ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

THE PROPENSITY TO SERVE IN
THE ARMED FORCES: AN
EXAMINATION INTO THE
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH
MILITARY PROPENSITY DURING
THE POST-9/11 ERA

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The end of military conscription and the rise of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973 forced the armed forces to compete in the civilian labor market with other employers and colleges for desirable young workers. As a consequence, the Department of Defense and the individual services began large-scale programs of market research designed to monitor the quantity and quality of personnel in the civilian labor force who might be eligible and inclined to volunteer for military service. One element of these research programs has been microdata analysis based upon large-scale longitudinal surveys of America's youth. The University of Michigan's *Monitoring the Future* (MTF) project is one particular program that has been surveying high school seniors since 1975 and tracking their subsequent life-course trajectories up to the age of thirty-five. Although originally intended for use as a drug and alcohol use study, there are numerous demographic and

attitudinal questions on various forms of the MTF study that have been previously used by scholars and military practitioners to describe trends and predict factors associated with the propensity to serve in the armed forces. However, scholars have not extended this research since 9/11. My research bridges this gap in knowledge by employing cross-sectional data from MTF to examine the various macro-social and social-psychological factors associated with military propensity during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013)- a period marked by sustained war in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the macro-social level, I find that the propensity to serve in the military is negatively related to public support for war and U.S. casualties, but is positively related to a rise in unemployment. Black youth continue to have a higher propensity to serve compared to Hispanic and white youth, although their propensity is relatively lower compared to years prior to 9/11. Further, the gap in propensity between race and ethnic groups disappears after controlling for socioeconomic factors. Significant attitudinal differences are observed between youth with and without propensity and between racial and ethic groups who have the propensity to serve. Youth with propensity are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party and to possess a conservative political ideology. Youth with propensity are more likely to have greater institutional orientations toward work, although occupational orientations also exist among youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era. Youth with propensity are likely to possess more traditional attitudes toward gender roles and are no less egalitarian in their attitudes toward race relations compared to youth without propensity. Women continue to have lower propensity than men, but women's

overall propensity levels do not significantly decrease during the post-9/11 era

compared to years earlier. Findings have important implications for life course

studies of the post-9/11 era, recruitment and retention in the military, for research

on the integration of women into combat positions, and for research on civil-

military relations concerning the nature and extent of a civil-military gap.

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EXAMINATION INTO THE FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARY
PROPENSITY DURING THE POST-9/11 ERA

by

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Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
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Dedication

To Mom for always encouraging me to write my own book one day- maybe this will be the start of the journey toward that goal. Thank you for inspiring me to read and write and for your love and support for my academic and athletic endeavors. I miss you daily, but I still see you in the butterflies and fireflies.

To Dad for leading me out of the battlefield arena and back into the "academic arena"- most of all, for bringing me back to my roots in Maryland- I will always be forever grateful of our time spent together over the past few years during this project. "All the Way Sir- AIRBORNE!"

Last, and certainly not least- to my wonderful family- my wife, Coren; our daughter, Frankie Sue-"Sue"; and our dog, Nessie- thank you for showing me what is truly consequential and most important in life. I could never have "completed" (if that is even possible) this project without your love and support. As my Dad always said, "if it ain't worth doing right, it ain't worth doing at all." Thanks for helping me stick to his motto. Perhaps, most importantly, he also reminded me to "take the time to stop and smell the roses" each day. I will be forever indebted to provide our home with a fresh set of roses.

sadness when I left for work; your first low-crawl on the carpet while training at

Ft. Rucker, AL.; your first words of "Mama" and "Dada" (luckily it was "Mama"

first); your first steps at Ft. Campbell, KY (although it took you long enough!);

and – here's to many more firsts in our future as I continue to refine this project!

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Executive Summary

The end of military conscription and the rise of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) in 1973 forced the armed forces to compete in the civilian labor market with other employers and colleges for desirable young workers. As a consequence, the Department of Defense and the individual services began large-scale programs of market research designed to monitor the quantity and quality of personnel in the civilian labor force who might be eligible and inclined to volunteer for military service. One element of these research programs has been microdata analysis based upon large-scale longitudinal surveys of America's youth. The University of Michigan's *Monitoring the Future* (MTF) project is one particular program that has been surveying high school seniors since 1975 and tracking their subsequent life-course trajectories up to the age of thirty-five. The MTF project is an ongoing national study of youth and young adults conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor under a series of grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. MTF employs a cohort-sequential research design that includes nationally representative samples of seniors in U.S. high schools beginning in 1975 continuing each year thereafter (average response rates of 83% yield approximately 17,000 respondents annually). Although originally intended for use as a drug and alcohol use study, there are numerous demographic and attitudinal questions on various forms of the MTF study that have been previously used by scholars and military practitioners to describe trends and predict factors associated with the propensity to serve in the armed forces. However, scholars have not extended this research since the

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11). My research bridges this gap in knowledge by employing cross-sectional data from MTF to examine the various macro-social and social-psychological factors associated with military propensity during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013)- a period marked by sustained war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Research on civil-military relations over the past half-century has focused primarily on two separate streams of research. Those in Samuel Huntington's corner believe that the military should be separate and distinct from the society it serves to increase military effectiveness. However, those in Morris Janowitz's corner believe that the military should be woven into the fabric of society, arguing that the military should be representative in demographics, attitudes, and values of the people it serves. Since the end of conscription and the birth of the AVF, researchers have been particularly interested in analyzing whether or not one of the unintended consequences of the AVF would be to create a "civil-military gap" in demographic representation, attitudes, and values. Is the military becoming an "ideological caste" of its own as Janowitz inquired? Most recently, scholars have cautioned that the length of the post-9/11 wars could potentially increase the gap between civilians and the military. My research contributes to this body of literature by examining a potential civil-military gap through the analysis of various demographic and attitudinal factors associated with those most likely to enter the military.

Extensive research has also been conducted to examine the different reasons that people enter, stay in, and leave the military. Much of this research has

employed Charles Moskos' formulation of the "Institutional" and "Occupational" models of military service and organization to analyze different attitudes toward service. Researchers have considered institutionally motivated individuals to be driven by values such as duty, honor, and country with more of an emphasis on the military organization as opposed to the individual. In contrast, researchers have considered occupationally motivated individuals to be driven by more individualistic desires such as pay and benefits to service. Some researchers have shown that service members could exhibit a mixture of both orientations toward service. My research incorporates the Institutional and Occupational model to assist with uncovering why youth have the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era.

My overall research focus examines four major questions during the post-9/11 era: 1) What is our youth's propensity to serve in the armed forces during this era and how does it compare to earlier times throughout the AVF? 2) What are the macro-social, individual, and social-psychological factors that influence youth propensity? 3) What are youth motivations to serve- are they more institutionally or occupationally motivated? 4) What are the potential impacts to civil-military relations- has the "civil-military gap" increased or decreased?

Propensity to Serve

Propensity to serve, as defined in the MTF study as the percent of youth (i.e. high school seniors) who say they expect that they "Definitely Will" or "Probably Will" enter the armed forces, has gradually declined from the 1970s through the 1990s, but has remained relatively stable during the post-9/11 era. This

propensity measure has been shown to be a valid indicator of actual enlistment behavior. For most youth, propensity for military service is general and not tied to one specific military service.

Men's propensity during the post-9/11 era was as high as during the 1990s, although it was generally lower than the 1980s. Similar trends hold for women's propensity. Interestingly, women's propensity reached its second highest percentage in 2013. Since 9/11, young men's propensity initially increased after the 9/11 attacks, then dropped significantly after the invasion of Iraq from 2004-2007 during a period marked by high U.S. casualties, and then rose again after the economic recession of 2008 during a period of economic instability. For the most part, these trends hold for women, although there was not a significant spike in women's propensity immediately following 9/11.

Propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era is related to several demographic characteristics. Generally:

- Propensity remains higher for men than women, although women's propensity remains relatively stable compared to years prior to 9/11.

- Propensity is highest among Black youth, followed by Hispanic youth, and lowest among white youth.

- Propensity decreases with higher levels of socioeconomic status.

- Propensity decreases with increasing educational attainment and goals (i.e. G.P.A. and expectation to go to a 4-year college).

- Propensity varies by region such that it is highest in the South, followed by the West, Northeast, and the North Central region. These trends hold true for women.

- Propensity is lowest where youth grow up in the suburbs of a large or very large city and highest in the country. These trends hold true for women.

- Propensity increases with the expectation to attend a 2-year college or vocational training.

In addition to demographic influences, there are also various macro-social and social-psychological influences that influence propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. Macro-social influences include public support for war, U.S. combat casualties, and the economy. Social-psychological influences include attitudes toward politics, work, gender roles, and race relations.

Public Support for War Influences

Unexpectedly, propensity has declined despite increased levels of public support for war. For every five percent increase in overall public support for the wars, there is a significant decrease (OR=0.98***) in the propensity to serve. This translates to approximately two-thirds a percent decrease in a youth's probability to expect to serve for every five percent increase in public support for war. It appears that other factors, such as casualties and the economy, may have more influence on a youth's propensity to serve in the military during the post-9/11 era. Of note, military propensity increases with greater nationalistic attitudes.

Casualty Influences

There is a significant negative relationship between propensity and combat casualties from the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Results indicate that for every increase in combat casualties by one hundred deaths, there is a significant decrease (OR=0.95***) in the propensity to serve. This translates to approximately three-quarters of a percentage decrease in a youth's predicted probability to expect to serve for every one hundred increase in deaths. For every increase in casualties by 500, there is nearly a four percent decrease in a youth's probability to expect to serve. The decrease in propensity in relation to casualties is greater for women than for men. It appears that the benefits of military service do not outweigh the costs marked by casualties in war for America's youth.

Economic Influences

There is a significant positive relationship between men's propensity and unemployment. For every percent increase in the overall unemployment rate, there is a significant increase (OR=1.04***) in the propensity to serve. This translates to approximately one half a percentage increase in a youth's probability to expect to serve for every one percent increase in unemployment. It appears that the benefits of military service outweigh the costs of service during wartime when the labor market is constrained and when the military may be viewed as a viable job opportunity. For purposes of comparison, military propensity was less positively influenced by the negative impacts of the economy during the other time period of war since the AVF- the Gulf War period (1990-1991). During this time, for every one percent increase in the overall unemployment rate, there was

actually a decrease in the propensity to serve, albeit at insignificant levels

(OR=0.96). Nevertheless, recent data suggests that the expectation to serve

remains significantly influenced by economic factors during wartime. There is no

significant relationship between women's propensity and unemployment.

Race/Ethnicity

Scholars and military practitioners conducting propensity research in the past

have been interested in examining distinct racial trends in enlistment propensity.

Additionally, research has been informed by the analysis of racial differences in

the various factors influencing propensity. Black propensity continues to decline

compared to earlier years of the AVF. Black men's propensity is generally the

lowest during the post-9/11 era compared to their propensity during the years

prior to 9/11. Even still, propensity to serve by race/ethnicity reveals that blacks

and Hispanics are about one and half times more likely than whites to expect to

serve during the post-9/11 era. However, after controlling for SES factors, the

"race effect" for black youth no longer applies- black propensity is about the same

as white propensity. On the other hand, Hispanic youth remain significantly more

likely (OR=1.12*) than white youth to expect to serve, after controlling for SES.

Among women, black propensity is the highest, followed by Hispanics, then

whites regardless of controls.

It appears that black youth are the most negatively influenced by the effects of

casualties compared to white and Hispanic youth. For every one hundred increase

in casualties, black youth propensity declines by nearly one percent, while white

youth propensity declines by about one half of a percent. It appears that Hispanic

youth propensity is the least negatively influenced by the effects of casualties.

For every one hundred increase in casualties, Hispanic youth propensity declines

about one third of a percent.

It also appears that black youth propensity is the most positively influenced by

the negative effects of the economy. For every one percent increase in

unemployment, black youth propensity increases by nearly one percent. Hispanic

youth propensity increases about one half a percent for every one percent increase

in the unemployment rate. It appears that white youth propensity is the least

impacted by negative economic effects. For every one percent increase in the

unemployment rate, white youth propensity only increases about one third of a

percent. There are no significant differences in propensity between race/ethnicity

from the effects of public support for war.

Political Attitudes

Propensity to serve is influenced by various political attitudes such as political

party and ideology. It appears that youth who expect to serve are becoming

increasingly Republican in party affiliation and conservative in political ideology,

especially among men. Compared to those youth who identify with the

Republican Party, youth who identify with the Democratic Party are about half as

likely (OR=0.56***) to have the propensity to serve. Similarly, those youth who

identify as having a liberal political ideology are about half as likely

(OR=0.54***) to have the propensity to serve compared to those who identify as

having a conservative political ideology. Independents are a quarter less likely to

have the propensity to serve compared to Republicans. Youth who either "don't

know" or have "no preference" in a political party affiliation are about one third less likely to have the propensity to serve compared to Republican youth. Similarly, youth who identify as having a moderate ideology are a quarter less likely to expect to serve compared to conservative youth. Youth who "don't know," have "no preference" in political ideology, or did not respond are also about one third less likely to expect to serve compared to conservatives. It appears that Republican and conservative youth are significantly more likely to expect to serve- about twice as likely compared to Democratic and liberal youth.

Youth who have the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era are significantly more Republican than earlier years. During the pre-9/11 era, youth who identified as Democrats were about a quarter less likely (OR=.78***) than Republicans to have the propensity to serve. Contrast that with Democratic youth during the post-9/11 era, who are about half as likely (OR=0.56***) than Republicans to have the propensity to serve.

Similarly, youth who have the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era are significantly more conservative than earlier years. During the pre-9/11 era, youth who identified as having a liberal ideology, were only about a quarter less likely (OR=0.77***) to have the propensity to serve compared to conservative youth. Contrast that with liberal youth during the post-9/11 era who are nearly half as likely (OR=0.54***) to have the propensity to serve compared to conservatives. Overall, data suggests that the military may be becoming increasingly Republican and conservative in nature, which has important implications on civil-military relations.

Institutional/Occupational Orientations

There are various motivations for young men and women to serve. Some factors effecting the decision of youth to expect to join the military are at least partially controllable such as high school grades, graduation, and various health standards like height/weight and overall physical fitness. Other factors such as the job market are not as controllable. Thus, individual reasons to join the military are dynamic in nature. Over the past four decades, many scholars and military practitioners have used Charles Moskos' Institutional/Occupational (I/O) thesis as a framework to determine individual motivations to enter and remain in military service. Economic factors such as unemployment, along with operational environmental factors such as casualties, fall along the occupational side of the I/O framework of analysis. Patriotism is considered an institutional motivation to serve.

Unfortunately, the MTF study does not directly ask youth why they expect to enter the military. However, there are numerous questions that ask about youth attitudes toward work. Creating an index measure combining attitudes toward work along an institutional/occupational spectrum allows for the analysis of youth motivations to serve. Some youth may be more institutionally motivated to join the military while others may be more occupationally motivated.

Findings reveal that youth who expect to serve are significantly more likely (OR=0.98***) to have institutional orientations toward work compared to youth who do not expect to serve. Youth who do not expect to serve have significantly greater occupational orientations toward a job. Further, by an additional measure

of analysis, youth who expect to serve are nine times more likely than their civilian counterparts to say they would volunteer to serve during a time that is "necessary for the U.S. to fight in some future war"- an inclination that clearly leans toward institutional motivations to serve.

Among youth with propensity, there are also significant I/O differences in job related attitudes between race and ethnicity. White youth who expect to serve have significantly greater institutional orientations toward work compared to black youth. There are no significant differences between white and Hispanic youth with propensity with respect to I/O orientations toward a job. Further, it appears that white youth who expect to serve are more institutional than their black counterparts by additional measures. There are significant differences between white and black youth who have the propensity to serve concerning their likelihood to volunteer during a time that is "necessary for the U.S. to fight in some future war." For this measure, black youth are more than three times less likely (OR=0.21***) than white youth to say they would volunteer to serve in some future war. In other words, for white youth who expect to serve, there is an 85% probability that they would likely volunteer for a future war that is necessary. In contrast, for black youth who expect to serve, there is about a 55% probability that they would likely volunteer. There are no significant differences between white and Hispanic youth for this institutional measure.

Taken as a whole, it appears that youth who expect to serve have more institutional and less occupational orientations than youth who do not expect to serve. However, both institutional and occupational orientations continue to exist

for youth who expect to serve during the post-9/11 era. For example, there is little difference between youth with and without propensity in the importance of having a job in which you can "earn a lot of money"- clearly an occupational orientation.

Gender Role Attitudes

Youth propensity is also influenced by attitudes toward gender roles and attitudes regarding gender discrimination. Overall trends in youth attitudes indicate a large spike in liberal attitudes toward gender roles during the 70s and 80s. However, these trends flatten out by the mid-90s and remain relatively stable. Findings reveal that young men who expect to serve are significantly more traditional (OR=0.96***) than their civilian counterparts with respect to attitudes toward gender roles. Young men's propensity to serve declines by about one half percent for every one-point increase on the gender roles index scale. Data also suggests that men with the propensity are becoming increasingly more traditional compared to young men with propensity during the decade prior to 9/11.

Among youth who expect to serve, there are significant differences in gender role attitudes between race and ethnicity. White youth with propensity have more traditional orientations toward gender roles compared to black and Hispanic youth. There are no significant gender role attitudinal differences between black and Hispanic youth. On average, black and Hispanic youth score almost two points higher in the liberal direction on the gender roles index scale.

Not surprisingly, women with propensity have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles than men. Interestingly, young women who expect

to serve are also significantly more traditional (OR=0.97*) with respect to their attitudes toward gender roles compared to their civilian counterparts. Young black women who expect to serve are significantly more traditional than their white counterparts. There are no significant differences in gender role attitudes between white and Hispanic women who expect to serve.

Race Relations Attitudes

The U.S. military led the charge in society for racial desegregation by more than a decade with the integration of black soldiers into white units during the Korean War. Since then, the military has traditionally been viewed as possessing an egalitarian workplace environment that promotes racial equity more than the civilian labor market. However, some scholars have recently challenged this assumption by arguing that racial discrimination still exists within the military citing evidence that white veterans express more negative views of blacks relative to white civilians and that white veterans in the AVF generation exhibit the most negative views toward blacks.

Findings reveal that young men who expect to serve are no different (OR=1.00) than their civilian counterparts with respect to racial attitudes. In fact, findings reveal that those young men who definitely expect to serve (i.e. "high propensity") express even more positive racial attitudes (OR=1.03***) compared to young men who definitely do not expect to serve (i.e. "low propensity"). This equates to a one percent increase in a youth's expected probability to serve for every four-point increase on the racial attitudes index scale.

Among youth with propensity there are significant differences in racial attitudes between race and ethnicity. White youth who expect to serve have less positive racial attitudes compared to black and Hispanic youth. There are no significant differences in racial attitudes between black and Hispanic youth. On average, black and Hispanic youth score almost four points higher than their white counterparts in the positive direction on the racial attitudes index scale. Among white men only, propensity is negatively related (OR=0.99*) to an increase in egalitarian attitudes toward race relations prior to controlling for SES. After controls, there are no significant relationship between white men's propensity and attitudes toward race relations attitudes.

Results also reveal that young women who expect to serve are no different (OR=0.99) with respect to their racial attitudes compared to their civilian counterparts. Young black and Hispanic women who expect to serve have significantly more positive racial attitudes than their white counterparts. Young Hispanic women who expect to serve exhibit the most positive racial attitudes. On average, Black and Hispanic young women who expect to serve score about two or three points higher, respectively, than white women in the positive direction on the racial index scale. Men and women with propensity during the post-9/11 era have increasing egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to years prior to 9/11.

Gender

Women in the military have not been previously analyzed in most MTF studies. The rationale for excluding women from the analysis is sometimes that

men constitute the prime recruiting market, that women's propensity is too low to bother studying, or that the low overall amount of women enlistees for follow-up samples would produce unreliable statistical analysis.

As women have steadily increased their participation over the years and achieved success in combat, it is especially important to examine women's propensity during the post-9/11 era. My research adds to the existing literature concerning women in the military. Results reveal that women's propensity continues to be much lower than men's propensity. However, women's propensity remains relatively stable and does not decline during the post-9/11 era. The Department of Defense's recent removal of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy and the combat exclusion ban, which has made all combat positions available to women, provides a rich opportunity for researchers to continue to examine women's propensity into the future. Continued research on women's propensity will provide invaluable insight on the influence of these institutional changes.

Summary

Results from my research during the post-9/11 era add to the literature on Life Course theory as youth lives are shaped and embedded in the historical time and place that they experience. The post-9/11 era has been marked by a period of sustained war, the attacks of 9/11, high casualties, and an economic recession- all of which have had influence on youth decisions to expect to serve in the armed forces. The post-9/11 era is certain to have influence on various outcomes in other academic fields of study and warrants continued examination.

From a practitioner standpoint, results from my research will assist with recruitment and retention efforts as the military attempts to attract the best and brightest candidates who are representative of the population at large. Understanding individual motivations and attitudes of youth will assist with this endeavor. My findings suggest that institutional recruiting themes should attract new recruits during an era of sustained war. Previous research suggests that individuals who are attracted to these types of institutional recruitment appeals will be more committed to the institution overall, more likely to fulfill their initial enlistment obligations, and more likely to reenlist. Attracting youth who already have a fair amount of institutional orientations will certainly reduce the culture shock from the institutional socialization that occurs within the military itself after initial enlistment. To the extent that organizational functioning is affected by the goodness of fit between the values of the organization and those of its work force, it appears that military effectiveness during the post-9/11 era will be strengthened as a result of the institutional orientations of youth who are likely to enlist.

Despite evidence revealing strong institutional orientations among youth with propensity, youth still exhibit a mixture of institutional and occupational motivations to serve (the hybrid model) during the post-9/11 era. The military must ensure that incentive packages remain attractive to the "college-bound" youth amidst looming budget cuts to maintain the overall quality and readiness of the force. Young men and women are likely to be attracted to educational benefits as well as monetary incentives, especially during periods of economic stability in the labor market.

Results regarding racial and ethnic group differences in I/O orientations will further assist recruiters in focusing on various target audiences with appropriate recruitment techniques. Data suggests that recruitment techniques that focus on more tangible, occupational incentives such as pay and benefits may better attract black youth into the military. Conversely, those techniques that focus on more intangible, institutional incentives may better attract white and Hispanic youth. In accordance with one of the tenets of Life Course theory- human agency- it appears that minority men who are disadvantaged have agency when considering their options after high school. In particular, results suggest that the military remains viewed as a potential environment for one to make a "turning point" in the life course- an opportunity to increase ones socioeconomic position.

Results also contribute to the extensive body of literature on civil-military relations, which covers the political science, history, and military sociology domains. Gaps between those who expect to serve (i.e. the military) and those who do not (i.e. civilians) in such areas as family background, demographics, educational attainment, values and attitudes could have important implications for policy makers and for the overall relationship between the armed forces and society.

Is the military becoming a warrior-class with its own distinctive values and attitudes? Anecdotally, many believe that the military has become more separated from the society it serves after a decade and a half of war. My research suggests that there are different value orientations between those with and without propensity. Results show that youth with propensity have greater institutional

orientations, are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party and identify as having a conservative ideology, and are more traditional in attitudes toward gender roles. Of note, there are no differences in attitudes toward race relations between youth with and without propensity. Results also show that black propensity has decreased during this period compared to earlier periods, which has potential to add to issues with diversity in the military. The fact that those who expect to serve in the armed forces have different attitudes from the society it protects is not surprising in and of itself. Indeed, many organizations adopt a culture of their own that attracts individuals with unique personalities and attitudes that may be different than those outside the organization. From this point of view, the military is no different than any other organization. In fact, those in Huntington's corner would argue that this is a necessary condition for military effectiveness. However, insofar as one believes that the military should be a microcosm of the society it serves and protects, as Morris Janowitz did, these differences may bring cause for alarm. Perhaps the most worrisome differences are in the political attitudes of youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era. My findings suggest that the civil-military gap has widened to some extent during the post-9/11 era. Further analysis is necessary to determine the extent of this gap and the potential impacts to civil-military relations.

Chapter 1: Project Description

The end of military conscription and the rise of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF)

in 1973 marked the first time that the United States assumed the task of

maintaining a large peacetime force based solely on voluntary enlistment. The

nation relied upon marketplace philosophies as opposed to institutional-based

notions of citizen obligations to attract new recruits into the military (Moskos

1977). The armed forces were now forced into the civilian labor market in direct

competition with other employers and colleges for desirable young workers. As a

consequence of competing in the civilian labor market, the Department of

Defense and the individual services began large-scale programs of market

research designed at monitoring the quantity and quality of personnel in the

civilian labor force who might be eligible for voluntary military service. One

element of these research programs has been microdata analysis based upon large-

scale longitudinal surveys of America's youth (Bachman et al. 1998). The

University of Michigan's *Monitoring the Future* (MTF) project is one particular

program that has been surveying high school seniors since 1975 and tracking their

subsequent life-course trajectories up to the age of thirty-five. I utilize portions of

this data for my analysis to examine what factors are associated with a youth's

propensity to serve in the military and compare that to other available options

(e.g. going to a 4- or 2-year college, or vocational education) as one makes the

transition into adulthood. Specifically, I examine the relationship between

propensity to serve in the military and various macro-social factors such as public

support for war, casualties, and unemployment rates. I also examine various

individual-level demographic and attitudinal factors such as race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, gender, educational attainment, urbanicity, region of the country, and various attitudes toward politics, work, gender-roles, and race relations.

Since September 11, 2001 (9/11) U.S. forces have been engaged in combat, either in Afghanistan or Iraq, for longer than any other period throughout our history. Debate about whether to return to a draft to mitigate the negative consequences of the protracted wars was at the forefront of decision makers within the military as well as civilian leadership (Korb and Segal 2011). Indeed, the military has endured significant strains on both the active and reserve forces for over a decade of persistent conflict (Clever and Segal 2012). A recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center revealed that 83% of the public surveyed believed military personnel and their families have had to make the majority of the sacrifices since the attacks on 9/11 (Pew 2011a). Over a third of veterans of the post-9/11 era reported having experienced some form of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and about one half of them have also reported problems with reentering civilian life (Pew 2011a). These burdens of war do not come without potential costs to the future force. Technology and 24-hour media coverage have placed these burdens and the realities of war on the front pages, firmly imprinted within the consciousness of America's youth. It is conceivable that the recent burdens of military service could have negative impacts on future recruits for quite some time. Interestingly, when asked whether they would advise a young person to join the military, only about half of the public said they would, whereas

82 percent of post-9/11 veterans say they would advise a young person to join. Despite the hardships encountered during war, almost all (98 percent) veterans reported feeling proud that they had served and over three-quarters appreciated life more (Pew 2011a). In a period where less than one percent of our society currently serves in the armed forces, lower than any other time in the past century (Segal and Segal 2004), the gap between the public and the military's perception of service could negatively impact recruitment even further.

While the U.S. has concluded major combat operations in Afghanistan recently, a small contingency force of nearly 10,000 soldiers remains indefinitely to advise, assist, and train the Afghan National Security Forces. Meanwhile the military is currently undergoing significant budget cuts and reductions in force levels. The Obama administration recently proposed a defense budget that cuts spending by more than $450 million over the next ten years (Dreazen 2012). Estimates of the impacts show that the Army would lose about 14 percent of its troop strength, or about 80,000 active duty personnel (Taylor et al. 2015). Further, a Congressional proposal to reduce the military retirement package is likely to negatively influence potential recruits to enlist (Tilghman 2015). Yet, the current status of the global security environment remains as turbulent and unpredictable as before (National Security Strategy 2013). With the recent Russian expansion developments into eastern Ukraine and combat troops in Syria, artillery "show of force" exchanges between North and South Korea, and the emerging global threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the security environment is, perhaps, more unstable than before. It is absolutely imperative

for the U.S as a global superpower to preserve the health, status, and overall readiness of its military so that it can meet the challenges that lie ahead both domestically and abroad. Obtaining quality new recruits will be vital in maintaining our superior force and to remain prepared to operate in future complex environments. Analysis from my research will shed some light into the expected quantity and quality of potential recruits to tackle these challenges.

Life course theory and research focuses on how people work out paths of development over time. Throughout the life course, individuals encounter multiple developmental periods and transitions that shape their trajectories. The transition to adulthood is a particularly critical time impacting one's development over the life course. During this transition, there are a few options that one has to consider upon completion of high school. Going to college, joining the military, attending vocational technical training or doing something else (e.g. going to work, traveling) are the primary options. The reasons one chooses a particular pathway vary and an examination into what factors are associated with the expectation to join the military compared to other pathways to adulthood will shed light into our youth's decision-making processes during a critical time in our nation's history- the post-9/11 era.

My research specifically targets the population of young adults who expect to join the military to determine what factors might predict this outcome. There are many reasons for joining the military. Previous research (e.g. Kleykamp 2006; Segal et al. 1998) has attributed educational goals and attainment, the institutional presence of the military in nearby communities, and race and socioeconomic

status as key factors associated with military enlistment and propensity. Additionally, researchers have found that the benefits of military service (e.g. the Montgomery G.I. and Post-9/11 Bills, acquisition of job skills and training), especially for less advantaged individuals, have also been a key factor in attracting young adults into military service (Kleykamp 2009; Elder et al. 2010).

Research on civil-military relations covers an extensive body of literature in the political science, history, and military sociology domains. Scholars who study in this arena examine the relationship between the armed forces and society, the impacts of the relationship, and how the relationship has changed over time. Two prominent researchers in the field, Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz, are credited for formulating two separate yet similar streams of research paving the way for continued research over the past half century. Those in Huntington's (1957) corner believe that the military should be separate and distinct from society to increase the military's overall effectiveness. On the other hand, those in Janowitz's (1960) corner believe that the military should be more convergent with the society it protects with respect to attitudes, values, and demographic representation.

As a result of the shift in career-orientation of those in the military during the early years of the AVF, Janowitz (1975) suggested that the professional military was increasingly emphasizing distinctive military values; that its linkages with society had become weakened and tied to limited segments of the social structure; that changes in the recruitment base were making the officer corps and the enlisted less representative of society; and that such processes might create an

"ideological caste" in the military and be a source of political division from civilian society. Thus, the military culture might become decoupled from civilian culture. Essentially, what Huntington viewed as necessary for military effectiveness, Janowitz viewed as problematic for civil-military relations (Segal et al. 2001). Perhaps worse yet, "there has been widespread agreement that over the past few decades American society has become fragmented, more individualistic, and less disciplined" (Ricks 1997b: 10). These changes put society at odds with the traditional military values of sacrifice, team, self-discipline, and putting the interests of others above oneself. Couple the military's organizational changes with an increased individualistic, "Me" attitude among members of society and the potential for a cleavage, or "gap," between civilians and the military were thought by some to be wide and alarming (e.g. Ricks 1997b). This potential gap has been commonly referred to as the "civil-military gap."

Extensive research has also been conducted to examine different reasons that people enter, stay in, and leave the military. Much of this research has employed Charles Moskos' (1977) formulation of the Institutional and Occupational models of military service and organization to analyze different attitudes toward service. Researchers have considered institutionally motivated individuals to be driven by values such as duty, honor, and country with more of an emphasis on the military organization as opposed to the individual. In contrast, researchers have considered occupationally motivated individuals to be driven by more individualistic desires such as pay and benefits to service. Some researchers (e.g.

Segal 1986) have shown that service members could exhibit a mixture of both orientations toward service.

Utilizing the Life Course model as an overarching theoretical framework, the purpose of my research is to extend previous studies (e.g. Bachman et al. 1998; Segal et al. 1998; Segal et al. 1999; Segal et al. 2001; Kleykamp 2006; Elder et al. 2010) to examine youth propensity to serve in the armed forces and to determine what factors are associated with military propensity versus other options available during a time of extended war since 9/11. Utilizing the body of literature covering civil-military relations as an equally important overarching theoretical framework of reference throughout this project will assist with uncovering whether there is may be a "civil-military gap" in demographic representation, attitudes, and values between those who are most likely (i.e. the military) and least likely (i.e. civilians) to enter the military during the post-9/11 era. Utilizing the Institutional/Occupational (I/O) model of military service as a more detailed theoretical framework will assist with determining the motivations of young men and women who expect to serve during this era. It will also facilitate determining what youth value in job-related preferences.

My overall research focus examines four major questions during the post-9/11 era: 1) What is our youth's propensity to serve in the armed forces during this era and how does it compare to earlier times throughout the AVF? 2) What are the macro-social, individual, and social-psychological factors that influence youth propensity? 3) What are youth motivations to serve- are they more institutionally

or occupationally motivated? 4) What are the potential impacts to civil-military relations- has the "civil-military gap" increased or decreased?

Previous studies using data from the MTF project have included large-scale longitudinal surveys aimed at examining youth military propensity between 1976-1997. Research has demonstrated a significant relationship between propensity and actual enlistment (Bachman et al. 1998). These studies have also revealed variations in propensity over time and between racial and ethnic subgroups (Segal et al. 1999). The single MTF study of women's propensity (e.g. Segal et al. 1998) showed that women's propensity was significantly less than men's propensity, and, similar to men, the predictors of their propensity correlated most with actual enlistment. The MTF study of various youth attitudes related to propensity (e.g. Segal et al. 2001) showed that youth were no more conservative than their college peers, and that they were not as Republican in party affiliation as some other research has suggested.

My research employs cross-sectional, representative survey data collected annually available from the MTF project beginning in 1976 through 2013. Consistent with earlier research, I run two separate analyses to determine young men and women's propensity to serve in the armed forces. Women currently make-up about 15 percent of the military population and their representation continues to increase as barriers are removed (Clever and Segal 2013). For both men and women separately, I address the following interrelated questions primarily focused on the time period following the attacks on 9/11 between 2002-

2013, "the post-9/11 era," which has yet to be analyzed thoroughly: 1) What is the youth population's propensity to serve in the armed forces? Are there any significant differences in youth propensity after 9/11 compared to the previous quarter of a century of study (i.e. 1976-2001)? Are there any significant differences in propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era? How have societal and institutional influences contributed to these potential differences? 2) What factors are associated with a youth's propensity to serve? In particular, I focus on both macro and micro-level influences. At the macro-level, I examine the relationship between propensity and public support for war, U.S. casualties, and unemployment. How have these factors influenced military propensity since 9/11? On the micro-level, I examine individual demographic influences on military propensity such as race and ethnicity (i.e. whites, blacks, and Hispanics), socioeconomic status, educational attainment and aspirations, urbanicity (i.e. urban, suburban, or farm where a respondent grew up), and region of country. 3) How does one's propensity to serve in the armed forces compare to other available options after high school (i.e. attending a 4- or 2-year college, or vocational training)?

My primary analysis begins in Chapter 2 with a literature review of the theories I incorporate into my analyses, relevant background information, and my predictions of the relationship between various factors associated with men's propensity. In Chapter 3, I explain my research design and methodology. In Chapter 4, I report the results of my analysis of the relationship between men's propensity and various macro-social and individual factors. I provide a discussion

of my results and summarize my findings in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 includes my primary analysis of women's propensity, which parallels my analysis for men and includes relevant background information, predictions, analysis and results.

In the chapters that follow, I examine various attitudes and values that are related to propensity for both men and women focusing on the post-9/11 era. It should be noted that my follow-on chapters (i.e. Chapters 7-10) of analysis are supplementary, stand-alone chapters. These chapters are intended to be separate, distinct, and extensions from previous chapters to examine the relationships between propensity and various youth attitudes toward politics, work, gender roles, and race relations. As such, I largely keep the applicable literature review, hypotheses, methods, analysis, and discussion in its own respective chapter for organizational purposes so not to confuse the reader.

In Chapter 7, I examine the relationship between propensity and political attitudes such as political party affiliation and ideology. An examination into these potential differences will add to the literature on civil-military relations by identifying any possible gaps between the attitudes of those youth who expect to serve in the armed forces (i.e. the military) versus those who do not (i.e. civilians). For both men and women, separately, I address the following related questions: 1) Are there differences in political party affiliation between the military and civilians during the post-9/11 era? 2) What are youth overall trends in Republican Party affiliation over time?
3) Are there differences in political ideology between the military and civilians during the post-9/11 era? 4) What are youth overall trends in political ideology

over time? 5) Are there racial/ethnic and gender differences in political party and political ideology identification?

6) How do potential differences in political attitudes impact civil-military relations?

In Chapter 8, I analyze the relationship between propensity and differences in attitudes toward job preferences as a proxy measure for determining youth motivations to serve. An analysis of these attitudes will assist me in determining whether youth attitudes are more institutional (i.e. selfless/organizational) or occupational (i.e. self-interested/individualistic) in orientation (Moskos 1977). Specifically, I address the following related questions: 1) Are youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era more institutionally or occupationally (I/O) orientated? 2) Are there racial/ethnic or gender differences in I/O orientations? 3) Have there been differences in I/O orientations to serve over time? 4) Are there differences in I/O orientations between those who expect to serve in the armed forces compared to those who do not (i.e. military vs. civilians)? Have these differences changed over time? 5) What are the impacts of I/O differences to civil-military relations?

Finally, in Chapters 9 and 10, I examine the relationship between propensity and various attitudes toward gender roles and race relations respectively. Similar to earlier analyses, I examine differences in my key analysis groups. Results from these chapters also add to the literature on civil-military relations and have important policy implications for military practitioners. I conclude my work in Chapter 11 with a summary of my overall findings and a brief discussion of the

contributions of my research, a recommended future research agenda, limitations to my study, and overall implications to civil-military relations.

Results from my research are beneficial to the field of sociology overall by examining the influence of the 9/11 era on the expected military population. Other disciplines of sociological research will undoubtedly benefit from analysis of various outcomes that may be influenced by the historical moment and time of the post-9/11 era. Results will provide better insight on what factors help predict a youth's decision to choose a particular pathway to adulthood during the historical moment of prolonged war since 9/11. Specifically in the military sociology domain, results provide insight on what sub-group of our nation's youth and why they desire to serve in the military since 9/11, which will have implications on recruitment and retention within the armed forces. This is crucial given that the All-Volunteer Force must continually replenish its ranks as most military personnel depart service within a decade of entering (Segal and Segal 2004). Similarly, results reveal differences in the propensity of various subgroups that should assist in the efficiency and effectiveness of recruitment efforts to ensure that we continue to target the most qualified individuals possible, who are diverse and representative of society at large. Additionally, analysis provides invaluable insight to military and civilian leadership, human resource managers, and policy makers to ensure that the future force is adequately manned and prepared to tackle future challenges that lie in the complex environment ahead. Finally, results contribute significantly to the extensive body of literature on civil-military relations. Potential "gaps" between those who expect to serve (i.e. the

military) and those who do not (i.e. civilians) in such areas as family background, demographics, educational attainment, values, and attitudes could have important implications for policy makers and for the overall relationship between the armed forces and society.

Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks, Background,

Literature Review and Predictions

Propensity to Serve

Before examining the structural and social-psychological influences that predict the likelihood of the youth population to serve in the armed forces, I must first define the concept of "propensity" which has multiple meanings, including "tendency," "inclination," and "disposition." However, common usage of the term "military propensity" or "enlistment propensity" can broaden the meaning to include not only an individuals' interests and desires, but also their plans and expectations to serve in the military (Bachman et al. 1998). Indeed, the term "propensity" covers a broad range of meanings from wishes or preferences, to firm plans.

For the purposes of this study, I define "military propensity" as the likelihood or expectation that an individual will serve in the military. That is, unless otherwise specified throughout, military propensity refers to youth who say that they "definitely" or "probably will" serve in the armed forces. Due to the limitation of the dataset, I am unable to delineate between the various branches of service (e.g. Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps) of which a respondent expects to enter. From this point forward, I generally refer to the term military propensity as simply "propensity" (e.g. "youth propensity", "white propensity", "black propensity").

In this study, I do not compare actual military enlistment with the propensity to serve. Previous research on the MTF project has revealed that propensity is

strongly correlated with actual enlistment in the armed forces since most high

school seniors by this time have had ample opportunity to consider and explore

their options in detail. Indeed, among high school senior men who say they

"definitely" expect to enlist, 70 percent actually do so within five years of high

school graduation (Bachman et al. 1998). Prior MTF studies have also revealed

that propensity is the dominant factor contributing to actual enlistment as

compared with other factors such as family background, demographics,

educational attainment, educational plans, attitudes, values, and behaviors. In

other words, the various factors noted above directly influence propensity, which

has the greatest influence on actual enlistment (Bachman et al. 2000b).

   Throughout the study, I assume that the factors associated with "high"

propensity equate to the factors associated with actual military service, especially

when making comparisons between the military (i.e. youth with "high"

propensity) versus civilians (i.e. youth with "low" propensity). During these

analyses, I specifically delineate between "propensity" and "high" or "low"

propensity. Youth with "high propensity" indicates that they "definitely will"

serve, whereas youth with "low propensity" indicates that they "definitely won't"

serve.

   It should be noted that the sample size for the "high" vs. "low" propensity

analyses represent roughly 65 percent of the total sample size. Most important to

note, is that these response groups are the best proxies of the actual military

population and the civilian population to examine key differences in attitudes and

values between groups. This analysis technique enables me to draw better

conclusions on the differences between civilians and military members, which allows for the best contribution to the extensive body of literature covering civil-military relations. Furthermore, this technique enables me to better assess the nature and extent of a civil-military gap in attitudes and values during the post-9/11 era.

Life Course Theory as a Theoretical Framework

Life course theory and research focuses on how people work out paths of development over time. Research examines "how lives are socially organized in biological and historical time, and how the resulting social pattern affects the way we think, feel, and act…human development is embedded in the life course and historical time" (Elder 1998). The importance of the social context on individual development is key to the evolution of the life structure. According to Daniel J. Levinson and his colleagues:

> "The life structure requires us to consider both self and world, and the relationships between them. Through it one may examine how the self is in the world, and how the world is in the self….We try to determine how various aspects of self and the world influence the formation of a life structure and shape its change over time" (Levinson et al. 1978:42).

Throughout the life course, individuals encounter multiple developmental periods and transitions that shape their trajectories. The paradigmatic model of human development depicts the following periods with associated transitions: Childhood and Adolescence; Early Adult Transition-Early Adulthood; Mid-Life Transition-Middle Adulthood; and Late Adult Transition-Late Adulthood (Dannefer 1984). Both individual as well as societal factors influence how one develops throughout these periods and transitions. For my research purposes, I am interested in

examining what factors influence individuals during the early adult transition, which normally occurs between the ages of 17-22 (Dannefer 1984). During this transition, a young adult generally has the options to enlist in the military, attend vocational training, go to a 2- or 4-year college, or do something else (e.g. go to work or travel). Specifically, I am concerned with what individual and societal factors are associated with a young adult's expectation to serve in the military as compared to various other pathways to adulthood.

Life course research employs five major tenets of theory as described by Glen Elder: 1) Historical time and place; 2) Timing of lives; 3) Linked lives; 4) Human agency; and 5) Life course as a constant process and development (1998). For the purposes of my research, I am particularly interested in the life course theory tenets of "historical time and place" and "human agency." The first principle describes the life course of individuals as "embedded in and shaped by the historical times and places they experience over their lifetime" (1998:3). For example, children who grew up during the Great Depression era had different impacts to their development compared with those who grew up during the World War II era. It is reasonable that decisions made associated with the transition to adulthood would be influenced by the historical time of the post-9/11 era, which encompasses particularly noteworthy events such as the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq and an economic recession. This principle serves as the foundation for the preponderance of my research focusing on examining the various factors related to youth who expect to serve during the post-9/11 era such as demographics, family background (SES), educational goals and attainment, attitudes, and values.

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The principle of human agency states that, "individuals construct their own life course through the choices and actions they take within the opportunities and constraints of history and social circumstances" (Elder 1998:4). For example, as people experienced the turbulence of the Great Depression, some managed to work through it to overcome the negative consequences such as mothers who found jobs and children who assumed more responsibilities at home and within the community (1998). The tenet of human agency emphasizes that people have freedom to decide on what they want to do given the opportunities and constraints associated with their historical, social, and individual circumstances. Indeed, since the rise of the AVF in 1973, people have had free will to decide on whether or not they enter the military. This decision is typically made during the transition to adulthood period with the preponderance of enlistees occurring at this time (Bachman et al. 2000b). Thus, examining a high school senior's propensity to serve in the military is the best time to determine what factors are associated with this decision-making process.

The tenet of "linked lives" is also relevant to my research as prior research (e.g. Faris 1981, 1984; Segal and Segal 2004) has shown that those who enlist in the military are more likely to have close relatives (i.e. parents or grandparents) who served in the military, or have other direct exposure to military influences such as living within a community that has a large military institutional presence (e.g. Kleykamp 2006). Unfortunately, the MTF dataset does not capture whether or not an individual's parents or relatives previously served. The dataset does

capture in what region and what type of environment (i.e. urban or farm) an individual grows up.

Civil-Military Relations and the Rise of Military Professionalism

Equally important as an overarching theoretical framework to my project as Life Course theory is the literature extensive body of literature on civil-military relations. Thus, I must proceed with a discussion of the relationship between the armed forces and society and the concept of military professionalism. The post-World War II period provided a new and unique relationship between the military and society that sparked scholars to take notice of the changing dynamics. Bi-polar tensions between post-WWII powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, along with the threat of mutually assured destruction from nuclear technology, produced strong enough pressure for the U.S. military to maintain a mass standing army that was largely comprised of conscripted forces. Whereas in earlier military conflicts, beginning with the Revolutionary War, America had demobilized its forces after the end of war, this was not the case after World War II (Segal and Segal 2004). The nation no longer had the advantage of time and distance from the battlefield. For the first time in American history, the military became a significant continuing institutional peacetime presence (Burk 2001). Indeed, President Dwight D. Eisenhower's warning for Americans to beware of the military industrial complex during his farewell address in 1961 represented the pervasiveness of the military in American society. It also cautioned some to worry about the nature of the military profession and its impact on civil-military relations.

Due to the military's increasing influence in society, sociologists became interested in conducting more macro-sociological analysis as opposed to the micro-social focus that marked research during World War II. To describe the structural relationships between the military and its host society, researchers began to examine the nature of civilian-military relations. C. Wright Mills' (1956) influential piece, *The Power Elite*, argued that the military is one of the three major elite institutions, including politics and business, which hold significant power, prestige, and influence to shape society. This piece of work became a foundation for social psychological researchers interested in major concepts such as power and status. It also confirmed the increasing influence of the military on society. Harold D. Lasswell's (1941) developmental model of "the garrison state" also cautioned that the trend of the time was moving away from the dominance of the businessman toward the supremacy of the military soldier- a world in which the specialists in violence were the most powerful group in society.

Influenced by the military's continual institutional presence within society, researchers began to analyze the nature of the military profession and its relationship with the government and the people. Samuel Huntington (1957), a political scientist at Harvard University, and Morris Janowitz (1960), a sociologist at the University of Chicago, both published influential books on the topics. Huntington's, *The Soldier and the State,* focused on the relationship between the military profession and the government, whereas Janowitz's, *The Professional Soldier*, examined the relationship between the profession and the society it

protects. Their research focused primarily on the professionalism of the officer

corps instead of focusing on the enlisted ranks. Indeed, professionalism was

referred to as "officership."

Huntington's work attributed the rise of military professionalism in western

societies to the professionalism of the Prussian military after its reforms during

the Napoleonic Wars of the early nineteenth century, which he used to help model

his notion of American military professionalism. Huntington defined the military

profession as a special type of vocation marked by the distinguishing

characteristics of "expertise, responsibility, and corporateness" (1957). *Expertise*

was acquired only by prolonged experience and education, where education

consisted of a broad, liberal, cultural background, as well as specialized training

on technical skills and knowledge of the profession (1957). The central skill most

officers had, which distinguished them from civilians, was best summed up in

Harold Lasswell's phrase "the management of violence" or "successful armed

combat" (1957). *Responsibility* was conceptualized as a professional man who

worked in a social context to perform a service that was essential to the

functioning of society. Huntington explained that the "skill of the officer is the

management of violence" and that his responsibility was the "military security of

his client, society" (1957:15). *Corporateness* was the idea of esprit de corps in

that members of the profession had a common bond that kept them together based

on shared professional expertise and shared professional responsibility (1957).

It must be noted that it was the famous Prussian General and military theorist,

Carl Von Clausewitz (1976), who theorized *On War* providing advances in

military professionalism and stressing the moral and political components of warfare (Kestnbaum 2009). He may be most remembered for his notion that war is a delicate balance of a "trinity" of relationships between the military (i.e. war), and the government (i.e. state), and the people (i.e. society). Clausewitz famously remarked, "War is merely the continuation of politics by other means" (1976:87). "Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them" (1976:87). Theorizing in the first book of *On War,* he created the first theoretical rationale for the military profession, thereby contributing the first theoretical justification for civilian control (Huntington 1957). Indeed, Clausewitz remarked that

> "The subordination of the political point of view to the military would be unreasonable, for policy has created the war; policy is the intelligent faculty, war only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing which is possible" (Huntington 1957:58).

In other words, the soldier must always be subordinate to the statesman.

Janowitz essentially accepted Huntington's definition of professionalism with a few modifications. Both scholars believed that the soldier should be subordinate to civilian authority. Where the two differed most was in their viewpoint on the closeness of the relationship between the military and society. Huntington (1957) argued that it was most beneficial for the military to be separate and distinct from the government to increase efficiency and effectiveness, whereas Janowitz (1960) argued that the relationship between the military and society should be more convergent, similar in values, attitudes, and composition. Huntington saw an incompatibility between the professional ethic

of the military and societal liberalism, with its emphasis on individualism, hostility toward standing armies, and denial of the importance of power. He viewed the professional military ethic to be more compatible with conservative ideologies, and believed that the armed forces should be insulated from the liberal trends in society to remain effective. Janowitz, on the other hand, proposed a different model of civil-military relations. For him, informal social networks were more important constraints on social behavior than formal mechanisms of social control (Segal et al. 2001). Thus, he believed that in a democratic state, civilian control of the military would best be achieved when the military was woven into the fabric of society. He foresaw a military in which some identified first as citizens, then as soldiers, some of whose officers attended civilian universities (i.e. ROTC), and some of who lived with their families in civilian communities. Of course, he recognized that the military would have its own unique organizational culture similar to many civilian occupations and professional groups. However, he felt that citizen-soldiers and structural linkages would help coordinate the military culture with American society (Segal et al. 2001).

The rise of the AVF changed the mix of short-term enlistees and career-oriented military personnel, altering the balance achieved by the conscription era soldiers. The increases in technology created conditions for the lengthening of initial military enlistments to account for the additional training and costs required to train new recruits for technical specialties. Indeed, the short-term enlistment contracts during the days of the conscription were no longer available to

volunteers. As a result, the military became increasingly career-oriented, sparking Charles Moskos (1977) to posit that the military was transforming from a "calling" to an "occupation"- the essence of his Institutional/Occupational thesis, which will be discussed in greater detail below. If we regard the percentage of the military forces that has served for more than five years as career-oriented, then from the beginning of the AVF until the beginning of the twenty-first century, the career-oriented enlisted force increased from about 20 percent to about 50 percent (Segal et al. 2001).

As a result of the shift in career-orientation during the early years of the AVF, Janowitz (1975) suggested that the professional military was increasingly emphasizing distinctive military values; that its linkages with society had become weakened and tied to limited segments of the social structure; that changes in the recruitment base were making the officer corps and the enlisted less representative of society; and that such processes might create an "ideological caste" in the military and be a source of political division from civilian society. Thus, the military culture might become decoupled from civilian culture. Essentially, what Huntington viewed as necessary for military effectiveness, Janowitz viewed as problematic for civil-military relations (Segal et al. 2001).

The discourse between Huntington and Janowitz about military professionalism and the relationships between the military, the state, and society raised the debate on civil-military relations to another level. Their work set the foundation for a continued interest among researchers, the military, and the

political elite on the nature of these relations, establishing it as part of the research

agenda for decades to come.

The Post-Cold War Period- A Renewed Interest in Civil-Military Relations

    With the Cold War threat no longer present, the debate emerged on whether a

large peacetime force was still needed in the United States. Additionally, the U.S.

military's overwhelming success during the Gulf War in 1990-1991, highlighted

by a minimum amount of casualties, caused some to believe that our superior

technology in air power, precision weaponry, and communications no longer

necessitated a large ground force to protect our national interests (Ricks 1997b).

Indeed, after the swift and decisive victory during Operation Desert Storm,

Congress became only minimally interested with training, personnel issues, or

ground forces in general (Ricks 1997b). During the Clinton administration (1992-

2000), the military underwent significant cuts to the budget and personnel. As a

result, the military adopted a strategy of downsizing, a strategy used in the

corporate world to manage operations during economic downturns, which

produced problems for victims and survivors of the process much like it had in the

corporate world (Wong and McNally 1994). Those who volunteered for service

were now being pushed out or offered incentives to leave.

    While downsizing occurred, overall military missions increased. Now the

military was asked to do more with fewer resources available (Segal et al. 1999).

Changes in military missions resulted as well (e.g. Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia),

with a primary focus on peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations as

opposed to waging large-scale war. Many members of the military were not in

agreement with their involvement in these types of operations. This caused

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, to actively speak out

against military intervention in Bosnia, which was in direct contrast to Bill

Clinton's proposal- a significant political move given that it was during the 1992

Presidential election campaign (Ricks 1997b). As a result, research revealed that

there were negative impacts to morale and retention in the military highlighting

important leadership issues to address (Reed and Segal 2000).

To meet mission requirements amidst military downsizing, the army

experimented for the first time with the deployment of reserve forces to support

overseas contingency operations. American reserve forces served as part of the

Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Desert in support of the Camp

David Accords between Israel and Egypt. The army experienced great success,

which led to the expanded use of reserve forces for contingency operations,

usually in small numbers for six-month deployments (Phelps and Farr 1996).

Another way to accomplish more missions with fewer people was to employ

civilians in jobs to fill the gaps. Uniformed service members performed those

jobs most clearly requiring military expertise and status, while relying on civilian

DoD employees to perform other jobs (e.g. logistical and support jobs) that were

previously performed by military personnel (e.g. Kelty 2008). An additional

management strategy employed to offset personnel shortages included adopting

yet another corporate strategy- outsourcing. Instead of having government

employees perform tasks previously performed by military personnel, the military

contracted out support (e.g. Brown & Root), and in some cases core functions

such as private security tasks (e.g. Blackwater) to civilian companies. Indeed, the costs for contractors are much less than the cost of a standard military recruit, especially since civilian contracts can be terminated upon the completion of the mission (Clever and Segal 2012). Civilian contractors have always played a part in the military, but their participation has continued to increase in the contemporary force as a result of an increased reliance on technical systems and manpower shortages. The proportion of contractor to military personnel in U.S. military conflicts reveals an even greater reliance on civilians since the end of the Cold War. The first Gulf War marked a turning point in the use of civilians by the United States as the military transitioned from a historic pattern of using a relatively small number of civilians for support jobs, to a reliance on contractors in significant numbers across a growing range of jobs (Kelty and Bierman 2013). Just under 50 percent of personnel in the Balkans and Iraq have been civilian contractors- a dramatic increase considering there were only about 10 percent of civilians working during WWII (Clever and Segal 2012).

As forces were downsized, some military bases were closed (i.e. the BRAC Policy- Base Realignment and Closure), which produced negative economic effects on nearby communities that hosted those bases. Relationships between military bases and their host civilian communities became a focus of some sociological research (e.g. Hicks and Raney 2003; Thanner 2006), extending research on civil-military relations. Research showed that communities with a nearby military presence have less racial segregation in housing and less racial inequality in employment than other communities (Booth et al. 2000). This

supported the assertion that a military presence is generally beneficial to the community. However, research also showed that gender discrimination was higher for women in terms of higher unemployment, lower wages, and lower returns to human capital in communities with a high military presence (Booth et al. 2000). Of note, research showed that those likely to enlist in the armed forces were more likely to live in a community with a military institutional presence (Kleykamp 2006).

Another significant change impacting civil-military relations was the closure of many ROTC programs throughout the country, especially in the Northeast, after the Vietnam War. As a result of anti-war protests that broke out on college campuses across the Northeast, many schools decided to sever ties with the military, including the elite universities of the Ivy League, which have been the source of commissions for some of the most highly decorated officers in the military (Melia 2011). Ever since, military recruiters have not made as much of an effort to recruit in the area (Daileda 2012). The lack of military exposure among our civilian college population without ROTC programs throughout the Northeast continues today. For example, New York City is home to nearly 600,000 students and 80 colleges. The city's population of 8 million is about the same as the state of Virginia, yet it only has four ROTC programs on college campuses, compared to Virginia's eleven. Even the City University of New York, the third-largest public university system in America and the one that commissioned General Colin Powell, no longer has an ROTC program (Daileda

2012). The overall lack of military exposure among the college population has generated discussions concerning the impacts to civil-military relations.

    As a result of these changes since the end of the Cold War, there has been a renewed interest among journalists, scholars, military leadership and policy makers on the social-psychological (i.e. attitudes) and social-structural (i.e. demographics) implications on members of the military, as well as the impacts to civil-military relations. Indeed, an increase in civilian jobs within the military, especially technical and support specialties, means that military members are more likely to specialize in general military skills that may be less transferrable to the civilian sector and less understood by civilians. Additionally, the effects of the military's BRAC policy may cause the military to become even more isolated from its host society than before, as many installations have been closed and the preponderance of those remaining are consolidated in the South and West. Couple that with the dwindling number of ROTC programs throughout the Northeast and the lack of military exposure is exacerbated. Further, members of the civilian elite serving in government positions are becoming increasingly unaware of military affairs, as the veteran population in government has declined. In contrast to the Vietnam era, where over two-thirds of the members of Congress were veterans, the veteran population of Congress shrank to about one-third in the 1990s. This has caused some to wonder if the military is becoming even more estranged from the American public. Undoubtedly, the media's negative influence on the perception of the military highlighted by sexual harassment scandals, such as the Navy's Tailhook incident and among new Army soldiers in

training at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, has created a greater disconnect between the two (Ricks 1997b).

There is another dimension of the media that must be mentioned. The way the military has been depicted in popular culture more recently has created an increasing concern for those in the military and has contributed to a greater misunderstanding between both sides. A cursory review of recent movies is quite telling of the media's negative influence. Movies such as *The Rock* (1996) had a maverick Marine general hold San Francisco hostage by threatening to use poison gas. *Broken Arrow* (1996) portrayed a passed-over Air Force major who planned to steal nuclear bombs and hold the city of Denver for ransom. *The Siege* (1998) had an evil Army general oversee martial law in New York City. In *Snake Eyes* (1998) a Navy commander plotted the successful assassination of the Secretary of Defense. *The General's Daughter* (1999) painted a picture of the Army and West Point that condones gross sexual misbehavior and covers up rape. It is particularly noteworthy that the two 1998 box office hits that had positive portrayals of the military, *Saving Private Ryan* and *The Thin Red Line*, were both set in WWII, in direct contrast to the negative images depicted in movies of the contemporary armed forces (Moskos 2001). Certainly it is conceivable that these images have created some sort of disconnect between the military and society.

Perhaps worse yet, "there has been widespread agreement that over the past few decades American society has become fragmented, more individualistic, and less disciplined" (Ricks 1997b:10). These changes put society at odds with the traditional military values of sacrifice, team, self-discipline, and putting the

interests of others above oneself. Couple the military's organizational changes

with an increased individualistic, "Me" attitude among members of society and

the potential for a cleavage, or "gap," between civilians and the military were

thought by some to be wide and alarming (e.g. Ricks 1997b).

The Civil-Military Gap Literature Overview

Sociological theory and research suggest that there are linkages between

occupations and the values and attitudes held by those who practice them. For

example, Rosenberg (1957) suggests that people tend to differ in attitudes and

values in ways that are compatible with the characteristics of the type of

occupation they desire to enter. Thus, the transition to a career-oriented

professional military would be expected to produce a more attitudinally distinct

military. However, the important point with respect to civil-military relations is

not the existence of these occupational attitudes, but rather the compatibility

between the attitudes of the military profession and the attitudes of civilian

society (Segal et al. 2001).

Attitudinal differences based on the end of conscription, the increasingly

career-oriented force, and the increasing professionalization of the military have

caused some analysts to see a problem with civil-military relations in the 1990s

(Segal et al. 2001). Initially, a "gap" was viewed as emerging between senior

military leaders and the civilian leadership who exert constitutional control over

the military (e.g. Kohn 1994). Later, the gap was viewed as a broader cultural

divide between the American armed forces, including enlisted personnel, and the

civilian society they protect. The primary focus of research has been on whether

or not the distinctive attitudes within the military either converge or diverge with society at large as well as with civilian leadership.

In 1997, Thomas Ricks, a distinguished Pentagon correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal,* and later, the *Washington Post*, published a widely circulated and debated article in the *Atlantic Monthly,* about a growing civilian-military gap. Ricks suggested that, "U.S. military personnel of all ranks are feeling increasingly alienated from their own country, and are becoming more conservative and more politically active than ever before" (1997b:1). James Kitfield agreed, suggesting that, "soldiers [are] increasingly estranged from society, and vice-versa" (1998). Ricks referred to the fact that society has increasingly become a "what's in it for me" type of attitude among young people and that has increased a gap between those in the military and the rest of society. Given Ricks' stature, "his diagnosis of potentially serious problems in relations between the military and civilian society could hardly be dismissed as the ill-considered ravings of an antimilitary ideologue" (Collins and Holsti 1999:204). Although Ricks' analysis was largely anecdotal and restricted primarily to the attitudes of a platoon of new Marine recruits coming home after basic training, it sparked many scholars to take notice, renewing discussions about civil-military relations.

Just prior to 9/11, a large group of researchers interested in the topic conducted an extensive research project to determine the nature and extent of a civilian-military "gap" (e.g. Fever and Kohn 2001). The Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) conducted the comprehensive study in 1998 and 1999 attempting to assess whether an attitudinal gap existed between the military and civilian

populations (Holsti 2001). The study was the most comprehensive analysis of attitudes of military leaders to date, with 723 active-duty service members included in their surveys. Unfortunately, the timing of its publication coinciding near the events of 9/11 resulted in little attention to this important project. The renewed interest in civil-military relations and the nature and extent of a civil-military gap in recent times serves as an overarching framework for discussion throughout my research project with respect to the expected military population's demographics, attitudes, and values.

The Contemporary Operational Environment of the Post-9/11 Era

Figure 2.1 below depicts significant historical and socioeconomic events that occurred between 2001-2013. In accordance with Life Course theory's tenet of "historical time and place," these events are likely to influence a youth's propensity to serve in the armed forces. The preponderance of major events took place in foreign areas, but nonetheless had lasting impacts at home. I briefly highlight the key events depicted in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 — Significant Social and Economic Events During the Post-9/11 Era

Year

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013

George W. Bush Administration

Attacks of 9/11

Early 2000s Recession

Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)

Operation Iraqi Freedom

Capture of Hussein

Height of Iraqi Insurgency

Saddam's Execution

Surge in Iraq

Great Recession

Barack Obama Administration

Surge in Afghanistan

Osama Bin Laden killed

Repeal of Don't Ask-Don't Tell Policy

Rescission of the Combat Exclusion Rule

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Public Support	-	89	93	75	58	46	43	40	37	39	44	43	43	42
Casualties	0	3	18	333	738	739	769	847	353	345	456	394	239	91
Overall Unemployment	4.0	4.7	5.8	6.0	5.5	5.1	4.6	4.6	5.8	9.3	9.6	8.9	8.1	7.4

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Following the attacks on 9/11, U.S. and coalition forces invaded Afghanistan initiating Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2003, the U.S. military shifted its focus to the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom with the invasion of Iraq in March. Major combat operations in Iraq ended in May of 2003 and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was captured later that year. Of note, the beginning of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars were marked by high public support (Berinsky 2009). However, a major insurgency soon ignited that significantly prolonged the operation in Iraq, while shifting most of the attention away from Afghanistan. The height of the Iraqi insurgency lasted between 2004-2007 and was marked by relatively high U.S. casualties. In 2008, President George W. Bush authorized General David Petraeus, commander of coalition forces in Iraq, to execute a major counterinsurgency campaign by "surging" more forces back into Iraq to regain the initiative. Barack Obama was elected president in 2008 as the first African-American president and Commander-in-Chief. Under his administration, the U.S. transitioned responsibility and authority to Iraqi military and security forces beginning in 2010 and withdrew all forces by the end of 2011. At the same time, U.S. forces remained engaged in Afghanistan throughout, albeit as an economy of force with only about 20,000 troops in Afghanistan compared to approximately 150,000 troops in Iraq in 2006 (Belasco 2009). To regain the initiative in Afghanistan in 2010, President Obama authorized a surge of U.S. troop levels to over 100,000, which lasted until 2012. Soon after, troop levels returned to previous levels in Afghanistan. On a direct action raid in Pakistan, U.S. forces killed Osama Bin Laden on May 2, 2011. U.S. forces have recently transitioned

responsibility and authority to Afghan military and security forces at the end of 2014 and there are approximately 10,000 troops still remaining in a "train, advise, and assist" role. Currently, ISIS has emerged as a new global terrorist threat primarily basing its operations in Syria and parts of Iraq. There are approximately 3,000 U.S. troops in Iraq and Kuwait assisting with coalition partners to defeat ISIS.

A particularly noteworthy change to the military operational environment during the post-9/11 era not highlighted by Figure 2.1 is that there are no clearly defined "front" and "rear" lines of battle as in previous wars. Today's non-linear, asymmetrical battlefield is essentially penetrable by the enemy from all directions. Combat units routinely mesh with logistical units throughout the entire area of operations while the enemy intermingles with civilians beyond the normal front lines of battle. Formerly "protected" units, such as administrative and logistical support units, are no longer free from the risk of asymmetrical threats (e.g. suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices, small arms attacks) in recent wars.

Significant socioeconomic events at home are also likely to have an influence on a youth's propensity to serve in the military. The "Great Recession" of 2008 changed the environment at home significantly. Overall unemployment rates, depicted along the bottom row of Figure 2.1, dramatically spiked from approximately 5 percent to over 9 percent in 2009 and have remained relatively high ever since. Furthermore, youth unemployment rates, between the ages of 16-24, are even higher than the national average ranging from 10.8 percent in July of

2008 to 18.1 percent in July of 2011, with men about two percent higher in unemployment than women each year. Unemployment rates for blacks and Hispanics are even higher than for whites, which may influence propensity by racial and ethnic backgrounds differently (Department of Labor 2012). Additionally, the average cost of college (not depicted) continues to increase during this decade (National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 2011). Additional social factors, such as the repeal of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy in 2010 and the lifting of the combat exclusion ban for women in 2012, are events that could also influence propensity in the years to come.

For the purposes of this study, I focus on three time periods during the post-9/11 era that I predict will significantly influence propensity: the period following the 9/11 attacks (2003) marked by patriotism and high public support for war; the period of the Iraqi insurgency (2004-2007) marked by high U.S. casualties; and the period of the recession (2008-2013) marked by economic instability and high unemployment. Specifically, I examine the direct relationships between propensity and public support for war, casualties, and unemployment rates to explore how these macro-social factors may influence propensity during the post-9/11 era.

Institutional/Occupational Model of Military Service

For decades of the AVF, researchers have been interested in what motivates an individual to volunteer for military service. Many have employed Charles Moskos' (1977) "Institutional" and "Occupational" (I/O) models of military

organization and service as a method to tap into the underlying motivations of individuals who enter the military.

Charles Moskos introduced the concepts of "Institutional" and "Occupational" models to describe alternative conceptions of military social organization and to analyze expected organizational outcomes based on both models. His basic hypothesis was that "the American military was moving from an institutional format to one more and more resembling that of an occupation" (1977:42). Moskos defined an *institution* as "legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e., a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good" (1977:42). Members of an institution are often viewed as following a calling, with notions of self-sacrifice and dedication, and usually enjoy esteem from the public (1977).

Moskos defined an *occupation* as "legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e., prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies" (1977:43). The occupational model implies a sense of individualism with a priority on self-interest rather than for the employing organization; service is less of a "calling" and more of "just a job." For Moskos, the rise of the AVF in the U.S. served as the major thrust to move the military toward the occupational model of organization since recruiting focused more on monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards (1977). If Moskos' formulation were correct, one would expect to see more occupational orientations of service during the post-9/11 era. An occupational orientation would manifest itself as a decline in youth propensity

to serve during a period of war because the risks of service during this time do not outweigh the individual benefits of service.

David Segal (1986) posed the idea of a hybrid between the institutional and occupational models of military organization. Through his analysis of survey questions to American soldiers, he found that both models could exist at any point in time, with a mixture of orientations from a soldier- a form he referred to as "pragmatic professionalism." Segal hypothesized that future armed forces would:

> "Show a pattern of pragmatic professionalism—a combination of economic and mission-oriented concerns—with short-term fluctuations in mission-oriented directions during the early stages of military engagements or during periods when America's position in the international system is being challenged by terrorists or foreign powers" (1986:370).

If Segal's hypothesis is correct, then both institutional motivations (e.g. service as a calling and patriotism) as well as occupational motivations (e.g. monetary rewards and incentives) could influence a youth's propensity to serve. In other words, social factors such as the timing of a conflict (e.g. in its initial versus later stages) and overall public support, along with current military entitlements and benefits, would all influence youth propensity.

Literature Review and Men's Propensity Predictions

Enlistment in the military has been a relatively rare phenomenon among women, and previous work analyzing the classes of 1976-1995 has primarily excluded women from the analysis because the numbers of military women in follow-up samples were too low for statistical reliability (for exception see Segal et al. 1998). Additionally, earlier analyses revealed a variety of gender

differences in correlates of propensity (Bachman et al. 2000b). For my initial analysis (i.e. Chapters 4-5), I exclude women from the dataset. However, in my follow-up analysis (i.e. Chapter 6) I examine trends in women's propensity during the post-9/11 era since the overall number of female enlistees has continued to increase and women's success and opportunities in combat roles are expanding.

My study asks the primary question: What is the likelihood that young adults expect to enlist in the armed forces during the period following 9/11? Utilizing survey data taken from the MTF project, I assess the propensity of high school seniors. In accordance with the occupational model of military organization described by Moskos (1977), I predict that overall propensity levels will decline during a period of war since the costs associated with wartime service outweigh the benefits associated with the military service as an occupation. Thus, I expect to see propensity levels decline during the post-9/11 era compared to earlier time periods of relative stability and peace.

> **Hypothesis 1a: Military propensity will decline in periods of war**
> **as compared to periods marked by no war.**

Macro-Social Influences on Propensity

A related sub-question is to what extent and why propensity levels may fluctuate during the post-9/11 era. Structural changes within the military, as well as within society and the economy overall, will likely contribute to these fluctuations. In accordance with Segal's (1986) hypothesized hybrid model of military organization, "pragmatic professionalism," I expect to see variations in propensity throughout the post-9/11 era as a result of varying underlying

individual motivations. Specifically, I expect that public support for war, U.S. casualties, and the economy will have significant influences on youth propensity.

Public Support for War and Propensity

People responded to the attacks on 9/11 in various ways. One popular reaction was to display the American flag on one's home, car, or person. A recent study was conducted (Skitka 2005) to understand the underlying motivations that led to this behavior. Specifically, the study examined to what extent flag-display behavior was motivated by patriotism, nationalism, or a combination of both. I provide a discussion of the definitions of patriotism and nationalism below. The study demonstrated that post-9/11 flag-display behavior (approximately 5 months after 9/11) was an expression of patriotism, and not nationalism. The study also noted that national polls indicated a drop in flag-display behavior from 82 percent immediately after 9/11 to about 56 percent since the Iraq War began. The author noted, "One can speculate that what it means to display the flag since the Iraq War began may have shifted more toward the nationalistic end of the spectrum, a sentiment that fewer Americans may be prepared to endorse unequivocally" (Skitka 2005:2008).

A related behavior to displaying American flags after 9/11 could be an increase in the amount of recruits volunteering for military service as a form of patriotism. Similarly, a corresponding increase in youth propensity could also occur. Indeed, displaying the flag on one's uniform in service to his or her country could be construed as one of the highest displays of patriotism, especially during wartime. Anecdotally, portrayals in the media of voluntary service in

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response to the attacks of 9/11, such as the NFL's Pat Tillman, certainly depict patriotic sentiments. Similar lesser-known stories of patriotic calls to service, where people "rallied around the flag," also occurred throughout the U.S. The story of SGT James Regan is one of those cases.

SGT "Jimmy" Regan was an exceptional scholar-athlete as a college lacrosse player at Duke University. As a Long Island, NY native, Jimmy felt the shock from the events of 9/11 hit close to home while he was in college. Immediately following his collegiate career, Jimmy decided to bypass law school to satisfy his personal calling to serve in the military so he enlisted in the Army in 2004. While serving with the elite Army Rangers, he served two tours in Afghanistan and two in Iraq. SGT James Regan was killed in Iraq in 2007 while serving with the Rangers. The "Lead the Way Fund" was founded by his parents in honor of Jimmy "to raise funds in support of disabled U.S. Army Rangers and the families of Rangers who have died, who have been injured, or are currently serving in harm's way around the world" (Lead the Way Fund 2013). It is possible that Jimmy's legacy, highlighted by his foundation, could influence some individuals to serve in similar fashion.

The Pat Tillman story is more widely known and celebrated within the public, but is very similar in nature to Jimmy's story. A day after 9/11, Tillman remarked to a reporter, "At times like this you stop and think about just how good we have it, what kind of system we live in, and the freedoms we are allowed. A lot of my family has gone and fought in wars and I really haven't done a damn thing" (Pat Tillman Foundation 2004). Pat Tillman also felt the call to serve in the wake of

9/11 so he decided to postpone his distinguished football career with the Arizona Cardinals and enlist in the Army alongside his brother, Kevin, after the 2001 football season. Like Jimmy, Pat also enlisted in the Army Rangers where he served combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. While serving in Afghanistan, Pat was killed in action. Senator John McCain from Arizona lauded Tillman as "the quintessential definition of a patriot" (Garber 2004).

Despite the hardships and risks associated with combat, it is possible that many felt the patriotic calling to "rally 'round the flag" like SGT James Regan and Corporal Pat Tillman volunteering to serve during an international crisis. Certainly, patriotic sentiments flared throughout the U.S. after 9/11. One can recall the impact of elite rhetoric such as when President Bush echoed Todd Beamer's words, "Let's Roll," in a speech to his fellow Americans aimed at rallying public support for the war in Afghanistan (Reaves 2001; Gershkoff and Kushner 2005). Indeed, American pride was displayed in many ways as Americans "rallied around the flag," showing support for President Bush by extraordinarily high levels of public support for the war after it began through 2003 (Mueller 1970; Berinsky 2009).

Research has yet to show a link between public support for war and propensity, although research has demonstrated a fairly strong relationship between patriotism and public support for war (Federico et al. 2005). Inasmuch as one views the propensity to serve during wartime as a form of patriotism, then one would expect public support for war and propensity to be positively related. However, it must be noted that an extensive amount of literature in social

psychology has distinguished between two manifestations of national identification - the psychological concepts of "patriotism" and "nationalism." Therefore, I present a brief review of the literature covering these concepts.

Patriotism generally connotes pride and love for country, whereas nationalism refers to chauvinistic arrogance and desire for dominance in international relations (Li and Brewer 2004). Patriotism has generally been referred to as a healthy self-concept of national identification associated with a positive love of one's country (Bar-Tal 1993; Bar-Tal and Staub 1997; Kosterman and Feshbach 1989) that can be independent of out-group derogation (Brewer 1999). Nationalism, on the other hand, is related to intergroup differentiation, including the view that one's own country is superior to others and therefore should be dominant (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Feshbach 1994; Mummendey et al. 2001). However, research has also shown that both patriotism and nationalism can coexist since they share the feature of a positive in-group evaluation and pride, and they are positively correlated both conceptually and empirically (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Sidanius et al. 1997; Li and Brewer 2004; Skitka 2005).

As two different sides of the same coin, research (e.g. Worchel and Coutant 1997; de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003) has shown that it is certainly possible that a "love of nation" can be associated with patriotic attitudes in some cases or with more nationalistic attitudes in other cases, within the same individual. Research has also shown (e.g. Li and Brewer 2004) that groups who identify based on the virtue of sharing a common heritage (i.e. the "essence" definition of American unity), patriotism can be associated with derogatory attitudes toward other

nations, whereas groups who identify based on the virtue of facing a common problem or having a common purpose (i.e. the "common goal" definition of American unity), patriotism is less associated with nationalistic attitudes.

