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# Social Media Use and Political Participation in China: The Mediating Role of Political Efficacy

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Social Media Use and Political Participation in China:  
The Mediating Role of Political Efficacy

by

Bingyang Liu

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirement for the degree of  
Master of Arts  
Zimmerman School of Advertising and Mass Communications  
College of Arts & Sciences  
University of South Florida

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## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is dedicated to all the people who supported and encouraged me during the process of completing my master's degree. In three years, their sincere hearts gave me the power to make me brighter than before.

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## **ABSTRACT**

In the Chinese authoritarian and conservative political system, Chinese political efficacy and political participation are popular directions of research in recent years. Based on uses and gratifications theory and self-efficacy theory, this thesis explored the relationships among social media use, political efficacy, and political participation. The most important part of this study was examining the mediating role of political efficacy between social media use and political participation in mainland China. Internal political efficacy and external political efficacy are two dimensions of political efficacy that were separately examined in this study. The results revealed that internal political efficacy can mediate between social media use and political participation. However, external political efficacy cannot mediate social media use and political participation. The additional findings are related to gender, age, and educational level. Chinese males scored higher on average in social media use, internal political efficacy, and political participation than females. Chinese females measured a higher on external political efficacy score than males. In addition, Chinese young adults have more social media use related to politics than older adults. On the other hand, Chinese older adults have higher internal political efficacy and external political efficacy than younger adults. Furthermore, higher educational level is a strong predictor of political participation.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

#### **Introduction**

With the development of Internet and social media, China has changed gradually in different realms. This is so particularly in the political realm which has become more and more important for scholars to research in China. Social media is a useful platform to engage citizens' participation in political activities in democratic countries and even transitional countries (Zhang & Lin, 2014). In 2016, China had 731 million Internet users, which was an increase of 42.99 million from 2015 (China Internet Watch, 2017; Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, 2017). Due to increasing Internet access, Chinese people have more devices to use the Internet. The mobile phone is the dominant access that Chinese people use the Internet. Mobile Internet users in China were 695 million at the end of 2016 (China Internet Watch, 2017).

Mobile access provides more opportunities to Chinese people to use social media. In 2016, China had 730 million active social media users (Chozan, 2017). For these statistics, social media play an important role in Chinese civic society, especially in political realms. Social media usage changes the information accessed, types of political participation and cyber-citizens' political efficacy (Hill & Hughes, 1999; Zhao & Leung, 2013). Chinese citizens have more opportunities to get political information and knowledge from social media than the era when traditional media was dominant. Through increasing political knowledge, and more political discussions on social media, Chinese people will increase their confidence in political realms,

which influence their political behaviors and participations (Zhang & Lin, 2014). Gil, Jung, and Valenzuela (2012) investigated consuming news on social media influence on political participation such as voting. They found that the people who use social media frequently for news have more active political participation than the people who use less social media. On the other hand, the Chinese government also uses social media to communicate with citizens, such as disseminating policies and perceiving citizens' suggestions (Shao& Wang, 2017). There are 53,546 governmental official accounts on Weibo which is most popular social networking site in China, and more than 32% of citizens got the e-governmental services (Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, 2017).

In past studies, scholars examined the Internet, social media, or social networking sites use influence political participation. However, few researches have investigated the functions of political efficacy between social media use and political participation in the context of Mainland China. Consequently, based on use and gratification theory, social cognitive theory and self-efficacy theory, this research will examine the mediating role of political efficacy between social media use and political participation in Mainland China. In addition, the process of Chinese citizens changing their political behaviors through social media use and change of political efficacy will be analyzed by theoretical and practical explanations. Furthermore, because of special political context in China, social media use about politics, political efficacy and political participation have different implications from western countries. As a result, under the authority of the Chinese Communist Party, the meanings of social media use related to politics will also be analyzed in discussions and implications. These questions will be examined.

## **Background**

### **Chinese Political System and Democratic Process**

According to the Country Review of China (2016), with the decline of the last Chinese Qing Dynasty in 1644, Chinese people gradually realized that China was behind the western countries. The First Opium War that happened between Qing Dynasty and United Kingdom was related to international trade, territorial dispute, and diplomatic relations (Tsang, 2007).

Although Chinese people had awareness during that period, the Chinese government was not aware of the importance of technology and the necessity for transformation. In 1898, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao led the Hundred Days' Reform Movement that attracted many Chinese elites who advocated westernized culture, economy, and political institutions to change traditional China (Fang, 2014). Many Chinese people wanted to reform China during that time. During the Revolution of 1911, most of the provinces broke away from governing Qing Dynasty. In December 1911, Sun Yat-sen became president of the interim government. When the last emperor Pu Yi abdicated, Chinese feudal monarchy political system was replaced with a republic political system led by a president and built by Chinese Nationalist People's Party, which was the real beginning of Modern China and the first step toward democracy in China. After some warlords fought for centralized power, Sun Yat-sen who led the Chinese Nationalist People's Party (CNPP) aligned with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and started to reform the old China (Country Review of China, 2016). Although the CCP and CNPP continued battling for a long time under the table even open hostilities, they made efforts to unite during the Japanese invasion of China between 1937 and 1945.

In 1949, the CCP established the People's Republic of China on the mainland. Due to long term turmoil and wars, China needed to recover in all realms, including economy, politics,

culture, and social institutions. The more important thing is that Chinese people had more democratic power than during the feudal monarchy even though the CCP centralized power to the party, which controlled local communities directly (Country Review of China, 2016). During 1952 to 1956, CCP led citizens in socialist transformation, which means the CCP and citizens tried to eliminate the feudal influence and transform industry, agriculture, and technology. On the other hand, China did not completely change to democratic country. Chinese government just use one party political system replaced monarchy, and still used centralized political system (Zhong, 2007). In 1966, Mao Zedong led the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which led to a dark time for the Chinese people who became radical revolutionaries criticizing capitalism and cultural elites.

At the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, China needed once again a full recovery of development in every area, most importantly in the economy. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping, as the leader, established the reform and opening-up policy that promoted the Chinese economy dramatically. The government opened foreign trade, and encouraged private enterprises and decreased central government control (Country Review of China, 2016). In this period, Chinese people had more freedom than before, and cultural development was getting peak. On the other hand, because the speed of development was so fast, the problems of economic inequality, immigration security, and political elites' corruption led some students to be dissatisfied. In 1989, many people participated in a protest to resist political officers' corruption and seek further reform (Country Review of China, 2016). The government suppressed the Tiananmen pro-democracy movement, in which 86% of the population advocated democratic development (Wang, 2007). Although this protest had some negative influence on government administration, it began the transformation of Chinese people from being conservative and

acquiescent into protesters, which promoted democratic power in China and increased the speed of economic development.

Since the 1990s, successive Chinese governments have not only promoted economy but also developed democratic administrations that explore human rights (Semenov, 2016). For instance, the government liberalized criminal legislation and abolished correctional labor camps. At the same time, the Chinese government tried to include the vote for multi candidate party secretaries, and also involved merchants. Furthermore, the CCP built in feedback mechanisms to increase the transparency of the government (Semenov, 2016). Although China studied from western countries implemented open markets and advance political institutions, it did not completely follow western policies. It still insisted centralized control by one party, which was appropriate for Chinese national condition, including multiple ethnic, unequal economic development and cultural background.

Due to the dramatic development of the economy, China was facing many issues, including national unification, national security, international relations, pollution, education, and especially corruption among government officers (Yeoh, 2015). Corruption is a serious problem blocking Chinese democratic progress in this era. Large-scale administration of government officers' corruption has been an issue from the reform and opening-up policy that was announced in 1978 to now, and the serious administration was after Xi Jinping became president. An Anti-corruption campaign has developed throughout China. The Chinese government has not only punished local low hierarchy officers but has also arrested central highest-level hierarchy officers (Yeoh, 2015). Recently, an anti-corruption television series titled *In the Name of People* was very popular in China. There are many real corruption cases in this television series. The first week when *In the Name of People* was released, the audience rating was the top one in that

month, exceeding the most popular shows. The high-level attention to this program probably means that the public would like to pay attention to political issues, and probably has a passion to participate in politics.

According to Siebert's (1956) authoritarian theory of the press, the government through the mass media especially the press to achieve authoritarian social control. Authoritarian countries have media monopoly and absolute political restraint (Siebert, 1956). China is a country where the press was completely controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, especially in the era of traditional media. The main function of the press is to support government administration and control.

Furthermore, with the development of the four theories of the press, Ostini and Fung (2002) examined the new model of the national media system. The model combines the political system of states (democratic and authoritarian) and journalistic values (liberal and conservative). The specific four dimensions of the model are democratic-liberal, democratic-conservative, authoritarian-liberal, and authoritarian-conservative. Democratic-liberal systems emphasize free speech, which is supported by both the political system and individual journalists. While democratic-conservative systems promote freedom in the political realm, they emphasize more restrictive professional media practices. The journalists who work in this social context should support the current social structure. Authoritarian-conservative systems officially restrain content of all types of media. Journalistic professional values in this system are marked by a lack of freedom of speech. Authoritarian-liberal systems have restrictive political structures, but allow for a high degree of media freedom of expression.

Each of these four systems has a prototypical example country. China belongs to the authoritarian political system and the conservative journalistic value. By contrast the United



States follows the democratic-liberal system. However, other Asian regions do not have the system as China. Japan follows a democratic state system with conservative journalistic values. Although Hong Kong belongs to Mainland China in the political realm and has authoritarian political system, it also has a liberal journalistic value.

Based on this model, it is obvious that China has restraints from both the political system and journalistic value. Authoritarian and conservative characteristics restrain Chinese journalists' reporting. It is important that Chinese political system and social value were influenced by Confucianism. Confucianism as a rationalistic philosophy and ideology has influenced Chinese political, military, social economic and cultural realm (Yao, 2000). It initiated and developed during the Hundred Schools of Thought by Confucius who is a famous philosopher and educator. In Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE), the emperor advocated Confucianism, and it became the official mainstream ideology in that period (Yao, 2000). Although Chinese ideology infused diverse philosophical cultures, Confucianism still kept its significant influence in Chinese society even to now. Confucianism emphasized national unity, patriotic and loyalty to the nation and the emperor, and positive moral value (Fukuyama, 1995). This core values helped ancient dominators centralize power in the central governments, which still influences contemporary China (Jensen, 1997).

However, with the development of social media, the environment of Chinese journalism and political atmosphere are changed. Social media provides more opportunities for Chinese citizens to pay attention to, communicate, and participate in politics, which increases citizens' confidence in the political realm. Unlike traditional media, the characteristics of social media also provide a comfortable environment for citizens to express their own opinion. Although the Chinese government still has the strict supervision and the censorship power on social media,

social media is a significant contributor to the expanding citizens' liberal rights and facilitating political democracy.

### **Development of Internet and social media in China**

In order to understand the development of social media in China, understanding the development of the Internet in China is an essential phase. Back to history, Internet development in China has four phases. First, from 1986 to 1992, Internet was seldom used in researches of computer and sending emails (Yu, Asur, & Huberman, 2011). The second phase was from 1992 to 1995. During this period, the Chinese government set up several major Internet projects, which built the foundation of national network information (Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012). The third phase was from 1995 to 1997, when the Chinese government made efforts to develop IT industry, which brings enormous benefits for China (Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012). The fourth phase is from 1998 to present. Internet became the prevalent powerful medium in Chinese society, which change the predominant position of traditional media, such as television, radio, and newspaper (Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012).

With the development of online media and popularization of mobile access, China has more and more people to use online media through the Internet. According to the Statistical Report on Internet Development in China (2017), China had 731 million Internet users, which is 3.1% points higher than the world average and 7.6 % points higher than the Asian average. The news is the useful way to get information about politics. At the end of 2016 China had 614 million people who read news on the Internet, particularly on mobile devices. 82.2% of mobile Internet users read the news on mobile devices (Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, 2017).

With the development of Internet and influences of western social media, China gradually had its own social media. Different types of social media have different characteristics and users. The first type is blogging platforms. Blogging began in 2005 in China. There were more than 300 million users blogging by the end of 2011. The popular blogging platforms are wordpress.com, blogger.com, posterous.com, blog.sina.com.cn, blog.sohu.com, hi.baidu.com (Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012). The second type of social media is social networking sites. QQ (similar to SSN), RenRen (similar to Facebook), WeChat (similar to WhatsApp) and Douban (the stage of cultural comment and communication) are essential and prevalent social networks in China. Among these Chinese social networking sites, WeChat is most popular and has the highest influence. It was released in 2011. Mobile App of WeChat has the highest rate of usage among social networking sites in China (Gan, 2017). The third type is micro blogging platforms, such as Sina Weibo and Tencent Weibo. Sina Weibo which was launched at 2009, is the most prevalent micro blogging platform. It is similar to Twitter, which can post text, pictures, voice, videos, music, and links. It also has functions such as comment, group discussion and private chat (Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012). Unlike Sina Weibo, Tencent Weibo has no bigger influence in recent years. Sina Weibo predominates the Weibo market in China. Moreover, compared to Sina Weibo, users of Tencent Weibo have lower education level (Ingrid Fischer-Schreiber, 2012).

### **Functions of social media in the political realm in China**

Social media is the most influential factor in the political realms in different countries (Effing, Van Hillegersberg, & Huibers, 2011). It positively associates with citizens' political participation. Social media is an essential contributor of spreading news and relative information.

