Gentrification in the Central Zone of Medina, Saudi Arabia

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Abstract

The past fifty years have seen increasingly rapid advances in urbanization and development in Saudi Arabia. Medina is a Saudi city; it is the second most significant holy place after Mecca for all Muslims worldwide because it encompasses the Prophet's Mosque and the grave of the prophet of Islam, Mohammed. The central research aim of the thesis is to examine whether that redevelopment that has taken place in Medina between the 1970s to 2000s should be viewed as gentrification. The central zone of Medina was identified as a case study for this research. Qualitative mixed-methods research involving structured interviews and content analysis of archival data were used to investigate redevelopments in the central zone of Medina. A semi-structured interview was conducted with elite interviewees - officials and developers - and the non-elite, who are the displaced residents of the central zone of Medina.

The main findings of this study show that what has happened in central zone of Medina since the 1970s to the 2000s, when the redevelopment project was completed, constitutes new build gentrification. New build gentrification in the central zone of Medina is oriented towards tourism, as led by individual investors and real state dealers in the 1970s and 1980s and by the central state in the 1990s and 2000s. It was also shown that the touristic gentrification in new build form, which is also taking place in central Medina, has resulted in the full impact of displacement. This result has particular significance with respect to the global debates regarding gentrification research, in that gentrification in the Global South, including the Middle East, occurred simultaneously with that of the Global North. The findings and contributions of this thesis show that gentrified central Medina is a new story of gentrification coming from a Middle Eastern Islamic city in Global

South, as different than Global north context due to a number of issues such as being the fastest-growing urbanization in the Global South, the type of political systems, decision-making mechanisms in governmental bodies, and the cultural and social structures of communities.

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Abbreviations

BOE   **B**ureau **o**f **E**xperts at the Council of Ministers

GASTAT   **G**eneral **A**uthority **Stat**istic

MDA   **M**edia **D**evelopment **A**uthority

Chapter 1

Background to the Study

1.1. Introduction

Within the context of gentrification as an arguably global process, this study seeks to examine the processes of urban development in the central zone of Medina, Saudi Arabia, in order to establish whether they constitute gentrification or merely redevelopment and urban renewal. Medina may be viewed as a prototypical Islamic city in that its urban processes have been influenced by social, economic and political factors that are themselves the products of, or affected by, the religion of Islam. It is also a city of paramount importance to Muslims as the location of the Prophet's Mosque, being the second holiest city to Muslims after Makkah.

1.2. Urbanisation and Gentrification: The Global North and South Debates

Recent debates in the gentrification literature have highlighted the globalization of this phenomenon, suggesting there has been a generalization process throughout different parts of the world as an urbanization or modernization strategy (Smith, 2002; Smith & Derken, 2002), and the term gentrification itself, and indeed what it encompasses, has

been subjected to considerable scrutiny. Scholars such as Lees (forthcoming), Lees et al. (2015), Robinson (2006), and Roy (2009) have advanced an approach they call 'comparative urbanism', whereby urban processes in the Global South are not considered to be purely replicas of those occurring in the Global North. Until very recently, cities of the Global North such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, London, Paris and Tokyo, amongst others, were taken as archetypal cities which served as models for all urbanization processes. Discarding this approach, the aforementioned scholars stress the need for a truly global urban study that renounces the hegemonic, colonial and euro-centric views on urban processes which inherently fail to appreciate the unique circumstances and strategies of the Global South. Thus, Lees (forthcoming) argues that the latter should be investigated as an opportunity to learn and experience urban studies from a different perspective. This study is therefore designed to address this issue with regards to the central zone of Medina, where it investigates the impact of urban processes on Medinan residents. In particular, it explores whether these urban changes, which have affected the central area of the city referred to as 'Medina core' (Amirahmadi & Razavi, 1993), constitute gentrification rather than redevelopment, as based on the perspectives of former residents as well as the government officials and planners involved in the process.

Maloutas (2012) drew attention away from contesting the terminology itself to focus on context-specific studies of the gentrification processes in different parts of the world in order to explain the associated similarities and differences. This approach would offer stronger evidence of the causes and outcomes of gentrification in the specific context under investigation. An example of such country-specific research is that conducted by Cybriwsky (2011) into the planning processes and policies that were involved in the regeneration of Tokyo, Japan. Here, they found there had been a deliberate transformation through the construction of state office buildings, high rise luxury apartments, up-market retail shops, and arts facilities, all built for the wealthy. In contrast, Grange and Pretorius (2014) studied Hong Kong, and found that displacement was an outcome of the urban redevelopment and renewal there, although they had not planned to consider it. Similarly, Nobre (2002), in a study of Pelourinho in Salvador da Bahia, Brazil, made a distinction between urban renewal, rehabilitation and regeneration in the context of a historic

preservation process. Thus, the literature has shown how gentrification and renewal processes have become of interest to architects, planners, and urban geographers because of the spatial, social and economic implications in the various geographical contexts in which they take place.

Lees (2012, forthcoming) and Robinson (2006) have, in advocating comparative urbanism, maintained that in the past, the Global North has tended to dictate the form and shape of urban processes as a model to be replicated in the Global South, as Yacobi and Shechter (2005) have also argued in relation to cities of the Middle East. Bauer (2001) observed a tension between modernity and tradition in much of the urban planning in the Middle East. He posited that despite differences in decision making, the emerging urban structure in Middle Eastern cities, and indeed in most capitals of the Global South, replicate the Global North model, which he refers to as "Parisisation". This view is disputed by the comparative urbanists.

Comparative urbanism, therefore, questions the one-model-fits-all concept and urges geographers and urban researchers to reorientate towards an appreciation of the diversity in the Global South or East rather than taking a predisposition that hierarchically categorises some cities as superior to others for granted. Robinson (2006) emphasises that different cities are "unique assemblages of wider processes which are distinctive and in a category of their own" (Robinson, 2006, p.109). Each city's experience of urbanization needs to be situated within the "world of interactions and flow" whereby each has "a vast array of networks and circulations of various spatial reach" (Robinson: ibid.). As Lees (forthcoming) argues, urbanism is not determined by a specific type of city; instead, it should be understood in a context of "cityness" (Simone, 2010: 3), which means seeing a city as "a thing in the making" (Simone, 2010, p.5).

Significantly, the comparison of urban processes between cities advocated by comparative urbanists does not focus on the provincial particularism of each city (Lees, forthcoming), but instead on a more inclusive investigation that highlights the distinctive process of urbanization each city has gone through (Chakrabarthy, 2000). Thus, beside the old-style approach of comparative urbanism that focuses on separation and distinctiveness, the new approach of comparative urbanism opens up the debate on

gentrification by separating the diverse urban processes experienced by cities in the Global South from the Global North (Ferreira, 2016). An area that would benefit from more research in gentrification is the Middle East. Adopting this approach would allow researchers to dig deep into the causes of gentrification and other urban processes and therefore dictate how theory and practices should be applied to this question.

The Middle East has its own complexities within the literature of urban development. Of particular note is the discontinuity and disjuncture in the architectural and urban landscapes in the majority of cities that fall within the geographical and cultural boundaries of the region, which are historically linked with Islamic values and culture as well as the similarities of social institutions and structures (Abu Lughod, 1971). Scholars have argued that in this context, although urbanization tends to be occurring throughout the Middle East (Al Zoabi, 2004; Yacobi & Shechter, 2005), there is diversity in each country's experience. For instance, Amirahmadi and Razavi (1993:3) observed that regardless of "commercial, diplomatic, and military contacts with the European nations, the basic contours of urban society in the Islamic nations in the cities such as Cairo, Istanbul and Delhi did not experience any drastic changes until the early or mid-twentieth century". However, as cities with religious, social and economic structures associated with Islamic principles, "massive changes have occurred as a result of contact with modernity" (Amirahmadi & Razavi, 1993: 30). This modernity, defined in terms of Anglo-American contacts, has had an impact on migration and population growth in the majority of urban centres in the Middle East, including in Saudi Arabia, and many other parts of Western Asia and North Africa. Thus, this study examines the city of Medina, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, within the contexts of the Middle East, Islamic cities, and religious tourism, to examine whether the changes in the central zone are due to redevelopment or gentrification.

Recent debates on gentrification and its relationship with displacement have been concerned with producing empirically viable evidence that gentrification causes displacement (Freeman, 2006). Freeman (2006) criticises those he refers to as 'displacement-centric scholars' (e.g., Slater, 2004; Vigdor and Massey, 2002; and Schill & Nathan, 1983) for looking for what they believe happened rather than considering all the processes and outcomes of urban development without unduly prioritising one above

the other. This resonates with proponents of comparative urbanism, who see urban processes as context-specific and therefore reject the modernist view of the city as a holistic unit, a unified whole (Dear, 2005). A consequence of the modernist view is that most urban structures in other parts of the world are seen as mere replicas of those in major cities in the Global North, such as London or New York (Lees, forthcoming). Thus, this study is designed to investigate gentrification in the central zone of Medina as a field of inquiry whose aim is to make an original contribution to knowledge by yielding insight into "what is true for all cities and what is true for one city at a given time" (Nijman, 2007: 1, cited in Lees, forthcoming).

Freeman (2006) based on his study of Harlem and Clinton Hill, Brooklyn, in New York City, arguing that indigenous residents do not necessarily react to gentrification according to the preconceived notions of scholars towards gentrification and displacement, but rather are both receptive and optimistic on the one hand, and pessimistic and distrustful on the other. However, the residents who participated in his study recognised that gentrification brought 'trendy' restaurants, new housing, and white residents moving into the neighbourhood, all of which brought their neighbourhood into mainstream American commercial life with its concomitant amenities and services. They also saw new possibilities for achieving upward mobility without having to escape to the suburbs or to predominantly white neighbourhoods (Freeman, 2006:3). This argument is contextual and specific to the areas he investigated, namely Harlem and Clinton Hill, Brooklyn, in New York City. It should be noted that these changes in neighbourhoods are not necessarily positive, and Freeman's work has been widely criticised in gentrification studies through empirical evidence produced by researchers such as Martin and Beck (2018). Yet the benefits, as Freeman further argues, have been recognised in previous academic studies; however, there are many scholars who have critiqued his view and demonstrate that gentrification actually causes displacement (Slater, 2004, 2006 and 2009; Lees et al., 2008).

This current study is designed to establish the magnitude of both the costs and benefits of gentrification on the local residents of Medina's central zone. It attempts to study the relationship between gentrification and displacement by revealing how gentrification affects residents and how they perceive the changes in their neighbourhood, as Freeman

(2006) and Freeman and Braconi (2004) did when studying Harlem and Clinton Hill. This study is therefore partly a response to Freeman's criticism of displacement-centric research by investigating whether displacement really happened in the central zone of Medina and illuminating the diversity in (re)development and gentrification within the Global South and Global North debates.

This thesis considers the roles of developers, whether state agents or private agents, and residents. It also seeks to situate this case study within the Global North and Global South debates in terms of the commercialization that is increasingly associated with tourism and the tourist industry, particularly religious tourism and pilgrimages, as alternative drivers of redevelopment/gentrification in Medina, which characterise the case study of Medina's central zone.

Redevelopment and gentrification

Slater (2014) defines gentrification as the process of urban redevelopment that has, at its core, the displacement of original residents. It is acknowledged, however, that other researchers have contrasting views, including Freeman (2006). For instance, while Atkinson (2003) has affirmed that displacement is a major distinguishing factor between development, redevelopment, urban regeneration and gentrification, Newman and Wyley (2006) have argued that displacement has been overstated. Florida (2002) and Freeman (2006) have stressed the public benefits of gentrification, both to the individual as well as to the gentrifiers. Others, however, have argued that the long-term cost to the residents far outweighs its public benefits (Smith & Williams, 1986; Atkinson, 2003; Lee et al., 2008). Thus, scholars continue to debate the consequences and benefits of gentrification, even as more call for comparative and contextual inquiries into individual cities in which gentrification is taking place, both in the Global North as well as the South. This study is an attempt to situate the central zone of Medina in these debates.

At the heart of this discussion is also the definition of the term gentrification itself, as it has been associated with viewing urban development processes, outcomes, and consequences through an Anglo-American lens, regardless of the context.

New build gentrification was first examined in cities in the UK. This concept challenged one of the central tenets of the classic concepts of gentrification in that it implied that gentrification did not necessarily involve revitalisation but could be achieved entirely through new developments. It has been described as the construction of high-status housing in the inner-city areas and the making use of previously undeveloped sites (Davidson & Lees, 2005). The criticisms of new build gentrification by Lambert and Boddy (2002) and Boddy (2007) are actually much more overstated. Lambert and Boddy (2002) cautioned that not all new developments or renovations of old sites could be categorised as gentrification. They focused on the relationship between redevelopment and gentrification by claiming that new-build developments should not be characterised as 'gentrification', and they believe that the transformation to high-income groups creates a contrast with an existing low-income group so as to lead to social upgrading. Lambert and Boddy's views, including new build development in gentrification theory, is stretching the term that was coined by Glass. Similarly, Atkinson (2008) suggests that gentrification must be distinguished from redevelopment and general, organic changes to a neighbourhood. Slater (2006), and Davidson and Lees (2010), make the attempt to show how gentrification is unlike new build development and how displacement has occurred in different ways and in multiple forms. Davidson & Lees (2005) listed four signs by which to acknowledge new build gentrification, which are: reinvestment, social upgrading, landscape change, and direct and indirect displacement. At the heart of this discussion is also the definition of the term gentrification itself, as it has been associated with viewing urban development processes, outcomes, and consequences through an Anglo-American lens, regardless of the context.

Scholars who made an effort to provide evidence that new build gentrification is another form of gentrification opened the door for scholars from Global north, Global south and Global East to examine gentrification. Shin et al. (2016:6) claims that "If gentrification was only understood in its classic sense among researchers in East Asia or associated with only gradual incremental changes over time such practices of urban redevelopment would have fallen short of being identified as gentrification. Instead, they bear a strong resemblance to contemporary state-led, 'new-build' gentrification in Western cities". Atkinson and Bridge (2005) justify the need identified for a cosmopolitan view of

gentrification and other processes that are linked to urban renewal outside the Global North context. Although this view of cosmopolitan and imitative urbanism has been contested by Lees (forthcoming), it is still an on-going debate among comparative urbanists, as discussed above.

Overall, this study of Medina's central zone seeks to understand whether the changes that occurred in this location are truly gentrification or merely new build development and/or redevelopment. In the process, an attempt has been made to avoid over-generalisation of the gentrifying process in this country-specific study of the urban processes in a Middle Eastern, Global South city. The following section explains the aim and objectives of this thesis.

1.3. Genesis and Rationale of This Study

The reason for choosing this topic is the lack of previous academic studies on gentrification in Saudi Arabia, as mentioned earlier. In addition, my interest in this topic is also personal, because when I started a PhD programme in the Geography Department of the University of Leicester, I was interested in studying the relationship between the development project in the central zone and the urban growth of Medina. During my first year of reading and research, I was inspired by the term gentrification, because this is a completely unfamiliar theory in Saudi urban literature; I had never previously encountered this term during the various stages of my education, either at the undergraduate or master's level. Consequently, I was intrigued, and made the decision to focus my thesis on gentrification. I consulted databases in Saudi universities and in King Fahad National Library but was unable to find any studies of this phenomenon within any city in Saudi Arabia, even when considering terms that might have been synonymous with gentrification. Up until the time of writing this thesis, this has continued to be the case. Through my review of Saudi literature, I did, however, come across a thesis entitled "The relationship between the Prophet's Mosque and its physical environment" (Alharigi, 1989). This research examined changes in the central zone of Medina from an architectural perspective, and whilst I found this interesting, it did not address social changes in the area. I went on to contact Professor Makki, who completed a PhD in the

UK in the 1960s and was Head of the Saudi Geographical Society. He confirmed that, according to his knowledge, there had been no previous study of gentrification in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, this project will initiate a fresh field of study in the context of Saudi Arabia, as justified below.

This study contributes to the on-going dialogues regarding the Global South and the Global North as it focusses on Medina's central zone. By looking at gentrification in a Middle Eastern, Islamic city, it provides an understanding of urban developments in the Global South which scholars can, following Lees (forthcoming), learn from. Although I draw many of these concepts directly from studies of the Global North, this study does not directly compare the gentrification process described herein with the Global North, but rather situates the context within the current debates on urbanism in the Middle East and Islamic cities, besides considering the implications of the commercialization of religion for the consumption of tourists.

The empirical focus on Medina as the case study is due to its position in Saudi Arabia's hierarchy, where it is the fourth-most important city. It is also the second holiest city to Muslims worldwide, as it is the site of the burial place of the founder of Islam, for which reason it is a site for religious pilgrimage for Muslims, giving it a special relationship with urban structures in Islamic cities.

Medina is important in Saudi Arabia because of its geography and history, which also make it significant in the literature of urbanization in the Middle East. The selection of this site as a single case study is in line with Amirahmadi and Razavi (1993:6), who claimed that "the rich heritage of cities in Islamic societies has generated particular concern among urban planners with regard to the spatial disunion between the old medina core and the modern section of the cities", referring to the tension between traditional and modern architecture in the Middle East. It further reflects, as they argue, the gradual erosion of social institutions that maintained the traditional city even as the old Medina appears to be disappearing. Thus, they propose "intervention by planners to preserve what is left and to integrate the medina core into the contemporary life of this city" (p.5). This study therefore investigates the impact of this urban process.

Of further significance is the necessity to characterize the tension between modern and traditional that distinguishes the old core of Medina and the modern redeveloped or gentrified Medina.

1.3.1. Urbanisation and Revitalisation in Saudi Arabia

Gentrification, characterised by a neighbourhood change, is a complex phenomenon which occurs as a result of rapid urbanization in cities, as well as in places which are not experiencing urbanisation, within both Global North and Global South countries. However, this process can be clearly observed in developing countries with the advent of technology, boosting the economy and providing more opportunities for the middle-class population in cities (Stanley, 2005).

Over the last four decades, Saudi Arabian cities have transformed tremendously due to the replacement of low-income residents with high-income dwellers due to the so-called process of redevelopment and revitalization, thereby changing the character of various neighbourhoods in Saudi Arabia (Yacobi and Schechter, 2005). The process of transformation can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s as a result of the government-sponsored movement of urban renewal and revitalization. A number of cities in Saudi Arabia experienced a wave of redevelopment due to the strengthening of the oil-based economies in the Middle East, which led to the replacement of hundreds of neighbourhoods in Saudi Arabia.

Schechter and Yacobi (2005) argued that in many key cities, such as Riyadh, Makkah, Medina and Jeddah, the urban landscape was transformed due to unprecedented economic prosperity, although the wealth gap also increased. Consequently, the poor became concentrated disproportionally in the urban outskirts. Job opportunities increased in the core of the cities (central areas) and played a critical role in the development of metropolitan economies. The construction of plazas, shopping malls, entertainment facilities, information services and arts centres were carried out in the central areas of the major Saudi cities, especially those which attract religious tourists, namely Makkah and Medina, which are the two "Holy Cities" for the Muslim world (Lee et al., 2013).

The metropolitan areas of these two holy cities are now characterised by tall buildings, spacious downtown areas, and offices for government and business activities see Figure / and /. They were the focus of attention in development efforts due to the desire to attract pilgrims from all over the world (Ekiz et al., 2017) in order to boost the economies of these cities in particular, and of the whole region in general. Therefore, the Holy Cities in Saudi Arabia were targeted for redevelopment and construction activities in order to produce the most sustainable development and urbanization patterns. In order to attract the business class, the elite, and middle and upper-class residents, both national government and local governmental bodies vowed to revitalize Makkah and Medina, along with other major cities, as religious tourism destinations for the Muslim community. These included greater efforts for neighbourhood viability and making the the downtown areas more vibrant for tourists (Bigio and Licciardi, 2010).

Both local and central government officials claimed that the redevelopment and revitalization efforts were undertaken to increase housing and entertainment facilities, thereby indicating that the replacement of low-income residents from the core areas of the cities was not the explicit intention. However, gentrification may be the by-product of revitalization efforts, as it has been in major cities of the USA and the UK (Ellen and O'Regan, Roy, 2009). However, there is no empirical in the literature evidence regarding the impact of the redevelopment patterns on the urbanization and gentrification processes in Saudi cities.

Figure 1: The transformed urban landscape of Makkah city.

Gentrification can bring economic benefits to metropolitan areas, while simultaneously exerting financial and social pressures on businesses and families with low economic status. Rents tend to rise, such that the lifestyle is only affordable for the elite or upper-class residents. Slater (2006) argues that if revitalization efforts during urbanization are intended to distribute the profits of development equitably to the residents coming to the city and the local residents already living in the cities, then the plans are beneficial for all communities. Similarly, Smith (2006) posited that if the revitalization plans for the urbanization of metropolitan areas contain the essential support for, or contribute to, the social and economic welfare of the residents living in targeted neighbourhoods, then these efforts can create equitable, socially cohesive and strong communities with equal opportunities for prosperity. However, if the revitalization plans and redevelopment patterns are designed in such a way that they provide greater benefits for the people moving into the urbanizing areas compared to the local residents, policy-makers and decisions-makers in the private and public sectors should revisit their endeavours (Webster, 2004; Shaw, 2008).

Figure 2: The transformed urban landscape of Medina city.

The existing literature shows that policy-makers are reluctant to admit that their development plans are not designed to benefit long-time local residents, even though there are obvious signs that the communities will be displaced from the core areas of cities as a consequence of urbanization and redevelopment (Slater, 2006; Smith, 2002; Lee et al., 2014). The displacement of local residents from areas undergoing gentrification has been described as a part of the process of revitalization and development, while direct use of the term gentrification is often avoided (Shaw, 2008).

A number of urban areas in Saudi Arabia are experiencing different intensities of gentrification, but it is important to note that this phenomenon is not occurring across the whole country. Rather, it tends to occur in selected urban areas with tight housing markets (Davis and Frappier, 2000). Several cities in Saudi Arabia are starved for new residents and revenue; and movement of the professional and upper classes into the central areas of the cities is by far the dominant trend, which necessarily moves lower income residents away from the central areas of these cities to their outskirts or suburban peripheries (Florida, 2017). This study is based on the assumption that gentrification plays out differently in different Saudi cities, indicating that this phenomenon is context-specific and therefore needs to be studied with due consideration for the local conditions and factors behind its occurrence. Shin et al. (2016) similarly view gentrification as contextual and historical, and therefore new studies are required to investigate the influence of

gentrification on local residents in any given place. The link between gentrification and redevelopment must be explored to differentiate these processes from each other.

The transformation of the character of a neighbourhood in a city sometimes occurs within a matter of few years in the supercharged economy of Saudi Arabia. It is occurring rapidly in several major cities including Medina, Makkah, Jeddah, and Riyadh. In particular, the two Holy Cities of Medina and Makkah attract higher-income residents and investors due to the large community redevelopment and revitalization projects in these cities. Low-income residents are then displaced to the peripheries (Davis and Frappier, 2000), thereby meeting the definition of gentrification set forth in this thesis. However, in the literature, no study was found which sought to investigate the link between redevelopment and gentrification.

Though the pace and scale of transformation across the whole country may vary, its occurrence in Saudi cities can be attributed to three causes. Firstly, beginning in 1972, the booming oil-based economy of the nation generated great demand for housing and labour at the regional level, and in many cases newly built luxury apartments and housing schemes in the central parts of cities attracted higher-income residents (Smith, 2002; Yacobi and Schechter, 2005). Secondly, central and local government policies in the country directed redevelopment efforts specifically towards the central parts of the cities; under some circumstances, redevelopment projects could subsequently become gentrification. Thirdly, in response to an increased economy since the 1970s, Saudi Arabia launched a five-year development plan and as a result, its economy has progressed to world prominence in a matter of years after centuries of little or no change (Mallakh and Mallakh, 2015). Local authorities achieved this by working in concert with central government to make core areas in cities more attractive for business or tourism; however, this could have driven low-income residents from the city centres into cheaper areas further from the metropolis.

Importantly, in cities hit by redevelopment, revitalization and gentrification pressures, different groups, including government officials, residents, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), often descend into factional fighting and opposing rhetoric, which is generally a result of the fact that the different groups define these urban processes in

different ways, or try to talk past each other (Slater, 2009; Lee et al., 2013). Furthermore, the political focus in dealing with redevelopment is oriented towards arguing more about the consequences and character of revitalization rather than linking the consequences of gentrification with their causes in a pragmatic manner (Florida, 2017). The goal of this study is to enable all stakeholders, including government officials, residents, investors, developers, and owners, to gain a better insight into the dynamics of the urban processes taking place in the central zone of Medina, and to understand the link between redevelopment and gentrification.

1.3.2.　　　Medina's Central Zone as a Single Case Study

The literature review in chapter two shows how urbanisation has become a global process, and specific inquiry into the phenomenon must reflect the social, political and historical contexts in which the urban process is taking place. That the experience differs among nations experiencing urbanization has been affirmed by Clark (2004), even within Western Europe and North America (Kovaes & Wiessers, 1999). Central to this discussion is the implication of applying an Anglo-American theory to a phenomenon that has become a global process and which geographers and sociologists assert is producing "injustices, uneven developments and displacement" globally (Lee, Shin, Lopez- Morales, 2014:1). Indeed, global gentrification now extends beyond the United States, the UK and China, which have heretofore served as the prime examples of urbanization and gentrification processes worldwide.

In this respect, scholars have repeatedly drawn attention to the global consequences of a phenomenon that is both global and local. Because of the centrality of applying Anglo American norms to this complex phenomenon, scholars such as Atkinson and Bridge (2005) have argued that gentrification has become a new urban colonialism and have advocated, like many others, a comparative urbanism where contextual and ideological differences are unearthed, even when similarities are found between the developments and gentrification.

Secondly, the disjuncture and discontinuity between the traditional and modern is reflected in most architectural designs in the Middle East. The medina core[1] also reflects this tension, as it has a traditional core city as well as a modern area (Amirahanadi & Razavi, 1993: 5-6). As discussed previously, the processes of urban transformation in the Medina core, that is, the central zone, which is the focus of this study, have led to the disappearance of old Medina in favour of modern buildings. As a result, Amirahanadi and Razavi (1993) stressed the "clear need for planners to preserve what is left and to integrate the Medina core into the contemporary life of the city" (Amirahanadi & Razavi, 1993: 6). Thus, this study examines the relationship between the developments in the central zone and gentrification based on the perspectives of former residents of the central zone, as well as government policies in relation to these transformations, renewal and revitalization.

Costelllo (1977), in agreement with Amirahmadi and Razavi (1993), argued that the vestiges of the past still contain semblances of the period of growth and prosperity when the Middle East led the world in urban culture. However, urban life in the East and West diverged following an increasingly and entirely different evolutionary line in the Middle Ages (Costello, 1977). In recent times, however, there is something 'international' in the architecture of most Islamic cities, which feature "modern transportation systems, shantytowns, and squatter settlements, individual complexes, informal markets and satellite cities" (Amirahmadi & Razavi, 1993: 1). According to these scholars, cities in the Muslim world exhibit a blend of the modern with the pre-modern in terms of architecture and planning, which accentuates the inability of the planners to integrate "socio spatial, political and economic institutions of modernity with local structures" (ibid, :1). Thus, they contend that there is a failure in most of these Islamic cities in the Middle East to generate a "creative dialogue between the modernists and the traditionalists" (ibid) in their urban planning. Similarly, Al Sayyad (2011) examined the relationship between the Global North and the Middle East and their impact on the corresponding identity of societies and planning, and identified three historic periods, namely: the colonial phase, the independence era, and the globalization phase, which are

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[1] Old Islamic city.

manifest in the "three respective urban forms: the hybrid, the modern or pseudo-modern, and the postmodern" (Alsayyad, 2011:265).

These scholars are unanimous in stressing that most cities in the Muslim world now reflect a combination of Northern and Southern architecture and spatial planning, terming it 'hybrid'. Yacobi and Shechter (2005) assert that urbanization in the Islamic world is, in many ways, a multidimensional process which continues to be only superficially understood, and that the Islamic paradigm for planning remains undefined despite the influence of industrialisation on cities. From this background emerges this study on Medina. The rich history and heritage of cities in Islamic societies have generated particular concern among urban planners with regards to defining the spatial implications of the old Medina core and the modern sections of the city; specifically, how to integrate the Medina core into the contemporary life of the city (Amirahmadi & Razavi, 1993).

This section offers a short description of the study site, Medina's central zone. An in-depth discussion of the site in relation to its history, population, and government policies is given in chapter four, which explains the position of Medina in the context of Saudi Arabian urbanization processes, as well as its location in the country's urban history. It also provides more details about Medina's position in the hierarchy, rural to urban migration, its economy, its social, economic, political and cultural context, and its institutions in terms of governance, policy and planning. Furthermore, the power processes of the city, relating to who makes urban decisions with regards to planning, are explained.

The city is a major metropolitan area, though it is not one of the largest Saudi Arabian cities. In 2015, its population was estimated to be 1,148,941, according to the General Authority for Statistics of Saudi Arabia (GASTAT, 2016). Its inhabitants live in an area covering 589 square kilometres (Ibid) and the city is the administrative capital of a large hinterland with an area of 151,990 square kilometres (MRM) (see Figure 3).

Over the past four decades, starting from the 1970s, the city of Medina has been growing at an extraordinary rate; its population has doubled since the 1992 census, which recorded 1,084,947 inhabitants.

Figure 3: The location of Medina region (Source: MHE, 1999).

The actual city of Medina itself has grown from 608,295 residents in 1992 to 1,148,941 in 2016 (GASTAT, 2015). For the most part this has been due to the growth of the Saudi Arabian economy, which has produced capital for investments in urban properties, as well as raising incomes which have made pilgrimages more affordable, thereby increasing the number of visitors to the city. Within this period, the central zone where the Prophet's Mosque is located has seen great changes to its physical appearance. The old courtyard quarters around the Mosque have disappeared to make way for additional places where visitors can pray. New roads have been built to make the area more accessible. In addition, there have been new constructions, such as high-rise structures, large car parks and overpass bridges, all of which detract from the aesthetic features of the area and are largely incongruent with the historical nature of the Mosque and its surroundings. Managing conflicts between such religious sites and the wider community of tourists and their needs is a matter of concern, as is the noise and disruption caused by visitors which can take away from the sacredness of the place (Levi & Kocher, 2011).

It is clear that much development has occurred, but there has hitherto been no study that has explored whether this development might be interpreted as gentrification. The development was needed in terms of the space required for the expansion of the Prophet's

Mosque, but also for the economy of Medina itself. Smith (1982: 139) makes a distinction between gentrification and development, stating that redevelopment is the construction of new buildings on land that has been previously developed, whereas gentrification is the restoration of old structures. However, the nature of gentrification has also changed in more recent years, although it still retains the core factor of a change in social class due to the transformation of the area (Slater et al., 2004).

The city centre neighbourhoods of Medina have been one of the main areas affected by development since the mid-1970s. In the beginning, it was commercial development on the main street of the central zone, which was in front of the Prophet's Mosque. Later on, by the 1990s, the central zone was experiencing more redevelopment and regeneration as new project plans were put in place to expand the Prophet's Mosque, mainly due to an increase in numbers of visitors. On a local level, generations of households had lived in the central zone for many years, and had considerable familial pride in the fact of being neighbours to the Prophet's Mosque and grave (Alkayari, 1995).

This thesis seeks to explore the value of understanding these changes in the central area of Medina by making use of the concept of gentrification and comparative urbanism. More specifically, it will evaluate the extent to which the revitalisation of the central zone of Medina could be interpreted as an instance of 'state-led, new-build gentrification' and perhaps identify other forms of gentrification. Observing demographic changes will allow the examination of the roles of those involved in the production of the redevelopment, such as local authorities, developers and planners; it also explores the consequences and social costs of these urban regeneration schemes. In this respect, this thesis will be making a significant contribution to knowledge, as little is known about redevelopment and gentrification within cities in Saudi Arabia. It is also the first to investigate the development of a sacred site in Saudi Arabia and to provide more information about the ways in which this has occurred.

In addition to investigating the processes that have taken place, this thesis also provides qualitative input from those involved in the changes, ranging from administrators to the residents themselves. This provides considerable insight into the social costs of

transforming an inner-city site, and gives a greater understanding of the conflicts and issues that have been involved.

1.4. The Aim and Objectives of the Study

The central research aim of this study is to consider whether the central zone of Medina has experienced development or gentrification. Based on this, the following objectives have been set to guide the research. Specifically, however, behind this investigation is the aim of achieving the following four goals:

1. To find out what has triggered redevelopment in the central zone of Medina from the 1970s to date.
2. To identify the major actors that have been involved in the redevelopment of the central zone of Medina.
3. To determine what the impacts have been on local people.
4. To situate this redevelopment within the classic and recent debates on gentrification.

1.5. Methodology

This study draws on qualitative research methods and a theoretical framework of gentrification and urban processes in the Global North/Global South debates in the field of human geography to investigate urban changes in the central zone of Medina, the fourth largest city in Saudi Arabia. The study considers whether these urban changes and renewal amount to gentrification rather than mere redevelopment. For this purpose, a case study approach is taken. Qualitative methods of data collection have been chosen: archival documents, semi-structured interviews, and observation of the research area.

In contrast to the modernist and postmodernist studies of gentrification, the postcolonial and poststructuralist perspective sees each city as having its own unique features, which has given rise to the approach of comparative urbanism (Lees, 2017; Robinson, 2006). Qualitative, rather than quantitative, methods are chosen because the latter are

numerically biased and superficial, offering only a statistical analysis of the phenomenon. Freeman (2006) applied an inductive approach for this study, rather than a positivist deductive approach, as the former seeks to illuminate the relationship between displacement and gentrification in Medina's central zone from the residents' and officials' subjective perspectives.

An in-depth explanation of how the research study was carried out is provided in chapter 3. This section offers a brief description of the use of interviews as a qualitative research method that is appropriate for a study that seeks individuals' perspectives (Freeman 2006). The methods selected are also appropriate for examining a city-specific process within the theoretical framework of comparative urbanism, which sees cities in the Global South as unique entities worthy of scrutiny, rather than as developing (or even inferior) replicas of their counterparts in the Global North (Lees, 2017; Robinson, 2006).

Qualitative methods - in-depth interviews, observation, and content analysis of archival documents - are adopted as tools for data collection. One-on-one interviews were deemed to be the best way to give residents and officials the opportunity to expresses their feelings, perceptions, and experiences in a detailed and nuanced way. My insider position as a Saudi enabled me to establish the rapport necessary for my participants to express their views freely; it did not, however, influence my analysis of the data. Raw data from the interviews were used for analysis, as well as my interpretation of the meaning of their statements regarding the redevelopment, gentrification and displacement that occurred in the central zone.

The semi-structured interviews focused on eliciting the displaced participants' perceptions of the changes and how they had personally been affected. For example, I queried whether they had been compelled to move from the area or had simply been unable to afford the rent after gentrification. I also discussed the implications of the new developments with them, with particular focus on changes in amenities, services, demographics, and social interactions. In the interviews with officials, I sought information about how the changes had been planned and implemented, what had been intended with regards to the long-term residents, and what their personal roles had been.

Besides the interviews, I also collected data from observing the area as it looks now and taking photographs, as well as from archival documents. The latter included reports, newspaper articles, government documents, documentary films and census data (where available). These were collected from different public and private institutions or were found online. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the data, by which the information was systematically organized according to codes and themes. These were then used to report and interpret the data, as discussed further in chapter three.

1.6. Outline of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into two main parts comprising four chapters each, giving a total of eight chapters. The first part contains the introduction, literature review, methodology, and context chapters, which together set the focus of and give the background to the current study. The second part contains the three empirical chapters and the conclusion.

Chapter One is the introduction. It provides an overview of the thesis and its structure. It discusses the research background of the study, the importance of the study and its objectives. Chapter Two grounds the study in the theoretical framework through a review of the literature on urbanization in the Middle East and the significance of the spectacular urbanization that occurred in Dubai and Abu-Dhabi as prototypical examples of gentrification as a global phenomenon and its relationship with tourism. These cities also exemplify the role of global finance in the development of Islamic cities. The chapter further explores the role of religious tourism in urban (re)development in terms of its economics and its implications for urban development in the Middle East in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular as the home of two of the holiest cities for Muslims. Thirdly, an attempt is made in the chapter to find a synergy between global gentrification and gentrification in Islamic cities. This sets the premise for the study of the gentrification of Medina. Chapter Three justifies the use of a single case study approach and the choice of qualitative methods. Chapter Four provides information about Medina in the context of Saudi Arabian urbanization processes. It explains the suitability of the city for a single case study by explaining the role of Medina in Saudi Arabia's urban history and hierarchy,

and the developments that motivated the rural to urban migration process witnessed in the city. Furthermore, the chapter presents the urban economic, political and cultural contexts of the city.

The second part of the thesis starts with Chapter Five, the first empirical chapter, which answers the first research question. It discusses the emergence of redevelopment and gentrification in Medina by royal decree, which occurred in the first phases. Drawing on the interviews and archival data, it explores the factors that contributed to the development witnessed in the central zone of Medina in the second wave. Chapter Six answers the second research question by uncovering who the major actors were in the redevelopment process. It also draws on the data to reveal how the development in the previous wave set the stage for gentrification and the displacement of former residents. It covers the second wave, that is, from the 1990s to the present. Chapter Seven answers the third research question, using data collected through the interviews and archives to examine how the process of urban redevelopment affected the lives of the local people. Chapter Eight, the conclusion, reiterates the key empirical findings and the contributions that the study makes to the literature. It highlights the extent to which the redevelopment in the central zone of Medina resonates with classic and more recent debates in the gentrification literature.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1. Introduction

The aim of this research is to ascertain whether central Medina has experienced redevelopment or gentrification. A comprehensive literature review is presented in this chapter, in order to define the concepts and provide an overview of the literature on gentrification, the process of urban renewal and redevelopment, and urbanization, with a focus on the Middle East. It also presents debates on gentrification in the contexts of global cities, the Middle East and cities in the Muslim world. These concepts form the theoretical framework on which this study is based.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section covers the various debates surrounding and definitions of gentrification as well as how its conceptualisations has progressed over time amongst scholars, thereby revealing new aspects of urban redevelopment and gentrification. The second section describes the urbanisation processes in the Middle East and describes the context as well as the nature of Islamic cities. The latter includes the general features of these cities in terms of urban forms and their economic and political situations. Then, the spectacular urbanization and changing shapes of the premier Emirati cities Dubai and Abu Dhabi are discussed in order to provide a background for this current study. In the third section, the chapter discusses religious tourism and urban (re)development as well as the implications of the former on

the latter in Saudi Arabia as well as in the gentrification literature, citing the examples of cities such as Rome and Jerusalem. In the fourth section, literature is reviewed within the global North and global South debates in an attempt to demonstrate a synergy between global gentrification and gentrification in Islamic cities. In the fifth section, the chapter summarises the debates on global gentrification and on the new comparative urbanism, considering in particular the gentrification occurring in other cities in the Muslim world, such as Cairo and Damascus, within the global context in order to identify the existing gaps in the literature which justify this study.

2.2. Conceptualizing Gentrification: Evolution, Definitions, and Debates

Gentrification as a concept has attracted scholarly attention since its formulation by Glass in the 1960s. She described the phenomenon as the impact of the affluent rich class in a society, known as the 'gentry', buying and renovating properties, cottages and old mews in London's neighbourhoods. This situation led her to assert that:

Once this process of "gentrification" starts in a district it goes on rapidly until all or most of the original working-class occupiers are displaced and the social character of the district is changed. (Glass 1964: 22)

Subsequent debates around the concept have led to what Hamnett (1991) described as a concerted effort to explore the wide-ranging literature on the subject and its consequences. This research these efforts produced a number of publications in the field (e.g. Lee et al., 2008; Davidson, 2006; Davisson & Lee, 2005; Atkinson, 2003; Smith &William, 1986), which have all focussed on clarifying the definitions of gentrification, its applications and the discourses concerning its impact on the development of modern cities around the world (Lees et al., 2008 and Lees et al., 2016). The concept has therefore evolved to include various debates about urbanization processes in the global North and global South.

Following Glass's initial research, several other scholars, such as Smith (1979, 1982, 1986) and more recently, Lee et al. (2008) and Clark (2005), have concentrated on defining and exploring the link between gentrification and various urban changes in other cities of the world. Smith's (1982) definition of the term is one of the most popular, as it highlights that the process of redevelopment in such cases involves not simply a rehabilitation of old structures but the construction of new buildings. He stressed this by writing:

By gentrification I mean the process by which working class residential neighbourhoods are rehabilitated by middle class homebuyers, landlords and professional developers. I make the theoretical distinction between gentrification and redevelopment. Redevelopment involves not rehabilitation of old structures but the construction of new buildings on previously developed land. (Smith, 1982, p. 139)

Previously, Hamnett (1973) defined gentrification by relating it to middle-class and upper-class income groups invading spaces that had traditionally been inhabited by working-class families. Both scholars are unanimous in emphasising gentrification as a process that involves the middle class. Their consideration of the impact of redevelopment affirmed Williams' (1976) definition of gentrification, which suggests that it relates to the refurbishment (or reconstruction) of the structures as well as the alteration of the social composition of the urban area. Both of these aspects are related to economic development and changing the social class from the working to the upper class. The common perception behind the process of gentrification is that working-class people lack the resources to look after their homes, and therefore more asset-rich middle class incomers could make improvements to the area by buying and renovating. Thus, the phenomenon identified by the aforementioned studies has come to be called 'classic gentrification', which involves the movement of households into and out of properties which, in the process, are redeveloped (Smith & Hackworth, 2001; Lees et al., 2008).

Thus, in the beginning, gentrification was widely associated with the improvement and renovation of the houses in urban areas. However, over time, the retail and commercial structure of the cities was also undergoing distinct transformations, and terms such as 'retail-led' and 'commercial gentrification' emerged in the literature (e.g. Bridge and Dowling, 2001; Zukin et al., 2009; Shin and Kim, 2016; Postma ,2017; Hubbard 2017).

Smith (1982) argued that little attention has been paid to the causes and mechanisms behind commercial gentrification, as gentrification has predominantly been considered in terms of the residential changes noted above, whereby middle-class incomers were displacing older working-class residents by renovating dwellings which then increased property prices and rents (Butler and Lees, 2006; Shin et al., 2016).

Over time, the political context and the use of the term gentrification have changed. In the 1970s, many scholars used to avoid the term gentrification, opting instead to describe the transformation of urban landscapes as 'revival', 'renewal', 'reinvestment' and 'revitalization', which carry more positive connotations rather than a critical one (Albert, 2017). Since 1980, a critical analysis of gentrification has been promoted through a plethora of conceptualizations and re-conceptualizations of the term from different angles, creating a variety of descriptions of the transformations of both urban and non-urban areas (Lees et al., 2015). Smith (1982) defined it as the redevelopment of old structures and the construction of new buildings on previously developed land, while others focussed on economic and political developments as well as changes in the social composition of urban areas (Hackworth, 2001, 2002; William, 1976) or on the commercial benefits (Bridge and Dowling, 2001; Zukin et al., 2009; Shin and Kim, 2016; Albert, 2017; Hubbard 2017), which are still perceived as the positive impact of gentrification. Smith (1982) argued that more attention needs to be paid to the causes and mechanisms behind commercial gentrification. Despite the recognition of both the positive and negative impacts of gentrification, resistance to the usage of the term continues to rise as property developers, political forces and 'gentrifiers' avoid it due to its associations with the dark side of urban revival (Albert, 2017; Lees et al., 2016).

Lees et al. (2008) suggest that gentrification has changed in form over time and that the classic definitions of it have been expanded to cover all the aspects of development, redevelopment, social, economic and political transformation, revitalization and displacement, any of which may or may not be the outcome of gentrification in a specific context. Furthermore, Beauregard (2003) held that the one city case study approach in gentrification research does not suffice in a comparative context. This view contrasts with Clark's (2005) very particular (realist) way of connecting different forms of gentrification, which involves taking cases out of their context so as to apply them to all

contexts. Arguably, this offers a more comprehensive view suitable for modern contexts compared to the single city model. According to him: Gentrification is a process involving a change in the population of land-users such that the new users are of higher socio-economic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built-environment through a reinvestment in the fixed capital. The greater the difference in the socio-economic status, the more noticeable the process, not least because the more powerful the new users are, the more marked will be the concomitant change in the built environment. It does not matter where, it does not matter when. Any process of change fitting this description is, to my understanding, gentrification. Clark (2005, p.263) Irrespective of where the emphasis is, redevelopment or change in the socio-economic status of the land users, Glass's (1964) definition still provides a starting point for all arguments, even when there are visible changes that involve previous land users as well as the new users, who are usually of a higher social and economic status.

The focus of this current study is the type of gentrification that happened in central Medina. Clark's (2005) definition above offers three important characteristics of gentrification which can be observed in Medina: first, the displacement of residents of a lower socio-economic status by those with a higher status; secondly, the flow of capital to restructure the fixed capital in the urban and /or rural areas (Phillips, 1993); and noticeable changes in the built-environment due to reinvestment and refurbishment of the urban area. This is possibly the reason that Zukin (2010) stresses the process of wealthier people displacing poorer ones as the seminal feature of gentrification. This means that lower class people are essentially pushed out by a more upward social and cultural group from the same society.

Thus, the concept of gentrification has evolved from the classical era (1960-1990) to the modern era (2000-2010) and beyond as the concept continues to generate debates to the present time in terms of conceptualization, definition and understanding of the term, even as the subject continues to shift. In particular, gentrification is no longer restricted to the Western world; it has gone global, as Atkinson & Bridge (2005) argue. It has become a global urban strategy (Smith, 2002) which is no longer characteristic only of Europe, North America or Oceania. Furthermore, it has moved away from city centres to include suburbs (Badcock, 2001; Robson & Butler, 2001) as well as rural areas (Phillips, 1993,

2002; Smith & Phillips, 2001). It must be borne in mind that the term 'gentrification' may not have been applied originally to many of the restructurings which have occurred in recent years around the globe, but the processes are very similar. Furthermore, the form of gentrification has also mutated and no longer includes just private landlords or developers; now it can also be state-led, often in collaboration with developers (Hackworth, 2002; Lambert & Boddy, 2002). There can also be commercial gentrification (Carroll & Connell, 2000; Curran, 2004) and super gentrification (Lees 2000, 2003), which is the redevelopment of previously gentrified sites.

However, despite the dispersal and mutation of the term, certain features have been identified as crucial. Thus, apart from reflecting the challenges of explaining and interpreting gentrification in different contexts, there are a number of publications focussing on the urban temporal and spatial transformations which were termed a 'mutation of gentrification' (Lees et al., 2016). The evolution of gentrification in terms of temporal changes can be described using the three-stage model developed by Hackworth and Smith (2001), which is discussed further in the next section.

2.2.1. The Evolution of Gentrification: Spatial and Temporal Transition

Hackworth and Smith (2001) developed a three-stage model of the evolution of gentrification based on the sporadic gentrification that occurred on a small scale in neighbourhoods of the biggest cities in Europe and the US from the1950s to the early 1970s. Glass's (1964) seminal research was carried out during this as part of the first wave of gentrification research by notable and pioneering scholars. During this period, research in the field was sporadic, as the changes were occurring only on a small scale in certain neighbourhoods and were limited to big cities in Europe and the US.

This stage was followed by the second wave, which took place towards the end of the 1970s, and was marked by the process of gentrification becoming entrenched in central city neighbourhoods as well as by the expansion of gentrification into medium sized cities and even rural areas (Phillips, 1993). During the second wave, the role of the private

sector in gentrifying city centres and medium sized cities assumed a great deal of importance. According to Hackworth and Smith (2001), this stage showed the integration of gentrification within a "wider range of economic and cultural processes at the global and national scales" (p.468). Thus, one could argue that the term became more commonly used gradually during the second stage and into the third stage, which commenced towards the end of the 1980s.

Whilst the second stage has been characterized as both a period of expansion and resistance during which an "aggressive entrepreneurial spirit" was recognized (Lee et al., 2008, p. 175), the third stage witnessed, according to Shaw (2005), governments working together with the private sector. The latter arguably is the period when gentrification spread across the globe, even though there was also a "recessional pause and subsequent expansion" at this time (Lee et al., 2008, ibid). It continued despite the financial crunch caused by the reduced flow of capital put towards gentrifying areas of cities due to the worldwide economic recession that occurred during this period. Hackworth (2002) notes that in the third stage, gentrification became a large–scale capital project in which corporate developers paired with federal and local governments. The stage also saw the appearance of a process scholars refer to as 'de-genetrification' (Lee et al., 2008, p.277) whereby corporate and government involvement was more significant than that of the pioneer gentrifiers seen in the first stage. Thus, the first stage involved only pioneering gentrifiers, whilst the second witnessed only governments as facilitators through the establishment of rules and policies. The third stage, then, is when the role of government morphed into becoming 'genetrifiers' themselves. Thus, this study will fill a gap in the literature by exploring how the government, private investors and developers have been involved in the gentrification of Medina.

Furthermore, tourism as an industry and as a gentrifying force emerged during the third stage, in conjunction with the newfound involvement of the corporate sector, thus denoting the beginning of tourism gentrification in both urban and rural areas. This type of gentrification led to the demolition of old structures, the renovation of historical buildings, and the development of infrastructure for tourists, including hotels and transportation facilities. Principally because scholars have used the term 'tourism gentrification' to denote these developments in urban areas, Albert (2017) and Gant

(2005) have argued that tourism is also a gentrifying process which indirectly causes displacement by constraining the quality of life for residents. Gravari-Barbas and Guinand (2017) have similar thinking that tourism gentrification force for shaping urban and socio-economic landscapes. Ultimately, this results in the movement of residents away from tourist areas. Of particular relevance to the context of this study is religious tourism, based on the unique nature of the developments that have taken place in Central Medina. Consequently, this study attempts to fill the gap in the literature on the role of tourism – particularly religious tourism - in the redevelopment of the case study city, Medina, and if this can be interpreted and defined as a gentrifying process which has displaced residents.

Apart from the argument that tourism is a gentrifying process (Gant, 2005), several other factors have been identified as affecting gentrification in urban areas and possibly rural areas as well. Although they constitute small-scale factors, they are discussed below in the context of the broad debates about production versus consumption as driving gentrification. The former category comprises factors such as commercial and retail activities, public investment and tourism (due to its connection to local amenities), while cultural strategies[2] as well as fall under consumption. These factors of gentrification are reviewed in the next section.

2.2.2. Consumption and Production as Dynamics of Gentrification

Scholars who look at consumption as a driver of gentrification focus on the identity and importance of gentrifiers and their characteristics, as well as the range of motivations that underpin the process (Lees et al., 2008). In this view, gentrification is perceived as a consequence of a transformation in the industrialised and occupational structure of an area, a process that occurs only if people actually desire to move into newly redeveloped areas, thus creating demand.

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[2] "City authorities and urban development agencies use arts and culture-related initiatives as tools of urban revitalization" (GRIFFITHS, 1995:253).

It is difficult to separate the consumption side entirely from the production side, as many of the motivations as well as the gentrifiers themselves depend on capital investments derived from the rent gap theory, a situation where the rental value of the land falls below its potential value (Smith 1987). However, there are specific factors that underlie the preferences consumers have for redeveloped areas. Inner city developments attract young, middle class professionals who want to live in close proximity to their workplace and to restaurants, leisure sites and cultural activities (Thomas et al., 2015). Thus, under consumption, attention is focused on the gentrifiers. Belk (1988) sees consumption as being a source of identity for gentrifiers looking for a way of distinguishing themselves from others; they find this in residential environments, especially buildings and neighbourhoods which are highly visible and distinctive (Jager, 1986). Boorstin (1973) conceptualised this as a 'consumption community' where people with similar values and lifestyles come together. These neighbourhoods are socially constructed and provide residents with a sense of belonging, thus creating a perceived common identity (Cole, 1985). However, the neighbourhoods are likely to take time to evolve, as Ilkucan and Sandikci's (2005) study of Istanbul shows; in the early stages of gentrification, the consumers were university students and artists who were looking for affordable housing in a convenient city centre area. However, those who followed them were more affluent and likely to be making a lifestyle choice, and what appealed to them was the social diversity of the area, the historic buildings and the cultural amenities (Ibid.).

Conversely, Zukin (2010) described a gentrified city as one which has lost its soul. Such loss is exemplified by the displacement of the city's native population by middle class newcomers (Smith, 1996; Slater, 2009). In addition, the facilities are replaced and homogenised by global chains of restaurants and stores (Deener, 2007; Zukin, 2009). Butler and Robson (2003) argue that newcomers do not participate in neighbourhood activities, although Karsten (2014) found that new residents are involved on a local basis, with some of them opening up small businesses. However, these so-called losses may occur without gentrification, as modern social practices and tastes evolve. In looking at the processes that have taken place in Medina, this study will investigate the attitudes and perceptions of those involved in the regeneration of the central zone.

The large number of cultural strategies undertaken at both the micro and macro levels in large and medium sized cities of the world unveil their connection to gentrification. Zukin (1995) argued that various strategies are applied by cities in order to become distinct, gain a competitive edge and participate in inter-urban competitions, such as through cultural institutions, innovative designs, and star architects. Another way of standing out in the inter-urban competition is through the creation of flagships for entrainment and business purposes, such as entertainment districts, festivals and culturally distinct marketplaces (Hanningan, 1998; Boyer, 1992). In addition, convention centres (Sanders, 2002), sports arenas (Chapin, 2004; Noll and Zimbalist, 1997), and office complexes are reported to play a catalytic role in urbanization and gentrification (Bianchini et al., 1992). It could be surmised that cultural consumption now plays an important role in the features of major cities. This view is in line with Currid and Williams' (2010) claim that industries are not tied to "urban location, but are linked more with "infrastructure and their social and economic networks" (p.322). One could subsequently surmise that cities such as Sydney, Beijing, New York and London have adopted these strategies as an instrument for economic revitalization, with "arts, high end labour pools and firms, and generation of tourism revenue… boosting consumer demand" (Ibid,2010, p330), which is an instrument in urban development and economic growth (Hiller, 2000).

This also affirms Florida's (2002) line of thought that cultural strategies play an influential role in attracting the "creative class" and in stimulating consumer spending, although Markusen (2006) criticised this as fuzzy logic in which the creative class and its relationship to urban growth is grounded on the "spatial and political proclivities" (p.1921)) of educational attainment rather than creativity. This contestation aside, theorists such as Glaeser (2003); Chapple, Jackson, and Martin (2010) have also observed that cities with a plethora of local and cultural amenities witness rapid growth in terms of population influx, and this is considered a positive outcome of gentrification since it attracts investors and the elite class to inner-city areas. Other positive outcomes of gentrification that scholars have identified are a decrease in crime, an improvement in local services, social mix /poverty deconcentration, a boost in local tax revenues, and physical and infrastructural renewal (Atkinson, 2002, p.17). Similarly, Freeman (2011) found that many of his respondents welcomed the benefits of gentrification in central

New York. Thus, he noted that there are facets of gentrification that residents appreciate irrespective of the negative aspects, such as mixing elite newcomers with long-term residents, which has the potential to be both combustible and complimentary. Unlike the emphasis of scholars such as Slater (2004), Vigdor (2002), and Schill and Nathan (1983) on displacement as the primary negative outcome of gentrification, Freeman (2011) articulated a balanced view whereby suspicions and differing expectations and norms must be negotiated. Furthermore, he argues that contrary to the popular view that low income, especially black residents, are forced to move out of gentrified neighbourhoods, his findings in Clinton Hill and Harlem show that gentrification has increased social and economic diversity in these neighbourhoods, although "social ties rarely cross class and racial lines" (Freeman, 2011, p.14). He also argued that while diversity in terms of classes, ethnicities and races is laudable, it also has the potential to generate explosive scenarios if not properly managed and negotiated.

Similarly, other scholars have reported that cultural strategies are used as means to attract tourists, thereby promoting social stratification (Zukin, 1995; N. Smith, 1996). Researchers such as Zukin (1995, 2009) have stressed the role of cultural strategies in driving the cultural economy forward and creating 'commercialised urban spaces' which are subsequently employed to promote tourism and increase entertainment options for residents; yet these strategies are considered the main cause of increased gentrification and displacement due to rising property values.

A question that remains to be resolved is whether tourism has a negative outcome on social stratification or not. This issue is a central focus of this research, which considers whether attracting tourists necessarily equates with changes in social stratification, or if tourism can be had without gentrification. This issue, coupled with the notions of regeneration and redevelopment without displacement, is central to this study. Thus, gaps in the literature which this study attempts to fill include: whether the consumption of culture is necessarily connected to gentrification in Medina and whether there has been regeneration and tourism without gentrification in this city.

In any case, though a complex concept, the literature has demonstrated how "culture is a powerful means of controlling cities" (Zukin, 2009; Zukin, 1995,p.1), in the sense of

determining who belongs in specific areas of the cities and who does not. Scholars such as Florida (2002) and Landry (2008) have argued that cultural strategies have benefits which aid development, including aesthetic improvements and sound economic growth in areas that have witnessed urbanisation and gentrification. This view in line with Chapple et al. (2010), who posited that the development of public spaces does not only serve the cultural tastes of the middle class but has economic value as well, since the provision of shops, restaurants, art galleries and historic preservations can be part of a program to raise revenue and stimulate residents and visitors alike to spend their disposable income. Freeman (2011) asserted that the indigenous residents of gentrified neighbourhoods "they obtain better services and amenities wherever they live" (p.14). Hence, they often receive the changes with mixture of appreciation, resentment and resignation. Moreover, he found that the social networks in Clinton Hill and Harlem, the sites of his study, were often "impervious to the changes taking place around them" (p.14).