As forms of social identification, patriotism and nationalism both increase in response to an outside threat. The attacks on 9/11 resulted in immediate increases in expressions of national identification and unity throughout the United States. Whether by the visible displays of flags or the public's support for the war against terror, Americans appeared to be strongly united by a patriotic identity, perhaps under the common purpose of defeating terrorism. Indeed, public support for war in Afghanistan was at an astonishing high, between 80 and 90 percent following the attacks (Berinsky 2009). As the military and the public's attention shifted away from Afghanistan to the war in Iraq in 2003, support remained high as President Bush successfully framed the war as part of the larger war against terror and persuaded many people to believe that Iraq posed an immediate threat to U.S. security by possessing weapons of mass destruction (Gershkoff and Kushner 2005).

There is no shortage of theories to explain support for war or military operations, including work that places importance on various variables to include but not limited to: the amount of casualties (e.g. Mueller 1973); the belief of success (e.g. Gelpi et al. 2006; Berinsky and Druckman 2007); the belief that the war is just; (e.g. Gelpi et al. 2006); international support (e.g. Kull and Destler 1999); elite rhetoric (e.g. Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2009); the influence of media (e.g. Iyengar 1991; Zaller 1992); and various individual-level variables such as

sophistication, political awareness (e.g. Zaller 1992), and attitudes and values (e.g. Iyengar 1991; Druckman 2001; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). Additionally, research has also shown that individual national attachments (e.g. Federico et al. 2005), such as patriotism and nationalism, have also been strongly related to public support for war.

Federico and his colleagues (2005) recently conducted a study examining the relationship between the need for closure and support for military action against Iraq. Previous studies have suggested that a high need for closure- that is, "a desire for knowledge that is clear, stable, and unambiguous as opposed to confusing or uncertain" - may be associated with greater hostility toward relevant out-groups (2005:621). The authors examined how this relationship may be moderated by identification with the national in-group. As noted earlier, the literature has largely broken down the concept of national in-group identification into two primary groups - nationalism (i.e. an aggressive form of identification based on a desire for national dominance) and patriotism (i.e. a more neutral love of one's country). The authors found that the relationship between the need for closure and support for the use of force in Iraq was moderated by nationalism, but not by patriotism. In other words, among those with a high need for closure, the highly nationalistic were more likely to support the use of force in Iraq compared to the highly patriotic. The authors also found that both nationalism and patriotism were highly related to public support for war, with correlations of .69 and .56 respectively. Further, they found that nationalism and patriotism were also highly correlated with each other (r=.60).

Taken as a whole, intuition, anecdotal evidence, and prior research would lead one to expect that patriotism following the attacks of 9/11 would be positively associated with youth propensity to serve. Patriotism is, indeed, a tough concept to measure. Some research has examined behaviors (e.g. flag-displaying behavior), while other research has used survey questions from the Kosterman and Feshbach (1989) patriotism scale to assess this aspect of national identification. Unfortunately, there are not any questions in the MTF study related to this scale to directly compare the concept of patriotism to propensity. Previous research on propensity has not examined the relationship between public support for war and propensity, largely due to lack of opportunity throughout the AVF. However, as highlighted above, research has demonstrated that patriotism is moderately related to public support for war. Thus, it is reasonable to predict that propensity is positively related to public support for war. Consistent with institutional orientations of service as a calling, I expect that public support for war will be positively associated with youth propensity following 9/11. Despite the hardships and risks associated with combat, it is reasonable to believe that many young men and women would feel the patriotic calling to serve after 9/11, just as Pat Tillman and Jimmy Regan. Similarly, it is reasonable that the public's support for war would impact a youth's likelihood to serve.

> *Hypothesis 1b: There will be a positive relationship between*
> *military propensity and public support for war during wartime.*

Casualties and Propensity

The relationship between propensity and casualties has not yet been fully explored. Primarily, this is the result of a lack of major wars during the AVF prior to 9/11, when the preponderance of propensity research was conducted. While the military has been engaged in combat operations at various times throughout the AVF (e.g. Haiti, Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia), most operations were limited in both scale and duration with only 147 deaths during the Gulf War, and a total of 37 during the various other operations. As a result, it has not been feasible for researchers to examine the relationship between propensity and casualties during the AVF. Limited related research has only found that the "threat to life" was listed as an important reason for some youth not to join the military, which varied significantly between racial and ethnic groups (DoD 2000). Political science and public administration researchers have been much more interested in the relationship between casualties and public opinion (i.e. support for war), which can be used as a platform for discussion on propensity.

Mueller's (1973) study of public opinion concerning the Korean and Vietnam wars is a common starting point for discussions about the relationship between casualties and public support for war. Mueller argued that public support for military action declined as a function of American casualties. This contention has become better known as the "casualty hypothesis"- i.e., that the American public is casualty phobic- a conclusion that holds weight with both policymakers and academics (Berinsky and Druckman 2007). A distinction between casualty phobia and casualty sensitivity should be made. Casualty phobia is a reflexive

opposition to any casualties. Casualty sensitivity recognizes the human toll as a cost of war. Certainly the public would like to assume less of this cost, but a nonzero human cost does not necessarily mean that it will oppose war. Scholars have noted "a continuum of casualty sensitivity ranging from the minimally sensitive – those who view casualties as a necessary cost of war and not a determining factor in shaping support- to the maximally sensitive - those who support only military missions that guarantee virtually no casualties" (Gelpi et al. 2006:10). Casualty phobia represents one end of this continuum.

Indeed, the proposition that the U.S. public is casualty-averse or phobic has become an entrenched part of the post-Cold War conventional wisdom. Among some, there is belief that Western nations are becoming increasingly risk and casualty averse with their troops. A special issue of *Armed Forces & Society* was devoted to the casualty aversion phenomenon (Van der Meulen and Soeters 2005). Dubbed the "body bag syndrome" or "casualty hypothesis," many researchers believe that the American public will not tolerate large numbers of U.S. casualties in military operations (Holsti 2001).

Despite its popularity, many scholars have debated the casualty hypothesis arguing that it is more complex than often depicted in Mueller's original form. Among these scholars, there have been two distinct strands of research. The first strand of research follows Mueller and is concerned with whether the number of casualties affects public support for war according to a fixed pattern of unavoidable decline or whether the public views casualties and the use of force through a cost-benefit calculus (Gelpi et al. 2006). Scholars among the latter

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viewpoint paint a picture of a "rational public," that is capable of responding to political debate and weighing the complexities of foreign policy. Under this approach, Larson (1996) found, contrary to Mueller, that a complex cost-benefit calculation fits the data better than a reflexive response to casualties. In other words, the public could be flexible in accepting the price of casualties depending on the overall benefit of the military mission. Larson's argument came to be known as the "rational cost-benefit" model.

Under this model, researchers have explored the elasticity of the public's "demand" for war. Some researchers argue that the public sees so little benefit in the majority of military missions that, in effect, the cost-benefit calculation is essentially the same as the casualty-phobic stance (e.g. Mueller 2000). Similarly, others argue that, for certain key categories of missions (e.g. peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, etc.), the public's sensitivity to casualties is so high that even a very small number of casualties can produce what is known as the "Somalia syndrome," which refers to the precipitous drop of public support for U.S. intervention in Somalia after eighteen special operations soldiers were killed in 1993 (e.g. Klarevas 2000).

However, most scholars who have examined public opinion polls closely have favored the other side of the debate, concluding that the public's demand (i.e. support) for military operations, while not completely inelastic, is not as cost sensitive to approximate casualty phobia. These scholars make up the second strand of research, which takes the issue of elasticity a step farther: What factors shape the elasticity of demand for military missions? In other words, under what

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conditions would the number of casualties cause public support for a particular

mission to decline more rapidly or more slowly? There is wide scholarly

consensus that multiple factors may be working simultaneously. What

distinguishes between each argument is the importance placed on various factors

that influence more or less public support for military missions (Gelpi et al.

2006).

   Jentleson (1992) argues that the "pretty prudent" public bases its tolerance for

casualties on the principle policy objective of the military operation. He contends

that the public will accept casualties during missions that include traditional

military tasks of using force to coerce an adversary engaged in aggressive action

against the U.S. or its allies. On the other hand, he contends that the public will

only support "humanitarian intervention" missions if the costs are relatively low.

Larson (1996) argues that public casualty tolerance follows domestic elite

casualty tolerance. That is, when domestic elites line up in a consensus behind

the mission, public support will be strong despite mounting costs. However,

when elites are divided, even a small amount of casualties will cause public

support to diminish quickly. Kull and Destler (1999) argue that casualty phobia is

essentially a case of political elites misreading the public. They argue that public

support for a military mission will be more robust if the public sees that other

countries support the mission likewise, and thus the United States is not obligated

to bear all the burden of the costs. Thus, the priority of importance for the

public's casualty tolerance is based on multilateralism- i.e., gaining allied support

for U.S. military operations. Finally, Feaver and Gelpi (2004) emphasize

expectations of success as the critical factor in explaining the public's tolerance for casualties. When the public believes the mission will succeed, it continues to support the mission, even amidst mounting costs. On the contrary, when the public thinks success is unlikely, small costs will cause support to plunge. Of note, the critical belief specified is the expectation of eventual future success, not necessarily assessments of how the war is currently going or has recently been going.

Most recently, Gelpi, Fever, and Reifler (2006) conducted a study during the first few years of the Iraq war (2003-2004) to test the casualty hypothesis and to assess the relative importance of the various factors related to casualty tolerance noted above. They argue that the public will tolerate significant numbers of U.S. combat casualties (i.e. at least 1500 U.S. deaths) under certain circumstances. They found that the U.S. public's tolerance for the human costs of war was primarily shaped by the intersection of two crucial attitudes: beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of the war, and beliefs about a war's likely success. The impact of each attitude depended upon the other. However, ultimately, they found that beliefs about the likelihood of success mattered most in determining the public's willingness to tolerate U.S. military deaths in combat. Of note, they also found support for the arguments made by Jentleson (1992), Larson (1996), and Kull and Destler (1999) as well, albeit there was less importance placed on their factors of the principle policy objective, perceived domestic elite consensus, and multilateralism respectively.

Contrary to Mueller (1973), their findings suggest that the U.S. public makes reasoned and reasonable judgments about emotionally charged and politically polarizing issues such as fighting a war. In other words, the public forms its attitudes regarding support for war by weighing the costs and benefits associated with that war. While U.S. military casualties are a cost of war, they are a cost that the public is willing to pay if it thinks the initial decision to launch the war was correct, and if it thinks that the United States will prevail. Again, between the two public opinions, it is the belief that the United States will be successful that matters most for supporting a war amidst high casualties.

Intuition as well as prior related research (e.g. DoD 2000) would lead one to believe that propensity would decrease as U.S. casualties increase due to the increased risk of personal harm associated with service during war. However, the relationship between propensity and casualties may not be as clear-cut as intuition would suggest. If one is willing to accept the assumption that public support for war is similarly related to the propensity to serve, then one could use either Mueller's (1973) or Gelpi and his colleagues' (2006) recent argument to predict the relationship between casualties and propensity. Indeed, it is reasonable that casualties may not negatively influence propensity based on other mediating factors in the same manner as prior research on public support for war has shown. Perhaps, propensity would not decline as casualties increase if Gelpi and his colleagues' two conditions were met: 1) the public's belief that the U.S. is likely to succeed in war and, 2) the belief that the war being fought is just.

Although casualties from Afghanistan and Iraq have been far less than previous wars such as Vietnam, Korea, and WWII, the effects may be heightened due to the rise in media technology. Certainly, images of U.S. casualties are much more pervasive in today's media environment than during World War II (Berinsky 2009). It doesn't take much to recall the lasting images on television and print of an American soldier being dragged across the streets of Mogadishu by Somalis in 1993. More recently, it is hard not to find images of our wounded that have returned home from the battlefield and are coping with their injuries depicted on daily television advertisements for organizations such as the Wounded Warrior Project. With 24-hour media and Internet coverage in today's environment, the "flash to bang" of direct combat images has made war more of a reality for the average citizen. These images of the direct costs of war are likely to be imprinted on America's youth as they make a decision to join the military.

I expect that as U.S. casualties increase during war, the negative impressions left on the minds of the youth population will cause a decrease in the propensity to serve in the military. This prediction is in line with the occupational model of military service, as the benefits of service do not necessarily outweigh the actual costs associated with wartime sacrifices, which are exacerbated during periods of high casualties. Further, this prediction is consistent with related research (Mueller 1973) on the casualty hypothesis. Empirically, I expect that casualties will be negatively related to military propensity during the post-9/11 era- i.e., propensity will decline as casualties increase.

> *Hypothesis 1c: There will be a negative relationship between military propensity and U.S. casualties during wartime.*

Unemployment and Propensity

To date there has been limited research that has examined the direct relationship between military propensity and unemployment (Lawrence and Degree 1996). Most this research was conducted by the Department of Defense using the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey between 1976-1989, which found a fairly strong correlation between unemployment and propensity (Bray et al. 1990). Related research exists indicating that youth with propensity intend to join the military for reasons such as pay, educational funding, job training and security, and that propensity is higher for unemployed than employed youth (DoD 2000). Segal and his colleagues (1999) also conducted related research examining the relationship between the conditions of the recruiting climate and military propensity during six phases of the AVF separated by years between 1973-1997. They measured the recruiting climate by each phase examining the conditions of entry-level pay (compared to civilian compensation), recruiting resources available, educational benefits, recruit quality, and the recruiting environment. They measured the recruiting environment primarily by youth unemployment rates and cohort size. The authors found that a "poor" recruiting environment, indicated in part by low youth unemployment, was related to a decline in propensity.

Despite relatively limited prior research on the relationship between propensity and the economy, there has been an extensive body of literature examining the economic determinants of actual military enlistment since the rise of the AVF and the ensuing competition between the Department of Defense and the civilian labor

market for potential recruits. Various macroeconomic factors such as unemployment rates, military compensation relative to civilian earnings, and educational benefits have been shown to be important determinants of military enlistment during peacetime (e.g. Dale and Gilroy 1984; Horne 1985). Indeed, conventional wisdom would suggest that military enlistment is impacted by the conditions of the economy such that as economic conditions worsen, military enlistment increases. This is in keeping with the occupational model of service that Moskos (1977) predicted.

What has yet to be fully explored is the direct relationship between unemployment and propensity. Perhaps, more importantly, is examining this relationship during wartime, where the costs of military service are much higher, potentially changing the relationship that conventional wisdom would suggest. The post-9/11 era allows for the unique opportunity to conduct this type of research, which has essentially been infeasible to fully explore throughout the AVF until now, except for during the short period of the Gulf War (e.g. Segal et al. 1999). Further, the dramatic changes in economic conditions marked by the economic recession of 2008 provide an even richer opportunity to examine this relationship. Thus, I take advantage of these unique opportunities to examine the relationship between unemployment and propensity during the longest period of sustained war in history.

The occupational model of military service places most emphasis on self-interest as opposed to interest for the employing organization (Moskos 1977). These self-interests are manifested in the form of monetary rewards and financial

benefits expected for services rendered. A desire for stability in the work place is another factor that represents the occupational model of military service. Certainly, intuition as well as prior research would lead one to expect that as conditions in the economy become worse and jobs become more scarce, the military could be viewed as a more viable job opportunity, thereby increasing a youth's likelihood of serving in the armed forces. This expectation is consistent with prior related research on unemployment and actual enlistment as noted above. Since prior research has already shown that propensity is highly related to actual enlistment (e.g. Bachman et al. 1998), it is reasonable to predict that a similar positive relationship would occur between unemployment and propensity. This is also in keeping with Moskos' occupational model of service.

However, the main difference between earlier research and mine is the examination of this relationship during wartime as opposed to peacetime. In other words, how have the dynamics of war- considered to be institutionally related- changed the relationship between propensity and unemployment, which is considered to be an occupationally related factor? It is reasonable that the benefits of the military, such as good pay and job security compared to other job opportunities during declining economic conditions, may not outweigh the potentially higher costs associated with military service during wartime.

Certainly, one might expect that the risks associated with war could outweigh the benefits associated with military enlistment. While one may consider the military a viable job opportunity compared with other alternatives in the civilian labor market, especially during declining economic conditions, the dynamics are

much different when the military is at war. On top of the obvious risks of

personal harm, the hardships endured by military personnel while deployed away

from their families during war, certainly present a much different military than

during peace. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the military is "just another

job" during wartime as some (e.g. Moskos 1988) have suggested during

peacetime. I expect that the dynamics of wartime will change the previously

associated positive relationship between propensity and unemployment such that

there will not be a significant boost in propensity as unemployment increases.

Simply put, I expect that the risks associated with war will outweigh the benefits

of service, even amidst poor economic conditions, resulting in youth seeking

other pathways of lesser resistance to adulthood. Empirically, I expect that there

will not be a significant positive relationship between unemployment and

propensity during the post-9/11 era.

> ***Hypothesis 1d: There will be no significant relationship between
> propensity and unemployment during wartime.***

Individual and Demographic Influences on Propensity

There are certain individual factors such as family background and

demographics that may assist in explaining differences in propensity trends of the

youth population. Diversity in the military has increased significantly since the

beginning of the AVF in 1973. Bolstered by research (e.g. Bogart 1969) showing

that racially integrated units performed better than segregated units, along with

the high number of black recruits, the Army began integrating units in 1950

during the Korean War and officially abolished racially segregated units in 1954

(Clever and Segal 2012). It is particularly noteworthy that the Army led the way

for racial integration over a decade before the rest of American society caught up marked by the establishment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These developments attracted more African Americans to the force, as racial tensions and discrimination were more pervasive in the civilian labor market. The composition of the military at the beginning of the AVF became more diverse as a result, but the military did not become an overwhelmingly minority force. As of 2013, minorities (i.e. Black and Hispanics) only make up about a third of all active-duty personnel (DoD 2013).

Contrary to the architects' predictions, the AVF is more demographically representative of American society than the draft-era force (Clever and Segal 2012). Black enlisted personnel in the Army increased from 23 percent in 1973 to nearly 30 percent in 2009. Increasing Hispanic representation has also reflected the growth of this subgroup in society overall. In 1973, Hispanic enlisted personnel encompassed less than 5 percent of the military population, whereas they increased to 16 percent in 2009 (Clever and Segal 2012). There are still more strides to be made, especially within the officer corps, as racial and ethnic diversity has lagged behind that of the enlisted force. Yet, minority representation has improved in recent years increasing from 9 percent of all officers in 1990 to 22 percent in 2009, which is comparable to the civilian population where minorities comprise 20 percent of college graduates aged 21-49 (Clever and Segal 2012).

The "bridging hypothesis" suggests that military service functions as a mechanism for those with less-advantaged backgrounds to acquire the attributes

and attitudes that will enable them to succeed in civilian society and increase their overall socioeconomic status (Kleykamp 2009). The hypothesis applies to racial and ethnic minorities as well as to whites with lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Through the rigors of military discipline and training, military service is expected to provide human, social, and cultural training that will allow lower-advantaged individuals to "bridge" the gap to mainstream society.

Blacks in the Military

Analysts have proposed numerous reasons for black overrepresentation within the military compared to the general population. Blacks have fewer educational and job opportunities than whites (Binkin and Eitelberg 1986; Hosek and Peterson 1985; Phillips et al. 1992), and the military is perceived to be more of an egalitarian, meritocratic environment with less racial discrimination than the civilian labor force and educational system (Moskos and Butler 1996; Segal 1989). After controlling for a myriad of demographic, socioeconomic, attitudinal, and other factors, almost all studies have concluded that blacks are more likely than whites to join the military (Bachman et al. 1998, 2000b; Dale and Gilroy 1984; Hosek and Peterson 1985; Kilburn 1992; Kilburn and Klerman 1999; Mare and Winship 1984; Murray and McDonald 1999; Teachman et al. 1993).

Some argue that there is still a fair amount of racial "segregation" within the military. Blacks are overrepresented in administrative and logistical military occupational specialties and underrepresented in combat specialties. These trends may be in part from self-selection into jobs with a high degree of civilian transferability or due, in part, to institutional racism where barriers to success in

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some specialties, such as elite combat units like Special Forces, may dissuade minority representation (Kleykamp 2009). The overall increase in combat units in the military during the post-9/11 era at the expense of less-needed administrative and logistical specialties may be a contributing factor that could cause a decrease in black propensity, as recruiters may not be targeting this population as much during this period. Further, the increased risk to soldiers in administrative and logistical specialties resulting from the changes to the contemporary operational environment may also cause a decrease in black propensity in accordance with the occupational model of service.

Hispanics in the Military

Given Hispanics' disadvantaged positioning in the labor market and education system (Bean and Tienda 1987; Hoffman et al. 2003; Llagas 2003), one would expect them to migrate to the military as much as blacks. However, this is not the case. Hispanics remain underrepresented in the military, comprising just over 11 percent of the active-duty force, and about 15 percent of the civilian work force (Department of Defense 2012; U.S. Department of Labor 2012). The few studies that examine Hispanics find that they are less likely to enlist than whites or blacks (Hosek and Peterson 1985; Kilburn and Klerman 1999). This is especially puzzling given the fact that Hispanics have shown the high levels of interest in military service (Segal et al. 1999). It is possible that they are being screened out by the military for various reasons, most likely due to a lack of completing high school (Kleykamp 2006).

There has been a fair amount of racial segregation of Hispanics within the military as well. Studies have shown that Hispanics have been overrepresented in the combat arms specialties, such as the infantry, and underrepresented in more technical specialties, such as electronics and communications (Pew Hispanic Center 2003; DoD 2006). Overrepresentation in the combat arms specialties would put Hispanics more at risk of harm, especially in times of war. Gifford (2005) confirmed this when he examined casualty data from the Iraq war between May 19, 2003 and April 8, 2004 by race/ethnicity and military occupational specialty (MOS). Overall Gifford found that "the casualty rate among Hispanics during the war was 49 percent higher than their representation in the ground forces would suggest (p=.002), and 85 percent higher than [the percent of] Hispanics on active duty (p=.044)" (2005:215). In accordance with the occupational model of service, one could argue that the increased risk of becoming a casualty, especially for Hispanics, would contribute to an overall decrease in their propensity to serve.

However, there are other factors that may influence Hispanic propensity in the positive direction. During the post-9/11 era, the issue of illegal immigration has been at the forefront of political debate resulting in a considerable amount of media attention. Hispanics migrating from the Mexican border have been a large source of immigrants during this period. A recent study by Dempsey and Shapiro found that a rather large proportion (60 percent) of the Hispanic population in the Army is comprised of immigrants or the children of immigrants (Segal et al. 2007). Just as blacks desired to participate during WWII as a way to prove their

citizenship, Hispanics may desire to serve during this era to validate their citizenship (Armor 1996; De Angelis 2012; Clever and Segal 2012). The potential for Hispanics to acculturate to the U.S. may also be a contributing factor for their expectation to serve. Recent research finds greater acculturation among Latino veterans, including having better friendships with Anglos and speaking more English at home (Leal 2003). Research also shows that there is greater support within the Hispanic community for military service. Leal finds that "Latinos are more likely than Anglos to encourage young people to enlist" (2005:123). Additionally, the Army has specifically targeted Latino youth by increasing Hispanic recruiters and placing ads in Spanish-language media, including magazines, radio, and television (Segal et al. 2007). All rationale taken into consideration, it is likely that Hispanic propensity during the post- 9/11 era will not mirror that of blacks, despite their similar disadvantaged backgrounds. Indeed, Hispanics may have a stronger propensity compared to their white and black counterparts based on recent structural changes within the military recruiting environment and other more institutional reasons such as a desire to "serve my country" (Segal et al. 2007).

It appears that the racial composition of the military is changing during the post-9/11 era. Black representation in the active duty military has declined since 2001, while Hispanic representation is increasing (DoD 2002; 2012; Segal and Segal 2004). Similarly, the propensity to serve among blacks has been declining faster than among white youth, while Hispanic propensity has slightly increased compared to whites in the 1990s (Segal et al. 1999). A primary question my

research addresses is whether various youth sub-groups differ in propensity during the post-9/11 era. Previous research examining the two decades between 1976-1997 has already shown that black men had higher propensity than Hispanic men, and that both groups had higher propensity than white men (Bachman et al.1998). Consistent with the bridging hypothesis, and the view that the military is more of an egalitarian environment for minorities compared to the civilian labor force, I expect to see similar racial and ethnic trends during the post-9/11 period. However, the fact that black and Hispanic men will encounter more combat situations in the current operational environment makes it likely that their overall propensity will decline as well (Segal and Segal 2004).

> ***Hypothesis 2: Black and Hispanic men will have a greater propensity to serve in the military as compared to white men during the post-9/11 era.***

SES and Propensity

Socioeconomic status, independent of race, also influences an individual's actual enlistment in the military. Prior studies have shown that those who have lower family incomes, larger family sizes (which result in more sharing of scarce resources), and less-educated parents are more likely to join the military (Asch et al. 1999; Kilburn and Asch 2003; Kilburn and Klerman 1999; Kleykamp 2006).

Although the socioeconomically disadvantaged are more likely to join the military, the military has increasingly become more competitive in its selection of high quality recruits. Contrary to popular belief, the military does not simply select from the lower classes of society. Prior studies have also shown that individuals with high abilities, measured by the Armed Forces Qualifications Test

(AFQT), other test scores, G.P.A., or high school rank, are less likely to join the

military than attend college, but are more likely to enlist than work or perform

some other activity (Kilburn and Klerman 1999; Kleykamp 2006). Consistent

with the bridging hypothesis, I expect the previously observed association

between socioeconomic status and enlistment to be similar for predicting military

propensity as well.

> ***Hypothesis 3: Youth who are socioeconomically disadvantaged
> are likely to have a higher propensity to serve in the military as
> compared to those who are more advantaged.***

Race During the Post-9/11 Era and the Operational Environment

Social and institutional factors during the post-9/11 era such as changes in the

contemporary operational environment abroad and the economic environment at

home may impact one's propensity to serve by subgroup differently. A simple

test of this hypothesis implies an interaction between race and ethnicity and the

various macro-social factors (e.g. casualties and unemployment). Today's

operational environment abroad is as unpredictable and dangerous as ever before.

Guerrilla warfare tactics have blurred the front lines on the battlefields of

Afghanistan and Iraq placing formerly "protected" units and individuals, who

have "softer" military occupational specialties, directly into harm's way. This has

had the biggest impact on minorities, especially blacks, in the military since they

predominately occupy administrative and logistical MOSs as opposed to combat

specialties (Kleykamp 2009; Segal and Segal 2004; Sandhoff and Segal 2013).

Indeed, the costs of service during this era of continuous conflict have created a

"fog of war," perhaps obscuring the benefits of military service. Earlier research

(Segal et al. 1999) has already shown that black propensity dropped dramatically from over 47 percent to about 28 percent during the Gulf War period (1990-1991), and has yet to recover above 30 percent.

I expect to see similar downward trends in black propensity during the post-9/11 era, especially amidst high U.S. casualties. I also expect the large gap between white and black propensity, which decreased in the 1990s, to continue to decrease after 9/11 due to a change in the operational environment. Consistent with the occupational model of service, the benefits associated with military service simply do not outweigh the risks associated with the current wartime and operational environment. I do not expect to see similar trends between white and Hispanic propensity given that prior research did not show a significant decrease in either white or Hispanic propensity during the Gulf War period. Further, additional factors such as increased recruiting efforts, more support for military service among the Latino community, and greater institutional motivations to serve for a "calling," possibly to prove one's citizenship, could be considered an added benefit of service for Hispanics during this era. Using the same occupational motivation logic, I also expect that black youth will be more positively influenced by a dwindling economy, resulting in a higher propensity to serve compared to their white or Hispanic counterparts.

> *Hypothesis 4a: The gap between white and black propensity to serve in the military will decrease during the post-9/11 era as compared to earlier years.*

> *Hypothesis 4b: As casualties increase, black propensity will decrease more than white or Hispanic propensity.*

Hypothesis 4c: As unemployment rates increase, black propensity will increase more than white or Hispanic propensity.

Educational Attainment and Plans/Alternate Pathways to Adulthood

The Life Course theory tenet of "human agency" emphasizes that people have a choice on what pathway and trajectory they take as they develop over time. When deciding what to do after high school, the primary choice one has is to continue schooling, join the military, or do something else (e.g. go to work or travel). Recent studies (Kilburn and Asch 2003; Bachman et al. 2001) have shown that roughly 50 percent more youth say they definitely will graduate from a four-year college today than at the inception of the AVF in 1973. The fraction of high school students attending college within two years after graduation has grown from about half to about two-thirds, reflecting the large labor market returns associated with a college degree relative to just a high school diploma. Further, the overall size of the youth population has declined since 1980 from about 2.2 million to 1.9 million, depleting the supply of youth to the military's traditional recruiting market- the non-college-bound market (Kilburn and Asch 2003).

Studies on educational aspirations have shown that a large proportion of high school students plan to attend college, and an even larger proportion aspire to do so. Increased access to higher education for minorities, along with the increasing returns to investment for a college education, have contributed to military recruiting difficulties in the 1990s by attracting a large share of the sought after "high-quality" recruits more towards both two- and four-year colleges versus military enlistment (Bachman et al. 2001).

Studies reveal that there is a strong correlation between success in high school and college aspirations. Those with higher grades have lower propensity and lower rates of enlistment. Specifically, high school students with "C" grade averages are about twice as likely to enter service as compared to those with "A" averages. Those with the lowest grades (C- or D) show the highest levels of propensity, although they do not have the highest rates of enlistment due to military entrance requirements for cognitive aptitude (Bachman et al. 2000b). Of course the relationship between grades and military propensity overlaps significantly with college expectations and high school curriculum (i.e. college preparatory vs. all others). Nevertheless, studies show that the dominant pattern of causation is that students who consistently get good grades are, partly due to their success in high school, more likely to plan to go to college and that planning to enter college makes individuals less likely to plan on entering military service.

Though college enrollments have been increasing, the cost of college has risen dramatically. In the past decade, median family income, adjusted for inflation, has declined, while at the same time, tuition at two-and four-year colleges has increased at a rate faster than inflation or family income. To further exacerbate the problem, student financial assistance has not kept pace with college costs which means students are likely to assume greater debts for higher education (National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 2011).

Although studies (Bachman et al. 2001) have shown that students with high educational aspirations are more likely to go to college than to serve in the military after high school graduation, it is possible that college goals may also

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influence decisions between traditional four-year college alternatives. Concerns about college affordability may dissuade some students from taking on higher debt loads in fear of the inability to pay back college loans regardless of their college aspirations. These students may seek out alternative pathways to higher education such as through the military. Indeed, since WWII, the military has provided soldiers with additional educational benefits through the G.I. Bill, Montgomery G.I. Bill, and, most recently, the Post-9/11 Bill. In direct competition with colleges for "high-quality" recruits, especially right out of high school, the military may serve for some as an alternative pathway to college (Kleykamp 2006). Certainly, the educational benefits provided by civilian employers in the labor force pale in comparison to those offered by the military. Additionally, those who enlist in the military earn money, develop job-related technical skills, and, in some cases, earn credit toward a college degree for their military training (Kleykamp 2006).

Two-year community college enrollment rates have also increased significantly during the past decade as a result of the rising costs associated with four-year college programs. However, two-year institutions have also outpaced median family income in the majority of states, and in all states where community colleges are the most critical for access to higher education and a bachelor's degree. Additionally, state transfer policies designed to enable students to move from two-year colleges to baccalaureate-granting institutions lack efficiency and full credit transferability (National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 2011). Students who enroll in community college exhibit military enlistment

potential in that they are more likely to be low-income (less than $25,000 per year), the first in their families to attend college, and from minority groups (National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education 2011; Kilburn and Asch 2003).

Since two-year colleges have increased costs, issues with transferability, and low returns to investment, I predict that plans for higher education will increase youth propensity to serve in the military when they expect to graduate from a two-year college or attend a vocational or technical school. Indeed, some young people may exercise their agency and make a rational decision to enter military service to assist with achieving their educational aspirations. Consistent with earlier research, I predict that plans for graduating from a four-year college will decrease youth propensity.

> *Hypothesis 5a: Military propensity will be negatively related to the expectation to graduate from a four-year college.*

> *Hypothesis 5b: Military propensity will be positively related to the expectation to graduate from a two-year college or attend a vocational or technical school.*

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

Data

My research employs secondary-data quantitative analysis utilizing data collected from the *Monitoring the Future* project, an ongoing national study of youth and young adults conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor under a series of grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. MTF employs a cohort-sequential research design that includes: 1) nationally representative samples of seniors in U.S. high schools beginning in 1975 continuing each year thereafter (average response rates of 83% yield approximately 17,000 respondents annually), and 2) annual follow-up surveys mailed each year to subsamples from each high school senior class sample in the years following graduation (approximately 2,400 are selected from each class for follow-up with an initial response rate of 80%). For my research purposes, I only examine the initial surveys measuring high school seniors. Of note, during the post-9/11 era, response rates for follow-up surveys have been too low to obtain reliable results for examining the propensity to enlistment relationship. These low response rates are likely due to the high operational tempo for individuals who have joined the military after high school and have had multiple deployments and change of duty assignments (D. Segal conversation 2016).

First, I focus my analysis on responses from male high school seniors between the classes of 1976-2013. Later, in Chapter 6 and follow-on chapters, I examine responses from female seniors as well. The predominant focus of my research is

during the post-9/11 era so I use all available MTF datasets between 2002-2013. I do not consider 2001 in my analysis of the post-9/11 era because seniors are surveyed in the spring (i.e. March through May) of their senior year and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 had not occurred yet.

The basic research design involves annual data collections from nationally representative high school seniors during the spring of each academic year, beginning with the class of 1975. Data collection takes place in approximately 130 public and private high schools selected to provide an accurate cross section of high school seniors throughout the United States. The overall sample is representative of schools in the United States with respect to geographic area, urbanicity (i.e. urban vs. rural areas), school type, and school size. Bachman, Johnston, and O'Malley (1996) have described this study design extensively.

One limitation to the dataset worth mentioning is that it excludes the population of high school dropouts (i.e. those who drop out before the last few months of the senior year). This results in excluding between 11 and 20 percent of each year group. This group is not unimportant since certain behaviors, such as illicit drug use and delinquency, tend to be higher than average for high school dropouts. However, for purposes of my research, members of this group would not likely expect to serve in the military due to strict military entrance requirements. For the purposes of estimating potential changes from one year-group of high school seniors to another, the omission of dropouts only presents a problem if there is a considerable difference in the number of dropouts from each cohort. There is no reason to expect dramatic changes in those rates in the future,

and government statistics indicate only a slight decrease in high school dropouts since 1970 (Johnston et al. 2011).

Measures

There are six different questionnaire forms used in the MTF project surveys of high school seniors (five prior to 1989), each administered to a random one-sixth (or one-fifth) of the total sample. During follow-up surveys, individuals receive questionnaire forms similar to those they completed as seniors (e.g. a respondent who completed Form 2 as a senior would receive Form 2 in the follow-up- This is relevant for prior MTF research that I cite throughout; it does not pertain specifically to my current analysis). Most demographic and drug use questions (i.e. "core" variables) appear on all MTF questionnaire forms (Bachman et al. 2000b). Other items of interest (e.g. attitudes, behaviors) only appear on single forms. Given the breadth of content, the study is not presented to students as a "drug use study," nor do they tend to view it in this fashion (Johnston et al. 2011). To increase the overall statistical power of my study, I primarily utilize the dataset that includes all core variables, which has merged core responses from all forms (i.e. Form 1 through Form 6). After controlling for all the variables in my analysis, my overall sample size for the entire dataset (1976-2103) is 128,992 and for the post-9/11 era (2002-2013) is 49,259. For various portions of my analyses, I use single MTF forms that pertain to questions relevant to my area of focus. In these instances, I highlight which form is used during my analysis and the sample size is annotated in the corresponding tables relevant to the analysis.

Primary Dependent Variables- Propensity vs. High and Low Propensity

The primary dependent variable for my research is the propensity to serve in the armed forces- simply referred to as "propensity" largely throughout my project. This variable is measured in all base year questionnaires, which include a question asking: *How likely is it that you will do each of the following things after high school? Serve in the armed forces* is one of the activities listed, and all respondents are asked to choose among the following alternatives: *definitely won't; probably won't; probably will; and definitely will.* For my primary analysis, I code this measure of propensity into a categorical variable (0/1) where "no" includes the respondent's answers to "definitely won't" and "probably won't," and "yes" includes the respondent's answers "probably will" and "definitely will"- a "yes" indicates a respondent is "Likely to Enter" the armed forces. Unless otherwise noted throughout, propensity indicates that a respondent says they are "Likely to Enter" the military.

It must be noted that I gave careful consideration in determining the measure of propensity as a two-way measure by combining those who say they "definitely will" and "probably will" as "likely to enter" and those who say they "definitely won't" and "probably won't" as not likely to enter. First, this convention is consistent with a significant amount of prior research on propensity using MTF data (e.g. Segal et al. 1998; Segal et al. 1999) and using the Youth Attitude Tracking Study (e.g. DoD 2000), which serves well for comparison purposes. Second, combining the "probably will" and "definitely will" responses increases my military propensity group, thereby increasing my statistical power and overall

validity of estimates. This is vital to analyze differences in propensity between various subgroups (i.e. race/ethnicity and gender). Further, the various attitudinal items (e.g. nationalism, political party, political ideology, job preferences, gender role and race relations) I measure now and in later chapters only appear on one MTF survey form, thereby reducing my sample sizes available for detailed analysis even more. Third, as highlighted earlier, studies (e.g. Bachman et al. 2000b) show a strong correlation between propensity to serve and actual enlistment, and studies show that the predictors of propensity are the strongest predictors of actual enlistment. Indeed, those MTF respondents who say they "probably will" and "definitely will" serve in the armed forces have been shown to make up about 70 percent of those who actually go onto enlist. In contrast, those who say they "definitely will" serve have been shown to only comprise 47 percent of those youth who actually enlist (Bachman et al. 1997). Thus, it makes more sense to combine both response categories to gather information on almost three quarters of the likely military population versus less than half. Fourth, results are easiest to interpret and discuss using this measure of propensity.

Last, in some cases of my analysis, I compare youth with "high propensity" (i.e. those who respond that they "Definitely Will" enter the military) versus youth with "low propensity" (i.e. those who respond that they "Definitely Won't" enter). In these cases, I specify the groups of analysis as "high" or "low" propensity youth. It should be noted that prior research has shown that only about 5 percent of youth with "low" propensity actually go onto enlist, whereas about 70 percent of "high" propensity youth enlist within 5-6 years after graduation

(Bachman et al. 1997). For my analyses in Chapter 7 through Chapter 10, results and figures of "high" versus "low" propensity youth are located in their respective chapters or in Appendix A. For these analyses, I code those who respond as "Definitely Will" enter the military as a "yes" = 1, and those who say they "Definitely Won't" enter as a "no" = 0. This analysis represents only the two most extreme categories of propensity. All other response categories (i.e. "probably will" and "probably won't") are omitted during these analyses. The sample size for these analyses represent approximately 65 percent of the total sample size. Most importantly, these response groups are the best proxies of the actual military population and the civilian population to examine key differences in attitudes and values between groups. This analysis technique enables me to draw better conclusions on differences between civilians and military members to contribute to the extensive body of literature covering civil-military relations. Furthermore, this technique enables me to better assess the nature and extent of a civil-military gap in attitudes and values during the post-9/11 era.

In some cases, I change the dependent variable of my analysis to examine particular differences (e.g. attitudes) between racial and ethnic groups among youth with the propensity to serve. In these instances, I highlight the dependent variable utilized in the corresponding results and discussion sections, including all relevant tables and figures. I employ this analysis technique throughout the project.

Macro-Social Measures

The independent variables in my initial analysis are the macro-social influences: public support for war, casualties, and unemployment. The first set of macro-social measures corresponds to **hypotheses 1a-1d.** Additionally, I examine various individual individual-level variables such as race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, educational attainment, and educational goals to be discussed later.

Public Support for War

Data for public support for the wars was fairly complex to derive. Similar to the concept of patriotism, public support for war can be been measured in various ways. Mostly, researchers have relied upon public opinion polls to capture support for war. The question of how to exactly measure support for war is certainly a perplexing one, as Mueller (1973) identified, due in large part to the well-known existence of question wording effects (i.e. seemingly subtle differences in the way survey questions are phrased can lead to large differences in the responses and in the shape of aggregate public opinion). What can be difficult to capture is the same question that is routinely repeated on various polls to compare attitudes over time. This is especially the case with public support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As mentioned earlier, there were numerous public opinion polls conducted immediately following 9/11 focused on support for the war in Afghanistan. However, those polls quickly ceased once attention shifted toward Iraq in 2003. At that time, the preponderance of poll questions focused on the Iraq War.

Researchers have used various types of questions to most accurately measure public support ranging from presidential approval ratings during times of war (e.g. Mueller 1970) to directly asking whether or not someone supports a particular war. I scanned numerous American public opinion surveys (e.g. Polling Report 2015a and Polling Report 2015b) for the best questions that could be conceptualized as public support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. For the war in Afghanistan, Gallup consistently asked the question between the years 2001-2014 (with the exception of 2003, 2005, and 2006): "Thinking now about U.S. military action in Afghanistan that began in October 2001, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan, or not" (Gallup 2015a)? Similarly, for the war in Iraq, Gallup consistently asked the question between the years 2003-2014 (with the exception of 2011 and 2012): "In view of the developments since we first sent our troops to Iraq, do you think the United States made a mistake in sending troops to Iraq, or not" (Gallup 2015b). For both of these questions, the public was oftentimes polled more than once during the same year. For these instances, I averaged responses between the various months surveyed for a particular year to derive an average estimate of annual support for war. Of note, there was not a single polling question that asked for public opinion considering both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars together. Nor did any single question ask for specific support for a war (e.g. "do you support the war in Iraq") on a regular basis. Taken together, I deemed the two questions above to be the best measures available with the greatest frequency of annual polling data to measure public support for the wars in Afghanistan and

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Iraq annually. Similar "mistake-related" questions were also used in related research on public support for war (e.g. Mueller 1973; Burk 1999; Gelpi et al. 2006).

Since the war in Iraq began in 2003 and had the preponderance of U.S. forces along with the associated media attention between 2003-2010, the Iraq War was likely to be the most salient in the minds of youth. Therefore, I only use public opinion data from the Iraq question, instead of averaging the public opinion surveys for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars together, to measure public support for war during the post-9/11 era. Of note, the correlation between the Gallup data for Iraq only and the combined average Gallup data for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars by year was 0.98. Since there was no data prior to 2003 for the Iraq war (which had yet to begin), I use public opinion data from the Afghanistan war in 2001 and 2002. It should be mentioned that overall public support for the Afghanistan war was higher than support for the Iraq war, so my public support estimates are more conservative. However, public opinion trends by year for both wars generally declined in the same manner, as revealed by a correlation of .70 for public support of each war. To determine support for the Iraq war in 2011 and 2012 since the question was not asked, I interpolated between public support in 2010 (44 percent) and 2013 (42 percent) to provide an average measure of support (43 percent) for both years. It is important to note that my single measure for public support for war is consistent with existing research on public opinion concerning the Iraq War, which utilized multiple related survey questions to capture the latent construct of war support (Berinsky 2009). Descriptive statistics of the raw data

for public support for war by year during the post-9/11 era are reported in Table

3.1 below.

Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics for Public Support for War, Casualties, and Unemployment (Unemployment/Support in percent) by Year (lagged 1 yr)

Year	Public Support (OIF)	Casualties	Unemployment
2002	89+	3	4.7
2003	93+	18	5.8
2004	75	333	6.0
2005	58	738	5.5
2006	46	739	5.1
2007	43	769	4.6
2008	40	847	4.6
2009	37	353	5.8
2010	39	345	9.3
2011	44	456	9.6
2012	43*	394	8.9
2013	43*	239	8.1

* Denotes Interpolated Data; + Denotes Data Imputed by Gallup OEF data

Nationalism

To analyze the relationship between public support for war and propensity

further, I constructed an index measure of nationalistic attitudes. As noted earlier

in Chapter 2, a large amount of research has shown that patriotism has a

significantly positive relationship with nationalism. I use this measure later in

Chapters 4 and 5 to assist with the discussion of the relationship between

propensity and public support for war.

Both theory and empirical tests are used to determine whether items in a scale

measure the same construct or concept. I utilized the Cronbach's alpha (1951)

estimate to test the reliability that the survey items used for my I/O index scale

consistently measure the same construct. In other words, do the survey items in

my scale hang together and accurately measure the same concept? Rosenberg's

(1989) self-esteem scale is a good example of multiple survey items that tap into

the same underlying construct and provide an accurate measure of self-esteem.

Cronbach's alpha is a function "of the extent to which items in a test have high

communalities and thus low uniquenesses…It is also a function of interrelatedness" (Cortina 1993:100). The interrelatedness of a set of items as a group has often been referred to as "internal consistency." Additionally, alpha is very much a "function of the number of items in a scale, and although alpha is also a function of item intercorrelation, it must be interpreted with number of items in mind" (Cortina 1993:102).

Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficient normally ranges between 0 and 1, although there is actually no lower limit to the coefficient (Gliem and Gliem 2003). The closer the Cronbach's alpha is to 1, the greater the internal consistency of the items in the scale. The size of alpha is determined by the number of items in the scale and the mean inter-item correlations utilizing the following formula: $\alpha = rk/[1+(k-1)r]$, where k is the number of items in the scale and r is the mean of the inter-item correlations. George and Mallery (2003) provide the following rules of thumb or standards in research for interpreting Cronbach's alpha coefficient: $\alpha > 0.90$ is Excellent; $\alpha > 0.80$ is Good; $\alpha > 0.70$ is Acceptable; $\alpha > 0.60$ is Questionable; $\alpha > 0.50$ is Poor; and $\alpha < 0.50$ is Unacceptable. If a test has a large alpha, then it can be concluded that a large proportion of the variance in the test is attributable to general and group factors. This is important because it implies that there is very little item-specific variance (Cortina 1993). Put another way, if $\alpha = 0.70$, that means that 70 percent of the variance in the test is reliable variance, while 30 percent is variance due to error.

A series of questions on Form 2 of the MTF survey ask respondents how much they agree or disagree with each of the following statements related to

nationalistic attitudes. Response categories range between 1= "Disagree"; 2=

"Mostly Disagree"; 3= "Neither"; 4= "Mostly Agree"; 5= "Agree." Responses

are scored in such a manner that higher numbered responses indicate more

nationalistic attitudes. My nationalism index measure consists of the six

following questions: 1) The U.S. should begin a gradual program of disarming

whether other countries do or not (reverse coded); 2) The U.S. should be willing

to go to war to protect its own economic interests; 3) The U.S. does not need to

have greater military power than Russia (reverse coded); 4) The U.S. ought to

have much more military power than any other nation in the world;

5) There may be times when the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of

other countries;

6) The only good reason for the U.S. to go to war is to defend against an attack on

our own country (reverse coded).

Questions used for my nationalism index were selected based on theory and

prior research (e.g. Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Bachman et al. 2000; Federico

et al. 2005). Additionally, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to

confirm that the variables used for my nationalism index measure the same things

conceptually and to confirm the number of dimensions that the variables measure

in my index (Torres-Reyna 2010). The extraction method was principal

components analysis, with Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization (Abdi

2003). Results of initial CFA revealed two distinct factors with eigenvalues

above 1.0- 2.14 and 1.19 respectively. Following CFA, Factors 1 and 2 fit as

theorized into two groups which I categorized as: 1) a perceived need for U.S.

supremacy; and 2) acceptable conditions for U.S. military intervention. Both groups of analysis represent the overarching concept of nationalism and have been used previously in related MTF studies (e.g. Bachman et al. 2000). Results from my final CFA are reported in Table 3.2 below. Items with a factor loading greater than .46 were retained in each factor, "U.S. Supremacy" and "Acceptable Conditions to Go to War."

Table 3.2
Factor Analysis and Scale Reliability of Survey Items Representing Nationalistic Attitudes of Youth (Men Only) During Post-9/11 Era

Survey Items	Factors	
	1	2
Agree or Disagree-	U.S. Supremacy	Acceptable to Go to War
The U.S. should begin a gradual program of disarming whether other countries do or not	0.4778	-0.1030
The U.S. should be willing to go to war to protect its own economic interests	0.6797	0.0569
The U.S. does not need to have greater military power than Russia	0.7573	-0.3038
The U.S. ought to have much more military power than any other nation in the world	0.7625	-0.3590
There may be times when the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of other countries	0.4520	0.6300
The only good reason for the U.S. to go to war is to defend against an attack on our own country	0.3063	0.7496
% total item variance explained	35.7	55.6

Note: The extraction method was principal-components analysis and the rotation method was Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Years: 2002-2013

After constructing a separate scale from the "go to war" measures noted above, Cronbach's alpha was only equal to 0.44, which falls into the "unacceptable" category for most social science research according to George and Mallory (2003). After constructing a separate scale from the "U.S. Supremacy" measures above, Cronbach's alpha was equal to 0.66. After combining both indexes into a single nationalism scale, the mean inter-item correlation was 0.34 and the reliability (Cronbach's coefficient alpha with unstandardized items) was 0.61, which is "acceptable" for social science research (Cronbach 1951; George and Mallory 2003). I chose to combine both factors into one multi-item nationalism index measure since both factors are related to nationalistic attitudes and to improve overall scale reliability. Response values were summed, yielding a scale with a minimum response score of 6 and a maximum response of 30, with a

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midpoint of 18. Higher number responses are considered to be greater

nationalistic attitudes.

Casualties

I measure the casualties variable by annual U.S. deaths in the military resulting

from hostile action as reported by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC)

between 1980-2010 (DMDC 2015a). For casualty data between 2011-2014, I use

monthly data from the DMDC reported on casualties from Operation Enduring

Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation New Dawn (DMDC 2015b;

DMDC 2015c; DMDC 2015d). Of course the preponderance of U.S. casualties

were during the post-9/11 era, except for during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Of

note, consideration was given to analyzing all U.S. casualties, to include those

service members wounded from hostile action. After all, the number of wounded

veterans has increased due to advances in treatment and medical evacuation

compared to earlier wars. Additionally, television advertisements from

organizations such as the Wounded Warrior Project have undoubtedly left a

lasting impression of the scars of combat on the minds of people watching from

their living rooms. Although "casualties" refers to combat deaths *and* wounded in

action in military parlance, in more popular usage, the word "casualties" has

generally meant those who die while performing their mission (Gelpi et al. 2006).

Additionally, defining "wounded" can be a bit of a challenge since many service

members could be considered psychologically wounded from their service. The

DoD sometimes tracks these individuals, but not as easily since many do not

officially report these types of incidents for various reasons. Further, the

correlation between U.S. deaths and the number wounded in action was 0.95. Thus, there was no significant difference in the relationship between casualties and propensity when measuring casualties by deaths, wounded, or a combination of both. For simplicity and better accuracy, I measure casualties by the number of U.S. deaths due to hostile action each year. Descriptive statistics of the raw data for casualties by year during the post-9/11 era are reported in Table 3.1 above.

Unemployment

I measure the unemployment variable by using unemployment data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) between 1974-2014 for the ages of 16 years and older (Department of Labor 2015). Results from the CPS are reported monthly, so I average the results by year to capture annual overall unemployment rates to coincide with youth propensity by year. Since my analysis is on youth, I considered using youth unemployment rates between the ages of 16-24. However, the correlation between the overall unemployment rate and the youth unemployment rate was 0.93. Additionally, it is likely that the preponderance of media reports focused mostly on the overall unemployment rate during the post-9/11 era rather than on youth unemployment rates. Thus, it is reasonable that the overall unemployment rate was the most salient in the minds of youth. For these reasons, I measure unemployment based on the overall unemployment rate between 1976-2014. Descriptive statistics of the raw data for unemployment rates by year during the post-9/11 era are reported in Table 3.1 above.

Public support, casualty, and unemployment data are measured annually by calendar year beginning in January. Since the MTF survey is conducted annually

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in the Spring of a respondent's senior year (i.e. March or April timeframe), I

determined that the most likely influence of these data would be felt a year later

by the next senior class, especially since seniors usually decide whether to go to

school, join the military, or go into the work force by the beginning (i.e. Fall) of

their senior year. Thus, I employ a one-year lag (depicted in Table 3.1) to all

three macro-social variables: casualties, unemployment, and public support.

It is important to note that I gave careful consideration to using a fixed-year

effects model in my analysis to control for unobserved factors in each year.

However, after my initial analysis using the macro-social variables above in my

model, I determined that there were collinearity issues between the year variable

and the macro-social variables (i.e. public support for war, casualties, and

unemployment), causing certain random variables to be omitted in the analysis by

STATA. In other words, the year variable was highly correlated with each

macro-social variable. As a result of collinearity, I could not predict the

probabilities of propensity. Analysis revealed that the variables for public support

for war, casualties, and unemployment explained more than 90 percent of the

variation in the year variable (r-squared=0.91). Since the three macro-social

variables almost perfectly predicted year, I determined that there was no need to

keep the year variable in the analysis. Additionally, after comparing results on

the coefficients of all the control variables used for my analysis, by using year in

the model versus excluding year from the analysis, there were essentially no

changes in the magnitude or direction of the coefficients for all control variables.

This indicates that using year as a variable in the model or, instead, using the

three macro-social variables (i.e. public support for war, casualties, unemployment) in the model for analysis are basically the same models. Therefore, I excluded the year variable from my model altogether throughout my entire analysis and replaced it with the macro-social variables: public support for war, casualties, and unemployment.

Individual-Level Measures

The additional independent individual-level variables in my analysis are race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, educational attainment, and educational goals. The second cluster of measures in my analysis focuses on **hypotheses 2 and 3,** which are related to disadvantage. Race is measured by whether respondents report that they are white, black, or Hispanic. Notably, only white and black respondents were measured in this dataset until 2005 since other ethnic categories (e.g. Native Americans, Asian Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Rican Americans, etc.) only comprised a small proportion of the sample each year and would yield unreliable estimates. Due to the rising number of those who identify themselves as one of the Hispanic groups, this group was introduced into the dataset for analysis as of 2005 (Johnston et al. 2011). To measure socioeconomic status, I use proxy measures such as father's education level, mother's education level, family structure (i.e. number of parents in the household), and family size (i.e. an increase in number of siblings means more sharing of scarce resources). Those respondents whose father or mother has a college degree, who have two parents in the household, and have fewer siblings are considered advantaged. I use fathers and mother's education level less than

high school as the reference group, compared to high school completion through graduate school. I use a four-category variable to measure family structure- two parents (father or male guardian and mother or female guardian) as the reference group, single mother or female guardian, single father or male guardian, and no parents. For number of siblings, I use three or more as the reference group and decrease by one down to no siblings. Of note, the family income of respondents was not measured in this dataset.

The next set of conceptually relevant influences includes educational attainment and goals that test *hypotheses 5a and 5b*. I measure educational attainment by high school G.P.A. reported by respondents on a scale from D/C-through A, which I collapse into a continuous variable on a standard GPA scale (e.g. A=4.0), and high school curriculum of the respondent reported as college preparatory or other (reference group). I measure educational goals based on a respondent's likelihood to go to college. Likelihood to graduate from a four-year college is measured on the same scale as the likelihood to serve in the military (i.e. propensity) where "Definitely Will" and "Probably Will" are coded as a 1=Yes.

For my "additional pathways" to adulthood variables, I examine respondents who expect to graduate from a two-year college or attend a vocational or technical school. These variables are also measured in all base year core questionnaires, which include the question: "How likely is it that you will do each of the following things after high school?" "Graduate from a two-year college program" or "attend a technical or vocational school" are some of the activities listed, and

all respondents are asked to choose among the following alternatives: "definitely won't"; "probably won't"; "probably will"; and "definitely will". Similar to above, I combine "Definitely Will" and "Probably Will" responses to indicate the likelihood of youth who expect to graduate from a 2-year college or attend a vocational or technical school.

Additional controls for my model include past/current residence (i.e. urbanicity) and region of the country (e.g. Northeast, North Central, South, and West). Residence is measured by whether a respondent resides in a farm, city, or suburb of a city and is based on the size of the city in which a respondent grew up which includes populations less than 50,000; 50,000-100,000; 100,000-500,000; and greater than 500,000.

To test for *hypotheses 4b, and 4c,* I interact race and ethnicity with the macro-social variables (public support for war, casualties, and unemployment), using whites as the reference group. I also conduct an interaction between casualties and unemployment on propensity. Table 3.3 below presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in my analysis for men only.

Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Analysis (Percent):
Years 1976-2013 (Men Only)

	2002-2013 Mean	1976-2013 Mean
Dependent Variable		
Military Propensity (Definitely/Probably Will Serve)	14.06%	15.70%
High Propensity (Definitely Will Serve)	5.94%	7.18%
Propensity by Race and Ethnic Background		
White Men with Propensity (N=40,246/111,133)	13.19%	14.27%
Black Men with Propensity (N=4,899/13,745)	17.78%	26.51%
Hispanic Men with Propensity (N=4,114/4,114)	18.13%	18.13%
High Propensity by Race and Ethnic Background		
White Men with High Propensity (N=40,246/111,133)	5.85%	6.70%
Black Men with High Propensity (N=4,899/13,745)	6.49%	11.35%
Hispanic Men with High Propensity (N=4,114/4,114)	6.17%	6.17%
Independent Variables of Primary Interest		
Race/Ethnicity		
White	81.70%	86.15%
Black	9.95%	10.66%
Hispanic	8.35%	3.19%
SES Disadvantage/Advantage		
Father's Education		
Less than HS	9.25%	9.45%
HS	28.63%	29.46%
Some College	18.64%	19.10%
College	27.64%	25.86%
Graduate School	15.85%	16.12%
Mother's Education		
Less than HS	5.70%	6.61%
HS	26.38%	32.57%
Some College	21.19%	21.25%
College	32.49%	27.20%
Graduate School	14.24%	12.36%
Family Structure (# of parent/guardian in household)		
Both Parents or Guardians	74.59%	75.75%
Mother or Female Guardian	16.45%	15.61%
Father or Male Guardian	5.18%	4.59%
None	3.78%	4.05%
Number of Siblings		
3+	31.72%	33.49%
2	28.87%	27.96%
1	33.50%	32.90%
None	5.91%	5.65%
N	49259	128992

Table 3.3 (cont)
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Analysis (Percent):
Years 1976-2013 (Men Only)

	2002-2013 Mean	1976-2013 Mean
Educational Attainment and Goals		
High School G.P.A		
D/C-	3.64%	4.51%
C	5.76%	7.83%
C+	9.15%	11.48%
B-	12.07%	14.14%
B	18.71%	19.53%
B+	18.31%	16.85%
A-	16.91%	13.53%
A	15.46%	12.13%
HS Curriculum		
Other	43.61%	43.35%
College Preparatory	56.39%	56.65%
Additional Controls		
Where you grew up/live		
Farm	4.65%	5.08%
Country	11.95%	12.26%
Small City (<50k)	28.68%	30.03%
Medium City (50-100k)	12.87%	12.33%
Suburb of Med City	11.21%	9.40%
Large City (100-500k)	9.00%	8.94%
Suburb of Large City	9.96%	9.87%
Very Large City (>500k)	5.39%	5.47%
Suburb of Very Large City	6.30%	6.61%
Region of Country		
Northeast	21.62%	21.45%
North Central	29.61%	29.86%
South	31.42%	31.88%
West	17.35%	16.80%
Additional Pathways		
4-Year College	81.15%	76.56%
2-Year College	36.58%	33.99%
Vocational/Technical School	20.60%	21.77%
Other	3.28%	4.18%
N	49259	128992

Analysis Plan

It should be highlighted again that my follow-on chapters (i.e. Chapters 6-10) of analysis are stand-alone chapters. In other words, these chapters are meant to be separate, distinct, and extensions from previous chapters to examine the relationships between propensity and various attitudes (i.e. political, job-related, gender-role, and race relations). As such, I keep the literature review, hypotheses, methods, analysis, and discussion in its own corresponding chapter. This is for organizational and continuity purposes so not to confuse the reader.

For the most part, military propensity has previously been modeled as a two-way choice of either the expectation to serve or not. In certain cases, I analyze differences between high (i.e. those who "Definitely Will" serve) and low (i.e. those who "Definitely Will Not" serve) propensity. The results of these analyses are located in corresponding chapters and in Appendix A.

To determine the factors associated with military propensity, I use binomial logistic regression to model the probability of the propensity to serve in the military and analyze differences by various macro-social and individual level influences. I also use binomial logistic regression to model the probability of the propensity to serve in the military as compared with other options such as attending a four- or two-year college or vocational training. I present the odds ratios in my results, which indicate the ratios of odds of propensity to serve as predicted by the independent variables. Ratios higher than 1.00 represent a positive association between the independent variable and the propensity to serve, while ratios less than 1.00 represent a negative association.

In certain cases, I employ linear regression analysis to examine differences in my key analysis groups among youth with propensity utilizing additional control factors. Additionally, I employ difference of means techniques in some cases to highlight differences between groups without additional controls. For all these instances, I specify the analysis technique in the results.

Chapter 4: Primary Analysis: Men's Propensity Results

Unless otherwise specified, results reported for propensity are for those youth who are "likely to serve"- that is, those youth who say that they "definitely will" or "probably will" expect to serve in the armed forces. Figure 4.1 below depicts the overall average trends of propensity to serve by year of those young men who are likely to enter the military between 1976-2013. Results reveal a general decline in propensity since the mid-1980s, but a reversal after 2005.

Figure 4.1- Average Propensity to Serve by Year
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 4.2 below zeroes in on the post-9/11 era, depicting the average military propensity of young men between 2002-2013. Interestingly, results indicate a reversal of trends generally in the positive direction during the post-9/11 era, which does not support **hypothesis 1a**. However, results also indicate that propensity to serve has fluctuated at three critical time periods: immediately

following 9/11 (2003); during the height of the Iraqi insurgency (2004-2008); and following the economic recession of 2008 (2009-2011). These periods correspond to various macro-social influences such as public support for war immediately following the beginning of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, a rise in U.S. casualties, and a rise in unemployment respectively. Of note, propensity during the post-9/11 era reached its all-time low between 2005-2007, but increased back to levels of the early 1990s.

Figure 4.2- Average Propensity to Serve by Year
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

To examine the relationship between propensity and the macro-social influences (public support for war, casualties, and unemployment), I employ binomial logistic regression analysis. I also examine the relationship between propensity to serve and various other individual micro-influences such as demographics, SES, educational goals and attainment, region of country and type of residence, and the expectation to do something else (i.e. go to a 4- or 2-year

college or vocational education) after high school. Results are reported in Table 4.1 below. I begin with a report of the results revealing the relationship between propensity and the three macro-social factors. Then I report results of the relationship between propensity and the various other individual factors. Model 6 of Table 4.1 is highlighted to emphasize that it is my full model with all relevant control factors, excluding interaction effects.

Table 4.1
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=49259): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Macro-Social Influences												
Public Support (OIF)	0.98***	0.98**	0.99*	0.98*	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.99	0.98***	0.98***
Casualties	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	1.14***	0.95***	0.95***
Unemployment	1.04***	1.03***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04**	1.04***	1.03***	1.20***	1.04***	1.04***
Individual-Demographic Influences												
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)												
Black		1.42***	1.06	1.06	0.98	0.98	1.00	1.12	0.70*	0.98	0.82***	0.82***
Hispanic		1.44***	1.15**	1.14**	1.14**	1.12*	0.90	1.05	1.08	1.12*	1.00	1.00
SES Disadvantage/Advantage												
Father's education (less than HS=ref)												
HS			0.81***	0.87**	0.89**	0.89**	0.89**	0.89**	0.89*	0.89**	0.89**	0.89**
Some college			0.80***	0.94	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
College			0.63***	0.79***	0.84***	0.84***	0.84***	0.84***	0.84***	0.84***	0.84***	0.84***
Graduate School			0.56***	0.77***	0.84**	0.85**	0.84**	0.84**	0.84**	0.84**	0.84**	0.84**
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)												
HS			0.83***	0.88*	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90
Some College			0.84**	0.94	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96
College			0.76***	0.88*	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91
Graduate School			0.75***	0.92	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)												
Mother or Female Guardian			1.28***	1.20***	1.19***	1.19***	1.19***	1.19***	1.19***	1.19***	1.19***	1.19***
Father or Male Guardian			1.58***	1.40***	1.37***	1.37***	1.37***	1.37***	1.37***	1.37***	1.37***	1.37***
None			1.89***	1.65***	1.58***	1.59***	1.59***	1.59***	1.59***	1.59***	1.59***	1.58***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)												
2			0.80***	0.82***	0.82***	0.82***	0.82***	0.82***	0.83***	0.82***	0.82***	0.82***
1			0.66***	0.69***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***
None			0.58***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***
Educational Attainment and Goals												
High School G.P.A.				0.71***	0.70***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)												
College Preparatory				0.73***	0.75***	0.77***	0.77***	0.77***	0.77***	0.77***	0.77***	0.77***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.65***	0.67***	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Additional Controls												
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)												
Country					1.13	1.12	1.12	1.13	1.13	1.12	1.12	1.11
Small City (<50k)					1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.03	1.02	1.01
Medium City (50-100k)					0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.88
Suburb of Med City					0.91	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.90
Large City (100-500k)					0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.98
Suburb of Large City					0.81**	0.82**	0.82**	0.82**	0.82**	0.82**	0.82**	0.81**
Very Large City (>500k)					0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90
Suburb of Very Large City					0.83*	0.85*	0.85*	0.85*	0.85*	0.85*	0.84*	0.83*
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)												
North Central					0.96	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95
South					1.43***	1.41***	1.41***	1.41***	1.40***	1.40***	1.41***	1.41***
West					1.05	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.03	1.03
Race/Macro Interactions (White=Ref)												
Public Support (OIF)* Black							1.00					
Public Support (OIF)* Hispanic							1.03					
Casualties* Black								0.97*				
Casualties* Hispanic								1.01				
Unemployment* Black									1.05*			
Unemployment* Hispanic									1.01			
*Macro/Macro Interaction- Casualties*Unemployment*										0.97***		
Additional Pathways												
4-Year College					0.68***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***	0.67***
2-Year College					1.15***	1.15***	1.15***	1.15***	1.15***	1.16***	1.08**	1.15***
Vocational/Technical School					1.08*	1.08*	1.08*	1.08*	1.08*	1.08*	1.08*	0.97
Race/Additional Pathways Interaction- (White=Ref)												
2-Year College* Black											1.39***	
2-Year College* Hispanic											1.21*	
Vocational/Technical School* Black												1.75***
Vocational/Technical School* Hispanic												1.26*
N	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259
R^2	0.0032	0.0063	0.0269	0.0493	0.0551	0.0560	0.0560	0.0561	0.0561	0.0565	0.0564	0.0570
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 49259 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Public Support for War

Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 4.1 above indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables for men only. The primary predictor variables in Table 4.1 are the macro-social influences- public support for war, casualties, and unemployment. Surprisingly, findings indicate that there is a negative relationship between public support for war and the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. These results do not support **hypothesis 1b**. As public support for war increases, youth are significantly less likely to expect to serve (OR=0.98***), after controlling for various factors highlighted in Model 6 of Table 4.1. Figure 4.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by public support for war after controlling for all factors. On average, the predicted probability of serving decreases by about one fifth of a percent for every five percent increase in public support for war. Indeed, these results seem counterintuitive. However, it should be noted that overall public support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dropped precipitously after initially high levels, and they did not increase again (see Table 4.1). It appears that other influences, such as casualties and unemployment, may be influencing propensity more than public support for war. Thus, these results do not support my prediction. It should be noted, however, that the year immediately following the attacks of 9/11 (felt in the 2003 MTF survey) did see a significant spike in propensity that was also related to high public support for war (93%), which was more in line with expectations. Indeed, this could have been a direct patriotic reaction among

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youth.

Figure 4.3- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Public Support for War
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Nationalism

To examine the relationship between nationalistic attitudes and propensity, I
conducted binomial logistic regression analysis similar to my previous analyses.
Figure 4.4 below indicates overall nationalistic trends of men during the post-9/11
era, prior to additional controls. Interestingly, results indicate a general decline in
the nationalistic attitudes of youth following the attacks of 9/11 similar to the
decline in public support for war as depicted in Figure 4.3 above, albeit less
dramatic. This suggests that nationalistic attitudes may have been, in part, driving
public support for war.

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Figure 4.4- Nationalistic Attitudes of Youth, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 4.5 below depicts the nationalistic attitudes of youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era, prior to adding control variables. Overall, the nationalistic attitudes of youth with propensity are significantly higher than all youth surveyed in the dataset. Further, the nationalistic attitudes of youth with propensity appear to remain relatively stable throughout the 9/11 period, with the exception of a significant decline between 2009-2012. Interestingly, this decline corresponds with the recession period suggesting that occupational orientations may exist within youth with propensity, especially during this timeframe.

Figure 4.5- Nationalistic Attitudes of Youth With Propensity
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Mean Nationalism Index Scores-Greater # Indicates More Nationalistic

Class Year

Source: Monitoring the Future

Results from logistic regression are reported in Table 4.2 below. Model 6 of Table 4.2 indicate that as nationalistic attitudes increase, youth are significantly more likely (OR=1.09***) to have the propensity to serve, after controlling for various factors (e.g. race, SES, education) used in earlier analyses.

Table 4.2
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social, Social-Psychological, and Demographic Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=8220): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Macro-Social Influences						
Public Support (OIF)	0.94*	0.94*	0.96	0.94	0.95	0.95
Casualties	0.96	0.96*	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.96
Unemployment	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.05	1.04
Social-Psychological Influences						
Nationalism Index (> indicates more Nationalistic)	1.08***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***	1.09***
Individual/Demographic Influences						
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)						
Black		1.46***	1.06	1.09	1.06	1.05
Hispanic		1.60***	1.28*	1.29*	1.31*	1.27*
SES Disadvantage/Advantage						
Father's education (less than HS=ref)						
HS			0.68***	0.73**	0.74**	0.74**
Some college			0.66***	0.77*	0.80	0.80
College			0.58***	0.72**	0.76*	0.77*
Graduate School			0.56***	0.74*	0.79	0.81
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)						
HS			0.97	1.00	1.02	1.03
Some College			0.96	1.04	1.07	1.07
College			0.88	1.00	1.02	1.03
Graduate School			0.86	1.00	1.01	1.04
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)						
Mother or Female Guardian			1.59***	1.54***	1.54***	1.54***
Father or Male Guardian			1.78***	1.60***	1.58***	1.54***
None			2.13***	1.85***	1.82***	1.81***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)						
2			0.75***	0.78**	0.78**	0.79**
1			0.71***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***
None			0.72*	0.78	0.76	0.76
Educational Attainment and Goals						
High School G.P.A.				0.78***	0.77***	0.78***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)						
College Preparatory				0.70***	0.72***	0.74***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.72***	0.75***	
Additional Controls						
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)						
Country					1.16	1.16
Small City (<50k)					1.12	1.13
Medium City (50-100k)					0.80	0.81
Suburb of Med City					0.89	0.91
Large City (100-500k)					0.91	0.93
Suburb of Large City					0.78	0.8
Very Large City (>500k)					1.01	1.03
Suburb of Very Large City					0.96	1.00
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)						
North Central					0.86	0.85
South					1.23*	1.20
West					1.01	0.96
Additional Pathways						
4-Year College						0.77**
2-Year College						1.20**
Vocational/Technical School						1.14
N	8220	8220	8220	8220	8220	8220
Pseudo R^2	0.0187	0.0227	0.0458	0.0615	0.0670	0.0687
Prob> ch^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: N= 8220 (2002-2013); Form 2 Data Only; Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 4.6 below depicts the predicted probabilities of expecting to serve by nationalistic attitudes, after full controls. On average, for every unit increase on the nationalism scale between 6-30, it is predicted that there will be a one percent increase in youth propensity. This suggests that youth with propensity are more

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nationalistic than their civilian peer counterparts- a finding that is not surprising in

and of itself and one that is consistent with earlier research (e.g. Bachman et al.

2000; Segal et al. 2000).

Figure 4.6- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Nationalism Index
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Casualties

Consistent with **hypothesis 1c,** findings indicate that there is a significant

negative relationship between U.S. casualties and propensity during the post-9/11

era. As casualties increase, youth are significantly less likely to expect to serve

(OR=0.95***), after controlling for various other factors such as race, SES,

educational goals and attainment, region of country and type of residence. Figure

4.7 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by U.S.

casualties after controlling for all factors highlighted in Model 6 of Table 4.1. On

average, the predicted probability of serving decreases by about two-thirds of a

percent for every increase of one hundred U.S. casualties. This is substantial

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considering that between 2003-2011, there were no less than three hundred U.S. casualties per year resulting from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as highlighted earlier in Table 4.1. This equates to approximately a 2 percent decrease in the probability of youth expecting to serve for each of the years. A two percent decrease in the predicted probability to serve is a substantial difference since it equates to about a loss of 44,000 possible male recruits the age of 18 years according to U.S. Census data (U.S. Census Bureau 2015).

Figure 4.7- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Casualties Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Unemployment

Inconsistent with ***hypothesis 1d,*** findings indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between unemployment and the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. As overall unemployment rates increase, youth are significantly more likely to expect to serve (OR=1.04***), after controlling for various other factors highlighted in Model 6 of Table 4.1. Figure 4.8 below

depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by unemployment after controlling for all factors. On average, the predicted probability of serving increases by about one half of a percent for every percent increase in the overall unemployment rate. To put this into context, for the period following the economic recession of 2008, this equates to approximately a 2 percent increase in propensity during the years of 2009 and 2010, as unemployment rates nearly doubled.

Figure 4.8- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Unemployment Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

An interaction between casualties and unemployment depicted in Model 10 of Table 4.1 also yields significant results (OR=0.97***). Figure 4.9 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by the interaction of unemployment and casualties after controlling for all factors in Model 10 of Table 4.1. Figure 4.9 below indicates that, on average, as unemployment increases, higher casualties have a greater negative influence on propensity. On the other

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hand, as unemployment increases, lower casualties have a greater positive influence on propensity. Put another way, the greater the unemployment rates are, the greater the effect of casualties on propensity (Williams 2015). On average, an unemployment rate of nine percent when casualties are approximately 900 would yield a predicted probability of serving of about 12 percent lower compared to the same unemployment rate with approximately 200 casualties. These results suggest occupational orientations of service as the benefits of service, especially during periods of economic instability, may outweigh the costs of service when those costs (i.e. casualties) are low. However, when the costs are high, it does not appear that propensity increases even though unemployment is high.

Figure 4.9- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Casualties*Unemployment
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

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
Racial and Ethnic Group Differences

There are also significant differences in propensity between racial and ethnic groups. Figure 4.10 below depict actual differences in propensity between white, black, and Hispanic young men. Generally speaking, Hispanic propensity is the highest overall during the post-9/11 era, followed closely by black propensity, and then white propensity. This supports **hypothesis 2**. Of note, Hispanic designation did not occur in the MTF study until after 2004. Figure 4.11 depicts the actual propensity of white and black young men for all the years in the dataset (1976-2013). Results show support for **hypothesis 4a,** showing that white propensity has remained relatively stable over time. However, black propensity has declined significantly following the Gulf War period (1990-1991) and has continued to decline, albeit to a lesser degree.

Figure 4.10- Propensity to Serve by Race/Ethnicity
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 4.11- Propensity to Serve
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (White and Black Men)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Utilizing logistic regression, prior to controlling for various factors, results reported in Model 2 of Table 4.1 above reveal that both black (OR=1.42***) and Hispanic youth (OR=1.44***) have significantly greater propensity to serve compared to their white youth counterparts. However, after controlling for SES as depicted in Model 3 of Table 4.1, results reveal that racial differences between white and black youth (OR=1.06) diminish to insignificant levels. Significant differences in propensity between white and Hispanic youth still remain. After full controls, Model 6 of Table 4.1 reveals that Hispanic men are significantly more likely (OR=1.12*) to have the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era compared to white men. There is no difference in propensity between white and black men (OR=0.98).

Results reported in Model 7 of Table 4.1 depict an interaction between racial and ethnic groups and public support for war. Results do not indicate significant

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differences between racial and ethnic groups. Data suggests that there is a similar

negative relationship between propensity and public support for war between all

racial and ethnic backgrounds.

   Results reported in Model 8 of Table 4.1 depict an interaction between racial

and ethnic groups and casualties. Figure 4.12 below depicts propensity

differences between racial and ethnic groups by casualties during the post-9/11

era, after full controls. Results support *hypothesis 4b*, revealing that casualties

are significantly more negatively related to black propensity compared to whites

and Hispanics. In other words, as casualties increase during the post-9/11 era,

black youth propensity declines significantly greater than white or Hispanic youth

propensity. However, there is still a significant negative relationship between

casualties and the propensity to serve for all racial and ethnic groups.

