

APPROPRIATING DECENTRALIZATION:  
HOW URBAN POVERTY PROJECT TRIGGERS ADVOCACY

BY

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THESIS

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## Abstract

This exploratory research was designed to understand how poor communities appropriate decentralization policies to raise their expectations of the state and consequently press their own agenda in development and poverty alleviation projects. *Appropriating decentralization* is conceptualized as the evolution of marginalized communities into empowered and self-advocating ones, capable of influencing the way the government operates in strategic planning processes by using the resources provided by state-sponsored, decentralized programs. Largely relying on qualitative method—using a combination of data collection techniques including in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, field observations and documents reviews—this research explores Indonesia’s Urban Poverty Project’s implementation in two *kelurahans* (sub-districts) in the city of Pekalongan, Central Java, Indonesia. This research discusses how a community organization can strategically plan movements to put its agents in the government and influences the governmental operation toward more democratic and accountable governance culture. It also highlights stories and perspectives to understand the complex process of planning negotiation where poverty and economic interdependence plays important roles in the “give and take” between community organization and external parties. This research suggests that communities can actively appropriate decentralization policy to further their own agendas within the decentralizing State’s frameworks and do not require a different planning process exclusive of governmental agents or the State’s influence. The communities studied, however, demonstrate that engagement with the State-run planning processes is very contested and multi-layered. A thin, fine line exists between community-government strategic alliance and the State co-opting civil society.

Keywords: *appropriating decentralization; strategic alliance; co-optation; self-advocate; negotiation*

To the urban poor in Indonesia and all other parts of the world,

I wish I could have done more.

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## Glossary

<i>abangan</i>	nominal Moslems
<i>batik</i>	Javanese wax fabric
Bappeda	<i>badan perencanaan pembangunan daerah</i> [local planning agency]
Bappenas	<i>badan perencanaan pembangunan nasional</i> [national planning agency]
BKM	<i>badan keswadayaan masyarakat</i> [community self-help institution]
<i>bupati</i>	regent
<i>camat</i>	head of urban district administration
<i>carik</i>	secretary of the <i>kelurahan</i> office
CBO	community-based organization
<i>desa</i>	village
<i>desakota</i>	urban village
DPR	<i>dewan perwakilan rakyat</i> [house of representative, parliament]
DPRD	<i>dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah</i> [local house of representative]
<i>Golkar</i>	Golongan Karya
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	human development index
<i>Inpres</i>	<i>instruksi presiden</i> [president's instruction]
<i>kelurahan</i>	urban sub-district administration
<i>kabupaten</i>	regency
<i>kota (madya)</i>	city
KSM	<i>kelompok swadaya masyarakat</i> [self-help groups]
<i>kuli bangunan</i>	construction worker
<i>kuli panggul</i>	manual lifter
LPM	<i>lembaga pemberdayaan masyarakat</i> [community empowerment body]
LKM	<i>lembaga keswadayaan masyarakat</i> [community self-help organization]



LKMD	<i>lembaga ketahanan masyarakat desa</i> [village defense institute]
<i>Lurah</i>	head of urban sub-district administration
<i>madrasah</i>	Islamic school
ND	neighborhood development
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPO	non-profit organization
NU	<i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i>
Pamsimas	<i>penyediaan air minum dan sanitasi berbasis masyarakat</i> [community-based supply for drink water and sanitation]
PAN	<i>partai amanat nasional</i> [national mandate party]
Pantura	<i>pantai utara</i> [Java Island's north shore]
<i>pesantren</i>	traditional Javanese Islamic boarding school
<i>petak</i>	embanked field
PKB	<i>partai kebangkitan bangsa</i> [national emergence party]
PPP	<i>partai persatuan pembangunan</i> [united development party]
P2KSBM	<i>percepatan pembangunan keluarga sejahtera berbasis masyarakat</i> [family welfare acceleration through community-based development]
PU	<i>pekerjaan umum</i> [public works]
RT	<i>rukun tetangga</i> [neighborhood association]
RW	<i>rukun warga</i> [community association]
Sanimas	<i>sanitasi oleh masyarakat</i> [sanitation by people]
<i>santri</i>	student of <i>pesantren</i> , also devout Moslems
<i>satpam</i>	security guard
<i>sawah</i>	wet paddy field
TIPP	<i>tim inti perencanaan partisipatif</i> [core group for participatory planning]
UPP	urban poverty project
<i>warga</i>	citizen

## I. Executive Summary

Can communities move beyond performing the State's agenda in poverty alleviation projects? Can communities appropriate decentralized poverty alleviation programs and divert the State's agenda to press their own aims? Can communities advocate for their needs without engaging in a planning process separate from the state-run processes and exclusive of governmental agents? If so, how do these communities operate?

This research seeks to understand how poor communities actively evolve into empowered and self-advocating ones, capable of influencing the way the decentralizing government operates in strategic planning process for a pro-poor policy. Indonesia's Urban Poverty Project (UPP) successfully transformed community self-help institutions (*Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat* [BKM] ) into community governance owning the capacity for collective action, increased efficiency in the delivery of projects' resources to its beneficiaries, and prevented elite capture (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007, Beard et al, 2008). Potential for social transformation and reduction of elite control exists in denser, more populous urban areas, too (Beard & Dasgupta, 2006). However, this social transformation occurs only within the scope of the community. It does not represent transformation related to structural change, such as providing poor communities' with bigger roles in shaping the way poverty alleviation projects and pro-poor policies are designed at a higher level. Dissatisfaction from communities' isolated social transformations from the larger political process and the desire to witness a larger role for communities in the democratic urban governance motivates this research.

Two different notions of advocacy planning emerge from academic planning debates. The first one treats planning as a profession, and frames advocacy planning as an activity performed by professionals. In this notion, inclusiveness and participation in advocacy planning applies to the *process* and *substance*, but not the *actors* of planning because professional planners are assumed to have authority to plan. The great contribution of literatures in covert, radical, and insurgent planning

is to offer the notion that planning can be practiced in *invented* spaces, more informal arenas where marginalized population can formulate sharper differences with the state's and mainstream development agencies' agenda. The two different notions can be summarized as *professional vs citizen-grassroot* planning.

In Indonesia, planning is closely associated with the activity of the public sector. Indonesia has experienced major changes since the 1998 reformation and the ongoing demand for democratic decentralization. Hence, the most important part of the discussion on citizen planning is the authority transfer process from the State to citizen bodies. Literatures in decentralization have been extensively discursive about mechanisms for the State to transfer authorities to its sub-national entities, but there has not been equal amount of literature discussing how citizen bodies actively evolve to raise expectations in response to decentralization. This research uses two community self-help institutions (BKM) in the City of Pekalongan, Central Java, Indonesia, as case studies to fill that gap of empirical studies in advocacy planning.

This research is an exploratory study of UPP and its community organizations' evolution in the context of a decentralizing Indonesian government. Largely relying on qualitative research method, this research collected primary data through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and field observations. The researcher also reviewed community and municipality planning documents, plans, regulations and policy papers as a secondary data collection method. It aims to understand sociopolitical and historical factors influencing community organizations' evolutions, as well as the interplay between insiders and outsiders in managing these projects. Through extensive discussions with BKM members and leaders, government officials, and UPP facilitators, the researcher documented their perception on poverty and created an inventory of past collective actions to accurately analyze community-level (BKM) planning, governance, and capacity for advocacy.

This thesis organizes the observations and implications of these interviews into several subchapters. Stories of Pekalongan's newly elected mayor, Dr. Basyir Ahmad, illustrate his dualistic role: as both

the state's agent and as an agent of change representing community-based organizations' interests. As a state agent, Dr. Basyir's repertoire of action is limited to the rhetoric of a government's agent: utilizing the authority to enact ordinances and operate in a legal framework. By refusing to work within the new framework—emphasizing on democratic citizen participation—government officials can maintain the status quo. Dr. Basyir's election, however, exposed governmental agencies and officials to formidable structural and cultural change toward larger accountability, accessibility, and deferral toward local planning and governance. Drawing on his experience as community organizer, Dr. Basyir—known as “mayor of the people” for his egalitarian trait and pro-poor policy—acted as an advocate of change from within governmental institutions.

Findings on the interviews with BKM Podosugih, a *kelurahan* in the city of Pekalongan, discuss the strong connection between two events: Mayor Basyir's election in Pekalongan and a planned movement by BKM Podosugih to put its agents in legislative and executive government. This plan, tacit but exquisitely strategic and intensely coordinated, sought municipal governments' recognition of community-based organizations (CBO) in its legal framework. This advocacy resulted in legislation, which mandated resource provisions for other communities to establish their own community-based organizations and made CBOs a strategic partner in the city's poverty alleviation programs. Podosugih's experience provides an exemplary model of how to successfully appropriate a decentralized poverty alleviation program.

Stories and perspectives from Yosorejo, a *kelurahan* in Pekalongan, highlight its complex negotiation process to resolve flooding problems. Local people believed Kismatex, a textile factory, contributed to flooding of the surrounding neighborhood by destructing the indigenous drainage system. BKM, the area's civic organization, advocated for the drains' restoration in the negotiation process between local people—represented by BKM—and the factory, where *Lurah* (the sub-district administrator) acted as mediator. Throughout the negotiation process, *Lurah* influenced BKM's ideas of who is responsible for (infrastructure) development and who deserves to benefit from development and poverty alleviation efforts. *Lurah's* involvement, in the end, pacified the potential of aggressive

collective action. The case of Yosorejo also illustrates how local dependence on the factory's employment provision (and the factory's dependence on cheap labor) played important roles in the "give and take" of the negotiation.

In the two observed communities, UPP emerges as an effective social planning instrument to develop community organizations' collective criticism against the state's agenda. Both communities exhibited strong beliefs in self-direction and resistance to the state's prescriptions on development and poverty alleviation strategies. Their focus then shifted from addressing communities' interests in their sole geographic boundaries to their locus in wider urban social, economic, and physical contexts. The two BKM actively appropriated decentralization policy to press their agendas.

Abovementioned processes occurred within the decentralizing state's frameworks and did not require a different planning process exclusive of governmental agents or the State's influence. Moreover, communities can benefit from their engagement with the state by aggressively placing their agents in strategic governmental positions. Both communities observed, however, demonstrated that engagement with the state-run planning processes is contested with conflicting interests. A thin, fine line exists between community-government strategic alliance and the state co-opting civil society. As a result of this study, some gray areas between successful grassroots activism and community elitism also emerge.

## II: Introduction

### A. What Have We (not) Learned from (State-Supported) Empowerment Programs?

Can communities move beyond performing the State's agenda in poverty alleviation projects? Can communities appropriate decentralized poverty alleviation programs and divert the State's agenda to press their own aims? Can communities advocate for their needs without engaging in a planning process separate from the state-run processes and exclusive of governmental agents? If so, how do these communities operate?

This research seeks to understand how—in an era of decentralization—poor communities actively evolve into empowered and self-advocating ones, capable of influencing how government develops its pro-poor policy in its strategic planning process. By establishing community board governance, Indonesia's Urban Poverty Project (UPP) successfully transformed community self-help institutions (*Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat* [BKM]) into owning the capacity for collective action, increased efficiency in the delivery of project's resources to its beneficiaries, and prevented elite capture (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Beard et al., 2008). Potential for social transformation and reduction of elite control exists in denser, more populous urban areas, too (Beard and Dasgupta, 2006). However, this social transformation occurs only within the scope of the community. This transformation also does not address issues related to structural change, such as representing poor communities' interests as higher-level officials design poverty alleviation projects and pro-poor policies. Dissatisfaction from communities' isolated social transformations from the larger political process and the desire to witness a larger role for communities in the democratic urban governance motivates this research.

Earlier studies that assert a marginalized population could learn to divert a state's agenda and press its own (Geddes, 1999; Therborn, 1979; and Wood, 2001) through radical, sometimes covert, planning practices (Beard, 2002), inform this paper. However, this research examines this diversion process in

a different context. In contexts where an authoritarian regime reacts with hostility to threats of social and structural changes from its managed subjects, radical and covert planning proves highly effective. Because of their subversive planning goals, radical and covert planning actors' relationship with state agents is often adversarial, and typically, they effectively operate outside state control and beyond state-planning processes. As Indonesia—the subject of this study—decentralizes and democratizes, avenues for bottom-up planning processes increase. Presently the Indonesian state, to a certain extent, welcomes citizen input. Compared with its authoritarian period, state agents and CBOs, the main actors of local development during a decentralization-democratization period interact in relatively cooperative and mutually beneficial ways.

Despite the cooperative opportunities in a decentralizing state, the process of transferring planning authority and resources from the state to communities, representing a variety of agendas, still requires critical inspection. Although substantial amount of literature visualize decentralization of the state as a prerequisite for citizen participation that ultimately leads to democracy, efficiency, and equity (e.g. Agrawal & Gupta, 2005; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; and Ribot, 2002), it also can mask patronage by a central government (e.g., Nelson and Agrawal, 2008). In some cases, decentralization can even recentralize control, especially in natural resources management (e.g., Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson, 2006). Therefore, this research explores possible processes for communities to develop the crucial skills necessary to assess their circumstances and decide whether to strategically conform, confront, or divert the state's agenda.

This research also attempts to understand the *mechanism* for communities to divert the state's agenda without establishing a planning process separate from the state planning processes. While this research simultaneously values community autonomy in decision-making and praises planning conducted by non-state agents, it remains open to communities' ability to plan within the state's framework to effect larger change.

## B. Why Decentralization in Indonesia?

Widespread distrust toward former President Suharto, which led to a regime change in Indonesia, is still fresh in the nation's memory and acts as a preamble to today's decentralization. While O'Donnell and Schmitter (1968) argue division and negotiation between hard-liner and soft-liner elites typically characterize regime change, Indonesia's regime change highlights the role of non-elite actors (Ali, 2001; Woodward, 2002). Asian financial turmoil between 1997 and 1998 sparked civil unrest in major Indonesian cities. Mass protests in different areas in Indonesia often led to violent incidents and represented a near-example of a class revolt. Life's basic needs for most of the population were precarious. People from lower socio-economic classes plundered stores and businesses and attacked other groups assumed to be proprietors. Driven by the long, subtle, and latent social jealousy of Chinese descendants' control over the Indonesian economy, this civil unrest also turned into racial attacks against them. The New Order regime could not provide protection and security for its citizens or overcome the crisis.

Accusations of corrupt practices by the New Order's bureaucrat and presidential family fueled the crisis (BBC, 2008). Citizens rejected Suharto's offer of political reform (*reformasi*), and strengthened pressure for a change of national leadership. In an incident now referred to as *Tragedi Trisakti*,<sup>1</sup> political turmoil turned into widespread terror when military force killed four university students during a protest on May 12, 1998. Following this event, university student organizations saw the three-day period of presidential leave abroad as a window for bigger mass protest and occupied the National Assembly's building. This event was followed by similar occupations in other provincial offices in Indonesia. Witnessing the largest mass political protest in 30 years of Indonesia's history, the parliament recommended national leadership succession on May 20, 1998 (Kompas, 1998). That night, Suharto resigned.

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<sup>1</sup> Elang Mulia Lesmana, Heri Hertanto, Hafidin Royan, and Hendriawan Sie died in Trisakti University campus in this event. Antara News, May 12<sup>th</sup> 2007, retrieved from <http://www.antara.co.id/view/?i=1178940413&c=NAS&s=>.



Effective and efficient resource exploitation rather than equitable distribution of the economic benefit of the exploited resources by the New Order regime created the strongest pressure toward regime change (see, for example Walsh, 2008). Some scholars consider the Regional Autonomy Law no. 22 in 1999 as a major leap for democratic, participatory, equitable, and just distribution of economic benefits and a legal basis for greater community control of local natural resources management (e.g. Walsh, 2008). Simultaneously, the passing of Local-National Fiscal Balance Law no. 25, also in 1999, gave local government autonomy in political and fiscal decisions (Beard, 2008).

However, in practice provincial level government and the national government struggled for power and control over resources, which provides little, if any, actual power to the municipal level authorities (Ferrazzi, 1998). On the other hand, donors, international aid agencies, and local governments extensively transferred power and resources to local and private institutions, including civil society organizations for the sake of bureaucratic efficiency and political stability (Ito, 2008). On a legal basis, by the dismantling of Law 5/1979 and Law 5/1974, and the passing of Law 22/1999, community actors gained more roles in community-level governance because *desa* (villages) and *keurahan* (urban sub-districts) are no longer the smallest political administrative units (Antlov, 2003). To date, no study illustrates the potential disconnect between municipal government and community organizations, although in practice, this notion is generally accepted.

The Indonesian presidential administration quickly realized that administrative decentralization would not sufficiently moderate grassroots' pressure from a substantial portion of the Indonesian population. Government officials anticipated civil unrest in response to their failure to overcome severe poverty in areas of the country, underscoring the urgency for a nationwide poverty alleviation program.

Previously centralized, bureaucratically controlled mechanisms of job creation programs would not achieve their goal. Urban Poverty Project (UPP) as a community-based project emerged through designers with considerable experiences in non-governmental organization (NGO) operations, who were involved in the early stages of the project. Pungky Sumadi, the BAPPENAS (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional* [National Planning Agency]) officer responsible for preparation

of the UPP with the World Bank, described how the Indonesian administration raced the clock to deliver the program in the shortest time possible to prevent more eruptive mass action:

*“I just arrived at my office on one morning in January 1998 when my supervisor at the Bureau of Urban Development, Settlements and Public Housing of the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) called me for a quick briefing... [T]he Chairman of the agency had requested [the] World Bank to support Indonesia with a nation-wide project to help severe unemployment in urban areas. The Chairman was concerned that...the 1997 Asian financial crisis...would lead to further protest and uprising. The World Bank agreed with the request... the project should be ready within...6 months. [N]ever in my 10-year experience of working on any World Bank project that a single project took less than 24 months.... I went back to my office with total confusion.... I had no experience... with local communities. We were highly centralized government. We are experts in giving instructions. Having realized that... I never had any experience with community work... I... recruit[ed] more people (consultants) to help BAPPENAS prepare the overall project design and operation manual.... By late May I presented the project to the World Bank project task manager. She initially did not agree with the concept since the World Bank’s mission was to create employment and job opportunities as soon as possible. After some long arguments,... she finally accepted. We named the project as the Urban Poverty Project.” (Sumadi, 2004)*

### **C. Urban Poverty Project as a State-Prescribed Community Participation<sup>2</sup>**

The UPP targeted four syndromes of poverty for its intervention on selected urban centers. It perceives poverty as a result of one’s disintegration with the rest of the population in terms of political, social, economic, and environmental structures, referred as poverty syndromes. A low economic status (indicated by low income) often leads to the marginalization of someone without social and political associations. As a result, low-income individuals are excluded from decision-making processes within their community. In urban areas, there is a significant overlap between the three syndromes (political, social, economic) of poverty exhibited in marginalized living environments with poor public services and sanitary infrastructures. The four syndromes are self-perpetuating hence UPP intervention needs to address all four poverty syndromes simultaneously.

In an effort to be comprehensive, the UPP’s first three-year phase recommended three main activities:

- 1) a *microcredit scheme* to address the lack of economic opportunities and to create alternative,

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<sup>2</sup> This section, unless otherwise noted, summarizes the Ministry of Public Works’s “General Guide for Urban Poverty Project Phase 3.” R. Arief Rahadi, Sonny H. Kusuma, Adi Maadi, and Tri Maulana, contributors to this document, were the four consultants involved in the development of the initial UPP plan.

informal job creation; 2) *infrastructure development*, especially better sanitary infrastructures to improve public health and street paving to increase accessibility; and 3) *social charities*, as an instrument to help those without capacity to develop businesses. In the second three-year phase, the project also allowed housing improvement projects to increase poor people's property value and provide them with asset ownership. In the third phase, 50 percent of each community's funds are allocated for infrastructure development and 15 percent are allocated for social charities. The remaining funds will finance a microcredit scheme, where communities are required to retain 90 percent of their microfinance fund after 3 years. This requirement attempted to remedy inexperienced community organizations' previous experiences with financial management, where the UPP grant was completely distributed as a social charity and none of the microcredit budget was returned as a sustainable community capital.

The project funds are given to a *kelurahan*, the smallest administrative unit of local government in Indonesia. It requires each *kelurahan* to establish a new community organization or modify an existing one and transform it into a community self-help institution (BKM) to receive and manage the project funds. BKM act as policymakers for UPP projects in their respective *kelurahan*, not serve as project managers. Instead, self-help groups (KSM, *Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat*) implement projects through an ad-hoc committee for each special project. A *kelurahan* is typically subdivided into smaller units of communities and neighborhoods. Each unit has its own voluntary civic leader in a smaller neighborhood association (RT, *Rukun Tetangga*), and a larger community association (RW, *Rukun Warga*). Although BKM bears the name "community self-help institution," it barely represents a cohesive community; rather, RT and RW typically represent much more cohesive and homogeneous population.

To ensure fair representation, the project requires elections of volunteer members from the smallest basis of RT and RW levels, since BKM does not represent a cohesive community. The election process cannot involve any campaigning or self-nominations. A paid facilitator from the project's regional management consultant assists in RT and RW meetings, where nominations for BKM

members occur to ensure the aforementioned conditions are met. At the next meeting, *nominated RT and RW representatives* then vote for 11 to 13 BKM members from themselves. One-third of BKM's membership must be female; failure to comply with this protocol would result in the project's termination in that respective *kelurahan*. However, after the BKM members are elected, they are given the responsibility and freedom to define their own constitutional rules regarding the election procedure for the upcoming three-year term and the criteria for judging proposals they receive from community members. This system allows for a high degree of variation in each community (Beard, 2008).

There are several key differences from the three phases of UPP implementation in Indonesia. In the first phase (2000-2003), each BKM in a larger *kelurahan* received approximately Rp. (rupiah) 1 billion and the smaller ones received Rp. 250 million.<sup>3</sup> The substantial amount of money distributed to *kelurahans* raised concern on potential government corruption. Hence the first phase of UPP was characterized by a strict requirement that a community organization cannot involve any governmental agents.<sup>4</sup> UPP's originators envisioned BKM as completely extra-governmental institution.

In the second phase, (2003–2006), funding allocation was smaller (Rp. 200 million for *kelurahan* with less than 3,000 people and Rp. 500 million for *kelurahan* with more than 1,000 people), and BKM could co-manage the fund with *kelurahan* office, creating a more open relationship between BKM and the government institution. The project's third phase (2006–2009) encourages strategic partnerships with government offices, completely changing the relationship between BKM and the state. This strategic partnership is not limited to co-management with *kelurahan* officials, but also includes the Local Office of Public Works (Dinas PU) for infrastructure development projects and Local Planning Agency (*BAPPEDA*) for planning and budgeting processes. To deal with limited resources UPP even encouraged BKM to cooperate with private entities, such as banks and cooperatives. BKMs with

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<sup>3</sup> In 2000, the currency rate was around Rp. 10,000 / US\$. Due to the financial crisis, however, this rate was very fluctuant. At its lowest level it reached Rp. 20,000 / US\$.

<sup>4</sup> Despite this regulation, however, Beard and Dasgupta (2006, 2007) find that many of BKM members during UPP's 1st phase were government employees or closely related with government institutions in some other way.

relatively high achievement in the previous three phases— established self-governance, self-reliance, and expandable social and professional networking—may compete for an additional Rp. 1 billion grant for neighborhood development program, specifically designed to facilitate community-based infrastructure development.

BKMs' relationship with their governmental counterpart exhibits an interesting dynamic, because decentralization law does not recognize this relationship; BKMs' role as a community governing body is only required by the UPP scheme (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the dynamic relationship between BKM and its governmental counterpart(s)). First, although the UPP scheme prescribes that BKMs establish strategic partnerships with local governments, UPP does not force the local government agencies to comply with its requirement. In other words, BKMs needs to *earn* these strategic partnerships by developing their own networks and establishing their own contacts. This responsibility, of course, poses a great challenge for any BKM to represent their beneficiaries' interest in negotiations with their governmental counterparts.

Second, BKMs have no official legal standing to act as a community government. However, their operations echo cardinal principles of governance: elected memberships and the power to draft constitutional rules directing policies of program implementation. Thus, BKMs operate as if it is a community-governing body outside of the sub-district's administrative government. Lastly, decentralization does not only refer to a legal system, but also encompasses a growing citizen pressure toward more government accountability. Because BKM members are democratically elected by community members, they can be held accountable while sub-district officials cannot. Therefore, despite no official legal recognition, sub-district administrators cannot easily contest BKM's role in the *kelurahan's* governance.




