

EXCLUSION AND IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION:
THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP

By
MARA FRIDELL

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Dr. Linda Fuller, Chair of the Examining Committee

Date 11/19/07

Committee in Charge: Linda Fuller, Chair
Joan Acker
Lynn Fujiwara
Joseph Fracchia

Accepted by:

Dean of the Graduate School

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Mara J. Fridell for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Dr. Linda Fuller

In both Sweden and the United States immigration has increased, and public concern over immigration, integration, and social citizenship has become heightened. Across affluent Western countries, immigration and integration concerns have been molded into a consensus on the need to instill discipline, but conflict has emerged through public discussions of where discipline is to be applied. Analyzing media content and public documents, I find that in Sweden and in Europe more broadly, as in the United States, some disciplinary political narratives suggest that immigrants themselves are deviant and should be targeted for exclusion from the social rights of citizenship; other narratives hold that immigrants can best be incorporated by using the state to facilitate the expansion of the secondary labor market. It is popularly claimed that the expansion of secondary labor markets promotes economic inclusion, which is held to be the foundation for integration. While this has proven an effective wedge among voters, I probe the validity of this neoliberal claim by reviewing the integration of previous labor immigrants in Sweden through industrial-sector jobs, and by examining immigrant economic

inclusion and social citizenship in the U.S. I use comparative data on inequality and immigration within the United States and across Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries to assess trends in relationships driving social citizenship politics. In interviews with policy makers and integration officials, and reviewing the labor union confederation literature in Sweden, I find satisfaction with the operation of the Swedish social democratic division of labor in immigrant policy-setting and integration; as well I find on the national level a lack of concern with the wider, politically-transformative implications of prominent social citizenship politics. This allows me to demonstrate how state actors and even labor institutions can be steered into facilitating neoliberal wedge politics and reforms that undermine social citizenship in favor of concentrated accumulation.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Mara Fridell

PLACE OF BIRTH: South Saint Paul, Minnesota

DATE OF BIRTH: March 12, 1969

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon

University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Hamline University, Saint Paul, Minnesota

DEGREES AWARDED:

Doctor of Philosophy, Sociology, December 2007, University of Oregon

Master of Arts, 1998, University of New Mexico

Bachelor of Arts, 1987, Hamline University

AREA OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

Political Sociology

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Instructor, Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pennsylvania

Instructor, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon

GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS:

Fulbright Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, Sweden 2002-2003

Premium for Academic Excellence Award, Iowa State University, 1999

National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship in Ecological Complexity, 1996-1998

PUBLICATIONS:

Hort, S.E.O, T. Burns, M. Carson, and M. Fridell 2003. *Country Report: Sweden*. Brussels: CIVGOV Project.

Fridell, M., I. Hudson, and M. Hudson. 2008. "With friends like these...: The corporate response to Fair Trade Coffee." *Review of Radical Political Economics* 40 (1).

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For Mark and Quinn

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

When many, many people run in the same direction, two questions need to be asked: What are they running after and what are they running from
T.H. Marshall (1950).

Her arms hanging heavy with plastic grocery bags, Leyla motioned gracefully with her white-scarved head toward one of the high-rise apartment buildings outside the *tunnelbana* subway. Leyla is a New Swede,¹ a slender Somali refugee intermittently taking Swedish classes and mothering a thirteen-year-old son, now struggling in school. With little formal education, she has worked as a cleaner at the university and her husband has briefly worked as a mobile phone store employee. But now they are unemployed and receiving state support, while attending municipal classes teaching Swedish language. The stresses of the war and politics in her homeland have left both Leyla and her husband with health problems. Unable to keep above pressures, the couple has not completed Swedish language classes in the past, although her husband speaks better than she. With the interpretation of a mutual friend, the owner of a vegetarian restaurant I seem to be the only person in Stockholm patronizing, Leyla says she finds Swedes she interacts with—mostly in brief, commercial interactions—impenetrable, although the municipal workers have been friendly and the efficient welfare workers understanding. Americans are more friendly, right?, she asks, ingratiatingly. The years

¹ Because Sweden grants citizenship readily after four or five years of permanent residency, and because Sweden does not keep track of ethnicity or race in its extensive census, it is common to research integration issues by delineating Swedish or “foreign background”. In this dissertation I use the terms “New Swede” (citizens and residents with a foreign background) and “ethnic Swede” (citizens with a family background in Sweden).

she has spent as a refugee have been very difficult. Leyla is exhausted. A mosque in a southern town was set ablaze a few months ago and her son was disciplined a week ago for spray painting offensive, bragging language on a school wall. Her face hardens at the thought that families like her own are depicted as problems to society. It is an additional burden.

We navigate the small crowd of people disembarking the subway at this outer stop. Apparently mostly immigrants,² they stop to greet others under the winter trees in the small neat square faced by the ground floor small businesses of modernist apartment buildings. We walk a short way into the lobby of Leyla's apartment building and ride up the elevator. Although many of the immigrant families in this neighborhood are low income by Swedish standards, this is no slum as U.S. residents understand the concept. It is just a tidy, solid, but unostentatious complex, designed in the 1960s by groups including architects and sociologists to provide well-made, humanitarian housing for people with a wide range of ability. The suburban modernist developments became stigmatized after a couple of decades. Swedes came to consider them "ugly concrete buildings."³ They were thought to be too isolated, the living space too small, and the buildings massed together on too large scale. The standards for quality of life are high in the social democratic country. Yet a North American or Indian would enthuse over the suburban isolation, and the Japanese would appreciate the fourteen-story buildings

² As this study covers changing immigration policy, involving various mixes of types of immigration, I have tried to use the terms "refugee", "family reunification immigrants", and "labor immigrants" and "immigrants" carefully. When I use the term "immigrants" I mean to encompass more than one type of immigrant, usually all three. I also use the broad term "immigrant" to signify how the New Swede is discursively constructed in Sweden. Labor immigration declined after 1972, but immigrants from the pre-1972 period may be included in policy today. As well, most Swedish political parties are preparing to reintroduce labor immigration. Family reunification immigrants constituted the largest number of immigrants in Sweden prior to the recent surge in Iraqi refugees.

³ Despite modernist objections, most humans have to admit that an environment built of concrete in its typical, cheap form fails to communicate care to anyone routinely subject to the stresses of excessive (typical) external control, whether state based or market based. However, only sixteen percent of the Miljonprogram buildings have concrete exteriors.

(maybe they would consider them too low) and 75 square meter⁴ apartments. In Sweden, geographer Elisabeth Lilja tells me, people with disabilities are fond of the architecture, as it allows them to lead public as well as private lives. The suburban housing is well constructed, and designed for easy access to clean and efficient public transportation, public space, goods, and services. Recently, an English-language news site has promoted the modernist developments to higher-earning immigrants from England and the U.S. because they would regard them as nice.



Figure 1. Miljonprogrammet housing complex in Huvudsta.

Leyla unlocks her apartment door. Her lanky son is already home from school, on the green couch with two other Somali boys, watching television, their backs to the glass patio doors overlooking the suburb. The suburb is trimmed with dingy snow and the brittle trunks and branches of trees in winter. It is early afternoon and a pallid, distant sun is casting a tangerine tinge into the darkening grayness. Despite the bustling city center

⁴ 75 square meters is 800 square feet.

streets, cozy pubs and restaurants, and ubiquitous candle glow, the nearly-sunless Swedish winters are very hard on the spirits of a new resident, and even seasoned veterans become markedly cranky. By that point in winter, Swedes had barked at me for various imagined infractions on several public occasions. Most of them involved accusations of stealing seats, and when tickets were examined and the indignant person was found to be in error, he or she would abruptly flee without offering even a sheepish smile. Once an apartment neighbor flew down the common stairs to accuse me of routinely smoking in the apartment hallway, though I do not smoke at all. Last, late at night I was talking with a friend on the way home, and though sober, I was distracted and simply hadn't braced myself for a subway jolt. The prim young woman sitting across the aisle screamed—not shrieked, but screamed in horror when I was reduced to quickly bracing myself off the seats to her side. I'm not a very big person. Having managed to avoid falling on her or even touching her, I'm not sure exactly how I scared the screaming *tjej*⁵ that much, but for the rest of the ride I was surprised to find myself treated to a subway car full of deeply scornful and suspicious glares. My French friend was mortified. In retrospect I should have offered the car a joke at my expense to ease the tension, but my quickness was used up on the balancing manoeuvre and I might have been in shock from the scream. In short, I had some experiences in Sweden that could indicate that sun-deprived Swedes are not above transposing a little fear and loathing onto foreigners, if only fitfully, seasonally, and in anonymous situations. The occasional, small outbursts of misplaced righteousness seemed mercifully to evaporate as the sun revived in the spring.

As she slides her heavy wool winter coat onto a hanger, I realize Leyla and her family are amongst the worst off in Sweden, immigrants who have been processed through refugee camps and have attended introduction sessions—some of them, anyway—but remain among the most vulnerable to the ephemeral nature of disposable employment. For them, the idea of more jobs like the ones they have held sounds good, sounds more secure.

⁵ “Tjej” means “girl”.

They cannot think of what else they would want from Sweden. They are not networked into Swedish society or immersed in public life—do not belong to a singing group or innebandy team, do not browse design stores on the weekend, skate surely around expansive, well-groomed ice circles cleared on frozen lakes, or gather at 7-11s for hotdogs—and they do not follow or understand what is at stake in Swedish politics. Leyla's husband, she says, hopes to return to Muqdisho some day and start a business with his son, like his father's small motor repair business in a town near the Somali capitol.

If Leyla's family is the poster family for problems of immigrants in Sweden, I met many immigrants as well who are less marginalized from Swedish opportunity structures, studying, gaining education and credentials, cobbling together Swedish and English, learning to find bemusement in the popular passions of Swedes, and trying to connect with their new world politically. If some of the New Swede men regularly trek to the second floor of the Kulturhuset in the middle of Stockholm to settle in with a newspaper from their home country, they do so in front of giant glass walls overlooking the hubbub of public and commercial life. If many of the bundled New Swede women never come to connect on the *tunnelbana* with their subway-seat neighbors—highly educated ethnic Swedish women, with their smart haircuts dyed red and their expensive, architect's eyeglasses—some immigrant women gain prominent positions in social welfare offices, doing research in which they take pride.

Many of the New Swedes I met in day to day life were obviously researchers. Their lives were not perfectly easy, but they were good. They could not take pride in the extensive system of historical monuments, and they did not usually have access to the pleasant, modest summer homes passed on through Swedish families. Depending on their background distance from Sweden, some New Swedes had continuing, stressful language difficulties, and experienced academia at its least welcoming. But their research work allowed them a good opportunity to network themselves between their ethnic

communities and their new society, contributing to their new society through their findings and recommendations. They could count on a few good Swedish friends, and party invitations. They were middle class, often living in neighborhoods in center city or close to Stockholm University. They were secure.

The New Swedes had full citizenship rights and could join in public politics, including both establishment politics and demonstrations. Their languages were not stigmatized. Their apartments housed Swedish—well, IKEA anyway—furniture mixed with pieces from their former lives abroad. They participated in ethnic organizations. Sometimes the New Swedes had partnered with ethnic Swedes; if they were from Middle Eastern backgrounds, more likely they married someone of their own ethnic background. They had children who went to learn and play in public school with everyone else’s children, on top of which the Swedish state also provided their children their ethnic language instruction.

For three months I walked home from work past a small, children’s soccer field where ethnic Swedish and minority⁶ Swedish kids of all ages played together, pretty happily, day after day. As I am for some reason prepared to witness some form of child cruelty or another when I go by a playground, I sometimes took a small thrill of pleasure at how loving and playful the kids generally were. Their lack of political naïveté was even more surprising. “You can send us the photo at my email address,” an impish 12-year-old in a hijab told me. “My email address is *Yelaharaber...*” she said, and started adding to my ongoing Swedish language education, trying to explain the political-cultural reference of her email name.⁷

⁶ Here I am using the term “minority” loosely in the Swedish case. Because Sweden only recognizes the Roma, Laplanders, Touredalers, Finns, and Jews as ethnic minorities in Sweden, other groups are referred to by various other terms. In this dissertation I will use the term “New Swede” to refer to post-WWII refugee and labor immigrants and their descendents.

⁷ “Yehl” is a North American Tlingit trickster creator-god, who stole fire and gave it to humans, created the sun and the moon, and as a raven created land out of primordial fog. “Yelah” is a socialist, anti-racist, culture periodical founded in Sweden in 1994.



Figure 2. Young Swedish citizens/*fo*tbollspelare

Citizenship Retrenchment

Our world has been subject to a large amount of “creative destruction,” as economist Joseph Schumpeter might say. Such creative destruction has resulted in, *inter alia*, about 35 million displaced people in the world today. Displacement, dispersal, and destruction of human communities seem to have become characteristic dynamics of the world system. Dr. Norman Myers of Oxford University has estimated that human-induced climate change will soon add another 150 million refugees.⁸ Refugees, like other immigrants, are ordinary people from all walks of life. They have been through even more extraordinary circumstances, although in some cases they also have access to some level of social assistance that other kinds of immigrants may not. This dissertation focuses on how the resettlement and integration of refugees, labor immigrants, and their families into affluent societies can intersect in politically charged ways with ongoing struggles to build and reform these societies. This is because every state assumes the right to treat citizens and noncitizens differently, immigrants are usually vulnerable, and some political actors use state borders and stigmatization of new residents to induce new social consensus on citizenship in countries as a whole.

Citizenship sounds abstract—a topic for political experts, but it is the foundation for our prospects in life. One way or another, many people are talking about the contemporary decline of citizenship. From studies of the transfer of public goods and services to private corporations in the wake of disasters (Klein 2007), to the phenomenal contemporary growth of slums worldwide (Davis 2006), to the severe reduction in publicly-oriented, remunerated work accessible to the recent generations of U.S. citizens (Brooks 2007), much social observation today shows how elite political movement⁹ naturalized as economic necessity in effect degrades citizenship—“full membership in the community”

⁸ Myers, Norman. 1993. *BioScience* 43(11).

⁹ This elite political movement, neoliberalism valorizes the free market, devolution, all forms of business (profitable under *laissez-faire* conditions or not), and reduced accountability to the working class, women, and minority groups.

as T.H. Marshall called it in *Citizenship and Social Class* (1950). Below I explain how the many layers of social decline researchers are observing is the retrenchment of citizenship. I contribute a study of how political actors work to transform, maintain, and expand citizenship through immigration, integration, multiculturalism, and welfare policies, and I fill a gap by demonstrating the innovative democratic institutions, policies, culture, and practices that constitute the social democratic alternative.

Sweden is a particularly interesting case because it has highly developed citizenship rights for immigrants and refugees. Neoliberal critics are challenging some of these rights, ostensibly in an effort to improve social integration. In order to capture this challenge in the context of Swedish social democratic institutions, I studied the popular framing of immigrant integration problems in the media, in academia (academics are commissioned to study immigrant problems for the government in Sweden), and in political debates and policy formulations. I interviewed local and national authorities. I interviewed immigrants who were thriving. I visited the suburbs and a small town in which immigrants live, and I talked with immigrants. Sweden has exemplary immigration and integration policies, and very good outcomes compared to other immigration countries. But there are continuing problems, especially for refugees. These include observable problems with discrimination by ethnic Swedes. Immigrants are excluded from jobs and housing, and they experience discrimination in schools and in communities in Sweden. But immigrant exclusion—especially of refugees—is a common problem in all countries, especially when a country is impacted by economic crisis, as Sweden was in the 1990s.

Yet, mainly due to a humanitarian-focused immigration policy, Sweden has managed to take in many foreign-born people. Nearly 13 percent of the population is foreign-born, a level on par with the more famous immigration state, the United States. Sweden has incorporated very diverse populations of immigrants—some labor immigrants, some refugee immigrants, and even more family reunification immigrants. Its integration

policy for refugees and their families is based on humanitarian principles, which have resulted in multicultural education for both New Swedes and ethnic natives, ethnic language support for immigrant children, voting rights, representation in ethnic groups that serve in an advisory capacity to government, ombudsmen, a mandate for public officials to mainstream immigration issues, and legal reform to counter discrimination.

Integration policy has resulted in immigrants' rights to participate in organized labor, and rights to high quality, publicly-provided, lifelong education, job training, Swedish language training, housing, health care, social security, and where employment is scarce, financial aid. As well, immigrants have the right to access private services, if they have the financial wherewithal. The state bears responsibility for ensuring that immigrants have access to the job market.

These resources and social supports for immigrants work to ameliorate the vulnerable condition of immigrants. They cannot erase the profound social handicaps resulting from disrupted community, family, and individual lives. New residents face discrimination in receiving countries. Ethnic Swedes propagate discriminatory practices in employment and housing, and resist affirmative action policies just as other nations' citizens do. But Sweden as a country provides the resources for fostering immigrant citizenship, in the context of a highly-ranked economy and a healthy welfare state based upon progressive taxation and substantive national support for local autonomy. Because Sweden has been more successful than other countries at integrating not only labor immigrants, but some of the world's most vulnerable refugees and their families, this dissertation investigates how and why some refugees' levels of unemployment rates and welfare use, housing segregation, voting participation rates, and school drop out rates have been framed as crisis of the social democratic system, rather than as typical immigration challenges and the foreseeable consequence of economic policies that give the market more power over communities.

In spite of the many supports from the Swedish welfare state, some immigrants and minorities, as well as natives, are frustrated. I investigate the sources of these frustrations. In Chapter Three, I present the challenges that immigrants face in Sweden. In Chapter Four I analyze how integration reformists frame these challenges. Before I present the specific Swedish policies to meet these challenges in Chapter Two, I place these policies in the broader social development context implicated in immigration and integration reformism. Below I discuss the contextualized evolution of Swedish efforts to extend membership in society to previously excluded populations such as immigrants.

A Brief History of the Concept of Citizenship

The universalist logic of democracy has played a significant role in social democracies, resulting in universalist welfare state development, humanitarian refugee policies, and social citizenship. Marshall defined social citizenship as “the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.”¹⁰ In the universalist logic of democracy, respect, protection, and rights are owed to each person because she is a citizen. In the universalist logic of democracy, the goal for citizenship is expansion. However, democracy is hard-won and tenuous, and citizenship has long been denied to vulnerable groups across the world. Even in social democracies such as Sweden there is a social movement to roll back citizenship rights embedded in the welfare state.

This section reviews the historical concept of citizenship, as it was articulated in the rise of liberal political-economy in Anglo countries. The liberal conceptualization of citizenship laid the basis for and was further expanded by social movements that profoundly impacted the development of modern social democratic Sweden. I will turn to the expansion of citizenship and the rise of Swedish social democracy in the next section.

¹⁰ Marshall 1950:11.

Citizenship started out narrowly defined and in historical relationships and conflicts. Citizenship also started out ideologically. Liberal citizenship connected the newly-ascendant bourgeoisie to the state in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, as aristocracies and Absolutism declined. In the classic liberal formulation, citizenship is the bridge between the state and individuals in civil society, where civil society is a sphere to be protected from or autonomous from the depredations of the (feudal, absolutist, or totalitarian) state. Liberals view civil society as a sphere of human contracts within private institutions.¹¹ Making the state responsible for keeping itself separate from civil society invests in the state responsibility for the protection of some rights beyond Night Watchman policing, imprisoning, and military duties.¹² The scope of rights liberals see as compatible with capitalist market optimization include Locke's "natural" right, property, and where they do not conflict with the rights of property, life and liberty as well. Marshall recounts how systemic failures and social mobilization have goaded the extension of the state's capacity to protect citizenship rights beyond private property.

Liberal citizenship is conferred by a social contract. So in exchange for rights, citizens satisfy preconditions and obligations. In their arguments against the defenders of older patriarchal social systems, Anglo liberal theorists such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes legitimized the liberal citizen's capacity for consequential, political decision making.¹³ Political participation through voting thus has become a part of liberal citizenship rights. In liberal theory, the necessary precondition to citizenship—rationality—is located (or not) within the individual. For liberals, personal autonomy (or

¹¹ This means that civil society may simply be defined as the market. Hegel and Marx, however, defined civil society as voluntary groups as well as the economy—or all those human group associations apart from the state. Some modern theories of civil society (Arato and Cohen 1992) depart from the original liberal understanding of civil society further by positing civil society as excluding the economy, instead including the sphere of uncoerced human associations.

¹² Faulks 2000: 30.

¹³ Brennan and Pateman 1979.

individual independence) creates rationality. Often, material independence is considered to be what creates an independent mind, which is why many liberals have had difficulty understanding workers, the unemployed, and women as capable of creativity, innovation, and leadership. Influential modern liberal thinkers, like Friedrich von Hayek, for example, saw employed workers as trained in subordination. Because of their subordinate disposition, these theorists maintained, people who work for wages do not have the character necessary to wield the rights of citizenship.¹⁴

What concretely counts or should count as an obligation, or contribution of a citizen toward citizenship status has been the object of historical conflict. In original liberal theory, participation in the state's political institutions is not only a right but also an obligation of citizenship. While classic liberalism famously regards both the state and the "body of men"¹⁵ as potential threats to individual men's all-important autonomy, the liberal state is nonetheless needed to help protect autonomous citizens from the "body of men" as well as to teach citizens to desire justice and exercise their civil rights.¹⁶ To reduce the tension between the state's schizophrenic identity as both threat and protector/educator, liberal citizenship requires autonomous men's willingness to participate in liberal political institutions.

Subscription to a liberal political consensus is a second obligation of citizenship.¹⁷ Anglo liberal citizenship is defined by formal membership in a political unit with political institutions (the state). It is not explicitly defined by membership in a society. With a heavy emphasis on the autonomous individual, Anglo liberal thinking rejects the French republican version of citizenship, since the French version includes *fraternite*—belonging

¹⁴ Pateman 2005.

¹⁵ Berlin 1998.

¹⁶ Mills 1998; Rawls 1971; Berlin 1998. Conflicts have raged over who is the threatening "body of men" from whom proper citizens expect state protection.

¹⁷ Berkowitz 1999. Apart from this fundamental point of consensus, John Locke advocated "toleration".

in a rich, historical, but stratified society that includes both the bourgeoisie and the working class that fought together to overcome the aristocracy.¹⁸ In other words, in the French version of citizenship, as in the social liberal, social democratic, and socialist versions of citizenship, citizenship that accommodates the working class is guaranteed by the embeddedness of the individual in communities within state territory. This recognition of living through and sometimes overcoming inequality is part of why the French version of Republicanism is seen as antithetical to the Anglo version of liberalism. Despite the emphasis on autonomous individuals, however, Anglo liberal citizenship does imply a form of belonging. The basis of liberal belonging is idealist—subscription to a liberal political consensus. Consensus, of course, is rooted in particular social relationships.

The requirements of capitalism mean that citizenship in liberal societies does not follow the universalist logic of democracy. Liberalism maintains a “minimalist” view of democracy, citizenship scholar Carole Pateman (2005) makes clear. It tends to reserve the bulk of citizenship rights (not only the social rights such as health and education, but also political rights such as access to political representatives and the right to run for office, and even the civic rights to assemble, free speech, and freedom from arbitrary or indefinite incarceration) for allocation on the market, according to the distribution of effective demand. That is, it takes wealth (ownership) to secure these rights under liberal regimes. Because of this, liberal citizenship reinscribes the gender, race, and class relations embedded in, for example, the Anglo Poor Laws.

The Anglo Poor Laws existed from the seventeenth century until 1918 in Britain and in fourteen states in the U.S. until 1935. Reflecting a turn away from the view of citizenship as principally a relation between the individual and the state, and toward a view of citizenship as an obligation of the individual toward other citizens, the Anglo Poor Laws

¹⁸ Fitzsimmons: 32.

mandated employment as a condition of citizenship.¹⁹ While in some liberal theory employment makes people unfit for citizenship, in the Poor Law, unemployed people were seen as unfit for citizenship. Working people's citizenship appears to be tenuous under liberalism.

Poor Laws are based on the assumption that the poor in society are deviant. Typically the poor are thought to be *inherently* deviant—that is, their deviance, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities are thought to *not* result from environmental conditioning, which could be addressed with social reorganization. Race, gender, and the visible injuries of class tend to be used for material confirmation of the presumed naturalness of poor people's deviance. Because the less-affluent are self-afflicted by “indolence, improvidence, or vice,” as the British Poor Law Report of 1834 explained, they fail to fulfill their citizenship obligations.²⁰

Practically, the Poor Law view of the poor complements a high inequality economic model. A good example is how African-Americans have been viewed in the U.S., where throughout history, wealthy, white Southern elites (first Democrats, then after the 1970s Republicans) have engineered policy to preserve an extremely low wage workforce. The race-based citizenship model—which assumes a deviant, unfit domestic population—has excluded slaves. It has excluded people constrained to work in what were once black jobs—including agricultural labor, domestic labor, and hospital work—from basic labor protections.²¹ It created special “vagrancy” laws to force the poor to labor without basic rights of contractual agency such as choice or exit.²² Poor Law logic assumes that able-bodied, propertyless men, women, and immigrants (coded as a racial Other) take from

¹⁹ Pateman 2005: 40.

²⁰ Pateman 2005: 39.

²¹ Quadagno 1994; Gordon 1994; Piven and Cloward 1971: 424.

²² Chambliss 1964.

and do not contribute to society, and do so because they are corrupt, not because their employment options are excessively dehumanizing, immiserating, and depleting.

With the failure of the Gilded Age's laissez-faire political economy and the onset of the Great Depression in the 1930s, however, elitist worldviews lost their potency. Capitalist hegemony and monopoly on social organization deflated. Social liberals and social democrats moved to the policy making fore.

Through facilitating security and democratic participation rights for the working class, citizenship had erected a drawbridge to social citizenship, social liberalism, and social democracy.²³ In the U.S., Great Britain, and Sweden, the bridge was lowered to permit citizenship expansion because of the failures of elite rule, because of the rise of socialist movements, and because of heightened pressures on states to manage their populations.²⁴ In the 1940s New Deal reforms combined with socialized war production and tighter war labor markets to produce social citizenship and prosperity in the U.S. In Sweden, social movements instituted social democracy and, combined with economic advantage from war-time neutrality, ushered in decades of social citizenship and prosperity. The next section reviews the rise of social citizenship, which has been fundamental to Swedish social democracy.

²³ There is precedent within contracts for the intervention of status. Just as market contracts, for example wages, are imbued with the concept of status (what kinds of work deserve what kinds of compensation?), welfare state-based social rights similarly mediate contract with citizenship status, in this case “the subordination of market price to social justice” (Marshall 1950: 56).

²⁴ States trying to galvanize diverse populations work to instill a sense of nationhood among the people who live within their geographic boundaries. In addition to nationalist ideology, citizenship is also used to invest residents in the state, through granting residents protection of some of their rights in contractual exchange for duties owed. The terms of this contract vary by state and over time as well. They are the result of historical events, political realignment, and ongoing social struggles, involving class, race, and gender as described above.

The Rise of Social Citizenship

Studying citizenship struggles and trends in England from the eighteenth century through the middle of the twentieth century, T.H. Marshall concluded that, with struggle, full citizenship came to encompass civil rights, political rights, and social rights. Civil rights such as free speech, justice, worship, and property ownership were established in England in the eighteenth century. Political rights, such as the right to vote and stand for office, were championed in the nineteenth century (and also the twentieth century in the U.S.)²⁵ Class, Marshall observed, mediates possession of rights. To ameliorate this, social rights, such as public health care, education, and social security, were extended in England in the twentieth century. In Sweden, with widespread literacy since the Protestant Reformation, political participation rights for wealthier peasants, and fateful splits between the (usually foreign) king and the aristocracy, many citizenship rights had antecedents for hundreds of years, but were not universally achieved until the rise of social democracy in the early twentieth century.

Marshall's approach to citizenship contends that a flourishing welfare state is a required institution for counteracting the relentless capitalist tendency to allocate social rights and membership according to market power (effective demand). According to Marshall's study, the universalist welfare state promotes

a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilized life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalization between the more and the less fortunate at all levels—between the healthy and the sick, the employed and the unemployed, the old and the active, the bachelor and the father of a large family. Equalisation is not so much between classes (or

²⁵ The 1868 Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution formally extended voting rights to African-Americans. But until the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-twentieth century, courts extended the political rights enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment to corporations, rather than to African Americans (Zinn 1995: 255; Quadagno 1994: 190-191).

incomes) as between individuals within a population, which is now treated for this purpose as though it were one class.²⁶

The universalist logic of democracy underwrote the rise of social citizenship. The advancement of social citizenship in liberal countries came as a response, sometimes cooperative, sometimes only begrudging and preemptive, to the competing and compelling socialist idea that everyone, regardless of how much, if anything, she owns or whether she supports specific military offensives, should be regarded, treated, and facilitated to act as a member of society with rights to security and political participation. Because markets produce a skewed distribution of such rights, social citizenship reestablishes the conditions for universal security and political participation. To facilitate these conditions universally, social citizenship includes social rights, such as education, health care, housing, pensions, and social security. Effectively, the rise of the welfare state and social citizenship in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century moved liberal and conservative countries into the territory of social liberalism, if not social democracy.

By contrast, liberal Poor Laws were unconcerned with expanding citizenship. On the contrary, no security, protection, education, health, or human development was due (or could improve the lot of) the poor, who were considered naturally failed humans. “The true and proper relief of the poor,” Locke pronounced in 1697, “consists in finding work for them.”²⁷ Where universalist democratic logic effectively holds that citizenship should be viable regardless of market position, Poor Law logic insists that if the working class, women, minorities, and new residents are to be permitted citizenship, it is on condition of employment, the worker’s contribution to society. Democratic logic does not agree with this liberal definition of contribution to society. Explains Pateman, “There are many ways of contributing to social life, and duties other than employment are involved in the network of mutual aid and forbearance. The reproduction, education, and care of the

²⁶ Marshall 1950: 56.

²⁷ Quoted in Pateman 2005: 39.

population—social reproduction—is a basic social necessity and crucial for citizenship.”²⁸ As Pateman emphasizes, when wives were available to do much of this caring work and welfare states were developed, the political balance shifted from Poor Law to democratic citizenship.

But the early twentieth century replacement of Poor Law logic with democratic logic had a fragile constituency. Champions of democratic logic included some chastened elites; but a movement would soon rise to reconsolidate the ranks around reduced democracy.²⁹ Organized labor, another necessary institutional source of democratic logic under capitalism, was weakened, especially in countries with strong anti-socialist traditions.³⁰ Moreover, social citizenship depended heavily on the unremunerated labor of women assisting the state in the provision of democratic social reproduction. Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, women went increasingly into the remunerated workforce in the U.S. and Sweden. It was no longer legitimate to believe that unpaid caring labor should be supported by a family wage and the state should subsidize unpaid caring labor when a man with a family wage was not available. “The costs of, and time needed for, the replenishment, education and care of the population have become a drag on profit-making in the new economic order,” observes Pateman.³¹ Either more social reproduction responsibilities would be transferred to the state, as in Sweden, and/or in the context of structural adjustment and privatization, social reproduction would become a confusing social battleground involving dispossessed and migratory peripheral populations. This dissertation will examine how immigration and integration issues are used in ideological and political battles over social reproduction and citizenship.

²⁸ Pateman 2005: 43.

²⁹ Klein 2007; Vogel 1989; Domhoff 2002, 1990; Diamond 1995.

³⁰ Klein 2007; Vogel 1989; Domhoff 2002, 1990; Diamond 1995.

³¹ Pateman 2005: 44.

The Liberal Discontents of Social Citizenship

Although citizenship rights expanded into social citizenship with elite participation, there was never cross-class consensus on the democratic expansion of citizenship, because social citizenship reduced elite economic, social, and political competitive privileges derived from elites' superior effective demand on the market. In this section I present a broad, historical view on the ideological and political battles that target citizenship.

Nearly from its inception, much funding and preparation went into the attacks on social citizenship in the United States and United Kingdom.³² Though they had cooperated with organized labor and agreed to social liberal policies to get out of the early twentieth century laissez-faire economic collapse, many economic elites in the U.S. and U.K. nonetheless funded economists and conservative political experts to dismantle social citizenship not long after the ink on the New Deal had dried.³³ Beginning in the late 1940s, the main donors to the cause of disseminating and popularizing libertarian views in the U.S.—including the ideological claims that markets do not fail, and that socialism, not capitalism, is totalitarian—were the Volker Fund, the Reim and Earhart foundations, the Liberty Fund, and business leaders like Jasper Crane of DuPont, Henry Weaver of General Motors, B.E. Hutchinson of Chrysler, and the British entrepreneur Anthony Fisher.³⁴ As early as 1945 *Reader's Digest* participated in popularizing libertarianism by promoting an abridged version of Friedrich von Hayek's anti-socialist *The Road to Serfdom*.³⁵

A couple of years before Rupert Murdoch invested in the *Wall Street Journal* and its parent company Dow Jones, the newspaper's editorial staff recounted Hayek's legacy and

³² Klein 2007; Vogel 1989; Domhoff 2002, 1990; Diamond 1995.

³³ Klein 2007; Vogel 1989; Domhoff 2002, 1990; Diamond 1995; Piereson 2005.

³⁴ Piereson 2005.

³⁵ Piereson 2005.

argued for the continuing importance of Hayek’s message. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, Hayek’s seminal contribution was based in his conviction that capitalists had to put their money—lots of money—behind the development and diffusion of conservative economics and libertarian philosophy.³⁶ By investing in the development of conservative and libertarian ideas, Hayek maintained, capitalists could embed networks of thousands of experts throughout society’s institutions—in the media, academia, politics, and government.³⁷ These experts would establish and maintain consensus on behalf of their benefactors, from which an inexorable “neo-liberal” (and later a complementary neoconservative) consensus and political movement would rise like a tsunami.³⁸ In *The Intellectuals and Socialism* (1949), Hayek mapped out his ideological war plan and enjoined “practical men of business” to fund the pursuit of his program to reverse the rise of social citizenship.³⁹

Hayek’s social movement blueprint was quickly and enthusiastically adopted by political business leaders such as Citibank’s Walter Wriston and Nixon’s secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon, and public intellectuals greenhoused at the University of Chicago such as Milton Friedman and, later, Jeffrey Sachs.⁴⁰ More violently through imperialism and the “Shock Doctrine”, and more cordially through international scholarships for students to study at neoliberal institutions such as Chicago, the Anglo countries disseminated the consensus world-wide.⁴¹ When in the mid-twentieth century, large parts of the middle

³⁶ Piereson 2005; Klein 2007.

³⁷ Piereson 2005.

³⁸ Piereson 2005; Klein 2007.

³⁹ Piereson 2005.

⁴⁰ Piereson 2005; Klein 2007; Moyers 2007.

⁴¹ Klein 2007. According to Klein, the torture and structural adjustment regime of U.S.-installed dictator Augusto Pinochet was the proving ground for the “Shock Doctrine”, the use of destabilizing crisis (and torture) to wipe minds, communities, and societies clean, and insert unpopular social, political, and economic reforms that expand the role of markets at the expense of social citizenship.

class assumed their modern political, civic, and social citizenship no longer obligated them to support, manage, and render service in wars like the Vietnam war, economic, political, and military elites considered the middle class to have seriously violated the liberal social contract and their citizenship responsibilities.⁴² Social citizenship and even major pieces of civic citizenship, such as the right to protest and freedom from indefinite detention and torture, were slated for revocation.⁴³ Political citizenship would become uncertain as well with the establishment of Diebold voting machines in the U.S.

Who defected from the social contract first—the working class, women, and minorities, or elites—is a matter of contention, dependent on whether you view democratic social citizenship as legitimate. A particularly incisive social analyst in the period leading up to his assassination, Martin Luther King Jr. commented, “One of the greatest casualties of the war in Vietnam is the Great Society...shot down on the battlefield of Vietnam.” In this 1967 speech, King was warning of the collapse of elite political will to improve lives in the U.S. and the commandeering of the nation’s social wealth to the cause of attacking citizens of communist countries. Elite defection was reinforced by the decline of profits after the 1966 profit-rate peak and 1973 oil crisis, according to Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf’s (1989) seminal analysis of the ascendancy of conservative economics.

From its origins in the incubation of a neoclassical economic, political science, and legal opposition to Keynesianism and social democracy, to the John M. Olin Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation, Bradley Foundation, and the Scaife Trusts of Pittsburg’s subsequent funding of neoconservative cultural initiatives and think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, and American Enterprise Institute, neoliberalism and its neoconservative complement have become hegemonic around the world.⁴⁴

⁴² Piereson 2005.

⁴³ Klein 2007.

⁴⁴ Piereson 2005.

In complement to the neoliberals before them, neoconservatives have gained funding to theorize and propose forms of community more compatible with capitalist interests. In the footsteps of Thomas Hobbes four centuries earlier, neoconservatives opposed to political dissent have embraced the “Laws of Nature” and repackaged Hobbes’ conclusions. Hobbes’ Laws of Nature assume humans are naturally violent, brutish, inhumane, and solitary—inclined to the war of “all against all.” For Hobbes, it followed that human beings must draw up a social contract, which cedes authority to absolute power in exchange for cohesion.

According to communitarian theory, social reproduction suffers and people long for the restoration of community cohesion where neoliberals valorize the free market, all forms of business, devolution, and reduced accountability to the working class, women, and racial and ethnic minorities.⁴⁵ To provide a cohesive social foundation for the market, neoconservatives have promoted forms of authoritarian power. Neoconservatives work with capitalist funders to unhitch people’s communities from public social citizenship institutions, and hitch social cohesion instead to traditional authoritarian (and patriarchal) institutions like churches, corporations, the police state, and the military.⁴⁶ In retooling institutions and dispositions to advance the mobility and power of capital, neoliberals and neoconservatives have reasserted a classic liberal version of citizenship.

In the 1990s Poor Law logic resurfaced to animate racist and disingenuous “welfare queen” politics. The logic of the Poor Laws was firmly reestablished in 1996 with the passage of the U.S. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act

⁴⁵ Faulks 2000: 136-141.

⁴⁶ Piereson 2005. While neoliberalism and neoconservatism are complementary from the point of capital, they have their small differences. Irving Kristol wrote that Hayek “too often gives the impression that he considers reality to be one immense deviation from true doctrine” (Piereson 2005). Market transactions are not only purer, but freer than any social relationship, neoliberals have argued, because “each man can vote for the color of tie he wants” (Milton Friedman quoted in Klein 2007: 52).

(PRWORA). Through the reassertion of the Poor Law logic, “free riders” in society have been charged with violating their citizenship contract. In some cases—primarily in certain cities—the state has even been harnessed to the project of forcing very poor women to work under highly coercive, low-pay, high stress conditions for employers who are subsidized by taxpayers. Women needing social assistance or migrant workers trying to patch together resources in the low-wage economy are provided no support for their own social reproduction work, as paid employment gets priority. Social reproduction, “the replenishment, education, and care of the population” in Pateman’s words, came to be seen as worthless to the extent it takes time and does not appear to immediately produce profit for an employer.

The Chicago School’s neoliberal shock strategy has manufactured and used many crises to stun populations and institute depleting reforms.⁴⁷ This is in service of engineering one larger neoliberal crisis: the crisis of the democratic social reproduction of citizens. This is where the middle class is increasingly finding itself on the wrong end of Poor Law logic. Social reproduction is being efficiently reduced to one dimension of increasing importance: securing a continuous supply of cheap and vulnerable (often immigrant) labor, where the work of social reproduction is black-boxed within communities out of sight in impoverished and strife-ridden countries. Under neoliberal inequality, concern is rapidly diminishing about any need to maintain and foster the health, environment, well-being, and democratic skills of any humans—that is, most humans—who do not have the effective demand to buy care, health, and education on the market.

⁴⁷ “Only a crisis produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around,” Friedman wrote in 1962.

Reassessing the Welfare State and Integration “Crisis”

In the 1980s and 1990s neoliberal ideas gained hegemony.⁴⁸ The prefabricated neoliberal prescription held that the way to save social citizenship and the welfare state would be to dismantle parts of the welfare state and its supports. After an induced economic disaster in Sweden coincided with an explosion in refugee immigration, proposals circulated to revoke universal welfare supports on behalf of immigrants. Yet the liberal model used to guide the overhaul of social democracy in the face of this conjured disaster was less capable of producing security, participation, and affluent equality than was social democracy.

According to social citizenship theory, the removal of welfare supports would reduce the freedoms of working class people, including immigrants. Political sociologist Gosta Esping-Anderson (1990) developed a typology of Western capitalist welfare states that evaluates how and the extent to which states facilitate the development of social citizenship rights—in Esping-Anderson’s language, the extent to which different kinds of states de-commodify the people that live in them. Esping-Anderson explains the importance of social citizenship rights,

As commodities, people are captive to powers beyond their control...If workers actually do behave as discrete commodities, they will by definition compete; and the fiercer the competition, the cheaper the price. As commodities, workers are replaceable, easily redundant, and atomized. De-commodification is...as Polanyi argued, necessary for system survival. It is also a precondition for a tolerable level of individual welfare and security. Finally, without de-commodification, workers are incapable of collective action.⁴⁹

In a capitalist system, when people have no option but to sell their labor power on the market to survive, they are commodified. In laissez-faire societies this commodification

⁴⁸ Klein 2007.

⁴⁹ Esping Anderson 1990: 37.

of working-class people can reach an extreme in which individuals cannot afford many rights, cannot afford pleasant experiences, everyday mercy, and opportunities to develop in pursuing some of their aspirations. Under such conditions, millions—today even billions—of people live and die in exhausting, grinding, poverty and pain, punctuated by inadequate moments of escapism. They have neither the time nor the money to develop their skills and broaden their experiences. They have no time and insufficient resources to raise their children healthily or work together with others to protect their communities or better the world. They are extremely vulnerable to disasters.

Social citizenship rights and decommodification permit workers a degree of freedom from their disadvantages on the market, a degree of freedom from living in subordination to totalitarian work environments, and a degree of freedom from the political influence of the capitalist class. These disadvantages, subordination, and political influence can become exhausting, depleting, and disfiguring for the individuals subject to them. Social citizenship allows even people who own a small proportion (or nothing) of the factors of production (money, commercial land, commercial buildings, machinery, chemical inputs, peoples' labor power, etc.) to develop their interests, skills, capacities, and cultures as social humans and citizens, as the affluent are entitled to within the capitalist economic system. The socialist idea behind social citizenship is that in our lives on Earth all people ought to be entitled to human rights.

Because social citizenship rights are protections against class system tyrannies, they have to be enshrined in and protected by institutions with the power, ideas, and organizational capacity to stand up to the power, ideas, and organizational capacity of capitalists. That is why states and organized labor are essential institutions in establishing and maintaining social citizenship. The welfare state is the state form that can work with organized labor to protect social citizenship. Esping-Anderson's typology distinguishes three types of welfare state that protect social citizenship to varying degrees: the liberal—centering around the Anglo-American world; the Catholic-conservative, consisting of countries like

Germany and France; and the social democratic, consisting of the Nordic countries, including Sweden. In contrast to social democracies, liberal welfare states maintain the commodification of labor by limiting benefits to means tested welfare or those based on work related contributions. Esping-Anderson shows that the social democratic countries have been the most successful at advancing the democratic preconditions for struggles for social citizenship rights.⁵⁰

Both critical and liberal scholars argue that gender, race and other social statuses mediate citizenship as well as class. In 1993, a leading U.S. political sociologist, Ann Shola Orloff highlighted the role of “access to paid labor” in social rights as a fundamental criterion for citizenship. Orloff asserted that decommodification should be augmented with an emancipatory focus on state “de-paternalization”—freedom for women from providing unpaid caring work services that men do not have to perform, equal treatment for paid and unpaid workers, recognizing women’s rights to social services, and supporting women’s capacities to form and maintain autonomous households.

These proposed freedoms for women might have contributed to an expansion of social citizenship, as they did in Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s. However, access is one thing. The slide into stigma, or as Marshall put it “psychological class discrimination,” and compulsion to work is quite another. The seventeenth century Lockean “true and proper relief of the poor” reemerged in immigration politics in both the U.S. and Sweden. In Sweden the liberal promotion of citizenship as “access to paid work” (where “access” has been transformed into compulsion) has been married to a project to stigmatize immigrants’ and minorities’ access to universal welfare. Assisting this project, many groups of minorities in the multicultural society are identified as “immigrants” or “people of foreign background,” in other words *outsiders*. Integration reformists have thereby woven together a compelling political argument for forcing “immigrants” purportedly

⁵⁰ Esping-Anderson 1990: 53.

“excluded” by the social democratic welfare state to work in secondary labor market “junk jobs” in order to earn their citizenship rights.⁵¹

Because this dissertation shows how integration reformists and other political actors argue that the liberal model is preferable to the social democratic welfare state for increasing immigrants’ well being, here I ask the reader to take a moment to consider what the liberal model has meant in recent history for the social citizenship rights of non-elites. A lack of interest in inequality and its impacts is a particular issue in the neoliberal integration politics that I address in this dissertation.

Analyzing post-industrial employment in the U.S., Germany, and Sweden, Esping-Anderson speculated that, with Affirmative Action and if “junk jobs” are entry jobs, the liberal model may be a very good model for both the economy and social citizenship in the twenty-first century.⁵² Esping-Anderson’s 1960-1980 data showed that the U.S. liberal model, which privatizes the social services administered through the social democratic state, provides a vast field of junk jobs to women, minorities, and immigrants, as well as social mobility he saw in the influx of women and minorities to the growing number of private-sector positions managing the junk job workers. Although he offered more critical predictions as well, in 1990 Esping-Anderson speculated that the liberal U.S. model could both keep the “residual” welfare state lean and economically-fit, and stimulate social mobility, as women, young people, minorities, and immigrants moved in increasing numbers from “entry” jobs into the managerial jobs that oversee those workers.

The third possibility is clearly the most optimistic for the American post-industrial future. In the first and second version, we more or less assume that the problematic “junk-job” sector is a dead-end ghetto from which,

⁵¹ “Junk jobs” is the term Esping-Anderson (1990) used for precarious, low wage jobs without benefits, usually in the tertiary (service) sector. The ILO calls these “indecent” jobs.

⁵² Esping-Anderson 1990: 222-229.

having once entered, it is difficult to escape. If, instead, the huge bottom end of the American service economy were mainly a stepping-stone, or way-station, for youth and recent immigrants, our conclusions would have to be different. To verify this hypothesis, we need micro-data with detailed work-histories in order to identify the percentage of persons who remain or escape from poor jobs. It is, nonetheless, indicative that 25 percent of all persons engaged in food-service jobs are between the ages of 16 and 20.⁵³

Esping-Anderson's "third possibility" was the belief of an influential son of New Jersey sweatshop owners, Milton Friedman.⁵⁴ In hegemonic thought the liberal model came to be considered the prudent and emancipatory model of the future, from the point of view of sound fiscal policy, equality, and social mobility. Whether the U.S. achieved sound fiscal policy, equality and social mobility since 1990 is controversial. Its low-welfare fiscal policy, for one, might not be considered sound.⁵⁵ Critical economists recognize the growth of inequality and the breakdown in social mobility, as Chapter Four discusses further.⁵⁶

Looking back on this inequality-fueled collapse of social mobility in the U.S., we can see that junk jobs are not entry jobs (or even stepping stones to capitalist ownership) when they consume the individual's time, energy, health, and resources in excess of his or her

⁵³ Esping-Anderson 1990: 229.

⁵⁴ Klein 2007: 52.

⁵⁵ For example, the U.S. had \$5 trillion in public debt by 2006. Given drastic cuts to both the taxes of the rich and welfare state-supported social citizenship rights, the privatization of social reproduction, excessive and concentrated private appropriation of public funds (for example the massive public financing of the capital buildup of security and corporations like Blackwater, Bechtel, and Halliburton), and the speculation-borne inflation of non-indexed and deregulated basic goods like housing and energy, a counter-hegemonic argument could be made that neoliberal prioritization of the market to the occlusion of concern about inequality leads to an excessive concentration of power and poor leadership. Observes Pateman, "One of the lessons from great political theorists such as Hobbes or Hegel is that narrow, contractual views of reciprocity always depend on the wider web of social interdependence and, if extended too far, contractual practices undermine their own social grounding" (Pateman 2005: 56).

⁵⁶ Schmidt and Zipperer 2006; Lardner and Smith 2007; Weeks 2005; Howell and Diallo 2007; Baker 2006; see also epi.org; and "Income Gap is Widening, Data Shows." *New York Times*, March 29, 2007.

compensation. In a European Low-Wage Employment Research Network research overview, authors found that “downwards wage adjustment, whether through the weakening of wage-setting institutions or otherwise, does not present itself as a necessary, or even appropriate, response” to unemployment in Europe.⁵⁷ Junk jobs

serve as a trap. While the expansion of part-time employment can be claimed as a success for the European economies, the new opportunities in part-time work in the EU economies have been disproportionately in low-paid jobs. Even more worryingly, the study of part-time work for women in the UK has indicated not only a current wage disadvantage to part-time work, but a continuing disadvantage even after a return to work.⁵⁸

When economies become dependent on a large junk job sector, the iniquitous system can become reinforced and entrenched. Privileged citizens may then radically dissociate themselves from and blame depleted people, for example immigrants. Without democratic universalism, political projects eviscerate the public services and goods that could lighten the burdens of the poor.

That liberalism might not provide the preconditions for maintaining or augmenting social citizenship rights was further suggested when basic de-paternalization collapsed in the communist countries as they became liberalized, and women in the former Eastern bloc became subjected to the ruthless paternalism of laissez-faire societies. In the social democracies, by contrast, decommodification was followed by many aspects of de-paternalization.⁵⁹ The social democracies—and their emphasis on decommodifying labor—seem to have provided better, if not ideal, preconditions for the struggles for other social citizenship rights, when compared to other affluent countries. They did so very

⁵⁷ Salverda, Bazen and Gregory 2000: 3.

⁵⁸ Salverda, Bazen and Gregory 2000: 2-3.

⁵⁹ Though women in Sweden are principally employed in the public sector. High-paying or high-prestige positions are dominated by men, within academia and outside that sector.

clearly at least until neoliberalism brought on both Sweden's 1990s currency disaster and refugee immigration boom, and immigrant employment plunged.

Here at last, to the extent that some immigrants and minorities are frustrated in their work lives in Sweden, and some ethnic Swedes have become frustrated with immigrants and minorities' use of public assistance, neoliberal political actors seem to have found a solid case for selling liberal reform as being able to provide better preconditions for "underclass" citizenship than social democracy. After all, certain kinds of employers seek out immigrants (if not minorities) in the liberal U.S. (as well as the Catholic-conservative country Austria). Citing this evidence, professional political experts offer their advice on how to reform Sweden to improve immigrant "inclusion". If all citizenship flows from employment, as many of my respondents agreed, then, the reformists maintain, the problem of "exclusion" will be solved by barring immigrants from public assistance and by subsidizing low-profit businesses to create a large low-quality work sector (providing "access to employment"). To facilitate this project, the welfare state and the strength of organized labor must be reduced. The parsimonious liberal model on offer claims to cultivate the preconditions for enhancing citizenship by: one, employing immigrants and other new citizens in a larger field of "entry" junk jobs, and two, fortifying social relations within state territory with law and order politics and policy.⁶⁰

Examining contemporary citizenship politics and outcomes in Sweden before and after the 1990s crisis, this dissertation investigates optimistic assumptions regarding the effect on citizenship of the neoliberal model, which maintains a small, often stigmatized and stigmatizing "residual" welfare state, encourages the bifurcated growth of junk jobs and their private-sector control and management, and undermines labor organization through

⁶⁰ Law and order citizenship policy fortifies the management of diverse people within a spatial territory defined largely by elite history. "Citizenship is defined by residence in an exclusive, homogenized space: an often arbitrarily defined and circumscribed 'territory' which may, and usually does, encompass several self-ascribed nationalities and ethnic groups," state Yuval-Davis and Werbner (Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999:2). This is the coercive face of citizenship.

legal means and through uncontrolled immigration. Immigrants were the most vulnerable to the 1990s crisis in Sweden. Since then, immigrants have become the symbol of the campaign to reduce the social democratic welfare state, and increase public support for junk jobs. Likewise, Aristide Zolberg's (2006) encyclopedic history of U.S. immigration shows that immigrants, integration, and immigration in the U.S. have been used by capital to split coalitions along an axis of economic and identity interests. Immigration is quite politically manipulable, a useful political tool. In this work, I ask are immigrants, immigration and integration issues being used in Sweden to undermine the welfare state and democratic social citizenship? If so, how is it being done? How is this project opposed?

To the Democratic Alternative

What many of the critical studies of the effects of neoliberalism on citizenship lack is a strong presentation of the democratic alternative. This is not a flaw in these studies. Simply, real-world progressive alternatives have become increasingly difficult to find, even in countries that have had social liberal and social democratic leadership. Faced with manufactured disasters and a flood of neoliberal policy expertise in countries such as Germany, England, and the United States, social democrats and social liberals quickly caved in to the prefabricated right-wing prescriptions in fresh wrapping. These hegemonic political and economic prescriptions have come to be seen as the only way to keep the economy afloat. The upshot of the standard neoliberal wedge discourse is that state fiscal solvency—*if that is what attracts you*—is only possible through getting rid of the expense of collective, public problem-solving tools.⁶¹ Though they may have remained verbally committed to social welfare, many once-progressive political actors have been quickly persuaded to accept the economy as the arbiter of social well-being.

⁶¹ However, beyond rhetoric, neoliberals do not exhibit much concern for state solvency. This discrepancy between neoliberal marketing and implementation should stimulate a more critical approach to their prescriptions.

The Wall Street Journal claims this neoliberal movement is an effect of well-funded and well-orchestrated hegemony. If it is not an elite political project, and is actually required by the economic system, then, as Carole Pateman has noted, we need to take sober stock of the incompatibility between the economic system and democracy. Pateman's response to Hayek's conclusion that only "gentlemen of private means" are capable of citizenship is that Hayek's reasoning also implies that a basic guaranteed income would enable the universal independence that would foster democratic citizenship. "If cost proves a decisive obstacle, then we need to be clear about what is being given up and what that means for citizenship and democratization," Pateman advises.

If we care enough about democracy to recognize that it may well be incompatible with capitalism and in need of fortification, if we want to know how to approach the restoration of the great social project of expanding full membership in our communities—how to expand citizenship to include workers, women, minorities, immigrants, the disabled, and other non-elites, then we have to relearn how the institutions and culture of social citizenship work. This is not easy to do within an economic system whose very structure, functioning, and development subvert the citizenship of non-elites. Human particularities, postcolonial feminists' comparative work reminds us, "can only flourish in the context of shared, broad-based universalist-democratic and socialist-economic equality."⁶² The progressive model of citizenship is still available for observation in Sweden.

The Swedish social democratic model is important to examine because the trajectory of the liberal model of citizenship is troubling from the point of view of human emancipation. In order to secure individual dependency on the market, neoliberal actors strive to make dependency on society the mark of anti-citizenship. Immigrants in need of assistance are thereby framed as threatening the privileges and obligations of citizenship. Neoliberal movement actors hide the sociological push and pull immigration factors

⁶² Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999: 9.

instigated by imperial neoliberal projects. As they hide these factors beyond migrants' control, they advance an argument for using the state's policing function to discipline immigrants for the power, inequality, and dislocation problems immigrants shoulder. This can promote the development of the racial state that assists capital in fabricating a vulnerable population of "naturally" second-class citizens.

The context for this study is neoliberal globalization, which involves re-nationalization (reconfiguring the nation), harmonization (aligning policy with international regimes), and subordination (subordinating individuals, civil society, and the state to capital). The expansion of citizenship in Sweden today is as everywhere indirectly contested by neoliberal social movement actors, who argue that "economic citizenship" should be the primary concern. Neoliberal social movement actors work, through disaster and prefabricated policies, to delegitimize and destabilize democratic social citizenship and the democratic institutions that advance it. Through studying immigration politics in Sweden, I demonstrate not only how neoliberal hegemony works to dismantle citizenship, but also what institutions and cultures are required to oppose neoliberalism and undergird the expansion of democratic citizenship through social citizenship.

This work explores how integration and citizenship are addressed by actors who have the capacity and resources to mediate social conflict in a capitalist context. In siting this study of citizenship politics, immigration, and integration in Sweden, I do not wish to imply that Europe or Sweden presents the cutting edge of social approaches to capitalist problems today. On the Right, liberals who will not recognize social problems as capitalist developments will generally look to Anglo-America for authoritative responses.

Conversely, leftists can be too quick to point out that Europe is not the future. Latin-America is where the action is. It is true that Latin America is very dynamic right now; but we should acknowledge that even the well-organized Bolivarian movements explicitly embrace both socialism and capitalism. These innovative movements are trying

to build social democracies, aligned with socialism but retaining capitalism. Capitalism and socialism are not complementary systems. Their adherents are usually very unsympathetic to one another. Actually existing social democracy is therefore extremely hard work. It is thus all the more compelling to examine the politics and practices at sites of contradiction in a resilient social democracy that has long wrestled with maintaining some socialist—and advancing some feminist—building blocks of human development in a patriarchal, bourgeois-dominated world.

In this work I investigate this social democratic citizenship model as it has been challenged by immigration and integration reformist politics. I ask, are immigrants, immigration, and integration issues being used in Sweden to undermine the welfare state and democratic social citizenship? If so, how is it being done? How is this project opposed? How are immigration and integration issues used in ideological and political battles over social reproduction and citizenship? To get at these questions, I pursue the following questions, chapter by chapter: What are Sweden's immigration and integration policies? And how have they contributed to social democratic citizenship expansion? How does immigration interact with inequality to diminish citizenship? How do demographic and integration reform pressures converge to encourage state actors to reform social democratic citizenship? And how has organized labor resisted these reform pressures? How do integration officials in Sweden work to extend citizenship to immigrants? And what are the ways in which integration officials and immigrants are persuaded to move away from democratic citizenship practices? How can Swedish immigration and integration policy improve?

Methodology and Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation advances the comparative political sociology of states and social movements by incorporating an approach informed by work on the intersections of race, class, and gender. Engaging the political sociology community's insights into the anti-democratic policies that arise in the absence of key organized collectivities, this work

challenges the assumption that problems like racism and sexism are simply traditionalist dilemmas rooted in state and social movement institutions predating the rise of neoliberalism. They are instead modalities of stratification that are reconstructed through contemporary social movement and state initiatives.

The strength of my research methodology lies in my synthesis of multiple methods. In my Fulbright-funded year in Sweden and over the past three years, I have conducted semi-structured, in-depth interviews with parliamentarians and local officials carrying out immigration and integration policy; I have conducted secondary and primary historical research into state, social movements, and labor institutions' policies; I have selected survey data (general population and minority/immigrant community populations) for analysis; I have conducted content analysis on how minority/immigrant communities are portrayed in Sweden's main national newspapers; and I have engaged comparative data on inequality and immigration, as well as comparative data on stratified employment across OECD countries.

In Chapter Two I ask the questions, what are Sweden's immigration and integration policies? How have they contributed to social democratic citizenship expansion? I review the pre- and post-1990s history and political-economic context of immigration and integration policy change in Sweden, pursuing the question of how policy change reflects the shifting forces of political power. To understand the frameworks being used to give policy direction, I interview Swedish parliamentarians to detect trajectories in how these policy makers conceive of challenges and opportunities facing Sweden in terms of advancing citizenship. I ask if and the extent to which policy is shifting in a way that is convergent with neoliberalism. If policy that impacts citizenship is converging around a neoliberal consensus in Europe, what are the social democratic differences, if any?

If social citizenship for diverse people relies on democracy and equality, citizenship can be enhanced through addressing the conditions of inequality. In Chapter Three I ask how

does immigration interact with inequality to diminish citizenship? I examine inequality between natives and immigrants in Sweden as an effect of attitudes, discrimination, and the super-national political economy. Immigration scholars recognize that immigration is not driven solely by economics, but conforms to political initiatives as well. I investigate the relationship between inequality and immigration to understand immigration in the context of class relations and labor policy. Where economists have explained immigration in terms of people trying to secure economic advantage, sociologists have developed immigration research traditions foregrounding relationships among societies, classes, and national institutions. These include the dual labor market research tradition, which points toward domestic class inequality as a factor in migration. I pursue this tradition further by using data culled from the U.S. census, economist Emanuel Saenz' data on inequality in the U.S. over time, the International Monetary Fund list of GDP/capita by Purchasing Power Parity, United Nations 2005 World Population Policies, and the CIA to compare relationships between income inequality and immigration within the U.S. over time and across affluent net-immigration countries.

In Chapter Four I ask how do demographic and integration reform pressures converge to encourage state actors to reform social democratic citizenship? How has organized labor resisted these reform pressures? Chapter Four expands on the discussion of the welfare state's interest in labor migration by reviewing the demographic proportion of "productive" v. "dependent" population. The welfare state's interest in reducing conflict and maximizing employment converges with immigration and integration reformism. I analyze two prominent strains of reformist issue framing in Sweden on "the immigrant problem"—"the deviant immigrant" and "economic exclusion", as based in my content analysis of the Swedish press from 2000-2007. I interrogate the validity of the reformist framing of how a large number of immigrants and minorities in Sweden fare worse than their ethnic-Swedish compatriots, finding that the occlusion of gender plays an important role in experts' framing of the immigrant exclusion "crisis". I conclude this chapter by

turning to the Swedish union federation literature to investigate labor institutions' role in countering the citizenship politics of neoliberal reformists.

While policy and framing show a drift toward a neoliberal treatment of immigration and immigrants, the process of incorporation takes place at a local level, where autonomy is traditionally high. In order to examine on-the-ground social democratic integration practices and the diffusion of national and super-national citizenship politics, I interview local officials involved in the integration process in Chapter Five. In Chapter Five I ask, how do integration officials in Sweden work to extend citizenship to immigrants? What are the ways in which integration officials and immigrants are persuaded to move away from democratic citizenship practices? I find the political battles embroiling local integration emerge in a mixed approach, including the rise of an “economic efficiency” model, but also the persistence of a social democratic recognition that organized labor yet has a critical role to play in advancing citizenship.

