it may choose to trust its own judgment and meddle in operational and tactical details. This trust is concerned with both the skills and the motives of the officer corps. We have already seen that this was the pattern of Union elite civil-military relations during the Civil War. The same control policy was used during the early years of the Johnson administration. The Democrats who came into power in 1961 had only been in opposition for just eight years and had not yet lost the two decades of experience generated before Eisenhower's tenure. Seasoned administration members brought with them the confidence necessary to overrule the generals in crucial matters.[575] The Cuban Missile Crisis further exacerbated the administration's distrust of the military. The military pushed for a military strike on Cuba – a course of action which later evidence suggests

[575] Betts (1977), pp. 34-35.

would most likely have caused a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. After their diplomatic course of action prevailed and yielded a peaceful solution, the civilians had come to see the military caught in an archaic, military mindset. The crisis taught them not to trust the advice of the armed forces.[576] The Joint Chiefs, they believed, did not understand the logic of signaling that they believed defined the Cold War. This mistrust came to shape elite civil-military relations. The Joint Chiefs became isolated through the Johnson years. The administration took control over strategic and even operational and tactical dimensions of the war in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs were only included haphazardly to avoid military resistance to the government's decisions.[577]

The civilian choice of policy also depends on the feasibility of each option (C). Simply put, does the existing elite civil-military environment allow the government to pursue a policy, which may be met with resistance by the armed forces? Is the military sufficiently neutral to accept the civilian policy? If not, do the existing external institutions for surveillance and punishment allow it to push its policy through in spite of military resistance? The government will typically be able to pursue a more meddling civilian control policy, if it already controls the military. Conversely, if existing elite civil-military relations are characterized by discord, new meddlesome policies will typically increase military resistance.

Degree of civilian control

The next step is to see how the choice of policy affects the degree of civilian control. As we saw in chapter 6, civilian control is determined by the degree of political neutrality in military culture and the external institutions for surveillance and punishment. The government controls the military as long as it is politically neutral (D). I have already explained how military culture becomes politically neutral in chapter 7, where we saw that it depends on the officers' trust of the goal and effectiveness of the government and on the strength of the professional-bureaucratic nexus.

To reiterate a point that was already made in chapter 7, the political neutrality of the armed forces largely depends on military's trust in the goals and skills of the government, state, and constitutional system (E). The military officer is driven by a dual concern. Firstly, he wants to ensure that the civilians pursue goals that benefit the communities about which he cares. The state should secure his family, local community and nation. If avoidable, it should not put him and his military comrades in harm's way. To be sure, defining these communities is not always easy. As the example of the motives driving the French military during the Algerian War shows, it is not always entirely

[576] Lebow (1987), p. 79; Bacevich (2007), pp. 232-35.

[577] McMaster (1997), pp. 327-33; Bacevich (2007), pp. 231-37. To be sure, trust between civilian and military elites depends on the actors' *perception* of their own skills and those of their counterpart. It is not necessarily reflections of their actual skills. History is ripe with examples of civilian or military leaders who overestimated their own skills and increased their influence over military policy only to discover their mistake.

clear who constitutes the nation and who the state is meant to represent. Secondly, the state should pursue these policies effectively. The soldier becomes motivated to interfere in politics if he fears that the state is not pursuing policies that will maximize the security of the state. The fate of the Fourth Republic shows what may happen with inefficient governments. In chapter 7, we also saw that the strength of what I termed the professional-bureaucratic nexus also affect the degree of political neutrality within military culture (F). Soldiers become motivated to accept civilian supremacy, when their promotion structures are meritocratic and detached from politics. This is of course only possible when the military has become professionalized and organized along bureaucratic lines.

Civilian control not only depends on whether or not the military feels motivated to meddle in politics. It is also important to determine if military interference in politics is feasible.[578] As we saw in chapter 6, military shirking stops being a sensible political option, if it can be detected and punished by the civilians. It thus depends on whether or not the external institutions of the state allow the civilians to survey military behavior and punish shirking (G). Institutions enable civilians to control the armed forces, even when the military is motivated to shirk. Furthermore, as we also saw in chapter 6 and 7, these external institutions – especially the general outline of the constitution – also affect the professional-bureaucratic nexus and they therefore indirectly influence the degree of political neutrality within military culture (H). Simply put, the structure of military oversight affects the promotion structures, and thus the professional-bureaucratic nexus, of the armed forces. In states where oversight is split between the executive and the legislature (for instance the United States), the promotion structures will be less meritocratic compared to states where oversight is kept within the executive (for instance the United Kingdom).

The government's choice of civilian control policy affects the degree of civilian control through three channels. The first, and perhaps most obvious, causal channel is that the degree of meddling influences the civilian control of the military directly (I). Simply put, if the government determines tactics and operations, it naturally also controls these dimensions of overall policy. Assertive control thus increases the direct control of the military, while objective control of diminishes the direct control.

This effect is balanced by a second causal link that has the opposite effect on civilian control. As we saw in chapter 7, the civilian control policy also affects the professional-bureaucratic nexus (J). Civilian meddling in military policy make it more difficult to separate officer promotions from politics and it therefore makes officers more inclined to interfere in political life. Assertive control therefore

[578] Finer (1962), pp. 72-85.

diminishes the political neutrality of the military, while objective control enhances it. In that sense, these two policy options both have positive and negative effects on the degree of civilian control.

The final causal link is concerned with the institutional dimension of the civilian control policy. Instead of meddling directly in military policy, the government may choose to establish new external control institutions that allow it to detect and punish military shirking and thus increasing civilian control (K). These institutions, which include outside experts, oversight committees, and offices for civilian oversight, were presented in chapter 6. However, as we saw in chapter 6, establishing institutions typically decreases the military effectiveness of the state. Interservice rivalry, for instance, make it easier for the civilians to detect military shirking. Rival services with similar insights into the details of military policy will typically alert the civilian government of any wrongdoing that occurs within another service. However, interservice rivalry is also a waste of resources. It typically involves double or triple administration, because the services do not trust one another.

Outcome of elite civil-military relations

In chapter 5, we saw that the fundamental purpose of the elite civil-military system is to produce legitimacy and military effectiveness for the state. A healthy elite civil-military system ensures that the state continues to be militarily effective, while securing that its elite civil-military relations do not compromise the accountability ideal. Legitimacy and effectiveness are mutually constitutive. All other things being equal, increased legitimacy increases the military effectiveness and *vice versa* (L).

