

London School of Economics and Political Science

THE COLLABORATION PROBLEMATIQUE
Managing frontiers of insecurity through
state building interventionism

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A thesis submitted to the Department of
International Relations of the London School of
Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
London, August 2008

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ABSTRACT

The pulling nature of crises on the ‘frontiers’ stimulates Western interventionism focused on state building. This interventionism is fundamentally dependent upon collaboration with indigenous politics and ‘collaborative systems’, the relationships linking interventionist actors with indigenous ones, determine its structure and dynamics. State building interventions rely on collaborative systems because they define the interface of the external forces of the intervening power with indigenous politics. Unless the energy and resources of the intervening power can be translated and internalised into terms of indigenous politics, the intervention will be unable to achieve its state building goals. Presently, Western states are both failing to build appropriate collaborative systems and to manage their collaborative partners. However, if Western states can improve their approach to and implementation of collaboration with indigenous politics, they can better manage insecurity on the frontiers through state-building interventionism.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to firstly thank Professor Christopher Coker for his supervision of this thesis as his ideas and suggestions have been very helpful and exceptionally influential. As a part-time student living variously in three countries, it has been an extended and complicated process to write this PhD thesis and Professor Coker’s support and encouragement never wavered, as witnessed by the fact that tutorials were held in London, Bangkok and Rome. Additionally, the author would like to thank his good friend Sheila Grudem for allowing him to commandeer the office in her Rome flat for lengthy periods of time, thoroughly cluttering it with post-it notes spread around the walls and piles of papers consuming the desk and even some floor space. Lastly, the author must surely thank his mother for graciously forgiving his travels to so many frontier zones. Always questioning, “Do you really have to?”, she nonetheless always offered her love and support along the way.

INTRODUCTION: LIFE IN A FRONTIER

Smoke chokes the horizon. The sun is but a dulled orange spot, vainly trying to prod through the billowing clouds of dark sooty ash. The small, decrepit town lining the banks of the muddy river is eerily quiet after the violence that has just swept through it. The residents, those who remain, stay in their homes. The town has been transformed into a heavily defended garrison of the army. 'Locked and loaded' soldiers man machinegun posts at key intersections, patrols roam along the outskirts, and pick-up 'technicals' with machine guns and heavy trucks with cannons pace the main road. The smoke, initially from the scores of huts and buildings burnt in the recent ethnic violence, is now coming from grass fires along the town's perimeter. The army is burning clear lines of fire in case the town is again attacked by rebels.

As this scene unfolded itself in front of me one late afternoon in 2003, on Christmas of all days, I reflected to myself how seemingly archaic it was. I had spent the day counting burnt huts, 342 all told, in order to help start providing emergency relief to those displaced by the fighting. While going through the general mechanics of preparing emergency relief distributions as an aid worker for the United Nations, I could not help but question how this could all be going on in the 21st Century. What, with all its hype of globalisation, democracy, human rights, civil society, international law and justice, and on and on with the metaphysical myopia of an era intent on the future, but forgetful that not all proceeds at the same speed in the march forward of 'progress'.

The small town of Gambella is in the far west of Ethiopia, inhabited mostly by the indigenous Nilotic peoples who also populate southern Sudan. It also has a significant presence of 'highlanders', those Ethiopians who are lighter in complexion and come from the central plateaus of Ethiopia. Even when relatively peaceful, the region of Gambella is as impoverished and marginal as you are likely to find anywhere in the world. In Gambella town, the capital, there are no paved roads, no private cars, no running water, only sporadic electricity, a single miserably lacking hospital, a couple simple schools, and for all intents, very little 'development' in any sense of that word. The countryside is even more basic, with life by the local tribes continuing in most ways as it has for generations, as rural subsistence farming and herding societies.

During the length of time that I lived there, the region was plunged into anarchic violence. As a foreigner, it was hard to understand what was happening. It must have been hard even for a local. There was much violence between the region's two major tribes, the Nuir and Anuak. There was also significant in-fighting between the clans and sub-clans of the Nuir. Even more violence occurred between one tribe, the Anuak, and the so-called highlanders. This manifested itself into open combat between Anuak militants and the Ethiopian army, which had largely failed, obviously, to instil order upon the border region.

The state is a very loose conception in Gambella. The region's government has very little effective administrative control over the area. There are government buildings, and even the odd government worker, but the government has in many ways little real presence. What government does exist is limited to a superficial level; there might be a 'local administration office' or a 'police post' but little cause and effect emanating from such places. Indeed, even the presence of the army is itself more through manning 'outposts' and occasional patrols through 'the bush' than in maintaining a long-term presence where they are able to assert a monopoly on violence. In the state's stead, traditional power and cultural structures are still very influential.

Sitting on the bank of the river in Gambella town on that smoky Christmas afternoon, I was left pondering to myself that this part of the world really was a 'frontier'. It literally was the 'Wild Wild West' of Ethiopia. It always had been. Even the highlanders were Ethiopians from the central highlands who had been 'sent forth' by the Emperor Menelik to assert his claims to the western frontier region, populated by 'black Africans', as part of his imperial expansion of the Abyssinian Empire in the late 19th Century. Gambella town itself had in turn been conceded temporarily to the British in colonial Sudan as a frontier trading post while the Abyssinian Empire still formally controlled the region.

It appeared to me that in many ways, had I been a British colonial officer a hundred years previous, I would have seen many of the same attributes in the region as presently existed. There was very little real government presence, opposing tribesmen fought

pitched battles, bandits ambushed convoys on the region's few dirt roads, and the 'Ethiopian' army from the central government had small garrisons here and there and fought periodic skirmishes with an incomprehensible array of local armed groups- from rebels, to tribesmen, bandits, and local militias. All the while the resident herders and farmers largely continued their traditional way of life along the region's riverbanks and across its grassy plains. They were periodically interrupted by traders with wares of clothing or farm tools or the proselytizing of Christian and Muslim missionaries.

Of course there were some differences too; for one thing, myself. Although few in number, the couple resident foreign aid workers played a disproportionately large role in the socio-economic welfare of the region, largely because of its lack of effective governance. Furthermore, there was a Western Union money transfer office, pumping in money from the diaspora communities of the Anuak and Nuir tribes in America and Australia, probably the region's biggest source of income. The Malaysian multinational corporation Petronas was prospecting in the region, hoping to start drilling for oil and pumping it out to the economies of Asia. Western advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch were soon visiting, searching for alleged human rights abuses by the Ethiopian government. Refugee camps supported by the international community hosted large populations of those displaced by the neighbouring countries' wars.

It may all seem rather clichéd for somebody not sitting on the same river bank, sweating under the clouds of smoke wondering if, indeed when, the shooting would start again. To me, Gambella was very much an actual 'frontier' in every sense of the word as I understood it. There around me was a violent, wild land full of rebels, bandits, army soldiers, missionaries, traders, and spear toting tribesmen and all without much notion of what we would now call a 'state'. Modern ideas and technologies played a significant role in the region's dynamics, preventing a complete reversion to a timeless history. Things such as AK-47s, political parties, global telecommunications and mass media, and the very real idea of an 'Ethiopian federal government' (however limited it may have been in reality), played driving roles in the region's politics. Furthermore, although isolated, Gambella had a lot of contact with the outside world. It was tapped into international financial flows, the oil economy that drives the modern world, international civil society, and the humanitarian aid world of NGOs and the UN. The

violence of the region also had profound ramifications for its neighbours, both with the rest of Ethiopia and across to Sudan and further afield. The movements of rebel forces, illegal arms, and refugees all meant that Gambella's problems were also her neighbours, whether they wanted them or not.

The provocations of Gambella were not the only time I had thought of modern frontiers. I always had complaints about the simplicity of using terms such as 'failed states', which seemed so limited in their conceptualisation because they did not inherently take into account in any nuanced way the interaction that such places, as anarchic as they are, have with the outside world through globalisation, the driving reality of our time. It seemed to me- after working in states including Afghanistan, Sudan, Liberia, East Timor, Myanmar and the Democratic Republic of Congo- that there was much room for further academic debate about these two pressing realities, namely of globalisation and anarchic places where the state never really existed or has largely collapsed, and how these two realities interfaced with and shaped one another.

A second crucial theme from my time in frontiers was that as outsiders, we in the West are only responding to crises in the periphery of our modern world. That may seem rather obvious, but to many Westerners, especially within the humanitarian aid and foreign policy worlds, the understanding is very much that the West is driving most conflicts in one way or another and can hence significantly shape and resolve them. While many crises in the developing world, especially on the frontiers, have certainly been compounded or even provoked to some extent by external powers, fundamentally the crises, such as the one in Gambella, are products of local dynamics and are undertaken by local people. We can only but respond to them. To think otherwise is to be myopically pretentious; we do not live there, we just come and go as suits our own Western interests. No matter how important we think our role is, we are always but outsiders with a relatively superficial presence.

This leads into a third theme that has long resonated with me based on my experiences working in conflict zones. Whatever we try and achieve as outsiders, be it anything from a simple emergency aid project to trying to create a new government after a civil

war, can only really be accomplished through ‘collaboration’ with locals. Again, this is a fairly seemingly obvious point, but not so much so when you talk with many of the aid workers of the world, neo-conservatives in Washington or even the federal government of Ethiopia. When working in Gambella, it was always important for me to remember that although I as a foreigner had access to relatively large amounts of resources and many ideas that I wanted to share, whatever I did required the support and active participation of local people.

Watching the smoke swirl above Gambella, I decided to write my PhD thesis about these frontiers, an idea confirmed when visiting weak and failed states, most of which have seen foreign interventions. They are what will be called ‘frontiers of insecurity’, the actual areas of anarchy in the periphery and the contact that occurs there through globalisation with the rest of the world. Furthermore, feeling frustrated about what seemed to be mostly failed attempts by outsiders to really help bring more stability to such troubled areas, but also to mitigate our own security problems resulting from them, this thesis hopes to shed some humble light on better explaining why we respond to these frontiers and given that, how we can better respond through improved collaboration with locals- those who really make all the difference for the long-term. This is what an emphasis on collaboration is meant to highlight: the West must appreciate indigenous culture and political systems and the possibilities for collaboration with them more before anything else can be accomplished.

CHAPTER 1: ON FRONTIERS AND COLLABORATION

At the centre of late-Victorian imperialism in Africa lies an apparent paradox. The main streams of British trade, investment and migration continued to leave tropical Africa practically untouched; and yet it was tropical Africa that was now bundled into the empire. There is a striking discrepancy of direction here between the economic and imperial arms. The flag was not following trade and capital; nor were trade and capital as yet following the flag. The late-Victorians seemed to be concentrating their imperial effort in the continent of least importance to their prosperity.

- Robinson and Gallagher¹

While globalisation has spurred the global economy to grow manically over the past several decades, this growth has largely been concentrated in North America, East Asia and Europe. Concomitantly, in the post-Cold War era the international political discourse has most often focused upon the 'rise of China', the continuing integration and expansion of the European Union, the never ending Israel-Palestine conflict, the emergence of Russia as an energy dynamo, and the unipolar primacy of the United States. However, since the conclusion of the Cold War, Western states have been directly involved in interventions spread from Haiti and Liberia to Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor and as far as the Solomon Islands. A casual observer of these developments must surely be left pondering the 'apparent paradox' of such keen Western involvement in what can only be reasonably concluded as remote and outwardly petty locales relative to the major flows of the global economy and the power structures of the international system.

And yet, why are Western military forces and political agents currently active in such economically and politically marginal states as Liberia, East Timor and Haiti? Liberia, by example, is surely of little economic interest in the grand scheme of economic globalisation compared to the giants of America, Europe and Asia, offering little more than a single dilapidated Firestone rubber plantation to the world. Even aside from their ostensible marginality to the narratives of post-Cold War politics and economics, why is it that this Western interventionism has not been particularly successful in any case? By example, when the government of Afghanistan controls less than a third of the country after six years of Western interventionism and the DR Congo continues to exhibit nearly the same horrendously high mortality rates as it did during its official civil war from

1997-2002 despite a United Nations peacekeeping mission being present for over five years, there are clearly major challenges for achieving 'progress' in such locales. It is to these conundrums that this thesis seeks to offer greater clarity through its analysis on 'frontiers' and 'collaboration'.

1.1: The nexus of weak and failed states and globalisation

With the conclusion of the relatively simple bi-polar superpower conflict that was the Cold War, the ambiguities emerging in its stead for the international system were profound. Joyful initial pronouncements of a 'new world order' of collective security were quickly juxtaposed against a foreboding sense that there was rather a 'coming anarchy'. What was soon apparent to all was that conventional wars between states were not to be as driving a concern as previously. And indeed, the post-Cold War era has been most defined as experiencing a "problem of the state", witnessing the rise of intra-state wars in the most peripheral states of the international system.² Moreover, other issues- such as terrorism, drugs and human trafficking, the small arms trade, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation- assumed greater prominence as newly defined 'non-traditional security' issues.

The process of decolonisation was assumed to have created a universal states system, yet in reality there were still numerous sovereignties defined by weak or non-existent governmental control over geographic territories. It was to the presence of these weak and failed states and their centrality to so many increasingly important non-traditional security concerns that greater prominence was given to for defining the post-Cold War strategic doctrines of Western states. Initial post-Cold War thinking had assumed that such states could be left to the humanitarian care of the aid agencies or in exceptionally dire situations, responded to through so-called humanitarian interventions. The 'new interventionism' of the immediate post-Cold War era- in Cambodia, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia- represented a substantive break from Cold War interventionism, notably in that other rationales, then articulated most commonly as humanitarian, could supplant the state-centric 'peacekeeping' of the Cold War era.³

And yet, as the 1990s progressed, and culminating in the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, there was a realisation that because of globalisation, weak and failed states are a direct

problem for international security because aggressive non-state actors can directly threaten states in ways that only other states could in the past. Overall, the most worrying feature of the post-Cold War environment has been the “encroachment of chaos on the civilized world.”⁴

No longer was it possible to ignore anarchy and chaos on the extreme margins. 9/11 was especially significant as it showed that even the world’s sole superpower was vulnerable to attacks stemming from the weakest of states and hence it “re-ignited [a] strategic interest in the periphery.”⁵ Jeffrey Herbst highlighted this point when he noted the “contradiction of states with only incomplete control over the hinterlands but full claims to sovereignty was too fundamental to remain submerged.”⁶ Christopher Clapham noted of the post-Cold War ‘new Africa’ that it would resemble its pre-colonial origins in that it would be defined by “zones of reasonably effective government interspersed with ones in which anything readily identifiable as a ‘state’ is hard to discern.”⁷ While Africa has had a disproportionate share of weak and failed states, Clapham’s imagery can be applied to the world more broadly as evinced from such conflict-prone states as Afghanistan, East Timor, the Balkans, Columbia, Haiti and Cambodia.

Michael Ignatieff once famously wrote that 9/11 highlighted of the post-Cold War world that there had been “a general failure of the historical imagination.”⁸ Namely, the international community, and especially the Western states, did not fathom that there are still “border zones... where barbarians rule and from where, thanks to modern technology, they are able to inflict devastating damage on the centres of power far away.”⁹ Given these ‘border zones’, a defining context of the post-Cold War international system was the presence of what can be more aptly termed, seemingly archaic but still decidedly true, as ‘frontiers’- the major contextual theme of this thesis. Simply put, the world, and especially the West, was forced to answer the question of how to respond to an anarchical frontier- a question it had thought it had answered through decolonisation.

Indeed, the questions of how, in an era of globalisation framed against the unfinished process of establishing a truly state-based international system, such anarchy could best

be responded to have been difficult to answer. Taking action against anarchy in the frontiers is a timeless human need. Historically, as Barnett Rubin commented, stronger states have consistently “intervened along their peripheries to establish politically acceptable forms of order... to stabilise relations with unruly peoples on their frontiers.”¹⁰ The primary challenge of this presently has been that in an era where imperialism as an ideology is dead, the means to establishing ‘politically acceptable forms of order’ are fraught with difficulty and hesitation. Charges of ‘neo-colonialism’ sting bitterly to Western states and are compounded by a reluctance to engage in any type of warfare that could be considered an act of aggression.

With “post-Cold War battlefields [that are] localized but savage”¹¹, Western states driven by a growing sense of human rights norms, bounded by tactics defined largely for conventional warfare, and somewhat naively believing in the universality of their political ideologies and moral parameters are wary of finding themselves involved in ‘foreign adventures’. Overall, this leads them to show little willingness to engage in interventionist forays, especially when the context of globalisation has raised the general question of whether physical geography even still matters. Zygmunt Bauman has, for example, argued that “the global space has assumed the character of a frontier-land.”¹² He goes on to argue that presently, the “frontier-land cannot be plotted on any map; it is not a geographical notion anymore.”¹³

In an era of globalisation, many doubt that physical space matters particularly much. This is because technology arguably makes space and distance increasingly irrelevant because there is now only one ‘global space’ rather than the ‘territories’ of the past. The most cited example of this has been critiques of the US’ ‘war on terror’. After 9/11, many commentators on the Left challenged that the US’ response, decidedly misguided, was to attack two states following the actions of one shadowy, network dispersed non-state actor. One commentator argued, by example, that “the Bush Administration chose...to fight a familiar enemy whose face and address it knew”, namely a sovereign state, rather than engage al-Qaeda in a global space defined as a frontier-land.¹⁴

While there has been an interesting academic debate as to whether geography still matters, it nonetheless leaves policy makers working to understand how peripheral chaos relates to globalisation and what ramifications that has for security in the West. The consistent theme of the post-Cold War era has been that interventionism focused on 'state-building' is the required response to peripheral insecurity, i.e. to frontiers. And, indeed, it is hard for even the most devout post-modern geographer to argue that Afghanistan was irrelevant to the attacks in New York and Washington DC. While 9/11 may have catalysed the realisation that peripheral anarchy can cause horrendous outcomes for the West, it did not clearly identify the best forms that state building interventionism should take.

Post-Cold War interventions have focused on strengthening the governments of weak and failed states through providing them with a liberal-democratic framework of governance. Primarily this has been through military means, mostly utilising the multilateral forces of the United Nations, but also on occasion those of 'coalitions of the willing' composed of several states or funnelled through a regional organisation. Under these broad parameters there has been much confusion and debate as to what more precise modalities should be developed for state building interventionism. Issues such as multilateralism versus unilateralism, whether pre-emption can be justified, the value of self-determination, the types of force that can be applied, and what norms and values should be applied, notably those of democracy, have been heatedly deliberated.

The results of this operational hesitance and conceptual ambiguity have been poor practical knowledge about how to undertake state building interventionism. The United Nations, as a prime example, still does not have a peacekeeping doctrine despite the exceptional rise in its own interventionism.¹⁵ It should be qualified that this was somewhat understandable in the initial post-Cold War era as the UN literally had no previous experience undertaking missions "when there was no government with which to negotiate."¹⁶ While this was forgivable initially, lacking appropriate doctrines to function in new contexts serving new purposes has certainly been a major challenge over the longer-term.

Overall, interventionism during the post-Cold War era aimed at state building has not been particularly successful at stabilising the extreme periphery. This has resulted from the hesitance to define frontiers as security interests, the reluctance to engage in anything resembling ‘imperialism’, and disputes over what form interventionism should take. From Haiti to East Timor, the Balkans, Cote D’Ivoire, Afghanistan, and the Solomon Islands, Western military interventions have dragged on with ambiguous progress being achieved towards greater stability while other missions have outright collapsed, often spectacularly at times, such as in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

1.2: Literature review

In the post-Cold War era there has been significant academic analysis trying to understand whether there was to be a ‘new world order’ or a ‘new world disorder’. In its endless confusion, the era has lacked a seminal “Article X” such as that by George Kennan defining the strategic geopolitical parameters of the Cold War environment. In its stead there have been countless thematic approaches focusing on a ménage of often isolated or only loosely connected emphases ranging from globalisation, empire, state building interventionism, and even ‘new wars’.

One of the most provocative intellectual pieces of the 1990s was an essay by Robert Kaplan entitled *The Coming Anarchy*, which he followed with a book, *The Ends of the Earth*. Kaplan’s central tenet was that poverty and anarchy on the periphery were increasing to such an extent that they were soon to become defining attributes of the international system. His argument was novel in that it took a more holistic approach than most International Relations-oriented work, which usually focuses on mere politics. Resource scarcity, environmental degradation, demographic booms, crime waves, and weak governments have coalesced to create a socio-political environment of significant insecurity, namely becoming ‘frontiers of anarchy’. Essentially, these attributes compose such a tide of forces that an international system based upon states is gradually eroding and there is hence a need to “remap the political earth.” In this way, West Africa is representative of a general trend:

... the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war. West Africa is reverting to Africa of the Victorian atlas... ‘blank’ and ‘unexplored’.

Kaplan notes that while a small minority of humanity will live a Fukuyama-esque 'post-historical' existence of democratic stability and capitalist abundance, the vast majority will be "stuck in history, living in shantytowns where attempts to rise above poverty, cultural dysfunction, and ethnic strife will be doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to till, and space to survive in." The localisation of politics and violence is the inevitable consequence of these 'coming anarchy' developments, whereby "'national defense' may in the future be viewed as a local concept" and individuals seek protection through families, clans, and tribes. Ultimately, Kaplan concludes his endeavour to map the future political world, "The future map... will be an ever-mutating representation of chaos."

A further influential work has been *The Pentagon's New Map* by Michael Barnett. Barnett's work gained note because it was one of the first to strongly articulate the strategic parameters of the post-Cold War environment. Specifically, he focused on states composing the "non-integrating gap", those "largely disconnected from the global economy and the rule sets that define its stability."¹⁷ Furthering this main contention, Barnett argued that "globalization's uneven spread... delineated more than just a frontier separating the connected from the disconnected- it marked the front lines in a struggle of historic proportions."¹⁸ This struggle inside the 'gap' has primarily required the US and her allies to attempt to expand economic globalisation and neo-liberal governance.

Another important work is Robert Cooper's *The Breaking of Nations*. In it he argued that a defining characteristic of today's "divided world" is the presence of a "pre-modern world: the pre-state, post-imperial chaos" of states such as Somalia, Afghanistan and Liberia.¹⁹ While in the past, peripheral chaos would often be ignored because of the benefits of distance, today this is no longer possible because the "zone of danger and chaos" interconnects with the rest of the world through globalisation.²⁰ While "homeland defence begins abroad", the Western world has had a difficult time engaging in such an endeavour.²¹ Fundamentally, in the present era "the imperial urge is dead... [and] because none of us sees the point of empires, we have often chosen chaos."²²

What is interesting about these three works, amongst many others with similar themes, is their attempt to articulate how peripheral anarchy exists, namely in weak and failed states, and the responses to it. Rather than simply adhere to the label of ‘weak and failed states’, the literature has tended to identify peripheral areas of anarchy more broadly within a general understanding of their existence as weak and failed states. Essentially, this peripheral anarchy has been given countless names, albeit assigning different dynamics and causalities to it. From Kaplan’s ‘frontiers of anarchy’, Barnett’s ‘gap’ and Cooper’s ‘pre-modern states’, many others have also tried to define those zones in the periphery that have assumed such prominence since the end of the Cold War. The purpose of this naming has been to capture their deeper meaning, notably how they are perceived and what conditions exist in them, rather than to leave them as relatively dry, hollow terms- ‘weak and failed states’.

A key theme in this work is the ostensible detachment of these areas from the core, stable areas of the international system, notably the West. As early as 1991, Stanley Hoffman was interested in “New World Disorder” based on chaos in the Third World. By 1993 Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky were already writing of juxtaposed “zones of peace” and “zones of turmoil”. This initial interest has been expanded on by many authors subsequently. Michael Ignatieff, for instance, argued that “beyond the zone of stable democratic states... there are border zones” of the periphery.²³ Michael Vatikiotis has written of the “restive margins” of Southeast Asia, such as Papua New Guinea and Myanmar.²⁴ Robert Kaplan, in addition to ‘frontiers’ has framed his coming anarchy as stemming from the international system’s “marginal areas.”²⁵ Linking all of these illustrations is their extremely peripheral nature and hence detachment from the ‘progressing’ core.

A second key theme is authors attempting to conjure through their descriptions the key attribute of such places, the lack of strong governance associated with sovereign statehood. Speaking of Africa, Christopher Clapham noted the rising prominence of “borderlands and zones of shifting control and areas altogether beyond the realm of statehood.”²⁶ Cooper’s usage of ‘pre-modern states’ identified them as states that have not yet achieved the ‘modern’ status of strong government and industrialised economies. In its policy papers, the US government has placed its emphasis on identifying “ungoverned areas”²⁷ and areas with the “absence of effective

governance.”²⁸ In general, many academics have striven to highlight “unsatisfactorily governed locations”, as Marcus Fielding termed them.²⁹

A third major theme of the literature has been in defining anarchic peripheral areas using assorted adjectives for turbulence and unrest. Throughout the 1990s the term ‘arc of crisis’ was prominent in US strategic literature, with the Pentagon utilising the term to describe the broader Middle East while Australia called those areas of Southeast Asia and Oceania problematic to it an ‘arc of instability’. William Reno argued the existence of “disorderly areas”³⁰, Chester Crocker focused on a “vast zone of transition and turbulence”³¹ and Lucile Carlson articulated the presence of “zones of friction” and “trouble spots.”³² Furthering these sentiments was Mark Berger who wrote of “instability, terrorism, and criminality in marginalised regions”³³, and Eric Hobsbawn who labelled them as “areas of turmoil and humanitarian catastrophe.”³⁴

In addition to the broad literature focused on defining the peripheral anarchy of weak and failed states, there has been much work focused on empire and imperialism. This literature has sought to identify how and why the West has responded to peripheral anarchy through interventionism in the post-Cold War era. Michael Ignatieff’s work, *Empire Lite*, has been notably provocative. In it he argued of the need to respond to the “danger zones” of the periphery precisely because their instability posed direct security risks to the West and that renewed imperialism, albeit ‘lite’ in nature, is the means chosen.³⁵

In the wake of 9/11, there was much interest in Washington over calls for a return to imperialism to impose order on disorderly states such as Afghanistan, notably by prominent ‘neo-conservatives’ such as Sebastian Mallaby and Max Boot. The calls for specifically ‘liberal imperialism’ have been strong, with Deepak Lal, for instance, arguing it was necessary to “promote that globalization which leads to modernity.”³⁶ The British historian Niall Ferguson has been one of the most prolific champions of an assertive US Empire following in the footsteps of the British to push stability, arguing that “empire is more necessary in the twenty-first century than ever before.”³⁷ This is because it is needed to maintain global order, in the form of institutionalised rule of law

and effective administration over states, as well as to expand economic globalisation—namely free trade, capital movements and migration.³⁸

A third major emphasis in the International Relations literature has focused on interventionism as the response to weak and failed states. This literature is rather expansive in its gamut of analysis; indeed, it has developed as a major sub-field of International Relations. It has evolved as notions of interventionism have developed. For instance, ‘humanitarian intervention’ received extensive analysis in the 1990s from academics such as Nicholas Wheeler. This work focused mostly on the moral and ethical dimensions of humanitarianism and framed much of its discourse around the challenges of Western states’ ‘right to protect’ endangered individuals versus the norm of state sovereignty. Additionally, during the 1990s, academics such as William Zartman and Chester Crocker focused on analysing the difficulties of state building in weak and failed states more generally than only through Western interventionism. This literature expended great efforts on analysing both the causes of state weakness and the possible responses to it, from improved economic aid through to military intervention.

Following 9/11, the interventionism literature narrowed to emphasise the ‘state building’ activities of military interventions, especially as defence policies increasingly placed emphasis on the ‘absence of effective governance’ in locales such as Afghanistan. Stuart Eizenstat, Tonya Langford, and Andrea Kathryn Talentino, amongst other academics, placed much prominence on the roles interventionists could and should play, ranging from the fairly benign ‘peacekeeping’ of monitoring peace agreements through to ‘peacemaking’ and ‘peace-enforcing’ whereby interventionists could apply force against ‘peace spoilers’ such as warlords and militias. Furthermore, academics, such as Michael Doyle and Francis Fukuyama, placed their analytical emphasis on the mechanics of state building, such as on the institutionalisation of governance. Additionally, other academics such as James Dobbins, Kimberly Marten, and Robert Orr focused more on the foreign policy aspects of state building interventionism, especially as regards the US as the sole superpower. Much of this work attempted to provide an intellectual framework for guiding the US response to 9/11, building upon the experiences learned from state building exercises in the Balkans and Africa in the 1990s.

Gaps in the literature

Overall, there has been an immense body of literature which has sought to define the key dynamics of the post-Cold War era by placing an emphasis on weak and failed states on the international system's periphery and appropriate responses to them. However, despite the volume of literature on these topics, there are still gaps within it that allow for further research to be worthwhile.

The first major gap in the literature is that it does not consistently define the context of where interventions are occurring and subsequently whether or not they succeed in achieving their goals. As has just been illustrated, there appears to be a general sentiment that presently anarchy 'out there' affects security in the West. Many names have been applied to move beyond simplistically using the label 'weak and failed states'. This is necessary because it is essentially a misnomer to simply leave labelling them as 'states' because by definition they lack the 'empirical sovereignty' so crucial to delineating actual states. Furthermore, keeping the term only as 'weak and failed' states does nothing to explain other than the fact that they have weak governance structures, not what that means more broadly for the rest of the world.

However, while it is useful to move beyond the limiting notion of weak and failed states to try and define such areas in a more useful manner, i.e. more explanative for understanding what attributes define these places and what reactions they provoke because of how they are perceived, the literature does not do so consistently. For instance, both Kaplan and Ignatieff use the term 'frontiers' in their work but never define it in any meaningful detail and also use a ménage of other terminology anyway, as 'danger zones' and 'marginal areas' for example.³⁹ Furthermore, much of the terminology presently used is overly broad. Barnett's use of a 'gap' is dubious because he includes in it most of the developing world even though the problem he specifically identifies is limited to just the most direly weak or outright failed states. This critique has also been levelled frequently at Kaplan for over generalising the chaos of a few especially conflict prone states in West Africa to be representative of the developing world. As K.J. Holsti has argued, defining overly generic terminology to "predict vast zones of chaos and anarchy is fundamentally a mistake."⁴⁰ Many post-colonial developing states are doing well while others are certainly not outright disasters.

Somalia, for example, is special by any standard and not particularly comparable to neighbouring Kenya as a state or as an international security concern.

The second major gap in the literature is that it places little to no consistent emphasis on the relationships that form between foreign interventionists and indigenous politics and the way that the context of 'weak and failed states' shapes those relationships. As Barry Buzan and Richard Little have argued, if one accepts that on some level there is a 'zone of peace' and a 'zone of conflict' then a central issues becomes how they "relate to each other, for that they relate in many and significant ways is beyond question."⁴¹ Considering this, it is notable that out of all the comparisons with imperialism, so little is made of the dynamics that saw it succeed or fail ultimately, 'collaboration' with indigenous politics. It is notable that academics who write extensively on imperialism and its advocacy- such as Ignatieff and Lal- dedicate almost no attention to collaboration. Indeed, one cannot find the term applied to any degree in any of their works. For his part, Ferguson claims that "more than anything else, the British Empire was an empire based on local collaboration" yet he places absolutely no emphasis towards defining what that means exactly, why it was so, or what mechanisms would allow the US to emulate it.⁴²

And yet, as Jonathon Steele argued in one short newspaper column, in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the 'classic dilemma of collaboration' still defines those interventionist endeavours.⁴³ This timeless dilemma is true of interventions generally and covers both the hesitance of indigenous actors to partner with intervening forces as well as that of the foreign forces to choose and work with local partners. Fundamentally, in an era when imperialism as an ideology is dead but still remains a means to an end, how to collaborate, or not, is a defining issue but one that has received no comprehensive academic analysis. The Pentagon now euphemistically emphasises 'indirect action', namely undertaking operations with and through local indigenous partners. The increasing mantra of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and representative of state building interventionism more broadly, is that "everything we do...is 'by', 'through', [and] 'with' the *indigs*."⁴⁴ And yet, there is not a clear understanding of what these ambiguous terms and the sentiments behind them actually mean within the academic discourse of International Relations.

Representing a common theme of thought, Lal argued of the ‘American imperium’ that there is a need to “build the complementary imperial administrative structure required to run an empire.”⁴⁵ Sharing that sentiment, most of the academic analysis has focused rather generically on arguing laundry lists of ‘to do’ items for interventionist forces. For instance, many academics have argued for the need to have dedicated reconstruction agencies, improved multilateral partnerships, larger budgets, better linguistic skills, and a whole gamut of endless, usually bureaucratic items. Namely, nearly all of the analytical effort has been put towards understanding one side of the equation, the interventionist forces, rather than how they interact and partner with local participants. One of the few exceptions has been the outstanding book by Beatrice Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People*.

Overarching this general gap is that so much of the imperialism, intervention and state building discourse has focused too heavily on the assumed primacy and agency of the interventionists- be they an individual state, a ‘coalition of the willing’, or the UN- rather than giving more credence, and hence analysis, to indigenous actors. Considering that, there is not a systematic approach that looks at the definitive agency of local actors in states undergoing interventionism and the way that they interface with foreign interventionist actors. Moreover, there is no clear understanding of how the context of where that interaction occurs inherently shapes it- ‘gaps’, ‘arcs’, ‘marginal areas’, and ‘trouble spots’ cannot only but be confusing. The effect that this has had on policy is profound. This is perhaps most so for the US which, as Ignatieff contended, finds itself presently fighting wars “with no clear policy of intervention, no clear end in sight and no clear understanding among Americans of what their nation has gotten itself into.”⁴⁶

1.3: Thesis outline

... today’s environment resembles a challenge... so immense that it requires major shifts in strategic concepts for national security... New modes of cooperation can enhance agility and effectiveness with traditional allies and engage new partners in a common cause.

- US Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006’⁴⁷

There is a pressing need to understand why Western states are involved in interventions spread from Haiti and Liberia to Afghanistan and as far as the Solomon Islands. There is also a requirement to analyse why nearly all post-Cold War interventions have failed

to achieve their goals or have only done so slowly and merely partially. It is this thesis' argument that this can best be done through the contextualisation provided by an academic review of frontiers and collaboration. Needless to say, there is exceedingly little International Relations literature that is particularly useful to furthering an interest in frontier zones, their dynamics and their interactions with the wider world, or of 'collaboration' between indigenous and interventionist actors. Considering that, this thesis will argue that where International Relations' current analytical approaches have less utility, a new approach is instead required for improved analysis.

A new analytical approach is most likely to succeed if it looks at the 'point of impact' of current interventionism, specifically those relationships interfacing an intervening state with indigenous politics, namely who is interacting with whom, why for, and the context of the locale.⁴⁸ Older concepts that were developed for historical-based studies of imperialism as it relates to frontiers do still have applicability to current academic studies in International Relations focused on state building interventionism in weak and failed states. Considering that, this thesis is not on 'empire' or 'imperialism' but rather on 'frontiers' and 'collaboration'. Central to this thesis will be the adaptation and application of key theories developed by the British historians Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher in their seminal works on the British Empire. Emphasis will be given to adapting and expanding upon their arguments- notably for the definitive 'pericentric pull' of crises in the periphery, what can be considered 'frontiers of insecurity', as well as the 'theory of collaboration' sketched by Robinson- for application to International Relations in the 21st Century.

The reason for placing an emphasis on Robinson and Gallagher's historical works, as compared to say Geopolitics or mainstream International Relations theories such as Realism, is that they provide, as Sydney Kanya-Forstner noted, a "neat, logical- almost irresistible- extension of a line of argument, both conceptually and in terms of its scope."⁴⁹ Robinson and Gallagher were brilliant historians able to show how diverse factors- domestic politics in the periphery, international security dynamics and global economics- interacted together to create a panorama of international politics which fostered the British Empire. Through their analysis they were able to do what current literature is unable- provide for the context that would provoke Western

interventionism, explain the dynamic of that interventionism, and then articulate the conditions that would determine its efficacy.

Using ideas first promulgated by Robinson and Gallagher but adapted as necessary, this thesis will make its contribution to the study of International Relations by shedding light on post-Cold War state building interventionism in the peripheral anarchy of weak and failed states. Towards that purpose, guiding this thesis' research will be two related questions:

1. Why and how do Western states presently respond to peripheral anarchy in the form of weak and failed states?
2. Are their responses succeeding at meeting their goals, namely mitigating their security concerns in the present era of globalisation?

The thesis will answer these questions by providing the contextualisation of interventions- frontiers of insecurity, viz. 'frontier states'- and the dynamic for interventions- the pericentric pull of those frontiers. Most importantly this thesis seeks to argue that the academic review of interventions must focus on the centrality of indigenous political actors to defining them, namely through their 'collaboration'. In sum, the thesis argues that present state-building interventions must be understood as *interactive processes of collaboration with indigenous politics in frontiers of insecurity*, namely that they are endeavours to find and strengthen suitable collaborators to meet Western security needs by creating more stability in frontier states. Subsequently, the thesis is broken down into three major sections.

The contextualisation of frontiers of insecurity

The initiating argument of this thesis is that what actually exists, as often before, is literally a 'frontier problem'. Rather than invent a plethora of new terminology- e.g. trouble spots, marginal areas, arcs of crisis, zones of chaos, gaps- to describe an enduring historical reality, this thesis will analyse the timeless context of frontiers and attempts to manage them through interventionism. Conducive to this is the reality that many of today's frontiers were those of yesteryear, for instance the US again finds itself in the southern Philippines while the British are once more fighting on the Afghan-Pakistan border. Frontiers of insecurity are anarchic politico-geographical areas in the

periphery that are also zones of contact with the core states, notably the West, because of globalisation. This definitional construct places emphasis on the *what* of peripheral areas of anarchy, i.e. the actual politico-geographic areas of weak and failed states, and the *why* of globalisation, i.e. the actual contact with them. Despite arguments that geography is increasingly irrelevant, this thesis argues that territorial space still matters greatly; geography is not dead. There are real 'frontier states' and the best argument for this is that people still move in fairly uniform directions. There are no illegal immigration problems in Afghanistan, Somalia or Haiti and there are no peacekeeping missions in Norway, Finland or Japan. If geography is irrelevant this would not be so.

The importance of frontier states is the unique context they provide in contrast to the relatively simple 'peacekeeping' between states undertaken during the Cold War. As Mats Berdal argued, present interventions are occurring in "less than permissive environments", notably those of domestic anarchy where local actors often directly agitate against interventionists.⁵⁰ The construct of frontiers of insecurity provides sorely missing contextualisation for how weak and failed states, because of globalisation, interface with other actors in the international system, notably Western states. This thesis will focus on the significance of the contact which globalisation forces, noting the immediacy it provides as well as the increasingly powerful role of non-state actors that it facilitates. Furthermore, it is not the argument of this thesis that frontiers of insecurity are merely *terra nullius*. Rather, it is that they are in fact political worlds that require sophisticated interaction and partnership with indigenous politics in order to transition them into more stable states, namely they require nuanced collaboration. It is the argument of this thesis that frontiers of insecurity are actually a fairly limited occurrence. A major flaw of much of the current literature is that it is overly generic—the 'arc' being the Muslim world or the 'gap' being all developing countries. It is necessary to be more specific and focus on only about 20 states out of nearly 200.

Lastly, it is important to note that frontiers of insecurity are not 'rogue states', which are a substantively different matter. Dictatorships in North Korea and Iran do not make for frontier zones. Often academics have lumped together rogues with weak and failed states and this has caused profound policy miscalculations since they cannot be dealt with in an equivalent manner. Framing Iraq and Afghanistan as part of the same problem, notably claiming Iraq was substantively similar to Afghanistan, was US

President George W. Bush's primary mistake in diagnosing the need for toppling Saddam Hussein. The irony has been that subsequent to the US intervention in Iraq, it arguably now can be considered a frontier of insecurity. However, it should be clearly stated that this thesis will not analyse Iraq as it was not a frontier of insecurity in any manner when it was invaded by the US in March 2003.

The pericentric pull and state-building interventionism

The second argument of this thesis is that the pulling nature of frontiers, the *dynamic* of a 'pericentric pull', stimulates Western interventionism. In the post-Cold War era there has been a major shift in strategic thinking away from the central German plains and the Korean peninsula. A crescendo of 'local crises' has transformed into a 'general crisis' of frontiers of insecurity in locales previously deemed negligible to international security.⁵¹ This interventionism by Western states is focused on state-building, namely strengthening national governments to more effectively govern their sovereign territory, and is inherently 'imperialistic' because it requires the temporary control by foreign powers over domestic outcomes. This state building endeavour is not one particular activity but rather is a dynamic process focused on empowering indigenous collaborative partners in the form of national governments. This thesis examines how this process unfolds, namely how partners engage in collaborative processes to act or decide on issues contributing to achieving common goals, namely the more effective control of territory through stronger governance.

As Christopher Coker has argued, "insecurity can now only be managed."⁵² Through state-building interventions, Western states are attempting to do that in response to frontiers, namely they "wish to 'reshape environments' the better to minimise risks that come from them."⁵³ The purpose is not to naively 'create order' but rather it is to simply create stronger, more effectively governed states that allow for security concerns to be mitigated and become more 'manageable' rather than ended altogether. The ultimate goal of this interventionism is to push frontiers of insecurity beyond the 'peripheral threshold', viz. ending those attributes that define them as frontiers and this means empowering collaborative partners, again mostly in the form of national governments, to be able to more effectively manage their sovereign space.

The crucial attribute of the pericentric pull of frontiers, viz. the dynamic of peripheral insecurity stimulating Western interventionism, is that the presence and type of local collaborative partners determines whether interventionism takes place and indeed if it is practicable. As Robinson and Gallagher argued of imperialism, “the choice of mode was a purely tactical consideration shaped by circumstances.”⁵⁴ The circumstances were what possibilities for collaboration existed. What is notable about this aspect of the ‘pericentric school’s’ emphasis is that just as in the past, the general lack of local partners suitable for Western states meeting their security interests can be seen in the present era as well. The West seeks an international system based on at least somewhat functional states run by sovereign governments. And yet in the frontier states these indigenous partners in the form of effective national governments are decidedly lacking. Hence, a deeper type of engagement is required, one that can be deemed to be essentially about imperialistic control for the short to near term.

The importance of collaboration with indigenous actors cannot be understated for understanding present interventions. Interventions are required because the West cannot presently find collaborative partners in the form of effective national governments to help manage their security concerns regarding globalisation, so they temporarily employ imperialistic means to strengthen or even create anew such collaborative partners. Given that, analysing the framework, mechanics, and dynamics of collaboration allows for a greatly improved understanding of present interventionism. This thesis thus defines a ‘theory of collaboration’ for understanding present interventionism. It stipulates the following precepts:

- The absence or presence of effective indigenous partners as well as the structure of indigenous society determine whether interventions are practicable or not.
- The choice and combination of indigenous collaborative systems available to the intervening power should define the structure and form that the intervention takes- be it administrative, military, diplomatic, or legal.
- The degree of control necessitated for the intervening power to assert in order to achieve its goals is inversely proportionate to that of the capabilities (and hence control) which the collaborating indigenous elite are able to provide through governance.
- If the intervening power runs out of effective, responsive indigenous collaborating partners, it is forced to leave even if it has not achieved its goals.

Ameliorating the collaboration problematique

The major argument of this thesis focuses on what is termed the collaboration problematique, a ‘wicked problem’ never to be entirely solved, merely ameliorated. In its simplest terms, in a time when imperialism as an ideology is dead but imperialistic means are required, how can the West deal with the classic dilemma of collaboration in frontier states? Presently Western powers are both failing to build appropriate ‘collaborative systems’, those relationships linking interventionists actors to indigenous politics, and to manage their collaborative partnerships over the longer-term. The centrality of this crucial aspect to interventionism is the *collaboration problematique*—the inherent difficulty of finding and strengthening suitable collaborative partners within indigenous politics.

The collaboration problematique has several important aspects. The most important is that the pericentric pull provoking a strengthened presence in frontier zones is a result of the lack of suitable collaborative partners. If such persons or groups existed in the first place, there would be no provocation for an intervention. As Jochen Hippler noted, “the dilemma of needing dependable, effective and politically acceptable partners with influence in the target country lies in the fact that such partners often do not exist.”⁵⁵ Hence, the problem of finding or even creating anew suitable collaborative partners lies at the heart of contemporary state building interventionism. Often the goal of strengthening national governments contrasts sharply with the need for other types of action. With the reality that government structures are often non-existent, or exceptionally weak, ethnically divided, and/or exceedingly corrupt, it is not surprising that interventionist forces caught in the dilemma of needing timely action and functional partners instead turn to militias, warlords and at times even to criminal gangs.⁵⁶ For instance, as Rubin Barnett argued, state building “means creating a sovereign centre of political accountability, which is not necessarily the same as building an ally in the war on terror.”⁵⁷

Furthermore, the collaboration problematique currently facing Western states undertaking interventionism is internal in two ways. The first is that collaboration is not defined as a strategic doctrine presently and hence the art thereof is inadequately understood. This means that collaboration is simply poorly undertaken by the West; it

effectively lacks the ‘collaborative know-how’ to undertake effective interventions. Second is that the West is not willing to ‘pay’ very much for its interventions as shown by the current emphasis on shallow democratic processes, short timeframes and limited material and political commitment. This means that intervening actors struggle to maintain collaborative systems conducive to transitioning frontier states to greater stability. Overall, as highlighted in the theory of collaboration, the consequence of the poor approach to collaboration is that ultimately the West is not translating its energy and resources into ‘internalisation’ by indigenous politics. Given that, present interventions are not particularly successful at achieving their goal of creating stronger states.

Compounding these problems of know-how and dedication is a profound values debate which conflicts collaborative relationships. Attempting to balance Western interests and demands- such as democratisation, human rights, liberal economics, and ‘good governance’- with those of their collaborative partners in indigenous politics- who have often opposed demands and needs for their more ‘localised’ interests and institutions- is inherently challenging. If imperialism is dead as both an ideology and an accepted means, the challenge is how to implement interventions when Westerners hesitate to be ‘imperialists’ and actors from indigenous politics resist being ‘collaborators’.

1.4: Conclusion

This thesis concerns why some states feel threatened by anarchy in the periphery, how they respond to it by expanding control there temporarily, and whether they succeed depending upon how well they manage to interface with and shape local partners to take more control over territory using the governance institutions of the state. The best way to make interventions more effective is simply through improved collaboration with indigenous politics. Achieving this requires some major changes to the current approach taken to state building interventionism. If Western states can enhance their approach to and implementation of collaboration with indigenous politics, they can better manage insecurity on the frontiers through state-building interventionism.

A starting point is to simply place more emphasis on the centrality of collaboration to interventionism. If the West really does not want to engage in imperialistic

interventions because it does not believe in imperialism as an ideology but still feels pressed to use imperialistic means to protect itself, it must work to improve its collaborative skills to find and strengthen local partners rather than send in significant numbers of its own troops. With no willingness to send abroad massive armies or undertake formal colonisation, there is a need to essentially allow the frontier to help take care of the frontier's problems; to do local problem solving using local resources.

As the West does want to maintain a light presence but also to bring about profound changes in frontiers through state-building interventionism, it needs a new 'doctrine of collaboration'. This would require a move away from conventional war strategies, which have encouraged an unhealthy distancing from engaging indigenous politics and forming real relationships. Rather, such a doctrine of collaboration would centre on the interventionists' abilities to comprehend and nuance local politics in frontiers by finding and strengthening indigenous collaborative partners there. This responds to the dire reality that the Western way of war is only effective in itself against other states and struggles to engage the reality of frontier states, defined as they are by anarchy and non-state actors.⁵⁸

In places such as southeast Afghanistan and the eastern DR Congo, current emphases on awesome military power are failing and instead a new approach of engaging local politics more deeply through nuanced collaboration is required. On the whole, a doctrine of collaboration would emphasise more local partnership and fewer smart bombs. In this sense, such a doctrine would still combine some aspect of the 'Rumsfeld doctrine' of small, mobile, technologically advanced forces which undoubtedly have a lot of value with Nixon's 'Guam doctrine', namely Western powers should not engage in wars in the periphery unless interventionist forces have local partners with real potential and who are motivated. In this way, any sort of 'revolution of military affairs' should focus more on the rather archaic notion of collaboration and not merely on technology, making it more of a retrograde revolution than a progressive one.

It is important to explain why this thesis has chosen to focus on Western states and their responses to frontiers of insecurity. The states of North America, Europe, Japan and Australia/New Zealand have been chosen because they represent the bulk of the foreign

actors undertaking present interventions whether by using their own military forces and political agents directly or through their formative influence over and funding of the United Nations' missions. Furthermore, this thesis focuses on the West because, as David Rieff argued, only it is "rich enough and powerful enough to intervene in a far-off catastrophe in a way that can make a major difference."⁵⁹ Most interventions simply do not take place without a significant degree of Western involvement presently.

However, this thesis makes no assertion that the dynamic of a pericentric pull only provokes Western states in the post-Cold War era. There have also been cases of developing states intervening in their weak and failed neighbours, for instance Rwanda in the DR Congo, Nigeria in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and Ethiopia in Somalia. Importantly, collaboration with indigenous politics is as central to these interventions as it is for Western ones. In addition, the ideas articulated by this thesis also have validity for better understanding what Martin Shaw has termed 'quasi-imperialism', namely the control exerted over peripheral areas by the cores of power in large states that have imperial legacies.⁶⁰ In this way, it would be useful to analyse how collaboration on peripheral frontiers occurs within states such as Ethiopia (in places like Gambella), Indonesia, Thailand, Sudan, Russia, and China. However, in order to keep the thesis of a manageable size, only interventions undertaken by the West will be directly considered.

An additional qualification of this thesis' analysis must be made. Some would consider the very notion of frontiers to be direly Eurocentric and given that, lacking of academic rigour. While the focus of the thesis is on interventions in frontiers by Western states, it believes that the notion of what constitutes a frontier zone is universally applicable. In an era of globalisation, Somalia is as much a frontier to Ethiopia as it is to Europe while Afghanistan occupies the parallel security concerns for India and Iran as it does for the United States. Furthermore, that some especially prone weak and failed states should be contextualised differently is fairly obvious to all except the most dogmatically politically correct academic. Just before being assassinated, the Lebanese militia leader Bashir Gemal noted of his home country that "[it] is not Norway here, and it is not Denmark."⁶¹ Frontiers are a timeless condition and it is naïve to think that they no longer exist because of a detached hope that all states are now equal in terms of their abilities to function as states or that there is actually only one 'global frontier-land'. It

is hard to imagine anyone standing in the streets of Mogadishu, Kabul or Monrovia thinking otherwise.