Figure 4.12- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Casualties*Race
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Results reported in Model 9 of Table 4.1 depict an interaction between racial and ethnic groups and unemployment. Figure 4.13 below depicts propensity differences between racial and ethnic groups by unemployment during the post-9/11 era, after full controls. Results support *hypothesis 4c,* revealing that unemployment is significantly more positively related to black youth propensity compared to white and Hispanic youth. In other words, as unemployment increases during the post-9/11 era, black propensity increases significantly greater than white or Hispanic propensity. However, there is still a significant positive relationship between unemployment and the propensity to serve for all racial and ethnic groups.

Figure 4.13- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Unemployment*Race
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Socioeconomic Status

As noted earlier, results suggest that there are significant differences in the propensity to serve by SES during the post-9/11 era. Model 3 of Table 4.1 reveals

that those with higher SES, as measured by father's and mother's education, family structure (i.e. number of parents in household), and the number of siblings in a household, are significantly less likely to have the propensity to serve. Young men with a father who has a college degree are roughly half as likely (OR=0.56***) to expect to serve in the military compared to men who have a father with less than a high school education. The odds of propensity to serve for those men who grow up in a household with only a mother or female guardian are 1.28 compared to those with two parents or guardians. The odds of propensity to serve increase further with those who only have a father or no parents at all. Additionally, young men who have no siblings are about half as likely (OR=0.58***) to serve in the military than those with 3 or more siblings, most likely due to the lack of resources in the household to allocate towards college enrollment. In summary, as predicted by *hypothesis 3*, disadvantaged men are more likely to expect to serve in the military. As noted, the odds of the propensity to serve for blacks dropped from 1.42 to 1.06 compared to whites, after controlling for SES. This suggests that blacks may expect to serve as a result of their lower overall socioeconomic status. On the other hand, Hispanics continue to have a higher propensity than whites (OR=1.15*), after controlling for SES, suggesting that other factors besides socioeconomic reasons may be contributing to their propensity.

Educational Goals and Attainment

Model 4 of Table 4.1 includes the additional cluster of control variables pertaining to educational attainment and goals. Results reported in Model 4

support *hypothesis 5a*. These findings are consistent with previous research suggesting that educational attainment and aspirations also exert a significant influence on the propensity to serve in the military. As a young man's grade point average increases (approximate increase of .3 on a G.P.A. scale from 1.7 to 4), he is about a third less likely (OR=0.71***) to expect to serve. Young men who are enrolled in college preparatory classes are about a quarter less likely (OR=0.73***) to have the propensity to serve compared to those enrolled in non-college preparatory classes.

Region of Country and Urbanicity

Model 5 of Table 4.1 adds a few additional control variables such as where the respondent grew up and the school region of the respondent. Results from this model indicate that the odds of having the propensity to serve from those who grew up in the southern region of the country is about one and a half times greater (OR=1.43***) than those in other regions of the country, which is statistically significant. Additional significance is indicated for those youth who grow up in a suburb of a large city or very large city. Youth who grow up in these areas are about one quarter less likely (OR=0.81**) to have the propensity to serve compared to those growing up on a farm or in the country. These results are consistent with earlier research suggesting that more advantaged youth who are less likely to expect to serve in the military grow up in the suburban areas of large cities.

Additional Pathways to Adulthood

Results from Model 6 of Table 4.1 reveal differences between those who expect to serve in the military compared to other alternatives a young man can choose from when deciding among the various pathways to adulthood. As predicted in **hypothesis 5a**, those who expect to graduate from a 4-year college are about a third less likely (OR=0.68***) to expect to serve in the military. Interestingly, those expecting to graduate from a 2-year college or attend a vocational/technical school are significantly more likely (OR=1.15*** and OR=1.08* respectively) to have the propensity to serve in the military, which supports **hypothesis 5b**. Consistent with earlier research (Bachman et al., 2001), these findings suggest that the military may be an attractive alternative for those who still desire to pursue higher levels of education after high school.

Results reported in Models 11 and 12 of Table 4.1 depict an interaction between race and ethnic groups and the expectation to graduate from a two-year college or attend a vocational/technical school. Results reveal significant group differences in propensity between white and black men (OR=1.39***) and white and Hispanic men (OR=1.21*). Figure 4.14 below reveals that both black and Hispanic men who expect to graduate from a two-year college are more likely to expect to serve than their white counterparts. Similarly, Figure 4.15 below reveals that both black (OR=1.75***) and Hispanic men (OR=1.26*) who expect to attend vocational education are also more likely to expect to serve than their white counterparts.

Figure 4.14- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Race*Two-Year College

Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Expect to Graduate from a 2-year College- (0=No/1=Yes)

White   Black
Hispanic

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 4.15- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Race*Vocational Education

Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Expect to Attend Vocational School- (0=No/1=Yes)

White   Black
Hispanic

Source: Monitoring the Future

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
Chapter 5: Primary Analysis Discussion

My research on propensity is important in a few notable ways. First, researchers have not conducted propensity research using MTF data since 1999 (e.g. Segal et al. 1999). Further, the last Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS), which also measures enlistment propensity, was conducted in 1999. As of yet, no additional research has been published on military propensity. This is particularly noteworthy since enlistment propensity is likely to have changed as a result of the attacks on 9/11 and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Second, previous research on propensity has examined individual factors such as race, gender, SES, educational attainment and goals, region and type of residence, and various attitudes. Some research has examined temporal trends based on the recruiting climate (e.g. Segal et al. 1999). However, most propensity researchers have been unable to directly examine the relationship between propensity and various macro-social influences such as public support for war, casualties, and unemployment. The post-9/11 era has served as a good natural experiment to examine how these particular macro influences may be related to individual levels of military propensity. Third, by deeming these macro influences as proxy measures of motivations to serve, along with using prior research on individual attitudes, I am able to draw temporary conclusions about an individual's motivation to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era without directly asking these questions. Later in Chapter 8, I am able to test my temporary conclusions by creating an institutional/occupational index out of job-related attitudinal questions to examine the relationship between propensity and attitudes

toward work. Last, my research compares military propensity with various other pathways to adulthood (e.g. 4- or 2-year college or vocational education), which will provide recruiters insight as to which avenues of higher education are more likely to be attractive to possible enlistees.

The overall decline in propensity to serve during the 1980s and 90s as depicted in Figure 4.1 may be a result of ideological and structural influences. Increasingly individualistic attitudes since the end of the draft era, increased desire and access to higher education, increased opportunities in the civilian labor force for minorities, reductions in the size of the military at the end of the Cold War, and changes within the military from executing traditional to nontraditional missions (e.g. peacekeeping and humanitarian relief) have undoubtedly contributed to this phenomenon (Segal et al., 1999). Yet, the attacks on 9/11 may serve as a historical moment in time that could feasibly reverse this trend based on patriotic support for the cause. Additional factors may also be influencing propensity after 9/11 such as U.S. casualties, especially during the height of the Iraqi insurgency (2004-2007), and unemployment rates, especially after the recession of 2008. Indeed, Figure 4.1 reveals a reversal of the downward trend of military propensity from the previous two decades that is inconsistent with *hypothesis 1a*. The institutional model of military service best explains the possible reasons for this reversal since service during wartime is considered to be a greater "calling" as Moskos (1977) defined the institutional military. However, other more occupational motivations could also be at play during this era as a result of the influence of casualties and unemployment. Since propensity declines

as casualties increase, this suggests that more occupational motivations are at play. Additionally, since propensity increases as unemployment increases, this also suggests that more occupational motivations may be influencing youth propensity.

Public Support for War

Results indicate different impacts on military propensity based on the changing social, economic, and military operational context during the post-9/11 era. The period immediately following the attacks on 9/11 (2003) was marked by high patriotic feelings and public support for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Numerous public opinion surveys revealed that public support for the first year of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars averaged approximately 85 and 75 percent respectively (Berinsky 2009). The significant spike in propensity immediately following 9/11 (see Figure 4.1) suggests that institutional, "patriotic callings" to serve may have motivated more men to expect to serve during this time period. Surprisingly, findings do not support my prediction (***hypothesis 1b)*** that propensity increases with an increase in public support for war throughout the entire duration of the post-9/11 era. In fact, results indicate an overall negative relationship between propensity and public support for war.

There are a few possible explanations for findings contrary to my prediction. First, the fact that overall public support steadily declined shortly after the beginning of both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and remained consistently low (below 40 percent after 2006), as depicted in Figure 5.1 below, may contribute to the results. My measure of public support for war may not have enough variation

to accurately predict a true relationship with propensity over the entire period of analysis. Second, it is possible that other sub-factors of casualties and the economy (as highlighted in the literature review), which are not specifically measured in my analysis, may have greater influence on propensity than public support for war, especially as war continues over an extended period of time. Nonetheless, it is particularly noteworthy to highlight the significant spike in propensity, which corresponds to high public support for war, immediately following the beginning of both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. This result supports the notion that youth may have been motivated to serve in a similar "rally 'round the flag," patriotic fashion as Corporal Pat Tillman and Sergeant Jimmy Regan.

Figure 5.1- Public Support for War During the Post-9/11 Era, 2002-2013

Source: Gallup 2015a; 2015b

Third, propensity may not have a positive relationship with public support for war as predicted because the factors associated with propensity during wartime

may not correspond in the same direction or with the same magnitude as the factors associated with the public supporting war. As noted earlier, scholars have argued for decades over the various factors associated with public support for war, yielding different results for the importance placed on these factors (Gelpi et al. 2006). For example, it is possible that the most important factor associated with the public's support for war in Iraq could have been the consensus among political elites, which initially was united, but then became strongly divided as the war continued (Berinsky 2009). It is reasonable that elite differences in opinion may not have influenced propensity in the same manner as it would public support for war. Similarly, it is possible that the public may have been most concerned with building a multinational coalition for supporting the war in Iraq, and thus, support dwindled after the U.S. conducted its unilateral invasion (Gershkoff and Kushner 2005). However, youth may not have been as concerned with this particular factor when weighing the option of joining the military. Perhaps a combination of factors, to include those noted above and/or other factors such as an increase in casualties or the disagreement with the war's objective, may have caused public support to decline, while propensity may not have responded to these factors in the same manner. Unfortunately, my analysis is limited since I cannot fully tease out the actual reasons driving public support for war or the reasons driving youth propensity in great detail. I can only examine the general relationship between public support for war and propensity, and from my analysis, that relationship appears to be negative during the post-9/11 era.

My original assumption based on both prior research and intuition was that patriotism would be positively related to public support for war and public support for war would be positively related to propensity under the same patriotic rationale. As noted, researchers have shown that other factors besides patriotism have been related to public support for war. Indeed, at any given time, it may be the case that one factor is more important than others in driving public support for war. Since results did not support my prediction throughout the duration of the post-9/11 era, it appears that other factors besides patriotism may have greater influence on public support for war at different times. Thus, further analysis is warranted.

As mentioned earlier, public support for war may have initially tapped into the patriotic sentiments of Americans immediately following the 9/11 attacks. This was certainly evidenced by the remarkably high display of flags after 9/11, considered by some as an expression of patriotism, and not nationalism (Skitka 2005). However, displaying the flag can have different meanings. National polls indicated that the number of people who displayed flags dropped from about 80 percent immediately after 9/11 to about 55 percent since the Iraq war began (Moore 2003). One could speculate that what it meant to display the flag after the Iraq war began "may have shifted more toward the nationalistic end of the spectrum" (Skitka 2005:2008). Similarly, public support for war may have initially been an expression of patriotic sentiments immediately following 9/11, but may have shifted toward more nationalistic sentiments as focus shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq and the public's perception that Iraq was part of the "War on

Terror" declined. Indeed, no direct link between Iraq and terrorism was effectively established by the Bush administration as the Iraq war continued (Gershkoff and Kushner 2005). Making things worse, the argument that Iraq was harboring weapons of mass destruction never came to fruition. It is possible that the decline of public support for the Iraq War approximately a year after it began may have evidenced a shift from patriotic to nationalistic sentiment, a sentiment that fewer Americans were prepared to endorse unequivocally. Thus, it is possible that nationalistic sentiments, more so than patriotism, drove public support for war soon after the Iraq War began. It is also possible that public support for war was influenced by factors other than national attachment such as the war's objective, elite consensus, or multilateralism. Hence, public support for war may not be the best measure for tapping into the patriotic construct, especially throughout the entire post-9/11 era.

To examine this possible explanation further, I created an index of questions measuring nationalistic attitudes of youth that were only asked on Form 2 of the MTF survey. While there is not a measure within the MTF dataset that directly taps into the patriotism construct that other researchers have conceptualized, there are questions examining attitudes on military values that are related to the concept of nationalism similar to those used in the scales developed by Kosterman and Feshbach (1989). Using this index, I am able to directly examine the relationship between propensity and nationalism. I am also able to indirectly examine the relationship between propensity and patriotism, as researchers have routinely shown a moderate correlation between patriotism and nationalism (e.g.

Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Sidanius et al. 1997; Skitka 2005; Federico et al. 2005).

Although some researchers have argued that nationalism and patriotism are separate constructs of national attachment, research has also shown that they are moderately correlated (e.g. Kosterman and Feshbach 1989; Sidanius et al. 1997; Skitka 2005; Federico et al. 2005). Since propensity is positively correlated with greater nationalistic attitudes, this suggests that propensity would also be positively correlated with patriotic attitudes. The fact that my results indicate an overall negative relationship between public support for war and propensity suggests that public support for war may have been tapping into other attitudes besides nationalism or patriotism. Indeed, if more patriotic sentiments of war support remained high throughout, it is likely that public support for war would have been positively correlated with youth propensity. The overall decline in the nationalistic attitudes of all youth depicted in Figure 4.4 above supports the notion of a decline in public support for war resulting from a decline in either nationalistic or patriotic sentiment, or a decline in both.

It should be noted that this is not to imply that the public was any less patriotic because they did not support the war in Iraq soon after it began. Indeed, some would argue that standing up for the beliefs that the war was unjust, too unilateral, or not worth the costs by not supporting the war could be considered patriotic in nature. Certainly, this does not mean that people with these beliefs did not support our men and women in uniform any less. The point is that propensity may not have been positively related to public support for war as I predicted

because the public's originally patriotic support likely declined, and, thus, was not related to a youth's patriotic calling to serve. Indeed, Figure 4.14 above reveals that the nationalistic attitudes of youth with propensity remained relatively steadfast throughout the post-9/11 era. One could infer by this that the patriotic attitudes of youth with propensity also remained equally steadfast throughout, despite the decline in the public's support for war.

Future research should continue to examine the various factors associated with public support for war, and how they relate to propensity as well as military enlistment. In particular, researchers should examine the relationship between public support for war and patriotism, nationalism, or both. Further, researchers should examine the relationship between propensity and patriotism, nationalism, or both. Indeed, a great deal of research has already shown that one of the main reasons people join the military has been for patriotism and a desire to serve one's country, which clearly lies within the institutional model of military service that Moskos (1977) formulated (to be discussed in greater detail later in Chapter 7). Some research (e.g. Bachman et al. 2000) has also shown a positive relationship between propensity and various nationalistic attitudes, although those attitudes were not framed under the "nationalism" concept. My own research addresses these relationships (i.e. propensity, nationalism, and patriotism) in part. Future researchers could also examine how the various forms and frequency of patriotic behavior are related to propensity. For instance, how is flag-displaying behavior, various pop culture events (e.g. country music songs like "I'm Proud to be an American" or "American Soldier;" Hollywood movies like "United 93" or "Zero

Dark Thirty;" spotlights on the military by professional sports teams; or memorial

tributes such as the "Tunnel to Towers" run and the "Lead the Way" run), as well

as the media's attention (positive or negative) on the military related to

propensity?

It may be that public support for war is only positively related to propensity

during certain periods marked by high patriotic sentiment, like during what

Mueller (1970) described as "rally points" in which people 'rally 'round the flag"

showing spontaneous support for the President in times of crisis. Mueller used

the term "rally 'round the flag" in his research to help explain the phenomenon in

which presidents tend to experience short-term boosts in popularity after

international crises, or "rally points." As Kenneth Waltz has observed, "In the

face of such an event, the people rally behind their chief executive" (1967:272).

According to Mueller, the concept of a rally point generally must be associated

with an event which 1) is international; 2) involves the United States and the

President directly; and 3) must be specific, dramatic, and sharply focused.

Researchers should examine the relationship between presidential approval

ratings and propensity, using Mueller's methods described in his "rally 'round

the flag" concept. My own preliminary research, using Gallup Poll data, reveals a

positive relationship between presidential approval ratings and propensity during

the post-9/11 era, although results are only significant at the $p=.10$ level (Gallup

2015c). Although my analysis does not address the various "rally points"

throughout the entire period, the period immediately following 9/11 does show

support for the "rally 'round the flag" concept.

After additional analysis, my revised hypothesis is that propensity and public support for war will be positively related to each other during periods of high patriotic sentiment when public support for war is highly related to patriotism. These periods are likely to occur immediately following an attack on our own soil, immediately entering a war that is deemed morally just, or during other "rally 'round the flag" points such as significant changes in military missions (e.g. surge of troops in Iraq or Afghanistan), amidst significant threats (e.g. the ISIS attacks on Paris), or significant successes (e.g. the killing of Osama Bin Laden). To the extent that these rally points relate to propensity for a particular class of high school seniors, may be difficult to fine-tune since they are often fleeting moments that may not leave a lasting impression on youth as they decide on a pathway to adulthood. Of course, various factors such as media coverage, elite rhetoric, and political consensus are likely to influence these moments as well. Nevertheless, I believe that when public support is most importantly related to patriotism, propensity will be positively related to public support for war. On the other hand, when public support is not as related to patriotism (or nationalism for that matter) as other factors, propensity may be negatively related to public support for war.

In sum, there are a few things to reinforce from my analysis on the relationship between public support for war and propensity. First, propensity and public support for war are positively related to each other immediately following the attacks of 9/11 (2002-2003). This finding supports Mueller's "rally 'round-the-flag" concept. Second, throughout the entire post-9/11 era, propensity is

negatively related to public support for war. This suggests that various other factors associated with public support for war may not influence propensity in the same manner. My original prediction was fairly simple, but public support for war may be more complex. Thus, its relationship with propensity would be expected to be more complex as well. If public support for war is associated with patriotic fervor, it is likely that propensity will be positively associated with public support, as my results clearly show following the attacks of 9/11. If public support for war is based on other factors of importance (e.g. the war's objective, multilateralism, elite consensus, or casualties), propensity may not be positively related. Future research should examine these hypotheses further. Third, my research suggests that youth with greater nationalistic attitudes are more likely to have the propensity to serve. Since nationalistic attitudes are positively related to patriotic attitudes, it is reasonable that patriotic attitudes are also positively associated with propensity, which is consistent with prior research examining motivations to serve. Certainly, volunteering to serve during wartime could be considered to be the ultimate display of "love of one's country-" a common definition of patriotism.

It follows that institutional orientations appear to be relatively high among youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era, given their strong sense of national attachment (i.e. patriotic, nationalistic, or some form of both). In his address to the American Legion while running for President against Dwight Eisenhower, Adlai Stevenson's (1952) conceptualization of patriotism after the

World War II period seems to endure during the post-9/11 era for youth with the propensity to serve:

> "What do we mean by patriotism in the context of our times? I venture to suggest that what we mean is a sense of national responsibility…a patriotism that puts country ahead of self; a patriotism which is not short, frenzied outburst of emotion, but the tranquil and steady dedication of a lifetime. The dedication of a lifetime- these are words that are easy to utter, but this is a mighty assignment. Men who have offered their lives for their country know that patriotism is not the fear of something; it is the love of something."

It appears that youth with propensity remain steadfast and loyal to their nation with a patriotic fervor and desire to serve for a greater cause (i.e. "national responsibility") during the difficult times of the post-9/11 era. As war continues amidst new threats, it is important that we continue to try to tap into the underlying motivations of youth who expect to serve. It is my belief that patriotism will remain a major factor of influence.

Casualties

The period at the height of the Iraqi insurgency (2004-2007), marked by an increase in U.S. combat deaths, appears to have had a negative influence on propensity. Casualties in Iraq at this time were about 75% higher than during other years of the war (see Figure 5.2 below). Portrayals by the media during this period conveyed a message to the public that the U.S. military was losing the war in Iraq and support quickly dropped (Berinsky 2009). This negative attention, highlighted by an increase in combat deaths, is likely to have significantly influenced propensity in the negative direction during this period. Indeed, results indicate that casualties are negatively related to military propensity during the

post-9/11 era, which supports **hypothesis 1c**. This is consistent with more occupational motivations of service among potential recruits, as the benefits of service may no longer outweigh the costs associated with combat for some individuals. The decline in propensity in relation to higher casualties suggests that youth with more occupational orientations toward service may have been dissuaded from military service. Put another way, those youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era may have more institutional callings to serve amidst higher casualties.

Figure 5.2- U.S. Casualties During the Post-9/11 Era, 2002-2013

Source: Defense Management Data Center 2015a;2015b; 2015c; 2015d

These results are not surprising considering the extensive amount of research conducted on the casualty phenomenon since the Vietnam War, the last major war period during the AVF. Certainly it is reasonable to accept that propensity could be negatively influenced by an increase in casualties. However, as noted earlier, related research on public support and casualties suggests that the relationship

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between the two is mediated by additional factors. Inasmuch as one is willing to

accept that public support and propensity are related, the same could hold true for

the relationship between propensity and casualties. This is worthy of additional

analysis below.

Gelpi and his colleagues (2006) found that the public's tolerance toward

increased casualties is higher when two factors are present: 1) the belief that the

war is waged for a just cause, and 2) the belief that the U.S. will be successful in

the future conduct of the war. If both conditions are met, with primary

importance placed on the latter, public support for war will remain high despite an

increase in U.S. casualties. Taking their argument into consideration since it is

most recent in the literature, and perhaps, a more interesting debate, Table 5.1

below depicts the public's belief in the United States' eventual success during the

Iraq War- the most important factor in their argument. The table reveals that the

public's perception of future success considerably declined between 2004-2007.

Scanning numerous public opinion polls using "Polling Report.com," I

determined which polls most accurately and routinely assessed public opinion

toward success in Iraq, which was the primary war on the minds of most

Americans and produced the largest amount of casualties. Table 5.1 below

depicts four public opinion polls regarding the public's perception that the U.S.

would be successful in Iraq (Polling Report 2015a; 2015b). Most polls were

conducted multiple times throughout a year, so I took the average to determine the

public's perception of success for a particular year. An example poll question

from the USA Today/Gallup Poll routinely asked the question between 2005-

2007: "Which comes closer to your view about the war in Iraq? You think the

U.S. will definitely win the war in Iraq. You think the U.S. will probably win the

war in Iraq. You think the U.S. can win in Iraq, but you don't think it will win.

OR, You do not think the U.S. can win the war in Iraq." Similar questions were

asked routinely for the additional three polls I selected. The last "total" column in

Table 5.1 is an overall average of the four polls for each year.

   Generally speaking, the table reveals that the public had fairly optimistic

attitudes toward future success in Iraq (54 percent) about a year after the invasion.

Soon thereafter, however, polls indicate that the public's belief of future success

in Iraq reversed trends. From 2004 to 2007, the public's overall belief in future

success dropped from 54.3 percent to 35.8 percent, while the belief that the U.S.

would not be successful in Iraq increased from 27.7 to 56.2 percent. Additionally,

a CBS News Poll conducted routinely between 2003-2007 (not included in Table

5.1) revealed that the majority of respondents did not believe that "the United

States did the right thing in taking military action against Iraq" (Polling Report

2015b). These trends in opinion continued to increase as the Iraq War continued.

Of note, this was the other factor that Gelpi and his colleagues' (2006) identified

as key to contributing to the public's ability to tolerate casualties.

Table 5.1
Public Opinion of Likelihood of Success in Iraq

Year	USA Today/Gallup		CBS News Poll		Gallup		Pew Research Center		Total	
	Success	Non-Success	Success	Non-Success	Success	Non-Success	Success	Non-Success	Success	Non-Success
2004	-	-	-	-	-	-	54.3	27.7	54.3	27.7
2005	46	50	-	-	46	50	47.5	37	46.5	45.7
2006	41.5	54.5	47.5	49.0	41.5	54.5	38	45.5	42.1	50.9
2007	29	65.5	44.6	50.6	32.4	62.8	37	46	35.8	56.2

Notes: No questions were asked prior to 2004 and after 2007 about the likelihood of success in Iraq; - denotes question not asked that year

Source: Polling Report 2015a; 2015b

   Together, both the public's belief that the United States did the right thing in

taking military action against Iraq and the likelihood that the U.S. would succeed

in Iraq in the future dropped after the initial stages of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. Taking Gelpi and his colleagues' most recent argument into consideration, it follows that public support for war would drop in response to an increase in casualties. Indeed, public support for war dropped precipitously after initially high levels, especially for the Iraq war as the Iraqi insurgency grew and U.S. casualties mounted (Berinsky 2009; Gallup 2015a; 2015b). Insomuch as propensity and public support are related, it follows that propensity would similarly decline as casualties increased. Indeed, results from my research reveal a corresponding decline in propensity as casualties increase.

The analysis above supports the notion that military propensity may be related to casualties in a similar fashion as public support for war is related to casualties. Unfortunately, available poll questions only primarily captured public opinion about the expectation of future success in Iraq between 2004-2007. Due to the limited polling data available, I am unable to fully examine the unique relationship between propensity and casualties in the same nuanced manner as Gelpi and his colleagues. Indeed, their analysis was more precise using monthly polling data and casualty reports whereas I am limited to examining aggregate data to determine the impacts to propensity annually. Although their research methods do not fully match up with mine, the logic remains the same and serves well for comparison sake.

My research contributes indirectly to the considerable amount of research on the casualty hypothesis, including Gelpi and colleagues' recent study, showing that propensity declines as casualties increase. Further, it extends research on

propensity by examining the relationship to casualties as one of the primary independent variables. In this particular analysis, it also indirectly examines the relationship between propensity and public support for war. From my results, one could certainly make the leap that propensity and public support for war are related. However, it must be noted that propensity and public support are not entirely the same. Indeed, the willingness to actively serve during war is more costly than supporting war. It is reasonable to accept that propensity would be less elastic to an increase in casualties compared to public support. Future research should examine these potential differences. Nevertheless, data from my research suggests that casualties have a similar influence on propensity as have been shown on public support for war.

While propensity and public support for war are not one and the same (as has been shown earlier by my own research), their relationship to casualties appears to be similar. At least with respect to how the public's belief in the future success of war and that the war is just are related to casualties. Future research should examine those factors of high importance with respect to public support for war and casualties and determine how they influence the relationship between propensity and casualties. For example, the belief that terrorism was the principle policy objective of the Iraq war (Jentleson 1992), the perceived domestic elite consensus of support for war (Larson 1996), and the belief that U.N. support and a coalition was needed to fight the wars (Kull and Destler 1999) may all mediate the influence of casualties on propensity. Unfortunately, MTF data does not ask these types of questions. Most poll questions do not routinely ask these types of

questions either. However, it is well known that support for the Iraq war was politically divided between elites soon after the initial invasion (Berinsky 2009). It is reasonable that this lack of consensus between political elites could also contribute to a decline in propensity in response to greater casualties. Additionally, there certainly are a good number of people who believe that we should not have invaded Iraq unilaterally. Future researchers should examine these factors with respect to the relationship between casualties and propensity, especially as we vary our missions from combat to train, advise, and assist in Afghanistan, and we consider increasing our combat mission against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. It will be interesting to examine how these changes in missions influence propensity amidst possible U.S. casualties.

Unemployment

The period following the great economic recession of 2008 (2009-2012) marked a significant spike in overall youth propensity to serve in the military (See Figure 4.2). This period was marked by significant instability in the economy and the labor force. Overall unemployment rates rose from about 5% to over 9% during this period and never fully recovered (See Figure 5.3 below). Additionally, the unemployment rate of young adults ages 16-24 years also rose substantially during this period (Department of Labor 2015). Even those with a college degree found it harder to find a job after graduation. Further, the unemployment rate for young minorities was higher than for white youth. Overall, results indicate that unemployment is positively related to propensity during the post-9/11 era. In other words, the propensity to serve increases as the

unemployment rates increase. This suggests that the military may have been viewed as a more viable work environment, in the true occupational sense, for economic and stability reasons. These are particularly noteworthy findings, as they do not support my *hypothesis 1d*, suggesting that youth may perceive the benefits of military service to be great enough during periods of economic instability despite the costs associated with wartime.

Findings support earlier related research on the relationship between propensity and unemployment (e.g. Segal et al. 1999; DoD 2000) and between actual enlistment and unemployment (e.g. Dale and Gilroy 1984). However, it is noteworthy that previous studies could not fully take into consideration the impact of unemployment on propensity during wartime. Surprisingly, it appears that the negative aspects of war do not dissuade youth from the benefits of service during a bad economy so that propensity remains positively related to higher unemployment rates. This also suggests that soldiers exhibit some occupational orientations during the post-9/11 era.

The National Priorities Project conducted a recent study in 2010 analyzing the correlation between unemployment and military recruitment. Although the researchers did not find a strong statistical connection between unemployment and recruitment rates across counties throughout the U.S., they did note that other factors support recruiters' assertions that the poor economy after the recession of 2008 has driven many candidates to seek out the armed forces as a career choice (National Priorities Project 2011). For example, in FY 2008, the Army only exceeded its recruiting goal by one percent. During FY 2009, however, the Army

exceeded its recruitment goal by 8 percent, signing about 5,000 more recruits than its 65,000 benchmark (Moore 2012). Interestingly, as a result of the influx of recruits, the Army was able to be more stringent in its recruit selection thereby increasing the overall quality of recruits. This suggests that a bad economy may be related to higher quality youth with the propensity to serve. Indeed, some of these recruits have been college graduates who have found it increasingly more difficult to find a job after graduation and repay student loans (National Priorities 2011; Moore 2012).

Of course it must be noted that this period also encompassed greater success in Iraq and Afghanistan with the surge of U.S. forces in 2008 and 2010 respectively. During this time, U.S. casualties significantly decreased relative to earlier years of the wars (See Figure 5.2). These factors could also be contributing to an increase in youth propensity, as youth may have become less concerned about the risks associated with the wars and more concerned about finding a job amidst a stagnant economy. Indeed, an interaction between casualties and unemployment highlighted earlier in Figure 4.9 supports this notion, indicating that as casualties increase, unemployment has a greater negative effect on propensity. In contrast, as casualties decrease, unemployment has a greater positive effect on propensity. On average, the predicted probability of serving is about 12 percent lower when the unemployment rate is nine percent and casualties are about 900 compared to the same unemployment rate when there are 200 casualties. A recent study conducted by RAND Corporation examining insights from Army recruits also supports this assertion, finding that recruits report becoming less concerned with

the risks of war and more concerned with poor civilian job opportunities (Rostker et al. 2014). This is also consistent with occupational orientations of service, as the benefits of service, especially during periods of high economic instability, appear to only outweigh the costs of service when those costs are low. My results suggest that casualties may be the primary factor of importance influencing propensity as opposed to unemployment.

Particularly interesting for comparison sake is the fact that there was a significant negative correlation between unemployment and propensity during the other period marked by sustained war during the AVF- the Gulf War period (between MTF surveys 1991-1993). During this timeframe, overall unemployment rates rose from 5.6 percent to 7.5 percent, yet propensity significantly declined (Department of Labor 2015). These results appear to contradict my findings during the post-9/11 era, suggesting that the negative aspects of the economy reflected by higher unemployment rates were less influential on propensity compared to the negative aspects of the threat of going to war. Of course, this analysis is during a very short period of war, where unemployment only rose about half as much as it did during the post-9/11 era. Perhaps other factors, such as the unpopularity of the Gulf war or the downsizing of the military that occurred afterwards, during President Clinton's administration, negatively influenced propensity despite rising unemployment rates (Segal et al. 1999). Although casualties were relatively low during the Gulf War, it is possible that the risk of high casualties during a major conventional type of war, with the possibility of the use of biological weapons by Saddam's regime,

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may have also negatively influenced propensity. Nevertheless, this period serves as the best way to directly compare the relationship between unemployment and propensity during wartime since the AVF began. My data suggests that unemployment is positively related to propensity, yet that relationship may be mediated by the impact of casualties.

Further research should continue to examine the relationship between propensity and unemployment, especially during wartime. As the military continues its "train, advise, and assist" combat mission in Afghanistan, and perhaps expands its mission against ISIS, it is likely that continued research on the impacts of war will be fruitful in the near future. Additionally, unemployment rates have started to decline back to pre-recession levels in 2014 and 2015 (Department of Labor 2015). It would be interesting to see how propensity has responded to these recent changes and into the future.

Figure 5.3- Overall Unemployment Rates During the Post-9/11 Era, 2002-2013

Source: Department of Labor 2015

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Race/Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status

Researchers have long been interested in the relationships between propensity and race, ethnicity, and class. I set out to examine how these relationships might have changed as a result of war and an unstable economy during the post-9/11 era. Consistent with earlier research, results from the analysis of the MTF dataset during the post-9/11 era indicate that black and Hispanic men still have a proportionately significantly higher propensity to serve compared to their white counterparts. These findings suggest that the military may still be perceived as a "bridging" environment in this era for less-advantaged individuals to acquire human, social, and cultural capital from training and experiences during military service. The occupational model of military service best explains these motivations for service. Indeed, minorities still have less advantage overall compared to their white counterparts with respect to status, earnings, opportunities for education, and family structure (Kleykamp 2009).

After controlling for socioeconomic status, however, results indicate that black men are actually no more likely than white men to have the propensity to serve during this era. Consistent with the bridging hypothesis, it appears that SES is the significant factor related to propensity, as opposed to race. Interestingly, these findings are not consistent with earlier research (e.g. Bachman et al. 1998, 2000; Dale and Gilroy, 1984; Hosek and Peterson, 1985; Kilburn, 1992; Kilburn and Klerman, 1999; Mare and Winship, 1984; Murray and McDonald, 1999; Teachman et al. 1993) which found that, after controlling for a host of other factors (e.g. demographic, economic, and attitudinal), blacks still had a higher

propensity to serve compared to whites. The fact that SES is a significant

predictor of propensity is consistent with recent research (e.g. Lutz 2008), but

does not completely tell the story since Hispanics still have a higher propensity

than whites even after controlling for SES. Possible reasons for Hispanics having

greater propensity even after controlling for SES will be discussed later in the

discussion.

Although black propensity remains higher than whites or Hispanics during the

post-9/11 era, the gap between black and white propensity has decreased

compared to earlier years as predicted in *hypothesis 4a* (see Figure 4.11). This

suggests that youth with more occupational motivations to serve may no longer

expect to do so during wartime. Results of the relationship between black

propensity and various factors such as casualties and unemployment support this

notion as well.

The interaction between racial and ethnic groups and casualties during the

post-9/11 era reflects a significant difference in the negative relationship between

casualties and black propensity compared to white and Hispanic youth. As

casualties increase, black propensity declines at a significantly greater rate than

white or Hispanic propensity as depicted in Figure 4.7. This suggests that

casualties may have more of a negative influence for black men compared to

others, which is more in accord with occupational orientations of service. This

finding is consistent with findings from the Youth Attitude Tracking Study which

found that black youth are more likely to mention "threat to life" or to say that

"killing is against their beliefs" as reasons for not joining the military (DoD

2000). Indeed, my research suggests that some black youth may be dissuaded from service as a result of higher casualties during war.

An interaction between racial and ethnic groups and unemployment during the post-9/11 era reflects a significant increase in the positive relationship between unemployment and black propensity compared to white and Hispanic youth. As unemployment increases, black propensity increases at a significantly greater rate than white or Hispanic propensity as depicted in Figure 4.8. This suggests that some black men may be more positively influenced to serve by a reduction of available opportunities in the labor market, which is consistent with occupational motivations of service. As highlighted earlier, black youth unemployment rates between the ages of 16-24 years was approximately 10-15 percent higher than for white youth during this era, perhaps exacerbating the relationship between unemployment and propensity for black youth (Ramos-Chapman 2010; Department of Labor 2012). Black youth had the highest unemployment rates, followed closely by Hispanics, then whites. Since I used the overall unemployment rate as my measure for analysis, it is likely that unemployment influenced minority youth more than my estimates predict, as the conditions in the labor market were markedly worse for minorities compared to their white youth counterparts.

The fact that black youth may be more occupationally motivated does not necessarily mean that something is wrong. That a young man is concerned about pay, benefits, and the well being of his family does not mean that he is a bad soldier. It appears that minorities, especially blacks, are active agents who are in

control of determining their best pathway to adulthood. Indeed, the military's ability to increase human capital through job training, pay and benefits, and education assistance, which might not otherwise be available, may still present an attractive option for minorities despite it being a time of increased risk due to war. Military service during the post-9/11 era could certainly be viewed as a way for youth from disadvantaged circumstances to make a "turning point" in their career trajectories (Elder 1986; Sampson and Laub 1996).

The fact that black propensity has declined during the post-9/11 era at a significantly steeper rate than whites suggests a few other possible influences. Increased opportunities for blacks continue to emerge in the civilian labor force as a result of equal opportunity and affirmative action programs. These structural changes have likely contributed to the overall decline in black youth propensity to serve as more opportunities for mobility are offered elsewhere. However, the effects of combat and changes in the operational environment may have also influenced blacks more than whites compared to earlier years. In other words, the pros versus cons of military service during the post-9/11 era may have altered the "battlefield" for some individuals more than others. For instance, blacks who are predominantly in administrative and logistical roles are now in direct combat situations more than ever before. The increased risk of harm could dissuade those youth who seek to join the military for occupational reasons versus institutional reasons. Results from the interaction between race and casualty data support this notion. I must reemphasize that black youth still continue to have a proportionately higher average propensity compared to whites during this period

of increased risk, although it appears that may be due to SES differences. The sharper decline in black propensity during this era warrants further discussion on occupational motivations. Since the "battlefield" has changed, the pros of military service may no longer outweigh the cons. Those who serve for more occupational reasons may seek to find opportunities elsewhere, besides the military, especially during combat situations.

Another possible influence contributing to the decline in black propensity during this era compared to earlier years is the increase in combat jobs (e.g. infantry, armor, aviation, and special forces). In 2004, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved an increase in the number of active Brigade Combat Teams from 33 to 43 as part of the "Army Transformation" plan that was implemented as a result of the war on terror (Global Security 2015). Brigade Combat Teams (approximately 3000 soldiers) are primarily composed of combat specialties. As more combat jobs have been made available during this era, potential black candidates may not have been as attracted to these specialties as much as white or Hispanic recruits, who typically volunteer for these types of jobs (Segal and Segal 2004; Kleykamp 2009). Given the expansion of combat jobs, it is possible that recruiters may have targeted more non-black audiences. There also could be the possibility of discrimination among the ranks of these combat jobs, which dissuades blacks from joining these specialties. Further analysis of these particular dynamics is needed to determine additional structural constraints within the military organization that could be influencing the propensity to serve among various racial and ethnic groups.

It should be highlighted that there was not as significant a decline in black propensity during the post-9/11 era compared to the Gulf War period (1990-1991) as depicted in Figure 4.11. Previous findings (Segal et al. 1999) noted that black propensity declined precipitously about 20% during the Gulf War period and never recovered. In contrast, black propensity essentially remained the same as earlier years immediately following 9/11 and only declined about 8% at its lowest point in 2007, and then quickly recovered during the recession period. These findings suggest that there may have been more support within the black community for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq compared to the Gulf War. Of note, there was no Hispanic designation within the MTF dataset until 2005 (restricted access only), so I am unable to directly compare Hispanic propensity during the Gulf War timeframe with propensity during the post-9/11 era. However, Segal and his colleagues (1999) noted a slight increase in Hispanic propensity during this period.

A potential explanation for the differences in black propensity between the Gulf War and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq could be the perceived unfair treatment of black soldiers during Vietnam. One should remember that some made allegations that black soldiers were used as "cannon fodder" during the Vietnam era (Armor 1996). That is, they believed that the draft during the Vietnam War was essentially a "poor man's draft" where black and poor soldiers made up a large portion of the troops since they could not defer military service because of college enrollment. Further, soldiers with lower Armed Forces Qualification Test scores did not have much of a choice on which military

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occupational specialty to choose (Gimbel and Booth 1996). Thus, some argued

that black soldiers, with lower scores, were placed into combat positions on the

front lines, in more harms way than white soldiers. As a result, black soldiers

made up a large and disproportionate amount of the casualties during the war

(Armor 1996; Lucks 2014), although there is still debate on the point of the

disproportionality of black casualties compared to whites (D. Segal conversation

2016). Regardless, it is possible that these sentiments would still resonate within

the black community, resulting in a reduction of black recruits during wartime

because of the perceived unfair treatment during Vietnam a generation earlier.

Indeed, the civil rights movement was closely linked to the anti-war movement

(D. Segal conversation 2016). However, data from my research does not support

this notion since black propensity does not decline nearly as much during the

post-9/11 era. Indeed, soldiers of this generation are volunteers who willingly

enlist to serve in harms way during wartime. Further, it is likely that black youth,

and all youth for that matter, "rallied around the flag" more from the attacks of

9/11 than they did during the Gulf War.

Hispanic men have a significantly higher propensity to serve compared to their

white counterparts, even after controlling for SES and additional factors. This

suggests that there may be more institutional motivations to serve among this

group. Factors such as increased recruiting efforts toward the Hispanic

population and greater communal support for the military may be influencing

Hispanic propensity as well. Additionally, it is possible that Hispanics have a

strong desire to serve their country during this critical time of war as a way to

fulfill their sense of citizenship, regardless of their actual legal status. This is certainly plausible given the increased political and social debate concerning border security and illegal immigration issues since the attacks of 9/11. A recent study by Dempsey and Shapiro supports this notion finding that a rather large proportion (60 percent) of the Hispanic population in the Army is comprised of immigrants or the children of immigrants. Of note, there were 1188 respondents of all ranks (excluding E-9 and O-7 and above) in the overall sample with 397 Hispanic respondents. Indeed, in 2002, President Bush used his authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act to expedite the citizenship of non-citizens who had been serving honorably in the military since 9/11 (Lutz 2008). This could have been motivation for Hispanics to serve. Overall initiatives have proven successful and popular among service members. Between September 2002 and June 2013, 89,095 noncitizen members of the U.S. armed forces have become citizens. Interestingly, 10,719 of these naturalizations occurred at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration naturalization ceremonies in 28 different countries, including Afghanistan and Iraq (Barry 2013).

Dempsey and Shapiro also found that the main reasons Hispanics gave for joining the Army were not primarily economic. In fact, they cited "Desire to serve my country" (23%) as the highest reason (Dempsey and Shapiro 2009). Additional research has shown that one of the reasons Hispanics have been overrepresented in the Marine Corps is a result of how well the institutional nature of the service has intermeshed with the individual values of Hispanics (De Angelis 2012). Findings from my research also suggest that something other than

economic reasons may be motivating more Hispanics to serve during the post-9/11 era. Unfortunately, the MTF dataset does not specify the various Hispanic ethnicities (e.g. Mexican, Puerto Rican, Dominican, etc.). Thus, I am unable to discern differences in propensity and motivations between various Latino ethnicities unlike recent researchers (e.g. Lutz 2008). More research must be done to better determine motivations to serve among all young men, regardless of race and ethnic background. I attempt to tease out these motivations later in Chapter 7.

Additional Pathways to Adulthood

Ruling out the college-bound as potential recruits for the military should not necessarily be the standard. Research has shown that when a young man says he expects "definitely" to do both (i.e. graduate college and join the military), the odds are that he will (Bachman et al. 2001). In particular, the features of two-year students suggest that this population of the college market may have significant enlistment potential. Nearly half of the increase in college enrollment between 1980 and 1994 was attributable to the increase in attendance at two-year colleges. Although two-year colleges were thought by some to prepare students to transfer to a four-year institution to obtain a bachelor's degree, less than 15 percent of two-year entrants actually receive bachelor's degrees. Additionally, dropout rates are high among two-year students and only about half of these students ever attain a postsecondary degree at all (Kilburn and Asch 2003). The high dropout rate, part-time enrollment rate, and the low transfer rate to four-year colleges suggest that these students may be more ambivalent to postsecondary school activity, and

that they may be "trying out" school to determine if they are actually "college material" (Kilburn and Asch 2003). These types of young men may be lucrative targets for military recruiters who are competing for the best and brightest in the civilian market.

My research finds that those who say they are likely to graduate from a two-year college also have positive military intentions, which is consistent with earlier research (Kilburn and Asch 2003). In other words, those with interest in the military see themselves primarily as two-year college material. However, those who plan to graduate from a 4-year college are about a third less likely to expect to join the military. These findings suggest that recruiting policies that allow youth to combine college- especially two-year college- and military service are likely to be attractive to those with the propensity to serve in the armed forces. Given the interest in college among those who are also interested in the military, it is assuring to know that the current educational benefits, provided from the Post-9/11 Bill and the College Fund, already provide veterans with the ability to cover tuition costs at public institutions (Kilburn and Asch 2003). The Post-9/11 Bill has also included extended benefits that enable transferring to a spouse or child- an even better incentive package for potential military recruits. With increased discussions of continuing defense budget cuts, my research suggests that policy makers should strongly consider retaining the benefits of the Post-9/11 Bill to continue to attract high quality recruits.

My research also finds a significant positive relationship between those who expect to attend vocational training and those who expect to enlist. This could

further enhance recruitment practices, especially as the military becomes more technically advanced. Those who desire to gain a specific skillset or trade may find better opportunities through on-the-job training in the military with direct pay benefits and other opportunities to enhance their resumes.

Not surprisingly, there are significant racial and ethnic group differences with respect to those youth with propensity who also expect to graduate from a two-year college or attend vocational training as depicted earlier in Figures 4.13 and 4.14 respectively. This is particularly important for recruiters who target minority recruits. Indeed, data suggests that recruiters could be effective at targeting two-year colleges or vocational schools to attract young minority men into the military.

Summary

My initial analysis examines various macro-social and individual factors that are associated with men's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. These are particularly unique findings as research has yet to fully uncover the various influences on youth propensity during wartime. At the macro-social level, findings suggest that propensity is negatively related to public support for war, positively related to casualties, and positively related to unemployment. An interaction between the influence of casualties and unemployment on propensity suggests that as unemployment increases, higher casualties have a greater negative effect on propensity. On the other hand, as unemployment increases, lower casualties have a greater positive effect on propensity.

Various individual and demographic influences are also related to youth propensity. Findings indicate differences in propensity by racial and ethnic groups. Black youth have the highest propensity, followed closely by Hispanic youth, then white youth. After controlling for socioeconomic status, however, black and white youth are no different in their propensity to serve. Hispanics continue to have a significantly higher propensity compared to their white counterparts after full controls. Consistent with earlier research, youth with lower SES continue to have a greater propensity to serve.

Findings also suggest that there are racial and ethnic group differences in the relationship between various macro-social factors and propensity. It appears that black youth propensity is more negatively influenced by an increase in casualties than white or Hispanic propensity. Data suggests that Hispanic youth propensity is the least negatively impacted by a rise in casualties. It also appears that black youth propensity is more positively influenced by an increase in unemployment compared to white or Hispanic propensity. There are no significant racial differences in the relationship between public support for war and propensity.

Youth who have a higher G.P.A. or who are enrolled in college preparatory classes are significantly less likely to expect to serve. Youth who expect to graduate from a 4-year college program are also significantly less likely to expect to serve. On the other hand, youth who expect to graduate from a 2-year college or attend vocational education are significantly more likely to expect to serve. Additionally, Black and Hispanics are more likely than their white counterparts to

have propensity and expect to graduate from a two-year college or attend vocational schooling.

Similar to previous studies, youth who grow up in the South are significantly more likely to have the propensity to serve. Additionally, youth who grow up in the suburbs of a large or very large city are significantly less likely to have propensity.

My initial research suggests that young men during the post-9/11 era appear to be institutionally oriented as a result of fairly high expectations to serve during wartime compared to previous decades of peace. However, data also suggests that youth with propensity have a mixture of both institutional and occupational orientations as revealed by an increase in propensity after 9/11, a decrease in relation to increasing casualties, and an increase in relation to increasing unemployment. These findings suggest that youth who expect to serve exhibit a form Segal (1986) referred to as "pragmatic professionalism"- where both institutional and occupational motivations coexist. Additionally, it appears that young black men are more occupationally oriented than their white and Hispanic counterparts. This is not necessarily surprising given the disadvantaged history of blacks in American society. As mentioned earlier, I seek to further explore racial and ethnic group differences in motivations to serve later in Chapter 7. There, I create an I/O index measure and employ additional institutional and occupational measures to compare group differences among those youth with the propensity to serve.

In the following chapters, I explore additional factors that are associated with youth propensity during the post-9/11 era. In Chapter 6, I examine the relationship between women's propensity and the same factors analyzed for men in the previous chapters. In Chapter 7, I examine the relationship between various political attitudes and propensity. In Chapter 8, I explore institutional and occupational differences in youth propensity. In chapters 9 and 10, I examine the relationship between propensity and gender role and racial attitudes respectively. I conclude my dissertation with a summary and final discussion in Chapter 11.

Chapter 6: Women's Propensity to Serve

During the Post-9/11 Era

Background Information on Women's Military Service

Women have participated in every American war throughout history, although official military roles for women were not established until after World War II in 1948 (Sandhoff and Segal 2013). Despite being barred from service, some women disguised themselves as men and fought during the American Revolution, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the U.S. Civil War. Some served in noncombat positions such as nurses and spies, while others performed various other supporting roles such as cooking and laundry. At the time, social norms in society regarded combat tasks as masculine in nature, whereas support tasks were viewed as more feminine.

The first official military role for women was as nurses during the Civil War. After these successful experiences, Congress formed the Army Nurse Corps in 1901, providing a normative model for the incorporation of women's labor into military operations (Sandhoff and Segal 2013). Although women were excluded from combat based on social norms and military policy, the feminine role as nurses became entrenched within the traditional masculine culture of war and combat.

Responding to the personnel needs during World War I, the U.S. employed more women in the military in nursing as well as additional support capacities. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps established women's units in 1917 and 1918, respectively. Uniformed women were granted military status and were employed

in support jobs that women normally occupied in civilian society, such as telephone operator and administrative clerk (Sandhoff and Segal 2013). Women were demobilized after the war, since there was no longer a requirement for additional support personnel.

World War II saw a significant shift in the nature of women's military involvement as their roles expanded and participation increased. Congress created separate women's organizations in the military, even though their status was originally intended to be temporary in nature (e.g. Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, later changed to Women's Army Corps). Notwithstanding the fact that most women were assigned to more traditional occupational specialties such as health care, administration, and communications, small numbers served in almost every capacity (e.g. airplane mechanics, parachute riggers, and weapons instructors) excluding direct combat specialties (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).

Despite negative stereotypes and some civilian opposition, women's successful performance in military service during WWII paved the way for their permanent official acceptance in the military. In 1948, the Women's Armed Services Integration Act officially created a permanent place for women in the U.S. military. However, women's roles remained tightly constrained. They could constitute no more than two percent of the force, they could not be permanently promoted above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel/Commander (O-5), and they were barred from service aboard navy vessels (not including hospital ships and transports) and from service in aircraft on combat missions (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).

In 1967, Congress removed the two percent ceiling and the limits on women's opportunities for promotion. However, limits on their job opportunities remained. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, members of society challenged gender roles and norms with the emergence of a new feminist movement that broke down more barriers for women. Women increasingly entered higher education and employment, including fields that men traditionally occupied, such as law enforcement, coal mining, science, medicine, and law (Sandhoff and Segal 2013). In addition, women now had contraception to give them control over reproduction. Women delayed marriage and childbearing, while dual-earning households became more common. These changes in social norms were a prelude to more changes within the military structure during the 1970s.

The end of conscription in 1973, coupled with changes in social norms and gender roles, sparked women's participation in the military to dramatically increase. Facing personnel shortfalls with the end of the draft, the military opened more roles for women to fill the gaps. In the wake of Congressional approval of the Equal Rights Amendment, the military began equalizing service opportunities. Between 1974 and 1976, women became aviators in the Navy, Army, and Air Force. In 1976, Congress also opened service academies to women, with the first female academy graduates in 1980. Command positions also became available to women and automatic discharges for pregnancy ended. In 1978, women were allowed permanent assignment to noncombatant ships, and the navy initiated the "Women in Ships" program opening up additional positions for women (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).

Between 1971 and 1981, women's participation in the military jumped from 1.6 percent of the force to 8.9 percent. Women have fluctuated between 10 and 15 percent of military personnel throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Sandhoff and Segal 2013). In 2011, women comprised 14.5 percent of the U.S. military, 7.3 percent of general/flag officers, and 10.9 percent of the senior enlisted force. That year, U.S. military policy removed almost all barriers for women to serve in positions except enlisted submarine jobs and offensive ground combat positions below the brigade level. Almost 80 percent of active component positions were available to women, though with substantial variation by branch. For purposes of comparison, in 1972, only 35 percent of all military enlisted jobs were open to women (Segal et al. 1998). Currently, the Air Force is the most accessible for women with 99 percent of positions open for women and women compose 19 percent of the Air Force. The Marine Corps has remained most restrictive primarily due to its emphasis on ground combat and its reliance on the Navy for support services, to which women gravitate. Only 68 percent of positions in the Marines are available to women, and women compose just 7 percent of the Marine Corps. The Navy has 16.4 percent of women while the Army has 13.5 percent women in the force (DoD 2012). On February 9, 2012, the Department of Defense announced changes to its force structure that opened over fourteen thousand additional positions to women (e.g. women assigned to select positions in ground combat units at the battalion level), increasing positions open to women to 81 percent (DoD News Release No. 037-13).

In January 2013, the Department of Defense officially rescinded the direct combat exclusion in place since 1994. According to DoD, guidance was that the process of integration would follow "guiding principles developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff," including "preserving unit readiness" and "validating occupational performance standards, both physical and mental, for all occupational specialties, specifically those that remain closed to women." For those "specialties open to women, the occupational performance standards must be gender-neutral" (DoD News Release No. 037-13). After a thorough review of the services' implementation plans for integration, in December of 2015, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter officially opened all combat jobs for women in all services, despite notable resistance within the Marine Corps (Seck 2015).

In sum, women's roles and participation levels in the military have continued to increase over time as a result of various social and institutional factors to include but not limited to: manpower shortages within the military; an increase in women's participation in the overall labor force; the overall delay of marriage and childbearing in society; a continual increase in the military's occupational specialties available to women; and a widening acceptance and appreciation for women's performances in the military (Segal 1995; Sandhoff and Segal 2013).

Prior Research on Women's Propensity to Serve

Women in the military have not been previously analyzed in most *Monitoring the Future* studies. The rationale for excluding women from the analysis is sometimes that men constitute the prime recruiting market, that women's propensity is too low to bother studying, or that the low overall amount of women

enlistees for follow-up samples would produce unreliable statistical analysis (Segal et al. 1998; Segal et al. 2000). However, it is unlikely that the armed services would have been able to meet their recruitment goals in the All-Volunteer Force without the increased enlistment of women (Binkin and Bach 1977; Segal 1989; Segal and Segal 1991).

Previous research on women's propensity to serve (Segal et al. 1998) was conducted after the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Utilizing initial and follow-up MTF surveys between 1976-1995, the authors split the sample into two groups (1976-1983 and 1984-1991) for analysis. For both desires and expectations, men were considerably more likely to indicate high propensity for military service. Interestingly, women were more likely to indicate that they desired to serve rather than they expected to serve. Additionally, of those high school senior women who indicated that they definitely expected to enlist, only 40 percent actually did so. This is quite different than their male counterparts where 70 percent of those with high propensity actually enlisted. In contrast to the findings for men, the majority of all accessions among women consisted of those in high school who expected that they would *not* serve. Of note, having children did not explain the discrepancy between expectations to serve and actual enlistment. Those women who expected to serve actually found themselves in college full-time or working full-time.

Previous research (e.g. Segal et al. 1998; DoD 2000) examining predictors for women's propensity to serve has focused on similar factors as for men such as social background, educational performance, and place of residence. Propensity

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was shown to be highest among black women, lowest among white women, and Hispanic women in between. Similar to men, women from intact families were least likely to expect to serve in the military, as were women whose parents had a higher level of education. Women from cities or suburban areas of metropolitan cities were less likely to expect to serve than those from rural areas or from nonmetropolitan cities and suburbs. Like men, women from the northeast had the lowest military propensity. However, among other regions, differences were not as marked as they were for men. Those women with high grade point averages were less likely to expect to serve in the military as well. In sum, the predictors for women's propensity to serve were in the same direction as men, but with smaller magnitude, and propensity to serve remained the strongest predictor to actual enlistment, as was the case with men (Segal et al. 1998).

Women's Propensity to Serve During the Post-9/11 era

Research has yet to uncover the changing patterns of women's propensity during the post-9/11 era. My research seeks to determine what factors influence a young woman's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. I explore the same factors that I analyzed for men's propensity earlier, and compare results against the results for men. Although many factors should influence women's propensity in the same manner as they do for men, there are still some gender-specific factors that are likely to only have influence on women.

There are many factors that could influence a woman's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. The following are factors that could positively influence women's propensity:

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1) Feelings of patriotism after the terrorist attacks on 9/11; 2) Recruiting efforts to fill personnel shortages has increased women's participation and roles; 3) The contemporary operating environment and women's success in combat; 4) The removal of institutional barriers such as the repeal of DADT and the lifting of the combat exclusion ban of women; 5) The media's increasingly positive depiction of women in the military; 6) Continuing trends of women breaking down barriers in society; and 7) A lack of opportunities within the civilian labor market.

There are also factors that could negatively influence women's propensity to include: 1) A threat to one's life as a result of serving during combat; 2) Discrimination and harassment against women in the military; and 3) A lack of positive veteran outcomes for women after military service. Below, I briefly discuss the rationale of how these factors could influence a woman's propensity to serve in the armed forces.

Likely Positive Influences

First, the patriotic desire to serve during this critical time in our nation's history could influence women as much as men. Although war has generally been considered a man's responsibility to shoulder, it is reasonable that women were as motivated to serve as men in response to the attacks of 9/11. As discussed earlier in Chapter 4, there was a significant flux in patriotism during this time as all people, regardless of gender, "rallied 'round the flag' immediately after 9/11.

Second, to fill manpower requirements to support the wars after 9/11, women's roles have continued to expand, causing an increased representation of women in the ranks as noted earlier (Clever and Segal 2013). It is no coincidence that the

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"Army Strong" recruiting campaign in 2006 highlighted several women in uniform ("Army Strong" 2006) to influence women to join the Army. In contrast, the Marine Corps, which has traditionally been the most masculine service culture where women have been most underrepresented, did not depict any women in its recruiting commercial ("Best of the 21st Century! Marine Corps Recruiting Commercial" 2014). Women have even served as Female Engagement Teams alongside Special Operations Forces in combat. Undoubtedly, an increase in women's participation and roles is likely to have positive influence on women's propensity.

Third, the contemporary operational environment since 9/11, highlighted in Chapter 2, has blurred the traditional lines of battle more than during previous wars, placing women onto the "front lines" in direct harm's way. As a result of their increased participation and the nature of the current wars, women have been forced into combat situations more than any other conflict in our nation's history and they have performed extremely well during these demanding situations. As of February 2012, women composed about 12 percent of the troops who have served in operations in Afghanistan and have accounted for 144 deaths and 865 wounded in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (Sandhoff and Segal 2013).

Fourth, due to women's success in combat and the continuing need to sustain personnel requirements, the Department of Defense officially rescinded the direct combat exclusion ban that has been in place since 1994 (Bowman 2013). Public opinion of women in combat roles seems to overwhelmingly support the DoD's decision to lift the ban. According to a poll from the Washington Post in 2011, 73

percent of the respondents supported giving women direct combat roles (Sandhoff and Segal 2013). The recent wars could be a motivating factor for young women to desire to serve given the expansive nature of women's roles and their success in combat. Further, the lifting of the combat exclusion ban could have even more positive influence on woman's propensity into the future, especially given that combat jobs make-up a large number of actual positions in the military (i.e. in the Army and Marine Corps) and are the most valued, providing greater potential for career advancement (Kleykamp 2013). The removal of additional institutional barriers such as the military's DADT policy should also positively influence women's propensity.

On the home front, attitudes and value changes within society, such as the increased tolerance for homosexuals and gay marriage, have also influenced structural changes within the military. The military profession has traditionally excluded gays from serving openly, mostly on the basis of the cohesion argument-that is, that a reduction in cohesion leads to a reduction in military effectiveness and the belief that gay service members breakdown unit cohesion (e.g. Segal and Kestnbaum 2002). Indeed, the cohesion arguments used by military leadership and some members of Congress in the past have minimized the participation of both women and homosexuals in the military. However, as a result of societal pressures, manpower constraints, and a lack of clear evidence that cohesion would be reduced (e.g. MacCount 1993), the military agreed to support Congress' repeal of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy on September 20, 2011.

Comparative analysis of foreign militaries revealed that the inclusion of gays openly serving in the military has not had any significant negative impacts to unit cohesion and readiness. Further, the single study (Belkin et al. 2013) conducted since the repeal of DADT in the U.S. also showed that the issue has been a "non-event." Indeed, negative stereotypes have led many to believe that the inclusion of gays serving openly would have detrimental impacts to the organization, but the facts simply do not support the arguments as of yet. I expect that women's propensity will be positively influenced by the repeal of DADT, as a previously excluded group is now gaining more public and institutional acceptance.

Fifth, the media's attention to women's participation and their success in combat is likely to increase the salience of women in the military and the extent to which women see the military as a viable job opportunity and potential career. Further, the traditional masculine images typically depicted in pop culture filmmaking such as movies like *Patton* (1970) and the *Rambo* series (1982, 1985, 1988, 2008), have begun to be replaced by films highlighting women warriors such as *Private Benjamin* (1980), *Courage Under Fire* (1996), *G.I. Jane* (1997), *Zero Dark Thirty* (2012), and *Camp X-Ray* (2014). Indeed, the image of the modern single woman who achieves fitness and self-assurance by joining the military in spite of discrimination is sure to positively influence some young women to serve (Enloe 1993). As institutional changes continue throughout the military, such as the inclusion of women in combat roles and more promotions of women into command and leadership positions, it is possible that women could gain as much influence as white men which could reduce the amount of resistance

they have faced (Lucas and Segal 2011). As a result, women's propensity could increase as they witness their role models occupying high positions within the ranks and achieving success in combat-related tasks such as Ranger School.

Sixth, women have continued to break barriers during the post-9/11 era, especially within male-dominated occupations and positions. Although women still continue to strive for equality in the civilian work force, Fortune 500 CEOs such as Mary Barra (General Motors), Meg Whitman (Hewlett Packard), Virginia Rometty (IBM), Indra Nooyi (PepsiCo, Inc.), and Marillyn Hewson (Lockheed Martin) have continued to set the example for young women who aspire to climb the corporate ladder in America. More recognizable women such as Sheryl Sandberg, COO of Facebook, are trying to advance women in leadership roles through her writings in books like "Lean In," or in newspaper and magazine columns, and by giving inspirational talks (e.g. TED Talks) that are more accessible today than ever before. Women, such as Danica Patrick (NASCAR driver), or women participating in traditionally male-dominated sports such as basketball (e.g. WNBA), ice hockey (e.g. NWHL), or boxing (e.g. 2012 Olympic Games in London), highlight society's trend of women continuing to break down barriers. These "trail-blazing" trends should increase women's propensity to serve. Indeed, in an era of persistent conflict, the environment has been ripe for women who want to continue to break barriers and prove themselves during combat situations. Indeed, the recent first female graduates of Ranger School in 2015 are a great example of women continuing to break down barriers. It is likely that these role models will positively influence women's propensity.

Lastly, women's propensity to serve is likely to be influenced by factors in the civilian labor market. The U.S. Department of Labor reports only a slight increase in the number of women in the labor force during the post-9/11 era. Women's participation has increased from 38 percent of the overall labor force in the 1970s to about 47 percent in the 2000s (Department of Labor 2013). However, women's participation has remained steady at 47 percent of the work force between 2000 and 2012. Further, women between the ages of 16-24 have decreased in labor force participation from about 18 percent in 1990 to just 14 percent in 2012. The labor force participation rate is the proportion of the population that is working or looking for work. Women's overall participation in the labor force has increased from 43 percent in 1972 to about 60 percent in 2000. However, women's participation has slightly decreased since 2000 to just fewer than 58 percent in 2012, perhaps reflecting the overall negative impacts of the recession. Particularly noteworthy, women's earnings have steadily increased to that of men's reaching about 80 percent of men's total earnings in the 2000s. Black and Hispanic women's earnings are even higher reaching about 90 percent of their male counterparts in the 2000s. For comparison sake, white women earned about 70 percent of what white men earned in 1990. These data reflect an increase in income equality between men and women in the civilian labor force during the post-9/11 era.

Women's unemployment rates have generally declined over time. However, during the post-9/11 era, women's unemployment has increased with its most dramatic surges occurring after the Great Recession of 2008, jumping from 4.6

percent in 2006 to 8.6 percent in 2010, and then slightly declining to 7.9 percent by 2012. A comparison by age reveals that those women between 16-24 are most likely to be unemployed in 2012, with more than 12 percent unemployment compared to less than 8 percent for all other age groups. A comparison by race shows that white women (7 percent) are less likely to be unemployed than black (13 percent) and Hispanic women (11 percent) in 2012. Similar racial trends appeared in 2002 as well. Although women's unemployment rates have been on the rise, it is worth mention that they have been consistently lower than men's since 2000.

Women's opportunities in the labor force have continued to increase over time, as marked by their overall participation and increased earnings. Increased opportunities have been even greater among racial minorities. However, since 9/11 these trends have generally decreased or have remained stagnant, as is the case with earnings. Most strikingly, the increase in unemployment trends for women, especially among minorities, has created less opportunity in the civilian labor force during this era, especially after the Great Recession of 2008. Although it is reasonable to believe that high unemployment could positively influence women's propensity as prior research on propensity has suggested (DoD 2000), the current state of war and the corresponding risk to one's life could change these dynamics. Indeed, those interested in service for more occupational reasons, such as better job opportunities, may be dissuaded from service when the risks outweigh the benefits. Further, research has shown that women are less concerned with tangible benefits such as job pay compared to men (e.g. Beutel

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and Marini 1995; Wray-Lake et al. 2011). Thus, I do not expect that

unemployment will be a significant positive influence on women's propensity.

Likely Negative Influences

Despite all the influences noted above that could have positive influence on

women's propensity, there are also legitimate influences that could cause the

opposite to occur. First, the obvious threat to life could be a significant factor for

women's propensity. Indeed, prior research has suggested that a threat to one's

life is the second highest reason not to join the military among women (DoD

2000). It is reasonable to believe that the persistence of war coupled with the

increased risk among all military occupational specialties in the contemporary

operating environment, especially within the predominantly ground forces of the

Army and Marine corps, could cause some women to shy away from military

service after 9/11. Indeed, during the Gulf War period (1990-1991), there was a

significant decline in women's propensity from about 7.5 percent in 1990 to about

5 percent in 1992 through 1995, suggesting that war was a negative influence on

women's propensity (Segal et al. 1998). Additionally, women could potentially

be apprehensive about serving during wartime until they see other women role

models succeeding in combat. Therefore, it could take some time for women to

successfully prove themselves on the battlefield before positively influencing

other women to serve.

Although advancements have been made in technology, causing some to argue

that the horrors of war are more removed from soldiers than during earlier wars,

the nature of warfare remains as brutal as the days described by Clausewitz

(1976) during the Napoleonic wars of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.

Indeed, our enemy today fights without limitations and without parallel in

morality compared to the Western professional fighter. One can simply turn on

the television or peruse the Internet to see these harsh realities (e.g. beheadings,

burnings, etc.) come to life in their living rooms. These horrors of war could

certainly have a negative effect on the psyche of all youth, regardless of gender.

Second, while considering to volunteer to fight a war abroad against an enemy

of this ruthless nature, women also have to confront the challenge of fighting what

some refer to as *The Invisible War* (2012) of harassment within their own ranks.

Sexual harassment of women in the workplace has been a problem in society that

has received considerable media, academic, and legal attention as women's

participation in the workplace has increased. Similarly, sexual harassment has

been a problem within the military's traditionally hyper-masculine culture, as

women's participation has increased (Firestone and Harris 1994). The military's

Tailhook and Aberdeen Proving Ground harassment scandals initially brought this

issue to the public's attention (Enloe 1993). The military has made adjustments to

its policies to address these problems and change its environment. More recently,

issues at the U.S. Air Force Academy in 2003 and a study at the U.S. Naval

Academy, suggest that harassment remains a problem today even among our

nation's future military leaders (Pershing 2003). Sexual harassment is not the

only form of harassment that women face in the military. More often, many

women in the military report experiencing "gender harassment." Gender

harassment is not sexual; it is used to enforce traditional gender roles or occurs in

response to the violation of those roles (Miller 1997). Regardless of the type, harassment has been a challenge that women have had to face in the military.

Most recently, the military has placed a great deal of emphasis toward preventing sexual assault within its ranks. In 2005, the DoD enacted the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) program to encourage increased reporting of the crime, facilitate improved access to victim care, better organize response resources, and promote prevention (DoD 2010).

Reports of sexual assault crimes are the most within the Army and the least within the Marine Corps, with 2.6 per thousand and 1.3 per thousand respectively. The majority of these reports are service member on service member (53%) or service member on non-service member (30%). Of the 2,279 sexual assault cases handled in FY09, there was enough evidence to take disciplinary action against 983 subjects. Of these, 58% of subjects received some form of punishment, such as nonjudicial punishment, administrative discharge, or other adverse administrative action. The vast majority of sexual assault victims were women, under the age of 25, and among the junior enlisted population. The majority of the subjects of assault charges were male, under the age of 35, and from junior enlisted ranks (DoD 2010). Although there has been some success from the program by encouraging increased reporting, identifying more culprits, and administering swift punishments, the DoD still has strides to make to fix its culture.

The recent debate in Congress as to who should have jurisdiction over the military's sexual assault cases has drawn significant media attention on the topic.

It is possible that the media's attention on these issues could negatively influence a woman's attitude toward the military as a viable job opportunity. Indeed, it is reasonable that parents would discourage military service for their daughters as a result of the military's issues with harassment. However, media attention has also increased the salience of women's military service to the public. Further, the military has made strong efforts to mitigate the negative consequences of these incidents through equal opportunity and sexual assault prevention and response training (DoD 2013). The DoD's SAPR program continues to ensure that the military is a safe environment for all to serve- free of sexual assault and harassment. Therefore, I expect that sexual harassment and assault will not have a significant negative influence on women's propensity to serve as long as the military continues to place emphasis on preventing future crimes.

Third, research on the consequences of military service (i.e. veteran's outcomes) among women has been scant, but those few studies have applied the aforementioned "bridging hypothesis" to study the post-service outcomes of female veterans. Most research has shown that female veterans are less advantaged than their civilian counterparts. Using 1990 Census data, Prokos and Padavic (2000) found that female veterans earned less than their non-veteran peers after controlling for demographic and human capital differences. The authors found support for a veteran premium among older, pre-AVF veterans, which suggests that military service for pioneering women was relatively advantageous during a time when women did not work in large numbers in the civilian work force, especially in male-dominated occupations. Using 1990

Census data again, Cooney and colleagues (2003) also found no advantage to military service among black women with respect to income compared to their non-veteran peers. White women appeared to be disadvantaged compared to their non-veteran peers. The author's reasoned that these effects were more of a reflection of the available opportunities for black and white women within the civilian labor force and not of the effect of military service. In other words, if the civilian opportunities for black women are more limited than for white women, then black veterans may appear more advantaged relative to black non-veterans than white veterans are compared to white non-veterans. Another study among women reservists (Mehay and Hirsch 1996) found a 9 percent wage penalty among all female veterans, with a 12 percent penalty among whites and a 2 percent penalty among black female veterans relative to their non-veteran peers.

In sum, the three studies above focused on the earnings of female veterans, generally finding that female veterans received an earnings penalty for their time in service, after controlling for demographic and other controls. It appears that only women serving before the AVF have benefitted from their military service in terms of earnings. These findings confirm the racial aspect of the bridging hypothesis, in that women of color were more advantaged by their military service, but the theory did not appear to extend to all women as a group (Kleykamp 2013).

Kleykamp (2013) conducted the most recent study of veteran outcomes during the post-9/11 era. Using the Current Population Survey from 2005 to 2011, the author analyzed differences by sex, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment to

determine whether diverse veterans experienced diverse consequences of service. Interestingly, the study contradicted findings from earlier research noted above revealing that veterans of the post-9/11 era had higher earnings (nearly $1/hour more) than their civilian counterparts. Perhaps most striking, was the finding that the effects of military service on unemployment, which has been recently highlighted in the media, appear to be understated since veterans have other characteristics associated with higher employment rates. Indeed, post-9/11 veterans have a higher rate of unemployment than their civilian peers, despite possessing high job-quality characteristics. The unemployment rate is significantly worse for female veterans who may be less attractive to civilian employers. Female veterans experience unemployment at nearly twice the rate of their civilian counterparts (13.7 vs. 7.3) and experience higher unemployment than men (13.7 vs. 11.6). However, black veterans (male and female) appear to suffer less of an employment penalty than white veterans. It does appear that veterans of this era are more likely to enroll in college at higher rates than their civilian peers, suggesting the positive effects of the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Additional research using a sample of respondents between 1968-2003 examined the effects of combat exposure among men only, revealing that combat veterans suffer more disability and unemployment than non-combat veterans and non-veterans (Maclean 2010). It is reasonable to believe that these findings would hold true for female combat veterans, as Kleykamp (2013) already showed with respect to unemployment. Interestingly, a recent audit study conducted by Kleykamp (2010) showed that there were no negative consequences with respect to civilian

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hiring of female veterans after 9/11. This seems to contradict earlier research on women's employment opportunities and also gives some credence for the bridging hypothesis extending to women as a group.

Also of interest is the amount of stigma that may be associated with veterans from this era as a result of prolonged combat exposure. A recent study by Maclean and Kleykamp (2014) showed that despite being stereotyped with mental disorders such as PTSD, recent veterans were not stigmatized. Veterans actually benefited from the symbolic capital (i.e. honor and prestige) they obtained from combat service that outweighed the effects of negative stereotypes. They found that people actually want to be socially closer to, and support more help for, the veterans of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars compared to other veterans and non-veterans. It should be noted that this study was limited to men only. However, it is reasonable to believe that findings would generalize in the same manner to women combat veterans, especially given the "support the troops" narrative that exists among society today.

In sum, recent research suggests that there are more benefits to service among women veterans during the post-9/11 era compared to earlier years, such as increased earnings and college enrollment. Consistent with the bridging hypothesis, these benefits appear to be even greater for racial minorities. However, research has shown that female veterans do not benefit as much as male veterans with respect to earnings, employment, and status. Further, it appears that women veterans still suffer a significant employment penalty compared to their civilian counterparts. Taken together, women's outcomes from military service

are not as beneficial as they are for men. Thus, they are not likely to have a significant positive influence on women's propensity.

Women's Propensity Predictions

Although there are many factors noted above that are likely to have some influence on women's propensity during the post-9/11 era, I am unable to directly analyze the influence of most of them. For my research purposes, I directly analyze the influence of patriotism, the threat to one's life, and a lack of opportunity in the civilian labor market on women's propensity. Similar to men, I measure patriotism by public support for war, threat to life by casualties, and a lack of opportunity in the labor market by unemployment rates. It is possible that there are different relationships between these macro-social variables and women's propensity compared to their relationship with men's propensity. I also analyze the individual and demographic factors that I analyzed for men's propensity.

Overall, I predict that women's propensity to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era will increase compared to earlier years for both institutional and occupational reasons. Institutionally, I expect that a rise in patriotism after the attacks of 9/11, as measured by public support for war, will positively influence women's propensity. Further, the gradual increase in the acceptance of women's participation in the military, their success in combat, and the reduction of institutional barriers within the military (e.g. removal of combat exclusion ban and the DADT policy) should positively influence propensity. Additionally, I

believe that women will be motivated to serve during an era of combat to continue to prove their merit and break down barriers in a predominantly male institution.

Although there are many positive influences for women to serve during this era, there are some negative influences as well. Indeed, the threat to one's life due to the nature of military service has been a top reason for women not to join the military (DoD 2000). These threats are likely to be heightened during a state of war. Similar to men, I expect women's propensity to decline during the height of the Iraqi insurgency period (2004-2007) due to the significant increase in casualties. Thus, I expect to see a significantly negative relationship between women's propensity and casualties.

