

The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Biopolitical Condition: Re-thinking the Ethics of Political
Violence in Life-Politics

Elke Schwarz

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School
of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London,
November 2013

DECLARATION

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 95,355 words.

ABSTRACT

This project interrogates how the biopolitical rationale conditions our contemporary subjectivities, politics and ethics, in order to critique the ethical justifications of technology driven practices of political violence put forth in present counter-terrorism struggles. Employing the work of Hannah Arendt, and her insights into life-politics and technology to construct a biopolitical lens that adds to traditional Foucaultian analyses of biopolitics, my original contribution to knowledge is thus twofold in a) elaborating core aspects of an Arendtian theory of biopolitics, with which then to b) identify the theoretical underpinnings of biopolitically informed forms of ethics in emerging practices of technology-driven political violence. While a number of scholars have drawn on Arendt for the analysis of the biopolitical dimensions of contemporary violence, a systematic independent account of her work on biopolitical trajectories and technologies remains under-developed in current scholarship.

In this work, I suggest that the Arendtian life-politics account allows us to recognise a duality at work in the biopolitical shaping of subjectivities: the politicisation and technologisation of *zoe*, on one hand, and the ‘*zoeficiation*’ of politics on the other. It is this duality that conditions the human, politics, and the role and justifications of violence in modernity. Within these two umbrella categories, the project addresses the equally under-examined but pressing question of the ethics of technology-driven modalities of political violence in a contemporary context and argues that a biopolitically informed rationale of ethics occludes the possibility to engage with ethics as a perpetual and ever-anew arising and political demand that must be taken responsibility for. The analysis in this work unfolds in two parts to draw out and critically address the biopolitically informed ethical rationales of political violence. The first part engages closely with Arendt’s work to establish the theoretical framework of biopolitics for the project’s central analysis. The second part then departs from an exposition of Arendt’s work and draws on this framework to highlight and critique the implications of biopolitically infused subjectivities, politics, violence and ethics.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Completing this project has been a magnificent journey, satiated with the fervors of any spirited adventure. A journey that will remain with me as an incredibly rewarding experience. And it would not be such if it weren't for the extraordinary people along the way to whom I owe a great debt for their invaluable support, motivation and love. I lack the words to adequately express the depth of my gratitude for those who have made this journey such a gift. Nor am I able to acknowledge everyone who deserves acknowledgment. Suffice it to say I have, for once, reached the limits of language.

First and foremost, however, I must thank Kimberly Hutchings. I couldn't have wished for a better supervisor and intellectual guide. I am in awe of her sublime ability to subtly point me in just the right direction when I couldn't see the forest for the trees. And there were many such moments. Kim's sharp intellect, consistent support and lovely poise have been and continue to be a source of immense inspiration.

I am also deeply grateful to have such a wonderful group of friends who are as intellectually gifted, as they are amazing humans. Thank you to Myriam Fotou, and Diego de Merich, who have been, and are, a source of love and laughter always, as is Joe Hoover, whose unswerving support, advice and intellectual stimulation I am additionally indebted to. Paul Kirby, Nick Srnicek, Mark Kersten, Meera Sabaratnam and Mikey Bloomfield are deeply cherished for their friendship and sharp minds, and I will, no doubt, continue to be inspired by each. I also owe thanks to Sebastian Lexer, who has been an invaluable friend and interlocutor over so many years.

Furthermore, I owe a great intellectual debt to everyone involved in the IR502 seminars. Having had the privilege to be exposed to such brilliant minds as gathered on those Monday nights has allowed me to become a better scholar. I would also like to thank the International Relations Department at the LSE for the financial support that made this project and many a trip to distant shores possible.

My deepest gratitude, however, is owed to my family. To you I owe all the courage, strength, curiosity, optimism and love that made this journey happen. Ich danke Euch aus tiefstem Herzen.



TABLE OF CONTENTS I

Introduction: The Conditioned Human	7
I. A Matter of Thought	7
II. Biopolitical Conditioning	15
III. Technological Conditioning	19
IV. Ethical Conditioning	23
V. Structure and Chapters	28
Chapter 1: Shifting Life Into Politics	33
I. Politicisation of <i>Zoe</i> / <i>Zoefication</i> of Politics	33
II. Prioritising Life Processes in Modernity	39
III. Technologising Life: The Birth of Scientific Man	48
IV. The Elephant in the Room: Is an Arendtian Biopolitics Possible?	56
Chapter 2: Convergences and Contrasts: Biopolitical Trajectories and Technologies in Foucault and Arendt	62
I. Disciplinary Tactics, Biopolitical Strategies: Technologies and <i>Dispositifs</i>	62
II. Arendtian and Foucaultian Life-Politics: Core Symmetries	70
III. Essence, Telos, Power: Convergences and Contrasts in Arendt and Foucault	75
IV. What Can Arendt Tell Us That We Don't Yet Know with Foucault?.....	79
Chapter 3: Biopolitical Politics – The Anti-Political Condition of Modern Life	87
I. Politics and Anti-politics: The (Im)possibility of Political Biopolitics	87
II. Social Difference and Political Equality	91
III. Collective Philopsychia: Survival of Humanity	96
IV. Collapsing Categories: Means/Ends or the End of Meaning	104
Chapter 4: Biopolitical Violence – Mute Means for Certain Ends	110
I. From Life-politics to Necro-politics	110
II. Instrumental, Mute, Anti-political: Arendt's Account of Violence	113
III. Violence-as-Politics: Justification and Legitimation of Violent Politics ...	115
IV. Means – Ends – Outcomes: The Certainty Chimera	121
Chapter 5: Biopolitical Ethics – The Modern Practical Enterprise	132
I. Ethics and/for/in Politics	132
II. <i>Deus Ex Homini</i> : Man as Maker of Ethics	136
III. Applying Ethics: The Quest for Certainty	139
IV. Taming of the Infinite: Applying Ethics in Politics	144
V. 'Cure the Disease and Kill the Patient': Violence as Medicine	151

TABLE OF CONTENTS II

Chapter 6: The Biopolitical Human at War – Human Far Too Human	161
I. Radical Bio-rationality: The Techno-subjective Human	161
II. A Post-Humanistic Dream: The Tale of Man and Machine	165
III. My Sweet Analysable You: Coding Life	168
IV. Techno-Paternalism: Of Hybridity and Humility	171
V. Abstracting War	176
Chapter 7: Sanitised, Sanctified, Super-Human – Biopolitical <i>Todestechnik</i>	185
I. How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Drone	185
II. Push-Button Warfare	186
III. 3Ds: Distance, Dissociation, De-politicisation	191
IV. Prescription Drones: Preventive Modalities of Violence to Save Life	197
V. Drones: The Better Humans	201
VI. Violence by Numbers	206
Chapter 8: Despite The Biopolitical Subject – Rethinking the Ethics of Political Violence	209
I. Embracing Contingency: The Political Substance of Ethics	209
II. Biopolitically Anti-political: The (Post)Modern Human Subject	213
III. Neutralised and Coded: A Critique of Biopolitical Ethics	221
IV. Despite the Biopolitical Subject	228
Bibliography	234

Introduction: THE CONDITIONED HUMAN

Neither violence nor power is a natural phenomenon, that is, a manifestation of the life process; they belong to the political realm of human affairs whose essentially human quality is guaranteed by man's faculty of action, the ability to begin something new. And I think it can be shown that no other human ability has suffered to such an extent from the progress of the modern age.

Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*

I. A Matter of Thought

“What are we doing?” Hannah Arendt posed this question as a guiding theme for her explorations in *The Human Condition*. It's a simple, yet far-reaching question that carries both an ethical and a political demand. The question necessitates a pause for thought, a moment for reflection. It requests an assessment and evaluation of actions and the contexts within which they take place. It reflects an approach that is concerned as much with *what* is happening in the present, as it is concerned with *why* this present is as it is. In an Arendtian vein, this project is motivated by such concerns, as we observe practices of violence, which had hitherto been firmly situated in the realm of morally prohibited acts, re-emerge in a liberal context. The use of torture, indefinite detention and target killings have been sought to be justified and legitimised since 2001, in the name of the safety and security of (western) humanity at large. This raises questions: what is this present, and how can we recognise, decipher and understand more clearly what we are doing in this present? When acts of immoral political violence become introduced as justified practices, the need to interrogate the foundations of the politics and ethics of such violence arises anew. In 1962, Sheldon Wolin posed the question thus: “Do the social and political forms of any given age constitute a particular method for adjusting to violence?” (Wolin 2009 p.39)

This project examines how the biopolitical rationale conditions our contemporary subjectivities, in order to raise the important question of ethics more meaningfully in light of contemporary practices of political violence and their justifications. While it is typically Michel Foucault's work that serves as a medium for investigations into theories of biopolitics, his engagement with life-politics is not without limitations. The project draws thus on the work of Hannah Arendt, who not only lucidly

understood the significance of the shift of life into the centre of politics (see for example Esposito 2008; Braun 2007; Hayden 2009; Duarte 2006; Swift 2013), but whose work also provides an opening into understanding the biopolitics-technology nexus with which contemporary perspectives of warfare and counter-terrorism are infused. Against this background, the project analyses how the biopolitical rationale, set forth through an Arendtian account, informs politics, violence as politics, ethics and human subjectivity. While a number of scholars have drawn on Arendt for the analysis of the biopolitical dimensions of contemporary violence, a systematic account of her work on biopolitical trajectories and technologies remains under-developed in current scholarship. In this work, I argue that the Arendtian account draws out a duality at work in the biopolitical shaping of subjectivities – the politicisation and technologisation of life itself on one hand, and the emergence of biological imagery that informs metaphors and processes of politics on the other. It is this duality that gives rise to an altered perception of the human and the political, which in turn shapes ethical frames of political violence. Within these two umbrella categories, this project thus addresses the equally under-examined but pressing question of the ethics of technology driven practices of military engagement and counter-terrorism operations – specifically the lethal use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - and argues that a biopolitically informed rationale of ethics obscures and impedes the possibility to rethink ethics as a perpetual and ever-anew arising demand that must be solved and taken responsibility for, in politics and as politics proper. The project hopes to open a space to re-think ethics to challenge and overcome the biopolitical logic of how technologies of war and violence are framed in a political context. The project thus makes an original contribution to existing scholarship in several ways: it adds to the existing body of Arendtian scholarship by creating a specific account of life-politics in her work, provides a supplemental perspective to discourses on biopolitics and, furthermore, contributes to current debates on the ethics of technology-driven political practices of violence, such as the lethal use of UAVs.

Confronted with and motivated by the perplexities of a modern life that presents itself as preoccupied with concerns of life processes in a political realm that stands under the sway of technological and scientific authority and harbours the mindboggling capacity to destroy all life on earth (Arendt 1998 p.150), Arendt's chief aim was to

understand the modern human condition: the human in a specific political context and her potential for political action therein. (Arendt 1998 p.3) This ambitious objective lead her to a prescient analysis of a shift that made life processes the focus of politics in modernity – a shift to biopolitics¹ – and she understood clearly the implications and consequences this carried for the body politic at large in a technologized modernity. Her concern with understanding what it is we are doing in the modern world comprises a wide range of perspectives and anxieties unique to her time and environment, and has lead her into perceptive explorations and investigations of the human-politics-technology nexus. This included matters of scientific and technological advancements, some of which are perhaps more hotly debated topics today than they were in Arendt’s time, the future significance of which she was nonetheless sharply aware of. This included, for example, the issue of an emerging cyber sphere, and she took part in a symposium, held in New York in 1964, with a broad range of participants, from computer scientists to civil rights activists and, allegedly “at least one spy” (Robberts 2013), to debate the “cybercultural revolution” and its potential socio-political implications. Also, rather presciently, in her text *On Violence*, published in 1970, Arendt commented on the possible political implications of robot soldiers making “human soldiers completely obsolete” in the not-too-distant future. (Arendt 1970 p.10) Both, the cyber sphere and military robotics are issues at the forefront in contemporary military as well as socio-political affairs. With increasingly automated weapons system and a rapid foray into human augmentations through technology, new political and ethical challenges emerge continually in the contemporary context.

The investigations in my project are motivated by the perplexities of our present times, in which practices and technologies of political violence have (re-)emerged in the past decade under the umbrella of an interminable war on terrorism. Specifically the surfacing of hitherto morally prohibited acts of violence, couched in narratives of legitimacy, justification and necessity for international security and politics in the war on terror, paired with the rapid development of new military technologies, open new dimensions and demands for an investigation of the ethics of political violence. Such

¹ Arendt has not used a specific term to denote life-politics or biopolitics in modernity. Biopolitics has come to be framed in a range of terms, including the politics of life itself. (Rose 2006) In considering the broader analysis of what this politics of life comprises in the Arendtian account, the term life-politics is as suitable as biopolitics. Throughout this project I will thus use the terms ‘biopolitics’ and ‘life-politics’ interchangeably.

practices include torture, extraordinary renditions and the targeted killing, or assassination, of individuals as a measure of prevention. The appearance of these practices and the technologies that enable them presents a challenge to mainstream accounts and conceptions of ethics in international relations and international political theory. Existing discourses comprised in the just war tradition and the ethics of armed conflict, international laws, conventions and treaties all struggle to provide adequate guidance or constraint to prevent torture, indefinite detention and extrajudicial killings, to the extent that these previously prohibited acts of violence are now being justified as ethically permissible. Furthermore, with the war on terror shaping narratives and practices through which states and non-state actors engage in armed conflict, the face and character of war is in a state of transit at present - a state of transit that further challenges the ethical underpinnings that have informed warfare to date. No longer termed 'the global war on terror', operations relating to the fight against terrorism are now comprised under the euphemistic moniker 'Overseas Contingency Operations' (OCO)². (Kamen 2009; Kaag and Kreps 2012; Pickup 2010) This represents a shift away from the emergency operation of war as a response to atrocities or in anticipation of an imminent attack, toward a much more enduring (military) administration for the control of risk, terror and contingencies. This is especially reflected in the logic of the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), more commonly known as drones³, for lethal attacks carried out by the US secret service in countries that are not officially engaged in war with the United States, including Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan. As John Kaag and Sarah Kreps have noted: "Contingent targets emerge at unexpected moments in any variety of places. Targeting these individuals requires not mass invasion, but so-called surgical strikes, that are made without declaring war on a foreign state". (Kaag and Kreps 2012 p.21) In other words, assassination strikes by drone become the new tool in the US' foreign policy toolbox. (Roberts 2013)

Framed as a fight not only against the evils of terrorism but also – comprising the logic of the OCO – to mitigate 'contingency', the war on terror presents *per se* an ethical struggle wherein underlying and divergent value systems, as well as specific administrative perspectives inform the practices and goals of warfare. (Coker 2008

² For consistency of terminology, I will use the phrase 'war on terror' throughout this project.

³ Unmanned Aerial Vehicles can be denoted by a range of terms and there are a growing number of terms emerging, from Remote Piloted Aircrafts to Unmanned Aircraft System. For the purpose of this project, I will give preference to the use of the term 'drone' throughout.

p.4) At stake in this moralised battle is nothing less than humanity itself. Not merely the survival of humanity, but its values and its progress. It is against the background of a perceived perpetual threat to the corpus and advancement of humanity that new technologies designed for, and employed in, warfare not only challenge hitherto established norms of what is morally permissible and impermissible, but are furthermore styled in ethical language and posited as instruments for a (more) ethical approach to warfare as a whole. The use of drones, in the war on terror encapsulates the drive toward new forms of allegedly ethical warring. Posited as technology that can fulfil the tripartite liberal mandate to be “legal, ethical and wise”, as John Brennan declared in 2012 and White House spokesman Jay Carney reiterated in 2013, drones stand to gain a dimension as weapons that no other new military technology has hitherto acquired – righteousness beyond contestability. (Brennan 2012b; Carney 2013) These transformations in the character and contexts of armed and violent conflict demand “changes in the concepts that are used to aid the understanding of contemporary conflict”. (Goodhand and Hume 1999 p.14) In other words, as new technologies gradually change the nature of warfare and how we think about using violence as a political instrument, an adjustment of the lenses with which we view warfare must occur, not least so that the fundamentally ethical question can be addressed anew: what are we, in fact, doing?

Discourses on biopolitics have offered a useful resource in this reconsideration of concepts with which we look at warfare and violent interventions today, and a range of scholars have identified not only a biopoliticisation of war, where ‘life itself’ is the heart of war’s end, (Evans 2013 p.133; Barder and Debrix 2012; Dillon and Reid 2009; Jabri 2007, 2006; Reid 2006) but also see biopolitics as having become “the greater part of political power” today. (Vatter 2009) As Vivian Jabri notes, contemporary modernity may well be considered ‘the age of biopolitics’ (Jabri 2007) and scholars from many disciplines have shown how biopolitical rationalities saturate socio-political practices today⁴. Typically it is Michel Foucault’s work that serves as

⁴ In over 30 years since the inception of biopolitics as a political modality, the term is now widely used to denote a variety of intricate relationships between life sciences and politics and has itself become more elastic than the concepts that it seeks to explain: from Foucault’s original diagnosis of a new form of life government in modernity, to the politics of biotechnology (see for example Thacker 1999), biohumanity (see for example Dillon and Reid 2009), to biomedical politics (see for example Rose 2006; Youde p.2009) to highlight a few. These examples of variations on biopolitics are by no means exhaustive and illustrate the fact that biopolitics is a term of a range of nuances and to date presents itself as somewhat of an enigma. (Esposito 2008 p.13-44) As such, analyses of a concept in which life

a basis for investigations into biopolitically informed theories and practice of political violence. While instrumental to many critical approaches to the discourses of biopolitics, Foucault is, however, not without shortcomings. While some note limitations in the discussion of sovereign power in Foucault (Lazzarato 2002; Jabri 2006), others highlight that matters of security in a biopolitical context are not fully addressed in his work. (Dillon and Neal 2011; Bigo 2011) Using Foucault's work as a lens also has significant limits in considering both subjectivity as well as agency of the biopolitical subject (Allen 2002; Deleuze 2006), where his theories present an impasse for considerations of resistance to the biopolitical subject. As Foucault's analysis is chiefly engaged with the production of knowledge and power, a concern for the condition of plurality – multiple subjects in coexistence – is unavailable to a reader of Foucault, thus limiting discussions on politics. The Foucaultian analysis and account of biopolitics furthermore pays no heed to the epistemological trajectory of a naturalized understanding of politics, as the term 'biopolitics' denoted in its origins, when it was first used in a political theory context in 1916. Lastly, Foucault, in his otherwise insightful and valuable analysis of the modern condition is conspicuously unengaged with the prevalence of (material) technology in modernity so crucial to philosophical engagement in his era and during his own time⁵. It is here that I am turning to Arendt as an analyst of the human condition for politics in modernity. There are considerable commonalities between Foucault and Arendt (Blencowe 2010 p. 114) and Arendt has been drawn on by a range of scholars for an analysis of biopolitical dimensions in violent political practices in modernity, even though she has not made use of the term biopolitics herself⁶. Yet her comprehension of the biopolitical trajectories and technologies that inform the modern human condition remains under-estimated and systematic accounts of her work on this topic under-developed, specifically in relation to politics, violence and ethical justifications.⁷

and politics conflate may present significant differences in perspectives and approaches, with equally differing outcomes.

⁵ Rather what he focuses on as technologies are more accurately reflected in his use of the word *dispositifs*, comprising practices as technologies. Chapter two addresses this further.

⁶ The term biopolitics can be traced as far back as 1911. In his extensive philosophical exploration of biopolitics, *Bios*, Roberto Esposito attributes the coining of the term to the Swedish theorist Rudolph Kjellen in 1916. In Kjellen's original use of the term it denoted the organism-like qualities of the state. In my own exploration of biopolitics through Arendt, I seek to rescue this dimension of meaning of the term.

⁷ See for example Duarte 2006; Braun 2007; Hayden 2009; Swift 2013 for scholarship on placing Arendt as a thinker within the biopolitics discourses. See also Agamben (1998) and Esposito (2008)

My project argues that by looking at an Arendtian framework of biopolitics we can identify a tension in modernity that surfaces when the cyclicity of life processes, upon which biopolitical practices are modelled, meets with a directional mandate for a progressive telos. The tension emerging from this is one that holds a latent potential for the use and justification of violence as an expedient political instrument in the fight against evil and contingency. Against the background of this tension, I argue, the Arendtian perspective on life-politics / biopolitics offers three distinct insights: First, she highlights the problem of the biopolitical eradication of difference and plurality so important for the possibility of politics, and the consequently anti-political nature of a biopolitical form of politics. She also provides us with an understanding of how the human is embedded comprehensively into structures of biopolitics, through biological, or organic narratives of politics, as well as the technologised biopolitical subjectivity with which the human is constituted in modernity⁸. Lastly, she allows us to comprehend more clearly an additional dimension with which to understand the socio-political structures of politics, violence and ethics in a biopolitical modernity: the modality of the human as self-analysing and self-constituting - as maker of all things, including and foremost, life. It is these aspects, the *zoefication* of politics, the anti-political and technologised human subjectivity and the human as fabricator of life and life processes, which allow for this project to critically engage with contemporary conceptions of ethics in relation to practices emerging in the war on terror.

This project thus makes two key contributions in a) identifying core aspects of an Arendtian theory of biopolitics with which to b) identify the theoretical underpinnings of ethical considerations of new practices of political violence, such as the use of drones and military robotics for lethal acts. The question this project seeks to answer is thus also two-fold and asks first: how does Arendt conceptualise the shift of life into politics (biopolitics) and its consequences, and then how do we understand the implications for conceptions of ethics in relation to the use of violence in counter-terrorism operations with these Arendtian conceptualisations of biopolitics? The suggested answers to the questions posed unfold in several parts, whereby the overall project presents an examination of the ethics of political violence, in a biopolitical

for highlighting limitations in Arendt for the conception of biopolitics. See Blencowe (2010) for a reading of Agamben's limited understanding of Arendt as an analyst of biopolitics.

⁸ The dyad of the '*zoefication*' of politics and the politicisation of *zoe* is elaborated in detail in chapter one.

context, “from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears”. (Arendt 1998 p. 5) To do so, I first establish key aspects of an Arendtian analysis of biopolitics by engaging with her analytical trajectory of how life came to be a central feature of politics and the consequential shift in perspective and human subjectivity that ensued. Based on these insights, I build an Arendtian biopolitical framework that comprises the key aspects indicated above. In this, the technological/scientific turn is as important as the biological turn for insights into politics, violence, ethics and the human in a contemporary context, and the relationship between these two aspects – technology and biopolitics - remains somewhat under-examined. (Campbell 2011 p.viii) Placing Arendt in context with Foucaultian trajectories and analyses of biopolitics, I highlight where she exceeds Foucault in providing an insight into how the political context under the sway of biopolitical practices is determined by anti-political conditions and characteristics, and illuminates the drive toward eradicating uncertainty within a modernity based on biological principles and with a self-constitutive perspective. Having identified these elements in an Arendtian framework of biopolitics, I then examine, in the second part of the thesis, how the ethics of political violence are informed and infused by biopolitical rationales. In this endeavour, I make not only ethics the object of analysis, but also the biopolitical human and her capacity for politics proper, as well as the role and justification of violence in a technologized modernity.

An Arendtian investigation into new concepts to understand the use of and adjustment to contemporary forms of political violence must take into consideration Arendt’s diagnosis that the human condition extends beyond the structural and exterior conditions within which human life unfolds, rather, “[m]en are conditioned beings because everything they come in contact with turns immediately into a condition of their existence”. (Arendt 1998 p.9) The human condition is thus a perpetually co-constitutive affair: the ideas, structures, artefacts, rules, routines – all that comes into existence in the context of the human condition, becomes part of the human condition and enters the world’s reality and, in turn, “the impact of the world’s reality upon human existence is felt and received as a conditioning force”. (Arendt 1998 p.9) This applies to biopolitical structures as much as to the technologisation of modernity in a contemporary context and, by informing human subjectivities, both have intermeshed consequences for what we understand ethics to

mean in the context of political violence and war. Relevant to the focus of this project, I briefly engage in the following with three co-constitutive and interlaced aspects crucial to (the) human condition(ing) at stake in contemporary practices of political violence: biopolitics, technology and ethics.

II. Biopolitical Conditioning

Biopolitics, as it is used in scholarly analysis of political power structures, norms and practices that work within and upon societies, with national and global effects⁹, refers to technologies of power over the body and biological functions of both the individual and the population, whereby political government and life government become “imbricated with one another” (Lazzarato 2002) for the administration of life as politics. In continuance of the dictum ‘politics as war’, as Foucault argues, the rule of law, historically associated with a sovereign, is transformed in modern society by the rule of biopolitics and systems of governmentality, which are no less impactful in their exercise. (Foucault 2002a, 2004) Where traditional sovereignty imposes its power on the general public, governmentality imposes a normalising generality onto the individual and society as a socio-political body. The biopolitical administrative technologies in Nazi Germany’s totalitarianism represent the most radical example of such modalities, but also contemporary forms of life management, such as biometric identification for immigration controls reflect this category to some extent. A new form of politics crystallises with the implementation of biopolitical modalities as the basis for governmentality: life and the political conflate, war and politics merge; the mandate to secure the health, prosperity and survival and progress of a population becomes not only the master-mandate for politics but also its meta-mandate.

Employing a Foucaultian lens, the work of Michael Dillon has been instrumental in highlighting this relationship and its continued relevance in contemporary politics. In this context, Michael Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero point out that a politics that claims the protection of life is simultaneously always also a politics that seeks to secure life – a politics of security. (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008) In its aim to render life secure, biopolitics is inseparably entwined with concerns and practices of control, prediction and prevention and is reliant on distinct technologies of security that facilitate norms and practices, which come to (self-) govern societies. Such norms,

⁹ This reflects predominantly a Foucaultian perspective, on which I will elaborate in chapter two.

practices and technologies range from surveillance policies and border control mechanisms (see for example Bigo 2006), to regulatory policies on dietary requirements, to such extreme punitive measures as extraordinary rendition, torture or – as of late – targeted killing programmes, for the ‘security’ of a population. Where the biopolitical logic leads to a demarcation between a population that is to be ‘secured’ and that which might pose a risk to a population’s health, prosperity and the overall development of its internal processes, security technologies become the primary apparatus for the institutionalised aim to render secure what is fundamentally insecure: life itself. (Evans, 2010, 2013, Barder and Debrix 2012, 2009; Dillon and Reid 2009; Jabri 2007; Reid 2006)

Investigating global governance in liberal modernity as global biopolitics, Dillon, together with Julian Reid (2009), builds on the modern reversal of Clausewitz’ observation which deems war the continuation of politics, by other means and diagnoses, again with Foucault, biopolitics to be a continuation of war by other means, enabled by a myriad of technological inventions and institutions that liberal societies have come to accept and perpetuate as the norm. Developing this analysis of a biopolitical paradigm in contemporary modernity further, Reid’s work analyses the biopolitical implications of the global war on terror in light of life as rendered both pacified and mobilized through various tactics and modalities of biopolitics. His diagnosis of liberal modernity characterises the 21st century human as one “whose security is threatened by its refusal to question the veracity of its distinction between what does and what does not constitute a life worth living” (Reid 2006 p.12). Both Reid and Dillon take their lead from Foucault when they diagnose the radical indeterminacy of life, its underlying contingency, to be at the centre of what modern biopolitical modalities and *dispositifs* aim to control, if not eradicate (Reid 2006, Dillon 2007, Dillon and Reid 2009) in an ever-present and never-ending contestation. Dillon and Reid interpret this continual contestation in biopolitics as a war-like struggle over the aporia of an inherent indeterminacy of life in a security driven society. In such accounts of the biopolitical rationale, war thus becomes immanent to liberal society by two means: on one hand through institutional structures within liberal society that are informed by the originary military structures upon which technologies of disciplines and biopolitics were modelled in Foucault’s analysis, (Foucault 1991, 2004) and on the other through perpetual and pervasive power

struggles over life's indeterminacies at various levels of society. It thus becomes part of the security apparatus to render life as technologically manageable as possible. Reid critically argues that modern biopolitical life is in essence a logistical life, "under the duress of the command to be efficient, ... and crucially, to be able to extol these capacities as the values which one would willingly, if called upon, kill and die for". (Reid 2006 p.13)

Where the efficiency and functionality mandate is paramount in a biopolitical rationale, the logic relies equally on the 'other' to the efficiency and functionality mandate – failure and vulnerability. As Brad Evans highlights in his study of liberal and biopolitical terror, fundamentally, the political logics of biopolitics seek to ascertain predictable outcomes for an inherently unpredictable entity: life. The core and object of this logic is formed by "precarious and vulnerable subjects" (Evans 2013 p.196) whose sheer biological condition of mortality and finitude posit the central problem and concern of biopolitics. This, in turn, renders life a perpetually and eternally irresolvable problem. And precisely in this lies the conundrum, as Evans notes; the "entire discourse on security is paradoxically underwritten by an appreciation that life can never be made fully secure". (Evans 2013 p.196) The inherently aleatory, plural and contingent nature of the human, in co-existence with others, renders him a risk and stands in stark contrast to the desire to secure life. Where efficiency and functionality are requirements for the continued security of the life process of humanity, vulnerability and failure become dangerous imperfections that put life as such, as a political project, at peril. In the logic of always-immanent and contingent threats to human life, through aleatory and un-securable elements, security strategies must first conceptualise and define the human as a biopolitical being for the management of contingency and risk avoidance. (Evans 2013 p.45)

This encompasses a perilous rationale: as biopolitics renders life problematic in terms of its capacities and its inherently aleatory and unpredictable nature, in terms of its lack of certainty, its vulnerability in finiteness and mortality, it is rendered not only perpetually at risk, but also, in its unpredictable and aleatory nature, and infinite potentialities, poses a continual risk. (Evans 2013 p.87 - 90) Evans frames this perpetual risk in terms of terror. This terror contained within life, the terror of the unpredictable, is thus woven into the very fabric of biopolitical life. It is, according to Evans, a latent terror that is contained in the tension between the securitisation

mandate that seeks to ascertain life, and the inherent unpredictability and volatility of one's existence in the world. Terror, the terror of the unpredictable, is thus woven into the very fabric of biopolitical life as a ubiquitous threat. (Evans 2013 p.30) However, the perception of unpredictability, uncertainty and vulnerability as a perpetual threat is in itself conditioned by narratives which stipulate that certainty, security and control over aleatory processes can be brought about, and only then is every potentiality perceived as lack of control, becomes a threat, and turns into latent terror. And as Evan notes, in a liberal political context we seek to mitigate this terror with violence as a political strategy (Evans 2013 p.30, p.193), as 'creative' solution to eliminating and reducing threat through technological prophylaxis, whereby drones and other automated and autonomous military robotics serves as a panacea for all such problems and enable their violent eradication.

The biopolitics–technology complex that provides the technological ecology within which biopolitical subjectivities are shaped is crucial here. The human in a technology-driven biopolitical age is not only determined by rationality, but first and foremost captured in scientific terms and rendered 'predictable [and] knowable'. (Berkowitz 2010) In his writings and lectures, Foucault has engaged predominantly with technology as *dispositifs*, as institutions and mechanisms of power, and was interested to a much lesser degree in the material aspects of science and technology as biopolitically informed and working upon the world. Some have critiqued the concept of biopower as relying on a thoroughly outmoded conception of how technology – material technology – functions. (Braidotti 2011 p.329, 2013 p. 117; Haraway 1997) This is reflected in Foucaultian engagements of technology with biopolitics. While literature drawing on Foucault's *dispositifs* for the (self)-control and management of populations addresses the technologies relevant for and used in securitization practices in the context of war, such as iris scans or biometric passports for the securitization of borders (Bigo 2011), it engages little with the co-constitutive character of biopolitics and the very material aspects of rapidly developing technologies and their domination within the socio-political (Western) realm. As Rosie Braidotti points out, there is, indeed, a discrepancy between Foucault's biopower and the contemporary structure of scientific thought. (Braidotti 2011 p.329) This contemporary structure of scientific thought is significant in the biopolitical context, as it conditions the biopolitical human subjectivity. To date,

scholarship that looks at the biopolitics–technology–violence nexus in terms of both biopolitically *and* technologically constituted subjectivities and the ethical justifications they produce for violence, has remained sparse. Especially accounts interrogating biopolitics and its relation to material technologies have remained sparse¹⁰. In this project, I argue that Arendt has usefully engaged with the significance of technological developments in a life-politics centric modernity and her thoughts offer a way to analytically access the co-constitutive nature of biopolitics and material technology for the examination of the ethics of political violence today. Through her work we can better understand the technological conditioning of the biopolitical subject and the acceptance of specific modes of political violence, as this project aims to show.

III. Technological Conditioning

Recognising the immense potential of the impact of technology, Arendt neither condemned nor condoned scientific and technological developments as such, but was critically concerned with the political question of the use of these technologies. ‘What we are doing’ with the capacities of new technologies and scientific advancements, set within a biopolitical context, is not only a “political question of the first order” (Arendt 1998 p.3) but, in the context of warfare and when coupled with practices of political violence, becomes also a pressing ethical question. Arendt’s broad yet detailed inquiry into both biopolitics and the perils of a technocratic society render her a rich resource for the continued “project of understanding” (Parekh 2008 p.6) our biopolitically informed modernity. Arendt presciently, and perhaps speculatively, engaged with questions concerning technology and technology’s impact on the human in various lectures and essays in the 1950s and 60s¹¹. Today, it is clear that technological developments have considerable consequences for human life, politics and warfare and both issues remain under-examined in their influence and impact on society, not least because they develop at an ever-accelerated speed. From communications technology to the implantation of microchips into brains to improve performance and brain activity, to the use of remote controlled, unmanned weapons

¹⁰ Timothy Campbell’s recent study on ‘technology and biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben’ presents an insightful exception (Campbell 2011), as does Rosie Braidotti’s recent work on Nomadic Theory (2011) and the Posthuman (2013)

¹¹ Notably Arendt’s essay “The conquest of space and the stature of man” (Arendt 2006b) focuses on the consequences of modern technology for the role and status of the human within a human-made world.

systems, technology is advancing at a pace that exceeds the political, legal and ethical frameworks upon which we have hitherto built our co-existence in a shared world. While the interplay of man and machine has a long history, we can today see a change in the hierarchical relationship that ensues. Humans no longer merely constitute their machines, but are increasingly constituted by them as man and machine merge faster than ever. (Coker 2013 p.xv) As Christopher Coker observes in the context of new technologies of warfare, at stake is no longer the “interface of the human being and technology” but rather “the integration of technology into the human being. This is something that is new”. (Coker 2013) The mutual integration of man and machine is something that it is new because it places the human in charge of the technological progress not only at the periphery of the human, but of the human herself, as if, as biologist Julian Huxley observed, “man had been suddenly appointed managing director of the biggest business of all, the business of evolution – appointed without being asked if he wanted it, and without proper warning and preparation”. (Agar 2010 p.3) It is new because it shapes us as humans, and, in turn, shapes our human interaction. It is new also new because it requires us to urgently rethink what it means to be human in a anthro-technical¹² context, as Peter Sloterdijk posits, in which “technology puts humanity at risk but will also save humanity by creating superior human beings”, (Campbell 2011 p.115) and the question indeed arises whether, in this anthro-technical context, we are faced with a different, a new configuration of biopolitics and the violence this facilitates. The Arendtian perspective of the technologically informed logos of biology – bio-logy – as the basis not only for human subjectivity but also as the basis for conceptions of political practices allows for an understanding of the biopolitical underpinnings and rationales at work in the context of the ethics of political violence.

Underlying the technological logos is a scientifically informed biological logos of processes, as Heisenberg so perceptively highlighted in 1958, and Arendt picked up on when she notes, referring to Heisenberg, that technology “no longer appears ‘as the result of a conscious human effort to extend man’s material powers, but rather as a large scale biological process’”. (Heisenberg 1958; Arendt 2006b p.274; Arendt 1998 p. 153) Georgia Tech roboticist Ronald Arkin reiterates the relevance of biology for robotics today as he notes that “[e]very aspect of robotics is touched by biology

¹² In line with Peter Sloterdijk’s suggestion, anthro-technology refers to the “technique of the manufacture of humanity”. (Babich 2012 p.14; Sloterdijk 2009)

... It's a pervasive influence". (Arkin, cited in Singer 2010 p.90) The technological subjectivity is a biopolitically informed subjectivity and the biopolitical subjectivity, in turn a technologically informed subjectivity. We conceive of computers, machines and technology as logical extensions of (limited) human sensory and physical capacities in an ever-wider realm of applications, including warfare. The all-pervasiveness of the technological environment, modelled on and within the human logic, is now shaping and conditioning the human logic in return. Not only is the human subject and her subjectivity framed in bio-technological terms of seeing "the brain as software and the body as hardware" whereby the de-personalised and de-individualised logos of machines comes to be seen as an ideal (Coker 2013 p.xvi) but also, collectives of people are conceived of in abstracted technological terms and within a the symbolic order of codifications and mathematical signifiers as repositories of information and codes in a cybernetic assemblage. (Arendt 2006b p.274; Evans 2013 p.72; Coker 2013 p.xvi) This, as Evan rightly points out, has "profound bearings on the question of what it means to be a living thing, as life is seen to be able to generate beyond itself". (Evans 2013 p.72) Braidotti comes to a similar conclusion as she assesses that "the zoe-centred egalitarianism that is potentially conveyed by the current technological transformations has dire consequences for the humanistic vision of the subject". (Braidotti 2013 p.141) In other words, in the technological production of life and the merger of the human with machines the issue of how we understand ourselves as humans and among other humans must be considered anew.

In his critique of techno-subjectivities, Baudrillard notes that, "man and machine have become isomorphic and indifferent to each other: neither is other to the other" (Baudrillard 2009 p.143) - machines that, in Baudrillard's assessment, promote homogeneity, reproduction, replacement, prevention and prophylaxis for the "technological purification of bodies". (Baudrillard 2009 p.68) Not only is technology biopolitically informed, but in this, it also poses the ideal and powerful means to enable the logos of prevention and prophylaxis so crucial to the securitization mandate of a biopolitical modernity and thus promotes an ever-greater drive toward preventive and prophylactic practices. Yet, biopolitical technology relies on a rationality, or logic, that exceeds the human and her capacities. And it is here that a peculiar turn in contemporary modernity takes place, as the hierarchies of man

and machine shift and the two begin to fuse not merely performatively but also functionally and philosophically. (Coker 2013 p.18) Technology is increasingly placing the human in a space of functional obsolescence, or rather, the human places herself in that space, specifically in the context of war and political violence. Technology, shaped and informed by scientifically established biological and neurological patterns, (Coker 2013 p.9) is hailed to be able to perform human functions more accurately, faster, more efficiently, and, as some commentators posit, also more ethically. (See for example Arkin 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Marcus 2012; Strawser 2010; Wittes 2013) In this rationale, the human is not only grasped in her essence as a biologically ascertainable being, but also as fallible in her aleatory humanness, and humanity as fallible in its inherent alterity and unpredictability. The logic and rationale of technology seeks to mitigate these fallibilities and flaws to ensure the continued performativity, functionality, progress and process of humanity and humans therein, tacitly attesting to an ever-diminishing belief in human judgement and human choice (Coker 2013 p.xvii) in the aim to secure life. Encapsulated in this is, however, a diminished horizon for meaningful political action – that is to say political action not as management and administration of populations and resources but as acts and practices of interaction through “communication between singular entities and collective assemblages”, (Braidotti 2011 p.341) made manifest through set of limits to plurality (as technology relies on homogenisation), a limit to language (as technology relies on the ‘language’ of code and abstraction) and a limit to contestability (as technology is posited not only as politically and ethically neutral but superior) in the quest to make the human and humanity more efficient, functional and secure.

The accelerated use of and dedication to the employment of drones exemplifies this prevention mandate. (Alston 2012) The underlying rationale for the use of drones reflects the biopolitically informed technology drive as technological fixes become ever-more attractive in the securitization mandate as the dominant mind set in Washington circles betrays. (Alston 2012) Firmly held by proponents of the technology to be ‘ethical and effective’¹³, drones are framed not only as technologically superior to traditional weapons systems, in terms of efficiency and

¹³ As put forward in a recent Oxford Union debating the motion: ‘This House believes drones are ethical and effective’. The conjoined adjectives ethical and effective are indicative of a certain conflation of the categories ethical and efficiency in the current discourses on drone warfare.

effectiveness for the achievement of goals in warfare, but also as performing acts of war more morally, valuably and wisely. (Wittes 2013; Brennan 2012a, 2012b, Strawser 2010) Drones are, so the argument stipulates, able to conduct necessary acts of violence with better precision, greater ability to discriminate in terms of targets and with less human cost (both in terms of lives and money). They offer the ideal technology to take out threats and combat human evil before its risk-infused potentialities become realised. They are, in short, the ideal tool to technologically secure the very processes of a biopolitically conditioned and technologically informed socio-political body.

As the project aims to show, the biopolitics-technology subjectivity and ecology provides the cartography for a securitization rationale that is difficult to challenge or contest, ethically and politically. Not only does anthropo-technology condition human subjectivities toward a greater acceptance of a technology outlook or mentality, in creating a greater ontological reliance on analysability, predictability and the production of certain outcomes, but it also conditions the technological ecology within which acts of political violence are framed as necessary technical acts for the securitization of progress and survival of the human and humanity. Evans argues that it is through the imposition of “moral imperatives on a society so that certain productive ways of living become normalised to the point that they are not even questions is a sure way of embedding secure practices. Such moralisation is what allows biopolitical practices to take hold”. (Evans 2013 p.198) Violent biopolitical practices of securitisation, morally mandated by the need for survival and the continuation of progress for humanity, facilitated by techno-thanatological weaponry (Braidotti 2013) that are rendered inherently ethical, should give us pause to think about justifying narratives of these practices. This, in turn, should give us pause to think how the biopolitical-technological nexus that informs and shapes human subjectivities in technological terms, in turn informs certain contemporary perspectives of ethics of political violence.

IV. Ethical Conditioning

In her work, Arendt sought to engage with the problem of evil and the unmooring of morality in a secular modernity and, specifically, in the context of Nazi Germany. (Canovan 1995 p.156) Her work is virtually void of distinct “moral or ethical

theorems” (Kohn 1990 p.105; Isaac 1996 p.61), even though there is a tendency among her readers to consider her to be a “moral *thinker*”. (Kohn 1990 p.105) The absence of ethical imperatives in her work does not, however, mean that she was unconcerned with issues of ethics and morality¹⁴. Throughout her work, she thought through the problems of politics, revolutions, totalitarianism and the human condition as such, continually concerned with the relationship between morality, law and politics in the private and public spheres. Having witnessed the “total collapse of the ‘moral’ order not once, but twice” (Arendt 2003a p.54), Arendt grappled with the fact that people in Nazi Germany could adjust to a new set of moral principles upon which it seemed perfectly acceptable to perpetrate what had hitherto been known to be a crime, and, once the tables had turned and the Nazi regime had been defeated, that morality once more would change without much effort or any lengthy indoctrination. In other words, the ontology of morality is tested when that which was hitherto a crime has become socially sanctioned as a legal act (legal crime). (Bauman 2012 p.210) This extreme form of adjusting from normality to abnormality and back was a clear indication for Arendt that neither personal nor political morality were sufficiently rooted, and neither religion nor philosophy could avert the dangers of “moral nihilism”¹⁵. (Canovan 1995 p.174; Arendt 2003a pp.50 – 54; Parekh 2008 p.153) In this she identified a crucially modern turn (Parekh 2008 p.153) wherein morality is based on, and always temporarily enshrined in, rules, customs, regulations, codes and guidelines. (Canovan 1995 p.196) Only in her later life, during her work on *Life of the Mind*, did she begin to more deeply address the core of the problem of morality, a task she never managed to complete before her death in 1975. Although her considerations on morality and politics remain incomplete and, perhaps for that reason, strongly contested (see for example Kateb 1984; Butler 2009a), her considerations point to a precarious relationship between morality (and ethics)¹⁶ and

¹⁴ She was, as Ursula Ludz highlights, in fact very concerned with the creation of the basis for a ‘new political morality’ even though she never explicitly stated so out of modesty. (Ludz 2007 p.802)

¹⁵ Patrick Hayden discusses this development in the context of his writings on Arendt and radical evil and frames the problematic of inadequate moral grounding in terms of inadequate moral and political traditions. He states: “the Western moral and political tradition could not provide the intellectual and normative resources needed to grasp the concrete experience of the ‘overpowering reality’ of political evil”. (Hayden 2009 p.5)

¹⁶While I acknowledge that different schools of thought have different perspectives on the (in)distinction of the terms morality and ethics, I will use the two interchangeably throughout this project. This is based on the nature of the critique exercised in this project which acknowledges the co-constitutive conditioning of the human and her environment, and further follows Hutchings’ assessment that a distinction between the two is not only highly contested in current scholarship (Hutchings 2010 p. 8) but possibly unsustainable in a critical context. (Bulley 2013; Hutchings 1996)

politics in modernity, which can be seen in the legitimising of practices of acts of political violence, such as target killings, previously considered to be immoral and illegal.

Even though Arendt's work at this juncture cannot offer theoretical analyses that speak directly to the specific problems of the ethics of political violence today, the biopolitical framework built from her work aids this project in examining the biopolitical rationales that inform such modern forms of ethics and the human subjectivities upon which they rest. The inexorable relationship between human subjectivity and ethics requires that we make the human and how the human is constituted, and constitutes his environment, a distinct part of the analysis of ethics. (Campbell and Shapiro 1999 p.xi) Specifically where the continued merger of the human with technological innovations produces a biological-technological subjectivity that shaped the human condition and humans are conditioned in turn, the question arises how this further shapes our engagement with others in terms of ethics, and what types of ethics and politics this produces. As scientists strive to "investigate ways in which the human and machine may co-evolve, both functionally and performatively, and how we may even be able to biologically re-engineer ourselves", (Coker 2013 p.xiii) the effects this biopolitically informed techno-subjectivity might have on the ethics of political violence are paramount. And if we accept that "modern ethics is a species of the metaphysics of subjectivity" (Caputo 1989 p.55; quoted in Campbell and Shapiro 1999 p.xi) and that biopolitically conceived and shaped technologies condition human subjectivities today, it becomes clear that ethics, as conceived in modernity, must be examined against the biopolitical background of techno-subjectivities that conditions the human in modernity.

Ethics, in the context of politics – including international politics – is presently predominantly conceived in terms of applied ethics (Nardin 2008; Chadwick and Schroeder 2002 p.15) and chiefly concerned with the search for "a singular ethical theory that could be devised in the abstract and applied in the concrete". (Campbell and Shapiro 1999 p.viii) While burgeoning poststructuralist scholarship in the late 1990s sought to address ethics in terms that consider aspects of contingency, alterity and potentiality (see for example Campbell 1998; Campbell and Shapiro 1999; Der Derian 1997; Hassner 2001; Jabri 1998; Orlie 1997), the events unfolding in the aftermath of 9/11 appear to have given way to a more practical oriented approach to

thinking about ethics in international politics, giving priority to the application of ethical principles of warring. Such practical approaches often mirror scientific processes, or algorithmic logics in trying to find ‘correct’ outcomes. (Haraway 1997) This is exemplified in the IF/THEN logic of current discourses on the ethics of war or in the structures of target selections for lethal drone strikes. Seth Lazar’s recent work on the morality of war, for example, considers approaches to decision making in the following terms: “one plausible approach to decision-making under uncertainty is to determine the expected moral value (EV) of the outcomes available to me, and to choose the best one. So, I am permitted to f if and only if $EV(f) \geq EV(\neg f)$ ”. (Lazar 2013 p.10) Similarly, Bradley Strawser’s defence of the ethical obligation to use drones as a weapon of choice relies on a selection of variables (X, Y, G) and principles (principle of unnecessary risk – PUR) that, combined, serve to confirm the hypothesis, namely that using drones is an ethical obligation. (Strawser 2010) This algorithmic logic speaks to a biopolitical technoscientific-subjectivity with which ethical outcomes are ascertained. President Obama’s selection of terrorist targets – the so-called ‘kill list’ – takes such logics into consideration when deciding over life and death. Via a disposition matrix it is determined who can be (justly / necessarily) killed and who ought to be captured if feasible. (Byman and Wittes 2013) The matrix presents a flowchart that lays out the algorithm of target killing. Similarly the selection of potential ‘signature strike’ targets stipulates algorithms according to which certain behavioural, cultural and biological patterns are determined according to which individuals are deemed to be potential threats and thus legitimate targets¹⁷. As was indicated by *New York Times* reporters Jo Becker and Scott Shane in 2012, the method of determining who is considered a potential militant (and thus a potential target) is untenably broad: “It in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, according to several administration officials, unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent”. (Becker and Shane 2012) In other words, *if* the suspect is male and of a certain age, *then* he is considered a militant, thus sought to be legitimated as a target.

The algorithmic considerations of acts with ethical content rely on a law-like structure in ascertaining ethical conduct. Enshrined in codes, laws, and regulations, correct ethical conduct can thus be sought through algorithmic reasoning and

¹⁷ I will engage with this practice in greater detail in chapter seven.

abstracted for the application in a range of national and international political contexts. Discussion of the ethics of war, humanitarian interventions and most recently the use of automated military technology reflects such an ethico-legal framework for ascertaining which acts are ethical. In the context of military robotics, there is a strong drive toward increased levels of decision-making capacities of robotic technologies, including the decision to target and kill humans. By installing an ethics module, that incorporates the laws of war and international legal frameworks, according to proponents of lethal autonomous robots, having such robots make lethal decisions would render war more humane. (Arkin 2009b, 2010) This relies on ethics being conceivable and conceived as code, as ascertainable, and as producing clear, secure and certain outcomes. In our biopolitical and technological context today then, not only do we seek to secure the human, in her aleatory, vulnerable and uncertain characteristics, but also the ethical relations between such humans must also be ascertained, secured, made controllable. This reliance on codes and law in the ethico-legal construct of applied ethics has the potential to eclipse an engagement with that which cannot be secured in ethics, with the actual content of the moment of ethical interaction and an engagement with concerns that do not fit into the programmes of ethical administration conceived in the ethico-legal constructs. Where the ethical language is simultaneously also the language of code, subordinated to the attainment of a specific ethical end, it becomes altogether meaningless, or paralyzed, in Giorgio Agamben's terms. (Agamben 2000 p.116) As Coker notes, "[l]anguage matters, otherwise one becomes like Hardy's Judy who thought that you could understand Greek if you cracked a simple code in the professor's safe keeping". (Coker 2013 p.297) Language matters also, because it is the means with which political contestation can ensue, and with it, ethical contestation. Where language is replaced by the "meaningless formalism of mathematical signs" (Arendt 2006b: 274) we lack the proper political and ethical language to contest the contents of ethics and its meta-ethical underpinnings meaningfully, for "speech is what makes man a political being". (Arendt 1998 p.3) In the Arendtian account, politics arises from the encounter with the other, in a public context. In this encounter lies not only the potential for politics, but within it, the demand for ethics also arises. (Orlie 1997 pp.196 – 197) Melissa Orlie perceptively traces this relationship in her critique of contemporary conceptions of ethics:

The determination of ethical conduct ... emerges, at least in part, through thinking with others not as a thought experiment but as a locatable political practice. Ethical conduct requires more than thinking about the limits of the self, it also demands ethical political work on those limits. (Orlie 1997 p.183)

Applied ethics and an ethics of encounter seem to be located at opposite ends of ethical sensibilities and practices, and the techno-subjectivity shaped by biopolitical rationales gives precedence to the former rather than the latter in seeking to secure ethical outcome. An ethics of encounter must take into consideration the very unpredictability that arises out of political and social situations, each in its own context. (Orlie 1997; Campbell 1998; Jabri 1998; Bauman 2000) It is thus that Campbell and Shapiro suggest, along with others, that international political theory “should promote an ethics of encounter without commitment to resolution or closure” (Campbell and Shapiro 1999 p.xvii), whereby “our responsibility to the other” should serve as the basis for ethical reflection. (Campbell and Shapiro 1999 p.x) Judith Butler frames it similarly when she suggests that “[e]thics is less a calculation than something that follows from being addressed and addressable in sustainable ways”. (Butler 2009) This project aims to open a space to re-think the ethics of certain practices of war and counter-terrorism today by recognizing, examining and critiquing the biopolitical perspective that facilitates a human techno-subjectivity which views ethics either in code or as technologically neutralised, which may allow us to move beyond the biopolitical subjectivity condition. There is much to be done in re-thinking ethics in contemporary international politics in order to avoid the paradoxical condition that ethical considerations are relegated to the margins of moralising international politics, and to conceive of tangible solutions must remain a future aspiration and motivation for continued research and engagement with the topic. My project thus seeks to provide a critical perspective as a point of departure for further inquiry.

V. Structure and Chapters

The aim of this project is to understand how the biopolitical rationale conditions our contemporary context, so that the question of ethics can be raised meaningfully in the context of political violence. It is through this type of interrogation that “we can set aside the universalizing moral entrapments of liberal humanism, which reduces political ethics to a question of relations among already compliant political subjects”

(Evans 2013 p.11) and aim to think through what it is that we are, in fact, doing. In this spirit, the project thus seeks to examine how the biopolitical rationale, set forth through an Arendtian account, informs politics, violence as politics, ethics and human subjectivity. The thesis unfolds in two parts and eight chapters to demonstrate and critique how ethical rationales of political violence are shaped by biopolitical perspectives. The first part, constituted by chapters one through four, engages in an Arendtian exposition to posit the theoretical framework for the project's central analysis. The second part then departs from an exposition of Arendt's work and draws on the biopolitical framework established in order to examine how the life-politics rationales shape the ethics of certain, technology-driven, political practices today.

Chapter one places Hannah Arendt as a biopolitical thinker and establishes an Arendtian framework that unfolds the biopolitical analysis contained in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, *On Revolution* and, importantly, *The Human Condition*. The chapter establishes key terms and concepts and extracts two crucial trajectories relating to life politics in Arendt's work: the prioritisation of life processes in modern politics and the mathematisation of life and life processes to yield biologically analysable and calculable subjects and subjectivities. In this, the chapter sets out to establish the crucial tension that emerges in modernity when the cyclicity of life processes, upon which biopolitical practices are modelled, meets with a mandate for the progress of the human and humanity. The chapter also addresses some of the objections and scepticisms of Arendt as a biopolitical thinker and highlights that the term 'politics' in Arendt's work must be distinguished from a contemporary and already biopolitically informed understanding of the term as governmental management and administration.

As in most biopolitical analyses of war, security and violence, the term biopolitics is associated with Foucault's insights into how biopower and anatomo-power shapes a biopolitical context. Chapter two therefore delineates some of the significant congruencies and divergences in Foucault's and Arendt's analysis of life-politics, or biopolitics. It first engages with key aspects of a Foucaultian perspective of biopolitics before then highlighting where Arendt's work resonates with that of Foucault. The chapter also points toward some key concepts in both scholar's work – essence, telos and power – and offers an exploration where the two overlap with

respect to these concepts and where they differ. This then serves to establish where Arendt is useful for insights that exceed Foucault's work for the purpose of this project and highlights the relevance of Arendt's three-fold insights to this discussion.

Chapters three and four establish the consequences of the biopolitical rationale for the possibility for politics and the role of violence plays in an altered way of understanding politics. In both chapters, Arendt continues to be an instrumental interlocutor to stress the tension that emerges in a biopolitically informed political modernity that understands politics as administration, contrary to an Arendtian understanding of politics proper. Chapter three establishes the anti-political essence of biopolitics by engaging with key aspects that are necessary for politics in the Arendtian account and that become inhibited and obstructed in a biopolitical modernity (specifically plurality, freedom and speech) for the possibility of politics. The chapter also introduces the problem of instrumentality in the conception of political practices, whereby the narrative of violence as a creative force in the production of certain outcomes in a biopolitical context is established. This strand of thought is continued in chapter four, where the relationship between biopolitical rationales and violence is the central theme. The chapter continues to draw on Arendt for an exposition of violence as inherently anti-political and always instrumental, thus fitting seamlessly into the biopolitical logos.

Chapter five transitions away from an Arendtian exposition and engages in greater detail with the specific form of ethics that is produced in a biopolitically informed socio-political context and delineates how aspects of the biopolitical framework permeate and shape justifications of violent acts and the ethics of war and armed conflict. It problematises the conception of ethics as predominantly conceived in practical terms, as applied ethics, framed in terms of code and algorithmically ascertainable rules of conduct, specifically in the context of ethics in politics today and outlines the rise of medical narratives that provide the justifying framework for violent acts of intervention as preventive measures. In this, the chapter suggests two consequences of a biopolitical rationale for applied ethics in the context of justifications for political violence: ethics is framed predominantly in practical terms, enabled through code, rules, guides and laws. Furthermore, under the biopolitical sway of necessity, technologies of violence can be, and are framed as inherently ethical, thus rendered incontestable.

Considering the bio-technological human subjectivities emerging from the conditioning outlined earlier and with a view to current and future projections in terms of military technology, I address in chapter six broader questions of biopolitical underpinnings of technology, specifically in light of a technological enhancement of the human and military robotics for the purpose of armed conflict. Developing the problem of the human-technology-ethics nexus, this chapter establishes how the human is rendered and understood in algorithmically analysable terms in today's practices of war and political violence. It traces human life as conceived in and as code and delineates the biopolitical ideology of the progression of the human in terms of capacity, functionality and performance. The chapter suggests that this biopolitical techno-subjectivity is shaped to fit into a biopolitical socio-political context of development and progress and gives rise to the functionality mandate of life. This is notable in modern forms of warfare where the human is increasingly considered to be the weakest link, framed either in terms of danger or in terms of inadequacy.

Chapter seven then illustrates the problematic of ever-faster advancing technological means of enacting political violence, most concretely visible in the use of drones for target killing operations. The use of drones reflects biopolitical rationales in a number of aspects, from the depoliticized act of (target) killing, to the anthropo-technological positing of the drone as able to 'act' more ethically than humans and comprise the capacity to produce predictable and ethical outcomes in securing humanity through preventive interventions and prophylaxis. The chapter serves as an exemplifying chapter for the present real world challenges advanced biopolitical technology poses in the context of war and political violence and introduces the justifying narrative with which acts of political violence today are framed. Chapter seven thus connects the biopolitical anti-politics and violence problematique with the biopolitically informed justifications of violence and elucidates the biological-technological complex that informs perspectives of contemporary ethics of political violence.

The final chapter, chapter eight, serves as the concluding chapter in which I seek to move beyond the biopolitical subjectivities in engaging with the possibility for an ethics of encounter. In this chapter I suggest that concerns with the contents and the ethicality of ethics, are reliant on politics proper in the Arendtian sense, and draw on the previously delineated anti-politicity of the biopolitical subject and argue that it is, however, possible to challenge the biopolitical subjectivity. In this, I suggest in

that alterity, unpredictability and vulnerability must be taken into consideration in order to move beyond applied and coded ethics constructed from abstracted scenarios, applied to specific contexts, an exploration that draws on the Levinasian/Derridean perspective of ethics as an ethics of sensibilities and of the moment.

1: SHIFTING LIFE INTO POLITICS

In the last resort, it is always life itself which is the supreme standard to which everything else is referred, and the interests of the individual as well as the interests of mankind are always equated with individual life or the life of the species as though it was a matter of course that life is the highest good.

Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*

I. Politicisation of Zoe / Zoefication of Politics

In current analyses of biopolitical structures and practices in modernity, Arendt appears again and again as a relevant theorist. (See for example Agamben 1998, Blencowe 2010, Braun 2007, Duarte 2006; Esposito 2008, Fassin 2007, Hayden 2009, Vatter 2009, among others) Specifically the work of Kathrin Braun, Andre Duarte and Miguel Vatter, as well as that of Giorgio Agamben and Roberto Esposito has sought to establish some of the finer points in Arendt's exposition of the shift of life into the centre of political concerns within a wider biopolitics discourse on violence and contemporary forms of politics. However, while these efforts have provided an excellent point of departure, to date, her work has not been considered independently and in-depth within the biopolitical discourse of contemporary political practices and no distinct trajectory of the elements of what constitutes biopolitical traits in her work has been established. This is somewhat surprising given that Arendt was one of the early theorists who clearly understood the genesis of life as the main referent for politics in modernity (Esposito 2008 p.149) and has recurrently addressed the complexities involved in the modern matrix of life and politics, and its consequences, throughout her work. However, some theorists in this area see the biopolitical understanding in Arendt's work as incomplete (see for example Agamben 1998 p.3) or insufficient, if not a contradiction in terms within Arendtian categories. (See for example Esposito 2008 p.150) In this chapter, I address some of these concerns and aim to demonstrate that Arendt was indeed comprehensive and coherent in her understanding of the category life and its relation to politics in modernity, which makes it possible to place her as a relevant thinker within the wider biopolitical discourse and employ her specific perspective as a lens with which to examine the biopolitical conditioning of modernity.

As indicated earlier, Arendt herself makes no mention of the term ‘biopolitics’ as such, despite the fact that the expression had been used sporadically by social scientists since 1911 and within a political theory context since 1916. Nonetheless, I argue, she understood perhaps more comprehensively than other political theorists of her time and after her, the roots of a much broader spectrum of biopolitics, which emerged in modernity and has become manifest in contemporary times, than is commonly acknowledged. This chapter aims to trace a historical trajectory of biopolitical turns and perceptions in a modernity in Arendt’s work and highlight the very technologies and mechanisms that shape specific human subjectivities to provide a cartography for biopolitical practices in modernity.

Arendt’s account of the shift of matters of biological life processes into the focus of modern politics unfolds at various points and weaves through her work as a recurring referent for her political analyses in *On Revolution*, *On Violence* as well as *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, specifically. However, a thorough analysis of the development toward and consequences of biological life as politics only crystallises comprehensively in her seminal work *The Human Condition*, published in 1958. As Margaret Canovan rightly points out, *The Human Condition* is indeed most fruitfully read within the context of her earlier work on totalitarianism. (Canovan 1995 p.99) While there is no explicit biopolitical exposition in her first major work, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, her critique of the consequences of reducing human life to its bare biological state are clearly and most starkly discernible¹⁸ and in a final chapter added to the second edition of the book, titled “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government”, Arendt begins to theorise more carefully the implications of biology as a political aspect in a critique of Darwinian theories of a teleological progression of nature¹⁹.

While her “*magnum opus*” (Canovan 1995 p.99), *The Human Condition*, was not intended to offer a systematic statement of Arendt’s political philosophical thought

¹⁸ For an engagement with this text in a biopolitics context see Agamben 1998 and Esposito 2008.

¹⁹ The second edition of *The Origins of Totalitarianism* was published in 1958, the same year *The Human Condition* was published. This second edition contains a few changes Arendt made as more material had been made available in the years between 1951 and 1958. Most importantly, her essay “Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government”, first published in 1953 in the *Review of Politics*, was added to this second version as it contained “certain insights of a strictly theoretical nature, closely connected with her analysis of the elements of total domination”. (Arendt 2004 p.388) The timeline of this important addition suggests that Arendt’s theories on the human condition have informed elements of this final chapter and vice versa.

(Canovan 1995 p.99), it is here that Arendt most clearly provides her readers with a cogent account of the problems of a scientifically-minded, technocratic political environment, paired with a coherent analysis and critique of a modernity that is simultaneously firmly centred on life and life processes as political elements. It is here, in what Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves considers to be the “framework for a phenomenological anthropology” (Passerin d'Entreves 2006 p.56), that she develops a coherent genealogy of the originary elements and the consequences of the centrality of life for politics in modernity, and the tension it bears - a premise she further contextualises in her text *On Revolution* as well as in other writings. In order to better situate Arendt's account of the centrality of biological life and life processes within her broader analysis of the conditions of modernity it is thus helpful to briefly outline some crucial thoughts she proposes in *The Human Condition*, as it presents the key contextualisation for related arguments she presents throughout her work.

