

**The London School of Economics and Political  
Science**

**Analysing the role of Public-private partnerships in global  
governance: Institutional dynamics, variation and effects**

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## **Declaration**

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## **Abstract**

While the promotion and growth of global public-private partnerships (PPPs) is indisputable, the same enthusiasm has not fuelled their disciplined study; thus, their potential to deliver on their promise of being effective and legitimate governance entities is far from established. Addressing this lack, this work investigates the universe of transnational PPPs in form, functioning and effects. It suggests that as PPPs are institutional innovations, partnership analysis can benefit from applying theoretical constructs from international regime research complemented with adjacent literature from management and organisational studies. Building an analytical framework based on the notions of input and output legitimacy, the work analyses how variation in partnership inputs (focus, actors involved, organisational dynamics and institutionalisation) interacts with varying internal management processes to result in varying outputs. The thesis utilises the operational notion of effects rather than the more subjective notion of partnership effectiveness, and considers effects related to goal attainment and problem solving.

Applying a systematic methodology, the work also defines and describes the universe of PPPs, creating a transnational partnership database (TPD) which pulls together all existing sources, thus encompassing 757 partnerships.

The resultant analysis reveals a marked variation across the universe of transnational partnerships as well as distinct differences in their operational capacity. It also highlights that while highly institutionalised PPPs are more likely to produce tangible outputs and effects, the extent of these is highly dependent upon internal management. By building a cumulative understanding of these institutional models, the work furthers debates regarding the role of PPPs as legitimate and effective governing actors.

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

BIS	Bank for International Settlements
CHQ	Central Head Quarters
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CSD	UN's Commission on Sustainable Development
CSO	Contract Service Organisation
DFID	UK's Department for International Development
FTE	Full time working equivalents
GHP	Global Health Partnerships
GPPP	Global Public-Private Partnership
GSM	Global Social Movement
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IGO	Intergovernmental Organisation
ILEP	International Federation of Anti-Leprosy Associations
INGO	International NGOs
IPPPH	Initiative on Public Private Partnerships for Health
IO	International Organisation
IR	International Relations
IPE	International Political Economy
LDC	Less Developed Countries
MEI	Multilateral Economic Institutions
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MNC	Multinational corporation
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
NPF	New Public Finance
NSA	Non-state actor
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
PPI	Private Participation in Infrastructure
PPP	Public-private partnership
ROE	Return on Equity

TNC	Transnational corporation
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNED	United Nations Environment and Development Forum
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNFIP	United Nations Fund for International Partnerships
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNCTAD	UN Conference on Trade and Development
UNCSD	UN Commission on Sustainable Development
UN-DESA	UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNESCO	UN Educational, Social and Cultural Organisation
UNIDO	UN Industrial Development Organisation
UNOPS	UN Office for Project Services
USAID	US Agency...
WEHAB	Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity ( <i>issue areas</i> )
WHO	World Health Organisation
WRI	World Resource Institute
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organisation

#### **Terms introduced:**

CP	Centre Point
GDM	Governance and Decision-Making variables
ITP	Institutionalised, tri-sectoral transnational partnership
MM	Management Matters (Interview)
TPD	Transnational Partnership Database

#### **PPP Abbreviations**

4-C	4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee Community
ACCIO	ACCION International
AERAS	Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation
AGORA	Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture

AHPSR	Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research
APELL	Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level
ARMT	Agricultural Risk Management Team
ASE	Alliance to Save Energy
AVRDC	World Vegetable Centre
BPD-WS	Building Partnerships for Development in Water and Sanitation
BTFP	Biotrade Initiative
BVGH	BIO Ventures for Global Health
CAI	Clean Air Initiative
CBTF	Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment and Development
CGAP	Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
CGIAR	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
CHAI	Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative <i>(Now the Clinton Health Access Initiative)</i>
CIAT	International Center for Tropical Agriculture
CLASP	Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards Program
CP	UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme
CPWF	CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food
CSI	Cement Sustainability Initiative
CWI	Community Water Initiative
DNDi	Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative
e8	e8 <i>(Formerly e7)</i>
EcoSanRes	Ecological Sanitation Research
EdInvest	EdInvest
EESD	Efficient Energy for Sustainable Development
EMVI	European Malaria Vaccine Initiative <i>(Now the European Vaccine Initiative)</i>
EOLSS	Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems
ETI	Ethical Trading Initiative
EUWI	EU Water Initiative: Water for Life
FFI	Universal Flour Fortification Initiative
FIND	Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
GAELF	Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis
GAIN	Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition



GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GBC	Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GCP	Generation Challenge Programme ( <i>Former CGIAR Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor'</i> )
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GeSI	Global e-Sustainability Initiative
GET 2020	Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding Trachoma by the year 2020
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria
GGFR	Global Gas Flaring Reduction
GHI	World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative
GHS	Global Partnership for Capacity Building to Implement the Globally Harmonized System for Chemical Classification and Labelling
GMAI	Global Media AIDS Initiative
GPEI	Global Polio Eradication Initiative
GPHW	Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap
GRASP	Great Apes Survival Project
GRI	Global Reporting Initiative
GRSP	Global Road Safety Partnership
GVEP	Global Village Energy Partnership
GWP	Global Water Partnership
HINARI	Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative
HOPE	Project Hope
IAVI	International AIDS Vaccine Initiative
ICANN	Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICBG	International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program
ICSD	International Center for Sustainable Development
IDRI	Infectious Disease Research Institute
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
IOWH	Institute for OneWorld Health
IPHE	International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy
IPM	International Partnership for Microbicides
IRC	International Water and Sanitation Center
IRU	International Road Transport Union

ISAAA	International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications
ITI	International Trachoma Initiative
IYF	International Youth Foundation
MAF	MAC AIDS fund
MI	Micronutrient Initiative
MMV	Medicines for Malaria Venture
MNT	Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus
MSC	Marine Stewardship Council
MVI	Malaria Vaccine Initiative
NITD	Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases
OARE	Online Access to Research in the Environment
PACI	World Economic Forum - Partnering Against Corruption Initiative
PCFV	Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles
PCIA	Partnership for Clean Indoor Air
PDVI	Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative
PECE	Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe
PIANC	International Navigation Association
PIIPA	Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors
PPC	Partners for Parasite Control
RBM	Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership
REEEP	Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership
REN21	Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century
SATELLIFE	AED-SATELLIFE
SCNSD	Sister Cities Network for Sustainable Development
SEAM	Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for Health
SIGN	Safe Injection Global Network
StopTB	Stop TB Partnership
TB Alliance	Global Alliance for TB Drug Development
TI	Transparency International
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
UN-CEFACT	United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business
UNGC	Global Compact
UNWTO	World Tourism Organisation
Vision 2020	Vision 2020

WADA	Community Watersheds Partnership Program Global Development Alliance <i>(Formerly the Coca-Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance)</i>
WADE	World Alliance for Decentralized Energy
WBCSD	World Business Council on Sustainable Development
WEF DRN	World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network
WRI	World Resources Institute
WSUP	Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor

## CHAPTER ONE:

### Changing patterns of governance: Introducing partnerships

Transnational public-private partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly gaining prominence as governance engines due to their unparalleled ability to bring together diverse resources from the public, private and social domains and generate synergistic relationships.<sup>1</sup> Despite the positive rhetoric surrounding their perceived role, however, whether or not global partnerships<sup>2</sup> will prove a model of effective and efficient governance in a new world of complex interdependence has yet to be seen. Though there are prominent cases of success, their growing role has not been matched with an equivalent amount of systematic study. The argument that PPPs effectively address global challenges is still rather a normative idea than a methodologically sound and theoretically grounded empirical fact.

This work addresses this lack of rigorous analysis with its ambitious goal of undertaking a comprehensive study of these institutional innovations in order to present a clearer picture of the state of global partnering. It addresses key questions regarding the contribution of PPPs to global governance, and specifically asks: what does the universe of transnational PPPs encompass? How can this diverse body of PPPs be analytically assessed? What do we know regarding their variation in form, functioning, processes and effect? How can the diverging characteristics across PPPs account for their varying level of institutional effects? Finally, what do these findings suggest regarding PPPs' role as effective and legitimate tools of governance?

This introductory chapter briefly presents these global partnerships and the resultant study. It first reviews the emergence of PPPs within these changing contours of global governance; places PPPs within existing theoretical and analytical constructs; and then discusses the research design and methodological approach that will be used to analyze these concepts. The following section highlights the overriding questions and key findings; and then concludes with a presentation of the overall layout and design of the thesis.

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<sup>1</sup> See, among others, Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002b; Benner, Streck and Witte 2003; Reinicke and Deng 2000; Andonova and Levy 2003.

<sup>2</sup> The term 'partner' is inherently value-laden; the notion of a public-private partnership implies joint operations and shared commitment under a public-private framework; using the term also implies that actors are working at an equitable level in terms of power and status, which is a debatable assumption. Though a widely accepted term, given the rhetoric, "public-private partnerships" (PPPs) will remain in quotation marks for the duration of the work; however, for the sake of readability, henceforth the term partnership and PPP will be used interchangeably.

## **1.1 Global dynamics, global governance and debating the role of partnerships**

The increasing complexity of global economic challenges continually transforms the system of interdependent countries and placing increasing pressure on states and their existing national institutions (Reinicke 1998). As the limitations of purely intergovernmental efforts to coordinate effective public policies become ever-more apparent (Hewson and Sinclair 1999), corporations and global civil society organisations have begun to claim a growing presence in global affairs, leading to profound reconfigurations of global power and authority. Consequently, where these processes of interdependence and globalisation interact, public and private actors are coordinating to form new governance arrangements (Buse and Walt 2002, 43).

Governance concerns the manner through which a society or organisation ‘steers’ itself to achieve common goals (Rosenau 1995), but even using the term ‘governance’ implies a movement away from authoritative state-based governance towards one characterised by interactions between actors (Peters 2005) and a shift towards a cooperation state (Börzel and Risse 2005, 196) or even in the direction of a world of “governance without government” (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Yet this shift from government to governance marks ‘a significant erosion of the boundaries separating what lies inside a government and its administration and what lies outside them’ (Shapiro 2001, 369) and enhances the role of partnerships, which ignore the boundary between state and market (Tilly 1992; Polanyi 1957; Schwartz 2000). The increasing promotion of PPPs can be seen as a furtherance of trends towards greater reliance on multi-layered, multi-played patterns of governance.

As it became more widely recognised that global problems necessitated global solutions, growing support for these new forms of networked governance developed. Uniquely structured to overcome market and government failure and leverage the capacities of the varied sectors, partnerships are supposed to create synergies and results not possible without collaboration. However, public-private governance arrangements do not only counter state-led steering of the past. From an academic perspective, they challenge both traditional International Relations (IR) theories and the analytical tools used in its assessment.

Transnational PPPs present a paradox: as innovative institutional arrangements, they should bring together diverse actors to address pressing global governance deficits; on the other hand, their growing presence can lead to a fragmentation of policy authority and challenge the foundation on which global governance is based. At the crux of this paradox are persisting debates regarding partnership legitimacy. While the concept of legitimacy is

furthered in later chapters, drawing this distinction is especially significant at the onset: input, or procedural, legitimacy, versus output legitimacy, commonly associated with effectiveness.

When considering the role of PPPs in global governance, the implications of potential tradeoffs between these elements are paramount. Can PPPs compromise on democratic notions of accountability as long as they fulfil their promise of being pragmatic delivery mechanisms? Or, will PPPs be accepted as legitimate governance actors only if they bring enhanced elements of these procedural elements - participation, representation and transparency? These challenges are not unique to partnerships: governance arrangements always involve tradeoffs, but unlike traditional structures of international and national governance, we know little regarding how these are manifest within and across partnerships.

PPPs challenge both traditional notions of legitimacy, and there is a growing body of critiques which debate notions such as their participation, representation and accountability, as well as effectiveness more broadly.<sup>3</sup> Researchers have begun to tackle these questions, though largely from a theoretical rather than an empirical perspective, at best utilising a few case studies as examples. Emerging works suggest that partnerships have indeed led to substantial gains (Caines 2005; Buse and Tanaka 2011) and contributed to addressing these pressing global problems. Yet evidence on whether PPPs are truly “win-win” solutions, succeeding where both states and markets have failed, is far from clear. The cumulative positive impact of partnerships is neither established nor properly tested (Biermann et al. 2007b). Given their diverse nature and ranging focuses, more needs to be done to systematically study the impact of these unique collaborative institutions.

These debates will certainly continue, and this work does not promise to settle them here, but what is clear from the onset is that transnational PPPs need a thorough examination. Systematic analysis must address their contribution to global governance, and in particular address whether these institutions are legitimate and effective mechanisms for governance. Doing so involves placing these institutionalised interactions under a critical lens and developing an evaluative framework which addresses both the pragmatic questions at hand and the broader theoretical debates.

Crafting such an institutional model and theory which examines the varying characteristics of PPPs’ forms, functions and democratic mechanisms is a necessary first step of analysis. Only after this is done can a proper evaluation of their effectiveness be properly undertaken. As Marra acknowledges, “Evaluation could, in fact, help define the appropriate

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<sup>3</sup> See, among others, Bäckstrand 2006; Chan and Pattberg 2008; Utting and Zammit 2009. The second chapter of this work furthers these debates.

policy role for the private and public sector suggesting when each should have the principal responsibility, where the two can work together, and the extent to which they can share responsibility” (2000, 153). Transnational partnerships could be an effective answer to many global governance issues, but without a proper understanding of their variance and potential effectiveness, addressing where, why and how they can be successful will remain elusive.

## **1.2 Theoretical applications and alternative explanations**

From a pragmatic standpoint, it is worth knowing if partnerships actually work: that is, do they fulfil the promise of effective delivery? From a political grounding, what are the potential trade-offs between improved democratic legitimacy and environmental effectiveness. How can PPPs be assessed from an analytical perspective, especially in terms of their variation in institutional design and effects in a framework that makes sense. What are the broader effects of transnational partnerships from a sustainability perspective, and what are their actual and future impact on global governance, sustainable development and global challenges likely to be?

This thesis adds value to these debates regarding the promise, practice and potential of PPPs. It enhances the conceptual and normative understanding of PPPs by providing a multi-disciplinary framework and related approach to evaluating their variation in form, functioning and effects. This section reviews the conceptualisation of PPP and applicable theoretical constructs and analytical frameworks which will be furthered in subsequent chapters.

### **1.2.1 Conceptualising PPPs**

One of the most challenging aspects of partnership evaluation relates to the ambiguities and contestations surrounding the term. The analysis of partnerships is made difficult by the contested definition of the notion and the current fragmented nature of partnership-related publications. The term “partnership” and its subsequent study within the literature have been approached from a variety of perspectives, which has led to “an analytic cacophony” (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011, 3). The resultant empirical confusion contributes to a polarised and rather incomplete nature of current PPP research (Van Huijstee, Francken and Leroy 2007, 85-87) making it difficult to sort to sort rhetoric from reality (ibid; see also Brinkerhoff 2002; Wettenhall 2003). Thus it is fair to say that a cumulative understanding of transnational partnerships is still underdeveloped (Biermann et al. 2007b).

Unifying most approaches, however, is the idea that partnerships bring together varied actors in voluntary interactions, though the extent, involvement and commitment of the actual

partnering arrangement is – and can only be – assessed through targeted research. The second chapter of this work will detail these definitional issues and their implications in greater detail. This work begins with an encompassing definition of partnerships, but the research interest is on transnational partnerships, those operating beyond the nation state. This work attempts to represent the universe of PPPs in its constructed **Transnational Partnership Database (TPD)**; the details of which are discussed in chapter four. A subset of partnerships was also created for additional analysis, termed institutionalised, transnational partnerships (ITPs), which includes all PPPs within the universe that are transnational in scope and involve tri-sectoral base of actors (encompassing representatives from the public, private and social sectors) (*Table 1.1*).

**Table 1.1 Partnership definitions employed**

	Main partnership definitions employed throughout this work
<b>Public-private partnerships</b>	Voluntary, horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors that join for an actual partnering arrangement rather than only more informal interactions
<b>Transnational Public-private partnerships</b>	Voluntary, horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised arrangements transnational arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors organised with a <u>global/ transnational</u> reach and purpose of <u>providing collective goods</u>
<b>Institutionalised, Tri-sectoral transnational public-private partnerships (ITPs) (Sampling Frame)</b>	<i>Voluntary</i> <i>Horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised</i> <i>Tri- actor based</i> At least one actor from the public, private and social (not-for-profit) sector <i>Transnational</i> Global scope, and Actors join across more than one country or region <i>Public policy focused</i> Aim or goal is providing a collective good or addressing global public policy need/issue

### 1.2.2 Analysing institutional influence: Theoretical constructs and relevant applications

While a large body of research has focused on the reasons for the formation and existence of partnerships (Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand 2005; Broadwater and Kaul 2005), more recent attempts are turning to understanding whether or not PPPs matter. As this questions the extent to which these are effective governance tools, engaging with these debates means first clarifying what is meant by effectiveness.



While considerable progress has been made in attempts to evaluate institutional effectiveness, thanks notably the growing body of work analysing international environmental regimes (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006; Young, King and Schroeder 2008), varying and debated approaches still compose the field (Underdal and Young 2004; Miles et al. 2002). Generally, researchers utilise a version of effectiveness as the dependent variable and attempt to explain ranging partnership effectiveness given varying factors and inputs (Witte and Reinicke 2005; Ruggie 2003; Druce and Harmer 2004). Lacking standardisation in regards to the specification and measurement of the main explanatory (independent) variables, however, it is difficult to generalise findings across studies. Thus there has been less cumulative progress made towards the goal of explaining variation in partnerships and their effects, and even less in the predictive sense.

As argued in subsequent chapters, defining, measuring and comparing institutional effectiveness is a research area wrought with severe methodological and operational challenges (Underdal 2004; Biermann et al. 2007b). To define effectiveness as the dependent variable involves addressing issues surrounding concept formation and variable definition, hypothesis development and causal inference (Young 2004). Moreover, it is far from clear that effectiveness should even be the dependent variable of focus. Others note the need to assess institutional influence on a broader scale, attempting to approach what Young refers to as broad versus merely simple effectiveness (Young 1994). This is methodologically and analytically more challenging, and relatively few partnership studies have worked towards this.

Once a notion of effectiveness is defined and measured, the more pressing question relates to what explains the resultant variation. Regime analysis has advanced the development of several conceptual and practical tools to utilise in such regards (Underdal 2008; Mitchell 2008), however, and a range of variables which do seem to make a difference have been identified. The relevance of these approaches and related constructs are furthered in chapter three.

The issues of institutional design, variation and effectiveness are not new for regime theory, but are more novel when addressing new forms of governance, particularly PPPs, which do not fit clearly within the current lexicon of institutions, regimes and organisations. Yet we should not view PPPs as radical departures from these conceptions (Andonova 2007). Partnerships, as regimes, are social institutions in the sense that they are assemblages of rights, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmatic activities that guide or govern human actions in a given issue area (North 1990); thus the established body of IR theories,

specifically those analysing international regimes and recent developments in the new institutionalism lend considerable value.

It is also becoming more accepted to analyse PPPs within sets of traditional IR theories (Biermann et al. 2007b; Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009). As this work argues, while conventional IR approaches remain relevant, PPPs are distinct institutional forms from regimes or institutions more broadly, and traditional constructs are insufficient to fully account for the exhibited variation in PPPs. Given their unique structuring, varied operations and inner dynamics, assessing partnerships necessitates constructing a hybrid research framework and set of related approaches, which stand within the body of studies from management, behavioural economics and organisational studies. While there is an obvious need for a coherent theoretical grounding and set of refined techniques, partnership analysis stands to benefit from a multidisciplinary approach combining macro-level international regime theory with micro-level theories on management and organisation.

### **1.3 Research design and methodology**

Explaining complex phenomena such as partnerships requires applying multiple theories connected within a common framework. However, existing analytical frameworks are inadequate when it comes to fully capturing PPPs' institutional variety, something that is especially the case regarding frameworks applicable on a large-n basis. While creating a common framework which encapsulates the diversity of PPPs is difficult, there are benefits to applying an analytical framework which captures specific elements of partnerships, their variation and contributions to perceived and/or actual effectiveness.

Partnerships operate on multiple levels, and as such require multi-level focus for evaluation. This work's methodology analyses PPPs as institutions operating at the micro, regime and environmental level, which allows us to incorporate their multi-level, multi-layered nature. This thesis also takes a pragmatic, operational-based approach to analysing partnerships: it focuses on systematic empirical investigation of partnership effects rather than the more subjective notion of effectiveness. As such, it analyses variation across the range of inputs, processes and effects through identifiable, tangible outputs within each.