The choice of civilian policy may both enhance and diminish the military effectiveness of the state. These processes were described in more details in chapter 8. Civilian meddling may increase the effectiveness of the state, if the civilian have a better grasp of the war than the generals (M). Lincoln, for example, understood the true nature of the Civil War and his overall strategic vision, which he implemented through an assertive control policy, increased the Union's chance of success. However, this effect depends on the actual distribution of civilian and military skills (N). As we saw in chapter 8, the actual skills of soldiers and civilians influence the military effectiveness of the state. For instance, the state will most likely become less effective, if the government follows an assertive control policy, but its understanding of the situation is far inferior to that of the military.

Military effectiveness also depends on the degree of civilian control (O). In chapter 8, we saw that civilian control increases strategic coherence and minimizes bargaining costs, which in turn enhances the military effectiveness of the state. For instance, Lincoln faced a discrepancy between strategy, operations and tactics and had to increase the strategic coherence by meddling in the details of policy. Civilian control may not only increase effectiveness – it also increases the legitimacy

of the state (P). In chapter 4, we saw that the legitimacy of the modern state depends on a principle of accountability. In elite civil-military relations, this principle means that the civilian government should have unquestionable control over military policy, as we saw in chapter 6. This image is shattered by elite civil-military conflicts. Public struggles between officers and politicians diminish the legitimacy of the state by showing that the public administration is not necessarily accountable to the democratic procedures.

Patterns of elite civil-military relations

Elite civil-military relations depend on the complex interaction of several factors. The most important causal links are summarized in figure 9.1. below.[579] The purpose of this analysis of the elite civil-military system was to look specifically at the factors shaping the civilian control policy, the degree of civilian control, and the legitimacy and military effectiveness of the state. These four factors are highlighted by a thick box. The main component of the system is civilian trust of the military, military trust of the civilians, and the external institutions regulating their interaction. These factors are marked by a grey box.

This model allows us to arrive at a general idea of the factors that drive elite civil-military relations. There is no universally superior civilian control policy. Instead, the value of a control policy depends on the priorities of the government and the conditions that determine the success of the policy. The purpose of the policy is essentially to maximize the legitimacy and military effectiveness of the state.

This framework allows one to develop a theory of elite civil-military relations. Such a theory would involve showing how these factors shape the choice of policy exactly and which of them carries the most significant causal weight. To some extent, the description of variables presented above provides a rough guide to the shape of such a theory. However, it would also require a significant empirical analysis based on extensive data material. Developing such a theory is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Our current purpose is only to arrive at a coherent theoretical framework for elite civil-military relations - the conceptual language that allows one to ask the right questions.

[579] To be sure, one figure cannot contain all the causal relationships of elite civil-military relations. Figure 9.1. focuses on those links that are most likely to shape elite civil-military relations.

Figure 9.1. The main causal links of the elite civil-military system



Elite civil-military change

Having outlined the internal features of the elite civil-military system, the next step is to provide an overview of the factors that may alter the balance of the system. How may exogenous factors change elite civil-military relations? The previous chapters have highlighted eight variables that may affect the elite civil-military system. I analyze each of these individually in the following. Some of these factors are part of the elite civil-military system, but may still be altered because of changes that happen outside of the elite civil-military system. They can therefore be said to be exogenous of the system. In the following, I start by looking at domestic exogenous factors. I then explore how international factors may change the system.

Domestic factors

A host of exogenous, domestic factors may affect the elite civil-military system. *Societal legitimacy,* the general legitimacy of the state, constitution, and government, is – according to Samuel Finer – the most important variable determining patterns of elite civil-military relations.[580] As we have already seen, societal legitimacy is partly shaped by elite civil-military relations. However, it is also affected by exogenous trends that influence the degree to which the citizenry in general and the military in particular views the state, constitution, and government. For example, Richard Kohn argues that the legitimacy of democracy has been declining in the United States and laments that it decreases civilian control.[581]

Simply speaking, the higher the degree of legitimacy, the easier it becomes for the government to control the military. The legitimacy of the state and government essentially strengthens two of the causal links highlighted in figure 9.1. Firstly, it makes the government and state more trustworthy in the eyes of the military. When societal legitimacy increases, the military becomes less prone to disobedience, because it comes to see the state and government as working for the interests of its primary communities. Secondly, societal legitimacy increases the strength of the government's institutions for surveillance and punishment. Institutions rest on a bed of public support. An illegitimate government will find that very few citizens are willing to fight to preserve its institutions.[582] A legitimate government will be able to create strong external control institutions.

[580] Finer (1962), pp. 86-139. Finer uses the term "political culture" for what we call "legitimacy". Societal legitimacy is an umbrella term that encapsulates the general legitimacy of the constitution, state, and government within the armed forces. As we saw above, these types of legitimacy can be independent of one another. However, most commonly, they will reinforce one another. That is, if the democratic constitution is generally considered to be legitimate, a democratically elected government will typically also be seen as legitimate.
[581] Kohn (2002), pp. 23-24.
[582] Finer (1962), pp. 84-85.

Both of these effects increase civilian control. This in turn makes the state more militarily effective.[583]

The strategic culture of the civilian elite also influences the balance of the elite civil-military system. Strategic culture is not stable. Instead, it is changed by various exogenous reasons. For instance, Christopher Gelpi and Peter Feaver have shown that non-veteran members of Congress are more likely to support the use of force. Falling numbers of veterans in Congress, most likely a consequence of the introduction of the All-Volunteer Force, is thus affecting the strategic culture in Washington.[584] Such changes can have consequences for elite civil-military relations. The civilian strategic culture influences the priorities of the government. For instance, if the civilians view military security as less important, these priorities will affect their choice of civilian control policy. It may also shape the civilians' trust of the armed forces. This was a key part of Samuel Huntington's argument about Cold War elite civil-military relations: post-war civilian strategic culture did not prioritize military goals nor did it trust the armed forces.[585] Furthermore, a faulty civilian strategic culture may indirectly affect the military's trust of the civilians. Simply put, the elite civil-military relations come under pressure, if the civilian elite fails to comprehend the dangers facing the state. As we saw in chapter 4, civilian strategic culture can endanger the state if it becomes either too driven by moral concerns (excessive liberalism) or if it overestimates the importance of the armed forces for the continued survival of the state (militarism). The military loses its trust in the civilian elite, if the elite is incapable of grasping the threats facing the state. As figure 9.1. shows, falling military trust of the government makes it more likely to become entangled in politics. It thereby decreases civilian control of the military.

