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*Japan and the UN peace operations in the
post-Cold War era: their challenges and
choices*

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Relations of the London School of Economics for the
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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the ways in which Japan can contribute to UN peace operations. In particular, it looks into the political history of Japan as well as its foreign policies in order to understand how Japan's contributions were implemented and why they are characteristically distinct from other countries.

During the 1990s, Japan encountered heavy criticism for the way it responded to the Gulf War crisis. This prompted many discussions on the willingness and ability of Japan to contribute to the resolution of international crises. The main criticism was its unwillingness to send personnel to locations in need and instead, only offered financial assistance. The reasons for Japan's behaviour were deeply rooted in the interpretation of its constitution which was established right after the end of World War II.

Despite the constraints on Japan's initial offer, the way Japan was subsequently able to contribute was highly effective. This started a new way in which to take part in peace related activities that was distinct from the traditional approaches to peace operations.

In order to substantiate this argument, this thesis will look at analyses Japan's involvement in the UN missions in Cambodia and East Timor and draws on this analysis of those operations in order to identify future opportunities.

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List of Acronyms

Acronym	Name
AEPU	Advance Electoral Planning Unit
APODETI	Associacao Popular Democratica
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BEGIN	Basic Education for Growth Initiative
CAPET	Capacity Assistance Programme in East Timor
CDGK	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
CEP	East Timor Community Empowerment and Local Governance Projects
CG	Consultative Group Meeting for Cambodia
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
CLB	Cabinet Legislation Bureau
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States
ETPS	East Timor Political Service
FRETILIN	Frente Revolucionarie de Timor Leste Independente
FUNCINPEC	Front uni National pour un Cambodge ind pendant p'cifique st coop ratif
GARIOA	Government Appropriate for Relief in Occupation Area Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GGP	Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects
GPA	Government and Public Administration
HAER	Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation
ICORC	International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia
IDA	International Development Association
IFOR	Implementation and Stabilisation Force in Bosnia
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
JBIC	Japan Bank for International Cooperation
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
JSPP21	Japan-Singapore Partnership Programme for the 21st Century
KFOR	Kosovo Force

KPNLF	Khmer People's National Liberation Front
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party of Japan
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MINPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MINUGA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MNFs	Multinational Force
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
NADK	National Army of Democratic Kampuchea
NC	National Council
NCC	National Consultative Council
NDP	National Development Plan
NGC	National Government of Cambodia
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
NHK	Nihon Housou Kyoukai
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ONUC	United Nations Operation in Congo
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
P5	Five Permanent Members
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PDK	Party of Democratic Kampuchea
PKF	Peacekeeping Force
PKO	Peacekeeping Operation
PNGC	Provisional National Government of Cambodia
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea
RNGC	Royal National Government of Cambodia
SAPET	Staff Assistance Programme in East Timor
SDF	Self Defense Force
SDS	Strategic Deployment Stocks
SNC	Super National Council
SOC	State of Cambodia
SRSO	Special Representative of Secretary General

TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UDT	Uniao Democratica Timorese
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angolan Verification Mission
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angolan Verification Mission II
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angolan Verification Mission III
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEF I	United Nations Emergency Force I
UNEF II	United Nations Emergency Force II
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Office Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCO	United Nations' Humanitarian Operations Center
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq and Kuwait Observer Mission
UNIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observer
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission Support in East Timor
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOP	United Nations Mission Observer in Prevlaka
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti

UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Administration of Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration of East Timor
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTEA	United Nations Temporary Executive Authority
UNTMIH	United Nations Transitional Mission in Haiti
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Chapter 1 – Japan’s challenges in the United Nations peace activities in the post-Cold War period

Introduction

How can Japan be recognised by other countries as one of the developing countries that can take responsibility in international society? Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japan has been looking for some way to prove its capability to take a more active role especially within the framework of the United Nations. A new world order has required Japan to become more active – rather than simply as a financial contributor – in UN peace operations which have become a serious issue for the United Nations and its member states. The increased numbers and size of operations need more actors, and opens a door for Japan in an area that it had never thought of. Until the Gulf War crisis and criticism of Japan’s limited role in international issues, there never was a question of what Japan could do to contribute or what kind of potential Japan had. Nearly 50 years of Japan’s invisibility at the United Nations was no longer acceptable by either domestic or international society, and Japan was forced to make a transition in its politics in order to become a leading country in which its economic and political power were equal. However, the transition process was not easy due to the many obstacles that were present both internally and externally.

Background

Japan’s foreign and national security policy has been a serious issue within the constitution ever since the US occupation began at the end of World War II. When the Alliance occupation started in 1946, the US (which was a leading country in Japan’s occupation) aimed to rebuild Japan as a democratic state with a

pacifist constitution. The famous Article 9 of the Japanese Constitutional Law was set as the representative example of Japan's future – as a permanent neutral state¹. However, the change of the international power struggle between the US and the Soviet Union, the Cold War, brought a shift in the US policy on Japan from a “military containment policy (fujikome)” to an “important partner of East Asia (kyouryoku)”. With the increased tension between two big powers, Japan was seen as the key to the future balance of power in Asia. The critical moment for Japan's post-war strategy arrived in 1950, when the Korean conflict crystallised the structure of the new world order. Transforming Japan into a democratic political economy was no longer a priority of US: the US proposed to draw Japan into a regional defence system and remilitarise it for the Cold War. In 1953, US Vice President Nixon admitted that the imposition of Article 9 and the disarmament of Japan were mistakes. The US continually pressured Japan to participate actively in its alliance system, and tried to persuade the Japanese government to agree to upgrade the National Police Reserve which MacArthur had established in July 1950 (with 75,000 personnel) to the status of National Security Force (with 110,000 personnel) in January 1952.

The situation surrounding Japan's security and foreign policy became more complex after the signing of the Japan-US Security Treaty on 8 September 1951 – the same day that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed. It preserved many of the occupation prerogatives of the UN military and in effect made Japan a military satellite of the US. Finally, in 1954, the Defence Agency was established with responsibility for the ground, maritime, and air Self Defence Force with total

¹ Soeya, Y. (2005) *Nihon no middle power gaikou: sengerihon no sentaku to kousou*. Chikumashinsyo. P36

of 152,000 personnel. The establishment of the SDF and the Defence Agency became a big issue on how to interpret Article 9. Prime Minister Yoshida and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB) drafted a new interpretation of Article 9: it would permit possession of a military with only “the minimum necessary” for self-defence in the event of invasion². In addition, according to this interpretation, the SDF could not be sent abroad or participate in any collective defence arrangements. This narrow interpretation of the constitution was officially expressed (*seifutouitsukenkai*) by Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama – first leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (*Jiyuminsyutou*) – in 1954 during the Diet meeting, and has endured for nearly four decades. This is how Japan’s complex difficulties in its foreign and security policy started. The basic dilemma of Article 9 and the existence of the SDF, both of which Japan has dealt with for more than half a century, was started as US occupational policy.

The Yoshida Doctrine, formally named after Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (May 1946-May 1947, and October 1948-December 1954), has been the mainstream of Japan’s foreign and defence policy during the Cold War period. Yoshida’s primary concern in foreign affairs was to restore Japan’s reputation and gain acceptance by the international community. No one can deny that the Yoshida Doctrine kept Japan out of military conflict, brought about its resurrection as a democratic nation and led to prosperity as the world’s second-largest economic power. The revision of the basic principle of the Yoshida Doctrine was finally started as a result of Western Society’s humiliating response to Japan’s so-called “check book diplomacy” in the Persian Gulf War of 1990. For

² Samuels, J, R. (2004) Politics. Security Policy, and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation bureau: Who elected These Guys Anyway?” JPRI Working Paper, no99.

the first time in Japan's post-war history, Japan tried to shake the shackles of WWII from their politics. Many other countries have enacted change in their domestic system to accommodate change in the international system during the Cold War era. However none of the Japanese leaders wanted to touch the sensitive issue of Article 9 or the existence of the SDF until the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore, even with the drastic change in the international arena (maybe the first big movement in the post World War II period), Japanese politicians needed to be careful in the process of changing the course of their foreign and security policy in order to obtain both domestic and international agreement. Since Japan's diplomatic attitude caused a storm of international criticism, revolutionary policy changes were started by the establishment of a new Law to send the SDF to UN peace operations.

The developments that were rapidly made during the 1990s included changes in Japan's foreign and security policy. The most remarkable achievement was the establishment of the peacekeeping Cooperation Law which was passed on 15 June 1992. The legislation ended the ban on sending SDF Forces abroad. (It limited SDF deployment to logistical and humanitarian support for UN missions, monitoring elections, and providing aid in civil administration.) The Gulf War experience woke Japan to the realization of the urgent need for revising its "biggest issue" in post WWII history: the controversial legislative interpretation of Article 9 and SDF, and the Yoshida Doctrine. Japan's new challenge was not easy, even though it was necessary in order to take the responsibility Japan had always been looking for. The Cambodian peace process took place at just the right time for the MOFA and those politicians who were willing to make this change in the legislation.

It began with an active diplomatic role in peace settlement by sending personnel to the UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia in the early 1990s and they have continuously supported several peace missions around the world: Japan has been actively playing a unique role in the issues of peace settlement (including peace operations) by the United Nations. Japan's achievements were seen not only by its participation in the many UN peace operations (and peace settlements) but also in the areas of peace building and preventive action. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi expressed his view on Human Security in the "International Dialogue on Building Asia's Tomorrow" in December 1998. He also announced the establishment of a Trust Fund for Human Security in the UN with a 500 million Japanese Yen contribution³. The concept of Human Security is an idea in foreign policy which Japan is conveying to the international community (especially to those countries willing to support developing countries in need) to focus more on the life of the individual human being rather than on the national level. This new concept that Japan brought to the table has become a core principle in the support for developing countries in the 21st century.

UN operations in East Asia: Japan's role in both cases

It is well known that most of the peace operations are deployed in the African region, and many of them have been "problematic" operations. On the other hand, only two locations, Cambodia in 1992 and East Timor since 1999, have experienced UN peace operations in the East Asian region. Missions in both locations while generally defined as being "successful", have given an insight into

³ Prime Minister K, Obuchi's speech in Hanoi Vietnam December 1998. With this speech, the Trust Fund for Human Security was established in March 1999.

several weaknesses of the United Nations organizations which the Brahimi Report highlighted. The significance of UNTAC and UNTAET are that both operations had unique functions and tasks: UNTAC was one of the first multifunctional operations. It had both administrative and military components, and its mandate included several aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of elections, military arrangements, civil administration, and the maintenance of law and order, etc. UNTAET was established to administer the territory, to exercise legislative and executive authority, and to build self-government during the transition period. Both operations while complicated and problematic in terms of their historical background, however achieved their mandate. Why were these two cases in the East Asian region successful with all the weaknesses from which other “failure” cases have suffered? As the Brahimi report indicated, active cooperation from the neighbouring countries is an essential factor for the success of UN peace operations. For both the Cambodia and East Timor peace processes, Japan, Australia, and major ASEAN states played their role well to accomplish the peace process. Since Japan was looking for a chance to demonstrate its ability in the area of diplomacy⁴ (rather than in their famous role as financial contributor), they played a major role in both cases. Since Japan has a restriction on sending troops outside of its own territory⁵, the military role was played by Australia and it always fulfilled the part Japan could not. Therefore, the combination of these two nations made a good balance in Cambodia and East Timor. Usually, the United Nations suffered a lack of finance and personnel required for deployment in a full scale peace operation. However, in the East Asian region, there were two

⁴ Japan’s desire to play a role in the areas of peace and security with the UN started soon after it joined the UN in 1948. Y. Tanaka (ed) (2004) *Ima Kokuren Soshite Nihon. Kabushikigaisya Jiyuukokumin*. P49

⁵ See Chapter 2 for a details.

countries (followed by other regional states) that were willing to offer their help on this matter. This certainly was one of the factors for success in both cases. In the East Asian region, the presence of the US force in the region has been a central security mechanism. There has not been a regional super power for the last 60 years. However, the end of the Cold War has changed the regional structure and a new security dimension required the presence of leaders from its own region. The PRC is one of the UN Security Council's permanent members and a desirable candidate for leadership within the East Asian region. However, with its communist political regime and poor human rights records, this is unlikely to happen. Therefore, the next strong candidate, Japan, is the most appropriate choice – with its strong political influences and being an economic power in the region, it has been playing an active leading role for the past few decades.

The Research Questions

Since Japan successfully participated in both operations, and also played original roles outside the operations, what was its distinctive characteristic? What Japan has been trying to do is become a more responsible and active player in the field of the UN in a manner which will match its political and economic power. The growing numbers and size of UN peace operations required more support from member states, especially from countries like Japan, which has been mainly an observer in this area, and others willing to participate in the operations. Japan, particularly, has potential to become one of the leading countries in this area, not only as a financial contributor, but also in more wide-ranging areas – diplomatic negotiations, technical and logistic support, humanitarian support, rehabilitation support etc. This research will focus on two questions of Japan's role in the UN's peace missions in the two East Asian cases.

The first question is about Japan's role in both cases. Most developed countries provide available financial and personnel resources to the UN peace operations as required, therefore since Japan's contributions were significant to the two Asian cases, what kind of influence did Japan have? Therefore, the first question is:

1. How and why were Japan's contributions to the UN peace operations developed and implemented in Cambodia and East Timor? What were the distinctive characteristic contributions made by Japan?

When the Cold War ended, an opportunity for Japan to take a step forward into the international arena fell into its hands: pressure from US and the UN for Japan to become more involved in peace related activities under the authorization of the UN presented Japan a reason to open Pandora's box: revising the Yoshida Doctrine and the interpretation of Article 9. Discussion on the interpretation of Article 9 in the Japanese Diet was rather chaotic but it achieved an advance in Japan's foreign and security policy. It is well known that Japan has a strong desire to become a permanent member of a newly reformed Security Council, thus the establishment of the new law which would allow dispatching SDF abroad was a necessary step for Japan to show its pledge to the other member states. In addition, not only with troop contribution, but Japan was also searching for some alternative way to become involved in UN peace missions which would allow Japan to use its national strength more effectively. What kind of answer Japan has found out from their experiences in two cases?

2. What did Japan learn from its experiences in the Cambodian and East Timorese cases, and what is its future role in the areas of UN peace operations?

During the 1990s, Japan experienced changes both domestically and internationally: an aftermath of the post Cold War movement opened a new door for Japan to take on a new responsibility as one of the world's leading countries. Since Japan has been maintaining its position as a neutral state without military power (a power which could become a possible threat to neighbour states), its drastic policy changes in foreign and security policy sometimes was misread by other regional countries. However, Japan proved that it was no threat to the region, and its ability in peace related activities were a valuable resource for the region with its simmering disputes (the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan-PRC relation, the nuclear threat from the DPRK, etc). Moreover, what is the value of Japan's existence in the East Asian region in terms of peace related missions from the perspective of the United Nations? To what extent did the active engagement of Japan in regional and neighbouring states affect the design and implementation of the UN mission in Cambodia and East Timor?

Chapter Structure

Chapter 1 will explore the basic focus of the United Nations peace operations and Japan's foreign policy towards the UN including its financial commitment to the UN, its policy shift during the 1990s, and the new concept of Human Security.

These factors are necessary to understand for Japan's commitment, and its strong desire to play a more active role at the UN. As for the United Nations, those issues raised by UN peace operations will be highlighted. In order to consider the context in which the two main case studies of peace operations took place, Chapter 2 will review the history of the UN peace operations, and particularly the changes caused by the end of the Cold War. It will also highlight Japan's relation to UN policy and its political movement from the occupational period to the end of the Cold War. It will enable us to understand why Japan did not participate in UN peace operations until the early 1990s. Since most of the operations were deployed after 1989, and Japan did not participate any of the peace related activities during the Cold War era, the post-Cold War period will be the main focus of the analysis in this chapter. It is thus important to look at the ideas and choices which Japan had for its policies, and to pay attention to powerful US influence on Japanese politics.

In Chapter 3 and 4, two peace processes led by the United Nations, and the peace operations in Cambodia and East Timor will be analysed. In this research, there are two separate actors, the United Nations (the planner and organizer looking for the resources to conduct the operations) and Japan (a contributor and co-operator for the UN operations). The end of the Cold War caused an expansion in the need for UN peace activities and this necessitated additional resources and support from its member states. Japan was thrown into this new era completely unprepared. It did, however, try to maximise this opportunity to involve itself more visibly (not only by making financial donations) in the UN peace keeping activities. Therefore, the basic needs of both the UN and Japan are consistent, with the exception of Japan's domestic restriction. By analysing the two Asian

cases, this research will focus on Japan's distinctive characteristic contribution and the difficult processes of political reform including the sensitive issue of Article 9 of the constitution. Thus, the main focus of these chapters will be on Japan's involvement in the UN's peace related activities in both cases as well as the wide-ranging efforts by the Japanese government. Japan's domestic discussions and decision making process related to the UN peace operations since the beginning of the 1990s will highlight the process of UN peace operations on the ground in both cases. In addition, the focus will be on the characteristics and uniqueness of Japan's role in both cases.

In considering the findings from the above two cases, Chapter 5 will focus on the details of Japan's contribution to the two Asian cases. Japan's contribution in both situations was wide ranging. The first section will focus on the four areas which clearly show Japan's distinctive characteristics. Moreover, the concept of Human Security became a major concept in peace building and preventive action in the 21st century. Since Japan was the leading country on this subject, its experiences in Human Security will be highlighted. Japan's contribution in this area can not be a substitute for its lack of personnel dispatched to UN peace operations, however, it might be the best alternative for Japan in taking responsibility in peace activities under the UN. Also, this chapter will focus on the positive impact Japan has had on the UN in planning and conducting peace operations in Cambodia and East Timor. As for the conclusion, Chapter 6 will consider Japan's future with the UN peace operations.

Methodology

This research focuses on identifying what Japan can do in the area of UN peace operations. It looks at the role that Japan can play from two perspectives: from the point of view of Japanese interests and also from UN interests. In order to consider many of the issues surrounding Japan, it has focused on recalling historical records, events and statement of those involved. The primary sources of evidence in many cases are the academic literature books, journal articles, conference papers. Also used were the UN's official records of Security Council resolutions, Secretary General's recommendations and reports, several Conference reports on UN's peace operations, and also statistics on UN peace operations will be use as evidences. Moreover, Japanese Diet proceedings (including all committee meetings and governmental publications) helped to identify momentum shifts in Japan. In addition, the Diplomatic bluebook and ODA white paper provided details of Japan's contributions including statistical evidence of Japan's financial support (since the beginning of 1990s).

Due to poor record keeping of many of the events that took place during the 1990s, the interviews helped to supplement the formation of the view that many Japanese government officials had as well as UN officials.

In order to incorporate as much first hand information as possible, interviews were conducted in London, New York, and Tokyo during the years 2004-2008 with personnel from following organizations: United Nations headquarter (DPKO, DPA, and OHCR), and UNDP in New York City, WFP, UNDP, UNHCR and UNICEF in Tokyo. Heads of WFP, and UNDP of Tokyo office were able to

provide details of Japan's contribution on their organizations, and its necessity and effectiveness.

In addition, interviews were also conducted with Japanese diplomats including those who served in Indonesia and East Timor during UN peace operations. Further, there were interviews with Japanese bureaucrats from the Ministry of Financial Affairs, Prime Ministers Office, and Secretariat of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarter from Cabinet Office. Lastly, interviews were conducted with SDF personnel who served in East Timor. These interviews were incredibly insightful; what was intriguing was that many MOFA officials voiced similar concerns as well as favored direction about Japan's current state of affairs.

Interviews with personnel from both the Japanese government and UN officials have supported the objectivity of this thesis. In addition, the interviews have helped to reveal much of the diplomatic efforts that Japan has been making. This is something that has not received much documentation and resources have been scarce because of its lack of recognition.

The above sources have been used to support many of the arguments and have helped to identify the many ways in which Japan can contribute to UN peace operations.

The Brahimi Report: what Japan can do in the context of UN peace operations?

This study is mainly focuses on Japan's policy in UN's peace operations by examining the two East Asian cases which took place in the post Cold War era. It was a very difficult time for the UN coping with crises all over the world and its

capacity was overstretched. As a result, many issues within the UN surfaced. To get the situation under control, the UN began a review of its system and method of planning and conducting peace keeping operations.

In the year 2000, Secretary General Kofi Annan convened a high-level panel for a review of the United Nations peace and security activities. The need for change has been rendered even more urgent by events in Sierra Leone and by the daunting prospect of expanding United Nations operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Over the last decade, the UN has repeatedly failed to meet one of the challenges of its Charter, which is to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.⁶ During the post-Cold War period, there had not been a major war (except the second-Gulf War). However, the increase in the number of local conflicts, especially civil wars, acted as a threat for world peace and security. The UN peace operations are necessary to manage international and humanitarian crises, and there have been more operations established than ever before in the past 15 years. Maintaining world peace and security has been the primary purpose of the UN, and peace operations are one of the necessary conditions for the UN even if the Charter did not define its existence.

Therefore, none of the countries including Japan were ready to face this new era, and only the US, a leading country in the world, was willing to take on the job to “maintain world peace”, at least at the beginning of the 1990s.

⁶ Executive Summary “The report of the panel on the United Nations Peace Operations.” (A/55/305-S/2000/809).

“The report of the panel on the United Nations Peace Operations” (known as the Brahimi Report) examined the weakness of the UN Secretariat in planning and managing peace operations in the year 2000, however, it does not directly address the broader issue of the weakness of the United Nations organization and its Security Council as a body of states in approaching peace operations. As Brahimi himself admitted, the Security Council plays a key role in the field of “Peace and Security” and there will be much more international support for the United Nations when the Council becomes more representative than it now is. As it stands today, the Security Council almost certainly reflects the world as it existed in 1945⁷, when there were no more than 50 or so independent states, and is dominated by the victors of World War II. The reform of the Security Council⁸ is already on the table but it was definitely not within the mandate of the Panel to address the issue.⁹ Japan is the one of the leading countries in the reform of the Security Council with India, Germany, and Brazil. Under Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and the authority to act on behalf of all members of the UN. The five permanent members (P5): the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia (successor state to the seat of the Soviet Union in 1992), and the People’s Republic of China (PRC replacing the Republic of China in 1971) are the key to Security Council decision making since each has veto power. Also, the ten non-permanent members are elected for two-year periods by the General Assembly. The Security Council is the only UN body that incorporates both permanent and

⁷ The memberships for the UN Security Council were expanded from 11 to 15 in the 1960s. There were some marginal changes to accommodate states from other regions.

⁸ The new High Level Panels set up by the Secretary General in year 2003 is handling the wider issues of UN reform.

⁹ Brahimi, L. (2000) Overview of the Brahimi Report. Lin, C. L., N. d. Rham-Azimi, et al. (2001). The reform process of United Nations peace operations: debriefing and lessons, report of the 2001 Singapore Conference. The Hague, Boston, Kluwer Law International.

non-permanent members, and has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council has also had a central role in establishing UN multinational forces normally called the “coalition of the willing”. While only a smaller number of states are desirable to make the UN effective, it must reflect world realities and be more representative of its diversity.¹⁰ The challenges posed by different types of conflicts, changing normative expectations, and uncertain bases of intervention must be considered in the context of a more complex, diverse cast of players on the international stage.¹¹ The question of whether or not Japan, Germany and other powerful countries will become permanent members of the Security Council must be considered in the context of the politics related to Security Council reform.

Because it is essential for the members of the Security Council to match the current international power system, and since most of the issues discussed at the UN Security Council are of a global scale, more permanent members from different locations is the necessary change the UN is urgently considering. In addition, since most of the conflicts have occurred in the African region, more opinions from African states will help both preventive and settlement actions.

Moreover, the majority of the Brahimi report was spent on those lessons from the UN’s experiences in the 1990s. One of the important issues for the United Nations in this decade was the numbers of troops needed for each peace keeping operation. The important lesson from past experiences was that there always has to be a

¹⁰ India Defence Consultants. What’s hot? – Analysis of recent happenings. Democratisation of the United Nations. New Delhi, 27 April 2003. <http://www.indiadefence.com/UN.htm>

¹¹ Karns, P.M. and Mingst, A. K. *Peacekeeping and the changing role of the United Nations: Four Dilemma*. Thakur, R. C. and A. Schnabel (2001). United Nations peacekeeping operations: ad hoc missions, permanent engagement. Tokyo ; New York, United Nations University Press.

political will by member states for deploying troops in peace operations: if the member states are not willing to offer their troops to the UN, the United Nations cannot deploy operations on the ground. As the Brahimi report indicated, a close relationship with the regional organization could be an alternative to the lack of personnel and finance. Also, the concept of regional peacekeeping could be more effective when operations have taken into account the historical relations between various countries. In particular, the presence of the “white man” in certain regions has negatively influenced operations generated by anti-white sentiments. Understanding the cultural, religious, ethnic background becomes a vital part of peace operations. However, in the context of Cambodia and East Timor, the operations experienced a mixture of circumstances and events. In both cases, the major regional actors actively played their roles. This included the French and Portuguese (both former Suzerain states) who also played a major role in Cambodia and East Timor respectively. Moreover, Australia was one of the biggest troop contributors in both cases. Even with strong regional support, the “white man” was still the main actor in the peace operations¹². In general, for the past few years, 77% of troops were contributed by developing countries with Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana as the significant active contributors¹³.

In both cases the host countries rejected negatively to the participation of the former Suzerain states. However those claims were resolved by the appointment to positions of leadership nations friendly to the host country. Japan’s financial

¹² Mr. Akashi said “at the end of the day, it is not about who’s contributing in what area, but what they can do on the ground”. Ex-Suzerain countries have enough knowledge of the host country, and are the best participants for emergency based operations like the UN peace operation.

¹³ The Brahimi Report paragraph 103-104, and also the monthly summary of military and civilian police contribution to the UN peacekeeping operations on the UN web-page show the data on this subject.

support for those countries wishing to take a part in INTERFET operations is worth mentioning. In addition to the possible sacrifice of their troop's lives, those member states that decided to participate in UN peace operations needed large financial resources to maintain their troops abroad. The case of Japan's financial support to INTERFET could be a model for the future of UN peace keeping operations. The recommendations made by the Brahimi report are suggesting new approach in the planning of UN peace missions, and changes have already started including the raising of a numbers of participants from developing countries, and the active participation by regional organizations or arrangements (especially in the African region).

It is essential to understand the recommendations the Brahimi report has made which underline issues of the UN peace operations since this will allow us to understand how Japan can possibly implement some of them.

UN missions in Cambodia and East Timor: Japan's role

There were only two locations in East Asia in which the UN peace missions achieved its given mandate. In addition to that, some of the operations included missions that had never historically been experienced by the UN. For example, UNTAC in Cambodia was the first occasion in which the UN had taken over the administration of an independent member state, organised and ran an election, had its own radio station, and had been responsible for promoting and safeguarding human rights at the national level¹⁴. It was set up in February 1992 to implement the Paris Peace Accords of October 1991 – the product of intense diplomatic

¹⁴In this case, UN did not gain control of the country's administration. The existing government devised means to maintain its control and authority. Dobbins, J. (2001) *The UN's role in Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq*. RAND Corporation. P90

activity over many years. Moreover, UNTAET in East Timor was in all respects the formal government of the country. Its full legislative and executive powers made it unique among experiments in the transitional administration, since it was the first time sovereignty had passed to the UN independently of any competing authority.¹⁵ In both operations, the Japanese government attempted to play an active role both within and outside the framework of the United Nations: Japan's diplomatic effort on the Cambodian conflict was one of the major factors behind the success of UNTAC (it will be reviewed in Chapter 3). Japan is a potential security actor both within and beyond the Asian region: its defence force is amongst the largest (except for those of the USA and PRC) and the best equipped in the region. Nevertheless, until the Cambodian operation, Japan's efforts to contribute to the international community were based on its traditional policy of providing only financial assistance¹⁶. Japan may have been well known due to the following three factors: it is the UN's second largest financial contributor after the USA¹⁷; it is one of the biggest creditor nations¹⁸; and is one of the top three defence budget spenders in the world¹⁹, however, it had moved beyond merely playing these roles

The end of the Cold War has raised questions about Japan as to the future role it could play in the areas of peace and security, especially within the East Asian region. During the 1990s, Japanese foreign and security policies underwent the

¹⁵ Chopra, J. *The UN's Kingdom of East Timor*. Survival, vol. 42, no3, Autumn 2000, pp 27-39

¹⁶ Kimijima, A. (1993) Peace in East Asia and Japanese Constitution : A Re-examination 60 years after its making. Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies. P 171

¹⁷ As shown in Table 1, Japan provides approximately 20.6 % of the UN budget. Japan is second only to the USA in financial support of the Organization. *Source: An Argument for Japan to become a permanent member at the United Nations Security Council*. 2 Financial contribution. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/q_a/faq5.html

¹⁸ Total GNI 2002. <http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/GNI.pdf>

¹⁹ "Anzen hoshou ni kansuru kokusai hikaku" A Comparative Study in Defence Security 2001. . . <http://www.drc-jpn.org/kihonkenkyuu/B-97-03/kokusaihikaku2001.pdf>

most remarkable change. Japan can now legally dispatch its Self Defence Force (SDF) outside of Japan (in non-combat roles under the United Nations peace operations). It has been over 15 years since the Japanese government first dispatched its SDF to UN peace operations, and there is a possibility for them to perform more actively in future operations. Also, Japan's active involvement in the regional forum with its financial and diplomatic cooperation with neighbouring states has made remarkable progress. Since Japan joined the United Nations in 1956, cooperation with the UN has always been one of its main foreign policies²⁰. Based on its economical strength and world wide diplomatic network, Japan has the capacity to assume greater global responsibilities through the efforts of the United Nations, and its contribution to the UN's peace operations has most certainly opened the door for its future²¹.

The 1992 UN PKO Law permitted the SDF to engage in overseas operations but only in non-combat roles, including humanitarian assistance, election monitoring and logistical support. However, the Japanese SDF's involvement in UN peace operation in East Asia raised an extremely sensitive question: the legacy of WWII remains a real burden to Japan in its relations with its East Asian neighbours. After over half a century, the presence of Japanese troops, even in non-combat roles, would have a profoundly negative impact upon any regional collective security or peace support operation. Nevertheless, those negative responses from neighbouring countries have started to diminish especially within the past few years. Since Japan started to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, most of the regional states realised they had overreacted to Japan's new policy, and

²⁰ Generally Japan's foreign policy was called as "UN centred" policy. Coicaud, J.M. (2007) *Kokuren no Genkai. Kokuren no Mirai. Fujiwarasyoten*. P201

²¹ Akashi, Y. (2001) *Japan Should Expand Peacekeeping Role*. Yomiuri Shinbun.

dynamic debates around Japan's position in the new world order somehow promoted Japan's pacifistic constitution. Also, the Japanese government's response to those "non-sense" criticisms on remilitarisation and the "remaining legacy" are not without sensitive apologies anymore. The last official apology was made by Prime Minister Murayama, (the first Prime Minister after the Japan Socialist Party joined with the LDP), and since then, none of the Japanese leaders made this an issue in bilateral relationships with neighbouring countries. Japan's strong stance on this long remaining issue started to change: in 1998, in the Japan-Korea joint declaration a few sentences of apology from Japan were mentioned, but the focus was more on the future strong bilateral relationship²². Also, a similar statement between the PRC-Japan mentioned Japan's invasion of China and its formal apology, however, most of the statement was spent on Japan's ODA support for China's economic development. This does not mean there will not be the same kind of negative responses to Japan's new challenges, however should not get any more difficult from now on.

There are new multilateral institutions attempting to bring East Asian nations together to deal with common problems. Japan had played an active role in promoting new changes in the region, including its involvement in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a periodic meeting of foreign ministers to discuss security issues, with ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, the PRC and the South Korea), principally dealing with economic issues. It seemed obvious that Japan had begun to change its US-centred foreign policy to focus more on regional stability during the 1990s²³.

²² Inoguchi, T. (2005) Kokusaiseijinomikata:9.11gononihongaikou. Chikumashinsyo. p102

²³ Irie, A. (1991) Shin Nihon no Gaikou. Cyukou shinsyo. P192

When the Cold War ended, it became possible for Japan and the East Asian nations to engage more intensively in joint networking to maintain regional stability and prosperity in the future. Future relations will largely depend upon the question of networking as a way to promote the new regionalism in this part of the world. There are two regional organizations or arrangements existing in the East Asian region. ASEAN is a diplomatic association for political and security cooperation that concentrates on conflict avoidance and management driven initially by the goal of regional reconciliation. On the other hand, the ARF is a more extensive inter-governmental grouping, which focuses on dialogue and confidence-building measures as a first step in promoting cooperative security. The establishment of ARF has been a diplomatic success, at least from the Japanese perspective.²⁴ In the 1990s, ASEAN had been concerned with security problems that stem from both internal and external environments. ASEAN intended to include external powers, especially Japan, as a safeguard against actual and latent regional problems. This was because of ASEAN's dependence upon Japan both economically and politically²⁵. Now, the East Asian region has potential "regional problems" such as the issues of the Korean peninsula, China-Taiwan relations, Indonesia and Myanmar's political situation, etc. Also, many parts of the region have territorial disputes with neighbouring states which include Japan and Russia, the PRC, and South Korea. North Korea's nuclear issue is, however, the most serious problem in this region. In many of these cases, Japan is making effort through bilateral diplomatic discussions or cooperation with the regional organizations.

²⁴ Sudo, S. (2001). *The international relations of Japan and South East Asia : forging a new regionalism*. London, Routledge. P88

²⁵ Kuroyanagi, Y. (2003) *ASEAN 35nen no kiseki*. Yushindoukoubunsha. P101

With the acceptance and will from other regional countries, Japan is ready to play an active role in economic cooperation and development support which is in the best interests of both sides. Moreover, Japan was willing to play the role of mediator in issues between regional states with international organizations and Western countries.

Japan's financial contribution to the UN budget

When UNTAC was deployed in 1992, the cost of peace operations increased fourfold from \$700 million to approximately \$2.8 billion. This was even before the operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.²⁶ Faced with increasing shortages of finance²⁷, the UN attempted to cut corners which would affect operations on the ground. By the end of January 1994, the UN had accumulated a deficit of more than \$2.7 billion in assessed contributions, of which \$1.3 billion was owed for the regular budget and \$1.4 billion for peace operations. The annual cost of peace operations had risen to around \$3.2 billion a year, compared with the \$9.4 billion for all the UN operations since 1948. By the year 1995, the UN's financial situation had still not improved. Boutros-Ghali made two proposals for reforming the UN financial system in *An Agenda for Peace*. These proposals were either to deal with the high level of unpaid contribution by member states²⁸, or to

²⁶ By the end of the year 1992, the UN had deployed over 5,000 peacekeepers in 13 operations, at an annual cost of \$3 billion. This exponential increase in the costs was exacerbated by the reluctance, and in some cases refusal, of some member states to pay their duties. By the end of 1991 only 60 % of the assessments of the regular budget had been paid. As of June 1992, 35% of the 1991 assessments remained outstanding, together with 65% of the dues for the first half of 1992.

²⁷ unpaid contributions from 1992-2002. Global Policy.
<<http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/tables/htm.>>

²⁸ When *An Agenda for Peace* was adopted by the Security Council in 1992, only 60% of the assessments of the regular budget had been paid. As of mid-1992, the UN was short by an amount equivalent of a full year's funding. The greatest debtor in 1994 was the US – which owed approximately \$530 million for the regular budget and \$288 million for peacekeeping.

establish a United Nations Peace Endowment Fund with an initial target of \$1 billion. However, none of these instruments could be used unless national governments provided the necessary financial resources – the UN has no other sources of funding. The financial crisis in peace operations was afflicted by member states’ difficulties in providing troops, police and equipment on the scale required by the current volume of peace operations activities.




Fig 1. 1

The UN’s regular budget covers its administrative machinery, major organs, and their auxiliary agencies and programs. Peace operations expenses constitute a separate budget, as do the expenditures of the specialized agencies. These three types of budget expenditures are funded by contributions assessed among member states according to a formula based on their ability to pay.²⁹ As of September 1998, member states owed the UN over \$2.5 billion for current and past assessments to cover both regular and peace operation expenses. The financial crisis prompted by the unpaid assessments threatened the UN’s ability to fulfil its mandates given by member states and illustrated the second dilemma – the tension

²⁹ The General Assembly’s Committee on Contributions considers national income, per capita income, any economic dislocations and member states’ ability to obtain foreign currencies. Initially the highest rate (for the United States) was set at 40% of the assessed budget. The minimum rate was 0,04% for state with the most limited means.

between demands for governance and the institutional weakness arising from states' unwillingness to pay their assessed contributions.³⁰

The financial contributions from member states to the peace operations budget are assessed according to their ability to pay which is based on gross domestic product (GDP), as well as, for smaller states, the level of external debt. This is translated into a graded scale:

- Group A (the Five permanent members of the Security Council) pays 63.15% of mission costs;
- Group B pays 34.78 %;
- Group C pays 2.02%;
- Group D, the poorest states, pays 0.05%.³¹

This means that nearly all the costs of peace operations are met by member states in group A and B, with the US having the largest assessed contribution of any member state. The Permanent Five have complained about the size of its assessed contributions vis-à-vis states in Group C and D. There are several problems with the standard method of financing peace operations, and there are at least 2 alternative methods of financing peace operations. The first method was used for the UNFICYP, which is paid for by the government of Cyprus, the troop-contributing states and voluntary donations.³² The second method is related to the Multinational Forces (MNFs) which, although authorised by the Security Council,

³⁰ Mingst, K. A. and M. P. Karns (2000). The United Nations in the post-Cold War era. Boulder, Westview Press. P42

³¹ Source: <http://www.unausa.org/newindex.asp?place=http://www.unausa.org/programs/scale.asp>

³² United Nations. and United Nations. Department of Public Information. (1996). The Blue helmets : a review of United Nations peace-keeping. New York, N.Y, United Nations Dept. of Public Information.

are not an actual UN force. They are coalitions made up of, and financed by willing states, such as the Australian-led force initially deployed to East Timor in late 1999. These types of operations do not depend upon the lengthy procedures outlined above for securing funds, and can be deployed much more quickly.³³

As mentioned above, Japan is the second largest contributor to the United Nations budget after the United States. It is, in practice, however the largest consistent paying member state. Despite efforts to establish a unified peace operations budget, the United Nations continues to assess member states separately for individual peace operations. UNTAC was the largest and most expensive peace operation at the beginning of the 1990s, first estimated from November 1991 to the end of July 1993 at approximately \$1.9 billion. Secretary General Ghali had requested \$200 million for the first phase of UNTAC's deployment and \$600 million in operational expenditures for the May-October 1992 period, and Japan paid its assessment in full by the end of 1992.³⁴ Also, in comparison with other member states, Japan's contributions in 1996 accounted for more than 15% of the total peace operations budget, second to the United States (31%) but ahead of Germany (9%) and France (8%).³⁵

The table below shows the assessments for the ten leading contributors to the UN's regular budget for the year 2000.

Top 10 leading contributed member states to the UN regular budget for year 2000.
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³³ The Financial Crisis of Peacekeeping. *Source:* <http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/costs.html>.

³⁴ McDermott, A. "Japan's Financial Contribution to the UN System: IN Pursing of Acceptance and Standing". P76. *International Peacekeeping*. Vol6 Summer 1999. Number 2.

³⁵ Heinrich. P80

1. United States of America	25%	\$300 million
2. Japan	20.57 %	\$216 million
3. Germany	9.86 %	\$104 million
4. France	6.546%	\$69million
5. Italy	5.44%	\$57million
6. United Kingdom	5.09%	\$53million
7. Canada	2.73%	\$29million
8. Spain	2.59%	\$27million
9. Netherlands	1.63%	\$17million
10. Belgium	1.1%	\$12million

Table 1. 1³⁶

Japan's contribution to the peace operations budget between 1998-2002 is as follows:

- 1998 - \$10,971 (0.0007% of a total PKO budget of \$1,594 million),
- 1999 - \$9,809 (0.0007% of a total PKO budget of \$1,482 million),
- 2000 - \$437,434,417 (21.99% of a total PKO budget of \$ 1,989 million),
- 2001 - \$592,864,602 (32.52% of a total PKO budget of \$1823 million),
- 2002 - \$443,024,790 (33.19% of a total PKO budget of \$1335 million)³⁷.