In Chapter Six I conclude by reviewing the economic and cultural reasons that have been forwarded to explain why immigrant exclusion is a fundamental problem of Swedish social democratic citizenship. Recognizing the political potency of using immigrants to reconfigure citizenship, I review the framing—the political construction—of Sweden's integration “crisis”. Through this study I have come to conceptualize immigrant integration as a particular case of political formation, both reflecting and impacting the process of citizenship formation. I ask how Swedish immigration and integration policy can be improved to promote immigrant welfare and advance democratic citizenship.

CHAPTER II

IMMIGRANT CITIZENSHIP AND POLICY IN SWEDEN

The basis of the home is community and togetherness. The good home does not recognize any privileged or neglected members, nor any favorite or stepchildren. In the good home there is equality, consideration, co-operation, and helpfulness. Applied to the great people's and citizens' home this would mean the breaking down of all the social and economic barriers that now separate citizens into the privileged and the neglected, into the rulers and the dependents, into the rich and the poor, the propertied and the impoverished, the plunderers and the plundered. Swedish society is not yet the people's home. There is a formal equality, equality of political rights, but from a social perspective, the class society remains, and from an economic perspective the dictatorship of the few prevails

Per Albin Hansson (1928).¹

Active inclusion emerges (in the policy of European states) as a powerful means of promoting the social and labour market integration of the most disadvantaged. Increased conditionality in accessing benefits (reducing welfare state universalism) is a major component, but this must not push those unable to work further into social exclusion

The European Union Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion (labor markets, pensions, and health care planning) 2007.

How have immigrants been integrated in social democratic Sweden? How do policy-making elites from politics, the media, and academia view immigrant and minority

¹ *Från Fram till Folkhemmet*: 227-230; and quoted in Tilton 1990: 126-127. Cited in Berman 2006.

citizenship? How do policy makers see immigrant citizenship intersecting with Swedish identity, economy, and politics?

Immigrants' and minorities' citizenship is articulated today under conditions of neoliberal globalization. While export-oriented Sweden has long been integrated in the world economy, what has changed since the 1970s is investment opportunities. In the 1980s the growth of the European Common Market provided Swedish capital a new right of exit. Swedish capital began investing in European countries outside of Sweden. This opened opportunities for Swedish capital to credibly threaten to defect. The Swedish government and organized labor began to make new levels of concessions to capital starting in the Palme era, and accelerating after his assassination.

The most radical restructuring moment occurred in the induced economic shock of the 1990s. The force of that shock cost some economic elites. The Social Democratic Party (SAP) was restored to power, with the help of the Left Party and the Greens, and economic restructuring was slowed. Because Sweden is highly unionized and organized labor retains some power in Sweden, restructuring has not been as radical as in other countries. But after ten years of recovery, political actors moved again to create a new crisis as a vehicle for welfare state retrenchment and a larger role for a low-wage tertiary (service) firms sector. This time politicians would not use the currency, which hurt capital. This time, they would use the weakest part of the working class. Unemployed immigrants would be the focus of turn-of-the-twenty-first century disaster politics. Immigrant failure to contribute to society through remunerated work, their use of welfare, their criminality, their separate communities, their problems in school, their anti-democratic, anti-feminist paternalistic cultures were all cited as failures. They were identified as failures of social democracy.

Like other countries, Sweden struggles with the role of refugee immigrants in Swedish life and with the legacy of Swedish institutions and culture as they shape immigrants'

lives. In these struggles, the country is held back by the peripheral place immigrants hold in Swedish institutions, in politics, and in the labor force. Yet the idea that immigrants are especially excluded in Sweden is strategically overblown. The same public sensationalism that goads anti-racism programs also contributes to racism.² A study by the now-defunct *Integrationsverket* (Swedish Integration Board) found that the more press refugees get, the stronger the anti-immigration response of the public.³

In the 1990s, Alan Pred recognized media sensationalism contributes to racism in Sweden. I find as well that political actors who strive to promote the market at the expense of the welfare state use immigration and integration “crises” as a racial political tool. Immigration “crises” serve as a racial political tool because they use alienation from racial Others to obfuscate class and gender impacts of proposed policies. Political actors step in to reorient the public toward the ideal of the market-disciplined, policed community of legitimated economic and political stratification.

Raka Ray points out that in conservative societies the culture of servitude regulates relationships.⁴ Among OECD economists, politicians, the media, and immigrants suffering the stigmatization of unemployment, state support for the expansion of the low-wage secondary labor market is seen as the key to integrating immigrants and minorities in Sweden in tandem with reducing welfare state expenditures. This prescription rests partly on the promotion of the Anglo-American model, and in Sweden, partly on what is nostalgically viewed as a successful and complete history of citizenship expansion in Sweden.

² Pred 2000.

³ Integrationsverket 2006. Integrationsverket was disbanded by the bourgeois coalition shortly after it came to power in 2006.

⁴ Ray 2007.

In this chapter I describe the changing policy framework for immigration and immigrant citizenship in Sweden. I ask how the historical record of policy developments in Sweden sheds light on the conditions under which immigrants have been successfully integrated into the multicultural society as citizens. Democratic citizenship is an historically contingent social formation, feminist citizenship scholars Nira Yuval-Davis and Pnina Werbner (1999) hold. “It is therefore always inflected by power and by the commonsense assumptions of hegemonic cultural and political elites.”⁵ In light of this, I interview leading policy makers to assess how they include and exclude immigrants and other residents in citizenship.

I interviewed national-level public officials to learn about the operation of the Social Democratic division of labor that has often left municipal-level Left Party office-holders responsible for integrating outsiders and rebuilding Swedish citizenship. I argue that in failing to apprehend the problems of immigrants as a pressing, politically volatile problem of enhancing social citizenship, rather than a narrow matter of inclusion in the labor market or controlling Nazis, even social democratic policymakers and officials, as well as immigrants, participate in the rise of governance that incrementally diminishes citizenship in Sweden.

In Appendix B I present an immigration and integration policy timelines as a reference to the reader. The timeline includes brief information about refugees’ arrival in Sweden, as well as European politics that have driven Swedish policy development. This chapter contains interview data from my interviews with Social Democrat Party (SAP) and Left Party (Vänsterpartiet) Riksdag members. My contacts are listed in Appendix E, and the questions I asked Parliamentarians are listed in Appendix D. I either interviewed Parliamentarians in one and a half-hour interviews in their offices at the Riksdag, or received replies to questions by email between October 2002 and June 2003.

⁵ Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999: 3.

Social Democratic Efforts to Expand Citizenship

The struggle against the development of an ethnic underclass can be a contemporary extension of the historic struggle for expanding social citizenship in Sweden. Civic, political, and social citizenship rights were developed within a tight timeframe in early twentieth century Sweden. A combination of disruptive folk movements and cooperative parliamentary strategy contributed to the rapid expansion of citizenship rights that permitted the rise and success of Sweden as a social democracy. Parliamentarians tend to rely on formal channels when they work for immigrant and minority inclusion in society; but in order to help New Swedes claim the broad and deep citizenship rights that support social democracy, Left parliamentarians also use the Swedish disruption and cooperation tradition. Continuing to work in both disruptive social movement and cooperative formal political arenas, the Left plays a vital role in the maintenance of social democracy.

MP Kalle Larson is a young, sharp, charismatic parliamentarian. In Sweden he is able to develop both his leadership skills and critical skills, playing a role in both establishment and protest politics. Discussing his role in immigrant integration as a parliamentarian, Larson reports he follows official channels when he receives reports of exclusionary practices from his constituents. “When I get examples of discrimination, I refer the constituent to the Diskriminerings Ombudsman.” More emphatically, however, Larson notes that the Left Party is the only parliamentary party remaining with “street strength” to oppose the far Right in public. Not only does the Left Party counter-protest Right-wing demonstrations, “We have gone to over two hundred of their meetings, distributing leaflets, talking about the socialist alternative. Most political parties say, ‘It’s immoral to be racist.’ We say it’s understandable. As Marxists, we do not say that a racist is someone who has bad ideas, but rather bad living conditions.”

Larson sees right-wing violence as an effort to make social citizenship exclusive, privatized. He sees this as the right-wing response to social stress. In his experience, immigrants and Leftists are united by being targeted by Right-wing violence. “I have

been working against racism over the past ten or twelve years. Violence is directed against immigrants and Leftists. A Somali was jumped on by nazis. Leftist Björn Söderberg was shot in his home by Nazis.” Larson recalls, “Nazis terrorize us to keep people out of activism, but it works the other way around.” Although this combined establishment and extra-establishment approach seems anomalous today, in that Sweden is famous for professional, cooperative class relations, such a combined establishment and extra-establishment approach was fundamental to the founding and efficaciousness of social democracy.

Modern Sweden and social democratic citizenship were born out of the folk movements and coalitions that arose, along with mid-nineteenth century mass emigration, to do something about poor elite leadership and social stagnation and decline. Within a few decades into the era of modern nation building, labor immigration from Finland and Southern Europe replaced emigration, contributing to the “golden age” of social democracy that lasted from the beginning of the twentieth century through to Prime Minister Olaf Palme’s assassination in 1986.

Social democratic, “active” labor market policies (ALMPs) were developed in the 1940s and 1950s by LO (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, the blue-collar union federation) economists Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner.⁶ The Rehn-Meidner model featured a centralized system of wage bargaining that aimed to both set wages at a “just” level and promote business efficiency and productivity. With the pre-1983 cooperation of capital and labor federations that bargained independently of the state, the state determined that wages would be higher than the market would set in firms that were inefficient or uncompetitive and restrained (or lower than the market would set) in firms that were highly productive and competitive. Workers were compensated with state-sponsored retraining and relocating; as well, the state reformed wages to the goal of “equal pay for equal work”, eliminated unemployment (“the reserve army of labor”) “as a disciplinary

⁶ Carroll 2003; Esping-Anderson 1985; Korpi 1992; Olsen 1999, 2002; Samuelsson 1968.

stick", and kept incomes consistently rising, while taxing progressively and pooling social wealth to deliver services through local governments.⁷ Beginning in the 1950s as prosperity grew and middle class expectations elevated service standards, Sweden oversaw the development of a strong public service sector and the integration of well educated, highly skilled Swedish women into that lower-wage labor force.⁸

Not only labor market policy but immigration policy as well was inflected by the social democratic attempts to expand social citizenship. Yet Swedish efforts to drastically improve the domestic political-economy in this early period also meant that humanitarian concerns were not always prioritized. The Aliens Act of 1914 first introduced the right of asylum in Sweden, but also restricted the right of foreigners to stay in Sweden. The Act, however, stated that a person could not be deported if special circumstances existed, "for example, that his country is far away, that he was deported from there or that he would probably be charged or punished for political crimes there."⁹

The law did not prevent Sweden from pursuing a restrictive refugee policy when the Nazis rose to power in Germany. Sweden accepted only about 5,000 refugees from Germany after 1933 until World War II began in 1939. From 1940 to 1942, Sweden tightened immigration policy and controls on foreigners even more, until in late 1942 all those who sought refuge were allowed to stay in Sweden. Most people who took refuge

⁷ Berman 2006.

⁸ Korpi and Palme 2003. It is crucial to note that although women employed in the public sector are paid less than men employed in the private sector, they still receive living wages. According to the Swedish National Mediation Office (2004), women in Sweden earn six percent less than men do on (weighted) average. (For rough comparison, the gender wage gap for full-time employees in the U.S. was 23.5% in 2004, according to the U.S. Census. Unlike the Swedish statistics, this does not count part-time employment, which would increase the U.S. gender pay gap.) Allowing for the gender gap in public versus private employment, Swedish women's hourly earnings are thirteen percent less than men's of comparable education, in comparable occupations and industries. While this is a problem, Sweden's is the lowest hourly gender pay gap in Europe, according to Eurostat. Public sector jobs in Sweden are higher quality than (not comparable to) the inadequate and depleting service sector jobs in the U.S.

⁹ Jederlund 1998.

in Sweden during World War II moved on at the war's end in 1945.¹⁰ Guestworker programs were then instituted across Europe and in the United States. Sweden had a "guestworker" program in name as well, but it provided more rights, including citizenship rights to immigrants than the U.S. and German guestworker programs.

At the behest of the Swedish Employer's Federation,¹¹ Sweden beckoned laborers from Nordic countries, Baltic states, and Southern Europe, after the war and into the 1960s.¹² During this period immigrant laborers found jobs in the burgeoning industrial sector. Uniquely in Sweden, labor institutions influenced labor immigration policy to confer citizenship on the immigrant workers. The Social Democratic Party (SAP) grew out of working ties with the confederated labor unions. Because such a high proportion of the voting population in Sweden is unionized and because the unions have provided the electoral muscle to the SAP, the labor confederations and the political party that dominated government worked together closely. The SAP also worked closely with the capitalists' organizations as well, which is why Sweden is called a corporatist state. So the class compromise that resulted in state immigration policy at the time is that while the capitalists got to have labor immigration in Sweden, the labor confederations ensured that migrant labor did not contribute to the development of a segmented labor market.

Industrial jobs along with political citizenship rights and the social citizenship right of universal public education assisted immigrant workers to gain social mobility and integrate into the Swedish mainstream. The Swedish effort to build worker solidarity through facilitating immigrants' citizenship turned out to contribute to relative social stability in Sweden, whereas other European countries waited a few decades to struggle

¹⁰ Åkerman 1975: 175.

¹¹ The SAF, as it was known then.

¹² Johnsson, Hans-Ingvar 1995; Knocke 2000: 362.

with the fact that immigration is sticky, and it is not practical for many “guestworkers” to return to their families’ homelands.¹³

Multicultural programs were initiated early in Sweden, in the late 1960s, and American refugees helped prompt its development. After individual Greeks sought protection in Sweden from the 1967 military coup and African Americans sought protection from the Vietnam War, Sweden passed a series of laws that called for a multicultural society based upon “cooperation and solidarity between the native Swedish majority and various ethnic minorities.”¹⁴ The multicultural laws were supported by funding for migrant associations that participate in advisory councils attached to national government ministries and agencies. These associations are organized along ethnic lines.¹⁵

The 1960s was a decade of large scale labor immigration, with an influx of 30,000-60,000 people per year.¹⁶ This labor immigration period influenced not only Sweden’s 1973 refugee policy, but immigration politics throughout Europe. According to immigration scholars Tomas Hammar and Gary Freeman, the policies that stimulated the postwar guest worker and postcolonial migrations were rarely debated or legitimized in public and did not enjoy the support of political majorities, in Europe and in the U.S. Although Swedish labor confederations negotiated on behalf of the political majority in Sweden, immigration and immigrant access to citizenship rights were not public issues there either. Across Europe and in the U.S., governments deliberately misled their electorates about the creation of substantial permanent population settlements of non-

¹³ Boswell 2002.

¹⁴ Riksdag bills 1974: 28, 1975: 20, and 1975: 26.

¹⁵ Ålund and Schierup 1991.

¹⁶ Freeman 1998. There were nearly seven and a half million people living in Sweden in 1960, according to Statistiska Centralbyrån. Four percent were foreign-born. The population was over eight million in 1970, and nearly seven percent were foreign-born. By 2006, the population was over nine million, and nearly thirteen percent were foreign-born.

European origin. Many policymakers led their constituents to believe that guestworkers would visit to work and then go back to their homelands when they became infirm or aged. The same may be said of the continuing stream of secondary migration for family reunion and illegal entry, as Europeans and U.S. citizens were left unaware of the extent of chain immigration after labor recruitment was halted.

States that ran guestworker programs during the postwar boom are dealing with their long-term fall-out, and as a result typically have the most contentious politics and exclusive migration and asylum policies.¹⁷ While Sweden has had very inclusive asylum policies, it has traded those off against labor migration. However, this may not be an issue of transparency. Countries such as the U.S. that do not consider refugee, asylum, and labor migration totals together when determining immigration policy are well known for hiding the extent of immigration. I agree, however, that the susceptibility of the Swedish population to divisive immigration and integration politics can be due to a lack of public discussion of the special demands of family immigration on the receiving country.

In 1972, the blue collar trade union confederation effectively ended labor immigration to Sweden from non-Nordic countries. In conjunction with its humanitarian foreign policy, Sweden developed a refugee integration policy to replace immigration policy. Shortly thereafter, in 1975 the Riksdag endorsed an integration policy based on the principles of equal citizenship rights, freedom of choice in language and culture, and “partnership”—in that immigrants were not to undermine Swedish values and norms, such as democratic institutions like voting.¹⁸

¹⁷ Freeman 1998:100-101. Guestworker programs were instituted in Germany, Switzerland, France, Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. Freeman also counts Sweden as a guestworker country, although labor immigrants could easily obtain citizenship in Sweden.

¹⁸ Westin 2006.

Swedish refugee resettlement policy and practices have been more generous than United Nations (UN) policies at times, although they have also been aligned with UN and EU policies. The preferred UN policy is to resettle refugees in their home country. If that is not possible, the United Nations assesses the refugees' characteristics and directs refugees to the governments and private proxy agencies of refugee-accepting countries, based on those countries' criteria. For example, the U.S.'s foreign-policy and labor-policy centric criteria have been that the refugees should be young and healthy and not communist. Sweden's criterion is humanitarian. Today in Sweden the United Nations' (UN) 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees determines who counts as refugees, that is, people escaping violent political crises.

After the United Nations directs refugees to apply for relocation in Sweden, refugees arrive at camps in Sweden. From there, they are settled, usually in small manufacturing towns with housing availability, or in the suburbs of Stockholm, Malmö, and Göteborg. The Swedish state gives municipalities and counties grants for refugees' resettlement. The country's refugee reception, introduction, and settlement system provides refugees housing (and refugees are free to relocate without losing social assistance), and gives them a roughly \$300 monthly allowance. If the refugee stays in Sweden for six months, he or she can qualify for residency and an increase in their social welfare benefit to \$1,000 a month. Once refugees have residency, they can begin the process for bringing their families to Sweden.

Refugees have social citizenship rights. Like everyone else, refugees are provided public health care and education. Their children are guaranteed instruction in their parents' native language as well as in Swedish. Local integration officials provide refugees with a meeting place, language training, and job training. SFI (Svensk för Invandrare, or Swedish for Immigrants) language training is coordinated with work site training and acculturation classes. Integration officials direct refugees to employment opportunities, and like everyone else, refugees have access to welfare assistance. Refugees have civic

and political citizenship rights, and are encouraged to join ethnic associations with institutionalized advisory status in government, as well as cultural associations. They have recourse to Ombudsmen specializing in immigration and integration. Most working people, including refugees, are members of unions, and there are immigrant organizations in the unions. All residents of Sweden have the right to vote, and after four years, refugees can become citizens if they choose; and they have the right to dual citizenship.

In the 1970s and 1980s, while refugees flowed in from the Middle East and South America,¹⁹ Sweden entered a period of economic and political upheaval. The gender segregated public (lower paid female) and private (well paid male) labor forces began to clash over who was to bear the brunt of wage restraint policy,²⁰ while highly concentrated Swedish capital reaped the rewards of excess profits. In the face of labor unrest over wage restraint and the distribution of profits between classes, Rudolf Meidner, one of the architects of the social democratic economy, was commissioned to found a study committee. The proposal this committee formulated and presented in 1976 entailed transferring excess profits into investment funds controlled by unions and communities. Capital immediately distinguished this proposal as socialism, and launched an unprecedented opposition—including calling off the class compromise established in the 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement. In 1983 the capitalist confederation thereby ended the centralized wage negotiation they had conducted with the union federations. Contract negotiations fragmented somewhat from broad class based negotiations into industrial sector negotiations, with some degree of broader coordination remaining, due to the persistence of the union confederations.

¹⁹ Westin 2006.

²⁰ Wage restraint became controversial not only because it transferred income from workers to capitalists in efficient and profitable industries, but also it reinforced aggregate gender bias in wages, because women were predominantly employed in lower-wage jobs.

The turbulent 1980s were a period of massive industrial restructuring in Sweden. Restructuring required disbanding the shipbuilding industry, integrating pulp industries into modernized paper production, concentrating and specializing the steel industry, and digitizing mechanical engineering.²¹ In response to capital flight with the development of European Union trade, and the global neoliberal movement that began its ascendance after the 1966 profit-rate peak and 1973 oil crisis, the Social Democratic Party backed away from the progressive Meidner reform²² and began introducing neoliberal incentives to capital. These incentives laid the foundation for the economic crisis that launched the crisis of refugee integration in Sweden.

1990s Upheaval and Declining Immigrant Fortunes

1980s Social Democratic Party neoliberal measures—such as deregulating credit, repeatedly slashing corporate taxation and taxation on high income earners, switching from anti-unemployment policies to anti-inflationary policies, and depressing the currency in 1985 in order to prop up exports during the restructuring transition—resulted in export capitalists using the windfall to engage in unchecked currency and real estate speculation. International recession and the bourgeois government's (1990-1994) refusal to stabilize the currency created the fiscal crisis of the 1990s.²³ This in turn forced Swedish taxpayers to bail out five of the six largest banks in the country. The banks and financial companies would have lost 153 billion Swedish kronor, had the Swedish state not diverted public funds to them. The Riksbank allowed the Swedish transnational corporations to switch out their kronor for foreign currency and socialized the currency depreciation losses. Then the state gave the national bank over to private financial capital. Ten percent of jobs evaporated across the Swedish economy, unemployment soared

²¹ Krantz and Schön 2007.

²² Berman 2006: 198. Steinmo 2001. The capitalist and state response to the profit-rate peak is discussed in Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1989.

²³ Englund 1990; Meidner 1997; Olsen 1999.

throughout the 1990s, and wages declined accordingly.²⁴ Immigrant (including all refugees but especially refugees and family immigrants) and youth employment suffered the largest blows.

Citizenship also suffered from political and economic restructuring in Sweden. Voting declined,²⁵ but so did participation in economic life—especially for immigrants. The aggregate employment rate dropped in 1990, and the immigrant employment rate dropped to a low of 52 percent for women and 58 percent for men in the nadir years of 1995-1997.²⁶ Indeed for one group especially—highly educated Iranian male immigrants—the post-1990 incidence of low pay and unemployment was much worse than their high education would lead us to predict. An ethnic sacrifice to the new economy, this group's employment outcomes were most clearly impacted either by discrimination or by their lack of social networks within Swedish society—or some combination of each. Because of the institution of neoliberal policy changes—such as switching from full-employment policies to anti-inflation policies, immigrant and youth unemployment has only gradually improved over the past decade.

The Whole of Sweden Settlement Policy

The Swedish upheavals of the 1980s combined with refugee and family (chain) migration to prompt the growth of integration legislation and a new refugee settlement policy in Sweden. In 1985, when half of the immigrants to Sweden were refugee Middle Easterners, Latin Americans, Africans, and Southeast Asians, the Board of Immigration took over the duties of integration from the Board of Labor. Immigration policy converted into integration policy, with language and vocational training programs

²⁴ Statistiska Centralbyrån; Pred 2000; Wennerberg 1995.

²⁵ Statistiska Centralbyrån.

²⁶ Integrationsverket 2006: 43.

conducted by municipalities.²⁷ The *Whole of Sweden* policy placed refugees in scattered camps across Sweden, before settling the refugees with other members of their own ethnic group in towns with available housing across Sweden. The aim of this policy was to prevent (low-income) minority concentration in the three relatively-small metropolitan areas of Stockholm that were already under economic pressure.²⁸

After the initial settlement period, immigrant usually left the towns they were settled in for the suburbs of the major metropolitan area. In the 1990s the *Whole of Sweden* policy was changed to allow refugees to settle immediately in the suburbs if they want, though municipalities are still presented with financial incentives to settle and integrate refugees who have no strong preference. In the wake of the Iraqi refugee influx, both the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party circulated parliamentary proposals in 2007 to temporarily restrict settlement again.

Although in disrepute today, the *Whole of Sweden* policy was probably not such a bad temporary measure, and not only because it protected urban economies during economic strain and economic crisis. The *Whole of Sweden* policy helped refugees to secure better jobs that could support families through the economic downturn. Though immersion in Swedish towns was difficult for refugees at first, though becoming neighborly to refugees was difficult for small town ethnic Swedes at first, and though employment opportunities were inelastic, if refugees stayed, their economic outcomes and social integration were better than those of refugees who left to live in suburbs.

“Economic integration” is a term used by European immigration scholars to describe immigrants’ (and other vulnerable groups’) average earnings and their self-employment rate. Immigration scholars Olof Aslund and colleagues (2005) conducted a study into

²⁷ Westin 2006.

²⁸ Stockholm had a 2003 urban area population of 1,621,700, Göteborg 744,400, and Malmö 1,340,000

immigrant economic integration in Sweden, concluding that refugees' economic integration is chiefly determined by three factors: labor market conditions, "peers" (networks), and reception policies. In the popular consensus, the *Whole of Sweden* policy "failed" because towns with housing available did not necessarily have many jobs available. But this consensus does not allow us to conclude that refugees were more rational to move to immigrant enclave suburbs. Aslund et al's data shows that refugees' economic security was more sensitive to initial networks or nationwide labor market conditions than it was to geography. The settlement of refugees in small towns around Sweden was not the specific problem. Despite the consensus, small towns did not actually have worse labor markets for refugees than suburbs or urban areas. Rather, whether refugees had access to capital or whether the whole economy was going through a crisis, as it did in the 1990s, determined refugees' welfare relative to ethnic Swedes.

The economic crisis forced refugees to either secure good jobs in small towns or move to suburban immigration enclaves to cobble together various survival strategies. The problem with staying in small towns is that it induced in conservative ethnic Swedish leadership anxiety of how to economically and socially integrate the steady influx of immigrants in small towns. The problem with the suburban strategy is that it exposed refugees to an insecure labor market and it isolated refugees physically. In a way that the *Whole of Sweden* settlement did not, the suburban strategy provided resonance²⁹ to the new political discourse that immigrants do not contribute sufficiently to maintain a welfare state.

Why would suburban immigrant enclaves not provide the cultural resources for refugees to control the terms of their settlement in Sweden? First, the immigrant suburban enclave

²⁹ "Resonance is defined as the mutually affirming interaction of a frame with a discursive opportunity structure supportive of the terms of its argument, while radicalism is similarly defined as a mutually contradictory relationship between this structure and a frame" (Marx-Feree 2003: 310). Oliver and Johnson (2000) distinguish between frames as social movement resources—marketing tools, and ideologies, which are systems of beliefs, values, and norms, with roots in power struggles.

alternative to the *Whole of Sweden* policy was found to be beneficial to more affluent immigrant groups rather than less affluent immigrant groups.³⁰ Segregation was not harmful for individuals in groups with economic resources. When refugees settled together in suburban enclaves, their economic integration turned out to be higher than *Whole of Sweden* immigrants' average earnings and self employment rate—if there was a concentration of successful immigrant peers.³¹ However, in Sweden immigrant enclaves were less helpful for immigrants from groups with fewer resources. This was because immigrants from groups with fewer resources were only able to get precarious work once they moved away from the dispersed manufacturing towns.³²

Despite popular claims that the workplace is the cradle of integration, there is evidence that simple “economic integration” via service-sector “entry” labor markets is not necessarily the same thing as integration, or even settlement on immigrants' terms. Pieter Bevelander and Christer Lundh (2003) found that refugees' chances for economic integration were better in Stockholm in a good economic year, as there was more possibility in the city for finding low-skill service sector jobs. However, they found that such jobs are disposable, not likely to improve immigrants' skills, and so likely to prove unhelpful in economic downturns. Overall, immigrants found better, more durable jobs in the smaller manufacturing towns dispersed around the country.³³ These kinds of jobs permitted them paths to citizenship. Immigrants in *Whole of Sweden* settlements did not have to expend time, energy, and health cobbling together survival strategies, as did New Swedes who took precarious junk jobs in cities. Instead, they were able to earn incomes to support their families, try to make their unions more responsive to immigrant citizenship struggles, partake of cultural and educational programs, participate in politics,

³⁰ Aslund 2005.

³¹ Aslund 2005.

³² Aslund 2005.

³³ Although there is urban concentration, *manufacturing* industries are geographically dispersed in Sweden.

and start to extend their friendship networks into mainstream Swedish society. Their access to social citizenship rights was perceived as a legitimate extension of universalism.

Though they allowed many different immigrant groups to live together apart from the dominant culture, Swedish suburbs were not as empowering to immigrants as scholars of cultural hybridity might expect. Some immigration and globalization scholars, including Nestor Garcia Canclini (1995), have described how some immigrant groups have created their own separate organizations as a collective strategy to create “hybrid culture” and help immigrants integrate (or not) on their own terms. Although some of this work focuses on the cosmopolitanism of global elites, an early example of this perspective showed how working class Italian immigrants started ethnically-based mutual benefit groups, newspapers, and free employment agencies that allowed the immigrants to protect their own culture while interacting in a more empowered way, as a group, with the dominant U.S. society.³⁴ However, in the contexts of the post-1990 crisis, the social geography of Sweden, and existing, protective multicultural institutions in Sweden, the suburban strategy did not tend to build the same sort of protective organizations for refugees.

Why did multicultural institutions mean that suburban enclaves were not particularly helpful to immigrants in the Swedish context? Immigrants have needed more social support in Sweden, but they are denied social support in informal relationships with surrounding native communities. They are not denied social support to the extent that immigrants are in *laissez faire* countries such as the U.S. Swedish multicultural policy means that protective resources are already instituted in the educational system and political system, as well as in the many cultural organizations. The welfare baseline is simply higher in Sweden. Suburban segregation may not play the beneficial role for

³⁴ Nelli 1967.

immigrants in the Swedish institutional context that protective organizations have for immigrants in more laissez-faire societies.

Moreover, unlike Italian American organizations in the example above, suburban geography does not facilitate public engagement. Immigrants left the *Whole of Sweden* towns, which had housing available and some good jobs, but a limited number of good jobs, because immigrants felt they could get access to more work near cities and better social support in immigrant enclaves. The concentration of diverse groups of immigrants in the suburbs helped immigrants together juggle a combination of low-profit small businesses, welfare supports, and a decreasing number of urban tertiary sector jobs in a contracting economy. But it also isolated them from mainstream public life in city centers and in small town Sweden. Because suburban life did not encourage refugees' participation in public life in Sweden, it ghettoized immigrants in the popular imagination.

Finally, as mentioned above, the isolation of suburbs can help make scapegoating discourses more resonant in the dominant society. In the social geography of Sweden, as elsewhere, suburbs are isolated, but they are not high status as they are in some societies, including the U.S. Their denizens can be stigmatized as anti-social. In creating a discourse about parasitic immigrants, political actors enhance the classic liberal contributory/contractual understanding of citizenship, and undermine the democratic universalist basis for social citizenship. The 1990s crisis in Sweden allowed political actors to establish a neoliberal worldview that demands reduced social citizenship. Voters do not easily dispense with their social rights. They will, however, engage the process of sacrificing the social rights of others who, right-wing political actors argue, take too much and have not contributed sufficiently to society to have earned social citizenship. Social distance between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes allows political actors to more resonantly describe immigrants in terms invoking "invasion", as anti-immigrant activists describe immigrants in the U.S.

Conforming with European Institutions

The Social Democrats, Left Party, and Greens maintained a gradualist approach to convergence with EU countries through conformity to EU policy. The fundamental approach to policy making was social democratic. Even before 1990, Sweden began to establish institutions to address discrimination, and legislative documents clearly stated that integration was not the responsibility of immigrants alone in Sweden. Sweden adopted a law in 1986 to combat discrimination against immigrants in the labor market,³⁵ and it established the office of the Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination (DO). In 1985 and 1989 the Riksdag introduced bills that, asserting the existence and primacy of the profound legacy of social and cultural developments in Sweden, explicitly recognized the varying challenges that different immigrant cultures presented to Swedish society, as well as the varying challenges that Swedish society presented to different immigrant cultures.

In the context of gradually increasing refugee demands on social welfare, humanitarians and family reunification advocates suspected that these bills were preludes to a change in policy that would reduce refugee immigration.³⁶ Critics' fears were confirmed when, after debate surrounding the town of Sjöbo's rejection of refugees, the government restricted eligibility criteria for refugee status—formerly based on broad ad hoc humanitarian grounds—to the stricter criteria laid out in the Geneva Convention. This restriction eliminated some categories of persons eligible for temporary protection. Yet the Aliens Act of 1989 also broadened the interpretation of “refugee” and streamlined asylum processing.³⁷

³⁵ Lappalainen 2002: 7.

³⁶ Pred 2000: 47-48.

³⁷ Lappalainen 2002: 2.

Aliens Act of 1989 was justified as necessary for joining the European Common Market.³⁸ Prompted by the accelerated pace of economic integration after 1985 and the sudden rise of asylum claims after 1989, the European Union, which consolidated in 1992, rapidly harmonized member state policies with regard to visas, external border crossings, and asylum policy. Freeman refers to the European Union as the most impressive instance of the internationalization of immigration policy, and the largest and most comprehensive regional labor régime in the world.³⁹ This development of the “social” side of the European Union has manifested in attempts to coordinate immigrant economic integration, welfare state reform, pensions, and healthcare—referred to as social protection and social inclusion—across European countries. Partly because the goals suggested by member states are so varied as to contain both a campaign to “make work pay” and ensure “adequate levels of minimum resources for all,” the social dimension of the EU remains secondary to its function of economic coordination.

Despite Sweden’s new tighter refugee policy, world conflicts and disruptions were on the rise, and the population of refugees that fit into the Geneva Convention criteria boomed, just as the Swedish economy dropped into a tailspin.

The 1990s Economic Crisis and Recovery in Sweden

Sweden experienced an economic shock in the 1990s that was intended to disrupt everyday reality for Swedes. Its architects hoped shock would facilitate the demise of social democracy and its replacement with liberal institutions, as elsewhere. But as radical as it was, the shock was buffered by the very strong risk-dispersal mechanisms of Swedish social democratic institutions, and shock therapy was discredited in Sweden. However, because full employment policies had been replaced with anti-inflationary

³⁸ Pred 2000: 49-50; Hans Thoolen, Regional Director of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees 1996; Westin 2006.

³⁹ Freeman 1998: 90-92.

policy bias, the shock did manage to permanently disrupt the most vulnerable Swedes, refugees who were arriving in the relatively stable social democracy from conflicts and crises around the world. The disruption of refugee communities provided legitimation for a more gradual program of reform in conformity with liberal European institutions.

The crisis period was a feature of globalization. In order to bolster the declining profit rate world wide, the U.S. the Chicago School, among other institutions, was funded to recruit and educate world technicians in neoclassical economics and a complementary version of liberal law. Often educated in the U.S., and pressured by the threat of capital exit, Social Democrats as well as more conservative actors moved toward neoliberal ideology and policies. In the 1980s, after an economic bubble and low employment were followed by inflation, the Social Democrats began instituting neoliberal measures—including deregulating the currency, dropping corporate taxation and taxation on high income-earners, and switching from anti-unemployment policies to anti-inflationary policies. In 1990, a centre-right government led by Carl Bildt replaced the Social Democratic Party in charge of government. In the context of international recession, Bildt's determination to shock the Swedish economy by refusing to check the currency speculation created the economic crisis of the early 1990s.⁴⁰

When discontent with crisis-based unemployment brought the Social Democrats back to power in 1994, they responded by stabilizing the currency—and by reducing the welfare state and privatizing public services and goods, as governments did in many countries influenced by the Chicago School. Labor migration was likewise formally reinstated through EU membership. Under pressure from defecting Swedish capital, Social Democratic Party leaders continued the bourgeois government's promotion of European Union membership, and the Swedish referendum passed by 52 to 48 percent in favor of joining the EU on August 14, 1994. When Sweden joined the EU on January 1, 1995, it agreed to allow other EU citizens to work and live in Sweden; however, migration from

⁴⁰ Englund 1990; Meidner 1997; Olsen 1999.

Sweden to other EU-15 countries has been slightly greater than migration into Sweden from other countries.⁴¹ This is because until the intervention of European Courts in 2007, the Swedish labor confederations had the legal authority in Sweden to ensure workers' wages could not be undercut. Because there was little infrastructure to support low-wage tertiary sector firms and a low-wage, low-quality secondary labor market, there was little incentive for either owners of low wage firms or workers with low human capital to migrate to Sweden.

In fact, conditions for the Swedish working class, as well as business, improved throughout the turn of the twenty-first century. The Social Democrats initiated studies on the effects of the 1980s neoliberal policy changes, and, in the context of even elite discouragement over the bourgeois government's currency shock treatment, the dismal picture that emerged allowed the party to justify restoring some social democratic measures. The government reduced many tax expenditures, slightly increased taxes on high income earners, and significantly reduced taxes on food. The Social Democratic finance ministry increased spending on child support and continued to pay down the public debt.⁴² By 1998 the Swedish macro-economy recovered from the 1980s industrial restructuring and the currency speculation excess.⁴³ Today Sweden has a well regarded, generally robust economy, and the average quality of life, after government transfers, is very high, inequality is low (the gini coefficient is .28), and social mobility is high.⁴⁴ Yet by 1998 at the end of the economic crisis, when neoliberal policies had pushed the unemployment rate up from two to nine percent, society's most marginalized, including many refugees were locked out of jobs and forced into unemployment compensation.

⁴¹ Westin 2006.

⁴² Steinmo 2001.

⁴³ Krantz and Schön 2007.

⁴⁴ Steinmo 2001.

In order to combat what European technocrats call immigrant and minority “exclusion”, the Swedish Integration Policy was formulated to facilitate citizenship for immigrants. Following the Swedish multicultural integration policy tradition, “diversity” became a new cornerstone of integration policy in the 1990s. Formulating integration as a diversity issue was intended to accommodate the growing perception that “integration” was a “process of mutual adjustment and adaptation” of both migrant minorities and ethnic Swedes.⁴⁵ “Diversity management” policy was introduced to “help employers’ and employees’ organizations” (as Mona Sahlin put it) address social exclusion and discrimination.

Changes were instituted to formal citizenship. Since some countries would not allow their citizens to give up citizenship, Sweden began to grant dual citizenship. Children of immigrants do not technically automatically receive citizenship. Sweden does not have a *jus soli* principle, wherein being born on Swedish soil would confer citizenship. Nonetheless requirements for naturalization are not onerous. Applications for naturalization are submitted to the Board of Immigration. The requirement is five years of permanent residence in Sweden, or four year for refugees.⁴⁶ Commonly, local officials hold annual welcoming ceremonies for new citizens.

Despite these policy innovations to ameliorate the increased vulnerability of New Swedes, racialization would become increasingly prominent. Pundits described refugees’ troubles in cultural-essentialist terms, though New Swedes’ social citizenship rights ameliorated immigrants’ and minorities’ increasing distress. Moreover, integration reformists, discussed in Chapter Four, framed the social democratic state as the systemic source of the emergent racism. The racialization of neoliberal shock therapy’s results justified the Malthusian remedy: get rid of social citizenship and the welfare state, or the

⁴⁵ Westin 2006.

⁴⁶ Westin 2006.

“naturally” unfit will drag us all down. Welfare politics became profoundly racialized to substantiate the institution of relations of inequality.

The Post-1990 Swedish Media and Racial Crisis

Policy reform in Sweden is often undertaken in response to commissioned and publicized studies. But with the economic shock in the 1990s, as the Social Democratic Party strove to navigate the Swedish model through neoliberal reform, policy was also steered by media sensationalism. The media promoted the 1990s economic crisis as the fault of workers “living beyond their means” under a universalistic welfare state. The proof was in immigrant use of welfare and unemployment. Claiming that it would “efficiently” reform the crisis-ridden Swedish model, 95 percent of Swedish newspaper editorials promoted joining the European Union.⁴⁷ Their successful campaign laid the foundation for reducing the institutions of social citizenship in Sweden to allow the country to converge with a more liberal form of citizenship.

Concurrently, the media played a strong role in framing integration and racism in a way that appealed to the democratic self-image of Swedes while casting doubt on the wisdom of maintaining social democracy. Racism was framed in the media both as a local problem of deviant communities and as a general crisis of social democracy. Alan Pred’s study (2000) focused on the ways that race “spectacles” located problems in “other” communities. Spectacles included the 1988 referendum in Sjöbo that rejected the residential placement of refugees; 1993 anti-immigrant boy-gang violence, the burning of a Shiite mosque, and a march of 300 neo-Nazis descending upon economically-depressed Trollhätten; the slaying of a young Ivory Coast Swede in Klippan, and the forced departure of fifteen harassed and terrorized Bosnian refugee families from Örbyhus in 1995.⁴⁸ While ethnic Swedes’ violence toward women was portrayed as individual

⁴⁷ Wennerberg 1995.

⁴⁸ Pred 2000.

aberrations, newspapers framed New Swedes' violence as a cultural predisposition. Media fixated on stories of a young Turkish Swede viciously stabbed by her brother outside a discotheque, a Lebanese-Swedish twenty-one-year-old beaten to death by her former husband in Malmö, and a fifteen-year-old girl of Iraqi descent murdered in Umeå by her brother and cousin.⁴⁹

These three cases were discussed extensively in the newspapers as Muslim, non-Swedish behavior, and as a typical part of a foreign cultural system of patriarchal "honor" that potentially threatened Swedish women.⁵⁰ The Umeå district court ruled that, due to cultural differences, men of Iraqi origin could not be held responsible for murdering their fifteen-year-old sister.⁵¹ This ruling became a point of social contention, as Swedes debated whether their legal system should valorize cultural difference over universal rights, such as women's right to life.

Combating Systemic Racism in Sweden

Spectacles generate organized responses from the state and from social movement organizations (SMOs). If they are effective, such organized state and SMO responses recognize that the violence of social stratification, such as racism, is a systemic rather than a localized problem. The social democratic state addressed racism partly through education and partly through anti-discrimination legislation.

As racialized incidents become part of Swedish national and local debates, labor-force and cultural answers to racism continued to be forwarded and introduced into the Swedish institutional framework. In the 1997 Integration Policy, the Discrimination

⁴⁹ Pred 2000.

⁵⁰ Åland 1997. It should be noted that most Swedes who arrived from Iran and Iraq before 2003 are non-religious and came to Sweden because they were escaping religious fundamentalism (Sander 1997).

⁵¹ *Dagens Nyheter*, March 26, 1997, cited in Pred 2000.

Ombudsman's (DO) office was strengthened. Both public and private sectors were called upon to take account of ethnic and cultural diversity. Municipalities were offered generous grants by the national government to provide newly arrived refugees with introduction programs, including Swedish language programs. The Swedish Integration Board (Integrationsverket, SIB) was established in June 1998 to study and issue public reports (*Integration Barometer* reports) on the welfare of New Swedes. Integrationsverket was charged with ensuring that the goals of Swedish integration policies had an impact throughout society.⁵²

To do this, the Board funded NGOs around the country to assist integration and create anti-discrimination programs. This was because, along with other social services, integration is conducted on the local level in Sweden. Because their SIB-funded anti-discrimination policies were focused on other vulnerable groups, including women, the disabled, and sexual minorities, very few municipalities or educational institutions followed suit by instituting their own anti-ethnic discrimination policies. No private sector or NGO compliance was in evidence. This caused tremendous dissatisfaction with Integrationsverket among ethnic minority scholars and leaders.⁵³

Swedish policy has been less susceptible to change when it comes to legal reform and local prosecution of ethnic discrimination. The Swedish state has been reluctant to introduce a general protection against discrimination, and has also expressed reluctance to assume responsibility for discrimination between individuals.⁵⁴ This reticence may be associated with the perception that existing models of such legislation are incompatible with the distinct legacy of Swedish law that, according to criminologist Carl Jansson, is more oriented to discovery and collective arbitration and less oriented toward a win-lose

⁵² Lappalainen 2002: 19. The SIB worked with public authorities and organizations to promote equal rights, responsibilities, and opportunities.

⁵³ Diakite 2006.

⁵⁴ Lappalainen 2002: 13.

model of justice. Affirmative action is especially resisted. Employment and housing discrimination is not played as a spectacle in the media, so their public exposure is not maximized, and they do not act as goads on legal reform. The Swedish legal system is oriented toward universalism, and other institutions—welfare state employment and education—are used to ameliorate discrimination. Parliamentarian Britta Lejon explained the opposition to legalizing affirmative action,

“It’s not a good idea to create special solutions. Our job as legislators is to help judges with existing legislation. Legislation is a base. But you can’t look at problems in the labor market as separate from education. Problems on the labor market are due to attitudes, lack of knowledge, fear.”

Nonetheless, laws against ethnic discrimination were given more teeth, due greatly to the work of lawyer, immigrant, and politician Paul Lappalainen. In the 1997 Integration Policy, the Act on Discrimination at Work was tightened. Ethnic discrimination in the labor market was prohibited. The amended law required employers to show that the person hired or promoted was better qualified than other candidates.⁵⁵ In 1999 Sweden adopted its first law prohibiting ethnic discrimination in employment, education, and public services. This law was reinforced by EU Directives in 2000.

As anti-immigration sentiment grew sharply in the 1990s economic crisis, local governments as well as the national government responded. The City of Stockholm, for example, appropriated four million Swedish kronor⁵⁶ for anti-racism education programs. Efforts to combat racism in Trollhätten resulted in the discovery that anti-racism effectiveness depends on the use of a municipality’s own employees, especially adults working with children.⁵⁷ Official policy became *Zero Tolerance* of racist symbols in

⁵⁵ Lappalainen 2002: 7.

⁵⁶ Swedish kronor are usually designated as “SEK”, as in “SEK 4 million”, just as American dollars are usually designated “\$”.

⁵⁷ Lappalainen 2002: 8.

Swedish schools, and teachers received policy guidelines from the state. It is now illegal to wear racist symbols or disseminate racist ideology, although enforcement is difficult.⁵⁸ In response to the 1997 study indicating that a low but worrying percentage of Swedish school children held racist sentiments, the Social Democratic government sent out a booklet of information on the Holocaust to every household. The booklet came to be internationally regarded as a fine work on the Holocaust. Critics argued however that a book on the Holocaust failed to address cultural racism in Sweden at the start of the new millennium.⁵⁹ Alan Pred (2000) has suggested that focusing on Nazi symbols may distract people from coming to grips with the widespread middle-class racism that helps make fascism dangerous. Nazi symbols are certainly readily recognizable, but localizing racism in small communities of Nazi extremists makes invisible the societal contradictions and conflicts that feed racism.

Yet municipalities did not usually respond energetically to the national and EU efforts to prompt action against ethnic discrimination. In 2002, a new government mandate (SFS 2002:989) was adopted to fund NGOs to create local anti-discrimination bureaus (ADB, based on a Dutch model) which could file police reports, negotiate with employers and unions, locate the Discrimination Ombudsman for ethnic minority complainants, and provide public education. The various Ombudsmen for Discrimination retained the discretion over taking discrimination cases to court. This caused further resentment against Integrationsverket in the private NGO community, which wanted its anti-discrimination bureaus to be given the public funding and power to take cases to court. Moreover, private NGOs contested the distribution of Integrationsverket funding among them, charging political bias in favor of social democratic NGOs.⁶⁰ This resentment was mobilized by ethnic discrimination experts, who urged private anti-discrimination organizations to agitate for convergence with EU anti-ethnic discrimination policies.

⁵⁸ Lappalainen 2002: 9-10.

⁵⁹ Pred 2000: 93.

⁶⁰ Diakite 2006: 10.

Such (an NGO) strategy would require changes in Swedish laws regarding the taxation of large donations from business and industry to NGOs and others, a task that is clearly in need of development. But until NGOs in Sweden are really free from government control in the form of state subsidies from institutions such as the SIB, combating structural discrimination in Sweden will remain marginally successful at best.

By creating a compromise where the state funded private NGOs through a state agency, the Swedish state provided a new source of revenue for private NGOs. Liberal ethnic integration reformists like Diakite above argued that as the legitimate reformers in Sweden, NGOs were entitled growth opportunities. These private organizations, he suggested, could demand the diminishment of the welfare state, both on the national and the local level, as well as the reduction of taxation on private business, as the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) recommends. In 2006 integration expert Masoud Kamali successfully championed the welfare state reduction aspect of this program on the national stage.

Outside the political establishment many Swedes continued to fight racism. In the early 2000s, Swedes became concerned with immigrant child prostitution,⁶¹ and racism in political institutions. Muslims in Christian-secular Sweden have joined the struggles against neo-Nazis. At a rally in Nyköping on August 20, 2001, neo-Nazis targeted refugee immigrants and Swedish workers. Many Swedes responded with concern about what they saw as a rising assault on multiculturalism by the Right. There were ensuing demonstrations in Göteborg for and against racism, although the anti-racism mobilization was considerably stronger.

⁶¹ In the wake of the neoliberal reform of the former Soviet Union, Swedish municipalities saw a rise in the arrival of unaccompanied foreign minors seeking protection. Reception centers were not designed to accommodate so many children. With reports of children disappearing from the centers, child prostitution received notoriety.

Left Party members I interviewed, such as party leader Ulla Hoffman, hoped that anti-racism efforts had gained political momentum with recent publicity, including the highly-acclaimed release of the film *Lilja 4-ever*, a story of Western exploitation of vulnerable immigrant girls. Racist incidents have directly influenced the political world. In the 2002 elections, reporters Jan Josefsson and Lars-Göran Svensson posed as racists and interviewed Swedish bourgeois party politicians running for elections. The racist responses of many of these center-right politicians were caught on national television, causing a public uproar that forced a number of politicians to drop out of their races. This severely hurt the bourgeois parties in the 2002 election. But after the 2002 elections, Prime Minister Göran Persson announced that there was no person of non-Swedish ethnicity qualified for a top government position. In the following May a Muslim school was burned down; and public debate continued about the state funding of Muslim schools that do not conform to Swedish gender policies.

However, despite recent studies that showed racist behavior in private sector employment and housing, the dominant prescriptions for further systemic reform focused not on racism within Swedish culture, but rather on the public institutions of social democracy. Critics within the media, politics, and the academy held social citizenship rights and the social democratic welfare state responsible for promoting the conditions that produced racial social problems. They claimed social citizenship rights coddled undeserving, ungrateful, criminal immigrants, while suffocating the good immigrants. Neoliberals, including neoliberals in the media, offered their “anti-discrimination alternative”: pulling out state support for workers’ rights so that immigrants could work for Swedes in more low-quality service jobs. This political campaign has erected new political wedges between organized labor and Left parties on one hand, and immigrants (and youth) impacted by unemployment on the other.

Swedish Identity and Responsibility for Integration Troubles

Not only private experts and groups harness ethnic discrimination issues to challenging social democratic welfare state institutions. Swedes trained in U.S. economics, political science, and law can bring policy and politics Trojan horses home to undermine the institutions that protect social rights and assist social reproduction. In October 2002 I went to a Left Party policy-formation meeting at the Riksdag office of Ulla Hoffman. Attended by prominent Arbetlivsinstitut immigration and gender researcher Wuokko Knocke, and the Left Party's Kalle Larson, among others, the purpose of the meeting was to discuss how to integrate political scientist Ann Towns' academic work into a parliamentary motion.⁶² A political scientist from the University of Minnesota, Towns presented her "Something Rotten" argument that the Swedish state has been marketed on the international stage as gender-equal, and that this prevents Swedes from recognizing honor killings in New Swede families as a Swedish problem. Towns demonstrates that honor killings were rather framed as an issue confined to deviant immigrants. Barbara Hobson and Zenia Hellgren, in their recent (as yet unpublished) work on how immigrant women use the legitimation and expansion aims of the European Union as political leverage within Sweden, point out that Towns' article implies a need to reset the racist and xenophobic dividing line in Sweden from between "them" (patriarchal immigrants) and "us" (feminist Swedes) to "differences among us". This is a reasonable conclusion to draw from Towns.

The other implication, in neoliberal hands, is that Sweden is inherently incapable of addressing multicultural issues like honor killings. Towns herself suggested this at the close of the meeting, proposing to study the comparatively successful integration of Somalis in Minnesota to the situation of Somalis in Sweden. "They are a Muslim

⁶² The motion eventually became 2002/03:v475.

population,” she explained. “I want to explore the reasons why Sweden has failed and Somalis have done better in Minnesota.”⁶³

However such a study could not be done. As Sweden continued to recover from the 1990s, the U.S. government soon replaced unionized airport workers with non-unionized federal employees, which reduced Minnesota Somalis’ economic integration. Citing “anti-terrorism”, the state shut down Somali wire services, and anti-immigrant campaigns and immigrant-control legislation burgeoned throughout the U.S. Cultural clashes broke out. Somali taxi drivers refused service to certain people based on religious advice. Republican politicians in Minnesota campaigned on the anti-immigrant platform of forcing immigrants to list their residency status on their driver’s licenses. Minnesota instituted anti-immigrant legislation, including barring undocumented workers from medical services in accord with the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).⁶⁴ Somalis’ brief citizenship advantage in Minnesota deflated compared with their cousins in Sweden.

Reviewing the studies published at Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights’ website, it hardly seems that the immigration and integration issues in Minnesota differ from those in Sweden, except that in Sweden immigrants have not been beset by the rise of the military-security state. Precisely because of neoliberalism and its complement neoconservatism, Towns’ proposed study into the supposed advantages of liberal integration could not materialize. To suppose that post-1990 refugee troubles in Sweden are the result of social democratic citizenship is to claim that democratic social citizenship expansion prevents further democratic social citizenship expansion. In this tradition, Towns claimed that democratic citizenship expansion for women translated into a form of nationalism that blocked democratic citizenship expansion for racialized

⁶³ A basis for comparison is that Minnesota, with a population of over five million residents, has taken in mostly refugee and family reunification settlement like Sweden, population nine million.

⁶⁴ Preston 2007.

groups. Rather than social citizenship expansion, however, economic and political restructuring appear to block further democratic social citizenship expansion.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, social problems involving immigrants were arguably initially and popularly regarded in Sweden as non-Swedish problems. Towns' article, however, attempted to turn away from immigrant "deviance" and toward examining the Swedish component of citizenship troubles. Unfortunately for feminist contributors to policy, the political fight quickly wandered away from whether the state should prosecute patriarchy, and became about whether liberalism held the innovative solutions to the social problems that had only partially improved since the economic crisis. Honor killing was still on the legislative agenda, but by the time the bourgeois coalition came back into power in 2006, social problems involving immigrants were seen as both non-Swedish problems and *social democratic* problems. The solution on offer was not feminist. The bourgeois coalition's solution was not even particularly helpful to immigrants, who, after all the academic critique of immigrants' scant political representation as *ethnic groups*, were almost immediately deprived of the modicum of official institutional representation they had as a group through Arbetlivsinstitutet (the Institute for Working Life, a research institute) and Integrationsverket.⁶⁵

No Nazis Here?: Racialized Integration Reform Politics

The Social Democratic Party, originally the political arm of the labor movement, failed to fully apprehend the continued importance of the problem of social inclusion and citizenship in Sweden.⁶⁶ While the unions were counting on the Social Democratic Party

⁶⁵ In 2006 Masoud Kamali had called for the dissolution of Integrationsverket and all integration activities on the grounds that Sweden should instead pursue affirmative action and become more globally integrated. Although the bourgeois government did dissolve Integrationsverket, they did not replace it with Kamali's recommendations.

⁶⁶ Mulinari and Neergaard 2005. As we will see in Chapter 5, my interviewees agree with this interpretation.

to facilitate multicultural immigrant integration, the national party was focused on how to integrate with the European Union, and integration was devolved to local level officials. As the Social Democratic Party retreated somewhat from its cooperative division-of-labor relationship with the unions, and while high profile politicians such as Goran Persson worked on their career ties with the European Union, the issues of domestic citizenship seemed outside legislators' expertise, or so many claimed to me. The future lay in European Union consolidation, and, as in many other European countries, EU expansion was promoted as a way to inscribe the EU with the national (here Swedish) model. Parliamentarian Anita Jönsson for example explained to me that "Sweden is a driving partner" of EU common asylum policy. Most national politicians, however, saw change in store for Sweden rather than the EU. Parliamentarians I interviewed expected that Sweden would change its restrictive immigration policy to conform with EU open labor migration policy, and the welfare and citizenship of immigrants would shift from a local (municipal and county) concern to a super-national level.

In the interim, immigrants were a small fraction of the Swedish population, and their concerns seemed like a provincial matter, properly handled through municipalities and the Left Party, and through EU sponsored multiculturalism programs. Although every office had an official mandate to integrate immigrant issues in their policies, some Social Democratic ministers such as the Minister of Finance and Housing explained that immigration and integration matters were not their concern.

In one way or another, parliamentary ministers stated to me that they considered immigration and integration to be either smaller or larger than national concerns. Nonetheless, "immigrant issues" such as unemployment and housing segregation were prominent national concerns. There appears to be a broad public consensus that discrimination and exclusion need to be addressed. There were over 2,000 xenophobic

crimes reported to police in 2005.⁶⁷ The Ombudsman for Ethnic Discrimination received over 800 ethnic discrimination cases in that same year.

The impact of immigration on Swedish politics has been made invisible because stark fascism is not a prominent politic in Sweden.⁶⁸ The press seems unaware how much they have been reporting on immigration and integration, including tough-on-immigrants political contests and proposals to dramatically increase labor immigration. “Immigration is a dominant political issue throughout Europe, but in Sweden, where a general election is to be held on Sunday, the thorny subject has been markedly absent from the campaign,” asserts an article, bafflingly, in the midst of an extensive special section on recent immigrant integration stories.⁶⁹ Contrasting Swedish election results to the electoral successes of the flamboyantly anti-immigrant Right-wing parties in Europe—such as for example the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, political scientists have likewise concluded that immigration does not impact politics in Sweden. “The problem is on the agenda but no one from the main parties is trying to win voters on this issue (immigration and integration) and has never done so,” Göteborg University political scientist Marie Demker asserts.⁷⁰

Pre-election news stories, however, show that integration and race politics have had a profound effect on Swedish elections, and some immigrants have become strong voices within Sweden, promoting neoliberal and neoconservative integration agendas in the

⁶⁷ Xenophobic crimes are investigated and prosecuted by the Swedish government.

⁶⁸ According to the U.S. Department of state’s “Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Sweden,” there are about 3,000 neo-Nazis or white supremacists in Sweden, which has a population of over nine million people. An annual march the neo-Nazis and white supremacists hold has been dropping in attendance, to fewer than 1,000 persons in 2005. 11% of the 2,272 xenophobic crimes reported in 2005 were committed by neo-Nazis or white supremacists. A law prohibiting the incitement of hatred against ethnic groups makes it illegal in Sweden to wear xenophobic symbols or racist paraphernalia.

⁶⁹ The Local 2007d.

⁷⁰ Kohn 2006.

popular press. Prominent integration and race discourses had a marked effect on public perceptions. In the spring of election year, the research organization *Sifo* found that the public polled in western Sweden considered integration to be Sweden's biggest failing, and law and order its second biggest problem.⁷¹ The politicians responded to these opinions together. Leading up to the 2006 elections, the press announced tough-on-immigrants proposals from many of the parties.

In the midst of pre-election press on immigrant and integration issues, the far right Sweden Democrats proposed paying immigrants to leave Sweden. In one way or another, nearly every integration reformist claimed that low-cost *discipline* can easily overcome the archetypical problems of refugee integration. While some public intellectuals and politicians like Mauricio Rojas and Masoud Kamali proposed to cut down discrimination directly with strict anti-racism disciplinary measures for ethnic Swedes in government, the response to the immigrant unemployment in Sweden was influenced by a neoconservative law and order approach. Immigrant politics are a classic tool of right wing electoral mobilization, and the right wing politicians did not discount the important role of immigrants in reforming national citizenship. While blatantly racist statements lost the Liberal Party votes in the 2002 election, the freshly reorganized bourgeois coalition prominently advertised its more professional, get-tough-on-immigrants policies in its 2006 election manifesto.⁷²

Liberal Party leader Lars Leijonborg bragged that the bourgeois coalition called for disciplining more immigrants. They broadcast "a clear signal which is sent to people who don't need financial support," like "a woman who is supported by a man who considers

⁷¹ The Local 2006b.

⁷² Some tough-on-immigrants politics continued to backfire, and a Centre candidate had to quit the race after proposing, for immigrants merely accused of a crime, "It's just a kick in the butt and out with them" (Ewing 2006).

that she doesn't need to learn Swedish."⁷³ Anti-immigration sentiment had been stirred in the crisis-ridden 1990s by the refugees' job losses and consequent need for social support. While often "bad" refugees—as we see in Chapter Four—were portrayed in the media as teenage boys or sexist men, here the center-right politician portrayed bad immigrants as indolent women. These racialized anti-social citizenship politics echo U.S. politics since California's 1994 Proposition 187. Both anti-racism experts and the electorate could embrace these more "nuanced" anti-immigrant politics. Attacking immigrant women was only a "harmless", disposable tool for attacking the monolithic state or SAP party machine.

Integration reformists, both ethnic-Swedish nationalists and immigrants, called public attention to the moral dissolution of immigrants. The media interviewed scandalously sexist, bratty teenage boys with foreign backgrounds, in order to portray the moral depravity of immigrant communities. If immigrants are equivalent to antisocial teenage boys (or dissolute housewives), the logic proceeds: immigrants need to be disciplined. Such neoconservative law-and-order hegemony has infiltrated local integration practices. "Now we pay welfare benefits as a salary. This is to avoid teaching them (immigrants) to live on contributions," Västerås integration officer Mats Ericson says, revealing the influence of neoliberal anti-welfare state culture of poverty politics.⁷⁴

Liberal Party politician and Swedish Integration and Gender Equality Minister Nyamko Sabuni proposed policies banning headscarves for girls under fifteen, and compulsory grade school-administered female circumcision checks. A Moderata candidate for parliament, identified only as a doctoral student, released an unpublished study claiming

⁷³ *The Local* 2006e.