Any research design, especially one that combines quantitative and qualitative methods across a large universe of cases, faces a number of difficult choices. Analysing PPPs across these multiple levels involves combining varying methods of data collection, review and analysis. Together, these varying strategies build a set of methods which work together to

more fully analyse and compare PPPs. Given the methodological substance of this work, discussion is reserved for that dedicated chapter. (See *Figure 1.1*. for an outline).

**Figure 1.1 Methodological steps taken**

<b>PPP Platform: Summary of Methodological Steps</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Define and describe the universe of transnational PPPs by creating a global database of all claimed global partnering initiatives.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Establish the numerical and structural base of the universe;                   <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Describe PPPs along range of Inputs, including typology, actor, institutional, governance, organisational and other descriptive variables;</li> <li>• Analyse specific set of variables related to “input legitimacy” including participation, representation and transparency ;</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ Segment universe into a narrowed sampling frame of those previously defined institutionalised transnational partnerships (approximately 150).</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Construct a conceptual framework for analysis of partnership inputs; “procedural legitimacy” elements; management practices and processes; and effects.</li> <li>○ Establish a basic framework of evaluation for transnational PPPs :               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Distinguish PPP effectiveness into goal attainment and problem solving and segment each into outputs, outcomes and impacts</li> <li>▪ Categorise outputs as organisational and performance outputs</li> <li>▪ Define, collect and analyse a set of comparable organisational partnership outputs for the sampling frame of ITPs</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Measure and evaluate the <u>management practices of the transnational PPPs by utilising a conceptual management measurement tool and a double blind/ double scored methodology of interviewing operational managers and directors in PPPs through a structured conversation on internal management processes and practices.</u></li> <li>○ Use the evaluative framework and information on ranging PPP foci, inputs, and processes to compare across partnerships. This allows for understanding variations across PPPs and also makes inroads into analysing the influence of PPPs at large.</li> </ul>	<p><sup>1</sup> <i>ITPs are those PPPs that are: Voluntary, horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors organised with a <u>global/ transnational reach and purpose of providing collective goods</u></i></p>

#### **1.4 Effective and legitimate? Overriding questions and highlighted findings**

Do partnerships live up to these promises of effective and legitimate governance? Will strengths on certain aspects account for deficits in others? What is specifically of interest is also whether the perception of these institutions having legitimacy will enhance effectiveness (Stokke and Vidas 1996). Asking these questions implies that enhanced democratic or procedural elements of legitimacy further the PPPs’ effectiveness, but the relationship could go the other way, or exhibit little significance. This study addresses these central issues and contributes to the debate on the promise, practice and potential of partnerships. Not only do the findings of this work support many earlier sectoral-based studies on partnerships for sustainability or health, but they also challenge many traditionally

held assumptions. Significantly, the findings highlight key areas of focus for both our theoretical and practical understanding of transnational partnerships. These main findings, explored in subsequent chapters, are highlighted in *Figure 1.2*.

**Figure 1.2 Transnational partnerships: Highlight of key findings**

Partnerships are challenging to assess: Conceptual issues and methodological difficulties prevail; multiple approaches to their study ensure cumulative understanding is slowed

Little is known regarding the universe of transnational partnerships: Current information sources are sorely lacking, existing studies are still largely case-study based or sectoral-focused.

Partnership growth is undisputed but evidence as to operational activity is lacking:

- Of the 757 partnerships pulled together from the main existing listings of PPPs, only 440 have evidence of operational activity post 2008; the majority of these began with open ended timeframes;
- This is especially troubling for UN-CSD partnerships, for which 169 have no evidence or information outside of their self-reported CSD listing.

Transnational partnerships are operating globally; but they are heavily concentrated, especially in certain sectoral areas, notably health, energy, sustainable development and the environment.

Participation within the PPPs and representation on governing boards is dominated by public sector actors;

- Over 70% of PPPs have a government actor as a main partner compared to 50% with at least one NGO or business representative;
- Across the universe of PPPs, only 45% are truly tri-sectoral in their claimed partner base;
- Governing body representation is even more publically dominated, as only 16% of transnational PPPs have tri-sectoral decision making, and one-quarter of transnational PPPs only have government actors on their main governing body.

Partnerships are varied institutional forms; but across the universe of PPPs the majority – over 60% - are hosted within another organisation, mainly the UN and its agencies.

Internal management practices are varied but generally weak; especially for hosted PPPs who significantly underperform in terms of management performance to their independent peers; PPPs struggle the most in management areas related to managing processes of learning, sharing resources and reviewing performance.

“Input” legitimacy, notably transparency and accountability is lacking; especially for hosted PPPs;

- Less than half of operational PPPs publish an annual report or statement and slightly less than one third of all PPPs tracked have publically available finances.

Performance tracking, review and evaluation are varied across PPPs; while there are top performers, only 46% of the sampling frame of ITPs publish their performance indicators and only 36% have been subject to external evaluation.

## **1.5 Roadmap and Outline of study**

The next chapter introduces transnational partnerships and explores the debates surrounding their emergence, current governance role and ability to address persisting governance gaps. It highlights that little is known on a cumulative basis regarding these PPPs, especially as to their established effects. The third chapter elaborates on the theoretical argument and argues that PPPs, as institutional innovations, can benefit from applying frameworks from international regime research complimented with adjacent literature on management and organisational dynamics. The fourth chapter presents the study's methodology and framework, and it also details the methodological challenges encountered, decisions made and methods employed.

The fifth chapter begins the empirical results section of the thesis. The findings from the Transnational Partnership Database (TPD) are presented, and the universe of transnational PPPs is discussed through variation in operational capacity, focus and coverage, actors involved and institutional design and structure. The chapter also details the governance and decision making forms and processes within these PPPs before addressing key arguments related to partnerships and input legitimacy, mainly focusing on participation, representation, accountability and transparency. The sixth chapter moves inside the partnerships to analyse the internal management practices and processes of a set of these PPPs.

The seventh chapter returns to the question of partnerships' effects, which are distinguished between goal attainment and problem solving. After reviewing the framework the chapter analyses the range of goals, missions and visions set across these PPPs. The chapter then assesses a set of comparable organisational outputs of the ITPs as well as their efforts towards performance tracking and evaluation.

The final chapter brings the work back to the questions that drove the study: are PPPs effective and legitimate tools of governance? What do we know about these institutional innovations? The key findings of the empirical work are reviewed as well remaining analytical, theoretical and methodological considerations. The conclusion discusses the implications of this work as well as the potential avenues for further research and the outlook for transnational partnerships more broadly.

## **CHAPTER 2:**

### **Rise of public-private partnerships in global governance**

Promoted as the appropriate response to address pressing global challenges, public-private partnerships are fast becoming “the development approach of our time” (Kjaer 2003, 13). Yet though the partnership paradigm has firmly taken hold within the international political economy (IPE), their rampant proliferation raises several questions regarding their promotion, unexplained diversity and questionable eventual impact. While the growing body of research surrounding the emergence of transnational PPPs highlights the empirical richness of the partnering phenomenon, both the current practice and eventual impacts of transnational PPPs remain far from clear.

The aim of what follows is to introduce transnational partnerships, their rapid growth within the international system and the overriding concerns surrounding these institutional innovations. This chapter begins by defining the conceptions associated with partnering and then presents the main theories attempting to explain their growth and promotion. The third section presents a brief overview of the diversity that characterises the universe of transnational PPPs, especially highlighting their increasing engagement with Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs). This is followed by a brief consideration of the debates surrounding the potential risks of partnerships while the chapter concludes by highlighting the lack of partnership evaluation.

#### **2.1 Understanding and defining partnerships**

Employed for its “mobilising capacity” (Utting and Zammit 2006, 9), the term partnership is “undoubtedly one of the most mis-used in the contemporary administrative lexicon” (Langford 2002, 69; in Wettenhall 2003, 106). Given the term’s positive connotation, **partnerships** are assumed to involve shared goals or agreement, cooperation leading to a form of synergy and joint operation which is preferable to unitary action. The nature of this collaboration and extent of mutual benefit is contentious, however, and one should not assume there are equitable contributions across partners. Further, despite becoming “the new mantra for the new millennium” (Tennyson 1998, 3), there is no prevailing consensus on what **public-private partnerships** constitute, and the term is applied to a wide range of relationships. In its most neutral conception, PPPs are arrangements of

roles and relationships where public and private entities combine complimentary resources to achieve a certain outcome. While current utilisations of the term lack specificity, it is helpful to consider the notion through partnerships' mode of decision making, actors involved and overriding aim or goal.<sup>4</sup>

Partnerships are distinguished by their mode of governance, as they employ non-hierarchical methods rather than top-down or authoritative modes of steering (Börzel and Risse 2005). While this implies decision making based on collaboration rather than coercion, the extent of actors' separate roles are rarely specified. UN partnerships, for example, have been defined as “voluntary and collaborative agreement ... in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits” (Nelson 2002, 47), but it cannot be assumed that all parties/partners agree on the purpose, or even the general activities, of the arrangement, nor that there is equal sharing of either risks or benefits. This is troubling, as given the value-laden nature of the term, it could lead it to being “easily abused and exploited to disguise the real power dynamics of an unbalanced relationship” (Malhotra 1997; in Hailey 2000, 315).

PPPs can also be distinguished by considering actors involved. While distinct differences are claimed to persist in the incentives, mandates and operations of the public and private sectors, there is no clear boundary between **public** and **private** in the partnership literature. One approach defines public actors as “individual agents or organisational entities whose main mandate is to undertake activities that generate social returns, or put differently, generate benefits for society at large” in contrast to private actors “whose main rationale for engaging in economic activities is to generate private returns” (Broadwater and Kaul 2005, 4). While some account all non-governmental actors within the private sector (Nelson 2002; Utting and Zammit 2006), others consider only formal market participants. Private foundations and business associations are also accorded varying sectoral placement.<sup>5</sup> Given their close ties to profit seeking firms, these associations are often placed within the private realm (Bull and McNeill 2007, 6), but others associate them with civil society and insist they should be clearly separated from other corporations.

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<sup>4</sup> For more detailed discussion on the terminology associated with partnerships see Mcquaid 2000 and Caplan 2003; for other definitional issues, Buse and Walt 2002. For a full list of words that are used interchangeably with partnership, see UNED (2001), *Multi-stakeholder Communication: Clarification of Terms*.

<sup>5</sup> While some clearly place these within the private realm (Bull and McNeill 2007; Martens 2007) others consider them public enterprises (Ridley 2004); the UN further distinguishes between private foundations and corporations, despite the close ties between the two (Ollila 2003, 43).

To fully explore these actor dynamics and enhance clarity to the research, this work segments “private” into the commercial and non-commercial (*termed social*) and includes civil society organisations, mainly NGOs, along with academic centers and foundations within the latter. While attempts to distinguish commercial, for-profit based actors (those with a market-orientation concerned with generating private returns) from the not-for-profit or social sector (those who have voluntary and non-commercial aims) are made, the reality is that many actors will not fit clearly into one camp, and sectoral base does not necessarily speak towards for-profit or “for-public” interest.<sup>6</sup>

Overall aim or objective is a consideration, as while some assume that public and private partners interact to achieve separate objectives (Vigoda-Gadot 2003, 64), others assert “[PPPs] are not about the narrow plan of any one partner: true partnerships are about shared agendas as well as combined resources, risks and rewards (World Economic Forum 2003, 3). By including governmental actors, PPPs are assumed to have an overriding public policy goal, but the term can also be applied to commercial arrangements. That said, most conceptions and this work attempt to exclude for-profit arrangements from the analysis, as well as those arrangements that provide “public goods” (Börzel and Risse 2005).

As many organisations attempt to classify PPPs, varying definitions emerge that are highly context-specific depending on the actors involved.<sup>7</sup> The UN defines public-private partnerships as ‘voluntary and collaborate relationships between various parties, both State and non-State, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share the risks and responsibilities, resources and benefits’ (United Nations 2005). This contrasts slightly from UN-Business partnerships, which are “a mutually beneficial agreement between one or more UN bodies and one or more corporate partners to work toward common objectives based on the comparative advantage of each, with a clear understanding of respective responsibilities and the expectation of due credit for every contribution” (Tesner with Kell 2000, 72). This latter definition takes a more normative

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<sup>6</sup> Many argue that conceptualising public versus private, or state versus non state involves problematic normative assumptions regarding the incentives of these actors, as it cannot be assumed that public actors are always acting in the state interest and non state actors (NSAs) are not. Dingwerth and Hanrieder (2010) recommend distinguishing between public and private governance techniques.

<sup>7</sup> The definitions of partnerships employed by IOs are highly dependent on their operations and engagement with them. Only the World Bank offers specific guidelines on what constitutes a partnership, defining “an agreement to work together for common goals, with all parties committing resources (financial, technical, or personnel) to agreed activities, with a clear division of responsibilities and distinct accountabilities for achieving these goals.” The IMF classifies PPPs as “arrangements where the private sector supplies infrastructure assets and services that traditionally have been provided by the government” (Hemming 2006). Other IGOs consider topical focus: the WHO defines them as means to “bring together a set of actors for the common goal of improving the health of populations based on mutually agreed roles and principles” (WHO 2000).



understanding in assuming shared values and norms of the partners, or the development of the “we-feeling” in the relationships.

Supplementary conditions, mainly in regards to scope or issue focus are also often integrated into the definition. Thus, in short, even when formally defined, the term partner continues to incorporate a variety of engagements and values. This has led several authors (and many PPPs themselves) to forgo use of the term partnership, referring instead to public-private institutions (Andonova 2005), public-private policy networks (Reinicke and Deng 2000; Messner 1997; Thatcher 1998), multistakeholder alliances or transnational interactions, multi-stakeholder processes (Hemmatti et al. 2002), as exemplified in *Table 2.2* below.

Due to the wide diversity of partnerships and to avoid normative preconditions, **public-private partnerships** are here considered *voluntary, horizontally structured and relatively institutionalised arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors through an actual partnering arrangement rather than only more informal interactions*; however, this work focuses on **transnational public-private partnerships**.<sup>8</sup> This latter definition, which the work utilises to compile the related database, incorporates the universe of PPPs with global scope (operating across more than one country or region) and an overriding public policy goal.<sup>9</sup>

As the focus is on governance beyond the state, the term transnational rather than global is employed, but this does not imply the exclusion of governmental actors. Further, while “partnership” is utilised to focus only upon formalised partnering initiatives, the term here is value-neutral: it does not necessarily imply that there is a convergence or compatibility of interests, incentives or intended aims. As the empirical chapters of this work showcase, these not only diverge greatly across PPPs and their respective partners but should also not be assumed as given or necessary.

This work’s **Transnational Partnership Database** (TPD) attempts to capture all partnerships within these definitions. This partnering universe is then narrowed to a sampling frame of **institutionalised, tri-sectoral, transnational partnerships (ITPs)**, which is a subset of the “universe” of PPPs and allows this work to conduct a deeper probe and subsequent

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<sup>8</sup> Kaul’s (2006) work considers global public-private partnerships where global refers to those that address a global challenge, have operations that span several countries or regions and/or include actors joining forces across several countries/ regions. Others distinguish PPPs as governance beyond the state and employ the term transnational to signify either operations that span more than one country or the actors join forces across more than one country (Biermann et al. 2007b). This work utilises the term transnational, though it is acknowledged the words are used interchangeably in the literature.

<sup>9</sup> The provision of a public good or public policy goal is criterion, but this work separates the intended function from actual effects, as otherwise failing PPPs would be excluded from the definition. See Keohane (1993) for a discussion of the methodological issues in assuming standards within definitions as applied to international regimes.

analysis on this set of relatively institutionalised structures. What is significant is that sectoral or functional lines are not utilised to reach this universe; instead, the sampling frame represents all PPPs within the universe (collected in the TPD) which involve actors from the public, private and social sectors, are transnational in that their operations span more than one country/region *and* the actors involved join across one or more country or region, are not-for-profit and focus on *addressing* a global challenge or provision of collective goods<sup>10</sup> (*Table 2.1*).

**Table 2.1 Partnership definitions employed**

	Main Partnership definitions employed throughout work
<b>Public-private partnerships</b>	Voluntary, horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors that join for an actual partnering arrangement rather than only more informal interactions
<b>Transnational Public-private partnerships</b>	Voluntary, horizontally structured and relatively institutionalised arrangements transnational arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors organised with a <u>global/ transnational</u> reach and purpose of <u>providing collective goods</u>
<b>Tri-sectoral transnational public-private partnerships (ITPs)</b> ( <i>Sampling Frame</i> )	<i>Voluntary</i> <i>Horizontally structured</i> <i>Tri- actor based</i> At least one actor from the public, private and social (not-for-profit) sector <i>Transnational</i> Global scope, AND Actors join across more than one country or region <i>Public policy focused</i> Aim or goal is providing a public good or addressing global public policy need/issue

## 2.2 Promotion of transnational PPPs

The essence behind partnering is that collaborative effort will result in additional value and effects unachievable without cooperation. Motivation for these synergies, or the “perception that acting in collaboration with like-minded partners is more effective than acting alone” (Vigoda-Gadot 2003, 72), fuels their promotion. While partnerships have long played a role in governance, especially on the national scene (Pierre 1998), recent dynamics have proven conducive to a renewed partnering between business, governmental and social groups. The partnership “boom” has now firmly taken hold at the transnational level as well, and global PPPs are quickly becoming new authority models that are changing patterns of governance worldwide (Giddens 2000; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Pierre and Peters 2000).

<sup>10</sup> Public goods are traditionally defined as those that are nonrival and nonexclusive, see Kaul 1999 and 2001, where she argues for an expanded definition of the terms. Other works consider PPPs those that aim for the provision of collective goods, which have at least one of the two traditional characteristics (Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009).

The rampant promotion of transnational PPPs has fuelled heightened interest and a growing body of research studying PPPs from varied academic and practitioner-based disciplines. As PPPs are approached from different theoretical perspectives and ranging empirical motivations, there are several competing theories attempting to explain this trend towards public-private partnering. Thus, despite heavy treatment, and perhaps in some part stemming from it, the reasons surrounding the emergence of partnerships remain complex and contested. As PPPs are multi-level, multi-playered institutional arrangements, it is not surprising that no unified account can fully encompass this trend towards public-private governance. Thus varying accounts should be seen as providing complementary rather than competing perspectives, as it is also likely that linkages between these different conditions provide the most coherent explanation for PPPs' emergence.

### **2.2.1 Structural changes and macro accounts**

From a macro-level, structural perspectives attribute the recent partnering trends to changing forces within the political, economic and societal context. The competing pressures emerging from globalisation, the enhanced presence of non-state actors (NSAs) in authoritative roles and the continual blurring of formerly held notions of governance authority highlighted the complexity of governing a global system. As the issues facing global leaders become too demanding to handle alone (Reinicke 1999; Kaul 1999, 2006; Buse and Walt 2000a), there was a gradual shift towards relying on new governance arrangements in the form of partnerships.

Economic globalisation is often associated with the liberalisation of markets and the increasing reach of corporate and technological power. Rampant innovations in technology and communication have facilitated the international exchange of goods, information and services interlinking countries and societies. Furthered by lowered barriers to capital flows, increased market opening and loosened regulations, the impact of financial globalisation has changed how countries interact and enhanced the reliance of states and global leaders upon each other (Held et al. 1999), which paved the way for eventual partnering between them. Increasing interaction amongst people and nations also connects formerly isolated groups and communities, allowing them to organise in new ways, and with this heightened interaction, the ability for social groups to form networks has been facilitated (Castells 2000).

Such dramatic changes facilitated the increased presence of new actors, who were now taking on roles once firmly held within the ciphers of governmental control. Partnerships

further reflect the way transnational corporations (TNCs)<sup>11</sup> have fundamentally altered the global landscape. With over 82,000 TNCs operating internationally as of 2008, an increase from 37,000 in 1992 (UNCTAD 2009), their enhanced roles not only challenge the power balance between the public and private sectors but the regulatory framework of international commerce and activity (Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999). More than economic effects, globalisation also brought civil society to the forefront. The number of nongovernmental associations (NGOs<sup>12</sup>) operating globally also continues to grow,<sup>13</sup> with the worldwide NGO directory listing over 79,000 in 2011.<sup>14</sup> Yet while their increasing engagement in global interactions cannot be denied, critics continue to question NGOs' lagging standards in accountability and legitimacy and even their actual success.<sup>15</sup>

With rising corporate profits and an increased attention to social concerns, the nature and flow of financial monies related to philanthropy and developmental aid also changed (Bull and McNeill 2007, 46-51). Growing amounts of aid are now channelled through private means, with estimates of as high as a 13:1 ratio between private and public net flows (Bull and McNeill 2007). Beyond corporate and individual initiatives, private foundations are becoming dominant international players, especially in global health governance. Largely through their role in coordinating increased financial and technical resources, foundations are increasingly seen as critical to the partnering process, the financial flows from foundations continue to rise: even despite the recent global recessions estimated giving for international purposes was \$6.7 billion in 2009 from US foundations alone (down only 4% from the year prior) (Lawrence and Mukai 2010). Enhanced roles and increasing power leads to legitimate concerns not only about the reliance on foundations for resources but also the possible distorting affects these players have (Rushton and Williams 2011), especially given their new-found capacity to shape the global agenda.