Conversely, the production view looks at gentrification from the opposite angle, by exploring the role of capital and investors in the gentrification process. Thus, this view stresses the importance of capital movement and the people who invest in gentrification rather than the cultural strategies that emphasise people and their consumption. This reflects Smith's (1979, 2010) assertion that city changes and urbanization are driven by capital and not people. He argues that gentrification is based on capitalist appropriation and profit; in other words, it is an economic process. Capital is invested in an area in order to accumulate profits. Since Smith's seminal work, there has been a focus within the field on investigating this economic process inherent in gentrification and empirically examining gentrification in different cities (e.g., Marcuse (1985) in New York; Hamnett and Randolph (1984, 1986) in London; Carpenter and Lees (1995) in New York, London and Paris; Caulfield (1994) in Toronto; and Badcock (2001) in Adelaide.

Smith's (1979, 2010) concern stemmed from the uneven development of urban spaces, which he linked to capital investment in the inner city. Smith linked this phenomenon to the end of the Second World War and the flow of capital in the Global North towards suburbs, where it was used to develop recreational, residential, commercial and industrial facilities. This caused a rise in previously low ground rents in these suburban areas and,

simultaneously, a decrease in the value of inner city land. Because the investment of capital was being directed to the suburbs, the inner-city areas were neglected and often fell into disrepair (Bardford & Rubinowitz, 1975). This results in rent-gap, which became central to the production-side theory of gentrification, as it was viewed as the mechanism driving redevelopment. The devaluation of capital in the inner city enabled the revaluation of other areas. When the rent-gap is wide, land developers and other groups buying, and renovating properties invest in abandoned neighbourhoods of the city and make profits by transforming them for new, richer inhabitants (Smith 1986). Smith's focus on production and capital fluctuations rather than consumption has been widely critiqued. According to Hamnett (1991), the rent-gap theory should not be used as the only explanation for gentrification. In his view, it does not provide information about the gentrifiers themselves, and as gentrification involves people, the focus should consider people's individual preferences. Munt (1987) likewise pointed to the general neglect of such approaches to examine the role of demand and gentrifiers, who he suggests are consumers wanting to live in central areas of the city.

Even those who support Smith's theory of rent-gap find that there are certain deviations. For example, Clark (1988) concluded that the rent gap takes some time to arise but narrows once redevelopers take interest in the property. Nevertheless, Clark's (1988) study demonstrates that rent gaps are important in the process of transforming urban environments. Other studies, including those of Hamnett and Randolph (1986) and Lees (1994), agree that the transformation of rental properties into privately owned land is sporadic, both spatially and temporally. Indeed, Clark (1988) suggests that the time between building depreciation and redevelopment can vary between 75 and 125 years. Thus, the influences on gentrification come from both political and economic conditions, as well as the time factor, and all of these issues are relevant to this study of the city centre of Medina.

Another question in the gentrification debate is whether gentrification leads to retail changes or vice versa, or whether there is no relation between retail change and gentrification. For instance, Koebel (2014) conducted a study of six major cities to investigate the impact of a changing commercial format in urban areas on gentrification. He found little association between commercial factors and gentrification. However, he

did observe that revitalization and development projects are contributory factors to gentrification. In contrast to the findings reported by Koebel, Chapple and Jacobus (2009) showed that the growth of chain retailers in the San Francisco Bay area prompted gentrification and bipolarity of the urban social structure. Similarly, Metzer and Schuetz (2011) revealed similar findings in New York City, where the arrival of retailers in low-income areas caused gentrification by upgrading the neighbourhood. Many other studies have supported this position, asserting that commercial activities mediated gentrification in California and Asian countries (Schuetz, 2015)

Thus, in what Kasinitz and Zukin (2016) and Zukin et al. (2009) refer to as retail–led gentrification, changes in the retail or commercial outlook of an urban area leads to demographic changes. These scholars assert that retailing plays a major role as a driving force in the changes occurring in neighbourhoods where local shops had been presumed to reflect the socio-economic character of the neighbourhoods which subsequently witnessed the "replacement of corner cafes with coffee shops; convenience grocery stores with delis, pubs with wine bars" (Hubbard, 2017, p.3). Hubbard (2017) argues that these transformations are a vital stage in the gentrification and upscaling of neighbourhoods. In the same vein, Kasinitz and Zukin (2016) wrote that these changes serve as a means of supplying the "new consumption spaces for the material needs of more affluent residents and newcomers". It also becomes the source of their "tangible social and cultural capital, as new stores, cafes and bars become hangouts for both bohemians and gentrifiers, or places for social networking among stroller- pushing parents and underemployed artists and writers" (Zukin et al., 2009, p.47).

Similarly, Brown-Saracino (2004) revealed that the redevelopment of the retail and commercial market in neighbourhoods undergoing gentrification serves as a signal to the middle classes that the low-income commercial structures of the urban area are being transformed. These signals can cause the displacement of working-class residents by attracting richer residents. On the other hand, changes in the buying power of residents of gentrified neighbourhoods attracts a new mix of retailers in the commercial corridors (Ibid.). Accordingly, Freeman (2006) asserts that not only does the gentrifying middle class enjoy the benefits of gentrification, but the working-class residents of Clinton Hill and Harlem also saw their share of the brightness and fortunes which gentrification

brought to their neighbourhoods. However, this position is fraught with complexities, as residents view the changes with mixed feelings of reception and optimism on the one hand and pessimism and distrustfulness on the other. However, residents felt the possibility of achieving upward mobility without having to escape to the suburbs or to predominantly white neighbourhoods, and felt pride at their inner city neighbourhoods were brought into "the mainstream of American commercial life with concomitant amenities and services that others might take for granted. Hence, commerce, the middle class and globalization become the means of transforming forlorn neighbourhoods which initially were portrayed as forlorn neighbourhoods to white neighbours" (Freeman, 2006,p.1).

This position arguably means that gentrification serves the tangible needs of both the affluent newcomers and the long-time residents in terms of supplying social and cultural capital (Zukin, 1991). This is demonstrated by Loukaitou-Sideris (2002) and Hackworth and Rekers (2005), who reported that retail was a catalyst of gentrification in Toronto and Los Angeles, respectively, where incomers were attracted by the presence of ethnic commodification, which in turn revitalized the real estate markets.. Furthermore, new restaurants, stores and coffee shops are noticeable public spaces where social and economic transactions take place and where the culture is acted out, thereby giving residents a sense of place and belonging (Zukin et al., 2009).

Based on the foregoing, it could be argued that when new retailers offer products and services which were not previously available in an area, the response from local residents tends to be positive. As Freeman (2006) suggested, his subjects expressed pride at the inclusion of their neighbourhood in the American commercial mainstream, even if the situation caused the displacement of some long-time residents. The phenomenon of existing small retailers being driven out of an urban area undergoing gentrification is nevertheless normally seen as negative (Sullivan and Shaw, 2011; Freeman, 2006) (see section 2.2.3 for further discussion of displacement as a consequence of gentrification). It is part of a complex process whereby, for example, the arrival of McDonald's, KFC, and Starbucks may lead to the displacement of retailers operating on a small scale, and at the same time, the entrance of sophisticated, large-scale retailers can also raise property prices, which in turn causes the direct displacement of working-class residents who can

no longer afford to live in the area (Zukin, 2009). This investigates whether this occurred in central Medina, which no study has heretofore considered.

The fact that the working class are arguably unable to compete with middle class gentrifiers is therefore a key argument that supports the role of changes in the commercial or retail structure in causing gentrification and displacement. However, the process of gentrification and displacement is not as simple as it often appears. A complex network of factors, including economic buying power, social class differences, race, cultural capital and cultural factors such as values, sentiments, attitudes, ideas, beliefs, and choices, are at the forefront of mediating relations between commercial/retail change and the gentrification of a neighbourhood (Lees, 2003; Zukin et al., 2009; Fisherman, 2006). For Beauregard (1986), the consumption lifestyle of the new middle-class residents leads to the creation of new consumption spaces outside of the home to serve them, mainly restaurants, cinemas and nightclubs. Although there are social class differences between old and new residents in gentrified neighbourhoods and some studies (e.g. Freeman, 2006) have shown that there may be racial differences as well, it is uncertain how much race plays a factor in long time residents' use and opinion of new retail. Monroe, Sullivan and Shaw (2011), however, found that oftentimes, long-time Black residents express negative feelings, using racialized language, about the newcomers, detailing why they do not like the products offered and how they feel culturally excluded. In contrast, long-time White dwellers were more likely to fully embrace the new retail outlets.

The overall increase in rental prices associated with more customer traffic to chains such as Starbucks, McDonald's and M&S, brings about intensive competition between market forces on the one hand and the people and agencies that are involved in the market forces on the other. Such competition is reported to be a main factor in the failure of local business and their consequent displacement from an area undergoing gentrification (Deener, 2007, Maly, 2008).Empirical research (Wang, 2011) has demonstrated the mixed response to changes in the retail outlook of a gentrified area. This, in turn, affects the relationship between public investments and gentrification.

Regarding public investments and gentrification, the majority of studies in the gentrification literature have focussed on the influence of capital and private actors on

gentrification, but increasing attention has been paid recently to the role of government. Governments in many countries have enacted policies relating to the revitalization and redevelopment of their country's public-sector infrastructure, and this constitutes a source of the transformation of urban neighbourhoods (Smith, 2002; Smith, 2013; Fraser and Kick, 2007).

A number of researchers, including Marcuse (1986) and Van Weesep (1994), among others, emphasised the relationship between gentrification and public policy. In recent years, as indicated by Smith (2002) and Wyly and Hammel (2005), different governments around the world have seen gentrification as a regeneration strategy. The result is state-led gentrification, which generates more expensive housing in low-income areas, as noted by Hackworth and Smith (2001), Lees (2008) and Uitermark et al. (2007). In such scenarios, gentrification becomes a policy tool used by the state to intervene in dilapidated urban neighbourhoods. This type of gentrification is also known as 'social mixing', 'urban restructuring' or 'urban renaissance'. As early as the 1960s and 1970s there were policies in place in London that encouraged gentrification, including the provision of improvement grants (Hamnett, 1973) but because these policies focused on redistribution, gentrification was, in effect, often delayed (Ley, 1996). By the 1990s, 'more than ever before, gentrification [had been] incorporated into public policy', as noted by Wyly and Hammel (2005: 74), suggesting that by then, state actors were promoting gentrification more assertively.

As explained above, Hackworth and Smith (2001) identified three waves of gentrification that characterise the relationship between the process and state actors. In the first wave, from the 1950s until 1973, properties in areas experiencing economic recession and therefore lacking investment were renovated by 'risk-oblivious pioneers' for their own use. This was often supported by the public. The gentrification that occurred in the post-recession decades of the 1970s and 1980s was the second wave and was linked to global systems of real estate and banking. This became more extensive over time, but governments tended to adopt a 'laissez- faire' attitude towards it. Starting in the mid-1990s, state actors used gentrification as a policy tool in what Hackworth and Smith called the third wave of gentrification.

Even though the role of the state in more recent gentrification processes is understood to be prominent, it remains underexplored. Scholars such as Smith (2002) have demonstrated that gentrification is 'a global urban strategy'. Nonetheless, the methods, strategies and motivations of state actors in supporting gentrification in different contexts can only be understood through further research, as noted by Doucet et al. (2011).

Research has shown that government initiatives pertaining to the development of neighbourhood infrastructure, such as transit facilities, schools, hospitals, highways, government housing societies, and public spaces such as parks constitute major components of urban renewal and revitalization; and they are said to have a major role in the improvement of a neighbourhood (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001; Neman and Wyly, 2006). The impact of these schemes, however, is subject to debate and criticism. Thus, scholars such as Lees (2008), Lees et al. (2008), Butler and Lees (2006), Walks and Maaranen (2008), Gotham (2001), and Holcomb and Beauregard (1981) have observed that while government initiatives are often promoted as improvements, academic researchers tend to be quite critical of them, in part because they are seen to spur gentrification.

This debate is central to the current study, which looks at the relationship between state-led improvements in the central zone of Medina and gentrification in the light of arguments from scholars such as Smith, (2013) that although the development of physical infrastructure is intended to provide services for residents and improve their lifestyle, they often differ , in terms of social result , from one community to another . Similarly, Goetz (2003) showed how poverty alleviation programs in African American communities in the USA have been ineffective. These studies report that the federal government initiated housing mobility programs focusing on the deconcentration of poverty through a change in government policy to encourage consensus among policy makers and scholars, but that these projects were ineffective. Contrary to expectation, they merely led to the displacement of low-income residents from the targeted urban areas rather than alleviating poverty, which had ostensibly been the key objective of the housing and development policies (Joseph, 2006).

Similarly, governmental policies for developing physical infrastructure in low-income residents' neighbourhoods may result in their displacement and the subsequent gentrification of the area. This means that both government policies for urban development as well as infrastructure could result in the displacement of low-income residents. As Bridge et al. (2012) noted, government development programs in urban areas often proved detrimental to low-income and poverty-stricken residents because they resulted in an increase in rents and property values. Therefore, critics of government policies aimed at renewal and revitalization argue that housing and commercial policies have caused the displacement of low-income residents and therefore constitute state-sponsored gentrification (Ibid.), even if the intention was only to upgrade services and infrastructure.

This perhaps the reason that Lees (2008) calls for a critical evaluation of social mixing policies that may be detrimental rather than helpful to the communities such policies are meant to assist. Research has shown how such policies, which are implemented to foster diversity and harmonious socializing between various ethnicities, races and classes, have instead led to greater social segregation, displacement and social polarization (Lees, 2000; Lees et al., 2008; Holcomb and Beauregard, 1981). In fact, the results in the US have been dismal (Lees, 2008; Lees et al.,2008; Gotham, 2001), although Barnsbury, Islington in the UK has seen more success (Lees et al., 2008; Butler and Lees, 2006). Generally, social mixing policies have caused racial segregation in the US and UK and decreased rather than increased mixing between races, classes and ethnicities in Canada (Walks & Maaranen, 2008). Thus, Lees et al. (2008) conclude that social mixing policies only lead to more gentrification, segregation and polarization.

For all of the reasons above, Kennedy and Leonard (2001, p. 5) argued that "gentrification is a double-edged sword… [It is] often a productive by-product of revitalizing city neighbourhoods, but it can impose great cost on certain individual families and businesses, often those least able to afford them". Thus, the consequences of gentrification may be positive or negative for different stakeholders depending on the way they personally are affected (Newman and Wyly, 2006; Lees, 2006). For instance, neighbourhoods may lose most of the corner restaurants and stores, but they can enjoy the variety and commodification brought by the arrival of major chain retailers and

supermarkets that occurs as part of gentrification (Davidson, 2008; Curiel, 2000; Palen and London, 1984). Also, low-income residents may fear rising rental prices due to an increase in taxes, which lead to higher rents and property prices; others may welcome the financial equity they accrue due to price appreciation (Brown-Saracino, 2013).

These issues are complex and multifaceted, and few studies have been undertaken which might help us understand the impact of government housing policies on changes in neighbourhood demographics and on gentrification. Nonetheless, the development of public transport, such as rail tracks, rapid transit, and bus routes, has been shown to raise property values and rental prices (Johnson, 2003; Brown, 2004; Pollack et al., 2010; Dominie, 2012; Kahn, 2007). Therefore, there is a need to conduct studies in different contexts to determine the relationship between government mediated housing policies and gentrification, which is the focus of this study. A significant issue that is of relevance to this study is that of state–led gentrification and regeneration policies that are based on religion as a major attraction drawing tourists from all parts of the world to this location. Thus, the debates in the literature about the relationship between tourism and gentrification are discussed below.

Consumption, Tourism and Gentrification

Aside from the literature on the economic values of consumption and production discussed previously, tourism is another area that boosts the economy and promotes multicultural experiences. A type of gentrification has been seen to result from tourism, which Gant (2015) described as "a process of socio-spatial change in which neighbourhoods are transformed according to the needs of affluent consumers, residents and visitors alike" (Gant, 2015, p. 4), similar to the ways that consumption and production cause transformations in various neighbourhoods. The existing literature on gentrification sheds some light on its relationship to tourism. Gravari-Barbas and Guinand (2017) argue that tourism is a critical force shaping contemporary social and economic urban landscapes. To these scholars, the relationship between gentrification and tourism is multifaceted and complex because of the impact gentrification has on urban landscape regeneration, 'heritagization', culture, actors, beneficiaries, and, of course, victims. These

effects have necessitated the coining of terms such as 'tourism led gentrification' and 'tourist gentrification'.

Besides Gravari-Barbas and Guinand (2017), researchers such as Mullins (1991), Judd (1999) and Gotham (2005) have suggested that tourism and gentrification are some of the important factors in the development of post-industrial cities. Both are employed as strategies to attract affluent consumers and capital back to the cities. Gant (2015) defined tourism gentrification as a process in which the socio-spatial landscapes of neighbourhoods are transformed according to the needs of affluent consumers, residents and prospective visitors. Thus, Piñeros (2017) showed that in Cartagena, a port city on Colombia's Caribbean coast, both gentrification and tourism support and overlap with each other within time and space. Steyn and Spencer (2016), in their study of Bo-Kaap, Cape Town, also demonstrated how the process of tourism-driven gentrification is a catalyst for change, whereby wealthy investors drive out the original, poorer residents of the area.

Central to the ideas of all of the above scholars is the assertion that tourism gentrification favours the affluent, possibly because tourism is arguably a pleasure that only the wealthy can afford. Zukin (1989), however, argues that gentrified spaces attract non-affluent people who would like to experience a space that is different from their normal conditions. This view aside, the literature on gentrification and tourism illustrates that both processes support and overlap with each other within time and space. In some instances, tourism-oriented urban spaces attract higher income residents through the production of new built environments, and thus encourage gentrification-related processes. In other cases, such as Le Marais in Paris (Gravari-Barbas, 2017), the long and complex process of gentrification over a period of four centuries has created an urban history and space that is appropriated by different populations.

Irrespective of who benefits, and which process promotes the other, both tourism and gentrification are bound to exist within the same urban or rural space. This is possibly why the relationship between them is termed tourism gentrification, a process whereby the cosmopolitan middle-class acts as a major player in producing and consuming tourist sites, and reproduces a similar environment wherever they go (Judd, 2003). Although the

review has stressed the definition of tourism gentrification with regards to the affluent (Gant, 2015) and non-affluent (Gravari-Barbas, 2017; Zukin, 1989), other views must be recognized. For instance, there are cases of tourism without gentrification, such as Spain (Andrade and Lamela,2015), as well as tourism gentrification that is not exclusively urban, as Hines (2010) found in south-central Montana, USA. Similarly, different approaches to gentrification have produced different definitions of tourism gentrification, which, as with gentrification generally, can be categorised as either supply/production or demand/consumption.

Conceptualizing tourism gentrification is problematic because it is contextual and related to the separation of urban spaces used by the host and the visitors. A recognizable factor, however, is its implication for urban development and the subsequent impact of this on local lifestyles. This is possibly the reason Lloyd and Clark's (2001) asserted that the pursuit of urban development is often undertaken to increase local amenities, such as cultural, creational and consumption related opportunities, as well as accommodation befitting the high-skilled professionals and elites. The 'quality of life' slogan is used by agents with a range of powers to transform urban spaces in major cities of the world into places that suit the tastes of affluent consumers; consequently, the consumption patterns of both locals and tourists in the urban areas become increasingly similar. In fact, Lloyd and Clark (Ibid.) argued that "workers in the elite sectors of the post-industrial city make 'quality of life' demands, and in their consumption practices can experience their own urban location as if tourists, emphasizing aesthetic concerns" (Ibid., p. 357).

On the other hand, tourists demand the environment, amenities and daily life practices that allow them to experience the urban lifestyle of a city 'as if residents' (Quaglieri-Domínguez & Russo, 2010; Hiernaux & González, 2014; Maitland & Newman, 2008; Maitland, 2010). Gant (2015) argued that the merging and co-existence of locals and tourists is mirrored in the changes in traditional tourist practices in favour of 'new-urban tourist practices'. The latter comprised mainly visiting simplified landmarks, as guided by the tourist industry (Urry, 1999), including skyscrapers or historic buildings with little connection to the normal urban lifestyle of residents. In contrast to these practices, the 'new-urban tourists' aspire to have authentic and aesthetic experiences which give them a taste of the lives of the city's inhabitants.

Notably, understanding tourism as a force causing gentrification can only be achieved by viewing tourists as inhabitants of the urban spaces dedicated to tourism (Hiernaux and Gonzalez, 2014). In this way, and in line with Gant (2015), tourism is a form of commercially induced gentrification, resulting in the displacement of long-established residents. Gant emphasises that tourism causes changes in a neighbourhood through the provision of services, leading not only to the upgrading of commercial facilities, but also to shifts in the use of public and private spaces. The latter may not differ greatly between local residents and visitors in terms of their behaviour and motivations; therefore, it is almost impossible to distinguish between tourists' and non-tourists' use of urban spaces. Both are regarded as 'middle-class city users' (Gant, 2015) of a gentrified commercial space which may have been designed originally for visitors.

Gant's view is that commercial gentrification causes displacement indirectly through changes in the use of private and public spaces for consumption and entertainment. Several other studies have validated the existence of gentrification caused by the tourism in cities around the world (Zhao et al., 2009; Gotham, 2005; Hines, 2010). Such gentrification is increasingly related to commercial gains, and working-class residents arguably are the losers in such situations because the main concern is boosting the tourist industry. What distinguishes this from other types of gentrification is that tourism leads indirectly to displacement, whereas in other cases it results from housing policies that force long-term residents to involuntarily relocate (Gant, 2015). In any case, the provision of consumption facilities for a high-quality lifestyle plays a critical role in attracting affluent and middle-class consumers (Gladstone and Preau, 2008). Fainstein and Gladstone (1999) demonstrated that the construction of tourist facilities in urban spaces attracts retail and entertainment amenities while simultaneously driving out low-income residents and the small scale retailers that cater to them. Where lower income inhabitants remain, the authors posit that "the city centre belongs to affluent visitors rather to residents, resulting in the exclusion of working-class residents from the core" (Ibid., 1999, p. 23).

The preceding literature affirms that displacement is one of the outcomes of gentrification, irrespective of the reason for the urban transformation, whether it is driven by supply/production or demand/consumption and whether the beneficiary is the affluent

middle class or both the middle and lower classes. The next sub section therefore enumerates the arguments in the literature relating to the overall consequences of gentrification. These consequences vary from one group of stakeholders to another. The main outcomes of gentrification for different stakeholders include the displacement of low income, long-term residents from the gentrified neighbourhood, increased housing costs and tax revenues, changing community institutions and leadership structures, and changes in the cultural fabric and street flavour. These are discussed further below.

2.2.3. Debates Surrounding the Consequences of Gentrification

According to Kennedy and Leonard (2001, p. 5), "gentrification is a double-edged sword… often a productive by-product of revitalizing city neighbourhoods, but it can impose great costs on certain individual families and businesses, often those least able to afford them". Thus, its consequences may be positive or negative depending on the way different stakeholders are affected (Newman and Wyly, 2006; Lees, 2006). For instance, neighbourhoods may lose most of their corner restaurants and stores, but still they can enjoy the variety and commodification brought by major chain retailers and supermarkets (Davidson, 2008; Curiel, 2000; Palen and London, 1984). Similarly, low-income residents may fear rising rental prices and higher taxes, while others may welcome the financial equity that comes with price appreciation (Brown-Saracino, 2013). Thus, the consequences of gentrification vary.

Displacement has received the most academic attention, and has therefore generated various arguments, criticism and support. Freeman (2006) states that despite years of scholarly investigation of this phenomenon, there is still a lack of empirical evidence establishing its relationship to gentrification. Although scholars, geographers and urban developers tend to have different views of displacement, it is indisputably one of the fundamental consequences of the gentrification process, and primarily affects the lower class stakeholders in a neighbourhood undergoing gentrification.

Research endeavours undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s produced significant findings relating to the displacement of long-term inhabitants (Hamnett, 1973; William, 1976; Smith, 1979; Marcuse, 1985; Martin, 2007). The results of these studies varied depending on whether a people-based or a place-based approach was taken. Also, the effects of gentrification on a neighbourhood in terms of displacement were found to be directly proportional to the stringency of laws relating to local housing markets and rules guiding availability. For instance, the displacement in the San Francisco Bay (SFB) area was observed to be higher than other areas due to the greater restrictedness of the housing market (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001). Similarly, in a city-sponsored report, Jonathan (2000) showed that 881 people had been displaced in the SFB area, compared to 300 people in the previous year, due to the restructuring of the housing market and its consequent impact on supply. Similar figures were reported in the city of Atlanta in areas where there were many elderly people living on fixed incomes. It was shown that these residents were forced to leave their neighbourhoods due to rising rents and housing taxes, which were attributed mainly to revitalization projects in the area. The city government initiated a program of tax deferment for residents who were willing to sell their property, which antagonized homeowners. Consequently, this program was not widely used by people inhabiting the areas where revitalization projects were implemented (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001).

Bert and Holm (2009) observed that areas with a softer housing market suffered less from displacement. This finding was based on their examination of Berlin-Prenzlauer Berg in Germany where several abandoned and vacant properties were the focus of revitalization. Developers and government planners used the vacant land to build housing schemes and commercial properties to attract newcomers without displacing current low-income residents (Bernt and Holm, 2009). Thus, the arrival of high-income residents to the area as a result of revitalization simultaneously created economic gains for the population as a whole due to combined opportunities, i.e. the development of new commercial facilities for both the existing residents and the newcomers (Davidson, 2008).

Davidson's (2008) findings support the stance of scholars such as Freeman (2006), Freeman and Braconi (2005), and Vigdor (2002), who all maintained that more evidence is necessary to support any claim that gentrification results in the displacement of an

area's original inhabitants. Furthermore, Freeman (2006) submitted that the quantification of displacement has not yielded credible estimates of degree to which it is caused by gentrification (Freeman, 2006). Slater (2004) pointed to incidences where gentrification has led to displacement in North American cities, although he has been accused of deliberately focussing on this outcome without looking at other ways in which gentrification affects residents. Most scholars in this regard can be considered displacement-centric in the same way (Freeman, 2006). This counter argument is important to this present study, as it seeks to ascertain whether gentrification in the central zone of Medina caused displacement or if it can be considered merely development.

Davidson (2008) found that the introduction of new commercial opportunities benefits both the existing residents and the newcomers, he also notes that the involuntary displacement of poor/low-income residents and residents living in rental accommodations in the area could result. He further argues that this is a direct consequence of the impact of gentrification on taxes, housing renovations and rent increases, and the local lifestyle (Davidson, 2008). It could be surmised that displacement is therefore one of the negative consequences of gentrification. Evidence of this is offered by Grange and Pretorius (2014) in their study on Hong Kong, where they noted that displacement was an outcome of urban redevelopment and renewal, although it was not intended to be the focus of their inquiry.

Chavez (2015) noted the impact of gentrification on the wealth and culture of a regenerated area, observing that while many parties benefit, the gains are unequally distributed, with the wealthier newcomers reaping more. In light of its differing outcomes for various stakeholders, gentrification has been redefined multiple times and referred to euphemistically as reinvestment, redevelopment or regeneration, rehabilitation, or urban renaissance by those who perceive its consequences more positively (Lees et al., 2008).

Regardless of the terminology used to describe the process of gentrification and its consequences, debates continue about the status of displacement, and scholars have stressed the need for inquiries into specific contexts (Lees et al., 2008). Schill and Nathan (1983), Couch (1990) and Franklin et al. (1991) all considered the benefits and gains of gentrification and concluded that these outweigh the downsides. Even Freeman (2006)

did not fail to acknowledge that fact that the costs are unevenly distributed among the various segments of the population. Usually, the losers are members of the low income, semi-skilled class in the society while the middle class tends to benefit more. This buttresses Williams and Smith's (1986:2020) claim that the constant losers are the poor working class who are displaced as gentrification proceeds due to their inability to afford higher housing costs in a tight market. In gentrifying areas, low income residents who cannot afford the pleasures of the changing lifestyle become minorities in the neighbourhood, and in most cases, they are forced to leave the neighbourhood. They often end up on the periphery of the urban areas where there are affordable accommodation opportunities (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001; Martin, 2007).

Just as the concept of gentrification has widened to include different forms, the term displacement has also been extended, as Slater (2009) noted in his review of Marcuse's divisions of displacement. Marcuse (1985) expanded the term displacement in order to indirect means which may not be immediately recognised by those who deny that gentrification leads to displacement. These four types, which Slater (2009) provided based on Marcus (1985), are: 1. Direct last-resident displacement, whereby physical displacement occurs after landlords take measure such as cutting off heat in a building, flooding it, or setting fire to it in order to force the occupants to move out; 2. Economic displacement, where residents must leave because of rent hikes; 3. Direct chain displacement, which goes beyond the standard 'last resident' count to include previous households who were forced to move out due to the deterioration of the building or rent increases, in which case there are visible signs of displacement; and 4. Exclusionary displacement whereby residents cannot access housing because it has been gentrified or abandoned; that is, low-income groups are displaced by pressure and dispossession during the gentrification of their neighbourhood.

This understanding of the different forms of displacement is supported by Lees et al. (2016), who argue that expanding our perceptions of displacement makes us recognise the consequences of neighbourhood social changes. Those being displaced would appear to be the ones most affected by urban changes, whilst others may seem to benefit (Van Criekingen, 2009). The inequality of this is what has been at the centre of much of the discourse on gentrification. In any case, displacement can be direct as well as indirect,

but it is much more than the movement of one class of people to another space. As Davidson and Lees (2009) argue, displacement alters the urban neighbourhood in a class-based way, and also constitutes the loss of neighbourhood, community, family and home (Rerat et al., 2010). In this sense, it may be regarded as a loss of identity. He (2009) also suggests that moving residents to other areas, usually to the outer edges of towns or cities, leads to deprivation; it deprives people of the convenience of living in a central location, having access to public facilities, and social networks and it may increase the time and costs of employment, as they then need to travel farther to work.

However, scholars such as Lester and Hartley (2014) and Smith (2004) hold the view that gentrification is not solely about moving all the low-income residents out of an area. It often also involves giving new opportunities to the existing local residents in order for them to raise their own economic and social status. Therefore, although a certain amount of displacement is an inevitable consequence, new opportunities can also result for some, even if doors are unfortunately closed for others. A likely explanation is that both studies are conducted in neighbourhoods that have been gentrified and experienced industrial restructuring.

 One key issue that drives displacement is the increase in the value of property in the gentrified area, which produces increased housing and tax revenues. Housing upgrades, renovations and redevelopment projects may be initiated either by the government, through its sponsorship of housing schemes, or by private actors (Kennedy and Leonard, 2001). The increased values of the houses and properties affects different stakeholders in different ways. For example, developers, investors and the business class generally benefit by purchasing property at low prices and then renovating or redeveloping it into housing or commercial centres which they can sell or rent at much higher prices than their initial investment; the government then collects greater revenues through higher taxes on the now more expensive properties. Residents in the area may also benefit from the presence of a vibrant and growing commercial strip (Butler and Robson, 2001; Bernt and Holm, 2009). However, these changes may also cause affordability problems for lower-income residents. In Cleveland, USA, the Cleveland Foundation (2017) found that residents appreciated the success of gentrification and the subsequent increase in the value of their property. However, they also feared that changes in the demographics of the

community and the new lifestyle brought by investment would cause the old neighbourhoods to lose their charm and simplicity (Ibid.).

Regardless of this trepidation, the greater the increase in the values of the properties in an area, the greater the success of the redevelopment and revitalization projects is judged to be (Marcuse, 1985; Kennedy and Leonard, 2001). This view is contestable, however, as what some may view as success would be problematic for others. Nevertheless, scholars in the field have always affirmed that a key marker of gentrification is its impact on the value of properties and tax increases. This also indicates that redevelopment and revitalization projects do not always focus on the well-being of the existing residents. Rather, the main objective of such projects, whether stated or underlying, is to bring new homeowners and increase commercial activities, which would not only be expected to benefit the elite class but also the government in the form of greater tax revenues (Dearborn, 2000).

Closely related to the increase in the value of properties and taxes, another consequence of gentrification is a change in community institutions and leadership structures as well as the political leanings of neighbourhood residents. In the Cleveland experience cited above, it led to the creation of a forum where residents debated the benefits of redevelopment, in terms of property values, as well as contested its implications for community life. This arguably resonates with Zukin et al. (2009) and Betancur (2011), who posited that the arrival of the elite classes, political figures and religious leaders in urban areas can be seen to spur new developments, financial investment, social services, and religious and political diversity.

The newly arriving political leaders and social activists use their political weight and social contacts to initiate new commercial facilities and development, which they believe ultimately improves the lifestyle of the community. As the arguments above have shown, there is a complex process of negotiation between the gentrifiers and the long-time residents (Freeman, 2006). In addition, political figures and members of the business class in a gentrifying area are likely to have the knowledge and tactical awareness to lobby public officials for the improvement of public services and institutions which serve the interests of the residents (Mathews, 2010). How, or indeed whether, this has occurred in

central Medina has not yet been investigated, which is a gap this current study seeks to fill.

The preceding line of thought is important to this study, which considers the impact of newly arriving figures and businesses on the long-term residents of Medina. It is principally based on Kennedy and Leonard's (2001) and Hankins' (2007) observations that the government may play an active role in resolving any ideological disputes between newcomers and the older residents of a community. Religious schools and institutions such as churches, mosques and synagogues often need to adapt to the newcomers' needs. The presence and number of public services and non-profit organizations working for community welfare changes with the arrival of the elite class (Butler and Robson, 2001). Similarly, posh and sophisticated schools designed for the education of the 'gentry' come into existence alongside the educational institutions which educate minorities with limited resources and members of the lower classes. Although the report from Cleveland, Ohio did not find any noticeable changes in the schools' structure and number in the areas which had been gentrified (Newman and Ashton, 2004), other instances of education-led gentrification have been noted, whereby areas that are near good schools also become gentrified (Butler et al., 2013).

In addition to the community structure and leadership, the cultural fabric and street flavours of a neighbourhood are also affected positively by the gentrification process. As discussed previously, and demonstrated in the case of Cleveland above, long term residents recognize the impact of gentrification on property values as well as on the changes it may lead to in the old neighbourhood and community. This confirms that changes in the cultural fabric and street flavour are a consequence of gentrification (Warde, 1991). The residents of non-gentrified urban areas often exhibit considerable diversity, their cultural activities have a unique quality and their food is also distinctive (Ibid.). However, the scenario changes with the arrival of the elite and business classes in the city. They have their own special flavours, cultural roots, and meeting and gathering points, such as hotels, international flavours and cuisines befitting their status and standards (Betancur, 2011). The arrival of international players in the market stimulates competition for space and markets in the city, which in turn results in increasing property prices. This situation impacts local, small-scale, marginally profitable businesses, which

may be driven out of the area (Bridge, 2001). Consequently, gentrification can lead to the disappearance of businesses that have deep cultural and social ties with the local residents, thereby changing the whole cultural and social fabric of the area (Ley, 1997).

Gentrifiers and development officials in cities often welcome these changes, viewing them as being indicative of an improvement in the health of commercial and business activities in the area. In contrast, existing residents lose their businesses and spaces in the market (Uzun, 2003). The only businesses that survive are those which align their activities with new development, restyling their businesses and products to match the tastes of the newcomers in the market and housing spaces of the city (Slater, 2002). In order to thrive in an area undergoing gentrification, innovation and adaptation to the changing market are necessary, and these require capital, which the working or low-income class owners may not have or be able to access (Brown-Saracino, 2010). The ultimate consequence of gentrification is often to make the existing residents economically limited, take advantage of their low buying power, and make them socially and culturally alien to the area (Zukin et al., 2009).

The literature presented above demonstrate that despite divergent views on the relationship between gentrification and displacement, the latter is nevertheless accepted as an outcome of the former. Thus, it can be argued, gentrification has consequences for a community at the economic, social and political levels; and these vary from city to city and country to country depending on local factors and the 'pace of urbanization'. Bosker et al. (2013) expressed the view that local residents in Islamic cities face a greater threat of displacement from redevelopment projects in comparison with European cities, which can be attributed to increasing economic disparity in the population of the gentrifying areas. Furthermore, they stated that given the economic and political circumstances in Islamic cities, redevelopment and urbanization there mainly focus on new constructions, while in European cities, the aim of such projects is the general welfare of the residents (ibid.).

As the focus of this research is to explore the gentrification precipitated by redevelopment projects in an Islamic cities (Medina) in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia), a thorough overview of urbanization in the Middle East is necessary. Thus, the next section presents

debates on gentrification becoming a global phenomenon, on modern comparative urbanism, and on gentrification specifically in cities in the Muslim world. The redevelopments in Medina are situated within these debates in order to fill gaps in the existing literature.

2.3. Urbanization in the Middle East

Central to the notion of urbanisation is change, as according to Tisdale (1942), institutions and organisations continually adapt to new challenges and issues through the process of social change. He further argues that social change in any society affects population distribution, which ultimately determines the course of urbanisation, and this continues as long as social life goes on (p.313). In the context of the Middle East, the processes of social change have exercised a substantial impact on urbanisation in cities with an Islamic background, such as Istanbul, Cairo, Damascus Dubai and Abu Dhabi. These are cities that lie at the heart of the Middle East region, whose geographic boundaries are held by some to stretch across North Africa to Central Asia, from Morocco to Pakistan, although it is mostly associated with Arabia peninsula in popular thought (Zdanowski, 2014). The countries located in this region, also sometimes designated as MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) share cultural and often religious similarities yet differ in their specific historic developments, which have been influenced by poverty, conflict and oil, amongst other factors.

Many cities in the Middle East are still in the process of developing and face numerous obstacles, such as slums, pollution, inadequate drainage systems and water shortages; and these challenges have played a key role in their urbanization and gentrification (Moghadam, 2010; Davis, 2006; Fahmi & Sutton, 2008). Similarly, although some MENA countries are former colonies of Western nations and have therefore developed under policies introduced by the colonialists, others have never been colonised, and their growth and development can be seen as attempts to modernise themselves (Abubrig, 2012). However, Al-Bassam (2015) asserts that the role of globalization in the course of

urbanization in these cities is not as important as that of the religious, linguistic and historical roots that bind the cities of this region together.

According to Yacobi and Shechter (2005), "urbanisation is an economic, political and socio-cultural complexity" (p. 499), and in the urbanization of cities in the Middle East, these factors are interconnected with each other to stimulate development and revitalization. Indeed, the oil-rich countries tend to have many of the same issues as their poorer neighbours, including rapid population growth, growing urbanisation, large numbers of youth, high unemployment and housing shortages (Al-Bassam, 2012). The wealthy Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates) are one of the most urbanised areas in the world, with 90% of their total population living in cities (Ramadan, 2015). Nevertheless, across the whole MENA region, the majority now reside in urban areas (Moghadam, 2010), which suggests that cities are increasingly attractive to rural denizens because of the financial and professional opportunities and higher living standards they arguably provide.

Urban areas are influenced by socio-economic factors which determine the size and quality of the built environment; the amount of investment in housing and infrastructure can transform a city (Yacobi & Shechter, 2005). In addition, political factors determine the policies for cities and contribute to how urban spaces will be used for creating new markets and housing facilities for the newcomers. Socio-cultural factors in Middle Eastern cities remain key in determining the shape of the urban spaces; they symbolize the residents' identity and sense of belonging (Carmona et al., 2010). Proshansky et al. (1983) used similar arguments showing that the attachment to urban spaces is associated with the symbolic importance of a place where emotions and relationships are invested, thereby giving a sense of belonging to the culturally and socially identical residents. Such attachment is also influenced by racial, ethnic or class identity (Rose, 1996), which tend to differentiate one urban area from another. The next section discusses the nature of Islamic cities and urban development.

2.3.1. Urban Development in Islamic Cities

Most of the cities in the Middle East existed before the emergence of Islam. Makkah and Medina (Yathreb) as well as Damascus existed for centuries (or even millennia) prior to the advent of Islam. Other cities had Islam as the basis for their emergence, including Cairo and Baghdad Saunders (2002) . Irrespective of whether the Islam was the reason for the emergence of a city in the Middle East or not, the religion has affected most Middle Eastern cities with the possible exception of those in Israel since 1948, although even their existence is not independent of religion. Subsequently, one could argue that at least one of these three religions has been a major influence on the type of urbanization experienced by each city in this region.

This leads to the question of how a religion influences the features of a city, and while this is not clearly defined, it has been argued that an Islamic city reflects the economic, political, social, environmental and natural systems that are based on religious beliefs, tenets and rules, in both the public and private domains. Kasmi et al. (2017) support the view of the existence of common characteristics amongst the historic cities of the Muslim world. Hayaty and Monikhi (2015) also established that the social organization of these cities is grounded on ethnic similarities.

The concept of Islamic cities was first introduced by Orientalists such as the Marcais brothers and Jean Sauvaget in the early twentieth century (Neglia, 2008) based on the two main approaches taken by Europeans studying Islamic cities. The first is the English approach, which attributed the city's architecture to social and religious factors, while the second is the French approach, which entailed a detailed analysis of the cityscape. It has, however, been argued by some Middle Eastern scholars that the Orientalists' studies, using either approach, did not look at Islamic cities in a holistic way, and therefore did not consider the most important Islamic references, namely the Quran, the Sunnah3, and the Shariah4. This conviction stems from the latter's belief that Islam is a way of life and not just a religious practice. Similarly, Othman (1988) has argued that the Orientalists' concept of Islamic cities was influenced by Western social, economic and political

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[3] Prophet Mohammed's guidance
[4] Islamic law

systems, rendering the findings unrealistic. They looked at the cities from the perspective of Western city planning and its social, political and economic concepts, with the aim of proving that Muslims did not play a role in a city's establishment. Rather, they regarded Muslim cities as an extension of Roman or pagan cities, and urban planning as a modern trend that appeared after World War II (Alfara & Alhassi, 2013). Consequently, the cities need to be re-examined in such a way that is grounded in and subjected the Islamic experience. AlJadraji (1985) posited that the Islamic city is not just a geographical or historical phenomenon; it is first and foremost a religious phenomenon that is characterized by the expression and organization of the space according to Islamic legislation, where material laws are combined with spiritual values. On the other hand, Othman (1988) noted that, conversely, some Western scholars instead maximized the role of Islam in the history of urbanization and its impact on Islamic cities. Lombard and Spencer (1975), in particular, emphasised the presence of Islamic characters and features in Muslim cities from the Ottoman era.

Irrespective of scholars' perspectives on the authenticity of Islamic cities, there is a consensus among scholars that cities in the Middle East based on the norms of the Islamic religion have been vulnerable to the forces of modernization and globalization. The question and focus of inquiry therefore is not on whether but rather on the extent to which these forces have influenced the urban forms of Muslim cities. Stewart (2001) argued that despite disagreements over the Islamic city model, it is undeniable that Islam, as a social and religious system, has had a significant impact on the morphology of cities where it predominates. In this field, morphological studies, the Orientalist approach taken by Western scholars in examining Islamic cities has slowly been replaced by a more nuanced understanding of the urban model of these cities. Furthermore, a greater understanding of the unique character of each city has taken hold, replacing the generalised view that combined widely divergent cities under one urban model. According to Afif Bahnassi (1986:9), "Most cities in the Islamic world, with the exception of Cairo, followed a shared general design for houses that took climate and humidity into account." He further explains that the early Umayyad cities, such as Kairouan and Wasit, as well as Abbasid cities such as Samarra, were designed according to an architectural plan that ensured

straight roads as wide as 50 meters. However, they did not last long because social and climatic factors forced residents to opt for denser city models.

Abubrig (2012) argues that harmony between the individual self and the configuration of buildings are essential to Islamic ways of living. Also, important principles guided land policies, physical planning and the formulation of urban areas in the Muslim world. Land policies were applied evenly to all sectors of the society and did not support a pattern of development that would conflict with the egalitarian notions of Islamic Sharia law. Thus, land policies promoted cohesion among society members and safeguarded family relations.

Irrespective of this debate, Islamic cities existed from the seventh century CE to the period of the First World War, when the Ottoman Empire fell. Some argue that the Islamic city vanished at this time. Thus, Elsheshtawy (2008) claims that Arab cities do not exist anymore. This is in line with Akbar's (2004) view that presently, there are no longer Muslim cities but only cities that are occupied by Muslims. This assertion is based on the loss of identity and of the physical characteristics of what had been said to constitute an Islamic city. Elsheshtawy (2004) indeed argues that the architectural and urban story of Middle Eastern and Arab Muslim cities is a story of loss. This view is supported by Kan (2008, p.1036), who states:

The model and image for cities in the Islamic World have indeed changed. The contemporary Islamic city is moulded on the mythic image of the modern American city – New York, Houston, Chicago, etc.- as a symbol of mobility, corporate power, centralization, and "progress". As Muslim countries follow similar economic and development models [they] ... are looking more and more like Western cities.

Alsayyad (2011) is less critical view than others in terms of whether the Islamic urban form has been eroded under the impact of Western styles of urbanization. He claims, however, that in studying the influence of identity on modernization and globalization, the Middle East, more than any other place in the world, reflects the very problematic agitation between traditional and modern. In his examination of the relationship between the Global North and the Middle East and its impact on corresponding social identities and planning, Alsayyad identified three distinct historic periods, namely the colonial

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phase, the independence era, and the globalization phase. According to him, these three phases reflect "three respective urban forms: the hybrid, the modern or pseudo-modern, and the postmodern" (Alsayyad, 2011, p.265).

All these views give various consideration to the impact of modernization and globalization on the urban forms that have emerged in Islamic cities. Saleh (2002) maintains that the arrangement of the urban fabric in the Islamic community has four distinct determinants: social structure, defence requirements, climatic adaptation, and economic necessity. He argues that, although modernization has many benefits for a neighbourhood, it is not without its problems. The most notable features of modernization that he discusses are the gridiron pattern of streets and the villa as a prototypical dwelling. These designs afford nearly unlimited access to a space, creating problems with respect to privacy and security as well as imposing upon the people a 'Western' environment that is often violates their ethos, as expressed in their culture and lifestyle(Germeraad, 1992). Almutawa (as cited in Mahgoub, 2008), in his book on the history of architecture in Kuwait, denounces the ignorance of foreign designers of the cultural requirements and traditions of the people:

> The architects that came from abroad did not take the time to study the cultural needs of the people of Kuwait, such as having a separate entrance to the male guests' room, the Dewanina, and the future family expansion. They did not try to satisfy these needs through their designs, nor did they study the climate of Kuwait: hot and dry from April to November; cold and humid from December to March; dust and sandstorms; and high levels of solar radiation. (Almutawa, cited in Mahgoub, 2008, p.158)

Similarly, Yacobi and Schelter (2005) cite the example of Sutton (1993), who stressed the cultural incompatibility of housing typologies and open spaces with the needs and daily realities of many urban dwellers in Muslim cities, in particular the Egyptian women who felt confined in their domestic dwellings and spheres in the Western style houses which were not culturally specific.

The second half of the twentieth century brought about a change in most countries in the Middle East in terms of rapid economic and population growth. This growth led to a

substantial increase in urbanisation in the form of new districts, towns and housing, all of which were influenced by Western planning principles, as most cities in the Middle East hired foreign consultants and architects for planning.

It could therefore be argued that both the nature of Islamic Sharia law, coupled with the influence of globalization and modernization, have been major forces shaping contemporary urban forms in Islamic cities. Economic and political concepts coined after the Second World War demarcated the world according to the binary of 'Developed' and 'Developing', 'North and South', and 'First, Second and Third World'. These ideas have influenced not only the level of economic development but also the urbanization process in the Middle East, irrespective of the region's earlier designation as the cradle of civilization. Thus, as asserted by Alsayyad (2011), urbanization in most of the cities reflects the rift between the traditional and the modern, whereby a city is physically split between the modern and Westernized urban environment and the 'old city', which is visible in most Middle Eastern cities. Structures emerge in both "'Modern' (colonial) and 'traditional' (Islamic) styles," (p.508) and become a part of the local heritage, despite later renovations. Both the old city and the colonial centre become generified as existing residents are ejected and replaced by the more affluent:

> The newly emerging planned and modern/ Westernised urban environments seemingly created a split city, where different urban spaces represented binary oppositions— the 'old city' (in North Africa known as the medina) stood for 'tradition' and 'local' life, while the new public buildings, commercial centres, and residential neighbourhoods created an urban iconography of imported 'modernity'. In reality, cities were never totally segmented. City inhabitants were stratified economically, and at times lived and worked in a partially segregated religious and ethnic environment. (Alsayyad, 2011, p. 503)

Whilst this binary is the reality of most urban spaces in the Middle East, it could be argued that it also reflects the inequality between the Global North and the Global South. This is the focus in section 2.5 below. The specific type of urban development /redevelopment that has taken place in some of the cities is discussed in later section.

In considering the urbanization and gentrification patterns in any major city of the world, it is important to explore the drivers of urban migration and to understand why people would choose to live in cities. Kainth (2009) identified better employment opportunities as being a primary factor in encouraging people to move from rural areas to urban areas, but also suggested that this was because they were already experiencing poor economic conditions.

Kok and Collinson (2006) identified better living standards than rural areas offer, the likelihood of union with old friends and families, and the prospects of a better lifestyle and economic gain as the key motivators for people to migrate to cities. Additionally, the desire to live closer to workplaces is another cause for people to move to inner-city areas, and this increases the demand for housing and therefore leads to higher rental prices and property values. These motivating factors informed urbanization and gentrification patterns in Islamic cities; therefore, we can surmise that Islamic cities have developed in the same way as urban development has taken place in Western countries (Elsheshtawy, 2004) in modern times.

Whilst this arguably draws a similarity in the development of Islamic and Western cities, the difference is that Islamic influences have shaped urbanisation in the former due to the involvement of religion in shaping communities and social interactions (Al-Ammar, 1992; Atash, 1993). Saoud (1996, 2004) argued that prior to Islam, the Arabs were nomadic, and as a result, they did not settle in one place; towns started to develop only because people came together to spread Islamic beliefs and exercise their religious duties in the form of community, which was highly stressed in the Islamic way of life.

In addition, towns in the Muslim world were built to protect areas under Islamic rule and to provide safe places where Islam could be practised (Al-Sayyad, 1991; Hakim, 1996). This argument is in accordance with the religious rules seen in cities such as Makkah and Medina in Saudi Arabia, where people came to practise the Islamic way of life and spread the Islamic faith (Saoud, 2002). This process, therefore, sets the foundation for the processes of urbanization in such cities and the premise on which this current study seeks to determine the causes and types of redevelopment or gentrification that took place in the Central Zone of Medina.

In line with Tisdale's (1942) observation discussed above, and the notion of change that is often associated with the urbanization process, the predominantly religious role of Islamic towns changed around the 9th century as disputes and divisions within the Muslim world and with non-believers turned towns into fortresses (Saoud, 2002). Therefore, as common in many towns during the mediaeval period in Europe, Islamic cities were walled, with a number of city gates providing entrance (Ennahid, 2002) in order to protect the inhabitants from outsiders and invasion. These could arguably be compared with gated cities and condominiums in the modern era.

The gates or entrances to Islamic cities were connected to the city centres by roads (Atash, 1993), and residential areas in the city centres were often characterised by over-crowding. Here, it can be argued that as more people were attracted to the cities for protection, both religious and political, they were accommodated by political forces, tribal lords and highly respected religious authorities to oversee the mechanisms of protection and religious practices from their extended family tribes. Thus, the city centres contained the 'gentry' responsible for the administration of cities, making it expensive for low-income renters to reside there. Hence, the politicians, professionals and business people were the ones who made the town centres their abode.

The Ottoman control of the Muslim world beginning in the 16th century brought some stability, and urban growth was again revitalised as trade routes opened up (Shaw & Cetinsaya, 2017; Shojaee & Paeezeh, 2015). Though the towns began to open up and become more vibrant, the advancement of European militaries in the Mediterranean a century later meant that Muslim towns were once again turned into closed fortresses as they defended themselves against attack (Saoud, 2002). Many believe that Islamic cities consequently vanished with the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the beginning of colonialism.

What is clear from the above is that the concept of Islamic cities and urbanization patterns depend on how an Islamic city is perceived by the modern scholar. Given that the Arab people were nomadic and did not settle in one location, it is difficult to distinguish any other influence than Islam in the towns that played a fundamental role in their development, and the various social, economic and political functions of the towns are

derived from Islamic jurisprudence. This is supported by Ramadan (2015), who observed that the oldest towns in the Gulf States reflect the nomadic lifestyle and economic activities of the original inhabitants. In his view, the mud-walled towns were mostly developed in coastal areas where pearling and fishing were the main occupations, and trade links were maintained with India and other parts of the world. It was only in the 1960s, when oil was discovered, that towns started to develop into urban centres in similar fashion to the West, which transformed them into places of power and political manoeuvring.

Although oil contributed to raising living standards in countries where it was abundant, it also brought large numbers of foreigners to the cities; these people came for employment in the oil fields as well as to obtain education. A large number of people also came from poorer Asian countries to provide labour and domestic services for the indigenous population, thereby also benefiting from the oil wealth (Ramadan, 2015). These foreigners are normally consigned to specific low-cost residential areas of the cities, usually outside the city centre. Historically, this was not always the case as people from all social categories, both Muslim and non-Muslim, Arab and non-Arab, contributed to the social and cultural fabric of the inner cities.

Such contributions were made through donations to both public and private welfare foundations. For instance, urban management in Islamic cities depended on private foundations, or waqf "endowments", which were financed by an individual or group of individuals with proceeds from properties owned by the endowment's founder (Hamouche, 2007). Deguilhem (2008) explains how these foundations/endowment funds were used to support the poor or to construct public facilities such as mosques, drinking fountains or religious schools. Such endowments played an important role in Islamic cities, as they were used to finance most of the city centre buildings; many of the residential properties were owned by endowments, and the rents from these facilities were used to fund mosques and other public facilities. Endowments from across the Islamic world were very often arranged to benefit the two Holy Cities of Makkah and Medina (Deguilhem, 2008). These endowments eased the severe and serious consequences of the gentrification and urbanization pressures on the Islamic cities, such as stopping the abrupt

displacement of low-income rentals from the cities by financing their businesses or helping them pay rent.

The endowment system was not limited to Muslim communities, as residents following the Jewish and Christian religions also benefited from them within Islamic cities in the form of contributions towards their rents and sustaining their small business following rises in rents and property values due to gentrification. Leeuwen (1999) suggested that endowments strengthened community cohesion in the cities:

There was probably hardly anyone whose life was not at one stage or another shaped by the waqf system, either in the form of schools or mosques, or in the form of commercial locales, or in the form of bathhouses, coffeehouses and other social meeting places, or in the form of allowances, financial support and provisions. (Leeuwen, 1999, p.208)

Cities have always been formed by one of two specific geographical features (Kim, 2008), one of which is the location. Many cities throughout the world arose due to the presence of natural resources and/or proximity to water, which has always been important for trading purposes. The other feature relates to human capital, as interactions with other people can increase knowledge, productivity and promote economic growth (Rauch, 1991). It is argued that globally, migration, rural to urban movement and urbanization have led to rapid urban growth, and this has been experienced in most developing countries, where people have moved to cities from rural areas to take advantage of perceived economic opportunities (Veron, 2007). This is in line with the United Nations (2008) projection that the urban population would continue to grow between 2010 and 2025 to more than a billion people, in contrast to the rural population, which was projected to decline.

As mentioned earlier, although many Islamic cities have developed from coastal settlements which were designed to facilitate trade, urbanisation is now increasingly characterised by migration not from rural areas but from other countries. Thus, migration patterns have influenced urbanization and gentrification patterns in some Islamic cities. The next sub section will explain the characteristic features of Islamic cities in order to situate the different waves of urbanization in the region.

Features of Islamic Cities

The most prominent feature of any Islamic city is the mosque, as this is where community members gather and where Muslims go five times a day for prayers. The mosque therefore is a key feature of any Islamic landscape, one of the ways religion influences the structure and the shape of an Islamic city (Aburbrig, 2012). This historic core in the centre of cities across the Middle East is still in evidence through the architecture and spaces of Muslim societies, and can be seen in cities like Baghdad, Cairo and Damascus (AlBassam, 2012). According to Yildiz (2011), cities are assessed by their physical traits and architectural structure; he suggests that Islamic cities have maintained the structuring of ancient cities with minimal changes. Demirci (2003) maintains that the distinguishing characteristic of an Islamic city is its culture, that is, the existence of a Muslim society living there. Although the mosque may be located in a central position, it is also a place that combines both spiritual and earthly domains; this can be seen in its close proximity to the marketplaces and the attachment of a madrasah for education (Yildiz, 2011). The city exists to meet the requirements of a Muslim society; an Islamic city may, therefore, be defined as one that is designed upon Islamic values and principles (Shojaee & Paeezeh, 2015).

As alluded to above, the physical features of Islamic cities have also been influenced by the climate. The Middle East spreads across many of the hottest parts of the world; hence shaded areas abound in Islamic cities and the materials used for construction are selected to meet the demands of an arid climate. Cities were constructed and adapted to fit the natural conditions of the region; small courtyards and terraces can be seen along with narrow, covered streets and gardens (Saoud, 2002). The narrow streets within city centres were planned to be cul-de-sacs, separating the private domain from the public areas (Shojaee & Paeezeh, 2015).

Another feature related to privacy was that all walls had to be at a height higher than a camel rider (Saoud, 2002); within Islam, the principle of privacy is an important concept. Residential areas were grouped closely together and defined by families sharing courtyards, which often amounted to gated communities. Saleh (2002) writes that the

urban fabric in an Islamic community has four distinguishing determinants. These are the social ties system, the need for defence, the adaptation to the climate, and economic requirements. All of these can be identified in the physical features of Islamic cities.