The Human Condition presents a complex phenomenological analysis of human activity against a background of a range of historical features, causes and stages. (Passerin d'Entreves 2006 p.56) It is a dense work packed with categorisations and distinctions and Arendt herself had considered it as a critical introduction to a continuing investigation into political theory, which she never completed and always remained a preliminary investigation into the subject. (Canovan 1995 p.99) The compact intricacy of categorisations of labour, work, action, earth, the world, the public, the private, the social and the political contained in *The Human Condition* can be mitigated somewhat by untangling the work's essential organising principles as centring on a few key elements of her categorisations. (Canovan 1998 p.ix) Leaning strongly on a historical background that is rooted in the Greek form of political life, Arendt understands life proper in the Aristotelian sense as comprising biological life necessities (*zoe*) and a more comprehensive, public and political life (*bios*). (Arendt 1998 p.97) Arendt draws further distinctions and isolates three strands of the human condition upon which each life and its unfolding relies: labour (*zoe*), the category that, for Arendt, is concerned solely with life processes and necessities; work (*poiesis*), the act of fabrication, of making and creating artefacts and objects that then come to constitute a common and stable shared world for humans; and finally action (*praxis*), the activity relating to politics as conducted by free and equal men in the public sphere. (Arendt 1998 p.79 - 247) In like manner, Arendt makes a distinction

with regards to the spatial realms, within which these aspects of life, converging and separate, fall: the private realm, the social and the public (political) sphere. (Arendt 1998 p.22 – 78; Owens 2012 p. 553)

In this very distinction of realms we find the first key strand of Arendt's analysis of the shift of life into politics. While, in Arendt's assessment, the distinction of *zoe* and *bios* corresponds originally to the realms of the private family household and the political realm of the public sphere, respectively, the shift of life into the focus of a public realm has given rise to the emergence of a hybrid realm comprising this shift, in what Arendt contentiously terms 'the social'. This social realm presents a quasi public arena, situated between that which hitherto had been private and that which is public and absorbs the functions of the family realm. In this realm, the individual is rendered depoliticised and simultaneously becomes a subject of the functionalities of political administration as a member of the human species. (Arendt 1998 p.38 – 49) This controversial realm - the social - is thus neither private nor public and presents the vital sphere for an Arendtian account of biopolitics. It represents the very space in which biopolitical modalities in modernity find their foothold and come to be perpetuated and materialised in a form society where "the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public". (Arendt 1998 p.46) Her conception of 'the social' as distinct from 'the political' is a contentious issue, however, it is in understanding the social in a biopolitical context that some of Arendt's contentious assertions regarding this quasi-public realm where action becomes behaviour and politics becomes administration, might become a little less jarring²⁰.

²⁰ Particularly her conception of the social as a realm in which biological concerns dominate has received much criticism and even until recently, scholars have been concerned with trying to establish definitively what Arendt meant with this sphere (see Fenichel-Pitkin 1998 for an extensive account as well as Owens 2012 for an analysis of the social in the context of security). The social is indeed not entirely well defined in Arendt's work, part of which is perhaps an issue of inconsistent semantics on her part. However, the social as a concept in the discussion of forms of politics in modernity sheds an important light on the quasi-spatial aspects in which human life unfolds. Another key criticism of Arendt's work is her critique of Marxism which runs through *The Human Condition* and other works where many scholars have held that she based her critique on an outmoded interpretation of Marx or misunderstood Marx altogether (see for example Bernstein 2006, Jay 2006). The social is most often understood as the realm in which economic concerns gain political relevance and it is precisely her dismay at economic concerns becoming politically relevant which has caused much debate among Arendt scholars.

In his analysis of Arendt's conception of modernity, Passerin d'Entreves helpfully detects in Arendt's categorisations another fundamental aspect, that of the basic conditions of the human. He lists these as life, natality, mortality, plurality, worldliness and the earth - ontological factors for the broader category of the human condition. (Passerin d'Entreves 2006 p.55) All of these categories are crucial for understanding Arendt's conception of politics specifically, as well as her political philosophy overall, and are strongly interlaced in Arendt's analysis. In their interrelatedness they form the basis of her concern "with the settings of politics rather than politics itself". (Canovan 1998 p.ix) In short, she was concerned with the elements of the human condition that form subjectivities, which then, in turn, form the basis for the conditioning of the human for her political existence in the world. *Labour*, which "assures not only individual survival, but the life of the species" (Arendt 1998 p.8) is, for Arendt, traditionally related exclusively to the private realm, hidden from the public and neither part of nor relevant for politics proper in Arendt's understanding. Life processes and mortality are connected to this realm. *Work*, on the other hand, is the human activity that is required to provide a common and shared world by creating artefacts through which men can relate and endure. It is precisely work that can bestow "a measure of permanence and durability upon the futility of mortal life and the fleeting character of human time". (Arendt 1998 p.8) It is through work that worldliness can exist. *Action*, finally, is, for Arendt, the activity most closely linked to authentic politics, or politics proper, which can only play out in a public realm, within the space of appearances, where men can meet as equals in the pursuit of freedom. Action relates to the Arendtian conception of *natality* – of the very condition of birth, whereby new beginnings are immanent - and relies on the condition of plurality among men. (Arendt 1998 p.175)

In modernity, these tethered categorizations have, for Arendt, become unravelled with the positioning of life processes as a chief concern for the modern socio-political body, aided by the advent of new technologies, and result in a changed meaning of action and politics, specifically. The entire final chapter of *The Human Condition* is dedicated to this analysis. (Arendt 1998 pp.248 – 325; Swift 2008 pp.56 – 70) Authentic political action for Arendt is far removed from our contemporary understanding of politics as administration and this change is an essential feature of modernity for Arendt. In a historical trajectory, Arendt seeks to trace the factors that

gave rise to the modern, life-politics perspective, back to a number of key developments in history, beginning with the late 16th century. These include the Reformation and the resulting expropriations, the “discovery of the Archimedean point” (Arendt 1998 p.257), the advent and predominance of science and technology and the general ‘shrinking’ of the earth as a shared space. All have given rise to a modernity in which the important boundaries of categories and distinctions have all but disintegrated and given way to one dominant interest of society: that of its own perpetual progress and survival. The result is a modernity in which life necessities and life processes dominate the public sphere and the possibility for action has become severely limited. (Arendt 1998 p.41, p. 220, p.314)

The historically grounded trajectory of the role of life in the modern age in Arendt’s work has been challenging for many scholars and the strict categories of human life and life realms she establishes have been subject to much controversy throughout the years. (See for example Benhabib 1996; Canovan 1998; Fenichel-Pitkin 1998; Jay 2006; Kateb 1984) A number of scholars have interpreted Arendt’s analysis of society in modernity in light of the commoditisation of values (see for example Baehr 2003; Benhabib 1996; Bernstein 2006; Frampton 2006; Kohn and May 1997; Meade 1996) and have assessed ‘the social’ primarily as the “expansion of economic activities to the point where they become the central political concern of a society”.²¹ (Passerin d’Entreves 1994 p.25) However, I suggest that, as we read Arendt’s exposition of life and the human condition in the modern age against a biopolitics discourse, it becomes clear that she was indeed one of the early thinkers to define the modern age in biopolitical terms and clearly portrayed the political consequences of a dominant centrality of biological life in modern society, as this chapter aims to show.

Throughout her writing, Arendt offers a critical perspective that considers the prevalence of life at the centre of politics in not one but two significant aspects: life as the very target of political practices and its thanato-political consequences on one hand, and the theory of organic life processes and biology as serving as the very basis for political practices in modernity on the other. As such, her account considers not only the ‘making-political’ of biological life processes, or *zoe*, as the possibility to conceive of man as a member of a society or a community, emphasising his organic

²¹ This strand of interpretation of the social realm is indeed the dominant one in Arendt scholarship and her critique of Marx is most often related to rise of a political economy, focusing on the labourer as a Marxian figure and labour as a central activity in modernity.

aspects as a living being and in pursuit of one supreme goal: the perpetuation of the species. But Arendt further ties in another, ancillary consequence of the scientific process of truth-finding in a society in which *zoe* dominates the social realm and political concerns: the possibility for a naturalistic conception of political ends. The former approach of biopolitics dominates current biopolitical scholarship in International Relations and is in line with Foucault's expositions of biopolitical impacts on the subject and power relationships, while the latter aspect, theorising the allegorical underpinnings of organic and biological processes for the functions of the (nation) state, is often overlooked as an aspect of biopolitics. To capture a comprehensive biopolitical account in modernity, I thus suggest that, with Arendt, we should consider two key aspects of modern biopolitics: the technocratic politicisation of *zoe*, which constitutes the rendering of biological life and life processes as a target, as well as the *zoefication* of the political, which comprises the conception of the state and its people as a living organism that adheres to natural biological laws and is imbued with physical qualities, and shapes political practices accordingly. (Turda 2007) Both shape subjectivities substantially and considering both of these aspects of biopolitics provides us with a more comprehensive lens with which to examine political practices and activities and their relation to and justifications of political violence in modernity.

While *The Human Condition* is structured to present an analysis of the key features of Arendt's understanding of human life proper, Labor – Work – Action, as indicated earlier, aspects of the transformation of life-as-politics present an underlying and interwoven basis in her analysis. It is my aim to clarify these strands and explain how they form the basis of a biopolitical analysis in Arendt's work. As such, I see her biopolitical analysis as encapsulated in the following developments: world alienation, a shift in man's vantage point and the rise of the science of economy and technology. All of these aspects contain elements of either a basis in or an exclusive focus on biological life, or both, as relevant in the public and consequently the political sphere, to form a comprehensive biopolitical basis in modernity.

II. Prioritising Life Processes in Modernity

With her concept of world alienation, Arendt describes the development of a modern economy that allocated primacy of wealth creation over property ownership, a

process that was set off by a wave of expropriations during the Reformation. (Canovan 1995 p.150) The expropriation of certain classes (initially the poor, but this was later extended to other classes) and the severance of their ties to the common and shared world through property, initiated the liberation of the labour process from the previously secluded private sphere of the household into the public sphere of a society. It is on the basis of this elementary development that Arendt claims a hitherto non-existent class of labourers had emerged who “stood not only directly under the compelling urgency of life’s necessity but was at the same time alienated from all cares and worries which did not immediately follow from the life process itself”. (Arendt 1998 p.255) Canovan elaborates this transformation:

When peasants were deprived of the property that had given them their place in the common world, and were reduced to day labourers, they were, according to Arendt, transformed into embodiments of mere biological processes. (Canovan 1995 p.83)

For Arendt, the labourer, moved from the “hidden” private realm of the household and now appearing within a public social sphere at once gained significance not only as a resource for the cyclical process of production and consumption but was made into an element of the collective species ‘man’, whose survival is now publicly organised within and by the functions of the social, whereby “the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life, and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public”. (Arendt 1998 p.46; Owens 2012 pp.553-554) And it is within this collective public sphere that the social realm has now taken on the mandate to ensure the survival of the species and the very nature of the labouring process, the ‘taking care’ of life’s necessities, the meeting of biological demands, gains exclusive significance. In other words, it is in the liberation of labour power and its release into the public sphere that we see two crucial biopolitical developments in modernity: not only did the prevalence of labour in society turn the public human into a mere member of the species ‘human’, but it simultaneously provided, in its process-character, the very basis for a political economy that characterised the principle of wealth creation in modernity. Arendt notes:

Since the discovery of processes by the natural sciences had coincided with the discovery of introspection in philosophy, it is only natural that the biological processes within ourselves should eventually become the very model of the concept. ... Hence, it may seem almost inevitable that

the equation of productivity with fertility in the labour philosophy of the modern age should have been succeeded by the different varieties of life philosophy which rest on the same equation". (Arendt 1998 pp.116-117)

World alienation and the material consequences associated therewith, thus reflects the severance of man's relationship with a shared and common world, which ensued the moment when man was deprived of the property that both sheltered him from and simultaneously connected him to a common world and when those functions belonging to the private realm, in other words, matters of *zoe*, collapsed into the public realm. (Arendt 1998 pp.254 – 255) The function and role of a common and shared world that lends permanence to human life is of crucial significance to Arendt. For her, the world is a product of the human aspect of *work*, it is created not solely for immediacy or consumption but for a lasting temporal structure that exceeds the biological life cycle. It is the world that gives the human a context upon which to act. The world, as a tangible stage upon which human histories and history unfolds through events, connects the plurality of men, while simultaneously holding space to ensure the freedom of men to engage in political action. For Arendt, "without the world into which men are born and from which they die, there would be nothing but changeless eternal recurrences, the deathless everlastingness of the human as of all other animal species". (Arendt 1998 p.97) Only through the existence of a shared world do matters of biological cyclicity achieve meaning, life can gain a narrative and events can unfold. It is through an alienation from this shared and common world that the reduction of the human to his biological functions can ensue, in a sacrificial turn. As Arendt remarks, "the process of wealth accumulation, as we know it, stimulated by the life process and in turn stimulating human life, is possible only if the world and the very worldliness of man are sacrificed". (Arendt 1998 p.256)

In this shift of materiality, the creation of wealth for the on-going construction of and contribution toward a shared and permanent world gave way to a *zoefication* process in which the very basis for the broad category of life, one that allows for a condition of plurality among men, becomes drastically reduced to the necessity of life functions. Instead, an economy emerged that mirrors the life processes, channelling the "fertility of natural processes" (Arendt 1998 p. 255) in the creation of a surplus that feeds back into a cyclical process of creation and destruction. (Arendt 1998 pp. 255-256) As Arendt argues: "under modern conditions, not destruction but conservation spells ruin because the very durability of conserved objects is the

greatest impediment to the turnover process, whose constant gain in speed is the only constancy left where it has taken hold". (Arendt 1998 p.253), akin to what Zygmund Bauman identifies in the contemporary context as "Liquid Life", the "consuming life" that "casts the world and all its animate and inanimate fragments as objects of consumption" (Bauman 2007 p.9), with a limited shelf life and an inherent mandate for constant renewal. In such a form of society, the work-aspect of the human condition, so crucial for the creation of a shared world stage, *homo faber*, is rendered solely instrumental, whereby the products of his work are no longer the building blocks of a common lasting world in which man can present his unique self, but rather, the instrumentalisation of work as process renders *homo faber* essentially a labourer. (Arendt 1998 pp.305-308) Biological life processes of production and consumption have then become, in Arendt's account, not only the prime preoccupation of man's productivity, they have indeed become the very underpinnings of the understanding of man in his environment. Arendt recalls a Marxian expression for this transformation, the "'life process of society' ... whose wealth-producing capacity can be compared only with the fertility of natural processes where the creation of one man and one woman would suffice to produce by multiplication any given number of human beings". (Arendt 1998 p.255) This pre-eminence of productive labour power for a society that is dictated essentially by the biological necessities of life processes in the literal sense, and in the metaphorical sense in an economy that is focused on the perpetual process of surplus creation, engendered, in Arendt's account, the blurring of boundaries between the private and the public, replacing, through the emergence of the social, the family as the subject of life processes. In this substitution of society for family, "'blood and soil'" is supposed to rule the relationship between its members [and] homogeneity of population and its rootedness in the soil of a given territory become the requisites for the nation-state everywhere". (Arendt 1998 p.256) The social then merges with the political, whereby political action, in its delimited form has given "place here to pure administration" of life necessities. (Arendt 1998 p.45)

But how did this overarching biological consciousness emerge? And why did this urge of life necessities enter the public realm? The development of a modernity that is focused on life functions as a political concern is brought to a conclusion in Arendt with what she calls "*the victory of the animal laborans*". (Arendt 1998 p.320) Here

she delineates the emergence of a self-understanding of man as a biological being, not just in the private domain of the household, but rather on the public stage. It is here that the alteration of subjectivity is clearest. Where, through the consequences of world alienation, namely the loss of a common world, modern loss of faith, the process of secularisation, and the loss of “certainty for a world to come” (Arendt 1998 p.320) man was thrust upon his own interior and where “the only contents left were appetites and desires, the senseless urges of the body” (Arendt 1998 pp.320-321), man once more came to grapple with his own mortality in an quasi-existentialist quandary whereby the only tangible possibility for immortality was presented by the sheer cyclicity of the life processes. In Arendt’s words:

The only thing that could now potentially be immortal, as immortal as the body politic in antiquity and as individual life during the Middle Ages, was life itself, that is, the possibly everlasting life process of the species mankind. (Arendt 1998 p.321)

In the modern social body, where a society has but one chief and common interest, that of the survival and progress of the species, individual life is placed under the mandate of this goal. In Arendt’s account, this is exemplified by the fact that all society became a society of labourers, serving the survival of the species, rendered essentially un-free, impeding the possibility for political action proper. Instilled, however, in this type of society, is the acceptance of the priority of the biological, made manifest as a demand within a public realm, whereby this type of society of labourers “demands of its members a sheer automatic functioning, as though individual life had actually been submerged in the over-all life process of the species”. (Arendt 1998 p.322)

This formation at the heart of the *zoefication* of society in Arendt’s account has broad political consequences. The shift of life necessities and biological concerns from the private realm of the household and family into the social sphere and further, in the modern age, into the opaque nexus of the social and the political, according to Arendt’s distinction, reflects a growing predominance of biological concerns as a public matter that previously were of concern only to the private realm of the household. As Arendt states: “Through society, it is the life process itself which in one form or another has been channelled into the public realm”. (Arendt 1998 p.45) Where previously the survival not only of the individual but also of the species was secured and guaranteed by the family, the mandate of this function has, according to

Arendt, become a public matter in the social sphere. In her work on Arendt's realm of the social, Hanna Fenichel-Pitkin states: "the social connects with labour, since both the productive labour that supplies food and shelter and the reproductive labour by which women give birth are "subject to the same urgency of life" that rules over "the realm of the social". (Fenichel-Pitkin 1998 p.187) Arendt terms this the "unnatural growth of the natural" in society (Arendt 1998 p.46), a development she is strongly critical of. This social realm, for Arendt, thus is "the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and *nothing else* assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public" (emphasis added) (Arendt 1998 p.46) and political processes unfold accordingly. It is the life of the 'monolithic' collective, not of the individual that is at stake here. In a territorially bound public sphere of life necessities, "blood and soil" is supposed to rule the relationship between its members. (Arendt 1998 p.256) For Arendt, once initiated through world alienation, this processes of absorption of the life processes into a wider public realm represents a potential continuum on a larger scale and she draws a prognosis that foresaw the replacement of society with a notion of a comprehensive mankind, and that of state property with the entire earth. (Arendt 1998 p.257) And it is in this turn that a common public world upon which meaningful action, in concert and among others, can unfold and in which Arendt sees the dangers of a "worldless mentality of ideological mass movements. (Arendt 1998 p.257) It is also in this process, that action is substituted for behaviour and "personal ruler-ship" is replaced by an administrative bureaucracy, in which all and nobody 'rules'. (Arendt 1998 p.45)

But what does this shift mean for the relationship between life and politics, and how does this relate to what Arendt calls the social? What is essentially at stake here in this two-fold biopolitical process is on one hand, the transference of the care and concern over life processes out of the private and into the social realm, where societal homogenisation and political administration take on the function of the family. And on the other, the rendering 'biological' of political processes, in the perpetual creation of surplus and value, and for the continuation of production for the survival and progression of the species, which in turn perpetuates this endless cycle. In this process, life as *zoe* is both target and basis of a political perspective upon which administrative measures are built in the modern age. The other facet of life, *bios*, and

with it the capacity for authentic political action in the Arendtian sense is rendered virtually incapacitated. Fenichel-Pitkin recognises the biological relevance of this constellation clearly, even though she evades the obvious biopolitical dimension here. For Fenichel-Pitkin, it is evident that the unnatural growth of the natural becomes problematized when “politics ... would supply the collective body with a head to reassert human direction of its biological processes, of the socioeconomic forces generated by large numbers of interdependent people making their living”. (Fenichel-Pitkin 1998 p.11)

The problematic tension in the public sphere, which comprises both, the social and the political, for Arendt arises precisely if either the capacity for action is compromised or the condition of plurality is jeopardised. Bonnie Honig, among others has highlighted this incapacitating effect of a focus on life necessities in Arendt in her analysis of the failures of the French Revolution, where Arendt exemplifies the fateful collapse of the private and public sphere with the storming of the *Sans Culottes* on the political scene demanding their needs to be met, thereby giving rise to the centrality of life struggles, namely poverty. (Honig 1995) As Arendt writes in *On Revolution*, when the poor “appeared on the scene of politics, necessity appeared with them”. (Arendt 2006a p.50) And with sudden prominence and pre-eminence of life processes in the public realm, matters concerning *zoe* assumed the space of the creation of freedom, and right was constituted as a right to food, drink and reproduction – in short, the right to perpetuate not just individual life but rather that of the species, that of humanity. The conflict this creates for Arendt is obvious when we remember her claim: “in politics not life but the world is at stake”. (Arendt 2006b p.155) And it is precisely the jeopardy this world, the public space of plurality is in, when life, in its bare cyclical sameness becomes the core of politics, subsuming a heterogeneous plurality into one monolithic concern of “a mass that moves as one body and acts as though possessed by one will”. (Arendt 2006a p.84) In other words, the political basis is lost when political matters acquired a

biological imagery which underlies and pervades the organic and social theories of history, which all have in common that they see a multitude – the factual plurality of a nation or a people or society – in the image of one supernatural body driven by one superhuman, irresistible ‘general will’ (Arendt 2006a p.50)

This idea of a monolithic public space that is occupied by one dominant common interest, that of the survival and progression of the species, enforced not by one despotic ruler but rather by “sheer number” (Arendt 1998 p.40) is not a comfortable thought for Arendt. Here she becomes provocatively strict in her distinctions as she insists that what develops among humans in the social realm represents the antithesis of what Arendt values in the human condition for political action. In Arendt’s account, the full development of the social and its absorption of all life functions into its very remit means an almost inevitable exclusion of the possibility of action and therefore of politics proper all together. (Arendt 1998 p.40, p.45, p.321) Just as action, in Arendt’s analysis, is excluded from the original realm of the private household, as conditions of freedom and plurality cannot be sufficiently met, the social, as a kind of expansion of the household and its functions, offers no space or even need for action in order to fulfil the mandate of this public space and delimits the possibility for politics in the Arendtian sense significantly. In Arendt’s words: “it’s decisive that society, on all its levels, excludes the possibility of action”. (Arendt 1998 p.40) What replaces action is “a certain kind of behaviour, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ its members”. (Arendt 1998 p.40)

The urgent priority the social places on biological necessity jars strongly with the ideal Arendt has developed of a public space in which it is the plurality of men of difference that allows for the reality of action. Laura Bazzicalupo summarises Arendt’s objections succinctly: “When the cyclical metabolism of life occupies the entire public space in which the circle of production and consumption cannot be broken, we are ruled by necessity and survival, which is neither human nor politically free”. (Bazzicalupo 2006 p.112) In other words, when the life and survival of the species is at stake, no form of politics (proper) is given. For government, this means an exclusive two-fold mandate: the administration of means to perpetuate life processes and providing security for the population. For Arendt, this reduction of the possibility of action also represents a stark infringement for the possibility of freedom. She explains the detriment this means for freedom in modernity in her essay ‘What is Freedom’:

The rise of the political and social sciences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has even widened the breach between freedom and politics; for government, which since the beginning of the modern age

had been identified with the total domain of the political, was now considered to be the appointed protector not so much of freedom as of the life process, the interests of society and its individuals. (Arendt 2003b p.443)

For Arendt, the thought that the securitisation of life processes could result in greater levels of freedom presents a distortion of the very categories 'life' and 'freedom'. In Arendt's analysis, the life process "is not bound up with freedom, but follows its own inherent necessity". (Arendt 2003b p.443) In other words, freedom is entirely unrelated to the very course of the life process and its immanent urgencies and the political securitization of the life processes for the creation of freedom is a paradox in so far that it applies only to the very margins in which life itself is at stake. I will address the intricate relationship between this securitisation process and biopolitical modernity and its implications in Arendt, and with Arendt, in later chapters further.

The social sphere, for Arendt, thus is the space in which the human in modernity loses not only his capacity to act but also loses the material and physical space associated with it. The reduction of the human to a member of a species always represents for Arendt a diminution of their full human capacities and in the social sphere, which finds its *raison d'être* in the maintenance of the life processes of the species, these limitations become manifest. In the social realm wherein the common denominator of togetherness is not realised by the ability to act on difference, but rather based on the biological functions of the species and the homogenisation of the group for its benefit, conformism ensues thus paving the way to replace contingent action with predictable behaviour in a normalising turn. In Arendt's words: "...society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behaviour, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to normalise its members, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement". (Arendt 1998 p.40)

It is in this aspect that Benhabib levies her strongest criticism against Arendt's analysis. She finds this element of the social in Arendt lacking in two aspects and critiques that Arendt not only avoids a discussion of logic of rationality that renders behaviour predictable and homogenous, as Max Weber offers in his writings, but also fails to engage in a deeper investigation of institutions that facilitate the normalisation process. As such, Benhabib finds Arendt's exposition of the social as a contribution to social theory "thin and sometimes reductionist" (Benhabib 1996 p.26) and concludes that this element of Arendt's work must be read against the background of

and with other 20th century writers to render her work less implausible. However, in her analysis, Benhabib avoids a discussion of the life processes that so completely dominate the social and conflates the economization of life with the rise of life necessities in the public sphere without giving any further attention to the stark shift of a dominant focus on biological life in the social. It may be this inadvertent ‘blind-spot’ with regards to a biopolitical perspective of the social realm that gives rise to Benhabib’s claim that Arendt’s analysis of the mechanisms underlying mass society, driven by behaviours, are left wanting in terms of mechanisms and normalisation practices. When read against a biopolitical background, it becomes evident, that Arendt’s work offers a different but compatible perspective of how mass behaviour in a biopolitical society is normalised. Her analysis is focused less on institutional mechanisms, unlike Foucault’s, but on historical trajectories that have had a lasting influence on altering the human political perspective along with human subjectivities, and provide the cartography for a set of modern mechanisms for normalisation. As such, the developments that have enabled the shift of life into the centre of politics all contribute to the emergence of these mechanisms, whereby the rise of biopolitically infused political processes serves as the master mechanism in a life-politics context. In order to better understand how homogeneity and conformism in the social sphere comes to gain primacy over aleatory elements in action, we must consider another vital development in modernity Arendt addresses with clarity and concern: the advent and prevalence of science and technology in modern society.

III. Technologising Life: The Birth of Scientific Man

In the final chapter of the *The Human Condition*, ‘Vita Activa and the Modern Age’, Arendt frames her analysis with a historical trajectory of the pivotal developments that have come to shape and determine modernity. The biopolitical consequences of world alienation, as discussed above, present one strand of this trajectory; another important aspect is that of man’s shift of perspective from which he was able to interpret not only his broader environment, but also himself within it. It is this strand that represents the very underpinnings of how the institutionalisation of biopolitical life became a reality. Tracing the modern prevalence of science and technology in a political context all the way back to Galileo, Arendt paints a gloomy picture of how the shift from man as an earth-bound human to man as a universal being has come to facilitate and perpetuate conformity over difference, behaviour over action,

codification over speech, and has facilitated a perspective that posits man as maker of all things, including life, in modernity. At the very heart of this stands the birth of algebra and a shift from the spatially bound geometrics of ancient times to the ability to “grasp in symbols those dimensions and concepts which at most had been thought of as negations and hence limitations of the mind, because their immensity seemed to transcend the mind of mere mortals”. (Arendt 1998 p.265) With this revelation came the challenge to sense perception as being able to reveal reality, as the “modern *reductio scientiae ad mathematicam* has overruled the testimony of nature as witnessed at close range by human senses”. (Arendt 1998 p.256) What ensued was a lasting reliance on measuring and verification instruments - technologies, which exceed man’s sense perception but continue to remain man’s invention and thus originate always within man himself. This advent of technological reliance in turn led to a crucial change in man’s relationship with nature, as well as himself, as Arendt explains:

...even more significant was the fact that the new mental instrument ... opened the way for an altogether novel mode of meeting and approaching nature in the experiment. In the experiment, man realised his newly won freedom from the shackles of earth-bound experiences; indeed of observing natural phenomena as they were given to him, he placed nature under the conditions of his own mind...(Arendt 1998 p.265)

With the application of abstract mathematical principles and the rising confidence in the outcome of scientific experiments, life itself, its biological mechanisms were rendered translatable into patterns. Consequently, the mandate of the mathematisation of life, the duress of rendering life and its attributes analysable, organised and expressed in mathematical terms, and the ensuing aim to gain control over the unfolding of life processes came to shape man’s place in the world, as part of a scientific and increasingly technologised world, whereby “the reading of an instrument seems to have won a victory over both the mind and the senses”. (Arendt 1998 p.275) If we follow Arendt’s analysis, it becomes clear that the human mind has equally become the target of these mathematical mechanisms, so that the human is not only alienated from the world as a common stage but also removed from her position on earth by this newly found vantage point. As a consequence, according to Arendt, man understands himself as part of the very pattern he projects himself to be part of through his self-conceived experiments. Implied in this is a certain solipsistic

logic: if all that is true is authenticated through experiments, and all experiments are conceived by the human mind, in all its limits, modern man has little choice but to become a self-referential result of what science can demonstrate as possible. In this solipsism, man becomes an analysable being in so far as he follows certain patterns that are valid within specified parameters of what makes “man” and the potentialities he holds. The capacities for a normalising process that ensues in an Arendtian society, in which a multitude is present as ‘sheer number’ only and where the “communistic fiction” of one shared and common goal of society, namely that of the survival and progress of the species, is prevalent, are evident. (Arendt 1998 p.43, p.256)

Where sense perceptions no longer provide the basis for man’s place in the world, but must rely on the substitutive authority of technological means, the certainty of one’s actions, in the private as well as the public realm, is called into question. Arendt rightly detects a reductionist aspect here:

With the rise of modernity, mathematics does not simply enlarge its contents or reach out into the infinite to become applicable to the immensity of an infinite and infinitely growing, expanding universe, but ceases to be concerned with appearances at all. It is no longer the beginning of philosophy, of the “science” of Being in its true appearance, but becomes instead the science of the structure of the mind. (Arendt 1998 p.266)

And, importantly, by referring to Marx, she notes: “If Being and Appearance part company forever, and this – as Marx once remarked – is indeed the basic assumption of all modern science, then there is nothing left to be taken upon faith.” (Arendt 1998 p.275) Arendt presciently anticipated the technological pervasion that has come to determine our contemporary context, and that becomes increasingly relevant in discussions on post-humanity, when she notes that “we are surrounded by machines whose doings we cannot comprehend although we have devised and constructed them”. (Arendt 2006b p.264) When sense perceptions are insufficient tools in grasping the world, everything must be doubted, even to the extent of one’s own authority over biological functions and one’s political role. With the science revolution, truth comes to be tested and verified through hypotheses. And through these essentially man-made processes of verification, humans acquired the ability to analyse, systematise and eventually control nature. As Canovan states concisely: “Human beings found themselves able to dominate nature, not just observing what nature revealed but extracting information through experiments, and, furthermore,

subjecting it to the mathematical constructions of their own minds”. (Canovan 1995 p.151) The paramount points of authority in Arendt’s assessment of this *reductio scientiae ad mathematicam* are the “patterns of the human mind itself, which assures itself of reality and certainty within a framework of mathematical formulas which are its own product”. (Arendt 1998 p.284) Man-made verifications of mathematical logic then replace the previously established validity of sense perceptions. In this, however, lies a solipsistic turn Arendt clearly identifies:

While technology demonstrates the “truth” of modern science’s most abstract concepts, it demonstrates no more than that man can always apply the results of his mind, that no matter which system he uses for the explanation of natural phenomena, he will always be able to adopt it as a guiding principle for making and acting. (Arendt 1998 p.287)

What strikes Arendt as important in this development is the idea of the process, which, according to her, was unknown in pre-modern times. This constellation, the scientific rule of a mathematical logos and the operations required by scientific inquiry provided for Arendt the very basis for the primacy of labouring as a modern model for living. With the historical coincidence of the realisation of scientific processes as a mean for knowledge-finding and the shift toward introspection in modern philosophy “it is only natural that the biological process within ourselves should eventually become the very model of our new concept”. (Arendt 1998 p.116) When biological life becomes the modern life philosophy, it seems to be for Arendt an inevitable consequence that activity that falls under the domain of the process can only be transformed into labouring.

Based on such anthropocentric patterns of investigation, the human mind and body becomes both subject and object of science and technology. It is against the application of this development in modernity and with regards to the *zoefication* of economic and political processes that Arendt levels a grave critique in light of the rise of society and its preoccupation with biological life processes:

...it may be well to recall that its initial science of economics, which substitutes patterns of behaviour only in this rather limited field of human activity, was finally followed by the all-comprehensive pretension of the social sciences which, as “behavioral sciences,” aim to reduce man as a whole, in all his activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving animal. (Arendt 1998 p.45)

For Arendt, the emergence of the science of “man” as such determines the mandate of conformity in society, from which the possibility of a science of economics as ethically and politically relevant could have emerged. Again, in Arendt’s words:

Economics – until the modern age a not too important part of ethics and politics and based on the assumption that men act with respect to their economic activities as they act in every other respect – could achieve a scientific character only when men had become social beings and unanimously follow certain patterns of behavior, so that those who did not keep the rules could be considered to be asocial or abnormal. (Arendt 1998 p.42)

In this, Arendt detects a perilous development: where biological life processes rule supreme, where scientific inquiry into the human being reduces humans to their measurable, calculable, experimentally verifiable and, not least, predictable functions and where technology assists in further marginalising the realm of experience for humans, they inescapably become more narrowly defined in their full human potentiality and are rendered publicly relevant only as members of the animal species man, whose biology and behaviour can be determined, predicted and eventually controlled scientifically. In the modern context, Arendt critiques, this preoccupation with life facticities – *zoe*, and through the technological possibility for replication and the intervention into *zoe* – lets humans see themselves as essentially self-producing, thereby limiting the possibility for action, risking the loss of a heterogeneous plurality in a mass of sameness and cyclicity and placing increased emphasis on scientifically predictive qualities. Etienne Balibar lucidly elaborates this turn in Arendt and notes that an increasingly technicised reproduction of life provided an increasingly encroaching substitution of “the good life” in an alienated artificiality. He notes: “The paradoxical result is that the political becomes reduced to its natural basis in the inverted form of an absolute artificiality”. (Balibar 2007 p.729) Here again, if we follow Arendt, we see not only the realm of freedom for politics proper severely reduced, but also the possibility for action, as the basis for an Arendtian understanding of politics, considerably limited. For Arendt, the normalising processes that ensue with the universality of *animal laborans* culminate essentially in a fully developed labouring society. In a gloomy assessment she states:

The last stage of the labouring society, the society of jobholders, demands of its members a sheer automatic functioning, as though individual life had actually been submerged in the over-all life process of the species and the only active decision still required of the individual

were to let go, so to speak, to abandon his individuality, the still individually sensed pain and trouble of living, and acquiesce in a dazed “tranquilized,” functional type of behaviour. (Arendt 1998 p.322)

Arendt recognised the political dangers inherent in the mathematisation of life early. Foucault, only a decade later, describes this very development in terms of biopower, the power that renders the “seething mass, which is sometimes murky and sometimes bloody” (Foucault 2004 p.54) organised and manageable through the systematic collection of knowledge and ‘hard facts’. Here, in Arendt’s analysis of the scientific revolution and its negative political consequences, she offers a foundational perspective for Foucault’s theory of biopolitical institutions. The shift in governmental perspective from ruler-ship to administration and the management of life functions for the sake of the species, and the demand for behaviour so as to make life statistically determinable and yield “correct predictions” (Arendt 1998 p.43) forms the very basis of the mechanisms available to establish a politicisation of *zoe* and perpetuate a biopolitical modernity, for “it is no longer the secret political ideal of a society which, entirely submerged in the routine of everyday living, is at peace with the scientific outlook in its very existence”. (Arendt 1998 p.43) And, in Arendt’s analysis, this condition eventually provided an opportunity for “the society of scientists” to organise themselves in groups and bring about “the radical change of mind of all modern men which became a politically demonstrable reality” in the 20th century.²² (Arendt 1998 p.270) Only through the behavioural integration of man as a predictable and controllable entity, as a “mere part of a society that conditioned and determined the individuals as the whole determines its parts”, (Arendt 1953 p.304) and as considering himself as self-constituting, did the possibility for totalitarian ideologies and politics become a realistic possibility, as Arendt indicates most clearly in the final chapter in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. The pivotal combination of man as an analysable and mathematically ascertainable being, a reduced realm for political action and the concept of a ‘zoefied’, a natural basis for political action all play a contributory part for Arendt in the possibility of totalitarian reign. It is where the politicisation of *zoe* and the *zoefication* of politics come together most fatefully in a biopolitical reality. It is particularly the latter concept - the naturalisation of the

²² In line with Arendt’s understanding of power, this forming of scientific societies presented for her one of the few possibilities for political action in the Arendtian sense. Even if the claim of scientist organisations is non-political or even anti-political, in Arendt’s terms it is the very locus of the formation of a political institution. As she claims: “No scientific teamwork is pure science” (Arendt 1998 p.270), there is, for Arendt always an element of political action or at least the possibility for it.

political - that has been identified by André Duarte to hold the strongest potential for biopolitical violence, although he does not explicitly elaborate the *zoefication* of political acts. (Duarte 2006 p.418) Here, Duarte rightly stresses the negative significance a naturalised concept of politics has for Arendt as he highlights this aspect in her work accordingly and asserts: “when power and violence are interpreted in terms of biological metaphors this can only produce more violence, especially when race is involved”. (Duarte 2006 p.418) I will engage with this train of thought in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4.

Arendt’s theories of a modernity that has placed the glorification of biological processes at its political centre comprises a simultaneous critique of both Marx and Darwin. In her controversial criticism of Marx’s rendering of history as a scientific process and, likewise, Darwin’s theories of biology as a process, she explains how the understanding of nature or of history as a progressive and teleological development was so dangerous as a basis for totalitarian ideology. In her essay “Ideology and Terror”, Arendt most clearly exposes the essentially modern change in perspective she ascribes to Marx and Darwin. With this scientific shift, both history and nature were no longer understood as the “stabilizing source of authority for the actions of mortal men” (Arendt 1953 p.309) but rather are defined in terms of processes, in other words, in terms of movement. In her analysis, Arendt understands the Darwinian concept of the development of the species as an absorption of the cyclical biology of life by a progressive linearity of history, thrusting the circularity of life into a process and development driven linearity of life processes with predictable outcomes. She critiques Darwin strongly for this turn:

Darwin's introduction of the concept of development into nature, his insistence that, at least in the field of biology, natural movement is not circular but unilinear, moving in an infinitely progressing direction, means in fact that nature is, as it were, being swept into history, that natural life is considered to be historical. (Arendt 1953 p.309)

In other words, Darwin’s theories of the survival of the fittest have enabled an ideology of a natural law of movement, which appears to determine, as Arendt observes, that there is an inherent teleology in the laws of nature by which it is destined to fulfil itself²³. (Villa 1999 p.18) In such a context, what is at stake in Nazi

²³ While it is often noted that Arendt does not do justice to Marx in interpreting his theories of a socialised mankind as a basis of mankind, it should perhaps also be highlighted that Arendt might be

totalitarianism as an ideology then is the fulfilment of mankind – a process that only ends when all that is unfit to live, all that disrupts the progressive process of the movement of natural laws is eliminated fully, whereby “[c]ontingency would be eliminated, replaced by an inescapable historical or natural necessity”. (Villa 1999 p.20-21) Mankind, in this political ideology, is thus comprehended as a multitude not in difference but in its homogeneity, whereby it is claimed to be possible to identify that which is detrimental to the species. In Arendt’s analysis, in Nazi totalitarianism, this logic is developed to embrace, in principle and ambition, the whole population, which, in its mandate for inclusion is pressed against each other to become one, whereby the individual quite simply becomes a member of the species. Nazi biopolitics then receives its murderous legitimacy not by the exception, as Agamben states, but by referring to something with greater and more permanent legitimacy – not the laws of nature, but the laws of development of nature. To ‘realise’ mankind’s potential, that which is unfit to live must quite naturally be eliminated. And this process, in theory, only ends when mankind is fully realised. As we have seen earlier, it is evident for Arendt, that this development can only be achieved when man understands himself not as a unique individual, bestowed with the freedom of act, but rather when the radical uncertainties that thinking and acting can engender are reduced, if not eliminated. The mechanisms employed in Nazi politics to pursue and ensure that nature can “race freely through mankind, unhindered by any spontaneous human action” (Arendt 1953 p.310), are realised, according to Arendt, through terror. By eliminating the basis of positive laws, designed to constitute boundaries between and for men to act in favour for the supra-human mandate of the development of nature, the laws of movement.

Terror as the execution of a law of movement whose ultimate goal is not the welfare of men or the interest of one man but the fabrication of mankind, eliminates individuals for the sake of the species, sacrifices the “parts” for the sake of the “whole”. (Arendt 1953 p.311)

Indeed, Arendt claims, it is through this substitution in totalitarianism that the spaces between men, which provide the grounds not only for a condition of plurality among men but also for action and contingency, are eliminated and men in their uniqueness

charged with erroneously crediting Darwin with theorising patterns of biological evolution of mankind. Darwin did not, in fact, explicitly project his theories of the survival of the fittest in the animal kingdom onto mankind. This connection was made by others and Darwin himself largely remained obscure on the topic of human evolution. (See for example Bajema 1988, Bowler 1989, Vincenzo Bizzo 1992 and others)

“disappear into One Man of gigantic dimensions”. (Arendt 1953 p.312) The “iron band” of terror, demands that man becomes merely a part of this ‘supra-human one’ and, Arendt claims, is led to act accordingly. She states:

In the iron band of terror, which destroys the plurality of men and makes out of the many the One who unfailingly will act as though he himself were part of the course of History or Nature, a device has been found not only to liberate the historical and natural forces but to accelerate them to a speed they never would reach if left to themselves. (Arendt 1953 p.313)

In order to integrate the full plurality of man into a single entity that is concerned primarily with the development of nature, action is a hindrance and must be substituted for behaviour. While Arendt does not elaborate in greater detail the very technologies that turn action into behaviour in a society that is conceived as one, with one singular interest, in *Origins*, she expands on this essentially modern development in the *Human Condition*, as I have shown earlier. This allows us to more fully comprehend how thoroughly she understood the modern preoccupation with life at the heart of public concerns and its grave biopolitical consequences in modernity.

IV. The Elephant in the Room – Is an Arendtian Biopolitics Possible?

Both, Roberto Esposito (2008) and Giorgio Agamben’s (1998, 2000) expositions on the subject of biopolitics are to a greater or lesser degree directly reliant on Arendt’s work in *The Human Condition* and *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, and while both arrive at a different notion of biopolitics²⁴, the outcome of their perspectives builds on Arendtian theories: the notion of the camp as the inevitable logic of a biopolitical modernity for Agamben, and the significance of birth as re-birth in an affirmative biopolitics for Esposito, for example. Yet both authors find fault with Arendt as a biopolitical theorist. Agamben critiques the fact that Arendt fails to isolate a biopolitical perspective in her comprehensive work on totalitarianism and considers this a grave neglect in light of her other work, specifically in *The Human Condition*, in which she “analyzed the process that brings homo laborans – and, with it, biological life as such – gradually to occupy the very centre of political scene in modernity”. (Agamben 1998 p.3) Esposito, on the other hand, reproaches Arendt for

²⁴ Agamben frames a predominantly negative and critical account of biopolitics in his scholarship, while Esposito seeks to rescue an affirmative potentiality in biopolitics, specifically through his account of natality in Arendt’s work (Agamben 1998; Esposito 2008), and both draw on Arendt to do so.

having a “blind spot” with regards to biopolitics: “where there is an authentic politics, a space of meaning for the production of life cannot be opened; and where the materiality of life unfolds, something like political action cannot emerge”. (Esposito 2008 p.150) He asserts that it is indeed Arendt’s lack of thinking the category of life through sufficiently which prevented her from a, in Esposito’s opinion, more accurate interpretation of life and politics. These are assertive claims and coming from two highly prominent scholars of biopolitics, this criticism indeed begs the question: is an Arendtian account of biopolitics even thinkable?

Agamben, himself reliant on much of Arendt’s work for the concept of bare life (*zoe*) in the figure of the refugee and the camp as the logic of modernity, is somewhat inequitable toward Arendt as a biopolitical thinker. As we have seen earlier, her assessment of totalitarianism was indeed more faceted than Agamben concedes. Furthermore, a political theorisation of an Arendtian biopolitics as the trajectory of the shift of life into politics, as delineated above, requires a contextualisation of the core of the work she offers on life politics in *The Human Condition* and *The Origins of Totalitarianism* with other texts she produced, to better understand the consequences for politics and the ethics of violence as a political tool in contemporary modernity. Where Agamben sees Foucault as completing that which Arendt seemingly has ignored, I suggest that Arendt indeed provides us with a basic and historic understanding of a trajectory of life as politics that converges in many aspects with the biopolitical account Foucault delivers and on which Agamben builds his own theories.²⁵

Perhaps more pressingly at this point, however, is the issue of politics in Arendt’s biopolitical account. As Esposito highlights in his criticism of Arendt, the issue of how the social realm and its preoccupation with life necessities constitutes simultaneously a sphere of politics remains somewhat elliptical. As indicated earlier, Arendt makes a strong assertion that that which belongs to the private realm is disassociated from the political sphere. The perpetual cycle of biological need and life necessities, and with it the labouring processes, for Arendt, exclude the possibility of politics proper in the Arendtian sense. How then, can we understand her analysis of the primacy of life necessities as basis and target in the public realm as *biopolitics*?

²⁵ The next chapter contextualises the biopolitical aspects in the work of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault in greater detail.

This aspect of Arendt, her exposition as to what should or should not be a matter of politics, has received much criticism and continues to prove controversial in a contemporary context. (See for example Calhoun and MacGowan 1997; Schaap 2010; Bernstein 2006) While I acknowledge that the issue of what constitutes politics is complex in Arendt's work, particularly when viewed from a contemporary perspective, this is not the place to elaborate on the controversy or even delve deeper into the issue of whether she is indeed right or wrong, as it would exceed the scope of this chapter. What I intend to show here is that there is indeed a way to understand Arendt's strict categorisation of biological life processes as labour in modernity as life-as-politics, or biopolitics.

In order to be able to understand how Arendt fits into the context of biopolitical theory it is helpful to recall, that Arendt, in her characteristic manner of drawing strict distinctions, differentiates between politics and government or rulership. For Arendt, politics proper is, in close keeping with the Greek understanding of the term, an activity that takes place, facilitated through speech, among a group of free equals acting in a public sphere. Political action, for Arendt, comes to pass through action by unique individuals in a public sphere and consensus building and is never entirely predictable in its final outcome and consequence. It is in the capacity for political action, that men distinguish themselves from both "beast and god", and as such the "exclusive prerogative of man". (Arendt 1998 p.22) Politics among men is reliant on plurality, freedom and the existence of difference among men in a public sphere that provides the space for political action to unfold. The private realm of the household, occupied with life's necessities presents for Arendt the very opposite of the condition for politics. It is a sphere exclusively dedicated to "mastering the necessities of life", so as to provide the necessary freedom for man to engage in politics among his equals²⁶. Arendt explains: "within the realm of the household, freedom did not exist, for the household head, its ruler, was considered to be free only in so far as he had the power to leave the household and enter the political realm where all were equals". (Arendt 1998 p.32) In Arendt's account, always referring to the ancient Greek model of living together, the "natural community" of the household was born out of

²⁶ This is a highly contentious point in Arendt and numerous scholars have pointed out that she may not have thought through the consequences of her analysis when she refers to the gaining of freedom from the labouring processes in order to be able to engage in politics. More interesting, however, is her concept of courage. For Arendt politics proper takes courage. But not the courage that is so often association with heroic deeds or death defying acts, but rather to pay less heed to the urgencies of life processes in order to be free to engage in politics.

necessity and it is necessity, biological necessity that is, that is the sole focus of this realm. In the household, not plurality but the primacy of biological needs matters. Furthermore, the household, built on hierarchical structures of inequality, precluded the very possibility of providing a realm in which equality is granted by men to men. Additionally, the realm of the household is concerned not with difference but rather sameness, that is the sameness of the cyclicity of life processes, the sameness as represented by one collective concern – survival. The *zoe*fication of the social, quasi-public realm, and the merging of the political with the social in modernity bears clear tensions in an Arendtian account. Where life processes dominate, as a basis or as a target, conditions of freedom, plurality and difference cannot be provided and authentic political action becomes problematic.

In the rise of this quasi public realm, the social, which is dominated by the mandate of biological life necessity, the boundaries between what for Arendt belongs to the private realm (the household) and the public realm (political spaces) is blurred, “because we see the body of peoples and political communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs have to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide administration of housekeeping”. (Arendt 1998 p. 28) The political form of the social, as Arendt states, is made manifest by the nation state. The nation state thus represents a political form charged with matters of life processes and necessity, the very matters that are for Arendt excluded from political concerns. To better understand the political form of a biopolitically-focused nation state I would like to suggest a term that Andrew Schaap employs in his analysis of the politics of need: an anti-political politics. (Schaap 2010) In his critique of Arendt’s analysis of the labouring processes as non-political in modernity, he frames her argument in terms of Arendt’s anti-political politics of need. While I differ in my assessment of Arendt’s analysis of life politics from that of Schaap in his essay, the concept of an anti-political biopolitics perhaps best illuminates how the modern preoccupation with life processes can be understood as life-as-politics. While matters of life urgency and with it animal laborans excludes action for Arendt, and with it the possibility for politics proper, it takes place within a formal political organisation represented by the social sphere in modernity, i.e. among men, regulated by men, managed by political governments. While the social subsumes the political, it simultaneously changes dramatically what politics was meant to represent in modernity. What we, in the present day, consider to

be forms of politics, and specifically those forms of politics to which biopolitical analyses often refer (liberal, democratic, national, etc), specifically as they relate to contemporary issues of biopolitics, is, for Arendt, more akin to governmental administration and bureaucratic rule. Technically then, we are faced with what amounts to a definitional problem in considering Arendt as having conceived of a *biopolitical* analysis, as for her, the shift of life into the public (social) realm also meant an impediment of the faculty of action and a concomitant de-politicisation. However, if we accept the dual notion that, in an Arentian sense, the biopolitics of modernity are anti-political, the concept of biopolitics in Arendt's analysis is coherent with her perspectives of what belongs and does not belong to politics proper and is easier to follow.

Conclusion

Arendt's analysis of life-as-politics can best be understood as a critique of liberal biopolitics in modernity. While some consider the core of Arendt's biopolitical theory to lie anchored in the concept of natality (see for example Braun 2006, Esposito 2008; Vatter 2006), I argue that her analysis and exposition of the modern shift of life into the political centre, through the manifestation of the social realm, presents a thorough understanding of the core biopolitical issues as they have become part of the contemporary discourses on the topic. While Arendt focuses neither on the role of the sovereign, nor on distinct institutions associated with biopolitical mechanisms, nor does she engage in an analysis of the underlying power-structures, she presents in her work a thorough consideration of the category life in its entirety and biological life necessities in particular, as both, the basis and the target of political forms in modernity. This allows us to more clearly identify how techno-biological subjectivities are shaped and conditioned by a biopolitically informed rationale. It is this biological-technological rationale that Arendt highlights clearly, that provides the cartography for certain practices of political violence and their ethical framing today.

As the chapter has sought to show, both the *zoefication* of politics and the politicisation and technologisation of biological life, or *zoe*, are a relevant aspects in considering biopolitical subjectivities and thus have decisive consequences. Both aspects of Arendt's strands of biopolitics then harbour significant implications for the

modern conflation of violence with politics, and the ethical justifications with which they are narrated. This will be my focus in later chapters. In what follows, I will engage in greater detail with the implications this specific biopolitical rationale has for perspectives of and possibilities for politics and how this relates to the use of violence. Where some scholars see an impasse in reconciling biology and politics in an Arendtian account, I argue that it is indeed possible to establish a coherent account of abiopolitical modernity in Arendt when we consider crucial distinctions in Arendt's conception of politics with those of a contemporary perspective of politics primarily as management and administration. In understanding Arendt's theory of life-politics as an essentially anti-political politics in modernity, it is possible to see beyond this alleged impasse, as I will elaborate in chapter three. What follows next, however, is a paramount engagement with Foucault in order to situate the Arendtian account in the wider biopolitical discourses. This will make clear where she exceeds Foucault in offering a different lens and provide the context for the remainder of the thesis. The next chapter contrasts the relevant details and approaches of both thinkers.

2: CONVERGENCES AND CONTRASTS - BIOPOLITICAL TRAJECTORIES AND TECHNOLOGIES IN FOUCAULT AND ARENDT

As a category of revolutionary thought, the notion of historical necessity had more to recommend itself than the mere spectacle of the French Revolution ... Behind the appearances was a reality, and this reality was biological and not historical, though it appeared now perhaps for the first time in the full light of history.

Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*

[W]hat occurred in the eighteenth century in some Western countries ... was a different phenomenon having perhaps a wider impact than the new morality; this was nothing less than the entry of life into history...

Michel Foucault, *The Will to Knowledge*
– *The History of Sexuality VI*

1. Disciplinary Tactics, Biopolitical Strategies: Technologies and Dispositifs

While the focus of this project centres on the biopolitical theories in Arendt's work, it would be a gross oversight not to engage with Foucault, as the proverbial father of a theory of biopolitics in modernity, in order to delineate more clearly where Arendt's work on life-politics in modernity might provide an additional insight into how biopolitical structures inform our understanding and acceptance of violence in our contemporary context. Both Arendt and Foucault appear alongside each other in a wide range of contemporary scholarship²⁷, and the two thinkers converge in many aspects of their respective analyses of the challenges of modernity: both emphasise the distinctly modern shift of biological life into the centre of public concern, which provides the political underpinning of a monolithic collective, and both use a historical trajectory to approach their respective analysis of how modern structures have emerged.²⁸ With that in mind, this chapter seeks to engage with the key features

²⁷ See for example Agamben 1998; Allen 2002; Barder and Debrix 2009; Birmingham 1994; Blencowe 2010; Braun 2007; Dolan 2005; Duarte 2006; Esposito 2008; Edwards 1999; Enns 2007; Fassin 2009; Gordon 2002; Hanssen 2000; Oksala 2010; Orlie 1996; Taylor 2007; Vatter 2006 and others.

²⁸ Surprisingly, Foucault, in elaborating his theories on biopolitical techniques and *dispositifs* in modernity has remained virtually silent on the political theories of Arendt, who wrote her most salient analyses a good two decades prior to Foucault and who, in many respects, had already engaged with some of the biopolitical realisations in modernity, as the previous chapter has aimed to highlight. It can be assumed that Arendt's work was available to Foucault at the time (Bertani and Fontana 2004 p.287), however, the reason for his omission of a deeper engagement with her scholarship can only be guessed at. Bertani and Fontana suggest that this is largely due to Foucault not keeping records of

in which the Arendtian and the Foucaultian models of biopolitics show parallels and in which aspects they differ. The chapter looks specifically at some key elements that characterise and determine the biopolitical perspectives of both. Finally, I seek to then identify some key contributions the Arendtian account of biopolitics can offer for the analysis of political violence in contemporary modernity, that are relevant to this project. But before we delve more deeply into the symmetries and asymmetries of the respective accounts of life politics in Arendt and Foucault, it is helpful to briefly establish the cornerstones of Foucault's account of biopolitics in modernity.

Where the term biopolitics appears in contemporary discourses in International Relations, the name Michel Foucault is typically associated with it. Foucault was one of the eminent analysts of the subject 'life' in modernity and has essentially provided the foundation for much of the biopolitical examination of power structures and the production of knowledge in modernity. His analytical framework of power, constituted as bio-power in western modernity, has been much referred to and widely used by politics scholars (most enthusiastically perhaps by critical theorists) in explaining and understanding national and international political and social relations. While he was not the first to use the term biopolitics, his theories are dominant in the biopolitics discourses in International Relations today. To understand why Foucault has provided such a novel and persuasive lens with which to analyse the role and function of life-as-politics in a complex contemporary modernity it is helpful to briefly examine Foucault's aim of analysis in which he seeks to examine the "modes of objectification that transform human beings into subjects" (Foucault 2002b p.326) and the concomitant trajectory of power, beginning with the docility of bodies, as instituted through disciplinary powers in the late eighteenth century.

In his detailed account of the formation of malleable bodies in *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault lays the groundwork for a technology of power and its political investment in which the physical body becomes subject to punctilious methods of control,

which books he had read and was furthermore not particularly interested in the polemics of an exchange with individual authors. (Bertani and Fontana 2004 p.287) Agamben, on the other hand, suggests that Foucault's study of biopolitics without any reference to Arendt is testament to the difficulties inherent in thinking about these matters. (Agamben 1998 p.4) Whatever the reasons, we can perhaps presume that Foucault was not entirely ignorant of Arendt's work at his time of writing and some of the parallels between Foucault and Arendt might well stem from a familiarity which the French philosopher might have had with Arendt's political theories on the structures and challenges of life-politics in modernity, paired with a shared background of common influences.

instituted through temporal and spatial forms of restriction. (Foucault 1991 p.135) The natural body becomes the target, not *en mass* as an indivisible entity, but in its various distinct mechanisms and functions, thus making the body ‘analysable’ and subsequently ‘manipulable’. In order to wield this power effectively to work on the body, the physical body needs to be rendered in numerical and mathematical term, so as to apply measures and evaluation for a progressive development of the body.²⁹ Through continuous and meticulous exercise, temporal measurement, spatial restrictions and the establishment of the notion of rank, the natural body is thus shaped into an instrument for efficiency, productivity and achievement, it becomes insertable and replaceable, in short, a commodity. Foucault importantly notes that this particular ‘control of the operations of the body’ differs from slavery in that it is not an appropriation of the body which is achieved through violent coercion, nor is it comparable to the regulations of ‘service’, with a “non-analytical, unlimited relation of domination”. (Foucault 1991 p.136-137) Rather, these techniques of ‘docility-utility’ exerted upon the human body are “directed not only at the growth of skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful and conversely”. (Foucault 1991 p.137) The power wielded here is for Foucault in essence a political matter, as the disciplinary practices became “formulas of control”. (Foucault 1991 p.139) The body thus is rendered subject to the politics of docility, made into an object of utility in this political context. It is a political objectification of the physical subject through these anatomo-political technologies, from which “man of modern humanism was born”. (Foucault 1991 p.141) This politics of the anatomy, however, is for Foucault only one pole around which “the organization of power over life” (Foucault 1998 p.138) was installed. The second pillar was the growing mechanics of power over the population as a wholesale entity, a political power that Foucault first named ‘biopolitics’ in volume 1 of *The History of Sexuality*.

In conceiving of biopolitics, Foucault shifts away from the disciplining of the individual docile body through codified practices of control that divide relations of space and time, toward a politics that controls the health, maintenance, organization and management of populations. Biopolitics is thus a technology of power that exerts

²⁹ It is worth highlighting that, unlike Arendt, Foucault refrains from addressing the historical development of the prevalence of the mathematisation of life that essentially enables this analysability of the human body.

its reign not solely on the ‘anatomy-politics’ but on the politics of the human race. (Foucault 2004 p.240) It is not the discipline, surveillance and control of the individual physical body is of concern, but the health and safety of an entire population, its birth rates, mortality rates and longevity. (Foucault 2004 p.243) The preservation and security of the human race becomes the basis for a new type of discipline for the regulation, organization and management of a body of multiples. As such, the population becomes an economic and political resource for the perpetuation of production and consumption, an asset, the life of which must be preserved, increased and extended. Control over the life of populations is thus exercised through the institution of measures, statistics, forecasts, categorisations and rankings. (Foucault 2004 p.246) Here again, what could be considered a *mathematisation* of life and life processes, to speak in Arendtian terms, fundamentally underpins the Foucaultian theory, although he does not explicitly establish this in his own work. These practices employ the systematic collection of knowledge and ‘hard facts’, so as to make the disorganised, messy and unruly mass of people organised and manageable. (Foucault 2004 p.54) As a result, it is not individuals that, collectively, shape and define a population, but rather the population that defines the individual through naturalised modalities and regulations placed upon the individual. The individual then, in turn, is shaped and defined by the practices and discourses related to the promotion of health and management of populations, acts in accordance with the practices and discourses and thus comes to govern itself in a perpetuating and reflexive manner. In his essay ‘Governmentality’ Foucault states the matter of self-government in such systems of biopolitical modalities as follows:

In contrast to sovereignty, government has as its purpose not the act of government itself but the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, and so on; and the means the government uses to attain these ends are themselves all, in some sense, immanent to the population; it is the population itself on which government will act either directly through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly, through techniques that will make possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rates, the directing of the flow of populations into certain regions or activities and so on. (Foucault 2002b p.217)

Biopolitics differs from the discipline of the sovereign in the practices it employs, as it does not seek to alter the individual as a physical body, but rather impose a generality onto the individual as an element of a population. However, as Foucault

points out, the practices and institutions of biopolitics do not entirely replace the disciplines that exist for the control of the individual malleable body, rather they exist on a different, supplementary level, building a more comprehensive network of power that reaches to the far levels of societal structures. (Foucault 2004 p.270) This creates a matrix that serves to control the population, and thus the individual as an element of a population in a multitude of aspects in their lives. (Jabri 2007)

The modern humanity Foucault traces in his work gives rise to a central question for him and in his lecture series, published under the title *Society Must Be Defended*, he asks: “how can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centred upon biopower?” (Foucault 2004 p.254) In a system that hails the preservation, proliferation and security of the comprehensive human race, Foucault introduces a variant of the concept of racism as the binary counterpart to biopolitics, the politics of death, of letting die that which is to be located as outside of and a danger to the human race. As such, racism has two significant aspects for Foucault: firstly, to separate “the field of the biological that power controls” in order to disconnect various elements of a population into sub populations, thereby creating a binary structure. (Foucault 2004 p.255) Secondly, the institution of racism serves as a validation of the prevalence of one (good) race over another (bad) race. The relationship becomes biological, “the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (...) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer”. (Foucault 2004 p.255)

While a Foucaultian theory of biopolitics in its decentralising structure essentially undermines the role of sovereign power in the traditional sense - the legitimised power to “take a life or let live” (Foucault 2004 p.241) - there remains a moment of decision, whether that be the decision to engage in an act of war, or any other decision that affects the very biopolitical remits of a population. In this, Foucault points to Nazi Germany where a nation state has asserted its sovereignty through the employment of biopolitical tactics that eventually, if not necessarily enable genocidal practices. In Foucault’s words: “The Nazi State makes the field of the life it manages, protects, guarantees and cultivates in biological terms absolutely coextensive with the right to kill anyone, meaning not only other people but also its own people”. (Foucault 2004 p.260) As Foucault explains, in Nazi Germany, the totalitarian administration utilized biopolitical modalities to establish its own biopower, based on

the exclusion and subsequent elimination of that which was deemed ‘in-human’ to allow the human race to prosper. Technological means of communication and media were employed by the state to propagate the Aryan ideology and to depict specific non-Aryan ethnicities as vermin, as animalistic, as in-human, so as to facilitate the normative exclusion and the subsequent state of exception (*Ausnahmezustand*) in which legal restrictions to act upon the established discourse were suspended.

In this construct, the enactment of exclusionary practices, however, takes place no longer at the hands of a single sovereign but through multiple networks of both disciplinary and biopolitical institutions. As Foucault recognizes, disciplinary power and biopower thus perform a supplementary role to one another, in a web of power that reaches into the very interstices of societal levels. (Foucault 2004 p.250) It can only be through the creation of the docile, manageable body that the preservation of a distinct and manageable population is enabled and normalizing practices and discourses for the preservation of the population can be instituted. Perhaps comparable to Hannah Arendt’s *animal laborans*, the Foucaultian subject is conditioned to become “submerged in the over-all life function of the species” (Arendt 1998 p.322), the disciplined individual is accordingly shaped into a “fighting machine, a working machine, or indeed a consumer machine” (Jabri 2007 p.57) to consume for the promotion of a population, to work for the proliferation of a population or to fight wars for the protection of a population – in short, the individual is rendered an object of utility for that which sustains and shapes that very object as subject. It is through the institution of political economy in conjunction with immanent disciplinary technologies that Foucault’s power *dispositifs* come to establish a range of relations between the power structures that reach through the social body and function within the minutia of societal relations and perhaps also within a global sphere of societal interactions. (See for example Reid 2006; Jabri 2007) The synergetic constitution of disciplinary tactics and biopolitical strategies hence frames the procedure in which the contingency of human life is shaped into productive and consumptive life, while producing the biopolitical *dispositifs* that enable a population to wage war in pursuit of its preservation.