While globalisation did not create NSAs, it has certainly empowered them. These actors challenge traditional conceptions of governance as they increasingly assume power in

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<sup>11</sup> The term TNC is distinguished from a multinational corporation (MNC) to represent firms where the production process itself is globalised with a world-wide intra firm division of labour, while within an MNC the production process is complete within each regional base.

<sup>12</sup> Civil society is defined as "a political space where voluntary associations seek deliberately to shape policies, norms, and deeper social structures" (Scholte and Schnabel 2002, 3). NGOs are generally defined as organisations that are independent from government control, non profit making, and non criminal (Willetts 2004).

<sup>13</sup> For more on the rise of civil society see Wapner 1995; Scholte 2000; Steffek and Nanz 2008 and Bestill and Corell, eds 2008.

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.wango.org/resources.aspx?section=ngodir> Accessed August 1 2011.

<sup>15</sup> For recent overviews analyzing legitimacy and accountability of Transnational NGOs see Steffek and Hahn 2011; for accounts of limitations at the global level see Keck and Sikkink 1998; and O'Brien et al., 2000 for global social movements and their access points but limited results.

traditional government roles,<sup>16</sup> which leads to a reconfiguration of global political power (Ruggie 1993). Partnerships emerge from this system and also reflect this rebalancing of authority relationships. As Kaul (2006) notes: “the wave of government reengineering and market state rebalancing that has swept across many countries in recent decades has now reached the arena of international cooperation. Global public-private partnerships are an expression of this change and contributors to it” (2006, 2).

### **2.2.2 Pragmatic partnership response**

The perceived limited resources of governments, and the “rise of a new regulatory elite emphasizing flexibility and voluntarism,” all allowed multistakeholder partnerships to “logically emerge as a promising governance approach” (Inanova 2003, 17). Public-private partnerships emerged as a “pragmatic approach” and a needed movement towards results-based governance.

Engaging with partnerships complemented an increasing trend towards cooperation and interaction already existing within and across sectors. Governments have long coordinated actions, exemplified even further in recent years with a growing number of inter-state treaties and agreements (Andonova 2007). TNCs operate in complex webs of competition and collaboration, which often entails forming both horizontal and vertical networks.<sup>17</sup> They are also increasingly cooperating to establish international frameworks for their activity (Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999). NGOs also form alliances to consolidate resources and gain wider attention (Florini 2000). Especially from the mid 1990s, global leaders began crossing these sectoral lines: as Kofi Annan proclaimed to the World Economic Forum, “The UN once dealt with governments. By now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships involving governments, international organisations, and the business community and civil society” (UN 1998).

As once diverse groups of actors increasingly interacted, there was an influx of networks representing collaboration that was not only multi-actor but multi sectoral, multi-level and transnational as well (Zadek 2006; Witte, Reinicke and Benner 2002). Partnerships further institutionalise these ties and provide more concreteness to transnational relations (Steets 2005). More institutionalised than informal alliances or networks, they are often longer

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<sup>16</sup> For works analysing rising private authority in governance see Cutler Haufler and Porter 1999 and Hall and Bierstecker 2000 and Pattberg 2007 regarding rise of private environmental regimes.

<sup>17</sup> In efforts to enhance their representation and interests in the global forum, these firms also increasingly cooperating in international business associations, such as the ICC which represents more than 7,000 companies and has enjoyed consultative status with the UN since 1946 (Bull and McNeill 2007, 63).

lasting than networks but still maintain a level of operational flexibility, which is often seen as one of their main benefits (Witte, Streck and Benner 2003, 65).

The move to results-based governance through partnerships was not only a search for increased institutional stability but also a response to the perceived failure of traditional state-centered governance solutions to pressing international problems (Streck 2002). While they have similar functional advantages to transnational networks (Slaughter 2004; Cashore 2004), PPPs are generally focused on specific problems. The ability to add specificity with targeted goals allows greater focus in operations, which should lead to more tangible results (Widdus 2003; Reinicke and Deng 2000). An “absence of legalism” (Andonova 2005, 8) also characterises most partnerships. This allows for more flexible and efficient working structures and faster response times, but as noted in the introductory chapter, it raises questions regarding their legitimacy (Reinicke and Deng 2000; Bruhl 2007), which is furthered below.

### **2.2.3 Actor-based approaches**

Though linked to the accounts above, rather than focusing on structural conditions or the “partnership phenomenon itself,” another set of theories looks *into* rather than *at* partnerships. These perspectives view partnership arrangements as “advancements of actor-specific goals” (Van Huijstee, Francken and Leroy 2007, 81). The emphasis is on the incentives that led governments, corporations, IGOs and civil society groups to collaborate, and partners are seen as rational actors engaging within the partnership to maximize their own interests.

Financial concerns and access to resources are certainly at play, but governments also turn to PPPs to increase efficiency of by harnessing private market practices. More than monetary incentives, the combined skills and resources should “achieve a common goal that is unattainable by independent action” (Widdus 2003, 235). Even though they demand increased services or performance, many citizens remain wary of corporate influence on government, and public officials fear losing touch with citizens if their roles are undertaken by private actors. Combined, partnerships should channel the efficiencies of the private sector while maintaining public principles on citizen accountability and a focus on public good. That said, while the promise to bring more “businesslike” practice and thinking into traditional government roles is tempting, these incentives can be based on misguided normative beliefs regarding private versus public sector efficiencies and competencies (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2011).

Frequently subject to attacks for failing to address global concerns, or even contributing to them, IGOs and their agencies are often blamed for the “ongoing crisis of multilateralism” (Therien and Vincent Pouliot 2006, 60). While IGOs promises to reach and embrace some of these aforementioned global changes, their efforts were often seen as insufficient (Slaughter 2001; Archibugi and Held 1995; Held 2005; Woods 1999). Thus while these organisations are challenged to “reinvent” themselves if they wish to continue to complete and fulfil their aims (Witte, Reinicke and Benner 2002), they face dwindling budgets, lagging public support and growing contests over both their agenda and forms (O’Brien et al. 2000).

While IGOs had long engaged with civil society through partnering arrangements, the number of these relationships amplified in the past decade. IGOs engagement in PPPs is driven by multiple incentives ranging from acquiring or borrowing business expertise and resources to improving their image, among others. It is also argued that through partnerships, IGOs can ensure they are not neglected from global governance; indeed, far from diminishing their authority, engaging in partnerships could even strengthen their role if they become the “nodal points” in this “complex network of governance” (Bull, Boas and McNeill 2004, 493).

Firms were increasingly embracing partnerships as well, and the growing interdependence between business and society is a dominant feature of the past decade (Van Huijstee and Glasbergen 2010), especially as it become increasingly recognised that “social responsibility, social programs can enhance the profitability of the firm” (Kanter 1999; in Samil et al. 2002, 991). Enhancing their public relations, addressing social concerns and charitable giving are becoming core strategy, as “a social license to operate is critical for many companies and protecting it certainly represents a core business interests” (Caplan 2003, 34). Firms were also increasingly recognising that they were embedded within networks of interlinking stakeholders. This growing sense of interdependence in large part furthered a push towards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and its related initiatives. Originally associated with the notion of enhancing stakeholder instead of only shareholder values (Freeman 1987), the term is now more encompassing to consider companies’ broader economic, social and environmental impacts.<sup>18</sup> Cross-sectoral partnerships further these trends (Seitanidi 2005)<sup>19</sup> for companies to address global challenges within their CSR initiatives.

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<sup>18</sup> See, for example, the Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative at <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/index.html>

<sup>19</sup> See also Seitanidi and Crane 2009; Selsky and Parker 2005; and Hurrell and Tennyson 2006 regarding business-NGO or nonprofit partnerships.

IGOs, especially the WHO are also especially appealing partners for firms, as they can bring an enhanced profile and provides needed resources, such as cutting costs in research and development, and information. Especially given the reach of PPPs in less developed countries (LDCs), partnerships provide TNCs with access to new markets and regions, often deemed crucial for future competitiveness. Brand enhancement and reputation building are also dominant concerns (Witte and Benner 2006), and firms enter partnerships to improve their internal (Davis 1999) and external image (Murphy and Bendell 1997; Tholke 2003). More than pure self-interest, however, firms also recognise that this “new paradigm of innovation” between private and public can “produce[s] profitable and sustainable change for both sides;” (Kanter 1999; in Samil et al. 2002, 991).

Not only are civil and social groups boosting cooperating with public sector bodies (Cashore 1994; Matthews 1997), but alliances between businesses and NGOs have proliferated rapidly as well (Heap 2000). Traditionally viewed as confrontational foes, NGOs and businesses are increasingly collaborating with each other at heightened levels, and often without any government actors. While most of the related literature explores motivations for collaboration, generally focused on resources, both financial and capacity based, shared missions and furtherance of related CSR goals are also factors. Especially as NGOs often claim they are neglected in global decision making, they see partnerships as ways to further increase their involvement in global governance and becoming more respected global players.

#### **2.2.4 Ideational forces**

The shift from government provision of public goods to governance through networks of private and social actors also marks ‘a significant erosion of the boundaries separating what lies inside a government and its administration and what lies outside them’ (Shapiro 2001, 369). The proliferation of partnerships can also in part be attributed to changes in the corresponding set of ideational forces within the political economy that occurred along with these structural shifts.

The past quarter century was associated with an increasing wave of Neoliberal ideology sweeping across many OECD countries. Especially with the abrupt end of the Cold War, the tightly held notion of a state-market divide began to fall which fuelled the general acceptance of the role for the private sector in formerly publicly controlled functions as well as heightened reliance on market resources (Campbell and Pedersen 2001). Strongly associated with the “New Public Administration” and “New Public Management” trends of the early



1990s, partnerships embody new methods of delivering public services in efforts that reinforce the perceived win-win logic of combining public and private interests (Steets 2005).

A paradigm without a rival (Ivanova 2003), these neoliberal trends spread far beyond the political and economic realms, as there was a growing realisation of the need for balance between increased economic efficiency and social equity. Social and environmental concerns became institutionalised within this setting, especially in the now established concepts of sustainable development (Glasbergen and Groenenber 2001; Arts 2002) and CSR.

Even further, as they undertake increasing authority, non-state actors also shape the norms of the global agenda. Applying a constructivist approach to PPPs, others associate the rise of partnerships with the emergence of a “new global public domain” (Ruggie 2004, 519) where public finance is “adopting to the expanding globalising nature of its main deliverables, public goods and equity, and reinventing itself along the way” (Kaul and Concericao 2006, 19). Collaboration between NGOs and TNCs represents more than just reconfiguring global political power but also the “engendering and instituting [of] new expectations concerning the global social responsibility of firms” (Ruggie 2004, 510). Ruggie further notes that the Global Compact exemplifies these trends on a macro-level while the increased action of TNCs in HIV/Aids treatments points to this on the micro level (ibid, 513).

Further, it is this broad coalition of stakeholders that is seen as a precondition for realising sustainable development efforts. As Annan further argues, “These partnerships are changing strategies and practices in both the business and NGO sectors, with important implications for future sustainable development efforts and broader coalition and partnership building” (UN Secretary-General 2001). Partnerships are also about helping to “develop a range of trustworthy, reciprocal relationships which bind individuals, groups, and communities and society together” (Hailey 2000, 316), and thus public and corporate actors utilise partnerships to further “build broader social capital” (Ruggie 2004, 514) on a global level.

While less commonly applied to analysing PPP emergence, these sociological perspectives lend additional tools, especially where these structural and actor-based approaches cannot fully account for this rampant promotion of partnerships. The notion of path dependency attempts to explain why institutions develop then persevere, even if altering them would lead to more effectiveness in the long run (Powell 1991, 192). Path dependency suggests that “particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse” (Pierson 2004, 251). Applied to partnerships, it becomes more clear how the notion of partnering became fixed as a “win-win” paradigm, leading to their proliferation even

without adequate examination (Bäckstrand 2010). Buse and Harmer (2004) makes a similar argument, noting PPPs can become constructed within a “dominant discourse, furthering their “win-win” appeals despite little to no evidence of their effects.

Given the evolving political and social context and surrounding PPPs, assuming its participants are rational, self-interested participants is inadequate, as “beliefs in norms and principles – even beliefs only held in the past – can profoundly affect rational action in the present” (Keohane 2000, 8). To determine if PPPs promote emerging principles of conduct, “in that they assist in process of mutual adjustment of policies and practices between multilateral organisations and the private actors” (Bull and McNeill 2007, 42), or reinforce existing principles, this qualitative dimension on norms and values must be kept. Such views add a normative component to the analysis that further explains how the “PPP paradigm” became such an accelerating political process (Buse and Harmer 2004), even though PPPs themselves have been largely untested.

Of course these divisions are not clear cut; while there is a general distinction between rational accounts within the literature, neo-Gramscian and constructivist approaches (Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009), there are variants within each. While functional-based accounts are the most developed, they are obviously limited in their explanatory power, and they are criticised for the narrower set of outcomes they would assume. They also fail to account for the resultant institutional variety that encompasses the universe of PPPs (Andonova 2010).<sup>20</sup> Despite relevant overtones, few constructivist accounts have been empirically tested, and these also offer less in explaining resultant institutional variation, though there are many related constructs increasingly applied. Arguing that these constructs are still too state-centric to encapsulate the partnership trend, Boas, Bull and McNeill (2004) apply a “neo-gramscian” approach which is based upon a constructivist reading to examine multi-sectoral governance. Other similar accounts associate emergence of PPPs with the rise of corporate hegemony (Levy and Newell 2002) and corporate globalisation (Utting and Zammit 2006; Utting and Zammit 2009; Boas, Morten and McNeill 2004), issues returned to in subsequent chapters.

### **2.2.5 PPPs: Global governance gaps**

A movement away from authoritative government to a system characterised by interactions between actors (Peters 2005) and a world of “governance without government”

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<sup>20</sup> Subsequent chapters in this work will also expose their lacks when empirically tested against the universe of PPPs.

(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992) introduced in the first chapter, may also be leading away from the actual principles of governance. Even as they are gaining acceptance in authoritative roles, these newer actors are not only accused of lacking democratic principles, their ability to properly address global challenges is called into question. As the global political arena lacks one recognized authority, global governance is further defined as “the process of creating a legitimate political order in the absence of supranational authority or world government” (Bäckstrand 2005, 6). One of the challenges of establishing this order in the absence of modern statehood is “the lack of congruence between those who are being governed and those to whom the governing bodies are accountable” (Risse 2004, 1).

PPPs are professed to meet these challenges. To the extent that they are democratic, representative and transparent, partnerships could even enhance governance legitimacy (Börzel and Risse 2003). As the introduction prefaced, legitimacy can be considered via both its “inputs” of accountability, transparency and representation – and the “outputs” of effectiveness or problem solving achievement (Scharpf 1999).<sup>21</sup> These two aspects can often be at odds; that is, “while efficiency and [input] legitimacy are not necessarily contradictory, it is obvious that international organisations face a stiff uphill battle in their attempt to please and deliver on both ends” (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002, 4). As the rest of this work furthers these arguments, only a brief snapshot of the key points is provided below.

Partnerships are promoted with the promise they can bridge these aforementioned deficits in global politics (Andonova 2005; Buse and Walt 2000a). Given that in PPPs, unlike more informal interactions, “there are specific actors to hold accountable” (Hale and Mauzerall 2004, 222), **accountability** should be increased. Since PPPs operate with horizontal rather than top-down accountability mechanisms (Bäckstrand 2005), the range of stakeholders they are accountable to is increased which should allow for enhanced reputational accountability. Partnerships also improve decision making as they “spread the ownership of the decision making process and ensure that there is a broader accountability for actions taken” (Hailey 2000, 317). **Transparency** should be increased as public spending is made more visible to the public. This is furthered through the involvement of newer sets of actors if private sector methods of public reporting are preserved. Most foundations are also held accountable through public tax filings. NGOs involvement should also increase the “bottom-up” nature of decision making and lead to increased public knowledge sharing (Bäckstrand 2005, 5-7). With their claim of a wider base of representation, partnerships broaden **participation** in governance

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<sup>21</sup> Similar classifications into input versus output legitimacy are detailed by Kahler 2004 and Bäckstrand 2005; Zürn 2004 presents a breakdown into its normative and descriptive aspects. See also Biermann and Gupta 2011 for an introduction to legitimacy challenges as applied to private governance regimes.

processes. They also promise to increase not only the representation of actors involved in the decision making and operations but also of those receiving the services or benefits.

Especially with the inclusion of NGOs, it is promised to bridge the lack of participation in current governance (Andonova 2005; Benner 2002; Reinicke and Deng 2000).

At the end of the day, citizens and states are calling for results, or more “bang for their buck” (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002, 4); eventual achievements and output matter. There is a need for focused, results-based governing entities that prioritise the provision of global public goods and deliverables. Perhaps most promising is the potential for PPPs to close the **implementation** gap. The ability to draw together actors from across borders also addresses the jurisdictional gap hampering many current development efforts. Bringing together these diverse actors leverages diverse resource, information and skill sets; thus, it should improve lagging governmental effectiveness (Reinicke and Deng 2000). Achieving these results is possible by combining the strengths of the parties involved, and this implies more than just monetary resources but also combined expertise and commitment. As mentioned at the onset of this work, at issue are the possible tradeoffs between the two, especially related to those who argue that PPPs as emerging forms of governance are trying to improve output legitimacy through increased input legitimacy (Risse 2004, 16).

### **2.3 PPPs: Public-private partnerships: Current landscape**

The varied approaches taken to conceptualising PPPs inevitably leads to disjuncture in the use and understanding of them. This subsection emphasises the marked diversity of partnerships by briefly reviewing the timeline of PPP emergence, the key role of IOs in promoting and hosting PPPs and existing attempts to numerate and categorise them.

#### **2.3.1 Landscape and categorisation**

Given the encompassing nature of the term, it is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint the precise number of existing transnational PPPs. A large discrepancy prevails between the rampant attention given to promoting partnerships and that given to focusing on conceptual clarification. Though all PPPs represent some form of institutionalised interaction between public and private actors, the extent of the interaction, level of institutionalisation and diversity of the partners involved are highly varied, even among those arising in similar issue areas. Even more so, public-private relationships are also described via a multitude of terms (**Table 2.2**).

**Table 2.2 Partnership Terms: Common applications**

Public-private partnerships: Treatments and terminology		
Acronym	Full Name	Reference
CO	Consortium Organization	Updegrove 1995
CP	Civil Partnership	Zadek 2004
CSCA	Cross-Sectoral Collaborative Alliance	Gray 1996
CSOC	Cross-Sector Organizational Collaboration	Johnson 2002
CSP	Cross-Sectoral Partnership	Googins & Rochlin 2002
GAN	Global Action Network	Waddell 2003
GHP	Global Health Partnerships	Buse and Walt 2000a, 2000b; Buse and Harmer 2007
GIN	Global Issue Network	Rischard 2002
GPPN	Global Public Policy Network	Reinicke 1999; Reinicke & Deng 2000 Witte, Reinicke and Benner 2002
IP	Inter-sectoral Partnership	Waddell & Brown 1997
LP	Local Partnership	Kjaer 2003
MAC	Movement Advocacy Coalition	Ruzza 2004
MN	Multi-sectoral Network	Benner et al. 2004
MSI	Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives	Oldenziel et al. 2003
MSP	Multi-Stakeholder Process	Hemmatti et al. 2002
NSP	New Social Partnership	Nelson & Zadek 2000
PPO	Public-private institutions	Andonova 2005
SP	Strategic Partnership	Ashman 2001
<i>none</i>	Self- governing networks	Stoker 1998
SPO	Social Partnership Organization	Waddock 1991
<i>none</i>	Transnational partnerships and/or networks	Biermann et al. 2007a
UNBP	UN Business-Partnerships	<i>Varied</i>

While definitional issues are largely to blame, misunderstandings are also compounded by the diverse range of partnerships, their varying forms and attributes and the multitude of usages and treatment they accord. Few authors or reviews adequately elucidate the concept, so attempts at comparisons are thwarted. As Weihe (2006) argues, PPPs are also approached by distinct research traditions, and as such it is not logically possible or even sensible to construct an authoritative definition.<sup>22</sup> From a global perspective, Kaul estimates over 400 global PPPs are in operation, a rise from 50 in the mid-1980s (Kaul 2006). Her consolidated listing, however, does not account for the majority of the UN CSD-based

<sup>22</sup> Weihe (2006) summarises these approaches as the policy, economic and local regeneration, infrastructure, development and governance approaches. Osbourne (2000) presents a similar review and summarises the divergent theories as the nature of collaboration, public management, public governance, local development or empirically based case studies.

partnerships, of which 348<sup>23</sup> are currently registered, though not all are operating. Witte and Reinicke's (2005) review of UN-Business partnerships estimated over 125 active partnerships, but this also does not include the UN CSD partnerships.