Abu-Lughod (1989), however, suggests that there are rather three key features that gave identity to an Islamic city, and that these elements set in motion the processes for Islamic cities. She argues that although these elements no longer have a place in modern times, they were fundamental to the processes that shaped Islamic cities. The first of these features was the distinction between members of the Islamic society and any outsiders, which led to spatial distinction; in other words, those from the Islamic community were separated from other communities. A second feature related to segregation of the sexes, which affected the way in which spaces were organised. Finally, the third element, according to Abu-Lughod (1989) was the legal system, which did not regulate the use of land, but rather left this up to neighbours to agree mutual rights over space and the usage of land.

It can be argued that these features must be taken into account in the modernisation process, although they often are not. Al-Mutawa (1994), above, decried the use of foreign architects who had no understanding of Islamic culture in Kuwait, emphasising the way in which cultural needs were not met by simple additions, such as providing a separate entrance for male guests. In fact, most cities in the Middle East used foreign consultants for urban planning, and there has been much condemnation of this practice; for example, in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia hired Marshall, a British consultant whose plan reflected neighbourhoods designed to meet international standards with no reference to the local culture and lifestyle (Glasze & Alkhayyal, 2002). Additionally, decision-makers in Middle Eastern cities collaborated with foreign experts, resulting in a Westernised urbanism (Bianca, 2002). This is apparent in cities such as Dubai. This has led to the argument that a Westernised environment that contradicts the Islamic value of privacy has been imposed on most Islamic cities (Germeraad, 1992). In this respect, therefore, access to space in modern designs is not compatible with the Islamic culture and lifestyle. The next section reviews the urbanization of the United Arab Emirates that occurred as a result of globalisation.

Lee (2012) argues that the world is becoming more uniform in terms of building designs and the use of space, despite geographical division and social and cultural diversity; and she therefore argues that there is a need for a new global comparative urban study. Like many other developmental processes, gentrification is said to have been exported from the global North to the global South, and consequently, the urbanisation that is taking place in the global South is one of imitation (Lee, 2012). According to Lees (2017), what operates in the global South is a form of cosmopolitan urbanism whereby gentrification is an expanded imagination based on Western urbanism. Implied in this is that Western gentrification is imagined and made to fit the global South. Thus, she calls for a context-specific inquiry into the different processes by which each city experiences development (Lees, 2017; Robinson, 2006, 2010; Roy, 2009). This process of comparative urbanism, explains Nijman (2007, p.1), would "encompass, as a field of inquiry, the aim to develop knowledge, understanding and generalization at a level between what is true for all cities and what is true for one city at a given point in time" (cited in Lees, 2017, p.3).

2.3.2. Spectacular Urbanization in the United Arab Emirates

The UAE, located in the Gulf region of the Middle East, stands as an example of urbanization in the region as a result of globalisation and reflects the spread of gentrification from the global North to its southern counterparts. In its spatial and temporal dimensions, it could be argued that it constitutes a prototype of gentrification, as it exhibits all of the gentrification processes and has its offshoots from the UK and the USA, as argued in 2.3 above. Similarly, following the postcolonial perspective, the UAE serves as an example of the phenomenal urbanization that has taken place in recent times (Lees, 2011). In the UAE, a multiplicity of different cities is reflected (McFarlane, 2010) as well as the urban modernity that has become a feature of the 20th century as a result of globalisation and interconnectedness in the world, as Lees (2011) argues.

In line with comparative urbanism, Malecki and Wwers (2007) describe the UAE as the world's most urbanized region in terms of the pattern of urbanization and the segregation of the population in distinct domains. They write:

> The Gulf has become the most urbanized region in the world. Except for Saudi Arabia, all of the countries of the GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates] have more than 90% of their population living in urban areas... The familiar topic of polarization in world cities, characterized by widening inequality, multi-ethnic cities with marked segregation by ethnic group, and social exclusion, takes on new forms... multiple layers of distinct divisions between public and private sector... national and expatriate... male and female. (Malecki and Ewers, 2007: 474, 477)

From the above quote, it is clear that UAE cities offer spectacular images of urbanization and also raises some challenging questions. The latter stem from the fast-track development and display of architecture in the urban spaces. Many books and articles have already been devoted to describing the astounding and glossy showcase of architecture in major cities of the Gulf countries, such as Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai, and Manama as well as smaller cities like Sharija and Ajman. They have variously been described as featuring cultural hubs (Ponzini, 2011), shopping malls, skyscrapers (Acuto, 2010), artificial islands (Jackson and della Dora, 2009), stadia and free-trade zones (Keshavarzian, 2010).

Though migrants are in the numerical majority in the UAE, they are regulated through a strict, government sponsored regime and regulations: for example, immigrants are referred to as temporary workers who are denied the right of permanent residence and family reunion in the UAE. As Ali (2010) posited, migrants in the UAE work 'precariously on short-term contracts that can be revoked at any time for any reason', and often are hired for low wages (Malecki and Ewers, 2007).

The UAE's cities also tend to feature the creation of private and public spaces for consumption and entertainment as well as for showcasing to attract foreign workers and tourists from across the globe (Ramos, 2010; Hvidt, 2009). These cities have been described in the literature (Silver, 2010; Elsheshtaway, 2010) as models of urban modernity whose distinctive socio-spatial dynamics differ not only from classical and colonial Arab cities but also from other modern Arab cities and postcolonial cities in Asia and Africa. Muhammad and Sidaway (2012) developed the model shown in Figure 4

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representing the socio-demographic structures and segmented labour markets in the urban structures in cities in the Gulf states from Kuwait to the UAE.

A particularly significant feature of the UAE's cities is the segregation of the elites (national citizens), who reside in villas and palaces, from the state housing for low-income residents on the peripheries of the cities (but which have often been engulfed by urban sprawl). This fragmentary and segregated nature of the urbanization is referred to as "splintering urbanism" by Elsheshtawy (2008: 974). The housing spaces for migrants are also segregated based on the type of employment, ethnicity and class; residential camps, e.g., are formed to accommodate the construction workers. This division shows spatial and temporal differences in the use of housing spaces in a 20th century Middle Eastern country but nevertheless resonates with research findings from the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Hamnett, 1973; William, 1976; Smith, 1979; Marcuse, 1985; Martin, 2007; Kennedy and Leonard, 2001; and Jonathan, 2000). These scholars all reported that the restructuring of housing markets in the West led to the involuntary displacement of low income residents and those living in rental accommodation in gentrified urban areas (see 2.2.2 above).

Similarly, the state-led gentrification undertaken in older parts of Abu Dhabi city in the name of 'saving the heritage areas' (Muhammad and Sidaway, 2012, p. 3) links the process of urbanization with consumption. Air-conditioned markets and malls cater to those with sufficient disposable income and social standing (Khalaf, 2006). This reflects the relationship between gentrification and tourism as a critical force shaping contemporary urban landscapes (Gravari-Barbas & Guinand, 2017). Thus, the low- and middle-income residents of the UAE live and shop in different worlds which are separated from the urban spaces of foreign professionals and nationals of the UAE (Willoughby, 2006). These are important concepts in the study of Medina's Central Zone, which seeks to define the relationship between state-led development/ gentrification based on tourism and the city's long-term residents.

Figure 4: The socio-demographic structures and segmented labour markets in the urban structures in UAE, developed by Muhammad and Sidaway (2012).

It is vital to consider the demographic features of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which have a remarkable demographic profile wherein the indigenous - and numerically small - citizenry occupy the top of the social hierarchy; underneath the top layer, there is a foreign labour hierarchy containing a small number of highly paid professionals and a vast number of low-paid labourers. The highly paid workers come from the West, other Arab countries and south Asia, whilst the low-paid workers have migrated from Bangladesh, the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka (Bloch, 2010; Davis, 2007; Bianca, 2002; Al-Mutawa, 1994).

In contrast to the notions of natural population growth and rural to urban migration discussed previously, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and other UAE cities are spectacular examples of urbanization characterised by architectural display and an influx of migrants. This is evidenced by the fact that nearly 90% of the population of the UAE consists of foreign nationals (Roudi, 2011). Thus, Bassen (2010) argues that Dubai cannot sustain its development because historical and cultural factors have not influenced the city's urban planning. Rather, one can argue, the focus has been on modernising the space to reflect

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global interconnectedness whereby Dubai has been state-planned by the ruling class in collaboration with international financial elites. There is a contradiction, however, between the modernist view of city as a unified whole (Dear, 2005) and disregard for the influence of regional and national struggles on urban development, which leads Bassen (2010) to assert that Dubai stands alone in a political vacuum. This means that it cannot be held up as a traditional Islamic city, regardless of its origins in Islamic tenets. This possibly explains Aburbrig's (2012) observation that many members of the indigenous population have left the city because they cannot abide the changes in lifestyle and values brought about by such modernisation. This outcome arguably affirms Bassen's (2010) suggestion that "Emiratization programmes" only serve to integrate "the Emirates into a globalized business culture" (p. 300).

The global business culture engineered by a highly skilled expatriate business elite has transformed Dubai into a post-industrial city, whereby it has not only become a model for urban development (Bassen, 2010), it also reflects features of contemporary urban capitalism (Elsheshtawy, 2010) which have become a part of urbanization. Furthermore, as Sutton (2016) argues, the use of iconic buildings has created an image that enhances the appeal of the city and is part of a global strategy to attract investors. These images, Sutton stresses, give Dubai a strong and identifiable brand, which has resulted in extraordinarily fast urbanisation, attracting a flow of visitors and tourists from around the globe (Cherrier & Belk, 2015). Both the public and private sectors have been involved in development projects that aim to diversify the economy away from sole reliance on oil revenues; smaller cities focussing on specific economic activities have grown within the main conglomerate (Bamakhrama, 2015; Ramos, 2010). These include Dubai Industrial City, Dubai Media City, Jumeirah Garden City and Dubai Waterfront City, all designed to have separate identities and to serve different needs. In many ways, this presents a modern form that is distinct from the traditional Islamic city where separate districts were designed to serve specific functions in the growth and development of urbanization. Nevertheless, it is still an Islamic city in the sense that the government and even visitors consider it to be of Islamic origin because of its positioning within the Arab world. Stewart (2001) asserts that despite disagreement over the extent to which Dubai can be

considered an Islamic city as well as its status as a post-industrial cosmopolitan city, Islam is still the social and religious system the Emirates submits to.

Bassen (2010) describes Dubai as a post-industrial city state, which reflects the tension between traditional and modern that marks the Middle East (Alsayyad, 2011). Although greatly influenced by modernization and globalization, Dubai differs from other Middle Eastern countries whose relationships with the global North are based on a complex combination of experiences of the three phases of colonialism, independence, and globalization. Dubai's urbanization process has been deliberately planned, as explained above, by international consultants in the finance and business sectors (Bassen, 2010). Therefore, rather than reflecting one of the "three respective urban forms: the hybrid, the modern or pseudo-modern, and the postmodern" (Alsayyad, 2011:265), the postmodern, post-industrial and global financial institutions as well as an emphasis on global tourism are more prominent.

By comparison, in Abu Dhabi the rationale for re-development or gentrification is very much led by economic concerns (Chakravarty & Qamhaieh, 2015), where private and public interests overlap but are not seen to be in conflict. In Istanbul, the process of gentrification is firmly controlled by the state, but this tends to give it coherence (Islam & Sakizlioglu, 2015), although some criticise the monopoly. This is similar to the process in Damascus, where development is also controlled by an authoritarian state (Sudermann, 2015).

Positioning Dubai within a global network was very logical and appropriate, as according to Pacione (2005: 265): "It has an ample land resource in the form of a tabula rasa desert landscape, no legacy of industrial dereliction, no sprawl of spontaneous settlements, political stability, strong inward flows of capital investment, and is proceeding with a clear development blueprint that aims to create a city of regional significance for the twenty-first century". It also benefits from oil wealth, which has helped the city extend its network of urban infrastructure, as well as contribute towards megaprojects resulting in its iconic architecture, such as the Burj al Arab skyscraper.

The success of Dubai has led other cities in the Middle East to emulate the strategies the city adopted. For example, Istanbul has succeeded in developing the private sector in

government efforts to make the city into a global financial centre (Colak, 2012). Similarly, there are a number of processes of urban transformation taking place in Cairo, although Elshahed (2011) suggests that the policies and vision guiding Cairo's development lack the key features which enabled Dubai to become a global centre of attraction for investors and tourists. Shwayri (2008) and Krijnen and de Beukelaer (2015) have observed a similar pattern in the centre of Beirut, which has been reconstructed into a global business hub while being promoted as a tourist destination.

In particular, Dubai has cultivated event tourism. Current views on urban analysis show how this type of tourism has become the focus of targeted development in the city which has been important to its transformation from a fishing settlement to a world class event centre (Sutton, 2016; Pacione, 2005) in the 1990s. Dubai has implemented a similar method of attracting tourists as Damascus, Cairo and Jerusalem. In addition, the targeted developments employing different marketing and strategic approaches have created a strong brand image for Dubai as well as for Doha and Cairo, which make them reminiscent of tourism-oriented cities in Switzerland and elsewhere in the Global North. Therefore, the revitalization of tourism related infrastructure has contributed significantly to the brand extension of Dubai whereby it is known as a cosmopolitan 21st century city that compares favourably with various tourist centres in the global North, such as Paris, London, and New York.

The process of Dubai's transformation has taken only 50 years, a short time compared to the transformation of the Global North from pre-industrial to industrial and then to post-industrial, which took more than two centuries. The former is therefore a striking example of 'convergent urbanisation' which shows the city's and state's response to "global economic forces and the power of the local environment, history, culture and politics to mediate the impact of global processes to promote an urban form that is embedded in a particular local context" (Shatkin, 2006: 265).

Private and government initiatives alike have resulted from the economic prosperity prompted by the oil boom (Shatkin, 2006). These have had both a positive and a negative impact on lifestyle in this urban city. This is reflected in the polarization of differences between affluent and poorer residents (Yacobi & Shechter, 2005).

Development ultimately translates into transformation of the local identity, as new urban forms emerge "to assign novel meanings to urban landscapes" (Yacobi & Shechter, 2005:512). Property development funded by both private and government agencies, using the economic prosperity of oil for investment in real estate development, has ultimately culminated in global tourism. Gentrification is usually a by-product, even when not deliberately targeted as such, as in the case of the redevelopment of Hong Kong (La Grange & Pretorius, 2014).

Dubai can thus be viewed as representing a new phase in urban policy in Middle Eastern cities based on a modernisation approach which is supported by both political and economic structures and uses landscapes as a strategy for achieving objectives. This includes consistent endeavours to diversify the economy and invest in non-oil sectors, such as tourism. Furthermore, Dubai's model of urban development is being exported to other Muslim countries like Turkey and Qatar as well as far east countries like China through development companies controlled by Dubai's rulers (Bolleter, 2015). In aspiring to become global commercial and financial centres, the other cities similarly seek to reap the benefits of becoming an international tourist destination.

Nevertheless, although Dubai's urban planners have succeeded in changing the local landscape, Elsheshtawy (2010) and Karne (2009) have argued that these changing landscapes have also alienated the indigenous population by doing less than expected to preserve the Emirati culture. Their observation is in line with Aburbrig's (2012) statement that many of indigenous population have left the city. For this reason, Elsheshtawy (2010) and Karne (2009) stress that Dubai has lost its social and cultural identity due to its transformation into a 'global city'. As with other small, coastal Middle Eastern settlements, Dubai started as a fishing village, and within the short span of a few decades, it has managed to reinvent itself as a modern city with a global appeal. In so doing, it has neglected some of the social aspects of development related to the more disadvantaged groups. This neglect, Elsheshtawy (2010) further explains, is evident in Dubai's hidden urban spaces like Satwa district, where low-income houses are occupied by migrant workers, the backstreets of Menaa Bazaar and the surroundings of the Hindu Temple in Bur Dubai, which all offer a different story than the affluence and perceived success.

Although these demarcations fall along the separation of neighbourhoods, it could arguably constitute social segregation of rich and poor (Elsheshtawny, 2010).

Similarly, one can argue, the Islamic concept of segregation may be apparent to some degree in different parts of Dubai, but the values behind it are not. Dubai has rejected the traditional characteristics of an Islamic city and has never promoted itself as a place of religious significance. In contrast, cities whose significance is based on religion present a different story, such as the holy cities of Makkah and Medina. The next section therefore discusses religion tourism, pilgrimages and urban development.

2.4. Religious Tourism, Pilgrimages, Urban Development, and Tourism Gentrification

Section 2.3.2 has explained the contestable concept of how the prototypical Islamic city is associated with Islamic heritage. This notion is based on how Islam as a religion is reflected in the economic, political, social, environmental and natural features of cities in the region, which are based on religious beliefs and simultaneously designed to promote Islamic tenets and principles in both the public and private domains. The impact of this on urban structures and development in the Middle East have created a complexity that scholars refer to as the tension between the old and new, the traditional and the modern (Alsayyad, 2011). Even the spectacular development in Dubai and Abu Dhabi reflects this tension as they are firmly rooted in Islamic legislation, thereby combining material structures with spiritual values (Othman, 1988). In the Emirati cities, this is further complicated by the capitalism of the world's financial markets, business values and the pursuit of profit, and tourism promotion, which are all embedded in the cities' urban planning and marketing processes.

Central to this complexity is religion, which to a great extent still permeates life throughout the countries of the Middle East and Mediterranean. Whilst Islam is associated with Muslim cities, other old cities in the Mediterranean region are associated with the Christian or Jewish religion. Rome, Jerusalem and Makkah have attracted religious

pilgrims for more than a thousand years and are now capitalising on 21st century tourism. Visitors to religious sites, whether Biblical or Islamic, are expected to increase, especially in developing countries (Weidenfeld & Ron, 2008). In the modern era, religious attractions are seen as a way of attracting investment, as tourists seek both religious and leisure activities (Stewart, 2001). This possibly the reason Vukonic (2002) argued that religious tourism should not be neglected or underestimated, as religious institutions have done in the past. Thus, scholars such as Raj and Morpeth (2007) and Egresi et al. (2012) have observed the expanding economic impact of religious tourism and pilgrimages.

This is particularly significant given the suggestions by scholars such as Gravari-Barbas and Guinand (2017), Mullins (1991), Judd (1999) and Gotham (2005) that tourism and gentrification are amongst the most important actors in the development of post-industrial cities. Thus, in some cases, such as in Saudi Arabia, religious tourism has resulted in urban redevelopment and revitalization whereby new monuments and tourist sites are created by either displacing local residents or demolishing old housing facilities in order to construct new, posh-looking housing schemes for the elite class. Therefore, Smith (2016) has observed that in Saudi Arabia, government endeavours to promote religious tourism have been motivated by the desire to diversify the economy and reduce its dependence on oil (Smith, 2016). This has led to the enactment of policies that softened the visa application process for foreign tourists in order to encourage religious tourists to visit the traditional holy places, namely Makkah and Medina. It has also led to government initiatives to ease access through infrastructural development, e.g. with new railway networks and the construction of a bridge linking Saudi Arabia to Egypt. In this case, but not in all cases, tourism arguably could lead to redevelopment, displacement and demolition, as this study seeks to examine.

Inherent in these developments are economic gains (Raj & Morpeth, 2007; Egresi et al., 2012), as it is estimated that religious tourism in Saudi Arabia currently generates 12 billion dollars in revenue annually and could be expanded to 20 billion dollars within four years by the inclusion of non-religious sites (Smith, 2016). This would mean more urban development, similar to that experienced in Istanbul (Turkey) where attracting tourists to visit a second site has exponentially increased the interest of tourists to visit the city. This is possibly the reason Urry and Larsen (2011) recognised that tourism is an organised

activity, spatially and temporally, in social modern life which combines work and leisure (Ritchie & Adair, 2004).

Henderson (2011) and Vukonic (2002) assert that in modern times, religious activities cannot be limited to a specific religious domain but must consider all social aspects of human life, and this has increased interest in tourism. In this case, tourism is regarded as an essential human need to travel which has been commercialized for the sake of money and profit by tourism promoters (Contours, 1991).

Thus, Ritchie and Adair (2004) described three important components of tourism which need to be evaluated. The first one is related to the tourist's objective in visiting a place; the second one is related to parameters determining the potential of the host country in terms of its attractions and resources to attract tourists; and the third is the substantial impact of tourism on the socio-cultural fabric of the area in question, which may play a significant role in urbanization and gentrification patterns in urban spaces through the initiation of redevelopment and revitalization projects.

This implies that tourism is a social activity which triggers developmental processes in the places being visited. As Yacobi and Shechter (2005: 501) report: "the demand by tourists has enhanced the development of modern leisure environments such as hotels, restaurants, coffee houses, and shopping centres". Such requirements can change the built landscape of any tourist destination, including religious cities.

Studying the motivations behind tourism to a given place assists in ascertaining patterns of tourism demand, in addition to explaining why tourists choose specific areas as their destination. There have been numerous studies on motivation: Urry and Larsen (2011), for example, argue that the motivations of tourists should be considered as types of 'gaze' which comprise education, health, group solidarity, spiritual pleasure, play, heritage and memory, romantic gaze, collective gaze, spectatorial gaze, reverential gaze, anthropological gaze, environmental gaze, media gaze and family gaze. The scholars argue that heritage and spectacular gazes are the most important motivators for tourists to visit any tourist spot. These can be distinguished from other notable forms of tourist gazes, such as the social and the romantic gazes. In the former, the tourist gaze builds up and is indistinguishable from all sorts of social and cultural practices, whilst the latter

emphasises the appreciation of magnificent scenery and the contemplation of nature as romantic landscapes (Urry, 2005).

Both the heritage and spectacular gazes as well as the social and romantic gazes require the government to launch sweeping development and redevelopment programs to build and maintain heritage and spectacular sites which attract tourists. In Medina, for example, the most important motive of tourists is visiting the Prophet's Mosque because of its position in the Islamic heritage, and they tend to combine this with a pilgrimage to Makkah during the religious seasons, indicating that religion is the main motivation (Alharbi, 2005).

Rinschede (1992) confirms that religious tourism is a type of tourism which involves visiting religious destinations or sites for religious reasons. Jafari (2000) therefore categorizes religious tourism into three forms on the basis of the pattern of movement. Firstly, people move in groups to visit religious shrines, and this is termed pilgrimage. Secondly, on specific dates or religious occasions, people gather at certain places, often for a religious festival, which they travel far from their homeland to attend. Thirdly, there are planned trips which people join to find out about the religious aspect of any culture and visit religious sites. The presence of religious shrines and sites that attract visitors means that the area becomes developed and prepared to accommodate visitors throughout the year, as the case has been in Medina. Thus, development and redevelopment are the natural outcome of this type of religious tourism. In this respect, it can be argued that these development or redevelopment activities may affect the local residents by attracting retailers, developers and the affluent class to the areas around pilgrimage sites in Medina. Therefore, this current study is based on the premise of examining how the redevelopment in Medina, triggered by religious tourism, has affected gentrification. The next section will discuss the impact of pilgrimages and religious tourism in areas of the Middle East.

2.4.1. The Impact of Pilgrimages and Religious Tourism in the Middle East

Religious tourism was one of the earliest forms of tourism in the Middle East and Mediterranean because of the presence of cities with Biblical and Islamic importance, especially Jerusalem, Rome and Makkah, each of which attract millions of visitors every year(Timothy and Olsen, 2006). Israel and Egypt in particular attract large numbers of religious tourists, and UNESCO has identified four world heritage sites in Saudi Arabia. In addition, archaeological landmarks in Jordan, the Red Sea, and the Mount of Olives also attract religious tourism.

Most of the countries in the region continue to engage in market segmentation and urban planning to attract religious tourists. In Saudi Arabia, the government decided to promote religious tourism as a way of diversifying its economy, seeking to make it a major contributor on par with oil. It has introduced a plan to extend tourism beyond the traditional holy places of Makkah and Medina to other, non-religious cultural cities and sites, which led to infrastructural development in the form of railways linking Makkah, Medina, Jeddah and other large urban centres. Similarly, the construction of a bridge linking Saudi to Egypt aims to attract a greater share of the 90 million Egyptians to visit Saudi Arabia (Smith, 2016).

In this vein, religious pilgrimages, although regarded as the oldest form of tourism and a form of devotion (Onions, 1983; Rotherham, 2007) in contrast to leisure-oriented tourists seeking new experiences, have become less distinguishable from social and cultural practices, as Urry (2005) argues. Thus, people travel to sacred sites or religious destinations for a range of reasons and not always for deep religious purposes or in the pursuit of spiritual experiences (Rotherham, 2007). Consequently, religious tourism meets the demands of both pilgrims and tourists by catering to the needs of those seeking spiritual engagement as well as to those who may have an interest in the religious site for its historic significance.

Religious tourism in Islam is associated with Hajj, Umrah and Zeyarah (Pinter, 2014). Hajj refers to the pilgrimage to Makkah required of all Muslims who have the means at

some point in their life and takes place once a year at a specific time. Umrah refers to visiting Makkah at other times of the year; while Zeyarah means side-trip to Medina be before or after the Hajj and Umrah.   Kessler (2015) believes that Hajj, Umrah and other related visits are included in the scope of tourism in general; however, they have religious considerations and motives which form the basis of the religious tourism designation. Considering the case of Saudi Arabia, Bokhari (2008:144) defines religious tourism as a "pilgrimage of Muslims to the Holy Lands of Mecca and Medina, worshipping God, holding a great degree of faith, and seeking his mercy, in order to satisfy their spiritual and religious need". The religious tourism associated with Hajj, Umrah and Zeyarah involve particular rituals stipulated in the Sharia. One of these is the role of custodian of the two Holy Mosques (in Makkah and Medina), assumed by the Saudi government, which entails a special duty to preserve those places from non-Muslims. This is central to the governance of the Saudi state and is derived from Sharia law, which is based on the Quran as a cultural, social and political system. Another example is that women are not allowed to come alone without a male guardian, such as father, husband, son or other relative; as a result, the number of male visitors often outnumbers that of females; a survey by Alharbi (2005) indicated that the proportion of males was 61 percent.

The economic benefits of religious pilgrimages are seen elsewhere in the world, such as Lourdes, France. Nouwen (2011), Martins (2010), Barret (2001) and Harris (1999) affirm that the shrine at Lourdes attracts millions of Catholics every year seeking spiritual peace. Similarly, a CNN report in 2017 estimated that three million Muslims visit Makkah annually to perform Hajj. Despite the revenues these sacred sites bring to the economy of each country (Smith, 2016), they also consume local resources. Consequently, the government of Saudi Arabia introduced a licence system to regulate pilgrims during Hajj and Umrah seasons, according to a report issued by the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the UK in 20175. The licenses are issued to travel agents who are authorised to arrange pilgrimages define a quota for the number of pilgrims from each country who may be granted visas to visit the holy sites.

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5 http://embassies.mofa.gov.sa/sites/uk/EN/DiplomaticMissionServices/Consulates/Pages/default.aspx accessed: 29/11/2017

These licenses give the Saudi government and authorities some control over the number of visitors, given that there have been incidents in the past where overcrowding has caused accidents (Bahurmoz, 2006). It also means that provisions can be ensured for accommodation and food; the hotels and restaurants needed for such a large number of pilgrims have to be in accessible locations. Thus, urban development in the holy cities is carried out in such a way that hotels, travel lodges and private developers with both local and international backgrounds are allowed to establish their businesses and consume resources so that religious tourists (pilgrims) can be accommodated and catered to during the busiest period of the year. Roads and other infrastructure to control and manage the flow of pilgrims into, out of, and around the cities have been constructed in both Makkah and Medina.

Under special government directives, international retailers, commercial tycoons and affluent business people are allowed to enter the cities and transform their urban spaces into skyscrapers, apartments, shopping malls and plazas, which Freeman (2006) recognises as the initial stages of gentrification. The low-income residents and renters have thereby been displaced to the peripheries of the cities; the classic examples of this are seen in the religious sites located in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. These displacements of low-income renters can be classed as commercial gentrification due to arrival of businesses with international reputations, and as state-led gentrification due to the involvement of the state in gentrifying the urban spaces in tourist areas (Trono, 2009).

Trono (2009) asserts that religious tourism plays an important role in improving the image of a city and promoting regional development, yet many tourist cities are confronted with over-consumption of the local infrastructure. In addition, there are some other factors such as increasing numbers of tourists and a growing social conflict between local residents and new redevelopment processes, which have had vast developmental and environmental effects on the urban landscape. Thus, this current study explores the factors that led to redevelopment of the central zone of Medina, and seeks to establish whether gentrification has taken place in this religious tourist city.

In order for gentrification to take place, Savage and Warde (1993: 87) suggest that four processes must occur: displacement of one social group with another; regrouping of

people with similar interests; changes in the urban landscape to provide services for the high-income newcomers; and changes in the land system. To consider these as being key determinants of tourism gentrification, the reality of large numbers of visitors to an area must be considered. The privacy that residents once enjoyed may be impeded by tourists, local shops may serve the needs of visitors rather than locals, and property developers may see opportunities in the land around the site. Suntikul (2013) also describes how religious tourism has led local people to re-assess their religious heritage in terms of its commercial value to tourists; some people have stolen artefacts in order to sell them to tourists. Thus, not only does tourism change the urban landscape, it also changes the values of the local residents (Bramwell, 2004; Boissevain, 1996).

There are many aspects to serving the needs of religious tourism and some of these needs mean adapting the built environment. There are economic considerations inherent in meeting these needs as well as processes which might accelerate gentrification. Whilst these needs affect the wealth and cultural make-up of the new built or regenerated environment, the impact on long-term inhabitants must considered when increasing the area's appeal to newcomers. The displacement (Chavez, 2015) the results from gentrification which is ultimately caused by religious tourism remains a challenge in urban regeneration, redevelopment or renewal projects (Lee et al., 2008), irrespective of the spiritual benefits of religious tourism for tourists and the economic gains and development that they bring. The next section discusses gentrification that has been studied in different parts of the world and specifically in Muslim contexts.

2.5. Global Gentrification and Gentrification in Islamic Cities

Many previous studies on gentrification have focused on large Western cities, such as London, New York and Chicago, as these cities were places where the phenomenon was first identified (Glass, 1964; Smith, 1996; Zukin, 1989). However, countries in the Global South have also experienced gentrification processes, and Bellingham (2015), in line with Lees (2008, 2012) emphasises the need to expand the focus of gentrification research

beyond a select few cities in the wealthier Global North to consider rapidly urbanizing and developing cities in Global South. The spread of gentrification internationally has been noted by various scholars who have affirmed that it is no longer restricted to the Western world (Atkinson & Bridge, 2005). In the 1990s, gentrification developed into what Smith (2002) called 'an urban strategy' which is generalised and no longer characteristic only of Europe, North America or Oceania. Furthermore, it has moved away from central cities to include suburbs (Badcock, 2001; Robson & Butler, 2001) as well as rural areas (Phillips, 1993, 2002; Smith & Phillips, 2001).

The manifestations of gentrification may be varied, and may cover a much broader range of processes than previous researchers have identified. Thus, while displacement may be contingent on a specific context, it is nevertheless a global pattern associated with gentrification and urban re(development).However, whilst earlier writings tended to focus on the displacement of lower income, working-class households (Ley, 1986; Marcuse, 1986; Smith & Williams, 1986) and the perceived negative impact of gentrification on the lower classes, some of the more recent studies take the view that, in many cases, gentrification can be positive for an area (Atkinson, 2003; Freeman, 2006). For example, because gentrification raises the economic power of the area, the argument has been made that despite the upheaval associated with displacement and experienced by many of the original residents, gentrification could be seen as an overall positive force. Atkinson (2003: 2345) states that those on the right of the political spectrum tend to view displacement as an 'unfortunate corollary of processes that are revitalizing city centres, attracting private investment, and securing the physical fabric of architecturally valuable neighbourhoods.' It is hard to dispute the fact that, from certain perspectives, gentrification can be beneficial to certain people in some ways and indeed may be beneficial for the cultural heritage of a district.

The debate about who ultimately benefits from gentrification is one of high contestation. For instance, Slater (2009) argues that many recent contributors in gentrification discourse celebrate the process of gentrification and neglect issues of class inequality and displacement.

The displacement of long-time residents to make way for new housing, businesses, and shopping centres starts at the top and trickles down in a variety of ways, reaching large segments of the population in the Middle East. This has created various tensions and even political unrest, ultimately fuelling, in some cases, widespread discontent in the form of national struggles against imperialism (Yacobi & Schechter, 2005). From Cairo to Alexandria in Egypt and from Ankara to Istanbul and Izmir in Turkey, social inequality and economic injustice between the rich and poor, who live in close proximity, has spurred unrest among those who have not benefitted from transformations in the local and global economy.

Drakakis–Smith (1980) argued that the Western way in which development and planning was implemented in most cities of the Middle East was inappropriate for providing housing to the urban poor because of its expensive nature. This has created a need to empower disadvantaged urban communities (Burgess 1991). Furthermore, planning, both at the conceptual and practical stages, must consider different spatial, economic, political and social contexts, as scholars have advocated. Yacobi and Schechter (2005) advocate locally contextualized solutions to urban crises that consider the negative impact of globalisation, privatization and the withdrawal of the state from providing housing in most of the cities of the global South. Whilst development has led to the transformations in local identity, there have been calls for a wider discourse about contemporary urban realities in the age of globalisation, when the binaries of local vs universal, authentic vs imported and new vs old serve as the basis of country-specific analyses.

In essence, while geographers have acknowledged the spread of gentrification from the global North to the South, the spatial and temporal dimensions of gentrification outside of the UK and USA have not been sufficiently explored. Furthermore, international, intra-national and city to city comparisons are lacking. According to Lee (2012), the timing of the processes must be included in any comparison between various models of urbanism, whereby emphasis in inquiry should be on the similarities and differences among cities.

Lees (2012) has also argued that the urbanisation that is taking place in the global South is imitative, thus reflecting the gentrification that has taken place in the North. According to her, what operates in the global South is a form of cosmopolitan urbanism, whereby

gentrification is an expanded imagination based on Western urbanism. Implied in this is that Western gentrification is imagined and made to fit the needs of the Global South. Consequently, most of the modern structures in the Middle East resemble European buildings.

Finally, it can be argued is that although there are economic, political and social/cultural complexities that interact with cityscapes in the global South, especially the Middle East (Yacobi & Shechter, 2005), municipal and state decision-making are what ultimately shape the nature of urban spaces. These may be distinct from their Global North counterparts, irrespective of the modernisation and Westernisation that seem to dominate both sides of the debates in these contexts. Furthermore, although there are differences in decision-making, the emerging urban structure in Middle Eastern cities, as well as in Latin America, and indeed, in most capitals in the world, replicates the model set by the global North, which Bauer (2001) refers to as "Parisisation", i.e. westernisation.

2.5.1. Debate on Modern Comparative Urbanism

Whilst appreciating that in the 21st century in the Global South, more incidences of gentrification have been identified in countries such as China, India, Pakistan, and South Africa, scholars have noted that gentrification is one of the features of neo-colonialism but has not been studied in this context (Islam, 2010; Bosker et al., 2013). In this view, capital is seen as being used to exploit rather than develop less developed areas of the world. It has therefore been suggested that 'comparative urbanism', as a field of inquiry, should link urban studies in the Global South to the postcolonial perspective (Lee, 2012). A more post-colonial approach would critique developmentalism, categorisation and universalism, all of which are characteristics of gentrification in many cities in the Global South. Gentrification in this part of the world may be viewed as positive where it preserves historic buildings; however, in neo-colonialism, wealthy members of the population restore historic structures in order to live there, in contrast to the poverty of other neighbourhoods (Escher & Peterman, 2000).

Shatkin (2006) agrees with the need for comparative research but takes the view that urban development in developing countries tends to be modelled on the structures of cities in the USA, Europe and Japan. In her view, cities in the Global South exhibit a combination of global North features and local actors and institutions peculiar to their setting. The remarkable demonstration of such interaction, she stresses, is reflected in some cities in Global South, such as Dubai. However, Shatkin and scholars such as Sutton (2016) and Pacione (2005) have acknowledged that such cities have been influenced by economic and social factors that are associated with globalisation and event tourism.

In Makkah and Medina, two cities of enormous importance to the Muslim world, urbanization has led to the construction of skyscrapers, groundscrapers and hotels to accommodate pilgrims, turning Central Zones of the cities into commercial and marketing hubs. Dubai and other cities in the Global South undertook redevelopment and revitalization in the name of event-based and holiday-based tourism, whilst Medina and Makkah were revitalized in the service of religious tourism and with the goal of making it more profitable for the cities (Harris, 2005). As with their counterparts in the Global North, policy makers have referred to these developments as investment, redevelopment and/or regeneration instead of gentrification (Lees et al., 2008).

One particular similarity between cities of the Global North and the Global South is that it is mainly newcomers, developers, and landowners who perceive gentrification (or redevelopment, as they may call it) positively (Lees, 2012; McFarlane, 2010). For instance, Chavez (2015) has noted the impact of gentrification on the wealth and culture of the regenerated area, as well as the arrival of newcomers. However, its impact in terms of the displacement of previous residents, who are economically and socially less privileged, was reported to be worse in comparative urbanism studies in both the Global South and the Global North (Ley, 1997). Grange and Pretorius (2014) carried out one of these studies in Hong Kong, where displacement was found to be an outcome of urban redevelopment, although it was not intended to be the focus of inquiry.

Comparative urbanism, as an approach, emphasises the colonial and hegemonic selectivity that has characterised urban studies whereby important cities in the West, such as London and New York, are portrayed as models for urban processes all over the world.

Robinson (2006) contests the hierarchical analysis of cities whereby some are described as non-modern or primitive; the central critique of comparative urbanism is this emphasis on cities in the global North as setting the standard the city landscapes and urbanization (Lees, forthcoming). Thus, urban processes that do not fit this model are ignored.

Lees (forthcoming), Robinson (2006), and Roy (2009) all contest the universal model and advocate the potential for learning from the experiences of urban processes in other contexts, especially in the global South. The major tenets of their argument are that different cities experience urban processes differently, and such variations should be considered as "diversity rather than as hierarchical ordering or incommensurability" (Lees, forthcoming, p.2). Robinson (2006) similarly states that the study of ordinary cities does not privilege the experiences of only certain cities in analysis. Each is unique in its experience. Therefore, she stresses recognition of the "unique assemblages of wider processes – they are all distinctive, in a category of one" (p. 109, cited in Lees, 2017). Each city may have "a vast array of networks and circulations of various spatial reach" (ibid.), all of which deserve consideration.

Although it has been argued that making global urbanism more inclusive could result in provincial particularism, Nijman (2007) stresses the need to look outside the usual in order to break the colonial hegemonic thinking by which London, New York, and Tokyo are taken as the standard for urban development. Thus, the comparative urbanism approach adopts postcolonial theory whereby even the global North could learn from the differences and diversity in the urban processes of other nations rather than serving as benchmarks in a hierarchical categorization of urban processes based on specific city types, such as 1920s Chicago or 1990s London (Lees, forthcoming, p. 2).

A central tenet is that a 'city' should be seen as "a thing in the making" (Simone ,2010:3), and the analysis of urban processes should be based on a concept of "city-ness", coined by Simone (2010). Traditional Islamic cities, as defined above, exhibit a structure based on the social, cultural, political and religious organising principles of Islam that affect the design and use of space.

Thus, development geographers, researchers, and urban scholars should seek to learn these strategies and processes (Lees, forthcoming) rather than focus on how cities in the

global South measure up to those in the global North. This study therefore takes this approach in a case study of Medina in Saudi Arabia.

Comparative urbanism widens the debate on gentrification, in particular by enumerating the diverse urban processes which distinguish development in the global South from that in the Global North (Ferreira, 2016). One of the areas that would benefit from more research on gentrification is the Middle East.

2.5.2. The Debate on Gentrification in Islamic Cities

Whilst the focus of most gentrification studies has been on cities in the Global North, there have been many incidences of re(development) or gentrification throughout the Islamic world, particularly in the Middle East, where old and new structures exist side-by-side in urban settings. In the Middle East generally, the business, leisure and commercial environment has been inspired by a global, modernist and post-modernist vision (Yacobi & Shechter, 2005) that caters to new and exclusive sections of the local economy. Further, high-rise buildings in the midst of less affluent city spaces represent the re(development) and gentrification that that has taken place in Islamic cities. Most of these new buildings are international premises or provide accommodation for government offices, NGOs and tourists. These features are evident in transformations in Damascus, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, where a variety of shopping sites, supermarkets, department stores, food and other chain stores have been constructed in order to create new exclusive spaces. A result of this is the polarisation of the urban environment, such that emphasise socio-economic gaps between the rich and the poor are plainly manifested (Yacobi & Shechter, 2005).

The residents who cannot afford the lifestyle brought by the new establishments are often forced or choose to leave the city. Such displacement is much more than the movement of one class of people to another space. As Davidson and Lees (2009) argue, displacement alters the urban neighbourhood in a class-based way, and also constitutes the loss of neighbourhood, community, family and home (Rerat et al., 2010). In this sense, it may be regarded as the loss of identity. Davidson and Lees (2009) also suggest that moving the

displaced to other areas, usually to the outer edges of a town or city, leads to deprivation; it deprives people of the convenience of living in a central location, of access to public facilities, of social networks; and it may increase the time and costs of employment, as they then have a longer commute. In the Middle East in particular, Drakakis –Smith (1980) argued that the Western way in which development and planning was implemented in most cities failed to provide housing to the urban poor because of it was too expensive.

Another factor that requires attention in investigating a Middle Eastern context is rapid population growth, which is changing the fabric of Middle East societies, including the two holy cities, Makkah and Medina. Islamic cities are dynamic, and there is much debate about gentrification occurring in the inner cities, where many traditional styles of housing remain. When the historic buildings in the centre of Beirut were destroyed, there was an outcry but no consensus about what should be saved (Stoelker, 2012). As Middle Eastern cities may contain a mixture of different histories in their turbulent pasts, it is difficult to determine where the greater historic value may lie; in the case of Beirut, there were traces of French Colonial, Phoenician and Ottoman cultures in the built environment (ibid.). The loss of history has also been observed in Makkah and Medina; key artefacts of history have been demolished as gentrification replaces the traditional and cultural spaces in these cities (Ahmad, 2014). There is a dearth of studies exploring the impact of these redevelopment activities; hence, this study aims to investigate whether central Medina has experienced redevelopment or gentrification.

2.6. Conclusion

This literature review has provided an overview of the debates surrounding gentrification across time and culture and the processes involved in urbanisation, namely redevelopment, gentrification and the globalization of gentrification. It has discussed the current approach of comparative urbanism and described the gap which this study seeks to fill. This thesis is a scholarly inquiry that seeks to situate Medina within the discourse

on gentrification in the global South, which may or may not show a similarity with other types of gentrification and urbanism, as advocated by scholars such as Lees (2012).

The reviewed literature has reflected the fact that there are numerous studies on gentrification at the neighbourhood level in cities in the Global North, but few have paid attention to the gentrification in the Middle East, or more generally in Islamic cities in the Global South. Furthermore, research into Western urbanisation has examined the effects of socio-political factors on gentrification, urbanization and globalisation, but this is lacking in studies focussing on the Middle East. There is plenty of literature on urbanization in the Middle East, but not on gentrification in Islamic cities; this represents a gap in the literature. This study will illustrate the experience of one Islamic city – Medina – which has been exposed to redevelopment and gentrification; in so doing, it will provide insight into the complexities of redevelopment policies, restructuring of inner cities, and religious tourism. It is also intended to ascertain whether such redevelopment and restructuring plans caused gentrification in Medina.

This study principally explores the forms and processes that have occurred in Medina and investigates whether these relate to gentrification. If this may be the case, then further investigation will be carried out on the extent to which such gentrification may have taken place. The next chapter presents the methodology of this research, explaining how data are collected to carry out this investigation.

Chapter 3

Research Methodology

3.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the methods I use in this study; it explains the research design and the rationale for adopting the selected qualitative methods. This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section gives the research questions, which were formulated in light of gaps in the literature, as identified in Chapter 2, and in support of the research objectives presented in Chapter 1. The second section discusses the research design, in particular mixed methods adopted for data collection, and justifies the choice of a case study approach for this research. The third section elucidates the sampling strategy, sample size and selection criteria. The fourth section describes the data analysis tools used in this study, while the fifth section explains the positionality of the researcher and its influence on the study. The sixth section enumerates the ethical issues considered during the data collection and reporting stages. The seventh section provides a conclusion to the chapter.

3.2. Research Questions

The literature review, in Chapter 2, highlighted that due to the globalization of gentrification, there is a need for comparative analyses of urban processes in the context

of the global South, as these are distinct from their counterparts in the global North. This study attempts to partially fill this gap through a case study of Medina, in Saudi Arabia. Situated within the debates on Middle Eastern and Islamic cities, the thesis aims to investigate the urbanisation experience of one Islamic city, Medina, in order to ascertain whether gentrification has taken place in the central zone of this city as a result of redevelopment projects carried out between 1970 and 2000. In so doing, it will provide insight into the complex impact of various forces, such as redevelopment policies, the restructuring of the inner cities, and religious tourism. It will also consider whether the redevelopment and restructuring that occurred in Medina was in fact gentrification. This is important because scholars (e.g. Lee et al., 2015; Maloutas, 2012; Artkinson, 2008; Atkinson & Bridge, 2005) have argued that instances of what scholars have recorded as gentrification are being rebranded as (re)development or re-urbanisation, as in the case of development in British inner cities (Lee et al., 2008; Davidson & Lees, 2005). This study thus explores the processes that have taken place in Medina and whether they led to the displacement of long-term residents as well as the various actors involved, and how the city's experience fits into wider debates on gentrification and displacement.

Importantly, the literature review has shown the evolution of the concept of gentrification, reflecting controversies among scholars with regard to the outcomes of the process, in particular, whether displacement has been empirically validated (Freeman, 2006). Socio-economic and political circumstances as well as revitalization were also identified as specific factors that might cause disagreement in how gentrification is viewed. For instance, comparative urbanists have advocated the recognition of differences in how each city undergoes urban development processes (Lees, 2012, 2017; Robinson, 2006, 2010; Roy, 2009), and especially how cities in the global South have experienced development and gentrification differently from those in the global North. Therefore, this study seeks to apply theories and concepts developed with respect to cities in the global North (especially the UK, the USA, and Canada) to explain the gentrification process in a particular city in Saudi Arabia, in the Middle East. As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on urbanization in the Middle East presents a complex picture of how redevelopment and revitalization projects in the region have had often undesirable consequences on the lives of local residents, as reflected by the presence of slums,

pollution, inadequate drainage systems and water shortages. These challenges have played a key role in urbanization and gentrification in Middle Eastern cities (Moghadam, 2010; Davis, 2006; Fahmi & Sutton, 2008). Similarly, because of the colonial experience, some countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region still rely on development policies from the global North, despite growth and modernization (Abubrig, 2012). There are also religious, linguistic and historic factors that bind the cities of this region together despite globalisation (AlBassam, 2015), even in UAE, where the Emirati culture and religion are intermingled with the world financial industry and tourism in a unique confluence. This might therefore exemplify the tension between the modern and the traditional that affects the urbanization of most Islamic cities, resulting in economic, political, and socio-cultural complexity (Yacobi and Shechter 2005; AlBassam, 2012). However, the research in this field on cities in the Muslim world in limited, and none to date has considered Medina. Thus, the primary objective of this research is to determine whether the changes that have taken place in the central zone of Medina constitute gentrification or mere development. The following aims are derived from this objective: First, to determine what has triggered redevelopment in the central zone of Medina since the 1970s; Second, to identify the major actors that have been involved in the redevelopment of the central zone; Third, to determine what the impact has been on local residents, thereby situating Medina's central zone into the classic as well as recent debates on redevelopment and gentrification.

In line with these objectives, research questions have been formulated to address the gap in knowledge, and to be answered by the analysis in the three empirical chapters:

RQ1 - What are the factors that have contributed to the development witnessed in the central zone of Medina since the 1970s?

RQ2 - Who are the major actors involved in the redevelopment process?

RQ3 - How has this process of urban redevelopment affected the everyday lives of the local inhabitants?

RQ4 – To what extent does this redevelopment resonate with classic and recent debates in the literature on gentrification?

The first empirical chapter (chapter 5) answers the first two research questions, while chapter 6 focuses on answering research question 3, and chapter 7 answers RQ4 (see chapter 3, the methodology, for detailed explanation of the research process). Answering the research questions is very important form number of reasons first, understanding contemporary gentrification outside its classic border, which is global North. Second, promoting concept of variation between classic gentrification and new build development and therefore embed concept of new build gentrification in Middle East especially Gulf countries that witness so called "oil urbanization ". It became critical issue because of the region is experiencing significant urbanisation increasing and urban processes can overlap. Third, this study could reflect clearly a strong role of the state in term of both public policy and investment in gentrification and displacement studies in diverse political and cultural context.

The next section explains why the qualitative approach of a case study was selected and how it is used to investigate whether the central zone of Medina has experienced (re)development or gentrification.

3.3. Research Design: A Qualitative Approach to the Study of Gentrification in Saudi Arabia

In recent times, qualitative approaches have come to be favoured by researchers because they facilitate the exploration of the subjective meanings, feelings and experiences of the research participants. The methods employed in such approaches are interviews, observations, and discussions, amongst others, in contrast to quantitative research, which emphasises statistics and numbers, assuming that they reveal a social reality that is external, objective, universal and constant (Al Bassam, 2011; Bryman and Teevan, 2005). Furthermore, qualitative approaches are popular in geographical studies (Limb and Dwyer, 2001) where the goal is not to focus exclusively on quantitative data but to glean 'insight into human experience' (Robinson, 1998, p: 408; cited in Al Bassam, 2011:63). As this research study looks at the subjective experiences of the participants in the context of urbanisation and gentrification, qualitative research methods are adopted.

Similarly, a mixed approach comprising both qualitative and quantitative methods was rejected for this study, although it is acknowledged that most recent studies on gentrification have taken such an approach to examine social changes and the class composition of the gentrified area (Chum, 2015; Wheway, 2011; Wang & Lau, 2009; Préteceille, 2007; Atkinson, 2000). Quantitative gentrification studies usually use census data, questionnaires, surveys and statistical documents to gather data, which are then analysed according to variables to answer the research questions; this thesis does not, although documents and archive materials are accessed. Rather, the emphasis here is on understanding and explaining the gentrification process of Medina from the participants' perspectives, making my study distinctive. This approach is in line with Denzin and Lincoln's observation about what distinguishes a qualitative approach from statistically focussed survey research techniques, as the focus is on how "social experiences are created and given meanings" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011:10) by the participants in this study. Thus, the qualitative research approach was used in this study in order to probe and discover deeper levels of meaning regarding the experience of gentrification from the perspectives of the participants interviewed as well as from government documents, documentary films, archival photos and news reports, which provide empirical depth to this phenomenon; all of these are qualitative methods (Osborne, 2008; Al Bassam, 2011).

Thus, the focus of the study is not on census information and spatial distribution but rather the subjective feelings, experiences and meanings attached to gentrification and displacement by the subjects of this study with regards to the (re)development and gentrification of a specific location, the Central Zone in Medina. Moreover, the lack of sufficient census data from Saudi Arabia made it problematic to analyse, as explained in the next paragraph. I obtained population statistics for the years 1974, 1993, 2004 and 2010, but these were only used to explain the archival data and were not analysed statically, as the quantitative approach demands. Despite my efforts to access any unpublished census records for Medina, I faced barriers related to the availability and accessibility of information. According to GaStat, a researcher must seek such records through the central branch of GaStat in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, as they are not available directly. I did this but was then informed that applications for access have

to come from a team of employees, who must present a budget, and in the end, they did not show any willingness to provide assistance.

Hence, I had to make do with the data available on the GaStat website. There are, however, further problems with such census data. Firstly, the initial census was carried out in 1962-63, but subsequently, there was no regular collection of data; further censuses were taken in 1974, 1992, 2004 and 2010. In addition, the census reports are not consistent in their definitions, classifications, and tables (Abdul Salam et al., 2014). Secondly, and more significantly for studying social change, demographic, social and economic data for the population at the district or neighbourhood level of Medina are completely non-existent, and therefore what is available does not provide any basis for measurement of the city's population. This issue is common in countries in the Global South; Bulmer and Warwick (1993) enumerated the limitations of administrative data in developing countries and argued that the social data that exist are inadequate as basic population parameters and development indicators. However, qualitative gentrification studies are also feasible, even in developed countries, and for logical reasons, they are more likely to provide the best indication of small and impending changes in neighbourhoods. An example of this is provided by Slater's (2004) study of gentrification in South Parkdale, Canada; he argued that qualitative data picked up subtle changes that were not discernible from the descriptive statistics of census data.

Across many disciplines, however, the qualitative approach is widely known for not being value-free; it has been critiqued for the very reason it is chosen, that is, because it is subjective, and therefore its results are not generalizable. However, being case-based, it directs attention to and illuminates the specifics of a particular case (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). It is thus appropriate for my study of Medina's central zone. A qualitative approach has enabled me to explore the experiences of my participants in this context based on the objectives of my study, and make it a distinctive and contextual gentrification study. The flexibility afforded by interviews gave the participants the opportunity to narrate their experiences, attitudes, and the impact of the gentrification of the central zone on their lives.

Slater (2006) argues that despite the large amount of literature available on gentrification, there are very few qualitative accounts of displacement. However, seeing the effects of gentrification from the perspective of the residents themselves is essential for a more complete understanding of the phenomenon. This view is supported by Atkinson (2000), who confirms that there are issues in the data collected from quantitative methods, and that a qualitative approach could help to address such issues; these issues relate to a lack of closeness to the gentrification process and the tracking of displaced persons after the event. This thesis, which investigates whether the central zone of Medina has experienced (re)development or gentrification, employed a case study approach, as discussed further below.

3.4. A Single Case Study

Central to the various definitions of a case study is the emphasis on detail, the intensive study of a group, community, one person or of a phenomenon (Stake, 1995), although (Hancock and Algozzine, 2016) assert that it is not easy to describe what a case study is because there is no simple explanation There is, however, agreement that case studies can either be single or multiple. Whether a case study design is single or multiple, according to Yin (2003), depends on the researcher's goals in understanding a phenomenon or on what is to be investigated. In either approach, single or multiple, an intensive, detailed, and rich inquiry is made into the subject in order to generate new ideas(Berg, 2004); the desire to compare within or across cases distinguishes the single case approach from the multiple (Yin, 2003).

Thus, the researcher is expected to identify the case and the type of case study that would best address the research questions, following a thorough consideration of the context of the study (Yin, 2003). Thus, the adoption of a single case study approach in this thesis is premised on the approach's strength in offering me the opportunity to explore the subject in-depth and provide rich details that could serve as empirical evidence of whether the urban renewal and changes that took place in the central zone of Medina constitute development or gentrification. Murdie and Teixeira (2011) used a single case approach for a similar study looking at the patterns of gentrification and their participants' attitudes

towards the changes in the west-central Toronto neighbourhood of Little Portugal, providing affirmation of my choice.

Criticism of the method notwithstanding, the selection of a single case study approach affords a detailed and intensive study of the context, given the position of Medina in the Saudi hierarchy (see Chapters 1 and 2) and the tension its urban renewal has generated between the traditional and the modern, which is reflected in its urbanisation and landscape. Also, this approach was deemed suitable due to the importance of Medina for religious tourism. Henderson (2011) demonstrated the usefulness of the case study approach for social inquiry in Saudi Arabia when she examined the official responses to the formidable task of hosting Hajj (the pilgrimage); the stated goal was to expand the "capacity of key structures and spaces and, in cooperation with the commercial sector, extend and modernize transport and accommodation facilities" (Henderson ,2011:541). My strategy of examining archival documents also resonates with her study, as she relied on information in the public domain, such as print media and electronic media, as well as official government agencies. The difference is that while she records the "thoughts of a small group of hajj participants" (Henderson, 2011:541), I interviewed both government officials and former residents. Thus, the interviews with both planners and displaced residents, along with the analysis of archival data, photographs and media, generate insight into gentrification that situates this single case within the literature and debates by assessing the impact of the process on this city. In the next section, the data collection techniques for this thesis are presented.

3.5. Data Collection Techniques

This thesis employed semi-structured interviews, observation, and document analysis of archival data as data collection methods. As Kothari (2004) suggests, no single method is sufficient for producing an overall picture. There is also a long tradition of the use of multiple methods for collecting and interpreting data in geography (Cope, 2010). I therefore combined these data collection methods to take advantage of both methods. Interviews help me to understand people's perceptions of the processes and impacts of

change and the circumstances prior to change, as well as the environment of the central zone. In addition, the archival data provide information that the participants were unable to provide either due to their lack of awareness of the development project or to a lack of transparency on the part of the government in informing inhabitants in the project area as to whether the undertaking was an investment or a public service. An example of this was when the participants were asked about the reason for their displacement; the majority of them thought it was because of the expansion of the Prophet's Mosque, but their previous residences are now occupied by hotels. Thus, archival data as well as observation of the area allowed for the triangulation of data to provide a more complete picture as well as validate individual participants' interpretations. The perspectives of the participants regarding the reasons for their displacement are contrasted with the reality revealed by the document analysis in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

Table 1 below summarises the various aspects of the two phases of the research, which were carried out during two field-trips I made to the area in question, Medina's central zone. In the first phase (mid-July to mid-October 2013), I visited the study area frequently. In particular, I went to four neighbourhoods[6] in the central zone for observation, where I viewed and photographed the development from different places and at different times of the day and night. The purpose of these images was to gain a clear idea of the form of the buildings, towers, and streets at the time and to clarify the extent of the differences within the development of the central area. The second stage of this visit was collecting archival data from public and private institutions. A key objective here was to complement these sources of data with the information gleaned from the interview participants. This stage took nearly two months. The time allocated for the third stage was the remaining two weeks of the trip. After obtaining government data, I decided that I needed to carry out interviews with some government officials, decision-makers and planners in the Municipality of Medina and other government agencies related to the development project. In this regard, I requested an interview with the current mayor of Medina, but I was refused with the explanation that the new secretary had no clear

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[6] Bedah, Almanakah, Alnaqah and Bani Kodrah. A fifth neighbourhood, Bani Alnajar, appears in government reports but was not included in the process of development during my fieldwork. Development there commenced only in 2014. This is reflected in Figure 23 in chapter six (the second empirical chapter).

knowledge of the development of the central zone. I therefore conducted interviews with some of the staff and with the former mayor.