Japan's contribution in this area is more than that paid by four of the UNSC permanent member states. Japan sees this financial contributor role as part of its diplomatic skills, and one area it can actually take responsibility as expected by UN and its member states. However, with Japan's economic depression, the amount of contributions was reduced from 20% of its regular budget in 2000 to 16% in 2007 (but still the second largest contributor after the US). The Japanese

³⁶ http://www.un.int/france/frame_anglais/france_and_un/france_contribution_to_un_budget/contribution_to_un_budget.htm

³⁷ Because of the active involvement in the East Timor peace process since 1999, the amount of financial contributions has rapidly increased.

government also saw this role as financier as a way to keep Japan's voice at the United Nations. Thus the large amount of financial contributions to the PKO budget, especially when operations on the ground are in Japan's interest, makes Japan more willing to put extra money into the United Nations. Japan's financial diplomacy was sometimes criticised by other Western countries, however, none of the UN missions and activities can work without sufficient financial support from top financial member states. From this perspective, Japan has a strong element of national pride in its financial diplomacy, and the debate on whether Japan should have more power at the UN equivalent to its financial responsibility³⁸ has been expanding outside the political arena for the past few years (especially after attempts to reform UNSC failed). And yet, those debates by the media, academic society and NGOs have had no effect on the political decision making processes yet. Nevertheless, the changing awareness of the Japanese public on Japan's position in the international arena might put pressure for a political decision in the near future. If it happens, the UN will need to rethink the balance of power in the UNSC more seriously.

Japan as a middle power country in the post-Cold War era

Japan's uncertain role in the international arena started soon after the Alliance's occupation started in 1946. The main complications of Article 9 and the SDF still remain after 60 years, and the US-Japan treaty continues as the centre of its foreign and defence policy. The famous Yoshida Doctrine - economics-first national security strategy - was advocated primarily by pacifists and liberal internationalists and widely accepted by the general public during the cold war. Later in the 1960s, Yoshida expressed his regret for his policy and admitted that

³⁸ Kitaoka, S. (2007) *Kokuren no seijirikigaku*. Cyukoushinsyo. P28

“Japan should possess a military force as a matter of national honour” while feeling “deeply responsible over the situation on the national defence issue”³⁹. Yoshida may have thought of his strategy in the short term with the idea that once economic recovery was achieved, Japan would become like a normal country and have to not rely on the US security guarantee. However, as the years of Cold War system stretched out, and his successors took his tactical approach making it national doctrine, Japan expanded the Yoshida doctrine into a grand strategy that would be mainstream for many years to come.

The Yoshida doctrine guided Japan to economic success, however it left the country unprepared to deal with the newly obtained national economic power⁴⁰. The sudden changes in the world order unexpectedly disrupted Japan’s state-led capitalist system. Because Japan’s success in the Cold War era was a benefit of the unique conditions of the bipolar order which allowed Japan to develop, the major changes in the external environment caused profound issues in the politics such as the Yoshida strategy and the internal political order known as the 1955 system⁴¹. As Japan was under the protection of the US for entire post-war era, they were not ready to adapt to this new environment. During the Cold War era, no opportunities were given to Japan to rethink the fundamental issue of whether the constitution permitted collective security or not. However, the first international crisis of this new era – the Persian Gulf War – touched Japan in the one place it could to take an active part in supporting the coalition (authorised under the UN). Japan obviously lacked both a political consensus on how to respond and a legal framework that would enable it to proceed. In the end, the

³⁹ Yoshida’s letter to one of the LDP member in early 1960s. Yoshida, S. (1963) *Sekai no Nippon*.

⁴⁰ Pyle. P270

⁴¹ 1955 was the first year that this political order took firm root.

Japanese government concluded that dispatching the SDF to join the coalition in any form was constitutionally prohibited (details of this period will be analysed in the next chapter). In a post Cold War era, a gap between the reality and understanding of Japan stretched rapidly because of Japan's ambiguous position. The demands for Japan to take more responsibility outside the country as one of the world's leading nations created the wrong image of Japan in this new era (as misunderstood by some countries). Japan's image is far from the reality: for example, when the PKO Law was established, or the SDF began to be dispatched to the operations outside Japanese territory under the command of UN or UN authorised missions, some of the neighbouring countries criticised Japan's policy as "re-militarisation, and Japan should play a non-military role". However, Japan had been working actively in the areas of non-military development support or financial contributions, and sending personnel or SDF units to international operations was the least of its engagement. Japan has been referring to itself as a "humanitarian nation" because of its wide-ranging development support as method of diplomacy.

Japan had been struggling to make radical changes in its politics to adapt to this new world order for the nearly two decades, and finally began to shape its role by the beginning of the new century. Japan is not a "super power" or "great power. However, it is comfortably playing a role as a "middle power", if there is such a category of power in the international arena. The difference between a "super/great power" and a "middle power" is that a super power can use its power into to influence events and the decision making process of world issues⁴², and they are not afraid to push through their own values and policy. A typical country

⁴² Soeya. P7.

in this category is of course the US. On the other hand, a “middle power”, while it might have a constant power, cannot continue without a super/great power’s existence. It can only exert an influence in the areas in which a super power shows no interest, and it only exists in a multinational forum (including the bilateral relationship). There has been a misleading idea of Japan’s ability as a “possible super/great power” because of its strong economy. However, Japan still remains in its post-war structure in terms of its foreign (Yoshida doctrine) strategy and security policy (US-Japan treaty). Unless domestic changes in the above two areas are achieved, there is no chance for Japan to possibly become more than a middle power country. Regardless of some sceptical views, Japan knows its limitations and possibilities, and started to establish its own style of foreign policy which will enable it to contribute its strength and knowledge to international society. The promotion of a concept of Human Security is one such area, Japan has been working on in cooperation with other middle power countries such as Australia and Canada.

Human Security: new approach for the preventive action and peacebuilding

It is clear that Japan has been playing a major role in UN peace operations, particularly from a financial standpoint. It has also dispatched Japanese personnel to several UN operations (including humanitarian relief operations). However, this contribution has not had the recognition (by Western countries and the UN) that the Japanese Government expected. When Japan started to commit itself to the areas of peace and security for the United Nations, one of its main objectives was to receive recognition from other countries in order to strengthen its cause in becoming a new permanent member of the UN Security Council – which has been a core desire Japan has had since joining the UN in 1956. In order to achieve this,

Japan must shift its style of contribution from “financial alone” to that of “assistance with human power”.

In 1998, when Prime Minister Obuchi expressed his view of “Human Security”,⁴³ the Japanese government started to promote its new policy approaches in several areas of development. In addition, at the Millennium Summit in September 2000, Prime Minister Mori described the concept of Human Security as one of its main pillars of diplomacy and intended to establish an international committee for human security to deepen the idea of a human centred approach to the issues of development. The official description by the Japanese government on Human Security is:

a perspective to strengthen efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods, and dignity. The most important element of Human Security is to enhance the freedom of individual human beings and their abundant potential to live creative and valuable lives.

This concept of Human Security is not merely a symbolic concept but rather a practical necessity that should be used as a tool for bringing about specific actions.⁴⁴ Thus, Japan started applying this new concept to its Official Development Assistance (ODA), and all other development support. Japan’s new ODA Charter that was issued in August 2003 reflected the concept of Human Security, and also JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) announced a new reform plan

⁴³ It was in the policy speech “Towards the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia” at Hanoi in December 1998.

⁴⁴ From a speech by Dr. Sadako Ogata at the International Symposium on Human Security. 2 August 2000.

which underlies human security. This means the emphasis on Japan's support to the developing countries is shifting towards human security action. Generally, a three-stage approach is needed to address this concept, particularly in the post-conflict peace building phase or in conflict prevention: (1) preventing possible disaster, (2) stopping disasters already underway, and (3) bringing a halt to the use of armed force and building circumstances favourable to preventing a recurrence⁴⁵. The concept of human security first drew global attention in the UNDP's 1994 Human Development Report. The report's definition of human security argues that the scope of global security should be expanded to include threats in seven areas: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security⁴⁶.

The new concept of Human Security Japan proposed particularly focuses on aspects of developmental activities and approaches to dealing with the problems caused by conflicts. In general, human security can be considered freedom from death, poverty, pain, fear or whatever else makes people feel insecure. In this sense, almost any matter concerning people's lives can fall within the scope of human security, rendering it conceptually vague and of little practical use⁴⁷. In practice, most of the activities and approaches of Human Security are no different from before. However, assistance for development will concentrate more on the achievement of sustainable security to prevent recurrence of conflicts from micro-level perspectives. These include securing individual life from death, poverty, pain, fear or whatever else that makes people feel insecure. It has been the case

⁴⁵ JFIR report. Towards Collective Human Security: A New Internationalism and Japan. Paragraph 2.

⁴⁶ Summary from the UNDP Human Development Report 1994.

⁴⁷ Ogata, S. (2003) Overview for the Commission for the Human Security. Section 1. <http://www.humansecurity-chs.org>

that when peace operations withdraw from the ground, the subsequent peace building process is taken on by specialised UN agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF, and WFP. There has always been a gap between humanitarian assistance (peace operation) and a long term development and reconstruction programme. However, the concept of human security can connect these two different elements of the missions. In some cases, after the withdrawal of the UN peace operations, the host countries throw themselves into armed conflicts again because of social instability and poverty. One important fact is that the UN peace operation is designed to restore peace in conflict situations but not to build a new stable society. In the 1990s, many peace operations' mandate was to re-build a society, hold an election and to build a new government⁴⁸. Far too many of the operations focused on the macro basic function of countries as opposed to the needs of the individuals involved. Despite efforts to rebuild the country, many of the basic human needs as defined in Human Security were not met.

From this standpoint, Japan has had long term experience in development support in several countries through the ODA and has been successful through its initiatives from the point of view of Human Security. Moreover, Japan itself has had the experience of rebuilding a sustainable society from a crippled state 60 years ago. Since Japan has had its own legal limitation to participation in UN peace operations, this new concept of Human Security gave it wider opportunities to play an active role in the areas of humanitarian assistance.

⁴⁸ Yamada, M. Nomoto, K. Ogawa, H. and Uesugi, Y. (ed) (2005) Atarashii Heiwakouchikuron. Akashishoten. Chapter 4. Uesugi, Y. Heiwaiji to Heiwakouchiku no setten..P91

The concept of Human Security has been the backbone in supporting the ways in which Japan has been a leading and effective contributor to peace operations. Furthermore, Japan's experience and success in relation to peace keeping and peace building will be used as model cases for considering future operations in a more innovative light.

What Japan can do: its challenges in peace related activities

In the post-Cold War period Japan started to face a reality outside its borders. While looking at its possible role in the United Nations – Japan's idealised situation – Japan is facing the most difficult time in its history. Of course, both changes are occurring for the same reasons. However, for Japan, its awaited moment has finally come. With the Yoshida strategy and its bilateral treaty with US, Japan has been hiding under the shadow of the US for long time. The changes Japan made in its domestic politics have received popular support: a distinct majority of the Japanese population favoured sending the SDF to UN peace operations. There are still major issues such as the revision of the pacifist constitution to allow Japan to participate more actively as a “normal” country, but Japan has begun to change quietly and slowly to adapt to this new world order through the United Nations' mission.

Chapter 2 - UN peace operation and Japan's contribution

This chapter will review Japan's political history, particularly its foreign and security policy shift since 1945 along with the history of UN peace operations. Japan has had difficulties with its constitution and introverted political style which was established more than 60 years ago and is something that still continues to dominate the Japanese political system. When the Cold War came to an end, Japan was unprepared for the new international order which required Japan to become a more extroverted player. This study will first focus on Japan's domestic political history and policy shifts until the 1980s in order to understand its difficulties. Because of Japan's bilateral US focused policy, the spotlight will be on the US-Japan relationship. As for the UN peace operations, most of the missions have been deployed in the post-Cold War era. Thus this chapter will also focus on UN's difficulties experienced during the 1990s, along with its trends and the characteristics of its peace operations. These two separate analyses will come together and help us to understand how and why Japan's participation in the UNTAC operation in 1992 resulted. It will look at how the UN required urgent cooperation from member states, and how this new movement influenced Japan's policy shift towards UN peace operations. This was because during the Cold War period, the UN did not require countries such as Japan to cooperate in peace operations (there were only a limited number of operations on the ground, and the size and number of missions were within the UN's capabilities). Japan was also still in the recovery process from its painful destruction in World War II (its main concerns were on the rehabilitation and economic development of the country, and it had no interest in becoming involved in UN missions for maintaining peace and security). However, the situation had changed. Japan had become one of the

strong economic powers with political connections to developed Western countries, while the world had started to shift into a new order with the decline of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s¹. Japan's desire to play a more active role in the United Nations, especially in the area of peace operations became clear later, particularly after receiving criticism for its failure to participate physically in the Persian Gulf War crisis.

This sets the tone for the fundamental basis in understanding the issues regarding Japan and UN peace operations, and provides an essential building block in understanding the arguments for this thesis.

Cold War period

When the United Nations was established, the creators did not intend for missions to be about “keeping and re-building peace” on the ground. The purpose of both the League of Nations and of the United Nations was to promote international peace and security. When the UN was created, the world needed a new international organization to re-establish world order after the end of World War II. The creation of an international organization was undertaken by the Big Four (USA, USSR, UK and France), and then in January 1942, 26 allied states issued the “Declaration of the United Nations” drafted by the US State Department.² In March 1943, the Advisory Committee had produced a draft charter for the new organization, and in October 1943, the foreign ministers of the Big Four issued the “Moscow Declaration of the Four Nations of General Security”. Finally,

¹ Mingst, K.A. and Karns, P. M. (2000) *The United Nations in the Post-Cold War era*. Westview. P55

² Pamphlet No. 4, *PILLARS OF PEACE* Documents Pertaining To American Interest In Establishing A Lasting World Peace: January 1941-February 1946. the Book Department, Army Information School, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., May 1946

nation-states did indeed agree that there would be a post-war international organization, global in its membership and based on the principle of sovereign equality³. Moreover, the creation of the post-war security system took a major step forward at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in Washington on August 1944, and the principal features of the UN were agreed on. The conference was held in two stages: first, the US, UK and the USSR, and then the US, UK and China agreed on a working document – “Proposal for the establishment of a General International Organization”.⁴ Most of the organs from the League of Nations became primary features of the UN. Some issues could not be resolved at Dumbarton Oaks and had to be addressed at the next meeting involving the leaders of the “Big Three”, which took place in Yalta. Finally, on 25th April 1945, the representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the UN conference on international organizations to draw up the UN Charter. The Charter was signed by 51 countries on 26th June by the representatives⁵.

The idea of the peace operations is not something written on the UN Charter. How did the United Nations arrive at this? On 29th May 1948, the first decision by the Security Council was to create the first peace operation UNTSO to supervise the truce in Palestine. There were two operations (UNTSO and UNMOGIP) established in the first 10 years of the UN’s history. The primary operational focuses were observation, monitoring, establishing facts and reporting the findings on the ground. By the middle of the 1970s, the UN had established six new operations that included three operations with more complex duties. A

³ The Founding of the United Nations. 24 October 1945. IBM World Book 1999.

⁴ The plan for the UN agreed at Dumbarton Oaks meant that France was now included as a permanent member.

⁵ Poland was not represented at the Conference, but signed it later and became one of the original 51 Member States.

number of significant developments were made in this period which affected the development of peace operations in later years. The operations in this period established the fundamental characteristics of peace operations as well as exposing any problems. UNEF I was the first large scale armed operation established in response to the 1956 Suez Crisis⁶. In deploying UNEF I, the UN proved it could do more than serve as a forum for debate by helping to maintain the peace for more than a decade⁷. When UNEF I succeeded in fulfilling its mandate to secure a cease-fire and monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces, there was optimism about the potential for peace operations⁸.

Peacekeeping Operations 1947-1987			
Name	Date	Location	Mandate
UN Truce Supervisions Organization (UNTSO)	1948-present	Middle East	Monitor Ceasefire Line
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	1949-present	Kashmir-India and Pakistan	Monitor Ceasefire Line
UN Emergency Force I (UNEF I)	1956-1967	Sinai	Occupy buffer zone & supervise disengagement
UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	1958	Lebanon	Monitor border violations
UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC)	1960-1964	Congo	Supervise troop withdrawal & restore order
UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	1962-1963	West New Guinea	Monitoring administration transfer
UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)	1963-1964	Yemen	Monitor disengagement
UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1964- present	Cyprus	Occupy buffer zone (from 1974)
UN India Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	1965-1966	India & Pakistan	Monitor case-fire
UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II)	1974-1979	Sinai	Occupy buffer zone & supervise disengagement

⁶ Strength: 6,073 military personnel, supported by international and locally recruited civilian staff. Expenditures: \$214,249,000 (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unefi.htm)

⁷ T, Tsugeyama. (1995) PKO hou Ririon Jyosesu. Touthindou. P171

⁸ UNEF I is particularly important for UN peace operations as it established a number of principles which were used in subsequent operations including, among others, ONUC, UNIFIL, UNDOF and UNFICYP

UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	1974-present	Golan Heights	Supervise disengagement
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1978-present	Lebanon	Occupy buffer zone

Table 2. 1⁹

Before the 1960s, the UN peace operations had only monitored ceasefire along tense (though structured) cease-fire lines and borders such as those in the Middle East and between India and Pakistan. Also in most cases, operations revolved around keeping two belligerents apart. The UN operation in the Congo (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964 was one of the largest, including nearly 20,000 troops¹⁰ at its peak strength. During ONUC, the UN ignored the principles that had been established from the experiences with UNEF I such as non-use of force, impartiality, and the consent of the all parties. This was the first time UN had intervened in a civil war with armed forces without a clear mandate for enforcement action. (To restore order in the Congo, enforcement action was taken.) By the end of this operation a total of 126 peacekeepers had been killed, including the UN Secretary General Dag H. Hammarskjold. Because of the violence involved and the ambiguity concerning the mandate of the operation, ONUC was, for a long time, also an example of how UN peace operations should not work.

In the late 1970s, two large scale operations were launched in the Middle East: UNDOF in the Golan Heights, and UNIFIL in Lebanon. This was the first time the United Nations experienced difficulties in operating large scale peace missions. The experiences of UNIFIL demonstrated all that could go wrong with UN peace

⁹ All information of peacekeeping operations in the tables are based on the information from The Blue Helmets: a review of United Nations peace-keeping / United Nations.

¹⁰ Strength: *Maximum* (July 1961) 19,828 all ranks, supported by international civilian and recruited staff. *At withdrawal* (December 1963) 5,871 all ranks (<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucF.html>)

operations: high costs; refusal from the part of Member states to pay their assessment; and the lack of consent and cooperation from the parties involved in conflicts. Bitter lessons the UN had learned from ONUC and UNIFIL was that peace operations could only fulfil their mandate successfully if most of the criteria for peacekeeping were present.¹¹ During the Cold War, peace operations were mainly deployed in the Middle East, and did not carry multifunctional mandates. However, since its mandate was primarily ceasefire monitoring and border patrol, the duration of the operation has been particularly long.¹² At the end of the Cold War period, the UN was restricted to the maintenance of ongoing operations in the Middle East¹³ and those in Cyprus and Kashmir.

In this period, the UN started to experience difficulties in conducting large scale peace operations, particularly with receiving necessary cooperation from member states. However, at this time, the number of operations on the ground was manageable by both UN organizations and its limited member states. There was no need for a small country like Japan to take a part in this particular area. As for Japan, the Cold War period was the era for rebuilding a new national purpose (for the next few decades), and its main interests were on rehabilitation and economic recovery – domestic recovery – and not on international movement.

¹¹ Hill and Malik. P49

¹² Both of UNDOF and UNIFIL are still active, with force levels of over a thousand in the former and over five thousand in the latter.

¹³ Such as UNTSO, UNDOF, and UNIFIL.

Japan in the post-World War II: Yoshida doctrine as the main stream of national politics

The key person in shaping post-war politics and conceived the national purpose was Yoshida Shigeru, the prime minister for most of the first decade of the post-war period. Yoshida is one of the most important figures in modern Japanese history¹⁴. When he formed his first cabinet in 1946, tensions between the US and the Soviet Union were apparent, and Yoshida tried to use the disputes between the victors over the post-war settlement to Japan's advantage. The primary focus in foreign affairs was to restore Japan's reputation and gain acceptance by the international community. However, to achieve the goal, Japan needed to prove to other countries that Japan had changed and committed itself to peace and stability. Yoshida was determined that Japan should associate as closely as possible with the US which he saw as a new hegemonic power¹⁵.

The first critical moment for Japan's post-war strategy arrived in 1950 when the Korean conflict broke out and Japan was in the risky position of being drawn into Cold War politics. The US realised Japan's geographical vulnerability to the Soviet block and started to rethink its occupational objective, shifting from "reform" to "recovery". The first few years of the occupation of Japan were aimed at rebuilding Japan as a pacifist country by the imposition of Article 9 and the disarmament of Japan. However, the Cold War made Japan strategically important to the US. When John Foster Dulles, the Republican's leading expert on foreign policy came to Tokyo in June 1950 to negotiate a peace treaty and the end of the occupation, he urged Japan's rearmament. As a response to the US request and to secure Japan's safety from the Cold War movement, Yoshida made minimal

¹⁴ Wakabayashi, T.B. (1998) *Modern Japanese Thought*. Cambridge University press. P168

¹⁵ Fujii, W. (2008) *Japan's foreign and security policy in the 21st century*. GRIN. P7

concessions to Dulles' request: he consented to US bases on Japanese soil and limited rearmament. This resulted in a US agreement to a peace and security treaty with Japan for the post-occupational period¹⁶.

On September 8, 1951, on the same day that the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, the US-Japan security treaty was also signed. However, since Japan already had a pacifist constitution, this bilateral treaty could not fit anywhere into Japan's constitutional and political system. The interpretation of Article 9 and the existence of the SDF became untouchable issues for the Japanese government. During the occupational period, Yoshida made a maximum effort to establish a base for Japan's foreign policy which could be accepted by international society. His choices to concentrate on economic development and rehabilitation resulted in Japan becoming the world second largest economy a few decades later, and his successors have maintained this strategy as the main focus of Japan's national policy until now¹⁷. The most controversial part of the Yoshida doctrine was that his strategy was established to avoid unnecessary conflict Japan might throw itself into due to the international movement.

The Yoshida doctrine was not a product of Yoshida-Dulles negotiations, however a reflection of political compromise between those Japanese who preferred alliance to autonomy and those who valued autonomy over security depend on American guarantees. As the sacrifice of national pride or sovereignty¹⁸. Moreover, Yoshida doctrine provides the ideational foundation for the US-Japan relationship from the late 1940s till now¹⁹.

¹⁶ Graham, E. (2006) *Japans sea lane security 1940-2000*. Routledge. P93

¹⁷ Cooney, J. K. (2002) *Japan foreign policy maturation: a quest for normalcy*. Routledge. P39

¹⁸ Finn, B.R.(1983) *United States – Japan Relations: Toward a New Equilibrium*. The Program on

The US Ambassador John Allison concluded in 1954 that “Japan has no basic convictions for or against the free world”, and that Japan chose its position as a country with “no interest in the outside world”, which disappointed US leaders for the next few decades²⁰.

The Yoshida Doctrine is as follows:

US-Japan Relations Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University. P185

¹⁹ Vogel, K.S. (2002) US-Japan relations in a changing world. The Brookings Institution. P75

²⁰ Kataoka, T. (1991) Price of a Constitution: The Origins of Japan's post-War Politics. Crane Russak, New York. P122-123

Yoshida Doctrine

1. Japan's economic rehabilitation must be the prime national goal. Political-economic cooperation with the US was necessary for this purpose.
2. Japan Should remain lightly armed and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues. The SDF would not be deployed abroad. Japan would not participate in collective defence arrangements. Not only would this low military posture free the energies of its people for productive industrial development, it would prevent divisive domestic political struggle.
3. To gain a long-term guarantee of its own security, Japan would provide bases for the US Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Pyle, B, K. Japan Rising. P242

However, the US pressure for military obligation continued, and in 1954, the Defence Agency established the self defence force (SDF) with a total of 152,000 personnel (for ground, maritime and air self defence forces) which was less than half of what the US had demanded. Yoshida took a stand against the increasing demands from the US for Japan to expand its contribution to the Cold War system. If Japan had moved toward re-militarisation with demands by the US, there would have been no Japanese Economic miracle²¹. However, this was how the narrow interpretation of Article 9 began. This new interpretation of Article 9 would only allow a military for self-defence in the event of invasion and was set as a limit to

²¹ Pyle, B,K. (1996) The Japanese question: power and purpose in a new era. The AEI Press. P25

the US demands. The SDF was established in 1954 and until the end of the Cold War the Japanese government held that the constitution did not permit SDF participation in collective defence arrangements or deployment abroad.

In December 1954, Yoshida fell from power but his influence continued for several more decades. Nobusuke Kishi, an anti-Yoshida conservative who served as prime minister from 1957-1960, tried to eliminate the un-equal aspects of the peace treaty²² with the US. What Kishi wanted was a fixed treaty and an explicit guarantee of US protection in case of an attack on Japan. The left wing of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) mounted public opposition which resulted in an historical demonstration²³ against the approval of the new security treaty. It was, nevertheless, signed in 1960. As a result Kishi resigned, and the conservatives retreated to Yoshida's economic strategy again. For the next two decades, Japanese leaders avoided this sensitive issue which could destabilise the national political order. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was formed in 1955, was to be in power for the rest of the Cold War period²⁴. The LDP maintained Yoshida's strategy because of its effectiveness in dealing with the domestic political environment: the doctrine was a political compromise between the pacifism of opposition groups and the security concerns of the right-wing conservatives²⁵.

²² The most unequal part of the peace treaty (from Japan's standpoint) was permitting US intervention in domestic disturbances. Kishi also wanted a voice in the deployment of US forces stationed on Japanese soil.

²³ As the final deliberations in the Diet were being completed, hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered in front of the Diet building and over 6 million workers went to strike.

²⁴ Except during the Nakasone Administration (1982-1987), the LDP was dominated by people from the Yoshida wing.

²⁵ Pyle. P242

However, Yoshida himself never had any intention of seeing Japan remain dependent on the US for security indefinitely. As Ozawa notes in his book – *Blueprint for a new Japan* –, Japan should not continue to remain at the level where it depends on another country for its defence²⁶. As the end of the Cold War changed the dynamics of the international world, pressure for a revision of the Yoshida doctrine started to mount. Yet, most of the attempts to revise the Yoshida doctrine were, almost always, a further institutionalisation of Yoshida’s view and a more tight alliance with the US.

The Post-Cold War period: New era

The sudden end of the Cold War made the UN take on the impossible tasks of intervening in conflicts all around the world. This drastic change in the international movement created a new concept of peace operations which was different from the Cold War period in which operations were mostly deployed to monitor cease-fire and supervise buffer zones. The size and number of operations were beyond the capacity of the UN, and it was very difficult for member states to support this particular part of the UN’s activities financially and materially. The first decade of the post Cold War period was a struggle for United Nations. Despite the increasing demands for peace operations, the will to cooperate in this area from its member states was in rapid decline. Like many of the other member states, Japan was under strong pressure from the UN and leading member states to become a “responsible member of the international society” and involve itself in UN peace activities by sending its own personnel. Until the Persian Gulf War in 1991, neither the UN nor the US and other western countries demanded Japan’s presence in possible military activities, and Japan had no interest in taking part in

²⁶ Ozawa, I. (1993) *Blueprint for a new Japan*. Nihonkeizai Shinbun. P132

an unconstitutional role outside its borders. However, this new international trend finally put enough pressure on Japan to make drastic changes to its political system.

Currently, Japan is one of the strongest economic countries, and its role in international affairs is no longer invisible. Japan's SDF have now been dispatched to UN peace operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, East Timor, and the Golan High among other places. After the 11 September 2001, Japan joined the "coalition of the willing" by dispatching SDF forces to the Indian Ocean for non-combat roles, and later to Iraq. Japan finally began to fulfil its role in world security. What caused the drastic changes Japan had made during the 1990s? And how did the UN's difficult experiences in peace operations relate to Japan's motivation to make such changes?

First Expansion (1988-1991): rapid growing numbers and drastic character changes

By the end of 1991, the UN had established ten new operations covering many areas of the world. This rapid expansion and growth in peace operations was caused by a change in the nature and number of conflicts by the end of the Cold War. There were a growing number of civil wars within countries²⁷ that involved religion and/or race issues more than there had ever been before.

Peacekeeping Operations 1988-1991

Name	Date	Location	Mandate
UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	1988-1990	Afghanistan/Pakistan	Monitor troop withdrawal & disengagement
UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer	1988-1991	Iran/Iraq Border	Monitor cease-

²⁷ The growing number of peace missions and the decline of war as a conflict between states can both be seen in the statistics: in the 21 missions deployed between 1988-1995, 13 related to intrastate conflicts.

Group (UNIMOG)			fire/withdrawal
UN Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM I)	1988-1991	Angola	Monitor troop withdrawal
UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG)	1989-1991	Namibia	Supervise cease-fire & government transition
UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)	1989-1991	Central American States	Monitor withdrawal & demobilization
UN Angolan Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)	1991-1995	Angola	Monitor cease-fire & administer election
UN Iraq and Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)	1991-present	Iraq/Kuwait border	Monitor cease-fire
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	1991-present	Western Sahara	Monitor cease-fire & administer referendum
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)	1991-1995	El Salvador	Monitor human rights, elections and government restructure
UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)	1991-1991	Cambodia	Disarm factions, maintain order and supervise election
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	1992-1993		

Table 2. 2

The increase in the number of operations was beyond the capacity of the UN Secretariats and the UN started to suffer a lack of finance for deploying new operations. With the increased number of peace operations deployed around world, the cost of the operations grew ever greater than before in 1992-1993 (see a table below). In addition, the failure of some of the member states (including the USA, Japan, and other major financial contributors) to pay their contributions has caused disastrous results in on-going operations on the ground. It was because the radical increase in the cost of peace operations put serious pressure on member states' national budget, and it was impossible for them to contribute the full amount requested regularly.




Fig 2. 1²⁸

When the UN organizations and its Secretariats were struggling to conduct peace operations on the ground, the Egyptian diplomat Boutros Boutros-Ghali replaced De Cuellar as Secretary General at the start of 1992. This new Secretary General quickly took action to reform the existing UN system to manage peace operations. In January 1992, at the first ever meeting of the Security Council with the heads of state and governments present, the Council asked Boutros-Ghali to offer an analysis of ways for strengthening the United Nations' organization in the realm of international peace and security. He responded with a definitive statement about the role of the UN in the post-Cold War world, entitled *An Agenda for Peace*²⁹ in the middle of June 1992. This report reflected the changing attitude towards conflicts resolution, indicative of the changing nature of the UN's actions in the post-Cold War era. However, the growing number and size of operations and difficulties of conflicts did not stop. The UN was to face more difficulties over the next few years.

²⁸ UN Peacekeeping budget 1990-1995: Assessments vs Payments.

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/finance/index.htm>

²⁹ A Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to the Statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. A/47/277 - S/24111. 17 June 1992

The first three years of the post-Cold War era started with unqualified success for UN peace operations. This gave unwarranted confidence in the conduct of peace operations and led the UN to establish larger, more costly and complex operations in the next phase. However, those successes masked many of the serious problems which contributed to the failure of subsequent operations.

Japan's first attempt: to become more active participant

Once the Cold War system disappeared, the impact on both Yoshida's strategy and "the 1955 system" of political order faced profound disruption. How Japan was unprepared for this new international environment become clear at the very beginning of the 1990s. It began with a major event, which was of course the Persian Gulf War in 1990, when the UN organized an international coalition under its resolution in which Japan could not participate because of its pacifist constitution prohibiting any involvement in military activities³⁰. As a result, Japan lost its reputation and respect in the international arena, and its national pride was threatened. Now, its foreign policy and narrow interpretation of its constitution which had kept Japan from international involvement had to be confronted with the reality outside Japan.

The most fundamental issue was whether the constitution permitted collective security or not. According to the CLB's interpretation, even under the authorization of the UN, the dispatch of SDF personnel to join the coalition in any form was constitutionally prohibited³¹. With no hope of sending its own personnel

³⁰ Ismael, Y. T. (1994) *The Gulf War and the new world order: international relations of the Middle East*. The University Press of Florida. P139

³¹ The CLB refused to approve a proposal by the Defence Agency to send transport planes to rescue refugees. Samuels, J.R. "Politics, Security Policies, and Japan's cabinet legislation bureau: Who Elected these guys anyway?" JPRI Working paper, no99 (March 2004), p106.

under the current constitution, the Japanese government decided to make US\$13 million contribution to support the coalition. This ended up as criticism by other developed countries as “check book diplomacy”. This experience of the Gulf War was very humiliating in the eyes of the majority of the Japanese people and shook the very foundation of the Yoshida doctrine for the first time in its post-World War II history³².

In the early 1990s, Germany – another defeated country named as an “enemy state” in UN Charter – started to find its role in this new world order. Germany also had strict limitations on maintaining or deploying military forces outside the country. In 1994, Germany’s Constitutional Court decided that German forces could be deploy on UN missions when supported by majority vote in the federal parliament. Involvement in UN peace mission was a contentious political issue for Germany as well³³. For Germany progress to adapt to the post-Cold War environment began with participation in UN peace operations in Somalia and Bosnia in medical and logistical roles³⁴. Japan’s intention was exactly the same. Now, the majority of the Japanese public supported this intention, and with expectations from the international society already proved, the bases for radical change were complete. However, many conservative politicians believed that Japan must adhere to its established politics regardless of the foreign criticism.

In September 1991, the Japanese Government introduced a new draft legislation that would permit the dispatch of the SDF to peace operations, only under UN

³² Nakanishi, H. “The Japan-US alliance and Japanese Domestic Politic; Sources for change, Prospects for the Future”, Armacost, H.M. and Okimoto, I. D. (2004)The Future of American’s Alliances in Northern Asia, edited (Stanford: Asia-Pacific Research Center), p106

³³ Whitworth, S. (2004) Men, Militarism, and UN peacekeeping: a gendered analysis. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. P35

³⁴ Samuels. P87

command³⁵. The final product was *the Law Concerning Co-operation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations* technically known as “the International Peace Co-operation Law” which passed the Diet on June 15 1992.³⁶ This new legal framework enabled Japan to participate in UN peace operations and international humanitarian relief activities for the first time in post World War II history. The law empowers the Japanese Government to dispatch SDF personnel to UN peace activities, going beyond the logistical nature of any action being “frozen” until a new legislation is enacted. However, conditions for dispatch were quite restrictive in scope. This law stipulated five conditions which must be satisfied before a Japanese contingent could be dispatched:

- a cease fire must be in place;
- parties to the conflicts must have given their consent to the operation;
- activities must be conducted in a strictly impartial manner;
- participation may be suspended or terminated if any of the “above conditions ceases to be satisfied; and
- use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect life or person of the personnel.³⁷

Since its enactment in 1992, Japan has been involved in several operations by sending its personnel, including the SDF to Angola (1992), Cambodia (1992), Mozambique (1993), El Salvador (1994), Rwanda (1994), former-Yugoslavia (1998, 2000), and East-Timor (1999, 2001).³⁸ On 8th September 1991, just a week

³⁵The definition of “under UN command” was unclear in this first legislation.

³⁶ Japan’s International Peace Cooperation Law.

³⁷ “The International Peace Cooperation Law 1992”. An Article 3 defined the necessary conditions to dispatching Japanese personnel to UN peacekeeping operations.

³⁸ These are the operations in which Japan sent its personnel under the International Cooperation

after the Peacekeeping Law had gone into effect, the cabinet approved the dispatch of 600 SDF engineers to Takeo Province and 8 military observers to sites throughout Cambodia for the UNTAC operation. In addition, 75 policemen were to be sent to UNTAC's CIVPOL unit. Since the Japanese government had been looking for an opportunity in Cambodia long before the UN started the peace process there in late the 1980s, when the UN peace operation was set to take place, the LDP party and Miyazawa administration took advantage of this opportunity. In addition, Japanese participation in UNTAC was a big achievement for MOFA, and it was relatively easy to generate support and enthusiasm for the Cambodian operation because Japan had a strong interest in East Asian affairs and numerous ties with the region.³⁹

Crisis of Peace Operations : new challenges (1992-1994)

The first ever Chapter VII enforcement action by the UN in the Gulf Crisis indicated that the world had entered a new era. Most of all, the war was undertaken by a Security Council resolution and for the first time since the Korean War, the collective security provisions (Chapter VII) were successfully brought into play on the use of force. Since the Gulf War, the role of the UN with military involvement in international peace and security has become more complicated, which effectively limits the role member states can possibly play in peace operations.

Law during the period 1992-2002.

³⁹ Heinrich, L. W., A. Shibata, et al. (1999). UN peace-keeping operations : a guide to Japanese policies. Tokyo ; New York, United Nations University Press.

In An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali opined that political consensus was easier to achieve on the Security Council, the UN could undertake more complex operations in international arena.⁴⁰

Peacekeeping operations in 1992-1994

Name	Date	Location	Mandate
UN Operations in Somalia I (UNOSOM)	1992-1993	Somalia	Protect humanitarian supplies
UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	1992-1995	Former-Yugoslavia	Protect delivery of aid, supervise Cease-fires
UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)	1992-1994	Mozambique	Demobilization and Disarmament
UN Operation in Somalia (UNSOMII)	1993-1995	Somalia	Protect Humanitarian Supplies
UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)	1993-1994	Uganda-Rwanda	Monitor Border Violation

Table 2. 3

The growing number of peace operations in the post-Cold War era took place without appropriate analysis on how the problems posed by past operations could be useful for the future. Both the UN Secretariats and member states had no time to consider anything else but the operations on the ground. The year 1992 became a “key year” for the UN to reconsider the definition of peace operations. The crises in Somalia and Yugoslavia represented the beginning of a realization amongst the UN member states that the “New World Order” was not easy to build.⁴¹ The basic mission for traditional peace forces was to help implement negotiated agreement. In Somalia and Yugoslavia, however, no such settlement seemed possible. In both situations, the UN ended up providing only humanitarian comfort to civilians suffering the consequences of violence. This humanitarian

⁴⁰ J,Hillen. (2000) Blue Helmets. The Strategy of UN Military Operations. Brassey’s. US. P139.

⁴¹ Ex-president Bush’s speech on victory of the operation and the new world order in the 1990s, after the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991.

intervention type of mission was established in the early 1990s⁴² in line with UN's new policy on disaster situations. This new principle became one of the central approaches for the UN. The fundamental principle of the UN peace operation was gradually being ignored with the chaotic requests from UN forces present in conflict zones. The purpose of the UN peace operations is not to mediate between the conflicting parties. The fundamental role is "to restore" peace on the ground and provide security and safety for civilians". This important principle became sidelined for the next few years. The UN's painful experiences in Somalia and Yugoslavia left many lessons for future operations. The UN most significant lesson learned is that it lacked the ability and experiences to plan and conduct large complex operations.

Peacekeeping operations 1994-1995

Name	Date	Location	Mandate
UN Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO)	1994-present	Croatia	Provide secure environment
UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	1992-present	Bosnia	Continue with its existing mandate
UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP)	1995-present	Former Yugoslavia	Monitor border area
UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)	1994-present	Rwanda	Supervise cease-fire & provide secure environment
UN Verification Mission in Angola (UNAVEM III)	1995-present	Angola	Supervise cease-fire & provide secure environment

Table 2. 4

One other issue is that regarding cooperation from member states. The experience in Somalia left huge impact on the way the UN planned and conducted future peace operations. The murder of American soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 was a turning point for both the United Nations and the United States. The US attitude towards UN peace operations became restrictive - Congress began a series of measures designed to limit American contributions to peace operations. This

⁴² It was used for the first time to protect the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq.

incident showed how difficult and complex to deploy peace operations (especially with the enforcement power) in failed states to compared with the operations which the UN had undertaken before the Cold War end⁴³.

However, the changing US attitude opened the door for external participants on this area. Japan, for instance, was one of the countries which took this opportunity to show its abilities in one of UN's main activities. India, Pakistan and many African countries also began to contribute personnel to the peace operations⁴⁴. With careful planning and conduct, the United Nations could now deploy peace keeping forces with cooperation from member states which has never put themselves forward to take a role in UN operations before. This new era definitely gave opportunities for both the UN and its member states to share responsibilities which had previously only been shared by the super powers (sometimes as part their power game in the Security Council). What the painful experiences of the 1990s have left for the United Nations is a slight hope for the next phase which includes more willingness on the part of the member states to actively participate in peace operations.

Japan and their role in UN peace operations

Within the framework of the International Peace Cooperation Law, Japan also sent about 400 members of the SDF engineer or transport units to Goma (Zaire) and Nairobi (Kenya) in response to an appeal from the UNHCR. The Japanese government was not keen to send their SDF to operations in Africa – the Japanese

⁴³ Rotberg, R. (2000) Peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa: method of conflict prevention. Brooking Institution Press. P69

⁴⁴ Sorenson, S.D. and Wood, C. P. (2005) The Politics of peacekeeping in the post-Cod War era. Frank Cass. P205

public showed their pessimism for participation due to the loss of Japanese lives in Cambodia. However, the government and MOFA did not miss this second opportunity. Dr. Sadako Ogata - director of UNHCR - made a direct approach to the Japanese government for Japan's presence in the UNHCR mission in Rwanda, and after a month of discussion, the government finally agreed to send the SDF⁴⁵.

In a refugee relief mission, the SDF engaged in humanitarian assistance in medical services, sanitation, water supply and aircrafts, and accomplished missions without any serious incidents. Ever since the Cambodian operation, over 3000 Japanese personnel have participated in UN peace operations and humanitarian intervention activities.