News exposure is significantly related to political knowledge and discussion on social media influences political participation (Trepte & Schmitt, 2017). Social networking sites among social media are promoting information seeking and discussion about the news. According to the Statistical Report on Internet Development in China (2017), the top three important social networking sites in China are WeChat Moments, Weibo and Qzone. Weibo is the most popular social networking site for news reading and discussion. According to the survey of social media use in 2011, individuals' average usage time on social networking sites is 4.18 per day (Li, 2011). In 2016, social networking sites are more popular platforms used to discuss social issues than news websites and traditional media (Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, 2017). Because of the impact of social media, traditional media have tried to revival the influence that they have lost (Huang, & Lu, 2017). For example, CCTV News launched its official account on Weibo in November 2012. According to a report from CCTV Research and Development Center, CCTV's official Weibo account attracted more than 2.1 million followers at the end of 2015, and the follower is increasing 15 million in this year.

More importantly, social media has gradually changed Chinese political culture and manner in which government communication with citizens (Shao& Wang, 2017). The government uses social media to disseminate policies and connect with citizens. In 2016, Chinese president Xi Jinping stated that the Chinese Communist Party needed to reform its method of communication with citizens from government-oriented to audience-oriented, which combines traditional media and new media. Following the lead of the central government, local e-governments were gradually set up on Weibo and WeChat. Until December 2016, 32.7% of citizens received e-government services, and there were 53,546 account names with the suffix

“gov.cn” (Statistical Report on Internet Development in China, 2017). About 78% of users’ satisfaction level with the government service exceeded medium.

In addition, social media provides more opportunities to citizens to participate in politics in China. First, the basic reality is that Chinese citizens cannot easily get real information from mainstream media (Tai & Sun, 2007). Social media as an alternative resource for users not only provides more possibility of seeking information, but also ensure that users are more independent and able to understand, create, and supervise government activities (Shao& Wang, 2017). Citizens have gradually begun to realize that they have rights and access to express and participate in politics, which creates value to others, even society. This change is extremely important for Chinese people’s participatory democracy. Second, due to social media, Chinese citizens have become grassroots reporters and participate in discussions of public affairs, even politics (Zhou, 2009). Social media provide powerful access for Chinese citizens to engage in grassroots journalism in reporting public events, supervising officials, and participating or organizing discussions on public affairs (Gillmor, 2004). Third, social media promotes regional connections in mainland China that even expands to the global sphere. From the domestic perspective, local government depends on social media to achieve effective cooperation and supervision. From the global perspective, social media not only promotes the national image and international relationships but also increases the connection between domestic people and Chinese diasporas (Shao& Wang, 2017).

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **Uses and Gratifications Theory**


Uses and gratifications theory is the basic theoretical framework in mass communication, which can be used in different types of media. It investigates people's motivation for information seeking and acquisition (Weaver Lariscy, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2011). Back to the origin of uses and gratifications theory, Lazarsfeld's and Stanton's (1942) research focused on the intention of demanding content of media, such as newspaper and radio. Uses and gratifications theory emphasizes people's functions is related to media rather than functions of media to people (Katz, 1959). Katz (1959) also states that individual's interest, values, and social status are essential factors in choosing certain media. For mass media, uses and gratifications theory research that people's cognitions such as emotions, wishes, and motivations influence the behaviors of media consumption (McQuail, 2005). However, with the development of technology and the Internet, uses and gratifications theory expanded the scope of its investigation from the traditional media to new media. Social media as a strong interactivity online media provides more choices and motivations for users (Whiting & Williams, 2013). Social interaction, information seeking, and relaxation are the basic scale of the uses and gratifications approach to measure people's purposes in using social media (Ko et al., 2005).

With research on uses and gratifications theory, in order to explain people's motivations shaping more deeply, study specific realms of information content is necessary especially in

related to news and politics (Vincent & Basil, 1997; Levy, 1977; Blumler & McQuail, 1968). Kaye and Johnson (2002) found that people sought political information to satisfy their motivation and gratifications because they wanted political guidance and supervision. They also found that political interests and intention of supervision are positively related to political information seeking. Chen (2017) utilized uses and gratifications approach to examine the purposes in which Chinese people use WeChat and the relationship between WeChat use and political engagement in China. Although the previous study showed that social network usage was positively associated with seeking entertainment and negatively associated with political engagement, this study found that WeChat usage was positively related to levels of political participation, and promoted the reposting of political news even increasing comment and expression on WeChat (Shah et al., 2001; Chen, 2017).

### **Social Cognitive Theory**

With the development of mass media, it is important to understand human cognition thoughts and behaviors during the process of using media (Bandura, 2001). Social cognitive theory provides a conceptual framework to explain how personal, behavioral and environmental determinants influence each other (Bandura, 1986).



**Figure 1.** Schematization of triadic reciprocal causation in the causal model of social cognitive theory

In the above model of Social Cognitive Theory, personal, environmental, and behavioral determinants influence each other. In political communication, audiences' personalities, political interests, political knowledge, educational background, and media literacy will influence their political behaviors, such as browsing news, seeking political information, and political participation, which changes the local political atmosphere and even the national political environment. On the other hand, political environment can also affect audiences' political behaviors even their political interests and knowledge.

Based on this model of reciprocal causation, Bandura (2001) further explained the mechanisms of governing observational learning. There are four phases of mechanisms of governing observational learning: attentional processes, retention processes, production processes and motivational processes (Bandura, 2001). Utilizing political communication as the example, in the attentional process, when people pay attention to political information, they will keep the information in their mind depending on their cognitive skill, value preferences, bias, and affective elements (Bandura, 2001). In the retention process, people actively dispose political information and match it with the concept and rules in their mind. In the production process, people transform the conception to behaviors, such as paying attention to similar political information, political information seeking and political participation (Bandura, 2001). In the motivational process, people will have motivations to have intentions or realistic actions through different types of incentives: external, vicarious and self-evaluative incentives (Bandura, 2001). In other words, when people see this political information again, they will receive incentives, which can promote motivations for their actions.



## **Self-Efficacy**

In order to investigate political efficacy, self-efficacy of social cognitive theory is important. Bandura (1977) has claimed that self-efficacy is the power that changes individuals' expectations of success. It also refers to people have confidence in their ability to perform some things (Bandura, 1994). It is the significant determinant of behavioral change (Sherer et al., 1982). The level of outcome expectations is the core factor that influences the possibility of success (Bandura, 1977). However, the outcome expectation is not the sole determinant of behavior change. Individuals' success needs to combine expectations, incentives, appropriate knowledge and capability to achieve (Bandura, 1977). Bandura (1997) supplemented some content in the mechanism of behavior change. The individual who has a different level and strength of self-efficacy will bring a different degree of behavior change, and different types of outcome experiences such as physical, social, and self-evaluative experiences will have different realistic outcomes. In other words, if a person has a high level of self-efficacy and positive physical, social experiences and high self-evaluation, this person will be better able to attaining the positive outcome. In the political realm, if people have positive experiences with political knowledge or relative things, they will have high self-evaluation on politics, which leads to positive outcomes from political participation.

Specifically, self-efficacy needs four processes to be activated. The first process is the cognitive process. Cognitions control actions. People use their efficacy and relative thoughts govern behaviors and outcomes. People who have high self-efficacy usually have positive and successful expectations, but people who have low self-efficacy usually have negative and failed perceptions (Bandura, 1994). The second process is motivation process. The level of self-regulations of motivation depends on self-efficacy (Bandura, 1994). Different people have

different levels of self-regulation and motivation. Self-efficacy organizes the motivation through setting goals, the degree of overcoming difficulties, and speed of recovery of facing failures (Bandura, 1994). The third process is the affective process. Affective elements are the emotional master when people adjust their self-efficacy when they face difficulties (Bandura, 1994). The people who have low self-efficacy will also have a lower ability to control emotions. However, the people who have high self-efficacy will also have a higher ability to adjust emotions when they are nervous. The fourth process is the selective process. Self-efficacy influences how people select their behaviors, occupations, environments, and interests (Bandura, 1994). If people have high self-efficacy, they will have more selections and possibility in lives, such as having more interests and higher capabilities.

In conclusion, the high level of self-efficacy can promote human achievement and well-being. It also can provide more power to change their behaviors in order to achieve their goals. In the political realm, people can increase their political knowledge and political experiences to regulate themselves to overcome emotional difficulties while participating in politics.

### **Political Self-Efficacy**

Political self-efficacy is self-efficacy manifested in the context of political communication. Political efficacy is a significant element that can predict democratic participation (Morrell, 2003). In the past, many scholars have investigated political efficacy. According to Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954), political efficacy was defined as “the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change” (p.187). Arens and Watermann (2017) also defined “political efficacy” as referring to individuals believed in their capabilities to actively participate in

specific political activities, such as expressing their positive or negative political opinion and actively encouraging political candidates who they trust. Chao, Yuan, Li, and Yao (2017) also defined political efficacy as individuals' perception of self-ability to influence politics and their cognitions of government or other political systems.

Unlike these general definitions, further studies demonstrate that political efficacy contains two relevant components. These studies combined individuals' capabilities and their attitudes toward governments in two dimensions: internal efficacy and external efficacy (Balch, 1974; Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009). Internal efficacy is the micro level concept. It means someone having both confidence and competence to understand and participate in politics effectively (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990). Internal efficacy also means that individuals think they have the ability to achieve their desired outcomes through using their resources to participate in the political process (Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009). Individuals who have greater confidence in their political knowledge, skill, and abilities will have high internal political efficacy (Sullivan & Riedel, 2001). External efficacy is the macro concept. It refers "to beliefs about the responsiveness of government authorities and institutions to citizen demands" (Niemi et al., 1990, p.1407). If individuals have high external efficacy, they will think that the government is amenable to executing the wishes of their consistency when citizens provide some suggestions.

Some researchers have compared different functions of Internal and external efficacy. Internal efficacy focuses on individuals perceived ability to exert influence, on the other hand, external efficacy concerns individuals' attitudes toward governments whether having ability and awareness to exert influence (Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009). Additionally, Internal efficacy can promote political participation, perceived competence and interest in the

political process. (Abramson & Aldrich, 1982; Finkel, 1985; Kenski, & Jomini, 2004; Pinkleton & Austin, 2001; Cohen, Vigoda & Samorly, 2001; Morrell, 2003). External efficacy can be the indicator that citizens trust political system and institution (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei, 1991).

Moreover, scholars examined the relationship between political knowledge, political information efficacy, and political efficacy. Political knowledge is the extent of one's information that is related to politics in their mind (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). In the democratic society, citizens should have the political knowledge and political competencies to know what happens in the society (Galston, 2001). The citizen who has more abundant political knowledge will be more active in political activities and even encourage other people to engage (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Galston, 2001). Education significantly influences the level of political knowledge (Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Galston, 2001). Additionally, interpersonal discussion, media consumption, and income are also important contributors to political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002). In Reichert's (2016) research, political knowledge can translate into internal political efficacy. Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) also found that knowledge or information is a significant factor in democratic engagement, and it is also the essential element in measuring internal political efficacy. Nevertheless, political efficacy only affects people's intention to participate in conventional political activities, such as voting (Reichert, 2016).

In light of research on internal efficacy in the political realm, political information efficacy is also an important contributor to internal political efficacy. Political information efficacy refers to individuals' degree of confidence about their own political knowledge, which is enough or not enough to cause them to participate in politics (Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007). It was also defined as one's feeling that he or she has enough political knowledge to affect

politics (Weaver, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2011). However, political information efficacy has no the scale that has never been tested. Many scholars just use the scale of political efficacy to measure political information efficacy (Painter, 2011; Weaver Lariscy, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2011; Tedesco, 2011). Consequently, the scale of political information efficacy needs further research in the future.

In western countries, political information efficacy influences citizens' civic engagement attitudes and voting behaviors, especially among young citizens (Kerlinger, & Lee, 2000; McKinney, Spiker, & Kaid, 1998). Young voters show less confidence about their political knowledge than older voters, even influencing decision to vote or not vote (Kaid et al, 2004). Additionally, men's political information efficacy is higher than women (Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007). However, in China, political knowledge tends to affect citizens' intention to participate, information seek, and perception of political efficacy (Zhang & Lin, 2014; Tedesco, 2011).

Political efficacy plays a crucial role in media usage and political communication (Zhao & Leung, 2013). Mass media is a significant contributor to political socialization in China and Taiwan. If people pay more attention to mass media, they will have higher political efficacy than people who pay less attention (Wei & Leung, 1998). More importantly, online exposure to political information is also correlated to political efficacy.

### **Political Participation**

Political participation needs to be analyzed in related to the different cultural background. In western countries, political participation refers to normal citizens who have intentions and actual behaviors that can influence governments' decisions or policy making directly or

indirectly (Bennett & Bennett, 1986). Political participation contains engaging in activities of politics, including paying attention, voting for candidates and donating to political campaigns (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995). According to Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), education, income, and age are three crucial predictors of political participation from the demographic perspective. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman (1995) also developed resources of political participation: time, money and civic skills. In their research, institutional involvements are also defined as direct participating in political activities. Family background and experiences in school can influence intentions and actions of participating in institutional involvements (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995). In addition, the exposure to positive and negative political campaign information significantly influence on political participation (Hyland, 1995). It also shows functions of mass media in political participation. On the other hand, voting and political campaigns influence people's external efficacy in the political realm (Finkel, 1985).