Value changes within military culture may also affect elite civil-military relations. Just like civilian strategic culture, military culture is affected by various exogenous factors. The military's values and motives are not constant. Intra-organizational changes may affect the composition of the military or the values that are being taught at military educational system. For instance, the composition of the American military has changed over the last decades. The percentage of self-identifying Republicans within the ranks has soared, mainly due to political changes in the regions from which the bulk of the officer corps is recruited. Simply put, as the South became increasingly

[583] To be sure, legitimacy is an analytically intangible variable. It is difficult to measure societal legitimacy. The metrics used to assess societal legitimacy typically involve some degree of tautological reasoning. For instance, a state is considered legitimate if there is no overt resistance against it. However, the degree of resistance is in turn explained by the legitimacy of the state.

[584] Gelpi, Christopher & Peter D. Feaver (2002): *Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force,* in *American Political Science Review,* vol. 96, no. 4, pp. 779-93.

[585] Huntington (1957b), pp. 148-57.

Republican, so did the officer corps.[586] These changes are not included in the model above or in the model of military culture that was presented in chapter 7. They can instead be considered to be exogenous. Such changes may affect the elite civil-military system by changing the degree of political neutrality within military culture. This will mainly have an effect on the degree of civilian control.

Administrative changes may also alter elite civil-military relations. External institutions for control and surveillance are not permanent. They change due to either deliberate change in their design or due to exogenous changes that occur for reasons that on the surface has little to do with elite civil-military relations. For instance, the media contribute to the continuous scrutiny of military policy. However, the media landscape is constantly changing, due to a plethora of exogenous factors - for instance the introduction of new information technology. Richard Kohn, for example, claims that the media have "become less substantial, more superficial, less knowledgeable, more focused on profit, less professional, and more trivial" and argues that these changes affect elite civil-military relations for the worse.[587] Most of these exogenously driven changes occur on the margin and do not significantly change the relationship between soldiers and civilians. However, they are important to keep in mind as a causal mechanism that may affect elite civil-military relations in the long run.

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act provides an example of a large, deliberately planned reform, which significantly changed elite civil-military relations. The reform touched several areas of military organization. In an elite civil-military relations perspective, the most important consequence of the reform was that it made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the hub of the military's planning and policy formulation. Previously, all the service chiefs had served as advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Now this function was united in the Chairman.[588] The purpose of this maneuver was to reduce interservice rivalry. As we saw in chapter 6, interservice rivalry serves both positive and negative purposes. On the one hand, it provides the civilians with a fire alarm that permits them to detect military shirking. On the other hand, it wastes military manpower and resources. This unification of authority made the Chairman

[586] Holsti, Ole R. (1998): *A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence 1976-96,* in *International Security,* vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 5-42; Holsti, Ole R. (2001): *Of Chasms and Convergences: Attitudes and Beliefs of Civilians and Military Elites at the Start of a New Millennium,* in Feaver, Peter D. & Richard H. Kohn (2001): *Soldiers and Civilians. The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security,* Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 15-99; Dempsey, Jason K. (2010): *Our Army. Soldiers, Politics, and American Civil-Military Relations,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 95-126; Desch, Michael C. (2001): *Explaining the Gap: Vietnam, the Republicanization of the South, and the End of the Mass Army,* in Feaver, Peter D. & Richard H. Kohn (2001): *Soldiers and Civilians. The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security,* Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 289-312. For an excellent overview of more recent trends and the general demographic composition of the American military, see Schaub, Gary, Jr. & Adam Lowther (2012): *Who Serves? The American All-Volunteer Force,* in Cimbala, Stephen J. (2012): *Civil-Military Relations in Perspective. Strategy, Structure and Policy,* Farnham: Ashgate, pp. 115-37.

[587] Kohn (2002), p. 24.

[588] Previdi (1988), pp. 15-34.

an agile political player, who could more easily maneuver vis-à-vis the civilian principals.[589] The civilian authority over the armed forces was still divided between Congress and the President. This gave the military some room to act politically without being called out.

In chapter 4, we saw that *popular militarism* may affect elite civil-military relations. Increased military popularity within civil society provides the armed forces with stronger tools for counter-punishment against the civilians. Consequently, the civilian government finds it more difficult to use external institutions to survey and punish the armed forces. For instance, as we saw in chapter 4, Hindenburg and Ludendorff used their popularity within the German population to diminish the government's control of the armed forces and, in the end, to establish the Silent Dictatorship. To be sure, popular militarism is often caused by other factors. Only when the government is considered illegitimate or at least less competent than the leadership of the armed forces, will popular militarism influence elite civil-military relations. Other factors, such as the general legitimacy of the state, the civilian strategic culture, and the skills of the individuals in charge influence the growth of popular militarism. Furthermore, the existence of an outside threat further creates a milieu in which popular militarism can grow.

Finally, elite civil-military relations are affected by *the skills and personalities of civilian and military leaders*. Democracies change both civilian and military leaders every few years, which means that this variable is in many ways truly contingent. The skills and personalities of these leaders of course influence the skill ratio between civilian and military leaders. They also affect how much the civilian government prioritizes elite civil-military relations and the degree of trust that they have in the military and that the military have in them. For instance, the inexperience of civilian officials largely shaped elite civil-military relations during the Eisenhower years. Leading civilian officials in defense and security matters – barring the President of course – felt they lacked military expertise. The GOP had been out of office for twenty years and lower officials did not feel they commanded the complex details of the subject matter. Consequently, the administration pursued a policy of objective control.[590]

International factors

Changes in the threats facing the state also affect the patterns of elite civil-military relations. *The severity of threats* is one of the primary causes of elite civil-military change. It is impossible to describe a simple causal law between level of threat and elite civil-military relations. Almost the entire elite civil-military system is affected, when the state faces an increased level of threat. Flaws

[589] Kohn, Richard H. (1994): *Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations*, in *National Interest,* no. 35, pp. 3-17; Kohn (2002), p. 16.
[590] Betts (1977), p. 34.

and problems that can be papered over in peacetime suddenly come under pressure. Stronger threats exacerbate the effect of the domestic factors described above. As Michael Desch has shown, a strong, legitimate and well-functioning elite civil-military system experiences fewer tensions when faced with an increased level of threat. Conversely, a flawed system will have to handle an increased level of tensions, if it suddenly faces an increased threat level.[591]

Of course, the government prioritizes military policy and elite civil-military relations more, when the state faces an existential threat. *Ceteris paribus,* the state and government typically become more legitimate when facing a threat. This increased legitimacy enhances the military's trust of the civilian government (as we saw in chapter 7) and strengthens the government's external institutions for control of the military. Taken together, these effects thus strengthen the government's control of the military.[592] However, they are balanced by an increased need for effectiveness that may decrease the government's legitimacy and its ability to control the military. The government loses legitimacy if it is unable to handle the threat in an effective manner. This in turn destabilizes its institutions for control and diminishes the military's trust of the civilians.