In the context of this project there are two aspects in Foucault’s analysis that are thus critical to his biopolitical perspective: the body as a subject to and of political power structures and the perpetuation of the practices and norms that shape the individual

and collective body through institutions. Both work on and through the subject. This raises the question of ‘what is the subject in Foucault’, a question that has widely been problematized. As Amy Allen highlights, a wide range of scholars see Foucault’s position as anti-subjectivist. (Allen 2000 p.115) This position essentially posits that in Foucault’s analysis, the subject is merely a husk for the power inscriptions of anatomic-political and biopolitical technologies. As such, the Foucaultian subject is entirely constituted through the discourses and practices that work upon the body and the population – in short, the anti-subjectivist position holds that Foucault does away entirely with the subject as such – it becomes an object only. (Allen 2000 p.116) Allen argues against this position in that she points toward a nuance in Foucault’s work that helps understand that far from declaring the subject dead in his analysis, Foucault must be read as wishing to investigate what constitutes and explains the subject in modernity rather than how the subject itself constitutes subjectivity. (Allen 2000 pp.121-123) In Allen’s words: “Foucault indicates [...] that the goal of his analysis is to [...] explain the subject as constituted through discourse, to shift the subject as constituted through discourse, to shift the subject from the *explanans* to the *explanandum*”. (Allen 2000 p.123) Thus, in order to explain the subject, Foucault’s inquiry would have to move away from an understanding of the subject as constitutive. In other words, the ‘inside’, the transcendental of the subject is deliberately left to one side in order to explain the ‘outside’ of the subject. (Deleuze 2006)

Allen’s position is helpful in stressing Foucault’s specific vantage point of inquiry and confirms his explicit aim of analysis to be the “*modes* of objectification that transform human beings into subjects” (*emphasis added*) (Foucault 2002 p.327) but it ultimately fails to elucidate subjectivity, and with it agency, in the Foucaultian account. There are others (see for example Bernstein 1992; Patton 1998; Shinko 2008) who seek to rescue the subject from its Foucaultian death by turning toward Foucault’s later writings on ethics and the care of self. And indeed, in these writings the subject appears as a much more ‘active’ subject than previously (Foucault 2002b p.291), in which consciousness and reflexion are present, and with it a certain possibility for agency.³⁰ However, as Deleuze has effectively explained, the

³⁰ It is tangentially reminiscent of the Arendtian approach when we see Foucault turn here to the philosophers of ancient Greece in speaking of the significance of the care of self in the resistance to relationships of power. (Foucault 2002b pp.281 – 301)

essentially hollow “inside” of the subject is constituted only and always by the doubling folds of the outside. (Deleuze 2006 pp.78 – 101) Foucault is very clear about this himself: he rejects a theory of the subject as a lens for his approach and states instead that the subject is not a substance at all, but rather should be understood as a form. (Foucault 2002b p.290) Based on the contingency of these forms there are, then, multiple selves that depend on the constituent context. For Foucault, there are two meanings of ‘subject’: “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge”. (Foucault 2002b p.331) The existence of a conscience would suggest the existence of subjectivity, however, if we follow Foucault’s assessment of the ‘inside’ of the subject to be shaped and informed by the truth games and relations of power of the outside, then this consciousness is only ever a recognition of that which has been imprinted as constitutive of a form – which is essentially contingent. This continues to leave us with an unsatisfactory account of the agency of the subject to resist relations of power.

In the context of biopolitical technologies of power this leaves us with an impasse for resistance. The perpetual power dynamics Foucault describes, that in the matrix-like manner run through the interstices of society, render resistance to this power virtually impossible as it merely further manifests and reinforces the existing structures. Rupture of these biopolitical *dispositifs* is not a distinct possibility in the Foucaultian account, and subjects, conditioned and shaped through anatomo-political and biopolitical modalities as they are, have an already always conditioned (and thus limited) scope for action against these structures. An account of political action as creativity is underdeveloped in Foucault. This is problematic, as it reduces the possibility for politics to one that is fully entwined with biopolitical norms and practices and leaves the idea of politics as creative action an impossibility. Arendt’s account of life-politics in modernity, in contrast, may have a greater potential for such a caesura through specific concepts shaping the human condition, such as natality (see for example Blencowe 2010; Lupton 2012; Vatter 2009) or a perspective of temporality in Arendt’s biopolitics. (Braun 2007)

This indicates just one fundamental difference in the broader perspectives on life-as-politics in Arendt and Foucault. In the following I will highlight some substantial and, for the purpose of this project, significant overlaps in the fundamentals of both

accounts, then I will assess some of their ontological premises relating to these accounts in which both convergences and contrasts can be identified. Finally, I will be engaging more closely with distinct differences in their respective insights into life-politics in modernity.

II. Arendtian and Foucaultian Life-Politics: Core Symmetries

As highlighted earlier, the works of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault have been read as complementary and contrasting by scholars of political theory and international relations alike. (See for example Allen 2002; Braun 2007; Blencowe 2010; Dolan 2005; Gordon 2002; Hayden 2009; Lupton 2012; Mbeme 2003; Swift 2008) This is not surprising, given that both offer among the most piercing and useful critiques of politics in the modern era and both seem to have recognized and articulated early the challenges that continue to face us in the contemporary political context today. In this, both Arendt and Foucault consider the political in the modern era as one determined predominantly by social, economic and technological structures (Dolan 2005 p.370) and both, at different junctions of their respective work, express their bewilderment at a dark and fundamental question that determines modernity: how can an era that claims to value life above everything else and places it at the very heart of public concern, simultaneously be one that harbours the greatest potential for genocide and mass atrocity? (Isaac 1996; Braun 2007)

Comparing two scholars as different in their approach and perspectives as Arendt and Foucault is, however, fraught with the risk not only to compare apples with oranges but also to perhaps draw connections where there are none, and to ultimately miss the core of either account. It must remain a goal of any analysis that reads these two together to recognise that Arendt and Foucault each had a significantly different focus and core aim in their analyses, despite the apparent fact that both chose to analyse the challenges of modernity from a historical-philosophical stance. (Braun 2007 p.6) Where Foucault places emphasis on the genealogy and properties of power and knowledge in analysing the historical processes through which biopolitics emerged (Cooter and Stein 2010 p.110), Arendt is chiefly concerned with assessing the human condition and that which affects it in light of a distinctly modern context and “from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears” when she delineates her assessment of life-politics in modernity. (Arendt 1998 p.5) It is thus

perhaps more accurate to speak of symmetries or parallels in discussing the similarities that surface in the two scholars' accounts of the shift of life into the centre of politics, so that we are able to retain and recognise the value of each analysis for contemporary modernity. Scrutinising the examination of modern life-politics in both scholars' account brings up a number of parallels: both highlight the emergence of the category life as a resource for perpetual cycles of production and consumption, and the ensuing political economy of life; both make the assessment that the shift of life into the political centre results inevitably in a securitization mandate; both establish clearly that in a life-centric political modernity, the individual becomes absorbed by the generalized body of the population as a whole, both discuss the prevalence of administration as government and the management of life as the chief political activity in self-perpetuating structures that subsume human social and political activities by normalizing practices and behaviour in the public realm; both stress in their analysis the significance of life as characterized by value and utility and both display a somewhat critical attitude toward the institutionalization of science in the production of knowledge. To provide an exhaustive analysis of each aspect in which the two overlap is not the intent of this chapter. Instead, I will highlight some of the key symmetries in the work of Arendt and Foucault relating to life politics in modernity, before then engaging more closely with where the most significant and relevant asymmetries are, so that the usefulness of both authors for the analysis of political violence in a contemporary context is better situated.

The historical context which both scholars identify as significant in making the shift of life into the centre of the concerns of politics manifest represents a foundational symmetry between the two accounts. Both Arendt and Foucault identify the late 18th century, and specifically the French Revolution as pivotal in the emergence of life necessities as the central object of politics, made manifest by resulting norms and practices. (Edwards 1999 p.7) For Foucault, it was with the French Revolution that the technology of power that has biological life as its centre became to be codified continually in law – a process that resulted in making “an essentially normalising power acceptable”. (Foucault 1998 p.144) Like Arendt, Foucault clearly recognises the historical context in which a new and increasingly self-referential social perspective emerged, one that had its focus on life necessities:

One no longer aspired toward the coming of the emperor of the poor, or the kingdom of the latter days, or even the restoration of our ancestral rights; what was demanded and what served as an object was life understood as the basic needs ... It was life more than law that became the issue of political struggles, even if the latter were formulated through affirmations concerning rights. The “right” to life, to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs ... (Foucault 1998 p.145)

It is from this shift, from the demand that necessities are met in a political context, that biology appeared as an object of politics and regularizing and normalising practices could subsequently emerge. Where Foucault then centres his diagnosis of the ramifications this shift primarily on the body, Arendt, having made the same observation, discusses the consequences of life necessity bursting “on to the scene of the French Revolution” (Arendt 2006a p.49) in term of the “rise of the social”, as discussed in the previous chapter. In both accounts, it is essentially this manifestation of biological needs and matters of life necessities, ensuing from the French Revolution that enabled certain biopolitical normalising technologies and practices, giving rise to the emergence of racism (Foucault 2004 p.60) and essentially breeding a dangerous ideology of homogeneity, the perils of which Arendt highlights at length throughout her writing. These crucial aspects of the French Revolution as setting the scene for a new political subject – the biological mandate - thus provide the historical basis for both scholars to analyse the problem of biopolitics in modernity further. For Foucault this is a key moment: the context of the French Revolution provides the historical moment when the normalisation of anatomo-political and biopolitical power structures were codified in an unprecedented regression of the juridical. (Foucault 1998 p.144) For Arendt, the French Revolution provides the historical moment when the plurality of men began to be in peril with the uniform clamour to have basic biological needs met at a political level as the lowest common denominator of highest significance. It is from here that Arendt is able to analyse the precarious relationship between necessity and violence, as I will show in greater detail in the next chapter.

Other significant symmetries in what Arendt and Foucault identify as crucial and challenging characteristics of a modernity in which life has shifted into the centre of politics relate to specific conditions that are essentially enabling qualities for this shift. This includes the observation that is present in both scholars, that in order for

life to become the object of politics, life needed to be rendered analyzable, predictable and thus controllable through a process of mathematization and the scientific rendering of life, as discussed in the previous chapter. Both Arendt and Foucault place great significance on the scientifically transparent human for the realization and perpetuation of life politics. The development and prevalence of science to a point that it has allowed the human body to be disciplined and regularized (Foucault 2004 p.253) and the human mind to be “tested and measured like horsepower” (Arendt 1998 p.284), serve as a pivotal aspect for both scholars in the development of normalizing practices in a life-centric political modernity. And in both accounts, this mathematization of life and life’s functions gives rise to the possibility of man as a statistical object and subject in the normalizing process of society. In Foucault, statistics, measures and forecasts serves as essential mechanisms to intervene in the body of the population to promote life: birth rates must be increased, mortality rates ought to be lowered, life expectancy should be increased and the inherently aleatory nature of life is to be stabilized and secured. (Foucault 2004 p.246) Although Foucault does not make it explicitly clear, the focus on rates and measures that denote and demand a certain consistency in biological processes has become possible only with the scientific approach to man’s own nature. By rendering man’s biology and natural characteristics in scientifically observable terms, he can become subject to docility at the individual level and regulation at the population level.

Here Arendt’s account is considerably more helpful than Foucault’s, as she traces for us the historical-philosophical development of this self-referential man-centric mathematisation of life. In both accounts, however, this reliance on statistics, as the master category for utility, progress and processes, is norm-producing. Didier Bigo highlights effectively the consequences the ascendancy of statistics has on the securitization of a population in a Foucaultian biopolitical account. Statistics are central to the securitization mandate in modernity, where “population is a statistical category” (Bigo 2011 p.99), and provide the basis for normalization processes of security. In this perspective, normalization is derived from statistical technologies and mechanisms. This produces, conversely, a category of the abnormal, which must be classified as risk and danger to that which is statistically normal. As Bigo elaborates:

Abnormalisation is derived from constituting statistical regularity and classifying procedures which distribute events into particular categories labeled by bureaucracies of the state. Normalisation is not carried out through some principle of division but through statistical distribution. (Bigo 2011 p.105)

Bigo's Foucaultian analysis of the normalization process mirrors Arendt's assessment of the consequences of statistics as a dominating category in modern society. For Arendt, the prevalence of statistics as a key feature of the social realm in modernity presents a nearly inescapable danger of rendering society homogenous, simultaneously establishing that which is abnormal to the statistically determined homogeneity of society. According to Arendt, this presents a dangerous aspect of modern political society, as it not only stymies the capacity for action, so vital in the Arendtian account, but it also creates a contrived account of one equal society with one uniform interest - a development she refers to as the 'communist fiction' which assumes that that society, as if guided by an 'invisible hand' is uniform and harmonious in their otherwise conflicting interests. (Arendt 1998 p.44) The very basis of this dangerous fiction is statistics. Predictable behaviour, as opposed to contingent action is the consequence in the Arendtian account, and with statistics as the master guide for correct and regulated behaviour, non-behaviour, non-uniformity becomes increasingly less likely to be tolerated. Dichotomies of acceptable and unacceptable, safe and dangerous emerge, based on a scientific norm. As indicated in the previous chapter Arendt recognizes that uniformity through statistics carries the risk of submerging socio-political life in an intrinsically scientific outlook. (Arendt 1998 p.43)

Although a critique of the technocratic understanding of society in modernity and a strong scepticism of the institutionalization of science as a producer of knowledge is present in both Arendt and Foucault, Arendt is much more explicit and distrustful of the general advent of the sciences as a new means for truth-finding in modernity than Foucault. However, both, the Foucaultian and the Arendtian account rely on the prevalence of algebra, mathematics and statistics as a device with which society comes to be regularized and normalized and provides the basis for the practices that determine and shape society in the modern era.

III. Essence, Telos, Power – Convergences and Contrasts in Arendt and Foucault

There are three further symmetries between the Arendtian and the Foucaultian account that are important to stress in this context. These are situated on a foundational level, and define the ontological premise from which both analyses depart and, while presenting some convergences between the two strands of inquiry, also demonstrate nuanced differences between the two. Firstly, both Arendt and Foucault reject, in principle, an essentialist view of the human, emphasizing instead that human beings are fundamentally shaped and influenced by their social environment. (Gordon 2002; Braun 2007) In other words, for both Arendt and Foucault, there is no immanent ontological core to human nature that is independent from the social relations and conditioning factors, as presented by the world within which humans are situated. This intrinsic condition of the human as substantially constituted by social and political relations of power is perhaps somewhat more clearly a stipulation for Foucault than Arendt. As such, Foucault rejects the notion that there is a human nature. The Foucaultian perspective is illustrated in an interview published in 1984 where he expresses his scepticism toward the notion of liberation:

If [liberation] is not treated with precaution and within certain limits, one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there exists a human nature or base that, as a consequence of certain historical, economic and social processes, has been concealed, alienated or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of repression. (Foucault 2000 p.282)

Where for Foucault the very powers exerted on the human body form and determine the human in ever-dynamic events that allow this power to circulate, this relationship is slightly more complex in the Arendtian account as it is not as clearly inscribed into the physical body in her work. Arendt remains, in fact, conspicuously silent on the human body as a site of inscription. Furthermore, there could be considered an element of essence in Arendt's work: each human being is born with the intrinsic capacity for a new beginning. In this sense, the immanent uniqueness within each beginning may present an essence of the human as such. (Canovan 1995 p.70) It is in fact with this uniqueness that each individual holds that new beginnings in turn are created in Arendt's account. However, it is also precisely here that any essentialising moment ends for Arendt, as the uniqueness of each individual is further shaped and determined through a material ecology as well as through the various contingencies

that inter-actions with others carry within and remains in flux. Beginning, then, may perhaps more accurately be considered the essence of the human condition, rather than human beings *per se*. As Canovan highlights, “it is of the essence of the human condition that the persons who inhabit the world are continually changing”. (Canovan 1995 p.130) For Arendt, then, it is on this basis that the plurality of men can be maintained, which enables, or should enable the capacity for action. And herein lies also a significant difference between Arendt and Foucault: this non-essential nature of men, the perpetual dynamics of contingency they are subject to is simultaneously the essence of the condition of action as politics for Arendt. It is in the capacity for new beginnings, through action, that man can potentially resist and revolt against existing power structures in a biopolitical context. And even though the capacity for action is in grave peril in an Arendtian biopolitical modernity, there is always the hint of a possibility for a new beginning toward something novel and hitherto unknown. As I have highlighted earlier, this dimension is limited at best in Foucault. The subject is always objectified in biopolitical structures and this objectification constitutes the subject. While there is resistance, this resistance always only relates to these existing power relations. It is this non-essential quality of humans that enable disciplinary and biopolitical power structures to form and shape the human and thus render her perpetually conditioned under the mandate of these power-exerting structures.

Similar to the ontological non-essentialism found in Foucault’s and Arendt’s biopolitical perspectives of the modern era, they both also strongly reject any teleological understanding of history (or nature). (Gordon 2002, Braun 2007, Dillon 2011) Foucault is highly sceptical of any notion that would dissolve the dynamic and perpetual events of particularity into a greater meta-narrative which eventually reduces all that unfolds among people to a self-referential totality. The endlessly continuing matrix of power structures renders the fulfilment of such a deliberate trajectory of history implausible as Foucault posits the “genealogist’s ‘single drama’ over progressive ‘evolutionary’ paradigms of the Enlightenment and dialectical materialism”. (Roulier 1997) Similarly, Arendt fervently rejects a teleological understanding of history or nature as a process. For her, any understanding of history as a history of movement, of history as a “constant flow, concerned with the development of mankind and continuous with the evolution of nature” (Canovan 1995 p.75; Villa 1999 p.5) was of recent and modern nature and anthropocentric.

Like Foucault, Arendt could not accept the Hegelian notion of history as a gigantic process, subsuming individual stories and events into one larger realm of meaning. She rejected this not only on the grounds that such a perspective has proven to be dangerous and instrumental in the emergence of totalitarian forms of politics (Canovan 1995 pp.76-77), but also as the idea of a teleological fulfilment of history as a process runs counter to action and contingency, both crucial Arendtian theoretical categories, which facilitate and lead to new beginnings at an individual level ever anew. It is through these new beginnings that history cannot and ought not have a *telos*, let alone one that is made and determined by man, for man. For Arendt, this rejection of history as a process is perhaps much more fundamental to her critique than it is for Foucault. As highlighted in the previous chapter, it was this understanding of history as a process and its strong relation to the perception of nature as a process in modernity that provided the dangerous grounds for the murderousness of totalitarianism. This connection is absent in Foucault.

The third fundamental aspect where the two scholars intersect is in their understanding of power as opposite, if not contrary to force or strength. (Arendt 1970 p.43; Foucault 2004 p.29) Although here the intersections are perhaps fewer than the ultimate differences between the two accounts of power. The distinction both make between power and force, domination or strength is, however, vital. Power, in Arendt and Foucault is a property that functions and is actualized. In other words, power, for Foucault and Arendt is not an instrument of force individuals are subjected to, rather, power is generated among people (Arendt) or circulates perpetually (Foucault). Power is boundless in both accounts, its only limits are other people (Arendt 1998 p.201; Foucault 2004 p.29) and for both Arendt and Foucault, power is entirely relational and takes place between subjects, in other words, both maintain that power can neither be possessed nor stored. Furthermore, for power to have functionality, the subjects involved in the power relationship must first be free in both accounts. As we have seen earlier in Foucault, power is brought to bear on the freedom of a subject, requiring docility for complicity in the exertion of power. Similarly, in Arendt's account, freedom plays a vital role in facilitating the coming into being of power. Being subjected to the force and domination of a master renders neither the master powerful nor is the subject one that is free. Freedom, like power, for Arendt can only take place in plurality. In order to come together and act in concert, subjects

generating moments and circumstances of power must have gained freedom with the context of a plurality.

Although this is an important premise for their respective perspective of biopolitics this is, however, the limit of the extent to which the two thinkers overlap in their theories of power. There are finer nuances between the two theorizations of power that differ substantially in each account. In Foucault's theories, power is constitutive and relational among multiple elements. For Foucault, identities are shaped through power and power is articulated through the subject. (Gordon 2002) Dillon and Neal place emphasis on the multi-layered complexity of power in Foucault:

Power is [...] palimpsestuous. It is inscribed on us; we also inscribe it on ourselves, through many institutionalized writing practices. The outcome is a mobile, mutable and complex manifold in which different formations of power are continuously at play in different ways throughout different aspects and formulations of life. (Dillon and Neal 2011 p.13)

The positive production of power in Foucault's analysis requires that the individual subject displays a certain level of complicity in the ordering and controlling practices of disciplinary power. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri effectively highlight the key contribution Foucault makes here: "Foucault was insistent on the fact, and this was the brilliant core of his analysis, that the exercise of discipline is absolutely immanent to the subjectivities under its command". (Hardt and Negri 2001 p.326) And indeed what stands at the very core of Foucault's understanding of the workings of power is the differentiation that power is not exercised through coercive measures, by sheer violence, but that it is wielded by shaping a free subject's behaviour through certain technologies. Foucault illustrates this point in one of his lectures in 1979:

A man who is chained up and beaten is subjected to force being exerted upon him, not power. But if he can be induced to speak when his ultimate recourse could have been to hold his tongue, preferring death, then he has been caused to behave in a certain way. His freedom has been subjected to power. (Foucault 2002b p.324)

Power, for Foucault, is passed through individuals and articulated at a specific site only for as long as it is active within these particular power dynamics. Power perpetually continues to circulate. For Foucault, power has functional properties and

works through networks. In his words: “[power] is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is never appropriated the way wealth or a commodity can be appropriated”. (Foucault 2004 p.29)

In distinction to Foucault’s theory, power for Arendt is generated among people and is fully tied to the subject. The locus of the origin of power is the coming together of people in acting on a shared interest. Power can thus only exist for as long as this collectivity of power-generating subjects remains an active collective. A disbandment of the collective lets power vanish. For Foucault, however, even though power is exerted always temporarily only at a specific site, power does not vanish or disintegrate, rather, it shifts locale. Like energy, the Foucaultian notion of power is only ever transferred and does never truly dissolve. Staying within a terminology of physics, the Arendtian concept of power, in contrast, is more closely related to a process of friction by which power is generated but the level of this generation of power cannot be institutionalized permanently. In other words, power can only ever be “actualized”, but never fully “materialized” (Arendt 1998 p.200), and it always relies on the plurality of men. This means that power, for Arendt, can be generated at different locales and be maintained wherever people come together in a shared interest, including in the resistance to other locales of power. For Foucault resistance to power is problematic, as it always produces and shapes the subject in a continually oscillating transference of power that forms the subject’s interests. As Neve Gordon explains, “[f]rom within Arendt’s imaginary one would have no difficulty explaining how a group of students can decide to resist the powers that be, yet a Foucaultian would have difficulty, if only because power produces the subject and shapes its interest and identity”. (Gordon 2002 p. 135) Here again we can distinguish Arendt’s understanding of power as acknowledging the agency of subjects as able to change structures, to bring about something that is new and unknown – for better or for worse, while in the Foucaultian account agency is limited to always operate within the war-like structures of shifting powers at the micro- and macro level.

IV. What can Arendt Tell Us That We Don’t Yet Know With Foucault?

While calling attention to the symmetries in Arendt’s and Foucault’s work on life-politics in modernity is helpful for situating Arendt’s work as relevant in the general discourse on biopolitics, it is the asymmetries and differences that are perhaps most

telling in where the discourses of biopolitics might benefit from looking at Arendt's perspective in this context.³¹ Foucault has provided a powerful lens for scholars to consider recent international contexts of conflict, specifically the pugnacious practices instituted by the United States' administration since 2001 in the fight against terror. By investigating the liberal paradox in terms of biopolitics, he has certainly been instrumental in providing a novel perspective for looking at institutions and practices in terms of the powers they wield and the structures and subjects they wield it on. But the Foucaultian account also, naturally, has its limitations. As highlighted earlier, some scholars have raised the critique that his theories rely on an "outdated vision of contemporary technology". (Braidotti 2013 p.117) Furthermore, the issue of sovereignty and sovereign power is never fully satisfactorily resolved in Foucault (Lazzarato 2002; Jabri 2006), neither is his assessment of security in a biopolitical modernity fully confronted. (Dillon and Neal 2011 pp.11-12; Bigo 2011 pp.93-95) His later writings and lectures in particular meander through the topics of biopolitics, liberalism, security, the art of government, and related aspects, without fully committing to one aspect of in-depth analysis and he frequently leaves room for further interrogation of the subject. This is in part due to his ambling lecture style (given that some of the key texts on biopolitics are derived from his lectures at the College de France) and in part on his particular brand of inquiry.

Arendt's inquiry into the subject of the human condition in modernity, in contrast, looks to be more comprehensive in approach but no less detailed in the minutia, albeit perhaps slightly polemical in tone. This often leaves Arendt open to criticism as she does occasionally make vastly sweeping statements and constructs some tenuous relationships that require a benevolent attitude and a good dose of the benefit of the doubt granted by her readers. And in a direct comparison to the Foucaultian approach of the analysis of biopolitics, Arendt's work naturally shows some considerable limitations. Esposito points toward a blind spot in Arendt which disallows her to connect the material aspects of biological life to an authentic political sphere, thus excluding issues of materiality. (Esposito 2008 p.150) While I agree with Esposito's assessment that the categorical exclusion of the materiality of life processes from

³¹ No doubt, when considering the comprehensive discussions on biopolitics in contemporary scholarship, both the Arendtian and the Foucaultian account have shortcomings as has been stressed by a number of scholars. (See for example Agamben 1998; Esposito 2008; Dolan 2005; Blencow 2010 among others)

politics gives rise to enormous tensions in an Arendtian account of biopolitics, I propose, however, that these tensions can be eased by following Arendt's reasoning of the strict delineations she makes more carefully. I show this in the next chapter. However, where it comes to addressing overall materiality of biological life as it relates to the body and its functions, Esposito has a strong point: Arendt did not engage satisfactorily with the body as a political site at all, and this is perhaps Arendt's gravest limitation for a comprehensive discussion of life-politics. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the body as a relevant political entity receives very little attention by Arendt. Intensely private in all aspects, the body, as the "master signifier of necessity" (Honig 2006 p.360) is not an object open for political discussion, and, if we remain faithful to the biopolitical account in Arendt, with good reason, as the biology of man reflects not only sameness (as contrary to difference – the condition for political action), but something of a given – in political terms. Biological factors of the body cannot be altered or amended by debate, thus they must remain on the outside of politics proper for Arendt. We can thus understand Arendt not as overlooking or neglecting the body, but rather as highlighting the fact that in any *political* inquiry it ought to have limited attention. (See for example Honig 2006 on a discussion on the inadmissibility of the body in Arendt; Tamborino 1999 p.172) This limited attention continues to be a highly contested issue among scholars.

Given this perspective, the problem of the body as an apolitical entity cannot be resolved in an Arendtian biopolitics. But contrary to Esposito's claim, that Arendt has not thought through the category life sufficiently to allow her to consider the materiality of life in a political context, she has indeed quite carefully considered the biological category life which led her to arrive at the strict distinctions she draws in her consideration of life-politics, as addressed in the preceding chapter. But how can we then understand the non-material contribution that an Arendtian account makes to the discourses of biopolitics? In short, what does Arendt have to say that we have not already heard from Foucault? As indicated earlier, the answer lies in part in the focus of her respective studies. Where Foucault places *power* at the heart of human relations in his investigations, Arendt's investigative basis for human affairs is plurality – the fact that "men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world". (Arendt 1998 p.7) Where Foucault largely neglects the epistemological underpinnings of a 'naturalized' politics based on the modern knowledge of organic

processes in the technologies of biopolitics, Arendt supplies us with a dual consideration of biopolitical strands in modernity - the politicization of *zoe* and the *zoefication* of politics - as elaborated in the previous chapter. This comprehensive perspective of life-politics underpinnings in modern society allows us to understand how the human, in his new self-awareness as a fully biological being is situated in and understands himself within a totalizing quasi-political society based on life as the centre of political activity. What Arendt understood quite lucidly and began to theorize in 'Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government' was the problematic tension that emerged when the circulatory nature of life processes, which served as a basis for both the *zoefication* of life and the politicization of *zoe* became understood as a unilinear process, following certain laws of nature, as established through the sciences. It is in the infinitely progressing movement of what is otherwise a circulatory process that the greatest danger lies, in the Arendtian account.

The crucial insights an Arendtian framework of biopolitics allows are thus threefold. Firstly, Arendt's account allows us to examine the consequences of biopolitics in modernity by looking through her lens of plurality. When we consider the pivotal role plurality plays in human relations and political action, we are able to understand the ramifications of a modern political context that is centred around the biological mandate of bodily needs, where commonality in the demand to have needs met is understood as a shared political interest (Arendt 2006a) and the sameness of the body is taken as the basis for equality. (Arendt 2004 p.200) Commonality of need, sameness of biological processes are emphasized in a biopolitical modernity and difference, the basis for plurality, is diminished. (Honig 2006 p.361) This is amplified through technological means and perspectives that shape and inform ideas of the human as belonging to the category of a (biologically) functioning being. Through an account of Arendt's life-politics we can understand the dangers of this perspective. Arendt warns of the implications of such an overstretched emphasis on commonality in which survival and progress of the species becomes the master narrative:

The monolithic character of every type of society, its conformism, which allows for only one interest and one opinion, is ultimately rooted in the one-ness of mankind. It is because this one-ness of mankind is not fantasy and not even merely a scientific hypothesis [...] that mass society, where man as a social *animal* rules supreme and where apparently the survival of the species could be guaranteed on a world-

wide scale, can at the same time threaten humanity with extinction.
(Arendt 1998 p.46)

The next chapter addresses these problematic modern convergences of sameness and difference in a biopolitical modern context in greater detail.

The second distinctive insight we gain with Arendt is an understanding of the consequences of a naturalized understanding of politics in a setting that focuses on biology, which enables us to explore the totality under which man is embedded in biopolitical structures. Not only is he determined, shaped and influenced by the predominance of biological processes as paradigmatic for that which concerns politics as management, but he is also deeply embedded in societal-political structures that mirror closely the cyclicity of the life processes. While the original meaning of biopolitics (before the Foucaultian turn) placed more emphasis on the conception of the state as an organism, this relationship has largely gone astray. With Arendt, we are reminded how thorough the notion of life, of organic thought is presented in the processual structures of political society in modernity. It is when we recognise that modern understandings of politics rest on this strand of biopolitical perception that the contemporary medical narrative that Keane highlights in his discussion of democracy and violence resonates³²: “Within democracies, medical metaphors sometimes also surface, as when politicians speak of surgical strikes, sanitary cordons, mopping-up operations and fighting the ‘cancer’ or ‘plague’ of terrorism”. (Keane 2004 p.2) Although Keane mitigates his statement by adding that mature democracies have moved beyond this euphemistic metaphor in their political affairs, it is a narrative that increasingly resurfaces in discussions, debates and justifications of violence in the fight against terror in the contemporary context. This medical narrative indeed represents one of the manifestations of the *zoefication* of politics, as I will delineate in greater detail in the chapters that follow.

When man’s understanding of self, as a member of a species, and his political environment is predominantly based on the functionalities of life processes, survival becomes the master mandate. In the dichotomous relationship of life and death, death, as the antithesis to that which must be secured, the highest good, becomes the gravest

³² Chapter five sets forth the details and contexts of this medical narrative in greater detail.

danger. Not unlike in the Foucaultian account, Arendt lucidly recognizes thus that the result must be a political focus on securitization. (Arendt 2003b p.443) And it is in this survival and progression mandate of the population as a whole in its totalizing aspect that terror can unfold:

Terror as the execution of a law of movement whose ultimate goal is not the welfare of men or the interest of one man but the fabrication of mankind eliminates individuals for the sake of the species, sacrifices “parts” for the sake of the “whole”. (Arendt 2004 p.599)

Where for Foucault the very basis of this inclusion/exclusion dichotomy of who can and must be sacrificed is racism, in the broadest sense (Foucault 2004 p.255), for Arendt, this is a much more inclusive danger that potentially comprised all types and kinds of persons that, under some ideological strand or another, pose a danger to the progressive development of man, where foes of mankind are singled out as the “objective enemy”. In Arendt’s words: “‘guilty’ is he who stands in the way of the natural or historical process which has passed judgment over ‘inferior races’, over individual ‘unfit to live’, over “dying classes and decadent peoples”. (Arendt 2004 p.599; Villa 1999 p.185) Where the survival and progression mandate reigns supreme, everyone can become a potential threat in the perpetual struggle for progress.

The third pertinent insight we can gain from an Arendtian biopolitical framework is the modern perspective that perceives man and history as essentially self-constituting in a context of both history and nature as a process. In other words, man, in his scientific endeavour, has come to see both life (in manipulating life processes) as man-influenced and controlled, if not, in a not-so-utopian discussion of the looming and apparently inevitable ‘singularity’ (in Ray Kurzweil’s words³³), man-made. Dana Villa traces this perspective back to Arendt’s analysis of the “hubris of homo faber” in modernity in the project of “fabricating mankind” based on “humanity’s capacity to mimic and exploit natural processes”. (Villa 1999 p.185) Villa identifies Arendt’s realization of a biopolitical turn in this as he notes that the project of fabricating mankind “consists of the violent reshaping of available human material so that, in the

³³ Ray Kurzweil’s notion of singularity describes “the union of human and machine, in which the knowledge and skills embedded in our brains will be combined with the vastly greater capacity, speed and knowledge-sharing ability of our own creations” – machines. (Kurzweil 2005)

end, neither classes, races or individuals exist, but only specimens of the (perfected) species". (Villa 1999 p.185) In a schizophrenic turn, man is at once maker and reduced to his (inferior) biology in 'making better'. Arendt's insights into the implications of the scientific turn in which both nature and man had become subject and object of analysis for the fabrication and replication of life and the world, allows us to critically approach issues of post-humanism and the rise of artificial life, robotic life, as an improvement on man and his capacities. Simultaneously, and here Arendt directly raises a critique against Marx, man understands history as something that is 'made' by man. (Arendt 1967) Both require a reduction of "the incalculable" (Villa 1999 p.185), the aleatory elements inherent in life, both require levels of control that cannot but seek to eliminate uncertainty, thereby creating the very category of uncertainty and risk. Herein lies perhaps the greatest peril of a biopolitics: the demand to fully control life in an ever-increasing effort to eliminate its inherent uncertainties, specifically when paired with a narrative that claims the inevitability of certain natural or historical processes. Here again Arendt relates the extremes of such efforts with terror and her writing in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* is incisive as she states that "terror seeks to "stabilize" men in order to liberate the forces of nature or history". (Arendt 2004 p.599) This is elaborated in greater detail in the following chapter.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to situate Arendt more firmly in the discourses of biopolitics by highlighting not only where she is in line with a Foucaultian perspective but furthermore showing where she exceeds the Foucaultian account by highlighting her three-fold insights. The discrepancies between Foucault and Arendt are not surprising given the fact that they each had a different analytical focus. Where the production of knowledge and power is at the heart of Foucault's analysis, Arendt is chiefly concerned with the conditions for politics. Where Foucault primarily focuses on individuals and populations becoming both subject and object of politics, Arendt recognises that the political processes themselves are informed and underpinned by biological imageries. Lastly, Arendt allows us to engage with a specifically shaped human subjectivity in more than one ways. The Arendtian human, though biopolitically shaped, retains a certain level of agency in having become self-

constitutive, based on a scientific and technologised understanding of life. An Arendtian perspective of life-politics allows us thus to look at aspects beyond the Foucaultian insights into the objectification of subjects through biopolitical technologies. It offers a trajectory that allows us to identify how the human, her politics and her ethics are comprehensively biopolitically informed in a contemporary context and how this shapes in turn the socio-political body. The consequences for politics in modernity are, in all aspects highlighted above, of crucial importance to Arendt as she places the human subject and her capacity for political action at the centre of her inquiry. An Arendtian framework of biopolitics allows us to trace the implications of life-centric political practices at the centre of which stands the human being as an analysable, quantifiable, functional and, in essence, controllable entity and raises questions as to what conception of politics a biopolitical politics presents. In her own analysis, Arendt makes the anti-political consequences this totalizing life-politics perspective has thoroughly clear and she provides us with an apt analysis of the relationship between life-politics and a decreased capacity for political action. It will be the core of the next chapter to engage with this problematic in greater detail.

3: BIOPOLITICAL POLITICS - THE ANTI-POLITICAL CONDITION OF MODERN LIFE

It is not because we belong to the great cycle of organic life that we are also political beings

Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*

1. Politics and Anti-politics: The (Im)possibility of Political Biopolitics

In her analysis of modernity and its impediments for political actions, Hannah Arendt presciently developed a coherent account of the shift of life into the centre of politics, analysing the emergence of natural or biological life not merely as the basis of politics but also as its very target, as I have demonstrated in previous chapters. This *zoe*fication of politics and the concomitant politicisation (and technologisation) of *zoe* form part of the basis for the underlying tensions present in modern politics and political violence in more than one way. Biological life and political action are located for Arendt at exact opposite ends of the spectrum of the human condition, which renders matters of life necessity essentially politically un-actionable. As highlighted in chapter one, there may be a perceived contradiction in terms when we consider the Arendtian categories of what belongs to and what should be excluded from politics in a biopolitical context. However, if we try and conceive of Arendt's biopolitics as an anti-political form of politics in modernity, it opens an avenue to further explore the implications and dangers, in Arendt's account, of life at the centre of modern politics. And this in turn perhaps helps us understand why Arendt insists on this radical distinction in order to preserve not only the possibility for political action but also the space and stage so vital for it. A first step in this investigation must thus begin with some basic but essential questions: why exactly can biopolitics not be included in what Arendt understands as politics proper but rather remains anti-political for Arendt? What are the dangerous implications she highlights in the emergence of a dominant anti-politics in the political realm? And how are we to understand the real world practicalities in modernity of this strict categorisation?

Based on Arendt's account, this chapter aims to highlight the implications of making the public and political realm one that has at its heart - and seeks to secure - the

fundamentally anti-political matter of biological life. The chapter argues that, in drawing out an Arendtian framework of biopolitics, it is important to distinguish between her understanding of what politics proper entails and how this stands in contrast to contemporary conceptions of politics as management. In this I argue that the biopolitical condition is essentially an anti-political condition as it impedes the fundamental aspects of what constitutes and facilitates political action proper. The chapter highlights this relationship by showing how fundamental aspects of politics are hindered, if not eradicated through the biopolitical rationale and shows, in the final part of the chapter, the relevance this has for the use of violence in a political context.

Where once the social realm, comprising matters of life and necessity in a pre-political condition, represented the mediating space between the private and the public, in modernity the social realm appears to have usurped the political and “state and government gives place here to pure administration”. (Arendt 1998 p.43) Thus, Arendt argues, since modernity and in late modernity, our political realm is determined by new and different forms of authority (no longer sovereign rulership but increasingly socio-political forms of government at the national and supra-national level), based on disciplines and controls, which operate “under the guise of greater efficiencies in the administration and protection of life” (Der Derian 2010), made manifest within the nation-state. And it is through the emergence of the nation state, in Arendt’s diagnosis, that the boundaries between *zoe* and *bios* become indistinct. (Owens 2009) And, although hitherto most frequently discussed in a totalitarian context, Arendt’s warning of the limiting scope of politics extends to post-totalitarian liberal societies in which “life has been promoted as the ultimate point of reference for modern politics”. (Hayden 2009 p.75) I suggest, with Arendt, that it is in this confusion of the various aspects of political human capacity with analysable human aspects relating to biological processes that brings about a narrowing of political horizons and a diminished capacity for political action in modernity. This, in turn, renders the public sphere vulnerable to dichotomous distinctions of inclusion and exclusion, progress and deterioration, survival and extinction in a political context.

Arendt has been widely criticised for her rigorous exclusion of matters concerning life necessities and the biological aspects of human life from the political realm. In a

contemporary context, in which concerns of resource distribution to meet the basic and more advanced needs of life dominate political concerns, it is not difficult to locate where the tensions between an Arendtian account of biological life as anti-political and the requirement of life needs as a modern political issue arise. And indeed, in contemporary politics in which a key occupation of political governments seems to be the distribution and management of resources to maintain life and meet life's necessities, the Arendtian position of excluding matters of human life from political action appears untenable, if not outright delusional. I argue, however, that if we consider her perspectives on politics and life necessities as radical positions on the limitations of both aspects of biological life and authentic political engagement among humans, it becomes clear why a conflation of the two renders politics proper in modernity highly precarious.

To fully engage with the key strands of the critiques that are levied against Arendt in this aspect exceeds the intent and scope of this chapter, as they are manifold in perspective, approach and presentation³⁴. However, for the purpose of illuminating Arendt's position, Andrew Schaap's recent critique of Arendt's limited understanding of the historical-political implications of 'need' provides a useful point of departure. In his critique of Arendt's anti-political perspective of needs, Schaap identifies her assessment of politics to include five key aspects (initiatory, constitutive, inclusive, performative and disclosive³⁵) and summarises the Arendtian position on the exclusion of life necessities by juxtaposing that which exclusively relates to the private and non-political realm, and that which is part of the essence of politics for Arendt. These contrasts include for Schaap the anti-political priority of the collective life process in modernity in contrast to the political initiation of an event; the anti-political imagery of nature in contrast to constituting a shared world; the lack of difference in identical biological needs in contrast to a plural political condition; the image of a social body in contrast to the contingencies of a polity; and finally, instrumentality in contrast to praxis. (Schaap 2010 p.160) In line with Schaap, I

³⁴Among other works, Gareth Williams' 'Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers – Hannah Arendt' provides a comprehensive collection of critiques of Arendt's theories. Specifically contributions from Richard Bernstein and Jeremy Waldron deliver some interesting aspects on her perspective concerning the social and the political. (Williams p.2006)

³⁵ I would suggest that in this list of aspects of the political in Arendt is missing one key element that is relevant in this discussion. That is the concept of plurality without which no politics in the Arendtian sense is possible at all. Schaap may have intended the term 'inclusive' to comprise this plurality, however, in the context of his article this is not clear.

concur that the Arendtian category of *animal laborans* may be considered “pre-political insofar as politics ... is only possible to the extent that the needs of the body have already been satisfied” (Schaap 2010 p.159), but in a modern context in which life necessities and biological survival has moved into the centre of what politics is predominantly concerned with, this relationship changes. Here again, Schaap correctly observes: “A politics of need becomes anti-political when public life is overwhelmed by economic concerns ... Need cannot provide an organising principle for an authentic politics because it is the opposite of freedom”. (Schaap 2010 p.159) It is, however, precisely here that Schaap levies his critique of Arendt as rendering matters of human need unduly ‘de-politicised’ and reduced to their ontological rather than historical dimension. In this she fails, according to Schaap’s analysis, to see that human needs are contingent in that they are a product of political organisation, emerging from a social context, and that they cannot be equated with necessity.

For Schaap, the politics of needs, in their historicized dimension, can indeed be conceived of as contingent and it is in this recognition of contingency that Schaap sees the potential for a “properly political politics of need”. (Schaap 2010 p.164) For him, it is the socialized aspect that Arendt evades within which he recognises the possibility for a framework to establish a politics of need in the Arendtian sense of politics. While Schaap ultimately seeks to rescue the politics of need from a blind-spot that he identifies in Arendt and demonstrate the world-disclosing capacity of the rendering of need in political terms I use his point of departure to demonstrate why a politics of biological necessity (in contrast to need) is, for Arendt, always anti-political, not merely by definitional fiat, but by the very consequences of shifting life into a political centre. While Schaap’s analysis provides a thought-provoking perspective of how the politics of needs might be conceived, through others and contrary to Arendt, in terms of a potential ‘world-disclosing’ aspect, I suggest that a closer engagement with the key elements of Arendt’s notion of modern politics and issues of biological necessity as anti-political is merited if we are to better understand her very differentiated critique of life-as-politics. My analysis in this chapter aims to inquire into the inherently antithetical relationship between life necessity and politics, lifted into the modern political realm by a shift in the understanding of what politics means, by addressing opposing Arendtian categorisations of difference and sameness, of necessity and freedom, of futility and realisation.

II. Social Difference and Political Equality

It is important to remember that for Arendt, politics “deals with the coexistence and association of different men”. (Arendt 2005 p.93) Thus, at the very heart of Arendt’s understanding of politics and political action among men stands a fundamental condition without which politics could not transpire, that of plurality. Only in a context of *different* persons coming together to organise themselves by finding commonalities among an indeterminable plurality of unique aspects can political consensus emerge and the basis for political action be granted. And it is in this condition of a plurality of difference that equality is granted as the result of human organisation. This fundamental condition is jeopardised when difference is understood not as a natural facet of the infinite plurality of human beings but as a threat to the unity of a normalised standard for man as a species. Arendt’s critique of the social realm, where “necessity, not freedom rules the life of society” (Arendt 2005 p.149) provides an insight into her crucial differentiations between difference, multitude, equality and sameness.

In Arendt’s conception of the social and the political realm, equality *and* difference play an important role. It is only in *equality* that men can come together and effect political action in temporary cohesion, but it is only through *difference* that plurality exists as “not only the *conditio sine qua non*, but the *conditio per quam* of all political life”. (Arendt 1998 p.7) The problematic tension in the public sphere, that comprises both the social and the political, arises precisely if either the capacity for action is compromised or the condition of plurality is jeopardized. As highlighted earlier, this is most emphatically highlighted in Arendt’s assessment of the failure of the French Revolution, when unmet biological necessities became a politicised *want*. It is important to stress here that Arendt does differentiate quite deliberately between poverty and want in this context when she critiques the bursting on the social and political scenes of “dress, food and the reproduction of their species”, in short, “the urgent needs of the people” (Arendt 2006a p.50) in the French Revolution in contrast to the American Revolution, where poverty was also a problematic condition, but where “misery and want” (Arendt 2006a p.58) were absent from the scene. It is this condition of bringing a want (based on an urgent need) into a public realm that has the capacity to homogenize an otherwise plural multitude. And here the blurring of

private needs with political solidarity begins for Arendt. In her words: “the political trouble which misery of the people holds in store is that manyness can in fact assume the guise of oneness, that suffering indeed breeds moods and emotions and attitudes that resemble solidarity to the point of confusion”. (Arendt 2006a p.84) The political basis of difference is thus not guaranteed when political action is reduced to a ‘given’ commonality of biological life necessities rather than based on the plurality of differences and that which is in-between (*inter-esse*) people in a shared world.

It is on the basis of the reduction of human activities to their common factor in society - biological life - that plurality is stymied and difference becomes an obstacle to politics rather than a facilitator. In her analysis of the origins of totalitarianism Arendt first and most strongly develops her idea that the inherent tension in making natural facts a matter of politics presents evident cause for concern. Here we must remember that for Arendt equality, “in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given to us ... we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights”. (Arendt 2004 p. 382) Politics on the basis of human necessity must assume equalitarian inclusiveness on the biological basis of membership in the human species rather than guaranteeing each other equal rights on an agonistic basis. And it is precisely when natural factors become the basis of political equality, and equality, as a concept is shifted from a politically assured basis to a social concept that it becomes dangerous for Arendt as “society leaves but little space for special groups and individuals, for then differences become all the more conspicuous”. (Arendt 2004 p.74) In Arendt’s analysis, the ‘alien’ in modernity is an alarming figure of difference and individuality *per se* and signals the immutable and un-actionable realm for man, which is thus the realm in which man has a tendency toward exclusion, if not destruction. Arendt illustrates this reduction: “If a Negro in a white community is considered a Negro and nothing else, he loses, along with his right to equality that freedom of action, which is specifically human”. (Arendt 2004 p.383)

In her radical analysis of human rights, and their perplexities as they relate to man and citizen, (Arendt 2004 p.341-384) Arendt further distinctly addresses the problem of equality and difference. Her crucial insight here is that equality is always a product of human organisation. But, in line with her thought, such organisation can only be brought about through the pre-condition of the coming together and agreeing in

action of persons who are distinguished by their difference. This difference, however, only functions constitutively as such if it is not reduced to mere natural characteristics, for these are entirely un-actionable and present a “limitation of the human artifice”. (Arendt 2004 p.383) In a modern context where the boundaries of the social and political realms are indistinct, where social matters are elevated to issues that are to be engaged with politically, matters of life necessities become political. And where matters of biological human life enter politics, for Arendt fundamentally the realm of *doxa*, of opinion, they become subject to debate and discrimination. For Arendt, the inherent given-ness of biological factors, be it necessity or characteristics, are not a matter of opinion and should not become a political question as such³⁶. Equality on the basis of natural indicators remains thus precarious in a juridical sense. Arendt draws an important distinction here between difference, as a political basis, and discrimination, as a social reality³⁷.

Equality requires, or perhaps demands a dichotomy of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’. In the social realm this is a given for the freedom to associate, and by doing so discriminate between different social groups to which one feels a sense of belonging. It is when this discrimination moves into the political realm that the most violent consequences of a politics that has as its referent biological life features become possible. She states this as follows: “the more equal people have become in every respect, and the more equality permeates the whole texture of society, the more will differences be resented, the more conspicuous will those become who are *visibly and by nature* unlike other” (my emphasis). (Arendt 2003a p.200)

³⁶ A brief digression perhaps illustrates Arendt’s position on this matter. In a discussion at a 1972 conference organised by the Toronto Society for the Study of Social and Political Thought Arendt was pressed by her colleagues to engage with the criticism of why matters of social needs should be so rigorously excluded from political discussions when it seems so entirely impossible to separate social issues from political questions. Arendt illustrated her point as follows: “Let’s take the housing problem. The social problem is certainly adequate housing. But the question of whether this adequate housing means integration or not is certainly a political question. With every one of these questions there is a double face. And one of these faces should not be subject to debate. There shouldn’t be any debate about the question that everyone should have decent housing”. (Bernstein 2006 p.247)

³⁷ In her essay “Reflections on Little Rock” Arendt states bluntly that discrimination is in fact a social right. Given that she has been somewhat vague with the status of rights in a social realm I am not entirely sure this formulation contributes to a constructive discussion and prefer to discuss the issue of discrimination in society in term of a social reality or fact rather than a right. It is important to see, however, that Arendt, who, in her categorical conception of the social sees no problem with discrimination in the social realm just so long as it does not become political, which of course can no longer be ensured in modernity, according to Arendt.

In a society where homogeneity, based on biological sameness and fuelled by the production and consumption cycles of natural and quasi-natural processes, becomes the cultivated norm, natural and visible differences have a greater potential to be rendered in terms of normal and abnormal. It is the visible and audible appearance that engages as the political, whereas “inner qualities and gifts of heart or mind are political only to the extent that their owner wishes to expose them in public ...”. (Arendt 2003a p.199) It is precisely here that Arendt judges the admirable American principle of equality to have its greatest weakness, as it is “not omnipotent; it cannot equalize natural, physical characteristics”. (Arendt 2003a p.200) Equality demands that each individual is considered as equal – every self another self – thereby creating a tension between groups that, for whichever reasons based on differentiation, are unwilling to grant each other such equal rights. The most visible of these differentiation criteria, or markers, are of biological nature, such as colour of skin. The social-political equality that different-but-equal persons grant one another has thus limits, and these limits are what effectively then constitutes a biopolitical ground. The violence that resides in this arrival of biopolitics is clear when we consider the un-actionable and delimiting nature of a reduction to the natural. Equality as a fundamentally political principle, as based on the capacity of action, is thus limited, and in its limits, limiting.

The precariousness of equality is further highlighted in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* as follows:

Equality of condition, though it is certainly a basic requirement for justice, is nevertheless among the greatest and most uncertain ventures of modern mankind. The more equal conditions are, the less explanation there is for the differences that actually exist between people; and thus all the more unequal do individuals and groups become. (Arendt 2004 p.74)

Arendt speaks here of an equality of condition that provides a basic requirement for justice but she states: “When equality becomes a mundane fact in itself, without any gauge by which it may be measured or explained then there is one chance in a hundred that it will be recognized as a working principle of a political organisation in which otherwise unequal people have equal rights”. This closing of a space for difference, the mandate for a universally equal public realm renders natural, physical and perhaps even cultural differences a distinct anomaly within the public realm. And

it is here that Arendt's diagnosis of an increasingly conformist society that responds positively to normalising practices and discourses centring on biopolitical goals gains relevance.

Arendt's argument for the right to discrimination in the social (public) realm is based on her understanding of the individual uniqueness of each person as a comprehensive 'who', not merely a 'what'. (Arendt 1998 p.179; Owens 2012 p.555) This plurality in the public realm is, as is well known, the very cornerstone of the *vita activa* for Arendt. Only if we are to understand the social realm as a pre-political condition does her argumentation remain in line with her priority for plurality. A social realm dominated exclusively by the sameness engendered by matters of life necessity becomes thus anti-political. This then becomes the most treacherous realm in modernity as, in its extreme potential for conformism, difference is always in danger of becoming diminished, leaving those natural attributes that can not be made to 'conform' to an obvious parameter for inclusion / exclusion practices in societies where life, and the unfettered functioning of the production and consumption process for the perpetuation of the species is the unchallenged highest aim. It is when life, its necessities, its natural, immutable characteristics becomes the primary common denominator of a society that the spaces for trans-natural difference is endangered.

In a political sphere in which "political bodies are based on the family, conceived in the image of the family" (Arendt 2005 p.94), and ideas of kinship form the basis of political organisation, Arendt can detect nothing but the downfall of politics: "in this form of organisation, any original differentiation is effectively eradicated in the same way that the essential equality of all men, insofar as we are dealing with man, is destroyed". (Arendt 2005 p.94) Not only is the realm of the family that in which the security of the life process must primarily be served (Arendt 2003b: 448), but the image of the family as the basis for politics results in an essentially divine aspiration to create, or rather to amend, the concept 'man', "by acting as if we could naturally escape from the principle of human differentiation". (Arendt 2005 p.94) In seeking to establish a concept of kinship that attests to the 'sameness' of all that are to be included in the concept 'man', biology is the most obvious common, and lowest denominator and man is fundamentally reduced to a member of the *species* man, whereby the survival and perpetuation of the life processes of members of the gigantic family of mankind – humanity - are sought to be secured. For Arendt, this

ultimately represents a perversion of the political as it “abolishes the basic quality of plurality, or rather forfeits it by introducing the concept of kinship”. (Arendt 2005 p.94) And in this quandary she identifies the dangerous and anti-political basis of modern (Western) politics:

The west’s solution for escaping from the impossibility of politics within the Western creation myth is to transform politics into history, or to substitute history for politics. In the idea of world history, the multiplicity of men is melted into one human individual, which is then also called humanity. This is the source of the monstrous and inhuman aspect of history, which accomplishes its full and brutal end in politics. (Arendt 2005 p.95)

The escape from the freedom of politics into the necessity of history was, for Arendt, a “ghastly absurdity” and its implications for politics, for the world, dangerous. Political procedures that are based on the family and the protection of biological processes delimit this essential plurality and thereby render such types of political government anti-political. Political action is thus severely delimited in its constitutive capacity to establish, through non-biopolitical politics, a constitutional framework, in the Arendtian sense, that could perhaps, at a social level, comprise solutions to difficult questions of resource distribution and related issues.

III. Collective Philopsychia: Survival of Humanity

If we follow Arendt’s perspective of what constitutes the political, we recognise that modern and late modern conceptions of politics meet only faintly the conditions required for a politics proper. In a perhaps over-ambitious mandate for equality based on an abstract concept of humanity, it is assumed that there is a pre-existing condition (being a member of the human species) that determines a right. (Balibar 2007) On both a national and international basis, it is plain to see that this has to date not proven to be a viable deterrent for political violence engendered in the name of restoring abstract concepts of humanity. It is perhaps helpful to consider this precarious politics of a universal equality in a contemporary context to understand the implications that Arendt sought to highlight. Here, in a more stringent appropriation of the agonistic and antagonistic realities in politics, Chantal Mouffe makes a strong case in her normative considerations of the political as encompassing the potential for antagonism inherent in every political exchange. While Mouffe and Arendt speak from different perspectives of what constitutes the political as such, the parallels in

terms of the fundamental requirement to depart in politics from the acceptance of a plural perspective are clearly evident. Mouffe strongly criticises what she considers to be a rationalist, universalist and individualist political democratic thinking that essentially stems from an “[e]nlightenment universalism of an undifferentiated human nature”. (Mouffe 2005 p.13) She attributes such thinking with a major shortcoming: it remains blind to the specificity of the political in its dimension of conflict/decision – in short – antagonism. Such a universalising politics, for Mouffe, is “fraught with danger since it leaves us unprepared in the face of unrecognised manifestations of antagonism”. (Mouffe 2005 p.2) For Mouffe, antagonism, manifested through difference inherent in a plural populous is as much a social and political reality as discrimination and difference is for Arendt. In her own advocacy of radical democracy Mouffe claims: “when we accept that every identity is relational and that the condition of existence of every identity is the affirmation of difference, the determination of an ‘other’ that is going to play the role of a ‘constitutive outsider’, it is possible to understand how antagonisms arise”. (Mouffe 2005 p.2) And the moment of recognition is also the moment of potential to avert the antagonistic manifestation of actual political conflict framed as an existentially relevant inclusion / exclusion distinction and channel it into agonism based on mutual respect (equality for Arendt). Reminiscent of Arendt’s emphasis on the uniqueness of every person and difference as the condition for political inter-action in a pluralistic political realm, Mouffe highlights the existence of opposing perspective and simultaneously the dangerous implications of collective, identifications when differentiation occurs in an antagonistic ‘we’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy. In the context of the Arendtian conception of the social realm, this differentiation is not politically relevant but bestows a non-political level of association on members of groups. It is when the we/them construct becomes a political friend/enemy decision, in the Schmittian sense, that the anti-political basis of social discrimination can turn into an existential political differentiation. Mouffe explains: “This can happen when the other, who was until then considered only under the mode of difference, begins to be perceived as negating our identity, as putting in question our very existence”. (Mouffe 2005 p.3) In other words, it is through the us/them dichotomy, which is established through collective identity (or in Arendt’s terms social ‘discrimination’) - not individual identity (in Arendt’s terms ‘difference’) - that the Schmittian political friend/enemy

distinction is possible and pluralistic politics becomes diminished, in biopolitics, on the basis of biological characteristics³⁸.

This does not mean that in Arendt's social realm, which does not claim to include political action, coexistence under a quasi-united concept of diversity is impossible, however, the risk of political exclusion on the basis of survival is latent. When the 'other' is designated an enemy, jeopardising life and its progression, their elimination must ensue. When they are considered an adversary, "whose existence is legitimated and must be tolerated", mutual equality as the basis for antagonistic and pluralistic politics can ensue. (Mouffe 2005 p.4) Mouffe, via Carole Pateman, effectively illustrates the discriminatory potential of political equality that is granted based on an abstract concept of membership in the human species when she quotes Pateman:

The idea of universal citizenship is specifically modern, and necessarily depends on the emergence of the view that all individuals are born free and equal, or are naturally free and equal to each other ... We are all taught that the "individual" is a universal category that applies to anyone and everyone, but this is not the case. "The individual" is man. (Pateman 1986, cited in Mouffe 2005 p.13)

A universal equality that rests solely on the basis of man as a member of the human species offers thus no guarantee for actual political equality in matters of politics when social norms based on conformity appropriate the realm of political action. As the modern social realm, characterised by "cooperative, identity-destroying labour" assumes the role of the political sphere, which in Arendtian terms is marked by "competitive, identity-disclosing action" (Bull 2005 p.678), then matters of biology and life processes and necessity enter a field of competition, in which issues of life and survival are at stake and biopolitical forms of political violence appear as a means to remedy an abstract principle of what is considered to belong to the human species.

Where humanity is the political master narrative of a society that has as its chief purpose the security, promotion and progression of the life processes of the species, survival becomes the key purpose for such a political society. And it is this turn, in

³⁸ As Andrew Schaap rightly points out, the conceptions of agonism in Mouffe and Arendt vary in that the former presents the agonistic exchange in light of the distinction between groups, while Arendt's perspective on antagonism is based on the infinite plurality of human beings. This does not, however, bear on the illustration of the argument presented in this paper, but must perhaps be considered in the wider context of this project. (Schaap 2007)

politics becoming the administration of life in modernity, that politics substantially loses its meaning for Arendt: “if it is true that politics is nothing more than a necessary evil for sustaining the life of humanity, then politics has indeed begun to banish itself from the world and to transform its meaning into meaninglessness”. (Arendt 2005 p.108) Here, once again, the antithetical nature of the constellation of life necessities and politics becomes evident. It is without question for Arendt that politics proper neither means protection nor security, but its very meaning is freedom. We should recall here once more Arendt’s assertion that “in politics not life is at stake but the world”. (Arendt 2003b p.448) Liberal modernity no longer fulfils this condition for Arendt, as all action is governed by necessity in an “increasing sphere of social and economic life whose administration has overshadowed the political realm even since the beginning of the modern age”. (Arendt 2003b p.448) The perpetual maintenance of life processes and the predominance of survival as the prime concern, not only of private but now also of public concern renders man in the singular and men, collectively in the public space, fundamentally un-free, Arendt argues. In liberal modern government, this is reflected no longer in the Hobbesian security of the individual against death but rather a “security which should permit an undisturbed development of the life processes of society as a whole”. (Arendt 2003b p.443) In Arendt’s terms, liberal modernity thus reflects more closely the communal actions and codes for conduct of a non-political tribal association than a body politics proper in its dominant concern for life processes and the lack of space for both politics and freedom, as she claims that it is those communities that do not form a body politic in which “factors ruling their actions and conduct are not freedom but the necessities of life and concern for its preservation”. (Arendt 2003b p.442) In a modern society in which political preoccupations predominantly centre on matters of human survival and the progress of humanity, or at a minimum on the security of biological human life, the maintenance of the world, which provides for Arendt the spaces for men to come together in their agonistic plurality and act contingently in concert loses meaning entirely. In other words, if in politics life is at stake, security becomes a key political paradigm and all political resources that must necessarily focus on this very condition become anti-political as such.

To understand the impasse at which politics in modernity has arrived for Arendt, it is helpful to briefly engage with her conceptions of both necessity and freedom and the

consequences they bear when politics and necessity become conflated. Freedom and necessities are not only located at opposite ends of the spectrum, but are for Arendt mutually exclusive as such and this reflects in their relation to politics for Arendt. While, in her account, a person must liberate herself from the realm of necessity in order to be free in a public and politically organised realm, the sphere of life necessity is by definition always un-free. Freedom and politics thus are reciprocally related. Arendt does not understand freedom as ‘being free from’ something, but rather as a condition that we can experience only as inter-subjectivity, in the interaction with other (free) men. The term freedom, in the modern context, has become somewhat ambiguous and the meaning of freedom today, is somewhat obscured. In a contemporary Western context, freedom more often than not denotes ‘freedom to buy – economic freedom’, and, particularly in the past decade, has been linked closely with ‘humanity’³⁹. In Arendt’s own expositions it is not always entirely clear what precisely the term freedom denotes for her as it is presented in various nuances throughout her work. What is clear, however, is that the modern discussions of freedom,

where freedom is never understood as an objective state of human existence but either presents an unsolvable problem of subjectivity, of an entirely undetermined or determined will, or develops out of necessity, all point to the fact that the objective, tangible difference between being free and being forced by necessity is no longer perceived. (Arendt 1998 p.71)

In modernity, Arendt claims, freedom is understood as “a river flowing freely” (Arendt 2005 p.120) in which every attempt to block its flow is an arbitrary impediment. In such a view the contrasting opposite to freedom is no longer necessity, but rather “arbitrary action” (Arendt 2005 p.121), or contingent political action. A flow is always determined by directionality, which in a context of life politics translates into a deterministic conception of how man or humanity should progress within this flow of history. A flow delimits the unpredictable, the chaotic, the contingent as such. The dangers of a constellation where the free “flow of history” (Arendt 2005 p.121) is equated with politics and takes place within a totalizing sphere

³⁹ A telling example of the declaratory relationship of freedom with humanity is captured in the infamous 2002 US National Security Strategy document: “Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes.” (The White House 2002)

of life politics were clear to Arendt:

The distinction between such pervasive ideological thinking and totalitarian regimes lies in the fact that the latter have discovered the political means to integrate human beings into the flow of history in such a way that they are totally caught up in its "freedom", in its "free flow", that they can no longer obstruct it but instead become impulses for its acceleration. (Arendt 2005 p.121)

Where humanity is understood as deterministic, as progressive in nature and guided by the credo of 'coming into being' in a determined way, that which is not considered conducive to the historical flow of the evolution mandate must either be absorbed and made to conform, or be eliminated in a totalizing political community. Survival, then, is the trophy gained in the evolution contest, but it is an unstable and fluid prize as the inherent contingency of human action renders the teleological attainment of a universal humanity impossible.

