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The Nature of Deliberation in Aristotle

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to

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Declaration

I, Do Hyoung Kim, here declare that the thesis has been composed by myself and that it has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification except as specified.

Do Hyoung KIM (24th February 2014)

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Abstract

This dissertation argues that: (1) deliberation (*bouleusis*) is distinguished from theoretical thought, in so far as the former is strictly about the particulars of a given situation, while the latter is about universal concepts; and that (2) deliberation is practical only in so far as it prescribes the best option for action, that is, it prescribes practical truth, but there is no element within the deliberative soul that can initiate an action directly. With these two points in mind, I will show in Chapter One that what lets us consistently cognize the moral 'end', the moral first principle, is a character or emotional disposition we acquire as a result of habituation (*ethismos*). Having explained how the conception of ends can be determined, I provide an argument for the first thesis mentioned above, and claim in Chapter Two that deliberation is not of the ends (*ta telê*), but is only of the means (*ta pros to telos*). My argument for the second thesis will lead me to claim in Chapter Three that *prohairesis*, the conclusion of deliberation, is not an action. I end my argument with an investigation showing that the interpretation of Aristotelian deliberation supported in this thesis secures its justification not only in those discussions that are directly related to the nature of deliberation, but also in the context of other important discussions in Aristotle's ethics, namely, about the possibility of *akrasia* (in Chapter Four) and the definition of *eudaimonia* (in Chapter Five). My argument will provide a better treatment and solution, than existing attempts, of the puzzles surrounding the concepts of *akrasia* and *eudaimonia* in Aristotle's ethics.

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Abbreviations

Aristotle's Works

<i>EN</i>	<i>Ethica Nicomachea</i>	<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>
<i>EE</i>	<i>Ethica Eudemia</i>	<i>Eudemian Ethics</i>
<i>Met.</i>	<i>Metaphysica</i>	<i>Metaphysics</i>
<i>Pol.</i>	<i>Politica</i>	<i>Politics</i>
<i>Apo.</i>	<i>Analytica Posteriora</i>	<i>Posterior Analytics</i>
<i>DA</i>	<i>De Anima</i>	<i>On the Soul</i>
<i>MA</i>	<i>De Motu Animalium</i>	<i>On the Movements of Animals</i>
<i>PA</i>	<i>De Partibus Animalium</i>	<i>On the Parts of Animals</i>
<i>Top.</i>	<i>Topica</i>	<i>Topics</i>
<i>Phys.</i>	<i>Physica</i>	<i>Physics</i>

Dialogues of Plato are cited by full titles.

For translation, I use Broadie/Rowe (2002) for *Nicomachean Ethics*, Barnes (ed.), (1991) for Aristotle's other works and Cooper/Hutchinson (eds.), (1997) for Plato's works.

“... nun gar ou dêpou pros ge auto touto philonikoumen, hofôs, hago tithemai, taut’ estai ta nikônta, ê tauth’ ha su, tôi d’ alêthestatôi dei pou symmachein hêmas ampô...”

“... For surely the object of our present controversy is not to gain the victory for my assertions or yours, but both of us must ‘fight together’ for the most perfect truth... (Plato, *Philebus*, 14b)”

Introduction

This dissertation is a study of the nature of deliberation in Aristotle's ethics. In his *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN) 6.1, Aristotle divides the rational part of the soul (*to echon logon*) into two sections; the part for systematic knowledge (*to epistêmonikon*) and the part for calculation (*to logistikon*). It is generally agreed that the proper function of the latter part is deliberation (*bouleusis*) or practical thought (*dianoia praktikê*); and it takes the form of a series of thoughts on practical matters, especially on 'what are to be acted (*ta prakta*)'. However, if this is the case, how is such practical thought distinct from the non-practical, theoretical, or mathematical reasoning that concerns '*to epistêmonikon*', the other part of the rational soul? Furthermore, if deliberation is characteristically 'practical', in what sense is it so? Does it contain a certain force that can initiate a 'physical' moral action? These are the questions that I engage with throughout the dissertation.

A group of scholars (representatively, John Cooper, Terrence Irwin, Martha Nussbaum and David Wiggins) attempt to understand Aristotle's practical thoughts in a rather 'intellectualistic' way; they clearly admit that practical thought is distinguished from theoretical thought, in that the purpose (*telos*) of each type of thought is significantly different, but they think that practical thought also contains an element that defines universal concepts, and that this element affects the success or failure of deliberation — it is even a decisive factor. As long as this idea can be extended to a claim that deliberation is eventually supervised by a conceptual understanding about life as a whole, i.e. the most supreme and thereby the most architectonic end in one's life, it is naturally possible to regard the so-called Grand End view (GEV) as the most representative form of an 'intellectualistic reading' of Aristotelian deliberation. The GEV reading has been influential with regard to several important controversies regarding Aristotle's deliberation, i.e. whether deliberation is both of means (*ta pros to telos*) and ends (*ta telê*), or only of means; and whether the *prohairesis*, the conclusion of deliberation, is or is not an action in itself. However, my overall argument in this dissertation is to provide an alternative interpretation of Aristotelian deliberation, *contra* the GEV.

For Chapter One, although the main argument of the dissertation is about the proper function of the deliberative soul, still in the rational domain, I discuss Aristotle's doctrine of the mean (*to meson*), his theoretical definition of character-excellence (*êthikê aretê*); and the excellent disposition of the non-rational part (*to alogon*) of the soul. I focus

on this because, since the deliberative soul and the irrational or emotional soul are both intimately associated with practical and moral life, it is necessary to understand this division of the soul to go on to examine the function of the deliberative soul more comprehensively.

As such, in this chapter, I discuss two controversial questions: ‘whether the mean indicates moderation or appropriateness’ and ‘to what the mean is relative.’ I will criticize respectively the so-called doctrine of moderation and the character-relativity interpretation of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, based on my interpretation of Aristotle’s discussions on habituation and excellence of character in *EN* 1.13 and *EN* 2.6; both based on my position on the ‘practicality’ of the doctrine of the mean, and also because I see ‘the mean relative to us’ as strictly confined to excellence of character. Hence, having criticized my opponents, I will provide my own interpretation of the doctrine of the mean, which is that character-excellence is the mean emotional disposition (*mesotês*) of the soul, and that the *mesotês* is what lets a given agent pursue to the best or most appropriate option in each moral circumstance. I end this chapter with some remarks regarding how the *mesotês* and *to meson* should be distinguished, how the Janus-faced character of *to meson* might be captured, moving to look at some points Aristotle introduces in his discussion on habituation.

Chapters Two and Three comprise the main argument. First, I will claim that deliberation is distinctive from theoretical thought, in the sense that the types of ‘truth’ each ‘reasoning’ deals with are heterogeneous. Then, I will maintain that, since deliberation is still a function of the rational soul, whose common *ergon* is ‘truth (*alêthêia*)’ or ‘to say truth or be true (*alêthêuein*)’, (*EN* 6.2, 1139b12-13) the conclusion of deliberation is to provide a *hypolêpsis* on the relevant truth, but not to indicate or initiate physical action itself.

Chapter Two discusses a question in Aristotle’s ethics that has baffled commentators for millennia: whether deliberation (*bouleusis*) is only of the means (*ta pros to telos*), or of both the means and the ends (*ta telê*). Aristotle, in *EN* 3.3, clearly says ‘that we do not deliberate about the ends, but only the means to the end’. However, proponents of the GEV do not always take such remarks at Aristotle’s word. This is because, they argue, Aristotle seems to say otherwise in several passages in *EN* 6. Particularly in *EN* 6.5, 1140a25-28, Aristotle seems to suggest, according to them, ‘a certain deliberation is

about the life in general, and this “deliberating” includes not only deliberating about means to the end, but also deliberating general ends and even the highest human good, the *eudaimonia*. They claim that Aristotle maintains that deliberation is both of means and ends, and most of them take Aristotle to intend this in the *EN* 3 as well. It is because this deliberation starts from the conception of the highest good, by virtue of which the deliberator can supervise all following processes of deliberation, that this sort of interpretation of Aristotle’s deliberation is often labelled as ‘the Grand End view’.

However, I do not think the GEV is a correct interpretation of Aristotelian deliberation, first because Aristotle never discusses or mentions deliberating about happiness — although, if happiness were really the object of deliberation, this would be the most essential element in his account on deliberation — and, second, because the passages that proponents of the GEV regard as supporting their position cannot be read in the way they prefer. Hence, in this chapter, and against the GEV, I will claim first that even though deliberation does not entirely exclude some awareness of moral values and principles, a conception of ends is not established by Aristotle’s deliberation. Second, I maintain that the kind of deliberation that Aristotle introduces is a process of reasoning to find the best option to put into practice in a given situation, having evaluated various means to an end in respect of the given end. Hence, according to my interpretation of Aristotle, deliberation does not determine our conception of general moral ends or moral first principles, because it merely specifies and decides the best thing to do in a given situation out of particular variables, while referring to a conception of ends already determined by the disposition of character. In short, I argue that Aristotle’s deliberation is merely of ‘*ta pros to telos*’, not of ‘*ta telē*’, and that deliberation is limited to the realm of means to an end, or what is conducive to the end.

Chapter Three introduces a puzzle regarding the relation between *prohairesis* and action. Aristotle often says that ‘the *prohairesis*, the conclusion of deliberation, is a combination between *nous* (reason) and *orexis* (desire)’. However, what he actually means by this remark is rather unclear. Does he mean that the *prohairesis* is an action? Some of those supporting the GEV argue that the *prohairesis* is an action, claiming that the relationship between reason and desire here is of such a nature that the *prohairesis* becomes an action, at least in the context of ‘the *enboulia*’. Yet, this view seems inadequate, because not only is their idea of ‘practical necessity’, which is the major premise of their interpretation,

somewhat problematic, but more importantly, the combined nature of reason and desire is not a sufficient condition for the *prohairesis* to be or to indicate an action.

Therefore, to criticise the GEV on *prohairesis*, I will show that Aristotle's anankastic expressions, when addressing practical contexts, do not provide us with an explanation of deliberation, and then show that Aristotle states that the *prohairesis* is, or results from, a reason-desire combination only in the sense that it is a part of a deliberation that already contains both reason and desire. Hence the thesis, that the *prohairesis*, the conclusion of practical reasoning, is an actual action, cannot be accepted. Rather, I will argue that Aristotle never uses the term '*prohairesis*' to indicate a 'physical' action, so its indication does not go beyond the realm of the deliberative soul. Therefore my own interpretation of Aristotle's *prohairesis* will be that it is a decision, a combination of the best judgment (*nous*-element) of what to do and the correct intention (*orexis*-element); but importantly it cannot be either an action or a nullified judgment, but must be between these two. Consequently, in this chapter I will maintain, against the GEV, that what Aristotle indicates by the term '*prohairesis*' is confined to the realm of the deliberative soul, so that *prohairesis*, by its nature and definition, cannot be an action. As a result of the discussion in Chapters Two and Three, I will have reached a provisional conclusion that deliberation is neither a reasoning towards a general concept, and nor does it physically or necessarily initiate action.

In Chapters Four and Five, I will then examine, so as to confirm its credibility, whether my interpretation of deliberation can also be applied to two other important philosophical issues.

The main topic of discussion in Chapter Four is Aristotle's account of *acrasia*, but the more fundamental goal of my argument is to test the conclusion I came to Chapter Three, that the *prohairesis*, by its nature, cannot be an action. Hence, in this chapter I will claim that Aristotle admits, unlike Socrates, the possibility of the so-called conscious *acrasia*. I will first criticise the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's account of *acrasia*, showing that this view is not compatible with Aristotle's significant remarks on the weak-willed *acrasia*, and that it cannot support Aristotle's general tendency to find the cause of *acrasia* not in the cognitive state of the acratist, but in the genuine conflict between reason and emotion, or between the deliberative soul and the affective soul. Instead, I will suggest that for Aristotle *acrasia* occurs not because of a lack of *epistémé*,

but due to a recalcitrant operation in the irrational part of the soul; not only is acting consciously against one's moral principle possible, but the weak-willed *acrasia* is the most representative case of this kind of action. I will end this chapter by showing how Aristotle, approaching the cause of *acrasia* in the way just mentioned, distinguishes himself from Socrates with regard to *acrasia*. Consequently, I conclude that, regarding *acrasia*, Aristotle should be understood neither traditionally nor socratically.

The fifth chapter looks at Aristotle's account of *eudaimonia*. Referring to the fact that, for Aristotle, practical thought and theoretical thought are distinguished exclusively from one another - I have shown it in Chapter Two -, the main question I discuss in this chapter is 'what is the highest form of human life in Aristotle?' In this chapter I criticise two influential views, the so-called inclusive end view, and the dominant end view. Furthermore, I provide an alternative 'dominant' end view of Aristotle's account of *eudaimonia*, that the best form of human life is the life of contemplation. In such a life, although contemplation is still superior to moral and political activity, this is only because the former is more similar than the latter to the focal sense of contemplation — that is, the contemplation of God. To support this, and having introduced some problems in my discussion of Aristotle's *eudaimonia*, I show that we can see Aristotle's view on the focal-derivative relation throughout his discussion of *eudaimonia*. So through this, we can defend the dominant end view from two common criticisms; one is a worry about inconsistency in Aristotle's discussions between *EN* 1 and *EN* 10, and the other is the so-called non-ethical picture of contemplative happiness. Furthermore, I will maintain that, through the idea of focal-relation between moral activity and contemplation, we can provide an interpretation in favour of the dominant end view. This will interpret the relation between the two types of activity in a way that is compatible with Aristotle's suggestions about the relation between the deliberative soul and the scientific soul. We will see that my interpretation of Aristotle's *eudaimonia* is not an inclusive view, because I do not accept that moral and political activity is constitutive of contemplation (against J.L. Ackrill and John Cooper's inclusive end view). Yet it departs from existing mainstream 'dominant end' views, in that I do not support that moral and political activity is instrumental in contemplation (against Richard Kraut and Anthony Kenny), or that the excellence of the latter can promote that of the former (against Gabriel Richardson Lear). *Ergo*, my interpretation can be regarded as an alternative dominant end view.

In short, in the first chapter, I discuss the condition of the emotional soul, or the soul-listening to reason that is inexplicably interrelated with the function of the deliberative or calculative soul. In the following two chapters, I will intensively investigate the complicated nature of deliberation in Aristotle. Then, as applications for my interpretation of Aristotle's deliberation, I examine two other notorious philosophical issues in Aristotle's ethics, *acrasia* and *eudaimonia* respectively, in the fourth and fifth chapters.

Chapter One: Excellence of Character (*êthikê aretê*) and the Soul that Lacks Reason (*to alogon*)

Regarding Aristotle's discussion of excellence of character¹ (*êthikê aretê*), it seems right to say the following. Aristotle's discussion on excellence of character in general² is dealt with for a practical need as long as it is in principle to figure out the identity of the excellent action. However, it is interesting that such a practical goal is not accomplished yet in the discussion of the habituation (*ethismos*) where³ he mainly discusses individual action (*praxis*) and affection (*pathos*)⁴. This is because it seems that the identity of the excellent action is not sufficiently described until Aristotle provides the definition of excellence of character, a detailed picture on the identity of the excellent person, that is, what sort of the disposition (*hexis*)⁵ it is. What has just been said is the general structure of my interpretation on Aristotle's discussion of excellence of character between 1.13 and 2.6 of *Nicomachean Ethics* (EN).

Hence, based on this line, dealing with two of the most controversial issues out of many, of the famous expression, the 'mean relative to us (*to meson pros hêmas*)', I criticize one in each issue. The issues to be considered are the one of the sense of 'the mean (*to meson*)' and the other is on the relativity of the mean. For the first issue, what I criticize is one

¹ I will use the character-excellence for the same meaning.

² The discussion between EN 1.13 and 2.6.

³ Especially, the discussion from EN2.1 to EN2.4.

⁴ *pathos* is the internal accusative of *paschein*. The history of the word *pathos* is beclouded by a multiplicity of connotations, but in its most general acceptance it means 'something that happens.' Therefore, it can broadly mean what happens to anything that undergoes, suffers, or experiences anything. Hence, although naturally there are some physical *pathos* as well, the *pathos* Aristotle means in the context of his discussion on the *êthikê aretê* is confined to psychic ones. Specifically, what is clear about the *pathos* here is that it is what belongs to the appetitive part (*to epithumêtikon*) of the soul (EN 1.13. 1102b30) cf., Broadie/Rowe (2002), pp.19-20, 301-2., Urmson, J (1990), pp.126-7.

⁵ The meaning of *hexis* could be slightly different depending on what use of its corresponding verb, *echein*, the given *hexis* is conected. When it is connected to the transitive use of *echein*, *hexis* means 'possession'; see EN 1098b31 "... but perhaps it makes no little difference whether we suppose the chief good to be located in the possession (*en hexei*) of excellence, or in its use (*en energeia*)..." cf., Plato, *Lams* 625c 'possession of arm', and *Theaetetus*, 197b 'the possession of knowledge'. However, if it is connected with the intransitive use of *echein*, the corresponding *hexis* means condition or disposition; see EN 1106b36 "... excellence, then, is a disposition issuing in decisions..." cf., *Phaedo* 91a and *Theaetetus* 153b. cf., Urmson (1990), pp.71-2. Surely, the *hexis* mentioned and dealt with in the context of the doctrine of the mean is the second one. As long as it is clearly expressed as a disposition of some *pathê*, what counts as the *hexis* is also what the appetitive soul concerns.

position (the doctrine of moderation⁶) which claims that the mean is a moderate amount of something, and for the second, I criticize one view (the character-relativity⁷) which claims that the mean is relative to the character of the individual agent.

Therefore, for my argument, I provide textual analysis between *EN* 1.13 and 2.6 (in Section 1), introduce each opponent view in each problem (in Section 2), and give the criticisms for each of them respectively, giving my own interpretation in a detailed manner (in Sections 3 - 4). Additionally, I end this chapter with my own remarks on *the doctrine of the mean and the habituation in Aristotle's ethics*.

1. Aristotle, Habituation (*ethismos*) and Character (*êthos*)

1.1 *EN* 1.13 to 2.4 - The Discussion of Habituation

It seems to be widely agreed that, on excellence of character in general, Aristotle starts the discussion from *EN* 1.13 and ends in *EN* 2.6 where he provides his own definition of it. We could say that in *EN* 1.13 Aristotle points out *which part of the soul is concerned with excellence of character*. What is clear is that he seems to mean that excellence of character is somehow an excellent ability of 'listening-to-reason' as long as excellence of character, he says, is *the excellence of the 'listening-to-reason (katekoos tou logou)'* part of the human soul (*EN* 1103a1-5). Having said that in the end of *EN* 1, in *EN* 2.1-4, he devotes himself to making a discussion for a rather practical purpose; *to know what sort of activity we have to set up for the sake of our (or our children's, or young generation's) successful habituation in order to build an excellent person (cf., EN 2.1, 1103b20-25)*.⁸ In *EN* 2.1, Aristotle, having explained the reason that excellence of character is acquired by habituation, suggests that the primary object of habituation is action in general. So, to become excellent, we must habituate ourselves with a certain sort of action, because *"the same type of action makes its agent be in the same disposition (ek tôn homoiôn energeiôn hai hexeis ginontai (EN 1103b20)"* In the next chapter *EN* 2.2, Aristotle gives us a more specific answer for the question of what sort of action to habituate ourselves with. As he briefly says in the previous chapter, that is the action of a certain type, the action of character-

⁶ Representatively, Kraut (1989).

⁷ Representatively, Leighton (1992), (1995) & Lloyd (1968). Cf., Sherman (1989), p.37.

⁸ I think this is important because, here in the end of *EN* 2.1, Aristotle already assumes, in a sense, that his inquiry is in principle about action, but, to know it properly he will have to see the person of a certain disposition that determines a corresponding character of action.

excellence-agent, i.e. the action of a just person and that of a courageous person, etc. However, in *EN* 2.3, Aristotle does not mean that that action is the only requirement for the habituation, because to do a certain type of action is not only to repeat one action blindly, but also to suffer (*paschein*), such as ‘liking (*bédonê*)’ or ‘disliking (*lypê*)’ the action in a certain way. That is, we should also like the courageous action when we are doing it, because that is the proper way to do ‘that’ type of action and to lead our habituation of ‘that’ action successfully. Therefore, between *EN* 2.1 and 2.3, Aristotle explains the essential elements of habituation, as he himself summarizes in the end of *EN* 2.3; habituation needs a certain type of action and affection, and the type of action one habituates oneself with will be the type of action one firmly does after the end of habituation.⁹ He points out one more in *EN* 2.4, which is how we become an agent of excellence of character through excellent actions. He says here ‘doing an excellent action in the way the excellent person does’ is doing it (1) knowing (*eidenai*) what he/she does is an excellent action, (2) deciding (*prohairessthai*) it for itself, and (3) in a firm and unchangeable manner (*bebaiôs kai ametakinêtôs*). Aristotle comments that the first condition is not important¹⁰, but the other two are nearly everything for becoming excellent. (1105b1-2) Now, having finished answering to what sort of action we should do in the habituation, Aristotle, for some reason, goes on to discuss what kind of person the agent of excellence of character is in *EN* 2.5 and 2.6. A detailed explanation for ‘some reason’ why Aristotle goes on to the person of excellence from the action of excellence will be the key to my original argument in this chapter. But, for now, we shall look at these two of Aristotle’s chapters more closely, since they are directly related to our main issues, the meaning of ‘to meson’ and that of ‘hêmas’.

1.2 *EN* 2.5 - The *genus* of Excellence of Character

Beginning this chapter by inquiring ‘what the excellence is (*ti esti aretê*)’, Aristotle conventionally¹¹ proclaims that the following discussion is to provide a definition of

⁹This is my own interpretation on his ending remarks of *EN* 2.3; “... so much, then, for these subjects – that excellence has to do with pleasures and pains, that the things from which it comes about are also the ones by which it is both increased and – if they come about in a different way – destroyed, and that the things from which it has come about are also the things in relation to which it is activated...(1105a12-16)”

¹⁰ This point won’t be mentioned in the current chapter, but will be intensively dealt with throughout Chapters Three and Four.

¹¹ Aristotle’s “regular and formal way of setting the question of definition, in the Aristotelian ... sense of “definition””, in Urmson (1980), p.157.

excellence of character. Following the tradition, Aristotle investigates, respectively, the *genus* and the *differentia* of excellence of character. Therefore, the goal of *EN* 2.5 is to show the *genus* of excellence of character. Aristotle uses the so-called way of elimination (*via negativa*) here. Namely, he organizes the argument of this chapter by listing three things that occur in the soul as the potential candidates of excellence of character and eliminating some of them in which he finds inconsistent factors with this excellence. We can divide *EN* 2.5 into two parts; the first part (1105b20~28) is to give brief definitions of each candidate and the second (1105b29~1106a13) is allocated to negate the unsuccessful candidates from the one, that is actually the *genus* of excellence of character.

In the first part, it is said by Aristotle that affection¹² (*pathos*), capacity (*dunamis*) and disposition (*hexis*) occur in the soul. Affections are, generally, accompanied by liking (*hêdonê*)¹³ and disliking (*hupê*)¹³, capacities are something in terms of that we are said to be able to be affected, and dispositions are something by which we are disposed (*echomen*) well or badly to affection.

The second part is further divided into two subordinated parts. In the first (*EN* 1105b29~1106a6) of them, the reasons that affections are not the *genus* of the excellence are presented. He distinguishes affections from the excellences in terms of three aspects, praise (*ephainos*) or blame (*psogos*), decision (*prohairesis*) and the ways we are expressed when we are with affections and excellences.’ The first reason that affections are not excellences is that when we are called excellent (praised) or bad (blamed), the praise or blame is not made according to (*kata*) affections, but according to excellences and bad states. In ‘decision’, affections do not imply decision at all, whereas, excellences, at least, involve it. Additionally, Aristotle raises an example that we put different attributes in our expressions about affections and excellences. On the former, we say ‘to be moved’ (*kinêisthai*), but the latter we are said ‘to be in a certain condition (*diakêisthai*)’.

In the last part (1106a6~13), Aristotle says that these reasons are also applicable to the cases of capacities. Specifically, that we are praised or blamed is not because of

¹²I will also use ‘emotion’ for the same sense.

¹³Of course, one of the common translations for these two Greek words are respectively ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’. There should be another discussion for this, but I prefer translating them as ‘liking’ and ‘disliking’ because those words are mainly used to express some subjective feeling or attitude of a given agent towards something, in general, good and bad. Cf., Urmson (1988), pp.26-7.

capacities either. For, capacities are what we obtain naturally, but excellences are not. Therefore, due to these differences between two candidates- affections and capacities- and excellence, they must be eliminated from the list, the only one remaining is disposition, automatically proving it as the *genus* of excellence of character. Thus, what Aristotle originally aims at in this chapter is now achieved, because he have figured out that the *genus* of the excellence is disposition.

1.3 EN 2.6 - The *differentia* of Excellence of Character

Now, in EN 2.6, Aristotle discusses the *differentia* of the excellence, that is, on what kind of disposition excellence of character is. Very roughly, the discussion of this chapter is composed of three, in some sense, different discussions; the part (1106a14 - 1106b6) where he introduces a concept of the mean (to meson) and its kind as a preparation to apply it to our ethical discussion, the part (1106b7-1107a8) in which he eventually describes how such a concept of 'the mean relative to us (to meson pros hēmas)' can be applied to our ethical context and shows us his own 'famous' definition of excellence of character, and the part (1107a9-26) where he warns us that 'not every emotion/affection take such mean quality (mesotês)(1107a9-10)'.¹⁴

We shall see the content in a somewhat detailed manner. At the beginning, he says that a discussion on the kind of disposition of the excellence would also be possible to make even clearer what he gives us through his so-called 'function argument', (1097b22~1098a20) that excellence of character makes both its subject be good and its function do well. This is because, he stresses, the inquiry on the *differentia* of the excellence is the consideration of the *nature*¹⁴ of it. This attempt starts from a concept of the mean that can be found or measured among the continuous and divisible things. There are two different types of the mean, the mean 'with reference to the object itself (to meson kat' auto to pragmatos)' and the 'mean relative to us.' The former is "what is equidistant from each of its two extremes, which is one and the same for all", but the latter "the sort of thing that neither goes to excess nor is deficient-and this is not one thing, nor is it the same for all (1106a32-33)". Aristotle notes that they are different in the way they are determined, because the former mean can be easily found in a given object itself,

¹⁴I think this is the very important point in the doctrine of the mean. This assumes that 'mean' is proper to character-excellent people. See EN, 1106a25-6 "...but it will also be clear ... if we consider what sort of nature excellence has..."

whereas a different way is required to measure the latter mean. Using the case of gymnastic training, Aristotle explains that the way that the ‘mean relative to us’ is found is the same as how a proper diet is found by a trainer for the mighty athlete Milo and a novice respectively (EN 1106a14 -1106b6).

In the end, he employs the concept of the ‘mean relative to us’ to the ethical case saying that since (1) the ‘mean relative to us’ is what is pursued to in the domain of art (*technê*) as well, and (2) excellence of character is superior to (the corresponding excellence of) art in goodness and preciseness (EN 1106b8-16), the ‘mean relative to us’ is also something that is pursued by the person of excellence of character. Aristotle goes on to describe some of the details of this. He says excellence of character looks to the ‘mean relative to us’, because in affections and actions with which the excellence has to do there are the excess, the deficiency and the mean, but the mean among them (a) is praised (*ephaineitai*) and (b) successful (*katorthoutai*). He continues to say that since excellence of character (c) is able to hit (*ousa stochastikê*) the mean, this is a kind of ‘intermediacy (*tis mesotês*)’ or ‘mean quality’ and the bad is excess and deficiency. This is also, Aristotle says, because there is (d) only one way to hit the mean (*to katorthoun*), but there are many ways to go astray (*ta hamartanein*) (EN 1106b16-33).

Now, having discussed the commonness between the mean and excellence of character, Aristotle eventually gives us the following definition of excellence of character, “the excellence is a disposition issuing in decisions, depending on mean quality (intermediacy) of the kind relative to us, this being determined by the rational prescription and in the way the practically wise person (*phronimos*) would determine it.¹⁵” This is the bulk of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean, but this is one of the most controversial parts of Aristotle’s ethics for many different reasons and points¹⁶. Amongst many relevant issues, I will focus on two points already mentioned above; the one of the meaning of the mean and the other of the meaning of *hêmas*.

2. Discussions on ‘the Mean Relative to Us (to meson pros hêmas)’

¹⁵ EN 1106b35-7a2, “*estin ara he aretê hexis proairetikê, en mesotêti ousa têi pros hêmas, hôrismenêi logoi kai hos an ho phronimos horiseien...*”

¹⁶ For the other relevant discussions, cf., Broadie (1991), pp.96-103 and Bostock (2001), pp.33-53.

It seems clear that Aristotle says that excellence of character is significantly related to the ‘mean relative to us’, whatever it is. However, the meaning of the expression ‘*to meson pros hēmas*’ is far from clear, for there is some ambiguity and abstractness in the indications of *to meson* and *hēmas*.¹⁷ Again, the discussion on *to meson* is about how to understand Aristotle’s indication of *to meson* in the ethical case, whereas the discussion about *hēmas* is regarding the relativity of the mean and thereby that of excellence of character.

For the former discussion, there is one position called ‘the doctrine of moderation’ that claims that what Aristotle eventually wants to say in his doctrine of the mean is to prescribe that we should always do and suffer some moderate amount of action and affection to be an agent of excellence of character. Therefore, in this sense they defend the view that the concept of the mean is the moderate amount of action and affection. The latter discussion is to search the meaning of ‘*hēmas*’ in the expression ‘the mean relative to us’ (*to meson pros hēmas*); an inquiry to find an answer to the question to what the mean is relative. One position that can be labeled as ‘character-relativity’ claims that ‘*hēmas*’ indicates the individual agent or the character of each agent, so both the relativity of the mean and that of excellence of character are the character-relativity. Those two positions mentioned above are the views I criticize in each discussion, but, for now, we shall see some more about them.

2.1 The Doctrine of Moderation

2.1.1 The Mean and Moderation

In *EN* 2.1-6, Aristotle says that, to be excellent in character, one must suffer and perform the mean thing (*to meson*), such as affection and action in a mean. There seems to be no controversy in the understanding that Aristotle claims that those affections and actions in a mean are some appropriate affections and actions in a given circumstance.¹⁸ There, however, is a disagreement on how we should understand ‘appropriateness’. Specifically, it is about whether we can include the extreme, such as extreme degrees of actions/affections, into appropriateness or not. The doctrine of moderation denies this,

¹⁷ Bostock (2001), p.38 and Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.95.

¹⁸ “To have one’s emotions and actions in a meanto feel and manifest each emotion ...in such ways as are proper” Urmson (1980), p.161, “although the appropriate amount of the anger varies....., it is in a sense always a moderate amount.” Kraut (1989),p.339.

claiming that they are merely affection (and action) of moderate amount. Obviously, according to this view, Aristotle merely gives us a practical advice, through his doctrine of the mean, that to be an agent of excellence of character one must always target affection and action in moderate amounts. Richard Kraut has developed an idea based on this.

2.1.2 Kraut on the Doctrine of Moderation¹⁹

The idea of moderation regarding the doctrine of the mean is based on the idea that there is a certain type of affection and action which are always right.²⁰ This sounds strange to Aristotle²¹, but Kraut seems to defend this idea in a rather systemic argument in the way of preserving the practical quality of the doctrine of the mean. He seems to say that (1) Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is designed for a practical purpose. Namely, the purpose for Aristotle to introduce the doctrine of the mean is, not only, to provide the definition of excellence of character, but mainly to supply some practical support²² regarding the question 'how to become a person of excellence of character'²³. Therefore, Kraut seems to claim that (2) understanding 'the practical support' or 'help' is to be 'giving some more specific instruction on what to do and what to feel in each individual situation'. Namely, Kraut seems to maintain that, since what Aristotle substantively intends to explain in terms of the concept of the mean is to generalize the types of action and affection that are always recommendable to do and feel, the word 'the mean (to meson)' is supposed to pinpoint actions and affections rather than dispositions. However, Kraut (3) does not seem to deny that the mean actions and such affections are the manifestation of the mean character, so, in terms of *the mean quality (mesotês)*, disposition is prior to action and affection. However, the reason that he claims the

¹⁹ Kraut (1989), pp.327-341.

²⁰ Broadie (1991), pp.99-100.

²¹ I mean that it is so according to what Aristotle says in *EN 2.2* that "...things in the sphere of action and things that bring advantage have nothing stable about them, any more than things bring health... (ta d' en tais praxesi kai ta sumpheronta ouden estêkos echeim hôsper oude ta hygieinâ)".

²² The reason that Kraut sees the main goal of the doctrine of the mean is to give a practical advice seems to be because of the following. Aristotle says in *EN 1104a10-12* that (although for our current discussion it is difficult to have precise information) we should do our best to help (*boêthein*). Kraut seems to claim that here 'to help' means is to give a practical advice applicable to each particular circumstance, although it is difficult to make. Kraut argues that this helping covers the whole argument of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean, Kraut (1989), pp.328-9. I will deal with this point again.

²³ Kraut (1989), pp.161-2, 327-8 and 334.

doctrine of the mean to be mainly about the actions and affections is because, *says he, the actions and affections manifestating the disposition of a given agent fall essentially into somewhere between each extreme*. What he says about this is the following. The actions and affections of the excellent agent are, by their nature, conformed²⁴ to the right reason, or *phronêsis* – the preeminent excellence, for Kraut²⁵ –, so they are essentially in a mean, but neither in an excess nor in a deficiency, both of which are against the right reason, thereby destroying it. Namely, Kraut claims that the actions and affections that come from the disposition of the excellent agent cannot be either of the excessive quantity or of the deficient as long as either of these is, by nature, to disobey the right reason or practical wisdom. Therefore, the mean actions and affections are, by definition, always between zero and the most possible amount.²⁶

Citing several parts of *EN* 3 and 4 in which Aristotle mentions some particular excellences, Kraut tries to show that Aristotle describes, he thinks, the moderateness of particular excellent actions and emotions. In these parts Aristotle, Kraut says²⁷, shows that in being concerned with fear, pleasure and anger, the individual excellences such as temperance²⁸, courage²⁹ and mildness³⁰ are in the disposition moderate, but the others, too little or too much. Moreover, at the end³¹ of *EN* 3 when discussing the application of ‘self-indulgency (*akolastos*)’ to the naughtiness of children, Aristotle reveals a conflict between ‘the reason’ and ‘the gratification great and intense.’ Kraut tries to interpret this as the desire extreme potentially impeding the ability to make reasonable decisions³². Kraut argues that since making reasonable decisions is one of the characteristics of the excellence³³, something interrupting it is not compatible with the excellence. Consequently, for Kraut ‘not being moderate’ or ‘being extreme’ does not consist in excellence of character and, thereby, is not able to be overlapped with the concept of

²⁴ Ibid, pp.162,334, 339-341.

²⁵ Ibid, p.327.

²⁶ Ibid, pp.339-341.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ *EN* 1118b8-1119a21.

²⁹ Ibid 1115b7-13.

³⁰ Ibid 1125b33-5.

³¹ Ibid 1119a35-b18.

³² “If one greatly enjoys a certain activity....it will eventually become difficult to make reasonable decisions how such physical pleasures should be pursued...” Kraut (1989), p.341.

³³ *EN* 1106b35-1107a3.

the mean (*to meson*).³⁴ Consequently, for Kraut, actions and emotions in a mean are always somewhere between two extremes, so, by nature, the mean, again, cannot imply the extremes at all.

2.2 The Relativity to (the Character of) an Individual Agent

2.2.1 The Character Relativity

In general, the position that supports the ‘character relativity’ is based on the reading that Aristotle indicates the different agents of *character (êthos)* – the ethical identity of an agent-, through the word ‘*hêmas*’ in the expression ‘*to meson pros hêmas*’. Probably, in this position, we can assume that Aristotle does not explain only about excellence of character with the expression ‘the mean relative to us’, but also applies such a concept of the mean to the cases of other characters. We do not yet know clearly about the difference of the characters, but it seems, generally, to be agreed that they are different in moral development³⁵, which means that one character is somehow superior to the other. Hence, there could claim to be two different levels of ‘the mean relative to us’; one is the mean required only for the excellent person - probably the best possible action and affection for a human, as an ethical agent-, and the other is the mean that suits an individual state of moral development, again, somehow inferior to excellence of character. According to the character-relativity defenders, there is a mean even to such an inferior character, so this mean can practically help the agents of such inferior character to develop their characters³⁶. We shall see one specific point below.

2.2.2 Leighton’s Character-Relativity

It is agreed that Milo’s example plays an important role in understanding Aristotle’s relativity of the mean and excellence of character. So, we need to show how we understand this example to make a proper argument about ‘that relativity.’ Stephen Leighton sets a premise, having captured the role of ‘the mean relative to us’ in the definition of excellence of character, and seems to try to show, through this premise, his view of Milo’s example.

³⁴ “...The appropriate amount is always greater than zero but less than the greatest amount that is possible...” Kraut (1989), p.339.

³⁵ Bostock (2001), p.40.

³⁶ One can rephrase the character-relativity in this way. See Curzer (2006), pp.508-512.

Leighton seems to say the following. The mean is a *differentia* of excellence of character, so it had been originally introduced to indicate the character itself.³⁷ He thinks that Milo's example shows two different agents in the 'same' circumstances,³⁸ because in this example, the difference Aristotle shows between Milo and the novice is their abilities as athletes. Namely, both of them are in the same circumstance, where the extremes are the amount of two and that of ten, but as, in terms of physical condition, Milo is a mighty and experienced athlete, but the novice is not, the trainer would prescribe different diets to each of them. Therefore, as long as it is true that, in Milo's case, the proper amount of diet for each athlete indicates 'the mean relative to us', 'us' here should mean the different physical conditions and requirements of each athlete. Then, in ethical cases, the different ability or condition of each moral agent should mean the different ethical identities³⁹ of each agent, *the ethical character of each*⁴⁰. Consequently, 'the mean relative to us' in the ethical case is the mean that can be determined referring to the character of a given agent. Hence, the relativity of the mean and, thereby, that of excellence of character are in the character- relativity.

2.2.3 An Influence from a Strand of Contemporary Common Sense

Curzer⁴¹ says that those who support the character-relativity regarding Aristotle's doctrine of the mean are, in general, affected by the following strand of contemporary common sense. This common sense suggests that we should expect from and reward different sorts of people differently. Namely, it says, assuming 'it is easier for a man of courage (*andreia*) to fight and for one of liberality (*eleutheriotês*) to give', that we should

³⁷ Leighton (1995), p.75 "the context of the discussion...Aristotle expresses a concern for the sort of state of character that virtue is - not simply ... choices, actions and passions issuing from... that state of character...", "Aristotle's claim...is that the mean state that virtue is is relative to us, not that the mean state is a state that manifests itself in passion, choices and actions...", "this ... is a general reason to see the force of '*pros bêmas*' as committing Aristotle to a claim about character, not simply the circumstances of choice, action and passion...", p.76 "...there is additionally and centrally a concern for character itself..."

³⁸ Ibid, pp.73-74, "...some variety of mean positions falling between the 'same' extremes...in the face of the 'same' extremes differences concerning the mean are found, coordinated with differences in the subject and activity..."

³⁹ Ibid, p.69, "...our ethical identities are relative to who we are..."

⁴⁰ Ibid, p.76, "...the orientation of the chapter as a whole, the formal account of virtue... all these concern the state of character...these reasons taken together give good grounds for adopting the second interpretative strategy-character relativity..."

⁴¹ Curzer (2006).

expect more from the courageous people in the battle field and from the liberal person in the situation of charity. Moreover, it also says when a coward and the miser does, respectively, what the courageous person does and the liberal person does, they should be praised more than courageous and liberal people should be for doing the same acts, because they have done such things having overcome some obstacle(s). If this common sense implies that there is a different moral standard to an individual agent of different moral development, it may be right to say that the character- relativity interpretation is influenced by that.

The proponents of the character-relativity would not strictly deny the importance of circumstance in determining the mean in each case⁴², but the thing is that they do not think that is all. Namely, for them, even in the same circumstance, there can still be different ‘mean’ actions, because the mean options are different relative to each level of character. Again, they, in a sense, admit that in the same circumstance the action and affection of the excellent agent are the most ideal and the best option in a given situation, but they still argue that there could be a mean appropriate to each level of character. This kind of the mean, for the proponents, seems to be the second best option⁴³ as a practical advice to do the best action as much as each agent can do. Namely, they cannot necessarily be the best one that the excellent one does there, but still it will help the given agent to develop his or her character or at least not destroy it.⁴⁴

I see that what they – the proponents of the character-relativity – note is some sort of *subjectivity* in the concept of the mean. Probably this idea itself is neither very surprising nor strange to Aristotle in the aspect that, in *EN* 1.13, Aristotle says the part of the soul that concerns excellence of character is the soul that lacks reason (*to alogon*). This is also because when Aristotle explains in *EN* 3.4 the relation between the agent of excellence of character and the good, the object of his or her wish (*boulésis*), he often enjoys expressing that the excellent person *likes* the good rather than rationally chooses the good having reasoned or deliberated. Hence, it is possible to say that the expressions ‘liking’ (*hêdonê*) and ‘disliking’ (*lypê*), that describe one’s attitude or tendency towards such moral values, are in a sense similar to something called the prescriptive meaning of

⁴² Leighton (1995) and Stewart (1892), p.191.

⁴³ Probably the character-relativity defenders refer to us, as Aristotle says (1109a35), doing the second best thing (*ton deuteron*) when it is difficult to take the mean.

⁴⁴ Bostock (2001), Brown, L (1997), pp.77-93, and Curzer (2006), pp.508-512.

moral language whose existence and importance advocated by some strand of the contemporary metaethical theories.⁴⁵ So, in this aspect as well, it is right to be said that the position that claims a kind of the subjective awareness toward the mean, the essence of moral value, for Aristotle, is influenced by a contemporary strand mentioned above. However, is this reading compatible with what Aristotle actually says? The following content invites us to this point.

3. The Criticisms

3.1 *Contra* the Doctrine of Moderation

Obviously, whether we see the mean as moderation or appropriateness is also related to the problem of how we understand 'the action or affection in a mean (*to meson*)'. In general, the doctrine of moderation supports a premise that the concept of the mean is a 'quantitative' mean or at least a point on a quantitatively measurable scale. Therefore, to criticize, I show that (1) there is no textual evidence that supports that the ethical mean can be understood as a moderate amount of something and, more fundamentally, maintain that (2) although the substantive goal of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is in a practical context, as Kraut says, it does not follow that *to meson* (the action and affection that the excellent person does and suffers) is no more than *a certain amount of affection and action*.

3.1.1 No Textual Evidence

It is true and clear that Aristotle describes quantitatively 'the mean relative to us (*to meson pros hēmas*)' in some cases and that he also says that there are the excess, the deficiency and the mean even in ethical context, specifically, with regard to actions and affections. However, what I claim is that this cannot be a decisive reason to read the ethical mean in a moderate amount of action or of affection. For, first of all, the case where Aristotle describes 'the mean relative to us' clearly in a quantitative way is not an ethical case at all, but the cases of art or another field related to action, such as, medicine or gymnastics, etc. Also, even the cases where he mentions the excess, the deficiency and the mean in the ethical context do not give us an exhaustive explanation, but merely a rough description to be followed by a more specific one. This is because when Aristotle

⁴⁵ I specifically mean Hare's prescriptivism, see Hare (1952).

explains the mean in the ethical context, it seems quite clear that he tends to describe it with various parameters, rather specific and concrete. Some details will follow with the relevant text below.

3.1.1.1 Quantitative ⁴⁶ Description on the Mean Relative to Us.

In Milo's example (*EN* 2.6, 1106a36-b4), Aristotle says clearly and quantitatively that 'the mean relative to us' is the amount of food prescribed respectively to Milo and to the novice. However, here Aristotle does not yet talk about an ethical context. Of course, the mean in ethical context and the one in the art share some common points, but we do not know yet if it is a quantitative description or not. There is another passage where Aristotle describes 'the mean relative to us' both in the ethical case and in the case of 'production' (*poiēsis*) of which the corresponding intellectual excellence is the art (*technē*).⁴⁷

"... First of all, then, one must keep in view that the sorts of things we are talking about are naturally such as to be destroyed by deficiency and excess, just as we observe – since we have to use what is obvious to testify on behalf of what is not so – in the case of strength and health; for both excessive training and too little training will destroy our health, whereas drinking and eating proportionate amounts creates, increases, and preserves it. So too it is, then, with moderation, courage, and the other excellences. For someone who runs away from everything, out of fear, and withstands nothing, becomes cowardly, and correspondingly someone who is frightened of nothing at all and advances in the face of just anything becomes rash; and similarly, too, someone who takes advantage of every pleasure offered and holds back from none becomes self-indulgent, while someone who runs away from every pleasure, as boors do, is insensate, as it were. Moderation, then, and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency, and preserved by what is mean (intermediate⁴⁸) between them... (*EN* 2.2, 1104a11-26)"

⁴⁶ I will not deal with the 'quantitativeness' issue about *to meson* in this dissertation. But for the relevant debate, see the following; Curzer seems to defend a way of 'quantitative reading', but Hursthouse criticizes it. See, Curzer (1996), pp.129-38., Hursthouse (1980-1), pp.57-72 & (2006), pp.96-108.

⁴⁷ See *EN* 6.4.

⁴⁸ Again, I use Broadie/Rowe's translation for quotations of *Nicomachean Ethics*, but I will employ different translations for several Greek terms for consistency. It seems better to mention them here; for '*to meson*', they use 'the intermediate', but I use 'the mean', for '*phronēsis*', they use 'wisdom', but I use 'practical wisdom', and for '*sophia*' they use intellectual accomplishment, but I use 'theoretical wisdom'. Also, for *theōria*, they translate as 'reflection' or 'reflective activity', but I do as 'contemplation' or 'contemplative activity'.

Like Milo's example of *EN* 2.6, here in *EN* 2.2 Aristotle also, discussing the moral habituation, explains that 'the mean relative to us' in the case of art and in the case of ethics are somehow similar. In the case of strength and health, generally the cases of art, Aristotle clearly says that 'the mean relative to us' is some amount, as he also says in Milo's case. However, when he explains the cases of particular excellences, such as, temperance and courage, he never says that courage or temperance is a moderate amount of action or affection. Also, in this case he does not even use the expression '*to meson*' that indicates an individual action or affection. It is to be noted that he does not say more than that the *mesotês*, the disposition of the excellent agent, preserves temperance and courage. Of course, if we read the above passage generously, we may regard expressions like 'being afraid of everything or of nothing' as quantitative. Even so, this explanation is no more than a mere abstract explanation of the ethical mean. However, fortunately, mentioning the mean in the ethical context, Aristotle gives more than an abstract description that it is in a mean between the excess and the deficiency. In the following passage, we shall see Aristotle's more specific explanation of the ethical mean and also find out if there is any textual evidence that would allow us to say that the ethical mean is the moderate amount of action or affection.

3.1.1.2 Non-Quantitative Description of *to meson* in Ethical Context

“... and it is through pleasures (liking) and pains (disliking) that people become bad. i.e., by pursuing them or running away from them, either the ones they shouldn't, or when they shouldn't, or in a way they shouldn't, or however many other distinctions are made in one's prescriptions... (*EN* 2.3, 1104b21-24)”

Of course, this is not the discussion directly on the definition of excellence of character, but the one on the moral habituation (*ethismos*). However, it is more than enough to get Aristotle's hint that there are various parameters being referred to when 'the mean relative to us' is determined in the ethical context. Here, Aristotle means this. Liking or disliking itself is neither good nor bad. However, on the one hand, if someone likes something, satisfying all parameters mentioned, he/she becomes good, but on the other, if someone likes it failing to satisfy any of the parameters mentioned, he or she falls down to be bad. Of course, what he describes here are rather more affections that are always accompanied by liking and disliking, than actions. However, since affection is

what Aristotle also indicates by the word *to meson*, there is no problem at all in understanding Aristotle's thought that *various parameters are required when determining the mean relative to us (to meson pros hēmas)*. Then, how does Aristotle compose an explanation, referring to those various parameters, of the affection and action in a mean? The following passage tells us more about the point.

“... I mean excellence of character; for this has to do with affections and actions, and it is in these that there is excess and deficiency, and the mean. So for example it is possible on occasion to be affected by fear, boldness, appetite, anger, pity, and pleasure and distress in general both too much and too little, and neither is good; but to be affected when one should, at the things one should, in relation to the people one should, for the reasons one should, and in the way one should, is both mean and best, which is what belongs to excellence. In the same way (*homoioûs*) with actions, too, there is excess, deficiency and the mean... *EN* 2.6 (1106b16-23)”

What we have to note here is this; *although it is clear that Aristotle says that in action and affection concerned with excellence of character there are the excess, the deficiency and the mean, that is not an exhaustive or final description of ethical action and affection*. In this passage, Aristotle explains the action and affection of the excellent agent, that is, *the mean relative to us (to meson pros hēmas)*, employing the various parameters just as he explains that liking and disliking are always coupled with affections in the passage in *EN* 2.3 just above. He means that ‘*the mean (to meson)*’ in ethical context is the right action and affection we perform and have at the right time, to a right object, towards the right people, for a right goal and in a right way we are. Admittedly there should be some passages of Aristotle where he might express his quantitative conception on the mean, but there is no textual evidence to claim the doctrine of moderation. I think that the evidence we have seen so far already shows clearly that none of Aristotle's comments on *the mean (to meson)* in ethical context supports the view that ‘the mean relative to us’ in ethics is an affection or action of a moderate amount.

3.1.2 The Meaning of *to meson* and the Practical Need Toward the Definition of Excellence of Character

Apart from showing no textual evidence for the doctrine of moderation, there is an even more fundamental reason to deny it. Aristotle begins *EN* 2.2 with the following passage.

“ ... Since, then, the present undertaking is not for the sake of theory (*theória*), as our others are, (for we are inquiring into what excellence is (*ti esti hê aretê*) not for the sake of knowing it (*ou hin' eidômen*), but for the sake of becoming good (*hin' agathoi genômeta*), since otherwise there would be no benefit in to at all) the things about actions are necessary to be investigated, that is, how those are to be acted... But before that let it be agreed that everything one says about practical undertakings has to be said, not with precision, but in rough outline... things in the spheres of action and things that bring advantages have nothing stable about them, any more than thing that bring health... But even though the present discussion is like this, we must try to give some help (*boêthein*)... (EN 2.2, 1103b26 – 1104a12)”

Again, Kraut claims the doctrine of moderation based on some premises that (1) the discussion on excellence of character is to become a person of such a character, that (2) the meaning of ‘to give some help’ is to provide a general answer to what the right type of action for the successful habitation is and that (3) the definition of excellence of character is given in this context; it should be a practical instruction for such a moral education. If I am not wrong about Kraut, I do not disagree with any of these premises. I totally agree that the doctrine of the mean is given for a practical purpose, but I disagree that the practical quality of the doctrine of the mean guarantees its focus to be on individual actions and affections rather than disposition. However, for now, we must first see *in what sense* the doctrine of the mean is practical⁴⁹.

Again, I claim that although it is true that the doctrine of the mean is for a practical instruction, it does not follow that the meaning of the mean (*to meson*) indicates some actions and affections that have some values independently or in themselves. If the latter followed, the discussion of habituation would have just been stopped at the end of EN 2.3 where he finishes the discussion on liking and disliking, and we would have not needed the doctrine of the mean. What I mean is that if the action and affection of the excellent agent can be fully explained in the level of individual actions and affections rather than of the dispositions of the agent, we already have a good answer to the question of what sort of action we should set up for our habituation to make it successful. Namely, Aristotle has already discussed enough in EN 2.2, about what kind of action is excellent, temperate and courageous. It is important to know why Aristotle introduces the definition of excellence of character. It is because he thinks, through the study only of individual actions and affections, we cannot answer sufficiently the question of what the excellent action is to make our

⁴⁹ Cf., Susan Meyer understands as in Aristotle ethical evaluation on agent ultimately aims at the *hexis* of the given agent, not individual actions. See, Meyer (1993), pp.36-53.

habituation be successful. This means that since no action or affection has any moral value in itself, it is necessary to see the ethical identity of the disposition of each agent. It will be easy to understand this if we recall that whenever Aristotle explains a certain action or affection, he describes the action or affection that a certain person would do or suffer⁵⁰. A more fundamental reason not to claim the doctrine of moderation can be found if we grasp the exact reason that Aristotle composes the definition of excellence of character *after* having discussed habituation from *EN* 2.1 to 2.4.

3.1.2.1 What is to be Habituated

“...we may sum up by saying just that dispositions come about from activities of a similar sort (*heni dé logoi ek tôn homoión energeiôn hai hexeis ginontai*). This is why it is necessary to ensure that the activities be of a certain quality; for the varieties of these are reflected in the dispositions’. So it does not make a small difference whether people are habituated to behave in one way or in another way from childhood on, but a very great one; or rather, it makes all the difference in the world...(*EN* 2.1, 1103b22-26)”

In the first half of *EN* 2.1, Aristotle elaborates the meaning of the idea that excellence of character is acquired by habituation and in the later part he starts discussing ‘action’; the object of habituation in general. So, he says that the object of moral habituation is mainly action in general, and the object of the successful habituation that makes one be excellent is an activity of a certain sort. This is because, as we may see in the italicized part above, *the types of action determine the types of disposition of the agent*. Therefore, in order to acquire excellence of character in the end, that is, to be an agent of excellence of character, it is decisively important what sort of action (*phoia energeia*) we set up as an object of the habituation. I think that *Aristotle has already here started a question that covers the whole discussion (*EN* 2.1-6) on excellence of character in general*, that is, ‘if so, then, what sort of activity should be the object of our habituation in order to acquire excellence of character?’ I see that this idea continues to the beginning of the next chapter, *EN* 2.2. Therefore, in the same context he starts the chapter, saying that the discussion of excellence of character is a work for a practice (*praxis*) and that we have to study (*theôrein*) action.