	Duration	Location	Research procedure
First phase	Mid July-Mid October 2013 (3 months)	Saudi Arabia: Medina & Riyadh	*Stage 1*: Observe, study area, take photographs *Stage 2*: Collect, examine, sort archival data *Stage 3*: Interviews
Second phase	2nd -24th August 2014	Saudi Arabia: Medina	Interviews with displaced residents and employees in the central zone

Table 1: The two phases of data collection.

Due to my gender, there was some difficulty in communicating with officials, because women are not permitted to enter the headquarters of the government. This is explained further below in the section on the researcher's reflexivity and positionality. Interviews were therefore conducted in the lobby of a hotel with a male member of my family in attendance and accompanying me, for safety reasons as well as religious considerations. This also helped participants see me in a more positive and respectful way. In addition, the timing for the scientific trip was not in my favour, as it occurred during the month of Ramadan and at the beginning of the Hajj season. Due to the end of Ramadan and Eid Al-Fitr, a public holiday, some of the staff delayed responding to my requests until the end of the pilgrimage season, as they were out of office or very busy.

As a Saudi citizen, I had access to participants that would not be available to outsiders. Apart from being able to speak the local language, I come from the same culture and follow the same traditions. This makes me an 'insider researcher', in that I was carrying out research from inside my own society (Greene, 2014; Naples, 2003). The advantages of this are that people may feel they can talk more openly to the interviewer, as the participants feel the interviewer understands their issues, and being a member of the same group implies acceptance (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). On the other hand, it is argued that

the researcher can be too close to participants and therefore not objective (Agulier, 1981), or may make assumptions due to their insider knowledge (DeLyser, 2001). One way of mitigating any potential bias is by employing mixed methods and, as will be seen in the next section, archival data as well as observations were used as additional sources of information (Greene, 2014).

The second trip took place from 2nd to 24th August 2014. During this trip, interviews were conducted with 16 participants of different ages, genders, and professions, all of whom were previous residents of the central zone of Medina who had been displaced (see Chapter 7). Also, officials and planners who were involved in the urban renewal process were interviewed, as mentioned above (see Appendix A for the status and demographic factors of both categories of participants).

3.5.1. Archival Data

Analysing archival documents is a qualitative research method (Osborne, 2008); therefore, in order to better understand the context within which the process of gentrification took place in the central zone of Medina, both my first and second stages of fieldwork included archival research. As a result of the dramatic change of the area under study, there was a need to confirm what had taken place. Rather, the information in the archival documents provided me with a clear picture of the former landscape of the central zone. This resonates with Harris' (2001) argument that there is an evolving interaction between a researcher and the voices from the past which are recorded in archival documents.

According to Jones (2010) archival documents can include past administrative procedures as well as previous studies and evaluations or any kind of information collected by others. (Singleton Jr et al., 1988)as well as Jones (2010) state that archival documents can also include photographs and audio and video recordings; therefore, in addition to official written documents, media like film, photos and newspapers were utilised in my study. I obtained documents from a number of different sources, including local government authorities in Medina, other government departments, and private consultants. In

particular, I searched for documents on the city's urban planning, consulting public records as well as those from private organisations. The most important documents acquired in Saudi Arabia during my two visits and their sources are listed in the Table 2. These documents included reports on Medina's Master Plan, notes from the executive committee for development in the central zone, the Medina urban observatory, satellite images and photographs, the five-year national plan, and census data for four years between 1973 and 2010.

Documents of government bodies	Year
Reports of Medina Master plan, from The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs	1973, 1978 and 1994
Report of the Executive Committee for the Development of the Central Zone, by the Medina Regional Municipality	2000
Satellite images from IKNOS, from King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST)	2010
The Five-Year National Development Plan, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and from the Ministry of Economy and Planning	1975, 1980, 1985, 1990,1995, and 2000
Census Data for the years from The General Authority for Statistics	1974, 1993, 2004 and 2010,
Reports from the Urban Observatory of Medina, from the Medina Regional Municipality	2

Table 2: Governmental archival data used in the study.

The reason for using media, initially, was that there had been media coverage of national and local events at the time they occurred; in other words, it was history in the making. Furthermore, through media sources, I tried to determine who the players or actors were who were involved in developing the central zone in Medina. The media sources of archival data employed in this research included Saudi newspapers, documentary films and archival photos, both published and unpublished, from public and private sources. Singleton and Straits (2005) and Jones (2010) note that because of their age, archival documents tend to be stored as paper files, although some are now being digitised. Indeed, some of the material I examined was available on-line, which made it much easier to access, particularly once I had departed from Saudi Arabia. The online information used included digital documentary films and Saudi newspapers such as Aleqtsadiah and Alymadina.

The examination of photos and images was carried out during the latter stage of data collection because that was when I sought out photographs that would provide information about how the study area looked at different points in its history. Until this point in the research I had not finalised precisely what themes I was addressing, but it was subsequently possible to select photographs that covered the time and location I wanted to investigate. Furthermore, those photos helped me to link and recognise the previous and present landscape of the central zone of Medina.

The utilization of these archival data is guided by my research questions (Jr et al., 1993), and the documents helped me at the beginning of the study to understand the causes, the people involved and the consequences of gentrification in the central zone of Medina, besides providing basic information about the subject. Archival documents were also used after the interviews had been conducted to fill in gaps in the information from the participants. An example of this was when I saw an ECDCZ report that declared that 20 percent of buildings in the new development in the central zone were residential housing. However, some of the participants involved in operating and developing the central zone said that the majority of these buildings were transferred to commercial use for investment reasons. To investigate this discrepancy, I researched archives and obtained the final report of the Urban Observatory documents, which confirmed that there were no permanent residents remaining in the central zone (see Chapter 5).

3.5.2. Interviews

I also obtained data through semi-structured, face-to-face interviews. A total of 30 interviews were carried out with both elite and non-elite participants[7] at various locations. This division reflects the traditional class system of Saudi Arabia and is used in this study for purpose of identify who involve in gentrification process in central zone of Medina

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[7] Generally, and on a broader note, non-elite refers to the displaced people, while elite to the officials. It is, however, observed that within each of these two broad categories, there are sub divisions into elite and non-elite on the basis of their educational qualifications and status in Saudi society. Classification by class in Saudi Arabia is a taken for granted system based on the traditional class system that was the result of education and associated institutions and grounded on Islamic principles and values. However, in the 1970s, Rugh (1973) carried out a study of the New Middle Class (NMC) based on modern education. Although various studies (Al Nuaim, 1987, 2013; Luciani, 2005; Al Sultan, 1998) have examined it, class structure is still vague and generalised, requiring empirical validation.

moreover one of central argument in gentrification studies is elite and non-elite in redevelopment area (Bridge, 2007; Boddy ,2007; Davidson and Lees,2010). Elite status is accorded to officials on the basis of their job description, education and social status; one official interviewed, a security guard, would be considered non-elite but he was interviewed because he had worked on the site of one of the towers in the central zone. Thus, amongst officials, 14 interviewees were elite while one was not. Similarly, amongst the displaced persons, there were eight elites (on the basis of their educational qualifications), four who were uneducated and illiterate, three with a secondary school education, and one who had only a primary school education, for a total of 16. This division is in contrast to many studies of gentrification, where the interviewees have been divided into the categories of resident and non-resident (Davidson, 2006), delineating the actors involved in either the development process or community apparatus on the one hand and residents on the other. Although my participants fall within these two categories, their socio-economic and professional statuses are explained on the basis of class; hence, the sub-division within each as elite or non-elite.

The duration of the interviews was between 30 minutes and 50 minutes, depending on each participant. Whilst the archival documents initially served in providing information for the interviews; afterwards, the information gleaned from the interviews was used to corroborate the documents (see appendices B and C for a sample from the interview guide). The interviews illuminated the feelings of the former residents of the central zone, helped in discerning the motives of those involved in the planning processes, and yielded the interpretations of government officials and planners involved in the central zone's redevelopment. As observed by Al Bassam (2011), the two categories of participants helped me investigate the social processes and address the widely varying experiences of the participants (Longhurst, 2003). The patterns of gentrification and the consequences in terms of the interviewee's personal feelings were the focus of the interviews.

The interviews were divided into two parts and carried out at different times. The first part was conducted during the first phase of fieldwork with decision makers, planners and some of the department managers in the Municipality of Medina. During the interviews, I asked a series of open ended questions based on the topic areas I wanted to cover. In addition, I posed a series of broad questions as supplementary questions to help the

interviewees understand the question asked in the first place as well as for clarifying points I didn't understand. The open-ended nature of the questions posed during the interviews defined the topic under investigation but also provided opportunities for both interviewer and interviewee to discuss some topics in more detail. This allowed me the freedom to probe the participants to elaborate or to follow a new line of inquiry introduced by what he or she had said (Ryan and Bernard (2000); Neuman, 2006). Consequently, this method enabled me to investigate all the aims and objectives of this thesis. Each interview for this research took place in a convenient location for both researcher and participant. As the success of an interview depends on the rapport established between the interviewer and the participants (ibid.), I built rapport first and then carried out the interview. First, I obtained permission from each participant to use an audio digital recorder to record the interviews for later reference and increased accuracy. I also took short notes and joted down the dates and duration of each interview (see Appendix A).

Robinson (1998) cautioned that interviews might have a negative impact in terms of the interviewer injecting his or her biases because of the subjective nature of the method, in contrast to the more scientific and fact-based questionnaire, but I found the technique useful, as I was able to understand the former residents' feelings about displacement. They also served as an indirect way of accessing and probing for in-depth information (Al Bassam, 2011) from the participants which archival documents could not supply. Regardless of the critique that interviewers may impose their own views on the interview process (Al Bassam, 2011; Robinson, 1998), the technique in this study produced rich data and insights into the feelings, thoughts and attitudes of the participants(Frechtling, 2002). The unequal power relations which many scholars, such as Flowerdew and Martin (2005) fear could lead interviewees into holding back information or telling the researcher what they think he or she wants to hear, was well managed. There was a feeling of admiration for me as a PhD candidate when I introduced myself and my research objective. However, it was easier with the displaced people in contrast to the decision makers, officials and males because of social and cultural categorisation and unequal power relations between men and women in the Saudi Arabian cultural milieu.

Sampling: The Selection of Participants

I decided to use purposive sampling to select participants. Accordingly, this procedure was used to select 14 participants from the government official's category and 16 displaced persons to interview for the purpose of this study. The use of a small sample has been the subject of criticism in qualitative research; however, Hammersley and Atkinson (2003) have argued that in contrast to a quantitative survey, the depth of explanation involved in qualitative analysis allows the use of relatively small sample sizes. They cautioned that the researcher must still have an open mind and employ a variety of strategies and methods in collecting and analysing data. Similarly, various scholars such as Creswell (1998) have affirmed the efficacy of using only a few individuals or cases. Guest, Bunce and Johnson (2006) propose that saturation often occurs with twelve participants in a homogenous group, while Latham (2013) feels that eleven is sufficient. Rouch and McKenzie (2006) acknowledged that the more data sources, the better, but they assert that 15 to 20 participants in a qualitative study helps the researcher to offer an in-depth and extensive explanation of "how social experiences are created and given meanings" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005:10). Many other qualitative studies used fewer participants; Guta and Karolak (2015) had seven. Sudermann (2015) interviewed 28 when he study gentrification and urban heritage in old Damascus .In the Saudi context, Alsaggaf (2015) had a sample size of ten, although she used a combination of qualitative methods in collecting online and offline data in her inquiry into the use of Facebook by Saudi women. In consideration of these examples, the total number of 30 was deemed appropriate and sufficiently representative for the purposes of this inquiry.

Purposive sampling was used to identify potential participants amongst the first group, that is, the officials, because it allowed me to access participants who had relevant information on the research problem. If purposively selected participants are used, they can generate rich data, despite being few in numbers (Ryan and Bernard, 2000 and Neuman, 2006). In this research, the selected participants had deeper knowledge about the central zone of Medina and its development projects. Thus, the purposively selected participants served the real purpose of discovering, gaining insight and understanding whether gentrification had taken place in Medina, which forms it took, and the impact on

the residents, thereby shaping this thesis. A list of the names, positions, dates and lengths of interviews is provided in Table 3.5 below. One participant apologised that I would not be able to interview him face-to-face as he was so frequently busy and asked me instead to conduct a telephone interview. The other interviews were all carried out face to face. I am able to reveal the names of eight of the participants, as they gave verbal consent for their names and titles to appear in the thesis; another four did not want their names to be used. Therefore, they are identified as P1, P2, P3, and P4. The participants were selected because they had relevant information about the context of the study, including policies on development and Saudi laws. Most importantly, they had relevant information about the role of both the local and national authority.

The second set of interviews was conducted with former and displaced residents during the second stage of fieldwork and I had no problem accessing them because I was born and grew up in Medina. As a resident of the city, I had the advantage of social networks and family relationships that included displaced people. The participants were chosen from two different areas of the previous city centre. This meant that they included former residents, owners of houses or landlords, and people who lived in the endowment houses before the development project started in 1990. As shown in Figure 5 and 6, the first group were residents who used to live in an area called Bab Alsahmi, north of the Prophet's Mosque. Residents in this area tended to be people with a comfortable economic standing, with most living in houses that were owned by a male household member (Alkayari, 1995). The second group were residents who used to live to the west of the Prophet's Mosque in an area called Hosh Alnuzahat. Residents of this area had lived principally in endowment housing, as discussed in Chapter 5.

| | Prophet's Mosque | | Expansion of the mosque in 1975 | | Bab Alshami | | Hosh Alnuzhat |

Figure 5: Former area of displaced residents. Source: MRM, 1975.

These two areas were chosen due to the difference between the housing systems in terms of ownership. Furthermore, as explained in Chapter 6, I was able to reach a reasonable sample size through family and other social ties, recruiting through the snowballing technique. Alsaggaf (2015) found snowball sampling useful for recruiting women from different demographic backgrounds in her study of Facebook use in Saudi Arabia. In line with Atkinson and Flint (2001), I found this method particularly useful for identifying potential participants where "some degree of trust is required to initiate contact" (p.2). Most of the participants (13) in the displaced persons category were over 60 (up to 72 years old), while three were middle aged, between 42 and 55. None of the participants were younger than 42 years, as I sought only individuals who would be able to relate their experience of the time when the displacement occurred. Although none of the participants minded having their names, ages and occupations revealed, I informed them that this information would, nevertheless, remain confidential and anonymous. Thus, pseudonyms are used to identify the residents who participated in this research study. All the interviews were audio recorded with the participants' permission. The interviews were all conducted in the local dialect of Arabic because this was the only language the participants spoke.

I initially reached out to nineteen potential participants, all of whom met the requirement of having left the central zone because of the development project, but only fourteen responded. Among these, there were nine men and seven women. I had planned to organise focus groups but I faced difficulties getting people to meet each other, especially as some of them were conservative about mixing between men and women for religious and cultural reasons. Upon realising this, I tried putting them into two separate groups based on gender, but the number of participants in each group did not meet the criteria for this research method. Moreover, some of them were hesitant to take part in focus groups although they were willing to participate in an individual interview. Therefore, I opted to conduct semi-structured interviews with on an individual basis. The same questions were used that had been designed for the focus group.

Figure 6: Former area of displaced residents. Source: MRM, 1988

Transcription and Translation of Data

Immediately after carrying out the interviews, I transcribed them verbatim. This involved listening to the audio tape and writing down word-for-word in Arabic what had been said. As a result of the dissimilarity between the two population samples, I chose a different

strategy for each group. For the first group, the planners, decision makers, developers and officials, I transcribed and translated their accounts from Arabic into English after each interview. Afterwards, I categorised their comments by theme and grouped together any significant information related to the study. I did that because the type of language used by this sample was formal, and therefore it was easy to understand the meaning in Arabic.

On the other hand, a different technique was applied for the second group, the displaced dwellers and workers. After each interview, time was spent transcribing the interviews, and then I started to look for themes and patterns. The reason for doing this was the style of their language. The participants used very informal language and colloquialisms with idiomatic expressions, as a result of which some of the language was difficult to translate directly into English. For this reason, I opted to put off translating to the end. An example of the language used was when one of the participants described the economic level of wealthy people as 'the house of my sir and my masters', which means the houses owned by very rich people. Another example of using colloquialisms was when I asked one of the participants if he had received financial compensation from the government, and he replied that he 'had sand', which means he had got nothing. The non-elite interviews are nevertheless directly translated verbatim, and the excerpts used in the empirical chapters are direct translations from Arabic to English, with explanations of the meaning provided where I have deemed necessary. As a result of the more standard language they used, there is greater fluency in the translations of the elite interviewees' words than in those of the non-elite former residents. In the next section, I explain how I analysed the data.

3.6. Data Analysis

Basit (2003) argued that data analysis is the most crucial aspect of qualitative research irrespective of whether it is done manually or electronically. Data analysis requires the expertise of the researcher and is the most demanding, and least examined, aspect of the qualitative research process (Miles, 1979). Although flexibility in presenting a subject's thoughts is permitted, the researcher is expected to work methodically and exercise rigour, knowledge and intellectual competence in both selecting participants and in analysing qualitative data (Tesch, 1990). Whilst Coffey and Atkinson (1996) suggested

that analysing qualitative data is not about observing a set of correct techniques or a single proper approach, they also warned that the researcher is expected to be methodical and scholarly in applying intellectual rigour throughout the process. It is through the analysis that the researcher attempts to gain a deeper understanding of what is being investigated; he or she is therefore expected to continue to refine their interpretations through a dynamic, intuitive and creative process of inductive reasoning, thinking and theorizing. In so doing, the researcher puts his or her own mark, or 'bricoleur', on the research process and product. Analysis involves data condensation and reduction (Tesch, 1990). This, in turn, depends on interpretation, inclination and organisation. The process is aided by coding and categorising as organising tools (Sgier, 2012).

Using codes and categories to organise my data, I first analysed the interviews, which yielded verbal data, followed by the archival materials, which provided visual data, such as newspaper reports, documentary films, secondary government sources and photos. Notably, gentrification as a term is unknown in the social life or academic background of Saudi Arabia; thus, it is expressed by my sources without the actual term being declared. Qualitative content analysis allowed me to apprehend and convey such latent meaning. Sahreier (2012) argues that qualitative content analysis is used when the meaning of your material is less obvious and when interpretation is needed to help describe material in order for third parties (e.g. readers) to understand the latent meaning conveyed by the sources of information. Yan and Wildemuth (2009)suggest that qualitative content analysis was developed mainly to explore the meanings underlying physical messages. Another point for using qualitative content analysis is that oftentimes, criticism in cases of gentrification is directed at governments or other power players and their activities, and because of the nature of Saudi culture and the legal system, freedom of expression is limited. Consequently, people might not always directly say what they mean, necessitating the use of qualitative content analysis. Thus, the following steps were taken: the data first needed to be in the form of written text before analysis could start, so after the interviews had been transcribed, the documentary films were also transcribed and thereafter dealt with as text (Flick, 2013). Using codes and categories, I sorted the responses of those in authority, policy makers and planners according to the reasons they gave for the developments in the central zone, the roles of government or the state, the

capital involved and the contributions made by private and government sectors, landlords who owned properties before the development, housing features, the residents, and landlords after development. Themes were then derived from these key codes.

I used themes as units of coding, and therefore had to look for certain ideas that were being expressed. These ideas needed to be relevant to my research questions. I used the archival data as the basis for data analysis by comparing words used in the archival documents and in the interviews. My objective was to find words, idioms, phrases, sentences or paragraphs which showed some similarity of ideas, in order to try and establish some meaning from the data collected. I also considered the comments participants made to see if there were any contextual similarities in their responses. In analysing the data, I looked for patterns that appeared in different parts of the data collected, either the archival data or the participants' interviews, and this was how I was able to establish themes. Once I had evidence of certain themes, which were common to several participants, I could identify and match opinions, ideas and comments; these were sometimes expressed in different ways, but the meanings were similar. I carried out this analysis systematically to ensure that the results would be authentic as well as consistent. In order to code the data, I transcribed and translated, labelled the transcripts, and highlighted sections of text so that the data could be more easily reviewed. Using this systematic approach, I could get closer to the data itself and gain more insight into what was being presented.

All of this was done manually. Although Flick (2009) affirmed the quality of computer software for qualitative analysis, my analysis was carried out manually using coding and thematic analysis. I couldn't use NVIVO in Arabic, although other researchers have done so, because I found it to be unhelpful for dealing with materials in Arabic. When I attempted to do use it, I experienced technical difficulties whereby I lost all the work that had been given as input into NVIVO. I therefore decided to carry out the analysis manually. In fact, since there is no Arabic version of NVIVO yet, most researchers in the Saudi context, including for example Alsaggaf (2015), have done their coding manually. They also had to translate their materials from Arabic into English as I did. In the next section, I discuss my reflexivity and positionality.

3.7. Researcher's Reflexivity and Positionality

It has been argued that no research is value-free (Bryman, 2001) ,(Smyth and Shacklock, 1998). Researchers bring into the process of inquiry social and cultural baggage that may influence the research process. This is the reason for the importance of reflexivity as a process of self-critique whereby the researcher examines his or her own actions, beliefs, values and ideology during the research process (Seale 1998). It is especially important in qualitative studies, where the values of the researcher always influence the research design and process (Guba & Lincoln 1998). In my own experience, in the process of carrying out this investigation of gentrification and displacement in the central zone of Medina, I had to negotiate my dual insider and outsider positions as a Saudi Arabian, a female, a native of Medina (though not one displaced by the development in the central zone), and a researcher, through observing critical distancing advocated by Brewer (2008) in order to give precedence to the views of my participants about the gentrification in the central zone and its consequences on their everyday life in relation to displacement, which is the aim and objective of this study. As a researcher, I have to distance myself in favour of my participants' perspectives, in line with the qualitative approach I have adopted.

Although the insider/outsider position is often seen as a continuum, Dwyer and Buckle (2009) enumerate the complexities that are inherent in occupying the space of insider–outsider and the danger of closeness to either extreme in terms of compromising the validity of the inquiry. The researcher position requires that we navigate either of these positions. In view of this, my position as an insider, who is part of the culture and has knowledge, in particular, of the social and cultural relationship between the genders, allowed me to take measures and precautions where necessary. For instance, in social interactions, the genders are always segregated in Saudi Arabia. There is a very clear boundary between male and female, and Saudi society is highly patriarchal. These gender issues have been observed by previous researchers in Saudi Arabia. Al Bassam (2012), as a male, could not interview women, as male/female interactions are even more restricted in the Bedouin village culture where his study was situated. In contrast, Alsaggaff (2015) found her gender helpful in interacting online and offline with her participants, all of whom were women. The gender segregation also affected me in the

process of gathering data, especially with government officials. In recognition of the difficulty I would have accessing government buildings, I was accompanied by my brother for the interviews with government officials. Accompany of my brother is called in Saudi Arabia "Guardianship system". It is called in Arabic Mahram. "It is legal guardianship of women by a male is practised in varying degrees and encompasses major aspects of women's lives. The system is said to emanate from social conventions, including the importance of protecting women, and from religious precepts on travel and marriage, although these requirements were arguably confined to particular situations". (Ertürk ,2009:10). Based on the previous definition conducting interview would be one of particular situations. It was much easier with the displaced people, possibly because of the affinity and empathy they might have felt on account of my interest in their situation. An unexpected pleasantry was the pride and admiration shown by both the male and female participants due to my status as a female PhD researcher. This was more acute with the displaced residents than with the officials, who, because of domestic relations(Baki, 2004) between the female and male genders in Saudi society, were largely unable to see beyond my being a woman.

Significantly, the presence of my brother at the interviews I carried out with men may have affected the outcome of this thesis, because it is possible that the participants answer some of the questions in certain ways to please either me or him. Thus, it is acknowledged that the knowledge contained in this thesis was generated from the involvement of the researcher and research participants, as well as a bystander relative, in a reciprocal process of interpreting the social world subjectively. Consequently, we became collaborators, influencing each other in the creation and validation of knowledge, culminating in this thesis (see Chapters 4, 5, and 6). Thus, reflexivity opens the door for transparency in research by addressing ethical, political, ontological and epistemological concerns (Marcus, 1994). Reflexivity enhances credibility by showing that the truth established in this thesis is subjective and derived from the participants' perceptions.

It is also possible that my insider status may have caused me to deemphasize certain details which an outsider might have taken greater notice of, or it may have caused me to be too involved, as Alsaaggf (2015) noted. However, I have tried to mediate this potential by distancing myself. First, I did not experience displacement, as my participants did, and

neither was I part of the planning process in the central zone. Thus, my position as an outsider to the central zone and as a researcher is reaffirmed in the empirical details offered in chapters 5, 6 and 7. I have not, to be the best of my ability, allowed my knowledge, understanding and positon as a Saudi Arabian to affect my translation of the participants' feelings about their displacement, and I have reflected same in my analysis in the three empirical chapters. However, my PhD position earned an admiration and respect with displaced people more than with the government officials however, who were males; and.

3.8. Ethical Issues

To carry out the research process, the data collection and the analysis, I first had to gain ethical approval from the University of Leicester in the UK. This ensured that I was in a position to respect the confidentiality of the interviews and that I knew how to obtain informed consent.

Once in the field, the success of the interviews depended on the rapport established between me and the participants, and I was friendly, professional and polite in gaining their trust in me as an interviewer. I assured the participants that what they said during the interviews remained confidential and would not be released to third parties without their consent.

In deference to Flick (2009), I sought their informed consent by informing the participants of their right to withdraw from the interview and to decline to answer questions, should they wish. Also, I made sure they were aware that they had the right to rescind their permission for me to use any particular part of the interview, or the entire interview, if they wished. I told them that the information I collected was anonymous and would be treated as confidential, as they were participants in a research project, and their individual views would be respected. Furthermore, I explained how important it was to gain their consent, so that I could use the information contained in their interviews. I then asked the individuals if they consented to their interviews being recorded, as I would not be able to remember all the details otherwise. All the participants gave their written consent and

participated voluntarily. For 4 illiterate participants I obtained their written consent by a literate witness who they are member of their family which it was selected by the participant and have no connection to the researcher. Participants who are illiterate include their thumbprint as well.

3.9. Conclusion

This chapter has justified that use of qualitative methods and explained the methodology employed in this thesis, which included qualitative interviews, observations and archival documents for gathering data on the gentrification of Medina's central zone. The chapter also demonstrated the usefulness of employing these different sources of information in terms of allowing triangulation to improve validity (Denzin, 1970). The adoption of multiple methods facilitates the collection of rich data that would reflect the participants' own experiences with the complexities of gentrification. Besides several sources of data, this study has two categories of participants, displaced residents and officials, which enhances the validity of the findings, as it balances the information from one set with the other, and each can inform the other. For example, it was shown how the perspectives of the participants regarding the reasons for displacement were contrasted with the reality presented by the archival data, which yielded valuable insight.

This chapter revealed the usefulness of combined qualitative methods, which here comprise techniques that give a broad and harmonising approach to the experience of gentrification from two perspectives, the displaced people and the government officials, planners and other authorities involved in the planning process of the redevelopment that took place in the central zone. Being able to use my insider knowledge in order to access, and be accepted by, participants made this research possible. However, the challenges of being a female in a highly patriarchal society did present some problems for me as a researcher, as I was unable to access government buildings without a male relative in attendance. In addition, I found the bureaucracy of the Saudi administrative system frustrating, and the unavailability of consistent census data was also disappointing. Nevertheless, carrying out a qualitative study on gentrification has provided much insight

into the process, as can be seen in the following three empirical chapters. These chapters have been divided into three sections, in line with Smith and Hackworth (2000): theorization vis-à-vis the first and second waves of development (Chapters 5 and 6) and the third wave (Chapters 6 and 7).

Chapter 4

The Case of Medina, Saudi Arabia: Contextualisation

4.1. Introduction

Chapters 1 and 2 have established the tension between the modern and the traditional that exists in urban structures and urbanisation in most Islamic cities, and indeed between the global South and the North. This chapter discusses the historical position of Medina in the urban hierarchy of Saudi Arabia. It presents the historical, demographic, political and economic contexts, in order to set the context for use of Medina as the case study for this work which seeks to situate the city within the framework of global North and South debates on gentrification. Also, to examine if the urbanization processes in Central Zone Medina is simply (re)development or gentrification, with the subsequent consequences of displacement.

This chapter is divided into six main sections. The first section discusses the location of Medina in Saudi Arabia's urban hierarchy. The second section comprises a short history of Medina in the context of Saudi urban history, focusing on the developments and urban factors causing rural to urban migration and urbanisation in Medina. Next, Medina is described as a society and as an economy through population statistics and the socio-economic context resulting from urbanisation. Following that, the political context and

institutions are presented, particularly the administrative structure and decision-making system in terms of urban planning and policy development. The fifth section discusses the process of redevelopment in Medina as the setting for a study on gentrification. Finally, the last section comprises the conclusion of the chapter.

4.2. Medina's Location in the Urban Hierarchy of Saudi Arabia

AL Bassam, (2012) and Alhathloul and Edadan (1993) have established the impact of movement and population growth on urbanization process in Saudi Arabia. Presently, Saudi Arabia, a monarchical state that is mainly ruled by the Al Saud family has approximately 28.5 million, including 5.8 million foreigners with the capital in Riyadh. Ascension is by heritdity and whoever is the King on the throne in the Kingdom is considered the "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, a reference to his responsibility for Islam's two holiest sites in Mecca and Medina" (BOE, 2011). The legitimacy of the government however centres on the interpretation of Sharia, the Islamic law and the Basic Law, which was established in 1992. This Basic Law sets out the system of governance, the rights of the citizens, and the powers and duties of the government. Furthermore, the country has a Constitution; called Basic law of Governance, known has the Sunna, which is based on an interpretation of the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.

The Kingdom occupies 32 million, 2.24 million sq km (864,869 sq miles) of the world's landmass. The official language in the Kingdom is Arabic, while the Islam is the major religion although it is acknowledged by UN, World Bank that officially 85 to 90% of the citizens are Sunni Muslims, while 10-15% Shia, there are others who are Eastern Orthodox, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, and Sikh in Saudi Arabia(Kaya, 2015).

Economically, Saudi Arabia controls a "quarter of the global oil reserves and the largest OPEC producer, however since Saudi's accession to WTO, its regional economic and political role are becoming increasingly diversified and open to global financial and

banking systems (ibid), as well as the tourism industry has literature reviewed has shown (see chapter 2).

Administratively, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) consists of thirteen regions which are referred to as emirates. Each emirate has its own capital city and is further subdivided into a number of governorates based on the population and administrative functions. Thus, the number of governorates in each emirate varies from region to region in Saudi Arabia (see Table 3 and Figure 7). Governorates are divided into centres linked administratively to the wider region. Emirates, governorates and centres are categorised according to their prominent features: city, village, farm, water resources, or Bedouin area. Riyadh is the largest city in Saudi Arabia, and it is also the national capital of KSA, with a population of 5.2 million people as of 2010 (GaStat ,2017). Medina is the second most important Islamic city in the world, after Mecca, since the Prophet Mohammad's grave is located at his mosque in this city and a major metropolitan area. Literature reviewed in chapter 2, has shown that the mosque is generally the most significant feature in the Islamic cities, and is usually in the centre of the community, (Abubrig, 2012; Saoud, 2002).

It is arguably believed that this principle of the mosque having a central position in Islamic cities emanated from Medina, which is the first city recorded in Islamic history; consequently, Medina represents the typical Islamic city. In any country with an Islamic identity, the mosque remains the central focal point of its cities. This can be seen in Tunis, with its Zaitouna Mosque and in Cairo, with its Alazhar Mosque, both at the very heart of the city. Within the central zone of Medina, the Prophet's Mosque is located in the middle, yet religious usage is not the only purpose of the city centre of Medina. The planners of the first master plan for Medina in 1973 underlined the fact that the central zone, which is surrounded by a ring road, is a CBD area in which commercial activity is concentrated; in addition, it is a high-density residential area, which is heavily exploited throughout the year. Because of its religious significance, there has been a constant focus on the central zone (Makki, 1994), with hundreds of thousands of Muslim pilgrims visiting each year, especially at Hajj (Bokhari, 2017). It is understandable that this places much pressure on the city centre, where most visitors congregate.

Since the construction of the Prophet's Mosque in 622CE, there has been a strong relationship between the mosque and the city. Apart from the main mosque, the other outstanding feature in the central zone is the residential quarters. The Prophet's Mosque may be the core of the city, but its function is not simply religious as it is surrounded by urban activities, both from the private and public sector, as well as an accommodation service for visitors and tourists, as well as residential neighbourhoods. The key physical manifestations of urban structures in downtown areas and the social form that is associated with them are therefore intertwined with Medina's story.

Emirate	Emirate's Capital	Number of Provinces	The second province
Riyadh	Riyadh	19	Alkharaj
Makkah	Makkah	11	Jeddah
Medina	Medina	6	Yanbu
Alqaseem	Buraydah	10	Unayzah
Eastern Region	Dammam	10	Alahsa
Aseer	Abha	11	Khamis Mushayt
Tabouk	Tabouk	5	Umluj
Hail	Hail	3	Alghazalah
Northern Borders	Arar	2	Rafha
Jazan	Jazan	13	Sabya
Najran	Najran	7	Sharura
Albaha	Albaha	6	Biljurashi
Aljouf	Sakaka	2	Alquryyat

Table 3: Emirates or governorates of Saudi Arabia.(GaStat, 2010)

Medina is the capital city of one province of Saudi Arabia, the Medina region, which has six provinces under its administration. Geographically, the city lies 150 kilometres east of the Red Sea, and it has an elevation of 600 metres above sea level. The city itself has structures and landscapes that have historical, religious and cultural significance. In fact, the city has very favourable natural settings that are celebrated by locals and admired by visitors because of Medina is situated in an area that is surrounded in the north and south sides by mountains like Ayr and Uhod, respectively. These mountains provide a beautiful landscape that serves as beautiful covering for the city from the lava fields spread out around the southern and eastern basins, and there are some vegetated areas around the

northeast and south of the city, as well, where palm trees are planted. Moreover, Medina is home to the sacred Prophet's Mosque at its very centre, which is considered to be its the most significant site and is the reason it is held in renown by Muslims all over the world.

Figure 7: Map of Adminstrative regions of Saudi Arabia. Source: Ministry of Higher Education, 1999.

The sacredness of the city of Medina and its importance to Muslims are rooted in Islamic history. Medina is the final resting place for their Prophet Mohammad, who lived there for the last 10 years of his life after emigrating with his followers from Makkah in 622 CE. Thus, many of the pilgrims who arrive in the city of Makkah also visit Medina to performing religious rituals. During the time of the Hajj pilgrimage, the population of Medina increases substantially from its official tally of 1.1 million (GaStat, 2016).

The city of Jeddah is considered the main port for accessing the cities of Makkah and Medina. It is the largest city in the region of Makkah, with a population of around 2.4 million as of 2010(GaStat ,2017). Moreover, Jeddah is the second largest city in the KSA

as a whole, and it also has the biggest seaport on the Red Sea. The presence of the seaport gives the city a strategic location, which it is important to the country's economy. It has been observed lately that, the city's government has made requests for capital investments in order to stimulate growth in the science and technology sector (Abu Dawad and Za`zu, 2011).

Thus, Riyadh, Medina, Makkah and Jeddah are not only economically significant, but also in relation to the Islamic religion in the KSA, with all of these cites playing important roles in population growth and business development processes across the country. Furthermore, they are all key cities in the urbanisation process of the KSA. Each of them also plays a role in accommodating the 15 million pilgrims (GaStat ,2016) who visit the country annually.

In line with Max Weber, (Sica)the question in any nation has to do with who has power is the basis of every nation's governance. A power, Hurst, (2017) explains enables the achievement of goals irrespective of differences in opinions and goals of some people in the society. Therefore, about Saudi Arabia, the monarchs are the sole government authority and the chief of state and head of government as both the king and prime minister respectively. This contrasts with the UK, whereby the Queen only plays a ceremonial role and the head of government is the duly elected prime Minister. Although there is a type of separation of power whereby the Consultative Assembly/Cabinet serves as the official government advisory body; the fact that King Fahad established the Council through a royal decree No.A/91 in 1992 (BOE,2011), still makes it responsible to the King and each of its 150 members are appointed by the King. Saudi does not run an electoral democracy, given the fact that the Basic laws and constitution of the Kingdom are based on the Quran and Sunna has discussed above. There is therefore still a monopoly of power even as the law passed by the Cabinet must still be ratified by Royal decree. There is a strong government control over economic, social, and cultural activities even though Saudi Arabia is increasingly becoming a part of the global economy as a leading OPEC member with 16% world's resources and one of the largest exporter of petroleum

The King is still the head of state and head of government who exercises executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Therefore, the system of government and power structure is absolute monarchy in contrast to Britain's constitutional monarchy, whereby the Queen plays ceremonial role. Saudi Arabian monarchs have total control of political, economic, religious and social powers, even though legislation and law making is done by the Consultative Council and the judiciary/legal system is carried out through the Islamic Shariah Laws, which subordinates even the Basic Law to the Holy Quran and the Sunna (teachings) of Muhammad are Saudi Arabia's constitution. According to World atlas and Global Edge:

"Shariah Courts spread all across the kingdom dispense justice by the Shariah Law which has severe punishments for crimes including amputations, public stoning, and public beheadings. However, with the rapidly-changing technological landscape, other laws have been formulated through royal decrees and are not encompassed by Shariah law including traffic violations. These laws make up the administrative law. The monarch is the highest judicial office and also has the authority on pardoning of law-offenders"[8]. Thus, irrespective of the existence of the three arms of government that are visible in Western democracies, comprising of the King as the Executive, the legislative Cabinet /Consultative assembly and the judiciary system. Governance and power in Saudi Arabia still reposes on the King who is the head of the three arms and it is strongly bureaucratic. This reflects on the urban planning processes in all the regions in the Kingdom.

4.3. Urban History of Medina

The urban history of Medina can be divided into four phases, or eras, that reflect both key changes that the city has witnessed and transformations in the wider urban structures of the KSA. These four phases of the city's urban history are the pre-Islamic era, the rise of Islam, the Ottoman era, and the present Saudi epoch (Badr, 1994, Al-Samhoudi, 1984).

In pre-Islamic times, the city of Medina grew out of settlement founded there on account of the area's natural resources (Al-Samhoudi, 1984; Mustafa, 1981; Brown, 1973; Bianca,

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[8] https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-type-of-government-does-saudi-arabia-have.html

2000; Woodward, 2004). As mentioned above, it is surrounded by lava fields on three sides, making its soil fertile, and it has an abundance of underground water. Together, these features made it an attractive destination for immigrants in the past, and it became a stop on the caravan route connecting the south and the north of the Arabian Peninsula. The old name of Medina was Yathrib, which is said to belong to one of the descendants of Noah (Al-Samhoudi, 1984). It received many settlers and migrants during the course of its 1,500-year history before the Islamic era. Among these were Jewish tribes from Palestine who settled there after the destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar in 586 BCE (Al-Samhoudi, 1984). They were subsequently followed by several more Jewish tribes, who migrated to the city from Palestine in 70 CE, following the Roman destruction of Jerusalem, and again in 135 CE. Furthermore, in the second century BCE, Arab tribes from Yemen settled in Medina after the collapse of the Marib Dam (Badr, 1994). The city suffered from civilian war between Arab tribes Alos and Khazraj seeking to take control of the city, with these wars occurred for about 120 years before Prophet Mohammed time. Local residents embraced both religions paganism and Judaism, and depended economically mainly on farming due to nature of area and its location based on the area's natural resources. As mentioned above, it is surrounded by lava fields on three sides, making its soil fertile, and it has an abundance of underground water. Together, these features made it an attractive destination for immigrants in the past, and it became a stop on the caravan route connecting the south and the north of the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Samhoudi, 1984).

Inflowing of Arabs to Medina before the advent of Islam enabled them to enlarge their agricultural lands, exchange experiences and set up a variety of plantations growing dates, wheat and barley crops. The city was famous for a number of industries, including manufacture of metals such as swords, axes, pots, jewellery, and it manufactured of wooden tools such as seats, doors, windows, beds and boxes. The aspects of social life that prevailed in Medina had the same social system of other Arab societies that existed at the time. It depended on tribal system to enact norms and provisions that define relations between individuals and groups. Its inhabitants were divided into different classes, such as class of freemen, which included members of the tribe itself, classes of loyalists who individuals or families of clans that had no blood relationship connection

with tribes of Medina but they were allies, and slaves class who they were individuals owned by freemen through purchasing, or inherited from parents and grandparents. (Badr, 1994, Al-Samhoudi, 1984). This leads to the beginning of the second phase, known as the Islamic era.

4.3.1. The Rise of Islam

This period of Medina's history begins with the arrival of the Prophet Mohammed in the city, followed by the migration of his followers, from Makkah in 622 CE. This event, known as the Hijra, is considered the seminal event in the history of Islam in general and for the city in particular, and marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar.

After the migration and settlement of the Prophet Mohammed in Medina, the urban growth of the city increased exponentially, as his followers from other urban and rural areas of Arabian Peninsula and other territories migrated as well and made the city their home. This immigration played a significant role in extending the urban boundaries of Medina (Brown, 1973). The development and urbanisation initiated by the arrival of the Prophet continued, and a number of measures were taken and developmental plans were laid by the Prophet for the sustained urbanisation and development of the city. The city boundaries were marked, the bulwarks of the city were strengthened, and structures were reinforced in the built-up areas. For example, legislation was drafted and implemented regarding the ownership of properties and the acquisition of new properties by natives of the city and expatriates alike (Woodward, 2004).

In addition, Medina's borders were demarcated by the Prophet Mohammed, covering the area between the East Lava field and the West Lava field and between Mount Thor in the north and Mount Ayr in the south of Medina, as shown in Figure 8. Later on, the Muslims' affection for the Prophet's shrine and the Islamic importance of the city motivated Muslims to migrate to Medina for both business and religious reasons, which resulted in the concentration of the population within the city's urban boundaries. A detailed account of population increase and urbanisation will be presented in subsequent sections of this chapter.

Figure 8: Morophology of Medina city. Source: Makki,1985.

Furthermore, Prophet constructed a monumental mosque called 'Masjid-e-Nabawi', which has become a centre of education, learning and meetings for Muslims. This establishment attracted people from the farthest parts of the country to migrate to Medina in order to learn Islamic teachings directly from the Prophet and, later on, from his companions. The presence of the mosque, and the concentration of the population around it and in the suburbs of the mosque area expedited the urbanisation process (Bianca, 2000).

In addition, a new market called Almnakah was established on the western edge of the city (Khatrawi, 1987; Al-Samhoudi, 1984). Later on, the companions of the Prophet further refined the structures of the market, houses around it, and the patterns of the streets entering and passing through the market areas. The markets provided the city's inhabitants with their daily provisions and shopping facilities and enhanced the attraction

of the city. Hence, the systematic development of the markets (bazaars) led to competition in acquiring the land surrounding the market areas. Karkajah (2011) argued that a market based on the market structures proposed and constructed by the Prophet and his companions became the hallmark feature of every Islamic city. In 724 CE, at the behest of the governor of Medina, residential use was transferred to commercial use of the city, which stimulated the amalgamation of the residential areas into the commercial areas (Mustafa, 1981).

Al-Samhoudi (1984), a famous chronicler of the history of Medina up to the 15th century CE, posited that the city's urbanisation is demonstrated by the conquest of Makkah in 730 CE, for which an enormous army of 10,000 soldiers started their journey from Medina to Makkah. This indicates that the former city developed rapidly following the settlement there of the Prophet. This is affirmed by Brown, (1973) observation that immigration played a significant role in extending the urban boundaries of Madina, and as the development, and urbanisation processes initiated by the arrival of the Prophet continued, an increasing number of tribes who converted to Islam found safety in the city. The subsequent growth of their members and groups made Medina a preferred place of settlement in terms of not only safety, and the opportunity it offers in understanding the new religion, but also in properties ownership. The number of measures laid down in developmental plans by the Prophet for the sustained urbanisation and development of the city through legislation drafted and implemented affirms Woodward, (2004) aided ownership of properties and the acquisition of new properties by natives of the city and expatriates alike.

Furthermore, Al-Samhoudi showed that boundaries of Medina in the age of the Prophet were extended to Quba, a village located three kilometres from the heart of Medina, highlighting the sprawl of the city due to the influx of immigrants who came to perform their religious duties and to benefit from the city's social and economic development. The first wall around Medina was built with mud in 876 CE in order to protect the city from Bedouin attacks, as explained further on. These bulwarks provided the city with distinct boundaries and a social and economic milieu; they also marked a step towards the issuance of passports to foreigners wishing to enter the city through the designated gates.

Consequently, the process of migration of people from other parts of the country slowed down, and only surged again under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.

4.3.2. The Ottoman era

For 400 years, from 1517 to 1918, Medina remained a centre of development and attention under the Ottoman Empire due to the presence of the Prophet's shrine (Badr, 1994). Ottoman caliphs released special funds for the provision of housing facilities, the construction of streets, and for the provision of food and shelter for foreigners migrating to the city. Most of the development concerned the construction of public utilities, markets, libraries, and schools. Ottoman attention was focused largely on religious sites, with Sultan Abdul Majeed al-Othmani extending the Prophet's Mosque in 1849 to cover 10,181 square meters. In addition, Ottoman Caliphs set aside endowment funds for maintaining the Prophet's Mosque and its environs as well as for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Medina, besides establishing institutions for managing real estate. The endowment system played a significant role in extending the urban boundaries of Medina and in refining the urban landscape in the poorly developed suburbs of the city.

Burckhardt (2003) observed that Western travellers to the city during this period included Richard Francis Burton, John Bridger Phillby and Johann Ludwig Burckhardt. The latter visited Medina in the 19th century to study its urbanisation pattern, and wrote about life in the city, housing, migration trends and architectural blocks, and public services and facilities. For instance, following his visit in 1814, Burckhardt described Medina in this way: "*Medina is well built, entirely of stone; its houses are generally two stories high, with flat roofs. As they are not white-washed, and the stone is of a dark colour, the streets have rather a gloomy aspect; and are, for the most part, very narrow, often only two or three paces across: a few of the principal streets are paved with large blocks of stone; a comfort which a traveller little expects to find in Arabia. It is, on the whole, one of the best-built towns I have seen in the East, ranking, in this respect, next to Aleppo. At present, it has a desolate appearance: the houses are suffered to decay; their owners, who formerly derived great profits from the crowd of visitors which arrived here at all times of the year, now find their income diminished, and decline the heavy expense of*

building, as they know they cannot be reimbursed by the letting out of apartments. Ruined houses, and walls wanting repair, are seen in every part of the town; and Medina presents the same disheartening view as most of the Eastern towns, which now afford but faint images of their ancient splendour.

The principal street of Medina is also the broadest, and leads from the Cairo gate to the great mosque: in this street are most of the shops. Another considerable street, called El Belát, runs from the mosque to the Syrian gate; but many of its houses are in ruins: this contains also a few shops, but none are found in other parts of the town; thus, differing from Mekka, which is one continued market. In general, the latter is much more like an Arab town than Medina, which resembles more a Syrian city. I had no time to trace all the different quarters of the town; but I shall here give the names by which they are at present known.

The quarter comprised between the two main streets leading from the Egyptian and Syrian gates to the mosque, are, Es–Saha, Komet Hasheyfe, El Belát, Zogág el Towál, (here is situated the Mekkam, or house of the Kadhy, and several pleasant gardens are attached to the larger buildings;) Zogág el Dhorra, Sakyfet Shakhy, Zogág el Bakar" (Burckhardt, 2003 Adelaide).

To strengthen these arguments, Burckhardt produced a detailed map showing the urban landscape of Medina (Figure 9).

Some Muslim scholars have also produced accounts of the urbanisation of Medina in the 19th century, such as Ali Musa (1886, cited in Mostafa, 1981), who gave an account of Medina's immigrants and statistics relating to various facilities and services. Another Egyptian scholar working in human geography described the number of public buildings and services at the beginning of the 20th century as follows: 17 mosques, 18 libraries, 17 primary schools, a high school, 8 shelters, 21 water taps for drinking, one hospital, 108 free houses for charity, a castle, a military barracks, a large government house, 2 public baths, 932 shops and warehouses, 4 large shops, 18 bakeries, 36 coffee shops, 4 dye shops and 458 farmers (Pasha, 1925). Refiaat Pasha (1925:439) further discussed on the clans that had migrated to Medina, writing: "Medina has a population of about 56,000. It is inhabited by a few indigenous people, and most of the others are from the Levant,

Turkish, Indians, Egyptians, and Moroccans, who came to the city to be next to the Prophet of Islam" (Pasha, 1925:439).

Figure 9: Medina in 1914 by Burckhardt. Source: Mostafa, 1981.

Bianca, (2000) has argued that migrants were attracted to Medina due to its facilities related to education and food, plus its closeness to the Prophet's mosque. It is argued that these factors played a critical role in attracting tribes from far flung areas of the country to come to settle in Medina. Due to the pressures of a rising population, the boundaries of Medina were extended to include some rural areas located in the city's traditional suburbs.

The construction of housing facilities and gates for city's protection led authorities from the Ottoman Empire to build streets linking the different areas of the city with each other, and connecting all of the urban areas to the city gates to ease transportation and facilitate the movement of people into and out of the city (Mustafa, 1981). Interesting features of old Medina under the Ottoman Empire included the internal and external walls which were used to separate different tribes from each other in order to preserve their respective social and cultural values within urban space. About seven walls were constructed by governors of Medina until 1539; however, these walls were removed in 1950. This is possibly is the change Saoud (2002) observed, which he associated with the urbanization process in most Islamic towns around the 9th century, (see chapter 2). Reflecting the consequent complexities in most of the cities observed to be between traditional and the modern whereby, a split city of modern and westernized urban environment characterises most Middle East countries (Alsayyad, 2011; Yacobi &Shechter 2005). Thus, the walls that were initially constructed to protect the inhabitants from outsiders and invasion as well as non-believers from Islamic believers (Saoud, 2002; Ennahid, 2002) as features of the Islamic cities.

which arguably could be compared with gated cities and condominiums in modern era. Importantly, a new phase of growth and development of the urban spaces in Medina was initiated with the construction of a railway link between Medina and Damascus, during the late Ottoman period in the late 18th century between 1789 -1918. This development is in line with the social change that resonated around this period in history. With regards to Medina, this caused the revival of economic development and further extended the demographic and urban boundaries of Medina. The city's economic status was reinvigorated as a result of the increase in commercial transactions stemming from the transportation of goods into and out of the city on the new rail line. The construction of the railway stations, and the desire for better facilities, stimulated the development of associated infrastructure, such as warehouses, railway repair centres, water supply stations, administrative buildings and the main railway itself (Kakki, 1998).

With the growth and development of transportation infrastructure, such as roads and railways, connecting Medina to other cities in Arabia, Hafez, (1997); Makki, (1985) observed an exponential increase in the population, plus pilgrims and visitors from around

the world also increased to numbers far surpassing those of the past. These developments had a positive impact on the economy of the city, which was reflected in the welfare projects and real estate programs for improving the inhabitants' lifestyle.

In the early 20th century, scholars such as Makki, (1985) noted that the number of people residing permanently in the city increased six-fold between the close of the 19th century when it was recorded at 30,000, while it soared to 180,000 in the first quarter of the 20th century (Makki, 1985). Hafez, (1997) and Makki, (1985) however observed within the same 20th century there was an increase in population growth, ascribed to improved standard of living as well as, an associated growth in rural to urban migration trend which was significantly higher in the first quarter than it had been previously. There was also a decline in the second and third quarters of that century due to the destruction of urban spaces and of roads and railways connecting different parts of the country because of the First and Second World Wars.

This is in line with economic and political changes in the world as shown in literature (chapter 2). The result of Second World War and the demarcation of the world as a binary of 'Developed' and 'Developing'; 'North and South'; 'least developed and developed have influenced not only the level of economic development of countries, but also that of urbanization process in the Middle East irrespective of their earlier designation as the cradle of civilization. This is the situation in the world when Saudi Arabia was created in the first half of the 19th century by King Abd-al-Aziz through the unification by Royal decree the two kingdoms of Hejaz and Najd, which had existed as separated entities since 1927 on 23 September 1932 under a new name of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Wynbrandt, 2010). He proclaimed himself as the king from 1933 through to the 1950s one crown prince succeeded another. Within these periods, oil was discovered in 1938 and its production started under a US-controlled Arabian American Oil Company (Ibid). Thus, the beginning of Saudi era and the urbanization processes that situate Medina within the context of the new Saudi Arabia.

4.3.3. The Saudi era

Medina was incorporated into the newly created Saudi Arabia in 1925 (Ibid). According to Makki, (1982), St John Bridger Philby, who was a British explorer and intelligence officer, visited the city in the 1940s. He estimated that it covered an area of 1.4 square kilometres, and he indicated that the city centre, which comprised the religious and commercial area, occupied about 20% of this area (Makki, 1982).

During the Saudi era, a number of changes in the urban structure were introduced, which resulted in the extension of Medina's city centre through commercial and residential planning. First, the fortress-like structure of the city was obliterated with the demolition of the 1,105-year-old city wall in 1949, thereby allowing the construction of an open road leading into and out of the city, and of residential properties and colonies on either side of roads through the city (Cordesman, 2003). Spacious and wider roads were built in busy areas of the city to facilitate the transportation of goods and people from one place to another. These changes dramatically increased the facilities available to the business and professional classes amongst both the foreign and local population (Makki,1985). Makki (1994) stated that building roads and related infrastructure played a key role in raising the living standards of Medina residents, and was a milestone in the rapid urbanisation of the city.

Progressively, the form of urbanisation changed in many important cities of Saudi Arabia, including Medina, from simple bounded towns to sophisticated and complex city structures without boundaries between the residential and commercial areas of the city. These developments occurred out between 1945 and 1964 through special government initiatives and planning initiatives to fill urban spaces through giving property rights to residents and investors (Forstenlechner and Rutledge, 2011).

After 1964, Medina witnessed the appearance of suburban regions within and beyond existing urban spaces, developments which can mainly be attributed to the demolition of the ancient city wall and the new development processes begun in the city, as described earlier (Abou-Korin, 2011; Makki, 1981). Moreover, the new compact and sprawling suburban area of Medina extended to cover about 250 hectares. During the period of 1964 and 1984, the newly developed urban area was increased to three times its 1964 size,

which reflected the scale of the increase in urban spaces and the extension of the city's boundaries, such that the total city area covered 800 hectares by 1984 (Costa and Noble, 1986). Arguably, the importance of Medina as a key religious city and a hub for migrants and visitors from all over the world has been recognized historically because of its position as the home and burial location of founder of Islam (Commins, 2015). Thus, they placed a great deal of emphasis on the developmental processes within the city, which attracted investors to build commercial spaces and villas to accommodate the elite class within the city centre and the surroundings (Alhathloul and Mughal, 2004).

Bianca (2000) states that shopping, transportation and living facilities offered between 1970 and 1980 led to a tremendous increase in the population of Medina. This transformed the medium-sized city with some 100,000 residents into a large metropolis of more than one million, as explained later in this chapter. As part of the city's urban planning and development, the government of Saudi Arabia launched three master plans, with the help of foreign investors and consultancy firms, to improve the look of the city and make it more attractive to visitors (Brown, 1973; Bianca, 2000). The prominent feature of these development plans was infrastructure, and this opportunity led to an influx of investors and businessmen (Bianca, 2000).

However, these developments invariably affected the city's lower-class inhabitants, who could not afford the new apartments, houses, and shopping centres. However, the plans economically benefited the city government through increased revenues in the form of taxes derived from visitors who came either for religious tourism or for business activities spending. Moser et al. (2015) critically evaluated the significance of these master plans, and argued that they had been drafted by foreign consultancy firms which ignored the cohesion of the social fabric of the population residing in Medina

Several plans and development initiatives implemented by the government produced the opposite results to what was expected (Daghistani ,1993). Instead of facilitating the daily activities of residents, the urbanisation and development efforts led to increase number of low-income households in Medina that be facing hurdles to rent house because of Inability to afford and locational advantages (Salam et al., 2014). This could be one of the signs of occurrence gentrification that making people displaced. This is arguably is in

line with Smith's (1996); Marcuse, (1986); and Davidson (2006) assertion that displacement can be engendered by rent increases.