⁷⁴ While leading immigration economist George Borjas (1999:209) does not suggest this particular incentive policy, he does briefly advance a culture of poverty explanation for the financial precariousness of many refugee groups. The culture of poverty argument is used to contend that the reason why people are persistently poor is because the welfare state grooms poor people to be failures. It is used to counter arguments holding that the market fails, from a distributional fairness perspective.

that welfare provided to refugees by county council-run introduction (refugee integration) programs harmed immigrants' chances of economic integration (getting a job within two years of arriving in Sweden). To arrive at this conclusion she compared the early job entry figures of people who "qualified for the introduction programs" (refugees) to immigrants who did not (people who immigrated to Sweden because they had a Swedish job or spouse); but the methods that disqualified the "study" from publication were not revealed in the press any more than the "researcher's" political ambitions.

As rioting immigrants in French suburbs were recalled in news media in the weeks before the 2006 election, integration problems became a symbol of social democratic failure. Under the sponsorship of Social Democratic party leader Mona Sahlin, Swedish integration expert Masoud Kamali organized minority postcolonial post-docs to write and release that year's *Integration Barometer* report.⁷⁵ The report was a pre-election political fiasco for the Social Democrats. The Social Democrat Integration Minister Jens Orback expressed frustration with Kamali's report.

"We wanted structural discrimination to be identified and confirmed so that we could assess its scale. On that point we are not satisfied...(As the country's law forbids employment on the basis of ethnicity,) there are a number of major proposals which go so far as influencing our constitution. They are lacking cost analysis and suggestions about legislative changes."⁷⁶

The ethnic-affirmative action policies that Kamali championed have been repeatedly rejected by the Swedish courts, which, as MP Lejon states above, favor social democratic universalism. Panned as "ideology" as opposed to research, the report abetted the articulation of the neoliberal "inept government" framework.

⁷⁵ In 2004 and 2006 the Swedish Integrationsverket worked with leading immigration scholars to publish large studies of the integration challenges besetting immigrants and Swedish society.

⁷⁶ *The Local*, August 17, 2006.

In Kamali's view, Swedish society is atavistically fascist "*ein Volk, ein Reich*" and in need of shock therapy. Because this cultural racism is a "natural" attribute of Europeans, is capillary or micro-structural, in Kamali's assessment, local and national state officials are inherently corrupt. Singled out as prominent villains, in need of discipline and replacement, they and their work all should be "scrapped" as Kamali put it. Kamali's prescribed sub-system shock can be used to clear the way for neoliberal policies that the Swedish public may well rebel against if they had to compete against social democratic policies.

Kamali contributed to the theoretical foundation of neoliberal political actors' recommendation that all existing social democratic integration institutions be disbanded in Sweden. Extending to social integration neoclassical economics' critique of welfare state market distortion, in 1997 Kamali assembled some cases where "day care centers, schools, neighbors, police, child psychiatrists, and social authorities" had tried to help immigrant families experiencing difficulties, and failed. He laid out the basis for the neoliberal argument for Swedish welfare state dissolution in his "Distorted Integration" thesis.

Misunderstandings, abuse of power by social authorities, and abuse of the generous social allowance system by some immigrants created serious problems for Swedish social policy and welfare system. In other words, there are contradictions between the social service system, on the one hand, and a very substantial clientele group, immigrants on the other. This is one of the unexpected and unintended consequences of the parallel developments of the Swedish welfare system and large scale immigration.

Part of Kamali's story is that ethnic Swedes make particularly "insulting", culturally-insensitive "neighbors". This part of the argument gained traction in policy only by impugning state officials and workers' (European) racial (that is "natural" and immutable) incompetence. The heart of the argument is Kamali's depiction of the social democratic welfare state as a rigid, superfluous bureaucracy that infantilizes

immigrants.⁷⁷ This characterization has helped to justify and spur neoliberal reform. Citing Durkheim's theoretical argument that the division of labor is the source of integration in modern society, Kamali holds that the modern market is the proper model and site of social integration.

Modern integration in differentiated societies based on the complex division of labor and duties does not derive from "likeness" and conformity among its members, but rather from the diversity and difference between individuals and groups.

From this theoretical position, it follows for neoliberals that all efforts should be put into creating a segmented labor market, which would allow interdependent "diversity" to flower, and getting rid of a universalistic welfare state, which "distorts" the market. The bourgeois Swedish parties—including the Moderates, the Center Party, the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats—produced an election manifesto that amplified the 2006 Integrationsverket report, by proposing to discipline two of the problematic factors that report identified in Swedish life: the immigrants and the state. Discipline was to be administered in conjunction with managing increased labor migration. The Centre Party came out of the 2006 electoral campaign gates early, announcing their proposal for Green Card labor immigration.

Coordinating their policies with neoclassical economics theory and the EU management of labor mobility, the bourgeois politicians in Sweden claim to be innovative. Increasingly, they have set the mold in Sweden. In response to the bourgeois parties' immigrant politics (unemployment, the welfare state, and exclusion), immediately before the 2006 elections the Social Democrat Party Integration Minister unveiled a plan to tie arriving refugees' financial support to a rights and responsibilities contract. The Social Democrats announced they would make immigrants sign contracts and learn Swedish to get welfare. Liberal Party leader Lars Leijonborg chided the Social Democrats for

⁷⁷ Kamali uses Weber and Bourdieu to back this assertion theoretically. Neoliberals have long attempted to blur the distinction between social democracy and Stalinism, according to Klein 2007.

copying the bourgeois parties' election manifesto.⁷⁸ On the eve of the 2006 election, politicians and anti-racism experts circulated the populist "government ineptitude" discourse, sending exasperated voters to the bourgeois parties for a change of government.

The stigmatization of welfare by associating it with powerless, "sub-Swedish" refugees has been rapidly achieving hegemony. Both young ethnic-Swedes and the children of immigrants backed the Alliance's neoliberal promise to build a prominent low wage labor market.⁷⁹ When it comes to on-the-ground neoliberal jobs policy, the public can be credulous. One recent bourgeois government proposal, to "improve integration in rural areas" by encouraging immigrants to "seek jobs in the agricultural sector" was innocently interpreted by the public in letters to the editor as a proposal to give immigrants forty acres and mule, rather than to develop a Swedish Bracero program.⁸⁰

Supported by Social Democratic leaders, in addition to the bourgeois Alliance and EU labor policy, current immigration and integration reform and reform proposals shift the balance of political and labor market power to capital and reduce state capacity to enforce social citizenship rights. When Swedish voters ushered the bourgeois parties into power in the 2006 fall elections shortly following the release of the Kamali-Sahlin Integrationverket report, the bourgeois parties quickly moved to shut down what institutions were responsive to immigrants within the state, Integrationsverket and the Institute for Working Life (Arbetslivsinstitutet). They targeted purportedly "corrupt" (SAP-networked) immigrant NGOs in civil society for funding revocation. Immigrants, many of whom had voted for the liberal parties, protested. It is not clear that sacrificing social citizenship gains for neoliberal reform is turning out to have anything to do with

⁷⁸ The Local 2006e.

⁷⁹ Statistiska Centralbyrån 2007.

⁸⁰ The Local 2007d.

increasing diversity competence in Sweden, apart from the theoretical and political argument that all good things flow from the unfettered market.

Immigrants, Economic Needs, and Structural Labor Market Conditions

The victorious bourgeois government ran on a platform of unemployment policy innovation and has initiated an integration policy that has allocated funding to communities that fill low-skill jobs with refugees. In economic good times, these communities tend to be the cities, which support the bourgeois parties, rather than the manufacturing towns around Sweden. Although a Swedish business think tank also urges subsidizing businesses in refugee suburbs through U.S.-style Enterprise Zones,⁸¹ capital primarily seeks to create low-skill, low-pay jobs in Sweden. Policy deregulating the labor market and otherwise benefiting capital is promoted as the solution to the social inclusion of immigrants. The Integration and Gender Equality Minister presents the neoliberal discourse on social inclusion through jobs (without considering quality of work). She concludes with the neoliberal policy implication: more public transfers to capital.

An unacceptable number of migrants are excluded from our societies. Unemployment, low income and dependence on social welfare, lead to exclusion and isolation. Employment is an important element of integration. To have a job is not only about having an income. To have a job leads to participation and involvement in the community... We are trying to remove obstacles to entry in the labor market for the unemployed, for example by providing subsidies for employers.

Already accommodating labor markets to low-pay foreign labor is threatening solidaristic wages and unionization in Sweden. In 2003, the Workers' Educational Organization (ABF, Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund) organizer Magnus Pontusson advised me, "We have very, very little illegal working immigration." As a social democratic country, Sweden

⁸¹ Zenou 2007.

has had controls on business, unlike the U.S. government, where the state did not make any gesture toward regulating the hiring of illegal immigrants until 1986, and where an effective lack of enforcement on hiring since the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) has supported increasing levels of illegal immigration.⁸²

Both low-skill service and construction are sectors in which labor strength is more tenuous in Sweden. Building contracts have been awarded to low-bid Baltic companies, who have imported Baltic labor at wages below the Swedish construction sector's labor contract.

“We’re getting a whole lot of illegal labor in the construction sector. We have a lot of problems there. They’re overriding the system,” Pontusson admits. “But the union is trying to stop it. It’s hard to do, and the unions are being accused of being racists by the liberals.”

Integration reformists argue that when organized labor opposes building institutional support for junk job firms, it oppresses global people of color. Organized labor's counterclaim, that junk jobs (and stigmatized or poor housing) are racialized to substantiate relations of domination and subordination, has a difficult time getting heard in the media. Studies by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2006) and Swedish research⁸³ show that discrimination by employers has reduced refugee integration. Employers discriminate against New Swedes in hiring. Within a couple of months after the release of the long-awaited ILO study, the Confederation of Swedish Employers insisted that the framing instead should be that municipal integration practices, rather than employers, fail immigrants. To rebut the charges of employer discrimination, the Confederation of Swedish Employers publicized an international temporary labor firm's report, “Getting Europe to Work.” Unsurprisingly, Manpower's report called for increased labor market mobility. The temporary employment firm and the Confederation

⁸² Brownell 2005.

⁸³ Rydgren 2004; ILO 2006; Kesler 2006; The Local 2006f.

of Swedish Enterprise demanded that Sweden facilitate labor immigration.⁸⁴ Neoliberals employ immigration, a naturalizing discourse on culture, and charges of racism against organized labor. They demand a kind of “freedom” where naturally culturally different workers may be imported from lower-income countries, given a second-class, probationary citizenship—on the grounds of security, and paid in kronor below existing Swedish standards of living. “Let’s leave the ravings of the fever swamp socialist xenophobes to one side,” recommends a Swedish Right-wing think tank. Citing the U.S. as an exemplar of immigration-based economic growth, the think tanks urges Swedish businesses to go on a foreign-labor “hiring spree”, despite high levels of unemployment among immigrants already in Sweden.⁸⁵

European liberalization campaigns have intersected with immigration policy in Sweden to seriously reduce the capacity of the country’s labor organizations to support social democratic conditions. When the bourgeois parties came into power in 2006 the EU was able to pass the Bolkestein Service Directive.⁸⁶ The Bolkestein Service Directive reinforced European Court labor decisions by prohibiting member countries’ labor laws from applying to and protecting guest workers in many industries. The European Court decided in 2007 that the union confederations could not require unionized immigrant labor to pay the minimal union fee required to maintain industry-level collective bargaining. While the union confederation is working to show the direct contribution of their fee schedule to immigrant labor’s wages, this EU ruling poses a serious threat to the union confederation’s ability to keep wages from devolving into highly-unequal negotiations between oligopolistic capital and individual laborers in Sweden. Sweden is required to conform to the Service Directive by 2009. With that erosion of organized labor’s power, we can expect to see an orderly acceleration in dismantling social

⁸⁴ O’Mahony 2007.

⁸⁵ McCormac 2007.

⁸⁶ The Swedish SAP as well as France’s Socialist Party had opposed the Bolkestein Service Directive.

democratic institutions in Sweden that Bildt's economic shock attempted in the early 1990s.

Immigration researcher Wuokko Knocke's study of immigrant populations' labor market situations in Sweden affirms both Saskia Sassen's (1999) and Hagendoorn, Veenman, and Vollebergh's (2003) conclusion: it is "economic needs and structural labor market conditions that are decisive in whether immigrants are integrated, or segregated, or discriminated against in the labor market."⁸⁷ We need to be specific about those economic needs and structural labor market conditions. EU antiracism approaches in the education system and through social movement organizations supported the development of more public support for capital and more low pay, precarious service sector jobs. But the growth of refugee populations around the world, the abandonment of full employment, the growing importance of low-skill work in the Swedish economy, the pressure to decrease taxation on elites and stigmatize and shrink the welfare state, and the related growth of masculine violence against women are inequality problems that require innovative social democratic solutions. To gain a place over time in the mainstream of a multicultural society, refugees need welfare state support and quality work.

Toward a Market-dominated Citizenship?

In exit interviews from the last election the Social Democrats lost, the public frequently expressed frustration with the party's apparent inability to forward innovative policy. Not unlike bourgeois politicians, some SAP politicians I interviewed at the national level grouse (albeit more obliquely) about the constraints of "excessive" labor strength in the workplace and in politics. Like the Right, but in different language, Social Democrats partly attribute immigrant problems to immigrant failures and partly to what they view as atavistic Leftist institutions. "Why are there not enough minorities in positions of authority within unions and in politics? Immigrants have not wanted to focus on Swedish

⁸⁷ Knocke 2000: 362.

political, life, but rather back at home. It's natural," suggests a Deputy Member of the Riksdag Board, whose mother was a Social Democrat Party politician before her.

“Social structure has changed, but the work place has not adjusted. People in power are not eager to let go. Different regions and districts have done better or worse. The Old Swedish bruksamhället (factory society)—these are heavy-industrial regions where Social Democrats worked together with labor unions—where they have one powerful leader, then we have problems with immigrant integration.”

Yet despite this popular story condemning rural local labor good old boys, immigrant integration nonetheless has often been most successful in rural areas with manufacturing jobs, when New Swedes can secure good quality jobs.

Some Social Democrats such as the editor in chief of the Social Democratic Party newspaper *Aktuellt i Politiken* express an increasing aversion to working class politics, advocating distance from socialism. That may both derive from global neoliberal hegemony and be reinforced through trying to appeal to the growing, increasingly Right-wing urban voter base predominant in counties with high numbers of immigrants. SAP politicians are keenly aware they are politically weak in urban areas like Stockholm county and that these are the areas in which the population is growing.

Even though business regulation has been reduced while unions have begun to weaken, the tax burden has been shifted from capital to wages, and welfare is stigmatized through its association with deviant aliens, Social Democrats routinely portrayed class compromise and inequality as settled, accomplished facts, neither under renegotiation nor legitimate topics for public discussion. In a small Riksdag building courtyard, a young, suited, bespectacled Social Democratic aide, recently graduated with an American political science bachelors degree, and returned to Sweden knowledgeable *vis* the parameters of the politically possible, describes inequality as an issue *non grata*,

“We will not have class inequality in Sweden in the future because the social democratic state has already taken care of that in the past.” He draws on his cigarette, and taps the ashes onto the concrete at his feet with finality. “It is not possible,” he says absently, then glances at me, a little annoyed. “Don’t you smoke?”

Such blanket discursive stonewall may be intended to contain working class politics and maintain social stability and the legitimacy of the party in the eyes of capital, the EU, and the corporate media, but it may also be making the Social Democrats look like nothing more than a particularly vague bourgeois party. A lack of galvanizing vision also loses the SAP corporate media support and elections. At the very least, alienation is increasingly pushing urban immigrants to the Right, as the combined Social Democratic Party and Left Party vote of non-Nordic New Swedes (Swedes with foreign backgrounds) sank from 73 percent in 2002 down to 48 percent in 2006.⁸⁸ Yet despite the failure of the Swedish Social Democratic Party’s pre-election public attacks on communists to translate into an electoral victory, a Social Democratic communications professional locates the electoral failure of social democratic parties in insufficient neoliberalism. He explains France’s 2007 Socialist Party loss as the result of its failure to renounce socialist ideas and promote labor market deregulation.

“Two things might be good (about the French Socialist Party’s 2007 loss): One, the French Socialist Party might finally have its Bad Godesberg moment and shape up its economic outlook on the world and become a normal, European social democratic party when it comes to economic policy. Two, Sarkozy might implement a few needed economic reforms, which in the end will benefit working people and people desperately looking for jobs.”

While working conditions have become more stressful for all Swedes, class inequality has increased somewhat, highly-concentrated Swedish capital now has excessive power, and immigrants have become badly stigmatized, there is a case to be made that, quite contrary to party consensus, the Swedish Social Democrats floundered in the recent

⁸⁸ SVT 2007.

election because the SAP works to dampen popular Left organization, yet the neoliberalism they subscribe to is muddier than the bourgeois parties' neoliberalism.

In order to reclaim its popular support while harmonizing with EU policy, the Social Democrats appear poised to concentrate specifically on ameliorating the conditions of the most vulnerable residents of Sweden—promoting immigrant social mobility within Sweden. So far, promoting immigrant social mobility is to be done, as it has in the past, through education—a long-term solution, rather than a short-term electoral strategy—as well as by augmenting the junk jobs sector, an EU-supported policy.

“The EU is in deep crisis over its immigration policy, and policy falls to member states,” the European Commission’s Barbara Helferrich advised. (Still) “from immigration to gender policy, we’re experiencing in the EU a neoliberal movement to promote a hegemonic utilitarian discourse, and activate the public around financial goals.”⁸⁹

Augmenting the junk jobs sector is unlikely to promote economic dynamism in Sweden as there are already many low-quality job markets to compete with around the globe. It is unlikely to improve social mobility. If past neoliberal reforms are any indicator, it will exacerbate the inequality, stress, and suppressed social conflict that has been delegitimizing the Social Democratic Party in Sweden.

In immigration and integration politics, the Social Democrats work to both advance the international program of neoliberalization—which Harvey (2005) recognizes as capitalist class power restoration—and maintain what they think of as social democratic nationalist class cooperation. The problem for the Social Democrats is that neoliberalism is a competing—not complementary—capitalist model, promising like liberalism before it, to eradicate class conflict, but through disenfranchising and dispossessing the working

⁸⁹ Helferrich spoke in front of a group of scholars including myself at Stockholm University on November 4, 2006.

class,⁹⁰ rather than through government-mediated cooperation across enfranchised classes. This is a fundamental difference in the two “Third Ways”.⁹¹

Stability and security is engineered in social democratic societies by structuring the system to prevent *both* labor *and* capitalist strikes. Where neoliberal policy facilitates both capital and labor mobility, it only facilitates capital strike, and restricts the power of labor to strike. Neoliberalism claims that stability and security is best achieved parsimoniously: the state apparatus only prevents disruption by workers. Economic elites and their technocratic and communications retainers prefer neoliberalism, as it provides them political power and induces the primitive accumulation and imperialism that can stave off capitalist crises. The state apparatus is steered to make workers into expendable factors of production, while capitalists are made irreplaceable, invaluable, the very soul of social progress. Social democracy, on the other hand, creates the social citizenship rights and provides the social reproduction support that allow society (and markets) to value labor as well as capital.

The inability of the Left to gain public support for its policies—despite their successes—in Sweden is a contemporary development. Although the Swedish Social Democratic Party has traditionally enjoyed widespread public support for new policies through its ability to communicate with the public, the neoliberal politicization of corporate media may have greatly reduced the party’s access to dominant communication channels. The erosion of the Social Democratic Party’s position may push the party into either reauthorizing social movement, or joining or outdoing the Alliance as another plainly outspoken proponent of market-dominated citizenship. In either possible event, it is unclear whether the more radical Left Party and Greens, the trade union confederations, the LO newspaper, and progressive sociologists and labor economists can or will convene

⁹⁰ Harvey 2005: 75, 92; Pollin 2003.

⁹¹ Although social democracy had been called the “Third Way” in between capitalism and socialism, Giddens appropriated the term “Third Way” to apply to the neoliberal approach of New Labour.

to develop strategies for taking on an even stronger public leadership roles in a fight for immigrants'—and all Swedes'—social citizenship.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND IMMIGRATION

Both the politics of integration and the politics of social democratic welfare state retrenchment in Sweden highlight inequality between ethnic Swedes and New Swedes. This growth of immigrant-native inequality in Sweden has occurred in the wake of the institutionalization of some neoliberal reforms, as discussed in the previous chapter. In order to assess the possibilities for furthering the inclusion, citizenship, and welfare of immigrants in Sweden, and the proposals for immigration and integration reform, policymakers need to ensure that reform is oriented to preserve the high capacity of the Swedish state to foster, protect, and extend democratic citizenship. Esping-Anderson (1990) has shown that the diminishment of inequality dialectically reinforces democratic citizenship expansion. I argue this is because the state intervenes through social citizenship institutions to ameliorate the tendency of the capitalist market to allocate citizenship rights based on effective demand. To understand how the introduction of new residents impacts the institutions of democratic citizenship—specifically the social citizenship that enfranchises people at disadvantage on the market (such as working class immigrants) to participate as full members of their local and national communities, I ask in this chapter how inequality relates to immigration.

First I ask what are the forms of inequality observed between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes? Segregation and employment are frequently-highlighted inequalities between ethnic Swedes and some groups of refugee immigrants. But segregation is not always a cost to minority communities. This chapter discusses the pros and cons of segregation for minority communities. Then I ask why is the growth of inequality associated with the New Swede-ethnic Sweden axis, rather than, say gender, or class? Race and class

inequality theory argue that racial formation can occur in the systematic allocation of the costs and benefits of accumulation. Is racial inequality inevitable in Sweden, as (we will see in Chapter Four) integration reformists insist it is? Integration reformists hypothesize that local government officials and everyday Swedes are corrupted by racist attitudes. Reviewing the evidence on racist and xenophobic attitudes in Sweden, I find little indication that ethnic Swede-New Swede inequality should exist even as much as racial inequality exists in other countries. Just as I found in the second and fifth chapters that Sweden has high state capacity to innovate and improve immigration and integration policy and practices, here I show that Swedes demonstrate relatively low levels of racism and xenophobia. Given these impressive conditions, how has the inequality integration reformists observe grown in Sweden? I build on the immigration literature by demonstrating a relationship between immigrants and growing income inequality. I use comparative data to develop a framework for the political economy of immigration, foregrounding relationships of inequality, to describe the mutually-reinforcing relationship between immigration and inequality. I argue that growing immigration-fueled inequality means native workers' response options to capitalist political projects narrow to supporting projects that appear to contain inequality's costs among especially vulnerable groups.

I argue for the continuing importance of the sociological concept of inequality. Inequality is often translated into immigrant "exclusion" within European policy contexts. Exclusion is a concept that is supposed to capture the ways in which immigrants are peripheral to national life. It is typically measured in "economic integration", a binomial employment status variable: Is the immigrant a business owner or employee of someone, or not? Yet immigrant "inclusion" also implies a status identical to the native median on income, health, housing segregation, income, political involvement, education, and intermarriage variables. When critics say that immigrants are excluded in Sweden, they can be saying that the disparity between older and newer residents is too vast, which can have social democratic policy implications. Or they can imply that native norms are too

high on “inclusion” variables, such as income, education, health, etc. This formation of the exclusion problem does not have social democratic solutions; rather it calls for a reduction in social citizenship. Critiques of immigrant exclusion can therefore produce wildly different policy recommendations.

Some anti-racism and integration experts, who believe exclusion does not have social democratic solutions, claim that exclusion is excessive in Sweden because of the “natural” or “social democratic” culture of ethnic Swedes. I therefore ask is the level of inequality between natives and immigrants adequately explained by consistent, popular racist and xenophobic attitudes? If this is not clear, is the level of inequality between natives and immigrants better explained by discriminatory practices in labor and housing markets? If so, why hasn't *market* discrimination been a focus of policy reform?

I suggest that the uneven indications of racism we will see, not only in social democratic multicultural integration policies and practices, but also in comparatively humanistic popular attitudes versus the discriminatory behavior of employers and landlords, point to the role of transnational class conflict as well as racism in inequality formation. I investigate how inequality between natives and immigrants is related to broader trends in inequality growth.

Using data on inequality and immigration within the U.S. over time, and comparative data across OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, I discuss the implications of and underlying connection between policy disciplining immigrants, such as removing welfare access, and policy ostensibly addressing immigrant economic exclusion, such as subsidizing low-wage businesses. I contend that such integration reform will fail to address social exclusion because they will fail to address inequality.

Inequality Between Ethnic Swedes and New Swedes: Segregation

In a country that has defined itself in terms of social citizenship rights, economic productivity, and gender equality advancements, immigrants, particularly some types of refugees, have shared in the widespread affluence only through a patchwork of market participation and the intervention of the welfare state. New Swede-ethnic Swede inequality grew up in an era in which refugee (rather than labor) immigration increased. Critics have decried the growth of inequality between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes since the 1990s economic crisis, including spatial inequality, economic inequality, education inequality, health inequality, and political inequality. Refugee women and youth in particular have on average worse education outcomes than ethnic Swedish women and youth.¹ Healthcare is regarded as “worse for immigrant women.”² For example, a Karolinska Institute study found that women born in countries outside Sweden suffer more complications when giving birth than Swedish women.³ New Swedes, who are fully enfranchised in Sweden, have a lower political participation rate than ethnic Swedes, according to Integrationsverket; and they are less well represented in political parties and political leadership. Below I describe two of the most prominently discussed forms of inequality between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes, spatial and economic inequality.

As the Chicago School’s avatar of human ecology, Robert Park maintained, social relations are spatial relations.⁴ Racialized, class-based housing segregation has developed in Sweden. “High proportions of unemployed and inactive immigrants and refugees are concentrated in and are confined to living in suburbs surrounding Sweden’s bigger

¹ Rydgren and Sawyer 2003.

² The Local 2007e.

³ The Local 2007e.

⁴ Anderson and Massey 2001: 4.

cities,” affirms Knocke.⁵ Segregation has had gendered effects. Women in particular are isolated in immigrant suburbs. With around forty-five minute one-way transportation times, refugee women have reduced access to the cultural and social resources concentrated in city centers.

In suburbs refugees became increasingly confined, in Granovetter’s (1973, 1982) sense, to what strong ties remained.⁶ But even “strong” refugee ties are weaker than Swedes’ family and friendship networks. The social agency *Socialstyrelsen* (1999) found that contact between people within immigrant communities was eroding. Divorces were much more common among the immigrant groups than among ethnic Swedes. There were many single mothers within the immigrant groups, who had more children than ethnic Swedes. Contacts with relatives overseas had all but ceased, although contacts with relatives living nearby was frequent.

One sign of strain within refugee families is violence, and particularly gendered violence. The Right wing has seized on widely publicized accounts of gendered violence to support their attacks on immigrants as criminal, ignoring the conditions that exacerbate this violence. The phenomenon of honor killing has been particularly highlighted by this political project. *Hedersmord* (honor killing) in immigrant-receiving countries can be seen as an extreme outcome of a failure to attain social status beyond patriarchal identity. Social epidemiologist Richard Wilkinson (2005) discusses honor killing as a form of “kicking down”, the hierarchal chain of brutality that depletes lives along gender and race lines.⁷

⁵ Knocke 2000: 366.

⁶ “Strong ties” are intimate family and friend networks, as opposed to for example business networks, which are characterized by spatial distance and a lack of intimacy.

⁷ Wilkinson 2005: 224.

(D)ifference which as differences between equals in a nonhierarchical setting may give rise to little or no prejudice and friction—often become highly charged when overlaid with economic differences that cast relations between the groups in terms of superiority and inferiority.

Immigrants are over-represented in the suburbs of the top three metropolitan regions, though they report that they would prefer to live in areas with more Swedes.⁸ Acts of discrimination in housing have added to spatial segregation. Landlords have been found to separate out New Swedes from ethnic Swedes. Researchers at Växjö University released a Situation Testing study in March 2007 that showed that eight out of ten landlords avoid letting their properties to tenants with Arabic names. Only four percent of telephone inquiries by a man with a Muslim name were rewarded with invitations to see advertised apartments, whereas 19 percent of telephone inquiries by a woman with an ethnic Swedish name were rewarded with invitations to see advertised apartments.⁹ However, the popular perception in Sweden has been that New Swede segregation is voluntary. In the 1990s ethnic Swedes told themselves immigrants wanted to live with their own kind, or at least with other outsiders, sociologist Lillmor Andersson-Brolin found.¹⁰ Though segregation may be beneficial in some ways for some groups, immigrants' segregation in suburbs specifically may not discourage blame-the-victim racism in the dominant society. While in earlier periods, ethnic Swedes cited immigrants' ethnic cultures in explaining immigrants' disadvantages, today Swedes have come to blame immigrants for "cultural distance."¹¹ Further, segregation can stigmatize immigrants. The segregated underclass suburban communities in which immigrants have come to live have been exoticized in the Swedish press.¹² For example, the widest

⁸ Socialstyrelsen 1999:21.

⁹ The Local, March 18, 2007.

¹⁰ Andersson-Brolin 1984; Ålund 1999: 149; Pred 2000. Pred (2000) quotes Prime Minister Göran Persson affirming this view, in *Dagens Nyheter* May 27, 1997.

¹¹ Knocke 2000: 374; Broome et al 1996.

¹² Pred 2000: 126-129.

circulating news daily, *Dagens Nyheter* published a 1996 fiction series that painted a seamy underlife of oversexed, lazy, criminal immigrants living in the suburb of Rinkeby.¹³

Nonetheless, there is evidence that the suburbs have provided the protective space for young New Swedes to assert creative control over the integration process. Over the past quarter century, some young New Swedes have collectively developed pidgeon Swedish, or “Rinkebysvenska” (Rinkeby Swedish). Based on Swedish bastardized by English syntax, Rinkebysvenska liberally employs Turkish, Arabic, and Serbo-Croatian words. While this linguistic innovation provides a protective cultural space to young New Swedes, Rinkebysvenska is also a form of cultural distancing. Stockholm University professor emeritus of Nordic languages Ulla-Britt Kotsinas argues that Rinkebysvenska is a marker of subculture belonging and mainstream resistance for suburban New Swedish youths with dim employment prospects. This creative form of resistance is also moving toward multicultural integration, as the slang has begun to be deployed in mainstream conversation and in literature.¹⁴

There have been attempts to repair segregation. “The housing problem is huge,” an integration official, Mats Ericson acknowledges regretfully. According to Ericson, anarchist organizations have championed improvements in immigrant housing to help them feel at home and participate more easily in public life; and the Left Party has adopted their cause.

“Syndicates (anarchist workers’ organizations) played a big part in improving immigrant living conditions. Now Vänsterpartiet is trying to liberate meeting places amongst housing to help develop community through affordable and inviting public spaces.”

¹³ The newspaper defended this pablum with a flowery piece about freedom of the press.

¹⁴ Institutionen för Svenska Språket.

The Left-led municipality for which Ericson works made a deal with ICA (a grocery business), creating a complex of services, along with an activities hall people desired.

“It cannot be too artificial, but where people go needs to be developed as meeting places.” Ericson believes that to further relieve segregation, “we need to mix villas (large, unattached single-family homes) with multifamily housing.”

Yet European economic integration stymies Leftist efforts to improve quality of life.

“International ownership is blocking community development. For example, right now in Västerås, a German development company building housing is resisting public efforts to incorporate services and public space in a housing development.”

Despite local-level efforts that have been at the forefront in combating segregation up to this point, Ericson believes a higher level of organization is required to deal with international businesses. In order to deal with the power of international capital in Sweden, national government needs to address housing segregation, he believes. “The state should lead desegregation. Municipalities are prohibited from helping the private sector in development. But the state can.”

Economic Inequality between New Swedes and Ethnic Swedes

Persistent housing segregation, school segregation, discrimination in finding jobs, and discrimination in layoff decisions all contribute to the accumulating vulnerability of visible minorities. The 1990s saw increasing income gaps, social exclusion, and marginalization among immigrants in Sweden. In the mid-1990s, the aggregate unemployment rate of foreign-born citizens was 2.5 times greater than that of Sweden’s native citizens.¹⁵ Polish immigrant and social researcher Maria Roselius says that for

¹⁵ Rojas, Carlsson, and Bevelander 1997.

many immigrants, “there was no work, and no income.” In her work she observed that by 1997 immigrants from Turkey and Iran with low-quality, unreliable jobs had considerably lower incomes on average than ethnic Swedes. Due to discrimination, unemployment, and working in service sectors with lower rates of unionization, Roselius says, the post-1960s refugee immigrants to Sweden were not as embedded in unions as other members of the Swedish working class. According to Roselius, who authored a Swedish Social Committee (*Socialstyrelsen*) survey of ethnic- and New Swedes’ integration perceptions and experiences, both immigrants and the unions have become vulnerable to global economic crises and the pressures brought to bear on working people by the institutional responses to these crises. Like other respondents, Roselius told me she was particularly concerned about the persistence of unemployment and residential segregation amongst immigrant groups.

Arai and Vilhelmsson (2004) analyze the unemployment risk of a sample of Swedish employees in the depths of the Swedish fiscal crisis, in 1991, and find that non-European immigrants faced an unemployment risk twice as large as the corresponding risk for native workers despite controls for employee characteristics, the 1991 wage rate, and sorting across establishments with varying unemployment risks. While the unemployment rate for Swedes was 7 percent in the 1990s, it could exceed 45 percent for some groups of New Swedes. Although all employees enjoyed higher job security with higher seniority, large differences in unemployment risk by region of birth remained for workers with similar seniority levels. Immigration researcher Wuokko Knocke summarizes the research confirming economic exclusion in Sweden, “(E)ven when language proficiency, education, place of residence and family background are controlled for, there remain(ed in the 1990s) an unexplained residual of a 30 percent higher risk for being unemployed if one of the parents is born abroad.”¹⁶

¹⁶ Knocke 2000: 371.

Arai and Vilhelmsson's study suggests that labor unions as well as employers deviate from seniority rules established by the Swedish Security of Employment Act in favor of ethnic Swedish workers. Studies by Edin and Åslund (2001), Le Grand and Szulin (2002), and Berggren and Omarsson (2001) show as well that differences in human capital between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes cannot explain the differences in level and type of employment between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes that emerged with the early-to-mid 1990s economic recession. Demonstrating that Sweden-specific social capital accounts for some, but not all, of the employment difference between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes, Schröder et al (2000) show in a logistic regression model that the risk of being unemployed in 1999 was 410 percent higher for immigrants that had lived for less than ten years in Sweden (than for ethnic Swedes), and 230 percent higher for immigrants who had lived ten to nineteen years in Sweden. I examine how this labor market inequality between New Swedes and ethnic Swedes can be understood, given that in Sweden's labor immigration era (1950-1975), immigrants had the same or even higher employment rates as ethnic Swedes.

Racism and Class Inequality

Why has the growth of inequality in Sweden centered on the native-immigrant axis? To help answer this question, this section presents European theory on the intersection of race and class in European immigration. The root of racist and xenophobic discrimination lies in the distribution of the costs of inequality in affluent countries. We noted the global project promoting inequality in the previous chapter. In the post-1970s era, neoliberalism has advanced globally as a theory of political-economic practices that dedicates the state to championing private property rights, free markets, and free trade, while deregulating business and privatizing collective assets. David Harvey (2005) regards neoliberalism as a global capitalist class power restoration project. Neoliberal theory, institutions, policies, and practices arise out of a rejection of the class compromises embedded in previous liberal political-economic policies, including Keynesian policies and the Scandinavian Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs). Ideologically, neoliberals

promote entrepreneurialism as the normative source of human happiness. Economist Robert Pollin describes the standard neoliberal policy package as including cutting back on taxes and government social spending; eliminating tariffs and other barriers to free trade; reducing regulations of labor markets, financial markets, and the environment; and focusing macroeconomic policies on controlling inflation rather than stimulating the growth of jobs (anti-inflationary bias).¹⁷ These policies directly confront the expansion of citizenship.

While neoliberal post-nationalist forces such as the European Union intensify “conflict over the practice and understandings of national membership,”¹⁸ racism and sexism as tools of managing inequality often serve to answer the membership questions arising from economic scarcity requirements. Philosopher Etienne Balibar describes how racism is marshaled by “workerism” to displace working class self-loathing and construct exclusionary citizenship in a modern, European capitalist context. Combining nationalism and class struggle, workerism is a working class ideology centered on the institution of the working-class family as the bond between the individual and “his” class, the valorization of work as virility, and the closing of the working class “body” to preserve gains made. Workerism derives from a desire to escape exploitation and a rejection of classist contempt. To the extent that Europeans inflict racist discrimination on immigrants, Europeans project onto immigrants “their fears and resentment, despair and defiance, it is not only that they are fighting competition” with racial others. “(I)n addition, and much more profoundly, they are trying to escape their own exploitation. It is a hatred of themselves, as proletarians” under capitalism that they project, claims Balibar.¹⁹ Balibar provides a compelling theory for how racist alienation is used to

¹⁷ Pollin 2003: 196.

¹⁸ Feldblum 1998: 231. “Post-national” refers to developments beyond the formal state, or where the state is no longer the sole site for citizenship.

¹⁹ Balibar 1999: 330. According to European historians of race such as Guillamin (1972), race originally had a caste signification, rather than a national or ethnic signification. Balibar argues that “class racism” and ethnic racism continue to be interdependent. (Balibar 1999: 324-330).

ameliorate the injuries of class. In this sense, racism and ethnic discrimination as adopted by the working class sustain class inequality while somewhat redistributing the costs of class inequality (at least the psychic costs).

Though as we will see below racist and xenophobic attitudes are comparatively weak in Sweden, some of ethnic Swedes' discriminatory practices may still indicate efforts to promote policies that enhance inequality while protecting natives from the rise of inequality. According to Karen Brodtkin (1998), racism, sexism and classism locate socially the people who properly deserve to enjoy the citizenship fruits of nation-building. Examine how a 1920s American journalist distinguishes the proper prerogatives of white nationals from the undeserving recent immigrants:

And as the Aryans of Greece tried democracy with their bondwomen and failed, and the Aryans of Rome tried a Republic with slaves and failed, so they who came to America from Latin countries failed in this new world because their new world homes were half-caste and not free, and the liberty they sought was license and not sacrifice.²⁰

The above quote is a pompous example of how natives justify discrimination against new residents with claims that some kinds of immigrants cannot handle the benefits of national membership. Jones-Correa likewise demonstrates the historical concern with immigrant incorporation into U.S. political life, as it for example focused on immigrant dilution of the Anglo cultural traits thought necessary for democracy.²¹ In the historical development of unequal citizenship, Balibar argues that for “both the dominant class and for the popular classes” the point is “to mark with generic signs populations which are collectively destined for capitalist exploitation—or which have to be held in reserve for

²⁰ William Allen White, quoted in Brodtkin 1998: 176.

²¹ Jones-Correa 1998: 39-40.

it.”²² According to Collette Guillamin’s historical reading, once a method is established by which some people’s bodies and labor can be consistently appropriated, their racial or sexual category is taxonomically established and characterized by a mark.²³ Then individuals can be allocated into this group or the unmarked appropriator group as they are born, creating a racist exploitation dialectic. Over time, racist and sexist theories can be elaborated upon through naturalist ideology, in order to maintain these relations of appropriation.²⁴

Omi and Winant (1994) discuss racial formation as a dialectic. They have likewise proposed that race is “a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies.” Although prior to the generation of the “Muslim threat”, Americans would have recognized most refugees in Sweden as “ethnicities” rather than races, race in Sweden is advanced by a current historical project, in which “human bodies and social structures are represented and organized” in order to distribute newly-scarce resources along racial lines.²⁵

We can see why it is difficult for refugees to prove themselves as invested members of society.²⁶ Because their journey to Sweden is the result of push factors rather than of

²² Balibar 1999: 330.

²³ Historically, skin color and genitalia morphology, rather than, say, ear shape or eye color pattern.

²⁴ Guillamin 1995: 5-6. Naturalist ideology serves to hide *relations* of appropriation and creates race and sex (Guillamin 1995: 4). In other words, in Guillamin’s view, racism and sexism produce race and sex, and not the other way around. In naturalist ideology, like atomism, the properties attributed to matter arise as “characteristics intrinsically symbolic of matter itself,” not as consequences of the relations between its environment and history and the material being or form (4). Using this scientific discourse, a given nature is assigned to a whole category of interchangeable individuals where we find a particular type of *social relation*, the *appropriation* of bodies, labor and the products of these bodies and their labor (Guillamin 1995: 5).

²⁵ Omi and Winant 1997: 55-56.

²⁶ Like welfare state membership, citizenship has been thought to require proof of embeddedness in society. Under Ancient Greek and Roman laws, as well as in capitalist societies, citizenship has been attached to property ownership. According to Yuval-Davis and Werbner, property has been regarded as the proof of a person’s investment in and commitment to a social order. Citizenship thus traditionally has a class

fluctuating domestic Swedish labor supply or wage management, the post-1960s refugee immigrants to Sweden were not introduced into society through unions. They have suffered a precarious position on the Swedish labor market in the post-1990 era, and they have had to make use of welfare provisions.²⁷ As neoliberal political actors have worked to stigmatize the welfare state as a vehicle for criminal parasites, underemployed and unemployed immigrants have also become stigmatized. This further alienation and inferior status contributes to crises within immigrant lives, homes, and communities. Contrast the situations of these refugees to the characterization Mark Twain gives of the “good” immigrant, in his defense of Jewish immigrants in 1899:

(H)e is quiet, peaceable, industrious, unaddicted to high crimes and brutal dispositions; that his family life is commendable; that he is not a burden upon public charities; that he is not a beggar... These are the very quintessentials of good citizenship.²⁸

Reminiscent of US anti-immigrant politics, the Swedish press, as observed in Alan Pred’s study and in my own content analysis of immigration and integration news stories, often depict immigrants as failing this early description of the good immigrant citizen. Indeed, with American pundits recently going so far as to falsely accuse Mexican immigrants of bringing leprosy to the U.S.,²⁹ immigrants to the U.S. have also generally been found wanting. This is traditional. Twain’s 1899 essay was a counter-hegemonic argument.

character. How then is citizenship negotiated in capitalism, wherein ideally, the working class should own very little of the aggregate property, as a motivation to work for capitalists (Wollstonecraft, Condorcet, J.S. Mill)? Most production in society is alienated from workers, to be accumulated and concentrated within the capitalist class as property. Yuval-Davis and Werbner explain that traditionally disadvantaged groups like people of color and especially women have been disenfranchised in order to provide to working white male citizens something to own, as a guarantee of their investment in the social order (Yuval-Davis & Werbner 1999: 6).

²⁷ Socialstyrelsen 1998.

²⁸ Quoted in Horton, Scott. 2007. “The Unwanted Immigrant.” *Harper’s Magazine*, June 10. <http://harpers.org/archive/2007/06/hbc-90000262>, accessed July 2, 2007. In Twain’s 1899 article, Twain is arguing, against the Know-nothing Party anti-immigrant consensus, that Jewish people are an ideal immigrant group.

²⁹ The leprosy charge was leveled by Lou Dobbs on his television show on April 14, 2005.

As introduced above and discussed in Chapter Four, refugees are too often painted in the popular press as disruptive, lazy, criminal parasites on the welfare state. Their families are in shambles, whether because the young do not respect adults or because fathers beat daughters or marriages are collapsing. While there *are* worrisome indicators of social problems in the suburbs where refugees live, and these problems are not invisible, depictions of dissolute immigrants contribute to an alienating discourse that immigrants internalize and popularize. “The problem is they (immigrants) don’t want to work. They just want to get money and black work (under the table),” an Iraqi immigrant says to me. Like other immigrants attesting to immigrant deviance, this man does not count himself among the deviants. Racial formation theory suggests why New Swedes have suffered the brunt of increasing inequality, even if attitudes in Sweden are generally comparatively cosmopolitan, as we will see below.

Low Xenophobia and Racism in Swedish Attitudes

Social democratic policy makers in Sweden form policy in a context of low xenophobia and racism. In survey after survey over the years Swedes evince xenophobia and racism. In survey after survey over the years Swedes evince less xenophobia and racism than the surveyed residents of all other countries. In this section I present typical data on Swedish attitudes toward immigrants. While very consistent over time, attitudes are not absolutely consistent, and racist and xenophobic attitudes tend to increase in periods in which immigrant and integration problems are publicly highlighted. Combined with recent data on practices of ethnic discrimination by employers and landlords in Sweden, I suggest that attitude data shows that Swedes are unevenly and unremarkably racist, xenophobic, and prone to ethnic discrimination. They are, however, unusually anti-racist and cosmopolitan. Swedes’ relative humanitarianism and enlightenment hang on a supporting framework of social democratic social citizenship institutions like the multicultural integration policy, universal welfare, and anti-racist education.

Social strain has often been channeled through the discourses and practices of racism. Blatantly racist incidents have resulted, but are not widely supported in Sweden. 70 percent of Swedes believe that racist organizations should be forbidden. As well, Swedish individuals express anxiety that they themselves are always in danger of being called racist.³⁰ Nonetheless, persistent housing segregation, school segregation, discrimination in finding a job and discrimination in layoff decisions all contribute to the accumulating vulnerability of minorities. In Sweden as elsewhere, scapegoating race politics have taken the form of anti-immigration, anti-minority politics. While these politics have not fallen along party lines as starkly as in other European countries, members of the National Democrats, the Sweden Democrats, and the liberal Center Party are the most xenophobic and are the most opposed to immigration. The Christian Democrats, the Left Party, the liberal Folkpartiet and the Greens score the lowest on the xenophobia and highest on the attitudes to immigration indices.³¹

As mentioned above, surveys of the Swedish population's attitudes toward people of a different nationality, race, or religion show attitude stability over time, as well as some contradictions across the topic of difference. In 1997, at the tail end of the labor market slump that followed the economic crisis, Anders Lange and Charles Westin of the Center for Research on International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO)³² examined data from 1969, 1981, 1987 and 1993 on Swedish public opinion concerning xenophobia, attitudes toward immigration, social distance from and solidarity with immigrants. Lange and Westin's public opinion study showed that people hold fast to the opinions developed in their youth.

³⁰ Lange and Westin 1997: 130-131.

³¹ Lange and Westin 1997: 131.

³² CIEFO is the acronym for Centrum för Forskning om Internationell Migration och Etniska Relationer.

Attitudes toward immigration are not necessarily reflective of racism, however, but instead can reflect anxiety about the labor market. 40 percent of Swedes in the Lange and Westin study thought that the number of people entering Sweden on political grounds should remain the same, while 36 percent thought the number of refugees admitted should be fewer.³³ About 81 percent of Swedes thought that the number of people entering Sweden to find work should remain the same or be mildly or drastically reduced. Similar sentiments were expressed regarding people immigrating to be with family members. In general, 61 percent of Swedes surveyed thought that criteria for immigration should be more stringent. However, Swedes were more willing to grant asylum to people escaping poverty or war. As well, adopting foreign children was supported at current or greater rates by 87 percent of the sample.³⁴

Fear of immigrants appears to be relatively low in Sweden. Swedes are more accepting of close contact with people born outside their country than most other nationals are.³⁵ Of course, this by no means implies that Swedes are indiscriminately open-armed. We still observe familiar, geographically-concentric, and racism-tinged patterns of identification. Surveys asking respondents to identify which ethnic groups they identify with, or “feel similar to,” show that Swedes consider themselves “very similar to” other Swedes, as well as to Norwegian and Finnish immigrants, especially. Swedes “feel similar to” immigrants from England, to Samis, and to immigrants from Germany. They feel that they are “very different from” the Roma, as well as “very different from” Ethiopian and Iranian immigrants. Swedes feel they are “different from” immigrants from Turkey, Serbia, China, Japan, Croatia and Chile, and, to a lesser extent, Greece. Swedish

³³ Lange and Westin 1997: 127.

³⁴ Lange and Westin 1997: 128.

³⁵ Eurobarometer 53: 88.

respondents moderately identify with Russian and Polish immigrants, and are mixed in their identification and lack of identification with Jews.³⁶

Sociologists find constant and consistent ethnic identification rankings from 1981 through 1993,³⁷ and social prestige rankings generally mirrored identification and intimacy rankings.³⁸ At the greatest level of identification, 60 percent of Swedes say they would go so far as to be willing to have a child with a Norwegian. Most Swedes feel that one Roma household per neighborhood was sufficiently close contact. As low as 13 percent of Swedes think it is acceptable to have a child with a Roma, but this is not necessarily a social problem. Strict segregation is how Roma preserve themselves as a group. More problematically, most Swedes consider Ethiopians, Turks, and Serbs, who are not similarly inclined to self-segregate, unacceptable at the reproduction level of intimacy. But 41 percent of Swedes would have a very close relationship with an Iranian—as a best friend or a partner in a relationship, or to have a child with an Iranian.³⁹

Despite their unwillingness to share intimate relations with (non-Norwegian) immigrants, most Swedes are not worried that immigrants will become an underclass. In some ways that are insensitive to immigrants, Swedes are not worried about the survival of non-Swedish things. Swedes are not worried whether the immigrants' homeland becomes poorer as a consequence of emigration. They are not particularly concerned whether immigrants lose their culture in Sweden.

³⁶ Lange and Westin 1997: 133.

³⁷ Lange and Westin 1997: 54.

³⁸ Lange and Westin 1997: 134.

³⁹ Lange and Westin 1997: 129

But it is incorrect to say that Swedes are parochial, or as Kamali maintains, fundamentally racist and xenophobic. Swedes make distinctions among immigrant groups. They are satisfied with relations between Swedes and Greeks, Poles, and Chinese immigrants. They are very satisfied with their relations with Finns and with English immigrants. Swedes feel that their relations with Iranians, Turks and Serbs, however, are poor.

More promisingly, 88 percent of the Swedish population report that they are not disturbed by people of other nationalities, races or religion. This is the most cosmopolitan attitude in the world. For comparison, 18 percent of the European Union population as a whole finds people of other nationalities, races or religions disturbing.⁴⁰ In 1993 a little over half of Swedes had a friend who was born outside the country, although 60 percent had a less intimate relationship (working, studying, etc.) with a New Swede. Over 38 percent of Swedes had a relative who was born outside Sweden. Most all Swedes have traveled or lived in lands outside of Sweden, although most of those had only been outside Sweden on a short (less than three months) holiday. 40 percent of Swedes had been outside of Europe.

Swedes do not feel culturally- or racially-threatened by immigrants. Swedes are not very worried that the Swedish culture will be threatened by immigrants, or that Swedes will become racially mixed. They understand that economically, and in terms of housing and jobs, immigrants are worse off than ethnic Swedes, although—probably thanks to the multicultural thrust of Swedish integration—the cultural life of immigrants is understood to compare acceptably with that of Swedes.⁴¹ For most Swedes, speaking Swedish in the home is not considered vital to Swedish citizenship.⁴² Swedes generally feel that

⁴⁰ Eurobarometer 53: 88.

⁴¹ Lange and Westin 1997: 130.

⁴² Lange and Westin 1997: 131.

immigrants have had an even impact or have benefited the economy and cultural life in Sweden over the past 50 years.⁴³

Indicating both Swedish resistance to neoliberalism and a relatively low incidence of racist attitudes, over 91 percent of the 1997 respondents agree that “solidarity with the weak is important to me.”⁴⁴ 73 percent of Swedes disagree with the statement “Increased unemployment is due to immigrants taking Swedes’ jobs,” and over 75 percent say that immigrants should not be forced to leave if labor market conditions worsen. There has been little change in this view over time.⁴⁵ Respondents by and large agree that immigrants must get a living standard equivalent to that of ethnic Swedes. Swedes generally think the country has not let in too many immigrants. However, in the late 1990s, when the Swedish economic downturn was quite pronounced, Swedes in increasing numbers agreed with the statement, “It is wrong to let in as many immigrants as have been let in”,⁴⁶ and support for high rates of refugee immigration have been declining over the past couple of years as Sweden has almost single-handedly taken on the role of integrating the tens of thousands of refugees from Iraq.⁴⁷

However, underneath the often agreeable surface of public attitudes and opinions, anti-racism efforts continue to meet challenges. In 1997, at the tail end of seven years of labor market decline, Eurobarometer showed that 40 percent of Swedes considered minority groups to be so different that they would never be accepted.⁴⁸ One ominous development

⁴³ Lange and Westin 1997: 132.

⁴⁴ Lange and Westin 1997: 132.

⁴⁵ Lange and Westin 1997: 133.

⁴⁶ Lange and Westin 1997: 131.

⁴⁷ About 80,000 residents of Sweden are from Iraq, mostly residing in the southern Stockholm suburb of Sodertälje. The U.S., by comparison, has accepted 800 refugees from Iraq. Eighty percent of asylum applications by Iraqis were approved in Sweden in 2006, although the asylum rules were tightened in 2007.

⁴⁸ Eurobarometer 47.1.

which may imprint the current generation, is that since the 1991 fall of the Soviet system, Muslims have increasingly played a contrasting identity role to the West.⁴⁹ That is, they play the role of the bad guy throughout the West.

Swedes are worried that immigrants suffer racism, and they are worried about the costs of immigrants to society.⁵⁰ Since the refugee immigration era has been based on post-1975 policy repeatedly proclaiming the “right of opportunity to self-support” (the right not to be “dependent” on state financial aid),⁵¹ Swedes are concerned about the impact of ethnic Swede-New Swede economic inequalities on the welfare state. Although 65 percent of Swedes agree that immigrant have made vital contributions to the high living standards enjoyed in Sweden, and this percentage climbed after the late 1980s, over 60 percent of Swedes surveyed echo the California Proposition 187 (1994) discourse,⁵² suspecting that “many foreigners come to Sweden only to enjoy our social benefits” They feel that those Swedes who “built” Sweden are entitled to enjoy the fruits of the labor, and over time an increasing percentage of Swedes have come to believe it is most important that “the land’s own people” have work.⁵³

These nationalist sentiments resonate with anxieties about the process of accumulation. Immigration threatens the hard-won consensus affirming the allocation of the costs and rewards of nation-state building. The matter of what counts as sufficient social payment (Labor? Capital? On-site suffering? A history of labor, natural resource, and consumption remittances to the core?) for building the nation-state, and what constitutes sufficient payback (Citizenship? Wages?) are ambiguous and contested. The exclusionary

⁴⁹ Lange and Westin 1997: 112.

⁵⁰ Lange and Westin 1997: 129.

⁵¹ Ekberg and Hammarstedt 2002; SOU 1996:55.

⁵² Fujiwara 1998: 82.

⁵³ Lange and Westin 1997: 10.

appropriation of people's historical, aggregate contributions is crucial in capitalism. Massive accumulation is not going to occur if everyone has access to the things in society that they, their ecosystems, or their forbears have contributed to. Therefore, property law (constituting contractual social boundaries) is ringed by geographic and political boundaries, facilitating accumulation. How long should people who have crossed a geographic and political boundary pay dues before they are recognized as invested, proper, core owners, and before they are embraced as compatriots in the community-building project? A whole lifetime? Over generations? Or should they be "kept in their place, from generation to generation"?"⁵⁴

Most Swedes agree that Sweden needs a strong leader. This desire for leadership coincides with worry that the common European market threatens Sweden's distinctive character.⁵⁵ We see in Chapter Five that, combined with stigmatizing neoliberal framing of welfare and immigrant economic exclusion, the desire for a strong leader has translated into the electoral successes of the bourgeois political coalition that exacerbated income inequality in Sweden. Almost all Swedes surveyed expressed strong loyalty to Sweden and Swedishness.⁵⁶

Although inequality between ethnic Swedes and New Swedes is among the most prominent forms of inequality in Sweden, Swedish attitudes are, according to the survey institute Eurobarometer, less racist than their peers' attitudes in other countries. Thanks to the early discursive work of Social Democrat Per Albin Hansson in appropriating stirring Right-wing concepts such as the *Folkhem*,⁵⁷ the racist ideology of the extreme right does not have the purchase in Sweden that it has in other countries. There is little to suggest in

⁵⁴ Balibar 1999: 330.

⁵⁵ Lange and Westin 1997: 132.

⁵⁶ Lange and Westin 1997: 133.

⁵⁷ Discussed in Chapter Five.

cross-national comparative public opinion surveys why individuals' racist attitudes should cause inequality between ethnic Swedes and New Swedes.

Even though overt racist and xenophobic attitudes may be low, institutional racism can work through discrimination on the market. In a paper for Uppsala University's Center for Multiethnic Research, Jens Rydgren and Lena Sawyer (2003) identify different types of discrimination in addition to racist attitudes, including statistical discrimination and institutional discrimination. Statistical discrimination occurs when, in the face of imperfect information about the job applicant's skills and productivity, employers and landlords make hiring, promotion, firing, and rental decisions based on stereotypes about different groups' characteristics. Institutional discrimination results from the irrational deployment of apparently neutral criteria in hiring, promotion, firing, and renting, such as requiring cleaning staff to have perfect Swedish language skills in economic downturns.⁵⁸

It is not always possible to tell if statistical or institutional discrimination has been employed, but Swedes involved in refugee integration knew that employers were discriminating against immigrants. Västerås integration officer Mats Ericson considers the problem of discrimination,

“People with ‘strange’ names were not called by employers for jobs. Employers are not trusting immigrants’ credentials, seeing their strange names—it means the immigrant gets no interview.”

Yet it took a while for Sweden to acknowledge that discrimination was the scaffolding on which immigrants could be treated like a weak reserve army of labor, or that discrimination helped fill the undesirable apartment blocks and suburbs. Although scholars made good headway in isolating the impact of discrimination, it had been difficult to pin down the sources of discrimination in Sweden. Major political-economic actors were and continue to be resistant to the idea that racism, xenophobia, and

⁵⁸ Rydgren and Sawyer 2004: 8-9, 24; Knocke and Hertzberg 2000.

discrimination structure markets. Until 2006, the Swedish government did not permit a standard international ILO (International Labor Organization) discrimination study to be performed in Sweden, on the grounds that the country outlawed situation testing.⁵⁹

Using situation testing, which equalizes qualifications between testers, the ILO (2006) found that, with significant variation in different regions of Sweden and across gender, employer discrimination is a devastating problem. New Swedes need to apply for nearly three times the number of jobs ethnic Swedes apply for in order to get a job. Female New Swedes in Göteborg experience the highest level of discrimination; they must apply for six times the number of jobs ethnic Swedes apply to in order to secure employment. The ILO's Frank Bovenkerk warns that "denial of access to the desirable sections of the labour market..." will have as a consequence "that immigrant groups will eventually end up being part of an ethnic underclass...Rejected groups find themselves suffering from a multitude of social problems...In combination these processes can be expected to pervert values of equality, breed social conflict and end up in political turmoil."⁶⁰ Accusing the Swedish government of "ineffective integration policies" and failing to appreciate immigrant diversity, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise continues to deny employers discriminate against New Swedes.⁶¹

Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, inequality between refugees and ethnic Swedes has been driven by something more than differences or attitudes inherent in individuals. Domestic inequality cannot be solely a product of domestic discrimination. The effects of discrimination within labor and housing markets

⁵⁹ Situation testing was used by anti-racist groups in the U.S. as early as the 1950s. The situation testing used in Sweden was developed by the ILO. Pairs of ethnic Swedes and New Swedes are given equal credentials and sent undercover to apply for jobs. The researcher then compares how far each candidate gets in the job application process (Knocke 2000: 373). The refusal was officially on "ethnic" grounds, though the method does not reveal identities. Banton (1997: 419) concluded that the official refusal to allow situational testing was little more than a refusal to publicly acknowledge racial discrimination.

⁶⁰ Quoted in ILO 2006: 1.

⁶¹ O'Mahony 2007.

point toward the way markets function in social space. I argue domestic processes of inequality formation intersect with shifts taking place at the regional or global scales. In what follows, I discuss how inequality within countries has intersected with global political and economic changes, and economic and social strain.

Political Economy of Immigration: A Relationships Framework

The central contribution of sociology to the often policy motivated study of immigration is its attention to relationships. Rather than confining research attention to individual attributes, as in the neoclassical tradition, where immigration is said to occur because individual actors are trying to secure net economic advantage,⁶² a sociological approach shifts our gaze to relationships. After 1980, the neoclassical analysis of immigration spawned what immigration scholars Howe and Jackson (2006) identify as five major immigration research traditions. These traditions arose in reaction to the unrealistic market assumptions of the neoclassical approach, as well as its inability to work with social relationships. These include:

(1) the World-systems “globalization” framework, where immigration is strung along by marketization and by enmeshing trade, warfare, transportation, and communication networks;

(2) a “push” framework, the New Economic framework, that not only focuses on the agency of immigrants by viewing immigration as an economic diversification strategy of families living in societies with handicapped markets, but also sees immigration pushed by local inequality in sending communities;

(3) the social network framework that explains how social networks across origin and destination countries reduce the costs and risks of geographic mobility and create migration paths and momentum;

⁶² Borjas 1989, 1990.

(4) the “pull” side of the World-systems framework--the dual labor market framework, which casts light on the economic segregation of immigrants and native workers in most immigrant-receiving countries; and

(5) the policy framework, which studies how policy design and enforcement affect the conditions for immigration.⁶³

One of the fundamental commitments of neoclassical economics is that phenomena be explained by reference to the rational calculations of individuals.. A contrasting commitment of sociological research is that the *relationships between* units and/or aggregates are the fundamental causal units. Whereas economists either work with their individualist axioms or are forced to modify their model to investigate the real world, after much research, sociologists have not yet found evidence sufficient to cause sociologists to revise the sociological focus on relationships as causal. So while economists have explored the extent to which influxes of immigrants correlate with changes in the well-being of the native population (an aggregate of individuals), relationship-attuned economic sociologists have contributed to policy by illuminating the immigrant networks that contribute to more or less successful integration of the immigrant in society, and the ties between immigrant-sending and -receiving countries.

In this chapter I examine the impacts of another form of social relations— relations of inequality and hence of power. I take my departure from the pull-sensitive dual labor market framework,⁶⁴ a complement to the World-systems perspective that finds globalization driving immigration,⁶⁵ and which has often focused on elite migration. Focusing instead on mass immigration, the dual labor market framework contributes to the clarification of why labor markets do not behave like markets for inhuman factors of

⁶³ Howe and Jackson 2006: 22-29.