3.1.2.2 The Ideal Object to be Habituated

⁵⁰I mean where he describes the temperate action and the courageous action as the ones that the temperate person would do and that the courageous person would do (see *EN* 1104a35-b3).

“... First of all, then, one must keep in view that the sorts of things we are talking about are naturally such as to be destroyed by deficiency and excess, just as we observe – since we have to use what is obvious to testify on behalf of what is not so – in the case of strength and health ... So too it is, then, with moderation (*sōphrosunē*), courage (*andreia*), and the other excellences. For someone who runs away from everything, out of fear, and withstands nothing, becomes cowardly, and correspondingly someone who is frightened of nothing at all and advances in the face of just anything becomes rash ... Moderation, then, and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency, and preserved by what is mean between them... (EN 2.2, 1104a11-26)”

In general, *EN 2.2* discusses, regarding habituation, why we have to study action and what sort of nature the action has. This may show Aristotle’s thoughts on what sort of action we should take as an object to be habituated. The early part of this chapter is important for our discussion as well, but setting it aside for a moment we shall see how Aristotle talks about the ideal type of action for the habituation.

Aristotle seems to think that the commonness of strength, health and the excellence is that all of these have an ideal state, and also that there is an anti-ideal state that destroys each of them. Namely, the action of this ideal property makes the given agent strong, healthy and excellent, but the action of the anti-ideal affects the agent the other way around. In the case of ethics, Aristotle says, regarding the bodily pleasure, the action of the anti-ideal property lets its agent be intemperate, but the ideal property of the action lets the agent be temperate. Therefore, the anti-ideal property is represented as the excess or the deficiency, but the ideal property as the mean. Hence, according to what has been said so far, the ideal object of the habituation for excellence of character is the action that has *the mean quality* (*mesotês*).

As the ending remark of *EN 2.2*, Aristotle does, not only, say that the object of the habituation, whether it increases the excellence or it destroys it, is an action in general, but also that the result of the habituation, the origin of the excellent activity, is an action as well. I think by this, Aristotle gives us a brief explanation of how the habituation is finished. Here Aristotle says that the excellent action, if we repeat it, lets its agent have the excellent character, and it eventually means that the agent begins performing such an excellent action well and in a firm manner. It is not revealed clearly in the passage above, but Aristotle does not simply explain that ‘repeating the excellent action’ automatically guarantees the excellent disposition. That the agent who is used to blindly repeating the excellent action can come to performing that action in a firm manner is

that the agent's affection about that action now *chimes with reason*. In this sense, Aristotle goes on to discuss liking and disliking that are always accompanied by affection, in the next chapter, *EN* 2.3.

3.1.2.3 The Liking and the Disliking to be Habituated

“This is why we must have been brought up in a certain way from childhood onwards, as Plato says, so as to delight in and be displeased by the things we should; this is what the correct education is. (*dio dei êchthai pōs eutbus ek neōn, hōs ho Platōn phēsin, hōste chairein te kai lypeisthai hois dei·hē gar orthē paidein hautē estin.*) Again, if the excellences have to do with actions and affections, and every affection and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, this will be another reason for thinking that excellence has to do with pleasures and pains... (*EN* 2.3, 1104b10-16)”

In this passage, Aristotle introduces another important element for the habituation; the affection represented by liking and disliking. Namely, the successful habituation is not only about repeating the good action blindly, but it is also a process that lets the agent stably *like* the good action. Therefore, according to Aristotle, as soon as a child is born, we, having determined for him or her the right object to like and the right to dislike, should bring up the child in the way that he or she likes and dislikes these rightly. Aristotle says (*EN* 2.3, 1104b10-14), agreeing with Plato, this is the successful habituation and the right education (*he orthē phaideia*). Hence, in order to be an excellent agent, besides repeating the excellent action, it is also required to reveal or stimulate our affection to or with this action continuously. This is because it will eventually let us perform such actions due to liking them rather than disliking them or unwillingly. Therefore, in this very sense, that one acquires excellence of character as a result of the successful habituation is that he or she comes to be disposed to perform the excellent action liking it.

“... whereas the things that come about in accordance with the excellences count as done justly or moderately not merely because they themselves are of a certain kind, but also because of facts about the agent doing them – first, if he does them knowingly, secondly if he decides (*prohairesis*) to do them, and decides to do them for themselves (*di' auta*), and thirdly if he does them from a firm and unchangeable disposition (*bebaiōs kai ametakinētōs echōn*)... So things done are called just and moderate whenever they are such that the just person or the moderate person would do them; whereas a person is not just and moderate because he does these things, but also because he does them in the way in which just and moderate people do them (*alla kai ho houtō prattōn hōs hoi dikaiōi kai hoi sōphrones prattousin*)...” (*EN* 2.4, 1105a29 – b9)

What Aristotle means by ‘being disposed (*echein*)’ or the disposition (*hexis*) is explained again in the discussion in *EN* 2.4. For Aristotle, the meaning of the temperate person is the person who performs the temperate action in the way the temperate person would do. This means that the temperate person is the one who knows what he himself is doing is a temperate action, chooses it for itself and does it in a firm and unchangeable manner. Therefore, we are stuck in the situation where the type or quality of the excellent action, the ideal object for the successful habituation, cannot be explained entirely in the action itself. For, the excellent action, the paradigm for the successful habituation, is the action reflecting the disposition of the excellent agent. Hence, because of this very reason, Aristotle’s discussion on moral habituation also requires a discussion on the disposition of excellence of character that provides the definition of that excellence. Eventually, it is true that the doctrine of the mean has a practical purpose, but we should understand that it means no more than that we need a definition of the *éthikê aretê* for a perfect explanation on the excellent action, what to be habituated. That is, the practical aspect of the doctrine of the mean does not claim that the doctrine of the mean is supposed to provide a practical manual, such as saying ‘do this much of this action’ or ‘suffer this much of such affection or feeling’. Consequently, we have shown that although Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is discussed clearly in a practical context, this does not mean that the message Aristotle delivers to us through that doctrine is that we should always aim at the moderate amount of action or affection.

3.2 Contra the Character-Relativity

I criticize the character-relativity both by showing that their interpretation of Milo’s example is incorrect and by explaining, more importantly, that this interpretation does not suit the general structure of Aristotle’s discussion on excellence of character. I will start by exploring Milo’s example.

3.2.1 Milo’s example

3.2.1.1 On ‘Why Aristotle Introduces Such Example’

The discussion on the relativity of the mean, that is, the discussion on what the indication of ‘us’ (*hêmas*) in the expression ‘the mean relative to us’ is, is related to how we understand the identity of the difference between Milo and the novice in Milo’s

example in *EN* 2.6. But now we should first see, in the overall context of the doctrine of the mean, why Aristotle introduces this example to us.

“Now with everything continuous and divisible it is possible to take a greater and a lesser and an equal amount, and these either ‘with reference to the object itself’ or ‘relative to us’. The ‘equal’ is a kind of mean between what exceeds and what falls short; by mean ‘with reference to the object’ I mean what is equidistant from each of its two extremes, which is one and the same for all, whereas by ‘mean with reference to us’ I mean the sort of things that neither goes to excess nor is deficient – and this is not one thing, nor is it the same for all. So for example if ten counts and two as few, six is what people take as mean, with reference to the object, since it exceeds and is exceeded by the same amount; and this is mean in terms of arithmetical proportion. But *the mean relative to us should not be taken in this way...* (*EN* 2.6, 1106a25-36)”

Here, Aristotle says, there are two different types of the mean; ‘the mean in the object itself’ and ‘the mean relative to us’. As we see from the italicized part above, Aristotle seems to mean that they are fundamentally different in the way that they are determined. For while, as we can easily guess from its name, the mean in the object itself is what we can determine straightforwardly by measuring a given object itself; ‘the mean relative to us’ cannot be determined in this way. Hence, although it is true that ‘the mean relative to us’ is still of something divisible and continuous, the way it is determined or measured should be, and is, different from the way of the previous one. This is Aristotle’s general stance towards two different types of the mean mentioned here. If so, how is the second type of the mean different from the first one? This is the question that Aristotle intends to employ with Milo’s example, I think. So Aristotle goes on to say:

“..for if ten *minae* in weight is a large amount for a particular person to eat, and two a small amount, the trainer will not prescribe six *minae*, because perhaps this too is large for the person who will be taking it, or small – small for Milo, large for the person just beginning his training. Similarly with running and wrestling. *It is this way, then, every expert (pas epistémôn) tries to avoid excess and deficiency, and looks instead for the mean, and chooses this;* the mean, that is, not in the object, but relative to us. If, then, it is in this way that every kind of expert knowledge completes its function well, ... if excellence is more precise and better than any expertise, just as nature is, it will be effective at hitting upon what is intermediate... (*EN* 2.6, 1106b1-16)”

What Aristotle does here is to provide a detailed description on how ‘the mean relative to us’ is determined. If we agree that in the italicized part above Aristotle indicates a kind of art (*technê*), an intellectual excellence (*dianoêtikê aretê*) in the field of production

(*poiesis*), the agreement can be extended to what is following. It seems that the corresponding field to ‘the mean in the object itself’ is the field of the theoretical science, but the one for ‘the mean relative to us’ is something related to action - whether it is a moral action (*praxis*) or productive action (*poiésis*). If so, whereas the object of the former field is nothing other than the contents of the theoretical study, the object of the latter study is a sort of action- roughly production or ethical action. If, again, what has been said so far is acceptable, the mean in the object itself should be a theoretical truth which can be found objectively among its theoretical contents, but ‘the mean relative to us’ should indicate another kind of truth, the truth regarding actions that concern the practical sciences or studies, in general, art (*technê*) and the study of character (*êthikê*)⁵¹. However, the problem is that the truth or the falsity regarding action cannot be found or determined if we see only the individual actions themselves, as Aristotle often mentions in *EN* 2⁵². It means that there is another parameter to refer to when measuring the value of actions. Therefore, it is necessary to see both the action and the agent in order to know the practical truth, the truth regarding a given action. Hence, it seems that ‘the mean relative to us’ is a practical truth that can be determined as long as we refer to the given action and the subject of it altogether. Of course, it is still open whether what I mean by the subject is the character of the subject, or the circumstances by which the subject is surrounded. But it will become clearer in the following.

What I mean is that what Aristotle intends to show us through Milo’s example is not that it is how the excellent agents⁵³ of the practical fields, practise or perform ‘the mean relative to us’, but that it is how the relevant intellectual excellence in each field, i.e. in the art and the ethics, determines the relevant practical truth, that is, ‘the mean relative to us’. Again, if this is right, the trainer (the possessor of *technê*) in Milo’s example (in the art) is clearly an analogy for the practically wise person (in the ethics) or the practical wisdom

⁵¹ Cf., Bostock says, “Aristotle is the first one who used the word ‘ethics’ as the name for a particular branch of philosophy, but one may still doubt whether he named it well” in Bostock (2001), p7 & *Pol.*1261a31, 1280a18, 1282b20, 1295a36, 1332a8, a22, *Apo.* 89b9, where he states ethical philosophy (*êthikê theôria*), *Met.* 987b1, where he takes ‘ethics’ as a topic (*ta êthikê*).

⁵² Especially *EN* 2.3 (representatively, 1104b4-10) and 2.4 (representatively, 1105a28-1105b1 and 1105b5-9) respectively where he says action itself does not show entirely the character of the person, and where he mentions that doing just action properly is doing it in the way the just person would do, and there are many other examples throughout book two where, if we say, Aristotle says an individual action is not enough to show the identity of the agent.

⁵³ So, they should be a skilful agent in the field of production and a morally excellent agent in the ethical domain.

(phronésis), as long as he determines something ideal respectively to Milo and to the novice. It becomes clearer that Milo and the novice are the analogies for the agents who are different to each other in some way. Now here comes our question again; how different are they? Are they different in the characters or in the circumstances? I give two reasons to deny the former option.

3.2.1.2 Milo's Example as an Explanation of How 'The Mean Relative to us' is Determined

I suppose that if Milo's example is to show the way that the expert knowledge, the intellectual excellence in the domain of production, determines the best 'practical' option – the mean relative to us – in each case, those two athletes cannot represent the ethical agents of the different characters. For, if these two show the different characters, probably one should represent the agent of the *éthikê aretê*, but the other is of the one that is inferior to the *éthikê aretê*. However, we should remember, the practical wisdom (*phronésis*) is an intellectual excellence in which the *éthikê aretê* is actualized, in the sense that, Aristotle says (*EN* 6.13, 1144b30-31), what determines what the excellent agent does is the practical wisdom, and excellence of character cannot be completed without the collaboration of the practical wisdom. Hence, the following is clear. In short, since the practical wisdom is a specific, in a sense, intellectual excellence that is to determine what the excellent action is, it is impossible to claim, in the context of Aristotle's ethics, that this intellectual excellence can be also used to determine the best option for some other characters than excellence of character. Therefore, as long as it is true that Milo's example is to explain how the practically wise person would determine a truth regarding a certain action, the relativity of such practical truth cannot be toward the individual characters. For, the *phronésis* is naturally concerned with the action of excellence of character, but it is not to prescribe anything to an agent of the bad character (*kakia*) at all.

3.2.1.3 Milo's Example as a Warrant for An Ethical Usage of the Mean

As it is said above, in Milo's example Aristotle is not to show how the excellent agent aims at the mean option, but to show what the mean option, i.e. the mean action or the affection, the excellent agent performs is. There is indeed another reason that 'the mean relative to us' is strictly confined to excellence of character. This is about a logical status

of Milo's example to the doctrine of the mean or Aristotle's definition of excellence of character, namely, why Aristotle locates Milo's example *in front of his application of the mean to ethical cases*. The reason is this. He means to show that, like the production in the case of art, the ethical actions and affections also are what can be measured, in terms of some 'too much', some 'too little' or some 'mean'. Therefore, the actions and affections, as well as the productions, are what the concepts of the mean, the excess and the deficiency can be applied to, at least derivatively⁵⁴, so now we have a theoretical or logical warrant to apply the concept of the mean to ethical cases, especially the actions and affections of the excellent agent. Namely, eventually we have a warrant to describe the excellent disposition of character in terms of the concept of *to meson*. Hence, it becomes clear again that the general context of Milo's example is confined to the disposition of the character-excellence, so it will be nothing other than troubling us if we try to understand the doctrine of the mean that one claims that Aristotle tries to identify, at least directly, the character of a non-excellent agent.

3.2.2 The Nature (*physis*) of excellence of character

Again, the above two reasons are commonly based on my interpretation that Milo's example cannot support the view that 'the mean relative to us' determined by the *phronimos* can also be applied to other characters than excellence of character. However, I have an even more fundamental and stronger reason that 'the mean relative to us' should be confined to excellence of character.

There is a question that is already asked at the beginning of the discussion on excellence of character and that covers the whole context of the relevant discussion throughout *EN 2.1 to EN 2.6*; *what sort of action should we perform to be an agent of excellence of character*. For me, it is crucial to remember that this question is the main problem for the whole discussion on excellence of character in general. We know that Aristotle already shows us in the discussion between *EN 2.2* and *2.4* that that action is the action of the excellent agent. However, Aristotle does not stop there, *because that answer is not enough, i.e., to apply to our performing action*. This is clearly because no action has a certain excellent quality by itself⁵⁵, but it is excellent if and only if it is an action that reflects or manifests

⁵⁴ Clearly, the primary sense of the mean is of the arithmetical mean.

⁵⁵ I agree with Broadie saying that "no independent sense of 'intermediate (mean)' such that every response is right to which that sense applies..." Broadie (1991), p.100.

the disposition of the excellent person. Therefore, for Aristotle, we should not be happy with merely studying the individual actions, but also pay our attention to the person and more specifically the ethical disposition of the person, since that is the proper way to get the complete answer on the action of the excellent person, i.e. for our main question, what sort of activity we should prepare for the successful habituation. This is why Aristotle *has to and can* provide us with the definition of excellence of character in the current location of *EN 2*. Aristotle's intention can also be seen in the fact that he *starts* and *finishes* his discussion on the *differentia* of excellence of character with the comments on the nature of that excellence which makes its possessor be good and lets him/her do the function well. So, Aristotle might say this. What we are looking for is not something that can enable us to do a good action incidentally, but something that can enable us to do such action in a firm and unchangeable manner. We see the nature that can make this possible to us.

“... the excellence of a human being too will be the disposition *whereby he becomes a good human being and from which he will perform his own function well...* it will also be clear in this way, too, i.e. if we consider what sort of nature excellence has. Now with everything continuous and divisible it is possible to take a greater and a lesser and an equal amount, and these either with reference to the object itself or relative to us. The ‘equal’ is a kind of mean between what exceeds and what falls short...” (*EN 1106a21-29*)

We must not overlook that the discussion on the *differentia* of excellence of character is a theoretical study about the nature of the excellence by virtue of which the possessor of it becomes good, and the function of its possessor comes to be performed well. Aristotle significantly mentions the nature of the excellence again using the result of his definition of the *êthikê aretê*. This shows us that Aristotle's remark on the nature of the excellence in the beginning of *EN 2.6* is not incidental at all either.

“It is intermediacy between two bad states, one involving excess, the other involving deficiency; and also because one set of bad states is deficient, the other excessive in relation to what is required both in affections and in actions, whereas excellence both finds and chooses the mean. Hence excellence, in terms of its essence, and the definition that states what it is for excellence to be, is intermediacy, but in terms of what is best, and good practice, it is extremity.” (*EN 1107a1-7*)

In this passage, clearly *the essence (to ti en einaî)* is corresponding to the *nature (physis)* in the earlier context. However, we must see a difference between the two contexts. Here Aristotle added one more element. In the beginning of this chapter, he merely says *that*

excellence of character makes its possessor and the function respectively be good and be done well. The difference is a specification on the reason why the excellence does so, I think. That is, here, differently from the earlier part, Aristotle clearly says that the nature of the excellence that makes its possessor and the function be respectively good and well is *the mean quality (mesotés)*. Hence, now we see that the *mesotés* is the nature of excellence of character, and that, as he promised us in the beginning of *EN* 2.6, through the study of the nature of excellence of character, the following is even more specifically shown; it is the *mesotés* by virtue of which the possessor of the excellence and the function of the excellent person becomes good and done well respectively.

The nature of excellence of character is the mean quality (*mesotés*), a disposition aiming at ‘the mean relative to us (*to meson pros hēmas*)’. If this is correct, the character-relativity can be criticized again. Namely, if ‘the mean relative to us’ were the mean relative to an individual character, it would have been possible that we also call the disposition of the other agent- than that of the excellent one- the *mesotés*. Would Aristotle let us do this? That is, if by saying the *mesotés* Aristotle clearly and specifically indicates the nature of excellence of character, would it be also possible to say that he allows us to use such a name to describe non-excellent character as well? I think that is impossible. Here Aristotle emphasizes again that his doctrine of the mean is provided to give an answer to the question of what the nature of the excellence which makes its possessor be good and lets the function be done well is. Hence, in my opinion we have to agree that the *mesotés* is the nature of excellence of character in both the beginning and the end of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. In this sense, Aristotle will not let the term ‘the mean relative to us’ – the person that the *mesotés* aims at- be used for a property of non-excellent characters. Consequently, the character-relativity can also be criticised in the aspect that the nature of excellence of character is the *mesotés*.

3.3 The Recap

So far we have seen these: (1) Aristotle’s discussion on excellence of character in general, that is, the discussion between *EN* 1.13 and 2.6 is designed for a practical purpose as long as it is in principle to figure out the identity of the excellent action. (2) However, its practical goal is not accomplished yet in the discussion between *EN* 2.1 and 2.4, on individual actions and affections. This is because (3) it seems that the identity of the excellent action is not sufficiently described until Aristotle provides the definition of

excellence of character, a detailed picture on the identity of the excellent person; on “what sort of the disposition (*hexis*) it is”. Hence, based on this position, we have criticized respectively the doctrine of moderation and the character-relativity in each issue.

The doctrine of moderation has been criticized because (1) not only is there no textual evidence to show that Aristotle describes the mean as a moderate amount of action and affection, but also, (2) since ‘the practical goal of the doctrine of the mean’ still lies on the excellent person himself, the ‘moderation’ idea itself that Aristotle’s substantive message in the doctrine of the mean is predominantly about individual action and affection is fundamentally mistaken.

Dealing with the character-relativity, I also take a similar process as I do for the doctrine of moderation. (1) I showed that the text itself, the part of Milo’s example, does not support the character-relativity well because, I think, if the trainer in that example is analogous to the *phronêsis*, Milo and the novice cannot be different agents, saying that the *phronêsis* is proper to excellence of character. However, more fundamentally, (2) since the doctrine of the mean is essentially to identify the nature of excellence of character, and its nature is the mean quality (*mesotês*) aiming at ‘the mean relative to us (*to meson pros hêmas*),’ the ‘mean relative to us’ cannot be applied to another character than the excellence, because that label is confined to the excellent character.

4 The Concluding Remarks

4.1 The *mesotês* and the *meson*

In a rough sense, it seems that Aristotle indicates by the mean (*to meson*), the manifestation of the excellent-character person; that is, the action and the affection of the excellent agent. However, as it is said already, an individual action and affection do not possess any ethical value by themselves⁵⁶. They become bad or good only according to the disposition of a given agent. Of course, only what is acted or suffered by the agent of the excellent character can be rightly called the mean ‘*to meson*,’ but that by others are called the excess (*hupherbolê*) or the deficiency (*elleipsis*). What makes an action or

⁵⁶ Bostock (2001), pp.41-4, Broadie (1991), pp.99-100, Urmson (1980), pp. 160-164.

affection the ‘mean’ is the excellent disposition of such agents⁵⁷ and I suppose that this disposition is what Aristotle calls *the mean quality (mesotês)*. Therefore, it is not incidental for Aristotle that for *to meson* he tends to say that *to meson* is to be taken (lambanesthai), whereas for the *mesotês* he often describes it preserving (soizouse) or hitting (stochastikos) to meson.⁵⁸ Hence, mentioning at the beginning of the *EN* 2.6, that the nature of the excellence makes the one who has it be good and the one’s function be done well, he apparently means the *mesotês* of the excellence by the nature (physis). *In short, the nature of the excellent agent is the mesotês, but ‘to meson’ is her own action and the affection that come from the ‘physis’ of her excellent character.*

4.2 The Janus Character of the Mean (to meson)

Broadie says that by the term ‘*to meson*’ Aristotle does not seem to always point out the identical object⁵⁹. She seems to mean that Aristotle, mentioning an excellent action, sometimes means the excellent action causing one to be excellent in the future, but another time means the excellent action reflecting or manifesting the character of the given excellent agent⁶⁰. *That is, the former one is the cause of the excellence, but the latter is the result.* As long as it seems clear that ‘the mean action and affection, that is, *to meson*’ share such an ambiguity, there requires an elaboration to arrange the meaning of *to meson*. I suppose that the term ‘*to meson*’ primarily indicates the action and affection of the excellent agent, the result of the excellent character, but it seems that this is only applicable in the context of the theoretical definition of excellence of character. Clearly, *to meson* does another role in the aspect of causing the excellence; that is, the habituation. So, I say, this ‘*to meson*’ is the mean as the object of the habituation toward excellence of character, the *mesotês*. It is to be said that this is the action or the affection that can be the cause of excellence of character, because by repeatedly performing such action and suffering such affection the agent comes to acquire the excellent character at a certain point. Because of this very reason Aristotle, in the end of his discussion on habituation in *EN* 2.4, saying that “one becomes a temperate person doing an action a temperate

⁵⁷ Just as the excellence makes its possessor be in a good condition (*EN* 2.6).

⁵⁸ *EN* 1106a30-36, 1106b8-15, and 1106b27-8.

⁵⁹ Broadie (1991), p.95-96 “...there is a Janus-quality to Aristotle's conception of excellence of character or moral virtue. This excellence is the source of the mature individual's own responses to his particular situations... But at the same time, it is the reflection in the individual of the community in which he was reared”.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, pp.95-96.

person would do (1105a17-20)”, seems to claim that *‘starting doing such an action is, at least, the beginning of becoming a temperate person, but there is no possibility at all without trying such an action.’* It seems that Aristotle is providing a contrast between an excellent action that an excellent person *would* do, and an action that an excellent person *is doing* or *does*. Hence, they are different in terms of the second nature⁶¹ of the agent, only the latter excellent action is the second nature of the agent, but the former is no more than a single action that an agent probably incidentally did once. However, they are in common as long as the former promises us to become, one day, a proper agent who does the latter in a firm and unchanged manner if we repeat it well habituating the right affection on it. Therefore, it seems important to see that they are different but connected in the concept of being excellent, although one is in the potentiality (*dynamis*), but the other in the actuality (*energeia*).

4.3 Habituation

It is normally understood that Aristotle’s discussion on excellence of character in general starts from the *EN* 1.13. The discussion between *EN* 2.1 and 2.4 is directly on the habituation in Aristotle. Just before explaining how excellence of character is acquired, Aristotle talks about the soul that excellence of character concerns. In *EN* 1.13, Aristotle defines that excellence of character is the excellence of the ‘listening-to-reason’ part of the soul which does not involve reason in itself (1102b29-31). He assumes, I suppose, here that the level of character can differ according to *the degree of listening (obeying) to reason.* Then, in *EN* 2, Aristotle explains that *how the good or best disposition of ‘listening to reason’, the excellent function of the emotional / affective soul, can be acquired.* He emphasizes that it is not by nature (*physis*) that such excellence of character is acquired. However, *he does not mean that excellence of character has no relationship with ‘nature’ at all,* because he seems to say *that we are born to like or dislike something good* (1103a24-26). Aristotle seems to mean that how these ‘liking’ and ‘disliking’ are firmed in a certain way is the so-called process in which excellence of character is acquired and that there requires a habituation for this process. Although the first step of the habituation is no more than a mere repetition of a certain action, Aristotle thinks this is a very important element in the habituation. The reason is the following: We repeat a certain action in

⁶¹ See, *EN* 6.13 & *EN* 7.3 1147a23-4 where Aristotle mentions “intimidating (*symphyéna*) knowledge with character”.

order to perform such an action in a firmed and unchanged manner in the future, and for this we also have to have an appropriate emotional/affective disposition toward such action. Namely, we start the habituation by repeating a certain action in order that we also habituate ourselves to have a right affection (*pathe*) to such action and eventually come to perform such action in a firmed and stable manner. However, the ideal goal of the habituation is to make an agent or a young child be an excellent person, and, to make this happen, we should let one repeat an action of the excellent agent, rather a random action, from the beginning. This is why the right type of action is so important in the process of habituation. Now, we see again the contrast between two senses of *to meson*, the cause of excellence of character and the response from it. Therefore, we have to remember that this *Janus* quality of *to meson* or the excellent action is a necessary element for the habituation, because, in a sense, it is the very quality that makes the habituation possible.

One last point to be mentioned is the following. It is not new that in the context of defining excellence of character, Aristotle tends not to describe the action in detail, because in the excellent agent, the excellent action is no more than the manifestation of the mean affection, as long as there is no internal conflict. However, in the habituation, it comes to be changed. Although the affections are still important, Aristotle seems to say that it is crucial to determine what sort of action to put as an object of the habituation. This is because if the object of the habituation is a bad action, against the rational prescription, the result will invite a tragedy. However, while it is important, at the beginning of the habituation, to determine the right action, the goal of the habituation is to establish the right affection to such a right action. Namely, the goal of the habituation is to let one have the liking affection to the right action, and the habituation will end once one achieves that surely with the acquisition of the *phronêsis*.⁶² Hence, the one who has been well habituated thus becomes unconditionally prepared for doing excellent action and suffering right affection.⁶³ We can summarize Aristotle's thoughts on the habituation in this way. As long as one is a well-habituated agent, once, having become an adult and taking some time, he/she also acquires the *phronêsis* that

⁶² See *EN* 6.13, 1144b1-17, Aristotle seems to mean that the development of the *êthikê aretê* is eventually fulfilled by the acquisition of the *phronêsis*.

⁶³ Broadie also seems to describe the *hexis* with the 'unconditional preparedness' in 'Philosophical Introduction' in Broadie & Rowe (2002), pp.18-19.

prescribes what to do in a particular case, as a result of deliberation, this person can follow the prescription without hesitation or internal conflict. This can be a detailed explanation of *the unconditional preparedness*, the mark of the excellent disposition of character or affective soul.

Hence, we have seen so far in this chapter, first, that the ‘moderation’ idea on the concept of the mean (to meson) and the character-relativity interpretation on ‘*bêmas*’ in ‘*to meson pros bêmas*’ were criticized respectively, based on my position on the ‘practicality’ of the doctrine of the mean, and because of ‘the mean relative to us’ being strictly confined to excellence of character. Then, additionally, we have shown how the *mesotês* and *to meson* should be distinguished, how the indication of *to meson* itself can differ as well, and what Aristotle introduces us to in his discussion on habituation. The next chapter will start the discussion on deliberation, the function of the soul that has reason (to echon logon).

Chapter Two: Nature of Deliberation Part One – ‘ta pros to telos’ and ‘ta telê’

In the previous chapter, we have discussed excellence of character, that is, the excellent disposition of the emotional soul⁶⁴ or the listening-to-reason part of the soul that does not have ‘reason’ itself. In the coming two chapters (Chapters Two and Three), I will provide an interpretation on Aristotle’s definition of another excellence called ‘*phronêsis*’, one of the excellences of the other part of the soul, the part that has ‘reason’ itself. Aristotle calls the *phronêsis* ‘having deliberated well (to en bebouleusthai)’, (in *EN* 6.9, 1142b29-32), so he presumably assumes, I suppose, that deliberation is a function about which the *phronêsis* is excellent. Hence, in the current chapter, we shall study how Aristotle describes ‘deliberation (bouleusis⁶⁵)’ or ‘practical thought/reasoning (dianoia praktikê⁶⁶)’, the function about which the *phronimos* is distinctive from others.

⁶⁴ By this, I indicate what Aristotle says as ‘*to epithymêtikon kai holôs orektikon*’ which literally means ‘the appetitive and generally the desiring part’. Namely, in order to indicate this part of the soul, I will rather use the terms, the emotional soul or affective soul, than the literal translations. This is because, while in Aristotle the desire in general (orexis) also includes the rational desire, such as the *boulêsis*, what Aristotle tries to mean by this part of the soul is some ‘irrational’ capacity or happening, that is, the *pathos*. Therefore, agreeing with Bostock who assumes that Aristotle might be “misdescribing this part”, I also think it seems right to say that by this part of the *alogon*, Aristotle significantly means the part of the soul that deals with the *pathê*. Hence, I clarify that, although it is not a literal translation, I will use the emotional soul or the affective soul to address ‘*to epithymêtikon kai holôs orektion*’, the part that is concerned with the character, and thereby is developed by the habituation. See, Bostock (2001), pp.33-36, Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.295 & cf., *Top.* 4.5, 126a6-13, *EN* 1102b30, 1105b21-3, 1147b7-8 where Aristotle seems to assimilate the soul that the character concerns with the soul that deals with the *pathê*.

⁶⁵ *bouleusthai*: to deliberate; *bouleusis*: deliberation. It is said that the word ‘*bouleusis*’ is also a political term since it is originated from *boulê* which means a Council of elders or chiefs, a Senate. So, sometimes the expression ‘*ho bouleutikos*’ or ‘the man who deliberates’ can also indicate someone who deliberates and judges correctly some political issue. However, in Aristotle it generally means ‘systematic rational calculation on how to achieve the end (*EN* 1112b15)’. See, Irwin (1985), p.322, & Liddle/Scott (1889), pp.154-5.

⁶⁶ What Aristotle indicates by *bouleusis* and by *dianoia praktikê* seems to be the same thing. For both of them he describes the proper function of the calculative part of the soul (to logistikon/bouleutikon), and such proper function deals with what can be otherwise and is performed for the sake of practice. Furthermore, I would like to state that in this dissertation, I use deliberation, practical thought, practical reasoning and even practical syllogism for the same sense to mean the proper function of the deliberative/calculative soul. There seems to be some debate about this, but I cannot deal with that point in this dissertation. However, for the relevant discussion, see Anscombe (1957), Audi, R. (2006), pp.22-40., Cooper (1986), Gauthier (1963), & Natali (2001), pp.63-69.

If we extend our interest a bit, the main question in the current chapter is related to a notorious philosophical question, first sharply formulated in the 18th century⁶⁷; are moral first principles set by reason or non-rational desires? This question can be expressed in Aristotelian terms as; ‘is the conception of happiness, or *eudaimonia*, the ultimate end of a character-excellent agent, determined by deliberative reason or not?’⁶⁸ However, there is, I think, a related issue to the Aristotelian question of whether we deliberate moral ends or not. Representatively, John M. Cooper, Terrence Irwin, Martha Nussbaum, David Wiggins⁶⁹ who claim that deliberation is both of means (*ta pros to telos*)⁷⁰ and ends (*ta telê*) defend this view arguing that the moral conception of *eudaimonia* is determined by deliberation. According to this interpretation, Aristotelian moral deliberation indicates both determining the concept of ends (happiness and general ends) and choosing the best mean to achieve a general end given in each situation. From now on, I will call respectively this idea of deliberation the ‘architectonic deliberation’ and the interpretation, which claims this idea, the Grand End view (GEV) referring to Cooper⁷¹.

However, although this interpretation seems to be widely received, I do not agree with this view. For, in brief, there is no detailed description on deliberation to define happiness and there is no decisive textual evidence for the architectonic deliberation in Aristotle’s ethics. Or even if we accepted, very generously, that in some passage Aristotle seems to hint at some possibility of architectonic deliberation, we could still ask seriously why he just too vaguely mentions that important issue in his ethics. That is, if the architectonic deliberation was really Aristotle’s, the deliberation to define happiness would be the major premise for the architectonic deliberation. Then, on such an important element of the theory of deliberation, why he would just mention it merely mysteriously? Therefore, presumably, it seems guaranteed to think that he does not

⁶⁷ Allan (1953), pp.120–121, cf., Irwin (1975), pp.567-578, Smith (1996), pp.56-74 & Fortenbaugh (1975).

⁶⁸ Summarizing Tuozzo, see Tuozzo (1991), pp.193-212.

⁶⁹ Cooper(1986), Irwin (1978), pp. 252–72., Nussbaum (1978), Wiggins, D. (1980) [1] pp.221-240. And there are many others, if I introduce only some of them; Kenny (1979), pp.150-1, MacIntyre, (1988), pp.131-3, Sorabji (1973-4), pp.107-29, Annas (1993), pp.66-84, Dahl (1984).

⁷⁰ It can be also translated into ‘the things toward the end’, ‘what promote the end’ and ‘what conduce to the end’, etc. In this dissertation I, when needed, use all of these in the same meaning. Also, importantly, it is often replaced to ‘*to sympheron pros to telos* (what is conducive to the end)’.

⁷¹ Cooper (1986), pp.59-71, cf., Broadie (1991), pp.198-202.

claim deliberation for determining the conception of happiness, if there is no clearly and apparently provided explanation on deliberation of happiness.

Evidently, it is not to be claimed that Aristotelian moral deliberation excludes entirely the conception of moral ends, whatever they are. Also for me, it seems true that some conception of an end is what a deliberator refers to when weighing up various options to achieve the end in a given circumstance. *What I do not agree with about the GEV is that they claim the conception of ends to be determined by the process of deliberation.* The conception on ends, I think, is already determined by character (*êthos*) before deliberation actually starts. Therefore, I will argue that, in Aristotle's ethics, deliberation is the process of merely weighing up the various means to find the best one to achieve the already-determined-conception of a given end. Hence, in order to defend my view and criticize the GEV, I manage my argument in this chapter in the following way; I first introduce the context of the relevant passages (in Section 1), provide the detailed description of the Grand End view (in Section 2), and suggest my own criticism against the GEV (in Section 3), stating, first of all, that Aristotle never, at least directly, explains in detail how deliberation can be used to define happiness (in Section 3.1) and then, more importantly, that the passages provided by the GEV proponents as their textual evidences are not actually supportive to their view (in Section 3.2).

1. Aristotle and Deliberation

It is nothing new that the philosophical question of how a moral principle can be determined is widely known as a topic for the famous debate between Kant and Hume. However, a similar question, whether we deliberate the end or not, has also baffled Aristotelian scholars for millennia. Interestingly, although in some passages Aristotle rather clearly mentions that we deliberate only about what is conducive to the end (*to pros to telos*, or, *to sumpheron pros to telos*) but not the end itself, this remark of Aristotle's is often regarded as rightly ignored or overlooked, I think. It seems that this is the attitude of GEV proponents towards some relevant comments of Aristotle in the following passage.

T1: "But we deliberate, not about ends, but about what forwards those ends. For a doctor does not deliberate about whether he'll make his patients healthy, nor a public speaker about whether he'll persuade his audience, nor a political expert about whether he'll bring about good government – and neither do any

of the others deliberate about the end, but rather they take the end for granted and examine how and by what means (*pōs kai dia tinōn*) it will come about... (EN 3.3, 1112b12-16)”

In this passage of EN 3.3, Aristotle, taking some examples of occupations, rather clearly claims that we do deliberate only about means, but the end is to be taken for granted, not to be deliberated. Nevertheless, many of the commentators do not tend to take Aristotle at his word. Some of their reasons may be that in the last sentence here Aristotle seems to somehow include the end in deliberation, saying that deliberating about the means is considering ‘how and by what means’ the given end can be achieved⁷². They seem to think that Aristotle’s thoughts on the relation of deliberation to the end is in a detailed manner shown in the following passage.

T2: “ it is thought characteristic of a practically wise person to be able to deliberate well about the things that are good and advantageous to himself, not in specific context, e.g. what sorts of things conduce to health, or to physical strength, but what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general. An indication of this is that we also call those in a specific field ‘practically wise’ if they succeed in calculating well towards some specific worthy end on matters where no exact technique applies. So in fact the description ‘practically wise (*phronimos*)’ belongs in general to the person who is good at deliberation. (EN 6.5, 1140a25-33)”

In this passage of EN 6.5, Aristotle describes the excellence of deliberation or, by another name, the deliberation of the practically wise person (*phronimos*). He says that the excellence of deliberation is somehow related to the good life in general, not to some specific or limited end, i.e. health or strength, and that it is ‘being good at deliberating in general’. For the GEV proponents, ‘deliberating on the life in general’ includes deliberating about the principle of the life. This, they think, seems to give an even stronger warrant for them not to take Aristotle at his word regarding his remark in T1 ‘we don’t deliberate about the ends, but only about the means.’ Why the GEV read

⁷²There are some trivial differences amongst the proponents of the GEV. Nowadays, many GEV proponents (e.g. Cooper, Nussbaum and Wiggins) try to prove that *ta pros to telos* in EN 3 also includes ‘constitutional means’, but Ackrill seems to disagree with them. That is, even if Ackrill does agree that *ta pros to telos* is, in general, not only the instrumental means, but also the ‘constituent means’, he also states that what Aristotle means by that Greek phrase in EN 3 is the ‘instrument or external’ means. Therefore, what Ackrill seems to claim is that deliberation in EN 3 is only about the ‘instrumental means’, but deliberation in EN 6 is both about the ‘instrumental’ means and ‘constitutional’ means. Nonetheless, for Ackrill as well, since both of them are the objects of deliberation, he also seems to support in principle GEV. See, Ackrill (1974), pp.26-7. Cf., Anscombe (1965), pp.143-58.

the relevant passages in this way and how they eventually compose such an argument on the objects of deliberation will be investigated in the coming section.

2. The Grand-End View on Deliberation

Again, the Grand End theorists claim that deliberation is not only of means, but also of moral ends, i.e. individual excellences of character, in Aristotle's ethics, and their relationships to the highest good, end or *eudaimonia*. If I rephrase their interpretation of Aristotle's deliberation, we deliberate, of course, about 'particular matters that conduce to deciding the best possible type of action in a given circumstance', or just 'what conduce to our decision (*prohairesis*)', and we also deliberate about 'general moral ends', mentioned above, because, they think, deliberating about particular matters is, in a sense, a part of deliberating about general moral ends or the conceptions of moral excellence⁷³⁷⁴. Now we may see that the GEV assumes that there is some connection between particular moral matters and general moral ends, and thereby such continuation could also be the object of Aristotelian moral deliberation. Therefore, we could also say that the Grand End view eventually defines Aristotelian moral deliberation as a sort of specification of moral general ends⁷⁵. However, I see there are, at least, two essential components to be justified to keep this interpretation reliable; the concept of 'constitutional means'-- the idea of 'specifying' deliberation-- and the concept of 'architectonic' deliberation. It might be interesting to see where the GEV, they think, finds its textual evidence and how its possessors control that evidence.

2.1 The Possibility of 'Constitutional Means'⁷⁶

Can we think about a wheel without 'thinking about a vehicle'? I think, we can also say that the concept of 'constitutional means' in the GEV is a way to organize a negative answer to this question. Now, more related to our context, we shall think about playing

⁷³ Cooper (1986), pp.20-23., Irwin (1978), pp.256-59., Nussbaum (1978), p.170 with n.13., Wiggins [1], pp.223-237.

⁷⁴ I think this idea is pretty overlapped with the so-called inclusive end view on happiness, representatively of Ackrill's and Cooper's. This interpretation will be dealt with in Chapter Five on happiness.

⁷⁵ Tuozzo (1991), p.194 "...A number of writers have pointed out that Aristotelian phrase *ta pros to telos* ... includes closer 'specifications' of a general end..."

⁷⁶ Greenwood might be one of those who introduce the possibility that there could be two different types of 'the things toward the end, or the means (*ta pros to telos*)', although he himself does not claim that this is what Aristotle means by that phrase. See, Greenwood (1909), pp.46-47.

golf or golfing. It would not be unreasonable to say both ‘driving a car’ and ‘putting’ are *means* to golfing⁷⁷. This is respectively because before we actually start playing golf, we of course need to drive a car to the green, and because putting is an expression of a type of golfing-activities. However, we can easily see that driving a car and putting are means in different senses. ‘Driving a car’ is wholly external to, or only a causal condition for golfing, but ‘putting’ is a component of, or a constituent part of golfing and even a result of defining what golfing is⁷⁸. The former type of ‘means’ is what the commentators normally call ‘instrumental means’, so the concept of ‘constitutional means’ is the name for the latter type. Basically, the GEV claims that Aristotle’s ‘means’, namely, his expression ‘*ta pros to telos*’ indicate both ‘means’ above.

It seems easy to see that the Grand-End View is supported by their concept of ‘constitutional means’ simply because deliberating ‘constitutional means’ is actually deliberating the end to which means are constitutive. I understand that the GEV claims that deliberating constitutive means is deliberating the given end is justified by some assumption that what they call constitutional means *are somehow conceptually connected to, or conceptually constitutive of*, a given end. That is, according to the GEV, there is some conceptual link between constitutional means and their ends. Now, the question is whether this idea of the Grand End View is what we can find in Aristotle’s works or not. One of the favourite passages alleged, by the GEV, to contain Aristotle’s original idea of ‘constitutional means’ is Aristotle’s *Metaphysics (Met.)*, 7.7 (1032a32-1033a1).

2.1.1 The Possibility of a Conceptual Link between Means and Ends – The ‘Constitutional Means’ in Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. 7.7

2.1.1.1 The Possibility of the Specific Description of ‘Constitutional Means’

Before we proceed to the text of Aristotle’s *Met.* 7.7, it might be worth seeing some remarks on this concept from some proponents of the Grand-End view. Wiggins quite clearly describes the nature of their concept of ‘constitutional means’ saying that a constitutional means X ‘bears *to telos* Y when the existence of X will itself help to

⁷⁷ Majithia (2006), p.187 and p.191.

⁷⁸ Cooper (1986), pp.20-23, Greenwood (1909), pp.46-47.

constitute Y' and this X is 'a constituent of the end', and 'the presence of a constituent of the end is always logically relevant to happiness'⁷⁹.

After these remarks, Wiggins suggests the details of constitutional means. He provides an even more detailed description of category of constitutional means, also saying that in *EN* 3 Aristotle treats both deliberation about instrumental means and deliberation about constitutional means⁸⁰. According to Wiggins, constitutional means are (1) 'what kind of life he wants to lead', (2) 'which of several possible courses of actions would conform most closely to some ideal he holds before himself', (3) 'what would constitute *eudaimonia* here and now', and (4) 'what would count as the achievement of the not yet completely specific goal which he has already set himself in the given situation.'⁸¹ The GEV proponents⁸² believe that the basis of these details can be found in Aristotle's *Met.* 7.7 (1032a32-1033a1)

2.1.1.2 The Possibility of Aristotelian Originality of the Idea of 'Constitutional Means'

In the GEV's investigation of these passages of his *Metaphysics*, they focus on proving two different aspects of deliberation in their interpretation, the specifying process and the constitutive quality of '*ta pros to telos*.' Below, they think Aristotle assumes the possibility of deliberation of 'constitutional means' saying that deliberating is a sort of specifying.

"...For the substance of the privation is the opposite substance; e.g., health is the substance of disease; for disease is the absence of health, and health is the formula and knowledge in the soul. The healthy subject, then, is produced as the result of the following train of thought; since this is health, if the subject is to be healthy this must first be present, e.g. a uniform state of body, and if this is to be present, there must be heat; and the physician goes on thinking thus until he brings the matter to a final step which he himself can take... (*Met.* 7.7, 1032b3-10)"

⁷⁹Wiggins [1] (1980), p.224.

⁸⁰As I said, this is different from Ackrill (1974)

⁸¹Wiggins [1] (1989),pp.224-5.

⁸²There are some other texts where we could find, as Cooper, Nussbaum and Wiggins[1] say, some evidence of Aristotle's idea of 'constituent means', such as *Pol.* (1325b16 and 1338b2-4) and *EN* (1144a3ff). However, in general, they have more detailed arguments about the text of *Metaphysics* mentioned here. Tuozzo (1991), p.197.

According to Cooper's interpretation of this passage, if we know that 'in order that this patient is healthy again, she is to have her elements in balance, and in order that she has them in balance, she is to be heated, and finally in order that she is heated, she is to be rubbed', we can rub this patient to make her warm, keep her elements in balance and eventually get her healthy again. The Grand End view says that deliberating is specifying the general ends in this sense.⁸³ Therefore, what is important is that *rubbing the patient to make her warm and balancing her elements to make her healthy are, at least significantly, not different*. For, the former is an instrumental mean of health, and the latter is a constituent of health⁸⁴.

However, it is also important not to ignore that the general end, as an integrity, presents already, and its specifications presuppose the pre-presence of the general end, as Aristotle says in the cited passage '...therefore, ...generation would be impossible if nothing were already existent...(1032b30-31)' and in another passage (1032b15-17) '...the first step in the doing being the last state of the thinking...'. According to the GEV, Aristotle implies here that naturally there is some conceptual connection between each setp of specification, and that 'connection' is possible only because of the pre-presence of the concept of the general end. The Grand End view understands that this implication might be Aristotle's theoretical basis for the idea of 'deliberating-specifying'. More importantly, that is why the particular end in the context of our discussion is not external to the general, but constitutive to it. Now we can draw Aristotle's idea of constitutive means from this text of his *Metaphysics*. In Cooper's comments on the next passage, there are more details of the aspect of 'constituting (or constitutive mean)'.⁸⁵

"In generations and motions part of the process is called cogitation, and part production—that which proceeds from the starting-point and the form is cogitation, and that which proceeds from the conclusion of the cogitation is production. Each of the other intermediate measures is carried out in the same way. I mean, e.g., that if A is to be healthy, his physical condition will have to be made uniform. What, then, does being made uniform entail? So-and-so; and this will be achieved if he is made hot. What does this entail? So-and-so; now this is potentially present, and the thing is now in his power. (*Met.* 1032b15-22)"

⁸³ Cooper (1986), pp.20-21.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p.20, "...No distinction is made between the step of rubbing the patient ... and that of balancing his elements..."

More importantly, according to Cooper's interpretation, here Aristotle rather clearly claims that as long as we deliberate the particular end, it means we already somehow deliberate about the general end. This is because the beginning stage of deliberation is the conception of the general end⁸⁵. *Namely, what is proposed in GEV is that it is impossible to draw the best possible specification of the general end, unless there is already a conception of the general end.* Cooper says, for this specific case, 'balancing his elements is necessary in order to make him healthy, but we need to know what that is before discovering a means of producing it' and thereby 'bringing about whatever it is that balancing his elements consists in must be regarded as a way of bringing about the balancing'⁸⁶. Hence, for the GEV proponents, deliberating a general moral end, or determining the conception of it, in Aristotle's ethics, is not only a part of the process of deliberation, but the starting point of it. In this sense, the conception of a general end is a *mean* constitutive to the conclusion of deliberation. As long as one accepts this idea of 'constitutional means', one should also be able to say that, even the conception of *eudaimonia* is an object of Aristotelian deliberation, since general ends are somehow conceptually connected to the supreme end. The details of this will be discussed in a moment. Consequently, this section shows, according to the GEV, that even outside his ethical works we can find an Aristotelian idea of constituent means and to establish that it is possible to understand Aristotle's expression *ta pros to telos* as the concept of constituent means. Therefore, if we paraphrase what the Grand End view means by the phrase 'constitutional means', we have three options: (1) 'a particular type' or 'a particularization' of general ends (i.e. a particular type of 'just activity') which is acquired as the conclusion of deliberation, (2) the general ends (i.e. a conception of just activity) and (3) the relationships between (1), (2) and the general conception of *eudaimonia*. So far we have seen how the concept of constitutional means is possible in the Grand End view, but we have also seen that constitutional means pre-suppose some pre-existing thought to make them, namely the conception on happiness. As I have mentioned, the next section invites us to see how and why the Grand End view claims deliberation to define the happiness.

2.2 The Possibility of 'Architectonic' Deliberation – Deliberating from the Supreme End, Happiness

⁸⁵ Cooper (1986), pp.21-22; "...the first stage of deliberation is to take note of what the end, health, consists in; and it is by way of producing this that the man is to be made healthy..."

⁸⁶ Ibid, p.21.

Proponents of the GEV find, they think, textual evidence for the possibility of this sort of deliberation from Aristotle's remarks in *EN* 1140a25-31, I have already cited at the beginning with the title T2. As I already mentioned, the deliberation advocated by them is a sort of architectonic deliberation. The GEV proponents seem to mean by this the deliberation of a practically wise person is deliberation about things conducive to a good life as a whole (*poia pros to eu zēn holós*). This deliberation actually starts from, if I am not wrong, some planning with regard to leading a good life as a whole. It seems right to say that 'planning to go to Paris' actually means 'planning to decide the best possible particular action to make, in this moment, with regard to every related aspect about going to Paris, i.e., when, where, how, with whom, etc'. If Aristotle means---by his expression deliberation *poia pros to eu zēn holós* in *EN* 1140a28---some deliberation about 'our so-called moral principles', as the GEV suggests, it seems very clear that moral deliberation, as conceived by Aristotle, is both of means and ends. Wiggins, for example, clearly says that in *EN* 1140a25-31 and also in *EN* 1141b8-18, Aristotle mentions what I have called architectonic deliberation, which takes 'questions of general policy' as its object; Wiggins also claims that Aristotelian deliberation is a sort of 'investigation to the study of both, also citing *EN* 1142b-30, particulars and universals'.⁸⁷ Many others⁸⁸, citing the same texts (*EN* 1140a25-31, *EN* 1141b8-18 and *EN* 1142b31-3), ascribe 'being architectonic, supervisory and regulative' to the nature of deliberation mentioned in those passages of the *EN* 6. However, more importantly, in GEV, we should notice the 'architectonic' deliberation is possible if and only if there is deliberation on a general end⁸⁹, most importantly, the supreme end, happiness. Thus, since, I understand, in the GEV the possibility of 'constitutional means' presupposes the determined conception of a given end, that conception also presupposes the determined conception of the supreme end, happiness. In the end, they seem to say that the Aristotelian deliberation cannot even start until there is a conception determined about the supreme end, which shows how one views his or her own life as a whole. Now we can see that Aristotelian moral deliberation supported by the Grand-End view is composed of two stages; (1) deliberating to define the ends (happiness and the general moral ends) and (2)

⁸⁷ Wiggins[1], pp.227-8.

⁸⁸ Cooper (1986), p.4, p.101 and p.130, Irwin. (1975), p.257 and p.268., Sherman, N. (1989), pp.84,88-89 and 134., Urmson. (1988), p.81.

⁸⁹ Tuozzo (1991), p.198, "...those passages where it is said Aristotle explicitly says that the *phronimos* determines his general ends by means of deliberation. There are ... two passages where this claim can be plausibly made... *EN*, 1144a25-31"

deliberating to specify a general end given to a particular option best to achieve the end. Apparently, in the sense that the conception of happiness supervises all the following processes of deliberation, this deliberation is an architectonic deliberation. Now, it seems easy to see that deliberating to determine the conception of happiness is the major premise of the idea of architectonic deliberation. My criticism of the GEV targets this, the major premise of the GEV; the deliberation about happiness. I will jeopardize the Grand-End view undermining its major premise; showing that Aristotle never says that happiness is determined through deliberation.