However, in China, because of the different cultural context and political background, political participation has different implications (Xie & Jaeger, 2008). Although China has the legal policy allowing citizens can participate in politics, it has limitations and restrictions imposed by Party monopolized (Guo, 2007). Lieberthal (2004) suggested that, China has no real and meaningful system of political participation like western countries. Before the late 1970s, China was under a totalitarian political governance model and the Communist Party had absolute power to control the Chinese population (Hu, Sun, & Wu, 2015). Mass media was dominated by the state, and freedom of speech, press, and protest. Citizens were engaged in political events not to facilitate their personal participation or expression of opinion, but to promote the image of government propaganda (Hu, Sun, & Wu, 2015). However, with the development of the reform

and opening-up policy, new legislated policy provided more opportunities to Chinese citizens to engage in politics.

However, political participation in China also has some challenges. Citizens do not have enough channels and awareness to fully participate in politics (Zhang& Lin, 2014). The central authority's election has not been opened to the general public area, even candidates of local elections and voters are restrained by the central government and Chinese Communist Party (Shi, 1999; Li, 2001). Additionally, the bureaucratic structure of the Chinese government and officials' corrupt behaviors also block citizens' expression (Shi, 1997). Because officials use their private relationship to treat public affairs and provide opportunities for the people who have a close relationship deal with officials rather than the normal people who indeed need these opportunities.

In the Chinese political context, formal organizations are contributors to political development. Guo (2007) wrote that the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), mass organizations, and civic organizations are three typical forms of formal political organizations. Formal organizations that have official access attract active citizens, and motivate citizens' intentions, internal efficacy, and external efficacy, which promote their civic skills and even political participation (Guo. 2007). Additionally, community activities, grassroots election, and protest also were classified in the mode of political participation in China (Chen, Lu, and Yang, 2007; Shi, 2008; O'Brien, 1996). Shi (1993) also identified some forms of political participation in China in a survey, including expressing opinions to the leader, writing letters to the government and newspapers, attaining help from government officials, suing the government in courts etc.

## **Social Media Use, Political Efficacy, and Political Participation**

In this century, the influence of Internet on political participation is obvious. In democratic, nondemocratic and transformed society, the Internet is valuable access for citizens to communicate with the government to achieve political participation. Internet use and online expression have a direct relationship. The Internet provides a convenient, cheap and anonymous access to users to express their opinions, which brings a safe and comfortable feeling to users (Medaglia & Zhu, 2017).

According to Muir and Oppenheim (2002), political participation on the Internet occurs because people are " more informed about government laws, regulations, policies, and services" with online information (p.175). Internet use and consumption of online political information have a significantly positive relationship with political actions (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; Mossberger & McNeal, 2008). Information seeking is the essential reason to use the Internet (Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000). According to Lee (2006), Internet access is an easy way to communicate with government and engage in political activity, which is part of political participation. In Tedesco's (2011) research, Internet exposure to politics and interactivity on the Web not only promotes individual's political efficacy, but also increases political participation, such as voting and online expression (Shen, Wang, Guo, & Guo, 2009).

Besides, online social networking sites can facilitate civic and political participation (de Zúñiga, Puig-i-Abril, & Rojas, 2009). For instance, Facebook played a significant role during the 2008 presidential election in the USA. On Facebook, citizens communicated their political attitudes and information, advocated candidates, and participated in online discussions (Vitak et al., 2011).



With the development of social media in China, political participation has new implications. According to Gil de Zúñiga, Molyneux, and Zheng (2014), using social media news frequently has an obvious influence on political expression and offline political participation. Although in the Chinese context there is the same amount of free space with western countries, social media also brings more opportunities to Chinese citizens to express and participate in politics (Zhang & Lin, 2014). Zhang and Lin's (2014) research shows that political activities on social networking sites are positively associated with political participation. Weibo is one of the important platforms that engage citizens common and discuss politics in China. The intensity of use of Weibo will increase users' intentions to express opinions about politics and government (Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi, & Jin, 2012). Weibo provides a stage that can allow access to information about politics to users, which give them confidence in understanding current political affairs and participating in political discussions (Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi, & Jin, 2012). According to Chen (2017), the frequency of WeChat usage is the predictor of political participation. For example, people can repost report of news or political information, and they can also share the information with individuals or groups (Bimber, 2001). Elaborate on the relationship between social media use and political behavior – social media has become a dominant communication channel for acquiring, dissemination, responding to information about politics.

In addition, the mediating functions of political efficacy between media use and political participation have been examined. Reichert (2016) had examined the mediating role of internal political efficacy between political knowledge and political participation. Some previous researches showed that political knowledge can increase voting behaviors.... but other researchers found that political knowledge had less influence on other types of political

participation (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Howe, 2006; Milner, 2007; Oesterreich, 2003). In the Reichert's (2016) research, political knowledge did not have a significant influence on political participation. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate political efficacy as mediating variable influencing political behaviors. Reichert's research shows that internal political efficacy has no relationship with voting but internal efficacy plays a mediating role, which cause political knowledge to influence political participation. It is undeniable that political knowledge is positively related to media use, especially social media use (Kenski & Stroud, 2006); Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012). Consequently, internal political efficacy also can be a mediator between social media use and political participation. Additionally, Reichert also examined the intentions of political participation. Intentions are prerequisites of actual behaviors (Ajzen, 2012). Intentions combined with personal interests, political attitudes, and faiths etc (Galston, 2001; Polonsky et al., 2013).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES**

Under Chinese political background, based on uses and gratification theory and social cognitive theory, it is important to research whether social media use promotes political participation or intentions of political participation. There are no specific researchers who focus on examining the sole mediating role of political efficacy between social media use and political participation in China. Therefore, political efficacy as a mediating variable between social media use and political participation should be investigated in the Chinese political background. Especially, in the one party political context, the Chinese Communist Party has absolute authority in all social realms (Zhang & Lin, 2014). The methods of actual political participation are limited. Consequently, researching attitude toward and the behavior of political participation among Chinese citizens is feasible. Moreover, researching the intentions of political participation also can explore Chinese citizens' thoughts about actual political participation, and detect their aspiration to political participation.

#### **Research Questions**

**R1:** What's the relationship between using social media and political efficacy in China?

**R2:** What's the relationship between internal political efficacy and political participation in China?

**R3:** What's the relationship between external political efficacy and political participation in China?

The capital letters represent following phrases.

SMU: social media use

IPE: internal political efficacy

EPE: external political efficacy

PP: political participation

## **Hypotheses**

The first set of hypotheses deals with the relationship between social media use and political efficacy (SMU, IPE, EPE):

**H1:** There is a positive relationship between social media use (SMU) and internal political efficacy (IPE). (SMU → IPE)

**H2:** There is a positive relationship between social media (SMU) use and external political efficacy (EPE). (SMU → EPE)

The second set of hypotheses has to do with the relationship between political efficacy and political participation (IPE, EPE, and PP):


**H3:** There is a positive relationship between internal political efficacy (IPE) and political participation (PP). (IPE → PP)

**H4:** There is a positive relationship between external political efficacy (EPE) and political participation (PP). (EPE → PP)

The third set of hypotheses tests the mediating role of political efficacy:

**H5:** Internal political efficacy (IPE) will mediate the relationship between social media use (SMU) and political participation (PP). (SMU → IPE → PP)

**H6:** External political efficacy (EPE) will mediate the relationship between social media use (SMU) and political participation (PP). (SMU → EPE → PP)



**Figure 2.** The structural equation model that incorporates all above-stated hypotheses

## CHAPTER FOUR

### METHODOLOGY

#### Design & Sample

An online survey was conducted among Chinese adults during October 2017. AskForm (www.askform.cn), an online survey platform in China will be used for data collection. Established in 2001, AskForm serves multinational clients like Bristol-Myers Squibb, Merck, China Unicom and American Marketing Association. The researcher invited participants through popular Chinese social media sites such as Wechat, Sina Weibo, QQ, and Facebook, and members of well-known online communities like bbs.tianya.in, qzone.qq.com, and renren.com. Additionally, except social media platforms, the researcher also recruited Chinese professors, administrators of universities, students, managers of business, and employees of different realms to disseminate questionnaires. The total sample size is 1159. The table 1, table 2, table 3, and table 4 display demographic information of the sample.

**Table 1. Sample Gender.**

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Male	616	53.1	53.1	53.1
Female	543	46.9	46.9	100
Total	1159	100	100	

**Table 2. Sample Age.**

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
18-25	404	34.9	34.9	34.9
26-30	187	16.1	16.1	51.0

**Table 2 (Continued)**

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
31-35	86	7.4	7.4	58.4
36-40	52	4.5	4.5	62.9
41-45	63	5.4	5.4	68.3
46-50	77	6.6	6.6	75.0
51-55	119	10.3	10.3	85.2
56-60	127	11.0	11.0	96.2
60+	44	3.8	3.8	100.0
Total	1159	100.0	100.0	

**Table 3. Sample Province.**

Province	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Shanghai	24	2.1	2.1	2.1
Yunnan	7	0.6	0.6	2.7
Inner Mongolia	9	0.8	0.8	3.5
Beijing	64	5.5	5.5	9.0
Jilin	18	1.6	1.6	10.5
Sichuan	6	0.5	0.5	11.0
Tianjin	8	0.7	0.7	11.7
Anhui	9	0.8	0.8	12.5
Shandong	22	1.9	1.9	14.4
Shanxi	6	0.5	0.5	14.9
Guangdong	55	4.7	4.7	19.7
Guangxi	5	0.4	0.4	20.1
Xinjiang	7	0.6	0.6	20.7
Jiangsu	15	1.3	1.3	22.0
Jiangxi	2	0.2	0.2	22.2
Hebei	18	1.6	1.6	23.7
Henan	8	0.7	0.7	24.4
Zhejiang	15	1.3	1.3	25.7
Hainan	2	0.2	0.2	25.9
Overseas	18	1.6	1.6	27.4
Hubei	5	0.4	0.4	27.9
Hunan	9	0.8	0.8	28.6
Gansu	9	0.8	0.8	29.4
Fujian	15	1.3	1.3	30.7
Guizhou	11	0.9	0.9	31.7
Liaoning	643	55.5	55.5	87.1
Chongqing	8	0.7	0.7	87.8
Shanxi	8	0.7	0.7	88.5
Qinghai	1	0.1	0.1	88.6
Heilongjiang	132	11.4	11.4	100.0
Total	1159	100.0	100.0	

**Table 4. Sample Education Level.**

Valid	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Doctoral	25	2.2	2.2	2.2
Master's	183	15.8	15.8	90.7
Bachelor's	695	60.0	60.0	74.9
College	148	12.8	12.8	14.9
High School	108	9.3	9.3	100.0
Total	1159	100.0	100.0	

### **Survey Instrument**

The survey questionnaire will be designed in English first and then translated to Chinese. Instructions will be presented before the questions, including the informed consent. The questionnaire contains approximately thirty questions, and takes about five to ten minutes to complete. Measures of the key variables are adopted from previously published studies. All measures have shown acceptable reliability and validity.

#### **Social media use about politics**

The ten-item measure Zhang and Lin (2014) used in their study of political information exchange via social media and SNS-based political activities in China will be adopted in the present study. The items will be presented on a five-point frequency scale: never, rarely, sometimes, often, and always.

- (1) I read hard news via social media.
- (2) I repost photos or videos clips on government or politics.
- (3) I upload photos or videos shot by myself on non-recreational latest events.
- (4) I vote online.
- (5) I write blogs on government or politics, such as politics, economics, or international relations.



(6) I join topic discussions of politics via social media.

(7) I post political issues on social media and seek help or discussion.

(8) I express opinions explicitly on government and politics via social media.

(9) I follow and interacted with official Social media accounts of governmental or political institutions.

(10) I organize non-governmental campaigns or activities via social media.

### **Internal political efficacy**

To measure internal political efficacy, this study will use seven Likert-scale (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree) items adopted from Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991) and Amnå, Munck, and Zetterberg (2004).

(1) I know more about politics than most people my age.

(2) When political issues or problems are being discussed, I usually have something to say.

(3) I am able to understand most political issues easily.

(4) I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics.

(5) I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.

(6) I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.

(7) I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people

### **External political efficacy**

Five Likert-scaled (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, or strongly disagree) items will be used to measure external political efficacy. These items are also adopted from Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991) and Amnå, Munck, and Zetterberg (2004).

- (1) I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.
- (2) The government cares a lot about what all of us think about new laws.
- (3) The government is doing its best to find out what people want.
- (4) The powerful leaders in government care very little about the opinions of people.
- (5) When people get together to demand change, the leaders in government listen.

### **Political participation**

Zhang and Lin (2014) drew the distinction among three modes of political participation in China: canonical, contacting/lobbying and CCP (Chinese Communist Party)-initiated. Their results indicated that, perhaps due to the authoritarian and conservative political system in China, participation in the contacting/lobbying and CCP-initiated modes were substantially lower than participation in the canonical mode. This study will therefore focus on the canonical mode of political participation measured by four items on 5-point frequency scale (never, rarely, sometimes, often, or always).

- (1) I discuss politics with friends or colleagues.
- (2) I sign petition letters.
- (3) I join demonstrations that are not organized by party officials.
- (4) I contact official media to cover the event.

## Chapter Five

### Results

Table 5 presents the means and standards deviations of the items used to measure SMU, IPE, EPE, and PP. It also shows the means and standard deviations of the averaged composite measures of these constructs as well as the Cronbach's alphas used to measure the internal consistency of the scales. All Cronbach's alphas were greater than 0.70, indicating the measures achieved acceptable levels of internal consistency.

