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# Framing 10/12 and 3/11 in American and European News

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Framing 10/12 and 3/11 in American and European News

by

Andrea E. Lypka

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
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College of Arts and Sciences  
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## **Abstract**

This media analysis of the incidents in Bali in 2002 (10/12) and Madrid in 2004 (3/11) reveals the black and white portrayal of these attacks in western news through the localization of international terrorism occurrences, pro-government perspective, and internalization of U.S. policies. The Old Europe and New Europe debate further fractures the European press. Such rhetoric perpetuates the “us versus them” schism by contrasting the goals of the alleged perpetrators with the western values of democracy and freedom. Governmental sources remain central news sources during these crises. In addition, 9/11, war on terrorism, and fear from further attacks dominate news rhetoric to justify pro-U.S. policies and military actions in American and European media. This kind of news coverage that deemphasizes context and demonizes the enemy, as well as the lack of conflicting viewpoints hinder public understanding about crises, Muslims, and the Middle East.

## Chapter 1: Introduction

Research points to September 11, 2001 (9/11) as a tipping point in terrorism coverage in news. Norris, Kern, and Just argue that 9/11 symbolizes “a critical culture shift in the predominant news frames used by the American mass media for understanding issues of national security, etc” (2003, p. 4), because the U.S. government rationalizes its diplomacy and military actions in the frames of “9/11,” “the war on terrorism,” “the new terrorism.” Investigations establish differences in framing patterns of critical events across media: the U.S. press tends to frame them episodically, without context, and the U.K. newspapers predominantly depict them thematically, within context. Further, pro- U.S. government perspective and western worldview remain uncontested in discourse; the way such occurrences are treated and the degree of media coverage impact policies and public perceptions about terrorist attacks and the Middle East.

The absence of equivalency frames (Ruigrok, Atteveldt, & Vliegenthart, 2007) that present critical issues in multiple ways results in a parity coverage palpable in simplified media frames— key words, labels, and themes communicated through emotional language, personal stories, and iconic visuals, including Ground Zero, the pro-government rhetoric, the national interest, the “us versus them,” and the battle between good and evil frames (Nacos, 1994; Ben-Zedeff, 1996; Gross, Aday & Breweer, 2004; Hirst & Schutze, 2004; Ruigrok, et al., 2007; Brinson & Stohl, 2009; Powell, 2011).



Framing analyses demonstrate that treatment of 9/11 has impacted U.S. news consumption habits (Pludowski, 2006, 2007; Ruigrok, et al., 2007), the portrayal of other terrorism-related incidents and Arab Muslim Americans, and public perceptions of Middle East (Powell, 2011). In a broader sense, comparative explorations also provide an understanding on framing hierarchy and the impact of government on news rhetoric to determine the level of media freedom, human rights, and diplomacy within different contexts, cultures, and worldviews that divide the West and East. For instance, Pludowski (2006) reports that after 9/11, American consumption of foreign news was low; compared to 9/11, the train bombings in Madrid in 2004 (3/11) received less coverage in American newspapers because these events did not happen on U.S. soil. Moreover, 3/11 was framed as a moral outrage (Ruigrok, et al., 2007), in the context of 9/11 and the war on terror to justify U.S.-led policies and the impact of these events on U.S. economy. On the other hand, anti-war frames in Spanish news discourse, such as the “Old Europe-New Europe” dichotomy (i.e., U.S. allies and non-supporter countries) and the anti-war demonstrations in Spain after 3/11 shaped the outcome of Spanish election (the anti-Bush Zapatero has won the Spanish elections) and international relations with the U.S. (Pludowski, 2006).

Initial reports on terrorism are followed by the one-sided coverage of Muslim Americans in western news (Ryan, 2004; Ruigrok, et al., 2007, Tehranian, 2009; Powell, 2011, Disha, Cavendish, & King, 2011). Most research, synthesizes the racialized, episodic, and stereotypical coverage of Middle Easterners after 9/11—stories associate Muslims with terror and enemy, and hate crimes against Arab and Muslim Americans remain underreported. This discourse, nevertheless, was absent in the portrayal of the Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh “When a Christian individual of European

descent commits a barbaric act against civilians, he is simply an outlier, a crazed lone gunman. By contrast, when a Muslim of Middle-Eastern descent commits a barbaric act against civilians, his acts of terrorism are imputed to all members of his race and religion” (Tehrani, 2009, p. 789).

In line with these investigations, this multi-cultural analysis compares news framing differences on terrorism, perpetrators, victims, and news sources in two post-9/11 terrorist acts to gain context and to provide dimensionality to existing framing research. The attacks in Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2002 (10/12) and Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004 (3/11) were selected from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) at the University of Maryland because their selection criteria of critical events coincided with the definition of terrorism in this research. Occurrences included in the GTD Database are an “intentional threat or violence” for political, economic or social goals (Global Terrorism Database Codebook, 2010, p.5).

News articles were the medium of study because print press remains one of our primary information sources (Weimann & Brosius, 1991) and because it contains in-depth coverage that is accessible for analysis through databases. Coverage following one month after these crises was assessed through a content analysis of word frequencies in nationally distributed news outlets with the highest circulations in the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.), Italy, and Germany. The selected periodicals include *USA Today* and *The New York Times* in the U.S., *The Guardian* and *The Sun* in the U.K., *Corriere della Sera* and *La Stampa* in Italy, and *Die Welt*, *Welt am Sonntag*, *Bild am Sonntag*, and *Der Spiegel* in Germany.

This study was conducted in light of the theoretical underpinnings of journalism—

to inform the public, to interpret events within contexts, and to raise public debate on critical issues (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Graber, 1989; Dearing & Rogers, 1996). Public perception is influenced by hierarchical communication among framing actors, including media outlets, political establishments, and terrorist organizations (Nacos, 2007; Powell, 2011); therefore, the way media portray crises remains a hot research topic. For instance, critics argue that U.S. reports predominantly cover critical events in a sensational way through the government's lens. This one-sided communication is perceptible in story focus; in other words, through frames accessible to the widest number of news consumers. For instance, the influence of 9/11 frames can be exemplified in the collective reaction following the initial 9/11 news reports: 53% of Americans did not go to work on that day and public anxiety about future attacks increased (Nacos, 2007). Additionally, frames are impacted by volume of coverage, various professional, cultural, and societal biases, eastern and western ideologies, news values, and the news outlets' political affiliation (Weimann & Brosius, 1991; Ruigrok, et al., 2007; Powell, 2011).

Different papers have investigated this perpetuum mobile among critical events and agendas; the framing competition among media, public, political organizations, and terrorists; and the influence of news outlets' political/economical affiliations, journalistic guidelines, and various biases (Brinson & Stohl, 2009; Hirst & Schutze, 2004). For instance, in their research on 9/11 coverage, Traugott and Brader (2003) found that reports highlight the government perspective on critical events, and that news without context creates a knowledge gap and increases anxiety in society.

Moreover, the newspaper's political affiliation's influence on framing can be exemplified in the coverage of Australia's national newspaper, the *Australian* that

equated the 2002 bombings in Bali (10/12), a popular tourism destination, as attacks on Australia or Australia's 9/11. The center-right media outlet, owned by Rupert Murdoch, identified policies deriving from 10/12 within the "national interest frame" (p. 172) without contesting the government's war on terror perspective (Hirst & Schutz, 2004).

Furthermore, Brinson and Stohl (2009) stress that U.K. and U.S newspapers' political alignment impacted the London subway blasts' coverage: conservative papers (e.g., *The Wall Street Journal* and the *London Times*) presented these events within the Bush/Blair political views as opposed to liberal media outlets' community-oriented coverage (e.g., *Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times*, *The Independent*, and *The Guardian*). While the term "al-Qaida" dominated the American press compared to local-driven stories in British news, in general, reports erred on the side of the government.

Other scholars argue that the dichotomy between the western white, male-dominated, Christian view and "the Other" (Powell, 2011, p. 93), eastern perspective impact media treatment and news perceptions because discourses tend to channel dominant ideology and the government's view in uncontested ways. Specifically, reporters portray terrorism and Islamism through the "us versus them," "the new war," "and the war on terror" frames to contrast the goals of the perpetrators with the western values of democracy, gender emancipation, and freedom (Powell, 2011).

Additionally, research has supported that frames or story angles and prominence are influenced by news values (Weimann & Brosius, 1991), including: sensationalism, proximity, relevance, facticity, simplification, identification, confluence of impact, conflict, and novelty (Östgaard, 1965; Shoemaker, Chang, & Brendlinger, 1987; Eilders, 1996). For instance, local media are more likely to report on domestic terrorist activities

based on its relevance, confluence of impact, and proximity to the homeland (Schaefer, 1993). Similarly, Eilders (1996) has shown that the press applies the newsworthiness criteria and the government's view to establish news salience and story angle.

Additionally, Weimann and Brosius (1991) have confirmed that level of victimization, type of action, identity of the attackers, and accountability of the government influence salience of crises.

Further communication studies reveal that professional, cultural, and societal biases and the volume of media coverage of unexpected critical occurrences' impact public perception (Papanicolaou, 1990; Entman, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 2001; Norris, et al., 2003; Ruigrok, et al., 2007; Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008). Particularly, scholars have found that besides the length of news exposure and the attached entertainment value of a story, dominant frames have to culturally resonate with the audience to influence public perceptions about those events (Papanicolaou, 1990; Norris et al., 2003). Specifically, Norris, Kern, and Just (2003) have concluded that rhetorical differences in terrorism coverage among U.S. and U.K. newspapers are inherent in professional, cultural, and societal biases. Notably, American media tended to identify such attacks episodically, through a dramatic coverage with a focus on military and policy, while British newspapers covered these events thematically with a focus on international context and diplomacy. Moreover, Schaefer has reported "self-centeredness," the localization of international terrorist events, in both American and European news (2003): international terrorist acts received less local coverage; if covered, these events were presented with a local angle (for instance, European versus American victims) and within the country's cultural context.

Inspired by this scholarship, this paper dissects terrorism frames across media and nations to analyze whether 10/12 and 3/11 are portrayed within economic, social, cultural, and political contexts, multiple perspectives, and to determine which frames are omitted from reports. Consequently, this study explores whether the magnitude of the event (e.g., casualties), the proximity of these incidents to the homeland, the type of attack (e.g., hijackings and car bombings are emphasized in news), the portrayal of the victims and perpetrators, news sources, story focus, and the claimed responsibility determine news salience and frames. The investigation of terrorist incidents within the hierarchical and mediated communication employs framing and cascading activation model (Entman, 2003) as a theoretical foundation to argue that framing differences are inherent in professional, cultural, and societal biases.

This paper is organized as follows. The next chapter examines the evolution of the term “terrorism,” scholarship on terrorism, media, and framing, theoretical foundations, including the framing model, and introduces the research questions that guide this paper. Specifically, the researcher introduces definitions, relevant studies, and theories within the macro political, social, and cultural strata to argue that worldviews impact public understanding on critical events through news frames. Next, the research methods are defined, including the selection process for articles, events, news outlets, time period, research instruments, and coding process. In addition, weaknesses and challenges on defining research questions, sampling of events, news outlets, and stories, selection criteria, inter-coder reliability, and coding process, as well as possible solutions and topics are defined. The researcher then introduces the results of this content analysis to discuss the analysis of news frames of 10/12 and 3/11. Chapter 6 concludes with the

relevancy of the research in mass communication studies. The appendices include the coding book, categories and key terms, an article sample and the coders' data. The list of tables contains the periodicals' political and economic affiliation and the coded data.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

### **Defining Terrorism**

Before examining news frames on terrorism, the ambiguity surrounding the term “terrorism” must be explored through the framing model. Reports on the evolution of this concept reference combatants’ objectives, target, and ideology, media influence, cultural, historical, political, social, and military contexts, human rights, and worldviews. These frames create various interpretations of terrorism among communication scholars, political scientists, governmental entities, sociologists, philosophers, and public. Two general approaches in classifications are prevalent: the official perspective that equates it as a crime for political purpose and the alternative approach that regards it as complex phenomena.

Traditionally, governmental classifications mention the social and political purposes of these acts that threaten the status quo: “the systematic use of coercive intimidation against civilians for political goals” (Norris, Kern, & Just 2003, p. 6). Opponents argue that governmental agencies frame this concept based on their agenda because they fail to identify cultural, religious or ideological affiliations of the perpetrator(s) and do not regard state-sponsored terrorism acts and attacks against non-combatants as terrorist incidents. Furthermore, some authors insist on context dependent labels: “Since conceptualization is intimately linked with theory, there can be no single ‘correct’



definition” (Norris, et al., p. 6); instead concepts should be framed holistically, within the human rights, political and military contexts, culture, media, and history.

While there is some truth to all schools of thought, the focus in this paper is on the treatment of critical events, thus incidents are examined through the lenses of media-causation and framing. Proponents of media-causation theory contend that through press coverage, combatants trigger public fear (“Terrorists: War without Boundaries,” 1977; Papanicolaou, 1990, Dacres, 1999; Norris, et al., 2003; Stohl & Brinson, 2009). Dianne Dacres argues that reports foster terrorist groups’ reliance on the press by channeling their message to the audience. Dacres defines terrorism as targeted influence on politics and public— “the use of random violence for the purpose of making a particular belief system or problem to gain the attention of government officials and a nation’s population which otherwise would not be available” (1999, p. 3).

Continuing this line of definitions, in this study, terrorism is the use of controlled violence exposed in mediatized and targeted messages for legitimizing marginal belief systems for political and social goals. The media channel this strategic communication among public, political elite, and terrorists by focusing on certain messages. Therefore, the analysis of news reports on crises highlights the dynamic of the framing struggle to reveal that news coverage on crises is influenced by the most powerful framing actor.

Moreover, media representations on 9/11 provoked controversies in research, politics, and military. Since 9/11, definitions were linked to the concepts of war, preemptive action, and clash between civilizations and ideologies (Norris et al., 2003; El-Nawawy, 2004, Burke, 2004). In contrast, U.S. government agencies have set forth the meaning of this term as a “crime with a socio-political purpose” (Presley, 1996; Silverman, 2002;

Norris et al., 2003) that gives the political establishment the right to use “legitimate” power for self-defense (Borradori, 2005). Particularly, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) characterizes terrorism as a politically motivated and violent act “to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI, n.d.). Further, the FBI distinguishes between domestic terrorism on American soil and perpetrated by U.S. citizens, and international terrorism that “transcends national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum” (Terrorism 2002-2005, FBI Policy Guidelines). Moreover, the Executive Order 13224 specifies that terrorists “affect the conduct of a government by *mass destruction, assassination, kidnapping, or hostage-taking*” [emphasis added]. Further categories to these classifications are added within political and military entities; the U.S. Department of Defense’s (DTIC) includes ideological and religious objectives, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) mentions economical, political, social, religious, and ideological goals of the perpetrators and their ability to convey their agenda through the media, the DTIC adds the combatants’ ideological and religious objectives, and the U.S. State Department and National Counterterrorism Center (N.C.T.C.) focus on the non-combatant targets, civilians and unarmed or off-duty military personnel in their definitions: “terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against *non-combatant* [emphasis added] targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (U.S. Code Title 22, Ch.38, Para. 2656f /d). Similarly, terrorism occurs “when groups or individuals acting on political motivation deliberately or recklessly attack

civilians/non-combatants or their property and the attack does not fall into another special category of political violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribal violence” (N.C.T.C, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, n.d.). However, Whitaker claims that this classification excludes terrorism aimed against armed forces; including the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and military checkpoints (2001).

Similar to U.S. agencies, the Security Council and the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations (U.N.) and the European Union (E.U.) have yet to find a comprehensive definition. The E.U., an organization for economic and political integration, categorizes political violence in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002/475/JHA). Akin to U.S. agencies, the E.U. omits state-sponsored terrorist acts from the definition and classifies terrorism as a criminal act for political goals that creates fear in society. According to Article 1 in Framework Decision, terrorist activities disrupt societal, cultural, political, and economic structures through actions that endanger public safety by kidnapping, hostage taking, the obliteration of political, informational structures, and public transportation systems, and abuse of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and natural resources (Article 1, para. 1, a-i, p. 2). Moreover, U.N. advisor A. P. Schmid’ synthesis on terrorism as targeted communication creates a bridge between media-oriented and official views:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method [...] whereby—in contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat—and violence—based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audiences), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (1983, p. 70).

The above mentioned classifications demonstrate the multiple changes in the term terrorism that today has negative connotations. While official perspectives build on government-dependent definitions that omit state-sponsored terrorism and do not recognize groups against repressive regimes, others link terrorism to social, political, cultural, media, and philosophical environments and ideologies. For example, some authors favor canonical definition of terrorism (Boulden & Weiss, 2004; Meisels, 2008). In particular, Meisels (2008) proposes the inclusion of the killings of non-combatants, state-sponsored terrorist activities into the classification. On the other hand, scholars suggest the adoption of the government definition (Honderich, 2002; Kovacic, 2008), while others classify terrorism within macro-sociological context (Aradeau & van Muenzel, 2007), media (Papanicolaou, 1990; Wilkinson, 1997; Hoffman, 1998, Martyn, 2002; Norris et al., 2003; El-Nawawy, 2004), contemporary international, political, and military frameworks (Boulden & Weiss, 2004), as well as within the moral vs. immoral dichotomy, when political establishments' interests conflict with human rights (Boulden & Weiss, 2004).

In line with the traditional law enforcement perspective, Ted Honderich equates terrorism with violence for political and social gains (2002), but he leaves out the moral judgment factor from the classification: "either illegal violence within a society or smaller-scale violence than war between states and societies and not according to the international war." (Honderich, 2002, p. 98). In addition to the moral and social perspectives, Adam Silverman includes the sub-cultural frame to the definition:

Terrorism is one way that subcultural actors attempt to resolve the disputes between themselves and the larger culture or between

themselves and other subcultures. Terrorism is an attempt to assert the constitutive and regulatory subcultural norms of the actors onto the larger culture and/or other subcultures. (Silverman, 2002, p.7)

Silverman held that most attacks are identity-based and are committed by perpetrators belonging to a certain group or subculture with shared conventions and values which contrast with the dominant societal standards (Gelder, 2007). This view is shared from a macro-sociological view by Aradeau and van Muenzel (2007) who classify terrorism through the modernization of society from “industrial” society to “risk” society in which members do not produce goods, but rather combat terrorism. Additionally, Bulent Capli (2007) reframes this term within the macro-sociological approach and media focus on these incidents: “If the groups or organizations which commit the violent acts are sympathized with then the acts are regarded as legitimate violence and the people are not labeled as terrorists” (Capli, 2007, p. 77). Therefore, perpetrators’ subcultural identity influences media treatment because research has found predominant coverage of acts against Westerners by non-Western combatants (Weimann & Brosius, 1991).

Contrary to the government-dependent definitions, Tamar Meisels reports that the explanation of this term should be subjected to moral judgment (2008), and it should include the killings of non-combatants, state-sponsored terrorist activities, and other forms of discriminations excluded from government classifications.