Japanese Participation in UN Peace operations

Dispatched personnel based on the International Peace Cooperation Law 1992		
<i>August 1992: International Peace Cooperation Law enacted</i>		
UNAVEM	1992.9-10	Electoral Observers 3
UNTAC	1992.9-1993.9	Cease-fire Observers 8 Civilian Police Officers 75 Engineer Units 600 Electoral Observers 41
ONUMOZ	1993.5-1995.1	Staff Officers 5 Transport Units 48 Electoral Observers 15
ONUSAL	1994.3-4	Electoral Observers 15
The UNHCR mission on the relief of Rwanda Refugees	1994.9-12	Ground Units 283 Air Transport 118
UNDOF	1996.2-present	Staff Officers 2 Transport Units 43
<i>June 1998: The Amendment of International Peace Cooperation Law</i>		
UNAMET	1999.7-9	Civil Police Units 3
The UNHCR mission on the relief of East Timorese Displaced Persons	1999.11-2000.2	Air Transport Units 113
East Timor International Peace Cooperation Units	2001.8-2001.9	Electoral Observers 14

⁴⁵ Dobson. P149

The UNHCR mission on the relief of Afghan Refugees	2001.10-present	Air Transport Units 140
UNTAET	2002.2-present	Staff Officers 10 Engineer Units 522 (in 10 months shifts)

Table 2. 5

According to the results of a public opinion poll on diplomacy conducted by the Prime Minister's office in November 2002, over 70% of the Japanese public supported their country's participation in UN peace operations (and only 13 % were against it)⁴⁶. A similar poll conducted earlier in 1991 had indicated that only 45% of the population was in favour of participation, so there had clearly been a great change in public opinion.⁴⁷ Since the first personnel dispatch to Cambodia, both the Japanese government and public were getting used to the idea of sending troops to both UN operations and to international humanitarian interventions. However, difficulties and criticism on what Japan's participation should be continued. In 1998, the Japanese Diet passed an amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Law which enabled Japan to take part in election monitoring activities. As a result, at the request of international humanitarian relief operations, Japan started providing personnel for international election monitoring activities in areas disrupted by conflict.⁴⁸ The amendment in 1998 also allowed the SDF to use weapons for self-defence only, for the first time.⁴⁹

UN peace operations in the new era: reform for the future

The crisis of the mid-1990s prompted some serious analysis of peace operations at the UN Headquarters in New York. In 1999, two inquiries were made into the

⁴⁶ Source: Prime minister's Office. Kokusaiheiwagyoumu nikansuru kokumin no ishiki cyousa. Year 1991 and 2002.

⁴⁷ Morrison, A., K. Eyre, et al. (1997). Facing the future : proceedings of the 1996 Canada-Japan Conference on Modern Peacekeeping. Clementsport, N.S., Canadian Peacekeeping Press. Nishimura, M. "A Japanese Perspective on Peacekeeping" (P71-75.) P74

⁴⁸ Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Law. (Houritsu dai 102 gou. 1998)

⁴⁹ Amendment to the International Peace Cooperation Law on Self-Defence.
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/pko/ho_kaisei.html

well-known peace operation failures in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. By exploring the failings of the UN system and the uncooperative attitudes of member states, recommendations for reform were offered. Further review by the UN itself resulted in more criticism. The Brahimi Report, released in August 2000, attempted to formalise the reform process to improve the capacity of UN peace operations.

One significant step taken by the UN in the 1990s was deploying peace operations under Chapter VII of its Charter. During the 1990s, a shared understanding of the necessity of peace enforcement action emerged amongst academics and the major Western militaries that contributed troops to peace operations. These included the Australian-led force in East Timor (INTERFET), the NATO's Balkan operations – the Implementation and Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (IFOR and SFOR) – and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Despite the US foreign policy on the UN peace operations, more countries started contributing troops to operations. In Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), the main contributors to the operation were the United Kingdom⁵⁰, Nigeria and India. In the year 2000, the top 4 states contributing military personnel were India (3233), Nigeria (2931), Jordan (1816) and Bangladesh (1774) followed by Ghana, Australia, and Kenya⁵¹. This is one of the obvious changes to UN peace operations in the 1990s. Also, there was active cooperation by regional organizations such as ECOWAS, AU and ECOMOG. Since the late 1990s, active involvement by regional organizations helped the United Nations to deploy adequate peace operations. The United Nations was still suffering from a lack of personnel and finances for planning and conducting peace

⁵⁰ The UK took the leading role in the mission in Sierra Leone.

⁵¹ Source: UN DPKO. Military personnel contributions: Monthly averages of the top twenty contributors for the period from January to November 2000.

operations at the end of 1990s. Therefore, cooperation with regional organizations and neighbouring states became an essential part of a successful peace operation. However, with regards to financial contribution for peace operations, the major contributors have not changed dramatically with the US at 54.5%, Japan 14.4%, Ukraine 9.1%, France 3.7%, and Russian Federation 3.2%⁵².

Since the middle of the 1990s, the UN has launched peace operations in Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), East Timor, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Liberia, and there has been a corresponding increase in the number of UN peacekeepers (the operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Congo are large complex operations in difficult environments to which the United Nations has directed significant military forces). By the year 2003, the number of military personnel and civilian police serving in peace operations had risen to 45,732.⁵³ The late 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century also revealed a new level of complexity for UN peace operations. The UN assumed the role of transitional administration in the missions in Kosovo and East Timor, and to some extent, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Peace operations 1996-

Name	Date	Location	Mandate
UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)	1996-present	Eastern Slavonia, Branja, and Western Sirmium	Transitional Administration
UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)	1996-2002	Croatia	Monitor border area
UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)	1996-1997	Haiti	Modernize police and army of Haiti

⁵² Source: UN DPKO. Total outstanding financial contributors for prior period as at 31 October 2000. The peacekeeping budget cycle from July 2000 to June 2001.

⁵³ United Nations peacekeeping operations on going missions. Background Note: 15 January 2004. Source: <http://www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf>

UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)	1997-1997	Guatemala	Monitor ceasefire in Guatemala's civil war
UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)	1997-1999	Angola	Monitor ceasefire and disarmament
UN Transitional Mission in Haiti(UNTMIH)	1997-1997	Haiti	Help stabilize Haiti
UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti(MIPONUH)	1997-2000	Haiti	Modernise Haiti's Police forces
UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)	1998-2000	The Central African Republic	Maintain security and stability in The Central African Republic
UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)	1998-1999	Sierra Leone	Monitor disarmament and demobilization in Sierra Leone
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	1999-Present	Kosovo	Exercise administrative authority, including administration of justice in Kosovo
UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)	1999-Present	Sierra Leone	Help Stabilize and disarm Sierra Leone
UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	1999-2002	East Timor	Transition East Timor to independence
UN Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)	1999-Present	Congo	Monitor ceasefire in Democratic Republic of the Congo

Table 2. 6

What has been changed?

In the history of UN peace operations, the role and purpose of peace operations has changed from that of being a simple mediator to a nation-builder. The United Nations deployed few observer missions in its early years, however, UN missions did not receive public attention, thus, the term "peacekeeping" was not popularly used until 1956. The initial observation type missions presented minimal management challenges to the UN. These missions consisted of no more than a few hundred military observers who were equipped only with side arms. On the other hand, subsequent traditional peacekeeping operations were deployed with a slightly more complex military task than just observation. These traditional peace

operations consisted of a few thousand lightly armed troops, typically deployed in an international buffer zone to separate warring belligerents. Their mandates were mainly on monitoring a ceasefire, and controlling buffer zones. Most of the operations were temporary arrangements but they lasted a longer time if peacemaking efforts were slow to succeed – UNTSO has been deployed in the Near East for more than 50 years and UNFICYP in Cyprus for almost 40 years.⁵⁴ Traditional peacekeepers were not authorized to use force to fulfil their mandate – force was only to be used for self-defence.

Peacekeeping operations after year 2000

Name	Date	Location	Mandate
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	2000-present	Ethiopia and Eritrea	Enforce ceasefire between Ethiopia and Eritrea
UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)	2000-present	East Timor	2 years mission while East Timor develops government
UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	2003-present	Liberia	Oversee ceasefire and train national people

Table 2. 7

The United Nations’ experiences in the 1990s made one thing clear: regardless of the difficulties, UN peace operations could settle conflict situations and build stable societies provided necessary conditions were in place. With the increased number of brutal conflicts around the world, the UN deployed more peace operations than ever before in the 1990s. However, deploying peace operations is not the solution for states in chaos. Without “will” from host countries (including the fighting parties), peace missions will not achieve their mandates. A UN peace operation is only a support system for a state in crisis in order to re-build social systems. Furthermore, because of the complexity and violence of conflicts in the

⁵⁴ Goulding, M. The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping. *International Affairs*. July 1993.

post-Cold War era, several peace operations were deployed under Chapter VII of UN Charter. It was a necessary measure to protect the lives of thousands of peacekeepers on the ground, and enable a smooth transition for the operations. Nevertheless, the UN should not use enforcement action unless it is necessary. The experiences in Somalia and Yugoslavia highlighted the risks for the UN in becoming another party in battle. When the UN calls for personnel contributions to missions to unstable situations, member states should have the right to protect their troops should the mission be life threatening and decline cooperation.

Because of the bitter experiences from unsuccessful peace operations in the 1990s, and the urgent need for reform of the UN organizational structure in deploying more adequate undertakings, the UN made the most out of this opportunity to re-examine the environment surrounding peace operations. There are two remarkable reports reviewing UN peace operations in the 1990s, and both reports gave vital recommendations and analysis on how UN peace operations can become more effective – which the UN is still working on⁵⁵. For the future, member states, regional organizations and all related organizations must cooperate more effectively in order to deploy operations.

Japan's experiences in the 1990s

Through the 1990s, Japan made remarkable changes in its policy towards UN peace operations and humanitarian relief operations. On occasions, Japan's presence in UN operations has made an impact on the host country and conflicting parties. Several Japanese diplomats said that both Cambodia and East Timor

⁵⁵ United States Department of State (2007) United States Participation in the United Nations: A report by the Secretary of State to the Congress for the Year 2007. P63

leaders requested Japan's presence in UN operations⁵⁶. In most cases, Japan has strong relations with East Asian countries, and a strong influence in the region as a result of Japan being a super economic power in the region with its development assistance being very successful in many of the countries. The UN lacked reliable financial and personnel contributions and this is something the organization could not have since its chaotic peace missions in the early 1990s. There are still limitations for Japan's personnel contribution due to its legislative restriction, however, what Japan offered to UN peace missions was not enforcement power, but rather something that was related to the peacebuilding phase. It is apparent that the increase in Japanese involvement in peace operations in the 1990s was by and large due to the lack of resources experienced by the UN. The timing was perfect as Japan had been looking for a way to make a significant and noticeable contribution.

⁵⁶ Source: interview by author.

Chapter 3 UN peace operations in Cambodia 1992: Japan's first attempt

The focus of this chapter will be on UN peace operations at the beginning of the 1990s as well as Japan's first involvement in the area of peace operations. It will study the development of UN peace operations in the 1990s from the viewpoint of the UN and from Japan. There will be analyses of the many difficulties that the UN faced during this period and also how Japan was able to find its place amidst the crises that the UN was facing. Thus, it will identify why and how Japan began to contribute in UN peace operations, and discover the distinctive ways in which it did. In order to understand this, the progression of events as well as historical developments will be referred to as well as some of the key events for the transitions in policy/strategy that took place.

The operations in Cambodia were the UN's first attempt to deploy multidimensional operations in the post-Cold War era. This was also a first time opportunity for Japan to show its presence in an international dispute in its post-World War II history. Prior to the Gulf War crisis, no structure had been placed in the way that would allow it to react to international crises. Japan was under the protection of the US and was comfortable being able to justify the non-existence of a military force due to its constitution. The Japanese public as well as members of the Diet were not prepared to send Japanese troops into risky environments. There had been debates about whether Japan had the responsibility of contributing but it was only after the humiliating criticism regarding Japan's response to the Gulf War crisis that Japan's domestic politics took a transition to adopt a new international outlook. The case in Cambodia was the perfect opportunity for Japan

to pressure the Diet to make changes¹. Japan's new foreign policy was on being "Asian central" and in addition, Cambodia and neighbouring states requested Japan's active involvement. Therefore, it was the perfect timing for Japan to take advantage of this opportunity. In order to avoid unnecessary conflict with countries in the region apprehensive about what appeared to be Japan's remilitarization, Japan's stance was to act under UN authorization². The most remarkable progress that it had made was allowing for the dispatch of SDF units – this was seen as a symbol of Japan's new attitude to international matters and collective security. However, this was not the only contribution Japan made during this peace process. During the peace process and peace operations, Japan not only provided material support to the United Nations but also provided a diplomatic structure to pave the foundations for the road to peace.

The increase in the number of conflicts and the complexity of each UN operation required ever more support from its members. In particular, new participants such as Japan, Australia, and Canada – "middle power" countries – could play distinctive roles in their own capacity³. What the United Nations needed was varying contributions from each member state, and there was no requirement or definition on the ways in which they could contribute to each mission. Therefore, the resulting contribution by Japan was very distinct from other countries and characteristic of a country that had rebuilt its nation from ruins to an economic powerhouse with much political influence. The distinctive nature of its contribution was not due to Japan wanting international recognition but was a

¹ Irie, A. (1990) *Nihon no Gaikou*. Cyukoushinsyo. P200

² Rose, C. (2000) Japanese Role in peacekeeping and Humanitarian Aid. From *Japan Foreign Policy Today*. Ed. Inoguchi, T. Palgrave. P128

³ Cooper, F. A. (1993) *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in Changing World Order*. UBC Press. P18

natural consequence given its strength and experience in rebuilding a nation. The UN Secretariat's role proved vital in recognizing the different ways in which countries can contribute to peace operations. What Japan portrayed through this peace process was that Japan – the world's second largest economic country with the experiences of rehabilitation and rebuilding the society – could be relied upon as an active participant in the field of UN peace operations⁴.

UN and Cambodia until the late 1980s

Until the late 1980s, Cambodia had experienced frequent and drastic changes in its political and economic regimes since its independence in 1953. The country had suffered not only the effects of the overspill of the war in Viet Nam, but also devastating civil wars and the destructive totalitarian regime of Pol Pot. A number of attempts were made by the United Nations to negotiate peace between the nominal Cambodian government and the three resistance factions within the country. However, these attempts ended in failure. An international effort to make a possible peace process was first considered by UN Security Council in early 1979. It was due to the military coup in 1970 which launched Cambodia into a civil war. On 17 April 1975 radical Khmer Rouge forces were released in the country, overthrowing the America-backed Lon Nol military government, and establishing Democratic Kampuchea. The horror of the preceding years of civil war was replaced with a new kind of terror as the Khmer Rouge embarked upon a grotesque social experiment of anti-development.⁵ Under the Khmer Rouge rule, most of the country's economic and social infrastructure was dismantled. Over the

⁴ Warren, S. (1997) *Japan's quest: the search for international role, recognition, and respect*. M.E. Sharpe. Inc. P26

⁵ Curtis, G. and United Nations. Research Institute for Social Development. (1993). *Transition to what? : Cambodia, UNTAC and the peace process*. Geneva, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

course of 3 years, 8 months and 20 days of the Khmer Rouge experiment, as many as 1 million people (1 in 7 Cambodians) were tortured and executed, or died of hard labour, malnutrition and disease – a manifestation of auto-genocide in world history⁶.

The Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in 1978 in response to repeated border violations by the Khmer Rouge, and the forces of Democratic Kampuchea were pushed to the Thai border. Progress was made in 1982 when the Khmer Rouge entered into an alliance with Cambodia's non-Communist resistance forces, establishing the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (**CGDK**) under the nominal leadership of HRH Prince Sihanouk. Meanwhile, the Vietnamese installed a Communist style regime known as the People's Republic of Kampuchea (**PRK**)⁷. Cambodia's social reconstruction demanded the creation of a normal economic and social structure from an almost complete void. During the 1980s, international emergency relief efforts provided necessary equipment and helped to re-establish more than 100 clinics and hospitals and some 6,000 schools. With the progress of social reconstruction in Cambodia, the UN decided to involve itself in the peace process with cooperation from member states.

Japan and Cambodia until the peace process

The rising domestic and international pressure for Japan to play a practical role found an opportunity in the Cambodian peace process. MOFA had been seeking more active roles in UN activities long before the Gulf War crisis. Japan was

⁶ Bergin, S. (2009) *The Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian Genocide*. The Rosen Publishing Group. P29

⁷ Hughes, C. (2009) *Dependents Communities: aid and politics in Cambodia and East Timor*. Cornell Southeast Programme Publications. P176

seeking a more diplomatic role in the region as one of the developed countries, and it had no interest in participating in UN peace operations by sending its own personnel⁸. Japan's position in relation to the Cambodian conflict was in line with the majority of Western countries: the Japanese government acknowledged the CGDK and supported the position of Prince Sihanouk. However, Japan was in no position to take a larger part in this case due to complicated regional confrontations⁹. By the end of the 1980s, only Vietnam and the USSR supported the Phnom Penh government, while all other countries (PRC, USA, ASEAN nations) including Japan supported the CGDK. Since Japan proclaimed its "Asian Central Foreign Policy" as "a member of Asia¹⁰", MOFA began to analyse Japan's possible contributions for future opportunities and at the beginning of the 1990s, an opportunity was presented by HRH Prince Sihanouk and the government of Thailand.

In April 1990, the government of Thailand offered the Japanese government a bilateral collaboration on the Cambodian peace settlement at a top-level conference held in Tokyo¹¹: Prime Minister Chatichati suggested hosting a peace conference in Tokyo in June with participation from all Cambodian parties. Because MOFA had been actively establishing connections between all Cambodian parties, especially with Prince Sihanouk since the beginning of the 1980s, Japan could not hope for better chance. Also, because this opportunity was provided by the Thai government, Japan was able to accept without hesitation its

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⁹ The USA versus USSR, PRC versus USSR, and PRC versus Vietnam were the typical confrontations on Indo-Chinese Peninsula during the Cold War Period. After the end of the Cold War, the confrontation between the PRC and Vietnam was the central issue to resolving Cambodian Conflict.

¹⁰ Y, Hirono. (2000) Nihon Gaiko-shi Note. Koyo syobou. P181

¹¹ Y, Imagawa. (2000) Cambodia and Nihon. Rengo-syutupan. P93

involvement in this peace process in the East Asian region. Despite its ambition to play an active role in the East Asian region, the fresh memory of Japan's acts of aggression in WWII was something not easily forgotten by most countries. Japan feared that its involvement in the region would provoke much uneasiness in neighbouring countries. Thus, Japan had been waiting for an opportunity like this (an offer from other Asian states to get involved) for a long time¹². As soon as the Thai-Japan conference was over, MOFA sent Ambassador Ikeda to Prince Sihanouk, with Ambassador Imai to the Phnom Penh Government and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)¹³ to discuss details of a peace talk which Japan was planning to host¹⁴. The main purpose of the Tokyo conference was the meeting of Sihanouk (President of NGC¹⁵) and Hun Sen (Prime Minister of Phnom Penh government) – the two key parties in Cambodian conflict. As Japan was beginning this new role in the international arena, it started to make use of its major strength – its diplomatic skills. At the same time, the Japanese government was trying to enact a new bill which would allow SDF to participate in UN peace operations. However, given the narrow interpretation of Article 9, the process was not easy.

According to Hook, there are four different interpretations of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.

- 1) The LDP government's interpretation that, as the first clause of Article 9 does not go so far as to deny the right of self-defence, necessary minimum defence

¹² Source: Interview with Shinsuke Shimizu, (Director of Southwest Asia Division.

¹³ Japanese Diet Proceeding Record. January-June 1990.

¹⁴ Ambassador Ikeda and Imai were the key persons behind the scenes to the Cambodian peace process: their personal connection with Cambodian parties especially with the trust of Prince Sihanouk was an advantage for Japan's diplomatic activities until the end of UN mission in Cambodia.

¹⁵ The CDGK changed its name to National Government of Cambodia (NGC) in 3 February 1990.

can be maintained based on the second clause.

- 2) The Ashida interpretation that, although the first clause of Article 9 does deny aggressive wars, as it does not deny wars of self-defence, was potential for self-defence can be maintain.
- 3) The dominant interpretation of constitutional scholars that, as the first clause of Article 9 renounces all wars, second clause prohibits the possession of all forms of war potential.
- 4) The Naganuma court decision that, although the first clause of Article 9 does not deny wars of self-defence, as the second clause prohibits all forms of war potential, the result is that wars of self-defence also are prohibited.¹⁶

There is no easy way to settle with one particular interpretation, and ever since the establishment of the Constitution under US occupation, the Japanese government and public have recycled the same argument time and again over its interpretation. Therefore, given its restrictions, Japan found a way to use diplomacy (which was without restriction) as a first step to involving itself in international affairs.

Japan's diplomatic effort was a success; at the Tokyo conference, Sihanouk and Hun Sen made significant progress in the peace process. Both leaders agreed to a cease-fire, and a power sharing formula during the transition period before elections. Japan's effort was recognised by the UN and its member states for the first time. This achievement was possible due to the strong support from the Thai government: Bangkok and Tokyo made a draft of agreement before the Tokyo conference in consultation with the three Cambodian parties of CGDK¹⁷. One

¹⁶ Hook, G. D. (1996) *Militarisation and De-militarisation of Japan in contemporary Japan*. Routledge, NY. P78

¹⁷ A comment of Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama's at the Special committee for the

issue remaining from this conference was that the Khmer Rouge refused to participate in any of the meetings, so therefore, an agreement was signed only by Sihanouk and Hun Sen. This was the beginning of the resistance movement and the isolation of Khmer Rouge in the peace process. MOFA sent their officials before the Tokyo conference, and again at the beginning of 1991 to Phnom Penh to establish a diplomatic channel. Japan made its move very quickly behind the scenes. Because of its economic and political influence, and also as a neutral country in the Cambodian conflicts, Japan was able to gain the trust of all parties¹⁸.

With the success of the Tokyo conference, the Cambodian peace process was well on its way. Most of the process though, especially the preparation for the peace agreement was handled by the UN Security Council, and taken out of Japan's hands. However, the Gulf War crisis in January 1991 became the centre of attention at the UN, and the Cambodian peace process took a back seat until April 1991 when the war ended. During this period, the Japanese government earnestly showed its diplomatic skills. Firstly, it made a supplemental suggestion¹⁹ to the P5 proposal for the peace agreement, and had several meetings with each Cambodian party. The suggestions were not agreed upon by all Cambodian parties and this made it clear to the permanent 5 that their proposal was inadequate for all parties to accept.

At the same time, debate in Japan's National Diet concentrated on whether or not Japan should send SDF troops to the UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia.

Peacekeeping operations.

¹⁸ Source; Interview with MOFA official.

¹⁹ Japan's proposal was not an "official" proposal. It was a supplemental plan (or more like a suggestion) for the ceasefire and disarmament of the "P5 proposal" to the Cambodian parties.

Because of the restriction by Article 9 of the Constitution, if the United Nations requested a troop contribution to the Cambodian operation, Japan would require an amendment to its Constitutional Law. It is well known that the Japanese SDF is one of the best equipped and trained militaries in the region and in the world. Several tasks for peacekeeping operations required military experts,²⁰ and the future operation in Cambodia was to involve military elements. Therefore, the participation of Japan's SDF was to be of significant benefit for the Cambodian people, the United Nations, and most of all Japan itself. For this particular opportunity, what Japan feared most was the lack of recognition from the international community (especially from other Western developed countries). Receiving international acknowledgement and recognition in a way that would contribute to Japan's reputation was certainly an objective. However, this "reactive" foreign policy has its limit. In many respects, the PKO bill was monumental, but as with most groundbreaking legislation in any country, an impetus from out-side will at best serve to initiate the legislative process; it will not guarantee its ratification²¹.

Prince Sihanouk who keenly wanted Japan's assistance was actively meeting with Japanese officials including Foreign Minister Nakayama²². Most of the Cambodian parties, particularly Sihanouk and his son Prince Ranariddh, preferred the East Asian states, especially Japan, to play a major role in the UN operation in Cambodia rather than Western countries. Nakayama also visited several East Asian countries to discuss the Cambodian peace process. He visited the

²⁰ Many of the tasks of peacekeeping operations are "peaceful military operations" such as monitoring a cease-fire, cantonment, and disarmament. Since peacekeeping operations are deployed into the country in conflict, military experts from the UN member states are the essential.

²¹ Kato, M.E. (1995) Japan's role in the post-Cold War World. Greenwood Press. P76

²² Foreign Minister Nakayama visited Prince Sihanouk several times to discuss Japan's future involvement in Cambodia, and also as a negotiator for the Peace Process.

Vietnamese government to ask its support in persuading Hun Sen to accept the P5 proposal and he also had a meeting with the Foreign Minister of the PRC on 25 June about the Cambodian peace process, particularly regarding the Khmer Rouge. Japan's continuous diplomatic effort influenced the peace process until the end of the UN operation in Cambodia.

The UN and the Paris Peace Accords: deployment of UNAMIC and UNTAC

The Paris Peace Accords were signed on 23 October 1991 by the four contending Cambodian factions²³, and eighteen other nations including Japan, Australia, and the UN Permanent Five²⁴. The initial schedules made by the Paris Agreement were too tight and impossible to establish. Therefore the Secretary General recommended deploying a small advance mission to assist the Cambodian parties to maintain the cease-fire and to prepare for the deployment of UNTAC. Based on this recommendation, the Security Council supported resolution 717 (1991) of 16 October 1991, and decided to establish the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) which became operational immediately after the Agreement was signed. Due to its limited mandate as a fact-finding mission involving a small number of personnel, the UN was able to gather the necessary finances and personnel on time. UNAMIC was headed by *Mr. A.H.S. Ataul Karim (Bangladesh)* as Chief Liaison Officer of UNAMIC in Phnom Penh, and *Brigadier-General Michel Loridon (France)*, a Senior Military Liaison Officer, commanding the military elements of UNAMIC²⁵. By the end of December 1991,

²³ Such as Front uni National pour un Cambodge ind, pendant, neuter, p'cifique et coop, ratif (FUNCINPEC); Khmer People's National Liberation front (KPNLF); Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK); and State of Cambodia (SOC)

²⁴ Australia, Brunei, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Viet Nam, Yugoslavia which had replaced Zimbabwe as the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Permanent Five.

²⁵ Necessary personnel were contributed by the following countries such as: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland,

the Secretary General reported (S/23331. 1991) to the Security Council on the need to expand the mandate of UNAMIC to undertake (on an urgent basis) a major de-mining effort in Cambodia for the preparation and safety of UNTAC personnel. In addition, the Second session of the Paris Conference on Cambodia met from 1 to 23 October 1991. Cambodia was represented by SNC, with Prince Sihanouk as its Chairman. Also present with the 5 UN Security Council permanent members were 6 members of the ASEAN: Australia, Canada, India, Japan, Laos and Viet Nam.

Since this was the first experience of the UN Secretariats to deploy a multifunctional peace operation, the whole process was difficult and chaotic, especially with the tight schedule (The UN Secretariats lacked the experience, resources, and qualified personnel to organize a mission of such complexity, at such short notice). The negotiation process of the Paris Peace Accords apparently gave little thought to how the Secretariats could cope with the amount of work or whether they would require additional resources to organize and maintain UNTAC. Theoretically, the peace operations are deployed with 3 key principles:

- the consent of the parties,
- the impartiality of the peacekeepers, and
- the non-use of force²⁶.

In Cambodia, there was no consent from all 4 parties (especially from the Khmer Rouge), and also the concept of the non-use of force was somewhat uncertain. The lack of necessary conditions, particularly on maintaining peace during the deployment phase, was a serious misjudgement on the part of the UN Secretariats.

Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay.

²⁶ The basic principles of the UN peacekeeping are not set in the UN Charter.

Later in the operation, this incomplete agreement caused a number of deaths of UN peacekeepers, and created doubt on about the fundamental principle of UN's peace operations that it was "not to become another conflict party". Brahimi report stated that "If there is no peace to keep, the UN should not deploy peace operations". This was one of the basic mistakes made by the UN at the beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, UNTAC was deployed with two essential conditions: the full support of the Security Council, and the necessary financial resources provided by member states in a full and timely manner.²⁷ The creation of UNAMIC was not able to alleviate the UN's lack of preparation and resources which caused a serious delay in UNTAC's deployment.²⁸ In addition, UNAMIC's mandate was extremely limited with minimum personnel, and was unable to fulfil its role as a fact-finding mission. However, the presence of the United Nations soon after the signing of the Paris Agreement on Cambodian soil made people believe that the peace process was finally on the right track.

UNTAC: mandate and structure

While UNAMIC struggled to maintain the semblance of a UN presence in Cambodia, the Secretariat in New York was preparing a detailed plan for UNTAC²⁹. On 19 February 1992, the Secretary General submitted to the Security Council a report detailing the proposed implementation plan for UNTAC. The Council then endorsed the report, and finally by resolution 745(1992), established UNTAC under its authority for a period not to exceed 18 months. The brief schedule for UNTAC was: Election will be held sometime in April/May 1993 and

²⁷ UN, Report of Secretary General on Cambodia, UN document S/23613, 19 Feb. 1992, pp.40-41

²⁸ Hill, S. M. and S. P. Malik (1996). Peacekeeping and the United Nations. Aldershot, Hants., Dartmouth.

²⁹ The Security Council Resolution 718 on 1 November 1991. (S/RES/718)

the deadline for agreement on a new constitution and the establishment of a new government would be in August 1993.

Besides the traditional UN peace operations role of monitoring and supervising cease-fires, additional mandates given to UNTAC covered wide areas in both military and civilian administrative sides.

- ① supervision, monitoring and verification of withdrawal and non-return of foreign military forces;
- ② cantonment, disarmament and demobilization of the four factions;
- ③ location and confiscation of caches of weapons and military supplies;
- ④ the conduct of a free and fair election
- ⑤ promotion and protection of human rights;
- ⑥ oversight of military security and civil administrations and of the maintenance of law and order;
- ⑦ repatriation and resettlement of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons ;
- ⑧ assistance with mine clearance and establishment of training programme in mine clearance and mine awareness; and
- ⑨ rehabilitation of essential infrastructure and the commence of economic reconstruction and development.

Since there are no provisions within the UN Charter for peace operations, the legal basis for each operation was its mandates³⁰. Therefore, if the mandate was

³⁰ "Final Report on the In-Depth Evaluation of Peacekeeping Operation: Start Up Phase," UN Office of Oversight Services, 17 March 1995. Paragraph 11.

unrealistic, too vague, or too weak, it would cause several problems for the operations after deployment. It is well known that UNTAC's mandate went far beyond that of traditional peace-keeping. It postulated major tasks in institution-building and social reconstruction as integral parts of a peace-building package. It was designed to secure an end to armed conflict, and a transition to a democratic society. However, without the consensus from all the parties in the fighting, the first task of the termination of armed conflict was difficult from the beginning. Despite this, UNTAC achieved most of the mandates within the time schedule and also accomplished its primary objective of organizing and conducting free and fair elections in May 1993. During the transitional period, UNTAC directly controlled all administrative agencies and offices acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security, and information. According to Article 2 of the *Agreement of the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict* (A/46/608, 30 October 1991), UNTAC was under the direct responsibility of the Secretary General of the United Nations. As for the Cambodian representatives, the United Nations set up the Supreme National Council (SNC) as the unique legitimate body and source of authority for the Cambodian side. UNTAC's mandate in Annex I of the Agreement indicated how UNTAC and SNC should cooperate with the situation in Cambodia during the deployment phase³¹. This shows the UN's willingness to include the local powers in the process. It was the very first experience for the UN organization to take the responsibility of a sovereign nation during the transition period, and the UN achieved the remarkable transformation of Cambodia into a democratic country by the end of the UNTAC.

³¹ Sutresna, S. N. "How the Paris Agreement Affected UNTAC Operations". P116 From Rham-Azimi, N. d., Institute of Policy Studies(Singapore), et al. (1995). The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) : debriefing and lessons : report and recommendations of the international conference, Singapore, August 1994. Boston, Kluwer Law International.

UNTAC was to be structured into seven components: military, civil police, electoral, civil administration, repatriation, human right, and rehabilitation. As for the SRSG, *Mr. Yasushi Akashi (Japan)*, (former head of the Department of Disarmament Affairs) was appointed, on 9 January. In addition, *Lieutenant-General John Sanderson (Australia)* was appointed as a Commander of UNTAC's military force³². The total number of international personnel within UNTAC was more than 20,000, including some 16,000 military and 3,500 civilian police³³. Troops and police were provided by 46 countries, and the largest contingents were from France, India and Indonesia³⁴. Most of the countries contributing personnel had never participated in UN peace operations before³⁵. The biggest personnel contributor France (former suzerain state), provided 1,500 personnel which made up the main contingent assigned to UNTAC. In addition to that, Australia contributed over 500 personnel including 488 Force Communications Unit, and 14 staff at UNTAC's Headquarters under Lieutenant General Sanderson. Both France and Australia had interests in the Cambodian peace process, and were willing to play a significant role in different ways. The contribution of personnel to UN peace operations always comes with the will and desire of each member state. As for Japan, its national interest in taking part in this peace process was clearly recognised by the UN and Cambodia, and Japan was willing to maximise this opportunity in support of Cambodia.

³² The Cambodians preferred an Indonesian because of their cultural affinities.

³³ c, P245

³⁴ The exact number of troops and civilian personnel contributed by each country is not available due to the limited resources.

³⁵ Among them Brunei, Bulgaria, Germany (medical personnel only), Japan (an engineering battalion), Namibia and Uruguay. Findlay, T. (1995) *The legacy and Lessons of UNATC*. SIPRI Research Report No9. Oxford University Press.. P27

The basic starting point for planning a peace operation is information gathering. Until all the necessary information has been collected, there is always some gap between reality and the ideal scenario. In the case of Cambodia, once the final round of negotiations among all parties to the Paris Agreements was under way, preparations for the implementation of UNTAC could begin. It is well known that the first condition needed for a successful peace operation is a conceptually sound and appropriately detailed peace plan and adequate contributions from member states. Part of the difficulty in planning UNTAC was the limited availability of information. Cambodia had been deliberately isolated by the international community and was destroyed by a long-term internal war³⁶. Therefore, the United Nations used the most common way to collect information from the ground: they dispatched a fact-finding mission. When UNAMIC was deployed, the area outside of Phnom Penh was remote and inaccessible³⁷, so the resulting field report did not reach the heart of any issue. UNAMIC's main responsibility was for maintaining contact with SNC in preparation for the deployment of UNTAC, and since they were headquartered in Phnom Penh, they had no access to the rural areas of Cambodia. Until January 1992, the cease-fire was generally maintained. However, due to the limited mandate of UNAMIC in maintaining a cease-fire and its de-mining programme, it could not operate as a fact-finding mission.

The official establishment of UNTAC was scheduled for February 1992, however, various departments of UNTAC were gradually being established and it took a

³⁶ During the Pol Pot regime, most of the educated class and the public officers were executed, and all the official documents were destroyed.

³⁷ All the main roads and bridges were destroyed, and unlimited mine fields were spread outside of Phnom Penh.

few extra months to become fully operational. By August 1992, only 3 of the 5 section heads of the Administrative Division had arrived. Moreover, by the end of April 1992, only 3 out of the 24 military checkpoints which planned to monitor the withdrawal of foreign forces and verify that new military equipment and supplies were not entering the country had been established. What the UN and committee members of the Paris agreements did not realise was the complexity in preparing an operation of this magnitude given the limited amount of time. Since the end of the Cold War, UN peace operations had become more militarily involved and complex than traditional peacekeeping, where most missions were deployed in clearly delineated linear buffer zones between consenting nation-states³⁸.

A significant reason for the late deployment of UNTAC was the complete inadequacy of its advance planning. As Roberts described, “the United Nations lacks a satisfactory command system that is capable of making quick decisions and effectively coordinating the many different types of forces and national contingents it deploys”³⁹. It is not only criticised in the UN Secretariats, but also shares the responsibility with its member states for the efficient running of an operation⁴⁰. It is well known that the United Nations is an intergovernmental organization the main participants of which are its member states whose decisions are made by government representatives in political organs such as the Security Council and the General Assembly⁴¹. The Secretariat is usually defined as a

³⁸ Hillens, J (2000). Blue Helmets. The strategy of UN Military Operations. Brassey's. P140

³⁹ Robert, A. The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping. Crocker, C.A. (1996) Managing global chaos : sources of and responses to international conflict. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press

⁴⁰ Robert, A. The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping.

⁴¹ Shimamura, H. The role of the UN Secretariat in organizing peacekeeping.. Thakur, R. C. and A. Schnabel (2001). United Nations peacekeeping operations : ad hoc missions, permanent engagement. Tokyo ; New York, United Nations University Press.

supporting role to implementing the decisions made by the political organs. Thus, the success of a peace operation somehow depends on member states' willingness and generosity. In the case of Cambodia, gathering financial and personnel contribution from related countries went smoothly from two reasons. Firstly, it was the very first UN peace operation in the East Asian region, and most of the related countries were willing to contribute necessary assistance. Secondly, when the Cambodian peace process started, the UN did not yet have its hands full with ongoing missions, and consequently, the UN concentrated mostly on the Cambodian operation (When the Secretariat started planning the UN operation in Cambodia in late 1980s, the potential difficulties were not apparent during the planning process; a first intra-secretariat task force was established as early as February 1990, and seven more fact-finding missions were dispatched to Cambodia from 1989 to 1991).

Since the Paris Agreement: Japan's effort behind the scene

Before the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, Japanese Ambassador Imagawa was appointed as a Chairman of the 3rd Committee which focused on the issues of repatriation and peacebuilding. The appointment of Imagawa was from the desire of Prince Sihanouk (and most of the Cambodian parties) for Japan to cooperate in the area of the reconstruction of Cambodia after the general election. Hence, the appointment of Imagawa as one of the chairmen sent a clear message to Japan⁴². Several members of the Japanese Diet who also visited the Phnom Penh government or Sihanouk requested Japan's support for economic development

⁴² Ambassador Imagawa's active role behind the Paris Agreement was well known by the related country. Drifte, R. (2000) Japan's quest for a permanent security council seat: matter of pride or justice? Macmillan Press Ltd. P71

after the transition period. Much of the expectation was for Japan to contribute to the rehabilitation phase after the general election. This certainly was an area in which Japan already had a lot of experience and it did not violate Japan's pacifist law. However, Japan, at the same time, was trying to involve itself in new areas and it experimented to find out what and how it could contribute to UN peace operations.

The Cambodian peace process was finally on track and the Japanese government provided three agendas items on for the Cambodian peace process (during the transitional period):

- ① take an active initiative in economical support in the reconstruction and rebuilding of the Cambodian economy;
- ② persuade the Khmer Rouge to cooperate with the Paris Peace Agreement;
- ③ dispatch Japanese SDF to the UNTAC operation⁴³.

The environment around the Cambodian peace process improved for the Japanese government when two Japanese personnel were appointed to high positions at UN organizations during 1991-1992. Mr. Yasuhi Akashi was appointed SRSG of UNTAC on 9 January 1992, and Dr. Sadako Ogata became the High Commissioner of UNHCR in January 1991. The appointment of Akashi as SRSG generated high expectation from the UN and Cambodia on this operation, and as for Japan, the government had more reason to take part in this operation since Japanese personnel became the head of operation. In addition, the UNHCR was

⁴³ Ikeda. P210

leading the repatriation programme of 37 thousand people. With the appointment of Ogata, Japan was willing to cooperate in this part of the operation more actively as well⁴⁴. Japan was carefully considering every opportunity they could use to show their presence in this operation to gain recognition for their capability, and appointment of two Japanese personnel at this particular time perfectly matched the needs of the Japanese government.

As for the Japan's personnel contribution in UNTAC, Mr Hun Sen visited Tokyo on 22 March 1992 to ask for more support on the UNTAC operation. He had a series of meetings with Mr. Nakayama (Foreign Minister), Mr. Miyazawa (Prime Minister), and several other politicians (including the leaders of the opposition parties) about the establishment of the PKO Law. Mr. Hun Sen stated that because Cambodia had experienced 90 years of occupation by France, there was distrust about Western countries coming into Cambodia. Therefore, in his opinion, if one of the Asian countries like Japan could play a central role in UNTAC (on the ground), it would enable the operation to run more smoothly⁴⁵. In addition, Prince Sihanouk said that because Japan's Constitutional Law (Article 9: prohibiting any military action), there would be no chance for Japan to become another party involved in the conflict. Hence, Japan's SDF was considered the ideal candidate for the operation⁴⁶. These strong requests from the Cambodian leaders helped the Japanese governmental parties to establish the PKO Law and dispatch the SDF to the UNTAC operation⁴⁷. Japan's most difficult political issue of Article 9 and

⁴⁴ Ogata, S. (2006) *Funsou to Nanmin*. Syueisya. P439

⁴⁵ Dobson. P109

⁴⁶ Prince Sihanouk is well known for his favour towards Japan. However, his understanding of Japanese politics or the law was sometimes mistaken. This statement is one of his misunderstandings of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitutional Law-what he meant was that Japan's SDF was not allowed to participate in a war of aggression .