Chart 1. Institutional Model of the UPP

### III. Theorizing Advocacy Planning

#### A. Toward More Inclusive Planning in Poverty Alleviation: Advocacy or Insurgency?

Addressing different voices in planning a city's future is not a new idea, especially in the context of U.S. planning. Davidoff (1965), concerned with the increasing number of protests against racial discrimination against U.S. Blacks, encouraged planners to engage in a more democratic and inclusive process. He also argued that planners should engage in urban politics and play an active role as advocates for interest groups—a radical suggestion in the '60s. He envisioned planners as politicians who could be held accountable to their constituency or as lawyers who could be held accountable to their clients. According to Brooks (2002), two major elements define Davidoff's advocacy planning are *technical assistance* and *representation*. Yet advocacy planning moves beyond these two elements.

By playing the role of advocates, Davidoff believed the whole structure of planning would be revolutionized. An advocate planner who serves a particular interest group as a client would change the participation scheme, from citizens *reacting* to agency programs into groups *proposing* their concepts to be adopted as official programs. As early as the 1960s, Davidoff proposed that a) to address the plural needs of a diverse population, planners must be politically active; b) planning process must be inclusive, where citizen participation is a norm; c) the planning profession itself should include social and economic issues, not just physical planning; and d) planners should not fear the adversary nature of advocacy planning, because it would still benefit planning research, a constant learning process for all professional planners.

Krumholz (1982), the Director of Cleveland's City Planning Commission under the first Black mayor of a U.S. city, claimed that his planning staff consistently operated in an activist, interventionist style, with redistribution as its objective, making who became the mayor an unimportant fact. Implicitly,

Krumholz perceived planning as neutral to politics and power sharing. To Krumholz, equity, not advocacy, matters. In other words, who and how planning is performed, is not necessarily as important as providing choices to those who are most disfranchised and have little, if any, choices.

Though regarded by many planning practitioners and academicians as noble and popular, advocacy planning had also been harshly criticized. Practitioners contend that advocacy planning, as an instrument to mitigate conflicts, leads to decision-making gridlock. Meanwhile, community activists considers advocacy planning to be a new, veiled colonial-patronizing behavior by planners (Brooks, 2000). Piven (1970a) asserted that advocate planners have been alienated from beneficiaries, since typically they do not directly employ planners. She despises being an advocate as a *profession*, for professionalism was exactly what the typical beneficiaries of advocacy planning, i.e., people in the slum areas, do *not* have. Therefore *other people* from the outside brought their “expertise” to these populations. Ultimately, Piven believes professional advocate planners would serve the interest of the fund grantor instead of people they really are working for, and it would largely determine the outcome of the planning process.

Rosen (1970) criticized Piven’s standing, arguing that professional assistance in advocacy practices did not always lead to domination and manipulation. More importantly, the continuing practice of advocacy planning is part of the long-term effort to integrate previously disfranchised populations into the political discourse of decision-making. Rosen pointed out that Piven’s (and other social workers and community activists) works are generally militant, advocating for change outside established channels, which would not promote integration.

Piven (1970b) responded to Rosen’s critique, arguing that if advocacy planning does not serve the interests of beneficiaries, advocacy planning will *not* benefit the beneficiaries. Many years later, political scientists, like Young (2000), elaborated on this contention by pointing out the *logic of identity* in representation. No matter what, no one can speak on behalf of others as well as if others



spoke for themselves. To Young, participation is always superior to representation in a democratic system. Consequently, no matter how much technical assistance a planner offers, s/he cannot represent the voice of beneficiaries (unless s/he is one of them).

Two different notions of advocacy planning emerge from this intellectual debate. The first one treats planning as a profession, and therefore frames advocacy planning as an activity performed by *professional* planners. Inclusiveness in advocacy planning applies to the *process* of planning, because it encourages citizen participation. It also applies to the *substance* of planning, because it challenges the social and economic structure of a plan that matters more than the physical aspects. However, in at least Davidoff's advocacy planning framework, this inclusiveness does not apply to the *actors* of planning, because professional planners are assumed to have authority to plan. In short, those trained in the tradition of planning deliver a professional service.

Hence, both Davidoff and Krumholz greatly emphasize planners' education to ensure, once they leave school, they possess the mental framework to address equity issues and integrity to take a stand in a politically charged advocacy. This framework's traditional definition of planning, where the planner prescribes both the goals and means of planning, garners the most criticism. Thus, sometimes planners may advocate policies that benefit elite populations, but not the rest of the population (Gans in Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996).

The second notion is a little fuzzier. In the 1970s, the "alternative" to planning as a profession was not clearly defined. But Piven, among others, started one of today's most important questions within the discipline of planning: Who should plan? The purest alternative forms to professional planning are covert, radical, and insurgent planning (e.g., Beard 2002, 2003; Miraftab and Wills, 2005; Miraftab, 2006; and Sandercock 1998a, 2003). The three forms of this alternative planning are, of course, not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary concepts. Radical planning's normative aim is the emancipation of humanity from societal and state oppression and market-generated inequality

(Friedmann in Beard, 2003). The actors of radical planning are the managed subjects of state planning and, at times, they may be the exact counteragents of the state. Radical planning is often conducted by insurgent citizens, a subgroup which is often less “visible” to the state (and consequently in planning processes), because of systematic denomination through historical imposition of a “righteous image” (Sandercock, 1998a, 1998b, 2003). To the anthropologist James Holston (1998), insurgent citizens include homeless people, migrants, minorities, even queer nations and ganglands. Holston believes that along these fault lines, the city is actually rooted in a dynamic society and heterogeneous lived experience. Radical and insurgent planning model often poses danger to its practitioners, because the authoritarian political system sees them as subvert and revolutionary. Therefore most of the time, they operate in a more covert manner (Beard, 2002).

It is useful to see the distinction between radical and covert planning as different phases of social learning and social transformation, because as situation change, one type of planning may transform into another type. A covert plan, for example, on the surface seems to conform to the state’s agenda and follows the guidance of state agents. But if the repressive state weakens, it could easily culminate in a stronger radical movement (Tarrow, 1998). For example, a radical protest that youth organized from covert-planned, state-agenda–conforming, community library initiative in Indonesia illustrates this transformation (Beard, 2003). On the surface, a community library could not be perceived as a radical initiative. Rather, it conforms to the state’s agenda on the war against illiteracy. It is however, through this initiative youth learns about the contemporary sociopolitical situations and organizes for their own agenda of change and revolution.

The most important contribution of literature in covert, radical, and insurgent planning is to offer a different theoretical and operational framework of planning beyond the formal, institutionalized planning framework. Citizen participation in formal planning processes can only be conducted in *invited spaces*, the arena where the state grants citizens the rights to be involved in state-validated processes. On the other hand, insurgent planning can be practiced in *invented spaces*, the more

informal arena where marginalized population can formulate sharper differences with the state's and mainstream development agencies' agenda and mobilize to disrupt these agendas' implementation (e.g., Miraftab & Wills, 2005; and Miraftab, 2006).

The notion of inventing new spaces for citizen participation becomes very important, especially when the state's logic of social capital, participation, and empowerment are exploitive and manipulative. Miraftab (2004a, & 2004b), for example, documented how South Africa's neo-liberal government masks its exploitation of a community-based waste collection scheme between 1997 and 2001. Promoted as a community empowerment program, it has exploited poor, Black female population through unpaid or underpaid labor for neighborhood waste collection while the more affluent areas received government-organized waste collection mechanism.

Thus, from the lens of covert, radical and insurgent planning, it is necessary for grass-root organizations to operate beyond the framework of the state and, whenever necessary, to challenge it. Because the spaces for participation provided by the state are perceived as non-viable options to channel grassroots' interests, insurgent planning literature suggests and celebrates more informal mechanisms, such as social mobilization, mass protests, and other forms of collective action.

To continue with this discussion one implicit assumption used in this literature review must be examined. Although formal, institutionalized planning can be easily associated with state activity, in reality, many private, for-profit institutions also operate within this framework. In fully developed countries, such as the United States, private institutions often provide services to real estate developers, and municipal governments often outsource parts of its planning to these institutions. To a certain extent, some of these private institutions can also provide services to communities. This research, however would not include these private institutions as part of its planning framework for one reason: It is necessary to eliminate the "middleman" in a planning process to clearly understand the relationship between the ruler and the ruled subjects—in this case the state and grassroots entities.

Especially in areas where planning is closely associated with the activity of the public sector (such as in Indonesia), it makes more sense to visualize this relationship more directly instead of being mediated. In this context, therefore, the three forms of planning (covert, radical, and insurgent planning) directly oppose professional planning, because they all view planning as a process conducted by extra-governmental agents and a process beyond the state's control.

By using *planning actors* as the main criteria to draw the line between planning types and deliberately associating planners with the public planning agency, we then have at least two types of planning practices: the one performed by planners in state-run agencies, and the one performed by extra-governmental agents. We have excluded private, for-profit institutions from this framework, because they operate more like middlemen, hence leaving the ruled subjects, grassroots agencies, and poor people in the category of extra-governmental agents. The typology then could be simplified as *state-planning vs citizen planning*. Planning by state-run agencies and planning performed by extra-governmental agents are, however, two utopian extremes and, in reality, planning practice falls along a continuum between these two ends.

The shifts and transitions between these planning typologies also prove instructive. We are interested in the shift, not creating more subcategories within the typology, and hence our questions are: "When does a situation where planning is completely state-controlled and state-run turn into a process dominated more by non-state agents? What drive these non-state agents? What mechanisms do they use? What are the prerequisites for this shift? "

To answer these questions, we must look at both ends of the equation, considering the series of events and shifts in paradigms for both the state and its agents and what happens to the extra-governmental agents as well. This shift is an active process instead of an occurrence. Hence, this question more aptly reflects this dynamic relationship: "Why and how would the state grant its planning authority to

non-state agents?” The reciprocal question would be, “Why and how would non-state agents be able to appropriate planning authority from state agents?”

## **B. The Transition of the State: Debunking the Democratization-Decentralization Link**

A postmodernist worldview drives a substantial portion of the current planning literature. It moves away from a sense of order and rejects the claim that one could have complete comprehensibility, predictability, and rationality in planning (Brooks, 2000). In the past, modern planning had been associated with highly technical-rational approach. Consequently, it has also been closely associated with centralized, top-down, (sometimes) authoritarian, state operation. Following well-documented inadequacies of the modernist approach, skepticism emerges toward a centralized, top-down approach in policy and decision-making processes (Scott, 1998; and Tandler, 1997). In the 2000s, state decentralization is the norm in both academic literature and political movements.

The shift toward more decentralized, bottom-up decision-making is prevalent in fields closely related to planning, such as community development (e.g., Ward, Solomon, Ballif-Spanvill, and Furhriman, 2008) and community-based natural resource management (e.g., Agrawal and Chhatre, 2007; Etoungou, 2003; and Spierenburg, 2007). Separately, those interested in poverty alleviation also shifted from centralized, government-run programs as the solution for local poverty to locally managed, community-based microfinance programs (e.g., Chambers, 1994; Weiss and Montgomery, 2005; Yunus, 1998; and Yunus and Webber, 2007).

Competing claims about the benefits and the shortfalls of state decentralization exist as well. A substantial amount of literature visualizes state decentralization as a prerequisite for citizen participation, which in turn leads to democracy, efficiency, and equity (e.g., Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; and Ribot, 2002). Others scrutinize decentralization and participatory

approaches in planning, project implementation, and evaluation as masked patronage by a central government (e.g., Nelson and Agrawal, 2008). Contemporary literature tends to heighten the scrutiny over decentralization since empirical studies have shown that this approach is not always equivalent with autonomous decision-making; hence (administrative) decentralization can actually lead to more centralized control, especially in natural resources management (Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson, 2006).

What is more important than making a broad survey of competing claims is to understand the mechanisms of decentralization and their consequences. Ribot (2008) described at least two main ways decentralization occurs: through power transfer to local administrative government or to an authority that is locally accountable. Without accountability to local people, decentralization only changes the government's structure, but not the relationship between government agents and their citizens.

Therefore, the first mechanism would result in an *administrative de-concentration*, but a true *democratic decentralization* with meaningful citizen participation can only be reached through the second mechanism. Consequently, in addition to administrative process, a democratic process involves political decentralization (or devolution, as an alternative term). An election, for example, can return accountability of a local authority to its constituency. But power can also be transferred to any non-state agents, such as NGOs, non-profit organizations (NPOs), individuals, corporations, or even in some cases, to a customary authority for a specific purpose. Ribot (2004) strictly defined this third mechanism as *privatization* instead of decentralization because it applies the exclusive logic of public governance.

Many empirical studies have shown that the choice of mechanism and the locus of power to be transferred, often referred by many scholars as the *institutional choice* of decentralization, plays a very important role in determining the outcome (Chhatre, 2007; Oyono, 2004; Ribot, 2002; and Ribot, Chhatre, and Lankina, 2008). For example, in Indonesia, for the sake of bureaucratic efficiency and

political stability, donors, international aid agencies, and local governments have transferred much of their power and resources to private local institutions, yet failed to promote government accountability and popular participation (Ito, 2007).

It is very naïve to think that the transition from a centralized, authoritarian state would directly lead to democracy. Political scientists have shown that we should critically examine transition periods rather than where resources and power, among other things, go, implying that the declining regime is usually capable of shaping the transition and consequently makes it more elite-driven rather than mass-pressured (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). This implication leaves scholars space to study elites during state transitions, especially in regime changes. This transition is characterized by negotiations and agreements between regime elites and moderate opposition elites, typically political leaders of opposition parties, the protagonists in this process (e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; and Przeworski, 1991).

In the transition to democracy, both politicians and common citizens must have some common attitudes and some distinct attitudes (Rustow, 1970), but to date, little literature suggests conclusively how the process of democratization should be structured (Cheibub, 2009). Commenting about this transition, Linz (1996) asserted that a complete democratic transition should lead to a consensus on political procedures to elect new ruling government; the pressure for autonomous association or anything less merely constitutes liberalization. The key is in the choice of institution to exercise power after the transition. Przeworski (1988) provided great insight into this mechanism:

*“This, then, is the answer to the original question. Democratization, understood as a discrete step of devolution of power from the authoritarian power apparatus to institutions that permit an uncertain interplay of forces, is possible if there exist institutions that provide a reasonable expectation that interests of major political forces would not be affected highly adversely under democratic competition, given the resources these forces can muster. Substantive agreements are possible only if they are institutionally guaranteed because institutions mold the prior probabilities of outcomes. The leaders of conflicting political forces can agree to the actions of institutions while they cannot agree to substantive outcomes in the absence of institutional guarantees.” (Przeworski, 1998)*

### **C. Defining the non-state agent: Transforming the Community, Shaking the Elite**

This thesis's central question is "What would it take for a population of non-state, non-elite agents to be able to appropriate the planning process?" The focus of this section is to find out how that population transforms itself so it can socially mobilize in a strategic manner to reach a desired goal. In essence, we need to learn how a population *learns* to plan.

Rather than relying on political elites to drive change, political scientists have also proposed that mobilization by economically and socially marginalized populations (*insurgents*) and the working class through popular protest could force initial liberalization and eventually democratize the regime (Therborn, 1979; and Wood, 2001), especially during economic downturns (Geddes, 1999). Woods' (2001) work provides a counter-state, counter-elite framework for an insurgent path to democracy. It is useful to understand "elites" as not only those whose power is defined by state-official positions (Woods would call this regime elites) but also those who, through coercively disciplining institutions, could prevent or prohibit others from mobilization. These institutions include, but are not limited to, (manipulative) labor organizations, social and cultural hierarchies, and economic classes. Woods (2001) wrote:

*"In this insurgent path to democracy, sustained mobilization by poor and working-class people transformed key interests of economic elites, leading to pressure on the state to compromise with the insurgents, thereby strengthening regime moderates over hard-liners with the result that negotiated transitions to democracy followed."*

Although Woods wrote in the context of labor mobilization for a regime change, we could expand her conception as an analogy in social mobilization for a planning action. In Woods' framework, the elites are the proprietors of economic resources and the authoritarian regime, while in planning the elites are the state planners. In Woods' framework an authoritarian regime transitions to a democratic one, while in our framework, the state-run planning process transitions to an all-inclusive planning process.



Because of the claim that a relatively large group will not be able to act in cooperative and coordinated manner (Hardin, 1968 and 1998), the biggest puzzle of this framework is the idea of coordination and cooperation among individuals in a population. Chamberlin (1974), in his attempt to confront the belief that individuals in a large group could act in coordinated and cooperative manner, based his theory on different notions of economic goods: public and private.<sup>5</sup> Chamberlin found that individuals' decision to cooperate with other individuals in the group is determined by the type of the goods they are looking for. The more exclusive and rival a good is, the more selfish individuals would act against each other in the group. The more inclusive (when the good can be shared) and the more non-rival (when the use of the good does not prevent others from using it) a good is, the more individuals tend to cooperate to obtain the good. In summary, individuals work together when they share an interest. Still, however logical and persuasive, this study had not answered why and how some groups reach a consensus about what constitutes a common interest.

Chamberlin's study uses individuals as the unit of analysis instead of examining the group as an entity for a collective action—a major gap in his study. To address the actor of development as a group entity, the body of planning and development literature assumes planning could be done or driven by a “community” (see, for example, Agrawal, 2001; Cameron, 2003; Mathie and Cunningham, 2003; Ribot and Mearns, 2005; and Zeuli and Radel, 2005). In this context, a community is a “small spatial unit with a homogeneous social structure and shared norms” (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999) capable of making decisions and acting collectively. For practical purpose, in this thesis the terms *collective* and *community* will be used interchangeably, not because the richness of the two concepts should be discounted, but because the framework in this paper uses community as its main unit of analysis.

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<sup>5</sup> In economic perspective, a private good is characterized by its exclusionary and rivalry attribute. Public good is, on the contrary, inclusionary and non-rival. For better explanation, see Weimer, David L. and Aidan R. Vining. *Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice (4th ed.)*. Pearson: Prentice Hall, . pp. 72.

The idea of community-based development planning addresses the gap of Chamberlin's cooperative people theory. To fill that intellectual gap, scholars have proposed the broad concept of social capital. This concept emphasizes the quality of relationships, level of trust, and complexity of social networks among actors in a collective social group (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2004; Daniere et al., 2002; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000; Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Woolcock, 1998; and Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).

The concept of social capital, however, does not provide an understanding of the dynamism of social relations. Relationships among community members and individuals in a collective are not static and, to a certain extent, are bound to change. Arguably, the main goal of any social planning intervention itself is to shake the static and adherent social structure and, whenever possible, advocate for transformation. The chief purpose of this social transformation is to, whenever possible, eliminate (or at best, reduce) elite control in collective action and community-based development. The second goal would be to give the insurgent citizen more space in the public sphere and, whenever possible, bring them into the planning landscape and collective action.

Previous studies show how difficult it is to achieve inclusion. Beard (2005 & 2007), for example, has found that in Indonesia citizen participation is prescribed by the underlying family and gender roles and hence it is not evenly distributed among heterogeneous members of the communities. However, establishing an elected community board to govern the community and manage collective actions helps prevent the elite group from systematically corrupting collective action and intervening with the community's interest, a process often called the elite capture (Beard and Dasgupta, 2006; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; and Beard et al., 2008).

Specifically, for Indonesia's Javanese population, Beard and Dasgupta (2006) found that collective action at the community-level is highly determined by the relationships among multi-scalar social, political, and historical factors, internal and external to communities. Within the UPP, they have

identified two distinct forms of collective action. The first form depends on community cohesion and stable social relationships in addition to a stagnant social hierarchy, typically found in rural communities. The second form relies on a shared perception of interdependent future and a shared desire for change, sometimes associated with the urban population. While both forms of collective action effectively deliver services in poverty alleviation projects, only the second form demonstrates potential for social transformation.

#### D. Theoretical Framework: Appropriating Decentralization, Triggering Self-Advocacy




Chart 2: A Theoretical Framework: Appropriating Decentralization

The main criticism of Davidoff and Krumholz's advocacy planning framework is that people with different interests should not be prevented from self-expressing those interests. Debates should not take place behind planning agencies' closed doors and exclusively involve planners. Instead, a public sphere, where all citizens have space to negotiate their interests through a dynamic process of bargaining and compromising with planning agencies, should exist. Because negotiation's very nature requires more than one party, ideal negotiation requires that advocacy is conducted as an exogenous force driving planning instead of endogenous process directing planning. In short, borrowing Young's logic of identity, if one is a (state) planner, s/he cannot be an advocate. Conversely, an advocate should ideally be an agent outside the planning authority. The question that follows then is: "Who should be the advocate?"

This particular question cannot be answered without visualizing the process being conducted in a democratic state context—an underlying assumption of citizen participation and advocacy planning. However, not all populations live in a democratic state. Scholars of covert, radical, and insurgent planning have contributed the most in authoritarian or falsely democratic states. Radical planning can be conducted in the universe where its agents do not trust the state to promote structural change or equity. In an authoritarian context, the landscape of citizen planning is extraterrestrial to any state-run processes. Its practices do not involve any of the state's agents or agencies and, to a certain extent citizen planners' relationship with the state is adversarial. When a state is falsely democratic, it provides options for citizen participation with manipulative agenda, such as labor exploitation. In this context, citizen planning covertly conforms to the state's agenda. However, citizen-planners maintain a critical view of the state's agenda and ensure that control over planning intervention remains within the hands of the citizens. Whenever the authoritarian state weakens, citizen-planners engage in more radical approaches to disrupt the state's agenda and press their own.

The difficulty of applying either advocacy planning or covert, radical, and insurgent planning in this research lies in the dynamic transformation of the state. Indonesia, as the locus of this study, is

experiencing major shifts after its 1998 regime change. While the claim that it has been completely democratized may be challenged, Indonesia is definitely no longer an authoritarian state. To a certain extent, the state has opened up windows of opportunities to citizen participation, such as establishing of community-based poverty alleviation through the UPP.

The transfer process of power and authority from the state to the citizen becomes very important. While a majority of political science and planning literature has discussed how the state could transfer its power through administrative de-concentration, democratic decentralization, or merely liberal privatization, not much discussion about how communities could actively appropriate this decentralization to gain larger control over the planning processes exists. As Kohl and Farthing (2008) described, although decentralization can be seen as a catalyst for citizen participation and enrich the repertoire of political actions by marginalized groups, its main goal is to develop their ability to mobilize people and to raise new citizen's expectations of the state.

Covert, radical, and insurgent planning methods have effectively promoted social transformation as a prerequisite for establishing larger spaces for citizen participation. Instead of only using invited spaces offered by the state through formal planning processes, covert, radical and insurgent planners operate in these newly invented spaces through informal methods of collective action and social mobilization. By celebrating the use of informal politics as a space for citizen participation, covert, radical, and insurgent planners remain independent from external interests, from state and other entities, such as corporations.

Does this mean that opportunities that the state offers through mechanisms of decentralization should be considered as a last resort of citizen participation? In short, the answer is "no". I am not suggesting that citizen planning processes should necessarily be immersed in state planning. Communities should not become the state's agents in a non-state planning and development process in the era of decentralization. It is necessary to maintain the balance by staying outside the state's political borders

to be able to effectively negotiate with it. More importantly, it is crucial to critically assess the state's proposition and rhetoric, an advantage of being an extra-state agent. However, framing the state as entity in transformation, non-state agents cannot afford to lose the chance to influence the state's operations by using the channels afforded by decentralization.

That being said, *appropriating decentralization* still should be an active, conscious, and strategic process with a clear agenda. This research's goal is to explore possible *modus operandi* for non-state agents, i.e., community organizations to appropriate decentralization to press their own agenda upon the state without losing the opportunity to use official channels. We have identified the following assumptions:

1. Community-based organizations could channel the interest of beneficiaries in a bottom-up process and act on behalf of them to balance a top-down approach from the state.
2. Covert, radical, and insurgent planning literature had taught us that there is a potential benefit for non-state agents, i.e., community organizations, to stay exclusive from the government structure in order to effectively negotiate with it.
3. The state could administratively de-concentrate or politically decentralize. However, only political decentralization mechanisms return accountability of authorized officials to citizens and lead to democratization.
4. In the event of political decentralization, the state transfers its power to a locally accountable authority. For community organizations to gain power and still operate outside the state's structure, they must attain this power from a privatization mechanism.
5. State agents cannot be expected to be advocates, simply because of their association with the state.
6. State planners will not be able to represent the interest of beneficiaries, i.e., poor people. A mechanism for beneficiaries to self-express their interest and participate in a decision-making process is superior to any form of representation.