Additionally, several critics propose reframing this term in the contemporary international context of political and military power shifts or within the communication aspects of terrorism. In particular, Boulden and Weiss claim that war on terror frame impacts international policies and diverse interpretations of this term further fracture relationships between U.S., allies, and opposing countries (2004). Others point out that

definitions encapsulate political establishments' agendas (Best & Nocella, 2004; Kovacic, 2007; Moeller, 2009), and exclude certain groups from discourse (Kovacic, 2007). Furthermore, Bruce Hoffman (1998) distinguishes between earlier connotations of terrorism, including "freedom fighter," and the contemporary meaning, perpetuated by the press. Hoffman goes beyond the government's classification, which is violence for political change, and argues that the terrorism-freedom fighter debate is played out in the press, and describes it through the psychological effects it has on the victims and through the use of media as a tool for publicity. Particularly, Brinson and Stohl (2009) note that the interdependence between terrorism and media revolves around the principles of journalism, including freedom of the press and the goal to inform, claiming that publicity legitimizes terrorists' tools and goals (Papanicolaou, 1990; Nacos, 1994; Hoffman, 1998):

To sum up, the media's reporting of terrorist spectaculars helps to facilitate two of the universal goals of terrorism. Terrorists gain attention when the volume and the placement of news coverage affect the public agenda. There is also evidence that thematically framed stories that refer to specific grievances influence public attitudes about the roots of politically motivated violence (Nacos, 1994, p. 74).

In addition to the historical evolution of the term terrorism, El-Nawawy (2004) describes it within the context of the Middle Eastern view, within the Arab culture and media. His research finds a double standard within the Arab media when portraying the perpetrators and the U.S. army. When the Arab media publishes interviews or tapes of terrorists, it is vilified by the Western press. Moreover, the Arab media uses labels, such as "suicide attacks" and "terrorism" in the coverage of terrorism inside the Islamic world and defines the U.S. army as "occupying forces" or "invaders" rather than "coalition forces."

To the notion of the media-terrorists symbiotic relationship, Wilkinson adds the economical gain a news outlet faces in a competition for audience and advertising revenues (1997). Similar to El- Nawawy, Wilkinson argues that through media, terrorists seek to target a global audience to create fear, legitimize their actions, get support, and disrupt political order (1997, p. 15) suggesting media censorship during crises. For example, Wilkinson mentions the CBS guidelines that forbid live coverage of crises. Arguably, Wilkinson's approach disregards the media's function to inform the public and the free information flow online where the audience can find multiple views on this topic.

Besides political, historical, cultural, and media perspectives on terrorism, ideologies also shape the public's perceptions. Burke (2004) defines terrorism as a complex "mythic and religious narrative (p. 20) to create a "just and perfect society" (p. 19) in a single Islamic state. This ideology does not reject western values, "but they [militants] resent their failure to benefit from that modernization" (p. 20). For instance, Mohammed Atta, one of the hijackers of 9/11 was against the economic inequalities that ended up in the exploitation of "the Other," including the Egyptian farmers' strawberry production for the West, while these farmers remained poor. Burke argues that the terrorist narrative is overemphasized in the frames of mass destruction weapons because these groups use "conventional bombs or employ conventional devices in imaginative ways" (p. 24), but they attract attention and recruit through the media.

Moreover, several philosophers call for a culture-based definition claiming that terrorism has a different meaning for nations with dissimilar historical pasts (Habermas & Derrida, 1992; El-Nawawy, 2003; Norris, Just & Kern, 2003). Specifically, in contrast with Huntington's civilization clash theory, Inglehart' and Norris' modernization theory

refutes the West versus East dichotomy and argues that the clash is about gender equality and sexual liberalization (Norris et al., 2003). In contrast, Powell's research on post 9/ 11 domestic terrorist attacks supports the theory of the clash between the Western and Eastern views concluding that American reports contrast the "good" Western, Christian, white ideology with the "bad" Eastern ideology. Western news rhetoric confirms the "us versus them" frame and equates terrorism with Islam, contributing to the rise of public fear, and legitimizing foreign policies. Specifically, perpetrators are portrayed as non-U.S. citizens, demonized as being Muslims, and their actions linked to the "holy war against U.S." If perpetrators were U.S. citizens, they were not labeled as Muslims, they were humanized (labeled as mentally unstable individuals) and the act is treated as remote (Powell, 2011).

In comparing American and European worldviews, Giovanna Borradori (2005) and Archick (2005) claim the cultural frame in Europe rooted in a dissimilar historical past, geography, and priorities, Europe's economic ties with the Middle East, and differences on the use of force to legitimize actions. Mediatized disputes between U.S. and E.U. center on terrorism combat, war in Iraq, and weapons of mass destruction endanger future cooperation (Archick, 2005). Most Europeans consider terrorism within the context of international relations, human rights, and multilateral solutions, while Americans view terrorism within military context (Archick). Further, the European view prioritizes economic stability, emancipation of the E.U., and the Israeli-Palestine conflict, in contrast to the American perspective that considers terrorism as a major threat.

Similar to El-Nawawy (2004), Borradori (2005), and Archick (2005), Habermas and Derrida (2005) suggest that Western and Eastern Europeans and Americans interpret



terrorism through various cultural and historical lenses. Building on Samuel Huntington's culture clash theory (1993) that foresees future conflicts rooted in religious values held by Western and Islamic societies, Habermas and Derrida view the schism between the anti-war European countries (France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg) and the pro-war countries (United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Eastern- Europe, and the U.S.) as a civilization clash between Eastern and Western political powers. They claim that through the U.N, Europe would "counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States" (2003, p. 293). This anti-U.S. discourse is palpable in European news rhetoric through the new Europe frame.

At present, the lack of consensus in terrorism classifications remains a common thread. Future researchers should bridge differences among these value- laden definitions which remain open to interpretations in international relations and media.

### **Terrorism and Media**

The media-terrorism correlation has proven to be a longstanding area of mass communications research (Papanicolaou, 1990; Liebes, 1998; Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003; Katz & Liebes, 2007), linguistics (Meisels, 2008), criminal justice (Chermak & Gruenwald, 2006), psychology (Borum, 2004), philosophy (Honderich, 2002; Habermas & Derrida, 1992), international law (Martyn, 2002; Abi-Saab, 2002), social studies (Disha, Cavendish, & King, 2011), political sciences (Archick, 2005), and other fields of studies. Often, these research areas view this topic through a single aspect and few works compare the media- terrorism relationship in the socio-cultural contexts across media across nations. Mass communications literature on terrorism, news, and public

perceptions about critical events can be grouped into the following categories: media treatment of the perpetrators' objectives, effects of news frames on diplomacy and public, communication hierarchy and framing struggle (the construction of news frames by the framing actors), and differences in narratives in various media outlets. This paper fills the gaps in literature by comparing news frames of the same two events across media and nations from social and cultural perspectives.

A growing body of post-9/11 studies assert that media become an intermediary tool among public, political environment, and terrorists because news reports on crises often err on the government's side or publicize terrorist organizations (Brown, 2002; Nacos, 2002; Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003). Most of these investigations support the consensus that news frames, the way the story is framed, shape the audience's empirical and normative understanding about those events (Papanicolaou, 1990; Nitcavic & Dowling, 1990; Iyengar, 1994, Eilders, 1996; Norris, et al., 2003; El-Nawawy, 2004). Diffusion effects of frames impact policies, increase social and political concerns, public fear, and reliance on government because they "reinforce support for political leaders and the security policies they implement" (Norris, et al., 2003, p. 1).

Various papers have supported that the correlation between media coverage and the audience's knowledge and attitudes about catastrophic events are influenced by media exposure and false memories (Ost, Granhag, Udell, & Hjelmsater, 2008), education, political knowledge, interaction with other people, gender, and ethnic background. For instance, research has found that news frames and length of media exposure impact public perceptions (Papanicolaou, 1990; Traugott & Brader, 2002; Norris, et al., 2003). Specifically, according to a study by Ost, et al. (2008), Swedish and British participants

developed “false memories” about the bus bombings in the U.K., but Swedish participants were less likely to be misinformed about these incidents as opposed to British participants because of less extensive media coverage on these events. In addition, Papanicolaou discovered a correlation between news exposure and University of South Florida (USF) students’ knowledge on world affairs, gender, and ethnic background (1990): students from the College of Arts and Business were less informed compared to students from the College of Social Science, Education, and Engineering because they had less exposure to media reports on these events. In addition, white and Hispanic students predominantly had greater anti-terrorist attitudes than black students, and males were more knowledgeable about world affairs compared to female students.

Public knowledge about world affairs is also impacted by how media reports frame these issues, the level of penetration of dominant frames, and the length of coverage, however, news stories are driven by news values, commercial interests, and news outlets’ political affiliations. Thus, several critics pinpoint the use of press by policy makers and terrorists as an instrument for publicity and legitimization (Weimann, 1994; Wilkinson, 1997; Hoffman, 1998; Liebes, 1998; Liebes & Curan, 1998; Katz, 2002; Norris, et al., 2003; Blondheim & Liebes, 2003, 2002; Brown, 2003; Liebes & Kampf, 2004; Griffin, 2004; Kellner, 2004; Callaghan & Schnell, 2005; Katz & Liebes, 2007). For example, “media-oriented terrorism” (Weimann & Brosius, 1991), “disaster marathon” (Liebes, 1998), “terrorism as theater” (Nacos, 2002), and “spectacle of terror” (Kellner, 2004) all signify that continuous news coverage of crises reshape political and public agendas in mainstream news frames. Specifically, in his analysis of the broadcast coverage of the terrorist bus bombings in Israel in 1996, Liebes defined “disaster

marathon” as the continuous media coverage of a crisis by furthering Dayan and Katz’s “media events” term (1992). According to Liebes, the messenger (media) communicates chaos to the message receivers (audience) when reporting on not-scripted, anti-establishment events arguing that this rhetoric possibly contributed to the Israeli government’s breakdown. Liebes emphasizes the level of impact of such coverage on audiences and foreign relations. He notes that disaster marathons should be treated as a separate genre because news on extensively covered events instantly reaches a global audience, nourishing the collective demand for a solution and the power restoration of the status quo (Liebes, 1998):

From the media’s point of view, stories of disasters invite hermeneutic research for the culprit, someone whom to whom to assign the blame. The less possible it is to point to the actual villain, the less the chance of a satisfactory resolution, and the more powerful the role of television in providing the framing. (p. 74).

Continuing this theme, Liebes and First (2003) demonstrate that broadcast news frames simplify history by creating visual cues, such as iconic images that “represent emotionally evocative, self-explanatory, and universally understood pictures” (p. 59) to influence public opinion and policies. For instance, the 9/11 frame continues to shape foreign policies and U.S. military actions on the Middle East.

In contrast, Graber (2003) notes that the press is undermined during crises because of the media’s self-censorship and because of the governments’ efforts to suppress information to protect national security. Graber argues that this “opinion climate that seems hostile to criticism of the government during war” also contributes to media self-censorship (p.35), stating:

It is not unusual for the news media to censor their coverage when they deem it essential for security interests, especially when they agree with the government's objectives and face condemnation or economic penalties for voicing dissent. But self-censorship generally happens quietly behind the scenes to avoid the impression that the media are yielding to compulsion by the government. (Graber, 2003, p. 37)

Similar to Weimann & Brosius (1991), Liebes (1998), Nacos (2002), and Kellner (2004), Traugott and Brader consider instances of global media exposure as "modern tools of terrorists" (2003, p. 183). In their research on the effects of the 9/11 media coverage in *U.S. News & World Report*, they have informed that the media highlight the government's view, news lacks context, and this type of reporting creates a knowledge gap: "the press may fail to serve the needs of citizens as a whole, leaving only the most educated and attentive citizens capable of making full sense of these critical events" (p. 195). Similar to Papanicolaou's research (1990), Traugott' and Brader have also confirmed that the amount of media coverage and the audience's political knowledge and education played a role in public perception of terrorism.

In addition to the government-military-enemy triangulation, post-9/11 studies regard the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as a tipping point in the terrorism and media scholarship because of increased and continuous media coverage that followed these incidents (Liebes, 1998; Wilkinson, 1997; Norris, et al., 2003; Entman, 2003; Nacos, 2003; Kellner, 2004; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2006; Katz & Liebes, 2007; Meisels, 2008). In particular, studies by Schaefer (2003) and Powell (2011) demonstrate that extensive coverage of 9/11 has increased awareness of terrorist threats in the U.S. despite the fact that the number of terrorist acts have decreased.

The above mentioned works indicate that framing actors, including journalists, perpetrators, and the political elite simplify issues through frames dispersed within their messages and that these frames have a circular effect on the public and political decision-making process (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Iyengar, 1993; Eilders, 1996; Norris et al., 2003). However, the impact of these frames depends on a variety of factors previously mentioned, including news values, biases, cultural, social, and political context, and education. In particular, Norris, Kern, and Just (2003) and Schaefer (2003) note the international versus the local nature of the story, cultural and journalistic norms, structural contexts, and ideological biases influence media coverage. Structural contexts mean the socio-political condition of a country, and ideological biases are a culture's frames to interpret an event. In the study "Framing the U.S. Embassy Bombings and September 11 Attacks in African and U.S. Newspapers," Schaefer notes that the African media framed these occurrences from a "Third-World country" perspective, by framing them as a consequence of American foreign policy, while the American news adopted "the last remaining superpower" perspective (p.98), without conveying the anti-American sentiment. Schaefer's research concludes that proximity to the event and prominence determine news salience because both American and African news outlets covered more stories on domestic attacks. In a similar vein, Persson (2004) notes that Swedish press framed the bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as a tragedy and crime, as opposed to the 3/11 bombings in Madrid within the moral outrage tint. 3/11 received a predominant place in the Swedish media and it was presented to underline that terrorism is a global problem that affects Europe.

The power of frames is exemplified by the amount of coverage or the multimedia storytelling methods that wins over the audience because of ability to tell a story in simple but dramatic textual and visual frames (Liebes & First, 2003). But critics argue that online multimedia content does not equate to in-depth journalistic reporting that requires analysis of an event, multiple views, and follow up articles.

Framing research remains prolific in war photography studies suggesting that similar to textual frames, pictorial narratives emphasize stereotypes about war, the enemy, and Islam, and initially support the official view (Baudrillard, 1995; Griffin & Lee, 1995; Griffin, 1999; 2004; Schwalbe, 2006). Specifically, post-9/11 pictorial news narratives further the “live war” and “virtual war” dichotomy (Griffin, 2004; Fahmy, 2005): during conflicts, the U.S. media corroborated political and military agendas with photographs that reinforced cultural myths about war, the U.S. military, and power (Katz, 2002; Griffin, 2004). Others, like Baudrillard, criticize that by using these kinds of visual and textual frames, the media create a skewed reality, “virtual wars” that exist in the media only (Baudrillard, 1995). Griffin elaborates on this idea (2004) by confirming that pictorial narratives of the U.S. invasions in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, as well as the Gulf War in 1991 in *Time*, *Newsweek*, and *U.S. News & World Report* magazines reinforced the ethnocentric perspective, idealizing the U.S. military power, and justified the war by capturing weapons, U.S. troops in non-combat situations, and U.S. leaders (former President George H. W. Bush and Vice President Richard Cheney). In addition, Griffin noted the absence of U.S. military casualties, the paucity of cultural, economic and geopolitical backgrounds of the war, and the “symbolic monopoly” in presenting the Iraqi leadership (mainly through Saddam Hussein). Correspondingly, the majority of the

photographs were used to reinforce “the invisible enemy” view and stereotypes of Islam; for example, the image of a Palestinian boy throwing a stone is juxtaposed with an image of the burning World Trade Center. In contrast, the 2003 editions of these magazines contained more images that offered closure, framing the U.S. invasion as a “liberation and victory” (Griffin, 2004, p. 18). For example, some pictures portrayed Iraqi civilians waving to U.S. troops or receiving humanitarian aid from both the U.S. and the U.K. military. In line with Griffin’s study, Schwalbe finds that the government perspective dominated the pictorial narratives of the war in online news, shifting the pictorial narratives from conflict, conquest, rescue, victory, and control (2006).

Similar to research on visual frames in war by Baudrillard (1995), Griffin (2004), and Schwalbe (2006), Tamar Liebes and Anant First emphasize that news narratives on the Palestinian- Israeli conflict distorted the reality for a global audience in the Western media (2003). The image of Muhammad Dura, a Palestinian boy who was reported as being shot by the Israelis in Gaza strip during the Second Intifada on September 30, 2000, reiterates the ideology through the “selection of reality materials, the camera angle and the interpretation of the images in the studio” (p.69). Instead of focusing on the conflict, the commentator alleges that the Israeli soldiers killed him, but further reports are either inconclusive or prove the identities of the killers to be Palestinian. The story on conflicting viewpoints remains underreported, thus causing the public to incorrectly interpret this event. In a similar study, Liebes and Katz (2009) point out a shift in the media representation of Palestinians in the First Intifada and the Second because during the second Intifada, Palestinians were humanized as “the Others” who suffer. Their study also considered the analysis of the larger contexts too: the evolution of the international



media environment (i.e., the rise of the global channels of CNN and Al Jazeera that shifted reporting from objective to emotional and subjective reporting), national media (two additional broadcast channels in the Israeli market), and international relations (the 1993 Oslo agreement promoted the inclusion of the Palestinian voices in Israeli media).

These authors insist that media perpetuation of critical events draws public attention to crises and such kind of mediatized activities become the focal points in politics and public agendas. However, the salience of this type of news is shaped by the news selection criteria, including sensationalism, proximity, relevance, unambiguity, facticity, simplification, and identification (Östgaard, 1965; Eilders, 1996). Specifically, Eilders examined the impact of news factors on national news selection between journalists and 187 newspaper readers in Germany, and found that audience's news selection was influenced by placement, headline size, article size, and their own political interest. Readers preferred stories with high news values based on continuity, conflict, consequentiality (the number of people affected by an event), proximity, unexpectedness, damage, and low news value factors as personification, influence, success, and prominence (Eilders, 1996, p. 11-14). In contrast, journalists evaluated news reports based upon the news selection criteria (Eilders, 1996).

The above mentioned literature examined press reporting of critical events within the media-causation conceptual framework, supporting that newsworthiness factors, cultural, societal, and journalistic biases further nuance the media-terrorism relationship. This thesis expands on this research line by introducing the cultural strata in the analysis of news frames to convey a deeper understanding of the linkage between media and critical events.

### **Theoretical Ties to the Study: Media Framing**

Before examining framing as a relevant and evolving theoretical framework for this research, it is necessary to offer an overview of the media effects discipline as it relates to the framing model. Specifically, framing is defined within the historical development of the media effects theories. Then, the applicability of these theories to this study are discussed. Next, research traditions, framing factors, related concepts, and principles are defined within the media centrality paradigm. Furthermore, axioms and paradigm shifts in the Kuhnian and Lakatosian philosophies are revisited within the media effects framework. Related research is mentioned in reference to the theory development because the relevance of these studies was previously discussed in the literature overview.