⁴⁷ Sources: Interview with MOFA officials. Because of the movement against the establishment of the PKO Law and dispatch of SDF troops, strong requests from Cambodia helped MOFA and the

pacifist constitution helped gain the confidence of the Cambodian leaders. External pressure from the US (and other western countries) as well as the request from the host country for the peace operation provided enough grounds for Japanese politicians to make a drastic change.

Apart from the consideration of the contribution of personnel, the Japanese government hosted the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, which was held in Tokyo on the 22 June 1992 with the participation of 23 countries and 13 organizations. It had also hosted a prior consultation for this conference on 30-31 March 1992. Japan and UNDP, the hosts of this conference, were able to gather 88 million US dollar (Japan's contribution was about 2 million US dollar). This International Conference on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) was to be held in Tokyo/Paris once a year (hosted by the Japanese government)⁴⁸ – this was something Japan guaranteed at the Third Committee of the Paris conference. For the first time in their history, Japan has exerted leadership in this particular area of peace building⁴⁹. The tremendous success of this conference not only provided Cambodia with a sufficient amount of financial aid but also provided the opportunity for related countries and organizations to have consultation with all Cambodian parties to the conflict. Because of this conference, the issue on Cambodia was given the spotlight and resulted in much media coverage and international attention. The fact that this was hosted in Tokyo gave Japan the attention it so desperately sought (details of this conference will be analyzed in Chapter 5).

administration to gain public support on the issue.

⁴⁸ Japan was the chairman of the ICORC until the 1996. From 1996, Japan has been a host country for the Consultative Group Meeting for Cambodia (CG) with the World Bank until now.

⁴⁹ Maswood, J.S. (2001) Japan and East Asian regionalism. Routledge. P113

In addition to the area of rehabilitation, Japan was also continuously working on diplomatic negotiations with the Cambodian parties. Since the summer of 1992, Japan and Thailand were the only countries which had “serious talks”⁵⁰ with the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer Rouge and its political party PDK (**Party of Democratic Kampuchea**) became more isolated with the progress of the UN operation. Most of the countries involved in the Cambodian peace process (including the PRD) decided to keep a distance from the PDK. Most countries stated that despite the non-compliance of the PDK, which had initially agreed to the Paris Peace Accords (including the disarmament and cantonment phase), the peace process should continue even with the exclusion of the Khmer Rouge. Nevertheless, both Japan and Thailand put a lot of effort towards consultation with the PDK. The aim of the multilateral talks was to disarm the Khmer Rouge and establish a common ground with them (it was due to continued violence by the PDK which caused the delay and eventual termination of the UNTAC operation). The Japanese delegation had several talks with Mr. Akashi on the Khmer Rouge’s view; however their demands went far beyond the Paris Agreement. Their demands were to strengthen the authority of the SNC, and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. The consultation between the PDK and Japan/Thailand failed in the end. It became clear that the PDK would no longer follow the Paris Accords. The peace process would, however, continue without a consensus from the PDK. The efforts by Japan and Thailand were appreciated by UNTAC and all related countries including the P5. Japan was finally recognised for its role in the UN operation, and it was not because of

⁵⁰Japan and Thailand had 4 meetings with the Khmer Rouge until the end of 1992.

personnel contribution⁵¹. At the forth consultation, Japan and Thailand were recognised (S/RES/783(1992)⁵²) as representatives of the UN Security Council. The above three points show the serious changes in Japanese diplomatic skills: from passive diplomacy to tactical (constructive) diplomacy. This was yet another significant achievement for Japan and was followed by further recognition by the international community.

Establishment of the PKO Law

With all the internal and external expectation and pressure Japan experienced, the Japanese Diet finally started to make progress on the peacekeeping cooperation law. When the Miyazawa administration decided to establish a new law which would enable the government to dispatch the SDF abroad, Japan finally got a sufficient base (public support and a request from the host country) to fulfil this long time desire. Before the plenary session began, the three government parties (the LDP, Komei-party, and Minsyu-party⁵³) agreed on the original PKO bill⁵⁴. When the Paris Peace Agreement was signed, the PKO bill in the Diet was still under consideration. The centre of discussion was still on the dilemma between Article 9 and active participation in UN peace operations. Moreover, the response from neighbouring Asian countries to the PKO bill was a strong refusal as expected; when the PKO bill went through the House of Representative, demonstrations against the bill were held at several Asian countries.

⁵¹ Pitta, R. (1994) UN Forces 1948-84. Oeprey Publishing. Ltd. P28

⁵² Resolution 783 stated that the Security Council was expressing its gratitude to the governments of Thailand and Japan for their effort to find solution to the current problems relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

⁵³ Most of the parties in the 1990s have either renamed or were dispersed.

⁵⁴ The Japanese government tried to establish a new law allowing the dispatch of SDF outside Japan in 1990, however, it could not gain a majority in the House of Representative. As a result, the government parties took a safety precaution before the bill went for consideration.

The biggest problem that Japan faced both internally and externally was people's perception and their difficulties in distinguishing UN peace operations from "enforcement action" which involved military action⁵⁵. During the consultation process, several member of the Diet asked questions about the reasons behind the dispatch of SDF, and its role in peacekeeping operations⁵⁶. Their biggest concern was whether participation in UNTAC and also future UN peacekeeping operations would involve military action and thus violate Article 9.

The PKO bill (and future PKO Law) stipulates in detail the roles in which the SDF and Japanese civilian personnel can participate during peace operations. However, since each operation is unique and different the bill cannot cover every single condition or possible situation. Despite its possible shortcomings, establishing a new PKO bill was necessary for the Japanese government to participate in UN peacekeeping. Firstly, since the end of the World War II, Japan has been a pacifist country without an armed force (The SDF is not defined as an armed force). Since Japanese Constitutional Law prohibited all kinds of military action, Japan's participation in UNTAC (particularly the SDF contribution) caused an allergic reaction in both the Japanese public and members of the Diet (The limited understanding of UN peacekeeping led to the perception that the "UN force" was equivalent to an "allied force"). On 15 June 1992, the LDP and ruling parties managed to push the PKO bill through the Diet, and two months later the Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations (Peacekeeping Law) went into effect. UNTAC

⁵⁵ Sudo. P83

⁵⁶ At the Special Committee for the Peace Cooperation Law (1990-1992), the opposition parties mainly asked questions on the illegality of sending SDF to the UN peacekeeping operations. The ruling alliance emphasized that the UN peacekeeping operation was not a "military force" but a "neutral operation" dispatched at the request of the host country.

had already been on the ground for half a year, and the Japanese government took emergency measures to establish the PKO Law. For over a decade the discussion of the dispatch of the SDF has continued. However, the Japanese government continues to send the SDF and civilian personnel to the UN peacekeeping operations.

The establishment of the PKO Law marked the first revision to the law that banned the overseas dispatch of SDF. However, new principles of law required the reconsideration of some of the difficult conditions for its deployment. Examples include the withdrawal of SDF at the first sign of hostilities, and the prohibition of SDF personnel to use force except for the purpose of self-defence. The Japanese government took the most reliable and safest passage for this first time experiment, and it was concluded with the successful return of SDF personnel and its withdrawal from UNTAC.

How did the UN cope with issues on the ground?

UNTAC was officially established with the arrival of Mr. Yasushi Akashi, on 15 March 1992. Soon after its official deployment, UNTAC was thrown into a precarious military situation with continued fighting between the PDK and SOC. By the end of April, the fighting involving the PDK and SOC was brought under control. On 9 April, Mr. Akashi condemned the PDK for not cooperating fully with the UN by preventing UNTAC officials from gaining access to territories under PDK control. Access was granted on 20 April after UNTAC had opened three checkpoints on the border between Cambodia and Vietnam. However, the beginning of the UNTAC deployment suffered for several reasons. Not only did the continued fighting between the PDK and SOC contribute to this but the delay

in UNTAC's deployment was also a serious issue. There were various administrative delays, and even by May 1992, most UNTAC departments were only beginning to be established. The heads of three of five sections of the Administrative Division did not arrive until August, while only 20 percent of the staff was in Cambodia by the first three months of UNTAC's existence⁵⁷. This shows the lack of preparation and planning by the UN Secretariat. Also, the broken cease-fire agreement showed the difficulties for UN to get into unsettled grounds for the purpose of transition (including holding an election, and taking over the administrative function). Unless there is no peace to keep, the UN should not go into the country with peacekeepers lives at stake. This certainly was to affect Japan's stance on the dispatch of its SDF.

There had been a long-term internal conflict within Cambodia. There was also the mass genocide by the Pol Pot regime in the 1970s when the United Nations decided to get involved in Cambodia. In addition, the infrastructure of the country was completely destroyed, and there was urgent need for reconstruction of the basic infrastructure to facilitate the deployment of UNTAC. Most of UNTAC's schedule was well organized with a full calendar. However, the time required for the reconstruction of the infrastructure in the country had to be taken into account to make the deployment of UNTAC quick and effective. Apart from these initial difficulties, the peace plan set out in the Paris Accords remains the most detailed and orderly of any UN peacekeeping operation. It provides a framework and an end-point for the missions that order UN operations. The major lesson of Cambodia is that intense efforts should be made to reduce the delay between a negotiated settlement and the deployment of a peacekeeping force with its

⁵⁷ Findlay. P35

associated mechanisms and infrastructure⁵⁸. There were many reasons for the late deployment of UNTAC of which most were caused at the UN headquarters in New York. Despite this, the Security Council officially characterized the Cambodia mission at its conclusion as “a major achievement for the United Nations”⁵⁹. The organization and conduct of a free and fair election, the refugee repatriation programme, and the promotion of human rights were the most successful parts of UNTAC.

On 13 June, phase two of the military provisions of the Paris Agreement was launched. The second phase involved the demobilization of 70% of the armed forces of the 4 Cambodian signatories to the Paris Agreements⁶⁰ and the remaining 30 % were to enter into cantonment. However, the PDK refused to join in this process. Their refusal to join in phase two was censured by a unanimous resolution of the Security Council on July 21. This resolution requested the Secretary General and SRSG to ensure that international assistance would only benefit the parties fulfilling their obligations under the Paris Agreements. Also, the PDK came under criticism at a ministerial Conference in Tokyo on 22 June. The PDK was not mentioned in any official text of the conference records, even in the “Tokyo Declaration on the Peace Process”. The UN and other related countries started to isolate the PDK from the peace process. Several countries attempted to persuade the PDK to rejoin the implementation process of the Paris Agreements, and further efforts were made by the PRC during the second half of September as well as by Thailand and Japan in October. However, these initiatives did not result in the PDK rejoining the implementation process of the

⁵⁸ Findlay. P113

⁵⁹ UN, Security Council Resolution 880, UN document S/RES/880, 4 Nov. 1993.

⁶⁰ Total number of demobilization was estimated at some 200,000 troops and 250,000 militiamen.

Paris Agreement. Without cooperation from the PDK, the fighting continued leading SOC and other parties to rearm. With the failure of the cantonment and disarmament phase of the peace plan and the neutral political environment in which UNTAC was supposed to be established, the situation in Cambodia once again became unstable.

Series of violence

During the very first stage, the response of UNTAC to the PDK resembled quiet diplomacy and negotiation which has been characterized as a “low-key administrative approach”. The Security Council decided not to attempt forced compliance, but to continue the peace process without the PDK. There was a disagreement between Mr. Akashi (SRSG) and General Sanderson on the issue of the reaction to the PDK since the Military Component faced serious security risks. It was argued by Findlay in his book “*Cambodia: Legacy and Lesson of UNTAC*” that UNTAC should have confronted the PDK militarily at an early stage. UNTAC’s failure to take action encouraged the PDK to believe that it could get away with violence. It gave the PDK an opportunity to strengthen its forces politically as well as militarily. However, for UNTAC to play more of a role in enforcement action would require a complete change of its mandate under Chapter VII. If the mandate had been changed to that of enforcement, some of the countries, such as Japan, would have been obliged, constitutionally, to withdraw⁶¹. This could perhaps have been followed by the Australians thus starting a chain reaction that would have decimated the military component and possibly the civil police component as well. Therefore, a decision by SRSG Akashi was made not to

⁶¹ The Japanese Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law (1992) restricts Japanese participation in peacekeeping operations to cases where there is an agreement on a cease-fire and the neutrality of UN force is maintained. This particular case will be discussed in a later chapter.

change the mandate under Chapter VII enforcement, and none of the personnel were withdrawn from Cambodia. It is also because most of the main participants in this peace process had already invested sufficient resources in attempting to bring peace to the country, and were not willing to risk war with the PDK.

During March 1993 several attacks were carried out against ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia, which were thought to be an attack by the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) unit⁶². Mr. Akashi's criticism was directed at the PDK. However, the criticism resulted in a number of attacks on UNATC personnel, finally causing the death of several peacekeepers including a Bangladeshi soldier.⁶³ On 8 April, another fatal incident happened to a Japanese UN volunteer staff⁶⁴ acting as a district election supervisor in the province of Kompong Thom. This incident resulted in UNTAC withdrawing all the volunteers in the ten central and western provinces from the countryside, and they were not to travel without armed escort. However, attacks on UNTAC personnel continued throughout April into the month of May⁶⁵. During the operations up to mid-May 1993, the number of UNTAC casualties as a result of hostile action amounted to 13 deaths and 52 wounded.

Dispatch of the Japan's SDF to UNTAC operation

When the PKO Law went into effect, UNTAC had already been on the ground for 5 months (of the 18 month duration). The Japanese government immediately sent

⁶² NADK is the armed forces of the PDK.

⁶³ The investigation carried out by UNTAC concluded that NADK was responsible for the killing of 4 soldiers and CPAF was involved in a case of a Bangladeshi civilian.

⁶⁴ The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme is the UN organization that supports human development globally by promoting volunteerism and by mobilizing volunteers. It is administrated by UNDP.

⁶⁵ According to the statistics data collected by UNTAC, during the first half of May attacks on UNTAC personnel caused 2 deaths and 17 wounded.

two separate advance missions to Cambodia in July-August 1992⁶⁶. On 3 September, UNTAC made the official request for Japan's dispatch of personnel: 8 cease-fire observers, 600 Engineer, and 75 civilian police. As for the cease-fire observers, 8 SDF personnel were dispatched in September 1992 for 6 months, and replaced by the second contingent in March 1993 for another 6 month period. Their mission was to monitor the cease-fire and to supervise encampments storing weapons collected from disarmed ex-Cambodian soldiers of all functions. Their duties also included monitoring the cease-fire at checkpoints along the border along with monitoring any infiltration of other forces and the smuggling of weapons and ammunition. The first unit of 600 SDF personnel arrived in Cambodia and was stationed in Takeo from September 1992. Their mission was to reconstruct roads and bridges on routes 2 and 3 which had been damaged during the civil war. With the progress of the reconstruction work, their mission was expanded to supply water, fuel, food, medical services, and lodging facilities. In answer to the request, the Japanese National Police Agency dispatched 75 civilian police officers to the Civilian Police Component of UNTAC from October 1992 to July 1993 to assist and train the Cambodian police. Because of the delayed decision by the Japanese government to send SDF personnel (and other civilian officers) to UNTAC operation, their dispatch was immediately after the establishment of the PKO Law. However, the SDF had started preparation for the dispatch⁶⁷ to Cambodia much earlier than that and showed their eagerness and readiness. In the end, the reputation of Japanese peacekeepers in Cambodia and

⁶⁶ The First Advance mission was lead by Mr. Arima from the Cabinet Office from 2-7 July 1992. The second advance mission was lead by the head of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarter from 12-18 August 1992.

⁶⁷ Japanese MOFA and the Defence Agency gave a course on the Khmer Language and culture to the SDF (and civilian officers). (according to the MOFA officials)

the public response to their contribution was more than good enough⁶⁸ for the Japanese government to continue sending SDF to UN peace operations in the future.

One aspect both the Japanese government and UN officials were concerned about regarding Japanese peacekeepers and civilian police was that the PKO Law restricted the “use of force”⁶⁹. The situation in Cambodia was unstable with the violation of the cease-fire and disarmament by the PDK. With the beginning of 1993, guerrilla warfare by the PDK grew more intense. Two Japanese personnel, one a UNV and one a civilian police, were killed during the many guerrilla attacks before the election. The news of the two Japanese deaths in Cambodia was a shocking incident for both the Japanese government and public. This was the very first time since WW II Japanese personnel (SDF) had lost their life in battle.

The safety of Japanese personnel had been a serious concern to the Japanese government but it did not realize the potential risks involved in UN peace operations, even in areas where there was minimal risk. Therefore, the situation in Cambodia was far riskier than anticipated and Japanese contingents were faced with a possible battle situation with the PDK⁷⁰. This was certainly short sighted on the part of the Japanese government. It lacked the experience in understanding the risks involved and this was another reality Japan faced in understanding the roles involved in taking part in UN peace operations.

⁶⁸ Mr. Akashi of SRSG mentioned the reputation of the Japanese SDF in Cambodia as “polite and friendly, and doing an accurate job” in his comment to the Japanese Diet.

⁶⁹ The fundamental principle of the PKO Law is that the activities Japan carried out “shall not be tantamount to the threat or use of force” (Article II, Paragraph 2)

⁷⁰ As a result, Japanese contingents (SDF personnel) were never confronted with a battle situation.

On 17 May 1993, Japanese Electoral observers (total of 41 personnel⁷¹) arrived in Cambodia. During the electoral period (23-28 May), the observers monitored and assisted in administrating the election, and from 29 May to 1 June, they monitored ballot counting and conducted round-the-clock shifts at the election offices in Takeo and Phnom Penh.

In total, Japan sent over 1300 personnel to the UNTAC operation. What the Japanese government learned from the experiences in Cambodia was that the PKO Law did not cover many of the situations which the SDF personnel faced while on the mission. The PKO Law established 5 principles⁷² that govern Japanese involvement in UN peace operations. Those principles ensured that all the personnel participating in the UN operation would not violate the constitution. During the discussion in the Diet, the biggest concern was the possibility of Japanese personnel violating the constitutional law⁷³. The PKO Law limited the use of weapons to legitimate self-defence. In Cambodia, two lives of Japanese personnel were lost by the violation of the cease-fire. The United Nations ensured the safety of the peacekeepers on the ground before the deployment⁷⁴. However, since the peacekeeping operations are required for post conflict situations (after the peace negotiations or agreement in most cases) where there is still the possibility of instability, there is always the risk of becoming involved in a situation of conflict or civil war⁷⁵. Therefore, the PKO Law enumerates the

⁷¹ The Japanese government send 5 national government officers, 13 local government officers, and 23 individuals from the private sector to the Electoral Component.

⁷² Three of the principles are preconditions for Japanese participation, while the other two apply during Japanese involvement.

⁷³ Both the Japanese Socialist party and Japanese communist party called the dispatch of the SDF a “military campaign” or “remilitarization”.

⁷⁴ The basic principles of the UN peacekeeping required the all parties to a conflict must agree to, and maintain a cease-fire.

⁷⁵ This point was proven by the operations deployed in the African and European region after Cambodia.

specific tasks that Japanese personnel may carry out within the operation. It is well known that Japan's "oversensitive" protection of its own people on the ground caused a few problems for UNTAC: the Japanese government requested from UNTAC the removal of Japanese Civilian Police (CIVPOL), and also their relocation to a safer place. Japanese CIVPOL stayed on duty but withdrew on 7 July 1993 (2 months earlier than scheduled⁷⁶). From the painful incidents in which Japanese personnel were killed, the Japanese government and public finally understood the risk of participating in UN peacekeeping operations. Nonetheless, all Japanese personnel gradually withdrew from Cambodia by September 1993.

Preparation and General Election

The Electoral Component of UNTAC was one of the successful parts of the whole operation⁷⁷. The Voter registration was planned for a three month period beginning in October 1992, and was extended until 31 January 1993. The registration was successfully concluded with 4.6 million Cambodians having enrolled by the time voting tolls closed. In particular, thousands registered in Khmer Rouge-controlled areas. The electoral law was submitted by UNTAC on 1 April but was not approved by the SNC until 5 August, because of continuing PDK's objections. It is generally known that the draft electoral law for Cambodia was largely based on the Election Proclamation which had governed the conduct of the 1989 Namibian election⁷⁸.

⁷⁶Japanese National Police Agent strongly requested to UNTAC for the earliest withdrawal of the Japanese CIVPOL from their posts. NPA want to withdraw all Japanese CIVPOL soon after the killing of their member in May, however, Prime Minister Miyazawa decided that all Japanese personnel would remain at their posts as scheduled. (Interview with ex-MOFA official)

⁷⁷ The repatriation programme was mostly conducted by UNHCR, and UNTAC was in a supplementary role.

⁷⁸ The United Nations experience of the national election in Namibia by Australian (Red Book) was used in this case.

The isolation of the PDK among the four represented in the SNC was becoming more and more apparent. This was exemplified on 5 August when the SNC adopted an electoral law drafted by UNTAC despite the opposition of the PDK⁷⁹ (The primary reason given by the PDK for its opposition to the electoral law was that it would allow ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia to vote). Regardless of the PDK's disagreement with the electoral law, preparations for the general elections went ahead. As the general election grew closer, the PDK's continued refusal to join in the demobilisation and cantonment process prompted the Security Council to take action. In a unanimously adopted resolution on 13 October, the Council demanded that the PDK "fulfil immediately its obligations" under the Paris Agreements. The cantonment and disarmament process had not been completed due to the PDK's refusal to take part⁸⁰. The Security Council adopted another resolution on November 30 but not unanimously because China abstained from the vote. The other 14 members of the Council voted in favour of adoption. The resolution confirmed that the election would be held no later than May 1993 and called for measures to prevent the supply of petroleum products from reaching areas occupied by any party not complying with the military provisions of the Paris Agreements. UNTAC started to implement the ban on the export of logs referred to in the Security Council Resolution 792 (1992) on 31 December 1992. The ban was directed at all Cambodian parties, not only the PDK. As a consequence, the PDK's response was to step up its violence directed at the United Nations' presence in Cambodia. On several occasions, from December

⁷⁹ The Electoral law enfranchised any 18 years old person born in Cambodia with a mother or a father born in the country or, in the case of those born overseas, with a mother or a father born in the country. This constituted a revision of the provisions of the Paris Agreements which stated that any 18 years old born in Cambodia or the child of a person born in Cambodia would be eligible to vote.

⁸⁰ According to the Secretary General's report on 15 November 1992, a total of 55,000 troops had entered cantonment and handed over their weapons.

1992 to January 1993, the PDK took UNATC military personnel as hostages and held them for one day or a few days before releasing them unharmed.

Finally, at the meeting of the SNC held in Beijing on January 28, the date for a general election was set on 23 to 25 May 1993⁸¹. On 31 January 1993, the voter registration period ended and nearly 4.6 million voters had registered along with 20 political parties that had registered⁸². The general election was not arranged in a “disarmed” and “politically neutral” environment as envisaged at the outset. Even so, the election was held as scheduled from 23 – 28 May with the participation of 89.56 percent of the registered voters with only a few incidents. The outcome of the general elections showed that no single party had obtained a majority of the 120 seats on the Constituent Assembly. The largest single party was FUNCINPEC with 45.47 percent of the voters followed by the CPP with 38.23 percent. The rest of the voters were divided among the remaining 18 parties. On 15 June, the Security Council endorsed the results of the elections and fully supported the newly elected Constituent Assembly. This was a significant moment for Cambodia as well as all participating countries. This was also the first time Japan had participated in a peace operation. The result of the operation was an achievement for Japan in the eyes of the Japanese Government as well as opportunity for the Japanese public to see their international contribution in a new light.

⁸¹ For logistical reasons, three days of voting were added, so that the elections were scheduled to run from 23 to 28 May 1993. (The United Nations Cambodia, 1991-1995. P68)

⁸² 20 political parties that had registered to participate in the Cambodian election were: the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) was registered as representative of SNC; FUNCINPEC was registered and led by its President Prince Norodom Ranariddh, one of Prince Sihanouk’s sons; the KPNLF was not registered to take part in the elections. The political party created by the PDK on 29 November 1992, the National Unity of Cambodian Party (NUCP) was not among the 20 registered parties.

Post Elections phase to withdrawal from UNTAC

Political stability in the country was further enhanced through power-sharing agreements between the four parties represented in the Constituent Assembly. They established an Interim Joint Administration (Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC)) to rule the country until a new Constituent Assembly transformed itself into a legislative assembly. Under the new political system, the armed forces of FUNCINPEC, KPNLF and SOC would be brought under a central command, and Prince Sihanouk would become the supreme commander. On 19 September, the Constituent Assembly concluded its deliberations over a new constitution for Cambodia and on 21 September; the Assembly passed the new Constitution by 113 votes to 5 which exceeded the necessary two-thirds majority requested by the provisions of the Paris Agreements. In accordance with the Paris Agreements, the Constituent Assembly was transformed into a legislative assembly, and marked the termination of UNTAC's mandate in Cambodia. The new coalition government – the Royal National Government of Cambodia (RNGC) – was officially brought into office by a National Assembly vote on 29 October. King Sihanouk appointed Prince Norodom Ranariddh, of FUNCINPEC, as First Prime Minister and Mr. Hun Sen, of the CPP, as second Prime Minister. It was the official announcement of a new government. The United Nations then announced that UNTAC would be gradually withdrawn between early August and mid-November 1993.

As for a withdrawal, the Secretary General proposed⁸³ a United Nations team of 20 military liaison officers be established in Phnom Penh following the withdrawal of UNTAC. This recommendation was requested by Cambodia. The

⁸³ The Security Council dated 7 October 1993.

withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia over the period August-December 1993 did not imply that the United Nations had concluded all its activities. The United Nations continued to actively assist Cambodia in the field of rehabilitation, mine clearance, human rights, protection, and the reintegration of refugees and displaced persons⁸⁴.

The cooperation from member states

The success of the Cambodian peace process was achieved by the United Nations, with cooperation from its member states. Both France and Indonesia, who co-chaired the Paris Peace Conference, took a lead in the Cambodian peace process, as well as Japan, Australia, and others who had a stake in its implementation. Without their vital support and participation, the Paris Agreements could never have been put into operation. However, there were certain lessons the UN and member states learned from this experience. Firstly, the United Nations and its member states must ensure the best-qualified and well-disciplined personnel are recruited for the peace mission, in order to maintain the credibility of the operations. The basic concept of contribution to a UN peace mission is on a voluntary basis, and there has been no obligation on contributing countries to meet criteria on personnel. It is necessary for the UN to set appropriate guidelines on standards and the training of contributed personnel. For example, some units suffered from serious language incompatibilities⁸⁵; there were international personnel who is unable to speak either French or English (UNTAC's two official languages), and also, very few officers could speak Khmer⁸⁶ Cambodia's common

⁸⁴ Following the withdrawal of UNTAC, the United Nations presence in Cambodia is manifested through the activities of its specialised agencies.

⁸⁵ Some units in CIVPOL divisions suffered from serious language incompatibilities, with officers occasionally unable to speak either French or English.

⁸⁶ Partially a cause of Cambodia's long isolation.

language⁸⁷. Moreover, there were wide disparities in the training, equipment and competence of the various national contingents. According to an article in the Washington Post on 30 October, 30% of the Bulgarian battalion were former prisoners, and far from what the UN required as “well-trained and equipped” troops.⁸⁸ The minimum requirement of communication skills (troops must speak the mission’s official language) is a necessary precondition.

As for the contributors, five East Asian countries dispatched their personnel to UNTAC: the PRC, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, and Thailand. However, UNTAC was still operated by a majority of western countries; France, an ex-suzerain state of Cambodia, and Australia, one of the leading western nations in the Asian-Pacific region), were primary states in both diplomacy and personnel contributions. In many cases, the suzerain state played a major role in the peace process, due to its experience and knowledge of the host country. Nevertheless, there was a possibility that its presence would be rejected by local citizens. Prince Sihanouk’s preference to the presence of Asian states in the peace process was based on this point.

There is no doubt that the peace process, including the UNTAC operation brought benefits to Cambodia. It brought an end to the long-standing internal-conflict and international isolation. The peace process resulted in the successful return of more than 370,000 Khmer displaced persons and refugees. There were also other elements brought into Cambodia such as the introduction of human rights principles and practices, and the establishment of basic understanding and

⁸⁷ Doyle, W. M. and Suntharalingam, N. “The UN in Cambodia: Lessons for Complex Peacekeeping”. *International Peacekeeping*. Vol1, No2, Summer 1994, pp117-147. P113

⁸⁸ Branigin, W. “Bulgarians put crimp in UN peacekeeping mission”, Washington Post, 30 October 1993.

experiences with regard to multi-party democratic practices. The establishment of a new government by free and fair election would mark the end of both the transition period and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Most importantly, the major risk to completing the cease-fire, cantonment and demobilization successfully was the lack of cooperation from the PDK in the peace process was. Without accomplishing this there was still the possibility of a hostile act by the PDK.

What was Japan's experience in Cambodia?

As for Japan's effort on Cambodia, its attempt to exercise a degree of political influence to bring peace had a significant impact on both the region and the United Nations. ASEAN nations were mostly supportive of the SDF participation in the UNATC operation and encouraged Japan to maintain its presence. The Cambodian experience left open greater possibilities for cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN nations in terms of regional security issues. This relationship continued into the next operation in East Timor in the late 1990s.

The operation in Cambodia was the first time that Japan was involved in a UN peace operation. Prior to this, many of the domestic issues were never topics of discussion (such as troop contribution) and no determination for supporting any action by Japan was in place. Japan had to create new laws from scratch and persuade the Diet and public that this was the direction that Japan was to take. Much of this study helps us to answer the Research Questions on how and why Japan came to deal with the issues of peacekeeping and the process of implementation.

The reason Cambodia was the starting point was that of timing. The mounting external and internal expectations as well as the direction Japan wanted to take in international politics reached a critical point – Cambodia gave Japan the impetus to take action.

Through trial and error, Japan was able to identify where it could be most effective and also effective within the context of its political agenda. Despite much deliberation on the issues of sending troops, Japan was able to make other significant contributions that far outweighed mere troop contributions. Japan's contribution was its financial support and its effectiveness in hosting conferences and gaining the confidence of various parties. With Japan's initiatives, significant headway was gained in many of the processes. In particular, the conferences that were held in support of Cambodia continue to be held to this day and make consistent and reliable contributions. The significance of this will be elaborated on in chapter 5.

The role that Japan took was more of a “behind the scenes” role. As a Middle Power Country, this type of role was suitable for what it was capable of and discovered that its strengths lay in its political influences as well as its consistent and reliable financial contributions. Although the way Japan was only financially contributing was a subject of criticism, it became an indispensable asset.

The various events surrounding issues in Cambodia as well as international and domestic debates were what helped shaped the way Japan could effectively make its contribution within the context of its political agenda. Although troop

contribution was one of the ways in which Japan attempted to gain recognition, it resulted in only a small part as Japan recognized its strengths elsewhere. The mounting internal and external pressure for troop contribution allowed for the creation of a new law permitting the dispatch of the SDF. This also led to the revelation that the quality of SDF personnel in terms of their behaviour, quality of work, punctuality as well as the level of trust they gained by the locals was highly regarded. The advantage this had in conducting operations on the ground is significant and will be discussed in later chapters.

The operation in Cambodia allowed Japan to create, from scratch, its position on many issues regarding UN peace operations. It was able to recognize many of its abilities as a country and as a responsible member of the international community. Many of the strengths discovered were unknown prior to the chain of events described. The next chapter will look at Japan's involvement in the UN peace operations in East Timor. The difference this time was that Japan was experienced and had the knowledge of how it could more effectively contribute to peace operations.

Chapter 4 – The UN in East Timor: Japan in the new era

This chapter will focus on Japan's second opportunity in UN peace operations in the East Asian region. Similar to the previous chapter, much of the history of the Asian region and of Japan will be referred to in understanding how and why Japan's contribution was developed and implemented. The main difference is that this time the expectations of the UN peace mission were based on the establishment of a clear mandate and that Japan had knowledge of how and what it was capable of contributing. Since its challenge in Cambodia, Japan had sent the SDF to several locations outside the Asian region with the biggest contribution being to the UNHCR operation in Rwanda. This involved 283 ground unit personnel and 188 air transport unit personnel. Although these contributions did not receive much attention either domestically or internationally, Japan's involvement continued. In the case of the UN operations in East Timor, Japan's contribution started with the usual discussion of how and when to send the SDF unit and whether necessary preconditions were in place, such as a cease-fire on ground, in order to satisfy the conditions of the PKO Law and not infringe upon Article 9. In fact, the UN action in East Timor started with INTERFET which was a militarily involved operation, thus making it constitutionally impossible for Japan's SDF to take part. Nevertheless, Japan made a more significant financial contribution by providing financial support to those regional countries willing to participate in this operation.

The most significant aspect to note about this time period is the way in which Japan had finally begun understanding the kind of role it could play in UN peace operations. It is somewhat inconceivable Japan did not take advantage of the fact

that it had well equipped SDF personnel as well as strong political and economic influence in the East Asian region. Japan had several restrictions and limitations that kept it from taking action in a way that would seem to be the best course. Rather, Japan was able to establish its own way in which it could contribute given these restrictions and limitations. Japan received a lot of external pressure from the UN and other countries relating to the operation in East Timor as to how Japan could best contribute. Much of it was to do with sending SDF personnel as well as taking advantage of its political/economic influence and using it as leverage. However, Japan was not shaken and this was one of the main reasons why Japan's contribution resulted in something very distinct.

Japan after its experience in Cambodia

In 1993, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) decided to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and provoked a new crisis in East Asia. The US command in Japan requested Japanese backup assistance in the possible event of a conflict. However, Japanese officials were unable to respond. Once again, Japan's inability to meet expectations in the new era was made apparent, even after its participation in UNTAC. As a result of the continuing events in the 1990s, Japan agreed to revise its Guideline for US-Japan Defence Cooperation. These revised guidelines requested an increased role for Japan in response to various events in the region to make the US and Japan a more effective alliance. The actions taken by the DPRK confirmed Japan's dependency on the US as an ally clearly to the Japanese people so they recognized the urgency for revising Japan's security policy. Japan has demonstrated an increased willingness and capability to take a more active leadership role in multilateral forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group of regional economies, the

non-governmental Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the AFR by the end of the 1990s. The 1996-US-Japan Joint declaration and the 1997 Defence Guidelines also demonstrate Japan's increased willingness, within the confines of the US-Japan alliance, to become more equal and active security partner¹. The new defence cooperation guideline adopted in September 1997 set up three areas for alliance cooperation: the defence of Japan, regional security, and global cooperation. This provided the framework for all subsequent cooperation, including the dispatch of SDF personnel. It was revised again in 2004, allowing the SDF to not only assist UN forces during routine training but also to provide ammunition in the event of an armed attack². This was a change that later influenced Japan's involvement in East Timor – Japan saw East Timor as a regional security issue and decided to take part in the peace process.

In the summer of 1993, the Japanese political structure experienced a drastic change; this was a change that brought down the 1955 system. Ichiro Ozawa played a central role in this event when he formed his own group, which later became a party (Japan Renewal Party), and joined with opposition groups to end the LDP's thirty-eight years of one party-rule. The new generations of conservative politicians which emerged in the 1993 elections had strong desire for Japan to assume a more prominent political role in the international community, and be more outspoken in its foreign policy objectives³. As a result, for the first time in Japan's post war history, the LDP lacked the majority necessary to form a government.

¹ Tien, H. (2000) *The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific*. An East Gate Book. P38

² Asahi Shinbun 19 December 2004.

³ McCargo, D. (2000) *Contemporary Japan*. Palgrave P118

Later, joining with the Japan Socialist Party in 1994, the LDP was able to return to power. The LDP regained the premiership at the beginning of 1996, though the party remained reliant on support from the SDJP and Sakigake. However, due to their different political agendas between the parties, Japan lost a clear political direction which had been maintained by the Yoshida Doctrine and the 1955 system. Nevertheless, Japan was gradually moving out of the shadow of post-war politics and this made Japan more “normal” as a sovereign nation⁴ such as what Japan can and should and will do to contribute global security through the UN⁵.

As for its contributions to UN peace operations, in June 1998, three areas of PKO Law were revised on the basis of Japan’s experiences in UN operations in Cambodia as well as in several other areas. Firstly, Japan’s participation in monitoring elections, which was allowed only under UN peace operations, was expanded to elections under UN and regional organisations and not only under peace operations. Secondly, Japan was able participate in international humanitarian relief operations conducted by UNHCR and all related organisations, even when the agreement of cease-fire had not yet been reached. Thirdly, the decision to use weapons was now made by the superior officer on the ground and not under the judgment of each member when his or her life was threatened. An opportunity for Japan to take a part in UN peace operations for the second time in the region came at the end of the 1990s, but this time Japan was not as enthusiastic because of the many complications that were involved.

⁴ Brezezinski, Z. (1997) *The Grand Chessboard*, Basic Book. Brezezinski described Japan as “nation under the protection of other country (such as the US)”. It means that Japan does not have capacity of national security.

⁵ Cooney. P36

Japan and East Timor: until the late 1990s

Since its first effort in the Cambodian peace process, Japan participated in several UN peace operations⁶ leading up to its participation in East Timor. However, Japan's position towards the independence of East Timor was somewhat different from its stance towards the Cambodian peace process. Despite the mounting acts of human rights violation by the Indonesian military and the government in East Timor, Japan assumed an air of total indifference until the first time the UN Security Council put the issue of East Timor on the table⁷. Until the 1990s, Japan, among many countries, saw the issue of East Timor as an Indonesian "internal affair". Japan and the US voted against all the UN Security Council resolutions on East Timor, while most of the European countries abstained from voting on the resolution⁸ in the UN Security Council. Japan's attitude on the issues of East Timor was carefully measured considering its close relationship with Indonesia. As is well known, Indonesia is the most successful country in the East Asian region in terms of its political effectiveness, and the relationship with Indonesia was far more important for Japan to maintain⁹. Mr. Shimizu, the first Secretary at the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta during the East Timor peace process, said "East Timor was simply not in Japan's interest, even though there was a possible chance for the Japanese government to play an active role in a peace process". He added that the relationship with Indonesia was far more important to Japan in establishing its position in the East Asian region¹⁰.

⁶ See Chapter 2, Japan's involvement in UN Peacekeeping operations.

⁷ The first time the United Nations became concerned with the issue of East Timor was in 1960. In the 1970s, East Timor began a war of Independence, and the Indonesian government sent the military to suppress the insurgency. (See the first section of this Chapter)

⁸ The UN Security Council adopted a resolution to request the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor.

⁹ Mori, K. (2007) *A New East Asia: toward a regional community*. NUS Press. P31

¹⁰ Source: Interview with Mr Shimizu.

On 19 March 1998, interested members of Diet established the “East Timor forum” which mainly focused on human rights violation in East Timor. They addressed the issues in East Timor in a number of committees and study groups on foreign and defence policy on several occasions¹¹. At the Diet’s meeting on foreign affairs (gaiko-iinkai) on 8 April 1998, Japan’s timid attitude to UNHCR activities in East Timor was criticised by one of the members of the East Timor forum. This was due to Japan’s opposition towards a resolution for Indonesia to withdraw from the territory of East Timor. A representative from MOFA answered that Japan can only approve a resolution by the United Nations with consensus from all member states¹². At this time, Japan had no intention of taking any action without the consensus of all other countries involved in the Indonesia-East Timor issue – this was to avoid any unnecessary conflict with Indonesia. Therefore, the Japanese government initiated diplomatic action on issues outside the frame of the United Nations. At the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)¹³ and ASEM (Asian Europe Meeting)¹⁴ meetings in 1998, the Japanese Foreign Minister had discussions with the Indonesian Foreign Minister on East Timor. Prime Minister Hashimoto also had a talk with the Portuguese Foreign Minister on the issue in Tokyo¹⁵. The initiation of diplomatic channels was the starting point for Japan in its move towards contributing to the operation in East Timor. Japan went about this in a way which was least damaging to its

¹¹ On 19 March 1998, at the budget meeting, a member of the East Timor Forum, Representative Takemura, addressed the violations against human rights in East Timor, and Japan’s reaction to this issue. Japan’s active campaign on the issues in the East Timor started from this meeting.

¹² The Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee on 8 April 1998. A statement was made by Foreign Minister Koumura.

¹³ The APEC meeting was held on November 1998 in Malaysia.

¹⁴ The ASEM meeting was held on April 1998 in the UK.

¹⁵ In 1998 and 1999, Japan’s Foreign Minister Mr. Takemura visited Portugal, and Portugal’s Foreign Minister Mr. Amado visited Japan. On both occasions, Japan and Portugal discussed the future of East Timor.

relationship with Indonesia, yet promoting its commitment to international affairs in a visible way.