7. Because state agents cannot be advocates or represent the interest of beneficiaries, the state-planning agenda will not represent the community's interests.
8. Lessons from empirical studies in covert, radical, and insurgent planning practices help us understand the process of social learning by community organizations to divert the state-conforming planning agenda and set their own.
9. This social learning process involves a social transformation by the emergence of a new critical group questioning the power of the community and state elite.

This study proposes a more nuanced form of non-state planning agents' operation:

1. The process of social learning will lead to the emergence of "new advocates."
2. The new advocates are the newly formed community elite group. They are *from* the community and not external actors with a patronizing behavior, such as NGO workers, project facilitators, or state planners, who play an advocate's role. They are instead "self-advocates."
3. Non-conformity to the state's agenda does not characterize the actions of self-advocates. Rather, they are strategically decisive about when to conform and when to confront state actions, and they are critically capable of appropriating the state's agenda of decentralization to press their own agenda.
4. More importantly, the new advocates are also willing to continuously shift in between the framework of formal planning offered by the decentralizing state and informal, citizen-centered planning framework as envisioned by covert, radical, and insurgent planners.

## IV. Research Methodology

### A. Research Approach

*Appropriating decentralization* as a theoretical planning term is relatively new. Kohl and Farthing (2008) offer this term to illustrate a process where the state-supported decentralization process gives leeway for larger citizen participation in wider spaces than the state prescribes, in the end, raising new expectations of the state. Studying political decentralization in Bolivia, Kohl and Farthing found that decentralization could catalyze social mobilization of a marginalized population to adopt political actions at municipal level.

This recent proposition opens new spaces, albeit unexplored ones, in planning literature on decentralization and its planning implications. Literature on decentralization planning, for example, has not yet explored the different mechanisms that a state uses to decentralize and the different forms of citizen's political activism that result from these mechanisms. It also has not explored how decentralization policy awakens a marginalized population, triggering its ability to mobilize, socially and politically. The evolution of marginalized populations involves a very complex process of collective social learning. This thesis, then, provides an exploration of the step-by-step mechanisms through which a marginalized, urban poor population learns to organize its self-help institution, formulate its interests, devise the best solutions to achieve these interests, and negotiate with government agents and other private parties to further their aims.

Three reasons underlie why this research was conducted in an in-depth, qualitative, exploratory manner. First, appropriating decentralization, as defined by Kohl and Farthing, is a theoretical term without a practical application focusing on community-level, self-help institutions. A study of its application needs to address complex processes while relevant variables had not been identified for such a purpose. Second, Indonesian society is culturally unique and potentially exempt from the conventional wisdom of citizen planning as formulated by U.S. planning theorists. Therefore, this



research must be able to adapt to different social norms and perceptions about citizen planning, a relatively new term for Indonesian planners. Third, the use of “appropriating decentralization” as a planning term requires a paradigm shift from seeing planning as an activity exclusive to the state to planning as a more inclusive process with citizen participation, in this case driven by community self-help institutions.

Naturally, planning processes in the domain of community organizations are less formal and less structured compared with those in bureaucracy or institutionalized, private planning organizations. Sometimes, I discovered that informal linkages between events, processes, and key actors in the community provide more valuable insight than the formally stated goals by governmental agencies related to UPP management. In summary, the unique context of decentralization in Indonesia and the setting of urban poor people in a semi-traditional city in the Island of Java required descriptive and more exploratory research methods to ensure flexibility, while still providing practical guidance for engagement with the studied communities.

This research uses the cultural perspective to provide an in-depth understanding of the decentralization mechanism and the underlying collective social learning that occurs simultaneously with it. To fully understand how the two communities studied could appropriate decentralization policy, I spent two and a half months traveling between the two areas in Pekalongan. This time allowed me to understand the local culture of each place, key planning actors in each community, and their individual behaviors, as well as their social interaction with each other. It also helped me to understand the subtle differences in verbal and nonverbal communication to confirm, clarify, and sometimes challenge claims made by key planning actors who I have interviewed for the purpose of the research.

This research recognizes the potential of local variations among different communities, and it is not intended to create generalizations in the field of community development planning that would discount those local variations. Rather than making cross-comparisons between the two sites, I

preferred to delve into the complex interactions between local culture and local politics in each community. This approach allowed me to understand how a specific context can affect the process of collective social learning that in the end influences community organizations' relationship with their governmental / private counterparts in planning negotiations.

## **B. Site Selection Process**

Prior to the fieldwork in the two communities studied, I conducted pre-interviews with key informants, including the UPP concept developers and main policymakers in BAPPENAS (Indonesian National Development Planning Agency) and the national consultant for UPP Management. These interviews focused on four elements: 1) decentralization as a context; 2) the UPP's evolution; 3) sociopolitical and historical factors; and 4) the internal-external issue of UPP management. First, I explored key informants' understanding on how decentralization shaped the way the UPP was designed. Second, I explored the different phases of development of the UPP and the key informants' understanding on how periodic assessments of BKM operations influenced the design of UPP's next phase. Third, I explored the differences of social, political, cultural, and historical factors found in the implementation of the UPP and how it affected the general policy of BKM governance. Last, I explored the role of facilitators and the possibility of emerging community members' resistances toward them as external actors in a community's development.

Based on the responses I received during the last set of interviews, I revised my focus from economic development to the interplay between internal-external agents in UPP implementation. I looked at not only relationships between community members and UPP facilitators, but also between them and government agents / other private parties. The information from the interviews directed me to explore mechanisms communities use to develop self-advocating capacities.

To have a broad survey of UPP implementation in all areas of Indonesia, I participated in a three-day training program for UPP's advanced city-level coordinators and senior facilitators. During this event, I conducted six structured interviews (using the same questions posed to key informants) with senior facilitators and city-level coordinators. Five shorter, less-structured interviews with a different group of facilitators and city-level coordinators were also conducted to confirm claims made by participants in structured interviews. Through these semi-structured and less-structured interviews, a pre-finding emerged: The relationship between BKM members and *Lurah* could determine the result of UPP intervention in the respective *kelurahan*.

Based on these interviews, I developed a key informant interview guide, a focus group discussion guide, and personal guidelines for field observations to help me obtain information that would illuminate the relationship between BKM members and *Lurah*. I visualized this relationship as the representation of local negotiation between community and government agents. Veteran trainers and senior facilitators recommended I investigate UPP implementation in Central Java, where a patronizing governmental culture, reminiscent of the old Javanese social structure, meets the newly established egalitarian, community-oriented governance. To me, these interactions represented a clash between the new and the old elite.

I selected Kendal, a hinterland of Semarang—the fourth largest city in Java after Jakarta, Surabaya, and Jogjakarta, as the first site after hearing that the *Bupati* (regent) was imprisoned on corruption accusations. The *Bupati's* imprisonment was a result of widespread pressure through mass grassroots demonstration. In other interviews, I learned that Kendal was an exemplary model of empowerment and social mobilization. I expected to find a link between this event with UPP intervention and the process of social learning it had facilitated.

Following a recommendation from the city-level UPP coordinator, I focused on two of the most active and vocal BKMs, Plantaran and Kebondalem. These localities are completely different in terms of types of people and attitudes toward government. BKM Plantaran's members are mostly laid-off

workers from a local textile factory, while most of BKM Kebondalem's members are government officials. Both demonstrated amazing achievements in advocating for their community members. BKM Plantaran approached at least five different governmental offices to negotiate resources for training programs for their unemployed and underemployed community members. They also stood against the local rice conglomerates, demanding no price mark-ups in the market. BKM Kebondalem demanded tuition waivers for poor children to attend local school.

While inspiring, no evidence linked these movements and the fall of the *Bupati*—or any other structural change in Kendal. The administrative definition of the community's geographic location bounds these movements. While BKM Plantaran and BKM Kebondalem are excellent project managers and most people agree they delivered UPP's resources to constituents in an effective way, this research is primarily interested in how their involvement in UPP trained them to perform self-advocacy at a higher level of the planning process, not in their respective territories.

I redirected my project to Pekalongan, a city 50 miles to the West of Kendal. Evidence links the election of a newly, pro-poor mayor, with strong connections to local BKMs, and some movements from BKM Podosugih's cadres to put their agents in the government. Through pre-interviews, I learned that BKM Podosugih advocated for a legislation that established BKM as the government's main strategic partner in poverty alleviation-related programs. This process led to the establishment of BKM in all *kelurahan* in Pekalongan and the adoption of UPP as the city's poverty alleviation program. I compare BKM Podosugih's experience with BKM Yosorejo's advocacy for the restoration of indigenous drain systems in a local land-use, environmental conflict (local flooding) against local textile factory.

These two BKMs are comparable in two ways: Both BKMs demonstrate capacity for financial management and fair representation of community (RW) and neighborhood (RT) in BKM meetings—two criteria of good community governance. First, sound financial management often indicates less

corruption in the management of UPP money. Second, a good community government requires equal representation among different sub-community populations in the decision-making processes.

Quantitative measures can be derived from these two criteria of good community governance. To reflect sound financial management, the regional consultant for UPP management required a 90 percent retention rate for its microcredit scheme after 3 years.<sup>6</sup> Both BKMs had retention rates of more than 100 percent, where the initial capital investment accrued interest, showing the organizations' professionalism in financial management. In terms of community representation, both BKMs' administrative and the city-level UPP consultants' records report more than 80 percent of their meetings involve RT and RW representatives in addition to BKM members. These quantitative measures on both BKMs' financial management and community involvement complemented initial interviews about the similarities between the two BKMs.<sup>7</sup>

### **C. Researcher's Role Management**

As researcher gathering information from others with face-to-face interaction, I was required to negotiate my entry into each communities and governmental offices (with formal and informal gatekeepers) and make sure I did not offend the unwritten social rules. Being an Indonesian native did not guarantee acceptance from government officials or instant connections with the community members. The city-level coordinator of the UPP, the first key person who introduced me to BKM members in the two communities, was helpful when dealing with government agencies. While I was usually introduced as a student at an American university, people welcomed me better when I told

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<sup>6</sup> This requirement means that after three years, the BKM must not have a financial loss exceeding 10 percent of the whole microcredit fund. In short, the retention rate measures a BKM's capacity to manage the microcredit fund. Retention rate differs slightly from the credit return rate, which shows the percentage of debt paid.

<sup>7</sup> I followed recommendation by facilitators who had served in both *kelurahans*. Desi, a local facilitator, and Ratna, the city-level coordinator, for example, confirmed that both BKMs had actively conducted participatory decision-making processes by getting involved in RT and RW meetings, or vice versa. Facilitators are typically subject to rolling assignments, so they can provide insight into differences among BKMs.

them that I once studied and worked for the University of Indonesia, and welcomed me best when I said that my ancestors were from the area.

While the customary social norm is speaking *kromo*, the softer, more aristocratic version of Javanese language, my inability to speak it made conversations with BKM members, who were typically much older, difficult. Although I avoided using an interpreter, I did take a local resident, who I introduced as my “cousin”, with me every time I met with community members. While she broke the ice and made informal conversations, I explained that I had lived in Jakarta for my whole life, accounting for my inability to speak *kromo*, and asked permission to do the interviews and focus group discussions in the formal Indonesian language.

In interviews and focus group discussions, I needed to constantly shift position between being a student and an expert. As soon as community and BKM members learned that I was a graduate student at a U.S. university, they often deferred to my judgment and withheld their own perspectives on our discussion subjects. To avoid this, I sometimes intentionally pretended not to understand a very basic principle about UPP implementation and let my research participant teach me about the subject. This technique gave participants more confidence to voice their perspectives without bias. On the other hand, I needed to demonstrate my knowledge and familiarity with formal concepts and regulations of decentralization in Indonesia to government officials. If I failed to do so at the beginning of my interview with any government official, s/he would spend hours lecturing me on decentralization minutiae.

Building trust and managing politics were big issues in this research. For example, I also needed to convince government officials that I did not work for any NGOs because they had negative preconceptions about them. They typically perceived NGOs as provocative organizations and their involvement in local governance often leads to political instability. BKM members, to a certain extent, also shared this preconception and feared that any interaction with NGOs would harm their relationship with the government. Even though I emphasized that this research was solely intended for

personal academic use, to build trust, I needed to become involved in their social lives, visit their homes, meet their families, and engage in informal conversations unrelated to my study. While building this trust was time-consuming—I often had to spend time more than I initially planned for the interview sessions—this experience helped me to delve into and understand the cultural life of my research participants that my research questions could not reflect.

#### **D. Data Collection Techniques**

I used a combination of data collection techniques, which relied on qualitative research methods, to allow me to triangulate community planning actors' conflicting claims. Interviews, focus group discussions and participant observations were used as *primary data collection* methods. *Interviews* allowed research participants to reflect upon recent changes in their communities. The result of each interview produced each research participant's perceptions about decentralization and their community's exposure to this process. *Focus group discussions* were conducted to explore four themes: gain an understanding of community's perception on local poverty; gather an inventory of past collective actions; learn about community-level governance and planning; and analyze a community's advocacy efforts. These focus group discussions helped each research participant to confirm, clarify, and sometimes challenge each other's claims that interviews alone could not document. Through community planning meetings and daily interaction with the BKM staff, I also *observed* social interaction, hierarchy, leadership, and potential divisions and conflicts among community members.

To ensure my information about dates, plans, and processes was accurate I also reviewed documents on relevant community and local government contracts, regulations, planning guides, and other types of planning documents. I consider the document review process as *secondary data collection* method.

### *In-depth interviews*

I conducted nine in-depth interviews with community members in each *kelurahan* and eight interviews with elites at the city level, and I recruited the two populations in completely different ways. Using a snowballing technique, I selected interview participants from community members in each *kelurahan*. To gain access to people in the *kelurahan*, either a BKM member or a local resident, I first needed to interview the both BKM coordinator and *Lurah*, the informal and formal information gatekeepers, respectively, in the community. Formal introduction by the city -level UPP coordinator, whom I contacted before initiating interviews, was important in this process. Both *Lurah* and the BKM coordinators would then recommend people who could provide supplementary information. These sources would then recommend another person as a research participant and so on. Meanwhile, I selected interview participants at the city level by targeting elite actors with specific office positions related to UPP operations, including the mayor, the head and secretary of city planning agency (BAPPEDA), and the head of the city poverty alleviation program. A top-ranking UPP facilitator and three city-level UPP coordinators comprised the rest of my interview participants. .

While the number of interviews for elite source persons was predetermined, I only stopped conducting interviews with community members when I started receiving redundant information. In both *kelurahan*, this occurred after the ninth interview. In both *kelurahan*, I made sure I interviewed at least the BKM coordinator, some BKM members and UPP facilitators, and at least one local resident to gain different perspectives.

Interviews explored: 1) decentralization as a context; 2) the UPP's evolution; 3) socio-political and historical factors; and 4) the internal-external issue of project management. Each of these interview points was then developed into three open-ended questions.<sup>8</sup> While these interviews explored the same four themes, I conducted them in completely different manner for community members and city elites. While interviews with city elites were conducted in formal and structured manner, interviews

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<sup>8</sup> See the Appendix for a full list of interview questions.



with BKM members were conducted in very informal way, often resembling friendly conversations. Because of their administrative, social, or political position, interviews with elites were conducted in their respective offices while interviews with community members occurred in variety of informal places: in the *kelurahan* office, in their houses, in the mosque, sometimes in local food stalls.

None of my research participants received monetary compensation for their involvement in this research. In Javanese society, monetary transactions are considered as harmful to the relationship between friends. Elite participants were promised, however, a hard copy of the completed thesis, and I often gave inexpensive foods and merchandises to community members who participated in my research.

All of these interviews were audio-recorded with the interview participants' consent. Because some of community member participants were from low-income groups, it was necessary to protect their identities. To this particular group, to protect their identities and welfare (and in turn, encourage participation), I opted to audio-record rather than write our conversations; similarly, I obtained oral, rather than written, consent. For the same purpose, throughout this document, pseudonyms will be used for almost all research participants. However, because elected officials, including BKM members and coordinators, are accountable to the public, their names and responses were disclosed in every research notes and audio-recordings.

### *Focus Group Discussions (FGD)*

I conducted two FGDs in each *kelurahan*. Each FGD was conducted with a small group (3–5 participants) of at least one BKM member, one local resident, and one UPP facilitator. One FGD was also conducted with 20 UPP facilitators as a broad survey to determine variations among BKM operations throughout Pekalongan. Although UPP required females represent 30 percent of BKM membership, in reality it was very difficult to invite women to focus group discussions. Only two women participated in FGDs in Yosorejo, and no women participated in FGDs in Podosugih. In

contrast to male facilitators, more female facilitators participated in the city-level FGD.

BKM coordinators in each *kelurahan* were very helpful in inviting people to participate in the FGDs. Most participants were invited through informal ways, such as text messages and personal calls. Sometimes, a BKM coordinator contacted them and introduced the scope of the research being conducted and the FGD process—so that I would not have to. The BKM coordinator's involvement was an effective mechanism to raise interest in the discussion, as well as build trust between me—as the discussion moderator seeking information—and FGD participants.

All of the discussions explored 1) participants' perceptions of poverty; 2) past collective actions; 3) community-level (BKM) planning and governance; and 4) participants' personal ideas about community advocacy. Each of these four points was developed into 3–6 open-ended questions intended as a guide to lead and moderate the discussion.<sup>9</sup> The actual discussion was often conducted in less structured manner. Similar to the interviews, the discussions were audio-recorded with the participants' consent. Although participants in the group vary from low-income community members to BKM coordinators and UPP facilitators, they all were asked to consent orally, and pseudonyms were used for all FGD participants.

### *Observations*

I participated in BKM community meetings and took daily observation notes from June to July 2009. The observations focused on the dynamics of the decision-making process and relationships among BKM members, their governmental counterparts, and their beneficiaries. Through these observations, I experienced the daily life of community organizations and gained information on the cultural setting that underlies their organizational behaviors.

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<sup>9</sup> See the Appendix for a full list of focus group questions.

*Document Review:*

Observations and interviews often did not provide specific dates, plans, and processes. A review of solicited documents—contracts, memorandum of understandings, annual plans and surveys, annual organizational reports—from BKM administrative records and city-level UPP management provided much of this information; newspapers and other materials from the print and online media were also reviewed.

The following table summarizes the data collection for the purpose of this research:

Table 1: Summary of Data Collected


Techniques	Area of Study		
	Pekalongan	Podosugih	Yosorejo
FGD	<b>1 Focus Group Discussion</b> with 20 participants all participants are UPP facilitators	<b>2 Focus Group Discussions</b> each with 3-5 participants, each involved a government official, a BKM member, and a UPP facilitator	<b>2 Focus Group Discussions</b> each with 3-5 participants, each involved a government official, a BKM member, and a UPP facilitator
In-Depth Interviews	<b>11 Interviews with Key Informant</b> Andi Jeneng Warsito - <i>Secretary of Bappeda</i> Choirul Mustofa - <i>Head of Bappeda</i> Kajelan - <i>Poverty Alleviation Coord.</i> Mohammad Basyir - <i>Mayor of Pekalongan*</i> Rindu - <i>City-Level UPP Coordinator</i> Purwahjo - <i>City-Level UPP Asst. Coord.</i> Surono - <i>UPP Infrastructure Asst. Coord.</i> Dewi - <i>UPP Facilitator</i>	<b>9 Interviews with Key Informant</b> S Basir - <i>Secretary of BKM</i> Sudjaka Martana - <i>BKM Coordinator*</i> Parto - <i>Lurah</i> Badrawi - <i>Local Resident</i> Hery - <i>Neighborhood Development Facilitator</i> Stephen - <i>BKM's Urban Planner</i> Wanto - <i>UPP Economic Facilitator</i> Baswari - <i>UPP Senior Facilitator</i> Sudjatmiko - <i>Local Resident</i>	<b>9 Interviews with Key Informant</b> Sastro Amijoyo - <i>Lurah</i> Diningrum - <i>UPP Facilitator</i> Pratikno - <i>UPP Facilitator</i> Ali Mudlofar - <i>BKM Coordinator*</i> Ibu Muji - <i>BKM Member*</i> Ibu Wati - <i>Local Resident</i> Hariyadi - <i>BKM member</i> Surono - <i>BKM member</i> Riswanto - <i>Local Resident</i>
Observations	<b>8 Observation Notes</b> 4 Consultancy Meetings 4 Elections for BKM members Daily observation notes	<b>2 Observation Notes</b> 2 Neighborhood Dvlpmnt. Planning Sessions Daily observation notes	<b>2 Observation Notes</b> 2 Field Surveys with BKM members Daily observation notes

# Unless otherwise stated, all names represented here are pseudonyms used to protect respondent's privacy.


\* Indicates elected officials whose real names are disclosed

## V. Description & Findings

### A. Pekalongan as a Context



Map 1. Republic of Indonesia in the world    Map 2. Central Java Province in Indonesia



Map 3. City of Pekalongan in Central Java Province

### 1. A Place in Transformation: Regional Agro-Industry to National Textile Center

Pekalongan, after Batavia, Surabaya, and Semarang was the most important port for the Dutch colonial government, because it was the main exporter of sugar cane production on the northern coast of Java (Ingleson, 1983) and the largest tax base in Java on the 18th century (Ricklefs, 1986). The

port later was incorporated as an urban municipality by the colonial government between 1915 and 1921, separate from the Regency (*Kabupaten*) of Pekalongan (Cobban, 1993). The old Sultanate of Mataram once occupied Pekalongan because it was part of a very agriculturally rich region of Kedhu, Tegal, and Cirebon (Carey, 1997). Pekalongan-Tegal region supplied at least one-tenth of colonial Java's sugar cane production between 1800 and the 1940s (Knight, 1999; Bosma & Knight, 2004).

The industry grew extensively after European manufacturers started using large mills and modernized production at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, consequently replacing the previous Chinese manufacturers with smaller production scale (Fernando, 1999). The Java sugar industry then started to play a key role in the world sugar market and Pekalongan's pre-modern enterprises started to transform themselves into more capital-intensive ones with professional division between ownership and management (Knight, 1999). The colonial industry drew the greater part of its workforce with underpaid (Knight, 2006) and forced labor (Elson, 1986: 151) from the growing numbers of rural landless people (Knight, 1988). Yet, even landholders' entire holdings were exploited, because factories often rent the whole village for their plants (Knight, 1994). This new capitalist production scheme also created the Indies bourgeoisie, starting the development of social transformation (Knight, 1999). The worldwide Great Depression in the 1930s brought the sugar industry's previously stable expansion to a halt (Brown, 1994) and put thousands out of work in urban Java (Ingleson, 1988).

Less record is available on Pekalongan's non-agricultural economy, but earthenware and bamboo works were major exports in Pekalongan during the colonial period. While villagers made gold and silver fineries and brass wares, these goods were typically for their own use (Fernando, 1996). At least until 1820, most people produced their own clothing, although the quality of batik was high compared with the coarse area standard (Fernando, 1996). The number of *pasars* (marketplaces) only increased dramatically after the 1830s growth of the sugar industry and the local tradition of trading and crafting, including batik possibly grew during this time. Because of colonial privileges to selected insiders and a culture of cronyism, Chinese traders were well off until the end of Dutch period when

Indonesian traders start to take over the market in Pekalongan (Kwartanada, 2002). The batik industry kept growing until the Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945, where no less than 20,000 batik workers in Pekalongan alone were unemployed (Sato, 2006). Post-independence, in 1968, the purse seine was introduced to Indonesia's Java Sea, giving the city a head start in the regional and national fisheries industry. In the 2000s, Pekalongan is well-known as a regional and national textile and batik center, and the principal port for central Java where sugar, rubber, and tea are exported (*Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th Edition, 2009*).

While the *Kabupaten* (regency) of Pekalongan is still predominantly agricultural, *Kota* (city) of Pekalongan has become more urban in character. Over one-third (and growing) of its previously *sawah* (wet paddy fields) and *petak* (embanked field) lands have been converted into residential and commercial land uses as a response to the demand of its population of 250,000 (and growing). Its previously agricultural economy transitioned into a more industrial one. Its economy now revolves around the textile industry, where thread spinning, fabric manufacturing, manual and mechanized weaving, manual batik drawing and printing, and ready-wear garment industry comprise its outputs. Combined with fisheries, Pekalongan's textile industry is worth at least US\$2 million in annual gross domestic product (Pekalongan City Government website, 2009).