Contrary to these modern perceptions, freedom, in Arendt's account, means originally the freedom to leave the private realm of the household whose sole concern is that of securing life processes and taking care of life necessities. In other words, freedom, in part, meant liberation from the realm of the family in which survival and the taking care of life's necessities was ensured. But this was by no means a passive act. For Arendt, leaving this realm in which man stood necessarily under the sway of necessity or coercion, required what represents one of the earliest political virtues: courage. She states: "thus only that man was free who was prepared to risk his own life, and it was the man with the unfree and servile soul who clung too dearly to life". (Arendt 2005 p.122) Arendt uses the Greek term '*philopsychia*' in this context to denote the un-free man who had a "love of life for life's own sake". (Arendt 2002 p. 287; Arendt 2005 p. 122) Or to put it perhaps more bluntly, *philopsychia* characterises those persons who lack the courage to have any other ambition than to engage in labour as their sole activity. Modern society, which in Arendt's terms is fully under the sway of life necessities, and in which, as we have seen earlier, all political activities have been subsumed as quasi-politics in administrative tasks of life management, *philopsychia* indeed appears to have gained omnipresence, not as an individual characteristic but as a collective one. Politics proper relies on action, and action, for Arendt, is closely related to risk. Where life is at stake in politics and survival becomes its paradigm, fear is the emotional driver of political actions. The

consequences of a politics of fear have transpired and continue to transpire in the context of the U.S. initiated “with us or against us” rhetoric in the past decade and illustrate effectively the dangerous margins of policies based on an emotion⁴⁰.

There is a further aspect that must be considered in this discussion. It relates to the very capacity for politics, which, in the labouring process is for Arendt logically impossible. The possibility of speech and language as a means to express politics is paramount here. Arendt sees the labouring process, which is that process that relates to life necessities, as an inherently mute process. As such, she explicitly relates matters of necessity to a most private sensual experience that is characterised by its very incommunicability – the experience of pain. The outward manifestations of labour and of taking care of life necessities essential to survival fundamentally relate to pain and effort. (Arendt 1998 p.135) Likewise, when life necessities are not met and the body suffers deficiencies, pain in its various physical substantiation is the result. And pain, as Arendt recognised early, is one of the most world-denying and private realities possible. In her words:

Indeed the most intense feeling we know of, intense to the point of blotting out all other experiences, namely the experience of great bodily pain, is at the same time the least communicable of all. Not only is it perhaps the only experience which we are unable to transform into a shape fit for public appearance, it actually deprives us of our feeling for reality to such an extent that we can forget it more quickly and easily than anything else. (Arendt 1998 p.50)

The crucial point here is that the experience of pain, while an expression thereof can be approximated in similes, can never be shared or fully communicated in a public realm. Politics relies on speech, on communication, and it is precisely through speech and communication that politics is enacted. A society that stands under the perpetual duress of labouring and ‘making a living’ is a mute society and is for this reason alone thoroughly unsuitable as a basis for politics, in Arendtian terms. If we accept Arendt’s assessment that necessity and, derivatively, labour manifests as pain and effort and that the lack of necessities met results in the very same, and we acknowledge that pain is the least communicable of all experiences, then a politics of

⁴⁰ The shift of practices, such as torture and renditions, that were hitherto considered to be absolutely prohibited in warfare, into a framework of policies that essentially awards the president of the United States with the capacity to allow such practices (as initiated by George W. Bush) or prohibit them (as in some of Barak Obama’s policies) is just one such example of policies at the heart of which stands the survival of ‘humanity’.

necessity, or biopolitics, in the Arendtian sense of politics proper, where men appear freely in public and organise themselves through speech and action, is categorically antithetical. And it is here that Arendt's view of the muteness of violence echoes most strongly, as she critiques Marx for conflating history and politics and making violence the 'facilitator' of history to come.

The matter is further complicated when we consider that Arendt also asserts that freedom from necessity is inherently impossible as necessity is as intrinsic a matter of the human condition and so inextricably entwined with life, that to 'free man from necessity', as it was the Marxist aim, is fundamentally impossible. For Arendt "life itself is threatened where necessity is altogether eliminated". (Arendt 1998 p.71) Freedom from necessity, although a condition for being able to freely participate in Arendtian politics, does not constitute the establishment of freedom. Necessity remains a constant for Arendt, as long as there is life, necessity is its shadowy companion. She reiterates the same point, in a critique of Marx, in her diagnosis of a modern society that has become a society of labourers and consumers, as she warns that the easier these activities appear, the less aware we may be of the urges of necessity, not as they are not present, but because they do not manifest themselves in pain and effort. Neither do they manifest themselves in freedom or the capacity for political action as such. Quite the contrary - Arendt sees a grave danger in such a society that is caught up in its own radiant fertility and perpetual and cyclical processes that it is unable to recognise its own inability to contribute to making a shared and lasting world. In this, Arendt quotes Adam Smith when she critiques that such a society would "no longer be able to recognize its own futility – the futility of a life which 'does not fix or realize itself in any permanent subject which endures after [its] labour is past'". (Arendt 1998 p.135) Arendt was under no illusions that the meaning of politics in modernity would remain that of freedom, and she understood clearly that the shift of life into the centre of politics could only have taken place once the meaning of politics had become altered. She also acknowledges that the duality of the emancipation of labour that could only come about with this shifted perspective of politics as she states: "the emancipation of labor, both as the glorification of the laboring activity and as the political equality of the working class, would not have been possible if the original meaning of politics--in which a political realm centered around labor would have been a contradiction in terms--had not been lost". (Arendt

2002 p.286) But it is also in this shift that one of Arendt's key criticisms lie with regards to the anti-political life-politics in modernity: the confusion and conflation of categories she considers to be distinct elements of the human condition: labour, work and action and the resulting violent consequences, whereby life becomes an abstract end and the means to maintain life "will become, over time, the end". (Young-Bruehl 2006 p.56)

IV. Collapsing Categories: Means / Ends or the End of Meaning

Arendt's critique of the conflation of these three categories rests fundamentally on her critique on the Marxian perspective, which in Arendt's terms, comprise two crucial and problematic theories: "First, Labor is the Creator of Man; second, Violence is the midwife of History (...)". (Arendt 2002 p.287) Importantly, Arendt notes, in the context of violence and history that history for Marx is past political action, which in turn means "violence makes action efficient". (Arendt 2002 p.287) In a modern context, where humanity is abstractly comprised as one and where survival and progress is the key social and political paradigm, where labouring production is the key to the freedom to survive, usefulness and purpose become the master signifiers for all activities. With life as the highest good (literally speaking) and labour elevated to the highest activity, metabolic considerations reign supreme: "what was not needed, not necessitated by life's metabolism with nature was either superfluous or could be distinguished only in terms of a peculiarity of human as distinguished from other animal life". (Arendt 1998 p.321) Human experience became a matter not only reduced to metabolic activity but chiefly to utility and the mandate for progression. In an instrumental understanding of the labouring process, life is rendered instrumental. Action, and by extension politics,

was soon considered and still almost exclusively understood in terms of making and fabricating, only that making, because of its worldliness and inherent indifference to life was now regarded as but another form of labouring, a more complicated but not a more mysterious function of the life process. (Arendt 1998 p.322)

The cyclical, repetitive, inherently and literally futile acts involved in all life processes was, for Arendt, rescued from its status of futility and rendered not only as 'creative' work, but furthermore action in modernity. The means-ends question so critical in Arendt's instrumental category of work is entirely meaningless when

matters of life processes are concerned. With the survival of society as the highest good in a political community, and a perspective that deems history as a deterministic political process, it is not surprising that acts of politics, driven by utility, became not just literally but also metaphorically linked to the natural biology of life. This is the very point where the conflation of life with politics reaches its most dangerous point. If life processes are absorbed into a Marxian process of ‘making’ history, then politics stands under the sway of an organic metaphor by which the end of history must be violently brought about. Arendt frequently criticised what she considered to be one of the most forceful metaphors underlying the justification of violence, namely that “violence is linked to labour pangs”. (Arendt 1967) This particular organic metaphor not only rendered the use of violence as a political tool *zoefied*, but also was for Arendt vastly misleading as it quite blatantly equated biological life with politics between men and rendered violence a viable means to ‘fulfil’ history, to maintain ‘humanity’ or facilitate survival in a utilitarian means-end justification.

For Arendt, the application of violence is always instrumental, it relies on tools and technologies for its executions, has no language or speech, and as such no essence of its own. It exists in the political realm not independently but only ever through (verbal) justification. Arendt reminds us: “what needs justification by something else cannot be the essence of anything”. (Arendt 1970 p.51) She thus delineates the conditions for violence as firmly instrumental in application and constitution, and as such omits the bodily aspects of violent forces (perhaps relating predominantly to a realm of personal violence rather than politically organised violence) in the public realm. Where Franz Fanon famously embraces the physical embodiment of violence in the anti-colonial struggle in his seminal work *Wretched of the Earth*, Arendt finds “nothing, [...], more dangerous than the tradition of organic thought in political matters by which power and violence are interpreted in biological terms”. (Arendt 1970 p.75) In this, she clearly addresses the *zoefication* of politics elaborated in chapter one and identifies its potentially dangerous implications. It is her continued critique of a de-politicisation of politics in which life stands unquestioned at the centre of politics so that life processes, for Arendt the very manifestation of unfreedom, come to dominate that realm that is to provide freedom in Arendt’s understanding of the term. A violence that is instrumental to this life process and its

credo of creativity can then essentially be considered a radicalized form of biopolitics.

Her cautions against such a conflation are credible in light of the totalitarian reality she experienced and which continues to cast its shadow far into modernity. The *zoefication* of politics – placing emphasis on the biological as the basis for the political - allows for the consequential rationality of a political violence upon life as Arendt explains:

So long as we talk in non-political, biological terms, the glorification of violence can appeal to the undeniable fact that in the household of nature, destruction and creation are but two sides of the natural process, so that collective violent action, quite apart from its inherent attraction, may appear as a natural prerequisite for the collective life of mankind as the struggle for survival and violent death for continuing life in the animal kingdom. (Arendt 1970 p.75)

Aware of the temptations of such justifications, particularly in light of racism, Arendt rejects the conflation of violence-as-politics with natural processes. Such introductions of violence-as-politics into the sphere of biological processes harbours the greatest dangers of a biopolitical radicalization of violence, for the good of the population, based on racism or similar biopolitical ideologies, through violence. If politics and its violent instruments are defined as life processes, then the Schmittian friend/enemy distinction becomes one that is based on what is subsequently identified as hostile to humanity, in the modern context dominantly manifest as an ideology of race distinction. Violence as a legitimized and justified instrument of politics here becomes the murderous tool for racial exclusion in the totalitarian context. And it is indeed in this type of conflation of the political with the biological and the sovereign monopoly on the rational use of violence that Foucault demonstrates the murderous biopolitical racism of the totalitarian regime. As he states: “We have then in Nazi society something that is really quite extraordinary: this is a society which has generalized biopower in an absolute sense, but which also has generalized the sovereign right to kill.” (Foucault 2004 p.260)

The radical goal of violence is invariably death and death stands as the complete antithesis to Arendt’s conception of action, of new beginnings in the political sphere and of freedom of man and men. The glorification of violence as an essential and perhaps even necessary element of life is thus inherently antithetical to Arendt’s

understanding of what makes humans human. She states: “Death, whether faced in actual dying or in the inner awareness of one’s own mortality is perhaps the most antipolitical experience there is” (Arendt 1970 p.67), as such, it would seem contradictory for Arendt to consider violence as anything other than an act that stands fully outside of the realm of the political. The collapse of the categories labour, work and action solidifies two changed perceptions. Firstly, that labour, as the prime activity of man and necessary for the survival and progress of humanity, presents his relationship to a shared community based on biological characteristics, and secondly that politics is, literally, instrumental in facilitating the labouring process for survival. The Marxian adage of ‘violence as the midwife of history’ fits seamlessly into this perspective and, if contextualised with the Arendtian perspective, reveals the dangers inherent in understanding violence as ‘necessary’ to secure humanity in a *zoefied* understanding of politics.

Following Arendt’s analysis, it appears as though, for her, in modernity, there has been a shift in our capacities for collective political action from creating a shared and lasting world to creating life in a quasi-divine aspiration. No longer are we chiefly engaged in improving political life, bettering constitutional frameworks, enhancing capacities for politics proper, but rather, there is a pre-occupation with how we may have to labour less for our sustenance, improve biological functions of our individual bodies and eliminate actualised and perceived risk to human biological life. The body has become a site of production and creation in the very literal scientific sense. *Homo faber*, the toolmaker in the Arendtian account, no longer fabricates the world, but produces tools and instruments to facilitate the life process and soon, Arendt argues, machines to facilitate labour are what bind man to a shared world. In a contemporary context, these machines both mirror and produce biology and matters of life processes, whether that be in bio-molecular medicine or in warfare – the technological singularity that Arendt presciently was conscious of – is allegedly inevitably upon us, further thrusting humans away from the realm of politics proper in which human difference can be revealed, marginalising human political experience altogether. Man in his biology realises a productive purpose. As Dillon and Reid question effectively in their analysis of the liberal ways of war, in modernity, the question has arisen: “*What are people good for?*” – and it is precisely this question that renders biopolitics so precarious and anti-political. In their words:

Biopolitics cannot abide the good for nothing. But politics, that process by which order is changed to accommodate new principles of order rather than to rank all principles under a common metric, must insist on admitting the good for nothing to the conversation; must admit the good for nothing to the conversation, because that is the vocation of the political. (Dillon and Reid 2009 p.154)

Arendt's perspective of what constitutes politics proper strongly echoes in this assessment. It is clear that for Arendt, in line with Kant, neither man nor the life processes that sustain man, should be conceived in utilitarian and predominantly functional terms but rather as ends themselves. Where utility is radicalised "all ends are bound to be of short duration and to be transformed means for some further ends". (Arendt 1998 p.154) When violence is the means by which an end is to be achieved that relates to the security of survival and progress, the meaning of violence in society becomes subject to transformation.

Conclusion

The concept of an Arendtian biopolitics is challenging. But when understood in the context of differing conceptions of politics, we can detect how biopolitical politics is, in fact, anti-political in Arendtian terms and cannot be included in what Arendt understands as politics proper. Politics conceived as managerial processes of law, order and distribution differs considerably from an understanding of politics that focuses on the formation of groups in the powerful pursuit of collective action for a shared world and what is 'in-between' people. Each perspective has different theoretical implications for how we perceive and justify acts of violence in relation to politics in modernity, as the prevalent political perspective will "invariably shape our answers to innumerable questions about what should be punished, when nominal violations are justified and when wrongdoing should be excused". (Fletcher 2000)

Life and politics as a conjoined concept is one that bears fundamental implications on how we conceive of political action and political spaces in modernity. Where life, as biological life, forms the basis for the political subject (the human) as well as political processes, politics proper cannot be assured, as essential aspects of politics, in Arendt's terms, are fundamentally challenged. Difference, speech, freedom and the embrace of uncertainty and risk, vital categories for the possibility of politics proper in Arendt, disturb the biopolitical mandate of politics-as-management and put into question the *zoefied* processes of political administration that are reliant on control

and predictable outcomes. Where heterogeneity is absorbed by homogeneity, language and speech is obscured and freedom subsumed by necessity, politics proper is at risk. However, where the principles for politics proper are endangered, forms of violence, in lieu of politics proper, may more readily be employed in creating certain ends, and may, indeed, be glorified as the necessary instrument to make humanity survive and progress. A *zoefied* understanding of politics runs thus the risk of conceiving of violence in terms of its creative capacities for political ends, and can be justified in terms of necessity and control. The perils of this biopolitically informed understanding of politics was not lost on Arendt. The occlusion of the principles for politics becomes ever-more pressing when we consider the homogenisation mandate of new anthropo-technological developments. (Campbell p.115; Sloterdijk 2009 pp.24-25) The problems this comprises is developed in chapter six. In order to understand more clearly what role violence, and justifications of violence, play in this biopolitically informed anti-political condition, the following chapter establishes the relationship between politics and violence further in order to situate the biopolitically informed instrumental nature of the relationship between the two in present times.

4: Biopolitical Violence: Mute Means for Certain Ends

Listen up - there's no war that will end all wars

Haruki Murakami, *Kafka on the Shore*

I. From Life-Politics to Necro-Politics

Where biopolitical rationales inform perspectives of politics-as-management for the security and progress of humanity, the use of violence in relation to political goals is equally affected by biopolitical principles. It is here that biopolitics becomes necro-politics – the political administration of death for life, as Achilles Mbeme has so lucidly elaborated. (Mbeme 2003) The *zoefication* of politics provides the reference frame for a logic that posits violence as a possible tool for the creation of certain political outcomes. In contemporary practices of political violence the organic metaphor – the notion that the body-politic and its processes are akin to life processes and can be treated as such – is gaining currency, particularly as levels of sophistication in military technologies continue to improve. This is explicitly apparent in the current practice of the use of drones for counter-terrorism operations, whereby CIA director and proponent of the drones programme, John Brennan, continually advocates the use of violence for the health and well-being of the body politic and posits that it is indeed possible to cure the body-politic of its terrorist cancer⁴¹. (Brennan 2010, 2013) The political goal is the (expedient) eradication of the dangerous affliction to humanity – in all its unpredictable and ungovernable manifestations – and technologically facilitated violence serves as the tool in striving to eradicate threats and risks, thereby potentially engaging in “an endless series of wars to end all wars”. (Brown 2003 p.5) The biopolitical anti-politics of modernity is a dubious form of politics for Arendt, one that has ceased to have meaning, beyond meaninglessness, once it becomes nothing more than “a necessary evil for sustaining the life of humanity” (Arendt 2005 p.110) and this meaninglessness opens the pathway for violence as an expedient tool in the administration of humanity. Where the previous chapter has addressed how a biopolitical rationale shapes perspectives of

⁴¹ In a recent interview with the magazine GQ, Brennan invokes the ‘cancer’ metaphor several times, giving shape to the medical narrative with which violent political practices are justified. (Brennan 2013) Chapter five elaborates this medical metaphor as a justification narrative in greater detail.

politics-as-management, occluding politics proper in the Arendtian sense, this chapter focuses on how this, in turn, shapes the relationship between politics and violence.

Political history throughout modernity has been infused with violence as a political instrument and the much-quoted Clausewitzian truism of war as an extension of politics by other means, and its various inversions⁴², have manifested themselves into the collective consciousness of political life for centuries. In 1962, Sheldon Wolin pointed out that theorizations of violence should take into consideration the respective values and foundations on which a community is based, as he notes that “modern man’s view of violence differs almost as greatly from pre-modern man’s view as the nuclear warhead differs from the blunderbuss”. (Wolin 2009 p.41) His apt observation suggests that a closer look at the interconnection of violence and political modernity, in the context of new and different political forms is in order if we are to understand the role and position of violence in a specific form of political modernity. As acts of violence for political goals emerge in new and changing political contexts and realities in modernity, theories of violence and its relationship to politics ought to be investigated anew. And it has been suggested that such investigations should not merely take place at the specific and particular level, referring to either particular ethnographic studies or specific types of violence, such as terrorism or militant civil strife, for example, but rather at the conceptual level as well. (Keane 2004; Bufacchi 2007 p.11) As we are faced with new forms of political practices, conventions and norms in the 21st century, which, to date, seem to have failed to reduce the occurrence of violence (at the very least on a global scale), the need to rethink the coexistence of a universal claim to humanity and the practice of violence-as-politics in the name of the life and securitization of the species becomes highlighted. Where life has moved to the centre of political practices and imperatives, and violence is normatively conflated with politics as an instrument of power, the question emerges what role political violence plays in such a political society and what norms emerge for the relationship between politics and violence.⁴³

⁴² Both Arendt and Foucault have turned the dictum onto its head to come to an understanding of politics as the continuation of war by other means, although each of them in a different context as I will aim to address in this chapter.

⁴³ A brief word on defining violence: The term violence notoriously eludes definition, as the specificities of actual violence are manifold and theorisations of the term often polarising and steeped in concepts of morality. Aside from the normative question whether violence can or should ever be framed in terms of ‘good’ violence in opposition to ‘bad’ violence (Mueller 2002), abstractions and realities of violence are inherently elastic. Conceptions of political violence in contemporary

In this chapter, I engage with Arendt's analysis of political violence in order to delineate the biopolitical rationales that inform justifications of the use of violence in contemporary practices of political violence. I begin the analysis by highlighting her conception of violence as mute, instrumental and problematic if perceived as expedient political action in the biopolitical rationale of politics-as-management. The exploration then moves to the impasses faced in the conflated understanding and justification of violence-as-politics in modernity and addresses this relationship in a biopolitical socio-political context. In this, the chapter aims to highlight the instrumental role when politics is understood as having distinct ends. The final part of the chapter addresses the justifications of the use of violence in a biopolitical

discourses are often addressed in terms of structural violence in contrast to direct violence, most influentially outlined by Tord Hoivik and Johan Galtung (Hoivik and Galtung 1971), and have been largely classified in terms of their breadth or narrowness. The problem remains, however, that in order to discuss a conceptual understanding of violence one must find a definition that is broad enough to not unnecessarily limit certain aspects of violence yet "narrowly enough to be useful". (Litke 2009 p.297) C.A.J. Coady has effectively shown that different approaches (structuralist, legitimist) have political significance and warrant careful consideration when attempting to define violence as concept. (Coady 2009 p.244) Consensus as to a universal definition of the term, however, does not truly exist among scholars and finding a definition is complicated further by the very 'evolution' of the application of the term. (Keane 2004 p.30) The term political violence presents a sub-category of a far-reaching general concept of violence (Bufacchi 2007 p.96), and while this narrows the scope considerably in attempting to find a useful definition for analysis, there are still wide ranging perspectives as to what should be included or excluded by the term. Definitions are often normatively tinged⁴³ in framing violence in terms of legitimacy or legality in a political context. Such normative definitions are often restrictive and can, as such, prove counter-productive in the examination of violence as a concept. A more neutral definition of violence offers a broader platform from which to begin any analysis. (Keane 2004 p.35) But 'normative flourish' is not the only obstacle in finding an appropriate definition; there is also a wide elasticity in what is considered violence in a political context. Where some scholars focus their investigations of political violence on the notion of the unwanted violation of physical integrity or physical harm inflicted in a political context (Keane 2004, Rapaport and Weinberg 2001), others broaden the definition to include psychological or mental harm as inflicted by a deliberate omission to act. (See for example Litke 2009; Bufacchi 2007; Bäck 2009) And, in addition to the physical and psychological aspects of violence, the subject might further be considered in its personal or structural manifestations, as Johan Galtung carefully delineates in his influential essay *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*. (Galtung 2009) Other, broad concepts of violence in a social context include occurrences of alienation (i.e. living conditions) and social exclusions, as well as instances of repression such as the divestment of social or political rights. (Salmi 2009 pp.311 – 318) The aim of such definitions of violence is to address the far-reaching forms in which individual persons and groups can be oppressed and harmed in a political context. What makes such broad definitions problematic, however, is that they render political violence so general that they become all-pervasive in society and a meaningful analysis of violence as a political concept becomes further complicated, while that which is particular to violence as it is conventionally understood, i.e. the use of physical force to cause harm to the integrity of the subject of violence becomes somewhat obscured. (Giddens 2002 p.246) As the subject of my analysis in this discussion relates primarily to an Arendtian conception of violence, it makes sense to keep to a more narrow and conventional understanding of violence in this context. In Arendt's writings, violence is predominantly understood in its physical phenomenology, as an instrument whose very substance is "ruled by the means-end category" (Arendt 1970 p.4) and less so in its structural manifestations⁴³. Despite this circumscribed understanding of violence in a more narrow sense, however, her conceptual account of political violence is by no means uncomplicated and warrants a more nuanced analysis.

rationale that aims to achieve and ascertain certain outcomes, whereby this, for Arendt, constitutes a misunderstanding at best and a delusion at worst. The chapter further aims to tie the use of violence-as-politics to the *zoefied* understanding of politics. These considerations will then serve as the basis from which to depart from an exposition of the core elements of an Arendtian understanding of life-politics and its violent potential to then engage in an analysis of the ethical implications of political violence.

II. Instrumental, Mute, Anti-political: Arendt's Account of Violence

While highly critical of the conflation of politics with violence, Arendt was clearly aware that politics and violence have had a long tradition of enmeshment as she notes: “no one engaged in thought about history and politics can remain unaware of the enormous role violence has played in human affairs”. (Arendt 1970 p.8) In her seminal essay on the topic, *On Violence*, she engages thoroughly and critically with “violence in the political realm” (Arendt 1970 p.35), and seeks to analytically disentangle the two by making the case for violence as *antithetical* to politics and anti-political in nature. The essay earned Arendt strong criticism for her radical distinctions of what does, and what does not, constitute violence, but it also secured her place as one of the most vital thinkers on the topic of politics and violence to this day. (Buffachi 2009 p.3) In *On Violence*, Arendt does not offer a comprehensive definition of the term as such, yet it is clear in her writing that she distinguishes carefully between violence itself and the implements of violence. Where Arendt's analysis is most interesting for a conceptual analysis of the role of violence in politics, and also most contested, is in her positing of violence as distinct from the terms it is often (and in Arendt's view erroneously) conflated with, namely force, power or strength. (Arendt 1970 p.4) These distinctions have earned her analysis much attention, as well as criticisms (see for example Ricoeur 2006; Breen 2007; Hanssen 2000) but they make it possible to analyse violence as anti-political, as *outside* of politics, and vice versa. While Arendt does not offer a comprehensive definition of violence as such, she made it quite clear, by way of these categorisations, what violence is *not*.

Violence, in Arendt's terms, is neither identical with strength (although phenomenologically it can be similar to strength) nor is it the same as force, which

for her predominantly should be used to indicate “forces of nature” or the “forces of circumstances” (Arendt 1970 p.45), something that phenomenologically originates externally; She states most emphatically that violence is also not the same as power, or even authority. All these terms, for Arendt, indeed factor into a political context in modernity and become confused and conflated precisely when the dominant political question becomes: “Who rules Whom?” (Arendt 1970 p.43)

Arendt’s theoretical conception of violence rests on some key claims about the nature of violence. *Firstly*, violence is always instrumental in nature. It relies on the use of implements and tools to essentially amplify human strength, and is governed by the means-end category. For Arendt, violence, in contrast to power, as such has no essence. It always requires justification and guidance through the ends it pursues (Arendt 1970 p.51) and thus cannot be in itself the essence of anything. *Secondly*, violence and power are located at opposite ends of a spectrum. (Arendt 1970 p.56) Although they often appear together, they are, for Arendt, distinct phenomena, whereby violence has the capacity to destroy power but cannot create it. This is a major point of contention for scholars commenting on Arendt’s exposition on violence (see for example Ricoeur 2006) as it thoroughly defies commonly held perspectives that follow the Maoist position that “power grows out of the barrel of a gun”. (Arendt 1970 p.37) *Thirdly*, and this aspect is closely related to the previous points and most relevant for this discussion, violence, in Arendt’s account, is located *outside* of politics and as such in itself anti-political, as indicated earlier. Violence, for Arendt, cannot be politics proper as it is itself “incapable of speech” and as such inherently mute. (Arendt 1998: 26; 2006a: 9) This, naturally, renders any modern conflation of violence-as-politics highly problematic.

That Arendt was acutely aware of the problems of modern politics and violence is evident when we consider her sceptical analysis of social-political structures as examined in previous chapters. In trying to come to terms with her analysis on violence and its problematic relationship with politics, specifically in a life-politics context, it is helpful to keep in mind, her understanding of politics *proper*, as distinct from political administration or management as government in this discussion. Politics proper, for Arendt, is an action that takes places among free and different men that grant each other equality in their interaction for a common or shared interest. (Arendt 2005 p.93) It is, indeed the capacity for action, and with it to create

new beginning that “make man a political being”. (Arendt 1970 p.82) As highlighted in the previous chapter, it is through political togetherness, expressed through speech and action, that power is gained; hence the inability of violence, mute in its very nature for Arendt, to serve as a political action. To understand this exclusion in the context of modernity we must consider that the managerial model of politics predominant in modern administrative government is antithetical to Arendt’s understanding of what the political can and should be. The political congregation in the public sphere is, for Arendt, the true meaning of power in order to bring about changes for a shared world. As we have seen in earlier chapters, however, this capacity for action is severely delimited in a biopolitically informed modernity through the very socio-political structures in place. Arendt strongly links this incapacity for action with greater levels of violence as she states: “I am inclined to think that much of the present glorification of violence is caused by severe frustration of the faculty of action in the modern world”. (Arendt 1970 p.83)

III. Violence-as-Politics: Justification and Legitimation of Violent Acts in Politics

While Arendt was keenly aware of a *de facto* reality of political practices in which violence had been considered an integral part of politics for centuries, and specifically in her time - the 20th century (Canovan 1995 p.185) - she was nonetheless highly critical of the fact that the coexistence of politics with violence is, in fact, so ingrained in all modern generations that a disassociation of the two requires a conscious effort of imagination. The unquestioned concept of the construct of violence-as-politics thus presented a theoretical problem for her. It was precisely this lack of imagination, to conceptually and critically view this problematic composition in which modern politics has become imbricated with violent tools for the maintenance of government, and which Weber posed as the modern moral political dilemma for the “courageous” politician, Arendt addresses in her analyses of violence and politics in modernity throughout her work. (Canovan 1995; Hanssen 2000 p.25) While her perspectives on the problem of violence is most widely known through her expositions in the essay *On Violence*, theories of violence run through Arendt’s entire body of work, not least as a central element in her analysis of totalitarianism in 1952. When read in the context of her critique of modern political societies as essentially anti-political societies, a clearer picture of the specific problems of this conflation of violence with politics in modernity emerges.

While the violence-as-politics conjuncture in modernity posed a problem for Arendt, she was by no means a pacifist, despite her admiration for Ghandi's non-violent tenacity (Canovan 1995: 119), as many scholars have noted. (See for example Canovan 1995; Owens 2007; Frazer and Hutchings 2008) In her analysis, she carefully considers the instrumentality of violence in situations of self-defence as potentially justifiable, and holds the violent struggle against tyranny and the closing of public spaces and spheres of political activity as not only a justified, and necessary, utilisation of violence, but even as a legitimate struggle for liberation. (Canovan 1995) Yet the idea of a linear means-end utilisation of violence as an expedient instrument to be employed for distinct political objectives is not an equation Arendt can readily accept, as she makes clear throughout her writings. The complexities that arise with Arendt's account of violence and the problems she poses as a theorist of violence thus spring into sharp relief and her analysis becomes unclear. Her account of violence is somewhat problematized by the fact that she employs an instrumental justification for violence in some instances and simultaneously critiques the instrumentality of violence in the political context, specifically in the writings of Sorel, Fanon and Sartre. (Arendt 1970)⁴⁴ While she categorically rejects a means-end justification for violence as politics, she also makes concessions to the possibility of a justification to achieve political goals through instrumental, yet not political, violence. It then seems that Arendt indeed creates pockets of justifiability of instrumental violent action for political goals, albeit in a very restrictive sense. This allows Arendt to conceive of a more nuanced instrumentality of violence, one that considers violence as justifiable (albeit not legitimate) when seeking to either "set the scales of justice right again" in anti-political individual acts of violence⁴⁵ (Arendt 1970 p.64) or, in a collective sense, in the pursuit of the "liberation from oppression" and the "constitution of freedom". (Arendt 2006a: 25) In other words, Arendt does indeed argue for violence as a means with which to gain certain freedoms, if - and this is the crucial point for Arendt - this violence as a means and a tool is able to provide the condition for a new beginning, a new body politic, a new constitution, the political end of which cannot be entirely foreseen. It does not situate violence in the realm of politics as such, however. It is in this mitigation of violence as instrumental

⁴⁴ For in-depth discussions of Arendt in this context see Frazer and Hutchings 2008 and Finlay 2006.

⁴⁵ Arendt elaborates this through an interpretation of Melville's *Billy Budd*, whereby Budd represents for her a classic example for acts of violence to gain 'justice'. However, this 'justice' is not political justice for Arendt but due to its emotional content, anti-political. (Arendt 1970 p.64; Owens 2007 p.99)

for political spaces that Christopher Finlay seeks to highlight that Arendt, in her understanding of violence as a rational and instrumental means as a defence against the closing of spaces for the possibility of politics, moves much more closely along the lines of Walter Benjamin's conception of 'divine violence' in that she seeks to defend instrumental violence only for the *breaking up* of existing, oppressive structures, not – and this is an important difference in understanding Arendt's analysis of such a violence – to *bring about* a new structure. This perceived creative potential of violence is made manifest in metaphors that draw on imageries and processes of biology and nature, whereby power and violence are "interpreted in biological terms", with "life and life's alleged creativity [as] their common denominator, so that violence is justified on the ground of creativity". (Arendt 1970 p.75) Therein encompassed lies another hazardous conflation for Arendt: violence understood as power. Where power, for Arendt, is "indeed the essence of all government, [...] violence is not". (Arendt 1970 p.51) Where power has politically creative properties, violence surfaces where power is lost. Violence, however, cannot create power and is, as indicated earlier, located at opposite ends in relation to power. Where power does not need justification, but rather legitimacy, violence, being instrumental in nature, relies on justification but cannot be (politically) legitimate (Arendt 1970 p.52, p.79), In other words, legitimation occurs in the political realm, from which violence is excluded. Violence can, however, be quite rationally justified by the effectiveness of reaching specific ends. This perceived creative force of violence is then also pivotal in understanding the justification of violence in a biopolitically informed political context and it is useful to briefly draw on Walter Benjamin's original essay *Critique of Violence* in order to elucidate the complex condition of political violence as always bound up with moral and ethical justification and legitimation narratives in the political context of a biopolitical modernity.

Benjamin's *Critique of Violence* presents a complex analysis of violence and its relationship with law, codifications and the state. (Kochi 2009 p.209) Similar to Arendt's analysis, Benjamin is chiefly concerned with the means-end relationship of violence and law (Finlay 2009 p.40), whereby the essence of his critique focuses not on the ends that must justify the means, rather, for Benjamin, any judgement of violence must take a more discriminate approach within the sphere of *means* rather than *ends*. (Benjamin 2007 p.277) Derrida explains the basis of Benjamin's critique

of justification in terms of the symbolic character in the very nature of violence as follows: “the concept of violence belongs to the symbolic order of law, politics and morals [...]. And it is only to this extent that it can give rise to a critique”. (Derrida 2002 p.265) Where violence is differentiated from ‘natural force’ and placed in a political context, it is essentially bound up with justifications and legitimisations, in short judgement. Thus, in constructing an approach that is echoed in Arendt, as highlighted earlier, Benjamin’s focus of investigation is on the “question of the *justification* of certain means that constitute violence” (emphasis added). (Benjamin 2007 p.279) Benjamin seeks to disentangle the justification of violence from natural and positive law as they both, in their antinomy, cannot shed light on the category violence as such. In Benjamin’s words: “Natural law attempts, by the justness of the ends, to ‘justify’ the means, positive law to ‘guarantee’ the justness of the ends through the justifications of the means”. (Benjamin 2007 p.278)

In doing so, Benjamin arrives at a distinction between the implications of law and violence in what he considers as *mythical* violence and posits it against his concept of *divine* violence. Mythical violence, for Benjamin is that violence which is both law-preserving and law-making. In Benjamin’s analysis, mythical violence thus inevitably relates to existing state structures that prescribe, through laws, codes and norms, either a reaffirmation (preservation) of existing political structures, or indeed the making of new laws and codes, thus also prescribing or reaffirming the normativity of practices in the context of political violence. In short, law-making violence has the potential to create new normative conceptions of existing political practices and powers, in an effort to overcome or modify prevailing power structures and create new conditions, new normative practices, new codes of law. Contained within this is a two-fold function, as Benjamin writes:

...lawmaking pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to be established as law, but at this very moment of lawmaking, it specifically establishes as law not an end unalloyed by violence, but one necessarily and intimately bound to it, under the title of power. Lawmaking is power making and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence. (Benjamin 2007 p.295)

Contrary to Arendt’s distinction between power and violence, it is also this violent entwinement of new law and power that then posits the spectre that underlies law-preserving violence, in which what has been established as law is to be preserved

through legitimated violence or, at the very least, the possibility thereof. The Benjaminian mythical violence thus is concerned and intimately bound up with the making or preserving of law, of normativity, of new justifications of practices. (Benjamin 2007 p.297) The relationship between law and violence matters particularly within a biopolitical rationale, which seeks to ascertain as its legitimated and justified telos the survival and progression of the species – an end that is at best always uncertain, and, in Arendtian terms, not a viable political goal. The biopolitical dimension of violence in the modern context was not lost on Benjamin. He specifically critiqued naturalistic conceptions of law and the organic metaphor upon which the justification of violence for the attainment of something posited as natural is constructed, within the Darwinian justification that “regards violence as the only original means, besides natural selection, appropriate to all the vital ends of nature”. (Benjamin 2007 p.278) For Benjamin, as for Arendt, it was clear that the “dogma of natural history” serves to try and not only justify but legitimate the violence that is used to attain “natural ends”. (Benjamin 2007 p.278) The end to be attained through violence, however, is already outside the political realm in this biopolitical context. Furthermore, within the biopolitical rationale, the “justness of the ends ... ‘justify’ the means” in conceptions of natural law, while positive law ensures “the justness of the ends through the justifications of the means”. (Benjamin 2007 p.278) Where Benjamin sees natural law and positive law as diametrically opposed, Arendt, with her insight into the development of man-as-maker of life in modernity allows us to understand how the two not only coexist within the biopolitical rationale, but serve as a more comprehensive and less politically contestable justification of political violence in the *zoefication* of politics and politicisation (technologisation) of life. The target killing program through the use of drones, enacted by the US in the fight against terror is a case in point in this biopolitical rationale of justification as legitimation: while the survival and unhindered progress of humanity serves as the (natural) justified end, the technology used – the allegedly ethical, effective and minimally invasive drone – serves as the justified means with which the justification of the ends can be ensured, and the practice thus legitimated. I will engage with the direct ethical implications of this practice in the next chapter.

It is in contrast to the identification of mythical violence with legal and normative violence that Benjamin takes a turn toward the messianic in his concept of divine

violence. Benjamin's divine violence is a violence to end all violence; one that seeks to unravel the relationship between law and violence. Where "mythical violence is lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying" (Benjamin 2007 p.297) to establish a new order, one that is hitherto unknown, but of which it is clear that it will bring about a "new historical age". (Manchev 2009) It is in this 'clean slate' approach that Finlay seeks to establish the parallels between Benjamin and Arendt⁴⁶. It is important to stress, however, that these parallels are only tenable if Benjamin's conception of divine violence is not interpreted as creative, constitutive or in any way positive in terms of politics (Finlay 2009 p.40), for it is precisely the constitutive relationship of violence and politics (or with Benjamin: the law) that Arendt so vehemently rejects. Violence as destruction presents an acceptable instrumentality in the political context for Arendt and in a messianic context for Benjamin. Violence as a creative force serving the notion of 'making' a new political history is, for Arendt, not possible and for Benjamin an impasse. Here we see that Arendt's critique of Fanon's alleged glorification of violence is most pertinent. An understanding of politics that is at once intrinsically bound up with violence and at the same time liberating from the perpetuation of violence is for Arendt problematic for the very fact that it has, in her account, no creative capacity and thus cannot serve as a rational instrument for distinct political ends. Where Fanon, in his analysis of causal structures of violence (Frazer and Hutchings 2008 p.95) sees violence as constitutive of a new social order, he does so in the understanding that man can constitute himself, effectively 'make' history come about, in the sense that Marx described when he so notoriously claimed that 'violence is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one'. Even though Fanon sought to conceive of a new society that does not rely on violence, one that, in fact is free of both the originating and liberating violence (Frazer and Hutchings 2008 p.93) it is, indeed the immanent violence in the constitution of this

⁴⁶ Both, Walter Benjamin and Hannah Arendt have produced some of the most frequently cited works on the concepts of violence, both were contemporaries in the horrors of the politics of National Socialism in Germany and its most radical violent manifestation, both were highly sceptical critics of modernity and they both were friends. Where they make an interesting pairing against a shared background of a totalitarian experience of terror, it is surprising that there is very little work that sheds light on the relationship between Arendt and Benjamin, specifically with respect to their work on violence. However, what is perhaps even more surprising is that Arendt, who was such an astute scholar of violence and has been a driving force to publish some of Benjamin's work posthumously, makes, throughout her work, no mention at all of Benjamin's exposition on violence. (Finlay 2009; Hanssen 2002)

new society as a distinct political end that makes this a dangerous perspective for Arendt.

IV. Means – Ends - Outcomes: The Certainty Chimera

The difference here in Arendt's instrumental justification of violence and the violence-as-politics conflation is its relationship to the desired political *outcome*. For Arendt, uncertainty is immanent in all violent action. She writes: "the danger of violence, even if it moves consciously within a non-extremist framework of short-term goals, will always be that the means overwhelm the end". (Arendt 1970 p.80) In other words, violence, as enacted by humans among humans in the pursuit of political ends is subject to the same perils as all action is in the Arendtian account, namely that the outcome of human action cannot be certain. Certainty, for Arendt is a chimera in the violence-as-politics assumption. Arendt's most fervent criticism targets precisely this misconception perpetuated in modern political histories to date: the illusion of certainty present in the means-ends instrumentality for political goals and their modern glorifications. It is the appropriation of this original force of nature, violence, as a glorified means for a political end in which the aspiration of human deification that characterises modernity finds its most destructive extension.

The means-ends discussion surrounding violence, whether violence is violence as state initiated violence, war or revolutionary violence, relies, Arendt argues, on the assumption that the ends can be controlled, if not ascertained. This is precarious for two reasons, as she explains. First, human action rests on plurality and difference, and always bears an immanent contingency so that the results of human action can thus never fully be controlled, not even by the actor herself, and, second, the very nature of violence contains within itself an uncontrollable, arbitrary element which is beyond the influence of actors. (Owens 2007 p.70) As Arendt states, "[n]owhere does Fortuna, good or ill luck, play a more fateful role in human affairs than on the battlefield, and this intrusion of the utterly unexpected does not disappear when people call it a 'random event' or find it scientifically suspect". (Arendt 1970 p.4)

Where violence serves its rightful instrumental purpose for Arendt is in work, in the act of fabrication of artefacts. As such, violence is intrinsic to the creation, to the making of a common *world*, not, however, in shaping political outcomes. *Homo faber*, the creator of the human artifice, has always been a destroyer of nature – here

the instrumentality is limited and always for a certain, often expedient, end whereby the end (the tangible work produced) justifies the violence inflicted (on nature) in order to gain the material for the object to be created. Thus “the wood justifies killing the tree and the table justifies destroying the wood”. (Arendt 1998 p.153) In her assessment of the utility of violence Arendt does not see this violence employed for the creation of a world as problematic but rather as necessary for the construction of a shared world⁴⁷. Typical of Arendt’s strict categorizations and distinctions, this necessity of instrumental violence can only apply to the realm of work and within the very domain of *homo faber*. This delineation, however, becomes problematic when violence is conceived of as creatively instrumental in a modernity in which the boundaries between work and action have become somewhat blurred and labour, work and action become confused in a “matter-of-course identification of fabrication with action”. (Arendt 1998 p.306) If we consider that Arendt’s aim was not to eradicate violence entirely, but to seek ways and theorisations that aimed at delimiting violence in the human realm (Isaac 1992 p.133) her strict distinction of violence as instrumental in fabrication, but never applicable in the realm of action becomes clearer. Where violence is limited to fabrication of a common world, it remains controllable: what has been destroyed by man can – to a certain extent – be rebuilt. When violence enters the realm of action, of politics as Arendt conceives of it, it remains beyond that which is controllable: what is destroyed by man-made violence cannot be rebuilt by man within inter-human relationships.

This necessity of instrumental violence does not relate to the realm of action, but is intended to remain valid only within the domain of *homo faber*, thus limiting this purposeful instrumental violence for a specified end to the space of appearances, not as political grounds. In an Arendtian biopolitical modernity, however, man, as a political being, becomes increasingly self-referential and self-producing, substituting ‘making’ for ‘acting’, in Arendt’s terminology, whereby this instrumental relationship results in a precarious confusion. (Arendt 1998 p.229) In other words, where it has become a political normality that man is not only self-producing, but in which instrumentality increasingly determines the public realm the distinction between fabrication – making artefacts for a common world – and action are not

⁴⁷ In her ready acceptance of violence inflicted on nature for the construction of a common world for man, one might detect a certain perspective that suggests Arendt’s implicit acceptance of the domination of man over nature as she readily accepts that natural objects may, unproblematically, be turned into objects that serve man and thereby indeed become reified in their value.

merely conflated but rather confused. Therein lies perilous risk for Arendt. When man understands himself, politically, as the maker of his political trajectory, in a direct instrumental way reflected in the Marxian credo mentioned earlier, violence, as the tool which is understood to be the facilitator to bring about a new political history is not reduced but rather exacerbated. In Arendt's words:

Only the modern age's conviction that man can know only what he makes, that his allegedly higher capacities depend upon making and that he therefore is primarily *homo faber* and not an animal rational, brought forth a much older implication of violence inherent in all interpretations of the realm of human affairs. (Arendt 1998 p.228)

This modern understanding of man as a 'maker' of history is for Arendt deeply and problematically enshrined in the very understanding of political thought, not only as it renders politics in terms of instrumentality, but also because this very conception of man as the maker of human affairs relies on the understanding that political ends stand under the mandate of purpose, efficiency and expediency in modernity. In other words, a level of rational certainty is introduced into the realm of politics in modernity that accepts all means as long as they are efficient in achieving a desired end – the securitization of society. This, for Arendt is mechanised through a predominance of bureaucratic structures that pose as political technologies. And precisely therein lies the enormous potential for violence for Arendt:

the greater the bureaucratization of public life, the greater will be the attraction of violence. In a fully developed bureaucracy there is nobody left with whom one can argue, to whom power can be exerted. Bureaucracy is the form of government in which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act. (Arendt 1970 p.81)

In other words, biopolitically informed bureaucratisation renders public life anti-political. Reid frames this development in contemporary modernity similarly in terms of 'logistical' life, which suggests that life today is under duress, forced to be logistical and efficient. Rational calculations of efficiencies and the aim to ascertain life and its outcomes stand at the heart of life-politics, encompassing not only biology but also human behaviour. Where mapping of life processes and behaviour become possible, the human becomes analysable and thus rendered in operational terms, whereby the "oldest conviction of *homo faber* – that 'man is the measure of all things' – advanced to the rank of a universally accepted commonplace. (Arendt 1998 p.306)

As shown in previous chapters, Arendt drew a clear and critical link between this mathematisation and analysability of man and the technologisation of life in modernity. In Reid's work we see the primacy of purpose, manifested in logistical structures, that seeks to legitimise violence in modernity as he indicates: "Today it is deemed necessary to defend the logistical life of society from enemies which threaten to undermine the efficiency of society itself". (Reid 2006 p.35) The problematic character of the rise of society, where life-processes and the notion of necessity become paramount, as discussed in earlier chapters, is here highlighted once more. It is in the biopolitical rationale that violence

can indeed be easily understood as a function or a surface phenomenon of an underlying and overruling necessity, but necessity, which we invariably carry within us in the very existence of our bodies and their needs, can never be simply reduced to and completely absorbed by violence and violation. (Arendt 2006a pp.54-55)

In a rational, technologized modernity, the will to certainty and control, and the duress of necessity and purpose is both dependent on and simultaneously constitutive of violence as an instrument for political achievements. Yet, in Arendt's view, it is precisely this violence as a means for an allegedly specific political end that can only ever reconstitute the violent assumptions in modern politics. In the totalitarian context, this aspiration of omnipotence, of fabricating not only artefacts but also making, or *bringing about* humanity was reflected in the total integration of "man as a whole" (Arendt 2004 p.445), private and public, body and mind, within the totalitarian machine and its genocidal consequences. In the Cold War period, the aspiration to this quasi-divine omnipotence was made manifest through the development of technological weapons capacities as a means that by far usurped the very ends for which they were created, thereby rendering the means-ends category in modern politics grossly absurd. The relationship between such instrumentally understood violence and political ends carries for Arendt an inherent problem: "As long as we believe that we deal with ends and means in the political realm, we shall not be able to prevent anybody's using *all* means to pursue recognized ends" (*emphasis added*). (Arendt 1998 p.229) Her concerns must be read clearly against a background of the rationalised violent means for political ends in the totalitarian regime of Nazi Germany, yet given the lasting structures in contemporary modernity, they continue to ring true, as I have highlighted earlier. When we consider Arendt's account of life-politics, it becomes clear where the dangers of such instrumental

thinking in politics lie. As life processes become absorbed into the political process, and matters of biology are perceived of as unfolding on a historical continuum in a Darwinian insistence of natural movement as “not circular but unilinear” (Arendt 2004 p.597), man, as the self-regarded maker of said history and thus humanity, can only but be tempted to use *all* means to bring history into being, including ‘creative’ violence. Bauman convincingly follows this trajectory for a characterisation of genocidal violence in modernity. In a similar vein as Arendt’s critique on the Marxist idea of man able to ‘make’ history come into being, Bauman sees in the very utility of violence a quintessentially modern perspective that rests “on a devious symmetry of assumed intentions and actions”. (Bauman 2012 p.91) What is so distinctly modern in this relationship is the very idea of purpose in the application of violence toward a political end, whereby the end in this context is no longer the elimination of an enemy or an adversary, but rather the ‘making’ of a society, one that is “objectively better”, in line with superior values and in accord with an “overall, scientifically conceived plan”. (Bauman 2012 p.91) It is then the very ideology of an ‘objectively’ superior society that allows for the emergence of what Bauman likens to a ‘garden culture’, which departs from the underlying assumption that it is possible, to create an ideal human world – “more efficient, more moral, more beautiful”. (Bauman 2012 p.92) Such genocidal vision rely not only on the eradication of “contingency and chance” (Bauman 2012 p.90) but could also not exist without the practice of “scientific management”, specifically medical science and metaphors. (Bauman 2012 p.73) This point gains further salience in light of the rapidly developing scope and scale of the technologisation of political violence in contemporary modernity, as I will discuss in later chapters.

In *Introduction into Politics* Arendt presents perhaps the clearest account of why she is so adamant in rejecting a conflation of violence and politics. In this meticulous essay on the meaning of politics in contemporary society, Arendt elaborates the fragile relationship of means and ends in politics in the context of violence. It is precisely here that she becomes more nuanced in her analysis of the means and ends construct of political violence, in her analysis of the problem of war and revolutions in modern politics. She proposes a distinction between political goals and political ends. For Arendt, ends in politics are not the same as goals. While goals are indeed what political action pursues, they can never achieve more than serve as a directive or

guideline for the respective political action. (Arendt 2005 p.193) In other words, in political action, the outcome can be aimed at but never be certain. This uncertainty, the contingent, is immanent to politics proper for Arendt as it relies on action by men and among men, which has no clear and immovable outcome, but is constantly in flux. “Concrete realisations” in politics “are constantly changing because we are dealing with other people who also have goals”. (Arendt 2005 p.193) It is only when the use of force – violence – comes into play as political action that these changeable goals become the significance of ends in a quasi-rational and scientific manner. Violence as political action, then seeks to attain an end, for it is only the end that can ultimately justify the violent means. But what does this distinction between political goals and political ends ultimately mean for Arendt? It suggests two crucial aspects in the relationship of politics and violence: political goals become political ends when politics is misunderstood as ‘making’ and political action is expressed through violent actions. It is precisely in this distinction that Arendt excludes the violence-as-politics construct. In other words, the pursuit of political goals, which are never fully realised, is in the Arendtian understanding of politics, conducted through the ‘back-and-forth’ of speech in the space between people. When violence is introduced, political goals become ends, for violence stands under the mandate of expediency in its immanent instrumental character. When political ends are confused with goals and political violence is seen as political action, where “nothing counts except the achievement of postulated and fixed ends, brute force will always play a role”. (Arendt 2005 p.194) In this confusion of political violence with political action, a particular rationality is ascribed to such violence. Arendt’s position on violence-as-politics becomes clearer in the context of her other texts. As she writes in *On Violence*:

Violence, being instrumental in nature, is rational to the extent that it is effective in reaching the end that must justify it. And since when we act we never know with any certainty the eventual consequence of what we are doing, violence can remain rational only if it pursues short-term goals. Violence does not promote causes, neither history nor revolution, neither progress nor reaction; but it can serve to dramatize grievances and bring them to public attention. (Arendt 1970 p.79)

While she maintains that the act of violence is an anti-political act, as it is mute in itself, she makes concessions as to its ability to dramatize *political* issues, albeit in a limited fashion, as she immediately warns: “if goals are not achieved rapidly, the result will be not merely defeat but the introduction of the practice of violence in the

whole body politic”. (Arendt 1970 p.80) The danger is thus in the confusion of political action with violent acts: when mute violence becomes modern politics' form of expression through mute action and is rationalised and made clinical, the assumption that it is controllable as a means for a political end is radicalised. It fully leaves aside contingency.

The inherent muteness of violence presents a challenge to its study in a political context for Arendt. It is precisely for the lack of speech in violent acts that political theory “has little to say about the phenomenon of violence”. (Arendt 2006a p.9) Consequently, Arendt argues, any theory of war or of revolutions must deal with the *justification* of violence, whereby the justification is constitutive of its political restrictions. It is precisely when this distinction is no longer observed and maintained that theories of wars and revolutions “arrive at a glorification or justification of violence *as such* [and] is no longer political but anti-political” (*emphasis added*). (Arendt 2006a p.9) It is true that for Arendt, violence in a purely mean-ends understanding of the phenomenon, presents a much more immediately effective instrument to achieve a defined and declared end, so much so that if we are speaking in purely utilitarian terms, violence can be seen as a much more effective substitute for action in the pursuit of a political aim. In Arendt’s words: “If nothing more were at stake here than to use action as a means to an end, it is obvious that the same end could be much more easily attained in mute violence, so that action seems a not very efficient substitute for violence”. (Arendt 1998 p.179) Here again we could be tempted to understand Arendt as conceding that violence can indeed pursue an end, perhaps even quite effectively. But the key here is the emphasis on utility, which for Arendt is not part of the world of politics and it is important to understand in this context Arendt’s assertion of action as explicitly refusing the means-ends category. Action, unlike violence, is not instrumental and not solely utility oriented, but rather facilitate new beginnings with often uncertain outcomes – something that violence is utterly incapable of. Action, for Arendt, is thus the essence of politics, not violence. But in this construct in modernity, where difference, plurality, freedom and togetherness based on interest and a shared world becomes diminished – in short a reduction of the possibility for politics - lies a distinct danger as action is absorbed by behaviour, into a means-ends category:

This happens whenever human togetherness is lost, that is, when people are only for or against other people, as for instance in modern warfare, where men go into action and use means of violence in order to achieve certain objectives for their own side and against the enemy. (Arendt 1998 p.180)

When this happens, when utility becomes the meta-narrative of society, violence can indeed be seen as the more efficient and effective means to achieve a political end. The fallacy of this assumption is clear, as indicated earlier, and bears repeating: the supposition that violence as action could achieve distinct and clear goals is a chimera. And in fact, the further the means are from the desired goals, the less likely it is that violence can achieve anything politically.

The anti-political frustration of action in a biopolitical context further enables the use of violence as the only form of expression by those otherwise muted and rendered anti-political. The Arendtian category of action as the only performative expression of politics proper, and its relationship to violence plays a key role in this. In a modern polity that is dominated by life-politics and thus by the very restrictions of necessity, freedom, the very basis for political action proper, as Arendt understands it, is hampered. As I have sought to clarify in previous chapters, Arendt's conception of the modern perspective can indeed be understood as inherently anti-political. Here again we must remember Arendt's critique of the modern glorification of violence as a reaction to a significant impediment to the capacity for action in modernity. (Arendt 1970 p.83) Where politics proper are stifled, as action - through speech - is stifled, violence, otherwise without speech and entirely mute, becomes the most radical dramatization of the expression of individuals and groups in a political society. In other words, the frustration of the faculty of action in modernity renders violence a performative means of expression, often misunderstood as power. Arendt explains this as follows: "it is simply true that riots in the ghettos and rebellions on the campuses make 'people feel they are acting together in a way they rarely can'". (Arendt 1970 p.84) In other words, when language and speech become muted in an anti-political society, violence, as perceived action, replaces expression, often without a distinct goal other than the instrumental destruction in reaction to existing, frustrating structures. And it is in this life-political constellation in which action is frustrated through the very restrictions life-politics places on the Arendtian concept of freedom that her warning sounds most clearly: "The practice of violence, like all

action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world".
(Arendt 1970 p.80)

Conclusion

In a social and political context where the physical integrity of the individual human and the life, survival and progression of humanity stands fundamentally at the heart of political aspirations, the use of violence (essentially the ultimate force that has the capacity to render the human body and psyche violated) for political ends becomes a complex and problematic constellation. Yet, conceptualisations of violence and politics in modernity frequently present the two concepts as inextricably, if not necessarily, linked, comprising a notion that the pragmatist John Dewey perhaps most succinctly and somberly summed up as follows: "nothing was ever accomplished without using force" (Dewey 2009 p.8), reflecting the creative rationale of violence as a tool in making history, the world and life. While Dewey's sobering assessments may be perceived to present a rather inequitable perspective by some⁴⁸, it nonetheless echoes the modern sentiment that for certain political outcomes the use of violence is indeed justified, legitimate, if not necessary. The conflation of the two concepts is nothing particularly new: there is a wide-ranging body of scholarship on the interrelated conception of violence and politics, from a pre-modern Machiavellian tradition of understanding the use of force as integral to political rule, to the Hobbesian understanding of the essentially violent nature of humans which can be controlled by the very transference of this violence toward a mighty state structure; and eventually to theorizations of violence as a necessary, justifiable and perhaps legitimate means to disrupt forms of oppression in the pursuit of political freedom (as elaborated prominently by George Sorel, Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty). Furthermore, in the comprehensive body of contemporary scholarship on collective violence, politics and violence are frequently presented together as indivisible concepts.⁴⁹

Prominent conceptions of politics that uniformly confirm the presence of violence where politics appears have fostered the view that violence may indeed constitute the

⁴⁸ Specifically Dewey's claim that "squeamishness about force is the mark not of idealistic but of moonstruck morals" presents a highly normative perspective in this discussion but represents an existing polarisation between advocates for the elimination of violence as politics. (Dewey 2009 p.8)

⁴⁹ See for example Tilly 2003; Conteh-Morgan 2004; Barkan and Snowden 2000.

very essence of politics (Buffachi 2007 p.190)⁵⁰ and in a modern era that is characterised by large scale, total warfare, vast numbers of civilian casualties, genocidal practices aided by ever murderous technologies, we are increasingly inclined to accept as truth that “there could be no politics without violence”. (Duarte 2006 p.408) While, statistics gathered by the Human Security Report Project highlight that occurrences of interstate war have decreased in the past six decades⁵¹, often related to growing levels of democratisation of governments around the globe (Doyle 1983; Keane 2004 p.2-5), there is evidence gathered by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) that forms of one sided violence, directed toward civilians have, in fact, risen. And, as Keane effectively points out, the growing democratisation of governments around the globe by no means constitutes an unproblematic engagement with violence, as they find themselves faced with the question as to “whether or when or how to develop and deploy their own means of violence in order to repel or eradicate that of others”. (Keane 2004 p.5) In light of a growing number of theatres of military engagement in the past decade, paired with the ever growing destructive capacity of weapons technologies, the perceived and actual rise in the scale and scope of violence across the globe supports the assertion of a number of scholars that modernity, until now, constitutes what has been referred to in various ways as an age of violence. (Hobsbawm 2007 p.141; Buffachi 2007; Campbell and Dillon 1993) This sentiment is echoed by others who highlight the fact that the spread of democracy, despite all hopeful proclamations, has not been successful in limiting levels of violence, in fact, some would argue, quite the contrary is the case. (See for example Worcester, Bermanzohn, Ungar 2002) Indeed, the argument has been made that both levels and forms of violence – and in particular political violence – seem insufferably high in present times (Buffacchi 2007 p.1; Kreide 2009) and pervasive throughout the entire global realm. (Jabri 2007 p.1)

⁵⁰ Interestingly, while Buffachi, in his 2007 investigations of violence and social justice frames his thesis around the premise that violence constitutes the essence of politics in his introduction, he later, in his concluding chapter, questions this fact and reasons eventually that it can, in fact, be the essence of violence. (Buffacchi 2007 p.5; pp.187-197)

⁵¹ According to the Human Security Report Project, interstate violence in fact peaked in late 1980s and only then came to a decline again in the past two decades. This is often attributed to greater levels of democratization across the globe – the quintessential argument of the democratic peace theory. This, however, remains contested. (See for example Singer and Small 1976, Layne 1994, Spiro 1994) Whether the levels of overall occurrences of violence in a political context have increased or have been reduced in recent decades is far from being settled. Research from the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme indicates that violent conflicts have actually decreased, whereby other studies show that the campaigns of violence have significantly increased since the 1990s. (Stepanova 2009)

The biopolitical rationale, specifically a *zoefied* understanding of politics, fosters a perception that violence serves as the creative, effective and expedient tool to bring about certain ends that promote the life of the species that promote humanity. The violence-as-politics conflation follows a long held logic of instrumentality: “you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs”. (Arendt 1998 p.229) In other words, certain means are a necessity when an end is to be achieved. This logic is difficult to challenge as

it is not enough to add some qualifications, such as that not all means are permissible or that under certain circumstance means may be more important than ends; these qualification either take for granted a moral system which, as the very exhortations demonstrate, can hardly be taken for granted, or they are overpowered by the very language and analogies they use. (Arendt 1998 p.229)

In biopolitical forms of political violence politics becomes imbricated with specific conceptions of morality, couched in certain terms of ethics and framed within a certain linguistic structure of means and ends, whereby violence is held to be a necessary tool in the modern political tool box, to be implemented to achieve certain ends within a political realm. The false means/ends alternative “paralyses any ethics and any politics”, as Agamben notes. (Agamben 2000 p. 116) Aided in this process of means-ends conflation and confusion, in terms of justification of violent acts in the name of politics, is the alleged neutrality of new military technologies. The use of drones in the relatively recently introduced practice of targeted killing is exemplary for the ethical framing and neutralising of violence as a creative political tool. Chapter seven will illustrate this in greater detail. The next chapter will highlight how ethical rationales prevalent in politics – national and international – are equally infused with biopolitical perspectives and aid in providing a justification framework for acts of political violence.

*Naivität, als ob Moral übrigbliebe wenn der sanktionierende Gott fehlt. Das 'Jenseits' absolut notwendig wenn der Glaube an die Moral aufrecht erhalten werden soll*⁵²

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Zur Genealogie der Moral*

I. Ethics and/for/in Politics

The biopolitically informed relationship between politics and violence is, as the previous chapter has shown, infused with problems. The relationship between ethics and politics is equally complex. Hannah Arendt controversially engaged with this relationship by drawing a sharp distinction between morality and politics, arguing that morality is not only separate from politics proper, but highly personal, as an essentially private matter, thus ought to be excluded from the political (public) realm. (Butler 2009a; Canovan 1995 pp.155 – 157; Kateb 1984 p.29; Owens 2007 p.107, Williams 2007) Arendt's grappling with the complexities of morality and politics predominantly reflects her own experience with the collapse of morality in a political context in Nazi Germany and her struggle to make sense of the problematic and precarious relationship in a modernity that has hitherto unseen capacities for destruction. (Arendt 2003a p.54; Canovan 1995 p.156; Meade 1997 p.109-110, Williams 2007) In an effort typical for Arendt, she sought to understand what happens to morality in the public context when it becomes unanchored from a fixed, super-human law-giving authority and arrived at the insight that, in a political context, morality is never fixed but rather has to be negotiated and ascertained ever anew in agreements that may be enshrined as norms, customs, rules and standards for a time being. (Arendt 2003a p.50, p.54; Kohn 2003 p.xviii) She thus distinguishes between individual morality and the political establishment of rules, laws and norms for coexistence in a socio-political body, whereby moral notions, such as compassion, love or pity, should not factor into the political consideration, as they would obscure the possibility of acting politically, in an Arendtian sense. (Arendt 2006a pp.78-79; Canovan 1995 p.156; Kateb 1984 pp. 33-34; Owens 2007 p.107)

⁵² This passage, from Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* translates as follows: Naïveté: as though morality could remain in the absence of a sanctioning God. The 'beyond' absolutely necessary when belief in morality is to be maintained. (*my translation*)

Acting politically and thinking/judging are two crucial aspects in Arendt's considerations of morality and moral failure – an engagement reflected particularly in her writings on the Eichmann Trial in 1963. It was also her controversial coverage of the trial and the subsequently much debated and discussed idea of the “banality of evil” that informed her philosophical thinking about morality and judgement in her final work, *Life of the Mind*. This engagement, however, remained incomplete. (Canovan 1995 pp.268-270; Ludz 2007 p.799; Meade 1997 p.120) Despite the fact that her exploration of “the basic question of ethics” (Ludz 2007 p.801) remained unfinished, Arendt certainly touched upon an important aspect of considering morality and politics in modernity⁵³. However, the aim of this project is to examine the biopolitical underpinnings of ethical considerations relating to the perplexities of our own time. Writing her analysis of morality predominantly against the Nazi context, Arendt's unfinished theoretical insights are limited for this aim. It is thus here that I depart from the Arendtian exposition and engage the biopolitical framework identified in her work for the examinations of the ethics of contemporary political violence that follow in subsequent chapters.