The UN and East Timor: background knowledge of the issues in East Timor

On 20 May 2002, East Timor became an independent country,¹⁶ marking the end of a three-year process towards independence under the guidance of the United Nations. The United Nations has deployed five different peace operations in East Timor since then and UN peacekeepers are still there to this day¹⁷. For more than four centuries, East Timor had been a colony under Portuguese rule. The first time the United Nations General Assembly placed East Timor on the international agenda was in 1960 when the territory was added to the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories¹⁸. In 1974, Portugal required the establishment a provisional government and a popular assembly that would determine the status of East Timor. This led to the Timorese organizing political parties in preparation for self-determination. But as 1975 progressed, hostilities between pro-independence and pro-Indonesian parties led to civil war. Unable to control the situation, Portugal withdrew. Then, Frente Revolucionarie de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN), within a few months, took control of most of the Territory and on 28 November 1975, FRETILIN declared the independence of East Timor. However, the chaotic situation continued when a coalition of pro-Indonesian parties, Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT) and Associacao Popular Democratica (APODETI) also proclaimed the independence of the Territory and its integration with Indonesia. With these proclamations by Timorese political

¹⁶ <http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm>. In the year 2002, two nation-states, Switzerland and Timor-Leste, became new members of the UN. Now the total number of member states is 191. (Source: "Basic facts about the UN", DPI, 2000.)

¹⁷ U.N. (2003) United Nations and East Timor: Self-determination thorough Popular Consultation. UN Press. P5

¹⁸ <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>. Paragraph 1.

parties, Indonesia launched an air, land, and naval offensive in East Timor on 7 December 1975 in support of its allies, and integrated East Timor as its 27th province in 1976. However, the United Nations never recognized this integration, and both the Security Council and the General Assembly called for Indonesia's withdrawal. On 22 December 1975, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 384 unanimously, in which it recognized the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence. It called upon Indonesia to withdraw, without delay, all its force and for Portugal to cooperate fully with the UN to enable the people of East Timor to exercise freely their right to self-determination. Resolution 384 set the tone for the UN position on East Timor for the next 24 years. This was the point at which the issues of East Timor gained the attention of the UN.

However, there were mounting problems during these 24 years. With the end of the Cold War, the issue of East Timor was brought to the table again. The report by UN ECOSOC 1994 highlighted allegations of a high numbers of deaths in East Timor. Between 1975 and 1980, an estimated 100,000 Timorese out of a population of 700,000 were killed by the Indonesian armed forces¹⁹. Also, between 1980 and 1984, it was further alleged that another 100,000 were killed or died of starvation or disease²⁰. The mounting human rights violations caught the attention of the Japanese government and the rest of the world. Two particular incidents following this were to become the turning point for the situation in East Timor to become known on a global scale.

¹⁹ Cary P. (1999) East Timor: Third World Colonialism and the Struggle for National Identity, *Conflict Studies* 293/294. Research Institution for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism. P12

²⁰ Indonesia consistently denied these reports saying the death toll was more in the vicinity of 30,000.

The situation in East Timor turned around when Indonesian troops killed a large number of unarmed protesters at the Santa Cruz cemetery in the East Timorese capital of Dili on 12 November 1991²¹. In addition, when the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to two East Timorese figures in 1996, Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, and Jose Ramos Horta, the leading exile of the East Timorese resistance, for their work towards a just and peaceful solution to the conflict in East Timor²², more than 20 years of isolation finally ended. Receiving this most prestigious award made a strong impact on international opinion and a growing number of NGOs and parliamentary groups in Western countries began to influence their governments' policy on the issues of East Timor. It was seen as the turning point and turned international opinion in favour of self-determination for East Timor.

In May 1998, Indonesian President Suharto stepped down after 32 years in office and was replaced by his vice-President B.J. Habibie. The new President brought a fresh approach to the issue of East Timor²³. At first, the Indonesia government informed Secretary General Annan and Portugal of its plan to give East Timor wide-ranging autonomy with Jakarta, except in the three areas of foreign affairs, external defence, and some aspects of monetary and fiscal policies²⁴. This was

²¹ At the Santa Cruz cemetery, over 271 East Timorese were killed by the Indonesian troops and resistance groups that day or in hospitals soon after. <http://www.etan.org/timor/SntaCRUZ.htm>. (East Timor Action Network – which was funded after this massacre to stop the flow of US weapons and other military assistance to the Indonesian security forces) <http://www.zmag.org/zmag/articles/dec96timor.htm>.

²² <http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/1996/press.html>.

²³ At the beginning of his presidency, President Habibie stated his position to be the same as President Suharto on the East Timor issue. However, with strong criticism from the international community, he started to compromise on administrative policy. Greenless, D. and Garran, R. (2002) *Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom*. Crows nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin. P6

²⁴ Morimoto, S. (2003) *Ajia Taiheiyou no Takokukanhosyuu*. JIIA. P188

unacceptable to the leaders of East Timor, however, talks progressed rapidly resulting in a set of agreements²⁵ between Indonesia and Portugal which were signed in New York on 5 May 1999. The two governments entrusted the UN to organize and conduct a “popular consultation” in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accepted or rejected a special autonomy within a united Indonesia²⁶. In such circumstances, the United Nations accepted responsibility for the non-self-governing territory, enabling the process of transition to independence. As a beginning, UNAMET (United Nations Mission in East Timor) was established and mandated to conduct the ballot under UN Security Council Resolution 1246 on 11 June 1999. As for the planning phase, the selection and deployment of key personnel, as well as pre-planning and preparation was conducted by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)²⁷. It was because the issue on East Timor had been monitored by the DPA, and since deployment of the UN mission was urgent, the DPA took the lead on this case. The total duration of UNAMET was only about 3 months – the resolution was adopted on 11 June 1999, and the popular consultation voting date was set for 20 August 1999²⁸. The 5 May Agreement stipulated that after the vote, UNAMET would oversee a transitional period pending implementation of the decision of the East Timor people.

²⁵ The document contained three agreements: the constitutional framework for autonomy by Indonesia, agreement regarding the modalities for popular consultation, and a broad agreement on Security.

²⁶ United Nations Dept. of Public Information. (2000). The United Nations and East Timor: self-determination through popular consultation. New York, Department of Public Information United Nations. P10 Article 12

²⁷ According to Smith, the DPA had an excellent team of political analysts who, under the leadership of Under-Secretary General Sir Kieran Pendergast and the director for Asia and the Pacific, Francesc Vendrell, had worked closely over a long period with PRSG Jamsheed Market.

²⁸ The UNAMET assessment team was deployed to East Timor from 4 to 15 May 1999, before the Security Council adopted Resolution 1246 (1999).

Japan's first movement on East Timor: what can it do?

When President Habibie announced the new policy on East Timor and the cooperation with the UN to hold a public referendum, the Japanese government moved quickly to get involved in the East Timor peace process. The approval of the UN helped Japan to take this action. At the Diet meeting on security policy on 9 February 1999, the Japanese government started to discuss the possibility for Japan's SDF to participate in the UN operation in East Timor. Because the Japanese government had kept its distance from the issue on East Timor, many Diet members criticised Japan's "week-kneed" diplomacy with Indonesia at several committee meetings. As far as many Diet members were concerned, Japan, being the number one investor, trade partner and ODA provider for Indonesia, should take a stronger approach to Indonesia on the issue of East Timor rather than play a "neutral"²⁹ role. Representative Takemura from the opposition party also questioned the justification for Japan to provide a large amount of financial support to the party or country involved in the conflict or, as in this case, the illegal occupation of East Timor. Prime Minister Obuchi (30 July 1998 – 5 April 2000) responded that Japan's financial support to Indonesia was a "moral responsibility" to a developing country in the East Asian region, and that Japan would not take advantage to advance another political agenda. In several committees, this point was frequently raised by the opposition party, however, neither the cabinet nor MOFA agreed to use Japan's financial influence on Indonesia as points for negotiation. The Japanese government made a clear decision not to use its developmental support to Indonesia as an advantage. However, Japan was aware of its political influence and was waiting for the best

²⁹ Representatives Takemura and Eda energetically argued this point in the Diet fact-finding committee on the International Affairs and Foreign Affairs Committee during 1998-1999.

opportunity to start diplomatic negotiations with Indonesia. During the East Timor crisis in 199-2000, Japan came under international criticism for its less-than-vigilant approach to Indonesia³⁰.

At the budget meeting on 8 March 1999, the issue regarding the dispatch of the SDF was brought to the table³¹. Nevertheless, the Japanese government could make no progress until the UN's peace mission plan became clear in May. Since the East Timor operation was the second peace operation in the East Asian region, it was clear that Japan could not miss this chance to prove its ability in the peace process, and personnel contribution was a necessary step for Japan to show its presence in the UN operations once again³². Before the UN Security Council officially established UNAMET in June, MOFA sent a fact finding mission to East Timor to find out how Japan could potentially be involved. Also, Foreign Minister Koumura announced Japan's contribution of US\$100 million to the UN Trust Fund³³. It was Japan's intention to demonstrate its interest in East Timor to other related countries and the United Nations.

At the end of July 1994, unpaid contributions to the regular budget totalled \$835.1 million for 1994 and \$378.7 million for 1993. (The countries with the largest arrears in 1993 were: U.S. \$232.7 million, South Africa \$53.2 million and Ukraine \$25.9 million)³⁴ In comparison, Japan's financial contribution is always

³⁰ Schraeder, J.P. (2002) *Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality*. Lynne Rinner Publisher Inc. P99

³¹ At that moment, the United Nations had not requested Japan to send SDF to the UN peacekeeping mission.

³² Green, J. M. (2003) *Japan's reluctant realism: foreign policy challenges in an era of uncertain power*. P186

³³ Foreign Minister Koumura made the announcement to the Diet Representatives at the Foreign Affairs Committee on 1 June 1999 in answer to the question of the Japan's contribution to the East Timor popular consultation.

³⁴ Kanninen, T. (1995) *Leadership and reform: the Secretary General and the UN financial crisis of*

the most reliable in terms of its punctuality. Thus it certainly is Japan's strength in international cooperation. Therefore, by the end of the 1990s, Japan was well aware of its influence in the area of financial contribution. Japan was also aware that financial contribution was a necessity for the establishment of UN peace operations. Personnel contribution alone would not suffice for the deployment of an operation. Given its pacifist constitution, one of Japan's strengths lay in financial contributions and in addition, it also had the experience and interest in personnel contribution of the SDF.

After the signing of the 5 May agreement, the disorganized situation in East Timor³⁵ pushed Japan to the edge. Japan's PKO law restricted the dispatch of Japanese personnel in an act of hostility. However, in response to a request from the United Nations, the Japanese government decided to dispatch Mr. Noboru Nomura, first secretary of the Embassy of Japan in the Netherlands, to work as a political affairs officer for UNAMET³⁶. With the continued fighting in East Timor, Japan made a great effort to dispatch more personnel to UNAMET before the popular consultation on 30 August. Four days after the announcement of the dispatch of Mr. Nomura, Japan decided to send the electoral observers for the popular consultation as well as three civilian police officers³⁷ from the beginning of July with the dispatch of CIVPOL being announced on 29 June 1999. In addition, Japan sent 2,000 radio sets based on the International Peace Cooperation

the late 1980s. P281

³⁵ A Secretary General's report on 22 June urged that the continuing violence by pro-integration militia made impossible for the UN to deploy UNAMET fully. Between the 5 May agreement and the popular consultation in August 1999, several attacks were made on the UN and other organizations. (See section 1 of this chapter for more details)

³⁶ The announcement was officially made on 21 June 1999.

³⁷ Japanese CIVPOL were stationed at three different locations to carry out their duties including giving advice to the Indonesian police on their duties.

Law³⁸. Since its first experience in the UN peace operation in Cambodia, Japan was also able to come up with several alternative contributions that were the result of a loophole in the PKO Law. From its decade of experiences in UN operations, Japan was finally shaping its own style of contributions³⁹.

At the start of the UN operation in Cambodia, the dispatch of the SDF was initially seen as one of the ways in which Japan should take part in the UN operation in a visible way. There was much expected of Japan after the way it had been criticised for its response to the Gulf War Crisis. However, during its struggle in the 1990s Japan, as well as the UN and other member states, began to realise there were different roles that Japan could play and that Japan could use its strengths to its advantage⁴⁰. As Isezaki noted, it could connect related countries as a negotiator or use its bilateral relationships for diplomatic talks. Japan's promising neutrality was verified by its constitution and is its strong point in taking this position⁴¹.

The SDF dispatch to East Timor initially encountered problems that would not allow their dispatch. Two conditions required by Article 3 of the PKO Law were not being met. Firstly, Article 3 stipulated that there must be an agreement of ceasefire by all parties involved in the conflict⁴². The article also says that if there is no armed conflict, the acceptance by the authorities of the involved country is enough. Since the 5 May agreement was signed, there was no cease-fire

³⁸ Press release statement on 29 June 1999itary sphere.

³⁹ Cooney. P48

⁴⁰ Prime Minister Koizumi argued that Japan established a "different and special" idea for how to contribute UN peace operations, and the international community have to accept Japan's "one country pacifism" concerning the military sphere. Drifte, R. (2000) Japan's quest for a permanent Security Council seat: a matter of pride or justice? Macmillan press. P88

⁴¹ K. Isezaki. (2008) Jieitai no kokusaikouken wa kenpokyujyoude. Kamogawa syutupan. P79

⁴² See next chapter on the Japanese SDF Law.

agreement between the two parties as required by Article 3, and as a result, Japan could not send the SDF. Japan was nonetheless hoping for a request from the East Timor government.

Secondly, Article 2 concerns the definition of the type of UN peace operation in which Japan can participate. Japan can only participate in UN peace operations with strict neutrality and not take sides with any party involved. If Japan considers that the disputing parties are “pro-independence” and “pro-integration force”, Japan’s participation in the independence of East Timor would be a case of siding with a pro-independence force. In either case, the SDF would have to withdraw or remain inactive in order to maintain its neutrality once an armed conflict broke out. The definition and conditions legislated in the PKO Law became a hindrance for Japanese government. The law only covered a few scenarios, and did not recognise different types of situations in which the UN might be involved⁴³. At this point, the LDP, MOFA, and the Defence Agency were carefully watching for the right time to make an amendment to the PKO Law in order to lift some of the restrictions on Japan’s participation.

The legislative issue was one issue, but once again the Japanese government was faced with the matter of how to convince the opposition party and public opinion on personnel contributions. According to a public opinion poll by the Cabinet Office in 2000 about SDF participation in UN peace operations,⁴⁴ 29.9% people answered “should participate more than now” and 48.2% people answered

⁴³ Isezaki. P95

⁴⁴ From the results of a public opinion poll in 2000 (Heisei 12nen) on Japanese foreign policy on international cooperation.

“should participate the same as now” with a total of 77.4% of people supporting the participation of the personnel in UN peace operations⁴⁵.

A result of the public poll showed strong support from younger generations for more participation. More than 85% of people aged between 20-39 years old answered “more than now (36.8%)” and “same as now (49.8%)”. The overall result showed more people are supported personnel contributions to UN operations compared the early 1990s. For most of the younger generation, the memory of World War II is of the past and they have no difficulties with the idea of sending the SDF to UN operations⁴⁶. The discussion in the Diet on whether or not the dispatch of the SDF to UN operations would be a violation of the interpretation of Article did not reflect public opinion. Therefore, the opposition parties only delayed the process of the dispatch of the SDF.

During the public referendum period in East Timor, major Japanese newspapers⁴⁷ expressed the situation in East Timor as “being thrown into confusion”, and criticized the reaction by the Japanese government as “taking sides” with Indonesia or the pro-integration force. Prime Minister Obuchi’s statement⁴⁸ on the attack on the UN office in Dili on 30 June 1999, made even a stronger impression that Japan was taking sides with the Indonesian government⁴⁹. As a result, strong disapproval was given voice by the opposition parties and the media. This moved the Japanese public to give more support to the idea of active cooperation for the

⁴⁵ The Cabinet Office (2000) Public Opinion poll on SDF and its peacekeeping mission. The Cabinet Office PR Centre.

⁴⁶ Cooney. P145

⁴⁷ Such as the Asahi, Yomirui, Mainichi, and Nikei Newspapers

⁴⁸ He stated that the attack on the UN office was not directly offended the UN operation in East Timor. It was an “unfortunate incident” made by the minority group of pro-integration force.

⁴⁹ PM Obuchi’s statement on the incident was the same as the one by Indonesian government.

international effort to assist the people in East Timor. Both the administration and foreign ministry denied taking sides with Indonesia and stated that Japan supports the East Timorese. They also stated that the attacks on the UN office was a “matter of regret”, and expressed concerns over the situation⁵⁰.

The opposition parties and interested Diet members pressured the Obuchi administration and MOFA even harder to use its influence over the Indonesian government. Japan’s ODA contribution towards Indonesia was averaging 840 million Japanese yen every year, and the bilateral economic relationship between the two countries was an essential part of the Indonesian economy.⁵¹ Since the Japanese government had not taken advantage of this, there were doubts about Japan’s neutrality towards East Timor and this spread to the Japanese public very quickly.

UN Operations, and Multinational forces: Regional support

To carry out the consultation, resolution 1246 (1999) of the Security Council authorised the establishment of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999. The mission would set almost 1,000 international staff to work together with up to 4,000 locally hired personnel throughout the operation.⁵² The 5 May agreements stated that, after the vote, UNAMET would oversee a transitional period pending implementation of the decision of the East Timorese people. Despite an extremely tight timetable to prepare for the voting, delays were caused by security concerns, while administrative difficulties were

⁵⁰ At several meetings in the Diet (specially at the Foreign committee meeting in July-August 1999), MOFA officials and the Prime Minister tried to deny Japan’s position as in Indonesian side.

⁵¹ Especially after the monetary crisis in 1997, the Indonesian economy fell, and Japan’s financial support meant more than ever to the Indonesian government.

⁵² United Nations Dept. of Public Information. P12. Article 17.

caused by the heightened levels of tension. However, even with the problems of an underdeveloped infrastructure, UNAMET successfully registered 451,792 potential voters among the population of 800,000 in East Timor and abroad. On voting day, 30 August 1999, some 98% of registered voters went to the polls and rejected the proposed autonomy by a margin of 344,580 (78.5%) to 94,388 (21.5%). This was the beginning of the process of transition towards independence⁵³. Following the announcement of the result, pro-integration militias with the support of the Indonesian security forces, launched a campaign of violence with looting and arson throughout the entire territory. The exact number of deaths and other human rights violations remains uncertain, but the estimated number of deaths was around 1,000. As a result, the entire population was displaced, and more than 250,000 people left the territory, in some cases transported under Indonesian and militia control to West Timor.⁵⁴ Most of UNAMET personnel were evacuated to Darwin, Australia, but a small team of UNAMET staff remained in the UN Headquarters in Dili. The Secretary General and the Security Council undertook strenuous diplomatic efforts to halt the violence, pressuring Indonesia to meet its responsibility to maintain security and order in the territory.

In response to this emergency situation, the United Nations began to coordinate large-scale emergency humanitarian assistance. When a UN mission sent by the Security Council visited Jakarta and Dili on 12 September 1999, the Indonesian government agreed to accept the offer of assistance from the United Nations and

⁵³ <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm>

⁵⁴ Dunn, J. Crimes against humanity in East Timor, January to October 1999: Their nature and causes. McDonald, H. (ed) (2002) *Master of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999*. Australian National University. P66

its member states. Immediately, the Security Council passed resolution 1264 on 15 September acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and authorized the establishment of a multinational-force empowered to use all necessary measures to restore peace and security in East Timor. Then, the Security Council authorized the multinational force (INTERFET), under a unified command structure headed by Australia, to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations.

Rapid deployment of a multinational force

In the East Timor operations, the military component and INTERFET were the largest and costliest and the most effective and successful. Both INTERFET and UNTAET were mandated to use force to maintain security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Deployment of a peacekeeping force (PKF) was stipulated in the 5th May agreement to replace the TNI (Indonesian National Army) in an orderly transition. However, post-ballot violence and destruction required the rapid deployment of the PKF unit. However, it was impossible for the UN to deploy such large numbers of troops at short notice. Thus, as an alternative, the UN Security Council Resolution 1264⁵⁵ authorised “the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures” to restore security in the crisis-ravaged territory of East Timor. The Australian government agreed to lead the multinational force for East Timor-INTERFE⁵⁶ and Resolution 1264 authorised INTERFET to undertake the following mission:

⁵⁵ S/RRS/1264 (1999) 15 September 1999.

⁵⁶ Following the Indonesian government’s announcement that it would permit INTERFET in East Timor, PM Howard announced on 15 September 1999 that Australia would be involved in the multinational force.

- ① to restore peace and security in East Timor
- ② to protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks within force capabilities
- ③ to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations

It is generally known that deployment of any kind of peace operation, especially PKF, takes more than a few months. “Rapid deployment” is almost impossible except in a multinational force of the “coalition of the willing”. The UN’s desire to improve its capability to deploy PKF speedily when it was required was far from the reality. However, INTERFET proved to be a possibility in deploying a multinational force for an emergency base.

In general, contributors of troops are not comfortable with handing over operational control, however, in the case of INTERFET, Australia took all control under the usual command arrangements for its own operations. The decision was based on resolution 1264 (1999) which authorized the establishment of a multinational force under a “unified command structure”⁵⁷. The UN mandate ensured that the “leading nation” concept of command would prevail. Australian command adopted a strong lead nation’s approach and made this operation stand out. Most of the UN peace missions follow a more bureaucratic and collegiate model of command, where national representation often has priority over operational effectiveness. In East Timor, the INTERFET/UNTAET military model worked out, but it is likely to require modification for future operation in more hostile environments.

⁵⁷ Paragraph 3 of the resolution 1264.

The United Nations was unable to deploy the PKF quickly enough to restore security in East Timor. However, the regional will to gather a voluntary base of multinational forces with reliable financial contributors was certainly a success. Australia proved its ability to manage and control such a large force. Financial contribution was the only action that Japan could take given its circumstances. However, it is too vague to see INTERFET as a model case for a generic solution to regional peacekeeping in East Asian region⁵⁸.

Japan's contribution: domestic dilemma and international requirement

With the chaos in East Timor and the establishment of INTERFET in September 1999 put the Japanese government in a more difficult position. INTERFET was established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, however, Article 9 and the PKO Law both prohibited any kind of military activity. This meant that Japan could not send personnel to the East Timor operation until peace was re-established. Contrary to the response Japan received the previous time it was unable to contribute troops, Japan did not receive any criticism from other regional states. Since Australia was willing to play a leading role in this area, shared responsibility in the East Asian states was perfectly possible between the two countries⁵⁹.

Japanese government was taking alternative action to fulfil its responsibility from a non-military perspective. As for the beginning contributions, Foreign Minister

⁵⁸ Francis. J.D. (2005) Dangers of co-deployment: UN-cooperative peacekeeping in Africa. Ashgate Publishing inc. P71

⁵⁹ Cotton, J. (2004) East Timor, Australia and regional order: intervention and its aftermath in Southeast Asia. Routledge Curzon. P83

Koumura gave Japan's financial contribution of US\$1 million to INTERFET, and another US\$ 200 million to the UNHCR and WFP operations in East Timor at the Diet budget meeting on 30 September⁶⁰. The Diet session was extended to discuss Japan's possible personnel contribution to the operation not limited only to INTERFET, but also to missions with a more humanitarian purpose, and unfreeze the participation to the Chapter VII operation. At this point, the Japanese government had strongly supported the 5 principles of the PKO Law since 1992, and sought to play a role in "backup support" for the humanitarian mission of the East Timor so as not to violate its non-involvement principles. The SDF Law Article 100 does state that SDF can participate in humanitarian relief operation.⁶¹ Therefore, MOFA and the Defence Agency were looking for a possibility in the UNHCR refugee relief operation in West Timor.

This was a compromise for the Japanese government given the PKO Law. Finally in November 1999, in response to a request from UNHCR, the Japanese government was able to provide airlift services by SDF transport planes between Surabaya (Java Island) and Kupang (West Timor) for UNHCR's humanitarian relief items that were to be used for East Timorese people displaced in West Timor.⁶² The scale of the corps was as followed: Air SDF unit (150 personnel), Liaison officers (6 personnel), Aircraft (4 transport planes of C-130H), and 1 multi-purpose assistance plane (U-4).

⁶⁰ It was an answer to the Representative Kawabata, a member of the East Timor association. MOFA announced Japan's financial support to INTERFET to the public on 21 September 1999 by the Press Secretary.

⁶¹ Article III of the PKO Law defines "humanitarian international relief operations" in which Japan may participate. The requirements for participation in humanitarian relief operations are less stringent than those for PKO.

⁶² MOFA announcement on 19 November 1999.

Compared with the beginning of the 1990s, the Japanese government was able to manage personnel contribution even under the pacifist constitution with few amendments to the PKO Law. The Japanese government, MOFA and MOD found an alternative interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution – to deploy SDF in humanitarian intervention under the UN or related organisation – which will allow them to send SDF personnel.

By the beginning of new century, not only the Japanese public but also several Asian countries showed their respect towards Japan's active involvement in UN peace operations especially in Cambodia. There was still a concern from particular neighbouring states such as the PRC, DPRK and Republic of Korea on Japan's "remilitarisation" by sending SDF to UN PKOs⁶³. Despite some of the arguments inside and outside of Japan (this point will be discussed in the next Chapter), the debate in the Diet was moving towards allowing the SDF to participate in military aspects of the peace operations including monitoring a cease-fire, disarmament, and cantonment etc.. The basic argument by the LDP was that if the 5 principles of the PKO Law were maintained, permitting PKF activity would not violate Article 9 of the Constitutional Law which prohibited any kind of military action⁶⁴. The reason why the PKO Law was initially established in this way in 1992 was that the government carefully took into consideration the sensitivity of neighbouring countries as well as trying to stay true to its own pacifist constitution⁶⁵.

⁶³ Some Asian countries (particularly those three countries mentioned above) expressed their concern about Japan's SDF participation in the UN PKO even in the non-military part of the operation. Japan's

⁶⁴ Foreign Minister Kono's (Oct 1999-Apr 2001) answer to Representative Sato of the Komei Party at the Committee of the Security on 11 November 1999.

⁶⁵ Willibald, S. (2004) Japan's (UN) certain future? Permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council – A Delphi Study. GRIN Verlag. P36

Due to the restrictions, the Japanese government tried to show its presence by providing financial support. On 4 October 1999, Foreign Minister Koumura announced⁶⁶ the decision to contribute around US\$100 million to the UN Trust Fund for the multinational force (INTERFET). He also announced that Japan would provide a substantial financial contribution to INTERFET by providing financial support for those developing countries willing to participate in the force. The contribution by Japan was welcomed by the Australian government which lead the operation. It said that “Japan’s contribution will be decisive in encouraging strong regional participation”⁶⁷. Fourteen countries from the East Asian region, including Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia had already announced their participation in INTERFET at the beginning of October 1999. Japan’s contribution to INTERFET and additional support for the developing countries was significant and set things in motion⁶⁸. Moreover, the UN Secretary General, Annan visited Japan in November 1999 to discuss several matters with Japanese governmental officials in Tokyo. Before his visit to Tokyo, Annan had appointed Mr. Akira Takahashi who was Special Advisor to the President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA⁶⁹) as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Rehabilitation⁷⁰ of the UNTAET. Mr. Takahashi

⁶⁶ On 4 October 1999, Foreign Minister Koumura made an announcement to the public. Before the announcement, the Cabinet approved the financial contribution to the UN Trust Fund, and support for the developing countries to participate in INTERFET.

⁶⁷ Speech by Mr. Alexander Downer (Foreign Minister of Australia) 6 October 1999.

⁶⁸ This speech made by the Australian Foreign Ministry on the Japan’s financial contribution to the INTERFET on 6 October 1999.

⁶⁹ JICA was founded in 1974 as an agency to implement technical assistance, focusing on institution building, strengthening organizations and human resources development that would enable developing countries to pursue their own sustainable socioeconomic development.

⁷⁰ This position was one of the two deputies of SRSG of the UNTAET, and would take charge of the coordination and provision of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance.

already had experience in humanitarian assistance and the development programme in JICA which administrated most of Japan's ODA. This gesture was received as UN high expectation for Japan to play an important role in its area of greatest experienced. The official visit by the UN Secretary General in this timing highlights Japan's importance in the East Asian region, and also the necessity of Japan's financial contribution⁷¹. Because of INTERFET's nature as a "coalition of the willing" which was established under a resolution of the UN Security Council, the cost of this multinational force was not covered by the UN budget and Japan's financial contribution was crucial.

During the deployment of INTERFET, the Japanese government was still searching for a way to contribute its personnel to non-military posts⁷². As for the diplomatic effort, MOFA and the Foreign Minister continued their discussion with the Indonesian government. During the years 1999-2001, Indonesian President Wahid visited Tokyo twice (November 1999 and April 2000), and President Megawati (September 2001) once, while Japanese officials visited Jakarta 6 times⁷³ to discuss and exchange views on East Timor. This was an indication of Japan's willingness to lead in the area of diplomacy, however, none of the meetings were able to bring about any solutions to the issues.

⁷¹ The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Japan every year since his appointment as the UN Secretary General. His visits made clear that Japan's role in the United Nations and the East Asian region.

⁷² The Secretary General Kofi Annan suggests that Japan's participation in the UN operation in East Timor does not have to be a personnel contribution. (Press Release on 17 November 1999)

⁷³ Official visits by Japanese government officials, including the Foreign Minister of Japan, to the Indonesian Government were frequently repeated during the transitional period of East Timor.

UNTAET: UN to govern a country

With the delay of the deployment of UNTAET, the United Nations decided to extend the mandate of UNAMET until 30 November 1999 – until the deployment of UNTAET. Several UN officials and MOFA diplomats witnessed that the United Nations did not plan to establish a transitional administration between the 5 May agreement and the popular consultation⁷⁴. UN Secretariats were given an impossibly short time, and did not have time to consider a briefing report from any fact-finding missions⁷⁵. The Secretariat gathered available personnel and equipment within a short period of time, however, the scale of the operation needed to govern a nation was impossible to picture without experience and the operation found difficulties from the planning stage.

On 25 October 1999, the Security Council authorised the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) under Resolution 1272,⁷⁶ and the Secretary General appointed the highly regarded Sergio Vieira de Mello from Brazil as SRSG. Resolution 1272 mandated UNTAET to provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor. Its mandates were as follows:

- ① establish an effective administration;
- ② assist in the development of civil and social services;
- ③ ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance,
- ④ rehabilitation and development assistance;

⁷⁴ Source: Interview with MOFA officials posted in Dili during the transitional period, and UNV personnel engaged in the East Timor peace process. Smith, M. (2003) *Peacekeeping in East Timor*. Lynne Rienner. P60

⁷⁵ Speech by Breen B. at the Tokyo Conference 2002.

⁷⁶ It should be noted that the Security Council authorised UNTAET under Chapter VII of the Charter.

- ⑤ support capacity-building for self-government;
- ⑥ assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development.⁷⁷

This was not the first occasion in which the UN had acted in a transitional capacity, however, UNTAET was to be the *de jure* government of a ruined country.⁷⁸ What UN did in Cambodia or Namibia was re-building a society in countries with established Ministries and Agencies, a Judiciary system, Economy, and Education. In East Timor, on the other hand, the UN took the responsibility to establish the basic structure of a nation-state from scratch. In addition, due to the uncertain security situation, the infrastructure was almost completely destroyed and the population dislocated. To all intents and purposes, UNTAET assumed responsibility from UNAMET in November 1999, inheriting a small number of experienced UNAMET personnel and what remained of its equipment.

UNTAET's experience was distinct from other operations exercising transitional administration, since this was the first time sovereignty had been passed on to the UN despite competing authorities⁷⁹. Therefore, during the planning phase of UNTAET, the question of sovereignty was carefully avoided to minimize and attempt to steer clear of any resistance or objection. However, resolution 1272 became the instrument for giving sovereignty over East Timor to the United Nations, even though it did not use those words. As *Time* magazine noted on 20 March 2000, "the UN is legally the holder of East Timor's sovereignty, and it is

⁷⁷ <http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetM.htm>.

⁷⁸ Smith, M. G. and M. Dee (2003). *Peacekeeping in East Timor: the path to independence*. Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers.
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⁷⁹ In both Eastern Slavonia in 1996-98 and Kosovo since 1999, Croatia and Serbia respectively constituted the recognised sovereign states.

the first time in its history the world body had played such a role”⁸⁰. This new experiment by the UN was watched carefully. UNTAET was deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter which is entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Therefore, UNTAET consisted of essentially the same capabilities as the former INTERFET – the forces were modern, well equipped, well trained and well led.

The Secretariats: the Brahimi recommendations

The scale and responsibility of UNTAET was enormous and the importance of mission preparation and planning was highlighted in the mandates of UNTAET. However, the Secretariats could not fulfil such a requirement and advance planning was only managed in two particular areas: the Peacekeeping Force (PKF) and the Electoral Division (for the UNAMET ballot – popular consultation – and later for the Constituent Assembly elections⁸¹). Nevertheless, UNTAET had to replace all pre-existing authorities in the territory during the operation – this was something the UN had never experienced in its peace operation history.

The UN inter-departmental hand-over process caused unnecessary confusion and delay for the deployment of UNTAET⁸². UNAMET had been conducted by the DPA, while the UN authorisation of the deployment of INTERFET, whose strength ultimately reached 11,500 troops, entailed the transfer of responsibilities to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). However, as a

⁸⁰ Terry McCarthy, “Rising From the Ashes” *Time*, 20 March 2000. P14

⁸¹ Much of the credit for the electoral success went to the excellent preparatory work done by the DPA’s Electoral Assistance Division, under the capable direction of Carina Perelli from Uruguay.

⁸² Breen, B. (2002) UNTAET: Debriefing and Lesson. Tokyo Conference. JIIA

consequence, there was a significant loss of continuity in planning and leadership, in communication between New York and Dili, and in the transmission of in-theatre knowledge and experience from UNAMET to UNTAET⁸³. With the exception of some delays and disorganisation caused by the UN Secretariat, the overall time schedule for the UNAMET and UNTAET operations went smoothly. The difficulties experienced in the transition of roles between the departments at the UN headquarters served as another lesson for future missions.

After several years of experience in peace operations in the 1990s, many of the difficulties which most of the operations encountered related directly to inchoate planning and preparation within the Secretariats in New York. The Brahimi report indicated that the Secretariat was understaffed and lacked integrated planning. Also, bureaucratic difficulties were compounded by the parlous state of DPKO staffing levels.

As for the planning of UNTAET, only infrequent communication had been made between the departments and the UN agencies in the planning process. Therefore, when the UN personnel were deployed into East Timor, this brought in many different organizational paradigms. Those difficulties in addressing day-to-day problems also obstructed UNTAET ability to conduct a sufficient mission. Since the 1990s, most of the UN peace operations were deployed at short notice, and there had always been a need for Secretariats to improve the planning process so that it was organised and ran more quickly. There was sufficient time for the Secretariat to plan and prepare details of UNTAET, during the UNAMET deployment. However, the post ballot situation was more than anyone could

⁸³ Jarat Chopra. (2000) *The UN's Kingdom of East Timor*. Survival Vol 42. No3. Autumn 2000. P27-39

imagine, and most of the advance planning which was predicted for 5 May Agreements did not suit the actual situation⁸⁴.

The planning process of UNTAET took place in the context of a fierce bureaucratic power struggle between the DPA and the DPKO. Before the referendum and violence, the DPA⁸⁵ had been the principal unit in the Secretariat to handle the situation in East Timor,⁸⁶ however, the entry of INTERFET radically changed the nature of the mission. UNAMET was organized by the DPA and its mandate further gave the DPA a role in the initial transitional period regardless of the outcome of the ballot. The DPKO had been in control of the deployment of international troops in a peacemaking /peacekeeping capacity. Therefore, the control and management of the East Timor mission naturally moved from the jurisdiction of the DPA to that of the DPKO. However, from the very beginning of its transition, the DPKO did not respond to proposals from the DPA's Under Secretary General for a joint planning mission. This inter-departmental rivalry over institutional mandate caused some distractions for the planning of UNAMET. In mid-September, a decision by the Secretary General's office settled the matter. While the planning team drew its staff from both departments and was assisted by several UN family organizations, it was clear that the DPKO had to be in charge⁸⁷.

⁸⁴ Article 7 of the agreement stipulated that if the result of the ballot rejected the autonomy proposal, authority in East Timor would be transferred to the UN, which would initiate a process of transition towards independence.

⁸⁵ The Department of Political Affairs provides advice and support on all political matters to the Secretary-General in the exercise of his global responsibilities under the United Nations Charter relating to the maintenance of peace and security. The Department carries out activities related to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, peace-building, electoral assistance, substantive support and secretariat services to the Security Council, the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The Secretary-General, through his special representatives and envoys, is actively engaged in implementing political mandates in a number of countries.

⁸⁶ Suhrke, A. (2000) *Peacekeeping as Nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor*. International Peacekeeping. Vol 8. no4. 2000 P1-20

⁸⁷ Suhrke. P6

The conflicts between departments inside the UN had to be avoided, because cooperation between internal sectors was one of the important elements for the success of peace operations.

The fundamental interests between the DPA and the DPKO are different, however, both departments are the heart of United Nations planning and conducting peace operations. Therefore, stronger cooperation and joint planning or a joint mission seemed necessary. As the DPA had been the principal unit in handling East Timor since the 1970s, the DPKO had little knowledge of East Timor, and moreover, had only limited experience in “governance missions.” Institutional location also influenced the choice of a “model” for planning purposes – another important element in the mission’s genesis⁸⁸. The DPKO chose its operations in Kosovo as the model for East Timor. A comprehensive “peacebuilding” and “governance” mission had been established in Kosovo in June 1999⁸⁹. The duties and tasks by UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) were shared with UNHCR, OSCE, and EU, while NATO leading KFOR was deployed to ensure their security. However, UNTAET was taking full responsibility as a governmental authority, and also had the power to enforce peace under Chapter VII of UN Charter. The ability of UNTAET to conduct institution building had limitations since the missions only consisted of three departments. Because of UNTAET lacking capacity, a large part of the reconstruction work was taken over by the World Bank, the donors and the UNDP.

⁸⁸ Suhrke. P7.

⁸⁹ The Kosovo mission itself reflected a broader doctrinal evolution that incorporated experiences from Namibia to Eastern Slavonia, and UNAMET was not a complete structural replica of UNMIK.

In addition, East Timor lacked all necessary resources to rebuild the administration. If there was “nearly nothing” in East Timor for the UN to build on, as Sergio de Mello (SRSG) later said, then everything had to be brought in⁹⁰. Since each operation has a unique character and background, complications for “peace-building” and “governance” missions were unrecognised in the UN Secretariats until the East Timor operation. Some improvements made on the UNTAET were institutional changes in the UN Secretariats in the planning area. There was tremendous political pressure to demonstrate that the UN could act quickly and effectively. Ideally, the United Nations needed six months to prepare a multi-purpose mission like UNTAET.

As noted in the Brahimi report, “effective, dynamic leadership can make the difference between a cohesive mission with high morale and effectiveness despite adverse circumstances, and one that struggles to maintain any of those attributes... the tenor of an entire mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of those who lead it.”⁹¹ Ian Martin (SRSG of UNAMET), Major General Peter Cosgrove, Head of INTERFET, and Sergio Vieira de Mello all demonstrated leadership qualities under difficult circumstances. There is no doubt that the sustained personal commitment of Sergio Vieira de Mello as SRSG was one of the key factors in the overall success of the UNTAET operation. He was the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and head of OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) at that time, and had an extensive record of service with UN missions and agencies stretching over 30 years.

⁹⁰ Statement to the Security Council. UN doc. SC/6799/3. February 2000

⁹¹ Brahimi report. Para 92, P16.

De Mello arrived in mid-November 1999 with great expectations. The DPKO had delegated him wide powers of discretion, and his mandate from the Security Council was sweeping⁹². As soon as he arrived in East Timor, he immediately opened a direct dialogue with Gusmao and he relied on this personal relationship almost exclusively to guide the mission. During the operation, although East Timorese leaders were sometimes critical of the UN and UNTAET, they all recognized and solidly supported the efforts and commitment of the SRSG. To accomplish the mission's objectives, the SRSG is required to engage in constant negotiation with a wide range of actors, including the key persons from the host country. Therefore, the SRSG must provide leadership and be able to communicate effectively with the diverse international and local staff, as well as the rotating national contingents of peacekeepers, to keep them working toward the same objectives and to maintain morale⁹³. In the case of UNTAET, SRSG - De Mello did not have a problem with language – Portuguese was his native tongue. Moreover, he was a Director of Repatriation for the UNTAC – the only peace operation in the East Asian region before UNTAET. The cultural and linguistic background along with his experience with the UNTAC operation made Sergio De Mello extremely effective in the negotiation process with East Timorese leaders. This seemed to negate to the idea that the people in the host country experienced resistance to the “white man”.