Given these overlapping sources and definitional ambiguities, considerable confusion surrounds attempts to account for the PPP universe. The TPD provides clarity to the universe of PPPs by consolidating all existing data sources, databases and other listings. Based on the sources utilise, it enumerates the PPP universe at 757, though only 439 were operating at the time of writing. Remaining discussion is reserved until the fifth chapter which details these issues and presents the TPD.

### **Diversity and typologies**

What is immediately apparent is that PPPs represent a diverse and varying body of institutions. As partnerships cover a myriad of issue areas, differentiating amongst them is a useful starting point. PPPs should first be distinguished by actors involved, mode of steering and overall aim or goal, which often includes scope. Further categorising can include breaking down by nature of activity, membership, time scale and/or level of institutionalisation. In existing works, many separate by purpose, actors involved, phase of operation, location and structure (McQuaid 2000, 13), but partnerships still vary greatly within these classifications. Similarly employed categories are based upon constituency, organisational form, nature of activity or variety of partners involved (Reich 2002, 5).

Most existing studies employ functional breakdowns. As an example, the UN distinguishes between partnerships focused on advocacy, developing norms and standards, sharing and coordinating resources and harnessing markets for development, while the OECD notes that the CSD partnerships perform seven functions (OECD 2006). Bull and McNeill (2007) divide PPPs into those focused on resource mobilization, advocacy, policy and operations, which they term harnessing markets for development. Benner, Reinicke and Witte (2005) provide a similar breakdown and consider the following: facilitating the negotiation and settlement of global standards, allowing for the multi-sectoral sourcing of knowledge, making new markets where lacking and deepening markets failing to fulfil their potential and innovative implementation mechanisms.

Though functional breakdowns are useful,<sup>24</sup> many partnerships fit into multiple categories, and categories reveal little about actual functioning. Other attempts segment PPPs

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<sup>23</sup> The CSD websites notes 348 partnerships registered; the number 352 is the number of CSD based PPPs in the TPD, which includes 4 additional partnerships originally included within this listing that have been removed from the main website [Last accessed 30 July 2011].

by institutional status (Mitchell-Weaver and Manning 1990) or structural models.<sup>25</sup> One of the most comprehensive attempts at classification is Kaul's (2006) work covering more than 400 global partnerships finds seven types by considering purpose, venture class, nature of funding, nature of product, mode and legal status across.

While useful to enhance our understanding of the coverage and focus of global PPPs, a point returned to in chapter four, categorisation should be seen as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. As PPPs are such a diverse body of institutions, they cannot always be neatly placed into segments. Especially when only simple taxonomies are developed, crucial aspects of partnership functioning and operations remain unconsidered, such as partnering incentives, power relationships and decision making styles. These limitations noted, this work categorises the PPPs within the TPD across ten functional definitions, as furthered in the fourth chapter.

### **2.3.2 PPPs and international organisations**

While the progression towards partnering was not necessarily linear, it has undoubtedly accelerated in recent years, especially considering the role of IGOs played in promoting them. Though from their inception IGOs incorporated some acceptance towards engaging with the social sector and private business, it was nearer to the turn of century that they sought out partnerships as "an ideal means through which to reposition [themselves] and sharpen their missions" (Reinicke 2000, 54).

Executive leadership has been a main stimulant for reform (Ruggie 1999; Bull and McNeill 2000; O'Brien et al. 2000). Kofi Annan's leadership role as secretary-general beginning in 1996 undoubtedly was another major event in turning the UN towards private sector approaches (Tesner with Kell 2000, 31). Former World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz dedicated substantial attention to partnerships during his term, and when Go Harlem Brundtland became WHO Director-General in 1998, she began a strong push towards engaging with companies, noting that the WHO has to "be more innovative in creating influential partnerships" (Brundtland 1999; in Buse and Walt 2000, 554).

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<sup>24</sup> Other variations are based upon subject area, such as Buse and Walt's version that suggests simplicity is more necessary and segments global PPPs for health through goal orientation as follows: product based (focused on increasing supply in areas of unmet demand for certain drugs), product development (public sector offsets some portion of the costs of drug research and development; and system/issue orientation (focused on drawing attention to or creating promotion of certain healthy policy issues or resource (2000a, 700).

<sup>25</sup> See also Reinicke and Deng 2000; Nelson 2002; and Börzel and Risse 2005.

Though the UN was not created to actively engage with private actors,<sup>26</sup> and “then as now there was no basis covering hybrid forms of international collaboration” (Martens 2007, 11), it has fervently embraced partnerships in the past decade. The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg was integral in this accord. Initiated to some extent due to the perceived lack of progress on the Earth Summit goals, the WSSD launched close to 300 partnerships, known as Type-II agreements to distinguish them from the politically negotiated Type I agreements, which were promoted as follows:

“Specific commitments by various partners intended to contribute to and reinforce the implementation of the outcomes of negotiations of the WSSD and to help further implementation of Agenda 21 and the MDGs.”

*Bali Guidelines (UN 2002a)*

As Zadek expressed, “The Johannesburg Summit was more than anything about partnerships. Just as Rio was as much about legitimising the role of NGOs in global governance as it was about the environment, Johannesburg was about the legitimacy of the role of business in development, working with public bodies and civil society organisations” (Zadek 2004, 21). The Johannesburg partnerships were later registered within the UNDP’s Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), as discussed in the fifth chapter.

Though virtually all agencies engage in multistakeholder partnerships in some way, there is a marked variety within UN organisations.<sup>27</sup> Considering the UNDP’s key role in supporting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), it sponsors numerous partnerships programmes including the Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environment (PPUE), which hosts close to 400 partnerships and the Small Grants Programme, which is one of the earliest efforts involving non-state actors within IGOs. UNICEF claims it has “has the most extensive corporate involvement of any single UN body” (UN archives 93; in Buse and Walt 2000, 554), and reports entering into over 1,000 alliances. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) also has extensive involvement in local partnerships and initiatives, such as the UNEP Finance Initiative (UNEP FI). The United Nations Fund for International Partnerships (UNFIP) has also supported over 400 projects implemented by 39 UN agencies that cover activities in 123 countries between 1998 and 2006 (UNFIP 2007); however, projects do not necessarily imply the creation of a new partnership.

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<sup>26</sup> The initial UN charter incorporated a role for civil society under Article 71 (Tesner with Kell 2000, xxii), but UN officials did not formally work with them until the 1990s individual companies did not engage formally with the UN until the 2000s.

<sup>27</sup> See See Hoxtell, Preysling and Steets 2010 or Utting and Zammit 2009.



At the forefront of such relations given the daunting challenges of the global health agenda, the WHO began an earlier reach for corporate resources, expertise and funding. Indeed, some of the first and most highly profiled PPPs emerged within the WHO, such as Roll Back Malaria<sup>28</sup> in 1998. A lagging budget, perceived lack of effectiveness and overwhelming burdens led the WHO to feel that corporations were increasingly needed to further their work (Buse and Walt 2000a, 552); indeed, as WHO director Dossal notes that the involvement with business and civil society may “not just [be] the best chance, it may be the only chance to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (Dossal 2005, 2).

The World Bank exhibited a stronger private sector focus than the UN from the start, and it has always “tended to argue the merits of the private sector (Bull and McNeill 2007, 10). Its charter, however, technically not does permit it to enter into PPPs.<sup>29</sup> Based upon perceived early successes from greater private sector involvement in the late 1980s, the Bank’s efforts in these regards began to grow. In 1998 it launched its Business Partnerships for Development website with the goal of developing and promoting partnerships in the areas of natural resources, water and sanitation, road safety and youth development. It is estimated the Bank engages in over 125 Global Partnership Programs and 50 Regional (Steets and Thomsen 2009), and its other main partnering programs are the Private Participation in Infrastructure schemes (PPIs)<sup>30</sup> and the Carbon Fund.<sup>31</sup>

## 2.4 Debating partnerships

While they may be uniquely structured and suited to address the new global challenges they are increasingly promoted to face, partnerships are far from a proven mode of governance. Not only are “cross-sector partnerships by their very nature unnatural relationships” (Caplan 2003, 32), but public-private synergies may not always be achieved. Given that “the tendency towards multistakeholder partnerships continues to develop unhindered in international collaboration” without governments and IOs keeping pace with necessary regulations and guidelines (Martens 2007, 19), several issues emerge.

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<sup>28</sup> <http://www.rbm.who.int/>

<sup>29</sup> The Bank’s charter entails that it cannot lend directly to the private sector with governance guarantees; it can however do so through its subsidiary the International Finance Corporation (IFC), as well as engage in many private sector transactions through its growing Finance and Private Sector Development Department. See Miller-Adams 1999 for more background.

<sup>30</sup> <http://ppi.worldbank.org/>

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.carbonfund.org/>

### 2.4.1 Shortcomings

Positive ideological tones and optimistic promises have catapulted PPPs onto the global stage, but there are often “misguided assumptions” regarding the efficiency of combining the public and private sectors (Buse and Harmer 2007). The translation of complementary resources into a synergistic relationship often fails to materialise, and PPPs can lead to partners bearing more risk or cost for the undertaking than without the interaction. Rather than a “win-win solution,” partnering may lead to a trade off between the quality of government and the efficiency of the market (Hemming 2006, 15). Further, partnerships are not necessarily new, but rather a “relabeling” of existing operations, with no improvements or modifications made to current projects (Richter 2003). Many suggest partnerships only duplicate current IO work or new PPPs simply replicate existing ones (Caines and Lush 2004), which could further neglect more pressing needs. For example, it is claimed that the Global Fund was created in 2002 motivated by political and ideational aims over functional ones to replace the WHO’s Global Programme on Aids, despite lack of evidence a new institution was needed (Barnes and Brown 2010).

In regards to financing, despite the promises of increased financial resources, partnerships could actually detract from the provision of public goods if the money pledged towards partnerships takes away from other budget areas (Martens 2007). A study of the CSD partnerships finds they “have failed to bring a substantial amount of new, multi-sectoral resources to sustainable development activities” (Hale and Mauzerall 2004, 235), and similarly, “little evidence that donor funding has been able to leverage additional financial support” was noted in a recent review of GHPs (Pearson 2004, 7). For both GHPs (McCoy et al. 2009) and CSD-based partnerships (Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Bäckstrand 2010) private sector funding, with the exception of a few foundations, remains limited. PPPs’ existing funding is also often limited to a few sources; for example, some estimate the Gates foundation has contributed over 60% of all GHP funding (CIPRIIPH 2006, 92). The seven chapter explores these financial issues in more detail.

Such issues further concerns over potential power imbalances introduced above. Mixing TNCs, rich in financial resources and size, with NGOs could allow the operating modes of the firms to dominate. Neglect of local stakeholders is an even more dominant concern: many existing health and environment partnerships, which constitute the majority of these arrangements, are found to exclude smaller, local partners from key partnerships’ proceedings arrangements (Buse and Harmer 2007, 262-263; Rein et al. 2005, 10). Further, when corporations or IOs become involved in rural villages or smaller communities, the local

interests may be neglected (Hale 2002), and their involvement may even divert resources to issues of lesser national or local priority in an attempt to find quick solutions (WHO 2002).

Risks are also at stake for the partners themselves: for IOs, the threat is that the “proliferation of partnership initiatives can contribute to the weakening of multilateral cooperation under the UN system and to the fragmentation of global governance” (Martens 2007, 61) thus frustrating efforts to tackle global challenges (Buse 2004). More so, some accuse PPPs of only weakening further the power of NGOs or civil society (Richter 2002, 12; Rundall 2000, 11), advancing corporate interests (Stott 2003) and causing complex problems of international coordination (Martens 2007).

Though IOs are asked to play a role as “norm entrepreneurs” (Benner 2002), how these norms are formed is an issue. Tesner with Kell (2000) note that the UN has a role to play in transmitting global norms, which is facilitated by initiatives such as the Global Compact, but many fear such partnerships are only means for corporations to “blue wash”<sup>32</sup> their image without adopting or practicing these global norms. Furthermore, the Compact is a voluntary initiative, which does not “have the mandate or resources, to monitor or measure participants’ performance,”<sup>33</sup> and is often accused of too easily accepting partners that do not uphold the UN’s missions. In contrast, NGOs have a difficult and complicated procedure to gain consultative status with the ESOSOC to prove their activities are compatible (Martens 2007, 38). Despite acknowledging the need for multilateral support, there is also a growing fear that relying on PPPs might lead to a “diminished sense of the ‘public’ nature of global health initiatives” (Buse and Harmer 2007, 265).

#### **2.4.2 PPPs fail to address the gaps?**

Partnerships between business, IGOs and civil society are promoted as the most efficient and innovative solution to address these pressing deficits of global governance, but it is in these roles that PPPs are the most debated. Emerging criticisms regarding the accountability, transparency, representation, and ultimately effectiveness of these partnerships are also surfacing. The diverse nature of the actors involved and the lack of formal systems of reporting makes **accountability** even harder to track and assess. A paradox emerges that though the desire for increased accountability facilitated PPPs promotion and growth, complex relationships between partners, the lack of a polity to report to and a possible inequitable spread of resources among the partners could actually reduce accountability (McQuaid 2000,

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<sup>32</sup>As per Bruno and Karliner (2000, 3), bluewashing is a term used when companies work with the UN to improve their public image.

<sup>33</sup> [www.unglobalcompacy.org/aboutTheGc/integrity.html](http://www.unglobalcompacy.org/aboutTheGc/integrity.html)

10). Even more worrisome is the way that PPPs could allow governments and other public sector entities to “shift their policy-decisions to the realm of partnerships” and “circumvent parliamentary control” (Steets 2005, 5-6). Likewise, businesses are accused of using PPPs as “public opinion shields” (Andonova 2005, 16) gaining positive reputational effects without changing practices.

Thus despite the promise that PPPs can expand accountability in global governance, their flexible structures and diverging actor base certainly ensure accountability is made more difficult. Partnerships also lack internal accountability procedures: a year after implementation, most of the partnerships adopted at the WSSD had “specified very few such transparency and accountability mechanisms in their structure” (Andonova and Levy 2003, 17). Increasingly reviews criticize PPPs for lacking standards to both internal and external accountability mechanisms (Barstch 2008), though it is argued that as PPPs’ challenge traditional notions of democratic accountability (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2005), perhaps PPPs should be held to different accountability standards (Steets and Blattner 2010)

An inherent lack of **transparency** also persists in these arrangements, as it is argued PPPs could forgo either public or private means of promoting transparency. Such processes can be facilitated by the current lack of any comprehensive fiscal accounting or reporting standards for PPPs (IMF 2004, 23) which leads to varying reporting strategies being utilised (if any) across partnerships. Partnerships may also allow multilateral organisations to “weaken their accountability to member states” (Steets 2005, 6) and businesses may use PPPs to gain positive reputational effects without changing any actual practices. These challenges are often levied against GHPs, especially as to lacking transparency in publishing governing materials or reports (Buse 2004b).

In terms of increasing **participation**, it is also debated whether partnerships do more to represent neglected interests, as they could be continuing to promote the dominance of special interests. A continuation of northern dominance over southern interests is evident in many transnational partnerships (Richter 2002), and other studies of PPPs in developing countries show that the actual involvement of partner governments and civil society is low in terms of participation and any actual influence (Hoering 2003). Further, if the individual partners involved are themselves not representative, then “it is doubtful that close cooperation between essentially unrepresentative organisations – International Organisations, unaccountable NGOs, and large TNCs – will do much to ensure better protection for, and better representation of, the interests of populations affected by global policies” (Ottaway 2001). Determining actual influence is more than simply looking at representation. As this

work will argue in later chapters, static partner listings are often inaccurate and say little towards the actual workings within the PPPs.

### **2.4.3 Lacking output and limitations of current research**

Do partnerships really deliver results-based governance and address the **implementation** gap? Given they are studied from multiple disciplines and research traditions, misunderstandings prevail. Though recent growth of studies has advanced our understanding of the subject area, the theoretical coverage of PPPs is still broadly segmented between diverging perspectives, as became clear in the earlier sections outlining explanations for their emergence. One set of studies views PPPs as institutions while the other as arenas for goal-achievement and problem solving for individual actors. Within the former most research attempts are limited to case studies, which entails “partnerships and sustainable development are more clearly linked discursively than empirically” (Van Huijstee, Francken and Leroy 2007, 85). The latter tends to focus more on partnership success factors, focusing on the partnering process rather than outputs. Thus far, few concrete efforts to bring these varied disciplines together have materialised, which hinders efforts towards cumulative understanding.

Given a lack of comparable criteria, or even agreed upon notions of what a partnership entails, PPPs have not been evaluated in a *comprehensive, comparative* basis. While there is an emerging body of existing evaluations and partnership reviews, current attempts at evaluating across partnerships are limited at best, and most are based on high-profile case studies. Larger empirical reviews analyzing PPPs are mainly community or regionally focused, and though national PPP projects have been given more consideration, these are generally only project focused. IGOs are gradually conducting more evaluations and case studies of successful partnerships, but these documents are often generated internally, which may bias the analysis and questions comparability across PPPs. Third party agencies and public policy groups are beginning to focus more on review (Rein et. al 2005), but most are also case specific and only highlight areas of concern. Outside of attempts within the health and environmental subgroups, few comparative studies consider a large enough sample size of PPPs to allow for any generalizations to be reached in regards to their overall impacts.

While the partnerships hosted within the UN CSD have received more attention to evaluation, the most commonly cited works (Andonova and Levy 2003; Hale and Mauzerall 2004) are now rather outdated. More recently, a team of researchers furthered the evaluation

of these CSD-based PPPs with the Global Sustainability Partnership Database (GSPD)<sup>34</sup> (Biermann et al. 2007b). Emerging works from the GSPD are thus far focused on assessing sectoral groupings (Pattberg 2010; Biermann et al. 2007a; Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2010), but are shedding valuable light onto the state of play and legitimacy of these PPPs. Further chapters will discuss these in full when comparing these findings with this work.

Health partnerships have been the most serious in terms of internal evaluation (Lele et al. 2004). Most attempts at external reviews have also occurred within these GPPPs, and some of these reviews have even gone past impact assessments to examine broader consequences (Utting and Zammit 2006). While initial findings are broadly positive in terms of the potential for GHPs (Caines 2005), later reviews at the country-specific level (McKinsey 2005) highlighted serious concerns surrounding the costs at which these initial results were incurred. These and similar national or regional focused reviews further highlight the lack of attention to internal evaluation and assessment (McKinsey 2005). The most evaluated, especially as a group, are the set of product development partnerships (PDPs) (Grace and Druce 2009), and though these PPPs in particular are seen as delivering on many of their targets and leading to noted advancements within particular disease areas of focus, many recent reviews are still critical regarding their governance (Buse 2004b; Buse and Harmer 2007; Sorenson 2009) and note overriding shortcomings in legitimacy (Buse and Tanaka 2011).

If partnerships are to live up to their promise that they are “greater than the sum of its parts and about creating lasting and meaningful impact at all levels of action” (Global Knowledge Partnership Secretariat 2008) than evidence which transcends individual partnerships is needed. As these issues will be continually developed throughout this work, the above is purposely only a brief snapshot. The existing bodies of evaluations, assessments and large-n studies will be further explored in the remaining chapters that detail this work’s approach to evaluation and the empirical findings that result.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> <http://www.glogov.org/>. See also <http://www.ivm.vu.nl/en/projects/Projects/environmental-policy-analysis/partnerships-for-sustainable-development-research-project/index.asp> for more information.

<sup>35</sup> As the concluding chapter will discuss, the resource library within globalppps.org will host a separate area related to PPP evaluation, where downloadable reports, evaluation toolkits and critically the full body of sampling frame evaluations can be accessed. While this work conducted a meta-review of existing partnering toolkits, large-n evaluations and high profile case studies, this could not be included given space limitations but will be made available via this online portal.

## Conclusion

Public-private partnerships are increasing gaining a foothold in international governance, yet the motivations for these trends, the possible limitations of PPPs, and most significantly their actual effects are far from known. Though PPPs stand to address the global governance gap, the actual effects and impacts of PPPs are largely under explored, which is intriguing given their increasing attention, popularity, and perceived promises for future governance. Indeed, a striking component of the recent literature on partnerships is that researchers specifically say that they are *not going to address effectiveness* (Kaul 20006; Bull and McNeill 2007; Martens 2007), though they all acknowledge the pressing need for it.

Challenges certainly exist in examining output legitimacy: the diverse nature of partnerships challenges the academic literature in its need to incorporate non-state actors working with the public sector in joint operations. These are challenges undertaken by this work, and the next chapter details how by conceptualising PPPs as institutions, partnership analysis can benefit from substantial gains made within the research bodies analysing the variation and effectiveness of environmental regimes.

### CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONAL VARIATION

*“Every institution has its unique set of irrational and difficult constraints, yet some make a leap while others facing the same environmental challenges do not.”<sup>36</sup>*

The troubling array of global problems increasingly manifesting themselves both within and across borders further emphasises the interdependence amongst people and nations that characterises the current international system. Sovereign states have long looked to international institutions for their potential roles in facilitating action and enhancing cooperation to address these collective challenges. Though not all were firm to grasp Ruggie’s (1975) earlier proclamation that “international behaviour is institutionalised,” the role of institutions in coordinating international action has long been of focus within international relations (IR).

The pace of globalisation and increasing complexity of global challenges transform this system of interdependent nations and placed increasing pressure on states and their existing institutions (Reinicke 1998). As the limitations of purely intergovernmental efforts to coordinate effective action become apparent (Hewson and Sinclair 1999), corporations and global civil society organisations began to claim an increasing presence in global affairs, leading to profound reconfigurations of global power and authority. Consequently, where these processes of interdependence and globalisation interact (Buse and Walt 2002, 43), public and private actors are coordinating to form new governance arrangements.

The transnational public-private partnerships introduced in the previous chapter illustrate the further institutionalisation of such collective action, as they are seen as potential institutional vanguards to address these pressing governance needs. Yet, while these institutions certainly face challenging tasks and difficult environments, some partnerships have managed to not only persist but succeed while others fail miserably. Since some partnerships arose out of the same international conferences or mandates and/or involve similar actors and organisations, this variation is even more striking. Yet narrow focuses on individual partnership performance without taking internal processes, actor involvement and design along with external linkages will not contribute to overall concerns regarding PPP legitimacy (Bartsch 2011). Clearly, partnership analysis is in need of “robust analytical frameworks,” else “it will be difficult to make useful comparisons or draw practical conclusions” (Utting and Zammit 2006, iv).

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<sup>36</sup> Collins, Jim. *Good to Great and the Social Sectors: Why Business Thinking is not the answer*. 2005.



The purpose of this chapter is to place the study of PPPs within a suitable theoretical grounding. As PPPs represent a furtherance of the institutionalisation of IR, rather than viewing partnerships as a radical departure from the current system (Andonova 2007, 3), partnerships could be conceptualised as emerging forms of international institutions. Doing so would allow existing IR theory, especially focusing on evaluating international regimes, to maintain considerable value. Yet while institutional-based theories provide an appropriate grounding, a framework must consider that governing authority is now being shared by public, private and social actors across multiple spheres. Transnational partnerships operate at three distinct levels: the micro, internal partnership; the meso, institutional or regime; and the macro, societal level. To consider how relevant state and non state actors (NSAs) interact within partnerships, these theories must also be complemented with approaches that speak to internal governance, organisation and functioning.

The chapter proceeds by placing partnerships within the current conceptions of international institutions and regimes. The next part discusses the diversity these institutions exhibit and presents ranging theories explaining this variation. The following section returns to the issue of analysis and evaluation and specifically considers the progress made and applicable lessons from existing attempts aimed towards measuring institutional effectiveness. The concluding section brings these arguments together in an application to PPPs and outlines commonly considered sets of explanatory variables that will assist in building this work's analytical framework, which is designed to assess partnership variation.

### **3.1 Institutions, regimes and partnerships: Making sense of concepts**

#### **3.1.1 Definitions and background**

The post WWII era has witnessed a dramatic surge in the demand for institutions (Keohane and Nye 1989) and organisations (Archer 2001) attempting to cope with deepening interdependencies between nations. Traditional approaches that analysed institutionalised cooperation focused on the three associated yet distinct concepts of international institutions, regimes and organisations. While international cooperation was largely an intergovernmental affair, the advent of globalisation “subjects the intergovernmental regime to new disciplines” (Knight 1999), and challenges these existing institutions. As Kofi Annan aptly summed:

*“While the post-war multilateral system made it possible for the new globalisation to emerge and flourish, globalisation in turn has progressively*

*rendered its designs antiquated. Simply put, our post-war institutions were built for an international world, but we now live in a global world”*

*(Annan 2000, 11)*

Globalisation has not only blurred traditional boundaries between nations but borders between traditional governance mechanisms as well. PPPs, as networked forms of governance can lead to a gradual erosion of traditional constructs that have long formulated IR study. Yet transnational partnerships lack any clear placement within IR and “do not fit comfortably within the traditional structure and terminology of international regimes, institutions and organisations” (Andonova 2007, 5). As little consensus prevails on what even constitutes a partnership, their study has relied on a mix of approaches (Weihe 2006). In efforts to determine how PPPs fit within *and* complement the traditional institutional and regime literature, it is first necessary to review the ranging notions of these main concepts.

The proliferation of **international institutions** within recent decades has reinvigorated their study within all major disciplines from economics (Williamson 1985; Nelson and Winter 1982), law (Posner 1981), sociology, organisational studies (Dimaggio and Powell 1991) and political science (March and Olson 1989). While this expanded the research discipline, it also led to varying and often competing perceptions of what even constitutes an institution! A broad social science conception considers institutions as sets of rules, decision-making procedures and programmatic activities that serve to define social practices and to guide interaction of those participating in these practices (North 1990), or the “persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993, 5). Within sociology, institutions are basic building blocks of social and political life (Dimaggio and Powell 1991), while from an economic standpoint, institutions serve to minimize market costs and arise because the benefits of creating and participating in them outweigh the associated transaction costs (Williamson 1985).

Initially institutions were largely viewed as state sponsored actions, and as a result, “virtually no one predicted that these would triumph over politics” (Martins and Simmons 1998, 730-731). Their increasing role in areas long maintained within the ciphers of nations’ borders posed an uneasy challenge to the dominant realist agenda, which viewed institutions “as epiphenomena that reflect deeper social forces and distribution of power in society” (Strange 1983). While not disregarding power, neoliberal institutionalists focused on the constellation of interests or actor preferences that interact to form and shape institutions. Such perspectives, or power-structural approaches, are largely based on a functional logic: states

perceived that the benefits or joint gains from agreeing to cooperation within institutions outweighed the costs. A restricted view of states as rational actors has significant limitations (Hollis and Smith 1990; Wendt 2004), as it “left open the issue of what kinds of institutions will develop, to whose benefit, and how effective they will be” (Keohane 1988, 388). This led to the growing field of cognitive approaches which incorporated a role for ideas and knowledge and also viewed institutions as sites of normative discourse and learning.

A rising demand for new institutions to cope with deepening interdependencies coupled with a loss of confidence in “standard institutional tools” (Young 1994, 4-5) led to a renaissance in their study associated with new institutionalism (March and Olsen 1989; Rutherford 1994). Scholars saw more of a need to focus on social institutions as governance systems within the international order, or the “constellation of rules” that guided behaviour (Martin and Simmons 1998, 737) rather than only the institution as an actor or agency. Thus, the formal study of **international regimes** became increasingly mainstream within IR and the narrower fields of international political economy (IPE) and environmental politics (Young 1997; Hisschemoller and Gupta 1999).

Mostly following Krasner’s (1983) work there was general working consensus around a definition of regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of IR” (1983, 2), but this still left ambiguities regarding how these norms and principles should be defined as well as their role in explaining regime variation (Haggard and Simmons 1987).<sup>37</sup> This vagueness led many to apply a leaner definition (Keohane 1989, 4) while others utilise broader conceptions including all forms of “patterned behaviour” (Puchala and Hopkins 1983).

As both are forms of further institutionalisation of international relations, the emergence of regimes and **PPPs** has been conceptualised in similar ways. Considered as social institutions (Young 1994) and a major type of international institution (Keohane 1989), both regimes and partnerships “are created to respond to the demand for governance” (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006, 3; for similar argument for partnerships, see Reinicke and Deng 2000). They also function within similar realms as both “govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas” (Levy, Young and Zurn 1995, 274). Though topical concerns vary between international regimes and partnerships, regime theory provides many tools for

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<sup>37</sup> Though Krasner later clarified that “Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or postscripts for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice” (1983, 2), this still left several questions regarding the precise nature and place of regime theory, such as whether to focus “on the basis of explicit rules and procedures, or on the basis of observed behaviour, from which rules, norms and procedures can be inferred” (Keohane 1993, 26-27).

evaluating problem-driven institutions. Drawing heavily on new institutionalism, these research fields also have converging interests around collective action problems, or those situations in which undesirable outcomes arise from seemingly rational choices.

Though partnerships are distinct from regimes, they both function as governance engines which provide collective goods or meet these pressing governance gaps. As they can both be conceptualised in this way, the wide and continually developing analytical strands within this research discipline offer many potential tools for transnational partnership analysis. Early regime works focused on explaining how, why and under what conditions these regimes arise.<sup>38</sup> A second research pillar was more concerned with regime implementation and compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1991; Weiss and Jacobson 1998). Though these works produced a fruitful dialogue, they left many questions unanswered, such as why these regimes took on the different forms they did. These questions led to a promising field of study regarding whether or not regimes mattered (Levy, Young and Zurn 1995; Young 1997), and later more attention on how and why they do (Miles et al. 2002).

Even though its base stems partly from game theory and institutional economics, early regime theory still relied heavily on variables of power, interests and knowledge, relating closely to realist, neoliberal institutionalist and cognitive schools (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997). These approaches were heavily criticised for treating regimes as fixed entities, and they were later enhanced by those focusing on the role of knowledge, especially epistemic communities (Haas 1992). A close link exists between the roles that these communities take within regimes and similar roles of experts within partnerships, especially global health partnerships (GHPs), which rely on private practitioners for knowledge and information transfer (Buse and Walt 2000a). Thus while some rational actor perspectives persist, regime theory also relies on sociological approaches, and it these closely associated with neoinstitutionalism in political science and organisational behaviour (Dimaggio and Powell 1991).

New institutionalism clearly distinguishes between institutions and **organisations**, though regime analysts have always been aware of the close relationship between the two (Breitmeier 1997, 88). Regime theory exists as a subset within broader institutional studies,

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<sup>38</sup> For works on regime formation, see especially Hasenclever et al 1997; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Nye 1989 and Young 1989. Focusing within environmental regimes and cooperation, see especially Haas's (1990) work on epistemic communities, Liftin's (1994) work on ozone layer regimes and similar studies by Parson (2003) regarding scientific assessment.

but there is no simple or agreed upon distinction between institutions, regimes and organisations (Young 1997). Though IGOs also aid in international cooperation, they are not confined to operating within issue-specific areas, as regimes are by definition. International organisations often serve as instruments which aid the creation or support of international regimes and institutions, but they also function as actors in their own right. Further, while many regimes exist alongside formal organisations or are headquartered within an IGO (Sandford 1994), other organisations are created only *after* the regime to further aid its functioning.

It is possible to differentiate by noting that institutions are practices composed of recognized rules coupled with conventions governing relations among the occupants of these roles. Institutions affect the behaviour of actors but are not *always* actors in their own right (Young 1994, 3).<sup>39</sup> Organisations, on the other hand, are the physical material entities themselves, with headquarters, budgets and secretariats; thus, organisations have higher levels of bureaucratisation and structural formality than regimes. Regimes are the set of rights, rules and decision making procedures that “provide the rules of the game,” and actors within organisations function “under the terms of these rules” (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006, 3).

These definitional exercises are not an attempt to accredit higher status to one type of institutional form over another but serve as an exploration of the relationship between these concepts, especially as to how PPPs fit within the mix. Though the role IGO’s play as “partnership entrepreneurs” was elaborated upon in chapter two, there is a clear distinction between PPPs and organisations. Most PPPs are not formal organisations in their own right and often lack headquarters (termed Centre Points (CP) within this work). They are also distinguished by their horizontal, non-hierarchical governance. In contrast to formal organisations, most PPPs operate with flexible structures, often across multiple players and layers of governance. Further, many partnerships are institutionalised *within* organisations or reliant on them as partners for funding and resources. Perhaps PPPs should be further distinguished from IGOs since the promotion of the former in global governance is supposedly to address the perceived governance failures and inadequacies of the latter (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002; Tesner with Kell 2000). Regime theory as a framework show how international cooperation can be achieved without the creation of formal organisations, but most PPPs still embody many organisational characteristics. This implies that the management and organisational studies this work incorporates stand to contribute valuable analytical tools to compliment analysis.

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<sup>39</sup> This conception as applied to PPPs is furthered in the next chapter.

While useful for macro-level analysis, regime theory is thus not directly applicable for both definitional and theoretical reasons. Partnerships are divergent institutional forms from regimes: as an example, PPPs are generally more flexible and engage more private actors within internal collaborative governance modes. Given that participation within PPPs is voluntary (Andonova 2007; Kaul 2006), traditional regime theories assessing internal compliance become more difficult to apply. It is also easier to “exit” partnerships than formally negotiated regimes, as the only recourse may be “shaming” mechanisms rather than sanctions in the former. Though PPPs also function in target and rule-setting, they rarely have the binding nature of international treaties negotiated by regimes (Reinicke and Deng 2000; Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002). International treaties are also voluntarily entered, but once adopted they take the force of law. PPPs, on the other hand, have few or no formal mechanisms of legality. Further, even though private actors are participating more in international regimes, equal decision making status, where corporate actors hold veto power, is still rare.

As a body of research, the field of regime theory remains rather disjointed and lacks a coherent theoretical framework, or even one accepted definition of the unit of study,<sup>40</sup> though this same problem plagues partnership studies. It has been said that few theories have dedicated so much work towards establishing the need for their very existence (Rochester 1986) or concept definition and justification (Underdal 1995). The concept has been criticized for its “imprecision” and “woolliness” (Strange 1983, 343), and the theory deemed “vague” and “in need of conceptual defining.” Other criticisms levied against regime analysis concern its failure to fully account for the social nature of regimes as institutions and the perceived contradiction between its ontology and overly positivistic empirical tones (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 764), though this has arguable advanced within the past decade.

Efforts at conceptualising the role of private actors in transnational interactions are largely grounded within the “global governance debate” or “global governance theory” (Pattberg 2004, 10). Though governance and regime theory have shared roots in the literature on globalism and interdependence from the 1970s, the former is distinct. It moves from IR’s strict focus on intergovernmental regimes and incorporates the entire sphere of authority operating, and cooperating, beyond the state. Partnerships are constitutive of global governance structures, but they are also products of these wider configurations of changing power relations.

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<sup>40</sup> Though Krasner’s 1983 definition is the so-called “consensus definition,” it is not universally accepted and is also accused of having “a discomfiting degree of vagueness...which might inhibit the accumulation of knowledge about regimes in the long run” (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997, 11).

While the analysis of public-private partnerships challenges the traditional statism of IR theory, it also presents an opportunity to engage with existing, complementary literature that shows how PPPs operate as governance mechanisms in a world of “governance without government,” (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). Consider Young’s (1997) distinction between international and transnational regimes. Whereas the former are institutional arrangements whose members are states and focus on international society issues (e.g. arms control), the latter’s members are non-state actors and operate in issues associated with civil society. Though Young admits the reality is a set of mixed and more complex arrangements, he links this into a framework of global governance (1997, 283-284). As PPPs incorporate (perhaps to an even greater extent than most regimes) transnational civil society groups, operate with global reach and focus upon areas of lower political contestation than most regimes, such as public health or educational outreach, conceptualising the macro-level within this framework of transnational regimes provides a workable structure for purposes here.

The intricacies of partnerships also necessitate this merging of constructs and approaches. Transnational PPPs operate at many governance layers (micro, meso, macro), and their varying partners share governance roles across these layers. Understanding these dynamics involves sophisticated frameworks that can incorporate “complex processes of interaction involved in multi-level institution building” (Conca, Wu and Mei 2006, 282). Moving from the micro to the meso level of analysis, or from structure to processes (Schiller 2007, 11), necessitates drawing in varying approaches. Bridging these divides entails borrowing from the management and organisational disciplines, which integrates models of firm and organisational formation, functioning and performance. Collaboration at the micro level is inexplicitly tied to the resultant institutional level, and the dynamics involved at this micro level will certainly be heavily influenced by the characteristics of the actors themselves. Incorporating frameworks assist in explaining not only if and when partnerships will form but also the possible resulting characteristics the institution takes. This is why this thesis integrates the management interviews, detailed in the next chapter, into its methodology, as this allows for fuller exploration of partnerships at this level.

A multi-disciplinary framework also provides a link between the two distinct strands of literature on partnerships:<sup>41</sup> the institution-based partnership research, which closely parallels early regime research, and the actor-based perspectives that focus internally on the actors involved within partnerships and highlights actor incentives and internal dynamics

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<sup>41</sup> The distinction between institution-based approaches and actor-based approaches is discussed in chapter two; see also Van Huijstee, Francken and Leroy (2007) or Weihe (2006).

(Stafford et al. 2000; Rondinelli and London 2003). Drawing these together provides a needed synthesis of existing works, and it further integrates current PPP knowledge garnered from existing case-studies into more established research disciplines; thus, established tools of IR theory can be readily applied by integrating these complementary foci.

### **3.1.2 Exploring institutional variation**

As a form of international institutions, PPPs also cover a range of foci and vary in breadth and depth of specificity. Indeed, many of the definitional issues plaguing a coherent study of partnerships are strongly related to their marked variety. Variation is perhaps not surprising, as from the onset of institutional research, regardless of discipline, that institutions vary is perhaps one of the few points of agreement! While variety is to be expected, what is evidence is that similar attributes differ amongst all forms of institutions. Haggard and Simmons (1987) summarise four main areas of regime variation and change as strength, involving the degree of compliance or accordance with regime rules; organisational form, including areas such as membership, degree of centralization and dispute settlement mechanisms; scope, meaning the issue area(s) the regime covers; and allocation mode, or the way in which regime resources are distributed.

By nature, institutions are varying structures. At a basic institutional level, firms vary by ownership category, geographic location and spread (e.g. domestic versus multinational), form of legal incorporation and industry or area of focus. As organisations, the firms' internal forums for decision making procedures, such as structure of the executive board, are also highly variant across firms, and areas receiving more recent focus given heightened attention on corporate governance (Zammit 2003; Ikander and Chamlou 2000). Business and organisation studies have long attempted to show correlations between firm variation in performance with ranging variables of firm organisation and behaviour. While this is not the place for a focused review of this field of literature, variables that cause firms to vary, alter and achieve are linked to external threats emerging from the market, competition and industry considerations or geographic location, as well as internal regarding design, the role of leadership (Bowers and Seashore 1966; Dunn 2004), the development of managerial skills and employee morale. While too encompassing to discuss here, particularly relevant works within these bodies of literature that explore why institutions adopt varying organisational structures, employ varying internal processes and management, and critically how these relate to varying levels of organisational performance (See Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 2009 and Bloom, Kretshmer and Van Reenen 2010).



### 3.1.3 Explaining variation: IR constructs

While institutional variation is obvious, the reasons for these divergences are far from clear. Perhaps one of the few consensus is that partnerships are “organisms that change over time and can be expected to be dynamic” (Caplan et al. 2001, 5); thus it should not just be design features at initial outset of the institution that are incorporated into analysis but also the process of change over time. However, the dynamics involved in understanding these processes are even more difficult to account for than design (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Explaining institutional design and change is highly dependent upon the underlying epistemological and ontological perspectives taken, which influence the relative significance given to actor, societal and institutional variables, among others. Within regime research, differing perspectives and analytical clashes persist (Kratochwill and Ruggie 1986), which thwarts cumulative theory building. While these separate views provide distinct starting points for analysis, if they are seen as a complementary body of studies rather than only competing perspectives, they can further broaden understanding of institutional variation.

Though emphasized in divergent ways, ranging variables of power, interests, knowledge and culture tie together most early explanatory perspectives. For realists, as institutions are reflections of dominant power in society, their varying forms must be representative of the power preferences of the most influential actors in system (Gilpin 1987; Krasner 1985). Early work on institutional variation focused strongly on the role of a hegemon in their creation and variation, but institutions exist and later persist, as do many partnerships, even without a dominant power player. A more institutionalist perspective, on the other hand, explains variation through the constellation of actor preferences and interests. Such views consider regime formation as consequential actions taken by rational actors to maximise their self-interests; institutions are thus “rational, negotiated responses to the problems international actors face” (Koremonos, Snidal and Lipson 2004, 8).

In these settings institutions can influence the choices actors make, but they cannot determine them (North 1990). Though rational choice accounts<sup>42</sup> sheds light on ways institutions vary, it offers a more narrow view of why they do. Within this perspective,

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<sup>42</sup> These theories offer differing accounts of variation based upon structural, game-theoretic or functional perspectives. Structural theory is mostly associated with hegemonic stability theory (Krasner 1985), but these interpretations are not fully able to account for regime design and change. A game-theory view led early works on regime formation focuses on explaining cooperation, but is not as able to account for differing forms and change. Functionalists and neofunctionalists vary, and as Haggard and Simmons (1987) note that “new functionalism” is also not clear on differentiating between institutions and organisations, which affects their ability to clearly explain variation in design.