Within media effects, the media effects research focuses on the correlation between news and public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. Literature on media centrality suggests that the audience relies on news to define critical events remote to their direct experiences, including terrorist incidents. Several studies have confirmed that public attitudes are shaped by the length of the media coverage on these events and the frames used by interest groups (Lazarsfeld, 1948 a; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Iyengar, 1991; Entman, 1993, 2007; Jamieson & Capella, 1996; Scheufele 1999, Phillips, 2009). More specifically, David Phillips (2009) finds a correlation between airplane accident fatalities after newspaper reports about suicide- homicide, and argues that “that the impact of newspaper stories may be at once more general and more grave than was previously suspected” (p. 72). According to his research, airplane fatalities increased in areas with

high print media focus on murder-suicide incidents. However, his study does not include the study of certain other factors that may trigger these critical incidents, including demographic factors (e.g., age and gender), socio-cultural (e.g., loss of employment), and psychological (e.g., mental health problems) contexts.

Framing research includes scholarship on media frames, audience frames, and a combination of the two. Of particular interest to this study represents research on media frames that focuses on how framing actors, including the political elite and reporters gather, interpret, and represent critical events via news frames to the audience (Reese, 2001, Norris, et al., 2003). The interaction between message producers, called frame builders, and message receivers forms the center of the media effects research and its theories, including cultivation analysis, agenda setting, priming, framing, and social cognitive theories. In the past 30 years, framing as a developing research method has generated a growing research interest within the media effects discipline (Van Gorp, 2005; Weaver, 2007; Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2007; Bryant & Oliver, 2009).

Given the orientation of this study, the framing model is applicable as a theoretical background to analyze possible modifications of news frames in the presentation of an issue. Entman defines framing as a structuring process in the representation of the perceived reality “in such a way as to promote a particular *problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation*” (Entman 1993, p. 52, emphasis added). Using Entman’s definition as a starting point, Reese and Lewis (2009) describe frames as a “socially shared organizing principles,” arguing that the “war on terror” remains uncontested in the U.S. press and it legitimizes political and military actions. With respect to Entman’s definition of frames, Eilders and

Lüter (2000) distinguish among prognostic, diagnostic, and identity-related frames. Their research supports that the German media focused on the prognostic aspects (“what has to be done?” p. 417) of the Kosovo War and they captured this event as “problematic and in need of alteration” (p.417). Moreover, the legitimacy of the war remained uncontested in the public discourse and variations of this debate depended on the newspapers’ political affiliations: the left-leaning, liberal papers condemned the war, conservative papers focused on the military actions, and the right-leaning media outlets emphasized the humanitarian and diplomatic aspects of the war.

This method also allows the researcher to examine gender stereotypes through specific keywords and catchphrases that frame the discourse. For example, research by Nacos (2005) shows similar stereotypical patterns of female politicians and terrorists, thus, news frames “reflect and reinforce deep-seated societal attitudes” (p.448). Likewise, Cappella and Jamieson describe frames as “rhetorical and stylistic choices, reliably identified in the news, that alter the interpretations of the topics treated and are a consistent part of the news environment” (1997, p. 39). Research finds that the U.S. news place female candidates in a double bind by linguistically framing them in terms of traditional feminine stereotypes, as well as opposing masculine ones which puts them into a lose-lose situation (Jamieson, 1995; Nacos, 2005; Krepstekies, Lypka, & Strand, 2007). For example, the negative media focus on female candidates’ personalities, physical appearance, and personal lives creates barriers for women who run for political office. However, when women try to offset their femininity by being more aggressive, they are perceived as overly aggressive. Thus, female candidates are placed in a “Catch 22” situation (Jamieson, 1995, p.6).

The above mentioned findings indicate the media shape worldviews through frames and news reports based on framing hierarchy and other biases define western public discourse. In general, both American and European news embrace the government perspective, promotes the “war fever,” retaliation, and patriotism (Eilders, 2000; Kellner, 2002, Schaefer, 2003; Nagar, 2010), deemphasizes background and context (Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008), reinforces cultural stereotypes (Nacos, 2005), and perpetuates a cultural standard that portrays alleged perpetrators and Muslims negatively (Reese & Lewis, 2009; Nacos, 2005; Nagar, 2010). In addition, the political correctness debate also influences terrorism labels: the western press frames Islamic violence as “terrorism” when it is linked to al-Qaida as opposed to the Christian/Jewish political violence (Nagar, 2010).

Rather than studying public response to the media coverage of terrorism through the sender-receiver communication channel, this research focuses on the framing differences of the same two critical events among various news outlets through the most frequent labels and keywords. Since frames reinforce messages deemed important by the most powerful framing actor (e.g., the government), the absence of labels and key frames is also noted as elements ignored in the main discourse. Theoretical developments in this thesis relate to Iyengar’s episodic and thematic framing types (1991), and Entman’s cascading activation model (2003) to evaluate whether print news coverage supports the official perspective or whether it interchanges frames in critical events. These theorists point out that the salience of a critical event is determined by the hierarchy of the framing actors in the mediated communication. Following the sociological approach, Iyengar’s analysis of television news distinguishes between episodic framing and thematic news

framing (1991). His study corroborates that during the 1980s, American television news predominantly covered terrorist acts episodically— more drama-oriented frames that provide no context —, as opposed to the thematic framing in Britain that included in-depth coverage about the event. Moreover, Iyengar has found that exposure to episodic reporting makes viewers less likely to hold public officials accountable for terrorist events and also less likely to hold them responsible for solving it. His study has revealed that the attribution of responsibility depends on how the news story frames the issue. As defined by Iyengar, “causal responsibility focuses on the origin of a problem, while treatment responsibility focuses on who or what has the power to alleviate the problem” (Iyengar, p. 8). By presenting the news in either thematic or episodic form, the story influences attributions of responsibility both for the creation of terrorism (causal responsibility) and for the resolution of terrorism (treatment responsibility) (p. 3).

Conversely, a similar study (Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008) on terrorism-related coverage supports that the U.K. media used thematic frames with context and background within the diplomacy frame, as opposed to the event-oriented coverage in the U.S. media that uses the military frame. These authors argue that the fundamental differences between U.S. and U.K. media are found in the diverse orientations of the press in these countries. The British “sacerdotal” press tends to cover crisis events thematically, using multiple views and less drama as opposed to the event-focused, pragmatic American media emphasize news values and episodic coverage.

In a different vein, Schaefer (2003) investigates similarities in terrorism-related coverage in American and African newspapers. While his research found that culture differences did not play an important role in the media framing of these attacks, coverage

was influenced by the physical proximity of the events, governmental sources, local tint (reporters localized these events), and worldviews. For example, American and African newspapers portrayed the U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and in Dar es Salaam in 1998 predominantly from an ethnocentric perspective: African newspapers framed these events as a consequence of American foreign policies, while American newspapers framed these events from the superpower perspective. In a later study, Schaefer notes the framing struggle in the domestic news of the attacks in Kenya in 1998 in Nairobi and 2002 in Mombasa. While the Nairobi events received more dominant coverage in the local media as compared to the events in Mombasa because of the proximity of the events to the newspapers' offices, the local media evaluated these stories like the western media, based on the newsworthiness criteria and "production values."

Other scholars classify frames as strategic or issue-oriented frames. According to Druckman (2004), strategic frames focus on the strategy of a political, social or economic actor in a campaign or regarding a certain issue (i.e., a critical event is framed from the perspective of U.S. foreign relations). Issue frames explore a particular issue in a more in-depth manner, providing multiple news sources and story angles (i.e., the reporter provides the background on an event and provides the cultural, social, political, and other factors that contributed to the evolution of this event).

But definitions in this study are adopted from Entman's research. A dominant news frame has "the highest probability of being noticed, processed, and accepted by the most people" (Entman, 1993, p. 56). A frame enters public discourse if it is "noticeable, understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged" and if it culturally resonates with the public value and belief systems (Entman, 2003, p. 417). Entman's media framing

model explains how the press depicts reality. Following Entman's approach to framing, this analysis focuses on a specific detail of two critical events through descriptive and figurative language. In this thesis, framing is defined as the discourse structure whereby frames are used by frame builders, including media, government, and terrorist organizations to (mis)inform the public and legitimize political and military actions.

Entman's cascading network activation model (2003) is the theoretical map of the joint strategic communication among frame builders. According to this model, frames are formed on the top level of communication; thus, the political elite has the most framing power (2003, p. 419). The framing struggle and the cascading activation model are exemplified in news narratives about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. News narratives predominantly adopted the U.S. government's view and minimized the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories (Handley, 2010). This example shows the government's and military's framing power of a critical event to promote their agenda.

Several scholars assert that the power of framing events depends on how issues come to be understood by the public (Jones, 1994; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994; Stone, 1997; Ball-Rokeach, 1998; Hayden, 2003; Entman, 2003, 2004, 2007). These analyses have pointed out that, among the communicators, the political establishment has the most frame-construction power (Entman, 2007). In line with the aforementioned thematic and episodic framing models (Iyengar, 1991), the cascading network activation model (Entman, 2003), and following the comparative research line on terrorism events, this study proposes to analyze whether the government's viewpoint dominates American and European news rhetoric, whether the coverage of these events depends on the incidents' proximity to the homeland, whether these news frames reference European or American



interests in the war on terror, and whether these frames are impacted by American and European worldviews.

Furthermore, Entman proposed the adoption of media bias as a research tool and as an overarching concept that ties agenda setting, framing, and priming into a metatheory (2007). The content bias (e.g., the promotion of the government's views) and decision-making bias (e.g., rules within the news industry) as opposed to the distortion bias ("news that purportedly distorts and falsifies reality," p. 163) are focal points of this theory. However, Entman's distortion bias definition overlaps with the news slant definition "in which the framing favors one side over the other in a current or potential dispute" (p. 165). According to Entman's formula, news slant depends on the perceived facts and reports from official sources, and it is subject to decision biases within the framing factors, opposition, individual biases, and other variables, including the event context (p. 167), the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (market share of the news outlet), and technology (p. 167). However, Entman's research supports the changing dynamic of this formula depends on the communication skills of the political elites, the media, and on other variables. Because of these changing factors, the adoption of the news slant as a research tool proves to be difficult, but, within the framing concept, this formula can be included in future research designs. Parts of this formula, including the use of official sources by the media and the event context, have been adopted in this study. Including other factors in this research would have provided richer data but it would have also extended the research time for this thesis. For simplicity, most of these other factors were eliminated from this study.

Corresponding to these works, a growing number of studies have established that the national mainstream rhetoric, frames that “simplify, prioritize, and structure the narrative flow of events” (Norris, Kern & Just, 2003), adopted the official perspective during crises; and government sources dominated the episodic framing of critical events (Weimann & Brosius, 1991; Bryant & Oliver, 2009, Lim & Seo, 2009). This framing style became central because of the accessibility of the news frames to the public (Weimann & Brosius, 1991; Bryant & Oliver, 2009, Lim & Seo, 2009). Contemporary framing research on media bias also substantiates that this power struggle to influence the public through the media creates framing bias in the media coverage of political scandals (Albrecht, 2005), trade policies (Swenson, 2003), war (Groshek, 2008), stem-cell research (Fahmy, 2010), immigration (Van Gorp, 2005), separatism (Pokalova, 2010), the launch of the Euro currency (De Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001), and terrorist events (Altheide, 1987; Weimann & Brosius, 1991; Norris, et al. 2003; Danis & Stohl, 2008). Moreover, studies have found that socio-cultural identities shape media consumers’ worldviews and that the news has to be accessible and to culturally resonate with the public to influence perceptions (Norris, et al., 2003). The above-mentioned research line shifted the paradigm of the framing research tradition because these scholars proposed studying framing integrated into the broader cultural, social, and political contexts. This holistic approach to the study of the media bias through framing is employed in this paper.

For example, Traugott and Brader’s research (2002) suggests that the episodic framing following the thematic coverage of terrorism in the *U.S. News and World Report* between September 10, 2001 and April 17, 2002, left out the context and the causes of

these events. Additionally, comparative studies by Norris, Kern, & Just (2003) and by Papacharissi and Oliveira (2008) revealed rhetorical differences in coverage of terrorism among U.S. and U.K. newspapers. The U.S. media outlets tended to frame critical events episodically (dramatic coverage with a focus on the military and policy agendas), while British newspapers offered a more thematic coverage (context with a focus on diplomatic framing). In line with these studies by Papacharissi and Oliveira (2008), this paper contributes to the framing research within the socio-cultural context by including the Eastern and Western European news outlets to establish possible cultural differences across newspapers and nations.

In a broader context, the media effects field offers insight on the theoretical evolution of mass communications. Scholarly debates on the framing model reflect the polarized views on the evolution of the media effects discipline. On one hand, McQuail's three-stage media effects model based on the minimal and maximal effects schism classifies the theoretical progress of the media effects as a cyclical evolution from the strong media effects, to the minimal effects, and then a return to the strong effects model (1994). In contrast, Neuman and Guggenheim (2009) refute the weak/strong media effects dichotomy, arguing that this tradition disregards lesser known theories. Their analysis suggests that theoretical papers written by known researchers are more widely cited in literature compared to articles written by less known scholars. Neuman and Guggenheim's "Six Media Effects Cluster of 29 Theories" (p.39) considers the lesser known theories to identify gaps in scholarship. Their approach is based on a review of scholarly articles on media effects written between 1956 and 2005 and on the approach based "on theoretical accumulation and refinement, as assessed by actual patterns of

citation, not encamped opposition over an irresolvable philosophical and ironically rather one-sided dispute about whether effects are, in essence, really big or really little” (Neuman & Guggenheim, 2009, p.11). This media effects model includes the persuasion models, active audience models, social context models, social and media models, interpretive effects models, and the new media models. Of particular interest for this research is the interpretive effects models group in mass communications, which includes the agenda setting theory, priming, and framing as interrelated theories.

Moreover, several theoretical analysts argue that there is a fragmentation in the mass communications theories. Scholarly debates on the theoretical evolution of the media effects discipline, the polemics between the metatheoretical or multitheoretical schools of thought, the dissimilar methodological approaches, and the ambiguous research findings attest that there is no consensus on these theories, their applicability, definitions, or methodology. Some critics assert that the lack of consistent definitions of the framing concept and debates about the psychological and sociological origins of this term have led to diverse research traditions and methodological approaches (Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Hallahan, 1999; Scheufele, 2000; Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2007; Bryant & Oliver, 2009). Specifically, Tewksbury and Scheufele (2007) further Goffman’s concept of the media as a social force and define “interpretive schemas” as “category systems that humans use to classify information” (p. 18). In line with McQuail (2000) and Van Gorp’s research (2005), Tewksbury and Scheufele argue that framing is “both a macro level and micro level construct” (2007, p. 12) because it refers to communicators’ “modes of presentation”— in other words, to the way the audience construes messages from the

media. Future research may provide an alternative approach to these theories that are still evolving.

Of particular interest to this study are the concepts deriving from the media centrality, including social reality, news gathering, and news accessibility that further the framing concept. One principle in the framing research is the differentiation between “objective reality” and “social reality,” the latter being defined as “the pictures inside our heads” (Lippman, 1922, p.3). Media theorists agree that news outlets influence the public on critical issues through recurring textual and visual cues, which are defined as news frames, and contribute to the construction of social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Tuchman, 1978; Hallahan, 1999). Continuing the notion of the media centrality, “any serious analysis of American life and culture — and increasingly, much of Western culture — must consider media materials” (Altheide, 1996, p. 45). Furthermore, Altheide describes news frames as “overlapping concepts that aim to capture emphasis and meaning” in qualitative research. Altheide has studied news frames from the perspective of the accessibility of the news: “what we’ll be discussing, how it will be discussed, and above all, how it will not be discussed” (1996, p. 31).

Another term deriving from the centrality of the media is news gathering. This communication process among the framing factors is a social activity (Goffman, 1974) and a social structuring of reality (Altheide, 1996). However, the relationship between news gathering and media framing has been the focus in the mass communications literature and in other disciplines. Therefore, before critically evaluating the literature on framing, it is necessary to discuss the philosophical perspectives of this model within the mass communication research and other disciplines.

The two philosophical perspectives relevant to this study include the exclusionist Kuhnian (1962) and integrationist Lakatosian (1974). These schools of thought reflect divergent research traditions in mass communications (D'Angelo, 2002). Exclusionists following Thomas Kuhn's perspective argue for the theoretical development of framing within mass communications which bolsters it as a "scientific" discipline and as a "normal science" (D'Angelo, p. 872). Within the Kuhnian philosophy, Entman disputes that definitions from other disciplines lead to the "fractured paradigm" in mass communications (Entman, 1993, p. 51) and calls for a "consistent framing theory." Entman defines paradigm as "a general theory that informs a body of scholarship on the outcomes and operation of any particular system of thought or action" (p.51). Critics insist that the metatheory view leads to "the discipline's identity crisis" (D'Angelo, p. 874).

In contrast, the integrationist Imre Lakatos philosophy regards mass communications as interrelated with other disciplines and studies it through multiple theories, arguing that the "theoretical and paradigmatic diversity has led to a comprehensive view of the framing process" (D'Angelo, 2002, p.870). In support of the Lakatosian "positive heuristic" principles, D'Angelo's (2002) "multiparadigmatic" view considers framing as a model integrated into a "research program" (p.871), fermented by other theories and disciplines. These two competing theoretical axioms are important for this research because they tie the previously mentioned concepts into larger frameworks called paradigms that provide the foundations for this study. In particular, D'Angelo proposes the comparative approach to the "three paradigms in the news framing research program" (2002, p. 875): the constructionist, the cognitive, and the critical paradigms.

The constructivist paradigm is characterized by the “co-optation” (the media act as a mediator between the political elite and the public); the cognitive paradigm is defined by “negotiation” (frame interpretations depend on the individual’s existing knowledge and culture); and the critical paradigm is illustrated by “domination” (news frames depend on the political elite) (2002, p. 875). In support of D’Angelo’s research, this chapter reconceptualizes framing as an evolving theory within the media effects scholarship to study the international news discourse on terrorism within the social, political, and cultural contexts.

Other theoretical polemics address the treatment of the media effects theories as separate, or as part of an umbrella theory. A detailed explanation of the debate about these arguments is beyond the scope of this research; instead the theoretical developments and related concepts to the framing model are highlighted. Specifically, some theorists consider news framing as a distinctive media effects theory (Scheufele, 2000), while others define it as an effect of agenda setting because of its opinion-forming function (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver, 1997; Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Entman, 2007). For instance, in furthering Goffman’s concept of news-gathering as a social activity, Scheufele and Tewksbury regard priming and agenda setting as related “memory-based models of information processing” in which the audience structures the information: “both media framing and agenda building refer to macroscopic mechanisms that deal with message production rather than media effects” (2007, p. 12). In other words, through the selection of salient news that is accessible, the press influences the audience through its own agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 1968, 1972, 1976; Bantimaroudis, 2007). In contrast, these scholars theorize that framing is not a memory-based model, but rather a

macro- and micro-level model dependent on the individual's "interpretive schemas" (p. 12) or "primary frameworks" (Goffman, 1974, p. 24).