The *character of threats* also influences the elite civil-military system. In chapter 3 and 6, we saw that threats mainly require either political or military expertise. Changes in the character of threats therefore affect the skill ratio between soldiers and civilians. They also typically influence the mutual trust between soldiers and civilians. The civilian perception of the military's effectiveness of course depends on which type of threat is being encountered. Highly political threats - for instance threats that are best handled by politically vulnerable alliances - require a high degree of political finesse. The military expertise becomes less significant for military effectiveness and civilian trust of the military decreases. The civilian leadership will typically see strategic coherence as all-important and therefore pursue an assertive control policy. To use the example we used in chapter 8, the Cuban Missile Crisis was handled using a political logic of signaling that disregarded standard military practices to achieve a higher political goal. The administration used a policy of assertive control to make sure that military tactics did not inadvertently start a nuclear war. Conversely, of course, conflicts where military expertise is dominant will typically lead to a policy of objective control.

Exogenous factors and elite civil-military change

[591] Desch (1999), pp. 13-17 & 115-20. To be sure, Desch uses the term "internal threat" to describe societies with low levels of legitimacy.

[592] To be sure, this only describes the relationship between the civilian elite and the military. An increased level of threat will typically make it easier for the state to escape control by civil society. Democratically speaking, this effect may be more serious than the effect on the relationship between elites. In overall terms, threats may thus hurt democratic governance. However, this total view is beyond the scope of this dissertation that focuses mainly on elite relations.

We thus get a full picture of the several exogenous factors that may change elite civil-military relations. Each of these factors affects different parts of the system, as summarized in table 9.1. However, this effect is never isolated to this primary effect only. Instead, a change in one part has a rippling effect throughout the entire system. The factors typically interact with one another. For instance, the effect of a change in the international system typically depends on the constellation of domestic factors. Analyzing elite civil-military relations thus involves thinking about the complex interaction of several factors.

Table 9.1. The primary effect of exogenous variables on elite civil-military relations

Variable	**Primary effect**
Societal legitimacy	- Military trust of civilians - External institutions
Civilian strategic culture	- Military trust of civilians - Civilian trust of military - Civilian priorities
Military culture	- Military trust of civilians
Administrative reform	- External institutions
Popular militarism	- External institutions
Individual skills and personalities	- Military trust of civilians - Civilian trust of military - Civilian priorities - Actual civilian and military skills
Threat level	- Military trust of civilians - Civilian trust of military - Civilian priorities
Character of threat	- Military trust of civilians - Civilian trust of military - Actual civilian and military skills

American elite civil-military relations after the Cold War

The framework can be used to give an overview of American elite civil-military relations after the Cold War. This can only be a sketch of a wider and more extensive analysis and is mainly meant to illustrate how the framework presented above works in practice.

In overall terms, American elite civil-military relations are very stable. Societal legitimacy is of course very high. No-one, except the most extreme fringes of the political spectrum, would question the legitimacy of the state or the democratic principle underpinning it. Though both

Congress and administration have been criticized for being inefficient, their right to keep their offices has not been questioned. Almost no-one consider a military putsch a likely or preferable option.[593]

Culture is a relatively intangible variable, which is difficult to measure exactly. It is therefore difficult to arrive at any final conclusions about the health of American civilian strategic culture. As several scholars have shown, American strategic culture spreads wide and encompasses several contradictory strains of thought. It is not simply liberal or realist. Instead, both of these trains of thought are part of the wider tradition.[594] The last decade was defined by a willingness to use force to achieve normative goals. In Iraq, this willingness led to elite civil-military problems, when officers lost faith in a government that was not capable of bringing victory. Perhaps the biggest problem has been a failure to make the goals match the means available.

In overall terms, American military culture is characterized by a relatively high level of political neutrality in the period in question. The legitimacy of the state is high, bolstered by a strong national identity and a strong domestic economy. There have been some causes for concern though. As we saw above, demographic trends have made the American military more Republican. Some scholars have highlighted the existence of a certain disdain for civilian life within military culture.[595] Others have shown that some groups within the armed forces have an incorrect understanding of the relationship between top officers and their civilian masters that effectively questions the legitimacy of the principle of civilian control.[596] However, none of these studies show that the degree of political neutrality has changed within military culture.[597] Changing ideological patterns within the ranks are not necessarily evidence of less political neutrality. A Republican officer corps is not necessarily a politically meddlesome officer corps. The studies that look specifically at political neutrality do not make a longitudinal comparison. Simply put, they only show that the officer corps is not entirely politically neutral – they do not show that those tendencies were already present in earlier decades. Though many authors have claimed that political neutrality has been disappearing from military culture, no-one has presented any convincing evidence that this is the case.[598]

There have been no major administrative reforms of the channels between civilian and military elites since the end of the Cold War. Elite civil-military interaction is still governed by the

[593] The one remarkable exception is Dunlap (1992).
[594] See for instance, Mead, Walter R. (2002): *Special Providence. American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World,* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
[595] Ricks, Thomas E. (1997): *Making the Corps,* New York: Simon & Schuster.
[596] Gronke, Paul & Peter D. Feaver (2001): *Uncertain Confidence: Civilian and Military Attitudes about Civil-Military Relations,* in Feaver, Peter D. & Richard H. Kohn (2001): *Soldiers and Civilians. The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security,* Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 152-61.
[597] For an excellent overview of the literature on the civil-military gap, see Cohn, Lindsey (1999): *The Evolution of the Civil-Military 'Gap' Debate,* Durham: TISS working paper.
[598] Kohn (2002), pp. 26-36.

framework that was put in place with the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. In relative terms, the civilian principal is divided because of the separation of powers. Congress and the White House share oversight over the military. The military agent is united in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Some scholars have complained that this allows a politically adept chairman – the example used is typically Colin Powell – to outmaneuver his superiors and shape military policy beyond his administrative purview.[599] However, there are still several oversight mechanisms that ensure that the civilians are capable of detecting and punishing military shirking. Altering these institutions involves changes that may not be beneficial. Uniting civilian authority over military policy in the White House would improve the civilians' ability to control the military, but it would also diminish Congress' control with the executive. It would be a blow to the checks and balances that define the American constitutional tradition. Similarly, separating the military agent along the lines of the pre-1986 military would also make it easier to control the armed forces. However, it would decrease the effectiveness of the armed forces, as more resources would be wasted in interservice rivalry.