Koremonos, Lipson and Snidal's (2001) consider how the independent variables of distribution, enforcement problems, number of actors and uncertainty can account for variation in the institutional design features of membership, scope, centralization, rules of control, and flexibility of arrangements. Even though the authors' findings were largely compatible with their conjectures regarding choice and incentives (2001, 296), they acknowledge that rational design "is essentially silent on the sources of preferences that underlie these incentives" (32), and does not provide a full explanation for elements of design choice<sup>43</sup>.

As discussed in the previous chapter, the majority of theoretical attempts at explaining PPPs have relied upon similar functional accounts. Viewing their emergence in this light would argue that as states "can no longer do it alone" (Nelson 2002, 15), partnerships arise to fill in the gaps left by their inadequacies (Pierre and Peters 2000). With this logic, partnerships should form in areas of greatest governance deficits. Empirical studies show limitations to these accounts, however, as an early study of the original WSSD partnerships found most functional arguments were clearly lacking: partnerships arose more in areas that largely reflected the dominant interests of the main powers involved *rather than areas of greatest need* (Andonova and Levy 2003; Bäckstrand 2005). Related structural views conceptualise PPPs as a "logical response to structural changes in state-market -society relations that have occurred since the 1980's" (Utting and Zammit 2006, 3), further suggesting PPPs should emerge with forms that fit these functional requirements.

Narrower, structural accounts also cannot clearly address why previously unengaged actors interact to create international regimes or partnerships or account for the motivations for existing actors and institutions to function alongside them. Though rational accounts incorporate actors' preferences, these are considered previously formed and fixed. Even cognitive perspectives emphasising continual social learning as reinforcing change and driving towards more efficient regime solutions (Haas 1990), are still criticized for assuming a convergence of interests that may not occur and are still largely agent-centered (Milner 1992). Though similar accounts are applied to partnership studies, these are usually focused on the actors' incentives to join partnerships (Ruggie 2002; Dingwerth 2004; Rondinelli and London

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<sup>43</sup> These arguments are returned to in the concluding chapter, though as discussed in chapter four, many of these elements are integrated into this work's analytical framework.

2003) and can examine *when* and *why* partnerships arise, but they do less to explain the resultant varying forms.<sup>44</sup>

In a complex system, characterised by multiple levels of governance, when structural changes occur, “it is not inevitable that a specific institutional approach such as PPPs should emerge as the preferred solution” (Utting and Zammit 2006, 3). Though rational choice may go the farthest in accounting for institutional variation (Martins and Simmons 1987; Koeble 1995), even many rationalists agree that social and cultural influences matter. Within the theoretical threads of neoinstitutionalism, institutions are placed within a broader societal and sociological environment and no longer considered solely as fixed entities (Brint and Karabel 1991). Institutional design depends on the larger macro environment and is attached to the product of sociological construction and of political, economic or social decisions, or “realms of meaning” (Dimaggio and Powell 1991).

What differentiates this view is that variation cannot be explained *ex ante*; it is a continual process and highly influenced by setting, and actors’ preferences are no longer fixed but must be considered within the institutional context. Now “institutions are more than just another variable . . . . By shaping not just actors’ strategies (as in rational choice) but their goals as well, and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflicts, institutions structure political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes” (Steimo, Thelen and Longstretch 1992, 9). The connection between individual choices in designing institutions *and* institutions’ ability to shape these interests and ideas is a two-way relationship. While institutions are still a product of human design, it is not necessarily conscious design (Dimaggio and Powell 1991, 8). Such perspectives place further emphasis on the unit of study, as the “institutions do not merely reflect the preferences and power of the units constituting them; the institutions themselves shape those preferences and that power” (Keohane 1988:382; see also Kratochwill and Ruggie 1986), and even more so institutions can not only shape but also determine human behaviour (March and Olsen 1989). As institutions incorporate institutional and environmental demands in diverging ways (Powell and Friedkin 1986; Covalleski and Dirsmith 1988), such perspectives help examine not only why PPPs emerge with the actors, forms and functions they do, but also how and why PPPs interact and cope within the diverse, and often demanding, environmental contexts that they do.

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<sup>44</sup> Works on national PPPs stand to contribute to some of these explanations, see for example Rosenau Vaillancourt (2000) and Osborne (2000) for most comprehensive comparisons of national PPPs and their structure, functions and effects.

### **3.1.4 Explaining variation: Integrating perspectives**

This brief overview should also reinforce the need for PPP analysts to refrain from overly heavy reliance on any one perspective, given the marked variation and unique structuring PPPs embody. Despite the accumulation of research regarding regimes, no strong theory of regime variation and change exists, and regime analysis still does more to note marked variation rather than explain it. Perspectives that focus on power, interests or knowledge are not only often at odds with each other, but they do not fully account for the dynamics involved in regime negotiation. While constructivist approaches go farther in explaining variation, these accounts still consider states as main actors, which is an issue as many partnerships form without any state members. Even theories more rooted in sociological perspectives are not directly applicable, and they are often also accused of having too little explanatory power due to their post-hoc and case-specific avenues of explanation (Gorges 2001).

Another area regime theory has not addressed well is how existing institutions vary or are impacted by their interactions with these newer forms of governance (Stokke 1997). This is important not only in explaining the varying forms PPPs take but also what factors drive relatively unlikely partners to cooperate. Though the actor-based perspectives approach partnerships from this angle, few have advanced beyond basic theoretical outlines, and empirically most remain focused on identifying success factors (Van Huijstee, Francken and Leroy 2007).

As a form of institutions, firms vary in deciding whether or not to partner with NGOs and IGOs, the extent of interaction and the form of the resultant relationship. The incentives and dynamics that motivate these diverging decisions can be difficult to conceptualise from only macro-based IR theories. Such limitations further highlight the need to integrate micro-level analysis, which this work does by pulling in relevant management theories. While there is already a noted high synthesis of “business” literature and existing partnership literature on possible success factors (Caines et al. 2004), this literature is largely applied to the partnering process rather than with an empirical focus on outputs, and there have been few efforts to synthesise or combine these.

Given the extent of corporate engagement within these transnational PPPs, these complimentary foci provide insight into not only the incentives to engage in these structures, but also the varying forms the emerging institutions take. If the adage that form follows function applies, variation can only be explained by incorporating internal dynamics which this related literature provides. Partnerships are not a new idea for corporations, either, as the

“urge to merge” has led to a high number of joint ventures and consolidations amongst corporate actors within the past decade. Lessons from high profile failures, to the numerous, struggling cases of these joint ventures highlight the internal issues and noted variation in internal culture, ideas and processes just as much, if not more, than overriding structural or institutional explanations.

Before giving up in exasperation, one can note that institutions vary in *similar* ways; these diverging variables can be broadly segmented into focus or scope; internal features (elements of design, decision-making procedures and main actors involved) and external or exogenous factors, the latter being more socially and environmentally situated or constructed. Further, though surely not comforting, one certainty is that all institutions, whether private or public, social or economic, vary in their performance or effectiveness. Understanding how and why PPPs as institutions vary is a significant undertaking, and the primary focus of this work, but how this variation could possibly explain varying degrees of performance or effectiveness obviously the overriding concern.

### **3.2 Explaining institutional effectiveness**

As partnerships increasingly gain a larger governance role, it becomes more critical to determine why some PPPs succeed while other efforts fail. Evaluating hybrid forms of governance is methodologically and analytically challenging, however, as “the nature of the evidence to assess effectiveness is less clear” (El Ansair et al. 2001, 215). Though it is acknowledged that “we need to learn much more about the factors that control the effectiveness of international institutions” (Young and Demko 1996, 1), the study of regime effectiveness has become a major and continually growing field of research (Breitmeir, Young and Zurn 2006, 7), leading to an established body of study of lessons learned.<sup>45</sup>

#### **3.2.1 Defining effectiveness**

While some convergence is occurring in regards to operationalising and comparing regime effectiveness (Underdal 2004), the field is still limited by a lack of standardisation of terms and varying methods of operationalising hypotheses and procedures (Breitmeir, Young and Zurn 2006, 10). Lacking a comparable basis, cumulative understanding is slowed as varying definitions utilised ultimately determine the methodology employed. Effectiveness is a highly subjective term which is used synonymously with significance, consequences or influence, which only heightens its ambiguity. Being effective is often taken to mean being

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<sup>45</sup> Underdal and Young 2004; see also Levy, Young and Zurn 1995 and Miles et al. 2002

successful at the tasks set out to achieve, but this leads to fundamental questions regarding the nature of the goals and task setter(s) and also necessitates that objectives are clearly defined and articulated. First, a distinction should be made between *effects* and *consequences*. While a considerable amount of research targets the former, this often excludes other consequences or side-effects of functioning. For example, Young (1999a) defines regime effectiveness as “a matter of the contributions that institutions make to solving the problems that motivate actors to invest the time and energy needed to create them” (Young 1999a, 3), but he acknowledges this focuses rather narrowly on the subset of consequences the regime produces which are related to its specific tasks. A similar notion considers effective regimes to be those that successfully perform some generic function or solves the problem that motivated their establishment (Miles et al. 2002), but this also focuses upon *internal* effects, closely related to regime-specific behavioural complexes.

Analysts also often make the distinction between *simple* and *broad* effectiveness.<sup>46</sup> Whereas the former involves the effects of the institution upon institution-specific behavioural complexes or issue areas, the latter accounts for all of its impacts on the environment. Attempts evaluating simple effectiveness generally compare regime problem focus to the perceived solution (Underdal 1992; Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Weiss and Jacobson 1998; Miles et al. 2002). Though the merging of public and private interests may indeed fulfil the initial goals of the arrangement, unintended externalities could offset any positive contribution.<sup>47</sup> As broader consequences move outside of internal regime-specific analysis and involve cross-regime, domestic and systemic consequences and possible further impacts on international society (Young 2004, 8), incorporating these into the analysis is clearly more difficult, and thus it is much less developed empirically. Attributing causality also becomes more challenging as one moves towards assessing consequences.

Effectiveness also includes the overlapping, and often confused, notions of strength and robustness. As a point of analytics, effectiveness is generally related to problem-solving, (Underdal 1992; Young 1994, 142-143), and strength is considered “the extent to which [the regime] constrains the freedom of legitimate choice open to the individual member” or the degree of compliance with its rules (Underdal 2004, 28; see also Aggarwal 1983 and Haggard and Simmons 1987). Robustness is also associated with the institution’s ‘staying power’ (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1996, 178) and refers to those regimes that “master threats to their existence” with their functioning capacity intact” (Hasenclever, Mayer and

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<sup>46</sup> Another version of this differentiation is between simple and complex; see for instance Young 2002a, 14-15.

<sup>47</sup> This is a commonly cited criticism of the recent proliferation of partnerships, especially in areas of regulation (Pallemaert 2003, Hale and Mauzerall 2004), CSR initiatives (Utting 2005) and health (Buse and Harmer 2007).

Rittberger 2003, 184). While the terms are not unrelated, they are conceptually independent, and may even be inversely related to each other (Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996). An institution's persistence does not always mean it is still effective or serving any relevant interest, nor are all regimes or partnerships intended to endure.<sup>48</sup> If effectiveness is a self-reinforcing concept (Brinkerhoff 2007, 72), one assumes that for a partner to remain involved in a partnership, the partnership must result in benefits (collective and individual) which exceed the financial and opportunity costs of the partner's involvement (OECD 2006), than the pure maintenance of the partnership may then be one proxy of effectiveness.

Defining effectiveness thus often involves clarifying what it is not. Effective is not necessarily equitable, either in terms of the interests involved or the populations targeted. A key concern regarding PPPs is that they only serve the interests of their most dominant members, generally corporations, which could further detract from real development needs (Richter 2003; Zammit 2003). They also may only target a limited geographic area and divert resources from being deployed to more needy areas. Effectiveness is also not always equated with efficiency: while a partnership may well fulfil its tasks, it may not do so in the most cost effective way. Costs are often not fully considered in existing partnership evaluations: many existing impact assessments focus on partnership financials but neglect to perform calculations on whether the partnership is a cost-effective institution (McKinsey 2004). Though PPPs are promoted as a "quest to increase economic and social efficiency," more recent IMF evaluations caution that it "should not be taken for granted that PPPs are more efficient than public investment and government supply of services" (IMF 2004, 3-5). Though truly evaluating effectiveness should require a comparison of all relevant costs and benefits, this would include incorporating opportunity costs, which are often intangible and thus difficult to define and measure.

Currently, the notion of partnership "success" factors is more prevalent than effectiveness, but such criteria are often vague or unspecified, such as making a contribution to the global partnership movement (Tennyson 2004, 33-35) or "ensure that we don't do harm" (UNDP Nordic Office 2006, 1). Many argue that a narrow conception of success is relevant as "PPPs are mostly focused on achieving specific goals, and at the end of the day both the partners and the PPPs will be evaluated based on the degree to which they reach those goals" (Bull and McNeill 2007, 41-43). However, though the majority of existing work focuses solely on these narrower views, this could lead to a "danger that impact assessment will become the new mantra in policy circles" (Utting and Zammit 2006, 24).

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<sup>48</sup> As discussed in the next chapter, many of the CSD-based set time frames of as little as two or three years

Thus while the conventional regime definition considers effectiveness the “extent that [the partnerships] performs a particular function or solves the problem it was established to solve” (Underdal and Young 2004), this is certainly a limited view of effectiveness and “not sufficiently precise to be useful as an analytical tool for systemic empirical research” (Underdal 2002, 4), nor does it incorporate the noted social, ecological or political concerns.

One way to address these methodological challenges is to break down partnership effectiveness into dimensions or areas of focus. A McKinsey (2002) review of health-focused global partnerships notes effectiveness should be tracked along three fitness dimensions: outcome performance, activity performance and relationship performance. Brinkerhoff (2007) defines partnership effectiveness along three distinct parts: relations, reduction of transaction costs and reinforcement (2007, 72-73). Young (1994: 142-152) distinguishes amongst six dimensions of effectiveness: effectiveness as problem solving, goal attainment, behavioural, process, constitutive and evaluative effectiveness, but even he notes there are probably more. In later work exploring the causal, behavioural pathways of regimes’ effects, he remarks that while most attempts, including his own, link effectiveness to problem solving, it should also include legal, economic, normative and political elements. Even more, these varying dimensions may not necessarily co-vary in any predictable fashion (Young 1994, 150).

The most common practice is to analyse effectiveness via the triad of *outputs*, *outcomes* and *impacts* (originally Easton 1965, see also Underdal 2008). Outputs are the regulations, procedures, or research results relating to partnership formation and functioning; outcomes are the behavioural changes or effects associated with the partnerships’ efforts; and impacts are the environmental consequences or effects on the overall problem or issue area. These approaches, as furthered in chapter four, are attractive as they link PPP research to the larger body of policy analysis and also place the focus on direct effects that can be considered within a causal results chain (Young 2001). This is not to deny the obvious caveats: outputs, while tangible and traceable, may not actually lead to problem solving. Behavioural changes are difficult to trace and even harder to compare against each other. While a PPP can potentially fulfil its goals in terms of problem solving and be considered a success, this does not guarantee effectiveness at the environmental level. Partnerships will certainly produce unintended side effects through their operations, which may even be severe enough to negate any positive influence; these are significant issues to which later chapters will return.

It is doubtless that the concept of partnership effectiveness will continue to evolve, and highly likely it will always remain contested. As fully developed in the next chapter, given this work’s purpose it moves past these definitional issues and instead builds a



framework that works towards analysing tangible partnership effects. While it is certainly necessary to consider partnerships' full efforts towards program solving, this work focuses narrowly on effects. The remainder of this section still continues the theoretical, analytical and methodological discussion of explaining institutional effectiveness, as these build the eventual framework and methods utilised.

### 3.2.2 Measuring and evaluating effectiveness

Previous work exploring regime effectiveness notes the importance of “focused conceptual definition, ease of operational measurement, comparability across time and issue areas and ability for aggregate performance measures...” (Sprinz and Helm 1999, 360). Methodologically, building a conceptual framework for such a study must involve addressing the following three questions, originally proposed by Underdal (1992, 228-229) (*italics in original*):

- What precisely constitutes the *object* to be evaluated?
- Against which *standard* is the object to be evaluated
- *How* do we operationally go about comparing the object to our standard<sup>49</sup>

#### *Object*

The first point seems straightforward: obviously the object is the partnership, but in practice this is far from clear. Clarification is needed between the partnership itself and/or the tools it utilises, such as its set of rules, norms or procedures. Whether the assessment considers the “sum” of its influence or only the extent of its intended effects must also be clear. Partnerships, as regimes, are political constructs, developed and operated through political processes which also generate their own consequences (Underdal 2004), separate from the set of rules or standards they actually implement. The time in its lifespan is also a consideration, but institutional effectiveness may also not be a linear process but rather curvilinear, increasing initially but diminishing as the PPP ages.

#### *Standard*

Actually measuring effects requires defining a standard of evaluation, which involves two steps: the first is establishing a standard metric of measurement that can be applied across

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<sup>49</sup> Originally outlined by Underdal (1992) see also Underdal 1997; Sprinz and Helm 1999; and Miles et al. 2002 for further discussion.

cases while the second is determining the reference point for comparison. While evaluating hybrid forms of governance obviously presents challenges in both regards, applicable tools from regime research for the latter are more developed than the former (Underdal 2004, 35). A standard allows comparison of actual performance to a defined benchmark. A view that effectiveness refers to the extent to which a partnership has achieved the objectives it set does not necessarily lessen the methodological challenge. For one, it detracts from the ability to apply a common metric of measurement across cases. Assessing goal attainment also depends on the clear articulation of scope, focus and objectives, yet many PPPs lack this specificity and clarity. More fundamentally, determining whether or not the partnership is working towards an attainable or feasible goal is beyond the scope of most researchers' work,<sup>50</sup> as it involves not only making several subjective judgements but also possessing an intricate knowledge of the subject matter at hand.

Attempts to establish a standard present two common options: what would have occurred in the partnership's absence (the hypothetical state of affairs that would have existed without the partnership), and a second a notion of a good or optimal solution. The former looks into whether or not the partnership "matters" by assessing relative effectiveness while the latter attempts to answer whether or not the partnership indeed "solved" the problem (Underdal 1992). Sprinz and Helm (1999) specify these as upper and lower bounds and combine these with measures of regime performance, falling between a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum which allows one to arrive at a coefficient of regime effectiveness on a 0 – 1 interval.

This approach offers a method of comparing regimes in absence of common metrics by comparing proportional gains or effects – or relative versus absolute effectiveness. Despite its frequent use,<sup>51</sup> these techniques still leave much to be desired:<sup>52</sup> there is often a lack of transparency in operational terms, generaliseability is difficult and it cannot capture simultaneous cross-institutional or multi-level governance attempts. These values are also not mutually independent from each other (Underdal 2004, 36), as determining whether or not a partnership improved matters depends on some notion of what an improvement constitutes, leading to the latter standard.

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<sup>50</sup> For attempts to determine the degree or range of problem difficulty within regimes, see Effinger and Zurn 1990; Stein 1982; Underdal 2002 and Zurn 1992.

<sup>51</sup> The techniques is frequently applied to international regulation regimes (Sprinz et al 2004; Wettstad 2002) and environmental regimes (Helm and Sprinz 2000; Hovi, Sprinz and Underdal 2003a), while numerous reference the concept in terms of possibilities of evaluating regime effectiveness. See also Biermann et al. 2007b for relation to partnership evaluation.

<sup>52</sup> For a critique of the approach, see Young 2001 and 2003 as well as the rejoinder by Hovi, Sprinz and Underdal 2003b.

Constructing the no regime counterfactual is difficult, as it requires considering what would have happened under the previously existing situation. Common methods employ expert opinion or review teams, where specialists within the issue area conduct thought experiments to arrive at a “score” on either an interval or ordinal basis (Miles et al. 2002; Helm and Sprinz 2000), but even these experts often disagree with each other (Young 2003, 99). Also utilised are simulations (Bueno de Mesquita 1994; *ibid* et al. 2003), political cost-benefit analysis (Helm and Sprinz 1999; Pastor and Wise 1994), status quo ante or statistical effects separation. Though they offer a methodological repertoire of applications, whether all or any of these can be relevant to partnerships is still far from clear.<sup>53</sup>

Arriving at the notion of collective optimum is an even more challenging, if not impossible task, and few studies attempt it.<sup>54</sup> Approaches that do usually focus on specifying and comparing regime effects to regime goals, attempt to define technical functional optima (Miles et al. 2002), emphasise cost minima analysis or define environmental thresholds. The notion of collective optimum is clearly a more unattractive option for PPP research; one reason is the empirical difficulty in constructing the measure. Partnerships are also generally narrower problem-focused governance arrangements than environmental regimes. As such effectiveness compared against an ideal-type scenario may be less relevant. Further, neither standard is operationally convenient for PPPs: the “no-partnership” case is often absent (Druce and Harmer 2004, 14) and establishing a counterfactual is difficult as there is often “very little baseline data” (Holm 2001) from which to establish a comparison. One exception would be considering the “ideal scenario” in a limited application of the term, such as product development partnerships (PDPs), with specific aims. For example, the International Partnership for Microbicides (IPM) could consider an ideal type scenario where an effective female contraceptive is developed.<sup>55</sup>

### **Metrics:**

Any effort to measure or compare institutions against a standard also necessitates common metrics of measurement, or a defined unit(s) that at least specifies notions of more, the same or less. These are still arguably rare in regime research (Mitchell 2004, 121).<sup>56</sup> With

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<sup>53</sup> See Breitmeier, Underdal and Young 2009 for overview of recent advances in quantitative techniques.