⁹² Chopra. P32

⁹³ Malone, D. (2004) *The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st Century*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. P324

Japan's first movement: cooperation with related countries

The Prime Ministership of Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) was the turning point for Japanese foreign policy, and domestic institutions. What was most significant about the Koizumi administration was that he took anti-mainstream ideals to the mainstream, which had been impossible in Japanese politics for more than a half of century. The first change was seen when terrorist attacked the US on 11 September. Unlike previous prime ministers, Koizumi took necessary measures within a few hours. He established an inter-ministerial task force under his supervision, and issued six initiatives by the following morning including the dispatch of SDF if necessary. Prime Minister Hashimoto (1996-1998) formed the Administrative Reform Council, one of its major goals was to reinforce the authority of the cabinet and the prime minister, provide them with more staff support and give firmer control in emergencies. The administrative reform related bills passed in July 1999. It resulted in significant institutional changes that strengthened the power and function of cabinet secretariat⁹⁴.

Koizumi's understanding of interpretation of Article 9 was no different from previous administrations, however, he added that "there is room for consideration⁹⁵" for an amendment or variation on the interpretation. After consulting with MOFA and the Defence Agency, Koizumi decided to dispatch SDF ships to refuelling mission to the "Coalition of the Willing" in Afghanistan, which was a breakthrough for Japan's foreign and security policy. This action was seen by the White House as a major step forward by Japan towards collective self-defence and taking on a role in global security.

⁹⁴ Shinoda. P194

⁹⁵ Kyodo-tsushin, 21 April 2001, and the Asahi Shinbun, 6 November 2001.

Koizumi's effective policy-making leadership was never seen in Japanese post-war political history, and he was willing to exercise his power on the SDF dispatch to operations in East Timor.

As for a breakthrough, Foreign Minister Kono visited East Timor on 30 April 2000 to meet with Sergio de Mello, and Xanana Gusmao. During his visit, Mr. Kono and the East Timor representatives exchanged views on the issue of East Timor, while Mr. Kono promised further support by the Japanese government. He also explained Japan's policy on support for reconstruction and development, including an early implementation of tangible aid and assistance for human resources development which was support through JSPP21 for East Timorese students in Indonesia. Foreign Minister Kono also expressed his intention to raise the issue of East Timor in some form at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the G8 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit. This first time attempt at raising the issue of East Timor also contained indirect messages⁹⁶ towards the government of Indonesia. This was Japan's way of applying pressure in a non-direct way, given its political relationship with Indonesia, by showing Japan's support for East Timor. This was the point when Japan finally used its strong influence on Indonesia even though indirectly.

Foreign Minister Kono also visited Singapore ahead of Indonesia and East Timor, and re-visited Singapore again. With regards to the regional situations, Foreign Minister Kono explained the reasons for his visits to Indonesia and East Timor and exchanged views with the Singaporean leaders. Specifically, he reached an

⁹⁶ Sources: Interviews with Mr. Matsuura in NYC December 2005, and with Mr. Shimizu in Tokyo March 2006.

agreement in principle with Foreign Minister Jayakumar on assistance to human resources development in East Timor under the framework of the Japan-Singapore Partnership Program for the 21st Century (JSPP21). Japan's diplomatic efforts for East Timor continued through its own channel during the UNTAET operation. Japan used the visits by F.M. Kono to promote its own commitment to East Timor, and also asked other regional states to cooperate with Japan in playing a leading role in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase.

Finally, with the hand-over for the responsibility of the security of East Timor from INTERFET to UNTAET on 23 February 2000, the Japanese Diet started preparing for the dispatch of SDF units to UNTAET. However, because of the legislative system, it took more than a year to get SDF troops on the ground. In the Japanese legislative process, if a bill cannot be passed by the end of the session, those bills will be abandoned for the current session and be reconsidered in the next session.

Therefore, to fill the time gap between the dispatch of SDF on East Timor soil, Japanese government first held a Donor's Meeting for East Timor in Tokyo in December 1999, and pledged around US\$130 million in assistance over three years - the largest package to be provided by a donor country⁹⁷. Subsequently, MOFA dispatched an economic cooperation study team to East Timor to examine the reconstruction and development needs in January 2000. Japan was able to contribute financially and in addition, took the time to examine the ways in which

⁹⁷ Approximately US\$100 million was for reconstruction and development assistance, and approximately US\$30 million for humanitarian assistance.

it could help rebuild East Timor. The delay in the contribution of troops was inevitable, however, troops were finally dispatched in November 2001.

The Independence of East Timor

During the post-ballot violence, more than 75% of the population was displaced while more than 70% of East Timor's private housing, public building and utilities were destroyed. Some 200,000 persons fled or were deported to West Timor and other areas of Indonesia⁹⁸. There was an urgent need for reconstruction of the infrastructure and a stable society in which Japan could take a lead with expectations from leaders in East Timor already being high for Japan (details of Japan's projects on rehabilitation and reconstruction will follow in Chapter 5). The crisis in East Timor needed a great deal of external support if it was to move towards a solution.

Following the deployment of INTERFET in October 1999, displaced refugees began to return home. From October to December 1999, close to 85,000 refugees were initially repatriated from camps under the auspices of the UNHCR, and a further 42,500 refugees were repatriated later. However, thousands of refugees that remained in West Timor were continually intimidated and misinformed of the situation in East Timor by pro-Indonesian militia⁹⁹. This led to confusion on the part of the refugees. As a result, UNTAET took a more active role in facilitating the return of more refugees, especially in the difficult cases involving militia and

⁹⁸ All the data are from "Global Report 1999" by UNHCR available at UNHCR home page. <http://www.unhcr.org>.

⁹⁹ Indonesia failed to disarm and curtail the power of the militias that were effectively preventing repatriation to East Timor. The distractions by the Indonesian military become serious when three UNHCR international staff members were killed by militia elements in Atamuba in West Timor on 7 September 2000. Following this tragic incident, the UNHCR was less able to assist in the repatriation of refugees due to consideration for the protection of its own personnel.

pro-autonomy supporters. Between the Atamuba killing in September 2000 and May 2002, only some 29,000 more refugees returned from West Timor, with support from UNTAET.

Japan contributed its SDF units to UNHCR's refugee relief operation. From November 1999 to February 2000, Air SDF transport units totalling 113 personnel airlifted relief supplies from Surabaya, Java, to Kupang, West Timor, using C-130H transport planes¹⁰⁰. The UNHCR expressed appreciation for this contribution, which made it possible to deliver relief supplies to some 120,000 East Timorese displaced persons in West Timor. This was another noteworthy accomplishment by the Japanese government. Humanitarian relief operations such as these are the kinds of operations that are allowed under the new PKO Law. UNHCR operations are those that have no military aspect to the duties and this was particularly consistent with the way Japan was willing and able to contribute and further defined Japan's role in UN peace operations.

During the early deployment period, the United Nations paid more attention to the situation in East Timor and less to that in West Timor. More senior UN presence in West Timor might have helped the UN to better succeed in the repatriation programme¹⁰¹. By the Security Council Resolution 1319 (2000) on 8 September, security in West Timor had sufficiently improved and gave good reason for a return of UN personnel¹⁰². From then, the UNHCR in partnership with UNTAET helped 188,646 refugees return to East Timor, but an estimated 60,000 to 80,000

¹⁰⁰ Data from the Japan Peace Cooperation Headquarters.

¹⁰¹ Kings College report. P246, Para 150.

¹⁰² The resolution called on the Indonesian government to take immediate steps to disarm and disband any militia, and restore law and order in the affected areas in West Timor to ensure safety and security in the refugee camps.

still remained in Indonesia¹⁰³. The number of those returning increased after the successful election on 30 August 2001. In summary, the efforts to repatriate the refugees and resettle the displaced population were successful.

The election of the Constituent Assembly, scheduled for 30 August 2001, the second anniversary of the balloting, was promulgated on 16 March 2001. On the same day, civil registration of all residents began, and by 23 June, 737,811 people had successfully registered. Finally, the date for East Timor's independence was set for 20 May 2002. On 30 August 2001, two years after the Popular Consultation, more than 91% of East Timor's eligible voters went to the polls. An 88-member Constituent Assembly and a new East Timorese Government which would govern East Timor during the remainder of the transitional period before its independence was chosen by the Timorese people. Then, East Timor's Constituent Assembly signed the Territory's first Constitution on 22 March 2002 and following presidential elections on 14 April, Xanana Gusmao was appointed president of East Timor. With both these preconditions for a hand-over of power, the Constituent Assembly transformed itself into the country's parliament on 20 May 2002¹⁰⁴.

State building: new areas for UN peace operation?

What the United Nations tried in East Timor was distinct from all other peace operations. For the first time in its history, the UN exercised sovereignty over a territory. For example, UNTAET held effective treaty making powers¹⁰⁵, and

¹⁰³ S/2001/983, Para 36, P5.

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/background.html>. UNTAET home page.

¹⁰⁵ Full legislative and executive powers were concentrated in the hands of one individual, SRSG and Transitional Administrator Sergio Vieira de Mello.

entered into a treaty with the World Bank's IDA negotiating on behalf of East Timor¹⁰⁶. Since the transitional administration had all power, it raised questions about whether the United Nations was involved in "state-building" and, if it was, how? *An Agenda for Peace* regarded *Peacebuilding* as "reforming or strengthening governmental institutions", and *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (1995) described an essential goal as "the creation of structure for the institutionalising peace". Clearly, what the UN did in East Timor overextended this concept of peacebuilding, and raised questions of the capacity of the UN in peace operations. The most fundamental task of a transitional administration was to govern effectively, and prepare for a smooth transition to a sustainable government. Until East Timor, the UN had limited experiences in governmental administration. Added to the limited experiences of the UN, the existing difficulties of planning and conducting peace operations certainly did not help the situation and it was one of the most frustrating times for the UN.

That UNTAET was again ill prepared made it no different from other peace operations. Especially with the unique responsibility the UN took in East Timor to activate itself as a governmental administration, the UN Secretariat needed to give full support to prior planning and preparation and to the provision of a start-up package at the inception of the operation¹⁰⁷. While planning for UNTAET was brief, the planning for UNMISSET began early, allowing the transitional authority to develop a detailed and comprehensive plan for the follow-up mission. As for the logistics and financial support, the UN had no difficulties in getting cooperation from regional states. This reduced the amount of pressure that the

¹⁰⁶ Kreijen, G. (2004) *State failure, sovereignty and effectiveness*. Koninklijke Brill NV. P321

¹⁰⁷ Guttieri, K. (2007) *Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to peace and democracy?*. United States Institution of Peace. P234

Secretariat normally gets in planning peace operations. However, the UN Secretariat needed more than regional support to prepare peace missions, and what it needed was a sufficiently prepared unit (for emergency cases) that could quickly adapt to different kinds of worst case scenarios in conflict zones. Since regional cooperation and interest are the most fundamental needs in deploying peace operations, it was possible to quickly deploy operations in the East Asian region in emergency situations.

As in the pre-deployment phases at UN headquarters, UNTAET experienced difficulties co-existing with local powers in sharing responsibilities. After several months of UNTAET's deployment, the East Timorese people became suspicious of the UN's sovereignty, and doubting whether the UN had any inclination for sharing power during the transition. For the planning process, the DPKO had not tried to cooperate with East Timorese representatives until the establishment of the NCC. According to UN representatives, because most of the political leaders had been exiled or escaped from East Timor soil, most of the leaders knew little about the reality of civilian life in East Timor¹⁰⁸. In addition, due to the dramatic changes daily in circumstances, it was hard to devise an actual plan that would work or be adapted to the situation the next day. At the end. UNTAET was intrinsically involved in mediating the access of local parties and politicians to key positions of authority in the period before the elections¹⁰⁹. UNTAET was an ideal case study for the skills required by an interim administration to perform the duties of a government until replaced by local authorities. UNTAET's performance was often perceived to be inefficient and ineffective. However, given

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Matsuura.

¹⁰⁹ Tansey, O. (2009) *Regime-building: Democratization and international administration*. Oxford University Press. P74

the responsibility it took to build a new country in the short period that was given, the operation accomplished a relatively exceptional job.

Participants – regional aspects and support from the host country

One of the significant factors of the UN operations in East Timor was the strong support from regional states. All UN operations in East Timor had been successful coalitional operations with a significant regional component. The commanders of the military component of INTERFET and UNTAET were both from the Philippines. One of the significant regional developments was made by the PRC, which contributed 60 civilian police officers to UNTAET. The majority of personnel contributed to UNTAET were mainly from neighbouring countries. This included members from following countries: Bangladesh, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand, as well as others beyond the Asia-Pacific. However the major contribution in the entire operation were the Australian leading military and police components.

UNTAET personnel contribution (December 2001)			
	Troops	CIVPOL	Observers
Australia	1,407	78	14
Bangladesh	539	35	
China		60	
Fiji	194		
Jordan	777	200	4
Nepal	159	47	3
New Zealand	667	9	5
Pakistan	821	44	15
Philippines	58	105	8
Portugal	931	149	
Republic of Korea	439		
Thailand	736	24	

(in bold are the East Asian regional countries)¹¹⁰

Table 4. 1

As Lt.-Gen. Sanderson (former Commander of the military component of UNTAC) said, Australia proved to be the only country in the East Asian region which was capable of building a “coalition with strong regional representation” for both peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions¹¹¹. This was because of the geographic circumstances that shaped the performance of the operation that affected the role Australia played in the operation. East Timor is located only 500km from the city of Darwin in Australia’s Northern Territory. One of the conditions for success of UN peace operations is the degree of acceptance and support provided by the host country. In East Timor, the UN’s involvement was highly supported by the majority of the population. Despite differences of opinion on certain issues, Timorese political leaders were committed to working with the UN. All the East Timorese domestic factions requested the UN’s continuous support for its country following its independence, they did not want the UN to withdraw too quickly. This was because the Timorese understood the difficulties they would be facing in the post-independence environment and recognized the need for continued international assistance¹¹².

UNTAET personnel contribution (December 2002)			
	Troops	CIVPOL	Observers
Australia	840	55	15
China		69	
Fiji	185		
Japan	650		
Pakistan	102	9	13
Philippines	55	72	7
Portugal	639	30	1
Republic of Korea	436		

¹¹⁰ Source: Contributors to UN peacekeeping operations. Monthly Summary of Contributions on Military Observers, Civilian Police and Troops. From 2001 - 2003.

¹¹¹ Ryan, A. (2002) The Strong Lead-nation Model in an ad hoc Coalition of the Willing: Operation Stability in East Timor. P23-44. *International Peacekeeping*. Vol9. no1. P25

¹¹² Smith. P101

Singapore	228	25	
Thailand	502	36	6
(in bold are the East Asian regional countries)			

Table 4. 2

Although INTERFET was an Australian lead exercise, many East Asian countries, including ASEAN member states, contributed decisively in a discrete but effective manner in persuading Indonesia to accept international intervention in East Timor (the PRC, Japan, Philippines, Singapore and the Republic of Korea worked closely with Australia). Indonesia was highly sensitive to the role of Australia in this particular issue on East Timor. Although it was clear from the beginning that Australia would provide the core of the force, Indonesia wanted as much Asian participation as possible and a force commander from ASEAN¹¹³. In the end, INTERFET consisted of contingents from all major Asian countries, and was less “western-led”. Below is a brief summary of Asian participation:

- Thailand agreed to provide the deputy force commander along with its contingent;
- Japan provided its SDF troops mainly for construction work;
- The Philippines and the Republic of Korea confirmed their commitments;
- Singapore agreed to send a medical component¹¹⁴.

The United Nations continued to maintain its presence in East Timor throughout the post-independence period to ensure the security and stability of the nascent State. A successor mission, known as the United Nations Mission for Support in East Timor (UNMISET), was set up by resolution 1410 (2002) adopted

¹¹³ Martin, I. (2001). *Self-determination in East Timor: the United Nations, the ballot, and international intervention*. Boulder, Co., Lynne Rienner Publishers. P112.

¹¹⁴ All the information of ASEAN participation was based on the record of APEC leaders meeting in Auckland, New Zealand September 1999.

unanimously by the Security Council on 17 May¹¹⁵. The Security Council authorised the extension of UNMISET's mandate until 20 May 2004 by Resolution 1480 of 19 May 2003. There were 4,694 troops and 114 military observers present in May 2002.

The latest personnel contribution to the UNTAET operation shows that the main contributors are mostly from the East Asian region. The exception was Portugal, an ex-Suzerain state of East Timor. The East Timor operation proved that strong regional support in East Asia was one of the factors that enabled the UN to fulfil the needs of the host country. This also helped the UN Secretariat to plan and conduct the peace operation on short notice. As argued in the previous section, the mission in East Timor was not well prepared and the Secretariats experienced difficulties, however the mission resulted in the creation of a newly independent country with much regional support. If there is a future opportunity for the UN to deploy peace operations, there will be a promising commitment from regional countries, and the Secretariats can take into consideration these offers at the planning stage. In East Asia, there are countries that can play distinctive roles in UN operations. Japan is a country that can provide finance, diplomatic channels, and experienced rehabilitation and development support. There is Australia which willing to contribute trained troops to the military aspect of the operation. Also, ASEAN nations are willing to take any role available for them to participate. The UN Secretariats certainly lacked the knowledge of the availability of regional support. Although the mission had many positive outcomes, there were many issues that could have been avoided if regional contributions were considered in the planning stages by the Secretariats.

¹¹⁵ This mission was established for an initial period of 12 months, starting on 20 May 2002.

UNTAET personnel contribution (December 2003)			
	Troops	CIVPOL	Observers
Australia	301	20	7
China		16	
Fiji	197		
Japan	376		
Pakistan	74	10	3
Philippines	147	16	3
Portugal	517	20	1
Republic of Korea	9		
Singapore	4		
Thailand	49	8	6
(in bold are the East Asian regional countries)			

Table 4. 3

Continuous support by the UN: for the future

UNMISSET was established by Security Council Resolution 1412 (2002) of 17 May for an initial period of 12 months, starting on 20 May 2002. The United Nations' involvement in East Timor went beyond traditional peacekeeping and, maybe different from second or third generation peace operations. This is a completely new challenge for the United Nations. The role of peace operations has now expanded to a much more complex and multinational peacekeeping/peace support operations including a much greater non-military component to undertake the tasks of governance, humanitarian assistance, electoral supervision, police tasks, and nation building¹¹⁶. The building of the new State of Timor Leste by the UN transitional administration had not been the building of an ideal State as imagined by international experts. However the achievement of self-determination for East Timor did great credit to the United Nations as an institution: without the UN, and without the principled persistence of committed individuals within, the fundamental human rights of the East Timorese might never have been realised. Despite the criticism of the UN's slow movement on the decision-making and deployment processes, UNTAET and all

¹¹⁶ Smith P23.

other UN operations achieved a great deal within the minimum duration of its deployment.

There is no doubt that UNAMET and UNTAET achieved the set mandates and built a new democratic country in East Timor. The UN successfully established a newly elected government with the basic structure for a democratic government with infrastructure improvement including healthcare, and educational system¹¹⁷. Until the independence of East Timor, the Timorese people's journey to freedom had been long, arduous, and painful, with considerable loss of life. However, within a few years of the UN operations, the recovery of East Timor was starting to take shape. Efforts to resettle the displaced population and resolve the refugee problem were extremely successful. Most importantly, East Timor had declared independence, marking an official end to 450 years of foreign rule over the territory¹¹⁸. East Timor is still one of the poorest countries and the people are amongst the most illiterate. It is a heterogeneous population in language and culture where unemployment is high, and major reforms in agriculture and fishery are long overdue. Thus, the United Nations and related organizations will continue their support to assist East Timor in the long run. Also, a good relationship will need to be maintained with Indonesia, Australia, Japan, ASEAN/ARF, and all other Asian nations. ASEAN is important for the future of East Timor – not so much as an economic cooperation, but as a means to achieve security. The UN intervention in East Timor provides an example of the positive contribution that can be made to peace and security, to the establishment and survival of a new state. Also, the active participation by Asian countries was more

¹¹⁷ According to da Costa, over 700 primary schools, 100 junior high schools, and 10 technical colleges were established during UN operations.

¹¹⁸ BBC News online. Sunday 19 May 2002.

than the United Nations had estimated. The coordinated support of key member states such as Japan and Australia in this case was crucial to the success of UN operations, and functioned particularly well in the case of East Timor.

Japan's participation in UNTAET

As for personnel contribution, 11 Japanese personnel served as senior staff and civil officials in UNTAET from the end of December 2000. Japan's gradual personnel contribution is due to its enormous efforts to make its presence known in UN operations. In the case of UNTAET, however, the initial numbers turned out to be extremely small and barely recognized. There had been a freeze, pending amendment of the PKO Law so SDF and other units could participate in certain duties of UN peace operations, including monitoring the disarming of combatants, stationing personnel in and patrolling of buffer zones, and the collection and disposal of abandoned weapons.

Finally, on 7 December 2001, the PKO Law was amended¹¹⁹ to remove the freeze on participation in the above-mentioned duties. With the amended PKO Law, the process of the dispatch of the SDF to East Timor was accelerated¹²⁰. With this, the UN officially requested Japan's participation in UNTAET/UNAMET in November 2001. The direct official request from the UN silenced critics and opposition parties opposed to the dispatch of SDF personnel. Both government and opposition parties agreed that Japan needed to be recognised and respected in the international arena and all the available chances under the flag of the UN

¹¹⁹ The new PKO Law was approved by the three parties of the coalition government, the Japanese Security Council and the cabinet on November 20, and submitted to the House of Representative shortly after this. *Source*: Asia Times. 29 November 2001.

¹²⁰ Hoadley, S. (2006) Asian Security reassessed. ISEAS Publications. P73

must be taken. The Communist party and Socialist party did not agree on this point. In addition, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Marie Guéhenno visited Mr. Nakatani, the Defence Agency Director General, and formally requested Japanese personnel contribution. This request, at last, confirmed that the Japanese contribution was required, and silenced opposition attacks once and for all. Mr. Guéhenno expressed his high expectations of Japan's SDF's techniques and machinery material to be use in peacebuilding works, and counted on their participation.

The official announcement of the dispatch of SDF units to UNTAET/UNANET was made on 6 November 2001. On 14 Feb 2002, in his policy speech opening the 159th session of the Diet, Prime Minister Koizumi incorporated the plan to send SDF units to East Timor from March 2002 as a replacement for a unit of Pakistan¹²¹. They were to engage in logistic support of UNTAET/UNMISSET operations, including the maintenance and repair of roads and bridges, the management and maintenance of water supply points, and civil military affairs. On 25 February 2002, both Houses approved the dispatch of 690 Ground Self-Defence Force personnel, consisting of an Engineer Unit and 10 UNTAET Headquarters staff, in succession from February to April¹²².

Since Prime Minister Koizumi came to power, most of the administrative process was accelerated, and Japan's foreign policy became much more active in terms of international cooperation. Koizumi was head strong on political reform and took considerable action on many fronts. He was able to speed up many administrative

¹²¹ Prime Minister Juinchiro Koizumi's Policy Speech at the opening of 159 Diet Session on 4 February 2002. <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2004/01/19sisei.html>

¹²² Foreign Minister Press Release on 15 February 2002.

processes which allowed Japan to make decisions and act upon them in a timely manner. Koizumi was able to reach out to the public and restore some of the faith in Japanese politics that had been long lost¹²³. One of the highlights of his term at office was the way he visited the Yasukuni War Memorial shrine and paid his respects. This had been particularly controversial as there was much pressure from China and other Asian countries against the Japanese Prime Minister paying tribute to those who were internationally considered war criminals during World War II. However, this was among some of the actions that he took that opened up talks about the implications of World War II that Japan had been keeping a lid on for so long. There was much public debate which raised the awareness of the public to issues that had been almost taboo about Japan's historical background. Koizumi was able to unite a divided Japan and was gain the support he needed to pursue the political reform he had been advocating for so long. Koizumi's time in office was certainly a turning point for Japanese politics¹²⁴.

There was a symbolic moment on 29 April 2002, when Prime Minister Koizumi visited East Timor. He had meetings with President-elect Xanana Gusymao and SRSR Sergio Vieira de Mello. Prime Minister Koizumi announced that Japan was steadily implementing the US\$130 million project in reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance that had been approved at the Donors Meeting for East Timor in 1999. He also visited the camps of the SDF units and offered his direct encouragement¹²⁵. Until June 2004, a total number of 2300¹²⁶ SDF

¹²³ Shinoda, T. (2007) Koizumi Diplomacy. University of Washington Press. P80

¹²⁴ The Numerous changes in structures and policies, some put in place by his administration, (others in place before he took office), have provided Koizumi with a reconfigured policy making process, enabling him and his supporters to push through changes in economic policy that will force substantial structure reforms and an end to many old patterns. Katzenstein, J.P. and Shiraishi, T. (2006) Beyond Japan: the dynamic of East Asian regionalism. Cornell University. P54

¹²⁵ Prime Minister Koizumi became the first serving Prime Minister to visit the camp of an SDF unit serving in a UN PKO.

personnel served in the UN peace operations in East Timor. The Japanese government continued implementing assistance that focused on three areas: human resources development; agriculture and infrastructure building, and facilitating nation-building towards a self-dependent nation. It is clear that Japanese diplomacy was most successful where there were Japanese personnel on the ground: the presence of peacekeepers enhanced Japanese credibility in both Cambodia and East Timor¹²⁷.

At the Open Meeting of the Security Council on the Situation in East Timor on 26 April 2002, Mr Yukio Sato, the permanent Representative of Japan, explained the purpose for this visit as “conveying directly to the leaders and people of East Timor the Japanese people's message of congratulation and their determination to assist East Timor”¹²⁸. Koizumi's visits to East Timor sent several messages domestically and internationally. Most of all, the Japanese Prime Minister's presence on East Timor soil acted as pressure on Indonesia for active cooperation. As for the domestic impact, his visit to East Timor gave the Japanese people a strong impression that their government is committed to the UN peace operation and that it supports regional countries in need.

Japan was not able to use many of the experiences it had gained in Cambodia. However, because of these difficulties, Japan was able to discover more of its hidden talents in a way that was to be recognized internationally. Since Japan was the number one ODA provider in the East Asian region, most of the leaders of

¹²⁶ The first and second units included 680 personnel, the third unit included 522 personnel, and the fourth unit was 405 personnel. The duration for the each unit was 6-8months. *Source*: SDF's international cooperation. Defence Agency.

¹²⁷ Green. P191

¹²⁸ From Mr. Sato's speech at the meeting of the Security Council on the situation in East Timor on 26 April 2002.

neighbouring countries are influenced by what Japan might suggest in the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase of an operation¹²⁹. It was able to gather support for the case in East Timor and this resulted in neighbouring countries pressuring the Indonesian government without Japan having to do it.

Moreover, Japan was able to use its expertise and knowledge in the area of developmental support in the post deployment phase of the operation. This is certainly one of the areas in which Japan can play a leading role in the East Asian region and is now considered one of the components of Japan's contribution to Human Security. Furthermore, Japan is now one of the greatest financial contributors to the UN despite being criticised for its apparent chequebook style of diplomacy in the early 90s. Japan's financial support¹³⁰ to the developing countries and its participation in INTERFET made a strong impression on Japan's support for regional states. One of the focuses of Japan is to look for more meaningful, effective, immediate and noticeable ways of contributing financially. Lastly, much effort has been put into the amendment of the PKO Law and with the impact of the Koizumi administration, the PKO has now become more flexible in the contribution of the SDF.

There have been significant findings in this chapter and the next chapter will focus on the details of the ways in which Japan has begun to find its role as well as possible future areas in which it can contribute to UN peace operations.

¹²⁹ The Japanese government believed through the financial assistance, it also provides political and security value to the international community. It has accepted that through economic development, societies can cultivate democratic values and institutions and that the best instrument Japan has for promoting democracy and human rights. Schraeder. P105-106

¹³⁰ As mentioned previously, the Japanese government focuses its assistance in 3 areas in which Japan can contribute the most.

**Chapter 5 - Japan's experiences in Cambodia and East Timor:
distinctive contributions?**

This chapter will review the main arguments of this thesis and also elaborate in more detail some of the findings from previous chapters. It will also identify key features for Japan's role in the future.

The focus of this study has been to identify key points surrounding Japan's involvement in UN peace operations. The case studies in Cambodia and East Timor have been used to highlight many of the discoveries and insights made through this process as well as pose new questions for the future role of Japan. In order to guide this inquiry, the two research questions devised were:

3. *How and why were Japan's contributions to the UN peace operations developed and implemented in Cambodia and East Timor? What were the distinctive characteristic contributions made by Japan?*
4. *What did Japan learn from its experiences in the Cambodian and East Timorese cases, and what is its future role in the area of UN peace operations?*

The following summarises findings from previous chapters:

Much of the question of "how" and "why" Japan's contribution was developed and implemented has been answered through the various processes that Japan has endured since the end of World War II. Also, the experiences of the UN in its mission and changing role have provided the "bigger picture" on Japan's position in relation to the UN in further assisting this inquiry. The US assisted creation of

the new Japanese Constitution and its restrictive nature; changing global expectation of the role of Japan in peace operations; public opinion; balance of economic/political power; and diplomacy are only some of the factors that have shaped the development of the Japanese contribution. Many of the distinctive characteristic contributions by Japan have been new discoveries, as Japan had never been involved in the practical aspects of peace operations before. Japan's unique position as an economic super power; devoted financial contributor to reconstruction projects; a country having succeeded in the recovery from war have led to many areas of expertise in peacebuilding. Despite the regional stigma, many of the neighbouring countries look up to the accomplishments of Japan as a country that has been revived from defeat. Because of this unique position, it has been able to gain the trust of political leaders; gain international attention; assist rehabilitation work; and provide further financial aid to the region in a continuous manner.

The experiences in Cambodia and East Timor provided Japan with many learning opportunities. It has given Japan the drive to make the necessary changes in responding to international crises. The reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution; the establishment of the PKO Law with revisions; and the dispatch of personnel and SDF personnel were only the starting points for many new discoveries which Japan had made through its experiences since the end of the Cold War. In fact, Japan was able to learn that its major strengths lay elsewhere in the realm of UN peace operations. The role of Japan has certainly been made clearer by the UN's realization that peace keeping/building could be more effectively developed and maintained through the emphasis on Human Security.

This realization characterizes the gap that Japan is able to fill, and has been filling, which provides it with a new future role as a leading country in this area¹.

Bearing in mind these findings, the concept of Human Security will be explained in this chapter as one of the key roles that Japan can play, and will be further expanded in the final chapter.

Japan's contribution to Cambodia and East Timor

Prior to Japan's involvement in Cambodia and East Timor, Japan's contributions were never recognized by the United Nations or its member states². Japan had made several contributions through the ODA and bilateral financial support to the East Asian region since the end of World War II as post-war compensation. Its effectiveness has gained recognition during the 1990s: Japan's ODA mostly concentrated on society building and establishment of infrastructure which are fundamental factors of peacebuilding.

While financial contribution is one significant area, as argued in previous chapter 3 and 4, Japan was able to contribute in many other areas including diplomacy, personnel, hosting conferences as well as various other humanitarian projects in the East Asian region. The following are further elaborations on the findings as well as some of the background for understanding the significance of Japanese contributions. This will build up to the concept of Human Security and how Japan will be able to take a leading role in this area.

¹Kohama, H, (2003) External Factors for Asian Development. Institute of International Affairs and ASEAN Foundation. P237

² Interview with Mr. Shimizu from the North-American Division but who also served in East Timor as UNV.

Contribution focused on civilian lives with a financial base

Japan is the second largest contributor to the United Nations' after the US. Japan provided an estimated US\$ 280 million (19.5%) of the UN general budget of year 2004, and gave about US\$530 million for UN operations³.

Much of the Japan's financial contribution focused at both the level of individual as well as the national level. The nature of the contribution was of continuous support over a long period of time as opposed to one-off donations and much of the work was based on the experience Japan had as a nation that successfully rebuilt itself from the ruins of war. There have been discussions on the need for long term support for peace building after UN peace operations withdrawal. As Manning argued, "establishing legitimate state institutions at the central level is just the tip of the ice-berg. It is at the local level where a peace settlement has the most immediate and far reaching consequence for ordinary citizens"⁴. Japan's financial support is exactly targeting the ground level of peacebuilding. Prior to the peace operations in Cambodia, Japan already had a history of experience in developmental support in the East Asian region and among through the ODA. However, Japan's financial contribution on UN peace operations was usually highlighted by its operational support and donations at conferences on rehabilitation.

³ Yomiuri Shinbun.8 July 2005.

⁴ Manning, C. (2003) Local Level Challenges to Post-conflict peacebuilding" International Peacekeeping, Vol. 10, No3, P36

Japan's bilateral assistance to Cambodia had been suspended between fiscal years 1974 to 1991 but was resumed in 1992⁵. Since then, the Japanese government has been the biggest contributor to Cambodia's rehabilitation and reconstruction. The first grant aid was made by Japan at the ICORC which was hosted by the Japanese government in Paris on 8-9 September 1993. This was the very first direct support by the Japanese government to UNTAC in addition to its active cooperation. Between 1992-1997, Japan provided US\$1,306 million, which included US\$182 million for a bilateral loan, in financial assistance under Japan's ODA bilateral grant aid for the peace process, and rehabilitation and development of Cambodia⁶. Japan's support was mainly in the following areas: reconstruction of the road system, rehabilitation of the infrastructure, and economic and social development. Japan also established JSA (Japanese Government Team for Safeguarding Angkor) in 1994 and has contributed, until now, an estimated US\$2,500 million to protect Angkor Watt and all other National Heritages in Cambodia⁷.

During the years 1992-1993, Japan's ODA contribution was mainly used for the reconstruction of the road system that consisted of the following:

- ① A project for the rehabilitation of Chroy Changwar Bridge (Cambodia-Japan friendship bridge): US\$ 23.2million
- ② A project for the rehabilitation of National Route 6A (Japan Friendship Sangkum Restr Niyum Highway): US\$ 29.94 million
- ③ A project for improvement of the Road construction centre: US\$ 20.16 million

⁵ Japan-Cambodia relationship. MOFA Diplomatic Blue Book. 2006

⁶ Japan's ODA support to the Kingdom of Cambodia. Source: Embassy of Japan in Cambodia. P1

⁷ Source: JSA home page. <http://www.angkor-jsa.org/>

In addition to road reconstruction, even after the withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia, Japan has continued its bilateral support in a variety of areas. Later, in 1993 -1994, Japan was also involved in restoring and upgrading electricity and water supply facilities in Phnom Penh. Moreover, Japan made grant aid, of approximately US\$29.148 million, for increasing food production (1992-1996).

There has been much involvement in developmental support in Cambodia, and through the cooperation of JICA, Japan has developed policies stipulating that contribution to Cambodia would focus on the following areas:

- ① Good governance
- ② Improvement of conditions for economic growth
- ③ Improvement of the social and economic infrastructure
- ④ Health sector development
- ⑤ Education sector development
- ⑥ Agricultural and rural development
- ⑦ Demining and support for people with disabilities
- ⑧ Environment resource management⁸

This has helped to shape the consistent ways in which Japan can make a long term commitment by focusing on particular areas of development. It is clear that this does not conflict with any of the issues regarding restrictions resulting from the constitution and it focuses more non-controversial aspects of development.

⁸ A report on Japan and Cambodia by JICA office in Phnom Penh. 2004. P3-4.

In addition, through the key support of JICA, Japan has been running an aid scheme called the “grass-roots projects (Kusanone)”⁹ in Cambodia since 1991. The Kusanone project was established in 1989 and is known as the GGP (Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects). This provides flexible and timely support to small-scale development projects, which aim to improve the social well-being of the people at the grassroots level. This project that was launched globally and for 2001 - 2004, JPY 3,022,340,000¹⁰ was given as aid to 428 cases around the world. Japan’s assistance to Cambodia through this project from 1991 - 2007 has been a total of US\$ 39,377,782¹¹. Most of these projects helped to fund the education and health sectors by building schools, hospitals and training centres, and to supply equipment for those facilities, assistance that continues to this day.

Japan has been involved in many initiatives in Cambodia and in the year 2003, Cambodia was one of the top ten largest recipient countries of Japan’s ODA. Figure 5.1 shows that Cambodia received 2.7% (JPY 3,755,236,000) of the ODA budget in the year 2003, ranking 6th overall. This is indicative of the way that support for Cambodia has been continuous.

**10 Largest Recipient Countries in FY 2003
(Technical Cooperation by JICA)**

No.	Country	Budget thousand/JPY	(in	Portion (%)
1	Indonesia	9,101,046		6.4
2	Philippines	6,717,791		4.7
3	China	6,179,713		4.4
4	Vietnam	5,577,065		3.9
5	Thailand	4,296,291		3.0
6	Cambodia	3,755,236		2.7

⁹ As a part of the ODA, the Japanese government offers a programme to support NGOs and community based organizations (CBOs) working specifically in social development.

¹⁰ Source: Kaikeikensain 2005. ODA ni kansuru kaikeikensano kekka

¹¹ Source: Japan’s assistance for Cambodia. Amount of Grant Assistance for Grass-Roots/Human Security Projects

7	Laos	2,982,858	2.1
8	Kenya	2,831,458	2.0
9	Malaysia	2,730,904	1.9
10	Afghanistan	2,644,794	1.9

Table 5. 1¹²

The contribution to East Timor took a somewhat different form than that of Cambodia. There was no bilateral relationship through which aid could be made and many of the contributions were made through UN family organizations such as UNICEF and UNDP.

On 16 December 1999, the Japanese government announced US\$100 million in financial assistance to East Timor for the cost of rehabilitation and economic development over the next three years¹³. The category of assistance for the rehabilitation and development of East Timor was built into Japan's supplementary budget for the year 2000. This included US\$9 million for the UNTAET Trust Fund for providing basic administrative services and US\$3 million for rehabilitation requirements¹⁴. Japan also contributed US\$100 million to the UN Trust Fund to facilitate participation by developing countries to INTERFET, and another US\$30 million for the purpose of humanitarian assistance. As for the deployment of UNTAET, Japan's total amount of contribution was US\$52 million. On 14 July 2000, the Japanese government announced the details of its emergency aid to East Timor for the year 2000. The total amount was \$28,710,000 to the UNDP and UNICEF to assist nation building.

The assistance focused on seven particular projects of UNDP and UNICEF:

¹² Source: Japan's ODA White Book 2003.

¹³ An announcement was made on 16 December 1999 by MOFA. Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/annouce/annouce/1999/1216.htm>

¹⁴ Issues relating to Japan's contribution of assistance to East Timor by MOFA on 17 December 1999.

- ① Rehabilitation and Improvement of the Dili water supply system:
\$11,280,000 (UNDP)
- ② Urgent rehabilitation of the Dili-Ainaro Road: \$4,700,000 (UNDP)
- ③ Urgent Rehabilitation and Restoration of Navigation Aids and
Fender System at the Port of Dili: \$2,650,000 (UNDP)
- ④ Rehabilitation and Maintenance of the Output Capacity of Komoro
Power Station: \$3,100,000 (UNDP)
- ⑤ Urgent Rehabilitation of Small Power Stations in Rural Areas:
\$2,390,000 (UNDP)
- ⑥ Emergency Irrigation Rehabilitation: \$3,360,000 (UNDP)
- ⑦ Rehabilitation of School Building in East Timor: \$1,230,000
(UNICEF)¹⁵

Japan's support for nation-building and rehabilitation was focused on improving the living conditions of the people in East Timor and building the foundation of a future independent nation. Therefore, assistance concentrated mainly on re-building the infrastructure, which included improvement of roads, water supply systems, and power supply systems, and building educational facilities as well as improving or re-building school buildings. In addition, because most of the projects were related to construction work, it contributed to job opportunities for the local population. The unemployment rate was extremely high in East Timor – in Dili, the estimate was more than 80 % of the population – so the provision of job opportunities was essential in establishing a stable community. In 2001, Japan

¹⁵ An announcement by MOFA on Emergency Aid to East Timor for Rehabilitation and Development. 14 July 2000.

extended US\$19,270,000 in assistance to the UNDP which also focused on civilian lives. In the second year of the project, Japan concentrated on educating the younger generation for the future of East Timor. There were shortages of professionals, such as teachers, and properly equipped and trained professionals were required to further accelerate the process of the restoration and development of the country. Thus, the following two areas were added to the list of projects in the year 2001:

- ① Establishment of the Timor Loro Sae Scholarship, funded by the government of Japan for East Timor students: \$707,000
- ② Urgent Rehabilitation of Faculty of Engineering East Timor National University: \$4, 670,000¹⁶

What Japanese government and MOFA learned from its experiences in the 1990s was how to maximise its strength in development support by financing rehabilitation projects. Since it was the biggest ODA contributor in the 1990s, Japan's long time experiences in development support are definitely valuable in the phase of peacebuilding. In East Timor, Japan made most of the donations through UN organisations such as UNDP and UNICEF and also UN Trust Funds. It was due to the unique situation in the case of East Timor, where there was no government to represent the territory except UNTAET, that the Japanese government took alternative measures, rather than bilateral grant aid, to make its contribution. Japan's support for the development of East Timor focused on the

¹⁶ MOFA Press Conference on Emergency Aid to East Timor for Rehabilitation and Development on 18 December 2001. Source: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/12/1219.html>

following three areas: improving the infrastructure system, human resources development, and local community development¹⁷.