Occupationally, it is reasonable to expect that the decrease in women's opportunities in the labor market, marked by fairly high unemployment rates after the recession of 2008, would have a positive influence on women's propensity. However, I expect that those women who are motivated by more economic factors may not be as likely to serve during wartime due to the risks of combat outweighing the benefits of service. Further, research has shown that women are less concerned about tangible benefits of work compared to men (e.g. Beutel and Marini 1995; Wray-Lake et al. 2011). Thus, I do not expect to see a significantly positive relationship between unemployment and women's propensity.

Although roles for women continue to increase and barriers become removed, the military still remains a highly masculine organization as viewed from both within and outside of the military. Indeed, strides still need to be made to attract more women into military service. Thus, I expect women's overall propensity to

continue to be significantly less than men's propensity to serve during the post-

9/11 era.

> ***Hypothesis 6a: Women's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era is likely to be less than men's propensity to serve.***

> ***Hypothesis 6b: Women's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era will be greater compared to earlier years.***

> ***Hypothesis 6c: There will be a positive relationship between women's propensity and public support for war during wartime.***

> ***Hypothesis 6d: There will be a negative relationship between women's propensity and U.S. casualties during wartime.***

> ***Hypothesis 6e: There will be no significant relationship between women's propensity and unemployment during wartime.***

We already know that black women continue to be overrepresented in the

military, even more than black men (Segal et al. 1998; Segal and Segal 2004).

Hispanic representation, both within the labor force as well as the military,

continues to rise as well. We know that the Hispanic population in the Army is

composed of a greater proportion of women than the Army's white population. I

expect Black and Hispanic propensity to be positively influenced by the removal

of the combat exclusion ban even more than for white women. Consistent with

the bridging hypothesis and earlier research (e.g. Segal et al. 1998; DoD 2000), I

expect that racial and ethnic differences in propensity as noted earlier for men will

remain similar among women, such that black and Hispanic women will continue

to have higher propensity than their white counterparts.

> ***Hypothesis 6f: Black and Hispanic women will have a greater propensity to serve in the military during the post- 9/11 era as compared to their white counterparts.***

Prior research on men's propensity leads one to expect a higher propensity and enlistment among young men who are black, from families without two parents, have parents with lower education, and are from rural residences in the south (Bachman et al. 2000b; Segal et al. 1999; Teachman et al. 1993). Prior research on women (e.g. Segal et al. 1998) has also shown that the predictors for women's propensity have been in the same direction as men, but with smaller magnitude, and propensity to serve has remained the strongest predictor to actual enlistment, as was the case with men. During the post-9/11 era, I expect to see similar trends as men for women's predictors of propensity with respect to socioeconomic status, educational attainment and goals, and place of residence.

> ***Hypothesis 6g: The predictors for women's propensity to serve (i.e. SES, educational goals and attainment, urbanicity, and place of residence) will be similar in direction as the predictors for men's propensity during the post-9/11 era.***

Women's Propensity Analysis and Results

Below, I present the results for women's propensity during the post-9/11 era. Consistent with earlier research, I focus my presentation on comparing women and men's propensity, highlighting the similarities and differences by gender. In general, I utilize the same analysis techniques and variables I used for the men's analysis in Chapter 4, and I present similar tables and figures for comparison purposes. However, unlike for men, which I split into separate chapters, I include the analysis for all the variables influencing women's propensity in this stand-alone chapter. This is for ease of comparison and since most of the literature and logic related to the macro-social variables (e.g. public support for war, casualties, and unemployment) is the same regardless of gender. When necessary, I state the

pertinent differences. Later, in subsequent chapters, I include the analysis of the

relationship between women's propensity and various other variables (e.g.

political attitudes, I/O orientations, and attitudes toward gender-roles and race-

relations) in the same chapters as I do for the men's analysis. I report results for

women's propensity- that is, those young women who say that they "definitely

will" or "probably will" expect to serve in the armed forces. The low sample size

of women with high propensity (especially by race/ethnicity) would yield

unreliable estimates. Therefore, I do not analyze differences between high and

low propensity women as I do for men in the following Chapters 7-10. Table 6.1

below presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in my analysis of

women's propensity. My total sample size for women is 52,356 (2002-2013) and

139,284 (1976-2013). During the post-9/11 era, 2,398 women have the

propensity to serve. Among women with propensity, there are 1423 white

women, 744 black women, and 302 Hispanic women.

Table 6.1
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Analysis (Percent):
Years 1976-2013 (Women Only)

	2002-2013 Mean	1976-2013 Mean
Dependent Variables		
Military Propensity (Definitely/Probably Will Serve)	4.58%	4.64%
High Propensity (Definitely Will Serve)	1.65%	1.70%
Propensity by Race and Ethnic Background		
White Women with Propensity (N=41,610/117,002)	3.24%	3.13%
Black Women with Propensity (N=6,434/17,970)	11.56%	13.91%
Hispanic Women with Propensity (N=4,312/4,312)	7.00%	7.00%
High Propensity by Race and Ethnic Background		
White Women with High Propensity (N=41,610/117,002)	1.26%	1.17%
Black Women with High Propensity (N=6,434/17,970)	3.89%	5.06%
Hispanic Women with High Propensity (N=4,312/4,312)	2.13%	2.13%
Independent Variables of Primary Interest		
Race/Ethnicity		
White	79.48%	84.00%
Black	12.29%	12.90%
Hispanic	8.24%	3.10%
SES Disadvantage/Advantage		
Father's Education		
Less than HS	10.22%	10.45%
HS	31.04%	31.49%
Some College	18.88%	19.10%
College	24.62%	23.65%
Graduate School	15.23%	15.32%
Mother's Education		
Less than HS	7.03%	8.12%
HS	26.94%	32.55%
Some College	23.01%	22.73%
College	29.06%	24.43%
Graduate School	13.96%	12.16%
Family Structure (# of parent/guardian in household)		
Both Parents or Guardians	71.80%	73.82%
Mother or Female Guardian	20.17%	18.69%
Father or Male Guardian	4.04%	3.41%
None	3.99%	4.08%
Number of Siblings		
3+	35.59%	36.06%
2	27.56%	27.28%
1	31.34%	31.36%
None	5.52%	5.30%
N	52356	139284

Table 6.1 (cont)
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Analysis (Percent):
Years 1976-2013 (Women Only)

	2002-2013 Mean	1976-2013 Mean
Educational Attainment and Goals		
High School G.P.A		
D/C-	1.65%	2.13%
C	3.10%	4.60%
C+	6.34%	8.02%
B-	9.31%	11.26%
B	16.44%	19.03%
B+	19.26%	19.56%
A-	21.59%	17.90%
A	22.32%	17.51%
HS Curriculum		
Other	37.71%	37.63%
College Preparatory	62.29%	62.37%
Expectation to graduate from College (4-yr)	87.96%	81.68%
Additional Controls		
Where you grew up/live		
Farm	3.78%	4.03%
Country	11.52%	11.44%
Small City (<50k)	29.34%	30.40%
Medium City (50-100k)	15.36%	15.20%
Suburb of Med City	12.69%	10.84%
Large City (100-500k)	9.57%	9.38%
Suburb of Large City	9.00%	9.23%
Very Large City (>500k)	4.64%	4.90%
Suburb of Very Large City	4.19%	4.59%
Region of Country		
Northeast	21.58%	21.81%
North Central	28.81%	29.28%
South	32.70%	33.17%
West	16.91%	15.74%
Additional Pathways		
4-Year College	87.96%	81.68%
2-Year College	36.14%	34.80%
Vocational/Technical School	14.26%	15.73%
Other	1.70%	3.18%
N	52356	139284

Figure 6.1 below depicts the overall average trends of women's propensity to

serve by year between 1976-2013. Similar to men, results reveal a general

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decline in women's propensity since the mid-1980s. However, women's propensity did rise again during the mid-1990s through 2001. Figure 6.2 below zeroes in on the post-9/11 era, depicting the average military propensity of women between 2002-2013. Consistent with ***hypothesis 6a,*** women's overall propensity is significantly less than men's propensity during the post-9/11 era. Consistent with prior research, men's propensity averages about fifteen percent higher than women's. However, annual trends in women's propensity during the post-9/11 era generally follow the patterns of men's propensity (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Somewhat surprisingly, results indicate an initial decline in propensity during the first few years of the post-9/11 era. However, women's propensity increases after 2005, and reaches levels higher than the 1990s between 2010 and 2013, providing some support for ***hypothesis 6b***.

   Results indicate that women's propensity has fluctuated at three critical time periods: a decline immediately following 9/11 (2003); a steep decline during the height of the Iraqi insurgency (2004-2008); and an incline following the economic recession of 2008 (2009-2011). As noted earlier, these periods correspond to various macro-social influences such as public support for war immediately following the beginning of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, a rise in U.S. casualties, and a rise in unemployment. There are a few things to highlight from Figures 6.1 and 6.2. First, women's propensity does not increase immediately following 9/11 as it did for men. Second, women's propensity during the post-9/11 era reached its all-time low between 2005-2006 (similar to men), corresponding to the highest amount of U.S. casualties. However, women's

propensity increased back to its highest levels, which occurred throughout the 1980s. Third, although trends in propensity generally appear to be similar between men and women (aside from immediately following the 9/11 attacks), propensity changes for women are relatively small compared to men during the post-9/11 era. For example, women's propensity reaches its peak in 2013 at about 8 percent, while its low point was in 2005 at about 4 percent, netting its largest difference of 4 percent. In contrast, for men, the largest difference in propensity was 9 percent, ranging from 22 percent in 2013 to about 13 percent in 2005. Proportionately speaking, women and men's propensity fluctuated in a similar manner (except following the attacks immediately after 9/11 in 2003). However, data reveals that men are about three times more likely to have the propensity to serve compared to women during the post-9/11 era.

Figure 6.1- Average Propensity to Serve by Year
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

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
Figure 6.2- Average Propensity to Serve by Year
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Women's Propensity and Macro-Social Influences

Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 6.2

below indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as

predicted by the independent variables for women only. Model 6 of Table 6.2 is

highlighted in a similar fashion as it is for my men's analysis earlier since this is

the full model for analysis, excluding interactions. The primary predictor

variables in Table 6.2 are the macro-social influences- public support for war,

casualties, and unemployment. Somewhat surprisingly, findings indicate that

there is a negative relationship between public support for war and women's

propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. Similar to the results for men's

propensity, these results do not support **hypothesis 6c**. As public support for war

increases, women are significantly less likely to expect to serve (OR=0.97**),

after controlling for various factors highlighted in Model 6 of Table 6.2.

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	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Macro-Social Influences												
Public Support (OIF)	0.97***	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**
Casualties	0.93***	0.93***	0.93***	0.93***	0.92***	0.92***	0.92***	0.93***	0.92***	0.94	0.93***	0.92***
Unemployment	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.01	1.03	1.02	1.02
Individual-Demographic Influences												
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)												
Black		3.88***	2.91***	2.82***	2.55***	2.54***	2.70***	2.89***	2.16***	2.54***	2.09***	2.36***
Hispanic		2.24***	1.77***	1.70***	1.68***	1.64***	1.39	1.57**	1.91*	1.64***	1.36**	1.48***
SES Disadvantage/Advantage												
Father's education (less than HS=ref)												
HS			0.90	0.95	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.97	0.97
Some college			0.76***	0.84*	0.86	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88	0.88
College			0.65***	0.75***	0.79**	0.81**	0.81**	0.80**	0.81**	0.81**	0.80**	0.80**
Graduate School			0.48***	0.57***	0.61***	0.63***	0.63***	0.63***	0.63***	0.63***	0.62***	0.62***
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)												
HS			0.69***	0.72***	0.74***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***
Some College			0.70***	0.76***	0.79***	0.80**	0.80**	0.80**	0.80**	0.80**	0.81**	0.80**
College			0.60***	0.68***	0.71***	0.73***	0.73***	0.73***	0.73***	0.73***	0.73***	0.73***
Graduate School			0.61***	0.71***	0.75**	0.77**	0.77**	0.77**	0.77**	0.77**	0.78**	0.78**
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)												
Mother or Female Guardian			1.16**	1.11*	1.10	1.09	1.09	1.09	1.09	1.09	1.09	1.09
Father or Male Guardian			1.57***	1.46***	1.46***	1.45***	1.45***	1.45***	1.45***	1.45***	1.46***	1.45***
None			1.82***	1.62***	1.54***	1.51***	1.51***	1.51***	1.51***	1.51***	1.51***	1.51***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)												
2			0.77***	0.80***	0.80***	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***
1			0.62***	0.65***	0.65***	0.66***	0.66***	0.66***	0.66***	0.66***	0.65***	0.65***
None			0.56***	0.60***	0.60***	0.61***	0.61***	0.60***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.60***
Educational Attainment and Goals												
High School G.P.A.				0.71***	0.69***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)												
College Preparatory				0.79***	0.80***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.71***	0.74***							

Table 6.2 (cont)
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences During Post 9/11 Era- Women Only (N=52356): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Additional Controls												
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)												
Country					0.97	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95
Small City (<50k)					0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.88	0.88
Medium City (50-100k)					0.78*	0.78*	0.78*	0.78*	0.78*	0.78*	0.78*	0.78*
Suburb of Med City					0.71**	0.72**	0.72**	0.73**	0.73**	0.72**	0.72**	0.72**
Large City (100-500k)					0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.81
Suburb of Large City					0.68**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**	0.69**	0.70**
Very Large City (>500k)					0.90	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.92
Suburb of Very Large City					0.65**	0.67*	0.67*	0.67*	0.67*	0.67*	0.66*	0.67*
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)												
North Central					1.08	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06
South					1.72***	1.65***	1.65***	1.65***	1.64***	1.65***	1.66***	1.66***
West					1.24**	1.19*	1.19*	1.19*	1.19*	1.19*	1.20*	1.19*
Additional Pathways												
4-Year College						0.80***	0.80***	0.79***	0.80***	0.80***	0.78***	0.78***
2-Year College						1.21***	1.21***	1.21***	1.21***	1.21***	1.04	1.21***
Vocational/Technical School						1.24***	1.24***	1.24***	1.24***	1.24***	1.23***	1.06
Race/Macro Interactions (White=Ref)												
Public Support (OIF)* Black							0.99					
Public Support (OIF)* Hispanic							1.02					
Casualties* Black								0.97				
Casualties* Hispanic								1.01				
Unemployment* Black									1.02			
Unemployment* Hispanic									0.98			
Macro/Macro Interaction- Casualties*Unemployment										1.00		
Race/Additional Pathways Interaction- (White=Ref)												
2-Year College* Black											1.45***	
2-Year College* Hispanic											1.39*	
Vocational/Technical School* Black												1.33*
Vocational/Technical School* Hispanic												1.51**
N	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356
R^2	0.0041	0.0422	0.0654	0.0773	0.0848	0.0867	0.0867	0.0869	0.0868	0.0867	0.0875	0.0872
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 52356 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Public Support for War

Figure 6.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women's propensity to serve by public support for war after controlling for all factors. On average, the predicted probability of serving decreases by about one eighth of a percent for every five percent increase in public support for war. Indeed, these results seem counterintuitive. However, it should be noted that overall public support for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq dropped precipitously after initial high levels, and they did not increase again (see Table 4.1). It appears that other influences, such as casualties and unemployment, may be influencing women's propensity more than public support for war. Thus, results do not support my prediction.

Figure 6.3- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Public Support for War
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

As a potential explanation for the results that contradict my hypothesis, I analyze women's nationalistic attitudes using the nationalism index measure I created in Chapter 4. Figure 6.4 below depicts the predicted probability of

serving for women by nationalistic attitudes after all controls. Similar to men,

results indicate that for every unit increase on the nationalistic scale, women's

expectation to serve is predicted to increase by one percent during the post-9/11

era. Given that prior research has shown that nationalism has a fairly strong

correlation with patriotism, these results suggest that women with propensity are

likely to be patriotic during the post-9/11 era. Thus, it is possible that my

measure of public support for war is not tapping into the patriotic construct as

well as I predicted.

Figure 6.4- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Nationalism Index
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Casualties

Consistent with ***hypothesis 6d,*** findings indicate that there is a significant

negative relationship between U.S. casualties and women's propensity during the

post-9/11 era. As casualties increase, women are significantly less likely to

expect to serve (OR=0.92***), after controlling for various other factors such as

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race, SES, educational goals and attainment, region of country and type of residence. These results are similar in direction but greater in magnitude than the results for men.

Figure 6.5 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women's propensity to serve by U.S. casualties after controlling for all factors highlighted in Model 6 of Table 6.2. On average, women's predicted probability of serving decreases by about one-third of a percent for every increase of one hundred U.S. casualties. This is substantial considering that between 2003-2011, there were no less than three hundred U.S. casualties per year resulting from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as highlighted earlier in Table 4.1. This equates to approximately a 1 percent decrease in the predicted probability of women expecting to serve for each of the years. A one percent decrease in women's predicted probability of serving is a substantial difference since it equates to a loss of about 21,000 eligible female recruits the age of 18 years according to U.S. Census data (U.S. Census Bureau 2015).

Figure 6.5- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Casualties
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Unemployment

Consistent with **hypothesis 6e,** findings indicate that there is no significant

relationship between unemployment and women's propensity to serve during the

post-9/11 era. As overall unemployment rates increase, women are not more

likely to expect to serve (OR=1.02), after controlling for various other factors

highlighted in Model 6 of Table 6.2. As noted earlier, I use the overall

unemployment rate as my measure for analysis instead of using the youth

unemployment rate for women, since I think overall unemployment rates would

be the most salient in the media and in the minds of youth. Regardless, the

correlation between overall unemployment and the unemployment rate for young

women is 0.98.

Figure 6.6 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by

unemployment after controlling for all factors. On average, women's predicted

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probability of serving only increases by about one tenth of a percent for every

percent increase in the overall unemployment rate. It must be noted that these

results are not consistent with the results for men. It appears that women are not

as positively influenced by economic factors as men.

Figure 6.6- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Unemployment
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

An interaction between casualties and unemployment depicted in Model 10 of

Table 6.2 does not yield significant results (OR=1.00). Figure 6.7 below depicts

the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by the interaction of

unemployment and casualties after controlling for all factors in Model 10 of Table

6.2. Results indicate that, on average, as unemployment increases, lower

casualties do not have a significantly lower negative effect on women's

propensity. Put another way, the greater the unemployment rate, there is no

significant change in the negative effect of casualties on propensity (Williams

2015). These results suggest that casualties have a significant negative influence

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on women's propensity regardless of the unemployment rate. This suggests that women with more occupational orientations do not expect to serve amidst high casualties. This finding is also noteworthy as it differs from the finding for men's propensity.

Figure 6.7- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Casualties*Unemployment Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Racial and Ethnic Group Differences

There are significant differences in women's propensity between racial and ethnic groups during the post-9/11 era. Figure 6.8 below depicts the actual propensity of white, black, and Hispanic women respectively. Consistent with *hypothesis 6f*, black women's propensity is the highest overall during the post-9/11 era, followed by Hispanic women's propensity, and then white propensity. Of note, Hispanic designation did not occur in the MTF study until after 2004. Figure 6.9 below depicts the actual propensity of white and black women for all years in the dataset (1976-2013). Results show that white women's propensity

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has remained relatively stable over time, hovering at almost 5 percent throughout

the AVF. On the other hand, black women's propensity has been about three to

four times higher than white women's. Of note, black women's propensity

significantly declined by about ten percent during the Gulf War period (1990-

1991) from approximately 23 percent to 13 percent. Black women's propensity

has since recovered averaging between 12 and 15 percent. These results are

consistent with prior research (e.g. Segal et al. 1999; DoD 2000).

Figure 6.8- Propensity to Serve by Race/Ethnicity
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 6.9- Propensity to Serve
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (White and Black Women)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Utilizing logistic regression, prior to controlling for various factors, results reported in Model 2 of Table 6.2 above reveal that black (OR=3.88***) and Hispanic women (OR=2.24***) have significantly greater propensity to serve compared to their white counterparts. After controlling for SES in Model 3 of Table 6.2, results reveal that black and Hispanic women's propensity to serve decreases somewhat. However, black (OR=2.54***) and Hispanic women (OR=1.64***) continue to have significantly greater propensity to serve than their white counterparts after all controls, which is consistent with the bridging hypothesis. These results are different than the results for men, which show that there are no differences in propensity between black and white men after controlling for SES. Hispanic men continue to have higher propensity than white men after all controls.

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Results reported in Model 7 of Table 6.2 depict an interaction between racial and ethnic groups and public support for war. Similar to men, results do not indicate significant differences between racial and ethnic groups. Data suggests that there is a similar negative relationship between women's propensity and public support for war among all racial and ethnic backgrounds.

Similarly, results reported in Model 8 of Table 6.2 depict an interaction between racial and ethnic groups and casualties. Results indicate that there are no significant racial/ethnic differences in the relationship between women's propensity and casualties. These findings are different from the findings for men, where casualties negatively influence black men's propensity significantly more than white men. Figure 6.10 below depicts differences in the relationship between women's propensity and casualties by racial and ethnic groups during the post-9/11 era. Of note, results do indicate significant differences at the $p<.10$ level in the relationship between casualties and black women's propensity compared to white women. This is consistent with findings from YATS conducted in 1999, which suggested that black women were more likely than white or Hispanic women to state that "threat to life" was a main reason for not joining the military (DoD 2000).

Figure 6.10- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Casualties*Race Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Results reported in Model 9 of Table 6.2 depict an interaction between racial and ethnic groups and unemployment. Results suggest that there are no significant racial/ethnic differences in the relationship between women's propensity and unemployment. Figure 6.11 below depicts differences in the relationship between women's propensity and unemployment by racial and ethnic groups during the post-9/11 era. Although there is a slightly higher rise in black women's propensity compared to white or Hispanic women's propensity as unemployment increases, results are not significant. These findings are also different from the findings for men's propensity, where unemployment positively influences black men's propensity significantly more than white men.

Figure 6.11- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Unemployment*Race
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Socioeconomic Status

Model 3 of Table 6.2 reveals that women with a higher socioeconomic status, as measured by father's and mother's education, family structure (i.e. number of parents in household), and the number of siblings in a household, are significantly less likely to have the propensity to serve. These findings are similar to the findings for men and consistent with earlier research (e.g. Segal et al. 1998; DoD 2000). Women with a father who has a college degree are roughly half as likely (OR=0.48***) to expect to serve in the military compared to women who have a father with less than a high school education. The odds of propensity to serve for women who grow up in a household with only a mother or female guardian are 1.16 compared to those with two parents or guardians. The odds of propensity to serve increase further for women who only have a father or no parents at all. Additionally, women who have no siblings are about half as likely (OR=0.56***)

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to serve in the military than those with 3 or more siblings, most likely due to the lack of resources in the household to allocate towards college enrollment.

In summary, disadvantaged women are more likely to expect to serve in the military, which is consistent with the bridging hypothesis, **hypothesis 6g**, and the results for men. Although SES is a significant predictor for women's propensity, it does not appear to be as significant a predictor as it is for men's propensity. As noted earlier, after controlling for SES, black and Hispanic women continue to have significantly higher propensity (OR=2.91*** and 1.77***) compared to their white counterparts. In contrast, there are no significant differences between black and white men's propensity after controlling for SES. This suggests that minority women may be more attracted to military service for other reasons than economic.

Educational Goals and Attainment

Model 4 of Table 6.2 includes the additional cluster of control variables pertaining to educational attainment and goals. Results reported in Model 4 also support **hypothesis 6g** and are consistent with previous research, suggesting that educational attainment and aspirations exert a significant negative influence on women's propensity to serve in the military during the post-9/11 era. As a woman's grade point average increases (approximate increase of .3 on a G.P.A. scale from 1.7 to 4), she is about a third less likely (OR=0.71***) to expect to serve. Women who are enrolled in college preparatory classes are about a quarter less likely (OR=0.73***) to have the propensity to serve compared to those

enrolled in non-college preparatory classes. These results are similar to the

results for men's propensity.

Region of Country and Urbanicity

Model 5 of Table 6.2 adds a few additional control variables such as where the

respondent grew up and his or her region of school. Similar to men, results from

this model indicate that women who grow up in the southern region of the country

are greater than one and a half times more likely to have the propensity to serve

(OR=1.72***) compared to those who grow up in other regions of the country.

Additional significance is indicated for women who grow up in the suburb of a

medium, large, or very large city. Women who grow up in these areas are about

one third less likely (OR=0.65**) to have propensity compared to those growing

up on a farm or in the country. These results are also consistent with **hypothesis

6g** and earlier research suggesting that more advantaged women who grow up in

the suburban areas of cities are less likely to expect to serve. Results also lend

support to Kleykamp's (2009) finding that a military institutional presence is a

key predictor for military enlistment. Indeed, the preponderance of military

installations and ROTC programs are in the south and western regions of the

country.

Additional Pathways to Adulthood

Results from Model 6 of Table 6.2 reveal differences between women who

expect to serve in the military compared to other alternatives a woman can choose

from when deciding among the various pathways to adulthood. As predicted in

hypothesis 6g, women who expect to graduate from a 4-year college are about a

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quarter less likely (OR=0.80***) to expect to serve in the military. Interestingly, women expecting to graduate from a 2-year college or attend a vocational/technical school are significantly more likely (OR=1.21*** and OR=1.24*** respectively) to have the propensity to serve in the military. These findings are similar to the findings for men. Consistent with earlier research (e.g. Bachman et al. 2001), findings suggest that the military may be an attractive alternative for women who still desire to pursue higher levels of education after high school.

   Results reported in Models 11 and 12 of Table 6.2 depict an interaction between race and ethnic groups and a woman's expectation to graduate from a two-year college or attend a vocational/technical school. Similar to men, results reveal significant group differences in propensity between black (OR=1.45***) and Hispanic women (OR=1.39*) compared to their white counterparts. Figure 6.12 below reveals that black and Hispanic women who expect to graduate from a two-year college are more likely to expect to serve than their white counterparts. Similarly, Figure 6.13 below reveals that black (OR=1.33*) and Hispanic women (OR=1.51***) who expect to attend vocational education are more likely to expect to serve than their white counterparts. Interestingly, white women who expect to graduate from a two-year college or attend vocational school are no more likely to have propensity than if they do not expect to do either.

Figure 6.12- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Race*Two-Year College
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Expect to Graduate from a 2-year College- (0=No/1=Yes)

White   Black
Hispanic

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 6.13- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Race*Vocational Education
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Expect to Attend Vocational School- (0=No/1=Yes)

White   Black
Hispanic

Source: Monitoring the Future

Women's Perception of Discrimination Against Women in Military

In a separate but related analysis, I analyze women's attitudes toward the perception of discrimination of women in the military. This is of particular interest during the post-9/11 era given the media's recent attention to an increase in sexual harassment and assault incidents in the military, and the military's corresponding implementation of SHARP to address the problems. A question on Form 4 of the MTF survey asks a respondent: "To what extent do you think there is any discrimination against women who are in the armed services?" Response categories include: 1="To a Very Little Extent" 2="To a Little Extent" 3="To Some Extent" 4="To a Great Extent" 5="To a Very Great Extent."

Table 5.3 below reports results from a difference of means test using the question above as the dependent variable on a scale from 1 to 5. Results reveal that on average, women (mean=3.00) believe that there is a degree of discrimination against women in the military "to some extent" during the post-9/11 era. Not surprisingly, women with propensity believe that there is significantly less (p<.01) discrimination (mean=2.89) than women without propensity (mean= 3.00). Perhaps more telling, is that the perception of discrimination in the military has significantly increased (p<.001) during the post-9/11 era compared to earlier years. Between 1976-2002, all women averaged 2.92 on the scale from 1 to 5, indicating less perceptions of discrimination against women in the military. Among women with propensity there are significant differences (p<.001) between eras as well. Before 9/11, women with propensity score an average of 2.72 compared to an average score of 2.89 post-9/11.

Results in Table 6.3 also reveal differences between racial and ethnic groups. Interestingly, black women with propensity have significantly (p<.05) less perceptions that there is discrimination against women in the military compared to white women. Black women with propensity score an average of 2.70, whereas white women have an average score of 2.92. Perhaps these perceptions contributes to the fact that black women have greater propensity to serve compared to Hispanic or white women.

Not surprisingly, men with propensity have significantly less (p<.001) perceptions that there is discrimination against women in the military compared to women with propensity during the post-9/11 era. Additionally, men with propensity have less perceptions (p<.001) of the discrimination of women in the military than men without propensity.

Table 6.3
Difference of Means of Perception of Discrimination Against Women by Key Analysis Groups during Post-9/11 Era

Scale of 1-5 (1=To a Very Little Extent 2=To a Little Extent 3=To Some Extent 4=To a Great Extent 5=To a Very Great Extent			N
Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	3.00	11220
Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.89	706
	Difference	0.11	
	Std Error	0.04	
	t	2.58**	
White Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	3.01	7089
White Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.92	275
	Difference	0.09	
	Std Error	0.07	
	t	1.31	
Black Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.97	1157
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.70	198
	Difference	0.28	
	Std Error	0.10	
	t	2.86**	
Hispanic Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.92	1188
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.98	90
	Difference	-0.06	
	Std Error	0.13	
	t	-0.44	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	2.92	275
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.70	198
	Difference	0.23	
	Std Error	0.12	
	t	1.97*	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	2.92	275
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.98	90
	Difference	-0.05	
	Std Error	0.14	
	t	-0.38	
Women With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.72	1822
Women With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.89	706
	Difference	-0.17	
	SD	0.05	
	t	-3.28***	
Women With High Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.59	633
Women With High Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.84	231
	Difference	-0.25	
	SD	0.09	
	t	-2.62**	
Men Without Propensity- Post- 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.77	8840
Men With Propensity- Post- 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.63	1730
	Difference	0.14	
	SD	0.03	
	t	4.80***	
Women With Propensity- Post- 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.89	706
Men With Propensity- Post- 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.63	1730
	Difference	0.26	
	SD	0.05	
	t	4.97***	

Note:p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Discussion

My research on women's propensity is important in a few notable ways. First, the majority of propensity research excludes women from the analysis. The rationale for excluding women from analysis includes that men are the primary

recruiting target or that women's propensity is simply too low to produce reliable results. The last research on women's propensity using MTF data was conducted between 1976-1996 (Segal et al. 1998). Additionally, the last time the Department of Defense conducted research on women's propensity using the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey was between 1996-1999 (DoD 2000). My research bridges the gap from the last research on women's propensity- almost a decade and a half void in knowledge.

Second, due to the general lack of war throughout the first three decades of the AVF, this is the first time that the impact of war can be analyzed on women's propensity. This is important, as combat has largely been a reason to exclude women from service in general, and more recently, a reason to exclude women from various combat roles. Not only does the post-9/11 era serve as a natural experiment to analyze how war may influence women's propensity, but there are also other changes that should have significant influence on women's propensity as well. As mentioned, the removal of institutional barriers such as the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy in 2010 and the combat exclusion ban in 2012 are likely to positively influence women's propensity to serve in the future as more opportunities become available and greater acceptance of women in the ranks occurs, including the combat ranks.

Lastly, this is the first time that research has been conducted directly examining the relationship between women's propensity and various macro-social factors such as public support for war, casualties, and unemployment.

Undoubtedly, findings on these relationships will contribute to the extensive

amount of literature in the political science, economic, and sociological domains.

In general, results during the post-9/11 era are consistent with earlier trends

revealing that women are less likely than men to expect to serve. Military service

remains less typical for women than for men, at least in the statistical sense.

Some may have expected women's propensity to significantly decrease during a

period of war. However, this was not the case, as women's propensity reached

levels as high as the 1980s during a period of relative peace and stability. Despite

lower percentages relative to men, proportionately, women's propensity has

remained as high as men's during the post-9/11 era. Indeed, in 2013, women's

propensity reached its second highest mark during the AVF, suggesting that

positive trends may continue into the future as more opportunities become

available and greater acceptance continues for women in the military.

Public Support for War

Equally as surprising as the results for men, it appears that women's propensity

is negatively related to public support for war. I suspect that the possible

explanations for a decrease in men's propensity in relation to an increase in public

support for war may be operating in the same manner for women as well. Indeed,

a similar analysis of the relationship between propensity and nationalism,

discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, reveals that women with greater

nationalistic attitudes are more likely to expect to serve. Under the same logic

used for men, this suggests that women with propensity may be more patriotic

than those without propensity. Thus, it appears that public support for war may

not be tapping into the patriotic construct that I originally intended. See the "discussion section" of public support for war in Chapter 4 for a more complete explanation of results that are contrary to my expectation for women's propensity.

It is noteworthy that women's propensity did not spike as it did for men following the attacks of 9/11 (see Figure 5.1). This suggests that men may have "rallied around the flag" more so than women. This isn't necessarily surprising given the long tradition that fighting wars has generally been considered a man's duty and responsibility as evidenced by our past and current draft system. Despite a few highlighted stories in the media and pop culture of women's successful performance during the Persian Gulf War, in large part, women have not had the opportunity to prove themselves in combat situations. Thus, it is reasonable that women may have been more apprehensive toward volunteering for military service immediately following 9/11. It is more likely that stories of women's success in combat over the first few years of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars had a greater influence on women's propensity as the wars continued.

Casualties

Similar to men, results show that women's propensity is negatively related to casualties during the post-9/11 era. However, it appears that casualties may more negatively influence women's propensity compared to men's. Again, it isn't necessarily surprising that women appear to be more concerned than men about the risks associated with combat. Indeed, the danger associated with military service has previously been identified as a main reason for women not to enlist (DoD 2000). Interestingly, results reveal that there are no racial and ethnic group

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differences in the relationship between women's propensity and casualties. These findings may be considered contrary to the findings from the YATS, which indicated that black women were more concerned than white or Hispanic women about a threat to one's life as a reason not to enlist. These findings are also different than my findings for men, where casualties negatively influenced black men significantly more than white or Hispanic men. Overall, these results contribute to the extensive amount of literature on the casualty hypothesis. See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion on the relationship between casualties and propensity overall.

Unemployment

Results show that women's propensity is positively related to high unemployment during the post-9/11 era, although results are not significant. These findings are contrary to the findings for men's propensity as noted earlier, which showed a significant positive relationship between unemployment and men's propensity. Interestingly, results reveal that there are no racial and ethnic group differences in the relationship between women's propensity and unemployment. Again, this is different than the findings for men, where unemployment positively influenced black men significantly more than white men. Results suggest that women with propensity, regardless of race or ethnicity, have less economic motivations compared to men. It appears that for women, the economic benefits of military service do not outweigh the associated costs during wartime as they do for men. This is in keeping with the line of research

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suggesting women are less concerned with tangible benefits of a job (e.g. Beutel and Marini 1995; Wray-Lake et al. 2011).

Race, SES, Education and Region

Among individual and demographic predictors, results show that the predictors for women's propensity are generally similar in direction and magnitude as the predictors for men's propensity during the post-9/11 era. Consistent with earlier research, black and Hispanic women, respectively, continue to have a significantly greater propensity to serve compared to their white counterparts, even after controlling for all factors. These results are different than results for men, as black men are no more likely to expect to serve than white men after controlling for SES. Consistent with the bridging hypothesis, results suggest that black and Hispanic women may perceive the military as a better opportunity than white women despite being a time of war. Further, results suggest that black and Hispanic women may have greater institutional orientations than their white counterparts, since they have greater expectations to serve during war after controlling for SES.

Of note, black women's propensity does not decline during the post-9/11 era nearly as much as it did during the Gulf War period (see Figure 5.8.2.1). Results show that there was about a ten percent decline in propensity during the Gulf War, compared to only about a six percent decrease at any point during the post-9/11 era. These results are similar to the results from the men's analysis. During the Gulf War period, some black leaders suggested that blacks would suffer heavy casualties in the event of a ground war (DoD 2000). Findings suggests that there

was greater support for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars among the entire black community, regardless of gender, compared to the Gulf War period. Indeed, it appears that the "cannon fodder" argument may not be as pervasive within the black community as years earlier (Armor 1996).

Women's propensity is positively associated with lower SES, lower educational attainment and goals, growing up in rural areas and growing up in the southern or western regions of the country. Of note, data suggests that women who grow up in the west are more likely to serve than men. While a father's level of education is a significant predictor among the cluster of variables used to measure SES, it appears that a mother's education level is a more significant predictor for women than it is for men. That is, the higher a mother's education level, the less likely women have the propensity to serve.

Additional Pathways

Results suggest that women who expect to graduate from a two-year college or attend vocational school are more likely to have the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. These results are greater in magnitude than results for men. It appears that women who are attracted to military service are also somewhat attracted to higher education. Thus, it is likely that educational benefits to military service will be an attractive incentive for women. This is consistent with earlier research from YATS, which found that women cite educational benefits as a reason to join the military somewhat more than men (DoD 2000).

Also similar to men, black or Hispanic women who expect to graduate from a two-year college or attend vocational training have greater propensity than their

white counterparts. This suggests that minority women who are interested in pursuing higher levels of education may be more attracted to the military's educational benefits than their white counterparts.

Women's Perception of Discrimination Against Women in Military

In a separate but related analysis, findings suggest that women's perception of the discrimination of women in the military has increased during the post-9/11 era. This is of particular interest given the media's recent attention to an increase in sexual harassment and assault incidents in the military, and the military's corresponding implementation of SHARP to address the problems. Although women with propensity believe there is less discrimination compared to women without propensity, findings suggest that there has been an increase in these perceptions during the post-9/11 era among women with propensity. These perceptions are important for military practitioners and recruiters to understand since they may be negatively influencing women's propensity during this era. Indeed, the military has been aggressively addressing the problem to eliminate instances of assault within the ranks. Results suggest that the military must continue to keep after the problem of sexual assault and harassment and possibly advertise significant improvements in this arena to the media to increase public awareness. This is likely to reassure the public and young women who are considering the military as a viable option.

Prior research on women (Segal et al. 1998) has shown that the predictors for women's propensity to serve has been in the same direction as men, but with smaller magnitude, and that the propensity to serve was the strongest predictor to

actual enlistment, as was the case with men. My research does not specifically

examine how propensity relates to actual enlistment during the post-9/11 era. The

last examination of this type was conducted in 1991. At that time, data showed

that among women with high propensity (i.e. "definitely will" serve), only about

40 percent actually enlisted in the military within 5-6 years after high school. In

contrast, data showed that 70 percent of men with high propensity enlisted after

high school. Despite the relatively low number for women, it is reasonable to

believe that the percentage of women with the propensity to serve who actually go

on to enlist after high school has increased over the past two decades given the

expansion of women's job opportunities in the military in the mid-1990s, their

successes during war after 9/11, and the most recent removal of institutional

barriers (i.e. combat exclusion ban and DADT policy). Future research should

examine how current propensity relates to actual enlistment for women. My

expectation is that it will follow more closely to the trends for men, showing that

propensity is more strongly related to actual enlistment.

The results from my analysis suggest that there are various motivations to

serve among women. The fact that women's propensity has increased during the

post-9/11 era, especially after 2010, suggests that women with propensity have

fairly high institutional orientations. Although women's propensity was at an all-

time low between 2005-2006, propensity did bounce back to levels as high as in

the early 1980s. Indeed, the spike in women's propensity to 8 percent in 2013

was the second highest percentage (1983 was 8.5 percent) overall throughout the

entire AVF era. This may be somewhat surprising as some might expect that

women would not be as likely to serve during a combat era. However, the removal of barriers such as the DADT policy and the combat exclusion ban are likely to have influenced women with greater institutional orientations to serve. Indeed, volunteering to serve during wartime is considered to be a noble calling.

Since the Department of Defense recently announced its decision to open all combat jobs to women in all branches of service, it is likely that more female recruits will be attracted to military service. As more women role models, such as recent Ranger School graduates, Captain Kristen Griest, First Lieutenant Shaye Haver, and Major Lisa Jaster, continue to break down stereotypes and succeed in combat-related scenarios, women's propensity is likely to continue to increase even further. As the era of combat proceeds indefinitely, further research on women's propensity must continue to assess how the expansion of combat jobs available to women will influence their propensity to serve. It is my expectation that propensity will increase and more women will be institutionally motivated to serve as a result.

The fact that women's propensity is not significantly positively related to unemployment suggests that women may be less occupationally motivated to serve. These results differ from results for men, but that is not necessarily surprising. As mentioned, men are generally more concerned with economic and tangible benefits than women (e.g. Beutel and Marini 1995; Wray-Lake et al. 2011). However, the fact that women's propensity is negatively related to higher casualties suggests that women may have occupational motivations as well. Indeed, the benefits of military service may not outweigh the costs, especially

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when those costs are high. Further, the fact that women's propensity is positively related to lower SES also suggests that women may have occupational orientations.

Taken as a whole, and similar to men, it appears that women may have a mixture of institutional and occupational orientations during the post-9/11 era (i.e. "pragmatic professionalism). More research is needed to uncover women's underlying motivations to serve. In chapter 7, I analyze women's motivations further by analyzing their attitudes toward work using the I/O spectrum of analysis.

Summary

Women's propensity during the post-9/11 era is related to several macro-social factors. In general, the relationships between these factors and women's propensity are similar in magnitude and direction as for men. Below, I highlight the differences between men and women's propensity.

- Propensity is lower for women than for men.
- Propensity during the post-9/11 era is as high as other years during the AVF without war; propensity levels reached its second highest percentage in 2013; men's propensity during the post-9/11 era was as high as in the 1990s, although it was lower than the 1980s.
- Propensity declines with increasing public support for war; propensity increases with greater nationalistic attitudes; the same trends hold for men.
- Propensity decreases as casualties increase; the decrease in propensity is greater for women than for men.

- Propensity does not significantly increase as unemployment rates increase; propensity significantly increases for men as unemployment increases.

Women's propensity during the post-9/11 era is also related to several individual and demographic factors. In general, the relationship between women's propensity and these factors are similar in magnitude and direction as for men.

- Propensity levels differ by racial and ethnic background. Propensity is highest among black women, followed by Hispanic women; white women show the lowest propensity of race/ethnic groups. These relationships hold true even after controlling for all factors, including SES. This is different than for men, where Hispanic men have the highest propensity after controlling for SES. Black men have the lowest propensity after all controls.

- Propensity declines with parents' education; women of college-educated mothers and fathers have a lower propensity than women whose parents did not attend college. Mother's education level is not a significant predictor for men's propensity.

- Propensity declines with educational achievement during high school; the same trend holds for men.

- Propensity varies by region: propensity is higher in the South and West, lowest in the Northeast; the same trend holds for men.

- Propensity declines in suburban and urban areas of the country; the same trend holds for men.

- Propensity declines with expectations to graduate from a 4-year college; women who expect to graduate from a 2-year college or attend vocational education have higher propensity. Minority women have greater propensity than white women when they expect to graduate from a 2-year college or attend vocational school; the same trends hold for men.

- Perceptions of discrimination against women in the military among women with propensity have increased during the post-9/11 era, although these perceptions are less than women without propensity. Men have lower perceptions of discrimination against women in the military.

Chapter 7: Political Attitudes of Youth
During the Post-9/11 Era

Civil-Military Relations and the Civil-Military Gap

Prior to a discussion of political attitudes, I must proceed with a brief review of the relationship between the armed forces and society and the civil-military gap literature as highlighted earlier in Chapter 2. Influenced by the military's continual institutional presence within society, researchers began to analyze the nature of the military profession and its relationship with the government and the people. Samuel Huntington (1957) argued that it was most beneficial for the military to be separate and distinct from the government to increase efficiency and effectiveness, whereas Moris Janowitz (1960) argued that the relationship between the military and society should be more convergent, similar in values, attitudes, and composition. Huntington saw an incompatibility between the professional ethic of the military and societal liberalism, with its emphasis on individualism, hostility toward standing armies, and denial of the importance of power. He viewed the professional military ethic to be more compatible with conservative ideologies, and believed that the armed forces should be insulated from the liberal trends in society to remain effective. Janowitz, on the other hand, proposed a different model of civil-military relations. For him, informal social networks were more important constraints on social behavior than formal mechanisms of social control (Segal et al. 2001). Thus, he believed that in a democratic state, civilian control of the military would best be achieved when the military was woven into the fabric of society. He foresaw a military in which some identified first as citizens, then as soldiers, some of whose officers attended

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civilian universities (i.e. ROTC), and some of who lived with their families in civilian communities. Of course, he recognized that the military would have its own unique organizational culture similar to many civilian occupations and professional groups. However, he felt that citizen-soldiers and structural linkages would help coordinate the military culture with American society (Segal et al. 2001).

As a result of the shift in career-orientation during the early years of the AVF, Janowitz (1975) suggested that the professional military was increasingly emphasizing distinctive military values; that its linkages with society had become weakened and tied to limited segments of the social structure; that changes in the recruitment base were making the officer corps and the enlisted less representative of society; and that such processes might create an "ideological caste" in the military and be a source of political division from civilian society. Thus, the military culture might become decoupled from civilian culture. Essentially, what Huntington viewed as necessary for military effectiveness, Janowitz viewed as problematic for civil-military relations (Segal et al. 2001).

The discourse between Huntington and Janowitz about military professionalism and the relationships between the military, the state, and society raised the debate on civil-military relations to another level. Their work set the foundation for a continued interest among researchers, the military, and the political elite on the nature of these relations, establishing civil-military relations as part of the research agenda for decades to come.

Due to changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War, there has been a renewed interest among journalists, scholars, military leadership and policy makers on the social-psychological (i.e. attitudes) and social-structural (i.e. demographics) implications on members of the military, as well as the impacts to civil-military relations. Indeed, an increase in civilian jobs within the military, especially technical and support specialties, means that military members are more likely to specialize in general military skills that may be less transferrable to the civilian sector and less understood by civilians. Additionally, the effects of the military's BRAC policy may cause the military to become even more isolated from its host society than before, as many installations have been closed and the preponderance of those remaining are consolidated in the South and West. Couple that with the dwindling number of ROTC programs throughout the Northeast and the lack of military exposure is exacerbated. Further, members of the civilian elite serving in government positions are becoming increasingly unaware of military affairs, as the veteran population in government has declined. In contrast to the Vietnam era, where over two-thirds of the members of Congress were veterans, the veteran population of Congress shrank to about one-third in the 1990s. This has caused some to wonder if the military is becoming even more estranged from the American public. Undoubtedly, the media's negative influence on the perception of the military highlighted by sexual harassment scandals, such as the Navy's Tailhook incident and among new Army soldiers in training at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, has created a greater disconnect between the two (Ricks 1997b).

There is another dimension of the media that must be mentioned. The way the military has been depicted in popular culture more recently has created an increasing concern for those in the military and has contributed to a greater misunderstanding between both sides. A cursory review of recent movies is quite telling of the media's negative influence. Movies such as *The Rock* (1996) had a maverick Marine general hold San Francisco hostage by threatening to use poison gas. *Broken Arrow* (1996) portrayed a passed-over Air Force major who planned to steal nuclear bombs and hold the city of Denver for ransom. *The Siege* (1998) had an evil Army general oversee martial law in New York City. In *Snake Eyes* (1998) a Navy commander plotted the successful assassination of the Secretary of Defense. *The General's Daughter* (1999) painted a picture of the Army and West Point that condones gross sexual misbehavior and covers up rape. It is particularly noteworthy that the two 1998 box office hits that had positive portrayals of the military, *Saving Private Ryan* and *The Thin Red Line*, were both set in WWII, in direct contrast to the negative images depicted in movies of the contemporary armed forces (Moskos 2001). Certainly it is conceivable that these images have created some sort of disconnect between the military and society.

Perhaps worse yet, "there has been widespread agreement that over the past few decades American society has become fragmented, more individualistic, and less disciplined" (Ricks 1997b:10). These changes put society at odds with the traditional military values of sacrifice, team, self-discipline, and putting the interests of others above oneself. Couple the military's organizational changes with an increased individualistic, "Me" attitude among members of society and

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the potential for a cleavage, or "gap," between civilians and the military were thought by some to be wide and alarming (e.g., Ricks 1997b).

The Civil-Military Gap Literature Review

Sociological theory and research suggest that there are linkages between occupations and the values and attitudes held by those who practice them. For example, Rosenberg (1957) suggests that people tend to differ in attitudes and values in ways that are compatible with the characteristics of the type of occupation they desire to enter. Thus, the transition to a career-oriented professional military would be expected to produce a more attitudinally distinct military. However, the important point with respect to civil-military relations is not the existence of these occupational attitudes, but rather the compatibility between the attitudes of the military profession and the attitudes of civilian society (Segal et al. 2001).

Attitudinal differences based on the end of conscription, the increasingly career-oriented force, and the increasing professionalization of the military have caused some analysts to see a problem with civil-military relations in the 1990s (Segal et al. 2001). Initially, a "gap" was viewed as emerging between senior military leaders and the civilian leadership who exert constitutional control over the military (e.g., Kohn 1994). Later, the gap was viewed as a broader cultural divide between the American armed forces, including enlisted personnel, and the civilian society they protect. The primary focus of research has been on whether or not the distinctive attitudes within the military either converge or diverge with society at large as well as with civilian leadership. In particular, researchers who

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see the "culture gap" as problematic view the military as becoming strongly

Republican in political party preference, increasingly conservative in ideology,

and distrustful and disrespectful of the civilian government (Segal et al. 2001).

In 1997, Thomas Ricks, a distinguished Pentagon correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal,* and later, the *Washington Post*, published a widely circulated and debated article in the *Atlantic Monthly,* about a growing civilian-military gap. Ricks suggested that, "U.S. military personnel of all ranks are feeling increasingly alienated from their own country, and are becoming more conservative and more politically active than ever before" (1997b:1). James Kitfield agreed, suggesting that, "soldiers [are] increasingly estranged from society, and vice-versa" (1998). Ricks referred to the fact that society has increasingly become a "what's in it for me" type of attitude among young people and that has increased a gap between those in the military and the rest of society. Given Ricks' stature, "his diagnosis of potentially serious problems in relations between the military and civilian society could hardly be dismissed as the ill-considered ravings of an antimilitary ideologue" (Collins and Holsti 1999:204). Although Ricks' analysis was largely anecdotal and restricted primarily to the attitudes of a platoon of new Marine recruits coming home after basic training, it sparked many scholars to take notice, renewing discussions about civil-military relations. This prompted Ole Holsti, a political scientist at Duke, to put Ricks' hypothesis to empirical test to determine the nature and extent of any political, social, and cultural gap that Ricks predicted.

Holsti (1998) identified the gap as between military and civilian elites more generally. He described changes over time while drawing on surveys of leaders

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from 1976-1996. This was the first major attempt to assess attitudes between the military and civilians over a long period of time. Holsti discovered a growth in the proportion of military officers who identified themselves as Republicans and who regarded themselves as overwhelmingly conservative in political orientation. Further, he provided tentative support for the hypothesis, which he attributed to Ricks (1997b), that "younger members of the military are even more pronounced in their embrace of hard-core Republican conservatism" (Holsti 1998:12). However, he noted that his analysis did not include junior officer or enlisted personnel. Holsti's (1999) follow-up analysis continued to show support of a gap between the military and civilians with respect to political partisanship and ideological orientations, with the military being more Republican and conservative than civilians.

Just prior to 9/11, a large group of researchers interested in the topic conducted an extensive research project to determine the nature and extent of a civilian-military "gap" (e.g., Fever and Kohn 2001). The Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) conducted the comprehensive study in 1998 and 1999 attempting to assess whether an attitudinal gap existed between the military and civilian populations (Holsti 2001). The study was the most comprehensive analysis of attitudes of military leaders to date, with 723 active-duty service members included in their surveys. Unfortunately, the timing of its publication coinciding near the events of 9/11 resulted in little attention to this important project. The TISS study was limited to the attitudes of military elites (i.e. middle to senior-level officers) who were attending professional military schooling. The surveys

did not include junior officers or the enlisted ranks. This is particularly noteworthy because these ranks only comprise about six percent of the total military population (Dempsey 2010).

To fill the void in knowledge, Dempsey (2010) conducted a survey focusing on the attitudes of enlisted soldiers and junior officers within the Army, who comprise the vast majority of the Army population. His analysis also examined racial and ethnic differences, as well as gender differences in attitudes, where Holsti's (1998) analysis did not. The Citizenship and Service (C&S) study was a survey of Army personnel conducted in 2004. The sample size for analysis was a total of 1188 respondents, including 563 enlisted men and women, 90 warrant officers, and 535 officers. Excluded from analysis were junior soldiers (i.e. E-1 and E-2) along with very senior soldiers such as Sergeant Majors and Generals, which left about 90 percent of the army population for analysis. Attitudes measured covered a broad range of topics including: 1) General attitudes toward the army, including morale, career intentions, and opinions about army leadership; 2) Reasons for joining; 3) Personal attitudes toward social and political issues; and 4) Experiences of discrimination and opinions concerning gender and racial relations in the army and civilian society.

Political Party Affiliation

One of the concerns in the debate on military culture was whether the military has become disproportionately Republican with respect to party affiliation. Political partisanship has been regarded as a long-lasting identification, rooted in one's location in the social structure (e.g. Janowitz and Segal 1967). Although

the Republican and Democratic parties essentially switched platforms between the 1860s and the 1930s, before the end of conscription and the AVF, the Republican Party has maintained consistency with its political stance of supporting a basic ideology of less federal government involvement. Thus, what was meant by identifying as a Republican in 1976 (when the MTF studies began) still has the same connotation today. Political party affiliation has direct implications for perceptions of the military among the American public, for the role of active and retired members of the military in political campaigns, and for the interactions between senior military leaders and civilian elites (Dempsey 2010).

Findings from the TISS project confirmed widespread anecdotal evidence that the military has become overwhelmingly Republican in party affiliation, with 64 percent of officers in the survey identifying with that party. On the other hand, only 8 percent identified themselves as Democrats. This was in stark contrast with civilian non-veterans where only 29 percent identified as Republican and 33 percent as Democrats (Holsti 2001).

Findings from the C&S study reveal differences from the TISS project with respect to political party affiliation. Results from the C&S survey reveal an army that is, overall, less likely to identify with a political party than conventional wisdom suggests. However, results do show some similarities with the TISS project among army officers of comparable rank. Among soldiers in the Army, 29 percent of respondents identify with the Republican Party while only 11 percent identify with the Democratic Party. Among the civilian population, 31 percent identify as Republican and 33 percent identify as a Democrat. Many

army personnel (26 percent) remain neutral in their party affiliation while only 9 percent of the civilian population does so. Interestingly, however, the author noted that in a "virtual army," where a group of civilians correlated with those in the army on the dimensions of gender, race, income, age, and education, the Army would differ only slightly from the general population in its party affiliation. Results also indicate that there is a strong correlation between rank and increasing Republican Party identification. Indeed, among Majors and above, as well as Warrant Officers, over 50 percent identify as Republican. In contrast, from senior NCOs to junior enlisted personnel, those who identify as Republican range from 36 percent to 18 percent respectively (Dempsey 2010).

Party identification by demographic subgroups reveal that white officers (58 percent) are most likely to identify as Republican while black officers (33 percent) are most likely to identify as Democrat. Black enlisted soldiers are more than three times more likely to identify as Democrat compared to white enlisted soldiers, while being three times less likely to identify as Republican. Hispanic soldiers are more like black soldiers with respect to their party affiliation. However, Hispanic officers are in between white and black officers with 34 percent identifying as Republican and 17 percent as Democrat (Dempsey 2010). In sum, being male, having a higher income, and having a bachelor's degree lead to a greater likelihood of Republican Party affiliation.

Political Ideology

One of the long-standing controversies about the social-psychological impacts of military experience cross-nationally has focused on the connection between

military service and conservatism or authoritarianism (Segal et al. 2001). While authoritarian personalities have been shown to have preferences for the military (Roghmann 1966) and those in the military have been shown to be relatively conservative (Abrahamsson 1970), it is not clear whether the causality of the relationship is due to self-selection into the military or to military socialization itself. Past research does not provide any strong basis for asserting that military service changes attitudes in a conservative direction. Data on ideological orientation of the American public reflect a statistically significant but proportionately very small increase in conservative self-identification since the 1950s (Robinson and Fleishman 1988). Thus, a shift in conservative identification in the military might just reflect a larger overall ideological trend in society, rather than a divergence between the military and civilian cultures.

With respect to ideological identification, results from the TISS project show that 66 percent of military leaders identified themselves as either "somewhat conservative" (53 percent) or "very conservative" (13 percent). In contrast, the general public non-veterans were only about 38 percent conservative combining both response categories. Those military leaders who identified as having a liberal ideology (i.e. "very liberal" or "somewhat liberal") comprised only 4 percent of the population. On the other hand, the general public non-veterans were 28 percent liberal, with about 7 percent identifying as "very liberal" and 21 percent as "somewhat liberal" (Holsti 2001). Although a significant gap in political affiliation and ideology between the military and civilians existed, it must be noted again that this survey focused on the attitudes of the military elites.

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Findings from the C&S study also reveal differences from the TISS project with respect to political ideology. The C&S data shows that there are no significant differences between the military and civilian populations in ideological identification. For example, 38 percent of army personnel identified as conservative, whereas 37 percent of civilians did the same. Only 21 percent of army personnel identified as liberal, whereas 24 percent of civilians did so. Most identified as having a moderate ideology, as 41 percent of army personnel and 39 percent of civilians identified this way. Where differences still remained were between the officer corps and the enlisted ranks. About 63 percent of officers and 69 percent of warrant officers identified as conservative, but only 32 percent of enlisted personnel identified this way. Further, only 14 percent of officers and 12 percent of warrant officers identified as having a liberal ideology, while 23 percent of enlisted personnel identified in this manner. Most enlisted personnel identified as moderate (45 percent), while only 23 percent of officers identified this way (Dempsey 2010).

Political ideology by demographic subgroups reveals that there are still significant differences in conservative ideology between officers and enlisted personnel even after controlling for race and gender. The difference between the conservative identification of officers and soldiers among whites, Hispanics, men and women is a substantial 30 percent. For blacks, these differences between officers and soldiers were reduced to about 6 percent. Similar to the findings on political party, within the army, being male, having a higher income, and having a bachelor's degree contributed to a greater likelihood of possessing a conservative

ideology within the army. Being black significantly contributed to having a more liberal ideology. Compared to civilians, those soldiers in the army were significantly more conservative even after controlling for various demographic controls. Most interestingly, those civilians with a college degree were more liberal than those in the army with a college degree.

Segal (2001) and his colleagues conducted a thorough analysis of military attitudes focusing primarily on young enlisted personnel covering most of the period of the AVF. Their analysis was part of the TISS project (Fever and Kohn 2001), but they utilized data from MTF examining two decades from 1976-1985 and 1986-1995. Results showed an overall trend of youth Republican Party affiliation increasing in the 1970s up until about 1990, and then decreasing but never falling below the levels in 1976. Republican Party identification rose from 24 percent in 1976 to 45 percent during the Reagan administration. Then it fell to 27 percent in 1993 coinciding with the Clinton administration. Since 1984, Republicans have outnumbered Democrats in this age group (Segal et al. 2001).

Results from the MTF study also showed that the military was not as politically affiliated as noted in earlier research. Results indicated that the military was significantly less Republican than full-time college students for both decades of analysis. Compared with those young people who did not go to college, there were no significant differences between the military with respect to Republican Party affiliation during both decades. Consistent with earlier research, however, those high school seniors who expected to join the military and become an officer were significantly more Republican than those who did not

expect to be an officer, except between 1992-1995 where differences were minimal. With respect to race, the MTF study revealed that white enlistees were significantly more Republican than the non-white men. After controlling for race, the same patterns above appeared. Although white men were consistently significantly more Republican than non-white men, those men who went to college were still more Republican than those (white and non-white) who entered military service.

Results from the MTF study also indicated that the military is not as conservative in ideology as conventional wisdom predicts. Between 1976 and 1995 results reveal an upward trend in conservative ideology among the youth population overall. However, high school seniors who had a high propensity to serve were not as conservative in ideology as their counterparts who definitely expected to attend a 4-year college, although there were no statistically significant differences between both groups. Interestingly, results revealed that those who did enter the military within 1-2 years after high school were significantly less conservative than their college-bound peers. Compared with those who did not expect to go to full-time college, in the decade of 1976-1985, those who expected to enter the military were significantly more conservative. However, the following decade of 1986-1995 revealed no significant differences between these groups. Perhaps, most importantly, results indicated that those young men entering service as enlisted personnel were only about a third as likely to consider themselves as conservative as the military officers in Holsti's (1998) sample (Segal et al. 2001).

The Civil-Military Gap During the Post-9/11 Era

A possible implication from today's wars on civil-military relations is the continuing (or newly discovered) gap between the armed forces and society. Some scholars (e.g., Moskos 2001; Bacevich 2013) argue that the length of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, as well as the sole reliance on the AVF, have contributed to widening the gap between the military and the general population. If so, this gap could have important impacts effecting policy issues with respect to military manpower and financing.

Many people viewed the Iraq War, in particular, as highly politicized in nature. At the beginning of the war in March of 2003, a review of numerous polls revealed that overall public support for the war was about 75 percent (Berinsky 2009). Contrast that with the Korean War and the Gulf War, where public support for both was initially just above 60 percent. After 9/11, public support for the war in Afghanistan initially fluctuated between 80 and 90 percent. During the Iraq War, however, there was significant debate about the motivations for going to war, and public support began to dwindle as the war continued. In October 2005, at the height of the Iraqi insurgency, support had dropped around 40 percent and never recovered completely (Berinsky 2009). Many analysts began to comment on the political aspects of the war, as a significant political divide occurred between members of Congress. Indeed, the Iraq War policy became a major topic of debate during the Presidential elections of 2004 and 2008. Although there was an initial split between Republicans and Democrats when the war began, it exacerbated as the war continued. In 2003, Republicans

overwhelmingly supported the Iraq War with almost 90 percent approval, while

Democrats were at about 55 percent. As the insurgency in Iraq grew and U.S.

casualties spiked, Republican support remained high, never falling below 75

percent through 2008. On the other hand, Democratic support dropped

precipitously to below 20 percent, reflecting over a 50 percent difference in

support between political parties, lasting almost four years between 2004 and

2008 (Berinsky 2009).

The Pew Research Center (2011a) conducted the most recent study analyzing

the impact of the recent wars to reassess the nature and extent of a civil-military

gap since 9/11. Considering that our armed forces have remained in combat

longer than any period in our history, the extent and nature of a gap could

increase. Researchers at Pew interviewed a representative sample of 1,853

veterans who served in the U.S. armed forces and are no longer on active duty.

Of the total sample, 1,134 had separated from service before 9/11 ("pre-9/11

veterans") and 712 served after 9/11 ("post-9/11 veterans"), including 336 who

served either in Afghanistan or Iraq in combat. The general public survey

consisted of a national sample of 2,003 adults 18 years or older living in the

continental United States.

Post-9/11 veterans were more likely than the general public to identify with the

Republican Party and to disapprove of the job that President Obama was doing as

Commander-in-Chief. Results from the Pew Study indicated that 36 percent of

post-9/11 veterans identified as Republican whereas only 23 percent of the public

identified this way. Further, 34 percent of the general public identified as

Democrat while only 21 percent of the post-9/11 veterans did so. The pre-9/11

veterans were more Republican than the general public (30 percent) but not as

much as the post-9/11 veterans (Pew 2011a). Equally telling, when the general

public was asked to consider all costs versus benefits to the U.S. in determining

whether or not the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were worth fighting, 56 percent

of Republicans said the war in Afghanistan was worth it while only 34 percent of

Democrats thought the same. For the war in Iraq specifically, 59 percent of

Republicans thought the war was worth fighting, while only 24 percent of

Democrats agreed (Pew 2011a).

   With respect to political ideology, results from the Pew study show that nearly

half of all veterans (48 percent) were politically conservative, compared with 37

percent of the public. Pre-9/11 veterans were more conservative than their post-

9/11 peers who have served since the terrorist attacks, with 49 and 40 percent

identifying as conservative respectively. At the same time, the general public

identified as more liberal than all veterans with 22 percent identifying in this

manner, while less than 15 percent of veterans did the same (Pew 2011a).

Interestingly, post-9/11 veterans were most likely to be moderate in ideology (43

percent) and were more moderate than the pre-9/11 veterans or the general public

(both 34 percent).

Recent Trends in Republicanism and Conservatism

   According to a recent Pew study (2013), since 1995, trends in overall

Republican Party identification have been on the decline, fluctuating between two

and eleven percent less than those identifying as Democrats. Meanwhile,

Democratic Party identification has been on the rise throughout this period. Since 2003, the split between those identifying as Republican or Democrat has grown even larger, with Democratic affiliation holding steady while Republican affiliation has continued to decline as more people have been identifying as Independents. Interestingly, in 2009, people started identifying as Independents more so than Democrats or Republicans (Pew 2013).

Since 1999, conservative trends in the U.S. have been on a steady rise and have remained consistently above (approximately 15 percent above) those who identify as having a liberal political ideology. Those identifying as having a moderate ideology have been slightly above (about 2 percent) conservatives in the early to mid-2000s, and slightly below conservatives since 2007. In 2013, 38 percent of Americans said they were conservative, 36 percent said they were moderate, and 22 percent said they were liberal (Pew 2013).

Another recent study conducted by the Pew Research Center (2011b) revealed that Republican Party affiliation has also decreased among the younger generation. Younger people of the "Millennial" generation, between the ages of 18-30, were more likely to vote Democratic during the last four national elections. These people also hold liberal attitudes on most issues, as well as America's approach to foreign policy. Today, half of Millennials (50 percent) consider themselves as Democrats or Democratic-leaning Independents, while only 36 percent affiliate or lean toward the Republican Party. Additionally, Millennials are far more likely to describe their political views as liberal compared with older generations. In 2011, 26 percent of Millennials identified as liberal, while only 19

percent of the "baby-boom" generation did the same. In contrast, 42 percent of the "Boomers" identified as having a conservative ideology, while just 30 percent of Millennials did the same. Since 9/11, conservative trends have generally increased across most all generations. For example, the Boomer generation increased from 35 percent to 42 percent while the Millennials remained fairly stable at 30 percent (Pew 2011b).

Parental Attitudes

Prior research has shown that political ideology is oftentimes passed down generationally from parents to their children. Indeed, family has been shown to be a primary influence on political socialization and the major shaper on basic attitudes (Glass et al. 1986). Other influences include schools, peers, mass media, political leaders, and religious institutions. Thus, it is a reasonable assumption that high-school seniors' stated political attitudes and ideology reflect that of his or her parents. Indeed, parental political attitudes have been shown to significantly predict children's orientations after childhood (Glass et al. 1986).

Political Party Predictions

Trying to predict a youth's political party affiliation and political ideology is a bit tricky given variations in the recent data. Indeed, Dempsey (2010) and Segal and his colleagues (2001) show that those in the military are not as Republican as other analysts (e.g., Huntington 1957; Ricks 1997b; Holsti 1998; Holsti 2001) have originally argued. There certainly have been variations in what part of the military has been studied, ranging from mid-to-senior level officers of the military elite, to junior enlisted personnel and those in high school expecting to enter the

military. Given recent societal trends revealing a decline in Republican Party identification (Pew 2013), it is expected that these attitudes will be transferred to the youth population by their parents (Glass et al. 1986). The fact that young junior enlisted soldiers have been shown to be less Republican than the officer corps (Dempsey 2010; Segal et al. 2001) suggests that this trend will also hold for high school youth who are about to enter the armed forces. However, the overwhelmingly large political divide in support of the wars in Afghanistan and, especially Iraq, (Berinsky 2009) can lead one to believe that parental attitudes (i.e. Republican) may have had a strong impact on shaping the attitudes of those about to join the military in the post-9/11 era. Therefore, I expect that those youth who are likely to serve in the armed forces will affiliate with the Republican Party more than the Democratic Party. Prior research (e.g. Dempsey 2010) has shown that white men who have a higher income in the military are more likely to be Republican. Additionally, race and ethnicity influence party affiliation in the army in the same manner as in the civilian population. Consistent with earlier research, I expect that white youth who expect to serve will be more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party compared to blacks or Hispanics. I also expect that men who expect to serve will be more likely to be Republican than their women counterparts.

> **Hypothesis 7a: Youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party than other party affiliations.**
>
> **Hypothesis 7b: White youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party compared to black or Hispanic youth who expect to serve.**

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Hypothesis 7c: Young men who are likely to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party compared to their women counterparts.

Political Ideology Predictions

Given the recent data on political ideology in the military, it is clearer on what to expect. The preponderance of research (e.g., Holsti 1998; Holsti 2001; Dempsey 2010; Pew 2011a) reveals a military that is primarily conservative in political ideology. Therefore, there is no reason to expect that youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era will be any different than before. Although moderate ideology has recently increased and the Millennials are less conservative and more liberal than previous generations, conservative trends still remain high across America (Pew 2013). Despite the fact that previous MTF studies (Segal et al. 2001) have shown that the military is less conservative than others have argued, the majority of evidence leads me to expect that those youth who have a high propensity to serve will be more likely to identify as conservative than liberal. Although some studies have shown (e.g. Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010) that the general military population is no more conservative than the civilian population, I expect that the impacts of sustained war after 9/11 will result in significant differences between the military and civilian populations with respect to ideological attitudes, especially given that there are fewer people in the U.S. population serving today than during previous wars.

Hypothesis 7d: Youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era are more likely to identify as having a conservative political ideology than other ideological orientations.

Hypothesis 7e: White youth who expect to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era are more likely to identify as having a conservative political ideology compared to black or Hispanic youth who expect to serve.

Hypothesis 7f: Young men who expect to serve in the armed forces during the post-9/11 era are more likely to identify as having a conservative political ideology compared to their women counterparts.

Methods for Deriving Political Party Affiliation and Ideology

For identifying a respondent's political party affiliation, I combine those who identify as "Strongly Republican" and "Mildly Republican" and categorize them as identifying with the Republican Party. I keep "Independent" responses as their own category. I combine responses of "Strongly Democratic and "Mildly Democratic" and categorize them as identifying with the Democratic Party. I combine other response categories such as "Other," "No Preference," and "Don't Know, Haven't Decided" into a separate category. The four total categories are "Republican," "Independent," "Democrat," and "No Preference/Other/Don't Know." This political party classification generally corresponds with recent research (e.g. Holsti 1998; Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010) for purposes of comparison. For some of my analyses below, I drop the "No Preference/Other/Don't Know" category to compare whether youth with propensity lean more toward a Republican or Democratic Party affiliation by racial and ethnic background. In these instances, I highlight the distinction.

For identifying a respondent's political ideology, I combine those who identified as "Conservative" or "Very Conservative" and categorize them as identifying as having a conservative political ideology. I also combine those who identify as being "Liberal" or "Very Liberal" as having a liberal political ideology. I keep "Moderate" and "Radical" responses as their own separate categories. I combine "None of the Above, or Don't Know," and missing data into another separate category. The five total categories are "Conservative," "Moderate," "Liberal," "Radical," and "None of the Above, Don't Know, or Missing." This convention generally corresponds to other studies (e.g. Holsti 1998; Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010). For some of my analyses below, I drop the "None of the Above, Don't Know, or Missing" category to compare whether youth with propensity lean toward more conservative or liberal ideology by racial and ethnic background. In these instances, I highlight the distinction.

First, I examine overall youth trends in Republicanism and Conservatism during the post-9/11 era by including all youth who respond to those questions in my analysis. To test *hypothesis 7a*, I conduct logistic regression analysis using propensity as the dependent variable to determine how likely youth with propensity will affiliate with the Republican Party compared to other party affiliations- Independent, Democrat, or No Preference, Other, or Don't Know. To test *hypothesis 7d,* I conduct a similar logistic regression analysis to determine how likely youth with propensity will identify with a conservative ideology compared to other ideologies- Moderate, Liberal, or None, Don't Know or Missing. To test *hypotheses 7b* and *7e*, I analyze differences in political party

affiliation and ideology by racial and ethnic background. I also conduct an additional logistic regression analysis that combines both of the political variables, party affiliation and ideology, into a model to control for one another.

As a test to verify that youth know what it means to identify as conservative or liberal, I utilize the nationalism index that I created earlier (see Chapter 4) to compare a youth's political ideology identification with their responses on a series of questions from MTF Form 2 that are related to conservative or liberal values. As noted earlier, my nationalism scale index measure consists of the six following questions: 1) The U.S. should begin a gradual program of disarming whether other countries do or not (reverse coded); 2) The U.S. should be willing to go to war to protect its own economic interests; 3) The U.S. does not need to have greater military power than Russia (reverse coded); 4) The U.S. ought to have much more military power than any other nation in the world; 5) There may be times when the U.S. should go to war to protect the rights of other countries; 6) The only good reason for the U.S. to go to war is to defend against an attack on our own country (reverse coded). Higher responses on the index scale indicate a greater conservative ideological orientation. These questions have been used as measures of youth attitudes in earlier research (e.g. Bachman et al. 2000a/b; Segal et al. 2001). From these questions, I conduct a simple regression model to examine how my conservative scale index is related to political ideology identification.

Propensity and Political Attitudes Analysis

Descriptive statistics for the analysis of propensity in this chapter by my primary predictor variables, political party affiliation and political ideology, are reported for men only in Table 7.1 below. Additional controls used in my earlier analyses (i.e. Chapters 4 and 6) are maintained for this analysis for continuity and theoretical purposes. For brevity sake and continuity, I focus the report and discussion that follows on the results reported in my full model utilizing all controls (i.e. Model 6 for logistic regression analysis and Model 3 for linear regression analysis) for the pertinent tables below.

Table 7.1
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Political Attitudes Analysis (Percent):
Years 1976-2013 (Men Only)

	2002-2013	1976-2013
Dependent Variable		
Military Propensity	14.06%	15.70%
Political Attitudes of Primary Interest		
Political Party		
Republican	30.34%	31.67%
Independent	11.42%	7.14%
Democratic	22.33%	20.92%
No Preference/Other/Don't Know	35.91%	40.27%
Political Ideology		
Conservative	22.12%	21.99%
Moderate	26.56%	28.66%
Liberal	19.23%	18.46%
Radical	2.78%	3.68%
None/Don't Know/Missing	29.32%	27.21%
Individual/Demographic Influences		
Race/Ethnicity		
White	81.70%	86.15%
Black	9.95%	10.66%
Hispanic	8.35%	3.19%
Socioeconomic Status		
Father's Education		
Less than HS	9.25%	9.45%
HS	28.63%	29.46%
Some College	18.64%	19.10%
College	27.64%	25.86%
Graduate School	15.85%	16.12%
Mother's Education		
Less than HS	5.70%	6.61%
HS	26.38%	32.57%
Some College	21.19%	21.25%
College	32.49%	27.20%
Graduate School	14.24%	12.36%
Family Structure (# of parent/guardian in household)		
Both Parents or Guardians	74.59%	75.75%
Mother or Female Guardian	16.45%	15.61%
Father or Male Guardian	5.18%	4.59%
None	3.78%	4.05%
Number of Siblings		
3+	31.72%	33.49%
2	28.87%	27.96%
1	33.50%	32.90%
None	5.91%	5.65%
N	52,356	139,284

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Table 7.1 (cont)
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Political Attitudes Analysis (Percent):
Years 1976-2013 (Men Only)

	2002-2013	1976-2013
Educational Attainment and Goals		
High School G.P.A		
D/C-	3.64%	4.51%
C	5.76%	7.83%
C+	9.15%	11.48%
B-	12.07%	14.14%
B	18.71%	19.53%
B+	18.31%	16.85%
A-	16.91%	13.53%
A	15.46%	12.13%
HS Curriculum		
Other	43.61%	43.35%
College Preparatory	56.39%	56.65%
Additional Controls		
Where you grew up/live		
Farm	4.65%	5.08%
Country	11.95%	12.26%
Small City (<50k)	28.68%	30.03%
Medium City (50-100k)	12.87%	12.33%
Suburb of Med City	11.21%	9.40%
Large City (100-500k)	9.00%	8.94%
Suburb of Large City	9.96%	9.87%
Very Large City (>500k)	5.39%	5.47%
Suburb of Very Large City	6.30%	6.61%
Region of Country		
Northeast	21.62%	21.45%
North Central	29.61%	29.86%
South	31.42%	31.88%
West	17.35%	16.80%
Additional Pathways		
4-Year College	81.15%	76.56%
2-Year College	36.58%	33.99%
Vocational/Technical School	20.60%	21.77%
Other	3.28%	4.18%
N	52,356	139,284

Figure 7.1 below depicts the overall average youth trends of political party affiliation (men only) between 1976-2013. Results reveal a general decline in Republicanism since the late-1980s, after the heyday of the Reagan administration, where youth percentages peaked at just under 40 percent. During the post-9/11 era, it appears that Republicanism among men has remained fairly steady at approximately 25 percent, with a peak at over 30 percent in 2005.