Entman, however, calls for the integration of the agenda-setting, priming, and framing as a metatheory that allows the researcher to establish patterns of content bias in the news frames. Entman defines frames as text narratives that "favor one side over the other in a current or potential dispute" (2007, p. 165) to encourage a particular interpretation of an event. Additionally, priming is the filter of a news frame through the individual preferences of the audience. Entman argues that framing and priming are influenced by the media agenda setting that "defines problems worthy of public and government attention" (Entman, 2007, p. 164). Contemporary research suggests that the placement of the news reveals the salience of the news; therefore, this research identifies and compares news framing patterns through textual narratives, placement of the news, and the theoretical framework of framing. Due to time limitations, the application of related theories, including priming and agenda setting, was eliminated. Identifying schemas that provoke audience reactions would have required adopting additional research methods, including questionnaires or interviews with media consumers that would have lengthened the research process, but these methods would have provided a better understanding about the media-terrorism-audience relationship.

Recent scholarship on media effects, however, redefines the media-induced hegemony paradigm in the dynamic new media ecology. In the online media environment, the audience becomes the fourth key factor in the communication process because the public controls and aggregates the news along with the traditional gatekeepers, including the news outlets, interest groups, and political establishments.



Much of the current research regards the online mass communications system as decentralized, fragmented, and interdependent with traditional gatekeepers. While public opinion is influenced by the traditional media environment in which certain details may be stressed (Ball-Rokeach, 1998; Iyengar, 1990; Chaffee & Metzger, 2001; Hayden, 2003; Entman, 2003, 2004), the audience may receive alternative news frames online. Some critics have suggested that discourse on critical issues may be less likely to occur online where the public opinion becomes fragmented. Therefore, the changing patterns in media consumption, such as Negroponte's customized media consumption notion, the "daily me" (Negroponte, 1995), and the rise of the social media urge theorists to redefine agenda setting and framing (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001) within the new media ecology. However, this fragmentation in the online media makes the study of news frames more complex and it is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Academic inquiry of news framing of critical events remains a hot research topic because of the flexibility of the framing model that synchronizes the empirical and normative understanding of critical issues in politics, media, and public opinion. However, a new offshoot of framing considers the ensemble of societal, political, cultural, and individual factors that influence news frames. These factors include proximity, education, family, moral values, and peers. Further research would require a synthesis of the most current research on framing applied in other scholarship areas to redefine this theory in the new media context.

## **Research Questions**

This thesis draws from studies that examine framing on macro- and micro levels and within the societal, professional, and cultural norms. Advancing the cascading activation model and framing concept, this paper compares news frames in different media because frames from these largely available news outlets are the most likely to be recycled and interpreted by other media, political actors, and audience. Drawing upon Weimann's and Brosius's research on newsworthiness factors (1991), Altheide's concept on the accessibility of the news (1993), and Entman's framing hierarchy theory, this research proposes to analyze possible framing differences or similarities. This cross-national investigation focuses on the quantity of reporting, as well as the quality of reporting, through a content analysis of news discourse in the *USA Today* and *The New York Times* in the U.S., *The Guardian* and *The Sun* in the U.K., *Corriere della Sera* and *La Stampa* in Italy, and *Die Welt*, *Welt am Sonntag*, *Bild am Sonntag*, and *Der Spiegel* in Germany. Narratives of the terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2002 and the train bombings in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004 were evaluated in socio-cultural contexts to establish whether news frame shifts are inherent in professional, cultural, and political biases. The spotlight is on proximity and prominence, news sources, main topics, dominant keywords, tone, and portrayal of the perpetrators and victims as key factors in the framing model. The research questions are formulated:

*RQ 1: How do mainstream American and European media outlets cover the same two terrorist events?*

*RQ 2: What are the themes about terrorist events in the mentioned periodicals?*

The next chapter discusses the research methodology, including the selection process for the articles, events, news outlets, time period, the employed research method, research instruments, and the coding process. Studies are discussed only in reference to the research methodology in this study.

### **Chapter 3: Research Methodology**

To answer the research questions posted in this study, two post-9/11 incidents were analyzed to survey whether the media treatment of these attacks was affected by the metaframes of "9/11," "us versus them," "the war on terror," and the government's rhetoric. These occurrences were selected using the following criteria: these attacks had to have happened in or after 2002 (because the databases contained data from 2002), they had to be covered in American and European news, and they had to include terrorist acts that challenged American and European status quos. News narratives of 10/12 and 3/11 are investigated within the cultural, economic, and political contexts of these events using content analysis.

The attacks and media outlets were purposefully selected to avoid repeating prior studies. Particular incidents and international periodicals were analyzed because there is less comparative research on these events and media outlets. Therefore, findings are not generalizable; instead, conclusions relate strictly to the above-mentioned events and periodicals. The following incidents were selected: the suicide bombings and car bombings in the tourist district in Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2002 (10/12) and the train bombings in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004 (3/11). The first set of events led to the deaths of 202 people in Bali, targeted U.S. consulates and tourists, and were connected to the terrorist cell Jemaah Islamiyah. These incidents that occurred outside of the U.S. were selected to test American versus European coverage of violent incidents that targeted U.S. interests. As they were tied to U.S. interests, more coverage of these

incidents in American newspapers was expected. The second set of occurrences, the four train bombings in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004 led to the deaths of 191 people. These attacks were initially blamed on ETA and later on al-Qaida. These incidents were chosen to compare media coverage of crises that involved E.U. interests because they happened in Europe.

According to framing literature, both national and international media cover critical events differently. The British press emphasizes the contexts of these events within the community and diplomacy frames. In contrast, the military frame and al-Qaida dominate American event- oriented news narratives (Brinson & Stohl, 2009). These reports provide, in general, a one-sided coverage of crises, representing the agendas of political elites. Research also suggests that domestic terrorist events get more coverage in national press. In line with these works, more media coverage on the Madrid attacks in the European periodicals was expected because they occurred on that continent, and less coverage on 10/11 in both European and American news was expected because these events occurred in Bali, Indonesia.

The events were selected from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) of the University of Maryland to test previous research findings concluding that international crises get less coverage in the local press and that the general media focus is increased on events tied to U.S. interests. The GTD database fulfills the selection criteria because this is the most up-to-date database on national and international terrorist events.

While the circumstances of the chosen incidents are diverse, similarities between these events allow for comparison. These attacks have different targets (hard, mixed or soft targets) and impacts, but both relate to the identity-based grievances of the terrorists

(Silverman, 2002), have similar amount of casualties, and are widely covered in the media. In addition, these critical events may help illuminate larger issues about the relationship between culture and media, the possible interrelation among ideologies, policies, and news frames, and the adoption of the dominant frames by legitimate sources in the international press.

Critics argue that few studies on terrorist events have taken a comparative approach (Weimann & Brosius, 1991, Reese & Lewis, 2009; Schoemaker, Whang, & Zhang, 2010). Initially, the sample included Eastern European countries, including Romania and Hungary, but these countries were eliminated because no available databases provided access to this data. In addition, the Spanish media was excluded from the initial sample because, based on a survey of the headlines in Spanish newspapers, the train bombings in Spain received predominant media coverage in that country.

The present research design applies the comparative framework to analyze framing struggles in one media platform (periodicals) across nations. European periodicals are examined side-by-side with U.S. newspapers to evaluate trends and news framing differences of the same crises in news outlets, among social, cultural, and political contexts. Britain, Italy, and Germany represent the European media. Because these countries had accessible news archives of the coverage of these critical events, they were comparable samples to the U.S. media. Finally, these countries are U.S. allies in the war on terror and they are part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that leads the global war on terrorism using military and political means. Despite public criticism, governments in the mentioned countries support this war; however, they differ in the use of the phrase “war on terrorism” and conflict resolution methods (soft versus

hard approach). European countries prefer a solution within the civil liberties and human rights, as opposed to the military approach led by the U.S.

Mainstream or popular news outlets were chosen because they have the largest circulations and dominate a media landscape nationally and locally. Moreover, research suggests that newspapers include more in-depth coverage of events (Krippendorff & Bock, 2009), they are considered credible news sources and are widely cited in other media outlets (Handely, 2010). Periodicals are the medium of study for practical reasons; they are translated in English and researchable through the Access World News database, and print media remain available and affordable to the public. Print media also provide a more nuanced view of whether or not journalists convey or modify frames to provide context to issues (Reese & Lewis, 2009, Weber, 2009). Periodicals are preferable to the online platform, which requires technological knowledge, a computer, and internet connection. Comparing disparate media would have been difficult because of the inaccessibility of all the archives stored on the media outlets' websites or in databases.

The following media outlets in four countries are analyzed: *USA Today* and *The New York Times* in the U.S., *The Guardian* and *The Sun* in the U.K., *Corriere della Sera* and *La Stampa* in Italy, and *Die Welt* and *Der Spiegel* in Germany. These are nationally distributed newspapers with the widest readership in their home countries, with the exception of *Der Spiegel* and *Bild am Sonntag* news magazines. These periodicals were included in the sample pool because they were the only other print news sources from Germany available through the Access World News database. Additionally, the weekend editions-*Welt am Sonntag* and *Bild am Sonntag* were included in the pool. Choosing another newspaper in Germany through another database would have lengthened the

research process because it would have required the translation of all the news articles into English.

Contemporary research methodology suggests the adoption of the “institutional roles” of the news outlets (Krippendorff & Bock, 2009). Earlier studies also indicate that the periodicals’ political and economic affiliations determine the media treatment of those events in those news outlets. Specifically, Puglisi concludes that, during presidential campaigns, the Democratic leaning *New York Times* emphasized topics in line with the democratic ideology, including healthcare, civil rights, labor, and social welfare (2004). Additionally, research by Brinson and Stohl (2009) on the media coverage of the London bombings in 2005 and of the transatlantic terror plot in 2006 finds that the conservative *Wall Street Journal* and *The London Times* adopted the governments’ perspectives, as opposed to the community-oriented coverage in the liberal *Los Angeles Times*, *The New York Times* in the U.S. and *The Independent* and *The Guardian* in the U.K. In a similar vein, Eilders and Lüter (2000) report that conservative German media outlets emphasized the military frame and German liberal newspapers highlighted the humanitarian and diplomatic efforts in the coverage of the Kosovo war. Expanding on this literature, this study clarifies whether Italian and German papers adopt frames from U.S. and U.K. elite media or they reframe these events based on the media outlets’ political affiliation or the cultural frames in those countries. Additionally, the way the political elite portrays these events in news discourse and the identification of these framing contests provides a more in-depth analysis of the strategic communication during crises.



Data on the average daily circulation and the political and economical affiliation of the periodicals, shown in table 1, were obtained from the Audit Circulation Bureaus (ACB) of these countries, including the Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern (for the German media market), the European Journalism Center, Wordpress (n.d.), and scholarly articles (Eilders, 1996; Koopmans & Statham, 1999, Eilders & Lüter , 2000; Puglisi, 2004, Brinson & Stohl, 2009). The characteristics of the periodicals are as follows: the private ownership, mainstream media organizations, researchable archives, and existent coverage of the mentioned events. U.S. newspapers are in general on the center-right, democratic political spectrum, European media tend to navigate towards the center-left side of the political spectrum.

Table 1: News Outlets’ Circulation, Political, and Economical Affiliations

News outlet	Circulation	Economical alignment	Political affiliation
USA Today	1, 830,594	Gannett Company	center-left
The New York Times	876,638	The New York Times Company	center-left
The Sun	2,904,180	News International	conservative/populist
The Guardian	283,063	Guardian Media Group	center-left/liberal
Corriere della Sera	664,000	RCS MediaGroup	centrist
La Stampa	314,117	Fiat Group	centrist
die Welt	209,000	Axel Springer GmbH	conservative
der Spiegel	1,113,000	SPIEGEL Verlag Rudolf Augstein GmbH & Co. KG	liberal
Bild am Sonntag	3,800.000	Axel Springer GmbH	conservative
Welt am Sonntag	209,000	Axel Springer GmbH	conservative

Sources: IVW - Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e.V. (n.d.), Eilders & Lüter (2000), World Association of Newspapers (2005), Larcinese, V., Puglisi, R., & Snyder, Jr. J. M. (2007), Wordpress.org (n.d.), Brinson & Stohl (2009).

The Access World News database was the preferred database for the sample collection because it provides an English translation for the BBC selected articles in mainstream media and it is available on USF’s library webpage. The database’s reliance

on the BBC selection criteria constitutes a weak point in this research because these criteria are not specified.

The entire article, including title, headline, and body text, served as the unit of analysis. Articles were retrieved for each event based on the following selection criteria. First, the articles chosen consisted of at least one sentence in addition to the headline. Second, the location of the incident (“Bali,” “Indonesia” and “Madrid,” “Spain,”) and the year when the incident happened (“2002” and “2004”) were inserted in the search box as keywords. Third, “terrorism,” “bombing” and other keywords were excluded from the data collection because these terms may or may not have been mentioned in reports, especially in the initial phase of these events. Hence, the sample includes all printed articles that refer to one of the two terrorist events, filtering out sports pieces, illustrations, announcements, and advertising. The analysis of photographs and the online multimedia content has been eliminated from this study because still images and multimedia content were incomplete or inaccessible through the Access World News database. Fourth, all the articles that do not strictly relate to the mentioned events were eliminated. Finally, the remaining stories were saved as a text file; duplicates were eliminated from this pool, the remaining samples were numbered and printed out. A total of 502 articles that referenced one of the two terrorist attacks were coded: for the event in Bali a total of 198 were included in the analysis and for the event in Spain a total of 304 articles were selected.

Previous research indicates that critical events remain on media agenda until the public demand for the perpetrators’ accountability is met (Liebes, 1998). Furthermore, across the entire period of media coverage, the initial surge in media focus diminished

one month after these events (Traugott & Brader, 2002). However, because of time and resource limitations, the period of time for my research was one month from the starting points of the events. The initial, intense coverage of such events impacts the follow-up coverage of these incidents (e.g., it sets the tone and main frames in stories) and it impacts international policies and public opinion often through one-sided coverage of crises.

Media treatment of the same two critical events is investigated using the framing approach because frames delineate issues (Entman, 1993) and classify themes (Gamson, 1992) in a media text to analyze trends, recurring themes, and possible biases within cultural dynamics across media. Additionally, the research method employs content analysis which is a preferred empirical method for textual investigations to determine the way recorded messages have been delivered (Stacks, 2002; Krippendorff & Bock, 2009, see studies by Gerber, Allport, and Tenney in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century). Iyengar defines content analysis as “a systematic effort to classify textual material” (1994, p. 18). The method permits the methodical analysis of “latent units” (Stacks, 2002, p. 111) called themes or frames (De Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001) and frame shifts through the classification of words and phrases and the analysis of their frequencies. Literature suggests that frequency measures expose messages deemed important by frame builders (Dovring, 2009). However, critics argue that this method regards only messages that have been produced or created, therefore this method can’t be applied to online content because that content might change over time (Stacks, 2002). Furthermore, Weber states that, through this research method, the researcher may reveal worldviews and explain differences in media focus:

When an English lord marries an American woman, the American press publishes details of her physical and psychological attributes, including her dowry, while a respectable German newspaper, following views prevailing here, would spurn such publicity. Where do such differences originate?...Which worldview underlies the one tendency or the other? (2009, p.11)

This study explores frame shifts of the same two terrorist events within the cultural and political contexts because, arguably, these larger contexts shape the audience's perceptions of these incidents. Messages on crises are influenced by framing actors, for that reason, the media text is treated as a flexible script/communication that flows between framing actors and audience. The analysis of changes in news rhetoric and fluctuation of dominant frames also reflects the dynamic of this strategic communication between framing actors. The meaning extraction method used in combination with word frequency measures allows the identification of news framing differences and news sources to establish how framing actors frame events for national and international audiences.

The exploration of textual features requires various content analysis softwares, human coders or a combination of these two methods (Krippendorff & Bock, 2009). In this research, all the articles pertaining to the two events were included in the sample, the coding process and the counting of frequencies were done manually, and then, the data was evaluated in SPSS. Arguably, human coding is labor intensive, time consuming, and it is prone to bias, but this process allows the coding of nuanced messages, including the tone and the perspective of the articles. Feedback from the second coder allowed for a refinement of the coding book, thus improving inter-coder reliability. While computerized content analysis is less time consuming, this method does not allow the

coding of nuanced messages and it is dependent on a predetermined word list, a dictionary.

The research instruments used in this study are the selected 502 articles and the coding book. The design of the coding book (Appendix 1) follows the coding instructions of Cappella, Mittermaier, Weiner, Humphreys, Falcone, and Giorno (2009) (Table 2) because their study about framing cancer and other diseases was one of the few studies with a detailed description of the research process, including the sampling phase, coding structure, coding book, and the criteria for exclusion or inclusion of articles in the sample pool.

Table 2: General Coding Instructions

Coder ID#
Newspapers
Date of newspaper article
Location of the article (page, section, and story number)
Length (word count)
Title
Main topic
Sources
Themes

(Cappella, Mittermaier, Weiner, Humphreys, Falcone, & Giorno (2009, p. 253).

Through five meetings with the second coder, questions, as well as guidelines in the coding book, were redefined to make them clearer, more accurate, and pertinent to the goals of this study. For instance, after the coding of a sample of 20 articles, the war on terror frame was included as a key term in the coding book because this frame was present in news rhetoric. Additionally, the absence of the Other, including the Muslim community, was noted.

The research questions establish the foundation for this analysis. These questions were developed through an initial pilot test and then, subsequently, revised along with the changes in the coding book “to reflect the analyst’s implicit or explicit research questions” (MacQueen, McLellan, Kay, & Milstein, 2009, p. 213).

The following research questions are explored:

*RQ 1: How do American and European news report on 10/12 and 3/11?*

*RQ 2: What are the themes in the news rhetoric on terrorism?*

These questions focus on the analysis of the news discourse differences in mainstream periodicals because discourse variations are palpable in frames and themes. Thematic and episodic (Iyengar, 1991), and strategic and issue frames (Druckman, 2004) were included in the coding book. As described by Iyengar, episodic frames portray public issues with a narrow focus, and thematic frames present them in general or abstract contexts. Strategic frames focus on the strategy of a political, social or economic actor in a campaign or regarding a certain issue, and issue frames explore a particular issue more in-depth. Frame builders prioritize certain information in such frames; the framing struggle between the political elite and journalists, as well as changes in frames illuminate legitimizations of political and military actions, and ultimately shape the public view about crises and the Middle East.

Frames were determined based on the most frequent labels in news articles. A list of positive, negative, and neutral labels and key words were compiled in the coding book. For example, when reporters included the “terrorist” label in the portrayal of the perpetrators, these labels were regarded as negative (“terrorist assassins” and “evil terrorists”). When combatants were mentioned as “alleged perpetrators,” these labels

were coded as neutral and when the perpetrators were regarded as “good neighbors,” “normal,” “business men,” and “nice boys,” these labels were coded as positive. Since “frames emphasize some ideas while oppressing others” (Nagar, 2010, p. 538), the absence of certain frames in discourse was also specified to determine missing information and parity frames (Entman, 1993).