3. Criticism – *Contra* the Grand-End View

I agree that the process of deliberation does not exclude the given end entirely, and also accept that deliberation is a kind of specification from the given end to its best practical option in a given circumstance. As we have already seen, even in *EN* 3.3, Aristotle says ‘in deliberation we investigate what is the mean to the given end, and how such a mean can be conducive to that end (in *EN* 3.3, 1112b14-17)’. Therefore, clearly, the general moral end given in the circumstance is a material for us to *deliberate with*. I think this is not to be disagreed. However, what I deny, again, is the idea of deliberating to determine the conception of the supreme end, happiness itself, and, thereby, the claim about its relationship to the general moral ends; particular excellences of character (the ends assumed before the relevant deliberation begins, I think). Hence, again, my criticism of the idea of architectonic deliberation is toward the fundamental premise of the Grand End view that the conception of happiness is determined through deliberation. Once this is criticized, the logic of the GEV will become problematic.

Therefore, I first, rather briefly though, criticize the possibility of deliberating about happiness itself under the general context of Aristotle’s discussion on happiness and deliberation in *EN*. What I complain about is that if happiness and its relation to each general end were also the objects of deliberation, Aristotle’s discussion on deliberation would remain very unnatural. After this, more strongly, I will claim that the passages in *EN* 6 that is understood, by the Grand End view, to show Aristotle’s idea of deliberation about the supreme end, cannot actually be textual evidence for them.

3.1 A Fundamental Problem Regarding Deliberation about Happiness

EN 6 is mainly devoted to distinguishing between the theoretical reasoning and the practical one⁹⁰. It is true that Aristotle, several times, mentions that deliberation is concerned with the universals (*ta katholou*) as well, but it is also very clear that, for some reason, the centre of the gravity of his explanation on deliberation lies on the particulars (*ta kath' hekaston*). Every time he mentions such universals in deliberation, it is to be noticed that he emphasizes that practical wisdom (*phronêsis*) is about the last things (*ta eschata*), the particulars. Aristotle stresses, saying thus⁹¹, that practical reasoning or deliberation is about the particulars and he distinguishes it from theoretical reasoning.

Therefore, my point is this. If deliberation was also to determine what happiness is, and that aspect of deliberation was the predominant part in deliberation as enough as it decides the success or failure of deliberation, why did he not spell out exactly how deliberation on the supreme end can be processed? In *EN 3*, he only describes the deliberation as an investigation or an analysis of how to determine the best particularization of the given end. In *EN 3*, he also claims that deliberation is about the particulars and never explains how the deliberation on happiness can be composed. Hence, if Aristotle's idea of moral deliberation is architectonic, we cannot help suspecting why Aristotle, very astonishingly⁹², does not explain clearly the deliberation to determine the conception of happiness. For me, the reason that Aristotle does not make a detailed description of the 'architectonic' deliberation, i.e. on the relationship of general ends to the supreme end, and on the supreme end itself, is rather straightforward. That is simply because he does not claim the 'architectonic' deliberation. This is the thesis I will support through the following analysis of the relevant passages.

3.2 Anti-GEV Text Analysis

Again, my criticism, through the denial of the possibility of deliberation on the definition of happiness, is staring at the idea of architectonic deliberation for Aristotle's deliberation. If we see this idea briefly again; Aristotelian deliberation is a series of deliberation that starts from determining the conception on happiness that determines the conception on general ends and controls all the following processes of deliberation,

⁹⁰ Cf, Broadie (1991), pp.179-185.

⁹¹ Representatively, *EN 1142a24-25* '*phronêsis* is concerned not with the objects of *epistêmê*, but the most particular things.' and *EN 1143b3-4* 'what *nous* in practical domain deals with are the last and variable things, that is, what concern the *hetera protasis*.'

⁹² Broadie calls this point "astonishing lacuna" in Broadie (1991), p.195.

i.e., weighing various particular elements and deciding the best option to achieve the general end given in a particular situation. However, in this section I will show that the passages alleged to support this architectonic idea of deliberation cannot be read in the way favoured by the Grand End view. Hence, providing my own analysis of the passages in question, I will claim that none of them can evidently show the possibility of deliberating to define happiness; which lets me argue that neither the conception on happiness nor its relation to the general moral ends is of objects of deliberation. Consequently, I will criticize the view that the conception on the ends is determined by deliberation, and eventually maintain that, showing the impossibility of the architectonic deliberation, deliberation is merely a specification from the general end, about which we have a stable attitude through habituation, to the particular end that can be achievable by an action.

3.2.1 The Impossibility of Deliberating on Architectonic End, Happiness

3.2.1.1 Rendering ‘What Kinds Conduce to the Good Life *holôs*’ (*poia pros to eu zên holôs*).

Here is T2 again. This passage is rightly known to explain the distinction between moral deliberation and technical deliberation.⁹³ However, the GEV seems to understand that Aristotle, through the distinction, stresses the whole-part relation amongst the ends in moral domain, and that is the point of moral deliberation from which it is distinguished from non-moral deliberation. For, they claim that in T2 Aristotle explains a deliberation to determine the conception on an architectonic end that supervises a life as a whole. Therefore, the GEV maintains, based on their interpretation in question, not only that in Aristotle, deliberation on the supreme end is possible, but also that as a result of it, the deliberation process in general can supervise all the following processes to arrive at a certain conclusion. However, manifesting the unreliability of their view on the contrast between two deliberations suggested by Aristotle in T2, I confirm that T2 can provide no credential for the Grand-End view’s claim.

T2: “it is thought characteristic of a practically wise person to be able to deliberate well about the things that are good and advantageous to himself, *not*

⁹³ See, Engberg-Pedersen (1983), pp.195-6 & Tuozzo (1991), pp.199-201.

in specific context (kata meros), e.g. what sorts of things conduce to health, or to physical strength, but *what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general (poia pros to eu zên holôs)*. An indication of this is that we also call those *in a specific field practically wise (peri ti phronimos)* if they succeed in calculating well towards some specific worthy (*soudaion*) end on matters where no exact technique applies. So in fact the description ‘practically wise (*phronimos*)’ belongs *in general (holôs)* to the person who is good at deliberation. (EN 6.5, 1140a25-32)”

Although the contrast mainly described by Aristotle in this passage is that between moral deliberation and non-moral or technical deliberation, it is important to note that there seems to be another contrast suggested to help with describing the former contrast. Therefore, it can also be said that in this passage, Aristotle actually shows us two distinctive contrasts, so it is very important to attend to how they are distinguished respectively. Specifically, two distinctions are; [the supplementary contrast] the one between deliberation about what kinds of things toward the good life in general (poia pros to eu zên holôs) and deliberation of those who are practically wise in a particular area (phronimoi peri ti), and [the main contrast] the one between deliberation *poia pros to eu zên holôs* and deliberation about things good in a particular respect (kata meros). We shall first see the supplementary one, because it shows the characteristic of the main contrast Aristotle intends to explain.

3.2.1.1.1 The First (supplementary) Distinction - Between ‘Deliberation of *poia pros to eu zên holôs*’ and ‘Deliberation of Those Who are *phronimoi peri ti*’; Type and Token

If one thinks she can draw the possibility of architectonic deliberation, presupposed by the concept of ‘constitutional means’, from this passage, it is possible for her, on the GEV, to translate *holôs* ‘as a whole’. This is because proponents of the GEV tend to think that the former type of deliberation is a sort of integration of all latter types of deliberation⁹⁴. However, again, this interpretation seems misleading, because, I render, the former deliberation is no more than a simple generalisation of the latter. Namely, it seems that the only relationship between these two deliberations is the relationship

⁹⁴ Irwin (1978), p.257, Wiggins [1], p.228, cf. Greenwood (1909), pp.45-45, Tuozzo (1991), p.199, 200 with n.49.

between ‘type’ and ‘token.’⁹⁵ That is, the relationship between these two is simply inductive, because, as I agree with Tuozzo⁹⁶, there is no case where the expression *holós* is used to indicate ‘how a number of things fit together to form a single whole’.⁹⁷ Therefore, based on this distinction between the deliberations above, it seems impossible for the architectonic deliberation of *phronimos* to obtain, because we cannot say that deliberation about the well-being of life in general is a deliberation of a whole of constitutive particular moral excellences, namely, another end which supervises all those subordinate ends. Aristotle hardly means by the term ‘*holós*’, a single thing that implies all other relevant things as its subordinates and supervises them, but he mostly enjoys using the ‘*holós*’ to indicate something as ‘a type’ when explaining a type-token distinction. In the following, I will present several passages where Aristotle indicates a type by the ‘*holós*’ justifying my claim that in the above passage we can’t read the *holós* as ‘wholly’ or ‘architectonically’.⁹⁸

(1) “For just as for a flute-player, or a sculptor or any expert, and generally (*holós*) for all those who have some characteristic function or activity... (EN 1.7, 1097b25-26)”

Here, Aristotle clearly provides a type-token distinction between those who have some characteristic function and the particular cases of it. Hence, it is clear here that Aristotle indicates the type in the type-token distinction by the *holós* in this passage.

(2) “... By affections (*pathê*), I mean appetite, anger, fear, boldness, grudging ill will, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, envy, pity – generally, feelings attended by pleasure or pain...(EN 2.4, 1105b21-3)”. Cf., EN 110618-21, for another type-token distinction regarding the *pathê*.

In this passage, Aristotle even more clearly shows the type-token distinction. The *pathos* is that in type of which is accompanied by pleasure or pain, but there are various kinds

⁹⁵ Surely, the type of deliberation well merely indicates the deliberation of the excellent agent in general, but the token of deliberation well can mean a deliberation of a person of particular excellence, i.e., courageous person’s deliberation, temperate man’s deliberation, etc.

⁹⁶ Tuozzo (1991), p.200.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ However, it is true that the Greek adverb ‘*holós*’ does not exclusively mean ‘in general’ or ‘generally’, but that that adverb also means ‘wholly’ in some specific context in EN, i.e., some passages on justice (especially EN 1130a1-1131a9) and some on pleasure (1174a13-1175a21). However, I suppose that none of these passages support the possibility of the architectonic deliberation. Rather, as already said everywhere else Aristotle, meaning ‘generally’ by that adverb, enjoys pointing something a type describing the contrast of the things in a type - token distinction.

of it, such as, appetite, anger, fear etc. These are particular cases of the *pathos*, so it is evident that there is a type-token distinction here regarding *pathos*.

Apart from these passages, Aristotle also briefly distinguishes *orexis* as a type and *epitymia* as a token of the former in *EN* 1102b30. Therefore, it is not difficult to see, at all, that Aristotle uses the *holôs* to mean the sense of type in the type-token distinction. Furthermore, it is no exception where he seems to assume the relationship between the individual excellences of character and excellence of character in general⁹⁹.

Hence, as long as my reading of the adverb ‘*holôs*’ in those passages mentioned is correct, it is best that we read ‘*to eu zên holôs*’ as ‘the good life as a type’ rather than ‘the good life as an ‘architectonic’ whole’ when it is contrasted with ‘deliberation of those who are *phronimoi peri ti*’. If so, the supplementary distinction in T2, at least, cannot be a distinction between an architectonic deliberation and the deliberations as its parts, but one between deliberation of the *phronimos* in general and deliberation of the *phronimos* in particular moral cases. Hence, it is shown that, at least, the supplementary distinction cannot support the idea of the architectonic deliberation.¹⁰⁰

3.2.1.1.2 The Second (Main) Distinction - Between Deliberation About *poia pros to eu zên holôs* and Deliberation About Things Good *kata meros*; Primary Sense and Secondary Sense

Aristotle seems to mention the ‘main-second’ contrast here is to clarify that moral deliberation and technical deliberation are distinctive to each other in their subject

⁹⁹ Some representative cases of many; *EN* 1095b5-6: “consequently, in order to listen appropriately to discussion about what is fine and just, i.e. about the objects of political expertise in general, one must have been well brought up.” [contrast between justice and the object of politics] *EN* 1101b14-15“... everything praised appears to be praised for being of a certain quality and being disposed in *a certain way* towards something; for we praise the just man, the courageous man, and *in general* the good man, and excellence because of his action...” (contrast between particular agent of character-excellence and the excellent-character agent in general) cf., *EN* 1099a7-11 saying the contrast between those who love justice and those who love excellence in general.

¹⁰⁰ Engberg-Pedersen’s interpretation on this passage seems not exactly correct, as long as they cannot see this point. See, Engberg-Pedersen (1983), pp.195-6.

matters¹⁰¹, so these two kinds of deliberation cannot be applied to in the same sense. Therefore, Aristotle seems to mean that technical deliberation can be called deliberation only in an analogous sense or a secondary sense, whereas moral deliberation can be called deliberation in a primary sense or a proper sense. However, then, how can the primary sense's deliberation be characterized? How can this deliberation be distinctive from the other, of the secondary sense, deliberation? The GEV assumes the characteristic of moral deliberation to have moral ends amongst whose unity can be characterized by the whole-part relation, as long as, they believe, there is one supreme end covering every other end, about which deliberation is architectonic. Yet, I do not think that Aristotle would admit that moral deliberation and the unity of its ends are described as GEV proponents do.

Of course, I do not have to deny that there is some sort of unity (probably the unity amongst the individual excellences of character) that allows moral ends to be clearly distinguished from the ends to which the objects of technical deliberation are conducive. Namely, I clarify that I do not refuse to claim the sense of unity amongst the so-called moral ends that can be explained in the following way; it is clearly true for Aristotle that if you deliberate excellently in a courage-required-circumstance, it is already enough to manifest that you are a *phronimos* who deliberates well wherever/whenever you need to do 'moral' deliberation, although that is not the case in 'technical' circumstance, because that fact that you do deliberate well about making shoes does not imply that you will deliberate well building amours. However, what such a concept of unity just mentioned suggests is not the so-called whole-part distinctions amongst moral ends that many, if not most, GEV proponents would assume, but the type-token distinction as we have seen earlier regarding the first distinction. Therefore, although some unique unity of moral ends should be understood in this distinction, that unity, again, does not support the idea of architectonic deliberation of the *phronimos*; the distinction between moral deliberation and technical deliberation here represents that between moral ends whose unity can be characterized as type-token and technical ends that lacks such unity. Therefore, I claim that this-second-distinction informs us no more than that moral deliberation is deliberation in a primary sense, whose ends have type-token relation, but technical deliberation is in a secondary sense,

¹⁰¹ Tuozzo (1991), p.200 "...medicine and gymnastics are not adduced as particular cases of *phronésis*..."

whose ends lack such a unity. Hence, there is no evidence based on which we can claim deliberation about the highest end and architectonic deliberation.

Although, I think I have already shown clearly that in the passage in question (T2) Aristotle never says that deliberation, when it is excellent, i.e. that of *phronimos*, is an architectonic deliberation. One might still wonder, especially in the second distinction, why the *holós* should be rendered as ‘in a primary sense’ not ‘as a whole’ when the term ‘*holós*’ clearly contains a sense of the ‘whole’. Regarding this point, I shall present some interesting passages. Actually those adverbs, *holós* and *kata meros* are Aristotle’s favourites, especially when he describes a qualified usage and an unqualified usage of some adjectives and nouns, and explains how they can be contrasted. Therefore, to explain away the last potential worry about this second distinction, it is worth seeing some more cases where the same principle applies.

“As for ‘theoretical wisdom’ (*sophia*), this we ascribe, in the case of the various kinds of technical expertise, to those experts in them who are most precise, e.g. Pheidias is an accomplished worker in stone, Polycleitus in bronze, here at any rate meaning no more by ‘theoretical wisdom’ than excellence in technical expertise; but we think that there are people who are accomplished in general (*holós*), not in a specific sense (*kata meros*), and not accomplished in something else... (EN 1141a9-17)”

In Aristotle’s philosophy, *sophia* generally indicates theoretical wisdom¹⁰², but when he says this wisdom in some particular respect (*kata meros*), he clearly means some analogous sense of theoretical wisdom, namely, some intellectual excellence of an excellent practitioner in the field of art, *techné*¹⁰³. That is, here ‘unqualified theoretical wisdom (*sophia holós*)’ and ‘qualified (*kata meros*) theoretical wisdom’ differ in their subject matters. Remember, the *techné* cannot be a kind of the *sophia* in Aristotle (EN 6.4, 1140a). Again, the distinction given shows neither the contrast between a so-called constituent theoretical wisdom and the whole theoretical wisdom, nor that the qualified *sophia* is a specification or particularization of the unqualified *sophia*. In the next few passages, we can see more clearly what the expression ‘*holós*’ means in this specific usage.

“... we must next discuss whether there is any type that is un-selfcontrolled without qualification (*haplós*), or whether everyone is un-self-controlled in some

¹⁰² EN 6.7, 1141a16-18 “...so it is clear that ‘theoretical wisdom’ (*sophia*) must be the most precise of the kinds of knowledge. The person possessing it, then, must not only know what follows from the starting points, but have a true grasp of the starting points themselves”

¹⁰³ A more detailed discussion on this point will be in Chapter Five on *eudaimonia*.

specific way (*kata meros*); and if there is, what sorts of things make up the objects of this unqualified lack of self-control... (EN 1147b20-21)”

Although, in the case of *acrasia* the adverb *haplôs* is preferred to *holôs*, the contrast is the same. This is because the contrast here is also the one ‘between some central or privileged case of the predication of some term (‘un-self-controlled,’ ‘theoretically wise’) and cases where the predicate applies only in a qualified or, at least not proper sense.’¹⁰⁴ Aristotle emphasizes in EN 7.3, 1146b19-20 that ‘the *acratia haplôs* is the one who is acratia regarding pleasure about which the intemperate is intemperate’, so it clearly means that the proper case of the acratia is concerned with the common pleasure with which the morally vicious is, but, of course, in some different manner. In EN 7.4 and 7.5, Aristotle compares and contrasts between *acrasia* and *kakia*, and at the end of the relevant discussion, he gives a decisive reason for us to understand the distinction in question as the so-called primary – secondary distinction.

“It is clear, then, that un-self-controlled and self-control are concerned only with the things that concern self-indulgence and moderation, and that in relation to other things in question there is another form of lack of self-control, one so-called in a transferred (*kata metaphora*) and not in an unqualified sense (*ouch haplôs*)... (EN 7.5, 1149a20-23)”, cf., EN 1157b1-4; friend *haplôs* and friend in similarity, and EN 114621-23 regarding pleasure

Here, Aristotle concludes the proper sense of *acrasia*, in that he himself is most interested, for the current discussion, is the case of those who are acratia about the common pleasure with the intemperate. He very kindly clarifies for us that if the title *acrasia* is called in some other case, or more specifically, to some case of pleasure not shared by the intemperate, we use such a title not in a primary way, but a non-typical or derivative way (*kata metaphoran*). Hence, between these two ‘un-self-controlled (*acrasia*)’, it seems evident that by the *acrasia haplôs* Aristotle means the *acrasia* in the primary sense, but by the *acrasia kata meros*, the *acrasia* in the derivative or analogous sense.

Consequently, we can see that in the contrast of two, in a sense, different *acrasia*, Aristotle also distinguishes the un-self-controlleds of different subject matters in the same manner he employs in distinguishing qualified *sophia* and unqualified *sophia* --he uses *haplôs* instead of *holôs* though. Accordingly, I believe we can now confirm that the relationship between deliberation *kata meros* (deliberation in a qualified sense) and

¹⁰⁴ Tuozzo (1991), p.201.

deliberation *holós* (deliberation in an unqualified sense) is not inductive. Rather, it is eventually that Aristotle, in the second distinction in *EN* 1140a25-31, means the deliberation in a derivative sense, by deliberation about the objects of *technê* (production or art), as long as it means the deliberation *kata meros*. Also, Aristotle refers to the deliberation in a primary sense, by his expression deliberation about moral matters (deliberation *poia pros to eu zên holós*), in the sense that *holós* and *haplós* are replaceable to each other in that they share the common meaning, that is, ‘in a primary sense’.

Having seen my investigation on two distinctions in the passage in question (*EN* 6.5, 1140a25-31), it becomes very convincing not to claim that in the passage, Aristotle assumes the presence of ‘a certain type of deliberation which is confined to a practically wise person or *phronimos*,’ or ‘a sort of architectonic’ deliberation, which presupposes the reliability of ‘constitutional means’. That is, the only deliberation we can ascribe to the *phronimos* is the deliberation concerned with specifying general moral ends in each particular case. If so, it seems true that in this passage, although it contains two different distinctions, none of them can support the GEV claiming that here Aristotle suggests the presence of architectonic deliberation about ends, relation among them, and eventually about the highest good, *eudaimonia*. There are some more important passages based on which the GEV claims that Aristotle there suggests, assuming that moral deliberation has a potentiality to determine the end, at least, the excellent deliberation of the *phronimos* is to determine the conception on happiness. In order to complete my criticism against the GEV, I shall also deal with those passages.

3.2.1.2 The Insufficient Evidence for Deliberation to Determine End

According to the GEV, again, the following two passages are commonly taken to claim that the excellent deliberation of the *phronimos* determines a conception of general ends. However, each passage explains slightly different aspects of the architectonic deliberation. The first one seems to mean, if the GEV is right, that the deliberation of the *phronimos* (and of any other moral deliberator as well) starts from determining the conception of an end. The second that the deliberation of the *phronimos* is an excellent ‘architectonic’ deliberation that supervises the relations of the various human goods to

each other, based on his/her right apprehension on the supreme end, happiness.¹⁰⁵ We now shall examine if they are really to be said in the way mentioned.

3.2.1.2.1 Deliberation and ‘What Can be Acted (*ta prakta*)’ - Another Usage of the ‘*haplôs*’

T3 “For we say that good deliberation is especially (*malista*) the task of the practically wise man ... and the one who is without qualification (*haplôs*) good at deliberation is the one who aims, by reasoning, at what is best for man of all things attainable in action (*tou aristou anthrôphôi tôn praktôn*)... (*EN* 6.7, 1141b9-14)” (cited from Bostock (2000). p.85.)

I quoted the translation of Bostock, because he himself defends the GEV based on his own interpretation for this passage. Regarding this passage, Bostock claims confidently “‘what is best man of all things attainable in action’ is surely a way of referring to the supreme end, which is *eudaimonia*”. It seems that Bostock translates a bit excessively ‘*tôn praktôn*’ into of ‘all things attainable by action’, because he thinks the *haplôs* here means ‘wholly’ or ‘entirely’. What he seems to show here is that ‘deliberating well without qualification (*haplôs*)’ means ‘deliberating well everything related to action’, i.e. the definition of happiness, its relationship to general ends and how they are applied to practise the particular end, the conclusion of deliberation and a specification of a general end.

Since in this passage there is no clear distinction, it is not very certain if the *haplôs* here can be applied to one of the distinctions we saw in T2. However, fortunately, I think, that will not significantly affect us when criticizing the GEV’s interpretation on this passage, that is, there will be no problem, whatever the *haplôs* means here, to show that the *haplôs* in this passage, at least, is not the sense of ‘whole’ or ‘architectonically’. Instead, I suppose it seems safe to render the *haplôs* as ‘simply’ or ‘absolutely’. The reason for this will now be explained.

It is important to notice that in the general context of the discussion in *EN* 6.7, Aristotle distinguishes *phronêsis* from *sophia*, theoretical wisdom. The main point of the distinction is that they do not share a common object, because the *phronêsis* deals with human good (*anthrophina agatha*), but the *sophia* with something most serious (*spoudaiotaton*) or more godlike (*theiōtera*), such as heavenly bodies (*EN*, 1140b1, cf., 1112a210-5). I

¹⁰⁵ Tuozzo (1991), pp. 202-3.

believe that in this line Aristotle wants to stress that the *phronêsis* is different from the *sophia* in that the former deals with what can be acted amongst human goods, but the latter does not. Therefore, in continuation of this, I suppose whatever sense Aristotle means by the term '*haplôs*' here, he uses to distinguish the *phronêsis* from the *sophia*, but clearly not to emphasize the deliberation in the moral sphere to be architectonic. If he did in the latter way, it would be totally out of context, because there is no reason he needs to raise such a point in the current context. Again, since Aristotle tries to distinguish *phronêsis* from *sophia* to avoid some relevant potential confusion, I think it is safe to say that the deliberation *haplôs* is no more than the deliberation in a strict sense by virtue of which it is clearly distinctive from the excellence of contemplation (*theôria*).

Additionally, since Bostock's translation for '*tou aristou anthrôpôi tôn praktôn*' is based on an incorrect assumption that the good deliberation *haplôs* is the good deliberation architectonically, it seems that '*tôn praktôn*' also cannot simply mean 'of all things attainable by action'. Hence, the expression '*tou aristou anthrôpôi tôn praktôn*' is no more than a general description for 'the conclusion of that good 'moral' deliberation', which actually points out 'the best option to actualize the general end assumed before the beginning of the deliberation' that is, 'the *prohairesis*'. Consequently, from this passage as well it seems difficult to argue that Aristotle describes the good deliberation as an architectonic deliberation that determines the conception of happiness and applies it to its relationship to the general ends and all the rest process of deliberation. Therefore, this passage also cannot support the Grand End view.

3.2.1.2.2 *euboulia* and *phronêsis*

T4: "Again, it is possible to have deliberated well without qualification (*haplôs*) or in relation to some specific end (*pros ti*); deliberative excellence without qualification, then, will be deliberation that is successful in relation to the end without qualification (*pros to telos to haplôs*), while the specific kind (*tis*) will be deliberation that is successful in relation to some specific end (*pros ti telos*). So if it is characteristic of the practically wise to deliberate well, deliberative excellence will be that sort of correctness that corresponds to what conduces to the end, of which practical wisdom (wisdom; *phronêsis*) is the true grasp (*alêthês hypolêpsis*). (EN 6.9, 1142b28-33)"

This is a very important passage, so it is useful to mention what the Grand-End view specifically argues based on their reading of this passage. They seem to argue that here Aristotle, not only, says deliberation is of happiness, but also claims that the correctness

of deliberation is determined by whether the deliberator has a true understanding of the definition of happiness, because, they think, deliberation starts from such understanding on the *telos*¹⁰⁶. Again, for the GEV, this passage contains a decisive content for the possibility of the architectonic deliberation. Here they seem to read ‘*to telos to haplós*’ as ‘the *téléion haplós*’ (EN 1.7, 1097a35), namely, as happiness. So, for them, deliberation *haplós* is not only deliberation regarding everything related to one’s life as a whole, but more importantly about comprehending happiness that supervises the other ‘subordinate deliberations’. Assuming this, they also read the last sentence in this following way. What the *aléthês hypolépsis* means is still a very controversial and important issue, because it can sharply distinguish those who support the Grand-End view from those who do not. The advocates for the GEV take the end (*to telos*) for the antecedent ‘of which (ou)’ in that sentence. Consequently, what they claim is this. The moral end *haplós* is happiness referring to which moral deliberation processes all the following processes; determining the conception of the subordinate general moral ends, i.e. the individual excellences of characters and weighing up every possible things to actualize the conception on a general end given (and eventually that on happiness) until the deliberation arrives at a certain conclusion. Hence, for the Grand-End view, again, the conception on happiness is not only an essential starting point of deliberation, but it also works as a sort of ‘control tower’ for all the processes of moral deliberation. In this very sense, I understand, for them, deliberation is architectonic, and the excellence of, or, the bad state of it is determined by how the deliberator grasps the definition of happiness. Obviously in this logic, in the last sentence of this passage, the *aléthês hypolépsis* must be a true conception or supposition on the end (*to telos*) rather than some typical-moral decision about ‘what is expedient to the end (*to sympheron pros to telos*)’, a replaceable expression for ‘*to pros to telos*’.

Now, we can confirm again that for the Grand-End view the excellent deliberation, the mark of *phronimos*, is the deliberation that, first, defines correctly about the happiness, figures out the general ends referring to the right conception of happiness, and supervises specifying the general end to a particular end, the best option to practise the end given. Consequently, according to them, we notice that there seem to be three distinctive stages in moral deliberation in general in Aristotle; (1) the deliberation to

¹⁰⁶ Grant (1874), p.176, Stewart (1892), pp.82-3. However I disagree with these, but rather agree with the following commentaries; Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.376, Burnet (1900), pp.277-8.

define happiness, (2) the deliberation to determine the conception of general ends and (3) to specify a general end to the best possible actualization in a given situation. Then, eventually for GEV again, Aristotelian moral deliberation is both of means and ends. The first two can be labelled as a deliberation of ends and the last one as a deliberation of specification. As I said, since I do not significantly deny (3) above, what I will keep criticising in the remaining content of this chapter is the possibility of (1) and (2), together rightly called the architectonic deliberation, a major premise for GEV's logic.

As I have sufficiently suggested, I believe, in the summary of GEV's interpretation of the passage just above, the crucial point regarding the content in this notorious passage is about what is the antecedent for the relative pronoun 'of which (*ou*)' and thereby what the *aléthéia hypolépsis* means and to which it corresponds between 'the *telos*' and 'what conduce to the *telos*'. I will claim, showing that the distinction between the deliberation *haplós* and the deliberation toward some ends is the type-token distinction, the first one in T2, the antecedent of the '*ou*' is what conduce to the *telos*, so the *aléthés hypolépsis* should be 'a true grasp about what conduces to the *telos*'¹⁰⁷, that is, the *spoudaion probairesis*. However, before providing the intensive discussion on such distinction, I will mention a rather trivial, but still worth noticing though, grammatical point regarding another reason why the antecedent of the '*ou*' should be 'the means to the end' rather than 'the end itself'.

It seems that there is another reason, apart from the reason regarding the type-token distinction, not to take the *telos* the antecedent for 'of which' and that is because of a verbal adjective '*katorthousa*' in the phrase "...*hê pros to telos to haplós katorthousa*...(deliberation that is successful in the respect of the end without qualification)" The term, then, means 'to be successful' and often takes as its objective something particulars such as 'means' than 'ends'. For, as we can often see in *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Eudemian Ethics*, (EN 2.6, 1106b27, 32, 1107a14, EE 1247a13-15, b25-35; in these passages Aristotle indicates 'hitting the target, *to meson*', correctly.) this verbal adjective is used to indicate succeeding to take '*to meson*', i.e. a particular excellent action (and *pathos*). Therefore, what I stress is, if the GEV proponents understand the phrase "*hê pros to telos to haplós katorthousa*" as it means that 'such successful deliberation deals directly with some general ends or happiness', it will be a mistake. For, in Aristotle,

¹⁰⁷ So, I agree with Broadie's translation; Broadie/Rowe, p.184, cf., p.376.

the conception of *eudaimonia*, or, any other belief on moral principles cannot be a particular excellent or eudaimonic action, or at least, not, definitely, *to meson*, as long as the former are universals, but the latter are particulars. I think Aristotle presumably omits his expression for the means, '*ta pros to telos*', for the purpose of simplification. So, if this is the case, the idea of Aristotle regarding the *eu bebouleusthai haplôs* is not, merely, to deliberate (to determine) the conception of the end directly, but it is to '*prohairessthai*' the best possible option referring to the end without qualification. Therefore, about this grammatical point as well, Aristotle's focus is not on the end directly, but on 'what are conducive to a moral end given'. Hence, the correctness of deliberation *haplôs* relies on the true grasp, that is, *prohairesis*, as I will argue more in a moment, the conclusion of excellent deliberation or the specification of a general moral end given beforehand, not on the true conception or supposition on happiness.

Now, as I announced above, I will explain why the distinction between the deliberation *haplôs* and the deliberation in relation to some end (*pros ti*) in the passage in question is the distinction between type and token. Presumably, one naturally wonders if Aristotle really uses the *haplôs* here to indicate is a type-token distinction, and thereby, for him, the *haplôs* and the *holôs* can be replaceable to each other for the sense of 'type' as well as they are for the sense of 'a primary sense'. We shall very briefly see the first distinction in T2.

In the analysis on T2, Aristotle's distinction between the deliberation of what sort of things conducive to the good life in general (*poia pros to eu zên holôs*) and the deliberation of those who are practically wise in some specific end (*phronimoi peri ti*)' displays the so-called type-token distinction. That is, such distinction manifests that the former is no more than a general description for the deliberation of the *phronimos*', while the latter is for the particular cases of it. Hence, in T2, having justified this rendering for the *holôs* referring to some other relevant passages, I figured out that the *holôs* represents the type in a type-token distinction, the '*peri ti*' a token of it. So far so good for T2, but then the question is if we can render the *haplôs*, used in the passage (1142b28-33) we are currently dealing with, as the same sense. In the following I will show how possible it is.

I think we can render the *haplôs* in the current passage as a sense of 'what is in type', because Aristotle actually quite often employs the term thus. The following passages will

show, so if my interpretation on them is correct, they can be a very useful group that can justify my position on the distinction in question.

(1) Being angry in type and being angry in token: "... for the frightened isn't praised, nor is the angry person, nor is the person who is angry simply (*haplôs*) angry blamed (censured), but the person who is angry is a certain way... (EN, 1105b35-1106a1)"

Here Aristotle seems to distinguish being angry *haplôs* from being angry *pôs*. Aristotle clearly in this passage separates 'being angry in type' and 'being angry in token', because he seems to suggest that being angry itself is not a type to be blamed, but only being so in a certain way, that is, a particular case of being angry is the case to be blamed. Since it is clear that being angry in a certain way indicates a particular instance of being angry in general, Aristotle can be taken to assume a type-token distinction here as well. Next passage as well will show the similar indication of the term *haplôs*.

(2) What is bad and what is fearful: "...and clearly, what we fear are fearsome things, and these are, broadly speaking (*hôs haplôs eipein*), bad things – which is why people define fear itself as expectation of what is bad..." (EN 3.6, 1115a8-10)

In this passage, clearly Aristotle says the fearful things (*ta phobera*) or what we fear is a kind of bad thing (*kakia*). Although it is possible to read *hôs haplôs eipein* as 'as it is said roughly or broadly', there is no strong point for us not to extend this to the sense of 'in type' or 'in general'. Evidently, there is a type-token relation between what is bad and what is fearful. The last passage I will show contains even more clearly the distinction we are looking for.

(3) Fornication in type and Fornication as token: "... nor does a good practice or the lack of it in relation to such things consist in (e.g.) fornicating with the woman one should, when one should, and how – rather simply (*haplôs*) doing any one of these things is going astray..." (EN 2.7, 1107a16-18)"

In this passage, through the term *haplôs*, Aristotle describes the exact same distinction as the first distinction in T2. Here Aristotle says that fornication is a type amongst which doing anything is going astray, that is, what is bad. Therefore, doing fornication in some way, doing it with a certain person, or doing it at a particular time are still bad as long as they are all the individual instances, tokens of the fornication as a type to be blamed.

I suppose that the passages¹⁰⁸ I have just shown are clear enough as a justification for us to render the deliberation ‘*haplós*’ in question as a general description for deliberation about human (moral) goods in general rather than as a deliberation supervising all ends relevant for one’s life to be good comprehensively. Consequently, synthesizing all the respects I have examined so far regarding the term ‘*haplós*’, I claim that the *haplós* can also be used to denote the sense of ‘in a type’, so the *haplós* and the *holós* can be replaceable regarding that sense as well.

Besides this, there is just one more point to be mentioned briefly. Aristotle, at least in *EN*, uses the *haplós* mainly in three different contexts. We have actually seen all of them in this chapter; the passages where he indicates some in a primary sense, where he describes something in a type and where he uses it to mean something in an absolute sense. The last one is the sense I think Aristotle employs to describe the sense of the deliberation on human goods distinctively from theoretical excellence, called *sophia* in 1141b9-14.¹⁰⁹ *Ergo*, at least, there is no significant passage in *EN* where Aristotle uses the expression *haplós* to indicate something as a whole or in an architectonic sense, by which the GEV proponents presumably think of some one end, not only, superior to any other ‘subordinated’ ends and means to them, and supervising them, but also separated from them. Hence, having regarded all I mentioned so far in the current section, I think it is best to understand the distinction between ‘to have deliberated well *haplós* (*haplós eu bebouleustai*)’ and ‘to have deliberated well *pros ti* (*pros ti telos eu bebouleusthai*)’ as the distinction between excellent moral deliberation in type and that as a token of it. The details of my interpretation of the passage in question will be followed.

¹⁰⁸ There are some other passages where the *haplós* seems to mean a type rather than a whole or what is absolute. See the following:

(1) 1104b23-25 [excellence *haplós* and excellence with specification) “... this is also why people define the excellences as kinds of impassivity and immobility; but they go wrong because they say without specifying – they don’t add ‘as one should’, ‘as one shouldn’t’, ‘when one should’, and ‘all the other specifications...’(1104b23-25)”.

(2) 1106a7-10 ‘having emotion is not the type to be criticized, but some token of having emotion as a type is to be criticized’

(3) 1130a11-15 ‘justice is a token of excellence, a type’

They all can be said to indicate the sense of type by the term *haplós*, at least, rather than the sense of the whole.

¹⁰⁹ This sense, of course, is more manifestly displayed in this famous passage where he distinguishes the good in absolute sense and the good in relative sense, “...the good is without qualification and in truth the object of wish, whereas the apparent good is to a given person is the object of wish for that person? (*EN* 1113a23-25)”

Taking it as a principle for my analysis on the passage in question, that the term *haplós* can be used to indicate something in type, I will claim that Aristotle, in the notorious passage in *EN* 1142b28-33, never mentions about a deliberation to determine the conception of *eudaimonia*. Instead, I will maintain that the distinction between deliberation *haplós* and deliberation *pros ti telos* are between deliberation in general (type) and deliberation in particular (token).

It seems to be admitted that Aristotle, beginning this passage with the distinction between ‘to have deliberated well *haplós*’ and ‘to have deliberated well *pros ti telos*’, emphasizes ‘the end’ (*to telos*) given in each deliberation, not ‘the means to the end’ (*to pros to telos*). However, it will be a misunderstanding if one reads as he assumes there the existence of deliberation to determine or establish our conception on ends. What Aristotle clarifies at the end of the current passage, that is, that (excellent) deliberation is the sort of correctness in accordant with what is conducive to the end, can also¹¹⁰ let us suppose that in the earlier part he has presumably omitted, for the purpose of simplicity, the expression ‘what is conducive’ (*to sympheron*). Therefore, the distinction is actually supposed to mean the distinction between ‘to have deliberated well what is conducive to the end in general’ (*bebouleusthai to sympheron pros to telos to haplós*)’ and ‘to have deliberated well what is conducive to the end in particular’ (*eu bebouleusthai to sympheron pros ti telos*)’.

I think, through the distinction here, what Aristotle is telling us is no more than the following; when one deliberates well, such a phenomenon can be said in two ways, i.e. generally and specifically. Therefore, his/her deliberation is, in the former sense, a type called ‘excellent deliberation (in respect of excellence-character in general)’, but the same thing can be said ‘to have deliberated well in the respect of a specific kind of character-excellence’. Namely, it can be, specifically, said that he or she deliberates well in respect of courage, temperance or justice, etc. But, it cannot be denied that such deliberation in respect of particular character-excellence is a token of deliberation in respect of character-excellence in general. This is what Aristotle wants to show through the distinction between excellent deliberation ‘*haplós*’ and excellent deliberation ‘*pros ti telos*’ and that between ‘*to telos to haplós*’ and ‘*ti telos*’. I am sure what Aristotle means by ‘*to telos*’ is excellence of character (*éthiké aretê*). Therefore, again, the distinction between the end

¹¹⁰ I have already suggested the same rendering through my analysis on ‘*katarthousa*’ earlier in the current section.

'*haplôs*' and the end '*ti*' is no other than the distinction between excellence of character in general and some particular excellence of character.

However, importantly, although the unity amongst the ends here cannot be characterized as the whole-part relation, unlike the GEV suppose, there need not deny a meaningful unity, as we have already seen earlier¹¹¹. If we briefly see this point again, although courage, temperance and generosity, etc. are particular excellences of character, excellence of character '*haplôs*' is a type under which these individuals are. But, clearly, this does not mean that excellence of character as a type is architectonic to the particular excellences of character. Therefore, again, the end '*haplôs*' is no more than a general expression for end in 'moral' deliberation, '*ti telos*' is a description for an end in deliberation in a particular 'moral' circumstance. If this is the case, we should not agree with the GEV's typical interpretation on the remaining part of this passage, notoriously regarding the distinction between '*euboulia*' and '*phronêsis*'.

The GEV claim, again, regarding the antecedent of '*ou*' as the *telos*, that the *alêthês hypolêpsis* of the *phronêsis* is about the end, which means that for them *phronêsis* is the excellence to suppose the general end, happiness, truly, but the *euboulia* is the excellence whose correctness is merely about the means or 'what is conducive to the end'¹¹². Therefore, the GEV maintains as if Aristotle clearly teaches us in *EN* 1142b29-34 that the excellent deliberation without qualification is the deliberation that starts from a deliberation of the *phronêsis* to suppose the end correctly, and that supervises and control all the following process of deliberation, mostly about what is conducive to the end.

However, again, I don't think here that Aristotle means *euboulia* to be a sort of subordinate deliberation to *phronêsis* exclusively conceiving ends, general ends and happiness. Aristotle starts one very controversial sentence (1142b32-4), saying that to 'have deliberated well' is the mark of the *phronimos*. The following part of the passage seems to be a specification of this remark, so it is important to find out the real meaning of this. As long as he said '*to eu bebouleusthai*' which is of the perfect tense, we should notice that this does not merely mean 'deliberation in general', but it is specifically

¹¹¹ I mean section 3.2.1.1.2 in this chapter where I explained the distinction between deliberation in primary sense and that in secondary sense.

¹¹² Broadie seems to disagree with GEV's understanding on the relation between *euboulia* and *phronêsis*, Irwin seems to accept it though; Irwin (1999), p.248. cf., my note 107 & Burnet (1900), pp.277-8.

pointing out the conclusion of deliberation, that is, *prohairesis*. Therefore, the remark that ‘to have deliberated well’ is the mark of *phronimos* seems to mean that the characteristic of the *phronêsis*, the excellence of the deliberative soul of the *phronimos*, yields the sincere *prohairesis* through the excellent deliberation. In short, what Aristotle means by the mark of *phronimos* is not merely that he or she performs the excellent deliberation, but *he or she yields the sincere prohairesis, practical truth as the conclusion of it*. This expatiation will help us to understand the most notorious part of this passage.

After this short remark, Aristotle, in the part in question, seems to continue his explanation about the mark of the *phronimos* whose deliberative soul is excellent enough to be *phronêsis*, at least apparently, in the structure of the contrast between *euboulia* and *phronêsis*. However, I strongly claim, *contra* the GEV, that *euboulia* and *phronêsis* do not indicate different deliberations, but merely different aspects of the same thing, that is, the deliberation of the *phronimos*. We shall first see the sentence in question in Greek.

“... *hê euboulia eîê an orthotês hê kata to sympheron pros to telos, ou hê phronêsis alêthês hypolêpsis estin.*” (EN 6.9, 1142b33-4)

As I already said earlier in the current section, since I read the antecedent of the relative pronoun ‘*ou*’ is *to sympheron pros to telos*, what the *alêthês hypolepsis* corresponds to is as well what is conducive to the end (*to sympheron pros to telos*) or the means to the end (*to pros to telos*). If this is the case, the *euboulia* and the *phronêsis* do not have significantly different objects, but they have a common one, that is, ‘*to sympheron pros to telos*’, or, just, ‘the means,’ particulars. However, the objects of the excellent deliberation and the *phronêsis* are not identical, of course (1113a3-10). As I said in the previous paragraph for the expatiation regarding the mark of *phronimos*, *the phronêsis is the excellence of deliberation that has already reached the conclusion of excellent deliberation*. Then, we can see that Aristotle here suggests that, although the *phronêsis* and the *euboulia* roughly deal with the common things, the means to the end, they do not indicate the identical aspect of the deliberative soul of the *phronimos*; instead, by the former Aristotle means the intellectually excellent disposition that has performed the *prohairesis*, the fruit of the excellent deliberation, but the latter indicates the function through which the *phronêsis* has reached the *prohairesis*.

Now, we can see clearly that *phronêsis* and *euboulia* here are to indicate two different aspects of the same thing, the excellent deliberation of the *phronimos*. Again, the former

means the excellence of the deliberative soul of the practically wise person who has already reached the sincere *prohairesis*, that is, having grasped practical truth, while the latter manifests the deliberation fully in agreement with such practical truth, that is, a sort of deliberation whose combination of *orexis* and *nous* is harmonious enough not to have any internal conflict against following the *prohairesis*. In short, it is very clear that here Aristotle indicates the function ‘seeking to practical truth’ by *euboulia* and the excellent disposition that ‘has already possessed practical truth¹¹³’ by *phronêsis*. Namely, again, the GEV’s interpretation on the *euboulia* and *phronêsis* cannot be accepted. Consequently, the *phronêsis* means the excellence of the deliberative soul itself, but the *euboulia* indicates a proper function performed by the excellence.

So far, I have shown that in this passage as well there is no evidence to take Aristotle to indicate the architectonic deliberation and its subordinate deliberations, respectively, by the deliberation ‘*haplôs*’ and the deliberation ‘*pros ti telos*’. Furthermore, it has also been clarified that Aristotle’s notorious remark about the relation between *euboulia* and *phronêsis* either cannot be understood as he implies that the relation between those two is the relation between deliberation about the instrumental means and the deliberation about the constitutional means and general ends. Therefore, I think this passage also, very clearly, cannot support the GEV’s interpretation on deliberation, unlike they believe.

It seems that I have rightly and sufficiently criticized the Grand End view showing that three most important passages (T2, T3 and T4), according to the GEV, alleged to support the idea of deliberation to determine the conception of ends cannot be read in the way the GEV read. Since the idea of deliberating on ends is the major premise for the GEV’s idea of architectonic deliberation, it seems right to be denied that Aristotle’s deliberation is architectonic, along with that that deliberation is both of means and ends.

3.2.1.3 *Nous* in Practical and Moral Sphere

Again, by the analysis so far, the problems of the idea supporting the architectonic deliberation and of the similar way to understand the *phronêsis*, has already come to be evident. However, although there seem some other passages that often confuse scholars,

¹¹³ A similar expression for *euboulia* and *phronêsis*; Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.376.

it will be useful to deal with, albeit rather briefly, at least one of them¹¹⁴ in order to make my interpretation on Aristotle's deliberation be more firmed.

“... intelligence (nous) has as its objects what is last in both directions; for both the primary definitions (tous protous borous) and what is last (ta eschata) in practical reasoning are to be grasped by intelligence, not with an account, the objects of the sort of intelligence that operates in demonstrations being definitions that are unchanging and first, while the objects of the sort that operates with practical dispositions is what is last and contingent, and belongs to the second premiss. For these are the starting points of that for the sake of which, since things that are universal (ta katholou) consist of particulars (ta kath' hekasta). So one must have perception of these, and this is intelligence... So one should pay attention to the undemonstrated assertions and judgements of experienced and older people or practically wise one (phronimos), no less than to demonstrations, because they have an eye, formed from experience, they see correctly.(EN 6.11, 1143a35-b16, cf., EN 6.8, 1142a24-32)”

The GEV proponents¹¹⁵ seem to think, having in mind Aristotle's comment in this passage that “intelligence (nous) has as its objects what is last in both directions; for both the primary definitions and what is last in practical reasoning are to be grasped by intelligence, not with an account” that here Aristotle assumes an intellectual intuition, in deliberation as well, to conceptualize the first ‘moral’ principles. What they eventually want to claim seems to be that in Aristotle, just as in theoretical reasoning its axiom can be supposed only by *nous*. Universal concept in moral sphere as well can be ‘rationally’

¹¹⁴ Two other passages are (1) EN 1.1-2 where Aristotle mentions about the architectonic end and the good of the most architectonic knowledge and (2) EN 6.8 where he seems to assume some architectonic type of practical wisdom. If I briefly deal with them,

(1) EN 1.1-2, 1094a6-1094b11; the most architectonic end or the good of the most architectonic knowledge clearly indicates the highest form of human activity, happiness. Regardless of whether we support the inclusive or the monolithic idea about Aristotle's happiness, it is clear that the most architectonic activity cannot be the function of deliberative soul on the variable objects. As long as end A is architectonic to end B, A is authoritative over B. If this is the case, deliberation is authoritative to any other human activity, including the contemplation. But this is clearly impossible since between deliberative activity and contemplative activity, the latter is authoritative over the former, as Aristotle says in several passages in EN 6. Hence, these early chapters of EN cannot be supportive to the GEV's position.

(2) EN 6.7-8, 1141b23-29: here Aristotle clearly says that there is some architectonic kind in practical wisdom. However, very briefly, although this may mean, as Broadie/Rowe (2002) read (p.373), some deliberation regarding what kind of/ how policies/laws should be made for a *polis*, i.e., the process of the legislation (nomothesia), this cannot mean the possibility of architectonic deliberation in Aristotle. For, this practical reasoning on the *polis* in general fulfils its function to making a law or policy, that is, the function of execution is not under their power. Aristotle clearly names another type of practical wisdom for the execution, the political expertise (politiké). Therefore, this one cannot support the architectonic deliberation of an individual agent, either.

¹¹⁵ Representatively regarding this specific point, Kenny (1979), pp.151-2. Reeve (1992), pp.79-91., & Irwin (1978). cf., Richardson Lear (2004) pp.93-122. Cf., Natali, C. (2001), pp.72-76.

conceived by *nous*¹¹⁶. And surely this becomes, the GEV thinks, another textual evidence for their claim that the conception on the happiness, ‘the end of the most architectonic knowledge (1094a28)’ that supervises all the following processes in deliberation and even determines whether the deliberation given is successful or not. Namely, the GEV think, based on this passage, that for Aristotle, deliberation, the proper function of the calculative soul, as well is a reasoning in which some rational intuition on relevant first principles functions as a decisive factor for the overall process of the reasoning.¹¹⁷ I think it can probably let them ultimately maintain some sort of ‘intellectualistic’ interpretation of Aristotle’s deliberation, that in principle a rationally correct conceptualization on the major premise in practical syllogism is what decides, or the most decisive factor for, the excellent deliberation and eventually an excellent action in a particular moral circumstance.¹¹⁸ Therefore, in the same line, GEV thinks, the conception on the *eudaimonia* will be crucial for the excellence in deliberation and also for whether the life of the deliberator is happy or not¹¹⁹.

However, this is not what Aristotle means here. His message in this passage is that, surely, *nous* exists both in the theoretical sphere and practical or moral, but whereas the *nous*, in this context, of theoretical sphere is concerned with the unchangeable theoretical first principles, the *nous* in practical or moral is mainly concerned with the premise on the most particular and the last thing, that is, the ‘*hetera protasis*’, (EN 1143b2-5) rather than the premise on universal moral value, i.e. excellence of character or definition of any individual excellences. Hence, Aristotle in this passage means no more than that *nous* in theoretical or scientific soul and *nous* in deliberative soul deals with, respectively, the primary definitions in the former case and the particulars that are normally dealt with by the last premise, in the latter.

¹¹⁶ Reeve (1992), pp.73-4, 94-7.

¹¹⁷ By the overall process of it, I mean a series of the ‘thinking’ process under the title of deliberation in which rational element (*logos*) and desire (*orexis*) are harmoniously combined or conflicted to each other. How ‘*logos*’ and ‘*orexis*’ are combined or related under the title of *boulensis* will be intensively discussed in the next chapter.

¹¹⁸ See, note 116. Cf., Dahl, N.O. (1984), pp.194-201, 227-236.

¹¹⁹ Richardson Lear also seems to admit the practical *nous* in a similar sense that Reeve thinks. She thinks, regarding *nous*, there is a structural similarity between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning. Eventually the *nous* can be a link between these two reasoning, so that she claims that the *sophia* can promote *phronêsis* in the sense that practical reasoning is pursued as an approximation of theoretical reasoning. See, Richardson Lear (2004), pp.93-122. However, I don’t agree with her either because of the same reason through which I criticize the GEV.

What is important is that we should not misunderstand as Aristotle says that ‘practical’ *nous* is concerned with the last premise itself. He only means that the *nous* is concerned with the things, the components of the last premise. Therefore, we should not read here as that *nous* on the last and changeable things means the *nous* as the conclusion or the last step of deliberation. Aristotle actually maintains that *nous* in a practical sphere is the starting point (*archê*) of deliberation, what is toward the end (*EN* 1143b3-5). I think Aristotle importantly implicates here that we perceive the particulars in every moral circumstance, but it is neither merely a sense perception nor pure rational intuition, but some ‘rational perception’. By calling this function either *nous* or perception, I think he seems to avoid both from including it into deliberation and from regarding it as a perception shared by irrational animals. Not only is *nous* this, I think, perception on particulars in the sense that it is acquired by the excellence of emotional soul, but also it is *nous*, which is rational, in that the successful habituation through which one has the *nous* has been performed according to rational principle of the excellent *polis*, the *polis* whose policy has been excellently legislated and executed by practical wisdom regarding the *polis*¹²⁰.

Of course, it is still true that, for Aristotle, the *nous* in a practical sphere does an important function based on which the deliberator or the agent can consistently and generally do good behaviour in their life. However, it should be noticed that, unlike the function of the theoretical soul, the right attitude toward moral principles, according to which we can perform excellent deliberation, is acquired or established not by the excellence of deliberative soul, still a rational soul, but by the excellence of the emotional soul, what lacks reason (*to alogon*), the outcome of successful habituation. Consequently, since we cannot say in this passage the *nous* in practical or moral sphere is what is concerned with universal concepts or first principles, this passage either cannot support the GEV’s idea of architectonic deliberation¹²¹.