It is difficult to pinpoint the degree of popular militarism in contemporary American society. Gallup polls have consistently shown that more Americans have confidence in the military than in Congress and the Presidency – a trend that has become even more significant in recent years.[600] However, such evidence is not sufficient to determine if the population's trust in the military is strong enough to change the relationship between soldiers and civilians. Though we do have some indications that the military is somewhat popular, we do not have a clear picture of how deep this popularity runs amongst voters. Neither do we know if it gives the military any leeway vis-à-vis the government.

Individual leaders have had different backgrounds and expectations to elite civil-military relations. For example, the contrast between the two Bush administrations and the Clinton administration is stark. The first Bush White House contained several seasoned foreign policy veterans and prioritized military policy highly. The President had of course served as Director of Central Intelligence in the 1970s and Brent Scowcroft, his National Security Advisor, was a retired air force general.[601] The Clinton administration, on the other hand, did not seem to prioritize military policy and his administration was generally thought to be thin on military expertise.[602] The second Bush administration came into office feeling that the military had been left alone to languish and

[599] Kohn (2002), pp. 14-21.
[600] Gallup (2013): *Confidence in Institutions,* accessed August 14th 2013 on www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx.
[601] Herspring, Dale R. (2005): *The Pentagon and the President. Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush,* Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, pp. 297-330; Herspring (2013), pp. 49-50.
[602] Herspring (2005), pp. 331-76.

had become institutionally and culturally dormant. Defense reform became a high priority.[603] Several of its members – which included two former secretaries of defense - had extensive experience with defense policy. Changes in civilian leadership lead to different takes on military policy. This affected the elite civil-military system.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States no longer faced an immediate military threat. The Soviet Union had collapsed and left the United States alone as the world's sole superpower. Although the United States still faced some minor threats, its long-term survival is no longer in jeopardy. Though global terrorism should be taken seriously, it does not pose an existential threat against the United States. Consequently, American policymakers have been given a somewhat free hand to pursue the policy goals that they decided to prioritize. Without an international threat, the domestic flaws of the American system have never delegitimized the government, the constitution, or the state.

Post-Cold War conflicts have mainly been fought for political reasons. Their character has largely been dictated by political reasoning. For instance, political considerations – concern for public support, for support in the international community, and for the health of the Western alliance – meant that the wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were fought as air wars. Though the idea of a land invasion was considered, it was eventually discarded because of the heavy political costs it would entail.[604] The United States could afford to pursue this type of war because of the lack of a clear international threat. This led to some dissatisfaction and a minor loss of trust within the ranks.[605] The combination of a lack of overall threat and a lack of consensus over the way in which military power should be used, did lead to some elite civil-military tensions. [606] However, in spite of a few episodes, this dissatisfaction was never strong enough to fuel a large-scale military resistance against the government. [607]

All in all, the fundamentals of American elite civil-military relations are healthy. Tensions are largely caused by the unavoidable changing of civilian and military leaders and the changes in skill, outlook, personality and visions that this entails. There are some factors that could be changed to improve elite civil-military relations. The external control institutions split the civilian principal, while uniting the military agent in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, altering this

[603] Cohen (2003), p. 227; Stevenson, Charles A. (2006): *Warriors and Politicians. US Civil-Military Relations under Stress,* London: Routledge, pp. 177-82.
[604] Herspring (2005), pp. 355-60 & 363-73.
[605] Herspring (2005), pp. 331-76.
[606] Feaver(2003), pp. 225-26; Desch (1999), pp. 22-38; Weigley, Russell F. (2001): *The American Civil-Military Cultural Gap: a Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to the Present*, in Feaver, Peter D. & Richard H. Kohn (2001): *Soldiers and Civilians. The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security,* Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 217.
[607] Herspring (2005), pp. 331-76.

fundamental set-up has significant negative side-effects that would most likely make it a suboptimal choice of policy. The civilian strategic culture has lacked a consistent understanding of when and why force should be used. It seems obvious that a more prudent relationship to the use of force would not only improve elite civil-military relations – it would also be beneficial for the overall national security of the United States. However, our understanding of American strategic culture is not strong enough to predict if the mistakes of the past years can be avoided in the future. Finally, it is not entirely clear how deep the popularity of the armed forces runs or if this popular militarism allows the military an excessive sanction against the government.

Looking forward, the main question is if the elite civil-military system is capable of handling the challenges that lie ahead. The international balance of power is changing and the long-term security of the United States may soon be at risk. Will its elite civil-military system be up to speed with the trials that arise? Answering this question requires a more extensive study of the exact nature of the future problems of national security and the strength of the current American elite civil-military system. A crude estimate would be that the current system is relatively well-functioning. One should always hesitate to make ironclad predictions, but it seems likely that though elite civil-military tensions will certainly occur, they do not pose a mortal danger to the long-term survival of the United States.

Conclusion

Elite civil-military relations constitute a system of interrelated variables, the purpose of which is to maximize the legitimacy and military effectiveness of the state. Five key variables make up the center of the system: the priorities of the civilian government, civilian trust of the military, military trust of the civilians, the external control institutions available to the civilians, and the actual skills of the military and civilian elites. The stability of the system can be affected when one or more of eight exogenous factors are altered: the legitimacy of the state, constitution, and society; the strategic culture of the civilian elite; military culture; administrative reforms; popular militarism; skills and personality of individual leaders; level of threat facing the state; the character of conflicts in which the state is involved.

This model of the elite civil-military system illustrates the complexity of these relations. One cannot say that one civilian control policy is superior *a priori.* Instead, it depends on a host of different factors that determine if the government should pursue an assertive or an objective civilian control policy. Furthermore, harmony between civilian and military elites is not a goal in itself. Discord may be the correct policy if it creates more effectiveness in the long run.