What is more, it is worth pondering about who wants 'frontiers'. Through their responses, namely state building interventions, it is apparent that Western states do not. Mary Kaldor argued of the post-Cold War era's 'new wars' that they "take place in regions where the state is weak, so the aim is to capture or control parts of the state apparatus."⁶² While true on occasion, ever more this is not really the aim of 'frontiersmen', the growing multitudes of increasingly powerful non-state actors. Violence is now often defined less by the instrumental political goals of state control than the maintenance of a condition, one of perpetual anarchy that permits the continued existence of individuals and groups that do not need, and indeed do not want, stronger states to exist. These include, for instance, warlords in Somalia and opium traders in Afghanistan. Frontiers are special precisely because they are anarchic; the goal is the maintenance of a perpetual frontier. Indeed, as David Keen has argued, "bizarre forms of collaboration" often exist in the chaos of civil wars whereby assorted local actors, rebel movements and rogue government agents, work together to exploit violence over the longer-term and actively stymie the creation of stronger states, such as happened in Sierra Leone in the mid- and late-1990s.⁶³

In conclusion, as Yahya Sadowski noted, with ever more complexity defining the world, the strategic doctrines of the West will need to be "tailored more to local particularities rather than relying upon global maxims."⁶⁴ There have been many debates on 'empire' and 'imperialism', state building and interventionism, and on globalisation and weak and failed states. The purpose of this thesis is not to try and probe through those discourses exhaustively or argue for the merits of certain arguments within them. Rather, the intent is to introduce the notion that 'collaboration' in 'frontiers', i.e. the 'point of contact', is central to understanding why, how and whether Western interventions are successful or not at creating stronger states in the extreme periphery and hence mitigating their security concerns stemming from globalisation.

CHAPTER 2: FRONTIERS OF INSECURITY

*... globalisation has drawn us out of self-contained national or local communities into a larger world that offers none of the old protections.*¹

Long before the creation of the present international system, frontiers have been a strong theme in the history of humanity. From the northern edges of the Roman Empire facing Germanic barbarians, the ‘Wild West’ of America, to the Northwest Frontier of the British Raj, frontier zones always played a central role in the politics and identities of their respective times. The romance, danger, and mystery that they have conjured as ‘wild lands’, chaotic and turbulent, compelled those facing them to engage them so as to manage them and mitigate the insecurity emanating from them. Gradually most were even subsumed into the hinterlands proper. This chapter will review understandings of what define frontiers and from that articulate how modern frontiers exist in the form of ‘frontiers of insecurity’, namely as ‘frontier states’, by building upon the insights of the British historians Robinson and Gallagher in their seminal work *Africa and the Victorians*.

2.1: Defining frontiers

*Frontiers... are places where authority- neither secure nor nonexistent- is open to challenge, and where polarities of order and chaos assume many guises.*²

It is important to firstly clarify the meaning of the term ‘frontiers’ by considering its usage over time, notably how it relates to a boundary with which it is often confusingly used as a synonym. A good place to start is with Lord Curzon, writing and speaking in 1907, who noted that the academic study of frontiers as a subject “was almost totally ignored” despite the fact that the “majority of the most important wars of the [19th] century have been frontier wars.”³ Curzon attempted to rectify this by focusing on the term in his hallmark Romanes Lecture at Oxford University where he defined frontiers both as geographic areas and as boundaries between states in two senses. Firstly, he meant as fairly ambiguous areas there “to be settled, demarcated and then maintained.”⁴ Secondly, he meant it at times to be a strict territorial limit, i.e. demarcated, between

states and noted: “Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death to nations.”⁵ In this way, frontiers could exist as fairly defined markers of territory or as more general areas of control or influence between political entities.

Presently, the general application of the word in public discourse has taken a fairly bland, utilitarian meaning confining its usage largely as a synonym of ‘boundary’, connoting the delineation of a border between states. The *Oxford English Dictionary*, for instance, merely describes a frontier as “a boundary between countries.”⁶ As the academic study of frontiers has largely subsided in the last forty years, especially within International Relations, the present definitions of it have also disappointingly tended to be rather simple. Within the present field of International Relations, frontiers have most commonly been used to signify ‘contact zones’ between different cultures and civilisations and especially in the context of empires. For instance, in its short entry, *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* leaves its definition of frontiers as “a zone of contact between two entities or social systems” and notes it is distinct from a boundary, which is a strict territorial limit.⁷ Another relatively common definition in International Relations literature is as the “politico-geographical area lying beyond the integrated region of the political unit.”⁸ However, it is remarkable that in general, the term has not been used very much in International Relations literature in the past several decades and when done, in a very abstract and fleeting manner.⁹ This is unfortunate as the term historically had much more depth to it and hence analytical value. Perhaps the constriction in its application has been a result of the ostensible completion of the states system, the ‘final frontier’ being space itself, gleefully claimed by NASA.

In order to maximise the utility of frontiers as an intellectual construct it is necessary to define the term in a much more nuanced way than the fairly limited usage of them as ‘boundaries’. Overall, it is still appropriate to define a frontier as 1) the ‘politico-geographical area lying beyond the integrated region of the political unit’ as well as 2) a ‘zone of contact’ for entities or social systems, as it is generally understood in International Relations literature. Yet, it is crucial that these two overly general definitional themes be complemented by some qualifications.

Ladis Kristof, writing in the 1970s, presented some of the more nuanced understanding behind the origin and development of the term.¹⁰ Historically the usage of the term has implied to project outwards, 'in front', rather than inwards, 'within bounds' as in for a boundary. A frontier, originally, was not a precise delineation of a zone or area between entities but rather "designated an area which was part of a whole, specifically the part which was ahead of the hinterland." As it was not a strict limit or the end to a political unit because of a belief in a universal state or existence, the frontier "meant quite literally 'the front': the *frons* of the *imperium mundi* which expands to the only limits it can acknowledge, namely the limits of the world." Hence, frontiers were 'beginnings' and not 'ends' of societies because they were the symbolic "spearhead of light and knowledge expanding into the realm of darkness and of the unknown." However, as more developed patterns of human life formed above the mere levels of subsistence, frontiers became "meeting places not merely of different ways of physical survival, but also of different concepts of the good life and hence increasingly political in character."

There are three crucial differences between frontiers and boundaries, a key conceptual need for the present application of frontiers in International Relations. Firstly, a frontier is outer-oriented and "directed towards the outlying areas which are both a source of danger and a coveted prize... and develop their own interests quite different" from the hinterland, often representing "runaway elements and interests."¹¹ A boundary on the other hand is inner-oriented, created by a hinterland or state, and has no life of its own. While frontiers have 'frontiersmen' who are "teeming, spontaneous, and unmediated in their daily activities", boundaries are "mediated... generalised into international law... removed from the changing desires of the inhabitants of borderlands."¹² This specification is why frontiers have been seen to have their own 'spirit', which is believed to create a unique process of character building conducive to life on a frontier. On the American frontier, as on other frontiers such as the Australian 'outback' or those of the British Empire, this could be seen in the emphasis placed on rugged individualism and the related belief in proactive action. Furthermore, frontiers are distinct from boundaries in that they are "characteristic of rudimentary socio-political relations and/or absence of laws" while the presence of boundaries "is a sign that the political community has reached a degree of maturity and orderliness, the stage of law abidance."¹³

Secondly, frontiers are manifestations of centrifugal forces while boundaries are those of centripetal forces. Frontiers do have a strategic utility in keeping out enemies which is dependant on the support provided by the hinterland. Yet, it is because of this need to use frontiers as strategic tools, to maximise all the available resources of any given state, that hinterlands must seek to “control and bound” frontiers and an “effort is made to draw a line of effective control over both ingress and egress; not only the enemy has to be kept out but one’s own citizens have to be kept in.”¹⁴ Hence, because of these opposing forces, it is natural for any state over time to seek to exchange frontiers for boundaries, which provide them with more security in the longer-term. This can be seen in what Edward Luttwak defined as the two phases of the Roman Empire as it related to its frontier policy.¹⁵ The first being a “hegemonic empire” and the second as a “territorial empire” with the former as “indirect (hegemonic) rule through clients” and the latter as “more overtly defensive... frontiers were delineated... and incorporated into the provincial structure of the empire.”¹⁶ As the Empire matured, it naturally sought to consolidate its security, with the primary need being to formally absorb its frontiers, to incorporate them effectively under its own direct control.

Thirdly, frontiers should be understood as integrating factors while boundaries are a separating one. A frontier is a zone of transition between different spheres of ways of life “neither fully assimilated to nor satisfied with each other, [and as such] provides an excellent opportunity for mutual interpenetration and sway.”¹⁷ Frontiers see a blending of the socio-political approaches of the different spheres of life. It is because of this “watering down of loyalties and blurring of differences” that states in turn “attempt to forestall by substituting the semi-autonomous frontiers with a controlled and exact borderline.”¹⁸ W.G. East argued that there are both ‘frontiers of contact’ and ‘frontiers of separation’.¹⁹ For instance, historically there have indeed been frontiers intended to separate opposing powers, notably through the creation or maintenance of buffer states like Siam, Afghanistan or Abyssinia. However, almost universally, “frontiers normally diminish in width... and frontiers of separation are replaced by frontiers of contact.”²⁰ Even physical walls, such as Hadrian’s Wall or the Great Wall of China, are but stages in wider frontier zones, not the literal end to contact between those peoples and societies on either side. To continue with Luttwak’s Roman analysis, even with the formation of

a territorial empire, “Rome did not bring down the shutters” on the barbarian worlds, but continued to interact with them through diplomacy and at times warfare.²¹

Furthermore, frontiers have psychological and cultural connotations and hence have frequently fulfilled symbolic functions; “Primitive man lives in a world which has a spatial unknown, a dread frontier populated by the heated imagination.”²² Yet well into modern times, frontiers have still been viewed as a “mythical place of uncertainty and fear.”²³ As frontiers have largely been considered as ‘wild lands’ on the outer edges of any respective polity, they have represented a dark and dangerous unknown filled with the ‘other’. This was essential to early understandings of the term for explaining expansion into frontiers as spreading ‘civilisation’. The notion that they are inhabited by peoples of a fundamentally different societal persuasion has left frontiers with a strong cultural connotation of fear and danger, which in turn has left a deep psychological imprint on the hinterland.

Simply put, we’re afraid of frontiers because they are an unknown quantity; they are unpredictable. While sovereignty assumes domestic concerns, such as freedom from violence, are dealt with by a respective state, historically frontiers are in front of a state and populated by fairly autonomous ‘frontiersmen’ who largely exist with their own rules. ‘We’ just don’t know what will happen there because that is where we find the ‘other’. For instance, frontiers often existed in mountainous regions for the simple reason that the terrain is conducive to their relatively autonomous development. As Christopher Coker noted, “What distinguishes regions such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Colombia is that they are mountainous and they breed martial people who are good at war.”²⁴

2.2: Robinson and Gallagher’s ‘frontiers of insecurity’

Great Britain was on the brink of a collision with France over the frontier incident at Fashoda; she advanced to Khartoum not to avenge Gordon, but to defend an imperilled and to recover a lost frontier.

- Lord Curzon²⁵

Having reviewed frontiers, a further intellectual construct necessary for introduction is that of 'frontiers of insecurity'. This construct is of significant value, with adaptation into a rigorously defined term, to an improved understanding of current debates in International Relations, namely interventionism in the peripheral crises of the states system. The groundbreaking historians of the British Empire, Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, used the term 'new frontiers of insecurity' as a chapter title in their seminal work *Africa and the Victorians*, which examined British colonial expansion into sub-Saharan Africa in the late-19th Century.²⁶ They did not provide a specific definition for their term. Instead, their running theme was to describe the re-assessment of the Empire's strategic posture starting in the crucial years of 1889-1890. During this time, the Empire's leaders viewed the need to expand British rule into the anarchic Nile Basin frontier as absolutely essential to the Empire's overall security.

Before the financial melt-down of the Khedive in the late-1870s, Britain had been strictly willing to manage her interests in Egypt through informal collaboration with the Khedive. However, more rigid control was increasingly necessitated since it was the only way of "keeping the lid on the unsolved internal crisis" of Egyptian governance and through the 1880s Egyptian governments progressively became ever weaker for a variety of reasons- such as the loss of Sudan in 1885 to the Mahdi, crippling financial debt, and rising nationalist sentiments against the Khedive's rule.²⁷ Given this, by 1889 it was impossible to maintain Britain's preferred method of securing its interests as there was "no way back to an independent order and the old supremacy by influence."²⁸

Evelyn Baring, the British agent in Cairo, warned the British Prime Minister in 1889 that because the indigenous ruling elite had become so discredited, without stronger British intervention the Egyptian ruler's reign would surely end in "a revolution [within] six months'."²⁹ The evolution in Britain's geopolitical considerations laid new found significance upon Egypt because of her control of the Suez Canal and as such elevated Britain's interest in her governance. And indeed, it was this internal crisis in Egypt which mandated the stronger presence of the British Empire there. As a British diplomat explained regarding the weakness of Egypt's internal politics: "This anarchy provides such disorder and weakness on the Egyptian frontier that you are almost bound

to interfere’.”³⁰ By 1890, Britain had indeed made Egypt into one of its ‘veiled protectorates’.

This re-assessment by the British in the late-1880s of both the centrality of Egypt to their global security needs and their concern over Egypt’s internal stability was vital for understanding why there was an expansion of the Empire’s control over even more territories, namely present-day Sudan and Uganda, which had previously been largely ignored. These ‘frontiers of insecurity’ for the Empire were ‘new’ in that they had shifted from the long held, more conventional belief that the key to protecting India, and hence the Empire as a whole, lay in its immediate frontiers to the northwest facing Imperial Russia. This older viewpoint was in stark contrast to the new interests in the apparently marginal and strategically useless lands of sub-Saharan Africa, specifically the Nile Basin areas of present-day Sudan and Uganda. As Robinson and Gallagher explained, “the defensive psychology which kept watch over northern India had been transplanted into Africa [and] the frontiers of fear were on the move.”³¹ This shifting of strategic interests deep into Africa was quite novel and represented a significant break with previous imperial policy. Indeed, as Robinson and Gallagher rather wryly observed regarding the then Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury: “he became the first Victorian statesman to discover a vital interest in the middle of tropical Africa.”³²

Robinson and Gallagher were quite revolutionary in their explanation for the expansion of the British Empire into sub-Saharan Africa because they ascribed so much importance to the internal crises in the politics of regions in the periphery rather than just internal metropolitan motivations. Fundamentally, they argued that the crux of imperial expansion into Africa in the late 19th Century was that “from start to finish the partition of tropical Africa was driven by the persistent crisis in Egypt.”³³ Simply put, as long as Egypt was suffering internal crisis, Britain could not withdraw her control there because to do so would be “risking a return to anarchy which might draw another Power across the route to India.”³⁴ This fear was especially prone as the French and Russians deepened their alliance in world affairs towards the end of the century.

As Robinson and Gallagher would argue more broadly throughout their careers, the imperialist expansion into sub-Saharan Africa was fundamentally not brought about primarily by metropolitan motives for direct, formal control over foreign lands. What Egypt served to illustrate regarding metropolitan motives was that the “transition was not normally activated by these interests as such, but by the breakdown of collaborative mechanisms in extra-European politics which hitherto had provided them with adequate opportunity and protection.”³⁵ The British leadership had contemplated evacuating Egypt in 1889 and 1890, but this was eventually discarded as an option because not only was the country of such strategic value, but that “the politics of the country offered no basis for collaboration after withdrawal.”³⁶ To withdraw would have left Egypt open to either or both complete anarchy or an intervention by another Great Power, most likely the French.

Subsequently, faced with the prospect of attempting to collaborate with Egyptian elites plagued, in the words of Baring, with an “utter incapacity” at governing, there was no other choice but for deepened British imperial control. Furthermore, although the Sudan had been ruled by Egypt up until its conquest by the Mahdi, the prospects for a rejuvenated Egypt returning to manage Sudan to resolve the issue of the Mahdi and his successors, were nigh impossible. Given that there were no suitable collaborators in either Egypt or Sudan itself, a strategic conclusion was reached by London in 1890: “In the end, occupation alone could make certain of the Upper Nile. The Prime Minister agreed that sooner or later the Sudan would have to be reconquered.”³⁷ Sudan was indeed subjugated by the British to formal imperial control by 1899.

As Robinson and Gallagher provided no explicit definition of their term ‘frontiers of insecurity’, it is important to review what they meant given the preceding section’s definition of a frontier. Firstly, the common understanding of frontiers during the British Empire was still very much as ‘wild lands’, anarchically occupied by tribes or weak kingdoms at the margins of a given state’s control or even more broadly of an empire’s. This usage of the term accords with the definition of frontiers as a ‘politico-geographical area lying beyond the integrated region of the political unit’, i.e. the state or the empire itself. Conversely, this makes their application of the term very different from the common usage of the term today as just being a ‘boundary’ between states.

They meant an actual geographic area, not just a thin border marking. As the term was used primarily to describe the areas of the Nile Basin south of Egypt in the 1880s and 1890s, they obviously did not use it to define the delineating lines between states as there were no formal borders then between whatever states might be considered to have existed in the area. What did exist were large tracks of land, occupied by indigenous tribes or by the Mahdi's successors and the Abyssinians, which had been largely ignored by the Great Powers in their expansion of global empires prior to the 1880s.

Secondly, Robinson and Gallagher can also be seen to have had an interest in frontiers as 'zones of contact'. In this sense, it can be understood as contact between polities, namely where the imperialists of Britain were forced to interact with indigenous politics and the other Great Powers in the Nile Basin frontier. To begin with, the contact with other Great Powers was fairly significant in the Nile Basin. While Europe itself had by 1890 been enjoying several decades of peace, brought about by the Concert of Europe and its balance of power, the scramble for Africa once again allowed the Great Powers to confront one another in a more direct, physical manner. This was namely on the ground rather than primarily just through written treaties or other diplomatic manoeuvrings. The Fashoda debacle best epitomized this whereby the race for an obscure town in the Upper Nile and the literal contact there between Great Powers, namely between the respective French and British expeditions of Marchand and Kitchener, was potentially disastrous for peace and stability in Europe proper.

Furthermore, in addition it can be seen that the contact between the British in the Nile Basin frontier was also with actors other than fellow Great Powers. While British interests in the frontiers of the Nile Basin primarily stemmed from their fear of encroachment by other Great Powers, they also had significant contact with indigenous political actors as well. Obviously, the killing of General Gordon by the Mahdi left a very strong impression on the British as did their eventual defeat of his successor in 1898. This interaction with Islamic fundamentalism is notable because it is strikingly reminiscent of many of today's concerns about the rise of political Islam in the Sudan and elsewhere. On the humanitarian front, the Nile Basin was also an important zone of contact for the British public's disdain for the African slave trade. Indeed, it was this dislike that had prompted the devoutly Christian General Gordon to return to the Sudan

at the service of the Khedive for a second time in order to attempt to stifle the trading of slaves from the Upper Nile region by Arab slavers from further north. Overall, contact with other Great Powers, and to a lesser extent Islamic fundamentalism and slavery, was important interaction for the British in the Nile Basin frontier and insightful for understanding their foreign policy approach to the region.

In conclusion, a focus on frontiers of insecurity is central to this thesis' research because of the insight that it provides regarding the shift in strategic thinking by a state, in this case the British Empire, towards frontier zones on the periphery. Areas that had once been considered marginal at best to the security of the state were rapidly changed into central pillars of the state's strategic policy. As Robinson and Gallagher concluded, "these once remote and petty interests in Sudan, Uganda and the hinterlands of Zanzibar were changing into safeguards of Britain's world power."³⁸ And, once these frontier zones were elevated in their strategic importance because of the new found significance of Egypt, a deeper imperial control by Britain of the Nile Basin was dictated because of the lack of suitable indigenous collaborators there in order to preclude the other Great Powers from occupying the lands in her stead.

2.3: Current frontiers of insecurity

America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.

- The White House, 'National Security Strategy, 2002'³⁹

For the purposes of this thesis- to research why and how interventionism occurs in weak and failed states by Western states and whether or not this interventionism is successful at managing insecurity- it is now necessary to allocate some thought to adapting and refining the term 'frontiers of insecurity' as a dedicated intellectual construct in International Relations. This is necessary so as to provide the contextualisation required for understanding present interventionism and hence the term must be made more literal, giving much greater emphasis to both the actual geographic area and the contact there as constituting an actual frontier. This section will refine and expand Robinson and Gallagher's general introduction of the term by comparing the two dimensions of frontiers- as zones of contact and as politico-geographical areas- with two of the most

driving trends in International Relations presently, globalisation and weak and failed states.

Defining the 'why' of frontiers of insecurity- the contact of globalisation

The post-Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked.

- The European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'⁴⁰

Today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America's borders have a greater impact inside them.

- The White House, 'National Security Strategy, 2002'⁴¹

One of the key dynamics of the 21st Century is globalisation, what is generally understood to be the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections which transcend the states that compose the modern world. A common entry point for understanding globalisation is the perception of the world as a whole. In the 19th Century, the conception of one 'world' entered the popular lexicon and was greatly solidified when Earth was first viewed as a single entity from space in the early-1960s. That image has had profound connotations for how humanity views itself, namely that of the 'global'-one holistic 'home' for humanity. The global can be understood as "the sum of multiple local activities with worldwide range, consequences and significance" which means globalisation "involves the interpenetration of local activities with world-wide range, consequence and significance."⁴² Hence, of primary importance for globalisation then is that it ties "local life to global structures, processes and events."⁴³

The term globalisation has most commonly been used to define the advent of a truly global economy. The consideration of globalisation cannot be limited, however, to merely the increase in economic interaction and interdependence. There are other deep linkages and interconnections that are increasingly drawing people and societies ever closer together. Some of these increasing interactions can be considered 'good', such as greater cultural exchange through international educational experiences, while there are also decidedly negative consequences due to the increasing linkages and interconnections of globalisation, such as narcotics and human trafficking.

Globalisation brings many fairly new conceptions of security threats other than the most prevalent one of the 20th Century, that of war between states. While interstate wars are still a threat, albeit less so of one, the UN identifies six clusters of current threats: economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; inter-state conflict; internal conflict, including civil war, genocide and other large-scale atrocities; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and international organised crime.⁴⁴ In this way, understandings of what constitutes a ‘security’ issue have broadened such that it is no longer tied merely to the sovereign issues of states and can now include those issues which make individual citizens feel insecure.⁴⁵

Central to globalisation is the role of technology and its increasing ability to allow people and organisations to interact with one another quicker and easier. Technology is also the key to much of today’s insecurity. While in the 18th Century there was technology of global reach, such as steamships, the speed of interconnection was not the same as it is today. What is new to this era of globalisation is the intensity and amplification possible through the technological capabilities of the computer age. Subsequently, the primary implication that globalisation has for present security considerations is its power of immediacy. This immediacy is unique because it allows individuals and sub-state actors to interface with the broader world much more freely. As Michel Foucault once famously concluded, “We are in the epoch of simultaneity; we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed.”⁴⁶

Considering the increase in immediacy, the luxury of safety once enjoyed through physical distance is no more. In the past, individuals in one part of the world were largely free of concern that events elsewhere would directly impact upon them personally. Peoples in diverse parts of the world, which previously may have been entirely unaffected by what happened elsewhere, now find themselves drawn into what is essentially the same social space. Simply put, globalisation now forces contact because ‘we’ are all part of the same space, a planet called Earth that is inhabited by one group of people for all intents and purposes. While in the past it was possible to

separate the 'global' from the 'local', this is increasingly impossible as 'local events' have worldwide ramifications.

Christopher Coker has provided some of the more insightful thinking into globalisation and insecurity and he notes seven globalisation related challenges that have forced states to redefine their security interests- weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, the environment, inequality, migration, organised crime and HIV-AIDS.⁴⁷ Because of the speed and types of interaction and interconnectivity now experienced between multiple sources of insecurity, there is no single country that can defend itself independently from others since a "globalised age requires global responses."⁴⁸ The key consideration of these challenges is that they require coordinated responses since the problems emanating from one state cannot simply be cordoned off from the rest of them.

Furthermore, there has also been a refocusing in the present age of globalisation to cover more than just 'state security' and there is now a strong emphasis on the notion of 'human security', the idea that individual humans should be part of security considerations in the 21st Century. This emphasis on individuals has led to a strategic focus on 'preventive defence' that requires states to take early action to prevent threats from growing to catastrophic size, such as nuclear proliferation, because this is more effective for protecting individuals.⁴⁹

However, it is hard for states to attempt to manage the risks associated with globalisation if they themselves are finding their powers eroded by globalisation. James Rosenau argued that the distinguishing feature of globalisation is that its "globalising processes... are not hindered or prevented by territorial or jurisdictional barriers."⁵⁰ This bypassing of states is a significant feature in rationalising globalisation's security implications because it fundamentally raises doubts about the ability of states to maintain blanket security for their citizens.

Many academics have been quick to point out that because of globalisation, empowerment is shifting from governments to individuals. Michael Barnett noted that in the present age, insecurity can be caused primarily by individuals largely through

their ability to move freely and to access destructive technology. Simply put, in the present era of globalisation, “states don’t kill people, people kill people.”⁵¹ The ability of states to protect their individual citizens from the violence of other individuals is a very challenging task, something that is quite novel to modern history. States have relatively long experience countering the aggression of what they understand, other states, through tools such as diplomacy or military strength, but they have a much harder time devising strategies to prevent violence by individuals against other individuals across state boundaries.

Despite all of the arguments of globalisation ‘shrinking’ the world and bringing humanity ever closer together, this needs to be qualified by the other significant trend of ‘localisation’. People are naturally rather fearful of radical change, especially if they feel powerless to control it. Globalisation, and the contact that it forces, is certainly a radical change agent and one that people around the world have been very keen to resist in defence of what they do know and understand, their own local culture and socio-economic systems. Rosenau has iterated that localisation can be understood as the “pressures that lead people, groups, and societies... to narrow their horizons and withdraw to less encompassing processes, organizations or systems.”⁵² The keywords for understanding globalisation are ‘coherence’, ‘integration’, ‘centralisation’ while localisation has connotations of ‘decentralisation’, ‘fragmentation’ and ‘disintegration’.⁵³ While globalisation is forcing people to identify themselves beyond just the locale where they live, localisation is on the other hand “being driven by pressures to narrow and withdraw... and intensifying the deep attachments to land that can dominate emotion and reasoning.”⁵⁴

Localisation dynamics give an emphasis for people to become more introverted and isolated and this is especially the case when there is no government, or a very weak one, able to balance these localisation dynamics by facilitating the more positive aspects of globalisation, such as formal, regulated trade. Simply put, when the state fades people return to local strategies for survival. This is primarily because as there is no government, or one that has little to offer in tangible benefits, people must look to their local environment for more of their general sustenance. If a national government does not exist or cannot provide any real tangible benefits, then certainly the international

community is much harder to access in positive ways other than through limited interactions, such as humanitarian aid.

The dynamic of localisation, the opposing reaction to globalisation, is ironically driven by the dynamics of globalisation itself. Indeed, it is these “continual tensions and interactions between the forces propelling the fragmentation of communities and those conducting their integration” that are a defining feature of the present age.⁵⁵ Not everybody is enjoying the benefits of globalisation, especially economic, and presently the greatest cultural gap in the world is between those who are fully integrated, and largely willingly so, into globalising processes versus those who feel cut-off from them, coerced into them, or indeed just resentful of globalisation in general.

The inherent tensions between globalising dynamics provoking localising ones have the potential to see that “enormous social and political power is unleashed.”⁵⁶ This can be seen presently around the world at anti-globalisation protests, the resentment of ‘Americanisation’ in many parts of the world, and the wide-ranging efforts of people and communities to defend their local culture and traditions, be they French farmers, indigenous rebels in Mexico, or factory workers in Indonesia. In conclusion, as Coker noted: “To the globalised the other seems marginal; to the marginal, the globalised seem uncaring and exploitative. This difference is likely to be a growing source of conflict in the near future.”⁵⁷

Having now provided a brief review of globalisation, it is possible to explain how the definition of frontiers can be used to develop a specific definition for frontiers of insecurity in relation to globalisation. Globalisation is central to the definition because it is very much the ‘contact’ in the two-pronged definition of a frontier, namely a frontier being both a ‘zone of contact’ as well as a ‘politico-geographical area’.

John Lewis Gaddis argued that one of the primary attractions historically for would-be immigrants to the US has been the hope that it could “insulate domestic life from a violent external world.”⁵⁸ The protection of distance is no longer taken for granted in the post-9/11 world. Because of the nature of present globalisation, it is no longer

possible for anybody to separate themselves fully from anybody else. We all truly live on one planet now. The types of insecurity presently faced- be they terrorism, WMD, or epidemics- cannot be separated and blocked by the borders of the world. The Australian military thus noted that “asymmetric threats... have reduced the value of defences built around geographic advantage”⁵⁹, such as distance, while the US military added, “geographic insularity no longer confers security for the country.”⁶⁰ There are some who attempt to isolate themselves from the contact with others brought about through globalisation, hence the dynamic of localisation. However, as mentioned, the dynamics of globalisation versus that of localisation are such that the driving one is globalisation, which is fundamentally about integration rather than the separation of localisation.

Frontiers may simultaneously be a conduit for contact among different kinds of objects and activities as well as barriers to contact for other objects and activities. As Rosenau highlighted, there are six basic types of interaction: goods and services, people, ideas and information, money, normative orientations, and behavioural patterns and practices. The technology of the present era, through globalisation, has greatly expanded the possibilities for all these types of interaction. Many of the positive interactions can at times be supplanted by negative ones. On the one hand, the beneficial movements of goods and services, labour and capital through free trade have been stifled by the twin problems of “civil wars and lawless corrupt governments.”⁶¹ On the other hand, the states of the world have largely been unable to stem the more negative types of interaction.

Of significance is the movement of people. A world facing ‘super-empowered individuals’, those able to cause great damage relative to their own numerical insignificance, means the possibilities for danger are greatly increased.⁶² In the past, the primary threat for mass violence was from states, yet individuals or small groups are now able to do “the sort of damage which before only state armies or major revolutionary movements could achieve.”⁶³ As Gaddis pointedly noted regarding 9/11: “by expending 19 lives and a few hundred thousand dollars, the attackers managed to kill some 3,000 people, to inflict as much as a hundred billion dollars’ worth of property damage, and to redefine the nature of our times.”⁶⁴

Furthermore, even while one type of interaction may be limited, given the interrelated nature of present insecurity, it is possible for one type of interaction to allow for more negative types of results to occur. For instance, the relatively free movement of legal immigrant labour may also allow for a rise in narcotics or human trafficking. Moreover, the EU has argued of the interrelated threats it faces by pointing out that 90 percent of heroin comes to Europe from Afghanistan through Balkan criminal gangs, the same ones responsible for the annual trafficking of 200,000 women for the European sex trade.⁶⁵

While the conditions of weak and failed states hinder their economic interaction in terms of formal, regulated trading with the core, it does not stymie it outright. For instance, Somalia as a state has not really 'existed' since the early 1990s. In the time since it has not ceased to interact with the world overall, but it has so in many formal ways such as regulated international trade. However, what is crucial to highlight is that while frontiers might be 'moving away' from the hinterland in the sense of them having less 'normal' interaction (what could mostly be considered the 'good globalisation', viz. increasing formal economic linkages and interdependence or increased government participation in multilateralism), they are still interacting with the rest of the world through the other aspects of globalisation.

Research by the World Bank, amongst others, has persuasively shown how increased economic opportunities provided through globalisation allow actors in weak and failed states to exploit opportunities allowed for through economic globalisation.⁶⁶ So while for weak and failed states as sovereign entities there is increasing isolation as members of the international system, there is not necessarily a decrease in other types of interactions. For instance, while the DR Congo was imploding into prolonged civil war, it was increasingly incapable of functioning as an actual state in the international states system while still being a member of it. Yet, at the same time people there were still exporting large quantities of goods- gold, timber, diamonds and selenium- into the global economy, mostly through the international black market. By way of another example, the Leftist rebels of Colombia, FARC, have been able to accrue 500 million dollars per year through the cocaine trade to continue to wage war against the Bogota government.⁶⁷

Importantly, in the context of present globalisation, conditions are conducive for the dynamics of civil conflict to be encouraged by actors benefiting from them over the long-term. Increased access to international markets provided through globalisation has augmented the ability of local elites to profit economically from perpetuated violence and conflict.⁶⁸ Government officials, petty traders, international criminal networks, and warlords are all examples of actors who can benefit from the perpetuation of conflict which opens up immediate, very rationally sought opportunities for profit-making through resource exploitation and trading. In the context of weak and failed states, defined as they are by exceptionally inept governments, and notably when immediate profits can be accrued through the perpetuation of violence, controlling state apparatuses are not instrumentally necessary in themselves. As David Keen argued of rebels in African civil wars, the incentive to take control of government is not significant where “the state is unable either to monopolize violence or to tax economic activity.”⁶⁹

Lastly, frontiers also have strong psychological and cultural connotations, notably as ‘wild lands’ and have represented a dark and dangerous unknown filled with the ‘other’. The academic Thomas Diez has remarked that for much of recent history, the most common processes of ‘othering’ have been primarily geographic in nature whereby people living in states “establish an inside and an outside, represent the outside as a danger to the presupposed identity of the inside and thereby construct and reproduce that very identity.”⁷⁰ This was especially the case for Europe, which is now, however, seeing the move from a primarily geographic othering to one based on the “construction of ‘Europe’ through practices of othering in which identity, politics, and geography are intimately linked with each other, and which can therefore be called ‘geopolitical’ otherings.”⁷¹

This broader geopolitical othering has seen an emphasis given to a potential existential threat, which should be outside of one’s own space and can then be defended against. Europe has given its priority in this regards to defining illegal immigration and rising Islamic terrorism as the most significant threats it faces from others. In this way, the 9/11 and 2004 Madrid terrorists attacks have “intensified the making of a ‘European’ territory that needs to be secured.”⁷² Considering this fear of terrorism as well as of

illegal immigration, Europe has developed a 'Fortress Europe' mentality whereby she has tried "to construct the widest territorial entity which can be effectively integrated into an area of political stability and economic prosperity in a dangerous world."⁷³ The boundaries of Europe have hence been expanded and strengthened to prevent the incursion of others from the 'outside' who are deemed to be a risk to the 'inside' security of Europe. Overall, Europe, by way of example for the West more generally, has braced itself against turbulent frontiers over the horizon in an age defined by the contact of globalisation.

The 'what' of frontiers of insecurity- the realities of weak and failed states

State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance and adds to regional instability.

- The European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'⁷⁴

With the conclusion of the Cold War, there were widespread expectations of a significant peace dividend and the world has in fact grown less violent in the years since the end of the superpower conflict.⁷⁵ The numbers, in absolute terms, for wars and their resultant casualties are both at lower levels than what they were during their high point in the 1970s and '80s. However, even while claims of a 'new world disorder' are exaggerated, what has been the case is the very significant presence of what this thesis terms 'frontier states', those weak and failed states that are effectively the international system's peripheral areas of anarchy and hence exist as its 'frontiers of insecurity'. It should be noted that 'anarchy' in this usage does not mean that of sovereign states existing in a system of 'anarchy' whereby there is no world government. Rather, it refers to domestic anarchy- political disorder and violence- within certain politico-geographic areas, viz. the frontier states themselves.

Frontier states are those that have struggled or completely failed to maintain their ability to exert internal sovereignty. Generally, these states can be understood as those where a government cannot effectively control its territory or maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Furthermore, other key attributes are a breakdown of law, order and basic services, often accompanied by communal conflict, violent ethnic

nationalism, militarism and even endemic regional conflict.⁷⁶ The culmination of these attributes ultimately leads to a state failing when it's sovereign government:

no longer performs the functions normally attributed to it... the central authority through which laws are made and enforced is inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved and societal cohesion is not enhanced... government has lost its minimal capacity.⁷⁷

Examples of frontier states include those that have had governments, but in general have been exceptionally chaotic, such as Haiti and Liberia, and those that have even been without any government for significant periods of time, such as Somalia.

Alex Maroya argued that many present states which previously constituted the frontier zones of the European colonial empires continue to exhibit many of the same governance characteristics. In the past, colonial powers on their frontier zones kept the "colonial state... [as] a bare mechanism of control"⁷⁸ which means that today "institutions in former frontier areas are typically more hybridised, less stable and (in conventional terms) more underdeveloped than in either Western states or areas where the duration and intensity of the colonial experience was greater."⁷⁹ Conventional notions of states as being a 'contrarian model' where individuals in their equality have a social contract through government simply do not exist there. The post-colonial state, because of an "absence of substantial institutional capacity," simply became a divided, conflicted entity where "various pluralities negotiated their relationship with each other and with the outside world."⁸⁰

Having noted these considerations of Maroya, this thesis will thus argue that the actual frontier zones proper, i.e. frontier states, can be defined as geopolitical areas at the edge of the effectively controlled sovereign spaces of the present international states system: a zone of transition of low administrative intensity outside the centres of the international states system. The following 'frontier elements' define frontier states⁸¹:

- Present or recent armed conflict;
- a lack of effective territorial control or intensive administration;
- highly militarised institutions with a low level of responsible government;
- limited economic and social development (as conventionally understood);
- fundamental internal disagreement over the nature of the state.

In order to be considered frontier states they must cross a threshold whereby they share to a significant degree the above characteristics. It is not the contention of this thesis

that there are a great many states that could be considered to have crossed the threshold to become actual frontier states. This thesis really only intends the term to be adequate for describing the most direly anarchic areas in the world, perhaps twenty states in total. In this way, they range presently, or recently, from such states as Haiti, the Balkans, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the DR Congo, Cambodia, Burundi, Somalia, Afghanistan, to East Timor and the Solomon Islands.

It is worth considering in more detail the construction of frontier states in order to understand what it is that makes them distinctive from the rest of the international states system. One of the starting points for this consideration is to review the notion of 'quasi-states', a term developed by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson and later by Robert H. Jackson. The main theme of this term is that all post-colonial states have 'juridical' sovereignty, recognition by other states as being independent states, but lack the 'empirical' sovereignty of statehood, fundamentally a government with the "political will, institutional authority and organized power to protect human rights and provide socio-economic welfare" to its citizenry.⁸²

The general argument is not that 'quasi-states' equal weak and failed states. Rather, the prevalent conditions that allowed for the maintenance of many post-colonial states in the present international system- notably self-determination, the assumed equality of sovereign states, and the norm of non-intervention- leave the possibility open that some of these 'quasi-states' might fragment and weaken even further because there is still largely nothing to prevent them from doing so. Namely this is because, regardless of their empirical condition, they are recognised as sovereign states. What this thesis is interested in is those areas in the periphery of the international states system that have digressed the most in their claims to exhibit even a minimal standard of empirical sovereignty. Fundamentally, it is interested in those areas in the periphery that are *anarchic* because they exhibit to a significant degree the 'absence of government', 'political disorder and violence' and general 'disorder and confusion'.

It is crucial to further emphasise that when considering frontier states as a physical, geographic reality, i.e. the weak and failed state itself, that it is necessary to understand

frontiers as being one part of a whole in the sense of them being inherently part of the international states system. Frontier states do not exist in a separate system to that of the international system of sovereign states, but rather they are still an “integral part of the world system of governance.”⁸³ This is in contrast to understanding there being a frontier between the international states system and a separate system, because one simply does not exist. They are not an ambiguous region between states or between states and something else.

However, this thesis will still emphasise frontiers more broadly as the ‘politico-geographical area lying beyond the integrated region of the political unit’. In this way the definition is dialectic in that frontiers in the present are part of a whole, i.e. the international states system, and yet the actual physical and geographic frontiers are also essentially detached in important ways, notably their lack of effective governance, from the stable, orderly part of that system, i.e. peaceful and at least relatively functional states that are effectively the international system’s hinterland.

Presently, the large majority of states are relatively stable, or even increasingly prosperous, and these can be considered as the ‘core’ of the international system. These states of the core are able to function largely as sovereign equals in terms of both the conduct of their internal, domestic administration as well as recognising one another as sovereign equals in the realm of international politics. They are also increasingly tied together, especially formally, through the linkages and interactions brought about through economic globalisation. The foundations of the core are America, Europe and Japan but also increasingly other parts of Asia, Australasia, and Latin America. Importantly, the vast majority of states in the developing world do not exhibit the conditions of being frontier states and should be considered part of the core as they have largely functioning governments.

Furthering an emphasis on the structure of frontier states, it is also important to note identity creation there, especially in relation to localisation as defined previously. Within frontier states, because of the erosion of state structures there, alternative sources of identity have developed. As Rosenau highlighted:

... with globalising and localising dynamics having undermined the national level as a source of psychic comfort and with transnational entities seeming too distant to provide the psychic benefits of affiliation, the virtues of the satisfactions to be gained through more close-at-hand affiliations are likely to be increasingly salient...⁸⁴

In this way, identity creation returns more to the local level, notably against any previous post-colonial sentiments of nationalism arising at the state level. This emphasis on local identities is often confusing, or even outright perturbing to outsiders, who can see it as ‘backward’ or even ‘barbarian’ compared to more universal identities, such as states-based nationalism. An example of this could be the condescension with which peacekeepers consider many of the armed bands who infest frontier states. For instance, the major militia in the Congo- Brazzaville during its last civil war was known as the Ninjas. This can seem rather infantile or even severely detached from the ‘reality’ of war to outsiders, but it serves as a strong identifying point for the men who serve in the militia and the local community that supports it.

When much of the state structure has disappeared or been direly corrupted, individuals often seek local modalities to protect themselves. One way is through local armed groups and the breakdown of government structures able to control local violence in frontier states has seen the manic growth in the number of non-state actors engaged in violence for various rationales. Coker has termed this the development of “neo-feudal security regimes” whereby individuals look to membership in “gangs, clans, or allegiance to personal warlords or leaders with their respective feudal affiliations and ties” for protection.⁸⁵

These protective ties that bind are often illogical or incomprehensible to outsiders and are one of the prime ways in which these frontier actors can be deemed as ‘runaway elements’ who are engaged in their own interests detached from what can be considered ‘normal’. Life on the frontier, shaped as it is by local identities and local modalities for providing security, can indeed be a very alien place for governments and academics, amongst others, looking in from the outside. And yet, if viewed at that individual level, when confronted by insecurity and weak or non-existent government, it is only natural for people look to other modalities for identity creation and personal protection when and where the state is so lacking.

The interface of globalisation and peripheral areas of anarchy

*... previously such areas, precisely because of their chaos, were isolated from the rest of the world. Not so today when a country without much law and order can still have an international airport.*⁸⁶

It is the initiating premise of this thesis that ‘anarchic politico-geographical areas’, i.e. weak and failed states, interfaced to the international system through globalisation should be conceptualised as ‘frontiers of insecurity’. A weak or failed state in itself does not constitute a frontier. If there were no globalisation or it was different in form, failed and weak states could be left in isolation. However, because of globalisation, those same weak and failed states become frontiers of insecurity because other states, including those of the West, are forced to interact with them as ‘contact zones’.

The contact of globalisation is what makes such states more than merely weak or failed, they become frontiers. This contact cannot be regulated, for instance as the European Union does of its expansionism eastwards. No conditionalities for greater contact can be set; the contact is through the forced interface with frontiers of insecurity through globalisation. As the US government concluded, the realities of globalisation “mean great dangers may arise in and emanate from relatively weak states and ungoverned areas.”⁸⁷

The presence of frontier states is one of the most pressing security concerns presently faced in world politics. Indeed, the international states system has frayed on its edges as a relatively small minority, but still significant number of states in the developing world, created through decolonisation and largely maintained through the bi-polar politics of the Cold War, have collapsed or deteriorated over the last several decades. Globalisation is intimidating enough because of the power of immediacy that it brings and the empowerment it offers to individuals and non-state actors through technology. However, this is especially so when the state as an institution, the foundation of the international system and the primary means of regulating human interaction, is failing in locales stretching from Haiti to the Solomon Islands.

The lack of governmental control in these frontier states means that it is even harder for the international community collectively to 'manage' globalisation's negative effects, the risks that it creates and compounds for everybody for the indefinite future. In an age generating a much more ambiguous array of threats- ranging from WMD proliferation, environmental degradation, organised crime to the rise of Islamic terrorism- the inability of weak governments to counter globalisation's insecurities and the related export of chaos can have grave consequences for international order. As the Australian Defence Ministry concluded, "globalisation can add to the potential fallout from failing states... the interconnectedness globalisation brings... widen and intensify their impacts."⁸⁸

The relatively carefree days of the 1990s when civil wars and the related entrenchment of state collapse in areas of 'remote and petty interest' could be largely ignored by the international community have ended. This was because they were shattered with the forced realisation, mostly through the trauma of 9-11, that one's own security in a globalised world founded upon a states system requires stability throughout, not just in the West. Fundamentally, there are still frontiers which are zones of contact and they morph from just being isolatable areas of anarchy to being everybody's frontiers of insecurity.

Lastly, a consideration of what makes frontiers of insecurity 'new' from previous eras can serve to highlight how they are key to understanding the current security dynamics of the international system. In a similar way to the shift of strategic frontiers for Imperial Britain, the 'new' frontiers of insecurity in the post-Cold War era have shifted in several important ways. The Cold War's geopolitical friction focused primarily on the plains of Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia, and only to a lesser extent on other developing states in the then so-called 'Third World'. However, the post-Cold War era has been more focused on frontiers defining the contact zones between orderly states and those that are patently not internally, mostly found in Africa and the Greater Middle East. Indeed, 'once remote and petty interests' in the form of frontier states have assumed primary security importance for Western states since the end of the Cold War.

This shift in emphasis from the dynamics of insecurity largely defined as war between states, especially with the fear of nuclear war between superpowers, to one primarily centred on the strategic fear of failing states and the rising destructive power of non-state actors has been dramatic. During the Cold War there were certainly weak and failed states and there was also manic globalisation. However, the main difference was that the international system's dynamics were largely structured on a realist's understanding of an anarchic international system requiring classic power balancing and conflicts between states.

Given that, state failure was viewed through "the prism of superpower conflict and was rarely addressed as a danger in its own right."⁸⁹ Anarchy in the extreme periphery was merely to be filled and influenced as part of the accumulation of power within the broader struggle between the two superpowers. However, since 1991 the strategic rationale of the West has shifted from 'containing' the Soviets and communism to 'managing insecurity' as global risks in all their ambiguous forms, be they terrorism, nuclear weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, or illicit trades. The lesson of the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, was that everybody needs to care about the "dangerous exports of failed states."⁹⁰

This shift in frontiers has meant that much of the international infrastructure constructed during the Cold War by the West has struggled to find updated roles for dealing with new security problems, notably the confluence of globalisation's dynamics of insecurity and weak and failed states, i.e. with frontiers of insecurity. This situation is exemplified best by NATO, which for many years after 1991 had its continued existence as a multilateral military organisation called into question, but now sees a fresh mandate as it shifts to meet new needs.

These updated terms of reference include helping to bring peace and security to weak and failed states and helping its members increase coordination against the more dangerous flows of globalisation, such as illicit trafficking in nuclear materials or combating the movements of terrorists. It is notable that in its entire history, the only time NATO's collective defence clause has been activated was after 9/11 when NATO's

member states declared solidarity with the USA and sought to help defend both her and themselves from further terrorist attack by a non-state actor. This emphasis on new threats has continued for NATO, most relevantly and significantly with the organisation's assumption of management for the intervention in Afghanistan.

Compared to frontiers of insecurity during the 1880s and 1890s, there are also significant differences with those of the present. In Robinson and Gallagher's work, crises in the periphery provoked a concern by European imperial powers that other Great Powers would exploit weaknesses there and assert their own dominance in such places. Presently, the threat of war between the Great Powers is not a driving, or even particularly plausible, concern. The European Union noted that "large-scale aggression against any member state is now improbable"⁹¹ while the UK has argued that "there is currently no major conventional threat to Europe."⁹² In fact, conventional threats are now of such relatively little concern that the US National Security Strategy stressed that "the world's Great Powers [now] find themselves on the same side- united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos."⁹³

Currently, the fear of Western states is not that other Great Powers will exploit crises in the periphery, but rather that the anarchy resultant from peripheral crises will increase all of the negative consequences of globalisation, which they are forced to have contact with. There is especially a fear that the crises of frontier states will be exploited not by other Great Powers, but rather by increasingly powerful non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, and violent individuals who cannot be dealt with by Western states in the older, conventional manner as for other states. The significant threat posed by non-state actors "waging war in a global system" is direly compounded by the fact that these non-state actors are able to catalyse global agitation within and through frontier states.⁹⁴

2.4: Conclusion

*The DRC...a country of more than fifty million people with no functioning government or national institutions, a vast territory contested by tribal and ethnic forces, foreign armies, regional satraps, private militias, warlords, brigands, and black marketers. Congo seemed just about as hopeless as any place on earth.*⁹⁵

This thesis has chosen to focus on ‘frontiers’ for a number of reasons. The primary reason is that responding to peripheral anarchy in the form of frontiers is a timeless problem. While the 21st century may be defined by globalisation and its compression of time and space, that does not negate the fact that there are still geographic territories that constitute dire security threats because of their anarchy. John Lewis Gaddis wrote that cartography, “like cognition itself, is a necessary simplification that allows us to see where we are going.”⁹⁶ A geographic understanding of ‘frontiers’ allows academic analysis to conceptualise a reality clearly by using a timeless construct. Rather than invent new terminology, this thesis emphasises frontiers to allow for consistency and definitional clarity allowing for a better contextualisation of present interventionism.

This chapter has sought to argue that there are frontiers presently. Taken together, the *why* of globalisation, i.e. the actual contact, and the *what* of peripheral areas of anarchy, i.e. the actual politico-geographic areas of weak and failed states, allows for an understanding of frontiers of insecurity actually existing. If there were no contact through globalisation, there could be no understanding of them as frontiers; they would just be peripheral, isolated areas of no consequence. Conversely, if there were no physical reality of peripheral areas of anarchy, the actual weak and failed states, there could be no consideration of modern frontiers actually existing either. There would be no frontiers, just a complete and largely functional international states system with lots of contact between its component parts, viz. sovereign states, through globalisation. That frontier zones do indeed exist means that they must be dealt with, a subject to be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3: MANAGING FRONTIER STATES THROUGH STATE BUILDING INTERVENTIONISM

Many countries in the South West Pacific remain challenged by internal conflict [and] the need for stable governance... The ability to manage and enforce sovereignty is an abiding concern.

- Government of Australia, 'Australia's National Security, 2005'¹

The presence of anarchy looming in frontiers is a timeless challenge and leaders have needed to respond accordingly to protect those 'within the realm' against such troubles. Regarding present needs for managing 'frontiers of insecurity', this chapter will firstly argue that a 'pericentric pull' emanating from frontiers explains *why* such places stimulate a response from Western states, namely their intentions to mitigate their security concerns relating to them. Secondly, this chapter will explain *how* Western states respond to frontiers of insecurity. It will argue that since the end of the Cold War, that response has been in the form of state building interventionism, namely of finding and strengthening suitable 'collaborative partners' there in the form of national governments capable of more effectively managing their sovereign territory.

3.1: Rationales and methods for responding to frontiers

We need both to think globally and to act locally.

- The European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'²

This thesis intends to better understand how and why the West responds to 'anarchy in our midst', namely interventionism into frontiers of insecurity. This chapter will articulate the pericentric school of imperial theory, notably that argued by imperial historians explaining Western expansionism in response to peripheral crises. While this thesis is not one on empire and imperialism, the review of the dynamics specific to those phenomena is important because theories of empire and imperialism look to understand how and why some states impose control over other states- namely those deemed peripheral and dangerous, i.e. as frontiers- in order to achieve their own strategic objectives.

Historical responses to frontiers

... as the ambitious schemes of the humanitarians broke one by one against the facts of Africa, statesmen became more and more hard-headed.