An important idea of Aristotle’s implicated in this point, I think, needs to be mentioned before the conclusion of this chapter. Surely, it needs not to be denied that a morally

¹²⁰ See, my note 114, especially the passage (2)

¹²¹ In what sense Aristotle uses *nous* is not always very clear, so naturally, that is another hotly controversial issue. I cannot deal with the issue in the limited space of this dissertation. For some details of the relevant discussion, see van Cleemput (2006), p. 135 with n.21, Stewart (1892) p.93. Broadie (1991) p.29, Bostock (2001), pp.76-7.

good agent has a right thought on moral value in general and says that she herself ought to do according to it. Also it is possible that the fact that this one holds the right thought lets the person be much more excellent than others in terms of moral character, in Aristotle. For, Aristotle thinks that the one lacking this kind of thought cannot even be qualified for attending his lecture on the study of character (1095a1-3, cf., *EN* 1110b25-30). However, significantly, this sort of abstract and conceptual supposition, if any, on moral first principles and universal values cannot be a sufficient or decisive condition, probably a necessary condition though, through which he or she can be a perfectly (*keuros*) character-excellent person. This is because not only can you not be such a person without the collaboration with affective or irrational element, but also in respect of *êthikê aretê*, the quality of appetitive soul is predominant to that of deliberative/rational soul, as long as the title, *êthikê aretê*, primarily indicates the disposition of such an emotional part of the soul, not that of a rational¹²².

4. Concluding Remark

So far I have shown, employing my own analysis on the senses of the *haplôs* and the *bolôs* that several crucially important passages for the Grand-End view cannot be read in their favourite way. Hence, I have sufficiently, in this chapter, claimed that the interpretation of the GEV is not a very successful one, although it is supported by many, if not most. However, I think the GEV's misleading on the passages in question is neither unlucky nor coincidental. Rather, for those who think we can deliberate to define moral ends; moral first principles and general concepts, that is a necessary consequence of their position. Intuitively, we say that we deliberate about moral principles because, in day-to-day life, we think we decide and establish many principles, such as to be a vegetarian or to be a good father. In general, the decisions as such are properly rational decisions. However, the point is that the Aristotelian concept of deliberation (*bouleusis*) should not be understood in this common-sense fashion. Under the Aristotelian conception, what we determined through the deliberation is only the *prohairesis*, a combination between conceptual element (*logos or dianoia*) and desiderative one (*orexis*) in deliberation. If we note Aristotle's comments about the 'function of deliberation' or about 'what we deliberate for', it is not actually difficult to see Aristotelian deliberation is to determine something. I see some texts in *EN* 3.

¹²² This point will be discussed in the next chapter as well.

“...Deliberation, then, occurs where things happen in a certain way for the most part, but where it is unclear how they will in fact fall out; and where the outcome is indeterminate... (EN 1112b9-10)”

“... what we deliberate about and what we decide on are the same, except that what is decided on is, as such, something definite; for it is what has been selected as a result of deliberation that is ‘decided on’... (EN 1113a3-4)”

It is said, in the cited texts above, I think, that the objects of deliberation are strictly to be determined through that deliberation. In the context of EN 3.3, determining is deciding which action is the best particular type of action to perform, for each moral circumstance. We can hardly say that moral ends and moral principles are to be determined in the same way that these particular types of actions are to be determined, because they (moral ends and moral principles) are, in a sense, antecedent to moral deliberation in Aristotle’s ethics. Namely, moral ends and principles have already been determined by something other than deliberative reason. They may be determined by ‘wish (*boulésis*)’ as Aristotle says ‘...we wish rather for ends than for means ... (EN 1111b27)’ and ‘...If then whereas we wish for our end, the means to our end are matters of deliberation and choice... (EN 1113b3)’. Not surprisingly, how to determine, at least, a moral principle or how to cognize it is very important to understand the nature of Aristotle’s moral reasoning, *although it in itself is not a part of that reasoning as we have seen so far*. The key to know more about how a moral end is determined in our ‘moral psychology’ is in the study on the *prohairesis*, the conclusion of deliberation, a particularization, in a sense, of a given general end. This is the topic for the next chapter.

Chapter Three: Nature of Deliberation Part Two- Decision (*prohairesis*)

In the previous chapter (Chapter Two), I have discussed objects of deliberation. There, I have claimed, against the Grand End view, that deliberation is only of the means in the sense that, although the conception on ends is not entirely excluded from deliberation, Aristotelian deliberation is not performed to provide such a conception or a conceptual judgment on moral first principle or *eudaimonia*.

However, since I disagree with the GEV about objects of deliberation, naturally I also criticise their interpretation on the outcome of deliberation, or on what has been determined through the deliberation, that is, the deliberative desire (*bouleitike orexis*) or the decision (*prohairesis*)¹²³. Therefore, the main topic of this chapter is the *prohairesis*. More specifically, I will deal with the question ‘whether the conclusion of deliberation is an action or not’. GEV proponents claim that it is an actual action, at least in the context of excellent deliberation (*euboulia*). I will criticize this view and introduce my own answer to the same question as an alternative interpretation on Aristotle’s *prohairesis*. However, we shall first see some of most representative passages where Aristotle suggests an important nature of the *prohairesis*.

“... what we deliberate about and what we decide on are the same, except that what is decided on is, as such, something definite; for it is what has been selected as a result of deliberation that is ‘decided on’ (*prohaireton*). For each person ceases to investigate how he will act, at whatever moment he brings the origin of the action back to himself, and to the leading part of himself; for this is the part that decides. (EN 3.3, 1113a3-8)”

“... the origin of action – in terms of the source of the movement, not its end – is decision, while that of decisions is desire and rational preference to an end... thought by itself sets nothing in motion; thought that sets in motion is for the sake of something and practical. (EN 6.2, 1139a31-b1)”

Many, if not most, commentators seem to agree about the fact that in these passages¹²⁴ Aristotle describes the *prohairesis* both as ‘what we reach as a result of deliberation’ and as ‘some sort of combination between *nous* (reason) and *orexis* (desire)’. However, what Aristotle seems to suggest by his statement that ‘the conclusion of deliberation (*bouleusis*) is a combination between reason and desire’ remains controversial.

¹²³ Other translations; Ross translates as ‘choice’ in Ross (2009) and Crisp does as ‘rational choice’ in Crisp (2000).

¹²⁴ Also, *Eudemian Ethics* (EE) 1126a19-1126b21; in this passage, Aristotle provides an answer to the question; why the *prohairesis* is a *bouleitike orexis* rather than *boulêsis*, *hypolêpsis* or *doxa*.

The GEV proponents¹²⁵ attempt to understand this message as Aristotle saying, at least implicitly, that *prohairesis* is an action, in the sense that, since deliberation is a unique kind of reasoning to be fulfilled by an actual action, the sincere¹²⁶ *prohairesis* itself, the end of ‘excellent deliberation (*euboulia*)’, indicates, through ‘practical necessity’, an excellent action actualized.

However, again, I disagree with this view on Aristotle’s *prohairesis*. For, although it is not to be denied that the *prohairesis* is a combination of reason and desire, not only such a combined quality of *prohairesis* does not represent that it can be an action in excellent deliberation, but also the GEV’s idea of practical necessity is not compatible with Aristotle’s intention in the so-called ‘*anakastic*’ expression in practical/moral context¹²⁷. Rather, I will claim that, since Aristotle’s *prohairesis* by its definition does not go beyond the realm of the rational soul that lacks a physical force to move a body, not only does *prohairesis* not indicate an actual action, but neither is deliberation, whose conclusion is *prohairesis*, fulfilled by an action.

Hence, in the current chapter, I will first examine the relevant argument of the GEV proponents that claim the conclusion of practical syllogism to be an actual action (in Section 1), will criticize this opponent view in terms of two aspects, practical necessity and the reason-desire combination of *prohairesis*, (in Section 2), will introduce my own interpretation on Aristotle’s *prohairesis* (in Section 3) and will end (in Section 4) the

¹²⁵ Those whom I regarded as GEV in the previous chapter seem to possess a similar view about the *prohairesis* as well, but for my opponent argument in the current chapter, I particularly refer to the following literatures; Anscombe (1965), Dahl (1984), Reeve (1992), pp.67-98., Natali, C (2001), Nussbaum (1978), and von Wright (1963), pp.159-179. For Dahl and Reeve, they do not, at least explicitly, claim that the conclusion of practical syllogism is an action, but I think it will be no problem to regard these as agreeing with GEV on *prohairesis*. This is because both of them clearly think that the true conception on end is not only of the deliberation, but also can necessarily make its conclusion be practised. See, Reeve (1992), pp.87-91 and Dahl (1984), pp. 146-149 and 215-126.

¹²⁶ In Greek it is the *spoudaia prohairesis*.

¹²⁷ There are many examples, but most ‘traditionally’ representatively, (1) “... I need a covering, a coat is a covering: I need a coat. What I need I ought to make, I need a coat: I make a coat. And the conclusion ‘I must (*dei*) make a coat’ is an action. And the action goes back to a starting-point. If there is to be a coat, there must (*anankê*) first be this, and if this then this—and straightaway he does this. Now that the action is the conclusion is clear... (*MA* 7. 701a18-24), (2) “... when a single proposition is formed from them (the universal judgment and particulars), the soul necessarily (*anankê*) assents, in one type of case, to what has been concluded, or else, when the premises are about making something happen, it acts immediately – thus if everything sweet should be tasted, and this (some particular item) is sweet, one will necessarily (*anankê*) at the same time also do this, provided that one can do it, and is not prevented...(EN 7.3, 1147a26-31)”. Cf., *Met.* 5.5, 1015a20ff, 7.7, 1032b6-9, *EN* 3.3, 1112b15ff & *EN* 6.12, 1144a31ff.

chapter with the upshot of my own interpretation on Aristotelian deliberation in general and the announcement of the remaining chapters.

1. The GEV on *prohairesis*; The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning is an Action

Although the GEV claims that deliberation is a unique kind of reasoning, which is fulfilled by an actual action,¹²⁸ this, of course, does not mean that they say any deliberation can be necessarily completed *by* an actual action. What they generally seem to believe is that there is some sort of necessity (*anankê*) proper to practical cases, through which excellent deliberation is fulfilled by an actual action.¹²⁹ What they mean by ‘practical necessity’ is roughly that, just as in the theoretical reasoning with the correct supposition of the major premise we can draw the correct conclusion, in the practical reasoning as well, once we have the correct supposition on the major premise of the so-called practical syllogism, we can, necessarily, yield the relevant conclusion, that is, an action.

I think that Anscombe also manages a similar argument in her famous paper, ‘Thought and Action in Aristotle’. Roughly, her ultimate claim there seems that what Aristotle calls ‘*prohairesis*’ is an action ‘rationally decided’. But, she emphasizes that, although truly the *prohairesis* is what is acquired through deliberation, not every deliberation is terminated by the *prohairesis*. For, she thinks that only the deliberation started with the wish (*boulêsis*) on the good (or the apparent good) can yield the *prohairesis* as its conclusion. Therefore, because of this reason, although the weak-willed akratic (*astheneia*) decides what to do through some form of deliberative process and acts in accordance with that decision, the action of the weak-willed is not a rationally decided action, she thinks¹³⁰. For, since that deliberation of the weak-willed is not started with the wish on the good, but with the *epithymia* on rather limited end¹³¹, such a reasoning process, still deliberation though, cannot be the deliberation whose conclusion is *prohairesis*. Consequently, what

¹²⁸ Anscombe (1965), pp.152-158, Natali (2001), pp.45-49, 57-61, but more intensively the section 5. The Conclusion Is an Action, pp.92-96, Nussbaum (1978), pp.184-201. Their references are naturally, *De Anima (DA)*, 433a13-20, 432b21-3a8, *De Motu Animalicum (MA)* 701a6-24.

¹²⁹ Anscombe (1965), pp.152-3, Natali (2001), pp.70-72, 88-89 and Nussbaum (1978), pp.175-184.

¹³⁰ Anscombe (1965), pp.147-8.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, p.144.

we have to remember here is that Anscombe seems to mention some form of cognition on the good or moral first principle, as a necessary requirement for this ‘being rationally decided’, or the origin of the ‘rationality’ in the conclusion of deliberation. Indeed, this point is very important, along with Aristotle’s remarks¹³² that we cognize the end with the belief and the wish on it, for the GEV’s argument. This is because Anscombe’s position on the rationality of *prohairesis* can be extended to a claim that Aristotle has an idea of practical necessity that is originated in the cognition on the end or moral first principle.

Hence, the GEV thinks that this necessity of the excellent deliberation is originated in excellent cognition of the real good (*to agathon*). They see that Aristotle claims, in *EN* 1144a33-36, along with 1113a33-b2, that ‘the real good is what appears thus only to the character-excellent (*ēthikē aretē*) person’. Since, again, in Aristotle, excellent cognition on the real good means the ideal combination of belief (*doxa*) and wish (*boulēsis*) on the good (*EE* 1225b25-1126a19)¹³³, the claim seems to be that such excellent cognition of the good implies a certain necessity for the corresponding agent to act, to actualize such cognition.¹³⁴ Not surprisingly, the very process from ‘such excellent cognition of the good’ to ‘the actualization of it’ is ‘excellent’ deliberation.

Excellent deliberation, then, is described in the following way: If we cognize, in practical reasoning, the major premise, which is a moral principle about the good, correctly in the way mentioned above, it is ‘practically’ necessary to capture the minor premise, that is a specification of the good, correctly at the same time as our true ‘*nous*’ and correct ‘*orexis*’. Since, just as in theoretical syllogism, there is a relationship of necessity between each premise and the conclusion that follows from it, in the practical case there should also be an analogous necessity between each premise and conclusion. However, while theoretical reasoning is fulfilled with a proposition to speculate, practical reasoning is fulfilled with an actual action¹³⁵.

¹³² *EE* 1226a16-18 “...boulesthai mēn gar kai doxazein malista tou telos...”, cf., Natali (2001), pp.67-74.

¹³³ See, my note 132.

¹³⁴ They seem to refer to *Phys.* 2.9, 200a15 ff; where Aristotle seems to say that the *archē* necessitates the conclusion, *EN* 1151a16-17; the *archē* in action is a goal. Cf., Nussbaum (1978), pp.175-183 & my notes 127, 128 and 129.

¹³⁵ See, my note 129.

Hence, for the GEV, both in theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning, there is commonly what can be called ‘necessity’, although the character of this in each case is still remarkably different. The difference, for them, is that while in the former the necessity is from the *a priori* senses of each element in the theoretical reasoning and it can merely guarantee drawing a proposition for the conclusion, in the latter, that is, in the practical reasoning, its necessity from the combination of reason and desire on its major premise can even guarantee the generation of an individual action for the conclusion of the practical reasoning. Furthermore, the GEV believes that such ‘practical’ necessity necessitates an action for the conclusion of the ‘successful’ deliberation.¹³⁶ This is why Nussbaum, representatively of GEV, says that “the so-called conclusion is, in the practical case, not a proposition at all, but an action¹³⁷” and that “The theoretical syllogism is essentially linguistic; to the theory of practical syllogism language is of minor importance¹³⁸”.

Consequently, it seems possible to suppose that those GEV assimilating the *prohairesis* with action have a more fundamental idea to clarify; the practical truth of Aristotle is an actual occurrence of the morally excellent action produced by the character-excellence. As a result, for them, the practical truth is not a semantic truth, but truth in agreement with a correct desire (*aléthēia homologós echousa tē oreksei tē orthē*) (EN 6.2 1139a31-32), which means an event of the corresponding action¹³⁹. Hence, they argue that its truth-value is determined not only by the meaning of the employed sentences, but it is mainly dependent upon both whether the mentioned action is a good or bad and whether it actually conducted or not.

So far, I have shown the GEV’s interpretation of *prohairesis* that the conclusion of (excellent) deliberation is an action, based on an assumption that there is a proper necessity in practical context, both originated in the special cognition on moral value and possible because of a ‘reason-desire’ combined nature of practical thought in

¹³⁶ Anscombe (1965), pp151-158, Natali (2001), pp.65-67, 93-35, Nussbaum (1978), pp. 175-184.

¹³⁷ Nussbaum (1978), p186.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Representatively, Anscombe (1965), pp.157-8, & Nussbaum (1978), p.186, cf., Kenny (1979) p.128 where he seems to say that ‘the mark of practical reasoning is not that it is culminated in action, but it deals with the good rather than truth.’

Aristotle. In the following, I will criticise this interpretation and provide my own suggestive reading on Aristotle's *prohairesis* as an alternative interpretation.

2. Criticism – Contra the GEV on *prohairesis*

I have just introduced the GEV's idea on Aristotle's *prohairesis* that maintains that the *prohairesis* is an action in the sense that, since the deliberation of the *phronimos* is fulfilled by an action, the conclusion of the practical syllogism, in an excellent context, is, or even indicates, no other than an individual excellent action. However, I think their interpretation on the relation between the *prohairesis* and action is also mistaken. For, first of all, their understanding of 'practical necessity', the major premise of their interpretation on the *prohairesis*, seems incorrect (in Section 2.1). Additionally, more importantly for my argument, Aristotle never mentions the term '*prohairesis*' to indicate what happens in the emotional soul that can start movement (*kinēsis*) and action (*praxis*)¹⁴⁰(in Section 2.2). In the current section, I will discuss these points, but will deal with the latter point more predominantly, not because the former is not important, but it can already be explained in the context of my discussion in Chapter Two.

2.1 Aristotle's '*anankastic*' Expressions in the Practical Context

Again, as long as my criticism against the Grand-End view is correct, their idea of practical necessity in practical syllogism can be readily criticised as well. As we have seen, according to the GEV the practical necessity is originated into the true supposition of deliberator on the *telos*, or moral first principle. Therefore, since, in their position, deliberation starts with the conception of the relevant moral first principle, and the deliberation in which such conception can supervise and control all the following deliberating processes is, at least, the deliberation of the *phronimos*, the true conception on the *telos* is, naturally, a constituent of deliberation. If this is correct, it would also be true that the practical necessity they say is, at least, what belongs to deliberation. Hence, again, if the GEV is correct, it would be possible to say that in deliberation there is some form of 'necessity'. Furthermore, it could also be true that just as in theoretical reasoning the true supposition of the major premise can ultimately necessitate a true

¹⁴⁰ In *DA* 432b26-433a9, Aristotle seems to emphasize that even the practical thought cannot physically initiate an action.

understanding on the relevant minor premise and the conclusion, the combination of cognization on both premises, there is some, at least in an analogous sense, necessity in deliberation or practical reasoning as well. However, already in Chapter Two, I have shown that the object of deliberation cannot be an ‘end’ in the sense that we don’t deliberate in order to conceptualize or suppose the end, but to specify and figure out what the best option to actualize it¹⁴¹. Also, I have maintained¹⁴² in the previous chapter that the passages the GEV employs for their textual evidences do not actually support their view. Consequently, I think, that, in the continuation of my criticism against the GEV in Chapter Two, their understanding on ‘necessity’ expressions used in practical context can be criticized as such usages of ‘necessity’ are not used to describe the nature of deliberation.

Still, surely, I don’t deny the fact that Aristotle uses such anankastic expressions¹⁴³ in a practical context. I suppose, however, that if such ‘necessity’ is originated in our cognization on the end, as the GEV also says, through such expressions, Aristotle indicates rather *êthikê aretê*, or at least beyond the excellence in the deliberative soul (*EN* 1.13, 1103a3-5). Namely, such a ‘necessity’ expression does not mean the necessity within deliberative function, but indicates the whole process of yielding a morally excellent action, that is, the combined process of *êthikê aretê* and *phronêsis*. Therefore if we can say Aristotelian ‘practical necessity’ through his anakastic expression in practical context, such ‘practical necessity’ is necessity in the following sense; once one acquires a noble character through the good habituation¹⁴⁴ and decent moral education, he or she will necessarily, not only, have true belief and correct wish on the end, but also his or her emotional *hexis* necessarily, supports and promotes perfectly the conclusion of deliberation. Consequently, again, the practical necessity, if we can grant anything like it in Aristotle, is not confined to the deliberative soul, but is beyond it, or at least it indicates something in the combination between excellences in each division of the soul: the emotional soul and the deliberative soul. *Ergo*, there is no such a concept of ‘practical necessity’ in Aristotle, through which the conclusion of practical reasoning is necessarily an action.

¹⁴¹ See, Section 3 in Chapter Two.

¹⁴² See, Section 3 in Chapter Two.

¹⁴³ See, my notes 127 and 128.

¹⁴⁴ Again, about habituation (*ethismos*) I will deal with in Chapters Four and Five.

2.2 Clear Conceptual Distinction Between *prohairesis* and Action

We have just seen that although the GEV assumes that by the anakastic expressions, Aristotle indicates a certain element in practical reasoning itself that can transform its end to be an actual action, when the deliberation is excellent, Aristotle's expressions are never employed to mean that necessity confined to the function of deliberative soul. In this section, as I announced, I will show that by the term '*prohairesis*' Aristotle never indicates an actual action. In order to argue for this, I will first show that (1) Aristotle already gives us hints about his conceptual distinction between *prohairesis* and action through the remarks on the *prohairesis* that the weak-willed fails to act upon, and that (2) practical thought and theoretical thought are significantly distinguished from each other, and the core of such a distinction is clearly the fact that the characteristic of the former thought is the combination of reason and desire, but these two aspects are not decisive enough to assimilate the excellent *prohairesis* with an excellent action.

2.2.1 Aristotle's Clear Suggestion: The *prohairesis* Against Which the Weak-Willed Acts

I think another problem with the GEV's '*prohairesis*-is-an action' interpretation is that they cannot explain the *prohairesis* as the weak-willed acratia fails to remain. If we remember Aristotle's remarks on the weak-willed *acrasia* (*astheneia*), it seems right to say that the weak-willed person initially, through some deliberation that can yield *prohairesis*, decided what to act, but fails to stick to it, so this person does not act what she has decided¹⁴⁵. However, Aristotle, again, says that this weak-willed person may arrive at the result of calculation and so in a sense good (correct) deliberation. What Anscombe criticizes in this context is the view that claims that the end of the second-instrumental deliberation here to be the '*prohairesis*'¹⁴⁶.

Hence, I think, it would be useful to be aware that there are, in a sense, two different types of *prohairesis* that could be mentioned in the context of the weak-willed *acrasia*, although, importantly, none of them is identical with the weak-willed acratia action. What Anscombe

¹⁴⁵ EN 1152a16-19, 1148a17-8, 1150b19-27; for more detailed argument, see, Section 3, later in the current chapter.

¹⁴⁶ Anscombe (1965), pp.144-5.

means, I think, by two different types of *prohairesis* are respectively the *prohairesis* that the akratic is against, and the *prohairesis* that the akratic would have made if his/her deliberation was performed along with the wish on the apparent good, i.e. the *prohairesis* of the morally vicious agent.¹⁴⁷ Surely, the inconsistency that Anscombe concentrates on is, I think, about the *prohairesis* in the latter case¹⁴⁸. However, my concern is the inconsistency, still merely apparent, about the former one, the *prohairesis* against which the akratic acts. I shall explain what I mean by ‘the inconsistency about the *prohairesis* against which the weak-willed acts’.

As I have shown at the beginning of the chapter, in several passages¹⁴⁹ of *EN* 3.2-3, 6.2 and *EE* 2.10, in which the central topic of the discussion is deliberation and *prohairesis*, Aristotle says “deliberation is completed only when and where the deliberator succeeds to lead the principle (*archê*) of the movement inside oneself (*EN* 1113a5-7)” and “the *prohairesis* is the deliberative desire (*EN* 1113a11-13)”. Especially in *EN* 6.2, Aristotle says that *prohairesis* is what we have when we desire and reason towards the same point, and it is an efficient cause of action (*EN* 1139a32-3). Therefore, it seems quite plausible to say that for Aristotle there is at least a rather intimate relationship between the *prohairesis* and action, a sort of movement, and naturally, again, these passages could be attractive especially to our opponent view that the *prohairesis* is an action.

However, in the context where Aristotle discusses *acrasia*, one can see that the above interpretation can confront a strong obstacle. Unlike the passages regarding the intimacy between *prohairesis* and action, in the passages¹⁵⁰ (representatively, *EN* 1152a16-19, 1148a17-8, 1150b19-27) regarding the ‘akratic *prohairesis*’, Aristotle rather continuously mentions that the akratic acts against his or her *prohairesis*, because one of the akratic

¹⁴⁷ Anscombe (1965), p.146 “if he had been ... an *akolastos*, the decision to seduce her would have been a ‘choice’...”

¹⁴⁸ Again, what Anscombe famously shows through her ‘inconsistency’ is that the deliberation according to which the weak-willed akratic acts is not the deliberation sufficient to yield the *prohairesis* as its end. Therefore, Anscombe says, the weak-willed akratic acts through some deliberation, but that action is not the *prohairesis*, because such deliberation does not include the wish on the good or the apparent good. See, Anscombe (1965), pp.146-8.

¹⁴⁹ *EE* 2.10, 1226b10-15, “...Now about the end no one deliberates (this being fixed for all), but about that which tends to it—whether this or that tends to it, and—supposing this or that resolved on—how it is to be brought about. All consider this till they have brought the beginning of the process to a point in their own power...”

¹⁵⁰ This will be the main theme for the next section, Section 3. So, these passages will be dealt with properly then.

types completed a deliberation but cannot remain there due to the affective soul (*pathos*) that, in a sense, produces some recalcitrant appetite (*epithumia*)¹⁵¹, and the other cannot even finish the deliberation, again, due to the operation of appetite (*EN* 1150b20-28, 1151a1-4). Hence, in short, on the one hand, we have the passages where Aristotle seems to emphasize, in a sense, a rather intimate relationship between the *prohairesis* and actual action, but, on the other, it seems that Aristotle distinguishes conceptually the *prohairesis* from action.

Now, is there a real inconsistency¹⁵² in Aristotle's discussion on *prohairesis*? I suppose that if we keep the view that the *prohairesis* is an action itself, it would be very difficult not to deny that there is an inconsistency. There are some commentators who disregard these remarks saying that those comments on *prohairesis* are not very consistent¹⁵³. However, I don't think it is fair to say merely thus, because Aristotle mentions such *prohairesis* often and very meaningfully. Aristotle seems to regard the *prohairesis*, as the mark of our ethical identity, saying that humans are also an *arché* of movement (*EN* 3.3, 1112b33-4). If so, would Aristotle really rather carelessly use such an important concept inconsistently? Of course, there are several passages in *EN* where another, non-philosophical, sense of *prohairesis* is meant¹⁵⁴. However, when he mentions the *prohairesis* in the context of *acrasia*, he clearly uses it as his own terminology. Therefore, it is not possible to say that the *prohairesis* against which the acratist acts means another sense of *prohairesis*, different from what Aristotle means by the term '*prohairesis*' whose most characteristic quality is the combination of desire and reason. I do, not only, think that Aristotle's remarks on 'the *prohairesis* against that the acratist acts' cannot be inconsistent with his comments on *prohairesis* elsewhere, but also I stress that they, i.e. those comments on the *prohairesis*-failed-by the acratist, are even crucial to capture Aristotle's subtle idea about *prohairesis*; its confinedness to the deliberative soul. My analysis on

¹⁵¹ *EN* 2.5, 1105b22-24, cf., *EN* 7.3, 1147a31-b5 & *EN* 7.7, 1150b19-22.

¹⁵² I clearly recognize what I call 'inconsistency' here is different from what Anscombe indicates in her paper. For her, the 'apparent' inconsistency is between Aristotle's comments that the acratist action is because of appetite in *EN* 3.2 and his remarks that the weak-willed acratist action is an end of a sort of deliberation. So, there is, at least for Anscombe, an apparent inconsistency between Aristotle's sayings on the end of deliberation. The details will be discussed in a moment.

¹⁵³ Stewart says "we must suppose that *prohairesis* is used loosely here for 'the good intentions' which are overcome by *pathos* in the *acratés*" in Stewart (1892), p215. Cf., Gottlieb (2009), p 103 with n.28.

¹⁵⁴ For 'undertaking' at *EN* 1094a2-4, 1095a14-15, & for 'program' at 1179a34, cf., Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.86.

those passages will, then, surely provide an alternative interpretation on *prohairesis* as well as an argument to claim that the inconsistency I mention here is merely an apparent inconsistency. However, I will present this point later (in Section 3). For now, being satisfied with the fact that the case of this *prohairesis*-failed-to-be-enacted is a very strong obstacle to our opponent claim, I shall examine, in detail, the nature of practical reasoning and why such a nature is not enough to let its conclusion be an actual action.

2.2.2 Nature of Deliberation

Although, as I have just shown, Aristotle rather clearly distinguishes the *prohairesis* from action, Aristotle's contrast between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning and his remarks that the *prohairesis* is a sort of rational desire often let our opponents believe that the *prohairesis*, at least in the context of excellent deliberation, is an action. Therefore, in this section, I will explain that, although it is undeniable that practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning are to be distinguished in object, quality, and, more fundamentally, in ends, such distinctions do not yet mean that the conclusion of practical syllogism, in the deliberation of *phronimos*, is necessarily an action.

2.2.2.1 Aristotle's Division of the Soul – The Difference Between the Functions of Two Rational Parts of the Soul, Both in Object and Quality

In *EN* 1.13, Aristotle first provides, referring to its function, a conceptual division for the soul; the soul that has reason (*to echon logon*) and the soul that lacks reason (*to alogon*), but in *EN* 6.1 he gives us a further division for the part '*echon logon*'; the theoretical part and the calculative part. We shall see below in detail.

“... Now with the part that possesses reason we must in the same way make a division. Let us assume the parts possessing reason to be two, one by virtue of which we contemplate (reflect) upon things that can be otherwise; for with things that are generically distinct, the part of the soul that stands in a natural relationship to each genus will itself be generically distinct, given that they have cognition in accordance with a certain likeness (*homoitês*) and affinity (*oikeiotês*) to their objects. Of course, let the first be called ‘scientific’, the second ‘calculative’; for deliberation and calculation are the same thing, and no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise. So the calculative is one distinct part of the part possessing reason. (*EN* 6.1, 1139a5-14)”

It seems that in this passage two points should be noted; (1) the divisions are due to the different objects for each 'rational' part, not due to the different function of each part, and (2) that the function of each part is to be significantly distinguished because of the objects that each part of the soul deal with are primarily different.

Aristotle seems to mean, through the first point, the fact that the division between two rational parts is not because of the proper function of each part, but primarily because of the significant difference in the objects that each part respectively deals with. Namely, the primary reason by which the division of the soul is possible lies in the difference amongst the objects of cognition, not in that between the function of each soul. However, for the second, more importantly for us, Aristotle seems to mean that the cognitive functions proper to each rational section that 'commonly' has reason, but deals with different types of beings, will be significantly and exclusively different. For, Aristotle says that cognitive function is assimilated with the things to be cognized (*EN* 6.2, 1139a9-10), so it means that, since functions of each rational soul deal with completely different beings, the functions of each part, i.e. practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning, are completely different types of reasoning to each other. (*EN* 6.2, 1139a9-12, *DA*, 404b11-18, Plato's *Timaeus* 45b-46c, *Republic* 490)

Therefore, again, now we know from the first point that the proper objects of each rational soul are not overlapped at all, so it means that each section of the rational soul that deals with these beings is not to share a common object at all. And, we should also see, through the second, that the cognitive functions proper to each section of the rational soul, not only do not share the common objects, but also, very importantly, are heterogenous in terms of their cognitive qualities. Namely, we can already say that the cognitive functions in each rational soul are different, both in their objects and the quality of their cognitive functions.

However, what more specifically does Aristotle mean by the function of each rational soul? Some further study on 'what each rational soul is respectively concerned with' will help us to know about this. It is commonly understood that the things the rational part Aristotle calls the *epistêmikon* deals with are the so-called theoretical sciences, for Aristotle and his contemporaries, such as, metaphysics, mathematics, physics and

geometry etc¹⁵⁵. However, the part called the *bouleitikon* or the *logistikon*¹⁵⁶ seems to be the part that deals with matters regarding behaviours. More specifically, it is a rational-soul part dealing with moral action (*praxis*) and productive activities (*poiésis*)¹⁵⁷.

Therefore, it is possible to say that the most representative excellence of the scientific part is the theoretical wisdom (*sophia*) and that of the deliberative part is the *phronésis*.¹⁵⁸ Although I will discuss the relationship between these two excellences more in the later chapter¹⁵⁹, we can already guess that since there is no common object between these two intellectual excellences, there cannot be a necessary relation between them, so one cannot be either an instrumental mean or a constitutional to the other¹⁶⁰.

Anyhow, I have shown so far, again, that the part of the soul dealing with pure theoretical subjects and the part dealing with practical matters are clearly distinguished both in the objects of each cognitive function and the quality of such cognition. If so, how can the difference between these two ‘rational’ faculties be systematically characterized? According to Aristotle’s teleology, the fact that those two rational parts of the soul have different functions indicates that they are of the different purposes. I can, then, explain the difference between these cognitive functions referring to what kind of purpose (*telos*) each cognitive function implies and pursues to.

2.2.2.2 The *telos* of Practical Thought - Teleological Difference

For Aristotle, practical thought and theoretical thought are different in the *telos*, that is, the *telos* of the former is to practise (*prattein*), but the latter is to contemplate (*theôrein*). The following two passages show us more clearly.

¹⁵⁵ Bostock (2001), p75-81, Broadie (1991), p361 and Hardie (1965), pp.284-5. Cf., *Met.* 1026a18-19, cf. EN 6.8, 1142a16-18: theoretical sciences, *De Partribus Animalium (PA)*, 644b31-645a4, where he discusses on the heavenly objects and the objects of philosophy.

¹⁵⁶ EN 6.1, 1139a12-15.

¹⁵⁷ EN 6.2, 1139b36-1140a6.

¹⁵⁸ EN 6.5, cf., EN 2.6, 1106b8-16 where Aristotle suggests the relation between expertise and *phronésis* through the *Milo* case. There he means, I read, that *areté* or a corresponding intellectual excellence to it is more exact and better than the expertise, *techné*.

¹⁵⁹ In Chapter Five on happiness.

¹⁶⁰ The former is one representative type of the so-called monolithic end view Aristotle’s *eudaimonia* and the latter is the general line of the inclusive end view on the same issue. However, based on this difference between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning, I will criticize both interpretations in Chapter Five.

T1“...thought, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e. practical thought (it differs from speculative thought in the character of its end)¹⁶¹... (DA, 433a14-15, cf., MA 701a9-13)”

T2 “... If then Nature never makes anything without a purpose and never leaves out what is necessary ... it follows that, had they been capable of originating forward movement, they would have possessed the organs necessary for that purpose. Further, neither can the calculative faculty (to logistikon) or what is called thought (to kaloumenos nous) be the cause of such movement; for mind as speculative (ho theôrêtikos) never thinks what is practicable (to prakton), it never says anything about an object to be avoided or pursued, while this movement is always in something which is avoiding or pursuing an object. No, not even when it is aware of such an object does it thereby enjoin pursuit or avoidance of it; e.g. the mind often thinks of something terrifying or pleasant without enjoining the emotion of fear. It is the heart that is moved (or in the case of a pleasant object some other part). Further, even when thought (nous and dianoia) does command (epitattesthai) and bids (legein) us pursue or avoid something, sometimes no movement is produced; we act in accordance with desire, as in the case of moral weakness (acrasia)... (DA, 432b25-433a3)”

In T1, Aristotle clearly means that the practical thought and the theoretical thought are distinctive in terms of their purposes (telê). What he says here seems to be a generalization of what he has explained in the passage just before in DA, 3.9, that is T2 above. In T2, it seems clear that by ‘to logistikon’ he means the deliberative soul or the function of it and by ‘to kaloumenos nous’, the scientific soul, what he says as ‘to epistêmonikon’ in EN 6.1, 1139a12-3. Namely, by the former Aristotle means deliberation or its corresponding soul, but by the latter, he means theoretical reasoning or its corresponding soul. At least, it seems evident that Aristotle suggests that the function of theoretical reasoning does not deal with what can be acted (ta praktâ), or even if it does, it does not prescribe to pursue or avoid (keleuein pbeugein e diokein), but the practical reasoning is the nous that does it¹⁶². If T1 is the summary or upshot of the T2, and we can still say the telos of practical thought is action, we may already say that, by that, Aristotle does not mean that the practical thought is fulfilled by action. For, in T2 Aristotle never says the practical thought as to necessarily initiate an action, rather he means that is a thought regarding what to be acted, i.e. what to be avoided or to be pursued. Then, what does Aristotle suggest, if it is true that he thinks the telos of

¹⁶¹ “nous de ho beneka tou logizomenos kai ho praktikos. diapherei de tou theôrêtikou toi telê?”

¹⁶² In DA 433a1-3 “eti kai ephitattontos tou nou kai legouses tes dianoias pbeugein ti be diwkein ou kineitai, alla kata ten ephitumian prattêi?” I think, here, what Aristotle means by tou nou ephitattontos kai legouses tes dianoias, is the practical reasoning, as long as he means a function properly dealing with urging avoidance or pursuit.

practical thought is *praxis*? I believe that already in T2 we can find some hints, but the next passage will also help us.

“thought by itself sets nothing in motion; thought that sets in motion is for the sake of something (*ho logos hous heneka*) and practical. For this also controls productive thought (*he poiêtikê*) ... (EN 6.2, 1139a36-b1 & cf., EE 2.10, 1227a6-22.)”

Again, it can still be said that both practical and theoretical reasoning have a *telos*. However, why does Aristotle specifically express the practical reason with *the reason referring to the end* (*ho logos hou heneka*)? I think this probably means that the end of practical reasoning is a unique one, compared to that of the theoretical reasoning, in that it has a distinctive quality from the end of theoretical reasoning. In a sense, it seems that using this expression, ‘the reason referring to an end’, Aristotle already suggests the unique character of deliberation. The expression ‘*ho logos ou heneka*’ is rather to mean ‘the reason referring to an end’ than ‘the reason (merely) pursuing to it’. More details will follow.

Hence, I think that, in this expression, it is implied that the function of the practical reason is to consider and determine, referring to the end as its standard, what will be the best possible actualization of it. I understand, in the similar sense, Aristotle mentions “the origin of action is *prohairesis*, but the origin of *prohairesis* is desire and reason referring to an end” (EN 6.2, 1139a30-33).’ Again, this is compatible with what we have said both in the previous chapter and earlier in the current chapter; although we do not acquire the end through deliberation, deliberation does not entirely exclude the end, but it takes the end as a standard when comparing various options and determining the best among them. That is, the meaning of ‘the reason referring to an end’ is that the ‘practical’ reason that ‘the things which can also be otherwise (*endechomena allôs exein*)’ concern is a faculty that refers to an end posited by a rational desire (*boulêsis*) and keeping it as a standard, determines which particular action can be the best possible option to actualize the posited end in a given situation. Namely, deliberation is a rational process to specify the end that is general and merely posited before the termination of deliberation. So far we have seen that the practical reasoning is distinguished from the theoretical, since its end is acting, and that the practical reasoning is not merely a way of thinking that posits a type of action as its end, but there is a continuous and consistent

care for the *telos* in the cognitive function, called deliberation. The next passage will introduce the consequence of the deliberation ‘successfully referring to’ the end.

2.2.2.3 The Meaning of Reason–Desire Combination of the *prohairesis*

In the previous passage we have seen that the practical reasoning referring to an end is not only to imply the conception of the end from the beginning, but mainly to put down the end from the general and abstract level to the specific and concrete type. The passage below seems to show us that the specification of the end is finished at the point very close to the actualization of action.

“... what we deliberate about and what we decide on are the same, except that what is decided on is, as such, something definite; for it is what has been selected as a result of deliberation that is ‘decided on’. For each person ceases to investigate how he will act, at whatever moment he brings the origin of the action back to himself, and to the leading part of himself; for this is the part that decides. (EN 3.3, 1113a3-9)”

Here Aristotle says that the *prohairesis*, the end of deliberation, is where we decide how to act, that is, there is no need for further deliberation on the same thing, and he also seems to mean that it is what we have, as soon as ‘the leading part (to hegoumenon)’ of ourselves becomes the starting point (archê) of action. Therefore, it is clear that the *prohairesis* is very intimate with action. This remark seems pretty natural if we remember Aristotle’s general description on the objects of deliberation; what can be acted, or ta praktâ (EN 3.3, 1112b34). It is generally about some possible options (dunata) to act. However, we cannot merely say that the conclusion of such deliberation is a ‘purely rational or merely conceptual’ judgment on what to do. It is more than that. Aristotle seems to mention this right after the above passage.

“Given that what is decided on is an object of deliberation and desire among the things that depend on us, decision too will be deliberational desire for things that depend on us; for it is through having selected on the basis of having deliberated that we desire in accordance with our deliberation... (EN 3.3, 1113a10-13)”

Here, Aristotle seems to suggest that the nature of *prohairesis* is a combination of reason and desire saying that the *prohairesis* is a deliberative desire. In this passage, by the *orexis*, Aristotle seems to rather mean some desire of specific objects rather than the abstract moral principle, the objects of the wish (boulêsis). However, it is still not fair to claim that

the *orexis* in the *bouleitike orexis* is another desire, totally separated from the wish that posits the end. Throughout the whole process of deliberation, our *orexis* participates a main role in our evaluation of moral matters, as Aristotle says in the early chapters of *EN* 2, especially *EN* 2.3¹⁶³; what we like(*hêsthênai*) or dislike(*hypêsthênai*) is the standard for our moral activity. Hence, there is nothing wrong to say that *prohairesis* is a desire towards a specific option for action, we draw as a result of deliberation, but such a desire is not something completely foreign from the previous process of deliberation. That is, such desire cannot be something that suddenly occurs coming from outside the body of deliberator. Now, we can make sure that the combination of desire and reason is not exclusively of *prohairesis*, but the general distinctiveness of deliberation or practical reasoning. I think that is why Aristotle says in the following passage, the practical truth is truth in agreement with correct desire.

“... what affirmation and denial are in the case of thought, pursuit and avoidance are with desire; so that, since excellence of character is a disposition issuing in decision (*hexis probairetikê*), and decision is a desire informed by deliberation, in consequence both what issues from reason must be true and the desire must be correct for the decision to be a good one, and reason must assert and desire pursue the same things. This, then, is thought, and truth, of a practical sort; in the case of thought that is theoretical, and not practical nor productive, ‘well’ and ‘badly’ consist in the true and the false (this is, after all, the function of any faculty of thought), but that of a faculty of practical thought is truth in agreement with the correct desire (*EN* 6.2, 1139a22-31)”

While the *prohairesis* itself is an end of deliberation containing the wish (whether or not for the real good or the merely apparent good), the sincere (*spoudaion*) *prohairesis*, the combination of true reason (*alêthê logos*) and correct desire (*orexis orthos*)¹⁶⁴, is the end of excellent deliberation, finished with a true reasoning from the wish toward the real good. It seems, hence, that the sincere *prohairesis* is a practical truth as long as it is a truth drawn from practical reasoning that is of the combined nature of reason and desire. Since, Aristotle clearly says, the *prohairesis* is a principle of movement in the sense that from it our movement starts, it is actually highly possible for us to act morally excellently if we have the sincere *prohairesis*, the practical truth. We believe that is why our

¹⁶³ Anscombe (1965), pp.150, 156-8., Broadie (2002), p.44 “However, the association of character-qualities with the potentially obedient part of the soul is misleading if it suggests that they are simply concerned with the execution of decisions...”, Natali (2001), pp.94-5 where he explains the contemporary misunderstanding on Aristotle’s practical reasoning through the concept of the *synesis*.

¹⁶⁴ *EN* 6.2, 1139a24-5 above.

opponents claim for the identity between *prohairesis* and action based on this passage and some others similar¹⁶⁵.

However, can we really and necessarily find here the idea that *prohairesis* and action are somehow necessarily related, or that the end of such successful deliberation is identical with the action conducted accordingly? For me, these seem not to be possible; Aristotle does not indicate an actual action, by his terminology ‘prohairesis,’ or by the expression ‘the end of deliberation’. For, again, I do not think that the combined nature of reason and desire cannot be the sufficient condition of *prohairesis* to be an action itself. In my interpretation on *prohairesis*, which will be provided in detail later in this chapter, the prohairesis is what is still confined to the realm that concerns the deliberative part of the soul. I, therefore, think there must be some extra help for those who draw the sincere *prohairesis* from her or his excellent deliberation to eventually exercise the excellent action, the practice of the *prohairesis* in question. *Ergo*, in the following, I will explain in what sense I claim that *prohairesis* cannot be an action and then what my own interpretation on *prohairesis* is.

3. Suggestion: Confineness of the *prohairesis* to the *bouleutikon/logistikon*

In this section, I will introduce my own interpretation on Aristotle’s essential idea of *prohairesis*, showing that Aristotle never mentions it to indicate an action at all. Remember, I have finished the Section 2.1 saying that Aristotle’s remarks on the ‘weak-willed *prohairesis*’ can be a strong obstacle for the GEV’s ‘*prohairesis*-is-an action’ position. Now, as I have announced, I will start my own argument for the *prohairesis* explaining in detail why such remarks can be a problem for them.

3.1 The Weak-Willed ‘*prohairesis*’ Again

Aristotle clearly says that ‘the weak-willed acratik finishes a deliberation, but he can’t act according to it, but against it (representatively, *EN* 1151a6)’. The end of the deliberation mentioned here, hence, as we have rather briefly seen above, is not the same thing as an end of the deliberation by which the acratik actually acts. I also said¹⁶⁶ that the end of the latter deliberation is the weak-willed’s action, but not a *prohairesis*. Aristotle, regularly and

¹⁶⁵ Anscombe (1965), p. 157, Natali (2001), pp.48-49, 66, Nussbaum (1978), pp.170, 177, 181 and 192.

¹⁶⁶ In Section 2.2.1 in current chapter.

consciously also uses the title, the *prohairesis*, for the end of deliberation against which the weak-willed fails to stick to.¹⁶⁷ Since it is clear that Aristotle characterizes the *prohairesis* with a combination of reason and desire, it seems, then, that we shall think about the following. The weak-willed deliberation contains a correct conception, a right belief and a correct wish, on the real good (*EE* 1225b25-1126a19), and through the deliberation, that weak-willed deliberator eventually reaches the best specification of the end and the conclusion on how to execute it, and he or she even has a correct desire to practise the outcome of such deliberation. In my interpretation, until this much, there is no significant difference amongst the morally excellent person, the *enkratic* and the weak-willed *acritic*, that is, as long as all of them have a right ‘*orexis*’ to perform a morally excellent action to do in a given situation. How, then, cannot the outcome of such deliberation that the weak-willed acritic performs be practised? Again, assuming that our deliberation implies a correct combination between *nous* and *orexis* on the real good and that, referring to such correct conception on the end, we reach correctly the *prohairesis*¹⁶⁸, how cannot such an excellent *prohairesis* – the harmonious reason-desire combination on the best possible thing amongst what can be acted – be acted upon?

It seems that we have eventually arrived at the point where we can ask a fundamental, I think, question regarding *prohairesis*; does the *prohairesis* imply, by the definition and by its nature, a physical or psychological force that can initiate an action, necessarily? Namely, the question should be asked as whether, by his terminology ‘*prohairesis*’ and saying that it is a sort of desire, Aristotle really indicates something essentially including a substantial force to trigger physical movement. I will provide a negative answer to this question through the following discussion in the rest of the current chapter.

3.2 Indication of *prohairesis* in Aristotle

We shall first see the latter point above. For this very point, Aristotle’s remarks on the *prohairesis* against which the acritic is are pretty useful.

3.2.1 Aristotle’s Clear Remarks on the *prohairesis* That the Weak-Willed Fails to Keep

¹⁶⁷ *EN* 1152a16-19, 1148a17-8, 1150b19-27.

¹⁶⁸ It can also mean the determination of the best option to do in a given situation.

“... it is evident, then, that lack of self-control is not badness (though perhaps in a sense it is), because the one is contrary to decision, the other in accordance with it... (EN 1151a6)”

“...and he acts voluntarily (since he acts knowing in a way both what he is doing and what he is doing it for), but is not a bad person, since what he decides on is decent; so he is half-bad ... one of the un-self-controlled types (of *acrates*) does not stick to the things he has deliberated about doing (EN 1152a16-19)” cf., 1148a17-8 and 1150b19-27.

It is important to recognize the fact that in these passages Aristotle explicitly mentions the *prohairesis* that an *acratice* acts against (EN 1151a6, 1148a17-8) or that the *acratice* fails to stick to (EN 1152a16-19, 1150b19-27). Therefore, it can be surely said that Aristotle supposes there that ‘what the weak-willed *acratice* reaches at the end of his deliberation, but cannot act upon’ is still the *prohairesis*. Since, the meaning of *prohairesis* in this context is not inconsistent from the proper sense of Aristotle’s terminology, *prohairesis*¹⁶⁹, it is right to say that the ‘*prohairesis* against which the weak-willed acts’ is also the *prohairesis* Aristotle defines as a deliberative desire (EN 1113a19), that is, still a combination of *nous* and *orexis*. Hence, we can already say that Aristotle clearly admits the existence of a *prohairesis* that cannot, categorically, be an action. I, therefore, claim that his remarks on *prohairesis* in these passages are, not only, entirely consistent¹⁷⁰ with the remarks emphasizing the reason-desire combination of deliberation and *prohairesis*, but also, are very useful, since they are even more important for an understanding of Aristotle’s view of the *prohairesis* as *belonging to the realm of the deliberative soul*. This will become clearer if we examine Aristotle’s usages of the *orthos logos* (correct prescription) in the *acrasia*.

3.2.2 The *orthos logos*; Another Expression for *prohairesis*

“And since the un-self-controlled type is the sort to pursue bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to the correct prescription but not because he is persuaded he should ... (EN 1151a11-13)”

“But there is a type that is inclined to depart from reason, contrary to the correct prescription (*orthos logos*), because of his affective state, who is overcome by that state to the extent of failing to act in accordance with the correct prescription, but not to the extent of being the sort of person to be persuaded that one should straightforwardly pursue such pleasures: this is the un-self-controlled type ... (EN 1151a20-25)”

¹⁶⁹ Section 2.2.1 in current chapter.

¹⁷⁰ Cf., my note 153 on Gottlieb.

I think in these passages¹⁷¹, Aristotle uses another expression for what he indicates by the term *prohairesis*; the *orthos logos* (correct prescription). In these passages, Aristotle seems to say, I think, that what the acratist acts against is the correct prescription, and there he uses this term as almost analogous with the term '*prohairesis*'. I assume, therefore, that it is possible to say that, at least in the context of the acratist, that the *prohairesis* and the *orthos logos* share a common indication. Hence, regarding that for Aristotle, the acratist acts against his *prohairesis*, I do not think that Aristotle gives us a different message from this when saying that the acratist does not follow the *orthos logos*.

It is then worth remembering that Aristotle wants to indicate, in the title of *acrasia* as well as by the names of other characters¹⁷², the affective or emotional disposition (*pathos*)¹⁷³ or what he means by the part of the soul 'that listens to reason' (*EN* 1.13, 1102b31-1103a4). More specifically, in the expression '*acrasia*', Aristotle doesn't seem to refer either to the *prohairesis* or the *orthos logos*, but to indicate the condition of an emotional or affective disposition we find in a certain relationship with the *prohairesis*; the non-rational soul (*to alogon*) whose agent is not well disposed (*echein*) to follow the correct prescription from his deliberative soul¹⁷⁴. Therefore, I think we now reach, at least provisionally, a thesis that since the *acrasia*, a kind of character, does not indicate either the *prohairesis* or the *orthos logos*, these two are commonly used to refer to a certain event in the realm of deliberative soul, not of the emotional soul. Furthermore, this means that the indication of the *prohairesis* and the indication of Aristotle's titles of character are respectively in different sections of the soul.

This suggestion of Aristotle's *prohairesis* will become clearer when we examine another case of character. Namely, Aristotle's account on *prohairesis* will be confirmed, as I will show that even the title of the '*ēthikē aretē*' does not conceptually indicate the *prohairesis* whatsoever.

3.2.3 The *hexis prohairetikē*: The Emotional Disposition That is Completely Supportive to the Voice of the Deliberative Soul

¹⁷¹ Also, *EN* 1147b30, 1149b34, 1151a1, 1151a33-35 cf., *DA* 432b21-433a8.

¹⁷² Aristotle enumerates four (six) different levels of character or emotional dispositions in *EN* 7.1, and they differ depending on whether they listen or follow the rational soul, or how completely they do. Cf., *EN* 1.13.

¹⁷³ See, my note 64.

¹⁷⁴ *EN* 1147b7-9; *acrasia* is a *pathos*, 1151a20-15; the weak-willed acratist is the one whose *pathos* is not supportive to act in accordance with the *orthos logos*.