Its population size may give a false impression of Pekalongan's physical characteristics. Pekalongan is an example of a *desakota*, a term popularized by McGee (1991, 2008) to visualize typical South East Asian urban areas.<sup>10</sup> Land use patterns in *desakotas* typically alternate—between agricultural and residential, residential and commercial, residential and industrial—giving it a sense of “in-between” rural and urban character. This physical characteristic also represents the dualistic character of social life—traditional and modern—creating a mixed culture in Pekalongan. For instance, the regency

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<sup>10</sup> The term *desakota* comes from the merger of the Indonesian words *desa* (village) and *kota* (city). More elaborate discussion about *desakota* and social dualism can be found in Leaf (1996). Recently this term had been used to represent the dualistic character of cities in a larger context of the Asia-Pacific region. A substantial number of scholars have also used it in their studies of Chinese cities, (e.g., Guldin, 1996; Tang and Chung, 2002; Marton, 2002; Heikkila et al., 2003; and Yichun et al., 2007) Thai cities (e.g., Sajor and Ongsakul, 2007; and Hirsch, 2009), even Ghana (Yeboah, 2000) and Tokyo (Desbois and Le Tourneau, 1999).

branded the place as *kota santri*, reflecting its strong traditional Moslem culture, while the city branded itself as *kota batik*, reflecting its place as a production center for a unique batik tradition comparable to Jogjakarta and Solo.<sup>11</sup> Put another way, while the city associated itself with its industrial life, its neighbor still associated its culture with the word *santri*, which refers to a traditional Moslem believer on the island of Java related to agriculture (Sebastian, 2003: 431). Compared to *abangan* (nominal Moslems), the *santri* community is seen as devout Moslems, affiliated with either moderate organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or Muhammadiyah (Desker, 2002).<sup>12</sup>



Picture 1. Alternating Land Uses: residential, commercial, and agricultural  
 Picture 2. The Informal Economy of Transportation  
 Source: Personal Documentation, June 2009.

The city of Pekalongan is economically attached to its surrounding villages by a regional commuting pattern, further emphasizing its mixture of urban and semi-rural culture. Presently, Pekalongan draws its labor from the city itself, while other workers commute from Batang (on the East), Wonopringgo (on the South), and even Comal, which is 10 miles away to the West. People commute daily through *Pantura* with motorcycles, although exact statistical information on this trend is nonexistent.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> *Santri* refers to a student of a Javanese Islamic traditional boarding school (*pesantren*).

<sup>12</sup> Geertz (1960) and Koentjaraningrat (1985) provided a very extensive discussion of the *santri / abangan* (*kejawen*) variations in Islamic religious practices in Java.

<sup>13</sup> *Pantura* (*Pantai Utara*) refers to the 1.316 kilometer street line on the northern shore of the Island of Java, connecting the ports of Merak in West Java to Banyuwangi in East Java. Most of the line was a reminiscent of *De Grote Postweg* (The Great Post Way), built under Governor General Daendels during the Dutch colonial period to move Dutch troops in the colonial war against the British.

## 2. A Government in Transformation: Participation in Progress

### *Newly Elected Mayor: New Vibe for the Culture of Local Government*

Dr. Basyir was very popular in Pekalongan even before he ran for, and eventually was elected, as the mayor. People in Pekalongan associated him with generosity and charity: As a general physician, he charged low prices for his service. Some of interview participants claim of hearing that if a poor person comes to his practice, he would not charge him, but would rather give him money instead. Some others say that he often helps pays for poor people's children to go to school. He was well known with his motto: "serving the poor will make God love you."<sup>14</sup>

After his election, because of his accessibility, Mayor Basyir was called "mayor of the people." For the first time in Pekalongan's history, a commoner could meet the mayor simply by making appointments with his office secretary, seeing him at his house or visiting him at his general practice.<sup>15</sup> He claimed that this trait could be traced back from his involvement in community organizations, including serving as head of LPM (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat [Community Empowerment Body]) in *kelurahan* Sugihwaras.<sup>16</sup> In our interview, he frequently pursued to convince me that he actually belongs more in the community than in a government's office. He repetitively mentioned that he was "supposed to serve the people," which accentuates his belief in direct connection between the executive officer and his constituency.

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<sup>14</sup> For a very urban place like Pekalongan, this story is overwhelmingly widespread. I did some unstructured interviews with UPP beneficiaries at the local traditional market, and, to my surprise, most of them at least had heard their peers confirming *Pak Basyir's* reputation as a generous practitioner.

<sup>15</sup> *Satpam* (security guards) in the mayor's office enthusiastically confirmed that they were told not to prevent any people from visiting the mayor. They were specifically ordered to respectfully lead anybody to the mayor's secretary. A BKM member told me another story: "*Pak Basyir* once left a meeting with the Governor of Central Java because he was scheduled to meet BKM members. This was very uncommon in the bureaucratic culture and to a certain extent was considered rebellious."

<sup>16</sup> LPM (*Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat* [Community Empowerment Body]) was envisioned as the main institution that organizes people as the main partner of the government in development. It is the most recent adaptation of the New Order's LKMD (*Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa*, Village Defense Institute). Central Bureau of Statistics defined LKMD as "an institution in a village that originates from, by and for the community. It is also a mode of the community participation in development, that combines various government activities and the pioneer of *swadaya* (self-help) mutual community help in all life aspects in developing the National defense that covers ideology, politics, economy, social, culture, religion and security defense" (Central Bureau of Statistics, 1993).



Dr. Basyir also exhibited skepticism about democracy's representative model. He mentioned several times that executive officers now are bound to serve the legislative members instead of serving people directly. More than once he alluded to the utopian model of democracy, where he could directly talk to people and hear what they need and want.

According to government officials in the planning agency, the whole bureaucracy was overhauled under Dr. Basyir's leadership, and he transferred some of his personal egalitarian values into the bureaucracy's operations. Most of government officials are now required to be much more accessible. Every city government official within the second and third echelon in every single bureau is now assigned a territory to supervise.<sup>17</sup> They are personally and professionally responsible on the Human Development Index for that particular territory, transferring the bureaucratic responsibility to personal officials and requiring them to be more attached to the people from that territory.<sup>18</sup> To date, however, their responsibilities are limited to coordination with territorial administrators (*Lurah* and *Camat*) for planning in education, the poverty index, and health services.

Dr. Basyir identified difficulties in changing not only the bureaucratic structure, but also its culture as well. His employees' skills (or lack thereof) pose the greatest challenge, in his opinion. Most of the higher rank officials are hold over from the New Order's nepotistic regime, and most of them lack the qualifications to assume their governmental positions. For example, they are typically not well trained in strategic and territorial planning and accustomed only to the financial budgeting scheme. They typically work on a project-based administrative assignment and are not very "client-oriented;" in other words, they work for their supervisors, not the people. Dr. Basyir called this reform effort "a

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<sup>17</sup> A head of governmental bureaus (e.g city planning agency) is ranked as 2<sup>nd</sup> echelon. A one rank position below this position (e.g a section head) is classified as the 3<sup>rd</sup> echelon. A more comprehensive explanation is provided by the Ministry of State Apparatus' decision num. 62/KEP/M.PAN/7/2003: <http://www.pu.go.id/satminkal/itjen/hukum/kmPAN62-03.htm>.

<sup>18</sup> The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of human development that is published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The HDI provides an alternative to the common practice of evaluating a country's progress in development based on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For recent report on country HDI refer to The Encyclopedia of Earth: [http://www.eoearth.org/article/Human\\_Development\\_Index](http://www.eoearth.org/article/Human_Development_Index).

personal battle between the newly elected mayor with the strain of the languid government culture.”

But the mayor claimed that shifts have occurred slowly, mostly because he did not succumb to that strain, but rather swiftly altered it. BKM members and local facilitators confirmed Dr. Basyir’s commitment and pursuit of his ideals.<sup>19</sup>

*Pak Basyir’s* explanation on the success of a community-based development model in Pekalongan emphasizes the government’s devolution into a more decentralized and participatory system. He firmly believes that the government becomes more open to community organizations’ operations after decentralization. To him, the government “granted” the opportunity for community organizations to develop. In his own words:

*“Philosophically, lower level [government and community-base] institutions know better about their locale’s issues than the higher level [institutions], hence I need to grant autonomy in decision-making process to them, although [we] need to continuously work side by side to fix all organizational problems [associated with the lower level institution]. But we [the government] cannot and is not supposed to solve all issues like poverty. It’s their [the poor’s] own responsibility to solve the problems. I think UPP is a very good program because: 1) It delegates the [government’s] authority of budgeting, planning and implementation to a lower [community-level] institution; 2) It creates an ideal organization with strong rootedness to the RT (neighborhood) and RW (community) level; 3) [The] UPP provides facilitation to empower themselves to plan and take responsibilities of the implementation; and 4) It accelerates development from planning to execution.”*

#### *A Concrete Step for Community-Based Development Support: Legislation Provision*

City Ordinance No. 11 / 2008 on Family Welfare Acceleration through Community-Based Development (P2KSBM) was Dr. Basyir administration’s main contribution to support the community-based development model in poverty alleviation. This ordinance, as Dr. Basyir claimed, is a legal statement of the city government’s commitment to a bottom-up planning and development process in poverty alleviation projects. His past experience as a community organizer understandably

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<sup>19</sup> To illustrate this shift has indeed occurred one focus group discussion participant told a story about a visit from BKM members from Jogjakarta. He said, “Those guests were so surprised to know that the head of the planning agency and the mayor used to exchange text messages with BKM members (to discuss a community project). In other cities, it’s so difficult to even schedule a meeting with government officials.”

influenced the ordinance's emphasis on capacity building for community-based organizations.<sup>20</sup> This formal statement ensures future mayors must follow his legacy, because legislations embody it.

In this ordinance, five main long-term goals have been set for the purpose of advocating for pro-poor policy: 1) The city should help children from poor families access to education (through high school); 2) The city should support healthcare for poor families, especially pregnant mothers and toddlers; 3) The city should support the development of local infrastructure; 4) The city should encourage poor families to establish micro-businesses and small businesses through skills training; and 5) The city should advocate for stronger community-based development organizations to fulfill all the goals outlined above. The ordinance specifically mandates a partnership between the government and community self-help institutions (BKM) to perform these goals through mid-range participatory planning processes with the city providing necessary resources and facilitation.<sup>21</sup>

Although it is difficult to discern whether this ordinance affected community-based development, it is interesting to see the incremental changes governmental agencies have made. This ordinance, for example, mandated the city government to advocate for communities' autonomy in decision-making, planning, budgeting, and implementing poverty alleviation projects.<sup>22</sup> Pak Choirul Mustofa, the head of city planning agency, acknowledged that his bureau is exposed to formidable adaptation of their role to conform to the recent policy. Planning becomes more decentralized as autonomy is transferred to *Kelurahan* to plan locally. Through the Acceleration Program, this autonomy comes with dedicated financial provision from Bappeda.<sup>23</sup> This way, every local project can be implemented locally without

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<sup>20</sup> Chapter I: General Provision, Article 12 of the Ordinance: "Capacity building for independent community organizations is Pekalongan City Government's commitment through the facilitation of Community Self-Help Organizations (LKM)." This article does not particularly refer to BKM because of the issue of legal semantics: BKM is an organization established by the UPP project under the Ministry of Public Works and is not legally recognized by the Indonesian government administration.

<sup>21</sup> This paragraph summarizes *Lembaran Daerah Kota Pekalongan Nomer 12 Tahun 2008*.

<sup>22</sup> Chapter V: Main Programs, Article 14 of the Ordinance: "Acceleration for Poor Families in Business is Pekalongan City Government's commitment through facilitations and advocacy for training and access to initial capital."

<sup>23</sup> Bappeda (*Badan Perencanaan Daerah* [City Planning Agency])

waiting for budget approval, a process that is sometimes politically charged.<sup>24</sup> By executing their plans without delay, something that typically happened when Bappeda was the gate keeper of budget allocation, communities' participation in development was encouraged, because their involvement in planning processes in *Kelurahan* would lead to tangible results of project implementation in their areas.

### *Pekalongan City Government's Take On Participation and Equity*

The unequivocal motive for the city government to encourage people's participation is to compensate their limited resources in project implementation. Participation means that some part of the government's responsibility in development is delegated and shared with community organizations, which means that financial support and labor constitute participation. Community-based projects are also considered better compared to government-run projects because it increases a community's ownership over a project's outcome, which they tend to maintain even without the government's financial support. Ultimately, involving community institutions in development also emphasizes the government's perspective on project implementation: Communities deliver projects in a faster and more efficient way. In Mayor Basyir's own words:

*“More [people] helping and working for development is better. [Now that they've become so efficient] if you give Rp. 100 million [for a project] to a contractor, you would get [a product worth only] Rp. 50 million. If you give it to communities, you would get [something worth around] Rp. 150 million. If they could do it better, why should we waste our resources [by hiring contractors]?”*

Because of their efficacy and efficiency in project management, sometimes city government uses community organization as their extended arm. For example, when the national government could not provide its annual Rp. 25 trillion subsidy for kerosene and required a national conversion to liquid petroleum gas (LPG), the city government “outsourced” the task of conducting citizen information

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<sup>24</sup> Andi Jeneng Warsito, a senior staff at Bappeda Pekalongan, shared an insight about how politics could interfere in decision-making process because every project proposals need to be approved by DPRD (local parliament). He claimed that this would indirectly hinder participation because DPRD had the final decision, and that not every community plan would be approved. By direct autonomy in *kelurahan*, this tendency of political interference would be moderated. He also claimed that the Acceleration Program is unique to Pekalongan and many other regional governments already started to imitate this model.

sessions to BKM, using BKM's resources and personnel in *Kelurahan* offices and in community spaces to reach more community members.<sup>26</sup>

Because participation is almost always understood as equivalent to contribution, government programs that require community participation are not always without resistance. *Lurah* (sub-district administrator) Purwanto of Podosugih, for example, once refused to accept the implementation of Sanimas, a national program for sanitation in impoverished urban cities, because it would require his *kelurahan* to provide 6 square meters of land for the water tower and another 100 square meters for the purification facility.<sup>27</sup> Despite its urgency, the *kelurahan* believed that the cost of providing that amount of land in an urban setting like Pekalongan was an excessive burden to their people. However, the program did proceed in Podosougih with a negotiated condition that some of the facilities would be built on a structure above the riverbanks, instead of requiring people of the *kelurahan* to acquire new land. This story is not unique to just *kelurahan* Podosugih or its particular project. Many *kelurahans* in Pekalongan also refused to implement Pamsimas, another water supply and sanitation program under the Ministry of Public Works.<sup>28</sup>

*Pak Kajelan*, a senior official at city's planning agency and coordinator of Pekalongan's Core Group for Participatory Planning (TIPP) explained that these repercussions were not completely unreasonable.<sup>29</sup> Most *Lurachs* were concerned with the equity issues. Services, which supposedly

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<sup>26</sup> Although it sounds exploitive, some BKM members whom I have interviewed share a sense of pride on their reputation as efficient "project managers" and do not mind the extra burden of work.

<sup>27</sup> Sanimas (*Sanitasi oleh Masyarakat* [Sanitation by People]) is a national program of Ministry of Public Works, partially funded by AusAID and a World Bank loan. *Pak Kajelan* provided an account on *Lurah* Purwanto of Podosugih's refusal to fund Sanimas.

<sup>28</sup> Pamsimas (*Penyediaan Air Minum dan Sanitasi Berbasis Masyarakat* [Community-Based Supply for Drink Water and Sanitation]) is another Ministry of Public Works program funded through a World Bank loan. On its website, the program aims to deliver water services to regions with extensive rural areas and low fiscal capacity by a demand responsive approach. "Demand responsive" is where the project would provide facilities while potential beneficiaries would be willing to partially contribute to the facilities' construction cost and maintenance. For more information, refer to the Pamsimas website, [http://www.pamsimas.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=42](http://www.pamsimas.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=42).

<sup>29</sup> TIPP (*Tim Inti Perencanaan Partisipatif* [Core Group for Participatory Planning]) is an ad hoc group at the city level, established under the umbrella of the UPP project to execute participatory planning processes in neighborhood development projects. Neighborhood Development (ND) is the final phase of UPP with more emphasis on participatory planning in urban infrastructure decisions. To date, only *Kelurahan* Podosugih has received the grant of Rp. 1 billion (US\$ 100,000) in Pekalongan.

subsidized poor people, would actually financially burden them. *Pak Kajelan* admitted that not all government officials reach that in-depth level of thinking about equity issues in the implementation of government projects. To him, reaching a truly equitable solution would require a detailed local knowledge of people's economic situations. He referred to the Podosugih case, where the *Lurah* needed to raise money from communities adjacent to the community where the Sanimas project would be built. Because sanitation affects not only personal but also public health, the economically well-off adjacent communities should help the less economically advantaged community, because they would indirectly benefit from the project.

*Pak Kajelan* also explained that to moderate resistance, sometimes government agents needed to limit the number of people involved in decision-making processes, consequently hindering participation for a greater purpose of avoiding decision-making gridlock. According to him, an open forum is not ideal, because most of the general public almost always reacts negatively to minor impositions, and does not always respond positively when searching for both feasible and equitable solutions. Most of the time, inviting only the most vocal stakeholders in public decisions to a smaller meeting to craft preliminary solutions and then offering these solutions to the general public allows for better outcomes. To illustrate his point, he spoke about his involvement in the implementation of Sanimas and Pamsimas in Podosugih:

*"We need to be very strategic when dealing with a situation like this. Not only Lurahs, even [the supposedly resourceful] consultants were also stumbled [upon this situation]. But I did not lose my optimism. We need to convince people that we need to implement this because our beneficiaries' interest in this kelurahan is at stake. However, gathering the general public too early would be counterproductive because it would raise powerful resistance. I believe that if all the important stakeholders, especially those whose opinion is influential to the public, sit down together to confer with each other we could find the solution.<sup>30</sup> Finally the four of us met here (pointing his own table) to discuss. It's easier to explain to a stickler this way (making hand gestures illustrating personal conversation). We finally had an idea: The water tower could be built on the river with a very skinny structure so it would not block the river flow. We still had an issue with the 16 percent financial contribution required by Sanimas at that time, but then I suggested that they could use the Acceleration Fund that was about to be granted next year. Because this project would also benefit poor people who would not be able to afford private water supply by PT PAM, I think the use of that fund would be justified. Some other times and in other kelurahan, it's not*

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<sup>30</sup> *Pak Kajelan* used the word *rembug* that is more nuanced than *rapat*. *Rembug* means more than *meeting to discuss something*. In Javanese society it bears the cultural meaning of *meeting in a sense of kinship*.

*always that easy. Sometimes I have to go to people's places just to make a conversation and to listen to their concerns."*

*Summary: Pekalongan City Government's Transformation*

Dr. Basyir illustrates his dualistic role: as both the state's agent and as an agent of change representing community-based organizations' interests. As a state agent, Dr. Basyir's repertoire of actions is limited to the rhetoric of government bureaucracy, such as passing ordinances. By refusing to work within the new framework—emphasizing on democratic citizen participation—government officials can maintain the status quo. To a certain extent, this internal drive for change is also subject to a cultural challenge: Some governmental officials were accustomed to the state's old paradigm, where participation was synonymous with (labor and financial) contribution. This paradigm can turn decentralization into an instrument of exploitation: Community-based organizations provided underpaid labor for the city government's poverty alleviation projects.

Dr. Basyir's election, however, exposed governmental agencies and officials to formidable structural and cultural change toward larger accountability, accessibility, and deferral toward local planning and governance. Drawing on his experience as a community organizer, he used the territorial assignment of administrative officials as his main instrument to forcefully institutionalize governmental agents to work closely with community representatives. Hence, this increases community organizations' ability to access officials, and consequently, provided larger space for their activism and negotiation with the state. In this case, Dr. Basyir acted as an advocate of change from within a governmental institution.

# *Pekalongan as a Context*

## Transformation: Government

### **City Ordinance 11 / 2008**

#### **(Family Welfare Acceleration through Community-Based Development)**

1. *Advocacy for poor students – 12 year education*
2. *Commitment for health care, especially the targeted population of pregnant women and infants*
3. *Development of local infrastructure*
4. *Advocacy for small – micro businesses for poor population*
5. *Strengthening of community-based development organizations (BKM)*

*Legal Framework*

### **Governmental Accessibility Policy**

1. *Territorial Assignment to Administrative Officials*
2. *Open to co-management with Community Development Organizations*
3. *General Accessibility Policy*

*Governmental Culture*

### **Perception & Motives Towards Community-Based Development**

1. *Efficiency Concern*
2. *Match between Needs – Project*
3. *Increase Participation*
4. *Increase Contribution*

*Perception & Motives*


### **Force Driving Change**

1. *Personal Influence of Newly Elected Mayor*
2. *Implementation of Decentralization*
3. *Social Pressure*

*Forces*

Chart 3. Summary of Pekalongan's Governmental Transformation.





Map 4. Situating *Kelurahan Podosugih* and *Kelurahan Yosorejo* in the City of Pekalongan  
Source: *Pekalongan City Administrative Map*.  
Areas situating *Kelurahan Podosugih* & *Yosorejo* and the *Pantura* lines were added by author.

## **B. Alliance or Co-optation? BKM Yosorejo on Environmental Advocacy**

### **1. The Conflict: A Planned Environmental Disaster**

PT Kismatex, a textile factory located in *Yosorejo*, an urban village at the periphery of City of Pekalongan, was built upon three traditional lots of *sawah* (wet paddy field) in the mid-1980s. The factory needed to accumulate a substantial, albeit unprecedented, amount of land. For such purpose, it converted three adjacent paddy fields, creating a contiguous lot in a north–south direction.

Paddy fields are typically intentionally flooded, because the crops need extensive watering. Mechanized irrigation was considered too expensive for traditional paddy farming practices, and as a result, paddy fields are typically laid on natural wetlands. Paddy is a very sensitive crop: Water levels should be set at a very precise point—not too high, and not too low. As a cheap solution to deal with the crop’s sensitivity, traditional farmers build short soil hillocks around their lots to minimize fluctuations in water levels. On these hillocks, they drill horizontal holes at a certain depth, creating a drain if extensive rain threatens the paddy’s water levels. When the water reaches threatening level, it is expected to run to neighboring field, which also uses this mechanism to drive water out, until it finally reaches the field’s lowest point and drains into the river. Because paddy fields are almost always located adjacent to each other, the hillocks then also function as a marker of “territories,” a traditional border of properties. An embanked paddy field is typically called a *petak*. This embankment technique, though, manages storm-water (and in this way, avoids its negative environmental effects) in a traditional and natural way.

The Kismatex factory’s north-south orientation broke up the traditional water management system, where gravity carried water from higher altitudes in the west to the river in the east, instead retaining water at the factory’s longitudinal west side. Soil, which was moved to provide space for development, covered the two traditional drains farmers had built between their rice fields. One traditional drain was left untouched, but the factory’s heavy trucks eroded some parts of the drain,


making it impossible for water to flow through it. The heavy load overburdened the only remaining drain, which was adjacent to the factory wall. During the 1990s the area around the factory has become prime land, and some of the paddy fields were converted to housing, including the area west of the factory. Because the factory blocks the area's natural drainage patterns, this area has experienced annual flooding during the rainy season.

## 2. The Resolution: A Mediated Negotiation

UPP Facilitators had trained BKM *Yosorejo*'s members for community-level planning. From the beginning, BKM realized that they needed to involve the factory to resolve the flooding problem. Creating an alternative drainage system circling the factory site would exhaust all of BKM's very limited resources, which they received as UPP money from the national government.<sup>31</sup> One solution proposed at a BKM meeting was to restore the three drains that had not been functioning since the factory started its operations. Since the drains were part of the factory's property, BKM needed to approach the factory managers to persuade them to accept the idea. Feeling like they had less of a bargaining position, they sought patronage from the *Lurah*. This process led to a series of *Lurah*-mediated negotiations between BKM and the factory.

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<sup>31</sup> A typical neighborhood sewer drain would provide water clearance of 60 centimeters wide and 80 centimeters deep. To be reasonably durable, it needs to be built with concrete mix, and typically would cost Rp. 100,000 (US\$10) per meter. The drains span around 40 meters long, all three of them totaling into 117 meters of drains. Construction cost (excluding labor) would cost around Rp. 15 million (US\$ 1,500). The total construction cost for the drain reached Rp. 54 million. (LPJ RWT Rejo Makmur, 31 March 2009). In this community of underemployed people, that amount of money was considered excessive. *Yosorejo*'s residents are typically working as on-call labors. They only work seasonally as *kuli bangunan* (construction workers), *kuli panggul* (manual lifters), or seasonal paddy harvesters (PJM *Pronangkis Kelurahan Yosorejo* 2007–2009).