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Conclusions

This dissertation is about civil-military relations theory. What do we know about how the interaction between soldiers and civilians affects the political governance of the state? What are the limits of our knowledge? What is holding us back from knowing even more? How do we develop better theories of civil-military relations? This concluding chapter answers these questions based on the findings of this dissertation. It begins by outlining why the lack of a theoretical framework is the primary stumbling block preventing the development of better theories of civil-military relations. It then presents the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation. Having done so, it then shows why this theoretical framework is superior to any alternative framework, most importantly the one presented by Samuel Huntington in *The Soldier and the State.* Finally, it ends by highlighting the blind spots within our understanding of civil-military relations, which have been exposed by the theoretical framework.

The problem of contemporary theory

The social scientific study of civil-military relations is hampered by the lack of a coherent theoretical framework. The concepts used within the field are simply not properly defined and scholars therefore often talk past one another. Many studies focus on highlighting the weaknesses in the classical works of the field – weaknesses that were often the result of an imprecise use of terms. The solution was to develop a more exact terminology. In other words, the field needs a better theoretical framework.

I sought out to remedy this problem in this dissertation. In the introduction, I compared this venture with the task facing Kenneth Waltz, when he wrote *Man, the State, and War*: to explore how scholars think about civil-military relations and make sure that the concepts used within the discipline make sense. Using political and military sociology, I analyzed the meaning of the different concepts used to explain the interaction between soldiers and civilians. Unpacking the scholarly literature, it became obvious that the dominant theoretical framework was developed by Samuel Huntington in *The Soldier and the State*. Later scholars have attacked Huntington, pointing to the empirical faults of his theory, or the theoretical imprecision of one or more of his concepts. However, none of them have provided an overarching theory; nor have they tried to significantly challenge his theoretical framework.

This dissertation might be read as a denigration of Huntington's work, but is meant to be anything but that. Huntington brought much needed consistency to the civil-military relations field, but was preoccupied by a need to solve several puzzles within one work. He simply tried to address too many things at the same time. *The Soldier and the State* contained a theoretical framework of civil-military relations, a discourse on Western military history, a theory of civil-military relations, a theory of civilian control of the military, an overview of the fundamental policy problems facing civilian leaders, and a set of policy recommendations for American Cold War policymakers. The scope of his project forced him to multitask. While many of his findings were sound, and still stand the test of time, his theory of civil-military relations, his policy recommendations for American Cold War policymakers, and his theoretical framework were all somewhat off the mark.

The goal of developing a theoretical framework for civil-military relations – which he explicitly identified as his core task - disappeared in the jostling of his purposes. Huntington's nascent theoretical framework was developed by marrying different types of scholarly literature. He combined political sociology with military sociology, military history, and military science. I decided to replicate this route, but to take more time to explain the nature of each concept. Many advances have been made in political and military sociology since Huntington wrote his book in 1957. Using these advances helped me to paint a more thorough and coherent picture of the interaction between soldiers and civilians.

The theoretical framework of civil-military relations

Here is the end product of that endeavor. Civil-military relations consist of two subtypes: elite civil-military relations (the interaction between military and civilian elites within the state) and societal civil-military relations (how and why the armed forces contribute to the survival of modern society in general). Political science approaches to civil-military relations typically focus on elite civil-military relations, but bring in societal civil-military relations to explain the general requirements that are asked of civilian and military elites.

Policymakers in modern democracies have to choose between a palette of different civilian control policies. They have the option of controlling the military directly or establishing external control institutions. There are basically three types of direct control: objective control entails allowing the military to handle policy details autonomously, assertive control involves some meddling in the operational and tactical details of military policy, while subjective control involves meddling in policy details and replacing the military elite with officers who share the values of the civilian government. Subjective control is rarely pursued in advanced democracies and scholars typically focus on the choice between assertive and objective control. Furthermore, policymakers

may also choose to establish external control institutions. These help them detect and punish military shirking. However, they typically entail a loss of military effectiveness. There is no easy solution to this aim. Instead, all policy options have advantages and disadvantages. The choice of policy depends on the circumstances under which the choice is made.

The policy options facing political leaders reflect the complex nature of civil-military relations. Civil-military relations consist – as mentioned above – of elite civil-military relations and societal civil-military relations. Elite civil-military relations constitute a system, based on five core variables: the policy priorities of the civilian government, the civilians' trust of the military, the military's trust of the civilians, the balance between civilian and military skills, and the external institutional set-up that define the interaction between soldiers and civilians. The purpose of elite civil-military relations is to maximize the legitimacy and military effectiveness of the state. The strength and health of the system is determined by eight exogenous factors: the general legitimacy of the government, state, and constitution; the civilian strategic culture; the values defining military culture; administrative reforms; popular militarism; the skills and personalities of individual leaders; the general level of threat; and the character of the conflicts in which the state engages. Together, these factors make up the fundamentals of the elite civil-military system.

Essentially, the relationship between soldiers and civilians is essentially a classic information asymmetry problem: because they do not know the details of the use of force as well as members of the armed forces, civilian leaders have a hard time ensuring that the military is implementing their policies completely. This problem is exacerbated by the secrecy required in military affairs. Furthermore, the military also has significant and subtle informal power, which it can use to destabilize the government. For example, military officers, whether retired or serving, have several venues they can use to speak out against the government. Many of these conduits are impossible to remove, as they are also used for legitimate purposes. Though clearly illegitimate if used to pursue narrow, bureaucratic interests, such practices are hard to distinguish from legitimate usage motivated by a genuine concern for the constitution. The military does not necessarily have to use these options for them to be politically important because the very possibility of their usage may influence the government's course of action vis-à-vis the armed forces.

Students of elite civil-military relations focus on one of two analytical perspectives. Civilian control refers to the civilian leadership's ability to control the armed forces. It focuses on how the military becomes motivated to accept civilian supremacy. Military effectiveness is the capacity to generate military force from a state's basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital. It focuses on the effect of elite civil-military interaction.

Civilian control is established through a combination of external and internal mechanisms. External mechanisms refer to the use of institutions to monitor and punish military actors. This approach assumes that actors pursue their own narrow interests. Institutions essentially influence the payoffs of behaving in one or another manner. Institutions can delimit the incentive to act against the will of the government by making it easier for the government to detect and punish such behavior. Internal mechanisms are defined as the creation of a military culture of loyalty. The soldier is more easily controlled if he feels loyal to the democratic institutions of the state. But neither external nor internal mechanisms are a panacea that solves the problem of civilian control. Instead, these mechanisms are typically combined to ensure that the military implements the will of the government.