Apart from these frames, additional categories and key terms were defined and coded to measure associations among these actors across media, including themes, metaphors, labels, and news values. The initial categories and key terms in the coding book were obtained from similar studies (see Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2002; Cappella, et al., 2009). They were operationalized and refined through an initial scanning of articles, trial and error, and inter-coder agreement. The main categories are the duration of the article (the number of days such stories appeared in the newspaper), the length of stories (word count), type of attack, portrayal of the victims and perpetrators, main news sources, tone and perspective of the article, claimed responsibility, and themes and topics in each news item. The purpose of each of these categories is as follows: story duration tracks how long the event remained on the media’s agenda; length of stories demonstrates the importance the media attach to an issue; type of attack, portrayal of the victims and perpetrators define the cultural contexts and the conflict frames; main news sources, tone, and perspective of the articles prognosticate the news outlets’ content policies and political affiliations.

First, the macro categories and micro terms were piloted on the coders, and then, the list of terms and the coding sheet were reexamined. The micro terms were scrambled and compiled in a list on the coding sheet. The goal was for the coders to categorize key

terms based on the context of the event and then to compare labels from the coding sheet. The macro categories included political, military, cultural, economic, entertainment, social, crime, infrastructure, unknown, and mixed (Appendix 3). Even though these categories overlap, they nevertheless are useful because they help define broader frames, including episodic, thematic, issue, and strategic frames. For example, the term “terrorist attacks” can be placed in the military category if it is used to justify the government’s view on the war on terrorism. This term can also be coded as a crime (if the main story is about the investigation), and diplomacy (if the main story is about the changes in E.U. policies against terrorism). The war on terror or war in Iraq frame can be included in the military (e.g., if it describes military actions in Iraq) and diplomacy (if it describes E.U. and U.S. relations) categories based on context.

When coding of micro terms and macro categories became problematic at times, the context of the story was a deciding factor in placing the terms in the categories. For example, in *The Guardian*’s article number 112 (Appendix 4) the main topic and dominant keywords required a careful examination of the story. The coders agreed that the story focus was how Romania and Spain dealt with the Romanian immigrants who survived the attacks in Madrid. Therefore, the coders decided that in this article, the main topic is immigration with the diplomacy frame (Spain promised to provide legal status for the victims, and Romania offered monetary compensation for those injured or the families of the dead).

The coding process in this study followed the structure mentioned in research by MacQueen, McLellan, Kay, and Milstein (1998). First, the raw material was selected from the database and saved as a text file. Then, the news frames, key words, and catch



phrases were identified in the articles, and the text was analyzed through coding, broken down into categories, and re-examined through an initial pilot test conducted by the author and second coder at the first meeting. The final coded categories are shown in table 3.

Table 3: Coding Book Structure

V1	Coder ID
V2	Coding date
V3	Article number
V4	Name of the media outlet
V5	Publication location
V6	Date of the story's publication
V7	Title of the article
V8	Location of the main incident
V9	Type of attack
V10	Main topic
V11	Dominant keywords
V12	Main sources
V13	Tone of the article
V14	Perspective
V15	Portrayal of perpetrators
V16	Nationality of perpetrators
V17	Portrayal of victims
V18	Nationality of targets
V19	Claimed responsibility
V20	Background
V21	References to other terrorist attacks
V22	References to specific incidents
V23	Strategic/Issue frames
V24	Episodic/Thematic frames
V25	Word count per article

Some of the data is relevant to establish the prominence of the events in the articles: geographic location of the incident, duration (the number of days such stories appeared in the newspapers); type of attack, news values (the number of victims and damages to the infrastructure), news sources, language used in stories, and portrayal of perpetrators and victims. Finally, the episodic, thematic, strategic, and issue frame categories were

employed (Iyengar, 1991; Druckmann, 2004). Once the categories and frames were agreed upon, the second coder assessed 20 percent of articles per event.

The second coder was a Ph.D. student in the Communication Department at USF. She was provided with a coding book and printouts of randomly selected articles from the pool of 502 articles. The second coder's sample included 20% of the all the articles per event, 25 news reports from the Bali event and 61 from the Madrid attacks. The random numbers for the selected articles were generated by Microsoft Excel software.

The training procedure was as follows: first, the researcher explained to the second coder this research's context and purpose, and the coding process that involved the coding of frequent terms, labels, and keywords. Then, the second coder evaluated the articles independently using the previously established categories in the coding book to analyze the media coverage's duration, type of attack, nationality of the targets and of the perpetrators, the main sources in the articles, and themes and topics addressed in the news (Appendix 1). After the initial pilot test, the ambiguous coding instructions, key words, categories, questions, guidelines, and definitions were reevaluated and agreed upon, and the coding process was repeated independently by the researcher and the second coder. During five meetings, the coding results were compared to assess the level of consistency in the coding process.

Although literature about inter-coder reliability is limited, Hak and Berntz define it as a complex phenomenon impacted by the second coder's knowledge and the coder's attitude toward the events, the quality of such coder's training, and "the development of such coder's subculture" (2009, p. 221), the follow-up communication, and the socialization between researcher and coder. Moreover, critics argue that human coders

are not reliable and suggest, instead, the use of content analysis software (Shapiro, 2009). However, some of the questions in the coding book, including the tone and the perspective of the article, were complex and would have produced errors in computational content analysis. Further aspects, such as the coders' existing knowledge about these events, academic and military experience, personal biases, and exposure to media environment may have influenced the decision-making strategy and thus, limit this study. As a result, a certain level of subjectivity from the coders is acceptable in this paper, as long as the conceptual framework is well-defined and the inter-coder reliability is met to establish the reproducibility of the research, transparency in coding, and coherency in rules, definitions, and questions in the coding book (Hak & Berntz, 2009). After the mediation of initial differences of ambiguous terms, the inter-coder reliability of 91% was established using Holsti's reliability formula (see Stacks, 2002, p. 116):

$$R. = 2m / n1 + n2,$$

where  $r$  is reliability,  $m$  is the number of the items agreed upon by the coders,  $n1$  = number of items for coder 1,  $n2$  = number of coding decisions made by coder 2.

In the next chapter the results on this content analysis will be reviewed. Data is broken down by newspapers, publication locations, location of the incident, type of attack, main topics, key words, news sources, story perspective, portrayal of perpetrators, nationality of perpetrators, portrayal of victims, nationality of victims, claimed responsibility, background on incidents, references to other attacks, and news frames, including strategic, episodic, as well as issue and strategic, to analyze news frames in mainstream European and American media.

## Chapter 4: Results

This research explores news frames of 10/12 and 3/11 across media and nations to establish possible frame shifts within American and European periodicals. This study attempts to answer the following questions:

RQ 1: How do mainstream American and European periodicals cover the same two terrorist events?

RQ 2: What are the themes of these incidents?

This chapter presents the data analysis used to answer these questions. The results are compiled into tables using frequencies to break down data by newspapers, publication locations, location of incidents, type of attacks, main topics, key words, news sources, story perspective, perpetrators, nationality of perpetrators, victims, nationality of victims, claimed responsibility, background on incidents, references to other attacks, strategic and issue frames, as well as episodic and thematic frames.

Tables 4 and 5 summarize the amount of published news articles about 10/12 and 3/11. The results indicate that 3/11 generated more media coverage overall than did 10/12. Both incidents received the widest coverage in *The Guardian*, followed by *The New York Time*, *The Sun*, and *USA Today*. The least amount of coverage was offered in German and Italian periodicals, *La Stampa* (.5%) and *Bild am Sonntag* (.5% and 7%).

Table 4: 10/12 Media Coverage

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
USA Today	11	5.6	5.6
The New York Times	47	23.7	29.3
The Guardian	110	55.6	84.8
The Sun	19	9.6	94.4
Corriere della Sera	2	1.0	95.5
La Stampa	1	.5	96.0
Die Welt/Welt am Sonntag	7	3.5	99.5
Bild am Sonntag	1	.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 5: 3/11 Media Coverage

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
USA Today	17	5.6	5.6
The New York Times	84	27.6	33.2
The Guardian	137	45.1	78.3
The Sun	41	13.5	91.8
Corriere della Sera	12	3.9	95.7
La Stampa	5	1.6	97.4
Die Welt/Welt am Sonntag	6	2.0	99.3
Bild am Sonntag	2	.7	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 6 and 7 break down the treatment by publication location. Results indicate that the English speaking press provided the most extensive reporting on 3/11 and 10/12 compared to German and Italian media outlets. Overall, 279 articles that focused on 3/11 were published in the U.S. and U.K. compared to 187 articles on 10/12. In addition, 25 articles were published on 3/11 in Italian and German periodicals compared to 11 news stories on 10/12.

Table 6: 3/11 Media Coverage- Publication location

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
United States	101	33.2	33.2
United Kingdom	178	58.6	91.8
Italy	17	5.6	97.4
Germany	8	2.6	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Table 7: 10/12 Media Coverage- Publication location

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
United States	47	23.7	23.7
United Kingdom	140	70.7	94.4
Italy	3	1.5	96.0
Germany	8	4.0	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Tables 8 and 9 summarize the location of the incident mentioned in the articles. Most published stories focused on the events in Bali and in Spain. Incidents in Thailand, Russia, Mauritius, Sudan, and Yemen were the least covered within the 10/12 reporting, and incidents in the Philippines, Morocco, Uzbekistan, Iraq, and Cuba were the least covered within the 3/11 reporting.

Table 8: 10/12 Media Coverage- Location of the Incident

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Bali, Indonesia	189	95.5	95.5
Phuket, Thailand	3	1.5	97.0
Chechnya, Russia	3	1.5	98.5
Mauritius	1	.5	99.0
Khartoum, Sudan	1	.5	99.5
Gulf of Aden, Yemen	1	.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 9: 3/11 Media Coverage- Location of the Incident

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Madrid, Spain	297	97.7	97.7
Manila, Philippine	2	.7	98.4
Casablanca, Morocco	1	.3	98.7
Uzbekistan	1	.3	99.0
Iraq	1	.3	99.3
Germany	1	.3	99.7
Guantanamo, Cuba	1	.3	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 10 and 11 exemplify the exposure based on the type of attacks. Results demonstrate that most articles referred to 3/11 and 10/12 as bombing incidents. Stories also depicted 10/12 as a terrorist threat and 3/11 as suicide acts. Few references included hijacking, kidnapping, maritime attack, and facility takeover.

Table 10: 10/12 Media Coverage- Type of Attack

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Bombing	185	93.4	93.4
Kidnapping	1	.5	93.9
Terrorism threat	10	5.1	99.0
Hijacking	1	.5	99.5
Maritime attack	1	.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 11: 3/11 Media Coverage- Type of Attack

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Bombing	295	97.0	97.0
Kidnapping	1	.3	97.4
Suicide	6	2.0	99.3
Facility takeover	1	.3	99.7
Not applicable	1	.3	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 12 and 13 indicate the main topics. More stories on 10/12 frame these events as a crime/catastrophe (42.9% of articles), followed by political/diplomacy (30.8%) and

economy/tourism (12.6%). Reports refer less to transportation, cultural, military, social, and other issues (27%). Most articles on 3/11 include the political/diplomacy angle (50.3%), followed by crime/catastrophe (31.6%), and economy (8.2%). Overall, the least mentioned frames remain culture (2.5% and 3%), military (1.5% and 2.3%), entertainment (.5% and 1%), social (1% and 7%), and transport (3% and 7%).

Table 12: 10/12 Media Coverage- Main Topic

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Political/Diplomacy	61	30.8	30.8
Military	3	1.5	32.3
Cultural/History	5	2.5	34.8
Economic/Tourism	25	12.6	47.5
Entertainment	1	.5	48.0
Crime/Catastrophe	85	42.9	90.9
Social	2	1.0	91.9
Transport	6	3.0	94.9
Other	10	5.1	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 13: 3/11 Media Coverage- Main Topic

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Political/Diplomacy	153	50.3	50.3
Military	7	2.3	52.6
Cultural/History	9	3.0	55.6
Economic/Tourism	25	8.2	63.8
Entertainment	3	1.0	64.8
Crime/Catastrophe	96	31.6	96.4
Social	2	.7	97.0
Transport	2	.7	97.7
Other	3	1.0	98.7
Total	304	100.0	100.0

Tables 14 and 15 highlight the key words in both events. The most frequently mentioned topics on 10/12 included war on terrorism (15.7%), terrorism attacks (11.6%),



descriptions of human suffering (13.1%), and background on terrorists (8.6%). The least mentioned terms in the 10/12 coverage included hate attacks on Islamic community, E.U. legislation, anti-demonstrations, investors' confidence, political corruption, research on terrorism, poverty, distrust, sports, clash of civilizations, education, budget deficit, and political corruption (all .5%). The 3/11 discourse was dominated by the war on terrorism (19.7%), terrorist attacks (11.5%), background on terrorists (11.2%), and defense and national security (7.2%). The least mentioned key words on 3/11 referenced the joint operation between ETA and al-Qaida, party conflicts, non-terrorism related conflicts, museum, celebrity, Graffiti, collective remembrance, multiculturalism, and torture (all .3%).

Table 14: 10/12 Media Coverage- Dominant Key Words

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Human suffering	26	13.1	13.1
Hate attacks	1	.5	13.6
Oil and defense links	2	1.0	14.6
Background on terrorists	17	8.6	23.2
Media criticism	4	2.0	25.3
E.U. legislation	1	.5	25.8
Weapons of mass destruction	3	1.5	27.3
Law and order	3	1.5	28.8
Terrorism combat	5	2.5	31.3
Defense and national security	4	2.0	33.3
Terrorism/attacks	23	11.6	44.9
War on terrorism	31	15.7	60.6
Condolence	12	6.1	66.7
Demonstrations	1	.5	67.2
Stocks and bonds	3	1.5	68.7
Tourism/travel	13	6.6	75.3
Al-Qaeda	15	7.6	82.8
Saddam Hussein	3	1.5	84.3
Bomb	6	3.0	87.4
Investors confidence	1	.5	87.9
Multiculturalism	3	1.5	89.4
Political corruption	1	.5	89.9
Research on terrorism	1	.5	90.4
Sports	2	1.0	91.4
Travel insurance	1	.5	91.9
Intelligence	8	4.0	96.0
School	1	.5	96.5
Clash of civilizations	1	.5	97.0
Butler keeps items	1	.5	97.5
Poverty	1	.5	98.0
Distrust	1	.5	98.5
Budget deficit	1	.5	99.0
Asia-Pacific economic cooperation	2	1.0	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 15: 3/11 Media Coverage- Dominant Key Words

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Collective remembrance	1	.3	.3
Human suffering	11	3.6	3.9
Hate attacks against minorities	2	.7	4.6
Torture	1	.3	4.9
Oil and defense links- Britain and Libya	2	.7	5.6
Suicide bombing	2	.7	6.3
Background on terrorists	34	11.2	17.4
Media criticism	2	.7	18.1
E.U. legislation	11	3.6	21.7
Border security	1	.3	22.0
Traffic/transport/travel	4	1.3	23.4
Museum	1	.3	23.7
Celebrity	1	.3	24.0
Transportation security	9	3.0	27.0
Human rights	2	.7	27.6
Data protection	2	.7	28.3
Immigration	3	1.0	29.3
Law and order	4	1.3	30.6
Terrorism combat	8	2.6	33.2
Defense and national security	22	7.2	40.5
Terror/terrorism/attacks	35	11.5	52.0
Non-terrorism related violent conflicts	1	.3	52.3
War on terrorism	60	19.7	72.0
Election	21	6.9	78.9
Party conflicts	1	.3	79.3
Condolence	14	4.6	83.9
Demonstrations	3	1.0	84.9
Stocks and bonds	12	3.9	88.8
Tourism	5	1.6	90.5
ETA	3	1.0	91.4
al-Qaeda	4	1.3	92.8
Bomb	11	3.6	96.4
Investors confidence	2	.7	97.0
Multiculturalism	2	.7	97.7
Joint operation- ETA and al-Qaida	1	.3	98.0
Sports	3	1.0	99.0
Intelligence about the event	2	.7	99.7
Graffiti	1	.3	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 16 and 17 classify the main news sources mentioned in articles. The main news sources in the 10/12 coverage are the government (37.9%), reporter (11.6%), and witnesses (7.1%). The least mentioned sources in the 10/12 reports are the assumed perpetrators, police, Islamic community, perpetrators' relatives, think-tanks, other, and al Islam boarding school (all .5%). The main news sources in the 3/11 reports were the government (50.7%), police (8.6%), and reporter (8.6%) compared to the least mentioned sources including assumed perpetrators, anonymous, nonprofits, victims, Islamic community, exclusive interview, celebrities, business owners (all .3%), followed by the secret service, court sources, and military sources (all .7%).

Table 16: 10/12 Media Coverage- Main News Sources

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Government/Party/Diplomacy	75	37.9	37.9
Polls	6	3.0	40.9
Other media outlets	9	4.5	45.5
Anonymous	12	6.1	51.5
Non- participants	4	2.0	53.5
(Assumed) Perpetrators	1	.5	54.0
Terrorist organization	3	1.5	55.6
Witness(es)	14	7.1	62.6
Police	1	.5	63.1
Analyst	10	5.1	68.2
Reporter	23	11.6	79.8
No answer	6	3.0	82.8
Business owner	4	2.0	84.8
Victims	6	3.0	87.9
Secret service	14	7.1	94.9
Other	1	.5	95.5
Court	3	1.5	97.0
Islamic community	1	.5	97.5
Perpetrators' relatives	1	.5	98.0
Mortuary staff	2	1.0	99.0
Think-tank	1	.5	99.5
Al Islam boarding school	1	.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 17: 3/11 Media Coverage- Main News Sources

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Government/Party/Diplomacy	154	50.7	50.7
Polls	8	2.6	53.3
Other media outlets	10	3.3	56.6
Anonymous	1	.3	56.9
Non- participants	11	3.6	60.5
(Assumed) Perpetrators	1	.3	60.9
Terrorist organization	10	3.3	64.1
Witness(es)	3	1.0	65.1
Police	26	8.6	73.7
Non- profit	1	.3	74.0
Analyst/Expert	27	8.9	82.9
Reporter/Writer/Author	26	8.6	91.4
No news source	8	2.6	94.1
Business owner	5	1.6	95.7
Victims	1	.3	96.1
Secret service	2	.7	96.7
Court source	2	.7	97.4
Islamic community	1	.3	97.7
Exclusive interview	1	.3	98.0
Terrorists' relatives and friends	3	1.0	99.0
Celebrities	1	.3	99.3
Military	2	.7	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 18 and 19 break down the media treatment based on story focus. Overall, the assumed terrorists' views (1% and .7%) remained the most neglected. Additionally, the victims' views were less covered in 3/11 rhetoric (23.2% and 1.3%). Specifically, in the 10/12 coverage, most articles reported on the event itself (28.8%), closely followed by the government's views (26.3%) and the victim's view (23.2%). In contrast, compared to the 10/12 coverage, most articles on 3/11 revealed the government's view (35.9%), followed by stories that illustrated the consequences (30.3%) and reports on the event itself (26%).