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Young men's affiliation with the Democratic Party has also remained fairly stable during the post-9/11 era, averaging slightly less than Republican affiliation with a peak at almost 28 percent in 2009. There are a high percentage of young men who have no preference toward a political party, don't know, or there is missing data, although percentages have declined during the post-9/11 era.

Figure 7.1
Political Party Trends Among High School Seniors (Men Only), 1976-2013

Figure 7.2 below reveals overall trends of political party affiliation for men with military propensity between 1976-2013. Results show a fairly consistent percentage of men with propensity who affiliate with the Republican Party since 1984. During the post-9/11 era, however, it appears that the gap between affiliating with the Republican Party compared to the Democratic Party has increased further among men with propensity. Overall, results indicate a rise in Republican Party affiliation and a slight decline in Democratic Party affiliation

among men with propensity, which is not consistent with overall youth trends for men.

Figure 7.2
Political Party Trends Among Youth With Propensity (Men Only), 1976-2013

Utilizing logistic regression analysis similar to the baseline analysis used in previous chapters, results reported in Table 7.2 below indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables for men only. The primary predictor variable in Table 7.2 is the political party variable. Consistent with **hypothesis 7a,** findings indicate that men who expect to serve are significantly more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party compared to other parties. Model 6 of Table 7.2 utilizes full control measures (e.g. race, SES, educational attainment and goals, urbanicity, and region of country) and indicates that men who identify as Democratic are about half as likely (OR=0.56***) as Republicans to have the propensity to serve. Those who have no preference, don't know, or choose other are about a third less likely

(OR=0.65***) to expect to serve compared to Republicans. Independents are a quarter less likely (OR=0.75***) to have propensity compared to Republicans. It appears that men who are likely to serve during the post-9/11 era are becoming increasingly Republican in party affiliation, even prior to controlling for SES, educational attainment, and other factors.

The magnitude and direction of these findings are strengthened even further when you compare those men who expect that they "definitely will" serve (i.e. "high propensity") versus those men who expect that they "definitely won't" serve (i.e. "low propensity"). High propensity men have even greater affiliation with the Republican Party compared to men with low propensity. Model 6 of Table 7.2.1 utilizes full control measures and indicates that men who identify as Democratic are nearly two-thirds less likely (OR=0.42***) than Republicans to have high propensity. Those who have no preference, don't know or choose other are about half as likely (OR=0.52***) to have high propensity compared to Republicans. Independents are a third less likely (OR=0.62***) to have high propensity compared to Republicans. Results from this analysis are located in Table 7.2.1 of Appendix A.

Table 7.2

Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=49259): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	0.98***	0.98**	0.99**	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***
Casualties	0.95***	0.95***	0.96***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***
Unemployment	1.03**	1.03**	1.03***	1.03***	1.03***	1.04***	1.04***
Social-Psychological Influences							
Political Party (Republican=Ref)							
Independent	0.82***	0.79***	0.77***	0.73***	0.76***	0.75***	0.73***
Democratic	0.64***	0.56***	0.55***	0.54***	0.56***	0.56***	0.53***
No Preference/Other/Don't Know	0.88***	0.81***	0.73***	0.65***	0.66***	0.65***	0.65***
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		1.66***	1.25***	1.25***	1.15**	1.14**	0.94
Hispanic		1.56***	1.26***	1.26***	1.25***	1.23***	1.05
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.80***	0.86***	0.88**	0.88**	0.88**
Some college			0.79***	0.92	0.95	0.95	0.95
College			0.61***	0.76***	0.80***	0.81***	0.81***
Graduate School			0.54***	0.74***	0.79***	0.81***	0.81***
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.83***	0.87*	0.90*	0.90*	0.90*
Some College			0.83***	0.92	0.95	0.95	0.95
College			0.75***	0.87*	0.90	0.90	0.90
Graduate School			0.76***	0.93	0.96	0.97	0.97
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.32***	1.24***	1.23***	1.23***	1.23***
Father or Male Guardian			1.60***	1.42***	1.40***	1.39***	1.39***
None			1.91***	1.67***	1.62***	1.62***	1.62***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.80***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***
1			0.67***	0.70***	0.69***	0.69***	0.69***
None			0.59***	0.62***	0.62***	0.62***	0.62***
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.70***	0.68***	0.70***	0.70***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.72***	0.74***	0.76***	0.76***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.65***	0.67***		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.16*	1.15*	1.15*
Small City (<50k)					1.08	1.08	1.08
Medium City (50-100k)					0.94	0.94	0.94
Suburb of Med City					0.96	0.97	0.97
Large City (100-500k)					1.03	1.04	1.04
Suburb of Large City					0.85*	0.86	0.87
Very Large City (>500k)					0.96	0.97	0.97
Suburb of Very Large City					0.87	0.89	0.89
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					0.93	0.92*	0.92*
South					1.36***	1.32***	1.32***
West					1.01	0.98	0.98
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.68***	0.68***
2-Year College						1.16***	1.16***
Vocational/Technical School						1.09**	1.09**
Political Party/Race Interactions (Republican/White=Ref)							
Independent* Black							1.46
Independent* Hispanic							1.16
Democratic* Black							1.35*
Democratic* Hispanic							1.31
No Preference/Other/Don't Know* Black							1.16
No Preference/Other/Don't Know* Hispanic							1.18
N	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259
R^2	0.0069	0.0120	0.0329	0.0564	0.0612	0.0622	0.0624
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 49259 (2002-2013) and 128992 (1976-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 7.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by political party affiliation after full controls. Results indicate that the predicted probability of the propensity to serve for Republican men is about 18 percent.

Conversely, the predicted probability of the propensity to serve for Democratic

men is about 11.5 percent. Independents have about a 14.5 percent probability of

serving.

Figure 7.3- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Party Affiliation
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Model 7 of Table 7.2 above includes an interaction between political party

affiliation and racial and ethnic background. Results indicate that there is a

significant difference (OR=1.35*) in the propensity to serve between black men

who affiliate with the Democratic Party compared to white men who affiliate with

the Republican Party. Figure 7.4 below indicates that, on average, black men who

affiliate with the Democratic Party have about a 12 percent predicted probability

of serving, whereas white men who affiliate with the Republican Party have about

an 18 percent predicted probability of serving. Interestingly, the biggest

difference in the predicted probability of the propensity to serve is between white

Democratic men and Hispanic Republican men. White Democratic men have

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about an 11 percent probability of serving, whereas Hispanic Republican men

have about an 18 percent probability of serving. Also of interest, Independents

have the greatest probability of serving among black men.

Figure 7.4- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Party Affiliation*Race
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 7.5 below reveals overall average trends of political ideology (men

only) between 1976-2013. Results show a fairly consistent percentage of men

who identify either as conservative or liberal over time. During the post-9/11 era,

it appears that men's trends are becoming slightly more conservative as opposed

to liberal after 2009, which is consistent with recent research (e.g. Pew 2013).

Additionally, it appears that men are more moderate in ideology than conservative

or liberal, although the moderate ideological trends of the male population appear

to have been on a modest decline since 1990.

Figure 7.5
Political Ideology Trends Among High School Seniors (Men Only), 1976-2013

Figure 7.6 below reveals overall average ideological trends of men with propensity between 1976-2013. Results show a fairly consistent percentage of men with propensity who identify as conservative as opposed to liberal over time. During the post-9/11 era, however, it appears that the gap between conservative and liberal attitudes among men with propensity has increased further. Additionally, data shows that men with propensity are becoming equally as conservative as moderate in ideology since 2005. Overall, results indicate a rise in conservatism and a decline in liberalism among men with propensity, which is not consistent with overall men's trends.

Figure 7.6
Political Ideology Trends Among Youth With Propensity (Men Only), 1976-2013

It is possible that youth may not fully understand what it means to identify

with a particular political ideology. To test this possibility, I compare a

respondent's political ideology with various attitudinal questions that are related

to conservative or liberal values. Specifically, I utilize the nationalism index that

I created earlier from questions on the MTF Form 2 survey (see Chapter 3 for

details on the questions used for the "nationalism" index) and compare attitudes

toward U.S. supremacy with a respondent's political ideology identification.

Greater numbers on the nationalism index indicate more conservative attitudes,

whereas lower numbers indicate more liberal attitudes toward U.S. supremacy. A

simple regression model using a respondent's score on the nationalism index as

the dependent variable and political ideology as the predictor variable supports

the notion that youth have a good understanding of what it means to identify with

a particular political ideology. Indeed, results indicate that youth who were most

conservative on the index also responded as having a conservative political ideology. Similarly, youth who scored lower on the nationalism index, indicating more liberal views, responded as having a liberal ideology. As expected, identification with a moderate ideology fell somewhere in the middle of scores on the nationalism index. In other words, men who identify as liberal score on average approximately 3.79 points less (p<.001) on the nationalism scale (indicating less conservative attitudes) compared to youth who identify as conservative.

Figure 7.7 below shows a box plot of a respondent's score on the nationalism scale by political ideology. As depicted, those who identify as having a conservative political ideology score highest on the nationalism scale while those who identify as having a liberal ideology score the lowest. Thus, data show that youth were consistent with responding to their attitudes on multiple questions measuring conservatism and their stated ideology.

Figure 7.7- Conservative Ideology by Nationalistic Attitudes, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Results from logistic regression analysis reported in Table 7.3 below indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables for men only. The primary predictor variable in Table 7.3 is the political ideology variable. Consistent with **hypothesis 7d,** findings indicate that men who expect to serve are significantly more likely to be conservative. Model 6 of Table 7.3 utilizes full control measures and indicates that men who identify as having a liberal political ideology are about half as likely (OR=0.54***) as conservatives to have the propensity to serve. Those who report having no political ideology, they don't know, or are reported as missing data are about a third less likely (OR=0.62***) to expect to serve compared to conservatives. Moderates are a quarter less likely (OR=0.75***) to have propensity compared to conservatives. It appears that men with propensity during the post-9/11 era are two times more conservative than liberal in political

ideology.

The magnitude and direction of these findings are strengthened even further when you compare high propensity versus low propensity men. High propensity men have even greater conservative ideologies compared to their low propensity counterparts. Model 6 of Table 7.3.1 utilizes full control measures and indicates that youth who identify as having a liberal ideology are nearly two-thirds as likely (OR=0.43***) as conservatives to have a high propensity to serve. Those who have no political ideology, don't know or are missing data are about half as likely (OR=0.51***) to have high propensity compared to conservatives. Moderates are about a third less likely (OR=0.70***) to have high propensity compared to conservatives. Results from this analysis are located in Table 7.3.1 of Appendix A.

Table 7.3
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=49259): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	0.98***	0.98**	0.99*	0.98**	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***
Casualties	0.95***	0.95***	0.96***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***
Unemployment	1.03**	1.03**	1.03***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***
Social-Psychological Influences							
Political Ideology (Conservative=Ref)							
Moderate	0.82***	0.79***	0.77***	0.74***	0.76***	0.75***	0.75***
Liberal	0.56***	0.53***	0.53***	0.52***	0.54***	0.54***	0.52***
Radical	0.99	0.96	0.88	0.75***	0.78***	0.78**	0.71***
None/Don't Know/Missing	0.87***	0.82***	0.74***	0.61***	0.62***	0.62***	0.60***
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		1.45***	1.10*	1.10*	1.02	1.01	0.86
Hispanic		1.52***	1.22***	1.22***	1.21***	1.19***	1.14
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.81***	0.88**	0.89**	0.89*	0.89**
Some college			0.80***	0.93	0.96	0.97	0.97
College			0.62***	0.77***	0.81***	0.82***	0.82***
Graduate School			0.56***	0.76***	0.81***	0.83**	0.83**
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.83***	0.87**	0.89*	0.89*	0.89*
Some College			0.83***	0.92	0.95	0.95	0.94
College			0.75***	0.87**	0.89	0.90	0.90
Graduate School			0.76***	0.92	0.95	0.96	0.96
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.31***	1.23***	1.22***	1.22***	1.22***
Father or Male Guardian			1.60***	1.42***	1.39***	1.39***	1.39***
None			1.91***	1.66***	1.61***	1.60***	1.60***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.80***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***
1			0.67***	0.69***	0.69***	0.69***	0.69***
None			0.59***	0.62***	0.62***	0.62***	0.62***
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.70***	0.68***	0.69***	0.69***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.72***	0.74***	0.76***	0.76***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.64***	0.66***		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.15*	1.15*	1.15*
Small City (<50k)					1.07	1.07	1.08
Medium City (50-100k)					0.93	0.93	0.93
Suburb of Med City					0.95	0.96	0.96
Large City (100-500k)					1.03	1.03	1.03
Suburb of Large City					0.84*	0.86*	0.86*
Very Large City (>500k)					0.94	0.95	0.95
Suburb of Very Large City					0.87	0.89	0.89
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					0.93	0.92*	0.92*
South					1.37***	1.34***	1.34***
West					1.02	0.99	0.99
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.67***	0.68***
2-Year College						1.16***	1.16***
Vocational/Technical School						1.09**	1.09*
Political Ideology/Race Interactions (Conservative/White=Ref)							
Moderate* Black							1.13
Moderate* Hispanic							0.92
Liberal* Black							1.32*
Liberal* Hispanic							1.10
Radical* Black							1.45
Radical* Hispanic							1.59
None/Don't Know/Missing* Black							1.22
None/Don't Know/Missing* Hispanic							1.08
N	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259
R^2	0.0083	0.0120	0.0324	0.0562	0.0613	0.0622	0.0625
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 49259 (2002-2013) and 128992 (1976-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 7.8 below depicts the predicted probabilities of the propensity to serve by political ideology after full controls. Results indicate that the predicted probability of the propensity to serve for conservative men is almost 19 percent.

Conversely, the predicted probability of the propensity to serve for liberal men is about 11.5 percent. Moderate and radical men are in between with approximately a 15 percent probability of serving.

Figure 7.8- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Political Ideology Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Model 7 of Table 7.3 includes an interaction between political ideology and racial and ethnic background. Results indicate significant differences (OR=1.32*) in the propensity to serve between black liberal men compared to white conservative men. Figure 7.9 below indicates that, on average, black liberal men have about a 12 percent predicted probability of serving, whereas white conservative men have about an 18 percent probability of serving. Interestingly, the biggest difference in predicted propensity is between white liberal men and Hispanic conservative men. White liberal men have about an 11 percent probability of serving, whereas Hispanic conservative men have about a 20

percent predicted probability of serving.

Figure 7.9- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Ideology*Race
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Table 7.4 below combines the political party and ideology variables into a model for analysis. Results reported in Table 7.4 indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables for men only. The primary predictor variables in Table 7.4 are both political attitudes variables: party affiliation and political ideology. When combining both variables to the model, results do not significantly change in magnitude or direction from the results above where only a single political variable was in the model. Consistent with *hypotheses 9a and 10a,* findings indicate that men who expect to serve are significantly more likely to be Republican and conservative compared to those who don't expect to serve. Model 6 of Table 7.4 utilizes full control measures, including political ideology as a control, indicating that men who affiliate with the Democratic Party are about

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one third as likely (OR=0.66***) as Republicans to have the propensity to serve. Those who have no preference, don't know or choose other are about a quarter less likely (OR=0.77***) to expect to serve compared to Republicans. Independents are about one fifth less likely (OR=0.85***) to have propensity compared to Republicans. Similarly, after controlling for political party affiliation, Model 6 of Table 7.4 indicates that men who identify as having a liberal political ideology are about one third as likely (OR=0.66***) as conservatives to have the propensity to serve. Those who report having no political ideology, don't know, or are reported as missing data are about a third less likely (OR=0.71***) to expect to serve compared to conservatives. Moderates are about one fifth less likely (OR=0.83***) to have propensity compared to conservatives.

The magnitude and direction of these findings are strengthened even further when you compare high propensity versus low propensity men. Those men with high propensity have even greater Republican Party affiliation and conservative ideology compared to men with low propensity. Results from this analysis are located in Table 7.4.1 of Appendix A.

Table 7.4
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=49259): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Macro-Social Influences								
Public Support (OIF)	0.98***	0.98**	0.99*	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***	0.98***
Casualties	0.95***	0.95***	0.96***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***
Unemployment	1.03**	1.03**	1.03**	1.03***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***	1.04***
Social-Psychological Influences								
Political Party (Republican=Ref)								
Independent	0.91*	0.88**	0.86**	0.84***	0.85***	0.85***	0.82***	0.85***
Democratic	0.76***	0.66***	0.65***	0.64***	0.66***	0.66***	0.63***	0.66***
No Preference/Other/Don't Know	0.93	0.86***	0.80***	0.76***	0.78***	0.77***	0.77***	0.78***
Political Ideology (Conservative=Ref)								
Moderate	0.87***	0.87***	0.85***	0.82***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***
Liberal	0.64***	0.65***	0.66***	0.65***	0.66***	0.66***	0.67***	0.65***
Radical	1.07	1.07	1.00	0.87	0.89	0.89	0.90	0.83
None/Don't Know/Missing	0.91*	0.90**	0.83***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***	0.70***
Individual/Demographic Influences								
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)								
Black		1.62***	1.22***	1.23***	1.13**	1.12**	0.96	1.05
Hispanic		1.58***	1.28***	1.28***	1.27***	1.24***	1.09	1.26
SES Disadvantage/Advantage								
Father's education (less than HS=ref)								
HS			0.81***	0.87**	0.88**	0.89**	0.89**	0.89**
Some college			0.79***	0.92	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96
College			0.61***	0.76***	0.80***	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***
Graduate School			0.55***	0.74***	0.79***	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)								
HS			0.83***	0.87**	0.89*	0.89*	0.89*	0.89*
Some College			0.83***	0.92	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94
College			0.75***	0.86**	0.89*	0.89*	0.89*	0.89*
Graduate School			0.77***	0.93	0.96	0.97	0.97	0.96
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)								
Mother or Female Guardian			1.33***	1.25***	1.24***	1.24***	1.24***	1.24***
Father or Male Guardian			1.60***	1.42***	1.40***	1.40***	1.40***	1.40***
None			1.92***	1.67***	1.62***	1.61***	1.62***	1.61***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)								
2			0.81***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***
1			0.67***	0.70***	0.69***	0.69***	0.69***	0.69***
None			0.59***	0.63***	0.62***	0.62***	0.62***	0.62***
Educational Attainment and Goals								
High School G.P.A.				0.69***	0.68***	0.69***	0.69***	0.69***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)								
College Preparatory				0.72***	0.73***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.64***	0.66***			
Additional Controls								
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)								
Country					1.16*	1.16*	1.16*	1.16*
Small City (<50k)					1.09	1.09	1.10	1.10
Medium City (50-100k)					0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95
Suburb of Med City					0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98
Large City (100-500k)					1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05
Suburb of Large City					0.86*	0.87	0.87	0.87
Very Large City (>500k)					0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98
Suburb of Very Large City					0.88	0.90	0.90	0.90
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)								
North Central					0.92	0.91*	0.91*	0.91*
South					1.34***	1.31***	1.31***	1.31***
West					1.00	0.98	0.97	0.97
Additional Pathways								
4-Year College						0.68***	0.67***	0.68***
2-Year College						1.16***	1.16***	1.16***
Vocational/Technical School						1.09**	1.09**	1.09**
Political Party/Race Interactions (Republican/White=Ref)								
Independent* Black							1.41	
Independent* Hispanic							1.14	
Democratic* Black							1.26	
Democratic* Hispanic							1.24	
No Preference/Other/Don't Know* Black							1.12	
No Preference/Other/Don't Know* Hispanic							1.14	
Political Ideology/Race Interactions (Conservative/White=Ref)								
Moderate* Black								1.06
Moderate* Hispanic								0.89
Liberal* Black								1.14
Liberal* Hispanic								1.02
Radical* Black								1.25
Radical* Hispanic								1.47
None/Don't Know/Missing* Black								1.07
None/Don't Know/Missing* Hispanic								1.01
N	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259	49259
R^2	0.0094	0.0142	0.0348	0.0588	0.0635	0.0645	0.0647	0.0647
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 49259 (2002-2013) and 128992 (1976-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 7.10 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by political party affiliation after controlling for all variables in the model to include

political ideology. Results indicate that the predicted probability of the propensity

to serve for Republican men is almost 17 percent. Conversely, the predicted

probability of the propensity to serve for Democratic men is less than 12 percent.

Independents remain in between with approximately a 14.5 percent probability of

serving.

Figure 7.10- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Party Affiliation
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 7.11 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by

political ideology after controlling for all variables in the model to include

political party affiliation. Results indicate that the predicted probability of the

propensity to serve for conservative men is almost 17 percent. Conversely, the

predicted probability of the propensity to serve for liberal men is about 12

percent. Moderate and radical men remain in between at approximately a 15

percent probability of serving.

Figure 7.11- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Political Ideology
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Model 7 of Table 7.4 includes an interaction between political party affiliation and racial and ethnic background. Similarly, Model 8 of Table 7.4 includes an interaction between political ideology and racial and ethnic background. Results indicate no significant differences between racial and ethnic background and either political party or ideology.

Racial/Ethnic Differences in Political Attitudes Among Men with Propensity

In a separate but related analysis, Table 7.5 below reports differences in means of political party affiliation for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era. My dependent variable for analysis is the political party affiliation variable which is coded on a scale of 1 to 3 (1=Republican, 2=Independent, 3=Democrat), where all other responses of "No Preference," "Other," or "Don't Know" are dropped from the analysis since they would skew results. Table 7.5 shows that, on average, men with propensity, regardless of racial and ethnic background, lean

significantly away from the Democratic Party compared to men of the same race/ethnicity without propensity. However, black and Hispanic men with propensity still lean more toward Democratic Party affiliation compared to white men, even among youth with propensity. White men with propensity affiliate with the Republican Party significantly more than their black and Hispanic counterparts respectively. Similar results appear between racial and ethnic groups when comparing men with high and low propensity. Results also show that men with propensity during the post-9/11 era lean more toward the Republican Party than men with propensity prior to 9/11.

Table 7.5
Difference of Means for Political Party by Key Analysis Groups During Post-9/11 Era (Men Only)

Political Party Affiliation (1-Republican; 2-Independent; 3-Democratic)			N
Youth Without Propensity	Mean 1	1.97	36451
Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	1.81	6967
	Difference	0.16	
	Std Error	0.01	
	t	13.96***	
Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.05	25075
Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.72	3087
	Difference	0.33	
	Std Error	0.02	
	t	19.50***	
White Youth Without Propensity	Mean 1	1.80	25683
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	1.57	4434
	Difference	0.23	
	Std Error	0.87	
	t	16.31***	
White Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 1	1.88	17146
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.52	2083
	Difference	0.36	
	Std Error	0.02	
	t	17.63***	
Black Youth Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.65	3168
Black Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	2.57	756
	Difference	0.08	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	2.96**	
Black Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.67	2549
Black Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.54	276
	Difference	0.13	
	Std Error	0.04	
	t	3.06**	
Hispanic Youth Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.34	2884
Hispanic Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	2.17	659
	Difference	0.17	
	Std Error	0.04	
	t	4.69***	
Hispanic Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.38	2078
HIspanic Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.16	243
	Difference	0.23	
	Std Error	0.06	
	t	4.07***	
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	1.57	4434
Black Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	2.57	756
	Difference	-1	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	-32.69***	
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	1.52	2083
Black Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.54	276
	Difference	-1.02	
	Std Error	0.05	
	t	-20.94***	
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	1.57	4434
Hispanic Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	2.17	659
	Difference	-0.60	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	-18.11***	
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	1.52	2083
Hispanic Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.16	243
	Difference	-.64	
	Std Error	0.05	
	t	-12.09***	
Youth With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 2	1.93	18579
Youth With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 1	1.81	6967
	Difference	0.13	
	SD	0.01	
	t	9.65***	

Note: p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Utilizing linear regression analysis, I analyze racial and ethnic differences in political party affiliation among men with propensity. The dependent variable in Table 7.6 below is political party affiliation and the primary predictor variable in Table 7.6 is the race/ethnicity variable. After full controls (i.e. SES, educational attainment and goals, urbanicity, and region of country), results reported in Model 3 of Table 7.6 reveal significant differences between political party affiliation and racial and ethnic background similar to the results noted above from the difference of means test. Consistent with *hypothesis 7b,* black men with propensity are significantly more Democratic in party affiliation compared to their white counterparts. On average, black men score about .94 higher (p<.001) on the scale of 1 to 3. Similarly, Hispanic men with propensity score about 0.52 higher (p<.001) on the same scale compared to their white counterparts.

A comparison of racial and ethnic differences in political party affiliation among men with high propensity shows that there are no changes in magnitude and direction from the results noted above. Results from this analysis are reported in Table 7.6.1 of Appendix A.

Table 7.6
Political Party Affiliation (1=Rep; 2=Ind; 3=Dem) of Youth by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only With Propensity to Serve (N=4362)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Casualties	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02*
Unemployment	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	0.99***	0.94***	0.94***
Hispanic	0.60***	0.56***	0.52***
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.06	-0.07
Some college		-0.10*	-0.10*
College		-0.20***	-0.20***
Graduate School		-0.17***	-0.17***
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.03	-0.02
Some College		-0.05	-0.05
College		-0.03	-0.03
Graduate School		0.02	0.02
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.15***	0.13***
Father or Male Guardian		0.19***	0.18***
None		0.10	0.10
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		0.04	0.04
1		0.03	0.03
None		0.04	0.03
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.07***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.02
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			0.12*
Small City (<50k)			0.18**
Medium City (50-100k)			0.16**
Suburb of Med City			0.14*
Large City (100-500k)			0.21***
Suburb of Large City			0.19**
Very Large City (>500k)			0.25***
Suburb of Very Large City			0.21**
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.10**
South			-0.20***
West			-0.14***
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.04
2-Year College			0.07**
Vocational/Technical School			0.02
CONSTANT	1.77	1.87	1.98
N	4362	4362	4362
R^2	0.1571	0.1710	0.1869
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 4362 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 7.12 below depicts political party affiliation by race and ethnic

background among men with the propensity to serve after full controls. On

average, white men with propensity score about 1.57 (on a scale of 1 to 3)

indicating more Republican affiliations compared to black men who score 2.51

and Hispanic men who score 2.09.

Figure 7.12- Political Party Affiliation by Race/Ethnicity
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

  Not surprisingly, results from Model 3 of Table 7.6 also indicate that higher

socioeconomic status is related to a greater Republican Party affiliation as

opposed to identifying as an Independent or affiliating with the Democratic Party.

Additionally, it appears that greater educational attainment (i.e. G.P.A.) is related

to greater Republican Party affiliations as well. Not surprisingly, it appears that

growing up in a city or the suburbs of a city is related to greater affiliation with

the Democratic Party. These results support earlier research (e.g. Segal et al.

2001; Dempsey 2010). Indeed, my research suggests that men with propensity

are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party and they are more likely to

be white, of a higher class, have a higher grade point average, and reside outside a

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small city or in the country in the southern region of the country.

Table 7.7 below reports differences in means of political party affiliation for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era. My dependent variable for this analysis is the political ideology variable on a scale of 1 to 3 (1=Conservative, 2=Moderate, 3=Liberal), where all responses of "Radical," "None," "Don't Know," or missing data are dropped from the analysis since they would skew results. Prior to controls, results show that, on average, men with propensity, regardless of racial and ethnic background, lean significantly toward a conservative ideology compared to men of the same race/ethnicity without propensity. White men with propensity identify closer to a conservative ideology than their black and Hispanic counterparts respectively. Similar results appear between racial and ethnic groups when comparing men with high and low propensity. Results also show that men with propensity during the post-9/11 era are significantly more conservative than men with propensity prior to 9/11.

Table 7.7
Difference of Means for Political Ideology by Key Analysis Groups During Post-9/11 Era (Men Only)

Political Ideology (1-Conservative; 2-Moderate; 3-Liberal)			N
Youth Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.02	39007
Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	1.85	7327
	Difference	0.16	
	Std Error	0.01	
	t	16.33***	
Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.07	26665
Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.81	3173
	Difference	0.26	
	Std Error	0.01	
	t	17.96***	
White Youth Without Propensity	Mean 1	1.95	27147
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	1.76	4509
	Difference	0.19	
	Std Error	0.01	
	t	15.24***	
White Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.02	18094
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.73	2120
	Difference	0.29	
	Std Error	0.02	
	t	15.92***	
Black Youth Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.08	3182
Black Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	1.94	788
	Difference	0.14	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	4.87***	
Black Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.09	2519
Black Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.94	275
	Difference	0.15	
	Std Error	0.05	
	t	3.11**	
Hispanic Youth Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.23	3284
Hispanic Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	2.08	786
	Difference	0.15	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	4.98***	
Hispanic Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.26	2340
Hispanic Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.02	268
	Difference	0.23	
	Std Error	0.05	
	t	4.91***	
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	1.76	4509
Black Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	1.94	788
	Difference	-0.18	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	-6.15***	
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	1.73	2120
Black Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.94	275
	Difference	-0.21	
	Std Error	0.05	
	t	-4.45***	
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	1.76	4509
Hispanic Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	2.08	786
	Difference	-0.32	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	-10.92***	
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	1.73	2120
Hispanic Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.02	268
	Difference	-0.29	
	Std Error	0.05	
	t	-6.09***	
Youth With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	1.94	23692
Youth With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	1.85	7327
	Difference	0.08	
	SD	0.01	
	t	8.40***	

Note: p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

In a similar analysis to above, I analyze racial and ethnic differences in political ideology among men with propensity utilizing linear regression. The dependent variable in Table 7.8 below is political ideology and the primary predictor variable in Table 7.8 is the race/ethnicity variable. After full controls, results reported in Model 3 of Table 7.8 reveal significant differences between political ideology and racial and ethnic background similar to the results noted above from the difference of means test. Consistent with **hypothesis 7e,** black men with propensity are significantly more liberal compared to their white counterparts. On average, black men are about .14 higher ($p<.001$) on the scale of 1 to 3 in the liberal direction. Similarly, Hispanic men with propensity are about .29 higher ($p<.001$) on the same scale compared to their white counterparts.

A comparison of racial and ethnic differences in political ideology among men with high propensity shows that there are no changes in magnitude and direction from the results noted above. Results from this analysis are reported in Table 7.8.1 of Appendix A.

Table 7.8
Political Ideology (1=Cons; 2=Mod; 3=Lib) of Youth by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only With Propensity to Serve (N=4563)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	0.01*	0.01*	0.01*
Casualties	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Unemployment	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	0.22***	0.17***	0.14***
Hispanic	0.36***	0.33***	0.29***
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.01	0.01
Some college		-0.02	-0.01
College		-0.08	-0.07
Graduate School		-0.07	-0.06
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.01	-0.01
Some College		-0.00	0.00
College		-0.04	-0.04
Graduate School		0.00	0.01
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.09**	0.08**
Father or Male Guardian		0.06	0.05
None		0.07	0.07
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		0.02	0.02
1		-0.02	-0.01
None		0.01	0.01
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.05*
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.06
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			0.00
Small City (<50k)			0.11*
Medium City (50-100k)			0.10
Suburb of Med City			0.10
Large City (100-500k)			0.22***
Suburb of Large City			0.13*
Very Large City (>500k)			.17**
Suburb of Very Large City			0.10
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.03
South			-0.08**
West			-0.12***
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.03
2-Year College			0.02
Vocational/Technical School			0.02
CONSTANT	1.75	1.87	1.86
N	4563	4563	4563
R^2	0.0289	0.0362	0.1869
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 4362 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;

p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

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Figure 7.13 below depicts political ideology by race and ethnic background among men with the propensity to serve after full controls. On average, white men with propensity score about 1.77 (on scale of 1 to 3) indicating a more conservative ideology compared to black men who score 1.91 and Hispanic men who score 2.06.

Figure 7.13- Political Ideology by Race/Ethnicity Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Interestingly, results from Model 3 of Table 7.8 indicate that higher socioeconomic status is not significantly related to identification with a conservative ideology as opposed to a moderate or liberal ideology. Additionally, it appears that greater educational attainment (i.e. G.P.A.) is related to a greater conservative ideology. Not surprisingly, it appears that growing up in a city or the suburb of a city is related to greater affiliation with a liberal ideology. These results support earlier research (e.g. Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010). Indeed, my research suggests that men with propensity are more likely to be conservative,

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and they are more likely to be white with a higher grade point average and reside
somewhere outside a major city in the southern or western region of the country.

Women's Propensity and Political Attitudes Analysis

Descriptive statistics for my analysis of women's propensity by the primary
predictor variables, political party affiliation and political ideology, are reported
in Table 7.9 below. For brevity sake and continuity, I focus the report and
discussion that follows on the results reported in my full model (i.e. Model 6)
utilizing all control variables, to include the political party and ideology variables
together in the model (similar to Table 7.4 above for men). Results do not
significantly change in magnitude or direction when I analyze the relationship
between women's propensity and either political party affiliation or ideology
separately.

Table 7.9
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Analysis (Percent):
Years 1976-2013 (Women Only)

	2002-2013	1976-2013
Dependent Variables		
Military Propensity (Definitely/Probably Will Serve)	4.58%	4.64%
High Propensity (Definitely Will Serve)	1.65%	1.70%
Political Party		
Republican	28.83%	23.25%
Independent	8.89%	5.74%
Democratic	25.78%	24.56%
No Preference/Other/Don't Know	41.51%	46.44%
Political Ideology		
Conservative	16.72%	15.03%
Moderate	24.93%	27.77%
Liberal	21.86%	21.94%
Radical	0.79%	0.97%
None/Don't Know/Missing	35.70%	34.29%
Independent Variables of Primary Interest		
Race/Ethnicity		
White	79.48%	84.00%
Black	12.29%	12.90%
Hispanic	8.24%	3.10%
SES Disadvantage/Advantage		
Father's Education		
Less than HS	10.22%	10.45%
HS	31.04%	31.49%
Some College	18.88%	19.10%
College	24.62%	23.65%
Graduate School	15.23%	15.32%
Mother's Education		
Less than HS	7.03%	8.12%
HS	26.94%	32.55%
Some College	23.01%	22.73%
College	29.06%	24.43%
Graduate School	13.96%	12.16%
Family Structure (# of parent/guardian in household)		
Both Parents or Guardians	71.80%	73.82%
Mother or Female Guardian	20.17%	18.69%
Father or Male Guardian	4.04%	3.41%
None	3.99%	4.08%
Number of Siblings		
3+	35.59%	36.06%
2	27.56%	27.28%
1	31.34%	31.36%
None	5.52%	5.30%
N	52356	139284

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Table 7.9 (cont)
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Analysis (Percent):
Years 1976-2013 (Women Only)

	2002-2013	1976-2013
Educational Attainment and Goals		
High School G.P.A.		
D/C-	1.65%	2.13%
C	3.10%	4.60%
C+	6.34%	8.02%
B-	9.31%	11.26%
B	16.44%	19.03%
B+	19.26%	19.56%
A-	21.59%	17.90%
A	22.32%	17.51%
HS Curriculum		
Other	37.71%	37.63%
College Preparatory	62.29%	62.37%
Expectation to graduate from College (4-yr)	87.96%	81.68%
Additional Controls		
Where you grew up/live		
Farm	3.78%	4.03%
Country	11.52%	11.44%
Small City (<50k)	29.34%	30.40%
Medium City (50-100k)	15.36%	15.20%
Suburb of Med City	12.69%	10.84%
Large City (100-500k)	9.57%	9.38%
Suburb of Large City	9.00%	9.23%
Very Large City (>500k)	4.64%	4.90%
Suburb of Very Large City	4.19%	4.59%
Region of Country		
Northeast	21.58%	21.81%
North Central	28.81%	29.28%
South	32.70%	33.17%
West	16.91%	15.74%
Additional Pathways		
4-Year College	87.96%	81.68%
2-Year College	36.14%	34.80%
Vocational/Technical School	14.26%	15.73%
Other	1.70%	3.18%
N	**52356**	**139284**

Figure 7.14 below depicts the overall average youth trends of political party affiliation for women only between 1976-2013 prior to additional controls. Results reveal a general pattern of greater Democratic Party affiliation among young women. On average, women tend to affiliate with the Democratic Party approximately 5 to 10 percent more than with the Republican Party. Those

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women who identify as an Independent are comparatively lower than the two

parties. Similar to men, there are a high percentage of young women who have

no preference toward a political party, don't know, or there is missing data,

although percentages have declined during the post-9/11 era.

Figure 7.14
Political Party Trends Among High School Seniors (Women Only), 1976-2013

Figure 7.15 below reveals the overall average trends of political party

affiliation for women with military propensity between 1976-2013 prior to

additional controls. Similar to the population of young women overall, results

show a fairly consistent percentage of young women with propensity who affiliate

with the Democratic Party since the beginning of the AVF. These trends are not

consistent with the trends among men with propensity who generally affiliate with

the Republican Party. These results support **hypothesis 7c**. During the post-9/11

era, however, it appears that the gap among women with propensity who affiliate

with the Democratic Party compared to the Republican Party has somewhat

decreased. Interestingly, data show that women with propensity who identify as an Independent has slightly increased since 2004.

Figure 7.15
Political Party Trends Among Youth With Propensity (Women Only), 1976-2013

Figure 7.16 below reveals the overall average ideological trends of women between 1976-2013 prior to additional controls. Not surprisingly, results show a fairly consistent percentage of young women who identify mostly as a moderate or a liberal over time. Although moderate trends remain high among women, they have been on a slight decline since the 1990s. Women are least likely to be conservative, although conservative trends appear to be on a slight rise during the post-9/11 era. In comparison, women are much less conservative than men. However, results show that both men and women are more moderate than conservative or liberal in ideology.

Figure 7.16

Political Ideology Trends Among High School Seniors (Women Only), 1976-2013

Figure 7.17 below reveals the overall average ideological trends of women with propensity between 1976-2013 prior to additional controls. Trends show a fairly consistent percentage of women with propensity who identify most with a moderate political ideology. Unlike men, trends show that women with propensity are more liberal than conservative, which is consistent with **hypothesis 7f**. During the post-9/11 era, however, it appears that the gap between liberal and conservative attitudes among women with propensity has decreased. Overall, results indicate a rise in conservatism and a decline in liberalism among youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era, which is not consistent with overall women's trends. Moderate ideology remains highest among women with propensity during the post-9/11 era.

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Figure 7.17
Political Ideology Trends Among Youth With Propensity (Women Only), 1976-2013

Interestingly, about 45 percent of women with propensity affiliate with the either the Republican or Democratic Party. For men, over 50 percent of youth with propensity identify with one of the two major political parties. In contrast, Dempsey (2010) found that only 31 percent of the junior enlisted population identified as either a Republican or Democrat. It appears that both women and men with propensity are becoming less apolitical than Dempsey suggested during the post-9/11 era.

Table 7.10 below combines the political party and ideology variables into a model for analysis. Results reported in Table 7.10 indicate the odds ratios of women's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables. The primary predictor variables in Table 7.10 are both political attitudes variables: party affiliation and political ideology. Findings indicate that young women who expect to serve are significantly more likely to be Republican and conservative compared to those who don't expect to serve.

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Model 6 of Table 7.10 utilizes full control measures, including political ideology as a control, indicating that women who affiliate with the Democratic Party are about one quarter less likely (OR=0.78***) than Republicans to have the propensity to serve. Those who have no preference, don't know or choose other are no more likely (OR=0.88) than Republicans to expect to serve. Interestingly, Independents are about one and a quarter times more likely (OR=1.20*) than Republicans to have propensity. Consistent with *hypothesis 7c*, results for women are different than results for men, suggesting that men with propensity are more likely to be Republican than women. Of note, the percentage of women who identify as an Independent is relatively low at about 10 percent compared to those who affiliate with the Republican Party (see Table 7.9).

Interestingly, it appears that controlling for racial and ethnic background changes the magnitude and direction of the political party predictor variable. Model 1 of Table 7.10 shows that Republican women are least likely to have propensity prior to controlling for race and ethnic background. However, after controlling for race/ethnicity, Model 2 of Table 7.10 shows that Democratic women are least likely to have propensity. This suggests that for women, race is the most significant predictor of political party. This is not the case for men, where men who affiliate with the Republican Party are most likely to have propensity (see Table 7.4 above), regardless of racial and ethnic background.

Similarly, after controlling for political party affiliation, Model 6 of Table 7.10 indicates that young women who identify as having a liberal political ideology are about one quarter as likely (OR=0.78**) as conservatives to have the

propensity to serve. Those who report having no political ideology, don't know, or are reported as missing data are about a fifth less likely (OR=0.81**) to expect to serve compared to conservatives. There are no significant differences in women's propensity between moderates (OR=0.91) and radicals (OR=1.02) compared to conservatives. These results are generally consistent with the results for men, suggesting that conservative women are more likely to have propensity than liberal women.

Table 7.10
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Women Only (N=52356): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Macro-Social Influences								
Public Support (OIF)	0.97***	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**	0.97***	0.97**	0.97**	0.97**
Casualties	0.93***	0.93***	0.93***	0.92***	0.92***	0.92***	0.92***	0.92***
Unemployment	1.02	1.00	1.01	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.01	1.01
Social-Psychological Influences								
Political Party (Republican=Ref)								
Independent	1.73***	1.33***	1.23*	1.17	1.22*	1.20*	1.31**	1.17
Democratic	1.48***	0.78***	0.74***	0.73***	0.78***	0.78***	0.78**	0.76***
No Preference/Other/Don't Know	1.45***	1.03	0.91	0.85*	0.89	0.88	0.84*	0.86*
Political Ideology (Conservative=Ref)								
Moderate	0.83**	0.90	0.90	0.89	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.97
Liberal	0.54***	0.69***	0.74***	0.74***	0.77**	0.78**	0.78**	0.90
Radical	1.07	1.14	1.09	0.99	1.01	1.02	1.02	1.42
None/Don't Know/Missing	0.87	0.91	0.86*	0.80**	0.81**	0.81**	0.81**	0.85
Individual/Demographic Influences								
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)								
Black		4.17***	3.20***	3.10***	2.77***	2.75***	2.52***	3.39***
Hispanic		2.33***	1.88***	1.80***	1.76***	1.73***	1.66**	1.78**
SES Disadvantage/Advantage								
Father's education (less than HS=ref)								
HS			0.91	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98
Some college			0.76***	0.83*	0.86*	0.87	0.87	0.87
College			0.65***	0.73***	0.77***	0.79**	0.79**	0.79**
Graduate School			0.48***	0.56***	0.60***	0.62***	0.61***	0.62***
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)								
HS			0.70***	0.73***	0.74***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***
Some College			0.70***	0.76***	0.79**	0.80**	0.80**	0.80**
College			0.61***	0.68***	0.71***	0.72***	0.72***	0.73***
Graduate School			0.63***	0.72***	0.75**	0.78*	0.78**	0.78**
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)								
Mother or Female Guardian			1.18**	1.12*	1.11*	1.10	1.10	1.10
Father or Male Guardian			1.59***	1.49***	1.48***	1.47***	1.47***	1.47***
None			1.82***	1.63***	1.54***	1.52***	1.52***	1.51***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)								
2			0.77***	0.80***	0.80***	0.81***	0.81***	0.81***
1			0.63***	0.65***	0.65***	0.66***	0.66***	0.66***
None			0.57***	0.61***	0.60***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***
Educational Attainment and Goals								
High School G.P.A.				0.70***	0.68***	0.71***	0.71***	0.71***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)								
College Preparatory				0.79***	0.80***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.71***	0.74***			
Additional Controls								
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)								
Country					0.98	0.97	0.97	0.96
Small City (<50k)					0.92	0.92	0.91	0.91
Medium City (50-100k)					0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80
Suburb of Med City					0.74*	0.75*	0.75*	0.74*
Large City (100-500k)					0.83	0.84	0.84	0.83
Suburb of Large City					0.71*	0.73*	0.73*	0.72*
Very Large City (>500k)					0.93	0.95	0.95	0.94
Suburb of Very Large City					0.68*	0.70*	0.69*	0.69*
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)								
North Central					1.06	1.04	1.04	1.04
South					1.66***	1.59***	1.59***	1.60***
West					1.21*	1.16	1.15	1.16
Additional Pathways								
4-Year College						0.79***	0.79***	0.79***
2-Year College						1.20***	1.20***	1.20***
Vocational/Technical School						1.23***	1.23***	1.23***
Political Party/Race Interactions (Republican/White=Ref)								
Independent* Black							0.85	
Independent* Hispanic							0.73	
Democratic* Black							1.10	
Democratic* Hispanic							0.92	
No Preference/Other/Don't Know* Black							1.15	
No Preference/Other/Don't Know* Hispanic							1.20	
Political Ideology/Race Interactions (Conservative/White=Ref)								
Moderate* Black								0.80
Moderate* Hispanic								0.96
Liberal* Black								0.71
Liberal* Hispanic								0.76
Radical* Black								0.52
Radical* Hispanic								0.38
None/Don't Know/Missing* Black								0.82
None/Don't Know/Missing* Hispanic								1.12
N	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356	52356
R^2	0.0098	0.0471	0.0693	0.0812	0.0878	0.0896	0.0900	0.0902
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 52356 (2002-2013) and 128992 (1976-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 7.18 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women's propensity to serve by political party affiliation after controlling for all variables in Model 6 to

include political ideology. Results indicate that the predicted probability of the propensity to serve for Independent women is almost 6 percent. Conversely, the predicted probability of the propensity to serve for Democratic women is about 4 percent. Republican women are in between with an approximate 5 percent probability of serving. As already noted, the preponderance of women identify with the Republican or Democratic Party as opposed to identifying as an Independent.

Figure 7.18- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Party Affiliation Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Political Party Affiliation

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 7.19 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women's propensity to serve by political ideology after controlling for all variables in Model 6 to include political party affiliation. Results indicate that the predicted probability of the propensity to serve for conservative women is about 5.5 percent. Conversely, the predicted probability of the propensity to serve for liberal women is about 4 percent. Interestingly, women who identify with a radical ideology have the

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highest propensity at about 5.5 percent, but standard errors are much higher for this group as the percentage of women who identify this way is less than one percent (see Table 7.9).

Figure 7.19- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Ideology
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Racial/Ethnic Differences in Political Attitudes

Among Women with Propensity

Table 7.11 below reports differences in means of political party affiliation for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era for women only. Similar to men's analysis, my dependent variable for this analysis is the political party variable on a scale of 1 to 3 (1=Republican, 2=Independent, 3=Democrat). Results show that, on average, white women with propensity, lean significantly toward the Republican Party compared to white women without propensity. Additionally, results reveal that white women with propensity lean significantly more (p<.001) toward the Republican Party than their black and Hispanic counterparts. On average, all black women, regardless of propensity, appear to

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lean most toward the Democratic Party. As noted earlier, men with propensity

lean more toward the Republican Party than their women counterparts. Of note,

women with propensity during the post-9/11 era lean significantly farther

($p<.001$) from the Democratic Party compared to years prior to 9/11.

Table 7.11
Difference of Means for Political Party by Key Analysis Groups During Post-9/11 Era (Women Only)

Political Party Affiliation (1-Republican; 2-Independent; 3-Democratic)			N
Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.03	29318
Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.08	1307
	Difference	-0.05	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	-1.86	
White Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	1.90	23994
White Women With Propensity	Mean 2	1.73	784
	Difference	0.17	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	5.04***	
Black Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.79	3294
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.72	397
	Difference	0.07	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	2.43*	
Hispanic Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.39	2030
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.25	126
	Difference	0.14	
	Std Error	0.08	
	t	1.86	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	1.73	784
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.72	397
	Difference	-0.98	
	Std Error	0.05	
	t	-20.88***	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	1.73	784
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.25	126
	Difference	-0.52	
	Std Error	0.08	
	t	-6.40***	
Women With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.23	2044
Women With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.08	1307
	Difference	0.15	
	SD	0.03	
	t	4.51***	
Men With Propensity- Post- 9/11 Era	Mean 1	1.73	4362
Women With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.08	1307
	Difference	-0.35	
	SD	0.03	
	t	-12.89***	

Note: p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

In a separate but related analysis, I analyze racial and ethnic differences in political party affiliation and ideology among women with propensity. Utilizing linear regression analysis similar to the men's analysis above, results reported in Model 3 of Table 7.12 below reveal significant differences between political party

affiliation and racial and ethnic background among women with propensity after

full controls. These results are similar in magnitude and direction to the results

for men. Not surprisingly, black women with propensity are significantly more

Democratic in party affiliation compared to their white counterparts. On average,

black women score about .95 higher (p<.001) on the scale of 1 to 3. Similarly,

Hispanic women with propensity score about 0.52 higher (p<.001) on the same

scale compared to their white counterparts. These findings are generally

consistent with Dempsey's (2010) research, although with greater significance.

Table 7.12
Political Party Affiliation (1=Rep; 2=Ind; 3=Dem) of Youth by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Women Only With Propensity to Serve (N=1307)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
Casualties	-0.03**	-0.04**	-0.04**
Unemployment	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03*
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	0.99***	0.96***	0.95***
Hispanic	0.52***	0.50***	0.52***
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.04	-0.03
Some college		-0.18*	-0.18*
College		-0.19*	-0.21**
Graduate School		-0.10	-0.12
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.09	0.08
Some College		0.02	0.01
College		0.12	0.11
Graduate School		-0.09	-0.10
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.05	0.06
Father or Male Guardian		0.02	0.02
None		0.01	0.03
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		0.14**	0.13*
1		-0.01	-0.01
None		0.31**	0.29**
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			0.02
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			0.05
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			0.13
Small City (<50k)			0.23
Medium City (50-100k)			0.14
Suburb of Med City			0.36**
Large City (100-500k)			0.25
Suburb of Large City			0.19
Very Large City (>500k)			0.15
Suburb of Very Large City			0.39*
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			0.03
South			-0.01
West			-0.08
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.02
2-Year College			0.00
Vocational/Technical School			0.07
CONSTANT	2.29	2.26	1.95
N	1307	1307	1307
R^2	0.2542	0.2741	0.2853
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 1307 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;

p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

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Figure 7.20 below depicts political party affiliation by race and ethnic background among women with the propensity to serve after full controls. On average, white women with propensity score about 1.74 (on a scale of 1 to 3) indicating a significantly more Republican affiliation compared to black women who score 2.69 and Hispanic women who score 2.27. Consistent with earlier research (e.g. Dempsey 2010), data suggests that, on average, all women with propensity lean more toward the Democratic Party than their male counterparts.

Figure 7.20- Political Party Affiliation by Race/Ethnicity
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Table 7.13 below reports differences in means of political ideology affiliation for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era for women only. Similar to the men's analysis, my dependent variable for this analysis is the political ideology variable on a scale of 1 to 3 (1=Conservative, 2=Moderate, 3=Liberal). Prior to controls, results show that, on average, women with propensity, regardless of racial and ethnic background, lean significantly toward a

conservative ideology (p<.001) compared to women of the same race/ethnicity

without propensity. Black women with propensity identify closest with a

conservative ideology compared to their white and Hispanic counterparts. Results

also show that women with propensity during the post-9/11 era are significantly

more conservative (p<.001) than women with propensity prior to 9/11. As noted

earlier, men with propensity are significantly more (p<.001) conservative than

their women counterparts.

Table 7.13
Difference of Means for Political Ideology by Key Analysis Groups During Post-9/11 Era (Women Only)

Political Ideology (1-Conservative; 2-Moderate; 3-Liberal)			N
Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.09	31853
Women With Propensity	Mean 2	1.98	1398
	Difference	0.11	
	Std Error	0.02	
	t	5.15***	
White Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.06	26297
White Women With Propensity	Mean 2	1.97	829
	Difference	0.1	
	Std Error	0.03	
	t	3.51***	
Black Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.13	3125
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	1.95	407
	Difference	0.19	
	Std Error	0.04	
	t	4.91***	
Hispanic Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.27	2431
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.10	162
	Difference	0.16	
	Std Error	0.06	
	t	2.72**	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	1.97	829
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	1.95	407
	Difference	0.02	
	Std Error	0.05	
	t	0.45	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	1.97	829
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	2.10	162
	Difference	-0.14	
	Std Error	0.07	
	t	-2.12*	
Women With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.09	5538
Women With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	1.98	1398
	Difference	0.11	
	SD	0.02	
	t	4.64***	
Men With Propensity- Post- 9/11 Era	Mean 1	1.81	4563
Women With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	1.98	1398
	Difference	-0.17	
	SD	0.02	
	t	-7.22***	

Note: p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

   In a similar analysis to above, I analyze racial and ethnic differences in

political ideology among women with propensity utilizing linear regression.

After full controls, results reported in Model 3 of Table 7.14 below reveal

significant differences between political ideology and racial and ethnic

background. It appears that black women with propensity are no more liberal compared to their white counterparts. On average, black women with propensity average about .06 less than white women on the scale of 1 to 3 in the more conservative direction, although results are insignificant. On the other hand, Hispanic women with propensity average about .14 higher (p<.05) on the same scale, indicating a significantly more liberal ideology compared to their white counterparts.

Table 7.14
Political Ideology (1=Cons; 2=Mod; 3=Lib) of Youth by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Women Only With Propensity to Serve (N=1398)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	0.01	0.01	0.01
Casualties	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Unemployment	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	-0.02	-0.05	-0.06
Hispanic	0.18**	0.17*	0.14*
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.00	-0.02
Some college		-0.07	-0.08
College		-0.11	-0.12
Graduate School		-0.12	-0.14
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.00	0.01
Some College		0.02	0.01
College		0.05	0.05
Graduate School		0.00	0.00
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.07	0.07
Father or Male Guardian		-0.10	-0.11
None		-0.02	0.00
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		0.05	0.04
1		-0.01	0.00
None		0.08	0.08
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			0.04
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.05
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			0.18
Small City (<50k)			0.23*
Medium City (50-100k)			0.13
Suburb of Med City			0.35**
Large City (100-500k)			0.27*
Suburb of Large City			0.42**
Very Large City (>500k)			0.29*
Suburb of Very Large City			0.35*
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			0.01
South			-0.02
West			-0.02
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			-0.01
2-Year College			0.10*
Vocational/Technical School			-0.08
CONSTANT	1.91	1.92	1.64
N	1398	1398	1398
R^2	0.0120	0.0212	0.0405
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 1398 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 7.21 below depicts political ideology by racial and ethnic background among women with propensity after full controls. On average, white women with

propensity score about 1.97 (on scale of 1 to 3), whereas black women score 1.92.
These differences are not significant. Results indicate that white women with
propensity are significantly more conservative (p<.05) than Hispanic women who
score 2.11 on the scale. Black women with propensity appear to be the most
conservative in ideology. These findings are different than the findings for men,
which showed that white men with propensity are significantly more conservative
than black or Hispanic men. Consistent with earlier research (e.g. Dempsey
2010), data suggests that, on average, all women with propensity are more liberal
than their male counterparts.

Figure 7.21- Political Ideology by Race/Ethnicity
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

In sum, after controlling for all factors in the model, women who affiliate with
the Republican Party or identify as Independent, and women who identify with a
conservative political ideology are most likely to have the propensity to serve
during the post-9/11 era. Similarly, men who affiliate with the Republican Party

and who are conservative are most likely to have propensity during the post-9/11 era. Both women and men who affiliate with the Democratic Party and who have a liberal political ideology are least likely to have the propensity to serve. Men with propensity are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party and to identify as conservative compared to their women counterparts.

Perhaps the most notable difference between men and women is the impact of control variables to the model. Prior to controls, women who affiliate with the Republican Party are least likely to expect to serve. However, after controlling for race and ethnic background, women who affiliate with the Democratic Party are least likely to expect to serve. In contrast, men who affiliate with the Republican Party are most likely to expect to serve and men who affiliate with the Democratic Party are least likely to expect to serve, regardless of race, SES, or any other additional controls. It appears that race is the significant predictor variable for the relationship between women's propensity and party affiliation. For political ideology, men and women who are conservative are most likely to have propensity and those who are liberal are least likely to have propensity, regardless of race, SES, or additional controls.

It appears that, prior to and after controls, there are political differences by racial and ethnic background among women with propensity that don't always follow the same pattern as for men. Similar to men, white women with propensity are significantly more Republican than their black and Hispanic counterparts. However, black women with propensity are no more liberal than their white counterparts. Hispanic women with propensity are the most liberal in political

ideology. In contrast, white men with propensity are more conservative than black and Hispanic men respectively. Hispanic men with propensity are the most liberal.

Discussion

For brevity sake, I focus my discussion below on the relationship between men's propensity and political attitudes, unless otherwise specified, since men comprise about 85 percent of the total military population (Segal and Segal 2004) and results on political attitudes do not differ greatly by gender. Results suggest that young men with the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era are becoming increasingly Republican in party affiliation and conservative in ideology. This is particularly noteworthy, as recent studies prior to 9/11 (e.g. Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010) have suggested otherwise, especially among the enlisted population that comprises the majority of the military force. Conventional wisdom has held that the upper ranks of the military (i.e. the senior officer ranks) are predominantly Republican and conservative. However, my own research reveals that Republican and conservative attitudes may be increasing among the lower ranks of the military, especially among men and regardless of race or class, given that the majority of youth with propensity will most likely enter the military in the enlisted ranks. My results beg the question: Is the military becoming what Janowitz (1975) referred to as an "ideological caste" of its own, separating from the society it serves and protects?

It is worth comparing my findings with the most recent related research conducted in 2004 by Dempsey (2010) to highlight the differences. One of the

starkest differences between both streams of research was in the findings among the junior enlisted population. With respect to political party identification, Dempsey found that only about 18 percent of the junior enlisted population identified as Republican. In contrast, my results show that about 28 percent of men with propensity identify with the Republican Party in 2004 (see Figure 7.2). My results show that these high average trends continue throughout the post-9/11 era. Dempsey's research did reveal, however, that Republican affiliation significantly increased by rank. The overall average percentage of Republican affiliation among male soldiers (not including officers) in Dempsey's sample was about 26 percent, which is closer to my results. In general, Dempsey's research showed that the total Army population (including officers) was almost twice as likely to be Republican than Democratic. My research reveals a similar gap between political parties, but my sample primarily consists of future junior enlistees as opposed to officers. Dempsey also noted that a "virtual army", where civilians correlated with those in the army on the dimensions of gender, race, income, age, and education, only differed slightly from the general population in its Republican Party affiliation. However, after controlling for essentially the same factors as Dempsey, my results reveal stark differences in party affiliation between those with and without propensity (i.e. the military vs. civilians). Indeed, young men with propensity are significantly more Republican in party affiliation (p<.001) compared to men without propensity (see Table 7.5).

Dempsey also found similar differences in political party affiliation among various racial and ethnic subgroups as I found in my research. Indeed, white men

with propensity are more Republican than Hispanic and black men respectively. Similarly, men with propensity are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party compared to women with propensity, although both are more likely than their civilian counterparts to affiliate with the Republican Party.

With respect to political ideology, findings from my research also differ from Dempsey's research. Dempsey found that there were no significant differences between the military and civilian population in political ideological identification. Between 2002-2004, my results generally support that finding. For example, in 2004, about 19 percent of young men overall identified as conservative, while almost 22 percent of men with propensity did the same (see Figures 7.5 and 7.6). However, in 2005, 21 percent of men overall identified as conservative, whereas over 27 percent of men with propensity did the same. After 2004, there was approximately a 4 percent average difference between men overall and men with propensity who identified as conservative. With respect to liberal identification, my results do not support Dempsey's findings. In 2004, about 19 percent of men overall identified as liberal, while only about 14 percent of men with propensity did so. On average, there was approximately a 5 percent difference between men overall and men with propensity who identified as liberal throughout the post-9/11 era. Although Dempsey found that the Army was significantly more conservative than liberal in ideology, he noted that the main differences lie in the upper ranks, where officers were more than two times more likely to be conservative than liberal. In contrast, he found that the enlisted population was only about one and half times more likely to identify as conservative than liberal.

He noted that the enlisted population was most likely to identify as moderate. My results from logistic regression analysis reveal that men with propensity are two times more likely to be conservative than liberal, even after full controls. Additionally, men with propensity are about 1.5 times more likely to be conservative than moderate.

Dempsey found similar differences in political ideology among racial and ethnic subgroups as I found in my research. Indeed, white men are more conservative than black or Hispanic men respectively. Additionally, men with propensity are more conservative than their women counterparts.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have, indeed, become politically polarizing. Recent research shows that public support for the wars indicated major variations by political party, with the majority of support stemming from Republicans (Berinsky 2009). Further, data reveal that political polarization is not the result of general trends within the youth population. Figure 7.1 shows that youth overall are about equal with respect to their Republican and Democratic affiliation, revealing only small gaps in attitudes slightly in the Republican's favor during the post-9/11 era. However, among youth with propensity, Figure 7.2 reveals a significant split in party affiliation much more in the Republican direction. Similar results are found with respect to political ideology as depicted in Figures 7.5 and 7.6 respectively. It appears that youth with propensity are more conservative and less liberal in ideology than the overall youth population. After controlling for a host of various factors, results from logistic regression analysis overwhelmingly support this assertion.

The gap between Republican and Democratic Party affiliation among youth with propensity during the Persian Gulf War period (1990-1991) serves well for comparison purposes during a period of war. For example, in 1991, the percentage of youth with propensity who affiliated with the Republican Party was 34.16 percent. In contrast, the percentage of Democratic youth with propensity was half as much at 17.52 percent (see Figure 7.2). During years prior to and after the Gulf War, the gap in political party affiliation among youth with propensity was not nearly as significant. Similar gaps between conservative and liberal ideologies among youth with propensity appear during the Gulf War period as well (see Figure 7.6). It appears that a period of war, whether during the Gulf War or the post-9/11 era, is associated with greater Republican and conservative attitudes among youth with propensity.

Interestingly, it appears that youth with propensity may be influenced by the party affiliation of their Commander-in-Chief. Results reveal fluctuations in the Republican and Democratic affiliations of men with propensity that correspond in the same direction as the party of the current Commander-in-Chief (see Figure 7.2). For example, from 2000-2008, results show an increase in Republican Party affiliation among men with propensity while President George W. Bush was in office. Similarly, from 2008-2010, men with propensity appear to decrease in Republican affiliation and increase in Democratic affiliation while President Barrack Obama is in office. However, trends of Republicanism among men with propensity continue to increase a few years into President Obama's administration. These results, in part, suggest a valuable contribution to the

literature discussing the "rally 'round the flag" phenomenon (e.g. Mueller 1970),

yet a more in-depth analysis would be required to analyze these relationships

completely.

The fact that political polarization appears to be influencing the propensity of

youth to enter the armed forces (i.e. future recruits) could be a bit troubling for

some. The military prides itself on being a subset of society, diverse and

representative of the population at large. Diversity and representation are

important for many reasons to include military effectiveness, shared

responsibility, and the involvement of society at large- the latter reason arguably

being the most important for better civil-military relations (Janowitz 1960; Armor

1996). For scholars such as Morris Janowitz (1960), a military that is convergent

with society is paramount for military effectiveness and professionalism. If

military participation is becoming increasingly politically polarizing, where

Republican and conservative attitudes are represented much more than

Democratic and liberal attitudes, this could be to the detriment of civil-military

relations and military professionalism overall. It is believed that an apolitical

military is considered to be a key attribute of military professionalism, which

fosters better civil-military relations (Janowitz 1960). Indeed, it is reasonable that

relations could be negatively impacted by a military that is primarily Republican

and conservative and a civilian government that is Democratic and liberal.

Political polarization could also lead to racial and ethnic diversity issues within

the military. A plethora of prior research (e.g. Holsti 2001; Segal et al 2001;

Dempsey 2010) has already shown that white men are more Republican and

conservative than black men, to include those among the military population. My own research supports these findings among youth with the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. The lack of representative political attitudes among youth with propensity could be indicative of a lack of representation among racial and ethnic groups within the military population. Indeed, my research shows a decline in black propensity during the post-9/11 era compared to earlier years (see Figure 4.11). Again, a lack of diversity and inclusion in the military could be troubling for military effectiveness as well as civil-military relations.

A politically polarizing war could have serious ramifications to recruitment and retention during a time when precious military resources are most in demand. It is vitally important for political leaders to understand the consequences of a politically divided country at war, especially in an all-volunteer era. Strong efforts should be made by politicians and the Commander-in-Chief to rally the country under a common cause for sending our nation into war. If not, one of the unintended consequences will be that future recruits will represent the division among our politicians and society. Certainly, I am not insinuating that there should not be a healthy debate among politicians and the people prior to going to war. However, once the decision is made, we should make every effort to unite under the cause much larger than politics- the cause for national security.

Summary

My research on political attitudes related to military propensity is important in a few notable ways. First, this is the most thorough analysis of political attitudes among the expected military population throughout the duration of the post-9/11

era. In comparison, Dempsey's (2010) research was conducted in 2004 and only

analyzed attitudes within the Army population. As noted earlier, the TISS project

(e.g. Holsti 2001) was an extensive body of research on political attitudes in the

military, but it was conducted prior to 9/11 between 1998 and 1999. Further, the

focus of the TISS analysis was on the military elite (i.e. officers). Segal and his

colleagues (2001) conducted a related analysis of political attitudes of the

expected enlisted population using MTF data, but it was also conducted prior to

9/11, between1976 and 1995. The single most recent related study conducted by

Pew (2011a) analyzed post-9/11 veterans, but did not analyze the current or

expected military population. Also of note, Dempsey's research was the only

study that analyzed the political attitudes of women since 9/11. My research

serves as the first thorough analysis of the relationship between women's

propensity and political attitudes.

Second, my research extends Dempsey's research drawing conclusions that are

generally contrary to his findings. Dempsey's main claim was that the wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq have not resulted in significant differences in political party

affiliation or ideology between the Army and civilians, especially among the

lower enlisted ranks. However, my research suggests otherwise, highlighting a

gap in political attitudes between the military and civilians that is larger than

others have suggested (e.g. Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010) during the post-9/11

era. Overall, my findings are more in line with findings from the TISS project

(e.g. Holsti 2001). My research suggests that the junior ranks are becoming

increasingly Republican and conservative in nature more like the senior ranks of the military analyzed in the TISS project.

Third, my research also compares to recent studies conducted by the Pew Research Center (e.g. 2011a; 2013) in a few ways. My overall findings are consistent with Pew's study (2011a), revealing that the military population during the post-9/11 era is becoming increasingly Republican and conservative in political attitudes. However, results from the Pew study noted that post-9/11 veterans are more moderate (43 percent of those surveyed) than conservative (40 percent) in ideological identification. My study of future recruits found that they are more likely to be conservative than moderate or liberal. Another Pew study (2013) found that Millennials are most likely to be liberal in ideology. However, my study shows that overall youth during the post-9/11 era are more moderate than liberal.

Fourth, my findings support earlier research (e.g. Holsti 2001; Segal et al. 2001; Dempsey 2010) suggesting that white men with propensity are significantly more Republican and conservative than their black or Hispanic counterparts. One could infer that an increasing gap in political attitudes in the military could lead to a lack of racial and ethnic diversity within the military population.

Last, my research provides invaluable insight to politicians, military leadership, and scholars who are interested in the broad domain of civil-military relations, which transcends various academic disciplines such as history, political science, and sociology. The fact that my research suggests that the military is becoming more politically divided from the society it serves is potentially

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troublesome, especially during wartime. After all, a military that stands divided from its population could lead to issues standing united under a common cause. The slogan, "United We Stand- Divided We Fall" shouldn't be a distant memory from the World War II days. It can still be a reminder of how it's supposed to be, especially during the post-9/11 era- an era of persistent war. As the war on terror continues against threats such as ISIS and Al Qaeda into the unknown future, perhaps more debate will occur concerning the reinstatement of some form of a draft to potentially lessen the divide.

Chapter 8: Motivations to Serve-

Institutional/Occupational Analysis

Background

Motivations for military service can range from tangible reasons such as pay, education benefits, job skills training, health care, and retirement to more intangible reasons such as family traditions, defending freedom and serving society, seeing the world, and increasing one's structure and self-discipline. John Faris (1981) proposed a useful way for thinking about major recruitment techniques by splitting the military's eligible population into two groups. The first group responds primarily to "marketplace factors" and can be expected to join for the aforementioned tangible benefits. The second group is driven by more intangible benefits such as family tradition and service to country. These tangible versus intangible benefits can be conceptualized as ranging between Moskos' (1977) formulation of the occupational and institutional models of military organization. As highlighted earlier, Moskos viewed military service as a "calling" in the institutional model, whereas military service was viewed as more of "just a job" in the occupational model. Although Moskos' and Faris' categories of distinction may not be mutually exclusive, they are a good way to understand the different perspectives from which those who join the military approach service.

Interestingly, when writing about professional soldiers of the conscription era, Janowitz had already observed Moskos' notion that the military was becoming more and more similar to an occupation. He noted that, "those who see the

military as a calling or a unique profession are outnumbered by the greater

concentration from whom the military is just another job" (1960:117). Was the

conscription-era institutional soldier that Moskos celebrated just a romantic

idealization that represented only a minority of personnel instead of the norm for

that period? Has the AVF really changed motivations of service in the way that

Moskos hypothesized (Segal et al. 2001)? Although I cannot tap into soldier

motivations prior to the AVF, my research addresses these questions in part using

MTF data from 1976 through the post-9/11 era.

The major components of the institutional and occupational models can be

summarized using Moskos' model of military social organization depicted in

Table 8.1 below (Moskos 1988). The I/O thesis originally assumed a continuum

ranging from a military organization highly divergent from civilian society to one

highly convergent with civilian structures (Moskos 1988). Of course, the military

can never be entirely separate from the society it protects, but the model, in the

form of a scale in which the military more or less overlaps with civilian society,

shows the ever-changing relationship between the armed forces and society.

Table 8.1 depicts the variables of interest and the general trends associated with

each that Moskos utilized in formulating his I/O dichotomy.

Table 8.1: Military Social Organization: Institutional vs. Occupational

	Institutional	Occupational
Legitimacy	Normative Values	Marketplace economy
Societal Regard	Esteem based on notions of service	Prestige based on level of compensation
Role Commitments	Diffuse; generalist	Specific; specialist
Reference groups	Vertical within the armed forces	Horizontal with occupations outside military
Recruitment Appeals	Character qualities; life-style orientation	High recruit pay; technical training
Evaluation of Performance	Holistic and qualitative	Segmented and quantitative
Basis of Compensation	Rank and seniority; decompressed by rank	Skill level and manpower
Mode of Compensation	Much in noncash form or deferred	Salary and bonuses
Legal System	Military justice; broad purview over member	Civilian jurisprudence; limited purview over member
Female Roles	Limited employment; restricted career pattern	Wide employment; open career pattern
Spouse	Integral part of military community	Removed from military community
Residence	Work and residence adjacency; military housing; relocations	Work and residence separation; civilian housing permanence
Post-service Status	Veterans' benefits and preferences	Same as non-veteran

Source (Moskos 1988)

I briefly describe the main components of these variables that distinguish between the institutional and occupational formats of military organization. For Moskos (1988), an institution is *legitimated* in terms of values and norms that provide a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a higher good. In contrast, an occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace. Society generally *regards* institutional members with esteem, whereas prestige is based on levels of compensation for an occupation. Members of an institution usually have diffuse *roles* that are more general in nature. Members of an occupational military organization have more specific roles and are considered specialists in their particular area of expertise. In an institution, *reference groups* are more vertical as subordinates aspire to be like their leaders. In an occupation, members look to other occupations outside the military for reference groups of comparison. In an institution, *recruiting appeals* to character qualities and values, promoting a lifestyle that is separate and distinct from society and one that is full of adventure and challenge. Recruiting in an occupational military organization focuses on benefits in the form of pay and job skill training that is easily transferrable to civilian work later. *Performance evaluations* for members of an institution are more qualitative and holistic as opposed to quantitative and segmented. Rank and seniority take precedence for the *basis of compensation* in an institution, whereas skill level and manpower needs dictate compensation in an occupation. Members of an institution receive much of their compensation in the form of noncash or deferments such as educational, medical, and retirement benefits. Members of the occupational format receive their compensation in the form of a salary and

bonuses. Members of the institutional format have a *military justice system* that has broad purview. Members of an occupational military organization have civilian jurisprudence with limited purview. *Female roles* within an institutional military are limited and restricted, whereas they are more available and unrestricted in an occupational military. *Spouses* within an institution are expected to play an integral part within the military community, whereas they are more removed from the military community in an occupational organization. Members of an institution work and *reside* in close proximity to each other, usually on-post. Members of an occupational military organization separate work and off-duty time, usually residing within civilian communities. In an institutional military, *veterans* usually receive more benefits and preferences than their non-veteran peers, whereas there is little to no difference between veterans and civilians in an occupational military organization. In sum, members of an institution are primarily value-driven, motivated by factors that contrast with the calculative workings assumed to exist in the marketplace. An occupational model implies a priority for self-interest rather than that of the employing organization (Moskos and Wood 1988).

It must be highlighted that the institutional and occupational models may imply a one or the other choice on the spectrum of analysis. However, these two models simply offer a frame of reference for analysis. Beyond military sociology, polarities of social structures have been prevalent in mainstream macrosociology. One need only consider Max Weber's traditional versus legal-rational authority, Emile Durkheim's organic versus mechanical solidarity, or Talcott Parsons' shift

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from collective to individualistic pattern variables to see how societal trends have been described as dichotomies. Moskos' posited shift from an institutional to an occupational military is nothing more than an application of the master trend of polarities describing Western societies (Moskos 1988). Specifically, his formulation is fundamentally rooted in society's general overall trend toward rationalization (Segal 1986). Contrary to popular belief, Moskos' differing models do not necessarily suggest a zero-sum game when describing models of military organization or individual attitudes of military members. Indeed, Segal (1986) suggested that there can be a mixture of institutional and occupational orientations among members of the military- a form he referred to as "pragmatic professionalism."

Segal (1986) also emphasized that Moskos' model could have different units of analysis for research purposes: 1) Organizational- to examine the military as an institution versus the military as a workplace; 2) Individual- to examine attitudes of military service as a calling versus military service as a job; and, perhaps 3) The nation-state as another level of analysis. For Segal, Moskos' I/O model required measurement and analysis at all levels. He emphasized using different methodologies to analyze Moskos' I/O thesis- both quantitative methods utilizing direct or indirect inquiry (e.g. surveys using single-item questions and multiple-item indices), as well as qualitative methods (e.g. ethnography of military organizations)-to examine soldier attitudes toward institutional or occupational motivations of service and changes to military organization. He also highlighted the importance of longitudinal studies utilizing quantitative and qualitative

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techniques to assess changes in motivations of service and military organization over time. He even challenged researchers to re-examine the plethora of survey questions from Samuel Stouffer's WWII studies (1949) to retrospectively measure I/O trends during this time period, despite the fact that they were not originally intended for this purpose. For example, *The American Soldier* studies showed support for a soldier's motivation in combat that was primarily based on "ending the task," "solidarity with group" (i.e. cohesion/team), and a "sense of duty and self-respect" (i.e. a calling) (Stouffer et al. 1949:109). These motivations in combat during WWII could reasonably fit into the institutional model of military service. Of note, Segal (1986) also emphasized that although Moskos' I/O formulation was originally intended to study the military, it could be extended to examine civilian attitudes as well as other civilian organizations.

For purposes of my research, I incorporate Segal's advice utilizing survey methods, both single item questions and a multiple-item index, to analyze individual motivations and attitudes toward military service. Due to the secondary nature of my analysis of the MTF data, I take advantage of indirect inquiry that is related to Moskos' I/O construct to determine I/O motivations of youth who are likely to serve since there are not direct questions that inquire about these motivations. I also utilize the longitudinal nature of the cross-sectional surveys from 1976-2013 to assess changes in youth attitudes and motivations toward service over time. Further, I compare differences in attitudes toward work between the military (i.e. those with "high" propensity) and civilians (i.e. those with "low" propensity).

My research examining I/O attitudes is unique compared to other related research in a few notable ways. First, insofar as one is willing to make longitudinal inferences using cross-sectional surveys over time, it allows for the analysis of long-term I/O secular trends throughout the duration of the AVF (with the exception of 1973-75). This allows for the empirical testing of Moskos' hypothesis that the military has become increasingly occupational in nature over time. Indeed, this is the type of testing that few researchers have been able to effectively conduct methodologically. Second, there are multiple measures within the dataset that can be combined to assess the I/O orientations of those who are likely to enter the military. Furthermore, the nature of indirect questioning via secondary analysis allows for a better assessment of actual individual motivations by minimizing the social desirability bias (to be discussed in greater detail later) that often influences individuals to reason why they joined the military for more altruistic purposes. Third, the data allows for the examination of I/O differences between racial and ethnic groups, which has been lacking to some extent in prior research. Lastly, there are ways to examine attitudinal differences between the military and civilian population by considering those with high propensity (i.e. "Definitely Will" serve) as a proxy for the military and those with low propensity (i.e. "Definitely Won't" serve) as a proxy for civilians. This type of analysis contributes to the extensive amount of literature on civil-military relations, studies of American values and beliefs, and other areas of research such as public service motivation (PSM), which I will discuss in greater detail later.