Estimated Donor Contributions to East Timor October 1999 – May 2002

No	Donor	UNTAET Trust Fund/CFET	TFET	Humanitarian Assistance	Development Assistance	Total 99-02	Budgetary Support 02-05	Project Support 02-05	Total 02-05	Grand Total	Ratio
1	Japan	9.31	27.90	34.26	75.00	146.47	0.00	60.00	60.00	206.47	21%
2	Portugal	6.00	50.00	10.30	51.10	117.40	9.00	60.00	69.00	186.40	19%
3	Australia	9.00	12.43	34.17	43.20	98.80	13.20	29.00	42.20	141.00	14%
4	EC	9.07	41.79	41.85	2.90	95.61	6.00	27.00	33.00	128.61	13%
5	USA	8.50	0.50	36.20	50.00	95.20	12.00	19.00	31.00	126.20	13%
6	UK	5.09	10.16	9.50	3.45	28.20	18.00	0.00	18.00	46.20	5%
7	Norway	3.04	2.40	9.07	1.44	15.95	9.00	9.00	18.00	33.95	3%
8	Sweden	5.97		5.00	0.09	11.06	0.00	12.00	12.00	23.06	2%
9	Canada	0.37		0.90	11.84	13.11	0.00	9.00	9.00	22.11	2%
10	World Bank		10.40			10.40	5.00	0.00	5.00	15.40	2%

Notes:

Development assistance includes funds committed by donors in 2000, 2001 and 2002 according to their respective financial years
Portugal disbursed US\$30 million by May 2002 and provided promissory notes of US\$20 million in accordance with its pledge of US\$50 million
According to the World Bank, another US\$43 million (including Technical Assistance) was unofficially pledged in addition to the US\$320 million.
Hence, the total pledge amounts to US\$360 million

Table 5. 2¹⁸

Figure 5.2 shows the Estimated Donor Contributions to East Timor between October 1999 and May 2002. The top three donor states put weight in different areas of development through different channels. Since Portugal was an ex-suzerain state, it was one of the active western countries in the East Timor peace process. Its main area of contribution was in education with almost 50 % of the financial support being focused on areas related to education. The Portuguese government announced a US\$900 million financial aid for the next three years and also US\$ 6,billion for development assistance in May 2002. On the other hand, the third biggest contributor, Australia, took a different role in its support for East Timor. Its aid primarily concentrated on personnel training and the construction of structures for the administrative system in East Timor through SAPET (Staff Assistance Programme in East Timor), and CAPET (Capacity

¹⁷ JICA report 2002. P56

¹⁸ A report on East Timor's reconstruction and rehabilitation. JICA May 2002. P44

Assistance Programme in East Timor). Not only did the Australian government make financial contributions, but it also sent professional advisers to support the following areas: training public officials, election support, and judicial and taxation etc. The Australian government also announced the continuous financial support for East Timor of US\$8.billion for five years from the year 2000¹⁹. This shows the interests of different countries in various areas of the peace operations. The location and relationship with East Timor definitely played a role in the way each country contributed. Nevertheless, whereas other countries tend to focus on particular areas of contribution, comparatively Japan supports a much wider field in multiple areas.

Even after the UN operations withdrew from both Cambodia and East Timor, Japan has continued its financial support to both countries for rehabilitation and development. Since Japan is the only super economic power in the East Asian region, most of the countries in the region accept Japan's ODA or bilateral grant aid. For the Japanese government, these development support initiatives have two different elements – diplomatic and financial. In terms of financial contributions, Japan's purpose was to improve civilian lives and help to build a stable independent society. Therefore, Japan's support is in both hard (building schools, hospitals, and port etc.) and soft (personnel training, support organizing administrative structures in local government, support local businesses) infrastructure²⁰. On the other hand, Japan sees development support as its way of “diplomacy” since Japan has been reinforcing its bilateral relationships with some of the developing countries through its support. Active support for the developing

¹⁹ Australian Aid programme. Aid activities in East Timor. Source: <http://www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm?CountryID=911&Region=EastAsia>

²⁰ Watanabe, T. and Miura, Y. (2003) ODA Nihonni nanigadekiruka. Cyukoushinsyo. P154

countries in the region can strengthen Japan's economic relationships, and build pro-Japanese feelings. This is something Japan needs in order to improve confidence in East Asia. In addition, the Japanese government reviews its development support every year with JICA, JBIC (Japan Bank for International Cooperation), and MOFA to analyse the effectiveness of its contributions for future operations.

However, there have been cynical views on Japan's financial support in the peacebuilding phase. There are questions about the validity of some of the projects that are not in urgent need and how some of the initiatives are about Japan "showing their face" on the ground²¹. Japan is particularly keen on local/international recognition and projects like this, no doubt, contribute to Japan's objectives. Nonetheless, much of the focus of Japan has been on the improvements in the quality of the daily lives of the local people.

Many of the abovementioned financial contributions in peacebuilding concentrated on human security, and this is perhaps the most distinctive contributions of all. Specific projects for the local community/individuals are where significant amounts of financial support are being directed. The amount being contributed is enormous and it is something that has an immediate impact on civilian lives. This was certainly the intent of Japan in building its reputation as a visible contributor to the operations. Japan fully understands the importance and effect of full and consistent support; it was one of the biggest recipients of low interest loans from the World Bank after its defeat in World War II. Furthermore,

²¹ In some cases, big projects (roads, bridges, hospitals, and schools are the typical cases) are named after the country providing financial assistance.

it would not have been able to make the rapid economic development it did without the Government Appropriation for Relief in Occupied Area Fund (GARIOA) from the US²². This is why Japan is highly experienced in this area of targeted financial support and values long term committed support for sustainable development. This also helps us to understand why East Asian countries such as Cambodia and East Timor requested Japanese support: it could be seen as a country that had already been able to achieve the outcome desired.

Hosting international conferences: a leading country in the peacebuilding phase

The Japanese government was the host country for international conferences on the rehabilitation of both Cambodia and East Timor. The conferences allowed the warring parties the rare opportunity to open and hold talks in a neutral environment. Much progress was made in the peace talks and in addition, this initiative gradually caught the attention of the international community, particularly regarding the situation in East Timor. Not only did this accelerate the process of international support, but also gave Japan the recognition of taking an active role in peace keeping initiatives. By holding international conferences, Japan was able to achieve one of the aims of showing its strong political influences and its passion for both peace processes²³.

For the operation in Cambodia, Japan hosted the Ministerial conference on the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia in March 1992, and was able to successfully gather US\$8,000 million. In addition, Japan and related countries established the ICORC (International Committee on the Reconstruction of

²² Chronological History of the GARIOA programme in Japan.

²³ Interview with Mr. Furuta.

Cambodia) in which Japan took a leading role as a chair country. ICORC meetings were held three times (September 1993, March 1994, March 1995). This was later renamed the Consultative Group Meeting for Cambodia (CG)²⁴ in 1996 and successfully held its 8th meeting in 2006²⁵. Japan served as a chair country three times for the CG meetings. As for East Timor, the Japanese government held its first Donor Meeting for East Timor in Tokyo in December 1999. By holding a donor meeting, the Japanese government officially announced its support for the independence of East Timor. Although interest on the issue of East Timor had been very limited, and almost ignored by the international society, this meeting was able to effectively catch the attention of rest of the world²⁶.

These types of international conferences were extremely important for the progress they were able to make. They are rare opportunities for related countries and organizations, particularly those coming from different factions, to discuss the progress of the peace process. During the deployment of peace operations, occasions like this are quite limited. Thus, in many cases, conferences such as these become the only chance for negotiation or discussion. In the case of Cambodia, even the Khmer Rouge, who had been rejecting any kind of negotiations, showed up at the Tokyo conference, and at least sat on the negotiation table²⁷. Japan provided the Tokyo conference and all other meetings related to the issue as “frank talk” opportunities for the four Cambodian parties and international organizations. Not only was this an opportunity to publically

²⁴ Co-chaired by the Royal Government of Cambodia and the World Bank, the CG is a group of donors who meet annually with the Government to discuss issues of development, growth and poverty reduction, and reform.

²⁵ World bank Report on the Eight Meeting of the Consultative Group meeting for Cambodia 2006. Source: World Bank Home Page.

²⁶ Interview with Mr. Matsuura.

²⁷ Miyoshi, N. (1994) Kanbojia PKO. Akishobo. P84

discuss various issues but also provided the platform for many of the talks that were conducted behind closed doors. Many off-the-record discussions occurred during this time which would not have been possible otherwise²⁸. On occasions, this resulted in substantial progresses being made on the peace talks. As for East Timor, the Tokyo conference was the very first opportunity for related countries to gather and discuss the future independence of East Timor. Because of the lack of interest by rest of the world²⁹ until the independence movement in 1999, the opportunity of the Tokyo conference was the first time in which significant financial support was gathered. It was also the time when the world tuned into East Timor amid the various global crises that were present at the time.

Japan's initiative of hosting a platform for discussions has played a significant role. Many of these forums continue to this day and this is indicative of Japan's constant support for neighbouring countries. From a political point of view, the fact that the conference is held in Japan and is referred to as the "Tokyo" conference is significant for Japan in gaining recognition for the role it plays as facilitator³⁰. Regardless, as the only regional country in East Asia that can facilitate financial and diplomatic support, Japan has certainly been able to attract much attention to the region as well as add value to its status by expanding its role as an ever more active player in supporting the initiatives of peace operations. This is only possible because of the economic power and political influence Japan has both globally and in the East Asian region. This is yet another role that Japan will continue to play in the future.

²⁸ Comments made by Amb. Owada, Sato and Kitaoka (successive UN ambassadors) on numerous occasions

²⁹ Many MOFA officials and UN Secretariats admitted that the issue of East Timor was not getting enough attention from any of the western countries or even from the international organizations until the 1990s. Source: from several interviews the author conducted.

³⁰ Interview with Mr Matsuura and Mr Furuta

Diplomatic initiative: Japan's role in peace process

The kind of role Japan can play during the peace process under the United Nations authority has become much clearer from its experiences since the end of the Cold War. As discussed in previous chapters, Japan is well aware of its advantages and disadvantage in this area. Japan's diplomatic influence it has had in the East Asian region stems from Japan's unique position. It is the only country with a pacifist constitution; it experienced complete destruction from World War II and managed full recovery to become the second most powerful economy in the world; it has had a policy of active *non*-involvement in any conflicts in the region since the US occupation; and it has had strong bilateral relations with many of the world's leading countries.

Japan's involvement in development support in the East Asian region started as early as 1954. Japan's wartime atrocities were in need of repair and Japan took the initiative of reconstructing friendly relationships with the Asian countries, and it offered compensation for wartime damages. For more than 50 years, Japan's ODA has supported as part of its diplomatic policy the self-help efforts of developing countries, especially in East Asia. In Cambodia and East Timor, Japan's long time experiences in development support in the region was based on Japan's mid to long term support policy in both countries.

When the issue was raised about how Japan was willing to provide for the future operations, which did not require military involvement or judicial amendment, in the East Asian region following the crisis in Cambodia, taking diplomatic initiatives behind the scene became a point for discussion. Mr. Hiroshi Matsuura,

former Japanese Representative in East Timor during the transitional period of October 2000 - April 2002 said there were four areas the Japanese government focused on in relation to diplomatic efforts:

- ① Establish cooperative relationship with UNTAET to support East Timor's independence
- ② Build a relationship with the newly independent government of Timor-Leste
- ③ Make diplomatic efforts at UN headquarters to focus more attention on the issues in East Timor
- ④ Become a mediator between Indonesia and East Timor to rebuild their relationship³¹

Much of the role that Japan was willing to play related to behind the scenes work linked to major breakthroughs. This was a long, hard process of talks and negotiations in which progress was made at an incremental rate. Japan's persistence in diplomatic relations certainly made, over the years, an impact in the cases of Cambodia and East Timor. These kinds of roles are consistent with the type of role Japan can play as a Middle Power country as opposed to a Super Power. Japan, with its background, was in the perfect position to take on this kind of role.

Japan particularly used its diplomatic skills on the relationship between Indonesia and East Timor at the beginning of the process for independence. When the Santa Cruz massacre occurred, Ambassador Kawakami of the Japanese Embassy to

³¹ Source: A series of interview with Mr. Matsuura in NYC and Tokyo.

Indonesia (1997-2001) had direct talks with President Suharto on the issue of East Timor to accept the popular consultation by the United Nations. Kawakami made a landmark achievement as the first diplomat ever to successfully negotiate the resignation of President Suharto to facilitate an easier transition to independence. Amb. Kawakami also established a personal relationship with the new President Habibie and the Minister of Defence for Indonesia. They were the two key persons for the independence of East Timor and the establishment of this relationship was vital for the influence that the Japanese government was to have on the two countries³².

One of the distinctive skills of Japanese diplomats is their ability to develop personal relationships with top politicians in host countries. Amb. Kawakami's personal connection with President Suharto and Habibie was based upon the strong relationship between Indonesia and Japan. However, the confidence from both Presidents was gained through friendship and trust³³. Amb. Kawakami was not the only diplomat who was able to form this kind of relationship. In Cambodia, Ambassadors Imai and Ikeda both established personal relationships with Prince Shianouk, Prince Ranariddh, Hun Sen, and even with Khieu Samphan – the four key persons in the peace process. The success of diplomatic efforts certainly assisted the progress of peace talks. In particular, Akashi Yasushi refers to the success as follows: Japan as a country has no complicated relationships in either conflict, the key persons have nothing but trust for Japanese diplomats who are willing to support a road for peace and independence³⁴.

³² Interview with Mr. Matsuura and Mr. Shimizu who both worked under Amb. Kawakami in Indonesia was First Secretary during the transition period in Indonesia.

³³ Comment from Mr Shimizu

³⁴ Akashi's comment at the International Symposium on the role of Japan in the 21st century IN: what are the world's expectations? Held on 10 June 2001. Tokyo, Japan.

One of Japan's advantages in diplomatic initiative in both cases, but especially in Cambodia, is its pacifist law. Because of Article 9 of its constitution, the leaders of host countries saw Japan as the best country for a negotiating and mediating role between the disputing parties, related countries, and the organizations. Japan did not involve itself in the Cambodian conflicts since most of the neighbouring countries and major powers of the UN were taking sides with at least one of the battling parties. Thus, when the peace process came to a deadlock, Japan was able to play the role of negotiator smoothly as a neutral party. All of the parties, even the PDK, accepted talks with Japanese diplomats, and agreed to take a seat in the discussions. In the case of East Timor, Japan was seen as taking the side of Indonesia because of their tight economic and political relationship. However, Japan's continued neutrality since the end of World War II was well known by leaders of East Timor and so did not affect the talks with East Timor.

Although Article 9 of the constitution had been seen as a restriction on Japanese participation to UN peace operations, the pacifist nature of Japan worked to gain the trust of the Cambodian leaders during the Cambodian peace process. This was the first time the constitution was seen as an advantage in the area of diplomacy.

One of the factors which aided this success was Japan's neutrality in the East Asian region since the end of the World War II. For the UNTAC deployment, Japan did not have any connections with any one of the parties in the conflict

before the Paris Agreement: all four parties saw Japan as the only neutral country in the peace process³⁵.

Another factor which contributed to Japan's diplomatic success was its reputation as a reliable financial contributor and development supporter. This was something with which most Asian countries had continued long term experience. In the case of East Timor, since Japan is the biggest development support country with its ODA support and bilateral loans and grants³⁶, it already had a strong relationship with the Indonesian government. Japan had never shown interest in taking part in the movement for independence by East Timor in 1999, however, according to MOFA diplomats, Japan's changing policy on East Timor made a strong impact on the Indonesian government and President Suharto³⁷. Japan had a significant effect on Indonesia to accept the public referendum.

Much of Japan's contribution to UN peace operations, particularly in the East Asian region, is a direct continuation of its development support and diplomatic effort to build a stable Asian region from past decades³⁸. As Mr. Kiya mentioned in his speech, the Japanese themselves experienced the hard process of rehabilitation and reconstruction from the painful defeat of World War II. Compared to other Western countries, the Japanese people know the importance of peace, and building new democratic society³⁹. Therefore, Japan's development

³⁵ According to Amb. Ikeda, Vietnam, the PRC, Thailand, US, USSR, France, and Indonesia were the seven countries militarily involved in the Cambodian conflicts. Especially the first five countries had seriously committed themselves to one of the fighting parties. Ikeda. P211

³⁶ Bilateral Financial contributions from Japan to Indonesia during FY1996-2005 are as follows: Loans: US\$16.3 billion, Grants: US\$1.7 billion, Technical cooperation: US\$28.8 billion. Source: Japan-Indonesia relationship. MOFA Japan's ODA White paper.2006.

³⁷ Source: A Series of Interviews with MOFA diplomats who were stationed in Indonesia during the transitional period of East Timor (1999-2004).

³⁸ Source: Interview with Ms. Yuge (former Head of UNDP Office in Tokyo).

³⁹ Mr. Masahiko Kiya's speech on Peacebuilding and Global Governance. UNU Global Seminar

support is comprehensive and wide-ranging including construction work, medical and educational support, administrative support, judicial support, community building in local villages, etc., which was a result of their own experiences. It also had the flexibility to exercise alternative ideas and adapt to different situations on the ground.

As mentioned in previous chapters, Japan's diplomatic ability to open discussions and negotiations with key countries has been indispensable in the case of Cambodia and East Timor⁴⁰. Japan's diplomatic role in smoothing the peace process during the UN operations was vital to its success. It is rather unfortunate that Japan does not receive the international and domestic recognition that is fitting its diplomatic efforts. Although one of Japan's primary objectives has been to seek recognition, many of the efforts occur behind the scenes and behind closed doors where only the outcome is measurable while the intense process and quality of negotiation skills takes a back seat. MOFA officials believe that its long-term process of nurturing a relationship of trust is what results from its diplomatic success where other parties have been unsuccessful⁴¹. It is the slow and incremental steps that are taken that achieve further success. This is exactly what Japan has accomplished in the cases of Cambodia and East Timor, yet, this is a process that is never truly recognized internationally. It is certainly ironic in that it is a strength that cannot be fully measured in a way that would achieve a level of recognition. Perhaps this is the dilemma that faces a Middle Power country.

2006 in Kobe. 6 September 2006.

⁴⁰ Interview with Matsuura.

⁴¹ Consistent comments from all interviews by MOFA personnel

From a cultural perspective in the East Asian region, there are certain “Asian values” involved in handling crises: the importance of harmony; being reserved and modest; and most importantly respecting the opponent⁴²; are some but to name a few. One of the issues regarding UN peace operations are the difficulties in integrating western values into the local culture, and yet at the same time respecting local culture and tradition. In Cambodia and East Timor, Japan took great care in its diplomatic efforts that were based on Asian tradition and culture. Ambassadors. Ikeda and Imai, for example, paid respect to Prince Sihanouk by visiting him regularly wherever he was staying, whether in Beijing, Phnom Penh, or Bangkok, during the Cambodian peace process. It is well known that many developed countries, especially ex-colony states, have an apprehensive attitude towards Western culture and the white race. Respect and understanding for the local culture and tradition most certainly played an integral role in Japan’s diplomatic efforts. This is another aspect that is very difficult to qualify and quantify, however, is regarded as an integral part of the diplomatic process.

There were many factors that contributed to the diplomatic success of Japan as an effective negotiator/mediator in the cases of Cambodia and East Timor. The consistent developmental support for the region added to the successful self-reconstruction of Japan as well as its flexibility in meeting new challenges has certainly earned the respect of the region and has certainly played a significant role in its diplomatic efforts. The neutral status of Japan and its pacifist constitution as well as its unwavering efforts to continue talks, while respecting the cultural norms, has earned the trust of key persons. While Japan maintains its success in diplomacy, it still continues to seek more recognition from the

⁴² Mr. Matsuura and most of the MOFA diplomats strongly indicated Japan’s diplomatic principles.

international community. Nevertheless, the diplomatic support that Japan has provided in Cambodia and East Timor is one of the keys to the success of the UN peace operations. Japan is one of the members of the G8, and its bilateral relationship with other western powers (the US, UK, France, and Russia) is firmer than with all other East Asian nations. Since the PRC as a member of the P5 is not in a position to play a leading role, a country like Japan is expecting to play a more active and visible role as a regional power in future peace operations. Japan has much to offer in diplomatic terms when coming to represent the interests of the region as well as representing external interests to the region. It can act as a diplomatic portal to peace within Asia.

Personnel contribution to UN operations

Japan received much disapproval for what appeared to be its lack of effort in contributing personnel to UN peace operations. There was a lack of sympathy for Japan's internally controversial status regarding its constitution. Its passive approach to international crises was dismissed and was criticized as "chequebook diplomacy"; this was a shock for the Japanese government which had made substantial contributions in many other areas of developmental support. However, the creation of a new law followed by further amendments has allowed Japan to contribute personnel even with some restrictions.

An interesting point to make is the difference in perception in how different countries regard troop contributions. One of the SDF personnel serving in East Timor commented that "sending troops is a very big deal for both the government and public of Japan. However, for other participating countries, it is part of their

duties and nothing special which was a big shock for me”⁴³. There is a big gap between Japan and the other UN member states, especially with those who send their troops to peace operations, in the way troop contributions to UN peace operations are regarded. The existence of a military in many countries is commonplace and the contribution of troops is an extension of their duties. However, for Japan, the existence of a military itself is under question let alone sending troops abroad. This is only one aspect of Japan’s inability to respond rapidly, or respond at all, to requests for troop contribution.

The biggest issue of personnel contribution was the restrictions that were placed in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. There was much initial debate regarding the dispatch of troops to Cambodia which led to the establishment of the PKO Law in 1992. There were more debates at the time of East Timor where amendments to the PKO Law were necessary to satisfy conditions for the dispatch. Japan decided to dispatch personnel to UN operations and other humanitarian relief operations, pending approval, yet there were always discussions of whether the dispatch of SDF units was unconstitutional or not, and whether the five principles of the PKO law were being fulfilled. In principle, Japan only sends SDF unit to engineer groups of the operation, and not to the military component⁴⁴, since SDF is not a military force. Japan’s personnel dispatch was mainly from its SDF unit which engaged in reconstruction work of the operations. Nonetheless, Japan has dispatched more than 5,000 personnel to UN peace related missions

⁴³ Interview with SDF personnel who served in the 6th Unit at UNMISSET.

⁴⁴ In the UNTAC operation, 16 Japanese personnel worked in military observer units (Sep 1992-Sep 1993).

since 1992⁴⁵ including 1,332 persons to UNTAC and 3,110 persons⁴⁶ to the operations in East Timor.

As a country, Japan strongly values its Constitution. There is a widespread belief, particularly in the older generation, that faith in the constitution is what helped develop the country to its current status from its destruction in World War II. However, many polls have shown that the public is becoming less resistant to the idea of sending troops abroad, that there has been the gradual acceptance of a responsibility to be fulfilled in this area. The public view of troop contributions has run parallel with government debates and the establishment of the PKO law was a milestone achievement for the Japanese government. Since then, Japan has contributed SDF unit to several UN missions, and the understanding of Japan's complicated judicial system and restriction on the SDF by the five principles of the PKO Law are now well known to other participating countries to UN missions⁴⁷.

Despite some difficulties, the disciplined and well-organised behaviour of the SDF units impressed not only the local people but other participants and UN commanders.

Considering the serious misbehaviour⁴⁸ caused by peacekeepers from some other participants during peace operations, Japan's SDF units are regarded as model

⁴⁵ Record of Japan's international peace cooperation activities based on the International Peace Cooperation Law. (as of March 2005) Source: MOFA web-site.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/UN/pko/pamph2005-2.pdf>

⁴⁶ The numbers included personnel contributions to UNAMET, UNTAET, and UNMISSET operations. Personnel to International humanitarian relief operations by UNHCR (Nov 1999-Feb 2000) are also included.

⁴⁷ Seki, H. Ochiai, S. Sugino, Y. (2004) PKO no Shinjitu. Keizaikai. P98

⁴⁸ See Chapter 3 for a details.

cases in various locations. The misbehaviour of peacekeepers can easily jeopardise the reputation and the future of an entire mission, and unfortunately Cambodia is a good example of this⁴⁹. Moreover, Japan's SDF is one of the best trained and militarily equipped in the world, even though they do not engage in any military action. One of the SDF personnel deployed in East Timor (UNMISSET) said that most of SDF personnel were willing to participate in UN missions, and were proud to make use of their ability and technique for the people of East Timor⁵⁰. Due to the unusual situation surrounding the SDF existence in Japan, the SDF play an active part only in the domestic restoration of devastated areas, and spend most of their time on practicing and training. Therefore, the SDF's participation in UN missions and other humanitarian relief operations abroad was the first time for most SDF personnel to practice what they had been training to do – rescue people in situations of disaster. The SDF's work has always had a good reputation, especially with their flawless jobs and hard work, and has received the admiration of local communities and leading organizations.

One of the major issues with the dispatch of SDF personnel was the gap between the reality on the ground and the idealistic restrictions. The personal safety of SDF personnel always took a back seat given the initial PKO Law. This led to the amendment of the PKO Law which took into consideration the safety of Japanese personnel on the ground. The freeze was lifted in December 2001 as a result of a revision of the PKO legislation that relaxed the rules for weapons use by SDF personnel. Japan's view on the safety of its own personnel was salvation by faith:

⁴⁹ Utley, E.R. (2006) *Major Powers and Peacekeeping: perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention*. Ashgate Publishing Ltd. P131

⁵⁰ Interview with several SDF personnel from the Fourth Engineer group (405 personnel) engaged in UNMISSET operations from October 2003-June 2004. Their main tasks were: maintain and repair roads and bridges necessary for peacekeeping activities, and maintain reservoirs used by units of other national and local rehabilitants in Dili and surrounding locations.

in a report on Japan's perspective on UN peace operation in January 1997, the Japanese government stated as followed:

the responsibility for the safety of the dispatched personnel rests mainly with host countries and the United Nations. However, in case where neither the host countries nor the UN can take effective measures, troop-contributing countries should be authorised to take appropriate measures to ensure the safety of their personnel.....⁵¹

Several SDF personnel, engaged in Cambodia and East Timor, as well as other locations such the Golan Heights, and Mozambique, expressed their "fear" of threat to life because of the restriction on the use of force⁵². Since most of the discussion on SDF participation concentrated on its justification, the issue of the reality and practicality on the ground were always put aside. However, there is still a need for the Japanese government to consider self-defence measures and emergency countermeasures for life-threatening situations.

Japan's SDF dispatch to UN operations has been favourably received both domestically and internationally. In a Foreign Ministry poll conducted in 2002 in six Southeast Asian nations, "maintenance of peace" topped the list of contributions expected of Japan, followed by "economic and technical cooperation" and "promotion of trade and private investment"⁵³. At the same time, in a poll taken by the Cabinet office 76% of the respondents said cooperation in

⁵¹ Current issues surrounding UN peace-keeping operations and Japanese perspective. MOFA January 1997, Safety of personnel.

⁵² Seki. P159

⁵³ The Japan Times, 15 February 2005.

UN peace operations should be provided at current levels or in more active ways. Both results show promising support around Japan's personnel contributions, which it did not have at the beginning of the 1990s. As the environment around Japan's personnel contribution begins to settle, the United Nations Secretariats can count on Japan in personnel contributions for non-military related roles with the engineer unit being the most suitable role).

The experience in Cambodia and East Timor as well as international expectations have aided the formulation of the current PKO Law and the definition of what Japan is and is not allowed to do in regards to troop contribution. Despite the many visible restrictions, it is with these restrictions that Japan was able to define its role in a unique way. There is still much work to be done regarding legislation, however the public and government have supported many of the changes as Japan continues to make contributions. Much of the foundation has been laid for further changes to be made but more importantly, Japan can be relied upon to make valuable contributions with its experience and expertise.

The significance of regional support

The perception of Japan in the eyes of the East Asian region changed dramatically during the 1990s. It has gained the support and trust of the region through the contributions it has made to the operations in Cambodia and East Timor as well as many of the other countries. Speculation of Japanese military advancement that was once an obstacle for Japan to contribute troops is no longer an issue. Gaining regional support for Japan's active participation (by sending SDF personnel) has been vital for Japan in achieving international recognition as an active player in

the area of peace operations. The following summarizes the processes in which regional support was gradually attained.

Since World War II, Japan was a country which had remained uninvolved in East Asian politics, security, or economic relationships. It had only been interested in active aid programmes, and official pronouncements. This was the result of Japan's US-focused relationship that was the foundation of Japanese foreign policy. The importance and endurance of this bilateral relationship was supported by the US - Japan Security Treaty and economic links⁵⁴.

However, there was a shift in policy with the newly appointed Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda; he came to office with Japan's new Southeast Asian policy known as the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. This is the doctrine that has formed the axis of the Japan-ASEAN relationships to this day with its special emphasis on ASEAN⁵⁵. Japan's diplomatic efforts to consolidate its relationship with ASEAN continued and were able to make significant headway after the end of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, the first official attempt was made by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu (1989-1991) when he visited the ASEAN countries in 1991 and made a policy speech in Singapore. Kaifu underscored the importance of the Japan-ASEAN partnership. He stressed the important political role that Japan could play in the region, and stated that Japan was ready to host an international conference on the reconstruction of Cambodia when peace was

⁵⁴ Maswood, S.J. (2001) Japan and East Asian Regionalism. London, Routledge. P6

⁵⁵ Prime Minister Fukuda set out his vision for Japan's relationship with ASEAN. The three principles he put forward: that Japan would never become a military power, that Japan would build up a "heart to heart" relationship of mutual confidence and trust with Southeast Asian countries, and that Japan would cooperate positively with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts, as a partner " - would become known as the Fukuda Doctrine.

restored to the war-torn country⁵⁶. The promulgation of the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977 served as a catalyst in strengthening Japan-ASEAN relations.

The appointment of Yasushi Akashi as the SRSG of UNTAC was extremely important for the development of Japanese involvement in Cambodia. Japan had already been contributing as a key financier, apart from contributing personnel which included SDF units, but the appointment of Akashi was an indication by the UN to ensure continued Japanese support for the mission in Cambodia, and future UN missions in the East Asian region. The UN request for Japanese involvement was what Japan was seeking given the stigma attached to Japanese involvement in the region. In addition, in April 1990, the Japanese government decided to hold an international meeting to resolve the Cambodian conflict by inviting concerned parties to Tokyo⁵⁷. This meeting was Japan's first effort at "peacemaking diplomacy" since the end of World War II. Since then, Japan has embarked on a more active political role in Southeast Asia.

One of the main problems that Japan had been carrying was how it was perceived in the East Asian region. Because Japanese foreign policy operated within the framework of the US-Japan alliance and the Western camp of capitalism and liberal democracy, some East Asian states, those such as the PRC, DPRK, and Republic of Korea who were always against Japan's active involvement in peacekeeping or any military activities, were unlikely to view Japan as a neutral state⁵⁸. In addition, the wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese in the region

⁵⁶ Source: US Congress HP. Japan –Asia-pacific countries. <http://countrystudies.us/japan/134.htm>

⁵⁷ Sudo,S. (2001). *The international relations of Japan and South East Asia: forging a new regionalism*. London, Routledge. P84

⁵⁸ Maswood. P130

resulted in a significant level of distrust by those in the region and they feared Japanese involvement, specifically any type of military involvement. Added to the Yoshida strategy, this was one of the primary reasons why Japan remained relatively uninvolved in East Asian political, security and economic relations⁵⁹.

The operations in Cambodia and East Timor gave Japan the opportunity to demonstrate what Japan was able to offer and cast aside any doubt on the intention of Japan in the region. Japan had also made continuing contributions to peace operations outside East Asia having made contributions to operations in Mozambique, Zaire, Golan Heights, and Afghanistan. Such involvement in East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East were probably unthinkable to both Japanese and its neighbours a decade ago. However, Japan has gradually been building on its reputation as a country with much to offer in the East Asian region and internationally.

Japan is potentially a highly significant security actor both within and beyond the East Asian region. The Japanese SDF is indeed amongst the largest and best equipped military with advanced technology and adequate logistical support, trailing only those of the US and PRC. SDF involvement had been regarded as a sensitive issue in the region but the regional response to Japan's active involvement in security issues, especially the visible presence in UN activities, has become much more moderate. Japan has been maintaining its pacifist position for the past 60 years and playing a leading political and economic role in the region. It has taken almost 15 years since the early 1990s for the East Asian

⁵⁹ Yamada, T. (2003) Kokurenniyoru funsou yobou to nihon no yakuwari. JIIA kenkyu 9. Morimoto, T. (ed) Asiataiheyio no takokukananzenhosyuu. JIIA. P173

region to re-consider the impact of a Japanese contribution of SDF personnel and this has been a major accomplishment for Japan.

The UN has provided Japan with the framework in which it could make contributions. The initiatives in Cambodia and East Timor are good examples of this, and Japan has been very careful and selective about how to make its mark in the area of security threats to various regions. It has also proceeded cautiously in developing its security contacts with East Asia. Japan was involved from the outset in the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), and while this forum has a rather doubtful potential as an active regional peace support agency, its value as a confidence building mechanism as a security extension of the ASEAN way may be very considerable⁶⁰. This is Japan's attempt to work outside of the structure of the UN and focus more on cooperation within the region.

Many of the issues regarding international and regional security have been discussed, however, there is still much progress to be made. The possibility for Japan to participate in UN security activities beyond peace operations in full capacity is not possible without the amendment or changing the interpretation of its constitutional law. In addition, there needs to be further consideration for contributions outside the framework of the UN. This is particularly important in making provisions for regional considerations such as in the ARF (as mentioned above). There is a need for Japan to reconsider the narrow interpretation of Article 9 and the right to collective security, which is protected by the UN Charter for a sovereign nation.

⁶⁰ McCoubrey. P176

Nonetheless, Japan has proved its ability to support rehabilitation and development in peacebuilding. This was a proposal in which Japan's commitment in this area was welcomed by both the UN and host countries. Japan no longer receives the criticism that it was accustomed to since the beginning of the 1990s because of the frequent presence in international crises as well as its positive reputation. Although Japan has experienced many difficulties, its continued persistence, with much caution and care, has resulted in a region where its contribution is highly regarded on many fronts. This process has certainly defined Japan's role in the region and also lays the foundation for many of the future opportunities that lie ahead.

Internal struggle for Japan: why its problematic?

Japan's participation in UN peace operations has always been problematic in many ways. The biggest difficulty is the militaristic past which has invited many regional concerns, resulting in the slow transition in the area of personnel contributions. Some Asian states are sceptical that the deployment of SDF personnel overseas will eventually lead to more troops being sent overseas and in turn, revive Japanese militarism. These kinds of misunderstandings have gradually diminished with the continued deployment of the SDF during the 1990's, however, the PRC and North Korea are still expressing their resistance towards Japan's active cooperation in UN peace operations. These negative responses from neighbouring countries have influenced the opinion of the Japanese public, and have sometimes influenced the decision-making processes in the Diet. They have also been used by the opposition parties, especially the Socialist Party and the Communist Party, to denounce the SDF dispatch to UN operations.

Through the 1990s, Japan dispatched personnel to several UN operations, and public knowledge about UN peace operations improved greatly. The Prime Minister's Office polls demonstrated a steady increase of public opinion in support of Japan's contributions to peace operations in the past decade. However, the Japanese media sent mixed messages of both the positive and negative aspects: for example, the Yomiuri-Newspaper, the largest newspaper in Japan, stated that "Japan should prepare to participate in the multinational force (PKF)"; and the Sankei Newspaper also addressed the necessity of the Japanese government to act flexibly in different situations such as sending SDF to rescue refugees and providing assistance for the multinational forces acceptable under current law. On the other hand, the Mainichi Newspaper expressed doubts about the hasty conclusion to lift the freeze on the dispatch of SDF personnel by stating "the government must present reasonable justification to be able to persuade the nation in order to send the SDF"⁶¹. These mixed messages demonstrated the difficulties and confusion in Japan to participate in UN operations, however the public polls prove that the Japanese public accept their responsibility as one of the leading countries to play an active role in the areas of peace and security.

With Japan's successful participation in UNTAC, the United Nations unofficially requested its participation in UNDOF in June 1994. However, the Japanese government declined the offer since it was already sending SDF troops to ONUMOZ. The Golan Heights had first been mentioned as a possible future dispatch for SDF personnel in May 1994 as the five conditions for Japanese

⁶¹ All the newspaper articles appeared in September 2001, before the International Peace Cooperation Law was amended.

participation were clearly met, and the Middle East would prove to be a new regional experience for Japanese peacekeepers⁶². Dispatch of an SDF unit armed with light machine guns despite the initial emphasis on pistols only started in February 1996.

Even after the successful participation in UNTAC, both the Japanese government and MOFA were sensitive about taking the next step to sending more SDF troops to UN operations⁶³. This was triggered by a Japanese UN volunteer worker and a CIVPOL officer being murdered during the UNTAC operation. This led to the Japanese public becoming sceptical about the active involvement in UN operations. The Japanese people was not used to the idea of their own personnel participating in UN missions in possible areas of combat, and the loss of Japanese lives made them realise the difficulties and serious responsibility they were about to take. When these events took place, the Japanese government quickly expressed its regret to the public as a measure of damage control, but also stressed its firm commitment to UN operations. Contrary to the concern of the government, public opinion polls demonstrated a positive change in people's attitudes to Japan's contribution to the UN peace operations. A Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK) poll carried out in May 1993 saw a total majority of 64.8% holding a positive view of participation in UN peace operations⁶⁴. This revealed that the Japanese public was not as sensitive as politicians or bureaucrats, and the opposition party could no longer argue SDF participation in UN operation as being "against public will".

⁶² Yomiuri Newspaper, 1 June 1994.

⁶³ Mr. Shimizu and Mr. Matsuura both expressed difficulties MOFA has experienced during the past decade to being involved in UN peace operations. Source: Interviews by Author.

⁶⁴ Yanai, S. Law concerning cooperation for UN peace operations and other operations-Japanese PKO experiences. *Japan Annual of International Law* 36. pp33-75

This kind of public opinion supported the government and MOFA in taking the next necessary steps for active engagement in UN operations. In his speech to the 126th regular Diet session, Foreign Minister Watanabe called for “greater flexibility” and “further participation in UN peacekeeping efforts world-wide⁶⁵. Further encouragement came from the United Nations when Boutros-Ghali encouraged more participation in UN peacekeeping within the framework of the Japanese Constitution during his visit to Tokyo in February 1993. Ogata Sadako, the high commissioner for UNHCR, also called on the Japanese government to dispatch SDF personnel even when the five principles of Japan’s participation were not fully met. Japan’s policy on UN peace operations became clearer after engaging in several UN peace operations and related humanitarian intervention.

By the end of the 1990s, the Japanese government was forced to face key issues to expand SDF’s role in peace operations: the revision and amendment of the Peace Cooperation Law and the possible use of force by SDF troops. The review of the PKO Law began in 1995, under the Peace Cooperation Department of the Prime Minister’s Office. Prime Minister Hashimoto, who believed that the use of force should be allowed, suggested that they should avoid conflict with the Constitution by either establishing a new body or by clearing up the Law⁶⁶. A debate on the use of force by the SDF had been on the table ever since Japanese lives were lost during the SDF participation in the operation in Cambodia. For a more secure and safe environment for future participation, an amendment proposal was made by IPCHQ in August 1996 which sought to revise the PKO Law to allow use of

⁶⁵ The Japan Times, 23 January 1993

⁶⁶ Asahi Newspaper, 6 September 1996.

weapons in line with UN standard practice. During the discussion, MOFA and MOD officials explained to MPs that SDF personnel were only allowed to use weapons by individual judgement, when required for personal self-defence. However, the “organised” use of weapons would still be intended only for the personal safety of individual member⁶⁷. Finally, in March 1999, the Cabinet agreed to revise the PKO Law to allow SDF commanders to order the use of weapons.

One of the problems in Japanese politics was that discussion of UN peace operations at the Diet sessions changes in to discussions about Article 9 and Japan’s pacifist position. Many MOD, SDF personnel and MOFA diplomats claimed that the slow process in Diet sessions does not reflect the urgent needs required in conflict zones. The Japanese government could not reply quickly enough in order to send personnel by the official deployment date of the operation. The reasons for the delays are due to discussions in the Diet that lose focus as well as the time constraints of Diet sessions. A regular session of Diet starts in January and concludes in June (normally 150 days), and mainly discusses the budget for the next fiscal year⁶⁸. For an unexpected issue like participation in a UN operation, there is not enough time to reach a conclusion. In addition, bills which did not pass during the regular session, and if no extra-ordinary session is approved to consider them, they will be tabled at the end of the year⁶⁹. Japan’s legislative organs have not changed for over 60 years, and it has not been able to adapt to

⁶⁷ Ku, C. and Jacobson, K.H. ed (2002) *Democratic Accountability and Use of Force in International Law*. Cambridge University Press. P231

⁶⁸ In a normal Diet session, approval of the budget for the next fiscal year continues until the middle of March, and all the other issues put on the table are started after the budget meeting.