⁶⁴ Constant and Massey 2003; Portes and Jensen 1987, 1989.

⁶⁵ Sassen 1988, 1991; Castells 1989, 2000; Portes and Rumbaut 1996.

production. If labor power were merely a factor of production, labor markets would fit the neoclassical model better. Immigration would cause wages to fall because labor would be perfectly substitutable. However, researchers have found that in such countries as the United States, even during laissez-faire periods, wages do not equalize downward. Social stratification permits labor markets to segment.

Most countries with large immigrant populations do not prove to be “melting pots” in many senses. Immigration countries are characterized by immigrant enclaves and other forms of segregation between immigrants and native workers. So if a stew exists to any extent, it is a very chunky one. As native workers do not seek and do not get the jobs that have become “immigrant jobs”, wages do not fall as far as they otherwise would—as far as neoclassical theory would predict. A sociological way of understanding the dual labor market is as a form of class compromise, an outgrowth of both capitalist tactics to discipline workers and keep or push wages down, and worker rearguard action to resist such tactics through both migration and discrimination. Among the five major immigration research traditions, the dual labor market framework alone gestures to the independent importance of receiving-country domestic inequality as a pull factor in immigration.⁶⁶

But according to Robert Pollin (2003), neoliberals have often used tools other than unemployment to increase inequality. In addition to unemployment, other forms of neoliberal “shock and awe” disciplinary policy have been used in many countries.⁶⁷

Below I investigate if it is possible that immigration is part of the labor-discipline policy

⁶⁶ The New Economics framework considers the push effect of local inequality in sending communities, while the neoclassical economic literature only recognizes inequality between sending and receiving countries. In the neoclassical framework, unemployment is considered a substitute for inequality, and is viewed as a push factor in immigration. Low unemployment in the receiving country (compared to the sending country) is hypothesized to encourage immigration.

⁶⁷ Germany and Great Britain, however, appear to rely greatly on unemployment. In the case of the German state, Esping Anderson (1990: 224) finds it “powerfully biased towards reducing labor supply,” linked partly to maintaining low female employment and partly to a “consistently tight fiscal and monetary policy regime.”

toolkit, and if so, how it is comparatively deployed to modify class relationships. I examine inequality between classes⁶⁸ in immigration-receiving countries—to see how inequality can interact with immigration.

A Relationship between Inequality and Immigration in the U.S.

Demography can be a site of class warfare. While more affluent working class families try to maintain a comfortable living standard partly through limiting the number of dependents they support, their employers call on the state to maximize the number of potential workers. The state plays a role in this conflict according to its level of autonomy. Although not all states are capable of responding to their own interests, it can be in the interest of the state to maximize the number of taxpaying wage-earners. However, depending on where tax dollars go, different levels of government can have opposing incentives in immigration. Thomas Espenshade and Gregory Huber argue that because immigrant households tend to use the services provided by local governments, in the U.S. “immigrant households appear to be a fiscal asset only for the federal government.”⁶⁹ Even if the state is not autonomous, it can harvest taxpaying wage earners who are barred from crucial civic, political, and social citizenship—including education, health care, labor protections, and so on. Then there is incentive for the state to engage in and, as an organizing force of society, encourage extreme exploitation of increasing numbers of immigrants.

From a capitalist class perspective, maximizing the number of workers generating *disposable* income increases consumption and increases profits. If tax policy is favorable, as in the U.S., taxes on workers are even redistributed to capital in the form of exemptions, privatization, subsidies, and public goods and services. However, as distinct

⁶⁸ Operationalized as income groups in the gini coefficient.

⁶⁹ Espenshade and Huber 1999: 361.

from a state revenue perspective, it is not just maximizing the number of income-generating workers that is important. Maximizing the number of potential workers also matters. More potential workers keep labor disciplined, and labor discipline is a favorite way of bolstering productivity and profits. The benefits of immigration for individual capitalists lie also in the “traumatization”, as Alan Greenspan put it,⁷⁰ of workers.

U.S. research confirms economic theory showing that immigration does lower wages in the secondary labor market.⁷¹ That is, working class people without much education, who compete directly with immigrant labor for “low skill” jobs, find themselves negatively impacted by high rates of labor immigration. On the other hand, “skilled” or educated native workers benefit as consumers of services and goods produced by cheap, unskilled immigrant labor.⁷² As well, workers who own homes, are self-employed, or own some form of capital see the value of their capital stock increase as labor cheapens.⁷³ However, it has not been shown that any reduction in wages is offset by the increase in the value of the capital stock owned by the working class, where working class persons own little of the capital stock. If the reduction in wages is not offset by increased value of capital stock owned by the working class, class inequality increases even though many working class people may own some capital and benefit from cheap consumer goods, as has been the case in the United States since the early 1970s.

Historical economics, as reviewed by Susan Carter and Richard Sutch (1999), generalizes the early-twentieth century growth of GDP in the United States and a coinciding period

⁷⁰ Pollin 2003: 53.

⁷¹ Borjas 1984; Borjas and Tienda 1987.

⁷² Because migration flows also cause “brain drain”—the transfer of high skill workers from poor to affluent countries, and increasing inequality between countries—we are also beginning to see the reduction of wages in some high skill labor markets in affluent countries as well. However, Borjas has argued that in the twentieth century U.S. this wage depression has been offset for high skill workers by cheaper consumer goods.

⁷³ Carter and Sutch 1999.

of high immigration to argue that the more recent immigration surge will also stimulate economic growth. However, historical economics is riddled with historical idiosyncrasies—such as high rates of young, single male immigration with high rates of saving—that cannot describe immigration conditions in the contemporary U.S.

Further, and more untenably, economic assumptions lead economists to discount the impact of inequality on standard of living. Inequality and the political, social, and economic consequences of inequality are outside the purview of neoclassical welfare analysis. Thus, economists and immigrant advocates tend to hush working class concerns about immigration's effect on secondary labor market wages by citing historical aggregate production function research showing that immigration can have positive effects on capital accumulation, innovation, and change in the participation rate and skills of the labor force.

Without addressing the myriad costs of inequality, immigrant advocates will cite the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, claiming that some deunionized and mechanized businesses, which would not pay living wages in the U.S., stay in the U.S. and could possibly have multiplier effects when supplied with immigrant labor. "Certain kinds of jobs would likely have been moved out of the country had immigrants not taken them at lower wages here," reports Peter Constantini of the Inter Press Service News Agency (2006). Aware that neoclassical economic theory implicitly assumes that more economic growth is automatically better for everyone, and that inequality has no impact on society, immigration economists urge scholars to shift their attention "away from the redistributive issues and toward the impact of immigrants on productivity change, growth, and economic development."⁷⁴

But why do that? There is no controversy there. Capitalists in many sectors know that they benefit from immigration. It is voting workers who have difficulty discerning the

⁷⁴ Carter and Sutch 1999: 340.

benefit of immigration, despite the hegemony that neoclassical economic assumptions enjoy in the Anglo-American cultures. American workers know that their quality of life is suffering. Because of the readily available racist framework, immigrants serve as an opportune scapegoat for declining standard of living. Such racism makes an excellent tool for political entrepreneurs, which is why so much social science work addresses popular arguments that immigrants take away jobs and gobble up public services and welfare.

For scholars and proponents of human rights, it is more accurate and more strategic to acknowledge that redistribution upward is occurring, it has negative effects on most people's lives, and the machinery of this system cannot be jammed or reversed either by neglecting or immiserating immigrants. Immigrants contribute to inequality to the extent that they are excluded. In light of the flood of social epidemiological evidence that standards of living decline in societies that encourage inequality and have passed the epidemiological transition zone of \$15,000 per capita GDP, a turn away from the controversy of redistribution is unwarranted, including in the case of immigration.

There is a correlation between deskilled labor wage decline and immigration.⁷⁵ However, one should not be too quick to infer the direction of causality in a society in which capital can readily work with the state to execute capital's interests in lowering the factor cost of labor. Sociologist Ruth Milkman's case study (2000) of the Los Angeles construction industry shows how business owners first destroyed unions and downgraded construction labor in the 1970s, and then subsequently employed immigrants. This particular example of the direction of causality points to the tactical importance of workers defending their living standard through labor movement, instead of engaging in rear-guard anti-immigrant politics. Whether in the liberal U.S. or in social-democratic Sweden, the tactics of ignoring, ostracizing, and penalizing immigrants have shown little power to either decrease immigration or reverse increasing inequality and declining working class

⁷⁵ Borjas 1984, 1987; Borjas and Ramey 1995; Borjas and Tienda 1987; Friedberg and Hunt 1999: 358.

standards of living.⁷⁶ To the contrary, these tactics in Sweden and in the U. S. seem only to compound the impact of inequality through creating a vulnerable immigrant population. In Chapter Four I will discuss this dynamic further. Yet while it may not be tactical, it is still reasonable for native workers to believe and scholars to talk about immigration depressing wages in countries in which employers can depend on the state facilitating immigration as a complement to working class disorganization.

Although it is by no means clear that immigration *causes* decline in working class living standards, immigration surges are associated with the exacerbation of existing inequalities by transferring income from labor to capital. Immigration economists Carter and Sutch summarize the economists' conclusion from historical studies on immigration surge,

Immigration-initiated redistribution of income among individuals was far more muted than the redistribution between labor and capital as factors of production.⁷⁷

Heavy immigration could also be splitting the interests and identities of the working class, again adding to the power of the capitalist class by maintaining (or creating) dim prospects for a cohesive labor movement. Divided by racism and divided by a segmented labor market, a divided working class is likely to result in the decline (or the impossibility) of organized labor, social democratic parties, and the social citizenship states that are dialectically crucial to working class organization. Bruce Western has shown that the decline of working class organizations in the OECD beginning after the 1970s oil shocks was caused by the institutional changes of decentralized collective bargaining and the electoral failure of labor parties.⁷⁸ OECD countries saw the rise of a

⁷⁶ According to the Congressional Research Service's analysis (Wasem 2004), anti-immigrant measures have in fact contributed to increased illegal immigration.

⁷⁷ Carter and Sutch 1999: 323. Borjas (1999) concurs.

⁷⁸ Western 1995: 196.

hegemonic discourse asserting that world economic conditions had changed in a way that required the decline of working class politics and institutions. Because labor organizations in countries like Sweden and Finland were strong enough to counter this hegemony, those countries retained relative independence, for longer, from the connection between economic changes and working class decline.⁷⁹

Not just growing inequality between capital and labor, but racism can also act to split immigrant and native working class identities. Because working class politics have been rendered inchoate in the United States, occluded by racist and sexist politics woven in the fabric of American society and identity, even many skilled working class and capital-owning citizens fight against their interests, opposing immigrants on racist grounds. Employers and politicians stimulate this racism, and they expertly manipulate racist irrationality by formulating showy, punitive policies designed to further diminish the labor contract leverage of immigrants.⁸⁰

Right-wing social movement entrepreneurs harness popular perception of worsening living standards, including the rise of unemployment,⁸¹ in xenophobic campaigns. Resonant in conservative societies, such xenophobic campaigns further degrade working-class conditions and permit capital's increasing power over the labor force. Paradoxically, we see illegal immigration actually soaring in periods of anti-immigrant militancy, such as in the U.S. in the 1990s, where the state has abdicated control over capitalists' powers to employ whatever workers they prefer.⁸²

⁷⁹ Western 1995.

⁸⁰ Zolberg 2006.

⁸¹ Esendshade and Huber 1999: 364.

⁸² Brownell 2005; Meyers 2005.

In the “fiscal politics of immigration”,⁸³ immigrants are framed as a major cause of the purportedly “high” price of social services (that is translated to “high” taxes for the stressed everyday American Joe or Swedish Kalle). Inducing the fiscal politics of immigration is a strategy to mobilize popular support for anti-welfare reform (balanced budget conservatism), such as Californian Proposition 187. “Because resident aliens cannot vote and because they have no strong constituency apart from immigrant rights groups, immigrants represent an attractive and therefore vulnerable fiscal target from the perspective of federal policymakers,” argue Espenshade and Huber from a state-centric perspective. In the US, targeting the vulnerable has meant a reduction in social services to the point that even legal immigrants (as well as natives) are barred from public resources.⁸⁴

Yet despite the reassurances provided by neoliberal discourse and a vast think-tank labor market for policymakers, state actors cannot assume they profit by targeting immigrants. U.S. labor economists have come to agree that immigrants contribute more to federal coffers than they get out of the public.⁸⁵ An exception may be the economic crisis period in Sweden, when immigrants especially lost their jobs or failed to find jobs, and were provided with state supports in excess of their tax contributions. Even in Sweden, with its emphasis on providing financial and organizational resources to the socially excluded, immigrants do not receive the benefits of public provisioning and public amenities that ethnic natives enjoy. Geographer Jennifer Mack (2003) has found that part of immigrants’ experience of social exclusion stems from their unseen and unaddressed inability to enjoy public spaces that are impenetrable—effectively privatized—to them.

⁸³ Kitty Calavita (1996), quoted in Espenshade and Huber 1999.

⁸⁴ Espenshade and Huber 1999: 367.

⁸⁵ Espenshade and Huber 1999: 361.


As we see in Chapter Four, associating immigrants with the high costs and failure of the welfare system is a neoliberal political strategy, playing on racism and nationalist fears of decline. The object of this policy is to cripple the welfare state, remove popular support for immigrant and native working-class power resources, rededicate the state to its capital-subsidizing, contract-enforcing, police and military functions, and redistribute social wealth upward. Its tool is the encouragement of racism, nationalism, and anti-immigration sentiment.

Neoliberal international policies have both prompted immigration to affluent countries and exacerbated global inequality. Advocates of neoliberalization have claimed that stimulating labor mobility will equalize wages in the North and South in North America, and in the West and East in Europe. However, since the implementation of the neoliberal trade regimes, inequality has, instead, grown within the US, within Mexico, and between the two countries.⁸⁶

Contrary to neoclassical economic assumptions, inequality has had nontrivial consequences, and its political resolution is not independent of economics. Social-epidemiological studies warn that inequality in affluent countries reduces standard of living, social mobility, human welfare and health, and environmental health.⁸⁷ Standards of living of all but the very affluent in the U. S. have declined in recent history, while the fortunes of the very affluent have become spectacularly enhanced. The public is not incorrect to feel that immigration surges have a relationship to inequality (see Graph 1 below). In a capitalist context, immigration results from increased global inequality, and immigration increases domestic class inequality as well as global inequality.

⁸⁶ Harvey 2005; Pollin 2003.

⁸⁷ Wilkinson 2005.



Graph 1: Percent of Foreign-born in the U.S. Population and U.S. Inequality, 1917-2005.⁸⁸

The chart above should help the reader grasp the popular tendency to feel that immigration is connected with declining working class standards of living, but the correlation is imperfect. What is also apparent is that immigration follows, and thus does not cause, inequality. The share of national income going to the top decile was forced down to 37 percent in the late 1930s before immigration plummeted. Likewise, while inequality and immigration both began to creep upward after 1970, when the share of income going to the top decile hit 35 percent in the 1980s and began to soar upward,

⁸⁸ Foreign-born data by decade, with 2005, intervening years extrapolated, compiled from <http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab01.html>. Income inequality data from Saenz, Emmanuel, accessed at elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/, May 26, 2007.


immigration followed by also skyrocketing upward.⁸⁹ This suggests that, at least in the United States, inequality influences immigration, not the other way around.

In confirmation of Milkman's case study of the Los Angeles garment industry, I suggest that what Harvey (2005) terms the "restoration of class power" must commence before a program of importing a more vulnerable labor force can be induced. After an inequality threshold is reached, immigration and inequality appear to be mutually reinforcing until the next class power restoration movement gains momentum.

⁸⁹ Zolberg (2006) presents a thorough historical account of the changing political alliances that induced immigration policy changes, which induced different levels of immigration. But his account does not focus on the receiving country inequality context and ramifications of these changes.

Cross-national Relationships between Inequality and Immigration

In Graph 2 below, I use cross-national data on countries of immigration to further consider how class inequality projects interact with immigration across countries.



Graph 2: Inequality as a Predictor of Levels of Immigration.⁹⁰

In my cross-national comparison chart above, I have indicated the affluence of each country by bubble size, in order to distinguish disparate trends within wealthy net-immigration countries and countries that have not passed the inequality epidemiological transition zone (about 15,000 in \$US1999). Wilkinson⁹¹ shows that the negative impacts

⁹⁰ Gini coefficients and percent of foreign born in population for the 40 net-immigration countries. Countries are represented by bubbles corresponding to PPP GDP/capita. Data sources include the International Monetary Fund list of GDP/capita by Purchasing Power Parity; levels of immigration and inequality coefficients provided by the United Nations 2005 World Population Policies, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division, and the CIA World Factbook.

⁹¹ 2005: 68.

of inequality kick in above this transition zone; whereas below that zone, the effects of broad basic-needs deprivation hide inequality's impacts. The smaller bubbles in the chart above indicate immigration countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Jordan, Thailand, and Venezuela, which have Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita below the inequality epidemiological transition zone. These smaller economies can be accepting immigrants because they are neighboring refuges in destabilized regions. We see that for small-economy countries, there is a tendency to accept fewer immigrants as inequality increases. Poor countries with high inequality do not attract immigrants. This is the opposite of the tendency within the affluent U.S. over time. Social epidemiology would lead us to expect a divergence between the small-economy countries and the large-economy countries in terms of the impact of inequality.

The inequality-immigration pattern for countries above the inequality epidemiological transition zone (represented by the larger diameter bubbles) is bifurcated. Sweden is the large bubble to the farthest left, with the lowest inequality, and at the middle of the affluent countries' pack in terms of the percentage of foreign born in its population. From Sweden at the low end of inequality, affluent countries exhibiting increasing levels of inequality peel off into those with fewer immigrants and those with a larger foreign-born population. Affluent countries are following a couple of divergent immigration-inequality paths, where politics, or the legacy of class compromises, rather than the economic structure of capitalism, likely come into play. The affluent countries on the trendline of more foreign-born residents with increasing societal inequality include, by increasing order of inequality, the liberal countries of Austria, Canada, Switzerland, and Australia. These liberal countries confirm the positive correlation between inequality and immigration that we saw in the historical U.S data.⁹²

⁹² Although they affirm a positive correlation between inequality and immigration, Israel and Singapore have been excluded from the analysis because they are outliers, in that they have such extraordinarily high levels of immigration.

Theory that recognizes class relationships again helps us make sense of trends in the data. The affluent countries on the increasing inequality-lower immigration trendline are mostly Catholic-conservative and include Germany, the Netherlands, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Japan, and at the very high end of inequality and at the social-epidemiological borderline, South Africa. South Africa's behavior better fits within the group of net-immigration countries with smaller economies; though its borderline status affirms the salience of the inequality epidemiological transition. The Catholic-conservative countries suggest an alternative, negative correlation between inequality and immigration.

The United States and United Kingdom need some explaining. That the U.K. groups with the Catholic-conservative countries is unexpected. The United Kingdom's high level of inequality is associated with a relatively low number of the foreigner-born in the population. However, we might consider that the U.K.—with its historic leadership in shutting down the commons at home and its colonial expertise abroad—is an innovator in fostering a diversity of labor control tools. Unlike other liberal countries, the U.K. may be using immigration as only a secondary means of disciplining labor (in fact, labor was disciplined heavily and with lasting consequences by the extraordinary measures undertaken by the Thatcher government to break the unions, the wedge of which was her confrontation with coal miners).

In international comparison the U.S. appears, as it often does, to be an exception. While it has the highest level of inequality among the affluent net-immigration countries, and lies on the far end of the inequality spectrum from Sweden, its percentage of foreign-born in the population is only two percentage points higher than Sweden's in the middle of the affluent pack. The trendline for liberal countries would predict that the U.S. should have a higher percentage of the foreign-born in its population, to match its high inequality. For

a liberal country with such high inequality, the U.S. has a relatively small percentage of foreign-born residents.⁹³

The U.S.'s lower-than-predicted foreign-born population may be due to official underreporting,⁹⁴ and may also be an effect of the large size (population) of the United States in relation to the weakness of its non-“law and order” state apparatus. In terms of sheer numbers, the notably small and feeble U.S. *welfare* state may be processing as many immigrants as it can.⁹⁵ Moreover, Graph 1 confirms a positive correlation between inequality and immigration in U.S. history.

These trends, taken together, suggest that inequality in affluent net-immigration countries has a bifurcated relationship with immigration, one that falls along Esping-Anderson's (1990) typology of political economies of the welfare state: in Catholic countries immigration declines as inequality rises; in liberal countries, immigration rises as inequality rises.⁹⁶ Determining these distinct political economies are the pattern of

⁹³ The total population in the U.S. was 295 million in 2005 (it crossed over 300 million in 2006); the total population of the foreign-born in the U.S. was 35.8 million in 2005. The number of unauthorized resident aliens living in the U.S. rose from 3.2 million in 1986 to about 12 million in 2006, based on the March Current Population survey (Wasem 2004; Pew Hispanic Center 2006). Between 2002 and 2006, the annual level of migration averaged 1.8 million immigrants to the U.S. per year; 500,000 of those per year are thought to be unauthorized (illegal) aliens (Migration Policy Institute, May 2007).

⁹⁴ Migration Policy Institute, May 2007.

⁹⁵ Immigration and naturalization is incorporated under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and so immigration is processed as a subset of policing concerns within the U.S. Almost all immigrants are treated as criminals, complete with parole. In that way, the state assists capital in disciplining them; but otherwise state capacity has been withdrawn from immigrant integration matters since Clinton's 1990s welfare reforms (Espenshade and Huber 1999: 366-367). If we substitute *number* of foreign-born in the population for percentage, the U.S. lines up with the positive-correlation liberal countries. According to the U.N., the U.S. has twenty percent of the 200 million migrants in the world. The reason why we might consider looking at non-percentage numbers in the U.S. case is that the U.S. takes in so many immigrants, and has such a big population and such a large arable landmass, that policymakers may be uniquely moderating its percentage of foreign-born to prevent massive population explosion, and/or there may be a limit to the number of people within the sphere of the U.S. that can and want to migrate to the U.S.

⁹⁶ In general, the Scandinavian welfare states have shown no trend in inequality since the 1960s (Weeks 2005), and are mostly not net-immigration states. Sweden is the only Scandinavian country with net immigration, according to the UN (2005). Sweden's gini coefficient was .21 in 1975, and was stable until

working-class formation, political coalition-building in the period of transforming to a middle-class society, and how past reforms have institutionalized class preferences and political behavior.⁹⁷ The Liberal states are primarily concerned with market efficiency, so the state supports capital, contains social rights,⁹⁸ and stratifies welfare.⁹⁹ Thus, as the Liberal states promote class inequality, they promote the proliferation both of what Esping-Anderson terms “junk jobs”, and the managerial jobs to oversee the junk job workers.¹⁰⁰ Though the U.S. fosters a heavy managerial sector, its indecent job growth is even more impressive.¹⁰¹ Even in 1985, the U.S. promoted a mere 2.1 to 1 ratio of good jobs to bad jobs, compared to Sweden’s 4.8 to 1 ratio.¹⁰² As junk jobs increase, immigrants fill them. In the U.S., Blacks and especially Hispanics “are vastly over-represented” in both unpleasant (and numerically-declining) industrial jobs and in the “reserve army for the post-industrial ‘junk jobs’.”¹⁰³

By contrast, in the Catholic-liberal welfare states there was no founding preoccupation with market efficiency and commodification, and so social rights were readily granted—in conjunction with the preservation of status differentials. Rights are therefore attached to class and status (including gender) in these states, where strong bureaucracies were created by absolutist rulers in order to circumvent the labor movement and socialism. As these conservative countries are shaped by the Catholic church, they have been strongly

the 1990 crisis (Oberg 2005); since then, Sweden’s gini coefficient has crept upward to about .25 (UN 2000).

⁹⁷ Esping-Anderson 1990: 32.

⁹⁸ Social rights are opposed to property rights. They include education, health care, and anti-discrimination. Esping-Anderson calls them “freedom” (1990: 221).

⁹⁹ Esping-Anderson 1990: 26-27.

¹⁰⁰ Esping-Anderson 1990: 203.

¹⁰¹ Esping-Anderson 1990: 215.

¹⁰² Esping-Anderson 1990: 207.

¹⁰³ Esping-Anderson 1990: 210-211.

committed to the preservation of both the “traditional” European Christian family and “subsidiarization”—the Church as an intermediary institution in society.¹⁰⁴ The post-industrial service sector is not there to integrate immigrants; women provide many services for free within families. The resulting constitution of Catholic-liberal welfare state social citizenship protects Catholic-liberal country families and status,¹⁰⁵ so that as inequality worsens, the high-capacity welfare state closes the borders.¹⁰⁶

“Controlling” Immigration by Demobilizing Capital

In many countries, policy makers, academics, social movement actors, and the public question how immigration can possibly be controlled, and whether it should be controlled. This is especially true in countries with limited state regulatory powers (limited state autonomy) that are experiencing high volumes of illegal immigration, countries such as the United States, Spain, and Italy. While constraining immigration is presented in the media as a highly intractable problem, it is possible. To the extent that it can assist social movement, organized labor, and social democratic efforts to reduce societal inequality and social exclusion, it seems advisable for democratic countries to manage immigration and integration by considering their *substantial* (as opposed to formal) rationality, including their humanitarian as well as economic objectives.

In Sweden’s case, humanitarian goals have prioritized refugee immigration over supplying capital with cheap labor. Substantive humanitarian goals are threatened less by Swedish racism and xenophobia (or by Kamali’s Iron Cage) than by membership in the EU and subjugation to markets. Even when Sweden’s economy was in crisis, the country

¹⁰⁴ Esping-Anderson 1990: 27.

¹⁰⁵ Esping-Anderson 1990: 224.

¹⁰⁶ Esping-Anderson (1990: 228) discerns a tendency in Germany “toward antagonistic and discriminatory behavior towards foreign workers” when a shrinking active labor force is compelled to shoulder the costs of a swelling human surplus.

took in tens of thousands of refugees every year. Unlike the U.S., Sweden has not plucked the most high skilled, wealthy refugees out the millions of displaced persons. Rather the country took in among the most challenged immigrants. As in the U.S., the majority of immigration has been family reunion immigration. In an organized way, Sweden has provided refugees with decent housing, affordable transportation, free education and job training, social assistance for the most vulnerable, and resources for cultural expression, including linguistic preservation. These humanitarian goals were undertaken with confidence in the social democratic welfare state's ability to facilitate integration. Integration rested on Swedes' confidence in working with refugees to facilitate their participation in the production and reproduction of Swedish social life, and facilitate their sense of belonging in Sweden. From above the democratic fray, the new EU Bolkestein Service Directive and supporting European Court rulings encouraging low skill labor movement and increased opportunities for low wage businesses set less humanitarian, more market-dominated objectives for Swedish immigration policy as well as economic and labor policies.

The U.S. as well has "controlled immigration" in the past—or rather, it has controlled immigrants. From 1942 to 1964 the U.S. and Mexico arranged to bring Mexican workers into the U.S., under the Bracero Program, in order to subsidize U.S. agriculture with unskilled labor. African-Americans were moving out of highly coercive Jim Crow agricultural relations within the rural South; a new population of the vulnerable was needed. The restrictive application of the Bracero immigration program enjoyed the support of capital. As time went on, increasing numbers of farmers and railroad companies began to covet and acquire the cheap immigrant labor. The Bracero Program permitted Mexican workers to be controlled through inhumane conditions, perpetuating inequality and social exclusion. When the program was finally disbanded in the midst of the Cold War, as it reflected poorly upon the liberal ethos, American companies began working directly with the Mexican government to establish the border maquiladoras that

would continue to allow U. S. firms to exploit Mexican labor. This resulted in the movement of a significant Mexican population to the U.S. border.

The tremendous latitude given American capital—incribed in the historical structure of the U. S. government—has generally limited the ability of the state independently to manage labor immigration. Usually the U.S. government has been constrained to use the option of bringing the police function of the state down upon immigrants.¹⁰⁷ In the high-inequality eras in which capital has had maximum power in American society, the busy coercion, policing, jailing, disciplining and punishment of immigrants has not resulted in reduced immigration, nor resulted in improved living standards for average Americans. According to integration and border control scholar Peter Andreas (2000, 2003) it has simply been “a politically successful policy failure.”¹⁰⁸

Immigration has also been managed in Sweden. In the past, the Swedish union confederation, the LO, has worked with the Swedish Social Democrats and the social democratic Swedish state effectively to limit immigration to immigrant groups that were thought to be non-disruptive to the ongoing incorporation of the immigrant into a social democratic society. This system of limited and managed immigration was executed in a multicultural fashion and not punitive to immigrants. The Swedish system was considered to function well until the effects of state autonomy decline began to be felt in Sweden in the 1990s. “National politicians have a formal decision-making power over an increasing powerlessness,” the Social Democratic Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson explained as he promoted the European Union within Sweden in 1994. Sweden’s system

¹⁰⁷ Brownell 2005; Meyers 2005. For instance, Meyers (2005) shows that Border Patrol and Inspections funding, staffing, and military technology began to increase strongly in 1994 and 1992, under the Clinton Administration. Border Patrol funding has increased 500 percent and staffing increased 200 percent between 1985 and 2005, as immigration control was militarized and combined with drug operations. After 2001, funding for Border Patrol and Inspections jumped again as the U.S.-Canada border, airports, and seaports were included in Border Patrol operations.

¹⁰⁸ Quoted in Meyers 2005.

of immigration, while still operating comparatively well, is slated for neoliberal reform, meaning the reduction of state control of labor immigration.

Control of immigration requires the historical juncture of capitalist agreement and an high capacity state, both constrained by the strength of organized labor. In a 1982 General Accounting Office study, it was found that controlling immigration failed when states refused to monitor or sanction employers. According to a study by Peter Brownell (2005), successful enforcement of immigration standards appears to coincide with the state's ability to secure employer compliance, rather than the state's ability to prosecute immigrants. That is, Brownell shows that the state's emphasis should be primarily on controlling capital rather than on controlling immigrants.

Since turning immigration into a security issue is not associated with a decline in immigration within the U.S., with what is it associated? Immigrant vulnerability seems one plausible answer. Inequality increased in the U.S. when the state confined its immigration activities chiefly to prosecuting immigrants—and hiring low wage immigrants at national security sites, such as airports, nuclear power plants, and military bases. Immigrants have been subject to ruthless border smuggling. A lack of employer compliance enforcement has increased immigration as immigrants are encouraged to enter the United States—where not explicitly by corporate and government recruitment, by networks and declining conditions within their home countries—and then become trapped in coercive conditions within the U.S.¹⁰⁹ Backed by the unsustainable subsidization of cheap transportation, the inducement of human mobility points to an unmet human need in this world of migrants: the need for a different global political-economy.

It seems that neoliberal “security” is a state subsidy for employer control over at least a portion of the labor force. This may make cheap goods available domestically, but at

¹⁰⁹ Brownell 2005; Meyers 2005.

what cost to people dependent on wages, and to citizenship? Many economists argue the market efficiency benefits are worth the cost. But efficiency should not ever be confused with fairness. The enforced vulnerability of a subpopulation of the labor force is associated with immigrant exclusion from goods and services such as education and healthcare, as well as further contributing to inequality within the society.

In this chapter I have pursued a labor discipline perspective on immigration, revealing the ways in which today's immigration issues, even in the case of refugee policy, find their origins today in a common driver: neoliberal globalization. There are a number of policy and social movement implications of the labor discipline framework. If global inequality is to be reduced partly through facilitating the mobility of workers, then mobility must be accompanied by adequate resources and enough time for people to reestablish social networks and cultivate hybrid cultures, as well as recoup financial losses suffered in transit. Societies' dependence on low-quality work should be reduced. Societies should increase human capital through training and education; otherwise, inequality and exclusion persists, simply shifted geographically—a shell game. “Demobilizing” capital might help to attain these goals.

Promoting secondary labor markets, the businesses dependent on cheap labor that the Swedish labor confederation calls “unserious businesses”, and the movement of “factors of production” is not the integration strategy it is claimed to be. In a world of *social* actors—as opposed to interchangeable units, this is a long-term strategy of creating hierarchal social divisions. At best, hierarchal social divisions are profitable to some; at worst, they are stagnating and dehumanizing.

As we see in Chapter Four, integration reformists have the Swedish public talking about relative levels of immigrant employment as if that were synonymous with integration, the last problem for Sweden to solve. They would have the public believe that through the cultivation of marginal businesses and marginal labor for immigrants, exclusion will be

eradicated. There will be a place for the foreign born. The Swedish public remembers the days of social democratic class compromise as the days of full employment and widespread prosperity. But inequality and alienation are exclusion, and they are not reducible to unemployment. By freeing inequality to grow, even with relatively low unemployment statistics, we find the rest of the indicators of exclusion rising, if not throughout society, as in neoliberal shock therapy, then focused in sub-sectors of the population, as in neoliberal gradualism. Economists John Schmitt and Ben Zipperer (2006) show that the American neoliberal model is no escape from the problems of global inequality, concluding,

The U.S. economic and social model is associated with substantial levels of social exclusion, including high levels of income inequality, high relative and absolute poverty rates, poor and unequal educational outcomes, poor health outcomes, and high rates of crime and incarceration. At the same time, the available evidence provides little support for the view that U.S.-style labor-market flexibility dramatically improves labor-market outcomes...Despite popular prejudices to the contrary, the U.S. economy consistently affords a lower level of economic mobility than all the continental European countries for which data is available.

If immigration is a tool for disciplining labor, I suggest that it functions as such due to immigrants' *vulnerability* in relation to other groups and the market in society. The importance of rediscovering working-class solidarity, immigrant and native, is underscored by the recognition that it is not immigrants themselves but immigrants' *vulnerability* that can compound the widespread impact of inequality. It stands to reason—unless loss of wages is offset by cheaper prices and an egalitarian distribution of the capital stock across society, it remains in native workers' best interests to dedicate significant collective resources to championing immigrants' welfare, especially where organized efforts to slow down immigration have failed or are failing.

Through protecting and promoting immigrants and other vulnerable populations as people we have relationships with—members of society and valuable and capable people

with both human potential and frailty, the native working class could advance a united working-class power restoration that reduces inequality and improves standards of living for immigrants and for natives. Unfortunately, democratic enhancement is disruptive and requires disruption. But if the policy goals were ever actually to reduce immigrant exclusion and promote native welfare, then a solidarity movement is needed to combat alienation, and enhanced democracy is needed to combat inequality—not just within formal, established political channels, but also within the everyday production practices and working relationships that reinforce the boundaries of political possibility.

CHAPTER IV

“A CREATIVE TRANSITION TO A NEW TIME”: INTEGRATION AND REFORMISTS

Well, they hate us. When a Swede goes shopping, the lady behind the counter gives him the money back into his hand, looks into his eyes and laughs. When we go shopping, she puts the money on the counter and looks the other way.

This is how an immigrant boy responded to the question of “why he hates Swedes”. His interlocutor, criminologist Malin Åkerström, is quoted in the Swedish and European press concluding that there is only one solution to the “ethnic absolutism”¹ and deviant “hard man” identities of boys with foreign backgrounds. Put them to work. “If this entails a deregulation of the labor market to create more jobs, then we should do so,” she asserts. This chapter compares and evaluates the work that is needed to translate “I need respect.” into “They need low-wage jobs with no benefits.”

Immigrant unemployment has been at the heart of the neoliberal strategy to undo social democracy. Why? In this chapter I start by asking what demographic pressures influence state policymakers to sympathize with neoliberal reformism. What are the dominant integration reformist framings, and how do integration reformists’ framings work to promote neoliberal reform? I ask, What are the bases of the integration reformists’ case? Do the persuasive reformist formulations imply the maintenance of the welfare state and Swedish society? What are their implications for the welfare state? If policymakers are being steered away from fortifying the social democratic society, how has a key interested party, organized labor, responded?

¹ Ålund (1999: 149) cites Paul Gilroy’s (1987) term “ethnic absolutism” to describe the modern reaction to contemporary forms of exclusion from the dominant culture and social order.

Replacing social democratic class compromise with new class relations requires a felicitous economic structure, such as the ability of Swedish capital to invest outside Sweden, political organization, and, where those falter, crisis and shock. The ability of Swedish capital to invest outside Sweden was facilitated by the rise of the European Union. As introduced in the last chapter, when bourgeois leader Carl Bildt came to power in 1991, he gave the whole Swedish economy, and especially labor, a massive shock through leaving the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (the ERM) and letting the Krona float, generating wild currency speculation. While the economic crisis raged throughout Sweden, unemployment among New Swedes (people with immigrant origins, including immigrants and their non-naturalized descendents) began to rise faster than unemployment among ethnic Swedes. New Swedes were the first to be fired and last to be hired.

As Sweden struggled out of the downturn, unemployment was at its highest, and the native-immigrant employment gap was at its worst (a 23 percent difference) in 1995 and 1996. Employment for both ethnic Swedes and New Swedes began rising by 1998, but by 2005, ethnic Swedes had an 80.7 percent employment rate, and New Swedes had a 64.1 percent employment rate. But the facts alone mean little. Taking over the state has also required hegemony.

According to Antonio Gramsci, hegemony, the "spontaneous consent" of the people, is secured through intellectual and moral leadership or authority. Political reformists in Sweden have used youth, immigrant, and immigrant youth unemployment trends to stage both an incremental, complex war of position across the institutions of civil society. On the eve of the 2006 elections, they used a war of manoeuver to get more bourgeois politicians in power and more neoliberal ideas in currency.² Most commentators attribute

² Civil society tends to be posited as a wide range of institutions and organizations, other than those of the state.

the bourgeois coalition victory in 2006 to its success in convincing the Swedish public that they alone had promising solutions to immigrant unemployment. The media-supported bourgeois Alliance was successful not because the Social Democrats were floundering on economic outcomes, but because reformists successfully convinced the public that “(T)he old workers’ party no longer has any answers when it comes to jobs. The movement has run out of ideas.”³

Since the 1990s economic shock, immigrant integration has become the Swedish crisis motif. Immigrants’ and minorities’ right to social citizenship beyond multicultural policies has not been a framework or goal for many experts on the integration “crisis” in Sweden. Rather “inclusion” is the more hegemonic framework, especially as it hinges on employment. Today the unemployment of immigrants is the foremost problem cited in discussions of integration (crime, electoral participation, and school dropout) and the welfare state in Sweden.⁴ Labor market reform arguments are forwarded in comparative perspective, with the countries of Austria and the U.S. figuring in prominently as liberal models. How valid are the comparisons at the empirical heart of reformist arguments for how to integrate immigrants and reduce their unemployment? In this chapter I address the comparative evidence for the Swedish integration “crisis”, as well as race and gender assumptions embedded in these immigrant labor market reform arguments.

Using immigrants and unemployment, neoliberal hegemony paints two types of pictures, constituting a dual-pronged attack on labor institutions in Sweden. One solution to immigrant exclusion (as well as the solution to immigrant deviance) that I address in Chapter Two is to reduce welfare state-based social citizenship in favor of increasing discipline. The politics of markets over welfare state have a gendered cast. Discipline is something the masculinized market is supposed to do best. Reducing the feminine

³ *Expressen* 2006.

⁴ The gendered dimension of immigrant unemployment figures is not well understood.

welfare state, integration reformists claim, will free immigrants from “dependence”. A complementary solution forwarded to ameliorate immigrant exclusion is labor market reform. These two types of reform discourses have been experimented with throughout this new century. They have been championed by various actors, including politicians, academics, and European Union representatives. Although their depictions of immigrants are not consistent, they form a complementary basket of immigrant employment crisis politics to appeal to wide and varying public opinion.

Proposals for enhancing immigrant integration in “crisis” have consisted of labor market reform proposals and social citizenship reduction proposals. These categories emerged from my content analysis of 400 newspaper articles from the leading, mostly-liberal Stockholm newspapers—*Dagens Nyheter*, Sweden’s biggest-selling daily *Aftonbladet*, and the liberal tabloid *Expressen*, as well as *The Local*, and *Metro*,⁵ and selected programming from SVT, Sweden’s public television. 131 of these articles were selected from *The Local*’s archive of diversity-related articles from 2004-2007.⁶ 300 of these articles were selected at random from a search using the key term “integration” for 2000-2004 from a Swedish media archive.⁷ As well, I followed citations in government literature, like the *Integration Report* to determine what voices and discourses were influential in policy formation. In this chapter I examine the most influential expert voices that emerged from my content analysis.

What are the main arguments and assumptions reformists rely on? There are clear leaders

⁵ Swedes are recognized as among the most avid consumers of newspapers in the world, see BBC News 2007. Most of private media in Sweden is owned by the Bonnier and Stenbeck families. Their media companies are international, see http://www.medialinnakkeet.com/kvomistus.htm#anchor_Alma.

⁶ <http://www.thelocal.se/guides/integration/Diversity+in+Sweden/>. “Diversity” means immigrant and immigration-related. *The Local* summarizes Swedish press articles in English, as well as presenting pieces written by social movement actors.

⁷ <http://www.medicarkivet.se>.

in advancing neoliberal hegemony through immigration and unemployment. In this chapter I evaluate the labor market reform proposals at the neoliberal immigrant-unemployment political nexus. I dissect Irene Kogan's (2003) gender-blind comparison of immigrants in Sweden and Austria, and I review labor market data to address the comparative data behind the reformist case that a less social democratic/more liberal approach to immigration and integration can better reduce immigrant exclusion. I find that countries that have recently reformed their labor markets have traded off immigrant unemployment for keeping women out of the labor force, increasing marginal employment, and even increasing native unemployment. Moreover, the legitimacy of the segregated labor market model can rest on racial assumptions and promulgate racial formation.

While Left parties in government and strong labor have a generally positive effect on immigrant employment, refugees and women immigrants without high human capital are much less likely to be employed than natives. In Sweden the native-immigrant employment gap is augmented by refugee immigration from communities where women had little education or history of paid employment, not by social democracy and organized labor. If Left parties and strong labor institutions and protections are not the central problem in immigrant integration in Sweden, nonetheless immigration and integration politics are a frequently used and potent tool for delegitimizing democratic social citizenship. I conclude by reviewing how organized labor, including New Swede union members, protected social citizenship by addressing the racialization of the new transnational working class.

Demographic Pressure and Immigration-Integration Policy

How does anxiety over welfare state viability align state policymaking actors with integration reformist agendas? I will start by discussing demographic pressure on national immigration policy, labor markets, and the welfare state in this section, and continue from there in this chapter into pressures exogenous to state logic—the political immigrant integration reform arguments for reforming labor market policies and the welfare state. Integration reformists recognize that “designing effective immigration policies is not just a technical project. It is a political issue.”⁸ One of the more frightening specters haunting state policy planners of Europe today is the growing dependency ratio. The dependency ratio is the portion of a population composed of dependents, that is, people who are too young or too old to work).⁹ Sweden’s is 52.89; and, despite successful government encouragement for Swedes to reproduce, the World Bank projects that, by 2030, the country’s dependency ratio will increase to 70.23. This means that there will be over 70 dependent children and elders for every 100 adult wage earners producing in the country’s economy. As shown in the age pyramid below (Figure 3), Sweden’s population, like most affluent populations, is aging. Aging is a particularly strong demographic factor in countries like Sweden and Japan that have fostered relatively low inequality. Social epidemiologists have found that egalitarianism extends healthy lifespans years beyond the social stress-based limits on longevity in affluent but highly unequal societies such as the United States.¹⁰

⁸ Katseli 2004.

⁹ The dependency ratio is equal to the number of individuals aged below 15 or above 64 divided by the number of individuals aged 15 to 64, expressed as a percentage. A rising dependency ratio is a public policy concern in countries that are facing an aging population because a larger proportion of the population is using pension and security systems while a smaller proportion of the population is paying income taxes toward those systems.

¹⁰ Wilkinson 2005.




Figure 3. Sweden's age pyramid 2006. Statistics Sweden.¹¹

A healthy society has a lot of people who reach old age. The age pyramid of a healthy society looks like a blotch. Notice not “blotch” but “pyramid” is the normative shape, however. Age pyramids present a banal picture of contradictory goals. From the point of view of economic and political elites, unfortunately, the closer the age pyramid comes to resembling an actual pyramid, the better, because that means they can expect both a large number of people to enter the workforce in the future, and few elders, who cannot or do not work and who use the health system more intensively. Although we can see that the birthrate in Sweden responds to government programs encouraging and giving incentives for procreation and raising children, immigration is today widely recognized as another way to boost the population of working adults. Comments Stockholm University migration and ethnic relations researcher Charles Westin, “Sweden, like all countries in

¹¹ Men are on the left. Women are on the right. Each bar represents an age increment of 4 years, starting at age 0-4 on the bottom, and ending at age 95 and up at the top. The length of each bar indicates number of Swedes of that gender in that age category, starting at zero in the middle, in increments of 50,000 per column, with the seventh column on either side ending at 350,000. For example, there were about 250,000 0-4 year old Swedish girls in 2006.

Western Europe, is facing an aging population and low birth rate. It is reasonable to believe that Sweden will have to rethink its immigration policy in the not-too-distant future and to accept low-skilled labor immigration from non-European countries.”¹²

Policy makers tend to be only too motivated to plan around introducing strong, capable immigrant adults to labor cheaply, consume goods and services, and pay taxes. Then, before those immigrants need care, the planning theory goes, they should be deported back to their countries of origin, without pensions or even compensating friendship networks. That is why a Guestworker program is not just the rational reallocation of labor as a factor of production out of a glut area, but also global exploitation, a no-social-contract fix for transferring value—labor-power and tax income—to affluent societies with high-dependency-ratios. It is also a formula for continued crises in the families, neighborhoods, and societies sending labor immigrants.

The immigration version of social dumping¹³ (or the credible threat of immigration social dumping) has negative consequences for the receiving country as well. It encourages the domestic growth of enterprises dependent upon low wage costs, and this market eventually puts pressure on the government in the immigration-receiving country to reduce indirect wage costs, such as public education, health care, a clean environment, social security, unemployment insurance, unions, and so on. Eventually, the breakdown in universal welfare erodes support for public goods and services.

Sweden has never had a Guestworker program, although it has had labor immigration. Sweden competed with other Western European countries for labor immigrants from

¹² Westin 2006.

¹³ “Immigration” social dumping as I describe above is distinct from the neoliberal understanding of social dumping. Neoliberal authorities, such as the EU, describe social dumping as a threat that only applies when countries fail to let in low-skill foreign-born workers seeking employment. In this view, the social dumping threat is that enterprises seeking low indirect labor costs will relocate to countries with little public welfare. It is logically possible to argue that deregulation and cheap transportation has already facilitated the relocation of low-wage enterprises; states facilitating labor mobility will only exacerbate welfare decline.

southern Europe; companies recruited from Yugoslavia (approximately 60,000 labor migrants), and Greece (approximately 20,000 labor migrants). This migration was regulated by the Swedish trade union confederation, the LO, and workers received the same wage levels and rights as Swedes, including access to social benefits like unemployment benefits. Settled by the Swedish National Board of Labor, labor migrants were treated in Sweden as future citizens, an exceptional policy in Western Europe. With the rise of the 1973 oil crisis, countries throughout Western Europe stopped recruiting labor. Sweden officially ended labor migration from non-Nordic countries in 1973, which started the formal institutional separation between immigrants and labor institutions. The National Board of Labor lost the authority to settle refugees in 1984. Refugees were settled under various municipal multiculturalism programs and diversity policies under the authority of the Board of Immigration. Refugee integration has posed a particular challenge to the Swedish government since the economic crisis of the early 1990s.¹⁴ This has been theorized to threaten the demographic balance between productive and dependent citizens. A 2007 report commissioned by the Swedish government suggests that Sweden's "failure to integrate immigrants into the labour market could have a major impact on society, as the proportion of Swedes of working age is set to fall."¹⁵

Like all working people, immigrants are discussed as both a pox, because like everyone, they have dependency life stages, and also as an exploitable resource, because they also have life stages in which they can and do labor, usually under conditions that are suboptimal for them as workers, but optimal for owners of low-profit businesses and for debt-ridden consumers. Immigrants' human life stages permit reformists to present these workers among the potential beneficiaries of labor market solutions, and as the bountiful, cost-free, natural-resource solution to "labor shortages".¹⁶

¹⁴ Westin 2006.

¹⁵ Savage 2007.

¹⁶ OECD 2005.

Neoliberal Framing: Reforming the Deviant Immigrant and the Welfare State

In order to strengthen capital, neoliberal politicians and technocrats have been dismembering the older class compromises embodied in the labor movement and the welfare state, according to David Harvey.¹⁷ I argue that immigration politics can be an important dismembering tool. This is because while effective immigration policy requires regulating business,¹⁸ integration reformists argue just the opposite. Immigration requires giving capital more latitude, they theorize, including deregulating the labor market and reducing the welfare state. As in Kamali's Durkheimian argument, reformists hold that an undistorted market will help immigrants find a natural place in a multicultural society's division of labor. Disciplining the state can mean disciplining immigrants as well. Communities that come to be invested in seeing immigrants as a problem appear to be amenable to policies that dismantle liberal Keynesian and social democratic Active Labor Market Policy (ALMP) class compromises in favor of less democratic regimes.

In the context of a crisis discourse, immigration can be a vehicle of change. It is a process that always, everywhere involves complications and adjustments. Immigration entails not only migration, which is a costly risk to individuals and families, but also a reconstitution of society, a renegotiation of hard-won social contracts, and an influx of labor power to reconfigure the landscape of viable business and working conditions. Coping with insecurity and stress originating in transfers of risk through monetary policy, environmental degradation, restructuring, deregulation, or imperial warfare tends to be a formidable challenge to resource-poor working class people.¹⁹ Integration reformists have ready solutions to the insecurity of the everyday Joe, Jane, or Kalle—solutions that

¹⁷ Harvey 2005.

¹⁸ Brownell 2005.

¹⁹ Eliasoph (1998) shows how apathy is commonly reproduced in response to problems that are not "close to home".

promise to impose discipline on socially-excluded people, like immigrants, as well as the welfare state.

Why would disciplining immigrants accompany disciplining the welfare state in the liberal model? They both liberate capital at workers' expense. Unregulated business promotes illegal and legal immigration to augment the workforce and reduce wages.²⁰ In turn, uncontrolled immigration facilitates capital to drop the floor of remuneration, working conditions, and living standards, permitting otherwise unviable businesses to prosper and expand markets, which, in turn, raises domestic economic indicators and stock market ebullience. In addition to benefiting stockholders, an immigrant-fueled housing bubble benefits existing homeowners.²¹ But business activity that would not be viable were it not for lowered standards of living is problematic for workers. Workers experience this kind of business not just as a proliferation of consumption opportunities but also as rising social costs, declining work conditions, and a set of personal problems. To reduce these costs, they join business owners in calling for the state to help discipline immigrants. Low-wage businesses further exert well-organized political pressure for fewer public goods and services, and more desperate labor. This is because collective, public resources and amenities exert upward pressure on job standards and wages by making workers more comfortable and by providing living-wage jobs.

For political reformists who reject the salience of inequality for human welfare, however, immigrants can be used to argue that were it not for deviant outsiders, capitalism *should* work perfectly. Acknowledging a widely perceived decline in living standards, political actors assert that the social problem is that the criminals and aliens are threatening our security and have too much access to "our" hard-earned resources. Just as Swedish criminologist Malin Åkerström used her interviews of immigrant boys in Malmö to call

²⁰ Brownell 2005.

²¹ Borjas 1999.

for deregulation of the labor market, the 2005 U.S. Representatives' Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims considered revoking some legal protections, under an "Alien Gang Epidemic" rubric.²²

Laced with racist politics, problems with immigration and integration can be reliably used as a crisis discourse. Crisis talk clears the way for efforts to instigate modest to massive right-wing reform, such as abandoning social democracy in favor of laissez-faire capitalism—even where immigration and integration have gone comparatively well. Leading up to the 2002 election, the Liberal Party became a prominent mainstream voice in Sweden for the view that immigrants are deviants, requiring law and order policies. In both elections, the party floundered—in 2002 with racist statements, and in 2006 by spying on the Social Democrats. Nonetheless The Liberal party's "fierce" discourse pushed the Social Democrats into a tough, "restrictive" posture in the 2006 elections, and its proposed policies were implemented as a party member was appointed head of Integration and Equality in the new bourgeois administration.

Neoliberal Framing: Economically Excluded Immigrants and Labor Market Reform

While the Tough On Crime approach to immigrants continues to flourish despite setbacks, the second prong of the neoliberal attack on labor strength—economic exclusion—is propagated in Sweden by both Swedes and other European integration reformists. "Economic exclusion" is perhaps the "good cop" in the integration reform discursive strategy, as it posits that immigrants are not deviant. Rather, Swedish social democratic institutions and habits are to blame for excluding immigrants from the labor force. In Mauricio Rojas' *Förnyelse och Medborgarmakt (Sweden's Renewal and Civic Power: Liberal Politics Against Social Segregation and Exclusion)*, the Swedish business

²² Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. 2005.

class's premier free-market think tank Timbro has spelled out the next logical step for Swedes, both immigrant and ethnic:

The rules and system have formed a rigid labor market where our security is paid with many others' insecurity and exclusion. The increasingly demanding corporative model should be broken up, as it hinders a creative transition to a new time, a time of great possibility that we can take part in if we aren't stuck in the old one, which endures out of a combination of political leadership without a vision for the future and strong pressure groups that undermine our interests, cost what that will.²³

Summarizing the conservative ideology, Rojas warned that, unless the welfare state that he feels has thwarted immigrants is disbanded, "the age of the web" would become a "reality just for a privileged few".²⁴ As a politician of the Right, Rojas' eye was on courting young Swedes, some of whom founded the Pirate Party (2006), with its steely focus on internet intellectual property reform, and its claim to being open to all political positions. Rojas has argued for his capitalist political organizations that well educated and urbane immigrants have been stifled by the atavistic Swedish Social Democrats, who, he claims, fancy Swedes a "Master Race".

Immigration politics in Europe and specifically Sweden tie together a bundle of social democratic concepts and institutions as social "problems" as we will see in this chapter. These immigration politics argue that governance practices that include working-class representation protect job quality at the expense of easier labor market entry; they argue that working class representation in policy making holds working conditions "artificially" high, and that to integrate immigrants into society, immigrants require more "natural", state-supported, lower-functioning businesses. Thus, integration reformists advocate dismantling working class organization and representation, and they propose that countries should facilitate labor immigration. Integration reformists typically consider

²³ Rojas 1999: 20.

²⁴ Rojas 2001: 106.

Sweden's economic strategy too high end, citing high education levels as well as high barriers to job entry. It is argued that decent work and "generous" welfare state policies *harm immigrants*, and integration reformists conclude that countries should divest of welfare because it is a barrier to valued multiculturalism.²⁵

Swedish Multiculturalism and Cultural Essentialism

One possible answer to the integration of diverse immigrants is multicultural policy that encodes respect for cultural difference. Multicultural policy helps to extend social citizenship to disadvantaged groups such as substate nations, ethnic minorities, and immigrants. Since the 1970s Sweden has had multicultural policies "that go beyond the non-discriminatory enforcement of the traditional civil and political rights of citizenship for the individual members of ethnic groups."²⁶ Multicultural policies are in some ways an extension of social citizenship to include people of foreign origin. Swedish multicultural immigrant integration policies include parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at all levels of society and in all state institutions; government boards and ombudsmen to consult with ethnic communities; multicultural school curricula; dual citizenship; state funding of ethnic organizations and activities; and state funding of mother-tongue instruction. Sweden also has multicultural policies to accommodate substate national groups.

Although integration reformists in Sweden cite multiculturalism to support their welfare retrenchment and labor market reform arguments, this is likely because multiculturalism is a resonant theme in Sweden. Multicultural social citizenship is meant to enhance rather than replace other forms of social citizenship, since groups such as immigrants have other vulnerable statuses as working class people and women. Banting and Kymlicka (2003)

²⁵ Hjerm 2005a.

²⁶ Banting and Kymlicka 2003: 62.

point to social spending and the redistributive impact of social policies in countries such as Canada to demonstrate that multiculturalism is not connected to welfare state retrenchment.

Because multiculturalism foregrounds and celebrates cultural difference, however, it has been used by political projects that essentialize culture to the occlusion of gender, as well as political, labor, and class relations. For example, popular discourse has been blind to injustice as a *Swedish* problem of male dominance and violence, framing it instead as a cultural issue confined within non-Swedish communities. Newspapers would announce, “Yesterday another immigrant woman was murdered—for cultural reasons,”²⁷ thus discursively framing patriarchal oppression as an issue of difference rather than power.²⁸

For example, a judge legalized New Swedish men’s prerogative to threaten to kill or killing young New Swedish women, on the basis of accommodating multicultural policy. (His ruling was later voided.) Altering the judicial process for New Swedes in this way can authorize the repression of young women of foreign backgrounds, such as Fadime Sahindal. These young women have been socialized within Sweden and cannot feel they should be governed by cultural rules they are, at best, ambivalently attached to. Because “multiculturalism” is cited in many cultural essentialist arguments, an activist immigrant woman from Iran blames multiculturalism itself, writing to parliamentarian Ulla Hoffman,

Multiculturalism forgets or wholly trashes all the individuals who are members of ethnic groups, but don’t agree with the group’s culture, and want to live differently. Multiculturalism discriminates against and violates the people who don’t want to be converted to their elders’ culture or religion. Traditionalist, often male citizens with a foreign background

²⁷ *Aftonbladet*. February 10, 1997.

²⁸ In a similar way and to similar effect, Yuval-Davis and Werbner find that the United Nation’s Beijing Platform of Action on Violence against Women stated that violence against women “derives essentially from cultural patterns” United Nations 1996: 49, cited in Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999: 21.

are allowed to disrespect people, animals, and the environment, and are excused under the rubric of multicultural respect for religion and culture.²⁹

While this activist's statement may seem ethnocentric or a-cultural, she is trying to point out that multiculturalism as reified culture, for example, within a state policy (for example the state allowing immigrant men to execute patriarchal justice on women they are related to, whereas ethnic Swedish men are not allowed to threaten to kill or kill women) can undercut its own humane intent. One problem with multiculturalism in Sweden is that through some interpretive lenses, such as a Durkheimian valorization of division of labor or a legal lens, it has been converted into cultural essentialism. For example, generations of immigrants only partially share culture. New Swedish women raised in Sweden cannot be expected to be enclosed within the cultural orbit their fathers inhabit. They often want to go to school for reasons that can include a desire for a high skill occupation, or they may want a partner for their own benefit.

Why do integration reformists forward inconsistent frameworks (immigrants are deviant; immigrants are victims)? Advocating for the social movement power of pluralism, New Social Movements theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) revised Gramsci's concept of hegemony into a discursive strategy of combining principles from different systems of thought into one coherent ideology. While social movements theorists of cultural resonance and collective action frames also hypothesize that creative and *effective* social movement political framing must coherently tap into collectively-held values, principles, ideas, and beliefs,³⁰ cultural theorist Anne Swidler (1995) has argued that coherence is unnecessary. In the movement to reform the Swedish state, I find as well that "coherence" is less a matter of logic than a matter of alignment with, as Myra Marx Ferec (2003) points out, the global political-economic power that constrains the

²⁹ From the personal papers of M.P. Ulla Hoffman 2002.

³⁰ Cultural resonance social movements scholars follow in the tradition of Snow and Benford 1998.

“discursive opportunity structure”. While the reform discourses on immigrants and unemployment can be inconsistent, the conclusions reformists draw from such framing are staunchly consistent: labor institutions, including the welfare state and social citizenship, must be dismantled.

The Neoliberal Comparative Case Against Social Democracy: Austrian Economic Inclusion

Social Democracy produces a complementary combination of expanding social citizenship and a high skill, high wage labor market.³¹ Whereas I discussed Masoud Kamali’s theoretical critique of social democracy in Chapter Two, in this section I dissect integration reformists’ empirical case against Swedish social democracy. Claims that Sweden’s social democratic integration practices are too coddling and its labor market too rewarding are backed by the frequently-cited multivariate analysis of Irene Kogan (2003). Because Kogan’s work is often cited by political agents claiming that social democracy undermines immigrants’ welfare,³² I analyze the study below to see how well it supports that claim.

Kogan’s study is cited to support the discussion of the large difference between ethnic Swedes’ and immigrants’ rates of employment, as well as to support the conclusion that for all its progressive multicultural policies, Sweden’s program of immigrant integration is a failure, and that more liberal regimes treat immigrants better. It is clear that refugee immigrants to Sweden (along with young Swedes under 25) are relatively excluded from the labor market and have had high rates of unemployment since 1990. As well, Kogan shows that in a period of economic crisis, older labor immigrants also had high rates of withdrawal from the Swedish labor market. The study is salient because immigrant unemployment has been a cost to the welfare state, and it has presented problems to

³¹ Esping Anderson 1990.

³² For example ERCOMER.

immigrants and immigrant communities, mixed outcomes for ethnic Swedes, and opportunities for political reformists seeking to induce further neoliberalization.

I argue that much of the public shame over discrimination in Sweden is not as helpful to immigrants as to political agents who seek to weaken labor; and policy scholars have played an important role in this. Given the prominent role Kogan's findings have played in the critique of social democratic social integration, I demonstrate the importance of fully discussing the impact of composition and contextual effects when taking lessons from cross-national comparisons. "Composition" refers to the characteristics of individual members of a population, and "context" to the contextual environment of individuals. Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap's influential 2004 research into comparative economic integration describes the impact of the distribution of human capital (the composition effect) on immigrants' comparative economic integration. This is the traditional economic inquiry into immigration. In addition, van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap pursue economic sociology's characteristic inquiry into the impact of discrimination (a contextual effect) on economic integration.