Against a contemporary background where hitherto morally prohibited practices, such as extrajudicial killings by drones strikes, as currently conducted in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, are instituted as legitimate and justifiable practices, underwritten by technological and military developments that open new horizons and requirements for ethical considerations (Swiffen 2011 p.57), it becomes vital to understand the relationship between politics, violence and ethics, and its limits, anew, and against a specific socio-political rationale - a biopolitical rationale. Questions of good and bad, right and wrong are inseparable from basic political concerns about legal, procedural and institutional organisation in a political community. (Hutchings 2010 p.8) Especially since 9/11 and in the on-going war against terror are practices of political violence infused with moral language and concerns. (Coker 2008; Hardt and Negri 2006 p.27) The notion that violent political acts ought to be considered in terms of right or wrong, good or bad and all shades in between has been a recurring demand in political theory and practice, captured in the various discourses on the just war

⁵³ For an interesting analysis of how one could read Arendt as a thinker of ethics as contingent and incalculable see Elisabeth M. Meade's excellent essay 'The Commodification of Values' (1997), which critiques, with Arendt, ethics as “the application of reified concepts like rules, values, and standards” as a viable ethical response to situations of crisis. (Meade 1997 p.124) My own analysis, using an Arendtian biopolitical framework, is sympathetic to Meade's conclusion.

tradition, which dominates the subject of “the ethics of international violence” to this day.⁵⁴ (Brown 1992 p.132; Rengger 2013 p.7-8) Yet the nature of war and the justness of the reasons for engaging in war and political violence remain fiercely contested in the modern era. (Nabulsi 2006 p.58) The inherent open-endedness of the question of ethics in political violence, including international violence, is perhaps unsurprising when we consider the complex nature of ethics and its relationship to politics in modernity. While some scholars see ethics as coming before politics, i.e. as normatively capable of exercising considerable influence on political acts (Meffan and Worthington 2001; Sorabji and Rodin 2006; Frost 1996, 2009), others, most notably those embracing a realist perspective, maintain that morality and (international) politics cannot fruitfully be considered in this sequence, but rather in the reverse – especially when questions of the survival and security of a state are at stake. And indeed, specifically in an international context, matters of violence as an instrument of foreign policy tend to lack an in-depth engagement with the question of ethics, reiterating the stale partition between morality and the practical realities of war and international politics. (Bulley 2013; Sorabji and Rodin 2006 p.2; Shue 1995) The core of the challenge might rest in the still ill-demarcated and somewhat underexplored relationship between ethics and politics (Chadwick and Schroeder 2002 p.15), whereby ethics in politics, specifically international politics, is predominantly understood as practical or applied ethics. (Bell 2010; Brown 2002; Hutchings 2010; Nardin 2008) While there has been a proliferation in scholarship on examinations of global ethics in recent years (Bergman-Rosamond and Phythian 2011 p.1, see also, for example, Amstutz 2005; Bell 2010; Brown 2002; Coker 2008; Coicaud and Warner 2001; Frost 2009; Hutchings 2010; Kymlicka and Sullivan 2007, among others), ethical concerns addressed in the international and global context are primarily framed in terms of finding and applying appropriate ethical principle, codes and rules in trying to resolve “real moral problems”. (Winkler and Coombs 1993 p.2) This seems particularly precarious as the general sub-field of applied, or practical, ethics, remains contested in methodology and approach. (Beauchamp 2005 p.7-14; Chadwick and Schroeder 2002 p.1)

⁵⁴ In this context, Brown quite rightly highlights the unusually lasting influence of “essentially medieval theoretical construction[s]” on this particular subject. (Brown 1992 p.132) This has remained unchanged to this day.

The previous chapter has addressed the precarious conflation of politics and violence in modern political structures that rest on the centrality of life and life processes in modernity and has sought to point toward some of the dangers that Arendt detected as a symptom of this specifically modern variant of the understanding of violence and politics. While the preceding chapters examine the relationship between violence and life-politics in modernity, the question of an underlying ethical principle of this relationship, in theory and, more importantly, in practice remains open. What are the elementary moral principles substantiating norms and normalisations of ethical practices of political violence today? What do these moral principles rest on? And what renders such moral principles and ethical practices acceptable in a *zoe*-centric political society? (Hutchings 2010 p.9) In order to investigate the relationship between biopolitical practices of political violence and their relationship to ethics more closely it is helpful to take a brief look at how certain practices are framed and engage with the field of applied ethics and its contemporary relevance for politics.

The chapter argues that contemporary conceptions of political ethics, as a sub-field of applied ethics, are infused with a biopolitical rationale and, in turn, enable the consideration of acts of political violence through a biopolitically informed lens. Metaphors drawn from the medical field and professionalism become instrumental in this and give rise, I argue, to the *adiaphorisation* of violent practices, on one hand, and radical coding of the ethics of violence on the other. Both strands of the biopolitical rationale – the politicisation / technologisation of *zoe* and the *zoefication* of politics and – are reflected in ethical justifications of political violence in modernity. While, I suggest, the techno-political rendering of life shapes a perspective of ethics as code, rule and law, the *zoefication* of politics supports narratives that seek to justify the use of violence as necessary for the survival and progress of humanity, as reflected in the medical metaphors used in a contemporary context of war and counter-terrorism interventions. The chapter thus first considers the wider context and critiques of practical, or applied, ethics before addressing the biopolitical rationales and core limits of international politics as a sub-field of applied ethics and delineates, in the final section, the medical narrative increasingly employed in justifications of violent interventions in international politics today. Departing from a purely Arendtian perspective at this point, I build the continued analysis on the groundwork laid through the critique of life-politics established in earlier chapters

to clarify the contribution to scholarship that can be gained in this field from an Arendtian perspective of life-politics.

II. *Deus ex Homini: Man as Maker of Ethics*

The problem of morality in modernity has been eloquently addressed by a number of scholars (see for example MacIntyre 1981; Poole 1991; Bauman 1993; Larmore 1996; Gabriel and Ilcan 2004), including Arendt, as highlighted briefly earlier. An increasingly secularised modern society, epitomised by Nietzsche's account of the 'death of God', a rational, technocratic and scientific turn in modern socio-political affairs and the advent of mass society, and multiple and diverging identities provided the context for a renewed consideration of and engagement with the grounding of ethics. Furthermore, it called into question what ethics actually is, what it relies on, whether it can be determined and how it can be conceived of in a modern society. In modernity, ethics is in a seemingly continuous process of re-definition, along with a shifting understanding of the human as a subject and object within a socio-political context. With the waning of a higher (divine) authority, which had hitherto served to give a framework and anchor to the contents of morality by a transcendental set of given rules, a new tension arises in a secularised modernity where the location of morality shifts from such a transcendental (external) and 'given' realm into the phenomenological space of human existence, in which morality must ever-new be secured. With a shifting understanding of the human not merely as a 'given' entity of divine creation, but rather one with a growing sense of individualism and the concomitant significance of identity, the possibility of certainty about right and wrong, as hitherto announced by the law-giving divinity, gave way to an inherently un-secured sense of morality located in the co-existence of an infinite multiplicity of humans. (Bauman 1993) In this, "the proper site of ethics is at the centre of the phenomenological enterprise, in which ethics is grounded on a phenomenological basis, as opposed to being left groundless in abstract theorizing on so-called applied and theoretical ethics". (Raffoul 2008) In this new socio-political condition, the biopolitical developments in technology and science replace God as the ultimate source for determining and instructing 'right' and 'wrong'; the human, as maker of both man and history, has taken this place. (Larmore 1996 p.8; Swiffen 2011 p.39) Amy Swiffen succinctly relates this shift to a human-centric turn to nature and life as sources of authority and notes:

It is true that the idea of God as a supreme lawgiver has given way to the notion of the authority of nature defined wholly by reason and scientific knowledge, not metaphysics. Along with this comes the belief that moral principles can be directly known by human beings ... (Swiffen 2011 p.39)

The practical enterprise that characterises ethics today, however, is marked not only by the immense power for the destruction of life at the hands of the human as maker, but also characterised by an understanding of the creative capacities of man as the maker of life. The creation, perpetuation and destruction of life gains centrality and “forms of ethical thought that are based on limits to human knowledge and power are no longer justified”. (Swiffen 2011 p.64) For Swiffen, this yields a new moral mandate: to shape and secure the life of future generations in a biopolitical turn (Swiffen 2011 p.65) and she relates this to the emergence of a “new natural law” which replaces theological aspects with the rationality of nature and the “certainty of moral knowledge which asserts that survival is the minimum purpose of life, which is seen as continuous with nature”. (Swiffen 2011 p.92) The relationship to law in this biopolitical rational of ethics is essential for Swiffen and reflects the relevance of ‘law’ as intrinsically tied to the practical side of ethics in modernity.

Despite a shifting authority of moral principles away from a divine entity to the human herself, the notion of ethics as tethered to some sort of ‘law-giving’ authority remains prominent in discussions on the ethics of politics in a secularised modernity (Bauman 2000 pp.85-86), and is particularly relevant for the sub-field of applied ethics. Not only, as Tom Beauchamp indicates in his text on the nature of applied ethics, can law be considered the public agency for making morality intelligible as social guidelines, whereby case law has been substantially influential in all areas of applied ethics (Beauchamp 2005 p.2), but, as Bauman notes, in modernity, ethics is shaped after the format of law. (Bauman 1993 p.29) Arendt made similar observations when she reflected on the relationship between ethics and codes. Expanding on her argument that moral rules and standards can be changed “like a table cloth” (Arendt 2003a p.50) in modernity, she recognises, in *Life of the Mind*,

what people get used to is less the content of the rules ... than the possession of rules under which to subsume particulars. If someone appears who, for whatever purpose wishes to abolish the old “values” or virtues, he will find that easy enough, provided he offers a new code ... (Arendt 1977 p.177, cited in Meade 1997 p.123)

In this type of ethics, the danger of a conflation of ethics with legal regulations in order to secure 'good' behaviour looms large. Furthermore, the growing recognition of legal frameworks as a source of international authority in deciding matters of war and violence has propelled moral autonomy into somewhat of a grey area. (McMahan 2008 p.19-20) The focus on law as 'protected reason', superseding individual ethical judgement and more importantly replacing the potential indeterminability of ethicality with a rational ethico-legal framework, betrays a certain rationalist perspective in turning to practices and procedures that, mirroring the scientific approach, seek to validate moral judgement and gives rise to a prevalence of an ethical rationalism that holds the potential to become a *moralising* force in modern society. As Bauman explains, "[l]aw and interest displace and replace gratuity and the sanctionlessness of moral drive. Actors are challenged to justify their conduct by reason as defined either by the goal or by the rules of behavior". (Bauman 2012 p.214) He recognises the relative content of morality as socially normed: "The moral authority of society is self-provable to the point of tautology in so far as all conduct not conforming to the societally sanctioned rulings is by definition immoral." (Bauman 2012 p.213) The regulation of behaviour through normed ethico-legal codes and frames becomes paramount. In order to make ethics a regulatory theory, the homogenisation of the human and her conduct is crucial as informing a norm of behaviour. The application of ethics through regulatory frameworks, guidelines and codes has thus a functional dimension.

Ethics itself then becomes something that must serve a purpose or, at the least, have an underlying reason. This finds a radical expression in discourses on the evolutionary 'purpose' of ethics, in other words, the continual investigation as to what ethics is actually 'good for'. Biological determinism discourses most starkly exemplify the aim to mitigate the indeterminability of ethics and ascertain the functionality, if not performativity, and "success of ethics", as well as society's ability to predict certain outcomes of actions, especially in instances of moral ambiguity through an investigation of the "biological roots of moral behaviour". (Wilson 1998) In his influential work on biological science⁵⁵, E. O. Wilson went as far as to suggest that, in fact, the inquiry into ethics ought to be removed as a study of

⁵⁵ Specifically his works *On Human Nature* and *Sociobiology* reflect on the supremacy of biology as a determinant of human (inter)action.

philosophy and become a “branch of biological science” (Rodd 1990 p.84; Wilson 1998) in order to ground ethics in a “foundation of verifiable knowledge of human nature sufficient to produce cause-and-effect predictions”. (Wilson 1998) Wilson’s pursuit to ground ethics in a biological foundation so as to make it ascertainable, if not predictable is, perhaps, the extreme manifestation of the problematic of ethics in a biopolitical modernity, but with its focus on the biological underpinnings as a determinant of man’s behaviour epitomizes the desire to render the human and her actions calculable in the search for certainty and predictability. Contemporary research in neuroscience picks up on this strand of inquiry, in a new biological determinism turn, when it targets the notion of free will as merely a chain of synaptic sequences. In other words, according to these neurological studies, a thief’s decision to steal is determined by her neurological make-up and conditioning, by the unconscious brain which makes the decision for her. In these terms free will is an illusion and casts a serious doubt over the ethical category of responsibility as such. (Koch 2012; Stenger 2012; Arnason 2010)⁵⁶

In this particular rationale, the biopolitical underpinnings are clear as they seek to inform what ethics is, can and perhaps should be in contemporary times. Whether this position on the elimination of the philosophical category of free will has currency in the long run remains to be seen, what becomes clear, however, is that there is a certain instrumentality prevalent in applied ethics, that seeks to establish certain ethical outcomes through regulatory frames, laws and codes. As ethics’ modern form in the political context is one of practical concern, chiefly occupied with applying abstracted principles to specific situations, it is useful to engage with some of the underpinnings and critiques of applied ethics to then identify the biopolitical rationales that inform the application of ethics in politics.

III. Applying Ethics: The Quest for Certainty

In recent years, some scholars of philosophy have noted that there has been a focus in philosophical thought on the application of moral and ethical principles rather than the “ethicality” of ethics itself. (Raffoul 2008 p.271; Bauman 2000 p.86) This trend is

⁵⁶ It is worthwhile highlighting that the scientific tests that contest the notion of free will are heavily disputed whereby scientific and philosophical scholarship have engaged in a fierce battle over this issue. As with all categories of truth by proof, it would seem that science is on the winning end.

specifically palpable among Anglo-American philosophy, which predominantly views the chief role of ethics to be that of providing a practical guide for moral agents, based on rational analysis. (Atterton and Calarco 2003 p.xi) This shift is demonstratively encapsulated in applied ethics as a sub-branch of ethics in the hierarchies of philosophical debates that are concerned with “furthering our understanding and thus the resolution, of practical issues, right or wrong”. (Dare 2002 p.23) In other words, throughout the past few decades ethics in contemporary debates, has been less considered as an autonomous concept, escaping all codification and inherently without ‘purpose’ (Bauman 2012 p.214), and also less in terms of meta-ethics (LaFollette 2003 p.2) but is much more intent with establishing practicalities and ways of application.

Applied ethics⁵⁷ has experienced a tremendous surge in the past decades and is one of the largest areas of growth in philosophical investigations. (Baier 1997 p.333; Frey and Wellman 2005; Chadwick and Schroeder 2002; LaFollette 2003) As a relatively new area of philosophy, applied ethics remains marked by controversy and debate about what exactly applied ethics is, what basis it should rest on, what methods to approach ethical problems with. (Chadwick and Schroeder 2002 p.1, Beauchamp 2005 p.7-14, LaFollette 2003 p.4) The challenge at the heart of the field is encapsulated not only in the difficulty of defining applied ethics and its contents⁵⁸ (Beauchamp 2005 p.2; Beauchamp 1984; Gert 1984), but also by the “disputes as to what the task of applied ethics should be”. Ethical content in applied ethics remains vague, yet, as Kurt Bayertz astutely observes “applied ethics is increasingly being integrated into the training procedures of various professions” and is “called upon on different levels of practical decision-making” (Bayertz 2002 p.36), taking on a distinct public role. Both, as a term and a branch of ethics, applied ethics has emerged in the 1960s and further gained relevance in the 70s with the definition of bioethics as a subfield of medical ethics. While, according to Beauchamp, the roots of the idea of

⁵⁷ The term ‘applied ethics’ is typically synonymous with ‘practical ethics’. For the purpose of clarity I will use the term applied ethics.

⁵⁸ The debate on content centres primarily around the key question as to what the relationship between ethical theory and applied ethics is. Beauchamp goes to great lengths to show that ethical theory and applied ethics should not be considered distinct, while Gert, for example, maintains that there is a separation of ethical theory and applied ethics in a mutually beneficial relationship. Alisdair McIntyre and others, however, question the possibility of applying an ethical theory to specific contexts altogether. A fruitful and interesting discussion on this topic is captured in a 1984 edition of the *Monist*, Volume 64:4.

applied ethics reach as far back as antiquity (Beauchamp 2005 p.2), a distinct increase in the conceptualisation, use of and interest in applied ethics can be located in the 1960s and 70s and its prevalence is attributed frequently to wider social concerns over injustices. For Beauchamp, it was specifically issues of "civil rights, women's right, animal rights, the consumer movement, the environmental movement and the rights of prisoners and the mentally ill" that gave rise to approaching ethics from a perspective of practical philosophy (Beauchamp 2005 p.1 -2), paired with a greater level of interdisciplinary interest in issues of morality. Hugh LaFollette similarly attributes the volatile context of the 60s and 70s, where matters of "racial and sexual discrimination, the war in Vietnam, abortion and the degradation of nature" (LaFollette 2003 p.2) became central issues in socio-political reality to the rise of applied ethics. Furthermore, there is consensus among scholars, that the emergence and pervasiveness of bio-medical problems and issues, brought about by rapid technological developments in the medical field and its various realms of applications, was instrumental in boosting the pervasiveness and relevance of applied ethics in a wider social and political context. (See for example Dare 2002; Chadwick and Schroeder 2002; Callahan 2002; LaFollette 2003) In other words, applied ethics bears a historical background that stands in direct relation to the ever-increasing capacity to technologically capture and analyse biological concerns of the human as an individual, and humans as a species.

The turn to an applied and practical ethics is thus, I argue, in itself biopolitically grounded, whereby the shift of life into the centre of politics, paired with the technological and scientific capacities for the mathematisation of life plays a crucial role in the politicisation of *zoe*, as well as the *zoeficiation* of politics. It is the calculability of the human self and the human other, in her physiology, biology, neurology and psychology that allows for a consideration of ethics in terms of physiologically, biologically, neurologically and psychologically established norms of right and wrong. This, in turn, informs the perspective that ethics can and ought to provide solutions to calculable problems. LaFollette elaborates in this context the greater accessibility and availability of empirical data as a key reason for the possibility and the materialisation of applied ethics, as it is through empirical data, i.e. what is known about the human and her biology, physiology and psychology and a greater awareness among philosophers of science and its applications, that ethics

can be rendered in these terms. LaFollette illustrates this relationship:

We may say, for example, that we should maximize the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people or that we should respect people's rights. However, those claims are little more than vague objects of our homage unless we have some knowledge of human psychology, the nature of human happiness and autonomy and an awareness of the ways that our, others' and institutions' actions shape people's ability to live happy or live autonomously. (LaFollette 2003 p.7)

While this statement and reasoning is not flawed *per se*, it implies the assumption that human happiness can indeed be measured and empirically ascertained - in this case through scientific knowledge of human psychology. It presumes, that the human can reliably be scientifically captured to more accurately give content to practical moral reasoning. In short, it gives credence to the priority of the scientific basis of biological, psychological and neurological human to establish 'accurate' ethical content, ignoring the very plural, aleatory and uncertain character of the human in her context, let alone the status quo of science to date being unable to provide any stable account of human nature. (Bell 2012 p.655) However, it is this calculability that paves the way for ethics to be considered as a possibility for *securing* right and wrong. It is this calculability also that obscures the investigation into the meaning of ethics with a preoccupation of applying a defined set of principles in the encounter with the other in a socio-political context of alterity.

Applied ethics, thus, in its various forms, whether bottom up, top down, in coherentism⁵⁹ or other methodological approaches, is thus chiefly concerned with finding valid and 'right' ethical solutions that apply to delineated areas of application. The predominance of a rational and very practical approach to ethics has given rise not only to ethical considerations being framed increasingly in terms of dilemma and debate (MacIntyre 1981 p.6), but a debate that can be won, ethical outcomes that can be secured. Ethics becomes a quest for certainty that the right thing can be and is

⁵⁹ As Tom Beauchamp outlines, there are a number of approaches to practical ethics reasoning, none of which is, in his assessment, fully satisfactory. Top down approaches rely on pre-existing general norms which are applied to new particular situations. The top-down approach is a common approach in applied ethics. The bottom up approach, in contrast, focuses on "existing social agreements and practices, insight producing novel cases and comparative case analysis as the starting point from which we commonly make moral decisions". (Beauchamp 2005 p.8) Coherentism, also referred to as "reflective equilibrium" or "coherence theory" favours a reflective approach which starts with an extensive and broad set of moral judgements to build a set of principles to test validity in specific contexts. (Beauchamp 2005 p.9-10)

done across the respective field of application, that wrong behaviour is curbed, if not eliminated through the establishment of rules, specific frameworks and codes that specify and enshrine what the 'right' behaviour is. Bayertz sees the institutionalised role of applied ethics as pointing toward a "changed purpose for ethical reflection within modern society" (Bayertz 2002 p.42) and refers to this process as politicisation, whereby applied ethics is understood as "part of society's problem-solving process". (Bayertz 2002 p.42) The tension inherent in this desire for certainty through the specific application of general principles is palpable when we consider the inherently plural and diverse potentiality within a socio-political context.

Alasdair MacIntyre makes a strong case for the impossibility of applied ethics as a valid regulatory framework for a generalisable 'right' social conduct. His critique addresses a core question surfacing in the context of the practical application again and again: is it possible to apply moral principles, through the use of a regulatory framework, codes or rules, to particular social situations. In his 1984 article, responding directly to the rise of applied ethics as a branch of ethics, MacIntyre asks the crucial question: "does applied ethics rest on a mistake?" and shows that the moral theories or principles that are appropriate to particular situations, in their abundant plurality, cannot actually be *applied*, as each application, if it were true to taking each social particularity into consideration, would have to yield a new moral principle, which leaves nothing to be 'applied'. (MacIntyre 1984) There is then an inherent impasse in the relationship of applied ethics and that which it seeks to apply - moral principles - based on the very existence of social particularities and he concludes that, as there is no such activity as 'applying' ethics, this new branch fulfils a substitutive role for morality, "simulacra of moral principles that are what moral principles are transformed into in the great pluralist mishmash of the shared public life of liberal societies". (MacIntyre 1984 p.511) He further identifies applied ethics, as it substitutes an inherently indeterminable morality in a broad social context, as an ideological measure to lend credence and justification to certain, morally bound, professions, regulated through explicit and implicit codes. (MacIntyre 1984 p.511)

While MacIntyre wrote his critique at a time when applied ethics, as a sub-field of ethics, was in its infancy, he identifies and addresses two key problems with the branch that remain unsolved in the field of applied ethics today: a) there is an inherent tension in the demand of applying *general* moral principles to a potentially infinite

range of *particular* situations and thus aim to solve moral problems successfully and b) the nature of the content of morality as something that is essentially indeterminable in the endless heteronomy of potentially arising situations that require a moral decision, and thus must be considered anew time after time in the modern context. (Bauman 1993; Bauman 2000) Bauman attributes this quest for certainty of ethical rules and codes to the precarious character of modernity, in which “the ambivalence of moral judgements” was viewed “as a morbid state of affairs yearning to be rectified” (Bauman 1993 p.21) – an endeavour that stands in direct contrast to the messiness of human reality (Bauman 1993 p.32) and the infinite potential of plurality in a socio-political context. What then can we make of ethics in an international political context as being situated within this branch of ethics that seeks to ascertain ethical conduct through rules and codes rather than contingency and ambiguity?

IV. Taming of the Infinite: Applying Ethics in Politics

Not least since the 1990s, politics has increasingly been considered in its ethical dimensions, domestically and internationally (Bell 2010 p.3), yet the relationship between these essentially human aspects of shared life remains somewhat fuzzy. Where Arendt argued that personal moral motivations ought to not inform politics, there has been a drive to consider politics in its ethical dimensions as such. (Brown 1992; Coicaud and Warner 2001 p.5; Bergman-Rosamond and Phythian 2011 p.1-2) The contradiction resides in part in the difference between the conception of politics proper, for Arendt, and the notion of politics-as-management in a contemporary biopolitical context. As indicated earlier in the project, violence, for Arendt, cannot be equated to what is generally understood as politics today. Today’s notion of politics relates to a much greater extent to a professional dimension of politics, namely the administration, management and government of populations and their resources. It is in this context, that we can understand politics as being grouped, in its ethical dimensions, in the sub-field of applied ethics, whereby ethics is understood as embedded in practice and subsequently codified. It is then a question of “what kind of ethics should apply” to politics that becomes the core question in this context. (Gamble 2010 p.74)

While the general field of applied ethics is divided yet again into several sub-categories – medical ethics, bioethics, business ethics, etc. – there has to date not yet

emerged a category by the name of ‘political ethics’, yet to most scholars in the field it is clear that political practices fall broadly under the category of applied ethics. (Chadwick and Schroeder 2002 p.15) Political administration addresses real-world questions that seek and demand a practical solution, from issues of housing to matters of criminal punishment, to problems of integration, which makes applied ethics as a branch of ethics relevant and useful for political governance. This is reflected also in the international context, where ethics in international relations, global ethics or international ethics, as a relatively new field of analysis, has presently shaped an identity “as a branch of applied ethics” (Nardin 2008), addressing a wide range of complex international issues such as migration, intervention, economic sanctions, terrorism and warfare. To consider politics, and international politics under the sway of applied ethics as a moral frame of reference presents, however, the same problems relevant for the broader area of applied ethics, as indicated above, only amplified by the very plurality of communities and various international interests present in the international realm. Not only is the ascertainment of any general moral theory that could be applied to so complex a sphere as the international realm a questionable endeavour (Nardin 2008; Hassner 2001 pp.84 – 85; Campbell 2001) but it seeks to use principles external to the realm it deals with in order to solve internal problems. This, according to Nardin “turns ethics in to a technical subject” (Nardin 2008), whereby a certain level of expertise is require to correctly identify and apply relevant external principles. The framing of moral policies then is reliant on a certain expertise that the politician (de Wijze 2002 p.35), the committee (Bayertz 20024 p.3) or the philosopher of science holds to secure the moral content that can be applied. This moral content is then made manifest and sought to be ascertained in laws, rules and regulations guiding the national and international in ethical decisions. This ethico-legal construct is palpable in nearly all discussions of the ethics of war, humanitarian intervention and, most recently, drone warfare, whereby discussions on the legality of procedures seems to obscure a deeper engagement with the ethicality, or the moral content, of the established (or still debated) ethical framework or code. When the socio-political mandate that informs the norm is centred on a calculable humanity and focused on the abstract idea of the survival of mankind, it is perhaps not surprising that contemporary theories about ethics, specifically in the context of war and just war theory, are turned into something calculable and predicable, framed as formulas or algorithms with which to determine ethical behaviour. (Hutchings 2010 p.161)

This is nowhere clearer than in the current debates on the ethics of war, specifically in recent accounts of just war theory⁶⁰. (Lazar 2011) The focus of current just war theory debates lies primarily in finding applicable ethical guidelines, principles and rules to fight justly in wars. Jeff McMahan, Cheyney Ryan, Yitzhak Benbaji, David Rodin and others have sought to address precisely this question in a 2009 symposium, which was published as a set of papers on the topic in 2011⁶¹. In their current work, these scholars predominantly engage with questions of liability and permissibility to kill (as, in Seth Lazar's words, "killing is the business of war") combatants and non-combatants in generalized and specific circumstances, thereby strongly appealing to the law as a source of authority to render abstract ethical considerations as legal principles for the practical application of the laws of war. While each of these scholars differ in their respective assessment as to which logic allows or disallows for the killing of non-combatants and at which level, they all predominantly appeal to law and legality in their considerations, resulting in a "legalization of the tradition". (Rengger 2002 p.360) As Lazar highlights, this is a potentially wrongful move as it "dichotomizes normativity into abstract moral principles and law". (Lazar 2011) This appeal to law renders moral inquiry incomplete in abstracting principles from a complex situation that contains inherent complications and then seeks to apply the abstracted laws within the full complexity of a situation. (Lazar 2011) Precisely this complicates the moral inquiry into the justness of political acts such as humanitarian intervention, or the lethal use of drones in counter-terrorism practices.

The question of what constitutes justness of going to war remains somewhat under-developed in the context of new technological military means and potential – as McMahan recently remarked at a talk, held at the Oxford University Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict centre, titled 'Where to Now for Just War Theory': "[an issue] we haven't dealt with very well up until now is the use of robots and automated technology ... but I have very little to say about these issues". (McMahan 2013) With an increasingly 'scientific' form of ethical reasoning, emerging from a modern intellectual political fashion of "'principles', 'rules' and 'theories'", spurred by "modern science and technology" (Rengger 2002 p.360) the predominant logic of just

⁶⁰ I am distinguishing, following Rengger, between just war tradition and just war theory, whereby the latter denotes the "scientific" adaptation of just war traditions in seeking to devise rules and principles from the just war tradition. (Rengger 2002 p.360)

⁶¹ Published in full in *Ethics*, Symposium on Jeff McMahan's *Killing in War*, Vol. 122, No. 1, October 2011

war theory (and ethics in politics in general) becomes one of utility and purpose. In other words, just war discussions are increasingly framed along the lines of practicality and distinct outcomes and are often confined to the *practices* of war, rather than the morality and justness of going to war. For this, a certain expertise and skill in logical reasoning and in conceiving of specific frameworks, that can then be enshrined in the laws of war, or the laws of armed conflict, is necessary. Ethics, as a technical matter, then “mimes scientific analysis; both are based on sound facts and hypothesis testing; both are technical practices”. (Haraway 1997 p.109) Questions tend to primarily revolve around the rational logic as to who may or may not be targeted and in which circumstances, with a reductionist view. This frequently centers around the issue of what is ethical *conduct* in war, and what ethical conduct is *possible* in war; who can be taken to account and who is responsible for moral or immoral acts, all within the framework of consolidating ethical demand with the laws of armed conflict. In other words, just war discussions thus become increasingly framed along the lines of practicality and utility, and are often confined to the practices of war, rather than the morality and justness of going to war. For this, a certain expertise and skill in logical reasoning and in conceiving of specific frameworks, which can then be enshrined in the laws of war or the laws of armed conflict, is necessary. It is in this move that the practicalities of war supersede the moral concerns of going to war.

This is amplified in the discussions on new military technologies, and specifically, drone warfare, as I will explicate in the following chapters in greater details. But it is also notable in discussions on military ethics, on ‘good’ and ‘bad’ killing. What emerges from this need for expertise in the conception and the application of frameworks of ethics is the demand for codes that specify how those engaged in matters of life and death (medical or warfare related) ought to best conduct themselves, so that training can be given and the ‘right’ moral decision can be ensured. This conflation of ethical conduct is exemplified in William L. Nash’s anecdote of a group of soldiers tending to the thirst and fatigue of their prisoners of war. Nash is a military professional and was a colonel in Operation Desert Storm. He describes his arrival at the tactical command post in Operation Desert Storm where he observed a group of forty or fifty Iraqi prisoners huddled together in an enclosure, guarded by two soldiers. It was evident to Nash that the prisoners were hungry, cold

and exhausted. Nash describes the scene:

Before I could act, I saw four American soldiers going toward the prisoners' enclosure with their arms full of blankets and food rations. No orders had been issued, training had taught the soldiers to do the right thing according to the laws of armed conflict. (Nash 2002 p.17)

For Nash it is clear that the training in the laws of war has made (and makes) soldiers behave ethically, based on their knowledge of the law and the codes of ethics relevant to their profession, as Nash describes the soldiers' behaviour as being compliant with the law, rather than an act of responsibility and compassion. This professional detachment and the possibility of code superseding potentially different ethical considerations and individual responsibility is radicalised in contemporary discussions and research on autonomous lethal systems for use in armed conflict. A key proponent for the use of robot ethics in current debates on military technology is Ronald Arkin, roboticist and roboethicist at the Georgia Institute of Technology and adviser to the U.S. military in matters of ethics and robotics. Arkin argues that it would make for more humane killing in war if autonomous robotic systems were to be equipped with an ethics module, programmed with specific information based on the laws of war and armed conflict, so as to eliminate the messiness, ugliness, uncertainty, potentially erratic behaviour and flaws of human soldiers in the battlefield. (Arkin 2010 pp.334-337) His main claim that robots can be 'better' and more humane in the battlefield rests on the assumption that robots can be equipped with 'emotions' as well as heightened rationality and are able to make faster and more accurate decisions and thus have the capacity to make warfare cleaner, fairer and more swift. (Arkin 2010) Arkin goes as far as to suggest that, eventually, ethically equipped robots ought to become the guides of mere mortal soldiers in overseeing and adjudicating the rightness or wrongness of their conduct. (Arkin 2010 pp.333-334) While this sounds somewhat like a product of the 'Terminator' series or the plot of a sci-fi novel, the notion that robots are the better moral agents and might be able to employ violence in a more humane manner, it is a discussion and debate that continues to gain currency today⁶². I will engage with the problematic of this

⁶² The 2013 Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War has dedicated a third of the volume to technologies of war, which features essays that seek to engage with the impending ethical issue of autonomous robots in the conduct of war. (Allhoff, Evans and Heschke 2013) More specifically engaged in this matter are Lin, Abney and Bekey, who have published their contributions to ethics and robotics technologies in *Robot Ethics* in 2011.

issue and its consequences for the understanding of what it means to be human and the role of the human in the context of warfare, and ultimately how it affects ethics in greater detail in the following chapter. For the moment it is relevant to acknowledge that such a perspective on ethics, one that is based on scientific formulation, reduces the notion of what it means to act ethically to a set of technical guidelines (residing in the functionality of the human, transposed onto the post-human plane), so as to make ethical behaviour, specifically in the context of war, certain. In short, recent technological developments in warfare and military affairs echo the desire to render ethics not only finite but concretely definable, codeable and thus predicable and benefit from considerations such as Wilson's and the neuroscientific community. Arkin is not the only scholar fervently addressing the issue of the codeable morality of machines, academics and practitioners in the field of military technology alike are currently debating not only the very ethics of the use of robotics as substitutes for the human in warfare⁶³ (Lin 2010, 2011; Abney, Bekey, Lin 2011; Singer 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Arkin 2009, 2010) but also the possibility of creating a formulized 'ethics' that can be implemented into military robotic structures through mathematical structure and with the lofty goal to make robots "more humane than humans". (Arkin 2009b)

The focus on ethics' practicality over considerations of its ethicality occludes any deeper engagement with what ethics actually is, how it is, in fact, determined by the characteristics of a specific type of society and how we can make sense of ethics in modernity as something beyond a mere set of context specific norms and legal regulations. Ethical codes in warfare then become the biopolitically informed technical solution of matters of killing, whereby technology, frequently framed as neutral, is the expedient tool for administering the ethico-legal mandate that has been enshrined. The most significant danger lies in the potentiality that the application of normalised ethical standards, as given by a scientific authority eclipses considerations of individual and perpetually new responsibility toward the other, specifically when ethics is understood as a programme that is to be applied rather than something that arises uniquely, in alterity and ever-again. I want to be clear here, I am not arguing that the use of codes, specifically codes of conduct or ethical conduct as enshrined through law or other regulatory frameworks is *per se* a bad thing, or ought not to take place. Rather, I suggest that we should highlight that the resort to codes as an ethical

⁶³ See for example the varied discussions on the topic in the Journal of Military Ethics 2010, 9:4

frame of reference transfers responsibility to the regulatory frameworks, and codes that have been established. This, in a plural international context and against a background of technological authority, is problematic, as I will further elaborate in the following chapters.

The professionalization of matters of war and political violence, the framing of violent practices in and of war as practical solutions to ethical problems is informed by a heightened demand for ethical certainty and gives rise to the requirement for codes and regulations that determine behaviour. It bears repeating here that the political underpinnings are biopolitical underpinnings and not politics in the Arendtian sense. It is politics as administration, politics as governance, politics as people and population management that facilitates the ‘applicability’ of ethics, just like business ethics, medical ethics and so on. As in other professions, this gives rise to the need for codes that validate and justify not only the content of the profession, but also the general conduct (behaviour – not action) of the participants in the profession. As Michael Davis describes the role of codes of ethics for the engineering profession:

A code of ethics would then prescribe how professionals are to pursue their common ideal so that each may do the best she can at minimal cost to herself and those she cares about. The code is to protect each professional from certain pressures. (Davis 2002 p.250)

Considering the great lengths to which the Bush administration went to justify the use of torture through legal memoranda and the current efforts to frame target killings in terms of international law, this notion of the law as a form of ethical code for the profession of international politics crystallises.

While the biopolitically informed field of international politics gives, on one hand, rise to the use of codes and laws as the basis for ethical considerations, it also facilitates the ethical justification of practices of political violence under the sway of the *zoefication* of politics. In other words, when politics sees itself as the regulatory authority of the body politic and its health and well-being, the professional politician as physician becomes a useful metaphor for the justification of violence. This is most vividly demonstrated by the increased use of medical metaphors in framing acts of political violence.

V. "Cure the Disease and Kill the Patient"⁶⁴ – Violence as Medicine

In considering the implications of a biopolitical mode of political life, not only the politicisation of life and its necessities, but also the understanding of politics as part of the processes of greater biological existence, the *zoefication* of politics should be taken into account. Conceiving of communities - whether states, nations or other body politics - as 'organisms' in their functionalities and processes, harbours an always-latent potential to see violence as 'creative'. As I have shown in earlier chapters, Arendt recognised the "biological justification of violence" as an allegedly creative means in politics early and warns strongly against such a *zoefication* of politics. In the context of her writings on violence she states:

The organic metaphors with which our entire present discussion of these matters, especially of the riots, is permeated – the notion of a 'sick society,' of which riots are symptoms, as fever is a symptom of a disease – can only promote violence in the end. Thus debate between those who propose violent means to restore 'law and order' and those who propose nonviolent reforms begins to sound ominously like a discussion between two physicians who debate the relative advantages of surgical as opposed to medical treatment of their patient. The sicker the patient is supposed to be the more likely that the surgeon will have the last word. (Arendt 1970 p.74)

This passage, written in 1970, strongly resonates in our contemporary context, domestically and internationally by bringing out the biopolitical underpinnings and dangers of a naturalised understanding of what politics does and should do. Increasingly, medical metaphors serve as a means to assess (diagnose) what is wrong within a body politic and what can and ought to be done to remedy the ill. This is perhaps not surprising, given that the medical profession and the military industry are, in principle, located on opposite ends of the biopolitical spectrum⁶⁵ - one serves to prevent death, the other delivers death. But both are instrumental in the survival paradigm: one saves the lives of the individual, the other, so the contemporary narrative goes, is tasked with ensuring the survival and welfare of a body politic. The biopolitical language in which societal assessments are couched is rife with pathologising terms such as sick and healthy, cancer and cure, diagnoses and remedies.

⁶⁴ Francis Bacon (1612), Of Friendship - Essays

⁶⁵ But with equal importance when we consider budgetary allocations of federal governments in major Western states.

In August of 2011, shortly after the London riots in which mostly underprivileged parts of the UK capital suffered the consequences of the rioting acts, PM David Cameron framed the problem precisely in such biopolitical terms when he diagnosed society as being “not just broken, [but] sick”. (Cameron 2011a) In his public statements following the riots, Cameron laments at various points the decay of moral behaviour and the sickness of certain pockets of society. In his value judgement, the behaviour displayed by the rioting public was one of immoral (diseased) behaviour, which must be met with whichever means necessary, including physical violence. (Cameron 2011b) It thus is only controllable, pre-determined ‘healthy’ behaviour that is deemed moral behaviour and all other forms of action that do not meet such standards are deemed unhealthy elements that society must be cured of. This cure, Cameron emphasises, certainly includes “first and foremost ... a security fightback”, greater show of sovereign strength and tougher physical measures if need be⁶⁶. (Cameron 2011b) The morality of the cure thus cannot be questioned, as it is in making society healthy again that it is employed, thus bearing an intrinsic claim to morality. This type of rhetoric and the new securitisation policies that emerge from such metaphors validate Arendt’s warning against the use of organic metaphors in politics.

The use of medical metaphors is also widespread in the contemporary rhetoric of military engagement and intervention in social and political crises (McFalls 2007), nationally and internationally, and has been steadily rising since the 20th century. (De Leonardis 2008) As indicated earlier, Keane has highlighted the medical narrative in the context of his analysis of democracy and violence, observing that in democratic regimes the medical narrative is used to justify acts of violence, framed in terms of the necessity to remove a sick or cancerous element that otherwise threatens the survival of the rest of the ‘organism’, i.e. society. By this rationale the ‘sick’ element is considered non-human, irrational, non-reformable, incurable and must thus not only be stopped but rather eliminated. While Keane insists that “mature democracies find such euphemisms embarrassing” and regard them as corrupting and contestable, other scholars have shown that the use of medical metaphors by what would be considered mature democracies for the justification of violence is alive and well.

⁶⁶ It is in this context, that the option of using water cannons against rioters first emerged as potential means to get the riots under control, a move that was supported by both Labour and Conservative politicians as a viable option. Water cannons has hitherto not been used and had been deemed as too dangerous. (Bates 2011 - <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/09/theresa-may-water-cannon-riots>)

(Keane 2004 p.2) In a recent address to the General Assembly, Ban Ki Moon used precisely such an analogy on the five-year action agenda, titled “The Future We Want”. In his speech he addresses tackling peace and security with a preventive approach: “It is well known that prevention is better – and cheaper – than cure”. (Ki Moon 2012) Here, not only the implicit (moral) superiority of prevention is stressed, but also its economy. Similarly, language and conceptions of medical metaphors influence revisionist just war consideration. In her exposition on the rationale of liability of killing and be killed in war, and, specifically in humanitarian intervention, Cecile Fabre draws an analogy of the practices in medical ethics (Fabre 2011), where the patient (a population in crisis) is no longer able to render consent and thus is presumed to consent. This echoes the hierarchical relationship of physician authority with the technical means available to diagnose and operate. It assumes the population to be incapacitated, worse yet, comatose. Such a positing of conflict scenarios, affected population and intervener has normative consequences.

Medical metaphors are premised on the anthropomorphism of nations and communities as organic entities with human qualities: the state is conceptualised as a person, strength is represented in military might, while the well-being and health of this person is often conceived in terms of wealth and economic prosperity. This is a vital connection to the survival of the community, and threats to the economic prosperity “can thus be seen as death threats”. (Lakoff 1991) The analogy largely relates to a linear progressive understanding of human development, whereby a community (state, nation) is considered ‘mature’ (developed) when it has been industrialised and economies that do not function in line with the industrialised model are considered under-developed, in other words: immature. As Lakoff highlights: “there is an implicit logic to the use of these metaphors: Since it is in the interest of every person to be as strong and healthy as possible, a rational state seeks to maximise wealth and military might.” (Lakoff 1991)

While terms such as “surgical strike” have often been interpreted as being a rhetorical device serving to present the typically messy and erratic nature of warring in a more hygienic and controllable light, thus making war more palatable to the wider (unaffected) public, it also betrays an underlying biopolitical mind set in contemporary politics. Such metaphors are not neutral in their cognitive effect. More than merely an effective rhetorical device, they are considered by linguists to be a

‘figure of thought’, which “consists not merely in *representing* the objects, but in *depicting* them”. (De Leonardis 2008 p.34) Furthermore, metaphors have the capacity to create a reality, whereby a similarity between two otherwise not similar concepts can be established and manifested. It is through the use of such specific metaphors then that the logos of a certain socio-political form is disclosed and circulated.

The biopolitical logic of military engagements in Afghanistan, or more recently Libya, has been framed by pathologising the respective nation or community. The narrative of military intervention as a ‘therapeutic’ procedure that remedies the unhealthy aspects of a specific society in turn renders violence as something good and intrinsically moral. Thus, using biologically grounded metaphors, civilian casualties and targeted assassinations can be fully justified by the biopolitical mandate for survival. “Counterinsurgency becomes chemotherapy, killing insurgent cells and sometimes even innocent bodies to save the body politic”. (Gregory 2011 p.205) This rationale is strongly reflected in a 2010 article by battlefield officers Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell and Capt. Mark Hagerott, published in *Foreign Policy* with the indicative title: “Curing Afghanistan”. In the article Caldwell and Hagerott draw an analogy between a country in crisis and an ailing patient and liken Afghanistan to “a weakened person under attack by an aggressive infection”. (Caldwell and Hagerott 2010) In other words they explain the logic of the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan by comparing their own position with that of a surgeon, and the Taliban and other insurgents to a disease, an infection of the organism, with military action depicted a course of antibiotics. The current advocacy of the use of armed drones in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia is also couched also in these terms as the drones are repeatedly referred to as instruments that enable surgical precision in eliminating the cancerous cell that is the terrorist enemy. (Brennan 2010, 2012a, 2012b; Carney 2012; Anderson 2011) As such, the use of lethal drones is positioned not only as legal and ethically sound, but also wise, a narrative I will discuss in greater detail in chapter seven.

The contemporary *zoefication* of politics is most clearly exemplified in these examples. As De Leonardis aptly explains: “what is at stake here is a view of society as an organic body that is threatened by some external or internal noxious substances, a *corpus organicus* that can be cured only by a ruler-physician.” (De Leonardis 2008 p.37) In the same vein as two specialist consultants would Calderon and Hagerott ‘examine’ the course of treatment hitherto applied and find that “Afghanistan’s

illness” was diagnosed too late. The ‘low level antibiotics’ employed to date are insufficient to cure Afghanistan. What is needed is a shock to the system through heavy medication. It is within this biopolitical logic that stepping up military action is seen as a heavy but necessary dose of antibiotics, which has unfortunate but necessary side effects:

To be sure, similar to a powerful antibiotic, the use of large numbers of combat troops brings with it side effects that can cause discomfort and pain to the body politic of Afghanistan. The effects range from disruption of civilian day-to-day life to, regrettably, sometimes civilian casualties. Senior NATO commanders seek to minimize civilian casualties and thus apply combat power with restraint and, to the extent possible, surgical precision. (Calderon and Hagerott 2010)

Calderon and Hagerott extend this analogy further to introduce the logic of a further course of action for a healthy and prosperous Afghanistan. Health and vitality are achieved by strengthening the immune system, which is depicted in Calderon and Hagerott's metaphor as “the collective security forces: the police, the military and the security bureaucracy”. In other words, the *corpus organicus* of Afghanistan can only regain its health if it is secured by an executive branch in possession of the legitimate means of state violence. The homology of biological malady and social malady implies a specifically biopolitical power relationship whereby the “governed must submit to the ruler with the same eagerness a patient entrusts his/her health to a physician”. (De Leonardis 2008 p.39) Calderon and Hagerott's metaphor is by no means radically new; they rather frame their normative course of action more explicitly along lines of biopolitical necessity, which implies that the path to a healthy body politic is an arduous one, “but the first step is appreciating what a lasting cure will require”. (Calderon and Hagerott 2010)

The underlying rationale of such a biopolitical narrative has several consequences for the ethics of political violence. One such consequence is that it enables the drawing of dichotomous boundaries, through medical discourse, as to what is normal and what is abnormal, and prescribes effective treatment for the abnormal condition. Furthermore, this, in turn, manifests the implicit morality of necessity, instrumental to a polity that has at its political heart the survival mandate and simultaneously affirms the authority of scientific and technological expertise, fit to prescribe a remedial path to that which has been delineated as in need of a cure. The survival mandate in biopolitical societies, highlighted in previous chapters, places an intrinsic ethical

demand on the diseased element to submit to being cured (for its own good and that of greater society) by the entity in possession of knowledge, expertise and technology, which gives authoritative diagnosis and treatment. What emerges is a hierarchical power relationship, enabled by the socially constructed medical categories of health and illness, cemented by a moralized technology. (Bauman 2012 p.159; De Leonadis 2008 p.39) In an ever-greater rendering of science as truth in the inquiry into human biology, the biological knowledge available to the individual becomes limited. The morality of the remedy, understood in terms of utility, stands unquestioned in the survival mandate. The modern aspiration toward the omnipotence of man means that not only, as Arendt asserts, is ‘everything possible’ in this understanding of man as the maker, but furthermore, ‘we have no choice’ but to secure the health and well-being of humanity with all means possible. The underlying premise of this mind-set is the biopolitical belief that a society can be cured. This, in turn rests on a somewhat reductionist assumption that the essentially aleatory, complex and contingent elements of a society can be mathematized, like a biological organism, and thus be brought under control.

Ben Anderson highlights this military and intelligence effort in the context of the PSYOPS employed in the Afghan war. His analysis convincingly shows how boundaries of ‘transformable’ (curable) and ‘non-transformable’ (incurable) are drawn with respect to populations affected by insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. While members of Al Qaeda definitely are beyond remedy and are, from the outset, deemed to be incurable, they must thus be eliminated⁶⁷. In this, non-combatants and civilians are shifted into a zone of potentiality that renders them subject to on-going assessments as to the level of danger they might present, now or in the future. (Anderson 2011 p.224) Just as in preventive medicine, the figure of the ‘suspect’ becomes subject to pre-emptive and preventive action in order to secure their healthy and normal behaviour before it can slip into categories of abnormality. PSYOPS reach this goal by modifying the behaviour of “the population as a set of potential enemies and potential friends”. (Anderson 2011 p.225) Reinforcing the image of the quasi-divine authority seeking to render the population calculable, governable and treatable, many of these PSYOPS engage with populations not in a

⁶⁷ To stay with the medical metaphor, here drone strikes and target killings, frequently framed as surgical strikes, have become increasingly frequent as a means with which to eliminate the incurable element from a given society. The chapter seven will discuss the biopolitical logic of these extrajudicial means in greater detail.

direct inter-human mode, but from high up in the sky. While Anderson explains this biopolitical power relationship by drawing on Foucault, it is with the supplementary Arendtian life-politics framework focused on the instrumentality of the mathematisation of human beings that we understand the full mechanics and consequences of this power relationship. Forms of calculation that give rise to the analysability of humans as an object of manipulation are central to biopolitical mechanisms. Understanding the population as a “collective that has a set of biological needs” is a crucial aspect of this calculability⁶⁸, as is the knowledge of infrastructures upon which the meeting of life necessities depends. (Anderson 2011 p.226) As Anderson explains:

If disciplines attempt to engender expectations, ‘regulatory mechanisms’ function to ensure, sustain and multiply life in part through forms of anticipation. Hence the link between biopolitics and forms of calculation that enable the prediction of threats to the continuation of the valued life of the population, including threats that emerge from within the many-headed population itself. (Anderson 2011 p.225)

Herein again we recognise the importance and biopolitical consequence of rendering life mathematisable and calculable so as to render it governable and controllable for the benefit of humanity at large.

While it would be tenuous to argue that interventions should not happen at all, we need to examine the grounds on which the ethical underpinnings are established. The medical narrative is fraught with dangers as it allows violent means to become the sole, or worse still *intrinsically* moral, instrument to right or prevent a wrong. Other means thus fall victim to the medical narrative of swift and expedient intervention in order to preserve life. Rendering human categories along the lines of friend, enemy and suspect (healthy, ill, in need of prevention) establishes boundaries of normal and abnormal, whereby abnormalities are subject to a set of expert techniques, knowledge and authority to be come by with violent expedience. As De Leonardis states: “An implicit assumption of this view is the perception of whoever does not fit into a supposed normalcy as deviant, obnoxious element that has to be expelled”. (De Leonardis 2008 p.33)

⁶⁸ As Anderson highlights, the biological aspect is one element, analysable knowledge of culture and infrastructure on which life processes depend are further important aspects in the counter-insurgency logic. (Anderson 2011 p.226) Similarly Kyle Grayson highlights the interconnectedness of the importance of biopolitical and cultural aspects in contemporary warfare, specifically target killings, as I will engage with in more detail in subsequent chapters (Grayson 2012)

The medical narrative combines knowledge with authority and thus functions effortlessly as a moralising principle in modern societies preoccupied with the rationalisation and application of ethics. The narrative is largely congruent with existing laws and where it does not fit, the quasi-divine goodness implicit in the profession of the healer and caregiver renders both, the intervener and the target of intervention beyond moral questioning. As McFalls highlights: “The apparent neutrality of the Hippocratic commitment to human life and well-being, moreover, exempts medical intervention from ethical critique”. (McFalls 2007 p.1) Morality, or goodness, is assumed in the very profession and implicit acts to save lives. Rendering the target of the intervention in medical terms further depoliticises their realm of action. Either depicted as a victim (the patient) or a symptom of a disease (the enemy), the subject is denied a political dimension on natural/biological grounds. The scientific mandate and the advocacy of technology are a crucial aspects in the manifestation of anti-political life-politics in which ethical decisions become obscured in the pursuit of certainty.

It is here that Bauman’s notion of *adiaphorisation* strikes a chord. Drawing on terminology from the church, adiaphorised acts may be regarded as neither good nor evil, but rather exist in an artificially created a-moral space. It is the product of social organisation in modern society that enables people “to silence their moral misgivings in order to get certain jobs done”. (Jacobson and Poder 2008 p.81) Bauman describes the term adiaphorisation to denote “the tendency to trim and cut down the categories of acts amenable to moral judgement, to obscure or deny the ethical relevance of certain categories of action and to refute the ethical prerogatives of certain targets of action”. (Bauman 2000 p.92) Marcus Doel highlights the inherent technocratic basis of adiaphorisation as being

exemplified in all of those bureaucratic practices that withdraw things and especially social relations from 'moral space' (where the justice and legitimacy of one's dealings with others is always at stake) into the cognitive space of technical performance, instrumental rationality and administrative competence. (Doel 1999 p.73)

While the biopolitically informed shift toward applied ethics on one hand facilitates a neutralization, or adiaphorisation, of ethical content under the sway of the *zoefication* of politics, it also, on the other, gives rise to the greater reliance and use of abstracted

codes and laws for ethical considerations. This condition is particularly relevant in the discussion of violence-as-politics, when the latter is predominantly understood as a branch of applied ethics.

Conclusion

The biopolitically informed branch of applied ethics holds a number of challenges as an adequate framework for understanding the ethics of political violence today. As ethics is rendered a professional and technical subject, it seeks to clarify and ascertain outcomes. This is precarious in international conflict and war. Furthermore, in a *zoefying* turn of politics, it lifts political acts from the realm of ethical evaluation in framing certain actions as necessary for the health and survival of a body politic. The use of medical narratives is instrumental in this adiaphorising move. Furthermore, it enables the prevalence of codes as ethics, based on a technologized understanding of *zoe*, of the human and her biology. Understanding ethics as a highly rationalized framework informing the rightness or wrongness of the conduct of man, situated in a realm of predictability is limited and limiting for a comprehensive consideration of ethics and moral action in modernity and it is important to keep in mind the tension of an ethics that demands a duality of consideration: on one hand ethics is increasingly conceived in terms of its functionality, while on the other, it continues to pose questions about the very autonomy inherent in ethical thinking. Applied ethics is only an appropriate framework for ethical investigations in matters of politics and violence, when the subject matter itself is considered in terms of utility and functionality. Applied ethics, most fittingly, are applied in a professional context. For this to be transferable to the realm of politics, where life processes stand at the core, the very elements of the subject matter – politics, violence, the human – must thus be rendered and understood in professional and technological terms.

To more thoroughly consider the ethics of political violence today it is worth keeping in mind the inherently unpredictable and indeterminable nature of both politics and violence as human endeavours. As Bauman notes: “Any society is the togetherness of potentially moral beings. But a society may be a greenhouse of morality, or a barren soil ...”. (Bauman 2000 p.84) If ethics is shaped by the specificities of a society, which human subjectivity it produces, and what political basis it considers, it is crucial more closely examine what type of soil is provided by contemporary

biopolitical subjectivities and political or anti-political practices. In this, the relationship between biopolitical technologies and the human becomes crucial in understanding what human subjectivity is produced and how this subjectivity relates to the justification of certain violent practices. The next chapter will investigate the role and place of the biopolitically produced human and the subjectivity this informs in the context of warfare.

6: The Biopolitical Human at War: Human, far too Human

*Und täglich steigt aus Automaten
immer schöneres Gerät.
Wir nur blieben ungeraten,
uns nur schuf man obsolet.*⁶⁹

Günther Anders, “*Molussische Industriegymnen*”

I. Radical Bio-rationality: The Techno-subjective Human

In order to get to the core of the question adapted from Sheldon Wolin, posed earlier in the project - whether a specific socio-political form facilitates a specific method for adjusting to and accepting the use of violence - I have sought to show the biopolitical rationales with which politics, violence and ethics are underpinned in modernity. Considering the interdependence of ethics with subjectivity (Campbell and Shapiro 1999 p.xi; Critchley 2009), it is useful to make the biopolitically shaped techno-subjectivity that pervades human subjectivity in a contemporary context, also the object of analysis in this project. The question this chapter aims to address is thus: how do the biopolitics-technology complex, and the technological ecologies this creates, shape human subjectivities and how does this relate to contemporary biopolitical perspectives of ethics as outlined in the previous chapter. To do so, a closer look at contemporary technologies, in the context of warfare and armed conflict and the role of the human in this new technological ecology is warranted.

The role of technology as a consequence of, and influence on, modern society has been covered by a vast literature. The Frankfurt School in particular has taken on the task of critically engaging with what it considered to be the substitution of the commodity fetishism with a technology fetish in modernity, as Herbert Marcuse examines in his 1941 essay “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology”. In the essay, Marcuse calls attention to the fact that while technology *per se* is indeed neutral – an artefact and product of human work (to stay within the Arendtian terminology) - and carries the dual potential to oppress or liberate, toward authoritarianism or liberalism, to ease life or burden it. The technological process has

⁶⁹ *And daily arise from automates, ever-better new machines. Only we remain defective, were created obsolete.* (my translation)

produced “a new rationality and new standards of individuality have spread over society, different from and even opposed to those which initiated the march of technology”. (Marcuse 1982 p.139) This affects the subjectivities that are produced within a society to a considerable degree.

Writing against a backdrop of the breath-taking appropriation of technological means for oppression and large-scale violence by the National Socialism in Germany, Marcuse’s insights continue to ring true in our contemporary modern context. Since the technologisation of modern society was set into motion, the world, and the individual within this world, has submitted to a rationalisation mandate in which the rationality of technology has become a social power. (Marcuse 1982 p.140) In this move toward increased and increasing rationalisation, however, the individual – the human – is progressively analysed and marginalised, requiring her to submit to the ‘anonymous wisdom’ (Marcuse 1982 p.142) that devises the most cutting edge technological advancements. The next step in this acceleration toward a technologically dominated present, this “rational apparatus, combining utmost expediency with utmost convenience, saving time and energy, removing waste, adapting all means to the end, anticipating consequences, sustaining calculability and security” (Marcuse 1982 p.142) is the enhancement, and perhaps the replacement of the human, for a post-human future. Or, to use a term Braidotti employs, the meta(l)morphosis of the understanding of the human. (Braidotti 2011 p.77)

In an increasingly technologically dominated present, the role and place of the human as actor in a private, social and political context is perpetually transformed, and transforming. This applies to day-to-day activities as much as it does to war and situations of violent political conflict. In a mundane environment, these rapidly developing technologies render our lives optimally convenient and effortless, and bestow a new freedom from labour on us, to put it in Arendtian terms. We are said to be ‘empowered’ (as technology entrepreneur David Rose insists⁷⁰) by machines and applications that ‘think’ for us, that open doors and gates by the scan of our irises, that allow us to swiftly check in at our own pace at the airport, giving us ever-greater levels of freedom and eradicating human error in the process. The medical field,

⁷⁰ In the context of a conference titled “Human Being in an Inhuman Age”, held at the Bard College in New York, USA in 2010, Rose elaborated on the many ways machines, such as self-service check-out machines and other devices liberate humanity from the toils of labour. An assertion that was received with apprehension.

among others, is at the forefront of technological advancements, which not only support human life, but also render it enhanced, improved and biologically substituted. From the injection of oxygen into the bloodstream to prevent suffocation, to mobile phone applications that allow the user to monitor biological functions such as heart rate, sleep patterns and blood pressure - human biology, physiology and psychology has been captured in scientific terms and can, increasingly, be influenced accordingly. Once more it becomes evident that the conception of the mathematisable human is crucial as the enhancement and substitution of human functions relies on the ascertainability of certain human aspects. The ethical dimensions and potential problem these technological practices comprises are evident and, as discussed in the previous chapter, typically fall within practical considerations of applied ethics through regulations and codes. The human, perceived as a near fully analysable entity in this context, becomes herself a practical and technical subject matter in this context.

However, this harbours a latent danger: wherever human functions can be rendered in mathematical and analysable terms there is a drive to imprint progress in the form of technological enhancements on the patterns identified, rendering the human in her natural flesh, her natural capacity as flawed and failing. While the merger of the human with machinistic aspects is by no means a novel development per se – humans and their tools and technologies have been, to a certain degree mutually constitutive throughout history – it differs from previous developments in two crucial aspects: one is the break-neck speed of current technological developments that poses a challenge for the human and her socio-political context, which had hitherto not presented itself. Never before have technological advancements altered the socio-political context with such speed and so drastically. Paul Virilio has captured this contemporary acceleration in digital technology under the term ‘dromology’, where he describes power relations of speed and slowness in technological developments. (Virilio 1986) In the current context, this development is captured in Ray Kurzweil’s notion of the ‘law of accelerating returns’, which holds that the speed of an “evolutionary process increases exponentially over time – both for biology and technology”. (Kurzweil 2004) The second aspect is the hierarchy that shifts as the human begins to subordinate herself to the capacities (physical and otherwise) of the machine. I will address both aspects in greater detail throughout the chapter.

As in medicine, technology has also become an instrumental focal point in war and military affairs. Through the application of technologies in both fields, the human becomes subjected to the scientific authority of technology, in the interest of improving and saving lives. However, while developments in neuroscience, robotics and physical enhancements in warfare seek to render the human improved and perfected in her resilience, performance and capacity (with increasingly intrusive ways of modifying the human body and mind) to be better and more humane and professional warriors, the act of war itself remains, as Elaine Scarry brilliantly argues in *The Body in Pain*, one that is chiefly preoccupied with injury and the physical destruction of the human body, as the “main purpose and outcome of war is injuring”. (Scarry, 1985 p.63) The contradiction could not be starker. The technologically sanitised war in which casualties are mitigated by technology is contrary to “classical conceptions of the subject at war”. (Hardt and Negri 2006 p.48) And indeed the narrative is flawed, as Hardt and Negri identify lucidly: “When U.S. leaders imagine a bodiless war or a soldier-free war, they are referring, of course, only to the bodies of U.S. soldiers. Enemy bodies are certainly meant to die”. (Hardt and Negri 2006 p.46) Death remains “central to political theory and practice in terms of the new killing techniques within a fast-expanding technological context”. (Braidotti 2013 p.128)

From this contradiction ensues an asymmetry that gives rise to the question: how do we understand the human and her life as a subject and object in warfare when human life is increasingly conceived in scientific patterns that can be augmented, improved upon and, ultimately, substituted and what consequences does this understanding have for ethical considerations of political violence? To this end and in light of contemporary practices of warfare, such as drone strikes, it is useful to consider both, the consequences of the calculability of the human that has the desire and capacity to enhance their abilities (a mostly Western – for a lack of a better term – aspiration to date) and the un-enhanced human, as target in warfare. Both have implications on the acceptance of certain violent practices in a modern socio-political context. In this chapter, I first engage with a (predominantly Western) narrative that places great value and importance on moving beyond mere humanism into the realm of post-humanism and trans-humanism before engaging with the abstraction of the human target in war based on normative models of calculability and mathematical analysis. The core of both is informed by a distinct and necessary focus on the patterns of life-

processes and an essentialising of the human in her observable biological patterns, as elaborated in previous chapters. Braidotti highlights the risks this machinist perspective of humanity comprises as one that “recreat[es] a hard-core, unitary vision of the subject, under the cover of pluralistic fragmentation to reassert transcendence via technological mediation and [...] propose[s] a neouniversal machinic ethos”. (Braidotti 2011 p.77) In other words, the human subject becomes homogenized and essentialised as a functioning machine. While Braidotti optimistically dismisses this perspective as one that can be overcome, I argue that it crucially informs the ethics of contemporary practices of political violence and warfare, as indicated in the preceding chapter.