Military effectiveness depends on the balance between need for a division of labor between soldiers and civilians and the need for strategic coherence. The division of labor between soldiers and civilians originate in the specific expertise that each group possesses. Soldiers are professional experts in the art and science of warfare, while civilian politicians are experts in the art and science of politics. None of these spheres of expertise are purely scientific, though the element of science is more pronounced for the soldier than it is for the politician. This division of expertise informs the division of labor between soldiers and civilians. Ideally, decisions should be made by the latter in after an open and frank discussion, where both groups contribute. These deliberations are based on information gathered by the military bureaucracy, which also has the task of implementing decisions once they have been made.

This division of labor principle is balanced by a need for strategic coherence. The civilian leadership has to ensure that the military bureaucracy gathers information and implements decision in a way that reflects the overall strategy. This can only be done by interfering in tactics and operations. Civilian control ensures strategic coherence. In other words, strategic coherence is ensured by meddling in decisions within the armed forces' purview. It necessitates compromising the division of labor.

The two imperatives that define elite civil-military relations can only be understood by taking a broader perspective and looking at how they originate in the processes that define society. In other words, elite civil-military relations are shaped by societal civil-military relations. These relations are characterized by a tension between a societal and a functional imperative. The societal imperative is the degree to which domestic features of society obstruct the state from pursuing an optimal political course. The functional imperative is the material requirements that a society has to fulfill in order to survive: the state needs to accumulate power to ensure that enemy states do not cut off its access to material resources.

The need for military effectiveness grows out of the functional imperative. All states require power to fend off enemies, and to keep order within their borders. Military force is one of the tools through which the state generates power. Compared to earlier state forms, the modern state has access to a wider range of power generation tools. Whereas earlier states depended largely on continuous military campaigns, the modern state has the option of generating power through its domestic economy. Thus, whereas pre-modern states relied on constant warfare, the modern state can generate power through peace.

The need for civilian control originates in the legitimacy structures of the modern state. Modern society is defined by a need for accountability. Members of civil society offer taxes, manpower, and loyalty in exchange for protection and services. This need for accountability was less pronounced in previous societies. In modern society, it is absolutely central. Since the military revolution during the early modern era, the military competition between states has forced the state to include a steadily wider group in the social contract. Consequently, the government needs to control the armed forces, because it is part of the larger idea of accountability to which it owes its legitimacy.

The societal imperative depends on whether or not the ideas and cultural categories that determine the state's course of action are compatible with the threats it faces. In other words, the state's ability to respond to foreign threats is influenced by the ideas within the government and civil society and the degree to which the political system allows ideas to transfer from civil society to the state. Because of the accountability principle that defines modern society, ideas fermented in civil society may influence the state's ability to respond to foreign threats. The societal imperative may become problematic due to either excessive individualism or excessive elite militarism. In other words, the elite may either under- or overestimate the importance of military force. Furthermore, the armed forces may gather additional clandestine power if it becomes too popular in the population at large (popular militarism). This can skew the relationship between civilian and military elites.

Moving beyond 'The Soldier and the State'

This dissertation is the first comprehensive meta-theoretical study of civil-military relations and the first complete description of the theoretical framework of civil-military relations. Contemporary theorists have been pre-occupied with exploring sub-dimensions of civil-military relations. The present study collects all these insights into a coherent theoretical framework. The theoretical framework that Samuel Huntington developed in *The Soldier and the State* did not fully define the concepts, or describe the causal logic within the field. These limitations influenced his theory of civil-

military relations. The result was a set of empirical predictions that did not pan out. I have highlighted the most important conceptual inconsistencies throughout this dissertation.

Huntington did not explore the policy-dilemma facing policy-makers. When mapping out the policy options facing civilian leaders, he only explored subjective and objective control, the two extreme positions. He did not investigate the consequences of an assertive control policy, the middle position between these extremes. Modern, advanced democracies rarely, if ever, pursue a policy of subjective control. Instead, most policy-makers choose between assertive or objective control. This study added this option to the framework of civil-military relations. Furthermore, Huntington did not explore how civilian policymakers could control the military by establishing external control institutions.

Huntington regarded professionalism as the pivotal factor in his theoretical framework. In his view, the choice between different civilian control policies should be evaluated based on whether or not they enhanced professionalism. Professionalism ensured both civilian control and military effectiveness. But he did not distinguish between civilian control and the creation of military effectiveness.

By contrast, the theoretical framework presented in this dissertation draws an important analytical distinction between civilian control and military effectiveness. It is difficult, if not impossible, to explore how the military comes to accept civilian supremacy and the consequences of interaction between civilian and military elites concurrently. Studies typically look at just one of these dimensions. Huntington did not explicitly distinguish between civilian control and military effectiveness, and his description of each of these categories was incomplete. His implicit conception of military effectiveness focused on the division of labor between civilian and military experts. He did not emphasize the need for strategic coherence; nor did he describe how this entailed compromising the aforementioned division of labor by allowing civilians to meddle in operational and tactical details.

Similarly, his conception of civilian control focused excessively on internal mechanisms of control, while largely ignoring the equally important external mechanisms. He did not see civilian control as a combination of external and internal mechanisms. Instead, he offered a purely internalist position. This argument was based on an imperfect conception of military professionalism. Huntington believed that professional soldiers will automatically be loyal to a democratically elected government. However, this is not necessarily the case. Even professional soldiers are loyal to many different groups and communities and one cannot argue *a priori* that they will remain loyal to the government in a time of crisis. Furthermore, many of the mechanisms that

create modern military culture also lead to parochialism. Officers may just as well pursue the narrow interests of the military bureaucracy as they may pursue the interests of the government.

Huntington did not provide a comprehensive definition of professionalism – the most important variable in his scheme. He offered three empirical characteristics of the professional soldier, yet he did not pinpoint the essential nature of professionalism. The framework presented in this dissertation offers such a definition. Military professionalism is the spread of officers, who have become experts in military science through specialized training in military academies, throughout the armed forces. When looking at the development of the modern military, one finds that it is only one of several factors that facilitate political neutrality within military culture. Other factors, such as the development of bureaucratic modes of organization characterized by meritocratic promotion structures and a strong and legitimate state, play an equally important role.