I compare Kogan's influential analysis to the composition effects and contextual effects expected to influence immigrant employment. Using data from 1996 and 1997, just prior to Sweden's economic recovery, Kogan contrasts the economic outcomes of the mostly-1990s flood of educated Yugoslavian men and women refugees in Sweden against the constant influx of mostly-male, poorly-educated, German-speaking Yugoslav labor immigrants in Austria. She finds that while the Yugoslav refugees in Sweden have better jobs, the historically-steady influx of young, male labor immigrants in Austria has a higher employment rate, albeit confined in low-end jobs.

The awkwardness of this comparison arises from neglecting well theorized composition and contextual effects. For example, Kogan plays down the variation between refugees and labor immigrants' labor market attachment that has been observed by immigration

scholars. Chiswick (1999) hypothesizes that because refugees do not emigrate for purely economic reasons, but rather their movement is pushed by instability and political repression in their countries of origin, they may be less favorably selected than economic migrants and may perform less well on the labor market. Yugoslav immigrants to Sweden were not always refugees however.

Just as the United States signed the Bracero Program labor contracts with the Mexican government in the 1940s, western European countries signed labor contracts with Mediterranean countries in the 1960s and 1970s.³³ Sweden dropped this kind of labor immigration in 1973. The pre-1973 Yugoslav labor immigrants to Sweden had low-status jobs similar to their labor immigrant counterparts in Austria. Historically, young male Yugoslav labor immigrants in Sweden and Austria fared similarly in both countries, as both countries exerted what Borjas (1988) terms “negative selection”. That is, this immigrant population was selected for its lower productivity and skills. Young male Yugoslav labor immigrants had high employment rates in both Sweden and Austria. A difference is that older immigrant Yugoslavs stayed working in Austria’s labor market during its 1990s boom, while their counterparts in Sweden unsurprisingly were more likely to exit the marketplace during the early-1990s Swedish economic shock.

Kogan mentions that the comparatively low unemployment rate of the Yugoslav immigrants in Austria can be attributed to the difference between the Swedish policy of allocating welfare to the unemployed, versus the Austrian policy that removes unemployed immigrants from the country, and thus from the unemployment statistics. However, rather than emphasize the culling effects of Austrian policy, Kogan casts it in a more ideal, reformatory spirit, as “discouraging” unemployment.³⁴ While “discouraging” may be the technical term here, it is also misleading. Although it would fit liberal theory,

³³ Fassman and Munz 1994.

³⁴ Kogan 2003: 601.

unemployment is probably not caused by recalcitrant behavior on the part of the unemployed, especially since unemployed immigrants in Sweden want work and do not need a policy to encourage them to want to be employed. It is more accurate to admit that a major factor is that Austria deports the unemployed, and this affects the data. In addition to the contextual effect of Austria removing unemployed immigrants where Sweden does not, there are additional community and contextual effects to note in Krogan's study. A prominent community effect is that Yugoslavs have a tradition of steadily immigrating to nearby Austria; this goes back to the Austro-Hungarian empire, continues strongly through the Cold War period, and then continues strongly through the 1990s wars within the former Yugoslavia. Austria is a home away from home for Yugoslavs, comparable to the U.S. for Mexican immigrants.

In contrast, Yugoslavian immigration to Sweden has been limited to a mid-twentieth century labor immigration influx and a 1990s refugee influx. Yugoslavs do not have an equally strong, traditional community presence within Sweden as they do in Austria. The importance of community networks to immigrant employment emerges in how jobs are acquired. In Sweden, immigrants from distant countries are much more likely to have to use formal channels to acquire jobs than are ethnic Swedes. Nearly 40 percent of immigrants from outside Western countries have to secure their job through formal processes, compared to just 26 percent of ethnic Swedes. Furthermore, 42 percent of ethnic Swedes but only 34 percent of non-Western immigrants are able to use informal networks to land a job.³⁵ Without a substantial, existing ethnic network, economic integration can be more costly and risky, as immigration social network theorists point out.³⁶

³⁵ Behtoui 2005.

³⁶ Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Zhou and Logan 1989; Van Tubergen et al 2004; Howe and Jackson 2006: 25.

The contextual effect poses a bigger problem for drawing conclusions about immigrant economic integration. It could be regarded as a major research design flaw that Kogan compares immigrant unemployment rates during an economic crisis in Sweden and an economic boom in Austria. Austria did not have a monetary crisis in the 1990s. Unlike Sweden, it was not a social democracy run through a bout of neoliberal “shock therapy”. Before we can pronounce social democracy the foe of immigrants, the presence of contextual effects requires us to extend our view on comparative integration outcomes past 1996 (Austria) and 1997 (Sweden).

Looking past 1996-1997, Sweden’s economy improves and is arguably more dynamic than the Austrian Catholic conservative model it is compared to. In the context of Sweden’s redistributive social democratic welfare state, Sweden’s economic successes have positive implications for long-term immigrant welfare. When the social democratic state was more autonomous, prior to the 1990 economic shock, unemployment was lower. In the years just before the shock was applied, ethnic Swedes enjoyed an 87 percent employment rate, and immigrants enjoyed a 76 percent employment rate. There was an employment rate gap, but with such low unemployment, it made little political impact. The gap opened wider at the first crack of the crisis in 1990. Then the Social Democratic Party (SAP) was returned to head the state in 1994. The SAP reversed the bourgeois government’s “starve the beast” (bankrupt the welfare state) program, and the social democratic policies set the country back on its feet. Overall, the good-cop/bad-cop flow of neoliberal reform in Sweden has pleased the global business community, which sees much opportunity in the affluent country for privatization. In 2006-2007, the World Economic Forum’s “Global Competitiveness” Index placed Sweden in third place, after Finland and Switzerland. In contrast, Austria’s economic promise to capital ranks at number seventeen. What does this mean for immigrant inclusion in the social democracy? Despite the inherent advantages of the young, male, relatively local, linguistically fluent immigrants in the 1996 Austrian integration model, refugees in

Sweden make more impressive strides over the long haul. Kogan finds that second-generation immigrants do uniformly well on the labor market across the two countries.

The Hidden Gender Component of the Immigrant-Native Employment Gap in Sweden

Data on immigrant labor market exclusion in Sweden seems to be the strongest empirical case for the neoliberal argument against the Nordic model. Unemployment is to a large degree contained within the immigrant communities and among under-25 youth. Such containment could be an ad-hoc attempt to both meet the letter of neoliberal anti-inflationary policies and quarantine the full labor-disciplining force of anti-inflationary/unemployment policy among both kinds of new citizens, because social democracy requires a solidaristic, politically-engaged, and empowered working class. It is, however, misleading to simply argue that the immigrant employment rate is sacrificed to fight inflation while maintaining social democratic labor strength.

Why is there an employment gap between immigrants and natives in Sweden? There is an important, hidden gender component to the immigrant-native employment gap in Sweden. Taking gender into account clarifies an important source of disparity between New Swede and ethnic Swede employment rates. Part of New Swedes' comparatively low unemployment is explained by the relatively high employment of Swedish women, especially within the public sector. The social democratic welfare state, as described by Gosta Esping-Anderson, functioned on the basis of "three interlocked principles: 1) the improvement and expansion of (public) social, health, and educational services; 2) maximum employment-participation, especially for women; and 3) sustained full employment."³⁷

³⁷ Esping-Anderson 1990:223. The third principle has been dropped.

In only five of the nineteen OECD countries do women immigrants have more success on the job market than in Sweden. Immigrants' chances on the labor market appear relatively low in Sweden because its female labor market is among the strongest in the OECD, and the employment rate of ethnic Swedish women is *the* highest in the OECD. There is an especially marked difference in Sweden between the levels of employment of ethnic-Swedish women (75 percent in 2003) and immigrant women (60 percent in 2003). Low female immigrant employment is not atypical. As Pierette Hondagneu-Sotelo (1994) has shown, when spouses and children migrate together, as they commonly do in refugee and family migration to Sweden, patriarchal patterns are likely to be maintained. Immigration economist Heather Antecol (2000) confirms: immigrant women's labor force activity tends to be reflective of gender differences in labor force activity in their countries of origin.

Regardless of the state of the welfare system, immigrant women often have it tough on the job market. Even the most high-skilled immigrant women in even the most laissez-faire market societies have difficulty finding appropriate work.³⁸ It also should be recognized that to remain outside of the labor market is a common immigrant women's strategy across countries. It allows them to maximize resistance against social forces that threaten poor, minority families.³⁹ In short, the native-women/immigrant-women employment gap holds across OECD countries, except for in Austria, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece, which all have low rates of native women's employment *to match their low rates of immigrant women's employment*. Comparing immigrant employment across OECD countries, and bringing out women's employment data within this comparison, it is apparent that we are not observing simple success or failure of

³⁸ Roger Waldinger and Greta Gilbertson (1994) have shown that highly-educated immigrant women in the U.S. have been unable to convert education into out-competing natives for high status occupations. While "there is now broad consensus that immigrant women attain some limited, albeit uneven and sometimes contradictory, benefits from migration and settlement," to what degree immigrant women secure improved status in the home, workplace, or community in the U.S. remains unclear (Pessar 1999: 64).

³⁹ Pessar 1999: 67.

immigrant economic integration, but rather the *trade-offs* of different political-economic development strategies that impact not only racial formation, but gender and class as well (see Table 1 below).

Table 1. 2003 OECD Political-economic Development Strategy, by immigrant employment level. Source: OECD (2005), derived from table I.A1.1.

	Catholic-conservative (8 OECD countries)	Liberal (7 OECD countries)	Social democratic (4 OECD countries)	Out of 19 countries
Male immigrant employment higher than male native employment	Italy (+17%), Greece (+12%), Portugal (+4%), Spain (+6%)	USA (+6%)		Describes 5 countries, mostly Catholic-conservative
Male immigrant employment roughly equal to male native employment	Austria (0.3% immigrants' favor)	Ireland (2% natives' favor), Canada (2% natives' favor)		Describes 3 countries
Male native employment higher than male immigrant employment	France (+5%), Germany (7%), Belgium (11%)	Australia (+5%), Great Britain (+6%), the Netherlands (15%), Switzerland (+4.5%)	Norway (+6%), Finland (+4.6%), Sweden (+12%), Denmark (+21%)	Describes 11 countries, across ideal types
Low male native employment, below 75 percent	Italy (69%), Greece (72%), Portugal (75%), Spain (73%), France (70%), Germany (71%), Belgium (68.5%)	USA (73.5%), Ireland (74.7%)	Finland (70%)	Describes 10 countries, mostly Catholic-conservative
High female native employment, at or over 65 percent		Australia (72%), Switzerland (73%), Great Britain (67%), USA (66%), Canada (70%), the Netherlands (68%)	Finland (67.5%), Denmark (73%), Sweden (74%), Norway (73%)	Describes 10 countries, Liberal and Social-democratic
High female immigrant employment, at or over 60 percent	Portugal (67%), Austria (60.5%)	Australia (65%), Switzerland (63%), Canada (61%)	Norway (62%), Sweden (60%)	Describes 7 countries, across ideal types

Most OECD states⁴⁰ are like Sweden in that they employ native men at a higher rate than immigrant men. Most OECD states (eight out of eleven) *with a strong female presence in the labor force*, including Sweden, employ native men at a higher rate than immigrant men. The exceptions are two large, traditional immigration countries, Canada and the United States, with both relatively high levels of native female employment and high rates of immigrant male employment. Relatively low levels of native male employment (less than 75 percent) coincide with even lower comparative rates of native female employment. In the Catholic countries, Austria is unique in that it has both low native female employment (61.3 percent) and native male employment that hovers just above 75 percent. If the countries were evaluated on a continuum, Austria likely would be within the normal range of Catholic-conservative deviation.

Relying on women's (typically) most productive years for delivery of unremunerated care for dependents, no Catholic-conservative state has 65 percent or more of its working-age women in the workforce. While integration reformists are not making arguments that the *character* of women is subverted where their employment statistics are low, they reproduce the culture of poverty discourse in proposing that welfare for immigrants in particular produces a "negative impact of inactivity on hopes and habits."⁴¹ If we are willing to imagine that the character of women is not subverted by exclusion from the labor market, then why should we suppose that the character of other people, including immigrants, is subverted by state support?

If there must be unemployment and low inflation, should not the problem be approached by policy makers from the standpoint of how to valorize welfare for all residents, or valorize as a "calling" the contributions of any people excluded from the labor market? Could not states allocate welfare-supported care or community development work to the

⁴⁰ There are thirty member countries total; nineteen of the wealthiest keep this data and are in this OECD data set.

⁴¹ OECD 2007a.


unemployed, and create a culture of celebrating care-giving, as Canada and Sweden have celebrated multiculturalism, and most societies have celebrated motherhood? In order to increase immigrant welfare, should not policy makers be directly concerned with conceiving the most just, most economically-dynamic way to distribute unemployment and indecent work, given the situation of each society in the world system, rather than dully shuffling unemployment and underemployment around?

The relative lack of women in the Catholic labor market appears to have no relation to how immigrants are used within the Catholic-conservative labor market—some Catholic conservative states employ immigrants intensively (Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain); others do not (Belgium, France, Germany). The X-axis for the above table reflects Esping-Anderson's welfare-state types, but an additional geographic pattern lies within. Among the Catholic-conservative (or Catholic-conservative) states, the level of male immigrant employment in 2003 reflects how far north the country is situated. The further north the country is, the more likely male natives are to enjoy a higher employment rate than immigrant men; the further south the Catholic-conservative country is, the more likely it is to employ immigrant men at a *higher* rate than natives. Austria is in the middle. What would cause such orderly geographic variation in the value of native men's work as against replacing them with foreign labor? Perhaps it is an anomaly. Perhaps men in southern European countries do not have much more human capital than new entrants to society; and perhaps the business firms characteristic of southern Europe require low labor costs rather than human capital.

The geographic, gender, and immigrant-status patterns in the OECD countries' labor markets suggest that different locations and kinds of regimes devise a few different formulas for utilizing and disciplining the available labor power. In Graph 4 below I compare the two kinds of difference in labor market employment across selected OECD countries. Many Catholic-conservative and Liberal countries use women as unremunerated care providers, where men are paid "family wages" to support women as

dependents. In most but not all of these countries, immigrants have had high rates of employment since 1980. However, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Italy have large gaps between the rate of native male employment and the rates of native female employment and immigrant employment. Sweden is the labor market mirror image of Germany, and, to a lesser extent, Austria.

It may be that such patterns support a structure of market niches within the OECD, such as varying percentages of firms that utilize high human capital and low human capital, and varying amounts of commodified care service delivery. It comes as no surprise that after the demise of full employment policy, social democratic Sweden, with a high human capital labor force and much commodified and state-supported care service, is the type of state that employs women at high levels and immigrants at lower levels. It is a bit puzzling that Sweden's integration of immigrants is commonly compared unfavorably (and without full disclosure) to Austria's integration of immigrants. Austria is one of only three OECD countries that currently have roughly equal native and immigrant employment rates, corresponding to a political-economic mix that keeps women working without pay, produces a robust number of low-skill-employing firms, dumps immigrants outside of the borders in economic downturns, and generates particularly acrimonious native-immigrant relations.



Graph 3: Exclusion from the Labor Market: Flexible Immigrant Labor Force v. Unremunerated Female Care Providers
 White columns: Comparative Difference between the Average Immigrant to Native Employment Rate, 1980-2001. Black columns: Comparative Difference between the Native Male-to-Female Employment Rate, 2003. Data derived from van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004: 715, and OECD (2005) tables 1.A1.1 and 1.A1.2.

Integration Approaches Compared Across Social Democratic and Liberal Regimes

Immigrants are faced with alternative risks, depending on the sort of society to which they migrate (see Table 2 below). Generally, immigrants and refugee immigrants do not have much choice in what country they emigrate to. But since the point here is to assess the validity of the political claim that liberal societies provide better conditions for immigrants, consider a hypothetical exercise. An immigrant may choose not to invest in human capital, and immigrate to a liberal-conservative country where he or she will find

plenty of low-quality work. The risk is that the immigrant is compelled to migrate again in the event of an economic downturn. Or, an immigrant investing or planning to invest in human capital may choose to immigrate to a social democracy where he or she will have to compete for decent work with highly educated, better connected natives. The risk is that the immigrant may have to go on state-supported assistance, may need state-supported further education, or may start a state-supported small business. Facing this kind of decision—were one to have the luxury of decision making—the immigrant may find that other factors including language, existing human capital investment, migration networks, proximity, and the hostility of the social climate can be persuasive.⁴²

⁴² There are similar downsides to immigrant integration in affluent social democratic and liberal societies. Other forms of immigration may combine different aspects of these scenarios, and countries change policy over time; but in either ideal type of immigration discussed here, liberal-conservative or social democratic, the immigrant's children will fare better than the first-generation immigrant. And in the mid-to-northern European countries, at least, the immigrant will pay the steep costs of racism, xenophobia, and discrimination as he or she tries to work into a place in a new society.

Risks	Social Democratic Swedish Model	Liberal Austrian Model
High human capital work opportunities for immigrants?	Yes	Few
Abundant work for immigrants?	Not since 1990. 64percent immigrant (male and female) employment rate in Sweden in 2005.	Yes, during economic boom; in 2003, immigrant and native Austrian men shared a 75percent employment rate.
Womens' work	Ethnic-Swedish women (75percent) are far more likely to be employed than immigrant women (60percent).	Labor immigration policy requirements discourage women from immigrating.
Work quality	High	Low
Cost of unemployment to immigrant (form of "social exclusion")	Unemployment assistance; retraining; education; entrepreneurship	Revocation of residency permit
Discrimination in labor market?	Yes	Yes
Outcomes for immigrants' children	Equivalent to native population	Equivalent to native population
Anti-immigrant hostility: Public largely assigns blame for immigrants' unemployment on:	Mixed: Immigrants, immigrants' culture, racism, welfare, labor market, social democracy	Targeted: Immigrants, immigrants' culture

Table 2. Employment Trade-offs for Immigrants in Social Democratic Sweden v. the Austrian Model. Based on Kogan 2003.

I call into question the appropriateness of the popular terms "inclusion" or "economic integration". There is a fair case to be made that a large community of low-skill Yugoslavian immigrants to Austria have a traditional place in a segment of the Austrian labor market. But given the tensions labor immigration causes in Austria, as well as the tenuous citizenship status immigrants have in Austria, it is far more difficult to say that this is what we mean by "inclusion" or "integration". Both of these terms imply a social as well as a labor market dimension. As an operationalization of "integration" or "inclusion", Austria's immigrant "economic inclusion" would please only a small cadre of state bureaucrats with a very specific budget-balancing mandate and very limited discretion.

Where immigrants are uncompetitive on the labor market, there exist multiple policy options. Policy options include removing the immigrants from the country; reforming government policy to support more low-skill jobs; establishing programs to combat and decrease discriminatory attitudes and practices within the work place, among business owners, within labor institutions, in education, and through cultural initiatives; pursuing full-employment Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) more aggressively than anti-inflationary policies; and allocating to unemployed immigrants a combination of retraining, education, and unemployment benefits (see Table 3 below). Mobilized by neoliberal-neoconservative reformist strategies, ethnic natives resent immigrants and reject and stigmatize taxation and public programs when public assistance benefits immigrants. Most immigration studies consequently assume that the public assistance policy option is the most troublesome and in need of comparative investigation.

Table 3. Uncompetitive on the Labor Market: General Policy Interventions for Immigrants.

Policy option	Benefit	Cost	Ideal type receiving country
Remove immigrants	Reduces welfare rolls; exports social problems	Inhumane; costly to immigrants and public; employers may resist loss of reserve labor force, capital may exit	Right-wing regime: Austria
Ban or reduce new immigration	Prevents additions to labor market; can allow present immigrants to integrate more thoroughly, living standards to rise	Immigrant family disruption; can abandon refugees; can increase global inequality, pressure on sending countries; employers may resist decline of domestic reserve labor force, capital may exit	This can be a cyclical policy tactic pursued by different kinds of countries
Guestworker program	Designed for temporary labor infusion in specific sectors; removes immigrants when they enter a dependency lifestage	Ineffective, immigrants tend to stay illegally; creates disenfranchised underclass; robs sending countries of citizens' productive years, returns dependents to sending countries	Liberal: Germany, United States
Promote secondary labor market	Provides easy job entry; supports labor markets with low human and social capital requirements; maximizing the ease of immigration will permit immigrants to consume goods and services and pay taxes in receiving country.	Cultivates low human capital; higher health costs, higher state support in caring for poor people's dependents, higher housing subsidies; can cultivate an underclass with insufficient resources, generations of social problems; increases inequality	Liberal: United States, Spain
Pursue full-employment Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) more aggressively than anti-inflationary policies	Reduces the job losses in economic downturns that impact vulnerable groups such as immigrants most severely; decreases inequality; raises human capital	full-employment is today economic and political blasphemy, and may result in a capital strike	Social-democratic: formerly Sweden
Allocate welfare to unemployed immigrants	Acknowledges risks to immigrant workers, and provides safety-net	Intersecting with right-wing mobilization, this will cause ethnic natives to abject immigrants and reject taxation and public programs; immigrants prefer reduced unemployment risk over unemployment assistance; liberals object that unemployment corrupts recipients	France, Germany

Table 3. (continued).

Policy option	Benefit	Cost	Ideal type receiving country
Allocate retraining, education, welfare to unemployed immigrants; create "Works Project Administration"-style program	Acknowledges risks to immigrant workers, and provides safety-net; increases human capital	Intersecting with right-wing mobilization, this will cause ethnic natives to resent immigrants and reject taxation and public programs; liberals object that assistance programs targeted at workers smother individual initiative	Social-democratic: Sweden
Small-business support for immigrants	Provides alternative to unemployment, and provides exit from discriminatory labor market	Small businesses are risky and on average immigrant business owners report low income	Liberal: Sweden, United States
Establish multicultural programs to combat and decrease individual and institutional discriminatory attitudes and practices	Reduces employer, union, and coworker discrimination against immigrants	Takes time and human-relations dexterity; may create tolerance without friendship, fail to reduce social capital disparity between natives and immigrants	Left-liberal: Canada, Sweden, European Union
Imprison unemployed immigrants resorting to illegal activities	Deletes unfavorable unemployment statistics; total prison labor force control; provides cheap labor for firms; disciplines labor force, immigrant communities; stimulates prison-industrial economy; reduces political impact of unemployed; popularizes domestic surveillance and policing	Inhumane; deleterious long-term effects of captivity, disenfranchisement on individuals, families and communities; increases inequality with attendant social problems	Right-wing: United States
Promote military duty for unemployed immigrants	Provides military personnel for war campaigns; provides employment to immigrants	Very expensive; disrupts families; very hazardous work; facilitates militarism and imperialism; promotes authoritarianism	Right-wing: United States
Provide public funding to private charities	Private charities dispense aid to "the less fortunate", including unemployed immigrants; can integrate immigrants into religious communities' networks	Charities do not provide sufficient welfare coverage; promotes private charities rather than direct human well-being; reallocates public resources to private institutions	Right-liberal /conservative: United States

The Sweden-Austria immigrant welfare comparison not only has a prominent place within the (now-defunct) Swedish Integration Department's *Rapport Integration 2005*, but is also cited by the leading researcher into comparative immigrant employment, Frank van Tubergen, who sums up simply, "Her [Kogan's] findings showed that Yugoslavs fared better in Austria than in Sweden in terms of labor force participation and employment."⁴³ Yet Van Tubergen found many factors that explained the large immigrant-native employment gap in Sweden. Social democracy was not one of them.

Using Van Tubergen's pooled cross-national data set, based on Eurostat's European Union Labour Force Survey (1992-2001), van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap found that Left-wing parties in government tend to have a positive effect on immigrant employment. Other characteristics of the destination country, the immigrant origin country and immigrants themselves accounted for relatively low immigrant employment in Sweden. Refugees participate less often in the labor market, and when they do, they are less often employed. Migrants who exit a less-egalitarian society and move to a more-egalitarian society are less often employed, as predicted by immigration economist George Borjas. There are very few countries that can compare to Sweden's egalitarianism. Migrants from non-Christian countries are at a distinct disadvantage on the OECD labor market, as predicted by the immigrant-native social distance hypothesis.⁴⁴ Van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap's findings also strongly suggest that the gap between native women's employment rate and immigrant women's employment rate in Sweden is best predicted by the low rate of women's employment in their countries of origin.⁴⁵

The low employment rate for highly-educated male immigrants in Sweden contradicts van Tubergen's findings, which suggest that a high level of education typically confers

⁴³ van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004: 705.

⁴⁴ Portes and Rumbaut 1996.

⁴⁵ van Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004: 722.

employment. This makes sense, because the employed, highly-educated immigrants van Tubergen typically observes are not refugees, as in Sweden, but highly-skilled workers immigrating to fill needed high-end job vacancies, as in medicine or computer technology development. For example, many highly-educated Leftists were forced to leave Iran after the Shah was overthrown and the Islamic clerics turned against their socialist co-insurgents. The neoclassical theory of migration would suggest that some highly-educated individuals may have more economic capital and social capital as well as human capital invested in their homelands. From a perspective of economic and network rationality, these highly-educated individuals would require either very strong push or pull factors to migrate. Thus their employment prospects would be particularly strongly tied to the cause of their immigration.⁴⁶

Assessing Neoliberal Inclusion: Labor Market Policy Reform and Economic Exclusion Trade-offs

Immigrant inclusion is the rationale for creating the conditions for liquidating public assets, namely the increased commodification of labor combined with divisive income inequality and welfare state reduction. The OECD is a leading institution in the popular campaign to alter Swedish labor markets, ostensibly in order to combat “economic exclusion. Its imprimatur backs the bourgeois government’s reform program.⁴⁷ The OECD urges,

As the economy may now be hit by more frequent structural shocks than some decades ago, reallocation of labour may be increasingly important and add to the pertinence of traditional insider-outsider problems. Making the labour market more inclusive and flexible is therefore a key challenge.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Kogan 2003: 607. More immigrants from industrialized Slovenia and Croatia went to Sweden, while Austria initially recruited less-skilled workers from Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia.

⁴⁷ OECD. 2007a. “Economic Survey of Sweden 1007: Making Employment Inclusive—for Immigrants and Natives Alike.”

⁴⁸ OECD. 2007a.

The organization places the blame for discrimination in Sweden on labor market regulations and “a compressed wage structure” (low inequality). That is, Sweden “discriminates” against immigrants because policy does not foster a large number of low-wage jobs.⁴⁹ According to the OECD, discrimination is eradicated by increasing the number of low quality jobs, what it terms “work on conditions that match their (immigrants’) competence and education.”⁵⁰

The complete neoliberal OECD prescription for “making employment inclusive” is to lower wages, diminish welfare, and abolish the state income tax.⁵¹ Neoliberal reform, while consistent in its prescriptions for change,⁵² appears to impact countries to different degrees. The difference is mediated by states. How is reform mediated by states? In order to see where the effect of neoliberal-prescribed labor and immigration policy reform is the most pronounced, I compare van Tubergen’s longitudinal data to the 2003 difference in native male and male immigrant employment.⁵³ While the Nordic countries Sweden

⁴⁹ As Mona Sahlin says, there is a silent struggle between policy makers over the term “flexible work.” Flexible work in the social democratic tradition means high quality working conditions that accommodate workers and their families. Whereas in the liberal tradition “flexible work” means workers who accommodate inconsistent business patterns by, for example, working overtime without overtime pay, working shifts at all hours of the day, going without work and pay and social supports for periods, and so on. The meaning of the term “flexible work” is slippery because some experts who use the term do not distinguish between working conditions that accommodate social reproductive activities and workers’ lack of control over working conditions.


⁵⁰ It should be pointed out that if the OECD’s economic assumptions about discrimination were valid, we would expect to find little discrimination in the U.S., a leader in low-quality work as well as immigration.

⁵¹ OECD. 2007a. “Economic Survey of Sweden 1007: Making Employment Inclusive—for Immigrants and Natives Alike.”

⁵² “The standard neoliberal policy package includes cutting back on taxes and government social spending; eliminating tariffs and other barriers to free trade; reducing regulations of labor markets, financial markets, and the environment; and focusing macroeconomic policies on controlling inflation rather than stimulating the growth of jobs,” reports economist Robert Pollin 2003: 196.

⁵³ Luxembourg’s data comes from 2001. Van Tubergen’s 1980-2003 data does not include Norway. The data used to calculate the 2003 gap is segregated by gender, whereas the 1980-2003 average includes both men and women. However, comparing the 2003 female gap to the 1980-2003 average gap reinforces the above picture of increasing deviance from the average pattern.

and Finland have had more consistent policies over the recent decades, many other countries' latest employment practices (in white) appear to be at great variance from their average employment practices between 1980 and 2003 (in black), see Graph 4 below.⁵⁴



Graph 4: How Do Labor Markets Vary and How Are They Changing? Native-immigrant Employment Gaps: Averages over 24 years and the Employment Gap in 2003. Source OECD.

Can we say that these non-social democratic reformist countries are making better progress toward economic inclusion, as integration reformists assert? Given Howell and Diallo's findings in the U.S., and well as Slaverda, Bazen and Gregory's findings (2000) across the OECD, it is not accurate to say that the *non*-social democratic countries have been more effective in wiping out economic exclusion, especially if we consider the impact of job quality on economic exclusion, as do Howell and Diallo (2007).

Except in the social democratic countries, we find the growth of the junk job sector high and increasing throughout the OECD. By contrast, it appears that a well-developed welfare state discourages the growth of precarious work. While the OECD finds that few

⁵⁴ Howell and Diallo show that the low-quality labor market has been a stable feature of the US since at least 1979. This is the labor market model that neoliberals seek to export.

Swedish (6.4 percent) and Finnish (7 percent) workers struggle to survive on low-wage jobs, non-Nordic economies are heavily dependent on low-wage labor markets.

While the U.S. has had a consistently large low-wage sector since at least 1979 (the year such data became available), Germany increased its low-wage segment from 11 percent of the labor force in 1995 to 16 percent in 2005. Poland increased its low-wage segment from 17 percent of the working population to 23.5 percent. Korea increased its low-wage labor market segment from 23 percent to 25.4 percent. Japan (16 percent), Spain (16 percent), Canada (22 percent), and the U.K. (21 percent) have similarly large low-wage labor markets that have grown slightly over the decade.⁵⁵

The OECD claims that an enlarged junk jobs sector benefits “immigrants and natives alike.” Where the low-wage labor market segment has been enlarged, immigration economists find that low-skilled, low-educated natives lose economically. Labor economists find that in the leading liberal country, the U.S., economic exclusion has increasingly afflicted moderately-educated (high school to some college-educated) citizens.⁵⁶ Immigrants do not necessarily benefit from reduced native welfare. Schmitt and Zipperer find that the U.S. performs comparatively poorly in “incorporating traditionally disadvantaged groups into the paid labor force.”⁵⁷

It is more accurate to say that some countries trade off a degree of immigrant unemployment for marginal employment and native unemployment. This trade off comes with its own set of exclusions. John Schmitt and Ben Zipperer (2006) of the Center for

⁵⁵ Data are from the OECD Statistical Annex 2007, Table H. The OECD data on incidence of low pay, while ostensibly measured using the same criteria as Howell and Diallo (2007) reports the U.S. low pay incidence at the top of the OECD, but 5 percent lower than Howell and Diallo’s findings for 2006. The OECD only has 1995 and 2005 low pay data on Australia, Canada, Germany Ireland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S.

⁵⁶ Borjas 1999.

⁵⁷ Schmitt and Zipperer 2006.

Economic Policy Research (CEPR) name these exclusions as income inequality, poverty, unequal education and health, and incarceration.⁵⁸

The exclusion tradeoff is political, involving differences in class compromise across countries. In an effort to harmonize their policies with the uniform neoliberal prescription of diminishing the welfare state and husbanding tertiary firms, many countries have seen an influx of “negative” labor immigration and a massive relative increase in their native male unemployment rate. Whether immigrant employment is too low or native employment is sinking, the OECD’s prescription is always the same: get rid of welfare supports and enlarge the tertiary firms sector and the secondary labor market; then unemployment will go away, and labor will come to heel.

Economist Robert Pollin (2005) shows that unemployment statistics are lowered by such anti-working class policy in the U.S., but economic and social exclusion have nonetheless increased, not declined. Pollin claims that junk jobs play the same role in neoliberal countries that unemployment is supposed to. Junk jobs deplete quality of life and discipline workers. In the small European countries that have worked to conform to the apparently successful (from an employment and employers’ perspective), liberal U.S. model promoting junk jobs and removing welfare supports, we find continuing evidence of unemployment shifted to the native subpopulation. The removal of welfare has nothing to do with reducing economic exclusion in a society.

Is the U.S. liberal model a one-size-fits-all solution for economic growth, or a path-dependent niche strategy that works through a highly coercive labor market saliently including historical slavery, indentured servitude, unregulated business, racial segregation, and extensive and racialized imprisonment⁵⁹? Looking down the road, we have to notice that the liberal high inequality model is damaging to the health of workers,

⁵⁸ Schmitt and Zipperer. 2006: 16.

⁵⁹ 1 out of 37 Americans is under penal supervision.

and requires increased health-care expenditures. Following the U.S.'s model could put further fiscal strain on states with public healthcare in an era in which populations are aging. It is a liberal shibboleth that a lifetime of bad jobs is better than an occasional bout with no job and welfare supports. But according to social exclusion studies and social epidemiological findings, the low-inequality social democratic path of good jobs and high employment provides measurably better outcomes for a very high number of people, permits women to be semi-independent economic actors, increases human capital, and creates capitalist economic dynamism.

I suggest that "exclusion" is not what integration reformists are trying to reduce through reforming labor market policy. That social democratic economic dynamism fails to appeal to neoliberals has less to do with the welfare of new members of society than it has to do with the balance of decision-making power between classes, as well as centers of power. Regulating capital as well as labor, social democracy simply fails to provide capitalists the latitude and satisfaction of accumulation without social and environmental constraint.

Assessing Neoliberal Inclusion: Racialized Labor Market Segmentation

Reformist neoliberal institutions regard the liberal model as fundamental to labor mobility because they assume that structures must be installed to incorporate a low human capital pool. The OECD recommends,

(S)ome (immigrants) lack the basic literacy and other skills needed to command a wage higher than the benefits offered when not working. Others are highly educated, but potential employers may feel uncertain about their exact competence. For both groups (of) marginalized immigrants...reforms would have to include substantial easing of job security rules, more individual wage flexibility and considerable reductions in benefit levels.⁶⁰

⁶⁰ OECD 2007a.

The economic theory behind such policy reforms is not made clear. It is not clear why it would be advantageous to every country to duplicate the segmented labor market economic strategy. The rationale for integration policy reform in Sweden rests heavily on the argument that a segmented labor market will improve immigrants' lives. But it is not made clear, for either immigrants or societies, why installing a junk jobs labor market is preferential to installing the infrastructure to build up immigrants' human capital over time.

A persistent argument among followers of Milton Friedman is that the reason why Swedes have prospered under social democracy is because of their racial endowment.⁶¹ Attempting to delegitimize social democracy as an approach to capitalism, neoliberals marshal cross-national comparison as evidence. Poverty rates for ethnic Swedes are also low in the liberal U.S., they argue. Therefore, affluence in Sweden is an effect of Swedish racial (cultural or biological) endowment, rather than social democracy. But low poverty rates among ethnic Swedes in the U.S. may be more a result of favorable racial conditions for them as white people in their timely (1850-1920) insertion within the historical U.S. racial order than any transhistorical Swedish fitness.⁶² There is one more comparative framework needed to adjudicate whether Swedes are naturally destined for affluence, regardless of labor market conditions.

The other obvious comparative framework, historical comparison, does not support the idea of a Swedish racial endowment. Before social democracies created social democratic policies and institutions, their own populations had low human capital. Instead of simply creating low human capital labor markets, however, social democracies built the infrastructure to increase the population's human capital. In an era in which race was

⁶¹ For example, see the responses on the Gary Becker-Richard Posner blog at http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2006/11/on_milton_fried.html.

⁶² About 1.3 million Swedes emigrated to the U.S. between 1850 and 1920.

used prominently to justify inequality, but the naturalism of class differences was contested, social democratic policies effectively reduced working class hardship. Swedes have prospered both in Sweden and the U.S. in the twentieth century, but on very different institutional bases, not on the basis of any transhistorical racial endowment.

The integration reformists' belief that immigrants must be integrated into a secondary labor market partly reflects a racist belief that non-natives do not develop human potential as the native population did. It also partly implies the intensified belligerence of capital since the Saltsöbaden days in which Swedish workers and capital cooperated for economic development. Racism and capitalist belligerence can be mutually sustaining. Returning to the European neoliberal model again, we find for example that Austria's more authoritarian immigration and integration practices have evolved into elevated anti-immigrant hostility and the ascendance since 2000 of an extreme right-wing governing coalition.⁶³ Graph 3 indicates that at least Sweden has been able to maintain a relatively steady policy course through the turbulence that has rocked European labor markets.

Immigration politics invoke questions of who can and cannot be members of the civic nation, and in some kinds of societies, race provides the answers. In the U.S. for example, the consensus on those questions was often rooted in racial formation, and changed over time. Not just socialists, supporters of the French Revolution, the poor, and non-Protestants have been regarded in policy and consensus as incapable of being resocialized "in the American mold," but First Nations people, African-Americans, the Chinese, and the Japanese were all considered inassimilable.⁶⁴ Members of groups considered incapable of being resocialized in the national mold are sometimes not allowed to immigrate. But often they are allowed to immigrate without various citizenship rights. Racial groups can be "wanted" for cheap labor, without being "welcome", as Zolberg has

⁶³ Jandal and Kraler 2003.

⁶⁴ Zolberg 2006: 432.

shown. Integration reformists' prescriptions gloss the membership distinction between wanted and welcome. Moreover, they cannot dispose of aggregate unemployment, given anti-inflationary policy.

The OECD holds that social democratic governance in pursuit of more egalitarian and democratic goals is not sufficiently “flexible” to accommodate immigrants. Practically, this means that high “threshold barriers for labour market entrance produced by the social democratic welfare state regime” preclude the state from facilitating the growth of enough junk jobs. In neoliberal discourse, “reducing threshold barriers for labor market entrance”—by reducing job quality and by subsidizing and promoting businesses that use cheap labor—is a crucial part of the accumulation panacea. But the effectiveness of removing threshold barriers for improving immigrants' labor market fortunes depends on a system of racism. Suzanne Model shows that where immigrants can claim more positive outcomes in the U.S. as compared to the United Kingdom, it is because they are inserted above African-Americans, who are consigned by a nationalist-racist tradition to the lowest position in the labor queue.⁶⁵ It would be surprising if making labor market entrance easy would change the distribution of unemployment in a country in which immigrants are the low racial on the social hierarchy.

Junk Jobs Reform for Inassimilable Immigrants

European migration expertise steers the discourse of social exclusion. Although in a global context, the Swedish social democratic welfare state has fostered comparatively strong citizenship rights, and has been comparatively inclusive,⁶⁶ Diana Mulinari and Anders Neergaard's study (2004) of the “new Swedish working class” (immigrants) reports on how traditional *laissez-faire* accounts use immigrants as a bludgeon to attack the labor movement and social democracy, characterized by integration reformists as

⁶⁵ Model and Lapido 1996; Model 1997, 2005.

⁶⁶ Schierup & Ålund 1991.

stultifying and atavistic. Mulinari and Neergaard find “a discursive coupling” between “change” and the category “immigrant” in integration reformists’ arguments. If we are concerned about the welfare of immigrants, integration reformists advise, our first task is to save immigrants from the depredations of organized labor, the labor movement, and social democratic state supports. Holding up the United States as an ideal, integration reformists claim that immigrants will automatically, smoothly integrate themselves into their new homelands, once they are free of working-class institutions and power resources.

Some neoclassical economics arguments have been transferred to Sweden from outside continental Europe. The most basic of these is the hegemonic discourse that uses poor immigrant vulnerability to economic downturns and crises. Well established in the U.S., this argument holds that welfare teaches such vulnerable groups as immigrants to be “dependent” on welfare hand-outs, and drain society. According to migration economists, “special interest groups” maintain the welfare that holds immigrants in the thrall of a culture of poverty.⁶⁷ By being exposed to a welfare state, immigrants use social assistance more frequently than native households. By 1998 welfare use was high among nonrefugee immigrant households in the U.S. 21 percent received some type of public assistance.⁶⁸ George Borjas is deeply disturbed at immigrants’ propensity to “assimilate into the welfare state.”⁶⁹ Refugees, he says are even more “disturbing”, and the economist identifies the problem with welfare.

The high propensity of refugee households to enter and stay in the welfare system may be the result of misguided government policies designed to ease the transition of refugees into the United States. Persons who enter the country as refugees have immediate access to a wide array of social

⁶⁷ Borjas 1999: 107-112.

⁶⁸ Borjas 1999: 109.

⁶⁹ Borjas 1999: 107.

services and programs that neither other legal immigrants nor natives qualify for.⁷⁰

The integration reformists' prescription is that the welfare state must be dismantled, to save "tax-payers" from being dragged down by individuals who need to learn to pull themselves up by their bootstraps, and to save these immigrants from their own descent into a culture of poverty. This economic theory claims that immigrant welfare use is excessive because it is greater than native welfare use. It refuses to consider the empirical, sociological context for diverse economic survival strategies. With the immigration reform legislation of 1965, national quotas were dropped in the U.S., and immigrants increasingly came to the U.S. from poorer countries than they had in the post-1920s immigration trough period. Legislators determined that the affluent U.S. had the capacity, including institutions such as the low skill labor market and the welfare state, to integrate people who once had been considered inassimilable because of poverty, low human capital, and race. The new integration would be multicultural.

I argue that the neoclassical theory of the welfare state pedagogy of dependence is based in the material interest of increasing immigrant dependency on the junk jobs sector. That is, the neoliberal dependency discourse aims to increase immigrant commodification. Granted refugees both have had more access to public assistance and have used it more. But labor immigrants have if anything less access to public goods and services than natives. Why should labor immigrants use public assistance more than natives if this is not a matter of need but rather cultural learning? If both the population of post-1965 immigrants and the population of natives are exposed to the welfare state, and its purported capacity to "teach" dependence, why do only some populations submit to the so-called culture of poverty?

⁷⁰ Borjas 1999: 109.

Often anti-immigrant, Islamophobic, and racist politics undergird integration reform politics in Sweden as elsewhere. Europe in general has seen racial formation in the rise of an understanding of Muslim immigrants as having an essential culture that is inassimilable even under multicultural conditions. The essential inassimilability of Muslim immigrants is thought to be due to Islam's "fusion of civic and religious functions".⁷¹ This contemporary view reflects famous previous notions of the inassimilable Jew in Europe and the inassimilable Catholic in the U.S. But even in Europe today, Koopmans et al (2005) find that Muslim immigrants only very infrequently demand special cultural rights incompatible with Western democracy.⁷² To the small but threatening extent that Islamic civic-political fusion contradicts the European relegation of religion to the private realm of individual faith, Islamic civic-political fusion is more likely an outgrowth of historical, sociological relations, such as imperialism, than a permanent feature of a transhistorically incompatible culture. The relationship between the West and the Islamic Middle East is in this era iniquitous and politically charged. But Muslim immigrants are racialized to substantiate the global relation of domination/submission. As with the accommodation of Jewish and Catholic minorities, relations can change over time. Western anxiety about the multicultural integration of Muslims could be placed less on Muslims' supposedly "essential" political-religious difference, and more on how imperial relations can be reformed in the Middle East. Anti-imperial politics in Sweden have done more to historicize, contextualize, and humanize Muslims in this way than many other countries, which has been a point of complaint for imperialists in the U.S.⁷³

Does the logic of the neoliberal "dependency" argument rest on racist and sexist cultural-essentialist assumptions? New Suburban Historians such as Kevin Kruse (2005) and

⁷¹ Koopmans et al 2005: 174.

⁷² Koopmans et al 2005: 173-177.

⁷³ Caudwell 2007.

Thomas Sugrue (1996) have documented how racism has fueled campaigns against public goods and services in the U.S., beginning in the Civil Rights Era decades before even the racial politics of the 1990s welfare retrenchment. They show that racism also undergirds the popular U.S. myth that markets are “fair”,⁷⁴ which neoliberal policy depends on for legitimacy. For example, neoliberal politics do not use the valid claim that a segmented labor market is economically efficient. Its political resonance depends on circulating the notion that junk jobs constitute for immigrants a fair, rather than a highly exploitative or depleting, “entrance” into the labor market and mainstream society. The claim of fairness is rooted in social mobility.

Based on Portes and Zhou’s (1996) investigations of Cuban, Korean, and Chinese immigrant communities, neoliberal institutions, such as the OECD, have claimed that segmented labor markets can facilitate social mobility.⁷⁵ Investigating this claim further, however, Douglas Massey disagrees. He points out that the social-mobility version of the segmented labor market model is not widely applicable to the immigrant experience because it requires the convergence of three rare conditions: geographic concentration, that the first round of immigrants be entrepreneurs with access to wealth, and that there is a steady stream of new, lower-class workers of the same ethnicity.⁷⁶ Despite the legitimization of race and the inaccurate promises of social mobility, segmented labor markets are not fair.

⁷⁴ Blount-Lyon 2002.

⁷⁵ In segmented labor market theory, the agent of immigration is the industrialized society’s demand for labor. There are three driving engines to the imbalance that creates the segmented labor market: supply of/demand for labor, labor’s demand for social hierarchy (the problems of motivation and structural inflation), and demographic changes that have removed women, teenagers, and rural-to-urban migrants from the bottom-rung of the labor pool. Major theorists of this perspective include Piore (1979). As well, Portes authored reports in the mid-1980s on the Cuban “ethnic enclaves” social mobility strategy in Florida.

⁷⁶ Massey 1999: 39.

Swedish Integration Reformists' Neoliberal Arguments

Some variations on integration reform politics appear to be Swedish innovations. Swedish immigration and integration policy reformists, such as Masoud Kamali, Annika Forsander, Mauricio Rojas, and Mikael Hjerm have suggested that in the Nordic welfare model more inclusive and more universal social benefits as well as more regulated labor markets make it more difficult for immigrants and other vulnerable groups like disabled people or those who are unemployed long-term to “break in”.⁷⁷ They condemn labor movement achievements such as the welfare state and Sweden’s high quality labor market.

Borrowing from Durkheim’s conception of organic solidarity, Kamali creates a philosophical version of Borjas’ definition of integration in opposition to welfare dependency. As we saw in Chapter Two, Kamali claims that the universalist Swedish welfare state and the middle-class men and women working in the welfare system clientelize and colonize non-European immigrants, preventing them from joining the civil sphere. The civil sphere from which immigrants are marginalized is for Kamali solely the market. Integration is presented as one type of economic integration, that is, “individuals’ active participation in the production and reproduction of their own life with little or no dependence on state subsidies.”⁷⁸

Forsander defends the segmented labor market. She explains that social democratic assimilation measures promote an ideology in which only through decent work is it possible to become a full citizen; and without access to decent work, immigrants are turned into a problem.⁷⁹ Therefore, integration methods of the Nordic welfare state include education, assisted employment, apprenticeships, language courses, social

⁷⁷ Forsander 2004: 219-220.

⁷⁸ Kamali 1997: 11.

⁷⁹ Forsander calls this ideology the Protestant Ethic (Forsander 2004: 218).

education, and other measures to increase human and social capital.⁸⁰ Liberal countries are free of these problem-solving approaches, because they let immigrants be as they are. For example, “In the US there is no ethnonational culture into which one must be integrated,” Forsander claims.⁸¹

Presumably free of the constraints of ideology, these liberal states offer a smorgasbord of low-paying, low-skill jobs and ethnic occupational niches that, she holds, provide immigrants with legitimate citizenship and allow immigrants to escape being treated as a problem. This is the key to some groups’ “easier” integration in the liberal countries. She finds that Nordic countries fail to provide these opportunities. Forsander cites Rojas, Timbro Deputy President responsible for The Center for Welfare Reform at “the free-market think tank of Swedish enterprise.” Rojas asserts that integration policies in Sweden are misdirected in their efforts to foster equality,⁸² one of the “philosophical” (ideological) foundations of the Swedish welfare state, along with humanitarianism and mercy, rehabilitation, integration, solidarity, justice, and security.⁸³

Forsander offers a cultural-essentialist explanation for both the successes of the social democratic welfare state, and the social democratic failure to support junk jobs firms in Sweden. She maintains that the internalization of Protestant Ethic norms of “refraining” (from making excessive demands on the welfare state) and independence maintain the Nordic welfare state, not its financial management or its administration.⁸⁴ She sees ideology as causal both in determining the type of welfare state and in immigrants’ lack of assimilation. She does not put much weight on the role of discrimination in hampering

⁸⁰ Forsander 2004: 218.

⁸¹ Forsander 2004: 208.

⁸² Rojas 1999 (the English translation of his 1996 book, *Efter folkhemmet: En agenda för Sveriges förnyelse*).

⁸³ Samuelsson 1975: 335.

⁸⁴ Forsander 2004: 217.

integration. Instead, for Forsander, the social democratic welfare state culture prevents the promotion of the segmented labor market's low-quality jobs and ethnic niches that she assumes integrate immigrants.

Hjerm, a sociologist at Umeå University, has argued that because immigrant small-businessmen in the 1990s had on average less income than immigrant workers in Sweden, the social democratic welfare state is not "as successful in incorporating immigrants as has been claimed" and so "the reshaping of the welfare state to meet the multicultural reality is a more fundamental and urgent task."⁸⁵ "It stands clear," he extrapolates, "that the social democratic welfare state, built and expanded on grounds of homogeneity, is insufficient to deal with changing circumstances in a plural society."⁸⁶

Hjerm points out that the social democratic government has promoted entrepreneurship as a way for immigrants to circumvent labor market discrimination.⁸⁷ But because entrepreneurship decreases immigrant unemployment and use of welfare, without statistically raising immigrants' income, Hjerm describes the state's promotion of entrepreneurship as a sinister effort to "hide" immigrants' problems. However, if we were to suspend belief in the Chamber of Commerce position that engaging in entrepreneurship is a spectacular accomplishment that demands extraordinary rewards, it could just as easily be concluded that entrepreneurship is a viable alternative to unemployment. Hjerm's discourse implies that immigrant entrepreneurship would be better rewarded in a more market-dominated society. Contributing to the anti-social citizenship argument for reducing labor strength and transferring social wealth to capital,

⁸⁵ Hjerm 2005: 120, 136.

⁸⁶ Hjerm 2005: 117.

⁸⁷ SOU 1999.

Hjerm implies that greater state support for immigrant entrepreneurs' income will smooth immigration and integration.⁸⁸

Immigrants are used in so many different ways by integration reformers because in Sweden the Right-wing social movement actors have been constrained to use erosive tactics. Common neoliberal reform tools are not as reliable in Sweden. Sweden comparatively (though not completely) resisted the urgent calls to neoliberalize that were echoing throughout the world.⁸⁹ Racism has not been as central a feature of national formation as elsewhere. Consequently the neoliberal movement has not yet won majority agreement with the idea that unfettered markets are fair. As comparative political sociologists including Ian Gough (1979) have long demonstrated, and as political capital has long known,⁹⁰ strong organized labor has a crucial role to play in resistance to market ideologues, and in maintaining and expanding social citizenship. The backbone of social democracy, the labor movement, retains some power in Sweden; but it is under threat. Incremental neoliberal reforms began in the 1980s and key components of labor power

⁸⁸ In order to make any claim about the need to scrap social democracy in favor of a more "market-oriented" approach, we ought to be clear about what we expect from a market-oriented society. First, what do we expect immigrant entrepreneurs' income to look like in a liberal regime? Using Current Population Survey data (2006), we find that in one exemplary market-oriented country, the U.S., neither native entrepreneurs nor immigrant entrepreneurs have very high incomes, on average. The average annual income of self-employed immigrants is \$20,710. That is \$2,263 more than self-employed natives. More to the point, Portes and Zhou (1996) show that in the U.S., immigrant workers also report a higher average income than do immigrant entrepreneurs. Given that the self-employed tend to claim many tax deductions that workers cannot, it is not surprising that in official statistics, on average, entrepreneurs' income can look smaller than workers' income. Even within a "market-oriented" state, the success of small businesses is not guaranteed. The U.S. Small Business Administration reported in June 2006 that one-third of new employer firms in the United States fail within two years, and about 66 percent fail by four years. The real point of contrast is that in the United States, the costs of unemployment are much more severe than in social democracies. Social democratic welfare protects all sorts of people from unfavorable markets. Moreover, because the social democratic welfare state standard of living is high, if immigrant entrepreneurs' official incomes are somewhat lower on average (average gross income of immigrant non-entrepreneurs in 1998 was roughly \$22,500, whereas the average self-employed income was roughly \$15,000 in Sweden), it is unreasonable to conclude that immigrants would be better off under a liberal regime that subsidizes tertiary sector firms.

⁸⁹ Harvey 2005: 71.

⁹⁰ Vogel 1989; Domhoff 2002, 1990; Diamond 1995.

resources have been chipped away, partly by a neoliberalized Social Democratic Party, but more emphatically through the cooperation of bourgeois governments and the European Union.

Immigration and Integration Policy and Organized Labor

Unfortunately, organized labor has been late in recognizing and countering the potency and implications of immigration and integration reform politics. As unionization levels declined slightly but steadily, and the union federations fought to fend off bourgeois government efforts to rescind the unions' powers to organize and strike, immigrants were invisible to the labor movement.⁹¹ Yet this has started to change. Through a lawsuit brought to the European Court of Human Rights by immigrant laborers, the Swedish government was ordered in February 2007 to enable nonunion workers to opt out of minimal service fees that allow the union to monitor working conditions. This application of Article 11 of the Human Rights Convention—the right to “negative freedom of association”—assists employers to marshal select employees to break unions. It is a significant further blow to the social democratic Swedish model, which is based on a high level of trade union participation and collective agreements. At a retrospective on Nordic compliance with European labor law, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise's (Svenskt Näringsliv) Sverker Rudeberg summed the neoliberal goal: the Swedish model of bargaining and cooperation on the labor market should be “qualified for preservation as an ancient monument. The overall aim for Svenskt Näringsliv was and is to promote economic growth as the primary source for social welfare.” Today Svenskt Näringsliv's program has a privileged position in the bourgeois-dominated Swedish Riksdag.

To the extent that integration reformists have been effective in marshalling culturally-resonant discursive frames—immigrant as victim, immigrant as perpetrator, multiculturalism, even social democratic full employment—to their ideological

⁹¹ Mulinari and Neergaard 2005.

opposition to labor strength, why has the counterposition between immigrant employment and labor institutions been effective? How has organized labor addressed immigrant integration? Are they able to use labor radicalism, or have they been constrained to the establishment politics that are resonant?

Unions and the labor movement in general are in a contradictory dilemma, when it comes to immigration. They might oppose immigration as it floods the labor market and reduces workers' negotiating positions, but they cannot afford to oppose immigrants. In 1973 Castles and Kosack pointed out that with anti-immigration politics, unions can risk alienating immigrants. "The result is a weakening of the unions and the deepening of the split in the working class."⁹²

Immigration policy in Sweden has been a tug of war between the employers' confederation and the union confederations. Although the employers' confederation established Sweden's encouragement of labor immigration in the aftermath of World War II, immigration policy has been strongly influenced by unions in Sweden. As discussed in Chapter Two the union confederation in turn insured that labor immigration would not undermine labor rights or compete with natives in Sweden.⁹³ Legal changes in 1919 gave the union confederations veto power over work permissions for immigrants.⁹⁴ Through that veto power, labor gained influence over the immigration that came with labor importation, whereas refugee and relative-immigration remained outside labor's direct influence.

In the U.S. as well, organized labor contributed to securing tight immigration controls

⁹² Castles and Kosack 1973: 128.

⁹³ Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 103.

⁹⁴ Hammar 1988; Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 110.

between the Great Depression and 1965. However, in the U.S. labor has not been able to exert independent influence over immigration policy. Southern elites in the Democratic Party and conservative Midwestern politicians formed a coalition providing the legislative muscle to ensure effective immigration policy during that era.⁹⁵ In contrast to the weak labor movement in the U.S., the union has been a national symbol of the Swedish People's Home, *Folkhemmet*.⁹⁶ The rate of unionization in Sweden remains high, though it has been gradually decreasing, especially among white-collar workers. Represented by the LO (Landorganisationen), over 80 percent of blue-collar workers are unionized, while over 78 percent of white-collar workers are unionized,⁹⁷ for a total unionization rate of over 79 percent.⁹⁸ The incidence of non-Swedish background in the white-collar federation (TCO) is 15 percent and in the academic workers' federation (SACO) 17 percent. By 1972 in Sweden the blue collar union confederation Landsorganisationen (the LO) had the power to get the social democratic state to replace labor immigration with refugee immigration.

The Swedish union federations have played a prominent role in creating immigration policy in Sweden with the ongoing integration of immigrants into a social democratic society. This "non-disruptive" immigration has included the traditional labor flow among

⁹⁵ Zolberg 2006: 437. Both groups of legislators wanted to reduce immigration. Southern elites competed economically using an African-American low-wage labor force, while conservative Midwestern politicians were interested in preserving cultural homogeneity.

⁹⁶ Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 17.

⁹⁷ The white-collar union federation is called TCO (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation) and the academic union federation is called SACO (Svenska Akademikers Centralorganisation).

⁹⁸ LO 2006. Because women are more likely to work in the public sector, a higher percentage of women (82.6 percent) are unionized than male workers (75.8 percent). The highest rate of unionization, 89 percent, is amongst Nordic women born outside of Sweden who have lived in Sweden for over 10 years. 46 percent of the LO membership is female and the president, Wanja Lundby-Wedin, is female. 14 percent of the LO membership was born in another country. 22 percent have some non-Swedish family background (Hellemark 2004. Nelander, Acchiardo and Goding 2004. Because Sweden grants citizenship readily after five years of permanent residency, and because Sweden does not keep track of ethnicity or race in its extensive census, it is common to research integration issues by delineating Swedish or "foreign background").

neighboring Nordic states as well as refugee immigration. Yet out of this labor-initiated form of effective immigration control a blind spot developed. That blind spot has been over refugee immigrants, because refugee immigration has been imagined as primarily a humanitarian concern. The union federations assumed the Social Democratic Party representatives would manage refugee problems with national government tools of education, integration programs, and welfare protection. The ruling Social Democratic Party, however, devolved refugee integration to local government. On the surface, this devolution to a community level permitted human needs to be served at a more “human”, less imposing scale; but it also served to make immigrant concerns seem parochial, unconnected to the big Social Democratic players.

Social Democrats also assumed that, as with labor immigrants, the workplace would be the site of integration for refugees. If immigrants were comparatively excluded from the labor market, it was presumed that the welfare state would prop them up through the crisis. This actually has worked to a great extent. The social democratic refugee integration formula was, first, locally-based official support, with the aim of landing immigrants in the workplace and ethnic organizations, then a backup of welfare and small business support; and finally, educating the second generation. Immigrants to Sweden have worked in high-quality jobs compared to their peers abroad; their children have opportunities comparable to ethnic Swedes’ children. During an economic crisis, immigrants were out-competed by ethnic Swedes in a shrunken labor market, but they were buffered by welfare and state support for small businesses. The social democratic immigrant integration formula is well-crafted and viable.

The integration system was designed to operate effectively and humanely, with a series of backups. However, as integration official Mats Ericson commented, “The Swedish system is not personalized. It’s mathematical. A negotiation.” It can be argued that integration operates in Sweden without mobilizing the public’s imaginations and emotional investment.

There has been a diversity of refugees to Sweden, with patchy ties into their new society. This requires an innovative approach. Swedish social democracy has not been afraid of experimentation. For one approach to the diversity challenge, the Swedish government and the European Union created and encouraged immigrants to join ethnic associations. But since the Swedish state does not represent ethnic groups, ethnic associations are not strongly integrated into political representation. With more than a fifth of its members from a non-Swedish background, the LO is basically the largest immigrant organization in Sweden.⁹⁹ Ethnic associations have provided insufficient representation where the unions and union federations have been inattentive to ethnic discrimination, inattentive to the unique position of refugees, and inattentive to their not-so-unique needs.

Immigrant projects within *Landsorganisationen* (LO, the blue collar union confederation) have not been perceived as integrated. New Swedes “work within a separate organization trying to promote national and local activities among immigrants. The LO is bureaucratic. There are few opportunities to participate. In conferences run by union-active immigrants, immigrants are saying, ‘The LO doesn’t listen to me.’” Västerås official Mats Ericson connects the peripheral place of immigrants to temporary work controversies, summing, “There is a temporary worker problem in general.” In these statements, the local official both relayed awareness of immigrants’ invisibility in unions and imagined a segmented, racialized labor market.

Until 2001, the unions considered left political parties and the state responsible for integrating what they saw as essentially “cultural” immigrants. The unions and the union confederations were consumed with other matters, including dealing with the collapse of Salsjöbaden industrial compromise and the Social Democratic Party leadership’s

⁹⁹ Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 57.

expressions of distance from the SAP and the LO's longstanding partnership.¹⁰⁰ "Strains developed between SDP and the LO during the 1980s and 1990s that threatened their alliance, as the SDP became increasingly influenced by neoliberal ideas and the example of Britain's 'New Labor Party'," remark integration scholars.¹⁰¹ Union inattentiveness has been overdetermined by an aggressive advance in EU policy, world-wide neoliberal hegemony, union density decline, and the decline of the Social Democrats' reliability as a governance partner to the union federation.