**Table 5. Descriptive and Reliability Statistics.**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Cronbach's $\alpha$
<b>SMU</b>	1158	1.9511	.71675	.914
smu1	1158	3.3420	1.07239	
sum2	1158	2.0769	1.04611	
smu3	1158	1.8756	.97243	
smu4	1158	2.3903	.96327	
smu5	1158	1.5535	.92976	
smu6	1158	1.7858	.93657	
smu7	1158	1.6114	.87069	
smu8	1158	1.6952	.93773	
smu9	1158	1.7090	.94486	
smu10	1158	1.4715	.86042	
<b>IPE</b>	1158	2.9768	.72357	.900
ipe1	1158	3.0242	.89526	
ipe2	1158	2.8264	.93898	
ipe3	1158	3.1623	.89919	
ipe4	1158	2.8998	.90727	
ipe5	1158	3.2029	.93307	
ipe6	1158	2.7772	.87731	
ipe7	1158	2.9447	.95647	
<b>EPE</b>	1158	3.1838	.61337	.704
epe1	1158	2.9905	.92450	

**Table 5 (Continued)**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Cronbach's $\alpha$
epe2	1158	3.2591	.88894	
epe3	1158	3.3316	.92533	
epe4	1158	3.2159	.95356	
epe5	1158	3.1218	.83352	
<b>PP</b>	1158	1.7651	.66732	.785
pp1	1158	2.6105	.89237	
pp2	1158	1.6339	.89691	
pp3	1158	1.3636	.79537	
pp4	1158	1.4525	.83510	
Valid N (listwise)	1158			

**Measurement Model Results**

Table 6 shows the standardized regression weights of the constructs and their indicators. All regression weights are statistically significant ( $P < .001$ ), indicating acceptable validity of the measurement model.

**Table 6. Measurement Model Results.**

		Standardized regression weight	p
smu10	← SMU	.767	--
smu9	← SMU	.756	***
smu8	← SMU	.821	***
smu7	← SMU	.859	***
smu6	← SMU	.873	***
smu5	← SMU	.828	***
smu4	← SMU	.603	***
smu3	← SMU	.675	***
smu2	← SMU	.698	***
smu1	← SMU	.366	***
ipe1	← IPE	.757	--
ipe2	← IPE	.776	***
ipe3	← IPE	.791	***
ipe4	← IPE	.758	***
ipe5	← IPE	.736	***
ipe6	← IPE	.779	***
ipe7	← IPE	.649	***
epe5	← EPE	.605	--
epe4	← EPE	.291	***

**Table 6 (Continued)**

			Standardized regression weight	p
epe3	←	EPE	.886	***
epe2	←	EPE	.798	***
epe1	←	EPE	.223	***
pp1	←	PP	.417	--
pp2	←	PP	.745	***
pp3	←	PP	.853	***
pp4	←	PP	.820	***

\*\*\* p<0.001,  $X^2 = 2993.34$ ,  $df = 295$ ,  $p = .000$ ;  
GFI = .921; AGFI = .891; NFI = .927; CFI = .941; TLI = .924, RMSEA = .059

### Structure Model Results

Table 7 presents the results of the structural model obtained through SPSS AMOS (version 24.0). An initial question is whether the structural equation analysis estimates for the model provide adequate fit to the data. Although the Chi-square test indicates a lack of model fit ( $X^2 = 2993.34$ ,  $df = 295$ ,  $p = .000$ ), it should be noted that the Chi-square test is sensitive to large sample sizes, like the one employed in the present study. Assessment of the model's fit thus relied on other goodness-of-fit indices. Bryne (2001) suggests that models with GFI, AGFI, and CFI values greater than .90, and a RMSEA less than or equal to .10 be judged as providing a reasonable fit to the data. Similarly, Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend RMSEA values below .06. In this study, all these goodness-of-fit measures (GFI = .921; AGFI = .891; NFI = .927; CFI = .941; TLI = .924, RMSEA = .059) indicate that the model provides acceptable fit to the data. Figure 2 is a pictorial display of the structural model results.


**Table 7. Estimated Standardized Regression Weights**

			Standardized regression weight	p
SMU	→	IPE	.516	***
SMU	→	EPE	.177	***
IPE	→	PP	.401	***
EPE	→	PP	.044	.172

**Table 7 (Continued)**

\*\*\* p < .001

Chi-square = 2993.34, df = 295, p = .000; GFI = .921; AGFI = .891; NFI = .927;  
CFI = .941; TLI = .924, RMSEA = .059



**Figure 3.** Structural Equation Model Results (\*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < 0.01)

### Hypotheses Testing

In this section, hypotheses testing results are presented. H1 states that there is a positive relationship between social media use (SMU) and internal political efficacy (IPE). The hypothesis was supported by the significant and positive regression coefficient from SMU to IPE ( $\beta$  SMU→IPE = 0.516, p < 0.001).

H2 predicts that there is a positive relationship between social media use (SMU) and external political efficacy (EPE). Supporting the hypothesis, results of the SEM analysis showed that the relationship was significant and positive ( $\beta \text{ SMU} \rightarrow \text{EPE} = 0.18, p < 0.001$ ). Together, the results showed that the relationship between SMU and IPE is stronger than that between SMU and EPE.

H3 states that there is a positive relationship between internal political efficacy (IPE) and political participation (PP). Supporting the hypothesis, SEM results showed that the relationship was significant and positive ( $\beta \text{ IPE} \rightarrow \text{PP} = .401, p < 0.001$ ). The results, however, failed to support H4 which predicted a positive relationship between external political efficacy (EPE) and political participation (PP) ( $\beta \text{ EPE} \rightarrow \text{PP} = .044, p = .172$ ).

H5, which posits that internal political efficacy is the mediator between social media use and political participation ( $\text{SMU} \rightarrow \text{IPE} \rightarrow \text{PP}$ ), was supported ( $\beta \text{ SMU} \rightarrow \text{IPE} = 0.516, p < 0.001$ ;  $\beta \text{ IPE} \rightarrow \text{PP} = .401, p < 0.001$ ). H6 predicts that external political efficacy plays a mediating role between social media use and political participation ( $\text{SMU} \rightarrow \text{EPE} \rightarrow \text{PP}$ ). Results showed that, despite the significant path between SMU and EPE ( $\beta \text{ SMU} \rightarrow \text{EPE} = 0.18, p < 0.001$ ), the path between EPE and PP did not attain statistical significance ( $\beta \text{ EPE} \rightarrow \text{PP} = .044, p = .172$ ). Thus H6 was not supported.

### **Additional Findings**

In this section, this study presents some additional analysis pertaining to sample demographics.

## Gender

Table 8 presents the means and standard deviations of SMU for male and female respondents. Results of a one-way analysis of variance (Table 9) showed that male respondents' SMU use (mean = 2.035) was significantly higher than that of female respondents (mean = 1.855) ( $F = 18.499, p = .000$ ). Analysis (Table 10 & 11) showed that male respondents (mean = 3.073) exhibited higher level of IPE than female respondents (mean = 2.867) ( $F = 23.863, p = .000$ ). Conversely, as shown in Table 12 & 13, female respondents (mean = 3.221) exhibited higher EPE than male respondents (mean = 3.150) ( $F = 3.927, p = .048$ ). Finally, Table 14 & 15 show that male respondents showed higher level of PP (mean = 1.8435) than female respondents (mean = 1.6763), and the difference was statistically significant ( $F = 18.367, p = .000$ ).

**Table 8. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: SMU

Gender	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Male	2.0356	.76460	615
Female	1.8554	.64585	543
Total	1.9511	.71675	1158

**Table 9. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: SMU

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	9.362 <sup>a</sup>	1	9.362	18.499	.000	.016
Intercept	4366.147	1	4366.147	8627.338	.000	.882
Gender	9.362	1	9.362	18.499	.000	.016
Error	585.032	1156	.506			
Total	5002.760	1158				
Corrected Total	594.394	1157				

a. R Squared = .016 (Adjusted R Squared = .015)



**Table 10. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: IPE

Gender	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Male	3.0734	.76297	615
Female	2.8674	.65999	543
Total	2.9768	.72357	1158

**Table 11. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: IPE

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	12.238 <sup>a</sup>	1	12.238	23.836	.000	.020
Intercept	10177.876	1	10177.876	19823.911	.000	.945
Gender	12.238	1	12.238	23.836	.000	.020
Error	593.507	1156	.513			
Total	10867.224	1158				
Corrected Total	605.744	1157				

a. R Squared = .020 (Adjusted R Squared = .019)

**Table 12. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: EPE

Gender	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Male	3.1502	.64918	615
Female	3.2217	.56833	543
Total	3.1838	.61337	1158

**Table 13. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: EPE

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	1.474 <sup>a</sup>	1	1.474	3.927	.048	.003
Intercept	11708.857	1	11708.857	31200.514	.000	.964
Gender	1.474	1	1.474	3.927	.048	.003
Error	433.821	1156	.375			
Total	12173.200	1158				
Corrected Total	435.295	1157				

a. R Squared = .003 (Adjusted R Squared = .003)

**Table 14. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: PP

Gender	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Male	1.8435	.71198	615
Female	1.6763	.60124	543
Total	1.7651	.66732	1158

**Table 15. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: PP

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	8.058 <sup>a</sup>	1	8.058	18.367	.000	.016
Intercept	3572.811	1	3572.811	8143.442	.000	.876
Gender	8.058	1	8.058	18.367	.000	.016
Error	507.177	1156	.439			
Total	4123.125	1158				
Corrected Total	515.236	1157				

a. R Squared = .016 (Adjusted R Squared = .015)

**Age**

Table 16 to 27 present values of SMU, IPE, EPE, and PP across age groups as well as tests of differences via ANOVA and post-hoc comparisons with Tukey's HSD procedure. For SMU, the only significant difference was found between age 31-35 (mean = 2.141) and age 56-60 (mean = 1.828) groups. For IPE, the general finding was that older respondents exhibited higher level of IPE than younger respondents. Likewise, older respondents showed higher level of EPE than younger respondents. However, no statistically significant difference in PP was observed across the age groups.

**Table 16. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: SMU

Age	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
18-25	1.9973	.75126	404
26-30	1.9333	.71165	186
31-35	2.1407	.77799	86

**Table 16 (Continued)**

36-40	1.9192	.50412	52
41-45	1.9683	.72575	63
46-50	1.8091	.49423	77
51-55	1.9664	.73638	119
56-60	1.8276	.70595	127
60+	1.8091	.72105	44
Total	1.9511	.71675	1158

**Table 17. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: SMU

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	8.489 <sup>a</sup>	8	1.061	2.081	.035	.014
Intercept	2831.330	1	2831.330	5552.440	.000	.829
Age	8.489	8	1.061	2.081	.035	.014
Error	585.904	1149	.510			
Total	5002.760	1158				
Corrected Total	594.394	1157				

a. R Squared = .014 (Adjusted R Squared = .007)

**Table 18. Multiple Comparisons.**

Dependent Variable: SMU

Tukey HSD

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
18-25	26-30	0.0639	0.06328	0.985	-0.1327	0.2606
	31-35	-0.1434	0.0848	0.752	-0.407	0.1201
	36-40	0.0780	0.10521	0.998	-0.2489	0.405
	41-45	0.0290	0.09673	1.000	-0.2716	0.3296
	46-50	0.1882	0.0888	0.460	-0.0878	0.4641
	51-55	0.0309	0.07448	1.000	-0.2006	0.2624
	56-60	0.1697	0.07265	0.321	-0.056	0.3955
	60+	0.1882	0.11336	0.771	-0.1641	0.5405
	18-25	-0.0639	0.06328	0.985	-0.2606	0.1327
	31-35	-0.2074	0.09312	0.389	-0.4967	0.082

**Table 18 (Continued)**

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
26-30	36-40	0.0141	0.11202	1.000	-0.3340	0.3622
	41-45	-0.0349	0.10409	1.000	-0.3584	0.2886
	46-50	0.1242	0.09677	0.936	-0.1765	0.4250
	51-55	-0.0331	0.08382	1.000	-0.2936	0.2274
	56-60	0.1058	0.0822	0.935	-0.1497	0.3612
	60+	0.1242	0.11971	0.982	-0.2478	0.4963
31-35	18-25	0.1434	0.0848	0.752	-0.1201	0.4070
	26-30	0.2074	0.09312	0.389	-0.082	0.4967
	36-40	0.2215	0.12544	0.705	-0.1684	0.6113
	41-45	0.1724	0.11842	0.875	-0.1956	0.5405
	46-50	0.3316	0.11203	0.076	-0.0166	0.6798
	51-55	0.1743	0.10107	0.731	-0.1398	0.4884
	56-60	.3131*	0.09972	0.045	0.0032	0.6230
	60+	0.3316	0.13236	0.230	-0.0797	0.7429
36-40	18-25	-0.078	0.10521	0.998	-0.4050	0.2489
	26-30	-0.0141	0.11202	1.000	-0.3622	0.3340
	31-35	-0.2215	0.12544	0.705	-0.6113	0.1684
	41-45	-0.0490	0.13379	1.000	-0.4648	0.3668
	46-50	0.1101	0.12817	0.995	-0.2882	0.5085
	51-55	-0.0472	0.11871	1.000	-0.4161	0.3217
	56-60	0.0917	0.11756	0.997	-0.2737	0.4570
	60+	0.1101	0.14627	0.998	-0.3444	0.5647
41-45	18-25	-0.029	0.09673	1.000	-0.3296	0.2716
	26-30	0.0349	0.10409	1.000	-0.2886	0.3584
	31-35	-0.1724	0.11842	0.875	-0.5405	0.1956
	36-40	0.049	0.13379	1.000	-0.3668	0.4648
	46-50	0.1592	0.12131	0.928	-0.2178	0.5362
	51-55	0.0019	0.11126	1.000	-0.3439	0.3476
	56-60	0.1407	0.11004	0.938	-0.2013	0.4827
	60+	0.1592	0.14030	0.969	-0.2768	0.5952
46-50	18-25	-0.1882	0.08880	0.460	-0.4641	0.0878
	26-30	-0.1242	0.09677	0.936	-0.425	0.1765
	31-35	-0.3316	0.11203	0.076	-0.6798	0.0166
	36-40	-0.1101	0.12817	0.995	-0.5085	0.2882
	41-45	-0.1592	0.12131	0.928	-0.5362	0.2178
	51-55	-0.1573	0.10444	0.853	-0.4819	0.1673