Table 18: 10/12 Media Coverage- Perspective

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Story focus is on the event	57	28.8	28.8
Story focus is on the government's/ politicians' views	52	26.3	55.1
Story focus is on the (assumed) terrorists' views	2	1.0	56.1
Story focus is on the victim' view	46	23.2	79.3
Story focus on consequences	41	20.7	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 19: 3/11 Media Coverage- Perspective

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Story focus is on the event	79	26.0	26.0
Story focus is on the government's/ politicians' views	109	35.9	61.8
Story focus is on the (assumed) terrorists' views	2	.7	62.5
Story focus is on the victim' view	4	1.3	63.8
Story focus on consequences	92	30.3	94.1
Other	18	5.9	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 20 and 21 enclose labels used in the portrayal of the alleged combatants. In most stories, the perpetrators remained unknown (47% of articles on 10/12 and 42.4% of stories on 3/11) or they are depicted as al-Qaida (16.2% and 9.5%) or their names are mentioned in a few stories (11.6% and 7.6%). Additionally, 7.1% of 10/12 coverage includes terrorist labels, and 9.8% of the 3/11 coverage includes the Islamic and Islamist labels when portraying terrorists. The least mentioned terms in the 10/12 coverage included terrorists, attackers, changed personality, fundamentalist killers, madmen, assassins, fanatics, obsessed, Indonesian separatists, and militants (all .5%). The least mentioned terms in the 3/11 coverage were martyrs, cold-blooded killers, barbarians,

separatist guerrillas, evil terrorists, Angel of Death, and alternative views on terrorists (all .3%).

Table 20: 10/12 Media Coverage- Perpetrators

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Terrorists	14	7.1	7.1
Muslims	3	1.5	8.6
Cold-blooded killers	1	.5	9.1
Extremists	1	.5	9.6
Kidnappers/Hostage takers	1	.5	10.1
Islamic+	4	2.0	12.1
Members of a Terrorist Group	2	1.0	13.1
Fanatics/Obsessed	1	.5	13.6
Barbars	8	4.0	17.7
Madmen	1	.5	18.2
Assassins/Murderers	1	.5	18.7
Names	23	11.6	30.3
Unknown	93	47.0	77.3
Devout Muslims	1	.5	77.8
Al-Qaida	32	16.2	93.9
General	3	1.5	95.5
Separatist	1	.5	96.0
Evil terrorists	3	1.5	97.5
Gang	1	.5	98.0
Fundamentalist killers	1	.5	98.5
Indonesian militants	1	.5	99.0
Changed personality	1	.5	99.5
Attackers	1	.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 21: 3/11 Media Coverage- Perpetrators

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Bombers	10	3.3	3.3
Martyrs	1	.3	3.6
Terrorists	16	5.3	8.9
Muslims	1	.3	9.2
Cold-blooded killers	4	1.3	10.5
Extremists	7	2.3	12.8
Jihadists	4	1.3	14.1
Combatant	2	.7	14.8
Islamic +	29	9.5	24.3
Members of a Terrorist Group	10	3.3	27.6
Fanatics/Obsessed	4	1.3	28.9
Barbars	1	.3	29.3
Perpetrators/Suspects	5	1.6	30.9
Madmen	1	.3	31.3
Assassins/Murderers	3	1.0	32.2
Names	23	7.6	39.8
Unknown	129	42.4	82.2
Devout Muslims	3	1.0	83.2
Al-Qaida	29	9.5	92.8
Positive light	1	.3	93.1
General	6	2.0	95.1
Islamist	1	.3	95.4
Cowardly murderers and gangsters	1	.3	95.7
Muslim+	4	1.3	97.0
Separatist guerillas	1	.3	97.4
evil terrorists	1	.3	97.7
ETA	5	1.6	99.3
Angel of Death	1	.3	99.7
U.S.	1	.3	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Data regarding the combatants' nationalities are shown in tables 22 and 23. Results demonstrate that the nationalities of the perpetrators were usually not mentioned in most news (92.4 % of stories on 10/12 and 78.3% of stories on 3/11). In contrast, 2.5% of 10/12 stories and 10.9% of 3/11 stories mentioned mixed nationalities, including Moroccan and Indian nationalities.



Table 22: 10/12 Media Coverage- Nationality of Perpetrators

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
African	1	.5	.5
Asian	1	.5	1.0
Middle Eastern	3	1.5	2.5
Unknown	183	92.4	94.9
Multiple	5	2.5	97.5
European	5	2.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 23: 3/11 Media Coverage- Nationality of Perpetrators

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
African	29	9.5	9.5
Asian	1	.3	9.9
Middle Eastern	2	.7	10.5
Unknown	238	78.3	88.8
Basques	1	.3	89.1
Mixed	33	10.9	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 24 and 25 reveal the coverage of fatalities. Victims were predominantly described as unknown (56.1% and 67.8%) or in general terms in 35.4% of stories on 10/12 and 28.3% of stories on 3/11. Few specific references were made to victims (8.6% and 1.6%).

Table 24: 10/12 Media Coverage- Victims

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
General	70	35.4	35.4
Unknown	111	56.1	91.4
Specific	17	8.6	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 25: 3/11 Media Coverage- Victims

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Non-combatant	4	1.3	1.3
General	86	28.3	29.6
Unknown	206	67.8	97.4
Specific	5	1.6	99.0
Other	3	1.0	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 26 and 27 contain data on the nationality of the victims. Overall, the victims' nationalities were not mentioned in most news (75.8% and 93.8%). In the 10/12 reports, 10.6% of stories referenced Britons and 6.6% of stories referenced Australian victims. In contrast, Britons, South American were mentioned less in 3/11 coverage. Specifically, 2% of 3/11 stories mentioned multiple nationalities of victims. Balinese, Asian, Irish and multiple nationalities remained the least mentioned in 10/12 reports.

Table 26: 10/12 Media Coverage- Nationality of Victims

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
U.S.	6	3.0	3.0
U.K	21	10.6	13.6
Asian	1	.5	14.1
Unknown	150	75.8	89.9
Multiple	1	.5	90.4
South American	3	1.5	91.9
Balinese	1	.5	92.4
Australian	13	6.6	99.0
Irish	1	.5	99.5
Other	1	.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 27: 3/11 Media Coverage- Nationality of Victims

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
U.K.	2	.7	.7
African	2	.7	1.3
Asian	4	1.3	2.6
Unknown	285	93.8	96.4
Multiple	6	2.0	98.4
Other European	3	1.0	99.3
South American	2	.7	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 28 and 29 relate to the claimed responsibility of incidents. In most articles, terrorist acts remain unknown (54% of 10/12 stories and 61.8% of 3/11 stories) or are attributed (41.9% and 30.3%). Claimed attacks were mentioned less (4% and 7.9%).

Table 28: 10/12 Media Coverage- Claimed Responsibility

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Claimed	8	4.0	4.0
Attributed	83	41.9	41.9
Unknown	107	54.0	54.0
Total	198	100.0	100.0

Table 29: 3/11 Media Coverage- Claimed Responsibility

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Claimed	24	7.9	7.9
Attributed	92	30.3	30.3
Unknown	188	61.8	61.8
Total	304	100.0	100.0

Tables 30 and 31 highlight whether reporters described the background of incidents. Most reports offered no background (82.8% and 83.6%) on these attacks and in both events about 16% of the articles offered background on these incidents.

Table 30: 10/12 Media Coverage- Background

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	33	16.7	16.7
No	164	82.8	99.5
Not applicable	1	.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 31: 3/11 Media Coverage- Background

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	50	16.4	16.4
No	254	83.6	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 32 and 33 contain frequencies on references to other terrorist events, and tables 34 and 35 include concrete references to specific other occurrences that are mentioned in articles. Results indicate that most reports mentioned other incidents (52.5% and 55.3%). The 9/11 attacks were the most referenced (34.3% of news coverage on 10/12 and 33.6% coverage on 3/11), followed by other incidents, including the alleged tortures of perpetrators in Guantanamo, the Casablanca bombings in 2004, the suicide bombings in Iraq, and the Egyptian massacre in 1997 (13.1% and 10.9%). However, the Basque separatist group ETA received the most references after 9/11 (18.8%) and other attacks (10.9%) in the 3/11 news reports.

Table 32: 10/12 Media Coverage- References to Other Terrorist Incidents

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	104	52.5	52.5
No	93	47.0	99.5
Not applicable	1	.5	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 33: 3/11 Media Coverage- References to Other Terrorist Incidents

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	168	55.3	55.3
No	136	44.7	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Table 34: 10/12 Media Coverage- References to Specific Other Terrorist Incidents

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
9/11	68	34.3	34.3
10/12	7	3.5	37.9
No references	92	46.5	84.3
Other	26	13.1	97.5
USS Cole	2	1.0	98.5
None	3	1.5	99.5
Total	198	100.0	

Table 35: 3/11 Media Coverage- References to Specific Other Terrorist Incidents

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Saalam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998	3	1.0	1.0
9/11	102	33.6	34.5
Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2002	3	1.0	35.5
Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004	4	1.3	36.8
Lockerbie, Scotland in 1998	4	1.3	38.2
No references	96	31.6	69.7
Three or more references	2	.7	70.4
ETA	57	18.8	89.1
Other attacks	33	10.9	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 36 and 37 pertain to story frames. In general, issue frames dominated the 10/12 and 3/11 coverage (66.2% and 47.7%). While strategic frames did not dominate discourse (11.1% and 30.6%), increased frequencies of strategic frames were notable in the 3/11 coverage. In addition, articles that were not categorized in the strategic, issue or both

categories were added to the neither category (17.7% and 21.1%). Only few reports contained both frames (.5% and .7%).

Table 36: 10/12 Media Coverage- Strategic or Issue Frames

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strategic	22	11.1	11.1
Issue	131	66.2	77.3
Both	10	5.1	82.3
Neither	35	17.7	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 37: 3/11 Media Coverage- Strategic or Issue Frames

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strategic	93	30.6	30.6
Issue	145	47.7	78.3
Both	2	.7	78.9
Neither	64	21.1	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

Tables 38 and 39 specify the episodic and thematic frames of a story. Findings demonstrate that 10/12 was covered predominantly episodically and in contrast, 3/11 was covered thematically. Specifically, 49.5% of stories covered 10/12 episodically as opposed to 38.5% of stories that framed 3/11 episodically. Reports that included both frames remained scarce (2.5% and 1%).

Table 38: 10/12 Media Coverage- Episodic and Thematic Frames

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Episodic	98	49.5	49.5
Thematic	85	42.9	92.4
Both	5	2.5	94.9
Neither	10	5.1	100.0
Total	198	100.0	

Table 39: 3/11 Media Coverage- Episodic and Thematic Frames

	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
Episodic	117	38.5	38.5
Thematic	166	54.6	93.1
Both	3	1.0	94.1
Neither	18	5.9	100.0
Total	304	100.0	

The next chapter discusses the results of the data analysis of 10/12 and 3/11 news frames. It analyzes data by newspapers, publication location, location of incident, type of attack, topics, key words, news sources, story perspective, perpetrators, nationality of perpetrators, victims, nationality of victims, claimed responsibility, background on incidents, references to other attacks, and episodic and thematic frames to study news frame differences in media. Results are mentioned in relation to the theoretical background of the study, including the cascading activation and framing models.

## **Chapter 5: Discussion and Analysis of 10/12 and 3/11 News Frames**

News narratives of 10/12 and 3/11 are explored through content analysis to establish possible frame shifts in Western periodicals. This research attempts to answer the following questions:

RQ 1: How do periodicals portray 10/12 and 3/11?

RQ 2: What are the themes in news rhetoric on terrorism?

This chapter presents the data analysis. The results were compiled into tables using frequencies broken down by newspapers, publication locations, location of the incident, type of attacks, main topics, key words, news sources, story perspective, description of perpetrators, nationality of perpetrators, description of victims, nationality of victims, claimed responsibility, background on incidents, references to other attacks, issue and strategic, as well as episodic and thematic story frames.

The analysis of discourse of the immediate aftermath of these events supports the cascading activation and framing models that argue that, within the hierarchical communication, news frames depend on cultural, political, and professional biases, as well as news values. Findings suggest that the story perspective, main topics, keywords, dominant news sources, the portrayal of perpetrators and victims, and news frames promote the western worldview in terrorism coverage. In line with Schaefer's research (2003) that confirmed the adoption of "the superpower" news frame in American press as opposed to the "Third World" perspective in African news on terrorism, these events were highly politicized and localized. Narratives predominantly adopted the



governments' views, and the depth and length of coverage depended on the proximity of these incidents to their homeland. Consequently, the American press emphasized negative consequences of these attacks on U.S. international relations and economy, and the European media overwhelmingly referenced national interests, such as border security. Additionally, based on the amount of media coverage, 3/11 received more press exposure compared to 10/12 with 304 and 198 reports, respectively (see tables 3, 4, and 5).

The 3/11 attacks were primarily depicted within the 9/11 metaframe, as shown in tables 12 and 13. Despite the pro-war/anti-war antagonism rooted in different views on the government's use of force as a legitimate tool, European news narratives echoed the portrayal of the war in Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, and global terrorism combat. This can be because the European view considers terrorism within the context of human rights and international law as opposed to the military actions adopted by the U.S. As shown in tables 14 and 15, central terms in the coverage of 10/12 included the war on terror (15.7%), terrorism attacks (11.6%), and descriptions of human suffering (13.1%). Similarly, relevant keywords in 3/11 press—the war on terrorism (19.7%), terrorist attacks (11.5%), background on terrorist organizations (11.2%), and defense and national security issues (7.2%)—illustrate the homogenization of political themes and U.S. foreign policies in news.

These central terms and the lack of alternative frames attest that most U.K. and U.S. newspapers did not challenge the political/diplomacy frame in reports on 3/11. News clusters confirmed the internalization of U.S. policies through the metaframes of “9/11,” “the war on terror,” the “us versus them,” and the “fear from potential terrorist

events” to justify military actions taken by the U.S. and its allies. The main sources in both incidents were the government elite, with 75 out of 198 articles about 10/12 and 154 out of 304 articles about 3/11 demonstrating that the political elite framing power has increased in the 3/11 coverage. The secondary sources were reporters, police, secret service, and analysts, as shown in tables 16 and 17.

The story focus also varied in the coverage of these events, as shown in tables 18 and 19. In the 10/12 coverage, most stories focused on the event itself (28.8%), followed closely by the government’s views (26.3%) and the victim’s view (23.2%). In contrast, news narratives on 3/11 reported on the government’s view (35.9%), followed closely by reflections on the consequences (30.3%) and on the event itself (26%). In contrast, the alleged terrorists’ views remained neglected in reports. Thus, narratives demonstrate that the government had the most framing power during crises.

Furthermore, results suggest that the government’s framing power has increased in the 3/11 coverage. As seen in tables 12 and 13, most stories treated 10/12 as a crime or catastrophe (42.9%) and as diplomacy (30.8%), as opposed to the 3/11 coverage that was dominated by the political (50.3%) and the crime frames (31.6%). This demonstrates a shift from crime to political frames and the media focus on victims. For example, articles in *The Sun* on 10/12 referenced British, Irish, and Australian casualties, 9/11 (“The slaughter of 187 innocents may have taken place on Indonesian soil -but this was Australia's 9/11,” Kavanagh, 2002, p. 7), and the magnitude of these attacks: “Everything shook and all of the windows smashed and fell to the ground, decapitating a security man.” (Larcombe & Cardy, 2002, p. 2). In addition, *The Guardian* framed 10/12 as crimes against humanity, referenced mainly British and Australian casualties, and

reported that “radical Islam remains the most pressing threat in the world today” (Freedland, 2002, p. 7). Similarly, 3/11 articles referenced U.S. policies: “It’s essential that we remain side-by-side with the Iraqi people,” (Benedetto, 2004, p. 10A), the “Old Europe versus New Europe” debate on the war, and the “united against terror” frame in European news. Media focus on Blair’s “the evil knows no limits,” Bush’s “axis of evil,” the globalization of terrorism, and the fear from future attacks attest that these policies remain uncontested in news rhetoric.

It is important to mention the absence of alternative perspectives in mainstream media. Contrary to prior research that suggests terrorists convey targeted messages through the press, in 10/12 and 3/11 narratives, the alleged perpetrators had less framing power than politicians, reporters, and analysts, as seen in tables 16 and 17. The least mentioned sources included the assumed combatants, the Other, and the Islamic community. Voices of the terrorists’ relatives and the Islamic community were predominantly represented in reports on 10/12 and 3/11 in *The Guardian* and *La Stampa*. Specifically, *The Guardian* was the newspaper that provided the most views of terrorist organizations and the victims’ relatives by describing the enemy as human. The one-sided coverage of these events is further palpable in the portrayal of perpetrators and victims. In line with Powell’s research (2011), perpetrators were demonized, as shown in tables 20 through 27. In most stories, they remained unknown, as seen in 47% of articles on 10/12 and 42.4% of stories on 3/11, and their names were mentioned in 11.6% of stories on 10/12 and in 7.6% of stories on 3/11. Additionally, 7.1% of 10/12 coverage included terrorist labels, and 9.5% of 3/11 coverage included the Islamic label. The most frequently used themes were al-Qaida, the names of the attackers linked to al-Qaida or a

related terrorist organization, terrorists, and religious connotations of the word Islamic. The emerging main labels suggest that narratives connect terrorism with Islam. Other labels included Jihadists, cold-blooded killers, bombers, extremists, (evil) terrorists, and “a mere handful of Bedouins” (Bonino, 2004, para. 2, *Corriere della Sera*), furthering generalizations about the enemy.

Notably, most of the few reports on the human aspects of perpetrators, were published in *The Guardian*. For example, Giles Tremlett (2004) described the alleged 3/11 perpetrators in court as humans using labels and headlines such as Moroccans, detainees, innocents, and “Jamal Zougam reportedly wept in court” (para. 2). In addition, Bowcott (2004) describes the alleged attackers by providing a historical and cultural contexts and offering the view of the assumed perpetrator’s family and neighbors in Tangier. For instance, Jamal Zougam was described as “a very kind guy” (para. 1), a “bright science student” (para. 25), “normal,” “he eyed up girls and laughed and played with everyone. He smoked cigarettes, went to the beach, kissed girls on their cheek. Islamists don't do those kinds of things” (para. 22). These additional perspectives and socio-cultural analyses in *The Guardian* provide the missing link between mainstream news frames that remain, in general, uncontested. However, the re-appropriation of the characteristics of the combatants as part of “us” rather than a human example of “them” further accentuates the “us versus them” dichotomy. The humanization of perpetrators within the cultural norms of the West possibly makes it easier for the audience to relate to them.

However, results demonstrate that the nationality of the victims and of the perpetrators did not substantially impact the amount of coverage of these events. As

shown in tables 22, 23, 26, and 27, in the majority stories the nationalities of the perpetrators and victims were not referenced (92.4 % of stories on 10/12 and 56.1% of stories on 3/11, as well as 75.8% and 93.8% of news coverage). For example, in the 10/12 news coverage 92.4% of articles did not mention the nationality of the victims, and 5% mentioned European, including Australian and British nationalities, as opposed to the 3/11 coverage where 78% of the stories portrayed the victims as unknown and 10.9% of the articles referred to more than one nationalities, including Britons and Americans. Additionally, victims of terrorist attacks are mostly mentioned in stories using general terms, including those killed, victims, people, or the number of fatalities, as shown in tables 24 and 25. In the reports on 10/12, British and Australian victims were emphasized while multiple nationalities, including South American and British victims were pointed out in reports on 3/11. Moreover, 2% of 3/11 stories mentioned multiple nationalities of victims in stories. Balinese, Asian, Irish and multiple nationalities of victims remain the least mentioned in 10/12 coverage. Thus, based on the fact that most stories portrayed the nationalities as anonymous, a causal link between the nationalities of the victims and perpetrators and media focus on the event was not found in this study.