Thus, on the one hand, urbanisation improved the lifestyle of those residents who could afford the cost of the new developments (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – Human Development Report, 2003), while old residents who were part and parcel of the social fabric of Medina began to move out of the down town neighbourhoods to the outskirts. Several critics of these developments questioned the goals and objectives of the urbanisation and development plans (Abdelatti et a., 2017; Salam et al., 2014). Thus, Cordesman, (2003) and Woodward, (2004) argued that the urbanisation of the city has invariably been associated with projects to expand the Prophet's Mosque, although other physical structures such as trendy restaurants, hotels and …etc (Freeman, 2006) are also visibly signs of development and gentrification. This landmark is undeniably important and has been pivotal in shaping the urban pattern of the central zone of Medina as well as in stimulating the development of a local network of roads, hotels, plazas, and shopping malls. The expansion of the Prophet's mosque that has taken place during the Saudi era was carried out in three phases according to Braibanti and Al-Farsy(19770); Hendersen, (2011): the first occurred in 1951, the second in 1975, and the third in 1977(see chapter 5). Each of these expansions led to the demolition many residential buildings to allow for new streets, squares, shops, markets and hotels to be constructed around the Prophet's Mosque. This resulted in the expansion of the city centre, and in the spread of commercial and residential activities to the north, east and west of Medina. Urban growth, at this stage, took an arterial form, with new streets linking the Prophet's Mosque area and the city centre to nearby suburbs such as Quba, Awali and Qirban (Abou-Korin, 2011). The effects of the extension of urban growth to previously vacant places in the suburbs of Medina and to the east, north-east and north-west areas of the city are shown in Figure 10 (Makki, 1981). Hossain (1998) posited that from 1970 to 1980, urbanisation took place with such speed that the total area of Medina jumped from 250 to 1,300 hectares, or more than fivefold (Hossain, 1998).

Figure 10: Stages of urban growth of Medina.Source:MAM,1999 and MDA, 2017

From 1980 to 1990, Medina experienced horizontal expansion which extended the peripheries and boundaries of Ahwash, a residential area that was very similar to gated community in terms of its physical and character, through establishing new transportation routes that have motor vehicles access to this residential area. In addition, new neighbourhoods emerged adjacent to the old residential area, and the city expanded to the east, west, southeast, and southwest, which had previously been left uninhabited due to the fossilized lava spread (Syriani, 1998). In 1989, the total urban area of Medina was recorded to be approximately 578,511 hectares, which indicates the trends towards

urbanisation (Kaki, 1998). From this Kaki (1998) observed that Urban growth in the city occurred under the auspices of the previously initiated growth plans as the local city authorities had not made any new provision to direct resources towards guiding any alternative development process.

In the 1990s, the rise in development was larger than in any previous era since the commencement of Medina's urbanisation process. The last project to expand the Prophet's Mosque, initiated in 1992, was a particularly critical factor in the increasing urbanisation. There were substantial changes in the urban spaces surrounding the Prophet's Mosque, which led to the disappearance of almost all features of the old city and its neighbourhoods and caused the residents of these neighbourhoods to search for alternative housing facilities in nearby neighbourhoods. The rising demand for new housing schemes and development projects was felt by the government, which introduced a new master plan for Medina's development. This was assigned to the consultant Dar Al Handasah of the Design & Technical Consultancy in Contract no. 21, dated 09/04/1988 (Kaki, 1998). The consultancy was commissioned to carry out preliminary studies showing need-based development areas, followed by the design of a comprehensive outline for Medina's development. All aspects of the master plan were scrutinized by local authorities and periodically reviewed to ensure the quality and successful delivery of the project.

To the local authorities this plan appeared to be the first realistic plan and was implemented thoroughly. Thus, Kaki, (1998); and Syriani, (1998) noted its application has systematically promoted the division of Medina's landscape into three sectors, and each one was in the form of a ring (ibid.). These sectors, Syriani, (1998) stresses were designed to facilitate the movement of people into and out of the city during busy seasons of the year, such as Hajj. The three ring-shaped sectors have been characteristic of the urban form of Medina since 2000, as shown in Figure 11. These rings include the central zone of Medina as the first sector, an area between the first ring road (King Faisal Road) and the second ring road (King Abdullah Road) was designated as the second area, and the southwest areas became the third sector (MOMRA, 2013). The second sector includes neighbourhoods of Medina that emerged after the destruction of the wall. The third sector is the suburban sector, a round belt that surrounds the second ring road and extends to the

limits of the urban area of Medina, which is defined by the third ring road (King Khalid Road), which lies five to seven kilometres away from the Prophet's Mosque (MOMRA, 2008). This range includes some of the old neighbourhoods that have been focal points of urban growth during the last 40 years as well as modern districts that have emerged more recently, including Al-Faisaliah district in the west, Khaldiyah in the southeast, Alhejrah in the south, and Azizia in the southeast (ibid.), in addition to the neighbourhood of Azhari and Nasim (MOMRA, 2008).

Due to the rising population and the influx of migrants into Medina, as well as into many other major cities, including Makkah, Riyadh, and Jeddah, the government of Saudi Arabia imposed a boundary policy. The phase I boundaries were introduced during the 1990s in Medina, in order to place some restrictions on the urban growth, and these controlled the growth to a considerable extent (Looney, 1990). The Phase II boundaries were imposed in 2005, and through them, a central urban protection zone was identified with plenty of vacant spaces for future development and urban expansion (Al-Sobhi et al., 2010). Alhathloul and Mughal (2004) posited that although government officials insisted that these boundary policies achieved their objectives, no empirical evidence was furnished to corroborate their claim. Madanipur (2013) reiterated that there was a lack of research on the impact of these restrictive policies and urban growth on the local residents, or on their capacity to utilize the developed infrastructure to increase the per capita incomes of their households. According to Urban Observatory of Medina, the total area of Medina was about 721 square kilometres as of 2012, and there are currently 62 neighbourhoods in the city (see Figure 11). This is the present form of Medina city, the context in which this study is situated, and the premise on which economic and society activities operate within the city.

The next section explains further the implications of the preceding discussions on Medina's society and the economic processes that evolved because of population increase in the socio-economic context. Thus, the impact of population growth on urbanisation, in particular that the urban growth of Medina was accompanied by massive changes in the city's economic status and resources. This urban growth can be divided into four main periods: the nuclear period (before 1963), the growth period (1963-1974), the

developmental period (1975-1995), and the post-developmental period, which continues to the present day. Each period can be characterised by unique economic features.

Figure 11: The current form of Medina city in which 62 neighborhoods are located and this study is situated. (Source: MRM, 2004)

During first phase, the wells and springs as well as security and trade activities between Medina and other cities improved the availability of essential resources, such as the water supply for residents of the city. People had long been attracted to the city for its water resources and trade routes (Brown, 1973); however, the number of people inhabiting

Medina's urban spaces was still small, and they used traditional building materials (mud and palm fronds) to build their houses (Bianca, 2000).

During the second phase, which lasted from1963To 1974; oil price was increased, which led to the development of an oil-based economy and increased the per capita income of the country's citizens. During this stage, the Saudi government launched a Five-Year Development Plan for major cities in the kingdom, including Makkah and Medina, which were at the top of the list of priorities in the development plans (Omran and Roudi, 1993). These projects played a key role in improving the socio-economic conditions of not only the residents of Medina, but also citizens throughout the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Bianca, 2000). The impact of these developmental plans was observed in Medina in the form of improvement in the economic situations of the city's residents and in a massive increase in the use of land for commercial activities and residences. The building materials used in the construction of new residential and commercial properties was more advanced (concrete and cement) rather than the traditional materials (Elsheshtawy, 2004). At this stage, facilities were improved, and living standards in urban areas were raised. The development for the most part was concentrated on the cities, and consequently, the rural population began to feel neglected, which led to migration to the cities, including Medina, in greater numbers compared to the first phase (Mandeli, 2008). As a result, the annual population increase in Medina became 3.5%, which was mainly due to the abundance of resources in the city, including job and business opportunities and a relatively high per capita income (Askari and Dastmaltschi, 1990).

The third phase, then, was characterised by great demand for housing and an unpredicted increase in urban growth. The city and central governments implemented various residential schemes to accommodate the increasing population of the city, coupled with the provision of more sophisticated and improved infrastructure. This necessitated the construction of wider roads, more streets, communication networks, plumbing systems and power lines for the urban population (Alhathloul and Mughal ,2004; Woodward, 2004). Both internal and external migration during this period resulted in an increase in the population of the central zone as well as of the outskirts of the city (Woodward, 2004).

The third period also witnessed the completion of three expansion schemes for the Prophet's mosque. During these expansions, bulldozers were used to demolish residential and commercial properties so that the land they occupied could be integrated into the Prophet's mosque. The most significant of these were the King Faisal and King Fahad expansions, which added a total of 40,400 square metres to the mosque, thereby increasing its capacity to 1.6 million worshippers at one time (Alhathloul and Mughal, 2004). These expansions altered the residential and commercial outlook of the city around the Prophet's Mosque, and extended the downtown area. The population that had been living around the Prophet's mosque moved to other areas of city, and the government authorised further special development plans to enhance the commercial zone around the Prophet's mosque. These involved the construction of hotels, ground scrapers (see chapter 6), shopping malls and plazas in order to accommodate pilgrims visiting Medina and to cater their needs (Mandeli, 2008; Al-Rasheed, 2010). These developments provided plenty of opportunities for the local residents to rent out their properties and start new businesses. Thus, they had a healthy impact on the economic situation of Medina, and city revenues were increased due to the large number of guests, visitors and pilgrims to the historical and religious sites (Al-Hemaidi, 2001; Mubarak, 2001).

The construction of roads and related infrastructure affected the agricultural output of the city, as most of the palm gardens were paved over to make way for essential commercial properties, and this lowered the income earned from the trade of dates (Mubarak, 2001). Furthermore, the implementation of two development projects, in particular, by the Saudi government to modernise the economy and society of Medina, assumed tremendous significance in terms of increasing the urban growth and urbanisation of the city during the fourth period. These two are known as the Medina Knowledge Economic City (MKEC), started in 2006, and Saudi Vision 2030, started in 2014 (Moser et al., 2015).

MKEC was initiated by King Abdullah in 2006 in six major cities of Saudi Arabia, including Medina. The project covered an area of over 4.6 square kilometres (1.9 square miles). According to this program, the management of MKEC was assigned the task of building residential properties for the professionals, business community and elites who were supposed to boost the economy of Medina in particular and of Saudi Arabia in general (Medina KEC, 2015). MKEC attracted talent from all over the world in building

knowledge-based industries and made Saudi entrepreneurs leaders of the industry. The program created 20,000 job opportunities for locals and foreigners in Medina, built residential properties for 150,000 people, and increased the regional economy of Medina to the tune of 10 billion Saudi riyals (Moser et al., 2015).

The Vision 2030 project was introduced in 2014 as a development program run under the aegis of the Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund to achieve the construction of various mixed-use facilities for the residents of Medina and other major cities in Saudi Arabia (Moser et al., 2015). This project as Moser et al noted, is expected to contribute 15 billion riyals to the regional economy by the end of 2030. The Rou'a Al-Medina development agency was established to oversee various aspects of the projects. The agency was tasked with designing hotels, commercial spaces, and residential units to meet the increasing demand for housing to cater to needs of the city's growing population (Public Investment Fund Program, 2015). This project has already generated new revenues for the Medina region. It was announced that Development of Madinah Authority approves 39 tourism projects in Medina (DMA, 2017)

Riffat, (2004); Eden, (2000) observed that the average annual growth rate of the population in Medina between 1974 and 2004 stands at about 5.09%, which can primarily be attributed to progress in health care and improvement in the economic status of the population. In addition, the abundance of economic resources resulting from increased revenues, growing per capita income and the migration of a skilled workforce from all over the world have all contributed to the city's population growth (Riffat, 2004; Eden, 2000). The non-Saudi population increased by 23% in Medina, indicating the scale of immigration, which has put pressure on the economy and resources of the city (UNICEF, 2010). Salama (2007) argued that the non-Saudi population, concentrated in the country's major cities, played a role in building infrastructure for the native population (Salam and Mouselhy, 2012; Khraif, 2007; Sly and Serow, 1993).

During the fourth period, an unorganized movement of professional people towards the centres of cities resulted in the construction of apartments instead of houses to accommodate the increasing demand for housing near urban centres (Eben Saleh, 2001; Eben Saleh, 2004; Soliman, 2002). The demand for housing in urban areas of Medina,

due to the proximity of facilities, raised prices and thereby affected the ability of low and middle-class earners to buy accommodation (Alhathloul, Mughal,2004). Population City (2015) summed up the overall increase in Medina's population from 1995 to 2014 due to development precipitated in the third and fourth stages in the chart shown in Figure 12. Consequently, 36% of the Saudi population and 56% of the non-Saudi population in Medina live in rental properties. As a result of luxury redevelopment, Medina's central areas according to Al-Mubarak, (2004) are now seemingly occupied by the upper classes as well as commercial and administrative activities, while the residential spaces of lower income families and labourers have been shifted to the periphery of the urban spaces, a phenomenon which this study is trying to evidence.

Although yet to be empirically researched, it has been noted that non-native people in Medina generally prefer private, rented accommodation over their employers' offered accommodation, which increases the burden on housing in the private sector. MKEC and Vision 2030 both made provisions for housing facilities, but they remain unaffordable for the majority of locals and foreigners alike.

Figure 12: The population trend in Medina, 1995-2014 (Population City, 2015).

As the largest city and the capital of Al-Medina Al-Munawra region, Medina is the centre of both internal and external migration in comparison with other provinces of the region (see Table 4). This is due to the religious importance of Medina, and because it has been the centre of development and revitalization activities sponsored by both the local and

central governments. The data also highlights the relatively larger increase in the population per annum (50.5%) compared to other cities in the region, which can be attributed to the importance of Medina to religious tourism and to the construction of infrastructure to support this tourism, which has attracted internal and external migration (UN, 2016). Other cities in the region, such as Alula and Khaybar, are predominantly inhabited Bedouins, who are mainly farmers (Makki, 2013). These areas are devoid of the lavish infrastructure possessed by Medina, which attracts foreigners to settle there. After Medina, the city of Yanbu showed higher urban growth compared to other cities, which might be due to its proximity to Medina, by virtue of which it experiences ripple effects from the industrial economy of Medina (Fakeeh, 2009).

As noted above by Riffat, (2004); Eden, (2000), the basic reasons for the population growth in Medina and its outskirts are improved health care and economic factors, including development projects, which have led to increased migration. Nevertheless, house ownership has decreased due to the abundance of luxury housing schemes, which ordinary residences cannot afford. In addition, renting is preferable for professionals with limited contracts. The movement of locals from central urban areas to the outskirts increased, which could be attributed to either rising prices or government-led redevelopment projects. That is the central focus of this thesis. This study was designed to provide empirical evidence for why locals started leaving the central areas of Medina, being replaced by elites and professionals who began relocating to these areas. There are several important areas where this study makes an original contribution to understand the processes and manifestations of development in study area and it intends to know if gentrification that taking place in central zone of Medina or it is just redevelopment by going through investigate the factors and players that have contributed to the development witnessed in the central zone.

Governorates	Population 1974	Population 1992	Population 2004	Population 2010	population growth %
Medinah	267,558	686,958	995,619	1,183,205	4,22
Yanbu Albahar	69,090	172,086	249,797	299,526	4,16
Alula	46,528	50,067	57,495	64,482	0,91
Almahd	43,168	52,297	53,687	61,936	1,01

Governorates	Population 1974	Population 1992	Population 2004	Population 2010	population growth %
Badr	36,058	50,567	58,088	64,209	1,62
Khaybar	32,216	39,984	45,489	48,901	1,17
Alhinakiyah	24,677	32,988	52,549	59,474	2,74
Total	519,295	1,034,380	1,512,724	1,781,733	3,48

Table 4: Population in Medina region and average annual population growth rate (%) of Medina city compared to the Medina region and Saudi Arabia as a whole. Source: Makki (2013), GaStat (1974, 1992, 2004, 2010).

4.4. Political Context and Institutions in Urban Planning

The movement of locals from central urban areas to the outskirts discussed above, which is a central focus of this study, determined by the political context and institutionalization of the urban planning process. Since 1970s in global north context, several researchers identified the state role in gentrification or development such as Hamment (1973); Smith (1979); Zukin (1982). Posteriorly, Hackworth and Smith (2000) point out that state in the second and third wave of gentrification has become direct involvement in gentrification. Lee (2000) highlights the need to pay attention to different political context that gentrification takes place could led to different kind of gentrification and different result. Davidson (2006;22) state that "any connection made between national urban policy objectives and the process of gentrification has to consider how national urban policies are implemented and negotiated through multilevel government structures". Therefore, this part shed light on Thus, this section clarifies who has power, who tells planers what to do and who makes urban policy in Saudi Arabia. An examination of the political context and institutions context is presented in this section of the chapter to traces the relationship between development and urban policy in Saudi Arabia, demonstrating how redevelopment has been promoted in central zone of Medina practically by urban policy.

4.4.1. Nexus Between Central and Local Governing Bodies: Urban Planning and Policies

The administrative relationship between the central and local governments has four important components in the development and expansion programs of Medina and other cities in Saudi Arabia. First, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs (MMRA), established in 1975 under government directive, connects the central government with the local government bodies, called the principalities (Kari, 1992). MMRA is responsible for urban planning in urban and rural areas in Saudi Arabia and is the fundamental government body for devising planning and management policies at the national, provincial and neighborhood levels. The Ministry is further responsible provision of basic service, granting licenses for infrastructure services, improvement and beautification of cities and development of municipal and rural areas and necessary services to preserve cleanliness and health of environment. Moreover, the ministry must produce master plans for the principal cities and towns in conjunction with the municipalities of those urban areas (Niblock and Malik, 2007).

The second critical component of administrative relationship between the central and local governments is the Principality, which is led by the Prince who is the Governor of the city and he must be one of royal family, and reports the needs of the residents to the Ministry of the Interior and the MMRA joint Committee. The Principality is also responsible for the development and evaluation of the Five-Year Plans and other expansion programs, reporting back to the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) (Kari, 1992; MRM, 2016). The third important component is the Municipality, which would seem to work independently of the influence of the principality, and is responsible for formulating policies, development programs, and budgets for the city's development. The municipality submits all of its plans and policies to the MMRA, especially in matters related to land distribution, new housing plans and commercial endeavors, and granting permits for buildings and constructing commercial plazas (MOMRA, 2015; Nimir and Palmer, 1982).

Though the functions and activities of municipalities are highly coordinated and independent, they can engage in consultation with other governing bodies such as MOI,

MMRA and the principalities in order to help facilitate developments that will seemingly cater to the needs of their community (Niblock, 2004). The Mayor of a city will head the municipality, whose members are elected by a Municipal Council, which an elected body which is responsible for providing recommendations on new projects such as roads, parks and project operation and maintenance, but it has no authority to implement its decisions. All the decisions and programs recommended by the Municipal Council are reviewed by the MMRA, which determines whether they should be implemented (Kashoggi, 1979).

The fourth important component is ministerial local bodies which are thought independent of the principalities and municipalities. Such ministerial bodies are based on Government directorates that work with specific sectors of activity, such as the Directorate of Housing, the Directorate of Planning, and the Commercial Offices designated by the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) (Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly, 1999; Kari, 1992). These agencies and offices are seen to be responsible for surveying the needs of the local community, conducting research and preparing reports on potential development projects to boost the standard of living of the residents within the boundaries of the municipality. These reports can later be utilized by MOI, the central government, the principality and the municipality in designing future development projects (al-Rasheed, 2008; Kashoggi, 1979).

In addition, there are several higher committees of planning and development which evaluate, supervise and monitor the performance of economic plans, especially urbanization plans which are initiated on the premise of generating revenues for the city, and are usually headed by the governor of the city and his deputy. The members of such committees include the mayor of the city, councillors, and officials from MOI and MOC (Al-Rasheed, 2010; Al-Rasheed, 2008).

To sum up, some of points could be said about the administrative relationships between the governmental bodies. First, there is a vertical power relationship between the central and regional governments, through which power flows from the central government to the local government, as shown in Figure 13. Second, it would seem difficult to substantiate princess's power who have capacity or ability to direct or influence a decision made by others in municipality such as the Mayor or the course of events. It is kind of

symbolic power that the prince of Medina has more than a bureaucratic power, and this applies to all Saudi cities that governed by royal family princes. Third, the power of the local government is limited by the fact that decision-making power and the authority to grant approval are vested in the central government. The local government can make proposals and suggestions but depend on the central government for approval and financing. This indicates that power is concentrated in the central government, whilst the local government is given only limited power for urbanization and policy development. It has been criticized that municipalities in Saudi Arabia suffer from lack of substantive autonomy and undertake urban management functions (UN-Habitat, 2012). The central government still has the power to disband a local government, mayor, expel members of the local council or choose contractors to undertake local projects, which in some cases can create conflicts of interest (Ibid). The administrative structure involving planning and development bodies exclusive to the city of Medina is described in the next section.

Administrative context of urban planning in Medina

Medina is one of the largest cities in Saudi Arabia in terms of population and its specialized urban planning system for determining the development needs and approving development plans. This section explains the various components of the local bureaucracy responsible for urban stability and development.

In Medina, Medina Development Authority (MDA) is the Highest Committee for Medina Planning, headed by the prince (governor) which was established by royal decree in 2009, is the authority responsible for reviewing and approving plans related to the construction of new housing schemes or shopping plazas as well as the management of the city's commercial sector (MMRA,2016). In addition, this committee also oversees the implementation of developmental plans, coordinates between various agencies involved in the construction, development and economic activities of the city, and ensures the smooth implementation of projects associated with land distribution, acquisition and development. Furthermore, appeals and claims made by residents against investors, contractors, building associations and public individuals related to the inappropriate use of land are also heard by this committee (Ibid).

Figure 13: An illustration of how the central government and local government of Medina are related to each other in terms of policy making for urbanization and development (Source: Author).

It should be noted that the first committees were Executive Committee of development central zone (ECDCZ) (see chapter 6), and the Ministerial Committee which were established by royal decree in 1990, headed by King Fahad, was authority which approves proposals for the extension and expansion of the Central Zones and surroundings of the Prophet's Mosque. On behalf of the King, the Prince (or Governor of Medina city), who

was the president of ECDCZ, heads the Committee, and his approval is required for all plans concerning the development or expansion of the central zone, in consultation with members of the ECDCZ.

The Office of the Mayor was created for the management and implementation of plans and operates under the supervision of committees that hold for development purpose and MMRA. The main responsibilities of this office are planning, coordination among various agencies, liaising between these committees and other public agencies involved in development, consultation and following up on the projects and development plans. Other departments, which report to the Office of the Mayor, include:

A. *Deputy Municipality of Technical Affairs:* This bureau formulates plans regarding urban development projects and implements such plans in Medina under the supervision of the Office of the Mayor.

B. *Deputy Municipality of Municipal* Affairs: This agency is involved in the management of the urban environment, beautification of the city, public health and the management of recreational areas (such as parks) within Medina.

C. *General Directorate of Finance and Admin*: This agency is responsible for managing the finances of the city, and thus looks at the impact of development plans on boosting the economy of the city in addition to preparing the city budgets (Kashoggi, 1979, Kari, 1992).

D. *General Administration of Building Permits*: The Directorate of Building Permits is the office responsible for issuing permits for construction projects. These projects can be of two types: public and private sector building projects. The former are prepared and submitted by the public agencies under the control of the Office of the Mayor to the local planning department in the Directorate of Building Permits (Kari, 1992). The building projects may be small, large, or exceptionally large, and residential and commercial types. The small and large residential building projects submitted by public agencies are directly approved if the land on which the buildings are being planned is subdivided (Kashoggi, 1979). However, if the land is not sub-divided, the project is referred to the Tanzeem department of the Directorate of Building Permits for approval. This department arranges the plans for subdivision and demarcates the

areas for streets and recreational and social activities, following which, approval is granted (Ibid). Similar steps are followed for approval of land projects ranging from small to medium-large in size from private organizations or individuals apart, from certain extra checks and reviews of applications by the Office of the Mayor. Based on the reviews and checks, the Government Project Sub-division (GDS) approves or rejects the project, and the decision is referred to the Building Permit Department (BDP), which is responsible for issuing building permits to the applicants (Kashoggi, 1979; Al-wajji, 1989).

Exceptionally large projects within the city are examined by a special GDS committee established to review the impact of a proposed project on the economy and environment of the city. Based on the reports and proposals of the committee, the committee decides whether to grant the building permit. If the decision of GDS is negative, the respective organization can make amendments as suggested by GDS, and resubmit the project. In the event of a negative decision, the applicants have the right to appeal the decision in court (Kashoggi, 1979; Al-wajji, 1989; Kari, 1992; Hertog, 2011).

Justification for Medina to study gentrification

Medina has a specific history of religious tourism, on account of which it receives millions of pilgrims annually. This not only contributes to social development and population increase in the city but is an important source of revenue for the city. However, modern development to improve infrastructure and facilities has affected the local population by changing the socio-economic context of Medina (Al-Rasheed, 2010).

The development projects initiated during the third and fourth periods of urban growth, which is presented previously in this chapter , led to a rise in apartment, villa and other luxury housing schemes, which in turn increased inflation, raised rents, and decreased the capacity of local residents to afford to buy houses due to the influx of well-healed professionals and elites into the urban spaces of Medina. For this reason, it is necessary to explore the extent, causes and impact of the development and mobility of locals from the city's central urban spaces. Whether it could be revitalization and redevelopment or revitalization and redevelopment with displacement, based on the luxurious lifestyle of the newcomers to city centre of Medina, is important to explore. Thus, is can be

ascertained whether the revitalization stimulated by the oil economy and religious tourism in Medina has benefitted all residents equally or whether it could be non-state led gentrification/development as well as state-led gentrification/development which pushed out the lower classes.

In addition, historically and economically, Medina holds a critical position in the economy of Saudi Arabia and in Medina region, remaining a hub of redevelopment and revitalization projects initiated by government, including the Five-Year plans, MKEC and Vision 2030. These projects have potentially altered the population dynamics and the occupation of urban spaces, which were previously utilised by locals for commercial activities (MKEC, 2015). These changes might be catalysts for the displacement associated with redevelopment; therefore, it is very important to study the effects of these developments on changes in the population structure of the central urban spaces of Medina.

Furthermore, Medina has a unique administrative structure compared to other major cities of Saudi Arabia due to its religious importance, religious tourism and being the capital of Medina region; hence the special Committees and Development Wings directly controlled by the King and the Prince of Medina. This means that the government has a keen interest in developing the whole city on a modern scale by triggering the immigration of foreigners and professionals to support these developments. Due to Medina's unique administrative structure, the state-led machinery has more say in implementing revitalization projects than: (1) Saudi private sector itself where the sector has not enough power of money to be competitor to state projects (Al Rajhi et al., 2012), or (2) other states in Global North where Britch cities ,as an example, are albeit to a varying degree in terms of state interventions where in Manchester (Ward,2003) is different from Leeds (Dutton,2003) and both are different to some extent from Newcastle (Cameron, 2003) but they adopted gentrification as an urban strategy (Hackworth and Smith (2001) . Therefore, it is quite possible that the displacement of locals and the construction of commercial hubs and luxury housing apartments and schemes may be considered gentrification. The state slogan of revitalization to boost the living standards of the city's residents might thus be associated with gentrification rather than developing

the locals economically. To unravel these complexities, Medina is the perfect case study for investigating gentrification.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how Medina has grown from a small settlement into a modern urban city that has a unique contrast between traditional and contemporary structures due to the influence of the Global North on the architecture and urban planning processes throughout the Middle East. The traditional influence of Islamic city is still there represented by presence of Prophet's Mosque in the city centre unlike other cities in Middle East, where they abandoned mosque as city centre and the central business areas become more attractive (Abubrig , 2012). In terms of the urban planning process, the chapter has explained the influence of the central government on local urban development and planning processes, thereby affirming the highly centralized legislative processes that are involved in urban planning policies in Saudi Arabia. In essence, the local government has very limited authority in effecting urban policies, and merely serves as the implementation tool of the central government's policies.

With regards to Medina's social hierarchy in urban planning processes and growth in Saudi Arabia, Medina occupies the fourth position in the social hierarchy in terms of population. However, it is the second most important city in the Kingdom because of its position as the resting abode of the founder of Islam and its consequent status as a major destination for religious pilgrimage. During various periods of development in the history of Medina, it has been placed at the centre of planning activities and attracted foreigners, visitors, professionals, and pilgrims (Bogari et al., 2003). The Ottoman and Saudi eras, in particular, were marked by social and economic development activities including the construction of infrastructure, such as roads, new housing schemes and commercial hubs in Medina.

Due to these activities, the population of Medina has continuously risen since 1995 to the present day. In this time, the trend of locals moving out of central urban spaces to the periphery has increased, which has mainly been described by the state as redevelopment or revitalization. The following chapters examine the central zone of Medina change since

1970 in conjunction with rising of urbanization in the city and its impact on the study area to understand whether central zone Medina has experienced redevelopment or gentrification. First in Chapter Five, determining the causes and the actors that have been involved in the redevelopment of the central zone of Medina in 1970s and 1980s by identifying the old urban fabric of city centre which is experiencing redevelopment besides investigating former social environment of local residents them and analysing the causes for redevelopment process in city centre. Second in Chapter Six, analysing the urban changes socially and physically that redevelopment is bringing to central zone in 1990. Third in Chapter Seven, examining the consequences of these changes particularly on the residents of central zone.

Chapter 5

The Emergence of Gentrification in Medina

5.1. Introduction

This is the first empirical chapter, and it answers the first and second research questions. Grounded in the study's objective to determine what has triggered redevelopment in the central zone of Medina since the 1970s. This chapter therefore analyses the factors that have contributed to the development of the central zone and the major actors involved in this process, in order to reveal the causes and discuss the outcomes.

The analysis is based on archival documents obtained from the government and interviews with both government officials (the elite) and former residents of the central zone (see chapter 3). The chapter discusses the urbanization processes and its relationship with the emergence of gentrification in Medina beginning with the Royal Decree in the 1970s and continuing until 1990, a period containing the first two phases of development. Subsequently, the chapter examines the real estate development fund and how it was used to finance the development. Thus, the discussion begins with the Royal Decree and how individuals applied the policies set forth therein.

The chapter argues that the development processes in Medina are in line with the urban revitalization programmes, development, transformations and changes discussed in

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chapters 1 and 2. These processes show evidence of gentrification, based on Smith's (1982) definition, in that the redevelopment was not limited to the rehabilitation of old structures but also involved the construction of new buildings and resulted in a change to the social composition of the urban area (Williams, 1975). Thus, the development led to economic changes and a shift in the social class of residents from the work and middle class to the upper class.

This chapter is divided into sex sections. The first discusses urban fabric of city center from 1970s until 1980s heritage houses, the prophet mosque and Ahwash the period from the 1970s until 1990, whilst the second and third parts focusses first and second waves of urban development in the central zone examine the legislations of housing which were issued by royal decrees. The fourth section is about Endowment houses . The third section analyses data on the real estate development fund.

Chapter 4 explained the decision-making process in the redevelopment of the inner city of Medina. This chapter now examines these decisions further and considers the actors involved in the urban restructuring of the city's central zone and their contribution to the area's gentrification. It discusses newly-built, gentrifying structures and the processes supporting this, in particular by scrutinising the programmes and investments that enabled the inner city area to be redeveloped.

One of the characteristics of gentrification is the amount of capital that is invested in an area, which creates the space for the redevelopment to take place (Smith, 1979). It is also associated with physical and political changes as well as alterations in the social composition of an urban area (Hackworth, 2001, 2002; William, 1975), in addition to changes in the area's economic power (Smith, 1982). Within Medina, the inner city neighbourhoods can be considered in terms of administrative, socioeconomic and religious aspects, as these represent different causes and factored into different processes, amongst which are the endowment system, urban regulations and the project to enlarge the Prophet's Mosque. Central to the conception of Medina as an Islamic city is the presence of the Prophet's Mosque, as a result of which the city is the recipient of heavy capital investments and is situated within religious tourism. The debates about global

North versus global South are also relevant due to its location in Saudi Arabia, in the Middle East.

The central zone of Medina was developed around the Prophet's Mosque, which is the focal point of the city. The development of the zone occurred as a result of King Fahad's decision to expand the Mosque in 1986, to add legitimacy to Saudi Arabia's appointment as custodian of the two holy Muslim sites of Makkah and Medina. The expansion project was designed to enlarge the area around the Mosque, and commercial developments first took place in the main street in front of the Mosque. By the 1990s, more development was needed so that the central zone could accommodate more pilgrims. This finding resonates with other studies which found that gentrification is indeed a multi-layered process which continuously changes over a period of time, as it is seen as a solution to a wide variety of issues (Morris, 2006; Murphy, 2008; He, 2012).

Although it can be argued that development carried out to meet the needs of pilgrims or visitors is a form of tourist gentrification. Secondly, it facilitates an analysis of the activities themselves to determine the extent to which they were catalysts for change. The form of new-build gentrification features a number of aspects which indicate that urban development decisions are associated with a political context. They also relate to the morphology of Medina in general and of the central zone in particular. To examine the implications of the concerns related to political performance and structural form, it is necessary to investigate the real estate systems and urban morphology of Medina.

The regulations for real estate in Saudi Arabia stipulate quite specific urban policies. These include a mixture of laws: some are issued by royal decree, whilst others are enacted by Council of Ministers resolution (BOE, 2009). All the initiatives connected with real estate come under the umbrella of the Municipal Services and Urban Planning departments. The specific regulations relating to property were issued in the period 1970 to 2003. According to BOE (2009), these initiatives include the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF), the government land grant programme, the Law of Eminent Domain and Temporary Taking of Property, the Law of Real Estate Ownership and Investment by Non-Saudis, and the Law of Ownership of Real Property Units and Plotting. The role of

each of these initiatives in influencing the processes of gentrification of the city of Medina is considered in this section.

Within the central zone of Medina, the Prophet's Mosque is located in the middle, yet religious usage is not the only purpose of this area of Medina the city. The devisers of the first master plan for Medina in 1973 underlined the fact that the central zone, which is surrounded by a ring road (see Figure 6 in chapter 3), is a CBD area in which commercial activity is concentrated; in addition, it is a high-density residential area and is heavily exploited throughout the year. Because of its religious significance, there has been a constant focus on the central zone (Makki, 1994), with hundreds of thousands of Muslim pilgrims visiting each year, especially at Hajj, and generally confining themselves to this area of the city (Sherwood, 2015). It is understandable that this places much pressure on the city centre, where most visitors congregate. The key physical manifestations of urban structures in the downtown area and the social form that is associated with them are therefore intertwined with Medina's history. For this reason, it is important to consider the built environment of the city.

The old quarters of Islamic cities, including Medina, were comprised of narrow lanes and habitations often constructed in mediaeval times, many of which were designated as local workers' quarters under colonialism (Blake & Lawless, 2016). The ensuing overcrowding resulted in those who could afford to do so moving out into other parts of the city, where better living conditions were available. By the 1920s, the inner cities were starting to show signs of physical erosion due to low-cost housing being sub-divided to accommodate more families, and to commercial enterprises being established in order to provide income-generating opportunities (Blake & Lawless, 2016). This provides a background to the way in which the central area of Medina itself has undergone significant change, as discussed in the next section.

5.2. Urban History of Medina

As discussed in chapter 4, the Prophet's Mosque occupies the middle of Medina's central zone, yet the area is not restricted to purely religious usage. However, its religious

significance is the reason for the constant focus on the central zone due to the number of visitors the Prophet's mosque attracts (Makki, 1994; Sherwood, 2015). It is therefore important to consider the built environment of Medina. This section presents the data collected on the built environment in the central zone, heritage housing, the Prophet's Mosque, and Ahwash as a residential space unit.

5.2.1. The Built Environment in the Central Zone

Zukin (2010) argues that there is a different story for every neighbourhood's experience of gentrification and how an area becomes revitalised. This study has identified three main features together comprising the built environment within the central zone of Medina, namely the heritage housing (traditionally constructed houses), the Prophet's Mosque, and Ahwash residential units. These three features represent the culture of the city and are reflected in the Medina landscape. As Czepcyzynski (2012) affirms, the landscape we see is a combination of the past and the present, modified by culture, economy and society. Additionally, within these three features we can see contrasts of care and neglect over the years, which have resulted in dramatic changes to the city centre, including social and economic changes in the urban life of Medina.

It is important to keep in mind that Medina is a traditional city which lacks, for the most part, post-industrial city characteristics. Furthermore, it is difficult to track the early history of neighbourhoods in Medina, as there was no tax system or election data, which might shed light on the make-up of the population and residents; the first official documentation comes from the master plans devised in the 1970s. However, this was not an exception in the case of Medina, as it was common to most Islamic cities of the Middle Ages, when divisions in the central zones were established and maintained by residents, not by civic authorities (Smith, 2010).

Figures 14 shows that the neighbourhood system in the central zone of Medina, until 1990, starts with the residential quarter, a courtyard and an alley. These are all linked together by streets or lanes, all of which lead to the Prophet's Mosque and the suq (city market). The courtyards are known as Hosh or Ahwash in the plural, and these have

existed since the Middle Ages (Kaki, 2006). One of the former residents who participated in this study, aged 64, explained that:

> *The old city had nine quarters and their names were Altaiyar Alley, Alsahah, Altagouri, Bab-Alawali, Bab-Almajidi, Alanbaryah, Almnakah and Alanabeya. Each of these included six, seven, eight or even nine small courtyards and each of these courtyards had a number of houses. Each courtyard was unique in that it was not like the others in terms of area, design and the number of households. (Interview with Adam 2 on 06/08/2014).*

This participant's comments indicate that there were two levels of residential areas, the courtyard and the quarters. Kaki's (1998) descriptive study of Medina explored this part of the city, and he explained that Alaghawat and Therwan were two of the oldest areas around the Prophet's Mosque and were characterised by narrow alleys. They contained a number of special features such as a watering place, two hospices, public baths and a library. However, in 1985 they were marked for demolition by the King Fahad Extension project for the Prophet's Mosque. Altaiyar was one of the most important quarters as it consisted of a group of nine alleys, with other alleys diverging from these into many courtyards. It also had a number of traditional buildings, renowned for their design and style (Kaki, 1998).

Figure 14: Two various neighborhoods in the central zone of the old city of Medina.Source:Kaki collection

The role of these alleys in the urban fabric of Medina was that of a vital network connecting the different parts of the city. Chapter 2 noted that this has been identified by some researchers, such as Ennahid (2002) and Atash (1993). Atash (1993:351) drew a typical layout of a medieval Islamic city (see Figure 15) which resembles Medina's fabric in medieval times, and which razed in 1990.

The alleys were identified by a hierarchal system whereby the larger ones were interlinked with smaller, winding ones. Most were between 1.50 and 4 metres wide in order to benefit from the shade of the buildings and to create a barrier from the wind (Makki, 1984). Kaki (2006) also reported that there was an architectural goal behind the construction of such alleys as they created shadows to protect pedestrians from the sun and also lowered temperatures inside the alleys leading to the courtyards. They thus served as an ambient feature of the city centre, enabling residents to interact and socialise while also providing access to amenities. Aburbrig (2012), Al-Bassam (2012), Yildiz (2011), and Saoud (2002) all confirm that such alleys were typical features of Islamic cities in the past.

The courtyards do not match what Park and Rogers (2014) defined as a residential neighbourhood, which they suggested was composed of several face-blocks. It would seem that their definition can be applied only to Western or global North contexts. Certainly, people resided within these areas, as this study's participants confirmed, hence making it a residential neighbourhood. Within the courtyards, there is an open area surrounded by terraced housing, and these are linked to other parts of the city through gates built for security purposes, which used to be closed after dark. These still exist in contemporary urban landscapes and are often described as gated communities, walled communities or artificial neighbourhoods (Blakely & Snyder, 1997; Grant & Mittelsteadt, 2004). However, it should be noted that gates for security reasons have not been used by the Saudi government since the 1940s.

Figure 15: The typical layout of a medieval Islamic city. Source: Atash (1993:351).

A former resident, who is now retired, explained that:

The courtyards or hosh are a unique security system, an interior space surrounded by houses which form a protected vacuum to control entrance when the need arises. They were a security element in the formation of Medina, as the courtyard gate protects a group of houses and they are therefore more secure than the houses outside the courtyard. This availability of security within the courtyard made people feel safe and protected their property, especially at night time, when the gate was closed. This protected the courtyard residents from strangers and bad people, and only people known to the inhabitants could visit (Interview with Adam 1 on 12/08/2014).

These courtyards varied in size, with the largest occupying 4,730 square metres and being surrounded by 74 houses, while the smallest covered a mere 80 square metres and was

surrounded by only eight houses. The average space occupied by a house was 51 square metres. Alhussayen (1992) reported that there were about 78 courtyards distributed throughout the central zone and that each of these courtyards had a unique name related to the family or ethnicity of the residents of the surrounding houses or some distinct architectural feature. It is evident that the irregularity of such courtyards meant that the alleys linking them were also irregular and usually narrow; therefore, they impeded rather than facilitated the movement of residents and pilgrims. Thus, although they may have suited the purposes of the early residents, they were becoming more problematic due to the increasing numbers of visitors and expanding families within the central zone. The next section considers the traditional (heritage) housing inhabited by the residents and provides a clearer picture of the social structure of the area.

5.2.2. Heritage Housing

The way in which housing is organised reveals much about the inhabitant's values and lifestyles. Living in such close proximity to others reflects the accommodating nature of people towards their neighbours, often members of the extended family (Fadan, 1983). The wealth or prestige of the inhabitants is not reflected in the size of the traditional house, which rather has more to do with family size (Fadan, 1983).

In Medina it was easy to recognise the mediaeval houses as they had a number of unique features in terms of exterior design and building materials. Most were constructed from materials readily available from the local environment, such as stone and the trunks of palm trees. One interviewee described his house in the following way:

**Figure 16: Some of the heritage housing in the old city of
Medina.Source:Almagamsi collection**

*The ceiling was made of palm trees and subject to damage due to insects; there were
two rooms and a kitchen without a roof. My grandfather told me that he had used the
wood from the ceiling to keep warm during wartime. In the summer time my family
would sit in that area. (Interview with Adam 3 on 11/08/2014)*

Figure 16 shows a picture of the heritage housing. The floors of the houses were built
using stones and bricks, and mud was used for the walls. Eve 7, now 63 years old, had
lived in one of these houses since her birth until her family was displaced. She described
her former home:

*All the houses in our courtyard had the same structure. They were built from stone,
bricks and wood. The roofs were made of palm trunks and normal wood, and when
people started repairing their houses they used red brick for the upper floors. They
later added modern bathrooms and laundries, and the houses consisted of three
rooms on the ground floor with four rooms on the upper floor. (Interview with Eve 7
on 15/08/2014)*

Another resident from the old quarters gave further details on the structure of his home:

*Until they started redeveloping this area, my house still retained most of its original
features. It was not different from any of the other houses, apart from space and
number of floors. There was a living room (Almeqad), a room for storing dates*

(Tairma), and a room for receiving guests who were not relatives (Alkaha). The bedrooms (Almoaker) were the farthest rooms in the house, but there was also a room called Aldewan for receiving guests who were relatives. In the ceiling there was a window for providing air and light, and there was also the Alkarjah at the front of the house upstairs, which served as a balcony but with perforated wooden windows (Roshan) to afford privacy for women to have the opportunity to watch what was going on outside. (Interview with Adam 5 on 07/08/2014)

Figure 17: The Roshan appear in the first floor of an old building.

The Roshan, shown in Figure 17, were well-known features of old houses in all the cities in the west of Saudi Arabia, including Medina as well as Makkah and Jeddah. Under Islamic law, the placement of windows, the height of adjacent buildings and the mutual responsibilities of neighbours are regulated to guard visual privacy. The old houses in the inner neighbourhoods of Medina exemplified such features, which were also considered a status symbol, indicating the wealth of the house owner, as their design revealed the economic level of a household. However, Kaki (2006) said that the common elements of houses in the old city were an important factor in harmonising the community; the

structural features reinforce an overall sense of homogeneity such that there is no overt distinction between neighbourhoods. It will later be shown how the courtyards became a symbol of social cohesion.

Moreover, it was observed that the houses always provided architectural features which give the impression that women could see men, but men could not see women except those who were close relatives. Clearly, the lattice screens of the roshan served this purpose. Indeed, Saoud (2002) and Abu-Lughod (1989) found privacy – of women first and foremost, and of the family - is the main concept informing the physical features of the prototypical Islamic city. This is the reason for many regulations, such as the one that buildings on opposite sides of the street must not have doors facing each other. According to Kaki (2006), such rules constitute another measure of visual control.

Figure 18: Physical formation of the south-western area of Medina's city centre in 1985.Source:Kaki collection

The reconstruction and modernisation of housing in the downtown area of Medina continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and this is further discussed later in this chapter. Figure 18 shows an example of the physical formation of the south-west of the

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city centre[9] (the Prophet's Mosque) in 1985, before the development project started in 1990. It is clear that some of the houses on the main streets have been modernised, most likely for the purpose of visitor accommodation, as they are more than three stories high. They were probably bought by businessmen, indicating that there was gentrification at the beginning.

Another example is seen on the north western side of the city centre (see Figure 19). On the right side of the photo, many heritage buildings can be seen, whereas on the left and in the centre of the photo, modernisation is taking place. The physical changes were therefore not limited to one particular zone; yet up until 1990 it was not surprising to find a heritage house next to a contemporary building (Figure 20), as many older houses were starting to deteriorate.

Figure 19: View to the north-west of Medina's centre in 1985.

Table 5 provides a summary of the condition of the houses in 1990, indicating the extent to which specific areas of the city centre contained the largest portion of the oldest and most deteriorated housing; this is especially notable in the Alahram sub-municipality. It can be seen that more than half the houses were in poor or run-down condition, offering evidence of the state of housing in downtown Medina at that time. A possible explanation for this may be the endowment system. Endowment housing constituted more than half

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[9] The Prophet's Mosque in this study is considered as the centre of Medina.

the housing in inner city neighbourhoods, whether they were traditional or modern buildings.

Figure 20: Heritage and contemporary buildings in 1985.

Bulding Age (Years)	%	House condition	Q	%
Less than 10 years	7	Under construction	24	0,8
10-19 years	38	Good	599	20,8
20-29 years	25	Acceptable	700	24,3
More than 30	30	Poor	1,315	45,6
Total percentage	100	Tumbledown	247	8,5

**Table 5: Classification of housing in Alharam sub-municipality in 1990
(Source: MRM 1990).**

This table shows that more than 30% of the housing was classified at that time as old by the municipal government, being more than 30 years old. However, this is not accurate, as thirty years cannot be classified as old for a house. As discussed earlier, records were not kept of the early housing, which means that in reality, most of these may be heritage buildings. The highest percentage of housing is recorded as being 10 and 19 years old at that time, having been constructed for the government housing programme started in 1973. From 1973 to 1985, accommodation was sporadically constructed; as it was inconsistent and disorganized, it created a tapestry of different buildings, old and new, in various sizes, height, usage and quality of design. There was not only an overlap with the functional aspects but also in the spatial aspect; ownership may have covered several

thousand square metres of property, whilst the neighbouring property may not have exceeded twenty square metres. Overshadowing all the housing in the central area of Medina was the Prophet's Mosque, one of the main features of the built environment, and the heart of the city, which in this study, is taken also as the physical centre of Medina.

5.2.3. The Prophet's Mosque

The word mosque originates from the Arabic masjid, which literally means a place for prostration before God. Muslims are required to perform obligatory prayers five times daily. Whilst prayers can be performed anywhere, there is a greater reward in offering them as a group, since this promotes the cohesiveness of the Muslim community (Zaimeche, 2002). The first mosque was built in Quba, which is located on the outskirts of Medina. The Prophet's Mosque has been cared for by governing organisations since the earliest days of Islam, which indicates its importance; however, it also reflects how any governing organisation gives attention to Islam as a religion through the Prophet's Mosque, as the maintenance of this structure gives an aura of sacredness and legitimacy to rule.

Due to its religious significance, and to accommodate growing numbers of visitors, the Prophet's Mosque has been expanded through a series of projects. As a result of these projects, a substantial number of residential buildings were demolished to make space for new infrastructure, including roads, markets, hotels and squares. In chapter 4, it was explained that urbanisation of the city has invariably been associated with projects to expand the Prophet's Mosque. This led to the spatial domain of the Prophet's Mosque being extended to the north, east and west to accommodate commercial and residential functions. In addition, urban growth related to the mosque area and central zone was supported by new streets to the suburbs (Makki, 1982). In the ten years following the 1978 enlargement project, Medina's area increased from 250 hectares to 1,300 (Alhusayen, 1999). However, the most extensive enlargement project was undertaken in 1985, and over the course of four years, that project had significant implications for the landscape around the mosque, in the central zone, and for Medina itself. The project enlarged the Prophet's Mosque to a vast area of 40,032 square metres (Alhusayen, 1999).

This expansion also had an impact on other parts of the inner city, including, significantly, the Ahwash, that is, the courtyards.

5.2.4. Ahwash as a Residential Space Unit

The urban context of Medina, provided by the master plan of 1988, sheds light on the socio-economic structure of Ahwash in the central zone of Medina. It is important to analyse the courtyards at the city level to be able to assess how the central city zone differs from other parts of Medina. The city centre is the oldest part of Medina and covers an area of 1.2 square kilometres (MRM 1982). The majority of neighbourhoods have been newly constructed since the 1970s, on the basis of development plans, as discussed in Chapter 4, and often stipulating housing programmes supported by the government. This is further discussed in the following sections. Table 6 shows the monthly income of residents in 1982, revealing wide variations in their socio-economic status. Most (20.4%) residents earned around RS4,000 (£735) monthly, although 22.9% of foreign residents were earning only around RS2,000 (£367), compared to 14.9% of Saudis. Although the monthly income extends from less than RS1,000 (£183) per month up to more than RS16,000 (£2,900), there are fewer households at the extremes. Foreign residents are mainly bracketed at the lower end of the scale. People earning less than RS 4,000 (£735) per month would be considered poor in the Saudi Arabian context, and therefore part of the working/lower class.

Until 1990, there were around 50,000 people living in the central zone of Ahwash (MRM 1990), and the majority belonged to extended families as each courtyard accommodated people from the same family or tribe. The occupants of each individual courtyard shared a diversity of social and economic features. There was no segregation of residents on the basis of class or income status, and the courtyards were often composed of families of modest means. Interviews with two former residents of the Ahwash area provided more information on social unity and cohesion within this inner city area.

There were strong connections. People visited each other constantly, and whenever there was any special occasion, everyone in the courtyard was invited. There was a happy atmosphere because friendship and love brought them all together and they

were all from the same class. I think because the majority of people were at the same economic level, nobody could call them rich, apart from a few people, but they were not from our courtyard. (Interview with Eve 7 on 15/08/2014)

Monthly income in Saudi riyals	Saudi %	Non Saudi %	Total %
Less than 1,000	4,2	9,2	5,5
1,000-1,999	10,4	21,1	13,8
2,000-2,999	14,9	22,9	17,4
3,000-3,999	19,3	18	19
4,000-4,999	22,5	15,3	20,4
6,000-6,999	13,2	6,4	11,1
8,000-9,999	6,9	3,1	5,7
10,000-11,999	4	2,4	3,5
12,000-13,999	1,8	0,7	1,4
14,000-15,999	1,2	0,3	0,9
16,000 or more	1,6	0,6	1,3

Table 6: Socio-economic context of Medina in the early 1980s (Source: MRM, 1982).

Adam 9 shared a similar memory, saying:

Every courtyard included a number of households, all of them like one big family. They were all one class, no discrimination, and they all loved one another and were close to each other. They had the same traditional habits, went to the same meetings, ate the same special food. It was a local community with shared customs and traditional clothes that do not exist in any other city. There was a wonderful social solidarity, for example, at Eid [Islamic holiday] all the people living in the same courtyard were gathered together by the Omdah [chief] and we visited every house with him. (Interview with Adam 9 on 17/08/2014)

This indicates that the courtyard played an important role in the social structure, as each one fostered a neighbourhood identity. Each courtyard had a local head or chief, called an Omdah, who represented the residents of the courtyard in local government, enquiring about services or resolving problems. The Omdah had the legal and moral authority to speak for the courtyard residents, and was responsible for maintaining local order, serving as a judge and ensuring the maintenance of the area. There was also a courtyard captain responsible for residents' safety and security. Additionally, the research data show that

Ahwash was part of the social life of Medina, not just a place to reside. They were an essential part of a cohesive community within which neighbours looked after each other and maintained close relationships.

Although the memories may be beautified by nostalgia or age, Eve 4, who is 60 years old, described life within the Ahwash courtyards thus:

> *Our houses were simple and at the same time were luxurious, the courtyard life was beautiful and much better than now, where neighbours looked after his or her neighbours and people gathered at Eids and helped each other. There was much love and interdependence among them, and they visited one another and tasted each other's foods. On occasions, one of the daughters of neighbours would gather our children and did hairstyles and [painted their hands with] henna…. Our days were sweet and beautiful and both older and younger age groups mixed together. (Interview with Eve 4 on 18/08/2014)*

Adam 1, a 72-year-old former resident who is a retired teacher, shared similar memories of the social life and relationships within the courtyards. He said:

> *Ahwash had social benefits in that the structure of the courtyards helped in creating strong social links between the resident population by involving them in the use of an open space where they could meet during exit and entry. The courtyard created space and the possibility for inhabitants to use the front of the houses to sit at evening time and invite neighbours and friends, leaded to increasing linkages between them. In some parts of Ahwash, women chose pillars inside the yard for sitting, as well as meeting with boys in a certain spot of the yard to talk and socialise. The courtyard was for occasions such as weddings or holidays, where a carpeted area was for seating for men, and the allocation of one of the corners was for cooking and food preparation; the centre was there for folk dances, and children played together and had fun. (Interview with Adam 1 on 12/08/2014)*

Based on such reports, it seems that the courtyards tended to provide accommodation for extended families; thus, relationships among the residents were mainly familial. Extended families could have multiple generations living together, and all adults would take on responsibilities for a household if living together in the same accommodation. The

research participants mentioned that some of these responsibilities might include financial contributions or sharing childcare duties, or in other ways such as cleaning and cooking. The discovery of oil in 1938 initiated the process of social change, as Saudis found new work opportunities and began to have more financial independence. This had an impact on Saudi society, which has since been shifting away from the tradition of living with the extended family to a more nuclear family pattern (Fadan, 1983). However, the extended family was a common household structure in the courtyards the interviewees in this study previously inhabited. Eve 8 is a 52-year-old housewife who described their household thus:

> *I used to live in Jaffer alley with my husband and children. We shared the house with my brother-in-law, his wife and their children. In total there were 8 children in the household. My husband was a student at the College of Education, and he and his brother had inherited the house from their father. We used to live on the ground floor and the other family was on the first floor, but we sat together at meal times. (Interview with Eve 8 on 14/08/2014)*

There were signs of social change as early as the 1970s and 1980s, when educated young people started to leave the extended family home during a period of unprecedented economic growth and a consequent housing boom (Fadan, 1983). Thus, the new middle class started to emerge from the courtyards, leaving the city centre housing in favour of modern neighbourhoods further away from the central zone. They moved to areas such as Sultanah Road, the Alwali area, and the Alharah Alshrakeya area, all of which are north or south of the city centre. Figure 21 - shows a new development in the Sultanah suburb in the 1970s. As Rugh (1973) explained, the nuclear family was emerging from the upper layers of the new middle class, because it was these Saudis who could afford to have a household separate from their fathers. This did not mean the breakdown of the family relationship, however, as sons continued to visit their parents' home every day and maintained the bond that attached them to their extended family (Rugh, 1973).

Education was not always available to the residents of the courtyards, and their work was often in the retail industry or they were self-employed. Adam 3, a 62-year-old retiree, explained that in the 1950s, his family were all involved in the sale of gold as they were

goldsmiths, but his neighbours were self-employed as they lacked education. Eve 8 described the jobs that others in her courtyard had:

My father was famous for baking Moroccan bread, but our other neighbours were blacksmiths, carpenters, tradesmen, grocery shop owners and builders. I knew some of them found simple work for the government, such as porters, and some were in the military. (Interview with Eve 8 on 14/08/2014)

Figure 21: A new suburb (Sultana Road) in 1982.

Likewise, Adam 11, who is 70 years old, explained that he had been, and still was, selling margarine at a market, but others he knew were manual labourers; only a few held government jobs. Eve 9, a 62-year-old widow, lived close to the Prophet's Mosque until 1990. She described the occupations of the local people thus:

Our neighbours were shepherds, auctioneers, a dyer, goldsmiths, tradesmen. Most of the courtyard people had a craft because it was rare to have anyone educated past primary school level. Few went on to secondary school. My father passed away when I was a baby, so my oldest brother took on the family responsibility. My father had bought and sold lambs, so my brother continued with that. He left school at 13 to do this. (Interview with Eve 9 on 08/08/2014)

These findings indicate that most of the residents were people of low income and a limited level of education. The changes happening in the central zone were bringing about both

the direct and indirect displacement of these residents (see chapter7), as can be seen in the redevelopment and transformation of the inner city. Consequently, it could be argued that the low level of income and social class of residents in central zone of Medina in terms of their work and lifestyle made them an easy target for gentrification. This was particularly the case due to the absence of some government laws to protect local people. In support of this idea, Freeman (2006) acknowledged that usually, the losers are the low income and semi-skilled class in the society, while the middle class benefit more from this process. The development or gentrification that occurred in Medina was financed in large part by the real estate development fund and government land grant programme, which are discussed in the tow next sections.

5.3. The Real Estate Development Fund

A proposal to establish a Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) was made by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy (MFNE) in Minister's letter number 2939, dated 26 June 1974 (REDF, 1981:8). It was approved by the Council of Ministers (CM) as per document number 793, with the same date. As a result, a specialised financing institution associated with MFNE, the REDF, was established by Royal Decree number M/23, dated 1 July 1974 (ibid.). Its aim was to allocate credit through offering long-term loans to Saudi citizens for the purpose of building houses. This was conceptualised as a mechanism to expand the development of the private housing sector (REDF, 1992:12; REDF, 1982:8). Part of this was due to the rapid expansion of development within Saudi Arabia, leading to more people aspiring to have better quality housing. There were simply not enough good quality houses to accommodate the burgeoning population. The high birth rate increased demand for housing as people found themselves living in cramped quarters. In 1975, Saudi Arabia had a population of 7.3 million, which had expanded to 22.8 million by 2003, and the country needed to find ways of housing this burgeoning population. The fund created the opportunity for ordinary Saudi citizens to build their own homes.