The chapter addresses the broader question of the conception of the human subject and subjectivity in a modern context in which the human can be enhanced, if not replaced through technology, specifically in war and warfare, in what Braidotti identifies as a “new semiosis of killing” (Braidotti 2013 p.124), aided by “telethanatological warriors”, within a “technology mediation in contemporary necropolitics”. (Braidotti 2013 pp.126 – 128) The goal is to highlight the biopolitically informed conception of the human subject to better understand how ethics is conceived of in terms of ascertainability, codes and programmes in the modern context. It is the subject of biological life that is captured and rendered in scientific, technological and political terms in this turn, creating an essence of the human as a biologically ascertainable and improvable functional entity. As such, the chapter addresses the complex and dynamic relationship between the human and the advent of machines as supplementary and substitutive and the consequences this harbours for human subjectivity in a socio-political context.

II. A Post-Humanistic Dream: The Tale of Man and Machine

The present relationship between man and machine, technology and human life is one that is characterised primarily by its very dynamism and has been the subject of a vast array of sci-fi culture, from Fritz Lang’s *Metropolis*, to Isaac Asimov’s Robot Series to the *Terminator* franchise. Encapsulated within these and other works within the genre is a considerable anguish over the possibility of the machines going rogue, becoming independent, intelligent mechanisms that approximate human life capabilities in ever-more realistic shape but with super-human strength, endurance

and computational capacities, eventually spinning out of control on a violent path of destroying all that is human. The underlying question addressed and played out in these fictional accounts of a robotic dystopia is whether the human can and will remain master over the machines he creates, what emerges from this is what Guenther Anders encapsulates in his theory of ‘promethean shame’, a concept I will delineate in more detail below.

With technologies that comprise progressively greater complexities, seeking to render machines more and more life-like and increasingly autonomous and intelligent, bestowed with the capacity to ‘make decisions’ (Singer 2010a), this question of the hierarchy of humans and ‘their’ machines continues to have no definitive answer. In a somewhat self-defeating turn, scientists and roboticists appear to work feverishly to replace what we hitherto have known and understood as human life with a bigger, better, bolder robot version of what life ought to be – fully embracing the possibility of becoming obsolete as humans. Machines are being designed to exceed human capacities, humans won’t be able to keep up with the pace and will, eventually “clearly face extinction”, so the narrative goes. (Singer 2010a p.415) In his seminal work on military robotics, *Wired for War*, Peter Singer extensively documents this attitude among the robotics and military experts he has interviewed in the course of his research. The palpable sense in the robotics industry is that there is a realistic danger of technology spinning out of control at some point in the not too distant future. Singer highlights this effectively, even among technophiles. In this context, Singer quotes military robotics expert Robert Finkelstein who asserts in no uncertain terms that it is in the nature of robotics that machines will eventually outperform humans. Finkelstein explains:

It will be more than human, different than human. It will change at a pace that humans can’t match. ... On Monday you control it, on Tuesday it is doing things that you didn’t anticipate, on Wednesday, God only knows. Is it a good thing or a bad thing, who knows? It could end up causing the end of humanity, or it could end war for forever. (Singer 2010a p.415)

Similarly, Singer quotes another expert, Eric Drexler, as stating:

Our machines are evolving faster than we are. Within a few decades they seem likely to surpass us. Unless we learn to live with them in safety, our future will likely be both exciting and short. (Singer 2010a p.415)

Statements like these seem to betray not only a peculiar defeatism on the part of the human who has, in fact, conceived of, designed and realised said autonomous machines, but also questions whether technology can indeed still be considered a human activity or has moved into a post-human sphere that we are yet to comprehend in its full extent. Humans, as conceived by popular post-humanist discourses and narratives are in the apparently conscious process of outmoding themselves through technology⁷¹. Given the proliferating literature on the topic, post-humanism discourses can no longer be dismissed as the fleeting aspirational brain-child of singularity advocates such as Ray Kurzweil and Steve Fuller – a vast range of scholars in the social sciences and humanities are in the process of engaging with the topic. (See for example Braidotti 2011; Cudworth and Hobden 2011; Agar 2010; Papadopolous 2010; Diprose 2009 among others) If we wish to understand the human, and human subjectivity in a contemporary context, we have to accept the notion that there is a continually growing interest in the merger of man with machine in a meta(l)morphosis, which, by many, is considered inevitable in the post-human perspective, even though, seeking to move into a post-human era harbours an implicit paradox in two aspects. The conception of science and technology as outmoding the human and human capacity is inherently a human activity – it is not determined and initiated by an implicitly non-human entity which demands or elicits submission, rather it is through human thought and imagination that this context emerges in the first place. The human is thus always already immanent. Furthermore, within the post-humanist credo still lies an implicit humanism, as Eugene Thacker identifies: the post-humanist approach is one where “technological progress will necessarily mean a progress in ‘the human’ as a species and as a society”. (Thacker 2003 p.75) In other words, while the human will be transformed by advanced technologies, it will retain an element of its own essence. (Thacker 2003 p.6) This is useful to keep in mind when considering the implications this has for the moral authority narrative of technologised warfare.

⁷¹ Steven Fuller offers a concerning but also comprehensive explication of the role of the human in a post-humanism and trans-humanism context in his book *Humanity 2.0* (Fuller 2011a), whereby he asserts an underlying theology of the human as perpetually enhanced aims to become more God-like as in the Christian theological narrative in the new *Humanity 2.0*.

III. My Sweet Analysable You: Coding Life

‘What is the human’ is a crucial question emerging when biology, neurology and information science merge, and experts struggle to comprehend what it means to be human in an age where we are not only living within but are also constantly adjusting to a technological universe. As Jacques Ellul remarked in 1978: “Man’s environment is completely a function of technology, to which it increasingly adapts itself.” (Ellul 1978 p.216) This interconnection carries implications and consequences for our contemporary understanding of the human body and mind, our relationship to human biology and human life as such, which demands perpetually new adjustment as technology develops at an ever-accelerating rate. In the 21st century, life has increasingly become reconfigured in terms of information. Specifically physical and biological aspects of human life are defined and rendered in terms of the information they consist of and contain, and biology and computer science begin to intertwine, as Eugene Thacker quotes Ben Rosen of Compaq Computers: “biology is becoming an information science.” (Thacker 2003 p.73) Projects such as the Human Genome Project, which sought to identify all of the 20,000 – 25,000 genes in human DNA and determine their chemical sequences have long redrawn the boundaries between biology and information technology. This conflation of biology with information gives rise to some fundamental questions about the meaning of human corporeality as information, as Thacker asks: “ What does it mean to have a body, to be a body, in relation to genome databases?” And it also calls into question the very referent ‘the human’, when defined primarily by her functionality and existence as units of information. (Thacker 2003 p.73) In other words, the very category ‘life’ is called into question. As Dillon and Reid rightly diagnose: “We have entered the age of life as information”. (Dillon and Reid 2009 p.21) Developments in neuro- and cognitive science, biotechnology and cybernetics are rapidly afoot. (Allen 2011) On almost a daily basis, reports are published of the latest technologies that strive to imitate, enhance or replace human functions by technological means. The normalised potential of technology as making humans better, creates an aspirational normality of what we as humans ought to be able to do – and without much effort. This is a demand placed on the self as much as the other. Concomitant, as the flipside of this new aspirational human normality is a growing understanding of the traditional human in her un-augmented capacity as flawed, error-driven and fallible.

Technologies in the medical, commercial or military field, that seek to produce a better, healthier, more efficient and more resilient human, rely on breaking down the human body (and mind) into analysable informational patterns, into making it mathematically graspable, and, consequently improvable and reproducible. Thacker provides the crucial insight here: “Once the brain can be analysed as a set of informational channels, then it follows that that patterns can be replicated in hardware and software systems” (Thacker 2003 p.74), opening doors for ‘hardware’ interventions and virtual replications. This applies to all observable aspects of the human - her biology, physiology and neurology – so that she can be captured and explained in terms of ‘how she works’ and ‘how she can work better’. In other words, Dillon and Reid describe the digital and molecular revolution as paving the way for a new realm of mechanics: “of life as mechanism and of mechanism as life”. (Dillon and Reid 2009 p.57) In the context of biotechnology this could similarly be formulated as: Life becomes code, code becomes life. The rendering of life as code is thus essential in order to ‘make’ life. To imitate, augment and eventually replace human life through technology – via information technology – it must be pared down to its analysable and replicable elements, rendered abstract and graspable – in code. And it is precisely in this mandate of seeking to code human life (life processes, human behaviour) that the ontology of the normed human resides. Life as code and code as life carries the immanent potential to manifest what is normal and what is abnormal, what is flawed and what is perfection, in all its teleological aspirations and in all aspects of the analysable human – purely by statistical and mathematical determination. Only with the human body and mind analysed and rendered as information, the notion of ‘perfection’ can take hold.

In this informationalising and technologising turn the complexity that characterises human (biological and neurological) life was not sought to be eradicated through simplification – quite the contrary. Dillon and Reid are helpful in pointing out that comprehending life as information requires also the algorithmic embrace of the ‘accident’ in the process of evolution and life development to account for and replicate the adaptive powers human life exhibits. This forms the very cornerstones of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and cybernetics. Along these lines of algebraic life, Thacker offers a particularly useful summary of the body as information in its totality and the possibilities that emerge from it:

In short, when the body is considered as essentially information, this opens onto the possibility that the body may also be programmed and reprogrammed (and whose predecessor is genetic engineering). Understood as essentially information, and as (re)programmable, the body in informatic essentialism increasingly becomes valued less according to any notion of materiality or substance (as we still see in modern biology) and more according to the value of information itself as the index to all material instantiation – a kind of code for matter. (Thacker 2003 p.86)

In other words, the essence of the body becomes information, information as the basis and the index for the creation of new, improved, artificial aspects of life, and thus life's ultimate value. It is, however, in this turn that the role of the human becomes precarious. With the advent of cybernetics, "crude and outmoded" (Dillon and Reid 2009 p.64) biological distinctions of the human could be replaced, refined and taken as a new normalising referent. Now that life is replicable not only in its static elements but also in evolutionary patterns, however, it renders that which disturbs the process of evolutionary pattern formation in the creation and enhancement of life as hazardous or undesirable. Thus, latent lies the perpetual danger of unruly, unanalysed and disturbing life in its infinite potentiality. It is this infinite potentiality, the "pluripotency and totipotency of life-potential" (Dillon and Reid 2009 p.149) that renders life inherently dangerous to those seeking to control it. Specifically as technology, in its Heideggerian essence, makes man the same in an equalizing (less political equality, more in the sense of 'sameness'), the inherent adaptive and aleatory quality of human life renders it a danger onto itself in a perpetual state. This is, Dillon and Reid conclude, why securitization must necessarily be future oriented – in a preventive and pre-emptive outlook. I will return to this important point toward the final part of this paper. Technology has the capacity to address and mitigate the aleatory nature of the human. Peter Sloterdijk reveals this as anthropo-technological governing that has the capacity to "tame" the unruly, aleatory and, ultimately fallible elements of life through biotechnology and bioengineering, providing the basis for an encroaching standardisation and homogenisation of mankind. (Campbell 2011 p. 115; Sloterdijk 2009 p.25)

What is aimed at in the technologisation and informationalisation process is a modern form of homeostasis, an ordering principle and stability along these new information patterns. (Campbell 2011 p.115) The result is a more 'purified' life than un-augmented life can ever be, in the pursuit of perpetual perfection through techno-

scientific embodiment, whereby an anthropomorphizing of technology, specifically in its alleged autonomy becomes explicitly manifest. The value of the 'traditional' human in her body and functionality resides in the informational processes she offers, so that technology can thus improve, mimic and move beyond the evolutionary process, thus rendering the human not obsolete, but in a process of re-distribution of identity and difference in her self-evaluation. (Halberstam and Livingston 1995) However, it is only from this condition of the informatic essentialism of the body that movements such as trans- or posthumanism can ask questions as to the utility of the 'old' body, as Steven Fuller does when he questions "how much of the biological body needs to be intact, especially when one wants to become more human, or ultra-human, or trans-human or something like that". (Fuller 2011b) The question of identity and subjectivities arises in this context anew. Fuller claims that identification is shifting as people tend to identify more with developments and aspirations taking place in cyberspace, much more so than what is happening in their biological bodies, rendering the relationship of the self with the body unsettled. But this is perhaps too quick an assertion to make. The question remains: how do we perceive and accept the human self if we consider an ideal self to be a self based on technological fiction? Or, phrased slightly differently: what is the imperfect human in relation to the perfection of technology?

IV. Techno-Paternalism: Hybridity and Humility

What emerges in the relationship of the human and technology since the advent of cybernetics then is a peculiar and contradictory duality of aspects. One aspect is that of man as the creator of life – a quasi-divine aspiration of omnipotence – in his own image, or rather, based on his own informatic essence. This perspective strongly resonates with Arendt's astute critique of (biopolitical) man as perceiving himself as the maker of all things, specifically life and history in modernity and acting accordingly. It contains the desire and the drive to not only improve our own functionality as humans into flawless, better, stronger and more divine as creatures ourselves, but also that to *make* life. The creation of artificial life, not only as a creation of life forms as such but as an improvement on existing life forms presents the culmination of man as perceiving himself not only as in the image of God striving toward infallibility and perfection, but like God in his creative capacity. It is also in this aspect that the medical narrative of the human as (medical) expert in the decision

to operate on a sick body politic is reflected; the quasi-divine human with the knowledge, skill and technology to decide authoritatively over life and death. It is, however, a relationship of the creator and his offspring, who, like children, will one day supersede those who have given life to them. (Singer 2010a p.415) This relates to the other side of the coin in the human-technology relationship.

This second aspect in the emergent duality in the relationship between man and machine is that of surrender to the technologies we have created, in a near fatalistic passivity, accepting what is apparently inevitably to come. As Hans Moravec, robotics authority at Carnegie Mellon comments on the hierarchical shift of man and machine in Singer: “I’ve decided that it’s inevitable and that it’s no different from your children deciding that they don’t need you. So I think we should gracefully bow out”. (Singer 2010a p.415 – 416) This hierarchical relationship whereby robots supersede humans in authority is echoed by the general media, exemplified by a recent article published in *The Economist* with the call to action for society to urgently develop new rules to manage the new breed of autonomous robots. (The Economist 2012; Braidotti 2013 pp.124-125) or Gary Marcus’ suggestion in the *The New Yorker* last year, that autonomous machines, such as driverless cars, might be inherently more moral as they function better than humans when it comes to driving. (Marcus 2012) This form of techno-paternalism, whereby the human willingly submits to the superior computing powers and authority of technology in her mundane as well as exceptional dealings, is decidedly on the rise as humans increasingly sense that they, despite all best efforts, cannot keep up. A somewhat schizophrenic turn when we consider that technology is, following Heidegger’s initial assessment, a *human* tool and a *human* activity. (Heidegger 2009 p.312) The ‘creator’ thus accepts the position of being inferior in relation to a peculiarly anthropomorphized technological authority (whether that be robots, cyborgs, bionic limbs or even GPS systems) in a puzzling role reversal. The inherently flawed human can never fully meet the standards of flawless functionality and perfection that is the mandate for the machines that are created. In her hybridity of being simultaneously deity (creator) and flawed mortal (human) lies an inherent tension. Guenther Anders speaks in this context of a “promethean shame” inherent to the modern man who measures his worth (and moral standards) by the flawless functionalities of machines and must forever realise that, despite being a producer, he cannot himself fully be a

product, never fully live up to the strength, speed, precision and functionalities of his creations, and thus never fully fit into the normed environment that is shaped and determined by ever-new machines, by ever-accelerating technology. (Anders 2010) Anders sees precisely in this emerging shame of man in an increasingly technologized modern context the advent of the drive for human engineering and a physio-technology that aims to first determine and then to overcome the restrictions and limitations of the human corpus, that has as its goal to not only interpret the human and her function, but to change her. Anders sums up the modern desire to become technology, as the modern human questions the value of the self, the flawed human:

The desire of modern man to become self-made, to become a product has to be considered faced with this changed foil: not because man does not tolerate anything that is not made by him does he want to make himself, but rather because he does not want to remain un-made. Not because he is ashamed to be made by others (God, gods, Nature), but because he is not made at all and as un-made man remains inferior to his own fabrications. (Anders 2010 p.25)⁷²

To compensate, adapt to and fit into the technologized environment, man seeks to become machine through technological enhancement, not merely to be better but to meet the quasi-moral mandate of becoming a progressive product: ever-better, ever-faster, ever-smarter, superseding the human limited corporeality, and eventually the human self.

Chiefly, these developments harbour two important consequences: one relates to the ontological security of the individual in a technologically dominated society, the other to the potential for social and political control – the two are related. The first aspect is that technologies such as those highlighted above present a rather unsettling potential for a shift toward a regressive view of human capacity as a kind of incompetence and impotence, which alters the understanding of one's being in a technology driven world. The questions that begin to emerge and linger are of an ontological nature: Can I even still understand my own biology or psychology? Can I trust my own body – can I even know my own body or mind if functionalities are technologically enhanced and beyond my very own comprehension? And, in extension, can I trust my own self to make judgements over ethical decisions in this realm?

⁷² Text translated from German – my translation

As a consequence, this translates into a context where the precarious human has but little choice but to seek a source for authority, in a political and ethical sense, in science and technology, through experts, through laws and codes. And it is precisely here that the potential for biopolitical control in the wider sense can gain foothold. Technological developments of scientific minutiae in biological human life create a higher dependency on said technologies in aspects of day-to-day life. Once a reliance on the constant and uninterrupted availability of these enhancing and augmenting technologies for day-to-day routines has been cemented the disturbance of such routines can put the ontological security of the individual (and populations) in jeopardy. And, following Giddens, “in situations where the ontological security of individuals is put in jeopardy by the disruption of routines, or by a generalized source of anxiety, regressive forms of object-identification tend to occur”. (Giddens 1987 p.218) In other words, with an ever-greater drive toward a synthesis of human biology, psychology and physiology with enhancing and superior technology, the issue of what role humans have in such a context becomes increasingly precarious in an ontological and political sense. As David King notes: “When organisms to be ‘improved’ are human beings these issues become not just ethical and political, but existential.” (King 2012) When what is considered optimal human functioning increasingly relies and depends on external technological expertise, the potential for mechanisms of political and social control is rife.

This technologized understanding of self is naturally not without socio-political consequences, specifically the speed and acceleration with which this understanding must adapt ever-anew. With Marcuse we can understand this development as a radical rationalisation of society that has but little choice but to submit to the superior speed and ability of technology at an ever-increasing pace: “The world had been rationalized to such an extent and this rationality had become such a social power that the individual could do no better than to adjust himself without reservation.” (Marcuse 1982 p.142) In a contemporary context, it is not merely a rationalisation, but one that assumes as superior a rationality that is inherent to technology and machines and stands to outpace the ‘natural’ rational capacities of the human. Applying biopolitical (although not explicitly so) frameworks of prophylaxis and virulence, Baudrillard draws a connection between the increased cerebrality of machines and a subsequent auto-immunization ability of bodies. He writes:

The growing cerebrality of machines must logically be expected to occasion a technological purification of bodies. Inasmuch as bodies are less and less able to count on their own antibodies, they are more and more in need of protection from outside ... Once dispossessed of their defences, human being become eminently vulnerable to science and technology; dispossessed of their passions, they likewise become eminently vulnerable to psychology and its attendant therapies; similarly too, once relieved of emotions and illness, they become eminently vulnerable to medicine. (Baudrillard 2009 p.67)

In seeing his metaphorical assessment through, Baudrillard too arrives at a condition of techno-paternalism when he likens this immanently vulnerable human life to the condition of the ‘boy in the bubble’ who is “‘cuddled’ by his mother through the glass, laughing and growing up ... under the vigilant eye of science.” The parenting, as Baudrillard concludes, here is done by science and technology – computers. (Baudrillard 2009 p.68) Baudrillard’s inference of this condition onto society is lucid. The greater our augmentation and alteration of life with technological prostheses and substitutes, the greater our necessity to submit to the superiority of the artificial proxy, which immanently holds a technologically informed ordering principle upon which society orients itself. This relationship of creator to creation and the concomitant (and apparently inevitable) role reversal of parent (authority) and child (imperfect) inevitably also informs social and political structures in a very real biopolitical sense. Baudrillard detects a proportional relationship of this act of technological substitution, not just in light of individual life, but society as well: “The social system, just like the biological body, loses its natural defences in precise proportion to the growing sophistication of its prosthesis”. (Baudrillard 2009 p.70) Joseph Pugliese, in his insightful essay on the anomic violence of drones, frames this biopolitically prosthetic relationship in terms of law and technology and notes that “[t]he prosthetic relation of law to technology is [...] premised on the indissociable articulation between technology and its seeming opposite: the biological human”. (Pugliese 2011, p. 931) Notable in this development and most dangerous is the assumption of neutrality of technology, as technology is never neutral but rather engages man in a complex relationship of societally mediated values. (Heidegger 2009; Kranzberg 1986; Pugliese 2011; Thacker 2003)

Accepting this role and place of the human as inferior to the anthropomorphised authority of technology reflects a submission to a hierarchical relationship and normalises and perpetuates the narrative of the always flawed and imperfect human in

need of technological support from those with the expertise to provide it. The greater our own sense of imperfection, of fallibility and of flaw, the greater also the immanent necessity to strive perpetually toward perfection, with external help, as we become increasingly removed from our own materiality. In this, the creator and her creation, in a continual and ever-accelerating cycle, becomes paramount, becomes the authority on what is good and normal. Furthermore, once what is normal has been reframed in these technological terms, based on the *zoe*-centric (Braidotti 2013) informatic essence of humans, the potential to render some particularly uncontrollable and un-analysable elements of (global) society as lethal and in need of not merely identification but eradication, necropolitics, facilitated through new methods of thanato-technologies, becomes possible. (Dillon and Reid 2009; Mbeme 2003; Barder and Debrix 2012; Weizman 2009)

V. Abstracting War

Military spending on robotics and neuroscience is at a record high globally. Approximately 50 to 80 countries are engaged in either using or developing robotic systems for their military operations, including unmanned systems for ground, aerial and underwater operations. By conservative estimates, the current global market for military robotics is projected to grow from US\$5.8 billion in 2010 to more than US\$8 billion in 2016 to US\$12 billion in 2019. (ABI Research 2011) Some sources indicate defence spending will exceed US\$13.4 globally by the end of 2013. (Krishnan 2009; Parsons 2013) New technologies in modern warfare are designed with the main aim to reduce casualties among soldiers (ABI Research 2011) making warfare increasingly riskless and sanitized. (Hardt and Negri 2006 p.46; Singer 2010a, 2010b) Military investment in human enhancement is greater than ever⁷³. (Abney, Mehlman and Lin 2013 p.21) This includes projects that investigate enhancement possibilities in neuroscience, illustrated, for example, by DARPA's (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) recent research project, "Battlefield Illusion", to investigate neuro- and bioscientific technologies that seek to "better understand how 'humans use their brains to process sensory inputs' with the goal to "manage the adversary's sensory perception' in order to 'confuse, delay, inhibit or misdirect [his] actions'". (Shachtman 2012) Similarly, a recent UK Royal Society research report on

⁷³ For a very nuanced and interesting discussion on human enhancement in the military context as well as an exhaustive survey of current military projects for the development of human enhancement technologies see Abney, Mehlman and Lin 2013 p.21 – 27.

“Neuroscience, conflict and security”, outlines how neuroscience could be utilized by the military with two specific interests in mind: “performance enhancement, i.e. improving the efficiency of one’s own forces, and performance degradation, i.e. diminishing the performance of one’s enemy. (The Royal Society 2012) A 2010 call for research proposals, issued by the US Air Force Research Laboratory asks scientists concretely to research biotechnological and bio-behavioural methods and technologies that enhance personnel performance and influence enemy capacity through neurological and cognitive augmentations (Shachtman 2010, 2012; Department of the Air Force 2010) with three distinct declared goals:

1. Applied Biotechnology, to develop and exploit advances in biotechnology and associated nanotechnologies to enhance performance and situational awareness of the force
2. Biobehavioural Performance, to develop bio-based methods and techniques to sustain and optimize airmen’s cognitive performance
3. Vulnerability Analysis, to rapidly identify human threat conditions and sustain/expand airmen performance in stressful environments. [This] includes research in physical and physiological biosignatures, neuroscience, anthropometry, biomechanics, human modelling, database networking and data mining. (711 HPW/RHP 2010)

In short, the US\$43 million research project, spanning four years, seeks to further and in greater minutiae than hitherto known analyse and mathematize human biology, physiology and psychology so as to be able to enhance performance (predictable, controllable) and diminish (control or eradicate) enemy cognitive capabilities by tapping into brain and body functions. The human in warfare becomes the object of analysis for the potential of biological and neurological interference. A 2008 report issued by the US ‘Committee on Military and Intelligence Methodology for Emergent Neurophysiological and Cognitive/Neural Science Research in the Next Two Decades’ for the National Research Council reflects the interest of decision-makers in ascertaining docile bodies by posing research questions such as: “How can I know what people know?”, “How can we make people trust us more?” and “Is there a way to make the enemy obey our commands?”, among others. (The National Academies p.16 – 17) Following this logic further, ‘winning hearts and minds’ becomes obsolete when the messy unpredictability of the human targeted in war can just be circumvented by adjusting their biology and neurology accordingly. Technologies such as these, in neuro-, cognitive and bio-science, not only serve to narrate war in terms that make it appear a clean, increasingly risk-free and, above all scientific

endeavour, they also help radically alter the role and place of the human in modern warfare. In their objective to capture the human in her biological, physiological and neurological aspects, they target the body of the human on both sides of the war divide by addressing her solely in her analysable and calculable functions and functionalities. In this, the human is rendered as a 'standing-reserve' in a radical instrumentalisation of her functions and functionalities, thereby increasingly framing the human in war in abstract and abstracted terms. And it is in this growing abstraction from the human in the context of war that DARPA can diagnose the apparent need for an 'upgrade' for soldiers, as "the human is becoming the weakest link". (Falconer 2003)

This altered perception of the human also contains an altered perception of ethical judgement. As highlighted earlier, there currently is a vibrant debate as to whether machines might have the capacity to act more ethically, and kill more humanely. By prioritising the veracity of algorithmic calculations over the judgement of the senses, "inference drawing, calculation and dispassionate rationality may all be seen as appropriate ideals". (Coker 2013 p.2013) The key assertion here is the perception of *consistent* ethics as *good* ethics, as John Arquilla, Executive Director of the Information Operations Center at the Naval Postgraduate School in the US claims: "my A.I. will pay more attention to the rules of engagement and create fewer ethical lapses than a human force". (Markoff 2010; Coker 2013 p.xviii, 178) A similar strand of thought drives Arkin's argument for the ethics module for military robots in the aim to facilitate a more humane way of waging war, whereby the adherence to the International Laws of War implies the correct ethical behaviour. In this, ethics is once more reduced to a legal framework, to codes, to rules, to laws, whereby unpredictable human behaviour is framed as a challenge to ethics. Arkin highlights the benefits of robots over humans for killing in war as six-fold:

1. Robots have no conservation mandate, they have no implicit drive for self-preservation.
2. Robots are equipped with superior sensory processors such as electro-optics, wall-penetrating radars, acoustics and seismic sensing, among other capacities.
3. Robots are not impeded by uncontrolled emotions.
4. Robots do not suffer from psychological problems such as 'scenario-fulfillment'.
5. They are all around faster in terms of information processing.

6. When teamed up with human soldiers, robots could have the capacity to monitor the ethical behavior of human soldiers. (Arkin 2010 pp.333-334)

Arkin frames the logical coding of robotic machines in the quintessentially ethical decision over life and death as superior to the human – a rationale that places the human in the realm of functionality and performative capacity in warfare. The underlying question is not: is it ethical to kill, but rather, would machines do the killing better than humans.

The altering role and place of the human in warfare frames the analysable human either in terms of inadequacy (needing to be enhanced externally through technology); redundancy (needing to be replaced entirely by machines that can act more swiftly or accurately) or both; or danger, (as an inherently untameable living entity that poses a risk to the progress of others through her unpredictability). This abstracts and distances the very act of injury and injuring from the full sensory reality of the human, enables the medical narrative as supra-ethical necessity, as highlighted in the previous chapter. In other words, the human in contemporary warfare characterized by rapid technological advancements, such as those spotlighted throughout the chapter, is increasingly framed as being removed from the embodied act of warring. While the technological developments for fully autonomous robotics remain a work in progress, the problem of distancing and dissociation is highlighted in discussions and debates about autonomous and unmanned systems, which are destined to sooner or later be given sufficient authority in their autonomy to make the ‘decision’ to kill (or let live) in war (Harris 2012; Arkin 2010) - a decision over life and death, based on an algorithmic calculation. In this debate on whether drones should ‘pull the trigger’, the human is taken from being ‘on the loop’ to being ‘out of the loop’ (Cummings 2011; Harris 2012) in the decision-making process. Yet it stands to question whether this technological autonomy of decision-making, is and perhaps could ever be, autonomy in the philosophical sense, but merely in an engineering sense. (Allen 2011) And herein often lies the dangerous confusion - on both sides of the argument, which has consequences, again, for the conception of the human subject as such and the resulting conception of ethics.

Autonomy of robotic systems is always a matter of engineering, of programming, of mathematics. Yet in an anthropomorphizing tendency, and with a growing

understanding of the human as reduced to her biological, physiological and neurological functions, this tends to be merged more and more with the notion of 'human' autonomy, which relates to 'decision', 'responsibility' and, in a sense, ethics. This conflation is precarious when we consider the narrative of ethical killing as advanced by Arkin. It gives rise to the notion of 'machine morality' (The Economist 2012; Marcus 2012; Wallach and Allen 2008) which, when considering what technology is, and does, and when we reject the notion of ethics as purely a programmable code, an oxymoron. In its immanent need for instruction through programming the machine remains tied to the human and, as such, is bound to the moral 'input' of humans. Furthermore, in our ethical and political decisions, humans are social beings, "negotiating the moral hazards and ambiguities of our human-built world". (Coker 2013 p.192) Robots, on the contrary are not social units. Markus Wagner addresses this ethical fallaciousness concisely:

In order to determine whether an ethically problematic situation even takes place, the [Autonomous Weapons System] would have to be cognizant of the ethical implications of its actions. It would have to be able to compare the ethical implications of various courses of actions and decide which of these courses of action is more appropriate. The dilemma thus consists in the "ethical governor" not being able to recognize ethically problematic situation in the first place, or it would have to be able to think ethically on its own – and act accordingly. (Wagner 2012 p.56)

The inadequacy narrative affords technology with this privileged necropolitical position, as Arkin's argument for ethical killing machines makes starkly clear. Arkin sees the emotional unpredictability, the flawed psychology – in short, the failing of the human – as a threat to just warfare and advocates the use of machines to not only replace the human in battle, but rather guide her also in her conduct of war. Here again it is the aleatory, contingent, uncertain and unascertainable aspect of the human that is rendered in terms of risk and flaw. In making the case for ethical autonomy in 2010, Arkin lists a litany of atrocious acts committed by soldiers during the Operation 'Iraqi Freedom', taken from a report on battlefield ethics and mental health. It is irrational and unreasonable atrocity, according to Arkin's logic, that is the ethical problem in warfare. In other words, if all soldiers would be able to perform their soldiering role without committing atrocious acts outside of that which they were ordered to do, war would be considerably more ethical. Again, the assumption is that better performance, better adherence to rules and codes, is implicitly more ethical.

Paradoxically, it is the increased distance between soldier and the theatre of war, and the growing dehumanization of the enemy – both facilitated by technological advancements – that Arkin names as among the reasons for increased levels of atrocities committed by soldiers. (Arkin 2010 pp.335 - 336) However, rather than investigating this relationship between distancing technology and the role of the human in war further, the way forward, for Arkin and others, is to assign more ‘responsibility’ to technology and let ethically programmed machines do the killing, to eliminate the ‘fog of war’, to advance the ordering principle.

This perspective raises issues of both consent and intent. With a growing material distancing, facilitated by technology, the element of consent (once a requirement in war from both sides) is not only diminished on the receiving side of war, but also on the side from which war is enacted. Scarry explains this relationship as follows:

[P]resence will not even be required in the weapon's firing when the actual war begins. So completely have the formerly embodied skills of weapon use been appropriated into the interior of the weapon itself that no human *skill* is now required; and because the need for human *skill* is eliminated the need for a human *presence* to fire it is eliminated; and because the human *presence* is eliminated, the human act of *consent* is eliminated. The building-in of skill thus becomes in its most triumphant form, the building out of consent. It is, of course, only at the 'firing' end of the weapon that human presence is eliminated: their bodies' presence at the receiving end is still very much required (Scarry 1985 p.152)

In other words, it requires less and less consent of the human to engage in warfare, rendering both the practical and ethical threshold considerably lowered. Consent is instead replaced by a zoefied necessity, the mandate to secure the life and progress of populations. While this is, again, nothing new *per se* in the context of warfare, as growing distances have always been sought through weapons technologies, it is the radical physical removal of the material human from the act of war that presents the new challenge today. With the advent and increased use of drone technology, for example, the act of warfare is shifted into the realm of gaming, whereby the skill set required is also radically removed from traditional acts of war. (Cole, Dobbing & Hailwood 2010) Through drone technology, war becomes a game and killing a job from which one returns to the safe shores of one's home after a day's work. This further abstracts the act of war from the human, with her capacity to have empathy, to make decisions in her infinite potentiality. I will address this relationship further in the following chapter.

Assuming that human-like or even wise decisions in warfare can be made by sophisticated programming and code is to frame this essentially human and uncertain endeavour in reduced (and neutral) terms, again, practically and ethically. Perceiving and positing the human in terms that frame him as an inadequate and inferior version of technology is to render humanity itself in biologically, physiologically and psychologically limited and limiting terms in this radicalized violent military techno-paternalism. The abstraction is also made manifest in the role of the human targeted in warfare. To reiterate Scarry's point, the human body that is targeted by the violent act is still very embodied in her presence in for contemporary warfare, however, the corporeality of the targeted human is framed and understood in much different terms in thanato-technological practices. As indicated earlier, the reduction of an understanding of what it means to be human to the human functionalities, and to understand those functions as analysed and replicated by bio-, cognitive- and neuroscience, posits those human elements that cannot be ascertained, and thus not controlled in war's demand for order, as immanently risky and dangerous to life as such. (Evans 2013; Dillon and Reid 2009) Here, the figure of the suspect is actualised and calls for preventive measures in the biotechnologically informed ordering principle underlying biopolitical societies and war.

In his analysis of US counter insurgency doctrine, Ben Anderson makes a similar point when he notes that “[c]ounterinsurgency shares a future-oriented logic”, hence the population must be “governed” by outlining which future has which consequences (Anderson 2011 p.225), or rather which actualized potentialities poses which threat to the warring party. In Anderson's research, the US counterinsurgency strategies rely on biopolitical technologies for the ‘ascertainment’ or surrender of the targeted population among which the infinite potentiality for insurgency exists. Thus the *enemy* is no longer the central figure of contemporary warfare (which becomes increasingly an act of perpetual policing) but rather it is the *suspect* that gains centrality in the technologized abstraction of biopolitical war.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ This is a precarious condition specifically in light recent studies which have shown that the increase in drone use by the US generates considerable levels of grievances, which in turn fuel the growth of terrorism among targeted populations in Afghanistan and Pakistan in an iatrogenic reactions. (McFalls 2007)

Conclusion

The chapter has sought to show that the growing absorption of human life into technological life aims to eradicate risk and unpredictability. By capturing the human in biological terms, it is possible to improve upon her, to replace her, or – if neither is possible – to eradicate her. The human essence becomes her biological essence, which can be replicated technologically to create a homeostatic ordering principle, and the human becomes rendered in normative terms of functionality. In this implied is – despite the complexities of biological life at the molecular level – a distinct drive toward homogeneity. The opacity of the human is what disturbs the ordering principle of political practices in the service of the securitisation and improvement of populations. This creates a tension as, in her infinite potentiality, the human can only ever remain opaque, and can only be narrowed down to certain ascertainable factors, which never comprise the entirety of the human. Practices that aim to mitigate the risk factors associated with life thus are limited to addressing risk in those biological-technological terms. The US policy shift in the use of drones from ‘personality strikes’ (specific persons) to ‘signature strikes’ (persons that meet certain algorithmically captured criteria) provides an illustration of this. The following chapter addresses this in more detail. If we follow Scarry’s logic of the targeting of the human body as an extension of the weapon the human body wields in war, it becomes clear that in new forms of technologized and biotechnologically informed warfare, it is actually the human itself, abstracted in terms of his neurologically, biologically and cognitively determined (ab)normal behaviour, that becomes the direct target.

The role and place of the human as inadequate, replaceable and/or dangerous in our technologised present renders the relationship of humanity and war increasingly abstract. With a growing passivity toward wars conducted in the name of (Western) populations it becomes less and less possible to *understand* war - war as such and war as a human activity. The warrior is now an operator and executor of technology at best, and a spectator at worst. War can be viewed through this lens as riskless, as efficient, as necessary, as just. Dominated by a growing techno-paternalism, the desire emerges to homogenise life whereby our decisions of life and death are relegated to the superior human, the machine, or – at the least – done with the utmost support of technology so as to make the human perfected. In all this, a God-like

infallibility is ascribed to technology, all the while assuming it remains neutral. However, the use of technology in war is never neutral, just as there is no neutrality or cleanliness in war. The argument that this trend of warfare has the potential to lower the threshold to engage in war holds sway. (See for example Asaro 2013; Alston 2010, 2012; Heynes 2013; Lin, Mehlman and Abney 2013; International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012) It bears repeating that war is in essence a human endeavour. In a *zoefied* understanding of politics, wherein the human is abstracted to the level that current trends foresee, war (or acts of political violence) not only can be framed as effective and clean, but also as necessary and intrinsically ethical. Therein lies the danger. The current development in the use of drones as weapons illustrates this clearly. In the next chapter I set out how the use of drones is framed in terms of such an understanding of the human and the implications for the ethics of the use of lethal technology through drones therewith.

The Western European conceived of the machine because he wanted regularity, because he wished to reduce the movement of his fellows as well as the behaviour of the environment to a more definite, calculable basis

Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilisation* 1934

It's this surgical precision – the ability, with laser-like focus, to eliminate the cancerous tumour called an Al-Qaida terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it – that makes [drones] so essential

John Brennan – *US Counterterrorism Advisor to the Obama Administration* 30. April 2012

I. How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Drone

As new technologies alter our shared world and the conflicts we engage in, they create “a host of ethical questions that must be dealt with”. (Singer 2010b p.299; Abney, Lin and Mehlman 2013 p.2) The rapid developments of technologically enhanced warfare, such as the conception and increased use of autonomous robotics and automated systems, moves at a pace that challenges human cognitive capacities in ways that leaves little room to contemplate and assess the very real consequences of these virtual means for human life and human living in the context of ethics. The pace with which new demands for new codes and programmes of ethics is required in light of innovation and development has become very fast – too fast perhaps. Nonetheless, the ethical, legal and policy implications are highly pressing topics for analysis (Abney, Lin and Mehlman 2013 p.iii, 3; Heyns 2013) if the human condition is not to become entirely absorbed by the biopolitical rationale of a technocracy in a reliance on ‘anonymous wisdom’, as Herbert Marcuse has highlighted decades ago. As the previous chapter has discussed, man appears to surrender to a hyper-rationalized superiority of the machine, of technology, over his own capacities - in a somewhat self-defeating turn - specifically in the context of war and political violence. While the meta(l)morphosis in this technological mediation (Braidotti 2011, 2013) is, in itself, based on the biological processes of life as a science, it furthermore facilitates the politicisation of life, or *zoe*, as a technical subject (and object) of politics as management, and enables a medical narrative to unfold that posits survival

and progression of life as an implicitly ethico-political goal. In this meta(l)morphosis, human subjectivity is shaped and formed by these biopolitically infused anthropotechnologies. This, in turn, shapes how political violence is justified and possibly legitimated in ethical terms.

This chapter engages with the question of how specific practices of political violence today are framed in terms of ethics and within a life-politics context and suggests that the use of drones for target killing programmes constitutes a representation of the biopolitical strands highlighted throughout the project, whereby killing is rendered a foreign policy tool, justified by the sanitised authority of a biopolitically informed technology. This reflects the enactment of the *zoefication* narrative that posits that a body politics can be healed through ‘medical’ intervention. The chapter also connects the relationship between the human in her biology and her relation to technologies relevant in the context of political violence and war more broadly and engages with the type of ethics that this relationship produces. The first part of the chapter briefly outlines the status quo of drone use and the specific problems the use highlights in the contemporary context. The second part then engages more broadly with the ethical implications of increasingly autonomous systems for military use and the justification of “lethal autonomy” as an effective tool of prevention and prophylaxis.

II. Push-Button Warfare

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles⁷⁵, commonly known as drones among the wider public, have become the hottest asset in military equipment and have proliferated significantly in recent years⁷⁶, a development that is led by both Israel and the United States. (Lorenz, Mittelstaed, Schmitz 2011) The US military alone currently possesses at least 7,494 unmanned aircrafts (Gertler 2012; Ackerman and Shachtman 2012) and, according to the Congressional Budget Office, is planning on purchasing an additional 730 new medium-sized and large UAV systems, spending a minimum

⁷⁵ Frequently, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are also referred to as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) or Remote Piloted Aircrafts (RPAs). While there are nuances in the differentiation between UAS and RPAs (systems typically refer to weaponised unmanned vehicles), the terms are often used interchangeably. There is a strong push by military groups to get rid of the term “drones” for its negative connotation, however, it is the term most often used in current media coverage and for the purpose of this project I will refer to UAVs primarily as drones.

⁷⁶ Military journals and newspaper reports abound with reports about new UAVs being developed with ever-accelerating speed. Since the 1990s there has been a growing interest in developing UAV for combat purposes and this trend is set to continue strongly as drones have become the centrepiece of interest at arms trade shows and conventions (Shima and Rasmussen 2008; Finn 2011; Ackerman and Shachtman 2012)

of US\$ 37 billion on unmanned systems (COB 2011 p.9) over the next ten years. And while the majority of the US\$45.5 billion spending on aircrafts for 2014 continues to be for traditional, manned aircrafts⁷⁷ (USDOD 2013), almost one in three military planes is now unmanned and automated. (Gertler 2012; Ackerman and Shachtman 2012) Over 50 countries possess drones with various capacities at this point and while the majority of these drones are used primarily for surveillance, the arms race for countries to produce their own drones with combat capacity is, according to widely held media opinion, well and truly on. (See for example Lorenz, Mittelstaedt and Schmitz, 2011; Ouden and Zwijnenburg 2011; Sanger 2011; Wan and Finn 2011)

25 NATO countries presently possess drones with a plan in place for 13 countries to own five of the more sophisticated systems, i.e. the Global Hawk, by 2017. (Nolin 2012) While NATO and the US traditionally employed drones for surveillance purposes as well as for the detection of potential hazards, such as landmines, they are increasingly weaponised and used to take out specific targets. (International Human Rights And Conflict Resolution Clinic At Stanford Law School And Global Justice Clinic At NYU School Of Law 2012; Ouden and Zwijnenburg 2011) Typically, drones are used in arenas of conflict in three ways: as carriers and launchers for bombs and missiles, much like traditional aerial systems; for surveillance purposes to detect suspicious behaviour on the ground and for targeted killing operations of suspected terrorists. The US administration currently oversees two drone programmes: a military programme operating in known theatres of war (Afghanistan and Iraq) as ‘an extension of conventional warfare’. (Mayer 2009) The second programme is the (somewhat covert) CIA programme – a counter-terrorism measure within the euphemistically termed ‘Overseas Contingency Operations’, which targets terror suspects in a number of countries with which the US is not (officially) at war. Presently this includes Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen. (Asaro 2012; Miller 2012b) With daunting names like ‘Predator’ or ‘Reaper’, US drones are launched from local or regional airbases and controlled by drone pilots or operators from remote bases located in the US, including the US Air force base in Creech, Nevada, via a computer screen and a joystick control. Once targets for elimination have been identified, Hellfire missiles, attached to the drones, are fired by the push of a button on the joystick. (Cole, Dobbing and Hailwood 2010 p.6) As a form of warfare it is as

⁷⁷ The US had allocated US\$19.5 for traditional combat aircrafts and US\$3.8 for unmanned aerial vehicles in 2013 (USDOD 2012)

minimally invasive to the weapons operator as possible. As Singer writes, the drone pilot thus “‘goes to war’ by commuting to work each morning in his Toyota to a cubicle where he could shoot missiles at an enemy thousands of miles away and then make it home in time for his kid’s soccer practice”⁷⁸. (Singer 2009 p.2)

While drones have been in existence since WWI, primarily for surveillance purposes, weaponised drones are a relatively recent tool in the military arsenal. (Cole, Dobbing and Hailwood 2010 p.4; Gertler 2012 p.1; International Human Rights And Conflict Resolution Clinic At Stanford Law School And Global Justice Clinic At NYU School Of Law 2012 p.8) They have been used by the US military in official theatres of conflict including Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Additionally, the US is presently running a CIA drones programme to target terrorists in various conflict and non-conflict states. Israel has used drones in Gaza since 2008 (Cole, Dobbing and Hailwood 2010; International Human Rights And Conflict Resolution Clinic At Stanford Law School And Global Justice Clinic At NYU School Of Law 2012) and NATO has conducted drone strikes in Afghanistan (with UK and the US flying armed drones) as well as Libya in support of UN resolution 1973. (Nolin 2012) Reports claim that targeted killings form part of NATO’s operational strategy and, with the growing availability and use of drone technology, are increasingly considered as a practice of war. (Bachmann and Haeussler 2011) There is little doubt that drones have become the most modern weapon of choice in contemporary conflicts, putting the greatest distance between the human exerting violence and the human on the receiving end. Advocates of drones praise first and foremost the efficiency, expediency and effectiveness of the technology: drones are considered to be low in financial and human cost to the military body operating drones. As Cole, Dobbing and Hailwood write:

The use of drone technology is a no brainer from the military’s point of view. Compared with traditionally piloted aircraft, they are cheaper to make and carry an array of sensors and cameras that can watch both day and night ... unlike a pilot, a drone does not get tired or fatigued and can record on video all that is happening on the ground below in real time. New generations armed drones flying at these altitudes cannot be seen

⁷⁸ Perhaps tellingly, the UAV base in Creech Nevada displays a sign that attests to the radical removal of drone pilots from any risks of warfare – It reads: ‘drive safely, this is the most dangerous part of your day’, as a participant at the 2012 Codepink Drone Summit recounted.

and are silent, so the attack is completely unexpected. (Cole, Dobbing and Hailwood 2010 p.7)

In short, drones make warfare cheaper, easier and, first and foremost more efficient by transcending human limitations. Furthermore, a drone is dispensable and does not incur any greater political cost when shot down or ‘killed’. This, and the fact that we are dealing with new and, for many, exhilarating military hardware, makes the use of drones exceptionally alluring for military and secret service operations and drones have become the “fastest-growing sector in the aerospace industry”. (Goldfarb 2012) This is not only illustrated by then CIA director Leon Panetta’s enthusiastic assessment that drones are “the only game in town” for taking out Al-Qaeda operatives, (Shachtman 2009) but also by the fact that they seem to be the most popular type of military hardware at arms trade shows around the world. The 2013 DSEI fair – a defence and security trade show – is hosting an entire day dedicated to unmanned aerial vehicles this year and the International Defence Exhibition and Conference (IDEX) provides a dedicated and separate area as well as a one-day workshop to unmanned technologies, including drones, in 2013⁷⁹.

But not only military professionals stand under the sway of the efficiency and effectiveness narrative of the use of drones, the wider US public appears to also approve of the technology as a form of necessity in the securitization of life. A recent poll conducted among American citizens in February 2012 indicates that “83% of polled Americans approve of Obama’s drone policy” (Wilson and Cohen 2012) despite the fact that little is known about it⁸⁰. The pressing question that arises with this new normalization of the use of drones is: what does this mean for warfare and the ethical considerations involved in the use of drone technology for the purpose of political violence? Increasingly, there are dissenting voices in the international arena that sharply critique the use of drones as terrorist hunters and killers in the name of (Western) populations⁸¹.

⁷⁹The arms trade shows advertise the events here: <http://www.dsei.co.uk/page.cfm/link=140> and here: <http://www.idexuae.ae/> respectively.

⁸⁰ Of the American’s polled, 59% responded that they agree strongly with Obama’s drone policy. Furthermore, the rate of approval of the targeting programme by drone dropped only slightly when asked whether the person to be targeted was an American citizen and 79% stated that they would still approve of the policy. (Washington Post / ABC News 2012 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postabcpoll_020412.html)

⁸¹ Specifically, the work of Noel Sharkey, Peter Asaro, Glenn Greenwald and Micah Zenko represent a substantial body of criticism of the use of drones.

Both, the legal status of the strikes and the exact number of casualties inflicted in the NATO, US military (JSOC) and CIA drone engagement and target-killing campaigns is obscure and highly contested which has led to much debate at present. In legal and ethical terms, the use of drones for the targeting of individuals is a matter of significant controversy. As UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston writes:

The use of drones for targeted killings has generated significant controversy. Some have suggested that drones as such are prohibited weapons under IHL because they cause, or have the effect of causing, necessarily indiscriminate killings of civilians, such as those in the vicinity of a targeted person. (Alston 2010 p.24)

Specifically, the use of drones as the instrument of choice for the US' controversial CIA kill list (Alston 2010, 2012) raises important questions about the framing of the means (the drones) for the end to be achieved. In the three years since Alston first raised the issue of ethics in the context of drone warfare, not much progress has been made in advancing the ethical debate. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully address all the problematic aspects (specifically legal aspects) involved in the conception of a target-killing programme it is helpful for a more thorough understanding of the ethics of such acts of political violence to briefly highlight some of the controversies the killing-by-drone programme creates.

The CIA target-killing programme has been an open secret for some considerable time now. Even though Obama has vowed to render the practice more transparent and shift parts of the programme to the military for better oversight, the details of the programme remain obscure. However, it was only recently officially acknowledged by President Obama in January 2012, and again by his counter terrorism staff in April 2012 (Ignatius 2012; Brennan 2012b) that the CIA operates a drone programme which is particularly active in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen and targets suspected terrorists and militants in its on-going fight against terrorism. The drone programme for the covert targeted killings of terrorist suspects was first instituted under President George Bush Jr. in 2002 and framed as a military act to weed out and eliminate high-value Al-Qaeda members. In recent years, this programme has been stepped up considerably (Ofek 2010) and the number of drone strikes per week in regions deemed terrorist hotbeds has roughly doubled under the auspices of the Obama administration. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that, to date, there have been over 400 *known* covert CIA strikes in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan (Serle

and Woods 2012; Zenko 2012a), with the majority of strikes taking place in the Waziristan area of Pakistan. The estimated number of unknown strikes is considerably higher but impossible to ascertain. (Stanford University and NYU School of Law 2012; Greenwald 2011)

III. 3Ds: Distance, Dissociation, De-politicisation

Since 2004, US initiated drone strikes are reported to have killed between approximately 2,700 and 4,000 individuals (Asaro 2013; New America Foundation 2012; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2013), including American citizens⁸², whereby some analysts estimate the civilian casualty rate among these statistics to be as high as 25%. The vast majority of the deaths resulting from drone strikes have occurred in 2010. While the policy originated as a programme to “capture and kill” a *small* number of high value terrorist leaders in the G.W. Bush years, the programme has expanded its remit considerably since. Drones strikes in target killing missions fall typically within one of two categories: so called “personality strikes” where the target is known by name and deemed to be a high-value or particularly dangerous individual and the “signature strikes” which target unknown persons based on based on anomalous and thus suspicious behavioural patterns and characteristics. Typically, the drone programme has focused on personality strikes on targets that were known to the intelligence community and known to potentially pose an elevated terrorist threat. However, target selection by “signature” is becoming an increasingly common practice whereby “individuals are targeted when their identities are not known but whose behaviour suggests that they are legitimate targets”. (Becker and Shane 2012, Nolin 2012, McDonalds 2011) And the White House continues to approve of broadening the drone campaign to include the targeting of such unknown persons based on their behavioural patterns. (International Human Rights And Conflict Resolution Clinic At Stanford Law School And Global Justice Clinic At NYU School Of Law 2012; Miller 2012a) In order to ascertain what constitutes suspicious behaviour, data is gathered through “signals intercepts, human sources and aerial surveillance” (Miller 2012b) and evaluated in order to conceive of a complex algorithm that renders probable whether the human behaviour observed should be

⁸² The targeted killing of Anwar Al-Awlaki is the most high profile of killings of a US citizen and has sparked a flurry of debate about the legality of target killings. While Al-Awlaki’s death is often framed in legal terms of self-defense, this is a harder case to be made for the killing of his 16 year-old son, also an American citizen, only two weeks later, in October 2011. (Savage 2013)

deemed benign or dangerous. In other words, suspected militants are targeted for killing based on their “‘patterns of life’ such as carrying a weapon or entering a military compound.” (Fisk and Ramos 2012; Gregory 2011; Pugliese 2011) The ‘patterns of life’ analysis employed in selecting the signature strike targets is in itself deeply biopolitically informed. Pugliese delineates this relationship between algorithms and biology clearly:

The military term 'pattern of life' is inscribed with two intertwined systems of scientific conceptuality: algorithmic and biological. The human subject detected by drone's surveillance cameras is, in the first scientific schema, transmuted algorithmically into a patterned sequence of numerals: the digital code of ones and zeros. Converted into digital data coded as a 'pattern of life', the targeted human subject is reduced to an anonymous simulacrum that flickers across the screen and that can effectively be liquidated into a 'pattern of death' with the swivel of a joystick. Viewed through the scientific gaze of clinical biology, 'pattern of life' connects the drone's scanning technologies to the discourse of an instrumentalist science, its constitutive gaze of objectifying detachment and its production of exterminatory violence. (Pugliese 2011, p.943)

Furthermore, underlying the distinction of whether a suspect or victim is framed as a potential militant or not are basic biological factors such as age and gender. As Becker and Shane have exposed in 2012, all military-age male persons count as potential combatants in a strike-zone in US target-killing decision making and their actual status is often not confirmed until after a strike has already occurred. (Becker and Shane 2012) With such scientifically and technologically mediated selection criteria for killing targets, civilians are affected and lives, not only those of militants, are lost⁸³.

With civilian lives lost in these operations that take place outside the immediate realm of an officially declared war, how then can we understand that the US public's general acceptance of drone strikes – even when a fellow citizen is marked for death from above? What are the *dispositifs* that yield this “growing disconnect” between the public and the wars it fights? (Bumiller and Shanker 2011) How can we better understand the reasons and ethical implications underlying this disconnect? The use of drones for killing and warfare raises a number of ethical issues that demand attention, some of which have been prominently highlighted by lawyers, human

⁸³ The first ‘personality strike in Pakistan killed two children as well as the targeted person. The first ‘signature strike’ in 2002 in Afghanistan killed three civilians and no militants at all (Parker / Amnesty International 2012).

rights advocates, activists, journalists and other members of the discerning public and there is a consensus emerging that ethical issues must urgently be addressed (Nolin 2012)⁸⁴. As drones strikes are conducted on a regular basis as part of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism measures, the ethical standard of using violence as a last resort means is no longer warranted. Related to this is the argument that the lower costs of using drones, as well as the greater distance of the drone operator from the target results in a lowered threshold of resorting to violence-by-drone. (Sifton 2012; Nolin 2012; Cole, Dobbing and Hailwood 2010, Johansson 2011) As Dave Grossman has shown in his study on the resistance to killing, distance is an important factor in lowering the resistance exponentially. (Grossman 1996; Cummings 2012; O’Connell 2010) The greater the physical and emotional distance between the weapons operator and the target, the lower is the resistance to engage in killing. Drone pilots operate in a context of both radical geographical distance as well as emotional distance. For drone operators, as Mary O’Connell explains, this includes social distance, moral distance, cultural distance and mechanical distance. (O’Connell 2010) Cultural distance concerns racial differences, while moral distance “takes into consideration intense belief in moral superiority and ‘vengeful’ actions”. (O’Connell 2010) But it is perhaps the mechanical distance, which relates to the fact that the theatre of war is essentially mitigated by a screen, that renders the act of killing essentially a non-real, virtual event and the wars fought virtual wars, like video games. (Cole, Dobbing & Hailwood, 2010) Alston has addressed precisely the latent danger of a ‘playstation mentality’ in his report on extrajudicial killings:

Furthermore, because operators are based thousands of miles away from the battlefield, and undertake operations entirely through computer screens and remote audiofeed, there is a risk of developing a “Playstation” mentality to killing. States must ensure that training programs for drone operators who have never been subject to the risks and rigors of battle instill respect for IHL and adequate safeguards for compliance with it. (Alston 2010 p.25)

Also dubbed ‘cubicle warriors’, the military increasingly selects and recruits drone pilots based on their previous gaming skills (Sharkey 2010 p.371 – 372; Royakkers and van Est 2010 p.292) for their dexterity and experience with operating virtual weaponry. As Royakkers and van Est highlight, there is not likely to be a tremendous differentiation between “the experience of playing a video game and that of actually

⁸⁴ Testament to the ethical vacuum in which the drones programme operates is the pains at which the Obama administration appears to be to frame the use of drones as ethical per se.

being a cubicle warrior” (Royakkers and van Est 2010 p.292), reducing the moral engagement with the targeted human to a level of fiction. In a striking passage Singer illustrates this moral disengagement present in drone pilots. One UAV operator is quoted as having stated: “It’s like a video game. It can get a little bloodthirsty. But it’s fucking cool”. (Singer 2010a p.308-309) Amidst growing reports about the psychological stresses drone pilots face at present⁸⁵, there are persistent accounts of drone operators and military professionals that attest to the virtual video-game nature of piloting and firing a lethal drone. As a former Predator drone operator remarks, piloting a lethal drone resembles “playing the same video game four years straight on the same level”. (Brown 2013) Furthermore, training courses for drone operators employ virtual elements similar to video games to prepare operators for the challenges ahead⁸⁶. In other words, drone operators are professionally educated by means of virtual applications that typically require a certain distancing and dissociation to be able to compartmentalise the events on screen and those in one’s own sensory environment – as it is the case with video games, shaping subjectivities in the process. (Macchiarella 2013; Olson and Rashid 2013; Asaro 2013)

As Royakkers and van Est lucidly elaborate, identification with the target and victim of the killing by remote control is diminished, if not entirely eclipsed by the simulation character of the act of killing. A dehumanization of the target (enemy or otherwise) is implicit and the object on the screen becomes expendable as operators “lose sight of means and their ethical implications, and start concentrating only on the ends or outcomes.” (Royakkers and van Est 2010 p.292) The result is an ever-further advancing moral disengagement of those with the power to make a life and death decision, mediated by technology. Euphemistic (and official) language among drone operators is rife and indicative of how far eclipsed the moral engagement in this type of act of violence is. The term ‘bugsplat’, for example, is used to denote a successful

⁸⁵ There are growing indications, that drone operators are experiencing similar levels of combat stress as conventional airforce pilots and a recent study has documented that 15.3% of US armed forces drone operators report extreme stress, while 19.6% are reported to suffer from extreme exhaustion. This is roughly on par with regular armed forces pilots. Approximately 3% are afflicted with PTSD. (US Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center 2013) However, it is not clear from the report what the causes of these extreme stresses are. Drone operators often work long shifts which requires them to monitor the same area for extended hours at a time. The monotony and boredom that ensues might contribute significantly to the occurrence of stress. (See for example Dao 2013; Air Force Times 2012; Blackhurst 2012. For a detailed analysis of the various potential causes of the different types of stresses endured by drone operators, see Asaro 2012)

⁸⁶ There are a growing number of courses on offer for aspiring drone operators, such as the offered by the Unmanned Vehicle University, for example: <http://www.uxvuniversity.com/uav-pilot-training-certificate/>

attack. (Ahmad 2011) It is official terminology used by US authorities to refer to the individuals killed by a drone, as the dead bodies resemble squashed bugs when rendered as pixels on a screen.⁸⁷ (Robinson 2011) Similarly, a person observed to run for cover in fear of a drone attack is called a ‘squirter’ in drone slang. (Mayer 2009) In a reciprocal relationship, terms like these simultaneously represent the abstraction of the human drone victim and serve to further depersonalize the act of violence so the act of killing is facilitated further.

While the depersonalisation and dehumanisation of targets in military engagement has a long-standing history that goes hand in hand with increased distances, the problem is exacerbated in drone warfare, as the geographical distances are radicalised. Furthermore, read against a background in which the technologically mediated, distanced soldier understands herself as a (technical) functioning entity and is shaped as such, the act of killing also becomes a technical matter. As Coker notes, rather than a depersonalisation of the target, the drone operator increasingly experiences a dissociation from the act of war in which the act of what is done is abstracted. And it is precisely here that the bio-technologically informed subjectivities come to bear: this dissociation of sensibilities is not merely an “attitude of mind; it is a function of changes in the brain itself”, whereby the act is radically abstracted from the results. (Coker 2013 p.135) This dissociation from the act of war presents a different commitment and engagement with acts of violence and allows the human operator to avoid the ethical engagement with the visceral act of killing. Acts are virtual, targets are not humans, rather they are algorithmically captured entities, represented by pixelated dots and shapes on a screen. Captured as a ‘heat signature’ by the drone’s sensors, the human targets become reduced to the “purely biological categories of radiant life”. (Pugliese 2011, p.943) For Pugliese, it is precisely here that the tele-technologically mediated abstraction of the act of killing suspends “the causal relation between the doer and the deed”. (Pugliese 2011 p.944)

What results from the conditions of such a type of war-making, which is essentially mediated by a TV screen, is a distorted radicalisation of Baudrillard’s assessment of the virtual war as overwriting the very realities of war and rendering violence as a videogame not only for the broader public, who is presented with TV images and

⁸⁷ Incidentally (or quite deliberately) ‘Bugsplat’ is also a popular kids game that has as its game goal the aim to squash as many bugs as possible.

bird-view renderings, but for the actor of war itself who engaged via a pixelated medium as the executioner in the decision of existence or non-existence. (Baudrillard 2001; Poole 2007) It is the moment and condition where the technologically mediated virtual and the real have become entirely indistinct from one another for the drone operator and form simply one unit. The traditional consequences of the ‘blood, sweat and tears’ - in short, the horrors and messiness – of war remain utterly remote to the operator, spurring a further stage in a process of ‘moral commodification’. (Royakker and van Est 2010 p.292) It is the radical abstraction of what happens to the human body in war – the alteration of human tissue (Scarry 1985 p.64) and war could not be perpetuated, according to Scarry’s account, without this sequence of “disowning of the injury so that its attributes can be transferred elsewhere. (Scarry 1985 p.64) By creating a physical and emotional distance and by conceiving of and perpetuating the renaming of the consequences of the act of violence serve to let the act of injuring bodies disappear.

In line with this depersonalisation of war comes a de-politicisation of war. The depersonalisation is the ultimate abstraction of the target or victim as a political entity. When the broader target population is no longer acknowledged as a human target but rather a shape or pattern, or perhaps an animal at best, political costs to the warring population are minimal, while political resistance by the population directly and in a real-world context affected by the consequences of political violence inflicted upon them is denied a voice and capacity to resist and counteract, the target population is essentially rendered outside of any political realm – a *homo sacer* in the Agambian sense, who may be killed without being sacrificed. (Agamben 1998) The task of the lethal drone is a thanato-political task: it can kill and destroy, but it cannot make arrests or capture a suspect for trial. In other words, those placed on the kill list are placed in an anti-political sphere of being denied a voice, or, in Arendtian terms speech and language, to politically address their status as suspects. The biopolitical conditionality upon which the justification and (hyper-)rationalisation of the use of drones as weapons of war relies becomes starkly evident. The de-humanisation of the human target for the moral commodification of killing in war by remote control is but one aspect of the ethical challenges this new technology poses. However, as James Der Derian has noted, the virtualisation of violence is not *per se* a revolution in “diplomatic, military, let alone human affairs” (Der Derian 2000); it is when it is

brought into the fore as a modality of political violence under a new ethical precept that the normalisation of such technology becomes a radical challenge. And it is in this context that I turn to the medical narrative that serves as an ethical framing to justify specific acts of political violence as necessary and just with the drone as a paragon of ethical neutrality.