- Robinson and Gallagher³

Robinson and Gallagher argued throughout their works that imperial expansion was primarily the result of peripheral crises rather than in strictly systemic imperatives to accrue power or the metropole's capitalist dispositions. They highlighted that the "times and circumstances" of British imperial expansion into parts of sub-Saharan Africa were indeed "called forth by crisis" from within those locales.⁴ It was only when the ability of those regions themselves failed to provide "satisfactory conditions" that Britain felt compelled that "power [be] used imperialistically to adjust those conditions."⁵ Crucially, as suitable conditions developed in the periphery, namely the presence of local collaborators of sufficient capacity for effective local governance, the "frequency of imperialist intervention lessens and imperialist control is correspondingly relaxed."⁶

Another British historian who has emphasised responses to crises in the periphery is David Fieldhouse. He noted that a "general crisis" sparked by numerous problems in the periphery provoked British imperial expansion in the latter quarter of the 19th Century. As Fieldhouse explained, "for the first time in modern history, these local problems were so widespread and the European powers concerned so numerous that collectively they constituted a 'general crisis' in the relations between Europe and the less-developed world."⁷ The need for expansionism to secure themselves saw Europeans implement a "new imperialism" because they were "pulled into imperialism by the magnetic force of the periphery."⁸

A third important British historian, David McIntyre, focused on what he called the "tropical frontiers" of Fiji, the Niger Delta and the Malay States, which had seen "ferment and disintegration" in the early 1870s.⁹ Namely, the British Empire had a "frontier problem" since the "internal conditions [of these frontiers] posed serious threats to the security of the colonies" bordering them because of both geographical

proximity and socio-economic interchange.¹⁰ Because of this insecurity, these frontiers hence required “expansion into new areas” by the Empire in order to secure itself.¹¹ The tropical frontiers that McIntyre highlighted were not as significant as those that others focused on- such as the Northwest Frontier- which highlights that even in exceptionally peripheral areas, such as Fiji, the Empire still felt the need to respond to peripheral crises for security rationales.

John Galbraith was a further prominent imperial historian to argue that there was a “pull exerted by ‘turbulent frontiers’.”¹² Specifically, British expansion was resultant from the “‘man on the spot’s’ reaction to the problem of the turbulent frontier.”¹³ This was primarily because “Britain as the paramount power... must be responsible for order and security” not only in its immediate areas of sovereignty but in their general proximity as well.¹⁴ A response of expanding imperial control was most often done with great hesitance as the peripheral areas generally were of little commercial value and strategically provoked further problems. As Galbraith concluded, this was because efforts “to eliminate the disorderly frontier by annexations... in turn produced new frontier problems and further expansion.”¹⁵ An ever expanding empire was left ever more exposed to turbulent frontiers.

US history also provides examples of expansionism being provoked by frontiers. John Lewis Gaddis argued that Americans have long felt that “expansion... is the path to security.”¹⁶ An early example of this was General Andrew Jackson’s invasion of Spanish Florida in 1818, an action later defended by President John Quincy Adams who argued that either Spain properly manage the territory or “cede to the United States a province... which is in fact derelict, open to occupancy of every enemy, civilized or savage, of the United States.”¹⁷ An anarchic frontier- be it Florida, Texas or California- required that power vacuums be filled, both to impose order against internal actors spawning insecurity and to cancel the threat of other states occupying them. Gaddis concludes that “concerns about ‘failed’ or ‘derelict’ states are nothing new in the history of United States foreign relations” as could be seen from her expansion into frontiers in continental North America and later further afield.¹⁸

The key dynamic in all of these examples of 'frontier problems' was that it was from the peripheral crises themselves that expansionism was stimulated rather than metropolitan motivations to accrue power or the amorphous dictates of global capitalism. Peripheral crises are the driving dynamic of imperial expansionism, at certain points and locales, in that the crux of the crises is the lack of suitable indigenous partners with whom an external power could work through without resorting to costly imperial expansion. Essentially, the type of collaborative relationships possible determined the type of imperial expansion. Significant indigenous actors with cohesion and capacity for local governance allowed for relationships to be developed without seeking any type of imperial control, merely the furtherance of commerce and trade. If some control was required, then stronger actors allowed for informal rule to be implemented rather than expensive formal control. However, it was when crises in the periphery saw either a complete lack of indigenous partners or the collapse of competent partners that the deepening of imperial control became necessary.

The present pull of frontiers

In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand... the first line of defence will often be abroad.

- The European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'¹⁹

Western interventions since 1989, including through the UN, have been spread from Haiti to Kosovo, Somalia, Liberia, the Congo, Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor and the Solomon Islands. That the military forces of so many Western states have found themselves in such a gamut of locales around the world raises some important questions for understanding International Relations presently. Namely, why are states which had previously been deemed as 'remote and petty interests' achieving such significance strategically for the West currently? What are Western interventionists attempting to achieve there and how are they attempting to achieve it?

The pericentric pull of frontiers of insecurity continues to stimulate interventionism by Western states seeking to secure themselves from the insecurity emanating from them. Presently, this pericentric pulling is the primary dynamic provoking interventionism into frontier states as they pose significant security challenges for the wider world. The

locales of present interventions show a common trait: domestic instability stemming from a lack of rudimentary governance. Fundamentally Western states are responding to the lack of effective governance that allows for the uncontrolled proliferation of security problems emanating from such places, especially because of the empowerment of non-state actors- be they terrorists, insurgents, or criminal gangs- who are able to act free of or with limited governmental influence over their activities.

An interest in responding to frontiers for security rationales can be clearly seen in the present defence policies of Western states. As the sole superpower, the US has led. This has notably been so since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and since then the US has acted on the premise that the US' global role requires it "effectively projecting and sustaining our forces in distant environments."²⁰ For US government policy, this means that the US "must remain vigilant to those states that lack the capacity to govern activity within their borders", notably to prevent dangerous non-state actors from exploiting "ungoverned spaces and border areas."²¹ The non-state actors considered to be a threat in such anarchy include "a diverse collection of terrorists, insurgents, paramilitaries, and criminals" that are problematic because they "seek to undermine the legitimate governance" of weak and failed states.²² As these crises of governance pose security challenges to Western states, it means they cannot sit idly by and hence military responses are required. Given that, since the end of the Cold War, the US has led interventions in places as disparate as Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo and thence on to Afghanistan.

The US' strongest European ally, the United Kingdom, has been quick to argue that its own armed forces have "the increased likelihood of deploying forces outside... [our historically] core regions", namely Europe and the Middle East.²³ Considering this, the UK Ministry of Defence argued in its White Paper that it has a need to "extend our ability to project further afield" because "instability and crises... will require us both to engage proactively in conflict prevention and be ready to contribute to short notice peace support and counter terrorism operations."²⁴ It has already seen its forces since the end of the Cold War in as assorted locales as Sierra Leone, East Timor, Afghanistan and the Balkans. Another key US ally, Australia, has also seen its armed forces, the Australian Defence Force, deployed in operations ranging from East Timor and

Afghanistan to the Sudan. Although a small country, its foreign policy has placed a special interest, notably alongside New Zealand, in the “security challenges faced by the island states of the Pacific.”²⁵ In this regards it has been active in those island nations to its north, notably East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Fiji.

For its part, the European Union has noted in its foreign policy papers that in the relatively short period since the end of the Cold War, European forces have “been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”²⁶ These interventions in distant states have been in addition to the EU’s, as well as her member states, significant interest and participation in the interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the mid-1990s, in Kosovo after the US and UK’s initial air campaign there in 1999, and in Macedonia since 2003. The Balkans has been a special EU priority, notably as the fall-out from the Balkans in terms of organised crime and refugees has had dire ramifications for it. Given that, the EU has argued that “restoring good government... and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU.”²⁷ The French have also demonstrated a keen interest in mitigating anarchy in world. President Jacque Chirac, for instance, made note of “the threat that failed states carry for the world’s equilibrium.”²⁸ France’s armed forces have found themselves deployed around the world, including to Afghanistan, but have tended to be found in Francophone states such as Cote D’Ivoire, the DR Congo, Chad and the Central African Republic.

Even the two most notably pacifistic states in the West, Japan and Germany, are feeling the need to project their military power further. Japan is in the process of reforming its 1946 constitution with its immobilising pacifist conditions. This has been encouraged by tensions with China and North Korea but also represents a desire to be able to participate in missions outside of Northeast Asia, something represented by the fact that the Japan Self-Defense Forces continue to support operations in Afghanistan. Germany is also in the process of reforming its military, with Berlin noting in its 2006 Defence White Paper that the Bundeswehr is to be “thoroughly restructured into an intervention force” to participate in “peace-creating interventions.”²⁹ German troops have been to the DR Congo repeatedly since the turn of the century and are presently serving in both

Lebanon and Afghanistan. As *Newsweek* highlighted, the Germans seem to have finally accepted “the idea that their once-cosy role has ended” and their greater participation is required in state building interventionism.³⁰

The United Nations, at the behest of Western states, has steadily seen its role in the post-Cold War era change. While the UN had historically undertaken ‘classic peacekeeping’ missions involving the monitoring of peace agreements between states, it has since 1989 increasingly conducted interventions into frontier states aimed at state building. The BBC, amongst others, has highlighted that the “route [that’s been set for the UN] is much more interventionist, moving away from the UN’s traditional emphasis that it cannot meddle in the internal affairs of a member state.”³¹ Indeed, increasingly since the end of the Cold War, “more blue helmets [have been] in action” than at any time in history.³² This momentum towards increasing the UN’s assertive presence has seen its missions deployed to such diverse locations as Somalia, Burundi, the DR Congo, Haiti, the Ivory Coast, Cambodia, East Timor, Sudan, Liberia, and Sierra Leone amongst others. It is notable that even the African Union, at the encouragement of and with support from Western states, has seen its forces deployed to Sudan and Somalia while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was involved repeatedly in interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

3.2: Frontiers require engagement

The world is inter-dependent. To be engaged is only modern realpolitik.
- British Prime Minister Tony Blair³³

Following an explanation of interventionism based on the pericentric pull of security rationales, it is now necessary to examine how that response is manifested. The possible responses to the anarchy of frontier zones have historically been to try and isolate it, to retreat from it, or to engage it to some extent in order to mitigate or overcome it. Attempts at isolation or retreat, namely to try and cease interaction with frontiers, are infeasible due to the immediacy provided by globalisation in its present form. Frontiers of insecurity exist precisely because globalisation forces other states to have contact with them. With ever more powerful technology, space is compressed and

even physical distance does not stop interaction between peoples and cannot completely prevent the movement of illicit goods and services.

Attempts to ignore problems in frontiers have seen their negative ramifications for the outside world delayed, not ended. Kofi Annan, by example, argued that “ignoring failed states creates problems that... come back to bite us.”³⁴ The primary lesson of Afghanistan in the 1990s was that although it was largely ignored as a security concern by Western states, in the hopes that the insecurity there would be contained by its geographic isolation, it eventually turned into an epicentre of insecurity for the West. The US learned this reality the hardest and only later came to appreciate from Afghanistan’s experiences that internal strife and anarchy “do not stay isolated for long.”³⁵ Another example of this has been the near total anarchy of Somalia since 1991 and the West’s general efforts to isolate itself from that problem by largely ignoring it after its retreat from UN peacekeeping efforts there after 1994. With the rise of global terrorism, Indian Ocean piracy, and the usage of Somalia’ anarchy as an explosive playground for proxy wars between neighbouring Eritrea and Ethiopia, the dangerous spill-over effects of that state’s internal problems have proved impossible to contain.

As the West lives in a world where it cannot isolate itself; it must respond to the dangers facing it through engagement of some sort with its frontiers of insecurity. Since 1989, possibilities for engagement with problematic areas in the periphery were framed by understandings garnered from the past, namely that of preferring economic or political engagement where possible. In terms of what might generally be considered political engagement, attempts were on occasion made to broker agreements between the assorted domestic actors in a state or region’s civil strife, such as the US’ efforts in Haiti in the mid-1990s or the EU’s initial efforts in the Balkans in the early 1990s, both centred on trying to foster moderation and mediation.

Economic engagement has taken the form of development aid, a method that had been tried throughout the Cold War era. With the reduction of Cold War imperatives, ‘conditionalities’ placed on this assistance since 1991 have sought to encourage governments to move towards ‘good governance’, notably in terms of countering

corruption, encouraging democracy, and improving government efficiency. The international financial organisations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have been central to driving this development. Furthermore, utilising the influence of large multinational corporations has also allowed Western states to exert some influence. For instance, William Reno noted in the case of Angola in the 1990s that large oil and private security companies became “back channels for strong state influence without commitment to expensive direct rule.”³⁶

However, in those areas that qualify as frontiers of insecurity, the degree of violence and the extent of the corrosion of the state effectively negate any positive effects that political or economic engagement with them might bring. Political engagement in such areas is limited because it is likely that none of the indigenous political actors, especially national governments, have the capacity to implement decisions and agreements negotiated with the help of outside parties. For instance, even after peace talks concluded for the DR Congo, it still required a UN military force to allow for the implementation of the peace agreement there. In terms of economic engagement in the form of development aid, the simple lack of credible partners to work with in states that are frontiers of insecurity is largely overwhelming. At times there are none in the form of even a weak government, such as Somalia for most of the 1990s, or they are so lacking in credibility or hold such extreme positions that engagement is nigh impossible, such as with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan or the Taylor dictatorship in Liberia.

Moreover, the challenge of trying to influence governments in frontier states through multinational corporations is limited by the fact that while such governments may have the legitimacy of sovereignty, they may not have any practical control over their own territories outside of the capital (or in Somalia’s transitional government’s case, they do not even control Mogadishu).³⁷ That is to say, it is hard to work with actors who possess a legal recognition, i.e. sovereignty, but no physical control. On the other hand, insurgents or warlords who might control territory and actually be in a better position to work through, lack the legitimacy of sovereignty, which limits options for engaging them legally. The US learned this the hard way when it backed Mogadishu warlords in

2004-05 and was widely criticised for doing so after they were defeated by a rival Islamist movement.

Overall, it can be seen that the criteria that define the internal conditions of frontier states mean that engagement with them requires even more intrusiveness than mere economic or political outreach if the insecurity that the West is trying to mitigate is to be possible. Traditional political and economic engagement strategies are workable approaches for ‘developing states’, namely those that still have functional governmental structures with a meaningful degree of control over their sovereign area. In the states that are today’s frontiers of insecurity, however, the possibility for working through such governments is largely impossible. Hence, as in days gone past, stronger states feel the need to impose deeper forms of control in order to assuage their own security concerns.

3.3: Frontiers require state building interventionism

Some conflicts pose such a grave threat to our broader interests and values that conflict intervention may be needed to restore peace and stability.

- The White House, ‘National Security Strategy, 2006’³⁸

The American journalist Walter Lippman once noted of the Cold War that “unless ideology can be translated into geography, the conflict cannot be dealt with.”³⁹ As was true for the Cold War, is true for the present- geography still matters. However, while during the Cold War “world leaders... worried about who was amassing power; now they worry about the absence of it.”⁴⁰ The more passive, blasé attempts at intervention that had been undertaken in the 1990s, when it was still felt that frontier states merely “excited pity, anger and shame” have been replaced by a re-awakened understanding that “chaos spreads... [and] a zone of chaos can turn into a major direct threat to state security elsewhere.”⁴¹ Terrorism, narcotics, and illegal immigration, amongst others, must be made ‘real’. There are still physical frontier zones, the actual peripheral areas of anarchy, and they need to have effective governmental control instilled over them in order to mitigate the negative outflows that globalisation makes possible. If geography is not ‘dead’, it means there is still a need to ‘manage space’ and that entails working to

strengthen the governments of states, something only achievable through state building interventionism.

In this manner the 9/11 terrorist attacks presented a conundrum: how to make the response to them 'real'. Much analysis has noted the irony that the US' response to a 'stateless' terrorist network was to invade a state. However, the USA was faced with the challenge of how to respond to al-Qaeda after the attacks, whether to combat it through international police efforts and international law or to wage war in a specific territory. Ultimately, the US argued that it needs an "active, forward and layered defense."⁴² Globalisation is what dictates the requirement for a 'layered defense'. Functioning states 'out there' are merely the first layer of defence, followed by international policing efforts, such as multilateral agencies like Interpol and Europol, and then by individual Western states' domestic security and judicial systems. These multiple layers are required to counter the negative ramifications of globalisation. As an initial step, the US chose to conduct an intervention in Afghanistan while it also pursued other 'non-spatial' measures for combating international terrorism, such as through the international financial system and countering terrorist cyber-propaganda.

That geography still matters is also recognized by none other than al-Qaeda itself. That 'stateless' terrorist group's number two commander, Ayman al-Zawahiri, highlighted the value of holding territory when he argued thus:

Victory by the armies cannot be achieved unless the infantry occupies the territory. Likewise, victory for the Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be attained unless movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region.⁴³

While the US had pushed al-Qaeda out of Sudan in 1996, it was still able to find sanctuary in Afghanistan from where it could train members and organise attacks. The US Government, startled by the effectiveness of al-Qaeda after 9/11, bitterly noted that "the absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents."⁴⁴ Following the US' intervention in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has been able to regroup in the anarchic northwest of Pakistan, which appropriately composes the Northwest Frontier Province.

Strengthening an international system of states

... in an era when dozens of states are under stress or recovering from conflict, there is a clear international obligation to assist states in developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly.

- The United Nations, 'A more secure world'⁴⁵

Driving a sharpened awareness of 'frontiers' after 1991 has been the emphasis placed on the domestic anarchy of such states by the international community, especially the West. There is a strong need to strengthen an international system based on states that currently has members that cannot effectively manage their territory, allowing for the unmitigated negative flows of globalisation and the empowerment of dangerous non-state actors. The overarching imperative has thus been to defend an international system based on states by strengthening those members that are essentially unable to manage themselves, even if that requires interventionism, a dislikeable policy prescription because of its human, political and material costs.

Strengthening states through their national governments has been deemed the best way to counter the dangers of globalisation, viz. through functional governments more effectively managing their territories. As the US has noted in its foreign policy statements, it intends to "create conditions conducive to a secure international system" and that "such conditions include the effective and responsible exercise of sovereignty."⁴⁶ This sentiment was echoed by the UK when she argued that her "security and national prosperity depend upon international stability" and she will consequently be willing to "deliver effective military force in peace support and intervention operations."⁴⁷ For its part, the EU claims as a guiding purpose "to promote and maintain stability around the world"⁴⁸ and that "by helping to create security and stability in the wider world, the EU also helps to make life safer within its own borders."⁴⁹

What is notable about the pericentric dynamic is that just as in the past, the lack of local partners suitable for Western states to meet their security interests can be seen in the present era as well. The West seeks an international system based on functional states

run by effective governments, yet in the frontier states these indigenous partners in the form of sovereign national governments are decidedly lacking. Hence, a deeper type of engagement is required, one that can be deemed to be essentially about imperialistic control for the short to near term. This sentiment is best articulated by the US Government when it says that it “will expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us...[and] help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.”⁵⁰

Overall, the primary challenge for responding to the present frontiers is to change their internal dynamics so that they can participate as ‘normal’ members of the international system, namely in the sense that they can exert stronger control over their sovereign territories. By intervening for relatively short periods of time, and leaving after the “creation of self-sustaining state capacity”, Western states are able to ensure their security concerns are met by long-term collaborators in the form of more effective national governments.⁵¹ US policy summarises this theme well; the ability of non-state actors to export terrorism, narcotics, or fuel internal insurrection “will be outweighed by the capacity and resolve of local governments to defeat them.”⁵² This is exactly what those undertaking interventions want to happen after they leave.

Considering that, the rate of interventions into frontier states has increased notably in the post-Cold War era as notions of sovereignty and the justness of intervention have broadened, spurred along by security imperatives.⁵³ Hence, there has been an increasing willingness to engage in coercive military interventions and, as Robert Cooper concluded, such interventionism has in fact become “increasingly normal.”⁵⁴ For instance, during the Cold War the US launched military interventions once a decade on average, but since 1989 the US has led interventions approximately every other year.⁵⁵ For its part, the United Nations has seen the pace of its interventions accelerate, with a new peacekeeping mission being undertaken approximately every six months as compared to ever four years during the Cold War.⁵⁶ In numbers this has meant that from 1945 to 1978 the UN conducted 13 operations, from 1978 to 1988 it did no new operations, yet since 1989 47 have been undertaken.⁵⁷

Before proceeding, it is important to qualify this thesis' interest in the dynamics of imperialism, as highlighted by the historians of the pericentric school, with its application towards analysing present interventionism. This thesis is not interested in the debate of whether or not the US or the West in general *is* an empire.⁵⁸ Rather, it is interested in whether it operates *as* an empire in terms of its short-term interventions into frontiers of insecurity since the end of the Cold War. Hence it is important to highlight that there are some important differences between present interventionism and imperialism historically, but that present interventionism is at least 'imperialistic' without being 'imperialism' in the full sense of that word. This point must be qualified so that the dynamics highlighted through imperial history, specifically the pericentric pull of frontiers and the importance of indigenous collaboration, can be applied to understanding the success or failure of current interventionism.

Imperialism can be defined as the "the process of establishing and maintaining an empire."⁵⁹ Post-Cold War interventions should be considered *imperialistic* because they result in one state coercively interfering in another to the point where the one can be said to control to a significant degree the other's effective sovereignty. Interventionism requires a significant degree of control in the internal affairs of one state by another, the key similarity with imperialism. Rather than mere influence, intervention must be to the degree where both internal and external processes and outcomes of a target state can be controlled by the intervener. However, the depths of control, in terms both of length and of intent, are not strong enough to warrant labelling them as imperialism in the full sense of that word. Contemporary interventionism should therefore be understood as more coercive than hegemony, yet less than imperialism.

Empires of the past focused largely on the permanence of their control over peripheral societies whereas present interventions merely see control as temporary and only "justified as the exercise of force and coercion necessary to restore peoples to their sovereignty."⁶⁰ This contrast was also made by James Rosenau of Cold War interventions with imperialism historically by arguing that "these latter phenomena involve the continued presence of the intervening actor in the target society."⁶¹ The same contrast can be made for present interventions since while at times there is formal

occupation, there is no long-term implementation of empire and the permanent presence of foreign coercion. Indeed, the whole point of the present interventions is the temporary exertion of control necessary to transition the targeted frontier state towards achieving domestic changes whereby it is deemed ready to resume its full, sovereign independence.⁶²

Furthermore, present interventions attempt to transition frontier states by strengthening their national governments, which inherently requires a profound degree of participation by locals. Western states need competent national governments with whom they can collaborate with to better respond to the security challenges of globalisation in order that the pericentric dynamic is assuaged. Given this key difference with past imperialism, the degree of forceful coercion is considerably different presently. Violent coercion is applied primarily against specific ‘peace spoilers’ and political wrangling undertaken with domestic elites to conform to expectations of the interventionists, such as for democratic elections. Overall, present interventionists focus not on catalysing change through military force but rather “discover ways to generate voluntary cooperation” conducive to allowing frontier states to stabilise.⁶³

While these interventions are ‘imperialistic’ in that they briefly control frontier states, there has been no return to colonialism or even informal imperialism as witnessed in previous eras. The current interventionism is very much intended to strengthen sovereign states as part of the universalisation of the international states system. As the US has argued, through interventions it seeks to “bolster threatened states... and build capacity.”⁶⁴ This is echoed by the UN in its interventionist interest to “assist states in developing their capacity to perform their sovereign functions effectively and responsibly.”⁶⁵ Western states, including their actions through the UN, accept that the world is entirely enclosed in equal sovereignty and a return to the imperialism of the past is unacceptable. However, while imperialism as an ideology is dead, there is still an interest in ensuring an international system of effective states even if that includes accepting that sometimes the ‘imperialistic’ means of interventions be utilised, an unfortunate necessity and one that has provoked much hesitance by the West. This has indeed hindered the effectiveness of present interventionism, something to be discussed thoroughly in subsequent chapters.

State building interventionism in detail

The European Union... intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC.

- The European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World'⁶⁶

The driving dynamic of the Westphalian states system is the notion of sovereignty. Intervention most broadly can be understood as the violation of the sovereignty of another state by a fellow state. For the purposes of this thesis, intervention will be specifically defined as: "To interfere, usually by force or the threat of force, in another state's internal affairs, especially to compel or prevent an action or to maintain or alter a condition."⁶⁷ More broadly, interventionism can be considered as a general behavioural pattern stemming from the proclivity of a state or a group of states in partnership to intervene in the internal affairs of other states.

In order to understand what state building is in the context of post-Cold War interventionism, it is firstly necessary to review what constitutes a 'state' and what the 'building' of it might entail. A good definition of what constitutes a state is provided by Anthony Giddens, who defined it as existing "when there is a political apparatus (government institutions, such as a court, parliament, or congress, plus civil service officials), ruling over a given territory, whose authority is backed by a legal system and the capacity to use force to implement its policies."⁶⁸ Even in an era of globalisation, states cannot be detached from the fundamental need to exert sovereign control over their territories. The primary need for correcting 'state failure' is hence for the state's government to be "reconstituted in some form", viz. to be 'built'.⁶⁹

State building was historically considered to be brought about through war, a theory most notably articulated by Charles Tilly when he famously argued 'war makes states, states make war'. This thesis will use the term 'state building' rather than 'nation building', which is often used synonymously in International Relations literature. A 'nation' is more appropriately understood as "a distinctive group of people who feel a communal bond on the basis of culture, history, religion, geography or linguistics" rather than as a state by itself.⁷⁰ Decolonisation failed to bring effective governance to

some of the international system's new states and given that, the present state building process sees the consolidation of a state potentially happening through foreign intervention rather than through war by itself. Considering this, state building definitions in International Relations focus on the use of interventions to stop domestic conflicts and reconstruct and strengthen national governments. James Dobbins thus defined state building as foreign efforts which "aim to halt a conflict... and promote the emergence of an indigenous government capable ultimately of resuming full responsibility for the security and well-being of its population."⁷¹

State building interventions should be understood as exercises in building the capability of frontier states to be effective members of a sovereignty-based international system. Mark Berger nicely summarises this general theme of present state building efforts thusly:

... an externally driven, or facilitated, attempt to form or consolidate a stable, and sometimes democratic, government over an internationally recognised national territory against the backdrop of the... universalisation of a system of sovereign states.⁷²

It is important to highlight that the form of the government sought is 'sometimes democratic' but that the primary goal is that of a creating a 'stable government' that can effectively control its sovereign territory.⁷³ The issue of democratisation in the context of imperatives for stability will be raised in subsequent chapters as a major issue but at this point, the definition of state building will focus on the creation of stable states rather than on democratisation in itself.

The post-Cold War era has been defined by interventions that are much more penetrating of what has traditionally been considered within a state's sovereign jurisdiction. The evolution of interventions can be seen in their categorisation within International Relations literature as 'generations'. The so-called 'first generation' interventions were those that occurred mostly during the Cold War and were considered 'classic peacekeeping' missions whereby foreign military forces, usually under a UN mandate, worked to monitor a peace agreement or ceasefire between opposing states. In this way they were very much geared towards enforcing Chapter VI of the UN Charter, "recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute", and also decidedly lacking in any state building intentions.

However, second generation interventions, namely those involving the UN since the end of the Cold War, have been geared towards Chapter VII implementation, “such action... as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” This has meant operations that were “qualitatively different from those of traditional peacekeeping... [because they attempt at] helping to build a long-term foundation for stable, legitimate government.”⁷⁴ Even so, second generation interventions were generally undertaken after the conclusion of a peace agreement and with the general consent, albeit often tenuously, of the warring parties, notably including non-state actors rather than only state governments. It was often necessary for military forces sent on peacekeeping missions “to go in prepared for battle” against non-state actors threatening agreements rather than merely expecting to monitor an agreement between state governments.⁷⁵ Examples of second generation interventions include those in Haiti, Bosnia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda, and the Solomon Islands.

As with second generation interventions, those of the third generation have also been geared towards Chapter VII mandates since the end of the Cold War. Crucially, they are “peace enforcing” operations intending to “use force to impose a peace” and have not been preceded by even a tenuous ceasefire much less a peace agreement.⁷⁶ In this spirit, they have been “military-led” interventions rather than merely “military-supported” such as those of the second generation.⁷⁷ The most prominent examples have included the UN intervention in Somalia and US-led interventions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Crucial to both second and third generation interventions is a focus on state building as the primary goal which makes them qualitatively different from the first generation. That there are few first generation peacekeeping missions presently highlights the prominence of intra-state war and state failure since the Cold War’s conclusion.

The third generation intervention in Somalia in 1993-1994 set the post-Cold War precedent that no longer would “‘quasi-states’ enjoy protection under the principle of non-intervention.”⁷⁸ Second and third generations effectively saw the revocation of such ‘courtesies’ extended previously to such states. Interventions now centre on the “idea of trying to control foreign societies... [and have the] intrusive aim of shaping the political development” of them.⁷⁹ It is important to conclude by noting that this has

been because Western states have pushed for an expanded understanding of what constitute ‘threats to peace’, notably state failure and all the negative ramifications that this has for international security, what has been termed the pericentric dynamic. Indeed, it is important to again emphasise that the intervention in Somalia in the early-1990s was an important precedent as it was the first time that “statelessness” was acknowledged as a threat to an international system of states and requiring of an intervention.⁸⁰

An important approach for understanding present interventionism is to consider it as a spectrum in terms of interventionists controlling the sovereignty of a target state. On one end would be lighter interventions where the “multinational forces [aren’t] strong enough to assert control over the country” and are there at the consent of warring parties.⁸¹ The foreign forces are able to assert some presence in the capital city and perhaps a few other major urban centres but no effort is made to implement a comprehensive security presence, what *Foreign Policy* magazine has called “peacekeeping on the cheap.”⁸² In these cases, the intervening force never assumes any formal sovereign responsibilities and examples of such interventions include Haiti and in the DR Congo.

On the other end of spectrum are “overwhelming intervention[s]”, such as that into Bosnia in 1995, when “foreign troops effectively installed an international protectorate for the ethnically divided government.”⁸³ In this sense, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor can be considered as semi-trusteeships of the international community, similar to ex-German colonies after the First World War. In these cases the UN formally assumed to a significant degree responsibility for administering those states for an extended period of time. For instance, in Cambodia the UN process went beyond just the monitoring of a peace agreement and rather established a ‘Transitional Authority’ that “actually... substituted for Cambodian sovereignty in key areas.”⁸⁴

In the middle of the spectrum of external control of sovereignty is where frontier states have seen intensive interventions, leading to the toppling of governments, but which do not establish formal UN protectorates. The best example of this was the US’ overthrow

of Afghanistan's Taliban regime in 2001. In that case a very weak government deemed hostile to the US was quickly defeated and an internationally-supported transition process immediately allowed for an indigenous government to take over. Overall, most interventions since the end of the Cold War have been on an "uncomfortable path between trusteeship and complete withdrawal."⁸⁵

A second understanding of present interventionism comes from viewing it as "a process rather than an event."⁸⁶ Present interventions centre on the complex task of state building rather than on the simpler goals of interventions in previous eras, notably monitoring a peace agreement between two states. State building efforts presently undertaken through interventions should be seen as "a process of cultivation that fosters the growth of local actors."⁸⁷ More specifically, it can be seen as a two pronged process. The first prong is the development of the "specific instruments states use to control society, that is, state capacity" and the second prong is the element of how "states and societies negotiate their relationship, that is, the kind of state."⁸⁸ These are complicated tasks and require a large variety of activities to accomplish.

An interventionist state building process can be seen as the series of events starting with the instigating one- such as the signing of a peace agreement and the arrival of foreign military forces or indeed a foreign military invasion- through to the 'conclusion' of the intervention. This can be assumed to exist when the target state's government has resumed full control of its sovereign space. In this understanding, an intervention could be considered to be a process that's come to a 'successful' conclusion in terms of sufficient "state stability" allowing for international withdrawal.⁸⁹ On the other hand, it can also come to an end with the retreat of an intervening force which has not achieved its stated goals, such as the UN from Somalia in 1994. In either case what is important is that within an international system defined by sovereignty, present interventions are indeed "finite and transitory" and can be said to cease when their "convention breaking behaviour" no longer exists.⁹⁰ Either a sovereign state resumes sovereign control in terms of being a relatively stable state or indeed lapses into an anarchic one, but in either case without a coercive, interfering foreign presence.

In addition to defining post-Cold War interventions as a spectrum and as a state building process, it is subsequently important to briefly discuss that they are multifaceted, complex endeavours. Overall, ‘state building tasks’ intend to create a “stable political structure.”⁹¹ In general, post-Cold War interventions usually follow a model although key differences are whether the ‘negotiated settlement’ is instigated by outsiders or merely mediated by them. This model was best summarised by Marina Ottaway, who described it thusly:

The model usually envisages a negotiated settlement and the holding of a national conference... to reach an agreement on the structure of the political system, followed by elections. In addition to these core activities, the model calls for subsidiary but crucial undertakings, beginning with the demobilization of former combatants and the development of a new national army, then extending to reforming the judiciary, restructuring the civil service, and establishing a central bank- thus creating all the institutions deemed necessary to run a modern state.⁹²

In this light, it is apparent that state building interventions are more than just the presence or use of military force for occupying a foreign country. They can be said to constitute a “hinge between foreign, development and military policy” and without looking at them as such, it is impossible to analyse them properly.⁹³

Considering the ambitions of state building interventions, the types of activities they undertake cover a wide gamut of needs, such as filling security vacuums, dealing with humanitarian issues, rebuilding government institutions, and implementing new economic policies. Interventionist militaries play the crucial role in present interventions, often grudgingly when forced to undertake activities they consider beyond their traditional responsibilities as ‘war-fighting forces’. Whether this is appropriate or not will be discussed in later chapters, but suffice to say the activities they implement “can encompass formal military occupation, counter-insurgency, [and] peacekeeping” as well as what are traditionally considered non-military tasks such as governance, policing and development work.⁹⁴

The usage of military power to instigate change in the governance of frontier states is required, at least initially, to quell or at least mitigate civil violence while a national government is formed or strengthened. This necessity is, at its simplest, dictated by the fact that those intervening, even if through the UN, at times have “to use force to stop

those who try to undercut them.”⁹⁵ Utilising military force, either to force a settlement or to protect one, is required because of the presence of ‘spoilers’ to peace processes and agreements, be they militias, warlords, insurgents, terrorists or any other amongst a plethora of non-state actors. This threat is especially prescient in an era where there is an increasingly willingness to intervene even when not all of the conflicting parties consent to the involvement of the intervening power, such as in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Haiti.⁹⁶

Furthermore, interventions apply military power as a catalyst to achieve a strategic objective, the creation of a more stable state with a government capable of exerting sovereign control over its territory.⁹⁷ In this sense, rather than waiting for a civil war to rage on in seeming perpetuity, the intervening power is willing to catalyse the situation through its own military force. This is deemed necessary because it is felt that “there is inadequate domestic capacity to deal with the situation and outside help is needed to jump-start the process.”⁹⁸ Passive, external participation has been deemed lacking in resolving the problems of the frontier states. The pericentric pull dictates that proactive action be undertaken, including applying military force when required. While the interventionist military forces play primary roles, state building activities also require the efforts of other foreign actors. NGOs and UN agencies currently do the “hard work” activities necessary to “help states transition from civil war to civil society.”⁹⁹ These can include training programmes, infrastructure construction, humanitarian aid provision, and democracy promotion, amongst numerous others.

Lastly, it is important to highlight the tasks required during state building interventionism have provoked important changes in the defence posturing of Western states. One of the most notable changes has been a new emphasis on projecting force into frontiers, or as NATO articulates the need, “the possibility to be expeditionary, to project stability.”¹⁰⁰ An emphasis on ‘expeditionary capabilities’ has been driven by the realisation that in the present and future, the US, as well as other Western states, will not be “conducting war against nations [but rather will be] conducting war in countries we are not at war with.”¹⁰¹ This means militaries must now prioritise being able to conduct ‘irregular’ warfare activities such as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns.

In addition to expeditionary capabilities, present interventions require militaries, as mentioned previously, to partake in actual state building activities. While an intervention may be initiated by military force, what follows next is where the transition is, in theory, achieved by ‘the expedition’ and the actual state building activities are undertaken. The US military has termed these follow-up efforts as ‘Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)’ operations. SSTR operations intend to produce those “effects” which cumulatively “lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.”¹⁰² Within Europe, the UK has best articulated this need to enhance capacity to transition frontier states following initiating military action. In its “effects based” planning, the UK military emphasises the need to “stabilise”, which it defines as “to set the secure and stable conditions required for political and economic action so as to bring a situation under control.”¹⁰³ As with civilian counterparts, these activities can include training programmes, infrastructure construction, and humanitarian aid provision, amongst numerous others.

3.4: State building interventionism as frontier management

... to assist in the establishment of effective and responsible control over ungoverned territory.

- US Department of Defense, ‘National Defense Strategy, 2006’¹⁰⁴

Before concluding, it is important to articulate how state building interventionism is a strategy of management undertaken by Western states. Sociologists, notably Ulrich Beck, have developed the theme of ‘risk society’ which emphasises that a reflexive rationality presently guides actors who have no secure ends to choose between but who instead endeavour to balance ‘risks’. A risk is a scenario provoking a policy response in order to prevent that scenario from becoming real. Furthermore, risks can be considered perceptions of future dangers that need management. In risk societies, politics is essentially a process of ‘risk management’, notably when governments identify success not as singular outcomes but rather as the “ability to manage processes of transformation.”¹⁰⁵

This concept of risk society has been expertly applied by Mikkell Rasmussen towards strategic studies in the post-Cold War era, namely that risk management is the “new

guiding principle of strategy” because it allows policy makers to connect apparently random events, policy initiatives, and technological developments within the context of globalisation.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, in an era defined by globalisation, Western strategy is limited to an emphasis on managing risks rather than “creating enduring security.”¹⁰⁷ This is notably so because present security challenges are not in the form of state-centric warfare with conclusive outcomes, such as ‘surrender’ and ‘victory’, but rather on a ménage of non-state actors who are greatly empowered through globalisation because of the immediacy it provides. Overall, risk management in an era of globalisation requires “managing imperfection.”¹⁰⁸

Risk management as a strategy is centred upon the ‘precautionary principle’, propositioned most notably in environmental and crime prevention policies, and intends to prevent problems before they surface or at least to mitigate them before they become unmanageable. Prevention is the key aspect of risk management due to the simple rationale that the causes of insecurity in an era of globalisation are diverse and largely unpredictable. In the past, when risks were ascertained they could at least to some extent be isolated or deterred. However, because of the immediacy offered through globalisation, this is largely impossible now. For instance, the spread of bird flu or a computer virus cannot be simply isolated geographically or even by time as some risks only manifest themselves slowly over an extended period. As guaranteeing final results is no longer feasible, more diverse strategies must be adopted. Essentially, the strategy must endeavour towards preserving a “manageable environment [in which] the threats that might erode control in the future... [are to] be pre-empted.”¹⁰⁹

How can governments manage risks in an era of globalisation? Christopher Coker has provided insights into how risk management is implemented, notably that because of globalisation, “instead of managing security, we manage insecurity.”¹¹⁰ Resultant from the uncertainties of the risks currently faced, the “only option open to governments is to police the world.”¹¹¹ This policing is primarily of managing communities that are considered the most threatening. Crime prevention as a precedent is especially apt, namely to remove factors that allow crime to be part of a social environment in order to manage it. In this sense, ‘risk profiling’ becomes critical and whereby governments seek to identify the most prominent risks so that they can be dealt with proactively

rather than merely reactively. In this way, risk management as a strategy mirrors those of 'preventive defence' and 'anticipatory defence' put forth respectively by the Clinton and Bush administrations in the US.

If one were to assume the role of a strategic policy maker, surely one of the most obvious risks would be frontiers of insecurity; and if insecurity can now only be managed, state-building interventions are a management strategy by Western states. Rasmussen argued as much when he noted that the increased number of interventions by Western states since the end of the Cold War reflected "the challenges of globalisation and the way the governments of risk societies have interpreted them."¹¹² Fundamentally, state building interventionism is a strategy response attempting to 'reshape environments' in order to minimise the risks that come from them.

As Lane and Sky noted of Western forces in Afghanistan, and true of interventions elsewhere, interventions are fundamentally a "contest of ungoverned space" with dangerous non-state actors.¹¹³ Western states, because of the pericentric dynamic, realise that their own security depends on "proactive and sustained efforts abroad to prevent security threats emanating from unsatisfactorily governed locations."¹¹⁴ The purpose is not to naively 'create order' as a clear-cut outcome, but rather it is to simply engender stronger, more effectively governed states as best possible to allow for security concerns to be mitigated and become more 'manageable' rather than ended outright. Even in the West itself, insecurity is merely managed. By example, illegal trafficking and terrorism exist in the UK yet the most reliable responses to them are government policies aimed at limiting them to the greatest extent possible. This is what is sought in frontier states as well, the allowance for more effective governance to manage risks locally.

The crux of this management strategy is placed on empowering sovereign governments, namely effective local 'collaborative partners', to better manage their territory. Exercising control through more effective governance allows for national governments to combat dangerous non-state actors and the negative outflows of globalisation. At its simplest, this means more effectively controlling territory through state power, what

Robert Orr terms a “minimally capable state.”¹¹⁵ In this manner, the *pro tem* presence of interventionist troops provides a “stop-gap” until the national government has the capability of fulfilling these duties by itself.¹¹⁶

3.5: Conclusion

Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.

- The European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’¹¹⁷

In concluding, it is necessary to qualify the assertions of this chapter with the imperatives of prioritisation. East Timor as a frontier is not as pressing for Germany as it is to Australia. However, there is nonetheless a profound, overarching strategic interest in the West to prevent and mitigate state failure, but it is done in consideration of the strategic concerns of the respective states and in review of available resources. Given this, it is only when a state, a coalition thereof, or a multilateral organisation becomes ‘sufficiently animated’ that it will be willing to incur the costs of intervening.¹¹⁸ Not every frontier will merit a direct response. Those deemed of priority might see such outcomes if policy-makers in interested states consider them as such, viz. Afghanistan was a US priority, East Timor an Australian one, and the Balkans paramount for the EU.

This chapter has sought to answer two questions: why the West responds to the challenge of anarchic frontiers and why it responds through state building interventionism. Through the pericentric pull, Western states are fundamentally responding to the lack of effective governance that allows for the uncontrolled proliferation of security problems emanating from frontier states through globalisation. What is most notable about the pericentric dynamic is that just as in the past, the lack of local ‘collaborative partners’ suitable for Western states to meet their own security interests can also be seen in the present era. The West seeks an international system based on at least minimally functional states. Yet, in the frontier states indigenous partners, in the form of minimally effective national governments, cannot be found currently. Hence, a deeper type of engagement is required.

This engagement has been through state building interventionism focused on improving the capabilities of indigenous partners in the form of national governments. Whether it is the multilateral intervention of the UN in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the US' largely unilateral intervention in Afghanistan, or Australia's presence in the Solomon Islands, the purpose of state building interventionism is to strengthen national governments that are then better able to exercise improved sovereign control over their territory, combating dangerous non-state actors and mitigating the negative outflows of globalisation such as narcotics, human trafficking, and organised crime. If the West can strengthen frontier states, it means national governments there will then be able to better manage the insecurity of globalisation themselves and by doing so, Western states are better able to guarantee their own security and that of the wider international community.

Considering state building interventionism as an effort to strengthen national governments to better exercise effective control over sovereign territories, there is a need to give proper emphasis to the inherent centrality of local actors as critical to the entire endeavour. The next chapter will argue that 'collaboration' between an intervening power and indigenous politics is the definitive theme that runs through the state building processes of current interventions. Unless collaboration can be engendered in a manner conducive to working through the state building processes, interventions can only but fail in achieving their objective. Given that, the art of state building is fundamentally one of collaboration.

CHAPTER 4: THE THEORY OF COLLABORATION

*The difficulty... is in knowing what form intervention should take.*¹

The previous chapter argued that Western states react to the pericentric pull of frontiers of insecurity through state building interventionism. While that explanation provided an improved understanding of how Western states respond, it did not suitably explain whether that response is adequate to meeting the actual security needs of Western states. The balance of the thesis will be focused on answering that question by seeking to understand why the state building interventions of the post-Cold War era succeed or fail, namely whether the West is able to 'manage' its frontiers of insecurity thus mitigating the pericentric pull of peripheral crises.

In order to ascertain if the West is indeed managing frontiers of insecurity, it is necessary that a better understanding of the efficacy of present interventions be garnered. This chapter will consequently contend that an emphasis be placed on the centrality of 'collaboration' to interventions by defining a theoretical approach for it, namely a 'theory of collaboration'. The central principle of a suitable theory of collaboration must be that indigenous 'collaborative systems', which interface an intervention's external participants with indigenous politics, determine more than anything else the efficacy of post-Cold War interventions.

This argument is premised on the assertion that the agency of indigenous political actors is definitive as is their interplay with an intervener's agents and both are widely disregarded or misunderstood in the present International Relations analysis of state building interventionism. Without fully analysing the structure, dynamics and centrality of indigenous collaborative systems developed and applied in interventions in frontier states, it is impossible to truly understand whether or not they succeed or fail in reaching their goals, creating more effectively governed states.

4.1: Why it is necessary to analyse ‘collaboration’

Collaboration... is a word with an unsavoury sound, amplified by the reaction against the Quislings and Petains of World War II... [yet] there is no reason why they should lead us to either studiously ignore collaboration or reduce it to a simple act of betrayal.²

James Rosenau argued nearly forty years ago that the academic analysis of interventions was “singularly devoid of efforts to develop systematic knowledge on the conditions under which interventionary behaviour is initiated, sustained, and abandoned.”³ Rosenau’s comments were prescient and what is still lacking is a theoretical understanding of interventions that allows for consistent analysis. The present literature about state building interventionism is primarily flawed because of its overemphasis on the assumed primacy and agency of the intervening power as an actor.⁴ Yet, the importance of indigenous actors should not be understated.

Interventions are required because the West cannot presently find ‘collaborative partners’ in the form of effective national governments to help manage their security concerns regarding globalisation, i.e. the pericentric pull, so they temporarily employ imperialistic means to strengthen or even create anew such collaborative partners, viz. through state building interventionism. Hence, it is worth specifically considering how an intervening power actually interacts with indigenous actors, giving them more importance as players with significant agency, and whether this might hence provide more insight into understanding how and why interventions unfold and their overall efficacy. A theory is required to allow for a consistent framing of the discourse around these considerations of the agency of indigenous actors and their interactions with the agents of an intervening power in the form of collaboration.

Collaboration has widely assumed a negative connotation in a political sense as meaning ‘cooperating with the enemy’, notably in regards to Nazi Germany. One historian thus described it as “all manner of cooperation, active or passive, shown to the occupier; anything, in fact, that enables an occupation to continue.”⁵ However, despite such stigma, the word collaboration actually has a long past largely free of such taint and has more generally been understood as ‘working together in an undertaking’. This

can be seen etymologically in that collaboration is a back-formation of the of the word *collaborator*, which in turn stems from the Latin *collaboratus*, a past participle of *collaborare* (“to work with”).⁶ Other academic analyses- such as that in the computer and library sciences, governance and business management fields- have avoided using the term in a constrictive normative sense and instead applied it using the ‘classic’ definition. For example, within governance literature, collaboration delineates “networks, ‘joined up’ governance, and partnership working.”⁷ Overall, within other academic disciplines, collaboration is seen as a non-normative, utilitarian process in which autonomous actors work together in an “attempt to increase values for the other as well as for oneself.”⁸

An attempt to look at collaboration intellectually, given its negative connotations and historical baggage, might seem decidedly masochistic, even counter-productive, within International Relations. If collaboration as a term is to provide value to International Relations it must be clearly defined and rigidly applied so as to strengthen its utility for suitable analytical application. Considering that, this thesis will apply a value neutral understanding of collaboration and it should be understood as a utilitarian term “in a purely functional sense.”⁹ A suitable definition, to be used by this thesis, is: *collaboration* occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a problem domain engage in an interactive process to act or decide on issues related to that domain.¹⁰

The key distinction between collaboration and similar words is its dynamic nature as an interactive process. While cooperation is similar in intent (and a synonym at least in the vernacular), it has a more static meaning. It implies a limited, fairly well defined partnership required for reaching a limited goal. Conversely, collaboration intends for a dynamic relationship that can evolve and change and importantly does indeed involve cooperation but also to an important degree, manipulation.¹¹ Hence, collaboration can be seen as a multifaceted process involving more than mere cooperation.

Given that collaboration is an interactive, dynamic process involving the finely balanced dialectic of cooperation and manipulation, all of the collaborating participants intend to maximize one another’s abilities to achieve more together than what they could

individually, what can be termed ‘collaborative advantage’.¹² The specific goals for collaboration between the participants may vary but overall the relationship must be one of mutual benefit and loosely aligned towards a broader, commonly understood outcome. While there may be ‘unfair’ terms of power, and hence agreements, during the progression of collaborative relationships it is still necessary that all participants feel that they have more to gain than lose through the partnership in order for collaboration to exist. Lastly, the participants of a collaborative relationship must exhibit some degree of autonomy from one another otherwise they can be seen to ‘merge’ rather than to collaborate.¹³

Collaboration during interventions

Much of the academic study of collaboration comes from imperialism literature. Even the most totalitarian empires required some degree of support from indigenous peoples to exert local control and to sustain themselves over the longer-term. The centrality of collaboration to imperialism has long been highlighted. Niall Ferguson, for instance, noted empires “do not survive long if they cannot establish and sustain local consent.”¹⁴ The most effective imperialists were those best at collaborating with indigenous politics, thereby achieving ‘economy of force’. By example, Allen Isaacman argued for 19th Century European imperialism in Africa that “without collaborators, the Europeans could not have imposed their rule so thoroughly and with such a minimal cost in manpower.”¹⁵

While collaboration may be central to exerting control during imperialism, is it even applicable to present interventions? If empires could not be maintained without collaboration, it is all the more valid for present interventions which do not see nearly the same degree of coercion involved in the imperialism of the past, have very short timeframes which increases the need for participation from locals, and most importantly, the entire purpose of present interventions is to empower locals by building up their capabilities for governance. Tonya Langford argued that state failure is a “complex and essentially political problem” and responses to it cannot be simplified to merely externally driven and imposed solutions that singularly attempt to settle war, build governing institutions, or revive an economy.¹⁶

Indeed, there is a strong need to see interventions as politically defined processes revolving around indigenous actors. Patrick Regan came closest to highlighting this when he argued that the “makeup of the participants to the conflict affects the strategy for and likelihood of successful” interventions.¹⁷ The need to exert control through mere ‘imperialistic’ interventions inherently requires collaboration with indigenous politics. This is because present state building interventions see external and internal actors work together to create a more viable state, i.e. they are intrinsically a collaborative effort. At times, such as in the early stages of an intervention, the interventionists may be paramount, but they are still fundamentally dependent on local participation throughout.

Considering this, there is a need to systematically look at the interface of an intervening power with indigenous politics and the best way to do that is by analysing it from a collaboration standpoint. Overall, state building interventionism should be defined as *dynamic, interactive processes of collaboration* interfacing intervening agents with those of indigenous society; empowering indigenous actors, namely national governments, to exercise more effective sovereign control over their territory. The West needs national governments in frontier states to work more effectively, i.e. this is the ‘problem domain’ of collaboration, and state building interventions are collaborative processes that attempt to achieve that.