<sup>54</sup> As an exception, Helm and Sprinz (1999) and Miles et al. 2002 use both standards in *comparative* empirical research, but these attempts are frequently attacked by critics.

<sup>55</sup> This would still be a limited view if it neglected critical aspects of access, distribution and advocacy, as well as eventual elimination of HIV in woman, as the latter would be, for traditional scholars, the assumed CO and hence only if IPM achieved this ambitious goal –*and the effects could be attributed solely to IPM*– would it be considered effective.

<sup>56</sup> Exceptions include Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006; Meyer et. al 1997; and Miles et al. 2002.

the inclusion of corporations, focus usually turns to financial metrics, such as growth, operating margins, net profit and earnings per share, but applying financial indicators to the public or not-for-profit sector is difficult as they are not dictated by rational capital markets that channel resources to those who deliver the best results (Collins 2005, 19). Social objectives also cannot be priced or easily quantified, so no single economic metric is applicable across cases (e.g. profit margin), nor is financial data available for most PPPs,<sup>57</sup> even if this was the desired metric.

While examples of PPP performance metrics are available from case studies, these are often more suited to analysing intra-partnership change over time rather than comparative assessment. Some metrics could be benchmarked to other PPPs in similar functional or issue areas, but it is fair to say metrics are most developed in partnerships that target tangible products or goals. When comparing across partnerships, common metrics become difficult to apply, especially if one wants to speak to partnership performance rather than compare the process of partnering. More metrics and tools are available for the latter including many practitioner-based guides,<sup>58</sup> but these are closer to checklists rather than evaluative assessments.

Even lacking applicable common metrics, many studies still compare partnerships and deem certain PPPs more or less effective than others. This is possible by comparing *relative* effectiveness, where performance is measured across regimes by comparing proportions of gain or relative improvement within the areas. While only a few attempts have applied a interval scale to partnerships,<sup>59</sup> many have proposed ordinal level rankings of PPPs, both within IGOs (OED 2004; Lele et al. 2004), and there has been a more recent attempt evaluating a set of 21 transnational partnerships, which will be furthered in subsequent chapters.<sup>60</sup> While few would deny the difficulties of such analysis, the larger issue at stake is transparency. Without transparent metrics and clear specification of methods used, it is difficult for such attempts to present convincing conclusions, especially if there is little

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<sup>57</sup> As discussed in chapter five and seven, only 27% of operational PPPs publish financial reports.

<sup>58</sup> For example, see Building Partnerships for Development (<http://www.bpdws.org>) and the Partnering Initiative (<http://thepartneringinitiative.org>).

<sup>59</sup> See Sprinz and Helm 1999 for application to regimes; Biermann et al 2007b propose working towards a scale for PPPs registered with the CSD.

<sup>60</sup> The team based at the team Berlin SFB700/D1 has an ongoing research initiative since 2005 on transnational partnerships, see [http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/teilprojekte/projektbereich\\_d/index.html](http://www.sfb-governance.de/en/teilprojekte/projektbereich_d/index.html) for more information as well as Liese, Andrea. 2010. Explaining Effectiveness: The Degree of Institutionalization and Beisheim, Marianne. 2010. Process Management. In: Marianne Beisheim and Andrea Liese (eds.): *Transnational Public Private Partnerships for Development – Explaining Effectiveness by Institutional Design*. Forthcoming (To be submitted to Palgrave Macmillan, Governance and Limited Statehood Series).

guidance on the composition behind these rankings. More so, it is difficult or impossible for another researcher to duplicate the work, and as such contributes less to the research field.

### *Operational procedures*

Even if one assumes that a standard and metrics are in place to note comparative change over time, the remaining challenge is to determine if, how and to what extent these changes are different than those that would have occurred without the partnership. This can be done through counterfactual analysis, introduced above, which involves modelling the likely course of events that would have occurred in the absence of a regime (Fearon 1996). This involves determining 1) what order would have occurred in absence of the partnership? and 2) what would have happened under that order? For the first, one can assume the previous order, and while this is not necessarily ideal it is workable. Answering the second question is more challenging, but can be attempted by assuming a linear approach (extrapolation), building various change models or relying on existing models for estimates (Underdal 2004).

While this returns the focus to the institution, it leads to the persisting issue of making causal connections between the institution and its supposed consequences. This has led to tendency-finding analysis (Dessler 1992), which focuses upon identifying mechanisms or pathways through which the institution could influence behaviour (Haas, Keohane and Levy 1993; Young 1999a). This is helpful in actually attributing effects as it allows one to trace actual behaviour pathways, but it cannot be used for large samples or in a cross-comparison basis. Rather than identifying relationships between independent and dependent variables, this asks “Under what conditions will the regime prove effective?” (Dessler 1992) and probes the combination of factors that matter for success in a given regime. As establishing causality and attributing changes in output or behaviour to the partnership’s functioning is analytically challenging, Young (1999) argues that only by viewing behavioural changes to explore casual connections can the analysis be free from “charges that the relationships reported are little more than spurious correlations (1999, 10).” He proposes an analysis based on a more deepened understanding of the regimes, rather than arriving at a score or indexed ranking of regimes (See also Haas, Keohane Levy 1993).

The ability to make sound causal inferences and attribute consequences also leads to a more frequent use of contribution analysis (CA) (Mayne 1999) in existing attempts at PPP evaluations of impacts (IHP+ 2008; IHP+ Framework 2009). CA addresses the difficulty of the attribution problem and limits of measurement and attempts to move past this to demonstrate how a partnership is actually making a difference. It is a way of using

performance measurement information to deal with attribution under uncertainty by acknowledging that other factors are also at play. CA allows one to reach likely association regarding evidenced outcomes; it does not attempt to definitively prove contribution, but provide enough evidence about the difference the program is making (Mayne 2001).

While none of these techniques will be satisfactory alone given the inherent underlying epistemological concerns, they do offer an agenda regarding how to understand the consequences of partnerships as similar complex institutions. Moving forward, the most appropriate methodological options may best be a toolkit which pulls together different yet complimentary options (See, for example, Underdal and Young 2004; Young, Lambin et al. 2006; Delmas and Young 2009).

### **3.3 Measuring institutional variances**

Assuming that the challenges encountered above are met, the pressing questions then relate to explaining resultant variance in effectiveness. While attempts assessing regime performance have advanced, “it is abundantly clear that we do not have a well-developed causal model identifying the most potent independent variables and specifying how they work and interact under different circumstances” (Underdal and Young 2004, 365), and the field as a whole lacks any common model “to serve as a guide to research and as a framework for integrating findings” (ibid). Most recent attempts at partnership evaluation (Biermann, et al. 2007b) build analytical frameworks that define effectiveness (or some variation of the term, e.g. goal attainment and compliance often featured as dependent variable in studies on international regimes as the dependent variable and a set of independent variables, as explanatory variables or determinants of effectiveness. The same initial steps are taken to reach and build the framework in this work, though it steps apart slightly from these common methods.

Drawing closely on this regime literature, this section begins by returning to broader debates in IR theory, specifically focusing on social action models emphasising the role of power, interests and knowledge (or state centrism, pluralism and rational institutionalism, critical theories and sociological perspectives). Within these broader contextual theories, three sets of more operational variables converge, which fall within the following main camps: institutional problem solving capacity; nature of problem; and the impact of environment, linkages and broader socioeconomic setting.

#### **3.3.1 International Relations theories and social constructs**

The first group concentrates on variables of power, interest and knowledge. From a neorealist perspective, those focusing upon power argue the need for a hegemon or dominant power in the operation of a successful regime (Keohane 1986). Power relationships remain paramount in critical global governance studies, which seek to explain the ability of actors to constrain or influence policy choices and actions (Cox 1987; Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2010). An institutionalist perspective, however, emphasizes actor interests and preferences and how these interact or converge (Underdal 1987).<sup>61</sup> More effective institutions would be those that were most successful in reducing transaction costs (North 1990; Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999), improving transparency, and producing cooperation in ways that fulfilled the dominant interests of the actors involved (Oye 1986). These more rational attempts at explaining regime effectiveness are often lacking, and they struggle to explain why institutions persist. As regimes are clearly more than institutional hangovers left after their creating hegemons' interests or activity has declined (Ward Grundig and Zorick 2004, 152), more is needed to explain their variation - just because they are potentially effective does not explain why or how this occurs.

A stronger cognitive stance, however, finds more of a role for information and knowledge; these studies rooted in more social or constructivist frameworks highlight the importance of linking regimes to information needed to solve the problem, key experts who provide this knowledge or proper counselling and the dynamics involved in social learning within the institution (Miles et. al 2002). The presence of an epistemic community within environmental regimes is also seen as necessary for successful functioning (Lifitin 1994; Haas 1992). Miles et al. (2002) supplements this by also finding that the presence of these informal expert networks enhances the abilities of the powerful actors within the regimes (e.g. chairs or heads), but that epistemic communities seem to make the most impact directly through national policy channels (451-452). The role of social learning within the regimes also plays a large role in adding knowledge during regime functioning and thus increasing effectiveness. Still it is possible that including industry experts could actually lead to failure if including private actors within rule setting regimes ends up weakening regulations as they are the ones who will be forced to comply (Börzel and Risse 2005, 10). These perspectives have interesting implications for partnership analysis, especially considering the intended roles partnerships are purported to play in knowledge sharing and learning.

In contrast to these traditional state-centred approaches, others consider the emergence and presence of transnational environmental activist groups as representing a new organizing

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<sup>61</sup> See also Cashore 2002 and Scharpf 1997.

principle in global politics (Wapner 1997; Lipschutz and Mayer 1996). From this view, there is a role for a wider group of actors involved in the institution, and this is not limited to “pressure politics” but rather a formal, recognised authority, giving a place for global civil society (Scholte 2002). Rather than viewing partnerships as more effective with dominant state actors, some of these perspectives might consider a negative correlation between state involvement and partnership success (Wapner 1996). This could be especially relating to sustainable development efforts in which partnerships often arise due to perceived state failures (Glasbergen and Groenenberg 2001).

While these more macro-perspectives can account for dynamics related to power, interests and their interactions, partnerships are non-traditional governance realms where these dynamics may not be emphasised to the same extent. These traditional modes, even though they are now accounting for roles of non-state actors, are also still focused on the issue of sovereignty, and as such stand to be complimented with elements from organisational and economic theories to work towards identify sets of characteristics that can be assessed across partnerships. Further, the above are more developed theoretically than empirically and are also difficult to compare or contrast because observed variance is highly dependent upon the perspectives. Thus while not completely leaving these behind, fulfilling the methodical aims of this work involves focus as well on more operational variables, which will be integrated into areas of analysis and tracked within this work’s framework. The remaining subsection reviews these existing camps of focus.

### **3.3.2 Institutional Problem solving capacity**

Focusing on the institutional setting, researchers have found that even more challenging problems can be effectively handled if appropriate institutional attributes fit. Mitchell’s (2002) work sees convergence around the main variables of institutional design (including participation, governance and decision making structure, centralisation and flexibility), resources and leadership. This relates to the institution’s problem solving capacity. Combining the expertise of the public and private sector in a win-win scenario is a driving impetus behind partnership promotion. Thus, including diverse **actors** should bring the “necessary technical, regional, social and political information” to the process of policy generation (Brinkerhoff 2002, 1301; see also Witte and Reinicke 2005) and lead to greater effectiveness than acting alone. *Participation* must be distinguished from membership, however, while membership is endogenous to design choice, actors refers more to the group of



interested actors and their relative importance to the institution (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001, 769).

**Institutional structure or design** is an area of considerable significance for both regime analysts and practitioners (Mitchell 1994). As institutions are increasingly seen as being effective global problem solvers, the more attractive focusing on design principles will become. These elements are of practical significance, “since they can, at least in principle, be deliberately manipulated and used as instruments” (Underdal 2004, 41). Another related aspect is **flexibility**, or how well the institutional rules and procedures adapt to or accommodate changing settings or circumstances (Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2004). This is considered as their “flexibility and voluntarism,” which is argued to make PPPs a more “promising governance approach” (Ivanova 2003, 17). If partnerships are supposed to exist in a dynamic environment, then inflexible arrangements or procedures could frustrate partnerships’ ability to adapt to needed change (Biermann et al. 2007b, 11). Mitchell (2002) also finds increased flexibility enhances effectiveness in environmental regimes. Also related to the institution, and arguably its effects or performance, are the internal management **processes and practices**, both formal and informal, which guide its functioning (Breitmeir, Young and Zurn 2006; Bloom and Van Reenen 2007).

Despite the increased attention given to **Governance and decision making (GDM)**, less is known about why rules and procedures vary so drastically across these institutions. These are critical to this work’s purposes which consider variation across input and output legitimacy, as elements of representation, accountability and transparency (Bexell, Tallberg and Uhlin 2008) are inherently tied within these structures and processes. For example, though it is argued GDM procedures that enhance equitable and balanced representation are necessary for global PPPs (Buse 2004a), whether this is evidenced empirically has yet to be shown, though noted deficits in governing forum representation are often highlighted (Sorens0n 2009).

### **3.3.3 Problem nature and scope**

Alternative viewpoints consider the problem or issue area to explain variation in effectiveness (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997; Miles et al. 2002). Institutions will be more or less effective depending on how well the problem *can or cannot* be addressed; thus, the more benign the problem, the more effective the regime. While it seems to make sense that some problems are by nature easier to solve than others, how these are differentiated and categorized will always be a subjective process (Hasenclever, Meyer and Rittberger 1996).

Though none of the studies arrive at the same conceptions of the term, they can be considered largely in line with each other in terms of overall problem characteristics (Efinger and Zurn 1990; Stein 1983; Underdal 2002).

Though insights from these studies are useful, partnerships generally focus upon more narrowly defined issues or tasks than regimes, lessening some of the direct application of existing theories. It is also worth exploring if partnerships are focusing on relatively neglected areas, as functional accounts suggest, or within areas where international regimes or IGOs already exist. This would also have implications for how relatively easy or difficult the issue is to solve, as well as addressing a central question regarding PPPs justification: issue coverage and value add, as subsequent chapters will address.

### **3.3.4 Exogenous and environmental factors**

As social institutions, partnerships exist within a wider sociological, political and economic **environment**, and their ability to succeed will inherently be linked to the environment – political, social, economic, cultural - of operation. This also highlights the relevance of the economic locus, as it is known that firm performance is highly dependent on the nature of the market in which it competes as well as its acceptance in varying domestic settings. Beyond systematic and environmental affects, the more recent heightened focus on governance by regime scholars in addition to institutions places more focus on the multilevel, multiplayer nature of the interactions across actors. Partnerships obviously do not exist in isolation from each other, and **institutional linkages and embedding** matter. While it is clear that the international system has seen a growing number of these newer governance arrangements, the impact of these linkages between and across institutions is less studied but a growing area of research (Silan and VanDeever 2009) This concept has been applied to other arrangements, mainly in Social Network Analysis (Granovetter 2002) and organisational studies.

How much the partnership is fixated within existing institutions or organisations (its host) or as its own entity apart from its parent institution is a key issue. While attempts to research structural linkages within regimes are becoming more developed (Stokke 2001; Andersen 2002), less is known on the extent and impact of embedding within existing institutions for global partnerships, a point returned to in this work's concluding chapter. While Mitchell (1994, 457) highlights the importance of building on existing institutions, overriding institutional linkages could be constraining as well. This is certainly relevant as applied to PPPs who started within host organisations and later “broke free” to become fully

functioning independent entities, as for example IAVI did when it eventually left the Rockefeller Foundation (Rockefeller Foundation and IAVI 2003). Linkages across PPPs and institutional interplay, sharing and exchange are also key issues in this regard, either enhancing effectiveness or potentially detracting if it leads to unnecessary duplication or competition, issues returned to as well in the empirical chapters.

### **3.4 Revisiting institutional variation, summary and concluding remarks**

A key lesson that emerges from the above is no easy success framework exists as context matters (Rein et al. 2005), and these factors will interact in dynamic and situational ways. Further, certain processes will work better in certain institutional designs or within some internal governance structures, and certain problem characteristics are better dealt with under some design features than others (Wettestad 1998; Miles et al. 2002). While it is clear that internal elements can go far in explaining partnership variation, there is still little consensus in current works as to which elements matter more than others. Further, there is often a contrast between design elements in theory and practice, or what is intended and the practices actually manifest. This is already evidenced in existing PPPs: Partnerships thrive without dominant state powers; indeed, some of the studied transnational PPPs do not have a formal national government as members. Even when teams of experts are consulted or involved, partnerships still falter, and while some partnerships perform multiple tasks exceedingly well, others are incapable of generating actor interest around even narrow functions. Internal partnership dynamics can also not be clearly isolated from the exogenous variables, and certainly these variables are tightly linked in explaining variation; isolating them as independent variables may be too methodologically challenging.

In conclusion, transnational partnerships as institutional innovations can lean on the cumulative information garnered from existing IR research on international institutions complimented with a micro-level focus from managerial and organisational studies. Bridging this macro and micro divide allows the framework to analyse partnership variation more closely. While evaluation will always be an area fraught with methodological, analytical and conceptual problems, this broad theoretical framework will be applied to PPPs in order to examine the variation in partnership form, functioning and effects, or input, process and output variables. While it is perhaps the interplay of these internal and external dynamics that lead the most towards explaining variation, this is an element this work cannot address empirically. The next chapter reviews the main methods and modes of this analysis before transitioning to the database to present the findings.

## CHAPTER FOUR:

### Methods and framework for partnership analysis

Despite the promise that PPPs will effectively address global challenges, the enthusiasm dedicated to their promotion has not been matched with the same ardent push towards evaluation. Lacking integrated, large scale or evidenced-based analysis, PPPs' ability to influence global policy, drive change and lead to lasting impacts is far from clear. Despite more recent trend towards critical assessments of PPPs, existing academic works are inherently tied to the researcher's theoretical perspective and analytical approach. This means as a set of research and methods, existing PPP evaluation studies still represent a rather fragmented and inconclusive body of works. Thus cumulative, evidence-based reviews of transnational partnerships and their variation are lacking.

While existing approaches provide a starting point for analysis and note key lessons learned (Caines 2005; Schipulle 2003; Vollmer 2009), what is needed is a rigorous and systematic review of the broad universe of PPPs. A more focused study and evaluation framework "could indicate whether and to what extent the expectations raised by the partnership paradigm are indeed met" (Van Huijstee 2007, 86). This work makes progress towards this needed systematic study, and this chapter now turns to its constructed framework utilised to analyse and compare transnational partnerships.

As expressed in the previous chapter, this work takes a unique approach to partnership evaluation, focusing on **variation and effects** rather than effectiveness. Even with a narrower focus, evaluating PPPs presents several notable challenges and is inherently based upon several assumptions. The result of which is that any evaluation will inevitably be guided by the research strategies chosen. The decisions made regarding strategy and methods certainly directed the work and resulting analysis presented in the remainder of this thesis, and therefore need presenting and justifying. In doing so, this chapter first reviews the prevailing methodological and analytical challenges of partnership and institutional effectiveness evaluation more broadly. This is followed by introducing the conceptual framework and its components, and the next section details the modes and methods of evaluation employed. The chapter concludes with brief summary remarks and reiteration of this work's limitations and remaining issues.

#### 4.1: Challenges, definitions and specifications

Evaluating institutions and attempting to account for institutional effectiveness involves precisely defining both the institution of focus and also how that institution’s observed (or perceived) performance compares against a standard of effectiveness. Any approach taken towards the goal of evaluation should thus not only recognise the distinctive analytical and methodological challenges assessment involves but also devise ways to meet these. This involves clearly articulating overriding definitions, so speaking to this, this section walks through the persisting methodological challenges and discusses the strategies employed to identify the object(s) of study, the definition of the dependent variables and related approaches taken.

##### 4.1.1 Defining unit of study and partnerships of focus

Partnerships are complex arrangements, and their varying components and at times vague degrees of separation between them compound the difficulty of identifying a unit of focus. As introduced in the second chapter, this work begins with the intention of presenting transnational PPPs. This encompassing definition, which creates the universe of transnational PPPs, focuses upon *claimed* partnering initiatives: the extent, involvement and commitment of the actual partnering arrangement is – and can only be – assessed through research. This work then narrows this to a sampling frame of (ITPs), as per the definitions reviewed in **Table 4.1**.