IV. Prescription Drones: Preventive Modalities of Violence to 'Save Life'

Since UAV technology has taken off as a modality of war and political violence after 9/11, it has consistently been hailed and framed as a technology that is superior to hitherto known weapons systems in the sense that it can outperform just about any other aerial weaponry in terms of longevity, range, stealth, convenience, efficiency, precision and ease. (Strawser 2010; Gertler 2012 p.8) As such, drones are often framed as a more efficient and effective, as Daniel Byman recently made the case, they 'work' (Byman 2013) and become thereby an ethical choice of weaponry (Anderson 2013; Brennan 2012a, 2012b; Strawser 2010; Wittes 2013;), as they have the capacity to pinpoint targets, limit damage and reduce casualties on both sides. There has long been an obsession with progressive levels of precision in military equipment. The terminology of surgical strikes is nothing new and has been used widely in modern aerial wars and has been a key aim of the revolution in military affairs for years. In its vision for 2047, the US Airforce has outlined its plans to achieve a status quo where "one human controller and a fleet of drones [is] able to attack thirty-two target with near-perfect precision". (Harris 2012a) Plans and proposals to develop and employ drones that function fully autonomously, including the potential to make the targeting and killing decision, are no longer a matter of science fiction and well and truly underway. (Sharkey 2010, Harris 2012a, 2012b, Singer 2010a, 2010b, 2011, Sullins 2010, Arkin 2009a, 2009b, 2010) I have engaged with the ethical implications of full autonomy in the previous chapter, suffice it to mention here that drones are framed and presented as tools with utmost precision and literally super-human qualities. In January 2012, President Obama alluded to the use of drones for the targeting of Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and other regions by justifying the practice as a precise and pin-pointed strike when he claimed:

Our ability to respect the sovereignty of other countries and to limit our incursions into somebody else's territory is enhanced by the fact that we are able to pinpoint-strike an al Qaeda operative in a place where the

capacities of that military in that country may not be able to get them.
(Obama 2012)

The philosophy behind the CIA targeting programme speaks of a biopolitical motivation: to keep the population healthy and unscathed, it must be cured of its terrorist cancer. The biopolitical mandate which places its political focus on the health, welfare and survival of a population gives priority to mechanisms and means to secure precisely this political goal. It is in this medical demarcation that the unfolding of biopolitical exclusionary violence in the name of the protection of a population becomes salient in the discussion of violence in contemporary (Western) modernity. This line of analysis suggests that biopolitics inevitably creates a relational construct that finds its basis in opposing conditions: that which is killed justifies with its death the life of those who live. Therein, precisely, is the slippery slope. As Hannah Arendt reminds us in her considerations on the origins of totalitarian rule:

A conception of law which identifies what is right with the notion of what is good for – for the individual, or the family, or the people or the largest number – becomes inevitable once the absolute and transcendent measurement of religion or the law or nature have lost their authority. And this predicament is by no means solved if the unit to which the ‘good for’ applies is as large as mankind itself. For it is quite conceivable, and even within the realm of practical political possibilities, that the one fine day a highly organised and mechanised humanity will conclude quite democratically ... that for humanity as a whole it would be better to liquidate certain parts thereof. (Arendt 2004 p.381)

Like a medical doctor, seeking to respect and cure the (sovereign) boundaries of a human body, President Obama justifies the incursion by highlighting the surgical expedience and swiftness, which this new technology affords. Minimally invasive, minimally intrusive, and, so the logic goes, entirely rational in the necessity narrative of fighting the cancer of terrorism. Only a few months after Obama publicly admitted to the existence of target killing operations, John Brennan further explicated the medical rationale of the use of drones for the safety and security of the American population when he presented his speech on ‘The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy’. The speech highlights the positioning of drone technology as necessary and preventative medical instruments with which the “cancer” that is Al-Qaeda terrorists can be removed – ethically and humanely. The narrative of his address suggests that not only are drones “wise” because they remove

risk for US personnel altogether, but they also conform to the “principle of humanity which requires us to use weapons that will not inflict unnecessary suffering”. (Brennan 2012a) The underlying assumption is that the US possesses the wisdom and authority to perform this surgery, with “laser-like focus”, using very specific tools, and doing so responsibly. The US administration is the surgeon, countries like Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and others within which terrorism is diagnosed, the sickly patient. (Brennan 2012a) In a follow up interview, Brennan further elaborated on the necessity of this medical intervention for the rescue and survival of humanity when he stated that

... we have been very, very judicious in working with our partners to try to be surgical in terms of address those terrorist threats. ... Sometimes you have to take life to save lives, and that’s what we’ve been able to do to prevent these individual terrorists from carrying out their murderous attacks (Brennan 2012b)

Again, the justification and alleged ethicality of the use of drones is framed in terms of the precision of the tools available and the mandate of the survival of humanity. The rationale and delivery of the defence of the target killing programme by drones strongly evokes the notion of the modern version of the Hippocratic Oath, in which a passage reads: “If it is given me to save a life, all thanks. But it may also be within my power to take a life; this awesome responsibility must be faced with great humbleness and awareness of my own frailty.” And it is precisely this medical narrative of precision and prevention that allows for the programme to pursue its aim to “penetrate areas and kill people in ways that would not previously have been available without major political and legal obstacle”. (Sharkey 2010 p.375) The high proportion of US citizens approving of drone strikes as a ‘necessary’ counterterrorism tool is testament to this condition. It is thus that the prevention mandate supersedes a hitherto established “global norm regarding the use of force as the last resort” (Fisk and Ramos 2012), giving rise to a new norm of clinical prevention as necessary and intrinsically ethical. As such it manifests a new perspective of the intervener, armed with lethal drones, as the professional authority that seeks to eliminate a condition of sickness *and* is now armed with the ‘right’ precision tools to do so, as a surgeon would do. The novelty here lies in the very combination of the medical narrative of the necessity for targeted strikes and the technological capacity to do so, through the use of drones, increasingly closing the space for objections based on *ad bellum* und *in bello* concerns. As John Brennan was at pains to highlight, the use of drones is,

according to the current administration not only legal and ethical, but also wise and humane. In order to demonstrate this Brennan notes that the use of drones conforms to principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity. (Brennan 2012a, 2012b) In each explication Brennan relies on the notion that the administration is able to target *only* clearly identified Al-Qaeda terrorists that pose an identifiable (health) threat, specifically to the US population. However, in light of an increased use of ‘signature strikes’, the identification of all military aged males as ‘militants’ (Becker and Shane 2012) and the growing evidence that more civilian lives are lost in drone operations than hitherto known, (Ackerman 2013; Woods 2013) the narrative is fairly weak. And yet a recent Pew Research study indicates that the majority of Americans surveyed (62%) support the use of drone strikes in Pakistan. (Pew Research 2012)

The danger of such a narrative in promoting violence was not lost on Arendt and she warns strongly against a biological justification of violence as an allegedly ‘creative’ means in politics as she notes that

[The] debate between those who propose violent means to restore ‘law and order’ and those who propose nonviolent reforms begins to sound ominously like a discussion between two physicians who debate the relative advantage of surgical as opposed to medical treatment of their patient. The sicker the patient is supposed to be, the more likely that the surgeon will have the last word. (Arendt 1970 p.74)

Furthermore, by positing the practice of political violence by drones as one that is (medically) mandated by survival, it is placed, in terms of the ethicality of the act and those deciding on the modality, outside of the ethical mandate as an adiaphorising action in the sense Bauman describes and as indicated in chapter five. In other words, the medical narrative renders the act of killing by drones neither inside nor outside the realm of moral decision, but rather under the sway of radical necessity. (Bauman 2000) A recent comment made by Air Force Chief Gen Norton Schwartz in an interview on drone strikes is indicative of implicit ethicality of the act of targeted killing: “The issue is not whether this is ethical ... if what we are doing is righteous, and I believe it is, the exact modality is less relevant.” (National Defense Magazine 2012) The practice is thus framed in the starkly biopolitical terms of survival and necessity whereby all that serves the survival mandate is simultaneously righteous, so that the actual ethical question of a moral decision cannot be asked or demanded. The framing of the practice of drone strikes in medical terms cements a biopolitical

condition of the power to save lives, but also the power (and responsibility) to extinguish that life which is deemed a danger to the survival of the population – as a measure of prevention. What is an important political and ethical question (can/should lives be taken preventively as a political practice?) is occluded by the implicit morality of the survival and progress mandate.

Furthermore, the medical narrative is supporting the claim that outcomes through invasive violence can be ascertained. As highlighted earlier in the project, the use of violence for the attainment of political ends is problematic. Nonetheless, it is assumed that the “cancer” of terrorism can be effectively treated⁸⁸. The medical narrative is functionally performative in a biopolitical context, as it is the medical profession that has developed and holds the greatest body of knowledge over the very intricacies, processes and patterns that constitute biological human life. It is through scientific advances in medical knowledge that the very functionalities of biological human life have been rendered graspable and, to a degree imitable through technology. But on the flipside, these advances have also served to render the limitation of human capacity, or rather, render the human, in her natural cycle of generation and degeneration of biological functions, limited and fallible. And it is here that the scientific analysability and mathematisation of the human in her biology and functionality becomes so starkly relevant in rendering the human radically abstract for the perpetuation of practices of political violence, thus placing technology in the space of superior authority in a hyper-rationalised reality.

V. Drones: The Better Humans

Where the medical narrative serves to elaborate the decision to specifically target life for extinction, without doing too much damage to the ‘surrounding tissue’, the framing of drones as super-surgical, clean, effective, hygienic and, essentially, super-human instruments is crucial in advancing the mandate of biopolitical necessity. As frequently highlighted, unmanned systems are ideal for taking care of jobs marred by the so-called 3-Ds: dull, dirty and dangerous. (Nolin 2012; Sharkey 2010; Lin, Bekey

⁸⁸ This is reflected in a statement US Secretary of State made in July 2013 to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in the context of the controversial strikes in Pakistan. Kerry states in an interview that “the program will end as we have eliminated most of the threat and continue to eliminate it”. (Golovina and Wroughton 2013)

and Abney 2008)⁸⁹ Designed to make acts and actions in war less risky, less messy and more convenient, drones and other automated military devices promise the capacity to, essentially, render war less taxing and deadly – for some (Singer 2009), reducing the horrors that are imminent in traditional ways of fighting and conducting wars. Furthermore, it is argued, they are inherently ‘more ethical’ as both the drone operator – mitigated through technology, and the drone as such remain detached and are less likely to be subject to erratic human behaviour induced by the stresses or real-world warfare. (Arkin 2009b, 2010; Nolin 2012) In the anthropomorphised understanding, the drone is considered a peer to the human in the conduct of warfare. The recently released ‘Roadmap for the integration of civil Remotely - Piloted Aircraft Systems into the European Aviation System’, released by the European RPAS Steering Group indicates this equalisation of man and machine in terms of the general public’s expectations for ethical capacities as it states:

Generally speaking, Citizens will expect [drones] to have an ethical behaviour comparable with the human one, respecting some commonly accepted rules. Then, they will expect to identify a legal or physical entity to blame and condemn in case ethical rules are broken. (European RPAS Steering Group 2013 p.44)

In this, the anthropomorphic logic of technology is continued as drones are posited as moral actors that can ‘act’ rationally, dispassionately. They are furthermore dispensable, as “[t]he drone computer has no family to be upset if it’s killed, so everything is fine”. (Cole, Dobbing and Hailwood 2010 p.7) However, the anthropotechnology narrative does not end here. Drones are also designed to outperform the human in the tasks of war. They can remain in the skies longer than any manned aerial system and are not plagued by pilot fatigue (Lin, 2011), they can capture and analyse data in greater quantities, they need less frequent breaks, can perform their tasks with much greater accuracy than any human could and they become “smarter” with every new model and incarnation. (Singer 2009; 2010a) Furthermore they are not obstructed and “clouded” in their actions by human emotions and irrationalities – in short, automated systems, such as drones, make the better humans. Singer quotes Joint Forces Commander Gordon Johnson: “They are not afraid, they don’t forget their orders. They don’t care if the guy next to them has just been shot. Will they do a better job than humans? Yes.” (Singer 2009 p.4) Drones are designed to meet, with

⁸⁹ Some commentators and scholars have added a fourth ‘D’ to the list – dispassionate – to indicate the emotional disconnect with which a robotic system is better equipped. (Sharkey 2010)

increasing accuracy, the ever-accelerating demands of speed in the performance and decision-making process of modern warfare, gradually outpacing the human in the very conduct of warfare, making the human the “weakest link in the defense system”. (Singer 2009 p.4) The human capacity limitations in processing accelerated combat situations poses a frustration in the pursuit of the efficient and effective conduct of war and, to the military and defence industry, the answer is an increased digitalisation of decisions and performances. Arkin’s aspirations of robots ethics echo here strongly: “Military systems (including weapons) now on the horizon will be too fast, too small, too numerous and will create an environment too complex for humans to direct.” (Arkin 2010 p.333) The logical consequence is to leave a growing number of tasks to the automated machine, gradually taking the human from being ‘in the loop’ to being ‘on the loop’. By being shifted from ‘in’ the loop to ‘on’ the loop, the role of the human becomes increasingly marginalised in the operation and control of drones. Machines are designed to “adjust to local conditions faster than can be signalled and processes by human operators”. (Allen 2011) As military technologies, including drones, begin to outpace humans in speed, performance and eventually considerations of applied ‘ethicality’, the push for greater levels of machine autonomy is enormous within the industry⁹⁰. And there are “myriad of pressures to give war bots greater and greater autonomy”. (Singer 2009 p.6) Military experts are certain that the future of modern warfare will include machines that can “hunt, identify, authenticate and possibly kill a target – without a human decision in the loop” (Johansson 2011 p.280; Sullins 2010) all under the mandate of saving lives, as Arkin states:

Ultimately, these systems could have more information to make wiser decisions than a human could make. Some robots are already stronger, faster and smarter than humans. We want to do better than people, to ultimately save more lives. (Arkin 2010, cited in Bland 2009)

By positing robotic autonomous systems as such, Arkin advances a narrative, which is, not only characterised by an assumed inevitability but also marked by a hyper-rational application of practices of political violence in which man has outmoded himself, has become too flawed to function. New standards are set for what adequate

⁹⁰ In July 2013 a wave of excitement rippled through the military technology community as the first drone, the X-47B, managed to land autonomously at an aircraft carrier at sea. This maneuver is apparently one of the most difficult to manage and it was hailed as a momentous step toward greater autonomy in drone technology. (Clark and Freedberg 2013) However, autonomous decision-making technology is already available, such as the Israeli Samson Remote Weapon Station which is able to select targets and shoot them by sensors and without any human intervention. (Braidotti 2013 p.126)

performance in warfare means, and what role the human may, or may not play in his limited capacity to meet these new levels of standards. Perhaps Arkin's most controversial claim resides in his thesis that ascribes moral agency to robots, including drones, in assuming that robots can, in fact, 'act' more ethically than any human could, as a robot can be designed in accord with hyper-rational principles, adhering to a pre-programmed code of ethics that meets the standards of the laws of war and eliminate human error, human flaw and human folly that result in bad decisions and deaths. (Lin 2011) Pre-programmed robots would be able to eclipse the irrationality of war and make it, in effect, a clean and surgical operation:

Robots wouldn't act with malice or hatred or other emotions that may lead to war crimes and other abuses, such as rape. They're unaffected by emotion and adrenaline and hunger. They're immune to sleep deprivation, low morale, fatigue, etc. that would cloud our judgment. They can see through the "fog of war", to reduce unlawful and accidental killings. And they can be objective, unblinking observers to ensure ethical conduct in wartime. So robots can do many of our jobs better than we can, and maybe even act more ethically, at least in the high-stress environment of war. (Lin 2011)

Arkin goes as far to claim that, given these superior and more humane qualities of robotic systems, it should be the robots themselves that - once equipped with the capacity to 'make ethical decisions' - judge over the ethicality of the human act. (Arkin 2010) this implies a very specific, and limited, understanding of ethics as purely applicable and programmable in code. The more ethical human is thus a coded human. The problematic dimension of a reduction of ethics to code seems to escape Arkin, but is usefully highlighted by Singer who notes "of course, while a machine might be guided by ethical rules, this does not make it an ethical being. Software codes are not moral codes; zeros and ones have no underlying moral meaning." (Singer 2010a p.425)

In philosophy and computing scholarship, the question of the possibility for robotic moral agency is hotly debated⁹¹. Aside from the still unresolved issue of whether it is indeed computationally possible to create robots that are indeed autonomous moral agents (Wallace and Allen 2009, Coekelbergh 2010), the question at heart is whether it is indeed desirable to do so for warfare. The military community answers this question with a resounding 'yes', while others, prominently Noel Sharkey, warn

⁹¹ See for example the special issue of Ethics and Information Technology, 2010, vol. 12 no. 3 or Philosophy & Technology 2011 Vol. 24 no. 2

strongly against misunderstanding the capacities of robots as ethical agents. (Sharkey 2010; 2008) The debate, however, highlights the growing problematic of how ethics is understood in contemporary modernity. Sullins addresses the question in this context as such: Are ethical problems technological problems? (Sullins 2010 p.265) Asking the question whether one can and should create robots that act in ethical ways relies entirely on the assumption that by ethics we mean an application of guidelines of behaviour that has been pre-determined to constitute 'good' behaviour.

Designing artificial moral agents thus essentially relies on the *coding* of ethics and moral agency. This, in turn relies strongly on a regulatory type of ethics, a prescription ethics and ethics as adherence to pre-established laws of war. It is assuming that algorithms can be formulated that simulate ethical dimensions as they relate to human behaviour, better still, improve on how humans grapple with and understand ethics. The keyword here is "Operational Morality". (Allen 2011) And herein lies the fundamental problem of ethics understood as a litany and set of rules and guidelines for "correct" and "accurate" behaviour. When ethics becomes a matter of engineering, the notion that within each ethical moment, within each ever-again and always uniquely arising moment of a moral demand, and with that demand to take up the responsibility to act morally becomes entirely eclipsed. This type of ethics is synonymous with applied ethics, in the most literal sense. (Singer 2010b p.302) As Allen states: "the engineer might ask: Isn't ethical governance for machines just problem-solving within constraints?" (Allen 2011) Allen highlights the complexities of devising ethics for autonomous machines but nonetheless expresses a frustration with the inherent un-certainty of ethical decisions. He concludes that if the framework for ethics guidelines to be implemented into robots is left to philosophers, engineers won't ever get any "instructions". If it is left to engineers, ethics will be found left wanting. As Anthony Beaver rightly sums up the frustration: "Fuzzy intuitions will not do where the specifics of engineering and computational clarity are required". (Beavers 2010) This rationale of practical ethics departs relies on guidelines, regulations and codes rather than an always new decision and responsibility for ethical actions. (Allen 2011) As Sharkey convincingly explains the reduced 'reasoning' capacity of robotic systems:

Programmes can become very complex through the management of several sub-programmes and decisions about which sub-programme should be initiated in particular circumstances. But the bottom line for

decision making by a machine, whether is it using mathematical decision spaces or artificial intelligence reasoning programmes, is the humble IF/THEN statement. (Sharkey 2010 p.377)

In other words, the decision whether to let live or take a live is left to a system that makes this decision by purely applying a calculus that determines the fate of the target. It is here that we encounter the IF/THEN logic of the biopolitical informed rationale of applied ethics, indicated in previous chapters, radically. Robot ethics is thus reliant on accurate inputs in order to achieve 'ethical' outputs. This strongly reflects the modern drive to want to ascertain ethical standards and an inability to conceive of uncertainty as an inherent aspect of the ethical moment that is in each demand unique.

VI. Violence by Numbers

However, the reliance of the algorithms of machines reaches even further in the biopolitical decision of and over life and death in warfare, as it is through the very rendering of the human as calculable that it is determined what is to live and what is to die. As forms of acting become increasingly digitalised in robot age, so becomes life, whereby the human is rendered as mathematisable and thus analysable and calculable in her biology and existence. The targeting of lives through the use of drones is subject to such a calculability of human life in more than one ways. Not only are so-called signature strikes based on the algorithmic evaluation of behavioural patterns of life⁹², as highlighted earlier, but the 'official' calculation as to what constitutes acceptable collateral damage is also framed in terms of statistics and calculations. In other words, whether and how much 'collateral damage' (or, in Brennan's analogy damage to the surrounding tissue) is incurred rests on precise calculations. As Gregory McNeal is at pains to explicate, if followed correctly, the calculus and procedure of avoiding collateral damage provides a successful process of limiting collateral damage to a minimum percentage. However, when collateral damage does occur, he concedes, it is 70% due to "failed positive identification of a target", while "22% of the time it was attributable to weapons malfunction". (McNeal 2011) The human is thus rendered utterly abstracted for the purpose of the conduct of

⁹² Whereby the exact algorithm by which the identification of the signature and thus target is classified (McDonald 2011)

war. In the context of drone killings, Patrick Lin illustrates this ethical puzzle when he poses the question:

What's an acceptable rate of innocents killed for every bad guy killed: 2:1, 10:1, 50:1? That number hasn't been nailed down and continues to be a source of criticism. It's conceivable that there might be a target of such high value that even a 1,000:1 collateral damage rate, or greater, would be acceptable to us. (Lin 2011)

However, despite the narrative of neutrality and impartiality of hyper-rationalised robotic decision-making based on algorithms that are utilised to render the human abstract and, eventually, identify who may pose a risk to the healthy 'tissue', using calculations as a more ethical means to determine the right and wrong is, in itself, never entirely value free. It can be argued, in fact, that algorithms are value –laden and can be designed to reflect certain values. Kraemer, van Overveld and Petersen have shown the intrinsic bias of value in the design of algorithms based on a study in the medical field to determine threshold of whether a biological body is considered as diseased or not. (Kraemer, van Overveld and Petersen 2010) Yet the narrative of technological means as ethically superior to the fallible and failing human gains currency in the military field. What is forgotten, or at the least neglected, is the very fact that it is, and continues to be, a human decision to conduct war.

Conclusion

Drones, as the weapon of choice in counter-terrorism practices reify the biopolitical rationale that informs certain practices of political violence today. Anti-political in their thanato-technological function, they further de-politicise the enemy by rendering her without the capacity to enter into the political act of speech and debate. The medical narrative that supports the use of drones as a political tool to keep the 'world body' alive and progressing aids in this de-politicisation process and furthermore renders the possibility for ethical contestations obscured. The technology of the drone and its use for target killings itself is not only in large parts based on biological life patterns (Singer 2010a p.90-91) but also relies on target selections based on certain life patterns and indicators. The biologically informed technologies that are set to supersede human capacity, in performance and ethical decision-making, are new ways of wielding direct power on the biological body of individuals and populations, whereby the human is further reduced to her functions and functionalities as such. Drones have become the medium that represents the anthropo-technology narrative in

a radicalisation of a scientific and technocratic master narrative, which increasingly seeks to replace that which is human with a quasi-divine superhuman by emulating and improving on the very limitations of the functionalities of the human. In these capacities, drones embody both the *zoefication* of politics as well as the politicisation of *zoe*. The telos is the absolute, in which uncertainty and contingency pose no use other than as a target and justification for a growing and sanitised militarism. In this biopolitical context, the human is understood predominantly in somatic terms, as an entity that is made up of scientifically detectable and ascertainable (life) processes and patterns that render it in specific terms of functionality and can be shaped into certain futures. (Rose 2001) In this development, we must recognise that the conception of the understanding of the human subject shifts. An identification of the subject with her biology, physiology, neurology as presenting a “unitary vision” (Braidotti 2011 p.77) informs the contemporary notion of ethics which has the capacity to render violent practices justified. In order to conceive of an ethics that considers and has as a basis a more comprehensive notion of the human subject, we need to move away from this specific biopolitical conception which posits ethics as a technical subject, concerned exclusively with practicalities, occluding a deeper engagement with what ethics actually is.

8: Despite the Biopolitical Subject: Rethinking the Ethics of Political Violence

We might even assert, with considerable justification, that the fact that contemporary politics is concerned with the naked existence of us all is itself the clearest sign of the disastrous state in which the world finds itself – a disaster that, along with all the rest, threatens to rid the world of politics

Hannah Arendt, *Introduction into Politics*

The voice of individual moral conscience is best heard in the tumult of political and social discord

Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*

I. Embracing Contingency: The Political Substance of Ethics

By engaging with Hannah Arendt's insights, this project has sought to show the trajectory through which the biopolitical perspective emerging in the 18th century has given rise to an altered perception of the human and the political. Today, the content and meaning of 'biopolitics' is not fixed and has been widely employed to make sense of practices in contemporary politics. Political practices that could be considered to have biopolitical content change as new contexts and technologies emerge. As the term 'biopolitics' gains different shades and meaning within a growing range of research areas - from gene engineering to security to medical politics – the underlying rationality has, however, not lost its relevance for the analysis of the human and politics today and informs not only the justification for the use of certain means of political violence, but also shapes the civic willingness to accept these means and justifications. In short, the biopolitical rationale informs the ethics of political violence in specific ways.

While a range of scholars have recently inquired into a 'beyond biopolitics' (see for example Barder and Debrix 2012; Chandler 2011; Clough and Willse 2011; Esposito 2011; Farrier and Tuit 2013), what crystallises is that the biopolitical perspective, whether conceived of as negative or positive, remains relevant for discourses of politics in a contemporary setting and perhaps even more so within the discourses of a post-human future. The infusion of a biopolitical rationality into the

idea of the human is as significant in the post-human context as it has been in the context of Nazi Germany totalitarianism. At stake is nothing less than the production of human subjectivity, “who we are, how we view the world, how we interact with each other” (Hardt and Negri 2006 p.66) and the political conceptions that emerge therefrom. The biopolitical production of subjectivity thus informs the possibility of acting politically and, importantly for the aim of this project, ethically in a shared world. As shown earlier, the biopolitical context and the technologically mediated ecology in which the human today finds himself, shapes a subjectivity that stands under the sway of an imperative of reducing risk, eliminating uncertainty and, most importantly, producing predictable outcomes. In this, alterity and difference pose an obstacle and must be captured in homogenizing terms to render the inherent unpredictability and uncertainty of aleatory life mitigated by the calculability of common factors. Arendt recognised the problem of this drive toward predictable outcomes (for the production of man and the production of mankind based on homogenizing terms) in the context of Nazi Germany, as well as the possibility for politics in modernity in general.

She offers us three distinct insights: First, she highlights the problem of the biopolitical eradication of difference and plurality in a political context as it impedes political action and substitutes action for homogenisable behaviour. Second, with Arendt we understand the consequences of a naturalised, *zoefied* understanding of politics in a socio-political environment that focuses on life-processes. This allows us to explore the totality under which the human is embedded in biopolitical structures: not only is the human determined, shaped and influenced by the predominance of the functionalities of his being (biological, neurological and psychological), but he is also deeply embedded in socio-political structures that mirror closely the cyclicity of life processes, along a directional trajectory of progress. Finally, Arendt furnishes us with the modern perspective that perceives the human as fundamentally self-constituting in a context of both history and nature as a process, whereby the scientifically driven human, informed and perhaps spurred by the discovery of insights into his own biological processes and the possibility to intervene in those processes, considers life and the development of life processes (of the human and humanity as such) as adjustable and controllable in an ever-increasing effort to eliminate the inherent uncertainties that mark ‘life’ as such. Linked to this, Arendt identifies the modern

problem of the “seemingly so novel biological justification of violence” (Arendt 1970 p.74) which proposes the use of violence as a ‘creative force’ to surgically rid society of its ills. (Arendt 1970 p.75) In this, not one but two aspects of a biopolitical rationale emerge – the rendering of life (zoe) in techno-political terms and the zoefication of political processes on which the anti-political management of modern politics is modelled. Both influence political and ethical perspectives that in turn inform how violence is used and justified. And to what end.

Two distinct perspectives of and consequences for ethics unfold from this: practices that stand under the sway of the necessity and progression mandate enable the adiaphorisation of ethics, underlined by the medical narrative with which current practices of target killing through the use of drones are justified. This ‘neutralisation’ of ethics, based on the alleged immanence of the morality of the technological tool as well as the basis and goal of the act impedes any challenge to the rectitude of the alleged ethical content. The other distinct tangent in ethical thinking to emerge in a biopolitical context is the codification of ethics through guides, regulations, rules and law, as most strikingly evidenced by the drive to develop a coding of ethics into fighting machines. The two developments in ethical perspectives relate to one another, whereby the latter comprises the excess of the former and the former is supported by the rationality of the latter. The biopolitical rationale of ethics and its underlying demand for ethical certainty occludes the possibility to rethink ethics as a perpetual and ever-anew arising demand that must be solved and taken responsibility for. Dillon strikingly highlights the problem with politics and calls for a reopening of the category, within both liberal and realist perspectives. His understanding of politics highlights the crucial role ethical considerations play:

The space of politics, as I understand it, is constantly one posing the challenge of ethical decision, because it concerns individuals and groups that regularly find themselves on the borders or beyond the pale of the normativities within which they are already always located and whose boundaries are continuously in formation and under challenge. (Dillon 1998 p.564)

Subjectivity is paramount in conceiving of ethical conduct. If this subjectivity is situated outside of what it means to be political it becomes difficult to act ethically. The anti-political condition of a biopolitical rationale makes this relationship

problematic. Where the possibility for debate and contestation is impeded, a continual interrogation with the ethicality of ethics is also impeded. As Dan Bulley insightfully notes: “ethics is political”. (Bulley 2013 p.2) And the two should be considered in relation to one another. Melissa Orlie makes a similar point: “Ethical conduct requires more than thinking about the limits of the self, it also demands ethical political work on those limits”. (Orlie 1997) I argue in this concluding chapter that contemporary ethics of political violence is informed by a specific biopolitical human subjectivity and suggest that the ethicality of ethics is reliant on politics proper (Orlie 1997; Campbell 1998) and the inclusion of alterity, unpredictability and the possibility of failure, or vulnerability. By keeping open toward these aspects of politics and ethics we are able to judge each moment of encounter and engagement with others responsibly and are able to evade that the (Western) humanity ‘dog’ is “being wagged by the technology tail”. (Alston 212) This, however, require a socio-political perspective that “minimizes codification and maximizes debate”. (Rose 2003 p.193)

In order to rethink ethics, we ought to reconsider the biopolitical human and her subjectivity as well as her relation to the concept ‘politics’. (Jabri 1998; Rose 2006) And in making not only ethics the object of analysis, but also the biopolitical human and his capacity for politics proper, the Arendtian framework helps to engage more deeply with the consequences of the shifted human subjectivity in a biopolitical modernity. In this concluding chapter I aim to look at the aspects of a biopolitical rationality that impede a re-thinking of ethics as they relate to the human, politics and the ethicality of ethics. I look at these concepts in relation to one another, within the two umbrella categories of an Arendtian biopolitics: the politicisation of *zoe* and the *zoe*fication of politics. In this I engage further with the key impasses that emerge in modern conceptions of the human and politics from this framework and highlight the key aspects an Arendtian perspective contributes to the biopolitics discourses: the recognition of the erosion of plurality and subsequent impossibility of politics, the organic metaphor for socio-political processes and the self-perception of man as maker in the drive for perpetual progress, for the unhindered flow of the development of life processes along a directional trajectory, continual progress toward perfection, informed by an ever-greater inquiry into the biological, neurological and psychological patterns of the human. These aspects have to be understood against the background of a technologized biology and ecology, which informs and shapes the

self-understanding of the human today. In this, I aim to tie together the problems of contemporary biopolitical conceptions of a technologized human and the consequences this raises for the understanding of ethics of practices of political violence with the key features of the Arendtian biopolitical framework, as established earlier.

The chapter thus proceeds by first briefly engaging with some of the salient aspects of the biopolitical framework in Arendt as a reminder of the specific human subjectivity and its relation to politics that emerges as a result. The second part engages with the key strands and problems of a biopolitically informed ethics, leading into part three, in which I aim to look at how human subjectivity, politics and ethics form a dynamic triad in being able to conceive of ethics in a different way and speculate how we might be able to not only think ‘beyond’ but rather ‘despite’ the biopolitical subject of an ethics that comprises and perhaps overcomes the certainty mandate that dominates the biopolitical contemporary context. This concluding chapter argues that a rethinking of the ethics of political violence is indeed possible when we open these biopolitically informed categories and subjectivities and subject them to continual contestation and debate by taking contingency, uncertainty and alterity into account.

II. Biopolitically Anti-political: The (post)modern Human Subject

Both Foucault and Arendt have grappled with the altered perception of power, politics and humanity in a biopolitical modernity. Where Foucault’s emphasis of inquiry lies with the examination of the power relations in a political context where life stands at the core of political practices, Arendt’s investigation is chiefly concerned with the human capacity for action, and with it, politics, and those factors that make it possible in a socio-political body. Arendt’s insightful question bears repeating: “What are we *doing?*” she asks. (Arendt 1998 p.5) Implied in this is a view of humans as agents of their fate – good or bad. This is where Arendt exceeds Foucault. Where Foucault sees (and critiques) the intrinsic presence of war, metaphorical and structural, in the context of modern politics (Foucault 2002 p.124), Arendt furnishes us with a critique of the latent danger of violence in viewing politics in organic terms – structurally and metaphorically. (Arendt 1970 p.75; Arendt 2004 p.599; Owen 2007 p.62) It is Arendt’s understanding of the focal shift of life-

processes (labouring) as the predominant mandate of modern politics and her understanding of the dangers of conceiving of political processes in naturalistic terms, understood as life processes but adhering, all the same, not to a cyclical but to a linear process of progress and development, that make her such an interesting theorist for the problems of a biopolitical modernity. It is through her pertinent insights into the conjoined condition of man as “taking control of their lives in the belief that everything is possible” (Canovan 1995 p.103) and the belief that “everything is determined within an inevitable process” through the “laws” of movement and development (Canovan 1995 p.103; Arendt 2004 p.597-599) that we can investigate some of the ethical tenets of contemporary practices of political violence.

As explored in chapters 1 and 2, the Arendtian framework offers three distinct lenses to look at the problematic of biopolitical practices in contemporary modernity, at the centre of which stands the increasingly measurable and calculable biological, physiological and psychological qualities of the human, which can be, with ever-greater accuracy and minutiae, be determined in the quest for greater certainty and predictability and this knowledge be projected onto drives for the development of humanity as such. Arendt convincingly delineates the emergence of man as determined by labour to sustain life processes – the life processes of the biological body and the life processes of the socio-political body, whereby economic cycles of production and consumption reflect the cyclical life processes of biological existence and subsumes all aspects of life, giving rise to the politics of the management of these life processes. In this, the human, as labouring entity, is functionally embedded. The Arendtian angle of biopolitics further illuminates how the human came to be viewed and view herself as an analysable and mathematisable entity, through introspection and a growing abstraction of mathematical models of man, thereby producing a subjectivity of normalised and normalising patterns, with an ever-greater reliance on measuring instruments, algorithmic calculations and the authority of the number as “code, data, and statistics” (Ansorge 2012 p.2), as a substitute for reliance on sensory perceptions and evaluations. Arendt, by no means a Luddite (Berkowitz 2010), recognised the novelty of modern technological developments as no longer merely extending man’s instrumental capacity and, with Heisenberg, identified the biopolitical underpinnings of modern technology as reflecting nothing more as an amplified biological process. (Arendt 2006b p.274) Lastly, it is through Arendt’s

analysis and critique that we can engage with the problematic coexistence of a socio-political body that is based on and functions like (cyclical) life-processes and the continual mandate for progress and progression (directional) of man and mankind in modernity, including the violent capacities this holds.

It is with Arendt then that we can distinguish a different biopolitical nuance to the Foucaultian analysis of the biopolitical paradigm of making live and letting die (Foucault 2003 p.241) and the securitization practices this invokes in liberal regimes; the chief concern and critique of an anti-political biopolitical world in Arendt's work is not merely the securitization for the *survival* of the species (Foucault 2004, 2007; Dillon and Reid 2009; Bigo 2008); but moreover the securitization of the *development* of life processes in terms of continual and perpetual progression, in her words: "a security which should permit an undisturbed development of the life process of society as a whole" (Arendt 2003b p.443) against the background of a man-made technologised ecology, in which the human is increasingly conceived not only as a functional being in the drive for perpetual progress and development but also as an improvable and perfectible biological being⁹³. The analysable and technologized human being is embedded in the biological health and development mandate within a technological ecology that offers the frames and tools to drive this mandate with ever-increasing speed and acceleration. Humanity, as a socio-political body, is conceived in much the same terms. And it is precisely here that the necessity and prevention mandate of a *zoefied* politics grabs hold, not merely to 'make live' the species mankind, but let develop and improve along a teleological linear progressive trajectory, aided by technologies that promise an illusory certainty. (Rose 2001 p.12) In this, the Arendtian biopolitical framework not only lets us investigate the ethical implication of necropolitics, enacted so radically and in large scale in Nazi Germany, but rather she allows us to look at the ethics of technologised thanato-rationality in the use of drone technology for target killings today as a practice of the *zoefication* of politics, whereby progress through technology is the ethical master narrative as intrinsically containing morality, beyond contestations of right or wrong. (Anders 2010 p.46; Bauman 2000 p.159-160)

⁹³ A radicalised example of humans rendered ultimately a function of their roles, enhanced by biological augmentation is the case of the British SAS soldier who had laser eye surgery that would allow him to have night-vision of 400 meters at night. (Singer 2011)

As developed in chapter six, the biopolitically technologized mandate relies on a techno-political understanding of *zoe* and shapes the human in a number of ways: it renders the human functional and perfectible, but also serves to abstract the human as an arithmetically comprisable entity. Ansorge's assessment of a new military 'visual' register based on numbers and data in the context of Orientalism illustrates this shifted focus as he finds that "[c]urrent Orientalism is more concerned with arithmetizing and measuring the individual than discovering any linguistic or civilizational essence", thereby constituting a specific kind of military visuality. (Ansorge 2012 p.2) It is this prevalence of data and arithmetic calculations in the context of warfare that has the capacity to abstract the human as a target in contemporary theatres of violent engagement in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan⁹⁴. Hereby the use of machines and technology is instrumental in conceiving of the rationality and justification of practices of political violence. While the machine – in this context the drone – is posited as calculated, clean, effective, the selection of kill targets is codified and determined based on demographic indicators (Ackerman 2012), in the case of CIA strikes determined by a 'Disposition Matrix' (Greenwald 2012), abstracting the human to be reduced to a determinable and terminable entity. As Micah Zenko quotes a military official engaged in the US target killing programme: "It's really like swatting flies. We can do it forever easily and you feel nothing. But how often do you really think about killing a fly?" (Zenko 2012a)

In this biopolitical context the human and humanity is understood predominantly in somatic terms, as an entity that is made up of scientifically detectable and ascertainable (life) processes and patterns, that make it function in specific ways and that can be shaped into certain futures. (Rose 2001) The minutiae with which these processes and contexts – biological and otherwise - can be detected through scientific and technological means promotes an ever-greater drive to intervene preventively and create *certain* futures. Nikolas Rose has provided a salient reading of this development in the context of biomedical politics, which, I suggest, informs the *zoefied* politics in contemporary modernity. For Rose, it is precisely in the increased analysability of the life processes and biological minutiae that the subjectivity (and ethical focus) of the human shifts toward being an 'active partner in the drive to health', whereby each individual is expected to join in the 'will to health', regulated

⁹⁴ I hesitate to consider the CIA engagements in Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia to fall under the category 'war' as traditionally conceived of. Neither nation is technically 'at war' with the US.

and enforced by a range of institutions, from insurance companies to health providers to government ministries. This drive to health relies crucially on “calculations about probable futures in the present, followed by interventions into the present in order to control that potential future”. (Rose 2001 p.7) Identifying manageable factors becomes essential in this endeavour. In other words, risk thinking in terms of human development gains prevalence in the sense that the human (for Rose predominantly in her biological health) ought to be analysed as much as possible so as to not jeopardize her healthy development. Thus, in his analysis of contemporary biopolitics, specifically in the medical field, Rose diagnoses that biopolitics is essentially risk politics. The centrality of risk thinking thus gives rise to risk profiling in order to find factors that would enable the identification of high-risk groups and enable an intervention. And while Rose contains his analysis largely within the medical field of bioethics, it is here that the medical metaphor highlighted earlier finds striking resonance, as the principles of risk profiling in the medical field are mirrored in the strategies of identifying risk in the context of target killings through drone strikes.

As Rose explains in the context of the medical field, based on probabilistic factors, identifiable characteristics and physiological and psychological knowledge linked to higher risk categories, algorithms are conceived to identify high risk groups and individuals. (Rose 2001 p.8) This conception of risk profiling in order to preventively and/or prophylactively intervene is echoed in the practices of target killings by drone strikes, specifically the so-called signature strikes, as highlighted previously, where that which poses a risk is identified and selected as a justified target merely by identifiable markers, patterns and algorithmic calculations, whereby the exact factors that contribute to the calculation are kept opaque. For Rose this results in a hierarchical relationship that underwrites the ethics of such practices and he harks back to Foucault’s thoughts on pastoralism (Foucault 2007) in linking the ‘will-to-health’ subjectivity of modern man to a pastoral power that administers the essence of the practice of risk politics. In the contemporary context, this is not a pastoralism by the state but rather “a plural and contested field traversed by the codes pronounced by ethics committees and professional associations”. (Rose 2001 p.9) In short, the ‘will-to-health’ mandate and the resulting risk politics produces a form of ethics that is determined by the intrinsic moral ‘good’ implicit in health and life and safeguarded

by the various codes and law-like regulations of those that claim the expertise to administer prophylaxis and prevention effectively, thereby minimising risk.

But how does, and can, the biopolitically understood human relate to political action as understood by Arendt? And how can we understand politics in a contemporary biopolitical context that is shaped by the characteristics earlier identified? It is worthwhile to remind ourselves of Arendt's disenchanted assessment of the transformed meaning of politics in such a biopolitical context as matters of life necessities eclipsed the possibility of freedom and engulfed the meaning of politics to become "regarded simply as administration, the management of the collective life process of mankind". (Canovan 1995 p.118; Arendt 2003b p.444) As highlighted earlier, this posits a strict distinction between contemporary, biopolitically informed conceptions of politics as management and administration and the notion of politics proper, in the Arendtian sense as a political act that each subject, be it free to do so, can engage in. The zoefication of politics, as well as the politicisation of life, or *zoe*, are both reliant on an understanding of the former type of politics – politics as administration, a type of politics that corresponds to "rule by a bureaucracy, charged with national housekeeping". (Canovan 1995 p.119) It is a politics that is defined and also bound by the technological frameworks in managing and organising the processes for the progress of mankind. In this, difference and plurality is "flattened out and obscured by a triumphant politically legitimated master vocabulary of security, organisation and efficiency". (Dolan 2005 p.370) While this type of politics operates under the mandate of greater efficiencies and effectiveness for the promotion of the development of mankind, it simultaneously hampers the possibility of politics as a practice of engaging with others, in inter-active plurality. In order to re-think ethical acts, we must, I suggest, also rethink how we perceive politics today.

The Arendtian framework of life-politics highlights one aspect specifically: biopolitical political politics carries anti-political consequences in modernity. In a technologized modern context, the problem is two-fold. The first aspect is the de-politicisation of the subject. While this sounds like a contradiction in terms when we speak of the politicisation *zoe*, we must, once more distinguish between the two perspectives of politics as indicated above. While with the politicisation of *zoe*, which Arendt rightly detects, *zoe*, or rather matters of life-processes are absorbed within processes of political management and administration for the security of development

and to control certain futures, this very process of absorbing the life-functions of the human and rendering him functional within norms of correct and incorrect, success and failure abstracts the human from the possibility to engage in politics proper in the Arendtian sense. The political act is the very abstraction of the population as numbers, cells, data, based on algorithms of manageable information in a technologized context – as Arendt notes, the question of how scientific and technological knowledge is used is “a political question of the first order”. (Arendt 1998 p.3) This is, however, where politics ends for Arendt, as the human is propelled into statistically determined and normalised anti-political abstraction. The administrative focus on the securing and developing of life processes cannot provide an ordering principle for politics proper as it stands under the sway of necessity. When necessity forms the core of politics, two important consequences for the (im)possibility of politics ensue: freedom, as the opposite of necessity and a fundamental condition for politics is curbed, and difference is rendered an obstacle in seeking to administer and secure the certainty of futures. The biopolitical subject is not only un-free as such, but also determined by the demand for homogeneity, for more efficient management, greater security, better control. In this, alterity poses a threat as escaping the structures erected that comprise the controllable norm. Where difference is sought to be mitigated, or ‘flattened’ – through management, administration and other technique of conformism, plurality is jeopardised; where life processes reign supreme, freedom is restricted. Politics, however, is reliant on both, freedom and plurality, where there is neither, no politics proper can ensue.

This is further exacerbated in a technologized context where man not only holds a self-perception of creator of all things, including life, but is increasingly seeking to do so. When Arendt wrote *The Human Condition* in 1958, she could not quite have foreseen the extent to which the human and her capacity for politics might become imperilled in contemporary modernity, but, like Heidegger, Marcuse and Anders, she had an inkling as to the implication this development of technology as a ‘biological process’ might have and presciently attested to man’s capacity (and perhaps desire) to exchange ‘given’ life “for something he has made himself”. (Arendt 1998 p.3) In other words, by creating life, man relies on scientifically informed and technologically conceived ‘truths’, but it precisely these scientifically informed truths that seek to create life (as biological life form) that not only must abstract the ‘truth’

of life to scientifically determinable (biological, neurological, etc.) and programmable aspects of life, but also shape a technological socio-political environment in which speech has become replaced by expressions in mathematical symbols (Arendt 1998 p.4; Berkowitz 2010) In the context of the (im)possibility of politics, the degradation of normal expressions of speech and thought comprises a problem and she notes that “under these circumstances speech and everyday language would indeed be no longer a meaningful utterance that transcends behaviour even if it only expresses it”. (Arendt 2006b p.274) In other words, human agency is hampered where mere behaviour cannot be transcended and action becomes impossible. Plurality, freedom and speech are crucial and fundamental aspects in the Arendtian account of politics. In a highly technologized biopolitical context, all three are altered to the point of irrelevance. In order to act politically, elements of contingency, risk and unknowability must be embraced for Arendt, as political outcomes themselves can only ever be characterised by uncertainty. Such is the human condition. But it is precisely in this that the potentiality for new beginnings and the possibility to overcome ‘dark times’ in humanity lies. Arendt considers this ‘dark side of human affairs, but does not bemoan it, rather she considers it part of the human condition in all its positive potentialities. What she does bemoan is the loss of human action and politics in a biopolitically technologized modernity, as “to try to ‘make’ human life by eliminating its unpredictability is to destroy the human condition”. (Parekh 2008 p.172)

Homogeneity as a requirement and condition of for the correct (ethical) behaviour is problematic. As we have seen in the Arendtian account, the prevalence of behaviour over action as a consequence of politically defining the human and humanity by reference to life processes underlying the perpetuation of man and the species reflects the anti-political turn in biopolitics. When sameness is mistaken for equality and difference is sought to be mitigated in a biopolitical modernity, the consequences are not only a stark limitation of political action, but also harbor the potential for a delineation of what is to be included and what excluded in securing the development of humanity. Heterogeneity, or plurality, is equally important for the conception of ethics. The existence of others and the other is crucial in conceiving of ethics in two ways. On one hand, the encounter with others stipulates that plurality is constitutive of the ethical moment, on the other, it is only in reflexivity that an ethical decision can be made. Without plurality (man’s situatedness among men) there is limited

capacity for reflexivity and without reflexivity ethical considerations and ethical decision-making can only but become norm driven in seeking to homogenize societal behaviour. (Bauman 2012; Williams 2007) In a technology dominated and biopolitically informed world in which the drive toward a post-human perspective, in which the machine might indeed “realize their potential as the masters of man”⁹⁵, is becoming increasingly visible⁹⁶, what can we then make of politics? And more importantly, how does this inform the ethics of the use of violence in the context of politics?

III. Neutralised and Coded: A Critique of Biopolitical Ethics

The question of violence, and specifically political violence is a quintessential ethical question. It relates directly and in the most radical sense to the responsibility we have, as humans to other humans. As Dillon notes: “The question of the human is not only central once again, but also is that of the understanding of politics. The one is always intimately related to the other.” (Dillon 1998 p.545) Situated at the nexus of this relationship is the question of ethics, which is shaped and influenced by both. As a growing part of our contemporary world is dominated by technological substitutes of the human, a growing remit of “our ethical and political thinking is tested through technologically informed rational choice models”. (Berkowitz 2010) In this era it seems notoriously difficult to define what the term ‘human’ denotes, not only as there is a lacking agreement as to any specific definition, but also because the terms ‘human’ and ‘humanity’ are by no means politically neutral. (Agar 2010 p.19) In order to analyse what it means to be post-human, and thus to be human, Nicholas Agar sees very few options other than to arrive at a definition that is informed by the biological sciences. As such, he considers humanity as the biological species *Homo Sapiens*. Agar concedes that his point of departure of what it means to be human is somewhat reductionist and excludes a more comprehensive perspective of humanity that considers reason, creativity, sociality and morality, among other traits and

⁹⁵ This refers to the title of a panel – ‘Will Machines Realize Their Potential as the Masters of Man’ – which was held as part of the Being Human in an Inhuman Age Conference held at the Hannah Arendt Centre, Bard College NY in October 2010.

⁹⁶ There is a growing body of scholarship in a range of fields that dedicate resources to the relationship between man and the machine. The New York Time has been running an ongoing series on the topic of human enhancement entitled “Smarter than you think” since 2010 and a growing number of research projects concern themselves with the risk that machines and technology pose to humanity, such as the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk in Cambridge.

aspects. But Agar, in his inability to pin down satisfactorily the “cluster concept” (Agar 2010 p.21) that distinguishes the human from the non-human hits an important point in modern and contemporary considerations of the human subject: In the quest to ascertain the human as a scientific being, common (scientifically ascertainable) denominators are required to comprehend the essentially aleatory nature of the human as individual entity and humanity as a whole.

It is when the analysable human (and humanity) can be abstracted from the comprehensive sensory, intuitive, emotional and material entity that comprises her (it) that her processes can be controlled and she can be functionally embedded in the management of securing the development of humanity. The greater the knowledge of her processes, the better the potential to eradicate potential risk factors through prophylactic intervention. This informs a range of aspects of human life, including the engagement with means of violence and the underlying ethics thereof. From this emerges a biopolitically informed rationalisation of ethics that is reflected by discourses of ethics as a matter of biology rather than philosophy (Wilson 1998) and the more recent assertions that ethics ought to be considered an evolutionary concept that promotes the survival of the human. In other words, this view holds that we make ethical choices based on how likely these ethical choices will promote our existence, survival and continuance as biological beings. (Joyce 2006; Muehlhauser and Helm 2012; De Lazari-Radek and Singer 2012) The drive to absorb ethical choices into models of the biological mandate aims to make moral choices and ethical acts intelligible and rationalizes the ethicality of ethics.

Seeking to ascertain (and be able to code) ethics also stands at the core of the discussion of machine morality, as discussed in chapter six, whereby the “moral demand is transferred from the human to the machine”. (Babich 2012 p.28; Anders 2010 p.40) The (still controversial) discussion as to whether it is possible and desirable to install an ethics module into a military robotic machine, so as to make them more reliable and entirely rational killing machines, is rapidly advancing (Singer 2010a, 2010b; Lin 2010, Arkin 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Human Rights Watch 2012, Sharkey 2012) and perpetually runs the risk to be subsumed by a technology fetish that demands that whatever is technically possible must be realised without delay. (Alston 2012; Babich 2012 p.28) This not only comprises a formulized ethics (in the military context this would / will be modelled on the laws of war and armed

conflict) that can be implemented into machine structures based on a professionalised, regularized, universalised and technologized conceptions of engagement with the other, but also increasingly raises an intrinsic demand for the machine to be the more moral agent in the world. Arkin holds that it military robots hold the potential to make war more just by creating robotic agents (Arkin 2010); in the discussion of the use of UAVs Bradley Strawser voices the concern that it would indeed be unethical not to use drones as intrinsically more humane killing machines. (Strawser 2010) And in the context of the self-driving car, Gary Marcus formulates the ethical demand of the future as follows:

Within two or three decades the difference between automated driving and human driving will be so great you may not legally be allowed to drive your own car, and even if you are allowed, it would be immoral for you to drive, because the risk of hurting yourself or another person will be far greater than if you allowed a machine to do the work. (Marcus 2012)

Contained in this is the complex relationship between ethics and law, whereby law and ethics become one. While law ought to be, no doubt, informed by morality and considerations of ethics, the two are distinct. Laws are abstracted into continuously and, ideally, consistently applicable rules. There is an appeal to law as the protected reason, but that is problematic. In the context of the ethical justification of war, Seth Lazar diagnoses this appeal to law to render moral inquiry incomplete in abstracting principles from a complex situation that contains inherent complications and then seeks to apply the abstracted laws within the full complexity of a situation. (Lazar 2011) This precisely stands at the impasse of the moral inquiry into the justness of humanitarian intervention. Similarly Dillon states: “the law itself is neatly absolved of moral challenge because of course it is claimed to exist outside the circumstances in which we do issue moral challenges to one another”. (Dillon 1998 p. 557) This makes it impossible to assess the status of the law and also challenge its moral content. Beauchamp's exposition on the emergence and history of applied ethics highlights this, to his judgement, evident overlap of moral philosophy and law and their shared "criteria of evidence", specifically in social matters. He goes as far as to consider law as the "public's agency for translating morality into explicit social guidelines and practices". In other words, ethics is coded, through law. (Beauchamp 2005 p.2) But in doing so it is enshrined and cannot be challenged or rather be conceived of ever anew.

The focus on ethics' practicality over considerations of ethicality occludes any deeper engagement with what ethics actually is, how it is, in fact, determined by the characteristics of a specific type of society and how we can make sense of ethics in modernity as something beyond a mere set of context specific norms and legal regulations. The most significant danger lies in the potentiality that the application of normalised ethical standard, as given by a scientific authority eclipse considerations of individual and perpetually new responsibility toward the other, specifically when ethics is understood as a programme that is to be applied rather than something that arises in alterity and ever-again. Within this technological mandate, we are lacking the ethical language to address non-linear and coded issues of ethics adequately. It is here that we see the consequences of the scientific / technological disconnection from the sense so important for communication, which Arendt warns of. When matters of ethics are expressed "by the extreme and in-itself meaningless formalism of mathematical signs" (Arendt 2006b p.274) and "speech and everyday language" is no longer meaningful, we have also lost the capacity to address the ethicality of ethics.

The quest for being able to ascertain with certainty the rightness or wrongness of a solution to an ethical dilemma reflects a determination to limit, if not eradicate the very aleatory nature of human life. By searching to prescribe ethical principles to an abstracted set of instances and occurrences the contingent character of the encounter with the Other, to speak in Levinas' terms, is disregarded in the assumption that ethical dilemmas can be resolved. (Hutchings 2010 p.152) When we understand ethics in the Levinas-Derridean tradition as being "centered on the relationship between the subject and Otherness in the mode of indebtedness, vulnerability, and mourning" (Braidotti 2011 p.302), and as arising from the encounter with the other (the face of the other), which does neither threaten to punish or promise a reward (Bauman 2012 p.214), but simply triggers, by sheer presence, an ethical moment (Bauman 2012 p.214; Dauphinee 2009 p.243), it is precisely in this very moment of the ethical decision that the actual indeterminacy of ethics lies. Similarly, for Derrida, it is in precisely this moment of an ethical demand being made that requires a decision that ethics unfolds. (Raffoul 2008 p.273) It is the very impossibility of knowing the 'right decision' that makes ethics possible and that requires that ethics is considered not in a universalized and universalizing abstract set of rules, but with

each encounter. Derrida elaborates the rationale for this complex distinction between ethics as principles and ethics as reliant on the very possibility of the impossible as follows:

If I know what I must do, I do not take a decision, I apply knowledge, I unfold a program. For there to be a decision, I must not know what to do ... The moment of decision, the ethical moment, if you will, is independent from knowledge. It is when I don't know the right rule that the ethical question arises. (Derrida 2004, cited in Raffoul 2008 p.285)

In other words, the ethical decision, contrary to modern aspirations of applying ethical principles as ethical laws (universal or otherwise), arises from a status of non-knowledge. It is the encounter with the Other that not only bestows an implicit vulnerability on the Other, but also a certain vulnerability of the self in being unable to know, to have certainty. For such ethical decision to occur authentically, one must thus accept the very fallibility of man. Right and wrong can thus not be secured, which, in turn means life cannot be definitively secured.

In this perspective of ethics, the ethical decision maker finds herself in a moment of uncertainty, which arises ever anew, with each new ethical decision. The potential 'fallibility' of the decision maker in each ethical decision is in tension with the perception of man as controllable, calculable and utilizable entity within project mankind. It is, however, only in the biopolitical context of man (and the species) understood as a calculable and mathematisable being that the notion of 'fallibility', 'failure' and 'error' of the human can emerge in the first place and ethics and moral acts can be framed in terms of 'correct' and 'incorrect'. Considering ethics in terms of correct guidelines for a collective ethics, grounded in the quasi-scientific formulation of the biology, psychology and technology of man, delimits the recognition of ethics as the unique and momentary encounter that requires us to take responsibility for this encounter with the other rather than refer to a pre-established set of applicable rules, which can then be framed in terms of 'success' and 'failure'.

This tension in the perspective of ethics is evident in the apparent disconnect between ethics as understood as the moment of responsibility for the other on one hand and the ethics of a specific profession on the other, where the notion of improving moral standards is a matter of providing an enforceable ethical code and the failure of

adherence to stipulated ethical behaviour is “blamed on the faults of the ethical code or the laxity of the organs of its promotion and enforcement”. (Bauman 2000 p.86) The ethical code is thus performative as a technical and professional “moral compass to regulate behaviour”. (Balmer and Rappert 2007 p.58) This focus on integrity and professionalism as a version of ethics is particularly notable in the military profession. Martin Cook discusses the import of looking at practical ethical guidelines in the army in terms of the “limits of the philosophical approach”. (Cook 2011) In Cook’s account ‘professionalism’ and ‘integrity’ are two crucial aspects of what is considered ethical behaviour. While Cook is sceptical of this conflation, he nonetheless focuses on the very practicalities of being able to conduct oneself in the military profession accurately as ethical behaviour. Key aspects of conducting oneself ethically, in his presentation, comprise professional competence, retaining the public’s trust and continually adapting to emerging challenges. As such, in his account, an ethical obligation consists in ensuring that battle practices are progressive rather than conservative and that military professionals continually develop their expertise. As he states: “it’s an ethical obligation of a profession to adapt its body of knowledge and expertise so as to be relevant, but it’s always a tension to get them to do it”. (Cook 2011) In narrating his account on military ethics as professional ethics, Cook repeatedly refers to the medical field as a comparable profession that considers professional behaviour as ethical behaviour, and ought to do so following a quasi-scientific rationale.

The notion that ethics relates to fulfilling a role, and fulfil it responsibly, reflects what is at the heart of Alisdair MacIntyre’s critique of the modern “moral fiction”, where “the most culturally powerful [moral fiction] is embodied in the claims to effectiveness and hence to authority made by that central character of the modern social drama, the bureaucratic manager.” (MacIntyre 1981 p.74) In a quasi-scientific application of expertise, morality becomes conflated with law-like generalizations, which, in turn, allows the expert to be rendered professional. And it is only in this alleged ‘scientific’ neutrality that the necessity mandate to decide over life itself in a political context can take hold. Present justification of war and political violence are infused with a scientific assessment. As Hutchings rightly highlights: “In contemporary arguments about just war, there has been a tendency to want to turn just war theory into something much more like an algorithm”. (Hutchings 2010

p.161) As spotlighted in the introductory chapter, such algorithmic thinking relies on IF/THEN rationalities, replete with scientific processes, variables and premises that determine when certain conditions are met for acts of violence to become permissible. Such arguments often play out in a sequence of logical considerations: if a certain group or individual meets specifically delineated criteria, then they may be justifiably killed in the context of warfare.⁹⁷ Seth Lazar's engagement with mathematical equations, as highlighted in the opening chapter of the thesis, presents the extreme version of current Just War reasoning. This renders ethics and ethical principles not autonomous and for themselves, able to comprehend the incalculable, but rather a functional and normalising tool. This is palpable in the discourses on the ethics of target killings through drones. The medical narrative manifests the mandate to let those (professionals) who are able to deal with the illness deal with the problem in the most effective and efficient manner and with the utmost professional conduct⁹⁸. Ethical codes serve as a framework to further cement the implicit morality of the goal. In target killings, the preventive measures taken are often posited as a matter of ethical dilemmas framed morally in terms of "the morality of hard choices" (Altman, Finkelstein and Ohlin 2012) and legally in terms of self-defence in order to avert imminent disaster that would jeopardise humanity as such. It becomes increasingly difficult to argue against the use of a practice that supports humanity and humanness with a tool that allegedly can minimize the damage of necessary act of violence. With algorithmic calculations and formulised processes involved in selecting targets, however, we recognise that the CIA drone programme is a codified programme of prophylactic intervention, resting on the claimed moral authority of being both, intrinsically good for humanity and supported by the ethical professionalism of the technology.

Where ethics is coded, in an anti-political biopolitical context, it leaves us with little possibility to challenge the ethicality of the context. Where ethics is coded, it furthermore curbs ethical responsibility of the individual subject. The problem is not codes of ethics per se or codes as law, but rather the reduction of the understanding of ethics as code and regulation normalises something that cannot be normalised for its

⁹⁷ See for example the symposium on Jeff McMahan's Killing as published in *Ethics* in 2011, Volume 122, No 1)

⁹⁸ To underline the professionalism (and ethicality) of the drone as a tool, the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI) has issued a 'code of conduct' for drones in July 2012 (Wolfgang 2012, AUVSI 2012)

aleatory and inherently contingent nature. Each ethical moment ought to be decided anew. Where ethics is coded, it contains the illusory promise of certainty the fallacy of being able to offer a technical way of resolving ethical questions. If the biopolitically informed human subjectivity leaves little room for politics proper, how then can we conceive of ethics in a less formalised and coded manner? It is here that Arendt's insights into the significance of uncertainty and the embracing of unpredictable outcomes make it possible to think of ethics in a different way.

IV. Despite the Biopolitical Subject

Ethics and law are not the same. While the latter relies on abstraction, the former always contains an element of contingency inherent to human interactions, enshrined in experience. Whether this element is considered to be embodied (Coker 2013 p.190) or whether is rooted in sensibility (Critchley 2009 p.63), it relies on the human and his subjectivity to be actualised. In current narratives of warfare, this human element, and with it its radical uncertainty, is obscured by codes, algorithms and statistical perceptions. (Sylvester 2013 p.111) It is further occluded by the subservience mandate in the military profession. If we want to rethink ethics, we ought to consider it in the context of politics, the human and the complexities of today's technologised world. As Braidotti suggests, "an ethics worthy of the complexities of our time requires a fundamental redefinition of our understanding of the subject in his location ...". (Braidotti 2011 p.300) In this, ethics ought to be able to incorporate the uncertain, the un-ascertainable, including fallibility, alterity and the multitude of plural beings. (in Braidotti's case human and non-human entities) In this vein, Vivienne Jabri advocates an ethicality that questions subjectivity as a singular way of being and doing and is able to embrace the 'messiness' that emerges in human interaction. (Bauman 2000; Jabri 1998) I suggest that we must consider the subject and how we conceive of the subject in conceiving of an ethics that is not limited and limiting through code but has the capacity to be inclusionary assessing each situation, specifically those in war where life and death are at stake, anew. It is through the "unobvious decision" within which ethics is revealed. (Coker 2013 p.175) It is by doing what is not expected, and which might pose a certain, further risk, in which ethics is actualised.