This limitation within Huntington's framework was, to some extent, caused by an incomplete conception of military expertise. He implicitly understood it as a scientific and universal knowledge type, which can be taught at the military academy and which will not differ from officer to officer. The framework presented in this dissertation offers a more nuanced portrayal of military expertise. Clausewitz understood military expertise as both an art and a science. While it certainly contains scientific elements, such as the calculation of troop movements and the performance of weaponry, it cannot be reduced to a purely scientific type of knowledge. It also contains some elements of intuitive and artistic thinking, which cannot be taught at the academy. Thus, different officers come to different recommendations about the same issue. For that reason, military expertise is not of a universal standard, and the military officer, though an expert in the eyes of the public, cannot claim the authority of infallible skill. Instead, his judgments may be questioned by other experts, and become the subject of debate.

Huntington's framework also failed to paint an accurate portrait of societal civil-military relations. The twin imperatives shaping these relations were not defined adequately. When analyzing the societal imperative, he grasped how the state could be endangered if dominated by anti-military ideology. However, he did not describe how militarism – the flip-side of the ideological coin – could also cause significant problems. His analysis of the functional imperative overestimated the importance of military force and failed to grasp how many states have other tools for power generation at their disposal. Analyzing the American Cold War societal civil-military relations, he did not understand that the United States occupied a privileged position in the international system, which - combined with its strong domestic economy - allowed it to dominate even though it did not direct all its available resources to the military. This latter mistake was transposed into his theory of

civil-military relations and caused him to make inaccurate predictions of American Cold War civil-military relations.

Based on the many problems with his theory and theoretical framework, the status of Samuel Huntington's work within the field should be reconsidered. Huntington's writings – especially *The Soldier and the State* –have hitherto been the starting point for exploring civil-military relations. Huntington is certainly one of the field's great masters. However, he can no longer be the starting point for all scholarship. He should instead become a figure of primarily historical importance, whom it is crucial to study to understand the historical background of the field, but who does not define the field in the 21st century. His role should be akin to that which figures like August Comte or Ferdinand Tönnies have within sociology. Comte was the father of modern social science and introduced several of the categories that eventually turned into our modern social science vocabulary. Tönnies introduced the distinction between traditional communal life and the rationalized existence of modernity – *Gemeinshaft* and *Gesellschaft* – which has become central to most sociological theory from Weber to Foucault. Reading Comte and Tönnies is crucial if one wants to understand the intellectual history of the social sciences. It gives us a chance to understand from where our frames of mind come. Anyone who would want to scrutinize our present concepts might go back to Comte and Tönnies to understand their historical origins. However, no one would argue that one could analyze today's society in any satisfactory way using their categories alone. Instead, contemporary sociologists have taken their notions and refined them through a long process of theoretical discussion. In the same way, the civil-military relations field has to move beyond Huntington. Challenging Huntington has been an important task – this dissertation has been doing just that – but the field simply has to move on. This dissertation has shown that Huntington's theory and theoretical framework were both flawed. It has provided the field with a new and coherent theoretical framework. The study of civil-military relations is moving into a post-Huntingtonian era.

The future of civil-military relations research

Theoretical frameworks help us to ask better questions about a field of study. For instance, Kenneth Waltz' theoretical framework of international relations - presented in *Man, the State and War* - allowed scholars to pinpoint the gaps in their existing knowledge of international politics. Thus, the theoretical framework of civil-military relations permits us to understand what we do not know about how soldiers and civilians interact. I would therefore like to conclude this dissertation by listing what I consider to be the five most promising avenues for future research. Firstly, and perhaps foremost, the literature still lacks a comprehensive theory of elite civil-military relations. The framework presented in this dissertation highlights the crucial factors that determine patterns of

elite civil-military relations. However, it has not explored the relative importance of these factors. Which of them determine how soldiers and civilians interact? Had it done so, it would have presented a theory of elite civil-military relations. Such a theory, however, requires careful empirical analysis, which was well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Analyzing empirical cases to develop a theory of elite civil-military relations is perhaps the most important task facing students of civil-military relations.

Secondly, we still need a greater understanding how civilian control is the result of internal and external mechanisms for control. Civilian control is – as mentioned - one of the two major subtopics within civil-military relations. By distinguishing between these two types of control mechanisms, this dissertation showed that neither of these mechanisms can explain civilian control of the military. Instead, civilian control is always instituted through a combination of external and internal mechanisms for control. The literature has hitherto focused on either internal or external mechanisms. Future research should explore how these mechanisms are combined.

Thirdly, we need a much better conception of how internal control mechanisms work. The civil-military relations literature cannot explain why members of the military become politically neutral. Political neutrality, the dominant literature argues, follows from the fact that modern officers are professionals. This dissertation explored this idea and found it wanting. Professionalism most often means a politically neutrality military. It covers a variety of different causal mechanisms, which are rarely mentioned. The relationship between these causal factors – which constitutes the underlying cause of political neutrality – is generally not explored. Understanding how and why militaries become politically neutral should be a goal for future civil-military relations research. The model presented in chapter 7 could be a starting point for that endeavor.

Fourth, we must gain get a better understanding of how military effectiveness – the second area of study within elite civil-military relations - is generated. The literature on elite civil-military relations and military effectiveness has focused on the empirical study of historical examples. It yields several important insights about which patterns of civil-military relations are optimal for military effectiveness. It generally argues that civilian meddling generates military effectiveness. However, to be useful for the civil-military relations field, these historical insights need to be captured in more general terms. The existing literature focuses on a few successful cases. Very little research looks at cases where the civil-military interaction results in defeat. One could hypothesize that there would be cases where civilian meddling had a detrimental effect.

Finally, this dissertation kept two variables – the character of war and the polity of the state – more or less constant. It was shown that the relative importance of political and military expertise is crucial for elite civil-military relations. However, I did not explore how different types of war entail

more or less political and military expertise. Future research can broaden the conclusions of this dissertation by looking at that question. Furthermore, I only looked at elite civil-military relations in advanced, Western democracies. In principle, one would expect that the processes uncovered in this dissertation can be found in other types of societies as well. Merging this research with the vast coup studies field that looks primarily on developing states is another avenue for future research.

With that outline of the future avenues for civil-military relations research, this dissertation has gone full circle. We set out to understand how better theories of civil-military relations could be developed, and if there were any stumbling blocks preventing this from happening. It was shown that the lack of a coherent theoretical framework was the main problem. Such a framework was then developed and the avenues for future research were highlighted. This framework will hopefully serve as the foundation for more accurate analyses of civil-military relations.

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