The REDF regulations granted medium- and long-term loans to Saudi citizens whose income was classed as 'low' or 'medium', which related mainly to the working or lower middle classes. It allowed for Saudi citizens to receive a loan for up to 70% of the estimated home construction cost, which was set at a maximum of £55,000 (REDF, 1974:2; REDF, 1989:18). Legal and natural entity companies were also eligible for loans under the Fund, where they were sought for the purpose of constructing units containing multiple residences envisaged as rental properties or hotels. These companies could receive up to 50% of the estimated home construction cost, to a maximum of £1.8 million (REDF, 1995:14). The REDF acted as a financial stimulus for redevelopment by providing financial support to Saudi establishments aiming to develop cities and towns by turning old areas into new residential and commercial sites, if approved by specific municipalities. Companies could also receive up to 50% of costs for housing units built for their employees, which was a further incentive for companies to invest in such structures. From 1975 until 1993, the fund released £19.6 billion (107.9 billion SR) in the form of 411,711 personal loans, and 2,470 investment loans, totalling £900 million (5.1 billion SR); a further £3.8 billion was disbursed from 1994 to 2006 (SAMIRAD, 2016). It is clear by its uptake that this fund was seen as necessary to help with providing more accommodation and was popular with citizens.

The REDF programme allocated loans for housing projects, depending on their eligibility, according to factors such as age, gender, and marital status; it also considered whether the applicant already owned property. One of the issues within Saudi Arabia has been that, although an oil rich country, most of its citizens are not rich (Jeddah Economic Forum, 2013). Additionally, the cost of housing is high, especially in cities, with an average home in Saudi Arabia costing about 10 times the average annual salary (Jeddah Economic Forum, 2013). Consequently, overcrowding in Saudi homes has long been an issue; in 2004 more than half (56%) of Saudis were living in overcrowded households (Sfakianakis, 2011). The Fund, therefore, was an attempt to make home ownership more accessible to the Saudi population.

The funds from the REDF were awarded to Saudi males over twenty-one years old, or eighteen years old if they were married. Saudi women, either widowed or divorced, provided they had legal custody of their children, or unmarried women over forty, were

also eligible to obtain a loan (REDF, 1995:14; Al-Saati, 1987:260). Applicants could receive the loan only once and only if they did not already own a house, although people were also eligible to apply for the funds if they wished to demolish an old house they were living in and re-build it for their personal occupancy. If granted the loan, it was repayable over twenty-five years. In order to receive the loan, the applicant had to own a plot of land on which he or she was planning to build a house, have a municipal permit and provide building plans which fulfilled REDF's specifications (Nassier, 1991, Al-Saati, 1987). This was to prevent a repeat of issues that occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s, when people built temporary homes out of any materials available, or had poor quality concrete dwellings constructed by unprofessional builders (Al-Naimi, 1989).

Once successful in their application, borrowers agreed to a mortgage contract with the REDF. The contract stipulated that the recipients were not allowed to sell, relinquish, transfer ownership or otherwise change the status of the property before the complete repayment of the loan. In case of any delays or missing repayments on the due date, the REDF had the right to sell the property in order to recover the remaining balance (Al-Saati, 1987; Nassier, 1991). This ensured that the loans were being taken out with due consideration, and that the applicants would realise that they were to be regarded as an investment in the property. It meant that many people would thus be tied into these loans for twenty-five years and would not be able to move away for any reason, as it would be difficult for them to pay off the whole loan immediately. In addition, it meant that those who ran into any financial problems might find themselves homeless, as the REDF had the right to sell their property.

With people developing their old housing, or building new housing, the REDF can be viewed as a mechanism encouraging the processes of gentrification. The new or reconstructed homes provided modern housing in the older city areas, and this began to change both the social and physical structure of the areas. Although these new homes were not able to be sold in the short-term, they began to represent a better lifestyle for the residents; some of these homes were rented out, so they also represented a form of landlord gentrification. There was also the perception that local communities were being improved. Sheppard (2012) suggests that community improvements enhance the quality of life in a neighbourhood, which is a positive effect, but also increases the demand to

live in such areas, which may mean higher rents. The REDF had stipulated that the land on which the new house was to be built should already be owned by the loan applicant; Saudi land laws, and the way in which land is distributed, are very specific.

However, the REDF loan was only intended to cover 70% of the construction costs, meaning that only people who could afford 30% of the cost were eligible. A study of the characteristics of Saudi citizens who received financial help to build a house found that middle and higher income groups appear to have benefited more than the low-income group (Altasan, 1998). In Medina, around 14,000 requests were approved by the REDF between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s (Abdullah, 1985). Many of the lower income families from the central zone sold their inner city houses to developers and chose to take up loans to build new houses in the suburbs. This was what happened in the case of Adam 3:

> *When people left their old houses in the inner city in the late 1970s, they chose areas far away from where they used to live. The roads were poor, but the Municipality tempted them with cheap prices, such as Alharh Alsharqeya and Ameda Street; it was a gloomy and dreary place. Anyway, I bought land with my inheritance from my father and built this house. (Interview with Adam 3 on 11/08/2014)*

Land was being made available in Medina's suburbs, which were at least three kilometres away from the city centre, and many of those approved for loans constructed houses in these areas, as Adam 3 explains. When inhabitants of the inner city neighbourhoods already owned old houses, which required rebuilding for their individual tenancy, they were still eligible to obtain funding from REDF. However, it was preferred that they sell their houses and buy new land away from the city centre. This meant they had a larger area than they had before, and could spend the rest of what they received for their old home on the remaining 30% of the construction costs. As another resident explained:

> *People from the old neighbourhoods easily found land in Quba or Alawalee to build a new house, especially those who got compensation or sold their land. (Interview with Adam 2 on 06/08/2014)*

A common theme amongst of two previous interviewees, who chose to leave city centre in the 1970s and build houses in the suburbs, was that the low cost of land is what drew

them to the suburbs. However, this contradicts what Smith (1979, 2010) found in his studies on the aftermath of the Second World War and the flow of capital in the Global North towards suburbs for the development of recreational, residential, commercial and industrial processes. He found that it caused a rise in previously low ground rents in the suburban areas while simultaneously decreasing the value of land in the inner city. Neither an increase in prices in the suburbs nor a decrease in prices in the inner cities was found to result from the REDF programme.

In addition, it is clear that both national and local legislation has been implicated in the changes to the central zone of Medina; this is apparent in actions and decisions made at both the national and local levels at different periods of time. This involvement might be seen as administrative, such as the enactment of financial mechanisms previously described. Both the REDF and land grants played key roles, from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, in encouraging the private sector and developers to invest in central Medina. As the former has just been covered, the next section discusses the land grant programme.

5.4. Government Land Grant Programme

A number of Sharia (Islamic law) ordinances shaped the system of land distribution in the early 1970s and resulted in different types of land ownership, mainly public (government), private or collective. According to Sharia, God owns all things, and hence, in the first instance, all the land belongs to God, then to his Messenger, and then to the Muslim community represented by the Imam (the King). Even though all land belongs ultimately to God, individuals can benefit from it, and private ownership covers large parts of urban areas or cultivated areas. Any land which is not privately owned is viewed as being public property and is controlled by the King. It can either be utilised by different ministers, according to Royal Decree, or it remains public and the King can distribute it as he sees fit through grants, to individuals or public agencies, and to communal groups, such as tribes. It can be inherited from relatives or passed on through sales. Although foreigners can own property and land in Saudi Arabia, there are some restrictions, and in the holy cities of Medina and Makkah, foreigners are barred from owning land (Arab

News, 2014). The king's right to grant land was significant to the way in which the city centre of Medina was redeveloped.

In contrast to other countries, the global economic recession between 1973 and 1975 did not adversely impact Saudi Arabia, which actually witnessed rapid economic growth in all public and private sectors at this time. This was due to increasing oil exports from the country, along with higher oil prices. Although Hackworth & Smith (2000) argue that the global economic recession did not lead to an end of gentrification activity, it can be inferred that in Saudi Arabia, income generated from oil sales actually acted as a stimulus for gentrification. The loans that became available through REDF, in addition to the land grant programme, meant that land became available and financial risk was minimised (Batalo, 2013).

Urbanization in the 1970s and 1980s played a role in creating the demand for housing across every urban area in the country, as discussed in chapter 4. Firstly, a high urban population growth rate in this period suggests an increase in demand for bigger housing units. Secondly, there was an influx of millions of foreigners, as permanent or semi-permanent residents, into Saudi Arabia due to the economic boom created by oil, which created more jobs than Saudis alone could fill. Over 1.5 million foreigners arrived in the country in 1980; this jumped to almost 2.7 million by 1985 (GaStat, 1985). They were expatriate workers or family members of workers, and they all required housing, generating demand for rental properties, given that foreigners were not allowed to own land at that time. Thirdly, the increase in crude oil prices in 1973 accelerated urbanisation, industrial development and public spending. Many farmers and Bedouins moved from rural areas to cities in order to find better-paying work (see chapter 4). This further increased the demand for housing.

The high rate of urbanization throughout the country in the 1970s and 1980s was witnessed in Medina as well. Thousands of Bedouin tribes lived in the hinterlands around Medina, and many of their members migrated to the city during this period. Furthermore, as alluded to previously, another reason for greater housing demand was a substantial increase in the number of new family units in Saudi Arabia (Al-Suhaibani, 1988). At that time, the traditional structure of the family started to change, as younger Saudis started to

prefer to leave their parents' home when they got married, marking a shift away from the traditional multi-generational living. The average Saudi family sought to live independently in a villa-style housing unit, which generated further demand for housing (Boon, 1981; Tuncalp & Alibrahim, 1990).

Urban redesign in the inner city neighbourhoods of Medina was carried out by both national and local private sector agents. The archival documents reveal that there was an increase in the number of building licences issued by the Municipality for the purposes of construction, repair and walling at this time. In particular, 521 such licences were issued in 1983, which increased to 2,746 in 1991 (Ministry of Commerce, 1992). Under these two programmes, the REDF and land grants, developers were able to undertake investment projects in the city centre of Medina. Many of the houses being sold for redevelopment were located to the north of the city centre, which used to be called the Baballshami area (see chapter 3), because the majority of the inhabitants in this area owned their old houses. Consequently, they could see them in order to take advantage of low land prices in the suburbs. In other areas of central Medina, people tended to live in endowment houses, a type of property where the residents were renters and hence, unable to sell. One interviewee from Baballshami area in city centre described how his family sold their home to a developer:

> *We had a family house; my father inherited it from my grandfather. It was 300 square metres, but with time, our house became a ramshackle house so we left it for sale. It was in 1978 and during the sale process, my father passed away so we shared the money with my brothers. The price was 700,000 RS (£128,000), which actually was cheaply priced compared with 15 years ago, when the central zone development project was inaugurated. The buyer was one of the real estate dealers. He built a huge building after he bought houses adjacent to our house. (Interview with Adam3 on 11/08/2014).*

The process allowed the private sector to invest, but the original residents themselves obtained hardly any benefit from the construction of new houses in the city centre. For example, as Adam 3 mentioned, an investor can rebuild the whole neighbourhood into a tower. There were a number of reasons for this. First, land prices increased from the mid-

1970s to the early 1980s, as a result of which many of the residents could not afford to buy, even with loans from the REDF; as mentioned above, the REDF offered 70% of the price, leaving 30% of the development costs for them to finance 30% themselves, but most were in low-paid jobs. With the help of loans from the REDF covering 50% of redevelopment costs, private property developers were in a better position to buy up property. Alyemeni (1986) reported that within cities, land prices in Saudi Arabia rose in three phases. From 1965 to 1973, land prices rose at a constant rate of 30 to 40 percent per annum, mainly in response to demand. From 1974 to 1980 land prices increased at a rate higher than the GNP and GNI growth rate. From 1980 to 1986, the limited availability of properties meant that land prices were still increasing. In addition, Al-Harrbi (1998) points out that the latter period witnessed high demand for construction materials and labour, which further increased costs. Specifically, according to archival documents, land prices in the inner city area of Medina reached RS15,000 (£2,755) per square metre, whereas prices in the suburbs were between RS500 (£91) and RS1,000 (£183) per square metre (RMJM, 1975). This means that land prices in the suburbs were 10 times less than in the central area. This was likely a result of Medina's status as a religious and touring centre for hajjis (pilgrims) and other visitors, as people wanted to be close to the Prophet's Mosque in the central zone; they wanted to be able to attend prayers within walking distance and to feel part of the pilgrim community. The most expensive land in the city centre cost eight to ten times more than the most expensive areas in the suburbs, with location and distance to major arterial roads, such as Quba Street, Sultan Street and Airport Road, being key factors in prices in the built up areas (Abdulaal, 1987).

Although the REDF helped people to own land and build a house without financial discomfort, the programme had the drawback of not providing reasonably priced land in the inner city areas. According to the chairman of a one development company, which was involved in a range of architectural projects in the western side of Saudi Arabia:

> *The Saudi government launched two programmes for helping Saudi people with housing by giving them land and money. At first glance, it was a good thing, but those programmes flooded citizens with a style of individual construction and made citizens self-developers, which we could not find in any country in the world. This led to increased prices of construction materials and construction labour. Another reason*

for the land price increases issue is the government land grant for a special group of people who obtained good, extensive land by royal decree and who kept the land without development. The state lost large stock of lands and they became land banks, who controlled hundreds of square metres of land and transferred large areas inside Saudi cities to empty areas called white lands. (Interview with P2 on 03/10/2013)

P2's comments indicate that part of the problem behind increased costs was the number of people wanting to build their new houses, which led to greater demand for materials and resources. Another aspect appears to be that there was limited land available for development, as royal decrees meant that large tracts were kept undeveloped, especially central areas. According to Short (2014), an individual contract method of production, such as that described above, meant that only the wealthy could have houses, as a large sum of money is required to hire builders to construct accommodation. Additionally, the best housing in the most desirable locations is taken up by those who can pay the most (Short, 2014). This, again, served to limit the chances of the original residents of Medina's central zone, as they were priced out of the market. This is called direct chain displacement, where residents simply cannot afford the higher prices that the refurbishing of their housing demands (Slater, 2009). Thus, the gentrification process in central Medina was well underway by the mid-1980s, as the original residents were being replaced by wealthier developers. Additional point could be discern from P2 words, which is supported by Alzaid later in this chapter in term of lacking in real estate developers, that there was not real estate developers and corporate developers at that time. It was individual act by real estate dealers took advantage from the housing regulations as result it was not same radical new build development in central Medina in 1990s, which will investigate, in the next chapter.

The national development scheme that was launched by the aforementioned programmes – REDF and land grants - could be considered government intervention in the housing sector. Hutchison (2010) states that such intervention can take different forms. One is regulation, whereby the state influences what private actors are doing by setting standards or frameworks for them to follow. An example of this would be building codes or zoning regulations. Another common form of intervention is a system for the regulation of new

developments through land use planning rules. Additionally, subsidies may be used to influence the behaviour of housing developers or users.

In Saudi Arabia, housing regulations enacted in the mid-1970s and 1980s had a negative effect on the housing stock for a number of reasons. First, they aided only those people able to pay the balance of the cost of home construction, rather than helping people that lacked housing and did not have the financial resources to own their own home. Additionally, both housing schemes led to an increase in construction prices in terms of labour and materials. Because of the prevalence of self-building, as this was the cheapest way to get a home, there was a lack of awareness of the importance of the role of developers; all of these implications made it more difficult for disadvantaged people to have their own house. The data collected in this study indicate that new buyers of city centre properties and/or investors made disadvantaged people leave their homes by voluntary or involuntary means, whether they were landlord occupiers or rental occupiers. In general, therefore, it seems that the mechanisms that were applied by the national government in their housing policy had an indirect impact on the central zone of Medina by stimulating the gentrification process. It seems that the objective of the housing programmes was not directed at upgrading the quality of existing dwellings, especially in the city centre, where houses tended to be in a bad condition as it is explained previously in Table 5. Rather, the programmes were directed at encouraging the construction of new houses in the suburbs for advantaged individuals while simultaneously supporting investors in redeveloping the city centre. Accordingly, one group who played a big role in developing the central zone in the 1970s and 1980s were real estate traders and property investors, who took advantage of government housing regulations to rebuild parts of the central zone of Medina. As mentioned in the literature review, government housing policies and development programmes have been shown by other studies to be the reason for increasing real estate values and rental prices in a neighbourhood, which leads to changes on neighbourhood demographics and gentrification.

Since Medina is a typical Islamic city, there are three types of land ownership, as noted above: public, private and collective. The third type of land ownership, collective, also known as endowment, is managed predominantly by religious organisations or, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowments (MIAE). This land

is usually situated outside or on the outskirts of urban areas, is owned by an Islamic charity, and is used for non-permanent agricultural purposes or for housing for the poor. Rents for housing on such land are substantially subsidised by the charity, and hence are well below market rental prices. As this type of housing was prevalent in central Medina prior to redevelopment, it is discussed in more detail in the next section.

5.5. Endowments

As mentioned in the literature review, endowment land is one of the components of a prototypical Islamic city. The Oxford Dictionary (1998) defines 'endowment' as:

1. The action of endowing something or someone.
2. (endowments) a quality or ability possessed or inherited by someone e.g., talent, attribute, etc.
3. An income or form of property given or bequeathed to someone.

None of these explanations include the religious connotations of the word as it is used in Islamic contexts, which are key to understanding the term as it is used in this study. Thus, the English word 'endowment' does not convey the same meaning as the term in Arabic does. Different cultural contexts create different meanings and understandings, and words that are ostensibly corresponding may denote different things in response to specific cultural and contextual factors. Nevertheless, 'endowment' is the closest English equivalent to the Arabic word waqf. Islamically speaking, this term refers to the reservation of the origin and bequeathing of a product (Ibn Tymya, 2004). The term may be used in a legal sense, which refers to assets designated for the purposes of charity, which is what the endowment housing in Medina represented. Such houses thus are viewed as the property of God, but the revenues derived from them can be used for the greater social welfare. The endowment system, with its own set of legal regulations, exemplifies one of the concepts of the urban geography of Islamic cities, within the global South, which distinguish them from cities in the global North.

The objectives of endowments are very specific (Al Bishi, 2001). In Islamic belief, according to the will of God, people are different in terms of their capabilities.

Endowments may foster solidarity among members of the Muslim society. They create a balance or contribute to reducing inequality in society by assisting and protecting the poor, the weak and the disabled. In addition, endowments do not place any feelings of extra responsibility on the rich. Rather, they are regulated by deed and are designated for a specific purpose; in this way, they ensure the long-term continuity of wealth, as the beneficiary is guaranteed a continuous profit, according to the words of the Prophet, because the deed lasts forever. As Dahlawi noted, the Prophet conceptualised endowment as a form of charity, including benefits which would otherwise not exist (Sabeq, 2005). Public welfare needs to have a fund, which is designated for the poor. The revenue from the trust, which will last forever, is therefore spent on alleviating poverty.

The study found that many of the displaced people who were interviewed used to live in housing endowments, and most housing was funded to service the Prophet's Mosque (see chapter 7). It is clear that the constructions were very old, as this kind of endowment housing, located in the city centre area, had been around since the Ottoman Empire (see chapter 4). At that time, the houses were dedicated to a Turkish administration called the Prophetic Venerable Treasury (Makki, 1984), which managed and supervised the collection of rents from the inhabitants of the endowments, and the allocated the proceeds to the budget of the Prophet's Mosque. Later, endowments came under the control of the Saudi state through the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Calling and Guidance (MIAECG).

Endowment buildings formed a large proportion of the buildings in the central area prior to redevelopment, and they came in three forms. The first form is a house or houses built by individuals who came from other Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Egypt or India[10], who then leave it as an endowment for the city following the encouragement of the Prophet Muhammad's for people to live in Medina and to have roots there. As he said, "Who had roots in Medina, they should hold on to them and who didn't have, then should create roots there" (al-Bukhārī, 2002 edition). The second type of endowment is housing constructed by individuals or government representatives from various countries in the Islamic world for other people of the same nationality when they visit Medina, so they

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[10] www.census2011.co.in; India is considered part of the Muslim world as Islam is the second largest religion in the country, and it is in fact the largest population of Muslims in the world.

find free-of-charge accommodation. This is demonstrated by, for example, the Sudanic endowment, which provides housing for residents of Sudanese descent. The third type of endowment is for specific families or even for ethnic groups. In this type, the leader of the family builds one or more properties for investment purposes, and divides the profit among the members of that family. There are also individuals who have an endowment building and donate its profits to the Prophet's Mosque or to the workers who serve and clean the Prophet's Mosque. This is illustrated by the Alagwat endowment, which was the name given to men servicing the Prophet's Mosque.

Attempts were made to obtain some statistics regarding the number of endowment buildings in the city centre, as this information is unpublished. However, I was not granted permission to access the MIAECG archive due to ownership issues in the local courts as well as litigation regarding various governments' claims of ownership and the sovereign rights of certain endowments. For example, Egypt and Turkey have been responsible for some of the endowment properties since the fourteenth century. This might be one of the reasons why the Saudi government was prompted, in the middle of the twentieth century, to join the Department of Endowments to the Ministry of Hajj, and to prevent the disposal of endowment properties of any form without express permission from the courts or the Department of Endowments. Abdulaziz Almuski, an urban historian and a volunteer from the Tourism Authority, said:

> *Endowment in Medina is a complicated issue because it is a continuous process since the Prophet's time up to nowadays. MIAECG do not have a clear policy for organising endowment data but I think more or less half of the central zone space was endowment. Now I am writing a book about the Prophet's Endowments and his charity. Actually, I faced difficulties in obtaining some information and tracking endowments from the beginning until the current situation. Sometimes I do not have any answers to how some endowments belong to others. As an example of that, I found out that a farmer's endowment existed for 1,400 years, the owner benefited from the Prophet but I do not know how it was owned by others. (Interview with A. Almuski on 23/09/2013)*

However, an individual survey conducted by Makki (1984) identified 68 endowments[11]. He reported that the number of properties owned by each institution was different; for example, he found that 434 properties belonged to MIAECG and 378 properties were owned by private endowments. Makki pointed out in his survey that 34% of the inner city area was occupied by endowment sites, and that endowment properties constituted 38% of residential buildings in the same area. A former member of Medina's city council explained the complexity of endowment ownership thus:

> *The roots of endowment in Medina are old, and some alleys did not exist. Two-thirds of endowment houses are affiliated with the Prophet's Mosque and are handled by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, and one-third of them belong to the people of Medina, such as the Alagawats' endowment, Muezzins' endowment, the Moroccan endowment, the Algerian endowment and some gentlefolk's families[12]. (Interview with P4 on 25/08/2013)*

P3 corroborated this understanding about the situation regarding endowments. He commented:

> *Sixty percent of the buildings in the central area were endowments for the Prophet's Mosque, and 25% were for other endowments. Unfortunately, all of what was dedicated for endowment has now been attached to the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. There is a series of old endowments that goes back more than 1,400 years, as there was an endowment that belonged to master Abu Bakr, may God be pleased with him, who came after the Messenger of God, peace be upon him, and it was written on the property on a brass panel: 'endowment of master Abu Bakr'. The income from this endowment goes to specific people. Also, there was a very old endowment in the Alagawat area, which was located south of the Prophet's Mosque. (Interview with P3 on 10/10/2013)*

The data indicate that endowment buildings, including not only houses and flats but also schools and libraries, as part of Medina's urban morphology, have played a complex role

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[11] One endowment would contain more than one properties an example Moroccan Endowment have 12 towers in Medina.
[12] Family who attributed to descendants of the Prophet from his daughter Fatima.

in the gentrification and filtering process. The endowment system is a key component of the socio-economic profile of the urban morphology of Medina's inner city. A large proportion of endowment buildings in the inner city belonged to the Prophet's Mosque endowments, which means the financial returns were intended to be put to use paying the expenses and wages of its employees. This has been the case since the time of the Ottoman Empire, so when the city came under Saudi control, the properties were transferred to the state treasury. Residents living in these accommodations henceforth paid rent to MIAECG.

One of the study's participants, now divorced and unemployed, used to live in one of these endowments. She said:

> *The house in which I used to live in the city centre was our family house. It used to belong to my grandfather, then my father, and finally it became mine. The rent was 15 Kurus during my grandfather's life, but for me I paid RS 3,000 a year. The land owned by the Ministry of Endowments passes its earnings from rentals back to the Prophet's Mosque. Because the ground was the property of Turkish leaders who ruled the city before the Saudi state, all the houses in our neighbourhood were subordinated to the Ministry of Endowment and the incomes to the Prophet's Mosque. (Interview with Eve 6 on 09/08/2014)*

Another participant, a housewife and widow who had lived in the city-centre, confirmed that the rent money went to the Prophet's Mosque, although they were expected to maintain it themselves:

> *My husband paid rent to the Ministry of Endowment, and, as we knew, our house was affiliated to the Prophet's Mosque endowment. We spent a lot of money for the houses's maintenance and rehabilitation without any financial compensation from the Ministry. (Interview with Eve 7 on 15/08/2014)*

Makki (1984) pointed out that endowments in Medina's city centre suffered over time from negligence, especially when handled by people who did not care about maintenance issues or could not afford the upkeep of these ancient houses, as many of the residents survived on small incomes. Consequently, many of these properties fell into ruin and bought in few economic benefits. As such, these properties could be viewed as

constitutive of a rent-gap, being not only leased out at below-market rates but falling in value as a consequence of lack of maintenance and capital investment. As central Medina was, at the same time, becoming increasingly popular with pilgrims, there was both a decline in relative rents and an emergence of a new, much higher, potential rent linked to the provision of accommodation and services for religious tourism linked with the Prophet's Mosque.

It is difficult to estimate how much maintenance was carried out on the endowment properties prior to 1990. The local state and the MIAECG did not have a budget for the rehabilitation or renovation of these endowment houses. Those families who came from the manual workers category in general took financial advantage of the Hajj seasons by renting rooms in their houses to pilgrims for accommodation. As RMJM (1974) pointed out, many households in the city centre of Medina used to let their rooms during Hajj seasons to pilgrims. For some families, almost all of their financial resources came from these deals, which were carried out through an old inherited, structured framework. This was a common business in central zone houses until 1990, and the income obtained may have been put towards maintenance work, as stated by Adam 8, a factory worker. He said:

> *During Hajj seasons we rented most of our rooms to pilgrims and my father used the revenues for repairs. My father used to maintain and repair our family house as it was built of stones – then my father rebuilt it with cement bricks. (Interview with Adam 8 on 22/08/2014).*

Thus, it appears likely that occupants may have undertaken some rudimentary repair work in order to keep the property fit for the purpose of accommodating pilgrims. There is evidence that this was a common occurrence, as corroborated by documents obtained from the Saudi authority of the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah, set up in 1980. Its mission included inspecting accommodation for pilgrims and issuing licenses for those who wished to rent their homes to visitors during the pilgrimage season. In addition, several quantitative studies have been carried out on pilgrim accommodation by local people in Medina (Alharbi, 1990; Fadel, 1999; Alabdali, 2008). These studies provide empirical proof of such economic activity amongst the residents of Medina, which is further

evidenced by archival documents I obtained from residents, who provided me with a copy of a licence to provide accommodation to pilgrims.

Based on the above, it could be argued that the local people were part of the accommodation market and tourism facilities providing services to pilgrims. This reflects the financial profits might local people might make, helping them to earn their living. This contradicts the findings of Cocola-Gant (2018: para. 4), who argues that "tourism causes place-based displacement, [which] refers to the loss of place experienced by residents as the consumption of space by visitors effectively displaces them from the places they belong to".

With regard to progeny endowments, a different situation existed wherein they were managed by a person who was hired as the endowment overseer. One of the participants in this study, Dr Jalol, was one such overseer, responsible for the Moroccan endowments in Medina. He commented:

> *Moroccan endowments are one of the most famous and deep-rooted endowments in Medina; we had properties in the old city which were invested in the housing market. Our endowments have expanded and their revenues grow because of professionalism in endowment administration, development and the running of its revenue in real estate. (Interview with Dr Jalol on 08/10/2013)*

Dr Jalol's words resonate with Makki's (1984) point of view, as he noted that long-term contingency planning to guarantee endowment continuance served to support some of the endowments.

Endowment houses under state supervision provided housing in the lowest-income neighbourhoods in the central zone. This happened in the absence of local government attention and despite recommendations from town planners in 1974 and 1978, who suggested that the local government of Medina should continually maintain the ancient houses. As Spada (2009) argues, a filtering down process occurs when properties decline in value and only low-income families remain; when they are no longer able to renovate or invest in these houses, then the properties deteriorate. Al-Harrbi (1989) carried out a study in which he interviewed 450 pilgrims to Medina during the 1986 pilgrimage season, and he found significantly low levels of satisfaction with the cleanliness of the

neighbourhood around the Prophet's Mosque, as well as with the lack of privacy and overcrowding in the accommodation. Additionally, Al-Harrbi (1989) indicated that those who rented out the properties could not afford to live there themselves, and so had moved to cheaper parts of the city. The absence of government supervision in terms of maintenance and rehabilitation, which was left to the inhabitants, as well as endowment regulations, which give priority to low-income people, may have accounted for some of the poor conditions of these houses. Moreover, some residents had lived in those houses for a long period of time; during the interviews it was discovered that sometimes three generations had lived in particular houses.

Besides financial reasons, endowments might also not have been maintained due to the death or emigration of those who would have been responsible for the endowment's upkeep. As another participant, Abdurrahman Kaki, said:

> *The problem is that some of the endowment workers (in administrative and financial charge of the endowment) did not have enough authority or the financial capacity to maintain and restore those buildings. Some of them died and some of them left Medina. Therefore, these endowments became disintegrated buildings, and when they were removed during the development of the region, the lands were transferred to the Finance Ministry and their owners were not compensated because they were not known. (Interview with Kaki on 19/09/2013)*

It could be argued that both public and private endowments, which were a feature of residential neighbourhoods and of the social structure of the city centre, were old dwellings occupied by the poor. In addition, some of the private endowments could not be transferred as they could not be sold, inherited or mortgaged. Even the state did not have the authority to change their use. Some families took advantage of this by converting their properties into endowments, thereby protecting them from redevelopment, although this meant that they were not allowed to sell the property or dispose of it in any way. This is corroborated by a previous research study conducted by Hamouche (2007), who observed the political role of endowments in Islamic cities in shielding the property of individuals and families from control by the authorities. Furthermore, there were no rules or systems in place to maintain endowment housing, public housing or individual

housing. It should be noted that private endowments faced the same situation that family households faced; both owner occupiers and renters of private dwelling units made the area more susceptible to gentrification. As the area around them became developed and the housing improved, rents were more likely to be increased and owners were placed under more pressure to sell their properties for higher prices and move away to suburban areas, where the land was cheaper.

According to Hamouche (2007), the endowment system could represent a unique approach to public participation in planning, managing and developing Islamic cities. However, government policies and practise related to housing in the global North often have comparable counterparts in the global South. Bridge et al. (2012) criticised government policies ostensibly aimed at renewal and revitalization of urban neighbourhoods, arguing that these policies led to the displacement of low-income residents, and therefore constituted state sponsored gentrification. Indeed, such policies are evident in Medina as well. The next section discusses how laws and plans affected redevelopment in Medina's city centre.

5.6. City Centre Redevelopment as Gentrification in 1970s and 1980s

The first five-year plan in Saudi Arabia was introduced in 1970 and was based on the accumulation of revenue from oil sales due to higher prices and increased production, both of which occurred at this time. The price of oil rose from $3 per barrel in 1950 to $35 per barrel in 1981, leading to an economic boom in oil-exporting countries (Alkhathlan, 2013; Mahran, 2012; Alshahrani & Alsadiq, 2014). The nation state of Saudi Arabia took advantage of the stable political situation and economic prosperity to promote development across a range of different spheres. One of these was upgrading places of worship, including the Prophet's Mosque. This was carried out in response to an urgent need to expand the mosque due to an increasing number of pilgrims (Kettani, 2010).

A consequence of this was a series of projects and new build development carried out in Medina between 1975 and 1990, 1990 and its implications will be discussed in the next chapter, which involved a number of residential buildings being demolished to give space

for new roads, markets, hotels and squares. This led to the stretching of the spatial domain to the north, east and west areas of the Prophet's Mosque for commercial and residential purposes. It could be said that every time the mosque was expanded, there was transition in land use around the Mosque area and city centre. In this way, the residential areas were gradually replaced, and the area was transformed; the data indicate that the process of regeneration happened sporadically over time rather than steadily. Figure 22 shows the gradually clearance process of the historic fabric around the Prophet's Mosque since 1910 to 1990 and the successive urban interventions made by local authority presented in MRM and central authority. Under the Law of Eminent Domain and Temporary Taking of Property by Royal Decree No. M/15 (2003), the state was granted the right to take private property for public use if there is no suitable state-owned land available. However, the project for which land is seized must already have been approved in the budget, and compensation should be paid to the owner. In order to assess the amount of compensation, a committee of seven officials and experts has to convene and make a decision within 90 days. This regulation was used by authorities for the enlargement of the Prophet's Mosque and later for the redevelopment of the central zone of Medina. Adam1, a retired teacher and a 72-years-old, said:

I think the first spark of change was when a fire broke out in a fabric market in an area called Sweeka. It was in 1977, and I was told that the fire was caused by an electrical short-circuit. Fire units were not able to put out the fire until after it destroyed all the shops and affected buildings badly, some of which collapsed. And the relevant state committees decided to remove all the buildings and turned the region into a spacious yard for the Prophet's Mosque, and the building of the Medina h hotel, Altayseer hotels and a number of private hotels. (Interview with Adam 1 on 12/08/2014)

Figure 22: The gradually clearance process of the historic fabric around the Prophet's Mosque since 1910 Source:(Bianca 2000)

The GADR (1982) report provided more evidence of the pattern of the processes applied at that time. It described the marked changes, since 1977, in urban structures in the old internal city around the Prophet's Mosque, where developers demolished old buildings and replaced them with hotels and towering blocks of buildings. The ground floors were kept for shops and restaurants. Both investors who participated in the transition processes, and property owners, who had the financial capacity to set up investment projects, took advantage of the state funding facilities. Makki (1982) said that during the economic boom period, affluent families moved out from the city centre to arterial roads and axis streets between the city centre and suburbs, which led to the demolition of old residential buildings to make way for new roads, markets, hotels and commercial structures. This, in general, concerned the area around the Prophet's Mosque. Participant Eve 3, who worked as a tailor at the time, provided an illustrative account of this late 1970s movement. She said:

> *I am a widow; my husband passed away in 1976. He was a tradesman. We had a villa*
> *located in Quba Street. At that time my house was very luxurious by the standards of*
> *those days, because all the people used to live in Ahwash , which had ancient houses.*
> *My house's location was for rich households, but I did not stay more than two years*

after my husband's death – I had to move to Sultana Street and my father's house, a modern three-storey building. My father and I used to live in Babalshami, which is now in the middle of the central zone. (Interview with Eve3 on 09/08/2014)

Both Quba (in the north of city centre) and Sultana streets (in the south of city centre) were major roads which had been paved and asphalted by the municipality as part of the implementation of the development projects. What is interesting in this comment is the mention of new suburbs, Sultana and Quba, both used to be new suburbs since 1970s but now they close to central zone and part of area between first ring road and second ring road. Smith (1979, 1987) and Bardford and Rubinowitz (1975) confirm that the flow of investment in the Global North was towards developing residential facilities in suburbs, while inner city areas were neglected and often fell into disrepair. A similarity is apparent here with investment processes in the new suburbs in Medina in the 1970s as result of rent gap in the central zone of Medina at that time. The rent gap drove investors and real estate agents to purchase land from individuals in the central zone, taking advantage of government support.

On the other hand, some inhabitants chose to stay in the city centre neighbourhoods, and it was discovered in the interviews that the people who stayed there lived in endowment housing. Eve 5, a divorced woman, was born in one of the old neighbourhoods (Ahwash). She said:

There were people who left the central zone before they received a note from the government, as a warning signal to vacate the accommodation they lived in and move out of the central zone, and who could not build their own houses. They rented apartments, then later they could raise money for building, but some of them – including me – could not leave the town as we did not have any financial capacity to build or even to let. (Interview with Eve 5 on 16/08/2014)

As she states, Eve 5 chose to live in endowment housing in the city centre because she lacked sufficient money to move elsewhere. As explained in chapter 7, she was not happy with her house. Eve 4, a former resident of the Babalshami area in the city centre and her husband, an administrator for the Saudi airline, had to leave the city centre area:

My husband was a leaseholder and paid RS 2,000 a year, as it was an old house in Babalshami. Then my family moved to Jeddah because my husband got a job in the Saudi airlines, and when we came back to Medina in 1982, we lived in Babalkoomah in an apartment paying RS 3,000 a year. But we had to leave to go out to Airport road because Medina Municipality started expanding the inner city streets. After that we built our house in the Shuhada neighbourhood. (Interview with Eve 4 on 18/08/2014)

The destruction of the old residential courtyard areas due to redevelopment in the inner city neighbourhoods, marked a shift in land ownership and land use in the old inner quarter. This resulted from people wanting to live in better and larger accommodation, and also the need to accommodate the growing number of visitors coming to Medina as pilgrims, as they were starting to become important to the economy of the city. The data indicate that large numbers of residents left the area, either because they could not afford the investment of improving their housing, or because they were seduced by the thought of modern, cheaper and larger housing elsewhere. Their houses were then replaced by upgraded accommodation or hotels. Housing laws and systems played a key role in producing this kind of urban situation in the city centre of Medina.

One of these laws is a ban on foreigners buying property in Medina (also in Makkah), but they are able to rent properties within the boundaries of these cities for up to two years at a time, according to the Non-Saudi Proprietorship Law issued by Royal Decree 15, dated 2000. Moreover, the Supreme Council for Endowments is entitled to supervise any endowed property. This has a political dimension related to issues of security and sovereignty. The desire of foreigners to own property in Makkah and Medina reflects their high status in the Islamic world, as these are the holiest cities. In addition, they are also popular cities for Saudi Muslims to own property. Consequently, the Saudi government exercises close control over the land in both cities. Although non-Saudi ownership no longer exists in Medina, the interviews revealed that, for local residents, long-term leases for 99 years have been a feature of the housing market since the 1990s. Much of this has been due to the endowment system.

Saudi entrepreneurs, who did not allow foreign entrepreneurs to establish any projects, took advantage of the situation created by a number of government regulations and

systems, which also attracted real estate developers. The chief executive of a real estate investment company called Taiba said:

Real estate development as a culture or industry was not familiar in the Saudi community because the government system did not support that kind of developers. Real estate dealers led the Saudi real estate market up until the early nineties. Real estate developers emerged as actors in the development of the city centres of Makkah and Medina. (Interview with Alzaid on 01/10/2013)

It is clear that these housing finance systems served landlords rather than non-owners, which led to a confrontation between investors and low-income groups after the majority of the middle-class left the central zone. Indeed, it might be argued that the complex conditions observed in the 1970s and 1980s surrounding housing development were the vehicle for new buildings in the central zone. In other words, these factors created a favourable atmosphere for gentrification, as discussed further in the following section.

As Smith (2002) pointed out, in the 1970s and 1980s gentrification became affiliated with a wider context of urban and economic restructuring, which Medina witnessed during this period. There were rebuilding projects envisaged to upgrade services and accommodation for visitors to the city as a result of enhanced economic prosperity from oil and higher wages.

Gentrification   was responsible for the urban changes in the inner city area, which took several forms, it was a response to the requirements of the modern age. The dilapidated housing needed to be upgraded and, at the same time, the familiar surroundings were being changed; the new-build developments were attracting newcomers who could afford higher rents. From these changes came losses as neighbourhoods and communities disappeared (Rerat et al., 2010), and the inner city of Medina began to see families relocating to the suburbs, which He (2009) describes as a form of deprivation as well as displacement.

It can also be seen that the dilapidation and state of disrepair of what was becoming an increasingly important pilgrimage site was a matter of concern by the 1980s. In 1942, there were 23,863 pilgrims to Medina, but by 1979 this had increased to 2,079,689 (Al-Harrbi, 1989). There was therefore a need to accommodate such a large number of

visitors, and the inner city in its current condition could not offer the facilities they required. There were too many visitors, all wanting to stay within close proximity to the Prophet's Mosque. The redevelopment that was taking place within Medina was occurring in different directions from the city centre along main commercial streets, but it was concentrated around the Prophet's Mosque.

At this time, gentrification was commercial (Lees et al., 2013) and tourism (Gotham, 2005) was a main cause, as the redevelopment was driven by economic and commercial activity. A survey study reviews the data for accommodations of hotels in city centre of Medina shown that increasing the number of hotels from 2 hotels in 1955 to 19 hotels in 1982 (Abdul Manan.1990). Both commercial and tourism gentrification feed off each other. Tourism brings investment into the area, and the more commercial activities provided for visitors, the more tourists will be encouraged to visit the area. However, tourism can displace residents (Gant, 2015; Cocola-Gant, 2018), and this has been seen in the way that hotels were house. Such displacement of populations by more affluent newcomers has been well documented as an important indication of the way an urban neighbourhood's class composition can be altered by redevelopment (Davidson & Lees, 2009).

5.8. Conclusion

This chapter was designed to determine the causes and the actors that have been involved in the redevelopment of the central zone of Medina in 1970s and 1980s. In the beginning indicate the previous urban fabric in city center quarters and it is explained architectural characteristics of houses and alleys and a layout of a medieval Islamic city until 1990. Locals were occupiers' heritage houses for generations. Those designs were compatible with the hot climate conditions of the city as well as considerate cultural and social privacy and space. On the other hand, new buildings were sporadically constructed beside and adjacent to the old structure with presence of the difference in physical and functional aspects. Courtyards system in city centre of Medina was not just physical identity neighbourhoods design and streets layout but they were urban fabric gave the place cultural identity as well. Majority of Ahwash residents belonged to extended families as

each courtyard accommodated people from the same family or tribe. A few held government jobs but some are artisans, their work was in the retail industry, or they were self-employed.

Accommodations was sporadically constructed; as it was inconsistent and disorganized, it created a tapestry of different buildings, old and new, in various sizes, height, usage and quality of design. There was not only an overlap with the functional aspects but also in the spatial aspect; ownership may have covered several thousand square metres of property, whilst the neighbouring property may not have exceeded twenty square metres.

This chapter has shown that REDF and Government land grant programme were the main causes for gentrification process in city center. City centre residents of Medina in 1970s who can take advantage of REDF chose to leave and build houses in the suburbs, was that the low cost of land is what drew them to the suburbs or the obtained free land from government grant programme. It was also shown that both are considered government intervention in the housing sector have triggered redevelopment in the central zone of Medina.

The second major finding was that private sector, real estate dealers and property investors the major actors that have been involved in the redevelopment of the central zone of Medina. They took advantage of the national development scheme that was launched by the aforementioned programmes – REDF and land grants. As a result of that government intervention allowed the private sector to invest, but the original residents themselves obtained hardly any benefit from the construction of new houses in the city centre. New buyers of city centre properties and/or investors made disadvantaged people leave their homes by voluntary or involuntary means, whether they were landlord occupiers or rental occupiers and in the end it caused displacement.

The chapter also described the endowment system that was a key urban component of the socio-economic profile of the urban morphology of Medina's inner city. It provides evidence that the absence of government supervision in terms of maintenance and rehabilitation of Endowment housing, which was left to the inhabitants, as well as endowment regulations, which give priority to low-income people, may have accounted for some of the poor conditions of these houses. The investigation of endowment housing

has shown that its occupiers who they were still in city center until the new build development in 1990 as it is discussed in chapter six and seven.

Chapter 6

21st Century Gentrification in Medina: 1990s to 2000s

6.1. Introduction

Having discussed the urban development in Medina's central zone that followed the royal decree in 1974, i.e. the first and second waves of gentrification, this chapter presents the findings relating to the third wave. It answers the second and third research questions by showing how the process of urban development in the central zone has affected the everyday lives of the local people. The emphasis is also on the actors in the redevelopment process, in particular, government actors and the policies described in the previous chapter.

The findings presented in this chapter are based on data gleaned from the interviews with elite and non-elite participants and from archival documents. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section presents the data which reveal the physical transformation of the central zone. This is followed by a discussion of the social changes that were identified through the collected data. The fourth section presents the findings related to the role of the government in the development of Medina's central zone, which indicates state-led gentrification. This analysis includes a subsection on the specific policies which spurred the development and the actors involved, followed by another on the monopoly

granted to the Taiba company. The fifth section presents data which would suggest that the changes in Medina's central zone amount to tourism gentrification. Finally, a summary wraps up the chapter.

Figure 23: Images of the area around the Prophet's Mosque, showing the demolishment of the Ahwash.

This chapter also situates the findings within the debates about global North and global South, and the assertion that gentrification, although a global phenomenon (Smith, 2001), is experienced differently in each city where it occurs. Although its effects may be comparable, it is case-specific, based on economic, political, and commercial factors, as well as, in this case, religious tourism (Lees et al., 2015; Hackworth, 2001, 2002; William, 1975; Bridge and Dowling, 2001; Zukin et al., 2009; Shin and Kim, 2016; Albert, 2017; Hubbard, 2017; Smith, 1982).

The previous chapter covered two decades (1970 to 1980s) which saw a significant increase in the urbanism of Medina; the physical area of the city grew by more than twenty-five times. In the period 1978 – 1990, there was a 142% increase in urbanisation (Alharbi, 2005). The most important change in urban planning occurred in the 1970s when two master plans were developed and a contract was given to the company Dar al-Handash for design and consultancy, in preparation for the challenges Medina was deemed likely to face through 2010 (see chapter 4). Based on the new master plans, a new city centre area was allocated and given the designation of 'central zone'. Additionally, the neighbourhoods of the new central zone were given new names related to the era of the Prophet Mohammed's residence in the city from 622 to 632 CE, and the old names ceased to be used for the purposes of administration. Figure 23 shows how all the Ahwash area was demolished, leading to the disappearance of all the ancient city's landmarks. The Prophet's Mosque expansion project started in 1985 and had an impact on design of the central zone, thereby perhaps being a direct cause of its gentrification (see Chapter 4). The following section discusses the transformation of the central zone.

6.2. The Physical Transformation of the Central Zone

The literature review in chapter tow has shown the complexities that are associated with defining gentrification and the centrality of displacement as a major outcome of the social and physical changes associated with the process. While researchers have been unanimous in identifying the processes of transformation that signify the presence of gentrification, they argue that these can vary depending on the context. Nevertheless, some of the key features of gentrification and displacement, whether in urban or rural locations, include first, the rehabilitation of old structures and the construction of new buildings (Smith, 1982), and second, distinct transformations in the retail and commercial structure of the cities (if this precedes gentrification, then it might be termed 'retail-led' or 'commercial' gentrification; e.g. Bridge and Dowling, 2001; Zukin et al., 2009; Shin and Kim, 2016; Albert, 2017; Hubbard 2017). The third key feature is residential change,

which specifically entails the replacement of a working-class population with middle-class incomers (Smith, 1982) due to an increase in property prices and rental values (Butler and Lees, 2006; Shin et al., 2016). These features have been observed both in international and provincial cities and in both the global North and the global South (Lees, 2000). Gentrification is a process where the development is conceptualised, its purpose is defined, and the location is decided; Subsequently, it can be categorised into the form of gentrification it will take. Whichever form this is, the result is the transformation of a declining neighbourhood both physically and socially as a result of reinvestment; in Western countries, it has been found that previously low-rent areas of cities have attracted new homeowners once gentrification has occurred (In et al., 1987).

The data from both interviews and archival sources show that a wave of new buildings arose in Medina's city centre in the mid-1970s, caused by economic growth due to oil price increases and governmental housing policies. The previous chapter found that development in city centre began sporadically, as is often seen in the second wave and second wave of gentrification, and spread around the Prophet's Mosque, avoiding the endowment housing. At this time, it was driven by real estate agents who took advantage of the opportunities offered by national housing programmes. The chapter argues that the development processes in 1990 in the city centre of Medina constituted a third wave of gentrification. It came when the state invited private sector participation in the Prophet's Mosque project to offset the high costs and large scale of the project. According to Hackworth and Smith (2001), this is the wave when large developers start to have state support to change whole neighbourhoods. This affected the city centre of Medina, where development, representing new-build gentrification with luxury and modernistic considerations, brought with it a new social form. The next section discusses the physical transformation of the central zone during this third wave.

6.2.1. New Features of the Central Zone

The central zone of the city surrounds the Prophet's Mosque and is located entirely within the First Ring Road (see Figure 24). The mosque itself covers 100,000 square metres of

the total area of the central district, which covers close to 2.56 million square metres (MRM, 1999).

Figure 24: Central zone of Medina. Source: MRM, 1999.

The central zone can be divided into six sectors: The Prophet's Mosque, neighbourhoods, squares, the ring road, the cemetery and streets. Of these, the residential neighbourhoods are the largest sector, occupying 50% of the area. The Prophet's Mosque occupies an area near the residential neighbourhoods; the squares surrounding the Prophet's Mosque are commonly used for praying during Hajj and Ramadan, creating more space for religious practices. The Bakea cemetery takes up a substantial part of the central zone, covering 180,000 square metres; it is an ancient graveyard and has been dedicated as a holy place by Muslims since 622. It is regarded as a religious shrine where the wives of the Prophet and his family were buried, along with ten thousand of his companions.

During the development project which commenced in 1990, the neighbourhoods of the central zone were divided into five residential and commercial districts, namely: Bedah, Almanakah, Alnaqah and Bani Kodrah. At the time of fieldwork, the fifth neighbourhood had not yet been developed. These neighbourhoods are separated from one another by the main street (MRM, 1999) (see Figures 25; 26; 27, and 28). Table 7 lists the neighbourhood areas, their size in square metres and the permitted number of storeys allowed to be built in each of them. Bedah, located north of the Prophet's Mosque, is the largest and is permitted the biggest number of storeys. In my interview with the former mayor of Medina, who was in charge of supervising the development project, I asked him why there were differences in numbers of storeys and plot spaces between the north towers and the ones on the other sides. He responded that:

> *Bedah has an advantage that other parts do not have. It is located in the north of Alharam. You know as a Muslim that when I want to pray, I must face the direction of Makkah. So everyone at peak times or high seasons, such as Hajj and Ramadan, who is living in Bedah, can pray from there. As a result of this demand, it was permitted for the number of floors of housing in Bedah to be increased. (Interview with the former Mayor of Medina on 15/09/2013)*

Figure 25: Beddah neighbourhood in the central zone of Medina.

Figure 26: Almanakah neighbourhood in the central zone of Medina.

Figure 27: Bani Kodrah neighbourhood in the central zone of Medina.

Figure 28: Alnaqah neighbourhood in the central zone of Medina.

Bedah is one of the best locations on the north side of the Prophet's Mosque, especially because of its proximity to the mosque. Muslims praying in the Prophet's Mosque gain extra special benefits over and above the benefits they gain from praying in other places. This means that it is in high demand for visitors to stay. As one of the planners in Medina Municipality explained, the local government made a special case for Bedah:

We did this in order to find adequate housing for pilgrims nearest to the Prophet's Mosque, where the benefits of prayers in the city of Medina come only to those who actually pray in the Prophet's Mosque itself. This is unlike Makkah, where pilgrims can gain benefits from praying anywhere in the city, not just in the Al-Haram Mosque there. Consequently, all pilgrims to Medina aim to pray in the Prophet's Mosque, which requires them to go there five times a day, or at the very least three times a day, from their accommodation. (Interview with Hattem on 17/09/2013)

Neighbourhood and location relative to Prophet's Mosque	Area in m²	Max. number of storeys
Bedah (N)	343,000	16
Almanakah (W)	211,500	12
Alnaqah (SW)	237,000	12
Bani Kodrah (S)	240,000	12

Table 7: Neighborhood size and storeys allowed. (Source: MRM, 1999).

As a consequence of its proximity to the Prophet's Mosque, all of the adjacent land became very expensive, reaching prices of approximately £30,000 per square metre (MRM, 1999). The Executive Committee for the Development of Medina announced the sale of 12 plots of land in 2001; this covered a total of nine thousand square metres and was just 400 metres away from the mosque. It was valued at more than £31 million at the start of the auction. Both previous comments affirm the viewpoint of Glaeser (2003) and Chapple, Jackson, and Martin (2010) that cities with a plethora of local and cultural amenities apply strategies to attract investors and the elite class (gentry) to inner-city areas. The findings also resonate with Zukin (1995, 2009), who pointed out that the cultural economy is driven by cultural strategies to create 'commercialised urban spaces' which are subsequently employed to promote tourism and increase the entertainment options of the residents; these strategies are considered the main cause of an increase in gentrification, followed by displacement due to rising property values.

The physical landscape of the central zone consequently changed dramatically. In 1996, the previous and current features of the area were compared (see Table 8), and these illustrate the changes that had occurred. The plots of land and old neighbourhoods had almost disappeared, and the stone buildings that had mainly comprised the heritage housing had been completely eliminated. Nearly 100% of buildings were made of concrete by that time. This shows that gentrification was taking place in the central zone of Medina.

Feature	Previous	Current
Plots of land	3,277	570
Neighbourhoods	78	5
Percent of stone buildings	44%	0%
Percent of concrete buildings	65%	100%
Percent of land covered by pedestrian areas	9%	15%

Table 8: Features of the redevelopment of Medina's central zone.
(Source: Alhusyn, 1996).

Thus, the cultural identity of the old city centre landscape was starting to disappear and be replaced by concrete tower blocks. This provoked very emotional and painful

responses from the inhabitants, as a columnist from one of Saudi Arabia's widely distributed newspapers explained in one of her articles:

> *Medina is my home town and I grew up in the downtown neighbourhoods. I used to walk all around the area. I saw the old city vanish and turn into a kind of distorted form of Manhattan. I find it very strange the way we are treating our city. Talking about this topic makes me very upset because we were all powerless to stop it. Because now there is nothing left, everything was destroyed for no reason. I am very emotional about this and I do not like to talk about it as it is so painful to me. (Almadani newspaper, 12/06/2012)*

Other participant had the same impression about the new design of buildings in the central zone:

> *"Now when I get here, I feel that I am in front of towers in Tokyo. The height of the buildings is too high, they have made a big mistake to the extent that this height and size is visually wrong". (Interview with Eve 2 on 23/08/2014)*

Both Eve 2's comment above and the reaction reported by the newspaper are similar to the responses of residents in cities in the global North that have been studied. When they express their dissatisfaction with the new design of structures in the central zone, it is obvious they are not happy with the new style of building, which they view as westernisation because it does not reflect the authenticity and the spirit of city as it was before. It resonates with the claims of some scholars, such as Germeraad (1992), Elsheshtawy (2004, 2008) and Kan (2008), who posited that the prototypical Islamic city has vanished and does not exist anymore because of the loss of identity and physical characteristics that had previously exemplified the architectural and urban history of Middle Eastern or Arab Muslim cities.

These revelations show how the new-build redevelopments affected the lives of the residents of the central zone of Medina; they left their homes, heritage and space so the expansion project of the Prophet's Mosque could go ahead. Globally, however, there were movements starting to emerge for historic preservation, especially in urban areas, as people began to realise they were destroying the past. There was a gradual shift away from the values entrenched in aspects of modern architecture towards a culture of more

conservation of heritage (Pauley, 1998; Zukin, 2006). This had not yet affected the way in which the regeneration story of Medina continued with the appearance of towers shaped and known as "groundscrapers". The term "groundscraper" was used by the architect Charles Jenks to describe low rise, deep-plan office buildings, which were developed in response to market needs (Carmona & Freeman, 2005; Massey, 2013). In Medina, the ECDCZ was responsible for groundscraper development, as they clarified in their annual report of 1999.

The ECDCZ (1999) commissioned developers after first holding a number of workshops with stakeholders, such as developers, engineering officers and contractors, to set out the quality of the design required, and the conformity to committee standards necessary for its implementation. Secondly, the ECDCZ committee adopted plans for the project once they were assured that the architectural character of the central zone, as stipulated by the committee, would be maintained; these were the regulatory requirements for construction in the central zone neighbourhoods, such as the minimum area of a room being 20.88 square metres (Albenaa, 2012). Finally, there were regular inspections to ensure that the approved plans did indeed conform and that the materials were those specified in the regulations. As a consequence of these procedures, the architecture of the central zone began to take on a conformity and similarity in terms of shade and shape. One can observe that the tower blocks on the south side of the Prophet's Mosque, for example, closely match the exterior form of the towers on the north side. In its annual report, ECDCZ (1999) stipulated that the central zone buildings had to express the spirit of the city's architectural heritage, which was represented by the Roshan style, as previously described, and shown in Figure 9 in chapter 5.