Map 5: Yosorejo Situation Map.  
 The lines with arrows show the three drain restored by BKM in 2008. The box shows the location of the Kelurahan's office. BKM also uses this office for its daily operations.  
 Source: BKM Yosorejo's Internal Document

It took numerous meetings to reach a settlement. BKM's first solution (to create a drain circling the factory's site) was financially unfeasible: If the drain was built around the factory's existing site, the factory would need to buy the surrounding land. The drain would also be much longer than it was necessary and this length would increase construction cost. The factory, after a significant amount of time, agreed to restore the drains that were earthed during the factory's construction (BKM's second solution).<sup>32</sup>

The restored drain then would cross-section the factory's site. BKM saw this as a win-win solution that would solve the problem in a relatively inexpensive manner. BKM could not afford to buy the land or construction if the factory did not cooperate. The factory's willingness to dedicate a portion of their land in an urban setting for the project was seen as "generous enough," so they could continue with the plan to restore the indigenous drains. When BKM and the factory reached a settlement, the Department of Public Work (*Pekerjaan Umum*, PU) agreed to allocate funding for construction of a road above the drain's outlet next to the factory's wall, significantly reducing the cost born by BKM.

*Lurah* Satro Amijoyo's personal relationship with the factory's general manager, as he claimed, was a very helpful asset for him to negotiate with them. The factory manager was an ex military officer who turned to be a government official as the head of state-run traditional market. When he retired, he was appointed the factory's general manager.<sup>33</sup> *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo gave enough pressure to the factory in a very "soft" manner. He warned the factory general manager that local people could be very "shortsighted" and "narrow minded", and when an aggressive collective action is held against the

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<sup>32</sup> They reached settlement on 17 December 2008 (indicated by the Memorandum of Understanding). Both *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo and BKM members did not specify the time-span of this negotiation. They hastily recalled that it took more than necessary and that it involved frequent meeting. In the Javanese community, sense of time is not as accurate compared with Western society. Typically the true meaning of a time frame in verbal communication is longer than the pronounced one. When a local mentioned that an event occurred "yesterday," it typically means that it happened in the relatively short past, possibly around less than a week or a month ago. When *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo and BKM members mentioned that this process took a long time, the time-span may be even longer than 6 months or one year. However, I am, of course, speculating.

<sup>33</sup> *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo correctly commented that it was really common for the New Order's regime to give military officials privileges to assume civil public positions.

factory, they would not be able to bear the cost. *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo explained to me in a straightforward way:

*“This is a very uncertain period. Unemployment is high. Basic needs are overpriced. People can get shortsighted at times. Faced with problems they do not expect, like flooding, can make them lost their rationality. If they protested in a large mass to the factory, and it ended up as a violent event, it would be very unfortunate for all parties. If the factory was burnt for example, none of us win. Everybody loses. The factory lost their investment. Local people lost their jobs. I don’t want that to happen.”<sup>34</sup>*

To avoid aggressive action toward it, the factory offered to pay for all construction materials needed for the drain; BKM would only need to provide sweat equity for the construction process.



Picture 3. Local residents constructing the drain outlet outside factory wall

Picture 4. The drain inside the factory’s site

Sources: BKM *Rejo Makmur*, *Kelurahan Yosorejo*’s internal documentation.

### 3. Understanding Negotiation and Its Actors

#### *Who are the Advocates? Introduction to BKM Yosorejo*

BKM Yosorejo’s members are a very unique mix of people. *Pak* Noor Ali Mudlofar, coordinator of BKM, was an accounting staffer at a textile factory in the adjacent Batang regency. He considers the burden of the assignment to the BKM as “too heavy of a responsibility for a common person.” He quits his job to remain responsible for the assignment, though nobody else in the board made such a

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<sup>34</sup> The number of impoverished households in the area rose from 391 in 2007 to 432 in 2008 (BKM Yosorejo, 16 June 2009). Laid off workers from the factory account for this increase. *Yosorejo* has only 1,088 households, demonstrating how dependent local people are on the factory’s jobs.

decision. It was not an easy decision since he was also the breadwinner of his family, and made it only after his wife granted him permission.<sup>35</sup> If one asks him why he made BKM his full-time “job,” he would answer, “I want the rest of my age to be meaningful for others. That’s what my religion taught me.” Another key figure is *Bu Muji Lestari*, a teaching superintendent of the City of Pekalongan. Both are very vocal and active in BKM’s management, decision-making processes, and advocacy efforts. Local people considered them the most “knowledgeable” people and possibly the ones with most authority: They often asked them if they were uncertain about a particular thing.

Four other BKM members, who hold college degrees and professional employment, have sophisticated backgrounds like *Pak Noor Ali Mudlofar* and *Bu Muji Lestari*, but five members have far less sophisticated backgrounds. *Pak Sugeng* for example, is a seasonal labor worker. The five members are typically seasonal workers, local teachers, or entry-level government employees with a high school education.

Hari, the neighborhood development facilitator for both Yosorejo and Podosugih, confirmed that Yosorejo’s BKM membership owns more “rootedness” on the place and its people, since they are elected from the smaller RT (neighborhood) basis, while BKM Podosugih’s members were elected from RW (community) basis.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, there is also more diversity among BKM Yosorejo’s members, representing a wide range of socio-economic statuses and indicating that BKM is not an elitist group. Hari also confirmed that local residents typically know BKM members and are eager to get involved in BKM’s activities. During his service as a facilitator, he also observed that sometimes BKM is also involved in community activities, such as meetings at RT and RW, proving their good relationship is reciprocal.

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<sup>35</sup> It is very uncommon for a paternalistic society to ask their wives to “grant permission.” They instead would use the term “consulting the wife.” *Ibu Rusiningrum*, his wife, works at a local contracting company. It is possible that she supports the family after *Pak Ali* quit his job and serve as a full-time BKM coordinator. Otherwise, it would be difficult to imagine reversed power relations in his household.

<sup>36</sup> The UPP scheme only mandates that BKM elections be conducted from the basis level. The base may be either RT or RW, depending on the feasibility of the election at the respective locale.





Picture 5. BKM members showing the fixed drain's outlet in front of the factory wall.  
*Left to right: Khaula (local resident), Hari (project facilitator), Ali Mudlofar (BKM coordinator), and Hariyadi (BKM member)*  
*Source: Personal Documentation, July 2009*



While BKM members are well known among *kelurahan* people, some focus group participants agreed that some concerns surround how they represent the people's voice. Diningrum, a local facilitator, confirmed that Yosorejo's capacity to involve local people in its activities is astronomical compared with the other 8 *kelurahan* where she has served. She confirmed that people's participation in planning meetings is extensive. However, she also mentioned that people in Yosorejo are less critical and typically wait until their leaders take actions. That is, although they realize that there is an issue regarding their communities, they don't speak freely in formal meetings unless a more influential person already opened a discussion regarding the issue. Therefore, even though BKM members always invite the public to BKM meetings or BKM members actively engage in community meetings, it does not mean that these meetings result in a tangible proposition of a project or resolve a real concern. Hence, even a participatory forum does not guarantee that people's voices are transferred into BKM's policies.

Abovementioned phenomenon may explain why BKM members' attempted to keep a neutral, if not artificially positive, attitude toward Kismatex during the negotiation process.<sup>37</sup> Although some community members openly made the claim that Kismatex had contributed to the flooding, in several of my interviews, *Pak Ali Mudlofar* frequently rejected this proposition. According to him, the flood was a result of local peoples' "bad habit[s]." He claimed that local people "do not have the conscience to keep the environment healthy" by collectively cleaning the drain periodically, so during the rainy season, water will not pass to lower land. Urged to answer how cleaning the drain would help water flow better, while the drain itself had been earthed, he said that it is still "local peoples' responsibility to keep their environment safe and healthy, including bearing the burden of making necessary constructions to avoid flooding." *Bu Muji* also confirmed *Pak Ali's* claims, adding that the factory had been very generous with its proposition to let the drain cross-sect its property.

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<sup>37</sup> I am asserting my subjectivity here. Given that my mother's ancestors were from Java, I am fully aware of the local rhetoric. "Bad mouthing" about others is considered taboo, even until today, as urbanization changes its society. Javanese people typically avoid direct confrontations. Their verbal communication is full of euphemisms. Conflicts are solved internally, and opening conflicts to the general public will bring the whole community into "a shame." I was still considered as a stranger by my interviewees, and I expected people to speak more carefully about what happens internally. As a result, I consciously heightened my critical comprehension of what people actually said.

I tried another strategy—dealing with them in a more neutral way—to see if the BKM members’ responses changed. Asked why the only drain left could not let water flow, *Pak Ali* claimed that it was unintentionally earthed. Vehicles with heavy loads overburdened the red brick, stone, and mortar construction of the bridge over the drain’s outlet. In my observations, none of local residents owned heavy vehicles. Motorbikes are generally the most sophisticated means of private transport in the *kelurahan*. The only heavy loaders were container trucks owned by the factory. *Pak Ali* did not confront my observation, but also failed to admit the factory contributed to the flooding. He claimed that the bridge was located on a main road that is passed by people not only from the *kelurahan*, but also from neighboring areas. Therefore, the road is also burdened by frequent traffic. My field observation of the road conflicts with *Pak Ali*’s information. I found that the road he mentioned was a neighborhood driveway with relatively low traffic and did not see more than five motorbikes passing by in each hour of the day.

Because *Lurah Satro Amijoyo* reported some of local residents had complained to the factory about the flooding, I expected either *Pak Ali* or *Bu Muji* to explain more about the social movement they led. They, however, remained neutral on their positions against the factory. To a certain extent, they exhibit deference to the factory and their responses seem to absolve it of responsibility for the flooding.

#### *Who Mediated the Conflict?*

*Satro Amijoyo*, the *Lurah* of *Yosorejo* for the past five years, is not a typical Indonesian administrator or bureaucrat at the sub-district level. He deals with local people with an egalitarian attitude, almost with no sense of bureaucracy. On a daily basis, *Lurah Satro Amijoyo* works relatively long hours (9–5) compared with administrators at his level, who usually only work between 10–3. Accessing him is considerably easy: He never sits at his own office. Rather, he uses the *Kelurahan*’s function room as

his daily office, where he sits at a long table with the *Carik* (secretary of the office) and one other administrator.<sup>38</sup>

In my observations, I witnessed how he dealt with one local person asking about his property tax memo, which he believed had been wrongly calculated—a task beyond the *Lurah*'s authority. His office distributes this type of notification, which it receives from another city bureau that specifically deals with taxes. Yet, the *Lurah* had to deal with these complaints every day. The person had come into the office three times, first to collect the notification, then to clarify a miscalculation, and then again in the same day to demand further explanation and file a complaint. In all occasions, *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo dealt with the person. During none of his three encounters did he refer the person to his staff. Once or twice, he asked his *Carik* for information on certain procedures, but most of the time, he patiently answered all questions himself.

While his formal job-description as *Lurah* is administrative, Satro Amijoyo's real responsibilities stretch beyond his formal mandate. His office helps people get citizenship documents, makes identity cards, and provides references for citizens to the bureaus issuing birth or death certificates and residency letters to other locales. Little of the office's business is non-administrative jobs. However, the *Lurah* did mention that local people refer to him as local leader, which makes his position very difficult. He has to be ready to solve local conflicts, act as a mediator, or even deal with local legal disputes. Sometimes he even has to testify to police officers as the recognized authority of the area a crime, such as a theft and or local fight, occurs. These "additional assignments" are nowhere in his job description, but traditionally have burdened *Lurahs* everywhere in Java.

*Lurah* Satro Amijoyo provided insight about how decentralization changed government operations at local level. For instance, when the central government under the New Order's regime would call for

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<sup>38</sup> The term *kelurahan* refers to the smallest administrative level of urban government in Indonesia. It applies to a geographically contiguous area with a population between 5,000 and 10,000 residents. In this paper, the term *Kelurahan* (with capital) refers to a locale's "government body", while *kelurahan* refers to the administrative definition of the geography of the place.

school constructions (infamously known as *Inpres* [President's Instruction]), their efforts largely failed to address the demand for school buildings in *Pekalongan* in general, because most local schools were privately owned by Islamic foundations and serve students from the traditional Moslem background. The centralized *Inpres* program lacked the knowledge on local demand and typically dedicated buildings for general, secular public schools. Hence in *Pekalongan*'s religious society, these buildings were usually left unused, and the schools almost never attracted enough students. Local students' parents usually preferred to send their children to *Madrasahs*, where their children receive substantial amount of Islamic education in addition to the general education mandated by national curriculum.<sup>39</sup>

*Lurah* Satro Amijoyo was well aware of political changes beyond his jurisdiction. He mentioned, in a favorable way, that under the "new mechanisms" local people are involved in the process of development by self-identification of local needs and beneficiaries, self-formulation of local solutions, and self-implementation of the proposed projects.<sup>40</sup> He recognized that a larger force drives this trend, although he did not explicitly mention what or who played this role. He also was aware that the city (municipal) government had been trying to allocate a larger portion of its budget for locally planned and implemented projects. In *Pekalongan*, this type of dedication was called an "acceleration" fund.<sup>41</sup> *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo also identified impediments to this process, including the requirement of *DPR Daerah* (DPRD)'s approval on municipal government's budget provision.<sup>42</sup>

Since DPRD members represent political parties, they may have differing political agendas from the

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<sup>39</sup> *Madrasah* in Arabic literally means "school." Typically categorized as *Madrasah Tsanawiyah* (elementary school), *Ibtidaiyah* (middle school), and *Aliyah* (high school), these institutions provide general education in science, language, physical education, and arts as mandated by a national curriculum, but with substantial religious education as well. In Java, *Madrasahs* usually operated by *Muhammadiyah*—an Islam-oriented civic association. A more traditional type of Islamic education is provided by *Nahdlatul Ulama*, another civic association, in the form of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools). The distinction between *madrasah* and *pesantren* is important, because *madrasah* provided Islam as an add-on to general education, while *pesantren* offers education with religion as its core. Jung (2008) provided a very thorough discussion on how *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama* differ as civic organizations.

<sup>40</sup> He did not refer to the "new mechanism" as decentralization. To avoid bias in understanding, I also had avoided the term in further interviews with him and used terms he was comfortable with.

<sup>41</sup> Refer to the Acceleration Program explained in the previous subchapter.

<sup>42</sup> Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR, House of Representatives) serves as the legislative branch of government in Indonesia. *DPR Daerah* (DPRD) is established to perform this legislative function at provincial, city (*Kotamadya*) and county (*Kabupaten*) levels.

municipal governments, and the process of budget allocation typically suffers from a long, time-consuming negotiation between them.

*Illustrating Cooperative Measures: BKM–Kelurahan Alliance*

Since BKM *Yosorejo*'s establishment after the UPP began in *Pekalongan*, it has been the *Kelurahan*'s most important partner not only in poverty alleviation policymaking and implementation, but also in day to day operation. To illustrate this, *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo gave wide access to BKM members to the *Kelurahan*'s office. In my observations, BKM members and volunteers are indistinguishable from the *Kelurahan*'s staff, except they do not wear the civil servants' khaki-colored uniform, working together on a daily basis with a strong sense of coordination and intense communication. To accommodate BKM members, *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo even gave his personal office to be the BKM's filing and working room while he worked in the office's lounge instead.<sup>43</sup> Sometimes, *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo pays for BKM members' drinks or food for internal meetings. His wife, the director of Bank Pasar in *Pekalongan*, has even provided free consultations for BKM's financial planning. *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo explained his behavior toward BKM: He "pities them for working as volunteers with substantial burden as much as we (*Kelurahan*'s staff) who receive monetary compensation."

*Lurah* Satro Amijoyo understood the difficulties of dealing with "a complex mix of unsatisfied locales." He illustrated how BKM members, who are unpaid volunteers, often received complaints from local people because they were not listed as a beneficiary of the UPP program. He implicitly asserted that locals should have thanked BKM members for working voluntarily, as he was grateful that some of the *Kelurahan*'s irregular work was redistributed among more people.

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<sup>43</sup> My background as an architect informed these observations as well: The spatial configuration delivers strong meaning about how inclusive *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo is. I didn't find this in any other of the *Kelurahan*. Typically, the *Lurah* assumes a strong sense of hierarchy and spatial configuration of the office represents this hierarchy. In most cases, the BKM office is located outside the *Kelurahan*'s office.

*Lurah* Satro Amijoyo frequently presented BKM as a great help to the *Kelurahan*, taking on tasks which the *Kelurahan*'s staff could not handle themselves. When *Kelurahan* Yosorejo was competing for the UPP grant, for example, the administrative requirements were extremely complicated; the *Kelurahan*'s staff has neither the capacity nor the time and energy to draft proposals, survey and identify beneficiaries, and implement projects. BKM members performed all these tasks instead. In the *Lurah*'s own words, "BKM *Yosorejo* had benefited from a 'good mix of high resourced persons' with excellent work ethics and relatively high soft skills to do all works abovementioned."

Because he believed BKM members' need to meet some qualifications, *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo criticized the mechanisms to search for BKM members. He was skeptical about the democratic election process. Often, as he pointed out, the democratic election enabled people who are highly unqualified to fill positions. The UPP is a very complicated project with elaborate administrative requirements and an almost unrealistic time frame for its projects. He claimed that common people would not be able to understand the UPP's typical report sheets and proposal forms. When a "unskilled" person is elected by the traditional community as BKM member, administrative problems he faces may jeopardize the project.

Aside from administrative issues, according to the *Lurah*, democratic elections do not elect people with "honored intentions." He pointed out that some elected BKM members assumed the position would benefit them financially. After experiencing the real work without payment, they quit the position. No one wanted to assume those positions, since word spread about how demanding the work was. He claimed that the BKM members that were left are the only ones with good intentions to serve the community.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> The UPP emphasizes good human qualities in its program implementation; its technical program books emphasize *honesty* and *altruism*. In its constitution, the BKM election process explicitly prohibits self-candidacy and campaign. Predictably, little, if any, interviews reveal any motivation of political "reward" of being a BKM member.

*Delving into the Dynamics of Thoughts: Collateral Impact of Alliance?*

Regarding decentralization, the *Lurah* provided insight about the rights and responsibilities from local government to local people when asked how he perceived the difference between old and new mechanisms:

*“Usually, large projects, such as road construction and maintenance that required substantial amount of money, needed to wait for approval from municipal government since it would exhaust their resources. Nowadays, whenever local people felt that they could handle those projects themselves with local resources, they could just go for it. So everything can be done ‘faster’ than previously.<sup>45</sup> This is empowerment! People are empowered to solve their local problems with their own solutions, ideas, and resources.”*

This interview illustrated a larger asymmetry between a local constituency’s rights and responsibilities in *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo’s perception of “empowerment.” He visualized empowerment as “independence” from the ruling body, often coupled with a timely response to local problems. In this framework, however, independence is reached when localities gain the rights to decision-making *and* the responsibilities of taking on the burden of resource exhaustion.

*Lurah* Satro Amijoyo hesitated to answer my next question, on whether under this “new mechanism,” the reverse may happen—that local constituents had larger access or at least more power to demand redistribution of resources that fit their interests. He turned defensive as he believed his conception of empowerment was superior to other practices. He also argued that local resources are scarce, directly confronting me by pointing that I come from the capital city of Indonesia and would not be able to appreciate how resources are managed to meet all interests. While budget allocation for typical empowerment programs for one *kelurahan* in Jakarta reaches hundreds of millions rupiahs, his *kelurahan* receives only a fraction of that.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> This interview took place during the period of national presidential election. The word “faster” has implicit meaning since Jusuf Kalla, one presidential candidate used “the faster, the better” as his campaign gimmick. In a joking way, *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo illustrated how Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, the then–Vice President Jusuf Kalla’s political party as well as the main political machine of the New Order) was very influential in the area after the election of Mayor Basyir. Refer to the next case study for more comprehensive explanation on this.

<sup>46</sup> I corrected him, mentioning that in Jakarta each *kelurahan* receives one billion rupiahs annually for a similar program. Given that similar jurisdictions in Jakarta deal with more population, higher density, more complex urban problems and higher price index, I argued that this amount is relatively small. He, of course, disagreed.

*Lurah* Satro Amijoyo insisted that self-help for the supply of resources for development or poverty alleviation projects should accompany the privileges of self-determination in community decision-making. According to him, not everybody in the community or a particular locale receives the benefits of poverty alleviation projects in the same way. Some people receive benefits more than others. *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo pointed out that while public facilities' construction, such as roads and pathways, can benefit the whole community inclusively, some projects only benefit certain people, such as the house renovation projects using UPP money, which only benefit the homeowner. He highly scrutinized the practice of funding the whole house as an inappropriate way to free homeowners from poverty although he admitted that before the program was implemented some of them had "indecent housing and quality of life". In these types of projects, he believed that individual homeowners should also contribute personal funds, and the UPP money should only serve as the stimulus to the project. Relatively, the proportion of this personal fund will be much higher than the proportion of community's self-help funds used in road construction projects, which provides more inclusive benefits.<sup>47</sup>

Mechanisms of resource collection also arose out from my conversations with *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo. In home renovation projects, it is much easier to determine how much the homeowner needs to contribute in a construction cost by asking him, whereas it is much more difficult to determine the costs for more "public" projects like road construction. *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo told me that local contributions do not always come in the form of money. The biggest contribution actually comes in labor and dedication of private land for public use. The cost to purchase all private lands that a planned road requires is generally equal to all construction materials. Without local people dedicating their private lands to the project, the construction is nearly impossible.

To illustrate how difficult it was to collect partial contribution from community members, the *Lurah* told me an anecdote about the local village where road construction needed to take place:

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<sup>47</sup> Though we differ in our perspectives on empowerment, I admire *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo's elaborate conception of the balance between locals' rights and responsibilities.



*“The [planned] road stretched about 100 meters (330 feet). It was previously only pathways on soil. Villagers’ tolerance made it possible that people passing by other people’s lawns and front/backyards. Through time, people had figured out that the path was much shorter than the other road circling the village. We [kelurahan officers] came to the village sessions and threw the idea of paving the pathways to create [a] more permanent road. We let them know, that we only had this much [amount of money], while the land would cost us Rp. 350,000/m<sup>2</sup>, Rp. 35 million in total.<sup>48</sup> We had no money to bear that burden, and suggested the villagers discuss how they could contribute to the road construction. Some villagers then agreed to just give away a portion of their land because it is only a strip on their property. Some others, because the road would take more of their land, wanted compensation, by which their neighbors would pay by collecting money among them.”*

When I asked *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo whether past experiences have shown that local villagers are reluctant or resistant to contributing for a public project, he expressed unease. Traditional Javanese people, according to him, are communal, and individualistic traits are unappreciated. Put another way, giving to the community’s urgent needs is highly regarded, and property ownership is not a popular theme. Asked about what would happen if a landowner decided not to give his or her land to the road construction project, he surprisingly answered that “the road construction would still go on without his dedication. When he sees that road has been constructed and it was cut on his personal land, he should’ve been ashamed, because his neighbors have dedicated land, while he had not.” This response illustrates how in traditional communities, the idea of community or public interest is superior to almost all private interests.

Implicitly, *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo mentioned that personal commercial interest in publicly owned facilities is highly unpopular. That is why when landowners are faced with options to sell or to dedicate their land without compensation for road construction, they would prefer to dedicate it, because they would not want their neighbors to scrutinize them. Moreover, they do not want to create the image of “appropriating” the public’s interest by imposing financial burden on public projects. According to the *Lurah*, “He [the one who does not want to give away his land] did not realize the fact that he also passes by other villagers lands. They have given away their[s] as well.”

Local decision-making is not always rosy. The sub-district administrator mentioned that in one project, the landowners were not that “generous” and were not willing to dedicate their land to the

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<sup>48</sup> He did not specify how much money they already had allocated for the road construction.

public project. The village “committee” responsible for the project decided that the construction needed to keep going on, creating an incomplete road. Where landowners did not want to give away their land, the road was cut and left as unpaved soil pathways to exhibit that the land was not yet dedicated for the road project. As more and more people use the road and scrutinize the landowner, s/he would unwillingly give the land away.

Surprisingly, BKM members shared so much of the *Lurah*’s thoughts. Once, our three-party discussion touched on who had primary responsibility for the flooding issue. Since *Pak* Ali claimed that the bridge above the drain was on a main road, I had asked him if local residents believed the city Department of Public Works was responsible for this issue. *Pak* Ali concluded “citizen[s] should be held responsible of what happened around their neighborhood;” therefore they need to “solve their own problems with their own resources.” One day, when *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo and I were walking down the street, we passed a local resident who lived in front of the drain outlet. During our interview, she said that while she had lived in the house for more than 40 years, the flooding never occurred before the factory was established. *Lurah* Satro Amijoyo pointed at the drain outlet, which was at the time covered by some household waste, and said, “[You] should also clean that. [People] should also have awareness that environmental health starts with environmental responsibility.” *Pak* Ali whispered to me confirming the *Lurah*’s words.