**Table 18 (Continued)**

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Lower Bound
46-50	56-60	-0.0185	0.10314	1.000	-0.339	0.3021
	60+	0.0000	0.13495	1.000	-0.4194	0.4194
51-55	18-25	-0.0309	0.07448	1.000	-0.2624	0.2006
	26-30	0.0331	0.08382	1.000	-0.2274	0.2936
	31-35	-0.1743	0.10107	0.731	-0.4884	0.1398
	36-40	0.0472	0.11871	1.000	-0.3217	0.4161
	41-45	-0.0019	0.11126	1.000	-0.3476	0.3439
	46-50	0.1573	0.10444	0.853	-0.1673	0.4819
	56-60	0.1388	0.09111	0.844	-0.1443	0.4220
	60+	0.1573	0.12599	0.945	-0.2343	0.5488
56-60	18-25	-0.1697	0.07265	0.321	-0.3955	0.0560
	26-30	-0.1058	0.08220	0.935	-0.3612	0.1497
	31-35	-.3131*	0.09972	0.045	-0.6230	-0.0032
	36-40	-0.0917	0.11756	0.997	-0.4570	0.2737
	41-45	-0.1407	0.11004	0.938	-0.4827	0.2013
	46-50	0.0185	0.10314	1.000	-0.3021	0.3390
	51-55	-0.1388	0.09111	0.844	-0.4220	0.1443
	60+	0.0185	0.12492	1.000	-0.3697	0.4067
60+	18-25	-0.1882	0.11336	0.771	-0.5405	0.1641
	26-30	-0.1242	0.11971	0.982	-0.4963	0.2478
	31-35	-0.3316	0.13236	0.230	-0.7429	0.0797
	36-40	-0.1101	0.14627	0.998	-0.5647	0.3444
	41-45	-0.1592	0.14030	0.969	-0.5952	0.2768
	46-50	0.0000	0.13495	1.000	-0.4194	0.4194
	51-55	-0.1573	0.12599	0.945	-0.5488	0.2343
	56-60	-0.0185	0.12492	1.000	-0.4067	0.3697

Based on observed means.

The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .510.

\*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

**Table 19. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: IPE

Age	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
18-25	2.8129	0.72314	404
26-30	2.8425	0.73289	186
31-35	3.0598	0.82298	86

**Table 19 (Continued)**

Age	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
36-40	3.0357	0.63754	52
41-45	3.0499	0.66915	63
46-50	3.115	0.67008	77
51-55	3.2269	0.61555	119
56-60	3.1777	0.70164	127
60+	3.2143	0.62650	44
Total	2.9768	0.72357	1158

**Table 20. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects**

Dependent Variable: IPE

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	31.832 <sup>a</sup>	8	3.979	7.966	.000	.053
Intercept	7113.929	1	7113.929	14242.421	.000	.925
Age	31.832	8	3.979	7.966	.000	.053
Error	573.913	1149	.499			
Total	10867.224	1158				
Corrected Total	605.744	1157				

a. R Squared = .053 (Adjusted R Squared = .046)

**Table 21. Multiple Comparisons.**

Dependent Variable: IPE

Tukey HSD

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
18-25	26-30	-0.0296	0.06262	1.000	-0.2242	0.1650
	31-35	-0.2469	0.08393	0.080	-0.5077	0.0140
	36-40	-0.2228	0.10412	0.447	-0.5464	0.1008
	41-45	-0.2369	0.09573	0.245	-0.5345	0.0606
	46-50	-.3021*	0.08788	0.018	-0.5752	-0.0290
	51-55	-.4139*	0.07371	0.000	-0.6430	-0.1849
	56-60	-.3648*	0.07190	0.000	-0.5882	-0.1413
60+	-.4013*	0.11220	0.011	-0.7500	-0.0527	
26-30	18-25	0.0296	0.06262	1.000	-0.1650	0.2242
	31-35	-0.2173	0.09216	0.309	-0.5037	0.0692
	36-40	-0.1932	0.11086	0.720	-0.5377	0.1514

**Table 21 (Continued)**

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
26-30	41-45	-0.2073	0.10302	0.535	-0.5275	0.1128
	46-50	-0.2725	0.09577	0.104	-0.5701	0.0252
	51-55	-.3843*	0.08296	0.000	-0.6422	-0.1265
	56-60	-.3352*	0.08135	0.001	-0.5880	-0.0824
	60+	-.3717*	0.11848	0.046	-0.7399	-0.0035
31-35	18-25	0.2469	0.08393	0.080	-0.0140	0.5077
	26-30	0.2173	0.09216	0.309	-0.0692	0.5037
	36-40	0.0241	0.12415	1.000	-0.3617	0.4099
	41-45	0.0099	0.1172	1.000	-0.3543	0.3741
	46-50	-0.0552	0.11088	1.000	-0.3998	0.2894
	51-55	-0.1671	0.10003	0.765	-0.4779	0.1438
	56-60	-0.1179	0.09870	0.958	-0.4246	0.1888
	60+	-0.1545	0.1310	0.961	-0.5616	0.2526
36-40	18-25	0.2228	0.10412	0.447	-0.1008	0.5464
	26-30	0.1932	0.11086	0.720	-0.1514	0.5377
	31-35	-0.0241	0.12415	1.000	-0.4099	0.3617
	41-45	-0.0142	0.13242	1.000	-0.4257	0.3973
	46-50	-0.0793	0.12686	0.999	-0.4735	0.3149
	51-55	-0.1912	0.11749	0.790	-0.5563	0.1739
	56-60	-0.1420	0.11636	0.952	-0.5036	0.2196
	60+	-0.1786	0.14477	0.949	-0.6285	0.2713
41-45	18-25	0.2369	0.09573	0.245	-0.0606	0.5345
	26-30	0.2073	0.10302	0.535	-0.1128	0.5275
	31-35	-0.0099	0.11720	1.000	-0.3741	0.3543
	36-40	0.0142	0.13242	1.000	-0.3973	0.4257
	46-50	-0.0651	0.12006	1.000	-0.4383	0.3080
	51-55	-0.1770	0.11012	0.801	-0.5192	0.1652
	56-60	-0.1278	0.10891	0.962	-0.4663	0.2106
	60+	-0.1644	0.13885	0.960	-0.5959	0.2671
46-50	18-25	.3021*	0.08788	0.018	0.029	0.5752
	26-30	0.2725	0.09577	0.104	-0.0252	0.5701
	31-35	0.0552	0.11088	1.000	-0.2894	0.3998
	36-40	0.0793	0.12686	0.999	-0.3149	0.4735
	41-45	0.0651	0.12006	1.000	-0.308	0.4383
	51-55	-0.1119	0.10336	0.977	-0.4331	0.2094

**Table 21 (Continued)**

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Lower Bound
46-50	56-60	-0.0627	0.10208	1.000	-0.3799	0.2545
	60+	-0.0993	0.13356	0.998	-0.5143	0.3158
51-55	18-25	.4139*	0.07371	0.000	0.1849	0.6430
	26-30	.3843*	0.08296	0.000	0.1265	0.6422
	31-35	0.1671	0.10003	0.765	-0.1438	0.4779
	36-40	0.1912	0.11749	0.790	-0.1739	0.5563
	41-45	0.1770	0.11012	0.801	-0.1652	0.5192
	46-50	0.1119	0.10336	0.977	-0.2094	0.4331
	56-60	0.0492	0.09017	1.000	-0.2311	0.3294
	60+	0.0126	0.1247	1.000	-0.3749	0.4001
56-60	18-25	.3648*	0.07190	0.000	0.1413	0.5882
	26-30	.3352*	0.08135	0.001	0.0824	0.5880
	31-35	0.1179	0.09870	0.958	-0.1888	0.4246
	36-40	0.1420	0.11636	0.952	-0.2196	0.5036
	41-45	0.1278	0.10891	0.962	-0.2106	0.4663
	46-50	0.0627	0.10208	1.000	-0.2545	0.3799
	51-55	-0.0492	0.09017	1.000	-0.3294	0.2311
	60+	-0.0366	0.12363	1.000	-0.4208	0.3477
60+	18-25	.4013*	0.11220	0.011	0.0527	0.7500
	26-30	.3717*	0.11848	0.046	0.0035	0.7399
	31-35	0.1545	0.1310	0.961	-0.2526	0.5616
	36-40	0.1786	0.14477	0.949	-0.2713	0.6285
	41-45	0.1644	0.13885	0.960	-0.2671	0.5959
	46-50	0.0993	0.13356	0.998	-0.3158	0.5143
	51-55	-0.0126	0.12470	1.000	-0.4001	0.3749
	56-60	0.0366	0.12363	1.000	-0.3477	0.4208

Based on observed means.

The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .499.

\*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

**Table 22. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: EPE

Age	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
18-25	3.1634	.62776	404
26-30	3.0527	.61055	186



**Table 22 (Continued)**

Age	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
31-35	3.0721	.65145	86
36-40	3.1500	.68356	52
41-45	3.1778	.69571	63
46-50	3.2935	.52374	77
51-55	3.3025	.55226	119
56-60	3.2598	.55738	127
60+	3.4591	.49289	44
Total	3.1838	.61337	1158

**Table 23. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: EPE

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	11.174 <sup>a</sup>	8	1.397	3.784	.000	.026
Intercept	7853.592	1	7853.592	21276.425	.000	.949
Age	11.174	8	1.397	3.784	.000	.026
Error	424.121	1149	.369			
Total	12173.200	1158				
Corrected Total	435.295	1157				

a. R Squared = .026 (Adjusted R Squared = .019)

**Table 24. Multiple Comparisons.**

Dependent Variable: EPE

Tukey HSD

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
18-25	26-30	0.111	0.054	0.504	-0.057	0.278
	31-35	0.091	0.072	0.941	-0.133	0.316
	36-40	0.013	0.090	1.000	-0.265	0.292
	41-45	-0.014	0.082	1.000	-0.270	0.241
	46-50	-0.130	0.076	0.733	-0.365	0.105

**Table 24 (Continued)**

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
18-25	51-55	-0.139	0.063	0.409	-0.336	0.058
	56-60	-0.097	0.062	0.826	-0.289	0.096
	60+	-0.296	0.096	0.056	-0.596	0.004
26-30	18-25	-0.111	0.054	0.504	-0.278	0.057
	31-35	-0.019	0.079	1.000	-0.266	0.227
	36-40	-0.097	0.095	0.984	-0.394	0.199
	41-45	-0.125	0.089	0.893	-0.400	0.150
	46-50	-0.241	0.082	0.084	-0.497	0.015
	51-55	-.2498*	0.071	0.014	-0.472	-0.028
	56-60	-0.207	0.070	0.076	-0.425	0.010
60+	-.4064*	0.102	0.002	-0.723	-0.090	
31-35	18-25	-0.091	0.072	0.941	-0.316	0.133
	26-30	0.019	0.079	1.000	-0.227	0.266
	36-40	-0.078	0.107	0.998	-0.410	0.254
	41-45	-0.106	0.101	0.981	-0.419	0.207
	46-50	-0.221	0.095	0.329	-0.518	0.075
	51-55	-0.230	0.086	0.156	-0.498	0.037
	56-60	-0.188	0.085	0.398	-0.451	0.076
60+	-.3870*	0.113	0.018	-0.737	-0.037	
36-40	18-25	-0.013	0.090	1.000	-0.292	0.265
	26-30	0.097	0.095	0.984	-0.199	0.394
	31-35	0.078	0.107	0.998	-0.254	0.410
	41-45	-0.028	0.114	1.000	-0.382	0.326
	46-50	-0.144	0.109	0.927	-0.482	0.195
	51-55	-0.153	0.101	0.851	-0.466	0.161
	56-60	-0.110	0.100	0.975	-0.421	0.201
60+	-0.309	0.124	0.241	-0.696	0.078	
41-45	18-25	0.014	0.082	1.000	-0.241	0.270
	26-30	0.125	0.089	0.893	-0.150	0.400
	31-35	0.106	0.101	0.981	-0.207	0.419
	36-40	0.028	0.114	1.000	-0.326	0.382
	46-50	-0.116	0.103	0.971	-0.437	0.205
	51-55	-0.125	0.095	0.926	-0.419	0.169
	56-60	-0.082	0.094	0.994	-0.373	0.209
60+	-0.281	0.119	0.309	-0.652	0.090	

**Table 24 (Continued)**

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
46-50	18-25	0.130	0.076	0.733	-0.105	0.365
	26-30	0.241	0.082	0.084	-0.015	0.497
	31-35	0.221	0.095	0.329	-0.075	0.518
	36-40	0.144	0.109	0.927	-0.195	0.482
	41-45	0.116	0.103	0.971	-0.205	0.437
	51-55	-0.009	0.089	1.000	-0.285	0.267
	56-60	0.034	0.088	1.000	-0.239	0.306
	60+	-0.166	0.115	0.881	-0.522	0.191
51-55	18-25	0.139	0.063	0.409	-0.058	0.336
	26-30	.2498*	0.071	0.014	0.028	0.472
	31-35	0.230	0.086	0.156	-0.037	0.498
	36-40	0.153	0.101	0.851	-0.161	0.466
	41-45	0.125	0.095	0.926	-0.169	0.419
	46-50	0.009	0.089	1.000	-0.267	0.285
	56-60	0.043	0.078	1.000	-0.198	0.284
	60+	-0.157	0.107	0.873	-0.490	0.177
56-60	18-25	0.097	0.062	0.826	-0.096	0.289
	26-30	0.207	0.070	0.076	-0.010	0.425
	31-35	0.188	0.085	0.398	-0.076	0.451
	36-40	0.110	0.100	0.975	-0.201	0.421
	41-45	0.082	0.094	0.994	-0.209	0.373
	46-50	-0.034	0.088	1.000	-0.306	0.239
	51-55	-0.043	0.078	1.000	-0.284	0.198
	60+	-0.199	0.106	0.631	-0.530	0.131
60+	18-25	0.296	0.096	0.056	-0.004	0.596
	26-30	.4064*	0.102	0.002	0.090	0.723
	31-35	.3870*	0.113	0.018	0.037	0.737
	36-40	0.309	0.124	0.241	-0.078	0.696
	41-45	0.281	0.119	0.309	-0.090	0.652
	46-50	0.166	0.115	0.881	-0.191	0.522
	51-55	0.157	0.107	0.873	-0.177	0.490
	56-60	0.199	0.106	0.631	-0.131	0.530

Based on observed means.