US ‘collaboration’ during interventions

We will help... domestic partners increase their capabilities to contend with complex issues of common concern.

- US Department of Defense, ‘National Defense Strategy, 2005’¹⁸

A further reason why a systematic analysis of collaboration is necessary is because it has euphemistically been introduced into defence policy papers without concurrently being accorded significant weight in the academic discourse on state building interventionism. A review of US defence policies yields the most apt examples of what more appropriately should be termed collaboration. While the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) initial efforts during an intervention may be the military defeat of an

enemy, the overall focus is on “transitioning responsibility” to a national government and ultimately “helping others to help themselves.”¹⁹

In its post-Cold War emphasis on expeditionary capabilities and stability operations, the DoD therefore increasingly expresses an interest in what it terms an ‘indirect approach’. At its simplest, the indirect approach can be defined as “building up and working with others.”²⁰ Fundamentally, this entails empowering indigenous partners, which allows the US to “to act with and through others... shifting from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for themselves.”²¹ Central to the efforts of an indirect approach is working together to “achieve common objectives”, such as the defeat of a shared enemy but also of eventually improving a partner government’s ability to “police themselves and govern their populations more justly and effectively.”²²

The value of such an indirect approach is that “building and leveraging partner capacity” allows it to function more effectively during the complex operations required for state building interventions.²³ This is because many of the US’ interventions occur in areas of the world where US forces want to maintain, as best possible, a “low-visibility presence” for as short a period as is feasible.²⁴ Furthermore, the critical significance of an indirect approach is the legitimacy it brings to such operations. The DoD argued this when it noted that by “working indirectly with and through others” it helps to deny popular support to an enemy because US partners have “legitimacy with their own people.”²⁵ Considering all of the above, the DoD now places a priority interest in “being organized to work with and through others, and of shifting emphasis from performing tasks ourselves to enabling others.”²⁶ How these Pentagon policy prescriptions have actually been actuated is more problematical and this thesis is hence intent to provide an initial, humble attempt to rectify the gap in the academic understanding thereof.

4.2: Robinson’s ‘sketch’ for a theory of collaboration

The theory of collaboration suggests that at every stage from external imperialism to decolonisation, the working of imperialism was determined by the indigenous collaborative systems connecting its European and Afro-

Asian components. It was as much and often more a function of Afro-Asian politics than of European politics and economics.

- Ronald Robinson²⁷

Of specific interest to this thesis is Ronald Robinson's seminal article entitled "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration."²⁸ Robinson's argument was that collaboration with indigenous politics was the 'non-European foundation' of imperialism and given that, collaboration was definitive for determining the shape and course of imperialism. The transition from more benign, informal influence to deeper levels of imperial control was primarily the result of a breakdown of collaboration between the agents of an empire and its collaborators in the periphery. Following crises in the periphery, what had once been accomplished without imperial control was no longer possible, requiring a deepening of control and a re-shaping of local 'collaborative systems', those relationships between imperialists and indigenous collaborative partners critical to achieving their strategic interests.

Robinson argued that without indigenous collaboration, it would have been impossible for any European state to establish, much less maintain, imperial control abroad since the military and administrative power necessary for that rule was "drawn through the mediation of indigenous elites."²⁹ Considering that, the "central mechanisms" of imperialism were the "systems of collaboration... which succeeded (or failed) in meshing the incoming processes of European expansion into indigenous social politics and achieving some kind of evolving equilibrium between the two."³⁰ Given this centrality of collaboration to imperialism, Robinson argued that the "changing bargains of collaboration... define the actual working of imperialism at the point of impact at a particular time" and subsequently the "study of them appears to offer a more comprehensive view of the factors involved than does the one-eyed analysis of European forces."³¹

Robinson's arguments for emphasising collaboration in itself will subsequently be applied for defining an updated theory of collaboration. However, before proceeding it is first necessary to define the collaborative dynamics that differentiate imperialism

historically from present interventionism. Firstly is to consider that while present interventions are 'imperialistic' in that they briefly control internal processes and outcomes within frontier states, there has fundamentally been no return to formal colonialism or even informal imperialism as witnessed in previous eras. Indigenous collaboration during imperialism, and especially that of totalitarian empires, was largely motivated by a belief that the empire was permanent so collaboration with it, though unfortunate, was necessary.³² Present interventions are decidedly different. Collaboration will occur, but not primarily because indigenous actors feel the interventionists are going to be occupying their country permanently or even for an extended period.

The current emphasis of state building interventions is for transitioning frontier states by strengthening their national governments, something defined intrinsically by the active participation of local peoples. In past colonialism, if they gained social and economic power, indigenous collaborating elites rose to challenge their imperial rulers, something the imperialists did not intend to happen. This is what Robinson considered the evolutionary inversion of collaboration, what he called "non-collaboration."³³ Given that, imperialists tried as much as possible to maintain a balance of "political influence between imperial collaborators and nascent nationalists" in order to keep both in check.³⁴ The purpose of keeping indigenous collaborators relatively weak was that it was required to perpetuate colonial rule in the long-term. In contrast, the whole purpose of present interventions is to actually expedite the process of 'collaboration inversion' rather than to stymie it. Interventionists want to be 'over-powered' and 'challenged' by the national government so that they can leave as quickly as possible. In this manner, present interventionists are seeking a "gradualism of collaboration" whereby as a national government gains more and more capability to effectively govern its territory, the intervener gradually withdraws until the intervention can be concluded.³⁵

4.3: An updated 'theory of collaboration' for state building interventionism

They were in the indigenous business of faction and clientage-making with zamindars and talukdars, Hindu bhadrak and Muslim jihad leaders, African clan heads, paramount chiefs and kings. The permutations on which they rang the changes, the brinkmanship involved in pushing indigenous politics in desired modern directions, constituted the true genius

of colonial administration.

- Robinson on colonial administrators³⁶


Michael Ignatieff argued that an intervening power presently intends to engender transitions “through the medium of an exit strategy... to get results, to turn the place back to the locals, and to get out.”³⁷ This thesis contends that the premise for such a transitive strategy be determined by what collaborative possibilities are available from the very start of an intervention. Collaborative systems are what should define the ‘opportunity structure’ of state building interventions. Indeed, the context of collaborative possibilities determines everything else. With this in mind, this section will outline a theory of collaboration that can be used as a theoretical foundation for the analysis of present state building interventionism.

The framework for collaboration

The most important consideration in understanding present interventions are the changing bargains of collaboration. These bargains, i.e. the agreements between collaborating actors, define the actual structure of an intervention at the point of impact at a particular time. The relationships between intervening actors and those of indigenous actors can be termed ‘collaborative systems’.³⁸ The dynamics driving collaborative systems during interventions are the politics of collaboration, the “continual renegotiation of the terms and conditions of cooperation... [a] process... of constant manoeuvre for political advantage.”³⁹ Overall, the defining feature of collaborative systems can be summarised as the “the constant struggle for leverage” between the different collaborating actors, especially of the indigenous collaborative elite who have to balance the interveners’ demands with their own and to at least some extent with those of the wider indigenous society.⁴⁰

The collaborative systems used during interventions are centred on two interconnecting sets of socio-political linkages. The first set, what can be called the ‘external’ one, is the collaborative arrangement between the intervening power’s agents and the indigenous elites drawn into collaborating with them. The second set, what can be termed the ‘internal’ one, is that connecting the collaborative elite to local interests and institutions, be they political, ethnic, or religious.⁴¹ Collaborative elites have to perform

certain functions in the external set with the intervening power’s agents whilst being sure that they accord with that done in the internal set, the more important of the two. In this way, the kind of collaboration possible in the external set is largely determined by that of the internal one because it shapes its parameters.



The emergence of collaborative systems begins in the external set, most often through initiating events such as a national reconciliation conference, for example the ‘royal jurga’ in Afghanistan, or through the acceptance of a negotiated peace agreement, such as that which officially ended the Congolese civil war in 2002. The purpose of the external set is primarily to interface the intervening power with indigenous society whereby the demands of the interventionists are made known, such as stipulations for certain types of governments (mostly democratic and liberal), while conversely the general “intentions and demands of the subject people are articulated” through indigenous elites collaborating with the interventionists, namely through a national government.⁴²

‘Progress’ during state building interventionism requires a strong interface of the internal and external sets through the indigenous collaborating elite. Collaborating elites exerting prominence in the external set that have no broadly accepted legitimacy to govern will lead an intervention to fail. Avoiding this requires that the developments agreed to and worked towards in the external set are able to garner consent through the relationships formed in the internal set. Given these considerations, the challenge for interventionists is that the state structures they are attempting to solidify correspond to the broader demands of the indigenous society, namely there must be “acceptance of,

and commitment to, the processes of the state- belief in their legitimacy, a sense of ownership in their representation, and even pride in the development.”⁴³ In that manner, the indigenous collaborative partners from the external set are required to explain through the internal set what the intervention is trying to achieve and why that is a worthy cause for the society involved.⁴⁴ Most often, this explanation of the intervention being beneficial simply means demonstrating peace has been achieved initially and later that good governance and economic development are to be possible.

The internal collaborative set is, as mentioned, the more important of the two. Michael Doyle argued that “the problem of rebuilding a war-torn society [is] one of rebuilding social trust.”⁴⁵ Essential to the internal set supporting the goals of the intervention, namely the creation of a more capable, stronger state, is the consent given by the broader population to the external set’s agreements, namely of the creation of a national government that has broadly recognised legitimacy. Furthermore, the internal set is important for allowing ‘citizen agency’ whereby individual citizens have a sense of participation in broader political developments which helps to overcome societal divides, such as ethnicity or religion.⁴⁶

Characteristic of collaboration

There are three characteristics of collaboration shaping the internal and external sets of collaborative systems. Firstly, rather than there being entirely unified groups of indigenous ‘collaborators’ representing cohesive social groups, collaboration is instead more generally dispersed throughout indigenous societies as ‘collections of mediating functions’.⁴⁷ There are few, if any, entirely dedicated indigenous collaborative partners. Collaboration does not stipulate that indigenous partners be subservient ‘proxies’ of the intervening power; indeed they must have an autonomous ability to negotiate their relationships as actors in their own right.⁴⁸

Interventions are both a disruptive as well as a potentially stabilising force and the function of collaboration is to mediate between these polar dynamics. The purpose of the indigenous partners to collaboration will be of mediation to achieve goals when they are in common with the intervening power rather than mere implemental subservience.

However, it must be said that collaborative relationships are fairly lopsided at times, notably in the beginning of an intervention when collaborating elites are relatively dependent on the intervening power for material support and security.⁴⁹ Even considering that there is some dependence initially, analysis of a “collaboration-exploitation ratio” shows that dependence is of less importance to determining the relationship’s dynamics than the expected benefits of the relationship, specifically the satisfaction of achieving expected and shared outcomes.⁵⁰

Secondly, the efficacy of collaboration is significantly affected by the amount of resources, both material and political, that is committed to it. Intervening powers that attempt to sustain collaborative systems with little more than goodwill, notably of their agents on the ground, should not expect to achieve their interventionist goals. Collaboration is a nuanced mixture of cooperation and manipulation. It is not based on altruism and mutual goodwill between the participants but fundamentally by the desire, or indeed the need, to achieve more together, often acrimoniously because of the manipulation involved, than what could be done individually. Given that forced rationale of necessity and the driving role of manipulation, resources are required to facilitate it rather than just friendly intentions conducive to mere cooperation (although those do help). However, resource provision is not an end in itself and poorly rationalised collaborative systems will perform inadequately even if they have significant amounts of resources at their disposal.

Thirdly, degrees of trust and amounts of knowledge sharing are crucial factors shaping collaborative relationships. Trust entails a general understanding of the motives and intents of collaborative partners and given that, a willingness to try new and different approaches that would not be contemplated otherwise.⁵¹ It is inherently affected by how much one collaborative partner actually does know about the other’s roles, needs, objectives, and constraints faced.⁵² During an intervention, the intervening power wants to trust that its indigenous partners are serious about implementing the significant reforms necessary to build a stronger state. Conversely, indigenous partners want to believe that the interventionists are actually going to leave but provide security and resources to them in the meantime. Furthermore, indigenous partners want to trust the interventionists to “provide guarantees for the peace process that transcend the lack of

trust among the belligerent parties.”⁵³ Knowledge sharing can be in either an explicit form, such as reports and speeches, or implicitly conveyed through actions and procedures. Poor information sharing can result in stymied partnerships that suffer from a lack of trust. Trust based upon knowledge sharing is also crucial because it affects the willingness of collaborative partners to engage in risk taking. Overall, decidedly low levels of trust and knowledge sharing cause hesitation and anxiety for collaborating actors about making decisions and managing ongoing relationships and hence damage collaborative systems.

All three of these factors are important because they determine the degree of engagement which the participants sustain in their collaborative systems. Low levels of engagement provide for low levels of collaborative work being accomplished.⁵⁴ Choosing and managing indigenous partners capable of effectively mediating foreign demands into indigenous realities as well as engendering trust and effectively sharing knowledge between collaborative partners all serve to increase the efficacy of collaboration to produce results on the ground. A lack of achievement through collaborative work serves to dilute the impact that all of these factors connote for collaborative systems.

The mechanics for collaboration

Coalition Forces are building capacity of indigenous forces, forging relationships with local leaders and preventing Taliban attempts to re-establish themselves in the area.

- US military efforts in Afghanistan⁵⁵

The mechanics for collaboration centre on the ability of collaborative partners to manage options. Namely, the ability of the agents of the intervening power to both cooperate with and manipulate their partners in the indigenous elite through collaboration is largely defined by their capability to provide and exclude options.⁵⁶ As military and political powers as well as financial resources, the agents of the intervening power can shape to a significant degree the working environment for collaboration by the options that they control in order to achieve their particular goals for an intervention. However, while the agents of the intervening power do have significant leverage, they

are still ultimately dependent on their collaboration with indigenous elites to attain their goals at a bearable cost, in both terms of blood and treasure. Given this, their ability to coerce the shape and undertakings of their indigenous collaborating partners, especially in the longer-term when partnered with a sovereign government, can be fairly limited.⁵⁷

For their part, the indigenous partners, also through the provision and exclusion of options, strive to translate the power and resources of the intervening power into opportunities to strengthen their positions within indigenous politics and to push their own domestic platforms. Successful indigenous collaborative partners are those who can translate external resources and power into terms of indigenous politics. They can manipulate those external forces of the intervening power into terms that can be 'internalised' into indigenous politics, rather than just being other 'external' variables that might or might not have consequences for indigenous politics. In this way, indigenous collaborative partners attempt to channel the energy of the intervening power into not just strengthening their own positions, but also into roles and outcomes that are actually defined by indigenous politics rather than what the intervening power might attempt to define as their own 'foreign' ones.⁵⁸

Motivations for collaboration

Establishing good governance and national order will reduce the opportunity for the return of Taliban forces and their terrorist associates. It will ensure that Afghanistan is no longer a safe haven for terrorists to plan, organise and train.

- Government of Australia, 'Australia's National Security, 2005'⁵⁹

As has been argued extensively in this thesis, Western states are motivated by their need to respond to the pericentric dynamic of frontiers of insecurity. They are provoked by a desire to mitigate their security concerns, and to a lesser degree to dampen humanitarian worries, by working to empower national governments in frontier states. The rationale to collaborate is more ambiguous for indigenous actors who face a 'collaboration dilemma', deciding whether to collaborate with the interventionists or to oppose them.⁶⁰ Overall, what indigenous elites are willing to participate in collaborative systems do so for the simple reason that if interventionist forces cannot be totally excluded, notably through military resistance, they can instead be used to improve their own status, access

new resources, and change domestic realities.⁶¹ In that way foreign interventions provide indigenous elites with opportunities previously unavailable to them.⁶² These opportunities can cover a range of possibilities.

Undoubtedly prime motivations for many indigenous actors who participate in collaborative systems are genuine interests in improving their states. One of the most important ones in this regard is the desire by groups that had been brutalised by the previous government or the ruling social group to collaborate with the interventionists.⁶³ Furthermore, a general desire to end an anarchic, violence prone existence, even if that means tolerating a foreign intervention, is a compelling one. However, other less altruistic motivations can include economic considerations and personal aggrandisement.⁶⁴ Whatever more individual motivations may exist, collaborating elites often see themselves as being required to play the role of an intermediary, positioning themselves to protect constituent groups from the interventionists or other domestic actors during turbulent times.⁶⁵

The broader interests of social groups, often expressed through their elites, to collaborate with an intervening power can stem from a number of rationales, not necessarily mutually exclusive. Allen Isaacman argued that five major reasons were prevalent: 1) to protect ones primordial group against encroachments by a historic enemy, 2) to facilitate expansionist ambitions, 3) to enable a segment of the ruling strata to regain or reinforce its privileged position, 4) to eliminate authoritarian regimes, and 5) to increase ones economic status within a new order.⁶⁶ In sum, group behaviour towards collaboration with other domestic groups or an intervening power is conditioned by past history and current realities. The more that a group's needs can be met in isolation, as deemed possible from current realities and past experience, the less willing a respective group will be to engage in collaborative relationships and vice versa.⁶⁷

In addition to these more generalised points regarding collaborative motivation, a more specific analysis of 'motive force' can be applied through the development of a typology of collaboration. There are many types of individuals and groups who can

participate in collaborative systems. Foreign actors can include military forces, diplomats, UN officers, NGO aid workers, and private sector contractors. By example, the US identifies its military 'Combatant Commanders' and diplomatic 'Chiefs of Missions' as its primary actors for collaborative endeavours.⁶⁸ Indigenous actors participating in collaborative systems can include government agents, warlords, politicians, religious and clan leaders, tribesmen, diaspora returnees, militias, local NGOs, civil society organisations, businessmen, and indeed the assorted strata of the general public.

Rather than try to create a typology of specific actors, as there are so many, it is more useful to look at the instrumental motivations for indigenous collaboration. This is because it helps ascertain the internal dynamics and approaches taken to the state building project of present interventions. Werner Rings created a typology for an historical analysis of collaboration and this thesis will use that as a basis but amend it accordingly for the conditions of present interventions.⁶⁹ Four types of collaboration can thus be ascertained:

1) *Neutral collaboration* is that done knowingly and from self-interest and which indirectly works towards the achievement of the intervention's goals. It does not mean that the intervening forces are actively supported or encouraged but because of the circumstances and the lack of better alternatives, they are tolerated. The best example of this collaboration can be found in the general public, often the majority of which might not particularly like the intervening power but also are unwilling to resist it in any meaningful way. Because of that they are willing to participate in such activities as elections or to continue with old jobs in the civil service.

2) *Unconditional collaboration* is when indigenous actors fully cooperate with an intervening force because they entirely endorse its principles and ideas. The motive is not dictated purely by circumstances but rather by a sincere belief to see the intervening power achieve its goals because they are considered a common cause ideologically. A frequent example of unconditional collaboration would be that undertaken by liberal indigenous political parties and diaspora returnees.

3) *Conditional collaboration* is that done ‘up to a point’ and arguably the most common. Indigenous actors may endorse some but not all of the intervening power’s goals. Collaboration is partaken on points agreed but resistance provided elsewhere when there is no consensus with the intervening power. Furthermore, the conditionality of this type of collaboration also defines its *modus operandi* of leveraging the intervening power and other indigenous actors to concede to demands. A common example is political parties who have signed peace agreements and are bound by that to collaborate but who still exert resistance as felt necessary to pursue their own domestic agendas.

4) *Tactical collaboration* is that done despite outright animosity towards the intervening power. It can be done for a variety of reasons- to help overthrow an abusive regime or majority community, to prevent the mass murder of innocent people, or to engage in group or individual opportunism. Because it is tactical, it can be seen as collaboration to some shade but also as a form of resistance. Tactical collaborators would say of their collaboration, “I do... but I don’t.” Militias and armed groups can be examples whereby short-term collaboration is implemented secretly with an intervening power for local tactical gain.

Considering the rationalisations of both the intervening power and indigenous actors, the success or failure of collaborative systems is ultimately determined by the ability to mesh the demands of the intervening power, viz. to create a stronger state, with the rigidities of indigenous politics through achieving an evolving equilibrium between the two sets of collaborative linkages.⁷⁰ In this way, the role of the indigenous collaborating elites as mediators is crucial and they can be considered as a fulcrum for achieving equilibrium between the often opposed external demands of the intervening power and the localised dynamics of indigenous politics.

Furthermore, given that the collaborative systems should change in tandem with the evolution of indigenous politics over time, indigenous collaborating elites can be seen as a sliding fulcrum for balancing the demands of the intervening power vis-à-vis those of indigenous politics as they respectively change. Ultimately, the challenge of

collaboration is reaching an agreement as how to achieve the “overarching rationale for everybody”, i.e. the collaborative advantage.⁷¹ This overarching rationale to achieve more together than alone helps to “drive the collaborative process and make it work more effectively.”⁷²

Collaboration as an evolution of capacities

... from crisis response, to shaping the future...

- US Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006’⁷³

Collaboration as a dynamic, interactive process of state building interventionism can be broken down into four phases: 1) identifying and selecting potential collaborative partners, 2) negotiating the terms and structures of a collaborative agreement, 3) monitoring and managing an ongoing collaboration and 4) terminating the collaborative project.⁷⁴

The first phase is perhaps the most critical because the intervening power’s agents’ ability to control a foreign state is limited and collaboration with indigenous elites is always necessary to some extent.⁷⁵ Considering this, the choice of indigenous elites available to the intervening power is what should determine the form that the intervention takes during and after any initiating military or diplomatic action.⁷⁶ The intervention’s chosen administrative, constitutional, military, economic and social policies should all fundamentally be institutionalisations of the indigenous politics that the intervening power is interfacing with through collaboration. A poor choice of policies by the intervener, based on miscalculations of the capabilities of collaborative partners in the indigenous elite and more importantly of the dynamics of the internal collaborative set, can only result in a decreased likelihood of interventionist actors achieving an intervention’s initiating goals.

In sum, the potential for successful collaborative systems in the external collaborative set is possible through the choice and combination of collaborating indigenous elites available to the agents of the intervening power. The selection of collaborating elites must be made in consideration of how those elites are to collaborate themselves in the

internal collaborative set with local interests and institutions. It is counter-productive to prescribe which combinations of actors are most useful for interventionism because the context of each intervention is too important to allow for formulaic prescriptions. The one driving dynamic of choosing collaborative partners by the intervening power is that they have “amenable successors” in the form of a more effective national government once the intervention concludes.⁷⁷

As the political, social and economic conditions that define indigenous politics evolve, the collaborative systems for both sets of linkages should change accordingly.⁷⁸ If collaborative relationships remain static, then it is likely that the entire collaborative endeavour will fail. The agents of the intervening power may be able to exert a disproportionate amount of leverage, at least initially, due to their political and military dominance. Yet, if the agents of the intervening power demand too much from their collaborative partners in the indigenous elite, they risk undermining them if those elites are unable to ‘square’ their subsequent actions with the local interest groups and institutions of the internal set given its very different collaborative dynamics.⁷⁹ Similarly, for their part, indigenous collaborating elites must be careful not to be seen conceding too much to the intervener’s agents as to do so would serve to de-legitimise them within the internal collaborative set.⁸⁰ Overall, for interventionists the benefits of intervening must outweigh the costs of temporarily exerting control in a frontier state. Concomitantly, for indigenous politics the benefits of indigenous elites for collaborating must exceed the costs of not doing so.⁸¹

The surest source of striking a balance of interests between the intervening power and its collaborators in the indigenous elite stems from the fact that the interventionists and indigenous collaborative partners will generally have different levels of interests conducive to partnership.⁸² The intervening power will most likely be concerned with central politics and other macro-issues, for instance the respective state’s foreign and defence policies. On the other hand, indigenous collaborating partners will be much more focused on localised interests and strengthening their standing within the domain of domestic politics. This diffusion of interests, albeit interfaced by general commonalities of the individual goals of the intervention, allows for collaboration to continue and be beneficial to all of its participants.

At this point it is useful to illustrate what roles interventionist might play and how these roles will be shared over the evolution of an intervention with indigenous collaborative partners. The roles played by interventionists can be viewed as a spectrum, notably in terms of the depth of sovereign control assumed by interventionists. Building upon the work of Michael Doyle and Andrea Kathryn Talentino, it is possible to present such a spectrum.⁸³ The below table summarises how this thesis views the possible roles of interventionists:

Table: 4.1.

Role(s) of intervening actors	Structure of intervening party	Reform mandate for internal politics	Degree of intrusiveness and coercion
Peace-making	Political delegation	Only peace agreement advice	Very low- external efforts to push peace
Peace-keeping	Light military force	None, just to monitor peace agreement	Low- military forces on ground but only monitoring and advising accordingly
Peace-building	Civilian force backed by light military presence	Monitoring peace agreement and in some cases organising the implementation of human rights policy, national democratic elections and economic rehabilitation	Medium- external actor helps to shape domestic events- such as elections but does not regularly use military force
Peace-enforcing	Civilian force backed by strong and active military presence	Actively supports settlement terms against spoilers, including through regular military force	High- external military forces are engaged in using military force to shape domestic situation
Peace-instigating	Strong civilian and military forces	Comprehensive- includes all major aspects of domestic politics and all the other roles	Very High- can include the temporary, official control of the state


If undertaken by themselves, peace-making and peace-keeping could be seen as first generation interventionist roles while peace-building and peace-enforcing could be construed as second generation ones. Lastly, peace-instigating could be viewed as a third generation role. These latter three roles are important because they allow for the active participation of the intervening power in state building itself. Peace-making and peace-keeping are important roles that potentially could be employed during an intervention but conversely can be utilised outside of interventions as well whereas the other three cannot.

Many academics have advocated undertaking and implementing state building interventions in numerous, singular forms- for instance as ‘security-keeping’ or ‘peace maintenance’, or just focussing on one of the roles of peacebuilding, peace-making, or

peace-enforcing in themselves. However, rather than view interventions in singular ways and as binary choices, what is important to conceptualise is that present interventions can come in many forms and that a respective intervention can evolve in terms of role-playing as the situation in the state evolves, most notably as the national government's capacity changes and depending on how peace spoilers develop.⁸⁴ Indeed, those designing and implementing interventions may decide circumstances dictate that they undertake various roles simultaneously or progress through them dynamically.⁸⁵ Lastly, they might assume different roles in different parts of a frontier state. For instance in the DR Congo's capital of Kinshasa, the UN provides a peace-building role to support the national government while in the eastern provinces it assumes peace-enforcement responsibilities as it actively engages in combat with anti-government militias to disarm them.

Overall, it is crucial to visualise collaboration as a spectrum of collaborative systems continually shifting during the evolution of indigenous politics as collaborative participants assess their goals and change their capacities. The degree of control of internal processes and outcomes, notably of the state's military or administration functions, required by the intervening power to realise its goals for an intervention are inversely proportionate to the ability of the collaborative indigenous elite to provide the same control within the state, notably through government apparatuses, depending on its own changing capacities.⁸⁶ As an intervention proceeds, those roles played by interventionist forces should ideally change accordingly, viz. 'peace-enforcement' and 'peace-instigation' through to a presence resembling classic peacekeeping, until an intervention is outright concluded.

Evolving capacities of collaborative partners during interventions



The ability of the indigenous elite to function more effectively through governance is then dependant through the internal collaborative set upon the shape and structure that local interests demand and institutions take. By example, an indigenous collaborating elite lacking in popular legitimacy and overseeing an exceptionally fractured domestic society would require a more coercive and intrusive participation in the frontier state's political space by the intervening power. Yet, during the course of an intervention, assuming the given frontier state progresses from exceptionally fractured politics and little government capacity to more formalised political processes supported by an increasingly capable government, the degree of direct control required by the intervening power could decline. As this progression is made, the type of control exhibited by the intervener would shift from a more intrusive control of the state apparatus itself to more informal influence by the intervening power through the ruling, collaborative elite in government. Contrary to this, an increase in turmoil of indigenous politics would potentially require a stronger presence by the intervening power.

It is important to conclude this section by defining when state building interventions based upon collaborative systems can be considered to have concluded. Emphasising collaboration as a spectrum of degrees of control over processes and outcomes geared towards state building, two points can hence be made. 'Progress' during an intervention comes through pushing indigenous politics deftly in a direction conducive to an interventionist's own political and security needs, notably in the form of more capable national governance.⁸⁷ The outright conclusion of an intervention is possible when the relationships between states have been restored to a satisfactory level whereby the intervening power feels that it will still be able to maintain adequate opportunities and protection for itself once its interventionist forces vacate the state in which it intervened. If there is no possibility for its indigenous collaborating partners to maintain the intervener's interests and security after its departure, then the intervening power will be unable, or at least hesitant, to leave. Interventionist actors will have to stay and either further strengthen those particular indigenous collaborating partners or choose new ones and develop their capabilities suitably.

4.4: The ‘collaboration problematique’ of state building interventionism

*They may, or may not, be citizens of a new world empire- perhaps an economic, cultural, or media empire, if not a political one. They may even be barbarians, outcasts or refugees knocking vainly at the gates of such an empire. But they will be world citizens, more fully than their ancestors ever were.*⁸⁸

The *collaboration problematique* is the difficulty that an intervener has in achieving collaborative systems with indigenous actors and of maintaining an evolving equilibrium in and between the sets of collaborative systems that allows for progress towards an intervention’s goals. Defining an intervention’s collaboration problematique as a medium for assessing its overall efficacy provides for an insightful analytical discourse for academia and a powerful policy-design tool for governments. Considering that, this section will briefly outline a theoretical paradigm for doing so.

Challenges to and the failure of collaboration

The challenges to implementing collaborative systems and maintaining them to allow progression towards achieving an intervention’s goals are many. General pitfalls to wanting to engage in collaborative efforts are threefold.⁸⁹ An actor engaging in a collaborative process firstly loses control to make decisions which can be especially problematic if events appear to be going wrong and corrective action cannot be readily taken. Secondly, individual actors lose flexibility to amend their course of action because of agreements with their collaborative partners, which means quick responses or the ability to act with discretion can be hindered. Lastly, a further pitfall to collaboration is the loss of ‘glory’. Engaging in collaborative relationships means credit must be shared at some times and at others completely forsaken by one partner so that the other can claim full credit.

In addition to the pitfalls that might cause hesitance to engage in collaboration in the first place are other challenges to actually implementing effective collaborative systems. The first challenge, and perhaps the biggest one for an intervening power, is to initially identify what collaborative relationships are even possible and whether or not the costs that are necessary to support them are worthy of the goal that is sought. Miscalculations

in this regard can be disastrous and ultimately leave an intervening power mired in an endeavour that was largely doomed from the start. The second challenge is that the maintenance of collaborative relationships is complicated by norms that may not be fully shared, if at all, by interventionists and their indigenous partners. Democracy, human rights, 'good governance', women's empowerment, and free markets are but a few examples of contentious ideas that can provoke tensions between collaborative partners from different cultures. A third challenge is the controversial area in collaborative relationships of goal setting and timeframes. Collaborative relationships are dynamic ones based on bargaining. They need to be constantly in flux allowing for the re-arranging of responsibilities and capacities. Discrepancies in the understandings of expected outcomes, both in terms of 'end products' delivered and within certain timeframes, between collaborative partners can greatly weaken responsiveness between partners and hence the entire collaborative endeavour.⁹⁰

In addition to the general challenges of collaboration, the outright failure of collaborative systems results for two major reasons. The first reason is that if there is a lack of responsiveness between the different participants, the collaborative systems are inherently bound to fail.⁹¹ Collaboration is by definition a multi-party effort premised on being able to achieve more together than what is possible individually. If the various participants in either the internal or external sets of collaborative systems do not respond to the demands inherent to participation, progress towards the broader and individual goals of those systems will not be reached. If that happens, either new collaborative systems will be formed or the intervention will stagnate in terms of progressing towards its goals until it collapses.

The cause of unresponsiveness by the various parties can result for a variety of reasons. Firstly, participants may have initially overcommitted and simply not have the power or resources to deliver on their agreements. Secondly, the ability of the participants to deliver results may have waned because of changing 'in-house' dynamics, for instance lowered public support in the intervening power's domestic politics or the loss of a charismatic leader in an indigenous political party. Thirdly, in their efforts to manipulate their collaborative relationships, participants may be withholding following through on agreements in order to exert guiding pressure on the relationships. These are

but three possibilities for unresponsiveness, others exist as well, but decisively, responsiveness must be exhibited if collaborative systems are to be maintained and kept effective.

The second major reason for the failure of collaborative systems is if miscalculations have been made by collaborative partners, in either set, in ensuring an evolving equilibrium in their relationships. Common challenges to an evolving equilibrium are that imbalances are inculcated in the formation of the relationships because the intervening power chose poorly or demanded too much of collaborative partners in the indigenous elite initially. Furthermore, if collaborative partners are unable to ensure that their relationships are sufficiently dynamic to maintain an equilibrium that balances the control either side seeks of internal processes and outcomes, the entire collaborative endeavour can collapse.

The ability of an intervening power to rally a significant proportion of the indigenous political elite into collaborative systems effectively makes active resistance costly and ultimately futile. However, should opponents of the intervening power be able to effectively detach that power's ability to collaborate with indigenous politics, then the power would be forced to leave the country. This formation of a 'united front of non-collaboration' is a dangerous development for any intervening power's collaborative systems.⁹² If an intervening power is incapable of undertaking collaboration with any indigenous partners with the political or administrative capacity necessary to effectively work with, its interventionist efforts are effectively made pointless. Another hazardous possibility would be that should one era of collaborative systems collapse and the costs of creating new ones be especially high (this assumes there is no united front of non-collaboration), then the intervening power would have to leave as the new costs negate the value of reaching the intervention's original goals.

The structure of 'non-collaboration'

A pertinent question to now analyse further is: If not collaboration, then what? *Non-collaborative systems* can be defined in the context of state building interventionism as those dynamics within indigenous politics that coalesce in response to collaborative


systems to challenge both the intents and interests of the intervening power and its indigenous collaborative partners, namely their consolidation of an effective national government. The non-collaboration participants who align themselves against the intervening power and its indigenous collaborating partners will be those indigenous actors who can cater to the different strata of indigenous politics that the intervening power is unable to interface with through its own collaborative systems.

Indigenous non-collaboration can be seen as an inversed formation of indigenous collaboration since they are both catalysed by the intervention itself.⁹³ While the forms and shapes of the indigenous collaborative systems will evolve according to their relationship with the intervening power, the development of non-collaboration will also be shaped significantly by the presence of the intervening power. The spread of technology, the creation of larger political units, the development of broader political horizons, and the inducements for the citizenry's wider interest and participation in the respective state's political processes can all result and be directly shaped by the presence of the intervening power and hence the indigenous resistance to it as well.

However, although this thesis uses the terms 'collaboration' and 'non-collaboration' extensively, it must be emphasised that they are not always simple binaries because they are both part of a "complex pattern of reaction" to foreign penetration.⁹⁴ While in some instances they are, such as insurgents who actively battle the nascent national government and foreign troops; at other times it can be seen that "collaboration and resistance mingle."⁹⁵ Remembering that collaboration is more about mediating functions during an interactive, dynamic process of state building, it is important to avoid analysis (and policy prescriptions) that simply label indigenous actors as 'collaborator' or 'non-collaborator', something that will be discussed in the detail in later chapters.⁹⁶ In general, as Timothy Brook argued, an understanding of collaboration and the challenges to it are best gleaned from the "thickets of ambiguity rather [than]... the familiar trees of collaboration or resistance."⁹⁷

The overall objective of present interventions is to strengthen national governments such that they can more effectively govern their sovereign territory. Given that, an

intervention's activities strive to help the government garner the support of the bulk of the population. Conversely, non-collaboration as a dynamic seeks to de-legitimise the interventionist's intentions and hence the national government it is supporting. As seen in the graph below⁹⁸, ideally an intervention must see a gradual change in public attitudes towards supporting the national government if it is to progress.



During an intervention it is unlikely that the elimination of all forms of non-collaboration can be achieved. In any case, all that is required for the intervention to conclude ‘successfully’ is if non-collaboration can be minimised to a point whereby the national government can stand on its own against such resistance without interventionist forces being present.

4.5: Conclusion

The test for US policy in Afghanistan, as in any other post-conflict setting, is how quickly and solidly we can help the people and their leaders build a political order that is legitimate by their terms and based on their traditions and history.
 - US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad⁹⁹

This chapter has outlined an updated and expanded theory of collaboration premised upon the work of the historian Ronald Robinson. The central tenet of the theory of collaboration is that indigenous collaborative systems, more than anything else, determine the structure, dynamics and ultimate efficacy of state building interventions in the post-Cold War era. Present interventions rely on collaborative systems, both of internal and external sets, because they define the interface between interventionist

forces with indigenous politics. Unless the energy and resources of the intervening power can be translated and internalised into terms of indigenous politics, the intervention will be unable to achieve its state building goals.

Given these arguments, an academic analysis of the agency of collaborative systems is crucial to analysing post-Cold War interventions. In conclusion, the following four tenets can be highlighted to summarise the theory of collaboration:

- The absence or presence of effective indigenous partners as well as the structure of indigenous society determine whether interventions are practicable or not.
- The choice and combination of indigenous collaborative systems available to the intervening power should define the structure and form that the intervention takes- be it administrative, military, diplomatic, or legal.
- The degree of control necessitated for the intervening power to assert in order to achieve its goals is inversely proportionate to that of the capabilities (and hence control) which the collaborating indigenous elite are able to provide through governance.
- If the intervening power runs out of effective, responsive indigenous collaborating partners, it is forced to leave even if it has not achieved its goals.¹⁰⁰

CHAPTER 5: GRADUALISM COLLABORATION

Today, the aim is for partners to govern and police themselves effectively.
- US Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006'¹

The previous chapter provided a theoretical explanation for the centrality of collaboration to state building interventionism. The theory of collaboration's value is that it presents a set of ideas useful for conceptualising and explaining the very complex process of state building during interventions. However, the theory of collaboration is relatively clinical and linear yet the reality is that collaboration is an incredibly messy and complicated endeavour, especially so in the context of frontier zones. Considering that, this chapter will analyse how collaboration is actually undertaken during current state building interventions using the theory of collaboration, notably by looking at the nature as well as key aspects of the framework and mechanics of collaboration.

Collaboration is currently defined by the 'gradualism' required for interventionists to be gradually freed of the imperatives to intervene directly and for indigenous partners to gradually assume a rightful position of sovereign independence. This is primarily because in contrast to imperialism in the past, the 'imperialistic' collaboration of present interventions is based on a 'gradualism of collaboration' centred on the empowerment of indigenous partners in sovereign national governments. This requires a strong emphasis on compromise, consensus and mutual reliance, something which leads the balances of collaborative relationships to be generally inclined towards strong indigenous participation.

5.1: The nature of gradualism collaboration

Once, nations were forged through 'blood and iron'. Today, the world seeks to build them through conflict resolution, multilateral aid, and free elections.²

A starting point necessary to be covered before proceeding is to put present collaboration into context by further reviewing that of the past. The imperialism of the past, notably that of colonialist Europe, was most often based on the forceful co-option of indigenous elites into collaboration through the strong “possibility of coercive violence.”³ As Michael Doyle argued, persuasion was first used to engage with local elites, followed by political coercion and outright bribery, but should all of these collaborative approaches fail, European imperialists still had “gunboats... to supplement their shortcomings.”⁴

In contrast, the defining rationale of state building interventionists, seeking to strengthen indigenous collaborative partners as quickly as possible, means that present collaboration is defined by its gradualism. Present collaboration based upon imperialistic methods mean that interventionists must largely accommodate the dynamics of indigenous politics rather than coerce it through force. In this way, current collaboration could also be considered temperate as intervening military forces must maintain some self-restraint in their efforts to shape domestic politics through indigenous political actors. Given these restraints, the limited control exerted during present interventions precludes overt, formal rule except in a few circumstances, notably in Kosovo and Bosnia, and instead prefers informal, indirect control evolving steadily towards the full withdrawal of interventionist forces.

While present interventionism is imperialistic rather than imperialist, one historical comparison worth making is of the US’ experiences in the Philippines. Central to the US approach in the Philippines was the “conservative gradualism of collaboration”, as identified by David Steinberg. This was namely the US’ effort to reconcile her own anti-imperialist feelings with a need to exert imperial control there by reaching an “evolutionary understanding” with the indigenous elite. Notably they were allowed to “espouse an evolutionary nationalism which would lead to independence when the nation was ready” but had to accept US imperial rule in the meantime.⁵ Thus, a symbiotic relationship was made possible by US concessions to the Filipino oligarchic elite, which had large amounts of influence over the Filipino masses, which helped to ensure relative stability.⁶

Overall, what is crucial for understanding present interventionism in relation to this historical experience is that the gradualism of collaboration equates to what the theory of collaboration termed the ‘evolving equilibrium’ of collaboration. This is notably whereby indigenous elites accept an evolving degree of foreign interference because they know foreign control is merely temporary and their own empowerment (albeit qualified through democratisation) is the exit strategy of the interventionists. The most important difference between the collaboration of current interventions and that of outright imperialism concerns the degrees of empowerment allowed to indigenous partners. The informal, indirect imperial rule of the past, such as that of the British, had the goal of “maintaining a balance of political influence between imperial collaborators and nascent nationalists.”⁷ Such a balance effectively compromised the ability of either group to supplant the imperialist’s ultimate control. Considering that, the major difference with present interventionism’s collaboration, viz. why it is imperialistic and not imperialism, is that the goal of interventionists now is to strengthen indigenous collaborative partners, defined by a high cognizance of nationalism amongst them, to supplant their own interventionist control whereby they can gladly leave.

The most important aspect of this empowerment is the role of democratisation, what James Dobbins calls the “core objective” of state building interventions.⁸ Democratisation during interventions is advocated because it serves several basic purposes. Holding elections ideally makes it possible to install a more legitimate government which should encourage a more stable state through the instigation of a durable democratic system.⁹ This is especially crucial for present collaboration as it allows interventionists to partner with indigenous political actors after elections to fill a political void at the national level, one which might have been provisionally filled by interventionists such as in East Timor.

In sum, this emphasis on democratisation aims at meeting two paramount needs as defined presently by Western states: to create stronger states and ones that are also generally liberal in character. Indeed, one academic has gone so far as to term US efforts at democratisation through interventionism, by example, as “Wilsonianism with a vengeance.”¹⁰ In this way, if one feels compelled to intervene, as liberal states as possible ought to be created, something not mutually exclusive to meeting security

needs. For instance, Robert Jervis argued President Bush's liberal goals for US interventionism were "an end in itself as well as a means to US security."¹¹ In terms of collaboration, Bush has himself articulated a preference to working with governments that bear a liberal orientation, noting that the US "can reward and support governments that make the right choices for their own people."¹² This emphasis on democratisation is premised on a strong belief in the 'democratic peace theory' that democracies are inherently the most peaceful states.

The gradualism of present collaboration results largely from this emphasis placed upon democratisation. Specifically, democratisation pushes interventionists to choose collaborative partners primarily through elections rather than the forceful, opportunistic co-optation of elites. This is also another explanation of why present collaboration must not be 'traditional imperialism' in nature, a topic written about most suitably by Robert Cooper. The ideology of imperialism is over and with it a desire at times to solely use force to co-opt elites into collaboration. Hence, there can be no return to imperialism in its traditional form because Western states now have an ideology of democracy which cannot be implemented fundamentally through coercion.¹³ The most Western interventions can do is to "create the conditions for it", notably by providing to indigenous actors "breathing space" to enable them to re-establish a more stable state.¹⁴

In any case, regardless of Western sentiments, the traditional imperialism of times past is simply not acceptable to indigenous peoples in a 'post-imperial' age. The most important aspect that this distinction means for collaboration is that present interventionism must "be voluntary if it is to be acceptable; if it is to last it has to be cooperative."¹⁵ This responds to the reality that Western states do not seek a return to their imperial history and that indigenous political actors engaging them through collaboration only do so because they perceive their collaboration to be of a different nature than that undertaken during past imperialism. Ultimately, as Cooper concludes, present interventions see indigenous collaboration with interventionists as largely voluntary and hence subject to negotiation and compromise.¹⁶ This parallels Michael Doyle's argument that Western interventionists seek to instigate an "active process of consent-based intervention."¹⁷ While such compromise, consent and open negotiation

may not be as efficient as older types of imperial collaboration; it is all that is possible in a post-imperial era.

It is also important to note that aside from the more normative dynamics of a post-imperial age, the practicalities of present interventions also necessitate a gradualism of collaboration. Notable is the reality that intervening forces are usually relatively small in number and hence must be more readily willing to compromise and give leeway to indigenous partners accordingly. The UN has the most emphasis on a supple, gradualist approach to collaboration because it does not have the resources or sovereign mandate to use such force so must rely more extensively on collaboration with empowered indigenous partners. Even non-UN interventions are the same though, including that of the US in Afghanistan, because the interventionist forces are so relatively few in number.

However, while the gradualism of collaboration allows for more flexibility towards collaborative relationships with indigenous partners, it is still rigid in important ways. This is primarily in that it does seek to strengthen states towards a liberal democratic outcome. There have been no Western interventions after the Cold War to restore monarchies (aside from Kuwait which was not a frontier) and there have been no interventions by Western forces, including through the UN, which did not have a clear emphasis on creating more liberal, democratic states. It is also important to conclude that gradualism collaboration still allows for the strong influence of interventionists. Interventions occur in the frontier context where there are “fragmented societies” and the “usual structures of mediation between the different segments of the societies are generally weak.”¹⁸ This allows interventionists a good deal of leeway to impose themselves onto a situation, especially during the early stages of an intervention.

A second overarching point for a discussion of gradualism collaboration must be to emphasise that Western interventionists are not neutral participants in a frontier state. They are partisan actors attempting to push frontier states in very specific directions and they do so through their collaboration with partners from amongst indigenous politics. At its most simplest, the very presence of interventionist forces compromises their

neutrality, notably in the context of intra-state war. As Mark Duffield rightly concludes, “It is impossible to be neutral within the logic of internal war.”¹⁹ Many advocates of interventionism, notably under the misguided label of ‘humanitarian’, argue that interventionism should be defined by impartiality. However, intervention by definition is not impartial or neutral and certainly indigenous actors do not perceive it as such because “whatever form intervention takes means influencing the social, political and economic foundations of local society.”²⁰

While few would doubt the partisan nature of US or NATO interventionism, for instance, even UN operations cannot be considered as wholly impartial endeavours benignly assisting locals through turbulent times. Not only does the UN affect local political dynamics, but local political actors perceive the UN as an actor to be manipulated for their own use as well. Even those foreign actors who most value their ostensible neutrality, humanitarian aid agencies, cannot be considered as fully neutral actors, especially as regards indigenous perceptions of them. For instance, indigenous NGOs often “denounce that which they call the collusion, at their expense, between large northern NGOs and the UN.”²¹ In this sense, international NGOs are perceived by indigenous actors as interventionist actors of the West, notably as ‘sub-contractors’ to Western governments and the UN.²²

Given that they are not neutral, Western interventionists presently face a definitive conundrum; they feel the need to undertake imperialistic state building interventionism but they do not want to be ‘imperialists’. Given that, present interventionism is defined by the “essential contradiction” of using imperialistic means to strengthen sovereign states, which essentially means “building institutions for the sake of local people, without confiscating their decision-making capacity.”²³ One ramification of this is that where the imperial militaries of the past “were often too brutal in the actions they took”; present interventionists “are often too reluctant to take action.”²⁴ This dilemma provokes the driving conundrum of present collaboration, namely how to empower locals through the imperialistic means of interventionism without becoming truly imperial, a topic to be discussed extensively in the balance of this thesis.

5.2: The framework of gradualism collaboration

Any effort to build the post-war order must be based on a fundamental understanding of the aspirations or political centre of gravity of a newly liberated society and must be implemented by civilian and political leaders who know how to align the United States with those goals.

- US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad²⁵

It is important to recall the theory of collaboration's emphasis on the 'politics of collaboration', namely the 'continual renegotiation of the terms and conditions of cooperation.... a process of constant manoeuvre for political advantage'. This manoeuvring centres on the need for leverage to successfully engage in the bargaining that defines collaboration. Considering this overarching imperative, it is necessary to understand the framework supporting collaboration by reviewing expected outcomes, the external and internal sets of collaboration, and the definitive characteristics of gradualism collaboration.

Shared expectations of gradualism collaboration

The US, its allies and partners must remain vigilant to those states that lack the capacity to govern activity within their borders.

- US Department of Defense, 'National Defense Strategy, 2005'²⁶

A starting point for understanding present collaboration is to firstly review what expected outcomes are shared by collaborative partners. For interventionists, the primary rationale for state building interventionism is the initiating lack of suitable collaborative partners conducive to meeting the security needs of the West, viz. the pericentric pull of frontiers. Hence the goal of present interventions is to empower collaborative partners in the form of stronger national governments to more capably administer their sovereign areas. This effort intends to translate the interventionists' external resources and power into indigenous politics conducive to ameliorating the pericentric pull of frontiers.

From the perspective of indigenous collaborative partners, what is expected is a stronger but ultimately independent state free of interventionists; hence that there be a

‘gradualism of collaboration’. Western interventionists have an explicit desire to create liberal, democratic states. While this goal is certainly shared by some indigenous partners, it is by no means a given. What could be considered an overarching goal amongst indigenous participants would be more moderated expectations of a new political regime supporting greater stability. Of course, such generalisation is open to numerous local interpretations, hence the centrality of the ‘politics of collaboration’ towards pushing for individual viewpoints. What unites these indigenous and interventionists perspectives is a loose consensus that new or reformed state institutions are required and that they must be strong enough to enforce ‘the rules’ conducive to ensuring greater stability over the longer-term. While some of these institutions and rules are fairly controversial, such as constitutional law or security sector reform, others are less controversial, such as strengthening national bureaucracies.

The easiest method for ensuring shared understandings of expected outcomes is to have explicit, detailed mandates. For UN missions there will be a mandate for the mission but otherwise interventionists will declare their aims through public statements. The easiest mandate to implement for interventionists is that of enforcing a peace agreement because of its explicit dictates. As Beatrice Pouligny argued, this “affects the situation radically” because the stipulations have already been through long negotiations where the details have been agreed upon.²⁷ This of course does not mean that parties will not try to later nuance their interpretations but peace agreements do at least allow a starting basis for creating common understanding. The challenge more generally is that peace agreements do not cover ‘state building’ activities in detail, leaving interventionists and their indigenous partners stipulated by the peace agreements to work through those finer points.

Where common expectations are decidedly ambiguous, the opportunities for manipulation by indigenous actors become greater. The challenge of this is either that false hopes are raised about an intervention’s purposes or conversely that the ambiguity is openly exploited to foster further conflict. Considering collaboration as constant manoeuvring for political advantage, ambiguities in common expectations leave indigenous actors free to exploit the situation. One example has been the lack of a clear

‘end goal’ for Kosovo, which has been exploited by both nationalists within Kosovo and Serbia seeking to respectively promote or stymie independence there.