Moreover, some of the victims were humanized correspondingly to the Western views. For example, the father's description of his son gets Christian resonance in an article on 3/11 in *The Guardian*: "He was the only son I had," the father said. "I came to Spain so he could study; he wanted to be an actor. He said, 'Dad, I want to study in Europe.' I fought for him, I gave my life for him and now they have taken him away from me. Those bastards have taken him and he never hurt anyone" (Chrisafis, 2004, para.10). The humanization of victims complements the negative portrayal of the alleged

perpetrators and furthers the frames of us versus them and the battle between good and evil; these frames are the basis of the rhetoric on the war on terrorism/war in Iraq.

The exposure of these events varied, as shown in tables 4, 5, and 6. Specifically, 3/11 garnered more media focus than did 10/12. The English-language media provided more extensive press coverage on 3/11 and 10/12 compared to German and Italian periodicals. Altogether, 279 articles were published on 3/11 in the U.S. and U.K. media, compared to 187 published articles on 10/12. In addition, 25 articles were published on 3/11 in Italian and German periodicals compared to 11 news stories on 10/12. One explanation might be that these events occurred outside of the U.S. and Europe. The American press focused more on 3/11 perhaps because Spain was a key ally in the war on terror.

*The Guardian* provided the most extensive coverage on both 10/12 and 3/11. In contrast, *The New York Times* provided 50% less reporting on the attacks in Bali in the U.S., as compared to the events in Spain. While coverage by German and Italian periodicals was less extensive compared to other periodicals, this could be due to the fact that some of these periodicals are monthly or weekend editions. Furthermore, the European media focused more on 3/11 than on 10/12. The 3/11 incidents received predominant attention in the European media (66.8%); most of these reports were published in *The Guardian* (45.1%). These results confirm previous findings that the proximity of an event raises the degree of press coverage on those attacks in national media.

Table 39: News Coverage of 10/12 and 3/11

10/12 in News	Frequency	Percent	3/11 in News	Frequency	Percent
USA Today	11	5.6	USA Today	17	5.6
The New York Times	47	23.7	The New York Times	84	27.6
The Guardian	110	55.6	The Guardian	137	45.1
The Sun	19	9.6	The Sun	41	13.5
Corriere della Sera	2	1.0	Corriere della Sera	12	3.9
La Stampa	1	.5	La Stampa	5	1.6
Die Welt/Welt am Sonntag	7	3.5	Die Welt/Welt am Sonntag	6	2.0
Bild am Sonntag	1	.5	Bild am Sonntag	2	.7
Total	198	100.0	Total	304	100.0

In line with previous research, international crises received less coverage in American newspapers, possibly because they happened outside the U.S. and did not involve American interests. Specifically, 58 articles were published in *USA Today* and *The New York Times* on 10/12 as opposed to the 140 articles published in European press. The 3/11 events remained underreported in the U.S.: 101 articles were published as opposed to 203 articles in European periodicals. Both incidents garnered about 50% more media interest in Europe compared to American newspapers. Besides the low coverage of these events in American newspapers, these reports predominantly focused on the consequences of 3/11 on U.S. foreign policies and economy. As shown in table 39, the Democratic-leaning *The New York Times* provided the most coverage on 3/11 (84) in the U.S. as opposed to *USA Today* (17). Main key terms in *The New York Times*' narrative followed similar coverage patterns in *The Guardian*, including the “war on terrorism” frame and background on terrorists. News reports in *The New York Times* indicated less interest in the Spanish elections and the anti-war demonstrations in Spain. The lack of reports in American news on the Spanish election and demonstrations following 3/11

suggests that these events were conflicting with U.S. policies to continue the war on terror.

Contrarily, European rhetoric on terrorism varied across the periodicals. Specifically, European reports prioritized the upcoming Spanish elections, anti-war demonstrations, and the fear of future terrorist attacks, and provided more in-depth analyses on combatants or terrorist organizations. The European press mirrored the Spanish government's view that initially blamed ETA, the Basque separatist group, for these incidents without evidence. Spanish President José María Aznar and the Partido Popular initially denied, for electoral reasons, the possibility of a connection to an Islamist group, possibly al-Qaida. The acknowledgement of a link to al-Qaida would have forced the president to reiterate his support on the war on terror, which polarized Spanish public opinion. Arguably, Aznar's pro-American rhetoric might have ultimately caused him to lose the election.

Furthermore, coverage of 3/11 varied within *The Sun* and *The Guardian*. Sensational headlines and graphic descriptions characterized stories in the right-wing tabloid *The Sun*. For instance, in the article entitled "The Train Was Cut Open Like a Can of Tuna" (Syson & Darvill, 2004, p.3), the quotes of ambulance driver Enrique Sanchez exemplify this descriptive language and the emphasis on drama: "We didn't know who to treat first. There was a lot of blood, a lot of blood. People were scattered all over the platforms. I saw legs and arms. I won't forget this ever. I've seen horror" (p. 3). The sensationalist coverage of *The Sun* can be found in another article by the same reporters who linked the 3/11 events to 9/11 and named the perpetrators "Islamic terrorists": "Yesterday's horror was dubbed 3/11 - coming on March 11, exactly 2 1/2



years after the 9/11 attacks on America and three days before Spain's general election" (Syson & Darvill, 2004, p.8). The 9/11 frame dominates news discourse in *The Sun* and *The Guardian*, signifying the 9/11 impact on terrorism coverage following these events.

In contrast to *The Sun*, *The Guardian's* coverage on 3/11 was more in-depth and larger than *The Sun's*. Although reports on the background of these crises were infrequent and were still not comprehensive, they were better-rounded than the treatment of combatants in *The Sun*. In the month following the attacks, the paper published 132 articles about the events surrounding 3/11, as opposed to *The Sun* which published 41. *The Guardian* published 19 articles on the day after the incident, as opposed to *The Sun* that published 10 pieces. Reports in *The Guardian* used less sensational descriptors, multiple perspectives—including cultural differences, media criticism, and reports on hate attacks against Muslims— and a variety of news sources, including local Muslim community, ETA, and sources from the Socialist Party. Most of these articles, however, did not link perpetrators immediately to al-Qaida.

Compared to the American rhetoric, Italian and European news reports on 10/12 and 3/11 were more analytical. Rhetoric focused on the unity between the U.S. and its allies and framed terrorism as Europe's biggest threat. For instance, news narratives on 3/11 focused on the "Old Europe and New Europe" divide over the Iraq war (where Old Europe consists of countries that favored the war and New Europe consists of countries that did not). Reports juxtaposed the U.S. official view that the war on terrorism must continue with the Spanish government's view that blamed ETA for 3/11, ETA's denial, and the public's anger that culminated in anti-war reactions. Coverage also linked 3/11 to 9/11 and to the Casablanca bombings. The "Old Europe/New Europe" schism was

signified by the vow of the newly-elected Spanish President, Rodríguez Zapatero, to withdraw troops from Iraq. Moreover, in Italian news discourse, the “new war” frame reinforced the Italian stand on the war on terrorism, Italy being a U.S. ally. For example, the social-liberalist *Corriere della Sera* reports on Romano Prodi’s call for a “strategic alliance” in Europe to combat terrorism and it also conveys that the results of the recent Spanish elections were a victory for al-Qaida. Additionally, the Italian reports on the 3/11 investigation extending to Lombardia are an example of a localization of an international incident.

Like the localization of 3/11 in the Italian news discourse, German reports also covered unfulfilled terrorist attacks in Germany, perhaps because these events happened in Germany after 3/11. Framing patterns in German periodicals can be equated with the U.S. and U.K. news frame patterns, including the “us versus them” frame with focus on unity, “we must withstand terrorism together,” to signify the government’s view on the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Iraq as a “decisive mistake.” These examples illustrate that the U.S. allies’ news discourse is aligned with the U.S agenda.

Findings suggest that for the most part stories don’t offer background about events, as shown in tables 30 and 31 (82.8% and 83.6%). Additionally, most articles did not include the claimed responsibility of the perpetrators. Instead, the government’s perspectives and foreign policies become the spotlight, further enforcing the cascading network activation model in communication. In addition, the majority of the stories referenced other terrorist incidents, as shown in tables 32-36. Specifically, narrative about 10/12 predominantly included no references to other terrorist incidents (46.5%) and 34.3% of the stories referenced 9/11. In contrast, 3/11 discourse predominantly

referenced 9/11 (33.6%), while 31.6% of the stories contained no references to other terrorist incidents and 18.8% of the stories referenced ETA. These findings suggest that 9/11 remained central in discourse.

Uncontested ideologies are palpable in the one-sided coverage of these events through news frames that simplify information as opposed to the thematic frames that reveal background information on these attacks. Results indicate that issue frames dominated the 10/12 and 3/11 coverage (66.2% and 47.7%). Specifically, 49.5% of stories covered 10/12 episodically as opposed to 38% of stories that framed 3/11 episodically. 10/12 was covered predominantly episodically and in contrast, 3/11 was covered thematically. Specifically, *The Guardian* provided the most thematic coverage of 3/11 (91 articles), followed by *The New York Times* (27), and *The Sun* (23). In contrast, there was little difference between these frames in the coverage of 10/12: 98 stories framed these events as episodic and 85 articles used thematic frames. Episodic frames on 3/11 dominated the American media, while these events received thematic coverage in European news conceivably because they occurred outside of the U.S.; therefore, they represented less news value for the American audience. In Europe, news on 10/12 and 3/11 remained dominated by the U.S. agenda and 9/11. This signifies the transfusion of U.S. policy agendas through the Western European media.

The next chapter delineates challenges and limitations of the data analysis of 10/12 and 3/11 news frames. It also proposes possible improvements in the research methodology and questions for future research. Specifically, research questions, sampling of events, news outlets, and stories, selection criteria, inter-coder reliability, and coding

process are discussed, as well as possible solutions and topics that would yield more nuanced data.

## **Chapter 6: Directions for Future Research**

The results of this study are discussed within the context of 10/12 and 3/11 in mainstream periodicals. In addition, the paper outlines weaknesses and challenges on defining research questions, selection criterion for sampling events, news outlets, and stories, inter-coder reliability, and coding process, as well as possible solutions and topics for research.

Previous research have confirmed that the press is a platform for collective knowledge, and the examination of media content can predict trends in culture, politics, and communication. Also, the amount of coverage and dominant news frames shape the public's worldview, therefore, story angles can reveal how political agendas penetrate public discourse through the media and diagnose the communication dynamic among reporters, political elite, and the public. This topic combines the researcher's interest in content analysis and framing of critical incidents to analyze the media focus on two events across media and nations. This examination calls for comparative analysis within political, cultural, and social boundaries.

The main obstacles were time and resource limitations and minimal research experience. Questions pertaining to the study and challenges were discussed in the meeting with the second coder and the thesis chair. For instance, based on the recommendations of the thesis committee, the initial nine research questions have been condensed to keep the study focused to the overarching question of news frame

differences of 10/12 and 3/11 in mainstream periodicals. The initial research questions were as follows:

RQ 1: Are news frames on terrorist events embedded in media agendas?

RQ 2: How are news frames rooted in the political, cultural, and social contexts of that country's newspaper?

RQ 3: What are the themes of terrorism in American and European news?

RQ 4: Do domestic terrorist activities receive more extensive coverage in that country's press?

RQ 5: Does the U.S. media's coverage of a crisis situation emphasize the role of government?

RQ 6: Do U.S. media reports sensationalize certain types of terrorist events?

RQ 7: Do more stories offer just the facts of the event or do they also offer background information on the event?

For practical reasons, the number of questions and terrorist incidents studied was reduced. Originally, this thesis was a longitudinal study on news frame shifts caused by 9/11. The initial sample was representative because it included pre-9/11 and post-9/11 events to compare news framing differences before and after these attacks. The following incidents were included in the first sample: the truck bombings of American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Saalam, Tanzania which occurred in August 7, 1998; the attacks against the World Trade Center in New York which occurred in September 11, 2001; the bombings in Bali, Indonesia which occurred in October 12, 2002; and the bombings of four trains in Madrid, Spain which occurred in March 11, 2004. Most of the events that occurred prior to 9/11 were discarded from the sample, because the Access

World News database did not provide reports on attacks prior to 2002; thus, an investigation of crises before and after 9/11 would have required the use of additional databases and the translation of the articles from Italian and German into English. This process would have lengthened the research, but would have provided richer data for analysis. Future studies should include terrorist events that occurred inside and outside of these countries to have reference points for comparison. Furthermore, 10/12 and 3/11 were comparable because they were included in the GTD dataset (and their selection criteria and definition of terrorism was adopted in this study), had analogous size in casualties, and had received extensive media coverage.

Arguably, a longitudinal analysis of pre- and post-9/11 events can reveal larger trends of differences in reporting of such crises. The examination of longer time periods, as well as distinct time phases— a pre-crisis, acute crisis, a lingering crisis, and a post-crisis phase—would have produced more nuanced data for this research (Nacos, Shapiro, Young, Fan, Kjellstrand, & McCaa, 2009). Potential research could include other databases to obtain a wide variety of articles from other media outlets and might be optimized for group research involving coders, translators, and analysts. Moreover, as this paper does not compare the portrayal of terrorism to other forms of disruptive events, such as natural disasters and wars, news framing differences between these events could also be explored.

Defining a comparable sample size for each nation's news media market was challenging. It is unlikely, for instance, that British newspapers match the coverage in the American news outlets due to the larger population of the U.S. Specifically, Britain's population is 61.9, Italy's population is 60.1, Germany's population of 82.1 million

people, compared to the U.S. population of 317.6 million (BBC). Therefore, the author selected mainstream and accessible newspapers based on data obtained from the Audit Circulation Bureaus (ABC) of these countries focusing on periodicals with the highest numbers of readership accessible through the Access World News database. The inclusion of media outlets in the Middle East and Africa through additional search engines could broaden the range of the research perspectives. More time and effort could have been devoted to research the characteristics of these news institutions and the history of their evolution, but the focus of this paper was research on mainstream frames.

It was sometimes difficult to select international mainstream news outlets. For instance, the monthly news magazine *Der Spiegel* was included in the sample since this periodical was a second available news source for Germany in the database. Possible solutions were the addition of German dailies from other databases, but this option would have lengthened the research time because it would have required the translation of the articles.

Consequently, stories from the news outlets' websites were not included in the sample for practical reasons. For example, not all periodicals have news archives dating back to 2002. Another challenge was the access to the multimedia content that was not available through the Access World News database. Also, multimedia content becomes fluid online because it constantly changes. Thus, the application of content analysis to online material and inter-coder reliability may become problematic. Possible studies could include web content downloads using print screen function or the coding process done by coders at the same time (McMillan, 2009). Print articles were chosen as sample



units of analysis in this paper, but future research could expand on the analysis of web links and of the photographs that accompany published news pieces.

Another limitation is the exclusion criteria set for the articles. Sports pieces, illustrations, announcements, advertising, and photographs were filtered out because of time limitations and unavailability of some materials through the database. However, critics argue that the exclusion of the “irrelevant content” from the pool may hinder the scientific validity of the research (George, 2009). Future studies could examine frame receivers to shed light on the impact of news frames on audiences. The investigation of the whole content, editorial letters, and public comments could provide richer data. However, the analysis of the full media content becomes a lengthy process if a few coders are involved, and this option was not considered at this time.

Additional research suggests that a coder group or the use of content analysis software may reduce research time and improve inter-coder reliability. The coder group consisted of the researcher and a second coder. A second coder was preferred over the use of the content analysis software because human coders are able to code the nuanced data, including the tone of the article. Data sets were computed in SPSS.

Further limitations regarded the inter-coder reliability because the second coder’s knowledge, attitude toward the events, and military background may have been influencing factors in the coding process. Literature on coder training is scarce (Krippenforff & Bock, 2009); thus, there is no empirical evidence for the author to evaluate the efficiency of the coder’s training or the coder’s biases. Nevertheless, the coder’s training established the groundwork for the coding process, and prompted the revisit of research questions. Questions agreed upon were not revisited, but literature

suggests that these questions may not advance the research (Hak & Berntz, 2009). Furthermore, the inter-coder agreement improved the overall coding process, including the revision of rules, instructions, questions in the coding book, and the research questions. The involvement of the second coder in filtration methods and initial establishment of the coding book may have contributed to a more grounded comparison of the coding design and research questions.

### **Conclusion**

One-sided coverage and the hegemony of U.S. governmental frames dominate Western news rhetoric on 10/12 and 3/11. Stories lack shades of gray because they don't provide contexts and multiple news sources, including the Islamic community, terrorist perpetrators, and larger society. Frames on terrorism and combatants homogenize the western Judeo-Christian worldview and pro-U.S. rhetoric by demonizing the enemy, using labels such as "al-Qaida" and "Islamic terrorist." Through the metaframes of the "war on terror" and the "fear of attacks," this coverage also supports the government's agenda that terrorism can be defeated by invading Iraq and Afghanistan. Alternative angles, including the views of the Other, reports on hate attacks on the Islamic community, and coverage of anti-war demonstrations in Europe remain scarce shifting this reporting trend in *The Guardian* through the use of multiple viewpoints and sources, as well as in-depth analyses of these incidents.

This black-and-white portrayal of critical acts promotes public misinformation on terrorism, Islam, and the Middle East, and encourages one-size-fits-all solutions and policies to these crises. Dominant western news frames alter views in the Middle East

through political agents. For example, Afghan president Hamid Karzai's condemnation of Florida preacher Terry Jones' public burning of the Koran on March 20, 2011 exemplifies the power of news frames and demonstrates framing contests between media and political elite. While the Western press treated this incident as isolated, the way Karzai framed the burning of the Koran in his speech sparked protests and raised the anti-Western sentiment across Afghanistan.

Alternative news frames—occurrences reframed within the collective consciousness of the Muslim culture, global community, and values, including human rights, social, cultural, and political contexts— would provide perspectives on the complexities of such events. These story angles would shift public discourse dominated by the “us versus them,” ”9/11,” and “the war on terrorism” frames into a global dialogue on multiple perspectives and historical and cultural contexts on critical occurrences and the Middle East.

Mass communication on such crises should happen within journalistic and ethical standards and through the adoption of multiple viewpoints. If dominant news frames on terrorism continue to err on the side of the government or enemy, they erode the core value of journalism to inform the public through balanced reports.

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## Appendices

## Appendix 1: Codebook- Global Reporting on Terrorism

**This codebook covering framing differences of various media outlets is being distributed to fulfill the general requirements for a Master's Degree in Multimedia at the University of South Florida.** The design of the coding book follows the structure of the coding book by Capella, Mittermayer, Weiner, Humphreys, Falcone, and Giorno (2009). **Please read the guidelines and then answer the questions to the best of your knowledge. There are no correct answers, so choose the response closest to your own. Please write the correct answers on the coding sheet.**

The selected articles contain news about the terrorist events on October 12, 2002 in Bali, Indonesia and on March 11, 2004 in Madrid, Spain. Your sample includes articles from the United States (U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.), Italy, and Germany. The selected periodicals are *USA Today* and *The New York Times* in the U.S., *The Guardian* and *The Sun* in the U.K., *Corriere della Sera* and *La Stampa* in Italy, and *Die Welt*, *Der Spiegel*, *Welt am Sonntag*, and *Bild am Sonntag* in Germany. Code each article separately, including the title, the headline, and the body of the text.