Another interesting observation was how *Pak* Ali adopted the *Lurah*’s perception of “citizenship” and “benefactor’s rights.” In a short walk one afternoon, we reached the *kelurahan*’s bordering areas with paddy fields around them. I saw two shacks in the middle of the paddy fields. I asked *Pak* Ali if the two shack owners are also beneficiaries of the housing reconstruction projects. This was his answer:

*“We have a dilemma with those shack owners, or people living in [that] typical type of housing settlement. We could not really consider them as “our citizen[s].”<sup>49</sup> They do not have any [legal form of] identification as proof of their residency here. Those shacks are of course impermanent and they are typically not building them on their own land. Giving them money is still fine. They are sometimes benefiting from charities that BKM organized. But we cannot really consider them as our beneficiaries [for the housing reconstruction program]. When we*

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<sup>49</sup> *Pak* Ali used the term *warga*, which literally means “people belonging to a group.” The phrase *warga negara* is used in official documents as a literal translation of “national citizen.”

*are having home improvement projects, for example, they cannot be benefactors. If they build their shacks and it becomes more permanent, it is as if we legalize their presence, helping them to claim the property of their shacks and the land underneath them, and it will create problem[s] in the end.”*

Hari, a facilitator that the national government provided for the UPP project in the area added:

*“In fact, they may not belong to this place at all. They come from some different place to try their luck in this area, probably looking for seasonal jobs harvesting the paddy fields, and when the jobs are gone, they will probably be gone too.”*

#### **4. A Thin, Fine Line between Strategic Alliance and Co-optation**

The case of Yosorejo illustrates how poverty and locals' dependence on employment from the factory (and reciprocally, the factory's dependence on cheap labor) played important roles in the “give and take” of negotiation. In this negotiation, the *Lurah* is not only acting as a mediator between the BKM, representing the local people's interests, and the factory. The *Lurah* played a dualistic role, representing the interests of the state (in political order and stability), as well as representing the public's interest (in the security of employment). The *Lurah's* involvement pacified potentially aggressive collective action.

While BKM struggled to advocate for local peoples' interests, the *Lurah* influenced the negotiation process by shaping BKM members' perceptions on citizenship. Chief among this process is a transfer of the administrative definition of citizens' responsibilities and rights in development and poverty alleviation programs. The *Lurah* successfully diverted BKM members' perceptions from poverty alleviation as a responsibility of the state to a social burden of community members and community governance. Consequently, this moderated their demands on the administrative government and pacified their potentially aggressive collective action.

This perception transfer is, however, possible only when BKM members are constantly exposed to the *Kelurahan* and the *Lurah*, who represent the administrative local government. To do this, *Lurah* needed to open both his agency's physical and political space to BKM operation. BKM Yosorejo then benefitted from making the *Kelurahan*'s office their domicile. Shared space was then followed by stronger appropriation of *Kelurahan*'s resources to the BKM, and use of the *Lurah*'s personal and professional social networks to smoothen their negotiation processes. The price of this appropriation is that BKM is exposed to the official definition of citizenship and needs to operate within the framework of that definition.

The case of Yosorejo demonstrates that CBOs engagement with the state in planning processes remains contested. While it represents a successful example of community's appropriation of decentralization policy, it highlights the thin, fine line between a strategic alliance between the state and CBOs and the co-optation of civil society by the state.

### Yosorejo: *Alliance or Cooptation (?)*




Chart 4. Framework of Yosorejo's Advocacy

## C. Political Hijack or Grassroots Activism? BKM Podosugih on Political Advocacy

### 1. Podosugih as a Context

Podosugih is a *kelurahan* with the most urban setting in the City of Pekalongan. Sudirman, Urip Sumoharjo and Hayam Wuruk streets divide the *Kelurahan* into four unequal quadrants. The Ponolawen intersection, where the three arteries meet, is considered the heart of Pekalongan. It has the busiest traffic all over the city, because Sudirman Street serves interprovincial traffic that bypasses Pekalongan from the Northwest to the East, while Urip Sumoharjo and Hayam Wuruk connect the area with Kajen, the regional center of batik textile industry. It is where the mayor's office, city planning agency, local parliament, and other governmental offices are located. It is also the place of Sri Ratu Mega Center, the city's first modern indoor mall, and a traditional bird and bicycle market. Its land use has transformed into mostly residential from the original agricultural uses. Through decades of acquisition, most of remaining agricultural lots no longer operated by traditional farmers with individual ownership. The open lots are typically owned by corporations or businessmen with large capital and will soon be converted into residential buildings. RW (communities) 8 and 9 recently have been completely transformed into a modern real estate development.

Most of Podosugih's poor households are identified by their low monthly incomes, typically lower than the regional minimum wage regulation even after income of all family members is aggregated.<sup>50</sup> Through annual surveys, BKM Podosugih identified at least 700 out of around 2,000 households fell into this category. This relatively high figure was a result of the high number of lay off because of the economic crisis at the end of 2008. The number was slightly lower than when BKM was first established after the 1997 monetary crisis. In Podosugih's case, most of laid-off workers found that being highly skilled was a disadvantage. First, most workers were only trained to work in one particular type of industry, in Pekalongan's case, the textile industry. Sufficient growth in other

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<sup>50</sup> Regional minimum wage (UMR) for Pekalongan is Rp. 615,000 (US\$ 62) per month as of 2008 (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Indonesia, <http://regionalinvestment.com/sipid/id/ekonomiumrd.php?ia=3375&is=45>)

industries did not follow the textile industry's rapid decline and the remaining industries preferred labor with less experience, which they could pay a lower wage. Second, the newly unemployed people could not easily turn to traditional farming, like people from other *kelurahan*, because of the unavailability of land. Finally, a small number of the workers could not reenter the work force because of their old age and worsening health condition. Additionally, health suffered in the wake of these layoffs: Focus group discussions revealed that when income levels fall, families would first de-prioritize health care. Hence, the low service in health care and the fall of income are two self-perpetuating phenomenon following the decline of Pekalongan's industries.

## **2. Podosugih: From Community Self-Help to Advocacy Network**

### *Some Notes on Podosugih's Achievements*


BKM Podosugih's main achievement is its efforts that went beyond its geographic boundary and its beneficiaries' scope of interest. BKM Podosugih was actively involved in advocating for legislation that gives more flexibility to community-self help institutions operations in poverty alleviation efforts. As a result of its advocacy, the city adopted UPP as the city's poverty alleviation program, and promised to use a community-based development model as the main platform for all poverty alleviation programs within the city.<sup>51</sup> Consequently, the city would provide resources to establish and operate a BKM organization in all *kelurahan* in the City of Pekalongan. The city had helped to establish BKM in another 17 *kelurahan* that did not receive UPP grants from the central government. In 2010, at the time this thesis was written, all 46 *kelurahan* in Pekalongan already had a BKM. The city allocated Rp. 7.2 billion (US\$720,000) to supplement the Rp. 9.2 billion from the UPP grant allocated by national government to all *kelurahan* in Pekalongan. The city distributed the funds

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<sup>51</sup> UPP was previously a national government's program under *Departemen Pekerjaan Umum* (Ministry of Public Works).

evenly so every *kelurahan* would receive Rp. 150 million (US\$15,000), in addition to the Rp. 200 million (US\$20,000) granted by national government as BKM's initial capital.

## KELURAHAN PODOSUGIH EXISTING CONDITION



Map 6. Podosugih's Existing Conditions as Identified by Community Meetings  
Source: BKM Podosugih's Neighborhood Development Internal Document

Capitalizing on this major achievement, BKM Podosugih developed more sophisticated objectives other than just demanding budget allocations from the government for its operations. BKM planned to demand the city government to manage some strategic programs, such as provisions for clean water and training for underemployed laborers. Even more sophisticated, in some meetings, they started to raise awareness about the environment. Their short-term priorities included resolving the flooding problem created by Sri Ratu Mega Center. Their long-term priorities included improvement of water quality of the river that passes by the *kelurahan* and improvement of the artery road on the riverbank.

There have also been conversations in community meetings about developing the riverbank into a local tourist attraction to provide revenue for the community. To support this, BKM planned to advocate for a more environmentally friendly textile industry operation, especially those located on the upper course of the riverbank. This would be possible if they pressured the city government to regulate textile industries in *kelurahan* located at the river's upper course. They also planned to advocate for more public space. The only dedicated public space is Mataram Square, which is associated with the government's office complex. BKM's newest agenda seeks to reroute traffic throughout the city. Most residents felt that industrial vehicles passing by Sudirman and Hayam Wuruk streets create air pollution, noise, and ground vibrations that building structures cannot handle.

### *Pak Anton's Story: From Community Organizer to City Legislator*

BKM Podosugih's coordinator is Sudjaka Martana (*Pak Anton*), a soft-spoken figure whom I met on a series of occasions. As the coordinator of a successful BKM, *Pak Anton* had been personally invited to many formal functions, as well as hosting and speaking on comparative study sessions held by



other BKM<sup>52</sup>. He was more articulate than any other BKM coordinators or members I met, possibly because of his public speaking experience. He started his community service in 1989 as an aide for his area's neighborhood association for five years and community association for another nine years.<sup>53</sup> Almost 50 years old when he was elected as the BKM coordinator for *kelurahan* Podosugih, he had just started a managerial position at Astana, a then-three-star hotel in Pekalongan.<sup>54</sup> He described the election as "psychologically troubling." Being a BKM coordinator was considerably overburdening; it requires a full-time commitment, while the position offers no monetary compensation. At the same time, he was the breadwinner of his family.<sup>55</sup> To illustrate the situation, he told me:

*"I was elected [as coordinator of BKM] in 1999. I became severely ill and got hospitalized for four months in 2000 [because of the overburden of work]. I went back to Ngawi, my home village [to contemplate].<sup>56</sup> After two months, I came back to this place and decided to resign from my [paid] job. It wasn't a decision that anybody would make. It was daring. Back then I had already earned Rp. 2,000,000 [per month] while I knew in this job I wouldn't get paid."*

*Pak Anton* described his decision to serve as BKM coordinator as completely altruistic. In a series of conversations, he mentioned frequently about his "personal call to serve the poor and the old." He also frequently mentioned that not everybody gains the same trust that he and other BKM members had gained. Many people already trusted him, which made it difficult to reject the position. This statement, on the other hand, illustrates the typical social pressure in a semi-traditional Javanese society. Though *Pak Anton* received no monetary compensation for his position, he looked at it with a sense of pride. To him, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Aburizal Bakrie's visit—BKM

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<sup>52</sup> He is either invited to or hosting other BKM<sup>s</sup>. Some of these BKM<sup>s</sup> coming to Podosugih were from the same region, but most of them were from Indonesian islands of Sumatera and Sulawesi. *Pak Anton* jokingly told me that most of them were suspiciously intended to just travel as a tourist.

<sup>53</sup> Neighborhood Association (Rukun Tetangga, RT) consists of around 40 households. A Community Association (Rukun Warga, RW) consists of around 15 RT. Both RT and RW are informal structures of the community government in Indonesia. Services as aides are voluntary for a specified period.

<sup>54</sup> In old Sanskrit, the word *astana* means "palace". The three star hotel scales understates its importance and prestige among the locale's perception. Its parent company had several very successful business operations including gas stations and some interprovincial buses, by which *Pak Anton* managed.

<sup>55</sup> He later on told me that his eldest son worked as a UPP economic facilitator in another city. He shares his house with his son and daughter-in-law. It is pretty common for Javanese families to take care of elder relatives. This clarifies how he could maintain his household without earning any income as a BKM coordinator.

<sup>56</sup> Reading this text literally will not give that much of a sense. A reader has to delve through the spiritual notion of "revisiting the original purpose of creation" for traditional Javanese people to understand how he finally made such decision just by "going back to the home village".

Podosugih was granted the Award for Best Practice in Community Organizations at the provincial and national levels—was part of the reward for his service.<sup>57</sup>

Though many referred to him as “the brain behind BKM Podosugih’s achievements,” in our four interviews, he seldom emphasized his importance; he told his stories in simple narratives without exaggeration. Asked about whether Podosugih’s urban setting influences its poverty, he answered shortly that “our poor have jobs with irregular income, and the period of not receiving income is usually longer than the productive one.” Asked about the challenges of managing the microcredit revolving fund that was supposed to support micro-businesses, he answered: “when you need to eat, you don’t ask whether this money is a [business] loan or a cHeryty.” I asked him to describe how the community makes decisions about large projects like paving 250 square meter road behind the *kelurahan* in 2002. He told me that he was just “sitting with some other neighbors when somebody mentioned that to go to the mosque they had to walk through muddy pathways.” Asked about how the community could collect enough resources to do such exhaustive project, he explained that to complement the small amount of money the government gave them, “men put the bricks, women carried them [for the men], and teenagers did whatever they could.”

In all four interviews, *Pak Anton* affirmed his inclination toward inclusive and democratic participation, both in the BKM’s decision-making processes and the relationship between BKM and its beneficiaries. He claimed that other members were as engaged as he was, but he contended that most members do not have “the necessary valor to exercise their discretion.” He admitted that in Javanese society, a paternalistic figure like him is still considered important in decision-making processes, and other members felt “unease when they had to make an important decision.” Asked if

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<sup>57</sup> Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, often abbreviated as SBY, has been Indonesian president since 2004. Aburizal Bakrie was Chief Minister of Social Welfare in the 2004-2009 cabinet. Podosugih won the provincial title in 2001 and the national title in 2005.

other members could conduct meetings or make decisions without his presence, he answered “yes, but they wait until I could have my say and they usually would dutifully defer to my judgments.”<sup>58</sup>

In relation to beneficiaries, *Pak Anton* frequently emphasized that beneficiaries had the right of access to information because, “information is prerequisite to comprehension, and comprehension leads to participation.” He contended how most of BKM members felt that beneficiaries need to “earn” information by coming to BKM’s informative meetings. Most of beneficiaries are not just poor, but also less educated compared with the rest of the population, and typically are not interested in formal meetings. Therefore to guarantee beneficiaries’ rights to know about BKM’s projects, the BKM relied heavily on informal communication using existing social networks. To explain the microcredit scheme, volunteers literally had to go door-to-door, making one-on-one conversation with potential beneficiaries in language they could understand. This would not be able to be done if BKM members had transformed into new “elites” with assumption of authority as elected officials. Elitism and emerging fondness to bureaucratic culture (which will make it difficult for informal communication methods) were, as he contended, not uncommon phenomena in other BKM’s operations.

*Pak Anton*’s personal philosophy governed BKM Podosugih’s operations. He mentioned several times that BKM is not a “solve-it-all” organization, and each individual beneficiary of BKM projects must ascribe to self-help as a philosophy. According to him, BKM’s achievements are the result of its ability to involve all layers of the community in almost all of their projects, so that every single individual beneficiary “earns” those achievements. For example, during house reconstruction projects, once a household is identified as an eligible beneficiary of BKM’s projects, BKM would offer a soft loan for housing reconstruction, which would partially cover some elements of the house (e.g., for

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<sup>58</sup> Contradictory to his claim, a project facilitator and a BKM member who would speak in condition of anonymity clarified that there is a major disincentive for other members to make decision without their coordinator. According to the facilitator, *Pak Anton* did not always permit a meeting without his presence, and sometimes he deliberately overruled the decisions of those meetings. The night before I interviewed him 6 of 11 BKM members gathered for a meeting and they voluntarily dismissed after knowing that he was not present.

flooring or roofing) but not the cost of labor.<sup>59</sup> Typically, creditors use their own labor to do the construction. “This is in accordance with the spirit of self-help,” *Pak Anton* told me. In another interview session he said that, “people are responsible of their own problems and solutions. BKM can only provide them with some stimulus.” On another occasion, he mentioned how “BKM members could save so much time, energy, and resources by transferring some responsibilities to beneficiaries.”

In 2008, *Pak Anton* was elected as a member of DPRD Pekalongan, which he credited as a result of his extensive engagement in BKM’s projects.<sup>60</sup> The candidacy process was not initiated by him, but by a group of beneficiaries. They, he claimed, expected him to bring more concrete changes to government projects. The beneficiaries also ran a militant campaign through word-of-mouth and door-to-door visits to explain his platforms for inclusive and democratic government. *Pak Anton* confessed that none of the platforms were really groundbreaking. Almost all of them were actually lessons from managing the BKM, which *Pak Anton* believed were ideal to for being a parliament member.

#### *What does It Take to Lead a Community Self-Help Institution?*

A general consensus exists among local UPP facilitators and BKM members that BKM Podosugih’s operations are dependent on *Pak Anton*’s leadership.<sup>61</sup> By extension, though, a potential problem of leadership transmission then emerges. A verbal history shared by BKM members and facilitators confirmed that *Pak Anton* is one of two BKM members who has been reelected every three years since BKM’s first establishment. The other one is Ahmad Nuh, the *Lurah* of Kramatsari subdistrict

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<sup>59</sup> BKM Podosugih competed for and eventually received a Rp. 500,000,000 (around US\$50,000) grant from Ministry of Housing in 2005. This grant was used as a revolving loan for housing construction with 6% annual interest. This is relatively much more affordable compared to other governmental source of funding such as one that was provided by Housing Bureau of Central Java Province with 15% annual interest. As of June 2009, BKM Podosugih had channelled this loan to almost 400 households.

<sup>60</sup> Indonesia has an enormously immense system for political representation with the presence of DPRD at provincial, regency and city level. *Pak Anton* was elected as a member of the city DPRD.

<sup>61</sup> FGD participants disagreed with this claim. They thought *Pak Anton* was considerably resourceful at external networking and negotiations, but other BKM members already effectively perform BKM’s daily operations and internal relationships with beneficiaries.

who lives in Podosugih. Four of the 9 members elected in 1999 and 2002 withdrew from their positions because of the workload. After the 2005 election, 4 of the elected 13 members withdrew within their first 4 weeks of service. Now they have 9 active members as a result of the 2007 election. Most of interview and focus group discussion participants confirmed that they kept electing *Pak Anton* because they thought he would not resign from his post so that the services BKM provided would not be jeopardized.

*Pak Anton* himself is concerned about who will assume leadership after him, but he has prepared three young “cadres” to anticipate it. However, he realized that there were at least three potential problems with his cadres. First, he was not sure of their intrinsic interests to assume leadership.<sup>62</sup> *Pak Anton*’s other concern was about the professional capacity of the candidates. He insisted that besides honesty, a BKM coordinator must also be a visionary leader to keep BKM’s operations sustainable. This necessary “vision to the future” would not be easily supplemented by collective leadership, like in other *kelurahan*.<sup>63</sup> He claimed that even though other members were formally able to exercise their discretion through collective leadership, most of them have not been able to develop social, professional, and governmental networks as he had.<sup>64</sup> Most importantly, he emphasized that it took more than just a natural leader to assume this responsibility; it also took a notion of rootedness within the community.<sup>65</sup> Being rooted in the community in particular is not related to a lack of individual capacity, but rather persistence. He explained that most approaches to governmental organizations “require you to never complain or feel tired,” which is also true when dealing with beneficiaries and other community members. He claimed that he was often “sitting with five to ten people, sometimes housewives as well,” just to talk to them without the intention of offering BKM’s microcredit or

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<sup>62</sup> He mentioned about one BKM member who is very articulate but is not “administratively correct” in terms of accounting principles. I would speculate that this is part of *Pak Anton*’s euphemism. The term is archaically used by Javanese to refer to someone who prone to behave in a fraudulent way.

<sup>63</sup> He mentioned about BKM in *kelurahan* Panjang Wetan as a negative example where the whole Rp 500 million of UPP grant was completely spent for physical infrastructure. That BKM now has no budget to sustain operation although no fraud was detected and most BKM members and volunteers were considered trustworthy.

<sup>64</sup> He mentioned other BKM member who was well known for his trustworthiness but has no necessary articulateness to professionally negotiate settlements or persuade other people to claim leadership.

<sup>65</sup> He shortly told me a story of other BKM member who had been a very good administrator and program manager, but his accidental self-righteousness makes him not very well accepted by the community as well as other BKM members.

asking them to participate in their projects. The intention of those visits were solely “for them to get to know me,” as he put it.

FGD participants openly shared their strategies to prepare the three candidates, mainly by apprenticeship. Some members mentioned how *Pak Anton* brings at least one of the three candidates with him to governmental meetings so they can “get themselves a proper introduction” and “learn how to deal with their governmental counterpart.” However, the succession process poses difficulties, mainly because apprenticeship-style training is impractical. All of the three candidates have their own full-time commitments. While *Pak Anton* withdrew from all of BKM’s managerial functions to give more opportunities for leadership to other BKM members, he admits that he still plays a large role in planning and implementation processes through “supervision and control” functions. Another barrier to transferring leadership is that people can vote for a completely new member, who is unfamiliar with the BKM organization and the necessary traits to lead it.

Most FGD members agreed that “necessary knowledge” constitutes an understanding of local poverty and “necessary traits” constitute the ability to persuade community members and mobilize them into a collective action. Stephen, the professional urban planner hired by BKM to help with infrastructure planning, confirmed that the community’s potential to advocate for themselves have been developed through a series of community meetings. This capacity was observable from the rise of community members’ awareness to some equity issues, especially the underdevelopment of physical infrastructure in their area. However, when the time comes to take action, not all community leaders are assertive enough to generate collective action, or advocate at the government level.<sup>66</sup> Most social mobilization solely sought project completion, such as road construction, and no political pressure was exerted on the government to address long-term concerns. Community members’ reluctance to join collective actions was not merely because of community leaders and BKM members’ incapacity, but also the reminiscent of long-term conditioning by the New Order governance. Most citizens were

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<sup>66</sup> By “collective action,” I do not refer to community members’ participation in the implementation of community projects, such as road construction, but also to a larger process of determining the community’s needs and wants and involvement in mass movements to pressure the government.

skeptical that collective action would result in a tangible resolution to their problems, because governmental programs preceding the UPP were falsely participatory.<sup>67</sup>

### *On Interest, Representation, Participation and Conflict Resolution*

As an urban place, Podosugih is not very cohesive. Stephen claimed that of all nine RW (communities), only RW VII and RW II consistently responded to BKM's calls. This did not necessarily mean that other communities are nonresponsive. RW VII and RW II, however, had the capacity to involve more community members, including youth. Other communities, as he claimed, only involved a limited portion of their members in BKM activities. A focus group participant said that it was very difficult to involve people from some communities in BKM's meetings and community projects, because some community members still expected monetary compensation for their involvement.

Most focus group participants agreed that representation would not hinder people's participation in decision-making, because BKM invites most attendees of community meetings to vote on their decisions. However, some focus group participants agreed that there is equity problem associated with underrepresentation of a particular group. RW VII, for example, referred by FGD participants as the oldest and most impoverished community in Podosugih, has no representatives in the membership of BKM. Despite its urban location, RW VII is a group of closely related people. Their land is typically traditionally divided into parcels through a long process between heirs, the owners are usually related, the parcel divisions are subtle, and lots are typically not clearly demarcated. Therefore, circulation typically is not "built," but rather "happen" in between buildings. As a result of the unplanned built environment, none of the houses have internal toilets, causing sanitary problems. In most political systems, people in poverty often have little capacity to influence others. Hence, people from RW VII

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<sup>67</sup> Baswari, a senior UPP facilitator, disagreed. He claimed that the trading community makes a substantial portion of Pekalongan's middle-class population: They are already intrinsically indifferent to political and social movements hence difficult to mobilize. In his own words: "they are the *pa'ora sa'pore* (ultimately up to you) population." He claimed that this is unique to Pekalongan, even if compared to other Javanese cities. Other local facilitators confirmed this cultural attribute.

would not be able to have a very strong voice in meetings held outside their community, like a larger *kelurahan* meeting. Some facilitators agreed their voice would be better represented if one of their community members became a BKM member.

Although most of interview and FGD participants agreed that BKM members represent beneficiaries' interests well, this relationship is not without conflict. Disagreement often occurs when BKM do not grant microloans to some people not identified as an eligible beneficiary. In physical infrastructure development projects, due to the limited financial resources, BKM frequently prioritized one project over the other. Beneficiaries whose house was not categorized as an eligible recipient of a housing reconstruction subsidy, or a collective whose neighborhood was not an eligible recipient of road paving or gutter-improvement subsidies is usually disappointed.