Sets of collaboration for gradualism collaboration

The theory of collaboration defines the actual workings of interventions as being dependent upon collaborative systems, i.e. the sum of collaborative relationships linking interventionists with indigenous politics. These collaborative systems are based on the internal and external sets of collaboration linking interventionists with their collaborative partners and subsequently with the broader population. Given this, a defining aspect of present collaboration is the interface of the intervening power primarily with national governments, mostly through the holding of elections and the institutionalisation of state apparatuses that constitute the external collaborative set. Furthermore, even more importantly in the medium and longer-term is the internal collaborative set which is defined largely by the efforts of national governments to acquire legitimacy from their state’s citizenry and to exude greater control over their sovereign territories.

The first set of collaboration is the external set, that which is focused on reforming or creating anew national governments. With the most important interventionist goal being to strengthen a national government, the key tenet of the theory of collaboration related to the external set is that the choice and combination of indigenous collaborative systems available to the intervening power should define the structure and form that the intervention takes. Considering this, it is important to firstly examine which indigenous actors are chosen for the external set and how so.

The first method, and perhaps the easiest one, for ‘choosing’ collaborative partners is through the signing of peace agreements, notably so for UN missions. The primary advantage of peace agreements is that they clearly identify the principal partners with whom the UN will collaborate. Prominent examples of this in recent interventions have been the UN partnering with the armed groups which signed peace agreements in the DR Congo and Liberia. Furthermore, peace agreements may also legitimise an existing national government as a transitional one but also introduce its armed adversaries into

an extended peace process, thereby introducing them as collaborative partners for the interventionists. An example of this was the UN intervention in Cambodia whereby Hun Sen's Vietnamese-backed government was recognized but its primary adversary, the Khmer Rouge was also introduced as a partner, albeit one that could be defined as 'tactical collaboration' as they were widely loathed by the UN interventionists and vice versa.

The second method is selecting collaborative partners through national elections. With its emphasis on democratisation, present interventionism has commonly sought to legitimise itself through its collaborative partnerships with democratically chosen indigenous actors. This has most often been seen through the election of national governments after a transition period, such as in the DR Congo or East Timor. Furthermore, during some interventions, actors initially chosen for collaboration through peace agreements are discarded after national elections. An example of this was the LURD and MODEL rebel movements in Liberia which participated in the transition period stipulated by the peace agreement but whom then lost out in the first national elections.

The third method is the outright selection of indigenous partners when both peace agreements and national elections are entirely lacking. A prominent early example of this was the intervention in Somalia. During this time, the UN's effort to find partners became extended down to the local level as it sought to distance itself from warlords through the diversification of its indigenous partnerships.²⁸ This strategy included forming local district councils of traditional elders and other civil society actors. A more recent example is of the US' intervention in Afghanistan whereby it chose the Northern Alliance and the Pashtun factions loyal to Hamid Kharzai to lead an interim-government, albeit one endorsed through a 'loyal jurga' council.

Lastly, it is also important to note that when there are no peace agreements, no elections, and no possibilities for relatively strong collaborative partners to emerge quickly, interventionists have been most likely to assume a great deal of control themselves. East Timor provides the best example of this whereby the UN felt

compelled to assume the role of a trustee for an interim period prior to national elections. During the interim period, the main collaborative actor chosen to work with was the FRETELIN insurgency movement, which gradually morphed into a political party to contest the national elections. In a similar line of thought, such ‘default collaborators’ are more rarely dictated by the reality that monopolistic political and military movements arose in territories and assumed some of the functions of a government, for instance the Kosovo Liberation Army. In these instances, the external collaborative set is largely limited to these indigenous actors who have been able to monopolise a state’s political space prior to an intervention starting.²⁹

Overall, during processes for choosing collaborative partners from indigenous politics, armed actors have stronger likelihoods for selection. The most basic reason for this is that frontiers are defined by their intra-state conflict and the proliferation of armed non-state actors. Interventionists are most concerned, especially in the initiating phases of an intervention, with ensuring a necessary minimum of pacification on the part of “the military leaders whose power of obstruction is most serious.”³⁰ In this manner, peace agreements implemented through interventions often exclude other indigenous actors from participating in post-conflict activities. A prominent example of this was in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the extended conflict negated the potential of political parties who had early-on advocated maintaining Bosnia-Herzegovina’s territorial integrity and multi-ethnic character.³¹ However, eventually the diversification of collaborative participants away from armed groups is possible. This is primarily as the intervention develops away from any initiating violence, which is the time when the “salience of military force or presence is more important.”³² This is especially so as national governments are formed and the indigenous actors of most consequence for collaborative systems become political parties, bureaucracies, and government leaders.

With these considerations in mind, it is possible to explore the purpose of the external set. This is primarily to interface the intervening power with indigenous politics whereby the demands of the interventionists are made known while conversely providing a medium broadcasting the intentions and demands of the indigenous community through their collaborative elites, especially the national government. Once again, the role of democratisation has played a prominent role for attempting to achieve

this through gradualism collaboration. Interventionists believe that political parties assuming power through elections will have the legitimacy to represent the natural interests of their constituencies. In this manner, the main interface during an intervention is the interactions of the interventionists directly with a national government through ministerial meetings, staff exchanges, training programmes, etc.

If democratic elections leading to a national government are delayed in preference for a transition period, it has often been accepted that traditional leaders representing their own constituencies might play the same role as democratically elected ones. A good example of this was the usage of the 'loyal jurga' in Afghanistan to connect the demands of the interventionists, initially that a new non-Taliban and anti-al-Qaeda government be formed, with the desires of the broader Afghan society for peaceful change. This was also attempted in Somalia when elections were impossible and the UN mission did not want to assume direct control, leading the UN to develop local councils led by traditional leaders.

Additionally, should democratic elections not be immediately implemented, the interventionists may feel it necessary to create their own temporary authority to administer through. Often these semi-sovereign entities of the interventionists are created through peace agreements to guide a frontier state through a transition period leading to elections. Examples of such institutions include the UN trusteeships over Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the Supreme National Council in Cambodia and the Commission on the Peace in El Salvador. Michael Doyle highlighted a crucial aspect of these temporary institutions in that "they permit the temporary consensus of the parties to be formally incorporated in an institution with regular consultation."³³ Where it is impossible for indigenous actors to assume such a governance role directly, either because of the depth of the civil conflict or the technicalities of the conflict resolution process, allowing the interventionists to temporarily assume such control with the direct consultation of indigenous actors allows for the external set to still function. In this way, such temporary institutions are designed to be responsive to the general interests of indigenous politics when a complete consensus amongst the main indigenous actors involved in a conflict is impossible to achieve.³⁴

The second collaborative set is the internal one, namely those relationships connecting the indigenous collaborative elite to local interests and institutions. Within the context of frontier states, the internal set is ultimately the more important of the two because historically the main security threat to any regime there is internal rather than external, namely because of civil conflict.³⁵ Furthermore, nascent national armies tend to be focused directly on internal control, especially when they are “not organically linked to their populations” through broadly accepted national governments.³⁶ Considering that indigenous regimes see their ultimate survival as being dependent on domestic rather than international politics, they expend most of their effort strengthening their internal collaborative relationships.

For collaborative elites to have any authority within indigenous society, they must be able to legitimise their collaboration with interventionists. Essential to the internal set supporting the goals of the intervention is the consent given by the broader population to the external set’s agreements, namely of the creation and running of a national government. There are many tools that are available for securing support for the efforts of collaborating elites. Probably the most obvious, and potentially divisive, is to appeal to the respective identities- be they ethnic, religious, or national- of the base of support that the elites build themselves upon. For instance, the efforts of religious actors have been crucial in Bosnia-Herzegovina where they “served essentially as a resource for mobilisation for political actors.”³⁷

A further consideration is the relationship between the interventionists and the broader indigenous society rather than only with the collaborating elite. This is an important interface, though not a collaborative set in itself, as it allows interventionists some ability to shape their relations with the collaborating elite in the external set. An important understanding in this regards is that interventionists have “no intention of permeating society.”³⁸ There is an overarching desire to further stability by helping to structure a new government but there is no desire to fundamentally restructure indigenous society beyond instigating a form of governance and an economic system, specifically liberal democracies. This is mostly because the resources available and timeframes allowed simply do not allow interventionists the penetration that past imperialism was able to achieve, notably through its missionary zeal, extended

interaction over decades or even centuries, and rigidly imposed resource/export based economies.

This is not to say, however, that there is no interaction by interventionists with the broader indigenous society outside of collaborating elites. Much interaction and outreach is done through the aid provision and civil society support undertaken by international aid agencies. NGOs by their nature and mandates have a better ability to connect with local people rather than governments.³⁹ While NGOs would prefer to be perceived as neutral and not as ‘interventionists’, their presence amongst the broader indigenous society during an intervention nonetheless allows those Western powers undertaking the intervention to influence perceptions and build support for an intervention’s goals. This is notably because the intervening powers are most often the primary donors for the aid work and civil society promotion, and hence can shape its development.

Furthermore, there are occasions where interventionist military and civilian forces do liaise directly with local populations. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan are an example of morphing aid provision with the political and military agents of an intervening power. Additional interaction also occurs between interventionists and general publics through communication campaigns carried out by mass media, such as democracy promotion and health or landmine awareness campaigns undertaken by the Voice of America, the BBC, or local UN-sponsored radio stations.

Characteristics of gradualism collaboration

Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values. The immediate goal often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

- US Department of Defense, ‘Directive 3000.05’⁴⁰

Having now reviewed the sets for collaboration, it is possible to analyse in detail the three characteristics shaping the politics of collaboration. Recalling collaboration as the continual renegotiation of the terms and conditions for it, specifically the changing bargains of collaboration, these characteristics define the political interaction that occurs in those sets.

The first characteristic is the mediating functions that indigenous collaborative partners provide. Interventions are both disruptive and co-opting events for indigenous society and the function of collaboration is to mediate between these dynamics. Interventionists absolutely need indigenous collaborative partners to mediate between them and broader indigenous society. However, the challenge is that there are few, if any, entirely dedicated indigenous collaborative partners with clear, consistent aims. Collaborative partners by definition are autonomous actors, not mere proxies of the interventionists. Given that, indigenous collaborative partners should be perceived more generally as collections of mediating functions rather than simplistically as impermeable, unified actors with static aims.

Beatrice Pouligny has gone furthest towards highlighting the need to understand indigenous actors interacting with interventionists as complex, often nebulous, individuals and organisations rather than as simple unitary ones. She notes that their behaviour “needs to be understood in their capacity to move from one network to another, maintaining- sometimes deliberately- confusion as to their real status and, still more, their intentions.”⁴¹ Considering that, Pouligny advises that the interaction between interventionists and indigenous actors be considered “in plural and dynamic terms.”⁴²

There are many examples of this, such as the collapse in coherence of armed groups following a peace agreement as internal divides proliferate with the lack of a common enemy. FRETELIN provides an example of this whereby what started as a relatively unified insurgency movement imploded over the first several years of East Timor’s independence into diverse new political parties and factionalism within the nascent military and police forces. Another pertinent example is the Lavalas movement in Haiti

led by President Aristide. While it was the primary negotiating partner for repeated UN missions; rather than a cohesive organisation, it instead “appeared to be a network of complex, shifting relations, often among personalities rather than groups.”⁴³ The DR Congo has also proven a good example of this whereby countless political factions develop and disappear, often into and out of one another and from the armed groups, which has made it near impossible for any type of broad-based government to emerge. The most notable ramification of this has been that the ‘national army’ is little more than a collection of evolving local militias.

In any case, the utility of indigenous collaborative partners to interventionists is in their mediating functions, not merely in their existence. The prime function of the indigenous partners to collaboration is of mediation with broader indigenous society to achieve goals when they are common with the interventionists. It is important to recall collaboration as cooperation qualified through manipulation, not unabashed altruism. Given that, the challenge for mediating through a process towards achieving common goals will be to ensure that collaborative participants, who often lack coherence and are evolving constantly, can maintain fairly consistent policies in relation to their foreign partners.

A good example of this has been the collaborative dilemma of President Karzai in Afghanistan. Mediating between US demands to capture al-Qaeda terrorists and counter the Taliban often places Karzai in an awkward position with the Pashtun community that defines his internal set but also with his interventionist partners in the external one. Considering these dynamics, while Karzai has ostensibly been a strong partner of the US in Afghanistan, his mediating role has often meant he has to moderate or obfuscate his stances to placate either side of his partnerships. The government’s inability, or indeed unwillingness, to counter opium production provides one issue that demonstrates the difficulty of Karzai’s collaborative predicament.

In sum, the biggest challenge for successful mediation in frontier states is their exceedingly fractured social relations. This is because it makes it hard to achieve the critical mass necessary for governance to be secured and political decisions to be made.

State building activities require extended commitments that are hard for interventionists and nascent governments to secure in a frontier context. By contrast, the non-state actors who often contest state building activities are able to flourish in such a situation. As Christopher Coker noted, while interventionists and national governments inherently prefer “fixed alliances” to progress, other actors “can reach their own agreements in a world where enmities like allies and alliances appear to be in constant flux.”⁴⁴ Afghanistan again provides an example of this whereby the coalitions in contest with Kabul’s governmental control range from the Taliban itself to local militias, brigands, drug runners, and al-Qaeda all evolving freely as immediate opportunities dictate.

The second characteristic is resourcing dynamics; that is to say that collaboration is affected by the amount of resources, both material and political, committed to it. Collaboration is an effort to achieve more together, often acrimoniously, than what can be accomplished individually. Given that forced rationale of necessity and the driving role of manipulation, resources are required to facilitate it rather than just friendly intentions conducive to mere cooperation. Resource allocation during present interventionism comes in many forms. A general rule is that interventions which involve strong peace-enforcement requirements, notably those that “try to impose peace upon unwilling parties and aim to alter long-standing power relationships”, require more resource commitments than do those that are able to build upon strong peace agreements and can co-opt contending factions into “peaceful, but potentially mutually advantageous, relationships.”⁴⁵ For instance, East Timor and Haiti are roughly the same in size yet the intervention in Port-au-Prince has been expensive in relative terms because the resourcing requirements for brokering collaboration have been decidedly more complex than that allowed for in Dili, where relatively simpler collaborative partners and dynamics are available.

The third characteristic is the degrees of trust and amounts of knowledge sharing that define collaborative relationships. In terms of trust, the most crucial aspect for indigenous political actors is to believe that the interventionists are going to leave, namely that there will be a gradualism of collaboration. Inculcating this trust is easiest during UN interventions because of their international mandates and diverse force composition. For instance, despite complaints and reservations, the Timorese submitted

to the UN's "yoke" since they knew independence was assured as they had "no reason to suspect the UN of hidden imperialist designs."⁴⁶ Building trust is more difficult during interventions undertaken without a UN mandate because of suspicions that the interventionists- such as the US, Australia, and the UK which have all acted outside of UN at assorted times- might not actually leave. The US by example has consistently refused to declare timeframes for its intervention in Afghanistan. While this may help some of the US' collaborative partners to feel that they will not be precipitously deserted, it also opens them up to critiques within the internal set that the interventionists are but traditional imperialists.

Furthermore, crucial for building trust is the ability of all collaborative partners to follow through on the agreements that have been secured through the collaborative process. This can cover a long list of actions- such as resource transfers, military force provision, and reaching compromises within the internal set, say about political reforms. The "failure to perform as indicated" can lead assorted actors to resist future collaborative efforts, notably as they relate to implementing an agreed peace process.⁴⁷ Democratisation is again crucial in this regards. President Aristide of Haiti asked his foreign partners to trust him, stating "You need me, as I need you. Count on me and show me that I can count on you."⁴⁸ While they did for a period, the second UN mission ultimately facilitated his removal from power because of his deviations from democratic norms as well as an inability to implement governance reforms. Trust broken once is not likely to return.

5.3: The mechanics for gradualism collaboration

*For Special Forces, Afghanistan was the Wild, Wild West and the new Ranchers revelled in it.*⁴⁹

The mechanics of present collaboration are important considerations for understanding how it is presently implemented, namely how collaborative participants manage their collaborative systems. For all participants in collaboration, the most important management strategy is of controlling options though their respective abilities to provide or exclude them as bargaining tools to guide the bargaining process.

Interventionist strategies in collaborative systems

Conforming to the gradualism nature of present collaboration, the ability of interventionists to apply coercive force is generally limited, and would most often be counter-productive given the purpose is to empower indigenous partners in governance. Hence, other strategies are most often chosen instead which allow interventionists to stabilise indigenous partners, to condense and consolidate them when possible, but ultimately to institutionalise governments in such a manner that indigenous politics is more dependent on the structure of government itself rather than the fluid movement of political actors by themselves. Namely, the frontier is to be ‘tamed’ as much as possible through the rigidities of modern government.

In this way, interventionists attempt to provide the major missing ingredient in the frontier context, the “modern organisation” of governance.⁵⁰ With a hesitance to apply force, the challenge for present interventionists is “to generate voluntary cooperation from divided local political actors.”⁵¹ The need to institutionalise governance and to do it in a voluntary manner amongst fractured local players is decidedly difficult. The goal of strengthening collaborative partners through stronger governance ironically means that the leverage of interventionists is often limited by working with partners through the very medium that dilutes their influence the most, i.e. a sovereign government. Christopher Clapham highlighted this conundrum well when he argued that foreigners “could usually only implement their programmes in collaboration with the very governments that they were seeking to reform, providing these with endless opportunities to subvert the reforms themselves.”⁵² This makes it notoriously difficult to manage indigenous collaborative partners during interventions. However, although difficult, it is certainly not impossible and a number of methods are presently implemented.

Confer legitimacy: The most powerful tool for managing collaborative systems is the interventionists’ ability to confer legitimacy upon specific indigenous actors, namely for their existence in a new political order to be recognised as justifiable. In the anarchy of frontier zones, this recognition conferred by interventionists can be decisive because indigenous actors use it to increase their stature and authority in struggles with other

actors domestically as well as to increase their leverage in the bargaining process with the interventionists themselves. Foreign recognition to participate in an extended peace or reconstruction process can mean continuing life after a war for indigenous actors, especially armed groups such as LURD in Liberia and RENAMO in Mozambique. Furthermore, often recognition by interventionists can compensate for a lack of internal recognition, and hence legitimacy to participate. For instance, one Cambodian political party's leader noted of its rationale for engaging with UNTAC: "At that time we no longer had any means to create problems, and above all, we wanted to get a place for ourselves in Cambodian political life."⁵³

Without a formal peace agreement, the interventionists' recognition is even more important. Amongst a plethora of competing groups, being recognised as a 'player' by interventionists automatically raises a group's stature. This recognition serves to show a group's own supporters as well as its opponents that it has "assured worth", namely that it is strong and potent enough to merit foreign recognition.⁵⁴ Most often, meriting this assured worth requires staying armed and potentially militant and hence a threat to the broader process of state building. Examples of this are plentiful, but an especially apt one is the KLA in Kosovo. With interventionists' recognition so highly sought after, deciding whom to recognise and in what order of significance is a powerful tool for interventionists. Conferring greater recognition on certain participants- for instance by deciding which groups should participate in reconciliation talks in post-Taliban Afghanistan, or which East Timorese political parties will receive funding and inclusion on the ballot, or which local militias in the eastern Congo should participate in local peace negotiations- gives the interventionists a strong avenue to nuance the dynamics of indigenous politics.

Pick 'winners': A second method of managing collaborative systems is to simply pick what indigenous groups should come out of a conflict as the dominant ones. The clearest example of this was the US' support of Karzai's Pashtun factions and the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Another example was the UN's 1994 intervention in Haiti to assure that the deposed presidency of Aristide was re-inserted to power. As such, these actors are the 'chosen few' who are deemed by the interventionists to be the core of the external collaborative set. By example, one opponent of Aristide in Haiti

succinctly noted from this outcome: “We look at Aristide and we understand that it’s from outside that you can get power.”⁵⁵ However, such actions can often leave such chosen collaborative elites suffering from a lack of internal legitimacy, the despised ‘collaborator class’ of traditional imperialism. The ‘dog washers’ of Afghanistan is the best example of this whereby the Karzai government is widely criticised for being full of diaspora returnees chosen by Western interventionists for no other reason than that the Westerners feel comfortable around them.

Pressure through resource provision: A further method for managing collaborative systems by the interventionists is to use resource provisioning as leverage. Local actors often seek through their engagement with interventionists to acquire material resources, be it financial aid directly for themselves or humanitarian aid for their bases of support. Using resource provisioning as leverage allows interventionists to pressure collaborative partners to meet expected outcomes. Aid provision also allows for more subtle pressure to be applied in collaborative relationships because it contrasts directly with the overt coercion of military force. By example, the US government has argued that its Provincial Reconstruction Teams have proven effective because the provision of humanitarian aid money allows the US government “influence without the stigma of occupation.”⁵⁶

Pressure with future options: One of the most effective management tools available to interventionists is to apply pressure using possibilities for future developments. Robert Cooper has argued of Western efforts in the Balkans that they only began to succeed because of the “commitment to EU membership that has gone hand in hand with NATO force and money.”⁵⁷ This ‘trump card’ has been the ability to present eventual EU membership as a shared goal but one that requires strong actions being undertaken in the meantime, notably arresting war crimes suspects, implementing peace accords, and undertaking assorted governance reforms. In other places such as Liberia, promising universal debt relief has provided a powerful tool for managing collaborative relationships.

Circumvent difficult actors: One of the strongest management tools afforded to interventionists is to simply circumvent difficult indigenous actors. Often in post-conflict situations there is a proclivity towards intransigence by local actors “who have vested interests in retaining wartime political and economic arrangements and have not demonstrated real commitment to reforms.”⁵⁸ The easiest way to circumvent these actors is by expanding the diversity of potential collaborative partners beyond obstinate armed groups or obstructionist political parties. This can be done in several ways.

Firstly, it can be done by creating new actors, such as indigenous NGOs. For instance, in Cambodia UNTAC worked to create new actors in the Cambodian political space, such as a fledgling civil society and a free press, in order to diversify away from just the several main armed parties to the peace treaty.⁵⁹ This involved the creation of new indigenous NGOs as it was often a means for “occupying the political sphere by trying to form an opposition force” to existing indigenous power structures, notably the armed groups.⁶⁰

Secondly, circumventing difficult actors can be done by allowing for a lengthy transitional period to allow for the diversification of political parties through the implosion of armed groups, such as FRETELIN in East Timor or LURD in Liberia. Thirdly, often the best way to circumvent intransigent actors is to bypass them by appealing directly to the broader indigenous society. Kofi Annan argued UN missions should apply the “power of communication” by engaging the general public through mass media which allows them leverage that can be used “to push the parties to abide by their commitments.”⁶¹

By bypassing certain actors to appeal to broader public opinion, interventionists can then develop internal pressure for reform. An example of this is efforts by the UN to encourage warlord factions to undergo disarmament by directly reaching out to their base populations and offer development programming to those that apply pressure for disarmament. This has been used as a tactic extensively in Afghanistan for instance. Another example are UN efforts to promote indigenous civil society to counter the

influence of warlords by inviting Somali traditional, religious and women's leaders to peace conferences but excluding the warlords.

Develop constitutional leverage: One of the best advantages available to interventionists is their ability to manipulate the constitutional legal framework guiding the structuring of new governments. Being present and influential during the drafting of peace agreements allows interventionists strong this leverage. It allows, for instance of the UN in Cambodia, the possibility "to design in bargaining advantages for the UN authority."⁶² Usually this 'bargaining advantage' covers topics such as institutional reform, election frameworks, international monitoring schemes, and economic rehabilitation programmes. The value of this is that interventionists can decree the advantages when indigenous partners are weakened and fractured, notably during peace negotiations, and then implement them without needing further consent from indigenous actors. By example, in Cambodia the electoral component was only successful because it had been decreed in the UN's mandate as requiring independent implementation by the UN. This allowed elections to proceed successfully without needing to "depend on the steady and continuous support of the four factions" that had signed the initial peace agreement.⁶³

Apply coercive force: Lastly, it is important to note that there is still on occasion the need to apply force to bring about compliance to agreements. Madeleine Albright famously called this need 'coercive diplomacy', conspicuously using military power to persuade intransigent indigenous actors.⁶⁴ Notably this application of force means "raising the costs of non-cooperation" on parties who are deviating from peace agreements or undermining the mandate of an interventionist force.⁶⁵ At times, however, this may not require the actual application of force, but instead rely on the credibility of interventionist forces to potentially escalate a conflict to ensure compliance.⁶⁶ Often this potentially forceful application of 'collaborative management' would be preserved for action against wavering fronts of collaboration to prevent the splintering of partnerships during tactical collaboration, such as by the US with Afghanistan's Northern Alliance in 2001.

Indigenous strategies in collaborative systems

First they brought us food. Now, they bring arms. We fear they have in fact come to kill us.

- Political rhetoric used against UN mission in Somalia⁶⁷

Conforming to the gradualism of present collaboration, indigenous partners have a significant amount of leverage to manage their collaborative relationships and this is shaped by the context of the state building purposes of present interventionism in two ways. Firstly, while indigenous collaborative partners may share the overarching expected outcome of 'stronger governance' with interventionists, it is important that this be achieved on terms acceptable to them. In this way, while indigenous actors may make platitudes to 'democracy' or 'freedom', what is driving for them is gaining access to power and transforming external resources into suitably indigenised ones. Secondly, the centrality of working through the gradualism of collaboration, namely through empowering a sovereign government through formal governance institutions, means that indigenous partners inherently have a strong medium for bargaining, namely their sovereign right to do so through their own government. With these overarching dynamics noted, several strategies are adopted by indigenous actors to manage their collaborative relationships.

Confer legitimacy: The strongest management tool of indigenous actors is their ability to confer legitimacy on interventionists. There is currently a strong geopolitical need of interventionists to feel and be perceived as legitimate, i.e. not to appear as conquering 'imperialists' but rather as supportive allies to 'inviting' indigenous partners. Considering that legitimacy is "most of all dependent on perception"⁶⁸, indigenous actors use their ability to manipulate such perceptions to bolster their positions during the bargaining processes of collaboration on two levels.

The first is to leverage the interventionists' perceived legitimacy within the broader international community. The wider world expects to see political stability develop during interventions and given that, indigenous actors can counter such a perception quite easily. A frequent tactic during the bargaining processes of collaboration will be

to publicly claim that interventionists are undermining the sovereignty of a respective state, as if this were not blatantly obvious. It is a powerful tool however when interventionists wish to appear as ‘partners’ to local actors rather than as coercive, imposing imperialists. For example, one UN diplomat in Mozambique noted that every time a particular party felt displeasure with the UN, “it summoned the press and accused ONUMOZ of interfering in the country’s affairs.”⁶⁹ This displeasure usually comes from the fact that local actors feel interventionists favour another indigenous actor more and their main leverage for countering that is to claim that the state’s overall sovereignty is being infringed upon. For instance, the Hun Sen government in Cambodia often claimed the UN mission was too soft on the Khmer Rouge and complained it was undermining the government.⁷⁰

The second strategy is to question the perceived legitimacy of the interventionists domestically. Whatever the public rhetoric used internationally to defend an intervention, such as whether the UN Security Council mandated it, what defines its perceived legitimacy domestically is its ability to deliver results to the general public, notably quality of life improvements such as physical security and political stability. With such domestic perceptions key and with indigenous collaborative partners firstly seeking to strengthen their own positions, “they may not hesitate to undermine wider support for a mission by distorting local perception of international objectives” if that serves to strengthen themselves during the bargaining process with interventionists.⁷¹ Indigenous actors frequently adopt the tactic of building domestic displeasure with interventionist actions in order to show themselves as stronger actors.

Holding public protests against interventionist actions are a way of showing domestic displeasure and then using that to strengthen an indigenous actor’s negotiating position or to force interventionists to back down.⁷² For example, as a UN official noted, President Aristide in Haiti would call protest marches against the UN “in response to the pressure they were putting on him, and to show that he could ‘make trouble’.”⁷³ Furthermore, indigenous actors often consider local media and public information campaigns as “crucial political tool[s]” for directly reaching out to the broader public to sow displeasure with interventionists.⁷⁴ Another tactic may to question the ‘trust’ of the

interventionists to actually leave, accusing them of being ‘colonialists’ and ‘imperialists’ and juxtaposing themselves against that as ‘defenders of the people’.

Exploit fractured interventionist structures: The internal divides of interventionists offer one of the surest methods for indigenous actors to apply leverage. These divides can be between the states of a multilateral coalition or between states and an intergovernmental organisation, notably the UN. The fractured nature of present interventionists is easy to manipulate because of disagreements over norms, modalities, end goals, and resource commitments. At most times this manipulation can be fairly straightforward as so many interventionist actors are involved. For instance, the UN, NATO and the EU have all been involved in Bosnia.

Even assuming the international organisations involved in interventions were coherent unitary actors, which they assuredly are not, divisions between them could still be manipulated. It is particularly easy for indigenous actors to manipulate divides considering international organisations are composed of numerous member states, all with their own means and rationales. Hence, the easiest way for indigenous actors to manipulate internal divides is by simply choosing which interventionist actors they wish to interact with once they are found to be suitably ‘good’ in their orientation. For instance, in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge would pick “good UNTAC” rather than “bad UNTAC” from the multitudes of contingents forming the international peacekeeping forces depending on which contingents were the least likely to pressure them.⁷⁵

Additionally, manipulating internal divides is also made easier in intergovernmental organisations which suffer from profound bureaucratic divisions. For instance, UN missions often have tensions between their military and civilian components and at times it may be easier for local actors to talk to the military observers who are on short-assignments and hence less knowledgeable of local dynamics. UN military observers may also be more sympathetic of local armed groups than are civilian professional staffers who tend to push issues such as human rights and democracy promotion more strongly.⁷⁶ Even more striking is when local actors disregard locally based interventionist staff and appeal directly to heads of UN missions in the capital or in

extreme cases to New York, such as was done by El Salvadoran politicians at critical moments during negotiations there in 1993.⁷⁷ Additionally, indigenous actors may exploit cultural divides between Western troops and others participating in UN interventions. For example in Somalia the warlord Mohammed Aydid would encourage African UN peacekeepers not to follow US ‘imperialism’ and hence play on such divisions for improved leverage in his bargaining with the UN.

Extraversion: A further indigenous approach to managing collaborative systems is what has been termed ‘extraversion’ by Jean-Francois Bayart.⁷⁸ When confronted by stronger interventionist partners and within the context of domestic struggles to access power, indigenous actors will at times attempt to use the resources of those foreigners to consolidate their own domestic positions and authorities and hence be in a stronger bargaining position. Often this will entail situating themselves within a liberal ideological paradigm as a strategy for mobilising foreign support for their own local political struggles. In the context of state building interventions, this often means emphasising stabilisation firstly but also democratisation or civil society and human rights promotion. A rather warped example of this is the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia demanding humanitarian aid provision for its own areas to strengthen its internal political position in exchange for allowing the UN to proceed with elections there.⁷⁹

With the common application of conditionalities on governments receiving aid moneys, extraversion allows traditional power structures to be reorganised to circumvent the pressures placed on them. Often, elites will “partly undergo reconversion” into forms more accepted by interventionists and the political ideology they support.⁸⁰ This reconversion allows political actors to access aid, a major resource in post-conflict environments, and then use it to bolster their own domestic positions. By example, indigenous ‘NGOs’ with unofficial but strong affiliations to political parties can use their control of aid to benefit that party’s constituents and hence strengthen their domestic position. While at times this reconversion means playing the role of NGOs or civil society actors, most importantly it means armed groups morphing into political parties. For example, all of the major rebel movements in the DR Congo quickly morphed superficially into political parties stating full support for democracy so that they could compete in national elections.

In a related manner, a major strategy of indigenous actors to manipulate the strong position of interventionists as well as to bolster themselves in domestic battles for power is to leave the interventionists to implement politically inexpedient or unrewarding actions covering a wide range of issues. These could include basics such as bureaucratic reform leading to layoffs to more complicated endeavours such as countering militias through violence. Essentially, many collaborating elites in governance ‘sit back’ and expect the international community to do things for them, especially when the actions are politically disadvantageous.⁸¹ Rather than bear the political costs for unpopular actions, such as downsizing government bureaucracies, the tactic is to allow interventionists to bear the costs of these respective activities while political capital can later be accumulated for their successes, if there are any.

Apply pressure strategies: The application of assorted pressure strategies is a common approach by indigenous actors for managing their collaborative relationships. The first strategy, and perhaps the most effective one, is to simply withhold participation in the state building activities of the intervention. Interventionists must demonstrate that their interventions are succeeding and that is dependent upon visible cooperation with indigenous actors. Given that, indigenous actors can always threaten to withdraw from a peace process, elections, or a transitional government. Indeed, their main leverage comes from the ability of withdrawal or non-participation. The possibility to detach is especially useful when other collaborative management options are lacking and/or the indigenous actor is an especially marginal one. In this way it becomes “the ultimate resort of the weak.”⁸² The threat of withdrawal and the need to show ‘success’ often forces interventionists into making concessions that are not particularly palatable. By example, in East Timor prominent leaders Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos-Horta often threatened to resign and did so repeatedly from the UN’s transitional National Council unless more active consultation was taken with indigenous actors. This was an effective tool as it challenged UNTAET’s legitimacy, which was advocated on the premise of direct consultation with Timorese leaders.⁸³

The ability to threaten withdrawal or actually undertake it is especially powerful as a tactic in relations to the interventionists’ explicit desire for democratisation. As one Cambodian political leader noted of managing relationships with the UN, “Everyone

applied blackmail about non-participation, because it was undoubtedly the thing that made the United Nations most afraid.”⁸⁴ Often, interventionists are willing to literally pay indigenous actors for their participation in democratisation to counter threats of non-participation. For instance, in Mozambique the UN paid for ex-combatants to participate in the peace process and to prepare for elections, notably the former rebel group RENAMO which received 15 million dollars for their participation because they were always threatening to pull out of the peace process or to boycott elections.⁸⁵ This provoked smaller parties into demanding cash as well in order to participate in a ‘multi-party’ election.

In addition to detaching from participation, a second major pressure strategy of indigenous actors is to stay armed. This serves several purposes. The first is that to be armed strengthens an indigenous actor’s chances of continued recognition and strengthened leverage during extended periods of collaborative bargaining. One Cambodian political leader that had disarmed his armed group early-on regretted the decision afterwards, noting of the UN: “they fundamentally only gave way to people who kept arms in their hands. We should have kept our armed forces and police forces.”⁸⁶ Threats to detach from collaborative relationships are strongest when an indigenous actor has the possibility to return a state to war. The lack of this possibility greatly affects their ability for “refusing to play the cooperation game” and hence is generally a turning point in that respect.⁸⁷ Considering this, there is often a desire by interventionists to proceed with the military aspects of a peace agreement, notably disarmament, before proceeding to elections. Conversely, indigenous armed groups, and specifically warlord commanders are often “not inclined to give up the leverage of their ragtag soldiers” since their existence is particularly valuable during election periods.⁸⁸

A third pressure strategy is attempting to force interventionists into partisan support of particular indigenous actors over others. As mentioned previously, there is a general belief amongst indigenous actors that ‘neutral interventionism’ is an oxymoron and given that, it is better to have an intervening power as an ally when possible. Considering that, in near every case, indigenous actors will try to co-opt interventionists into being allies rather than neutral parties because in reality, “winning an argument

often means having the UN on one's side" as well as any other intervening power.⁸⁹ This is easiest when a conflict is ongoing and no peace agreements have been signed stipulating an ostensibly 'neutral' arbitrator. Provoking interventionists to ally with a particular group has at times been attempted by making the situation on the ground even worse. For instance, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Izetbegovic (a Bosnian Muslim) attempted to provoke the EU or US to forcefully intervene on the Bosnian Muslims' side through a "strategy of making things worse" by stalling the peace process.⁹⁰ At other times, urging allying is undertaken by certain indigenous actors secretly targeting interventionist forces in the hope of confusing them and provoking retaliation against their enemies. This was seen at times in the immediate aftermath of the US' toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan when assorted warlords attempted to use the US military to target one another.

Capacity provision: The last major management strategy of indigenous actors is the provision of capacity for governance. Providing capacity for governance is effective as leverage considering there is never enough foreign capacity for complete control and hence interventionists are dependent to a significant degree on local capacity. Furthermore, capacity provision is central considering the gradualism of collaboration means that interventionists are explicitly attempting, sooner than later, to rely on the capacity of their indigenous partners so that they can conclude the intervention and leave. With this knowledge paramount in the minds of indigenous actors, the requirement for local capacity provision leaves indigenous actors with leverage to nuance the direction of the bargaining process with interventionists.

However, the dependency of interventionists for indigenous capacity provision, especially early on, is somewhat paradoxical in that indigenous actors' ability to act is in itself extremely weak, i.e. the whole reason an intervention was provoked in the first place. The ability of indigenous actors to play off this dynamic is however profound and Lord Carnes argued their "extreme weakness can become [their] greatest source of strength" in bargaining with interventionists, notably when those indigenous actors control nascent governments.⁹¹ This is because interventionists have little choice but to compromise and concede to the demands of indigenous actors to provide capacity for governance since they are unable to do so themselves.

The leverage of capacity provision is in terms of the ‘inversion of capacity’, notably using another’s weakness as leverage to force them to allow one to fill the gap instead and hence control outcomes. For instance, tactics such as delaying an interview, cancelling meetings, restricting information flow all allow indigenous actors sitting in positions of governance to circumvent or obstruct the ability of interventionists to directly oversee and hence guide the direction of state building institutionalisation.⁹² Platitudes of ‘cooperation’ and ‘partnership’ are made of course, but the interventionists are quietly obstructed or excluded from exerting control.

5.4: Gradualism collaboration is currently not effective

They [UN observers] are here on picnic and holiday. I wish we could open the beaches for them to sun-tan and enjoy their dollars.

- Local commentary on the UN in Sierra Leone⁹³

It is important before concluding to ascertain how effective gradualism collaboration has been for state building interventionism. As argued previously, rather than focus on success as a clear end state, such as a liberal democracy, it is better to focus on it as ‘progress towards stability’.⁹⁴ In this sense, progress should be conceived as the state building processes that empower more capable national governments to exercise stronger sovereign control over their territories. Anthony Zinni summed up this sense of progress best when he noted that the “measure of successful on-the-ground programs is greater capacity leading to increased stability.”⁹⁵

In certain ways there has been progress towards improving stability in the frontiers. Despite ongoing claims of ‘new world disorder’ or a rash of ‘new wars’, the post-Cold War era is cumulatively one of increasing peace and prosperity.⁹⁶ The proliferation of state building interventions can take much credit for this as civil wars from Haiti to the Congo, Liberia, and Cambodia have been concluded through foreign interventions. However, while there have been some successes at conflict resolution, achievement of the actual state building goals of present interventions are still decidedly lacking. Interventions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo continue even after a decade of an interventionist presence in the Balkans. East Timor requires the continued presence of Australian peacekeepers while the US intervention in Afghanistan sees continuing

oscillations of violence and a perpetually weak government incapable of overcoming domestic turmoil. Some interventions have ended in outright failure, such as Somalia, while other states have seen repeated interventions following failures to establish stability, such as in Haiti, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The democratisation emphasis has also not been particularly effective. By example, the US has engaged in sixteen state building projects since the end of World War II and only four have been successful at democratisation: Germany, Japan, Panama, and Grenada, none of which occurred after the Cold War ended.⁹⁷ Even the conflict resolution successes of present interventions are shallow. The World Bank has found that half of all states emerging from civil war relapse into conflict within five years.⁹⁸

That progress is wanting can best be seen in a few key features of states undergoing interventionism. The first is a general tendency towards poor local security engendering broad mistrust between interventionists and indigenous society. With local populations still fearful, trust in national governments and their interventionist partners is stymied and hence people rely on local coping strategies such as seeking protection through their clans or tribes, leading to the creation of neo-feudal security regimes. At times personal security in the post-conflict environment is worse than it was during the official conflict period, such as in El Salvador where more people are now killed through crime related incidents than during the civil war itself.⁹⁹ Ultimately people don't trust the 'new' state if it cannot protect them.

This leads into the second general feature of present interventions, the overarching weakness of present interventionists within the context of frontier states. Rather than being strong 'imperialists' most often interventionists are perceived by indigenous actors as decidedly weak. One Haitian noted this when he commented on current UN 'occupations': "We do what we like, that can't be denied, it isn't like the other occupations we knew. The problem is rather they do nothing for us."¹⁰⁰ This leaves local peoples pondering why they should collaborate with interventionists when one cannot believe in their assurances of personal security. A common local perception is thus that 'the peacekeepers have lots of guns, but they don't do anything to actually protect us'. Interventionists often compound this sentiment by making public comments that are condescending and ultimately counter-productive. For instance, a

UN spokesman's message in Haiti was consistently to the effect that "insecurity forms a part of democracy" or "Haitians must get used to this insecurity, it is normal development."¹⁰¹

However, the third and most damning feature that defines frontier states undergoing interventions presently is the continued dire weakness of national governments. Ideally and in theory, an intervention should see 'evolving capacities' whereby national governments are empowered so that interventionists can leave, viz. the gradualism of collaboration. However, often this empowerment has been drastically lacking and all too often interventions have been concluded after the 'victory' of national elections leading to new governments which have no actual capacity to really govern. Considering state failure as the inability of governments to provide a minimum degree of order allowing routine interactions by individuals, it can be seen that all too often weak governments with little actual capacity for governance still exist after an intervention is officially concluded or continues in seeming perpetuity.¹⁰² Simply put, frontier states are all too often staying as frontier states.

5.5: Conclusion

Present state building interventionism is based on a gradualism of collaboration centred on the empowerment of indigenous partners in sovereign national governments. The central tenet of the theory of collaboration is that collaboration with indigenous actors determines the success or failure of present interventions. Unless the energy and resources of the intervening power can be translated into terms of indigenous politics, the intervention will be unable to achieve its goals. It must be concluded that the West is poorly managing its frontiers of insecurity presently because its approach to collaboration with indigenous politics is deficient. If gradualism collaboration is indeed lacking in its current conceptualisation and implementation, then present state building interventionism will remain largely ineffective. This leaves one pondering how so and why. Indeed, what is the 'problematique' defining gradualism collaboration?

CHAPTER 6: THE COLLABORATION PROBLEMATIQUE

*... in many ways it was harder to be aggressive in political matters than it was in military ones, even though diplomats were in no danger of disembowelment. The UN and its international partners were all too well versed in the evils of colonialism...*¹

Post-Cold War interventionism has not been successful at achieving its state building goals despite some successes at immediate conflict resolution. This means the current response to frontiers in the form of state building interventionism has not been particularly effective because frontier states are not stabilising sufficiently to dampen the pericentric pull. Improved state building interventionism requires ameliorating the collaboration problematique, the difficulty that an intervener has in achieving collaborative systems with indigenous political actors and of maintaining an evolving equilibrium in and between the sets of collaborative systems that allows for progress towards an intervention's goals, namely a more stable state.

Given the West's current approach of gradualism collaboration and the contextualisation of frontiers, the collaboration problematique currently facing Western states undertaking interventionism is on several levels. Firstly, and the most important aspect, is the general lack of indigenous actors for collaboration which makes the challenge of finding and strengthening suitable partners definitive. Secondly, collaboration is not defined as a strategic doctrine, meaning the West effectively lacks the 'collaborative know-how' to undertake effective interventionism presently. Compounding this lack of doctrine is that the West is not willing to bear the costs for more effective interventionism as shown by its emphasis on shallow democratic processes, short timeframes and limited material and political commitment. Thirdly, the values debate surrounding interventionism constrains the formation of collaborative partnerships as Western states hesitate to be 'imperialists' and actors from indigenous politics resist being 'collaborators'.

6.1: The contextual challenges of frontiers of insecurity

To maintain power, Karzai has to work with people who are not optimal, the same way we had to work with Dostum.

- US officer on partnering with warlords in Afghanistan²

The most definitive aspect of the collaboration problematique is that there is a lack of suitable indigenous actors with whom to collaborate, viz. the whole reason there is a deepening of interventionist control provoked by a pericentric pull. This is the primary contextual challenge provided by frontiers of insecurity. While Germany and Japan are often cited as lessons to learn from in terms of how best to occupy a state and transition it towards liberal democracy, they are actually not insightful because they were ethnically homogenous, offered good possibilities for post-war collaboration (namely in the form of established bureaucracies and reformist elites) and were distinctly not definable as frontiers of insecurity. In contrast, by example of Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan, “[a]ll three societies are divided ethnically, socio-economically, or tribally in ways that Germany and Japan were not.”³ The fragmentation of politics in frontiers is defined by the increasingly strong presence of non-state actors and localised rather than national politics which has dire consequences for picking and strengthening indigenous collaborative partners.

The overall lack of partners

*In Kosovo we had judges, lawyers, prosecutors; the problem was finding one who didn't have a Yugoslav past or a Serbian collaborator past. Here [in East Timor] you don't have a single lawyer.*⁴

- UN administrator on the challenge of finding indigenous partners

In frontier circumstances, finding and strengthening collaborative partners necessary for achieving interventionist goals is decidedly difficult although the challenge, while definitive, does vary between interventions. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in the early-1990s was an extreme example of this as it was an intervention in a “stateless society.”⁵ There was not even a rudimentary governmental structure to work with which left aid agencies, and eventually the UN mission, to try and finagle deals with an exceptionally diverse group of warlords. Cambodia provides another example of an extremely challenging context, namely the UNTAC mission there was expected to fill a

political power-vacuum “in the face of obstructive violence” by nearly all of the major Cambodian military and political actors.⁶

Afghanistan offers a more moderate example whereby the US was able to immediately partner with the Northern Alliance to topple the Taliban government, especially as it had previously been in power itself. However, the Northern Alliance, and the government it eventually formed the bulk of, proved hard to partner with in the longer-term as its component forces often fought with one another or proved utterly lacking in capacity, leaving the US to rely on even more local partners, such as ethnic militias. A more limited occurrence for interventionist forces is the possibility to work with a single, united political movement. FRETILIN in East Timor provides one of the few examples whereby the UN was able to proceed towards establishing a new government by working with an already established political actor with broad representation and legitimacy in indigenous society. However, as mentioned previously, FRETILIN itself eventually imploded into multiple political parties after independence, leading to violence within and between the army and police forces.

Further compounding the sheer proliferation of non-state actors is their proclivity towards localised politics and identities, which hinders finding collaborative partners conducive to strengthening national governments. In the ‘post-conflict’ violence of frontiers, local affiliations are especially salient as people seek protection through localised mediums, the neo-feudal security regimes of gangs, clans, or allegiance to personal warlords. The challenge that these affiliations provide is that while they offer a “spirit of community”, it is one that “often feeds off war.”⁷ Subsequently, the hardest need for interventionists to respond to is that of building a critical mass of collaborative partners conducive to strengthening a national government. Thomas Friedman noted that while external meddling at times might compound civil conflicts, that foreign meddling was possible because “the insiders were not united enough to make a fist” to resist it.⁸ The goal of interventionism is to reverse this tendency such that the intervention can conclude and leave a ‘fist’ behind in the form of a more effective national government supportive of Western security interests.

The lack of 'suitable' partners

... the warlords who filled the government's upper ranks were stealing funds as fast as the international community could deposit them in Congo's treasury, sacking the country's fathomless trove of natural resources, and ensuring that their militia fighters remained loyal to themselves rather than to the nascent national army.⁹

It has become a cliché that 'winning the peace' is harder than 'winning the war'. As overused as the sentiment is, its validity is that while foreign interventionist forces have enough military advantages or political leverage to forge peace agreements, failing at collaboration in the mid- to longer-term of an intervention is what breaks current efforts at transitioning frontier states through state building interventions. This is primarily because once a 'critical mass' of collaboration has been accrued, such that a national government can be formed say after a peace agreement, it is still difficult to find 'suitable' partners. This means those roughly sharing the liberal inclinations of the interventionists as well as those genuinely interested in engendering stability.

If the goal is to strengthen governments in a liberal democratic fashion, what is required most are committed elites, who might be termed 'unconditional collaborators', those that share the interventionists' norms and are wholeheartedly committed to their implementation. However, what is most often the case is the prominence of indigenous actors who are purely opportunistic in their motives, i.e. they are tactical or very heavily conditioned collaborators. The problem with such actors is they "are notoriously unreliable, their cooperation ebbing and flowing in proportion to the patronage they receive."¹⁰ Furthermore, with a 'gradualism' emphasis on empowering government actors first and foremost, a major challenge is often that local actors within the government itself often actively undermine a progressively stronger government forming.¹¹

For instance, Sierra Leone highlighted this whereby the world focused on RUF rebels but tolerated a weak and fractured military junta and overlooked abuses by government forces while at other times in Sierra Leone's history, military actors actually collaborated with rebels to stage a coup. The case of the DR Congo is perhaps the best example of an utter deficiency of suitable indigenous partners. What the DR Congo

fundamentally “lacked was not only the machinery of state.... [but] a legitimate conception of the state” amongst its elites.¹² Decades of kleptocratic rule by President Mobutu meant that participation in governance was little more than a business proposition. The continuing failure of the Kinshasa government led by Joseph Kabila highlights that whatever the ostensibly benign state building intents of interventionists they will be greatly challenged to “create functioning institutions when state power rests with people hell-bent on abusing it for their own purposes.”¹³

Even when ‘suitable partners’ are chosen, namely those that do share the democratic and liberal viewpoints of the interventionists, they are most often too weak to implement effective governments, something notably compounded by the chaos and violence of frontier zones. This is best seen in the Karzai government in Afghanistan whose writ has barely extended beyond the capital, hence Karzai’s nickname as ‘the mayor of Kabul’. While Karzai has very publicly espoused the US’ emphasis on democratisation, he has been forced into problematical coalitions with much more illiberal indigenous actors in order to try and expand the government’s influence. Furthermore, efforts to simply import suitable collaborators from the diasporas have not been particularly successful as they are widely branded as ‘dog washers’, namely US proxies, and subsequently disdained by the broader society in Afghanistan. Overall, attempts to explicitly empower such suitable partners often have poor results because these actors frequently lack public support which ultimately undermines an intervention.

The other major aspect of suitable collaborative partners widely missing comes in terms of interventionists needing actionable partners to meet immediate needs, notably when government capacities are literally non-existent or grossly insufficient. The best example of this has been that the most ‘suitable’ collaborative partners in Afghanistan for combating al-Qaeda terrorists have been local militias and warlords. This has presented a contradiction in policy because the Bush Administration wanted the Afghan government to take responsibility for the country’s security but it also wanted to use warlords to kill al-Qaeda, which detracted from solidifying the central government and building the national army.¹⁴ Ultimately, because of national government incapacities, Western forces are often inclined to make use of “allies of convenience” in frontier zones.¹⁵ These allies may provide immediate capacity, but nonetheless detract from the broader goal of instigating a more capable government.

6.2: Collaboration is not a strategic doctrine

The biggest problem is that the UN doesn't have a clear idea of what it wants to do.