Politics, as an aspect and consequence of interaction in human plurality relies on ethical principles that enable humans to coexist not merely in *Mitsein*, but rather *Fürsein* (being-for) in a shared world (Bauman 2000 p.84), taking up a certain responsibility for the Other. It is, as indicated earlier, the very plurality of mankind within a shared space that gives rise to ethics in the first place. As Bauman rightly points out “[w]e share the world, and so we willy-nilly affect each other’s lives; what we do, or abstain from doing is not indifferent to the life of the others.” (Bauman 2000 p.84) In other words, in being and acting among others in a shared space, we already have a responsibility for the other – a responsibility that we may or may not take up. In such a shared world, interdependencies between individuals not only give rise to the conception of ethics but also give it meaning as “ethicality has ... everything to do with what human beings do to each other” (Bauman 2000 p.83) – including political action. Subjectivity, the sense of self, is key here, as Critchley notes, “... ethics is entirely my affair, not the affair of some hypothetical, impersonal or universal I running through a sequence of possible imperatives” (Critchley 2009 p.66)

It requires, however, a restyling of the subject not as analysable entity under the sway of progress and development toward an improved goal. The biopolitical technology perspective perpetually measures the human and humanity against that which it is not, i.e. perfect and secure. First and foremost, understanding the human subject as a political being (in the Arendtian sense), means to understand her as one that must take responsibility, that reveals herself, in freedom, in the political interaction with others. Jabri addresses the importance of the understanding of the self and subjectivity in the context of shaping ethics. She advocates a subjectivity that incorporates alterity and contingency in the context of interactions with the other. It is only such a subjectivity of incorporated and accepted difference that can give rise to an ethicality and a normative International Relations enterprise that rejects rigid prescriptions and ethics as code, but rather seeks a morality and ethicality of multiplicities in an ever-changing interaction with the self in one’s context. In introducing a different way of thinking about ethics, Jabri highlights the unknowable and incalculable nature of human reality and underlines Bauman’s insight that “in place of the regularisation or systematisation of human moral conduct” one should call for “a recognition of uncertainty, mystery or spontaneity” (Jabri 1998 p.594) to encompass aspects of

spontaneity and inexplicable sympathies. Jabri, with Bauman, advocates a release of morality from the rigid frameworks of law-like depersonalised rules of ethical codes in support of a conception of morality that disregards “epistemological certainties” (Jabri 1998 p.594) and recognizes the “ambiguities and complexities, which surround each moral act”. (Jabri 1998 p.594)

Similarly, in his assessment of the ‘New Humanitarianism’ and humanitarian interventions, Campbell critiques the present underlying metaphysical conception of the human as one that needs rethinking to encompass alterity. He states: “that effort invokes a social ontology markedly different to that implicated in the technical rationality of the current debate about the creation of new codes, norms and principles for a New Humanitarianism, based as it is on the idea that ‘one can do no harm’. It depends instead upon an onto-political interpretation, which recognises that responsibility demands incalculability and unpredictability, while freedom requires that we be responsive to the harms that invariably accompany the good we would do. In short, to live ethically, we must think and act politically. (Campbell 1998 p.519) In Campbell’s analysis, it is the metaphysics of subjectivity that makes possible ideas of autonomy and freedom, as goods, that “gives rise to the notion that a theory of ethics should be constructed so as to secure those goods”. (Campbell 1998 p.504) For Campbell, coded ethics never can fulfil the demands of ethics as a responsibility to the other (Campbell 1998; Hutchings 2010 p.152) and there is always an excess remainder as ethics cannot be secured.

The ethicality of ethics implies fallibility, uncertainty and contingency and only through embracing risk, in political and ethical acts, can responsibility for actions toward the other be taken. As indicated in chapter five, the point here is not the outright rejection of code – on the contrary – coded guidelines, regulatory frameworks of law are of immense significance and value in a socio-political context and they provide the stability that supports the political body. But whether we should understand ethics as code, to conceive of ethics as a problem than can optimally be solved by the application of regulations, is at stake. To posit that ethics can be ascertained is, indeed, an illusion and one that limits the responsibility of the human to be morally accountable for acts that are committed in her name, in the name of humanity. It is here that Arendt’s warning holds sway that with the subsuming of speech into the expressions of symbolic and abstract scientific codes it becomes

difficult to break away from the anti-political boundaries of behaviour. Yet the Arendtian subject has the capacity for action, if she decides to take on a risk and engage in unpredictable outcomes – in short engage in political action proper.

Here, the issue of politics becomes so salient for ethics. Where politics is understood as management and administration, an engagement with ethics as outlined above is relegated to the margins, subsumed by the professional authority of technological expertise and instruction. Melissa Orlie elaborates the relationship between ethics and politics convincingly: “to be free is to act unpredictably, to upset expectations based on what you appear to be in order to reveal who you are becoming. To be incalculable is to act responsibly because we thereby abate the deadening weight of harm and wounds” (Orlie 1997 p.197) For Orlie the meaning and significance of ethical political action is precisely to be found in the fact that even under totalitarian oppression, most people comply with immoral rules – but not all. Each disruption of coded and rule based political acts that might, by an individual or collective, be considered unethical, cements the human capacity to interrupt “social rules” and act truly political, free and responsible. As Orlie states: “Paradoxically, responsibility demands incalculability and unpredictability, while freedom requires that we be responsive to the harms that invariably accompany the good we would do. In short, to live ethically, we must think and act politically”. (Orlie 1997 pp.169-170)

Simon Critchley highlights this possibility for a rethinking of ethics by conducting a thought experiment for an alternative outcome in the response to the World Trade centre attacks in September 2001. It is worth quoting at length:

Ask yourself: what if nothing had happened after 9/11? No revenge, no retribution, no failed surgical strikes on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, no poorly planned bloody fiasco in Iraq, no surges and no insurgencies to surge against; nothing.

What if the government had simply decided to turn the other cheek and forgive those who sought to attack it, not seven times, but seventy times seven? What if the grief and mourning that followed 9/11 were allowed to foster a nonviolent ethics of compassion rather than a violent politics of revenge and retribution? What if the crime of the Sept. 11 attacks had led not to an unending war on terror, but the cultivation of a practice of peace — a difficult, fraught and ever-compromised endeavor, but perhaps worth the attempt? (Critchley 2011)

Critchley considers here the unobvious decision, perhaps a decision that might be the more ethical decision in assessing the human impact and experience of warfare. He sees the moment of forgiveness as an ethical response. A moment that brings with it radical uncertainty and vulnerability. And it is precisely this moment of forgiving that Arendt sees as an authentic act of creating new beginnings in human relations (Canovan 1995 p.153; Young-Bruehl 2006); forgiving as an “alternative to revenge” which has the capacity to interrupt the “chain of automatic action and reaction in which human affairs so easily become trapped”. (Canovan 1995 p.191) And it is this moment of forgiving that is properly political in Arendt’s terms.

When we encounter discourses that seek to normalise drone strikes, that claim the moral superiority of lethal military robotics or that advocate practices of extraordinary rendition and torture under the mandate of the security of humanity, we ought to question the subjectivities that give rise to a politics and ethics that facilitate such discourses and narratives. As our “ethical imagination is failing to catch up with the fast expanding realm of our ethical responsibilities”, technological subjectivities and materialities may well remove us ever-further from “the responsibility we owe to our fellow human beings” (Coker 2008 p.151) - especially in situations of war and armed conflict. Further research into the ethical underpinnings of a fully technologized conception of warfare and armed interventions are needed as new technologies develop rapidly. The question that stood at the heart of Hannah Arendt’s inquiry into the human condition, and which has also inspired the inquiries of this project, is an open question. It has no definitive answer and requires to be posed anew in each different social and political context. For this reason alone, it bears repeating continually: What are we doing?

To pose this question creates an opening of the category ‘ethics’ and its relationship to politics today. This opening, in turn, allows for a rethinking of how we can act ethically and politically in an increasingly complex and technologised international world. The inquiry comprised in this project is limited to a critique. What it cannot offer, at this stage, are practical solutions and concrete ideas as to how to reform just war discussions, practicalities of guidelines for fighting in war or concrete reforms for policies as to what, indeed, constitutes ethical acting in international violent engagements. This falls within the remit of further and much needed research, especially as technologies race ahead to acquire capacities that we have yet to

comprehend. What this project has hoped to achieve, however, is to provide an insight into how our subjectivities are shaped in specific ways that change our engagement with ethics in the political context; how we are, indeed, biopolitically conditioned, and how this in turn conditions our engagement with one another. There is much to be done to overcome the biopolitically informed limitations highlighted in this project, and it requires first and foremost an interrogation of the subjectivities with which we shape the world in which we live. This project and the critical analysis it offers hopes to aid in creating the opening needed to freshly consider our actions and inter-actions in a shared world in an Arendtian sense, with thought and care, ethically, and politically ever-again.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ABI Research, 2011. *Defense Robots: UAVs, UGVs and Task Robots for Military Applications*, Available at: <http://www.abiresearch.com/press/military-robot-markets-to-exceed-8-billion-in-2016>.
- Abney, K., Mehlman, M. & Lin, P., 2013. *Enhanced Warfighters: Risk, Ethics and Policy*, The Greenwall Foundation.
- Ackerman, S. & Shachtman, N., 2012. Almost 1 In 3 U.S. Warplanes Is a Robot | Danger Room | Wired.com. *Danger Room*. Available at: <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/01/drone-report/> [Accessed August 9, 2013].
- Agamben, G., 1998. *Homo Sacer - Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Agamben, G., 2000. *Means Without Ends*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.
- Agar, N., 2010. *Humanity's End: why we should reject radical enhancement*, Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Ahmad, M.I., 2011. Fighting back against the CIA drone war. Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/07/201172612395401691.html> [Accessed August 9, 2013].
- Air Force Times, 2012. Demand grows for UAV pilots, sensor operators. *Air Force Times*. Available at: <http://www.airforcetimes.com/article/20120421/NEWS/204210318/Demand-grows-UAV-pilots-sensor-operators> [Accessed August 7, 2013].
- Allen, A., 2000. The Anti-Subjective Hypothesis: Michel Foucault and the Death of the Subject. *The Philosophical Forum*, 31(2), pp.113–130.
- Allen, A., 2002. Power, Subjectivity and Agency: Between Arendt and Foucault. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 10(2), pp.131 – 149.
- Allen, C., 2011. The Future of Moral Machine. *New York Times*. Available at: <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/the-future-of-moral-machines/> [Accessed August 6, 2012].
- Allhoff, F., Evans, N.G. & Henschke, A., 2013. *Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War*, New York: Routledge.
- Alston, P., 2010. *Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston*, United Nations Human Rights Council.
- Alston, P., Rona, G. & Hakimi, M., 2012. Live Seminar 46: Emerging Challenges in the Age of Drones: Target Killings and Humanitarian Protection. Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/kybxhym> [Accessed August 7, 2013].

- Altman, A., Finkelstein, C. & Ohlin, J.D. eds., 2012. *Targeted Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Amstutz, M., 2005. *International Ethics - Concepts, Theories and Cases in Global Politics* 2nd ed., Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Anders, G., 2010. *Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen - Ueber die Seele im Zeitalter der zweiten industriellen Revolution*, Muenchen: C.H. Beck.
- Anderson, B., 2011. Facing the Future Enemy US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Pre-insurgent. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 28(7-8), pp.216–240. Available at: <http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/28/7-8/216> [Accessed November 27, 2012].
- Anderson, K. 2013. Drones Are Ethical And Effective, Oxford Union Debate. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G99A8LAKnaU&feature=youtube_gdata_player [Accessed August 8, 2013].
- Ansorge, J., 2012. Orientalism in the Machine. In T. Barkawi & K. Stanski, eds. *Orientalism and War*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 129 – 150.
- Arendt, H., 1953. Ideology and Terror: A Novel Form of Government. *The Review of Politics*, 15(3), pp.303 –327.
- Arendt, H., 1967. Legitimacy of Violence. The Hannah Arendt Papers. Library of Congress. The New School. New York.
- Arendt, H., 1969. *Crisis of the Republic*, Orlando: Harcourt, Brace & Company.
- Arendt, H., 1970. *On Violence*, Orlando: Harcourt, Brace & Company.
- Arendt, H., 1994. *Essays in Understanding 1930-1954 - Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism* J. Kohn, ed., New York: Schocken Books.
- Arendt, H., 1998. *The Human Condition*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Arendt, H., 2002. Karl Marx and the tradition of Western political thought. *Social Research*, 69(2), pp.273–319.
- Arendt, H., 2003a. *Responsibility and Judgement* J. Kohn, ed., New York: Schocken.
- Arendt, H., 2003b. What is Freedom. In P. Baehr, ed. *The Portable Hannah Arendt*. London: Penguin Books.
- Arendt, H., 2004. *Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: Random House / Schocken Books.
- Arendt, H., 2005. *The Promise of Politics* J. Kohn, ed., New York: Schocken Books.
- Arendt, H., 2006b. *Between Past and Future* J. Kohn, ed., London: Penguin Books.
- Arendt, H., 2006a. *On Revolution*, London: Penguin Books.

- Arendt, H., 2006c. *Vom Leben des Geistes - Das Denken, Das Wollen*, München: Piper Verlag GmbH.
- Arkin, R.C., 2009a. Ethical Robots in Warfare. *IEEE Technology and Society Magazine*, (Spring), pp.30–33. Available at: <http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-publications/arkin-rev.pdf>.
- Arkin, R.C., 2009b. *Governing lethal behavior in autonomous robots*, Boca Raton: CRC Press.
- Arkin, R.C., 2010. The Case fo Ethical Autonomy in Unmanned Systems. *Journal of Military Ethics*, 9(4), pp.332–341.
- Arnason, G., 2010. Neuroscience and Free Will. In 24th European Conference on Philosophy of Medicine and Health Care. Zagreb, Croatia.
- Asaro, P., 2013. The labor of surveillance and bureaucratized killing: new subjectivities of military drone operators. *Social Semiotics*, 23(2), pp.196–224.
- Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International, Unmanned Aircraft System Operations Industry “Code of Conduct”. Available at: <http://www.auvsi.org/conduct> [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Atterton, P. & Calcarco, M., 2003. *The Continental Ethics Reader*, New York: Routledge.
- Babich, B., 2012. Nietzsche’s Post-Human Imperative: On the “All-too-Human” Dream of Transhumanism. *The Agonist*, 4(2).
- Bachmann, S. & Haeussler, U., 2011. Targeted killing as a means of asymmetric warfare: a provocative view and invitation to debate. *Law, Crime and History*, 1, pp.9–15.
- Bäck, A., 2009. Thinking Clearly about Violence. In V. Buffachi, ed. *Violence, A Philosophical Anthology*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Bacon, F., 1612. Of Friendship. Available at: <http://www.authorama.com/essays-of-francis-bacon-27.html> [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Baehr, P., 2003. Introduction. In *The Portable Hannah Arendt*. London: Penguin Books.
- Baier, A.C., 1997. Ethics in Many Different Voices. In J. Kohn & L. May, eds. *Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later*. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Bajema, C.J., 1988. Charles Darwn on man in the first edition of the Origin of Species. *Journal of the History of Biology*, 21(2), pp.403–410.
- Balibar, E., 2007. (De)Constructiing the Human and Human Institution: A Reflection on the Coherence of Hannah Arendt’s Practical Philosophy. *Social Research*, 74(3).

- Balmer, B. & Rappert, B., 2007. Rethinking “Secrecy” and “Disclosure”: What Science and Technology Studies Can Offer Attempts to Govern WMD Threats. In *Technology and Security - Governing Threats in the New Millennium*. New Security Challenges. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Barder, A. & Debrix, F., 2012. *Beyond Biopolitics - Theory, violence and horror in world politics*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Barder, A. & Debrix, F., 2009. Nothing to Fear but Fear: Governmentality and the Biopolitical Production of Terror. *International Political Sociology*, (3), pp.398-413.
- Barkan, S.E. & Snowden, L.L., 2000. *Collective Violence*, Welwyn Garden City: Pearson Higher Education.
- Bates, S., 2011. Use of water cannon on rioters backed across political divide. *the Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/09/theresa-may-water-cannon-riots> [Accessed August 5, 2013].
- Baudrillard, J., 2001. *Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings* 2nd ed. M. Poster, ed., Cambridge: Polity.
- Baudrillard, J., 2009. *The Transparency of Evil - Essays on Extreme Phenomena*, London: Verso.
- Bauman, Z., 1993. *Postmodern Ethics*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bauman, Z., 2000. Ethics of Individuals. *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 25(1), pp.83–96.
- Bauman, Z., 2007. *Liquid Life*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bauman, Z., 2012. *Modernity and the Holocaust*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bayertz, K., 2002. Self-enlightenment of applied ethics. In *Applied Ethics - Critical Concepts in Philosophy*. London: Routledge.
- Bazzicalupo, L., 2006. The Ambivalences of Biopolitics. *diacritics*, 36(2), pp.109–116.
- Beauchamp, T., 1984. On Eliminating the Distinction between Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory. *Monist*, 67(4), pp.514–530.
- Beauchamp, T., 2005. The Nature of Applied Ethics. In *A Companion to Applied Ethics*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Beavers, A.F., 2010. Editorial. *Ethics and Information Technology*, 12(3), pp.207–208.
- Becker, J. & Shane, S., 2012. Secret “Kill List” Tests Obama’s Principles. *The New York Times*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html> [Accessed May 30, 2012].

- Bell, D. ed., 2010. *Ethics and World Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bell, D., 2012. The Dawn of Biopolitical IR? *International Studies Review*, 14, pp.645–665.
- Benbaji, Y., 2011. The Moral Power of Soldiers to Undertake the Duty of Obedience. *Ethics*, 122(1), pp.43–73.
- Benhabib, S., 1996. *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Benjamin, W., 2007. Critique of Violence. In P. Demetz, ed. *Reflections - Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writing*. New York: Schocken Books.
- Bergman-Rosamond, A. & Phythian, M., 2011. *War, Ethics and Justice: New perspectives on a post-9/11 world*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Berkowitz, R., 2010. Human Being in an Inhuman Age. In *Human Being in an Inhuman Age*. Bard College, NY.
- Berman, D.K., 2012. So, What's Your Algorithm? *Wall Street Journal*. Available at: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203462304577138961342097348.html#ixzz1kBq7ueEr> [Accessed June 29, 2012].
- Bernstein, R., 2006. Rethinking the social and the political. In *Hannah Arendt - Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Bernstein, R.J., 1992. *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bertani, M. & Fontana, A., 2004. Situating the Lectures. In *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at The College de France 1975-1976*. London: Penguin.
- Bigo, D., 2006. Globalized (in)security: the Field and the Ban-opticon. Available at: <http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/conferences/muslims/Bigo.pdf>.
- Bigo, D., 2011. Security: A Field Left Fallow. In Dillon & A. Neal, eds. *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Birmingham, P., 1994. Arendt/Foucault: Power and the Law. In A. B. Dallery & S. H. Watson, eds. *Transitions in Continental Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Blackhurst, R., 2012. The air force men who fly drones in Afghanistan by remote control. *Telegraph.co.uk*. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/9552547/The-air-force-men-who-fly-drones-in-Afghanistan-by-remote-control.html> [Accessed August 7, 2013].
- Bland, E., 2009. Robot warriors will get a guide to ethics. *msnbc.com*. Available at: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/30810070/ns/technology_and_science-science/t/robot-warriors-will-get-guide-ethics/ [Accessed August 2, 2013].

- Blencowe, C., 2010. Foucault's and Arendt's "insider view" of biopolitics: a critique of Agamben. *History of the Human Sciences*, 23(5), pp.113 – 130.
- Bowler, P.J., 1989. *Evolution - The History of an Idea*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Braidotti, R., 2011. *Nomadic Theory - The Portable Rosi Braidotti*, New York Chichester: Cambridge University Press.
- Braidotti, R., 2013. *The Posthuman*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Braun, K., 2007. Biopolitics and Temporality in Arendt and Foucault. *Time & Society*, 16(5), pp.5 – 23.
- Breen, K., 2008. Violence and Power - A critique ofannah Arendt on the "Political". *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 33(3), pp.343 – 372.
- Brennan, J., 2010. Remarks by Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan at CSIS | The White House. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-john-brennan-csi> [Accessed January 8, 2013].
- Brennan, J., 2012a. The Efficacy and Ethics of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy. Available at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy> [Accessed August 7, 2013].
- Brennan, J., 2012b. "This Week" Transcript: John Brennan. Available at: <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-john-brennan/story?id=16228333&singlePage=true#.T6QEOu1OXna> [Accessed May 4, 2012].
- Brennan, J., 2013. Obama's Drone Master. Available at: <http://www.gq.com/news-politics/big-issues/201306/john-brennan-cia-director-interview-drone-program?printable=true> [Accessed July 23, 2013].
- Brown, C., 1992. *International Relations Theory - New Normative Approaches*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Brown, C., 2002. *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: international political theory today*, Cambridge, MA: Polity.
- Brown, C., 2003. Self-Defense in an Imperfect World. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 17(1).
- Brown, M., 2013. Life as a US drone operator: "It's like playing a video game for four years". *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/28/life-us-drone-operator-artist> [Accessed August 7, 2013].
- Buffachi, V., 2007. *Violence and Social Justice*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Buffachi, V., 2009. *Violence, A Philosophical Anthology*, Hampshire: Palgrave

MacMillan.

Bull, M., 2005. The Social and the Political. *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 104(4).

Bulley, D., 2013. Foreign Policy as Ethics: Toward a Re-Evaluation of Values. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, pp.1–17.

Bumiller, E. & ShankerThom, 2011. War Evolves with Drones, Some Tiny as Bugs. *New York Times*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/20/world/20drones.html?pagewanted=all> [Accessed August 7, 2013].

Butler, Judith 2009a. *Hannah Arendt, Ethics, and Responsibility*. European Graduate School (EGS) video lecture. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vOwdsO6KkkI&feature=youtube_gdata_p layer [Accessed July 12, 2013].

Butler, J., 2009b. *Frames of War - When is Life Grievable?*, London: Verso.

Byman, D., 2013. Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice. *Foreign Affairs*, 92(4), pp.32–43.

Caldwell, W. & Hagerott, C.M.R., 2010. Curing Afghanistan. *Foreign Policy*. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/07/curing_afghanistan [Accessed August 5, 2013].

Calhoun, C. & McGowan, J. eds., 1997. *Hannah Arendt & The Meaning of Politics*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Callahan, D., 2002. Bioethics. In R. Chadwick & D. Schroeder, eds. *Applied Ethics - Critical Concepts in Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Cameron, D., 2011a. Full Transcript David Cameron Speech on the fight-back after the riots Witney 15 August 2011. *New Statesman*. Available at: <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2011/08/society-fight-work-rights> [Accessed August 7, 2013].

Cameron, D., 2011b. PM statement on violence in England - Speeches - GOV.UK. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-on-violence-in-england> [Accessed August 5, 2013].

Campbell, D., 1998. Why Fight: Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-structuralism. *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 27(3), pp.497–522.

Campbell, D., 2001. Justice and international order: The case of Bosnia and Kosovo. In J.-M. Coicaud & D. Warner, eds. *Ethics and International Affairs- Extent & Limits*. New York: The United Nations University Press.

Campbell, D. & Dillon, M., 1993. *The Political Subject of Violence*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Campbell, D. & Shapiro, M.J., 1999. *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World*

- Politics*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Campbell, T.C., 2011. *Improper life : technology and biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben /*, University of Minnesota Press,.
- Canovan, M.,1995. *Hannah Arendt - A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Canovan, 1998. Introduction. In *The Human Condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,.
- Carney, J., 2013 *Drone strikes are legal, they are ethical, and they are wise*, Available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gg8jPheXtas&feature=youtube_gdata_player [Accessed August 2, 2013].
- Chadwick, R. & Schroeder, D. eds., 2002. *Applied ethics: critical concepts in philosophy*, London: Routledge.
- Chandler, D., 2011. Our Morals and Theirs: Politics beyond the Biopolitical Subject. In *Politics Beyond the Biopolitical Subject*. Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia.
- Clark, C. & Freedberg, S.J., 2013. Navy, Northrop Score Historic First With (Mostly) Successful X-47B Drone Carrier Landings. *Breaking Defense*. Available at:
<http://breakingdefense.com/2013/07/10/navy-northrop-score-historic-first-with-successful-x-47b-drone-carrier-landing/> [Accessed August 2, 2013].
- Clausewitz, C. von, 1989. *On War, Indexed Edition* Reprint., Princeton University Press.
- Clough, P. & Willse, C., 2011. *Beyond Biopolitics: Essays on the Government of Life and Death*, Durham: Duke University Press.
- Coady, C.A.J., 2009. The Idea of Violence. In V. Buffachi, ed. *Violence, A Philosophical Anthology*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Coeckelbergh, M., 2010. Robot rights? Towards a social-relational justification of moral consideration. *Ethics and Information Technology*, (12), pp.209–221.
- Coicaud, J.-M. & Warner, D. eds., 2001. *Ethics and International Affairs - Extent and Limits*, New York: The United Nations University Press.
- Coker, C., 2008. *Ethics and war in the twenty-first century /*, Routledge,.
- Coker, C., 2013. *Warrior Geeks: How the 21st Century Technology is Changing the Way We Fight and Think About War*, London: C. Hurts & Co.
- Cole, C., Dobbing, M. & Hailwood, A., 2010. *Convenient Killing: Armed Drones and the "Playstation Mentality"*, Oxford: The Fellowship of Reconciliation.
- Congressional Budget Office (COB), 2011. *Policy Options for Unmanned Aircraft Systems*, The Congress of the United States. Available at:

- <http://www.cbo.gov/> [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Conteh-Morgan, E., 2003. *Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts*, New York: Routledge.
- Cook, M. 2011 *Military Ethics as Professional Ethics: The Limits of the Philosophical Approach*. Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. 8th March 2011. iTunesU.
- Coombs, J. & Winkler, E., 1993. *Applied Ethics - A Reader*, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.
- Cooter, R. & Stein, C., 2010. Cracking Biopower. *History of the Human Sciences*, 23(2), pp.109–128.
- Critchley, S., 2009. *Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity*, London: Verso.
- Critchley, S., 2011. The Cycle of Revenge. Available at: <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/the-cycle-of-revenge/> [Accessed June 23, 2013].
- Cudworth, E. & Hobden, S., 2011. *Posthuman International Relations: Complexity, Ecologism and Global Politics*, London: ZedBooks.
- Cummings, M., 2011. Missy Cummings: Drones, Drones, Drones. Available at: <http://www.lawfareblog.com/tag/missy-cummings/> [Accessed August 7, 2013].
- Dao, J., 2013. Drone Pilots Found to Get Stress Disorders Much as Those in Combat Do. *The New York Times*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/us/drone-pilots-found-to-get-stress-disorders-much-as-those-in-combat-do.html> [Accessed August 7, 2013].
- Dare, T., 2002. Applied ethics, ehallenges to. In R. Chadwick & D. Schroeder, eds. *Applied Ethics - Critical Concepts in Philosophy*. London: Routledge.
- Dauphinee, E., 2009. Emanuel Levinas. In J. Edkins & P. N. Vaughan-Williams, eds. *Critical Theorists and International Relations*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Davis, M., 2002. Thinking like an engineer: the place of a code of ethics in the practice of a profession. In R. Chadwick & D. Schroeder, eds. *Applied Ethics - Critical Concepts in Philosophy*. London: Routledge.
- Deleuze, G., 2006. *Foucault*, London: Continuum.
- Department of the Air Force, 2010. Solicitation BAA-09-02-RH: Advances in Bioscience for Airmen Performance. Available at: <https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=946784f58fcd6994dacceb8cb1c2c2bf&tab=core&tabmode=list> / [Accessed August 2, 2013].
- Der Derian, J., 2000. Virtuous War / Virtual Theory. *International Affairs*, 76(4), pp.771–788.

- Der Derian, J., 1997. Post Theory: The Eternal Return of Ethics in International Relations. In M. Doyle and G.J. Ikenberry, ed. *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*. Boulder: WestviewPress.
- Der Derian, J., 2010. Revolutionizing Virtual War - an interview with James Der Derian. *Theory & Event*, 13(3).
- Derrida, J., 2002. Force of Law. In *Acts of Religion*. London: Routledge.
- Dewey, J., 2009. Law, Violence and Force. In V. Buffachi, ed. *Violence, A Philosophical Anthology*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Dillon, M., 1998. Criminalising Social and Political Violence Internationally. *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 27(3), pp.543 – 567.
- Dillon, M., 2007. Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Biopolitical Emergence. *International Political Sociology*, 1, pp.7 – 28.
- Dillon, M., 2011. Security, Race and War. In M. Dillon & A. Neal, eds. *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Dillon, M. & Lobo-Guerro, L., 2008. Biopolitics of security in the 21st century: an introduction. *Review of International Studies*, 34, pp.265 – 292.
- Dillon, M. & Neal, A., 2011. *Foucault on Politics, Security and War*, London: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Dillon, M. & Reid, J., 2009. *The Liberal Way of War - Killing to make life live*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Diprose, R., 2009. Toward an Ethico-Politics of the Posthuman: Foucault and Merleau-Ponty. *Parrhesia*, (8), pp.7–19. Available at: http://www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia08/parrhesia08_diprose.pdf.
- Doel, M.A., 1999. *Poststructuralist Geographies: The Diabolical Art of Spatial Science*, Edinburgh University Press.
- Dolan, F., 2005. The Paradoxical Liberty of Bio-Power: Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault on Modern Politics. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 31(3), pp.369 – 380.
- Doyle, M., 1983. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 12(3), pp.205–235.
- Duarte, 2006. Biopolitics and the Dissemination of Violence. In *Hannah Arendt - Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Edwards, C. 1999. Cutting off the king's head: the "social" in Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. *Studies in Social and Political Thought*. 1(1) pp. 3–20.
- Ellul, J., 1978. Symbolic function, technology and society. *Journal of Social Biological Structures*, (1), pp.207–218.

- Enns, D., 2007. Political Life Before Identity. *Theory & Event*, 10(1).
- Esposito, R., 2008. *Bios - Biopolitics and Philosophy*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- European RPAS Steerin Group, 2012. *Roadmap for the integration of civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft Systems into the European Aviation System*, Brussels: European Commission.
- Evans, B., 2010. Foucault's Legacy: Security, War and Violence in the 21st Century. *Security Dialogue*, 41(4), pp.413 – 433.
- Evans, B., 2013. *Liberal Terror*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Fabre, C., 2009. Guns, Food and Liability to Attack in War. *Ethics*, 120(1), pp.36–63.
- Fabre, C., 2011 *Killing in Humanitarian Wars*, Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. 16th May 2011. iTunesU.
- Falconer, B., 2003. Defense research agency seeks to create supersoldiers. *National Journal / Government Executive Magazine*. Available at: <http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/superSoldier.txt>.
- Fanon, F., 2001. *The Wretched of the Earth*, London: Penguin.
- Farrier, D. & Tuitt, P., 2013. Beyond Biopolitics: Agamben, Asylum and Postcolonial Critique. In G. Huggan, ed. *The Oxford Handbook of Postcolonial Studies*. Oxford University Press.
- Fassin, D., 2009. Another Politics of Life is Possible. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 26(5), pp.44–60.
- Fenichel-Pitkin, H., 1998. *The attack of the blob : Hannah Arendt's concept of the social .*, University of Chicago Press,.
- Finlay, C., 2009. Hannah Arendt's Critique of Violence. *Thesis Eleven*, 97, pp.26 – 45.
- Finn, P., 2011. Rise of the drone: From Calif. garage to multibillion-dollar defense industry. *The Washington Post*. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/rise-of-the-drone-from-calif-garage-to-multibillion-dollar-defense-industry/2011/12/22/gIQACG8UEP_story.html [Accessed May 4, 2012].
- Fisk, K. & Ramos, J.M., 2012. Drone Doctrine: Preventive Self-Defense as an Emerging Norm. In: International Studies Association. San Diego.
- Fletcher, G., 2000. The Nature and Function of Criminal Law. *California Law Review*, 88(3), pp.687–703.
- Foucault, M., 1991. *Discipline and Punish - The Birth of the Prison*, London: Penguin.

- Foucault, M., 1998. *The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality: 1*, London: Penguin Books.
- Foucault, M., 2000. On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress. In P. Rabinow, ed. *Ethics - Essential Workd of Foucault 1954 - 1984*. London: Penguin Books.
- Foucault, M., 2002a. Governmentality. In J. D. Faubion, ed. *Power - Essential Works of Foucault 1954 - 1984*. London: Penguin.
- Foucault, M., 2002b. The Subject and Power. In J. D. Faubion, ed. *Power - Essential Works of Foucault 1954 - 1984*. London: Penguin Books.
- Foucault, M., 2007. *Security, Territory, Population*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Foucault, M., 2004. *Society Must Be Defended*, London: Penguin.
- Frampton, K., 2006. The Status of Man and the Status of His Objects. In G. Williams, ed. *Hannah Arendt - Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Frazer, E. & Hutchings, K., 2008. On Politics and Violence: Arendt contra Fanon. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 7, pp.90 – 108.
- Frey, R.G. & Heath Wellman, C., 2005. *A Companion to Applied Ethics*, Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Frost, M., 1996. *Ethics in international relations : a constitutive theory /*, Cambridge University Press,.
- Frost, M., 2009. *Global ethics : anarchy, freedom and international relations /*, Routledge,.
- Fuller, S., 2011a. *Humanity 2.0 - What it Means to be Human Past, Present and Future*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Fuller, S., 2011b. *Humanity 2.0*, RSA Audio. Available at: <http://www.thersa.org/events/audio-and-past-events/2011/humanity-2.0> [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Gabriel, B. & Ilcan, S. eds., 2004. *Postmodernism and the ethical subject*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Galtung, J., 2009. Violence, Peace and Peace Research. In V. Buffachi, ed. *Violence, A Philosophical Anthology*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Gamble, A., 2010. Ethics and politics. In D. Bell, ed. *Ehics and World Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gert, B., 1984. Moral Theory and Applied Ethics. *Monist*, 67(4), pp.532–548.
- Gertler, J., 2012. *U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems*, Congressional Research Service.

Available at: <http://www.crs.gov>.

- Giddens, A., 1987. *The Nation-State and Violence*, Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Giddens, A., 2002. Political Theory and the Problem of Violence. In The Belgarde Circle, ed. *The Politics of Human Rights*. London: Verso.
- Goldfarb, M., 2012. Drone marketplace takes off globally. *GlobalPost*. Available at: <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/united-kingdom/120921/drone-marketplace-takes-globally> [Accessed August 2, 2013].
- Golovina, M. & Wroughton, L., 2013. Kerry hopes Pakistan drone strikes to end 'very soon. *Reuters*. Available at: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/08/01/uk-usa-pakistan-kerry-idUKBRE97015820130801> [Accessed August 8, 2013].
- Goodhand, J. & Hulme, D., 1999. From wars to complex political emergencies: understanding conflict and peace-building in the new world disorder. *Third World Quarterly*, 20(1), pp.13–26.
- Gordon, N., 2002. On Visibility and Power: An Arendtian Corrective of Foucault. *Human Studies*, 25, pp.125 – 145.
- Grayson, K., 2012. The ambivalence of assassination: Biopolitics, culture and political violence. *Security Dialogue*, 43(1), pp.25–41.
- Greenwald, G., 2011. New study proves falsity of John Brennan's drone claims. *Salon*. Available at: <http://www.salon.com/2011/07/19/drones/>.
- Greenwald, G., 2012. Obama moves to make the War on Terror permanent. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/24/obama-terrorism-kill-list> [Accessed January 10, 2013].
- Gregory, D., 2011. From a View to Kill: Drones and Late Modern War. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 28(7-8), pp.188–215.
- Grossman, D., 1996. *On killing: the psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society*, London: Little, Brown & Co.
- Halberstam, J. & Livingston, I., 1995. *Posthuman Bodies*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hanssen, B., 2000. *Critique of Violence: Between Post-Structuralism and Critical Theory*, London: Routledge.
- Haraway, D., 1997. *Modest.Witness@Second.Millennium.FemaleMan.Meets.OncoMouse : feminism and technoscience*, New York: Routledge.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A., 2001. *Empire*, Harvard University Press.
- Hardt, M. & Negri, A., 2006. *Multitude*, London: Penguin Books.

- Harris, S., 2012a. *Out of the Loop - The Human-free Future of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles*, Available at:
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/EmergingThreats_Harris.pdf.
- Harris, S., 2012b. Readings: Shane Harris, The Human-Free Future of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. *Lawfare*. Available at:
<http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/01/reviews-shane-harris-the-human-free-future-of-unmanned-aerial-vehicles/> [Accessed November 26, 2012].
- Hassner, P., 2001. Violence and ethics: Beyond the reason of state paradigm. In J.-M. Coicaud & D. Warner, eds. *Ethics and International Affairs- Extent & Limits*. New York: The United Nations University Press.
- Hayden, P., 2009. *Political Evil in a Global Age*, Oxford: Routledge.
- Heidegger, M., 2009. A Question Concerning Technology. In D. F. Krell, ed. *Basic Writings - Martin Heidegger*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Heisenberg, W., 1958. *The Physicist's Conception of Nature*, London: Hutchinson & Co.
- Heyns, C., 2013. *Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions*, United Nations Human Rights Council.
- Hobsbawm, E., 2007. *Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism*, London: Little, Brown & Co.
- Høivik, T. & Galtung, J., 1971. Structural and Direct Violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 8(1), pp.73–76.
- Honig, B., 2006. Toward an agonistic feminism: Hannah Arendt and the politics of identity. In G. Williams, ed. *Hannah Arendt - Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Honig, B., 1995. Towards an Agonistic Feminism. In *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Human Rights Watch, 2012. *Losing Humanity - The Case against Killer Robots*, International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School.
- Human Security Report Project, 2012. *Human Security Report 2012*, Vancouver, Canada: School for International Studies - Simon Fraser University.
- Hutchings, K., 2010. *Global Ethics - An Introduction*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hutchings, K., 1996. *Kant, Critique and Politics*. London: Routledge
- Ignatius, D., 2012. Politicizing the drone debate. *The Washington Post*. Available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/politicizing-the-drone-debate/2012/05/02/gIQArTMTxT_story.html [Accessed May 3, 2012].
- International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic Stanford Law School &

- Global Justice Clinic NYU School of Law, 2012. *Living Under Drones - Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan*, Available at: <http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Stanford-NYU-LIVING-UNDER-DRONES.pdf>.
- Isaac, J.C., 1996. A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(1), p.61.
- Isaac, J.C., 1992. *Arendt, Camus and Modern Rebellion*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Jabri, V., 1998. Restyling the Subject of Responsibility in International Relations. *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 27(3), pp.591–612.
- Jabri, V., 2007. *War and the Transformation of Global Politics*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Jabri, V., 2006. War, Security and the Liberal State. *Security Dialogue*, 37(1), pp.47–64.
- Jacobsen, M.H. & Poder, P., 2008. *The Sociology of Zygmunt Bauman: Challenges and Critique*, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Jay, M., 2006. The political existentialism of Hannah Arendt. In *Hannah Arendt - Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Johansson, L., 2011. Is it Morally Right to Use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in War? *Philosophy and Technology*, (24), pp.279–291.
- Joyce, R., 2006. *The evolution of morality /*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,.
- Kamen, A., 2009. The End of the Global War on Terror. *The Washington Post – In The Loop*. Available at: http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/03/23/the_end_of_the_global_war_on_t.html / [Accessed August 2, 2013].
- Kateb, G., 1984. *Hannah Arendt - Politics, Conscience, Evil*, New Jersey: Rowman & Allenheld.
- Keane, J., 2004. *Violence and Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ki Moon, B., UN News Centre - Remarks to the General Assembly on his Five-Year Action Agenda: *UN News Service Section*. Available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/speeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1437#.Uf-bauDehv0 [Accessed August 5, 2013].
- King, D., 2012. Luddites and bio politics now. *The Luddites at 200*. Available at: <http://www.luddites200.org.uk/biopolitics.html#sdendnote1anc> [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Klusmeyer, D., 2008. Hannah Arendt's Critical Realism: Power, Justice and Responsibility. In *Hannah Arendt and International Relations*. New York:

Palgrave MacMillan.

- Koch, C., 2012. How Physics and Neuroscience Dictate Your “Free” Will: Scientific American. *Scientific American*. Available at: <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=finding-free-will> [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Kochi, T., 2009. *The Other’s War - Recognition and the Violence of Ethics*, Oxon: Birkbeck Law Press.
- Kohn, J., 2003. Introduction. In *Responsibility and Judgement*. New York: Schocken.
- Kohn, J., 1990. Thinking/Acting. *Social Research: An International Quarterly*, 57(1), pp.105–134.
- Kohn, J. & May, L. eds., 1997. *Hannah Arendt - Twenty Years Later*, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Kraemer, F., Van Overveld, K. & Peterson, M., Is there an ethics of algorithms. *Ethics of Information Technology*, (13), pp.251–260.
- Kranzenberg, M., 1986. Presidential Address - Technology and History: “Kranzenberg’s Laws”. *Technology and Culture*, 27(3), pp.544–560.
- Kreide, R., 2009. Preventing Military Humanitarian Intervention? John Rawls and Juergen Habermas on a Just Global Order. *German Law Journal - Special Issue: The Kantian Project of International Law*, 10(1).
- Kreps, S. & Kaag, J., 2012. The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Contemporary Conflict: A Legal and Ethical Analysis. *Polity*, 44, pp.260–285.
- Krishnan, A., 2009. *Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons*, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Kurzweil, 2004. Kurzweil’s Law (aka "the law of accelerating returns). *Kurzweil Accelerating Intelligence - Essays*. Available at: <http://www.kurzweilai.net/kurzweils-law-aka-the-law-of-accelerating-returns> [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Kurzweil, R., 2005. *The singularity is near: when humans transcend biology*, London: Gerald Duckworth.
- Kymlicka, W. & Sullivan, W.M. eds., 2007. *The Globalization of Ethics*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- LaFollette, H., 2003. *The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lakoff, G., 1991. Metaphor and war: The metaphor system used to justify the war in the Gulf. *Viet Nam Generation Journal & Newsletter*, 3(3). Available at: http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/sixties/HTML_docs/Texts/Scholarly/Lakoff_Gulf_Metaphor_1.html.

- Lang, A. & Williams, J., *Hannah Arendt and International Relations*,
- Larmore, C., 1996. *The Morals of Modernity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Layne, C., 1994. Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace. *International Security*, 19(2), pp.5–49.
- Lazar, S., 2013. Legitimate Authority and the Morality of War.
- Lazar, S., 2011. Morality and Law in War. In *Oxford Ethics Law and Armed Conflict*. Oxford.
- De Lazari-Radek, K. & Singer, P., 2012. The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason. *Ethics*, 123(1), pp.9–31.
- Lazzarato, M., 2002. From Biopower to Biopolitics. *The Warwick Journal of Philosophy*, 13, pp.1–10.
- De Leonardis, F., 2008. War as a medicine: the medical metaphor in contemporary Italian political language. *Social Semiotics*, 18(1), pp.33–45.
- Lin, P., 2010. Ethical Blowback from Emerging Technologies. *Journal of Military Ethics*, 9(4), pp.313–331.
- Lin, P., 2011. Drone-Ethics Briefing: What a Leading Robot Expert Told the CIA. *The Atlantic*. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/12/drone-ethics-briefing-what-a-leading-robot-expert-told-the-cia/250060/> [Accessed May 3, 2012].
- Lin, P., Abney, K. & Bekey, G., 2011. *Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics*, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Lin, P., Bekey, G. & Abney, K., 2008. *Autonomous Military Robotics: Risks, Ethics and Design*, California Polytechnic State University. Available at: http://ethics.calpoly.edu/ONR_report.pdf.
- Litke, R.F., 2009. Violence and Power. In V. Buffachi, ed. *Violence, A Philosophical Anthology*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Lorenz, A., Mittelstaedt, J. von & Schmitz, G.P., 2011. Are Drones Creating a New Global Arms Race? *Spiegel Online*. Available at: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,792590,00.html> [Accessed May 4, 2012].
- Ludz, U., 2007. Arendt's Observations and Thoughts on Ethical Questions. *Social Research*, 74(3), pp.797–810.
- Lupton, J.R., 2012. Arendt in Italy: Or, the Taming of the Shrew. *Law, Culture and the Humanities*, 8(1), pp.68–83. Available at: <http://lch.sagepub.com/content/8/1/68> [Accessed August 7, 2013].

- Macchiarella, D., 2013. Going Back to School for Drone Pilot Training. Available at: <http://spectrum.ieee.org/podcast/at-work/tech-careers/going-back-to-school-for-drone-pilot-training>.
- MacIntyre, A., 1981. *After Virtue - a study in moral theory*, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.
- MacIntyre, A., 1984. Does Applied Ethics rest on a Mistake? *Monist*, 67(4), pp.498–513.
- Manchev, B. & Das, S.K., 2009. Terror and the Crisis of the Political. In *Terror, Terrorism, States and Societies*. Delhi: Women Unlimited.
- Marcus, G., 2012. Moral Machines. Available at: <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/11/google-driverless-car-morality.html> [Accessed January 3, 2013].
- Marcuse, H., 1982. Some Social Implications of Modern Technology. In *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group, pp. 138 – 162.
- Markoff, J., 2010. Robots, the Military's Newest Forces. *The New York Times*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/28/science/28robot.html> [Accessed July 31, 2013].
- Mayer, J., 2009. The Predator War - What are the risks of the CIA's covert drone programme? *The New Yorker*.
- Mbembe, A., 2003. Necropolitics. *Public Culture*, 15(1), pp.11–40.
- McDonald, J., 2011. Just and Unjust Signature Strikes. *Kings of War*. Available at: <http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/12/just-and-unjust-signature-strikes/>.
- McFalls, L., 2007. *A Matter of Life and Death: Iatrogenic Violence and the Formal Logic of International Intervention*, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Centre for the Critical Study of Global Power and Politics.
- McMahan, J. 2013 Where to Now for Just War Theory? Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. 2nd April 2013. iTunesU.
- McMahan, J., 2004. The Ethics of Killing in War. *Ethics*, 114, pp.693–733.
- McMahan, J., 2008. The Morality of War and the Law of War. In D. Rodin & H. Shue, eds. *Just and Unjust Warriors: The moral and legal status of soldiers*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McMahan, J., 2009. *Killing in War*, Oxford University Press.
- McMahan, J., 2011. Duty, Obedience, Desert and Proportionality in War: A Response. *Ethics*, 122(1), pp.135–167.
- McNeal, G.S., 2011. *The U.S. Practice of Collateral Damage Estimation and Mitigation*, Pepperdine University. Available at:

<http://works.bepress.com/gregorymcneal/22/>.

- Meade, E.M., 1997. The Commodification of Values. In L. May & J. Kohn, eds. *Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later*. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Meffan, J. & Worthington, K.L., 2001. Ethics before Politics. In T. F. Davis & K. Vomack, eds. *Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory*. University Press of Virginia.
- Miller, G., 2012a. Plan for hunting terrorists signals U.S. intends to keep adding names to kill lists. *The Washington Post*. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-11e2-a55c-39408f6e6a4b_story_4.html [Accessed January 10, 2013].
- Miller, G., 2012b. White House approves broader Yemen drone campaign. *The Washington Post*. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/white-house-approves-broader-yemen-drone-campaign/2012/04/25/gIQA82U6hT_story.html?sub=AR [Accessed May 4, 2012].
- Mouffe, C., 2005. *The Return of the Political*, London: Verso.
- Mudd, P., 2012. The Limits of Drone Warfare. Available at: <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/03/the-limits-of-drone-warfare.html> [Accessed August 5, 2012].
- Muehlhauser, L. & Helm, L., 2012. Intelligence Explosion and Machine Ethics. In A. Eden et al., eds. *Singularity Hypotheses: A Scientific and Philosophical Assessment*. Berlin: Springer.
- Mueller, J.-M., 2002. Non-Violence in Education. Available at: http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/file_download.php/fa99ea234f4accb0ad43040e1d60809cmuller_en.pdf.
- Mumford, L., 1934. *Technics and Civilisation*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
- Murakami, H., 2005. *Kafka on the Shore*, London: Random House Vintage.
- Nabulsi, K., 2006. Conceptions of Justice in War: from Grotius to Modern Times. In R. Sorabji & D. Rodin, eds. *The Ethics of War - Shared Problems in Different Traditions*. Hants: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Nardin, T., 2008. International Ethics. In C. Reus-Smit & D. Snidal, eds. *Oxford Handbook of International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nash, W.L., 2002. The Laws of War: A Military View. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 16(1), pp.14–17. Available at: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-7093.2002.tb00370.x/abstract> [Accessed August 5, 2013].

- National Defense Magazine, 2012. Ethics of Drone Strikes “Not a Relevant Question,” Says Air Force Chief. *National Defense Magazine*. Available at: <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=776>.
- New America Foundation, 2012. The Drone War in Pakistan. *New America Foundation*. Available at: <http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis>.
- Nietzsche, F., 1973. *Genealogie der Moral - Werke in drei Bänden. 3 (1973)*, Hanser Verlag.
- Nolin, P.C., 2012. *Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Opportunities and Challenges for the Alliance*, NATO. Available at: <http://www.nato-pa.int>.
- O’Connell, M., 2010. *Lawful Use of Combat Drones*, Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2010_hr/042810oconnell.pdf.
- Obama, B., 2012. Your Interview with the President - 2012. Available at: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eeTj5qMGTAI>.
- Ofek, H., 2010. The Tortured Logic of Obama’s Drone War. *The New Atlantis*, Spring 2010(27), pp.35–44.
- Oksala, J., 2010. Violence and the Biopolitics of Modernity. *Foucault Studies*, (10), pp.23–43.
- Olson, J. & Rashid, M., 2013. MODern Drone Warfare: An Ethical Analysis. In 2013 ASEE Southeast Section Conference.
- Orlie, M., 1997. *Living Ethically, Acting Politically*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Oudes, C. & Zwijnenburg, W., 2011. *Does Unmanned Make Unacceptable? Exploring the Debate on using Drones and Robots in Warfare*, Utrecht, The Netherlands: IKV Pax Christi.
- Owens, P., 2007. *Between Wars and Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Owens, P., 2009. Reclaiming “Bare Life”? Against Agamben on Refugees. *International Relations*, 23(4), pp.567 – 582.
- Owens, P., 2012. Human security and the rise of the social. *Review of International Studies*, 38(3), pp.547–567.
- Papadopoulos, D., 2010. Insurgent Posthumanism. *Ephemera - Theory & Politics in Organization*, 10(2), pp.134–151.
- Parekh, S., 2008. *Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity*, New York: Routledge.
- Parker, T., 2012. Drones: The Known Knowns. *Human Rights Now*. Available at: <http://blog.amnestyusa.org/us/drones-the-known-knowns/>.
- Parsons, D., 2013. Worldwide, Drones are in High Demand. *National Defense*.

- Available at:
<http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2013/May/Pages/Worldwide,DronesAreinHighDemand.aspx> [Accessed July 31, 2013].
- Passerin D'Entreves, M., 1994. *The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt*, London: Routledge.
- Passerin D'Entreves, M., 2006. Excerpt from "Hannah Arendt's conception of modernity". In *Hannah Arendt - Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Pateman, C., 1986. Removing Obstacles to Democracy. In International Political Science Association Meeting. Ottawa, Canada.
- Patton, P., 1998. Foucault's Subject of Power. In J. Moss, ed. *The Later Foucault: Politics and Philosophy*. London: Sage.
- Pew Research Centre, 2012. *Drone Strikes Widely Opposed*, Pew Research Centre. Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/12/20/slideshow-pew-research-global-year-in-review/pg_12-18-12_years_slides_01_drones/.
- Pew Research Centre, Obama and drone strikes: Support but questions at home, opposition abroad. Available at: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/24/obama-and-drone-strikes-support-but-questions-at-home-opposition-abroad/> [Accessed June 23, 2013].
- Pickup, S., 2010. *Overseas Contingency Operations: Comparisons of the Department of Defense's Overseas Contingency Operations Funding Request for Fiscal Years 2010 And 2011*. Washington: DIANE Publishing.
- Poole, R., 1991. *Morality and Modernity*, London: Routledge.
- Poole, S., 2007. Is the virtual warfare blurring the army's view of the real battlefield. *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/feb/07/military.stevenpoole>.
- Pugliese, J., 2011. Prosthetics of Law and the Anomic Violence of Drones. *Griffith Law Review*, 20(4), pp.931–961.
- Raffoul, F., 2008. Derrida and the Ethics of the Im-possible. *Research in Phenomenology*, 38(2), pp.270–290.
- Rapoport, D.C. & Weinberg, L. eds., *The Democratic Experience and Political Violence*, London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Reid, J., 2006. *The Biopolitics of the War on Terror : life struggles, liberal modernity, and the defence of logistical societies /*, Manchester University Press ;
- Rengger, N., 2013. *Just War and International Order: The Uncivil Condition in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press.
- Rengger, N., 2002. On the just war tradition in the twenty-first century. *International Affairs*, 78(2), pp.353–363.

- Ricoeur, P., 2006. Power and Violence. In G. Williams, ed. *Hannah Arendt - Critical Assessment of Leading Political Philosophers*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Robbets, K., 2013. The Philosopher, the socialite, the engineers, and the spy: “cybercultural” debates in 1964.
- Roberts, D., 2013. US drone strikes being used as alternative to Guantanamo, lawyer says. *The Guardian*. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/02/us-drone-strikes-guantanamo>
- Robinson, E., 2011. Assassination by robot: Are we justified? *The Washington Post*. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/assassination-by-robot-are-we-justified/2011/06/30/AGp0DlsH_story.html [Accessed May 3, 2012].
- Rodd, R., 1990. *Biology, ethics and animals* /, Oxford: Clarendon.
- Rodin, D., 2011. Justifying Harm. *Ethics*, 122(1), pp.74–110.
- Rodin, D. & Sorabji, R. eds., 2006. *The Ethics of War - Shared Problems in Different Traditions*, Burlington: Ashgate.
- Rose D., 2010. Is it Important to Maintain a Distinction between Humans and Machines? In: *Human Being in an Inhuman Age*, Bard College, NY.
- Rose, N., 2003. *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rose, N., 2006. *Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Rose, N., 2001. The Politics of Life Itself. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 18(6), pp.1–30.
- Roulier, S., 1997. Excavating Foucaultian Identity. *Humanitas*, X(1).
- Royakkers, L. & Van Est, R., 2010. The Cubicle Warrior: the marionette of digitalized warfare. *Ethics and Information Technology*, 12(3).
- Ryan, C., 2011. Democratic Duty and the Moral Dilemmas of Soldiers. *Ethics*, 122(1), pp.10–42.
- Salmi, J., 2009. The Different Categories of Violence. In V. Buffachi, ed. *Violence, A Philosophical Anthology*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Sanger, D., 2011. As drones Evolve, More Countries Want Their Own. *National Security*. Available at: <http://www.npr.org/2011/09/26/140812779/as-drones-evolve-more-countries-want-their-own>.
- Sartre, J.-P., 2001. Preface. In *The Wretched of the Earth*. London: Penguin.
- Savage, C., 2013. U.S. Acknowledges Killing 4 Americans in Drone Strikes. *The New York Times*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/us/us->

- acknowledges-killing-4-americans-in-drone-strikes.html [Accessed May 22, 2013].
- Scarry, E., 1985. *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schaap, A., 2007. Political Theory and the Agony of Politics. *Political Studies Review*, 5(1), pp.56–74.
- Schaap, A., 2010. The politics of need. In *Power, Judgement and Political Evil: In Conversation with Hannah Arendt*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Serle, J. & Woods, C., 2012. August 2012 update: US covert action in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. *The Bureau of Investigative Journalism*. Available at: <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/09/03/august-2012-update-us-covert-actions-in-pakistan-yemen-and-somalia/>.
- Shachtman, N., 2012. Darpa's Magic Plan: "Battlefield Illusions" to Mess With Enemy Minds | Danger Room | Wired.com. *Danger Room*. Available at: <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/02/darpa-magic/> [Accessed November 26, 2012].
- Shachtman, N., 2010. Air Force Wants Neuroweapons to Overwhelm Enemy Minds | Danger Room | Wired.com. *Danger Room*. Available at: <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/11/air-force-looks-to-artificially-overwhelm-enemy-cognitive-capabilities/> [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Shachtman, N., 2009. CIA Chief: Drones "Only Game in Town" for Stopping Al Qaeda. *Wired*. Available at: <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/cia-chief-drones-only-game-in-town-for-stopping-al-qaeda/>.
- Shane, S., 2012a. The Moral Case for Drones. *The New York Times*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-moral-case-for-drones.html> [Accessed July 29, 2012].
- Shane, S., 2012b. White House Presses for Drone Rule Book. *The New York Times*. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/world/white-house-presses-for-drone-rule-book.html> [Accessed November 26, 2012].
- Sharkey, N., 2010. Saying "No!" to Lethal Autonomous Targeting. *Journal of Military Ethics*, 9(4), pp.369–383. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15027570.2010.537903>.
- Sharkey, N., 2012. America's mindless killer robots must be stopped. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/03/mindless-killer-robots> [Accessed December 4, 2012].
- Shima, T., Rasmussen, S. & Rasmussen, S.J., 2009. *Uav Cooperative Decision and Control: Challenges and Practical Approaches*, SIAM.
- Shinko, R.E., 2008. Agonistic Peace: A Postmodern Reading. *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 36(3), pp.473–491.

- Shue, H., 1995. Ethics, the Environment and the Changing International Order. *International Affairs*, 71(3), pp.453–461.
- Sifton, J., 2012. A Brief History of Drones. *The Nation*. Available at: <http://www.thenation.com/article/166124/brief-history-drones> [Accessed May 5, 2012].
- Singer, J.D. & Small, M., 1976. The War-proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816-1865. *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 1(4), pp.50–69.
- Singer, P.W., 2009. Robots at War: The New Battlefield. *The Wilson Quarterly - Surveying the World of Ideas*. Available at: http://www.cc.gatech.edu/classes/AY2009/cs4001c_spring/documents/WilsonQuarterly-RobotsAtWar.pdf [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Singer, P.W., 2010a. *Wired for War: The Robotics revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century*, London: Penguin.
- Singer, P., 2010b. The Ethics of Killer Applications: Why Is It So Hard to Talk About Morality When It Comes to New Military Technology? *Journal of Military Ethics*, 9(4), pp.299 – 312.
- Singer, P.W., 2011. *The Morality of Robo-Wars: PW Singer*, Radio National.
- Sloterdijk, P., 2009. Rules for the Human Zoo: a response to the Letter on Humanism. *Environment and Planning*, 28, pp.12-28.
- Smith, K.E. & Light, M. eds., 2001. *Ethics and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Spiro, D., 1994. The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace. *International Security*, 19(2), pp.50–86.
- Stenger, V., 2012. Free Will Is an Illusion. *Huffington Post*. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/free-will-is-an-illusion_b_1562533.html [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Stepanova, E., One-sided violence against civilians in armed conflicts. In *SIPRI Yearbook 2009*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stock, G., 2002. *Redesigning Humans: Our Inevitable Genetic Future*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Strawser, B., 2010. Moral Predators: The Dury to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles. *Journal of Military Ethics*, 9(4).
- Sullins, J.P., 2010. Robo Warfare: Can robots be more ethical than humans on the battlefield? *Ethics of Information Tchnology*, (12), pp.263–275.
- Swiffen, A., 2011. *Law, ethics and the biopolitical /*, Routledge,.
- Swift, S., 2008. *Hannah Arendt*, Oxon: Routledge.

- Swift, S., 2013. Hannah Arendt, violence and vitality. *European Journal of Social Theory*.
- Sylvester, C., 2013. *War As Experience - Contributions from international relations and feminist analysis*, Abingdon: Routledge.
- Tamborino, J., 1999. Locating the Body: Corporeality and Politics in Hannah Arendt. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 7(2), pp.172–190.
- Taylor, D., 2007. Arendt, Foucault, and Feminist Politics: A Critical Appraisal. In *Feminist Politics - Identity, Difference, and Agency*. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Thacker, E., 2003. Data Made Flesh: Biotechnology and the Discourse of the Posthuman. *Cultural Critique*, 53(Winter 2003), pp.72–97.
- Thacker, E., 1999. The Thickness of Tissue Engineering: Biopolitics, Biotech and the Regenerative Body. *Theory & Event*, 3(3).
- The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2013. Covert War on Terror - The Datasets. Available at:
<http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/>.
- The Economist, 2012. Robot ethics: Morals and the machine. *The Economist*. Available at:
http://www.economist.com/node/21556234?fsrc=scn/tw_ec/morals_and_the_machine [Accessed June 30, 2012].
- The National Academies, 2008. *Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience and Related Technologies*, National Research Council Committee on Military and Intelligence Methodology for Emergent Neurophysiological and Cognitive/neural Research.
- The Royal Society, 2012. *Neuroscience, conflict and security*. Available at:
http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/brain-waves/2012-02-06-BW3.pdf [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- The White House, 2002. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington.
- Tilly, C., 2006. *The Politics of Collective Violence*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Turda, M., 2007. The Nation as Object: Race, Blood, and Biopolitics in Interwar Romania. *Slavic Review*, 66(3), pp.413–441.
- US Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, 2013. *Medical Surveillance Monthly Report*, US Armed Forces. Available at:
http://www.afhsc.mil/viewMSMR?file=2013/v20_n06.pdf#Page=02. [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- US Department of Defense (USDOD), 2012. *Department of Defense Report to*

Congress on Future Unmanned Aircraft Systems Training, Operations, and Sustainability,

- USDOD - US Department of Defense, 2013. *Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System*, United States Department of Defense. Available at: http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2014/FY2014_Weapons.pdf [Accessed August 6, 2013].
- Vatter, M., 2009. From Surplus Value to Surplus Life. *Theory & Event*, 12(2).
- Vatter, M., 2006. Natality and Biopolitics in Hannah Arendt. *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 26(2).
- Villa, D.R., 1999. *Politics, Philosophy, Terror*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Vincenzo Bizzo, N.M., 1992. Darwin on Man in the Origin of Species: Further Factors Considered. *Journal of the History of Biology*, 25(1), pp.137–147.
- Virilio, P., 1986. *Speed and politics: an essay on dromology*, Columbia University.
- Wagner, M., 2012. The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical and Political Implications of Autonomous Weapons Systems. Available at: http://robots.law.miami.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Wagner_Dehumanization_of_international_humanitarian_law.pdf [Accessed July 31, 2013].
- Wallach, W. & Allen, C., 2008. *Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong*, Oxford University Press.
- Wan, W. & Finn, P., 2011. Global race on to match U.S. drone capabilities. *The Washington Post*. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/global-race-on-to-match-us-drone-capabilities/2011/06/30/gHQACWdmxH_story.html [Accessed May 4, 2012].
- Weizman, E., 2009. Thanato-tactics. In A. Ophir, M. Givoni, & S. Hanafi, eds. *The Power of Inclusive Exclusion: anatomy of Israeli rule in the occupied territories*. New York: Zone Books.
- De Wijze, S., 2002. Toward a political ethic: exploring the boundaries of a moral politics. In R. Chadwick & D. Schroeder, eds. *Applied Ethics - Critical Concepts in Philosophy*. London: Routledge.
- Williams, G. ed., 2006. *Hannah Arendt - Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*, New York: Routledge.
- Williams, G., 2007. Ethics and human relationality: between Arendt's accounts of morality. *HannahArendt.net - Journal for Political Thinking*, (3). Available at: www.hannaharendt.net.
- Wilson, E.O., 1998. The Biological Basis of Morality. *The Atlantic Monthly - Digital Edition*, April. Available at:

<http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/98apr/biomoral.htm>

Wilson, E.O., 2000. *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, Harvard University Press.

Wilson, E.O., 2012. *On Human Nature*, Harvard University Press.

Wilson, S. & Cohen, J., 2012. Poll finds broad support for Obama's counterterrorism policies. *The Washington Post*. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-finds-broad-support-for-obamas-counterterrorism-policies/2012/02/07/gIQAFrSEyQ_story.html [Accessed May 4, 2012].

Wittes, B. & Byman, D., 2013. How Obama Decides Your Fate If He Thinks You're a Terrorist. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/how-obama-decides-your-fate-if-he-thinks-youre-a-terrorist/266419/> [Accessed January 3, 2013].

Wolin, S., 2009. Violence and the Western Political Tradition. In V. Buffachi, ed. *Violence, A Philosophical Anthology*. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

Woods, C. & Yusufzai, M., 2013. Get the Data: the return of double-tap drone strikes. *The Bureau of Investigative Journalism*. Available at: <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/08/01/get-the-data-the-return-of-double-tap-drone-strikes/> [Accessed August 6, 2013].

Worcester, K., Bermanzohn, S.A. & Ungar, M., 2002. *Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox*, Taylor & Francis Group.

Youde, J., 2009. *Biopolitical Surveillance and Public Health in International Politics*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan.

Young-Bruehl, E., 2006. *Why Arendt Matters*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Zenko, M., 2012a. America's Third, Orwellian War: The "Targeted Killing" Campaign. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/americas-third-orwellian-war-the-targeted-killing-campaign/256276/> [Accessed May 4, 2012].

Zenko, M., 2012b. Politics, Power, and Preventive Action » Institutionalizing America's Targeted Killing Program. Available at: <http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/10/24/institutionalizing-americas-targeted-killing-program/> [Accessed January 10, 2013].

Zizek, S., 2008a. Slavoj Zizek on Violence. Available at: available on <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5r8C6O0Jk5E>.

Zizek, S., 2008b. *Violence*, London: Profile Books Ltd.