In 1997, Lund sociologists and Arbetslivsinstitutet's Diana Mulinari and Anders Neergaard began researching immigrants active in the FAI (Fackligt Aktiva Invandrare or Union-active Immigrants) network, as well as the representation of immigrant issues in the LO newspaper. They found that immigrants' invisibility to unions was due to cultural racism. While Sweden's unions have rarely ever engaged in organized explicit racism,¹⁰² Mulinari and Neergaard's informants described unorganized, everyday racism in the union environment, in their work places, and in the society at large. They observed the formation of a cultural racism that is not only based on hierarchical assumptions about biological races, but also essentialist conceptualizations of culture that are firmly coupled with ethnicity and nation.¹⁰³ Racialized, subordinate masculinities and racialized, problematic females were processed within the unions. Unions had a solidaristic and exclusionary understanding of themselves as, on one hand Swedish, and on the other hand homogeneous.¹⁰⁴ A typical Swede, a "Svensson", is characterized as a balance of

¹⁰⁰ Former Social Democratic Party Prime Minister Goran Persson, who has referred to the LO as "another special interest group among many" said "It's a pity that the LO is caught in a discussion centered entirely on income redistribution and not on job creation."

¹⁰¹ Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 58.

¹⁰² Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 58, 2005: 109-110; Hammar 1988.

¹⁰³ Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 20.

¹⁰⁴ Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 18.

passivity and creativity.¹⁰⁵ The nationalist logic follows that a non-Swede cannot have this balance.

In addition, the reformist discourse on “total integration failure”¹⁰⁶ was seeping into union members’ and officials’ workplace views on immigrants. Mulinari and Neergaard summed up the LO newspaper’s discourse on immigrants,

The most penetrating picture is the coupling between immigrants and unemployment, labor market political measures, or welfare support... In a similar way but to less extent, immigrants are coupled with administrative problems in the public. It can be communal (county) politicians who coldly state that the incidence of many immigrants in the commune (county) is a burden, or officials at Social Security, the unemployment office or the unemployment agency who describe a stressful and strained work environment that among other things are full of too many immigrant clients. What distinguishes these articles...are how immigrants as a group are incidentally, relatively concisely, and repeatedly without some eventual clarification, coupled with overwork, stress and stressful work conditions.¹⁰⁷

This immigrant-as-burden discourse ran in the context of stressful post-crisis political-economic conditions, and demonstrates scapegoating.

In the 1990s racialized immigrants formed groups within unions to get the unions and the union confederation to face their mounting concerns. Immigrants had to get the unions to address the ways in which the state abandonment of full employment policy and the 1990s economic crisis impacted them in particular. But to do so, they had to get ethnic Swedes to see and interact with them in a new light. New Swedes formed the FAI (*Fakligt Active Invandrare*, Union-active Immigrants) network across all the union

¹⁰⁵ Mulinari and Neergaard 2004: 19.

¹⁰⁶ Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 232.

¹⁰⁷ Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 124.

confederations, working to break down the normative Svensson dichotomy. They work to undermine the stereotype of immigrants as passive, traditionalist “Svartskullar” (Black Skulls) by engaging as political-union actors, and they work to help break the stereotype of unions as passive and mired in tradition as well.¹⁰⁸ While their membership is diverse, most members of FAI are political refugees who have a long history of involvement with union and political work predating their arrival in Sweden. They are trying to help Swedes understand working class history in a transnational context.¹⁰⁹

The FAI, the unions, and the union confederations have increasingly taken up the issues of immigrants, discrimination, cultural difference, ethnicity and racism that are being debated in society at large.¹¹⁰ The FAI as well as outside political pressure are having an increasing impact on the unions. In 2001 the LO decide to concentrate its hegemonic work on fighting ethnic segregation and discrimination in working life, when it initiated a five-year program to train and deploy to its eighteen affiliated unions sixty anti-discrimination instructors.¹¹¹ In 2002 the LO began including a question about ethnic background (Swedish or non-Swedish) in its survey of union involvement.¹¹²

In a 2006 preamble entitled “All, regardless of where they are born, will have the same possibilities in the labor market,” the blue collar union federation declares the principles it commits itself to in social negotiations. These include “Labor immigrants will have access to welfare”, “We will defend immigrants’ access to a career”, and “We will defend

¹⁰⁸ Mulinari and Neergaard 2005.

¹⁰⁹ Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 65.

¹¹⁰ Mulinari and Neergaard 2005: 120.

¹¹¹ Berg 2001.

¹¹² 15 percent of ethnically-Swedish men as well as 15 percent of the male membership born outside of the Nordic countries hold leadership positions in the LO. Non-Swedish Nordic women (13 percent) have a high incidence of holding leadership posts in the LO, compared to ethnic-Swedish women (9 percent). Only six percent of women born outside of the Nordic countries hold leadership posts. LO members with a non-Swedish background read the union federation newspaper as often as ethnic Swedes (Hellmark 2004).

the right of asylum”. Promising to work within the international labor movement, LO announces its intention to strengthen unions and workers’ position throughout Europe and the world, vowing “We will have functional labor mobility in the EU.” Finally, LO announces its position on how it will allow labor migration to impact Sweden, “More is demanded of society than open doors.”

Today, unfavorable European Court labor rulings and the 2006 Bolkstein Directive discussed in Chapter Two point toward a near future in which organized Swedish labor will cede back control over immigration priorities to capital, and will have decreasing control over labor protection and labor market development in Sweden. Connecting with and organizing with migrant workers across borders has become increasingly important to unions and union confederations in Sweden. Sweden’s diverse New Swede union members should play a crucial role in this new phase.

Beyond Neoliberal Integration Reformism

No one claims that *refugee* integration is better anywhere than Sweden. The claim is that immigrant inclusion is better in countries that have deregulated their labor markets and diminished their welfare states. Social democratic labor strength is considered the problem. Neoliberal institutions such as the OECD terms labor markets in social democratic countries “rigid” or “unbalanced”. They blame labor market “imbalances” across Europe, not only for the failure of “globalization of production and the liberalization of commodity trade and capital markets...to equalize standards of living across the world,” but also for problems with immigrants within countries.¹¹³

Among the “rigid” structures to blame for “imbalances”, the OECD points to labor movement achievements that not only keep 15 to 24 year olds in school and out of the labor market, but also fail to support low-profit business generation and low quality jobs.

¹¹³ Katseli 2004.

Explains OECD economist and London's Center for Economic Policy Research fellow,
Professor Louka Katseli,

Labor market imbalances are attributable largely to structural rigidities. These include, among other things, the lack of interregional geographic mobility aggravated by linguistic barriers, restrictions that reserve access to specific professions only to nationals, mismatches between existing skills and those in high demand, and cultural and socio-economic barriers that preclude the entry of nationals into low-status or low-wage jobs.¹¹⁴

To tear down such “structural rigidities”, The OECD proposes that people without social democratic citizenship are the ideal population for staffing—they do not say building—the low-wage job sector. Sweden would have to build a larger low-wage sector to conform with these prescriptions. Yet building a secondary labor market will not solve the problems of immigrant exclusion. As economists Howell and Diallo (2007) show, employment exclusion includes precarious and insufficient work as well as unemployment. Currently, only six percent of the Swedish workforce is low-wage.¹¹⁵ Over five percent of the working-age Swedish population is unemployed.¹¹⁶ Those are very low statistics for aggregate economic exclusion in a capitalist country.

Sweden has abandoned the social democratic full employment bias (in favor of the neoliberal anti-inflationary bias), and so there will be unemployment. Even if a reduction in workplace and hiring discrimination is achieved to lessen the gap between immigrant and ethnic-Swedes' employment rates, and even if unions promote their refugee members, on aggregate refugees may still be less competitive than native Swedes on the labor market in Sweden. This is because of several reasons. Many refugees, including

¹¹⁴ Katseli 2004.

¹¹⁵ Whereas neoliberal policies have contributed to a model U.S. economy in which 30percent of workers earn low wages (less than two-thirds the median wage for full-time workers), and 35percent of the labor force is underemployed; only 40percent of the working age population in the U.S. is considered adequately employed, according to economists David R. Howell and Mamadou Diallo (2007).

¹¹⁶ World Factbook 2006. The unemployment rate for the U.S. in 2006 was 4.8percent.

refugee women come with more tenuous ties to education and the labor market and less human capital than native women. Immigrants have fewer social networks into the labor market and worse Swedish language skills than natives. Moreover, it should not be overlooked, but almost always is, that refugees entering a new society come with the disadvantages of having endured trauma. It should not be beyond the pale of discussion to consider that the destruction of their lives and communities can handicap workers in a competitive labor market. The state has labored to intervene in these compromising immigrant conditions, but since the end of the 1990s, they have only been able to dampen exclusion for first-generation refugees. Thanks to the social democratic emphasis on reducing inequality through enabling class mobility, second-generation immigrants have more success.¹¹⁷ The problem plaguing first generation refugees to Sweden seems to be that Sweden accepts more immigrants, relative to its population and landmass, than it has work for, since the 1980s when the country stopped pursuing full-employment and started cultivating a distinctly high-skills, high-Swedish human capital labor market.

From the OECD to the International Migration Policy Institute to academia and private think tanks, the integration reformists' prescription to resolve this problem has been to reform the labor market to accommodate more immigrant labor. The European Union's weight is behind promoting the conditions that facilitate low-skill, low-wage labor immigration to Sweden. From the case of refugee immigrant employment, we see that augmenting the supply of immigrant labor cannot itself stimulate the growth of the secondary labor market. The case of refugee immigrant employment in Sweden shows that firms offering junk jobs do not proliferate, as they do in liberal countries, unless social protections are destroyed and social wealth is shifted further to owners of capital. This means that the conditions facilitating an immigrant labor market in Sweden involve breaking down the conditions for social citizenship, the welfare state and its organized labor support. Yet dismantling the conditions for social citizenship in favor of targeted labor market conditions do not mean better immigrant integration. Even when the

¹¹⁷ Ekberg 1997.

secondary labor market is large and unions density is just a little over twelve percent, as in the liberal U.S., unskilled immigrants admitted after 1973 have suffered many forms of inequality exclusions, given their experience of limited or no wage mobility since their arrival.¹¹⁸

In 2006, Swedish voters—including a majority of immigrant voters elected a bourgeois government, and then increased immigration in 2007. Perhaps the way has been cleared for a conversion to a more complete neoliberalization of Sweden. However, it still remains to be seen whether continuing high levels of immigration strains the welfare state to the extent that it allows neoliberal politicians to convince the voting public to permit the dissolution of the social democratic welfare state and the social democratic class compromise. The union federations (and most Swedish commentators) cannot imagine a popular rejection of the welfare state and social democratic class compromise. But in handling immigrants as peripheral to labor's activities and goals, the working class organizations may have been underestimating the tactical manoeuvres of the Right that have proven so effective in other countries. Union confederations will have difficulty maintaining national regulation of wages regardless of citizenship or union membership. Therefore, it is critical for the union federations to both build strong public support for welfare protection for immigrants in particular—and that includes re-valorizing welfare, and to campaign vigorously to reduce discrimination in the workplace and in hiring, so that immigrants' public lives transcend the relegation to political tool. If Swedish unions can maintain labor mobility, exclusion can be addressed directly as the societal issue it is.

In this chapter I have examined how refugees' vulnerability within a labor market in crisis played a key pawn role in the neoliberal drive to weaken the working class and dismantle the Swedish social democratic welfare state and social citizenship. I argue that unions not only need to take refugees especially seriously as among the most vulnerable segments of their labor constituency, but that they also have to understand the various

¹¹⁸ Rajjman and Tienda 1999:254.

ways in which class opponents have used immigrant vulnerability in a hegemonic war of maneuver. To be sure, discrimination against immigrants is widely practiced by employers, and they have a responsibility to reform their practices. Yet that responsibility is merely moral, and is weighed against business owners' more pressing need to drive down wages and the bargaining power of workers. I argue that unions, on the other hand, have an interest in immigrants' welfare.

Because racism can atomize working-class politics, unions and union federations have a profound stake in contributing directly to immigrant integration as well as immigration policy. Whereas larger economic forces have limited the effectiveness of the government's multicultural approach to refugee integration, multiculturalism and anti-racist humanism were needed much more profoundly within union institutions. Where seasoned, ethnic-majority leaders cannot firmly establish and maintain solidaristic, class-conscious anti-racism within an institution, anti-racism can be reliably established only by the labor unions and the labor union federations promoting a critical mass of labor movement ethnic minorities to positions of responsibility and authority.

CHAPTER V

“TO BE A SWEDE IS TO HIDE AN ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT”:
CONTESTED CITIZENSHIP AND INTEGRATION PRACTICES

“It could have been prevented. If society had assumed its responsibility for integrating my family, it could have been prevented. If the Kurdish Association had helped my family, it could have been prevented”

Fadime Sahindal, testifying before the Swedish parliament on November 20, 2001, four years after her father began threatening her life and two months before he murdered her.

In response to Fadime’s shocking murder, reformist integration politics transcended Sweden to an international stage. After she died from her father’s *hedersmord* (honor killing),¹ U.S. pundits used Fadime Sahindal’s tragedy to argue both that Muslims are inassimilable in the West and that Sahindal’s murder was evidence of “the region’s (Sweden’s) failure to integrate immigrants.”² But people concerned about citizenship and integration might listen to Sahindal’s own political voice and understand the heartbreaking death of this pathbreaking activist and student of sociology as more than a tool for geopolitical strategic hegemony. Violence toward women is recognized as a

¹ Honor killing is a homicidal patriarchal practice. In honor killings, women are murdered by male family members to restore the men’s honor. In Fadime’s case, she refused an arranged marriage, went to college, dated an ethnic Swedish young man, and was a public figure in integration issues. Her family interpreted these actions as violating her father’s honor. Her father and her younger brother threatened to kill her. On the grounds of multiculturalism, the Swedish state refused to intervene as it normally would in response to the murder threat, except to recommend that Fadime avoid her family’s home town. Before she left on a study abroad trip to Africa, Fadime went to her family’s home town to visit her sister and mother, and was ambushed and killed by her father.

² Weintraub 2007; Williams 2002; Caudwell 2006.

widespread problem across societies. The Vancouver East Indian immigrant community, for example, is continually plagued by honor killings. This is not a problem unique to policy failures of specific regions.

Sahindal's death in particular conveys the limitations of *laissez-faire*, the limitations of multiculturalism, the enduring struggles of citizenship, and the sometimes horrible chasms that crack the heart of families straddling the different currents of overwhelming change. Pleading for humanitarian, not authoritarian, social intervention, Sahindal repeatedly explained, "I love my father. He understands no better way of treating me." Contradictions spinning off from powerful social heights can weigh in upon a household, and migrant generations are alienated from one another by uneven socialization. As Fadime Sahindal testified, there is an important place for humanistic rather than authoritarian state and organizational capacity in integration.

Asking Integration Officials about Integration Issues

People may take for granted that their children and grandchildren will continue their social traditions. People commonly think about these traditions in terms of culture and feel them (often self-righteously) as identity. The taken-for-granted processes of social transmission include their political-economic traditions. The architectures of socialism, liberalism, patriarchal feudalism, racialized imperialism and slave societies, and so on, are usually passed along through institutions and reproduced in the habituated preferences and practices of new generations. Through this transmission, these political-economic architectures heavily influence people's tastes for social inequality and social exclusion.

Political-economic architectures influence peoples' preferences, but this is not a guaranteed process. For example, the diffusion of hegemony by an historical bloc,³ or the

³ Hegemony in Antonio Gramsci's understanding is social dominance primarily through coercion and consent, and to a lesser degree by force. An historical bloc is the coalition of social forces that form the

introduction of newcomers can destabilize the transmission of institutions, practices, norms and preferences. A classic question of the globalization literature—and a burning question of immigration scholars—is *How does immigration—the introduction of outsiders—intersect with the social transmission process for both immigrants and natives?*

We can compare U.S. integration with integration in other societies, such as social democratic Sweden. The analysis here draws on interviews conducted with some of the people involved in securing the cultural and political-economic traditions that both modify and reinforce the way people live and interact. In Sweden, immigrants' integration and the reconstitution of Swedish society is effected through the combined work of immigrants like Sahindal, municipal officials, political parties and leaders, social welfare institutions, educational institutions, health organizations, the media, and national and regional anti-racism social movement organizations. Specific institutions involved in the process include The Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination, immigrant ethnic organizations, researchers like those at universities, CEIFO, and the Institute for Working Life (dismantled by the bourgeois government elected in 2006), the legal scholar Paul Lappalainen, and the Swedish Migration Board and the Social Democratic government integration agency *Integrationsverket* (also dismantled by the bourgeois government).

The onus for immigrant integration lies not only on immigrants themselves, but also on local-level officials in Sweden's decentralized integration scheme. In this chapter I have interviewed some of the local-level actors policymakers identify as responsible for decentralized integration, as well as investigating public intellectual discourse blaming racist municipal officials and workers for preventing the smooth integration of refugees, for example the recent introduction of tens of thousands of refugees from Iraq.

I interviewed local workers involved in decentralized integration practices to learn about their views of Swedish integration challenges, integration practices, and resources. The municipalities and counties, and typically the Left Party where elected to local office, are involved with the social integration of especially vulnerable groups, such as immigrant communities.

Critiques of Decentralized Public Integration

Sweden has decentralized refugee introduction across local public governments. In 1985, as Swedish policymakers ended labor immigration from Southern Europe and peripheral countries, and as refugee immigration emerged as the integration challenge in Sweden, the Board of Labor stepped aside from the work of managing refugee integration, and the new Board of Immigration decentralized the social integration of refugee immigrants. The *Whole of Sweden* policy meant that refugee immigrants were dispersed across a large number of towns with available housing.

Integration is implemented on a small scale without handing immigrants over to interested private groups that would become dependent on government financing. In order to maximize flexibility, municipalities are funded through the national Board of Immigration (and for a while the Integration Board) and local officials take responsibility for implementing introduction and integration programs. While local governments have discretion in how they run these programs, they are supported by national immigration and integration bureaus, and they meet to share approaches. The refugee reception, introduction, and settlement system provides refugees housing, and gives refugees a roughly \$300 monthly allowance. If the refugee stays in Sweden for six months, he or she can qualify for residency and an increase in their social welfare benefit to \$1,000 a month. Once refugees have residency, they can begin the process for bringing their

families to Sweden.⁴ Local officials manage meeting centers where free language training and orientation is provided to refugees. Meeting centers help immigrants learn about the day-to-day issues of living in Sweden, find schools, jobs, and ethnic, social, cultural, and political organizations, as well as meet with each other.

As shown in Chapter Four, two of the most consistent (but sometimes contradictory) complaints in Sweden have turned out to be that local integration officials are corrupted by the federal funds and are too independent of federal and European Union discipline. Postcolonialists and neoliberals such as Masoud Kamali and Mauricio Rojas argue not for centralization, but that the remedy lies in private, charity-based integration. From differing perspectives, they both argue that local state actors are uniquely unaccountable.

Integration reformists attack the *public* provision of refugee introduction and immigrant integration programs. Innovative neoliberals at the Captus and Timbro think tanks have articulated an anti-Weberian representation: government bureaucracy as (femininely) soft and pliable, or what prolific Captus neoliberal reformer Nima Sanandaji calls the “soft version of socialism”. In a 2005 article, Sanandaji argues that the welfare state should be destroyed because it is too soft to deal with criminal immigrants (for example his mother).

Social security secretaries...were responsible to see that each person had enough money to live a decent life at all times. If you told them that you had spent all your money at the beginning of the month and didn't have any left, they gave you some more. If you told them that your children cried every day in want of new toys, they helped you. If you told them that a neighbor had stolen all you (sic) clothes, they helped you...One thing

⁴ Because with even this level of support, the life of a refugee is very, very difficult and they miss home, it is typical for immigrants to plan on returning to their native home. Abdulkhaliq Anwer, one of 1.9 million displaced Iraqi refugees is quoted in *Der Spiegel* explaining his situation in Sweden, Sweden is a very generous country. But establishing a new life is a hell of a job. It's not as easy as you think it is. You leave everything behind—your car, your house, your career. And then you come here to save your ass (Hawley 2007).

that my up growing (sic) has shown me is that there is little incentive to work and educate yourself in the Swedish welfare system.⁵

Some neoliberal critics, such as Masoud Kamali and Mauricio Rojas locate the failure of decentralized integration partly in working-class ethnic Swedes' rigid cultural "backwardness". If only these local Swedes and bureaucratic local Swedish state managers were more cosmopolitan, these critics assert, they would have prevented the rise of immigrant exclusion. Such postcolonial and neoliberal critics have tried to present a structural problem (anti-inflationary bias raising unemployment) as a problem of the modern state—bureaucratic institutional racism, restricting their criticism to local state managers and their suggestions for discipline to local ethnic Swedes.

The gap between local Leftist integration officials' pragmatic approaches to integration and neoliberal reformists' critique of either the unaccountable bureaucratic state or the soft social democratic state has distracted attention from the problem of keeping both unemployment and inflation low without decreasing the quality of work and diminishing workers' opportunities. Eventually, as Sweden saw in the controversy surrounding Kamali's 2006 *Integrationverket* report, the conflict became a tool for attacking the legitimacy of the Left coalition's ability to efficiently reduce unemployment.

Whether the public sector is inefficient or the cause of poor refugee integration outcomes like high unemployment is debateable. In view of immigrant outcomes in Canada and especially the U.S., it cannot be said that "decentralizing" immigrant integration practices to the private sector would get rid of the incentives for integration charities to seek federal funding or pursue their own organizational interests. In the U.S., where responsibility for integration has been vested in decentralized, private interests to a large

⁵ Since Sanandaji actually got a biochemistry degree, but makes his living publishing neoliberal and neoconservative opinion pieces in the popular press, perhaps the real lesson he learned from his family experience is not that education is difficult for immigrants to obtain, but rather that Swedes will tolerate a lot of conning.

degree, there is no shortage of patronage dependency relationships between those organizations doing the integration, and the political regimes doing the funding.⁶

If private immigrant reception cannot provide the superior accountability or efficiency its champions claim, it still matters who, at the local level, is given responsibility for integration. Leftists are better than Right-wing officials at introducing refugees to Sweden. An expansive rather than exclusionary view of citizenship is necessary for social integration. While national-level bourgeois politicians call for increased cosmopolitan culture, immigration, and discipline, local bourgeois political officials quietly refuse to allow refugees to settle in their communities. While allocating 1.7 billion kronor to improve the integration of immigrants, the Social Democratic Integration Minister in 2006, Jens Orback expressed ire with the right-wing county councils that were failing to integrate immigrants,

“I find my patience tried by parties who have spoken of a general amnesty to allow up to 100,000 individuals to stay, but then don’t want these people even when the numbers are substantially less. Representatives of the Liberals and Christian Democrats were almost in tears in parliament when the idea of an amnesty was rejected. When councils run by those parties don’t take any (immigrants), there’s something that doesn’t add up.”

In the face of bourgeois intransigence, much sustained criticism, and a consequent public perception of failure, the Social Democratic government integration agency *Integrationsverket* briefly attempted to contest integration reformists’ crisis framing. 50 percent of refugee immigrants maintain themselves without extra state assistance after two or three years. Integration pointed out that this employment rate is a comparative success. They cited the Brussels-based Migration Policy Group that named Sweden the second most-successful country in integration, out of the fifteen countries in Western

⁶ Majka and Del Soto 2002.

Europe that made up the EU until 2004.⁷ Sweden is even on the better end of the normal range of refugee economic integration. The Swedish integration system is doing what it is designed to do—use immigrant demi-citizens as a flexible (surplus) labor force while cushioning the effects of this condition with welfare state support. Nonetheless the resulting lower rate by which “immigrants” (refugees) attain “independence” from the welfare state in Sweden has been vehemently criticized as insufficient by integration reformists in Sweden and throughout Europe and the U.S., as well as by racist ethnic Swedes and New Swedes themselves.

World wide, immigration experts typically recognize that integrating refugees into the labor market takes a number of years, and refugees remain tenuously tied to the labor market.⁸ One of Sweden’s major forms of immigration since the 1970s has been refugee immigration. Too often, however, refugees appear merely as undifferentiated political pawns in public Swedish integration debates. The unique challenges of refugees become buried in political battles over social citizenship, the welfare state, and the labor market. While political fights roll on about whether neoliberal, anti-racist, or social democratic approaches can optimize the practices of integration, the municipalities that are responsible for refugee reception have been under the gun to improve the practices of integration.

Refugee Diversity in Sweden

In the immigration literature, Sweden has been placed in a category with the U.S. and Canada as a multicultural immigration-receiving state. But Sweden distinguishes less between types of “people of foreign origin” in *integration* policy and politics.⁹ This could

⁷ *The Local*, April 19, 2006; Migration Policy Group 2005.

⁸ Borjas 1999.

⁹ While “immigrants” are studied carefully in Sweden, they are not typically categorized as they are in the U.S. or Canada. Reflecting a different historical context, Sweden’s is a slightly different epistemology of immigration, ethnicity, race, and minority status. Because Sweden grants Finns, Touredalers, Sami, Roma,

be interpreted as homogenizing, but in effect it is reflective of the post-WWII social democratic tradition recognizing the vulnerable position of all immigrants.¹⁰ Because Sweden's official focus on refugees has particularly informed its integration policies, I briefly describe the diverse refugee groups and issues that have impacted the policy and reform understandings of "immigrants" and integration in Sweden.

While refugee status itself is hazardous world-wide, there are unique issues among different groups of immigrants. Sweden's refugee diversity is related to American foreign policy. Historically, Sweden tends to take the refugees remaining after the U.S. and Canada have selected young, well-educated persons from UN refugee rolls.¹¹ Young, well-educated exceptions include the well-educated Leftist refugees from South America and Iran who were not welcomed by the U.S.'s anticommunist refugee agenda. These young, well-educated refugees nonetheless also arrived in Sweden at the instigation of Anglo-American actions abroad.

Between 1973 and 1989, 18,000 refugees came from Chile, according to Statistics Sweden, while 6,000 more came from Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru. There has been much refugee immigration from the Middle East throughout the decades. Christian Orthodox Syrians sought asylum on the grounds of religious persecution. Kurds emigrated from eastern Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. After overthrowing the U.S.'s Shah in

and Jews "minority" status, other ethnic groups, including all three types of immigrants, are categorized as and called "immigrants" or "people of foreign origin". Moreover, in contrast to the U.S. and Canada, Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån and state policy) does not as readily distinguish between ethnicity groups, and this is reflected in both data and discourse. Consequently, unlike in the U.S., it is often impossible to distinguish labor immigrants, refugee immigrants, or family reunification immigrants in identity politics, discourse about "immigrants", and both quantitative and qualitative data on "immigrants" in Sweden. I have done my best to translate the meaning of Swedish "immigrant" politics and policies into North American understandings of these kinds of politics and policies. (At least no immigrants in Sweden are understood as "those that from a long way off look like flies.")

¹⁰ Also, in practice some welfare agencies, such as Socialstyrelsen, and integration programs, such as study circle courses offered through ABF, do recognize and address group differences.

¹¹ Westin 2006.

Iran, Leftist Iranians fled to Sweden in the 1980s to escape the Islamic government that turned on them. Since the U.S. went to war in Iraq in 2003, Sweden has taken in over 80,000 Iraqi refugees. Between 1989 and 1993, Sweden received 208,700 asylum seekers after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the wars in Bosnia-Herzgovina and Kosovo. 56 percent were from the former Yugoslavia and 21 percent were from the Middle East. The majority of immigration in Sweden since 1972 has been family members, or chain migration.¹² There remain many challenges in integrating diverse groups of immigrants with diverse skill sets.

Many groups of immigrant women come to Sweden with little history of education and little job experience. Ethnic minority women from Turkey, such as Kurds, Syrians have considerably less education in comparison with other immigrants and the Swedish population in general.¹³ They are very likely to be unemployed, or to hold junk jobs. Women immigrants like researcher Wuokko Knocke have strained to bring stratified labor relations into the light in Sweden. Knocke's research shows that for women workers on the Volvo shop floor, for example, "gender and immigrant status merged," resulting in fairly permanent entrapment into the most monotonous, repetitive-injury-prone, and low-skilled jobs.¹⁴ Their unemployment and junk jobs compound the difficulties low-skilled refugee women face in the form of other discrimination hurdles—some traditional and some resulting from recent political and media campaigns.

In a society where high education and high skills are the norm, lower-skill immigrants are represented in popular depictions of the inassimilable immigrant. A small town integration official, Mats Ericson cautions, "The media is generating a 'Muslim threat'. Prior to that, Swedes don't think in religious terms." The racializing "Muslim threat"

¹² Over 50 percent, according to the OECD.

¹³ Socialstyrelsen 1997.

¹⁴ Knocke 2000: 366-368. Knocke 1994.

project coalesces with the racializing project depicting immigrants as welfare abusers, forming a political tool for advancing social change: the inassimilable alien.

In addition to education, ability to communicate is another form of human capital with an uneven distribution across refugee groups. “110 different languages are spoken in the town of Västerås. There are sixty language interpreters,” Ericson claims. Some immigrants have an easier time of communicating than others. Language ability is self-reported lowest for women from Turkey. Ericson reports, “Language is a challenge for African and Muslim immigrants. Somalis and Ethiopians have special difficulty.” The poorest and most racially otherizable immigrants are identified and self-identify as having difficulty communicating in Sweden.

Although refugee immigration has been the official policy, most immigration to Sweden since the early 1970s has been family immigration, including immigration to reunite refugee families. As Sweden has at times had a broad interpretation of “refugee” (exceeding the United Nation’s definition), the forms of immigration intertwine in Sweden.

Immigrants in a 1997 *Socialstyrelsen* study came to Sweden during the 1980s from Chile, Iran, Poland and Turkey. That study found that where most immigrants from Iran are younger, male, and clearly immigrated for political reasons, for example, most Polish immigrants are older and female, and immigrated for “family reasons”, such as marrying a Swede. Yet Polish émigrés as well as Iranian émigrés identify themselves within the continuum of immigrant minorities’ situations in Sweden. They feel they have similar reasons for moving to Sweden, as well as language abilities, education, income, occupational status, employment status, marriage status, number of children, support networks, health, political resources, security, social relations, and valued experiences in Sweden.¹⁵ Multicultural integration policies, based in efforts to integrate labor

¹⁵ Socialstyrelsen 1997:12.

immigrants, but elaborated in the refugee immigration policy era, has been concerned with all “people of foreign origin.”

Iranian Refugees and *Jantelagen*

Scandinavians have a fairly self-critical tradition in assessing how they integrate immigrants. Below I describe how the Scandinavian approach to “standing out”, modified by multiculturalism, can be cosmopolitan in the long term. But the critical view on Swedish interaction with immigrants who “stand out” is particularly apropos of one refugee group’s integration experience. What stands out in Sweden is that despite their high social capital, Iranians in particular have been afflicted with unemployment, and they also reported themselves overqualified for the work that they managed to get. Iranian men (and Poles) have higher levels of education than most ethnic Swedes. Even amongst immigrants with higher labor force participation, by and large, employers shut immigrant workers out of opportunities for promotion, or career development through learning-on-the-job or further training. Although they self-report high on their Swedish language skills, ease of Swedish use is a certain barrier to these highly skilled immigrants’ ability to compete with natives for high skill jobs. But Swedes also blame their own cultural response to immigrants who “stand out”, in the Iranian case in terms of skills as well as complexion.

“For highly-educated immigrants, discrimination can be a case of *Jantelagen*: ‘*Du ska inte tro att du är nånting.*’ (‘Don’t think that you’re better than us.’),” says Ericson. *Jantelagen* is a fictional system of behavior control described in Norwegian-Danish author Aksel Sandemose’s 1933 social satire *En flyktning krysser sitt spor* (*A Fugitive Crosses His Tracks*). *Jantelagen* is Sandemose’s critical characterization of the social sanctions applied when a violation of *lagom* is perceived to have occurred. *Lagom* has no direct equivalent in English. Its meaning is a combination of: just right, sustainable, fitting, suitable, appropriate, sufficient, balanced, proportionate, and reasonable. The

ideal of *lagom* and its fictional enforcement system, *Jantelagen*, convey an ethical system that encourages people to see their community membership as predicated on humble-but-confident egalitarianism rather than egoism.

The dark side of this ethic is that it assumes the interpretability, the legibility of behavior that we could expect to be associated with cultural homogeneity. So problems arise when this assumption fails to hold. Under *Jantelagen*, standing out as different is an affront, *attributed to* egoism and a lack of respectful empathy. However, the immigrant can hardly help standing out. In this case the reasonable (*lagom*) communal response is obviously *not* to sanction the immigrant. Multiculturalism is a method for redirecting culture clash to deepening the empathy at the heart of an egalitarian ethic.

Ericson's invocation of *A Fugitive Crosses His Tracks* is an indicator of the social-model warfare in Swedish society. "*Jantelagen*" problems in the social democratic labor market—cases in which sanctions are brought to bear against immigrants who, inevitably, violate *lagom*--are taken by the integration reformists as evidence that egoistic societies by contrast are more cosmopolitan and better at integrating immigrants, since they theoretically *promote* everybody who stands out, instead punishing those who are not sufficiently entrepreneurial. However, high-inequality societies clearly have their own mechanisms of holding individuals back, and are more effective at stunting social mobility.¹⁶ Sweden, as a small and relatively egalitarian country, has done a very good job of facilitating social mobility, and investing in education, technology, and innovation, as well as integrating immigrants. Sweden has created relatively nuanced and innovative refugee integration practices because egalitarian institutions and an egalitarian ethic *directly* (though not automatically) *promote empathy*¹⁷—another road to cosmopolitanism.

¹⁶ Schmitt and Zipperer 2007.

¹⁷ As attitude surveys including Eurobarometer consistently show.

“There is mistrust,” Ericson acknowledges. Yet discussing how African and Muslim immigrants contribute to Swedish society, he says “Somali young men are working with elderly people. First it was, ‘They’re scaring the elderly.’ But it aroused the elderly’s curiosity. Relations rapidly built. Somalis have respect for the elderly. They are pioneers.” This example of an alternative social capital development process (or gradual cosmopolitanism) opens the question of whether integration is best served by immediately-gratifying entrepreneurial norms, given the risk that egoistic cosmopolitanism only leads back to the increased inequality that exacerbates alienation. Ratio, a neoliberal business-class think tank, funded a study, “Inequality and Trust in Sweden: Some Inequalities are More Harmful than Others” that they kept unpublished as a working paper, because while it showed “that the proportion of people born in a foreign country is negatively associated with trust,” more unfavorably to their cause, they found that trust declines most precipitously with the growth of disposable income inequality.¹⁸ Perhaps the *lagom* ethic modified by multiculturalism is a more developmental approach to integration.

***Lagom* Meets Multiculturalism in Public Refugee Integration**

While there are important differences among Swedish immigrants, there are distinctive aspects to Swedish refugee integration. One of these is that refugees are not integrated in Sweden by publicly-subsidized, private, usually religious organizations, as they are in the U.S. and Canada. “Absolutely not. That is not a possibility,” parliamentarian Ulla Hoffman says, rather sternly. Leftist Swedes rejected the prospect of introducing refugees via private religious institutions—that is, settling refugees through a religious portal—because it is not considered more humane, more efficient, or more conducive to egalitarian integration. Hoffman advises that Swedes do not consider the humans who work for the government to be any less compassionate than the humans who volunteer for

¹⁸ Jordahl and Gustavsson 2006.

religious organizations. So the Swedish Left explicitly rejects the American Resettlement Agency charity model for integrating refugees. Worker's Educational Organization (ABF, *Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund*) organizer and Left Party member Magnus Pontusson discusses the Swedish rejection of the charity road.

Pontusson: "The main importance of my (unofficial) work with immigrant groups like the Palestinian People's Party is that I'm contributing...It's not the charity. Charity—often charity is confused with solidarity. But when we work with Palestinians, it took a while for them to realize that our position was, 'We can commit money. We can do...What do you want us to do? Do you want us to collect weapons, or what do you want? And we can do it, on your terms.'"

Fridell: "So the important thing is to let them set the terms, and make them feel like they've got help in the outside community?"

Pontusson: "*Ja*. Not that all that we have to do is we have to be solidaristic and 'let's collect'...I don't know. There's always a risk of perspective with charity. It is always important to keep the perspective with poor people that you're there to extend yourself on their terms, not to do it for yourself or just to placate your conscience. 'Always tell us what do you want us to do.' That's the important procedure."

Pontusson captured the spirit of combining *lagom* with multiculturalism. Leftist Swedes reject the private charity model that for example undergirded welfare expansion in the Progressive Era United States as well as refugee settlement in the contemporary era, because it is based on relationships of domination/submission. Again, egoism is not perceived as the key to cosmopolitanism. Swedes like Pontusson feel that approaching others' needs, including refugees, as an equal rather than a benefactor is a more stable way in the long term to contribute to social development in a diverse society.

Anti-racism Resources in Sweden

Sweden's economy, politics, and culture have been adapting to and resisting the global and regional ascendance of liberal institutions, such as those comprising the European

Union. In the 1990s neoliberal efforts to move Swedish policy closer to liberal regimes, called policy convergence, led to an economic crisis. The attending economic flux experienced in Sweden through the recent decades has aggravated the structural estrangement between ethnic Swedes and minorities of refugee origin. Racism has periodically come to the forefront of the national conscience, and the Swedish state has funded studies and promoted anti-racism education programs to help integrate immigrants and the native population.¹⁹ Through its participatory corporatist system, the Swedish state has amassed a high level of capacity which it can use to address social problems.²⁰ Refugees themselves have helped to advance anti-racism efforts.

Anti-racist education and multicultural celebration organizations are targeted at ethnic Swedes. For example, as anti-immigration sentiment grew sharply in the 1990s with the decline of economic conditions, the City of Stockholm appropriated \$600,000²¹ for anti-racism education programs. The Swedish courts outlawed Affirmative Action in 2007. As a result, much is riding on education, both to reduce racism and, eventually, discrimination, and to integrate New Swedes. In my interviews, Västerås public official Mats Ericson voiced the popular belief that “education” can carry the weight of avoiding the establishment of an ethnic underclass—that is, education can guarantee social mobility for New Swedes.

Non-state, anti-racist mobilization is also common in Sweden. While I was in Sweden, activists concerned with child prostitution and racism in political institutions joined struggles with Muslims against neo-Nazis. Swedes involved in immigrant integration in Västerås told me how, at a rally in Nyköping on August 20, 2001,

¹⁹ Knocke 1993.

²⁰ Esping-Andersson 1985. Participatory corporatism is, however, widely thought to be in decline (Korpi and Palme 2003).

²¹ SEK 4 million.

“neo-Nazis targeted refugee immigrants and Swedish workers. Many Swedes responded with concern about what they see as a rising assault on multiculturalism by the Right. There were ensuing demonstrations in Göteborg for and against racism, although the anti-racism mobilization was considerably stronger.”²²

Anti-racism organizations and programs abound in civil society, and are primarily concerned with cultural integration. Often they are funded through the EU. The EU's support for immigrant groups stems partly from humanitarian interest, partly from its goal of enhancing labor mobility within Europe, and partly from its goal of coopting networks within states and increasing its own embeddedness and legitimacy.

Swedish domestic capacity is accompanied by European Union initiatives to combat racism on a cultural level, and cultural programs have proliferated in Sweden. However, it remains unclear whether existing anti-racism efforts will help avert the development of an ethnic underclass in Sweden, contribute to the development of a multicultural society, or contain extreme right wing politics. Feldblum (1998) notes a limitation on supra-national programs to support immigration in many countries,

International conventions, agreements, and directives expanded the rights of foreigners even if they did not eliminate discrimination against non-nationals or foreign residents.²³

The effects of refugee integration policy can be seen in how local integration officials categorize the impact of refugees. In interviewees' discourse, for example, the benefits of immigration have been cultural. For Ericson, for example, refugee immigrants' positive contribution to Swedish society lies in helping Swedes to develop a cultural cosmopolitanism.

²² Andersson, Ulrike.

²³ Feldblum 1998: 235.

“Highly educated refugees, like the Iranian refugees, can contribute *mångfald* (multiculturalism) to society—can contribute to dynamic relations and multicultural attitudes.”

However, the need for immigrants to do work that develops their senses, thoughts, skills, and interchanges, is not considered in relation to their contributions to society. This is reflected as well in public opinion polls, where ethnic Swedes report very favorably on New Swedes’ cultural impact, but negatively on their impact on the country’s economic and institutional robustness.

Problems with refugees are not perceived so one-sidedly as their contributions. In the integration reform politics described in the previous chapter, problems with refugees and family reunification immigrants center in both the cultural and the material world. Cultural problems include immigrants’ authoritarianism and patriarchy. Material problems include immigrants’ joblessness. It is notable that multicultural programming appears to have helped Swedes—despite holding anxieties common throughout Europe—to feel comfortable with immigrants’ specifically *cultural* input into society. Yet reformists mobilize anxiety about immigrants’ material impact upon the social democratic society through competition for decent jobs, the welfare state, and women’s welfare. Reformists use (mainly refugee and family reunification) immigrants to transform anxiety about the diminishment of social democracy into consensus on the reduction of the welfare state, and, through labor market reform, on increasing labor immigration.

A Worker’s Educational Association (ABF) employee, Magnus Pontusson talks about how materialist anti-racism became submerged with the disarray of the Swedish Left social movement. “The Left used to “own” anti-racism. That’s a good way of putting it. And the Liberals are trying to, right?” Pontusson feels that liberals have had some traction usurping the Left’s anti-racism politics because, unlike the Young Left (to which

he belongs), “the Left hasn’t been involved with trying to force an anti-racist movement in the last ten or fifteen years. So that’s an agenda of the Left that’s now quite a high priority.”

Pontusson: Then we have Hardt and Negri’s contribution, alerting us that if the left cannot see the working class war anymore, it’s because they’re blocked by looking for the traditional interests of the working class that no longer apply. And that relates to the theoretical discussion about races, the theoretical base of race.

Fridell: Do you see these two debates about the nation and racism intersecting?

Pontusson: Ja, they are often intersecting. There is a lot of co-construction of the nation and a lot of co-construction of nationality, as sometimes quite racist, aren’t they? I reckon it is important to conquer the logical contents of nation-states, of what it is to be a Swede. In Sweden, we’re always...we have a nationality content that has been very close to the German *land und volk*. Our construction of nationality is quite near that. It’s very, very bad for the Left. However, the Left has always fought a battle like that. For instance, lots of people say, ‘This is patriotic.’ But the battle is *defining in action*: ‘What is the nation?’ For example, ‘What is United States?’ The radical hegemonic battle is to assert, ‘It’s peace.’ So you accuse a racist party of being un-Swedish. You say, ‘To be a Swede is to hide an illegal immigrant. That’s a real Swede.’ Things like that. This is very connected, also, to the debate on national sovereignty (in contrast with EU membership).

Pontusson follows his articulate discussion of the connection between nation and racism in Sweden by explaining a Leftist social movement approach to defusing that connection through a war of position. The Swedish identity is disentangled from race, and instead tied to anti-racism, or opposition to “social projects which create or reproduce structures of domination based on essentialist categories of race.”²⁴ Whereas most social movements framing scholarship in the U.S. has asserted that a frame must be culturally resonant for it to be useful as a social movement tool, Magnus Pontusson contended that

²⁴ Omi and Winant 1994: 162.

frame innovation was possible, and a necessary part of *leftist* social movement, as Antonio Gramsci likewise found in his work on the hegemonic war of position.²⁵

The active politician is a creator, an initiator; but he neither creates from nothing nor does he move in the turbid void of his own desires and dreams. He bases himself on effective reality, but what is the effective reality? Is it something static and immobile, or is it not rather a relation of forces in continuous motion and shift of equilibrium? If one applies one's will to the creation of a new equilibrium among the forces which really exist and are operative—basing oneself on the particular force which one believes to be progressive and strengthening it to help it to victory—one still moves on the terrain of effective reality, but does so in order to dominate and transcend it (or contribute to this). What 'ought to be' is therefore concrete; indeed it is the only realistic and historicist interpretation of reality, it alone is history in the making and philosophy in the making, it alone is politics.²⁶

Pontusson's political approach reflects the widespread influence of early Social Democratic Party leader Per Albin Hansson. Hansson usurped the fascist idea of the *Folkhem* in 1928. Debating the nationalist Swedish economist, Rudolph Kjellen, Hansson declared that "there is no more patriotic party than the [Social Democratic Party since] the most patriotic act is to create a land in which all feel at home," famously igniting Swedes' innermost longing for transcendence with the idea of the *Folkhem*, or People's Home.²⁷ It is worth quoting Hansson's (1928) hegemonic reconstruction of Swedishness.

The basis of the home is community and togetherness. The good home does not recognize any privileged or neglected members, nor any favorite or stepchildren. In the good home there is equality, consideration, co-operation, and helpfulness. Applied to the great people's and citizens' home this would mean the breaking down of all the social and economic barriers that now separate citizens into the privileged and the neglected,

²⁵ Myra Marx Fereee has made a similar point in "Resonance and Radicalism" (2003), where she argues "cultural resonance and movement success are not the same."

²⁶ Gramsci 1997: 172.

²⁷ Hansson, Per Albin. "Folk och Klass": 80. Cited in Berman 2006: 166.

into the rulers and the dependents, into the rich and the poor, the propertied and the impoverished, the plunderers and the plundered. Swedish society is not yet the people's home. There is a formal equality, equality of political rights, but from a social perspective, the class society remains, and from an economic perspective the dictatorship of the few prevails.²⁸

In this foundational social democratic reconstruction of Swedish nationalism, Hansson recrafted the classic conservative view of society as a patriarchal family writ large. Rather than an authoritarian, stratified family, the social democratic Swedish homeland consisted of solidaristic members striving to work with each other toward community, togetherness, equality, consideration, cooperation, and helpfulness. Clearly, the formulation aimed for inclusion across class, but it also left room for the inclusion of other “neglected”, “dependent”, “poor”, “impoverished”, and “plundered” citizens.

Immigrants slightly strain the resonance of Hansson's inclusive formulation, since inclusion was to apply to all *citizens*, and the citizenship of immigrants can appear less solid in a country “close to the German *land und volk*.” Citizenship is not difficult for immigrants to obtain in Sweden; but recently integration reformists have challenged New Swedes' *social citizenship*. Both Hansson and Pontusson saw this as a long term struggle. Pontusson's historical imagination allows him to see the present day opportunities to expand social citizenship through forging an anti-racist national identity. As well, he recognizes that the national project is challenged by a new, and less developed, but multicultural form of citizenship in the EU.

Working toward Integration at the Local Level

Refugee settlement and integration is carried out at the local level in Sweden. Notably, the people I interviewed who work with immigrants and integration at the local level

²⁸ Berkling. *Från Fram till Folkhemmet*: 227-230; Tilton. *The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy*: 126-127.

describe integration challenges as embedded in worrisome anti-democratic trends in national and global institutions. In the stark, blustery, cold days of April, I met with Pontus Pontusson in his office in the modest, bright, informal regional Left Party headquarters of Västerås, Sweden. The Västerås Left Party meeting room contained a wooden table with a red runner, walls of bookshelves filled with books and red party literature, a couch, and simple-graphic posters reading in Swedish, “For peace/against militarism,” “Women’s liberation and socialism: The Left Party,” “Red or wrong,” “Solidarity,” and “We need all of us: The Left Party.” This last poster featured multicolored, locked arms, echoing the Solidarity poster graphic.

Left Party members’ experience organizing gives them valuable perspective on effective inclusionary practices. Pontusson worked for the Worker’s Educational Organization (ABF, *Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund*) and was previously an Ombudsman for the Young Left in Västmanland and Dalarna. He spoke to this job experience, describing what he had learned about practices of inclusion.

An important thing is to make people feel that they are a part of a bigger organization. Work hard on getting people to go to help, get them to write in to newspapers, get them to attend conferences, festivals... that would help give a feeling of belonging, and a sense that the organization and yourself is something bigger than your local club.

Pontusson articulated an awareness of the importance of transcendent experiences that “make people feel that they are a part of a bigger organization.” The political and cultural organizations Pontusson worked in mobilized people’s need for connection and participation. He linked these organizational practices to the social inclusion of immigrants, arguing that society, like organizations, develops through actively facilitating new members’ participation.

The educational section of the Swedish labor movement, the ABF (*Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund*, Worker’s Educational Association) is responsible for drawing workers

into the issues of integration, health, trade unions, politics, international studies, and disabled issues.²⁹ Working for the district ABF, Pontus Pontusson researches “the role immigrants have played in Swedish history, Swedish development” in order to educate Left Party ABF study circle leaders to coordinate social integration projects. These were projects in the beginning stages in 2003. The *New Life in Sweden* program had the innovative goal of building a social memory of working class immigrants’ contributions to Sweden. It was developed through cultural instruments like theater.

“It’s a project that, hopefully, will lead us to a better understanding of the roles that you (immigrants) and your father and your friends have played in the forming of Sweden,” Pontusson says. The other integration project “is ‘start listening to immigrants’.” In the widely-used, informal Swedish education system, people interested in improving integration set up, take the free course and meet. The informal education system is a legacy of Sweden’s democratic social movements. There can be leaders in the study circles, but sometimes study circles also work out new knowledge and new approaches together. In the “start listening” integration project, Left Party study circle leaders simply met to practice and learn how to listen to New Swedes’ concerns.

A third, older “education bloc” is called Resistance, “and that’s about resisting against extremist movements.” Pontusson explains,

I tried to get it to be resisting against right-wing extremist groups, only because that’s the problem. We don’t have a problem with left-wing extremist groups. (laughing) People want to show “democracy”—(so they) have to mark a little against “the colonies” too. (Laughing ruefully) It’s so irritating, even here when we have almost-racist groups, we have almost neo-Nazi groups sitting in local city councils (in Södertälje and Haninge), things like that. And then we have the National Democrats, they call themselves. Another party, called the Sweden

²⁹ Headquartered in Stockholm, there are ABF-locations in almost every Swedish town and on several of the other major cities. Founded by the Swedish Social Democratic Party and some of the trade unions, ABF is today a resource mainly for the members of the Social Democrats and the Left Party. Its curriculum has been sponsored by Social Democratic state and union funding.

Democrats, they are a little more polished version of (laughing) fascists...culture racists, more or less. They can't just use the biological race, as you know, so they use the cultural argument instead. –That's one of the blocs, to educate people how to know more about these groups, and then how to ward them off. And that education is directed to people in the working life. And these are all sponsored by the LO and the ABF.

Pontusson asserts, correctly, that Right-wing extremist political actors have caused racism-based disruption in Sweden. He is irritated with the way in which Leftist institutions like the LO and ABF hitch their anti-racism programs to their traditional “democratic” opposition to Communists. In these anti-racism programs, the labor organizations presume that racism is an “extremist” problem, and the solution is to identify extremists and “ward them off”. If racism were rather conceived as a problem of the reproduction of domination based on essentialist categories, it would be recognized as an everyday problem.

The ABF and LO also provide education for people who want to know more about immigration, and a series of courses introducing people with immigrant backgrounds to the union and how it works. The ABF programs are conducted with strong cultural components. “Culture has always been an important part of ABF,” says Pontusson. According to the ABF, “culture inspires us and lets us think along new, creative lines, which helps us to interpret the surrounding world and ourselves in new ways. This is why the ABF embraces culture.” Consequently, the ABF is “one of the larger arrangers of cultural events in Sweden, offering lectures, public debates, and cultural programs.”³⁰ Within a socialist perspective (“Its focus on social class is no less important today than it was when the association was started in 1912”), ABF conducts seminars, classes and study circles on all kinds of subjects, including workshops, languages, and music.

³⁰ Pontusson. ABF is the Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund.

Fighting Immigrant Exclusion with Disruption

Sweden has a long twentieth-century history as a corporatist country, and the exclusion of New Swedes can be seen as one indication that compromises have unraveled. The end of social democratic class compromise at the hand of capital forces the question of the ability of the working class to likewise take a more confrontational, less cooperative tack to the onset of worsening conditions among the most vulnerable of the working class. Since capital has been mobilized, integration officials broached the role of disruptive strategies in creating opportunities to integrate ethnic and New Swedes.

Ulrike Andersson, the Distriktsombudsqvinna (the District Ombudswoman in Västmanland, and a member of the Vänsterpartiet District Board of Directors) talked about exclusion and disruptive politics. Economic exclusion problems that Andersson sees intersecting with immigrant integration include low public union wages, especially among women, often immigrant, working in health care. “Working women are an underclass,” she says. “Underclass” and “overclass” are the way Vänsterpartiet talks about social inequality in a social democratic way that tries to demonstrate the linkages between the conditions working class women, immigrants and minorities, and unemployed persons suffer.

“More and more people are feeling like they can’t take charge of their own lives. They’re not part of a political climate that they feel they can use to change their lives in the direction they want to go. There’s segregation between the overclass and the underclass, consisting of immigrants, women, and the unemployed. The gap (between classes) needs to be addressed—it’s a violence. In a stratified society, ties and respect are severed. It’s a downward spiral.”

Andersson acknowledges that this is not the elite’s interpretation of why people feel powerless, disrespected, and alienated from one another. “The elite feel that the underclass does not *want* to belong.”

A local Vänsterpartiet secretary, Stefan Kudryk as well feels that there is a vast reserve of counter-establishment feeling, which has in this century only found expression in protest marches. He sees dammed-up frustration shaping contemporary politics. In 2003 throngs of protestors—thousands more than I have ever seen with my own eyes—filled the Stockholm streets and outmassed the normal Saturday downtown shopping crowds of carefully-costumed, apolitical teenagers. The *Nej till Kriget* (No to the War) march protested the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and included miles of winter-bundled Swedes, cohering immigrant groups, individual workers and families, feminists, syndicalists, and politicians. Demonstrating opposition to imperialism was on the agenda, and the U.S.’s invasion was not the only target of protest. Iranian-Swedes handed out literature. Kurds, who regularly gathered in the public square *Stortorget* to chant in Kurdish in support of their stateless compatriots, marched together. Banners were raised protesting Israeli aggression against Palestinians. Neoliberalism was a target as well; flags fluttered in opposition to the euro (EMU) campaign. At the end of the day, the plan was ultimately to march on the U.S. embassy. A dark-clad, slick-helmeted, baton-and-gun-brandishing riot police force barred the way with barricades, bullhorns, guns, police cars, and snipers in the trees. Young men and women shouted at them in frustration, and older Swedes and children gradually drifted away.

“Last year (2002) were the Göteborg riots (as well). Politicians are claiming that people aren’t interested, but people are, using different, non-establishment expression. In response to violence, the elite say, ‘Why don’t you go through us?’ Yet elites have their own violence. Elite violence is the violence of the state.”

Protesting militarization, the 2001 EU summit and EU-US summit in Göteborg, and defending the public sector and the environment, 87 Swedish, European, and Iranian diaspora groups organized in Göteborg (which funded some of their less-disruptive activities) in June. Around 50,000 people participated in demonstrations, a conference with lectures and seminars, a street party, an anti-capitalist march, encounters, skirmishes, and riots (some of which were instigated by police). 64 people were

convicted of criminal behavior and sent to prison for a total of 50 years. Andersson sees exclusion growing with elite monopoly on “the violence of the state.”

Andersson describes how neoliberalism works to effect exclusion. Unemployment “including immigrants”, the Swedish housing legacy, and devolution combine to contribute to immigrants’ exclusion, she says.

“Low pay public sector jobs for immigrants leads to segregation in the way you live. There were changes in housing policy at the end of the 1980s. The idea was bringing democracy closer to people. So there was political devolution to the *kommuns* (counties), with little funding. The *kommuns* had low ability to tax. Responsibilities that the *kommuns* have assumed include housing, welfare, and hospitals. Some *kommuns* couldn’t afford the devolved responsibilities. They sold (state-subsidized) public housing apartments. It depended on (the political alignment of) local leadership as well.

There was a shift of focus from solidarity to the slogan, ‘Those who can afford it, why shouldn’t they?’ For ten or fifteen years, neo-liberal hegemony has been strong. The rights of the non-rich are seen as old-fashioned, naïve. Devolution reinforced segregation: the rich live in the city; the poor—students, immigrants, and substance abusers—live in housing projects in suburbs.”

Given devolution, Andersson sees social democratic solidarity as “a good notion that didn’t work. Then you say, you minimize how far people can fall, instead of starting off at ‘everyone deserves...’” Andersson also attributes exclusion to a larger establishment political development: a decline in concern for citizens’ and residents’ alienation. She reads this as a decline in Swedish politicians’ moral and intellectual leadership.

“Our political institutions are maybe not appropriate for current problems. They’re old. Political parties need to open up to activists, form coalitions, start learning from the groups. Politics is now a career. The motivations are not about changing. For example for me, and I think as well for many, many others, my emotions are efficacious in a non-establishment organization.”

While Andersson has a job within formal political channels, she sees better possibilities for working for integration in social movement organizations. Not everyone sees disruption as feasible in contemporary Swedish society. Pontusson feels anti-establishment politics are muffled, saying, “The new generation doesn’t have the communist fight in them—or a desire to participate, engage in activism.” Västmanland Secretary Stephen Kudryk agrees and adds that this assessment of young Swedes is affirmed by polls; young people’s depoliticization threatens social democracy.

“Swedish teens no longer have a sense of how or why they have grown up in such wealth, with a huge safety net waiting to catch them and their families should they fall. They don’t realize that this is the result of active labor unions and an ideologically-focused workers movement. To them, it all just dropped from the sky. This is the single most alarming thing to me. Without history, without knowing and understanding the values and benefits of solidarity, will our teens even care about the adverse effects that Reinfeldt’s politics will have? Will they even mourn the dismantling of our welfare state? Hardly!”

These younger Swedes, including Kudryk, Pontusson, and Andersson, were discouraged about the prospects for improving immigrant integration in Sweden because they were discouraged about the neoliberalization of Swedish institutions and mainstream culture. After decades of corporatism as well as corporatism’s decline, does the labor movement exert any extra-establishment pressure on integration policy anymore? “Unions and government and the private sector (businesses) all have worked together to change labor policy in order to address ethnic discrimination,” integration official Mats Ericson says.

But even this older official is pessimistic about the future of integration. Ericson associates EU-led, incipient labor immigration in Sweden with the decline of social democratic state capacity to expand social citizenship and maintain organized labor.

“(In the 1980s), high finance called off *klass samarbete* (class cooperation), *samfovstandsanda* (joint understanding spirit)—the peace in the labor market we had maintained to achieve higher standards in living.

Bourgeois parties want to eradicate *anställningskydd*—laws on the labor market. Bourgeois includes Greens (and by 2007 the Social Democrats as well) on the national level.”

Although local officials and unions have power in the everyday integration of refugees, Ericson distinguishes between kinds of working class immigrants when he considers who is responsible for averting the threat of a growing underclass. “An immigrant worker army—social dumping—threatens unions. It is *arbetsklassinvandring* (labor immigration),” not refugee immigration, that “leads to an ethnic underclass,” Ericson stresses. “The responsibility is on the national level to avoid the creation of an ethnic underclass; *arbetsmarknadspolitik* (labor market politics) must be discussed at the national level,” says Ericson. Yet integration reformists in Sweden have stressed the economic exclusion of immigrants, most of whom have been refugees and family reunification immigrants. The legislators I talked to point down to the local level officials when explaining who is responsible for immigrant integration. Ericson therefore has some reason to be concerned that “social democratic strategy is lapsing. Change is coming too fast.”

Who is taking responsibility for extending participatory inclusion to immigrants, as Pontusson suggested was crucial? Are refugees placed under non-official community members’ wings?, I ask local integration officials. What about union members? Do unions and union members take on face-to-face responsibility for integrating New Swedes into their communities? The answer seems to be yes and no.

Västmanland Distriktsombudsqvinna Ulrike Andersson mulls the unions’ role in integration. She does not think they have done enough. “They should set up language programs in the work place,” she affirms. She then considers the weak relationship between her political party and the unions, which have been tied historically to the Social Democratic Party.

“It is important for Vänsterpartiet to reach out to unions, to change their perspective from protecting the existing workforce. There’s too much focus in unions on consolidating power instead of on workers’ needs. Not all unions are supporting immigrant health care workers, for example. There’s not enough coalitional work on the part of major unions.”

Union coalitional began to dissolve a quarter century ago, though it was in a rush of global radicalism. In the 1970s and 1980s, public workers broke with the Saltsjöbaden spirit of wage solidarity, and organized for higher wages. “The LO was mobilizing people for conflict. Whereas, recently, Wanja Lundy-Meker, President of LO has said, ‘Demonstration is not the Swedish way.’ But the ‘buy-in’ model twenty-five years ago stopped working,” Pontusson points out. “Unions have to work more with demands,” he allows, but then recognizes the intersection of trade union interests with high immigrant unemployment. “They need to push for full employment. Open unemployment is 4.5 to 5 percent. Hidden unemployment is 9 percent.” Ericson pursues the theme of federal political accountability through labor market policy, “Labor unions ought to take a more active interest and press the government more.” “Unions should be tougher in employment decisions,” he adds.

But “Labor unions are starting to wake up,” Pontusson says hopefully.

“The (blue-collar union federation) LO, which has two million members, and the Social Democrats are participating in antiestablishment anti-war demonstrations. Last year (2002), six conflicts occurred on the labor market. Five by SAC³¹ –a small, 25,000-member syndicalistic union.”

Multiple respondents volunteered that they see a fitful anti-establishment movement for greater social inclusion frustrated by the neoliberal promise of a capitalism that can deliver the good life to those who believe. The critical response to neoliberalization is incomplete, Andersson reflects soberly. “Throughout Europe, since the late 1990s, there

³¹ SAC Syndakalisterna. <http://www.sac.se/>.

are groups addressing globalization, such as ATTAC,³² environmental issues, and war. But there's still a need for organization and a need for venues of expression.”

Economic and Political Understandings of Solidarity with Immigrants

Typical of Left Party members, Pontusson has devoted personal time to working with refugees and other immigrants. He has campaigned to collect money for an immigrant foundation, demonstrated against immigrant expulsions, and worked with the Palestinian solidarity movement, including cultural and political groups. He clarifies his understanding of solidarity,

Pontusson: I have an interest in that you fight for something, but together with me. That's the crux, that I can see myself in you, that we have something in common. It's the foundation, to say that we benefit by fighting together. The other way of explaining solidarity is: the feeling of solidarity is to see yourself in others.

Fridell: To clear this up for me—does this solidarity exist on an idealist level, or do you see yourself in others through working together?