“Excellence, then, is a disposition issuing in decisions (*hexis probairetikê*), depending on intermediacy of the kind relative to us (*en mesotêti ousa têi pros hêmas*), this being determined by rational prescription and in the way in which the practically wise person would determine it ... (EN 2.6, 1106b35-1107a2)”

In this passage, I think, what Aristotle means by the statement that ‘the *êthikê aretê* is a *probairetikê hexis*’ is that the character-excellence is the emotional disposition of the morally excellent person completely following the voice from the rational domain of hers, that is, the *probairesis*. Additionally, the expression that ‘depending on the *mesotês* relative to us and determined by rational prescription’, I think, as a specific description of the *hexis probairetikê*, means, no more than, *the excellent condition of the emotional soul ready to accept or listen to the correct prescription from the deliberative part.*

Hence, from this, we can first suppose, again, that the *probairesis* and the *orthos logos* are replaceable terms to each other even in the context of *êthikê aretê*. However, it is also very important to notice that by the term, the *hexis probairetikê*, Aristotle primarily indicates the emotional disposition of the morally excellent, not the *probairesis* itself. If so far true, we should be able to say that Aristotle directly indicates a disposition of emotion in talking about *êthikê aretê* as well, although this emotional disposition, surely unlike the *acrasia* and *enkrateia*, follows the *probairesis* without any internal conflict. Hence, now we are in the position to see that Aristotle, even by the concept of character-excellence, does not indicate excellent *probairesis* or the *orthos logos* itself, but means *the proper emotional disposition as listening (*katêkoon*) well to the probairesis.*

Eventually, I maintain that Aristotle separates, at least conceptually, the *probairesis* from an emotional disposition, locating the *probairesis* within the realm that the deliberative reason concerns. In the next section I will show even more decisive evidence for ‘*the belongingness of the probairesis to the deliberative soul.*’

3.2.4 Prohairesis in the Case of *ta parelelymena* (the Pareplegic)

“But another kind of soul also seems to be non-rational, although participating in a way in reason. Take those with and without self-control: we praise their reason, and the aspect of their soul that possesses reason; it gives the right encouragement, in the direction of what is best, but there appears to be something else besides reason that is naturally in them, which fights against reason and resists it. For exactly as with paralysed limbs, which when their owners decide to move them to the right take off in the wrong direction, moving to the left, so it is in the case of the soul... (EN 1.13, 1102b13-24)”

I think in this passage Aristotle most clearly shows that ‘what the acratia acts against’ is ‘what is still *in the part of the soul that has reason (ho echon logon)*’.¹⁷⁵ Also, importantly for my argument, it seems that, as long as this part of the soul *encourages (parakalein)* the acratia *toward the ‘best direction’ (ephi ta beltista)*, the encouragement or prescription from such deliberative soul is pretty much compatible with what Aristotle means by the correct prescription and, thereby, by the *prohairesis* in the passages we have seen so far.

These relations, indeed, become even clearer by Aristotle’s short, but significant example of ‘paralyzed limbs’. The physical disposition of the patient of ‘paralyzed limbs’ conflicts *with what he is deciding (prohairoumenon)*¹⁷⁶. Hence, just as the decision of the patient mentioned cannot be practised unless his/her physical condition CAN follow it, the *prohairesis* of moral agent cannot be practised unless his emotional disposition is ready to follow it. *What, so, we can see here is that the emotional part of the soul has a function that necessarily initiates movement, but what Aristotle calls prohairesis, by the definition, does not mean at all something that happens in that ‘emotional’ soul.* Now I believe we can say that the *prohairesis* is still in the calculative part (*ho logistikon*) of the soul, which is separated from *the part that lacks reason (to alogon)*. Thus, I claim that Aristotle’s *prohairesis*, by its definition, does not belong to the emotional soul that can necessarily initiate movement. For, what can move is in another realm, the emotional part of the soul¹⁷⁷. Therefore, the term *prohairesis*, by Aristotle, does not indicate an action at all, but *an event in our deliberative soul.* The next passage, I think, confirms the confinedness of the *prohairesis* to the deliberative or calculative part of the soul, that is, it never indicates a concept implying a necessary force to move body.

3.2.5 Sincere (*spoudaion*) *prohairesis* as a True Grasp (*alêthês hypolêpsis*)

“So if it is characteristic of *the practically wise (the phronimos)* to deliberate well, deliberative excellence will be that sort of correctness that corresponds to what

¹⁷⁵ Regarding this passage, I was helped very much by Scaltsas (1986), pp.375–382.

¹⁷⁶ *EN* 1.13, 1102b20.

¹⁷⁷ Cf., *EN* 1147a13-16 “But this is the state of those who are in the various affective states: *occurrences of temper, appetite for sex, and some things like this manifestly alter one’s bodily state too*, and in some people they even cause kinds of madness...” *MA* 701b23-33 “Now all *these affections are actually changes of quality, and with those changes some parts of the body enlarge, others grow smaller.* And it is not hard to see that a small change occurring at the centre makes great and numerous changes at the circumference, just as by shifting the rudder a hair’s breadth you get a wide deviation at the prow...” cf., *DA* 3.9-11.

conduces to the end, of which practical wisdom is the true grasp (EN 6.9, 1142b33-35)”

Remember, I already said, against the GEV, in the previous chapter, that the *euboulia* and the ‘deliberation of the *phronimos*’ are identical, rather than that the former is the part of the latter¹⁷⁸. Therefore, what I mean by the excellent deliberation is no other than the *euboulia* that means a deliberation that yields a sincere *prohairesis*. In this sense, I think, this famous and controversial passage introduces us to how Aristotle defines the excellent deliberation (*euboulia*). Again, I read that Aristotle here regards the excellent deliberation as being correct about what is conducive to the end. More specifically, it means that it yields the true grasp (*alêthês hypolêpsis*) on ‘what is conducive to the end’, not on the end itself. Obviously, the conclusion of the excellent deliberation is the *prohairesis* as well. Therefore, as long as he means that the deliberation here is the excellent deliberation, the *prohairesis* of it is what Aristotle says elsewhere (EN 6.2, 1139a22-31) as ‘the sincere *prohairesis* or practical truth; truth in agreement with correct desire’. The crucial point is that the practical truth that we acquire as a result of ‘excellent’ deliberation is not an action in itself, but, still, a ‘true grasp’ on the best to do in the given situation.

Surely, the *hypolêpsis* here should not to be understood as the grasp in general (*hypolêpsis haplôs*) that Aristotle clearly stresses as not to be the *prohairesis* (EE 1226a16-18)’. If we see in DA 427b25ff, he mentions various types of *hypolêpsis*, where Aristotle clarifies that there are grasps from *epistêmê* and *doxa*, but also from *phronêsis*. Clearly, the type of grasp from *phronêsis* should mean nothing else than the true grasp he mentions in EN 6.9, because, there Aristotle says, *phronêsis* is the mark of ‘having deliberated well (*eubouleÿsthai*)’, and ‘having deliberated well’ is, as in the quotation above, the true grasp. Therefore, again, although the term ‘*hypolêpsis*’ is, not only, used as a name for cognitive state in general, but also, it can mean a judgment on truth that concerns the scientific soul (*epistêmonikon*), it should be noticed that what Aristotle means by the *alêthês hypolêpsis* above is a special kind of *hypolêpsis* we acquire only from the deliberation, that is, the sincere *prohairesis*. Hence, that special type of true *hypolêpsis* indicates the combination of the best judgment (*nous* or *dianoia*; conceptual element) on what to do in the given situation and the correct and stable intention (*orexis*; desiderative element) to follow it. Since, now it is very clear that even practical truth, that the *phronimos* can reach through excellent deliberation,

¹⁷⁸ Section 3.2.1.2 in Chapter Two.

does not indicate an action, outside the deliberative soul, but an *excellent cognitive state* inside it, I maintain that deliberation is not a reasoning fulfilled by an action, but still by a proper form of grasp on the ‘*alêthêia praktikê*’, and that even the result of the very excellent deliberation cannot indicate or contain any element in which some physical or necessary force to act is immanent. I think it is crucial for the GEV’s interpretation of *prohairesis* that even the result of the deliberation of the *phronimos* does not necessarily mean the actualized action. For, although their main argument is that the conclusion of the excellent deliberation, at least, should indicate an actual excellent action, I have just shown that the *prohairesis* yielded from the excellent deliberation cannot be, by its definition, an action.

So far, I have shown that what Aristotle wants to indicate by his technical term ‘*prohairesis*’ is evidently what happens in the deliberative or calculative soul, neither that in the scientific soul that yields a proposition to contemplate, or in the emotional soul that moves the body. Therefore, moral action (*praxis*) that is physically triggered by the emotional soul cannot be referred to by the term ‘*prohairesis*’. In the following, I will introduce two more passages where Aristotle talks about some general character of his deliberation. I will complete my argument showing that even there Aristotle rather clearly suggests that the function of *phronêsis* is not to initiate an action, but to ‘merely’ prescribe.

3.2.6 Nature of Aristotle’s Practical/Moral Knowledge: Cleverness and Prescriptiveness

“... again, the ‘product’ is brought to completion by virtue of a person’s having ‘practical wisdom’ and excellence of character; for excellence makes the goal (*ton skopon*) correct, while ‘practical wisdom’ makes what leads to it (*ta pros touton*) correct... (EN 6.12, 1144a7-10)”

This is one of the notorious passages where Aristotle emphasizes, I think, that although the *phronêsis* and the *êthikê aretê* collaborate to produce a person of the perfect character-excellence (*he aretê he kuria*), what they respectively deal with in contributing to such a collaboration are explicitly different. Namely, for Aristotle, the *êthikê aretê* deals with positing the end correctly (*orthôs*), so its corresponding function is excellent, if and only if the end posited is the real good (*to agathon*). However, he also clarifies that to achieve the end excellently posited by the *êthikê aretê*, we need another excellence, *phronêsis*. What

is important, I think, is that a while after this passage, Aristotle introduces another capacity called ‘*deinotês*’ to describe a characteristic of *phronêsis*. One might say that this capacity shows that *phronêsis* somehow contains a physical or psychological force to initiate an actual action because Aristotle says (as in T3 we will see shortly) the deliberation including this capacity always ends up with an action in accordance with its conclusion. What I claim is that even such a capacity cannot let *phronêsis* contain such a physical force. However, before we see the passage directly on this capacity called ‘*deinotês*’, we shall see another, which is even more general, concept for the *phronêsis* or even Aristotelian moral or practical knowledge in general which he discusses in the following passage.

“... but comprehension (*synesis*) and practical wisdom are not the same. For ‘practical wisdom’ is prescriptive (*epitaktikê*): what one should do or not do – this is its end, whereas comprehension is merely discriminative (*kritikê*). (For comprehension and excellence in comprehension are the same thing; for in fact people who are ‘comprehending’ are also ‘good at comprehending’) Comprehension is neither having ‘practical wisdom’ nor acquiring it; but just as seeing the point is called ‘comprehending’ when exercising judgement in order to discriminate about the things ‘practical wisdom’ deals with, when someone else is speaking – exercising it in order to discriminate rightly (for ‘excellently’ is the same as ‘rightly’). (EN 6.10, 1143a7-17)”

This is, I think, a, rather short though, very important passage in which Aristotle provides a general description on the core nature of his moral knowledge, or more specifically the fruit of deliberation. Aristotle already, in many passage¹⁷⁹, implicitly and explicitly mentions that the function of deliberative soul is to persuade (*peithetai*) and to encourage (*parakalein*) the emotional soul regarding ‘to avoid (*diokein*)’ or ‘to pursue (*kinêitai*)’. Therefore, we should notice that Aristotle here contrasts *phronêsis* from something merely *kritikê*, describing *phronêsis* to be *epitaktikê*. He also emphasizes that, since the *phronêsis* is nothing like merely ‘to learn (*manthanein*) something conceptually through academic and purely theoretical effort’, this is not even some conceptual understanding on moral options to do, such as, what is good to do or bad to do in a given situation. Aristotle, again, means that the *phronêsis* is more than just merely conceptually judging what is best to do now and here.¹⁸⁰ Namely, he says, *phronêsis* is

¹⁷⁹ Representatively, DA 3.9, 433a1-3, EN 2.3, 1104b19-24, EN 6.2, 1139a22-27.

¹⁸⁰ Cf., DA 3.9, 432b27-31 “...for mind as speculative never thinks what is practicable, it never says anything about an object to be avoided or pursued... not even when it is aware of such an object does it thereby enjoin pursuit or avoidance...”

prescriptive (*epitaktiké*) seeming to suggest that the *kritiké* does not suffice to fully describe the *phronésis*. However, it shouldn't be confused that by the term '*epitaktiké*' he means that deliberation of the *phronésis* necessarily yields an action. What Aristotle suggests here is that the *phronésis* is a different type of cognition from the true conceptual judgment since the former contains a correct intention to follow such a judgment. In short, since the point of the contrast here is not between deliberation and action, but between two different types of cognition, the prescriptiveness of *phronésis* does not support the idea that the *phronésis* by itself can initiate an action either.

Anyway, such a remark on prescriptiveness can also be extended to mean that the *prohairesis*, the conclusion of deliberation, is not only to say, like a mindless machine, what best to do here and now is such and such, but it is to say 'sincerely' that what is best to do here and now is to do such and such, that is, along with the intention, at least sufficient, to follow what him or herself says. Hence, it is important that the prescriptiveness is not exclusive of *phronésis*, but it is a general character of Aristotle's '*prohairesis*'. Namely, since, as Aristotle says in *EN* 3.2 (1112b12-1113a3), deliberation in general is to provide a substantial answer to a question like 'what to do and what not to do in a given situation', the prescriptiveness is a general character of the practical information that we acquire as a result of deliberation. However, then, as long as quite clearly the *prohairesis* is not only of the *phronimos*, but also of the enkratic, akratic (at least, one type of it) and the vicious agent, it is true that deliberation of all these three types of agent yields such a prescription. Then, how are they different to each other, they are commonly called '*prohairesis*' though? I think, such difference and, thereby, the fact that any *prohairesis* cannot contain, in itself, a force that can necessarily initiate an actual action, can be eventually convinced by Aristotle's discussion on the term 'cleverness'.

T3: "... the decision, then, is made correct by excellence, but the doing of whatever by the nature of things has to be done to realize that decision is not the business of excellence but of another ability ... there is an ability that people call 'cleverness (*deinotés*)'; and this is of a sort such that, when it comes to the things that conduce to a proposed goal, it is able to carry these out and do so successfully. Now if the aim is a fine one, this ability is to be praised, but if the aim is a bad one, then it is unscrupulousness; which is why we say that both the practically wise and the unscrupulous are clever. 'practical wisdom' (*phronésis*) is not identical with this ability, but is conditional upon it. (*EN* 6.13, 1144a20-22, 24-30)"

Again, for Aristotle, the *êthikê aretê* itself, as an excellent disposition of the irrational soul¹⁸¹, is what lets you take the real good for the end of your moral activity. It means that this excellent emotional disposition by itself suffices, at least, one condition for you to reach the *spoudaion probairesis*. However, more importantly, to actualize this *probairesis*, there requires another excellence that deals with ‘the actions of the natural stages in the achievement of that *probairesis*’. Again, this is related to the very capacity Aristotle calls the cleverness. I think there are two important points to see in this passage. First of all, as long as the cleverness does not deal with end, but with actions to achieve the *probairesis* already stably directed by a certain end, it indicates, at least, a function in the deliberative soul. In addition, since it is a common function shared by the *phronimos*, whose emotional soul is already excellent, and the morally vicious person whose emotional soul also completely follows his or her own *probairesis*, clearly the deliberation including the cleverness lacks internal conflict, i.e. recalcitrant element. That is, their emotional dispositions are commonly the ‘*hexis probairetikê*’. Surely, it can be said that the one whose deliberation including the cleverness acts according to the conclusion of it.

Now, then, does the cleverness mean some physically-action-guiding property in Aristotelian deliberation? Or does it indicate some physical force, if any, in deliberative soul to initiate an action? I do not think so. I think by the term ‘cleverness’ Aristotle means no more than that the deliberation that lacks an internal obstruction against practicing according to the *probairesis*. Again, what ‘cleverness’ actually indicates is a characteristic of deliberation whose agent’s emotional soul is the *hexis probairetikê*, that is, the deliberation lacking obstructing element. What is important for the sake of our interpretation, is that even the concept of cleverness, although it not only shares a common function with the *phronêsis*, but also is a wider concept than *phronêsis*, does not conceptually include a physical force to initiate a movement, but merely to mean an urge or prescription still confined to the deliberative soul. Now, I think we can confirm that the *probairesis*, Aristotle defines as the conclusion of deliberation or the *orthos logos*, does not indicate or imply any sense of physical force to initiate an action. I am sure, in this very sense, Aristotle, in *EN* 6.9, we have just seen, clarifies a mark of the *phronêsis* (of the *phronimos*) to be a true grasp on what is conducive to the end, not to be an excellent

¹⁸¹ *EN* 1.13, 1101a4-5, cf., 1102b28-25; where Aristotle divides between *to echon logos* and *to alogon*. He says that the *êthikê aretê* is concerned with the soul that lacks reason, but can listen to reason.

practice or action of it. Namely, surely, as long as the *phronêsis* is an excellent disposition regarding prescribing, it belongs to the category of the cleverness. If so, it comes to be very explicit that the *phronêsis* does not contain a physical force to initiate an action. As a result, it is not correct to claim that the conclusion of practical syllogism is an action.

4. Concluding Remark

So far I have criticized the GEV's interpretation on *prohairesis*; first I explained rather briefly (in Section 2.1) that their idea of practical necessity, the major premise of GEV's claim that the conclusion of practical syllogism is an action, is not correct, and (in Section 2.2) that both the property of *prohairesis* and practical or moral reasoning in general do not indicate an actual action. Additionally (in Section 3), I have eventually introduced my own interpretation of Aristotle's *prohairesis*, the combination of the best judgment on what to do in a given situation and the correct intention to follow it.

Now I say that the combination of reason and desire is not only of the *prohairesis*, but it is also the mark of the objects of practical reason and the general characteristic of entire deliberation. Namely, reason combined with desire is the distinctive quality both of deliberation and its objects¹⁸². Hence, quite clearly, when Aristotle means the *prohairesis* to be a combination of reason and desire, he says no more than that it is a conclusion of deliberation, in which reason and desire are already mingled together nearly inexplicably. Again, the conceptual-desiderative combination is the mark of moral values in Aristotle's ethics, but it does not mean that the deliberation itself, when it is excellent, i.e. the *euboulia*, comes to have a necessary force to initiate a physical activity. I have also examined that Aristotle says that even the fruit of the excellent deliberation is not an action itself, but a true grasp on the best possible option to actualize such an excellent action. This means, I think, that whether the *prohairesis* really brings about the excellent action or not is up to the other part of the soul that concerns the *pathê* or the dispositions of the *ethos*. So, I can say now that the excellent *prohairesis* itself is what Aristotle means by the practical truth (*praktikê alêthêia*), but these cannot be identical with an excellent action conducted.

¹⁸² EN 6.1, 1139a9-13 the quality of cognitive function is similar to the nature of objects of the function; the tradition since Empedocles. Cf., Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.361 & Grant (1874), p.148 & Richardson Lear (2004), pp.108-115 where she discusses on '*akribeia*'.

What, then, does Aristotle seem to suggest by that definition of *prohairesis*? It seems that even the rational soul specialized for *ta prakteta* cannot guarantee the practice of the *prohairesis*, the occurrence of the corresponding action to the *orthos logos*.

It seems, I think, that here comes the importance of the right moral education and habituation from an early age. For, even when you reach the correct prescription through deliberation, whether to physically act in accordance with it or not is the task of the operation of emotions (*pathê*), not the job of the ‘reason’ soul. Thus, first of all, we educate young children from a young age in order to feel or experience (*paskhein*) in the way they should do, i.e. to like and dislike the right thing and, in turn, to come to be in a firm emotional disposition toward right objects of ‘liking (*hêdonê* or *hêsthênai*)’ and ‘disliking (*lypê* or *lypêsthênai*)’ (EN 2.3), surely because it is important to bring up morally excellent people who constitute a morally excellent society. Also, another reason for which, in Aristotle, the centre of gravity in moral education or habituation lies thus in the emotional or irrational aspect is because it is even more crucial that such an emotional disposition contains a physical force to practise or achieve the practical truth (*alêthêia praktikê*), the *prohairesis* drawn from the excellent deliberation, or the mark of the eudaimonic life, at least in the second degree¹⁸³.

My interpretation of *prohairesis* supposes that Aristotle thinks that even the excellent functioning of rational soul, especially in ‘*ta prakteta*’, cannot, by itself, guarantee the actualization of excellent action. This means that even if one practically knows (*phronêin*) something and he or she performs moral action excellently, it does not mean that the phronesis is something that does decisively and substantially initiate moral action. For, even if we succeed to reach the correct prescription through deliberation, whether to act accordingly is the task of the operation of emotion (*pathos*), that is developed by habituation, not by deliberation; *we are now in a place where ‘to bouleutikon’ cannot do anything.*

Ergo, this interpretation, I accept, even amplifies a current controversy regarding *acrasia*, e.g. regarding the so-called Socratic, intellectualistic and traditional interpretation on Aristotle’s *acrasia*. My interpretation of *prohairesis* can let us provide an alternative interpretation *contra* this orthodox position about Aristotle’s *acrasia*. Briefly, what has been said so far let us claim that, for Aristotle, the acratia against one’s particular

¹⁸³ EN 10.8, 1178a9-10, Again, happiness will be discussed in Chapter Five.

knowledge is possible, namely, the acratia action that happens against one's perfectly rational decision about the best thing to do is clearly possible. For, since the *prohairesis*, in my interpretation, is the combination of the best judgement and the correct intention to follow it, regarding what to do amongst every relevant option, that that the weak-willed acratia reaches the *prohairesis* is not different from that she or he has sufficient conceptual information about the particular situation regarding what to do. Hence, I do not agree with the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's *acrasia* that claims that the acratia person acts acratia because he or she does not know particular conditions about the situation in question, so the *acrasia* is a matter of ignorance or lack of knowledge in particulars, not a matter of genuine conflict between reason and desire. This will be the main topic for the next chapter on the possibility of *acrasia*.

In the previous chapter and the current chapter, criticizing the Grand-End view, I have introduced my own interpretation of the objects of deliberation and the conclusion of it. First, I have claimed (in Chapter Two) that, although deliberation does not exclude the conception of the end, the work of deliberation is not to provide such a conception, but to draw a prescription, a combination of the best judgment on what to do amongst various particular options and the correct intention to follow it. Then, (in Chapter Three) I have said that although such a prescription, the *prohairesis*, is a combination of reason and desire, it cannot mean an action at all, because the deliberation in itself lacks an element that can contain a necessary force to initiate a physical action. Hence, in my interpretation, Aristotelian deliberation or moral thought is distinctive from function of emotional disposition in that the former does not by itself indicate a physical activity, but also different from that of theoretical soul, because the deliberative soul is not to conceptualize universals or principles. Therefore, I say that deliberation, contrasting with theoretical reasoning, is to provide its unique type of *hypolēpsis*, a prescription, a combination between conceptual element and desiderative element. However, again, although such a *hypolēpsis* is surely regarding what to be acted (*ta praktā*), it, contrasting with the work of emotional soul, does not indicate or initiate an action by itself.

Therefore, my discussion in the Chapters Two and Three is to establish my own interpretation of Aristotelian moral or practical thought. Hence, the following two chapters where I will deal with, respectively, two important issues (*acrasia* and *eudaimonia*) regarding practical thought in Aristotle, will be an application of my interpretation. For,

I will suggest alternative readings regarding those important topics based on my interpretation on deliberation. The first one is, as I have just announced, about the notorious issue on *acrasia*, or lack of self-control; the (im)possibility of *acrasia* in Aristotle.

Chapter Four: On the Possibility of Lack of Self-control (*acrasia*).

In the previous chapter, I have claimed that since deliberation in itself does not contain any substantial force to initiate an action, its conclusion, the *prohairesis*, is a kind of grasp (*hypolēpsis*), not the action itself. Indeed, this, as I briefly suggested at the end of the last chapter, also admits a possibility of some case in which sufficient knowledge or judgment about action fails to be practised. For, the lack of necessary relation between action and deliberation can be extended to mean that the failure of a certain action does not necessarily represent the lack of knowledge on relevant matter in the agent. Therefore, if my interpretation of deliberation in the previous chapters two and three is correct, we will have to accept a possibility of consciously acting against one's knowledge. It seems to me that Aristotle, through his remarks that the weak-willed acratist reaches the *prohairesis*, clearly suggests the possibility of acting against knowledge, that is, the possibility of conscious or intelligent *acrasia*.

This position surely conflicts with the traditional interpretation on Aristotle's account on *acrasia* that believes that the cause of *acrasia* is the lack of knowledge about the particulars, and denies the genuine conflict between reason and emotion. Therefore, I will devote this chapter to criticise the traditional interpretation on Aristotle's account on (im)possibility of *acrasia*.

It will be useful to see the passage below before we see the discussion.

“But one might raise the problem: in what sense does a person have a correct grasp when he behaves uncontrolledly? Well, some deny that it is possible to do so if one has knowledge: it would be an astonishing thing if, when knowledge is in us- this was Socrates' thought – something else overpowers it and drags it about like a slave. For Socrates used completely to resist the idea, on the grounds that there was no such thing as behaving uncontrolledly; no one, he would say, acts contrary to what is best while grasping that he is doing so, but only because of ignorance. Now to say this is to say something at odds with what patently appears to be the case (*ta phainomena*)(EN 7.2, 1145b21-28).”

“So when one universal premiss is in the agent preventing tasting and so is one saying that everything sweet is pleasant – and this is sweet (and the latter premiss is active), and there happens to be appetite (*epithymia*) in the agent, then the first one says ‘avoid this’, but the appetite drives him to it; for it can move each of the parts... (EN 7.3, 1147a31-35)”

Traditional Interpretation (TI¹⁸⁴) takes Aristotle, in these passages along the relevant text about *acrasia* in general, to mean that the *acrasia* is a character in which the agent lacks, or cannot exercise, knowledge of the most particular premise in the relevant practical syllogism. Therefore, in TI, Aristotle's acratice agent falls into such a condition, substantially because he or she is ignorant about the particular elements in the given situation or cannot be aware of relevant knowledge that he or she might have 'imperfectly'. Importantly, in both cases, according to TI, the acratice does not know the relevant particulars in the situation; he or she may know some but not as sufficient as possible to be called as the acratice acts acraticeally 'knowingly'. Namely, the common ground of the various traditional interpretations is that the intellectual level of the acratice in question is not able to figure out (1) that the situation in which the acratice agent currently is is that to which a moral principle that him or herself possesses should be applied, and, thereby, (2) that he or she is not aware of that what him or herself is doing is actually against his or her moral principle¹⁸⁵. Therefore, if TI is correct, since the acratice lacks knowledge about the particular situation and his/her ongoing action, the idea of conscious *acrasia* who acts what is against one's general principle at the same time knowing that the ongoing action is against the principle is not possible in Aristotle's account on *acrasia* as well. Eventually, again, if TI is correct, Aristotle's account on *acrasia* is not significantly different from that of Socrates at least regarding the impossibility account of it¹⁸⁶.

However, as I briefly suggested at the end of the previous chapter, I think it is clear enough that, as long as one type of *acrasia*, the weak-willed (*astheneia*) reaches the *prohairesis*, there is a possibility of the genuine conflict inside him or her between some conceptual understanding and some irrational recalcitrant element. Therefore, I disagree with TI. Hence, what I will argue for in this chapter is the following: I admit that Aristotle would, without a problem, agree with Socrates in saying that the condition of the intelligence or rationality in acratice, including the weak-willed, is not *epistêmê*, more

¹⁸⁴ Representatively, Robinson (1969), Hardie (1968), Cooper (1986), Urmson (1988), Wiggins, D. [2] (1980), cf., Bostock (2001), Dahl (1984).

¹⁸⁵ Dahl (1984), p.146 "...What Aristotle says seems to imply that the incontinent person can have and exercise all of the premises needed to apply his or her general knowledge to the case at hand. But it is precisely this that the traditional interpretation denies." & pp.150-154.

¹⁸⁶ Dahl (1984), pp.139-144, Robinson (1969), pp.139-144; especially he described, in p.144, 'EN 7.3 to be the most Socratic passage in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*'. Cf., Bostock (2001), pp.135-139 & Robert, J (1989), pp.23-36.

specifically that the intellectual condition inside the acraties overcome by physical or irrational desires cannot be anyway *epistémê*¹⁸⁷ in primary sense. Nevertheless, I think that although such intellectual level in acratie agent is, again, not *epistémê* in primary sense, it can still mean, in the context of Aristotle's practical thought (*dianoia praktikê*), an intellectual condition sufficient to be called 'knowing about the particular situation where he/she is.' If this sort of knowledge is possible in a practical context, there is surely a genuine conflict¹⁸⁸ between this knowledge and irrational element in acratie agents. If so, then, the investigation on the identity of *acrasia* should be focused on the nature of this conflict, rather than on the error in rational capacity. For me, what Aristotle wants to maintain through the entire discussion on *acrasia* in *EN* 7.3 is that the examination on the relation of such a function of deliberative soul to the emotional part, not only, can let us understand such a cognitive function of the deliberative soul better, but also, it is the very way to investigate the substantial cause of *acrasia*. Consequently, the purpose of my argument in this chapter is to claim, *contra* TI, that Aristotle's account on *acrasia* is clearly different from that of Socrates not only in that the conscious *acrasia* is possible in Aristotle, but also in that he seems to suggest his treatment on the *acrasia* is a more substantial one to figure out the identity of *acrasia*.

The goal of my argument in this chapter, again, is to criticise the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's account on *acrasia*, so my discussion in this chapter will be mainly to give an alternative interpretation on Aristotle's discussion in *EN* 7.3, the most relevant and richest discussion regarding his idea of *acrasia*. However, first of all, before I start the main argument, I will explain about the general context of the discussion in the early chapters in *EN* 7 (in Section 1), and then I will introduce, as the first step for the main argument, the argument of TI on the discussion in *EN* 7.3 (in Section 2). After that, I will also show what is problematic in the argument of TI (in Section 3), and eventually provide my own interpretation on Aristotle's detailed discussion on *acrasia* in *EN* 7.3 (in Section 4). In the last two sections, I will first give a detailed explanation on the cause of *acrasia* focusing on moral habituation (in Section 5) and then, before the

¹⁸⁷ *EN* 7.3, 1147b14-18, cf., *EN* 7.2, 1145b21-27.

¹⁸⁸ I don't think this is irrelevant with the following passages where Aristotle seems to mean, 'in the case of *êthikê aretê*, knowledge (*to eidenai*) is not important or very little important' (*EN* 2.4, 1105b2-3) and 'for those who are led by *pathê* studying and listening to the lecture on Political Science will not be beneficial at all (*EN* 1.3, 1095a 3-5)'.

concluding remark, there will be a description on the relation between Aristotle and Socrates as the last step for the main argument in this chapter (in Section 6).

1. Aristotle and *acrasia*

In the first two chapters in *EN* 7, Aristotle provides preliminary discussions before he actually starts the main discussion on *acrasia* in the third chapter. Namely, in the earlier part of *EN* 7.1 (1145 a 15 – b7) he introduces six different levels of character and announces that he will intensively deal with the *enkrateia* and *acrasia* among the various characters he mentions there. Then, he explains his methodology for the relevant discussion pretty specifically. In the later part of the same chapter (1145b8-20), Aristotle enumerates the existing views regarding *acrasia*. In *EN* 7.2 (1145b21-1146b8) he lists the questions, difficulties and preliminary discussions regarding *acrasia*. Among the various existing views (*endoxa*) Aristotle introduces there is one about the relationship between *epistêmê* and *acrasia*. Aristotle announces he will first deal with the problems regarding this *endoxa* and the discussion about this is the main theme in *EN* 7.3.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the discussion on *EN* 7.3 is one of the richest sources regarding the notorious philosophical problem, the problem of *acrasia* even in the history of philosophy in general. *EN* 7.3 is broadly divided into 1146b8-24 where he introduces his plan for discussion on *acrasia* and knowledge and 1146b24-1147b19 where Aristotle provides his notorious account on *acrasia* (and *epistêmê*). This latter part is, again, divided into further two parts, one dealing with the *endoxa* on true belief and the other for Aristotle's detailed discussion on the acratist and his or her intellectual condition. It is this very part (1146b24 – 1147b19) about which I will criticise the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's account on *acrasia* and propose my own interpretation as an alternative.

As a brief introduction, it is normally agreed that this part is composed of four different discussions. Of course, it is hotly controversial how these four parts are related to each other and how each part, respectively, is to be understood. The passage 1146b31-5 (PART 1) introduces two possible senses of knowing; to have (*echein*) knowledge and to use (*chrôsthai*) and to have it but not to use. In the second passage 1146b35-1147a10 (PART 2) Aristotle says that knowledge in a practical context is composed of universal premises and particular premises and that about particular premises we can lack or not

use knowledge. The third 1147a11-23 (PART 3) invites us to the cases of the drunkard, sleeper and the apprentice actor, etc. Aristotle says that acratia agent is in a similar disposition with that of these persons. In the last passage 1147a24-b17 (PART 4), Aristotle discusses in detail how appetite (*epithymia*) can affect the cognition of the acratia person and finishes the discussion of *EN* 7.3 providing his own view regarding Socrates' claim for the impossibility of *acrasia*. Now I shall show how the so-called traditional interpretation defines the relation of each part in this discussion on knowledge and *acrasia* and how they understand each part respectively¹⁸⁹.

2. The Traditional Interpretation on Aristotle's Account on *acrasia*

I said that most commentators divide Aristotle's discussion of *EN* 7.3 into four passages respectively taking slightly different themes. TI says that in the first three passages Aristotle explains three different ways¹⁹⁰ in which we can easily understand how the action against one's knowledge can occur, while he devotes the last one to illustrate the actual case of acratia action using the elements mentioned in the previous three parts. We shall see more below.

2.1 PART 1 (1146b31-35) - Two Senses of the Knowing (to *epistasthai*)

Here, Aristotle says that there are two meanings of the 'knowing', i.e. on the one hand, 'having knowledge (*echon epistêmês*) and using (*chrôsthai*) it', and on the other, the 'having but not using it'. He means that in both cases, we can say that one 'knows (*epistasthai*)'. Therefore, in the former case, it is strange to say 'knowing but not acting on it'. However in the latter case, it sounds possible to act against knowing. What is important is that, according to TI, 'using' here cannot mean 'acting on', but 'being aware of' or 'conceptualizing knowledge'¹⁹¹. Therefore TI says that here the one who has knowledge but is not using it is the one who has the knowledge but is not aware of a certain knowledge that he or she has. And what they mean by that is that the one in this cognitive state can act against one's knowledge. But they don't think that the one in the

¹⁸⁹ Regarding the general structure of Aristotle's discussion on *acrasia* between *EN* 7.1 and 7.3, I agree with Broadie/Rowe, *contra* TI, See, Broadie/Rowe (2002), pp.385 & 388-389.

¹⁹⁰ Bostock (2001), pp. 125-127, Dahl (1984), pp.140-141. Cf., Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.391.

¹⁹¹ Bostock (2001), pp.125-6 with n.10 and 11.

former sense of having knowledge (having and be aware of it) can act against one's own knowledge.

2.2PART 2 (1146b35-7a10) – Two Types of Premises in Knowledge in the Practical Context

Here, Aristotle distinguishes between two different types of premises in the context of practical syllogism, i.e. the universal premise and the particular. The former type of premises indicate 'what is good' or 'what is to be done', but the latter are particular premises related to the universal premise in the given situation. Famously, for the example of the universal premise, he takes 'dry food is good for anyone', and for the relevant particular premises, he mentions 'such and such is dry food' and 'this is such and such'. With all these details regarding the premises and examples, what Aristotle emphasizes is that knowledge on how to act in a given situation (practical knowledge) implies two different types of knowledge: one on the general premise and the other on the particular. More specifically, the former is "knowledge of a general principle that might be brought to bear on a particular situation", and the latter is "knowledge needed to bring that principle to bear on that particular situation."¹⁹² According to TI, here Aristotle suggests that the akratic has a problem with the latter type of knowledge, lacking or not exercising knowledge of the most particular of the premises mentioned above. Consequently, TI takes Aristotle to say that failing to act on one's knowledge while 'lacking' or 'not exercising' knowledge of such a premise does not sound strange, but failing to act on it while having and exercising it is extraordinary. Of course, about exercising (*energein*) as well, TI understands it as 'being aware of knowledge' not 'acting on it'.¹⁹³

2.3PART 3 (1147a10-24): Drunkard, Sleeper and Lunatic, and Their Similarity to Akratics

According to TI, Aristotle now introduces a subdivision of those who have knowledge but are not using it.¹⁹⁴ He describes this case as those who have knowledge in one sense, but do not have knowledge in another sense. Aristotle's examples for this case are the

¹⁹² Dahl, (1984), p.140.

¹⁹³ Bostock (2001), p.126, cf., Mele (1981), pp137-59.

¹⁹⁴ Bostock (2001), pp.126-7, Dahl (1984), p141.

drunkard (*ho oinomenos*), the sleeper (*ho kathendon*) and the lunatic (*ho mainomenos*). He says that these persons are commonly under the influence of an affective state (*pathos*), and that those who are in *acrasia* are similar to them in this sense. TI claims that here Aristotle explains that the *pathos* of the acratice agent prevents his or her from being ‘fully’ aware of the most particular premise. Hence, TI may say that they already have nearly all the important details about *acrasia* in the first three passages, because they think that they have figured out that *acrasia* is the condition of an agent who fails to recognize fully his or her knowledge about the most particular premise, and that the cause of this failure is the operation of *pathos*. Consequently for them the final passage is a sort of an elaboration for the discussion throughout the first three passages¹⁹⁵.

2.4 PART 4 (1147a24-1147b19) - Practical Syllogism and *acrasia*

According to TI, Aristotle eventually applies the elements discussed in the previous three passages to the actual explanation of *acrasia*. Aristotle, says TI, mentions that the acratice has some sort of limited knowledge about how to act in the situation he or she faces. What they mean by ‘limited knowledge’ is; the acratice knows only in the sense that he or she knows a universal principle that might apply to some situation¹⁹⁶. Ergo, TI takes Aristotle to mean that since his or her physical desire (*epithymia*) causes the acratice agent to fail to be fully conscious about the fact that his principle is the very principle to be applied to this specific situation, the acratice agent is prevented from acting according to his general principle.

More specifically, TI seems to understand, Aristotle explains here that if, although one has knowledge about the general principle, i.e. ‘we should avoid tasting something’, he or she also has premises such as ‘everything sweet is pleasant’ and ‘this is sweet’, along with a physical desire toward sweet things, this very desire stops the acratice agent grasping properly the situation given where there is a sweet thing in front of him or herself. Namely, the acratice agent cannot recognize the fact that this sweet thing in front of us is what we should avoid tasting, because such physical desire prevents the acratice

¹⁹⁵ Bostock (2001), p. 127.

¹⁹⁶ Dahl (1984), p.140.

from understanding this situation based on his general premise urging him not to taste a certain type, potentially corresponding to what is sweet.¹⁹⁷

Therefore, the akratic described here would merely think this is sweet and tastes it immediately following his or her physical desire, that is, against his or her own general premise advising not to taste it. That is why TI defines that the akratic action is the action against the general knowledge or knowledge about universals.¹⁹⁸ For, according to TI, the akratic agent does not have knowledge about particulars, at least not as sufficient as it can be against by the akratic. Namely, for TI, since the akratic agents cannot be aware of the so-called particular knowledge, what they are consciously against cannot be knowledge about the particulars. Consequently, according to TI, we can already see, the existence of the so-called ‘conscious’ *akrasia* is impossible as well as it is so for Socrates.

TI claims that in this passage, Aristotle mentions that what people call as the akratic action occurs, since the agent does not have a *full and complete* knowledge about what or how to do in a given situation; a sort of Socratic conclusion¹⁹⁹. According to them, the full and complete knowledge in the current context is a combination of the universal premise and the particular premise in the practical syllogism. In TI, therefore, the akratic does not have ‘proper knowledge’ about what he or she is doing, in this sense.²⁰⁰ More specifically, they say, the akratic agent lacks the particular premise or does not use it sufficiently as an element of practical reasoning, so it can be, at least, said that the akratic fails to have proper knowledge about the particular situation. This can even mean that he or she fails to be conscious about the particular premise he or she has about the situation in question. As a result of this, for TI, the *akrasia* Aristotle intensively discusses in *EN* 7.3 is the condition of those who is not fully conscious about what he is doing,

¹⁹⁷ Dahl (1984), p.141.

¹⁹⁸ Bostock (2001), p.130, Dahl (1984), p.141, Urmson (1988), pp.93-94, Robinson (1969), pp.144-148.

¹⁹⁹ Dahl (1984), p.148 “Understanding *phronēsis* in this way, it would be quite natural to say that a person does not have full and complete practical knowledge unless he has *phronēsis*...”, cf., Ibid, pp.139-155.

²⁰⁰ On this point, TI seems to maintain that for Aristotle although the proper (*keuriōs*) *epistēmē* is knowledge about universals, in general, scientific objects, but there is a possibility to regard the *phronēsis* as a proper knowledge in practical context. See, Dahl (1984) p.141, “... What seems to emerge from these passages is that weakness of the will is possible only because incontinent people do not have full and complete knowledge of how they ought to behave in the situation that faces them... Aristotle, thus, seems to share the Socratic view that action contrary to full and complete knowledge is impossible. He even seems to admit this when he says, the position that Socrates sought to establish actually seems to result...”

that is, the acratia does not know that ‘what he is doing is bad’ and ‘that is against his principle’. As TI ultimately claims, if they are right, Aristotle’s account on *acrasia* conflicts with the *endoxa* we are dealing with now, i.e. that the acratia agent grasps correctly the fact that he is doing what is bad (*EN* 7.2, 1145b21-22). Also, Aristotle can be taken to agree with Socrates regarding the impossibility of *acrasia*.

Again, for TI, since the acratia agent does not have or exercise (*energein*) – in the sense of ‘being aware of’- knowledge about the particular situation where he or she belongs, the acratia agent fails to recognize that the specific action she or he is doing now is not what his or her ethical principle prescribes to do. Of course, this interpretation assumes that if someone has a full and complete knowledge, through the perfect combination between the universal premise and particular premises in practical syllogism, about what to do in a given specific situation, clearly, this person cannot be an acratia, acting consciously against his or her knowledge. Hence, if TI is a correct interpretation of Aristotle’s account on *acrasia*, it seems true that Aristotle can be taken to admit that acting consciously against the full and complete knowledge is impossible, and to say that the acratia agent cannot be aware of the fact that he himself is doing against his general principle. This is why TI claims that Aristotle agrees with Socratic theses that ‘knowledge cannot be dragged about by any thing else’ and that ‘what people call acratia action is action due to ignorance’²⁰¹. In this sense, the traditional interpretation on Aristotle’s account on *acrasia* is often regarded as the Socratic or intellectualist interpretation on *acrasia* in context of which Aristotle is not beyond Socrates, in some sense, because of his respect for Socrates.²⁰²

2.5 Relation to Socrates

Following TI, therefore, we can summarize Aristotle’s position to Socrates regarding *acrasia* in this way. In TI, the *acrasia* is the condition of an agent who has knowledge about the good merely in the universal level, but cannot have it in a particular context, due to the prevention of emotions. According to them, therefore, Aristotle admits that

²⁰¹ Cf., *EN* 7.2, 1145b22-25 & 27-29.

²⁰² However, of course, the traditional interpretation still thinks that there is some point to be compromised between Socratic conclusion on *acrasia* and the public opinions (*endoxa*). They think Aristotle still emphasizes that the simple division between knowledge and ignorance, as Socrates does, does not help to find a solution for our current problem, to provide a detailed explanation on the cognitive condition of acratia agent. Bostock (2001), pp. 124-5 and 135-9, Robinson (1969), pp.147-8, Urmson (1988), pp.94-5.

what is overcome by the *epithymia* is not genuine (*kurios*) knowledge, and that such an agent being influenced by the physical desire does not know properly the particular elements in a given situation. Therefore, for them, Aristotle seems to agree with Socrates holding that *epistémé* is not dragged about by anything else, and that the so-called acratia acts acratia because of the ignorance. However, TI further claims that Aristotle also attempts to compromise the gap between Socrates and the *polloi* who argue for the existence of the so-called conscious *acrasia*, in that Aristotle himself suggests that the acratia is not entirely ignorant, because he or she knows what is good or bad, at least on a universal level.²⁰³ TI even thinks, reading the *phainomena* as the *endoxa*, that this (the compromise) is Aristotle's ultimate goal of the discussion in *EN* 7.3.²⁰⁴ Nevertheless, according to TI, Aristotle does not significantly distinguish himself from Socrates in that, for Aristotle as well the so-called acratia agent does not know that what he is doing at the moment is bad. Again, if TI is correct, the existence of *acrasia* suffering from a genuine conflict between reason and emotion, supported by the *polloi*, is not possible in Aristotle's account as well. As a result, according to TI, Aristotle and Socrates are not significantly different at regarding the so-called impossibility account of *acrasia*.

3. Problem with the Traditional Interpretation – Incompatible Passages on *acrasia*

One can perhaps say that TI can provide a useful model to explain how the acratia agent can fall into ignorance²⁰⁵. However, is this interpretation correct about Aristotle's thoughts on *acrasia*? As I briefly mention in the end of the previous chapter, I do not think that every acratia agent fails to be conscious about the situation he or she faces. Again, Aristotle clearly suggests that, at least, the weak-willed acratia is aware of the fact that what he is doing is against his knowledge. This is supported by Aristotle's several remarks that the weak-willed acratia does complete his deliberation but fails to stick to the *probairesis* he has reached²⁰⁶. Indeed, this case of *acrasia* is a strong obstacle to support the traditional interpretation. For, according to TI, the *acrates* discussed in *EN* 7.3 who lacks or fails to be aware of knowledge of particular premise, anyway, cannot reach the

²⁰³ See, note 202.

²⁰⁴ Cf., Dahl (1984), pp142-3.

²⁰⁵ Cf., *Ibid*, pp146-7.

²⁰⁶ Especially, Section 3 in Chapter Three.

end of deliberation²⁰⁷. On the other hand, mentioning the weak-willed *acrasia* mostly outside the context of *EN 7.3*, Aristotle rather clearly announces that the weak-willed *acrasia* reaches the end of deliberation, *prohairesis*. Of course, since TI sometime claims, maybe because of this, that the discussion in *EN 7.3* is mainly about impetuosity,²⁰⁸ showing the passages on the weak-willed *acrasia* outside *EN 7.3* itself cannot yet be a decisive reason that we have to abolish the traditional interpretation.

However, I think, we can still say this. In order to understand Aristotle's 'consistent', if so, account on *acrasia*, we still need to find a way to read harmoniously the content both in *EN 7.3* and in other passages on *acrasia*. Therefore, I will ultimately claim that there is a way to put both types of *acrasia* into the discussion in *EN 7.3*, and this is a more reliable reading than TI. However, before I do that, providing my own interpretation on the passages in question in the following section, in the current one I will confirm that those passages on the weak-willed *acrasia* raise crucial problems to TI as well²⁰⁹.

3.1 Weak-Willed *acrasia* and Deliberation

“As for lack of self-control, part of it is impulsiveness (*propeteia*), part weakness (*astheneia*). For some people deliberate and then fail to stick to the results of the deliberation because of their affective condition, while others are led by the affection because they have failed to deliberate...(*EN 7.7*, 1150b19-22)”

Although in TI, the *acrasia* mainly dealt with in *EN 7.3*, one of the most representative discussions on *acrasia* in Aristotle's ethics, does not reach the conclusion of deliberation, there is a type of *acrasia* that, says Aristotle, clearly completes the deliberation. That is, it reaches the *prohairesis*.²¹⁰ I think that although TI may try to avoid the puzzle regarding this passage saying that *EN 7.3* is mainly about the impetuosity rather than the weak-willed, it is still open as to why Aristotle, in such an important discussion on *acrasia*, does

²⁰⁷ Dahl (1984), p.151, “... I think one can best see why the traditional interpretation has taken these forms by starting with a claim that is often associated with the traditional interpretation, that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is an action...”, cf., Natali (2001), pp. 100-109.

²⁰⁸ Regarding this point, Bostock, p.134, “some have attempted to see the ‘disputed’ paragraph in *EN 7.3*... as recognizing an inner conflict, and providing Aristotle's diagnosis of what happens in a case of weakness, rather than impetuosity...” Dahl (1984), pp.144-6 & Robinson (1969), pp.147-8.

²⁰⁹ I mean just as, as we have seen in Chapter Three, these ‘weak-willed *prohairesis*’ cases can be obstructs for the GEV on Aristotle's *prohairesis*, they can also be strong counter examples for TI on Aristotle's *acrasia*.

²¹⁰ As we have already seen in Chapter Three, the existence of this types of *acrasia*, the *astheneia*, is also crucial for the account, often associated with TI, that the conclusion of practical syllogism is an action.

not deal with the weak-willed properly. What I mean is that, clearly, Aristotle's discussion in *EN* 7.3 is the discussion about whether the acratice agent acts knowingly or not, and if so, in what sense he or she knows. It is not difficult to see that what Aristotle has in mind during his discussion in *EN* 7.3 is one of the most popular *endoxa* regarding *acrasia*; an acratice person acts, due to *pathos*, the bad thing even if he knows that is bad (*EN* 1145b13-4). Since this *endoxa* suggests the positive level of the acratice intelligence, if Aristotle, in his discussion in *EN* 7.3, wants to criticize this *endoxon*, agreeing with Socrates, he cannot complete the relevant argument at all without mentioning weak-willed *acrasia*. For, it is more than clear in Aristotle, that the weak-willed, between two types of *acrasia*, rather than the impetuosity, has a higher level of intelligence in the sense that this acratice can reach the *prohairesis*, which is not significantly different from the *prohairesis* of the *phronimos*. Therefore, not only because this *endoxon*, as Aristotle's discussion intends to at least deal with, seems to imply the weak-willed rather than the impetuosity, but also because 'to investigate weak-willed type' will be much more reliable and useful to deal with the *endoxa* for the conscious *acrasia*, it sounds not very persuasive to say that Aristotle merely discusses impetuosity in the discussion in *EN* 7.3. Of course, again, this is not yet sufficient criticism because of which TI should be entirely abolished, but I think it is enough to show that TI is problematic regarding the case of the *astheneia*, or the weak-willed.

3.2 Consciousness and Weak-Willed *acrasia*

T1: "... for badness goes undetected/unconscious of by its possessor, while lack of self-control does not (*ou lanthanein*) (*EN* 1150b37)..."

T2: "Of the self-controlled themselves, the sort inclined to depart from reason are better than those who are in possession of the prescription (*to logon*) but do not stick to it; for the latter are overcome by a lesser state of affection, and they do not act without prior deliberation as the other sort do (*EN* 1151a1-3)."

Although in T2, what Aristotle mainly says is that impetuosity is better than weak-willed for some reason, what we need, for now, is that in these two passages quoted Aristotle explicitly admits that the weak-willed acratice is at least conscious of what he is doing, while the vicious one is not. Therefore, TI saying that the acratice cannot know what he is doing is bad cannot explain these passages at all. Of course, Aristotle will not say that the cognitive functions between the *phronimos* and the acratice person are the same, but he still seems to mean that the weak-willed can be aware of the fact that he is going

toward some wrong direction. I think Aristotle would say, in a very rough sense, that the weak-willed has similar practical information (in the sense of ‘*kritikê*’²¹¹) about the given situation with the *phronimos*, but his intention to follow such information is not intense as much as that of *phronimos* is. Again, as long as the weak-willed reaches the *prohairesis*, his knowledge about the situation given is already prescriptive ‘*epitaktikê*’ enough to be called the ‘*prohairesis*’, the combination of *nous* and *orexis*. However, again, his ‘*epitaktikê*’ level is not intense as much as the *phronimos*’ deliberative soul is, importantly because the process of moral habituation of this person has not been successful enough to build his emotional or affective disposition to be a *hexis probairetikê*. Anyhow, again, since this type of weak-willed *acrasia* clearly means a conscious *acrasia*, it does not make sense to me that, some TI says, Aristotle does not deal with the weak-willed in the discussion in *EN* 7.3, that is, the argument to criticize the idea of possibility of conscious *acrasia*.

3.3 Genuine Conflict Between the Rational Soul and the Desire

T3 “But another kind of soul also seems to be non-rational, although participating in a way in reason. Take those with and without self-control: we praise (*ephainoumen*) their reason (*ton logon*), and the aspect of their soul that possesses reason (ten psyches to *logon echon*); it gives the right encouragement (*parakalein orthôs*), in the direction of what is best, but there appears to be something else besides reason that is naturally in them, which fights against reason and resists it. (*EN* 1.13, 1102b13-19)”

In this passage, Aristotle suggests, I think, the possibility of genuine conflict between the deliberative part of the soul and the emotional part. This becomes even clearer in the continuing part where he describes the case of the paralyzed limbs²¹². There Aristotle says the patient of the paralyzed limbs, even if he or she reaches *prohairesis*, that is, having right judgment and correct intention to follow it about how to move his left hand, cannot move that hand according to the prescription of his rational part, due to the physical condition of his body. So this patient is aware of that his hand is moving against his own will, and that is not good, but the patient cannot do anything substantially. It is certain that Aristotle shows this as an example of *acrasia* (1102b21-2). However, the problem is that TI does not accept this kind of genuine conflict in *acrasia*.

²¹¹ “...but comprehension (*synesis*) and ‘practical wisdom’ (*phronêsis*) are not the same thing. For ‘practical wisdom’ is prescriptive: what one should do or not do – this is its end, whereas comprehension is merely discriminative (*kritikê*)...” *EN* 6.10, 1143a7-10.

²¹² I have already provided my own analysis on this passage in Section 3.2.4 in Chapter Three & cf., Scaltsas (1986).