The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .369.

\*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

**Table 25. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: PP

Age	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
18-25	1.7989	.72610	404
26-30	1.7500	.64932	186
31-35	1.9390	.80890	86
36-40	1.7452	.52039	52
41-45	1.7738	.60860	63
46-50	1.7305	.44752	77
51-55	1.7353	.64792	119
56-60	1.6752	.58615	127
60+	1.5909	.65833	44
Total	1.7651	.66732	1158

**Table 26. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: PP

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	5.688 <sup>a</sup>	8	.711	1.603	.119	.011
Intercept	2324.267	1	2324.267	5241.083	.000	.820
Age	5.688	8	.711	1.603	.119	.011
Error	509.548	1149	.443			
Total	4123.125	1158				
Corrected Total	515.236	1157				

a. R Squared = .011 (Adjusted R Squared = .004)

**Table 27. Multiple Comparisons.**

Dependent Variable: PP

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
18-25	26-30	0.049	0.059	0.996	-0.135	0.232
	31-35	-0.140	0.079	0.701	-0.386	0.106
	36-40	0.054	0.098	1.000	-0.251	0.359
	41-45	0.025	0.090	1.000	-0.255	0.305

**Table 27 (Continued)**

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
18-25	46-50	0.068	0.083	0.996	-0.189	0.326
	51-55	0.064	0.069	0.992	-0.152	0.279
	56-60	0.124	0.068	0.665	-0.087	0.334
	60+	0.208	0.106	0.567	-0.121	0.537
26-30	18-25	-0.049	0.059	0.996	-0.232	0.135
	31-35	-0.189	0.087	0.422	-0.459	0.081
	36-40	0.005	0.104	1.000	-0.320	0.329
	41-45	-0.024	0.097	1.000	-0.326	0.278
	46-50	0.020	0.090	1.000	-0.261	0.300
	51-55	0.015	0.078	1.000	-0.228	0.258
	56-60	0.075	0.077	0.988	-0.163	0.313
	60+	0.159	0.112	0.888	-0.188	0.506
31-35	18-25	0.140	0.079	0.701	-0.106	0.386
	26-30	0.189	0.087	0.422	-0.081	0.459
	36-40	0.194	0.117	0.773	-0.170	0.557
	41-45	0.165	0.110	0.858	-0.178	0.508
	46-50	0.208	0.104	0.547	-0.116	0.533
	51-55	0.204	0.094	0.432	-0.089	0.497
	56-60	0.264	0.093	0.106	-0.025	0.553
	60+	0.348	0.123	0.111	-0.036	0.732
36-40	18-25	-0.054	0.098	1.000	-0.359	0.251
	26-30	-0.005	0.104	1.000	-0.329	0.320
	31-35	-0.194	0.117	0.773	-0.557	0.170
	41-45	-0.029	0.125	1.000	-0.416	0.359
	46-50	0.015	0.120	1.000	-0.357	0.386
	51-55	0.010	0.111	1.000	-0.334	0.354
	56-60	0.070	0.110	0.999	-0.271	0.411
	60+	0.154	0.136	0.969	-0.270	0.578
41-45	18-25	-0.025	0.090	1.000	-0.305	0.255
	26-30	0.024	0.097	1.000	-0.278	0.326
	31-35	-0.165	0.110	0.858	-0.508	0.178
	36-40	0.029	0.125	1.000	-0.359	0.416
	46-50	0.043	0.113	1.000	-0.308	0.395
	51-55	0.039	0.104	1.000	-0.284	0.361
	56-60	0.099	0.103	0.989	-0.220	0.418

**Table 27 (Continued)**

(I) Age	(J) Age	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
41-45	60+	0.183	0.131	0.899	-0.224	0.590
46-50	18-25	-0.068	0.083	0.996	-0.326	0.189
	26-30	-0.020	0.090	1.000	-0.300	0.261
	31-35	-0.208	0.104	0.547	-0.533	0.116
	36-40	-0.015	0.120	1.000	-0.386	0.357
	41-45	-0.043	0.113	1.000	-0.395	0.308
	51-55	-0.005	0.097	1.000	-0.308	0.298
	56-60	0.055	0.096	1.000	-0.244	0.354
	60+	0.140	0.126	0.973	-0.252	0.531
51-55	18-25	-0.064	0.069	0.992	-0.279	0.152
	26-30	-0.015	0.078	1.000	-0.258	0.228
	31-35	-0.204	0.094	0.432	-0.497	0.089
	36-40	-0.010	0.111	1.000	-0.354	0.334
	41-45	-0.039	0.104	1.000	-0.361	0.284
	46-50	0.005	0.097	1.000	-0.298	0.308
	56-60	0.060	0.085	0.999	-0.204	0.324
	60+	0.144	0.118	0.950	-0.221	0.510
56-60	18-25	-0.124	0.068	0.665	-0.334	0.087
	26-30	-0.075	0.077	0.988	-0.313	0.163
	31-35	-0.264	0.093	0.106	-0.553	0.025
	36-40	-0.070	0.110	0.999	-0.411	0.271
	41-45	-0.099	0.103	0.989	-0.418	0.220
	46-50	-0.055	0.096	1.000	-0.354	0.244
	51-55	-0.060	0.085	0.999	-0.324	0.204
	60+	0.084	0.116	0.998	-0.278	0.446
60+	18-25	-0.208	0.106	0.567	-0.537	0.121
	26-30	-0.159	0.112	0.888	-0.506	0.188
	31-35	-0.348	0.123	0.111	-0.732	0.036
	36-40	-0.154	0.136	0.969	-0.578	0.270
	41-45	-0.183	0.131	0.899	-0.590	0.224
	46-50	-0.140	0.126	0.973	-0.531	0.252
	51-55	-0.144	0.118	0.950	-0.510	0.221
	56-60	-0.084	0.116	0.998	-0.446	0.278

Based on observed means.

The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .443.

**Table 27 (Continued)**

\*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

**Educational Level**

Results pertaining to SMU, IPE, EPE and PP among respondents at different education levels are presented in Table 28 to 36. Although no significant difference was found in SMU, IPE and EPE across education levels, significant differences were found in PP between college students (mean = 2.980) and those who had attained a bachelor's (mean = 1.977) or a master's degree (mean = 1.928).

**Table 28. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: SMU

Education	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
High School	1.8991	.82332	108
College	1.8865	.69836	148
Bachelor's	1.9767	.71827	695
Master's	1.9280	.65261	182
Doctoral	2.0160	.74927	25
Total	1.9511	.71675	1158

**Table 29. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: SMU

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	1.568 <sup>a</sup>	4	.392	.762	.550	.003
Intercept	1496.627	1	1496.627	2910.823	.000	.716
Education	1.568	4	.392	.762	.550	.003
Error	592.826	1153	.514			
Total	5002.760	1158				
Corrected Total	594.394	1157				

a. R Squared = .003 (Adjusted R Squared = -.001)

**Table 30. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: IPE

Education	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
High School	2.8466	.74056	108
College	2.9797	.67419	148
Bachelor's	2.9772	.70541	695
Master's	3.0463	.80097	182
Doctoral	3.0057	.81804	25
Total	2.9768	.72357	1158

**Table 31. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: IPE

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	2.734 <sup>a</sup>	4	.683	1.307	.266	.005
Intercept	3505.768	1	3505.768	6703.279	.000	.853
Education	2.734	4	.683	1.307	.266	.005
Error	603.011	1153	.523			
Total	10867.224	1158				
Corrected Total	605.744	1157				

a. R Squared = .005 (Adjusted R Squared = .001)

**Table 32. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: EPE

Education	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
High School	3.1500	.52391	108
College	3.1770	.60633	148
Bachelor's	3.1871	.61715	695
Master's	3.1758	.65803	182
Doctoral	3.3360	.59363	25
Total	3.1838	.61337	1158

**Table 33. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: EPE

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	.728 <sup>a</sup>	4	.182	.483	.748	.002
Intercept	4079.938	1	4079.938	10824.966	.000	.904



**Table 33 (Continued)**

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Education	.728	4	.182	.483	.748	.002
Error	434.567	1153	.377			
Total	12173.200	1158				
Corrected Total	435.295	1157				

a. R Squared = .002 (Adjusted R Squared = -.002)

**Table 34. Descriptive Statistics.**

Dependent Variable: PP

Education	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
High School	1.7083	.75156	108
College	1.6166	.57099	148
Bachelor's	1.7921	.69018	695
Master's	1.8242	.60328	182
Doctoral	1.7100	.48240	25
Total	1.7651	.66732	1158

**Table 35. Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.**

Dependent Variable: PP

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	4.831 <sup>a</sup>	4	1.208	2.728	.028	.009
Intercept	1188.930	1	1188.930	2685.784	.000	.700
Education	4.831	4	1.208	2.728	.028	.009
Error	510.405	1153	.443			
Total	4123.125	1158				
Corrected Total	515.236	1157				

a. R Squared = .009 (Adjusted R Squared = .006)

**Table 36. Multiple Comparisons.**

Dependent Variable: PP

Tukey HSD

(I) Education	(J) Education	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
High School	College	0.0918	0.08420	0.812	-0.1383	0.3218

**Table 36 (Continued)**

(I) Education	(J) Education	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
High School	Bachelor's	-0.0838	0.06882	0.741	-0.2718	0.1043
	Master's	-0.1158	0.08082	0.606	-0.3366	0.105
	Doctoral	-0.0017	0.14767	1.000	-0.4051	0.4018
College	High School	-0.0918	0.0842	0.812	-0.3218	0.1383
	Bachelor's	-.1755*	0.06023	0.030	-0.3401	-0.011
	Master's	-.2076*	0.07364	0.039	-0.4088	-0.0064
	Doctoral	-0.0934	0.14387	0.967	-0.4865	0.2996
Bachelor's	High School	0.0838	0.06882	0.741	-0.1043	0.2718
	College	.1755*	0.06023	0.03	0.011	0.3401
	Master's	-0.0321	0.0554	0.978	-0.1834	0.1193
	Doctoral	0.0821	0.13544	0.974	-0.2879	0.4521
Master's	High School	0.1158	0.08082	0.606	-0.105	0.3366
	College	.2076*	0.07364	0.039	0.0064	0.4088
	Bachelor's	0.0321	0.0554	0.978	-0.1193	0.1834
	Doctoral	0.1142	0.14191	0.929	-0.2735	0.5019
Doctoral	High School	0.0017	0.14767	1.000	-0.4018	0.4051
	College	0.0934	0.14387	0.967	-0.2996	0.4865
	Bachelor's	-0.0821	0.13544	0.974	-0.4521	0.2879
	Master's	-0.1142	0.14191	0.929	-0.5019	0.2735

Based on observed means.

The error term is Mean Square(Error) = .443.

\*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

**CHAPTER SIX**  
**DISSCUTION**

This study focused on investigating the relationship between social media use, political efficacy, and political participation in mainland China. In particular, it examines the mediating role of political efficacy between social media use and political participation. The two dimensions of political efficacy measured in this study were internal political efficacy and external political efficacy. These are the two primary dimensions of political efficacy studied by previous scholars examining this research topic (Balch, 1974; Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009).

**Table 37. Summary of Hypotheses Testing.**

<b>Hypothesis</b>	<b>Relationship</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Results</b>
<b>H1</b>	SMU→IPE	Direct Effect	Support
<b>H2</b>	SMU→EPE	Direct Effect	Support
<b>H3</b>	IPE→PP	Direct Effect	Support
<b>H4</b>	EPE→PP	Direct Effect	Not Support
<b>H5</b>	SUM→IPE →PP	Indirect (mediated) Effect	Support
<b>H6</b>	SMU→EPE→PP	Indirect (mediated) Effect	Not Support

For the current study, 1159 Chinese participants responded to the questionnaires via the online survey platform Askform. The research goal was to test the validity of the previously

discussed structural equation model. The first part of the model is  $SMU \rightarrow IPE \rightarrow PP$ , and the second part is  $SMU \rightarrow EPE \rightarrow PP$ . The main findings are presented below.