Groundscrapers were chosen, firstly, based on religious considerations, as no building is allowed to be higher than the minarets of the mosque; secondly, it reflects the economic aspect of the high price of the plots of land. Thus, there had to be a balance between the height of the buildings, due to religious considerations, and the aspect of a good investment. One of the planners explained this in greater detail:

> *The high price of land in the central zone of Medina was the main reason for using*
> *this style of box building model for taking maximum advantage. Also, we tried to use*

Roshan in a way that reflects the traditional Medina construction. Moreover, the construction height was limited, in that it was not higher than the mosque minarets because of the sacredness of the mosque. For street planning we also took into account ease of access and car traffic. (Interview with Mohammad Alali on 26/09/2013)

Thus, the sacredness of the Prophet's Mosque was taken into account in terms of the height of its minarets. It could be explained that Islamic law still has influence in certain aspects of urban manifestations that are not completely released of Islam. This could be seen to relate to the work of Stewart (2001), who argued that despite disagreement over the Islamic city model, it is undeniable that Islam, as a social and religious system, has had a significant impact on the morphology of cities where it predominates. This must be interpreted with caution because the influence of globalization and modernization now have been factors in shaping urban forms in cities where Muslims are the majority. However, such considerations by the planners did not always convince the residents, who complained that the height of the buildings surrounding the Prophet's Mosque meant that they could no longer look at it. Eve 1 was 14 years old when her family left the downtown area in 1983.

When I go to Haram, or I leave Haram, I want to see green spaces with palm trees, not see huge buildings. I think this is not in line with the Prophet's Haram. (Interview with Eve 1 on 22/08/2014)

Haram means the sacred area surrounding and including the Prophet's Mosque, thus designating the whole area assigned to the mosque, not just the building itself. Eve 2 left Medina when she was 16 years old, when her father retired in 1987 and returned to his home town. At that time, he sold his houses, which were located to the north-west of the Mosque. She was asked about her feelings when visiting the central zone.

"Large buildings around the Haram, which block the sight of minarets, is not suitable in terms of height and is not suitable for the city, which should be covered by sunlight and showing the sky. Hotels must be placed in places far from the Haram so that empty space remains, and all those coming to the Haram should have wide open spaces. The huge buildings should be pulled down so that the air around the Haram

can enter my lungs every day to remind me how lucky we are to have this holy place. (Interview with Eve 2 on 23/08/2014)

Both Eve 1 and Eve 2 expressed a view shared by most of those interviewed, that the planners had failed to keep the visual dominance of the Prophet's Mosque so that everyone in Medina could see it on a daily basis. This could be said to reflect the resistance of the people in the global South towards the domination of high-rise buildings. This is in line with Germeraad's (1992) argument that the design of modern Islamic cities does not conform to certain principle that used to be applied in Middle Eastern cities, rather imposing upon the people a 'Western' environment that is often in contradiction to their ethos, as expressed in their culture and lifestyles.

P1, a public servant, added to what Eve 1 and Eve 2 had stated:

Nothing in these buildings reminds us of what the old city was like; I do not talk about just height, which is not good at all, but also about the design of the buildings. These high buildings do not express Medina's heritage and they have lost the harmony with the Haram. I had been hoping that the development project in the central zone would achieve what we were looking for, that they would reflect the place's identity and history, but I could not even see any palm trees, and this was our cultural inheritance. (Interview with P1 on 01/10/2014)

None of the research participants quoted above said anything about the planners not taking into account that the height of the buildings should be less than the height of the minarets, but there is a clear divergence in the views expressed by the local government and the local people in terms of the built environment. Two of the features that are criticised are the form of the buildings and the lack of green space. These two features have upset residents because the planners, it could be observed, created a new shape in their city in the form of a groundscraper, and they took away a symbol of the city, the palm trees. The disappearance of the green space, or the palm trees, and the over-dominance of the groundscrapers, can be clearly shown in Table 6. This build-up of tower blocks and lack of green space may result from a dependence on capitalism, with its emphasis on profit maximization, since the data in this study show there was clearly a desire to take advantage of the location in terms of it being seen as a profitable investment.

Saudi Arabia has no process for funding public places through public finances, as it has no tax system; therefore, other funding was sought; this was to come from commercial investment in the central zone. Consequently, the concerns and wishes of the community were ignored. This view is supported by Bentley (1999), who argues that government authorities and professionals tend to ignore the needs of society and place the requirements of developers first. However, this has been contradicted by Carmona and Freeman (2005), who point out that even where there is public investment available, in a city such as London, the national government favours the designs of planners over the needs of society. Consequently, I would affirm Lees (2012), who argues that globalization is causing the world to become increasingly uniform in terms of building designs and the use of space, despite geographical division and social and cultural diversity. This indicates the need for more global comparative urban studies.

In the case of Medina, the findings in this study show there had been no consultation with the public, either formally or informally, as at the time there was not widespread familiarity with the concept of the preservation of cultural heritage. The first organisation dealing with the preservation of cultural heritage was established in Saudi Arabia in 1996 (Al-turath.com, n.d.). In addition, Medina public authorities involved in the design process were represented by ECDCZ, and were obligated to provide designs meeting luxury specifications and high standards of urban design for the central zone; these were all carefully controlled, and they played a central role in the formation of the city centre. Unfortunately, the committee did not take into consideration the fact that pilgrims coming to Medina were from all different classes and economic levels; they were mainly coming from the Middle East and developing countries. Yet the stipulations from the committee for luxury specifications, along with the high price of the land, meant that the level of service value available rose in the central zone. Aburbrig (2012) observed that many of locals left the city because they could not abide the changes in lifestyle and standards brought about by such upgrading. Based on this evidence, it could be said that the Saudi authorities promoted rather than reined in aggressive gentrification in the central zone of Medina, as asserted by Wyly and Hammel (2005: 74).

The design blocks known as groundscrapers were selected on the basis of public and private objectives. Kahn (1998) argues that the role of the groundscraper is geared

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towards the privatisation of city space, as it is not seen as being as obtrusive as a skyscraper. Carmon and Freeman (2005) suggest that there are both advantages and disadvantages to groundscrapers (see Table 9), yet there is some doubt as to whether this term actually fits the buildings in Medina. As the latter are constructions of between 12 and 16 storeys, they cannot be categorised as low rise (Carmon & Freeman, 2005). Indeed, this is what most of the participants in this thesis complained about, that the new buildings are not sympathetic to the historic scale. Rather, the buildings known as the Medina groundscrapers control and dominate the skyline in the central zone, which is contrary to what the planners ostensibly wanted, as they had intended the minarets of the Prophet's Mosque to define the skyline of the city.

Possibly affirmative design features	Possibly unfavourable design features
Sympathetic to historic scale (low rise)	Disrupts historic street patterns (with large blocks)
Includes new urban public spaces	Reduces permeability/accessibility
Caters to modern business needs	Privatizes previously public urban space
Includes active frontages	Creates exclusionary spaces (by soft and hard means)

Table 9: The advantages and disadvantages of groundscrapers. (Source: Carmon & Freeman, 2005).

The construction of groundscrapers was a credible response to ECDCZ's conditions, but it caused two problems. Firstly, real estate properties increased and the private sector took advantage of groundscrapers to increase profits due to the high cost of land in the central zone. Freeman (2006) recognized gentrification as affluent incomers, international retailers and commercial tycoons entering urban spaces and transforming it into skyscraper buildings, apartments, shopping malls, and plazas using special government directives.

Facility	Capacity
Car parking	15,000
Shops	11,000
Hotel rooms	23,000
Seasonal apartments	36,000
Permanent apartments	17,500

Table 10: Facilities in the central zone. (Source: ECDCZ, 1999).

Table 10 shows how the facilities in the central zone are targeting business rather than residential users. The largest share is dedicated to shops, hotels, and seasonal apartments. Even the permanent apartments have been converted to luxury usage for long-term visitors, as local residents cannot afford the prices. One of the developers was asked about the reasons for not having new housing developments in the central zone.

> *The apartments did not achieve market expectations. It might be because of the large amount of supply compared with demand and also relatively high prices. The investors did not expect any future higher prices for making a profit on the purchased units. So the high price of the units made it difficult to use them as rented apartments especially because of the availability of alternative hotel rooms with a high degree of luxury and fixtures. All those reasons meant the majority of apartments were converted to aparthotels. (Interview with P2 on 03/01/2013)*

The second issue was that there was no incentive offered to those interested in housing developments or small-scale investments. A fairly limited number of competing corporate developers were involved, and they prevented the development of small business units for entrepreneurs or those wanting to run their own small business. Furthermore, redevelopment of downtown central zones is not generally focused on small developers constructing multiple housing units. Rather, it involves the construction of large blocks of accommodation and development, and the focus on these giant investments largely excludes others. In Medina, corporate developers who were seeking to get the highest return on their investments by building new luxury units in high-density populated areas, carried out the redevelopment of the central zone. Based on this finding, it could be said that gentrification in the central zone led to retail and commercial change. Conversely, Koebel, Chapple and Jacobus (2009), Metzer and Schuetz, (2011), (Schuetz, 2014) and Ong et al. (2014) found that in the cities in the Global North where they carried out their studies, such as San Francisco and New York, retail changes caused gentrification. The next section discusses the social transformation that has taken place in the central zone.

6.3. The Social Transformation of the Central Zone

As noted in the previous chapter, prior to the development of Medina's city centre, the inhabitants lived in a unique social and cultural communal environment, where most of the residents had strong social relationships with others within their courtyards. Economic differences were blurred as they all shared a similar social and financial status as craft workers. In addition, adult illiteracy was widespread, so that the job opportunities were limited (Makki, 1985). The population of Medina's central zone at that time was around 50,000 inhabitants (MRM,1999).

Many pre-industrial cities are comprised of two levels of residential zones, the neighbourhood and the district (Smith, 2010). The neighbourhoods are small units based on face-to-face social interaction, and the districts are larger zones where the public administrative units are located (Arnauld et al., 2012). Such cities are found in various parts of the world, and there is a country differentiation in the types of house. Courtyard houses are most commonly found in China, India, other parts of Asia and the Mediterranean, and in Latin America. In the Middle East and North Africa, the older residential areas have a feature that emanates from mediaeval times- they are subdivided into smaller quarters and, although their boundaries remain fairly constant, they are marked by their use of names as points of reference, even when they are not denoted as streets in modern terms (Abu-Lughod, 1987). This indicates whether the residential areas in downtown Medina may be identified as neighbourhoods. Having a clear idea of what a residential area means, it is important to place it in the right context, in terms of classification. Smith's (2010:139) definition could be applied to Medina, as he states: "A neighbourhood is a residential zone that has considerable face-to-face interaction and is distinctive on the basis of physical and/or social characteristics".

The ECDCZ plan considered the central zone as having residential as well as commercial usage, but the accommodation capacity of people has now increased to 300,000 (MRM,1999). Permanent residents were meant to comprise only 20% of the total population, with 80% allocated to temporary residents. This makes it clear that the

investment in housing units in the central zone was indeed heavily biased towards short-term visits (see Table 10). P3 is a retired administrator who was working in the Medina municipality in the 1990s. He explained:

> *"It was planned to allocate 10-20 % of the housing units in the developed region for permanent residence and the rest for seasonal housing [note that the season here means ten months in a year and not for pilgrimage only]. It did not allocate any permanent housing within the developed region". (Interview with P3 on 10/10/2013)*

This indicates that the urban structure of Medina was changing from an inner city residential area towards one geared visitors to the city, who would mainly want to visit the Prophet's Mosque. This confirms that gentrification in the central zone of Medina was the cause of modifications in commercial and retail activities. As the next section on state led gentrification in Medina explains, this may be determined to take the form of (religious) tourism gentrification.

6.4. State Led Gentrification: The Need for Development or Third-Wave Gentrification

There are indications in the data that individuals and companies could not be involved in the development processes and the new-build without national funding. Major funding for housing development in Saudi Arabia was provided by government agencies, and there was effectively no private-sector housing finance system (Al-Otaibi, 2006). There were commercial banks but none of these were savings or investment banks which would offer financial support for owning a home or constructing housing. It should be noted that commercial banks in Saudi Arabia give short-term loans and serve predominantly corporate customers (Tuncalp & Al-ibrahimt, 1991). Contrary to what was happening in other countries, neither insurance companies, pension funds, nor social security funds were involved in providing money for long-term investments.

As was shown in chapter 4, the rising numbers of pilgrims and tourists necessitated infrastructure improvements, services and accommodation facilities in Medina. The

development project of 1990 was also initiated due to the degradation of pre-existing buildings in the area, especially endowment housing, which were no longer fit to accommodate visitors (MRM, 1999; Kaki, 1998). The previous small plots did not offer viable investment opportunities; they were unfit to accommodate larger, modernised accommodations. Apart from the issue of the lack of space, the buildings lacked homogeneity, which was important in this context, as it was decided by the local government that the zone needed to match the aesthetics of the Prophet's Mosque, which, through King Fahad's expansion and renovation project, had become a spectacular example of Islamic architecture. This made it more attractive to pilgrims and consequently raised the economic value of the area. To aid the 1990 development project, sets of legislation were passed to organise and plan the redevelopment process in the central zone. The responsibility for development processes in the central zone lay with two committees, a ministerial committee and an executive committee, which were established by royal decree in 1990.

The 1990 development project aimed to reconstruct the areas surrounding the Mosque. This included pedestrian areas, roads and car parks. The zone around the Mosque was not easily accessible, which was a cause of continuous congestion and obstruction. The plan recognised the need to thoroughly upgrade the infrastructure and utilities, including transportation, highways, telecommunications, gas and electricity. As mentioned above, it was stipulated that this should be carried out in a way that ensured coherence and harmony with the aesthetics of the Prophet's Mosque, the design of which was guided by Islamic architectural traditions. The former mayor of Medina, who was a member of the Executive Committee responsible for the development of the central zone, explained:

Because the space that was required for the expansion of the Mosque included the greater part of the buildings near the Prophet's Mosque, which were recently selected to be hotels and apartments for the visitors' accommodation, this left only the old buildings of the central area, which became abandoned, damaged, or housing for the working class of low income. In addition, the status of streets, the narrow pedestrian footpaths, and the services and facilities that feed the region did not keep up with the giant projects that were implemented for the expansion of the Prophet's Mosque. As a result, the difference became obvious between the constructional and the planning

levels of the Prophet's Mosque after its expansion, reconstruction and its complementary projects, and the rest of the deteriorating residential areas surrounding it, which fell within the scope of the region. (Interview with Abdurrahman Alhusyn on 15/09/2013)

In order to proceed with the redevelopment of the central zone, the committee decided to demolish all the structures in the built-up area of this zone, which included residential, commercial and administrative buildings, and then rebuild it entirely anew. Historic places around the Prophet's Mosque were seen as taking away from the focus on the mosque itself, and were therefore deemed insignificant to the development plans. It might be argued that at the beginning of the development process in the central zone, the rebuilding was not planned, and a coordinated and planned development project was implemented only after the expansion of the Prophet's Mosque. The master plans for Medina issued in 1973 and 1977 make no mention of a development project or redesign of the central zone. There were also no recommendations concerning the preservation of the ancient buildings. In any case, from the onset, the 1990 development project intended to design the area for citizens, tourists, visitors and pilgrims. Trono (2009) found that religious tourism plays an important role in improving the image of a city and promoting regional development, yet many tourist cities are confronted with over-consumption of the local infrastructure surrounding and leading to tourist sites due to heavy demand.

In an interview conducted with an engineer with Medina Municipality, who is currently a consultant at the Medina Development Commission and the owner of the historic Medina museum, he stated that:

The main indisputable target of the development of the central zone was the expansion of the Prophet's Mosque. The second target associated with this was to re-accommodate the population of the central region, where previously it was impossible to accommodate the population. Now, however, it can accommodate 300,000 people. The expansion resulted in the demolition of buildings included in the area of the Mosque, which resulted in the distortion of the place. Then they decided to remove all the surrounding spaces and then develop it in line with the expansion of the Prophet's Mosque. (Interview with Abdurrahman Kaki on 19/09/2013)

The infrastructure and transportation system within the central zone was recognised as malfunctioning by various city planning teams involved in designing the project in 1990, and two alternatives for improvement were proposed (Ministry of Planning, 1990). The first suggested that the zone should be redeveloped partially through the removal of derelict buildings and their replacement with new ones. All buildings that were either in good condition or could be refurbished would be kept. It was also envisaged that the existing topography of the zone should guide the infrastructure for services and utilities. The second proposal was more expensive, with an estimated price tag of around 12 billion Saudi Riyals, equal to almost 2 million pounds (MMRSC 2013). This plan was for the zone to be entirely redeveloped, entailing the removal of all previously existing buildings. The objective was to install brand new infrastructure based on modern standards and foreseeing the future need for services and utilities. Despite the potential financial implications, the second option was selected. This resonates with Savage and Warde (1993), who identified four processes which must happen for gentrification to be said to have taken place; one of them is changes in the urban landscape for the provision of services for high –income residents, while another is changes in land distribution.

Thus, along with the ongoing refurbishment of the Prophet's Mosque, substantial redevelopment was now underway, which included considerable new-build construction. The next section investigates the role of the state as the main actor in the gentrification process.

6.4.1. The Role of Government

It is apparent that national and local governments were directly involved, and indeed were the main players, in gentrification in the central zone through the two committees described above. As Figure 29 shows, there was a ministerial committee, chaired by the King in Riyadh, and an executive committee headed by the Prince of Medina. Both committees had roles in regulating, supervising and investing in the redevelopment. These two committees contributed to gentrification by approving the plans for the development, and a new urban culture emerged around the modernised environment,

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facilitated by new governance structures, planning and increasing market demand (Murphy 2008). The governance structures ensured that both national and local governments were involved, the committees were there to approve the plans submitted to them, and the market demand came from the economic activity of the city of Medina, the expansion of the Prophet's Mosque, and the growing number of visitors to the area. This study found that both national and local administrations were involved in the gentrification, which is in line with Hackworth (2002), who maintained that the gentrification he observed was a large–scale capital project in which corporate developers as well as federal and local governments were involved.

A further political factor may have contributed to this development, as the overall strategy of the Saudi government is to consolidate the Saudi role as custodian of the two holy sites of Makkah and Medina and to ensure that pilgrims continue to come to Saudi Arabia. This is linked to economic considerations, as the Saudi government seeks to diversify its sources of revenue to be less dependent on finite oil reserves (Taylor, 2012). Smith (2002) argues that the gentrification of old city centres has become a competitive strategy in a global market, as cities seek to attract visitors and tourists. It was pointed out earlier that the Prophet's Mosque is the symbol of Medina, and also that, after Makkah, it is the holiest mosque in the world for Muslims, known also as the 'holy house of God'. The increasing number of visitors to Medina is evidence of its attraction to Muslims.

Yet one more factor in the development of the central zone and the Prophet's Mosque was the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. Iran was transformed into an Islamic regime with an agenda to export the revolution to other Muslim countries. One of the key objectives of the revolution was to create a greater Muslim community and 'Islamic world order', to be led by Iran. These aims guided Iran's foreign policy at that time (Amiri et al., 2011). Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution, verbally supported these goals, and in 1984 contested the legitimacy of the Saudi claim to be custodian of the two Holy Mosques in Makkah and Medina, asking for shared Islamic sovereignty over them. He saw the Al Saud family as being unworthy of guarding the holy shrines, deeming their ties to the West to be inappropriate. Moreover, their actions and connections defied Islamic traditions and principles, and were more improper than any Iranian rhetoric (Mabon, 2013). This call was supported by the Iranian prime minister at

the time, Mir-Hossein Musavi, in a message distributed to all Muslim nations (Amiri, et al, 2011). Additionally, the Iranian government requested more visas for pilgrims to visit Saudi Arabia (85,000 in 1982 and 150,000 in 1984). Furthermore, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who was Speaker of the Iranian Parliament at the time, argued that if the Saudi government could not manage the religious seasons in Makkah and Medina, then Iran should assist in organizing Hajj (Marschall, 2003). Such rhetoric from the Iranian government provoked a rapid response from the government of Saudi Arabia, whose rulers quickly announced an agreement for the expansion and development of the Prophet's Mosque in Medina in November 1984, which was to be the largest project in its history. Second, King Fahad publicly declared the legitimacy of the Saudi claim to the Two Holy Mosques in Makkah and Medina.

An example of one of his declarations comes from a meeting with a group of pilgrims in Makkah on 14 July 1987. He stated:

> *I am grateful to our God for giving me the opportunity to enlarge the Two Holy Mosques and surrounding squares, hopefully to accommodate abundant numbers of pilgrims and visitors, which flow throughout the year because of the ease of transportation. For drawing closer to God and because of all this, Saudi Arabia has a duty based on its legitimate mandate for the Two Holy Mosques in Makkah and Medina. We made procedures and regulations to ensure that the pilgrims perform their pilgrimage in accordance with the highest standards of performance, services, safety, comfort and ease and tranquillity. (Darah, 2013)*

Moreover, in an effort to show himself as the most powerful leader in his government, King Fahad gave himself the official title of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques in 1986, just after starting the expansion of the Mosque in Medina. Arguably, these actions conveyed the impression that Saudi Arabia was the leader of Islamic world and were capable of providing the necessary facilities for pilgrims and visitors without receiving any financial or technical assistance from anywhere else in the Islamic world.

Figure 29: Tasks of two action committees for developing central zone of Madinah 1990.

On the other hand, that the Prophet's Mosque had witnessed other enlargements during its history, so its expansion in the 1980s might not be related to geopolitical rivalries (see Chapter 5). However, on this occasion, the Prophet's Mosque enlargement project and the central zone redevelopment, which replaced the old city, were both initiated by Royal Decrees. This normally did not happen with previous master plans, which were more localised. Furthermore, on this occasion it was supervised by a ministerial committee headed by King Fahad himself.

Some have argued that the position of the state is exercised most fundamentally through forms of urban policy (Pacione, 2009), as the state has the power to invest in and transform urban areas. This takes us to the heart of the matter that both the national and local governments were adopting a kind of competitive urban policy related to the symbolic reconstruction of the Prophet's Mosque. This can be distinctly discerned through King Fahad's proclamation in a Council of Ministers meeting during his visit to inspect the development projects in Medina: "I am looking forward to making the city one of the most sophisticated and beautiful cities in the world" (Alamanah, 1994: 34). In this case, the meaning of a place is intentionally modified with the aim of encouraging new investments and visitors. This is discussed in the next chapter in relation to the rising number of pilgrims and visitors after the redevelopment of the central zone. In support of this idea, Zukin (1995) argued that numerous strategies are adopted by cities in order to become distinct, gain competitive edge and participate in inter-urban competitions, such as the construction of cultural institutions, the use of innovative designs, and the recruitment of star architects. All of these have been applied by cities in the Global North, as Zukin mentions, and many cities in the Global South, including Medina, have adopted some variation of them as well. In effect, the created image of a place is marketable and consumable. Such a change in the image of a city boosts tourism and enhances global appeal. It is noteworthy that the symbolic reconstruction of cities is not a necessity or an indispensable tool of urban policy. It is a conceptual framework, as Križnik (2011) calls it, highlighting the relationship between urban policy, urban renewal and city marketing, the latter two being the instruments of competitive urban policy. This study distinguishes the symbolic reconstruction of Medina from the central zone redevelopment even though they are related to each other.

Indisputably, the reconstruction of the Prophet's Mosque had an impact on the inner city area. It was intended to smooth the way for the redevelopment in the larger central zone. However, there was a six-year gap between these two processes between 1985 and 1991. This would suggest that the reconstruction and expansion of the Prophet's Mosque as a city symbol had at its foundation one of the keys to the city's economy: real estate development, which provided jobs and attracted tourism. It is important to note that the country, despite suffering from decreasing oil prices in the mid-1980s, still moved

forward with the implementation of the project. In a television documentary aired on MBC channel, one of the members of the executive committee said:

> *"There were numbers of reports coming from the Ministry of Finance. They indicated that oil prices would further decrease, so the Ministry strongly recommended no rush until the oil price war subsided. I remember King Fahad's reaction, which was that there should be no hesitation as this project was our responsibility before the Islamic world. (Fahad, 2001)*

The national government dealt with the development of inner city neighbourhoods even though this may have occurred during difficult conditions, such as the Kuwait War, which began on 2nd August 1990. The huge sum spent on the Mosque project, along with decreasing oil prices in the late 1980s and 1990s, is displayed in Figure 30. It seems clear that the government was determined to proceed with managing the development of Medina's central zone and with marketing the city.

Figure 30: Oil price in 1985 during the Mosque project.

The dropping price of oil created increased government awareness of the need to seek out other income sources to support national production. A new economic strategy was declared in the fourth and fifth five-year plans, executed between 1985 and 1995. Both plans argued that dependence on oil as a major source of national income should be

reduced. They also advised changes in the economic structure of the country through the diversification of its production base (MEP 1985, 1990). Religious tourism became a crucial pillar of this new vision, reproducing the view that improvement of the tourism infrastructure in the holy cities of Makkah and Medina was necessary. A Royal Decree for the redevelopment of the central zone was made on 20th July 1990. This decision was guided by the rising number of visitors and expected future demand for services and facilities, as was described by Kaki in the interview excerpt presented in section 6.4 above. Raj and Morpeth (2007) and Egresi et al. (2012) have observed the economic impact of religious tourism and pilgrimages, particularly in terms of investment. In Medina, this led to a radical rebuilding of the central zone.

Special committees were established and King Fahad himself also became involved in the process. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, two committees were convened: a national ministerial committee, which had a supervisory and financial role, and the second local committee, which had an executive role. It could be said the boundaries of responsibilities between both committees were hard to distinguish because both were responsible for the supervision of the project. The Executive Committee issued a general policy relating to the project and was in charge of executive orders, finances, planning, deciding upon designs, and contracting and subcontracting parties involved in the development. It also oversaw the process of compensation for properties that were taken over by eminent domain for the project. However, the value of the properties was calculated by a separate specialised committee, which included members of the Home Office, Finance and Justice Ministries, along with representatives of semi-governmental organisations and local real estate dealers. The committee organised auctions to sell plots of land for redevelopment. It also had to liaise with the Ministerial Cabinet under the rule of the King, being given by the King formal authorisation and broad powers to manage and direct the follow-up development process of the central zone and the implementation of the approved scheme. This committee was connected to the ministerial committee headed by the King and together, the two committees agreed on the stages and aspects of fiscal spending for the project. The Executive Committee for the Development of the Central Zone (ECDCZ) was headed by the Prince of Medina at that time, Abdulmajeed, who was Governor of the Medina region. Committee members also included the former

mayor of Medina, Mr. Alhusyen, and one of the most important businessmen in Saudi Arabia, whose company was called the Saudi Binladin Group. The company carried out nationwide and worldwide construction projects, such as public buildings, skyscrapers, airports, and various projects on roads and bridges. The committee operated as an independent authority, administratively and financially, from the municipality of Medina. It was established that the committee should be headed by an agent of the Governor of Medina, and contained a number of architects, civil engineers and counsellors, all of whom were on secondment from the municipality. After the committee had completed its missions, it was upgraded in 2009 to a commission for Medina called the Medina Development Authority (MRM, 1999).

In consideration of the political and economic concerns that Saudi Arabia faced, and consequently of the higher costs and the scale of the scheme, the government made a choice to invite the private sector to participate in the project (ECDCZ, 1999). This kind of collaboration is also known as a public-private partnership and is common in the West/ global North, where governments need more financial support and private companies seek to make a profit for lending that support.

Such urban policies have taken on a neoliberal stance, whereby the private sector plays a role in decision making processes as a way of injecting more capital into the city (Gonzales, 2007). This demonstrates how Saudi Arabia dealt with the challenges of redeveloping the central zone, but it also indicates that this was the beginning of a new phase in the region. When companies are seeking to make profit, then they are likely to look for the highest return on their investment rather than the wider public interest.

The Executive Committee for the Development of the Central Zone (ECDCZ) is a government agency and, based on the powers vested in it, was in a position to initiate many of technical and operational procedures to start the development project. They addressed the specific objectives of the project, which were to improve infrastructure, provide accommodation and services for citizens and pilgrims, and achieve a unique architectural design for the area. In addition, their remit was to focus on the expansion of the Prophet's Mosque and to look at land ownership to cover larger plots of land, rather than smaller, unplanned plots. There was nothing to suggest that they were to maintain

any of the old character of the area, or to modernise existing housing. Their purpose was to make the whole area into a place that would be suited to the role it would play in attracting more visitors or pilgrims. Indeed, a previous study, carried out by an architectural historian and practising urban designer, demonstrated that "the new project, executed during the late eighties, illustrates the consequences of a radically different approach, which stresses architectural monumentality while ignoring human scale and integrated urban form from consideration" (Bianca, 2000:264).

Two billion pounds were budgeted by the state for the project, and contributions to the investment included national money (the government's contribution amounted to 20%) and private sector funds (covering 80% of costs), principally from real estate developers (ECDCZ, 1999). Medina residents did not have much purchasing power compared with residents of the capital city, and they did not contribute to the project's funding. The majority of the investment came from Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam because they are major Saudi cities with regard to the economy and, of course, the number of people who would be in a position to make a significant investment. The Saudi government kept ownership of some land as an investment and later built hotels to benefit the General Organisation for Social Insurance and Public Pension Agency. Foreign capital came from international hotel chains such as the Hilton, Sheraton, Mövenpick and Marriott, which signed long-term contracts with the Ministry of Finance. Some of them secured management and operating contracts. However, foreign ownership of land is, as stated previously, against Saudi law, which bans non-Saudis from owning property in Makkah or Medina. The first Secretary-General of the Medina Development Authority that was established on 17th December 2009, said:

> *The invested money was national, and it wasn't allowed for foreign money to be invested. Also, there was no input of local money. With regards to the international hotel chains like Mövenpick, Marriott, Hilton and Sheraton, these hotels have a special procedure, as they are linked with contracts with the Ministry of Finance and just having a hotel in the central area doesn't mean owning the building. However, it is a long-term investment that benefits the Ministry of Finance, but it's not a free infinite investment and it's not an ownership. For example, when the Mövenpick hotel*

was built, it was on the basis that it's a hotel for Mövenpick and for pure investment, not for ownership. (Interview with Mohammed Alali on 26/09/2013)

This shows that gentrification in the central zone of Medina was an economic process grounded in capitalist appropriation and profit. This resonates with Smith (2010). This indicates how it is capital that creates gentrification, and not the people themselves, as Smith (2007) argued; nevertheless, people are still involved in making decisions about investing the capital. This capital all came from outside the area and the local residents of Medina were already being excluded, as Kaki reports:

The land, after demolition of the buildings, was put up for sale, and the nature of these projects was for it not to be purchased by individuals, but by companies, because individuals and citizens don't have the financial ability to buy and build and most of the land was for investment, not for housing. The only apartments that were offered for sale were those for the purpose of permanent housing, which were occupied by only a certain class of society and probably only less than 1% of Medina people were able to buy these apartments. (Interview with Abdurrahman Kaki on 19/09/2013)

On the whole, the Saudi state performed two roles in developing the central zone, financial and structural. The financial side included the purchasing of the lands from landlords and their subsequent reselling to national companies, entrepreneurs, or sharing them through partnerships. The national authority acted in this way as an entrepreneur, participating in the central zone's development. On the structural side, the state took on the responsibility for making the arrangements for the development to proceed. In global North contexts, this has been discussed by Wyly and Hammel (2005) and Hackworth and Smith (2001). However, it becomes clear that the state's intervention was one of the main forces behind the eventual gentrification of the area. The next section discusses the national government's strategy for accomplishing its urban policy regarding the gentrification of Medina's central zone.

6.4.2. Taiba Company as a Government-Granted Monopoly

After the national authority decided to develop the central zone, a national company was established to oversee it. Looking at the time-frame of the project, it is notable that the decision to create the Taiba company coincided with the middle stage of the project to redevelop the Prophet's Mosque and the formation of the ECDCZ. Taiba was established as a Saudi joint stock company by Royal Decree No. (M/41) dated 24/9/1988. According to Article 52 of the Company Law:

> *The establishment of joint stock companies generally requires an authorisation from the Minister of Commerce after reviewing a proposed company's 'feasibility' study. The law requires the authorisation through a Royal Decree based on the approval of the Council of Ministers for the formation of any joint stock companies with concessions, undertaking public sector projects, receiving assistance from the State, in which the State or other public institutions participate or for joint stock companies engaging in a banking business. (SAGIA, 2013)*

The main goal of Taiba, set up as a real estate developer in the central zone, was to carry out what was approved by the national committee, and by the ECDCZ in particular. Significantly, both the ECDCZ and Taiba were chaired by His Royal Highness, Prince Abdul Majeed bin Abdul Aziz, who was the governor of Medina.

It is evident that, at the beginning, the company acted as an executive arm for both the government and private sector. There was a kind of unceremonious monopoly but it was a government-granted monopoly. In a documentary film produced by MMRSC (2013), it was mentioned that Taiba was the first and only company that started working as a developer, but it was subsequently followed by other real estate developers. "The Taiba company started to build towers in the central zone, then later it was followed by other investors" (MMRSC, 2013). Monopolies in cities in the Global South, in particular in other Islamic cities such as Istanbul and Damascus, have been observed by Sudermann (2015) and Islam and Sakizlioglu (2015), respectively. Conversely, in Dubai, private and public interests overlap but are not seen to be in conflict (Chakravarty & Qamhaieh,

2015). This indicates that the processes of gentrification in the context of the Global South vary.

An important report about Taiba's activities was published by Aleqtisadiah, which is one of the most important newspapers in Saudi Arabia and, according to Forbes Magazine's list, it was the eighth most-read newspaper in the Middle East in 2011. Aleqtisadiah pointed out that:

> *Activities and investments in the first phase mainly focused on real estate, especially the development of the central area surrounding the mosque of Prophet Mohammad. To achieve that, Taiba was the first developer in the region, where several projects were established that were represented through the project, such as the Taiba Center, residential and commercial Eastern and Western towers, and the residential and commercial center of Alaqeeq. During this phase it succeeded in achieving outstanding returns and revenues. This enabled it to create a coherent growth and proliferation base. (Aleqtisadiah, 2008: 28)*

All redevelopment procedures were executed by Taiba, which was the main real estate developer. The majority of the shares of the company were owned by a group of businessmen and individuals. The rest of the shares belonged to the Saudi State. At the beginning of its establishment, the main mission of the Taiba Company was to prepare the area for marketing. Accordingly, the Taiba Company demolished all neighbourhoods within the central zone and subsequently established the planned infrastructure. It should be noted that the Taiba Company received incentives and privileges in many aspects. First, the Chairman of the Board of Taiba, as noted above, was Prince Abdul Majeed bin Abdul Aziz, who was the governor of Medina at that time. Based on this position, Taiba invested initially in three towers in the central zone covering an area of 11,100 square metres (Table 4.2), which is considerably large. This affirms the findings of Smith (2002), Smith (2013) and Fraser and Kick (2007) regarding the influence of capital and private actors on gentrification.

Tower name	Area (m^2)	Status of Taiba
Eastern tower	5,800	Joint Stock Company
Western tower	3,000	
Alaqeeq	2,300	
Total	11,100	
Taiba palace Hotel 5*	158,913	Holding Company (since 2007)
Alagwa Hotel 4*	824,434	
Alreyadah Hotel 4*	2,556,741	
Alsafwah Hotel 4* A	982,031	
Alkawther	540	
Arak Hotel	167,798	
Total area of Taiba Projects	842,880	central zone
Taiba property space	53% of central zone	1,580,000 m^2

Table 11: Taiba Company's Projects. (Source: Aleqtisadiah, 2008).

In addition, the Law of Ownership of Real Property Units and Plotting thereof was issued by Royal Decree No. M/5, dated 23 April 2002. This law was enacted to facilitate marketing plans and the construction of residential units in the three towers in which Taiba had invested. The manager of the Taiba Eastern Tower Owners' Association, in an interview conducted for the purpose of this research, explained: "Our Association was the first official owners' association in Saudi Arabia. Actually, we succeeded in issuing the law which can keep our rights and organise the relationships between owners in the Eastern Tower" (Interview with Alqorisea on 01/10/2013). Further, the Vice Chairman and Managing Director of Taiba Investment and Real Estate Development said that:

A decision was mandated on 6 September 2003 by the Minster of Labour, and based on Royal Decree, to register owners of the Taiba Association. This made it the first official owners' association in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with registration of an assembly of owners that became a legal requirement based on the provisions of the system and the regulations it was implementing. (Interview with Alzid on 01/10/2013)

It was apparent that the enactment of the Law of Ownership of Real Property Units and Plotting thereof was a response to the need to market Taiba's products. The strength of the relationship between the state and the company must be emphasised, despite its not being a public company and the government owning just 20 percent of its shares. As a consequence of the new regulation, Taiba bought 141 apartments in the first tower. The manager of the Owners' Association stated that:

In a short period, [Taiba] bought all apartments in the Western Tower, which was the first tower that had been built. The apartments' square footage was between 100m² and 200m² and they sold at 2 and 12 million RS [£369,000 - £2.2 million]. 95% of purchasers were Saudi but those from Medina were a minority. Most of the purchasers were from the outside of Medina. 5% of them came from countries around the Arabic Gulf, Egypt, and Malaysia. They had long-term contracts for up to 99 years. (Interview with Alqorisea on 01/10/2013)

Alqorisea comments indicate some of issues relate with gentrification process in general first increasing price dramatically of properties after redevelopment in central zone. In addition, it shows that purchasers come from outside Medina because of weakening purchasing power of locals and part of them they are foreigners and non-Saudi from Arabic Gulf countries, Egypt and Malaysia. This an evidence support the previous researches that in gentrification process capital is moving to city centre or to neighbourhoods in order to accumulate profits (Wyly and Hammel 1999; Smith, 2010).

In 2007, the company changed its legal status to become a holding company; over the 10 years since its foundation, it had achieved distinct earnings and income, which enabled it to create a coherent base for growth and proliferation. This was followed by Taiba receiving investment returns and gains on real estate investment, which provided the capital to expand the company's activities and investments. As a result of its expertise and factors related to financial gains, Taiba invested in about 53% of the total built area in the central zone which indicates an area of 1677.98m^2. This means that the Taiba Company was the main developer in the central zone.

6.5. A Case for Tourism Gentrification

One of the forms of gentrification that has been shown to displace residents from their original homes is that of tourism, which is also commercial due to the investment it brings to an area; it leads to a complete mutation in the way a neighbourhood is used (Gant, 2015). It can be seen that the use of the neighbourhoods in the inner city of Medina changed and that little regard was given to permanent residential housing; rather, seasonal usage was favoured. In a survey conducted by the Urban Observation of Medina, the central zone of Medina was identified as being unoccupied by local people (MRM, 2006). One of the security guards in the Taiba tower confirmed this when asked about owners of the apartments there:

Most of the owners of the occupied apartments come from outside the city, they can be seen here at Ramadan, especially during the last ten days of the holy month. Some of them spend Eid in Medina, some leave the day before Eid, otherwise none of them lives here all year round. But some of them put their apartment out for rent during the rest of the year. (Interview with P5 on 02/10/2013)

The security guard's words suggest that the majority of the beneficiaries of the new-build redevelopment come from outside the area, and they use their apartments simply as a second home or holiday home. This new class of people who were attracted to the central zone by the regeneration that has taken place can be classified as the Saudi elite. Such affluent users can be compared to the middle-class newcomers common to gentrification processes, who have been well documented as displacing lower income communities (Gotham, 2005).

When the development plan for the central zone was conceptualised, it was not expected to exclude inhabitants in the way it has. Despite the Taiba towers in the central zone being allocated for permanent housing, they have become temporary accommodation units for their owners. In 2004, a newspaper reported that one of the operations companies of the Taiba towers was launching a timeshare programme for 40% of the apartments. A manager of the towers was reported as saying that:

Based on one of the studies carried out by us to measure customer satisfaction, it was recognised that most of the owners of apartments in the residential Taiba tower do not use their apartments. They are there only a few days during the year and then they are closed up for the rest of the year, because many of them live outside the city of Medina. They come regularly once a year for breaks, for holidays and Ramadan holidays. (Alyaoum Newspaper, 2004:)

Thus, the commercial upgrading of facilities in the city centre facilities has had the effect of the zone being identified as belonging to wealthy visitors rather than permanent residents, and it can be seen that the working-class population has now been marginalised and excluded from the area, a finding that resonates with Fainstein and Gladstone (1999). Gant (2015) argues that in tourism gentrification, neighbourhoods are changed by commercial activities, and it is suggested that the apartments of Taiba tower could be categorised as commercial activity.

Nevertheless, Medina has the Prophet's Mosque at its centre, and people are attracted to Medina because of its religious significance. The above interview excerpts affirm that the visitors come mainly at Eid and Ramadan for religious purposes, although visitors can come to pray at the Prophet's Mosque throughout the year as well. However, the visitors as tourists represent a seasonal migration and, at the end of the stay, these visitors return to their permanent residences (Vukonic, 1996). They have no sense of belonging to the community of Medina. Such social impacts of tourism are generally realised only over time (Nyaupane et al., 2015) but when considered in the context of religious tourism, they tend to be regarded as having a negative impact (Olsen, 2008); it has been suggested this is due to religious conservativeness (Bilim & Ozer, 2016). More recently, studies of Islamic tourist destinations show that the socio-cultural impact of tourism is becoming more important (Zamani-Farahani & Musa, 2012; Jafari & Scott, 2014), and residents in religious tourist destinations are beginning to perceive the economic impact and view tourism development more positively (Bilim & Ozer, 2016). In the Middle East, the middle class is growing, which means that there are more people wanting to visit religious sites, and they are not deterred by threats that may put off other kinds of tourists (The Economist, 2013). They are also prepared to pay higher prices, and this means they may

now expect to find better quality accommodation and services in destinations such as Medina.

It could be argued that the redevelopment of the city center of Medina was undertaken in response to the poor condition and deterioration of the buildings in the area; besides, the infrastructure was not sufficient for visitors' and pilgrims' housing, and a solution was needed to support the rising number of tourists (see chapters 4 & 5). Arguably, a reason for redeveloping the central zone was religious tourism, and this redevelopment adopted new build gentrification in parallel with commercial gentrification, all of which was ultimately spearheaded by state-led gentrification. The religious overtones were promoted through the use of the Prophet's Mosque as a symbol of an ideal investment environment, because of the anticipated continued demand by visitors over the coming years; that is, the number of visitors could only be expected to increase and not wane.

Since the 1990s, however, the central zone has been transformed into luxury tourism accommodation. Figure 31 depicts two of the cosmopolitan hotels next to the Prophet's Mosque. The government carried out a vigorous marketing campaign to entice high-end developers to the city center in order to make the city physically attractive to visitors, besides the spiritual attraction of the Prophet's Mosque. A common denominator in both interpretations might be seen to be the state, with the local state represented by the Medina Municipality, having played a key role in the regeneration process and being a key promoter of tourism. However, it may also be argued that this redevelopment was the product of capital movements. Local, national and international capital has flowed into Medina in connection to the expansion of religious tourism, and the local authority's redevelopment initiative has been achieved through the implementation of policies and development strategies that have involved both Saudi and foreign investors' participation in the real estate market of the central zone of Medina (Medina Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1996). Vukonic, (2002) affirm that religious tourism should not be neglected or underestimated, as it has been done by religious institutions in the past, thus, this commonality is increasingly made visible through urban processes whereby government initiatives are meant to develop physical infrastructures as well as promote pilgrimages to these religious centres, an example of which the location of this study is.

Tourism is seen by governments as a key tool for development, and for developing countries, tourism has been seen as an effective option for the economic development of the urban landscape (Wallingford, 2008). The link between gentrification and tourism in the central zone of Medina cannot be ignored. The concept of tourism gentrification was

coined by Gotham (2005) to understand the nexus of tourism and gentrification in his case study of the socio-spatial transformation of New Orleans' Vieux Carre. He applied the concept of tourism gentrification as a way of explaining the transformation of a middle-class neighbourhood into an exclusive area full of entertainment and tourism venues. There is good reason to believe that the new build gentrification in the central zone of Medina constitutes tourism gentrification. This finding draws further supports from Gravari-Barbas and Guinand (2017), who found that in some cities, tourism comes first. Some developments are planned and designed in the beginning to cater to the visitors' economy. In the same way, Gotham (2005) believed that so-called tourism gentrification linked the supply and demand concepts of gentrification without being one-sided or reductive. This is supported by Liang & Bao (2015), who agree that this production/demand theory explains tourism gentrification.

Figure 31: Two five-stars hotels in new development in central zone.

A weakness of this argument, however, is that combining theories of production and demand to explain tourism gentrification is questionable. The production side could offer a more convincing case for tourism gentrification in Medina's central zone for the following reasons. First, tourism is counted under the economic sector for countries which are involved in local and national investment. Thus, it cannot be ignored that tourism is an important part of the export industry, and this has contributed economic growth in the past few decades (Assaf & Josiassen, 2012; De Vita & Kyaw, 2016; Moore & Doherty, 2011). Second, Gladstone and Préau (2010) studied the relationship between gentrification and tourism in New Orleans and identified two common preconditions for gentrification, namely: rent gaps in depressed downtown neighbourhoods, and a tourist bubble which inflates land values. In addition, according to Gotham (2005), one of the reasons behind gentrification is capital flow in the real estate market, in addition to shifts towards tourism. A similar interpretation was offered by Liang and Bao (2015), who suggested that in the early days of tourism gentrification, the focus is on a production-oriented approach due to capital investment. Moreover, in this case study, the explanation for new build gentrification could be found in the production theory, where the emergence of a rent gap and disinvestment in central zone government strategies and regulations influenced the gentrifying processes. It is clear that both public and private sector capital investment, locally and nationally, are an influential feature of new build gentrification. In Medina, the central zone's gentrifiers were the national government and the elite. Finally, it was mentioned in the seventh development plan, 2000 to 2004, that the private sector played a pivotal role in developing tourism in Saudi Arabia, while the state was planner, organiser and guide (MEP, 2000). Tourism can be considered an investment, and furthermore, it creates an industry in cities, with all the benefits related to its development (Law, 1993). It increases the value of land both within tourist areas as well as in surrounding neighbourhoods (Gladstone & Préau, 2010).

6.6. Conclusion

This chapter has presented the data on the physical and social transformation of the inner city of Medina in order to explore whether it amounts to gentrification. In order to explain these changes in the urban fabric, their origins have also been investigated. It is suggested that the form that has occurred could be categorised as tourism or religious gentrification. However, it may yet be concluded that the development of the central zone could rather be simple new-build gentrification, as all the new development took place on previously developed land.

The redevelopment of the central zone of Medina may have enhanced the economic and religious function of the area, but this has been at the cost of the residential usage for local people. Not only that, it appears to have taken away the cultural heritage of the inhabitants of Medina. Whereas the area around the Prophet's Mosque was once home to residents who lived in a unique courtyard housing system where the courtyards were social and community places, this sense of community has disappeared from the city centre. Instead, the central zone has now become a temporary home to the Saudi elite, who use the accommodation as a second home, and to wealthy visitors who can afford to stay in luxury hotels. Most of these visitors come to Medina for its religious significance. The heritage homes of the courtyards have been demolished to make way for concrete towers which block the visual aspect of the Prophet's Mosque for the residents of Medina.

Planners may not have realised the impact their vision would have on the city centre; there is no doubt that many of the traditional heritage housing had fallen into disrepair and the area was in desperate need of redevelopment. The importance of the Prophet's Mosque, which brings in so many pilgrims to Medina, is both the cause and effect of the gentrification that seems to have occurred. It was necessary to ensure that measures were taken to combat the dilapidation and overcrowding of the courtyards in the central zone surrounding the mosque, and to improve the pilgrim experience. Yet hotels, tower blocks and groundscrapers replaced heritage housing, and temporary visitors replaced residents. Thus, the physical environment of the central zone of Medina as well as its social composition has changed.

Based on the data collected through interviews and document analysis, that have occurred provide further evidence that gentrification has taken place in the city centre of Medina. The actors involved in making the changes and the decisions that have transformed the inner city are the national and local state in form of two committees, beside that the real estate developers at the beginning was only Taiba Company before other developers have been allowed to involve in. The social consequence of gentrification process will be identified in the next chapter.

Chapter 7

The Impact of Gentrification: Development and Sanitation

7.1. Introduction

The previous empirical chapter discussed the third wave of development, and in the process, situated Medina within the debate on 'cityness' (Nijman, 2007) by revealing the specific physical, social, governance and tourism effects of gentrification in this particular city in the Middle East, global South hemisphere. Thus, the development of Medina's central zone could be assessed within the global North versus global South discourse of "what is true for one city at a given point in time" (Nijman, 2007, p.1, cited in Lees, 2017, p.3).

Following up on the previous chapter's presentation of the findings related to the third wave of development in the central zone, this chapter, still focussing on the third wave, examines the impact of commercial gentrification on the displaced residents. In contrast, however, to the previous two empirical chapters, which scrutinised the processes that occurred in each wave, this chapter presents analysis of the impact of these processes on development and sanitation in light of the scholarly debate on commercial gentrification.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The following section 7.2 discusses gentrification-induced displacement and tracks the displaced residents, while the third

section explains displacement from the central zone and the displaced people's relationship with tourist facilities

In line with the central aim of this study to investigate whether the central zone Medina has experienced (re)development or gentrification, and with the data analysis in the previous empirical chapters five and six, this chapter examines the extent to which the development of Medina resonates with classic and recent debates on gentrification, in doing so, it answers the fourth research question.

The data collected on the process of gentrification in the central zone of Medina was examined in Chapter 5, revealing, first, the extent to which the national urban policy supported gentrification in the downtown courtyard areas; and secondly, how the old Medina witnessed the early stages of gentrification, which became overwhelming in the 1990s. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the outcomes of both state-led and new build gentrification for the study area, drawing on the semi structured interviews, observation and archival documents (see Chapter 3). The chapter also explores the displacement that occurred and the various causes involved, such as urban policy and investment.

7.2. Gentrification-Induced Displacement

As noted in Chapter 2, Davidson and Lees (2005) argued that one of the characteristics of third wave gentrification is the direct and indirect displacement of disadvantaged groups. Although Davidson and Lees focussed Brownfield sites, in contrast to the demolition that occurred in Medina, the findings nevertheless resonate with their study in the context of new build gentrification. The impact of new build gentrification in the central zone of Medina has its own story, according to some of the area's former residents who participated in this study, who were displaced from the central zone between 1984 and 1990. In this section, it is explained how different social environments can help in tracking such displaced people, based on the previous social structure of the central area. These former residents are categorised as displaced people.

7.2.1. Tracking Displaced Residents of the Central Zone

It is often difficult to track those displaced through gentrification, which is why few qualitative studies have been conducted on the social impact of the phenomenon on people's lives. As Satler (2006: 749) states: "*In a huge literature on gentrification, there are almost no qualitative accounts of displacement. Doing something about this is vital if critical perspectives are to be reinstated*".

Figure 32: Alnuzhat Hosh was located to the west of the Prophet's Mosque.

In this study, it was found that people displaced from the central zone could be tracked down by taking advantage of the social structure in Medina society, which is based on tribal allegiances and family connections. In general, the social structure in Saudi Arabia and other Arab societies, especially in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Fertile Crescent states, is dominated by tribes. These tribes are a regional phenomenon, whereby strong connections are maintained with extended family members, which provides a sense of protection and identity (Makki, 1985). As in other parts of Saudi Arabia, within Medina such tribes still exist as a social unit (see chapter 4). They are not the same as Bedouin

tribes, who settled in the desert long ago and are not involved in urban lifestyles, but rather there are a number of tribes whose members live an urban lifestyle in cities whilst nurturing tribal connections and family relationships. Even families with roots outside the Arabian Peninsula, who consequently do not belong to any tribe, have a similar system. They keep the name of their great grandfather, who chose to live in the city before the emergence of the Saudi state, and in the historic literature of Medina they are called neighbours (Badr, 1993). In Medina, both tribes and families lived and settled in specific areas called Hosh (courtyard, see chapters 4 and 5). For instance, Alnuzhat Hosh in Figure 32 was located to the west of the Prophet's Mosque, and the majority of the residents belonged to a clan called Alnuzah, although this did not preclude other families also living within that area (Alkayari, 1995). Alkayari (1995) wrote a book about social life in Medina in the twentieth century, and he provided detailed descriptions of various aspects of social life in the Ahwash (courtyards, plural of hosh; see chapter 5), pointing out the strong relationships that existed between dwellers of a hosh. Furthermore, he documented numbers of families and tribal names for the majority of the ahwash.

As explained in Chapter 5, the spatial configuration of the hosh helped to foster strong community links among the residents. By way of illustration, Doumato (1993) shows how the nature of social relationships in Saudi communities meant that families had a shared identity and all members of the family had to live up to certain ideals; this was how family honour was measured, and all individuals within that family had to respect these shared values. All these features helped me to locate displaced people who could potentially participate in this study, by using their family and tribal name to identify them, despite it being more than twenty years after displacement (see Chapter 3). Thus, it could be said that tracking displaced people in some regions in the Global South is not as difficult as in regions of the Global North, about which Slater et al. wrote: "displaced tenants, or those living under the threat of eviction and/or displacement, are very difficult to track down" (Slater et al., 2004: 1142). In the same vein, Newman and Wyly (2006) enumerate the difficulties they faced looking for displaced residents, practically disadvantaged people. This is due to differences in the social fabric as well as in the extent to which individuals are linked to others and to wider social networks.

At this point, certain differences between the Global north and the Global South, especially the Middle East, which pertain to gentrification and displacement studies, need to be understood. It is hard to deny that the presence of a sociocultural aspect leading to displacement in communities within capitalist societies is easier to discern than in societies within the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia. This is because capitalist societies are now not so dependent on close family associations within small communities; rather, families tend to be more dispersed. It also underlines the fact that neighbourhoods in capitalist societies are often more delineated by class, such that working-class families, for example, all tend to live in specific areas, whereas the middle class, with higher aspirations, seek out areas with features that are more familiar to them or that are associated with conspicuous consumption. For example, it has been noted that the presence of a Starbucks coffee shop in a particular area of a Western city is a sign of gentrification, as such shops cater to affluent clients (Dudley, 2004); these are the kinds of aspects that can have an impact on the sociocultural mix of the residents of an area. Medina families, the data show, tend to have more inter-connected lives as they lived in close proximity to each other in the old neighbourhoods, as described in chapters 5 and 6. Consequently, gentrification and displacement have had a great impact on their lives. The next section provides evidence of displacement from the central zone.

7.3. Displacement from the Central Zone

Although poor households might be able replace their previous houses with better quality houses elsewhere, their desire to stay in a particular neighbourhood may be because they do not want to lose their relationship with their neighbours, or miss out on social relations. In addition, for some of them, their housing has sentimental value, as they were born there and have lived most of their lives in the same place. One of the questions asked of displaced people from the central zone was if they preferred their new house or their previous house in downtown Medina. Some of them answered that they preferred their previous houses for reasons unrelated to the condition of the house, resonating with Vigdor's (2002) findings. One participant, Eve 7, expressed her feelings about her previous house thus:

"I prefer my old house because it had a feeling of psychological comfort, neighbours, relatives, no need for transportation, all the families close to each other and there was more family cohesion. Now my house is much bigger than the previous house, but there is a lack of such relevant social cohesion." (Interview with Eve 7 on 15/08/2014).

Adam11 expressed a similar view and feeling about his former house:

"24 years ago, I was comfortable in my house, previously it was more comfortable, although buildings may have housed more than one family, but I was at ease psychologically. I would go back to the old place as it was, even I live in an apartment. I now have to be prepared to stand in a queue waiting for the elevator." (Interview with Adam 11 on 11/08/2014).

A sense of loss was apparent amongst the interviewees Eve 7 and Adam 11. The loss related mainly to the psychological comfort they used to have because although both now live in more modern housing than before, they expressed longing for the social atmosphere of the hosh and for the close proximity of their relatives. This is in line with Davidson and Lees (2009) and He (2009), who observed that when disadvantage residents leave their former houses, they experience a loss of community, family and home as well as of the convenience of living in a central location where they had access to public facilities and social networks.

In general, the feelings the participants expressed about their displacement from Medina's central zone were negative. Eve 7 explained:

"We thought that we were being moved out due to the expansion of the Prophet's campus, as this was what we were told. But we found out too late that it was not for expanding the campus, but it was for hotel investment and for big business entrepreneurs. We feel the pain of leaving those places where we were born, and grew up in, homes to our fathers and our ancestors, and they got us out of them and, despite our objections, made us live far from the city centre. This was an injustice to households when they took them out." (Interview with Eve 7 on 15/08/2014).

It seems that, when the research participants were asked to leave, they were led to believe that it was to make way for the Prophet's Mosque enlargement project. It is clear that the

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former residents came from a humble, unprivileged background (see the next section) and that they were not fully aware of what was going on around them; in addition, they did not receive a clear message about the development project in the central zone. This situation reflects the public policy of the national and/or local government towards the public in general and previous households in the city centre in particular. This policy of the authorities does not mean that they ignored or were inconsiderate of the residents; rather, regardless of the policy's fairness or not, it was based on various legislation that the national authority relied on to execute their plans. This was deduced from the following information. First, a Royal Decree initiated the redevelopment project, as explained in chapter 5. Furthermore, a set of government regulations for real estate in Saudi Arabia was involved; these included the Law of Eminent Domain and Temporary Taking of Property, and the Law of Ownership of Real Property Units and Plots. Moreover, the endowment system was not in the interests of endowment occupants. For these reasons, the authority did not consider any need to inform the endowment residents about the project plans. Besides, the political system of Saudi Arabia (see chapter 4) lacks civil society institutions and community participation, therefore hindering citizens' ability to address the Saudi authorities as well as their right to know and transparency in the decision-making process, let alone their ability to participate in making decisions that will affect them. Marcuse (1986) and Van Weesep (1994), among others, emphasised the relationship between gentrification and public policy.