So far, the first passage (T1) shows that there is an *acrasia* in which the agent reaches the conclusion of deliberation on what to do in the given situation, but he can still fail to practise it. In T2, we see that the weak-willed acratist is conscious that he is doing something acratistically. For the last one (T3), Aristotle seems to say that in the case of *acrasia*- at least in the weak-willed- there is a proper conflict between *nous* and *pathos*. There is a common point suggested by these three different passages. Aristotle, through those passages, mentions that although the acratist not only has every premise in order to apply his general principle to a specific context, but he also draws a conclusion having combined them, he cannot practise accordingly due to the operation of emotion, i.e. an outburst of the physical desire. What is important is that as he clearly says in the case of the paralysed limbs, the acratist person, even while he is doing acratistically, is sufficiently conscious of what is going on. This is exactly what T1 of Aristotle's account on *acrasia* denies. If so, should we just say that whereas in *EN* 7.3 where Aristotle provides the richest and most detailed argument about knowledge and *acrasia* merely explains the impetuosity, the weak-willed is only scarcely mentioned in several passages outside *EN* 7.3? Or, is Aristotle's account on *acrasia* somewhat inconsistent? Or, may T1 be incorrect? At least, I do not think that T1 reveals properly what Aristotle wants to maintain substantially through his account on *acrasia*.

From now on, I will provide my own interpretation on the discussion in *EN* 7.3, and propose an alternative one that allows the content in *EN* 7.3 to be compatible with the remarks on weak-willed *acrasia* throughout *EN*, and that can also provide a better interpretation on Aristotle's position towards the Socratic view of *acrasia*.

4. An Alternative Reading on Aristotle's *acrasia*

Before I start interpreting the passages in *EN* 7.3 there is a point worth mentioning; Aristotle's remark on the *phainomena* (1145b28) that Socrates clearly conflicts.

4.1 The Indication of the *phainomena* (1145b28): Public View or Apparent Fact?

“... But one might raise the problem: in what sense does a person have a correct grasp (*orthé hypolépsis*; Aristotle's actual expression is ‘grasping correctly’ (*orthós hypolambanón*?) when he behaves uncontrolledly? Well, some deny that it is possible to do so if one has knowledge: it would be an astonishing thing if, when knowledge is in us- this was Socrates' thought – something else

overpowers it and drags it about like a slave. For Socrates used completely to resist the idea, on the grounds that there was no such thing as behaving uncontrolledly; no one, he would say, acts contrary to what is best while grasping that he is doing so, but only because of ignorance. Now to say this is to say something at odds with what patently appears to be the case (and in addition we need to ask about the agent's affective state: if it is because of ignorance, what mode of ignorance turns out to be involved)...” (EN 7.2, 1145b21-30)”

Here Aristotle says that Socrates gives a negative answer to the question Aristotle opens EN 7.2 with; Can the akratic both grasp the situation correctly and act akratically? Famously, the reason that Socrates asks this is because he thinks knowledge cannot be dragged about by anything else²¹³. Socrates, therefore, thinks that if one acts against one's best judgment, it represents that she or he does not know what he or she is doing is against his or her own judgment about the best. Hence, for Socrates, the akratic action, in which 'knowing X is bad' and 'acting X' at the same time, is not possible. As a result, Socrates believes there is no such thing as 'conscious' *akrasia*. What should bring our attention to this is that Aristotle says nearly at the end of the quoted passage “this view plainly contradicts the *phainomena*”

Some²¹⁴ of TI reads the *phainomena* here as the existing views (*endoxa*). They take Aristotle to say that Socrates conflicts three existing views mentioned in EN 7.1; the view regarding the *akrasia* and blameworthy, the view about knowledge and *akrasia* and the view about *akrasia* and the self-indulgent person²¹⁵. They say what Aristotle wants to say here is that Socrates disagrees with these three views respectively, but Aristotle himself does not conflict them, so he can provide a compromise between Socrates and the existing views of others.²¹⁶

However, their most fundamental reason is because, if they read this *phainomena* as the apparent fact, which is a more natural way to understand, they think they would confront an 'inconsistency' problem regarding their direction of the interpretation of Aristotle's idea of *akrasia*. More specifically, in TI, if what the Socratic view conflicts is the apparent fact of conscious *akrasia*, Aristotle also cannot be free from such a conflict.

²¹³ *Protagoras*, 352a-360d, *Meno* 77b-78b & cf., *Gorgias* 467c-479d, 492c-509d.

²¹⁴ Owen (1967), pp. 167-90. & Hardie [1968], pp.264-271). Cf., Dahl (1984), p.142 & Bostock (2001), p.124 with n 5.

²¹⁵ Dahl (1984), pp.142-143.

²¹⁶ My note 202, and Dahl (1984) pp.142-3.

For, about the impossibility of *acrasia*, there is no big differences between these two philosophers, according to TI. More seriously, TI thinks, this will cause Aristotle's discussion on *acrasia* in *EN* 7.3 to fall into a crucial logical inconsistency²¹⁷. This is because, whereas in the passage above from *EN* 7.2 it seems clear, according to TI, that Aristotle distinguishes himself from Socrates, suggesting that although Socrates' view conflicts against the *phainomena*, his own view doesn't, Aristotle, in the main discussion on *acrasia* in *EN* 7.3, actually claims what is not very different from Socrates' conclusion on *acrasia*. Consequently, for TI, if the *phainomena* were to be read as the apparent facts, it come to the situation in which Aristotle inconsistently argues for the possibility of *acrasia* in the *EN* 7.2 and argues against it in *EN* 7.3.

However, in my interpretation, we can remain in the more natural translation of the *phainomena* in this context, the apparant or observed facts. For, I think even if Socrates conflicts with the apparent fact, Aristotle does not have to face the same conflict. For me, indeed, this is how Aristotle intends to distinguish himself from Socrates. Perhaps, Aristotle means here that Socrates' simple distinction between knowledge and ignorance plainly conflicts what we observe, in the sense that such an account cannot provide a substantial explanation on the cause of *acrasia*. Therefore, although it is still true that the point of conflict is not to show that Socrates' view on *acrasia* is completely wrong, it is important to note that Aristotle's voice is still negative in that he seems to suggest, I think, that the Socratic conclusion on the relevant puzzle does not solve the puzzle substantially. More specifically, according to my interpretation of this passage, Aristotle seems to think that, again, Socrates' view that the so-called acratia acts acatically, somehow, in ignorance is not a completely wrong account of *acrasia*, but it is not a finished one as long as it does not explain the substantial cause of the *acrasia*, or the cause of the ignorance Socrates describes.²¹⁸ However, Aristotle anticipates his investigation on *acrasia* to give a detailed explanation on the substantial cause of *acrasia*. In this way, right after the passage where he says 'Socrate's view plainly conflicts with the *phainomena* (*EN* 7.3, 1147a31-35)', Aristotle seems to distinguish himself from Socrates. Indeed, I think, Aristotle's whole discussion in *EN* 7.3 is to clarify such a distinction; Aristotle, after all, finds a way to explain well the observed fact of *acrasia*, and that lets him admit the existence of the

²¹⁷ Dahl (1984), p.142.

²¹⁸ Cf., *EN* 7.3, 1147b6-7 where Aristotle seems to mention how acratia's ignorance becomes knowledge again.

conscious *acrasia* which Socrates denies. More about the relation between Aristotle and Socrates will be dealt with later in this chapter. However, in the following, I will provide my own interpretation on *EN* 7.3 to support this idea in general.

4.2 An Alternative Interpretation on *EN* 7.3

As we have already seen, in the first two chapters of *EN* 7 Aristotle introduces his methodology and lists the relevant *endoxa* and related *aporia*. Now, in *EN* 7.3 Aristotle eventually sets up his own treatment on the *aporia* regarding knowledge and *acrasia*.

4.2.1 *EN* 1146b8-24: Introduction to Two Versions of Agenda

Before he starts the main discussion on the relationship between *epistémé* and *acrasia* after 1146b31, Aristotle does some preliminary work in 1146b8-31. First, in 1146b8-24 he introduces two agenda; he announces that he will consider the question, ‘whether acratice people act knowingly (*eidotés*) or not, and with what sort of knowledge...’, and then he will examine another one regarding the distinction between *acrasia* and *enkrateia*. Although what is mainly dealt with in the discussion in *EN* 7.3 is the former question, one point needs to be noted in Aristotle’s remarks on the latter.

In *EN* 1146b22-24, Aristotle finishes his introduction to the second or last agenda – the contrast and comparison between *enkrateia* and *acrasia*- saying that “... For the self-indulgent type is drawn even as he decides to go in that direction, because he thinks one should always pursue what offers pleasure now; whereas the un-self-controlled type does not think one should, but pursues it all the same”. I think this remark is worth noticing regarding the view of the relation between ‘*doxa aléthés*’ and ‘*epistémé*’, which we will see in a moment. Anyhow, the message Aristotle gives us here is, I think, this; whereas the self-indulgent (*akolastos*), the specific type of vicious character, acts badly thinking that he or she must pursue the pleasure at hand, that is, deciding (*prohairoumenos*) to pursue the momentary pleasure, the acratice, although he or she may do some similar action in appearance, does not think it is necessary to follow the momentary pleasure, or, importantly, what makes him or her do such a single pleasant action is not his or her decision (*prohairesis*) on the pleasure. Again, it is slightly revealed that the acratice acts differently from what he or she thinks (*nomizein*). Of course, it is not yet clearly said, but I think in this remark Aristotle already suggests that *the puzzle regarding*

(the cause of) *acrasia* is not to be directly about knowledge or consciousness about the particular context given, but about something obstructing the practice or the execution of what the agent has in mind. I think that to have this idea in mind will be useful to understand Aristotle's account on *acrasia*, at least in my interpretation. Such thoughts of Aristotle will become more certain in his treatment regarding the view saying 'what the acratist has is true belief, not knowledge'. In a sense, Aristotle's discussion on knowledge and *acrasia* starts from there, and therefore my criticism of TI will begin from my treatment on the relevant -following- passage.

4.2.2 EN 1146b24-31: An *endoxa* Regarding the True Belief (*doxa alêthês*)

“Now as for the suggestion that its being true judgment (*to doxan alêthê*) and not knowledge that the un-self-controlled person acts against, this makes no difference to the argument; for some people when making mere judgments are not in two minds about them, but think they possess precise knowledge. If, then, it is because of the lightness of their conviction (*dia to hêrema pistenein*) that those merely making judgments will be more liable than those with knowledge to act contrary to what they suppose they should do, knowing will be no different from judging, since some people have no less conviction about what they judge to be the case than others have about what they know – as the example of Heraclitus shows. (EN 7.3, 1146b24-31)”

In this passage, Aristotle introduces again²¹⁹ the view that the acratist does acratistically because he has true belief not knowledge about what he does. However, Aristotle criticizes this *endoxon*, because this claim does not make any difference to our current debate. TI may understand this passage in the following way. They might take Aristotle to say that even if one claim that the reason that a person becomes an acratist is because he has 'true belief' not 'knowledge' regarding the relevant happening - assuming that belief is what we can act naturally against-, this cannot give an essential solution to our puzzle about the cause of *acrasia*. For, having true belief itself is not a sufficient condition to be acratist. It will be clear if we see the following. It is because, like Heraclitus, there is someone who has merely true belief, but since he has a strong conviction (*to pistenein*) toward the belief, he can do apparently similar actions as that of

²¹⁹ This is already mentioned in EN 7.2, 1145b32-5.

the one having knowledge. Hence, according to TI, saying that the akratic has true belief is not essentially helpful in distinguishing the akratic from the non-akratic.²²⁰

It seems true that Aristotle here means ‘having true belief is not a necessary cause of the one having such belief being an akratic.’ So, about this I don’t disagree with TI. However, for me, the message Aristotle suggests here is stronger than TI understands it to be. There are two important points to be noted. I don’t think TI significantly disagrees with me, but it seems they might underestimate the relevant importance. Anyway, in this passage (1) Aristotle does not say that the cognitive state the akratic has *cannot* be ‘true belief’. (2) The point of Aristotle lies in the conviction (*to phisteuein*) that the akratic might have to his practical information about a given situation, rather than to ‘whether one has true belief or knowledge’. And by the conviction, as long as he seems to mean, rather than either belief or knowledge, some attitude of the person to these cognitive conditions²²¹, it seems clear that Aristotle indicates what is in the affective part of the soul rather than the deliberative one. At least, it seems that what is external to true belief and knowledge is mentioned here. What is more important is that when Aristotle says “there is no difference between knowledge and opinion (*outben dioisei epistêmê*)”, he actually means, I think, that people can have a conviction (*to phisteuein; pistis – faith or conviction*) towards either belief or knowledge.²²² Perhaps, Aristotle already, from here, suggests some sufficient consciousness of the akratic about the particular situation. That is, I take Aristotle to suppose that what Aristotle calls ‘*to phisteuein*’, probably the agent’s attitude external to one’s information (knowledge or belief) in a given case, is an important factor for the cause of the *akrasia*. Furthermore, I think the main factor in forming such an attitude in Aristotle is the affective disposition or character of the agent.²²³

As a result, it seems to me that the message Aristotle wants to give us here is actually stronger than TI understands it to be – that true belief itself is not the cause of *akrasia*. Therefore, what Aristotle suggests regarding his treatment about the view mentioning true belief of akratic is that it does not seriously matter what kind of cognition the

²²⁰ Bostock (2001), pp.124-6.

²²¹ As Grant says, ‘Aristotle does not wish to do away with Plato’s distinction between *doxa* and *epistêmê*, but it is clear that they are both cognitive states that can produce a *hypolêpsis*. See, Grant (1874), p.203.

²²² Another instance where Aristotle mentions a conviction to *epistêmê*; EN 6.3, 1139b33-35.

²²³ Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.388, especially where they analyse the passage EN 1146b24-31.

acratia has, i.e. whether he or she has *epistēmē* or *alēthēs doxa*, to our current task; to identify the cause of *acrasia*²²⁴. It is supposed that the indication of the cause already here, through the concept of ‘conviction’, lies not in the ‘reason’ domain, the deliberative soul, but in the emotional or affective soul that directly participates in bodily movement. It seems that because of this aspect of the conviction, Broadie reminds us that *Nicomachean Ethics* is a task for the educators²²⁵. Hence, in my interpretation, Aristotle hints, connecting with the earlier passage where Aristotle assumes that the acratia acts against what he thinks to act, in the continuing passage as well, that we have to pay attention to something external, obedient or disobedient, to the cognition, not to what kind of cognition the acratia has.

4.2.3 Main Discussion on *acrasia* and Knowledge (1146b31-1147b19)

While TI, as we have seen earlier, reading these four passages respectively, discuss an analysis in different aspects; logical, dialectical and scientific, I, agreeing with a typical reading of the anti-traditional interpretation²²⁶, suppose the first two passages (PART 1 and PART 2) are, in general, searching for a way for the acratia ‘knowing’ to be possible without falling into logical contradiction. The third passage (PART3) states, for me, some common condition, where the action against one’s knowledge is possible. Importantly, I think only the final passage (PART 4) is an intensive discussion on the cause of being acratia. The details follow.

4.2.3.1 PART 1: Two Senses of the ‘Knowing (to *epistasthai*)’

“... But, since there are two ways in which we say someone knows – for both the person who has knowledge but is not using it and the one using it are said to know – there will be a difference between doing what one should’t when knowing one shouldn’t but not having regard to the knowledge, and doing it when actually having regard to it; for this is what is thought astonishing, not if one does what one shouldn’t when not having regard to the knowledge.” [EN 7.3, 1146b31-35]

In reading this passage, TI seems to have two premises; that (1) the meaning of using (*chrôsthai*) knowledge is identical with that of ‘*theôrein*’ and that (2) although the proper sense of the verb ‘*theôrein*’ is to contemplate (about conceptual and theoretical objects)

²²⁴ Or to distinguish the acratia from the non-acratia, cf., EN 1146b15-24.

²²⁵ Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.388.

²²⁶ Again, my understanding on the general structure of the discussion in EN 7.3 is not significantly different from Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.391.

here, rather exceptionally it can be extended to mean a conceptual understanding of the particular practical context. As a result, TI takes Aristotle in this passage to mean ‘being aware of’ or ‘being conscious of’ the knowledge oneself has, by the term ‘using knowledge’. Hence, TI says, the contrast here is between ‘having knowledge and being aware of it’ and ‘having knowledge and not being aware of it’. However, I think both of the premises mentioned are problematic. Firstly, I also think that the semantic relation between *chrôsthai* and *theôrein* here is important, but that their relationship is not identical, but analogous. Apart from this, as trivial as it may seem, I don’t think that the meaning of *theôrein* used here can be extended to indicate any practical concept, by the definition. I will explain the latter point first.

Again, according to TI Aristotle, through the term ‘*theôrein*’, means some conceptualization of moral concepts or premises in the so-called practical syllogism. However, by the definition of ‘*theôrein*’, TI’s rendering of this is not possible. This, as we saw²²⁷ in Chapter Three, becomes very certain through Aristotle’s remarks in *EN* 6.2 supposing that practical thinking and theoretical thinking cannot share common objects. If this were the case, it would not be very persuasive to take Aristotle to claim that, very exceptionally, only in this sentence the term for ‘theoretical activity’ can be applied to the practical matters. Hence, through this, we can at least confirm that there is no decisive ground according to which we can say the *theôrein* here indicates ‘being aware of’ or ‘being conscious of’ some practical knowledge.

Furthermore, even if we read, very generously to TI, that *theôrein* can mean a conditional sense of contemplation on moral or practical concepts, there can be no equitation between *chrôsthai* and (the primary sense of) *theôrein*. For, we think that in this passage there is an analogy between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. For this reason, it can also be said, in a sense, that understanding this passage is completed by the next one. Anyway, my claim that Aristotle here attempts an analogy between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge will become more specific by referring to Plato’s *Theaitetos*, probably the origin of Aristotle’s division in the current passage.

In *Theaitetos*, 197bff, Plato provides a distinction between ‘having (*echein*) knowledge’ and ‘possessing (*ktasthai*) it’. This distinction can be formulated as applying knowledge and

²²⁷ Section 2.2.2 in Chapter Three.

merely having acquired it, or knowledge actual and knowledge potential.²²⁸ Therefore, under the assumption that Aristotle follows this structure of Plato, in the distinction of *EN* 7.3, it seems right to say that the equivalent of ‘*echein*’ knowledge is ‘having and using (*chrôsthai*) knowledge’ and that of ‘*ketasthai*’ knowledge is ‘having but not using it’. If this is the case, the verb ‘*theôrein*’ in this passage of *EN* 7.3, although its original sense is theoretical reason or the exercise of it, is being used as “a stand-in for the practical analogous, in which case it is tantamount to ‘act upon’²²⁹”. Hence, Aristotle can be taken to say this, I think; while the use of theoretical reason is contemplation or conceptualizing, the proper sense of *theôrein*, the use of practical reason, according to Aristotle’s teleology, is not merely thinking about practical concepts or situations, but practicing or actualizing knowledge in a relevant situation. Consequently, what Aristotle means by ‘*chrôsthai*’ is not ‘being aware of’ or ‘being conscious of’, but ‘acting on’ or ‘practicing’. Indeed, this way of interpreting this passage becomes more persuasive through Aristotle’s remarks on actualizing or exercising (*energein*) knowledge of a particular premise in the next passage.

4.2.3.2 PART 2: Two Types of Premises in Knowledge in the Practical Context

“... Further, since there are two types of premiss, there is nothing to prevent someone from acting ‘contrary to his knowledge’ when he has both premises but is using only the universal one, not the particular one; for it is particulars that are acted on. The universal too has to be differentiated, in so far as there is one term for the agent and one for the object of action, e.g. that all human beings are benefited by dry foods, and that one is onself a human being, or that such-and-such food is dry; but whether this is such-and-such – this is what the agent either does not ‘have’, or does not activate; and which of these ways we mean will make an immense difference, with the result that his knowing seems, in one way, not at all strange, and in the other way amazing. (*EN* 7.3, 1147a1-9)”

Now Aristotle sets up explaining the context regarding ‘what to be acted (*ta praktá*)’. He seems to mean that in the so-called practical context there are two kinds of knowledge, one on the universals (*ta katholou*) and the other on the particulars (*ta kath’ hekasta*), and that the action against one’s knowledge happens in the relation to the latter type of knowledge. More specifically, Aristotle says when one lacks or fails to exercise (*energein*)

²²⁸ Burnet (1900), p.298 and Broadie (2002), pp.389-390.

²²⁹ Broadie/Rowe (2002), p389 in the commentary on 1146b33-4.

such knowledge, the agent acts against one's knowledge. Although there is not much controversy regarding what has been mentioned so far about the meaning of the 'energein', here there is a disagreement.

Again, TI commonly claims that the *energein* of knowledge of particulars is being aware of or being conscious of it. For them, therefore, the exercise of knowledge of the particulars in a given situation means being conscious of the specific circumstances where oneself belongs. Hence, naturally for TI the akratic who fails to have knowledge thus cannot know what he himself is doing is bad.

Apart from this passage, there is another reason that the TI generally understands that the use of knowledge is an awareness of knowledge, and that the akratic is the one who fails to cognize sufficiently about the specific situation he or she faces. That is because Aristotle mentions the combination of the major premise and the minor premise in practical syllogism, especially in *de Motu Animalicum (MA)*²³⁰. There and in *de Anima (DA)*²³¹, Aristotle, saying that the purpose of some practical reasoning is an action itself, rather strongly means that the combination of those two premises implies the awareness of knowledge about the specific situation and even that such a combination, if no obstacle, is necessarily an action. Hence, because of passages like these, TI endeavours to claim that in *EN* 7.3 as well, Aristotle does not mean at all that the akratic agent combines the major premise and the minor one in practical syllogism. For, such combination itself is an actual action and if so, the agent cannot be an akratic.²³²

I, of course, disagree with this. Although it seems pretty clear that Aristotle says that combining those premises in practical thought is actually acting, it cannot be an absolute reason for which we have to read in Part 2 that Aristotle means 'failing to be aware of some particular knowledge' or 'failing to complete deliberation' by the failing to exercise knowledge of particular premise'. Namely, although there is a combination of major premise and minor premise in practical thought, and that is the *prohairesis*, the conclusion of deliberation, there is no necessary point to assimilate such combination with an actual action²³³. For, there is a prerequisite for the combination to be transformed to an action

²³⁰ *MA* 701a9-13, 20.

²³¹ *DA*, 432b25-433a3. Cf., Section 2.2.2 in Chapter Three

²³² Dahl (1984), p.151-2.

²³³ Again, this is what I have claimed in Chapter Three.

actual. *There has to be no obstacle, no recalcitrant element.* The very case that has been raised as a representative example of a preventing element is the case of *acrasia*. Hence, if my interpretation is right, Aristotle says now that we study the situation like this; there is something we acquire, through deliberation, as a result of the combination of premises in the relevant situation, but we cannot act on or actualize such a combination. There is some recalcitrant element, called physical desire (*ephytimia*) preventing us from practicing such combination. This is the person we call the weak-willed acratic. Consequently, based on my interpretation of this passage, we do not have to deny that the type of acratic mainly mentioned in *EN* 7.3 is weak-willed *acrasia*²³⁴. We can take Aristotle to say both types.

In addition, the analogy between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning regarding the use of knowledge is eventually fulfilled at the end of this passage. As we have said earlier, by the term '*theôrein*', Aristotle does not mean the contemplation on moral concepts, but employs it as 'a stand-in' for using knowledge in practical context, which is 'acting on' or 'actualizing.' Namely, there is an analogy of the sense of 'using'; using theoretical knowledge: *theôrein*, and using practical knowledge: *energein*. What Aristotle intends to indicate through the term, *theôrein*, is the term, *energein*, whose sense is 'acting on' or actualizing. So, here Aristotle provides a proper expression for the use of practical knowledge. That is acting on or actualizing knowledge. Namely, Aristotle here again means the actuality of practical knowledge (in this sense as well, the distinction between knowing in the previous passage is right to be called a distinction between knowledge potential and knowledge actual). Again, according to Aristotle's teleology, the actualization of theoretical knowledge is being thought in reasoning and giving birth to another concept or belief, the actualization of practical knowledge is an action. Therefore, concerning this context, it is much better to read the *energein* as practising or acting on than to read as being aware of or being conscious of. For this reason, in the last sentence of this passage, it is not strange at all to say, against TI, both not practising (*energein*) knowledge about the situation oneself faces and acting against knowledge about it, because not-practising knowledge is actually acting against it. However, it is astonishing if one finds him or herself practising knowledge about the specific situation

²³⁴ Cf., my note 208.

and acting against it, not because it is physically impossible, but more importantly because it is logically contradictory²³⁵.

4.2.3.3 PART 3: Drunkard, Sleeper and Lunatic, and Their Similarity to Acratics

“Further: there is a way other than those just mentioned in which we humans can ‘have knowledge (*to echein epistémên*)’; for under ‘having but not using’ (*en tói echein mé chrésthai*) we observe a distinction in ‘having’, such that a person both has knowledge in a way and does not have it, as with someone asleep, raving, or drunk. But this is the state of those who are in the various affective states: occurrences of temper, appetite for sex, and some things like this manifestly alter one’s bodily state too, and in some people they even cause kinds of madness. Clearly, then, we should say that the state of the un-self-controlled is like these people’s (*homoiós echein tous akrateis toutois*). That they say the things that flow from knowledge indicates nothing, since those in the affective states mentioned, too, can recite demonstrative proofs and Empedoclean verses, and if those who have learned something for the first time can string the words together, they don’t yet know what they have learned – because they have to assimilate it, and that requires time (*dei symphyénai touto chronon deitai*) So we must suppose that those who act uncontrolledly, too, are talking like actors on the stage... (EN 7.3, 1147a10-24)”

I do not disagree with TI that in this passage, through the analogy of the drunkard, the sleeper and the lunatic, Aristotle explains in what sense the acratik has knowledge. However, their view that seems to claim, through the analogy to ‘knowledge’, that the emotional disposition enables him or her not to be aware of knowledge he has is incorrect. The following is a detailed explanation about this.

Clearly, what Aristotle means by the term ‘*hexis*’ here is not merely ‘possessing’ but ‘being emotionally/ affectively disposed to’. Namely, the indication of the ‘*hexis*’ is not knowledge that an acratik has, but the emotional disposition of the acratik who has knowledge in some sense. Of course, I am not saying that the emotional disposition of an agent is irrelevant with the nature of knowledge that the person has. Against TI, the analogy of a drunkard, a sleeper and a lunatic is not a subdivision of cases of ‘having knowledge but not using it’, but it is, in a sense, to anticipate, I think, that he will soon (in the next passage) explain the reason (cause) why the acratik’s knowledge about particulars cannot be

²³⁵ EN 1146b33-35 has to be read in the following way. It is not strange to say that one acts against knowledge at the same time, when he/she does not practise (use) knowledge. For, they are not logically contradict to each other. However, it is astonishing to say that ‘to use knowledge and to act against it at the same time, because they are contradictory!’

practised. Namely, the point here is not to say that the drunkard, for instance, cannot know, due to his drunken physical condition, what he knew properly when he was sober. The core of Aristotle's analogy here is to show that people in these physical conditions cannot practise what they know or what they are conscious of, because their physical condition that directly moves the body is not ready to practise the knowledge they have.

In the passage above, Aristotle seems to mean that the physical condition of those three people is similar to the *pathos* of the acratice. This means, I think, that in the acratice case as well, the agent has knowledge about the particular situation, but he or she cannot practise it because of the existence of an obstructing element in his or her emotional disposition.

Here Aristotle also says that the *pathos* makes 'change in body'. This also shows that the use of practical knowledge means acting (*to pratein*). Again, the *pathos* is what directly initiates action, but the affective state (*pathos*) of the acratice is not obedient to the knowledge that the agent has in his rational soul. Therefore, while the acratice person is in a sufficient – still inferior to knowledge of the *phronimos* though- cognitive state regarding the specific situation the acratice him or herself faces, since his affective state is not ready to follow the rational prescription, the acratice cannot act in the way that knowledge prescribes.

Of course, the drunkard cannot be conscious sufficiently of the situation he is facing, and the sleeper cannot know either. However, this is not the point of Aristotle's analogy here. The point is that there is an emotional disposition that stops the practicing knowledge. In such emotional disposition, knowledge and emotion (character) have not become integrated yet²³⁶. Naturally this is due to some malfunction in the process of moral habitation or training. Therefore, if this is correct, the reason why Aristotle writes about "men under the influence of these passions utter scientific proofs and verses of Empedocles", and "those who have just begun to learn a science can string together its phrases" can be explained easily. Namely, what is important is that Aristotle's interest is not in what kind of knowledge or cognitive state these people have. Rather, his focus is

²³⁶ Cf., Dahl (1984), p.147, "What this means is that Aristotle's position on practical reason allows him to rank on a continuum those who have a correct idea of the good, depending on just how well this end has been integrated into their character. At the top of the continuum will be the *phronimos*, who has the natural ends of human beings fully integrated into his character..."

on some unstable emotional disposition that cannot properly support what the agent is sufficiently conscious of. The reason that these people have such an unstable emotional disposition is because, since their moral habituation has not been performed ideally, their emotions, regarding what to be liked or to be disliked²³⁷, were not excellently formed.

I think that Aristotle's saying that 'the beginner who strings words together' and that 'it takes time for knowledge to be part of ourselves' is also an analogy showing that their training has not been performed well yet. Also through the remark about the actor on the stage, Aristotle means that they also repeat words only for the purpose of acting, but the words are not intimated into the actors themselves. That is, Aristotle seems to take this remark to represent the case in which the emotional disposition of the agent and knowledge of the one are not entirely intimated yet. So, again, I think that the examples mentioned here are cases where the soul and knowledge *have not become one yet (ou symphyénai)*²³⁸. Therefore, at least in this passage, the core point of Aristotle's discussion on the cause of *acrasia* is not knowledge but the emotional disposition concerned with the so-called irrational soul. Consequently, this passage either cannot support TI by showing that the acratist fails to be aware of the details regarding the specific situation, and that is why one acts an acratist action.

For, what Aristotle says in this passage is at most that the affective state (*pathos*) that makes changes in the body prevents the agent from acting on knowledge or whatever else the cognitive state the acratist has. At least, in this passage, we cannot know yet clearly whether the acratist person is sufficiently conscious of the situation given or not. There is no decisive evidence to affirm or negate this question. Aristotle did not mention it, clearly because it was not his interest.

4.2.3.4 PART 4 [1147a24-1147b19] - Practical Syllogism and *acrasia*

TI thinks that in this passage Aristotle analyses the ignorance, as they think, the cause of acratist action, in the scientific perspective, whereas in the previous passages he deals

²³⁷ As I have already maintained, emotional/affective disposition plays a main role in sharing the conclusion of deliberation. Cf., my note 163 in Section 2.2.2 in Chapter Three & Brodie/Rowe (2002), p.44.

²³⁸ *EN* 7.3, 1147a22-23.

with the cause (ignorance) in different perspectives, logical and dialectical, etc.²³⁹ Therefore, TI takes Aristotle to conclude by saying that the acratice agent, due to the operation of physical desire (*epithymia*), cannot use knowledge of the most particular premise in practical syllogism. That is, the acratice cannot be sufficiently conscious of the particular premise as a proper component of the practical reasoning. This eventually means, according to TI, that the acratice fails to be aware of the fact that the specific situation where the acratice belongs is the one where his general principle, the major premise of the so-called ‘reason’ syllogism, has to be applied to.

However, I do not agree with TI about the relation between these four passages in question. According to my interpretation, in PART 1 Aristotle, assuming that action against one’s knowledge is ‘logically’ possible, explains rather roughly the intellectual condition of those doing such actions. In PART 2, he explains, analysing more specifically the structure of knowledge regarding ‘*ta praktika*’ and employing the terminologies of practical syllogism, in which cognitive condition acts against one’s knowledge. In PART 3, after having hinted that the agents acting against what they know about particulars is in a specific emotional disposition or character, Aristotle seems to state that the emotional disposition or affective condition (*pathos*) of these agents and the physical conditions of the drunkard, the sleeper and the lunatic are similar to each other regarding their relation to knowledge or cognitive state of theirs. Aristotle also emphasizes that, in these cases, knowledge of the agent is not fully intimated into his or her emotional disposition or character. Again, knowledge, if we can say, in this case did not become a *second nature* of the agent.

In PART 4, I think that Aristotle analyses the affective state (emotional disposition) of the acratice agent, of course, regarding its relation to knowledge of the agent. In my interpretation, this is the substantial investigation of the cause of the acratice action by which Aristotle intends to distinguish himself from Socrates²⁴⁰. Therefore, against TI, I think that the research of the cause of *acrasia* is carried out, for the first time, in this passage. Hence, Aristotle’s hidden assumption so far is, I think, that when the acratice acts acraticeally, although it is clear that his or her cognitive state is not excellent as much as that of the *phronimos* is, his cognitive state itself, whether it is knowledge or belief, is

²³⁹ Broadie’s commentary on 1147a24-5 in Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.391.

²⁴⁰ EN 7.2, 1145b21-29.

not the essential cause of acratia action. Aristotle instead means that there is a more fundamental reason why one is acratia, and this is the cause of acratia action. I take Aristotle to mean that that is significantly related to the *pathos*. Hence, in the analysis of the cause of *acrasia*, we should lay the centre of gravity to the emotional and affective domain, not the rational or deliberative in Aristotle's division of the soul (*EN* 1.13 and 6.2). Having what I said so far in mind, we shall now see the details of PART 4.

In general, as most commentators read, I agree that in *EN* 1147a27-31 Aristotle, contrasting theoretical syllogism and practical syllogism, states that while the former syllogism yields a belief or a proposition through the combination of premises, in the latter, as soon as we acquire the minor premise, we act²⁴¹. Therefore, it seems right to say that this part is parallel with the passages²⁴² in *DA* and *MA* where Aristotle says the *telos* of theoretical thought is to draw a thought, but that of practical thought is to act. However, the most controversial part in this passage, PART 4, is 1147a31-35. So we shall see this part more carefully.

“(PART 4A) So when one universal premiss is in the agent preventing tasting and so is one saying that everything sweet is pleasant – and this is sweet (and the latter premiss is active), (PART 4B) and there happens to be appetite in the agent, then the first one says ‘avoid this’, but the appetite drives him to it; for it can move each of the parts... (*EN* 7.3, 1147a31-35)”

(1) PART 4 A (1147a31-33): Universal Beliefs that of Acratic Agent

This part shows, I think, what kind of belief on moral values the not-very-successfully-habituated-emotional disposition allows the acratia to have. What is important is that, in a sense against TI, we have to be very careful to say that Aristotle thinks there is something called, ‘the syllogism of desire’.²⁴³ It is not clear, for me, that Aristotle says ‘this is sweet’ as a minor premise of the reasoning started from the universal belief, “everything sweet is pleasant.” There is no decisive evidence to claim that there is an entirely separate from the other universal belief, syllogistic reasoning from the premise

²⁴¹ Broadie/Rowe's comments on the passages 1147a27-8 and 1147a29-30 in Broadie/Rowe (2002), p392, cf., Irwin (1999), p.259-260.

²⁴² Again, representatively, *MA* 701a9-13, 20 & *DA*, 432b25-433a3, cf., Section 2.2.2.

²⁴³ Dahl (1984), p.151, “At 1147a32ff, Aristotle seems to refer to two competing syllogisms, one that the *acratia* fails to act on (the syllogism of reason), and the other that he does act on (the syllogism of desire)...” Kenny (1966), pp.179-83. Cf., Charles, D (1984), pp.119-120 where he explains about ‘the syllogism of pleasure’.

“everything sweet is pleasant”. I think it is more natural to say that Aristotle just describes the particular situation where the given agent who has both beliefs mentioned is. However, I still do not claim that Aristotle, stating the sentence ‘this is sweet’, does not mean any conceptual connection of it to the universal belief ‘everything sweet is pleasant’. Surely, there is not need to deny that there is a reasoning from such ‘self-indulgent’ belief to the sentence ‘this is sweet’ as long as *it is not an independent syllogism which means ‘deliberation’, but a sort of reasoning, still a component of deliberation.* In my interpretation, the reasoning from the premise ‘everything sweet is pleasant’ to ‘this is sweet’ is not an independent deliberation as a result of which the acratia acts, but it is rather a sort of preventative element that *obstructs the agent performing an efficient deliberation to draw a conclusion saying ‘avoid this.’* Two points, then, should be mentioned when ending this paragraph; this remark cannot be used for the claim that the acratia acts as a result of deliberation. The so-called ‘bad’ deliberation, and the obstructing element to the acratia action is not only the occurrence of physical desire, which will be mentioned in a moment, but the acratia’s emotional disposition in general does also obstruct the deliberation²⁴⁴. Presumably, a more fundamental obstructing element is the acratia’s *pathos* in general, but the occurrence of physical desire is, in principle, a specific outcome of such *pathos*.

What Aristotle seems to say here is that the acratia *hexis* of the emotional soul, that has been formed through a not-very-successful moral habituation, lets the acratia agent (or his or her deliberative soul) possess two potentially conflicting universal beliefs, i.e. that ‘we should avoid tasting something’ and that ‘everything sweet is pleasant’. However, as I briefly mentioned earlier, it is not correct to say that the preventing element in the emotional disposition that causes the acratia to believe these potentially incompatible premises is confined to such an abstract level. Surely, the preventing element operates in the particular case as well. When the acratia person faces the specific situation where both universal beliefs can be applied, his or her emotional disposition tends to guide the agent to act according to the momentary impulse or physical desire, ignoring the correct prescription reasoned from the good universal belief. In short, the emotional disposition,

²⁴⁴ We have to note that, although here in *EN* 1147a33-35 Aristotle seems to say that due to the *epithymia* we come to act acratiaally, mostly in other passages Aristotle states that the cause of *acrasia* is the *pathos* in general; see, *EN* 1147a 10-20, 1147b14-18, 1150b19-22, 1151a20-22 and many others. However, more detailed discussions will be provided in Section 5 on moral habituation.

in an abstract or conceptual level, lets the akratic possess two potentially conflicting beliefs, and, in a particular situation, allows the physical desire to occur to move the body of the akratic. Therefore, I think, it is more natural to say that when Aristotle mentions the universal belief “everything sweet is pleasant”, he is to explain the characteristic of the akratic’s emotional disposition, the result of the not-perfectly-good moral habituation that enables its agent to have a universal belief that is not harmonious with his or her general moral principle. Also, it seems to me that it is then more reliable to say that the sentence “this is sweet” is not stated as the minor premise of some syllogism, but is mentioned to describe a certain specific situation *where the operation of the physical desire, a characteristic outburst of such not-excellent emotional disposition, happens*. I believe that Aristotle’s specific way of expression in the following passage can confirm that this interpretation should be admitted.

(2) PART 4 B (1147a33-34): The Operation of *epithymia*, the Obstruct in the Particular Level

It is noticeable that in this part (1147a33-35; after the occurrence of *epithymia*) Aristotle does not specifically mention the universal belief of pleasure²⁴⁵, whereas he states the other universal belief prescribing not to taste it. It seems to me that the important contrast here is between the ‘good’ universal belief (and its reasoning to this specific situation) and the occurrence of *epithymia*. I think, against TI, that here Aristotle rather clearly admits the so-called reasoning of ‘reason’ because when he says here the first belief encourages “avoid this!” this means no other than that the akratic finishes his or her (good) deliberation (from the wish on the real good, or, *to agathon*). Therefore, he or she judges sufficiently what is wrong and what is good in the situation given, i.e. he is conscious of the detailed elements in the specific situation which he or she belongs to. Namely, the akratic agent who succeeds in deliberating what to do is initially encouraged by the belief ‘we should not avoid tasting something’, *is aware of*, in the relation of the first universal belief, *the specific situation where the thing in front of himself is a sweet thing*. As long as what he has as a result of deliberation is still ‘*prohairesis*’, it is also clear that he has a correct intention not to taste it. However, the emotional soul that changes the body (*methistasin to soma*)²⁴⁶ when there is a sweet thing in front of the akratic person will

²⁴⁵ See, my note 243.

²⁴⁶ EN 7.3, 1147a14-15 & cf., EN 1.13 1102b13-25.

cause an operation of physical desire towards the sweet thing. Again, this is not a desire drawn from the deliberation that, some people say²⁴⁷, triggers an acratia action. Therefore, even the weak-willed acratia action is not initiated by such deliberation, but is stimulated by the momentary occurrence of a relevant physical desire. In this very sense, Aristotle seems to say that the acratia acts acratia due to *epithymia* (*EN* 3.2, 1111b13-5). But, again, in the case of *acrasia*, if we think that this physical desire stops the acratia's consciousness (on particulars) entirely, it will be a mistake. For, as we have seen in the passage in *EN* 1.13, there is a genuine conflict between the deliberative soul and the emotional soul. What, the physical desire is, then, essentially obstructing is 'acting' rather than 'knowing'. Again, where Aristotle mentions "the one-first- opinion bids us avoid this!", we can see that Aristotle says this acratia agent is not only aware of the fact that the situation where the agent oneself belongs is where his moral principle – we should not eat something- has to be applied to, but also is aware of the rather specific prescription "avoid this" telling him what to do very specifically in this situation. In short, Aristotle suggests here as well that at least one type of acratia agent grasps correctly both where he is and what he has to do now in order to act according to his moral principle.

Clearly, it is true that, comparing it to the *phronimos*, the acratia cognizes the situation given insufficiently. However, this 'relatively' insufficient level of the acratia's cognition is not seriously bad as much as it can be said that, for Aristotle, the acratia is not aware of what he is doing here and now. The acratia failing to actualize knowledge of the most particular premise only fails to practise such knowledge due to recalcitrant desire, but he still sufficiently cognizes the fact that what he is doing is something wrong. In this sense, for Aristotle, the conscious *acrasia* is possible. Furthermore, it is not exact enough, not wrong either though, to say that such insufficiency of the acratia's cognition is due to *epithymia*. More fundamentally, such insufficiency of the deliberative function is originated in some sort of malfunction of moral habituation. About the relationship between habituation and *acrasia*, I will deal with in a moment in Section 5. Anyhow, the *acrasia*, at least one type dealt with in the context of *EN* 7.3, indicates an emotional

²⁴⁷ Cf., Anscombe (1965), p.148, "...something is only a 'choice' if it is of means to the objects of a man's 'will'; hence, however much calculation may have gone into determining it, if it is of what is only a means to the objects of a man's *epithymiai*, his 'desire', then unless his 'will' in life is to satisfy these desires (as holds of the licentious man) it is not a 'choice'...". By the 'calculation' here, Anscombe means 'some' deliberation according to which the acratia acts.

disposition of a person that genuinely conflicts with a moral decision (*prohairesis*) in the deliberative soul in the same person, and thereby, in principle, there is no strong reason, concerning Aristotle's division of the soul, to deny the 'conscious' *acrasia*. This interpretation on weak-willed *acrasia* will be more persuasive through reading the remaining passage in *EN* 7.3.

(3) PART 4 C [1147b1-5] *acrasia*: In Some Sense, Under (*hypho*) *logos* and *doxa*, and Animal.

“So it turns out that uncontrolled behaviour is due to reason, in a way, and to judgment, but one that is not in itself, but only incidentally, contrary – for what is contrary is the appetite, nor the judgement (*doxa*)- to the correct prescription (so this is another reason why animals are not un-self-controlled, i.e., because they do not have a universal grasp (*hypolēpsis*), only the capacity to receive appearances from, and to remember, particulars). (*EN* 1147b1-5)”

In this passage, Aristotle says that since what is contrary to the *orthos logos* is *epithymia*, the belief is merely incidentally thus. TI might understand this to mean that, Aristotle says, due to the physical desire, the deliberation of the acratist agent has gone wrong in the middle of it. Namely, the deliberation has not been completed. However, this is not a correct reading. This passage as well represents both the acratist's sufficient cognition on the given situation and the possibility of the genuine conflict between reason and emotion. Again, the belief and reasoning that are not contrary to the *orthos logos* in themselves indicate the deliberation of the acratist that fails to be practised, but not that fails to yield the *prohairesis*. Hence, here what Aristotle suggests is that, although the acratist has a true belief and a correct deliberation from such belief, what he actually does is what is contrary to the conclusion of the deliberation. This happens because of the operation of the recalcitrant desire, or *epithymia*. Namely, again, it is possible for a genuine conflict to be between the deliberative soul and the emotional soul, and this can allow one type of acratist, the weak-willed, to be correctly conscious of what is going on in the given situation.

Additionally, mentioning the lack of universal belief as a reason why animals cannot fall into 'being acratist', Aristotle does not mean that, while the acratist person acts acratistically due to the desire against one's universal belief, animals cannot be acratist since there is no universal belief to be against. I think his point is slightly different; Aristotle talks about universal belief in this context, because, although this is 'what you can start deliberation with', and a prerequisite condition for *prohairesis*, the animals cannot even start deliberating,

due to the lack of such belief. Namely, what Aristotle seems to mean is; since the animals do not grasp (*hypolambanein*) a particular situation, and there is only perceptual imagination (*phantasia*) for animals, there can be no conflict between practical reason and physical desire. That is, the difference between the moral agent and the animal he means to emphasize here is not about ‘having universal belief or not’, but the ‘genuine conflict between *nous* and *pathos*.’ Consequently, in this passage as well, we can take Aristotle to say that the akratic is not against one’s universal belief, but against knowledge or some perceptual knowledge about particulars. We should also remember that above (1147a31-35) Aristotle describes the akratic situation first mentioning the correct prescription from the first or good universal belief and then adding the occurrence of the obstacles, i.e. *epithymia*.

(4) PART 4 D (1147b5-8): Recovering from Ignorance

“As for how the un-self-controlled type’s ignorance is resolved, and this behaviour becomes once again knowledge-based, the same account applies as in the case of the drunken discussing; this account one needs to get from the natural scientists (*EN* 1147b5-8)”

Probably for TI, because of this passage as well, the *acrasia* Aristotle importantly deals with in *EN* 7.3 is the one who is properly ignorant. However, I don’t at all claim that the akratic is the same as the *phronimos* regarding the intellectual perspective. Namely, when comparing it to the *phronimos*, in the case of the akratic agent there is clearly some factor that makes the intellectual level of the akratic insufficient to be ‘*phronēsis*’. However, what Aristotle means by the *agnoia* here is not the complete failure of the awareness of the particular situation, I think. He means the gap between an intellectual excellence of the *phronimos*, called, *phronēsis*, and the intellectual level of the akratic agent. What I claim throughout this chapter is that such a gap is not big as much as we can charge the akratic not to be aware of the particular details in the given situation. I can further claim that regarding conceptual contents in their practical information about the given situation, there should be no significant difference between *phronimos* and akratic, as long as the akratic also decides (*prohairessthai*). Again, the akratic also reaches the *prohairesis*, the combination of the right judgment and the correct intention to follow it. The significant difference between the *phronimos* and the akratic is, I think, the strength and the intensity of their desire in general (*orexis*) to follow the judgment (*krisis*) of what to do. Namely, the desiderative or motivational element in deliberation of the akratic

agent is not as strong as that of the *phronimos* is. I think, this is the important gap between these two different moral agents, but the gap regarding the conceptual content in their deliberations is not seriously big. Consequently, we can still say that the akratic, in the conceptual sense, rather properly understands the situation given. In short, the existence of the conscious akratic action is possible.

(5) PART 4 E (1147b9-17): Aristotle and Socrates on *epistêmê*

“But since the final premise (*he télentaia protasis*) is both a judgment about something perceived, and what determines actions, either he does not have this (the final premise earlier) because he is affected as he is, or he ‘has’ it in the sense in which we said ‘having’ was not a matter of knowing (*ephistasthai*) but only of talking (*legein*), like the drunk with the verses of Empedocles. And because the last premiss (*ton eschaton horon*) is not universal and does not seem to express systematic knowledge in the way the universal premiss does, one also seems to get what Socrates was looking for; for it is not what seems to be knowledge in the primary sense that the affective state in question overcomes (nor is it this kind of knowledge that is ‘dragged about’ because of the state), but the perceptual kind (*tê aisthêtikê*) (EN 1147b9-17)”

Knowledge about the last premise, whatever it is, that the akratic cannot practise means that he lacks it or he does not have enough to practise it. That is, this knowledge is not yet intimated into the akratic’s character. Therefore, in this case, although we ‘have’ knowledge, our ‘having’ it cannot yet guarantee that we can always practise it; for instance, if there is a recalcitrant element, such as physical desire, our emotional disposition cannot practise such knowledge.

Although Socrates rather clearly says that the akratic is in ignorance, there may be some reason why Aristotle might not take Socrates to announce decisively that the akratic person fails to be aware of what he is doing. Namely, even for Socrates, he may assume that the akratic agent is conscious of the details of the particular situation. However, what Socrates seems to emphasize is that such consciousness is not at least proper *epistêmê*. The reason that Socrates says this is not because this consciousness of the akratic is in the level of some serious lack of knowledge, but because his consciousness is dragged about by his emotional disposition. Again, maybe Aristotle suggests here that even Socrates, rather than merely denying that the akratic is aware of what he is doing is bad, emphasizes that the intellectual level of the akratic is not *kurio epistêmê*, and claims, in this very sense, that the akratic does not have ‘knowledge’.

(6) PART 4 F (1147b18-19)

“Let this much, then, stand as our treatment of the ‘knowing and not knowing’ aspect of the subject, and of the sense in which it is possible for someone to know and yet act uncontrolledly... (EN 1147b18-19)”

So far, I have shown that we can read the controversial passages in a non-traditional way, that is, in a way that allows us to harmonize the content of EN 7.3 with Aristotle’s comments elsewhere on the weak-willed *acrasia*. After all, I can secure the consistency in Aristotle’s account on *acrasia* and then claim that Aristotle discusses both types of *acrasia* in the discussion in EN 7.3. Furthermore, I maintain that Aristotle attempts to compromise between the view of *hoi polloi* and Socrates’s view about the ‘knowledge’ of *acraustes*. For, I show that, although, as Socrates means, the intellectual condition of the acratist is not the *epistêmê*, his or her intellectual condition is still sufficient for him or herself to be aware of the fact that what is going on is bad in the given situation and thereby, for him or her to suffer from a genuine conflict between reason and emotion in the case of the weak-willed *acrasia*.

Aristotle seems to suggest this; although Socrates’ statement ‘the proper intellectual condition of the acratist is not the *epistêmê*, as a systematic knowledge’, is not a wrong description²⁴⁸ of the acratist’s intellectual condition, it cannot be a substantial explanation regarding our current issue, on the cause of the acratist action. For, the cause of the acratist action that Aristotle sees does not lie in the rational part of the soul, but in the emotional part, that is, it is the operation of recalcitrant desire. Consequently, merely concentrating on the rational part of the soul will not help to figure out what the real cause of *acrasia* is, Aristotle believes. Therefore, remember that the substantial or essential cause of *acrasia* is the operation of *epithymia* and, in general, the characteristics of the acratist’s emotional disposition (EN 1.13, 1102b30), and that it is what is developed as a result of moral habituation (EN 1.13-2.1). Now, to investigate the actual cause of the *acrasia*, as it can be anticipated, we shall see how *acrasia* can be explained in terms of moral habituation.

5. How One Becomes Acratic; Characters and Moral Habituation

²⁴⁸ Surely, the reason that is not the *epistêmê* should be different between Socrates and Aristotle. For, Socrates thinks this because what is overcome by something else cannot be *epistêmê*, but Aristotle supposes so, because this is not the case where knowledge in proper sense is applicable.

It is worth remembering that, assuming that the acratia is the one who is under the influence of *pathos*, Aristotle mentions that the relation of the acratia to knowledge (*epistēmē*) they have in a sense, and that of people like drunkards and sleepers to their knowledge are similar²⁴⁹. Again, Aristotle's point of analogy here is that in both cases, although the agents have knowledge somehow, their internal dispositions that directly moves the body do not allow their 'knowledge' to be practised. Hence I claim, against TI, that Aristotle does not introduce here a further division of the cases of acting against one's knowledge, but he is hinting that we need to study *pathos* to know substantially how the acratia action occurs. For me, therefore, Aristotle, before his intensive discussion on the cause of *acrasia* that is about to begin²⁵⁰, is organizing some sort of preliminary discussion. It will be easily reckoned that if you see the text carefully after 1147a10, the point of Aristotle's discussion on *acrasia* is moved to the *pathos*, from the senses of 'knowing (*to epistasthai*)'. Consequently, it should be noted that in PART 3 above, Aristotle, suggesting that the emotional disposition of the acratia agent is the main factor preventing him from practicing knowledge he has – in the sense of 'possessing (*ktasthai*)', is preparing for the intensive discussion on '*pathos*' as a substantial cause of *acrasia* (that he talks about in PART 4).

If this is the case, in order to figure out the cause of acratia action, it is necessary to analyse the emotional disposition of the agent. That is the psychological study. If we agree to say that psychology, for Aristotle, is a sort of natural science, it seems that he, mentioning 'someone would observe the cause *physikōs* in 1147b24-5', clarifies the beginning of the substantial, that is, psychological study on the cause of acratia action²⁵¹.

Thus, assuming that Aristotle's investigation into the cause of *acrasia* is the analysis of the acratia's emotional disposition, there are two points to be mentioned before continuing the explanation of the relation between *acrasia* and moral habituation. (1) First of all, the emotional soul, in Aristotle's division of the soul, is the part that excellence of character (*ēthikē aretē*) concerns. Namely, excellence of character is the excellent disposition of the emotional soul. (2) Also, remember, such an excellent character or emotional disposition is developed and formed through the perfect habituation. Hence, it can also be said that while what counts as perfect and ideal

²⁴⁹ See, PART 3 above.

²⁵⁰ *EN* 7.3, 1147a10-23.