Prior Research on I/O Motivations

Many researchers exploring various individual-level motivations for joining

the military have used Moskos' I/O model for analysis. Scholars exploring these

issues have classified various motivations, such as "patriotic duty" or "job

training", as institutionally- or occupationally-related influences. Understanding

these motivations can have important implications for both recruitment and

retention in the military. For example, Griffith (2008) found that institutionally

motivated reservists were more likely to reenlist than their occupationally

motivated peers. Griffith (2009) argued that the importance of institutional

motivations was particularly apparent in an era where the military places more

demands on reservists. Griffith's (2008) research also revealed that younger, non-

white, and lower ranking reservists were more associated with having joined the

reserves for occupational reasons. Another study conducted by Eighmey (2006)

in the early 2000s found that a mixture of institutional and occupational

motivations influenced American youth to serve in the military. This finding was

consistent with Segal's (1986) assertion of "pragmatic professionalism." Stahl,

McNichols, and Manley (1980) argued that institutional and occupational

motivators are not at opposite ends of the same spectrum, but are separate

constructs. They found that, while both I/O motivators can be active in

individuals, job satisfaction and career orientation among Air Force personnel

were positively associated with institutional motivations and negatively correlated

with occupational motivations. This is consistent with Griffith's finding that

reservists "who were institutionally motivated reported greater levels of

commitment (in terms of reenlistment intentions and reasons for reporting), acceptance of the demands of military service, and combat readiness" (2008:252).

While Moskos' I/O model has been a useful analytical framework for the study of individual-level enlistment and retention decisions, there may be differences in its applicability across the services (e.g. Mastroianni 2005), across military occupational specialties (i.e. combat vs. support) within the same service (e.g. Burland and Lundquist 2013), between sexes (e.g. Eighmey 2006), between ranks (e.g. Boene 1988), and among other areas of analysis. Mastroianni (2005) noted that Army officers might have fewer occupational motivators compared to flight qualified Air Force officers. This could occur because there are attractive opportunities for flying positions in the civilian sector, whereas there are comparatively less attractive civilian opportunities for "soldiering." Additionally, Stahl and colleagues (1980) found that Marine officers were less occupationally motivated than those in other services. They attribute the difference to the Marine Corps placing greater emphasis on their role as combat soldiers. With respect to intra-service differences, Burland and Lundquist (2013) found that occupational motivations existed more in support functions, while institutional motivations were prevalent in combat specialties. Eighmey (2006) found that institutional motivations such as fidelity to goals (i.e. leadership, self-discipline, duty to country, respect for others and pride in one's accomplishments) were more important for men than women. In a study of the French Armed Forces, Bernard Boene (1988) found differences in all objects of analysis noted above. With

respect to rank, he found that officers and draftees were more institutionally motivated than non-commissioned officers and volunteers.

Most recently, Dempsey (2010) studied the general military population in 2004 and assessed their reasons for joining. He found that officers were most likely to choose the category "Desire to serve my country" as their most important reason for joining. Thirty-four percent of officers listed this as their primary motivation compared with 20 percent of the enlisted and warrant officer ranks. Officers were also most likely to choose "Educational benefits" as their primary reason for joining. Twenty-five percent of officers listed this as their primary motivation compared with only 13 percent of the rest of the army. This may seem counterintuitive at first, but it reveals the officer-recruiting power of ROTC programs and the military service academies (Dempsey 2010). On the other hand, enlisted soldiers were most likely to list a reason related to pay and benefits as their primary reason for joining. Thirty percent of enlisted soldiers and warrant officers chose one of the six following occupational reasons as their primary motivation for joining, compared with only 12 percent of officers: 1) earn more money than previous job(s); 2) family support services; 3) lack of civilian employment opportunities; 4) medical care benefits; 5) retirement pay and benefits; 6) security and stability of a job (Dempsey 2010).

Dempsey's statistics are certainly informative, although they may reflect a degree of military indoctrination as well, given that over 50 percent of respondents were beyond their tenth year in the Army at the time of the survey. After limiting the analysis to the 326 respondents with five or fewer years of

service, "Educational benefits" was the most popular reason given by young soldiers and officers. Thirty-six percent of new officers and 19 percent of new soldiers and warrant officers listed this as their primary motivation for joining the military. "Desire to serve my country" fell to second as 26 percent of new officers listed this and 17 percent of enlisted soldiers and warrant officers chose this as their first choice. The dynamic for pay and benefits as an incentive for joining remained the same as the overall sample. Thirteen percent of officers indicated this as their primary reason for joining compared with 28 percent of enlisted soldiers and warrant officers (Dempsey 2010). Interestingly, Moskos regarded educational benefits as an institutional orientation because they were viewed as deferred benefits of the institution (as noted earlier in Table 8.1). Since then, some researchers (e.g. Woodruff et al. 2006) have regarded educational benefits as more occupational in nature since education is typically viewed as leading to more job skills which leads to increased pay- an occupational consideration (D. Segal conversation 2015). Dempsey's examination of reasons to join the military is one of the most comprehensive to date during the post-9/11 era and serves as a good model for comparison purposes.

During the summer of 2002, Woodruff and his colleagues (2006) conducted another study to examine motivations to serve drawing from a sample of first-term soldiers in two infantry battalions (sample size 257) at Fort Lewis, Washington who were preparing for a combat deployment. Motivation to serve was measured by asking respondents to answer from a list of fifteen items which items were important in their decision to join the Army. The items included were

developed based on components of the institutional/occupational model and the different approaches, incentives, and programs that the military uses to attract recruits. Overall, results indicated that respondents had strong institutional motivations to serve. Over 73 percent of respondents indicated that "adventure/challenge" was a reason to join and over 65 percent indicated to "serve country" was another important reason for joining. Other top reasons for joining included "patriotism" (55 percent) and "desire to be a soldier" (46 percent)-all clearly institutional orientations. "Money for college" was third overall (61 percent) in respondent's motivations to serve- a reason the authors considered occupational in nature. Economic motivations, as described by Moskos, such as the "enlistment bonus," "a lack of better options," "best job available," and "need to support a family" were less important to these respondents. Three decades since the AVF, the major motivations to serve appeared to be institutional, contrary to Moskos' expectations. Further, findings indicated that those with "high" propensity (i.e. those who "Definitely" expected to serve) were significantly more likely to express institutional motivations to enlist than those with "low" propensity (i.e. those who definitely did not expect to serve) (Woodruff et al. 2006). It should be noted that the majority of respondents were infantrymen who have typically been considered to be more institutionally motivated compared to other military occupational specialties (Moskos and Wood 1988; Burland and Lundquist 2013). Further, the respondents in the sample were men only, as a result of the army's policy of excluding women from ground combat units, and they were predominantly white soldiers as black soldiers tend

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to enlist in noncombat support specialties (Segal and Segal 2004; Kleykamp 2009).

Most recently, the study conducted at Pew Research Center (2011a) revealed that the main reason to join the military for post-9/11 era veterans (sample size of 697) was "to serve your country" (88 percent). The next reason was "to receive education benefits" (75 percent), and then "to see more of the world" (65 percent). More occupational motivations such as "to learn skills for civilian jobs" and "because jobs were hard to find" were less cited as reasons for joining (57 and 28 percent respectively). As mentioned earlier, education benefits could be viewed as either institutional or occupational in nature. Taken as a whole, data from Pew reveals that soldiers are more institutionally motivated to serve during the post-9/11 era, although occupational motivations continue to exist.

As highlighted by the significant research above, the I/O analytical framework has been used extensively to examine motivations to serve. However, there are still gaps in the research. My research seeks to fill these gaps and add to the existing literature by uncovering I/O differences of youth who expect to serve between key racial and ethnic groups and the civilians versus the military, primarily during the post-9/11 era- a period that has been mostly understudied. Additionally, I examine I/O trends of the military over time, which has yet to be fully analyzed throughout the AVF.

I/O Predictions

To test Moskos' (1977) hypothesis of a shift in the military from institutional to occupational orientations, I analyze differences in I/O motivations of youth

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with propensity over time between 1976-2013. I analyze differences by

comparing group means between those who are likely to join the military and

those who are not during the post-9/11 era and the pre-9/11 era (i.e. 1976-2001).

Given that military service has been in a time of war during the post-9/11 era, I

expect to see greater institutional orientations among youth with propensity

compared to youth without propensity. For the same reasons, I expect that those

youth who expect to serve during the post-9/11 era will have greater institutional

orientations than those expecting to serve during the pre-9/11 era. However, I

expect that youth with propensity will also display both institutional and

occupational orientations (i.e. a form of "pragmatic professionalism") during the

post- 9/11 era, as Segal (1986) suggested.

> *Hypothesis 8a: There will be a positive relationship between youth with propensity and institutional orientations during the post-9/11 era.*
>
> *Hypothesis 8b: Youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era will display both institutional and occupational orientations to serve (i.e. "pragmatic professional" orientations).*
>
> *Hypothesis 8c: Youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era will have greater institutional orientations compared to youth with propensity during the pre-9/11 era.*

During the post-9/11 era specifically, I expect that those who say they are

likely to serve immediately following the 9/11 attacks will have greater

institutional orientations compared to other years. Naturally, it is reasonable to

believe that those who say they are likely to serve immediately following the

attacks will be more motivated by institutional reasons such as service as a

calling. Similarly, I expect that those who say they are likely to serve during the

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period marked by high casualties during the "Iraqi surge" timeframe, between 2004-2007, will also have greater institutional orientations compared to other years since the costs of military service during this particular period are exacerbated by a greater number of U.S. casualties. On the other hand, I expect that those who expect to serve during the economic recession period, between 2008-2010, will have greater occupational orientations, as the military may be considered the best job option in a constrained economy. Similar to my analysis in Chapter 4, I examine the general relationship between casualties and unemployment versus the I/O orientations of youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era. I expect that there will be a positive relationship between casualties and the institutional orientations of youth with propensity. Likewise, I expect that there will be a negative relationship between unemployment and the institutional orientations of youth with propensity.

> *Hypothesis 8d: There will be a positive relationship between casualties and institutional orientations for those youth with the propensity to serve.*

> *Hypothesis 8e: There will be a negative relationship between unemployment and institutional orientations for those youth with the propensity to serve.*

Results from my earlier analyses in previous chapters and prior research (e.g. Griffith 2008; Burland and Lundquist 2013) suggest that there may be differences in motivations to serve between various racial and ethnic groups during the post-9/11 era. Indeed, the fact that black youth propensity has generally declined during the post-9/11 era suggests the possibility of a decrease in institutional motivations. Possible differences in motivations of service between various

subgroups within the military could have policy implications for recruitment and retention. I expect to see differences in motivations to serve between racial and ethnic groups as described in the logic explained in my earlier predictions. For example, white men are more likely than black men to serve in combat specialties, which have been typically more institutional in nature. Additionally, non-white men have been shown to join the military for more occupational reasons (Griffith 2008). In accordance with the bridging hypothesis, I expect that black youth with propensity will be more occupationally motivated than their white youth counterparts. However, given the increase in the propensity of Hispanic youth during the post-9/11 era (see Chapter 4), I do not expect to see I/O differences between white and Hispanic youth with propensity.

> **Hypothesis 8f: White youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era will have greater institutional orientations compared to their black youth counterparts.**

> **Hypothesis 8g: Hispanic youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era will have similar institutional/occupational orientations as their white youth counterparts.**

To determine if there are different value orientations with respect to job preferences between those who expect to serve in the military and civilians, I also utilize the I/O index measure, along with the single-item questions, for analysis. I examine differences between those who say they "definitely will" join the armed forces versus those who say they "definitely will not" (i.e. military vs. civilians). I also analyze these differences between the post- and pre-9/11 eras. This analysis is a proxy measure of differences between the military and civilians to determine the extent of a gap in attitudes/values with respect to job preferences. Results will

provide insight into possible differences in value orientations between the military

and civilians, which could have implications for civil-military relations. Given

the trends toward individualistic attitudes among members of society (e.g. Billig

2000), I expect that those who say they definitely expect to enter the military (i.e.

"high" propensity) will have greater institutional orientations than those who say

they definitely do not expect to join (i.e. "low" propensity) during the post-9/11

era.

> **Hypothesis 8h: Youth with high propensity during the post-9/11 era are likely to have greater institutional orientations compared to youth with low propensity.**

I/O Analysis

   Methods

   Segal noted that "in addition to direct questions regarding institutional and

occupational orientations, Moskos' conceptualization lends itself to inference

based on measures not originally intended for this purpose but reflecting

components of the

conceptualization…components can then be combined into multiple-item scales

or analyzed individually" (1986:358-359). Researchers (e.g. Trainor 2004) have

used these types of techniques to conduct I/O analysis. Unfortunately, the MTF

dataset does not directly ask young men and women why they want to enter the

armed forces. Instead, I created an index of questions that include both

institutional and occupational embedded themes, as a proxy measure for

examining motivations to serve. In Form 4 only, the MTF questionnaire asks a

series of questions that are related to job preferences and what youth look for in

their work. Questions ask respondents to identify how important a particular subject area is to them with responses ranging on a scale from 1 to 4 as "Not Important," "Little Important," "Pretty Important," and "Very Important." There are twenty-three total questions related to the amount of importance a respondent places on job preferences. I utilize 11 of these questions to create a multi-item index measure for institutional/occupational orientations, as the following questions are the most closely related to I/O motivations of service in accordance with Moskos' (1977) original formulation and the extensive amount of prior research (e.g. Segal 1986; Trainor 2004; Griffith 2008; Woodruff et al. 2006; Taylor et al. 2015). I attribute the institutional measures that I selected to be most associated with selflessness and a greater concern for the employing organization, service as a calling, intangible benefits, and a lifestyle orientation toward adventure, challenge, and a team/relationships approach toward work. I attribute the occupational measures I selected to be most associated with individual/egoistic concerns, and a greater concern for tangible benefits like pay, job skills, and prestige. These I/O conceptualizations are consistent with earlier research.

As discussed earlier, researchers have used either a combined index scale or two separate scales to measure I/O orientations. Those who have used separate scales have argued that I/O concepts are not at opposite ends of the same spectrum, but rather they are separate and distinct (e.g. Stahl et al. 1980). On the other hand, others have shown that I/O concepts can be measured together on a single scale (e.g. Cotton 1981). After testing both options to determine the best

construct, I chose to analyze a combined multi-item index where both institutional and occupational orientations are measured as opposite ends of a single scale. A discussion of the rationale is addressed below.

For my I/O index measure, I combine job-related questions that have both institutional and occupational themes. I combine the four following questions that correspond most with various institutional values that I highlight in parentheses: 1) A job that gives you an opportunity to be directly helpful to others (i.e. selflessness); 2) A job that is worthwhile to society (i.e. selflessness/calling); 3) A job that permits contact with a lot of people (i.e. teamwork and relationships); and 4) A job where most problems are quite difficult and challenging (i.e. challenging environment).

I also combine the seven following questions that correspond most with various occupational values that I highlight in parentheses: 1) A job that is high in status and prestige (i.e. self-interest- prestige based on money); 2) A job where the chances of advancement and promotion are good (i.e. extrinsic rewards/benefits); 3) A job which provides you with a chance to earn a good deal of money (i.e. extrinsic reward/benefits); 4) A job where the skills you learn will not go out of date (i.e. job skills/transferability); 5) A job where you have more than two weeks vacation (i.e. self-interest/leisure); 6) A job which leaves a lot of time for other things in your life (i.e. self-interest/leisure); 7) A job that offers a reasonably predictable, secure future (i.e. self-interest/ non-adventure). Of note, a job that is high in status and prestige was fairly highly correlated with a job which provides you a chance to make a good deal of money (r=.47).

To highlight again, the measures used for my I/O index were selected based on theory from Moskos' (1977) original I/O formulation and are similar to various institutional and occupational measures that have been used in an extensive amount of prior research (e.g., Segal 1986; Trainor 2004; Griffith 2008; Woodruff et al. 2006; Taylor et al. 2015). Additionally, I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to confirm that the variables used for my I/O index measure the same things conceptually and to confirm the number of dimensions that the variables measure in my index (Torres-Reyna 2010). The extraction method was principal-components analysis, with Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization (Abdi 2003). Results of initial CFA revealed three distinct factors with eigenvalues above 1.0- 3.24, 1.68, and 1.03 respectively. Following initial CFA, Factors 1 and 2 fit as theorized into two groups that I categorized as institutional and occupational. I deemed the two items that were distinctly categorized as "Factor 3," "a job where you have more than two weeks vacation" and "a job which leaves a lot of time for other things in your life", to be most associated with occupational orientations (i.e. self-interest/leisure) based on theory and prior research. Therefore, I condensed the three original factors into two and conducted another factor analysis. Results from my final CFA are reported in Table 8.2 below. Items with a factor loading greater than .40 were retained in each factor, occupational or institutional.

Survey Items	Factors	
	1	2
A Job-	Occupational	Institutional
That is high in status and prestige	0.6413	0.1887
Where the chances of advancement and promotion are good	0.6987	0.1405
Which provides you with a chance to earn a good deal of money	0.7903	-0.0589
Where the skills you learn will not go out of date	0.3972	0.3604
Where you have more than two weeks vacation	0.6185	0.0972
Which leaves a lot of time for other things in your life	0.5795	0.1076
That offers a reasonably predictable, secure future	0.5263	0.2674
That gives you an opportunity to be directly helpful to others	0.0203	0.7780
That is worthwhile to society	0.1155	0.7516
That permits contact with a lot of people	0.1234	0.6844
Where most problems are quite difficult and challenging	0.0381	0.5170
% total item variance explained	24.6	44.5

Note: The extraction method was principal-components analysis and the rotation method was Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Years: 2002-2013

As noted above, I chose to combine both the institutional measures and the occupational measures into one multi-item index. After constructing a separate institutional scale from the institutional measures noted above, Cronbach's alpha was only equal to 0.68, which falls into the "questionable" category for most social science research according to George and Mallory (2003). After constructing a separate occupational scale from the occupational measures above, Cronbach's alpha was equal to 0.74. However, after combining both indexes into a single I/O scale, Cronbach's alpha increased to 0.76, which is "acceptable" for most social science research. Furthermore, items in the index scale were selected in such a manner that if they were not occupational, then they could be considered more institutional and vice versa. For example, the question that asks a respondent's importance placed on having a job in which they "can earn a good deal of money" indicates more of an occupational orientation if the respondent answers with a "4- Very Important." On the other hand, if the respondent answers

with a "1- Not Important," this indicates more of an institutional orientation toward work. All items within the index scale have similar dichotomous relationships. CFA verifies this logic as well. Thus, I reverse coded the institutional questions so that greater numbers indicate less institutional and more occupational orientations. Response values are summed, yielding a scale with a minimum response score of 11 and a maximum response of 44. Higher number responses are considered to be more occupational in orientation towards work. The mean inter-item correlation was 0.22 and the reliability (Cronbach's coefficient alpha with unstandardized items) for the I/O scale is 0.76, indicating an acceptable degree of internal consistency for a scale of this type (Cronbach 1951).

Additionally, there is a separate question on the MTF Form 4 that asks a respondent, "If YOU felt that it was necessary for the U.S. to fight in some future war, how likely is it that you would volunteer for military service in that war?" Responses include: 1) "I'm sure that I would volunteer;" 2) "I would very likely volunteer;" 3) "I would probably volunteer;" 4) "I would probably NOT volunteer;" 5) "I would very likely NOT volunteer;" 6) "I would definitely NOT volunteer;" 7) "In my opinion, there is no such thing as a 'necessary' war." Clearly, responses 1-3 indicate a strong institutional orientation while responses 4-7 do not. Arguably, response category number 7, "In my opinion, there is no such thing as a 'necessary' war," should not be a response category within the same question. Indeed, whether or not someone believes that there is such a thing as a necessary or just war could be considered a separate question altogether (D.

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Segal conversation 2015). Thus, I choose to drop those respondents who

answered #7 from the analysis entirely. By doing so, I only examine differences

in who would volunteer for a necessary war between those who believe that a just

war can actually exist altogether. I coded this institutional measure into a

categorical variable (0/1) where "No- Will Not Volunteer" includes respondent's

answers between 4-6, and "Yes- Will Volunteer" includes respondent's answers

between 1-3. "Yes- Will Volunteer" indicates that a respondent is "Likely to

Volunteer for a Future War that is Necessary." I use this question as an additional

method to determine the extent of institutional motivations of youth with

propensity.

Similarly, there is a separate question on the MTF Form 1 that is

unquestionably related to occupational orientations. The question asks a

respondent how important "having lots of money" is to them as one of their life

goals. Response categories include: 1= "Not Important;" 2= "Somewhat

Important;" 3= "Quite Important;" 4= "Extremely Important."   I use this question

as an additional measure to determine the extent of occupational motivations of

youth with propensity.

Research has shown that it is better to measure multiple items as opposed to a

single item, since it reduces the likelihood of measurement error in estimates,

increasing overall reliability (Segal 1986; Gliem and Gliem 2003). Thus, I use

both the multi-item I/O index measure as my primary measure in addition to the

single-item institutional ("Volunteer for War") and occupational ("Having Lots of

Money") measures to best assess youth I/O orientations toward service in the

armed forces, to analyze differences by racial and ethnic groups among youth

with propensity, and to analyze differences in value orientations between the

military and civilians. I analyze trends over time between 1976-2013 to test

Moskos' hypothesis. I also conduct difference of means tests and utilize logistic

and linear regression analysis to examine group differences.

Results

Table 8.3 shows differences in mean I/O scale scores for my key analysis

groups during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013), revealing average differences

between youth with and without the propensity to serve and between racial and

ethnic groups. For the overall sample during the post-9/11 era, the mean scale

value is 31.17 with a standard deviation of 3.74 and a range of response scores

from 11 to 44. The average overall scale score is greater than 27.5, the mid-point

of the scale, suggesting relatively greater occupational orientations of youth. The

mean scale score for men with propensity is 31.16, indicating no significant

differences between those with or without propensity. As a reminder, youth with

and without propensity represent the two basic categories of the propensity scale-

that is, those who say that they "definitely will" and "probably will" serve

compared to those who say that they "probably won't" and "definitely won't"

serve. However, mean scale scores indicate significant differences (p<.05)

between those with "high" propensity (30.86) and those with "low" propensity

(31.25), suggesting that men with high propensity are significantly more

institutional in their orientations toward work than men with low propensity.

Again, youth with "high" versus "low" propensity represent the most extreme

categories on each end of the propensity scale.

Mean scale scores also indicate significant differences (p<.001) between white and black men with the propensity to serve. White men with propensity have a mean scale score of 30.95 whereas black men with propensity have a mean scale score of 32.36, suggesting greater occupational orientations for black men. There are no significant differences in mean scale scores (30.95 and 31.12) between white and Hispanic men. However, there are significant differences (p<.01) between Hispanic and black men with propensity, suggesting greater occupational orientations among black men. Of note, there are no significant I/O differences between racial and ethnic groups for men with "high" propensity during the post-9/11 era. However, there are significant differences (p<.01) in mean scale scores between white (31.25) and black men with high propensity (32.07) during the pre-9/11 era.

Table 8.3
Difference of Means for I/O Orientations Toward Work During Post-9/11 Era (Men Only)

			N
Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	31.16	1058
Youth Without Propensity	Mean 2	31.17	6703
	Difference	-0.01	
	SD	3.74	
	t	-0.07	
Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	30.86	427
Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 2	31.25	4703
	Difference	-0.38	
	SD	3.81	
	t	-1.99*	
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	30.95	796
Black Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	32.36	146
	Difference	-1.41	
	SD	3.74	
	t	-4.24***	
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	30.82	344
Black Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	31.56	45
	Difference	-0.74	
	SD	3.94	
	t	-1.18	
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	30.95	796
Hispanic Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	31.12	116
	Difference	-0.17	
	SD	0.38	
	t	-0.46	
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	30.82	344
Hispanic Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	30.47	38
	Difference	0.34	
	SD	0.68	
	t	0.51	
Black Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	32.36	146
Hispanic Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	31.12	116
	Difference	1.24	
	SD	3.92	
	t	2.57**	
Black Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	31.56	45
Hispanic Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	30.47	38
	Difference	1.08	
	SD	4.40	
	t	1.12	
Youth With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	31.62	2227
Youth With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	31.16	1058
	Difference	0.45	
	SD	3.65	
	t	3.33***	
Youth With High Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	30.86	427
Youth With High Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	31.43	1068
	Difference	-0.56	
	SD	0.21	
	t	2.68**	

Note: Responses range from 11 to 44 where greater numbers indicate more occupational;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 8.1 below depicts the overall average I/O trends by year of men who are likely to enter the military between 1976-2013. Consistent with Moskos' predictions, results show that average scores generally increase between 1976-2001, indicating increasing occupational orientations toward work among men with propensity, with an overall mean of 31.62.

Figure 8.1- I/O Orientations of Youth Toward Work
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 8.2 below zeroes in on the post-9/11 era, depicting the average I/O

trends of men likely to enter the military between 2002-2013. During the post-

9/11 era, average I/O scores generally decrease indicating significantly greater

institutional orientations within the military, with an overall mean of 31.16. This

supports **hypothesis 8c** and suggests that Moskos' prediction does not hold as true

during the post-9/11 era since the orientations of men with propensity have

become significantly less occupational (p<.001) compared to years prior to 9/11.

Interestingly, there is a significant drop in occupational orientations for men with

the propensity to serve in 2003, the year following the attacks of 9/11. Mean

scores significantly dropped from 32.19 in 2002 down to 31.29 in 2003 and

continued to decline to 30.69 in 2008. These results suggest that those with the

propensity to serve had greater institutional orientations between 2003-2008,

which provides some support for **hypothesis 8d**. Indeed, these were the years

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most likely to be marked by service as a calling (i.e. institutional orientations) immediately following 9/11 and during the Iraqi surge (2004-2007) period, which encompassed high casualties. Equally notable, there was a significant spike in occupational orientations among men with propensity in 2009 (mean of 31.64), the year after the economic recession. Results suggest that men with the propensity to serve had greater occupational orientations between 2009-2010, which provides some support for *hypothesis 8e*. Indeed, this timeframe was marked by a period of economic instability in the civilian labor market, thereby possibly attracting youth with greater occupational orientations toward military service. There are similar I/O trends among men with "high" propensity (i.e. "Definitely Will" enter the armed forces) with lower overall index scores, indicating even greater institutional orientations among this group. I/O trends of men who definitely expect to serve are depicted in Figures 8.1.1 and 8.2.1 of Appendix A. Additionally, I/O trends of youth with "low" propensity (i.e. those who definitely do not expect to serve- civilians) are depicted in Figures 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 of Appendix A.

Figure 8.2- I/O Orientations of Youth Toward Work Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Mean I/O Index Scores-Greater # Indicates More Occupational

Class Year

Source: Monitoring the Future

Utilizing logistic regression analysis similar to the baseline analysis used in previous chapters, results reported in Table 8.4 below indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables for men only. The primary predictor variable in Table 8.4 is the I/O index variable (i.e. job-related attitudes of youth) where greater numbers indicate more of an occupational orientation toward work. Consistent with ***hypotheses 8a and 13,*** findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between youth with propensity and greater institutional orientations during the post-9/11 era. As occupational orientations increase, men are significantly less likely (OR=0.98**) to have the propensity to serve, after controlling for various factors such as race, SES, educational goals and attainment, region of country and type of residence. In other words, men who are likely to serve have significantly greater institutional orientations toward work.

Table 8.4
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=7761): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97
Casualties	0.96	0.96	0.97	0.96*	0.95*	0.95*	0.95*
Unemployment	1.05	1.04	1.05	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
Social-Psychological Influences							
Institutional/Occupational Index (> numbers indicate Occupational)	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.98*	0.98*	0.98**	0.97**
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		1.64***	1.27*	1.23	1.12	1.12	0.19
Hispanic		1.47***	1.15	1.16	1.15	1.14	1.39
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.93	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.98
Some college			0.93	1.08	1.12	1.11	1.11
College			0.72**	0.89	0.94	0.94	0.94
Graduate School			0.65**	0.92	1.00	1.01	1.00
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.73*	0.75*	0.79	0.79	0.79
Some College			0.72*	0.79	0.83	0.83	0.83
College			0.72*	0.84	0.89	0.89	0.88
Graduate School			0.56***	0.69*	0.72	0.72	0.72
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.12	1.06	1.05	1.05	1.05
Father or Male Guardian			1.43**	1.30*	1.30*	1.30*	1.29
None			1.76***	1.53**	1.47**	1.46**	1.47**
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.78**	0.79**	0.80**	0.80**	0.80**
1			0.63***	0.66***	0.65***	0.65***	0.65***
None			0.61**	0.64**	0.64**	0.64**	0.64**
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.72***	0.69***	0.70***	0.70***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.65***	0.67***	0.68***	0.68***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.62***	0.65***		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					0.96	0.97	0.96
Small City (<50k)					0.80	0.81	0.80
Medium City (50-100k)					0.65**	0.65*	0.65**
Suburb of Med City					0.78	0.79	0.78
Large City (100-500k)					0.79	0.80	0.80
Suburb of Large City					0.76	0.77	0.77
Very Large City (>500k)					0.87	0.88	0.88
Suburb of Very Large City					0.79	0.81	0.8
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					1.09	1.08	1.08
South					1.70***	1.68***	1.67***
West					1.14	1.13	1.13
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.67***	0.67***
2-Year College						1.06	1.06
Vocational/Technical School						1.1	1.1
Race/IOIndex Interaction (White=Ref)							
IO Index* Black							1.06
IO Index* Hispanic							0.99
N	7761	7761	7761	7761	7761	7761	7761
R^2	0.003	0.008	0.0268	0.055	0.0641	0.0644	0.0573
chi^2	0.0009	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: N= 7761 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 8.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by the I/O index scale after controlling for all factors highlighted in Model 6 of Table 8.4. The predicted probability of serving decreases by about one-third of a percent for every unit increase in the occupational direction on the I/O index scale from 11-44. In other words, a respondent who scores 4 points higher (indicating

greater occupational orientations) on the I/O index scale (consisting of eleven

questions with responses from 1-4), the predicted probability of serving decreases

by more than one percent. A one percent decrease in the predicted probability to

serve is a substantial difference since it equates to about a loss of 22,000 possible

male recruits the age of 18 according to U.S. Census data (U.S. Census Bureau

2015).

Figure 8.3- Predicted Propensity to Serve by I/O Orientations
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

The magnitude and direction of this finding is strengthened even further when

you compare men who expect that they "definitely will" serve versus men who

expect that they "definitely won't" serve. As occupational orientations increase,

men are significantly less likely (OR=0.95***) to have high propensity compared

to men with low propensity. The predicted probability of serving decreases by

almost one-half of a percent for every unit increase in the occupational direction

on the I/O index scale. Results from this analysis are located in Table 8.4.1 of

Appendix A.

Analysis of the single-item institutional measure overwhelmingly supports *hypothesis 8a*. Table 8.5 below shows the difference in mean scores of the variable, "Volunteer for War," for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013). Results reveal significant differences between men with and without propensity and between racial and ethnic groups. For the overall sample during the post-9/11 era, the mean score value is 3.78 with a standard deviation of 1.74 and a range from 1 to 6. Responses between 1-3 indicate a likelihood that a youth would volunteer in a necessary future war while responses between 4-6 indicate that a youth would not volunteer. The mean score for men with propensity is 2.14 and for men without propensity is 4.05, indicating significant differences (p<.001) between groups suggesting that men with propensity have greater institutional orientations. These results support *hypothesis 8h*. Average differences are increased even further between men with high (1.69) and low propensity (4.42). Mean scores also indicate significant differences (p<.001) between white and black men with propensity. White men with propensity have an average score of 1.96 whereas black men with propensity score an average of 3.24, suggesting greater occupational orientations for black men. There are no significant differences between white and Hispanic men (2.18) with propensity. However there are significant differences (p<.001) between Hispanic and black men with propensity, suggesting Hispanic men have greater institutional orientations. Of note, on average men with propensity, regardless of racial and ethnic background, have significantly greater institutional orientations than men

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without propensity.

Table 8.5
Difference of Means for "Volunteer For War"-Institutional Measure- During Post-9/11 Era (Men Only)

			N
Youth Without Propensity	Mean 1	4.06	5407
Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	2.14	932
	Difference	1.92	
	SD	1.74	
	t	33.65***	
Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 1	4.42	3676
Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.69	381
	Difference	2.73	
	SD	1.77	
	t	32.00***	
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	1.96	717
Black Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	3.24	119
	Difference	-1.28	
	SD	1.43	
	t	-9.52***	
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	1.55	307
Black Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.63	38
	Difference	-1.08	
	SD	1.20	
	t	-5.46***	
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	1.96	717
Hispanic Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	2.18	96
	Difference	-0.22	
	SD	1.25	
	t	-1.62	
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	1.55	307
Hispanic Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.89	36
	Difference	-0.34	
	SD	1.04	
	t	-1.84	
Black Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	3.24	119
Hispanic Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	2.18	96
	Difference	1.06	
	SD	1.79	
	t	4.51***	
Black Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	2.63	38
Hispanic Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.89	36
	Difference	0.74	
	SD	1.60	
	t	2.04*	
Youth With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	1.88	1265
Youth With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.14	932
	Difference	-0.26	
	SD	1.43	
	t	-4.31***	
Youth With High Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	1.59	632
Youth With High Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	1.69	381
	Difference	-0.10	
	SD	1.21	
	t	-1.27	

Note: Responses range from 1 to 6 where greater numbers indicate more occupational;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Utilizing logistic regression, results reported in Table 8.6 below indicate the

odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the

independent variables for men only. The primary predictor variable in Table 8.6

is the institutional measure variable, "Volunteer for War." Men who say that they

would volunteer to serve during a time that is "necessary for the U.S. to fight in

some future war" are over ten times more likely (OR=10.36***) than their

civilian counterparts to have the propensity to serve- an inclination that clearly

leans toward institutional motivations to serve.

Table 8.6
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences during post 9/11 era: Men Only (N=6339): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Macro-Social Influences						
Public Support (OIF)	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.98
Casualties	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
Unemployment	1.05	1.04	1.05	1.04	1.04	1.04
Social-Psychological Influences						
Volunteer For War (No/Will Not Volunteer=Ref)	10.28***	11.29***	11.09***	10.47***	10.37***	10.36***
Individual/Demographic Influences						
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)						
Black		2.80***	2.39***	2.31***	2.01***	2.01***
Hispanic		1.52**	1.30	1.30	1.23	1.22
SES Disadvantage/Advantage						
Fathers' education (less than HS=ref)						
HS			0.87	0.89	0.90	0.90
Some college			0.81	0.92	0.94	0.94
College			0.73*	0.87	0.90	0.90
Graduate School			0.75	1.02	1.06	1.07
Mothers' education (less than HS=ref)						
HS			0.82	0.88	0.91	0.91
Some College			0.82	0.94	0.97	0.97
College			0.83	0.99	1.02	1.02
Graduate School			.59**	0.73	0.77	0.76
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)						
Mother or Female Guardian			1.06	1.01	0.99	0.99
Father or Male Guardian			1.60**	1.45*	1.45*	1.45*
None			1.48*	1.26	1.25	1.25
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)						
2			0.75**	0.74**	0.74**	0.74**
1			0.65***	0.68***	0.67***	0.67***
None			0.75	0.77	0.78	0.79
Educational Attainment and Goals						
High School G.P.A (cont)				0.71***	0.69***	0.70***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)						
College Preparatory				0.68***	0.69***	0.69***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.69***	0.70***	-
Additional Controls						
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)						
Country					1.06	1.06
Small City (<50k)					1.07	1.07
Medium City (50-100k)					0.95	0.95
Suburb of Med City					1.03	1.03
Large City (100-500k)					1.31	1.31
Suburb of Large City					0.97	0.97
Very Large City (>500k)					1.24	1.24
Suburb of Very Large City					1.13	1.14
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)						
North Central					1.06	1.06
South					1.49***	1.48***
West					1.02	1.01
Additional Pathways						
4-Year College						0.69***
2-Year College						1.06
Vocational/Technical School						0.99
N	6339	6339	6339	6339	6339	6339
R^2	0.1630	0.1754	0.1878	0.2079	0.2125	0.2126
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 7274 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Additionally, analysis of the single-item occupational measure, "Having Lots of Money," using Form 1 data also supports **hypothesis 8a**. Table 8.7 below depicts difference of mean scores of the life goal variable, "Having Lots of Money," for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013). Results reveal significant differences between men with and without propensity and between racial and ethnic groups during the post-9/11 era. For the overall sample during the post-9/11 era, the mean score value is 2.84 with a standard deviation of 0.89 and a range of 1 to 4, with higher responses indicating greater importance toward having lots of money. Of note, a score of 1 corresponds to "not important," a score of 2 corresponds to a response of "somewhat important," a score of 3 corresponds to a response of "pretty important," and a score of 4 corresponds to a response of "very important." The mean score for men with propensity is 2.84 and for men without propensity is 2.85, indicating no significant difference between groups and suggesting that men with propensity have similar occupational orientations as their civilian counterparts. However, men with high propensity score 2.75 while men with low propensity score 2.86, indicating significant differences (p<.01) and suggesting men with high propensity are less occupational. Mean scores also indicate significant differences (p<.001) between white and black men with propensity. White men with propensity have an average score of 2.74 whereas black men with propensity score an average of 3.25, suggesting greater occupational orientations for black men. There are also significant differences (p<.001) between white and Hispanic men (3.14) with propensity, suggesting greater occupational orientations for

Hispanic men. Significant differences between racial and ethnic groups remain

for men with high propensity as well. Similar trends remain between black and

white men with propensity during the pre-9/11 era. Interestingly, there are

significant differences (p<.001) among men with propensity between the post and

pre-9/11 eras. Men with propensity during the post-9/11 era are significantly less

occupational compared to their counterparts prior to 9/11. These results remain

true among men with high propensity as well. Interestingly, there was no

difference between men with high and low propensity in the amount of

importance placed on having lots of money during the pre-9/11 era, suggesting

that men with high propensity during this timeframe were as occupational as their

civilian counterparts and were also more occupational than men with propensity

during the post-9/11 era.

Table 8.7
Difference of Means for Life Goal of Having Lots of Money- Occupational Measure- During Post-9/11 Era (Men Only)

			N
Youth Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.85	6316
Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	2.84	1032
	Difference	0.01	
	SD	0.89	
	t	0.30	
Youth With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.86	4455
Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.75	461
	Difference	0.11	
	SD	0.91	
	t	2.46**	
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	2.74	811
Black Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	3.25	123
	Difference	-0.51	
	SD	0.87	
	t	-6.23***	
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	2.66	378
Black Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	3.24	50
	Difference	-0.58	
	SD	0.88	
	t	-4.45***	
White Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	2.74	811
Hispanic Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	3.14	98
	Difference	-0.41	
	SD	0.87	
	t	-4.40***	
White Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	2.66	378
Hispanic Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	3.00	33
	Difference	-0.34	
	SD	0.88	
	t	-2.14*	
Black Youth With Propensity	Mean 1	3.25	123
Hispanic Youth With Propensity	Mean 2	3.14	98
	Difference	0.11	
	SD	0.81	
	t	0.99	
Black Youth With High Propensity	Mean 1	3.24	50
Hispanic Youth With High Propensity	Mean 2	3.00	33
	Difference	0.24	
	SD	0.89	
	t	1.21	
Youth With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.98	2121
Youth With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.84	1032
	Difference	0.14	
	SD	0.90	
	t	4.20***	
Youth With High Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.95	1011
Youth With High Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.75	461
	Difference	0.20	
	SD	0.90	
	t	4.03***	

Note: Responses range from 1 to 4 where greater numbers indicate more occupational;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 8.4 below depicts the overall average trends of importance placed on a

life goal of having lots of money for men with propensity between 1976-2013.

Results show that average scores generally increase between 1976-1997, and then

decrease afterwards into the post-9/11 era, indicating less occupational

orientations since 9/11. Again, this suggests that Moskos' prediction of an

increasingly occupational military holds true over the first two decades of the

AVF. However, it appears that support for his prediction is reduced after 1997 as

trends reverse. Men with propensity appear to have become less occupational,

especially after 9/11. There are similar trends among men with high propensity

depicted in Figure 8.4.1 of Appendix A, although men with high propensity are

less occupational overall.

Figure 8.4- Life Goal of Having Lots of Money
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Utilizing linear regression analysis, results reported in Table 8.8 below

indicate significant differences between youth with and without propensity (men

only) during the post-9/11 era using the life goal of "having lots of money" as the

dependent variable. After controlling for SES and various other factors, Model 3

of Table 8.8 below reveals that there are significant differences between men with

and without propensity concerning the importance placed on "having lots of money" as a life goal. Consistent with **hypotheses 8a and 13**, men with propensity place significantly less (p<.05) importance than their civilian counterparts on a life goal of having lots of money-an inclination that steers away from occupational motivations to serve.

Table 8.8

Table 8.8
Youth Life Goal of Having Lots of Money by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=7348)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Casualties	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Unemployment	-0.01	0.00	0.00
Military Propensity (Probably/Definitely Won't Serve=Ref)	-0.01	-0.05	-0.07*
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black		0.46***	.46***
Hispanic		0.29***	.26***
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.05	-0.05
Some college		-0.07	-0.06
College		-0.12**	-0.10**
Graduate School		-0.10*	-0.08
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.06	-0.06
Some College		-0.12*	-0.10*
College		-0.12*	-0.10*
Graduate School		-0.21***	-0.19***
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.03	0.01
Father or Male Guardian		0.04	0.03
None		0.05	0.04
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		-0.01	-0.01
1		0.05	0.05
None		0.00	0.00
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.05**
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.05*
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			0.04
Small City (<50k)			0.06
Medium City (50-100k)			0.08
Suburb of Med City			0.01
Large City (100-500k)			.12*
Suburb of Large City			-0.01
Very Large City (>500k)			0.01
Suburb of Very Large City			0.04
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.10***
South			-0.11***
West			-0.06
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.04
2-Year College			0.00
Vocational/Technical School			0.02
CONSTANT	3.03	3.05	3.19
N	7348	7348	7348
R^2	0.0006	0.0395	0.0455
Prob > F	0.3544	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 7348 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 8.5 below shows that, on average, men with propensity score 2.79 on a scale from 1 to 4 where higher numbers indicate greater importance placed on a life goal of having lots of money. Men who do not expect to serve score an average of 2.85 on the same scale, indicating greater occupational orientations. The differences between groups increase in magnitude in opposite directions when comparing men with high and low propensity. Results are reported in Table 8.8.1 of Appendix A.

Despite differences between men with and without propensity, it is clear that men who are likely to serve place fairly high importance on a life goal of having lots of money- clearly an occupational orientation. Indeed, this suggests that men with propensity have "pragmatic professional" orientations- a mixture of both institutional and occupational orientations- which supports **hypothesis 8b**.

Figure 8.5- Life Goal of Having Lots of Money
Youth with Propensity vs without Propensity , 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Military Propensity: 0-Without Propensity 1-With Propensity
Source: Monitoring the Future

Racial/Ethnic Differences in I/O Orientations

There are also significant I/O differences between racial and ethnic groups in job related attitudes among men with the propensity to serve. Figure 8.6 below depicts actual I/O differences in mean index scores between racial and ethnic groups with propensity by year during the post-9/11 era. Results reveal that black men with propensity generally have greater occupational orientations than their white counterparts during this period.

Figure 8.6- I/O Orientations of Youth Toward Work by Race/Ethnicity Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Results from linear regression analysis reported in Table 8.9 below indicate significant differences in I/O orientations by racial and ethnic groups using the I/O index measure as the dependent variable. Model 1 of Table 8.9 reveals that white men who expect to serve have significantly greater institutional orientations toward work compared to their black counterparts. On average, black men with propensity score 1.39 greater on the I/O index scale than their white counterparts,

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indicating significantly (p<.001) more occupational orientations toward work.

There are no significant I/O differences between white and Hispanic men.

Consistent with *hypothesis 8f*, after controlling for SES and additional factors,

significant differences (p<.01) in job related attitudes by race remain as

highlighted in Model 3 of Table 8.9. On average, black men with propensity

score 1.01 greater on the I/O index scale than their white counterparts. Of note,

there are no significant racial and ethnic group I/O differences among men with

high propensity (i.e. "Definitely Will" serve). These results are reported in Table

8.9.1 in Appendix A.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.02	-0.03	-0.07
Casualties	-0.09	-0.11	-0.14+
Unemployment	-0.09	-0.12	-0.15
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	1.39***	1.25***	1.01**
Hispanic	0.26	0.20	0.13
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-.40	-0.43
Some college		-0.77	-0.82
College		-1.18**	-1.12**
Graduate School		-2.07***	-1.86***
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.37	0.45
Some College		0.46	0.56
College		0.87	0.93
Graduate School		0.35	0.48
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		-0.12	-0.27
Father or Male Guardian		-0.53	-0.65
None		-0.47	-0.54
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		-0.52	-0.51
1		-0.24	-0.28
None		-0.52	-0.44
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.11
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.19
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			0.30
Small City (<50k)			0.40
Medium City (50-100k)			0.62
Suburb of Med City			0.17
Large City (100-500k)			0.56
Suburb of Large City			0.56
Very Large City (>500k)			-0.16
Suburb of Very Large City			0.36
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.13
South			0.61
West			-0.04
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.20
2-Year College			-0.21
Vocational/Technical School			0.84**
CONSTANT	32.08	33.05	33.10
N	1058	1058	1058
R^2	0.0197	0.0483	0.0692
Prob>F	0.0008	0.0001	0.0001

Note: N= 1058 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;

p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Results reported in Table 8.9 above reveal that there is a significant positive relationship (p<.10) between casualties and greater institutional orientations for men with propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. In other words, as casualties rise, men with propensity have greater institutional orientations. These results support my *hypothesis 8d* and are consistent with I/O trends depicted in Figure 8.2 above.

Results reported in Table 8.9 also show a positive relationship between unemployment and institutional orientations for those men with propensity. These results do not support my *hypothesis 8e.* From Figure 8.2, it appears that there is only a significant spike in occupational orientations from 2009-2010 when unemployment was at it's highest. However, this relationship does not hold true for the duration of the post-9/11 era. It appears that greater institutional orientations exist among youth with propensity regardless of unemployment rates.

Results reported in Table 8.9 also indicate significant I/O differences between SES categories, as measured by a father's education level, among men with propensity. As SES increases, men have greater institutional orientations toward work. This would seem to make sense as those with higher SES, typically measured by income, would likely be able to focus on more altruistic or intangible preferences for work, instead of focusing on the tangible aspects of pay and benefits. Put simply, those with higher economic status have more of a "luxury" to choose or prefer a "dream" job as opposed to a job where high pay is an important consideration. Interestingly, those men who expect to serve and who expect to attend vocational training have significantly (p<.01) greater

occupational orientations toward work. This also makes sense since those

interested in vocational education are generally "blue-collar" type workers who

may be more interested in acquiring job skills- an occupational consideration.

Additionally, it appears that white men who expect to serve are more

institutional than black men by analyzing the single-item institutional measure-

"Volunteer for War" variable. Results from logistic regression reported in Table

8.10 below indicate institutional differences by racial and ethnic groups using the

variable, "Volunteer for War," as the dependent variable. After controlling for

SES and additional factors, there are significant differences between white and

black men who have the propensity to serve concerning their likelihood to

volunteer during a time that is "necessary for the U.S. to fight in some future

war." Model 6 of Table 8.10 indicates that black men with propensity are more

than 3 times less likely (OR=0.18***) to say they would volunteer to serve in

some future war, suggesting less institutional orientations than their white

counterparts and providing additional support for ***hypothesis 8f***.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Macro-Social Influences						
Public Support (OIF)	0.99	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.97
Casualties	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99
Unemployment	1.12	1.11	1.12	1.12	1.12	1.14
Individual/Demographic Influences						
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)						
Black		0.16***	0.17***	0.16***	0.17***	0.18***
Hispanic		0.52*	0.55	0.55	0.56	0.60
SES Disadvantage/Advantage						
Father's education (less than HS=ref)						
HS			1.19	1.25	1.29	1.21
Some college			1.55	1.57	1.58	1.60
College			2.15*	2.14*	2.15*	2.09
Graduate School			0.96	0.92	0.92	0.86
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)						
HS			0.82	0.82	0.85	0.87
Some College			1.23	1.23	1.29	1.31
College			0.81	0.80	0.82	0.83
Graduate School			85	0.79	0.84	0.86
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)						
Mother or Female Guardian			0.95	0.99	0.97	0.97
Father or Male Guardian			1.15	1.18	1.21	1.22
None			0.71	0.77	0.80	0.84
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)						
2			1.64*	1.59	1.61	1.59
1			1.33	1.28	1.30	1.27
None			1.76	1.66	1.64	1.61
Educational Attainment and Goals						
High School G.P.A.				0.89	0.90	0.87
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)						
College Preparatory				1.83**	1.83**	1.65
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.99	1.00	
Additional Controls						
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)						
Country					1.80	1.73
Small City (<50k)					1.61	1.52
Medium City (50-100k)					1.43	1.35
Suburb of Med City					1.10	1.03
Large City (100-500k)					1.48	1.41
Suburb of Large City					1.02	0.96
Very Large City (>500k)					1.93	1.84
Suburb of Very Large City					1.74	1.65
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)						
North Central					0.83	0.86
South					0.77	0.82
West					1.03	1.11
Additional Pathways						
4-Year College						1.04
2-Year College						0.71
Vocational/Technical School						0.82
N	932	932	932	932	932	932
R^2	0.0063	0.0873	0.1088	0.1187	0.1258	0.1311
Prob > chi^2	0.1638	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 932 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

After full controls, Figure 8.7 below reveals that, on average, for white men who expect to serve, there is about a 90% probability that they would likely volunteer for a future war that is necessary. In contrast, for black men who expect to serve, there is about a 60% probability that they would likely volunteer. There

are no significant differences between white and Hispanic men on this

institutional measure, which is consistent with **hypothesis 8g**.

Figure 8.7- Likelihood to Volunteer for a Necessary War by Race/Ethnicity
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

In a similar analysis that clearly measures occupational orientations using

MTF Form 1 data, it appears that white men who expect to serve are less

occupational than their black counterparts. Results reported in Table 8.11 below

indicate occupational orientations by racial and ethnic groups using the variable,

"having lots of money," as the dependent variable. After controlling for SES and

additional factors, Model 3 of Table 8.11 below reveals that there are significant

differences between white and black men with the propensity to serve concerning

their importance placed on "having lots of money" as a life goal. Consistent with

hypothesis 8f, black men place significantly higher importance ($p<.001$) than

white men on a life goal of having lots of money. Similarly, Hispanic men place

significantly more importance ($p<.01$) than white men on a life goal of having lots

of money, which does not support **hypothesis 8g**. Racial and ethnic group

differences continue in the same direction and magnitude between white and

black men with high propensity. However, there is not a significant difference

between white and Hispanic men with high propensity. These results are reported

in Table 8.11.1 of Appendix A.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Casualties	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03*
Unemployment	0.00	0.00	0.00
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	0.51***	0.51***	0.46***
Hispanic	0.40***	0.37***	0.29**
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.03	0.04
Some college		0.03	0.05
College		-0.06	-0.04
Graduate School		-0.03	0.00
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.22*	-0.22*
Some College		-0.21*	-0.20
College		-0.20*	-0.19
Graduate School		-0.30*	-0.28*
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		-0.01	-0.02
Father or Male Guardian		0.09	0.08
None		0.10	0.10
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		0.02	0.03
1		0.11	0.11
None		0.06	0.05
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.07
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.02
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			-0.01
Small City (<50k)			0.14
Medium City (50-100k)			0.12
Suburb of Med City			0.01
Large City (100-500k)			0.12
Suburb of Large City			0.04
Very Large City (>500k)			0.15
Suburb of Very Large City			-0.05
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.06
South			0.00
West			0.03
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.02
2-Year College			0.07
Vocational/Technical School			0.02
CONSTANT	3.03	3.20	3.32
N	1032	1032	1032
R^2	0.0536	0.0663	0.0807
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 1032 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

After full controls, Figure 8.8 below shows that, on average, white men with

propensity score 2.75 on a scale from 1 to 4 where higher numbers indicate

greater importance placed on a life goal of having lots of money. Black men with

propensity score an average of 3.22 on the same scale, indicating greater

occupational orientations. Hispanic men with propensity score about 3.04 and are

also significantly different than their white counterparts. Despite racial and ethnic

group differences, it appears that all youth with propensity, on average, place

fairly high importance on a life goal of having lots of money- clearly an

occupational orientation.

Figure 8.8- Life Goal of Having Lots of Money by Race/Ethnicity
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Women's Propensity and I/O Orientations Analysis

I report the I/O analysis for women below. For brevity sake and continuity, I

condense the amount of tables and figures I use below for women compared to the

amount I used above for my analysis of men. In general, the results for the

analyses of the relationships between women's propensity and the additional

single-item variables (i.e. "volunteer for war" and "have lots of money") are

consistent with the analysis of women's propensity and the I/O index. Therefore, I only display the results of the relationship between women's propensity and the I/O index. As noted earlier, I do not compare differences in I/O orientations between high and low propensity women since sample sizes for women with high propensity would produce unreliable results.

Table 8.12 shows differences in mean I/O scale scores for my key analysis groups for women during the post-9/11 era (2002-2013), revealing average differences between women with and without the propensity to serve and between racial and ethnic groups. For the overall sample during the post-9/11 era, the mean scale value is 30.10 with a standard deviation of 3.73 and a range of response scores from 11 to 44. The average overall scale score is greater than 27.5, the mid-point of the scale, suggesting relatively greater occupational orientations of women. The mean scale score for women with propensity is 30.28, indicating no significant differences between those with or without propensity.

Mean scale scores indicate significant differences (p<.05) between white and black women with the propensity to serve. White women with propensity have a mean scale score of 29.96 whereas black women with propensity have a mean scale score of 30.76, suggesting greater occupational orientations for black women. There are no significant differences in mean scale scores between white and Hispanic women.

Interestingly, women with propensity during the post-9/11 era appear to be significantly (p<.001) more institutional than men with propensity. Women with

propensity average a score of 30.28, whereas men with propensity average a score of 31.16. These results are consistent with literature that suggests that women are motivated by more intangible benefits of work as compared to men (e.g. Beutel and Marini 1995; Wray-Lake et al. 2011). These results also support previous work highlighting that women in the military are motivated for institutional reasons (e.g. Shields 1988).

Table 8.12
Difference of Means for I/O Orientations Toward Work During Post-9/11 Era (Women Only)

			N
Women With Propensity	Mean 1	30.28	394
Women Without Propensity	Mean 2	30.09	8054
	Difference	-0.19	
	SD	0.19	
	t	-0.98	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	29.96	218
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	30.76	133
	Difference	0.80	
	SD	0.41	
	t	-1.96*	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	29.96	218
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	30.47	43
	Difference	-0.51	
	SD	0.61	
	t	-0.83	
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 1	30.76	133
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	30.47	43
	Difference	0.29	
	SD	0.67	
	t	0.44	
Women With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	30.06	671
Women With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	30.28	394
	Difference	-0.23	
	SD	0.23	
	t	-0.96	
Men With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 1	31.16	1058
Women With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	30.28	394
	Difference	0.88	
	SD	0.22	
	t	3.95***	

Note: Responses range from 11 to 44 where greater numbers indicate more occupational;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 8.9 below depicts the overall average I/O trends by year of women who are likely to enter the military between 1976-2013. Similar to the results for men, results show that average scores generally increase between 1976-2001, suggesting increasing occupational orientations toward work among women with propensity, with an overall mean of 30.06.

Figure 8.9- I/O Orientations of Youth Toward Work
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 8.10 below zeroes in on the post-9/11 era, depicting the average I/O trends of women likely to enter the military between 2002-2013. During the post-9/11 era, average I/O scores generally remain the same with an overall mean of 30.28. This suggests that Moskos' prediction does not hold as true during the post-9/11 era as the orientations of women with propensity are not any more occupational compared to years prior to 9/11. This is slightly different than the results for men, which indicated significantly less occupational orientations during the post-9/11 era.

Figure 8.10- I/O Orientations of Youth Toward Work
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Utilizing logistic regression analysis similar to the baseline analysis used in previous chapters, results reported in Table 8.13 below indicate the odds ratios of women's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables for men only. The primary predictor variable in Table 8.13 is the I/O scale index variable (i.e. job-related attitudes of youth) where higher numbers (i.e. numbers above 1.0) indicate more of an occupational orientation toward work. Consistent with **hypotheses 8a and 8h,** findings indicate that there is a positive relationship between women with propensity and higher institutional orientations during the post-9/11 era. Women who are likely to serve are significantly less likely (OR=0.96*) to have greater occupational orientations toward work compared to women who are not likely to serve, after controlling for various factors such as race, SES, educational goals and attainment, region of country and type of residence. In other words, women who are likely to serve

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have significantly greater institutional orientations toward work.

Table 8.13
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Women Only (N=8448): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	0.97	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
Casualties	0.91**	0.92**	0.92**	0.92**	0.91**	0.91**	0.91**
Unemployment	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05	1.05
Social-Psychological Influences							
Institutional/Occupational Index (> numbers indicate Occupational)	1.01	0.98	0.98	0.97*	0.97*	0.96*	0.99
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		4.52***	3.18***	3.24***	2.89***	2.91***	18.08**
Hispanic		2.02***	1.56*	1.55*	1.50*	1.47*	8.05
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.91	0.95	0.98	0.98	0.98
Some college			0.72	0.77	0.82	0.82	0.81
College			0.64*	0.70	0.76	0.76	0.76
Graduate School			0.43***	0.49**	0.53**	0.53*	0.53*
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.63**	0.67*	0.69*	0.70	0.69*
Some College			0.81	0.90	0.94	0.95	0.94
College			0.57**	0.66*	0.70	0.71	0.70
Graduate School			0.72	0.85	0.91	0.94	0.91
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.37**	1.31*	1.28*	1.27	1.27
Father or Male Guardian			1.60*	1.52	1.55	1.54	1.51
None			1.47	1.34	1.24	1.22	1.22
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.75*	0.78	0.80	0.80	0.81
1			0.51***	0.53***	0.53***	0.54***	0.54***
None			0.57*	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.86	0.83*	0.85	0.85
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.73**	0.73**	0.75**	0.75**
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.63***	0.66**		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.18	1.17	1.17
Small City (<50k)					1.10	1.10	1.10
Medium City (50-100k)					0.84	0.84	0.84
Suburb of Med City					0.88	0.89	0.89
Large City (100-500k)					0.97	0.97	0.97
Suburb of Large City					0.66	0.67	0.67
Very Large City (>500k)					1.10	1.11	1.11
Suburb of Very Large City					1.19	1.21	1.22
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					1.00	0.99	0.99
South					1.74***	1.69***	1.69***
West					1.24	1.20	1.20
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.68**	0.68**
2-Year College						1.23	1.23
Vocational/Technical School						0.97	0.97
Race/IOIndex Interaction (White=Ref)							
IO Index* Black							0.94
IO Index* Hispanic							0.95
N	8448	8448	8448	8448	8448	8448	8448
R^2	0.0081	0.0534	0.0803	0.0901	0.0993	0.1002	0.1014
Prob > chi^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Note: N= 8448 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 8.11 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women's propensity to serve by the I/O index scale after controlling for all factors highlighted in Model 6 of Table 8.13. The predicted probability of serving decreases by about one-third of a percent for every unit increase in the occupational direction on the I/O index

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scale from 11-44. In other words, for a woman who scores 4 points higher

(indicating more occupational orientations) on the I/O index scale, the predicted

probability of serving decreases by more than one percent. A one percent

decrease in the predicted probability to serve is a substantial difference since it

equates to about a loss of 21,000 possible female recruits the age of 18 according

to U.S. Census data (U.S. Census Bureau 2015).

Figure 8.11- Predicted Propensity to Serve by I/O Orientations
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

I/O Index of Job Preferences (Higher #s=More Occupational)

Source: Monitoring the Future

It should be noted that similar results held constant when analyzing the

institutional measure, "volunteer for war" variable, and the occupational measure

of a life goal to "have lots of money." For both measures, women with propensity

were significantly more institutional compared to their civilian counterparts

without propensity. These results were similar to the results for men. Overall,

results show that women with propensity during the post-9/11 era are more

institutional than their civilian counterparts.

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Racial/Ethnic Differences in I/O Orientations Among Women with Propensity

Results from regression analysis reported in Table 8.14 below indicate significant differences in I/O orientations among women with propensity by racial and ethnic groups using the I/O scale index measure as the dependent variable. Model 1 of Table 8.14 reveals that white women who expect to serve have significantly greater institutional orientations toward work compared to their black counterparts. On average, among women with propensity, black women score an average of 0.82 greater on the I/O index scale than white women, indicating significantly (p<.05) more occupational orientations toward work. There are no significant I/O differences between white and Hispanic women. However, after controlling for SES and additional factors, differences in job related attitudes by race and ethnicity are no longer significant as highlighted in Model 3 of Table 8.14.

It should be noted that similar results held constant when analyzing the institutional measure, "volunteer for war" variable, and the occupational measure of a life goal to "have lots of money." For both measures, black women with propensity were significantly (p<.001) more occupational compared to their white counterparts. There were no significant differences between white and Hispanic women with propensity. These results were similar to results for men.

Table 8.14

Institutional/Occupational Orientations of Youth (I/O Index Measure) by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Women With Propensity to Serve (N=394)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	0.22	0.20	0.14
Casualties	0.27*	0.24*	0.17
Unemployment	0.14	0.12	0.08
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	0.82*	0.77	0.64
Hispanic	0.32	0.15	0.04
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.55	-0.56
Some college		-0.80	-0.84
College		-1.20	-1.40*
Graduate School		-1.78	-2.04*
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.57	-0.62
Some College		-0.22	-0.37
College		-0.42	-0.41
Graduate School		-0.26	-0.02
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.32	0.23
Father or Male Guardian		-0.42	-0.07
None		0.38	0.48
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		0.54	0.55
1		0.43	0.34
None		0.80	0.88
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.76*
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.36
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			-0.27
Small City (<50k)			-0.59
Medium City (50-100k)			-0.32
Suburb of Med City			-0.07
Large City (100-500k)			-1.59
Suburb of Large City			0.48
Very Large City (>500k)			-0.13
Suburb of Very Large City			-0.08
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			0.26
South			0.45
West			-0.30
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.27
2-Year College			0.39
Vocational/Technical School			-1.19
CONSTANT	26.70	27.83	31.45
N	394	394	394
R^2	0.0246	0.0501	0.0942
Prob>F	0.0843	0.4146	0.3764

Note: N= 394 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;

p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

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Discussion

For brevity sake, I focus the discussion below on the relationship between men's propensity and I/O attitudes toward work. I highlight key differences by gender where relevant, which is consistent with previous chapters.

Taking all the I/O measures into consideration, it appears that youth who are likely to serve during the post-9/11 era have more institutional and less occupational orientations than youth who do not expect to serve. This makes sense given that the post-9/11 era has been marked by sustained war. It is reasonable that those who desire to serve during wartime would have fairly high institutional motivations overall such as serving for "patriotism" or as a "calling." Certainly it is not surprising that youth who expect to serve during this era are looking for something "more than just a job." Colonel Dandridge Malone's narration of a "Soldier's Story" during the 1960s, quoted in James Fallows' *National Defense,* dramatically expresses the institutional nature of military service prior to the AVF.

> "Malone tells the soldier's story, from the time he leaves home, a young recruit, on his way to boot camp…the anxiety and confusion at the training schools; the friendships, the coarseness, the constant reassignments and promotions; the compromises and satisfactions of military marriage; and on to Vietnam, through the fire fights, the fear again, the deaths of friends; survival and return; the first glimpse of children he has not seen for a year, the first embrace of his wife…
> "- and if all these wondrous things," Malone draws at the end… "which thousands of us share in whole or part, can, by the mindless logic of a soulless computer, programmed by a witless pissant ignorant of affect, be called, *just another job*… then, by God, I'm a sorry, suck-egg mule" (Fallows 1981).

Indeed, it appears that the sentiment expressed in Colonel Malone's "Soldier's Story," during the conscription-based military era, has, perhaps, withstood the test of time and that the occupational trends of the military may not hold as true as Moskos predicted during the post-9/11 era- an era marked by sustained war. The increasing trends of occupational orientations during the 1980s and 90s, as depicted in Figures 8.1 and 8.1.1, have reversed direction toward greater institutional orientations during the post-9/11 era. These results support and strengthen findings in recent research (e.g. Woodruff et al. 2006; Griffith 2008; Pew 2011a). However, these findings appear to contradict Dempsey's (2010) research. Dempsey found that U.S. enlistees were primarily motivated to join by a list of occupational reasons related to pay and benefits. On the contrary, these findings suggest that the future enlisted population, who comprise the majority of the respondents with propensity in the MTF study, are motivated by more institutional motivations such as patriotism (i.e. likely to volunteer in a "necessary" war in the future) as opposed to occupational motivations such as pay and benefits (i.e. having a life goal of "making lots of money"). Although Dempsey's research only captured a snapshot of soldier attitudes within the U.S. Army in 2004, one might have expected that those attitudes would be more in line with institutional orientations since 9/11 had just occurred. However, it is possible that greater institutional orientations of soldiers did not occur until after 2004, as the MTF data suggests. Indeed, only the most junior soldiers surveyed in Dempsey's research would have been from the post-9/11 cohort. In contrast to Dempsey's research covering the attitudes of those in the Army, my results reveal

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a more complete picture of attitudes across the entire military formation, regardless of MOS or branch of service, and primarily comprising the attitudes of the enlisted ranks during the post-9/11 era.

It should not be forgotten, however, that both institutional and occupational orientations continue to exist for youth who expect to serve during the post-9/11 era. For example, the fact that the mean scale score on the I/O index for youth with propensity does not fall below 29.90 for any key group of analysis (see Tables 8.3 and 8.12) indicates fairly high occupational orientations overall, as the midpoint of the scale is 27.5. Although there are significant differences between youth with and without propensity in the importance placed on having a life goal of "making lots of money," youth who expect to serve still score an average of 2.79, which is beyond the mid-point of 2.5 on a scale from 1-4, indicating that this goal is still "pretty important" to them. Additionally, as noted in earlier analysis, the fact that a dwindling economy is positively related to military propensity and that high casualties are negatively related to propensity, also suggests that some occupational motivations of service persist during this era.

Taken together, these data suggest that Segal's (1986) hypothesis of "pragmatic professionalism" is supported during the post-9/11 era. These findings also support earlier research (e.g. Eighmey 2006; Burland and Lundquist 2013; Dempsey 2010). That a young man is concerned about pay, benefits, and the economic well being of his family does not mean that he is a bad soldier. Indeed, prior evidence suggests that a mixture of orientations can coexist and is the modal type (Segal 1986). This is important to understand for policy makers in

Congress who are making defense budgetary decisions, as well as for military practitioners who are basing personnel decisions on Congressional funding or a lack thereof. As the military continues to undergo sequestration, and seeks to find ways to survive in a constrained environment by reducing service members' retirement benefits, annual pay raises, and other tangible benefits, it is possible that military recruitment and retention could be negatively impacted given the pragmatic orientations of service members and recruits.

In large part, researchers have neglected to examine differences in I/O attitudes between racial and ethnic groups. I have attempted to fill this void through my analysis. As a whole, data suggests that white youth who expect to serve have more institutional orientations than their black youth counterparts. These results support the findings of earlier research as well (e.g. DoD 2000; Woodruff et al. 2006; Griffith 2008). Generally, there are no significant I/O differences between white and Hispanic youth with propensity. However, for the occupational measure of having lots of money as a life goal, Hispanic men with propensity place greater importance than their white counterparts. It must be emphasized that these data do not suggest that black youth who expect to serve are not at all institutionally motivated. As noted earlier, there were no significant differences in I/O orientations between racial and ethnic groups among those with high propensity using the I/O index scale measure. Nor does it suggest that white youth with propensity are not at all occupationally motivated. Simply, data reveals that, on average, white youth who expect to serve are more institutionally oriented and less occupationally oriented than their black youth counterparts. As

highlighted earlier, however, there are certainly institutional and occupational orientations among all youth (i.e. "pragmatic professionals") who expect to serve in the armed forces, regardless of racial and ethnic background.

I/O differences between racial and ethnic groups are consistent with the bridging hypothesis. That is, those youth who are economically disadvantaged (e.g. minorities) may be motivated to join the military by more occupational reasons such as pay, benefits, and job security. This helps explain the average differences in occupational orientations between white and black youth with propensity. It appears that minority youth are active agents in making the best decisions for their pathway to adulthood- not merely victims of their socioeconomic standing as some have suggested by arguing that the volunteer military is nothing but a "poor man's draft" (Bica 2011). Indeed, the military's ability to increase human capital through job training, pay and benefits, and education assistance may still present an attractive option for minority youth, despite it being a time of war where the risks of military service are increased and possibly outweigh the benefits.

However, the bridging hypothesis does not fully explain the fact that there are generally no significant I/O differences between white and Hispanic youth. It is possible that other, more institutional motivations of service could be attracting Hispanic youth to serve during the post-9/11 era. Hispanic representation of men and women has been the highest among minorities within the Marine Corps, which is typically considered the most institutional branch of service. Indeed, research has shown that the large Hispanic representation within the Marine

Corps has been attributed to how well the institutional nature of the service intermeshed with the cultural values of Hispanics (De Angelis 2012). Perhaps, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq could be appealing to Hispanic individual institutional values, attracting Hispanic youth to serve their country and fulfill their sense of citizenship, regardless of their actual legal status, especially during a period in which immigration issues have been at the forefront of political and social debate (Segal et al. 2007). Certainly, the idea that those willing to fight for the United States are worthy of equal status is not a new one. Service during wartime has always been a way for all individuals to prove their merit and claim their equal stake in citizenship- especially for minorities (e.g. black service during WWII) (Leo Bogart 1969; Kestnbaum 2000; 2002; Clever and Segal 2012).

My findings also suggest that there may be differences in values between the military (i.e. those with propensity) and civilians (i.e. those without propensity). The starkest contrast in I/O orientations is between those who say they definitely will serve versus those who say they definitely will not. Results suggest that military members are more institutionally oriented than civilians. This suggests that civilians value more tangible personal rewards such as money and benefits than those in the military. This gap in values and attitudes between the military and civilian population contributes to the extensive body of research on civil-military relations as discussed extensively in Chapter 7. Indeed, there has been a large body of literature in business management that has grappled with I/O tensions in the business world and applying techniques to instill more institutional values in the private sector (Faris 1988).

The fact that there are I/O differences in attitudes toward work between the military and civilians is not necessarily surprising. Certainly, one would expect that those expecting to enter the armed forces after 9/11 would have relatively high institutional orientations. Indeed, the military has attempted to recruit these types of individuals through various institutional recruiting themes. The fact that those youth without propensity (i.e. civilians) have greater occupational orientations does not necessarily mean that they are bad or ill intentioned. Research has shown that civilians may also have both "occupational" and "institutional" orientations, similar to the concept of "pragmatic professionalism" (Segal 1986). Even in the public sector realm, workers can mix altruistic motives while still satisfying their individual needs (Taylor et al. 2015). Additionally, my research shows that general I/O trends for civilians (i.e. youth with low propensity) have also reversed direction from increasingly occupational orientations to slightly more institutional orientations during the 2000s (see Figures 8.2.2 and 8.2.3 in Appendix A), suggesting that American youth values may be becoming less individualistic in nature. Indeed, these findings could be representative of the service-based learning programs established within school systems over the past few decades. A good amount of research (e.g. Billig 2000) has focused on the service ethic (i.e. community service) put into place within K-12 schools from the perceived need to reform youth and education resulting from the belief that young people seemed to be growing increasingly alienated from their communities and from society as a whole. Service-learning systems were explicitly aimed at achieving the end state of decreasing the individualistic trends

within society overall (Conrad and Hedin 1991). My research contributes to this stem of research by indirectly analyzing the impact of the service ethic in schools over time, suggesting that youth overall are becoming less individualistic or occupational in nature. However, the main emphasis of my research is that youth who expect to serve have also become increasingly institutional in nature, even more so than their civilian counterparts, during the post-9/11 era.

What is perhaps most important to highlight from my research is that findings suggest that institutional orientations, reminiscent of the conscription-era days, steadfastly remain within all youth groups who have the propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era, regardless of racial and ethnic background, and especially among those with "high" propensity. As prior research (e.g. Faris 1988; Griffin 2008) has suggested, this bodes well for the effectiveness of our military in a time of war into the unknown future.

A possible limitation to my analysis is that the MTF study does not directly inquire about a respondent's motivation to serve. Although the measures used for my analysis are a proxy for I/O orientations and individual motivations to serve, they provide additional benefits that could not be found otherwise. It is well known that a basic human tendency is to present oneself in the most positive light, and, unfortunately, this can distort information gained on self-report questionnaires. Even in anonymous surveys, respondents are unable to report accurately on certain topics for "ego-defensive or impression management reasons" (Fisher 1993:303). The result is data that are systematically biased toward respondents' perceptions of what is "correct" or socially acceptable

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(Maccoby and Maccoby 1954). This phenomenon is called "social desirability bias" and has been found to occur in virtually all types of self-report measures and across nearly all social science literatures (Fisher 1993). The MTF dataset is unique in that it captures individual attitudes prior to actual enlistment, thereby effectively reducing the social desirability bias that could be present when a respondent is directly asked what motivates him or her to serve.

Oftentimes, service members are apt to cite more altruistic reasons for serving such as a desire to serve the country as opposed to individual reasons such as pay and benefits. Indeed, it is often the case for enlistees to nostalgically reflect on their motivations to serve as being romantic and selfless in nature. These responses typically become primarily altruistic the longer the enlistee serves in the military (Dempsey 2010). Research (e.g. Fisher 1993) has shown that indirect questioning has been employed to effectively reduce the social desirability bias. By indirectly examining youth attitudes about their work preferences in general, as a proxy for determining motivations to serve, instead of directly asking questions of why they expect to serve, we may better tap into the actual psyche of individuals without biasing responses with socially desirable answers such as stating that they serve for a "higher calling" or for "patriotism," which have been typical respondent options on surveys. For this reason, results from my research may underestimate the actual extent of overall institutional orientations of youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era. However, my data is useful for drawing comparisons between key groups such as white/black/Hispanics, military/civilians, and pre/post-9/11 eras. Since the MTF survey does not directly

ask these questions, results should allow recruiters and military practitioners to more accurately assess youth motivations to serve.

Summary

My research is unique compared to other research on I/O attitudes in a few notable ways. First, if one is willing to make longitudinal assessments using repeated cross-sectional data, I am able to depict I/O trends of youth with propensity over time during the AVF era. My data suggests that Moskos' prediction of an increasingly occupational military may not hold as true during the post-9/11 era. Utilizing a combination of single-item questions and a multi-item index to strengthen findings, my research suggests that on average, youth with the propensity to serve, regardless of race and ethnicity, are becoming increasingly institutional in nature during the post-9/11 era. In fact, given the secondary nature of the MTF data in which I utilize indirect inquiry, I am better able to eliminate social desirability bias. Thus, the institutional orientations of youth with propensity may be underestimated since youth are more likely to indicate altruistic motivations of service when directly asked. Furthermore, my analysis of the MTF data allows for a more complete examination of the attitudes of future enlistees across services and military occupational specialties. Indeed, prior research has largely been limited to the analysis of attitudes within specific branches of service or by MOS, typically finding greater institutional orientations in the combat arms specialties and in the Marine Corps or the Army.

Second, I am able to assess key group differences between racial and ethnic background. Data suggests that white and Hispanic youth with propensity

generally have greater institutional orientations than their black youth counterparts. Further, data suggest that a higher level of socioeconomic status, as measured by a parent's level of education, is also associated with greater institutional orientations among youth with propensity.

Third, by considering youth with high propensity as the best proxy for military attitudes and youth with low propensity as the best proxy for civilian attitudes, I am able to assess civil-military attitudinal differences. Data suggests that youth with high propensity have greater institutional orientations than their civilian counterparts. However, it is important to note that youth with high propensity have fairly high occupational orientations as well. Indeed, Segal's concept of "pragmatic professionalism" appears to be present during the post-9/11 era- an era marked by the surprise attacks of 9/11, a period of sustained war with fairly high casualties, and a period in which the stability of the economy has fluctuated from a recession. As such, the I/O orientations of those likely to serve in the military have fluctuated in predictable ways.

Data from my research is fruitful for the examination of I/O attitudes using individuals as the unit of analysis, to evaluate whether those youth with military propensity view their service as a calling, a job, or some combination of the two. However, it does not allow for the analysis at the organizational level to compare the military as an institution with the military as a workplace, nor at the nation-state level (Segal 1986). To better examine all applicable units of analysis, ethnographic research, complemented by survey analysis and organizational data, would be best to assess the I/O trends of the military overall. However, inasmuch

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as institutional orientations are positively related to increased military effectiveness, job satisfaction, and commitment to the organization, data suggests that the AVF of the military is in solid shape with institutional values of service prevailing during the post-9/11 era.