- Timorese political activist¹⁶

The second major aspect of the collaboration problematique is the internal conceptual and administrative dilemmas of Western states undertaking interventionism. Central to this is that the importance of collaboration to state building interventionism has not been and continues to be poorly understood. This has meant that collaboration has not been defined as a strategic doctrine, meaning the West effectively lacks the 'collaborative know-how' to undertake effective interventionism presently. Specifically, the West lacks effectiveness at identifying suitable partners, building trust, managing evolving relationships, engaging in conflict resolution, effecting logistics and resources transfers, and negotiating agreements.¹⁷

By example, despite interventionism and state building being central to its foreign policy, the US military still lacks a 'doctrine of collaboration' for application at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This has been for several reasons. In addition to a long held affection for its own technology-driven 'American way of warfare', another challenge is that the US has not tended to learn from its past experiences at state building. A reluctance to acknowledge a general condition of frontier crises and a disdain for believing itself to be imperialistic has meant that "successive administrations have treated each new mission as if it were the first and, more importantly, as it were the last."¹⁸

The application of any sort of doctrine of collaboration by the Europeans has also been lacking. In some ways the Europeans are even further behind as they bizarrely prefer to 'wage peace' rather than war as the Dutch, for instance, have termed their mission in Afghanistan. A further European proclivity has been to emphasise 'human security', especially through local economic development and social service provision, rather than a keenness to engage in combat missions. The crucial result of this has been a debilitating reluctance to apply military force when required to function capably in frontier zones.

Collaboration may indeed be fundamentally about consensus and cooperation, but that does not negate the fact that at times violence is required, usually against insurgencies and in support of indigenous collaborative partners. The willingness to act decisively when necessary is required for the trust essential to collaborative relationships. As Robert Cooper argued, “where there is no possibility of following up words with deeds, words are often irresponsible.”¹⁹ A result of this is that the Europeans are often not taken as seriously by indigenous partners as is the US. For instance, in the Balkans the US is viewed as a great power while the EU is not since “it is power that makes troubled countries feel secure, not goodwill.”²⁰ Furthermore, in Afghanistan, even though the Europeans give more aid and have more troops there, “it is the United States that calls the shots” both politically as well as military because military power is in fact paramount in an ongoing conflict situation.²¹ For the Europeans to better manage their own collaborative relationships they have to be ‘taken seriously’ by their indigenous partners and that means being perceived as showing a willingness to act decisively, notably through military force as required.

The United Nations is somewhat different. With little comparable military resources and few combat troops on the ground, UN missions have resorted to a much higher degree of interaction with indigenous politics out of need rather than any thoughtful doctrine. The primary challenge of the UN’s approach for collaboration in terms of applicable doctrine is that it has been overly mechanistic and formulaic. As Beatrice Pouligny noted, the UN approach to interventions is based on a major contradiction, namely that “while it claims to be (re)building the state, it continually reduces the process to highly technical dimensions, depriving it of all political substance.”²² In short, it lacks a nuanced approach to collaboration with indigenous politics and instead attempts to apply a uniform, mechanistic approach to state building universally.

Somalia provides a good example of how collaborative know-how has been misjudged since the very start of the post-Cold War era. The overarching problem in Somalia was that the interventionist forces of the UN could not determine whether the failed state “should be under UN trusteeship or negotiations with local authorities, including in some cases the warlords, should be fostered.”²³ The lack of conceptual clarity for defining an intervention’s modalities, notably based upon the requirements for collaboration, meant there was much confusion about how to undertake the intervention.

This was because interventionist forces thought that they ostensibly shared goals, namely humanitarian relief, with *all* indigenous Somali actors and given that, there was little to no emphasis placed on bargaining and partnering with indigenous actors in a thoughtful manner, merely arriving and distributing aid. However, the initial aid efforts quickly ran into trouble as the humanitarians of the world found themselves quickly and uneasily partnered with warlords for protection. If something as outwardly benign as relief aid becomes a medium for disagreement with indigenous actors, then the enormously more complicated task of state building is all the likelier to provoke tensions. The extreme incompetence determining ‘with whom and why for’ of collaborative system implementation has continued as a major error of interventionist policy conceptualisation.

A further example of a poor understanding and application of collaboration is that by the US. With little to no emphasis on collaboration, the US has instead most often turned to its long-held emphasis on technology and overwhelming military power as its response to state building interventionism. While this approach makes sense for conventional warfare, it is direly lacking in the frontier context of current interventionism. The problem has been that the US’ strategic doctrine “did not easily translate into tactical principles” for managing the day-to-day operations of interventions, especially after any initiating combat.²⁴ While the Pentagon has begun to somewhat euphemistically emphasise ‘indirect action’ in its policy papers and even with ‘military operations other than war’ now officially parallel to conventional war in priority, they are still strongly overshadowed by the US military’s historical desire to wage warfare ‘the American way’.²⁵ The reluctance to commit American ground troops for extended periods when there are possibilities to instead call in air strikes has been hard to overcome. For instance, Thomas Friedman argued that while the US won the initial stages of the war in Afghanistan by “remote control” using air power and Special Forces; it continues to belie a naïve belief that it can “win the peace in Afghanistan by remote control as well.”²⁶

6.3: No willingness to bear the costs of collaboration

... the UN and ‘the internationals’ have an unrealistic timeframe... they think they can implement very complicated ideas like the rule of law in a

couple years, it's impossible.

– Timorese political activist²⁷

The second internal challenge for Western interventionist forces is that they are still largely unwilling to bear the costs of collaboration during interventions. How much interventionists are willing to ‘pay’ to mitigate insecurity can best be put in terms of blood and treasure. If a state were willing to pay a heavy cost, it could impose a great deal of force upon a target state and occupy it with relatively little emphasis put into collaborative efforts. Presently, in an era of instant global media coverage, sensitive home publics, and odes to liberal values, such an approach is neither feasible nor desirable in any case.

Considering this, the challenge for today is that interventionists must place a heavy emphasis on achieving their goals through significant, if often poorly implemented, collaboration with indigenous politics, i.e. gradualism collaboration. Even given that, interventions still suffer from their superficial effort. Namely, they want to create stronger, democratic national governments as quickly and cheaply as possible and this has so far proven to not be particularly effective at transitioning frontier states through strengthening collaborative partners there. Within the dire environment that defines frontier states, it is simply impossible that progress can be made with relatively small amounts of military and economic resources and political capital dedicated.

Firstly, the relatively scant political will that is placed into transitioning frontier states is problematical. This lack of political will must be contextualised within the domestic environments of Western states by highlighting that troubles in distant locales still do not provoke public consensus as being national security threats. Even in a post-9/11 US, many Americans still doubt the broader presence of what this thesis terms frontiers of insecurity. By example, Kimberly Marten argued that the “liberal democratic states of today for the most part do not feel that their survival is threatened” by post-war Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.²⁸ In more pacifist Western countries, the degree of scepticism is especially pronounced. While European governments have generally been supportive of the intervention in Afghanistan, their publics often have not. For instance, the German newspaper *Die Welt* noted in defence of Berlin’s 2006 White Paper, which called for more interventionism, that the German public was “barely aware of the

dangers” presently faced and felt compelled to argue that “Germany’s security is also defended in the Hindu Kush.”²⁹

Amongst home publics, policy wonks, and academics alike, there is a general doubt of arguments which turn every failed state into another ‘domino’ capable of instigating global chaos. This doubt centres on the rhetorical question articulated by Alan Tonelson: “If those countries are not strategic... why should the United States [or anybody else] care whether their problems get addressed or not?”³⁰ Western publics retort that question by doubting that state building interventions indeed do serve national interests despite what political leaders may say. The result of this public apathy for ‘foreign adventures’ is a policy environment that encourages insufficient prioritisation to ensure follow-through precisely because publics have perceived that national security is not really at stake but the costs are potentially high. Ultimately, when political leaders struggle to persuade their publics, strategies of interventionism are reduced to the attention span of individual administrations rather than enjoy consistent national attention and hence effort.

The results of these domestic political dynamics manifest themselves in several ways. The most prominent is the relative lack of military and monetary resources dedicated. Given that, thoughtful policy responses to frontiers are stymied by inadequate budget allocations because of domestic spending priorities. The European budgetary commitment is exceptionally lacking since most European governments are unwilling to invest adequately in defence, despite the policy rhetoric of the EU to improve its competence to engage equally with the US in foreign interventionism.³¹ Most EU countries spend 2 percent or less of GDP on defence but perhaps the most lacking is Germany. The Merkel government has managed to push budget increases to support more interventionism abroad. Yet even then, such increases barely cover inflation and wage hikes much less radically supplement Germany’s weak military, which relies on Ukrainian charter planes for transport and receives only 1.5 percent of Germany’s GDP.³² The consequence of such Western hesitance is that the armies of developing states are most often sent on relatively cheap UN peacekeeping missions save for few notable exceptions, namely when the frontier states are close to Western states as were the Balkans and East Timor. Ultimately, UN peacekeeping forces, small in number and

lacking in the financial resources of the West, “lack the wherewithal to actually keep peace.”³³

The second major example of a lack of political will is the continuing inadequacy of institutional capabilities, notably of a civilian-political nature, by Western governments. While militaries have been pushing some initial reform, for instance by the US and UK emphasising ‘expeditionary’ capabilities, within the civilian world, the required changes have been even more deficient. Time and again this has been highlighted in government policy papers. The EU conceded as much when it highlighted that “in almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos.”³⁴ Considering that rather stark admission, it has called for itself to have “greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations.”³⁵ As is a common proclivity, despite official pronouncements the EU still lacks a consolidated, authoritative institutional structure to organise its interventionism.

The US’ civilian institutional capabilities are also deficient and are best described as “ad hoc, under-funded, and understaffed.”³⁶ For instance, the State Department has, in Anthony’s Zinni’s opinion, struggled to put competent teams of civilian managers on the ground:

State and other government agencies dig into their staffs, pick a bunch of people and kluge them together. There’s no cohesion, no preparation, no deep knowledge of the situation, no integrated planning with the other operational units.³⁷

While the US Government has created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department “to bolster the capabilities of US civilian agencies and to improve coordination with international partners”³⁸, it is still fairly marginal politically, notably against the Department of Defense, and woefully understaffed with just several dozen Foreign Service Officers.

The situation within the UN has not particularly improved either. One of its own prominent reports identified “a key institutional gap”, namely that there is “no place in the United Nations system explicitly designed to avoid state collapse and the slide to war or to assist countries in their transition to from war to peace.”³⁹ Kofi Annan further remarked the UN “has lacked a dedicated entity to oversee the process, ensure its

coherence or sustain it through the long haul.”⁴⁰ Given these concerns, there is now a Peace-building Commission yet it is mostly concerned with emergency financing and technical advice rather than being a decisive umbrella of coordinated implementation on the ground.

The third major example of a lack of willpower is the short timeframes that Western interventions attempt. All too often, interventions have been brought to premature, politically expedient closures. Often these short timeframes have been provoked by ‘successful’ national elections but all too often the hasty departure of foreign forces sees said state return to conflict. Prematurely concluded interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Haiti were good examples of this whereby national elections saw the quick withdrawal of foreign missions and the similarly quick return to outright war. And while longer timeframes in themselves may not ensure success, “leaving early ensures failure.”⁴¹

A last example of an unwillingness to pay the costs that would be necessary for effective collaboration is an overemphasis on force protection. This has been a long-running critique of interventionist forces stemming from an early-history of withdrawals over fears of casualties, namely after nineteen US soldiers were killed in Mogadishu in 1993. Because of the low level of political will attached to most interventions by Western states, the emphases of their troops have been to “privilege their own safety over the achievement of mission goals.”⁴² This emphasis on force protection has been particularly acute for the US military and it has subsequently been characterised as “a debilitating obsession.”⁴³

So prominent has its reputation for force protection become, the Pentagon itself acknowledges that non-state actors will “choose irregular warfare... in an attempt to break our will.”⁴⁴ Even neo-conservative commentators in Washington have argued that US troops make “lousy peacekeepers” because they spend “95 percent of their energy just protecting themselves.”⁴⁵ The perception of indigenous actors about interventionist troops is that they are often ‘prisoners of peace’, as peacekeepers in the Balkans were known as they largely stayed in their bases, while in Somalia foreign troops were decried as ‘human tanks’ in their layers of body armour. Between a

shallow level of political will and a detaching overemphasis on force protection, indigenous actors can understandably be rather sceptical of the sincerity of foreign interventionists.

6.4: The values debate of imperialistic interventionism

*Without an imperial ethos (or something very like it) it is difficult to justify casualties, and more difficult still to keep the peace in the way that imperial armies once did.*⁴⁶

The driving conundrum facing interventionists in frontier states is the desire not to appear as ‘imperialists’. This is true of Western states but also of the UN, itself born largely through de-colonisation efforts and keen not to appear as any sort of neo-empire. In an era where imperialism as an ideology is dead, imperialistic interventions are naturally clouded by normative values debates. This covers both the internal conundrums of Western liberal democracies that want to believe their imperial adventures are now purely historical as well as indigenous actors who resist becoming modern-day ‘collaborators’.

Western sensitivities to ‘imperialism’ accusations

We’re not imperialistic. We never have been.
- US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld⁴⁷

While Washington DC’s neo-conservative news pundits have no hesitance advocating a return to imperialism, the dislike of the West’s actions being perceived as imperialism is profound for most Westerners. Although present interventions are in reality merely ‘imperialistic’, that does little to assuage sensitivities to charges of a return to traditional imperialism. A major manifestation of this sensitivity is the denials of Western political leaders that they are modern imperialists. George W. Bush has argued, for instance, that the US “has never been an empire... We may be the only great power in history that had the chance and refused.”⁴⁸ Germany provides another example of extreme reluctance to be perceived as involved in refreshed imperial activities. A major domestic scandal was the so-called ‘Skulls Affair’ in which German soldiers were photographed posing with skulls found near old Soviet outposts in Afghanistan. The ramifications of the event were that domestic support for its foreign interventions plummeted, with 73 percent of

Germans wanting the Bundeswehr to decrease its foreign involvement.⁴⁹ Overall, Western political leaders go to such lengths to deny the imperialistic nature of their interventionist actions largely because to not do so would be political suicide domestically.

Western tensions with 'barbarians'

They are reluctant to 'go there'- and if they must go, then they count the days until they can come home. They eschew the periphery. They cling to the metropolis.⁵⁰

With a desire to not appear imperial, moral compromises by the interventionists with their indigenous partners often have to be made. This is decidedly a metaphysical dilemma, as Christopher Coker contended, when the West's "commitment to make war more 'humane' is intimately tied to its faith in humanitarianism... a universalistic faith that has little sympathy" for localising dynamics of the kind that exist in frontier states.⁵¹ In such circumstances, Western interventionists are left feeling that the rules and conventions applied in the West do not apply in states undergoing interventions because war in such places is becoming decidedly more 'uncivilised'.⁵² This leaves making compromises between a pragmatic need for action with a desire to maintain some connection with deeply-felt Western values a painfully conflicted undertaking.

Furthering this overarching moral dilemma, state building as a collaborative effort inherently must be done in correlation to indigenous politics, notably social orders and customs, which at times can definitely bolster reconstruction efforts but at other times be decidedly counter-productive.⁵³ This is perhaps no truer than for pragmatic Western attempts to partner with non-state armed groups and to turn a blind eye to their 'traditional' actions. This at times means relying on local social structures- e.g. tribal, clan, or religious- even if that compromises the national government. Examples are plentiful, ranging from the US' predicament of partnering with Afghan warlords who executed Taliban prisoners to UN forces in the Congo who undertake combat missions with the Congolese National Army despite its fracturing into individual ethnic warlord commands and the use of local militias by aid workers in Somalia to protect aid shipments.

Indigenous hesitance to undertake collaboration

First they send out missionaries, then consuls to support the missionaries, then battalions to support the consuls. I am not a Rajah of Hindustani be a made a mock of in that way. I prefer to have to deal with the battalions straight away.

- Abyssinian Emperor Tewodros⁵⁴

Perhaps even more striking than a Western hesitance to be perceived as returning to imperialism is the reluctance of indigenous actors to be seen acquiescing to it. This has major ramifications for collaborative relationships. There are profound cultural tensions against collaboration with foreigners coming from vastly different backgrounds, notably when they assert the ‘universality’ of the norms and structures they are trying to impose. Samuel Huntington asserted that the West won ascendance in global affairs not through its values and ideas, but instead through its ability to apply military force, emphasising that “Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.”⁵⁵ Western efforts to promote ‘universal values’, such as democracy and human rights, are often perceived by indigenous actors as simple, Western imperialism. In this way, many non-Westerners feel that the West, through its interventionism, is using its power to “legislate Western habits of the heart.”⁵⁶

In addition to the challenges of cultural tensions is a strong geopolitical awareness against collaboration. As Emperor Tewodros showed in the 1860s, a strong appreciation for events elsewhere can influence how indigenous actors perceive the overtures and activities of interventionist powers. In a post-imperial era and with globalised communication networks, nobody wants to be the one ‘colonised’. To be subjected to such pressures is often maddeningly upsetting to local actors. As the Bosnian-Serb general Radko Mladic exclaimed, “There is no greater shame for us Serbs than to be bombed by some Dutchman.”⁵⁷ While it is doubtful he would have preferred to be bombed by the Americans instead, that such imperialistic pressure was being applied at all, and often through smaller powers acting through multilateral forces, was all the more galling.

Put rhetorically, who would want to collaborate if that means being part of an empire, especially an American one? While Western leaders have denied their intentions are

imperial, this often counts for little amongst much of the global public if those intentions are still perceived as actually being imperial.⁵⁸ This has important implications for collaboration, notably in finding suitable collaborative partners. Rahul Rao noted as much when he maintained that “principled collaborators are unlikely to step forward at all, if they perceive that they are collaborating with is empire.”⁵⁹ This is notably in regards to ‘empire’ being a strengthened US presence in a region such as the Middle East. When Western leaders such as Tony Blair call for the West to “support, nurture, and build strong alliances” with so-called moderates, i.e. those on a “modernising path”, it is not often the case that such encouragement is welcomed by the respective persons or groups.⁶⁰ Such association by the ‘moderates’ probably compromises them in the internal collaborative set as agents of non-collaboration label them traitorous ‘collaborators’. This is all the easier in states with a colonial past where local actors often claim a heroic status of rebels fighting against foreign domination.⁶¹ Allusions are subsequently made to resisting ‘gringos’ and ‘bwanas’.

Consequently, a major form of countering collaboration is to increase the geopolitical awareness against it rather than to physically attack the West’s indigenous partners. When faced with the over-whelming military power of Western states, notably of the US, a plausible response is to use the asymmetrical means of the media to show the world how ‘imperial carnage’ is being wrought by Western forces. This can be accomplished, for instance, by funnelling videos to Al Jazeera or declaring human rights abuses through press conferences. The purpose of raising this awareness is both to apply pressure onto indigenous actors not to collaborate but also to dampen Western public support for interventionism abroad.

The centrality of democracy

He killed my papa, he killed my mama... I'll vote for him!
- Liberian election chant about Charles Taylor⁶²

The issue of democratisation has dominated the debate over what values should guide the state building efforts of post-Cold War interventionism. This discourse has ranged from the crude practicalities of such efforts to the moral imperatives for it. As the most contentious normative issue of state building interventionism, there is hence a need to understand how it defines the collaboration problematique.

The primary argument in favour of promoting democratisation through state building interventionism is twofold. The first part is that it is morally right to do so both because democracy is essential for universal freedom and that it is necessary for interventions to be legitimised. This has been a major argument of successive US administrations, although George W. Bush has been more assertive than either Bill Clinton or George Bush Snr. Critiques that interventionism which promotes democracy is actually imperialism is perplexing to most Americans. As Michael Ignatieff rhetorically asked to summarise the sentiment, “How can it be imperialist to help people throw off the shackles of tyranny?”⁶³ By promoting democracy, interventionists believe themselves to be more legitimate, both for Western domestic audiences to support and for the residents of the frontier state in question.

The second part of the argument is that democracy is inherently more conducive to stability than are authoritarian regimes. As the Bush Administration argued, the US “will not let the challenges of democratic transitions frighten us into clinging to the illusory stability of the authoritarian.”⁶⁴ Considering this general theme, if an intervention is to occur, Western governments argue why not use the opportunity to try and create longer-term stability through a new regime with strong domestic support engendered through democratic elections. While few would argue that it is easy, the challenges surely outweigh the benefits if one accepts Joseph Siegle’s argument that “democracies consistently outperform autocracies in the developing world” when it comes to political stability as well as quality-of-life measures such as clean water, improved literacy, and lower infant mortality.⁶⁵

Conversely, efforts to promote democracy through state building interventionism have been widely critiqued. The primary argument is that it is often actually counter-productive to extending stability. While the Bush Administration has been exceedingly outspoken on the matter, many Europeans have been more muted in their support. For instance, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder mentioned in a NATO address ‘extending stability’ eight times while hardly mentioning democracy at all as a grounds for interventionism.⁶⁶ Many academics have pointed out that interventions are most often motivated primarily by geopolitical concerns, namely the condition of weak and failed states, and hence that “democratisation alone [does] not fully address such concerns.”⁶⁷ Pouligny for instance argued that “premature political competition may, in

some cases, revive logics of confrontation and lead to the destabilisation of the socio-political situation.”⁶⁸ In this way, armed groups morph into political parties and usually keep their own militias, such as has been the case in Liberia, the DR Congo, and Kosovo. Continuing this general critique, other academics reason that democratisation can be destabilising as it “encourages the conflicts that exist in a collapsing state to manifest themselves freely” since the checks and balances of an established democratic system are still lacking.⁶⁹

Even if free and fair elections are held, in themselves they can be problematic if they provide a basis for illiberal actors to assume power. For example, Charles Taylor was elected initially under internationally mandated and observed elections after ECOWAS intervened in Liberia but his government turned into unadulterated despotism at home and encouraged Sierra Leone’s civil war. Furthermore, early elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina were arguably counter-productive since they merely legitimised the nationalistic governments responsible for the civil war.⁷⁰ In this way, democratically ‘legitimate’ governments can use their powers to segregate communities and discriminate against minorities, for instance in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the case of the DR Congo, exceedingly expensive UN-sponsored elections did nothing to dilute ethnic divides, redress endemic corruption, or give much hope for a sustained democratic future. As one UN election official wryly noted, “We could spend three hundred million dollars to elect a dictator... normally you can get a dictator cheaper than that.”⁷¹

In addition to arguments that it is counterproductive to stability, many critics dislike the messianic pretensions of ‘spreading democracy’. In tandem with arguments claiming democratisation provokes instability, other academics have argued for interventionism to initially push ‘soft authoritarianism’ rather than outright democracy. Fareed Zakaria has been foremost in calling for this approach: “First, a government must be able to control the governed, then it must be able to control itself. Order plus liberty. These two forces will, in the long run, produce legitimate government, prosperity, and liberal democracy.”⁷² These sentiments are echoed by ‘classic liberals’ such as Chris Patten who argue that democracy, while universally applicable, “must grow organically from within a society” since it “cannot be imposed by force.”⁷³ Rather than ‘spread

democracy' through foreign interventions, many would rather see democracy generated endogenously.

Lastly, it is important to note one last dislike for a strong emphasis on democratisation; most citizens living in frontier states do not themselves particularly care about democracy despite the West's interest in it. Instead, most frontier residents simply want more quality of life improvements, such as the cessation of violence, clean water, basic education, and enough food to eat, rather than any particular type of government. This responds to the reality that even without Western interventions, many of the world's poorest people have already experienced many 'elections' with no particular impact on their lives. What has always really been lacking for them is a competent government to instigate quality of life changes rather than a specifically democratic one.

If the goal of an intervention is to strengthen a national government so that it can better exercise control over its sovereign territory, interventionists are faced with several questions when searching for suitable collaborative partners. Namely, is domestic legitimacy, and hence stability, best secured through the democratic selection of national leaders? Or, do the necessities of post-conflict recovery give more credence to domestic legitimacy being secured by leaders who can meet basic quality of life needs without necessarily having to assume power through elections? The central quandary of democratisation then is that a reliance on elections becomes a "double-edged sword", namely that while it can provide a basis to develop government it can also empower dangerous elites, which from a Western interventionists perspective means illiberal ones.⁷⁴

Given that, the primary collaborative con for promoting democratisation is the real possibility it provides for interventionists getting stuck with illiberal partners in the external collaborative set. Time and again, elections during interventions have brought to power national leaders with dubious democratic credentials, whatever the hopes of the intervention. These leaders are then difficult to bargain with as they have the 'legitimacy of democracy' that the interventionists myopically declared as a paramount goal. This leaves interventionist with little flexibility to either seek new collaborative partners, if the elected ones are politically divisive or grossly ineffective, or to apply

pressure as needed to reach their goals. Moreover, with its own short timeframes and shallow follow-through, ultimately what the international community often ends up with is the “procedural democracy” of elections without the entrenchment of the political culture necessary to support it.⁷⁵ Interventionists are desperate for as much participation as possible to secure their own legitimacy and indigenous political entrepreneurs know it. They use that to manipulate their participation conducive to achieving their own needs, which are often averse to the broader democratisation goals of the intervention.

The main collaborative benefit of democratisation is that in an era where imperialism as an ideology is dead and only imperialistic interventions are undertaken, the simple reality is that collaboration without some democratic overtures is not likely to occur. And indeed, elections can at times greatly stabilise dire political situations. For instance, elections in East Timor, Cambodia, and Afghanistan, while not perfect, all helped to calm unease following extended violence. As Marina Ottaway argued, the “authoritarian solution- perhaps more promising in the short run- in the long run is very likely to lead to a new cycle of discontent and collapse.”⁷⁶ While democracy as a form of governance may be the most difficult to implement initially, it is the most viable in the longer-term. Simply put, Western interventions that do not place at least some emphasis on democratisation are not likely to find collaborative partners willing to wear the ‘collaborator’ label in a post-imperial era.

6.5: The ramifications of the collaboration problematique

*... Washington cannot simply avoid or wish away dealing with local elites, for ultimately their actions, not those of the United States, will strengthen or undermine institutions.*⁷⁷

The challenges defining the collaboration problematique have profound ramifications for the effectiveness of state building interventions. The general lack of suitable collaborative partners in frontier states, namely the pericentric dynamic which provokes interventionism, is inherently the most problematic. Undertaking interventionism with few selection possibilities and stymied flexibility means that interventionists are often stuck with nascent governments that all too frequently bear strong connections to the armed groups involved in the respective civil wars, have little interest in strong national

governments, and/or lack the basic competence for the most rudimentary forms of sovereign governance.

The second major ramification of the collaboration problematique concerns the effects of lacking it as a strategic doctrine, specifically that this prevents Western states from developing appropriate tools and mechanisms for undertaking collaboration. Firstly, a lack of collaborative agents from the interventionists' side makes establishing effective collaborative relationships more difficult. Even when indigenous partners can be found, without competent interventionist agents to collaborate with, they are doubtlessly poorly utilised. The West is simply short of the numbers of collaborative agents required to implement effective interventionism. Niall Ferguson has long argued this, noting that presently not enough Americans, for instance, are "out there" to make current state building interventionism successful.⁷⁸ Furthermore, even in sheer numbers of administrators, the UN is also very short of staff. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), by example, only has a headquarters staff of several hundred to oversee peacekeeping forces numbering over a hundred thousand troops.

The general 'suitability' of Western collaborative agents is also lacking in that there is a major challenge to recruit persons with the right skill sets, namely the linguistic competencies and political awareness appropriate to functioning in distant frontier states undergoing interventions. Without the requisite skills, the West's collaborative agents are fundamentally lacking in their ability to engage effectively with indigenous politics. Jeffrey Garten was emphatic on this point of US inadequacy, arguing:

We don't have enough economists with hands-on experience in managing failed financial systems; we don't have enough lawyers to support judicial systems; we don't have experts for police work; we lack experience in general civil administration... and we certainly don't have the leaders who can oversee all these areas.⁷⁹

The suitability of the UN's collaborative agents is also often in doubt even though it has the luxury of recruiting staff from anywhere in the world but still manages to have staff with superficial understandings of local cultures.⁸⁰ A common critique is that the limited coherence and local knowledge of UN missions is compounded by a quick rate of staff turnover, usually with individuals serving less than six months in a specific post. This is also harmed further since UN staff tend to "operate in a closed circle often far removed from the ground reality" of indigenous politics.⁸¹

Moreover, the suitability of using Western militaries as the primary actors of effecting change through interventionism is dubious, especially over the long-term. This point has been made most forcefully by Dana Priest who argued the US was “turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic.”⁸² The Department of Defense has conceded as much when it noted that “the challenges of achieving unity of effort” required for success during interventions are problematic since it has “tended to become the default responder.”⁸³ While militaries are essential to responding to the pericentric pull, especially initially, their prioritisation as lead agents is often negative for collaboration as they overshadow efforts to effect the political changes necessary for longer-term stability.

A further ramification of the lack of a doctrine of collaboration is a general tendency by interventionists to simplify local frontier circumstances. Anthony Zinni argued that amongst Western leadership there is a “lack of understanding of the complexities, the fine points, the subtleties of conditions on the ground.”⁸⁴ A failure to understand in appropriate detail the nuances of indigenous politics in frontiers leads to the formulaic and *ad hoc* management of collaborative relationships because of the poor decisions it provokes. This means that there is naïve hope that local politics can somehow be circumvented and hence there is a general unwillingness to engage local politics in a sophisticated manner. Considering state building interventionism is a dynamic, interactive process of collaboration, this is a disaster for better resolving the problems of frontier states.

One of the most important aspects of collaborative relationships is that they are founded on at least some degree of trust. Rather than analyse and hence understand local cultures, interventionists often use their own Western “cultural prisms to determine how things should be done” which leads to the stereotyping and over-generalisation of local political actors.⁸⁵ Understandably, this can lead to tensions developing within collaborative relationships as indigenous actors resist being labelled through simplistic stereo-typing. Crucially, considering collaboration as evolving bargain making, ignorance means interventionist actors have to compromise more than they probably would otherwise. This is most notably because of mistakes in choosing indigenous actors with whom to collaborate based on simplified understandings, notably in the context of a frontier zone teaming with a plethora of non-state actors. As Beatrice

Pouligny argued for UN efforts at collaboration in Somalia: “[w]hen missions try to identify ‘civil society’ against a ‘failed’ state, to play NGOs, intellectuals, women, religious groups, or elders against ‘warlords’ ... their task is not necessarily easier.”⁸⁶

Attempts to simplify the task of identifying collaborative partners are likely to be counter-productive as complex indigenous actors, and notably the mediating possibilities they provide, are not clear-cut and easily simplified. By example, efforts to look within ‘civil society’ for alternatives to ‘warlords’ are often stymied because, though not outwardly obvious, those chosen as ‘civil society’ often are actually connected to warlord factions in one way or another.⁸⁷ The attempt to pigeon hole indigenous actors using simplified understandings has the other major problem in that it tends to solidify challenges of non-collaboration. For instance, targeting the warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid individually only built up his power since it presented him as the one indigenous actor with the stature to confront UN forces.

A last result of a lack of a dedicated doctrine of collaboration is that it serves to fragment the ability of interventionists to collectively bargain with indigenous politics. The divisions and rivalries of the interventionists are themselves as big an obstacle to state building progress as is the fragmented nature of indigenous actors in frontier zones. The primary cause of this is that post-Cold War interventions have generally been multilateral endeavours and interventionism becomes difficult to manage when numerous Western states are attempting to further their own political visions for a foreign state. Recalling collaboration as an endeavour to achieve common goals, that the interventionists often exhibit a confusing array of national policies covering aid provision, economic regeneration, and political reform can only but be confusing for their indigenous partners. In the Balkans, for instance, despite public impressions of a united front from the West, what instead existed was a “variety of national and nongovernmental actors trying their best- but often failing- to present a coherent message to the involved populations about what is expected of them.”⁸⁸

Even aside from an incoherence of shared goals, the fragmented structure of multilateral forces is also often counter-productive because it greatly complicates collaborative relationships. Afghanistan provides a good example of a decidedly fragmented

structure. Firstly, although the US asked Europeans for assistance for the multilateral force there, it maintains its own separate military forces outside of the ISAF remit. Namely it undertakes many missions unilaterally, notably in border regions with Pakistan, but also relies on the ISAF force of NATO contingents. Additionally, the US asks the UN to coordinate political developments while allowing individual donor countries to encourage economic recovery using their own individual aid policies. The end result is a fledgling Afghan government wondering who exactly it is partnered with politically, militarily and economically and for what intents. This has resulted in efforts by the UN to appoint a 'super-envoy' to try and consolidate the interventionist presence.

The disparate front presented by interventionist forces is compounded by disjointed chains of command, especially within the UN peacekeeping forces. While ostensibly under UN command, individual national contingents often defer orders from UN DPKO. Sex scandals involving peacekeepers in the DR Congo highlighted as much. The primary challenge for presenting a united front on what should have been a clear issue ('child molestation is bad') was that the assorted national contingents "were not ultimately answerable to the mission's force commander, the civilian head of mission, DPKO headquarters, or even to the Secretary-General."⁸⁹ This reality of UN incoherence surely caused Congolese actors to doubt the competence of UNMOC overall and hence refrain from collaborating with it.

Furthermore, the fragmented structure of multilateral forces is also resultant from the fact that some contingents are simply more capable, and willing, of undertaking necessarily assertive missions. The division of interventionist missions along lines of competence and willingness can be seen all too frequently and Lord Douglas Hurd has for this reason argued that often there lack "coalitions of the *genuinely* willing."⁹⁰ For instance, the US, UK and Canada bear the brunt of counter-insurgency fighting in Afghanistan while Australia has assumed the most forceful role in East Timor. In dire contrast, France, Germany and Italy are largely unwillingly to engage in combat. Furthermore, within the UN, there is much jockeying by national contingents to be assigned the least problematic areas, often leaving the major troop contributing countries- Pakistan, India and Bangladesh- assuming the burden of the most violence prone locales.

In addition, debates over norms complicate Western interventionists' attempts at collaboration. By example, while the US and Europe both have an interest in intervening, "they do so according to different norms."⁹¹ These norms cover a gamut of issues, but mostly centre upon the role of military force and democratisation. In terms of collaboration, the problem this raises is that there are often too many interventionist actors with their own deeply felt norms to allow for unified outcomes to be readily achieved. A general inclination towards creating a 'liberal democratic state' does not really constitute a vision specific enough to bargain consistently with indigenous partners. A good example is of placing conditions on aid in order to pressure governments because deciding what conditionalities should be applied is divisive. Aid conditionality may be effective in principle, but there are limits to how well diverse groups of interventionists can coordinate who gets what aid, thus making the ability to influence even nascent governments difficult.⁹²

Disputes over norms cause a tendency to have overly ambiguous mission mandates that have important ramifications for collaboration. As a process of bargaining, collaboration can be stymied through ambiguous mandates. For instance, the mandate of UNOSOM II in Somalia was overly broad, essentially 'helping the Somalis to rebuild a democratic state' and hence was "open to varying interpretations, resulting in disagreements over major issues", such as whether disarming the factions through force was necessary to establish a secure environment.⁹³ A further ramification of ambiguous mandates is that local political entrepreneurs become aware of the "frequent gap between the means at the missions' disposal and the ambitions expressed in the mandates" because of their ambiguity.⁹⁴ Ultimately, the ambiguities of the UN's interventionist goals allowed Somali politico-military actors to extend their own control over the Somali political space.

Even in terms of personal clarity, the agents of interventionist forces are in doubtful positions to negotiate when they have unclear understandings of a mission's mandate. Somalia again provides a good example of this. Essentially the US and the UN "stumbled into Somalia without a plan" which resulted in a humanitarian mission evolving into a "misguided attempt at *ad hoc* nation building" as US troops attempted to capture the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid.⁹⁵ The ambiguity of purpose for that mission was certainly felt by US commanders attempting to comprehend a complex

situation on the ground with little real direction from above. Additionally, UN peacekeeping staff more generally share a sentiment that “nobody, at any time during the mission, ever told me what I was supposed to do” and given that lack of what is essentially a job description, “everyone made his own little mishmash’.”⁹⁶ This resulting emphasis on personal interpretations of mission mandates leaves the interventionists at a loss because it is easier for indigenous partners to manipulate their foreign partners by simply choosing whom and whom not to work with.

The ramification that this values debate has for collaboration is profound in that it constrains the formation of collaborative partnerships. In order to overcome this predicament, the main response by Western states has been through the “depoliticisation” of state building through its “technicalisation.”⁹⁷ Policies of interventionism are simply presented as ‘routine’ technical processes devoid of politics. The present formula for managing the state building processes during interventions is a decidedly “one-size-fits-all model for democratic reconstruction”, which leads efforts in such diverse places as Afghanistan, the DR Congo and East Timor to “bear a disturbing resemblance.”⁹⁸ And while a reliance on formulaic ‘toolkits’ may be appropriate for building hospitals, nutrition centres or refugee camps, it is “absurdly over-systematised” to working through the political realities of state building in varied locales.⁹⁹

The overarching problem of such technicalisation is that it places no emphasis on local collaborative possibilities, namely establishing and strengthening appropriate collaborative partners from within indigenous politics. Formulaic responses to state building inculcate mistrust and tension within collaborative relationships because of the inflexibility it allows for. While a ‘universal approach’ may seek to temper perceptions over imperialism, it is still problematic because a formulaic response does not account for the state-society dynamics of a particular state; it simply does not allow interventionist actors to nuance their collaborative relationships appropriate to meeting specific local needs. Western collaborative agents feel compelled to implement ‘the model’ with little room for manoeuvre while indigenous collaborators resent the imposition, yet again, of a rigid, foreign formula of governance.

In general, efforts to appear 'post-imperial' by applying a formulaic, technicalised scheme of democratic state building greatly complicates collaborative relationships, because indigenous actors come to perceive foreign interventionists as insensitive and unresponsive to local dynamics. The US' efforts, by example, often display a "lack of sensitivity to a whole host of factors on the ground, including cultural differences, the relativity of 'values' and local national feeling."¹⁰⁰ A good example for this is the reality that a key reason for the failure of many state building interventions is poorly chosen interim administrations.¹⁰¹ While there have arguably been some successes involving deference to local modalities, such as the use of a 'loyal jurga' in Afghanistan, pre-mature attempts at democratisation, for instance in Haiti in 1994, have conversely led to failure in the longer-term.

Lastly, before concluding, it is important to note that the short-timeframes of current interventions are especially problematic for collaboration. As Niall Ferguson argued, the "fatal flaw" of short-term state building efforts is the "extreme difficulty of securing local support" when locals know that the departure of interventionists is imminent.¹⁰² Why would indigenous partners leave themselves open for future retribution, namely to be 'strung from the lampposts', once their interventionist partners have left? When indigenous partners struggle to build enough trust to engage interventionists effectively, the entire state building endeavour suffers because of it.

6.6: Conclusion

The New Timor: A Xanana Republic?

- A *Jakarta Post* headline on government incompetence in East Timor¹⁰³

The challenges of gradualism collaboration for managing frontiers of insecurity are profound. The contextual difficulties of frontier states, the lack of doctrines for collaboration, a shallow willingness to pay its costs, and the normative debates of interventionism all combine to result in the poor actualisation of collaboration during state building interventionism. These challenges lead to less "direct encounter" between the agents of intervening powers and those of indigenous society.¹⁰⁴ The requirement for successful collaboration is to get indigenous collaborative partners to want an intervention's state building processes to progress; to get Western energy and resources translated into greater indigenous stability. As the theory of collaboration argued, that

requires collaborative relationships that work through the state building processes in a nuanced manner. Better responding to these challenges to allow for that is therefore crucial to managing frontiers of insecurity more effectively than is presently done, a task the thesis will now turn to.

CHAPTER 7: AMELIORATING THE COLLABORATION PROBLEMATIQUE

*America has...better understood the Caribbean basin than it understands faraway nations... What reason is there to suspect that America will do better in Afghanistan than it has in Haiti?*¹

The collaboration problematique for post-Cold War interventionism can be defined as a lack of suitable indigenous partners, that collaboration is neither defined as a strategic doctrine nor is the West willing to bear the costs for it, and there are strong normative dilemmas over the imperialistic nature of current interventionism. Given these challenges, it is only possible to ameliorate the collaboration problematique; it cannot be completely overcome as it is not a mere problem to be solved. There will always be inherent difficulties for autonomous actors working together to achieve shared goals and no where will this be more true presently than for foreign interventions.

This chapter will argue for ways of ameliorating the collaboration problematique to improve the art of state building interventionism to hence allow for the better management of frontiers of insecurity. Because present interventions are fundamentally provoked by the pericentric pull and since there is little political will or capacity to intervene, it is essential that the West does a better job at collaboration with indigenous politics. There simply must be better use made of peripheral resources to resolving frontier problems, viz. to translate the energy and resources of the intervening power into terms of indigenous politics leading to a stronger state.

While this chapter will identify themes for ameliorating the collaboration problematique, it should be qualified that the purpose is not to provide an *Idiots Guide to Collaboration* based on precise 'how to' points but rather to argue, as did Robinson and Gallagher, that the choice of mode for collaboration was a purely tactical consideration shaped by circumstances and hence each frontier state must be ascertained accordingly and thenceforth the appropriate types of collaboration systems undertaken. Nonetheless, there are still cross-cutting themes for improved collaboration, what can be

called ‘collaboration enablers’, which need to be entrenched for the stronger management of frontiers of insecurity to be possible.

7.1: Manage expectations for frontiers of insecurity

Here in this unstable borderland... warfare was continuous, of low intensity, and inconclusive.²

A more realistic approach is to emphasize the uncertainties and to throw doubt on recipes, formulas and programs.³

The most important collaboration enabler is simply reaching a greater understanding of the context and dynamics that define frontiers of insecurity. This is essential to allowing the improved management of collaborative systems because it helps to moderate expectations and to appreciate the nuances of indigenous politics. The first need in this regards is to appreciate more clearly that present interventions are occurring in actual frontier zones. With the 20th Century defined by conventional wars between states, the need at the beginning of the 21st is to return to unconventional approaches that allow for more flexibility because frontiers demand nothing less.

Jeremy Greenstock put it well when he noted that the present environment for interventionism is “a progressive collapse into a mosaic of different localities and interests, where security is decentralised and government isn’t powerful enough to hold the state together.”⁴ This is what frontier zones mean for interventionist forces and why references to state building experiences in post-war Germany and Japan are so lacking, viz. they were never frontier zones, hence their post-war collaborative dynamics were entirely different. Today, collaborative relationships must be maintained with a diverse group of indigenous actors in the confusing environment of a frontier zone.

The second key frontier context is to appreciate that there are no great collaborative partners; that is why there is a pericentric pull. If there were suitable partners already there, there would be no need for an intervention. Considering that, interventionists must appreciate that whoever they partner with will be an inherently difficult, often

morally ambivalent undertaking. Given that, there are requirements for dampening expectations for obvious or particularly solid partners to emerge and be easily engaged.

Furthermore is to emphasise that the response of state building interventionism is fundamentally provoked by security rationales. The pericentric pull of frontiers is not inherently related to a 'democracy gap' or even humanitarian needs. Humanitarianism may have "greater political salience" in the post-Cold War era, but fundamentally it is not enough to compel action if there are not clear strategic considerations involved.⁵ Simply put, current interventions are a response to a pericentric pull, not some kind of metro-centric driven 'do-goodism'. They are endeavours to engender greater stability in frontier states so that Western states can mitigate their own security concerns.

There are two reasons for being clear about the security imperatives provoking interventionism. Firstly, for the West this is necessary to keep a clear focus on state building, endeavouring to expand the more effective control over frontier territories by national governments. Ostensible emphasis on the primacy of humanitarianism can serve as both an excuse for real political problem solving and a distraction more broadly. For instance, the crises of West Africa, and especially Sierra Leone, in the 1990s saw emergency aid provision prioritised rather than taking the harder steps of effective diplomatic negotiations to resolve the deeper socio-political issues rather than immediate humanitarian crises.⁶ The international community was simply more interested to dump in aid rather than engage indigenous politics to come up with real solutions for the crises.

Secondly, in terms of forming good collaborative dynamics, it is important to be clear and honest with indigenous partners in order to build trust. They should be told straightforward that state building is not "simple charity" but rather a "smart investment" in the West's own security.⁷ If the West is unable to provide clear, honest justifications for the actions it undertakes, but gives platitudes to its own ostensible altruism, it is only reasonable that indigenous actors view interventionists with scepticism. Odes to humanitarianism and democracy will simply be perceived as shallow and hence the collaborative relationships weakened.

The third contextual need of frontiers is to perceive that state building interventions are about 'managing insecurity' and not about 'creating order', which would require a different response than state building interventionism. While the US, for example, declares that it wants to "achieve decisive, enduring results"⁸, this is not particularly feasible in frontiers using shallow imperialistic interventions. As has been argued consistently in this thesis, considering the nature of insecurity faced in the present era of globalisation, there are no outright solutions, only risk management strategies. This means the West can only but manage insecurity. Interventions are undertaken to mitigate insecurity because creating stronger national governments more capable of managing their sovereign territory is the best option for doing so. Even then, the goal, which Anthony Zinni rightly argued for, is a "condition of instability that is manageable" rather than to think that such shallow foreign engagement can affect deeper changes.⁹

Instead of clear-cut outcomes of profoundly 'new and improved' states, expectations should be that some security concerns are mitigated- such as threats of terrorism, drugs trafficking or mass migration- and the costs of doing so do not require re-establishing a formal empire. Thomas Friedman noted as much for the US' efforts in Afghanistan, "We didn't have to make it Switzerland, just a little better, a little freer, and a little more stable than it was under the Taliban."¹⁰ London's *The Times* also argued that realistic expectations must be maintained for Afghanistan, for instance, by noting that "progress cannot be measured here by the erection of skyscrapers" and instead more basic indicators, such as basic education provision and improved physical security, must be chosen.¹¹ In this way, it is most important to achieve progress towards empowering more capable indigenous partners rather than to believe in any sort of single, decisive 'victory'.

Overall, considering these three aspects of contextualisation, there must be more realistic expectations of what is possible in frontier zones in terms of state building interventionism. For those undertaking interventions, the first question they must answer for themselves is where they are; namely in frontiers. Secondly, they must ask themselves why they are there; to try to better manage insecurity. Thirdly, they must ask themselves what is the best way to do that; namely by finding and strengthening

collaborative partners to better manage their own affairs in the form of more effective national governments. State building interventionism must be conceptualised as a long-term, dynamic process of collaboration with indigenous politics fundamentally about empowering indigenous collaborative partners.

7.2: Make collaboration a strategic doctrine

The actions in 2001 in Afghanistan reinforced the principles of adaptability, speed of action, integrated joint operations, economy of force, and the value of working with and through indigenous forces to achieve common goals.

- US Department of Defense, 'Quadrennial Defense Review, 2006'¹²

If it is accepted that collaboration is central to state building interventionism, then it must be treated as strategic doctrine, the second collaboration enabler. Doing so would allow for improved 'collaborative know-how' enabling the West to be more effective at identifying partners, building trust, managing evolving relationships, engaging in conflict resolution, effecting logistics and resources transfers, and negotiating agreements. This responds to the reality that present conventions of Western warfare are outdated for responding to the realities of frontier zones.

A new approach for interventionism would be one of 'collaboration in frontiers' and shift away from an understanding of conventional warfare defined by the 20th Century with its over-emphasis on the detachment of technology. This thesis does not have the luxury of outlining precisely what a doctrine of collaboration would be other than that it would follow the general parameters of the 'theory of collaboration' outlined in Chapter 4.¹³ It would also not be a simple military doctrine, such as 'counter-insurgency' doctrines, but rather one broader in scope, notably guiding the civilian control of the overall process of collaboration and hence a strong emphasis on the political outcomes necessary for achieving progress. Assuming a coherent doctrine of collaboration could be formulated, there would need to be a number of general actions taken to see it implemented effectively.

Emphasise 'collaboration' in strategic planning

It is their war, and you're to help them, not win it for them. Armies of liberation have half lives. Money is ammunition. Intelligence is the key. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier. Success depends on local leaders.
- US General David Petraeus¹⁴

The theory of collaboration is about avoiding formulaic responses to frontiers of insecurity. It is about defining the entire 'mission' around the specific opportunities and challenges that collaboration with a respective frontier state's indigenous politics provides. While no specific 'collaborative doctrine' has been outlined, there is some growing consensus within the US military, by example, that collaboration is crucial. The US Chief of Staff, General Pace, argued there is a need for the US military to "maximize our military power through closer coordination" with local partners and that "building partnership capacity invigorates our efforts."¹⁵ This follows the general sentiments of the Pentagon now towards 'indirect action' and recognising 'the value of working with and through indigenous forces to achieve common goals'. However, even with growing interest from senior military figures, more than anything else, collaboration must be incorporated into strategic planning in detail rather than limited to smooth sound-bytes in speeches or Defence Papers.¹⁶

Furthermore, given the context of frontiers of insecurity, achieving improved collaboration requires allowing for more flexibility in implementing collaborative systems. Firstly, a requisite avenue for achieving more flexibility is to be less formulaic in approaching the state building activities undertaken during interventions, notably those of the UN. This means precluding a 'one-size-fits-all' model and allowing indigenous political dynamics more influence over institution building such as constitutional design, bureaucratic layout, and the distribution of power.¹⁷

Secondly, one of the key needs is for Western militaries to have the flexibility to perform in the fluid, chaotic environments that define modern frontier zones. Within the UK there is acknowledgement of the need for more flexibility from the Ministry of Defence. The MoD has argued that it needs the "ability to rapidly reconfigure forces in theatre as the conflict develops from heavy war-fighting to enduring peace support and

post-conflict reconstruction.”¹⁸ For its part, the US military has noted its need to have “greater flexibility... [in its] ability to partner directly with nations... to allow them to participate... in stability, security, transition and reconstruction operations.”¹⁹ A major challenge for the Pentagon yet to be overcome have been layers of unwieldy Congressional legal oversight, left over from the Cold War, regarding who could be partnered with and how. Ultimately, more flexibility in being able to work with local indigenous actors would allow the Pentagon to improve “building partnership capacity and strengthening alliances” because it would have greater “freedom of action.”²⁰

Thirdly, there is a need to have more moderation in introducing Western value systems. This is because the West’s insistence on the ‘universality’ of the norms and values it wishes to see entrenched through interventionism often provokes the most tension within collaborative relationships. As Robert Cooper rightly contended, it is “easier to find common ground through a discussion of interests than if an attempt was made to negotiate values.”²¹ In this sense, identifying the common goals that guide collaborative endeavours can best be kept to the common interest of seeking a stronger government better able to effectively manage its territory without immediately needing to be the perfect democracy demanded by a Western parliamentarian or able to avoid all criticism from New York’s Human Rights Watch.

The context of frontiers does not allow for an easy reconciliation of the absolutes of Western human rights and democratic norms with local realities. This is notably because the West simply cannot always collaborate with ideal types; there are no saints in places that have often experienced decades of war. The sheer practicalities of collaboration mean that interventionists have to take their partners as they find them and accept them as they are, at least initially. The US’ partnering in Afghanistan with assorted warlords was a good example of this. For instance, while General Dostum had a notoriously bad history (interestingly of collaboration with the Soviets), he still proved to be a useful partner for a crucial period and was subsequently marginalised, and rightly so, in the longer-term through the national political process.