The first phase was to analyze the process of  $SMU \rightarrow IPE$ . Results indicate SMU directly influences IPE ( $SMU \rightarrow IPE, r = 0.52$ ). This finding suggests that Chinese people who use more social media for political information and engagement have higher internal political efficacy than those who use it less. It is possible that Chinese people who are highly engaged in social media related to political issues think they have enough capability to participate in politics (Caprara, Vecchione, Capanna, & Mebane, 2009; Sullivan & Riedel, 2001).

Based on the scale of political social media use, many factors influence Chinese adults' internal political efficacy. These factors include frequency of reading hard news, posting political videos and photos, voting online, writing blogs about current events, joining political topic discussions, expressing opinions about politics or governments, following official government social media accounts, and interacting with government representatives on social media (Zhang & Lin, 2014).

Based on uses and gratifications theory, individuals' motivations for using social media related to politics are for seeking political information and guidance (Kaye & Johnson, 2002). It is probable that political behaviors, knowledge, discussion, and participation are related to social media use. Based on the literature review, interpersonal discussion and media consumption are significant factors in political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002). Especially, social networking sites use promotes users' knowledge about political campaigns (Gottfried et al., 2016). In order to development of political social media in China, Chinese government officials established more than 53,546 official accounts on Weibo to disseminate political information, policies, and communicate with citizens (Statistical Report on

Internet Development in China, 2017). This situation also provides more opportunities to Chinese citizens to know political information and knowledge. Political knowledge, in turn, is the central influence on individuals' political efficacy and actual political participation (Galston, 2001). Furthermore, various social media outlets provide more freedom to Chinese people to become grassroots reporters to express their opinions about politics (Zhou, 2009). For example, Chinese citizens can comment on recent political events and governmental policies and even report governmental officials' corrupt behaviors. Consequently, social media consumption about politics can promote Chinese adults' internal political efficacy in the current sociopolitical environment.

The second phase of the first part (SMU→IPE→PP) of this study found that IPE directly influenced PP (IPE→PP,  $r = 0.40$ ). The result revealed that internal political efficacy has a positive relationship with political participation. This indicates that Chinese people who have higher internal political efficacy are more likely to engage in politics, which is consistent with other studies (Morrell, 2003; Gastil & Xenos, 2010).

Self-efficacy can increase self-confidence and empowering behaviors, which can help people to achieve their goals (Bandura, 1994; Sherer et al., 1982). In the case of politics, political self-efficacy facilitates confidences in the political realm, including increasing their participation in political activities. Individuals who have high-level self-efficacy tend to have positive expectations of outcomes of behaviors, which motivates his or her actions (Bandura, 1994).

Because the Chinese political environment is authoritarian and conservative (Siebert, 1956), Chinese people generally lack opportunities for political expression and activities. However, the Chinese people who have high internal political efficacy will actively participate in some political activities that are approved by the Chinese government, such as discussing politics

with friends and colleagues, signing petition letters, joining demonstrations, and connecting with official media to report or discuss political events (Zhang & Lin, 2014). Consequently, the Chinese people's internal political efficacy has a positive relationship with political participation.

The third phase of the first part (SMU→IPE→PP) of this study found that SMU directly influenced IPE, and IPE directly influenced PP. Consequently, IPE is the mediated variable between SMU and PP. The result revealed that individuals who use more social media related to politics have high-level internal efficacy, which leads them to participate in politics. Additionally, political knowledge is positively related to social media use (Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012).

Information seeking is the basic reason that people use Internet and social media (Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000). Social media use can increase users' knowledge and the degree of understanding about a specific realm. In China, Wechat use can help users understand political events and motivate them to participate in politics (Chen, 2017). Although, some scholars argue that political knowledge increases voting behavior (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Milner, 2007), political knowledge cannot be proven to directly influence political participation (Reichert, 2016). However, based on the results of previous study, political internal efficacy is a significant mediating variable to motivate people to engage in politics (Reichert, 2016). Thus, the internal political efficacy is the pathway that transits political knowledge to political behaviors. Therefore, internal political efficacy plays mediating role between social media use and political efficacy.

In the first phase of the second part of model (SMU→EPE→PP), SMU directly influenced EPE (SMU→EPE,  $r = 0.18$ ). The result indicated that if Chinese people use more social media related to politics, they will have a higher level external political efficacy than the people who use less. However, the influence of SMU on EPE was weaker than on IPE ( $r = 0.52$ ). This result

is consistent with previous studies indicating online political communication influences internal political efficacy rather than external political efficacy (Lee, 2006).

In addition, the sociopolitical environment of the particular country influences citizens' external efficacy to a large extent. External political efficacy is positively associated with political trust toward government (Hu, Sun, & Wu, 2015). Likewise, positive assessments and attitudes toward government can increase people's political efficacy (Gastil et al., 2008; Gastil & Xenos, 2010). Under the Chinese political system, all types of media are controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This one party political reality restrains Chinese media, such as reducing truth for reporting and shielding sensitive anti-government ideas. In this context, citizens probably do not have enough positive attitudes toward the Chinese government, which leads to low external political efficacy likely due to restrictive governmental control regarding social media content.

In the second phase of the second part of the model, EPE had no significantly direct effect on PP ( $EPE \rightarrow PP$ ,  $r = 0.04$ ,  $sig = 0.172$ ). There was no significant relationship between external political efficacy and political participation. Although EPE and PP have the weak relationship in few studies (Gamson, 1968; Pollock, 1983; Finkel, 1985), this finding of current research corresponds to the previous research literature (Gil de Zúñiga, Diehl, & Ardévol-Abreu, 2017, Green & Shachar., 2000; Dyck & Lascher, 2009; Valentino et al., 2009).

In the third phase of the second part of the model ( $SMU \rightarrow EPE \rightarrow PP$ ), there was insufficient support for the process of  $SMU \rightarrow EPE \rightarrow PP$ .  $SMU \rightarrow EPE$  was supported, but  $EPE \rightarrow PP$  was not supported. Consequently, the EPE did not mediate SMU and PP.

First, based on the statistical results, EPE was almost neutral (Mean = 3.184). Under the Chinese political system, two realities likely cause this result. First, the reform and opening

policy has encouraged an expanding market economy since 1978. Chinese citizens have seen a significant improvement in their standard of living since the reform and opening-up policy. In general, the population has a positive attitude toward government economic policies and actions (Hope, Yang, & Li, 2003). However, many people are dissatisfied with government in other realms, including environmental problems, governmental officials' corruption, and the lack of actual political participation (Tian, 2016). Additionally, citizens cannot easily know the accurate information about government from traditional media outlets (Tai & Sun, 2007). However, social media provides more opportunities for citizens to know and understand political information, governmental affairs, and new policies. Because exposure to government and the Chinese Communist Party on social media has both positive and negative aspects, citizens can understand political issues from multiple perspectives through social media. For example, Chinese citizens acting as grassroots reporters can report on or repost governmental information and monitor governmental officials via social media. They can post the negative reports related to government officials. This trend decentralizes and challenges the control and censorship of central government (Chan, Wu, Hao, Xi, & Jin, 2012). This encourages citizens to critically evaluate government policies and officials rather than accept only positive state-approved perspectives.

Second, under the Chinese political system, citizens have limited access to engage in politics. This social climate leads to low citizens' political participation. Political participation is influenced by Chinese sociopolitical culture and historical factors (Hou, 2011). Confucian culture advocated centralized political system from Qin Dynasty (BC 221) (Bachman, 1993). The emperor and central government controlled all local governments and people. People did not have the right to decide who administrated country or local governments. Although China has



had a democratic revolution from the past to now, Chinese political participation is still limited. Compared to the United States, Chinese citizens have limited accesses to actual political participation.

Non-governmental organizations are important bridges that connect governments and citizens (De Tocqueville, 1850). However, Confucian culture emphasized that citizens should not organize non-governmental political groups (Liang, 2014). Although the current constitution of China protects citizens' right to organize associations, and the CCP also controls the influence of non-government political organizations. On the other hand, Confucian culture continues to have considerable influence on Chinese people's thoughts. Additionally, states of USA can independently administrate. However, the provinces in China need to control by central government (CCP), which is one of the reasons to lead corruption (Lin, 2014).

The additional findings are related to gender, age, and educational level. First, SMU, IPE, and PP statistical means are higher for male respondents than for female respondents. Although gender equality is spreading globally, males generally retain dominant positions in economic and political realms across the world (Mayer & Schmidt, 2004). Most Chinese citizens have the perception that males control the political sphere even though there is a similar degree of gender-based political participation. According to Sangwha (1999), Chinese patriarchy is also a factor in gender inequality in the political realm. Based on the historical and cultural context, traditional Confucian culture continues to dominate Chinese people's societal awareness and values. Confucianism has promoted a dominant male role in both public and private spheres. Both publically and privately, females are expected to obey male authority. Under this system, Chinese females lack the social status and resources to achieve equality (Sangwha, 1999). In the political realm, this dynamic results in a gender gap regarding political participation, which

brings more difficulties for women and reduces their interest in political engagement (Beauregard, 2014).

However, only the EPE statistical mean in the current study is slightly higher for female than the mean of male. In 1978, the reform and opening policy pressured the Chinese Communist Party to address the existing condition of extreme gender inequality (Sangwha, 1999). This development, combined with the need for an increased labor force to improve the Chinese economy, resulted in increased female employment. Chinese females have gradually become more prominent in the political, economic, cultural, and technological realms. In the political realm, Chinese females now have more access to know political knowledge and have more opportunities for civic participation than ever before (Mayer & Schmidt, 2004). Consequently, Chinese females probably owe their public development to government policies. Not surprisingly, most females have a positive attitude toward government.

For age, explaining the comparable findings of different age brackets—only the comparison between 31-35 years old and 56-60 years old is valid for SMU. The mean of 31-35 for SMU is higher than 56-60 (31-35 = 2.1407; 56-60 = 1.8276). In general, the SMU statistical mean for younger adults from 18 to 45 are higher than older adults from 46 to 60 and above. For these results, the age was negatively related to SMU. The older people are, the less SMU will be. According to the social media landscape of China (2016), social media users who are 18 to 35 comprise about 70% of all social media users. People over 40 years old comprise only 18% of users. Chinese young adults use more social media to seek political information or participating in politics than older adults. Older adults may use more traditional media than social media to obtain political news.

For IPE, the age brackets of 51-55 and over 60 had higher statistical means than other age brackets (51-55 = 3.2269; 60+ = 3.2143). In general, the IPE statistical means for 46 to 60 and above age brackets is higher than that people in the age group 18 to 45. Based on the age brackets comparisons, 18 to 25 have significant IPE differences from the age brackets 46-50, 51-55, 56-6-, and 60 and above. The age bracket 26 to 30 also has significant differences from those in age group 51-55, 56-60, and 60 and above. These results mean that older adults have higher internal political efficacy than young adults, and it also support that IPE increases with advancing age.

According to these results, age is positively associated with IPE. The older people are, the higher IPE they have. Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco (2007) also indicated older voters have higher information political efficacy than younger voters. This finding suggests that internal political efficacy has a positive relationship with age. Consequently, political information and knowledge is an important part of internal political efficacy. Moreover, based on the above results and literature review, knowledge, interest, interpersonal discussion, media consumption, and income are factors in political information efficacy (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002). Possibly because older Chinese adults have more political media consumption, knowledge, and discussion involvement than younger voters, their political efficacy is higher than younger voters.

The EPE statistical means increases with age from 18-25 to 60 and above (18-25 = 3.1634; 26-30 = 3.0527; 31-35 = 3.0721; 36-40 = 3.1500; 41-45 = 3.1778; 46-50 = 3.2935; 51-55 = 3.3025; 56-60 = 3.2598; 60+ = 3.4591). The statistical difference is especially significant between 26-30 and 51-55, and between 26-30 and 60 and above. This result also clarifies that older adults have higher EPE than young adults in China. In general, EPE increases with

increasing of age. External political efficacy is the citizens' attitudes toward government institutions and officials, and also refers to people's confidence of knowing government affairs (Niemi et al., 1990). Young adults are significantly more likely to think that public officials do not care what they think, and believe they have no say about government (Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007). Because Chinese older adults have more political knowledge about government affairs than younger adults via multiple media outlets, older adults generally have higher scores on measures of government knowledge than younger adults.

In addition, when this study measured Chinese people's attitudes toward the government, older adults seemed more cautious and less critical of the Chinese government than younger adults. This is likely because they have a deeper understanding of Chinese government operations. These older citizens know the established social rules regarding freedom of expression and rigorous censorship (Shambaugh, 2007). Some of older adults who are members of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) worry that the government will investigate them if they express negative attitudes toward CCP and government. This may explain why older adults have a higher level in EPE.

By contrast, there was not a statistically significant difference in political participation among age brackets ( $\text{sig} > 0.05$ ). However, earlier studies examined found that older Chinese citizens are more likely to engage in local politics (Xu, Perkins, & Chow, 2010). Other factors may account for these age differences, such as geography, income, marital status, and educational level. Consequently, age cannot be separated from other factors when analyzing political participation in China.