There were, however, some participants who did not like their old house because of its poor condition. One such complaint was made by Eve 5:

> *"My former house in the central zone was substandard. What made me worried were the harmful and toxic insects, especially in summer time". (Interview with Eve 5 on 16/08/2014)*

Nevertheless, it is hard to disregard the earlier comments about the feelings of loss experienced by former residents, which exemplifies the dark side of gentrification. However, Eve 5 indicated that her former house in the city centre was poorly maintained and had a problem with toxic insects. This means that she was not happy with her old house. On this point, it could be said that gentrification forced Eve 5 to move, especially

as she could not leave earlier in the 1970s or early 1980s because she did not take advantage of the housing programmes (see chapter 5), as she lacked sufficient funds. Indeed, some previous researchers have taken the view that, in many cases, gentrification can be positive for an area (Atkinson, 2003; Freeman, 2006).

There is an inconsistency between the new build gentrification in the central zone of Medina, as it displaced both disadvantaged and advantaged former occupants. For this reason, it could be argued that there was a radical change in the central zone, in line with Davidson and Lees' (2005) recommendation that new build gentrification and newly constructed buildings on brownfield sites or vacant land should not displace any existing residents, although there may be indirect displacement. Rérat et al. (2010) affirm that through evictions, direct displacement may be present in demolition/reconstruction operations, but it does not result from densification projects that build on vacant land or regenerate brownfield sites. In Medina's case, the central zone was a densely populated area before the new build development projects commenced. Davidson and Lees (2005) identified two kinds of site where new build developments are constructed, namely: "pre-existing residential land" and "an ex-industrial brownfield site".

Gradually, the people in the central zone of Medina began to move away, either because the rents in the new buildings were too expensive for them, they were persuaded that they would get more value for their money if they moved elsewhere, or because they could no longer identify with the transformed neighbourhood. The new build gentrification process in Medina robbed former residents of the right to return for a number of reasons. Many of these people occupied properties as tenants, whereas the regulations for housing in Saudi Arabia mean that, in general, the authorities deal with the landlord and not with the leaseholders. ECDCZ, as the government agent, paid compensation when a development project commenced, as was mentioned before, in Chapter 6, and that money went to the person who owned the property, not those who rented it. For the initial tenants, that meant any new landlord could redevelopment the property and raise the rent accordingly. It was not just leaseholders who came out of the central zone empty handed, but also households in the Prophet's Mosque endowment dwellings. It could be said this large group suffered harm for the following reasons. Firstly, they were third or fourth generation residents of houses where they paid a low annual rent, and they had the right to stay as long as they

paid the rent (see Chapter 5 for more on the endowment system). Secondly, despite the many years they had been living in their houses and in property owned by the Prophet's Mosque, which is supervised by a government institution, they did not have any right to claim compensation, even though they had taken it upon themselves to carry out on-going maintenance for their dwellings. Eve 6, a 65-year-old former resident, was asked whether she received any compensation when she had to leave her house in the central zone in 1990. She said:

> *"What I knew was that if a person owned a property and had a title deed, he or she got compensation, then built or bought a new one outside the central zone. Undoubtedly, everyone who had a house received good financial compensation, but anyone who did not have a title deed, or was just a tenant, or used to live in endowment housing like me, got nothing, we were just asked to evacuate the house. It was not compensated because the land did not belong to us, but I was born in that house, all the days of my youth I spent in it. The government asked us to evacuate and we did." (Interview with Eve 6 on 09/08/2014)*

Adam 6, 60 years old, was another example of a displaced person. He is a taxi driver, and he tried to explain his circumstances when he moved out of the central zone.

> *"I moved from the central zone in 1987. I lived in one of the heritage houses, which was my family home, at that time, as I was not yet married. My family house belonged to the Prophet's Mosque Endowment. I was told the reason for asking us to evacuate was the expansion of the Prophet's Mosque. Despite not wanting to move, the moving was compulsory; I remember that the power was cut off. They were supposed to give us an alternative house in another endowment building, as before, and it should have been close to the Prophet's Mosque and the central zone." (Interview with Adam 6 on 13/08/2014)*

Both Eve 6 and Adam 6 lived in endowment houses and the authorities forced them to leave on account of new build gentrification, but they were not provided with alternative housing nor given any financial compensation. There was no law that could help such people obtain any benefit, in contrast with the owners, because of the endowment law which are understood as the property of God which refers to assets designated for the

purposes of charity with detaining and preventing property and the revenues derived from them can be used for the greater social welfare. This finding is similar to the results of some studies conducted in the Global North (e.g. Hamnett, 1973; William, 1976; Smith, 1979; Marcuse, 1985; Martin, 2007). They show that the effect of gentrification on a neighbourhood in terms of displacement is directly proportional to the stringency of laws governing the local housing markets and rules guiding availability. This is inconsistent with Shaw (2008), who argued that policy can be used to drive gentrification, which causes displacement. Although the housing laws differ between Medina and cities of the global North, there is nevertheless increasing convergence in the urban experiences of larger cities of the global North and South, as Harris (2008) argues.

Even those who owned property in central zone of Medina might have had a title deed without updated documentation, according to the Saudi document ownership system; in this case, the owners had no right to claim compensation. One of the participants, Kaki, who was one of the supervisors of the development project, explained this issue:

> *"Some of the former residents were not compensated, as the excuse was that their paperwork dated back to before the Saudi state, so they didn't have the right to claim compensation." (Interview with Kaki on 19/09/2013).*

This situation could reflect the former residents' lack of awareness of Saudi law, as many of them were illiterate, especially the first generation of the modern Saudi state. Makki (1985) pointed out that 46% of Medina's population in 1977 was illiterate.

On the other hand, not all former landlords were displaced because of legal reasons, and some of the cases were resolved differently for religious reasons. Some of the landlords expressed a lack of satisfaction with their compensation, so they left the central zone without receiving any compensation at all. Kaki also mentioned cases that he faced with some of the former landlord residents who had legal difficulties with the price, which was based on land valuation. Ultimately, religious reasons led them to give up their properties.

> *"There are some who had very little compensation compared to their neighbours in other neighbourhoods, where they found a huge difference. Therefore, they left the compensation as a donation for the Prophet's Mosque, hoping to be rewarded by God. They didn't receive their compensation as they thought that the valuation of their*

properties was not fair, so they preferred to donate it to the Prophet's Mosque and
request a reward from God." (Interview with Kaki on 19/09/2013)

The case that Kaki discussed could be represent an example of displacement caused by new build gentrification in an Islamic city. This case reflects the religious attitude from some of the displaced residents who owned property in city centre of Medina. They relinquished their compensation for the feeling that it was inadequate, and in the end, they opted to donate it to the Prophet's Mosque for religious considerations that they believe in. This could be a manifestation of what Abubrig (2012) calls the harmony between the individual self and the configuration of buildings, which he argues is essential to the Islamic way of living.

Economic factors also prevented former residents from returning to the central zone following its redevelopment. These were connected to the level of rent in the central zone and the price of property. The new build development included some housing but they were much more expensive than before; rents in the courtyards before 1990 were between RS 2,000 and 3,000 per month (see chapter 5, Laws and Plans Affecting Redevelopment), whereas the price for a single night could reach RS 500 to 1,000 in 2009 (SCT, 2009). Thus, these real estate commodities were not produced or priced at the economic level of the former residents. Adam 7's father had a house in the central zone and obtained compensation, but he explained why his father did not return to the area after redevelopment.

> *"My father thought that he could go back to the central zone and buy new land with*
> *that money and build a new house for us, but he found out there was no chance for*
> *him to do that. We discovered it was a business investment, there was no room for our*
> *participation because of the land prices. The development of the area, yes it was good,*
> *but we were not properly compensated and we could not return there." (Interview*
> *with Adam 7 on 15/08/2014).*

Many issue arise from the comments made by Adam 7. First, it could be said that his father experienced displacement twice, based on Marcuse's (1985) and Davidson and Lees' (2010) categories of displacement. One of these is direct last-resident displacement, while the second is "exclusionary displacement: here residents cannot access housing

because it has been gentrified (or abandoned)" (p 389). Ultimately, he lost his chance to live in the central zone twice. Second, and related to the previous point, is the view that residents of Islamic cities face a greater risk of displacement from redevelopment projects compared to residents of European cities. On reason for this is that in light of the economic and political conditions in Islamic cities, redevelopment and urbanization there mainly focus on new construction (Bosker et al., 2013).

In any case, the general process of gentrification in both the global North and South have the same result, namely, that lower income residents are forced to leave their neighbourhoods due to their inability to afford higher housing costs in a tight market (Williams and Smith, 1986). The data show that new development in the central zone of Medina had directly displaced 100% of the existing tenants and leaseholders by 1990.

Adam 6, the taxi driver who had lived in endowment housing, had a similar viewpoint regarding the high price of property in the central zone:

"I could not go back to the central zone owing to the high price of real estate. The central zone is not for us anymore. It is dedicated to visitors and pilgrims." (Adam 6, Interviewed on 20/07/2014)

Adam 6 recognises that the central zone was redesigned for goals that did not include housing him. Not only were the previous residents priced out of the new housing in the central zone, the function of the area was altered from a mix of commercial and residential properties to only providing accommodation for tourist and seasonal visitors. This is in the line with scholars such as Albert (2017) and Gant (2005) who have argued that tourism is also a gentrifying process that indirectly causes displacement by constraining the quality of life for residents. In addition, it affirms the viewpoint of a number of researchers in both the Global North and South who have observed a relationship between tourism and gentrification. Gentrification has been found to increase real estate values in tourist areas, thereby causing displacement (Gotham, 2005; Gladstone and Préau, 2008; Cocola-Gant, 2018). The displaced residents of Medina's central zone were replaced by members of the upper class, in terms of the consumption view, and in terms of the production view, they were replaced by different agents with more financial power.

Considering the changes in the functions of the central zone of Medina, it could be said that there was obvious negligence of the right of local people to return to this area. P4, a participant who was a former member of Medina's city council, explained:

"There is an opinion now on the need to return the former residents to the central region, as many disadvantages were found in keeping the people of Medina out of the central region. There are very small numbers of the central region population who have returned after the development. The planners have failed to return the population to the central region, and they have completely forgotten that the people of Medina are unable to return to the central region because of the high prices". (Interview with P4 on 25/08/2013)

Medina's gentrification scenario could be said to differ from other gentrification scenarios from the Global North in that the authorities in the latter may offer a more holistic vision when making a development decision, and may take into consideration the reaction of the local community. Two points became apparent in the data about the social mix that followed years of gentrification. Throughout the course of development in Medina, there is no indication that culture or identity were considered by the authorities at either the national or local level. Thus, the policies demonstrate a blatant lack of cultural and social strategies, as the emphasis was on the economic side. Second, the failure is not only the absence of local people in the planning but also the absence of the civilizational dimension of Medina's history. The city's heritage of old houses, schools and Turkish public baths, which had a history of more than 400 years, were destroyed and utterly demolished. The local government, the Medina municipality, admitted that it had caused sociocultural damage to the former residents. It would seem that for new build development in the central zone, the local and national governments put the capital investment agenda first before any kind of social agenda, resulting in displacement and the destruction of cultural artefacts. The contradicts Yildiz (2011), who suggests that Islamic cities have maintained the structuring of ancient cities with minimal changes. However, there is no doubt that Medina represents an Islamic city where a Muslim society lives, as Demirci (2003) maintains, and which hosts Muslim visitors. However, the gentrification of the central zone of Medina also contrasts with Atkinson's (2003) finding that revitalizing city centres secures the physical fabric of architecturally valuable neighbourhoods.

It is also clear that commercial gentrification induced displacement in the central zone of Medina, as a completely new system of operating the central zone was put in place; this differed from before and caused former shopkeepers to lose their businesses and employees to lose their jobs, as Hatem ,who planner and director of urban observatory in Medina , explained:

"Most of the former residents were those who worked in trade or services in the region, and during the development period, which lasted for more than fifteen years, they needed to find alternative employment in areas outside the region. After the implementation of the development and the entry of new investors or employment companies, they were not able to return to work in the region, especially in the retail trade, due to the large amount of capital required for these activities. Therefore, they headed to work outside the development area. Also, the way of managing and operating the pilgrimage housing changed; before, houses used to be individually rented by owners or investors to the pilgrims upon their arrival in the city of Medina, now it's managed by companies and large groups, where it's not possible to work in the field of housing except through them". *(Interview with Hatem on 17/09/2013).*

Interestingly, commercial gentrification took place in the central zone of Medina as well. Here too, there are similarities with the cases of gentrification that have been documented elsewhere in the world by several research studies (Lees, 2003; Zukin et al., 2009; Fisherman, 2006). One argument that supports the role of changes in the commercial or retail structure in causing gentrification and displacement is that members of the lower class cannot compete with upper class gentrifiers because their buying power is much lower, and this is what Hatem refers to in his interview. Gotham (2005) asserted that rising land values in tourist areas also affects commercial properties, which the data indicate caused commercial displacement in the central zone of Medina. The commercial displacement caused by new build gentrification was led by public authorities who were also real-estate agents (see chapter 6). Trono (2009) argues that the displacement of disadvantaged renters can be classified as commercial gentrification when it occurs in connection with the arrival of international businesses, and as state-led gentrification due to the involvement of the state in gentrifying the urban spaces in tourist areas.

These comments fit in with Marcuse's (1986) arguments that increased prices cause forced displacement, highlighting how that gentrification can push residents out because of impersonal economic circumstances. However, new build gentrification in the central zone had extra impersonal circumstances contributing to displacement, in particular legislation such as the Law of Eminent Domain and the endowment system (see chapter 5) did not favour the former residents. A number of findings can be drawn from these impersonal circumstances. Firstly, the local state forced former residents, comprising tenant occupiers, owner occupiers, investors in property and those who had retail businesses, out of the area. This concurs with Davidson and Lees (2010) and Slater (2010), who highlight the types of displacement that can occur, one of which involves forcing people out by cutting off electricity or increasing rents. In the central zone of Medina, the local authority was in a landlord position, threatening residents through cutting off power and water in order to drive them out. Secondly, both commercial and residential displacement occurred. The people who lived in the housing endowments were the most affected by displacement. Examples of this from the data were provided in the following two cases of displaced people. First, Eve 6 was one of the displaced people who left her endowment house because of the state-led gentrification process. Her life after moving was different from before; she describes what happened when she left:

"It was difficult to find suitable accommodation due to high leases, and I wanted an area near the Prophet's Mosque and markets, also a bank, but I could not find anywhere the same distance as from my previous house. I live now in a flat that is more comfortable than my previous stone house. It is better in terms of space and safety. Also, I was never previously concerned about safety and I never used to lock my door during the day because everyone in the neighbourhood was lovely, neighbours whom I had lived with for a long time that we became like a family. Everything was very close to me, such as schools, hospital, bank, and the market, and I did not need to use transport. My house was very close to the Prophet's mosque and I used to go there by walking, but now I have to call a taxi for my shopping, bank or hospital, and this costs me." (Interview with Eve 6 on 09/08/2014).

Davidson and Lees (2009) also suggest that forcing residents to other areas on the periphery makes their lives more difficult and add transportation costs to their bills, as

they are farther from amenities and employment opportunities. In the Middle East in particular, Drakakis–Smith (1980) argued that the Western way in which development and planning was implemented in most cities failed to provide housing to the urban poor because it was too expensive.

Another participant, Adam 8, a 55-year-old factory worker, was asked to compare his current house with his former house in the central zone. He stated:

"Honestly, despite my house now being better than my house was in the central zone, because it is bigger and more comfortable, the rent is high, and since 1986 we have moved house 3 times; moving from the central zone was not my choice, living there was no cost to us. The Prophet's Mosque was very close, but now I use my car to get there and I miss the strong relationship between the sons of Hosh, we knew each other as one family". *(Interview with Adam 8 on 22/08/2014)*

Both of these participants were long-term residents of the central zone, and they both conceded that in terms of physical condition, their current home was much better than their previous one. This reflects the nature of their previous stone houses, which were built more than a hundred years ago, at least (see Chapter 5). In addition, there was a lack of continuing maintenance, as their houses were not serviced or renovated.

Eve 6 and Adam 8, however, both expressed dissatisfaction with other aspects of their new residences, namely the cost of the rent and the distance from the Prophet's Mosque. This result is consistent with research carried out by Atkinson (2000) in three areas of central London, who wrote that "The elderly were considered to be disproportionately represented among displacees by all of the project workers… this group was more profoundly affected by social changes around them. The loss of friends or kinship networks was cited as a reason for the decision to move from an area, to move where family have moved or, finally, to find someplace cheaper" (p.314). In the same vein, Harment (1979) claims that displacement means moving from a caring, supportive atmosphere where one finds encouragement, to a foreign area where the prices may be considerably higher, and transportation is required as everything is farther away.

For Adam 8, the latter was not such a big issue, because he could drive his car to the Prophet's Mosque. This would also not be particularly expensive, because fuel prices are

cheap in Saudi Arabia, costing no more than US$0.24 per litre. For Eve 6, access to the mosque in the central zone and to other destinations became considerably more difficult. As a woman, she was prohibited from driving in Saudi Arabia. In addition, there is no buses transport system in Saudi Arabia, which meant that she had to pay for a taxi each time she went out.

Furthermore, in line with Atkinson (2000), all of those interviewed agreed that there was a strong community relationship in the Ahwash, which served as a social welfare system that was not repeated when they left the central zone. This had an impact on their social capital and the social structure of the families that had previously been characterised by their inter-connections; indeed, the displacement caused a breakdown in relationships with friends, neighbours and extended families, especially on religious and social occasions, which were described in Chapter 5 as being part of neighbourhood life in the courtyards. This is similar to Moore's (2015) findings, which show that displacement causes the loss of community and relationships. The following section describes the characteristics of the displaced residents.

7.3.1. The Characteristics of the Displaced Residents

This part of the chapter presents the data on the characteristics of the displaced residents. As mentioned before in this chapter and in chapter 3, two areas of the old city centre, called Bab Alshami and Hosh Alnuzhat, are given for extra scrutiny for the purpose of illustration. Figures 5 and 6 presented in Chapter 3 depicts the current landscape of both areas. They show that the old neighbourhoods were replaced with tourist facilities to serve anticipated visitors, which can be seen as a manifestation of tourism gentrification. The new build development in this location was also a manifestation of tourism gentrification, as the new buildings were designed to accommodate visitors. Gravari-Barbas and Sandra (2017) confirm, "Tourism gentrification is a critical shaping force of socio-economic and contemporary urban landscapes". Steyn and Spencer (2016) similarly found that the process of tourism-driven gentrification made wealthy investors drive out the original, poorer residents of the area.

The participants who had been displaced from the neighbourhood of Bab Alshami (Eve 1, Eve 2, Eve 3, Eve 4, Adam 1, Adam 2, Adam 3, and Adam 7) shared at least four

notable characteristics. First, all of them owned their own home at the time of the interview and all had previously owned houses in their former area of residence; expect Adam 2 and Eve 4, who both used to live in rented houses. Second, all of them except Adam 7 bought their house between the mid-1970s and late 1980s from individual real estate agents because they had received a government land grant. In the case of Adam 7, it was his father who received compensation from the government, rather than obtaining a land grant. Third, all of them had been educated and were employed, apart from Eve 3, who was illiterate but married to a wealthy man, and Eve 4, who was not working but lived on her husband's pension.

Finally, all of the Bab Alshami respondents could be categorised as having experienced direct chain displacement because they moved out of the area due to the deterioration of the building in which they had been living. This result is in accordance with the types of displacement outlined initially by Marcus (1985) subsequently by Slater (2009) and Davidson and Lees (2010) (see Chapter 2). As the latter explain, "Direct chain displacement: this goes beyond standard 'last resident' counting and includes previous households who were forced to move out due to deterioration of the building or rent hikes" (Davidson and Lees, 2010:398). Adam 3 and Adam 4 left the central zone before the development project started. In addition, Adam 2 explained why he left the city centre:

"The reason was the high cost of rent, I've lived in several areas of the city centre, because my father preferred to live in the Hosh system; then when he died, I left the city centre. The houses were in poor condition, so it did not make sense for me to pay rent for a damaged house. Moreover, I received a grant of land from the government in 1988 and built the current home" (Interview with Adam 2 on 06/08/2014).

A number of implications can be drawn from the above excerpt from the interview with Adam 2 regarding why he left central zone. First, as a renter, he faced difficulties dwelling in the city centre, in particular rent increases, which forced his family to move several times. Although he made no direct reference to his landlords in these various residences, it could be inferred that raising the rent was an intentional act on the part of the owners to force the residents to leave. However, what made him stay in the city centre was his father's preference for the Hosh (courtyard) way of live; thus, he only left, because of the

deterioration of the houses which nevertheless had a high rent, after his father passed away. At that time, he took advantage of housing support from the national government. In fact, Adam 2's comments exemplify the circumstances of the second wave of gentrification in Medina's city centre, which is discussed in chapter 5. People who used to live in the city centre were forced to leave by individual investors or real state dealers who were taking advantage of housing policies that were ostensibly intended to provide support to both local people and investors.

The participants who had been displaced from Alnuzhat Hosh also shared many of the same characteristics. First, at the time of the study, all of them lived in rented housing in different parts of Medina between the first ring road and the second ring road except Eve 7, who lived in her own house which she had inherited from her late husband. Second, they had all originally lived in endowment housing, although Eve 8's journey differed slightly from the others, as she used to live in an endowment house with her family but left when she got married. Third, they were forced out of the central zone by the local authority's order, as it rescinded their right to stay in endowment housing. Additionally, half of them were illiterate and the rest had only a basic level of education. None of the female respondents were employed. Finally, the Alnuzhat Hosh residents interviewed had all experienced direct last-resident displacement according to Marcus's classification (1985), which Davidson and Lees (2010) define. "Direct last-resident displacement: this can be physical (e.g. winkling – when landlords cut off heat in a building, flood it, or set fires in it, forcing the occupants out) or economic (e.g. rent-hike eviction)" (Davidson and Lees, 2010: 398). With the exception of Eve 8, who left because of marriage, as mentioned above, some of these former residents of Alnuzhat Hosh faced power cuts by the local authority. The same situation occurred decades ago in a neighbourhood in London. Such actions executed by landlords are called winkling. Lees (1994) stated that:

"Creeping [vacancy] decontrol enabled the 'winkling' of tenants and the sale of buildings to developers and/or individuals who would then gentrify the property. 'Winkling' refers to the process of tenants being forced to leave their homes by bribery and harassment. In Barnsbury, when vacant possession value became higher than tenanted investment value, 'winkling' occurred and the vacated property was sold. When one of Knight's [an unscrupulous Barnsbury landlord] tenants reported him to the rent tribunal, he turned

off the electricity, locked her out, threw out her belongings, bolted the door, libelled her and threatened to shoot her" (Lees, 1994:208).

The experience of being forced to leave the area appeared to have had a considerable impact on some of these participants. Eve 6, for example, stated:

"I was the last resident who left Alnuzhat Hosh with my neighbour. She was my relative as well. She died after a few years of moving" (Interview with Eve 6 on 09/08/2014).

Amongst both sample groups, the oldest participant from Alnuzhat Hosh was Adam 1 . Accordingly, it was apparent that the people who had lived in endowment housing in the city centre prior to the development project were the most affected by new build gentrification. They lost not only their homes, where the rent was very cheap, but also the social capital that had been invested in their city centre neighbourhoods. In contrast, the former residents of Bab Alshami, whatever their reasons for leaving the area, were able to replace their old houses with newer houses outside the central zone, although they also lost the strong social capital they had previously acquired, for which they could not be compensated in the same way as they were for their houses. This result corroborates the findings of a great deal of the previous work in displacement and gentrification in Global North cities and towns (e.g. Ley, 1986; Marcuse, 1986; Smith & Williams, 1986; Slater, 2009), specifically that displacement is one of the manifestations of gentrification. Local people who used to live in endowment houses in the city centre of Medina, all of whom were disadvantaged, low-income renters, were the biggest losers in terms of being forced to leave without any alternative options or indeed any support or compensation. This is consistent with the views of Hartman et al. (1982), who claimed that the demolition of the housing units of low-income people, without providing alternative housing, is condemnable.

"It is also fundamentally wrong to allow removal of housing units from the low to moderate income stock, for any purpose, without requiring at least a one for one replacement. Demolition, conversion, or 'upgrade' rehab of vacant private or publicly owned lower-rent housing should be just as vigorously opposed as when those units are occupied" (Hartman et al., : 5).

7.4. Conclusion

The chapter has presented the data collected on the displacement of residents from the central zone of Medina as a negative feature of gentrification. Much of the information came from participants who had previously lived in the central zone but were forced out either directly or by circumstances, who were tracked the tribal structure of the society and invited to participate. It was made apparent that the redevelopment was a response to the insufficient infrastructure to support the rising number of tourists to the city, who are mainly interested in the Prophet's Mosque.

Thus, the chapter has answers the fourth research question and situated the development of Medina and the displacement it caused in the context of commercial gentrification. It has shown how gentrification and displacement may be an outcome of religious tourism in the study area. As seen in previous chapters, gentrification was a vehicle to transform the study area through the provision of tourist facilities, such as accommodation, markets and restaurants. New build gentrification in the central zone of Medina was not only driven by but was also responsible for increases in tourism. The various components of this tourism plan included hotels, malls, restaurants, and underground car parking. These modern city features stand in contrast to the neighbourhoods called home by the original residents and can be seen as a factor in their displacement. However, not all the displacement has been direct, and it must be taken into account that indirect displacement is also a negative effect of gentrification. Based on the status of Medina as a religious tourism destination, the analysis of gentrification in the city centre offers a unique case for understanding the connection between the global economic process of tourism and local actions related to the transformation of an urban space.

Chapter 8

Summary, Conclusion, and Contribution to Knowledge

8.1. Introduction

This thesis, through qualitative mixed-methods research involving structured interviews and content analysis of archival data, intends to investigate redevelopments in the central zone of Medina. The central research agenda of the thesis was to examine whether this redevelopment should be viewed as an instance of urban gentrification, and has sought to ascertain whether this gentrification is being led by individual investors and real estate dealers in the second wave during the 1970s and 1980s, and by the central state in the third wave in the 1990s. The chapters have elaborated on the four objectives of the research comprehensively: first, it has identified instigators of redevelopment in the central zone of Medina since the 1970s; second, it has identified the major actors that have been involved in the redevelopment; third, it has determined its impacts on local people; and fourth, it has discussed and fitted the gentrification in the study area within the classic and recent debates on gentrification in general.

The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section presents a summary of the chapters included. This is then followed with a discussion of the contributions made by this thesis to knowledge in three key areas: theoretical, empirical and methodological.

The third section is on the limitations of the study. The final section discusses the potential future study in gentrification in the Global South and Middle East regions, and the Islamic cities within the current debates of global gentrification, and in terms of the comparatively new gentrification from urbanism and tourism.

In developing this research question, the thesis has been set up as a dialogue with debates over the relationship between redevelopment and gentrification; processes of gentrification in the Global North and Global South; urbanization in the Middle East and its relationship with Islam, and the implications for religious tourism on urban re-development and gentrification. The mixed-method research used has been effective in providing empirical evidence on the former residents' perspective of the impact of redevelopment on the central zone of Medina, and thus on their everyday lives. The thesis has argued that in contrast to Freeman's (2006) questioning of displacement as a central outcome in gentrified areas, the displacement of former residents is a major outcome of gentrification in the central zone which contests the claims made by Boddy and Lambert (2002) and Boddy (2007) that new build developments are not gentrification, and that there is no instances of displacement/gentrification in instances of new builds and that social upgrading is not harmless. The thesis has also situated Medina in the context of global gentrification and of Islamic cities and urbanization debate. The thesis demonstrates that gentrification in the central zone of Medina was motivated by commercial gains, whereby a need to facilitate the experience of tourists in terms of a religious centre has had a negative impact on the local residents. The negative impacts of tourism on religious sites and ceremonies, in addition to the economics of religious tourism, are themes that are central to the topic of religious tourism (Timothy and Olsen, 2006) This therefore situates Medina, Saudi Arabia, within the global concept of religious tourism (Vukonic, 2002).

8.2. Summary of Thesis

Explanations about the topic, key concepts, research aims and objectives and its justification are provided in Chapter One. A comprehensive literature review is presented in Chapter Two, which are set up in dialogue regarding the debates over the relationship

between redevelopment and gentrification, the processes of gentrification in the Global North and Global South, the urbanization in the Middle East and its relationship with Islam, and the implications of religious tourism on urban redevelopment and gentrification. Chapter Three gives a justification for carrying out a qualitative study on gentrification. It provides an explanation of the methods used in this thesis, which includes semi-structured interviews for two categories of participants (elite and non-elite), observations, and archival documents for gathering data on the gentrification of Medina's central zone. Chapter Four identifies the urbanization of Medina in the Saudi context. Focusing on the developments and urban factors causing rural to urban migration and urbanisation in Medina and the explanation for how Medina became rated as part of the fourth rank of urban hierarchy of Saudi Arabia. The chapter discusses the highly centralized legislative processes that are involved in urban planning policies in Saudi Arabia, and clarifies how the central state is responsible for local urban development and planning processes.

The findings presented in Chapter Five show that the urban developments that emerged after 1974 by Royal decree in the central zone of Medina marked the second wave of gentrification. The chapter presented findings relating to the first and second research questions, as has been formulated from the research objectives: the first is relates to the factors that have contributed to the development witnessed in the central zone of Medina since the 1970s, whilst the second considers who the major actors involved in the redevelopment process are.

This study has shown that redevelopment in Central Medina in the 1970s and 1980s was a new build gentrification. It has revealed the relationship between the new legislation issued by Royal Decree in 1974 (REDF and land grants), and that the redevelopment taking place in the central zone has had a direct impact on city centre locals, whether they are rental occupiers or owner occupiers. The results show that the clauses in the new legislation indirectly prevented the locals from rebuilding their houses in central Medina whilst at the same time facilitating product redevelopment by investors. The clauses offered opportunities for central locals to obtain new houses in new suburbs such as Sultanah, the Alwali area, and the Alharah Alshrakeya area, while making it more difficult to have the same opportunities in the inner city. As a result, locals had been

voluntarily displaced with the exception of endowment occupiers who did not have any financial capability to leave and at the same time endowment law protected them if they remained. Although the endowment law acted as a safety valve allowing locals in endowment housing to stay, endowment housing has subsequently been neglected by the state administrative MRM and MIAECG.

The investigation to answer the second question has shown that the major actors involved in the redevelopment process in the 1970s and 1980s were individual investors, real estate dealers and property owners who had the financial capacity to take the opportunities offered by the REDF clauses provided by both the local and national authorities to set up investment projects. The findings show that new build projects led by individual investors and real estate dealers was a commercial and touristic gentrification to upgrade services and accommodations, hotels and restaurants for visitors and pilgrims who increased in numbers visiting the city. The chapter argued that the redevelopment between the 1970s and 1980s was triggered by potential commercial gain. The rent gap drove property investors and real estate dealers to purchase land from individuals in the central zone, taking advantage of governmental support. At that time, there was no associated business activities for real estate developers because this kind of business was essentially unknown in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the transformation of Medina city centre was not significant compared with later redevelopment. The analysis therefore shows that there is an incidence of commercial gentrification (Lees et al., 2013) and tourism gentrification (Gotham, 2005), both serving to feed each other.

One of the significant findings to emerge from Chapter Five is that the means of reinforcing the gentrification, which took the form of commerce and tourism, were the various urban regulations and policies formed by central state in Riyadh that focussed on the Prophet's Mosque enlargement project in 1973 and 1978. The increasing urbanization of Medina during this period, the increasing number of visitors and pilgrims, enforcement of housing laws (REDF and land grants) and the Prophet's Mosque enlargement project have led to positioning the site within the context of global tourism more than ever before.

Another of the findings in chapter Five was that losing part of the old urban fabric of the inner city of Medina, namely part of a residential area replaced by a new build

gentrification, has been at the cost of its residential usage by local people. Not only that, it has also taken away the cultural heritage of the inhabitants of Medina. In chapter Five, urban physical features such as Ahwash courtyards, heritage houses and the Prophet's Mosque, the social environment and endowment housing have been analysed to show how commercial and touristic gentrification was taking place in city centre. The process produced a partially gentrified central zone and enhanced the economic and religious function of the area.

This study shows that increasing urbanisation in Medina in the 1970s and 1980s (see chapter 4) could not be the only reason for the emergence of a new suburb, but that the gentrification in the city centre constituted an additional cause and reason for locals' mobility to the suburbs. The results show that displaced locals choose the new suburb in the south, north and east of the city centre to live (it should be noted that the western side of the city has a broken, rocky, and uneven surface).

Chapter Six answers the first research question because of the chapter covering the phase from the 1990s to 2000s, when the redevelopment was ultimately completed. The findings showed that the redevelopments that emerged, via Royal decree in 1990, in the   central zone of Medina marked the third wave of gentrification. It shows that new build gentrification taking place in the central zone of Medina was caused by the decisions that came directly from the highest legislative authority in the country, that is, the king. In 1990, King Fahad established the state development of the central zone by royal decree, and set up two committees that he chaired himself. The results show that the politically tense ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in trying to call the international management of the Hajj and internationalization of the Two Holy Mosques by the Iranian president arguably acted as a motivation to make the royal decision to provide evidence of Saudi Arabia's legitimacy to retain the two holy Muslim sites of Mecca and Medina. Related to these findings, it could be said that the Saudi King's interest was motivated by gentrification in the central zone. I would personally argue that geopolitical circumstances between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Middle East represented the underlying forces to new build gentrification. Thus, the outcomes of gentrification were excessive in terms of physical and social change, as will be argued later in this chapter.

Regarding the answer to the second research question: "who are the major actors involved in the redevelopment process?" the results of this investigation show that the two committees headed by the king and Taiba Company, which was responsible for around 50% of the redevelopment of the central zone were the main players, then later other elite actors and corporate developers became involved. In Medina's case, it can be understood that the central state managed to assemble the driving forces of gentrification, which can be termed state monopolist gentrification by giving itself priority from the outset by being the principal actor. It facilitated gentrification by controlling who could potential 'gentrifiers' could be through a number of finical requirements that could not in any way be available to a group belonging to the middle or working class.

This chapter also explained that even though gentrification is a global phenomenon, in this case it considered a specific city in the Middle East that was 1) ruled by an absolute monarchy, 2) a centrally planned system, 3) strong economic and governmental control over major economic activities in the country, and 4) it had witnessed significant urbanization in the previous 40 years, that ultimately had a different story. All previous elements as system of parts working together rustling in kind of aggressive gentrification. However, because of the consideration that Medina is a sacred city and has had a religious function for centuries (see chapter 4), redevelopment in the central zone was oriented around servicing pilgrims and visitors. Thus, Medina is religious tourist destination for all Muslims worldwide, resulting in touristic gentrification. Chris Park, in his book entitled Scared World, pointed out the relation between development and religion when he stated:

"*Religion and development are associated in a variety of different ways. Sometimes a religious group acts directly as an agent of development, particularly in terms of providing an infrastructure for aid and welfare support and providing a widely trusted vehicle for implementing socio-economic change*" (Park ,1994: 176).

This has placed these findings within debates about comparative urbanism and gentrification in the Global North and Global South.

Chapter Seven presented findings on the impact of the waves of redevelopment on local people. In contrast to the emphasis given to the methodological challenges of tracking

displaced people within gentrification studies of the Global North (e.g., Slater, 2004), this chapter has revealed that studies of Middle Eastern cities may enjoy some significant advantages. In particular, the tribal structures of Arab societies have enabled the study of displacement. Arab tribes in particular are already urbanised, but they are a closely knit community and locals still hold a certain allegiance to their tribes as a means of preserving their identities. Hüsken explains:

"*It is necessary to get away from the understanding of tribes as some sort of a medieval form of social organization……..Tribal belonging has already changed from denoting a way of life in the past to marking an identity today*" (Hüsken, 2012:28).

Based on this distinctive characteristic of tribal structures of Arab societies and , very close tribal and family ties is took advantages to track displaced people in central zone, so it is not hard to find someone who belongs to a tribe by asking one of the tribe members or the sheikh of the tribe. Hence, I think researchers who want to study displacement qualitatively in rural or urban areas in Middle East, for example but not limited to, Arab Gulf countries or Jordan, will not struggle to track people who are being displaced by gentrification.

The chapter was hence able to outline the fact that the redevelopment of the central zone of Medina was being accompanied by displacement. The findings also emphasised the fact that there are differences between the displacements that accompanied the second wave and third waves. The locals who were displaced in second wave were mostly occupier-owners, and they left the central zone voluntarily because of the number of limitations that had been imposed by REDF and land-grant lands (see chapter 5) when compared with the opportunities available outside the city centre. On the other hand, endowment occupiers in the central zone from low-income backgrounds were displaced in the third wave of gentrification. Endowment law had protected them from displacement during the second wave; however, the law did not intercede or protect them against displacement in third wave of state-sponsored gentrification. The displacement in the third wave was involuntarily, and local authorities enabled winkling (see chapter7) by cutting off water and electricity to their houses. The findings show that although the participants belong to two different kinds of occupiers: owner-occupiers and endowment occupiers but both tow groups were displaced. It has shown an extremely aggressive

gentrification in new build form where, unlike the Global North countries which promote and support gentrification, the Saudi authorities at both the local and national level enforced it.

It further showed that redevelopment was a response to the lack of infrastructure available to serve and support the rising number of tourists. In the process, the chapters provided answers to the fourth research question, which was: "to what extent does this redevelopment resonate with classic and recent debates in the literature on gentrification?" and situates redevelopment in the central zone in the context of commercial gentrification. The findings in this chapter show how gentrification and displacement is an outcome of religious tourism in Central Medina. Gentrification was a vehicle to transform the study area by providing tourist facilities such as accommodation, markets and restaurants. New build gentrification in the central zone of Medina was responsible for the development of tourism in the area. The various components of this tourism plan included hotels, malls, restaurants, and underground car parking. Overall, the findings of these chapters showed that, based on the image of Medina as a religious tourism destination, gentrification in the city centre offered a distinctive case study in terms of a city centre context, process, and actors. Further, the chapters have shown that despite the benefits of new build gentrification for pilgrims, by providing good tourist service such as hotels and restaurants, the losers have been shown to be the low-income and semi-skilled classes, while the elite, investors, and the Saudi tourist industry have benefitted considerably from this process. Middle-income households and owner-occupiers gained from this gentrification as they were able to sell their properties and replace their previous homes with modern houses in the suburbs; these had more space and led to developments in new areas. Nevertheless, not everyone living in the city centre benefited from these housing programmes (see chapters 5, 6 and 7).

In relation to the Islamic city and the split city debate, the findings in this thesis confirm Alsayyad's (2011) and Yacobi and Shechter's (2005) views concerning the complexities surrounding the traditional and modern that has become a feature in the urbanization processes in most of the Islamic cities in the Middle East. Medina thus reflects a split city, the result of modern structures (Yacobi &Shechter, 2005) associated with westernised, and 'traditional' architecture and urban design retained in the Islamic styles (see chapters

5 and 6). The newly emerged central zone reflects both a planned and modern/westernised urban environment where the 'old city' Medina reflects both 'tradition' and 'local' views of the pilgrimage site, while the new public buildings, commercial centres, and accommodations have created an urban iconography of imported 'modernity'. It was found that the city centre of Medina was partially gentrified in the second wave in the 1970s and 1980s, which removed a significant part of the architectural heritage that extends to nearly 400 years into the Ottoman era (see Chapter 4). Not only was the disappearance of part of the architectural heritage one of the results of gentrification, but the area around the Prophet's Mosque was also once home to residents who lived in courtyards that represented particular social and communal places; this sense of community has disappeared from the city centre. Instead, the central zone has now become a temporary home to the Saudi elite, who use the accommodation as second homes, and to wealthy visitors who can afford to live in luxury hotels (see Chapters 6 and 7). The heritage homes of the courtyards have become concrete towers blocking out the visual aspect of the Prophet's Mosque from the residents of Medina, as well as reducing the character and identity of a place related to courtyards and alleys.

Although the developmental impacts of religious tourism have been downplayed by religious institutions in the past (Vukonic, 2002), the findings suggested certain developmental impacts of tourism in places of pilgrimage. Within the religious tourism debates, the experience of the commercialization of religious cities necessitates the study of development or gentrification in places of pilgrimage as displacement could be occurred. This study confirms that new build gentrification that is taking place around the Prophet's Mosque has been taken advantage of in terms of transferring land use from residential use to commercial use in the central zone (see Chapter 6). The radical urban transformation in the city centre retained the most prominent feature, which is the mosque, as an attractive site in terms of investment in the hospitality industry. The central zone has been a place of production of tourism services that are consumed by pilgrims and visitors.

8.3. Contribution to Knowledge: Gentrification and Displacement

It could be said the present search has made the first steps towards studying gentrification in Saudi Arabia. This study addresses the gap in the existing body of literature regarding gentrification. The focus of the study is on gentrification in an Islamic city in the Middle East. It has provided insight into gentrification in Saudi cities in general, while focussing on the city centre of Medina.

Theoretically, the present study provides additional evidence with respect to the debates on comparative urbanism in gentrification research, which agrees with Lees (forthcoming: para.21) claim that "*Gentrification is not generalized but has generalizations*".

Geographically, the thesis gives some evidence that gentrification take place in the Global South within different urban contexts, by which I mean that the urban characteristics of central Medina (study area), which are religious features, distinguish the city from other cities; nevertheless, it has been gentrified. Historically, gentrification in Medina occurred simultaneously with cities in the Global North. This agreed with the notion of *idiosyncratic nature of place*, put forward by Nijman (2007:1) who stated: "*It should not surprise us that each and every place is different or even unique in some ways-this is the idiosyncratic nature of place*". Through the incorporation of Medina into this academic dialogue, the thesis shows that gentrification is true for this specific city's experience but, on the other hand, cannot be generalized either in other cities in Middle East or in Saudi Arabia, such as in Mecca, a location that shares a similar experience in attracting pilgrims. For example, the case of Medina is different from the spectacular urbanization in the UAE, which is directly targeted as a global emirate and by world financial services (see Chapter 2). Thus retailing, especially of religious tourism, is a process I can argue is spiritual, and religious activities are commercialized.

Another example is the study of Chakravarty and Qamhaieh (2015:67) into gentrification in Abu Dhabi in which they explained the political-economic context as different from the US and Western Europe, stating that: "*in terms of citizenship and residency regulations, Abu Dhabi is markedly different from what we find in, say, Western Europe or the US. All of the people being dislocated or having their lives disrupted by the redevelopment of the city centre are non-citizens living on employment-tied visas. Their vulnerability is compounded by their financial woes*". I say that although both Abu Dhabi and Medina are Arab Middle Eastern cities and they share common urban features in terms of oil urbanization, based on the findings herein, gentrification

in Medina displaced citizens who had lived in central Medina for generations (see Chapters 5 and 6). These findings enhance our understanding of gentrification that every place or city has different culture, lifestyle , political circumstance (the particularity of place), however, it is not opposite to that previously stated by Lees, namely that gentrification has generalizations.

The thesis is similar to the work of Freeman (2006) in that it examines the experience of gentrification from the residents' perspectives. However, in contrast to his work, its findings have shown incidences of displacement as an outcome of new build gentrification. As gentrification caused both former endowment occupiers, tenant occupiers and owner-occupiers to move to various districts of Medina that lay completely outside the central zone, whereby some of them found difficulties in gaining access to public services. In contrast to Freeman's residents, who were active in stating the impacts of gentrification on their neighbourhoods, these residents are passive victims of the negative outcome of gentrification, that of displacement.

The analysis of the central zone of Medina has not rejected the perspective of a political and economic framework, despite this often being associated with theorists of the Global North. This work contributes to the existing knowledge of gentrification in the Middle East by providing evidence that the geopolitical circumstances of the region, from my perspective, could be a latent force behind the royal decisions to upgrade central Medina (see Chapter 6). The thesis has demonstrated that gentrification in Medina has been led by the political and economic interests of the Saudi King, and that political rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia have had an impact on the interests of less privileged residents in the central zone, who have, as outlined above, been forced to leave the central zone to live in more remote areas. In essence, this research affirms Brown-Saracino's (2010) report that through prioritising the interests of the privileged political and economically wealthy few above those with less economic and political power, the state has continued to perpetuate inequality in the urban social landscape. Chapters 5 and 6 of this study have shown how inequality has continued to be perpetuated because gentrification was state-led and was informed by policy development that was based on providing a conducive atmosphere for pilgrims to Saudi Arabia, rather than for the benefit of the displaced people.

This research extends our knowledge of how the methods used for studying displacement may be applied to other areas elsewhere in the Middle East to take advantage of the social structures of tribes, especially in Arab Gulf countries such as Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, as well as Jordan and Iraq where urbanized tribes are still present. Methodologically, this study stands in some contrast with gentrification studies in the Global North in relation to the tracking of displaced residents, who appears to be almost impossible to

measure (Atkinson, 2000). It is, however, in line with Slater's (2005, 2004) suggestion that qualitative approaches should be used in capturing gentrification and displacement. I argue that it is likely that the difficulty involved in identifying displacement caused Boddy (2007) to take the view of whether such of new build, city centre residential development should be labelled with the term 'gentrification' at all. Studying displacement in Global North cities such as London by using a qualitative approach is problematic because of the lack of ability to 'track' displacements (Atkinson ,2000); however, it has been applied in this study to examine the connections between gentrification and displacement. It was critical to understand that what had happened in central Medina was gentrification rather than redevelopment by using a qualitative approach. Affirming the arguments of Lees (2017), Robinson (2010, 2006) and Roy (2009) noted that in comparative urbanism that there is a lot to learn from the Global South because this diversity is shown in the outcomes of displacement.

There are cultural issues associated with conducting interviews in Saudi Arabia and in countries belonging to the Global North, namely Western European and North American countries,where I had to use my brother to help with conducting any interviews because women are not allowed to talk to strange men without a male "guardian". The difference of cultural context of study area sheds light on the new potential distinctions methodically that would occur for qualitative research of gentrification in different urban contexts.

Empirically, the global debates about tourism and gentrification, taken together with this research suggest a role for tourism in promoting gentrification. Both processes are interconnected with the present study and this confirms the previous findings of Albert, (2017), Gant (2005) and Cocola-Gant (2018) that contributes additional evidence to suggest that tourism is also a gentrifying process which indirectly causes displacement through the way it constrains the quality of life for residents; ultimately, this results in the movement of residents away from the area in question. Marcuse (1985:208) conceptualized four types of displacement (see Chapter 2), stating: "*The full impact of displacement must include consideration of all four forms.… It must include displacement from economic changes, physical changes, neighbourhood changes, and individual unit changes*". I claim that the touristic gentrification in new build form which is taking place in central Medina has resulted in the full impacts of displacement.

I argued in Chapter 6 that the role of the central state in new build gentrification in the central zone of Medina was an intervened role through all levels of gentrification process in decision-making, planning, and implementation. In Saudi Arabia, Al Bassam (2011) recognised that many urbanisation troubles can be avoided if the local and regional authorities are given greater

autonomy and finances to manage local urban planning. It is true that centralised government is a problem for Middle Eastern countries (Al Bassam, 2011), where poor planning on the part of centralised government has resulted in slums, inadequate services and disease. Displacement will be, or is, among the list of these urban problems in some Middle East cities. Medina's gentrification is an example of a non-democratic regime context with a centralised government (see Chapter 4) in making decisions at the local level without any social or civilian participation. This kind of urban context could be produced by gentrification in its ugliest form through the eviction of locals from their social and physical environment without financial compensation.

8.5. Limitation of Study

A limitation of this study is that the numbers of participants were relatively small. The researcher would nominally have hoped that the number of participants would be higher. Due to the limited time (of just three months) that is authorised by Saudi Culture Bureau to have the field work, I was not able to meet the interviewees during the first trip which was only enough to investigate and obtain their data (e.g. names, address etc). Thus, I had to conduct the interviews during my summer holiday in following year. In fact, if at least six months were authorised for the fieldwork, this would allow applying the anthropology approach on their everyday life displacement.

As stated in Chapter 3, the desired sample of participants were to be officials and displaced people, but it was not possible to create a study sample of gentrifiers and developers because of difficulties in gaining access to the Taiba Tower for security reasons. Also, according to the security guards of the Tower, these residents are from outside Medina and had come to live in the properties during religious seasons only. For myself, the matter was like having invisible gentrifiers; in other words, it is more likely a methodological issue when studying displacement in Anglo-American cities. In Middle Eastern culture, most of the wealthy class is reticent to talk about their properties.

8.6. Future Research

While this study focus is not on directly comparing models or cities, the need for a scholarly study situates Medina's central zone within the Global South debate on gentrification. It does show any similarity with the other types of gentrification and urbanism as advocated by various scholars (Chakravarty and Qamhaieh, 2015). Although the findings show the forms and

processes of gentrification that have occurred in the central zone of Medina, further investigation is required as to the extent to which such gentrification has taken place in other parts of the city. It would be interesting to compare experiences of gentrification within: 1) given the nature and composition of governance in Saudi Arabia (see Chapter 4), there is a need to examine hegemony in the treatment of the city and policies that are associated with urbanization, urban renewal and gentrification in the Kingdom; 2) commercialisation of religious experience may also be an area that may be examined in the context of the debate on commodification, and to see if the religious core of Medina has an effect on external areas of city centre, which may or may not apply to religious tourism through urban policies.

The study noted a gap in the inquiry into the psychological implications of displacement on residents given the statement by one of the participants that what is currently visible in the central zone of Medina, is "a distorted form of Manhattan, a Global North and East". In addition, due to the influence of western planners is far from the Islamic spatial form identified. Although Freeman's (2006) study has shown how residents celebrate the inclusion of their neighbourhood in mainstream American society (see Chapter 2), limited research has been carried out into the emotional implication of such a perspective, as well as that of displacement.

For the winners in new build gentrification, I have termed induvial gentrifiers, who live in luxury apartments in Taiba Tower as second homes, as 'invisible gentrifiers' in new build gentrification of the central zone of Medina, and who must be identified and included in the literature on gentrification regarding the Global South. In contracts for losers, although Chapter 7 explores the impact of gentrification on the everyday life of the local people, there is still a gap in terms of the inquiry into social implications related to displacement of people, by observing their everyday life and giving the opportunity to highlight the extent to which their movement has affected their own social and/or economic capital.

Other cities, such as Mecca, with similar religious connotations to Medina, particularly given that Mecca has been through a similar redevelopment in its city centre as well seeing the expansion of the Holy Grand Mosque. Saudi Arabia has experienced accelerated urbanisation resulting from natural growth, immigration, and rural urban migration (Abdul Salam et al., 2014); it would be well within comparative urbanism theory to situate the capital city of Riyadh, and Jeddah within these debates.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Sample Detail and Archival Data

Document type	Publisher	year	link	No
Reports of Medina Master plan	The Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs	1973,1978 and 1994		3
Municipality reports	Medina Regional Municipality	2000,2006, 1999		3
Satellite images IKNOS	King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology (KACST)	2010		
Archival photos of central zone.	Private's libraries and museum. Private collection Fouad Moghamesi Collection Private collection Abdulrahman Kaki Collection.	From 1979 to 1999		
The Five-Year National development Plan, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia		1975,1980, 1985,1990, 1995,2000		
News papers	- Alyaoum Newspaper - Almadani Newspaper - Aleqtisadiah	2004 2008 2012		
Governmental Web	AlDarah	2013	https://www.darah.org.sa/	
Alamanah Magazine	Medina Regional Municipality	1994		
Television documentary		2001	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AIDCPZXsoh8	
Royal Decrees	the Bureau of Experts at the Council of Ministers		https://www.boe.gov.sa/MainDefault.aspx?lang=en	

	Name of Interviewee	Job Title	Interview Site	Date	Time
1	Abdurrahman Alhusyn	Median former mayor	Hotel lobby	15/9/2013	50 min
2	Abdurrahman Kaki	Engineer in the Medina municipality and currently is a consultant at Medina Development Commission	His museum	19/9/2013	60 min
3	Hattem Taha	planners and director of Urban Observatory in Medina Municipality	Hotel lobby	17/9/2013	45 min
4	Mohammed Alali	the first Secretary-General of Medina Development Authority	Hotel lobby	26/9/2013	45 min
5	Dr Ali Jalol	Director of Morocco endowment in Medina	Hotel lobby	8/10/2013	45 min
6	Abdulaziz Almuski	Urban historian	A cafe	23/9/2013	40 min
7	Alqorisea	Manager of Taiba Eastern Tower Owners' Association	His office at Taiba Tower	1/10/2013	45 min
8	Alzaid	Vice Chairman and Managing Director of Taiba Investment and Real Estate Development	By phone	1/10/2013	25 min
9	P1	Public servant	His house	1/10/2013	50 min
10	P2	Developer	Hotel lobby	3/10/2013	35 min
12	P3	Retired Administer	His house	10/10/2013	50 min
13	P4	Former member of city council	A cafe	25/8/2013	40 min
14	P5	Security guard	A cafe	2/10/2013	30 min

		Name of Interviewee	Job Title	Education	Marital status	Age	Date
Bab Alshami area	1	Eve1	Head teacher l	Bachelor	Married	43	22/8/2014
	2	Eve2	Teacher	Bachelor	Married	42	23/8/2014
	3	Adam1	Retired teacher	Associate	Married	72	12/8/2014
	4	Eve3	Seamstress and has shop	illiterate	widow	66	09/8/2014
	5	Adam2	Retired teacher	Associate	Married	64	06/8/2014
	6	Adam3	Retired & Musician	Associate	Married	62	11/8/2014
	7	Eve4	Non-working	Secondary school	widow	60	18/8/2014
	8	Adam7	Public servant	Bachelor	Married	40	20/8/2016
Hosh Alnuzahat area	9	Eve5	Non-working	illiterate	Divorced	65	16/8/2018
	10	Adam4	Retired	Associate	Married	63	14/8/2014
	11	Eve6	Non-working	illiterate	Divorced	65	09/8/2014
	12	Adam5	Retired	Associate	Married	66	07/8/2014
	13	Adam6	Taxi driver	Secondary school	Married	60	13/8/2014
	14	Adam8	Factory worker	Secondary school	Married	55	22/8/2014
	15	Eve7	Non-working	illiterate	widow	63	15/8/2014
	16	Adam9	Retired	Primary school	Married	64	17/8/2014

Appendix B: Interview Planners and Officer

Date	
Time	
Place	
Employment status	
Job position	

1. What was the purpose of the redevelopment of the central zone? Is linked to religious tourism activities? how?
2. What causes that led to the redevelopment of the central zone?
3. What's the mechanism which is followed in the redevelopment of the central zone?
4. What's the source of the invested money in the redevelopment of the central zone a local, a national or a foreigner investment   ?
5. What's the role of government in the redevelopment of the central zone?
6. What kind of housing in the central zone? Seasonal or permanent residence? Why is that?
7. Were the products (apartments or towers or shops inside the central zone) launch in the real estate market for sale to individuals, companies as a kind of housing or investment? How was that ?
8. 8.Who led the sector of redevelopment and investment in the central zone (the capital of a government or private sector capital and business whether it was a foreign or national capital and what was proportion for each them?
9. After redevelopment, did the same residents come back to the central zone and Why?
10. If did not where they are? have they been compensated and how?

Appendix C: Interview Ex-residents

Date	
Time	
Place	
Address	
Sex	
Age	
Educational status	
Marital status	
Employment status	
Previous address in central zone	
Present Address	

1. Why people left central zone?

2. When did people move from central zone? Before development scheme or when government asked them to leave? And Why?

3. Why some of people preferred to move before government orders?

4. Did you have new house after moving? Rent or ownership and how did you get it ?

5. Did you know who the developer was?

6. What did you know about the development project at the central zone?

7. What do you think about new-build development at central zone?

8. Was your old house at central zone better or your recent house and why?

9. Was your old neighbourhood at central zone better or recent neighbourhood and why?

10. What did you feel about your moving from central zone?

11. When you did live at central zone did you see any rehabilitation scheme for numbers of houses?

12. Did rehabilitated houses have been lived by others (how were look like) or the same residents lived there?

13. Did you see any new-build developing schemes in those days around your old neighbourhood?

14. How was the houses price in those days?

15. Did government do any rehabilitation project in those days? When and Why?

16. What kind of jobs residents did at central zone?

Appendix D: Informed Consent Sheet

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the study described in the participant information sheet, and that I have had the opportunity to ask questions.

   ☐

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, and I do not have to give a reason for this.

   ☐

3. I agree to take part in the study described in the participant information sheet.

   ☐

Please tick

Include/delete as appropriate

	Yes	*No*
4. I agree to the interview / focus group / consultation being audio recorded	☐	☐
5. I agree to the interview / focus group / consultation being video recorded	☐	☐
6. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in written work or reports based upon this project.	☐	☐

Name of Participant   Date   Signature

_____   _____   _____


Name of Researcher   Date   Signature

_____   _____   _____

Appendix E: Old and New Photos of Study Area

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Appendix F: Research Trip Authorisation

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16 May 2013

To whom it may concern:

I am writing to inform you Hanadi Alharbi, who is registered as a postgraduate student in the Department of Geography at the University of Leicester in the UK, will need to go to Saudia Arabia to conduct archive and field work between 15th July and 15th October 2013. This visit will be to collect primary and secondary data that is essential for her PhD thesis, currrently entitled 'New build gentrification in the central zone of Medina: an investigation of the role of religious tourism'. During this period, she intends to visit the following organisations to speak to people and collect information:

i)   In Riyadh: King Fahad National Library; King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology; National Centre for Documents and Archives; and the Central Department of Statistics and Information;

ii) In Almadinah: Ministry of Justice; Central Department of Statistics and Information; Almadinah Regional Municipality; Almadinah Development Authority; Research and Studies Centre, Medina; and the Local urban observation institute.

She will also be undertaking field observations, interviews and potentially questionnaires in the city of Medina.

If you require any further information, please do not hesitate to get in contact.

Yours faithfully,

Dr Martin Phillips
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