BKM Podosugih considers heavily the proportion of beneficiaries' contribution for the project to determine priorities. Although no interview participants mentioned this as a source of conflict, it potentially leads to equity issues because typically communities with less resource cannot contribute as much as the more affluent ones.<sup>68</sup> Sometimes, community members must contribute to projects that do not yield direct benefits to their communities. For instance, the construction of BKM's office was partly funded by a mass contribution of building materials.<sup>69</sup>

Debt collection is another source of interpersonal conflict between BKM members and beneficiaries. To reduce this problem, BKM Podosugih introduced banking practices to all of its debtors. Because debt collection was conducted through bank deposits, BKM members do not have to deal with

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<sup>68</sup> Pak S Basir, the BKM secretary, mentioned that beneficiaries' contribution is actually the only consideration. To illustrate this, a road-paving project worth Rp. 8 million (US\$ 800) was to be subsidized by BKM with Rp. 3 million of beneficiaries' contribution. The 90 households of potential beneficiaries would then collect Rp. 100 per day per household to fulfill the contribution requirement.

<sup>69</sup> Community members and surrounding retail stores donate bricks, cements, and pit sand for construction, worth Rp. 12,500,000 accounting almost half of the whole construction cost while BKM paid for the labor. As of 2001, the total construction cost was Rp. 25,670,000 (US\$2,567).



delinquency of debtors themselves.<sup>70</sup> So far, however, all emerging conflicts were considered easy to resolve.

### *Who Should Conduct the Orchestra? A Note on Self-Direction*

A general tension exists between BKM members and UPP facilitators. Some BKM members felt that UPP facilitators have less sense of belonging to the places they serve. Some facilitators do not live in the area, commuting daily from another city within 1 to 2.5 hour of travel by motorcycle, the most common mode of transport, while other live at UPP's *base camp*.<sup>71</sup> Pak Anton openly expressed his concern that some facilitators would leave the locale they serve on weekends to visit their families in other cities. Meanwhile, the most vibrant community activities usually occur on weekends when facilitators are absent. Mayor Basyir once asserted that UPP facilitators were supposed to work three times harder than normal people in Pekalongan (while they were not), because they were paid three times higher.<sup>72</sup> Another BKM member mentioned that some facilitators were promoted because BKM Podosugih was so successful, while BKM members were the ones who really worked for it.

Most facilitators would not confirm if they were underworked; however they confirmed that BKM members were more advanced than them in terms of negotiating with the government. UPP facilitators helped BKM members at RT- (neighborhood) and RW- (community) levels, while the city coordinator of facilitators helped bridge UPP's interest with government's institution. However, through Pak Anton and Pak Basyir's governmental positions, BKM has more access to government officials compared with facilitators.

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<sup>70</sup> Three BKM members' approval was necessary for each microloan. Debtors are given option to cash a check or deposit it in a new bank account in any of the three local banks, BNI, BRI and Bank Pasar. Pak Anton once asserted that involving banks was also a "fraud prevention" mechanism.

<sup>71</sup> It is a quite common practice in small cities like Kendal and Pekalongan to rent a house as an office, because of the limited options of "formal" office buildings available. UPP consultant for Pekalongan also did this.

<sup>72</sup> Facilitators are paid at relatively higher national rate and are. They are typically compensated between Rp. 2.5 million and 3.5 million (US\$ 250–350) per month, almost four times the minimum wage for Pekalongan (Rp. 700,000 (US\$ 70) per month as of July 2009).

An even more significant issue is who has more stakes in the plan. In some of the interviews when our discussion touched on “insider-outsider” issues within the planning process, some sparks occurred. Stephen told me that UPP’s infrastructure development program was a “half bottom-up and half top-down.” Essentially it served the government’s dual mission of infrastructure development and direct participation of beneficiaries, and facilitators often fell in the middle of the negotiation process between the two interests. BKM members seemed not to be persuaded with this dualistic approach. *Pak Anton* told me in a straightforward way, “[UPP] facilitators will leave our *kelurahan* at one point, and when that happens, we need to be able to organize ourselves [without them]. It is *our* plan, and it is *supposed* to be our plan, not theirs.” In another session, he firmly stated: “when facilitators come to our place, they [need to] work our way.” Another BKM member who only spoke on the condition of anonymity told me that any plan produced by BKM must “reflect what the community really needs instead of representing what facilitators felt is needed.”

Self-direction is not only visible in the relationship between BKM and facilitators, but is in their relationship with their governmental counterpart. In 2000, some BKM members from Central Java were invited by the DPRD to discuss UPP implementation. That meeting turned out to be instructive instead of dialogical. DPRD members expected BKM members to allocate Rp. 50 million of their money for infrastructure development in their area.<sup>73</sup> BKM Podosugih openly resisted these instructions, contending that in its particular area—an urban setting—more road construction or gutter improvements were not what its community needed. Because most of beneficiaries in their community are typically part-time and/or seasonal laborers, they really needed more low-interest microloans as additional working capital.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> The first grant given to BKM in 1999 was Rp. 250 million (US\$ 25,000). The DPRD has played an important role in local budgeting, including these types of grants. This instruction was to satisfy local constituents. Infrastructure development had been an easy strategy to demonstrate that governmental programs really worked.

<sup>74</sup> A perfect example of this is a textile laborer, working at the factory during the day and tailoring for neighbors at night. She benefited from BKM’s microloans by being able to own a capital asset (sewing machine) from BKM’s revolving fund.

In an open statement the DPRD doubted that, with a lack of BKM members' experience in managing microcredit schemes, the loans would be returned. DPRD members were also skeptical that the revolving fund would be channeled to the appropriate beneficiaries, because the official statistics did not represent Podosugih as a poor *kelurahan*. Aside from those concerns, BKM was also suspected of fraud. The dedicated budget allocation for physical infrastructure was meant to be a "safety net," where at least some of the money would fund "real projects."

BKM members argued that their annual poverty survey was much more accurate than the government's census, because their volunteer surveyors were locals with knowledge on local poverty and beneficiaries. BKM also convinced the DPRD that they had more sophisticated administration of microcredit schemes by using local banks as an intermediary between BKM and debtors. Pressured by the DPRD members, BKM, after a long negotiation, finally agreed to allocate 20 percent of its grant for infrastructure development only after they provided microloans for three years. The grant was treated as a revolving fund, and BKM could retain its full amount after the three-year period.

### **3. Where Should We Stand? Strategically Deciding When to Be an Insider**

BKM Podosugih's relationship with government agents was not always adversarial, but rather strategically determined. In 1999, the first platform of the UPP was to separate BKM's administration completely from the *Kelurahan*. The national consultant specifically mandated BKMs to be governmental counterparts instead of sub-administrations of the *Kelurahan*. This separation was necessary, because the *Kelurahan* was often seen as a very ineffective and corrupt branch of local government. BKM Podosugih openly confronted this policy.<sup>75</sup> Their rationale was that its BKM was a newly established organization. Without a recognizable person, they would have difficulty approaching citizens and gaining beneficiaries' trust. In the first three years, the BKM invited the

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<sup>75</sup> In Pak Anton's words "*kami lawan peraturan itu*" (we fought that policy). This is a very strong statement for a very euphemistic Javanese man. Their statements are typically less straightforward.

*Lurah* to every internal meeting and informational meeting with beneficiaries. *Lurah* and BKM members also worked very closely in the BKM's daily operations.

The close relationship between the BKM and the *Lurah* did not necessarily mean that the *Lurah* had an influence in its decision-making processes. More than one BKM member confirmed that the *Lurah*'s presence at BKM events was merely ceremonial, although they needed him to create a more legitimate perception of the BKM with the Javanese traditional-paternalistic audience. BKM members, however, did not consider the *Lurah* as a paternalistic role model they needed for decision-making.<sup>76</sup> Most BKM members consider *Pak Anton* as the person to fill that role. *Pak Parto*, the current *Lurah*, did not explicitly confirm to this, but whenever I asked his views on BKM policies, he would indirectly admit that he was not fully informed and did not have discretion to make decisions in BKM's bi-monthly meeting. He, however, claimed that he "shared all the positive values that BKM had brought to the community and he was proud to have a high achieving BKM."

From my observations, I concluded that, to BKM members, the position of *Lurah* had actually been degraded a bit. *S Basir*, the secretary of BKM Podosugih, apparently was the former *Lurah* of Podosugih. On occasions, I saw *Pak Anton* giving instructions to *Pak S Basir*, and he dutifully complied. Instruction and compliance were performed with mutual respect, but hierarchical order was still clearly visible. While under general circumstances this exchange seems very natural since *Pak S Basir* is a paid employee of the BKM, in a semi-traditional Javanese society where social position and hierarchy remained unchanged for a long time, it seems extraordinary.<sup>77</sup> A former *Lurah*, *Pak S Basir*, a public official of 14 years, would earn very high respect, especially from younger generations.<sup>78</sup> *Pak S Basir*'s response to a general public's inquiry, for example, was much more dignified compared to his response to a BKM member.

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<sup>76</sup> Stephen challenge the claim that the paternalistic culture had shifted into more egalitarian one. He mentioned that some BKM members actually "report" to *Lurah Parto*.

<sup>77</sup> *Pak S Basir* rejected the idea that he was a paid employee. He considered his job as a voluntary service. He was compensated Rp. 100,000 (US\$10) / month. He proudly said that the amount wouldn't even enough to reimburse his transportation cost, moreover to honor his service.

<sup>78</sup> *Pak S Basir* had served as a *Lurah* since 1987 before he retired in 2001. He was 67 at the time of the interview. Prior to being a *Lurah* he was an employee at Pekalongan's Chamber of Commerce.

Most BKM members agreed that personal relationships with government officials helped negotiations. Facilitators usually dealt with government bureaus with formal approaches, while BKM members could deal with individual officials through informal channels.<sup>79</sup> Most negotiations—and deals—happened in informal meetings. However, some members also contended that this informal method only worked with some officials and could not be replicated by others. It depended on individual relations and could not be institutionalized in any way.

Between 2001 and 2005, BKM Podosugih shifted their position to be more politically active. Driven by a general dissatisfaction of governmental bureaucracies in poverty alleviation efforts, they needed to “have [their] men in both the executive and legislative government.” They finally elected Mohammad Basyir Ahmad, a local doctor who was also an LPM coordinator at *Kelurahan* Sugihwaras. Some of BKM Podosugih’s members shared openly that since 2001, they had been one of the civic groups that supported and militantly conducted *Pak* Basyir’s campaign at a grass-root level. BKM’s support was part of a mutual deal. To gain its support, *Pak* Basyir was required to openly declare his support for the community-based development method in his campaign platforms. After elected, he must support this method by proposing a legislation process that gives more autonomy to community self-help institutions operations.<sup>80</sup>

BKM then supported *Pak* Anton as the candidate for the citywide forum BKM. This would expose him to members of other community self-help institutions (BKM) in the city of Pekalongan. When he was later elected as member of Forum LPM, they practically controlled the whole network of community-based development organizations in the city. This social mobilization strategy proved to be an effective way to reach the grassroots-level in a campaign. *Pak* Anton was also elected as a

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<sup>79</sup> I was surprised to find *Pak* Anton in the mayor’s office when I was about to interview Dr. Basyir. A government official who would speak in anonymity jokingly told me that nobody has more access to the mayor compared to *Pak* Anton, not even the Head of the City Planning Bureau.

<sup>80</sup> In 2005, Mohamad Basyir Ahmad run for mayor with his 9 point platform: three of which was on education, one on small businesses, one on labor protection, and one point emphasizing that poverty alleviation effort must be performed with a community-based development method, utilizing the community self-help institution BKM platform.

DPRD member in 2009 just a few weeks before I could interview him. In *Pak Anton*'s own words: "We have conditioned our debtors [to elect particular candidates]."

While social mobilization explains how *Pak Anton* and *Pak Basyir* gained grassroots' votes, it does not explain how they gained their candidacy. Both of them were closely associated with Golkar, a political party. *Pak Anton* had been the city secretary of Golkar between 2000 and 2005 before running for DPRD seat, and *Pak Basyir* was a DPRD member from the same party between 1999 and 2004 before he ran for mayor. *Pak Anton* was also an active member of *Pak Basyir*'s campaign team for the mayor position in 2005, because, as he claimed, that this was the only way he could assert BKM's mission in the campaign.

The fact that both *Pak Anton* and *Pak Basyir* were involved in a political party did not undermine the importance of their grassroots' support. On the contrary, grassroots support was an important part of their victorious campaigns for their positions. If anything, their involvement with Golkar actually weakened their opportunity to gain votes, since Golkar was infamously associated with the New Order. In 1997, witnesses said 10,000 people attacked a Golkar office in Pekalongan in a violent riot before the fall of New Order.<sup>81</sup> Through *Pak Anton* and Dr. Basyir's governmental positions, for the first time in Pekalongan's political history, Golkar had seats in both the executive and legislative bodies. Pekalongan historically had a base of traditional Moslem voters, and their votes are typically shared by Islamic parties, such as PPP (United Development Party), PKB (National Emergence Party), and PAN (National Mandate Party) even when the New Order was still in power.<sup>82</sup>

In 2001, BKM Podosugih was elected as a regional coordinator of the Forum BKM Pantura, a network for community self-help institutions on the northern shore of Central Java.<sup>83</sup> This forum

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<sup>81</sup> *New York Times*; 5/21/1997, p8, 0p

<sup>82</sup> The victorious story of a BKM member running for a government office election is not unique to Pekalongan. I have at least found that in Central Java alone this also happens in Jogjakarta, Klaten and Banyumas. Nationally there is even more stories alike.

<sup>83</sup> Pantura (Pantai Utara) also commonly refers to the series of cities on the north shore of Java that grows along Pantura's 1,300 km continuous street line.

subsumed 73 community self-help institutions from Kendal to Brebes, a 250 km distance. Membership varied from BKMs of mid- to large-cities like Pekalongan, Pemalang, and Brebes (population: 250,000) and mid- to small-cities like Kendal, Jepara, Sragen, Grobogan, and Kediri (population: less than 100,000). The self-help institutions had been actively communicating through monthly sHeryng sessions until major flooding in February 2002 made inter-city transportation on the island's northern shore impossible. Although speculative, it is possible that BKM Podosugih's grass-root activism does not stop there. The BKM has also developed an ultra-regional network with BKMs from Sumatera Island's cities of Medan, Padang, Payakumbuh, Padang Panjang, Bukittinggi, Pesisir Selatan, and Sepuluh Kota.

#### **4. A Thin, Fine Line between Successful Grassroots Activism and a Political Hijack**

These findings on Podosugih highlight the strong connection between two events: Mayor Basyir's election in Pekalongan and planned movements from BKM Podosugih's cadres to put their agents in legislative and executive governments. This plan—tacit but exquisitely strategic and intensely coordinated—sought municipal governments' recognition of community organizations in its legal framework. This advocacy resulted in legislation, which mandated resource provisions from the city for other communities to establish their own community-based organizations and made CBOs a strategic partner in the city's poverty alleviation programs. Podosugih's experience provides an exemplary model of how to successfully appropriate a decentralized poverty alleviation program.

The case of Podosugih illustrates a sophisticated process of collective social learning. It illustrates that a community can practice self-empiricism through the form of annual poverty survey. Self-empiricism would result in criticism against the state's agenda of community participation. A previously state-supported UPP coincidentally promoted a collective self-knowledge in the form of understanding local poverty characteristics. The previously state-supported UPP also triggered collective self-direction and enabled communities to critically assess the government's prescriptions

in poverty alleviation projects. They correctly questioned the DPRD's requirement for greater infrastructure development in UPP implementation. BKM members understood that while such an allocation would benefit DPRD members' political positions, it would not directly benefit their community members, and negotiated accordingly.

Knowing that the state-prescribed infrastructure development program do not fit their community members' interest in microloans, in the end they diverted from the state's agenda by pressing their own poverty alleviation programs. As a result, state support, in the form of UPP money, was used for microcredit to help small local entrepreneurs, as well as to support a very powerful network of community organizations in the city and in the wider region of Java's northern coast. This network effectively drew support for BKMs political activism.

The case of Podosugih, however, also illustrates the contested notion of grassroots' activism. Although successful, new elites, who were more comfortable with state agents, emerged from the advocacy process. Two of the new elites, Dr. Basyir and *Pak Anton*, even assumed governmental positions. Their elections demonstrate the delicate and intricate relationship between grassroots' and government agendas. On one hand, they were elected to government positions by a successful grassroots campaign. On the other hand, they could not share the political rewards and monetary compensation from their governmental positions with the community organizations and members struggling to support their election. Whether their personal benefits gained from their elections exceed the general benefits received by community-based organizations in the city of Pekalongan is a matter of value judgment. This judgment determines whether one frames the UPP's mobilization of its beneficiaries to draw political support as a manipulative hijack of community-based, grassroots organization or a successful grassroots activism campaign to advocate for community interests. Based on my observations, the initial motives—to advocate for a pro-poor policy through city ordinances—of Dr. Basyir's and *Pak Anton*'s candidacy proves completely altruistic. However, their commitment to community-based organizations and the interests of poor people is subject to the test of time.



## Podosugih: *The Political Hijack (?)*




Chart 5. Framework of Podosugih's Advocacy

## V. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation

### A. Summary

#### 1. Beyond State's Agenda

*Can communities move beyond performing the State's agenda in poverty alleviation projects?*

This research highlights a significant asymmetry between government and community's agendas and scope of action for decentralized, community-based poverty alleviation management. Interviews with key decision-makers at the national level, government elites at the municipal level, as well as administrators at sub-district level, revealed that improving project efficiency and efficacy were the state's unequivocal goals when delegating authority to communities. The simple and less bureaucratic structure of community organizations shortened projects' time span, hence increasing efficiency. Engagement with beneficiaries in project implementation raised their sense of belonging. It also motivated citizens to contribute sweat equity, monetary donations, or land, hence increasing efficacy. In this sense, while BKMs received power from the government, but they still acted within the state's agenda of development by carrying out the UPP.

However, this research also provided insight into collective social learning, including increasing community organizations' criticism toward the state's prescription in development agenda. In Podosugih, the annual survey they conducted without any state agency influence strengthened their perceptions of local characteristics of urban poverty. This practice of self-empiricism raised their determination to reject the state's prescription of infrastructure development and instead proposing greater allocation for a microcredit scheme. Podosugih's learning process as a community proves that collective self-knowledge can be translated into a powerful sense of collective self-direction. This collective self-knowledge is the preliminary social capital for communities to expand their activism beyond the state's agenda in development and poverty alleviation projects.

## 2. Appropriating Poverty Alleviation

*Can communities appropriate decentralized poverty alleviation programs and divert the state's agenda to press their own?*

Experience from BKM Podosugih shows that BKM members can strategically decide when they need to make an alliance with government agents (i.e, the *Lurah*) or to challenge the state's position. While the nomination of *Pak Anton* and *Pak Basyir* was primarily driven by political elites, BKM's militant campaign support was an example of diversion from the initial intention of BKM and UPP's establishment. In other circumstances, one may perceive this diversion as manipulative. Mayor Basyir could be seen as co-opting an official position with the noble intention of poverty alleviation. However, because BKM's goal was recognition by the municipal government in its legal framework, and the main tangible delivery of this effort was legislation that would help other communities establishing their own community organization, I would categorize this process as advocacy. Podosugih is an exemplary model of a successful appropriator of a decentralized poverty alleviation program.

Despite BKM Yosorejo's brilliant advocacy against the local factory, indicating that they were more than project managers for the UPP, they constantly negotiated with the government's agent. Naturally, the negotiation process involves a "give and take." In his effort to shape BKM members' perception on citizens' rights and responsibilities and pacify their potentially aggressive collective action, the *Lurah* opened the *Kelurahan's* physical and political space, followed by BKM members using *Kelurahan's* resources in the form of workspace, money, staff, and other operational resources. Moreover, the BKM also utilized the *Lurah's* personal and professional social networks to smoothen the negotiation process. Although it perhaps a less sophisticated achievement compared with the case of Podosugih, the case of Yosorejo provides a good example of a community's ability to capitalize on opportunities opened by general decentralization policy.

### 3. Setting the Planning Arena

*Can communities advocate for their needs without engaging in a planning process separate from the state-run processes and exclusive of governmental agents?*

Both Yosorejo and Podosugih had exhibited cooperative behavior with their governmental counterpart. Although in Podosugih, the BKM challenged higher authority, none of the BKM movements in both Yosorejo and Podosugih used adversary actions, such as protests and conflict. Evidently, advocacy planning in Yosorejo was transparent and open to other actors, including government agents. Their efforts were goal-oriented and to some extent, BKM members indicated they would be willing to use any means necessary to achieve their goal. Even though the advocacy process in Podosugih was motivated by significant structural change (i.e., the way municipal government deal with poverty alleviation projects), decentralization enabled their movements in the political and legal framework. In both observed communities, a strong sense of “sticking to the rules” to achieve their goals existed.

A critical examination of state’s framework and its implementation of poverty alleviation project is necessary. The state operated through a territorial approach, where the spatial definition of a place is bound to its administrative description, which the policy to establish BKMs at a *Kelurahan* level demonstrates. While this definition conforms to the existing administrative operational framework of governance, in reality, community’s cohesion and urban problems sometimes extend beyond this administrative boundary. If a community-based organization is forced to only focus on its administratively assigned territory, they would not be able to effectively address the complex, multilayered socio-economic issues their community members face.

This research supports the claim that successful community-based advocacy should expand its territorial reach in addressing community members’ problems. Community-based organizations should shift their focus from addressing communities’ interests in their sole geographic boundaries to

their locus in a wider urban social, economic, and physical context. This thinking was especially prevalent in Podosugih's movement to form a regional (city-wide) and ultra-regional (inter-city) network with other BKMs. These regional and ultra-regional networks were effective mechanisms to exchange thoughts and experiences, and accelerated the BKM's learning process to be more critical toward the state's agenda. More sophisticated operations, including negotiations with local government offices on infrastructure planning, job creation, and unprecedented political pressure toward environmentally unfriendly land-use provisions followed this learning process. In Yosorejo, where the BKM was only comfortable to ally itself with the sub-district administration (*Kelurahan* office) in their operations, their advocacy efforts (and results) were not as substantial and focused only on their local geographic area.

#### **4. Laying out the Modus Operandi**

*What is a possible modus operandi for community organizations to appropriate decentralization to press their own agendas?*

Yosorejo had used *strategic alliance* as its mechanism to appropriate decentralization. They openly allied with the sub-district administrator (the *Lurah*), shared work space together, and used all the *Kelurahan*'s resources, such as office instruments and personnel. There was, however, a thin line between this strategic alliance and *manipulative co-optation*. Since BKM gained legitimacy as the local governing body of the *kelurahan* by occupying the government office, one could perceive BKM's strategy more as co-optation of the *Kelurahan* than advocacy and collaboration. The reader should be wary, though, that co-optation can occur reciprocally, of the BKM by the *Lurah*. In some cases, there was evidence that BKM members actually helped the *Lurah* to do his job. Since BKM members and BKM secretary are volunteers and not paid employers, the *Kelurahan* could also be perceived as manipulative or exploitative.

Some interviews indicated that the *Lurah* significantly influenced BKM leaders' and members' theoretical framework on understanding decentralization, the shared burden of responsibility in development, and citizenship. In the end these means of perception transfer pacifies the potentially aggressive collective action by people. The case of Yosorejo highlights the complexity of community-based organizations' engagement with the state in planning processes. While a successful example of community's appropriation of decentralization policy, it also exposes the thin, fine line between strategic alliance between the state and community-based organizations and the co-optation of civil society by the state.

Podosugih's *modus operandi* was clear and transparent. First, BKM *hitch hiked* the government by placing their agent (Mayor Basyir) in the most important office of municipal government. After BKM consolidated their power and Mayor Basyir could create more conducive environment in the governmental bureaucracy for more significant change, they pressed for legislation that recognizes BKM as a main partner of the government's poverty alleviation project. The epilogue of this process was when BKM put more agents in both executive and legislative government bodies. At this point, they have redirected the municipal government's poverty alleviation policy toward more participatory and bottom-up approaches.