⁶⁹ Hayes, D.L.(2005) *Introduction to Japanese Politics*. M.E. Shape. Inc. P51

international movement⁷⁰ and this has made it extremely difficult for Japan to make the necessary rapid changes.

However, the emergence of Prime Minister Koizumi contributed to significant institutional changes and led to a revision of the role of the prime minister at the beginning of the new century. Koizumi's capacity to provide leadership in foreign policy was a key strength. As mentioned in Chapter 4, he took a more assertive and proactive role in crisis management, formulated a strategic vision, and most of all, he responded rapidly to the demands for international security. During his term, Koizumi established a much stronger cabinet with executive leadership by the prime minister. This drastic change was possible due to the strong public support Koizumi had. The Japanese public welcomed the new changes to the political structure and this allowed Japan to become more active globally in this new century. Koizumi's popularity was cemented in the general elections in 2005 when the Liberal Democratic Party marked an historic landslide victory, with the party winning 296 seats, the largest share in post-war politics⁷¹.

Human Security: the new challenge by Japanese government in peacebuilding

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a lot of confusion about the role of the UN in peace operations. Although it initially began with simple observer missions with minimal use of force, UN peace operations have developed into an entity much more involved than it was originally intended. There was much emphasis and recognition on the contribution of troops to many of the complicated missions including those that involved UN missions playing the role

⁷⁰ Interview with Matsuura.

⁷¹ In addition, the turnout for the elections was 67.5%, the largest in the history of Japan

of government. With the increase in numbers of operations and the shortage of personnel, Japan was under severe pressure to make troop contributions.

During the 1990s, the UN and Western countries mainly concentrated their efforts on how to restore peace in conflict situations, and the urgent need for a peacebuilding phase after the conflict was not recognised until recently. These conflicts mostly occurred in poor countries involving small arms and light weapons between weak government forces and ill-trained rebels. Until the mid-1970s, most battle deaths were in East Asia and in the 1980s, in the Middle East, Central and Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. However, since the end of the Cold War, more conflicts have taken place in the African region than in the rest of the world. This was mostly caused by pervasive poverty, reduced aid, poor infrastructure, weak administration, external intervention, and spread of cheap weapons among the public⁷². Therefore, there has to be shift from national centralised development support to individual human development support. Threats to human security are varied – political and military, but also social, economic and environmental⁷³. The reformulation of national security into the concept of human security is simple, yet needs profound policy changes for development support. This is precisely where Japan can play a more active role.

In addition, not only the United Nations, but all the international agencies, regional organizations, and donor countries for development support should have utilised non-military intervention measures to the new security threats. What has changed the most during the 1990s is how to conclude conflicts. It is no longer

⁷² Thakur, R. From national security to human security. The Japan Times 13 October, 2005.

⁷³ Keynote Speech by Dr. Ogata at the Ministerial Meeting on Human Security Issues of the “Lysoen Process” Group of Governments, Bergen, Norway, 19 May 1999.

enough to deploy peace operations and prevent conflicts and monitor the development of a governing body. The missing link is the gap between the emergency bases of assistance, before and during the peace operations), and mid - long term development and rehabilitation support⁷⁴. Once the emergency support of UN operations is able to establish a “safe and stable society”, there has to be a continuous process of “rehabilitation, reconstruction and development” to build an independent country with an economy and industry.

Human Security can provide the strategic perspective of a link between humanitarian aid and peacebuilding. In recent years, lack of human security is recognised as a hotbed of armed conflicts. The ultimate goals for both peacebuilding and human security are the same: to establish a durable peace and the improvement of humanitarian needs. Most of the works related to the protection of human security is conducted by UN family organizations such as UNICEF, UNDP, and WFP, or international aid organizations such as the Red Cross, OXFAM, and other NGOs. There is a clear gap between the UN peace operations and the establishment of a stable society during the transitional period, and the promotion of human security can be a solution for that issue. The report “Human Security Now” identified a number of gaps in post conflict strategies by the UN in four areas: security, governance, international response, and resources⁷⁵. Since the existing UN peace operations were aiming to provide and maintain security in the target areas, the fundamental functions of UN peace operations did not contain the protection of human security. Because of this, the changing nature of both conflict and the UN peace operations during the 1990s required the UN to

⁷⁴ Inada, T. (2007) Post PKO to mid-long term development support. JIA report. Chapter 1. P5

⁷⁵ Human Security Now. P59

protect individual civilian lives rather than national security, something the UN never experienced before. Moreover, the new demands are the key elements to promote the reintegration and establishment of a divided society.

This was the role that Japan was seeking and it is what was considered missing from peace operations during the 1990s. It mirrors the experience that Japan had had in the way that it had to rebuild itself from the defeat of war. Any work that Japan would be involved in would be a continuation of what it is already doing through its work with organizations such as the ODA and JICA.

Japan's mid-long term support in both Cambodia and East Timor was mainly made through ODA and activities by JICA. Promoting the welfare of developing countries and contributing to the stability and development of the countries through ODA is an important means of making international contributions suitable for the basic doctrine of the Constitution of Japan⁷⁶. Between the year 1991 and 2000 Japan became the largest provider of ODA assistance in the world.

⁷⁶ Japan ODA White Paper 2006. Section 1. P6

Trends in Japan's ODA by Sector (Commitment Basis)




Fig 5. 1⁷⁷

Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of Japanese contributions to the ODA. The general trend is to more focus on social infrastructure and services; transportation and storage; energy, and the production sector. Japan's ODA normally focused on the necessity of individual life. With its advanced technology and developmental experiences, Japan focused on building the infrastructure and transportation that is essential for development and rehabilitation of the developed countries in the restoration process. Since the main focus of UN peace operations is on "making peace" and not on "building a society", Japan's ability and experiences in peacebuilding can fill a gap between two different mission purposes. Since the concept of human security appears to be more of an underlying principle to formulate foreign policies in terms of development support and peacebuilding, it had not been explicitly expressed as part of Japanese foreign policy. However, many of the principles concerning Human Security have been consistent with what Japan has been practicing through the years.

⁷⁷ White book 2006

The concept of Human Security is not new: it means to protect human “life” and “existence” from distress and is profoundly related to human rights and human development⁷⁸. It became highlighted when Prime Minister Obuchi used the word “Human Security” in his speech at a conference in Hanoi 1998. Since then, Japan has been promoting this new concept for development support and has started to apply this new concept to ODA and all other development support functions.

The concept of Human Security was initially established by Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy in his speech to the UN General Assembly in 1996. He set out a broad view of human security which included the following areas: child labour, environmental issues and economic development. Axworthy linked human security to the practice of UN peace operation activities⁷⁹, however, the concepts were narrow and weighted towards the Western view of human rights⁸⁰. This approach seeks to promote freedom from fear alone and emphasises civil political rights in particular.

Japan’s approach to Human Security, however, emphasises the creation and maintenance of a stable society and economic environment as a means of achieving human security, and seeks to promote freedom from fear and also freedom from want. This approach also focuses on economic, social, and cultural rights, which is profound in the concept of human rights.

⁷⁸ Sen, A. (2000) *Ningen no Anzenhosyou*. Syueisya. P24

⁷⁹ Axworthy, L. (1997) *Canada and Human Security: the need for leadership*. *International Journal*, 52. P183-196. P190

⁸⁰ The Canadian approach was criticised in the UNDP Human Development Report as it focused too heavily on threats associated with underdevelopment at the expense of human insecurity that stems from violent conflicts.

In the East Asian region, most of the nations generally favour Japan’s approach because of the central policy of “promoting citizen’s welfare”. Japan established human security as a policy framework to connect different concerns, based on the report by the Commission on Human Security in 2003, and also supported the conclusion of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the Supported Responsibility to Protect at the 2005 HSN ministerial. The Commission of Human Security states: poverty continues to be a major challenge for the UN and developed countries, and is one of the causes of violent conflicts around the world especially in the African region⁸¹. The approach and philosophy Japan has developed, based on its knowledge and advanced technology which, in turn, is based on its own history and experiences, are favored by most of the developing countries. This is helping countries in need to establish democratization and a stable society⁸².




Fig 5. 2⁸³

⁸¹ MOFA Report: The UN in the 21st century: Time to Address New Challenges.

⁸² Which none of the Western Societies have experienced in their history.

⁸³ MOFA Report. The UN in the 21st Century: Time to Address New Challenges. Meeting the MDGs

Japan particularly emphasises the areas of education, health care, especially in infectious disease control, environment, and water and sanitation as ways to provide human security. In accordance with the Basic Education for Growth Initiative (BEGIN) undertaken in June 2002, Japan is strengthening its support for basic education in developing countries where the key areas of focus include elimination of gender discrimination, promotion of adult literacy and improvement of educational quality and administration.

Also, for Japan's Grant Assistance for Grass-roots Human Security, more than 50% of the projects concentrate on Educational research⁸⁴. Another area which Japan concentrates its development support is water and sanitation which includes the establishment of a JPY16 billion programme of grant aid for water resources world-wide, and the introduction of a low-interest loan programme for sewer construction⁸⁵.

⁸⁴ MOFA ODA White Paper 2007.

⁸⁵ Japan has been the largest donor for water and sanitation since the 1990s. Japan's ODA related to water and sanitation between 2000 and 2004 was \$4.6 billion, constituting 41% of the bilateral donors' total. Under WASABI, Japan will strengthen its contribution on water and sanitation to contribute toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Disbursements by Sector (FY 2006)




Fig 5. 3⁸⁶

For the Japanese government, promoting the concept of human security is another way to strengthen its foreign policy on UN peace activities. Since it has already experienced difficulties contributing Japanese personnel including SDF to UN operations, it is willing to play a more active role in the area, and this new concept is the key for its future role in the 21st century.

The biggest initiative by Japan is the establishment of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. This fund was established in March 1999 in response to Prime Minister Mori's statement at the UN Millennium Summit. Japan contributed US\$ 4.2 million at the beginning, and committed a total amount of US\$200 million by August 2003, which made the trust fund for the largest project in the UN history⁸⁷. The purpose of this fund was to translate the concept of human security into projects⁸⁸ which addressed threats to human security. The most

⁸⁶ ODA White Paper 2007

⁸⁷ MOFA Diplomatic Blue Book 2003. P185

⁸⁸ Categories of the projects supported by the trust fund are: poverty eradication projects such as community reconstruction, vocational training, food production and the protection of children,

unique part of this fund is its decision making process: projects for the fund was planned by UN agencies, and proposed to the Japanese government. If the Japanese government approved of the project proposal, they passed the proposal to UN headquarters for further approval. In this way, the Japanese government can be in control of the projects, and this would also commit Japan to promoting the concept and projects. However, further efforts should be made by both the UN and the Japanese government to promote this concept in the phase of peacebuilding, if they are willing to take this project to the next step. Firstly, in order to make this concept into the general UN project after the UN peacekeeping/enforcement operations for the peace-building phase, both the UN and the Japanese government need to invite and encourage other countries financial support⁸⁹. Secondly, because of the wide scope and cross-characteristic nature of human security, there is not only the need for financial assistance but also a need to increase coherence and coordination among the various organizations. This is a relatively new initiative and requires a lot of cooperation from different countries and organizations for the expansion of this project..

As for the Grass roots human security project in Cambodia, JICA began a technical cooperation project to assist legal and judicial reform. Japanese experts supported the revision of the Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure with careful consideration for Cambodian culture and customs so that it would be easy to gain the support of the Cambodian people. In the process of drafting these legal codes, the group also worked to develop legal personnel so that the new legal system

medical and health care such as reproductive health, control of infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS), refugees and internally displaced persons assistance, and conflict related areas such as social reintegration for ex-troops through vocational training

⁸⁹ Japan is the only financial contributor to this fund.

could firmly take root in Cambodian society. In addition, the focus turned to assisting the training and capacity-building of judges, prosecutors, lawyers, Justice Ministry officials, and other legal professionals who will be responsible for understanding and implementing the new laws⁹⁰. By developing Cambodia's legal system and then linking it to the people through the training of legal professionals, this project helps to empower individuals to fully utilize the law to defend their rights, a contribution that reflects a strong commitment to the human security perspective. In East Timor (Timor-Leste), since 2000, the Japanese government has been giving support, through JICA, in accordance with the National Development Plan (NDP) to ensure sustainable development for building a self-reliant nation by focusing on four areas of priority: Agriculture and Rural Development, Maintenance and improvement of infrastructure, Human resources development and institution building, and Consolidation of peace. Japan's continuing support to both countries, especially after the UN peacekeeping mission are appreciated by the local people, and has contributed to building a new society.

The effect of focusing efforts on Human Security is two-fold. Firstly, these projects work towards completing what the UN began with peace operations on the ground. After establishing a stable environment, projects such as these help to build and sustain a peaceful society. Secondly, following the withdrawal of UN troops from the ground, these projects help to maintain a stable environment, thus, preventing any future conflicts from occurring in the area. There have been many cases in which a stable society was not achieved, leading to conflicts reoccurring. Many of these cases have occurred in the absence of an economy, an education

⁹⁰ JICA - Cooperation to Cambodia. December 2006. P8

and many of the basic needs for human life. Therefore, Human Security also serves as a preventive measure for future conflict situations.

Although the concept of Human Security covers many aspects of developmental support, its core focus is on the improvement of individual lives. Where poverty, disease, and hunger have stricken, outbreaks of fighting become much more probable. Developmental support at the individual level helps to reduce such conditions. Also, factors such as education, the development of the infrastructure and judicial systems, etc., help to build a self-sustainable society. The cases in Cambodia and East Timor demonstrate the value of such endeavors and have also shown that regional countries such as Japan can take an active role in this area.

What can Japan do?- Japan in UN peace operation in the future

Japan has taken tremendous strides to involve itself in a role in UN peace operations. There were clearly many issues, particularly to do with the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution. However, Japan has taken measures to move beyond the restrictions of Article 9 in order to become a more active player in this field. The allowance of troop contributions has been a significant change, particularly in the eyes of the Japanese public as this was previously inconceivable given the interpretation of the constitution at that time.

The initial debate after the Gulf War Crisis focused on how Japan could send the SDF abroad to places of need. However, this study has shown that the areas in which Japan would make the most impact is clearly not in the contribution of personnel. Despite the changes made in the interpretation of the Constitution and

the establishment of the new PKO Law, Japanese troop contribution still has many restrictions.

What Japan was able to learn with regards to troop contribution during the 1990s was that the SDF were able contribute in very specific ways. Japanese SDF have upheld high standards in many ways. They have advanced technological skills, the ability to meet deadlines, are accurate and faultless in their work and have exemplary moral behaviour. In contrast to troops from other contributing countries, the Japanese SDF particularly is well regarded and it has had great reviews by both the local organizations and people and the UN for the troops moral behaviour and faultless jobs⁹¹.

However, this is only a minor portion of what Japan can contribute. The contribution of troops was, to some extent, a symbolic representation of Japanese commitment in the eyes of the rest of the world. There is still much expectation for a Japanese contribution, however, the true strength of Japan was to be found elsewhere.

The criticism that Japan was subjected to for what appeared as chequebook diplomacy after the Gulf War Crisis was perhaps one that was premature. The financial contribution of Japan to the UN and UN operations takes on a significant purpose. Without this contribution, the UN Secretariat would suffer a great deal as it would be unable to deploy operations to fulfil its mandate. It is a vital ingredient to the activities of the UN. In particular, Japan's reliability in terms of its long term and continuing contribution to operations led to significant progress in the

⁹¹ Sugino, Y. (2004) PKO no shinjitsu. Keizaikai. P226

development and rehabilitation phase in both Cambodia and East Timor. Japan is still the second largest contributor to the UN, is the largest contributor to East Timor and has been one of the top ten contributors for Cambodia for more than a decade.

Because Japan's financial contribution to all the operations in Cambodia and East Timor was the biggest, with bilateral financial support and technical development support for both countries still continuing, it is even now making significant results. In addition, Japan has some degree of political influence on East Asian nations, and faith in Japan as a leading state in the region is strongly felt⁹². It is partly because the pacifist constitution made Japan a safe neutral country, and also because of its 60 years of effort to support development in most of the regional countries. If there will be a future operation in East Asian region, Japan will play a similar role as financial contributor and shadow negotiator again. Those parts are indispensable for the UN to plan and conduct peace operation. Sometimes Japan's development support is called "ODA gaiko (ODA diplomacy)" because the side effects of this development support include the strong bilateral relationship with the recipients⁹³. Japanese ODA has been reduced by 35 % in past nine years⁹⁴ due to Japan's financial depression, but at the same time Japan continues its contribution to many projects in the region.

There were many facets of Japan's contributions that surfaced during the operations in Cambodia and East Timor. Japan learned many of the difficulties and limitations in its abilities as well as many of the advantages it possessed by

⁹² KItaoka, S. (2006) Kokuren no seijirikigaku. P264 Cyukou shinsyo.

⁹³ Tanaka, Y. (1994) Enjyo toiu gaikousenryaku. Ashahi shinbun.

⁹⁴ It is an amount of more than 400 billion JPY. Source: MOFA Blue Book 2006.

virtue of its nature and historical background. However, one of the main areas of interest in this study is Japan's future role in the areas of UN peace operations. This has been considered in reference to the concept of Human Security. It is not so much that Japan has found an area in which it can play a leading role in Human Security but rather, the role that Japan has been playing for many years in the area of developmental support has finally been recognized as an area of urgent need. This is an area that Japan has been promoting for the past decade. It is an area regarded as something "very difficult to put into practice"⁹⁵. However, in recent years, human security focuses more on post-conflict peace building and this is something in which Japan has much expertise and where there are no internal judicial restrictions. The areas of financial contribution, political influence, diplomacy, developmental and regional support all factor into strengthening Japan's position as a leading country in Human Security, particularly in the East Asian region. Despite being given the nature of its constitution and many of its internal struggles, Japan has reached a position where it can now contribute in many different ways, including the dispatch of SDF troops, although there still are many restrictions with this. In particular, the area of Human Security is the area in which Japan can take a leading role in the future.

⁹⁵ Dr. Ogata's speech at the International Symposium on Human Security. 50th Anniversary of Japan's Admission to the United Nations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan. 6 December 2006.

Chapter 6: Japan's future: choices and challenges

Having utilized the research questions as a guide for the details of specific contributions made by Japan involved in UN peace operations, this chapter will put into perspective how Japan's role has evolved given many of the external and internal forces. It will also look into the recent developments in UN peace operations and many of the roles the UN and Japan has begun to foster and continues to take. Much of these developments will be related to the findings from the research and will help to show many of the positive changes that have occurred.

What was found from this study

This study highlights some of the political processes that underpinned the reconstruction of Japan that formed the basis for some of the difficulties Japan faces in contributing to UN peace operations. This also analyzes the ways in which various events and conditions have led to Japan's participation in UN operations in Cambodia and East Timor. It talks about many of the slow changes Japan has undergone to facilitate the changing nature and expectations of contributions to UN operations and identifies many of the limitations. Finally, areas of strength are identified in which Japan can make effective contributions that have a major impact - this is an area that coincides with the urgent needs realized by the UN and is a gap that can be filled by the efforts and expertise of Japan. Although Japanese contributions to UN operations were never highly regarded, Japan has worked hard to make meaningful and visible contributions within its given framework. It has, in effect, turned what was considered a liability in to its greatest asset.

It has been demonstrated that what appeared to be hindering Japanese personnel contributions was Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. However, it was the US occupation of Japan that devised the creation of such a constitution. This has had a limiting effect on the way Japanese SDF were dispatched, and there was a lack of recognition for any other contribution made by Japan. The assumption that Japan should take part in much wider areas, including personnel contribution to military operations, was the basis for the criticism that it received as taking a passive role. For some of the countries, especially the US, Japan's role as simply a financial contributor was not seen as a proportionate share of the responsibility given Japan's status as an economic power. Japan's pacifist position was very clear during the post-World War II era, and Japan being in this position was the result of the US government and rest of the alliance. The constitution created by the US after World War II was the very reason Japan was initially unable to contribute personnel.

However, the existence of Article 9 was seen as a symbol of Japan's neutrality. There are even at some countries that do not know the existence of Article 9, but recognize Japan's neutrality. This pacifist position actually became an advantage for Japan when it was involved in the peace process. Japan's neutrality was easier to accept by the disputing parties and/or host countries because of this distinction. Japanese diplomats used this advantage, and have built strong relationships. The perception of Japan as the second largest economy with political power which does not involve itself in any kind of military operations is the biggest advantage of Japanese diplomacy. Mr. Isezaki, who has served in several UN peace operations as one of the high ranking officials including the operation in East

Timor, made some interesting comments on this point. From his experiences, he said Japan is recognised as a neutral country which does not involve itself in any kind of military actions as many other western powerful countries do, and makes Japan a distinctively unique country¹. If Japan maintains this pacifist position in the future, this trust in Japan will help it to gain more opportunities. However, since the September 11th terrorist attack, Japan started to send SDF to logistic support missions for the war against terrorism. This could affect the perception of Japan's neutrality in some of the locations such as Afghanistan or Iraq.

What Japan learned the most from its experiences in Cambodia, East Timor and other UN operations is that its role can be extended to non-military dimensions by using its experiences in support of development. Personnel contributions were seen as a benchmark of Japan's commitment; however, it could not make a huge impression to UN, operations, or even on other member states. Japan's personnel contribution was too small in numbers and was dispatched in the middle of the UNTAC operational phase with restrictions on SDF activities causing confusion for the mission. Sending personnel was a vital first step to taking part in UN operations, and Japan proved itself on that point in UNTAC. However, Japan discovered that what it could provide for UN peace operations was not the well equipped and well trained troops for military operations; it was able to provide more the fundamental needs to build a stable society in developing countries, needs that can prevent future conflicts. Human Security is the area in which Japan can take effective action without confronting the controversy of its constitution. Japan has accomplished much through financial contribution, diplomacy, hosting international conferences and has realized much of its potential through personnel

¹ Isezaki, K Jieitaino Kokusaikoukenwa Kenpoukyujyoude. Kamogawasyutsupan. P68

and other regional contributions. Many of these areas directly relate to the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts of development support and this is exactly what needs urgent backing in managing and preventing regional crises. Much of the assistance that Japan has provided requires a lot more recognition in order to promote the concept of Human Security. Many super power countries do not focus on these aspects of development while Japan, as both a middle power country and an economic super power, can be an ideal fit for this role.

What is more, the arguments for the need to recognize Japanese contributions stem from the lack of attention paid towards many of the urgent necessities finally recognized by the UN. Promotion of Human Security is certainly one of these areas. In order to do so, much more focus should be placed upon what Japan can do as opposed to its limitations. US criticism of Japan's limitations regarding personnel contributions does not help to reinforce the weight of Japan's voice.

In addition, Japan needs to express the impact of its financial contribution to UN operations and related activities in a much stronger way at UN related opportunities. Despite the fact that Japan's donation was necessary for the deployment of the entire operation, Japan's financial contribution to the Persian Gulf War came under strong criticism. That was not the only time Japan was subject to condemnation. Japan's financing was always vital, and the money was effectively used in the operations. While financial contribution cannot be counted as equal to human lives on the ground, financial contributions have to receive more credit. The Japanese government and MOFA diplomats must represent the necessity and effectiveness of Japan's financial contribution more clearly and without hesitation. Also, in the future, Japan needs to express its opinion more

openly on the use of its money. With careful consideration by the government and MOFA of their financial commitment to the international community, Japan needs to take more action to promote its characteristic financial contributions so it receives the recognition it deserves by the UN, the US and other countries.

There has to be an alternative for Japanese foreign policy around the UN peace operations, while the UN and other Western countries need to accept Japan's difficulties and its current responsibilities in financial contributions and diplomatic efforts as equal to personnel contributions². This is why the Japanese government has sought international recognition for so long – to further its cause amidst the criticism.

The current state of affairs

The fundamental shift in Japanese foreign policy in adapting to changes in the international system is leading to an extensive reshaping of domestic institutions. The Yoshida strategy of concentrating on economic growth during the Cold War period left many political issues unresolved. The domestic reforms which have been made in the post-Cold War era shows Japan's genuine desire for change. Most of all, Japan became seriously engaged in revising the pacifist constitution in order to define the role of SDF within the concept of collective security. Public polls show a strong majority of the Japanese public favour revision of Article 9, so political parties, Diet committees, the academic society, and the media have begun to draft revisions. Reaching a consensus on how to replace Article 9 will

² Many MOFA diplomats made this same comment on the evaluation and recognition Japan is getting on its role in UN peace operations. Heads of UN offices in Tokyo, Ms. Yuge from UNDP, and Ms Tamamura from WFP, also made similar comments on this point.

take time. However, it is clear that Japan will not be deterred from revisions, and negative reactions by neighbouring countries cannot effect the decision making process. Revision in the electoral law in 1994 and administrative reforms in 1999 and 2001 had the effect of restraining the prime minister's role while increasing the influence of public opinion and voices of younger politicians. Prime Minister Koizumi was the turning point for Japan's political reforms, and raised both the awareness and the expectations of Japanese public on political issues, something which had not taken place in more than few decades.

Soon after the events of 11 September 2001, P.M. Koizumi responded quickly to US demands for cooperation in the "war against terrorism". The Anti-terror Special Measures Law was quickly drafted and passed the Diet in October 2001. It was the swiftest deliberation of any security issue in Japanese political history. On 9 November 2001, Japanese naval vessels with seven hundred SDF personnel abroad, sailed to the Indian Ocean to supply fuel to US and British forces operating in Afghanistan. It was the first foreign dispatch of Japanese forces since 1945, and the very first step of Japan's collective-self defence action. The next large step was taken in May 2003. A commitment was made by Prime Minister Koizumi to President George. W. Bush that Japan would dispatch SDF units to Iraq. With strong public support for his administration, Koizumi was not going to miss a chance to prove Japan's capability and prove its new stance in response to the international crisis. The dispatch was legal as long as there was a UN resolution, and there was no integration of the SDF with other militaries using force. UN resolution 1483 which supported the reconstruction of Iraq was approved during Koizumi's visit to US. What Koizumi and LDP members feared the most was to repeat the same mistakes from the Golf War in the new century.

In January 2004, the SDF was dispatched to Samawah, a reportedly a “non-combat zone”, in southern Iraq. The SDF units had to be defended by British and Dutch forces because the Japanese were not permitted to use force. The SDF engaged solely in civil engineering, and building public facilities until 2006.

Fifty-three years after its establishment, the Defence Agency was elevated to ministry status and, from 9 January 2007, has officially been called The Ministry of Defence. The rules of engagement for the SDF were modified to deal more forcefully with incursions into Japanese territories of sea and air space. The threat of a possible terrorist attack and Japan’s vulnerabilities increased both popular and political appreciation of the existence of the SDF, and there was a desire for it to take a more active role in national security.

Participation in UN peace operations for more than a decade fulfilled the Japanese peoples wish to see their country, as one of the leading countries in the world, make greater international contributions. During the political process of dispatching the SDF, Japan found its own distinctive way to take a part in UN activities that would not require a debate on the pacifist constitution or bring up the past. It is clear that Japan has become more active and engaged in international issues and legally better prepared since the beginning of the 1990s. Japan’s experiences in UN peace operations through the 1990s without a major incident and with strong public support gave Japan the confidence and reassurance to assume more active roles and missions in the new century.

Japan's challenges in the new century: becoming a country with a voice in the UN arena

Japan must establish a new consensus of national goals if it wants to achieve a vital political role in UN and elsewhere. Since the first experiences in Cambodia, Japanese contributions to UN peace operations and collective security missions have greatly expanded. However, the fundamental issue of Japan's constitution, the interpretation of Article 9 and the existence of the SDF, is still untouched and it should be under serious consideration for change.

Japan started to express its opinion to the United Nations after a half century of playing the role of silent financial contributor. Japan, the second largest financial contributor to the UN budget, decided to cut its support by one-quarter from the year 2004. The Japanese government claimed that Japan's GDP (Gross Domestic Products) accounts for 14.1% of the global economy, however Japan pays 19.5% of the UN budget that is almost US\$1 billion a year³. Japan's plan is partly motivated by the nation's worsening financial condition. However, after a decade of experiences in UN operations, Japan wants more appreciation from the UN and other member states on its role. There are two particular counts Japan is feeling uncomfortable about. Firstly, besides all the contribution Japan has been made, the UN Charter still refers to Japan as "former enemy" after six decades⁴. Secondly, a proposal to reform the UN Security Council has continued to fail, and the Japanese desire to take a permanent seat in the Council has been declining over the past few years. Japan's new attitude of "No taxation without representation" was the first attempt by Japan to stand up for its principles. Some

³ The US accounts for 30% of world gross domestic product, and pays 22% according to MOFA.

⁴ A comment by Mr. Okamoto of the Prime Minister's office during Koizumi administration.

of the UN officials claim that Japan was sending the wrong message to UN, if its quest is for the Security Council seat⁵. Japan's commitment to the UN is stronger than ever after a decade of contributions to the peace operations, and the Japanese public has become more accepting of taking responsibility outside the country. Now, the Japanese government and MOFA need more recognition from the United Nations to take the next necessary step for the domestic changes which will enable Japan to take a more active role in UN peace operations and related activities⁶.

It is clear that Human Security is more than a practical approach to development support. Most of the conflicts since the end of the Cold War were internal conflicts that meant securing the country by deploying a peace operation could not cope with a complex humanitarian emergency. However, the concept of human security can fulfil those insecurities by shifting concentration from the national level to the individual level, and would not require a military presence but a wide range of non-military civilian power. After a decade of experiences in post-Cold War progress, Japan found the opportunity to prove its ability by non-military means in peace operations. Japan's assistance to development support through the Trust Fund for Human Security has increased every year, and the wide range of support is making progress in all locations. The Japanese government is viewing the promotion of human security as one way to reduce pressure from UN and other member states, especially the US, on SDF participation in military operations. This cannot be an alternative for risking the lives of SDF personnel,

⁵ The New York Times 22 January 2003.

⁶ From interviews with several MOFA diplomats in Tokyo and NYC. They all stated that without UN recognition by eliminating the status of "enemy state" and/or permanent membership in the Security Council, Japan cannot make serious domestic changes.

and the Japanese government is not trying to replace that role. Nevertheless, the Japanese government and public need to face the reality of the outside world by amending the constitution to legalise the right of collective security, and admit to the maintenance of own military such as SDF. Nearly half a century of hiding behind the US is over, and Japan is seeking more roles in the international community.

After a decade of experiences, Japan has reached the point where it recognizes the most unique way in which it can positively contribute to UN peace operations. What was discovered in Cambodia and East Timor was that if there was enough regional support, and political will as well as logistical support, financial and personnel, this could lead to UN peace operations achieving their mandates. However, after the withdrawal of the UN operations, both countries suffered small internal strife again due to their unstable economic and social structure indicating the Japanese concept of Human Security has significant value in maintaining peace. There will be increased regional as well as non-regional roles that Japan will be required to play and the UN will be/is in a position to rely upon Japan's contributions.

The UN peace operations: what has been learned and what kind of support is needed?

What has the UN learned from its experiences in peace operations since the end of the Cold War? Not only Japan but also the UN has been through major changes and challenges for the past decade and a half. If we compare the UN experiences in the first half of the beginning of the 1990s with the latter half in same decade,

there are certain rules UN has created to improve its ability in the area of peace operations.

The primary responsibility of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security and the second major responsibility is development. When the UN went into the chaotic era of internal conflicts, the concept of peace operations became rather vague and unclear. The UN did not have a clear image or purpose for peace operations except “stop fighting on the ground and establish peace” as a mission mandate for most of the cases.

In the first decade of the post-Cold War era, the United Nations was confronted with a significant change in the types of conflicts that demanded the organization’s attention. The post-Cold War conflicts were predominantly intra-state conflict or civil war, ethnic conflict, and terrorism. In several situations, conflicts entailed civil chaos resulting from the post Cold War phenomenon of failed states. It is a well-known UN lesson that peacekeepers cannot function where there is no peace to keep. The need for clear and achievable mandates and matching military and financial resources has long been recognised, however it has never been achieved. What became clearer in the late 1990s was that the UN needed a long-term plan of rehabilitation and reconstruction of its failed system and this required continuous support from developed countries. Japan’s new concept of Human Security is one of the possibilities for this new challenge of the UN, and Japan is willing to take a leading role in this area.

The reform of the UN’s organizational structure to plan and conduct more sufficient peace operations is gradually being implemented. The challenges

recommended by the Brahimi Report in 2000 are in progress step by step, with continuing efforts to improve the organization's system.

On 20 December 2002, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 57/300 by consensus, allowing the Secretary General to implement most of his initiatives and requested additional information regarding to UN's new agendas. The Secretary General indicated that the UN's programme of work, Medium Term Plan, and budget would reflect the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals)⁷ as agreed upon by the member states at the Millennium Summit in 2000. MDGs are development goals that 189 countries and 23 international organizations have agreed to achieve by the year 2015 which include reducing extreme poverty, reducing child mortality rates, fighting disease epidemics such as HIV, and also developing a global partnership for development⁸. In the new century, the UN started to focus on one root of conflict – poverty – to prevent possible further conflicts in developing countries, particularly in the African region. So far, the UN and its member states have made substantial progress; still it is not fully on track to fulfil the overreaching goals. Japan is also putting itself into this commitment. As one of the components of the MDG, Japan hosted TICAD IV in 2008, and brought up this particular issue of poverty at the G8 summit in Hokkaido-Tokyo in the same year. Japan, in addition, reflects the MDG in its ODA policy, and has set short-term priority areas to support over the next three to five years⁹. Japan has made its support primarily through ODA and now intends to increase its ODA budget by US\$10 billion in aggregate over the next five years.

⁷ Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. 55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration

⁸ Source: Millennium Development Goals. <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/bkgd.shtml>

⁹ Japan's Efforts towards the Achievements of MDGs. (September 2008)

Source: http://www.g8summit.go.jp/doc/pdf/20080929_02.pdf

Japan's intention to play a bigger role in UN activities especially in development support is clear, and it is willing to provide comprehensive assistance in this area in the future.

New challenges for the UN to prevent possible conflict through focus on the causes of conflict caught the world's attention. However, the UN still has to face a lot of difficulties in planning and conducting peace operations to prepare for more satisfactory future operations.

For rapid and effective deployment in order to achieve its mandates, active cooperation from all member states is essential. As the Brahimi Report said, peace operations would require the active political, logistical and/or military support of one or more great powers or of major regional powers.¹⁰ The painful experiences of the 1990s, such as those in Somalia and Yugoslavia, influenced the domestic political will of member states' to send their troops into conflict zones, especially the Western countries. One of the basic problems in the late 1990s was a lack of political will by member states to contribute to peace operation. However, for the last few years 77 % of troops active in UN operations were contributed by developing countries. The main contributors are:¹¹ Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India from the South Asian Region, with Nigeria, Kenya, and Ghana from the African region as other significant active contributors. All the contributing states are within the British tradition of military training. This means their national contingents are trained along common lines, and share procedures in signalling

¹⁰ Ibid. Para23

¹¹ Ibid. Para 103-104. Monthly Summary of Military and Civilian Police Contribution to United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations.
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/October2003Summary.pdf>

and command, which perfectly matched with urgent needs by the UN for troops. Since, the contribution of national troops is on a voluntary ad hoc basis from member states, deploying the similarly trained contingents is the best option for the UN. Also, the troops from Commonwealth countries can solve an underlying problem for the past few years of poorly trained and under-equipped peacekeepers.

Jan 2003		Jan 2004	
Top 10 Contributors	No of Troops	Top 10 Contributors	No of Troops
Pakistan	4290	Pakistan	6750
Bangladesh	4229	Bangladesh	6426
Nigeria	3279	Nigeria	3380
India	2750	India	2922
Ghana	2160	Ghana	2303
Kenya	1775	Nepal	2294
Uruguay	1662	Uruguay	1873
Jordan	1622	Jordan	1822
Ukraine	1146	Kenya	1794
Australia	929	South Africa	1453

Table 6. 1

In Cambodia, the quality of personnel was inconsistent and a lack of sensitivity served to damage the UN's reputation. The UN received complaints of sexual harassment and drunkenness from civilians during the operations. Importantly, UN medics predicted that at least 150 peacekeepers would return to their homes with AIDS.¹² One of the lessons from past operation is that countries contributing

¹² In 1993, WHO reported that 75 % of blood donors in the capital Phnom Penh were HIV positive, and a single German Hospital was treating as average forty cases of venereal disease amongst UN troops every day.

troops who cannot meet the terms of the memoranda of understanding must not contribute personnel. It is also important for the UN Secretariats to cooperate with the member states to maintain the minimum standards of training and equipment for the troops deployed in UN peace operations. For this viewpoint, Japan's SDF troops always distinguished themselves as, morally, the best behaved in all the operations in which they participated. In both Cambodia and East Timor, local people respected their work and behaviour, and this led to a lessening of the misgivings surrounding Japan's re-militarisation.

Measures for the implementation of peacekeeping reform are continuing. With staffing shortages in the DPKO, the member states started to focus their attention on the problem of slow deployment times caused by procurement delays.¹³ As a response, the General Assembly authorised funds¹⁴ in the amount of US\$ 141.5 million for the establishment of Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) at the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy¹⁵ for the quick deployment of an operation. Drastic changes were made in July 2007 when Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's proposal for the reform of the DPKO was approved by the General Assembly. He recommended dividing the department into two different functions, management and operations, to improve the situation of the numbers of peacekeepers on the ground¹⁶. The General Assembly accepted the Secretary General's proposal and approved creating the Department of Field Support to handle management and logistics, leaving the DPKO to focus only on operations.

¹³ The US Department of State Annual Report to the Congress. "US participation in the United Nations." Year 2002.

¹⁴ The General Assembly Resolution. 56/292 on 18 July 2002. The Concept of strategic deployment stocks and its implementation

¹⁵ The initial plan for the SDS had included enough equipment to outfit both a large, complex mission of approximately 10,000 troops, and a smaller, traditional mission of up to 5,000 troops.

¹⁶ In 2007, the numbers of peacekeepers on the ground reached 100,000 around the world which was the highest number in UN history.

In 2006, the UN experienced difficulties in deploying a large number of peacekeepers around the world. The UN deployed 13,000 peacekeepers to southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah guerrillas fought a 34-day war with Israel. The UN also sent police officers to help restore order in East Timor after weeks of political violence. The U.N. has nearly 9,000 peacekeepers in Haiti, often waging gun battles with armed gangs, and 18,000 in Congo, its largest mission. The biggest challenge in 2006 was to gather enough peacekeepers to send to the Darfur region of Sudan. In a major diplomatic breakthrough that government recently approved the deployment of a 23,000 joint U.N.-AU force¹⁷. The current increase in UN peace operations strained the institutional capacities of the UN Secretariats again. Secretary General Ban's reform is only a beginning in a series of changes for the UN to manage peace operations in a better way.

Maybe, there will be no end to the process of reforming the UN capacities for the management of peace operations. The nature and origins of conflicts keep changing and so as of necessity do peace operations in terms of size, mandate, and character, and it will not get any easier as we look back over the past few decades. More than ever, strong support and cooperation is needed from member states, especially from those countries with capacity to contribute in this particular area of UN activities. Japan and other member states are ready to take the necessary action to improve the UN capacity in this field.

¹⁷ A report on the Evolution of UN peacekeeping (2): Reforming DPKO. Friedrich Elbert Foundations New York. November 2007.

In the end, a proposal for Security Council reform must be considered, and it must include all regional representatives, as one of the reforms of the UN organization in the near future. Considering the power the Security Council has on the UN decision-making process, the current membership does not reflect the international community today. The possible reform Japan and other member states, Germany, Brazil, India¹⁸, has been promoting could not get enough support in the General Assembly. Their plan to create 10 new council seats, which would take total membership from 15 to 25, includes six new permanent members would not come with veto power for the first 15 years. The plan of this group four was to enable the United Nations to reflect the interests of the vast majority of its member states. However, the difficulties of adding new members to the Security Council are apparent. The United States has already advocated the addition of Germany and Japan as permanent Council members while Russia, the PRC, UK and France have remained deliberately vague¹⁹. Germany and Japan, who are still referred to as enemy states in the United Nations Charter, have proven their contributions to the United Nations in a wide range of areas include financially and politically, especially after the end of the Cold War. As for the rest of the possible seats on the Security Council, the selection of a single county, or possibly two, depending on the number of the countries on a continent, from each of Asia, Africa, and South America, is not an easy task because of the power struggles in each location.

¹⁸ The four countries are called "Group of Four"

¹⁹The Next Step: Security Council Reform. An Agenda for Peace Update, Issue No. 2, pg. 1,4
United Nations Association in Canada. Source:
<http://www.ncrb.unac.org/unreform/selected/Screform.html>.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Nations has not been able to cope with the increase in the number of conflicts around the world, and the unevenness in the Security Council's response and interest to various conflicts has resulted in questions of the United Nations' ability as an international institution. The effectiveness of peace operations will depend greatly upon the reforms made to the United Nations Organizations, including the Security Council. The UN needs to move forward from the original ideas since its establishment in 1946 and adapt to modern day situations in the 21st century. Japan is one of the leading countries in the reform of the Security Council, and will promote this issue in the UN arena until the actual reform takes place.

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