Chapter 9: Gender Role Attitudes and Military Propensity

Background and Prior Research

An individual's gender role attitudes consists of one's set of beliefs about the appropriate role for men and women in society. Beliefs on gender roles have been described as ranging from traditional to non-traditional, or as being part of the conservative/liberal spectrum. Traditionally, men have been expected to assume the role as "provider" or "breadwinner" for the family, while women have been expected to assume the "homemaker" and "caregiver" roles. On the other hand, non-traditional, or egalitarian, attitudes favor more equal distribution of professional and family responsibilities between men and women.

From 1970 to 2000, women's participation in the labor force increased by 40 percent, while men experienced a 7 percent decrease (Ray 2008). Indeed, the provider role normally associated with men has been challenged in recent times by an increased attention to women's ability to work outside the home and a man's ability to serve as a caregiver and to share more of the work inside the house. As a result of the expansion of women's participation in the workforce, attitudes toward appropriate gender roles have changed over time.

Previous research on gender roles (e.g. Thornton and Young-Demarco 2001) has shown a substantial increase in trends toward support for women's equality in the workplace between the 1960s through the 1990s. By the 1980s, a significant majority of Americans had egalitarian attitudes on most dimensions of gender roles, including equality in decision-making, the involvement of women in previously male roles, and the impacts of a working mother on children and

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families. These trends have continued into the mid-1990s. Further, these patterns of increasing egalitarian attitudes have held true for women as well as for men, and for high school seniors as well as the general adult population. However, research has shown that egalitarian trends in attitudes towards gender roles have leveled off since the mid-1990s. Regardless, current levels of egalitarianism toward gender roles are dramatically higher than those of the middle of the 20th century.

Research has also shown that there are racial and ethnic differences in attitudes toward gender roles. Black men are more liberal than men in other racial and ethnic groups in their attitudes toward gender roles. This has largely been attributed to the fact that black women have had to work as the provider more than women in other racial and ethnic groups (Ray 2008). Some (e.g. Konrad and Harris 2002) have attributed these differences in attitudes due to the fact that African-Americans have adapted to slavery, discrimination and racism by developing multiple roles for men and women, which has assisted them in functioning as a family unit. Since traditional gender roles are based on a definitive division of labor, blacks and other racial and ethnic groups, who depend on the economic contributions of both men and women, may develop more egalitarian views towards gender role norms (Millham and Smith 1986). Although research has shown that black men are more supportive of working wives compared to white men, research has also shown that black men have more conservative attitudes about a range of other gender roles (e.g. responsibility for housework and achievement outside the home).

Research on the gender role attitudes of Hispanics has been limited compared to blacks and results are generally inconclusive (Kane 2000). One of the earliest views of Hispanic culture is that Hispanic men and women have been labeled as very traditional, with men classified as "machismo" and women classified as "marianismo" (McLoyd et al. 2000). "Marianismo" is based on the Catholic ideal of the Virgin Mary, emphasizing the woman's role as mother and celebrating her self-sacrifice and suffering for her children. "Machismo," on the other hand, stresses the man's role more as head of the household than as father. Taken together, these values have painted the picture of the ideal Latino family type as the self-sacrificing mother and the dominant, tyrannical man (McLoyd et al. 2000). More recently, however, studies have begun to explode the myth of the macho man and submissive woman as the norm in Latino culture. Indeed, studies have shown that Hispanic men who held traditional values about gender roles have counted on their wives' income from outside the home to increase their families' standard of living and upward mobility (McLoyd et al. 2000).

Despite the increasing trends of egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles among society, attitudes among men in the military have significantly lagged behind. Research has shown that women's performance evaluations in military roles have been significantly negatively influenced by gender stereotypes that have led to discrimination by others against women in these roles (Boldry et al. 2001). Indeed, the stereotypes of women do not necessarily fit nicely with the perception of masculinity required to perform and lead within the military.

Gender Role Attitudes in the Military During the Post-9/11 Era

Women's roles and participation levels in the military have continued to increase over time as a result of various social and institutional factors to include but not limited to: manpower shortages within the military; an increase in women's participation in the overall labor force; the overall delay of marriage and childbearing in society; a continual increase in the military's occupational specialties available to women; and a widening acceptance and appreciation for women's performances in the military (Segal 1995; Sandhoff and Segal 2013). See Chapter 6 for more detailed background information on women's military service. Attitudes toward gender roles are of particular interest during the post-9/11 era as women's participation in the military continues to increase during a period of sustained combat operations. The removal of the combat exclusion ban and DoD's recent decision to open all combat specialties to women makes it especially worthy to analyze youth attitudes toward gender-roles, especially among young men with the propensity to serve. These institutional changes beg the question: will men's predispositions toward gender roles make them more or less likely to accept new combat roles for women?

With women's success during combat operations throughout the post-9/11 era as highlighted earlier in Chapter 6, it is reasonable to believe that egalitarian attitudes toward gender-roles may be increasing among young men interested in the military. Indeed, the barrier-breaking trends of women in society (see Chapter 6) continue to challenge gender norms. However, the military has long been viewed as a traditionally male, war-fighting institution with a hyper-masculine

culture. Thus, it is possible that attitudes toward gender roles are more traditional

among men in the military compared to the rest of society (Dempsey 2010).

Indeed, these attitudes could be strong enough to resist the changes within the

military institution.

Dempsey's (2010) recent study of the Army in 2004 included an analysis of

attitudes toward issues of gender. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree

on a scale of one to seven on the following statement: "Women should have an

equal role with men in running business, industry and government." Dempsey

found that 60 percent of the civilian population fully agreed with this statement,

whereas just 49 percent of Army respondents did so, indicating significant

differences between the military and civilians. There were no significant

differences in opinion by rank as 48 percent of soldiers and 51 percent of officers

agreed with the statement. However, there were significant differences between

men and women, particularly among the officer corps. Within the officer ranks,

46 percent of male officers agreed with the idea of full equality for women in the

workplace, whereas 81 percent of female officers felt the same. The same pattern

existed among the enlisted ranks, but to a lesser degree. Male soldiers essentially

had the same opinions (45 percent) as their officer counterparts. However, female

soldiers were significantly less (65 percent) than their officer counterparts.

Differences in attitudes between male and female enlisted soldiers were still

significant, but not as large as differences between male and female officers.

Perhaps most interestingly, there was a relative lack of differences in opinion

on gender equality between men and women in the civilian population, despite

significant differences by gender among those in the army. Across all ranks, the study found that the difference in attitudes toward gender equality between men and women was 23 percent (45 percent of men and 68 percent of women agreed with full gender equality in the workplace). These patterns differed markedly from civilian attitudes. The difference in attitudes by gender among the civilian population was only 6 percent. Fifty-seven percent of male civilian respondents agreed with the idea of full gender equality in the workplace, compared with 63 percent of women. Taken together, Dempsey's research suggests that men in the military are more traditional in gender role attitudes than their civilian counterparts, while women in the military are more egalitarian than their civilian counterparts. It is possible that these stark differences could lead to problems with women's integration into combat roles.

Propensity Predictions

Despite societal trends of increasing egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles, women's expansion of roles in the military, and their recent success in combat during the post-9/11 era, I do not expect to see a positive influence on egalitarian attitudes among young men with propensity. Given the traditional, hyper-masculine culture of the military and consistent with Dempsey's recent research (2010), I expect that men's propensity will be negatively related to greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles. Consistent with prior research (e.g. McLoyd et al. 2000) that analyzes the differences of gender role attitudes by race and ethnicity, I expect that minority men with propensity will have greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to their white counterparts.

Hypothesis 9a: Men's propensity will be negatively related to greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles during the post-9/11 era.

Hypothesis 9b: Black and Hispanic men with propensity will have greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to their white counterparts.

Consistent with prior research (e.g. Dempsey 2010), I expect that men with propensity will have less egalitarian gender role attitudes compared to women with propensity. In contrast to my prediction for men, I expect that women's propensity will be positively related to greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles, which is consistent with Dempsey's (2010) recent research. Indeed, it is reasonable that the barrier-breaking trends of women within society, as well as their recent successes in combat, are likely to attract young women with greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles into the military. Consistent with prior research, I expect that minority women with propensity will have greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to their white counterparts.

Hypothesis 9c: Women with propensity will have greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to men with propensity during the post-9/11 era.

Hypothesis 9d: Women's propensity will be positively related to greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles during the post-9/11 era.

Hypothesis 9e: Black and Hispanic women with propensity will have greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to their white counterparts.

Analysis of Gender Role Attitudes

Methods

A series of questions on Form 3 of the MTF survey ask respondents how much

they agree or disagree with each of the following statements related to gender

roles. Response categories range between 1= "Disagree"; 2= "Mostly Disagree";

3= "Neither"; 4= "Mostly Agree"; 5= "Agree." I created a "gender roles" index

measure that consists of the seven following questions: 1) Men and women should

be paid the same money if they do the same work; 2) Women should be

considered as seriously as men for jobs as executives or politicians; 3) A woman

should have exactly the same job opportunities as a man; 4) A woman should

have exactly the same educational opportunities as a man; 5) It is usually better

for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman

takes care of the home and family (reverse coded); 6) A preschool child is likely

to suffer if the mother works (reverse coded); and 7) A working mother can

establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who

does not work.

I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to confirm that the variables

used for my gender roles index measure the same things conceptually and to

confirm the number of dimensions that the variables measure in my index

(Torres-Reyna 2010). The extraction method was principal components analysis,

with Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization (Abdi 2003). Results of initial

CFA revealed two distinct factors with eigenvalues above 1.0- 3.08 and 1.35

respectively. Following CFA, Factors 1 and 2 fit into two groups which I

categorized as: 1) "Equality for Women," and 2) "Gender Roles." Results from

my CFA are reported in Table 9.1 below.

Survey Items	Factors	
	1	2
Agree or Disagree-	**Equality for Women**	**Gender Role**
Men and women should be paid the same money if they do the same work	0.7057	-0.3759
Women should be considered as seriously as men for jobs as executives or politicians	0.7969	-0.2395
A woman should have exactly the same job opportunities as a man	0.7588	-0.2102
A woman should have exactly the same educational opportunities as a man	0.6870	-0.4089
It is usually better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family	0.5742	0.4508
A preschool child is likely to suffer if the mother works	0.5089	0.6755
A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work	0.5535	0.5310
% total item variance explained	43.9	63.3

Note: The extraction method was principal-components analysis and the rotation method was Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Years: 2002-2013

After constructing a separate scale from the "Equality for Women" measures noted above, Cronbach's alpha was equal to 0.80, which falls into the "good" category for most social science research according to George and Mallory (2003). After constructing a separate scale from the "Gender Roles" measures above, Cronbach's alpha was equal to 0.65, which is considered to be "questionable." After combining both indexes into a single gender roles index scale, the mean inter-item correlation was 0.34 and the reliability (Cronbach's coefficient alpha with unstandardized items) was 0.74, which is "acceptable" for most social science research (Cronbach 1951; George and Mallory 2003). I chose to combine both factors into one multi-item gender roles index measure since both factors are related with respect to attitudes toward women at work and at home. Response values were summed, yielding a scale with a minimum response score of 7 and a maximum score of 35, with a midpoint of 21. Higher number responses are considered to be greater support for women's roles in the workplace and at home. Put another way, higher responses indicate more egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles. Of note, I conducted an analysis of men and women's propensity using the two separate index measures noted above, but results did not significantly change in magnitude or direction from the results reported below which utilizes one index scale measure.

Table 9.2 below depicts the difference of means in attitudes toward gender

roles for key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era. Not surprisingly, results

reveal that men with propensity are significantly more traditional (p<.001) in their

attitudes toward gender roles compared to men without propensity. Despite

significant differences, it is worth noting that men with propensity score above the

midpoint of the scale (i.e. 21), suggesting fairly high egalitarian attitudes toward

gender roles. On average, men with propensity score 26.33, while men without

propensity score an average of 27.35. On average, white and black men with

propensity are more traditional in their attitudes toward gender roles compared to

their civilian counterparts. However, results indicate that Hispanic men with

propensity are no more traditional in their gender attitudes than their civilian

counterparts. Not surprisingly, white men with propensity are significantly

(p<.001) more traditional in gender role attitudes compared to their black or

Hispanic counterparts. There are no significant differences between black or

Hispanic men with propensity.

Surprisingly, men with propensity during the post-9/11 era are no more

egalitarian in their attitudes toward gender roles compared to men with propensity

prior to 9/11. Men with propensity during the post-9/11 era score an average of

26.33, whereas their male counterparts average a score of 26.06 prior to 9/11. Not

surprisingly, results reveal rather large differences (p<.001) in gender role

attitudes between men and women with propensity, which supports **hypothesis 9c**.

Men with propensity score an average of 26.33, while women with propensity

average a score of 30.63.

Table 9.2
Difference of Means for Gender Roles Index by Key Analysis Groups During Post-9/11 Era

Index (Greater Numbers Indicate More Liberal Attitude Toward Women's Equality in Workplace)			N
Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	27.35	7059
Men With Propensity	Mean 2	26.33	1181
	Difference	1.02	
	Std Error	0.16	
	t	6.46***	
White Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	27.14	5819
White Men With Propensity	Mean 2	25.95	885
	Difference	1.19	
	Std Error	0.19	
	t	6.40***	
Black Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	28.61	683
Black Men With Propensity	Mean 2	27.49	157
	Difference	1.12	
	Std Error	0.39	
	t	2.86**	
Hispanic Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	28.05	557
Hispanic Men With Propensity	Mean 2	27.42	139
	Difference	0.63	
	Std Error	0.42	
	t	1.50	
White Men With Propensity	Mean 1	25.95	885
Black Men With Propensity	Mean 2	27.49	157
	Difference	-1.54	
	Std Error	0.45	
	t	-3.42***	
White Men With Propensity	Mean 1	25.95	885
Hispanic Men With Propensity	Mean 2	27.42	139
	Difference	-1.47	
	Std Error	0.48	
	t	-3.10**	
Men With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	26.06	2474
Men With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	26.33	1181
	Difference	-0.27	
	SD	0.18	
	t	-1.48	
Men With Propensity	Mean 1	26.33	1181
Women With Propensity	Mean 2	30.63	406
	Difference	-4.3	
	SD	0.28	
	t	-15.51***	

Note: p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 9.1 below indicates overall gender role attitudes of men between 1976-2013, prior to controls. Results indicate a general incline in men's gender role attitudes indicating greater egalitarian attitudes toward women in the workplace over the first few decades of the AVF. However, attitudes appear to have generally leveled off since the 1990s. These findings are consistent with previous research and correspond to the timeframe of the women's liberation movement (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001).

Figure 9.1- Gender Role Attitudes of Youth, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 9.2 below depicts the gender role attitudes of men with propensity between 1976-2013, prior to adding control variables. Overall, the gender role attitudes of men with propensity appear to mirror trends for all men. Most strikingly, however, results indicate a significant decline in gender role attitudes during the post-9/11 era, suggesting more traditional attitudes toward gender roles. It appears that men with propensity have significantly greater traditional

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attitudes toward gender roles during the post-9/11 era compared to men overall.

Yet, results show that egalitarian attitudes appear to be increasing among men

with propensity since 2010. This trend is similar to increasing trends among all

men as indicated above. Despite the modest decline in egalitarian attitudes during

the post-9/11 era, men with propensity still have fairly high egalitarian attitudes

compared to the 1980s.

Figure 9.2- Gender Role Attitudes of Youth Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis similar to previous analyses,

results reported in Table 9.3 below indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve

during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables for men only.

The primary predictor variable in Table 9.3 is the gender-role attitudes index

measure. After controls, results indicate that there is a negative relationship

between egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles and men's propensity to serve

during the post-9/11 era, which supports **hypothesis 9a**. As egalitarian attitudes

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increase, men are significantly less likely to expect to serve (OR=0.96***), even

after controlling for all factors in Model 6 of Table 9.3. Model 7 of Table 9.3

depicts an interaction between race and ethnic background and attitudes toward

gender-roles, indicating no significant differences.

The magnitude of this finding is only slightly reduced when you compare men

who expect that they "definitely will" serve (i.e. "high" propensity) versus men

who expect that they "definitely won't" (i.e. "low" propensity) serve. However,

significant differences remain between groups. Results from this analysis are

reported in Table 9.3.1 and Figure 9.3.1 of Appendix A.

Table 9.3

Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social- Psychological Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=8240): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.96	0.95	0.95	0.95
Casualties	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.97	0.96	0.97	0.96
Unemployment	1.05*	1.05	1.05*	1.05*	1.05*	1.05*	1.05*
Social-Psychological Influences							
Gender Roles Index (> number indicates more Liberal)	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***	0.96***
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		1.60***	1.23*	1.20	1.10	1.10	0.98
Hispanic		1.67***	1.37**	1.31*	1.29*	1.24	0.71
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.69***	0.74**	0.76*	0.76*	0.76*
Some college			0.83	0.97	1.01	1.02	1.02
College			0.68***	0.85	0.90	0.92	0.92
Graduate School			0.51***	0.68**	0.73*	0.76	0.76
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			1.02	1.04	1.08	1.09	1.08
Some College			0.92	0.97	1.01	1.01	1.00
College			0.78	0.86	0.89	0.91	0.91
Graduate School			0.86	0.99	1.03	1.05	1.04
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.31**	1.24*	1.22*	1.20*	1.20*
Father or Male Guardian			1.74***	1.56***	1.53***	1.52***	1.51**
None			1.78***	1.54**	1.53**	1.51**	1.52**
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.87	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89
1			0.67***	0.69***	0.69***	0.69***	0.69***
None			0.53***	0.57***	0.57***	0.57***	0.57***
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.69***	0.67***	0.70***	0.70***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.76***	0.78***	0.81**	0.81***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.70***	0.73***		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.26	1.25	1.25
Small City (<50k)					1.20	1.19	1.20
Medium City (50-100k)					1.09	1.08	1.08
Suburb of Med City					1.06	1.07	1.07
Large City (100-500k)					1.12	1.12	1.13
Suburb of Large City					1.02	1.06	1.06
Very Large City (>500k)					1.02	1.03	1.03
Suburb of Very Large City					0.78	0.80	0.80
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					0.93	0.91	0.91
South					1.41***	1.36***	1.36***
West					1.02	0.98	0.98
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.73***	0.73***
2-Year College						1.33***	1.33***
Vocational/Technical School						1.07	1.07
Sex Roles Index/Race Interaction (White=Ref)							
Sex Roles Index* Black							1.00
Sex Roles Index* Hispanic							1.02
N	8240	8240	8240	8240	8240	8240	8240
R^2	0.0092	0.0151	0.0366	0.0562	0.0623	0.0652	0.0653
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 8240 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 9.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by gender role attitudes after controlling for all factors. On average, the predicted probability of serving for men decreases by about one half of a percent for every one-point increase on the gender-roles index on a scale from 7-35. Results indicate that greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles are negatively

related to men's propensity during the post-9/11 era. This suggests that men with propensity are more traditional in their views toward gender roles than their civilian peer counterparts, even after controls- a finding that is consistent with recent research (e.g. Dempsey 2010).

Figure 9.3- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Gender Role Attitudes Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Racial/Ethnic Differences in Gender Role Attitudes

Among Men With Propensity

Results from regression analysis reported in Table 9.4 below indicate significant differences in gender-role attitudes by racial and ethnic groups among men with propensity using the gender-role index measure as the dependent variable. After full controls, Model 3 of Table 9.4 reveals that white men who expect to serve have significantly more traditional attitudes toward gender roles compared to their black and Hispanic counterparts, which is consistent with *hypothesis 9b*. On average, black men with propensity score 1.49 greater on the

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gender-roles index scale than white men, indicating significantly (p<.01) greater

egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles. Similarly, Hispanic men with

propensity score 1.27 more (p<.05) than white men. Interestingly, results suggest

that there are cultural differences in gender role attitudes between race and ethnic

background since SES is not a significant predictor in the model. These findings

are contrary to earlier findings that suggested that lower socioeconomic status

contributes to greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles (McLoyd et al.

2000). Of note, there are no significant racial and ethnic group differences in

gender role attitudes among men with high propensity after full controls. These

results are reported in Table 9.4.1 in Appendix A.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.25	-0.24	-0.23
Casualties	-0.20*	-0.20*	-0.19
Unemployment	-0.11	-0.12	-0.12
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	1.50***	1.50***	1.49**
Hispanic	1.41**	1.28**	1.27*
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.25	0.25
Some college		-0.44	-0.38
College		-0.24	-0.26
Graduate School		-0.84	-0.94
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.78	-0.68
Some College		-0.18	-0.12
College		-0.11	-0.04
Graduate School		-0.72	-0.60
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.54	0.57
Father or Male Guardian		0.41	0.52
None		-0.92	-0.68
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		0.57	0.53
1		0.28	0.22
None		1.15	1.12
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.14
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			0.09
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			0.59
Small City (<50k)			1.25
Medium City (50-100k)			1.62*
Suburb of Med City			0.66
Large City (100-500k)			0.83
Suburb of Large City			1.21
Very Large City (>500k)			-0.47
Suburb of Very Large City			0.33
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.84
South			-0.59
West			-0.73
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.29
2-Year College			0.49
Vocational/Technical School			-0.32
CONSTANT	28.90	29.10	28.69
N	1181	1181	1181
R^2	0.0197	0.0358	0.0530
Prob>F	0.0003	0.0015	0.0024

Note: N= 1181 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

After full controls, Figure 9.4 below shows that black and Hispanic men have

significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles. On average, black

men who expect to serve score 27.47 on a scale from 7 to 35, where higher

numbers indicate more egalitarian views toward gender roles. Hispanic men who

expect to serve score an average of 27.25 on the same scale. In contrast, white

men who expect to serve score an average of 25.98, indicating more traditional

views toward gender roles.

Figure 9.4- Gender Role Attitudes by Race/Ethnicity Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Women's Analysis of Gender Role Attitudes

Table 9.5 below depicts the difference of means in women's attitudes toward

gender roles for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era. Interestingly,

results reveal that women with propensity are significantly more traditional

(p<.001) in their attitudes toward gender roles compared to women without

propensity, which does not support **hypothesis 9d**. These results also contradict

Dempsey's (2010) research. On average, women with propensity score 30.63

while women without propensity score an average of 31.19. On average, black

women with propensity are significantly more (p<.001) traditional in their attitudes toward gender roles compared to their civilian counterparts. However, results indicate that white and Hispanic women with propensity are no different in their gender role attitudes than their civilian counterparts. Surprisingly, white women with propensity are significantly more egalitarian in their attitudes toward gender roles compared to their black or Hispanic counterparts, which does not support *hypothesis 9e.*

Perhaps most surprisingly, women with propensity during the post-9/11 era are no different in their gender role attitudes compared to women with propensity prior to 9/11. Women with propensity during the post-9/11 era score an average of 30.63, whereas their female counterparts average a score of 30.90 prior to 9/11. As noted earlier, results reveal rather large differences (p<.001) in gender attitudes between men and women with propensity. Men with propensity score an average of 26.33, while women with propensity average a score of 30.63.

Table 9.5
Difference of Means for Gender Roles Index by Key Analysis Groups During Post-9/11 Era

Index (Greater Numbers Indicate More Liberal Attitudes Toward Gender Roles)			N
Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	31.19	8228
Women With Propensity	Mean 2	30.63	406
	Difference	0.56	
	Std Error	0.17	
	t	3.33***	
White Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	31.17	6646
White Women With Propensity	Mean 2	31.11	228
	Difference	0.06	
	Std Error	0.22	
	t	0.27	
Black Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	31.43	967
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	29.92	118
	Difference	1.51	
	Std Error	0.34	
	t	4.43***	
Hispanic Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	30.98	615
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	30.15	60
	Difference	0.83	
	Std Error	0.44	
	t	1.89	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	31.11	228
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	29.92	118
	Difference	1.19	
	Std Error	0.38	
	t	3.13**	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	31.11	228
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	30.15	60
	Difference	0.96	
	Std Error	0.48	
	t	2.02*	
Women With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	30.90	721
Women With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	30.63	406
	Difference	0.28	
	SD	0.21	
	t	1.31	
Men With Propensity	Mean 1	26.33	1181
Women With Propensity	Mean 2	30.63	406
	Difference	-4.3	
	SD	0.28	
	t	-15.51***	

Note: p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 9.5 below indicates the overall gender role attitudes of women between 1976-2013, prior to controls. Similar to men, results indicate a general incline in women's attitudes indicating increasing egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles over the first few decades of the AVF. Like men, however, egalitarian attitudes

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appear to have plateaued since the mid-1990s. These results are consistent with previous research (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001).

Figure 9.5- Gender Role Attitudes of Youth, 1976-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 9.6 below depicts the gender role attitudes of women with propensity between 1976-2013, prior to adding control variables. Overall, the gender role attitudes of women with propensity appear to mirror trends for all women prior to 9/11, although they are slightly more egalitarian. Most strikingly, however, results indicate a significant decline in women's gender role attitudes after the attacks of 9/11. Similar to men, it appears that women with propensity have more traditional gender-role attitudes during the post-9/11 era compared to women overall. Not surprisingly, results indicate that women with propensity have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to men. These results are consistent with Dempsey's (2010) findings.

Figure 9.6- Gender Role Attitudes of Youth
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 9.6 below indicate the odds ratios of women's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables. The primary predictor variable in Table 9.6 is the gender-role attitudes index measure. Interestingly, results indicate that there is a negative relationship between egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles and women's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era, which does not support *hypothesis 9d*. Prior to controls, results reported in Model 1 of Table 9.6 reveal that women are significantly less likely to expect to serve (OR=0.95***) as egalitarian gender role attitudes increase. After controlling for all factors in Model 6 of Table 9.6, women remain significantly less likely (p<.10) to expect to serve (OR=0.97+) as egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles increase.

Table 9.6
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social- Psychological Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: Women Only (N=8634): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	0.91*	0.92	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93	0.93
Casualties	0.93*	0.92*	0.93*	0.93*	0.93*	0.93*	0.93*
Unemployment	1.05	1.04	1.05	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06
Social-Psychological Influences							
Gender Roles Index (> number indicates More Liberal)	0.95***	0.95***	0.96**	0.97*	0.97*	0.97+	1.01
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		3.57***	2.75***	2.62***	2.37***	2.36***	43.37***
Hispanic		2.63***	2.09***	2.00***	2.08***	2.04***	15.07*
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.84	0.88	0.90	0.91	0.92
Some college			0.92	1.01	1.06	1.08	1.09
College			0.79	0.90	0.96	0.98	0.98
Graduate School			0.54*	0.65	0.71	0.73	0.74
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.65*	0.69*	0.70*	0.70*	0.69*
Some College			0.58**	0.65*	0.67*	0.68*	0.69*
College			0.59**	0.67*	0.70	0.71	0.71
Graduate School			0.57*	0.67	0.72	0.73	0.73
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.29*	1.22	1.21	1.21	1.20
Father or Male Guardian			1.90**	1.74**	1.70*	1.68*	1.68*
None			1.65**	1.50*	1.45	1.43	1.42
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.67**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**
1			0.69**	0.72*	0.73*	0.74*	0.72*
None			0.64	0.68	0.68	0.69	0.68
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.65***	0.64***	0.66***	0.65***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.86	0.86	0.90	0.90
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.70**	0.73*		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.46	1.42	1.45
Small City (<50k)					1.48	1.46	1.47
Medium City (50-100k)					1.29	1.27	1.29
Suburb of Med City					0.82	0.82	0.83
Large City (100-500k)					1.23	1.25	1.26
Suburb of Large City					0.89	0.89	0.91
Very Large City (>500k)					1.29	1.31	1.33
Suburb of Very Large City					0.93	0.93	0.91
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					1.05	1.02	1.03
South					1.46*	1.38*	1.40*
West					1.02	0.98	1.02
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.80	0.81
2-Year College						1.13	1.12
Vocational/Technical School						1.40**	1.41**
Sex Roles Index/Race Interaction (White=Ref)							
Sex Roles Index* Black							0.91**
Sex Roles Index* Hispanic							0.94
N	8634	8634	8634	8634	8634	8634	8634
R^2	0.0105	0.0461	0.0666	0.0803	0.0882	0.0909	0.0653
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 8634 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: +P<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001;

Figure 9.7 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women's propensity to serve by gender role attitudes after controlling for all factors. On average, the predicted probability of serving for women decreases by about one third of a percent for every one-point increase on the gender-roles index on a scale from 7-

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35. Results indicate that greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles are

negatively related to women's propensity during the post-9/11 era. This suggests

that women with propensity are more traditional in their views toward gender

roles than their civilian peer counterparts- a finding that is somewhat surprising

and inconsistent with recent research (e.g. Dempsey 2010).

Figure 9.7- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Gender Role Attitudes
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 9.8 below depicts an interaction between race and ethnic background

and attitudes toward gender-roles, indicating significant differences between

black and white women. Results are reported in Model 7 of Table 9.6 above.

Results indicate that black women's predicted probability of serving declines at a

significantly greater rate than white women as egalitarian attitudes increase. In

other words, the more traditional black women's attitudes are, the greater

likelihood they have of serving. For white women, it appears that gender role

attitudes are not as significant of a predictor for their propensity to serve.

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Figure 9.8- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Gender Role Attitudes*Race Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Racial/Ethnic Differences in Gender Role Attitudes

Among Women with Propensity

Results from regression analysis reported in Table 9.7 below indicate significant differences in gender-role attitudes by racial and ethnic groups among women with propensity using the gender-role index as the dependent variable. After full controls, Model 3 of Table 9.7 reveals that white women who expect to serve have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to their black counterparts. On average, black women with propensity score 1.29 lower on the gender-roles index scale than white women, indicating significantly (p<.01) greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles. There are no significant differences in gender role attitudes between white and Hispanic women after full controls.

Table 9.7
Gender-Role Attitudes of Youth by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: Women With Propensity to Serve (N=406)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.37*	-0.34*	-0.29
Casualties	-0.24*	-0.22*	-0.20
Unemployment	-0.17	-0.15	-0.12
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	-1.25***	-1.39**	-1.29**
Hispanic	-1.18*	-1.08*	-0.87
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.66	0.32
Some college		0.08	-0.20
College		0.17	-0.17
Graduate School		-1.16	-1.26
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.24	-0.24
Some College		0.25	0.11
College		0.09	0.29
Graduate School		1.33	1.10
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.14	0.13
Father or Male Guardian		-0.82	-0.85
None		-0.33	0.07
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		-0.03	0.19
1		0.05	-0.07
None		-1.10	-1.22
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			8.00
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.25
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			0.63
Small City (<50k)			0.50
Medium City (50-100k)			0.54
Suburb of Med City			1.13
Large City (100-500k)			-0.04
Suburb of Large City			-0.16
Very Large City (>500k)			1.23
Suburb of Very Large City			-4.09
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			0.00
South			-0.01
West			0.11
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.85
2-Year College			-0.82*
Vocational/Technical School			-0.69
CONSTANT	35.24	34.71	34.38
N	406	406	406
R^2	0.0426	0.0740	0.1532
Prob>F	0.0037	0.0479	0.0019

Note: N= 406 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

After full controls, Figure 9.9 below reveals that black and Hispanic women

have significantly greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles. On average,

black women who expect to serve score 29.83 on a scale from 7 to 35 where

higher numbers indicate more egalitarian views toward gender roles. Hispanic women who expect to serve score an average of 30.26 on the same scale. In contrast, white women who expect to serve score an average of 31.13, indicating greater egalitarian views toward gender roles. These results do not support *hypothesis 9e*.

Figure 9.9- Gender Role Attitudes by Race/Ethnicity
Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Discussion

My research on the relationship between propensity and youth attitudes toward gender roles is important in a few notable ways. First, this is the first time that this type of research has been conducted. Dempsey's (2010) research briefly touched upon the attitudes among the Army population toward gender equality, but it only encompassed one year's worth of data (i.e. 2004) and it only analyzed one question. Prior research has shown that examining multiple items on an index or multiple separate questions increases the reliability of results (Segal 1986;

Gliem and Gliem 2003). Other notable research (e.g. Miller and Williams 2001) has examined attitudes toward allowing women into combat positions. Although these studies have undoubtedly contributed to the literature on women in the military, they have not thoroughly uncovered youth attitudes toward gender roles in the military.

Second, a study of these attitudes prior to enlistment can potentially lead to more accurate findings by eliminating the social desirability bias discussed earlier in Chapter 8. Of course, there is likely to be some form of bias on responses to these questions. However, asking individuals about their attitudes toward gender roles prior to actual military service is likely to result in answers that are more authentic compared to asking questions to actual service members. It is reasonable that men in the military would be more likely to state that they support greater opportunities for women to be more politically correct.

Last, given the recent decision by the DoD to expand combat roles to women, this research is especially relevant and important. As women begin to break barriers in the formerly closed, hyper-masculine culture of the combat specialties, the potential exists for friction to occur (Miller and Williams 2001; Segal and Kestnbaum 2002). Further, this research is timely given the military's recent attention to sexual assault in the ranks (see Chapter 6 for a more thorough discussion). Examining the gender role attitudes of men with propensity (i.e. likely future recruits) will help uncover views in the military that may be overly traditional, which could lead to potential problems with insubordination toward female superiors, sexual assault, sexual harassment, or gender harassment (Leary-

Kelly et al. 2009). An examination of these attitudes will undoubtedly provide

insight to military leadership at all levels. This will help leadership understand

the social-psychological dynamics at play among the junior ranks to better set the

conditions for a successful integration of women into combat positions.

Overall, results indicate that men with greater traditional attitudes toward

gender roles are more likely to expect to serve during the post-9/11 era. An

examination of the gender role attitudes of men with propensity over time

indicates a significant incline in egalitarian views during the first three decades of

the AVF (see Figure 9.2). However, during the post-9/11 era, it appears that these

attitudes significantly decline, suggesting more traditional views toward gender

roles among men with propensity. This may be somewhat surprising for some

given the fact that women's participation in the military has continued to expand,

and that they have performed very well during wartime since 9/11. However, as

noted earlier in Chapter 6, fighting wars has traditionally been viewed as a man's

duty and responsibility. Indeed, military service has been considered to be a rite

of passage for men despite women's increasing participation throughout (Boldry

et al. 2001). Thus, it is reasonable that young men who have the propensity to

serve during wartime may have more traditional views toward gender roles. My

results support some of the findings from Dempsey's (2010) research. However,

it must be highlighted that my research contradicts Dempsey's in a notable way.

Dempsey found that among civilians, there were small differences in attitudes

toward women's equality between men and women. However, my research

shows that differences in gender role attitudes between men and women without

propensity is rather large, and significant. This suggests that young men without propensity may be less egalitarian toward gender roles compared to their older civilian counterparts.

It does appear that there is a slight trend in increasing egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles among men with propensity since 2010. This is somewhat promising given the recent removal of the combat exclusion ban and the possible friction that could occur as the integration of women into combat positions continues into the future. However, it must be highlighted that service members in combat specialties are likely to have even greater traditional views toward gender roles compared to the overall military population, especially given the lack of contact with women. Indeed, the fact that traditional attitudes have increased since 9/11 suggests that the nature of combat may attract more traditional men into service. Thus, my analysis may underestimate the extent of traditional gender role attitudes within the combat specialties.

Not surprisingly, results indicate that minority men with propensity have greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles than their white counterparts. However, some researchers (e.g. Blee and Tickamyer 1995) have noted that black men may be more egalitarian with respect to some gender roles (e.g. women working outside the home to increase family income), but more traditional with respect to other gender roles (e.g. women's role as caregiver and household division of labor). My own research suggests that black and Hispanic men with propensity are more egalitarian toward issues of women's equality in the workplace and their role as a mother and caregiver compared to white men with

propensity. Further, my research suggests that these differences in attitudes are not significantly impacted by socioeconomic status as some have argued. Overall, my results contribute to the considerable amount of literature (e.g. Kane 2000) concerning racial and ethnic differences in gender role attitudes.

Interestingly, results indicate that women with more traditional attitudes toward gender roles are more likely to expect to serve during the post-9/11 era. These results are in the same direction as results for men, but with less statistical significance. This may be somewhat surprising since women in the military have generally been considered to be pioneering and barrier-breaking in a traditionally male-dominated organization. Indeed, the opportunity for women to break barriers during combat has been ripe since 9/11. Perhaps similar dynamics are at play for women as they are for men during wartime, attracting more traditional youth to service. Another possibility for women with propensity having greater traditional gender role attitudes is the fact that they are becoming increasingly conservative in their ideology as my research highlights in Chapter 7. Indeed, gender role attitudes can be viewed as being a part of the larger liberal/conservative spectrum. However it must be emphasized that all women on average have considerably high egalitarian gender role attitudes, regardless of propensity differences.

Results indicate that black women with propensity have the most traditional attitudes toward gender roles, and are significantly different than their civilian counterparts. In contrast, white and Hispanic women with propensity are no different in gender role attitudes from their civilian counterparts. Further, both

black and Hispanic women with propensity have greater traditional gender role attitudes compared to white women with propensity. Together, these results appear to contradict conventional wisdom (e.g. Kane 2000) regarding minority women's attitudes toward gender roles.

Perhaps most telling is that women with propensity have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward gender roles compared to men with propensity. Again, these results are not necessarily surprising. However, they do highlight differences in attitudes by gender within the likely military population that could potentially create friction as women begin to access into the military's combat specialties. Military leadership should understand the cultural attitudes of men likely to serve during combat in general, and the attitudes of men in combat positions more specifically. As prior research has shown (e.g. Berdahl 2007), men with more traditional attitudes toward gender roles are more likely to sexually harass women at work, especially in male-dominated occupations. Further, research has attributed issues of sexual harassment to be the result of power and dominance relationships, suggesting that sexual harassment occurs because of unequal power across men and women in society and at work (e.g. Cleveland and Kerst 1993). The fact that the military has dedicated significant time and resources toward confronting issues of sexual assault in the ranks is a good sign that it is headed in the right direction. It is recommended that the military continue to emphasize its Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention program (see Chapter 6). Further, it is recommended that leaders at all levels implement deliberate plans to successfully integrate women into combat

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positions to prevent issues of harassment or assault.

Future research should continue to track the gender role attitudes of youth with propensity over time. If the military continues to give significant attention to sexual assault and if leadership at all levels incorporates deliberate implementation plans for women into combat roles, I expect that men's traditional attitudes toward gender roles will reverse in favor of more egalitarian attitudes. Men's increased contact with women in combat specialties should assist with changes in attitudes. However, it is unlikely that these changes will occur by happenstance. Indeed, contact theory (e.g. Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998), a major theory used to improve relations between groups (to be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 10), predicts that interpersonal contact will facilitate a decline in prejudice only under certain conditions. First, the contact must take place in an environment that recognizes equal status among participants. Second, the participants must have a common goal that lends itself to intergroup cooperation. Last, there must be institutional support for positive integration within the organization. It is paramount for military leadership to continue to spearhead efforts toward establishing an egalitarian culture within the ranks for all MOSs. Undoubtedly, this will take attention to detail and significant efforts. My research has shown that men with traditional gender role attitudes continue to self-select into the military, especially during combat. In this case, it will take a strong and active socialization effort within the military culture to continue to break down stereotypes and allow for the successful integration of women into combat roles.

Chapter 10: Attitudes Toward Race Relations

and Military Propensity

Background and Prior Research

From the Civil War through the first half of the 20th century, the Army segregated and minimized the service of African Americans, who challenged the traditional European composition of the force. Occupational closure tends to be reversed in the face of market demands. After initial resistance, George Washington recruited black soldiers into the Continental Army. They fought in almost every engagement, and contributed to the colonists' victory. However, the U.S. government imposed closure once again by the end of the war (Segal et al. 2016).

Almost a century later, President Lincoln did not initially want black soldiers in the Union Army due to the fear that Border States would move into the Confederacy as a result. When it became clear that the war to preserve the Union was not to be short, he accepted the enlistment of black soldiers. Nearly 200,000 black soldiers served in 163 "colored" federal regiments and two state regiments. Unlike the Revolution, black soldiers were allowed to continue to enlist after the war and four black combat units were established: the 9th and 10th Cavalries (the Buffalo Soldiers) and the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments. Blacks also served among the lowest ranks in the Navy (Segal et al. 2016).

The Army remained segregated throughout World War I. As a result of manpower shortages during World War II, President Roosevelt issue an Executive Order to the military in 1943 to enlist black soldiers through military conscription.

More than one million black men and women served, most in menial jobs. Following the war, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981 in 1948, which called for the equality of opportunity in the armed forces regardless of race. His order did not call for desegregation, and was interpreted under the then-current legal doctrine of "separate but equal" (Segal et al. 2106). Late in WWII, black volunteers were sought to form platoons to be inserted into white infantry companies to fill manpower shortages. Black soldiers who volunteered expected that after the war, they would remain in their new units, but the Army reverted back to segregation.

   Racial integration began in earnest during the Korean War in 1950. The Far East Command discovered that because a 10 percent limit on black enlistments had been lifted, it had excess black replacements for whom there were no positions in segregated black units. The theater command received permission to assign black replacements to white units. Despite integration, the Army anticipated that it would segregate after the war, as it had during WWII.

   Survey research by social scientists came of age during WWII with *The American Soldier* studies by Stouffer and his colleagues (1949). Early surveys found that there was general resistance among white soldiers to the notion of serving with black soldiers. The Army used these surveys as an argument against racial integration. However, the major impact of diversity and relations among soldiers was found by analyzing the experience when black platoons were placed in white infantry companies. Over 80 percent of white soldiers surveyed felt that black and white soldiers "should be in separate units" (Stouffer et al. 1949). Yet

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white soldiers who had more contact with black soldiers were less opposed to integration than those who had less contact with black soldiers. These findings served as one basis of Gordon Allport's (1954) postwar "contact hypothesis" or intergroup contact theory.

Proponents of contact theory have claimed that interpersonal contact will facilitate a decline in prejudice under certain conditions. First, the contact must take place in an environment that recognizes equal status among participants. Second, the participants must have a common goal that lends itself to intergroup cooperation. Last, there must be institutional support for positive race relations within the organization (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). As a result of desegregation, the military became a natural environment to test the predictions of contact theory. Indeed, the military's ability to unite service members under a common purpose, its emphasis on the equality of all new recruits, and the increasing commitment by military leadership to foster racial equality within the military seemed to satisfy the necessary conditions for contact theory (Burk and Espinoza 2012).

Under the suppositions of contact theory, the Army conducted research studying race relations in the newly integrated U.S. Army during the Korean War by the Special Operations Research Office of Johns Hopkins University and sociologist, Leo Bogart (1969), a former army intelligence specialist. The major finding was simply that integration "worked." Indeed, integrated units were perceived to perform better than segregated units. Research found that white veterans of WWII (e.g. Stouffer et al. 1949) and the Korean War (e.g. Bogart

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1969) had more positive views of blacks overall once they had served alongside black soldiers. The studies concluded that the "enforced contacts" served as the catalyst for more positive racial views, referring to military experience, and combat experience in particular, as a defining event that triggered more tolerant racial attitudes among white soldiers. These results made segregation of the Army impossible after the war. Despite some resistance within the military and Congress, by 1954 the last all-black unit in the armed forces was dismantled, paving the way for full racial integration of the U.S. military (Moskos and Butler 1996).

Building upon Stouffer's significant WWII research (1949), Leo Bogart's study (1969) on race relations spearheaded a significant amount of research on racial attitudes both in and out of the military domain that has continued into the twenty-first century. Based on these influential studies and follow-on research, the conventional wisdom has been that the military is one of the key American institutions to model for socializing its participants to embrace egalitarian racial attitudes (Burk and Espinoza 2012). It is particularly noteworthy to highlight that the Army led the way for racial integration over a decade prior to the rest of American society, which was marked by the establishment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Although the military has been racially integrated since the Korean War, the Civil Rights Movement and the perceived inequities in the military during the Vietnam War brought greater attention back onto race relations within the military (e.g. Moskos 1973; Moskos and Butler 1996). Despite conventional

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wisdom that suggests the military is more of an egalitarian, meritocratic environment with less racial discrimination than the civilian labor force and educational system (Moskos and Butler 1996; Segal 1989), more recent studies have begun to challenge this notion. Some studies (e.g. Lawrence and Kane 1995; Nteta and Tarsi 2015) have shown that white veterans express more hostile views of blacks than white non-veterans, thereby questioning the liberal socialization within the institution of the military. The primary rationale for the shift in attitudes has been that the change from conscription to an all-volunteer force may have had negative impacts on the military's ability to engender positive racial attitudes among its participants. From this perspective, the differences in attitudes between white veterans and non-veterans may reflect the consequences of self-selection (Nteta and Tarsi 2015). The self-selection argument, in its simplest form, asserts that whites who volunteer for the armed forces may already hold more negative views towards blacks compared to whites who do not volunteer to serve. As a result, the consequences of self-selection with respect to more negative racial attitudes will be more pronounced during an AVF period than during a period of conscription (Bachman et al 2000).

Most recently, researchers (Nteta and Tarsi 2015) examined the impacts of military service during the AVF-era on the racial attitudes of veterans. Findings suggested that white veterans of the AVF generation express more negative views of blacks relative to white civilians without military experience. Additionally, the authors found that white veterans of the AVF generation were more likely than white veterans of older cohorts to support "racial resentment." Further, they

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found no significant differences between the racial attitudes of white veterans and non-veterans among older generations prior to the AVF. These findings appear to challenge the conventional wisdom that the military effectively inculcates its members to embrace norms of racial egalitarianism (Moskos and Butler 1996). Taken together, the authors claim that their findings provide evidence in support of the self-selection hypothesis, suggesting that the move to an AVF may have had deleterious impacts on the ability of the military to effectively socialize its members to support racial equality. In other words, the authors claim that those who volunteer for military service already possess negative racial attitudes which are likely to be resistant to the socializing forces of military experience and increased contact with minorities. Of note, the study above did not examine the attitudes of veterans from the post-9/11 era cohort. They examined veterans from the WWII and Korean War generation, the Vietnam generation, and veterans of the AVF up to 2000. The two measures used in this study to analyze the concept of racial resentment were taken from Henry & Sears' Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale. The first item asked respondents whether they supported the statement, "the Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors." The second item asked respondents if they agreed that, "generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class."

It is also worthy to mention Dempsey's (2010) recent research on race relations. Although the most significant contribution to his research was the

examination of political attitudes, his study also touched briefly upon the racial

attitudes among soldiers in the Army. On the question of racial and ethnic

integration, his survey asked respondents, "Thinking about society in general: In

order to make up for past discrimination, do you favor or oppose programs which

make special efforts to help minorities get ahead?" Dempsey found that among

soldiers, 38 percent opposed and 22 percent favored these types of programs.

Attitudes among officers were significantly different, with 56 percent of officers

opposing these types of programs and only 18 percent supporting them. Dempsey

also found significant differences between racial and ethnic groups. Whites were

the most opposed to such programs, followed by Hispanics and blacks. Despite

the differences in attitudes among army personnel, he found that soldiers were

significantly less opposed to these "affirmative action" programs compared to

civilians who responded to a similar question on a different survey, which focused

specifically on affirmative action in the workplace: "Some people say that

because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and

promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is

wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your

opinion- are you FOR or AGAINST preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?"

Although the racial attitudes among members of the military have not been at

the forefront of debate during the post-911 era, as issues of war and attitudes

toward women's integration in combat positions have been more salient, the

current state of affairs within society makes an examination of the racial attitudes

of youth with propensity especially worthy. Indeed, recent years have witnessed

renewed expression of racial tension and conflict. With the recent "Black Lives Matter" movement that has swept across the country in response to multiple claims of police injustice against racial minorities, it is timely to reexamine the racial attitudes among youth who expect to serve in the military. Further, given the timeliness and findings of the research cited above (e.g. Dempsey 2010; Nteta and Tarsi 2015), an examination of racial attitudes is especially relevant.

Propensity Predictions

My research attempts to address the recent claims of racial resentment among white veterans in the military as a result of self-selection. By examining youth attitudes among those with the propensity to serve, I am able to directly assess the impacts of self-selection. I expect that there will be no significant relationship between men's propensity and egalitarian attitudes toward race relations during the post-9/11 era. I also expect that men with propensity during the post-9/11 era will have greater egalitarian attitudes compared to years prior to 9/11. The increase in recruiting initiatives, especially among the Hispanic population, has increased minority representation in the military (Clever and Segal 2012). Further, the black population of the military continues to be overrepresented compared to the black civilian population (Segal and Segal 2004). It is likely that youth understand that the military is, indeed, an organization that continues to foster a positive racial environment (Moskos and Butler 1996). Despite recent claims of racial resentment among white veterans (e.g. Nteta and Tarsi 2015), I expect that white men with propensity will be no different in their racial attitudes

compared to their civilian counterparts. I expect to see similar relationships as

men between women's propensity and racial attitudes.

> ***Hypothesis 10a: There will be no significant relationship between men's propensity and egalitarian attitudes toward race relations during the post-9/11 era.***
>
> ***Hypothesis 10b: Men's propensity during the post-9/11 era will be more positively related to egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to years prior to 9/11.***
>
> ***Hypothesis 10c: Black and Hispanic men with propensity will have greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to their white counterparts.***
>
> ***Hypothesis 10d: There will be no significant relationship between women's propensity and egalitarian attitudes toward race relations during the post-9/11 era.***
>
> ***Hypothesis 10e: Black and Hispanic women with propensity will have greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to their white counterparts.***

Analysis of Propensity and Attitudes Toward Race Relations

   Methods

   A series of questions on Form 3 of the MTF survey ask respondents how they

feel about living or working with people of different races. Respondents were

asked to rate the statements below using the following terms: 1= "Not at all

acceptable: I'd avoid this if I possibly could;" 2= "Somewhat acceptable: I could

live with this, but not be happy about it;" 3= "Acceptable: This would be O.K., or

I'd be neutral about this;" 4= "Desirable: I'd really like this."

   The first group of questions asked respondents how they would feel about:

1) "Having close friends of another race;" 2) "Having a job with a supervisor of a

different race;" 3) "Having a family of a different race (but same level of

education and income) move next door to you;" 4) "Having your (future) children's friends be all of your race (reverse coded);" and 5) "Having some of your (future) children's friends be of other races."

The next series of questions asked respondents how they would feel about having a job where: 1) "All the employees are of your race" (reverse coded); 2) Some employees are of a different race;" and 3) "Most employees are of a different race."

The following series of questions asked respondents how they would feel about living in an area where: 1) "All the neighbors are of your race (reverse coded);" 2) "Some of the neighbors are of other races;" and 3) "Most of the neighbors are of other races."

The last set of questions asked respondents how they would feel about having their (future) children go to schools where: 1) "All the children are of your race (reverse coded);" 2) "Some of the children are of other races;" 3) "Most of the children are of other races."

From the four questions and fourteen variables noted above, I created an index titled, "Race Relations" index. I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to confirm that the variables used for my race relations index measure the same things conceptually and to confirm the number of dimensions that the variables measure (Torres-Reyna 2010). The extraction method was principal components analysis, with Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization (Abdi 2003). Results of initial CFA revealed three distinct factors with eigenvalues above 1.0- 6.00, 2.33, and 1.44 respectively. Following initial CFA, I deemed Factor 1 to be the best

overall measure to conceptually capture youth attitudes toward race relations.

Further, the relatively high eigenvalue for Factor 1 of 6.29 supports the idea to

retain only one factor for my index measure. The mean inter-item correlation of

the race relations index was 0.21 and the reliability (Cronbach's coefficient alpha

with unstandardized items) was 0.89, which is almost "excellent" for social

science research (Cronbach 1951; George and Mallory 2003). Response values

were summed, yielding a scale with a minimum response score of 14 and a

maximum score of 56, with a mid-point of 35. Higher number responses are

considered to be greater support for racial integration at work and at home. Put

another way, higher responses indicate more egalitarian attitudes toward race

relations, which is consistent with recent naming conventions (e.g. Nteta and

Tarsi 2015). Results from my final CFA are reported in Table 10.1 below.

Table 10.1
Factor Analysis and Scale Reliability of Survey Items Representing Race Relations Attitudes of Youth During Post-9/11 Era

Survey Items	Factors
	1
How would you feel about….	**Race Relations**
Having close friends of another race?	0.7482
Having a job with a supervisor of a different race?	0.7245
Having a family of a different race (but same level of education and income) move next door to you?	0.7509
Having your (future) children's friends be all of your race? (reverse coded)	0.4149
Having some of your (future) children's friends be of other races?	0.7671
How would you feel about having a job where….	
All the employees are of your race? (reverse coded)	0.4873
Some employees are of a different race?	0.7027
Most employees are of a different race?	0.7036
How would you feel about living in an area where….	
All the neighbors are of your race? (reverse coded)	0.4915
Some of the neighbors are of other races?	0.7049
Most of the neighbors are of other races?	0.7027
How would you feel about having your (future) children go to schools where….	
All the children are of your race? (reverse coded)	0.5221
Some of the children are of other races?	0.6402
Most of the children are of other races?	0.6694
% total item variance explained	42.8

Note: The extraction method was principal-components analysis and the rotation method was Varimax with Kaiser normalization. Years: 2002-2013

Results

Similar to previous chapters, I report the results for men and women

separately. Table 10.2 below depicts the difference of means in attitudes toward

race relations at work and at home for key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era. It is worth mentioning that I highlight key differences between "high" and "low" propensity youth below (i.e. "Definitely Will" vs. "Definitely Won't"), along with the normally reported differences between youth with and without propensity. Results reveal that men with propensity are no different in their attitudes toward race relations compared to men without propensity. On average, men with propensity score 38.22 on a scale from 14-56, while men without propensity score an average of 38.39. These results are particularly noteworthy since they are prior to controlling for individual-level characteristics that have typically been associated with youth with propensity (e.g. from the South, less educational attainment, more conservative, and more authoritarian) and greater negative racial attitudes (Nteta and Tarsi 2015). On average, white men with propensity are slightly less egalitarian (p<.05) in their attitudes toward race relations compared to white men without propensity. However, results indicate that black and Hispanic men with propensity are no different in race attitudes than their civilian counterparts. Not surprisingly, white men with propensity have significantly (p<.001) less egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to their black or Hispanic counterparts. There are no significant differences between black or Hispanic men with propensity. Somewhat surprisingly, men with high propensity have significantly greater (p<.05) egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to men with low propensity. Further, white men with high propensity are slightly more egalitarian than white men with low propensity, although results are not significant prior to controls.

Interestingly, men with propensity during the post-9/11 era have significantly (p<.001) greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to men with propensity prior to 9/11, which supports ***hypothesis 10b.*** Men with propensity during the post-9/11 era score an average of 38.22 whereas their male counterparts average a score of 37.13 prior to 9/11. Also of note, white men with propensity during the post-9/11 era have significantly (p<.01) greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to their counterparts prior to 9/11. White men with propensity during the post-9/11 era score an average of 37.22 whereas their male counterparts average a score of 36.37 prior to 9/11. Not surprisingly, results reveal rather large differences (p<.001) in race relation attitudes between men and women with propensity during the post-9/11 era. Men with propensity score an average of 38.22, while women with propensity average a score of 40.95.

Table 10.2
Difference of Means for Race Relations Index by Key Analysis Groups During Post-9/11 Era

Index (Greater Numbers Indicate More Egalitarian Attitudes Toward Race Relations)			N
Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	38.39	7059
Men With Propensity	Mean 2	38.22	1191
	Difference	0.18	
	SD	6.61	
	t	0.85	
Men With Low Propensity	Mean 1	38.59	4852
Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	39.22	495
	Difference	-0.63	
	SD	6.64	
	t	-2.02*	
White Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	37.78	5826
White Men With Propensity	Mean 2	37.22	896
	Difference	0.56	
	SD	6.68	
	t	2.35*	
White Men With Low Propensity	Mean 1	37.89	3891
White Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	38.25	378
	Difference	-0.36	
	SD	6.72	
	t	-0.99	
Black Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	41.14	676
Black Men With Propensity	Mean 2	41.54	153
	Difference	-0.40	
	SD	5.40	
	t	-0.82	
Black Men With Low Propensity	Mean 1	41.30	547
Black Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	42.51	67
	Difference	-1.21	
	SD	5.49	
	t	-1.70	
Hispanic Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	41.47	557
Hispanic Men With Propensity	Mean 2	40.95	142
	Difference	0.52	
	SD	5.46	
	t	1.02	
Hispanic Men With Low Propensity	Mean 1	41.59	414
Hispanic Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	42.20	50
	Difference	-0.61	
	SD	5.31	
	t	-0.77	

Note:p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Index (Greater Numbers Indicate More Egalitarian Attitudes Toward Race Relations)			N
White Men With Propensity	Mean 1	37.22	896
Black Men With Propensity	Mean 2	41.54	153
	Difference	-4.31	
	SD	7.23	
	t	-6.98***	
White Men With High Propensity	Mean 1	38.25	378
Black Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	42.51	67
	Difference	-4.26	
	SD	7.49	
	t	-4.38***	
White Men With Propensity	Mean 1	37.22	896
Hispanic Men With Propensity	Mean 2	40.95	142
	Difference	-3.73	
	SD	7.30	
	t	-5.74***	
White Men With High Propensity	Mean 1	38.25	378
Hispanic Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	42.20	50
	Difference	-3.95	
	SD	7.44	
	t	-3.58***	
Men With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	37.13	2473
Men With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	38.22	1191
	Difference	-1.09	
	SD	7.11	
	t	-4.35***	
White Men With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	36.37	1953
White Men With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	37.22	896
	Difference	-0.86	
	SD	7.32	
	t	-2.90**	
White Men With High Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	36.77	958
White Men With High Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	38.25	378
	Difference	-0.86	
	SD	7.32	
	t	-2.90**	
Men With Propensity	Mean 1	38.22	1191
Women With Propensity	Mean 2	40.95	413
	Difference	-2.73	
	SD	6.93	
	t	-7.01***	

Note:p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Using the race relations index measure, Figure 10.1 below indicates overall average attitudes toward race relations of men between 1976-2013, prior to controls. Results indicate a general incline in men's attitudes toward race relations, suggesting more tolerant or egalitarian attitudes over the first three decades of the AVF. However, attitudes toward race relations appear to have generally leveled off since the 2000s.

Figure 10.1- Race Relations Attitudes of Youth, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Using the race relations index measure, Figure 10.2 below depicts the overall attitudes toward race relations of men with propensity between 1976-2013, prior to adding control variables. Overall, results show that the attitudes toward race relations of men with propensity appear to mirror attitudes for all men, with generally greater egalitarian attitudes among men with propensity throughout the AVF. Similar to all men, results indicate a leveling off of attitudes toward race relations during the post-9/11 era. However, it appears that egalitarian attitudes toward race relations during the post-9/11 era are significantly greater than years prior to 9/11, which supports **hypothesis 10b**.

Figure 10.2- Race Relations Attitudes of Youth Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 10.3 below indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables for men only. The primary predictor variable in Table 10.3 is the race relations index measure. Consistent with *hypothesis 10a,* results indicate that there is no significant difference in attitudes toward race relations between men with and without propensity during the post-9/11 era. As egalitarian attitudes toward race relations increase, men are no more or less likely to expect to serve (OR=0.99), even prior to controlling for the individual-level characteristics that have been associated with more negative racial attitudes and propensity as noted earlier. After controlling for all factors in Model 6 of Table 10.3, results continue to indicate no significant differences (OR=1.00) between groups. Model 7 of Table 10.3 depicts an interaction between race and ethnic background and attitudes toward race relations,

indicating no significant differences.

Interestingly, the magnitude and direction of findings significantly change when you compare high and low propensity men. Results indicate that as egalitarian attitudes toward race relations increase, men are significantly more likely to have high propensity (OR=1.03***). These findings suggest that men with high propensity (i.e. the military) are more racially tolerant than men with low propensity (i.e. civilian counterparts). Results from this analysis are reported in Table 10.3.1 and Figure 10.3.1 of Appendix A.

Table 10.3

Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=8250): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	0.95	0.96	0.97	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.95
Casualties	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.96*	0.96*
Unemployment	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
Social-Psychological Influences							
Individual Attitudes Toward Race Relations							
Race Index (> number indicates More Tolerant Orientations Toward Racial Integration)	0.99	0.99*	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		1.52***	1.16	1.12	1.04	1.04	0.31
Hispanic		1.68***	1.35**	1.28	1.27*	1.23	1.55
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.69***	0.74**	0.75**	0.76**	0.76**
Some college			0.81	0.95	0.99	1.00	1.00
College			0.66***	0.81	0.87	0.88	0.88
Graduate School			0.51***	0.68**	0.73*	0.75*	0.75*
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			1.01	1.04	1.07	1.08	1.08
Some College			0.90	0.95	0.99	0.99	0.99
College			0.78	0.85	0.88	0.90	0.90
Graduate School			0.80	0.93	0.96	0.98	0.98
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.26**	1.20*	1.18	1.17	1.17
Father or Male Guardian			1.77***	1.59***	1.57***	1.56***	1.57***
None			1.72***	1.49**	1.47**	1.46**	1.48**
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.84*	0.87	0.86	0.86	0.86
1			0.64***	0.67***	0.66***	0.66***	0.66***
None			0.46***	0.51***	0.51***	0.51***	0.51***
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.70***	0.68***	0.70***	0.70***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.77***	0.79***	0.81**	0.81**
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.67***	0.70***		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.26	1.26	1.26
Small City (<50k)					1.17	1.16	1.17
Medium City (50-100k)					1.02	1.02	1.03
Suburb of Med City					1.06	1.07	1.08
Large City (100-500k)					1.07	1.08	1.09
Suburb of Large City					0.98	1.01	1.01
Very Large City (>500k)					0.97	0.98	0.98
Suburb of Very Large City					0.79	0.80	0.81
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					0.94	0.93	0.93
South					1.40***	1.36***	1.36***
West					1.01	0.98	0.98
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.70***	0.70***
2-Year College						1.29***	1.30***
Vocational/Technical School						1.06	1.06
Race Index*Race Interaction (White=Ref)							
Race Index* Black							1.03
Race Index* Hispanic							0.99
N	8250	8250	8250	8250	8250	8250	8250
R^2	0.0032	0.0084	0.0319	0.0523	0.0583	0.0606	0.061
Prob > chi2	0.0002	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 8250 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 10.3 below depicts the predicted probabilities of propensity to serve by attitudes toward race relations, after controlling for all factors. Results reveal that the predicted probability of having the propensity to serve does not significantly increase or decrease based on attitudes toward race relations. However, Figure 10.3.1 (see Appendix A), reveals that the predicted probability of having high

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propensity increases by about one percent for every 4-point increase on the race

relations index scale in the more egalitarian direction.

Figure 10.3- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Race Relations Attitudes Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Racial/Ethnic Differences in Race Relations Attitudes

Among Men With Propensity

Results from regression analysis reported in Table 10.4 below indicate

significant differences in attitudes toward race relations by racial and ethnic

groups among men with propensity using the race relations index as the

dependent variable. After full controls, Model 3 of Table 10.4 reveals that black

and Hispanic men who expect to serve have significantly more (p<.001)

egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to their white counterparts.

These results support **hypothesis 10c.** On average, black men with propensity

score 4.37 greater on the race relations index scale than white men. Similarly,

Hispanic men with propensity average a score of 3.44 greater than white men.

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Results are similar in magnitude and direction when you compare men with high

and low propensity after full controls. These results are reported in Table 10.4.1

in Appendix A.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.14	-0.13	-0.18
Casualties	-0.09	-0.08	-0.09
Unemployment	-0.13	-0.11	-0.15
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	4.32***	4.51***	4.37***
Hispanic	3.71***	3.61***	3.44***
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.08	0.08
Some college		-0.05	-0.34
College		0.94	0.63
Graduate School		1.20	0.63
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-1.49	-1.60
Some College		-1.59	-1.89*
College		-1.45	-1.95*
Graduate School		-1.57	-1.97
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.01	0.12
Father or Male Guardian		0.21	0.20
None		-1.75	-1.13
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		-0.12	-0.23
1		-0.05	-0.13
None		1.11	0.85
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.13
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			0.39
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			-0.79
Small City (<50k)			1.27
Medium City (50-100k)			2.32*
Suburb of Med City			2.83**
Large City (100-500k)			0.20
Suburb of Large City			0.76
Very Large City (>500k)			0.95
Suburb of Very Large City			2.22
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.21
South			0.00
West			0.54
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.86
2-Year College			-0.95*
Vocational/Technical School			-0.40
CONSTANT	39.21	40.07	40.30
N	1191	1191	1191
R^2	0.0598	0.0715	0.1064
Prob>F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 1191 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;

p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

After full controls, Figure 10.4 below shows that black and Hispanic men with

propensity have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations

compared to their white counterparts. On average, black men who expect to serve

score 41.62 on a scale from 14 to 56 where higher numbers indicate more

egalitarian attitudes toward race relations. Hispanic men who expect to serve

score an average of 40.69 on the same scale. In contrast, white men who expect

to serve score an average of 37.25 indicating less egalitarian attitudes toward race

relations.

Figure 10.4- Race Relations Attitudes by Race/Ethnicity Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Women's Propensity and Race Relations Attitudes Analysis

Figure 10.5 below indicates the overall attitudes toward race relations of

women between 1976-2013, prior to controls. Similar to men, results indicate a

general incline in women's attitudes indicating greater egalitarian attitudes toward

race relations over the first three decades of the AVF. Also similar to men,

attitudes appear to have leveled off since the 2000s. However, women's attitudes

are significantly more egalitarian than men's.

Figure 10.5- Race Relations Attitudes of Youth, 1976-2013 (Women Only)

Figure 10.6 below depicts the attitudes toward race relations of women with propensity between 1976-2013, prior to adding control variables. Generally, the attitudes toward race relations of women with propensity appear to be more egalitarian than women overall, and attitudes have been relatively stable over time. It appears that women with propensity have greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations throughout the AVF compared to women overall, although results show that women overall have similar attitudes toward race relations as women with propensity since 9/11.

Figure 10.6- Race Relations Attitudes of Youth Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Table 10.5 below depicts the difference of means in women's attitudes toward race relations for my key analysis groups during the post-9/11 era. Results reveal that women with propensity are no less egalitarian toward race relations than women without propensity. On average, women with propensity score 40.95, while women without propensity score an average of 40.75. Interestingly, black women with propensity are significantly less (p<.05) egalitarian in their attitudes toward race relations compared to their civilian counterparts. Not surprisingly, black and Hispanic women with propensity are significantly more (p<.01 and p<.001 respectively) egalitarian than their white counterparts. Women's attitudes toward race relations appear to remain stable over time. Women with propensity during the post-9/11 era score an average of 40.95 whereas their female counterparts average a score of 41.04 prior to 9/11. As noted earlier, results reveal rather large differences (p<.001) in race relations attitudes between men

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and women with propensity. Men with propensity score an average of 38.22, while women with propensity average a score of 40.95.

Table 10.5
Difference of Means for Race Relations Index by Key Analysis Groups During Post-9/11 Era

Index (Greater Numbers Indicate More Tolerant Attitudes Toward Racial Integration)			N
Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	40.75	8195
Women With Propensity	Mean 2	40.95	413
	Difference	-0.20	
	SD	5.94	
	t	-0.68	
White Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	40.22	6612
White Women With Propensity	Mean 2	39.97	228
	Difference	0.25	
	SD	6.03	
	t	0.62	
Black Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	42.65	959
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	41.65	125
	Difference	1.00	
	SD	4.97	
	t	2.12*	
Hispanic Women Without Propensity	Mean 1	43.39	624
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	43.23	60
	Difference	0.16	
	SD	5.16	
	t	0.23	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	39.97	228
Black Women With Propensity	Mean 2	41.65	125
	Difference	-1.68	
	SD	5.69	
	t	-2.67**	
White Women With Propensity	Mean 1	39.97	228
Hispanic Women With Propensity	Mean 2	43.23	60
	Difference	-3.26	
	SD	5.93	
	t	-3.88***	
Women With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	41.04	715
Women With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	40.95	413
	Difference	0.09	
	SD	5.92	
	t	0.25	
Men With Propensity	Mean 1	38.22	1191
Women With Propensity	Mean 2	40.95	413
	Difference	-2.73	
	SD	6.93	
	t	-7.01***	

Note: p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

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Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 10.6 below indicate the odds ratios of women's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables. The primary predictor variable in Table 10.6 is the race relations index measure. Results from Model 6 of Table 10.6 indicate that there is no significant relationship between attitudes toward race relations and women's propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era. In other words, there is no difference in racial attitudes between women with or without propensity, which supports *hypothesis 10d*. Model 7 of Table 10.6 depicts an interaction between race and ethnic background and attitudes toward race relations, indicating no significant differences.

Table 10.6
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Women Only (N=8608): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	0.90*	0.91*	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
Casualties	0.93*	0.92**	0.93*	0.92*	0.93*	0.92*	0.92*
Unemployment	1.06	1.04	1.05	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06
Social-Psychological Influences							
Race Index (> number indicates More Tolerant Orientations Toward Racial Integration)	1.01	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		3.91***	2.93***	2.81***	2.54***	2.53***	13.02**
Hispanic		2.70***	2.13***	2.02***	2.09***	2.05***	2.48
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.86	0.91	0.93	0.94	0.94
Some college			0.96	1.07	1.12	1.14	1.15
College			0.80	0.92	0.97	0.99	0.99
Graduate School			0.58*	0.69	0.74	0.76	0.76
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.65*	0.68*	0.70*	0.70*	0.70
Some College			0.59**	0.65*	0.68*	0.68*	0.69*
College			0.59**	0.68*	0.72	0.73	0.73
Graduate School			0.60*	0.71	0.76	0.78	0.78
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.39**	1.32*	1.31*	1.30*	1.28*
Father or Male Guardian			2.01***	1.86**	1.81**	1.79**	1.81**
None			1.80**	1.60*	1.54*	1.51*	1.51*
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.69**	0.71**	0.72**	0.73*	0.73*
1			0.70**	0.73*	0.74*	0.76*	0.75*
None			0.67	0.72	0.72	0.74	0.75
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.65***	0.64***	0.65***	0.65***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.83	0.83	0.87	0.88
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.67**	0.71**		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.23	1.21	1.22
Small City (<50k)					1.28	1.28	1.28
Medium City (50-100k)					1.08	1.07	1.07
Suburb of Med City					0.72	0.73	0.73
Large City (100-500k)					1.00	1.02	1.02
Suburb of Large City					0.78	0.78	0.79
Very Large City (>500k)					1.21	1.23	1.25
Suburb of Very Large City					0.87	0.87	0.86
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					1.09	1.07	1.06
South					1.51**	1.42*	1.42*
West					1.03	0.99	0.98
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.78	0.78
2-Year College						1.11	1.10
Vocational/Technical School						1.46**	1.45**
Race Index*Race Interaction (White=Ref)							
Race Index* Black							0.96
Race Index* Hispanic							0.99
N	8608	8608	8608	8608	8608	8608	8608
R^2	0.0082	0.0473	0.0685	0.0841	0.0918	0.0949	0.0958
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 8608 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 10.7 below depicts the predicted probabilities of women's propensity to serve by attitudes toward race relations after controlling for all factors. Results show a slight decline in the predicted probability of serving for women as egalitarian attitudes increase, although results are not significant.

Figure 10.7- Predicted Propensity to Serve by Race Relations Attitudes Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Racial/Ethnic Differences in Race Relations Attitudes

Among Women With Propensity

Results from regression analysis reported in Table 10.7 below indicate

significant differences in attitudes toward race relations by racial and ethnic

groups among women with propensity using the race relations index as the

dependent variable. After full controls, Model 3 of Table 10.7 reveals that

Hispanic and black women who expect to serve have significantly more

egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to their white counterparts,

which supports **hypothesis 10e**. On average, Hispanic women with propensity

score 3.51 greater on the race relations index scale than white women, indicating

significantly (p<.001) greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations. Black

women with propensity score an average of 2.20 more than their white

counterparts on the scale, which is significant (p<.01).

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	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	0.20	0.18	0.17
Casualties	0.10	0.08	0.02
Unemployment	0.06	0.06	0.00
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	1.71**	2.20**	2.20**
Hispanic	3.41***	3.40***	3.51***
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.96	-1.09
Some college		-0.74	-0.88
College		-0.45	-0.66
Graduate School		0.03	-0.41
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-1.39	-1.42
Some College		-0.06	-0.10
College		0.28	0.18
Graduate School		1.66	1.60
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		-0.93	-0.65
Father or Male Guardian		0.13	0.11
None		0.66	1.33
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		0.39	0.37
1		-0.58	-0.71
None		-1.86	-1.48
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			0.31
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			0.83
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			2.62
Small City (<50k)			2.47
Medium City (50-100k)			1.78
Suburb of Med City			0.90
Large City (100-500k)			0.64
Suburb of Large City			2.62
Very Large City (>500k)			1.35
Suburb of Very Large City			2.23
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.19
South			0.34
West			1.57
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.73
2-Year College			-0.18
Vocational/Technical School			0.12
CONSTANT	38.13	39.16	35.88
N	413	413	413
R^2	0.0463	0.0978	0.1355
Prob>F	0.0017	0.0022	0.0102

Note: N= 413 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

After full controls, Figure 10.8 below shows that Hispanic and black women

have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations. On average,

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Hispanic women who expect to serve score 43.29 on a scale from 14 to 56 where higher numbers indicate more egalitarian views toward race relations. Black women who expect to serve score an average of 41.98 on the same scale. In contrast, white women who expect to serve score an average of 39.77 indicating less egalitarian attitudes toward race relations.

Figure 10.8- Race Relations Attitudes by Race/Ethnicity Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Women Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

To more directly address recent claims by Nteta and Tarsi (2015), I analyze the relationship between *white men's propensity* and racial attitudes below. Utilizing binomial logistic regression analysis, results reported in Table 10.8 below indicate the odds ratios of propensity to serve during the post-9/11 era as predicted by the independent variables for *white men* only. The primary predictor variable in Table 10.8 is the race relations index measure. Results indicate that there is a significant difference in attitudes toward race relations between white men with and without propensity during the post-9/11 era prior to controlling for various

factors. As egalitarian attitudes toward race relations increase, white men are less

likely to expect to serve (OR=0.99*), prior to controlling for individual-level

characteristics that have been associated with negative racial attitudes and

propensity as noted earlier. After controlling for SES, Model 2 of Table 10.8

reveals that the level of significance disappears on the race index. This suggests

that higher levels of SES may be associated with greater egalitarian racial

attitudes. Differences in propensity remain insignificant after controlling for

educational attainment and aspirations, suggesting that higher levels of

educational attainment may be associated with greater egalitarian racial attitudes.

After controlling for all factors in Model 5 of Table 10.8, results indicate no

significant differences (OR=1.00). Results suggest that white men with

propensity are no more or less egalitarian in racial attitudes compared to white

men without propensity.

Interestingly, the magnitude and direction of findings significantly change

when you compare high and low propensity white men. Prior to controls, results

indicate that greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations are positively

related (OR=1.01) to white men's high propensity. After full controls, results

indicate that as egalitarian attitudes toward race relations increase, white men are

significantly more likely (OR=1.02*) to have high propensity. These findings

suggest that white men with high propensity (i.e. the military) are more racially

tolerant than their low propensity (i.e. civilian) counterparts. Findings appear to

contradict recent assertions made by Nteta and Tarsi (2015) that those who self-

select into the military have greater negative views toward race relations. Results

from this analysis are reported in Table 10.8.1 of Appendix A.