What is more, as Michael Cox noted of the British Empire, “it had to make deals here and compromises there in order not to provoke... ‘blowback’.”²² The same is decidedly true of present interventions as well since their lighter imperialistic nature means that the ability of the interventionists to impose outcomes is limited and consequently they must bargain with their collaborative partners to see changes implemented without provoking outright resistance. Returning to the British comparison, Bernard Porter argued that many a British colonial officer shared a wide disregard for what was “widely stigmatised as ‘enthusiasm’- burning faith, simpleminded conviction, the ‘crusading impulse’.”²³ In its stead was a more pragmatic worldliness. Presently, this can be seen, for instance, in Special Forces troops who argue, “You’ve got to compromise and go a little native” in order to function effectively in frontier zones such as Afghanistan.²⁴

On the whole, considering the response to frontiers of insecurity is primarily for a security rationale, there is a need to moderate the imposition of Western values for the sake of pragmatic prioritisation. To do otherwise is dangerously misguided. Samuel Huntington argued a “Western belief in the universality of Western culture... is false, it is immoral, and it is dangerous... Imperialism is the necessary logical consequence of universalism.”²⁵ Present interventions are merely imperialistic and should stay that way precisely because they are limited endeavours focused on state building in frontiers, not the global imposition of an absolutist moral and political order for its own sake.

Indeed, approaching these norms with messianic zeal can be counter-productive to the security rationales of an intervention. For instance, regarding human rights norms, there is simply no possibility of approaching their implementation in a frontier in the same manner as one would in the West itself. This again responds to the reality of the frontier context. David Rieff noted as much when he maintained that it was grossly naïve to believe human rights norms could be implemented in the midst of state building processes: “so Eurocentric is the... human rights perspective that it is somehow imagined that these agonizing processes can take place without violence, thanks to the worldwide diffusion of human rights norms.”²⁶ When the West’s own processes of state building provoked some of the most extreme violence in human history, it is recklessly

detached to think that elsewhere such outcomes can be altogether avoided through Westerners crassly dictating their own ideas. Even as renowned a human rights advocate as Bernard Kouchner reached the same conclusion when heading the UN mission in Kosovo, noting it would be “a mistake to implement norms too quickly” in the Kosovo of 1999.²⁷

This is not to say that democracy and human rights norms should be entirely forsaken; rather that they should be approached in a more subtle, nuanced manner that is defined by pragmatism and local realities. These norms are part of the Western identity and they cannot be entirely separated from the ethos of an intervening force. They can be moderated though and nuanced in such a way that allows for their gradual, locally qualified implementation. This moderation should be guided by sheer pragmatism. This is for the primary reason that, as mentioned previously, it is hard to imagine collaborative relationships being formed with ‘post-imperial’ indigenous partners without some ode to democracy made. In any case, the West values democracy and it cannot deviate too far from that belief when ascribing improved governance over frontier states. Perhaps it would be ‘easier’ if it didn’t, but that is somewhat of a mute point.

A practical examination of local circumstances can allow for the implementation of democratic norms, but adjusted as needed to still be conducive to stability, such as by allowing for a lengthy transitional period and traditional leadership to participate. For example, the UN in Afghanistan chose not to have quick national elections and instead opted for a transitional period, with traditional leadership ensuring representation for the country’s competing groups through a ‘loyal jurga’ council.²⁸ In some locales, provincial elections preceding national elections allows for “new local leaders to emerge and gain experience and for political parties to build a support base.”²⁹ This helps prevent dominant armed groups from simply morphing into coercive political parties at the national level, allowing for more suitable collaborative relationships to be formed. However, when good fortune presents moderate leaders with broad public support, then rapid elections can be undertaken and foreign forces withdrawn quickly, such as successfully occurred in Panama.³⁰ These decisions of sequencing and

timeframes must be based on local conditions, not strictly the West's own moral imperatives.

On the whole, Western interventionists should dictate less liberal, idealist propaganda and maintain more official pragmatism. This means appreciating the sentiment of many indigenous people who are naturally “suspicious when military powers claim to be doing favours... by occupying weaker states.”³¹ There is simply no need for the messianic rhetoric. It is fair enough to admit to undertaking ‘imperialistic’ interventions since one cannot send an army into another state and think otherwise. Given that, it is better to adhere to proclaiming the security rationales with only a subtle undertone of democratisation and human rights norms. This is also helpful for convincing Western domestic audiences of the correctness of an intervention as well. For instance, the US public, and notably the European publics, are more supportive of the Afghanistan intervention as it was advocated for on security grounds whereas the Iraq invasion has been profoundly unpopular, notably as it was promoted as ‘expanding freedom’ and a democratic Middle East.

Furthermore, pragmatic and deferential approaches to human rights and democratic norms are also likely to be more productive towards reaching them anyway, notably in the collaborative context of frontiers. As Robert Kaplan rightly argued, military men in developing states are “more likely to listen to American officers who briefed them about human rights as a tool of counterinsurgency than to civilians who talked abstractly about universal principles of justice.”³² Allowing for the ‘shifting greys’ of democratic implementation is also likely to eventually bear results for liberalism more generally. If a fledgling government with ‘limited democracy’ “steadily expands those freedoms, it should not be branded a dictatorship.”³³ This is notably so for the pragmatism required to better manage collaborative systems in frontiers.

Improved ‘collaborative system managers’

*The Special Forces troops then set out to do what they are trained so well to do: they squatted down on rugs, ate goat with agas, and got friendly. This put us through the door; greater cooperation followed.*³⁴

One of the major requirements for implementing a doctrine of collaboration would be to have ‘collaborative system managers’, namely interventionist managers with the collaborative know-how necessary for achieving more from collaborative systems.³⁵ Within the UN system, there have been some exceptional individuals who are ideal types for the art of collaboration in frontiers. Lakhdar Brahimi and Sergio Viera de Mello were widely considered as exemplary interventionist managers while for the US, the former ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, should be regarded as such. As *The Economist* noted of Khalilzad, “If you are going to invade and occupy a couple of failed Muslim states that have weird and impenetrable politics, it helps to have a Khalilzad or two on your team.”³⁶ The challenge for present attempts at interventionism is that there are so few managers that are notably effective at guiding collaborative efforts. Given that, if the West is going to continue with its state building interventionism, it simply must have more of such people in the field.

A first step to achieving this would be to define appropriate collaborative skill sets. This thesis is too limited to go into the details of such a skills set but in sum, it would need to be cross-disciplinary and emphasise dynamism and exceptional cultural and political awareness. The US military has perhaps gone furthest to defining such a skill set when it called for ‘stability operations skills’ being developed, including “foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations.”³⁷ Perhaps the most definitive feature of collaborative skill sets would be their diversity. This responds to the simple reality that managing interventions in frontiers is a complex endeavour. For this reason, Anthony Zinni said “renaissance men and women” are needed, competent in political science, economics, and even anthropology and sociology.³⁸ Given the West’s own immigrant communities, it would be beneficial that first and second generation citizens with deep understandings of their countries of origin, such as Khalilzad, be at the forefront of collaborative efforts since they would be in the best position to appreciate the political subtleties of each state.

Special emphasis for a collaborative skills set should also be placed on the ability of collaborative system managers to understand frontier zones. Western interventionists must accept that more learning has to be done. As Yahya Sadowski argued, “Learning

to recognise, acknowledge, and deal with complexity may be the hallmark of successful diplomacy in the coming years.”³⁹ This is certainly true for interventionist actors engaged in collaboration in complex and seemingly impenetrable frontier zones. The need for more knowledge is required because the reality of frontiers is uncompromising in its complexity such that many local conflicts are driven by Freud’s ‘narcissism of small differences’, an apparent obsession with tiny distinctions that are almost invisible to outsiders.⁴⁰

Overall, any collaborative skill sets would require an emphasis on the ‘micro-sociology’ of frontiers because it would help interventionists to distinguish assorted indigenous actors, their relations to one another, and discern their aims.⁴¹ Another related requirement is an awareness of the subtleties of suasion and coercion required for collaboration in frontiers. The key attribute of Roman statesmen was that they did “not threaten or menace” but rather “made requests and promises and followed through on both”, while the British imperialists also “made an art of imperial understatement.”⁴² This contrasts decidedly with a current proclivity for many Western interventionists being overly brusque, especially regarding ‘universal’ human rights and democracy norms.

Amongst Western militaries, the US military’s effort to improve its collaborative managers is the most advanced. The Pentagon has argued that it requires personnel with certain abilities:

... comfortable working in remote regions of the world, dealing with local and tribal communities, adapting to foreign languages and cultures and working with local networks to further US and partner interests through personal engagement, persuasion and quiet influence- rather than through military force alone.⁴³

As a starting point, the Pentagon has started training programmes to “improve the ability of the Armed Forces to work more effectively with international partners” through greater language competence and cultural awareness.⁴⁴ In practical terms, the US military has decided to increase its Special Operations Forces and has also created the post of Foreign Area Officers who provide field commanders with “political-military analysis, critical language skills and cultural adeptness.”⁴⁵

7.3: Collaboration needs stronger management

We're spending a billion dollars, and these people are a bunch of crooks who are stealing the country blind. We have a responsibility to be pushy.
- UN official on Congolese politicians⁴⁶

The third collaboration enabler is the stronger management of collaborative relationships. While a doctrine of collaboration would allow for improved collaborative know-how, its implementation will require stronger management through a willingness to apply this know-how.

More politicking, less military force

The Political Officers who accompanied the force... parleyed all the time with the chiefs, the priests and other local notables. These political officers were very unpopular with army officers... It was alleged they always patched things up... doing everything you possibly can before you shoot.
- Winston Churchill⁴⁷

The major emphasis required for stronger management needs to be on the political wrangling that defines the bargaining processes of collaboration and concomitantly a shift from military-driven efforts. This is necessary because military means eventually reach a “point of diminishing returns” whereby the security presence allowed for does not translate further into political stability without hard negotiations.⁴⁸ Indeed, in the context of present interventions, war should be seen as a subsidiary of state building. Essentially, any instrumental violence is used towards helping another society to recreate itself in the form of a stronger state providing a more physically secure environment. There may be an initiating phase of outright war, or there may be ongoing counter-insurgency campaigns, but fundamentally interventions are not ‘wars’ in the general sense. State building interventions are inherently political by nature and collaboration is a dynamic, interactive process and notably political in substance. Military force is necessary at times, notably in the frontier context, but it is not a substitute for thoughtful political wrangling between collaborative partners over the longer-term.

Placing an emphasis on more politicking and less military force would allow for a doctrine of collaboration to be truly implemented. As Lord Carnes argued, for example of the US, its strategic focus during interventions in frontier states “should be on their politics... the US relationship with the supported government must be considered the centre of gravity.”⁴⁹ Instead of military means, more effective political interaction through improved collaboration should be emphasised and a collaboration doctrine would focus on building broader political support for the external set of collaboration by creating ‘stakeholders’ among the general population.⁵⁰ For instance, Princeton Lyman argued of US interventionist efforts that “if it is to gain local support... [the US] must adopt a less heavy-handed approach” and this would be through a “stronger diplomatic and intelligence presence on the ground.”⁵¹

Considering that collaborative systems are fundamentally political agreements between interventionists and their indigenous collaborative partners, this requires that interventionists be politically tough and demanding of collaborative elites. As Jeffrey Herbst argued, state building does not emerge from eloquent political rhetoric but rather results from the “brutal political calculations about how it is possible to extend power within individual states.”⁵² The challenge of making politically tough demands is primarily because of interventionists’ hesitance to be deemed imperialists. This is a central part of the collaboration problematique and needs to be countered. While indigenous actors are expert at pressuring interventionists over the rights of sovereignty, there is an imperative to be more demanding of collaborative elites “no matter how neo-colonial it sound[s].”⁵³ The obligations of interventionists are firstly to meeting their own security needs but also to the local population at large rather than just the collaborating elites.

Inculcate indigenous collaboration

*... it is vital for the United States to position itself as an ally, not a conqueror or occupier, and to ensure that indigenous leaders take ownership of the new order.*⁵⁴

The second essential aspect of stronger management would be to inculcate indigenous collaborative partners. The most challenging aspect of the collaboration problematique

is simply finding collaborative partners. When they are found, they are most often directly unsuited for the task at hand, i.e. effective state building, which means they must be consistently supported as they increase their capacity, viz. through gradualism collaboration. An important consideration in this regard is that continuity and decentralisation are crucial for the interventionists' efforts at strengthening their collaborative partners.⁵⁵

Continuity is fairly self-explanatory in that erratic, short-term interventionist partners are harder for indigenous actors to collaborate with. This is a pressing concern when UN mission staff and the diplomatic corps are quickly rotated in their posts, notably in the 'hardship' duty-stations of frontier states. In response to this need, the Pentagon, for example, is now working to allow its Special Operations forces longer-term missions, which "will emphasize building personal relationships with foreign military and security forces and other indigenous assets to achieve common objectives."⁵⁶ On the whole, it is necessary that more continuity is provided by interventionists in their collaborative relationships.

'Decentralisation' does not mean that a government be federalist, rather that interventionist actors must place a priority emphasis as required on inculcating collaboration at a local level rather than merely through a central government. While the effort of state building interventions is overall focused on engendering a stronger national government, it should generally be done in a manner that allows for collaborative interaction at the local level. This is because it lets interventionists achieve a broader interface between the external and internal collaborative sets and hence encourages local participation in broader national changes. Given that state building processes are "easy hostages to insincere parties"⁵⁷, such as warlords or rebel movements, the major rationale for a broadened interface is to hedge against the manipulation of peace processes and elections by a few national elites. Rather than limit interaction to national leaders in the capital, collaborative approaches that seek to engage with general publics as much as possible are more likely to succeed.

At times, the most suitable approach may mean that strengthening local government should be prioritised ahead of the central government. A relevant theme of Samuel Huntington's is that state capacity must correlate with broader political changes.⁵⁸ If there is a weak central government with little ability to provide social services, notably personal security, it would be better to emphasise local politics first and build up local government capacities, which is often easier done in the fractious, chaotic nature of a frontier zone. Local people need to see results in their neighbourhoods, not just hear about changes in a distant capital.

Broadening the interface of the external and internal collaborative sets is crucial to enhancing overall public support for an intervention conducive to its success. The most important aspect for achieving broadened consent is to improve personal security. James Dobbins explained this succinctly: "If the population feels its security enhanced by the intervening presence, it will be inclined to collaborate."⁵⁹ A secure environment, while not enough in itself, is then conducive to political and socio-economic progress being made and can be built upon to strengthen public support for an intervention's goals. For example, NATO has sought to present itself as a 'service provider' in locales such as Afghanistan where it undertakes programming, such as rebuilding schools and providing medical clinics, to directly help the civilian population. In contrast, those who want to undermine an intervention will firstly target a general population's security in order to create resentment against the interventionists and their indigenous collaborative partners. Given these concerns, promoting secure local environments allowing for individuals to function as normally as possible should be a priority.

There is an overarching need to actively strengthen indigenous actors' technical competence for governance. One good way to do this is through educational outreach programmes. The US government has the best experience with this, notably through its military and civilian exchange programmes, and provides an example worth emulating by other Western states. As the Pentagon argued, indigenous actors- military and political leaders- who receive a US education "understand US values and interests, fostering willingness to unite in a common cause."⁶⁰ In this way, the Pentagon utilises programmes such as the International Military Education and Training and the Counter Terrorism Fellowship programmes to target "shaping relationships and developing

future foreign leaders.”⁶¹ Furthermore, education exchange programmes are also useful at developing links should weakened states falter in the future. By example of the Philippines, one commentator noted US Special Forces are currently “developing a cadre of Westernized officers and useful contacts... who could be influential even in the event that the state broke up.”⁶²

A last requirement for inculcating indigenous collaborative partners is that the interventionists themselves must allow for more empowerment at the local level. Managing frontiers is inherently easier with a ‘man on the spot’.⁶³ In an era of instant communication, there is a proclivity by Western politicians for micro-managing from afar the current batch of men on the spot- UN Special Representatives, ambassadors, and military commanders. The biggest problem with this tendency is that Western political leadership often has a decidedly poor understanding of local circumstances, for example American congressmen who do not know a Sunni from a Shiite or a Pashtun from an Uzbek. Washington and London politicians and any other detached concentration of ‘backseat collaborative managers’ should not impose themselves on interventionist management. The freedom to detach from rigid national policies and manage through specific area expertise is crucial for improved collaboration. Maintaining strong collaborative relationships requires “constant political influence and interference” and hence men on the spot must often “interfere for reasons that have little connection with the official policy” of an intervening power.⁶⁴ This is because of the pure pragmatism that frontier circumstances dictate.

Achieve ‘unity of effort’ for collaborative advantage

The third major theme for the stronger management of collaborative systems would be to achieve greater ‘unity of effort’. Recalling collaboration as a dynamic, interactive process of autonomous actors working together towards achieving common goals, it is inherently critical that unity of effort be achieved in order for the endeavour to be worthwhile. If collaborative partners cannot work together effectively, there is simply no point in engaging in collaboration. While it is most helpful to have total unity of effort between interventionists and their indigenous partners, it is very difficult to achieve even amongst the interventionists themselves.

Considering these challenges of coordination, a starting point for interventionist actors would be to truly achieve more unity of effort amongst themselves. For interventionists, the challenges for coordinated collaboration are notably so for multilateral efforts, such as the NATO presence in Afghanistan or the Balkans. Managing collaborative relationships is difficult when each Western state has different opinions on and interests sought from indigenous partners. Even within individual governments, however, coordinating collaboration is problematical. The Pentagon cites gaps in collaboration between its military Combatant Commanders and diplomatic Chiefs of Mission and has called for creating mechanisms to allow them “to work more collaboratively.”⁶⁵ In calling for more unity of effort, the Pentagon, by example, has correctly emphasised the need for “unified statecraft”, the ability “to bring to bear all elements of national power at home and to work in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad... toward common objectives and building the capacity of partners.”⁶⁶

In addition, key needs for improved collaborative efforts in the field are integrated civilian and military efforts. Perhaps the best solution for this would be to have dedicated civilian agencies leading interventions. Academics and policy pundits have often called for such dedicated agencies, be they a “post-intervention agency”⁶⁷ or an “Inter-agency Field Force.”⁶⁸ The US State Department now has a ‘Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability’ and there is currently a proposal for a larger ‘Civilian Reserve Corps’ as well as a ‘Conflict Response Fund’ to finance operations.⁶⁹ Needless to say, this thesis supports such efforts at acquiring dedicated capabilities but qualifies that by noting that while there is much talk, there has been little substantive action to date on the ground.

Additionally, one of the intervention types worthy of future emulation is that of ‘leading states’ because it allows interventionists a more united front for collaboration with indigenous politics. The Australian-led effort in East Timor in 1999 was a good example whereby the overall coherence of a mission was consistently maintained. Most crucially for collaboration, Australia’s decisive leadership was able “to send a clear and coherent message to the local population, one that integrated its various components.”⁷⁰ US leadership in Kosovo also provides another example of a leading state being able to ensure greater internal collaboration amongst interventionists. With consistent

leadership, the ability of the mission to bargain with the fairly unified indigenous actors involved in Kosovo- be they the Serbian government or the Kosovo Liberation Army and its successor political party- was greatly strengthened. Overall, interventionists must collaborate amongst themselves firstly if an intervention is to be successful.

Achieving unity of effort within the interventionists' approach to collaboration would then allow for improved interaction between foreign and indigenous actors, the more important relationships. The best way to achieving greater unity of effort, and hence more collaborative advantage, would be to maintain clear shared goals with indigenous partners. For instance, Lord Paddy Ashdown noted of his experiences leading the UN in Bosnia-Herzegovina that in order to improve current interventions there is a need to have a "political destination" guiding the overall effort.⁷¹ Ashdown placed his emphasis on that destination being defined by local conditions and interests, for instance in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was to become part of 'Europe', i.e. future European Union membership. Defining a political destination gives collaborative relationships the coherence needed to better maintain trust as well as bargain towards a shared end goal. While this emphasis on political outcomes is ideal, at times- such as in the early stages of an intervention in notably violent frontiers- it may be pertinent to define common goals in terms of improved security at the local level. Recalling interventionism as a contest of ungoverned space, seeking common security interests are crucial to collaboration, notably when tactical collaboration is required. Examples of this were US military efforts with Afghan warlords and between local armed groups and UN peacekeepers in the chaotic eastern regions of the DR Congo.

Improved scaling of institutionalisation

*The most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of government but their degree of government.*⁷²

Assuming that more unity of effort can be achieved, a crucial requirement for the stronger management of collaborative systems would be the better scaling of state building processes. The most important aspect of this would be to focus on the theory of collaboration's emphasis on an evolving equilibrium of capacities, namely ensuring indigenous partners' capacity to govern evolves in tandem with that capacity provided

by the interventionists. Ideally, as Marcus Fielding contended, “as the public governance sector strengthens and the indigenous government develops its capacity to govern, its mandate progressively expands” to cover the security and other roles previously assumed directly by interventionists.⁷³

Interventionists must also be careful to decide which institutions should be prioritised for strengthening and the real possibilities for doing so, although security organs will need to be strengthened near universally. When the purpose of state building interventions is the gradual empowerment of indigenous partners in governance to the point where foreign support can be withdrawn, the institutionalisation of bureaucracies simply must be done better. In reality rather than theory, this is difficult to achieve. There is already much emphasis on institutionalisation during interventionism and the UN, for instance, notes that “the core task... is to build effective public institutions.”⁷⁴ However, the overarching problem is that interventionists often undermine it through several mistakes of collaboration.

The first is to ‘hollow out’ nascent governments through the parallel provision of social services through international humanitarian actors rather than through their collaborative partners in government. Driven by a humanitarian ethos of neutrality, international agencies often “create havoc if they insist on operating independently” of a national government.⁷⁵ The outright circumvention of collaborative partners in nascent governments is hence a major challenge. With a goal of expanding government control over sovereign space, interventionists who bring in yet more foreign actors to assume parallel roles are misguided. The challenge this poses over the longer-term of institutionalisation is that the humanitarians’ emphasis on relatively small, localised projects means implementing larger national projects- such as bureaucratic capacity building or improving infrastructure- is hindered.

Rather than import foreign capacity in the form of Western aid agencies, a better option would be to ‘embed’ it directly into a developing government, notably for the longer-term. The Prime Minister of East Timor, Jose Ramos-Horta, noted that he and his government were very “conscious that our public administration, our Treasury, and

other branches of government are very weak.”⁷⁶ Given that, the UN mission in East Timor has since been active embedding technical capacity into the Dili government, notably into the judicial system and the national police force, and many judges and the police commander are actually UN staff. Another positive example is the US effort in Afghanistan whereby ‘Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams’ of American officers are embedded within the Afghan National Army. As government competence improves, these embedded interventionists are in tandem removed.

Secondly, a further necessity of scaling institutionalisation better is to force indigenous partners to assume responsibility as soon as possible but in a manner appropriate to actual capacities. This has been achieved inconsistently. For instance, some academics have argued that the UN took an overly paternalistic approach to the Bosnians, and this “overweening foreign presence has stunted the country’s political development.”⁷⁷ In contrast, despite a strong initial presence in East Timor, the first UN mission there was recalled prematurely, leaving the government with little capacity to effectively govern. Eventually, following national rioting, a second UN mission had to be formed and peacekeepers redeployed in strength. Achieving the correct oscillation is difficult and analysing it in detail is beyond the scope of this thesis suffice to say that it must be improved as an art based upon the collaborative possibilities of each frontier state.

Countering non-collaboration

Damn the Americans! Why don't they tyrannize us more?

- Manuel Quezon, Filipino rebel and also its first president⁷⁸

A further major requirement for the stronger management of collaborative systems is to effectively counter non-collaboration through co-opting local actors into collaboration as well as by raising the costs of dissent. Co-option is a crucial strategy in the frontier context for two reasons. Firstly, the definitive challenge of frontier states is the difficulty of finding local partners at all and subsequently it is sometimes necessary to co-opt any local actor into collaboration rather than allow them to coalesce into resistance against an intervention.

For instance, the US military has received much criticism of its approach of using local warlords and militias in Afghanistan. While this can indeed pose problems of undermining a nascent central government, as detailed in the previous chapter, it also highlights a pragmatic need in certain circumstances to prioritise local security provision. A US Special Forces soldier in Afghanistan commented that while strengthening the Afghan National Army is ultimately “the only way a real Afghan state will come about”, it is also “naïve to think you can simply disband the militias” in the meantime.⁷⁹ They are simply too valuable a partner at the local level for the immediate-term and efforts to disband them prematurely would more likely drive them into outright insurgency than leave them pacified.

Secondly, in an era of interventionism defined by gradualism collaboration, notably when there are profound hesitations to using force, the ability of interventionists to effectively co-opt indigenous actors into collaboration becomes a pragmatic approach. In the context of frontiers where it is hard to apply force in any case against agile and disparate non-state actors engaged in resistance, non-violent approaches need to be considered. Before any co-option can be undertaken, however, moral debates over the suitability of some potential partners must be tampered because of the pragmatic need for ensuring greater stability. By example, NATO’s experience in the Balkans showed temporarily moderating criticism of potential partners can be an effective strategy. NATO would have simply been unable to stabilise the situation there without the cooperation of presidents Slobodan Milosevic from Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, the two men arguably most responsible for the region’s wars.⁸⁰ Through short-term tactical collaboration they served a purpose for the interventionists and were then discarded as partners.

There are several possible approaches for co-opting dangerous local actors, especially warlords and militias, into collaboration. The first is to co-opt them using foreign aid to essentially buy them off.⁸¹ Some local leaders can be enticed into government through direct aid provision while others can be pressured into collaboration by providing aid to their home communities who then supply internal pressure for more collaborative engagement. Other dangerous actors can also be enticed into government by the provision of senior government positions. This has been used extensively in the DR

Congo, notably by giving out senior army posts to warlords. Once officially ensconced in the national army, these local actors are then rotated out of their home areas through ‘promotions’, largely neutralising them as a security threat. Furthermore, in Afghanistan during the initial military action against the Taliban in 2001, much tactical collaboration was induced through simply buying off wavering fronts of the Taliban with cold, hard cash. As a CIA officer remarked at the time, “You cannot buy an Afghan’s loyalty, but you can rent it.”⁸²

Another method is to co-opt the ‘moderates’ of an insurgency into collaboration, especially tactical collaboration, by juxtaposing the interventionists as a ‘least worst’ option against the fanaticism of assorted types of extremists. It helps if interventionists present themselves in a manner that strengthens the difference between options available to local actors deciding with whom to partner, notably by not being repressive of the general population. This approach is most likely to work in places where there are ethnic divides and a general fear of under-representation in governance. As Roger Lane argued, it can be more effective to engage in patiently “talking about the value of representation in local government” rather than to call in an air attack “against a group we think are insurgents but in reality are under-represented peoples.”⁸³

The second major method for countering resistance to an intervention is the application of violent force to raise the costs of dissent. While it is true that the nature of state building interventionism dictates a hesitance to use force, there are sometimes occasions where violent force must be applied, notably given the proclivity for ‘spoilers’ developing, non-state actors who will only respond to violence. In this sense, even aside from the actual application of violence, being firstly perceived as ‘serious’ enough to apply it is crucial. For instance, in East Timor a strong mandate which authorised the use of deadly force against pro-Indonesian militias and the obvious willingness of heavily armed Australian troops to carrying it out was critical to bringing the situation there under control in 1999.⁸⁴ Another example is that the siege of the Congolese town of Bunia in 2003 by local militias was only relieved after the EU, notably France, sent in a thousand heavily armed troops to help contingents of UN troops who had come to be regarded as weak by local ethnic militias.⁸⁵

While unfortunate, actually undertaking violent coercion is also sometimes required of interventionists. The general utility of violence for interventionists can be best achieved through its limited application through decisive actions during the initial stages of a particular intervention. A good example of this were the British commando strikes against the ‘West Side Boys’ militia in Sierra Leone. Whereas the same militia had previously taken large numbers of UN peacekeepers hostage in 1999, decisive British military action showed that appropriately applied violence could keep the situation from deteriorating over the longer-term, notably to the point where foreign troops were emasculated by being taken hostage. Where interventionist troops have had “guns they were willing to use” they have been able to demonstrate that “robust peacekeeping” can accomplish what is needed to bring about greater stability.⁸⁶ Other examples of this necessary application of force were UN efforts against criminal gangs in Haiti and rioting mobs in East Timor.

Pay the costs

If you are not prepared to pay the price of peace, then you'd better be prepared to pay the price of war.

- Harry Truman⁸⁷

State building interventionism is not altruism; it is a pragmatic response to the pericentric pull of frontiers and one that needs sufficient dedication devoted to seeing it through. Hence, it is essential that if the West is going to engage in interventionism, it needs to be willing to pay the required costs of collaboration. Failing to undertake interventions effectively means initial military successes do not translate into longer term stability, which ultimately may even increase the danger of security threats from frontiers of insecurity. If Western states indeed do not want to invade and occupy frontier states for the long-term, i.e. they want to remain merely imperialistic, then they need to at least invest enough resources and time to manage their interventions through actually empowering indigenous collaborative partners.

A crucial dynamic for effective collaboration is that building trust and achieving collaborative advantage require interventionists to invest adequately in terms of political support for their indigenous partners otherwise they are unlikely to get much enthusiasm

and hence results from them. Theodora Gizelis noted of the state building process that the “more committed external actors are to the process... the level of investment and efforts by the locals increases proportionately.”⁸⁸ Indigenous actors who doubt the commitment of the interventionists, most obviously in terms of their political willpower, are simply not as motivated to collaborate as effectively as they would be otherwise. While money and other material assets are important, what is more important is using those resources appropriately to managing collaborative systems. This means within the context of political commitments and as an investment in strategies that create thoughtful collaborative systems. In this way resources must be coupled to the strong political management of collaborative systems otherwise they are for naught.

While political commitment is crucial, it is still nonetheless necessary that adequate material resources be provided and longer timeframes maintained. Providing adequate resources, notably funding, has been a major gap in most recent interventions. The exception has been the Balkans which consistently received 100 percent of the estimated requirements but frontier states such as Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sierra Leone at different times have all received less than 50 percent of the resources deemed necessary.⁸⁹ Kosovo has been the best funded, receiving four times more assistance per capita than did even Germany after World War II. In stark contrast, Haiti and Afghanistan have received less than a quarter of Kosovo’s level.⁹⁰ Rather than make Kosovo the exception, other interventions need this robust resource commitment as well. All in all, the provision of adequate resources is essential and must be rectified if interventionists are to be able to manage their collaborative relationships effectively.

The other major requirement is for longer timeframes to be implemented. Niall Ferguson noted that interventions can be “a frustrating business, yielding only meagre returns.”⁹¹ This is probably an especially apt description for the challenges of extended collaboration when the timeframes necessary to establish greater stability have been underestimated. Considering state building as an interactive process of collaboration, there is a need to solidify indigenous collaborative partners for the long-term, which means accepting gradual ‘progress’ towards a more competent government rather than an outright ‘victory’ being achieved. Patience and perseverance are thus crucial, albeit costly. The necessary timeframes must be determined according to local needs, but in

general interventions are probably going to run at least five years but often more. There are moves towards this acceptance and they should be furthered. For instance, the Australian military now argues that its 'robustness' for interventionism is shown by its "depth in resources and personnel", both essential for maintaining "the ability to sustain operations for lengthy periods."⁹²

7.4: Alternative collaboration strategies

The existence of frontiers of insecurity means that some sort of Western response will be required for the foreseeable future and will most likely still be centred on the collaborative processes of state building. If Western states are unwilling to pay the high costs required to engage in interventionism themselves, then they will need to engage in alternative strategies of collaboration. Possibilities could be to let distinctly nasty political entrepreneurs such as Charles Taylor assert control through force, allow quasi-sovereign entities such as Somaliland to establish themselves, or to 'give war a chance' and allow the combatants of a civil war to fight and hope a clear victor emerges, such as in 1990's Afghanistan. As Marina Ottaway rightly concluded, "These are all unpalatable choices."⁹³ Better responses would be to use third parties to intervene or to place more emphasis on 'back-stopping' collaborative partners in weakening states that have not quite crossed the threshold to becoming frontiers of insecurity.

Using third parties to intervene

The Ethiopians will leave when they clear the terrorists and pacify Somalia.
- Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi⁹⁴

If the West does not want to intervene, its first option is to use others to do the work instead. The possibility for using third parties to intervene is a challenging one but potentially promising. Some academics have suggested that the "hired guns" of mercenaries be used.⁹⁵ This is notably when the high costs of Western troops are compared to the relatively cheap application of private armies, such as Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone. While there may be useful applications for such firms, notably training indigenous forces and providing embassy security, it is not plausible that they could be a full substitute for the army troops of states. Given that, it

is more feasible to look at possibilities to enlist the governments of developing states to intervene or for regional inter-governmental organisations to do so.

In this regards, it is important to highlight that attempts to bring more stability to frontiers of insecurity through stronger governance are not just a Western versus non-Western one. The need to intervene in areas of relative anarchy on the margins of the states system so as to meet one's own security interests is also prevalent within the developing world, as has been seen by Rwanda and Uganda's interest in the eastern DR Congo, Turkey's incursions into northern Iraq, or more strikingly in Ethiopia's recent intervention in central Somalia. Given this, enlisting the support of partner states from the developing world should not be particularly hard to achieve if it is advocated for in terms of security provision rather than solely for extending norms such as democracy.

There are already programmes to augment the capacity of developing states to undertake interventionism, notably in Africa. The Pentagon has been especially active in this regards, working to strengthen African capacity based on "identifying areas where our common interests would be served by partners playing leading roles."⁹⁶ For its part, the White House argued that the US' "security depends upon partnering with Africans to strengthen fragile and failing states."⁹⁷ The outcome of these sentiments is the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a multiyear, \$660 million effort to train and equip 75,000 African troops for peacekeeping operations and founded on the premise that "developed nations would not be able to sustain the burden [of peacekeeping operations] indefinitely" and hence it should be shifted to the Africans themselves.⁹⁸ For its part, Europe has supported the GPOI by hosting a *carabinieri* training centre in Italy, the Center for Excellence for Stability Police Units. The EU also has its own 'peace facility', a €250 million fund to support African peacekeeping and conflict prevention operations.⁹⁹

The best example of African troops engaging in state building interventionism in frontier states is the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in late-2006 to support the UN-sponsored Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG represents an interesting example of inculcating a collaborative partner, notably through extended

UN-brokered peace conferences in Nairobi, and then using a neighbouring developing state to undertake an intervention to support that nascent government. The US provided political encouragement for the intervention and on several occasions even bombed insurgent Islamists targets. Furthermore, it is also an example of a frontier state that was exceedingly unlikely to have another Western-led intervention and hence the intervention of a neighbouring developing state offered the best opportunity to stabilise it.

The usage of regional organisations also offers possibilities for third party intervention. The African Union has been active in Darfur, Sudan and in supporting the Ethiopians in Somalia. In terms of collaboration, interventions by regional organisations might receive greater support from local actors, because they will regard them as being less of an imperialistic threat as well as having a better understanding of local conditions. However, there are many challenges to using such organisations, namely their lack of resources, skills, and military capacity. The AU's force in Darfur has been widely criticised as incompetent and the AU contingent mandated for Somalia is lacking over half its troop allotment. Furthermore, with domestic uncertainty rife in its own member states, it is often doubted that African regional organisations can ever be reliable. As the Carnegie Endowment noted by example of Nigeria and its own interventions in Western Africa through ECOWAS in the mid-1990s, "it is in no position to export stability."¹⁰⁰

Despite these admittedly significant challenges, the reality is that aside from engaging individual states, such as Ethiopia, or regional organisations, such as the AU, there are no other particularly good options. Great Powers such as China and Russia certainly are not plausible interventionists. This means the 'least worst' option is to support regional organisations and individual developing states as much as possible to be adequate partners for undertaking required interventions. Considering that, it may be necessary to devise new forms of partnership for interventions led by developing states or regional organisations but financed, equipped, and to some extent managed by Western ones. These 'hybrid' interventions are still nascent and unproven but deserve further consideration, such as ongoing UN-AU efforts in Darfur, Sudan.

Provide 'back stopping' support

*A good rule would be to intervene early before the trouble really begins.*¹⁰¹

Engaging in 'backstopping' would provide another alternative strategy for collaboration. Recalling the dynamic of a pericentric pull, the provocation to intervene directly results from the lack of suitable indigenous collaborative partners on the ground requiring interventionists to intervene, find some and then strengthen them as best possible. However, if there are still some suitable, if faltering, indigenous actors present in the form of national governments, outright interventions can be avoided if those actors are pre-emptively strengthened. Anthony Zinni has correctly argued that a "forward-leaning engagement strategy" should be prioritised, namely of working with national leaders who are weakening but whose stabilisation is required for preventing states from becoming frontiers.¹⁰² Mostly this entails providing development and military aid and political support. Examples of this are ongoing US efforts to support presidents Musharraf in Pakistan, Arroyo in the Philippines, and Uribe in Colombia.

Furthermore, in terms of preventative management, broader packages of support aimed at backstopping entire regions are also possible. Tools of influence can range from directed commercial relations to the provision of guiding human capacity in government administrations and the augmentation and training of security forces, amongst others. A first example of such preventative management is the US' Pan-Sahel Initiative which works to bolster the weak states of Senegal, Mali, Niger and Chad by providing them primarily with military support. Another example is Plan Colombia, which is the US' effort to help counter long-running rebellions against the Bogota government funded by drug trafficking. A third example is the Pentagon's Horn of Africa Task Force, which it describes as an example of "distributed operations and economy of force" whereby the US military undertakes a wide variety of actions- security training, aid projects, raids on terrorist camps- in order to enhance "effective host nation governance."¹⁰³

Working in weakening states to stabilise them without needing to resort to outright interventionism requires an emphasis on a lighter ground presence for Western actors.

Robert Kaplan has been a strong proponent of this and he rightly argues that what are needed are efforts to “hold sway... only quietly, off camera, so to speak.”¹⁰⁴ Kaplan concludes current US efforts in the Horn, the Philippines and Colombia are the most telling of what will be needed in the future, notably “deployments in many dozens of countries involving relatively small numbers of highly trained people” who engage in assorted activities for securing stronger governance.¹⁰⁵ In this sense, the small-scale efforts in these places, by example of the Horn, can be seen through the lens of classic collaboration:

Just like the British and the French dealing with the Iroquois Confederacy... Americans in the Horn were interacting with indigenous peoples in small numbers, making various deals of mutual self-interest, and killing a few of them when necessary.¹⁰⁶

Crucially, in a future ‘post-Iraq’ era where Western publics are resentful of large military engagements abroad and when small professional armies struggle to maintain extended deployments, these limited, dispersed efforts could help to prevent fatigue amongst Western states.

These back-stopping strategies roughly match what the Pentagon terms a ‘foreign internal defense doctrine’, its efforts to support a foreign military so that it can “free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”¹⁰⁷ While this doctrine was designed for the Cold War context, it has strong applicability to that of frontiers of insecurity, notably strengthening partner governments and especially their security forces before they are subverted, in this case to the anarchy of frontier zones. In that sense, they also parallel William Cohen’s emphasis on activities to “shape the environment” in order to encourage more stable socio-political conditions in weak states without waiting for the need to intervene.¹⁰⁸ Similar in thinking is Australia’s policy of ‘enhanced cooperation’ with the national government in Papua New Guinea. Central to that effort, and somewhat distinct from the US’ approach, is to embed Australian government personnel into key ministries, notably security related, to try and stabilise them before a military intervention is required. Overall, prioritising such low-profile efforts is necessary because they can be essential for preventing frontiers from developing in the first place in states such as Papua New Guinea and the Philippines.

Contentiously, one last strategy of preventive management through engaging in early collaboration would be to 'pick winners' and support them during the course of an ongoing civil conflict. This was common practice during the Cold War but became politically unconscionable subsequent to the Cold War's conclusion in 1991. However, a minimal amount of support to collaborative partners engaged in a civil war could go a long way towards preventing a worse situation developing, one provocative of a direct intervention by Western states. Notable in this regards is the US' abandonment of the Northern Alliance rebels in Afghanistan during the course of the 1990s. More support to them could have helped prevent the ascension to power of the Taliban, and hence al-Qaeda. It may be politically challenging domestically to provide support to participants in a civil war but directly influencing a conflict in its progression, rather than simply responding to its aftermath, may actually be the most pragmatic collaborative approach to undertake.

7.5: Conclusion

To better manage frontiers of insecurity, the art of collaboration with indigenous politics must be prioritised and improved methods for it implemented. Firstly, interventionists must ascertain the correct choice of mode for collaboration based on the indigenous collaborative possibilities of each frontier state. Additionally, making collaboration a strategic doctrine means that improved collaborative know-how can be maximised. This know-how then requires the stronger management of collaborative systems during interventions. Lastly, in addition to collaboration during its own interventions, alternative strategies must be adopted by the West in the future, such as allowing third-parties to intervene in its stead and applying approaches that allow for a lighter, more detached presence aimed at the preventive management of weakening states before they become frontiers of insecurity. Through these efforts, the West can begin to ameliorate the collaboration problematique and gradually dampen the pericentric pull of frontiers of insecurity.

CHAPTER 8: WHO WANTS FRONTIERS?

I saw corruption and incompetence there: I saw little progress in building a viable nation.¹

With these stark words US General Anthony Zinni reminisced on his formative experiences in Vietnam. From US interventions in Indochina to Europe's development efforts in post-colonial states, the shadows of historical failures at state building linger in a Western psyche musing if past mistakes are being mindlessly perpetuated. Perhaps it simply is impossible "to make countries out of places that were never meant to be countries" and frontiers of insecurity are a dire reality that must be countered in other ways.² This hesitance is shown most starkly by the reality that when imperialism as an ideology is dead and humanitarianism is hardly a replacement, the West is left with no 'grand project' upon which to base change in frontier states. This chapter concludes this thesis by analysing this predicament, namely why attempt state building interventionism when there is no 'will' to really transition frontiers?

Rather than naively hope a grand project will miraculously materialise, it is better to focus on the practicalities of frontiers, namely of their improved management resulting in gradual gains in stability, instead of an immediate conclusion through the imperial imposition of 'order'. Given that, and so as to frame the context appropriately, it is most important to ask a simple question in order to spur improved management: who actually does want frontiers? While the West assuredly does not, there are many dangerous non-state actors that in fact do, from al-Qaeda terrorists to militias, warlords, and drugs and human traffickers. With this in mind and despite the challenges of state building interventionism, the efforts must be continued and strengthened by improved collaboration with indigenous partners who also do not want to see frontiers exist in perpetuity, the 'moderates' of the world.

8.1: Why even do state building interventions?

When, as in Cambodia, people have lived almost permanently under the domination of neighbours for centuries, before being 'protected' by France, 'backed' and then bombed by the United States, 'abandoned' by all and

*then 'liberated' by Vietnam, the foreigner is readily presented as the cause of all evils, past and present.*³

The first major point to conclude with is whether state building interventions should even be undertaken. James Mayall highlighted that “the problem of intervention” and particularly whether or not it can be justified “lies at the heart of all debates about international order.”⁴ This is certainly true for the controversy surrounding state building interventionism since the end of the Cold War. This thesis has itself argued that in terms of the state building efficacy of current interventions, rather than in immediate conflict resolution, they have not been particularly successful. Given that, it is fair to ask if state building interventionism is even an appropriate strategy for mitigating security concerns in an era of manic globalisation and a fractured states system. Many critics argue that present interventionism is both immoral and impracticable and hence the challenge of responding to frontiers of insecurity is best achieved through other means.

'Neo-imperialism' is morally wrong

*It is the fault of Empire... One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era.*⁵

One of the strongest critiques of present interventionism is that it is morally unacceptable because it constitutes ‘neo-imperialism’, the continuation of a long history of capitalistic Western exploitation of the periphery. Indeed, it is argued by many critical theory academics that the problems that exist presently, such as arbitrary boundaries and class divisions which helped to create weak and failed states in the first place, are in fact “a hangover from older periods of empire.”⁶ If that is so, they challenge how a return to imperialism, or anything even resembling it, can possibly help and argue it is rather more likely to perpetuate even more Western exploitation. Allegations cited in this regard are the US’ interest in securing pipelines through Afghanistan or Australia’s exploitation of oil and gas fields in East Timor.

Furthermore, it is contended that present interventions are morally corrupt internally as they leave liberal Western societies being asked to act “in ways that are fundamentally

at odds with their own character and values.”⁷ This has been a theme long articulated within the US, most famously by President John Adams when he contended America should not go abroad ‘in search of monsters to destroy’ since that would mean ‘she would be no longer the ruler of her own spirit’. And while many would agree the exigencies of security imperatives are pressing, critics of present interventions argue it is hardly worth it if the West “loses its soul” in the process.⁸ Indeed, many critiques of the morality of present interventionism argue it risks turning its ostensibly noble goals upon themselves since they are based upon the control and penetration of foreign societies, namely that “the necessary ‘dirty hands’ of violent means often become ‘dangerous hands’ in international interventions.”⁹ This means interventionism ultimately creates the Abu Gharaibs and UN sex scandals of the world or as Bernard Porter concluded, “Along with the ‘jodhpurs and pith helmets’ can come *this*.”¹⁰

Lastly, compounding fears over internal moral corruption is the critique mirroring that of ‘classic liberals’ that interventions “undermined the authenticity of domestic struggles for liberty” which were then left lacking of the legitimacy provided by self-determination.¹¹ In this sense, ‘liberal democracy’ cannot be imposed at ‘the point of a gun’ through imperialism, meaning “democracy and empire are ultimately incompatible.”¹² To claim interventionism as ‘liberation’ or ‘freedom’ is dubious as such change was not instigated endogenously.

Still other critics argue further that in a ‘post-imperial age’, notably in post-colonial states, the “abhorrence of empire is too visceral” for change through imperialistic means to be acceptable because it becomes grossly paternalistic, negating the agency of indigenous actors to instigate positive political transformation on their own.¹³ This leaves indigenous peoples feeling that interventions have little to do with real change for them and everything to do with the self-interested whims of interventionists. As they say in Haiti of the UN: “Many Whites, plenty of light; few Whites, little light; no Whites, no light.”¹⁴ Or, as locals complained bitterly of in East Timor, while the UN freely spent 25 million dollars annually on bottled water for international staff, only a tenth of the UN budget of \$500 million actually reached the Timorese themselves.¹⁵

State building interventionism is counter-productive

With all that is crying out for attention... can we really afford this missionary zeal to remake the Middle East in our own image? We could end up merely creating for ourselves ever more crumbling frontiers of insecurity.

- Paul Kennedy¹⁶

Aside from moral qualms, the second major critique of present interventionism has been that not only is it ineffective, but outright counter-productive towards assuring the security interests of the West. The most stinging critique is that “the result of intervention is all too frequently prolonged violence and bloodshed.”¹⁷ Central to this are Western pretensions that they can even instigate positive change through state building interventionism. Christopher Coyne terms this the “nirvana fallacy”, the naïve belief that “foreign governments can generate, via occupation and reconstruction, an outcome preferable to that which would occur absent these interventions.”¹⁸ Edward Luttwak has been most forceful in this regards with his ‘give war a chance’ argument, noting that “although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace.”¹⁹ The main problem with interventions is that they prevent solutions that would “come out of letting wars run their natural course.”²⁰

The irony of actually furthering crises is also noted as a worry by historians, such as John Gaddis who argued that the “first problem for a strategy of seeking security through expansion... was how to keep that expansion itself from generating new sources of insecurity.”²¹ Furthermore, Karen Feste noted the lesson from Cold War interventions was that where interventions “were regarded as meddlesome intrusion”, the efforts could “backfire, leaving the principal disputants in conflict longer and with greater intensity than would have occurred in the absence of any intervention at all.”²² This thesis noted in its introduction that while Iraq was not originally a frontier of insecurity, it did become one after the US invasion. Somalia is also cited as an example of interventionism spreading insecurity. With no experience of effective central government and a proclivity towards clans, state building efforts there have largely “resulted in failure and chaos.”²³

Another argument against state building interventionism is that it is a counter-productive policy response because it suffers from a fundamental misunderstanding of the situation. A starting point is the critique of the present emphasis on democratisation, namely it is a “fundamental paradox” since it is “conceived of as a solution to the dangerous transnational problems of our day.”²⁴ Equating the two, the insecurity of globalisation and domestic governance in the form of democracy, is hence directly misguided as a policy decision since they are fundamentally different issues. Critics cite the election of Hamas extremists in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as an example of democracy not being a simple remedy for terrorism spreading across borders.

On a more existential level, others have similarly argued that in the era of interconnectedness through globalisation, “there are no local solutions to global problems” but that is what present interventionist efforts try to achieve and fail so miserably at.²⁵ A critic of interventionist policies might rhetorically ask: where are the frontiers? Even London could have its own ‘frontiers’ accentuated by globalisation, such as the crime plagued East End. Anarchy in the periphery may be ‘localised’ to some extent, Afghanistan is Afghanistan, but a policy response that is insular and isolated rather than ‘globalised’ can only but fail. In this sense, many have challenged whether interventionism can even be an appropriate response to terrorism; with commentators musing why states should be targeted and not only the networks of non-state actors. Critics pointedly conclude that interventions in states such as Afghanistan lend credence to the argument that foreign rule is “notoriously a producer of terrorist movements.”²⁶ What the Soviets achieved for global terrorism in the 1980s in Afghanistan is only being furthered by US efforts there presently.

Other options are available anyway

*From a globalist, humanitarian and true political economy perspective, the system known as Westphalian has been an abject failure.*²⁷

Overarching these critiques is an observation of a major gap in analysis, namely that state building interventionism is conceptually lacking because there is now a general trend towards ‘Olympianism’, the supra-governmental structures of international

organisations and global civil society networks, instead of a mere states-based system. Globalisation is cited as the major cause of this, namely that the states themselves are weaker, and hence critics of interventionism challenge why an institution that is weakening regardless should still be utilised. If one accepts that globalisation is at the centre of current insecurity, governments surely can never match the manic ability of non-state actors to evolve, utilise technology, and to form shapeless networked organisations. This has been seen most vividly in the international narcotics trade and Islamist terrorism.

Rather than attempt the strengthening of states through state building interventionism, critics suggest that other non-coercive modalities be used instead. The benefits of non-military means and of non-intervention more broadly for the West would be that it could “avoid charges of imperialism and project an image of tolerance and non-interference.”²⁸ The current emphasis on military means is critiqued because “it trains its sights only on the symptoms and not the cause” of tensions between states and societies and other modalities would in fact better respond to these causes.²⁹ Instead of interventionism aimed at states, the ‘soft power’ of political tools needs to be applied instead, notably international law. Mary Kaldor, for instance, argued that what is needed is “the global extension of the rule of law... changing the currency of deterrence and coercion from the traditional use of military force to that of law enforcement.”³⁰ By example, progressives and critical theorists on the Left have generally argued that the West should rely more on policy tools such as spreading human rights norms, humanitarian and financial aid, economic cooperation, constructive social and environmental policies and political dialogue and conflict mediation.

Furthermore, there have also been calls for the existing system of sovereign states to be maintained less rigorously. Rather than undertake interventions, it might be more suitable to allow for the endogenous creation of new states. The sub-region of Somalia known as Somaliland is the most cited example of this whereby the West should focus on the ‘state-building’ that has progressed there without external assistance. Namely, Somaliland exemplifies where “a state has been built... in contrast to the transitional national government in Mogadishu” and hence Western efforts would be better utilised to help locales where rulers are actually instituting stability rather than marginalise them

because of their lack of formal sovereignty.³¹ Additionally, there have also been suggestions to encourage more participation by sub-national units such as warlords and traditional leaders.³² Western efforts would then be to pragmatically partner with people who have given up on sovereign governments and have endeavoured to seek ‘normalcy’ outside the framework of the states system through the structure of stronger non-state actors.