²⁵¹ Cf., Grant (1874), pp.205-6.

habituation brings about the agent of the character-excellence, and eventually the *phronimos*, the-not-very-successful habituation, then, comes to give birth to other-inferior-characters; the *enkratic*, the *acritic* and even the vicious agent, depending on how bad the malfunction of the habituation or moral education is. *Ergo*, we can see now that the moral habituation in Aristotle is devoted to the cultivation of the emotional disposition, and, importantly, that depending on how successful the habituation is, different dispositions of the emotional soul will be given birth to.

More specifically, if the performance of habituation is successful, it will produce the emotional disposition completely and fully in accordance with the prescription from the deliberative soul; the *hexis probairetikê* to the real good. Surely, however, the acritic emotion is not a fruit of the perfect habituation. Therefore, the emotional disposition of the acritic does not listen very well to the prescription of the rational domain as much as that of the character-excellent agent does. More importantly, the mark of the inferiority of this emotional disposition produced from the relatively good habituation is the fact that it is often vulnerable²⁵² to temptation from the type of pleasure that the self-indulgent blindly pursues (*EN* 1146b19-24). Namely, the malfunction of habituation that eventually gives birth to the acritic agent, specifically, forms the emotional disposition in question that physically and psychologically causes the acritic action; the *hexis 'ou-probairetikê'* This is completely compatible with what I said in the previous chapter; the acritic agent reaches the *prohairesis* through deliberation, but he cannot practise it due to some recalcitrant impulse in the emotional disposition of himself. Again, in the case of the acritic agent, the emotional disposition that in its nature directly moves the body obstructs the practice of action following the correct prescription (*orthos logos*). Therefore, the *pathos* is the cause of the acritic action in this sense.

Yet, this is not yet the comprehensive explanation of the cause of the acritic action. The mode in which the emotional disposition becomes a cause of the acritic action needs to be explained more complicatedly. Again, the emotional disposition is what is formed as a result of habituation (*ethismos*).²⁵³ Therefore, it is also true that one is acritic if and only if the habituation that makes him or her thus is neither a successful or ideally performed

²⁵² I mean 'comparing to two superior characters, the excellence of character and the *enkrateia*'.

²⁵³ Especially in *EN* 2.1, but this is Aristotle's general assumption for the discussion throughout from *EN* 1.13 to *EN* 2.6 and also at *EN* 3.5. cf., Brodie/Rowe (2002) p. 388.

one. However, what is important is that the emotional disposition or the character formed through such-not-perfectly-good habituation, naturally contains some negative elements, i.e. beliefs or wishes towards some apparent good or limited end that the excellent-character agent lacks. I think that when Aristotle mentions something preventing an agent from acting according to the practical syllogism given (1147a30-31), he also implies these negative elements inside the emotional disposition. It would merely think that such preventing elements are the physical desire that obstructs the agent's correct cognition of the particular premise "this is sweet". Surely, such a physical desire occurring from the emotional disposition interrupts the akratic's acting according to his deliberation. However, this explanation fails to manifest the nature of the *pathos*, the cause of akratic action²⁵⁴. It would be a mistake, I think, to understand that the negative elements, or the anti-rational elements in the emotional disposition of the akratic, are generated because of some malfunction of habituation and occur only in the context of particulars. It must not be disregarded that what lets the akratic agent have the wrong belief that "everything sweet is pleasant", the so-called major premise of the 'pleasure' practical syllogism, is also what reflects an inferiority of the akratic's emotional disposition. In short, the *pathos* is, comprehensively, the cause of the akratic action in the following sense; not only does it prevent the agent from practicing the conclusion of the so-called 'reason' practical syllogism in accordance with the relevant universal belief, but it also allows the agent to possess a bad universal belief within him or herself.

In addition, that is why I have preferred to deny, in my analysis for the PART 4, that there are two independent deliberations in the deliberative soul of akratics. What I mean is that the akratic's deliberation, of course, implies thinking about the bad universal belief and even allows the agent to cognize 'this is sweet' based on such a bad universal belief. However, we cannot say that 'thinking or reasoning about the so-called bad universal belief and particular premise' is an independent deliberation from the akratic's good deliberation through which he or she reaches, anyway, the *prohairesis*. Such a reasoning or thinking should be constitutive to the 'good' deliberation that the akratic performs, but it functions within the good deliberation as a recalcitrant and preventing factor interrupting the efficient and excellent deliberation in the akratic agent. Again, the akratic's thoughts that "everything sweet is pleasant" and "this is sweet" are not the

²⁵⁴ See, PART 4A above.

independent deliberation through which, one can say, the acratice's acratice action is also a result of deliberation. The acratice action cannot be a *prohairesis* at all.

So far, I have shown that Aristotle's focus in his discussion on the cause of *acrasia* is not on whether the acratice has knowledge or not, but on what kind of emotional disposition (*pathos*) the acratice has in the relation to knowledge he merely possesses. Therefore, I believe that what I have emphasized can also suggest that when Aristotle seems to mean the *acrasia* occurs due to one's emotional disposition, he is not avoiding some complicated explanation, but he is actually stating a substantial answer for it. In short, the cause of *acrasia* is, really, the recalcitrant operation of emotional soul, not merely the ignorance or the intellectually insufficient condition of the agent. In the remaining sections, I will establish the relation between Aristotle and Socrates on *acrasia* in the context of the interpretation I claim.

6. Aristotle and Socrates on *acrasia* and *epistêmê* in the Alternative Interpretation

First of all, I want to clarify, again, that I also admit that Aristotle does not disagree with Socrates about a thesis that the intellectual condition of the acratice is not the *epistêmê*, systematic knowledge. That is, there seems to be no disagreement regarding the idea that the cognitive condition of the acratice being overcome by desire is not the *epistêmê*, but something else.

However, in my interpretation, *this* similarity between Aristotle and Socrates is not important, because that is not what Aristotle wants to show by referring to the Socratic conclusion for the impossibility of *acrasia*. The reason that Aristotle cites Socrates' remark is, I think, because he wants to maintain that his account on *acrasia* is, not only, to be distinguished from Socrates', but also is it a better treatment regarding the cause of acratice action. More specifically, Aristotle's thought is that merely stating that the intellectual condition of the acratice in a particular situation is not the *epistêmê* cannot explain sufficiently the cause of, and, in turn, the identity of *acrasia*. Presumably, Aristotle sees that the Socratic conclusion on the *acrasia* is not an entirely wrong description about the *acrasia*, but it cannot be, although Socrates thinks it can, a substantial or sufficient explanation on the essential cause of the emotional disposition in the acratice. Now, it

will be useful to see why Socrates thinks his conclusion is enough to explain the cause of *acrasia*, but we shall first see how Aristotle introduces Socrates' account.

At the beginning of *EN* 7.2, Aristotle introduces Socrates' account on *acrasia* in this way; Socrates thinks that the acratia against one's *epistémé* is impossible. Socrates thinks (maybe Aristotle agrees with this much) it will be impossible that, inside a person possessing knowledge, something else than knowledge can drag about knowledge just like a slave. This line of thought can surely be logically extended to the claim that when one judges correctly (*hypolambanein orthós*) what is best, it is not possible that the agent acts against such a judgment at the same time, and therefore, that, if one acts in this way the agent does not know that what he or she is doing is against his or her judgment on the best. (*EN* 7.2, 1145b20-28) Therefore, according to Socrates, the existence of the acratia (*ousia akrasias*) correctly judging is not possible. Hence, *acrasia* described acting against knowledge as not possible, because there is no knowledge to be against. Therefore, for Socrates, if one's character is called thus, it is not significantly different from the vicious character as long as both *acrasia* and *vice* (*kakia*) happen due to being ignorant about the good²⁵⁵. It is generally known that Socrates' argument that Aristotle mentions in this context is the discussion on the condition overcome by pleasure, in Plato's *Protagoras*. We shall now see the original discussion.

The position that Socrates argues against in the relevant discussion²⁵⁶ in *Protagoras* is the view of the public (*hoi polloi*) that says that knowledge can be overcome by pleasure²⁵⁷. According to Socrates, they claim that some people often act what they know (*gignoskein*) is bad, because some pleasure the agents can feel through the bad things overcome knowledge in them²⁵⁸. In this part, Socrates explains that people pursue pleasure, and avoid pain, so the acratia agent also acts in accordance with what he judges as what is

²⁵⁵ *Protagoras*, 356c-357c., Cf., Dahl (1984), pp.142-43.

²⁵⁶ *Protagoras* 352a-360d & cf., *Meno* 77b-78b, *Gorgias* 467c-479d, 492c-509d

²⁵⁷ *Protagoras* 352b-c "Come now, Protagoras, and reveal this about your mind: What do you think about knowledge? Do you go along with the majority (*hoi polloi*) or not? Most people think this way about it, that it is not a powerful thing, neither a leader nor a ruler. They do not think of it in that way at all; but rather in this way: while knowledge is often present in a man, what rules him is not knowledge but rather anything else—sometimes anger, sometimes pleasure, sometimes pain, at other times love, often fear; they think of his knowledge as being utterly dragged around by all these other things as if it were a slave..."

²⁵⁸ *Protagoras* 353c-d, " Do you hold, gentlemen, that this happens to you in circumstances like these—you are often overcome by pleasant things like food or drink or sex, and you do those things all the while knowing they are ruinous?..."

pleasant to him or herself. Therefore, the claim that the akratic action – the so-called action against one’s knowledge- is overcome by pleasure falls into a fallacy. For, it should eventually mean that pleasure is overcome by pleasure.²⁵⁹ Hence, for Socrates, the argument that the cause of acting against one’s knowledge is pleasure is wrong, and it is an even more problematic claim that knowledge can be dragged about by pleasure, just like slaves.

How, then, does Socrates identify such acting against knowledge? Or, how does he explain the cause of it? Socrates says that it is an error in calculating what is pleasant and what is painful (*Protagoras* 357d-e). He says that people also judge what is pleasant and what is painful, just as they compare and calculate mathematical objects, and that such a judging ability is ‘calculating-ability’ which is a function of knowledge (*Protagoras* 357b-c). Therefore, as he continues to claim, those who perform this function well and thereby choosing well regarding pleasure and pain, can never act against the decision. However, if one acts what is actually painful to him or herself, it means that this person does not correctly calculate and choose or decide about the pleasant and the painful, and eventually does not have knowledge regarding them. Consequently, for Socrates, the so-called *akrasia* is not the condition where knowledge is overcome by pleasure, but where there is a lack of knowledge. Obviously, according to Socratic intellectualism, saying the lack of knowledge should be enough to determine the cause of the *akrasia*, because, roughly, for Socrates, as long as you systematically know (*gignoskein*) something, there is nothing that can stop the practice of such knowledge. Hence, for Socrates, lacking *epistêmê* is not only the sufficient explanation of *akrasia*, but also, the reason why *akrasia* is impossible.

However, in my interpretation, Aristotle does not think that this explanation of *akrasia* figures out the cause of it properly. For it seems that, regarding the status of the *epistêmê* to other parts of the soul and, in turn, to action, Aristotle holds a different view from Socrates. We shall see the following passage again.

“But since the final premise is both a judgment about something perceived, and what determines actions, either he does not have this because he is affected (*paschein*) as he is, or he ‘has’ it in the sense in which we said ‘having’ was not a matter of knowing (*to epistasthai*) but only of talking (*to legein*), like the drunk with the verses of Empedocles. And because the last premiss is not

²⁵⁹ *Protagoras*, 356a.

universal and does not seem to express systematic knowledge in the way the universal premiss does, one also seems to get what Socrates was looking for; for it is not what seems to be knowledge in the primary sense that the affective state (*pathos*) in question overcomes (nor is it this kind of knowledge that is ‘dragged about’ because of the state), but the perceptual kind (*EN* 1147b9-17)”

According to this important passage on the relation between Aristotle and Socrates on *acrasia* and *epistêmê*, Aristotle seems to understand Socrates in this way; Socrates claims that since the cognitive condition of the *acrasia* is overcome by the *pathos*, whatever it is, it cannot be *epistêmê* by its nature. Still, Aristotle does not either deny that in the case of acratia, the cognitive state overcome by physical desire and passion is not the *epistêmê*, in a primary sense (*kuriôs*). However, importantly, the reason why they say this is different; Socrates says it because what counts as *epistêmê* can necessarily dominate the *pathos*, but for Aristotle the *epistêmê* in a primary sense is irrelevant with such a non-rational element. Therefore, through the statement that the cognitive condition of the acratia is not *epistêmê* (in primary sense), these two philosophers deliver different messages. On the one hand, Socrates means that the acratia’s cognitive condition is inferior to *epistêmê*, and, furthermore, that that is the very reason why it falls into the *acrasia*, on the other, Aristotle suggests that the acratia’s cognitive condition is something different from the primary *epistêmê*. This is surely because in Aristotle the *epistêmê* in the primary sense is not only what is drawn from reasoning and contemplation on universals and theoretical concepts, but also, what is produced for the sake of such reasoning and contemplation. Namely, the *epistêmê* in that sense, for Aristotle, by its nature, is not what is substantially contributive to practical matters.

Yet, Aristotle seems to suggest, as he, in the whole context of *EN*, uses the relevant terms for “knowing”, such as *to epistasthai* and *to eidenai*, in a very wide sense,²⁶⁰ that

²⁶⁰ With the expressions ‘*to epistasthai*’ and ‘*to eidenai*’ (also other related words), Aristotle, throughout *EN*, seems to indicate the cognitive function in general in either a practical context or a theoretical context. See, the following examples, *EN* 1105b2-3 “when it comes to having the excellences, knowledge (*eidenai*) makes no difference, or a small one, whereas the force of the other conditions is not small but counts for everything”, *EN* 1141a17-18, “...the person possessing it (*sophia*) must not only know (*eidenai*) what follows from the starting points, but have a true grasp of the starting points themselves...”. In the former, Aristotle uses ‘*eidenai*’ to mean ‘knowledge in practical context, but in the latter he means ‘theoretical knowledge/’theoretical wisdom’. The same application is possible in the case for the *epistasthai*, *EN* 1113b31-35 “In fact ignorance itself constitutes grounds for penal correction, if the agent seems to be responsible for his ignorance – as when penalties are doubled for people acting while drunk; for the origin is in the agent; it was in his power not to get drunk, which was cause of his ignorance. And they correct people who are ignorant of something laid down in the laws

some sense of conceptual understanding is possible in the case of *acrasia*. I believe that this is what Aristotle indicates by the expression, ‘the perceptual kind (*tên aisthetikēn*)’, in the quotation just above. Therefore, I think, regarding the position about this sort of conceptual understanding, there should be a decisive difference between Aristotle and Socrates. Namely, Aristotle seems to suppose that in the case of *acrasia* the cognitive condition overcome by *pathos* is not the *epistēmē* in a primary sense, but it still contains some sort of conceptual understanding of a given situation. This sort of conceptual understanding is the perceptual kind in the sense that such understanding or conceptualization is, by its nature, affected by the non-rational part of the soul that deals with perception, more exactly in that, being associated with a certain sort of *pathos*, such conceptualization achieves its proper purpose as a rational thinking process for *ta praktā*.

Hence, since this sort of conceptual understanding, again, is, by nature, not separable from affection (*pathos*) and perception (*aisthēsis*), it is essential for the meaning of its existence what kind of affection it is related with. Clearly because of this, Aristotle suggests that stating merely that ‘the acratīc’s cognitive condition’ is not the *epistēmē* cannot provide a substantial contribution to the inquiry into the cause of *acrasia*, so the study on the operation of *orexis* and emotional dispositions should be conducted.

Therefore, for Aristotle, what is overcome by the *pathos* is not the *epistēmē* in a primary sense, that is, scientific knowledge, but conceptual understanding accompanied with perception. Hence, it can also be said that the acratīc cognition contains this conceptualization against which him/herself acts. Again, in the context of discussion on *acrasia*, the conceptual understanding dragged around by *pathos* is the perceptual kind, that is, the cognitive state that is naturally combined with *pathos*. Therefore, the well-trained emotional soul that deals with perception is crucial for that conceptual understanding to be ‘excellently’ practised. Obviously in this sense, regarding the cause of *acrasia*, the inquiry into the habituation is also important, as we have seen in the previous section (section 5).

– one of things one should know (*epistasthai*)...” Surely, although the *epistēmē* in a proper sense means the theoretical science, we can figure out here its related verb ‘*epistasthai*’ can also mean some ‘practical/pragmatic’ knowledge. Consequently, it seems that Aristotle pretty widely uses the verbs for the cognitive functions, so that it can be said that those two verbs commonly mean knowing in a rather loosed sense.

Anyhow, what is important for us is that the cognitive insufficiency in the acratice agent is not the lack of *epistémê*, but the lack of *pathos* well trained, and, in turn, the lack of *phronêsis*. Namely, the sense of ignorance Aristotle refers to regarding the cognitive condition of acratice is the inferiority of the acratice's *prohairesis* comparing to that of the *phronimos*. The significant difference between these two *prohairesis* is regarding the intensity of rational desire or correct intention to follow the rational prescription, rather than regarding the conceptual contents in them. I think it is clear that as long as the weak-willed acratice reaches *prohairesis* and it means he or she at least draws a proper judgment on what is best, Aristotle does not see a big gap between *phronimos* and the weak-willed *acratês*, at least, regarding what they conceptually understand about the situation given. This is an important point, because it can now be said that, regarding this sort of conceptual understanding, even when one does not practise what he or she thinks to do, he or she still possesses sufficient information about what is going on and, eventually, that the conscious or intelligent *acrasia*, denied by Socrates, is possible for Aristotle.

I suppose that Aristotle, by “the perceptual kind” or this sort of conceptual understanding, seems to indicate what he calls ‘*synesis*’ (EN 6.10) or the capacity regarding judgment (*krisis*) (1109b23). Presumably, Socrates, surely because he thinks the primary *epistémê* is authoritative over the practical matters as well, supposes that his sense of the primary *epistémê* can cover the *synesis* as well. However, for Aristotle, although the expressions like the ‘*synesis*’ and the ‘*kritikê*’ indicate some conceptual judgment on relevant details in a given situation, they are never meant to claim that this deliberative element, which is probably the most similar with the activity of theoretical reason²⁶¹, is decisive to the success or failure of deliberation, or to the practice in accordance with the conclusion of deliberation. Therefore, in Aristotle, it is not possible that the element in the deliberative soul that deals with some conceptual understanding (on particular objects) leads the other part to it. Consequently, in the system of Aristotelian deliberation, a thesis that the excellence of some conceptual understanding, mainly because of this, can lead substantially or physically to something else cannot be

²⁶¹ In EN 6.10, Aristotle mentions that the way we acquire the *synesis* is similar with the way we learn the *epistémê*. “Comprehension (*synesis*) is neither having ‘practical wisdom’ nor acquiring it; but just as seeing the point is called ‘comprehending’ when exercising judgement in order to discriminate about the things ‘practical wisdom’ deals with, when someone else is speaking – exercising it in order to discriminate rightly (for ‘excellently’ is the same as ‘rightly’). (EN 6.10, 1142a7-17)”

accepted. Again, even when the agent draws a sufficient level of conceptual judgment on something, it can surely happen that the agent cannot act accordingly. I mean not only that this is possible in Aristotle's account, but also that for Aristotle the most representative case of it is that of the weak-willed *acrasia*. Importantly, this is compatible with the statement that the weak-willed acratist reaches the *prohairesis* in the sense that what is overcome by *epithymia* in the weak-willed is the judgment (*krisis*) on what is best to do, one of two main elements in the relevant *prohairesis*. Before we conclude, there is one point to be mentioned about the *prohairesis* in the weak-willed.

So far, it is clear that the essence of difference between Aristotle and Socrates on *acrasia* lies in their views on the acratist's cognition on a particular situation given. Indeed, I think, the fact that for Aristotle, the weak-willed acratist reaches the *prohairesis* can also be a key to finding out why Aristotle and Socrates are disagreeing about the point just mentioned. Remember, in *EN* 6.9, Aristotle defines the *prohairesis* to be a grasp (*hypolēpsis*). For me, the origin in the different explanations of the *acrasia* from these two philosophers can be found in the fact that they have slightly different views about the term '*hypolēpsis*' (*EN*6.9). At the beginning of *EN* 7.2, Aristotle introduces to us about Socrates who claims that the one correctly grasping (*hypolambanein*) about 'what is the best' cannot be the acratist. However, Aristotle clearly admits that the weak-willed acratist acquires a *hypolēpsis*, since that agent reaches the *prohairesis* anyway. This point becomes more convincing by virtue of Aristotle's relevant remarks in *de Anima*. Aristotle says (*DA* 427b25) that the *hypolēpsis* can come not only from the *epistēmē*, but also from both *phronēsis* and *doxa*. Presumably, Aristotle means, when he introduces Socrates' claim about the correct *hypolēpsis* the acratist cannot have, that Socrates here merely means the *hypolēpsis* as the fruit of the *epistēmē*. Therefore, if so, there is a fundamental difference between Socrates and Aristotle regarding the cognitive level of the acratist agent, and that difference should be about their different views about the *hypolēpsis*. However, the *hypolēpsis* can be drawn not only from the *phronēsis* and, more generally, from the deliberative soul. Furthermore, it seems clear that Aristotle tends to importantly define the *prohairesis* to be a *hypolēpsis*. Therefore, the following is clearly true; the weak-willed acratist, his or her cognitive condition on the particulars is, evidently, not *epistēmē* in primary sense though, reaches a correct 'practical' *hypolēpsis* that implies a correct conceptual judgment (*krisis*) on what is best to do in a given situation. Eventually, in the sense described so far, regarding the cause of *acrasia*, Aristotle maintains a different

treatment from Socrates and in turn claims that the conscious or intelligent *acrasia* is possible.

7. Concluding Remark

Through the discussion in the current chapter so far, I have criticised the traditional interpretation of Aristotle's account on *acrasia* that the acratice agent lacks the proper cognition on the particular situation, and, instead, claimed that, since the weak-willed acratice reaches the *prohairesis*, he or she sufficiently cognizes the relevant elements in a given situation and, in turn, that the conscious *acrasia* is possible. I have also shown, based on this line of argument, that the consistency between Aristotle's discussion in *EN* 7.3 and his remarks on *acrasia* in other contexts can be secured. And most importantly, through this reading I have maintained that Aristotle's treatment on *acrasia* is evidently different from Socrates' account on it; for Aristotle, the cause of *acrasia* is not ignorance, but the genuine conflict between the deliberative soul and the non-rational soul, and, thereby, the conscious *acrasia* or the *acrasia* substantially against one's knowledge is clearly possible. Hence, I think that although it is still too hasty to deny that Aristotle respects Socrates regarding the treatment of *acrasia*, there seems to be no reason to assume that Aristotle admires Socrates too much to be against his account on the impossibility of *acrasia* or to claim that Aristotle's respect for Socrates is expressed in the way that Aristotle does not significantly disagree with Socrates about the impossibility account.

Chapter Five: Aristotle's Definition of Happiness, or *eudaimonia*

In the previous chapters (Chapters Two and Three), having investigated the nature of practical reasoning in Aristotle's ethics, I have shown that it is sharply distinctive from theoretical reasoning. The current chapter will examine how my interpretation of such a characteristic of practical thought (*dianoia praktikê*) in Aristotle can be applied to the discussion on *eudaimonia*, that is, I will test how it can solve the relevant puzzles, such as what the best form of human life is. Hence, the main topic of this chapter is Aristotle's account of *eudaimonia*.

Through the discussion in this chapter, I will provide an alternative 'dominant end' interpretation of Aristotle's account on *eudaimonia*; the best form of human life Aristotle encourages his students or audience to lead is, rather than the life of political activity, the life of contemplation, in which the 'human contemplation', the most characteristic activity of this life, is the best approximation to the activity of god, the focal sense of contemplation. This interpretation will not only criticise the so-called inclusive end interpretation, but also reveals some problems in some of the representative 'dominant end' interpretations.

My discussion in the current chapter will take the following order. I will first introduce a brief outline of the present debate regarding Aristotle's account on happiness (Section 1). Then, I will provide my own interpretation along with the analysis on relevant passages. For this, I will first maintain (Section 2) that there is Aristotle's significant assumption on focal relation in his account on happiness, so we have to understand Aristotle's *eudaimonia* in terms of focal relation. I will also show in the same section that some criticisms (of the 'inclusive end' view) against the 'dominant' reading in general are not successful. In the next section (Section 3), I will then provide a detailed picture on each happy life – life of contemplative activity and life of political activity - and the relation of each other, applying the idea of focal relation to my interpretation of Aristotle's discussion on *eudaimonia*. Through this argument, I will show the competitiveness of my interpretation to other dominant end views.

1. Aristotle and *eudaimonia*

Let us see an important passage regarding Aristotle's idea of happiness:

“... the best (*to ariston*) is evidently something complete (*teleion ti*). So that if there is some one thing alone that is complete, this will be what we are looking for, and if there are more such things than one, the most complete (*to teleiostatou*) of these. Now we say that what is worth pursuing for itself is more complete than what is worth pursuing because of something else, and what is never desirable because of something else as more complete than those things that are desirable both for themselves and because of it; while that is complete without qualification is what is always desirable in itself and never because of something else, we call complete without qualification (*teleion haplôs*). Happiness seems most of all to be like this; for this we do always choose because of itself and never because of something else. (*EN* 1.7, 1097a28-34).”

There are many points that can be mentioned in this passage, but the most relevant point is this; Aristotle says that happiness is, as long as it is an end which is always chosen for the sake of itself but never for the sake of something else, the chief good (*ariston agaton*), the most complete/final/end-like (*teleiostatou*) end or, the end complete/final/end-like without qualification (*teleion haplôs*).

Typically, a dominant end view²⁶² interprets that the most complete end, or the complete end without qualification, indicates an activity of a single excellence, contemplation. Therefore, according to this reading, happiness is the life of contemplation in which the contemplation is pursued only for the sake of itself, and every other activity is also pursued, eventually, for the sake of contemplation. More specifically, in this view, Aristotelian eudaimonic life is the life where the contemplation is the most complete end in the sense that it does not have any other end than itself, and the contemplation is superior or authoritative over every other activity, because they are all chosen as an instrumental mean for contemplation.

However, this is actually problematic, because, as we have seen in the previous chapters, there is no such necessary or causal relation between the functions of each rational soul. If we accept this version of the ‘dominant end’ interpretation, we let Aristotle be inconsistent regarding his thoughts on the relation between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning²⁶³. Along with this reason, the inclusive interpretation criticizes this ‘dominant end’ view believing that there is some inconsistency between *EN* 10 and

²⁶² Representatively, Kenny (1992), Kraut (1989) and Richardson Lear (2004). Also, Hardie (1965), pp. 297-322, & Heineman (1988), pp.31–53 & Meyer (2008), pp.50-63.

²⁶³ For the various discussions on the relation between practical reason and theoretical reason, see Ackrill (1981), pp.138-141, Irwin (1999), p.255, Broadie (1991), pp.207, 160 with n.7, 375-6, 386. Woods, M (1982), pp193-198.

elsewhere in *EN*. That is, since Aristotle never says, the ‘inclusivism’ claims, about the contemplative happiness outside *EN* 10, we cannot be sure whether we can take Aristotle’s remarks on contemplation seriously in *EN* 10²⁶⁴.

Ergo, the inclusive end view, instead, rendering the *teleiōtaton* or the *teleion haplōs* as a comprehensive set of excellences, claims that Aristotelian happiness, the highest form of human life or the most end-like (*teleiōtaton*) end, is a life (activity) in accordance with a set of excellences that include every excellence or at least, every intrinsic excellence. In this interpretation, of course, the *eudaimōn* still does contemplation when he is not in practical or moral circumstance, or when he is in leisure (*scholē*) from practical activities²⁶⁵. Importantly, in this interpretation, the contemplation is not significantly authoritative over other activities, since it is also a constitutional mean, like other excellent activities, for the happy life as a whole.²⁶⁶

However, this ‘inclusive end’ interpretation not only causes many more interpretative problems than its opponents might do, but it also conflicts with the nature of Aristotelian deliberation, that we have seen in previous chapters. This is because, since according to the ‘inclusive end’ view, the general character of Aristotelian best happiness is a morally good life, this interpretation even allows contemplation to be a constitution for activity of *phronēsis*²⁶⁷. Therefore, if my interpretation on the distinction between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning is correct, the ‘inclusive end’ view cannot be accepted either.

Now I have just shown that the most representative interpretations on Aristotle’s account on happiness fail to satisfy Aristotle’s position on the relation between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning. In addition, I think I have introduced, at the same time, the fact that in order to provide a consistent interpretation on Aristotelian happiness there should be a proper investigation on the relation between practical

²⁶⁴ Devereux criticizes Ackrill’s claim that there is inconsistency between Aristotle’s discussion on happiness in *EN* 1 and *EN* 10. See, Ackrill (1980), pp.15-34, Devereux (1981), pp.247–60.

²⁶⁵ *EN* 10.7, 1177b5-9.

²⁶⁶ Most representatively, I refer to for the inclusive end interpretation Ackrill (1980) and Cooper (1999), pp.212-36. However, there are numerous literatures for this position, so if I select some more literatures, Crisp (1994), pp.111–36, Devereux (1981), Irwin (1985), pp.89–124. Keyt (1983), pp. 364-387.

²⁶⁷ Ackrill (1980), Cooper (1999). Cf., Dahl (2011), pp. 66-68.

reasoning (deliberation) and theoretical reasoning (contemplation); the function of the deliberative soul and the function of the scientific soul respectively.

In the remaining part of this chapter, therefore, although I support the ‘dominant end’ view in principle, I will provide an ‘alternative dominant end’ view distinguishing myself from other ‘dominant end’ interpreters. I claim that although it is true that there is some important relation between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning, they are not necessarily or causally related to each other. This is a paradigm-approximation relation and, more specifically, a focal-derivative relation. However, if I briefly say, it does not mean that theoretical reasoning is not a paradigm or focal sense of practical reasoning, although some interpreters argue so²⁶⁸. For, I think, both of these rational thinking processes are approximations of the activity of god, divinity itself, or focally related to it. Of course, it is true that practical reasoning is similar with theoretical reasoning in some aspects²⁶⁹, but in my interpretation, such similarity is no more than that both of them share a common focal sense, the activity of god; contemplation or divinity itself. In the next section, I will provide an explanation of the identity of focal relation in Aristotle’s account on *eudaimonia* and, doing this, nullify the criticisms targeting the ‘dominant end’ view on Aristotle’s happiness.

2. Aristotle’s Usage of godlikeness (*theion*)

The current section is the first half of my own interpretation of Aristotle’s account on *eudaimonia*. In general, I will show in this section that, through his rather ‘ambiguous’ usage of the concept of godlikeness (*theion*), Aristotle assumes a focal relation in the system of his eudaimonism. Further, I will maintain that if this is the case, we can also explain away some important problems regarding the ‘dominant end’ view.

At any rate, it seems clear that the concept of divinity should be a main concept in understanding Aristotle’s idea of *eudaimonia*, because throughout *EN* Aristotle seems to mean that happiness or contemplation implicates something godlike. However, although it is very clear that the happiness and the relevant activities are something godlike, it is often ambiguous how and in what sense they are godlike. For me, the reason of the

²⁶⁸ Cf., Charles (1999), pp. 205-223., Richardson Lear (2004) & Scott (1999), pp225-242.

²⁶⁹ Richardson Lear on structural similarity between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning, see Richardson Lear (2004) pp. 94, 107 and 161.

ambiguity is mainly because Aristotle implicitly indicates two distinctive ‘divine contemplations’, the contemplation of god and the most godlike contemplation of human being. It seems evident that while the former is what is exclusive to god, the latter means some human activity. Hence, the following sections will invite us to see what they are and how related they are, although they are activities of ‘different beings’. Especially, in Section 2.1, I will show the passages where Aristotle clearly indicates the life and contemplation of gods by the concept of divinity. In section 2.2, I will then present the passages where Aristotle states the godlike happiness and the godlike contemplation of human beings. Then, in Section 2.3, I will eventually explain why we think the relation between the life of gods and the life of humans is focal-derivative.

2.1 Contemplation and Happiness Exclusive to Gods²⁷⁰

“... But if praise (*epainos*) is of things like this (excellence of character), it is clear that it is not praise that is appropriate to things that are good to the highest [*ariston*] possible degree, but some thing greater and better (*meizon ti kai beltion*), as in fact accords with our practice, *for we call both gods and the most godlike men ‘blessed* (*makarizomen*)’ and *‘happy* (*eudaimonizomen*)’ EN 1.12 (1101b22-25)”^{271 272}

As long as we think, this is one of the passages where Aristotle clearly means the happiness of gods. If we see the context in this passage, Aristotle says ‘praise’ in general is related to things like the character-excellence (*ethike arete*), but for Aristotle, clearly those things ‘to which the praise is related’ are not the best things²⁷³. For, in this passage, Aristotle suggests that ‘something bigger and better than the praise’ is allocated to the best things. By something ‘bigger and better’ here, he means ‘honour (*time*)’ which, he thinks, is superior to ‘praise’. Naturally the best (*ariston*) things are what are to be honoured, so, for Aristotle, they are what we call *the blessed and happy*. And he states here that the life of gods is clearly one of the things blessed and happy. Hence, I think that in

²⁷⁰ Notice, I did not intend to give a comprehensive interpretation or commentary on the passages mentioned especially in section 2. What I intended to do is to show that, when discussing and describing relevant properties of happiness, Aristotle uses the term ‘divinity’, or ‘*theion*’, rather ambiguously, that is, it has two different indications, ‘human affair’ and ‘god affair’, divine by itself.

²⁷¹ Although here Aristotle does not use the predicate ‘*theion*’, but the expression ‘*makarizomen*’ to indicate the happiness of god, I think this ‘*makarizomen*’ shares a common indication with the ‘*theion*’.

²⁷² cf., EN 1178b6-10 where he says, ‘we think that gods are most blessed and happiest...’

²⁷³ Long (2011), p.107.

this passage Aristotle, mentioning such a life, distinctively means the happiness exclusive to gods.

“But ... happiness ... will be the excellence of what is best. Whether this is intelligence (*nous*) or something else, this element that is thought naturally to rule and guide, and to possess awareness (*ennoia*) of fine things and divine (*theion*) ones – whether being, itself too, divine (*theion*), or the divinest (*theiotaton*) of the things in us ... contemplative (reflective) activity has been said ... (EN 10.7, 1177a11-19)”

In this passage, Aristotle rather explicitly mentions that happiness is the activity according to the best excellence, that is, the contemplative activity. I think, although there is some controversy regarding the indication of *nous* here²⁷⁴, it can be said that, assuming the discussion in this passage is eventually to confirm that the highest kind (*kraitistos*) of happiness is the contemplation, Aristotle here provides, at least implicitly, a subtle distinction between the god's contemplation and the human contemplation. Namely, here, Aristotle commits a contrast between something divine by itself and something (not divine by itself but) the most divine or godlike thing in humans. For me, Aristotle thus opens at least two possibilities of contemplation; the contemplation of gods, on the one hand, and that of humans, on the other. Of course, the former is the divine by itself and the latter is the most divine thing in us, that is, the most godlike activity that a human can perform. I do not claim, yet, that Aristotle maintains the paradigm-approximation relation here as well. However, it seems that Aristotle, saying the distinction mentioned rather ambiguously, is preparing for his more explicit statements in EN 10.8, which we will see in a moment. Anyhow, since it is to be noted that, by the contemplation divine by itself, Aristotle does not indicate any human activity at all, we shall take this passage where Aristotle assumes the existence of contemplation exclusive to gods. In the next passage, we will see Aristotle's clear statements on both contemplation of gods and happiness of gods.

“... the activity of god, superior as it is in blessedness, will be one of contemplation (reflection)... the life of gods is blessedly happy completely throughout... (EN 10.8, 1178b20-26)”

For us, this is one of the unique passages in EN where Aristotle states, at the same time, the relation between god's contemplation and humans', and the relation between god's happiness and humans'. Namely, I think here by the activity of a god, Aristotle means

²⁷⁴ Broadie's commentary on the passage 1177a13-16; Broadie/Rowe (2002) p.441.

the contemplation exclusive to gods, and by the life of gods, he indicates the happiness or the life exclusive to gods. Since this passage is a very important one regarding the relation between the so-called paradigmatic happiness and its approximation, we will come back to this passage to see that important point more carefully. It, however, can be already said that Aristotle significantly provides separate indications for the contemplation of god and the life of god distinctively from those of humans. Hence, I have shown that Aristotle clearly indicates non-human life and activity, as well, by the expression ‘what is divine (*theion*),’ so one would ask why Aristotle needs such non-human happiness in discussing human good. This will become clearer if we see where Aristotle indicates another activity and life by the expression ‘what is divine’.

2.2 Contemplation and Happiness Exclusive to Humans

In this section we will see another indication of Aristotle’s concept of ‘divinity’: human happiness and human contemplation.

“... even if the good is the same for a single person and for a city, the good of the city is a greater and more complete (*téleioteron*) thing ... for while to do so for one person on his own is satisfactory enough, to do it for a nation or for cities if finer (*kallion*) and more godlike (*theiotion*)... (EN 1.2, 1094b8-11)”

This is a passage where Aristotle seems to describe a human good as a sort of godlikeness. Regardless of whether we see the happiness as an inclusive end or a dominant end, it is important to note that in this passage Aristotle attributes human good to something godlike. More specifically, I think it can be sufficiently said that Aristotle even seems to mean that there is a degree of godlikeness in human affairs, so, although both a human good and a city’s good are godlike, the latter is more godlike than the former²⁷⁵. The next passage more clearly shows that some good belongs to human, but also godlike.

“... even if happiness is not sent by gods ... it is one of the most godlike (*theiotaton*) things; for the prize and fulfilment of excellence appears to be to the highest (*ariston*) degree good, and to be something godlike (*theion*) and blessed (*makarion*)... (EN 1.9, 1099b15-19)”

As long as it seems clear that, (1) since happiness here is mentioned as something sent by god or not, happiness in this passage is conceptually distinctive from happiness

²⁷⁵ Cf., Hardie (1965), p.281.

exclusive to gods, and that (2) Aristotle keeps attributing ‘highest good’, ‘godlike’ and ‘blessed’ to such (human) happiness as well, it can be said that Aristotle here as well describes a human life to be divine or godlike. Of course, again, at this stage it is not certain yet either that what kind of happiness, between life of contemplation and life of political and moral activity, mentioned in *EN* 10, 7-8, Aristotle means here. However, what is important is, I think, that at least we can say that Aristotle suggests here that in evaluating human lives as well, i.e, whether a certain life is a well-living one or how well it is, the property of god seems to be referred to. For now, we can be satisfied by this much, but a specific investigation, which will occur in Section 2.3, on the function of the property of god (divinity) in evaluating human lives-happiness, will eventually invite us to see which happiness Aristotle means in this passage and whether Aristotle significantly means the life of contemplation in the context of *EN* 1. But, before then, we shall see some other passage for divine human activity and life.

“...for in no aspect of what human beings do is there such stability as there is in activities in accordance with excellence: they seem to be more firm-rooted (*monimôterai*) even than the various kinds of knowledge we possess; and of these very kinds of knowledge the most honourable (*timiôtatai*) are more firm-rooted because of the fact that those who are blessed spend their lives in them more than in anything, and most continuously, for this is likely to be why forgetfulness does not occur in relation to them. What we are looking for, then, will belong to the happy man, and throughout life he will be such as we say; for he will always, or most of all people, do and contemplation (*theôria*)... *EN* 1.10 (1100b12-20)”

I think, this passage, at least more clearly than other passages in *EN* 1 mentioned, shows that Aristotle seems to talk about the contemplation already in *EN* 1. Here, Aristotle seems to mean that (1) the activity in accordance with the most honourable excellence is what those who are blessed spend their lives pursuing, and that (2) those blessed are happy men as long as they do such activity, i.e., *praxis* and *theôria*. Therefore a happy man here can be described as the most honourable and blessed, and at least one of his or her activities, contemplation, is thus as well.

The point of this passage is that Aristotle, describing human happiness, seems to attribute it to be the most honourable and the blessed. It is worth noticing that elsewhere²⁷⁶ Aristotle connects those predicates to the concept of divinity or godlikeness

²⁷⁶ It is important to remember that in *EN* 1.9- 1.12, apart from the expression ‘*theion*’, Aristotle also uses other ‘related’ words to mean the most *téléion* happiness; the blessed (*makarion*) in *EN*

or the most divine or godlike thing, and that what Aristotle means by the most divine human activity, which we will see in a moment, is contemplation. Naturally, with these reasons, we can already say that this passage in *EN 1* at least implies an important hint about the contemplation.

However, I do not yet claim that Aristotle, already in this passage of *EN 1*, means the person of the contemplative life by ‘the happy person (*ho eudaimôn*)’, although that will be justified later²⁷⁷. The current purpose is merely to show that in this passage as well Aristotle describes human happiness to be something divine. That is since, although he does not say ‘godlike’ here, his expressions, ‘the most honourable’ and ‘the blessed’ have the common indication with the expression ‘the most godlike’, it seems that the happy person here is also a person leading a life most godlike. *Ergo*, this is another passage where Aristotle describes human happiness to be something godlike.

So far, in Sections 2.1-2.2, I have shown at least, that (1) throughout *EN 1* and 10 Aristotle describes happiness to be ‘what is godlike’, that (2) there is some ambiguity regarding Aristotle’s indication of ‘what is godlike’, that is, (3) one is the divinity itself, the life of god, and the other is the most godlike human life, the highest form of human life. Since in *EN 1*, Aristotle does not discuss contemplation at least as particularly and explicitly as he does in *EN 10*, it can be admitted that it is not yet certain what Aristotle means by the most godlike human life is in *EN 1*, i.e. whether he indicates the life of contemplation or the life of political and moral activity, or both. However, for our current stage of the argument, it is sufficient to know, through the passages mentioned, that there is clearly some ambiguity in Aristotle’s usages of the expression ‘divine’ or ‘godlikeness’. For, in the next section, I shall show a characterisation of this ambiguity, explaining the relation between those two different indications of what is divine or godlike²⁷⁸, and that will eventually help us to see that what Aristotle means by the most divine or godlike human life should be the life of contemplation, and also that there is a noticeable consistency between *EN 1* and *EN 10* regarding the life of contemplation.

1.10, 1100a17, 32-35, 1101a, 6-9, 18-22, the most honourable (*timiôtatai*) in *EN 1.10*, 1100b15, *EN 1.12*, 1102a1-3, something superior to things to be praised (*kreítton ton ephaineton*) *EN 1.12*, 1101b29-31, etc.

²⁷⁷ Cf., *EN 1.10*, 1100b18-23 where Aristotle seems to say ‘the man who is truly good and four-square beyond reproach’ will do some *theôrein* on what is in accordance with *aretê*.’

²⁷⁸ For more about ‘*theios*’ and ‘*theion*’, see, Long (2011), p.96, Broadie (1991), p.30 & Richardson Lear (2004), pp.126-128.

2.3 The Relation Between Gods' Happiness and Humans'

So far we have seen that by the concept of divinity or godlikeness Aristotle not always indicates the same thing, since again he indicates sometimes the life of god, sometimes the life of human. Now, what kind of relation exists between these two lives, and how can we formulate such relations in the context of Aristotle's philosophy will be the main questions in this section.

“... One should not follow the advice ... ‘Mortals you are, think mortal’... but in stead, so far as is possible, (one should) assimilate to the immortals (*endechetai athanatizein*) and do everything with the aim of living in accordance with what is highest (*kratiston*) of the things in us... (EN 10.7, 1177b33-1178a1)”

Eventually in this passage, nearly at the end of EN 10.7, Aristotle reveals a more detailed view about the relation between the happiness of gods and the best happiness of humans saying that “so far as is possible, we should assimilate to the immortals...” So, here ‘the life that should be assimilated to the life of the immortals’ clearly indicates the life of a human. According to my interpretation, this passage is important in that Aristotle seems to prepare his intensive discussion of EN 10.8 on the paradigmatic – approximate relation between the happiness of gods and happiness of humans. About this relation, we will see more in the next passage.

2.3.1 The Paradigm-Approximation Relation Between the Life of the Most godlike and the Life of Aristotelian Gods

“... the activity of god, superior as it is in blessedness, will be one of contemplation; and so too human activity that has the greatest affinity (*syngenestaté*) to this one will be most productive of happiness...for the life of gods is blessedly happy throughout, while that of human beings is so to the extent that there belongs to it some kind of semblance (*homoiôma ti*) of this sort of activity(EN 10.8, 1178b22-28).”

So far, I believe I have shown many passages where Aristotle, employing the concept of ‘godlikeness’ and its related terms, tends to indicate two distinctive lives; the life of gods and the life of humans. This passage is uniquely important for my interpretation, because this is one of the most representative passages where Aristotle suggests, in a very detailed manner, his thoughts on the relation between the happiness of gods and the happiness of humans. Aristotle seems to mean, in this passage, that the contemplation of humans is a human activity that has the greatest affinity to the god’s

contemplation, and the life in which the person does such contemplative activity also has a resemblance of the corresponding life of gods. Therefore, this very smoothly reminds us of the previous passage in *EN* 10.7. There, Aristotle's 'implicit' message seems 'the more godlike, the happier'. So now Aristotle provides a more concrete explanation on that message; the relation between two different indications of 'what is divine' or godlike.

In this passage, Aristotle first announces that the activity of god is the contemplation, which is superior to any other form of contemplation, but human contemplation is a contemplation, only in that it has the greatest affinity to the god's contemplation. Furthermore, he says, the life of god is happiness as long as such life throughout and entirely filled with the relevant contemplation, but human happiness is happiness not in the same sense as the god's life is happy. For, human happiness is happiness in the sense that that human life contains a certain similarity with the life of gods, the contemplative activity of gods. In this description, it is reasonable to say that Aristotle defines the relation between the life of god and that of a human, likewise the contemplation of god and that of humans, as a relation between paradigm and approximation. That is, the life of god, the happiness of god is the paradigmatic happiness, but the happiness of human is the approximation to the former.²⁷⁹

To read the relation between the happiness of god and happiness of human the paradigm – approximation is not completely new. Recently, there is an increasing number of scholars who support this relation²⁸⁰, although they do not claim the exact same interpretation. At any rate, I roughly agree with them in that we all are interested in Aristotle's usage of the concept of 'divinity' for human affairs, but I think there can be a further way to formulate the relation in question. Aristotle's famous passage regarding the *pros-ben* statement in *Metaphysics* can help us.

²⁷⁹ Cf., Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.78, Cooper (1999), p.235, Long (2011), p98, & Richardson Lear (2004), pp.88-91.

²⁸⁰ Charles (1999), pp. 211-213, pp.216-7, Scott (1999), p.238, pp.240-41 & Richardson Lear (2004), pp.88-90, especially p.89, "However, a focal relation— in which the essence of one thing is defined by reference to the other— would capture this asymmetry in value. And if practical wisdom is an approximation of theoretical wisdom, this will be a focal relation...", but her discussion in pp.84-122 is in general about the paradigmatic-approximate relation between *sophia* and *phronésis*.

2.3.2 The Focal Meaning: The ‘In Relation to One (*pros-hen*)’ Statements in *Metaphysics*

“... There are many senses in which a thing may be said to ‘be’, but they are related to one central point (*pros hen*)... that which is ‘medical’ (*to iatrikon*) is relative to the ‘medical art (*iatrikê*)’, one thing in the sense that it possesses it, another in the sense that it is naturally adapted to it, another in the sense that it is a function of the medical art. ... So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point... (*Met.* 4.2, 1003a33-b3)”

I think this is one of the most representative passages where we can find Aristotle’s idea of the focal meaning. Therefore, we will find a theoretical basis for our ‘focal reading’ from this passage. In this passage Aristotle sees the various meanings of the term ‘being’ or ‘*to on*’ and makes the so-called ‘*pros-hen*’ statement to explain properly the relation between them, namely, between the central meaning of being and other meanings of being. In brief, Aristotle, through his famous ‘medical’ example, seems to say that there is a central or focal meaning of ‘medical’, and there are also some derivative meanings of ‘medical’. Terms related to ‘medical’ get their meanings from the concept of ‘medical’ or ‘medical art’. Namely, we can say that this substance is a medical doctor because it possesses ‘medical art’. However no one can say this substance (the medical doctor) is ‘medical’ or medical art itself, but only that it is related to the focal meaning of medical. For me, it is important to notice that the definition of ‘medical doctor’ is determined in relation to the focal meaning of ‘medical’. Likewise, we suppose that Aristotle tries to define the *eudaimonia* of human being referring to the *eudaimonia* of god, which is the focal meaning of *eudaimonia*. We will now show some specific examples of this focal relation.

• Examples of derivative ‘medical’²⁸¹

- 1) Doctor: ‘medical’ possessing it
- 2) Patient: ‘medical’ being adapted to it
- 3) Operation: ‘medical’ being a function of it.

²⁸¹ See, *Met.* 7.4, 1030a27-1030b13, especially where he says “...For it must be either homonymously that we say these *are*, or by making qualifications and abstractions (in the way in which that which is not known may be said to be known),—the truth being that we use the word neither homonymously nor in the same sense, but just as we apply the word ‘medical’ when there is a *reference* to one and the same thing, not *meaning* one and the same thing, nor yet speaking homonymously; for a patient and an operation and an instrument are called medical neither homonymously nor in virtue of one thing, but with reference to one thing...” & cf., *Met.* 4.2, 1003b4-18 and *Met.* 11.3, 1060b30-61a18.

As I said, in the example of ‘medical’, the focal meaning is ‘medical art’, because other medical terms are medical in relation to the medical art. For instance, a doctor is medical in the sense he or she has the skill of medical art, a patient is also ‘medical’ in the sense that he or she gets the treatment of medical art, and an operation is of course medical because it is a type of function of medical art. However, for us, it is also worthy of noticing that the focal relation is not between random things, but there is a significant categorical difference between the focal meaning and its derivative meanings. So much for Aristotle’s idea in this passage, now it would be useful to transform Aristotle’s example here in order to make it more suitable for our current discussion.

The fact that they are related to ‘medical art’ is common to all three, doctor, patient and operation, because each of them is defined referring to a name, medical art. However, importantly, the mode of the relation of each to medical art is different. The doctor is related to medical art in that he or she is possessing medical art, the patient is so in that he or she receives medical service, and finally the operation is so in that it is a function of medical art. It is to be noted that, as Aristotle seems to assume in the *Metaphysics* passages above, since these three are related to medical art in different ways, it cannot be figured out which one is superior to the others regarding medical art. In order to know what is superior to another in the relation of ‘medical art’, the focal sense, it is necessary to measure amongst things related to the focal sense in the same way or aspect. Namely, even if we cannot judge which one is superior between the doctor, patient and operation regarding medical art, we can surely know which one is better than others amongst doctors regarding medical art. Of course, we can do the same process in the case of patients and operations. Now, medical art, the focal sense in this context, can be a standard according to which we judge the ability and quality of medical doctors, for instance. I believe it is this very point that we employ from Aristotle’s discussion on the *pros-hen* statement to explain Aristotle’s account on *eudaimonia* more systematically.

In this very sense, human happiness is related to god’s happiness, and the relation can be described in terms of ‘godlikeness’. According to this standard - godlikeness, therefore, the best form of human happiness is the life called the life of contemplation, (1) whose the characteristic activity is human contemplation, the most godlike activity amongst the activities having god’s pure rational activity as a paradigm for themselves,

and (2) that also *includes* the moral and political activities pursued for the sake of ‘human’ contemplation.

Surely, according to the same standard, the life of political and moral activity is also happiness. That is, such life is a happy life as well, because moral and political activity, the main goal of this sort of life, is focally related to the pure rational activity of god in the sense that those activities are also pursued in accordance with some rational prescription. Of course, such life is *less related* to the activity of god as long as the activity of such life *lacks* human contemplation, the most godlike human activity. In this very sense, the life of political and moral activity is not happy as much as the life of contemplation is, so the former is said to be the second best form of human life by Aristotle. The more detailed explanation on the relation between two types of happiness will be provided in Section 3.

However, already, I can claim this much; (1) as we have just seen, what Aristotle means by the life of contemplation is not the life only of theoretical activity or philosophical study, and therefore, (2) although I still keep the dominant end view, as long as I think the best happiness is the life in which every activity is pursued for the sake of contemplation, (3) my interpretation can be exempted from the criticism that the ‘dominant end’ view is to jeopardize Aristotle’s account on *eudaimonia* to be non-ethical²⁸².

Now, the question is if Aristotle really says anything similar to the focal meaning in *Nicomachean Ethics* or not. I think that all the passages we have seen so far are the relevant passages of Aristotle’s idea of focal relation in his account of happiness. However, even apart from those passages, there are still more important places where Aristotle seems to already have the idea of focal meaning in mind. We shall first see *EN* 1.6.

2.3.3 Focal Relation in *EN*

“But in fact the definitions (*hoi logoi*) of honour, understanding (*nous*), and pleasure are distinct (*heteroi*) and different (*diapherontes*) according to the way in which they are goods (*tautéi héi agathá*) ... Or is it on the principle that other goods

²⁸² See, Broadie/Rowe (2002), p.79 “... Some interpreters think Aristotle implies that the superlative quality of theoretical activity requires its devotee to sacrifice everything else to it...”, & Cooper (1986), pp174-76; cf., Devereux (1981), pp.258-9, Meyer (2008), p59-61.

derive from a single one or that they all converge on it, or is it rather a matter of analogy?
(*EN* 1.6, 1096b23-29)

This is where we find Aristotle's famous criticism of Plato's theory of the Form. The context here is this. Aristotle denies that all other goods are said have the same name, the Form of Good, claiming that the various names of goods are not used in a homonymous way. Then, if not, how are they called? What Aristotle assumes here is that even if it is clear that there is a certain relation between the Form of Good and other goods, the relation is not a homonymous one²⁸³. But Aristotle does not want to explain further than this, because that will be beyond the realm of ethics (or the study of characters). However, two things need to be mentioned here.