Pontusson: You could use solidarity in a more neutral way. Let's just say we have a factory that's going good, and the owners, they can't get money. As a worker, I have an interest that the factory is working good and I can get my pay and I have my job. I can struggle with the owners to keep the factory, or something like that. That's solidarity too. You have common interests. You have to have a common struggle for it. Do you say, “A common struggle for a common interest?”

This “neutral” solidarity Pontusson describes is not socialist or labor movement solidarity. It is social democratic solidarity, containing elements of both nationalism and capitalist liberalism. Yet returning to discuss solidarity concretely, the next illustration of solidarity Pontusson gives is radical—the movement to hide immigrants.

³² ATTAC is the Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens, or the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens, which began by agitating for the Tobin Tax on foreign exchange transactions.

“About 5,000, possibly 6,000 immigrants are being hid by people. Because they (the government) got to send them back, you know? And we have, in the latest ten to fifteen years, we got from quite generous immigration policies for political immigration—it was for asylum—we had a generous asylum policy. Now we do not have that today. All kinds of people hide immigrants. From extremely religious people to hard-line Leninists. Political, humanitarian—the motives vary. But they can agree that it’s worth it, to treat people the way that we do.”

There are two senses of super-national solidarity, as Mats Ericson sees it, one international and one among Swedes. “There is solidarity internationally between peoples. Refugee policy is based on solidarity—politically.” He acknowledges that solidarity with immigrants is not fully developed. “We need to make the refugee concept more broad to include women,” he says. Ericson distinguishes political solidarity with refugees from a more institutionalized version for Swedes, founded in historical socialism.

“At the local level there’s another sense—working partners. Economics (tax policy) has been used as a tool to achieve social democratic solidarity. A progressive tax system results in solidarity. 10 percent of a worker’s paycheck goes to the state, 20 percent goes to the municipality, and 10 percent goes to the region. The worker keeps the other 60 percent of her paycheck as disposable income. The employer contributes another 32 percent of the worker’s gross income to the state. *“Av var och en efter förmåga, till var och en efter behov.”*³³

However, Ericson considers Swedish solidarity to be in decline.

“Solidarity is not as strong as I wish it could be. In Western life, everyone’s bound to the family, the home. Solidarity has become self-evident, taken-for-granted. The social welfare model is based on solidarity between generations, between the rich and the poor, or solidarity to create

³³ This quote translates as, “From each according to their ability, to each according to their need.” It is from Marx, Karl. 1875. *Critique of the Gotha Program*. In an interview conducted in English, Ericson keeps a Marxist quote in Swedish, as if to signify that English is the language of liberalism, at least in Sweden.

a better life. A vital concept—it was meant to be taken for granted, no more. Solidarity’s opposite, egoism is the new philosophy. It’s called ‘neoliberal egoism’ in Swedish debates. The bourgeois leader Carl Bildt said, ‘Solidarity—it’s not a word I use.’”

Ericson attributes the decline of ethical and economic solidarity among Swedes to the social democratic state turning the ethic into a purely mechanical tax policy. He thinks the ethical vacuum has been filled by a “neoliberal egoism” ethic that makes it difficult to extend solidarity with New Swedes past political solidarity.

Neoliberal Policy Diffusion: Economic Efficiency in Local Reform

At the expense of a focus on social citizenship, economic efficiency criteria have diffused into the discourse and work of even dedicated, local-level Leftist integration officials. For my interviews with Mats Ericson, the Vänsterpartiet municipal integration official, I took an hour-long train ride west of Stockholm, past red and yellow wide-vertical plank rural houses, bare-limbed woods, and still-frozen lakes, to Västerås. It is a small city with a downtown that structurally mirrors the 1970s “urban renewal” of unfortunate American cities like Eugene, Oregon, but somehow manages to maintain vibrant foot traffic. I interview Ericson in his two-room government office, or over a falafel at a nearby fast food restaurant. Swedish government offices are the direct counterparts to local American offices, though I could not detect any cubicles. The municipal building is plain, somewhat contemporary, but with high ceilings, and windows that open. Ericson’s office receives money from the state to coordinate the reception of refugees with other municipal committees. It sponsors *Arbetsförmedlingen*—which Ericson describes as “a multicultural group orienting refugees toward the labor market.” *Arbetsförmedlingen* is also a Swedish employment agency.

Ericson is friendly. His secretary’s brother has checked my background on-line. Ericson tells me he has been involved with civil society immigrant groups, including the Chilean Victor Jara Foundation. “Jara came from the Allende period. The foundation was

formerly cultural; now it is political,” he says. Ericson has also worked with other Swedish immigrant associations including the Kurdish Association and a Palestinian group. He organizes demonstrations with them through Vänsterpartiet (the Left Party). He was once married to and is now divorced from a Chilean refugee. He is still a latin music enthusiast. In fact, being able to share your musical taste seems to be an important piece of social capital in this country, where 80 percent of the population claims interest in Swedish music.³⁴

Ericson got onto his career path when he developed a sociological imagination in the anti-war movement, when he was working at prisons around 1969. He went to social work school, and from there into the public welfare system. In 1975 Ericson joined Vänsterpartiet, in the *kommun* (county) of Dalarna. Ericson describes Dalarna’s rural political complexion as a combination of anarchist and Right wing. Today Ericson works with “Refugees, 300 people per year in Västerås. There are 30,000 waiting to be settled in Sweden.” He describes the state contribution to the *kommun*: “SEK 169,000 per person. Two-thirds is for housing. One third is for education, language, and the introduction into society. We are bound to teach the language and social rules. The workplace is chosen later.”

In the mid-2000s, parties and high-ranking integration officials devised policies to reduce refugee education requirements and to show that they want refugees immediately into jobs. They devised these policies under a flood of criticism for high refugee unemployment rates, and pressure for more cheap immigrant labor from capital, the construction industry, and farmers. Polls in that climate found that the public perceived integration to be the greatest failure of Swedish society. Studies were published in newspapers demonstrating immigrants usually have not achieved Swedish language fluency. The new work proposals have included forcing family members to support each other without welfare assistance, reducing requalification for immigrant health workers,

³⁴ Eurobarometer 2003.

working especially hard to place highly educated immigrants in high skill jobs very soon after arrival, and promoting low skill job creation and immediate placement of most refugees in low skill jobs.

Although Västerås, with a strong immigrant population, is a refugee introduction and integration leader, intermunicipality conferences and study visits diffuse information and integration approaches across Sweden, allowing officials to learn from each others' experiences. Ericson describes the favored integration approach, "Never forget the women. We have to form contacts within cultural associations, following their cultural rules to get to women. It's not impossible, if you take their situation as serious and work with their possible conditions." Ericson has come to see health as an area in which women and immigrants' interests come together. "Poor immigrants suffer, women immigrants the worst," Ericson says. He sees immigrant women's health compromised by the stress of particularly egregious social exclusion. Such exclusion, he feels, needs to be combated through addressing the behavior of the men who intervene between individual women and the rest of society.

"We have to inform, argue with male immigrants to get their wives into Swedish studies, education, public life, the wider community. There are problems with some Somalis. There's reactionary—there's renewed traditionalism when they feel isolated," he claims.

By helping immigrant women articulate an active place in society, the Swedish municipal integration workers believe that the municipalities can fortify the women's health. As Towns observed, Swedish is a feminist nationality. Because it is a feminist nationality, integration in Sweden seems to mean making immigrant women more like Swedish women by getting them out of the home and into the public. Neoliberal integration reformists further push to get immigrant women out of their home and into junk jobs in the private sector. This pressure is difficult and painful for first-generation immigrants and their families, and so far seems to have limited success.

Lapsed social democratic full-employment goals merge with neoliberal preoccupations to influence integration approaches. Ericson's language conveys the rise of a business efficiency model in integration reform. "We used to misuse resources. Now we view refugees as 'human resources', rather than as problems." He expands,

"The inventory of immigrant skills was not being utilized. But a study in 1999 spurred reconsideration. Reforms aim for a better-organized reception of refugees," Ericson said. A better organized reception was operationalized as a reception that gets immigrants to pull their own weight. "Courses and instruments were implemented for getting immigrants in work sites. After two years, 60 percent of immigrants have to be self-supporting."

The Vänsterparti member and public official reproduces the neoliberal discourse that unions and the social democratic emphasis on cultivating decent jobs is to blame for "underutilizing the inventory of immigrant skills". He adds,

"There is little problem getting immigrant workers into small, private business. The greatest problem is with getting them into the state. Immigrants have problems with entering the public workforce due to today's stressed work force, and due to union intransigence in opposition to non-contract, temporary labor."

Here Ericson neither acknowledges that neoliberalism is shrinking the welfare state, thus reducing the number of state jobs, nor does he acknowledge that 75 percent of educated, employed Swedish women already fill the majority of state jobs, where they encounter less discrimination than in the private sector. Moreover, he does not acknowledge that the state jobs are decent jobs, compared to the precarious jobs immigrants have been getting in small, private businesses.

In contrast to how he discusses integrating New Swedes, there is some remnant socialist flavor to Ericson's statement as it applies to ethnic Swedes. In his statement, we encounter an indication that ethnic Swedes are experiencing increasing stress with neoliberalization. Gradually rising levels of inequality are reflected not just in more

stressful working conditions, or in the national obsession on declining dental health, or even in what Amnesty International Sweden has noted as a trend toward more violence against women. Here, Ericson is claiming that this stress is responsible for ethnic Swedes' incapacity to extend themselves and work with New Swedes.

Ericson does not make connections between the economic efficiency approach to immigrant integration and what he sees as disrupted integration. For Ericson, *arbetskraftsinvandring* (labor immigration) is the root of the immigration problem. "Bourgeois parties want temporary labor migration." By 2007, all parties except Vänsterpartiet wanted increased labor immigration. "They want special rules for immigrants from outside the EU. The cradle of integration is the job site, and temporary labor disrupts integration." Ericson is not making connections between cultivating precarious jobs for refugee immigrants and creating the conditions for the institution of temporary labor immigration. He does not connect the cultivation of a temporary, low-skill job sector to the cultivation of an ethnic underclass.

Despite the acceptance of the integration reformists' framing of refugee immigrants' problems as founded in a lack of disposable jobs, the integration official is less yielding on how to implement that consensus. What does the municipality do about the union's opposition to widespread plans for augmenting the low-quality job sector? The response would frustrate a neoliberal. The Left Party response seems to lean toward stimulating solidarity among organized workers.

"We try to change the attitude that immigrant issues are different. Municipalities are responsible for training leaders at the job site. The task for the union is to have a better understanding of the need to educate members about these changes. Everybody has to be on the train," asserts Ericson.

The *Hanglingsplan* is the foundational document for getting everyone on the integration train. The *Hanglingsplan* means that "discussion sessions are held in municipal public

work sites, such as schools, childcare, elderly housing (elders lose the new language first).” Through this process,

“Every county has to elaborate a program plan for how to fulfill integration policy. It’s top down, but Integration Secretaries—who are often older immigrant bridge builders—work to awake discussion and be an explanatory resource. So in a state energy company—we ask, how can we implement integration in selling energy? How can we integrate immigrants as production employees, including public service staff?”

The *Handlingsplan* is a good example of how integration is instituted locally in the social democratic state. This governance method leaves room for individual communities to commit to national policy or not. The *Handlingsplan* facilitates social citizenship under economic goals. For example, a common integration method is used for refugee programs and programs for the long term unemployed.

“We use group process, including discussions, documenting the person’s history, preparation, and support for job interviews. We provide self-reliance coaching to combat long term unemployment, low self esteem. Groups discuss political-social issues, sometimes meeting once a day in an old factory. It’s the Power Plant activity center. Groups meet there five or eight times a day. Including refugees, there are 6,000 unemployed persons out of a population of 130,000. 850 of them are involved in daily activities at the activity center.”

Ericson is aware of the extent to which local policy has been steered by economic efficiency models. He points to the role of neoliberal hegemony in the imposition of policy reform, in the daily life of the *kommun*, and in the diffusion of neoliberal ideas into the Social Democratic Party.

“They borrow money for a house, the loan is not taxed. Home-owners are favored in taxation. These are the ‘rights of riches’. Milton Friedman is to blame. The 1980s brought us a wave of neoliberal thinking. After the assassination of Olaf Palme, in 1985, the Social Democratic Party went through a lot of changes, in social policy, foreign policy.

Publicly-financed private schools have been a result. Labor laws and rules changed to come into line with the EU. The EU is a neoliberal project. The organization of the *kommun* became managerial, ordering services from not just public providers, but private providers, such as ProAros Company.

Things continued to change in the 1990s with the introduction of business-financed, Right-wing organizations to change popular attitudes. Timbro Publishing Company of Svensk Näringsliv (the premier capitalist think tank in Sweden) released press announcements designed to get people thinking along laissez-faire lines. Organization groups were developed within the Social Democrats to do neoliberal studies and distribute them. Pensions were invested in stocks; then pensions lost money.”

Ericson believes Right-wing objectives melded with neoliberal directives, both from Swedish political platforms and from the European Union, to constrain refugee integration practices in Västerås..

“The Moderaternas (The Moderate Party) are neoliberals, Right wing. But the extreme right wing is treated by political parties and journalists as if they don’t exist. They do not want to give them an arena. People don’t discuss political issues with each other using evidence. The anti-immigrant, right-wing Nydemokrati (The New Democrat Party) arose here in Västerås. They wanted restricted refugee reception. The Social Democrats and Moderata formed a majority in the Riksdag. They established Nydemokrati’s political platform, which coincided with an EU directive calling for European coordination of refugee policy. It makes helping refugees difficult for the municipal councils.”

European Integration and the Decline of Social Citizenship

Left Party members saw integration issues intersecting with neoliberalization—pushed especially hard by Right-wing parties. “The Berlin Wall came down, and an invisible wall arose in Europe, to compete with the U.S.,” Lotta Hochqvist says. Västmanland Vansterpartiet (Left Party) leadership, Daniel Salas, Niklas Malmberg, and Lotta Hochqvist discuss the tougher rules for immigration in the European Union. In 1988 it

became more difficult to gain entry and live in the EU. This EU tough-on-immigration politic was perceived to help the Right-wing parties win the 1988 election.

Malmberg perceives that “we lost a great weapon against unemployment” by losing control of the banks in the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s. “It’s a great risk for labor.” Private control over the banks gave way to European control. “Now the European Central Bank sets the policies. Now the political and institutional approach to social issues is economistic. Small countries are seeing increasing exploitation.” As the European Union became established, and the Social Democratic Party fractured along neoliberal and social-democratic lines, Swedish capital pushed the country to join the EU.

The bourgeois coalition rose to power in 1991, in the midst of the Social Democratic Party internal conflicts, and capital began to invest and reinvest heavily in other European countries,³⁵ effectively posing a capital strike. When the Swedish public voted the Social Democrats back into power in 1994, capital pressured Social Democratic leaders such as Goran Persson, Mona Sahlin and Anna Lindh to press the government into promoting the European Union within Sweden. EU promoters argued that with membership Sweden could more easily export the Swedish Model to liberal European countries (country-appropriate variations on this nationalist argument were repeated in countries throughout Europe).

The voting public ratified joining the EU on November 14, 1994 by 52-48 percent (urban) majority, and Sweden became a member of the European Union on January 1, 1995. In Sweden neoliberalization facilitated by the country’s entry into the EU has meant the growth of unemployment, heavily concentrated among immigrants, as well as

³⁵ Swedish direct investment outside of Sweden was 10 percent of all business investment in 1985 (1 percent of GDP in 1982), and rose to 28 percent by 1989 (over 6 percent of GDP by 1990, the highest in Europe). The proportion of Swedish direct investment in Europe had risen from 24 percent in 1986 to 73 percent in 1990 (Pontusson 1995).

the decline of unions in terms of effectiveness and in public perceptions. In 2003, Sweden faced a new referendum on further immersion within the European Union.

“The ‘Yes’ side of the EMU (European Monetary Union) debate argues that Sweden joining the EMU would show the workers of the European Union solidarity,” observes Hochqvist. Salas agrees, “The pro-EMU argument holds that the EU is a chance for Sweden to influence Europe,” agrees Salas. Malmberg shrugs. “But the EU hasn’t changed since Sweden joined it.” “The stealth incorporation of EU laws will void democracy,” Salas says. “Policy is set by neoclassical economics in the EU. They work to provide the opportunities for the rich to speculate.” Salas felt that the public was not generally aware of this function of the EU.

Hochqvist locates the pressure to join and conform to the EU in a fraternal impulse amongst the elites. “Swedish elites desire to join the European club. I don’t think they can see the dangers. It’s group-think with them.” Malmberg explains that in the social democracy, solidarity is not confined to international elites, but is traditionally spread across economic classes. “The rich person sees solidarity as small-change charity. The poor person sees solidarity in boycotts and demonstration.” But Salas thinks that social democratic solidarity has been undermined by the growth of a large middle class. “Middle-class status reduces interdependence and contact between citizens,” he notes. Hochqvist illustrates by referencing the breakdown of Saltsjöbaden solidarity³⁶ in wage setting.

“Unions used to take care of salary raises. Now each person at the *kommun* level, there are no rules, starting in the 1990s. (The major union) Metall still has a little power. But it’s illegal to strike (while a contract is in effect). Workers must go through different levels of arbitration.”

³⁶ The 1938 agreement between the Swedish Employers’ Confederation and the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) that established cooperative bargaining. The Saltsjöbaden Agreement can be considered the classic Swedish Model class compromise.

Salas gestures toward the straining relationship between the union federations and the Social Democratic Party, “Top union officials were in the Social Democratic Party before they got their position in the union. Recently 90 percent of union members voted against funding the Social Democrats.”

The decline of unions and the Social Democratic Party, as well as neoliberal gains are partly attributed to the economic shifts in work, the working man identity, and the exclusion immigrants, and until recently the exclusion of women. “Workers lose their identities in the post-industrial era. The work situation has changed. The unemployed, the poor are mostly immigrants,” says Hochqvist. When unemployed workers are identified as immigrant outsiders, the political solution appears to be to sequester away the social resources.

Exclusionary Citizenship and the Immigrant Move to the Right

On a bright spring day in 2003, Salas, Malmberg, and Hochqvist were discussing the upcoming referendum on Sweden’s monetary participation in the European Union. Around a long, warm-golden pine table in the ABF House in Västerås, they worked out how to network with other groups opposing the proposal to abandon the Swedish kronor, including Miljöpartiet (the Greens). The three considered in which of the county’s languages to publish the party’s anti-Euro position, deciding on Spanish, Kurdish, Arabic, and Turkish. On May Day, they would contact the unions. The group came up with a poster suggestion: “*Nej till EMU*” (“No to the European Monetary Unit”) with a little Vänsterpartiet logo. There was a suggestion to make a “multicultural” poster. As Salas, Malmberg, and Hochqvist planned out where to display the Left Party position, such as in the Stockholm buses, they mused that the question of who is out in the street brings into consideration how immigrants—for example, Latin Americans in the immigrant-dense Stockholm suburb of Rinkeby—participate in Swedish politics. The local party leaders talked about how to speak to their immigrant constituency. They had concerns about the challenges this posed.

Daniel Salas' family is a refugee family from Pinochet's Chile. "My father's family was involved in politics. He worked with a human rights organization in Chile. My motivation for my own political work (with the Left Party in Sweden) is that when I wanted to give back to society, I discovered democracy. I wanted to use it and help others." Salas feels lucky that this is how his life has gone. "There aren't a lot of immigrants in politics, due to discrimination." He ruminates on the challenges different immigrants face, "And they're scarred by their past experiences. They're cynical. Illiteracy sometimes is a problem. It's tough to get into society." Unlike in that alienated immigrant experience, however, most of Salas' friends are Swedish. A bit of resigned frustration flashes momentarily across his face, as he says he does not feel he is close to many immigrants, including Chilean-Swedes. He talks about the political gulf that can strand New Swedes socially.

"Immigrants are very occupied with their homeland politics," says Salas. Västmanland *Distriksombudsqvinna* (District Ombudswoman) Ulrike Andersson agrees. Andersson sees immigrant groups, including Chileans, Palestinians, and Kurds, as putting "their efforts into international work," rather than Swedish politics. They want to go home. But if they cannot, ignoring Swedish politics can reinforce refugees' segregation. "There's a romanticization of the homeland," Salas explains. "But Chileans and Bosnians who returned back to Chile and Bosnia when they could, returned back again to Sweden. You're not a Chilean anymore. They (Chileans) say to you, 'You can't come here with your new ideas.' My younger brother did that, went to Chile, and had to come back. He has had identity problems."

Salas crystallizes a recurrent theme in my and others' interviews with New Swedes: the common perception that there is a place, a home elsewhere where all their attributes, skills, preferences, and social networks will convene into an effective, vibrant, seamless whole, where "we will make sense and make a difference." This familiar dream of

substantive citizenship fueled immigrants' march across the U.S., as well as many other movements. But for immigrants, and refugee immigrants especially—as Yuval-Davis and Werbner (1999) call them, “ambivalent citizens”, the geography of hope can become the imagined country they left behind. Very often, however, there is no spatial fix for the uncomfortable, disjointed, peripheral identity immigrants are forced to negotiate. Most of my respondents believed that being in that state of existential “homelessness” can damage people.

In addition, immigrants may not feel their interests are well represented in Swedish government. As the socialist understanding of workers' position under capitalism recedes, “today not one Social Democratic member of the Riksdag is a member of the working class,” Andersson asserts. On this class dimension and, in terms of immigrant Swedes' political representation and appointment to government offices, migration scholar Anthony Messina (2004) argues that immigrant representation seems to be lacking.³⁷ Two of the biggest forces in contemporary domestic Swedish politics, the Social Democrats and the bourgeois parties' Alliance, have not provided adequate access or appeal to the growing immigrant population. In recent general elections, youth, masculinity and minority status have translated into a comparative lack of civic participation. Ethnic minority young men have been least likely to vote of all groups. Young foreign-born women and women with two foreign-born parents were not far behind in rejecting civic participation.

While immigrants were relatively excluded from the large and deeply networked Social Democratic Party hierarchy, local government and the Social Democratic Party while in power have had a formal responsibility for more or less helping immigrants find their way in Swedish society. Ericson, however, was critical of the Social Democratic Party's efforts to include immigrants in national political life. “Integration still needs to run through all political sectors,” says Ericson. “Integration was rhetorically mainstreamed

³⁷ Messina 2004: 30.

throughout government in 1998. By 1999 nothing had happened. The *Kommunstyrelsen* (City Executive Committee), they didn't enforce mainstreaming. Social Democratic officials were unresponsive." He thinks that the Social Democrats "came around (to mainstreaming) in the fall of 2002."

Even Vänsterpartiet, which has tried the hardest to reach out to New Swedes, has difficulty with immigrant citizenship. "The immigrants, who should vote for Vänsterpartiet—because they are working class, because Vänsterpartiet represents immigrants and provides places for immigrants in its party structure—they are less interested in Swedish politics," admitted Hochquist. People without Swedish citizenship residing in Sweden still have a form of citizenship and are enfranchised. Although immigrants do not vote in the high numbers that Swedes do (82 percent), their numbers increased in 2006, as did immigrant voting in France. 39 percent of foreign women and 35 percent of foreign men voted in Sweden, as well as 76 percent of eligible first-time voters.³⁸ In the 2006 elections, Vänsterpartiet along with Miljöpartiet (the Greens) and the Social Democrats elected candidates with immigrant backgrounds at a level that met or slightly exceeded New Swedes' numbers in the Swedish population. People with immigrant backgrounds were less well represented among the right wing parties, who also tend to run more wealthy candidates.³⁹

Korpi and Palme (2003) claim that Swedish workers are losing citizenship today because of intensified compulsion to sell their labor power to capitalists, or intensified commodification,⁴⁰ caused by the diminution of the welfare aspect of the state. Particularly impacted by intensified commodification as well as labor marginalization are women and New Swedes. Although women have gained economic independence through

³⁸ Statistiska Centralbyrån 2007.

³⁹ Statistiska Centralbyrån 2007.

⁴⁰ Esping Andersson 1985.

feminist social movement, *jämställdhet* (gender equality policy) and other social democratic policies, and labor force integration, women continue to suffer incomplete economic citizenship due to the fact that *jämställdhet* policies are designed primarily to maximize labor availability without undermining labor force reproduction (pregnancy and care giving), rather than to generally rectify wide discrimination in the assessment of the value of women's work.⁴¹ New Swedes are equally or more marginalized in the labor market. Women among racialized Swedish groups are somewhat more vulnerable to being used as the "flexible" (in other words, "expendable") part of the labor force.⁴² This marginalization in work has negative implications for citizenship, as the Left Party, local integration authorities, and *Integrationsverket* (the integration bureau) researchers imply when they concur that the work place is the cradle of integration.

The Swedish case provides support for the large body of existing literature⁴³ claiming that civic, political, and social citizenship can be undermined by changing labor market conditions. Citizenship can be weakened by a lack of integration into the work world and unions, by increasing commodification (as labor power) due to lack of control over work and lack of alternatives in labor, or by consumption of free time with increased working hours and/or unremunerated work. For immigrants, limited knowledge of Swedish, ghettoization and alienation, television viewing and lack of information, immigrants' own political orientation outside of the country they live in and toward their land of origin, lack of familiarity with or trust in democratic process, lack of political representation, and limited access to participating in political parties detract further from active citizenship.

The Left Party picked up where the Social Democrats stumbled on integration issues. Although bourgeois parties used some immigrant politicians in the 2006 election,

⁴¹ Nermo 1999; Orloff 1993; Hobson 2000.

⁴² Wadensjö 1993.

⁴³ Castles and Davidson 2000; Eder and Giesen 2001; Feldblum 1998; Icduygu 1996; Messina 2004; Ong 2003; Orloff 1993; Pettman 1999; Rosaldo 1999; Sassen 2002; Werbner and Yuval-Davis 1999.

immigrants' political integration has occurred mainly within the Left Party in Sweden. Ericson describes the Left Party's immigrant organization.

“Historically, the Left Party, there was no immigrant politic. Everything was discussed in terms of integration. In the 1960s, leftist refugees naturally gravitated toward the then-Communist Party. So Vänsterpartiet addressed multifamily immigrant housing problems. Until 1998 there was a Committee for *Invandrare* (Immigrants). Then integration was mainstreamed in Vänsterpartiet, and I'm satisfied with Vänsterpartiet today.”

Up until 2006, refugees played a strong role within Vänsterpartiet, a result of the small party's easier accessibility and the political origins of the victims of capitalist imperialism. Immigrants have entered the political system largely through the Left Party. Immigrants participate in Left Party meetings. Left Party media discuss the experiences of immigrants. Immigrants hold offices within the Left Party. Left Party members in their organizing jobs build cultural, historical projects to help Swedes recognize the constructive role of immigrants and minorities in Swedish life.

In the 1990s, however, imperial warfare began targeting Eastern European and Middle Eastern populations that had little allegiance to the Left. It is generally believed that within the context of Sweden, immigrants from South America, Africa, and the Middle East tend to be more Leftist in Sweden, while immigrants from Eastern Europe tend to be more Right wing. “In the middle East and Africa, Olaf Palme is still huge,” explains Social Democratic Party newspaper Chief Editor Eric Sundström.⁴⁴ At the turn of the twenty-first century, “Kurds will come to the Left Party because Vänsterpartiet is against the Turkish regime,” Ericson reports. But there are significant strains within this small political bloc that indicate that some immigrants would easily switch to more right-wing parties under the right conditions. “They (Kurds) have conservative social values that conflict with the politics of Vänsterpartiet. For example, with regard to family breakup.”

⁴⁴ Sundström, Eric. Personal communication, June 29, 2007.

While divorces occur at half the U.S. rate, at 2.2 per 1,000 population, divorce is as frequent in Sweden as in other Scandinavian countries.

Despite the political citizenship handicaps, Messina (2004) finds that Western European immigrants' traditionally-overwhelming allegiance to Left parties is one significant citizenship resource. While ethnic minorities' material and subjective interests dovetail with the traditional policy agendas of Left political parties, the interests of immigrants are increasingly being factored into the Left's policies.⁴⁵ Left Party member Stefan Kudryk reports, however, that many youth, immigrants and minorities switched their votes in 2006 to the bourgeois parties, which effectively claimed that they alone could provide the innovative leadership to stimulate further job creation.

A public service television exit poll confirms Kudryk. Immigrants and especially the children of immigrants—those who are doubly hit by unemployment as both new Swedes and youth⁴⁶—defected from the Left in droves at the 2006 election. The new Swede Left vote dropped precipitously from 73 percent in 2002 down to 48 percent in 2006.⁴⁷ The Social Democratic Party sees this defection as the result of a communication failure.

“I think that the main reason for us losing so much in that group has to do with jobs. The Moderates clearly won the debate about how new jobs

⁴⁵ Messina 2004: 39.

⁴⁶ In the 2006 election, the Social Democrats received 35 percent of the vote (Statistiska centralbyrån). In the 2002 election, the Social Democrats received 39.8 percent of the vote, up from 36.47 percent in 1998 (www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2880.htm). A striking aspect of the 2002 election is the substantial gain of the left Swedish political bloc amongst first-time voters. “Young voters were attracted in particular by the Left Party and the Greens, who picked up 18 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. With the 30 per cent of the first-time vote won by the Social Democrats, this meant that almost 60 per cent of the youngest voters in Sweden chose one or other of the parties in the left-of-centre bloc. In 1998, the corresponding figure was 50 per cent” (www.sweden.se/templates/cs/Article_3163.aspx, accessed on January 8, 2005). In 2006 first-time voters participated at pre-1998 levels: 78 percent for women and 74 percent for men. (Statistiska centralbyrån.)

⁴⁷ SVT (Sveriges Television). 2007. “Valet 06: Invandrarröstning 1”. <http://svt.se/svt/jsp/Crosslink.jsp?d=56667>, accessed July 2, 2007.

ought to be created. The only problem is the Social Democrats created a lot of jobs. I think since a lot of these people are unemployed, they thought something like this: ‘The Moderates might cut down the social benefits a lot of my family receives, but I am tired of waiting for the Social Democratic government to create more jobs, and that is what I want. So I will go for Reinfeldt (bourgeois Moderata Party leader) this time, he seems like a nice guy.’⁴⁸

Institutional immigrant political leadership declined in 2006, after increasing within the Parliament in 2002. 17, or less than 5 percent of Parliamentary members were foreign born in the 2006 elections. While women continued to make gains in Parliament, their representation likewise fell in municipal councils in the 2006 elections.⁴⁹ 6.5 percent of municipal council members and 7 percent of county council members were foreign-born in 2002. These numbers had been increasing since 1994.⁵⁰ Efforts to expand and deepen citizenship among women and New Swedes appear to have declined.

Local Actors and Public Intellectual Discourse

The onus for immigrant integration lies not only on immigrants themselves, but also on local-level officials in Sweden’s decentralized integration scheme. In this chapter I have interviewed some of the local-level actors policymakers identify as responsible for decentralized integration, as well as investigating public intellectual discourse blaming racist municipal officials and workers for preventing the smooth integration of refugees, for example the recent introduction of tens of thousands of refugees from Iraq.

I interviewed local workers involved in decentralized integration practices to learn about their views of Swedish integration challenges, integration practices, and resources. The municipalities and counties, and typically the Left Party where elected to local office, are

⁴⁸ Sundström, Eric. Personal communication, June 29, 2007.

⁴⁹ Statistiska Centralbyrån. 2007. “Citizen influence.”

⁵⁰ Svensk Migrationsverket. 2007.

involved with the integration of especially vulnerable groups, such as immigrant communities.

Political party-based officials discussed and displayed both creative approaches and the impact of larger hegemonic projects on their integration work. I find that immigrant integration in Sweden at the local level—and even the popular perception of immigrants and immigrant integration of Left Party members—is conditioned by the politics and policies of neoliberalization. What I find through dialogic interpellation between public and private discourse, based on the topic of immigrant integration and data on recent political-economic changes in Sweden, is that society is being reformed. Society is being reformed not just through the transmission of built institutions and habits, but also through an influx of diverse new members with their own multiple heritages, and through the ascendance of a global hegemonic project, neoliberalism. That project is anchored both within the Anglo-American empire and the global capitalist class, and promulgated by technicians and experts within the state and civil society.

The empire-building and environment-depleting projects of global capital and the states attached to them force the compromise of culture—the “cultural genocide” as well as the hybridization that occurs when people are compelled to move into new territory already occupied by powerful actors. As we saw in Fadime Sahindal’s story, this can mean the propagation of trauma and violence upon people, within families, and within communities. Considering the trauma inflicted upon people displaced by global accumulation, it should be recognized and respected that immigrants contribute their diverse experience and skills to the reconstruction of their receiving society.

Immigrant experiences and impacts are diverse along the lines of gender, skills, language, and ethnicity and race. Certain refugee groups have intrinsic barriers to citizenship, such as language, which can be considered more transitional than the fundamental issues of macroeconomic structural reform and discrimination that impact all refugee groups to

different degrees. To address citizenship difficulties in making a place for their communities within the receiving country, refugees have fielded some progressive social movement actors—such as Fadime Sahindal—supporting a feminist, compassionate-progressive state. However, much of refugees’ contemporary political impact in Sweden—as we saw in Chapter Three—is in advocating for and voting for the low-wage, high-inequality economic model. This is because, due to anti-inflationary bias and discrimination, unemployment has been concentrated among refugees, and welfare has become stigmatized—for immigrants. Some immigrants have been vulnerable to the shock doctrine of radical neoliberal change.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: ADVANCING IMMIGRANT INCLUSION THROUGH SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP

“But, as we have seen, the neoliberal state needs nationalism of a certain sort to survive. Forced to operate as a competitive agent in the world market and seeking to establish the best possible business climate, it mobilizes nationalism in its effort to succeed. Competition produces ephemeral winners and losers in the global struggle for position, and this in itself can be a source of national pride or of national soul-searching”

David Harvey (2005).

Immigration “Crisis” and State Autonomy

Liberals’ strongest empirical case against social democratic citizenship has been the “failures” of Swedish immigrant integration. Neoliberals have identified the source of the pains of the neoliberal era, and that turns out to be the distance between immigrants and junk jobs in Sweden. If this problem is solved, through one more innovative neoliberal initiative—labor deregulation, then social problems will be solved. New Swedes, because they are tired of being jobless and stigmatized, will be integrated through the junk job labor market. Confidence can at last be restored to ethnic Swedes when people of foreign origin no longer have access to citizenship rights. The welfare state, neoliberal integration reformists hold, will be preserved by reducing its risk dispersal capacity.

Through examining immigration and immigrant incorporation in Sweden, I conclude that even in immigrant inclusion, in that one area where we find an empirical case can be made that working class strength and relative state autonomy has produced some poor outcomes for some groups of people, the situation of a major group of immigrants,

refugees, in Sweden is not worse than the fate of refugees in other countries. New Swedes are subject to discrimination in Sweden, just as immigrants and minorities are subject to discrimination everywhere. But in Sweden, New Swedes have the advantage of an extensive and innovative system of national and local State and civil society-run social supports.

Why can integration be painted as a crisis in Sweden? Partly because Sweden has such a large proportion of refugees and family members in its immigrant population. In the absence of welfare state supports, being a refugee is typically fraught with even more risk and difficulty than being a labor immigrant. Much of the comparative welfare gap between immigrants and natives in Sweden can be explained by the “push” nature of refugee immigration. Many immigrants do not arrive in Sweden because they fill a place on the labor market. Their precarious relationship to remunerated work means that they need social supports.

Much of the comparative welfare gap between immigrants and natives in Sweden can also be explained by the high rate of female employment in Sweden. There is a larger gap between native female employment and immigrant women’s employment in Sweden than elsewhere because there is a higher employment standard for women in Sweden than in most other countries, and because many immigrant women in Sweden are refugees without much experience in remunerated work. I find that upon rigorous inspection, integration problems in Sweden fail to produce a sufficient argument for dismantling social democratic policies and programs and replacing them with liberal institutions. Sweden has some very good, multicultural, social democratic approaches to integrating vulnerable populations. There is no reason to believe that neoliberal measures will improve integration in Sweden. Neoliberal approaches, as instituted for nearly three decades around the world, are not *de facto* innovative, especially considering they are a repackaging of the laissez-faire capitalist policies of earlier eras.

Swedish policy had promised both ethnic Swedes and New Swedes that new residents would not be forced into welfare state “dependency”. In this social democratic context, I have also shown that, regardless of the validity of neoliberal integration arguments, the problems of immigrant integration in Sweden produce a *politically-effective* “crisis” argument for neoliberal political and economic change in the current political-economic historical context. Neoliberal reforms created the economic crisis that drove immigrant unemployment.

Over the course of time, unique and convergent class coalition and formation has been altered by a gravitational shift in international relations. With increased global capital mobility, declining rates of profit, and the demise of the Soviet Union, the unique class compromise in Sweden has been challenged. Under the hands of alternating Social Democrats and bourgeois coalitions, Sweden has embraced parts of the Anglo-American and Catholic-European projects to bolster profit-generation and accumulation through privatization, deregulation, and wage-earner re-commodification. Neoliberal projects have divided wage-earners and decreased support for public goods, dismantling some of wage-earners’ legal and policy power resources. Increasingly, wage-earners become more vulnerable, more tractable—as is clearly visible amongst the most vulnerable, immigrants—permitting capitalists domination of political and economic policy-setting, and reducing state autonomy.

Though the 1990s economic crisis was buffered by the social democratic welfare state, unemployment has lingered. Combined with the issue of Sweden’s aging population, immigrant unemployment has been stigmatized and pressed into a “dependency crisis”. It is a political formula that has allowed reformists to mobilize consensus around dismantling high-functioning, well-respected pillars of social democracy, including the welfare state, social citizenship rights, and the power of organized labor.

Today national reformists and the European Union are crafting a new era of non-Nordic labor immigration for Sweden. I argue that Leftists, labor, immigrant advocates, and working class men and women have an interest in opposing the EU, capitalist political organizations, and reformist politicians to prevent the development of a low-skill, low-wage service economy in Sweden, because in the post-industrial era, low-quality service sector jobs have been shown to deplete workers rather than provide opportunities for social mobility. While segregated housing has its costs and benefits, a post-industrial segregated labor market is associated with the emphatic diminishment of the public goods, public services, and public good culture that reduce inequality, nourish a large middle class, and maintain social mobility.

Repeatedly, Social Democratic and Left Party politicians insisted to me that the neoliberal policy changes were superficial, and the social democratic Swedish model was not in decline. Even bourgeois electoral politicians assure the public that they will not dismantle the Swedish welfare state. Unionization rates were high amongst ethnic Swedes; the middle class still identified with working class goals. Three years later, despite a thriving economy, the Left coalition was out of power. Winning on a campaign that promised reduced unemployment—an immigrant and youth issue, again the ruling bourgeois coalition was running Sweden, threatening the right to organize, and providing public funding to prop up businesses in an expanded low-wage, low-skill job sector.¹ All of these proposals came in the name of “jobs” for immigrants.

The concern is that such measures will not reduce inequality between ethnic Swedes and New Swedes. Recent experience in other countries shows that a capitalist class segment dependent upon low-skill, low-wage labor will use their resources, unsurprisingly, to support the depleting conditions that maintain a low-skill, low-wage labor force—conditions that include Right-center government. This might be of concern in a social democratic country. Yet the well-funded neoliberal movement in North America and

¹ Popular disgust with the SAP's Goran Persson was also cited as a reason for the Alliance's victory.

Europe is convincing to citizens and policymakers. The discourses of “inclusion” and “jobs” seem to lead to Margaret Thatcher’s no-alternative universe.

The focus here on the politics and policy of immigration, social exclusion, and integration has highlighted the importance of cross-border relations in the ongoing articulation of the State. This monograph documents the role of immigration politics in the reformist challenge to the Nordic social citizenship model and the rise of technocratic European liberalism. As neoliberals induce crises of the State to dismantle welfare systems and privatize public resources, it is worth examining the workings of a well-established, socialist-informed political system. Social democracy was able to foster a robust capitalist economy while minimizing inequality, through building consensus and explicitly transferring power resources to working class people and organizations. Because this was accomplished within a capitalist trade and governance network, it was a precarious achievement. Owing much to the socialist vision and praxis of democracy and human development, social democracy was not a small accomplishment. As we know from social epidemiology, reductions in inequality matter. Every decrease in inequality is a decrease on psychosocial damage to people, and an increase in human health and community and environmental vibrancy.

Framings of the corporate media and political careerists aside, neoliberalization was not inevitable. In 2003 Swedes opposed subordinating their economy to the European Union’s neoliberal monetary system. In this they opposed Social Democratic and bourgeois political leadership. Despite the increased militancy of export-oriented Swedish capital, political interventions—some radical, some strategic—could have stopped this fitful movement rightward. The Social Democrats could have designed innovative forms of nationalization when faced with capitalist militancy, rather than bowing to capital and combined Anglo-American and European Union pressure to induce further deregulation and privatization. Labor organizations and Social Democrats could have joined forces and dedicated primary efforts to articulating a coalition with rural

smallholders,² as well as promoting social rights for the new members of wage-earning society. At some risk to international relations, and turning its back on humanitarianism, the Swedish state could have temporarily decreased refugee acceptance during the 1990s economic crisis, instead of increasing refugee immigration. They could have limited refugees to individuals from wealthy groups and individuals committed to democratic and social citizenship values, as Borjas suggested. They could have tried to prevent diasporas by joining forces with other refugee-accepting states to oppose the U.S. military intervention in Europe. If dissatisfied with the Social Democrats' neoliberal policies, New Swedes as well as ethnic Swedes could have voted for the Left or Green parties, rather than the bourgeois coalition, which radically intensified the same neoliberalization program.

However, the gradual diminishment of the social democratic alternative in Northern Europe, spurred by Chicago economists such as Friedman and Sachs, is indicating that the social democratic state did not have the autonomy that political sociologists attributed to it. Sweden's appearance of exceptionalism and independence seems to have come not purely from Nordic creativity, smallness, homogeneity, conflict-aversion, or justice, as have often been suggested, but also from its position in between the Soviet-U.S. tension.³

Across neoliberal societies, making wage-earners more vulnerable to risk has been a multi-pronged policy involving the use of immigration politics in creating a substantial

² Rural smallholders, historically *the* crucial coalition for labor, have as elsewhere become captured by the conservative coalition.

³ Yet even as social democracy may be fading in the North (though Germany, France, and England demonstrate that "social democratic" parties can still survive and even prosper in non-social democratic states. Their instability is in convincing the public that they can provide alternative leadership under such conditions.), neoliberalism is in decline in Latin America, and there emerges a social democracy that embraces socialism, developing forces of production and infrastructure while building working class power resources— democracy and equality. With U.S. power drawn to securing oil resources and controlling what portions of Asia it can, these Latin American countries have found themselves untethered, and have begun pursuing the socialist-based social democratic alternatives to neoliberal globalization that European social democratic parties cannot and will not.

pocket of reduced social citizenship, undermining the social citizenship rights maintained by the welfare state. Immigration and integration are nearly the transhistorical constants that death and taxes are (though not necessarily as foreboding). In the long-term interests of developing social citizenship and reducing inequality in a society, it is essential that immigrants are buffeted with a mix of opportunities, respect, and social supports that contribute to the power resources of other subordinate social groups. Where social rights are compromised and cannot compete with property rights to produce empowered, enfranchised, decommodified citizens, wage-earners return to an atomized, stratified state. They are returned to a condition where they are compelled to compete, insecure, and dependent on decisions and forces beyond their control. It is not difficult to notice that these are not the conditions for the advancement of democracy.

Neoliberal Patches and Integration Policy

I have not tried to claim that new residents suffer no discrimination in Sweden. As situation testing shows, Swedes have not been innocent of prejudice, exploitation, and discrimination.⁴ Rather, I show that Swedish social democratic institutions and programs are ultimately better at helping both immigrants and natives develop as members within society than the proposed liberal alternatives. Although post-1970 refugee immigrants from Africa and the Middle East do fare worse than natives and other immigrants in terms of income, social mobility, health, and educational outcomes,⁵ the data on discrimination versus opportunity within Sweden tend to paint a favorable picture overall for both natives and new entrants to Swedish society. Even if belonging and participation were simply a matter of jobs, social democratic integration is successful. While researchers find incidence of lower wages for refugees in Sweden as early as the 1980s,⁶

⁴ Sweden has an imperial history in relation to Finland, and has inflicted internal colonialism upon the nomadic Samis and Romanis.

⁵ Integrationverket 2006.

⁶ Bengtsson, Lundh, and Scott 2005.

the wages of refugees in Sweden and the unemployment incidence was not very much worse than natives' wages or unemployment levels.⁷ In the period of labor immigration, immigrants were employed at a higher rate than natives. Into the late 1980s there was no more than a ten percent unemployment difference favoring native over immigrant women, and an eight percent unemployment difference favoring native over immigrant men in a country that fostered refugee and family reunification immigration.⁸ As I have shown in Chapter Four, this difference is lower than we would expect for women.

As the now-defunct Board of Integration and many experts have been at pains to show, first-generation refugees do worse than natives in Sweden, especially in periods of social upheaval. As is common elsewhere, a sense of proportion and perspective has been lost in the highly-opportunistic and emotionally-manipulative public politics of immigration and integration in Sweden. What is forgotten is that first-generation refugees do worse than natives almost everywhere. To be a refugee is usually to be handicapped and dependent because humans are social, and refugees are the people ripped from their social context. Refugee integration is typically difficult, even in an idealized liberal context like the United States. Immigration economist George Borjas demonstrates that economic outcomes for refugees are markedly poor, for example, in a country that—unlike Sweden—selects refugees by youth, skills, and assets.⁹

⁷ Integrationsverket 2004.

⁸ Integrationsverket 2006: 43.

⁹ Borjas 1999: 208-210. In fact the notion that refugee integration is normatively unproblematic seems to emanate from Sweden's own pre-1990 history, as well as the idea that prominently successful refugee groups in such countries as the U.S.—such as Jewish refugees after World War II or dispossessed Cuban capitalists—had no unique economic networks or group resources at their disposal, or assistance from their destination states. Both sociologist and economist immigration scholars understand that the immigrants' group networks (or "ethnic capital") have a profound effect on immigrant outcomes (Borjas 1999:146-160). A comparison of the state support and network resources of refugee *groups* needs to be undertaken, in order to get a more accurate picture of what resources, conditions, and substitutes refugees really need to successfully make a home in and contribute to a Western country. Currently, the refugee policy trend in both Sweden and the U.S. is drifting toward a "we'll provide an easy-entry low-quality job market, and you sink or swim on your own" program—with only theoretical assumptions and anecdotal evidence to suggest that such "tough indifference" is advantageous for all or even the majority of refugee groups and the

In Chapter Three, I posited that immigration is driven by both economic and political relationships. In order to capture not just economic characteristics like GDP growth and unemployment, but political-economic relationships, I analyzed inequality data in relation to immigration. While inequality does not relate perfectly with immigration, the data does suggest that the economic and political powers that drive inequality can also influence immigration. Inequality and immigration relationship trends vary along types of welfare states. For example, immigration tends to increase with increasing inequality in liberal regimes.

The movement of peoples may be eternal, but the kind and impact of immigration is a part of larger policy packages that create different qualities of citizenship. People are constrained by power and relations of exchange, but they also have choices about the sort of citizenship they create and live under—or the trajectories of citizenship development that they want to be on. I think people are assisted in making those choices when they have an historical and cross-national frame of reference. A comparative framework can help people resist the politics of disaster and reform from above.

How Can Swedish Policy Improve?

Sweden has an efficient, high-capacity welfare state, and immigrants need as much help as anyone. Other countries simply do not have the state capacity to incorporate some of the most vulnerable of the world's diaspora populations. The integration reformists studied in Chapter Four say immigrants are in trouble in Sweden. My review of the survey, economic, citizenship, and education findings confirms that refugee and family reunification immigrants face obstacles, with important comparative qualifications. Despite the accusations of state, local, and Swedish cultural incompetence, Sweden has

societies they enter, rather than advantageous for a nexus of specific firms, anti-tax politicians, and consumption.

both advanced programs for integrating refugees, and extremely high research and state capacity for improving on those programs.

Though the social democracy has great capacity to address the complex social nature of migrants and migration, impressive innovation in immigration and integration policies, and a strong history of immigration and integration policies, nonetheless extending membership into local and national communities is particularly challenging. Sweden both balances and fortifies its high-capacity state fiscal solvency and democratic citizenship by helping immigrants make a home and develop themselves and their communities, and fostering natives' personal development and communities. Migration entails many social problems, and while many natives can imagine "crime" and social "dependency" as social problems for immigrant-receiving communities, a sociological imagination is required for assessing the considerable social problems that entangle immigrants. Effective integration policy must be formulated with sociological imagination. It is not just that immigrants have fewer economic resources than they once had or that the relatively affluent natives have. As well, adult migrants have extensive and intricate social ties, many of which have been severed, which is a debilitating loss. It takes time and a supportive environment to rebuild social networks. Further, adult migrants have accumulated extensive and deep cultural capital, much of which does not translate into the historic, local specificity the receiving society.

The processes of hybridizing and adding to cultural capital is not something adult humans can do easily or comfortably. Even with multicultural policies working to establish a role in society for migrants' existing communities, extending social citizenship to immigrants is a formidable task. Yet social democracy is oriented specifically to enhancing democratic citizenship and reducing scarcity within the context of affluence. It has been successful in extending full membership in the community and developmental agency to many disadvantaged people and communities. Given this capacity, how can Sweden work with its own unique infrastructure to improve integration?

Make Sweden Home

Some immigrants will resist citizenship. The “myth of return” and the “community of memory” observed by Michael Jones-Correa (1998) create powerful disincentives for immigrants to seek citizenship in their new residence. The myth of return is crucial and probably non-negotiable for immigrants. It permits them the psychological comfort of feeling that after so many years and so much change, there will still be a comfortable place for them in their land of origin and it will be possible to go home. Few immigrants do manage to return to their sending country. Though most immigrants plan to return to their native land, in the U.S. for example, only one third on average have managed to do so over time.¹⁰ A study of return migration in comparative perspective found that although 95 percent of immigrants to France and Sweden intended to return to their country of origin, only 24 percent did return.¹¹ Despite intentions to return home, involuntary migrants such as refugees have an even lower rate of return immigration than labor immigrants.¹² Immigrants usually stay on in affluent receiving countries, but Jones-Correa found nevertheless that their immigrant communities and their organizations encourage immigrants to balance dual nationalist loyalties, emphasize their ethnicity to avoid making nationalist identity commitments, and talk and operate as if they were going home. Sweden has good policy in permitting dual citizenship, unlike the U.S. Dual citizenship allows immigrants to participate in a citizenship context without forswearing their countries of origin.

Since the immigrant communities tend to collectively maintain the myth of return, and in fact return may be a reality for a minority of immigrants, incentives to participate in the receiving country are important considerations in integration. Integration policy needs to

¹⁰ Jones-Correa 1998: 93, 95.

¹¹ Rogers 1984: 278, 271.

¹² Portes and Rumbaut 1990: 124-126.

provide participation incentives to immigrants that recognize and respect immigrants' psychological need for the myth of return. Increasing income is a rational motivation for people hoping their stay is short term. Motivation and incentives should be structured around participation as an instrumental strategy for gaining traction in the receiving country job market and economy, as well as around emancipatory goals that can and should include building networks and influence in the "temporary home" country.

Address Immigrant Unemployment in the Context of Anti-inflationary Bias

Policy planning has to accommodate the level of unemployment built into the economy. That implies welfare state support for the unemployed, and social democratic welfare state support to counter the development of an underclass. While it is likely that the most vulnerable members of society will be unemployed more frequently and use welfare more, the social democratic state has infrastructure, including free education, to prevent the development of an underclass. Within this context, the key to ensuring that refugee families do not become entrapped in chronic welfare use over generations is to help them feel that Sweden is home, in order to allow them to contribute their energies and skills to Swedish society. Discrimination is an impediment to this. Although it has been a political nonstarter, Affirmative Action should be promoted as a normative institutional good, in the context of discrimination on the labor market and in housing. Framing immigrants as the most vulnerable members of the working class will help to prevent the development of an Affirmative Action culture that promotes "visible minorities" while ignoring class.

Refugee immigration and family reunification immigration are immigration policies that result in more permanent settlement. They are also forms of immigration associated with higher rates of welfare use. In the context of anti-inflation biased policy, refugees and family reunification immigrants will have employment troubles relative to the rest of the population. They will use welfare services at a higher rate. If planners want to decrease refugee unemployment, they can reduce the number of refugees admitted into Sweden,

they can reinstate full-employment policies, and they can establish a non-stigmatized universal guaranteed income.

Reform Immigrant Introduction to Emphasize Language Acquisition

Cultural capital acquired by adults over time includes language, which takes time, effort, and social networks to develop. Although discrimination in the wake of Sweden's economic crisis reduced returns to human capital, in general immigration scholars have found language proficiency to make an important difference in immigrants' economic outcomes relative to natives.¹³

Sweden's free, public language programs—including top-notch English among other languages for natives, instruction in the mother tongue of immigrants for their progeny, and Swedish language instruction for refugees through local integration programs—could encourage language acquisition. But acquiring a new language is a difficult, long-term effort for most adults, especially those who have little experience with formal education, such as some immigrant groups. Since integration programs have emphasized job acquisition over the past couple of decades, language acquisition, an important key to economic integration, becomes an excessive burden. Refugees commonly abandon Swedish language studies before they achieve fluency.

Refugees would be more competitive on the job market over the long haul if those refugees with poor Swedish language skills were provided a basic guaranteed income for two years upon arrival in Sweden, and along with a 10-hour-per-week job, immediately placed into full-time Swedish language programs based on intensive language programs, such as the U.S. Mormon missionary language instruction program. The goal should be verbal fluency, even for illiterate immigrants. The intensive language program should be presented as an important two-year work assignment, and should be structured around

¹³ Carliner 1999; Chiswick 1993; Friedberg 2000; Park 1999; Espinosa and Massey 1997.

culturally-resonant motivations involving the immigrants' traditional authorities, building international ties, and emancipatory theory and goals. Language proficiency, rather than junk jobs, has been shown to provide a long-term tool to improve immigrants' economic outcomes.

Frame Immigrants as a Vulnerable Part of the National Working-class

Framing immigrants as aggressive invaders is inaccurate and has to be countered for society to address real problems. Moreover, it is not strategic for Swedes who rely on wages for income, labor organizations, and working class-affiliated parties to frame immigrants as invaders. "Invader" framing implies developing high inequality practices that reduce social citizenship and divert social investment to disciplinary public safety. For the receiving community, it is important to reframe who immigrants are. Just as von Hayek insisted that the long-term proliferation of ideas is a fundamental to social change, changing framing is a fundamental concern to social integration. Integration policy can improve by reframing immigrants—regardless of their reasons for migrating—as vulnerable, usually working-class members of the nation, rather than invaders. This requires placing immigrants in a class framework, in addition to understanding them as cultural, gendered, and racialized.

Even "different" migrants are best understood as a part of "us" that needs extra dispensation, not less, as they are sharing the national territory with natives. While immigrants certainly have agency, they are particularly vulnerable in a new society. Approaching immigrants as a particularly vulnerable part of society does not mean giving up on borders. But to the extent that there is a change in population over time, citizens can approach this reality with better policy based on a better policy framework.

In the U.S. immigrant and immigration advocates have argued that immigrants are not invaders. The framework in the U.S. is that immigrants are cultural persons in our midst, doing jobs that we do not want to do (for very low wages). This discourse is too evasive

of the distributional issues discussed in Chapter Three. Immigration experts such as George Borjas (1999) point out that the principal economic impact of uncontrolled immigration into the service-based U.S. economy is redistribution from the working class to the capitalist class. With an increase in unorganized workers and with its collective action advantages, capital is able to reduce the cost of labor. As native workers move from the key immigration regions, there is a widespread reduction in workers' share of the wealth generated. The keys to reducing the transfer of social wealth across classes are ensuring the conditions whereby labor is also capable of collective action and unions can organize immigrant labor. This has been the case in Sweden, but EU policy and court rulings are threatening this Swedish capacity.

State, organized labor, and social movement actors need to help the public recognize that there is little evidence that working class people benefit by reinforcing vast pockets of vulnerability in their midst. The policy implications of framing immigrants as vulnerable and working class are about expanding social citizenship and reigning in capital, rather than shutting borders down completely, reducing aggregate social citizenship, and building policing and prison infrastructure to treat "aliens" as criminals.

Focus on Sweden's Comparative Advantage

Comparative advantage arguments could be sharpened. The hegemonic policy proposal now is to create yet another low-skill service labor market in a world where junk jobs firms chase the slums that have grown at breakneck speed since 1970.¹⁴ Even with immigrants, Sweden has no comparative advantage among low-skill labor markets.

It is unreasonable to expect that immigrant families will experience social mobility in Sweden by creating a large secondary labor market? Only an expanding industrial economy or state sector employment has been shown to provide jobs that lead to social

¹⁴ Davis 2006.

inclusion and integration into the economic mainstream. If the Swedish state cannot provide state jobs, quality industrial jobs, and social services and welfare assistance to immigrants, then Sweden does not have the capacity to absorb so many immigrants. Increasing inequality through fostering a poor-quality job sector and a low-quality business sector will not increase state capacity, nor will it foster citizenship and diminish social exclusion. While social democracy has flourished by combining elements of socialist and liberal approaches within the capitalist context, combining elements of neoliberalism is not innovating a Third Way. It is just becoming more liberal and less social democratic. Providing neoliberal patches to immigrants' struggles to make a home means walking away from expanding social citizenship and democracy. Moreover, to fail to equitably distribute risk—to fail to reduce risk for those least able to weather risk—is to undermine people's ability to belong and participate.

Place Immigration within a Macroeconomic Policy Framework

In Sweden, one of the principal problems with immigration and integration policy is the lack of effective communication to the public of the macro-policy framework for immigration and integration. Opinion makers obscure the fact that one reason why Sweden takes so many refugees in is that on the global stage, the affluent social democratic country has the unique capacity to have more altruistic policies including a high proportion of refugee and family immigration. It should be widely understood that this capacity is due to two interrelated factors. First, Sweden can take on the global leadership role of refuge-provider because Sweden traded off labor immigration in favor of refugee immigration. Immigration economists contend that immigration will have to become more integrated across policy domains because different kinds of immigrants—labor migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees—are substitutable for one another.¹⁵ That labor migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees are separated in policy can be a counterproductive political and bureaucratic construct, as we see in Europe and in the

¹⁵ Louka Katseli (2004) and George Borjas (1999).

U.S., because even “non-labor” immigrants’ welfare is tied to their ability to get decent work, and often even labor emigration is compelled by political repression, as it has been recently in Chiapas and elsewhere.¹⁶

The EU is pressing Sweden to reduce its labor protections in order to facilitate “the mobility of labor”. Limits should be placed on refugee and family immigration as labor immigration increases. Sweden’s ability to introduce adult new residents needs to be calculated within the context of maintaining democratic citizenship. Though some may be able to bid for work more successfully than others, most immigrants will need assistance in becoming as close to democratic citizens as is possible.

Reduce Forced Migration

Generally, people do not want to emigrate. It is costly and traumatic for most people. From the point of view of immigrants and indigenous people subjugated and dislocated by global capital and the more or less democratic states attached to capital, integration is difficult to distinguish from assimilation. In this perspective, integration has been described as “cultural genocide” or “low-intensity genocide”. Even if Sweden has to reduce refugee or family-reunification immigration, Sweden should continue to coordinate its immigration policy directly with its humanitarian intervention policy, so that people around the world can live where they have social ties. Sweden has contributed to humanitarian foreign policy, as well as environmental approaches that maintain ecosystems. However, Swedish capital does engage in the international arms trade. The affluence that the arms trade brings should be weighed against its tendency to undermine stability abroad and force migration.

¹⁶ Increasingly in the U.S. different kinds of immigration are becoming integrated—though again, policy integration is not addressing immigrants as workers and citizens. Rather they are integrated as security threats.

Still, the problem for Sweden is not just reducing its dependency on industries that contribute to conflict and destabilizing intervention. The small country has limited power to prevent crises overseas. Not only does the International Panel on Climate Change predict global warming will increasingly spawn storms and other natural disasters, the U.S. and its closest allies are in an expansionary imperial phase. Sweden will have relatively little power to reduce conflict and irreversible environmental damage around the world. Even its Nordic network has limited power. Further, because the other Nordic countries have dissimilar immigration policies, they may not have the same degree of interest in coordinating international policies, including pressuring the UN for more efficacious humanitarian intervention in the event of crisis overseas.

What Swedes can do to reduce forced migration is refuse to support regimes that facilitate environmental destruction and imperialism. They can elect governments that put socially and environmentally conscious brakes on the global engines of accumulation. To reduce conflict, habitat destruction, and forced migration, affluent peoples need to be concerned with distribution rather than accumulation.

Protect and Restore Universalism

Refugee families will experience social mobility in Sweden without creating a large secondary labor market if the Swedish welfare state (including public education) is not diminished. After all, Swedes themselves were once unskilled and deeply divided by class. An advantage social democrats had in the past is that a significant portion of the Swedish bourgeoisie were persuaded that they would prosper as conditions in Sweden improved for all. The problem that needs to be addressed to solve exclusion is that the Swedish bourgeoisie do not believe that anymore. Socialism is what allowed the social democrats to build an affluent low-inequality country. In a one-ideology era, crypto-socialism may be needed to renew innovative policy planning and framing. The Universal Guaranteed Income movement in Europe could be harnessed to this cause.

Reform Labor Organizations

Not only should labor unions take a stronger role in framing the immigrants and integration debate today, but because organized labor's work is dependent upon how new residents become both workers and citizens, organized labor must recognize that it is to their mid-to-long-term advantage to make ongoing social incorporation—via immigration and integration policy formation—a pillar of their work. Vigorous labor requires expanding social citizenship. Without social or judicial support for affirmative action, labor organizations need to recognize labor's interest in detecting and combating discrimination in businesses.