Third, in terms of educational levels, there was non-significant relationship with SMU, IPE, and EPE ( $\text{sig} > 0.05$ ). However, educational level is related to PP. The results indicated

significant differences between individuals with college educations and those with university bachelor and master educations. (In China, colleges are lower level educational institutions than universities). To some extent, educational level positively influences political participation in China. According to Lv (2014), educational level has an independent significant effect on political participation in China. Higher educational level is a strong predictor of political participation (Berinsky & Lenz, 2011). Chinese people with a higher educational level tend to have higher information literacy and a better understanding of political information. This encourages engagement in political activities, such as online poll participation (Zhao & Leung, 2013). University educated individuals often have higher information literacy in political information, and have more passionate and deeper understanding, than people who are college educated.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **CONCLUSION**

This study focuses on analyzing the relationship among social media use, political efficacy, and political participation. The main purpose is examining the mediating role of political efficacy between social media use and political participation.

Based on the above findings, this study provides some implications for academic researchers. There are no previous studies examining the mediating role of political efficacy between social media use and political participation in China. However, this study revealed internal political efficacy as the mediating role between social media use and political participation. But external political efficacy does not mediate between social media use and political participation in the Chinese context. Internal political efficacy allows people to trust themselves to participate in politics. The internal political efficacy serves as a pathway to transfer political knowledge and interest into actual political behaviors (Reichert, 2016). This result also provides a theoretical support to the process of self-efficacy transferring to behaviors (Bandura, 1977).

Additionally, the demographic results of this study also contribute to the theoretical framework in the political research realm. Based on findings of gender, Chinese males use social media related to politics more often than females, leading to higher internal political efficacy and political participation among males. Only females' external political efficacy levels are higher than males'. According to findings of age comparison, younger adults have more social media

use behaviors than older adults. Older adults have higher internal political efficacy and external political efficacy than younger adults. Age has no direct relationship with political participation. Based on the educational level results, educational level is not associated with social media use, internal political efficacy, and external political efficacy. It is, however, related to political participation. Chinese people who have higher education are more likely to be politically participates. The above findings have theoretical implications for political research designed to investigate similar issues and related questions.

This study also has some practical implications for Chinese government officials, journalists and citizens. Government officials and journalists can use the study findings to improve the political dissemination of information and to engage citizens in civic participation. Because young people are target audiences of social media related to politics, government officials and journalists should use young people's methods of expression to disseminate political information, including using the popular words and lively engagement on political social media. In addition, the government can also improve Chinese citizens' internal political efficacy via social media due to the positive relationship between social media use and internal political efficacy. Furthermore, government should organize certain political activities on social media, and journalists can use social media to help the government to organize political activities. Together, such actions should provide Chinese citizens with more political opportunities and access to full engagement in politics.

This study also provides valuable information to Chinese citizens. Chinese citizens can use this study to understand how social media use can improve their political knowledge and internal political efficacy. They will increase their focuses and purposes when they seek political information or knowledge on social media. In addition, when they understand the role of internal

political efficacy in the process of political participation, Chinese citizens may have more confidence to participate in politics.

Although this study has multiple implications for academic and practical realms, it also has limitations. First, this study does not examine the correlation between variables. All relationships are one way rather than interrelationships. Second, this study did not analyze the relationship between internal and external political efficacy. In addressing these first two limitations, there is a study that found that political efficacy directly influences political news use (Gottfried, Hardy, Holbert, Winneg, & Jamieson, 2017). It also analyzed the relationship between internal and external political efficacy. Third, the future questionnaire should contain following questions: “Do you use social media?” and “Do you have social media accounts?”. These questions will filter out participants who do not use social media.

Future studies should expand on the present study. First, investigating the correlation between variables is necessary. Second, future studies also need to classify different kinds of social media related to politics (e.g. friendship, communities, and knowledge websites), and examine who are the major audiences of different types of political social media (Shiratuiddin et.al., 2017). Third, because some scholars use the scale of internal political efficacy instead of scale of political information efficacy, future studies need to clarify the specific definition of political information efficacy and develop an accurate scale to measure it (Painter, 2011; Weaver Lariscy, Tinkham, & Sweetser, 2011; Tedesco, 2011). These steps are necessary for future scholars to better understand the social and theoretical roles of political efficacy, both in China and elsewhere.



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## APPENDIX A

### QUESTIONNAIRE: ENGLISH VERSION

#### **The Mediating Role of Political Efficacy Between Social Media Use and Political Participation in China.**

Hello:

We sincerely invite you to participate in the research of "The Mediating Role of Political Efficacy Between Social Media Use and Political Participation in China." If you are 18 years old and older, and agree to participate in this survey, you will complete the following questionnaire through the online platform. This investigation is not registered and your personal information will be kept confidentially. You have the right do not to participate in this survey, and you also have the right to exit during the process.

#### **1. Social media use about politics.**

Score statement: This part is related to frequency of following behaviors. Each question has five grades. (1: never; 2: rarely; 3: sometimes; 4: often; 5 always.)

- (1) I read hard news via social media.
- (2) I repost photos or videos clips on government or politics.
- (3) I upload photos or videos shot by yourself on non-recreational latest events.
- (4) I vote online.
- (5) I write blogs on government or politics, such as politics, economics, or international relations.

- (6) I join topic discussions of politics via social media
- (7) I post political issues on social media and seek help or discussion.
- (8) I express opinions explicitly on government and politics via social media.
- (9) I follow and interact with official Social media accounts of governmental or political institutions.
- (10) I organize non-governmental campaigns or activities via social media.

## **2. Internal political efficacy**

Score statement: This part is related to the degree of agreement of following questions. Each question has five grades. The more you agree, the score is higher. (1: strongly disagree 2: disagree; 3: neutral; 4: agree; 5: disagree.)

- (1) I know more about politics than most people my age
- (2) When political issues or problems are being discussed, I usually have something to say
- (3) I am able to understand most political issues easily.
- (4) I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics.
- (5) I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country.
- (6) I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.
- (7) I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.

## **3. External political efficacy**

Score statement: This part is related to the degree of agreement of following questions. Each question has five grades. The more you agree, the score is higher. (1: strongly disagree 2: disagree; 3: neutral; 4: agree; 5: disagree.)

- (1) I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.



- (2) The government cares a lot about what all of us think about new laws.
- (3) The government is doing its best to find out what people want.
- (4) The powerful leaders in government care very little about the opinions of people.
- (5) When people get together to demand change, the leaders in government listen.

#### 4. Political participation

Score statement: This part is related to frequency of following behaviors. Each question has five grades. It is more frequent when your score is higher. (1: never; 2:rarely; 3: sometimes; 4:often; 5 always.)

- (1) I discuss politics with friends or colleagues
- (2) I sign petition letters
- (3) I join demonstrations that are not organized by party officials
- (4) I contact official media to cover the event

#### 5. Demographic information

(1) Your gender:

A: male B: female

(2) Your age:

A 18 ~ 25 B 26 ~ 30 C 31 ~ 35 D 36 ~ 40 E 41~ 45 F 46 ~ 50 G 51~ 55

H 56 ~ 60 I over 60

(3) Your province:

A Anhui B Beijing C Chongqing D Fujian E Gansu F Guangdong

G Guangxi H Guizhou I Hainan J Hebei K Heilongjiang L Henan

M Hong Kong N Hubei O Hunan P Jiangsu Q Jiangxi R Jilin

S Liaoning T Macao U Inner Mongolia V Ningxia W Qinghai X Shandong

Y Shanghai Z Shanxi A1 Shanxi B1 Sichuan C1 Tianjin D1 Xinjiang

E1 Xizang F1 Yunnan G1 Zhejiang H1 Overseas

(4) Your occupation:

A Full-time Students B Production C Sale D Marketing/PR

E Customer Service F Administration/ Support G Human Resources

H Finance/Audit I Civilian J Technology K Management

L Professor or Teacher M Consulting N Professionals (Accountants, Lawyers,

Architects, Healthcare, Journalists, and artists etc.) O Other

Thank you for participating in this survey. Have a good day! Goodbye!

## APPENDIX B

### QUESTIONNAIRE: CHINESE VERSION

#### 中国人的政治效能在使用社交媒体和政治参与中的作用

您好：

我们诚挚邀请您参与“中国人的政治效能在使用社交媒体和政治参与中的作用”的调查研究。如果您是 18 周岁及以上的成年人，并同意参与本次调查，您将通过网络平台完成以下这份调查问卷。此调查为不记名调查，您的个人信息将被完全保密。您有权不参加本次调查，也有权利在参与过程中选择退出。

#### 一 使用社交媒体上与政治相关的功能和信息

评分说明：这部分问题所问的是以下行为的频率，每题分数为 5 个等级，分数越高表示越频繁。（5 分：总是；4 分：经常；3 分：有时候；2 分：很少；1 分：从不。）

- (1) 我通过社交媒体浏览政治性硬新闻。
- (2) 我在社交媒体上转发关于政治的图片和视频。
- (3) 我上传自己拍摄的有关最新事件的非娱乐性的照片和视频到社交媒体上。
- (4) 我参与社交媒体的在线投票。
- (5) 我写关于政治或政府的微博或博客，内容例如：政治，经济，或国际关系。
- (6) 我在社交媒体上参与有关政治的主题讨论。

- (7) 我在社交媒体上发布和讨论一些政治性的问题，或对此寻求帮助。
- (8) 我在社交名媒体上明确地表述关于政府和政治地观点。
- (9) 我在社交媒体上关注政府或政治机构的的官方账户, 并与他们互动。
- (10) 我在社交媒体上组织有关政治的民间活动。

## 二 内部的政治效能

评分说明：这部分问题所问的是您对下列问题的同意程度。每题分数为 5 个等级，分数越高代表越同意。（5 分：很同意；4 分：同意；3 分：中立；2 分：不同意；1 分：很不同意）

- (1) 我比同龄人知道更多有关政治的事情。
- (2) 我经常可以在讨论政治问题的时候侃侃而谈（有话可说）。
- (3) 我可以很容易地理解大多数政治问题。
- (4) 我认为我自己可以很好地参与政治。
- (5) 我感觉我可以对自己国家重要的政治问题有非常好的理解。
- (6) 我认为我比大多数人在在政治方面消息更灵通，更见多识广。
- (7) 我认为我可以在政府机关和政治的相关机构做的比其他人好。

## 三 外部的政治效能

评分说明：这部分所问的是您对下列问题的同意程度。每题分数为 5 个等级，分数越高代表越同意。（5 分：非常同意；3 分：同意；3 分：中立；3 不同意；1 分：非常不同意）

- (1) 我不认为政府工作人员关心像我这样的人。
- (2) 我认为政府非常关心民众对新法律的看法。

- (3) 我认为政府在尽最大努力找到人们群众想要什么。
- (4) 权力很大的政府领导人很少关心人民的意见。
- (5) 当人民群众集体要求改变时，政府的领导会响应大家的需求。

#### 四 政治参与

评分说明：这部分问题所问的是以下行为的频率，每题分数为 5 个等级，分数越高表示越频繁。（5 分：总是；4 分：经常；3 分：有时候；2 分：很少；1 分：从不。）

- (1) 我和朋友或同事讨论政治。
- (2) 我在请愿书上签字。
- (3) 我参与非政党官方组织的游行活动。
- (4) 我联系官方媒体报道事件。

#### 五 人口统计基本信息

- (1) 您的性别： A 男 B 女
- (2) 您的年龄： A 18~25 岁 B 26~30 岁 C 31~35 岁 D 36~40 岁 E 41~45 岁 F 46~50 岁 G 51~55 岁 H 56~60 岁 I 60 岁以上
- (3) 您所在省份： A 安徽 B 北京 C 重庆 D 福建 E 甘肃 F 广东 G 广西 H 贵州 I 海南 J 河北 K 黑龙江 L 河南 M 香港 N 湖北 O 湖南 P 江苏 Q 江西 R 吉林 S 辽宁 T 澳门 U 内蒙古 V 宁夏 W 青海 X 山东 Y 上海 Z 山西 A1 陕西 B1 四川 C1 天津 D1 新疆 E1 西藏 F1 云南 G1 浙江 H1 海外
- (4) 您目前的职业： A 全日制学生 B 生产人员 C 销售人员 D 市场 / 公关人员 E 客服人员 F 行政 / 后勤人员 G 人力资源 H 财务 / 审计人员 I 文职 / 办事人员 J 技术 / 研发人员

K 管理人员 L 教师 M 顾问 / 咨询 N 专业人士（如会计师，律师，建筑师，医护人员，记者，文艺工作者等） O 其他

(5) 您目前的学历：A 高中及以下 B 大专 E 本科 F 研究生 G 博士及以上学位

感谢您参与本次问卷调查，祝您生活愉快！再见！

## APPENDIX C

### IRB APPROVAL LETTER



RESEARCH INTEGRITY AND COMPLIANCE  
Institutional Review Boards, FWA No. 00001669  
12901 Bruce B. Downs Blvd., MDC035 • Tampa, FL 33612-4799  
(813) 974-5638 • FAX (813) 974-7091

11/2/2017

Bingyang Liu  
School of Advertising and Mass Communications  
16602 Palm Royal Dr.  
1532  
Tampa, FL 33647

RE: **Exempt Certification**

IRB#: Pro00032503

Title: Social Media Use and Political Participation in China: The Mediating Role of Political Efficacy

Dear Ms. Liu:

On 11/1/2017, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets criteria for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45CFR46.101(b):

(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless:

(i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.


Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the application is closed in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that was previously declared exempt from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not warrant an amendment or new application.

Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does not limit your ability to conduct your research project.

We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University

of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Mark Ruiz". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "M" and "R".

Mark Ruiz, PhD, Vice Chairperson  
USF Institutional Review Board