One is that Aristotle is aware of the importance of the relation among the various goods, and recognizes that the character of their relation is not homonymous, but something else. Therefore, we can surely expect that Aristotle's awareness of this interesting relationship among the various goods will affect Aristotle's discussion on happiness, as long as this is the highest good in Aristotle's ethical system.

The other – still related though- important point is about what we have already seen. It is the fact that the specific description on the relation between the various goods which Aristotle stops discussing further here in *EN* is progressing in the passages we quoted from his *Metaphysics*. Therefore, we think, referring to the connection between these two of Aristotle's treatises, we can also claim that Aristotle's position on the relation between the good itself and other various goods is the focal – derivative relationship [paradigm – approximate]. But, of course, I am not saying that the happiness, the highest form of human good is the good itself. The good itself is the focal meaning of good, but the highest human good is the good that has the greatest affinity to the focal meaning of good (the good as a paradigm), but it is still good in derivative meaning. Further, there is another passage in *EN* seeming to suggest Aristotle's idea of focal relation, or at least paradigm-approximation relation, which is more important for our interpretation.

2.3.4 The Provisional Conclusion of Aristotle's Discussion of Happiness in *EN* 1

²⁸³ This is exactly what we have seen briefly from the examples of the focal relation above.

“... But if praise is of things like this, it is clear that it is not praise that is appropriate to things that are good to the highest possible degree, but some thing greater and better, ... Eudoxus ... thought that it (pleasure) is not praised, even though it is a good, indicated that it was superior to the things that are praised, as he thought god and the good are superior, because it is to these (pros taûta-god and the good itself) that the other things are referred (anapheresthai)...” (EN 1.12, 1101b22-32)

This passage significantly contains the idea of focal relation (paradigm – approximation). However as we have already said, this is more important than the previous one in a sense. For, I think this chapter (EN 1.12) contains, already in EN 1, sufficient information to compose Aristotle’s idea of happiness in terms of focal relation. That’s why I call this section the provisional conclusion of Aristotle’s discussion of happiness. The context of this passage is the following. Aristotle seems to stress to his audience not to confuse between *aretê* and *eudaimonia*, although the former is one of the necessary conditions for the latter. The reason is that what is praised and what is honoured are to be distinguished, as long as we praise someone’s activity referring to aretê but we honour someone’s achievement referring to something superior to aretê. What is superior to aretê is what is divine and blessed. As long as what is honoured is superior to what is praised, it is not wrong to say that the standard of honour is the god and the good itself. Hence, now we see that the *eudaimonia* to be rightly honoured is the honourable, complete and divine thing. We think it is very clear that Aristotle, already in EN 1, implicitly means there is a focal relation between the *eudaimonia* of gods and the *eudaimonia* of human beings. In a sense, we could say that the *eudaimonia* of god is not even the ‘proper’ object of our honouring, because it is the *standard* or *paradigm* in the relation to which we honour some human’s *eudaimonia*. Maybe, I can already claim that, says Aristotle, we call someone happy because we see the relation of his or her life to the gods’. Since whether one is happy or not can only be judged properly in the relation of the life of gods, we can also say that in Aristotle, there is a clear conceptual distinction between the *eudaimonia* of gods and the *eudaimonia* of human beings whose relationship to gods’ can be rightly described as the focal-derivative relation. Hence, I suppose that Aristotle’s idea of focal relation is clear enough in EN 1 as well, and thereby that we can also claim that such a relation between happiness of gods and happiness of humans plays a vital role in structuring Aristotle’s account of happiness, especially in providing Aristotle’s own definition of happiness. In addition, if this interpretation is correct, we can surely save the dominant end view from the

criticism²⁸⁴ that there is inconsistency between *EN* 1 and *EN* 10 regarding Aristotle's discussion on happiness. Again, if this interpretation on this passage is admitted, the focal relation can secure the consistency of Aristotle's account on happiness between *EN* 1 and *EN* 10. Hence, the criticism against the 'dominant end' view in terms of the inconsistency between Aristotle's discussions on happiness in *EN* 1 and *EN* 10 can be nullified by my interpretation on this passage.

2.4 Conclusion of Section 2

What I have attempted to do so far in the current section (Section 2) is to show that through the idea of the 'focal' meaning of 'contemplation' and 'happiness', we can save the 'contemplative' life from the extreme case of theoretical life. Of course, since I will do in Section 3, I did not yet explain how the life of contemplation and the life of political activity are related to each other, and how the contemplative activity and practical activities in the happiest human life are related. However, the argument I gave so far already has some important fruits. As a result of that, I think, this much can be said. Aristotle says, everyone agrees about the general description of happiness. Namely, he clearly says that there is no disagreement to say that happiness is doing-well, living-well²⁸⁵ and it is the highest human good. However, there often occurs controversy about the specification of happiness, which means they come to disagree to say which specific type of life is the most choice-worthy form of human life. One group of people claims it is the life of pleasure, some other claims it is the life of political activities and others argue it is the life of contemplative activity²⁸⁶. Facing this situation, Aristotle might have thought that the situation even seems to look as if there are different happiest lives for different people. Aristotle, of course, cannot accept this. Therefore, I think that Aristotle probably wants to say this at the end of his discussion of happiness, at the end of *EN*. We do not have to be confused about the best form of human life, because we have a common and authoritative standard by which we can judge what the happiest life is and what is not. *It is the divinity itself or the life of gods, which is the focal sense of*

²⁸⁴ For the inclusivist end interpretations against this claim are, most representatively, Ackrill (1980), Annas (1993), p. 216 note. 658. Cooper (1986), pp174-6, Nussbaum (1986), p377. cf., Bostock (2001), p.191. However, Cleemput (2006), p.154 and Devereux, pp.247-54 read that Aristotle already prepares for his position that *eudaimonia* is a contemplation.

²⁸⁵ *EN* 1.4, 1095a16-20. cf., Plato, *Euthydemus*. 278e, 282a & 280b-e, where he also suggests that *eudaimonia* is *eu prattein* or *eu zen*.

²⁸⁶ *EN* 1.5, 1095b14-1096a11 and *EE* 1214a31-35, 1215a32-b14.

happiness. Therefore, the particular type of life that has the greatest affinity to the life of gods is the happiest human life. That is the life of contemplative activity. Therefore, completing his own definition of happiness, Aristotle might have said that since we have an authoritative standard of happiness, the focal meaning of it, there should be no disagreement about the best type of human life, that is, *ho bios theôrêtikos*.

So far I have shown that the focal relation between human lives and god's life is crucial in understanding Aristotle's account on happiness. Because of that, I have argued that the life of contemplation does not have to be the life *only of contemplation*, but it is the life whose most characteristic activity is contemplation, in the sense that the most godlike activity of all the activities focally related to the activity of god in the life is the contemplation. Therefore, through this I think I have saved the 'dominant end' view from the extreme view that was sometimes misunderstood as admiring the life of the non-ethical genius or psychopath. Having, furthermore, shown that the focal relation can be found both in *EN 1* and *EN 10*, I have also protected the 'dominant end' view from the criticism in favour of some – not real- inconsistency between *EN 1* and *EN 10*.

Earlier, I have already briefly explained in Section 2.3 how the life of contemplation and the life of political activity can be interpreted in terms of 'focal relation'. What I will do in the remaining part of the current chapter is to provide an even more detailed explanation on how well Aristotle's thoughts on *eudaimonia* can be specified through the concept of the focal relation.

3. Focal Relation in Human Rational Activity

In the remaining part of this chapter, I will explain how Aristotle's account on *eudaimonia* can be described in a detailed manner, in terms of 'focal relation'. Again, until the previous section, I have shown, through the idea of focal relation, that in Aristotle, the life of contemplation is not the life 'only of' contemplation, but it has significant space for moral and political activity as well. Then, a natural question will be (in section 3.1) how the contemplatively happy person can both contemplate and act morally and politically excellently in his or her life. Namely, how we can explain, through the concept of focal relation, the relation, if any, between contemplation and moral and political activity in the life of contemplation. Furthermore, one can also naturally ask the following questions; if Aristotelian happiness can be explained in terms of focal relation,

(in section 3.2) in what specific sense is the second best happiness, the life of moral and political activity, happiness and, (in section 3.3) how can the relation between the life of contemplation and the life of political and moral activity be explained according to the interpretation I am claiming here. Hence, in the following content I will provide my answers to these questions one by one.

3.1 Moral and Political Activity and Contemplation in the *bios theôrêtikos*; A Possibility of *meta*-deliberation

As a matter of fact, it is not difficult to see that Aristotle does not exclude the practical activity out of the life of contemplation. In *EN* 10.8, he rather clearly suggests that a person leading the contemplative life, not only does not exclude the pragmatic and necessary elements for living as long as he is a human, but also does he or she act according to the excellence in practical domain.

“ ... but in so far as he (the person engaged in contemplation) is a human being, and share his life with others, he chooses (*aireton*) to do the deeds that accord with excellence (*ta kata tèn aretên*), and so he will need such things for the purposes of living a human life” ...” (*EN* 10.8, 1178b3-5)²⁸⁷

Clearly, here '*ta kata tèn aretên*' does not only mean the character-excellence (*êthikê aretê*), because it probably includes the other practical excellences, such as productive excellence (*aretê poiêtikê*) and external goods. Still, it is evident here that *aretê*, at least, includes the *êthikê aretê*. Therefore, what is important here for us is that the person engaged in activities in accordance with *aretê* in this life is the person who, not only does contemplation, also does activities according to the *êthikê aretê*, the title of his life is *ho bios theôrêtikos* though. In the passage quoted, therefore, Aristotle seems to suggest that if one is to live as a human being, he or she needs to be associated with other members of the society, and if he or she is to do so, he or she also needs to act according to practical excellence, both moral and productive. It is therefore quite certain that an Aristotelian contemplative person does not ignore the value of practical activities regarding the best life, rather, he or she would even actively participate in doing such an activity when he or she is in a practical or moral circumstance. Of course, this is not the

²⁸⁷ See, also, *EN* 10.8, 1178b33-1179a16 where Aristotle seems to suppose that even the contemplative person needs the external, non-moral goods & *EN* 1099a31-b8, 27-28, 1154a17-8, 1177a28, b1, & *Top.* 118a8-11., Cf., Haineman (1988), p.34-35, 52-3. & Long (2011), pp.111 & Bostock (2001), pp.12 and 190.

only passage where Aristotle emphasizes that the person of the contemplative life is both excellent at ‘moral and political activity’ and at ‘contemplation’. Interestingly and importantly, Aristotle mentions such a thing already in the *EN* 1.

“What we are looking for, then, will belong to the happy man, and throughout life he will be such as we say; for he will always, or most of all people, do and contemplate on what is in accordance with excellence... (*EN* 1.10. 1100b18-20)”

As we have seen earlier, what Aristotle means by the happy person is the one whose activity is the most honourable (*timiotatê*) and blessed (*macharia*). As long as it seems that Aristotle uses these predicates to describe the most godlike (*theiotatos*) activity and the life of it, the life of the happy person in this passage is the best form of happiness, that is, the life of the contemplation.

If so, it also seems very clear that in this passage Aristotle says that the person of the contemplative happy life acts morally or politically excellently and contemplates theoretically excellently. For, here, Aristotle says that the happy person in this context acts (*prattein*) what is in accordance with, surely practical and moral, excellence and contemplates what is in accordance with theoretical excellence. *Ergo*, it already seems that to claim that the life of contemplation includes both practically excellent activity and contemplation. However, then, am I arguing for the so-called inclusive end view that believes that human *eudaimonia* is the life that includes every excellence, or at least, every intrinsic excellence? No, I am not. Although I also admit that the life of contemplation includes moral activity as well as contemplation, I don’t agree with the inclusive end view, because I don’t think that there is happiness as a whole or a type, and all other excellent activities are constitutional means to that happiness. For me, again, the best happiness is the life in which all other excellent activities are wished (*boulomesthai*), pursued (*diokesthai*) and chosen (*aireton*) referring to (*heneka or charin*) the most godlike human activity, contemplation. Namely, the relation between contemplation and moral activity accompanied with *phronêsis* in the life of contemplation is the relation in which the latter is pursued and chosen referring to the former. What I mean by ‘referring to’ here will be explained in the investigation on the following passage.

“...But neither is ‘practical wisdom (*phronêsis*)’ sovereign (*kuria*) over ‘theoretical wisdom’ (*sophia*), or over the better of the two rational parts, any

more than medical expertise is sovereign over health; for it (medical expertise) does not employ (*chrósthai*) it (health), but rather sees to it that it comes into existence, so that it (medical expertise - *phronêsis*) prescribes on behalf of (*heneke*) it (health – *sophia*), not to it... (EN 6.13, 1145a6-9)”

In this passage Aristotle suggests that the relations between *sophia* and *phronêsis* is analogous with that between medical expertise (*iatrike*) and health (*hygieia*). It seems that the reason is because, just as the medical expertise is pursued ‘referring to (*heneke*)’ health, *phronêsis* prescribes what to do in a given situation referring to *sophia*. Again, although some would understand this part saying that medical expertise is eventually an instrument for health²⁸⁸, and some think here that Aristotle means having intellectual excellence on health guarantees that on expertise²⁸⁹, I don’t think that the sense of the ‘*heneke*’ used here would allow such interpretations. If we recall Aristotle’s discussion on the architectonic ends and that on the most final (*teleiôtaton*) end in EN 1²⁹⁰, we can see when Aristotle uses the expressions ‘*charin*’ and ‘*heneke*’ in the following way; first, when Aristotle says A is pursued *charin* or *heneke* B, it is certain that A is not pursued as an instrument for B²⁹¹. The excellence of B does not guarantee the successful achievement of A. Aristotle never says so.

Still, when Aristotle says ‘A is *heneke* B’ or ‘A is pursued *charin* B²⁹²’, it seems clear that B is the *telos* of (the activity of) A. It means that Aristotle’s expressions ‘*heneke*’ and ‘*charin*’ contain important messages regarding his ‘teleology’. However, in Aristotle, if B is the *telos* (end or goal) of A, it does not necessarily mean that A is an instrumental mean (*organon*) for B. That is, Aristotle says (EN 1.7, 1097b2-7), unlike wealth and other *organa*, pleasure, *nous* and honour are not pursued as instruments to something else than themselves, although they are surely pursued or chosen because of (*dia*) something else. Anyhow, Aristotle seems to mean (EN 1.7, 1097a24-b7, cf., 1096a5-11) that ‘not being an instrument for something else’ sufficiently lets them (pleasure, *nous* and honour) be some final (*teleion*) goods. However, still, they are not the most final (*teleiôtaton*) good, the best (*ariston*) good, because people, Aristotle says, take (*aireton*) them for the sake of

²⁸⁸ Kraut (1989), pp.200-03, 211-213 & Curzer (1991), pp.60-65.

²⁸⁹ Richardson Lear seems to maintain that since the *phronêsis* is focally related to the *sophia* and there are structurally similar in sharing *nous*, one’s having theoretical wisdom means, at least, his/her deliberative function is better than the one whose scientific soul is not that excellent. Richardson Lear (2004), pp.93 – 122.

²⁹⁰ EN 1.1, 1094a6-16 & EN 1.7, 1097a24-35.

²⁹¹ EN 1.7, 1097a25-28, cf., EN 1.5, 1096a5-8.

²⁹² Cf., Meyer (2008), pp.53-55.

(*charin*) something else (happiness), supposing *that they themselves can be eudaimon through them*. It is important to see that Aristotle's expressions 'being pursued for the sake of (*charin*)²⁹³ or 'on behalf of something else' do not always means 'being an organon for that' in Aristotle. Probably, when Aristotle says 'A is chosen because of (*dia*) B', in many cases it includes the meaning that A is an instrument for B (1097a27, cf., 1096a5-6). However, when he uses '*charin*' and '*heneka*', he does not always indicate the relation between some external instrument and its goal. Aristotle's comments below on wealth and other *organa* are clear enough to show his distinction between the final end and some ends does not indicate the relation between an instrument and its end.

"Since, then, the ends are evidently more than one, and of these we choose some because of (*dia*) something else, as we do wealth, flutes, and instruments in general, it is clear that not all (ends) are complete; and the best is evidently something complete. (EN 1.7, 1097a25-28; c.f., EN 1.5, 1096a5-8)"

Ergo, the final (*teleion*)²⁹⁴ ends indicate the ends that are not an instrument to something else at all, although it is not denied that some of those ends can be chosen for the sake of, or on behalf of some other(s). Furthermore, in Aristotle, if one end is the best good (*to ariston agaton*) or the end of the most architectonic science, it means that such end is not pursued for the sake of or on behalf of something else than itself, but everything else is pursued *charin* or *heneka* it²⁹⁵. Anyhow, although there are some exceptions²⁹⁶, it seems, the expressions '*heneka*' and '*charin*' are mainly used, by Aristotle, to explain the relationships amongst the final ends that are not an external instrument to another end. If this is a reliable reading, for me it seems safer to say that, when Aristotle mentions, i.e. A is chosen *heneka* or *charin* B, he means significantly something else than that A is an instrumental mean to B. I think the safest interpretation on the statement 'A is chosen *charin* or *heneka* B' is that we are choosing A in the relation (focal relation) of B or regarding B as its paradigm.

²⁹³ Aristotle uses '*charin*' in explaining some external instrument, like wealth, an instrument for happiness, not an intrinsic good for it (1096a6-7). However, most cases where Aristotle uses *heneka* and *charin*, he indicates, at least, something else than an instrument mean.

²⁹⁴ For the relevant discussion on *teleion*; Ackrill (1980) & Haineman (1988).

²⁹⁵ It is not difficult to see that Aristotle assumes this characterization for the *ariston agaton* in EN 1.2, 1094a18-23 "... if then there is some end in our practical projects that we wish for because of (*dia*) itself, while wishing for the other things we wish for because of (*dia*) it, and we do not choose everything because of (*dia*) something else (for if that is the case, the sequence will go on to infinity, making our desire empty and vain), it is clear that this will be the good, i.e. the chief good..."

²⁹⁶ See, my notes 293 and 295.

For me, therefore, it is convincing that Aristotle uses the same sense of ‘*heneka*’ when he says, “medical expertise prescribes *heneka* health” in explaining the relationship between *phronêsis* and *sophia*. Namely, in the passage in question in *EN* 6.13, Aristotle seems to suggest that in the life of contemplation, the happy person desires and chooses the activities in accordance with *phronêsis*, that is, the activities of character-excellence, in their relation of the *sophia*, the most exact excellence. What I mean is that, at least, the contemplatively happy person deliberates moral particulars and does excellent activities having in mind that *sophia*, theoretical wisdom, is the paradigm or focal sense of those practical activities. Again, surely, this does not guarantee any sort of necessary or causal relation between *phronêsis* and *sophia*. That is, although, probably here, Aristotle explains the relation between *phronêsis* and *sophia* inside the person who is both *sophos*, in Aristotle’s sense, and *phronimos*, Aristotle does not mean that this person is *sophos* through his *phronêsis*. He does not mean that that the contemplatively happy person is a better *phronimos* than any other ‘merely’ practically wise ones, only because the former one is also *sophos*. I think here regarding *sophia* and *phronêsis*, Aristotle primarily indicates the excellent dispositions of each rational soul in this person. Again, he does not suggest any necessary or causal relation between them. Still, however, there is a significant relation between them that can be explained in the following way.

Regarding the person in the life of contemplation, it seems true that Aristotle suggests a person who has excellence both in his scientific soul and deliberative soul, that is, he is both *sophos* and *phronimos*. Surely this person, as long as he has *phronêsis*, cares about activities of character-excellence (*êthikê aretê*). However, this person’s distinctiveness from the one who is merely *phronimos* lacking *sophia*, is that this one knows that his morally excellent actions are actions based on a certain form of rationality rather than they are purely emotional, and that his morally good activities are an approximation to the activity of god, the divinity itself, the focal sense for human happiness. Hence, this one, both *sophos* and *phronimos*, understands that his practically excellent activities are also actions, in a sense, in harmony with the cosmological law, so he is able to provide a perfectly rational explanation on his moral or practical activities. This, noticeably, is possible because this one has the excellence in contemplation, so he can also contemplate, in a sense, his deliberation at the same time he himself is deliberating. That is, this happiest person can contemplate about his or her own deliberation, just as

Aristotle's god, as his proper function, thinks about thinking (*noeseos noesis*)²⁹⁷. I wish to label this deliberation of the happiest or contemplative person with 'meta-deliberation'.

I think that it is important to see that, through this 'meta-deliberation', the contemplative happy person can explain rationally his or her morally excellent action better than the mere *phronimos* can do. To emphasize this, I shall briefly mention the life of political and moral activity and its relation to the life of contemplation, although I will deal with them more properly later. One who is merely *phronimos*, the person leading the second happiest life (*EN* 10.8), will not do, in appearance, different moral actions from the contemplatively happy person. However, this person cannot answer as much as the contemplative person can do to the question of why he did such a courageous action; he will just say no better than 'because I ought to (*dei*) do so' or 'because, I like (*hêdesthai*) to do'.

One might say this is a trivial point, but I think this is a very important distinction between the two types of happy lives. For, I think, the life of contemplation and the life of political and moral activity are distinctive from each other for the following two important reasons; the former person can do the contemplation, still incomplete though as long as he is a human, when he is not in a moral and political circumstance, and the former one, through his or her excellence of the scientific soul, can provide a more detailed exact rational explanation on his or her political and moral actions than the 'merely' *phronimos* can. Remember, still, this factor of the contemplation cannot substantially help at all when the person (of the life of contemplation) is doing moral and political activity. Also, as long as the *telos* of contemplation is to produce a belief²⁹⁸, there seems to be no strong reason not to claim that 'providing such an excellent explanation on practical activities prescribed by *phronêsis*' is not a significant way of performing the function of the '*epistêmonikon*'.

3.2 The Life of Political and Moral Activity: In What Sense it is Some Contemplation (*tis theôria*)

Now, I will talk about another type of happiness, the life of political activity, which is briefly described just above. If my claim that human happiness is happiness as long as it

²⁹⁷ *Met.* 12.9, 1074b33-35, cf., *Met.* 12.7, 1072b18-20.

²⁹⁸ *MA* 701a9-13.

is focally related to the activity of god is right, this second happiness should be surely focally related to it as well. Regarding this point, it will be useful to see the following remarks of Aristotle.

“Happiness too extends as far as contemplation (reflection) does, and those who have more of contemplation, more happiness belongs too, not incidentally, but in virtue of the contemplation, for this is in itself to be honoured. So then happiness will be *a kind of contemplation (tis theôria)* (EN 10.8, 1178b29-33).”

Agreeing with Richardson Lear²⁹⁹, I also think that as long as the life of political activity is happiness, it should be some contemplation as well. It seems very clear to me that Aristotle’s message here is not only to say that the contemplative life is happiness, but also is to suggest that if any other life is properly called happiness, it should also be some contemplation. In that line, the life of political activity should be ‘some’ contemplation. However, is this possible in Aristotle’s system? Isn’t the meaning of contemplation an activity of purely theoretical reason? Then, how can Aristotle apply this to practical cases?

As a matter of fact, what is interesting is that Aristotle, in more than several passages, uses this term mostly in describing the function of the so-called deliberative soul. I think that, in order to answer the question “in what sense the life of political and moral activity; that is, the life of the activity in accordance with practical excellence (*êthikê aretê* and *phronêsis*), is *theôria*”, it will very useful to examine those passages where Aristotle seems to use the terms ‘*theôrein*’ or ‘*theôria*’ in some non-typical way.

Aristotle says at the beginning chapter of the EN 6,

“Let us assume the parts possessing reason to be two, one by virtue of which we contemplate upon the sorts of things whose principles cannot be otherwise, on by virtue of which we contemplate upon things can be otherwise. (EN 6.1, 1139a6-9)”

Clearly, the sorts of things whose principles cannot be otherwise are the objects of the so-called theoretical sciences, theology, mathematics and physics etc, but the things that can be otherwise are the objects of practical science, practical thought³⁰⁰. It is noticeable that Aristotle here expresses the function of the deliberative soul, deliberation (*bouleusis*),

²⁹⁹ Richardson Lear (2004), pp.91-2, pp.206-8.

³⁰⁰ Cf., Section 2.2.2 in Chapter Three

as ‘contemplating (*to theôrein*)’. We should not disregard such an interesting point that Aristotle uses the term specialized for metaphysical and theoretical subjects to indicate deliberation in practical cases. I shall introduce some more relevant passages.

“Every technical expertise is concerned with coming into being, that is, with the practice and theory (*theôria*; what is actually used here is the infinitive form; *to theôrein*) of how to bring into being some one of the things that are capable either of being or of not being. (EN 6.4, 1140a10-14)”

Of course, here Aristotle does not talk about the moral case, but about *technê*. However, craft knowledge is still intellectual excellence in practical cases, that is, the excellence in another function of deliberative soul. Therefore, the reasoning that the craft man performs in producing things is deliberation. Consequently this passage is another passage where Aristotle names practical thought some contemplation. We shall see a more proper moral case.

“For each kind of creature asserts that what is practically wise is what successfully considers (*to eu theôroun*) the things relating to itself, and will hand over decisions to that ... (EN 6.7, 1141a26)”

This is the passage where Aristotle, contrasting *phronêsis* from *sophia*, clarifies that *phronêsis* is deliberating well about what is beneficial to oneself, *sophia* is about something superior to human beings. The passages I have introduced so far are where Aristotle indicates clearly deliberation by ‘*theôrein*’. It, would then be unfair to assume that Aristotle uses the term ‘*theôrein*’ carelessly or in a trivial sense, because Aristotle’s tendency there is too consistent to be just ignored. At any rate, we still have a question to be answered; in what sense Aristotle uses the term for deliberation and in what sense deliberation can be contemplation?

I think Aristotle’s discussion on the relation between practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning can help us to find an answer to such a question.

3.2.1 Practical Reasoning and Theoretical Reasoning

EN 6 is generally known to be Aristotle’s account on the ‘*dianoêtikê aretê*’. Distinguishing excellence of the so-called practical reasoning from that of non-practical or theoretical reasoning, Aristotle defines the *phronêsis*, the excellence of deliberation; the function of the deliberative soul. Again, although Aristotle’s main interest of this book (EN 6) is in the definition of *phronêsis*, since his process to provide such a definition is completed

through the contrast of practical thought from theoretical thought, the investigation on his discussion in *EN 6* will surely invite us to grasp how Aristotle characterises the relation between the function of scientific soul and that of the calculative one; practical reasoning (deliberation) and theoretical reasoning (contemplation).

3.2.1.1 How They Are Distinctive

As I have shown in the passage of *EN 6.1* just above, practical thought and theoretical thought respectively are the proper functions of different parts of soul. It is also to be noticed that the proper objects of each function are different types of ‘being’ (*to on*); the former are ‘those whose principle cannot be otherwise’, but the latter are ‘those whose principle can be otherwise.’ I think this difference can be explained in the following way; the former are truths that exist independent of the ‘thinking subjects’, whereas the latter are truths that are good or useful for the ‘thinking subjects’, the agents. There is an important implication, I think. That is, while the former are truths we can acquire only when we exclude entirely the emotional or affective aspects we share with non-rational animals, the latter are truths that we can obtain only when we are with the correct form of emotional or irrational aspects, because the latter type of truth is, by nature, accompanied by emotional aspects. This suggests another distinctive point between theoretical thought and practical.

As we have seen in Chapter Three, *not only do these two functions deal with different objects, but also they are totally different types of reasoning.*³⁰¹ Namely, practical thought and theoretical thought are also to be distinctive in terms of the nature of reasoning. What I mean is that, as it is said just before, the latter reasoning is the purely rational activity not to be associated with non-rational element, but the former is the activity of reason to be combined with emotional aspect, i.e. emotion and desire, etc. That is, why Aristotle says “the practical truth is truth in agreement with correct desire” (*EN 6.2*). Hence, in this (practical) reasoning, importantly, accepting some pleasure, emotion or desire is not the mark of its malfunction, but it is its nature to receive pleasure, emotion or desire.

Such significant difference between the theoretical thought and the practical thought, I think, again *sufficiently denies the necessary or causal relationship between the proper functions of these two parts of rational soul.* Namely, the excellence of one does not guarantee the

³⁰¹ Section 2.2.2 in Chapter Three.

excellence of the other. Therefore, the claims, like that the practical wisdom is a sort of instrument in the way to the theoretical wisdom³⁰² and that the one who possesses the *sophia* will necessarily do practical reasoning excellently as well³⁰³ will not be persuasive anymore, I think. However, does Aristotle's account on such distinction force us to reject any sort of meaningful relation between practical thought and theoretical thought? Interestingly, when he describes the nature of various intellectual excellences in *EN* 6, we can see, without difficulty, in several passages where Aristotle assumes a certain relation or similarity between those functions of rational soul, it is not either necessary or causal though. We shall see more below.

3.2.1.2 How They Are Similar: The Grasping Truth (to *alêtheuein*)

The theoretical thought and the practical thought, as long as both of them are the functions of the rational soul, can be commonly called as thought (*dianoia*) and share a commonness in their function; to grasp truth (*alêtheuein*).

“It holds, then, of both intelligent parts that their function is truth; so the excellence of both will be the dispositions in accordance with which each of them will grasp truth (*alêtheuein*) to the highest degree (*EN* 6.2, 1139b13-15)”

This is an important evidence by which we can claim some important relation between these two rational activities. It is to be noted that Aristotle, having compared the processes of each reasoning to obtain a corresponding truth, explains the practical thought, deliberation, earlier in *EN* 6.2 (1139a19-31), actually employing the terms that are primarily used in the context of theoretical reasoning, i.e. truth (*alêtheia*), affirmation (*kataphasis*) and denial (*apophasis*). That is, practical truth, pursuing and avoiding are used in a derivative sense. Specifically, terms like affirmation, denial and truth are properly used in theoretical case, although they would not, surely, be in the same manner in the practical context, can have similar functions in the practical case as well. Namely, of course, they should have different names as well, i.e. pursuing (*dioksis*), avoiding (*phugê*) and practical truth (*alêtheia praktikê*), but these practical correspondents express ‘truth’ and ‘false’ in a similar way. Also, although he mentions truths in each reasoning are in different manner, i.e. the former is truth itself, but the latter truth in agreement with correct desire (*orthê orexis*), it should be noted that Aristotle suggests some significant

³⁰² Kenny (1968) and Kraut (1989).

³⁰³ Richardson Lear (2004), pp.108-115.

relation between two rational processes still explaining them through a common title, ‘truth’. This should not be disregarded. Then, what is the identity of this relation? Aristotle in some passages of *EN* 6 compares *sophia* and *phronêsis*, intellectual excellences that grasp corresponding *alêtheia* well in each rational soul. Examining those passages, therefore, will be useful for us to identify the relation between functions of each part of *to logon echon*.

3.2.1.3 Structural Asymmetry Between Practical Thought and Theoretical

Clearly, Aristotle allows some similarity between the *sophia* and the *phronêsis*, but not a structural similarity between them that Richardson Lear says³⁰⁴, as Aristotle does not allow a structural symmetry between each reasoning. For, the *sophia* as the excellence in contemplation, *in Aristotelian sense*, is the combination between the rational intuition (*nous*) on the first principles, and the scientific and demonstrative knowledge (*epistêmê*) on things drawn from the first principles. What I mean is this; while the *sophia* is the best excellence of all, both deductively understanding things drawn from first principles and intuitively grasping the first principles as well, the structure of the *phronêsis* does not share the same structure. Namely, under the assumption that the so-called Grand-End interpretation on *phronêsis* is not correct³⁰⁵, the structure of *phronêsis* and that of *sophia* are asymmetric. This is because the *phronêsis*, a sort of intellectual excellence on particulars, does not significantly contain the element to define the first principles, moral universals. Of course, the *phronimos*, the moral agent having *phronêsis*, is in the correct emotional disposition, through *doxa* and *boulêsis* on the abstracts, toward moral universal principles, but clearly such emotional disposition, in Aristotle, is what we have as a result of habituation (*ethismos*), not that of deliberation (*bouleusis*). Therefore, since the *phronêsis* is ‘merely’ the combination between the judgment on the best option to do in a given ‘particular’ situation, and the *orexis* to follow it, the *phronêsis* is not enough to be said that it has a structural similarity with the *sophia* that by its excellence itself can determine correctly the first principles as well. Hence, we should not, still, disregard the similarity between contemplation and deliberation, but it cannot yet be claimed that deliberation is structurally analogous to contemplation. How then are they related? I think that the

³⁰⁴ Richardson Lear (2004), pp.93-108.

³⁰⁵ Chapters Two and Three.

focal relation can eventually be applied to the relation between practical reasoning and theoretical reason now. We shall another interesting passage,

“As for ‘theoretical wisdom’ (*sophia*), this we ascribe, in the case of the various kinds of technical expertise, to those experts in them who are most precise, e.g. Pheidias is an accomplished worker in stone, Polycleitus in bronze, here at any rate meaning no more by “theoretical wisdom” than excellence in technical expertise; but we think that there are people who are accomplished in a general, not in a specific, sense, and not accomplished in something else. (*EN* 6.7, 1141a9-13)”

As we have already seen in Chapter Two, here the contrast between *sophia holós* and *sophia kata meros* does not indicate the whole – part distinction, because *sophia* in making, i.e. *technê*, is not, definitely, a constitutional part of *sophia*, intellectual excellence on heavenly beings. Either it does not mean the so-called type – token distinction, as long as the *technê* is not even a kind of the *sophia*, the highest form of excellence. Hence, it is clear that we should admit here that Aristotle suggests a certain similarity between *sophia holós* and *sophia kata meros*, but we should also remember that it is neither a relation between whole and part or between type and token.

It is important to note why Aristotle says people name such craft knowledge ‘*sophia*’. Aristotle seems to allow that *sophia* can be applied, rather non-typically, to excellent craft men in the sense that the craft man is being exact in his field. Although it is very clear that Aristotle explains the concept of ‘exactness’ in a rather complicated way³⁰⁶, and that, surely, the sense of ‘exactness’ in the case of practical intelligence could not be identical with that in the theoretical case, there is certainly a commonness in all those called ‘being exact’. That is, truth (*alêthêia*) or grasping truth I have shown above introducing the passage in *EN* 6.1. Remember, I already said, the function of rational soul is commonly grasping truth. Here we see this commonness is applicable to *sophia* and *technê* as well. This is very important, because *sophia* is the highest form of intellectual excellence and *technê*, comparatively, is the lowest form of intellectual excellence. Hence, it can be said that as long as the highest intellectual excellence and the lowest one are common in being exact in the relevant field, they are also common in grasping a corresponding truth. As a result, we can also infer that if one is intellectual excellence, the excellent function of rational soul, it includes grasping truth in a given context.

³⁰⁶ On the rule on ‘preciseness (*akribêia*)’, see *Apo* I.27, 87a31–35, cf., Richardson Lear (2004), pp.110-115.

Eventually, I think, we can say that all functions of rational soul of human being are related to a focal sense, truth. Therefore, between *sophia* and *technê* there is a focal sense in the relation of which the former is superior to the latter; truth grasped by *sophia* is the highest form of truth human can know³⁰⁷. Notice, I am not interpreting that *technê* is focally related to *sophia*, the theoretical intelligence, what I claim is that there is truth itself, or truth in a focal sense, that can be grasped directly only by god himself, so *sophia* and *technê* are focally related to truth itself. Hence, I think, the reason Aristotle says that *technê* is *sophia kata meros* is, importantly, not because he thinks, *technê* is focally related to *sophia holôs*, but because he wants to suggest that *technê* and *sophia* share a common focal sense, truth itself, I think.

Naturally, now we can think about *phronêsis*. Surely, since *phronêsis* is also a kind of intellectual excellence, it has truth itself as its focal sense, as well as *sophia* which has the same thing as its focal sense. Therefore, I can also name, Aristotle would not stop us, the *phronimos* the ‘*sophos kata meros*’, because both *phronêsis* and *sophia* are focally related to the same focal sense. About the passage³⁰⁸ in *EN* 6.13 as well, we can understand that passage in the way just mentioned. Of course, as we have seen in the previous section, it can be understood as where Aristotle hints the relation between practical activity and contemplation in the life of contemplation, but the passage can also explain for us the nature of practical excellence in terms of theoretical excellence, *sophia*; in what sense the excellence in practical reasoning is similar with that in theoretical, or more importantly, in what sense the activity of *phronêsis* can be *tis theôria*. As a result, in the passage where Aristotle seems to suggest, through the analogy of medical expertise, “*phronêsis* is pursued *heneka sophia*”, (which I translate as *phronêsis* is (by us) pursued to referring to *sophia*) Aristotle means, I think, that practical wisdom is an excellence in reasoning that has a common focal sense with theoretical wisdom. Therefore, again, the term ‘*heneka*’ here does not indicate at all a ‘necessary’ or ‘causational’ relation between these different intellectual excellences. Anyhow, I think since now we can say practical wisdom is similar to theoretical wisdom in the sense that both are focally related to the same object, truth itself, we can eventually claim that the relation between practical reasoning

³⁰⁷ See *EN* 6.7, 1141a17-19 where Aristotle seems to mean that the *sophia* is it is the *epistêmê* of the most honourable matters.

³⁰⁸ *EN* 1145a7-11 “But neither is ‘practical wisdom’ sovereign over ‘theoretical wisdom’, or ever the better of the two rational parts, any more than medical expertise is sovereign over health; for it does not employ it, but rather sees to it that it comes into existence, so that it prescribes on its behalf, not to it. It is as if one said that political expertise rules over the gods, because it issues prescriptions about everything in the city”.

(deliberation) and theoretical reasoning (contemplation) can also be explained in terms of focal relation. Therefore, as well as the fact that *phronêsis* is *sophia* in the sense that *phronêsis* has a common focal sense with *sophia*, deliberation, the function whose excellence is *phronêsis*, is contemplation, the correspondent of *sophia*, in that they have a common focal sense. Hence, when Aristotle says in *EN* 10.8, human happiness is some contemplation, he actually means that human happiness is happiness in that they (two types of happiness) are focally related to contemplation of god. Since surely here by human happiness Aristotle means the life of political and moral activity as well, political and moral activity in accordance with *phronêsis* should be contemplation in some sense, that is, in the sense that those practical activities are focally related to the contemplation of god. I am sure that what I have already said can be a sufficient answer to a question raised at the beginning of this section, in what sense the life of the political and moral activity is contemplation, and thereby happiness. However, to give an even more detailed answer to the question raised, I will provide a further explanation, applying the idea of the focal relation, on how the life of moral and political activity is also a happy life.

It seems clear that, between the life of contemplation, the life in which the most characteristic activity is contemplation, and the life of political activity, in which the most characteristic activity is the practically excellent activity, there is a similarity regarding rationality, that is, there is a focal relation between each activity and rationality (truth) itself. In the latter type of life, therefore, through both the deliberation (*bouleusis*) that is to grasp practical truth and prescribe it to do, and the combination of belief (*doxa*) and wish (*boulêsis*) that establishes the agent's attitude on moral first principles, the *phronimos*, the person of the perfect (*kurios*) 'practical' excellence, can act 'rationally', that is, according to '*orthos logos*'. Therefore, although this person does not have a so-called propositional knowledge about moral principles (*contra* Grand-End view, again), he or she still is in a consistent attitude on moral values, and it is such an attitude that manifests his or her emotional disposition or character initiating the action prescribed by deliberation. This process is not a purely conceptual reasoning, such as contemplation or theoretical deductive reasoning. However, in the sense that there is clearly rational consideration on moral values and particulars, and that such 'rational' process, when it is excellent, can actualize, through the collaboration with the *êthikê aretê*,

its *telos*, action, the life of practical excellence is also ‘rational’ or being in accordance with truth. Importantly, as long as this life is also ‘rational’, the person of this sort of happy life is the one doing some contemplation (*tis theôria*) in the sense that his characteristic activity is accompanied with the function of calculative soul, deliberation that is focally related to the contemplation of gods. Therefore, in this sense, moral and political activity can be contemplation as well. Consequently, in this very sense, the life of political and moral activity is also an approximation of the life of god and, thereby, happiness.

3.3 The Relation between Life of Contemplation and Life of Political and Moral Activity

So far, I have explained, respectively, each type of happiness in terms of focal relation, it seems I need to end this chapter on happiness with my interpretation on the relation between two types of happiness. It will be a more detailed version of what I have briefly introduced at the end of Section 3.1.

3.3.1 Why the Life of Contemplation is Superior to the Life of Political Activity

As I mentioned briefly earlier³⁰⁹, the excellent-character-life person will just say that he does the good action because he likes to do it or he thinks he ought to do it. That will be the most detailed answer he can make to the question ‘why does he do such a good action or why does he decide to do it?’ However, the person of the life of contemplation, the best happiness, will say that he does it because he wishes to act according to a certain value appropriate to the particular situation, and that what he actually has done is the best specification of his general principle relevant to the given situation. More importantly, he will also add the following. He will surely ‘know (*epistasthai*)’ that what he has done is the most godlike thing to do in that situation³¹⁰, i.e. moral circumstance, as long as it is a fruit of a rational process (deliberation), ‘both conceptual and desiderative’ combination of the relevant premises. It means, as long as this person performs moral and political activity through a ‘practically’ rational thinking process, his relevant action

³⁰⁹ Section 3.1 in Current Chapter.

³¹⁰ I believe Aristotle would not stop us from saying that the contemplatively happy person say, when he/she performs an excellent action, ‘this is in accordance with what god orders (*kelenein*) us to do!’, just as Socrates says at the last trial. I will talk about this in a moment.

is also an approximation of the pure rational activity of god, in that *phronêsis* in accordance with which such action is performed is focally related to the contemplation of god. However, this action is not the approximation of that contemplation as much as the human contemplation is, because, into the rational activity in the practical case, the animal aspects of human beings, emotion and desire, are intrinsically participated. However, as long as the practical activity is rational, *it is godlike*. Therefore, we are in the position to see that there is a degree of similarity or approximation between the life of a philosopher and the life of a politician regarding the focal sense of contemplation, the divine activity itself. Namely, both the life of contemplation and the life of political activity are happy in the sense that they are focally related to the same focal sense, the life (or activity) of god, but the former is superior to the latter in the nature of their characteristic activity; human contemplation is much more similar to the activity of god than the human political and moral activity is.

4. Concluding Remarks

4.1 Concluding Remark One: The ‘Inclusive-Dominant’ Debate

Now, regarding the debate between the so-called ‘inclusive end’ view and the ‘dominant end’ view, my position is this; it is clear that the highest form of human life, in Aristotle, is what he titles as ‘*ho bios theôrêtikos*’, but such a life does, not only, not underestimate the importance of moral values, but also does it contain the even more ‘serious (*spoudaion*)’ understanding on them. Although, again, such understanding, ‘*sophia*’, does not substantially help the agent to act better, and that, in that life, the contemplative activity is still prior to the practical activity, such priority does not imply abolishing or abandoning some less prior for the reason of efficiency or usefulness. The priority here means what is more similar to the focal sense, i.e. god. My interpretation should be under the category of the ‘dominant’ end view as long as I also think that in the life of contemplation, for the sake of contemplation every activity is desirable and performed. However, significantly, my view is different from two main ‘dominant’ end views, of Kraut (and Kenny) and Richardson Lear, in that I explain the relation between *phronêsis* and *sophia* in the life of contemplation differently from them; Kraut and Kenny claim that the function of *phronêsis* is an instrumental mean to the *sophia*, and Richardson Lear suggests that *sophia* will let the agent given not only find the practical truth better, but

also, substantially help him or her to act better. However, as I have already said, the relation between *phronēsis* and *sophia* is not either of these, but they are related in the sense that in the life of contemplation, the *eudaimôn* pursues to *phronēsis* referring to *sophia*, that is, this happy person, again, of course, deliberates, when being in moral circumstance, but also contemplates about his/her deliberation. As a result, although such a contemplation cannot pragmatically help the agent at all, it can still provide a more fundamental and rational explanation on moral and political activity. This is, again, not a trivial point, because this is the benefit of that happy person comparing to others, and therefore the person comes to be one of the happiest humans. I think this is the better explanation of the for-the-sake-of relation used in comparing *phronēsis* and *sophia* than other commentators in that my interpretation can secure Aristotle's message in *EN* 6.13 to be compatible with his remarks regarding the division of the soul. Also, this interpretation not only succeeds in protecting the 'dominant' end view from the criticisms, but also can be an alternative 'dominant end' view having explained away problems in other dominant end views on Aristotelian happiness.

4.2 Concluding Remark Two: An Aristotelian Picture of the 'Happiest' Individual - The Death of Socrates

Since the most popularly raised question regarding the discussion on *eudaimonia* is 'what on earth, then, the specific example of it is?', it will be interesting to finish this chapter providing a remark on the following question; specifically, what individual's life might Aristotle want to put under his category of the best form of human life?

Already we have seen, many times, that a contemplatively happy person can understand his or her morally excellent action more fundamentally, so he or she can provide a more rationally profound explanation on practical and moral matters. This reminds me of Socrates' famous statements in Plato's dialogue '*Apology*'. Although, surely, there seems to be some important difference between Socrates and Aristotle regarding the statue of *sophia* in the eudaimonic life, at least it seems highly possible, I think, that Aristotle puts the life of Socrates under the category of the *bios theôrētikos*. More specifically, what

Aristotle means by the life of contemplation reminds me of Socrates' statement on the taking care of the *psyché* and the order (to *keleuein*) of god in *Apology* 29e-30c³¹¹.

If we see *Apology* in 38c-39c³¹², Socrates seems to stress that the reason he is guilty, is not because he lacks the ability to win the trial, that is, not because he is not able to prove his innocence, but because he lacks 'boldness and shamelessness and the willingness to say to the men of Athens what they would most gladly have heard from Socrates himself. Namely, I understand, he suggests that although he knows the way that he can escape from this difficulty and prolong his life, which probably is not only acceptable, but also even better for him from the worldly view, he does not want to compromise with the way, but rather to die (39a). Why, then, does he want this?

Of course, no doubt, there are many different ways to explain profoundly why Socrates rather decides to die. However, I want to claim that the reason is because Socrates contemplates that the compromise is that will corrupt his soul and eventually that is against the divine manifestation (theia moira) or the order (keleuein) of god. Probably, since his decision – to admit the death sentence- is what can preserve the best form (ariston) of his soul, and that is the order he was given, like all other human beings, from god, he says he can happily perform it.³¹³ Obviously, I don't mean here that Socrates' comments on god represent that Socrates also admits the focal relation between the life of gods and that of humans. What I mean is that Socrates not only regards a standard or criterion through which we can evaluate an individual's life as what is both external to and superior to human in general, but also understands perfectly the existence of such an external criterion. I think that this is what Aristotle would sufficiently admits his life to be; the life of contemplation, that is, the highest form of human life.

Presumably, one who is not a philosopher, like Socrates, but has been morally-educated well in a good environment³¹⁴, would do, Aristotle thinks, the similar action if he confronts the situation Socrates does. However, for Aristotle, this person cannot explain his or her action theoretically as systematically as Socrates does mentioning the

³¹¹ Which seems to be the central thing in the teaching of Socrates, see Burnet (1924), p.204, cf., Meyer (2008), pp. 14-15. Aristotle also seems to suggest taking care of the soul in order to be happy, see, *EN* 1098b12-18 & 1099b18-28.

³¹² On the relevant controversy on the historical fact of this 'third' speech of Socrates after the sentence, see Burnet (1924), pp.241-2.cf., Reeve (2002), p.56 with n.102.

³¹³ *Apology* 40c- 42a where Socrates seems to say that the life after death is actually blessing.

³¹⁴ Presumably, Aristotle would say 'Pericles' in *EN* 1140b8-11, cf., Haineman (1988), p.35.

soul and the divine manifestation (*theia moira*)³¹⁵. This ‘merely’ character-excellent person would only say he does this because he thinks he ought to do this and otherwise he or she would be in pain.

Again, the life of this ‘merely’ character-excellent person and the life of Socrates seem to be not significantly different in terms of the appearance of moral activity. However, for Aristotle as well, in the sense that Socrates understands the cosmological law that in principle deals with our everyday life and that he can explain moral activity based on this, his soul is more excellent than that of the character-excellent person. That is, Aristotle believes that even if the ‘merely’ character-excellent person is not killed by his political enemies or does not end his life in such an unfortunate way, to the view of the world, as Socrates ends his one, the life of Socrates is still happier and, even, more worth living than that of the other. I think that Aristotle expresses his respect to Socrates in this way; that is, not substantially agreeing, as many other commentators think, with Socrates regarding the impossibility of *acrasia*, but by putting Socrates’ life on the top of Aristotle’s system as the best form of human life.

³¹⁵ *Apology* 33c.

Conclusion

In order to claim that practical thought in Aristotle is significantly distinguished both from theoretical reasoning and from what can actually initiate a physical action (that is, to show that it is neither pure reasoning for conceiving a general concept, nor the initiation of physical action), I have investigated so far Aristotle's treatment and relevant discussions of the emotional soul and the deliberative soul comprehensively; especially excellence of character (*êthikê aretê*), deliberation (*bouleusis*) and decision (*prohairesis*), and I also explained away some relevant puzzles in his account on *acrasia* and *eudaimonia*, employing my interpretation of Aristotelian deliberation.

For Chapter One, I discussed Aristotle's doctrine of the mean (*to meson*), his theoretical definition of character-excellence (*êthikê aretê*); the excellent disposition of the irrational or emotional part of the soul. There, having criticized respectively the view that 'the mean is always a moderate amount of action and emotion' and the view that 'the mean is relative to the character of each agent', I have claimed that the character-excellence is the mean emotional state (*mesotês*) of the soul pursuing the best appropriate option in each moral circumstance.

Chapters Two and Three, then, have been composed of the main argument. In the second chapter, against the GEV, I have claimed that deliberation is not to determine our conception of moral general ends or moral first principles, because it is merely to specify and decide what the best thing to do is in a given situation, out of various particular variables, referring to a conception of end already determined by the disposition of character. In the third chapter, against the GEV, again, I have argued that what Aristotle means by the term '*prohairesis*' is what is confined to the realm that the deliberative soul is concerned with; so the indication of the *prohairesis*, by its nature and definition, cannot be an action.

In Chapters Four and Five I have examined, to confirm its credibility, my interpretation of deliberation, so far as it can also be applied to other important philosophical issues, especially to solve the existing puzzles in the relevant debates. In the fourth chapter, I claimed that the *acritic* is conscious that what he or she is doing is bad and I based it on my interpretation that, at least in the case of the weak-willed acritic, there is a genuine conflict between the deliberative soul and the emotional soul. The fifth or last chapter

has inquired about Aristotle's *eudaimonia* account. Here, criticising existing received interpretations, I provided an alternative 'dominant' end view to Aristotle's account on *eudaimonia*, maintaining the focal-derivative relation between practical reason and theoretical reason.

In short, throughout the discussion in the dissertation, I have suggested that Aristotelian deliberation or moral thought differs from the proper function of emotional soul in that the former does not by itself indicate a physical activity; but also, it differs from that of theoretical soul, because the deliberative soul does not give birth to a belief to be contemplated. Namely, I have shown that, in Aristotle, deliberation, contrasting with theoretical reasoning, is to provide its unique type of *hypolépsis*, a prescription, a combination between conceptual element and desiderative element on the best possible option to do in a given situation. However, again, although such a *hypolépsis* surely regards what is to be acted on (*ta praktá*), it does not indicate or initiate an action by itself, by contrast to the work of emotional soul.

What, then, does this idea of the nature of deliberation suggest? I suppose that it will be good to complete the whole argument in this dissertation by emphasizing the following point again. It seems that Aristotle maintains that, although deliberation is the rational function about *ta praktá*, and the *phronimos* is surely the one who always acts according to the *spoudaia probairesis*, the deliberation, or its excellence, cannot by itself either guarantee the practice of the *probairesis*, or explain exhaustively why the *phronimos* has performed such an excellent action. For, according to my interpretation, the deliberation cannot explain either how you came to have a certain principle, or how you were physically able to perform according to the *probairesis*. I think, here comes the importance of moral education and habituation in Aristotle's ethical theory. As we have seen earlier, Aristotle often means that, through the emotional or affective part of the soul a moral agent both conceives a moral first principle and moves his or her own body; for instance, Aristotle says, we determine the *telos* with character (in *EN* 3.4), and what moves our body is the operation of the *pathos* (in *EN* 7.3). Clearly, since what develops the emotional or affective soul of the moral agent is the habituation, we cannot explain sufficiently about human moral actions, without the habituation in Aristotle's ethical system. Consequently, when Aristotle explains how we set up a moral principle, mentioning the character of a given agent, he is not trying to give us an evasive answer, but actually he is

providing us with a substantial explanation on how we determine moral first principles, and about our moral action in general. This is why I think in Aristotle the emotional soul and deliberative soul intimately collaborate with each other, and why I claim that we cannot understand moral action fully without grasping such a complicated nature of their relationship. Eventually, such a complicated and delicate nature of the dynamic relations in human moral action is not irrelevant to Aristotle's intention in saying "we cannot be good without *phronésis*, but cannot be *phronimos* without the *éthiké areté*" in *EN* 6.13, 1144b30-32.

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