The efficacy of labor's ability to set immigration and integration policy in the face of the considerable weight of EU and neoliberal social movement pressure depends on labor organizations' ability to listen to immigrants as promising members of the Swedish community, as the LO and the ABF have started to do. In this era of unfettered global capitalism, Swedish labor organizations' efforts to connect strategically with workers' organizations overseas will help further maintain the Swedish social democratic model—affluence in the context of low inequality, secured by a distinctively capable and cross-class responsive Swedish state.

APPENDIX A

METHODS

Data collected for this project include the following.

- The attitudes and beliefs of a random sample (1997) of non-ethnic Swedes (invandrare), regarding the Swedish home country, life chances, discrimination (Socialstyrelsen study).
- The immigrant issues discussed by Riksdag members and Västerås (case study) municipal representatives, as per interviews, newspaper content, official Riksdag records and policy-formation meeting analysis. I analyzed the extent to which and how political actors facilitate (or impede) immigrant citizenship.
- The political parties' programs in party literature and public statements in newspapers, immigrant/minority-related content. I asked the extent to which and how political parties and politicians believe immigrant incorporation is an issue for their constituents and potential voters/party members.
- Integration process and challenges as expressed through interviews with municipal level integration policy-makers and Vänsterpartiet members. Vänsterpartiet has many minority members and these policies are at the forefront of their platform.
- The attitudes and beliefs expressed through interviews with members of the former ruling coalition (Social Democrat and Vänsterpartiet), and the current bourgeois ruling coalition (now named The Alliance) at the national level (Riksdag).
- An historical survey of the immigration and minority practices and positions taken by the LO, from 1973 through 2002.
- Secondary source historical research on political, ethnic and economic organizations and the state in the Reformation in Sweden, the farm reorganization period, and the

twentieth century, regarding the history of solidarity-building in Sweden since the Reformation.

- The effects of European Union policy on Swedish policy, reviewing the contents of pertinent Riksdag documents, EMU policy and newspaper articles.
- In Chapter Two, data on the U.S. foreign-born population by decade, with intervening years extrapolated, was compiled from the U.S. Census, and compared with economist Emmanuel Saenz's data on income inequality (the percent of national income held by the top decile of the U.S. population) between 1917 and 2005 in the U.S.
- In Chapter Two, I derive data from International Monetary Fund list of GDP/capita by Purchasing Power Parity; levels of immigration and inequality coefficients provided by the United Nations 2005 World Population Policies, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division; and the CIA World Factbook to compare inequality (Gini coefficients) and percent of foreign born in population for the 40 net-immigration countries.
- In Chapter Four, data from the OECD was used to compare OECD immigrant-native employment gaps in OECD labor markets, by country, and over time.
- In Chapter Four, data was derived from van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004: 715, and OECD (2005) tables 1.A1.1 and 1.A1.2. to contrast average immigrant-native employment rate differences between 1980 and 2000 against 2003 male-female employment difference, across OECD countries.
- In Chapter Four, data was extracted from Kogan (2003) to compare employment trade-offs for immigrants in Sweden compared to a model liberal country.

There is an increasing disciplinary recognition that, though action and structure theory need not be reconciled, sociological explanations must refer to both action and structure. To paraphrase Marx from *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, people make

their own history through collective action¹, but purposive though it may be, they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.² This study of citizenship serves to show how class, a concept that is most usefully anchored within a broad understanding of the economic, is formed in and through processes that also create and re-create racial and gender formations. Race, class and gender are thus accomplished through constrained practices, and should be understood from the locations of different people.³

Partly following the feminist methodology of Smith (1987), I seek to produce knowledge from local experiences—perspectives that are extralocal to each other—such as those of Swedes, ethnic minority Swedes, and their policy makers, using data from the 1997 Socialstyrelsen survey to gain a picture of the ethnic minority experience, Swedish and European opinion studies data, and interviews I conducted with policy makers at the national and municipal level on the subjects of immigration and solidarity. With an extended case methodology⁴ as well as the feminist interview, participant-observation and content analysis methodological technique of dialogical interpretation,⁵ these

¹ Action theory is an orientation to sociological analysis associated with the Weberian tradition, including symbolic interactionism. Social reality is the outcome of purposive social action and the aim of the approach is meaningful understanding and explanation, although meaningful explanation and other types of explanation are considered complementary forms. Symbolic interactionism provides the main alternative methodological approach to functionalism and to social survey using fixed choice questionnaires and standardized variables. Intensive interviews are among its select forms of social research. Thus, this approach makes an appropriate complement to the survey data and the historical-structural explanations for solidarity formation.

² An added actor-based interactional spin to this explanatory program is to examine how stability is furthered through actors' attempts to anticipate the probable consequences of their actions in others' responses (Becker 2002).

³ Acker 1997: 54.

⁴ Burawoy, Michael, et al. 1991. *Ethnography Unbound: Power and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁵ See Pettman in Hirschman 1999:59, and Yuval-Davis and Werbner.

contrasting experiences will help enable this study to achieve interpretation and explanation that is found beyond the meanings, intentions and views of causation that activities and events hold for participants.

In order to move toward the overarching question *How is citizenship formation impacted by internal and external pressures?*, to which a study of immigration and integration is particularly suited, qualitative analysis of citizenship formation was used, based on data gathered in interviews, and backed by news reports, policy documents, and public campaign literature. A substantial body of work exists in Sweden on the welfare of immigrants and on social, political and economic changes. The interview data, combined with survey data and archival material, provided me with both background information and a snapshot of the factors relevant to citizenship, supplying the raw material for an analysis of citizenship's relationship to organizational, political opportunity, resource availability, and framing factors.

Interview

The interview is an interactional situation,⁶ where it is more useful to talk of data generation than data collection.⁷ In the interviews I will examine how policy makers construct solidarity and the problems of integrating ethnic Swedes and refugee minorities. In order to map out collective action participants (political actors at the state, regional and municipal levels, coalition partners within unions, religious groups, women's groups and environmental groups) and targets (political parties, employers associations and national government agencies dealing with employment, worker protections, gender issues, child-care, housing, discrimination and integration),⁸ I will begin strategic research site⁹

⁶ Denzin 1978: 112-113.

⁷ Mason 1996: 35.

⁸ Cress and Snow, 2000: 1074.

municipal level interviews with nine Left Party political contacts in the municipality of Västerås, which has received a great bulk of refugee immigration. The Left Party deals with more minority matters than other parties, and its politicians, often for reasons of acknowledged expertise, tend to coordinate local integration programming. While in some ways the Left Party policy makers are not representative of Swedish policy makers in general as they deal with immigrant integration, we should also recognize that, due to the division of labor in the ruling Social Democrat-Left Party coalition and their key role in this policy area, Left Party policy makers set the agenda that all policy makers follow to some extent. I used the Left Party as informants on Swedish integration practices and history.

In order to compare a range of official understandings of the issues, I conducted interviews among a purposive sample of nine federal government officials, and a random sample of nine federal government officials, see Appendix D. Some of these officials are selected for their ties to the issue of immigration or integration, and some Riksdag members are selected randomly from the pool of parliamentarians who apparently lack ties to the issues studied. I also interviewed a snowball sample of government officials recommended by first-tier interviewees. This bolstered the data gathering process, because it is very difficult getting interviews with national level political leaders unless the researcher is recommended by someone they trust.

Appendix E lists organizations that I have contacted in the pre-research stage in order to gain a better understanding of the landscape of immigration, integration and solidarity in Sweden. Using interviews with polity members, together with legislative and government policy documents produced by the Riksdag, and public literature from political organizations, I gathered data on solidarity-formation factors, like political opportunity, resource mobilization, and framing activities.

⁹ Merton 1987: 10-11.

The interview method is best suited to this task for a number of reasons. Sweden is currently undergoing an intense period of adjustment to neoliberal changes in the state and society, as well as unstable growth. Its citizens are currently working out conflict as to the place of refugee immigrants where global economic pressures and liberal governance structures like trade agreements and the European Union have deprived the social democratic state of some of its levers.¹⁰ Interviews allowed me to gather data firsthand from some of the key participants in the struggle to define citizenship, and thereby permit me to test the citizenship-formation theories.

One serious and notorious limit to the interview method is the truth status of interviewee claims, and the more subtle issue of omissions and exaggeration. As Benney and Hughes¹¹ put it: “Every conversation has its own balance of revelation and concealment of thoughts and intentions: Only under very unusual circumstances is talk so completely expository that every word can be taken at face value.” Interviewers must be particularly cognizant of this problem when they are working in politically charged contexts, in which participants have a strong motivation to present facts and history in line with their normative projects, and are heavily personally invested in particular interpretations of the outcome. Sometimes interviewees gave me false or incomplete information. This issue of interpretive validity cannot be done away with entirely, but dialogical interpretation¹² and conducting interviews with actors in different parties and different institutions enabled some degree of verification of claims and interpretations.

¹⁰ For instance, capital exited from tripartite wage negotiation in the 1990s. This means that wages can no longer be rationally coordinated with economic needs. At that time, the liberal government deregulated the financial sector, so that the state could no longer direct investment rationally (Esping-Anderson 1990). With these key changes, the social democratic state has been moving away from its heyday commitment to universalism and decommodification (Esping-Anderson 1996: 15). Still, the 90s hemorrhage of capital declined with entry into the European Union and unemployment has fallen. Recently, a Liberal Party candidate admitted ruefully that in the heart of every Swede there remains a social democrat. The September 15, 2002 elections bore this observation out.

¹¹ 1984: 216.

¹² Pettman 1999: 59; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999.

While policy makers are likely to have widely varying interpretations of events and outcomes, blatantly contradictory testimony from the interviews enabled me to identify problem areas requiring either follow-up interviews and clarification or analysis in themselves. By placing them in context afforded by the official publications, public policy making records and newspaper account data I am collecting, I improved my analysis of my interview data. It should also be noted that some policy makers, particularly those with poorer English language skills used a younger, English-proficient political aide in the interview situation. These aides are working to establish political careers within the parties, and the parties can vary in their level of bureaucratization and the degree to which networks matter, with the Social Democrats at the high end of these. Swedish language versions in consultation between the policy maker and the aide may provide some degree of comparison with the English translation produced in the interview. Talking with political aides after official interviews provided a valuable source of fact-checking.

Ignorance of the context is also frequently cited as a drawback of the interview method: “Since interviewers ... do not directly observe people in their everyday lives, they are deprived of the context necessary to understand many of the perspectives in which they are interested.”¹³ This hazard is particularly acute for the foreign observer. For this reason, I have studied the Swedish language, followed Swedish newspapers, and procured a Fulbright fellowship to live in Sweden for twelve months, studying under Swedish sociologists, interviewing policy makers and attending policy meetings. Further, by bringing in historical data on policy formation, interviewing lower-level integration officials, and gaining a survey view on minority perspectives on their own relative social welfare, I put the policy maker statements in a valid social context.

Apart from the methodological issues of the validity of the data, I am faced with the

¹³ Taylor and Bogdan, 1984: 82.

dilemma of causality. Except for the data on inequality and immigration in the U.S., much of my data does not show change through time. It is also difficult to establish the comparative weight of each observed action on citizenship. I mitigate this by constructing an historical relationship between collective action and outcomes through triangulating interview data and archival sources. While none of these demonstrates causality definitively, together they provide a reasonable basis for making claims about structural change and collective action's influence over outcomes.

Procedures and Activities for Data Collection

Data collection was conducted as described in the sub-section above. Written letters to each potential interviewee were sent out explaining my position, the purpose and goals of the research, and inquiries as to their willingness and availability for interviewing.

Although they are public figures, each potential respondent was given the opportunity to answer anonymously, in order to bolster response rates around this sensitive political area. I also gave policy makers the option of completing the interview in an open-ended survey form, translated into both English and Swedish. I contacted potential interviewees selected from alphabetized Riksdag member lists, as described above, and asked them to participate in this study. Because the policy maker interviews constitute an attempt to “study up”, willingness to participate response rates were modest, and some members have recommended other members or staff to interview. Response bias favored women and former academics as people who might identify with me as a researcher, and favored those actors particularly concerned by immigration, integration, the changing politics of their party and their nation.

Negative responses to requests for interviews are data also. Integration is an issue that is by government decree supposed to be mainstreamed across policy areas, so that when I receive responses that cite the policy maker's lack of expertise as the basis for interview refusal, I can use this as data on the policy maker's attunement to the issues I am studying. As well, I can use this response as leverage for an interview, because I have

been working to achieve a better understanding of the policy making context and so I know the policy makers are expected to be able to discuss the issues of integration vis-a-vis their policy areas, where they might not expect a foreigner to be aware of this. Inquiries will also be made concerning other possible contacts they might suggest. Each letter of inquiry, on Stockholm University Department letterhead, will be followed up with a telephone call and an email containing the open-ended survey alternative.

Issues of data validity inherent in the interview method and strategies for the amelioration of validity problems have been discussed in the Interviews section. The interview method limits replicability and generalizability. However, I have designed the picture I draw from these interviews to intersect with my sources of triangulation, including the surveys and the historical review.

Ethical issues are always of paramount concern when working with human subjects, as the interview method requires. The interviewer must balance the need to obtain and use accurate and truthful data, with considerations of the possible ramifications of the publication of such data and research results for the informants. While the possibility of discarding data in the event that it is judged too sensitive or dangerous for informants must be considered on a case-by-case basis, it is hoped that the procedures of informed consent and complete anonymity will enable the published findings to reflect a full and accurate portrayal of the social reality lived and constructed by informants, without exposing them to any negative repercussions. Because I am interviewing public officials, I expect that they will not choose to remain anonymous.

Ethical Concerns

I acquired data on public actors and actions. Two incidents stand out in Swedish policy-makers' memories that make them avoid interviews. A few years ago an American professor working in Sweden published an account of Swedish racism, called *Even in*

Sweden,¹⁴ that to Swedes seemed shaming. The book played into neoliberal constructions of the state as incompetent. He did not return to Sweden to work. As a highly-informed, smaller core nation, Swedes from politicians to the general public do not wish to be set up as a foil for American normative arguments. I sympathize with this preference, and regret its impact on further research in Sweden. The matter is not assuaged by the fact that, as one parliamentarian expressed ruefully, the country's own tremendous research capacity has not yet been put to the topic of minority welfare as a barometer of the health of the social democracy. Nor is it assuaged by Sweden's self-appointed role as a model, to the world, of "good" capitalism. Other studies have observed that this model role makes Swedes especially sensitive to their ability to manage the country's image.¹⁵ This all indicates a problem for me as a researcher with perceptions of the domination inherent in my nationality. That the U.S. has been of late conducting belligerent foreign policy opposed by most Swedes does not undermine the associations of domination. Further, it is possible that these domination associations may interact in unpredictable ways with aspects of my personal presentation, such as my gender or my limited spoken-Swedish capabilities, which convey subordinate status.

A more recent incident that has discouraged politicians from permitting interviews on the subjects of immigration, minorities and integration happened during the 2002 elections, when a reporter with a hidden camera posed as a racist and successfully enjoined some politicians to reveal racist sentiments.¹⁶ This expose was aired on public television and ended the election bids of the politicians. Despite precautions I made in preparing official social-science requests for interviews under the auspices of the Fulbright organization and Stockholm University, policy-makers may not have made the distinction between a journalist and a sociology graduate student. The relative freshness of this journalistic incident likely discouraged responses, or encourage self-censorship, from policy-makers.

¹⁴ Pred 2000.

¹⁵ Townes 2002.

¹⁶ Sveriges Television. "Stora journalistpriset till uppdrag granskning." [Http://www.svt.se/granskning/](http://www.svt.se/granskning/).

As Foucault has shown, social science is based on a domination that ultimately produces documents that are out of the control of the people we study. The way we generally work to counter this is through engaging in a dialogue with subjects.¹⁷ However, whether I am able to dominate politicians, as would be their fear, or whether I do not have the power to make them talk with me, as was my concern, spurred me to find supporting data, such as public records. It can be easier getting survey data from the general Swedish public than getting interviews with politicians. Swedish survey response rates are extraordinarily high, which affords researchers the luxury of throwing out survey data with less than a sixty percent response rate.

An advantage of this project is that I am interested in questions involving the public, as opposed to private, sphere. As Eliasoph discovered in her ethnography, “Perhaps because I was purposely not interested in reporting on very intimate secrets, but was interested only in public displays, I felt less guilty...”¹⁸ It is likely that this also made her seem less dangerously powerful to her informants. I also had to encounter fear and mistrust, which can only be dealt with by balancing accountability to one’s subjects with a professional commitment to critical and objective research throughout the course of one’s work life.

Participant-observation

When I was invited to participate in policy-formation discussions, with permission I treated these as participant-observation (p-o) opportunities. P-o opportunities I had include meetings entailing the formation of a Left Party policy recommendation on immigration and regional meetings consolidating the Left Party position vis-a-vis the European Monetary Union. While not a primary component of my research methods, this supplemental data helped check understandings gleaned from interviews. The method of

¹⁷ Burowoy 1991: 1.

¹⁸ Eliasoph 1998: 273.

research which would best allow an examination of interactions in groups is one that involves studying groups in the field for an extended period of time. Participant observation has been used by Nina Eliasoph (1998) and Paul Lichterman (1997) in similar types of studies. This strategy for collecting data involves a researcher in direct contact with her informants, observing and recording the talk produced by members of civil society and the state in their natural setting.¹⁹ The goal is to gain an insider view of the everyday reality of people in groups.²⁰

Participant observation is a particularly appropriate method for a researcher trying to develop a deeper, fuller understanding of people in their social context.²¹ Participant observation allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the meanings of actions,²² and it is recommended for studies that need to consider changes and ongoing process. As the “paradigmatic” social science technique, participant observation is heralded as a method that can bring together the perspective of the participant who calls for understanding and the observer who seeks causal explanation. Understanding is the hermeneutic complement to the scientific aspect of sociological research, causal explanation. The advantages of participant observation, says Burawoy, are commonly thought to lie both in direct observation of how people act and in how they understand and experience those acts. “It enables us to juxtapose what people say they are up to against what they actually do.”²³

“What distinguishes participant observation is the study of people in their own time and

¹⁹ See Babbie 1992: 288.

²⁰ Singleton, Straits, and Straits 1993:318.

²¹ Whyte 1984: 26.

²² Babbie 1992: 288.

²³ Burawoy 1991: 2-3.

space, in their own everyday lives.”²⁴ What distinguishes participant observation has at times also been seen as the method’s weakness. The close contact between the researcher and her object of research can be considered a threat to objectivity. However, in this study, minimal intimacy, transference or identification is expected, due to the sporadic nature of participant observation opportunities. Another issue is that the low number of samples from the population limits generalization;²⁵ and the research process is not replicable in the experimental sense, making the method weak in terms of reliability.²⁶ Data gathered is in part the interpretation of the researcher, as discussed above. However, as mentioned above, the participant observation method has compensatory strengths, and the use of multiple methods in the proposed study is intended to address the weaknesses of the primary forms of data-gathering. As Babbie points out, participant observation is flexible, allowing for changes in the process of conducting research that can accommodate new insights, including those afforded by the complementary research method.²⁷

This participant observation portion of my study focused primarily on the talk produced in interactions within groups. I also compared group talk with private talk in smaller interactions. I did this living in the Stockholm area for twelve months, participating, observing, and interviewing in political and language groups in the city. I also studied American immigrant advocacy, living in the Philadelphia area and visiting Denver, participating, observing, and interviewing people attached to the American Friends Service Committee immigrants’ advocacy work. By personally involving myself in the group activities of political organizations, I gained valuable insight into understanding member’s practices, including their discursive practices, which build upon the

²⁴ Burawoy 1991: 2.

²⁵ Burawoy 1991: 2.

²⁶ Babbie 1992: 307.

²⁷ Babbie 1992: 306.

productive, state and civic institutions that make and remake citizenship. Direct contact allowed an analysis of constructions of citizenship, juxtaposing with the ways in which this construction is constrained by the historical, macro forces of the conditions of production.

Historical Comparative Research

In order to draw out the structural factors conditioning the development of immigration and integration policy implicating solidarity and alienation in Sweden, employed the historical-comparative method. In *The Historian's Craft* (1953), Bloch discusses intentional and unintentional data. Political interests and powerful sources leave their testimony to posterity, in order to maintain their interests into the future. This is distortion that has been “especially designed to deceive posterity” and to induce historical “sclerosis.” “In the course of its development, historical research has gradually been led to place more and more confidence in the second category of evidence, in the evidence of witnesses in spite of themselves” Bloch advises.²⁸ By following the tracks of an age, and cross-examining our evidence, we know more of the past than what it thought it tell us outright. The intentional evidence this study starts with is the testimony of policy makers and the Swedish public as to their political and ethical considerations, but the unintentional evidence is the changing character of their debates and the institutional constraints pressing upon them.

Research was informed by secondary histories covering the development of Swedish corporatism at the end of the nineteenth century onward, and covering the development of the European Union immigration policy. As well, I collected contemporary data from Swedish newspaper reports on integration, ethnic conflicts and citizenship politics in Sweden over the past five years; and I reported data from the Socialstyrelsen 1996 survey of immigrant welfare, and checked this against 2006 and 2007 Socialstyrelsen

²⁸ Bloch 1953: 61.

studies on immigrant and refugee AIDS, economic welfare, families, youth, and genital mutilation. I surveyed the on-line public record of debates in the Riksdag and acquired contextual data from Eurobarometer. Comparative aspects of this study include comparisons within Swedish society across time, a static contemporary comparison across the EU in terms of labor market and cultural integration policies (the CIVGOV project to which I have contributed), comparisons of labor markets across OECD countries, and comparisons of inequality and immigration within the U.S.

The policy environment, viewed as a collective action achievement, is created both through domestic collective action and through international institutions and processes. In this context, while a few researchers have attempted to study collective action in the European Union, and fewer still focus on collective action among proponents of neoliberalism—at least in part because these are difficult cases of “studying up”, but also because most studies attempt to investigate populations of concern to neoliberal institutions, which often commission the studies—this study foregrounds collective action at the domestic level. The processes of European Union and related neoliberal institutions as well as Swedish civil society data will bolster Swedish polity and public attitudes data on solidarity, immigration and integration processes, practices and policies. On the basis of my literature review, the view taken here is that globalization pressures are built at least in major part through the collective action of elites in international civil society. Because the scope of this study precludes including a complete collective action study component on the international level at this time, I reviewed the appropriate historical literature, polity member presentations and interviews, and news reports, and described how international institutions and processes impact the national solidarity construction process in the case study.

Exhaustively studying collective action processes amongst workers, the unemployed, and their organizations is beyond the scope of this study. To mitigate this and keep an interpretive eye on the workers involved in the collective action of citizenship

construction, I used self-reported data from multiple survey studies of the Swedish population, social movement organizations' (SMOs') and ombud interviews and publications, and news reports. The surveys I used in this study were designed and conducted by other researchers, which limits my familiarity with the data, although I was fortunate to be able to work with Maria Roselius, the director of the survey of immigrant welfare. Her kind support bolstered my understanding of the particularities of the study.

1997 Immigrant Welfare Data

The Socialstyrelsen study (1997) contains self-reported data on Statistics Sweden's questions from an original snapshot survey in which 2,000 people were chosen for interviews by last date of appearance in Sweden in the population registry. The response rate for this sample was 70 percent. This is combined with data from annual surveys with representative samples of between six and eight thousand individuals aged 16-84, from annual interview surveys with representative samples of 10,000 families, interview surveys with representative samples of 18,000 members of the labor force, age 16-74, a database derived from population and housing censuses from 1985 and 1990 and on public records of annual income and total assets from 1985-1994, as well as data gathered on behalf of Sweden's Major Urban Areas and the Stockholm County Council's regional data base.²⁹

This data pertains to immigrant minorities and ethnic Swedes' reasons for moving to Sweden (immigrants), language abilities (immigrants), education, income, occupational status, employment status, marriage status, number of children, support networks, health, political resources, security, social relations, valued experiences in Sweden, and experience of discriminatory treatment in Swedish society. My use of this data was descriptive; it was particularly useful for this purpose as it covered the period in which immigrant welfare declined precipitously. Along with ethnic Swedes for comparison,

²⁹ Socialstyrelsen 1997:12.

four groups of immigrants were interviewed. They came to Sweden during the 1980s from Chile, Iran, Poland and Turkey.

The interviews covered living conditions and were conducted by Statistics Sweden in 1996, toward the end of Sweden's great economic crisis decade. This decade saw increasing gaps, social exclusion and marginalization among certain population groups, such as immigrants. For them there was no work, no income, social assistance and residential segregation. Socialstyrelsen was particularly concerned about the persistence of unemployment and residential segregation amongst immigrant groups. The project leader in this research was Maria Roselius of the National Board of Health, who introduced me to this data and encouraged me to use it in my study, as she did not see the likelihood that a follow up study would be done, due to financial constraints. The study cost four million kronor, or about 500,000 U.S. dollars.³⁰

Data uniquely include background information on immigrants and particulars of the steps in the individual's occupational and educational careers and in family formation since their time of arrival in Sweden. In this study, the immigrants' individual security is measured by the self-reported presence of indicators on three foundations of individual security: the labor market, the welfare system and the family. The ages of the interviewees were between 27 and 60, except for immigrants from Iran, who were between 27 and 55 years old. There was up to ten years difference in the length of time immigrants had lived in Sweden, and the different groups had different sex compositions and dominant reasons for immigration.

Most Polish immigrants were older and female, and immigrated for family reasons, while on the other end, most immigrants from Iran were younger, male, and immigrated for political reasons. Educational levels varied, with Turkish ethnic minority women such as Kurds, Assyrians and Syrians having notably lower educational levels than the other

³⁰ Roselius 2003.

immigrants and than the Swedish society in general. Iranian men and Poles had higher levels of education than most ethnic Swedes, and while the Iranians in particular were afflicted with unemployment, they also reported themselves overqualified for the work that they were doing. Language ability was self reported to be highest for Poles and Iranian men, lowest for women from Turkey.

The immigrants from Turkey and Iran had considerably lower incomes than ethnic Swedes, and social network strain was evident. Divorces were much more common among the immigrant groups than among ethnic Swedes, which is high. There were many single mothers within the immigrant groups, who had more children than ethnic Swedes. Contacts with relatives overseas had all but ceased, although contacts with relatives living nearby was frequent. Immigrants are over-represented in the top three metropolitan regions of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö, although immigrants reported that they would prefer to live in areas with more Swedes.³¹

Quantitative Data

To investigate the role of inequality in immigration in Chapter Two, I selected data from the OECD.

In order to discern any political-economic relationship driving immigration, I compiled from the U.S. census data on the U.S. foreign-born population by decade, with intervening years extrapolated, and compared this with economist Emmanuel Saenz's raw data on income inequality (the percent of national income held by the top decile of the U.S. population) between 1917 and 2005 in the U.S. Extrapolation intervening years in the U.C. Census data compensated for the lack of data to correspond with Saenz's yearly data,; but since the yearly count of the foreign-born population is a smoothed approximation, the data on the foreign-born population is not sensitive to yearly jumps or

³¹ Socialstyrelsen 1999:21.

sharp declines. I present in this dissertation a cautious interpretation of the relationship between immigration and the domestic U.S. political-economic context. I ran preliminary longitudinal analysis of this data to check the correlation, which was at the .2 level; I plan next to use this longitudinal data to fully specify an immigration policy model that includes the level of domestic inequality, as well as other theorized drivers that encompass both labor immigration and refugee immigration.

In an effort to check the results of my finding in the U.S. against other affluent, immigration-receiving countries, I derived data from International Monetary Fund list of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP); levels of immigration and inequality coefficients provided by the United Nations 2005 World Population Policies, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division (triangulated with inequality coefficients from the CIA World Factbook) to compare inequality (Gini coefficients) and percent of foreign born in population for the forty net-immigration countries. I hypothesized that bifurcated relationships between immigration and inequality correspond to different welfare-state regimes. There are not a sufficient number of social-democratic immigration countries to use this sort of data to assess the relationship between immigration and inequality in social democratic countries.

In order to assess the degree to which the social democratic welfare state has comparative difficulty incorporating immigrants, data from the OECD was used to compare OECD immigrant-native employment gaps in OECD labor markets, by country, and over time. This analysis showed that most non-social democratic countries especially have undergone significant labor market adjustments that tend to show dramatic declines in inclusion for natives. The data used was the data made available by countries to the OECD. Finding that prominent characterizations of immigration country labor markets—used to establish the inferiority of the social democratic approach to incorporation—tended to hide significant differences in labor market participation, I derived additional data from van Tubergen, Maas, and Flap 2004: 715, and OECD (2005) tables 1.A1.1 and

1.A1.2. to contrast average immigrant-native employment rate differences between 1980 and 2000 against 2003 male-female employment difference, across OECD countries.

I was also originally given permission by Dr. Torsten Osterman to use the raw survey data collected by his Research Group for Societal and Information Studies (FSI) over a nearly fifty year period between 1955 and 1999. This is a study in which the same questions are asked of different, randomly-selected people every four years. From this survey data set I was in the process of selecting population descriptor items and solidarity indicator questions, such as willingness to pay taxes, attitudes on public education, housing, and welfare policies. However, before I could analyze the data, Ostermalm died of cancer and the entirety of his research firm's data was given to a German researcher, ending my work in this area.

Secondary Historical Data

I started the policy sections with overviews of the historical literature of economic and political relations between organized political groups and the Swedish state, from 1900 to the present, and between immigrants and immigration policy and the U.S. state from World War I to the present.

The choice of the Swedish secondary history time frame reflects a consensus regarding the advent of the social democratic state. While the 1860s were a foundational point in Swedish economic, political and cultural history as elsewhere in Europe,³² political changes in Sweden took off in the early part of the twentieth century. Historian Kurt Samuelsson describes, "A high degree of economic, social and political awareness spelled action: the Social Democratic party had been formed in 1889; the trade union movement had closed ranks with the founding of Landsorganisationen (the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions) in 1898, which was to provide the movement with a

³² Joll, James. 1990. *Europe since 1870: an international history*. Penguin.

unified leadership as from 1909. To counter this movement, the employers had joined forces in 1902 to form the Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen (the Swedish Employers' Confederation). The 'organizing' of society, which culminated after World War II, had begun."³³

While it is undeniable that the concentration of ownership and the globalization of capital have been in process since the late 1800s, the decades following the economic crisis beginning in the late 1960s have witnessed a sharp acceleration of these trends. The degree of significance accorded to international competition due to neoliberal globalization in the environment of capital has increased significantly in the previous two decades. Additionally, the statistics on foreign direct investment and inter-firm trade show unequivocally that the production, marketing, and exchange of goods have taken on a much more global character since the 1970s.³⁴ A further incorporation factor that will have to be taken into consideration when interpreting trends is the influx of women into the public sector job market since the 1970s. This time frame is appropriate for a secondary history overview of the development of European Union policy impacting the development of national immigration policy. Secondary historical research into U.S. immigration and immigration policy history follows a policy-development timeline that mirrors the Swedish timeline.

I examined historical documents, official government and legal documents and newspapers, including those pertaining to labor and cultural migrations, cultural clash, transportation siting, diversity in employment and industry, and national development. Secondary historical research involved investigating the specific processes of integration and citizenship formation that have impacted this case study site over the century, and which have contributed to Swedish minorities' economic welfare and political position.

³³ Samuelsson 1968: 185.

³⁴ UNCTAD, 1999.

The historical-comparative component of this study also charted the impact that immigration and integration have had on political framing in the U.S. and Sweden, and on Sweden's political development.

Part of the method here, following antecedent immigration research such as the work of Fernandez-Kelly and Schaffler 1994 and Waters 1994, is to trace the history of political, cultural and economic relationships—*patterns of incorporation*—that redefine what it is to be a “white” member of a society, insofar as race is tied to second-generation “adaptation” (as Portes has it). This study will specify political integration opportunities and ability to act vis-à-vis the social democratic political structure. But, unlike such immigration studies as Fernandez-Kelly and Schaffler's and Waters', this analysis explicitly focuses on what is happening to social citizenship in a society and what is happening to its political structure and climate as an increasing proportion of its citizens are consigned to a second-class worker identity and social citizenship.

Reliability and Validity

I gathered primary and secondary historical documents on the subjects of integration, immigration, the international context, and social citizenship. Historical artifacts, records and documents were collected, transcribed, and analyzed during my year in Sweden. They are varied in order to satisfy “the need for corroborative data as in all historical research.”³⁵ As Babbie concurs, protection from lack of reliability “in the case of historical research, lies in corroboration.”³⁶

There are validity weaknesses in the historical-comparative method. “Historical and contemporary non-scientific materials contain built-in biases and the researcher generally

³⁵ Tuchman in Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 313.

³⁶ Babbie 1989: 321.

has no access to the setting in which they were produced.”³⁷ This can be somewhat mitigated in some aspects of this case study because “If you gather the data yourself (as I did for some of the historical data), you generally are aware of their limitations, possible errors and biases, and you can adapt your analyses accordingly.”³⁸ Data validity might be compromised if legal and administrative systems in were in earlier times less rationalized. However, Sweden is noted for its outstanding extended history of high quality record collection. The multiple-method approach to this study will hopefully help me attain more reliable results than if I were approaching the problem with the historical method alone.

The historical method is best suited to uncovering the connections relevant to the shifting requirements of surplus accumulation under globalizing capitalism, the ways that societies (in this case, the nation-state) renegotiate their political structures, and how these forces impact and are impacted by moving peoples. Historical investigation allows us to analyze change through time, to examine the *process* of globalization and its consequences for integration. Furthermore, the historical method emerges directly from the Marxist theoretical perspective adopted. In explaining the key aspect of Marxist analysis, Abrams argues that Marx and Engels “identified their work as *historical materialism* because they saw human societies as embedded in their own past and thus regarded history as the necessary method for any adequate understanding of one’s own world.”³⁹

Sociology has an enduring tradition of historical methods, running from Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, through contemporary works of historical sociology like Barrington Moore Jr.’s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, (1966) and Theda Skocpol’s

³⁷ Cicourel 1964: 143.

³⁸ Singleton et al. 1988: 342-343.

³⁹ Abrams 1982: 35.

State and Social Revolutions (1979). Such Marxist workers as Thompson (1967) draw on historical sources. Thompson, for example, uses sources such as poetry and literature, secondary works of history, government reports, diaries, reports by industrial and business organizations, personal letters, and committee meeting minutes, among others. Among the best works on the political struggle for incorporation include Doug McAdam's *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. These works use the historical method to excellent effect, and it is from these that I took my methodological lead.

My last component of historical research was to examine the recent contributions and responses of the political establishment to this changing context. In specific, I examined resultant changes in debate and policy. Here, I drew on integration and immigration-related data from the Riksdag on-line parliamentary debates, newspaper, television and magazine accounts, website and party and organization publications to create a detailed contemporary history of the changing structure of solidarity. The political debates and newspaper accounts I reviewed over the past five years, as immigration and integration issues have come to the fore of the national conscience with the rise of right wing politics in Europe at large.

Most of this data is not assembled as a consistent, longitudinal dataset, and quantitative methods are precluded from the general analysis of the relationship between social citizenship and changes in the political economy of immigration and integration. However, the overlapping bits and pieces of data, carefully assembled, should enable the creation of an accurate historical representation of the changing nature of social citizenship over time. This historical representation provided a basis for the evaluation of the explanatory contribution of the theoretical approach allowing me to ask: *How is national social citizenship impacted by new residents and neoliberal pressures?*

The limitations of the historical method in terms of proving causality are apparent. Should a correspondence between the changing structure of social citizenship and the changing organizational forms of capitalism and race emerge from the data, the historical method does not permit the conclusion that the structure of a latent variable like social citizenship is purely determined by a combination of the shifting needs of capitalists in a changing competitive environment and by shifting domestic race politics. Rather, it is a matter of demonstrating a coincidence of changing structures and interpreting them using a theoretical perspective that provides a cornerstone of explanatory power. Should the data suggest that there is no coincidence between changes in capitalist organizational forms, race politics and social citizenship, then the explanatory power is lacking, and we need to look to other theoretical perspectives.

With an analysis of the meaning produced in interviews of policy makers, the historical research provides a vital part of the investigation as a whole, together providing a picture of the local, national and broader political-economic context in which various agents struggle over the structure of solidarity through the politics of immigration and integration.

Generalizability

This study asks, *How and why do people recreate citizenship in their everyday lives and in the institutions they inhabit?*, as it likewise asks how macro political economic changes constrain and create opportunities for these people's actions. To the extent that responses to interview questions and historical data gathered allowed me to establish the variables and meanings that operate in Swedish solidarity reconstruction, the results are only suggestive to other societies, classes, or movements. What is of concern to this study is to model the architecture of the institutions, relationships, practices, policies, beliefs and attitudes forming the historical trajectory of a society's disadvantaged or working classes and of social citizenship in that society. This model is used to discern when and how the active reconstruction of social citizenship in "model" Sweden is aligned toward a full

social citizenship or a very truncated liberal type of social citizenship, in which class and race and gender are hierarchical categories. This study will face generalizability threats, insofar as it is a composite of case studies based on different types of sampling of different populations (policies, institutions, language, debates, attitudes, minority group welfare), and not based on one representative sample of a population, or a representative sample of a population of regions or societies in which social citizenship reconstruction is occurring. This can be considered a trade-off for approaching social phenomena in an alternative paradigm, as a complementary validity check to the legacy of established technocratic interventions. In this spirit, I have tried to construct this study in such a way that the examined relationships and variables can be translated into related inquiries in countries with different political-economic institutions and processes.

What is unique about Sweden? Sweden is a small, prosperous country with abundant natural resources, a deep history of participatory corporatism, and climatic barriers to international labor flows (and no “sunshine rent”). It has presented itself and served as a model of solidarity on the global stage. Over the last thirty years particularly, Sweden has presented itself as a *Jämställdhet* (equal-opportunity) country, in which women and their sympathizers struggled to design and implement ways to break down gender-based hierarchies, and championed women’s welfare. Just as Great Britain and the US derive economic benefits from elaborating and exporting their liberal political-economic model, Sweden has also exported such components of a social-amelioration model, even to countries that do not have the social legacy of solidarity-based politics and institutions that Sweden does.

On the other hand, modest comparisons can be sketched out. Most countries today are subject to the same post-Soviet imperialist neoliberalization politics that Sweden currently is.⁴⁰ That Sweden has a recognizable history of social citizenship politics may permit me to establish valid variables and ascertain valid relationships for jointly

⁴⁰ Castles 2003.

assessing features of and untapped potential for social citizenship in the future. These variables and relationships may be less constrained by the methodological individualist static bias.⁴¹ The distinct contemporary development in Swedish social citizenship is seen—in skewed unemployment data, in political behavior, and in popular discourse—to reside in the division between ethnic Swedes and New Swedes. But not only is Swedish social citizenship being deconstructed and defended in the matter of immigration, it is also being deconstructed and defended through the labor market, the health care sector and in education and housing, and full social citizenship has its strong fortifications and threats in environmental politics, practices, and policies. Privatization is an impetus to this change, implemented by capital and contemporary Social Democrats, especially where the liberal *Moderata* party has held influence or power, as in Stockholm. Despite *Jämställdheten* policy, gender inequalities have not been resolved in Sweden, and may be regressing with the general flowering of liberal policies that work to raise the rate of exploitation, discount worker lives and contributions to the social wealth, and deconstruct solidarity and social citizenship, as it is in other liberal countries.

It is probably safe to say that in all countries today, citizenship is compromised by race, ethnic, and gender divisions. Certainly, class-based discrimination is the stabilizing and destabilizing foundation of social order in countries impacted by capitalism. However, more extreme class inequality and gender inequality has been fostered in countries other than Sweden. This study does not therefore attempt to claim generalizability. Instead I compared the citizenship reconstruction process in Sweden with citizenship formation in the U.S. in order to delineate points of convergence and divergence.

⁴¹ See Wright, E.O (1997). The reverse-J relationship between capitalist class disinclination to give concessions and working class resources for social movement is an apparent example of methodological-individualism's (M-I) static bias when applied to prediction on fundamental systemic change. Static bias is a safe approach to social phenomena. Can a complex ecological system comprised of conscious units of action (like a human social system) change significantly? Given current data on existing variables, we find the answer is no, and happily for the predictors, this answer should be borne out most of the time. This is why M-I can be conflated with the universe of scientific inquiry. The downside of the M-I approach is that the *deus ex machina* of the charismatic individual must be introduced to explain change, which is where the dialectical historical-materialist approach has comparative scientific advantage (as opposed to mystical advantage).

APPENDIX B

IMMIGRATION AND INTEGRATION POLICY TIMELINE

1914

Aliens Act introduces right of asylum in Sweden.

1938

Saltsjöbaden Agreement establishes centralized wage negotiation, social democratic class compromise in Sweden.

1942

Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner develop active labor market policies (ALMPs).

1940s- 1960s

Swedish Employers' Federation induces the State to invite labor immigration from Nordic countries, Baltic States, and Southern Europe; labor institutions induce State to confer citizenship on labor immigrants.

1951

United Nations High Commission for Refugees Geneva Refugee Convention established.

1954

Freedom of movement permitted for persons within Nordic countries

1959-1975

Vietnam War; Americans emigrate to Sweden.

1965-1974

Greeks emigrate to Sweden.

Sweden begins to establish multicultural laws.

1969

Swedish Immigration Board established.

1970s-1980s

Refugees and humanitarian émigrés arrive in Sweden from the disrupted communities of South America and the Middle East, including Kurds and Assyrians and Syrians from Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon.

1971

Sweden ratifies the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; adopts a criminal law statute prohibiting discrimination.

1972

Sweden ends non-Nordic labor immigration; converts to refugee immigration.

Ugandan Asians expelled by Idi Amin; 1,000 come to Sweden.

1973

18,000 Chilean refugees arrive in Sweden between 1973-1989.

1975

Sweden becomes signatory of the ILO Convention 111 and the ILO Convention of Migrant Workers;
The Riksdag establishes integration policy based on equal citizenship rights, cultural freedom, and the preservation of democratic norms.

1976

Meidner proposes to give workers and communities control over investing excess profits;
Plan quickly phased out.

1979

Sweden adopts its first gender equality act in labor law.

1980s

Industrial restructuring.
Social Democratic Party (SAP) deregulates credit, slashes corporate taxation, slashes taxation on high income, switches from full employment policies to anti-inflationary policies.
Refugees begin to arrive in Sweden from Central America.
Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Iranians flee to Sweden.

1983

Swedish Employers' Federation effectively ends centralized Swedish capitalist-working class wage negotiation.

1985

European economic integration accelerates;
Sweden depresses the currency to prop exports;
Currency and real estate speculation ensues.
Board of Immigration takes over immigrant integration from Board of Labor;
Whole of Sweden policy established;
Riksdag recognizes integration as a challenge.

1987

Sjöbo municipal council refuses to settle refugees.

1989

Asylum claims rise; refugees begin arriving from the Balkans.
Riksdag restricts refugee eligibility criteria to stricter Geneva Convention criteria.

1990s

Diversity management becomes new cornerstone of integration policy;
Sweden accepts dual citizenship;
Kurds struggle against Turkey, Iraq; Kurdish refugees continue to arrive in Sweden.
Refugees allowed to settle where they want.

1990-1994

Bourgeois government led by Carl Bildt refuses to stabilize currency;
Fiscal crisis ensues;
10 percent of jobs disappear and wages decline; immigrant and youth employment rate falls most precipitously.

1990-1991

Anti-immigration party New Democracy gains 8 percent of Swedish national vote.

1991

Somali Civil War begins;

1992

European Union (EU) established.

1994

SAP regains power in Riksdag;

SAP promotes joining the EU, and referendum narrowly passes.

Act Against Ethnic Discrimination becomes formal law.

1995-1996

Carl Bildt appointed by UNHCR to Bosnia;

60,000 Bosnian refugees arrive in Sweden.

1995

Sweden joins the EU.

1996

Ministry of Foreign Affairs becomes responsible for coordinating the refugee and immigration policy.

1997

Riksdag approves a new Integration Policy: the Act on Discrimination at Work improved; Discrimination Ombudsman (DO) position strengthened; Swedish Migration Board gains jurisdiction over asylum detention.

1998

Swedish macro-economic is recovered, but immigrants still have high unemployment; Integration policy bill mandates mainstreaming of diversity issues in government; Swedish Integration Board (Integrationsverket, SIB) established.

1999

With Act Concerning Measures to Counteract Ethnic Discrimination in Working Life, Sweden prohibits racial discrimination in labor law; Swedish Migration Board gains jurisdiction over asylum policy enforcement.

2002

Liberal Party racism costs bourgeois coalition the election.

2003-present

U.S. prosecutes war in Iraq; Iraqi refugees arrive in Sweden.

2005

Immigrants and minorities riot in French suburbs;

Social Democrats in Sweden and Socialists in France oppose the EU Bolkestein Services Directive removing barriers to low wage labor market development throughout Europe.

2006

Kamali & Sahlin's Integration Board Report released, calls for dissolution of all integration activities; affirmative action recommendations become political albatross for SAP.

Law and order integration politics dominate;

Bourgeois coalition, now called The Alliance, wins control of Riksdag, Frederick Reinfeldt (Moderata) becomes Prime Minister;

Bolkestein Services Directive passes in European Union.

2007

Bourgeois government shuts down the Integration Board (Integrationsverket, SIB) and the Working Life (Arbetslivet) research Institute.

Mona Sahlin becomes head of SAP.

European Courts begin to strike down the Swedish union confederations' legal jurisdiction over employees in Sweden; all parties except Vansterpartiet and the Greens plan to implement interlocked policies of stimulating labor immigration, removing labor protections, decreasing welfare availability, and subsidizing low-profit firms and junk jobs.

2009

Sweden must be in full compliance with Bolkestein Services Directive.

APPENDIX C

WHO RECEIVES REFUGEES?

With most of the industrialized countries taking steps to limit access to asylum procedures and tighten requirements for qualification, there have been few changes in the rank order of major receiving countries. The United States, the United Kingdom and Germany were the first, second, and third-largest receivers of refugees in 2003; each slipped one place the next year as 2003's number four, France, moved into first place in 2004. The next four rankings — Canada, Austria, Sweden, and Belgium — remained unchanged in 2004. In per capita terms, the order was quite different, with smaller countries such as Cyprus, Austria, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland occupying the top ranks of refugee-receiving countries.⁴² For a comparative view into the changing impact of refugee immigration across countries, the following two pages provide refugee application data comparing, first Sweden, the U.S. and Canada, and then select European countries. As the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) distributes refugees according to national policies, data on refugee applications is an appropriate proxy for refugees received.

⁴² <http://www.migrationinformation.org/images/UNHCR-numbers.jpg>.

Refugee Applications, Select Major Refugee Countries Compared 1989-2004 ⁴³

	Sweden	United States	Canada
Total population 2006	9,016,596 (2006)	298,444,215 (2006)	32,805,041 (2005)
Population growth rate 2005	0.16%	0.91%	0.9%
Immigration rate 2005: migrants/1,000 population	1.66	3.18	5.9

Year	Worldwide total	Sweden	United States	Canada
1980	179,670	--	26,512	1,000
1981	198,598	12,651	61,568	3,000
1982	139,343	10,225	33,296	5,000
1983	115,415	7,050	26,091	9,400
1984	143,004	12,000	24,295	11,000
1985	197,521	14,500	16,622	13,000
1986	247,332	14,600	18,889	26,000
1987	253,699	18,114	26,107	38,000
1988	352,986	19,595	60,736	48,000
1989	438,818	30,335	101,679	19,934
1990	573,177	29,420	73,637	36,735
1991	660,612	27,351	56,310	32,347
1992	856,506	84,018	103,964	37,748
1993	731,147	37,583	143,118	20,292
1994	501,478	18,677	144,577	22,006
1995	517,034	9,047	148,695	26,072
1996	437,291	5,753	107,130	26,120
1997	418,677	9,662	52,217	22,584
1998	440,086	12,844	35,038	23,838
1999	537,397	11,231	32,711	29,393
2000	534,734	16,303	40,867	34,252
2001	572,954	23,515	59,432	44,038
2002	555,310	33,016	58,404	39,498
2003	460,399	31,348	43,338	31,937
2004	367,249	23,161	41,667	25,499

⁴³ Sources: Governments, UNHCR. Compiled by: UNHCR, Population Data Unit; CIA World Factbook.

Refugee Applications, Select European Countries Compared, 1989-2004 ⁴⁴

		Sweden	United Kingdom	Germany	France	Spain
Total population 2006		9,016,596 (2006)	60,441,457 (2005)	82,431,390 (2005)	60,656,178 (2005)	40 mil. (2005)
Population growth rate 2005		0.16%	0.28%	0.0%	0.37%	0.15%
Migration rate 2005: migrants/1,000 population		1.66	2.18	2.18	0.66	0.99
	Worldwide total	Sweden	United Kingdom	Germany	France	Spain
1980	179,670	--	2,352	107,818	19,912	--
1981	198,598	12,651	2,425	49,391	19,863	325
1982	139,343	10,225	4,223	37,423	22,505	2,459
1983	115,415	7,050	4,296	19,737	22,350	1,416
1984	143,004	12,000	4,171	35,278	21,714	1,179
1985	197,521	14,500	4,389	73,832	28,925	2,360
1986	247,332	14,600	4,266	99,649	26,290	2,280
1987	253,699	18,114	4,256	57,379	27,672	2,477
1988	352,986	19,595	3,998	103,076	34,352	4,516
1989	438,818	30,335	11,640	121,318	61,422	4,077
1990	573,177	29,420	26,205	193,063	54,813	8,647
1991	660,612	27,351	44,840	256,112	47,380	8,138
1992	856,506	84,018	24,625	438,191	28,872	11,708
1993	731,147	37,583	22,345	322,614	27,573	12,615
1994	501,478	18,677	32,830	127,210	26,044	11,999
1995	517,034	9,047	43,925	166,951	20,170	5,678
1996	437,291	5,753	29,640	149,157	17,405	4,726
1997	418,677	9,662	32,500	151,700	22,637	4,975
1998	440,086	12,844	46,015	98,644	22,375	6,654
1999	537,397	11,231	71,145	95,113	30,907	8,405
2000	534,734	16,303	80,315	78,564	39,775	7,926
2001	572,954	23,515	71,370	88,287	47,291	9,489
2002	555,310	33,016	84,135	71,127	51,087	6,309
2003	460,399	31,348	49,407	50,563	59,768	5,918
2004	367,249	23,161	40,202	35,613	61,056	5,369

⁴⁴ Sources: Governments, UNHCR. Compiled by: UNHCR, Population Data Unit; CIA World Factbook.

APPENDIX D

POLICYMAKER INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Most interviews will be done in English; the Swedish translation is for clarification, for the benefit of the interviewee. The interview takes 1.5 hours to complete. The questionnaire below is based exactly on the interview and is sent to those who would rather answer the questions in written form. Many thanks to Dr. Joan Acker, Dr. Jenny-Ann Brodin, Mark Hudson, Dr. Carl-Gunnar Janson, Dr. Jens Rydgren and Dr. Kathy Saranpa for substantive comments as well as translation corrections. With my colleagues' help, and with feedback from practice interviewees, this interview schedule has hopefully improved through six substantial development stages.

Policy maker questionnaire

Var så god och skriv dina svarar till mig: Mara Fridell, Sociologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet, 106 91 Stockholm, *eller* mfridell@fulbrightweb.org *eller* mfridell@darkwing.uoregon.edu

1a. How did you get to the position you have today?

Hur har du kommit till den här position du har idag?

1b. With what groups do you most often do political work?

Vilka grupper arbetar du mest med, i politiska sammanhang?

1e. Do you have contact with ethnic minorities' representatives?

Har du kontakt med ombud för invandrare?

1h. Are immigrant issues taken up in meetings?

Diskuteras invandrarfrågan på era möten? Tas frågan upp?

2b. Besides integration and difference, what issues do immigrant issues most often intersect with in the policy making discussions you are party to?

Förutom integration och mångfald, vilka andra politiska frågor inbegriper—eller överlappar med—invandrarfrågan?

4a. How are politicians relating to right-wing groups today?

Hur förhåller sig politiker till högerextrema eller högerpopulistiska partier idag?

4b. How does your party treat the presence of parties like Sverige demokraterna and National demokraterna in various municipal councils?

Hur bemöter ert parti närvaron av Sverige demockraterna och National demokraterna i olika kommunfullmäktiga?

17a. What incidents have caught your attention, such as violence against minorities, discrimination in the job seeking process?

Vilka händelser, som diskriminering eller våld mot minoritetsgrupper, har du uppmärksammat?

17b. Who (what interest groups or political groups) shows concern over these incidents?

Vem eller vilka (exempelvis frivilliga organisationer eller politiska grupper) visar interesse i dessa frågor/incidenter?

6a. What are the foremost problems with immigration to Sweden and integration in Sweden, in your experience?

Vilken fråga relaterat till invandring och integration engagerar dig mest?

Om du har interesse för arbetsmarknadsfrågor, var sa god svara på fågor 7a-7f nedan. Annars, gå till fråga 8a och fortsätta.

7a. Is it important to have a reliable supply of flexible labor in Sweden? Why or why not?

Är det viktigt att ha tillgång till en flexibel arbetsmarknad i Sverige? Värför eller värför inte?

7b. What should be done to avoid creating an ethnic underclass through the **labor market**?

Vad skulle göras med **arbetemarknaden** om vi vill undvikas att frambringa en etniska underklass?

7d. What institutions and invididuals are leading labor policy changes to address ethnic discrimination?

Vilka institutioner och personer utformer andringar i politiken med avseende på etniska diskriminering?

7e. What institutions and individuals in Swedish society *should* lead these changes?

Vilka institutioner och personer i svensk sãmhallet *borde* leda dessa förändringar?

7f. What are the difficulties faced in instituting changes?

Valka svårigheter möter man i institutionella förändringar?

8a. Is it desirable to prevent ethnic segregation through policy impacting citizens' daily practices of association?

Är det önskvärt att förhindra etnisk segregation genom åtgärder som hindrar medborgarnas dagliga umgänge/samvara?

Om du föredrar att inte svara på frågor nummer 7a-7f, och svara på frågor nedan:

8b. What should be done to relieve the problem of segregation in **housing**?
Vad skulle kunna göras för att mildra segregationsproblemet inom **boendet**?

16. How does your political party encourage minority participation?
Hur uppmuntrar ditt parti minoritetsgrupper att vara politiskt aktiva?

13. How does the LO make immigrants' lives in Sweden better?
Hur förbättras den LO:n om invandras liv?

9a. What should be done to relieve segregation **within immigration policy**?
Vad borde man göra för att förhindra segregationen **inom immigrationspolitiken**?

10a. How can ethnic segregation and discrimination be addressed in complement with **gender policy**?
Hur kan vi tackla etnisk segregation och diskriminering tillsammans **med jämställdhetspolitik**?

11a. What should be done to relieve segregation and discrimination **in the legal sphere**?
Hur kan segregation och diskriminering avslöjas med hjälp av lagliga/juridiska medel?

12. What are the ways in which your [institution/department/ministry] is addressing problems related to immigration?
På vilka sätt hanterar din institution (myndighet)/avdelning/departement frågor som har att göra med invandring?

18. How might Swedish immigration or integration policies change, should Swedish government conform more closely to the government processes of other EU member states?
Om svensk regering anpassa sig till regeringar i den andra EU länder, hur ska svenska invandring eller integration byta?

14a. At what level of social organization (t.ex. state, community, family, osv.) is solidarity-building most important right now?
På vilken samhälls nivå (ex. stat, kommun, familj) anser du att solidaritet är mest viktig just nu?

14c. What does solidarity mean to you? Vad innebär solidaritet för dig?

APPENDIX E

NATIONAL POLICYMAKER INTERVIEW CONTACTS

First name	Last name	Org	Suborg
Ulla	Hoffman	Vansterp	Deputy Member of Committee on Social Insurance
Lars-Erik	Lövdén	s	
Ingrid	Burman	Vansterp	Committee on Health & Welfare
Göran	Hägglund	kd	Committee on Housing
Tomas	Eneroth	s	Committee on Social Insurance
Christer	Skoog	s	Committee on the Labor Market, Deputy Member of the Riksdag Board
Britta	Lejon	s	Committee on the Labour Market, the Riksdag Board
Britt	Bohlin	s	the Swedish Delegation to the Nordic Council, the Riksdag Board
Bo	Könberg	fp	
Margaretta	Israelsson	s	Committee on Health and Welfare, Riksdag Board
Berit	Johanesson	Vansterp	Riksdag Board
Kalle	Larson	Vansterp	Committee on Social Insurance
Sven	Brus	kd	Committee on Social Insurance
Mona	Sahlin	Justitie Departementet	Minister for Democracy and Integration Issues
Jan O.	Karlsson	UD	Minister for Development Cooperation, Migration and Asylum Policy
Anna	Lindh	Statsråds-	Minister for Foreign Affairs
Margareta	Winberg	Näringsdepartem.	Jämställdhetsminister
Leif	Pagrotsky	Näringsdepartem.	Näringsminister
Maria	Paz Acchiardo	LO	Utredare, integrationsfrågor

APPENDIX F

RESEARCH RESOURCES AND PERSONAL CONTACTS

1. The Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations/Centrum för invandringsforskning (Ceifo) at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Stockholm University. [Http://www.ceifo.su.se](http://www.ceifo.su.se). See Charles Westin.
2. Immigrant Institute/Immigrantinstitutet. [Http://www.imii.se/index.htm](http://www.imii.se/index.htm).
3. National Integration Office/Integrationsverket. [Http://www.integrationsverket.se](http://www.integrationsverket.se).
4. Ombudsman against ethnic discrimination/Ombudsmannen mot etnisk diskriminering (DO). [Http://www.do.se](http://www.do.se).
5. Swedish Government—Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications. [Http://www.naring.regeringen.se/inenglish/index.htm](http://www.naring.regeringen.se/inenglish/index.htm). Includes responsibility for integration and national minorities.
6. Swedish Migration Board/Migrationsverket. [Http://www.migrationsverket.se](http://www.migrationsverket.se). Responsible for deciding asylum cases, for preparing return migration for refugees.
7. Barbara Hobson, Professor of Sociology at Stockholm University. My major advisor in Sweden, Barbara studies fatherhood and gender in the European Union, now focusing also on race.
8. Wuokko Knocke. The National Institute for Working Life. Studies immigrants, labor market integration and segregation.
9. Calvin Goldscheider, Professor of Sociology at Brown University. Studies Swedish immigration, was at Stockholm University last year.
10. Lars-Erik Borgegård, Researcher at the Institute for Housing & Urban Studies, Uppsala.
11. Dr. Thomas Lunden, head of the Human Geography Department at Södertörn University, Stockholm.
12. Dr. Lars Nilsson, Department of History, Stockholm University.
13. Dr. Jonas Nordin, Department of History, Stockholm University.
14. Dr. Mark Ram, Department of Anthropology, Stockholm University.
15. Dr. Fredric Bedoire, School of Architecture, The Royal College of Art, Stockholm.
16. Dr. Elisabeth Lilja, Human Geography Department, Stockholm University.
17. Maria Roselius, Utredare, Centrum för Utvärdering av Social Arbete, Socialstyrelsen, Stockholm. Department conducted a 3 million kronor public survey on discrimination in 1997, will share data.
18. Socialstyrelsen, The National Board of Health and Welfare, Stockholm, Sweden.
19. Ulla Hoffman, national Left Party leader in the Riksdag.

20. Britta Lejon, Social Democrat, Committee on the Labor Market, Deputy Member of the Riksdag Board.
21. Kalle Larson, Vänsterpartiet, Riksdag.
22. Anita Jönsson, Social Democrat, Committee on Social Insurance, Riksdag.
23. Mats Ericson, Head of the Committee on Housing and Families, Västerås Kommun, Västmanland, Sweden.
24. Stefan Kudryk, Secretary to Ericson, Västerås.
25. Pontus Pontusson, Ombudsman for the Young Left in Västmanland and Dalarna 2001-2002, now working for the Worker's Educational Organization, Västerås, Sweden.
26. Ulrika Andersson, Districtsombudskvinna, Västmanland, Sweden.
27. Vänsterpartiet Västerås, including Daniel Salas, Niklas Malanberg and Lotta Hochqvist.
28. Dr. Torsten Österman, Research Group for Societal and Information Studies, Stockholm. Torsten is providing me with data on public attitudes on solidarity indicators, 1953- present.
29. RIFFI (Riksföreningen Internationella Föreningar för Invandrarkvinnor), i.e. Irene Milsten
30. Rud Wodak
31. Lars Sjärnqvist, Riksdag.
32. Johan Tidaman, Riksdag staffer
33. Mona Sahlin, Minister for Democracy and Integration Issues, Riksdag.
34. Rold Ekeus, High Commissioner on National Minorities, EU.
35. Barbara Helfferich, Member of Cabinet, European Commission.
36. Anders Lange. CEIFO. Lange@ceifo.su.se (Socialstyrelsen study, ref. Roselius.)
37. Agnes Utasi (Researches solidarity and friendships networks, ref. Livia Olah.)
38. Maria Paz Acchiardo. Utredare, integrationsfrågor, LO. 08-796 28 19.
39. Paul Lappalainen, Miljöpartiet—Stockholm city council, attorney on immigration and anti-discrimination issues.
40. Anti-racism SMOs: Eponera Rasism Nu, Folkhälsoinstitutet, Mångkulturellt Centrum, Nätverk mot Rasism, Ungdom Mot Rasism, Svenska Kommitten mot Antisemitism.
41. Channel 4 advertising campaign—"noll rasism".
42. Janne Josefsson and Lars-Göran Svensson—SVT journalists exposed racism among party political campaigners, election 2002.
43. Eric Sundström, Chief Editor of *Aktuellt i politiken*, the Social Democratic Party's newspaper. The newspaper is accessible at <http://www.aip.nu/aip/smpage.fwx>.

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