8.2: And yet, frontiers do require interventions

The arguments against the morality and efficacy of state building interventionism are profound. Nonetheless, despite their strengths, the critiques do not sufficiently proffer viable alternatives for dampening the pericentric pull of frontiers of insecurity. Considering that, for the foreseeable future and in the continuing context of globalisation and an international system based on states, the necessary strategy for responding to frontier of insecurity will continue to be through state building interventionism.

Other options are not particularly viable for frontier zones

*Who is being fooled by this? Perhaps the Western public. Certainly not the warlords.*³³

David Rieff comments above challenge the viability of Western human rights norms to actually bring about stability in weak and failed states and he starkly concludes that they have never “actually kept a single jackboot out of a single human face.”³⁴ This serves to highlight that the general suitability of other options, while appealing in many regards, are nonetheless decidedly lacking for the frontier context. If pursued solely, they would leave the West having to be content with frontiers lingering in anarchy and dealing with their direct consequences perpetually. In actual fact, the only reason there has been a so-called “imperialist revival” is because other options are so unreliable.³⁵

Arguments to spread international law and human rights norms or to engage in conflict mediation and dialogue all the way through to ‘giving wars a chance’ are not necessarily wrong and may have applicability in certain contexts, but those are aside from that of

frontiers of insecurity. By example again of human rights norms, it is perfectly fine to argue for such modalities as ends in themselves for states that have the capacity to bring them into effect but altogether different for those “societies that are too poor, or convulsed by ethnic war or political strife, to do so.”³⁶ The reality is that the West has tried most of these other options with normal developing states, notably aid provision with human rights norms and democratisation conditionalities, and although there have been some successes, they have never been outright and their feasibility for frontier states is dubious if not distinctly inappropriate. Additionally, a major alternative proposed to interventionism is development aid and between 1950 and 1995 approximately a trillion dollars in unrequited transfers were made by the West to developing countries.³⁷ This significant amount of aid by itself has neither resulted in consistent economic growth nor notably improved standards of living and good governance.

Furthermore, some policy advocates contend interventionism should be allowed, but limited to cases of genocide. For much of the 1990s, ‘humanitarian intervention’ gained much prominence as an intellectual concept within academia but also as a political justification for Western leaders undertaking interventions. By example, Tony Blair declared that the UK’s intervention in Kosovo was because of “its values, not its interests.”³⁸ In reality, the intervention there was actually more about wanting to confront aggressive Serbian nationalism in the “European backlands once and for all.”³⁹ Even in as seemingly marginally strategic states as Liberia the security imperative’s dominance is true. Princeton Lyman argued that in “painting US interests in Liberia... as solely humanitarian” the US government failed to show that US interests were more significantly strategic.⁴⁰

Indeed, even in the most troubled continent of Africa, it is a remote possibility that an intervention will occur in the future for solely humanitarian purposes.⁴¹ Purely humanitarian interventionism is dead and most likely never existed at all. Arguments giving primacy to humanitarianism are flawed as they do not respond to the pericentric pull of frontiers of insecurity, merely the West’s own shallow sense of humanitarianism. There must be a strategic desire to mitigate security problems for action to be undertaken and sustained. Indeed, the emphasis in the early-1990s on humanitarian

rationales being “somehow divorced from strategic considerations was an illusion.”⁴² That humanitarianism is secondary has been shown time and again, most strikingly by Rwanda and in the continuing debacle over Darfur.

Furthermore, the viability of ‘giving war a chance’ is also doubtful. While it would be convenient if war would gradually allow for stability to emerge, this is not particularly successful as a policy option as long-running conflicts in the DR Congo, Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan highlighted. One problem is that frontiers are not defined by ‘war’ so much as by their ‘anarchy’, a condition not likely to dissipate entirely on its own once it is entrenched. The ‘give war a chance’ argument also assumes a time threshold that is a luxury not afforded by the pericentric pull of frontiers of insecurity; globalisation does not stop and ‘giving war a chance’ accrues costs in the meantime. Lastly, Machiavellian allowances for the emergences of ‘strongmen rule’ which do result in temporary stability are most likely to eventually backfire as in themselves, they have historically been “a major contributor to the collapse of the state”, especially in Africa.⁴³

In any case, these options, aside from ‘giving war a chance’, are not wrong for developing states more generally, merely ill-suited for the extremes of frontiers of insecurity by themselves. While de-colonisation was supposed to result in a system of stable sovereign states, it has instead seen an “age of ethnic cleansing and state failure.”⁴⁴ The international system has simply not seen post-colonial states universally progress towards stability, leaving the international system with its present frontiers. In frontier states, defined as they are by civil conflict and the collapse of any meaningful governance, a further step must be taken towards state building, namely by instigating the creation of the institutions of sovereign governance that make all other development achievable. Whatever its admitted faults, and there are many, state building interventionism simply is the “only coherent model” for responding to the pericentric pull of frontiers presently.⁴⁵

Frontier states can only be 'managed' through interventions

While the state is an institution that has been weakened by globalisation, it has not yet been made redundant. The simple reality exists that the international system is still one based upon states because the world is still one “enclosed by equal sovereignty”, a principle that defines International Relations.⁴⁶ In the future it may be desirable to evolve away from the states system as a model for organising global order but that does not change the need to maintain it in the meantime, something that requires slowly but determinedly responding to frontier states to allow their governments to achieve more sovereign control over their territories. In this way, it must be acknowledged that the cause of instability in frontier states is “the inadequacy of state authority” first and foremost and given that it cannot be solved by trying to immediately surpass the Westphalian model.⁴⁷

Even with the proliferation of non-state and supranational actors, the world “still relies on governments” as the EU’s Javier Solana argued from his position as a leader of the most advanced supra-national organisation.⁴⁸ There is no desire by the West to replace sovereign governments because the West actually does value sovereign states. K.J. Holsti correctly summarised this sentiment when he noted that sovereignty has “provided more security, protected more diversity, and constructed a context for more human progress and improvement than any other political principle or arrangement.”⁴⁹ While talk of sub- or supra-national actors are amusing for academics to ponder, states still prefer to deal with other states, what Michael Cox argued was the imperative of “strong pressures for socialization in the international system.”⁵⁰ States would rather engage with the governments of frontier states that still do not possess full control over their territory than none whatsoever.

Frontiers of insecurity are still part of the states system, albeit its frayed edges but nonetheless still part of the whole. Mitigating the pericentric pull of frontiers requires stronger states, not their replacement. This does not necessitate a return to traditional imperialism but rather the effective application of state building interventionism that ultimately empowers indigenous governments to implement stronger control over their sovereign spaces. A simple reason for this is that for all their faults, the governments

of states remain the “front-line responders to today’s threats.”⁵¹ This was argued by the UN no less, one of the most advanced international organisations but one still fundamentally dependent on its member governments to alleviate poverty, counter infectious diseases, obstruct transnational crime, undertake reconstruction after civil wars, and combat terrorism.⁵² In short, they are needed to manage all the risks of globalisation.

Furthermore, the necessity of foreign military power invoked during interventionism may be unfortunate but is nevertheless essential. In the context of frontier states, outright anarchy must be overcome and this requires applying some degree of force, at least initially or potentially, against the warlords and terrorists of the world. While it would be ideal to rely only on civilian and peaceful means, this is naïve to the extreme. Without the ability of military power to impose a modicum of stability, “aid workers will simply get themselves killed.”⁵³ Although it is pleasantly self-gratifying to ponder that other more peaceful means can be a suitable catalyst, it is not likely that frontier zones will transition only through the nice words and sentiments expressed by thoughtful Westerners.

The Balkans provides the best example of this. Many policy makers, especially in Europe, advocated in the early stages of that conflict that “peace and justice could be achieved by simply asking people to be reasonable.”⁵⁴ However, while the Balkans are now a great deal more peaceful, this is in direct consequence of it being “brought there by military power” applied through multiple interventions, notably by the US after 1995.⁵⁵ Ultimately, it is only in this context of transitioning frontier states that interventionism aimed at state building becomes legitimised as an unfortunate necessity: the temporary application of foreign power to transition sovereignty back to states that are valued as part of an international system built upon them.

8.3: Values and individuals still matter

For strategy is not merely a reflection of the interests which it purports to defend, it is even more the register of the hopes, the memories and neuroses which inform the strategists’ picture of the world.

- Robinson and Gallagher⁵⁶

This thesis has emphasised the security imperative of responding to the pericentric pull of frontiers of insecurity through a necessary strategy of state building interventionism. While true, it is not enough to leave that necessity without qualification by looking at the broader moral and ethical parameters that guide such strategy, what Robinson and Gallagher observed as ‘the hopes, the memories and neuroses’ of the strategists. Indeed, present interventionism could be perceived as pragmatic utilitarianism and left as such, but this would mask that it is still a human endeavour of applying coercion and manipulation instrumentally and hence a very morally conflicted one for those undertaking it.

In a post-imperial age the West does not want to return to an ideology of imperialism, but it does however feel compelled to use imperialistic means. This is a hard moral conundrum and one not easily reconciled. This is most directly seen in the collaboration problematique. The need to find and strengthen collaborative partners in frontier states but at the same time push a liberal democratic agenda is decidedly difficult. Nonetheless, this desire represents a belief that frontiers can in fact be transitioned to achieve ‘progress’, as has happened at times in the past but something that is still conflicted by the memories of other state building efforts that have failed, overshadowed by often brutal imperial histories. This discord leads to a hesitance that has slowed the response to frontiers and hindered the efficacy of interventions. Most problematically, it has engendered a detachment between the West and those people whom it could and should be helping in frontier states.

The West still does not mind frontiers

*The marginalised societies of the globe are an embarrassment. At best, they are seen as useless; at worst, threatening.*⁵⁷

A starting point for understanding this conflicted mindset over frontiers is that while it may be increasingly fearful, the West still does not mind them, both literally and morally. Frontiers are seen as wholly disconnected entities, to be viewed idly on television: “You, the viewer, are not in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or Bosnia so much as you are in a humanitarian-tragedy land- a world of wicked warlords, suffering and innocent victims and noble aid workers.”⁵⁸ This detachment from the reality of frontiers

shapes Western perceptions of them as still not particularly worthy of efforts to manage and progressively transition them. Indeed, the “risks averted” through state building interventions, those unknown catastrophes prevented through steady frontier management, do not appeal to Western politicians keen to highlight tangible foreign policy results to publics expecting them in thirty-second news clips.⁵⁹

Current interventionism inherently raises the “question of ultimate as well as immediate responsibility.”⁶⁰ In terms of literally, the major fear of Western publics and governments is of ‘ownership’. Colin Powell famously quipped over the US’ interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan that ‘if you break it, you own it’; a sentiment that drives much of the present hesitance to engage frontiers. When “the world’s grown honest”⁶¹ and no longer wants to conquer, the West does not want to assume responsibility for crises in the frontiers. This is especially so if that means ‘occupation’, however qualified it is as being merely imperialistic and defined by the gradualism of collaboration leading to independent, sovereign governments. And while some academics grandly conclude “nothing less than the reconstruction of a global order of stable nation states is required”⁶², normal Westerners are left musing who is actually responsible for what in distant lands.

By example, for most Americans pondering current US interventionism, the costs appear too high while the “the benefits of doing so seem at best nebulous.”⁶³ Americans by and large simply do not want to dedicate the means that are necessary for strengthened interventionism to take place because they have not been sold on the idea by their political leadership. Needless to say, the ambivalence within Europe is even more so, detached as it was from the pain of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Perceptions are that the costs of frontiers are not worth bearing because frontiers are still far away and relatively non-threatening to individuals. Conversely the concerns of intervening forces getting into ‘quagmires’, committing human rights abuses or being accused of ‘imperialism’ are too great.

Considering these fears, there is little desire to engage in the interventionism required to better manage frontiers and Martin Shaw pointedly highlighted that “Western reluctance

to intervene... has been more widespread than interventionism.”⁶⁴ The cumulative result is that the Western body public still does not particularly care if some places ‘out there’ are anarchic frontiers even if there is an increasing acknowledgement by governments that such locales can cause personal harm to them. Subsequently a deluded naivety has developed that frontiers can then best be ignored. The net result of this apathy is that the political will required to deal with frontiers as literal realities through strong policy choices is generally lacking, a defining feature of the collaboration problematique.

Moreover, the West still has difficulties engaging frontiers morally, which has led to a profound detachment as described best by Christopher Coker. Anarchy in the frontiers is considered to be separated from the ‘progress’ that is being achieved currently in the West and so many other places in the world. Frontiers from the DR Congo to Haiti, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Somalia are all still seemingly distant lands with little connection to a present history in the West defined by stable democratic governance and unparalleled economic success. In contrast, by themselves frontier states have come to be seen as “a disaster zone, one so unrelentingly bleak that much of the world can be said to have no future.”⁶⁵ What has happened in places such as Bosnia with mass rapes or in Sierra Leone where arms were systematically amputated, leads Westerners to perceive such places as existing in “nihilism, barbarism or anarchy” which contrasts with a Western desire to see history as rational and ordered.⁶⁶

Coker further notes that Western perceptions of violence in a locale such as Liberia, by example, is that it appears to be autistic; “the belligerents appear to be unable to distinguish between destruction and self-destruction, or to conceive of the consequences of their acts.”⁶⁷ This leads to the West’s unwillingness to get involved at times because of a belief that in such anarchy, war and violence are no longer rational and hence controllable, and certainly not by foreigners. In this sense, the West has sought to “quarantine the nihilistic regions of the world” by effectively dividing the “globe into various time zones defined in part by their humanity or inhumanity, their civility or barbarism.”⁶⁸

A belief that frontiers are composed of a humanity that is in substantive ways different from the rest, notably in its partaking of violence, and the resultant moral detachment are compounded by the fact that there are no longer deeply-felt metaphysical beliefs to impel Western action despite such doubts. Western soldiers no longer have a metaphysical basis to rely on, one “which would allow them to act cruelly- if only to be kind.”⁶⁹ This is notably so in regards to conceptualising humanity as an extant whole, or at least one worth sacrificing for. When casualties mount, the rule has been for home publics to demand withdrawal. In the West, current interests lie in the “mundane satisfaction of mundane needs.”⁷⁰ This has notably been so in the context of a superficial, ephemeral interest in ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the lack of a ‘grand project’ deemed worth constructing.

Why the West should care about frontiers of insecurity

But we only win people to these positions if our policy is not just about interests but about values, not just about what is necessary but about what is right.

- British Prime Minister Tony Blair⁷¹

Despite this moral detachment, there are good reasons for Westerners caring about the fate of people living in frontiers in terms of lives lived in perspective of truth and justice, i.e. their metaphysical value. As has been argued extensively in this thesis, frontiers of insecurity should be effectively responded to because they do affect global security. There is no need for pure altruism, the West is responding because it is in its rational self-interest, notably in an era defined as it is by manic globalisation and the illegal trades, disease epidemics, mass movements of people, terrorism, and WMD that define it. The West simply cannot leave large swathes of the world as anarchic frontier zones. Indeed, what were once regarded as 'remote and petty interests' in the extreme periphery can no longer be benignly pandered to or outright ignored because they are indeed *our* frontiers of insecurity.

However, justifying a strategy of state building interventionism through the security imperative of a pericentric pull should not be viewed as enough in itself. The West should also feel compelled to act because frontiers are a part of a universal humanity,

not merely isolated 'frontiers' to be observed on television. While this thesis has emphasised the security imperative of the pericentric pull, it has not argued that humanitarianism as an ideal is wrong; rather that it is neither a primary rationale for intervention nor a cause of the pericentric pull. A humanitarian desire to help those in need is actually a crucial rationale for interventionist efforts because it connects interventionists to indigenous politics on a human level, i.e. as individuals working together towards common goals. Interventionist actors in the frontiers as well as home publics need to feel their actions and support are guided by some sort of individual, moral purpose rather than mere selfishness.

Besides, while it is true that it is ill-advised to become involved in distant conflicts as mere matters of principle, notably humanitarian, it is also equally true that alleviating human suffering and empathising with strangers in want versus meeting the rational self-interests for security need not be contradictory of one another. It could even be argued that the failures of the past were because they attempted to do so. In the 1990s too much emphasis was placed on a 'responsibility to protect' individuals through so-called 'humanitarian interventions' that were advocated as ends in themselves. Problematically, not enough emphasis was placed on the state building required to ensure individual security for the longer-term. David Reiff has been the most vocal critic of this lopsided emphasis of humanitarian intervention, arguing it is a "perversion of humanitarianism" and hence morally dubious.⁷² Interventionism that is justified solely on humanitarian grounds is infeasible and morally lacking just as interventionism without any qualification by moral imperatives can be cast in the same light as the more brutal types of European colonialism undertaken in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Indeed, the security imperatives of state building and humanitarian sentiments to help individuals should be understood to a good extent as being "inextricably intertwined" and hence any policy response should not try to keep them separated but rather "understand how they should be addressed simultaneously."⁷³ Anthony Zinni noted as much when he argued that "accomplishing good, noble and altruistic goals also happens to accomplish the pragmatic goals that will promote our self-interest in survival, security, well-being and future growth."⁷⁴ In this way the role of the state becomes central as an institution for both providing security to the individual as well as the wider

community of states that is the international system. At the end of the long process stemming from responses to chaos in the periphery is greater freedom for the individual, “first protected by the state and later protected from the state.”⁷⁵

This thesis has been concerned most with the ‘point of impact’ of collaboration, the interface of interventionists with indigenous politics. Considering that a desire to help individuals is indeed important, it is subsequently crucial to again ask the rhetorical question, who wants frontiers? This question is imperative because it frames the response to frontiers as a contest between possibilities. There are stark alternatives for who will assume control for the outcomes of the livelihoods of those living in frontiers. There is a responsibility to keep this rhetorical question in mind because the peoples and groups which do want frontiers to exist, from al-Qaeda to drug lords, do so for all the wrong reasons- segregation, exploitation and absolutism.

It is important to firstly consider why anybody would willingly collaborate with interventionists. Many local people collaborate because they simply know it is the best chance to bring about positive change to the most violent, anarchic places on the planet; to live as people everywhere wish to, in peace and security and with hope for the future. Overall, many people do not want frontiers and the West should support them as they seek more stability and security, the most basic wants of humanity everywhere. The collaboration problematique can only be ameliorated, not overcome, but that does not mean that the inherent tensions of interventionism should prevent Westerners from empathising with their fellow humans who indeed do value and need foreign help.

This has been seen most poignantly in Liberia where locals dumped bodies in front of the US embassy and pleaded for Western intervention, in Sierra Leone where Britain was asked to return, or in Somalia where an UN-sponsored transitional government has requested foreign peacekeeping troops. The UN chief in East Timor, Sergio De Mello, once said that despite occasional complaints by some Timorese that the UN acted like ‘colonial masters’, “Regardless, they keep asking us to stay.”⁷⁶ And so the UN should. In this sense, what is special about much of present interventionism is its resemblance to

an 'empire by invitation', namely the encouragement of foreign interference as a means of achieving positive results domestically.⁷⁷

In this spirit of empathising with strangers, values do matter, not just security interests and imperatives. The West should still emphasise its liberal democratic values because it believes in those values. John Lewis Gaddis put this well when he argued, "For however imperial we've become, we have held on to liberty."⁷⁸ This thesis argued that values should be projected in moderation during imperialistic interventionism. This is a call for their pragmatic sequencing, not their outright dismissal. The West may go to the frontiers fundamentally for security rationales, but it can still nuance the implementation of state building interventionism accordingly and pragmatically to values that ultimately do have at least some universal appeal. The kinds of states that exist are crucial for both the well-being of individuals that inhabit them and the broader international system's security and hence the present emphasis on liberal democracy, though moderated, should still be maintained.

This is because an emphasis on liberal democracy is still both a utilitarian necessity of ensuring collaboration in a post-imperial era as well as a moral imperative to push as a form of governance since the West insists upon it for itself. Most importantly, Tony Blair was correct to highlight that if you want people to engage with you, i.e. collaborate towards common goals, then you need to offer them more than your own shallow self-interests. To work through the long, tortuous path of state building through interventionism, bloodied as it is by insurgency or terrorism, there must be some sinews of shared values to pull collaborative partnerships together through troubled times. It is necessary that Westerners maintain a belief, albeit qualified through pragmatism, in universal wants, such as security for individuals and responsible, responsive government. There may be a time and a place for such developments, notably democracy and Western conceptions of human rights, but to argue that they have no role would be condescending and cynical of the universal nature of humanity.

Values do matter and the West can only but maintain a belief in the ones that have served it so well when seeking to instigate change for others, especially when those

values are already shared to a good degree. It is necessary to push values to some extent because indigenous populations must believe, even if only rudimentarily, that they are part of an effort to create a better future for themselves as well as the West. That future can include the West's improved security but it must also include a belief in security for individuals and responsible governance for local populations. The onus of inculcating this belief is on the interventionists, namely that there is a "future worth creating there."⁷⁹ This requires that these nominal values are identified and shared. By working with partners and emphasising a minimum of shared values, it is possible for those to gradually become institutionally entrenched in frontier states; helping to lead to their eventual transition away from such a condition.

Christopher Clapham makes an important point in this regards when he argued that China's current 'no strings attached' outreach to Africa ultimately risks failure as it will be seen "merely as an interloper bent on short-term gain."⁸⁰ In contrast, the West has had an exploitative relationship in many ways with Africa, yet enduring linkages have nonetheless been formed because they have "come to be valued by Africans themselves."⁸¹ Most significantly, the ideological agenda which the West seeks to promote "is not merely an alien imposition on unwilling Africans" because it presently "also strikes a local resonance", including on moral grounds.⁸² The values that the West pushes are actually shared by many in the developing world. Njugana Ng'ethe argued as much when he stated that "for many in Africa, democratic leadership is the preferred investment option"⁸³ while Francis Deng contended that Africa is engaging in a 'Second Liberation struggle' against "its own dysfunctional systems of statehood and governance."⁸⁴

The challenge is to find and empower collaborative partners through the institutionalisation of governance with whom the West shares at least a minimum of values. At its simplest these should be basic protections for the individual and a relatively responsible and accountable system of government. In the context of the question of who wants frontiers, this is important because there is a need to frame collaboration as a contest between those who want frontiers- such as terrorists, mafias, militias and drug traffickers- versus those who do not, the moderates of the world who do believe in stable, responsive or even representative governance and open, friendly

relations with the wider world. And indeed, there are significant numbers of moderates 'out there' on the frontiers. Through finding them and strengthening their position within indigenous politics, they can be used to ensure the stronger management of frontiers and even their eventual transition out of such a condition.

Crucial to this collaborative engagement with moderates is valuing them as individuals and indeed as partners. The requirement is not think of frontiers as 'keeping out the barbarians' or even as being full of 'barbarians' but rather to consider them inherently as part of one whole, both an international system of states and a universal humanity. Presently, too much of the Western discourse takes places as if interventionists were "working on 'objects' outside our own world, as though the people in question are not women and men like us."⁸⁵ On the other hand it is counterproductive to think that there are no frontiers just because of a naïve and ultimately pretentious Western belief that there is one 'global space' without any notable divergences within it. There are fundamental differences between daily human existence in the chaos of the eastern Congo or central Somalia which demands tangible action, not merely eloquent rhetoric on the universality of the human condition.

Reaching shared understanding for improved collaboration is feasible because moral barriers are easily dissolved when individuals from the West encounter "naked humanity", notably the misery that cannot be qualified by different social norms or obfuscated by geographical distance.⁸⁶ Put another way, the "brute fact of humanity" can be seen and connected to by those who wish to do so.⁸⁷ In fact, the extremes of frontiers- when so much of humanity's facades have been stripped bare by war, anarchy and social depravation- should allow the commonality of all humanity to be more clearly seen than anywhere else. Making moral connections with fellow individuals in frontiers requires a thoughtful approach by interventionists that is based fundamentally on understanding the nuances of local politics through considering local people as the driving dynamic and not as passive 'beneficiaries' of foreign help or as 'barbarians' incapable of ruling themselves.

Simply interacting as individuals, valuing one another as fellow humans, on the frontiers and valuing the sacrifices that one's collaborative partners are willing to make is the easiest method to build moral bridges and shared values. In this way, for example, the actions of a majority of Muslims in Afghanistan can and should be supported as they represent a rejection of Islamist radicalisation and terrorism. The grave dangers faced by indigenous 'collaborators' should not be dismissed because of a tendency by foreigners to be overly cynical about their motives. It is necessary to realise that as a rule, there are more commonalities than differences in the values that link such collaborative partnerships. True there is 'tactical collaboration' but it is secondary to deeper collaboration undertaken by individuals who do share longer-term desires and values. In this way it is important for interventionists to believe of their collaborative partners, as Tony Blair argued, that "victory for them is victory for us all" because otherwise interventionism is in fact pointless.⁸⁸

Furthermore, by way of example, the White House correctly noted that everywhere the US has fought Islamist terrorism, "Muslim allies have stood beside us, becoming partners in this vital cause" because of a shared understanding that such radicalism threatens "the survival of their own liberty, the future of their own region, the justice and humanity of their own traditions."⁸⁹ The West can support these aspirations because they mirror those found everywhere. And indeed, for instance, the only way to overcome something as odious as suicide bombings is to ultimately deter them in an efficient manner by partnering with groups and individuals within indigenous society who can expose and delegitimize them because they also detest such tactics.⁹⁰ Resistance against such extremism is a value that can be shared universally.

Crucial to all of these efforts is the need to interact as individuals in the frontier zones themselves. This requires personal and sustained interaction. Thomas Friedman succinctly noted as much when he argued, "You can't do this online. You can't download understanding."⁹¹ The West's current over-emphasis on the technology of military power and its formulaic responses through state building 'toolkits' have created a dangerous level of detachment on a human level leading to the loss of appreciation for personal interactions and of forming real relationships, viz. those with some shared values and acceptance of the universality of humanity. There needs to be more personal

understanding through collaboration and less reliance on precision weaponry such as smart bombs. And this does mean a continued emphasis on the values that the West has long advocated. While more pragmatism in implementing values is required, to forsake an emphasis on such values risks losing the trust of collaborative partners who have risked so much to partner with the West at all. Michael Ignatieff rightly concluded, to do otherwise means that “peoples disillusioned with our promises will have enduring reasons never to trust us again.”⁹²

The imperialistic interventionism of today is defined by its goal of strengthening frontier states through their national governments to ensure a modicum of stability. It is precisely that need to exert control relatively briefly over the effective sovereignty of another state that allows for the installation of an initial shading of liberal governance. While imperialism as an ideology may be dead, that does not mean the exigencies of responding to a pericentric pull cannot be capitalised upon. Intervening would be a rather wasted opportunity, and indeed counterproductive in the longer-term, otherwise. While there should be no delusions that interventionism will instigate grand and sweeping changes quickly, what can be realistically achieved is the improved and steady management of frontiers that will slowly transition them out of such a condition.

In this way, what interventionists can do is to help local actors, through the processes of collaboration, to gradually change the context of frontiers and in a manner conducive to engendering a trajectory of state building towards the liberal democratic values that have served the West so well. The job of the West in this endeavour is “not to command and direct but to help, support and empower.”⁹³ And this requires that the West, through its interventions, work through a process that recognises the importance of local actors first and foremost, namely one of collaboration that provides space to suitable partners to begin the long process of state building.

Need to keep trying despite the challenges

Fundamentally, the official calculations of policy... were inspired by a hardening of arteries and a hardening of hearts... What stands out in that policy is the pessimism. It reflects a traumatic reaction from the hopes of

mid-century; a resignation to a bleaker present...

- Robinson and Gallagher⁹⁴

The challenges of state building interventionism are profound. The successes have been few and the failures significant while the collaboration problematic is a condition that can never be overcome, merely ameliorated. Despite all of this, there is a need for the West to continue a strategy of state building interventionism as a response to frontiers of insecurity, albeit with an improved approach to collaboration. This is primarily because frontiers of insecurity will remain a challenge as they are not an ephemeral reality of the immediate post-Cold War era. The continued existence of weak and failed states and the contact with them dictated through globalisation assures that this be so for the West.

It is important that despite the challenges of frontiers, that they do not lead to a 'hardening of hearts' amongst Western leaders and their publics. Robinson and Gallagher argued that one of the primary dynamics of the late-Victorian era of the British Empire was that official policy increasingly attempted to preserve the status quo of empire rather than "to liberate social energies abroad."⁹⁵ Victorian strategists gradually maintained less faith in their ability to shape events on the ground, through their values and ideals and the collaborative partnerships that they sought to implement them through, and instead put more emphasis on blunt military force articulated in concomitantly crude foreign policies.

In a similar vein, there is the possibility that the challenges of the present will stymie efforts to engage frontiers appropriately, either through naïve attempts to merely isolate them or on the other extreme to respond to them through the greater application of military force. The success or failure of post-Cold War interventions still "hang in the balance" as nobody can say conclusively that sustained, democratic governance and improved control over sovereign territories is impossible.⁹⁶ It is necessary to attempt to salvage the effort through improved collaboration with indigenous politics during interventions, both for the West's own sake and that of the peoples living in frontiers.

The biggest mistake for Western strategists to make would be to do nothing in an era of dynamic globalisation, leaving frontiers in the hands of those actors who thrive in their

anarchy, who in fact do want frontiers to exist because they are so empowering to them. That mistake should be obvious as it has been made before to dire consequences. Eliot Cohen argued this point well when he contended that the “anarchy unleashed” by a withdrawal of a US disgusted by its failures in frontiers and the rest of the worlds indifference to them is “too horrifying to contemplate.”⁹⁷ Frontiers dominated by suicidal al-Qaeda terrorists, genocidal militias in the Congo, atrocious rebels in Sierra Leone or bastardised druglord-insurgents in Afghanistan are a reality that simply does not permit passive observation or blissful ignorance.

Considering the need for strategic perseverance is a parallel requirement for the continued assumption of Western responsibility for frontier zones. Most importantly, assuming responsibility solidifies the West’s ability to partner with actors in frontiers who share similar values. Gaddis put this well when he stated, “We keep hope alive... by taking responsibility.”⁹⁸ Collaboration is a partnership of autonomous actors and the West always needs to bear that in mind. Local actors will collaborate if they believe that Western engagement and partnership can provide for a better future more plausibly than anybody else and that the West is engaged for the long-term. If the West does not present herself as a partner, it is only understandable that other actors who in fact do present themselves- such as dangerous non-state ones- will be chosen in her stead by individuals in frontier states.

The need for strategic perseverance and assuming responsibility is important for the West because it has already invested much and benefited well from the international system it has been paramount to creating. If the West values the current system, it must be willing to bear the costs to continue with it. Moreover, the simple reality is that if the West is not prepared to act and assume responsibility, there are few other possibilities other than frontiers continuing to exist and the insecurity they wrought getting exponentially worse. There may be a need to focus on fewer interventions in the most pressing frontiers of insecurity and to improve the follow-through on those that have already been started, but the West must persevere altogether.

8.4: Conclusion

No one who has been involved in decisions that are weighed down with fateful consequences can afford to ignore the calculation of risks and probabilities. From this point of view, prudence is a virtue. Without prudence all visions of the future degenerate into mere utopia, with all its attendant dangers.

- James Mayall⁹⁹

Managing frontiers of insecurity through state building interventionism is required such that the challenges of insecurity shared through globalisation will be less in the future than what they are in the present. Central to this management is the need to engage in improved collaboration with indigenous politics in the frontiers, to find and empower indigenous partners to better manage their territories through stronger governance. In an era where imperialism as an ideology is dead and the political willpower to intervene is direly lacking, the West simply cannot do everything. Hence, it clearly must interact with local people better to work through partnerships towards achieving common goals benefiting everybody, essentially a more stable world.

The collaboration problematique is profound. The lack of the political will to really dedicate the resources, thought, and sincerity to decisively engaging frontiers is widely lacking and an obstacle that can only be resolved through brave political leadership in Western states. While implementing a doctrine of collaboration and improving a willingness to pay for it are easier achieved, the values debate surrounding interventionism is not likely to dissipate in a post-imperial world. The normative debate of state building interventionism will be harder to confront but ultimately is most likely to be dampened, never ended, through interventions being successful at strengthening states and hence improving the quality of peoples' lives there. As Michael Ignatieff rightly argued, "There is nothing odious or invidious about helping local people to find their way to the right institutional mixture" required for stronger, more stable states.¹⁰⁰ If interventions are able to achieve that to a meaningful degree, the difficulties of collaboration will gradually dampen.

Frontiers of insecurity can only be managed presently; their insecurity mitigated rather than ended outright because of the dynamics of present globalisation. Yet, there is still a need to know that when Western leaders put the lives of their soldiers on the line and expend large sums of national treasure, these costs are being borne for a reason. That may not be a 'grand project' but it must still nonetheless be that the 'something' worth endeavouring towards is real, even if that means merely more stable states that pose less of an international security threat and ones that are starting to bear a general trajectory towards liberal democracy.

The West can help to change the context of frontiers even if that can only be fully completed by the people who live there. The easiest way to avoid policies of pessimism and a 'resignation to a bleaker present' is through finding, strengthening and supporting indigenous partners over a long duration of collaboration and thinking of them and broader indigenous society in frontiers as real individuals. Keeping a human face on the challenge of frontiers of insecurity is essential for responding to them because it serves to reaffirm the common humanity that unites the world, including that existing in the direst periphery.

My own experience with frontiers was started in the violent chaos of western Ethiopia but the human face I attach to the need for avoiding detachment and emphasising the personal engagement of collaboration was also experienced during trips to Afghanistan, the DR Congo, and East Timor. A trip to Liberia provided the most telling anecdote of the task at hand. My taxi driver on the ride into Monrovia from the airport was agitated. He oscillated between what was unabridged hope and the deep, heartfelt hesitance to believe something good might actually happen, the cold hard reality check that comes from lots of crushed dreams over the years. His general theme, exclaimed over and over, was that he hoped the recent elections, those of 2004, would "pave the way" for long-term peace and prosperity. He seemed to especially enjoy saying it after the car hit each jarring pothole, the analogy obviously striking him as particularly appropriate. The road into Monrovia has lots of potholes, as does the path to a better future for Liberia.

When you enter the capital, one of the things that strikes you the most are the signboards lining the road. “UNMIL supports democracy through elections” is painted in bold letters on one sign, proclaiming the UN mission’s participation in organising the country’s elections. The next signboard says “Democracy is regular elections,” just to clarify the first one perhaps. One gets the feeling that all of this UN advocacy for and explanation of democracy is geared towards the political elite rather than the general masses. That is probably a good idea since much of the political elites are still a scandalous mixture of retired warlords, shady businessmen, and the remnants of disgraced former governments. Progress brought about by the UN intervention and its Liberian collaborative partners has at times been painful and slow with crime waves, little social service provision, and high unemployment rates continually nagging at the Liberian people’s hopes for a better future.

My taxi driver exclaimed to me one last time as I was getting out at my hotel, “What we need is somebody to pave the way. Yes, to start us forward again.” Indeed, the potholes of Monrovia are deep but one large pothole in Liberia’s future has begun to be filled in by the intervention there. The UN mission and its Western backers have tried hard to bring stability to the country and push it towards a better future. They are still there ensuring an environment of security and support for the national government. Now it is up to that new government led by President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, herself a committed reformer and a Harvard-educated economist, to fill more potholes, both proverbially and literally, lest the country should fall back into the ruinous hands of those who thrived in Liberia as a frontier state. It is easy to be cynical about present interventionism but it is deadly serious that the West supports the likes of Madame Sirleaf, who has an immense challenge. Surely the future for Liberia is brighter now than it has been for decades.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1: ON FRONTIERS AND COLLABORATION

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CHAPTER 2: FRONTIERS OF INSECURITY

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CHAPTER 3: MANAGING FRONTIERS OF INSECURITY

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CHAPTER 4: THE THEORY OF COLLABORATION

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- ²⁸ *Ibid.*
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- ³² H.L. Wesseling noted this when he wrote of past colonialism that the “aim was the permanent and total subjection of the population.” ‘Colonial Wars: An Introduction’, found in J.A. de Moor and H.L. Wesseling (eds), *Imperialism and War: Essays on Colonial Wars in Asia and Africa*, Leiden, Universitaire Pers Leiden, 1989, p. 3.
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- ³⁴ Michael W. Doyle, *Empires*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 218.
- ³⁵ David J. Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1967, p. 13. Steinberg argued the following about Filipino collaboration with American imperialism: “the elite continued to espouse an evolutionary nationalism which would lead to independence when the nation was ready... [Prime Minister] Quezon, who had as a youth served with the Insurrectionists, was won over to the conservative gradualism of collaboration with America....”
- ³⁶ Robinson, op. cit., p. 144.
- ³⁷ Michael Ignatieff, *Empire Lite*, London, Vintage, 2003, p. 22.
- ³⁸ This was the term Robinson used but other imperial historians used the term ‘collaborative mechanisms’. The meaning is the same. Edward I. Steinhart, *Conflict and Collaboration*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 257.
- ³⁹ Steinhart, op. cit., p. 258.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 265.
- ⁴¹ Robinson, op. cit., p. 132. Robinson defined internal and external sets to define imperial collaboration, labeling the internal set more ‘traditional’ while the external was deemed ‘modern’.
- ⁴² Kipkorir, op. cit., p. 2.
- ⁴³ Andrea Kathryn Talentino, ‘The Two Faces of Nation-Building: Developing Function and Identity’, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 17; No. 3, October 2004, p. 564.
- ⁴⁴ This matches the emphasis of Kipkorir when he argued for imperialism of collaborating elites: “He had to endeavour first to explain imperial decrees so they were intelligible to the governed. Next he had to demonstrate the usefulness of those decrees. At every stage he had to promote the subject people’s proprietary interest in colonial rule.” Kipkorir, op. cit., p. 2.
- ⁴⁵ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 47.
- ⁴⁶ Talentino, op. cit., p. 563.
- ⁴⁷ Robinson, op. cit., p. 132. Robinson noted that imperial collaborators were not commonly ‘unified social groups’ but were instead ‘collections of mediating functions’.
- ⁴⁸ William A. Kraus, *Collaboration in Organizations*, New York, Human Sciences Press, 1980, pp. 24-25.
- ⁴⁹ Doyle, *Empires*, op. cit., p. 207. Doyle remarked of imperialism traditionally that “Extensive contact with metropolitan transnational forces could lead to the economic and political dependence of patrimonial society. This dependence set the foundations of collaboration and informal imperialism.” It can be argued that dependence is substantively different under present interventionism than under imperialism historically because of the basic differences between the two, as outlined in the chapter itself.
- ⁵⁰ Schellenberg, op. cit., pp. 158 and 172.
- ⁵¹ Kraus, op. cit., p. 122.
- ⁵² Laura Black, et al., ‘A Dynamic Theory of Collaboration: A Structural approach to Facilitating Intergovernmental Use of Information Technology’, Proceedings of the 36th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, Section 5.3, 2002.
- ⁵³ Talentino, op. cit., p. 565.
- ⁵⁴ Black, op. cit., Section 5.3. A general dynamic of collaboration, and applicable in this sense, is that degree of engagement by collaborative partners is crucial and a low level of engagement, for whatever reason, hinders the overall implementation of collaborative works.
- ⁵⁵ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, op. cit., p. 56.

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- ⁵⁶ Doyle noted this for imperialism when he argued: “Metropolitan influence, informally exercised, most directly affects the environment by encouraging and excluding options.” Doyle, *Empires*, op. cit., pp. 228-229.
- ⁵⁷ Robinson, op. cit., p. 142. Robinson further argued that for imperialism, given that colonial control depended on collaboration with indigenous politics, the ability of imperial agents “to reform them remained slight” vis-à-vis its indigenous collaborators.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 137. Robinson argued that in the successful cases of Japan and India, indigenous elites “succeeded in translating the forces of Western expansion into terms of indigenous politics” and did so by adapting European institutions to strengthen indigenous political abilities rather merely imperial interests.
- ⁵⁹ Australian Department of Defence, *Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update*, Canberra, 2005, p. 8.
- ⁶⁰ Steinberg, op. cit., p. 172.
- ⁶¹ Robinson, op. cit., p. 131. Robinson noted that from the viewpoint of indigenous actors, “the invaders imported an alternative source of wealth and power, which, if it could not be excluded, had to be exploited in order to preserve or improve the standing of indigenous elites in the traditional order.”
- ⁶² Brook, op. cit., p. 12.
- ⁶³ Isaacman and Isaacman, op. cit., p. 59.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 60.
- ⁶⁵ Steinberg, op. cit., p. 13.
- ⁶⁶ Isaacman and Isaacman, op. cit., p. 57.
- ⁶⁷ These experiences can include: the satisfactoriness or un-satisfactoriness of the group’s experiences with its self-reliance versus experiences with collaborative measures; the degree to which the ideologies of the group’s members are isolationist or collaborative; the extent to which means of self-reliance seem practical and advantageous versus the extent to which collaborative means seem feasible and advantageous; the degree to which the group’s task requires interdependence with other groups or allows the group to pursue its goals in isolation; the degree to which the groups leadership perceives isolation or collaboration as supporting or destroying its elite positions; the extent to which the members of the group think of collaborative relations as interfering with successful self-reliance; and the extent to which the groups which interact have common and congruent, rather than contradictory and conflicting elements in their cultural backgrounds and language thought-processes.
- ⁶⁸ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, op. cit., p. 85.
- ⁶⁹ Werner Rings, *Life with the Enemy*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1979.
- ⁷⁰ Robinson, op. cit., p. 131. Robinson noted that the ‘meshing’ of ‘indigenous social politics’ with the ‘incoming processes of European expansion’ was crucial to defining collaboration and that an ‘evolving equilibrium’ was necessary.
- ⁷¹ Chris Huxham, ‘Pursuing Collaborative Advantage’, *The Journal of the Operational Research Society*, June 1993, Vol. 44; No. 6, pp. 602-603.
- ⁷² Ibid.
- ⁷³ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, op. cit., p. vi.
- ⁷⁴ Bernard L. Simonin, ‘The Importance of Collaborative Know-How: An Empirical Test of the Learning Organization’, *The Academy of Management Journal*, Vol. 40; No. 5, October 1997, p. 1155.
- ⁷⁵ Robinson, op. cit., 130. As Robinson noted, “Domination is only practicable in so far as alien power is translated into terms of indigenous political economy.”
- ⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 147. Robinson noted that the “choice of indigenous collaborators, more than anything else, determined the organization and character of colonial rule; in other words, its administrative, constitutional, land and economic policies were largely institutionalizations of the indigenous, political alliances which upheld it.”
- ⁷⁷ Stephen Howe, *Empire*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 110. Howe argued that colonial rulers could not suppress nationalism forever- so “they had to co-opt, cultivate, cultivate or create amenable successors who could be counted on to preserve the more

essential interests of the metropole. Such successors were not ordinarily to be found among the 'traditional rulers' or 'martial races'... they lay rather in an often small but fast-growing indigenous middle class..."

⁷⁸ Robinson, op. cit., p. 132.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 131. Robinson noted that the collaborative elite must "square" their actions taken in the external set with their own collaborative partners in the internal set in order to maintain their credibility.

⁸⁰ Ibid. It was noted that indigenous elites had to be careful not to make "too drastic concessions in sensitive areas which would undermine the basis of their authority."

⁸¹ This parallels Niall Ferguson's point on imperialism when he argued: "An empire, then, will come into existence and endure so long as the benefits of exerting power over foreign peoples exceed the costs of doing so in the eyes of the imperialists; and so long as the benefits of accepting dominance by a foreign people exceed the costs of resistance in the eyes of the subjects." 'Empires with Expiration Dates', *Foreign Policy*, No. 156, September-October 2006, p. 52.

⁸² Robinson, op. cit., p. 143. Robinson made a distinction between the imperialists' interests in "central politics and modern activities" while the indigenous elites were conversely focused on "regional politics and traditional activities."

⁸³ Michael Doyle starts his spectrum at the "peacemaker" level whereby external actors facilitate a peace treaty among the various warring parties. Second to this comes the "peacekeeper" level, namely of monitoring the cantonment and demobilisation of military forces according to a defined peace process. The third level is that of "peacebuilder", which involves monitoring and "in some cases organizing the implementation of human rights, national democratic elections and economic rehabilitation." Lastly is the role played of "peace-enforcer" when the use of force will be required to both implement a successful peace process and/or to maintain it. Doyle is careful to note that during interventions, these roles might all be played simultaneously or in tandem or conversely just one role might be played in total. 'The New Interventionism', *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 32; No. 1-2, January 2001, pp. 225-232. Andrea Kathryn Talentino uses most of the same categories as Doyle but tacks on a last one she calls "nation-building" which notably involves all of the other role levels and "may include the temporary control of the state." It is a "full service approach." 'One Step Forward, One Step Back?: The Development of Peacebuilding as Concept and Strategy', *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 14; No. 2, Winter 2004, pp. 36-37.

⁸⁴ James Dobbins, 'Preparing for Nation-Building', *Survival*, Vol. 48; No. 3, Autumn 2006, p. 32.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 33.

⁸⁶ Robinson, op. cit., p. 147. This assertion of an updated theory of collaboration builds on Robinson's general argument that the presence, or lack thereof, of effective collaborative partners determined the need, or conversely not, for assorted degrees of imperial control. The "breakdown of indigenous collaboration" hence required "a deeper, imperial intervention that led to imperial takeover."

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 144. Robinson argued of imperialism that the "the brinkmanship involved in pushing indigenous politics in modern, desired directions, constituted the true genius of colonial administration."

⁸⁸ Howe, op. cit., p. 128.

⁸⁹ Huxham, op. cit., p. 604.

⁹⁰ Simonin, op. cit., p. 1154.

⁹¹ Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 243.

⁹² Robinson, op. cit., p. 147. In this regards, Robinson noted that decolonization largely resulted when anti-colonial agents "succeeded in detaching the indigenous political elements from the colonial regime until they eventually formed a united front of non-collaboration."

⁹³ This parallels Doyle's argument about imperialism: "In fact, imperial development, just as it created collaboration, also created the basis for resistance and revolt: it spread technical and organizational skills, it widened political horizons as it built larger national political units, and

it recruited new strata into political participation. Imperial development is thus the dynamic balance between collaboration and resistance. Doyle, *Empires*, op. cit., p. 363.

⁹⁴ Steinhart, op. cit., p. 257.

⁹⁵ Klaus-Peter Friedrich, 'Collaboration in a "Land without a Quisling"', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 64; No. 4, Winter 2005, p. 743.

⁹⁶ Howe, op. cit., p. 97.

⁹⁷ Brook, op. cit., p. 240.

⁹⁸ Note this graph resembles one found in the US military's counterinsurgency manual. Headquarters Department of the Army, *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, Washington DC, December 2006, p. 1-21.

⁹⁹ Zalmay Khalilzad, 'How to Nation-Build', *The National Interest* (Online), Summer 2005, see page 2 of article.

¹⁰⁰ Robinson, op. cit., p. 147. Note that these summary points largely mirror those of Robinson's except for his fifth point. Robinson's interest in non-collaboration centred on the facets of decolonization. Specifically he argued that "since anti-colonial movements emerged as coalitions of non-collaboration out of the collaborative equations of colonial rule and the transfer of power, the elements and character of Afro-Asian national parties and governments in the first era of independence projected a kind of mirror image of collaboration under imperialism."

CHAPTER 5: GRADUALISM COLLABORATION

¹ US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review*, Washington DC, 6 February 2006, p. 90.

² Marina Ottaway, 'Nation Building', *Foreign Policy*, No. 132, September-October 2002, p. 16.

³ Michael W. Doyle, 'The New Interventionism', *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 32; No. 1-2, January 2001, p. 227.

⁴ Michael W. Doyle, *Empires*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 42.

⁵ David J. Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1967, pp. 12-13.

⁶ Such an approach contrasted sharply with other imperial relationships in Southeast Asia; for instance the Dutch in Indonesia who had never made clear to the Indonesians that independence was to be gradually achieved. Steinberg, op. cit., p. 14.

⁷ Doyle, *Empires*, op. cit., p. 218.

⁸ James Dobbins, 'America's Role in Nation-building', *Survival*, Vol. 45; No. 4, Winter 2003-04, p. 91.

⁹ Beatrice Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen from Below*, London, Hurst and Company, 2006, p. 240.

¹⁰ Edward Rhodes, 'The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda', *Survival*, Vol. 45; No. 1, Spring 2003, p. 133.

¹¹ Robert Jervis, 'The Compulsive Empire', *Foreign Policy*, No. 137, July 2003, p. 86.

¹² Rhodes, op. cit., p. 137.

¹³ Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations*, London, Atlantic Books, p. 70.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

¹⁷ Doyle, 'The New Interventionism', op. cit., pp. 231 and 233.

¹⁸ Pouligny, op. cit., p. xi.

¹⁹ Mark Duffield and John Prendergast, 'Sovereignty and Intervention after the Cold War: Lessons from the Emergency Relief Desk', *Middle East Report*, No. 187-188, March 1994, p. 14.

²⁰ Pouligny, op. cit., p. 181.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

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- ²⁴ Kimberly Zisk Marten, *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past*, New York, Colombia University Press, 2004, p. 98.
- ²⁵ Zalmay Khalilzad, 'How to Nation-Build', *The National Interest* (Online), Summer 2005, see first page of article.
- ²⁶ US Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy*, Washington DC, March 2005, p. 1.
- ²⁷ Pouligny, op. cit., p. 104.
- ²⁸ Ibid., pp. 45 and 80.
- ²⁹ Ibid., p. 54.
- ³⁰ Ibid., p. 59.
- ³¹ Ibid., p. 53.
- ³² Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Kristin E. Kosek, 'Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed or Fail: The Role of Local Participation', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 40; No. 4, 2005, p. 366.
- ³³ Doyle, 'The New Interventionism', op. cit., p. 227.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p. 228
- ³⁵ Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett, 'Dependant state formation and Third World militarization', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, 1993, p. 329.
- ³⁶ Georg Sorensen, 'War and State-Making: Why doesn't it work in the Third World?', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32; No. 3, 2001, p. 346.
- ³⁷ Pouligny, op. cit., p. 86.
- ³⁸ Ibid., p. 155.
- ³⁹ Duffield and Prendergast, op. cit., p. 11.
- ⁴⁰ US Department of Defense, *Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Washington DC, 28 November 2005, p. 2.
- ⁴¹ Pouligny, op. cit., p. 67.
- ⁴² Ibid., p. xii.
- ⁴³ Ibid., p. 50.
- ⁴⁴ Christopher Coker, *Empires in conflict: The growing rift between Europe and the United States*, Whitehall Paper 58, London, The Royal United Services Institute, 2003, p. 12.
- ⁴⁵ James Dobbins, 'Preparing for Nation-Building', *Survival*, Vol. 48; No. 3, Autumn 2006, p. 32.
- ⁴⁶ James Traub, *The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006, pp. 125-126. However, building trust was more difficult in Kosovo because Albanians had fought explicitly for independence and had collaborated with the UN through the provisional administration, but still the UN could not guarantee that independence would ultimately be achieved.
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- ⁴⁸ Pouligny, op. cit., p. 233.
- ⁴⁹ Robin Moore, *Taskforce Dagger: The hunt for bin Laden*, New York, Random House, 2003, p. 109.
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- ⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 193.
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CHAPTER 6: THE COLLABORATION PROBLEMATIQUE

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