### **Definitions:**

**Headline**= the title or caption of the story set in larger fonts.

**Frame** = the focus of the story. For example, some stories may depict the perpetrators as Muslims (religion), Arabs (ethnic minority) or fanatics.

**Framing**= the discourse structure whereby the frames used by frame builders, including the media, government, and terrorist organizations to (mis)inform the public and legitimize political and military actions.

**Media outlet**= a synonym used for newspapers and print media.

**News articles**= all articles printed that refer to the above mentioned events, excluding editorials, illustrations, announcements, and advertising. The news story consists of at least one sentence in addition to a headline.

**News agency**= a wire service that offers news content to various media outlets. For example, Associated Press, Reuters, and United Press International are news wires.

**Perpetrator**= enemy, attacker, terrorist.

**Terrorism**= the use of organized violence against political, economic and civilian targets for political, social or economic gains (Global Terrorism Database Codebook, 2010, p.5). The attackers' goal is to legitimize a minority belief system within the media through fear.

**Terrorist organization**=an organization labeled as terrorist organization by U.S. or E.U. entities (e.g., ETA, al-Qaida, Abu Sayyaf, the Afghan Moroccans, Moroccan Islamist, Combatant Group, Yeemah Islamiyah).

**NOTE:** To code news stories, code from the hard copies provided by the researcher. For the purposes of this project the unit of analysis is the printout of the published article. Articles in other languages were translated into English. If you don't find a topic in the coding sheet, write it down so we can discuss about it.

**V1. Coder ID** (you are the secondary coder, so circle number 2)

1. First coder
2. Secondary coder

**V2. Coding date** (date that the coding is taking place)

**V3. Article number** (the number listed on the left side of the article)

**V4. Name of the media outlet being coded:**

1. USA Today
2. The New York Times
3. The Guardian
4. The Sun
5. Corriere della Sera
6. La Stampa
7. Die Welt/ Welt am Sonntag
8. Der Spiegel
9. Bild am Sonntag

**V5. Publication location:**

- 1 United States
- 2 United Kingdom
- 3 Italy
- 4 Germany

**V6. Date of the story's publication in the following format: month/day/year**

**V7. Title of the article:**

**V8. Location of the main incident referring to violence and terrorism:**

1. Bali, Indonesia
2. Madrid, Spain
3. Manila, Philippine
4. Casablanca, Morocco
5. Uzbekistan
6. Iraq
7. Germany
8. Guantanamo, Cuba
9. Phuket, Thailand
10. Chechnya, Russia
11. Mauritius
12. Khartoum, Sudan
13. Gulf of Aden, Yemen
14. Unknown/Not applicable (i.e., the information is not provided in the article)
15. Other

**V9. Type of attack:**

1. Bombing/explosion (i.e., detonation of an explosive using a cell phone or other device; bombing carried out by a perpetrator who does not hope to survive it)
2. Assassination (i.e., perpetrators' goal is to kill public officials and prominent figures)
3. Armed assault (i.e., the intent is to kill/hurt civilians with a weapon other than a bomb)
4. Kidnapping (i.e., hostage taking)
5. Suicide
6. Facility takeover (e.g., attacks on institutions infrastructure, vandalism)
7. Terrorism threat
8. Hijacking
9. Maritime attack
10. Not applicable/ Unknown (i.e., the information is not provided in the article)
11. Other

**V10. What is the main topic in the story?** Circle up to three dominant categories in the article if you consider there are more important categories.

1. Political/Diplomacy (e.g., the global war on terror, security, Iraq war)
2. Military (e.g., defense, national security)
3. Cultural/History (e.g., media, education, cultural contributions of Islam, museums)
4. Economic/Tourism (e.g., stock)
5. Entertainment (e.g., lifestyle, sports)
6. Crime/Catastrophe (e.g., violent conflicts, terrorist attacks)

7. Social (e.g., human rights, immigration)
8. Transport (e.g., railway security)
9. Not applicable/Unknown (i.e., the information is not provided in the article)
10. Other (please specify- e.g., historic overview on terrorism, historical references, historical and cultural backgrounds)
11. Mixed (i.e., more than one category is mentioned)

**V11. What are the most dominant keywords mentioned in the article?** Circle one dominant key term in the article.

1. Collective remembrance/ memory
2. Minorities (the Basque group, the Acehese rebels)
3. Human suffering (human casualties, identification of victims)
4. Hate attacks against minorities (e.g., the Islamic community)
5. Torture
6. Oil and defense links between Britain and Libya
7. Suicide bombing
8. Background on terrorists or terrorist organization
9. Media criticism
10. E.U. legislation/ E.U. constitution
11. Border security
12. Traffic/transport
13. Museum
14. Celebrity
15. Transportation security (e.g., railway)
16. Drugs and drugs regulations
17. Human rights (i.e., political and social rights- e.g., gay marriage, gender equality, communication ban, religious repression, torture)
18. Data protection
19. Immigration (e.g., illegal immigrants)
20. Weapons of mass destruction program (e.g., nuclear weapons)
21. Law and order (i.e., legal challenges)
22. Terrorism combat/ (i.e., crime prevention - e.g., counter- terrorism policies)
23. Defense and national security
24. Terror/terrorism/attacks/threats
25. 9/11
26. Non-terrorism related violent conflicts or incidents (i.e., historical references, e.g., the Spanish Civil War in 1936-1939)
27. War on terrorism (e.g., war in Iraq)
28. Spreading democracy
29. Election
30. Party conflicts
31. Condolence (e.g., grief, vigil, funeral, mourning)
32. Demonstrations (e.g., protests)
33. Stocks and bonds
34. Tourism/travel

35. ETA
36. Alleged alliance of ETA with the Iraqi resistance
37. al-Qaida
38. Saddam Hussein
39. Bomb (e.g., explosive, TNT, Goma 2, C-4 plastic explosive)
40. War in Afghanistan
41. Investors' and/or consumers' confidence
42. Inflation
43. Multiculturalism (i.e., coexistence)
44. New E.U. member
45. Joint operation between ETA and al-Qaida
46. Political corruption
47. Research on terrorism
48. Sports
49. Travel insurance
50. Intelligence about the event
51. Graffiti
52. School (e.g., Al Islam boarding school)
53. Clash of civilizations
54. Islamism
55. Chechen separatists
56. Alternative media
57. Butler keeps items belonging to princess Diana for safekeeping
58. Poverty
59. Budget cuts at BBC
60. Distrust
61. Budget deficit
62. Oil industry
63. Asia-Pacific economic cooperation
64. Unknown (i.e., the information is not provided in the article)
65. Other (please specify)

**V12. What are the mentioned main sources in the article? Please circle the most frequently occurring sources. Sources have to be attributed directly or indirectly.**

1. Government/Party/Diplomacy (e.g., politicians, the Queen)
2. Polls/ research/ survey
3. Other media outlets (e.g., print media, broadcast, news agency, social media, including blogs)
4. Anonymous (e.g., unidentified people, for example, “a barman,” “a cleaner”)
5. Non- participants (victims' relatives, family or friends, protesters, voters, tourists)
6. (Assumed) perpetrators
7. Terrorist organization (e.g., video, audio or email obtained from them)
8. Witness(es)
9. Police



10. Church/religious leader
11. Non- profit (e.g., Human Rights Watch)
12. Analyst/Expert/Researcher (e.g., anthropologist, sociologist, terrorism researcher)
13. The Reporter/Writer/Author of the article
14. No news source provided
15. Business owner
16. Rescuers (e.g., volunteers)
17. Victims
18. Secret service/ Intelligence
19. Other (please specify- e.g., references to books and websites)
20. Health professional
21. Court source (e.g., lawyer, judge)
22. Islamic community/ Islamic Center (e.g., Muslim leader Abu Hamza)
23. Civil liberties groups
24. Exclusive interview or documents obtained by the coded media outlet
25. Terrorists' relatives and friends
26. Celebrities
27. Military (e.g., general)
28. Philosopher
29. Cultural institution (e.g., Hispanic Society of America)
30. Mortuary staff
31. Think-tank
32. Al Islam boarding school

**V13. What is the tone of the article?**

1. Subjective (i.e., sensational with a focus on violence and destruction; or it can be an opinion)
2. Neutral (i.e., reporter states verifiable facts and uses reliable sources including terrorist analysts, police, and statistics)
3. Not clear
4. Other (please specify)

**V14. What is the perspective of the story? Select one category that applies.**

1. Story focus is on the event (e.g., on the attacks, rescue, disaster, mourning, investigation, links to other related terrorist incidents, trials)
2. Story focus is on the government's/ politicians' view regarding religious, political, military, and international relations deriving from the events)
3. Story focus is on the (assumed) terrorists' view
4. Story focus is on the victim' view
5. Story focus on consequences and on other views (e.g., the author's view, the public's view, protesters' view, terrorists' relatives views)

6. Other (please specify- e.g., historical outlook on these events or the article is a comparison of the perpetrators to other enemy, media ethics, background on politicians, media criticism)

**V15. How are the (assumed) perpetrators or attackers portrayed? Please code only the perpetrators who relate to the main incidents.**

1. Bombers ( e.g., suicide bombers/shaheeds)
2. Martyrs
3. Terrorists
4. Muslims
5. Cold- blooded killers
6. Extremists
7. Hijackers
8. Jihadists
9. Kidnappers/Hostage takers
10. Combatant
11. Criminals
12. Arab Muslims
13. Freedom Fighters
14. Islamic + (e.g., Islamic Extremists, Islamic Radicals, Islamic Terrorists, Islamic Militants, Islamic Fundamentalists)
15. Members of a Terrorist Group (e.g., Abu Sayyaf, the Afghan Moroccans)
16. Fanatics/Obsessed
17. Barbarians
18. Perpetrators/ Suspects
19. Madmen
20. Assassins/ Murderers/Killers
21. Names of the (assumed) attackers is mentioned
22. Other (please specify)
23. Unknown/ Not mentioned
24. Devout Muslims
25. Al-Qaida
26. Positive light (e.g., good neighbors, nice boys)
27. General (e.g., four men)
28. Moroccan extremists
29. Islamist
30. Militants
31. Separatist
32. Cowardly murderers and gangsters
33. Muslim+ ( e.g. Muslim fundamentalists, Muslim fanatics)
34. Separatist guerillas
35. Ruthless terrorists
36. The world's most feared fanatics
37. Cut throat thugs
38. Evil terrorists

39. A mere handful of Bedouins
40. Gang
41. Coward
42. Warped minds
43. Enemies of democracy
44. Skulking murderer
45. Fundamentalist killers
46. Evil and perverted
47. Indonesian militants
48. ETA
49. Angel of Death
50. U.S.
51. Bastards
52. Chechen
53. Arabic origin
54. Changed personality
55. Attackers
56. Business men

**V16. Nationality of the (alleged) perpetrators'/terrorists' (Code the perpetrators who relate to the incidents in Bali or Spain):**

1. American
2. Briton
3. African (excludes Balinese- e.g., Moroccan, Nigerian, Ghanaian, Kenyan, Libyan, Somali, Congolese, Ugandan)
4. Asian, excluding Balinese (e.g., Indian, Malaysian, Chinese, Mongolian, Japanese, Cambodian)
5. Middle Eastern (e.g., Israeli, Iraqi, Afghan, Pakistani, Lebanese, Yemeni, Syrian)
6. Unknown/ Not mentioned (i.e., the information is not provided in the article)
7. Basques
8. More than one nationality is mentioned (e.g., one perpetrator is a Moroccan and the other one is Indian)
9. European (i.e., other than U.K.- e.g., French, Dutch, Spaniards, Italian, German, Scottish, Portuguese, Romanian)
10. Balinese
11. Australian
12. Other (please specify)

**V17. The victims of the incident (Code the victims only in reference to the two incidents in Bali and in Spain):**

1. Combatant (e.g., military, police)
2. Non-combatant (i.e., non-military victims). Use the categories below if the victims are civilians, embassy/diplomats, business people, aid workers, airlines, and religious organizations

3. General (use this category if there are general labels used in the article such as “those killed,” “victims,” “people,” the number of victims)
4. Unknown/Not applicable (i.e., the information is not provided in the article)
5. Specific (victims’ names are mentioned, additional information is provided on the victim)
6. Other (please specify)
7. Mixed (combatants and non-combatants)

**V18. Nationality of the targets or victims mentioned in the story:**

1. American
2. British
3. African
4. Asian
5. Middle Eastern
6. Unknown/Not mentioned (the information is not provided in the article)
7. Multiple
8. Other European (other than U.K.- e.g., Romania)
9. South American (Equador)
10. Balinese
11. Australian
12. Irish
13. Other

**V19. Claimed responsibility:**

1. Claimed
2. Attributed (i.e., suspected)
3. Verified (i.e., supported by evidence)
4. Unknown/Not applicable (i.e., the information is not mentioned)
5. Other (please specify)

**V20. Does the story offer background on the main incident** (the main narrative of the story addresses three or more of these questions: who, what, when, where, why, and how. For example, the article mentions the motivation of the perpetrators):

1. Yes
2. No

**V21. References to other terrorist attacks:**

1. Yes
2. No

**V22. Additional references to other terrorist incidents or terrorist organizations:**

1. The truck bombings of American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Saalam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998
2. 9/11 in New York
3. The terrorist attacks in Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2002

4. The train bombings in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004
5. The bombing of Pan Am jetliner 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1998
6. No references to incidents or terrorist organizations
7. Three or more references of the above (1-5)
8. ETA (i.e., the organization)
9. Other attacks, events, and organizations not mentioned above (e.g., alleged tortures of perpetrators in Guantanamo Bay, the bombings in Casablanca, Morocco on May 16, 2004, suicide bombings in Iraq, London bombings, terrorist acts committed by ETA, the Egyptian massacre in 1997)
10. The attack on the American destroyer, the USS Cole, in Aden on October 2000

**V23. Strategic/Issue** (strategic frames focus on the strategy of a political, social or economic actor in a campaign or regarding a certain issue. Issue frames explore a particular issue more in-depth.)

1. Strategic frames
2. Issue frames
3. Both
4. Neither

**V24. Episodic/Thematic:** (as described by Iyengar, episodic frames portray public issues as concrete events, e.g. story of a homeless person, bombing of an airliner, public protest, and thematic frames show issues in a general or abstract context (e.g., congressional debate over funding of welfare programs).

1. Episodic frames
2. Thematic frames
3. Both
4. Neither

**V25. Length of article (word count per article)**

**Appendix 2: Categories and Key Terms in the Coding Book**

Political/Diplomacy	democracy, election campaigns, parties, E.U. legislation
Military	war, defense and national security
Cultural/History	education, museums, cultural contributions of Islam
Economic	unemployment, poverty, stock, travel, tourism
Social	human suffering, drugs, migration/immigration, minorities, tribal conflicts
Entertainment	lifestyle, sports
Crime	terrorism attacks, violent conflicts
Infrastructure	transport, housing, railway system
Other	soft news and articles that can't be placed in the above mentioned categories, historic overviews
Mixed	terms can be placed in multiple categories at once
Unknown	

### Appendix 3: Coding Sample of Article 112 (Chrisafis, 2004)

#### **The Guardian: Victims queue to become citizens**

Guardian, The (London, England) - Wednesday, March 17, 2004

Author: ANGELIQUE CHRISAFIS, IN MADRID

A queue of people with bandaged heads, burned faces and legs in plaster formed outside **Spain's** immigration office yesterday. They carried doctors' notes, the death certificates of relatives and passports from Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Ecuador and most other parts of Latin America.

**Spain** announced last week that it would give citizenship or residency to the parents, children, husbands and wives of the dead and injured in **Madrid's** bomb attacks. Hundreds of wounded and bereaved illegal immigrants are taking up the offer.

At least 50 of the 200 killed in the train attacks were foreign nationals on their way to clean the flats of middle-class **Madrid** or build its new roads and shopping centers.

Romania - the worst-hit country with 11 fatalities and more than 100 injured - began to fly its dead home yesterday. It promised Euros 8,000 (pounds 5,400) in compensation to bereaved families and Euros 2,400 to the injured. One of Thursday's bombed carriages was the regular meeting point for Romanian workers travelling to the city centre.

Five identified bodies were still waiting at a **Madrid** cemetery yesterday to be claimed, possibly illegal workers who had come to **Madrid** alone.

Five Romanians are still missing, and families have been told to wait for news of the 12 sets of unrecognizable remains yet to be identified by DNA and dental records.

Julian, 33, from Bucharest, was one of those queuing for residency. The blast at Atocha threw him down the platform. He had been working illegally as a building worker for three and a half years, earning up to Euros 10 an hour and supporting his mother, father, brother and two nephews at home.

He lived in a two-room suburban flat with five compatriots. "The Romanian community here is very close, everyone feels destroyed by this, but there's no question of me going home," he said.

"There is nothing there, no life. My parents in Bucharest are upset and frightened for me, but they don't want me to go back."

His girlfriend **Maria**, 20, also survived the blast. She arrived a year ago to clean flats for Euros 5 an hour. "We don't want Spanish citizenship, we just want to be considered normal here," she said.

**Ionel**, 29, who had a bandaged head, was in the carriage where a bomb exploded at El Pozo. He had worked illegally as a builder for four years after his application for legal status was rejected.

"I haven't slept. If I close my eyes, I have nightmares about trains," he said. "I only ask one favor of **Spain** now: some sort of employment status to make my life normal for once."

Provided By: Financial Times Information Limited

Index Terms: General News ; Health & Healthcare ; Terrorism

Location(s): Bulgaria Ecuador Poland Romania Spain Americas Eastern and Central Europe Latin America South America Western Europe

Record Number: A20040317 -17A8-EIW,0,XML,EIW

Source: Access World News



#### **Appendix 4: Two Coding Samples of Article 112 (Chrisafis, 2004)**

Coder 1: Andrea Lypka, Coder 2: Sonia Dimitrova

V1. ID #	1	2
V2. Coding date	03/01/2011	03/05/2011
V3. Article Nr.	112	112
V4. Newspaper	3	3
V5. Publication	2	2
V6. Date of the story's publication	3/17/2004	3/17/2004
V7. Title	Victims queue to become citizens	Victims queue to become citizens
V8. Location of the incident	2	2
V9. Type of attack:	1	1
V10. Main Topic	1	7
V11. Dominant Key Words	19	19
V12. Main News Source	17	17
V13. Tone of the article	2	2
V14. Perspective	5	5
V15. Perpetrators	23	23
V16. Nationality of perpetrators	6	6
V17. Victims	2	2
V18. Nationality of victims	8 (Romania)	8 (Romania)
V19. Claimed responsibility	4	4
V20. Background	2	2
V21. References to other terrorist attacks	2	2
V22. References to:	6	6
V23. Strategic/Issue	4	4
V24. Episodic/Thematic	1	1
V25. Word count	459	459