Table 10.8
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: White Men Only (N=6722): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Macro-Social Influences					
Public Support (OIF)	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.96	0.96
Casualties	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97
Unemployment	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04	1.04
Social-Psychological Influences					
Race Index (> number indicates More Tolerant Orientations Toward Racial Integration)	0.99*	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00
Individual/Demographic Influences					
SES Disadvantage/Advantage					
Father's education (less than HS=ref)					
HS		0.64***	0.69**	0.71*	0.71*
Some college		0.74*	0.88	0.91	0.91
College		0.61***	0.77	0.83	0.83
Graduate School		0.45***	0.60**	0.64*	0.65*
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)					
HS		1.07	1.15	1.20	1.20
Some College		0.91	1.02	1.07	1.07
College		0.78	0.90	0.95	0.95
Graduate School		0.80	0.98	1.03	1.04
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)					
Mother or Female Guardian		1.24*	1.18	1.18	1.17
Father or Male Guardian		1.62***	1.44*	1.42*	1.41*
None		1.85***	1.57**	1.55*	1.53*
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)					
2		0.83*	0.85	0.85	0.85
1		0.62***	0.65***	0.65***	0.65***
None		0.50***	0.55***	0.56***	0.56***
Educational Attainment and Goals					
High School G.P.A.			0.70***	0.69***	0.70***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)					
College Preparatory			0.83*	0.86	0.88
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			0.67***	0.68***	
Additional Controls					
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)					
Country				1.17	1.17
Small City (<50k)				1.17	1.17
Medium City (50-100k)				1.06	1.05
Suburb of Med City				0.90	0.91
Large City (100-500k)				0.98	0.98
Suburb of Large City				0.96	0.98
Very Large City (>500k)				1.06	1.08
Suburb of Very Large City				0.75	0.77
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)					
North Central				0.91	0.91
South				1.26*	1.24*
West				1.09	1.07
Additional Pathways					
4-Year College					0.68***
2-Year College					1.19*
Vocational/Technical School					1.01
Interactions					
*Race Index*4-Year College*					
*Race Index * Father's Education (less than HS=Ref)*					
HS					
Some college					
College					
Graduate School					
N	6722	6722	6722	6722	6722
R^2	0.0026	0.0283	0.0467	0.0512	0.0521
Prob > chi2	0.0083	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 6722 (2002-2013); p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Perceptions of Discrimination Against Blacks in the Military

In a separate but related analysis, I analyze attitudes toward the perception of discrimination against blacks in the military. A question on Form 4 of the MTF survey asks a respondent: "To what extent do you think there is any discrimination against African-American people who are in the armed services?" Response categories include: 1="To a Very Little Extent" 2="To a Little Extent" 3="To Some Extent" 4="To a Great Extent" 5="To a Very Great Extent."

Table 10.9 below reports the results from a difference of means test using the discrimination variable noted above as the dependent variable on a scale from 1 to 5. Results reveal that, on average, men (mean=2.23) believe "to a little extent" that there is discrimination against blacks in the military during the post-9/11 era. Not surprisingly, men with propensity (mean=2.11) believe that there is significantly less (p<.001) discrimination against blacks in the military than men without propensity (mean= 2.25). Interestingly, it appears that the perception of the discrimination against blacks in the military among men with propensity has not significantly changed during the post-9/11 era compared to earlier years in the AVF. Before 9/11, men with propensity score an average of 2.07 compared to an average score of 2.11 during the post-9/11 era. Among men with high propensity, there are no significant differences between eras.

Results in Table 10.9 also reveal differences between racial and ethnic groups. Perhaps most telling, black and Hispanic men with propensity have significantly (p<.001) greater perceptions that there is discrimination against blacks in the military compared to white men. Black men with propensity score an average of

2.64 and Hispanic men average a score of 2.39, whereas white men have an

average score of 1.98. Despite differences, overall average scores of men with

propensity are relatively low (i.e. less than the mid-point) regardless of racial and

ethnic background.

Not surprisingly, men with propensity have significantly lower ($p<.01$)

perceptions that there is discrimination against blacks in the military compared to

women with propensity during the post-9/11 era. However, women with

propensity score an average of 2.33, which is a relatively low perception of the

discrimination against blacks in the military. Additional results for women's

perceptions of discrimination against blacks in the military are not reported since

there are no significant differences compared to results for men.

Table 10.9
Difference of Means of Perception of Discrimination Against Blacks by Key Analysis Groups During Post-9/11 Era

Scale of 1-5 (1=To a Very Little Extent 2=To a Little Extent 3=To Some Extent 4=To a Great Extent 5=To a Very Great Extent)			N
Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.25	6206
Men With Propensity	Mean 2	2.11	993
	Difference	0.14	
	SD	1.1	
	t	3.77***	
Men With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.30	4364
Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.85	405
	Difference	0.44	
	SD	1.12	
	t	7.65***	
White Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.19	5176
White Men With Propensity	Mean 2	1.98	753
	Difference	0.21	
	SD	1.07	
	t	5.12***	
White Men With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.23	3576
White Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	1.80	326
	Difference	0.43	
	SD	1.09	
	t	6.92***	
Black Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.68	542
Black Men With Propensity	Mean 2	2.64	134
	Difference	0.04	
	SD	1.20	
	t	0.35	
Black Men With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.68	432
Black Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.12	42
	Difference	0.57	
	SD	1.21	
	t	2.86**	
Hispanic Men Without Propensity	Mean 1	2.45	488
Hispanic Men With Propensity	Mean 2	2.40	106
	Difference	0.05	
	SD	1.16	
	t	0.41	
Hispanic Men With Low Propensity	Mean 1	2.47	356
Hispanic Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.03	37
	Difference	0.44	
	SD	1.20	
	t	2.13*	

Note:p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 10.9 (cont)
Difference of Means of Perception of Discrimination Against Blacks by Key Analysis Groups During Post-9/11 Era

Scale of 1-5 (1=To a Very Little Extent 2=To a Little Extent 3=To Some Extent 4=To a Great Extent 5=To a Very Great Extent)			N
White Men With Propensity	Mean 1	1.98	753
Black Men With Propensity	Mean 2	2.64	134
	Difference	-0.67	
	SD	1.19	
	t	-6.09***	
White Men With High Propensity	Mean 1	1.80	326
Black Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.12	42
	Difference	-0.32	
	SD	1.20	
	t	-1.63	
White Men With Propensity	Mean 1	1.98	753
Hispanic Men With Propensity	Mean 2	2.39	106
	Difference	-0.42	
	SD	1.15	
	t	-3.55***	
White Men With High Propensity	Mean 1	1.80	326
Hispanic Men With High Propensity	Mean 2	2.03	37
	Difference	-0.23	
	SD	1.17	
	t	-1.12	
Men With Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.07	1970
Men With Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.11	993
	Difference	0.04	
	SD	1.18	
	t	-0.77	
Men With High Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	1.94	968
Men With High Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	1.85	405
	Difference	0.09	
	SD	1.20	
	t	1.21	
Men Without Propensity- Pre 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.25	10047
Men Without Propensity- Post 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.25	6206
	Difference	0.00	
	SD	1.09	
	t	-0.02	
Women With Propensity- Post- 9/11 Era	Mean 1	2.33	376
Men With Propensity- Post- 9/11 Era	Mean 2	2.11	993
	Difference	0.22	
	SD	1.19	
	t	3.04**	

Note:p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 10.9 below indicates overall average attitudes toward the perception of discrimination against blacks in the military of men between 1976-2013, prior to controls. Results indicate consistently low averages of men's perceptions of discrimination against blacks. There appears to be a slight increase in these perceptions in the 1990s, but averages continue to remain relatively low throughout.

Figure 10.9- Perceptions of Discrimination Against Blacks in the Military
Among Youth Population, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Mean Perception of Discrimination-Greater #s Indicate Higher Perceptions

Class Year

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 10.10 below indicates overall average perceptions of discrimination against blacks in the military of men with propensity between 1976-2013, prior to controls. Similar to men overall, results indicate consistently low averages throughout the AVF. Further, perceptions appear to be consistently lower than men overall. These results suggest that, on average, men with and without the propensity to serve have fairly low perceptions of racial discrimination within the military institution overall.

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Figure 10.10- Perceptions of Discrimination Against Blacks in the Military Likely to Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Discussion

For brevity sake and purposes of comparison with previous research (e.g. Dempsey 2010; Nteta and Tarsi 2015), I focus my discussion below on the relationship between men's propensity and racial attitudes. As noted earlier, similar patterns appear in the relationship between women's propensity and racial attitudes as they do for men. Not surprisingly, women are more racially egalitarian than men.

My research on the relationship between propensity and youth attitudes toward race relations is important in a few notable ways. First, there has been very limited research on the relationship between racial attitudes and the propensity to serve. Most research (e.g. Segal et al. 1998; Segal et al. 1999; Bachman et al. 2000; DoD 2000; Segal et al. 2001) on propensity has examined youth attitudes toward politics, nationalism, trust in government, and reasons to serve and not to

serve. Further, the majority of research on race relations has examined the attitudes of individuals after their time in service, not before. Even the extensive number of authors who took part in the in-depth study by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies in 2000, which examined the civil-military gap in attitudes, did not think it was worthwhile to examine differences in racial attitudes of the military compared to civilians (Fever and Kohn 2001).

Second, this research is particularly timely given the recent "Black Lives Matter" movement occurring throughout the country, which has brought the topic of race relations back to the forefront of debate. Although the "Black Lives Matter" movement has occurred more recently than my current data covers, my research will serve as a good starting point for future research to examine the potential impacts of the racial debate on military propensity.

Third, the recent study conducted by Nteta and Tarsi (2015) has challenged the conventional wisdom that the military creates an environment that leads to more egalitarian racial attitudes among its members. Further, the authors attribute the differences in racial attitudes between white veterans and non-veterans as a result of self-selection and the negative impacts of the AVF. My research is unique since it can directly test their theory of self-selection by examining the attitudes of youth with the propensity to serve. Additionally, I can compare my findings with Dempsey's (2010) recent research, which briefly examines the racial attitudes of those in the Army in 2004. It must be emphasized, however, that my analysis of the attitudes of men with high propensity is being used as a surrogate for the attitudes of men who actually enter military service.

Last, it is particularly interesting to examine the racial attitudes of youth with propensity during wartime to see if the dynamics of war have any influence on these attitudes. As mentioned earlier in previous chapters, the Vietnam War, and to some extent, the Gulf War, brought the topic of race relations to the forefront of the political debate. Indeed, scholars have noted that the black community was particularly concerned with the unfair utilization of black soldiers on the front lines, arguing that they were more in harms way (i.e. the "cannon fodder" argument) than white soldiers (Armor 1996). Will these negative perceptions among the black community continue and will they heighten racial tensions between members of the military during the post-9/11 era? Bogart's (1969) research argued that the increased contact between white and black soldiers, during combat specifically, was a main reason for positive racial attitudes between whites and blacks. Thus, it is reasonable that soldiers, on average, regardless of race and ethnicity, who have served side-by-side during the post-9/11 era for longer than any other war in our nation's history, would have increased trust between each other and positive racial attitudes as a result. It is interesting to see how these dynamics may influence attitudes toward race relations among youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era.

Overall, results suggest that the military's views toward race relations are a reflection of American society- at least among America's youth. Youth with propensity are no more likely to have more or less egalitarian attitudes toward race relations than their civilian counterparts. In fact, youth with high propensity have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to

youth with low propensity after controls. Further, it appears that the racial

attitudes of youth with the propensity to serve have become increasingly more

egalitarian since the beginning of the AVF (see Figure 10.2). Indeed, attitudes

among youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era are significantly more

egalitarian compared to earlier years (see Table 10.2).

However, it should be noted that there is a significant difference, albeit small,

between white men with and without the propensity to serve prior to controlling

for any factors, suggesting less egalitarian racial attitudes among white men with

propensity. This finding offers some support to Nteta and Tarsi's (2015) claim

that white veterans have more negative racial views than white non-veterans as a

result of the negative racial attitudes among those who self-select into the military

during the AVF. As highlighted earlier, differences in racial attitudes between

white men with and without propensity are only observed prior to controlling for

various individual-level factors that have been associated with more negative

racial attitudes (Nteta and Tarsi 2015). My own analysis reveals that after

controlling for SES, differences in racial attitudes between white men with and

without propensity disappear. Further, when comparing white men with high

propensity to white men with low propensity, there are no significant differences

in racial attitudes prior to controls. In fact, it appears that white men with *high*

propensity are significantly more racially egalitarian after controlling for SES and

education. Given that prior research (Bachman et al. 1997) has shown that 70

percent of men with *high* propensity go on to enlist in the military within 5 to 6

years after graduation, it is most likely that youth entering military service do not

hold more negative racial attitudes than their civilian counterparts.

Although minorities with propensity have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to their white counterparts, all youth with propensity, on average, score relatively high on the race relations index, well above the mid-point of the scale. Although this should not be alarming, the significant differences in attitudes toward race relations between racial and ethnic groups should not be understated. Differences in attitudes should be monitored and understood by military leadership. Indeed, this could be a point of contention in efforts to increase diversity in the military (Dempsey 2010). The military must continue to work hard to ensure that there is no discrimination in its ranks.

Considering the question pertaining to the perception of discrimination against blacks in the military, there appears to be significantly less of a perception of discrimination among youth with propensity compared to their civilian counterparts. Although minorities with propensity have significantly greater perceptions of discrimination compared to their white counterparts, all youth with propensity, on average, score relatively low on the question, suggesting that there is discrimination against blacks only to a "little extent." Further, differences in perceptions of discrimination based on racial and ethnic background among youth with high propensity essentially disappear. This suggests that those most likely to serve have similar positive perceptions of a lack of discrimination against blacks in the military, regardless of racial and ethnic background. Most telling is that youth without propensity, on average, perceive that there is only a "little extent" of discrimination against blacks in the military. This supports the conventional

wisdom that the military remains to be perceived as an egalitarian and meritocratic environment, even during wartime. Additionally, white men with propensity have the lowest perceptions of discrimination against blacks in the military. Although this may not be surprising, it is unlikely that youth with negative preexisting racial views would be attracted to an organization that is perceived to have little discrimination. Despite the relatively low perceptions, the military must continue to work hard to minimize the perceptions of discrimination within its ranks.

Taken together, my results appear to partially contradict the recent study by Nteta and Tarsi (2015), who argue that white veterans have less racially egalitarian attitudes compared to their civilian counterparts as a result of the negative racial attitudes of those who self-select into the military. Indeed, my research suggests that there are no attitudinal differences with respect to race relations between youth with propensity (i.e. the military) and without propensity (i.e. civilians) during the post-9/11 era. In fact, it appears that youth with high propensity have greater egalitarian attitudes compared to their civilian counterparts. Although I find some support for their argument that white men with propensity are less racially egalitarian than their civilian counterparts, differences are very small. Further, significant differences disappear among white men with high propensity who are the most likely to enter the military. I find similar results among white men with propensity prior to 9/11 (between 1976-2001) as well, which was Nteta and Tarsi's primary period of analysis. In fact, there were no significant differences in racial attitudes between white men with

and without propensity (OR=0.99) or between white men with high and low propensity (OR=1.00) between 1976-2001, even prior to controls (results not shown). If Nteta and Tarsi's findings are accurate (i.e. that white veterans are indeed less racially tolerant than white non-veterans during the AVF era), it is doubtful that it is the result of differences in attitudes among those who self-select into the military compared to those who do not. Indeed, my results reveal that the racial attitudes among youth with propensity have been consistently significantly higher than youth without propensity throughout the duration of the AVF (See Figures 10.1 and 10.2). It is my own hypothesis that the two measures used in Nteta and Tarsi's analysis noted earlier are not the best predictors of racial attitudes. Indeed, it is unlikely that conventional wisdom is incorrect and white veterans' racial attitudes are less egalitarian after their increased contact with blacks in the military.

Future research should continue to assess the racial attitudes of youth with propensity and the attitudes among veterans of the post-9/11 era. Specifically, researchers should compare attitudes using the same measures. If white veterans are indeed becoming less egalitarian and more negative toward blacks, then it could be indicative of a problem with the military's ability to effectively socialize its participants to support racial equality as opposed to a problem with the preexisting attitudes of those who self-select into the military. This will be especially important for military practitioners to discover. Perhaps greater attention and emphasis will be required by military leadership to better foster a climate that promotes racial equality. Indeed, the potential exists that there could

be differences in racial attitudes among different populations within the military

due to the de facto segregation by military occupational specialties, which limits

opportunities for intergroup contact. Thus, future research should also examine

the racial attitudes among the military population by branch of service, rank, and

MOS. I challenge researchers to compare attitudes toward race relations between

youth with propensity and veterans following their military service utilizing the

same survey questions that the MTF study employs. This would produce more

accurate and reliable results to test the self-selection hypothesis and to see if

veterans are indeed becoming less racially intolerant.

However, to achieve the gold standard of the most accurate and reliable results to

test the self-selection versus organizational socialization hypotheses, I challenge

researchers to study a cohort of enlistees through their service and into retirement

to compare their attitudes toward race relations.

Nteta and Tarsi's recent research is limited since it does not cover the attitudes

of veterans of the post-9/11 generation. After a generation of soldiers who have

served in combat longer than any other period, I expect that the military and

combat environments have fostered a strong sense of trust between all of its

members, regardless of race and ethnicity. Indeed, the element of trust between

soldiers is the bedrock of the Army Profession (The Army Profession 2015). It is

likely that the military experience during the post-9/11 era has promoted an

atmosphere that has led to even greater positive racial attitudes among its

members in a similar fashion as Stouffer and his colleagues (1949) found during

WWII and Bogart (1969) found during the Korean War after the increased and

cooperative contact between whites and black soldiers during combat.

In the book, *Colin Powell and the American Dream*, the former Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff remarked about his thoughts of potentially leaving the Army after his first three years in service:

> "I was in a profession that would allow me to go as far as my talents would take me. And for a black, no other avenue in American society offered so much opportunity. But nothing counted so much as the fact that I loved what I was doing. And so, much to my family's bewilderment, I told them I was not coming home" (Cummins and Rudnicki 1995:100).

I expect that the beliefs of racial equality, security, and job satisfaction that a young black man felt within the military institution in 1961 will remain as strong today and into the future. Although continuing strides toward racial equality can still be made in the military, and perhaps more so within society, I believe that the military remains one of America's best institutions to model as an organization that engenders racial egalitarianism. As the popular saying goes-with a slight twist by members of the Army- "we all bleed the same color- the color of green!"

Chapter 11: Summary and Conclusion

Life Course research examines how individuals work out paths of development over time. The transition to adulthood is an important period that impacts one's development over the life course. During this transition, there are a few options that one can choose from after high school. Going to college, joining the military, attending vocational education, or entering the labor force are the primary options. My research addresses the first three options that an individual has during the transition to adulthood, with primary focus on those who are likely to enter the military. A key tenet of life course theory is how lives are shaped and embedded by the historical time and place people encounter during their lifetime. The horrific attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 have undoubtedly left a lasting impact on the lives of most Americans and many others across our world. These attacks were the catalyst that created a state of sustained war immediately following 9/11, which continues today predominantly against terrorism. The attacks of 9/11 and the post-9/11 period thus far is a historical moment that will likely shape how individuals work out their developmental paths.

The study of civil-military relations over the past half-century has focused primarily on two similar, yet separate streams of research that examine the relationship between the armed forces and society. Those in Samuel Huntington's corner believe that the military should be separate and distinct from the society it serves to increase military effectiveness. However, those in Morris Janowitz's corner believe that the military should be woven into the fabric of society, arguing that the military's representation in demographics, attitudes, and values should be

more convergent with the people it protects. Since the end of conscription and the birth of the AVF, researchers have been particularly interested in analyzing whether or not there is a civil-military gap in various demographics, attitudes, and values. Many have argued that a gap has widened due to various factors such as the lack of conscription, military downsizing and a lack of a military institutional presence in communities, increased professionalism, and a reliance on civilian contractors. More recently, scholars have cautioned that the period of sustained war could potentially increase the gap between civilians and the military. My research contributes to this body of literature by examining this potential gap through the analysis of various demographic and attitudinal factors associated with those most likely to enter the military.

Since 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have encompassed the longest period of sustained war throughout U.S. history. These wars have been placed squarely on the shoulders of the professional All-Volunteer Force. The costs associated with the prolonged wars have taken their toll on the AVF and have likely had an influence on whether a young man or woman would want to enter the military during a period of wartime. Similarly, the benefits associated with military service are also likely to have had an influence on these decisions. This cost/benefit analysis can be framed within the institutional/occupational model to assist with understanding the motivations of youth who expect to serve during a period of wartime.

There have been numerous studies examining the propensity to serve in the armed forces of America's youth, many of which have uncovered the underlying

motivations of those who expect to serve. However, the extent of how war has influenced youth propensity has only been marginally studied in the past. Given the circumstances, with the exception of the Gulf War period, prior research has not been able to directly analyze youth propensity during a period of war. My research extends previous work and fills a significant gap in knowledge of how war during the post-9/11 era shapes youth propensity to join the military.

Throughout the post-9/11 period, there have also been sub-periods (i.e. "historical moments") marked by additional significant events to include but not limited to: a period of high patriotic sentiment immediately following the attacks of 9/11 (2003); a period of high U.S. casualties during the surge of U.S. forces back into Iraq (2004-2008); and a period of an economic recession at home (2009-2011). These events are likely to have had significant influence on American youth propensity during the post-9/11 era - a period in total marked by sustained war, and in part by additional significant influences. To address these periods, I analyzed the influence of patriotism after 9/11 by examining the relationship between public support for war and propensity. I also analyzed the influence of the Iraqi surge period by examining the relationship between U.S. casualties and propensity. Last, I analyzed the impacts of the economic recession period by examining the relationship between unemployment on propensity. For the most part, these analyses add to or extend the existing literature on military propensity.

Additional significant historical events during the post-9/11 era may also influence propensity to serve in the future. The "Black Lives Matter" movement,

which began in 2014 and continues today, is a moment that warrants further analysis on racial attitudes and by racial analysis groups. My analysis of attitudes toward race relations among youth with propensity provides a good starting point to examine the influence of the "Black Lives Matter" movement on those likely to serve in the armed forces in the future. Will youth attitudes toward race relations strengthen or weaken among those expecting to serve in the military? Will these attitudes be distinctly different by racial and ethnic sub-groups? Will these attitudes diverge away from the attitudes among society (i.e. those who do not expect to serve)?

The Department of Defense's recent decision to open all combat positions to women at the end of 2015 is another significant moment likely to have influence on youth propensity. Analysis of the propensity to serve by gender allows for the continued examination of the impacts of this decision into the future. My analysis of attitudes toward gender roles among youth with propensity also provides a good starting point to analyze the extent of resistance expected among men who are likely to serve as a result of this decision. Further analysis of the perceptions of discrimination against women in the military, especially among young women, will provide insight to how successful the DoD's integration of women into combat jobs is working.

Summary of Analysis Results

Men's propensity during the post-9/11 era is related to several macro-social factors such as public support for war, casualties, and unemployment. In general, the relationships between these factors and women's propensity are similar in

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magnitude and direction as for men. Below, I highlight the similarities and
differences between men and women's propensity.

- Propensity is higher for men than for women.

- Propensity during the post-9/11 era is as high as other years during the
  AVF without war; women's propensity reached its second highest
  percentage in 2013. Men's propensity during the post-9/11 era was as
  high as during the 1990s, although it was lower than the 1980s; similar
  overall trends hold for women's propensity.

- Propensity decreases as public support for war increases; however,
  propensity increases with greater nationalistic attitudes; the same trends
  hold for women.

- Propensity decreases as casualties increase; the decrease in propensity is
  greater for women than for men.

- Men's propensity increases as unemployment increases; women's
  propensity does not significantly increase as unemployment rates increase.

Men's propensity during the post-9/11 era is also related to several individual
demographic and attitudinal factors. In general, the relationship between
women's propensity and these factors are similar in magnitude and direction as
they are for men.

- Propensity levels differ by racial and ethnic background. Propensity is
  highest among black men; followed by Hispanic men; then white men.
  For men, these relationships do not hold true after controlling for SES;
  Hispanic men have the highest propensity after controlling for SES; Black

men have the lowest propensity after all controls. These relationships are similar for women and hold true even after controlling for all factors, including SES. Black men's propensity is generally the lowest during the post-9/11 era compared to black propensity during the years prior to 9/11.

- Propensity decreases with higher socioeconomic status as measured by parent's education, the number of parents in a household, and the number of siblings. Men of college-educated fathers have lower propensity than men whose parents did not attend college. Mother's education level is not a significant predictor for men's propensity, but is a significant predictor for women.

- Propensity decreases with educational achievement in high school; the same trend holds for women.

- Propensity varies by region: propensity is higher in the South and West, lower in the Northeast and North Central regions. The same general trends hold for women, although women's propensity is the lowest in the Northeast.

- Propensity decreases in suburban and urban areas of the country; the same trends hold for women.

- Propensity decreases with expectations to graduate from a 4-year college; men who expect to graduate from a 2-year college or attend vocational education have higher propensity. Minority men who expect to graduate from a 2-year college or attend vocational school have greater propensity than white men; the same trends hold for women.

- Among women with propensity, perceptions of discrimination against women in the military have increased during the post-9/11 era, although these perceptions are less than the perceptions among women without propensity. Men with propensity have lower perceptions of discrimination against women in the military.

- Propensity is highest among those who affiliate with the Republican Party. Men with propensity affiliate with the Republican Party more than women with propensity.

- Propensity is highest among those who identify as having a conservative political ideology. Men with propensity are more conservative than women with propensity.

- Propensity increases with greater institutional motivations to serve. However, youth with propensity have a mixture of institutional and occupational orientations- a form of "pragmatic professionalism." On average, white men with propensity appear to have greater institutional orientations than their black counterparts. Hispanic men with propensity have similar institutional orientations as their white counterparts. Men with high propensity (i.e. "Definitely Will" serve) appear to have the greatest institutional orientations while men with low propensity (i.e. "Definitely Will Not" serve) have the least. Institutional orientations are generally among the highest of the AVF during the post-9/11 era.

- Propensity increases with greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles. Women with propensity have significantly greater egalitarian attitudes

toward gender roles than men. However, women's propensity also

increases with greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles. Men with

propensity have greater traditional attitudes toward gender roles during the

post-9/11 era compared to the decade prior to 9/11.

- There is no significant relationship between propensity and attitudes

  toward race relations. After full controls, men with high propensity have

  greater egalitarian attitudes toward race relations than men with low

  propensity. Men and women with propensity during the post-9/11 era

  have increasing egalitarian attitudes toward race relations compared to

  years prior to 9/11.

- Perceptions of discrimination against blacks in the military among men

  and women with propensity are relatively low and stable throughout the

  duration of the AVF.

Major Contributions of Research

   Findings from my research contribute to Life Course studies by examining data

in the "historical time and place" of the post-9/11 era, which is likely to influence

various attitudes, decisions, and outcomes of America's youth. Examining the

factors associated with military service compared to other options that young

adults encounter during their transition to adulthood provides insight to

sociologists interested in examining changes in motivations during a period

marked by domestic and foreign turbulence. Sociologists who fail to examine the

military in studies of youth transitions to adulthood could overlook important

findings, as the military may be an important route to higher education and

upward mobility (Kleykamp 2006). My examination of the entry point into the military through the Life Course theoretical framework could direct the research agenda to examine impacts at other points along the life course (e.g. the time to reenlist or exit the military and retirement) that could influence different outcomes. Future research should examine the influence that the post-9/11 era may have on various other academic domains of study. Studies that examine the effects from the 9/11 era are likely to discover unique findings that parallel earlier life course studies of notable historical moments such as the Great Depression or the World War II era.

According to the tenets of Life Course theory, individuals have agency when making a decision on which pathway to adulthood they choose. Weighing the pros and cons of one particular pathway compared to another is one method for making an informed and rational decision. The military certainly has a lot of advantages such as increasing human capital through educational benefits, pay and health care, and technical training that translates to the civilian labor market, especially for those less advantaged in mainstream society. For many underprivileged individuals the military can serve as a "turning point" in one's life that helps bridge the gap to facilitate a better transition to adulthood by increasing socioeconomic status (Elder 1986; Sampson and Laub 1996). The occupational model best depicts this rationale of military service. Those young men and women who desire to gain access to college could be a viable target for recruitment as the military seeks to attract the best and brightest. Additionally, those who seek a specific skillset or trade may find better opportunities through

on-the-job training in the military with direct pay benefits and other opportunities to expand their horizons through travel and experiences. There are also motivations to serve that are more in line with institutional orientations of service. For example, youth may be influenced to serve by a notion of patriotism- to rally 'round the flag in support of our country at war. Furthermore, some youth may be motivated to serve as a call of duty to serve as a citizen of the United States- especially during this critical period of war during the post-9/11 era.

Despite the many advantages of military service, the post-9/11 era has highlighted one major disadvantage- the increased risk of injury due to combat. Although fatalities during the wars since 9/11 pale in comparison to earlier wars, soldiers today are more at risk of becoming both a physical and a mental casualty from the prolonged wars. The nature of the conflict (e.g. small-scale, asymmetrical threats- IEDs, suicide bombers), coupled with the improvements in medical evacuation and treatment during this era, has kept soldiers alive, often as amputees or with mental and emotional scars invisible to the eye. Visions of our wounded warriors symbolize the costs of war and leave a lasting impression on our youth. It is likely that these factors influence a youth's decision on whether or not he or she will join the military. Indeed, my research suggests that propensity is negatively related to an increase in casualties. Youth who are more oriented to military service by the occupational model as opposed to the institutional model may be less likely to serve during this era compared to earlier times without war, as the perceived risks outweigh the benefits.

Findings from my research add to the overall literature on propensity to serve in the armed forces by extending analysis into the post-9/11 era. This research could have important policy implications with respect to recruitment and retention in the armed forces for both military and civilian leadership. As the military continues to undergo significant personnel and budget cuts, we must ensure that the quality and quantity of future recruits continues to improve as military missions become increasingly complex and diverse. Uncovering the macro-social, social-psychological, and demographic influences on propensity will facilitate a better understanding of the motivations of youth to serve in the military, which will improve recruitment strategies in the future. Continued knowledge of these factors will assist in the efficiency and effectiveness of future recruiting efforts to ensure that we continue to target the "highest" quality individuals, who are representative of the population at large, as the military continues to compete with the civilian labor market and college campuses.

My research examining the differences in propensity by gender is particularly important as the majority of prior research has neglected this analysis and the topic of women in the military has resurfaced as debate since the rescission of the combat exclusion ban in 2011 and the DoD's recent decision to open all combat positions to women. It is likely that women's success in combat since 9/11, along with the recent structural changes, should have a positive influence on women's propensity to serve into the future. However, I do not expect that women's propensity will increase by large percentages as the military continues to be perceived as a masculine and traditional culture. Future research must continue to

examine the various factors related to women's propensity and its trends over time.

The results from my I/O analysis suggest that recruitment techniques that focus on institutional messages and themes such as patriotism, adventure, leadership, and teamwork will be useful in attracting America's next generation of warriors. Indeed, the Marine Corps' institutional motto of "The Few, The Proud, The Marines" and their recent commercial "Which Way Would You Run," (2012) should continue to positively influence young men and women into the Marine Corps. The Army's new promotional campaign "The Team That Makes a Difference," (2015) is evidence that Army recruiters are also trying to tap into an individual's "institutional psyche." My findings support that that these types of institutional themes will continue to attract new recruits during an era of sustained war. Previous research suggests that individuals that are attracted to these types of recruitment appeals will be more committed to the institution overall, more likely to fulfill their initial enlistment obligations, and more likely to reenlist (Faris 1988; Griffith 2008). Youth who enter the military with greater occupational orientations similar to those of their civilian counterparts could risk disappointment upon entering the military institution. Indeed, attracting youth who already have a fair amount of institutional orientations will certainly reduce the culture shock from the institutional socialization that occurs within the military itself after initial enlistment (Faris 1988). To the extent that organizational functioning is affected by the goodness of fit between the values of the organization and those of its work force, it appears that military effectiveness

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during the post-9/11 era will be strengthened as a result of the institutional orientations of youth who are likely to enlist (Segal 1986).

Despite evidence revealing strong institutional orientations among youth with propensity, it is clear that a mixture of institutional and occupational motivations to serve (the hybrid model) persist during the post-9/11 era. The military must ensure that incentive packages remain attractive to the "college-bound" youth amidst looming budget cuts to maintain the overall readiness of the force. My results reveal that young men and women are likely to also be attracted to educational benefits as well as monetary incentives as propensity increases during periods of economic instability in the labor market.

Results regarding racial and ethnic group differences in I/O orientations will further assist recruiters in focusing on various target audiences with appropriate recruitment techniques. Data suggests that recruitment techniques that focus on more tangible, occupational incentives such as pay and benefits may better attract black youth into the military. Conversely, those techniques that focus on more intangible, institutional incentives may better attract white and Hispanic youth. The fact that there were no significant I/O differences (using the I/O index scale measure) between racial and ethnic groups with high propensity suggests that the significant differences lie in the population who claim that they "probably will" enter the armed forces. Indeed, this is the target audience that recruiters could best influence to join the military with appropriate I/O incentives. Those with high propensity are the most institutional in orientation regardless of race and ethnicity.

My research comparing civilian and military attitudes toward work contributes to parallel research in the civilian sector on public service motivation (PSM) (Taylor et al. 2015). PSM is "an individual's predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations." PSM is a construct that is "animated by specific dispositions and values arising from public institutions and missions" (Perry et al. 2010: 682). PSM is primarily associated with altruism although it satisfies individual needs at the same time that the community interest is being served. Recently, researchers have shown that the dimensions of PSM (i.e. Commitment to Public Values, Self-sacrifice, Attraction to Public Service, and Compassion) are positively correlated with institutional values, which address the notion of serving the greater good (Taylor et al. 2015). Much research on PSM has compared the differences in the motivations of workers between the public and the private sector, and has been extended to address the motivations of nonprofit workers and volunteers as well. In general, research on PSM shows that people who work or volunteer in government agencies and nonprofit organizations have higher levels of PSM than private sector employees. In other words, those who work in the public sector have greater institutional orientations than those in the private sector. Indeed, the true essence of PSM is "a willingness to provide service to others without receiving tangible personal rewards in return" (Taylor et al. 2015:146). These findings support my findings as well in that those people likely to join the military (i.e. the public sector) have greater institutional orientations than those people who likely will not enter the military (i.e. a large portion that comprises the

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private sector). It would be interesting for future research to examine if there are

I/O differences between those who join the military and those who join the public

sector for work.

Despite the considerable amount of contributions from my research, a

limitation to my study is the difficulty in determining causal mechanisms

associated with military propensity from the secondary nature of the survey

questions asked in the MTF project. Findings can only suggest factors that may

be directly or indirectly influencing a youth's expectation to serve. Further, I am

not directly able to uncover youth motivations to serve. A combination of

quantitative and qualitative analysis is required to best determine the direct

mechanisms influencing our youth along a particular pathway to adulthood.

Nevertheless, my findings provide a solid, unbiased foundation as a springboard

for more directed research into the future.

Potential Impacts on Civil-Military Relations

Is the military becoming an "ideological caste" of its own as Janowitz (1975)

inquired? Extensive research has been done on the civilian-military "gap" with

primary focus on distinctive attitudes within the military that either converge or

diverge with society at large as well as with civilian leadership. Researchers (e.g.

Fever and Kohn 2001) have previously compared values, attitudes, and the

representativeness of the military with the civilian population to determine the

extent and nature of a gap. Some theorists argue that the length of the

Afghanistan and Iraq wars, as well as the sole reliance on the All-Volunteer

Force, have contributed to widening the "gap" between the military and the

general population. Protégées of Morris Janowitz (1960), contend that relations between the military and the civilians should be more convergent than divergent, whereas protégées of Samuel Huntington (1957) believe the opposite.

My research suggests that there are different value orientations between those with and without propensity. Results show that youth with propensity have greater institutional orientations, are more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party and identify as having a conservative ideology, and are more traditional in attitudes toward gender roles. Results also show that black propensity has decreased during this period compared to earlier periods, which could create issues with diversity in the military. Of note, there are no differences in attitudes toward race relations between youth with and without propensity. The fact that those who expect to serve in the armed forces have different attitudes from the society it protects is not surprising in and of itself. Indeed, many organizations adopt a culture of their own that attracts individuals with unique personalities and attitudes that may be different than those outside the organization. From this point of view, the military is no different than any other organization. In fact, those in Huntington's corner would argue that this is a necessary condition for military effectiveness. Huntington argued that it is important that the military does not fall into society's liberal and individualistic trends. However, insofar as one believes that the military should be a microcosm of the society it serves and protects, as Janowitz did, these differences may bring cause for alarm. Perhaps the most glaring differences are in the political attitudes of youth with propensity during the post-9/11 era.

Differences in political attitudes between the military and society could signify differences in values, which could ultimately lead to a lack of trust between the two. Trust is an essential element for civil-military relations (Dempsey 2010). Indeed, trust is a mutual relationship between the military and the American people. It is a trust that the military has in its civilian leaders to provide the necessary resources and clear strategic objectives to carry out its assigned missions. It is also a trust that society and civilian leadership have in the military to remain the most effective and efficient fighting force in the world while remaining grounded with a solid moral and ethical foundation that is firmly rooted in American values, laws, and regulations.

If an appearance of a gap between American values and military values exists, as evidenced by a gap in political attitudes, the impacts to our national security could be harmful. As recently stated in The Army Profession, "Trust is the bedrock of the Army's relationship with the American people…Within the Army Profession, mutual trust is the organizing principle necessary to build cohesive teams...[trust] depends on- trust between Soldiers, trust between Soldiers, their Families, and the Army, and trust between the Army and the American people" (The Army Profession 2015:1). If the military loses trust with the American people or its civilian leadership, it is possible that issues of insubordination could arise or there could be a reduction in the supply of volunteers willing to serve and protect. If the people lose trust in the American military, it is possible that we could have another Vietnam era of chaos and division on our hands. The military has done well digging itself out from the trenches during the days of Vietnam,

regaining its prestige and status as one of the most trusted institutions in government (Pew 2011). It is essential to maintain this element of trust between the armed forces and society. If one political party is viewed as considerably more pro-military than the other, trust between the military and the government could possibly crumble when that party does not represent the Commander-in-Chief.

The fact that the military may be becoming increasingly politically polarizing is especially troubling during a time of war. Ideally, the entire country should be engaged and shouldering the burdens of war, regardless of political affiliation or beliefs. Carl Von Clausewitz's "trinity" of relationships (i.e. the military, government, and society) does not imply that each leg of the triad operates autonomously without overlap of goals, ideas, and values. Quite the contrary, attitudes and values should intersect among the various groups of the triad to achieve balance and to successfully accomplish its military and political goals during war to protect society. A military that is separate and distinct in attitudes and values from the society and government it serves could create issues with military effectiveness- certainly not an ideal situation during wartime. Does Clausewitz's famous phrase, "war is merely the continuation of politics by other means," necessarily mean that those who fight for political objectives should be politically polarized (Clausewitz 1976:87)? Shouldn't war transcend political partisanship for the greater good of the entire country? Does "Bush's War" or "Obama's War" really insinuate that only those similar in political views should carry out that war? Shouldn't the Commander-in-Chief and our entire political

apparatus unite under a common cause to accomplish its political and military objectives as one indivisible nation- united we stand?

Questions such as these have caused some to argue for the reinstatement of a draft during the post-9/11 era. After all, one of the primary purposes of imposing a draft during earlier wars was to equalize the burdens of war throughout all of society and unite the country under a common purpose, regardless of race, class, or politics. That wasn't necessarily always the case, such as during the Vietnam War, but that was certainly one of the intentions of conscription (Armor 1996). Indeed, the prolonged nature of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars caused some senior military leaders to call upon the President to initiate the draft. Most notably, former U.S. and International Security Assistance Force Commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, recently broke ranks to argue for reinstating the draft. McChrystal remarked at the Aspen Ideas Festival, "I think if a nation goes to war, every town, every city needs to be at risk" (Ricks 2012). This is the first time in years that a senior military officer has argued that the All-Volunteer Force may not necessarily be good for the country or the military (Ricks 2012). McChrystal offered the following reasons for reinstating the draft: 1) "the draft prevents the military from being unrepresentative of the population;" 2) the burden of war should be felt broadly across society;" and 3) "the all-volunteer military divorces public opinion about war from its human costs, and- as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown- too great a burden is placed on a small group of service members, doomed to multiple combat tours" (Hatfield 2013). Since then, Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin

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Dempsey, and former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno, have also spoken about the potential need to return to the draft.

Is the military becoming a warrior-class with its own distinctive values and attitudes? Anecdotally, many believe that the military has become more separated from the society it serves after a decade and a half of war. An article highlighting the tenth anniversary of 9/11 captured these sentiments:

> "The U.S. Army now begins its 10th continuous year in combat, the first time in its history the United States has excused the vast majority of its citizens from service and engaged in a major, decade-long conflict instead with an Army manned entirely by professional warriors. This is an Army that, under the pressure of combat, has turned inward, leaving civilian America behind, reduced to the role of a well-wishing but impatient spectator. A decade of fighting has hardened soldiers in ways that civilians can't share. America respects its warriors, but from a distance. 'They don't know what we do,' said Col. Dan Williams, who commands an Army aviation brigade in Afghanistan. The consequences of this unique milestone in American history are many- the rise of a new warrior class, the declining number of Americans in public life with the sobering experience of war, the fading ideal of public service as a civic responsibility. But above all, I think, is a perilous shrinking of common ground, the shared values and knowledge and beliefs that have shaped the way Americans think about war. Without it, how will soldiers and civilians ever see this war and its outcome in the same way" (Wood 2010)?

As we continue to prosecute a war against known and unknown threats with our professional all-volunteer military, it begs the question: What will be the unintended consequences from these wars? Fever and Kohn's assertion (prior to 9/11) that the "gap between the military and society in values, attitudes, opinions, and perspectives presents no compelling need to act to avert an immediate emergency" may, indeed, be outdated (2001:11). My own research supports anecdotal evidence, suggesting that the civil-military gap may have increased

since 9/11. If left unaddressed, this could undermine civil-military cooperation and hamper military effectiveness. As Fever and Kohn warned, "the result might well harm the national security of the United States." I charge researchers to extend the research agenda into the post-9/11 era in similar fashion as Fever and Kohn's (2001) extensive study. My research suggests that the civil-military gap has increased since 9/11 for a few different measures- in political attitudes, job-related attitudes, gender-role attitudes, and diversity- an unintended, yet potentially harmful consequence of the prolonged wars of 9/11 waged by a small population of professional warriors. It is my prediction that this gap will continue to widen as the wars wage on in Afghanistan and Iraq and are fought by the All-Volunteer Force.

Appendix A- Additional Analysis of "High" vs. "Low" Propensity Youth (Men Only)

Table 4.1.1

Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Def Will vs. Def Won't Serve Men Only (N=32352): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Macro-Social Influences										
Casualties	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	1.19**
Unemployment	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***	1.06***	1.27***
Public Support (OIF)	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.01
Individual-Demographic Influences										
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)										
Black		0.98	0.69***	0.73***	0.68***	0.68***	0.67*	0.82	0.57*	0.68***
Hispanic		1.07	0.82**	0.83*	0.86*	0.86	0.86	0.89	0.79	0.86
SES Disadvantage/Advantage										
Father's education (less than HS=ref)										
HS			0.85**	0.93	0.95	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.95
Some college			0.79**	0.99	1.03	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.03
College			0.62***	0.82**	0.88	0.87	0.88	0.87	0.88	0.88
Graduate School			0.51***	0.76**	0.83*	0.82*	0.82*	0.82*	0.83*	0.83*
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)										
HS			0.82*	0.88	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91
Some College			0.85	0.98	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.02	1.01
College			0.74***	0.89	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92	0.91
Graduate School			0.74**	0.95	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.98
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)										
Mother or Female Guardian			1.29***	1.21***	1.21***	1.21***	1.21***	1.21***	1.21***	1.21***
Father or Male Guardian			1.58***	1.36***	1.33***	1.34***	1.34***	1.34***	1.34***	1.34***
None			2.13***	1.80***	1.73***	1.74***	1.74***	1.74***	1.74***	1.74***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)										
2			0.72***	0.74***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***	0.75***
1			0.59***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***	0.61***
None			0.53***	0.57***	0.56***	0.56***	0.56***	0.56***	0.56***	0.56***
Educational Attainment and Goals										
High School G.P.A.				0.75***	0.73***	0.72***	0.72***	0.72***	0.72***	0.72***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)										
College Preparatory				0.64***	0.67***	0.66***	0.66***	0.66***	0.66***	0.66***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.52***	0.55***					

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Table 4.1.1
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Def Will vs. Def Won't Serve Men Only (N=32352): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Additional Controls										
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)										
Country					1.17	1.18	1.18	1.18	1.18	1.18
Small City (<50k)					0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Medium City (50-100k)					0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84	0.84
Suburb of Med City					0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91
Large City (100-500k)					0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.86
Suburb of Large City					0.71**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**
Very Large City (>500k)					0.76*	0.75*	0.75*	0.75*	0.76*	0.76*
Suburb of Very Large City					0.73**	0.72**	0.72**	0.72**	0.72**	0.72**
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)										
North Central					0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00
South					1.55***	1.57***	1.57***	1.57***	1.57***	1.57***
West					1.12	1.14	1.14	1.14	1.14	1.14
Race/Macro Interactions (White=Ref)										
Public Support (OIF)* Black							1.00			
Public Support (OIF)* Hispanic							1.00			
Casualties* Black								0.96		
Casualties* Hispanic								0.99		
Unemployment* Black									1.03	
Unemployment* Hispanic									1.01	
Macro/Macro Interaction- Casualties*Unemployment										0.96***
Additional Pathways										
4-Year College						0.54***	0.54***	0.54***	0.54***	0.54***
2-Year College						0.94	0.94	0.94	0.94	0.95
Vocational/Technical School						0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91	0.91
N	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352
R^2	0.0045	0.0045	0.0304	0.0618	0.0698	0.0701	0.0702	0.0703	0.0702	0.0709
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 32352 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

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Figure 4.1.1- Average Propensity to Serve by Year
Definitely Will Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 4.2.1- Average Propensity to Serve by Year
Definitely Will Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Table 7.2.1
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces ("Definitely Will" vs. "Definitely Won't") by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences during post 9/11 era: Men Only (N=32352): Odds Ratios

|	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	0.99	0.99	1	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Casualties	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.94***	0.94***	0.94***
Unemployment	1.05***	1.05***	1.05***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***
Social-Psychological Influences							
Political Party (Republican=Ref)							
Independent	0.65***	0.64***	0.63***	0.59***	0.61***	0.62***	0.60***
Democratic	0.42***	0.40***	0.40***	0.40***	0.42***	0.42***	0.38***
No Preference/Other/Don't Know	0.67***	0.65***	0.58***	0.50***	0.52***	0.52***	0.52***
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		1.25***	0.87*	0.91	0.86*	0.86*	0.52**
Hispanic		1.22**	0.95	0.97	0.99	0.99	0.94
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Fathers' education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.83**	0.91	0.93	0.93	0.92
Some college			0.77***	0.95	0.99	0.99	0.98
College			0.59****	0.78***	0.83*	0.83*	0.83*
Graduate School			0.49***	0.72***	0.79**	0.78**	0.78**
Mothers' education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.81**	0.87	0.90	0.90	0.90
Some College			0.83*	0.97	1.00	1.00	0.99
College			0.73***	0.87	0.90	0.90	0.90
Graduate School			0.74**	0.96	1.00	0.99	1.00
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.35***	1.27***	1.26***	1.26***	1.26***
Father or Male Guardian			1.62***	1.40***	1.37***	1.37***	1.38***
None			2.18***	1.84***	1.79***	1.79***	1.80***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.74***	0.76***	0.76***	0.76***	0.76***
1			0.60***	0.63***	0.62***	0.63***	0.63***
None			0.55***	0.58***	0.57***	0.57***	0.57***
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A (cont)				0.73***	0.71***	0.70***	0.71***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.63***	0.65***	0.64***	0.64***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.53***	0.55***	-	-
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.22*	1.22*	1.22*
Small City (<50k)					1.07	1.07	1.08
Medium City (50-100k)					0.90	0.90	0.91
Suburb of Med City					1.00	0.99	1.000
Large City (100-500k)					0.93	0.93	0.93
Suburb of Large City					0.77*	0.76*	0.76*
Very Large City (>500k)					0.84	0.84	0.84
Suburb of Very Large City					0.79	0.79	0.79
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					0.93	0.94	0.93
South					1.41***	1.43***	1.42***
West					1.07	1.08	1.08
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.55***	0.54***
2-Year College						0.87***	0.95
Vocational/Technical School						0.81***	0.92
Political Party/Race Interactions (Republican/White=Ref)							
Independent* Black							2.11*
Independent* Hispanic							1.00
Democratic* Black							1.97**
Democratic* Hispanic							1.42
No Preference/Other/Don't Know* Black							1.59
No Preference/Other/Don't Know* Hispanic							0.97
N	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352
R^2	0.0167	0.0175	0.0439	0.0768	0.0832	0.0834	0.0834
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 32352 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 7.3.1

Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces ("Definitely Will" vs "Definitely Won't" Serve) by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences during post 9/11 era: Men Only (N=32352): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 6
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Casualties	0.95***	0.95***	0.96***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***
Unemployment	1.05***	1.05***	1.06***	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***	1.07***
Social-Psychological Influences							
Political Ideology (Conservative=Ref)							
Moderate	0.71***	0.71***	0.70***	0.68***	0.70***	0.70***	0.69***
Liberal	0.40***	0.40***	0.41***	0.40***	0.43***	0.43***	0.40***
Radical	0.74**	0.74**	0.67***	0.56***	0.59***	0.59***	0.50***
None/Don't Know/Missing	0.69***	0.68***	0.61***	0.50***	0.50***	0.51***	0.47***
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		1.02	0.72***	0.76***	0.71***	0.71***	0.48***
Hispanic		1.15*	0.90	0.92	0.94	0.94	0.84
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Fathers' education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.85*	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.95
Some college			0.79***	0.97	1.01	1.01	1.01
College			0.61***	0.81**	0.86*	0.86*	0.85*
Graduate School			0.51***	0.75**	0.82*	0.81*	0.80*
Mothers' education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.81**	0.87	0.89	0.89	0.89
Some College			0.83*	0.96	0.99	0.99	0.99
College			0.73***	0.87	0.89	0.89	0.89
Graduate School			0.74**	0.94	0.98	0.97	0.97
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.33***	1.24***	1.24***	1.24***	1.25***
Father or Male Guardian			1.62***	1.39***	1.36***	1.36***	1.37***
None			2.16***	1.80***	1.74***	1.74***	1.75***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.73***	0.76***	0.76***	0.76***	0.76***
1			0.60***	0.63***	0.62***	0.62***	0.62***
None			0.55***	0.59***	0.58***	0.58***	0.58***
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A (cont)				0.73***	0.71***	0.70***	0.70***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.63***	0.65***	0.64***	0.64***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.52***	0.54***		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.22*	1.22*	1.23*
Small City (<50k)					1.06	1.06	1.06
Medium City (50-100k)					0.90	0.90	0.90
Suburb of Med City					0.98	0.97	0.98
Large City (100-500k)					0.92	0.92	0.92
Suburb of Large City					0.75*	0.75*	0.75*
Very Large City (>500k)					0.82	0.82	0.82
Suburb of Very Large City					0.78	0.77	0.78
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					0.93	0.94	0.93
South					1.44***	1.46***	1.45***
West					1.07	1.09	1.08
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.53***	0.53***
2-Year College						0.95	0.95
Vocational/Technical School						0.93	0.93
Political Ideology/Race Interactions (Conservative/White=Ref)							
Moderate* Black							1.28
Moderate* Hispanic							1.07
Liberal* Black							1.85**
Liberal* Hispanic							1.14
Radical* Black							2.87**
Radical* Hispanic							1.68
None/Don't Know/Missing* Black							1.71**
None/Don't Know/Missing* Hispanic							1.20
N	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352
R^2	0.0153	0.0155	0.041	0.0745	0.0813	0.0815	0.0824
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 32352 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 7.4.1

Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces ("Definitely Will" vs "Definitely Won't" Serve) by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences during post 9/11 era: Men Only (N=32352): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Macro-Social Influences								
Public Support (OIF)	0.99	0.99	1	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Casualties	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.95***	0.94***	0.94***	0.94***
Unemployment	1.05***	1.05***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***	1.06***
Social-Psychological Influences								
Political Party (Republican=Ref)								
Independent	0.76***	0.75***	0.74***	0.71***	0.73***	0.73***	0.70***	0.74***
Democratic	0.54***	0.51***	0.50***	0.50***	0.52***	0.52***	0.47***	0.53***
No Preference/Other/Don't Know	0.75***	0.73***	0.67***	0.63***	0.64***	0.65***	0.65***	0.66***
Political Ideology (Conservative=Ref)								
Moderate	0.84**	0.84**	0.83**	0.81***	0.83***	0.83***	0.83**	0.82**
Liberal	0.56***	0.57***	0.58***	0.58***	0.59***	0.59***	0.60***	0.57***
Radical	0.92	0.92	0.86	0.72**	0.74**	0.74**	0.75*	0.65**
None/Don't Know/Missing	0.83**	0.83**	0.77***	0.64***	0.64***	0.64***	0.65***	0.62***
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)								
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)								
Black		1.20**	0.85*	0.89	0.84*	0.84*	0.54**	0.65**
Hispanic		1.23**	0.97	0.99	1.01	1.01	0.99	0.98
SES Disadvantage/Advantage								
Fathers' education (less than HS=ref)								
HS			0.83**	0.92	0.94	0.93	0.93	0.93
Some college			0.77***	0.95	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.99
College			0.59***	0.78***	0.83*	0.83*	0.83*	0.83*
Graduate School			0.49***	0.73***	0.79**	0.78**	0.78**	0.78**
Mothers' education (less than HS=ref)								
HS			0.81**	0.87	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.89
Some College			0.83*	0.95	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
College			0.72***	0.86	0.89	0.89	0.89	0.88
Graduate School			0.75**	0.95	0.99	0.98	0.99	0.98
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)								
Mother or Female Guardian			1.36***	1.27***	1.27***	1.27***	1.27***	1.27***
Father or Male Guardian			1.63***	1.40***	1.37***	1.38***	1.38***	1.38***
None			2.18***	1.83***	1.77***	1.78***	1.79***	1.77***
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)								
2			0.74***	0.76***	0.76***	0.76***	0.76***	0.76***
1			0.61***	0.64***	0.63***	0.63***	0.63***	0.63***
None			0.55***	0.59***	0.58***	0.58***	0.58***	0.58***
Educational Attainment and Goals								
High School G.P.A (cont)				0.72***	0.70***	0.69***	0.69***	0.69***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)								
College Preparatory				0.62***	0.63***	0.63***	0.63***	0.63***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.52***	0.58***			
Additional Controls								
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)								
Country					1.23*	1.23*	1.24*	1.24*
Small City (<50k)					1.09	1.09	1.09	1.09
Medium City (50-100k)					0.92	0.92	0.92	0.92
Suburb of Med City					1.01	1.01	1.01	1.01
Large City (100-500k)					0.95	0.94	0.94	0.95
Suburb of Large City					0.77*	0.77*	0.77*	0.77*
Very Large City (>500k)					0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85
Suburb of Very Large City					0.81	0.80	0.80	0.80
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)								
North Central					0.91	0.92	0.92	0.92
South					1.39***	1.40***	1.40***	1.40***
West					1.05	1.06	1.06	1.06
Additional Pathways								
4-Year College						0.54***	0.53***	0.53***
2-Year College						0.95	0.95	0.95
Vocational/Technical School						0.93	0.93	0.93
Political Party/Race Interactions (Republican/White=Ref)								
Independent* Black							2.02*	
Independent* Hispanic							0.99	
Democratic* Black							1.81*	
Democratic* Hispanic							1.31	
No Preference/Other/Don't Know* Black							1.52	
No Preference/Other/Don't Know* Hispanic							0.93	
Political Ideology/Race Interactions (Conservative/White=Ref)								
Moderate* Black								1.14
Moderate* Hispanic								1.46
Liberal* Black								2.28*
Liberal* Hispanic								1.40
Radical* Black								1.02
Radical* Hispanic								0.99
None/Don't Know/Missing* Black								1.51
None/Don't Know/Missing* Hispanic								1.05
N	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352	32352
R^2	0.0199	0.0206	0.0467	0.0805	0.0867	0.0869	0.0875	0.0873
Prob > chi^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 32352 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 7.6.1

Political Party Affiliation (1=Rep; 2=Ind; 3=Dem) of Youth by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only With High Propensity to Serve (N=4362)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.02*	-0.02*	-0.02**
Casualties	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.03**
Unemployment	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.04**
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	1.03***	0.98***	0.98***
Hispanic	0.61***	0.56***	0.51***
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Fathers' education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.04	-0.05
Some college		-0.07	-0.08
College		-0.20**	-0.20**
Graduate School		-0.13	-0.14
Mothers' education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.07	-0.06
Some College		-0.02	-0.01
College		-0.01	0.00
Graduate School		0.02	0.04
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.10*	0.10*
Father or Male Guardian		0.20**	0.20**
None		0.21**	0.21**
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		0.03	0.03
1		-0.01	-0.01
None		-0.05	-0.05
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A (cont)			-0.04
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.02
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			0.10
Small City (<50k)			0.21**
Medium City (50-100k)			0.16
Suburb of Med City			0.13
Large City (100-500k)			0.29**
Suburb of Large City			0.20*
Very Large City (>500k)			0.18
Suburb of Very Large City			0.27*
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.16**
South			-0.21***
West			-0.17**
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.03
2-Year College			0.06
Vocational/Technical School			0.01
CONSTANT	2.12	2.21	2.27
N	1882	1882	1882
R^2	0.1576	0.1730	0.0544
F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 1882 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;

p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 7.8.1
Political Ideology (1=Cons; 2=Mod; 3=Lib) of Youth by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: Men With High Propensity (N=4563)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	0.01	0.01	0.01
Casualties	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Unemployment	-0.01	-0.01	0.00
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	0.26***	0.23***	0.20***
Hispanic	0.37***	0.35***	0.31***
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.07	0.07
Some college		0.01	0.02
College		-0.01	-0.01
Graduate School		0.02	0.03
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.05	-0.04
Some College		-0.03	-0.02
College		-0.08	-0.07
Graduate School		-0.02	-0.02
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.07	0.06
Father or Male Guardian		0.18**	0.17**
None		0.00	0.01
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		0.01	0.03
1		-0.02	-0.01
None		0.10	0.10
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.02
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.04
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			-0.02
Small City (<50k)			0.13
Medium City (50-100k)			0.12
Suburb of Med City			0.08
Large City (100-500k)			0.26**
Suburb of Large City			0.10
Very Large City (>500k)			0.10
Suburb of Very Large City			0.00
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.06
South			-0.07
West			-0.15*
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.01
2-Year College			0.04
Vocational/Technical School			-0.02
CONSTANT	1.64	1.65	1.66
N	1955	1955	1955
R^2	0.0276	0.0371	0.0515
Prob > F	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 4362 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;

p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 8.4.1
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces ("Definitely Will" vs "Definitely Won't" Serve) by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=5130): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	1.05	1.05	1.07	1.06	1.05	1.05	1.05
Casualties	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99
Unemployment	1.09*	1.09*	1.09*	1.09*	1.09*	1.09*	1.09*
Social-Psychological Influences							
Institutional/Occupational Index (> numbers indicate Occupational)	0.98+	0.98*	0.97**	0.96***	0.95***	0.95***	0.96**
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		1.01	0.72	0.71*	0.63**	0.63**	0.67
Hispanic		1.10	0.79	0.8	0.78	0.79	3.16
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.77	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.85
Some college			0.76	0.95	0.98	1.00	0.99
College			0.59**	0.79	0.83	0.83	0.83
Graduate School			0.39***	0.63	0.68	0.67	0.67
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.83	0.88	0.93	0.93	0.93
Some College			0.94	1.09	1.15	1.15	1.15
College			0.78	0.95	1.01	1.01	1.01
Graduate School			0.53*	0.69	0.73	0.73	0.72
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.04	1.00	1.01	1.01	1.00
Father or Male Guardian			1.22	1.09	1.08	1.09	1.08
None			2.26***	2.00**	1.94**	1.96**	1.94**
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.67**	0.67**	0.67**	0.67**	0.67**
1			0.58***	0.58***	0.57***	0.56***	0.56***
None			0.54*	0.56*	0.55*	0.55*	0.55*
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.81*	0.78**	0.77**	0.77**
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.51***	0.52***	0.51***	0.51***
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.55***	0.57***		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.14	1.14	1.15
Small City (<50k)					0.92	0.93	0.94
Medium City (50-100k)					0.65	0.66	0.66
Suburb of Med City					1.03	1.03	1.04
Large City (100-500k)					0.95	0.96	0.98
Suburb of Large City					0.73	0.73	0.73
Very Large City (>500k)					1.05	1.07	1.08
Suburb of Very Large City					0.75	0.75	0.76
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					1.08	1.08	1.08
South					1.64**	1.66***	1.66***
West					1.10	1.12	1.12
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.57***	0.58***
2-Year College						0.87	0.87
Vocational/Technical School						1.02	1.02
Race/IOIndex Interaction (White=Ref)							
IO Index* Black							1.00
IO Index* Hispanic							0.96
N	5130	5130	5130	5130	5130	5130	5130
R^2	0.0045	0.0046	0.0362	0.0734	0.0829	0.0834	0.0837
Prob>chi^2	0.0103	0.0358	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 5130 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

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	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
Casualties	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Unemployment	-0.01	0.01	0.01
Military Propensity-Def Will Serve (Definitely Won't Serve=Ref)	-0.11**	-0.12**	-0.14**
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black		0.49***	.48***
Hispanic		0.26***	.24***
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.02	0.02
Some college		-0.03	-0.03
College		-0.05	-0.04
Graduate School		-0.04	-0.02
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.11	-0.10
Some College		-0.16*	-0.14*
College		-0.16**	-0.14*
Graduate School		-0.28***	-0.26***
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.00	-0.01
Father or Male Guardian		0.00	-0.01
None		0.00	-0.02
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		-0.01	0.00
1		0.07*	0.07*
None		0.06	0.06
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.06**
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.04
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			0.03
Small City (<50k)			0.04
Medium City (50-100k)			0.08
Suburb of Med City			0.01
Large City (100-500k)			0.08
Suburb of Large City			-0.03
Very Large City (>500k)			-0.02
Suburb of Very Large City			0.02
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.11**
South			-0.11**
West			-0.06
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.03
2-Year College			-0.02
Vocational/Technical School			0.04
CONSTANT	3.12	3.15	3.35
N	4916	4916	4916
R^2	0.0020	0.0416	0.0476
Prob > F	0.0424	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 4916 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 8.9.1
Institutional/Occupational Orientations of Youth by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences
During Post-9/11 Era: Men With High Propensity (N=427)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.20	-0.24	-0.23
Casualties	-0.17	-0.21	-0.23+
Unemployment	-0.08	-0.11	-0.11
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	0.68	0.65	0.09
Hispanic	-0.38	-0.26	-0.69
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-1.09	-1.28
Some college		-1.17	-1.46*
College		-1.92**	-2.16**
Graduate School		-2.19*	-2.39*
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.41	0.36
Some College		1.09	1.04
College		1.51	1.46
Graduate School		0.93	0.91
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		-0.55	-0.60
Father or Male Guardian		-0.67	-0.71
None		-0.55	-0.59
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		-0.72	-0.72
1		-0.07	-0.21
None		-0.48	-0.45
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.20
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.19
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			-0.47
Small City (<50k)			-0.06
Medium City (50-100k)			0.61
Suburb of Med City			0.47
Large City (100-500k)			0.59
Suburb of Large City			0.50
Very Large City (>500k)			-0.54
Suburb of Very Large City			-1.23
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.07
South			0.62
West			0.25
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			0.94*
2-Year College			-0.67
Vocational/Technical School			0.66
CONSTANT	33.20	34.50	8.96
N	427	427	427
R^2	0.009	0.0434	0.0770
Prob>F	0.5786	0.4933	0.5821

Note: N= 427 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

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Table 8.11.1
Youth Life Goal of Having Lots of Money by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: Men With High Propensity to Serve (N=461)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
Casualties	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
Unemployment	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	0.57***	0.53***	0.54***
Hispanic	0.35*	0.34*	0.26
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.13	0.13
Some college		0.01	0.02
College		-0.04	-0.03
Graduate School		0.02	0.00
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.14	-0.16
Some College		-0.23	-0.23
College		-0.20	-0.21
Graduate School		-0.30	-0.25
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		-0.03	-0.04
Father or Male Guardian		0.16	0.15
None		-0.09	-0.09
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		-0.05	-0.05
1		0.04	0.02
None		0.32	0.33
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.09
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.00
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			-0.04
Small City (<50k)			-0.04
Medium City (50-100k)			0.00
Suburb of Med City			0.02
Large City (100-500k)			-0.11
Suburb of Large City			0.00
Very Large City (>500k)			0.37
Suburb of Very Large City			-0.06
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.20
South			-0.17
West			-0.14
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			-0.05
2-Year College			0.03
Vocational/Technical School			0.02
CONSTANT	3.05	3.17	3.60
N	461	461	461
R^2	0.0503	0.0206	0.0937
Prob > F	0.0003	0.0720	0.1558

Note: N= 461 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;

p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

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Figure 8.1.1- I/O Orientations of Youth Toward Work
Definitely Will Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 8.2.1- I/O Orientations of Youth Toward Work
Definitely Will Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)


Source: Monitoring the Future

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Figure 8.2.2- I/O Orientations of Youth Toward Work
Definitely Will Not Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 8.2.3- I/O Orientations of Youth Toward Work
Definitely Will Not Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 8.4.1- Life Goal of Having Lots of Money
Definitely Will Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Table 9.3.1
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces ("Definitely Will" vs. "Definitely Won't")
by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=5341): Odds Ratios

|	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	1.00	1.00	1.01	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Casualties	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
Unemployment	1.07	1.07	1.08*	1.08*	1.08*	1.08*	1.08*
Social-Psychological Influences							
Gender Roles Index (> number indicates more Liberal)	0.97***	0.97***	0.97***	0.97**	0.98**	0.97**	0.98*
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		1.39*	1.01	1.03	0.95	0.95	0.46
Hispanic		1.30	0.97	0.94	0.89	0.88	3.98
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.64**	0.70*	0.71*	0.71*	0.72*
Some college			0.70*	0.85	0.86	0.85	0.86
College			0.51***	0.67*	0.70*	0.70*	0.71*
Graduate School			0.43***	0.61*	0.65*	0.65*	0.66*
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			1.06	1.08	1.11	1.11	1.11
Some College			0.91	0.96	0.99	0.99	0.99
College			0.69	0.76	0.78	0.78	0.79
Graduate School			0.87	1.01	1.05	1.05	1.05
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.19	1.12	1.11	1.10	1.10
Father or Male Guardian			1.71**	1.50*	1.48*	1.49*	1.49*
None			1.90***	1.59*	1.60*	1.61*	1.61*
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.74*	0.77*	0.77*	0.77*	0.76*
1			0.63***	0.66***	0.66***	0.66***	0.66***
None			0.36***	0.39***	0.39***	0.39***	0.39***
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.70***	0.67***	0.68***	0.68***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.76**	0.79*	0.79*	0.79*
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.59***	0.62***		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.20	1.21	1.20
Small City (<50k)					0.95	0.94	0.93
Medium City (50-100k)					0.95	0.94	0.94
Suburb of Med City					0.95	0.95	0.94
Large City (100-500k)					0.88	0.87	0.86
Suburb of Large City					0.76	0.76	0.75
Very Large City (>500k)					1.03	1.02	1.01
Suburb of Very Large City					0.88	0.87	0.86
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					1.05	1.05	1.06
South					1.65***	1.66***	1.67***
West					1.41*	1.41*	1.41*
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.59***	0.59***
2-Year College						1.08	1.09
Vocational/Technical School						0.85	0.85
Race/Sex Roles Index Interaction (White=Ref)							
Sex Roles Index* Black							1.03
Sex Roles Index* Hispanic							0.95
N	5341	5341	5341	5341	5341	5341	5341
R^2	0.0074	0.0096	0.0413	0.0648	0.0726	0.0732	0.0653
Prob > chi2	0.0001	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 5341 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 9.4.1
Gender-Role Attitudes of Youth by Macro-Social and Demographic Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: Men With High Propensity to Serve (N=492)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.14	-0.12	-0.12
Casualties	-0.16	-0.15	-0.16
Unemployment	-0.06	-0.03	-0.05
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	1.75**	1.54*	1.23
Hispanic	-0.28	-0.48	-1.14
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.34	0.27
Some college		-0.93	-1.14
College		-0.26	-0.42
Graduate School		-0.52	-0.72
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-0.48	-0.31
Some College		-0.33	-0.40
College		0.07	0.05
Graduate School		0.41	0.31
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		0.57	0.49
Father or Male Guardian		0.47	0.59
None		-0.06	-0.05
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		-0.08	-0.27
1		-0.03	-0.17
None		-0.01	0.36
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.31
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			-0.17
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			-0.26
Small City (<50k)			0.74
Medium City (50-100k)			0.87
Suburb of Med City			0.33
Large City (100-500k)			1.24
Suburb of Large City			1.41
Very Large City (>500k)			0.37
Suburb of Very Large City			-0.10
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			-0.11
South			0.21
West			0.36
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			1.19
2-Year College			0.67
Vocational/Technical School			-0.73
CONSTANT	28.31	28.22	28.09
N	492	492	492
R^2	0.0165	0.0282	0.0546
Prob>F	0.1515	0.7975	0.8481

Note: N= 492 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;
p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 9.3.1- Gender Role Attitudes of Youth
Definitely Will Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Gender Roles Index- Greater #s Indicate More Support for Gender Equality

Source: Monitoring the Future

Table 10.3.1
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces ("Definitely Will" vs. "Definitely Won't") by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: Men Only (N=5347): Odds Ratios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Macro-Social Influences							
Public Support (OIF)	1.00	1.00	1.01	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98
Casualties	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96
Unemployment	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07
Social-Psychological Influences							
Race Index (> number indicates More Tolerant Orientation Toward Racial Integration)	1.01+	1.01	1.02*	1.02**	1.03***	1.03***	1.02**
Individual/Demographic Influences							
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)							
Black		1.21	0.87	0.89	0.82	0.82	0.27
Hispanic		1.20	0.86	0.83	0.79	0.78	0.45
SES Disadvantage/Advantage							
Father's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			0.60***	0.65**	0.66**	0.66**	0.66**
Some college			0.67*	0.81	0.82	0.81	0.81
College			0.46***	0.60**	0.63**	0.62**	0.63**
Graduate School			0.39***	0.55**	0.58**	0.58**	0.58*
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)							
HS			1.06	1.07	1.11	1.11	1.11
Some College			0.90	0.96	0.99	0.99	0.99
College			0.70	0.77	0.80	0.80	0.80
Graduate School			0.82	0.96	1.00	1.00	1.00
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)							
Mother or Female Guardian			1.09	1.03	1.02	1.02	1.02
Father or Male Guardian			1.77**	1.56*	1.53*	1.54*	1.54*
None			1.87**	1.56*	1.55*	1.56*	1.57*
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)							
2			0.70**	0.73**	0.72**	0.72**	0.72**
1			0.61***	0.65***	0.65***	0.66***	0.65***
None			0.31***	0.33***	0.34***	0.34***	0.34***
Educational Attainment and Goals							
High School G.P.A.				0.70***	0.68***	0.68***	0.68***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)							
College Preparatory				0.79*	0.83	0.82	0.82
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)				0.54***	0.56***		
Additional Controls							
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)							
Country					1.13	1.14	1.15
Small City (<50k)					0.85	0.85	0.86
Medium City (50-100k)					0.81	0.81	0.82
Suburb of Med City					0.85	0.85	0.86
Large City (100-500k)					0.80	0.78	0.80
Suburb of Large City					0.67	0.67	0.67
Very Large City (>500k)					0.93	0.92	0.93
Suburb of Very Large City					0.79	0.78	0.79
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)							
North Central					1.11	1.11	1.12
South					1.72***	1.73***	1.74***
West					1.42*	1.41*	1.41*
Additional Pathways							
4-Year College						0.54***	0.54***
2-Year College						1.07	1.07
Vocational/Technical School						0.83	0.84
*Race Index*Race Interaction (White=Ref)*							
Race Index* Black							1.03
Race Index* Hispanic							1.01
N	5347	5347	5347	5347	5347	5347	5347
R^2	0.0046	0.0054	0.0419	0.0671	0.0757	0.0764	0.0767
Prob > chi2	0.0044	0.0071	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 5347 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004; p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 10.4.1
Racial Integration Attitudes of Youth by Macro-Social and Social-Psychological Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: Men With High Propensity to Serve (N=495)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Macro-Social Influences			
Public Support (OIF)	-0.18	-0.14	-0.10
Casualties	-0.07	-0.04	0.00
Unemployment	0.09	0.15	0.16
Individual/Demographic Influences			
Race/Ethnicity (White=Ref)			
Black	4.23***	4.26***	4.13***
Hispanic	3.71***	3.36**	3.30**
SES Disadvantage/Advantage			
Father's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		0.61	0.79
Some college		0.68	0.69
College		1.75	1.86
Graduate School		2.64	2.47
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)			
HS		-3.20*	-3.39**
Some College		-3.36*	-4.09**
College		-2.70*	-3.60**
Graduate School		-3.26*	-4.05**
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)			
Mother or Female Guardian		1.15	1.05
Father or Male Guardian		1.58	1.51
None		-0.77	-0.33
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)			
2		-0.12	-0.41
1		-0.83	-0.94
None		3.27	3.24
Educational Attainment and Goals			
High School G.P.A.			-0.32
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)			
College Preparatory			0.24
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			
Additional Controls			
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)			
Country			-3.02
Small City (<50k)			0.69
Medium City (50-100k)			1.14
Suburb of Med City			2.04
Large City (100-500k)			-0.88
Suburb of Large City			0.46
Very Large City (>500k)			-1.28
Suburb of Very Large City			0.86
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)			
North Central			0.41
South			0.11
West			-0.22
Additional Pathways			
4-Year College			1.12
2-Year College			-0.59
Vocational/Technical School			-0.22
CONSTANT	38.95	39.99	40.50
N	495	495	495
R^2	0.0601	0.0979	0.1500
Prob>F	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001

Note: N= 495 (2002-2013); Hispanic designation does not occur until after 2004;

p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 10.8.1
Propensity to Serve in the Armed Forces ("Definitely Will" vs. "Definitely Won't") by Macro-Social and Psychological Influences
During Post 9/11 Era: White Men Only (N=4269): Odds Ratios

|	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Macro-Social Influences					
Public Support (OIF)	1.01	1.01	0.99	0.99	0.99
Casualties	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.97	0.97
Unemployment	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06	1.06
Social-Psychological Influences					
Race Index (> number indicates More Tolerant Orientations Toward Racial Integration)	1.01	1.01	1.02*	1.02*	1.02*
Individual/Demographic Influences					
SES Disadvantage/Advantage					
Father's education (less than HS=ref)					
HS		0.52***	0.57**	0.59**	0.59**
Some college		0.58**	0.71	0.72	0.71
College		0.41***	0.53**	0.57**	0.57**
Graduate School		0.34***	0.48**	0.52**	0.52**
Mother's education (less than HS=ref)					
HS		1.00	1.06	1.10	1.11
Some College		0.89	0.99	1.02	1.02
College		0.66	0.75	0.79	0.79
Graduate School		0.73	0.89	0.94	0.93
Family Structure (Both Parents or Guardians=Ref)					
Mother or Female Guardian		1.16	1.10	1.10	1.10
Father or Male Guardian		1.53	1.32	1.29	1.30
None		1.87**	1.52	1.51	1.55
Number of Siblings (3+=Ref)					
2		0.69**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**
1		0.60***	0.64***	0.64***	0.64***
None		0.34***	0.36***	0.37***	0.37***
Educational Attainment and Goals					
High School G.P.A.			0.71***	0.69***	0.69***
HS Curriculum (Other=Ref)					
College Preparatory			0.87	0.93	0.92
Expectation to go to College (No=Ref)			0.54***	0.57***	
Additional Controls					
Where you grew up/live (Farm=Ref)					
Country				1.19	1.20
Small City (<50k)				0.91	0.91
Medium City (50-100k)				1.04	1.05
Suburb of Med City				0.82	0.83
Large City (100-500k)				0.85	0.83
Suburb of Large City				0.68	0.68
Very Large City (>500k)				0.94	0.93
Suburb of Very Large City				0.89	0.88
Region of Country (Northeast=Ref)					
North Central				1.08	1.09
South				1.64**	1.68**
West				1.57*	1.57*
Additional Pathways					
4-Year College					0.52***
2-Year College					1.04
Vocational/Technical School					0.77
Interactions					
*Race Index*4-Year College*					
*Race Index * Father's Education (less than HS=Ref)*					
HS					
Some college					
College					
Graduate School					
N	4269	4269	4269	4269	4269
R^2	0.0028	0.0425	0.0646	0.0739	0.0751
Prob > chi2	0.1253	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000

Note: N= 6722 (2002-2013); p-values calculated using a two-tailed test: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Figure 10.2.1- Race Relations Attitudes of Youth
Definitely Will Enter the Armed Forces, 1976-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

Figure 10.3.1- Race Relations Attitudes of Youth
Definitely Will Enter the Armed Forces, 2002-2013 (Men Only)

Source: Monitoring the Future

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