The case of Podosugih, however, also illustrates the contested notion of successful grassroots activism. On one hand, they are exemplary models of communities' democratic struggle to place their agents in state institutions. On the other hand, the political rewards and monetary compensation these agents receive from their governmental positions are personal benefits instead of general benefits received by community-based organizations in the city of Pekalongan. One could frame the mobilization of UPP beneficiaries to draw a political support as a manipulative hijack of community-based, grassroots organizations or successful grassroots activism to advocate for citizens' interests. The initial motives—to advocate for the enactment of a pro-poor city policy—of Dr. Basyir and *Pak Anton*'s candidacies seemed completely altruistic. However, their commitment to community-based organizations and the interests of poor people is subject to the test of time.

## **B. Conclusion**

In the observed communities, UPP had been an effective social planning instrument to develop community organizations' collective criticism toward the state's agenda. UPP's requirement for communities to conduct an annual survey to generate their own data on local poverty is part of community's self-empiricism. This leads to the formulation of a collective self-knowledge and the creation of self-direction to challenge the state's prescription in community-based planning and development. More importantly, this was followed by their shifting focus from addressing communities' interests in their sole geographic boundaries toward thinking of their locus in a wider urban social, economic, and physical context. Two BKMs actively challenged the state's agenda—decentralizing development by encouraging citizen participation (through labor) and contributions (through monetary donations)—and pressed their own agendas. Decentralization allowed these actions without the necessity of establishing a different planning process exclusive of government agents and the state's influence. On the contrary, BKM operated transparently and openly by forging a *strategic alliance* with the government. They even conducted a more aggressive process by mobilizing their grassroots networks to elect their agents to redirect policies from within governmental institutions.

## **C. Recommendations for Future Study**

This study, based on observations of two and a half months, provides a glimpse into the complex processes of decentralization in Central Java. Exploratory in its nature, this study uncovered significant, albeit unexpected, issues. Perhaps more importantly, it found BKM's establishment led to the emergence of a new elite group. In both Yosorejo and Podosugih BKM members are now considered a new generation of elites because they possess the authority in community governance. These new leaders were unknown before they were BKM members. Their extensive exposure to planning processes, project management, and professional networking with BKM members and

BKM's government counterparts greatly enhance their capacity for advocacy. However, the same learning process also widened the gap between them and the rest of the community members. Although in the communities observed this did not prevent communication between BKM members and beneficiaries or hinder their integration in social life, their involvement with BKM operations provided them with capacities that no other community members could obtain without getting involved in BKM governance.

This process diversified the community's elite group, by creating a new elite group that did not previously belong to governmental bureaucracy or existing cultural and religious institutions. However, other than identifying its existence, this study did not address this diversification process. BKM members, especially in Podosugih where they hold government offices, may become the new repressive power that perpetuates self-interest.

This research explains how, under decentralization, poor communities evolve to become empowered to act as advocates for their interests in strategic planning processes. By identifying the fundamental phases in BKMs' evolution and highlighting the processes of collective social learning, this research enriches our understanding of the complex process of decentralization and poverty alleviation.

However, it is necessary to keep the scholarly planning discussion focused on what matters to most developing nations: What is the most effective method to free a large portion of their populations from poverty and unequal economic opportunities? Therefore, this research calls for further research to question, challenge, and confront the existing claims on decentralization and its positive impact on poverty alleviation. Among the questions that need to be raised in the future are as follows:

1. What are the economic consequences of advocacy at the community level? In a developing nation where resources are scarce, do advocacy processes lead to more desirable resource allocation in the interest of poor communities?



2. What happens when communities in similarly situated contexts develop the capacity for advocacy at different rates? Would scarce resources still be distributed in a desirable manner if communities with different advocacy capacities develop competition among themselves?
3. How can government and state agencies learn to use this experience for policy intervention? At which local level should a decentralizing government play a larger role in policy intervention for poverty alleviation purposes?

These questions needed to be answered by more in-depth, longitudinal researches that extend over a longer time span.

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## Appendix

### UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research  
Institutional Review Board  
528 East Green Street  
Suite 203  
Champaign, IL 61820



April 17, 2010

Faranak Miraftab  
Urban & Regional Planning  
218 Temple Buell Hall  
MC-619

RE: *Appropriating decentralization to reach democratization: How local contexts of poverty alleviation triggers self-advocacy. A case study of four sub-districts in Java Indonesia*  
IRB Protocol Number: 10480

Dear Faranak:

This letter authorizes the use of human subjects in your project entitled *Appropriating decentralization to reach democratization: How local contexts of poverty alleviation triggers self-advocacy. A case study of four sub-districts in Java Indonesia*. The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved, by expedited review, the protocol as described in your IRB-1 application. The expiration date for IRB Protocol Number 10480, is 03/28/2011. The risk designation applied to your project is *no more than minimal risk*. Certification of approval is available upon request.

Copies of the enclosed date-stamped consent form(s) must be used in obtaining informed consent. If there is a need to revise or alter the consent forms, please submit the revised form(s) for IRB review, approval, and date-stamping prior to use.

Under applicable regulations, no changes to procedures involving human subjects may be made without prior IRB review and approval. The regulations also require that you promptly notify the IRB of any problems involving human subjects, including unanticipated side effects, adverse reactions, and any injuries or complications that arise during the project.

If you have any questions about the IRB process, or if you need assistance at any time, please feel free to contact me or the IRB Office, or visit our Web site at <http://www.irb.illinois.edu>.

Sincerely,

Sue Keehn, Director, Institutional Review Board

Enclosures

c: Ahmad Gamal



**University of Illinois  
at Urbana-Champaign**

**Institutional Review Board Office**  
528 East Green Street, Suite 203, MC-419  
Champaign, IL 61820  
tel: 217-333-2670  
fax: 217-333-0405  
E-mail: [irb@uiuc.edu](mailto:irb@uiuc.edu)  
Web: [www.irb.uiuc.edu](http://www.irb.uiuc.edu)

**RECEIVED**  
**APR 15 2010**  
VICE CHAIR FOR RES

**WAIVER OR ALTERATION OF INFORMED CONSENT (45CFR46.116(D))**

ALL APPLICATIONS MUST BE TYPEWRITTEN, SIGNED, AND SUBMITTED AS SINGLE-SIDED HARD COPY. PLEASE, NO STAPLES!

Responsible Project Investigator (RPI):

Last Name: Miraftab		First Name: Faranak	Dept. or Unit: Urban & Regional Planning
Phone: 217.265.8238	Fax: 217.244.1717		E-mail: <a href="mailto:faranak@illinois.edu">faranak@illinois.edu</a>

Project Title:

Appropriating Decentralization: How urban poverty project triggers advocacy

**To request IRB approval of a waiver of the requirement to obtain informed consent completely, or of a consent procedure which does not include, or which alters, some or all of the elements of informed consent, please provide a response to ALL of the following questions. Please be specific in explaining why each statement is true for this research.**

1. The research involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects.

There is no physical treatment over any subject. The research will only use available data from interviews and focus group discussions collected prior to research. The interviews were conducted for the purpose of program improvement and administered by the National Consultant of UPP, the main organization for program implementation. The research will not add risk to research participants more than normal discomfort to their daily activities.

2. The waiver or alteration will not adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects.

Some of the participants are from low-income group of volunteers and it was necessary to protect their identities. Alteration (not a waiver) from written consent to oral consent was in their interest to protect their rights and welfare. Therefore during UPP's program evaluation by which the data was generated, no identifiable information was collected, including any information linking them to their participation to the program evaluation. The research uses pseudonyms for almost all research participants to protect participant's rights of privacy and employability. Exception was applied for all interviews conducted with elected officials who were properly provided with a written consent document

3. The research could not practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration.

All interviews were carried out prior to the research for the purpose of UPP program evaluation. To one group (low-income volunteer) a written documentation process was considerably inconvenient and might hinder their participation. They have provided oral consent during the program evaluation process by which the data for this research was generated. However since none of their identifiable information was collected they could not be located for the purpose of providing written consent. Exception applies to public official participants. A research consent separate from the consent for program evaluation will be prepared to be submitted to them for signature.

4. Whenever appropriate, the subjects will be provided with additional pertinent information after participation.

The research's finding and every final product will be made open to all community self-help institutions to enable self-assessment and self-improvement through the volunteer participants who had given information to investigator. Beside the thesis as the main product of the research, the investigator will craft a separate recommendation to provide participants easier guide to consult and/or implement the research's findings.

RPI Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

*Faranak Miraftab*  
*Jane K...*

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

4/14/10

IRB Member Approval: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

4/20/10

1106

## **Informed Consent**

### **Research on Urban Poverty Project - 2009**

Ahmad Gamal  
Dept. of Urban & Regional Planning,  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

This consent applies for the use of data generated in UPP program evaluation between May and July 2009 for the purpose of a separate proposed research. By signing this document you agreed to provide consent to allow the researcher to use your previous response in UPP program evaluation for this research purpose. The research is a basis of academic publications in the form of a master's thesis or an article in an academic journal.

#### *Purpose of research*

UPP's considerable success in micro-credit distribution infrastructure development and charitable donations for poor population needs to be followed by a significant integration of poor people into local planning and development processes. This research aims at investigating their participation and involvement in that process as part of government's continuing effort to increase its accountability and democratic decision-making processes.

#### *Interview Procedures*

This interview was conducted with city mayors / county heads, heads of local planning agencies, sub-district administrators, and numerous volunteers to this program as recommended by program coordinator of the city / county. This interview has been scheduled at a mutually agreed time and place between participant and interviewer. No personal questions will be asked during this interview. Interviews only explored challenges and opportunities as recognized by the staff of governmental organizations or volunteers of UPP. Interviews were tape-recorded. The length of the interview was around 1 (one) hour and could be repeated by mutual agreement between interviewer and participant.

#### *Risks*

Interviews would not affect your employability by the government or as a volunteer of UPP. You have the full discretion not to reveal any of your response to any question if you consider that is to bring any emotional discomfort and / or will result in unwanted consequences to your professional and / or social position.

#### *Benefit*

While you will not experience direct benefit from this interview, this research will benefit the whole program. By this evaluation you could express your feelings, complaints, critiques, and your suggestions to UPP to improve poverty alleviation programs in the future.



## Informed Consent

### *Alternative Process*

You have been provided the option to participate in another focus group discussion if you feel more comfortable speaking in public.

### *Confidentiality*

Your response in the interview will be a primary resource of evaluation of UPP. National Consultant as the main managing organization of UPP has full discretion release the result of this evaluation in a publication, or to release the data to other party as long as it is for the purpose of poverty alleviation program. However, all audio-files and transcription of this interview will remain undisclosed. As a public officer, most likely your personal identity will be disclosed as a contributor to this research.

### *Voluntariness*

Participation in this research is completely voluntary. You will not receive any monetary compensation and will not be required to pay to be able to participate in this process. If you decide to cancel your participation in the process or prefer to withdraw from the research by not providing consent to use your previous response in the program evaluation, it will not affect your employability to the government and / or your service as a volunteer to UPP.

### *About the Researcher*

The researcher is Ahmad Gamal, a graduate student at *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*, United States of America. He was an intern at National Consultant of UPP for the period of May – July 2009. National Consultant has assigned Mr. Gamal to travel and conduct interviews, focus group discussions as well as observations of UPP program implementation. In the end of this process, Mr. Gamal is required to present his findings in a meeting of UPP stakeholders, National Consultant, National Planning Agency, and a World Bank representative. Questions, critics and suggestions may be addressed to Mr. Gamal at 0811-842-721, or to program coordinator at your city / county.

### *Final Consent Statement*

I understand the explanation within this document and I am willing to participate in this research. I give permission to Mr. Ahmad Gamal to use my responses in the previous program evaluation as the basis for his research.

Full Name \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Place / Date \_\_\_\_\_

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS  
APPROVED CONSENT  
VALID UNTIL  
**MAR 28 2011**

## Penjelasan Proses

### Riset Program Pengentasan Kemiskinan Perkotaan – 2009

Ahmad Gamal  
Dept. of Urban & Regional Planning,  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Penjelasan ini berlaku untuk penggunaan data yang telah Anda berikan pada program evaluasi yang telah dilakukan pada periode Mei s/d Juli 2009. Dengan menandatangani surat ini Anda memberikan izin kepada periset untuk menggunakan hasil wawancara yang telah dilakukan sebagai bahan riset untuk tesis pasca sarjana dan artikel pada jurnal ilmiah.

#### *Tujuan Riset*

Keberhasilan dalam bidang pelaksanaan dan penyelenggaraan dana bergulir, pembangunan infrastruktur dan pemberian bantuan bagi warga miskin perlu dilanjutkan dengan keberhasilan dalam proses integrasi masyarakat ke dalam proses pembangunan dan perencanaan. Evaluasi ini diadakan untuk meneliti lebih lanjut keterlibatan warga miskin dalam proses tersebut sebagai bagian dari upaya peningkatan akuntabilitas dan kehidupan berdemokrasi.

#### *Prosedur Wawancara*

Wawancara dilaksanakan oleh pelaksana tugas evaluasi terhadap walikota/bupati, kepala biro perencanaan daerah, lurah, dan beberapa sukarelawan sesuai rekomendasi koordinator tingkat kota / kabupaten. Jadwal wawancara ditentukan berdasarkan perjanjian antara Anda dan pelaksana tugas evaluasi. Tidak ada informasi pribadi yang diminta dalam wawancara ini. Wawancara hanya akan digunakan untuk mencari tahu tantangan-tantangan dan kesempatan-kesempatan yang ditemukan oleh elemen pemerintah daerah maupun sukarelawan dalam program P2KP. Proses ini akan didokumentasikan menggunakan perekam suara. Wawancara dapat berlangsung selama 1 (satu) jam dan dapat diulangi / dilanjutkan di lain waktu yang disetujui bersama oleh pelaksana tugas evaluasi dan Anda.

#### *Resiko*

Wawancara ini tidak mempengaruhi jabatan dan pekerjaan Anda sebagai bagian dari pemerintahan daerah atau sukarelawan P2KP. Anda berhak tidak menjawab pertanyaan yang diajukan apabila menurut Anda pertanyaan tersebut dapat menimbulkan emosi negatif dan/atau memberi konsekuensi buruk terhadap pekerjaan Anda.

#### *Manfaat*

Manfaat dari wawancara ini tidak akan terasa langsung bagi Anda pribadi, namun dapat menjadi bahan informasi yang sangat penting bagi perbaikan program P2KP. Melalui evaluasi ini Anda dapat menyampaikan keluhan, kritik, dan usulan bagi perbaikan program.

## Penjelasan Proses

### *Prosedur Alternatif*

Selain wawancara ini, evaluasi akan dilakukan dengan metode diskusi kelompok. Apabila Anda merasa lebih nyaman berbicara dalam kelompok, Anda dapat memilih untuk ikut serta dalam proses tersebut.

### *Kerahasiaan*

Wawancara ini akan digunakan sebagai bahan evaluasi dan Konsultan Nasional P2KP memiliki hak penuh untuk mempublikasikan hasil evaluasi ini atau memberikan data untuk keperluan pihak lain selama masih dalam rangka program pengentasan kemiskinan. Walaupun demikian, rekaman wawancara dan catatan evaluasi tidak akan diberikan kepada pihak ketiga. Sebagai pejabat publik, nama Anda akan disebutkan sebagai kontributor evaluasi ini.

### *Kesukarelaan*

Evaluasi ini bersifat sukarela seluruhnya. Anda tidak akan dibayar dan tidak akan diminta bayaran untuk ikut serta dalam proses ini. Apabila Anda memutuskan untuk tidak ikut serta dalam proses evaluasi ini, tidak akan mempengaruhi jabatan dan pekerjaan Anda sebagai bagian dari pemerintahan daerah atau sukarelawan P2KP.

### *Tentang Periset*

Pelaksana riset ini adalah Ahmad Gamal, mahasiswa pasca-sarjana *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*, Amerika Serikat. Yang bersangkutan sedang menjalani pemagangan di Konsultan Nasional P2KP. Tugas ini mengharuskan yang bersangkutan untuk melakukan perjalanan dan menghubungi Anda untuk keperluan evaluasi program P2KP di tingkat daerah dan nasional. Di akhir periode evaluasi ini Sdr. Gamal akan diharuskan untuk membuat rekomendasi tertulis dan menyampaikannya pada pertemuan para pemangku kepentingan P2KP, yaitu Konsultan Nasional, Bappenas, dan perwakilan Bank Dunia. Kami sangat menghargai bantuan Anda kepada Sdr. Ahmad Gamal untuk keperluan evaluasi ini. Pertanyaan, kritik dan saran terhadap proses ini dapat diajukan kepada Sdr. Ahmad Gamal melalui telfon 0811-842-721, atau melalui koordinator P2KP tingkat kota / kabupaten Anda masing-masing.

### *Pernyataan Persetujuan*

Saya yang bertanda tangan di bawah ini menyatakan mengerti sepenuhnya penjelasan tentang penggunaan data dan bersedia berpartisipasi dalam riset dengan mengizinkan Saudara Ahmad Gamal untuk menggunakan data yang telah dikumpulkan untuk tujuan tersebut.

Nama Lengkap \_\_\_\_\_

Tanda Tangan \_\_\_\_\_

Tempat / Tanggal \_\_\_\_\_

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS  
APPROVED CONSENT  
VALID UNTIL

MAR 28 2011



Respondent's name:	Researcher's Name:
Professional title:	Date:
Agency:	Location:

## **Key Informant Interview Guide**

Revised: June 8, 2009

### ***Contextual Background***

1. What had been the most prevalent drive for decentralization policy in respondent's context? Is there another aspect aside from political pressure to the governmental authority?
2. What is the most prevalent intention for decentralization process? Has decentralization of governmental responsibilities followed with decentralization of authorities?

*(Relate these questions with respondent's agency position, whether national, provincial, city or community level)*

### ***Community Planning Advocacy***

1. How can decentralization trend enable communities to further participate in strategic development planning process? More specifically, how can community-level decisions be able to influence local planning agency's pro-poor development strategy? What are mechanisms that it has to go through? What are the barriers?
2. What are the fundamental phases of community evolution from being "poor" into a "self-advocating" one? What are the pre-requisites for this to happen?
3. How does socio, cultural, political and historical factors affect inter-scalar planning mechanism and en/discourage community's participation in higher level planning process? What are the most evident characteristics identified in a self-advocating community?
4. How significant is the role of facilitators and city-level coordinators in the process of capacity building for self-advocacy? What is the strategy to pass on advocating capacity from local facilitators to community to provide them with necessary independence?

*(These questions may be more relevant to be asked to CSI members, facilitators and city-level coordinators)*

### ***Planning Agency Paradigm Shift***

1. How had decentralization trend forced local government to accommodate communities' participation in strategic development planning process? More specifically, how had local planning agencies changed in dealing with communities for a pro-poor development strategy? What are mechanisms that it has to go through? What are the barriers?
2. What are the fundamental phases of local planning and governmental agencies evolution in the transition into a participative agency? What are the pre-requisites for this to happen?
3. How does socio, cultural, political and historical factors affect inter-scalar planning mechanism and en/discourage planning agency to involve community participation in strategic planning process? What are the most evident characteristics differ community-level planning processes and governmental planning processes?
4. How significant is the role of facilitators and city-level coordinators in advocating the process of paradigm shift for self-advocacy in local governmental level? What are the challenges to deal with this type of advocacy?

*(These questions may be more relevant to be asked to heads of local planning agencies, city mayors and other relevant governmental officials)*

Description of Focus Group	Date
Moderator's Name	Location

## Focus Group Discussion Guide

Revised: June 13, 2009

### Perception on Poverty

This section aims at uncovering unique local perception on poverty, how poverty characteristics differ at personal, household, and communal level, and what/who is perceived as the responsible cause for poverty. Questions asked may vary, but will be based on these pointing guidelines:

- 1) Do you perceive your community in general as poor/prosperous? *Explore specific criteria used by discussant to identify poverty at communal level.*
- 2) Is the community homo/heterogeneous in terms of poverty? Can you describe variations within the community in their poverty/prosperity status? *Explore specific criteria used by discussant to identify poverty at household and personal level.*
- 3) Is there a particular type of household dominantly represented in the community? (e.g. single-family, multi-family, single-person, widow-headed household, etc) If the answer is yes, how does this particular type correlate with the criteria of poverty? *Explore contextual economic functions of household members and local assumptions on poverty.*
- 4) What is the dynamics of poverty in your community? Has poverty been generally in/decreasing in the last 5, 10, or 20 years? Specify local events having possible direct relation with the in/decrease of poverty within the community. *Explore the economic base of the community and its level of dependence to particular industry.*
- 5) Can you imagine an alternative future if abovementioned events did not occur? To whom will you consult this alternative future, if you ever had an access? Who, in your perception, will have enough power to prevent such events occur? *Explore the local assumptions on most responsible parties for poverty and its alleviation efforts.*
- 6) To whom do you think I should talk to if I expect to better understand this issue? *Explore local assumptions about who understands poverty better from in/outside the community, and community's self-appreciation on internal/local knowledge.*

### Community-Level Collective Action Inventory

This section aims at generating an inventory of community-level collective action, initiator, leading positions, beneficiaries, executing agents, and their dynamics over time. The inventory was meant to measure how evolved the community is in generating social movement. The social indicator of this evolution is community's independence level for planning and implementing their community-level collective action. The institutional indicator of this evolution is whether the community is capable to generate planning at tactical (mid-run), strategic (long-run), or merely reactive-responsive (short-run) time frame.

- 1) Please identify poverty alleviation efforts undertaken in your community within the last 5, 10, or 20 years.
- 2) Please identify infrastructure (water, sanitation, informal settlement) upgrade efforts undertaken in your community within the last 5, 10, or 20 years.
- 3) Please identify health and social welfare programs undertaken in your community within the last 5, 10, or 20 years.

*(To all questions above, explore to what extent community members are involved in planning and implementation of each program/project, how sophisticated decision-making process are performed, how evolved each program/project is in term of institutionalization, and whether each program/project benefit the community in general, targeted households, or particular segment of the community. Enrich information with personal interviews.)*

### **Community-Level Governance and Participatory Planning**

This section aims at providing a valid basis for analysis of inter-scalar planning and how community-level planning is advocated at higher level planning process. Significant indicator analyzed is community's independence in decision-making process, participation level of decision-making at community-level, and internal/external drives for community-level decision-making/planning.

- 1) Please describe leadership in your community. *Explore possibilities of (in) formal leadership and different life realms (age, wealth, ownership of production factors, employment and education; political and religious associations) in the community.*
- 2) Please describe how power is shared among these different leaders. *Explore the dynamics between formal-informal leaders and who takes what decisions for whom.*
- 3) How is local leadership changing in the last 5, 10, or 20 years?
- 4) How is local leadership affected by external influences? *Identify interventions had been performed by national/local government, NGOs, political parties.*
- 5) How involved are each of you personally in decision-making processes? *Expect every focus group participant to provide answer. Silence may be interpreted as not being involved at all. Explore methods of how participation is generated in community-level decision-making processes.*
- 6) Have you been always in agreement with a decision made for the community? Have you heard of any people not in agreement with a decision made for the community? How is the negotiation process performed within community? *Explore how different interests are accommodated / ignored in decision-making process and how conflicts are resolved.*

*(To all questions above expect a detailed illustration with specific examples based on recent case, if possible)*

### **Community Self-Advocacy**

This section aims at picturing the community's capacity for advocacy. Questions asked are to identify community members' satisfaction level of decisions and plans made by local planning agencies, internal efforts to buffer planning failure in targeting beneficiaries, and efforts to advocate community's interest at higher level.

- 1) How do you feel in general with programs initiated by local government in poverty alleviation program, health care system, or infrastructure development? Do you consider your feeling as widely shared among others? *Explore the subtlest dissatisfaction embedded in verbal communication. Specify events/projects/programs/plans criticized by the group.*
- 2) What did you do when you were dissatisfied? What did the community do when this dissatisfaction was a widespread one? Did the community tried to consult/confront local government for resolution? *Explore community's awareness of intrinsic rights to benefit from government and governance, and their capacity to generate social movement.*
- 3) Who were the main actors for this movement? Was the negotiation delegated to community leaders or performed by mass movement? If this task was performed by delegations, who were trusted by the community to do so? Why were they trusted for the task? *Explore the community's capacity to advocate change and the internalization level of this capacity. Expect the group to identify internal figures as well as external actors such as NGO activists. Explore local assumptions on responsible figures for this task.*
- 4) What was the main channel for this movement? Did the community/delegations utilize formal channel with elaborate political processes, strategic information with media pressure, or informal strategy with personal negotiations with influential figures in decision-making institutions? *Explore sophistication level of the method for advocacy.*
- 5) Were you satisfied with the result of this movement? What did you do when you/others in the community were dissatisfied? *Explore the strength of internal drive for advocacy.*