**Table 4.1: Main partnership definitions employed throughout this work**

	Main partnership definitions employed throughout this work
<b>Public-private partnerships</b>	Voluntary, horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors that join for an actual partnering arrangement rather than only more informal interactions
<b>Transnational Public-private partnerships</b>	Voluntary, horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised arrangements transnational arrangements that bring together actors from distinct sectors organised with a <u>global/ transnational</u> reach and purpose of <u>providing collective goods</u>
<b>Institutionalised, Tri-sectoral transnational public-private partnerships (ITPs) (Sampling Frame)</b>	<p><i>Voluntary</i>  <i>Horizontally structured and minimally institutionalised</i>  <i>Tri- actor based</i>            At least one actor from the public, private and social (not-for-profit) sector  <i>Transnational</i>            Global scope, and            Actors join across more than one country or region  <i>Public policy focused</i>            Aim or goal is providing a collective good or addressing global public policy need/issue</p>

Multiple aspects of partnerships' functioning necessitate further definitional clarifications. As institutions PPPs can function either as arenas for actors to engage and interact *or* as organisations which are actors themselves (Underdal 2002, 24). The former refers to PPPs as a “framework within which politics takes place” (March and Olsen 1989, 16; in Miles et al. 2002, 24). Within this literature focused on the role of epistemic communities, institutions are arenas for interaction among experts, agenda setting and negotiation (Haas 1964). The latter occurs when institutions serve as significant actors in their own right. As arenas, institutions focus on regulating access to problems, and as such they specify not only the purpose but also the rules, location and timing of interactions. If functioning as organisations, however, partnerships “must have a minimum degree of internal coherence (unity), autonomy, resources and external activity” (Underdal 2002, 27). While this work attempts to focus on PPPs as organisations and actors in their own accord, it quickly becomes clear that many PPPs function *as actors* to facilitate interaction and build further partnerships, making clear distinction difficult.

Determining which actors are partners – versus members, funders or participants – and which sectoral base they represent is also challenging. Not only is this often unclear in design from partnerships' own publications, but it will certainly be a more critical issue in practice. As the second chapter traced, many definitions of partnerships imply equal sharing of risks and rewards across partners (Nelson 2002, 47), which is often not the case in reality. In attempts to avoid entering similar subjective criteria into the notion of partnering, this work steps apart from such definitions and maintains a non-normative stance and does not assume these criteria into the definitional base.

The disjointed nature of the partnering also often confuses the line between what the partnership itself accomplishes and what the individual partners contributed. This is especially the case when global partnerships function with a small central working staff and contract operations on the ground to various NGOs or Contract Service Organisations (CSOs), who have varying degrees of ties to the head office. It is also necessary to distinguish the effects of a group of related partnerships from individual PPP operations, or the phenomena of institutional interaction or interplay (Young et al. 1999/2005)<sup>62</sup>, which is likely to arise especially as more PPPs appear in similar issue areas. Further, as many global PPPs emerged from the same global or regional summits or function in areas heavily populated with similar, often competing, organisations such as NGOs or other partnerships, attributing effects to

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<sup>62</sup> See discussion in previous chapter, as well as Stokke 2001 and Rausutiala and Victor 2004 regarding the role of interactions as determinants of effectiveness.

particular institutions remains challenging. Distinguishing partnership effects also requires the difficult task of separating the PPPs' partner-based projects – often carried out by partners/actors – from those of the PPP itself. As this work discusses in chapter seven, this distinction is rarely made by the PPPs.

Ambiguities remain even with a solid notion of the partners and partnership. For instance, while most of this work focuses on the centre point (CP) to allow for more comparability, the relationship between CP and individual country operations or units is more complex than can be detailed here. Further, it is also not always clear the CP is the best representation of the PPP as a whole, or should be the focal point for examining its effects, which is why country-level consequences are increasingly the focus (McKinsey 2005; Biesma et al. 2009).

Finally, the definitions employed are articulated for clarification; this is not an attempt to claim that this should be *the* accepted notion of a partnership or that PPPs must be transnational or have a tri-sectoral actor base to be effective. This work purposely attempts to limit the universe of PPPs studied in order to ensure a reasonable scope of study; thus it does not cover national and local PPPs,<sup>63</sup> and given the sampling frame specifications, several notable global PPPs do not fall within the band, such as the majority of those partnerships hosted within the UNDP's CSD, those within USAID's GDA database or some well-covered partnerships such as PEPFAR.

#### **4.1.2 Operationalising effects**

Existing works employ alternative notions of effectiveness such as compliance, performance, influence or success, which leads to varying methods of evaluation and ranging views of PPP effectiveness. When comparing evaluations, the definition of effectiveness employed and which aspect of the PPP functioning is being evaluated must be considered at the onset. Given the inherent methodological problems involved in assessing effectiveness, this work attempts to move past these definitional issues and approaches PPP assessment from a more systematic, methodological angle. As discussed in the first chapter, while the original intent was to analyse partnership effectiveness, throughout the process the focus shifted to the analysis of partnership variation with an emphasis on effects. The previous chapters walked through progress made in attempts to evaluate regime effectiveness and also highlighted that despite progress made, varying and debated approaches still compose the field (Underdal and


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<sup>63</sup> See Vaillancourt Rosenau 2000 for work on national PPPs.

Young 2004; Young 1999b; Miles et al 2002). Yet this variety in approaches means there is an applicable and relevant accumulated body of knowledge and theory.

The last chapter’s discussion presented the distinction between effectiveness as goal attainment and as problem solving (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006, 32). This widely utilised categorisation of effectiveness is applicable to all types of institutionalised forms of cooperation. While these can be complementary, fulfilling the declared goals of the partnership does not always correspond to also solving the problem targeted by the efforts (Bernauer 1995). Not only can partnership effects be distinguished into goal attainment and problem solving, but the latter is broken down into outputs, outcomes and impacts,<sup>64</sup> each described in turn below (*Figure 4.1*).<sup>65</sup>

**Figure 4.1: Effectiveness segmentation**



Outputs are directly related to partnership performance and are associated with the actual activity of the institution. These can be noted as the tangible products produced by the partnership – the “promulgation of regulations designed to operationalise rules and the development of policy instruments intended to guide the behaviour of key actors” (Chayes and Chayes 1995; Weiss and Jacobson 1998). These are the procedures or arrangements needed to transform a [regime] from a chapter arrangement into a going concern (Mitchell 1994). At the onset of the PPP lifecycle, this can include the establishment of regulations, partnering rules and procedures, producing basic partnership documents and other procedures and functions that all institutions *should* undertake. As outputs relate to the core formation and operations of the partnership, such as specifying the goals and tasks of the PPP (Ulbert 2008) evaluating

<sup>64</sup> Originally defined by Easton (1965), similar methods are employed by two other existing large-n PPP studies: See Biermann et al 2007b and Liese and Beisheim 2011; Beisheim and Kaan 2010 and Beisheim and Liese forthcoming.

<sup>65</sup> See Beisheim, Liese and Ulbert (2008) for a similar conception; originally cited in Ulbert 2008.



them is a necessary first step. Determining if the partnership still *exists* has been an issue for early evaluators of the CSD partnerships: Tondreau's (2005) work found no data for nearly one-third of the PPPs supposedly operating in Chile. Once functioning, outputs become less comparable across partnerships and more concerned with the main objectives of the partnership, such as producing policy reports, undertaking awareness campaigns, or distributing medications: this stipulation presents a need to distinguish between organisational and performance-based outputs.

Occurring at a higher level than outputs, outcomes are actual changes in behaviour arising from the operation of the partnership or measurable changes in behaviour (Levy, Young and Zurn 1995; Young 1999b). Examples of possible outcome indicators include compliance with and implementation of partnership rules, established awareness of the issue approached, change in attitudinal views or other behavioural effects. Evaluating outcomes and establishing causality requires more methods than tracking outputs as outcomes occur at a higher level. For example, a program that sources varying partners (inputs) to train community leaders (output) may lead to greater social capital (outcome). Obviously more difficult to track and operationalise,<sup>66</sup> these can often be quantified based upon qualitative information, such as expert opinions and results from detailed interviews or surveys. Thus focusing on outcomes is closer to what Young refers to as "behavioural effectiveness," when a PPP causes others to alter patterns of behaviour, "either by doing things they would not otherwise have done or by terminating or redirecting prior patterns of behaviour" (Young 1994, 145).

Impacts are those changes that lead to eventually solving the problem targeted by the partnership *that can be attributed to the operation of the partnership* and are the most difficult aspect not only to define but also to measure and assess across PPPs. Partnership impacts are associated with actual improvement in targeted area of focus or those tangible changes in economic, social or environmental parameters. Both outcomes and impacts are easier to assess when PPPs clearly articulate their intended value-add (Lele et al. 2004), and further there is no straightforward method for inferring outcome or impact from information about output (Underdal 2002, 6). Many PPP studies utilise the OECD/ DAC impact definition as the "the positive and negative, primary or secondary long term effects produces by a development

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<sup>66</sup> For example, the Internal Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank evaluates outcomes by considering: the *relevance* of the intervention's objectives in relation to country needs and institutional priorities; *efficacy*, i.e. the extent to which the developmental objectives have been (or are expected to be) achieved; and *efficiency*, i.e. the extent to which the objectives have been (or are expected to be) achieved without using more resources than necessary.  
<http://web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=1324361&pagePK=64253958&contentMDK=20789685&menuPK=5039271&piPK=64252979>

intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended” (OECD 1991). Though impacts can be unintended, these are not necessarily negative side effects, as they can include further learning, norm diffusion or transference of skills, as examples.

While many studies focus on the “partnership working” (Caines 2005) as measured against partnership objectives or maintain a focus on outputs, measuring impact is less frequently employed.<sup>67</sup> Even amongst GHPs, there is a lack of empirical or even anecdotal evidence and studies on impacts, especially in relation to national health governance systems (Brown 2006). Yet, as individual regimes do not operate in an “institutional vacuum” (Young 2004, 8), broader consequences should be considered.

Impacts are obviously more difficult to assess and rarely considered outside of individual case studies, especially given the challenge of conceptualizing a collective optimum. Partnerships would have to focus upon narrowly defined problems or issue-areas in order to gauge an appropriate benchmark. Some larger macro variables could be used, such as percentage changes of a population with access to drinking water or overall changes in literacy rates or pre-natal deaths, but accurate measurement and causal attribution to the partnership in question are obvious caveats. This leads to the use of contribution analysis and similar methods discussed in the previous chapter. As the empirical chapters will further discuss, though, while the significance is acknowledged, few partnerships make strides towards measuring their work this way, though especially in the health field consolidated efforts to do so are making gains, it is lacking for most.

### **Distinguishing between Performance and Organisational-based outputs**

Another definitional aspect often muddled is that between what this work terms **performance** and **organisational outputs**. This involves clarifying between the effects *of the partnership itself* and the effects *of the partnering process*. The distinction is significant as the latter *can* be more readily compared across PPPs, despite varying areas of focus or activities performed; this is because process-based outputs are related to basic operations. The former speak more towards whether or not partnerships are effective as problem-solving institutions.

Lack of clarification can create confusion when comparing evaluations, as most reviews make no distinction between the two while employing varying notions of performance, effectiveness and legitimacy. Especially when studies attempt to rank or compare partnerships, scoring effectiveness based on partnership outputs can be misleading unless

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<sup>67</sup> For attempts applied to environmental regimes, see Barret 2003 and Miles et al. 2002.

there is transparency towards whether the scores are based upon how effective the partnerships are as institutions of cooperation or how effective they are as problem solvers. This work addresses this precisely by distinguishing between the two, and while the focus is on analysing the latter, as these are comparable across the universe of ITPs, performance is discussed, mainly through partnerships' attempts towards performance tracking, review and evaluation.<sup>68</sup>

### **4.1.3 Approach and operational procedures**

From the discussion thus far, it is clear that lacking common standards or benchmarks, existing evaluations of operational procedures across PPPs remain rather crude attempts. This work takes a very pragmatic, operational-based approach to analysing partnerships. Rather than presenting another conceptualisation of effectiveness and proceeding in the pursuit of a relative ranking, the focus here is on systematic study. As this work focuses on the narrower view of partnership effects rather than effectiveness, it does not attempt to define a standard of reference or construct a scale of effectiveness, though the concluding chapter will return to the discussion of performance more broadly.

This work operationalises effectiveness as effects into two components: goal attainment and problem solving. It does not focus on effectiveness purely in relation to PPP's goals set; instead, it analyses how articulated goals, visions, and missions vary across PPPs. It then segments effects into partnerships' attempts towards output, outcome or impacts. Outputs can be performance based or organisational based, but this work focuses the crux of the analysis on comparable, organisational outputs, for which standard metrics and indicators can be applied.

## **4.2 Transnational partnerships: Components of framework**

Though they are hailed as effective and legitimate governance tools capable of addressing persisting governance deficits (Reinicke and Deng 2000), there is little systematic evidence of PPPs' actual contributions and effects in these regards (Biermann et al. 2007a, 240). A relevant useful basis to structure a conceptual framework for this needed evaluation is to return to the discussion surrounding PPPs and legitimacy. While legitimacy itself is a rather vague and encompassing term (O'Kane 1994<sup>69</sup>), it provides a useful conceptual umbrella under which to analyse partnerships. The familiar distinction between input and output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999) is readily applicable. "Input" legitimacy, or democratic

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<sup>68</sup> See chapter seven for discussion.

<sup>69</sup> For an overview of applications of legitimacy to empirical research, see Hurrelmann et al., 2007. For works linking procedural legitimacy to output effectiveness, see Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008.

legitimacy (Dingwerth 2007), is said to refer to the accountability, transparency and participatory quality of the decision-making processes (Bexell Tallberg and Uhlin 2008; Dingwerth 2007) whereas output legitimacy refers to problem solving quality or capacity. Legitimacy thus concerns both procedural elements and their societal acceptance (See also Risse 2006). Using this conception, this work's framework builds on the challenge that PPPs should be evaluated both as to their efforts to increase the effectiveness (problem-solving capacity) and legitimacy (democratic accountability) of global governance (Börzel and Risse 2005).

Many argue PPPs' eventual acceptance and perceived success will be legitimized not only by their democratic qualities, such as enhancing participation, but also by their substantive results (Omelicheva 2009). Further, while output legitimacy is related to governance effectiveness, it "hinges on perceived effectiveness among stakeholders, which is not necessarily the same as resolution of underlying problems" (Biermann and Gupta 2011, 1858; see also Dingwerth 2005, 2007). This gives additional credence to the importance of organisational outputs, as these speak towards this element of *perceived effectiveness*, what Bäckstrand terms institutional effectiveness (Bäckstrand 2010). Building on this legitimization concept, this work moves towards the systematic study of the relationship between aspects of input legitimacy as defined here (i.e. structure, processes) and output legitimacy (effects) through this conceptual framework.

#### **4.2.1 Constructing a framework**

As it is often claimed that PPPs face a trade-off between input legitimacy and effective performance (Börzel and Risse 2005; Haas 2004), both components should be captured within the framework. From a normative perspective, legitimacy refers to how a process should be designed and what results it should have (Omelicheva 2009, 113-117) and encompasses the notion of consent of the governed – that is that those affected by a governing institution are represented and can hold it to account. Empirically, however, this is very much determined by perspective and depends on whether those subject to rules deem them valid and appropriate. Legitimacy can be derived from multiple aspects of the partnership, mainly its structure, process and outcomes (Brinkerhoff 2007, 74); these highlight relevant areas of focus: structure and form; functioning and management processes; and effects of partnerships.

Moving from theory to practice, a common framework serves a useful purpose as it furthers evidence-informed, comparative study. Instead of providing one common benchmark for evaluation, however, a framework should be seen as a useful means to focus upon the key

underlying questions and “provide a menu of possible indicators and not necessarily predetermine which indicators should be used and what the targets should be” (Pearson 2007, 12). The strengths of guiding frameworks are their ability to allow for cross-case comparisons and widen the dialogue on partnership evaluation. Basic frameworks also provide a common language that cuts across researchers, partners, funders, donors and stakeholders.

There are continued arguments for partnership study to be placed within more comparable, robust frameworks (Utting and Zammit 2006), and especially within the health sector there are calls and related attempts to develop common frameworks for monitoring and evaluation (for example, see Pearson 2007), as conceptual frameworks have been developed for analysing system-wide effects (Bennett and Fairbank 2003) and certain national-level effects (Brugha 2008). An attempt of a detailed framework for PDPs by Social Impact Advisors noted that a common framework should be “timeless” in that it is relevant both today and in the future and thus will continue to provide a common platform adaptable to individual organisations (FSG Social Impact Advisors 2007). That said, though it provides a comprehensive framework, this is considered too detailed and overly burdensome for existing PDPs (PPP Stakeholder InterviewF), and furthermore the directors of several notable, high profile PDPs have remarked this could not be practically implemented. This is a critical point: this work is not attempting towards a radical or novel framework nor as detailed as the FSG or similar works. Instead, it is purposely intuitive, usable across PPPs and even more so is in line with OED and World Bank proposals for global programs as well as closely aligning with that proposed by the joint work on health systems strengthening and International Health Partnerships<sup>70</sup> (IHP+) common evaluation framework. As these are proven applicable and useful across large sets of partnerships and programs, it is useful to model and build this work’s analysis within.<sup>71</sup>

Laying the context, the discussion provides the background and also guides later consideration of the relationships between inputs, processes and outputs within the framework (**Figure 4.2**). The remainder of this section lays out these components (e.g. inputs) which are broken down into areas (e.g. actors) and dimensions (e.g. sectoral split), which can be operationalised and tracked; the terms used are shown in **Figure 4.3**. Though the basic components are more generic, the variables were defined and operationalised so they related


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<sup>70</sup> <http://www.internationalhealthpartnership.net/en/home>

<sup>71</sup> That said, one interesting components of this work is how closely the 25 dimensions of the MM Interviews assess many of the same areas proposed within the FSG framework; yet the MM Interviews are done in a systematic, comparable way (and conducted within two to three hours). Thus, as will be returned to in this work’s conclusion, there may be considerable value to this approach moving forward practically for partnership evaluation as well as theoretically linking to the general constructs on which this work is based.

to the theoretical constructs as much as possible and would not only encompass most significant aspects of partnership structure and functioning but also allow for the further testing of relevant hypotheses.

**Figure 4.2: Evaluation framework**




#### 4.2.2 Framework components

While the model of inputs, processes and outputs drives the main framework of partnership evaluation, these should not be seen as a stepped sequence, where certain inputs necessarily lead to certain outputs: this is what is investigated throughout the work. The framework does aid in the identification of the expected causal links, similar to a “program logic” framework,<sup>72</sup> commonly applied to partnerships and related programs and initiatives. This framework is broken into main components at varying areas and dimensions of analysis. For example, within the input component is the area of institutional; within institutional are dimensions of legal status, legal structure (e.g. 5013c, Foundation) and level of institutionalisation, which can have sub dimensions (such as country of incorporation). Many attributes do not fit neatly into one category, as many suggested attributes are also considered within this work’s analysis of organisational outputs. For example, the launch, design and operations of governance and decision making (GDM) systems are a key input, activity and translate to a related outputs partnerships should produce.

<sup>72</sup> For more on the logframe framework, see World Bank. 2000. *The Logframe Handbook*, World Bank. Available at [http://www.wau.boku.ac.at/fileadmin//H81/H811/Skripten/811332/811332\\_G3\\_log-framehandbook.pdf](http://www.wau.boku.ac.at/fileadmin//H81/H811/Skripten/811332/811332_G3_log-framehandbook.pdf)

There are inherently trade-offs in designing a conceptually tight framework, which incorporates all dimensions noted to be significant, and one that is applicable to large-n empirical analysis. While I argue that this framework is theoretically based, conceptually sound and as encompassing as possible – as demonstrated through the discussion below and resultant analysis in this work’s remaining chapters – there are limitations that must be acknowledged when moving from theory to practice. As becomes clear, not all of the desired elements can be captured with the specific dimensions given the necessity of data availability and the desire to have minimal subjective assessments or rankings within the input side of the analysis. These variables and components will obviously not all be relevant in all cases, nor should these factors be seen as independent from each other – more appropriate combinations may be significant in some cases and not others, especially for certain functional types of PPPs. While full analysis of the interplay of these variables is outside the scope of this work, the framework encompasses the building blocks required to move towards this.

**Figure 4.3: Framework breakdown**



## INPUTS

The first aspect of the framework involves the input side of the analysis, and while the term itself is perhaps too broad to hold much analytical value, it serves as a useful area heading. In general, input indicators measure what goes into an activity, such as design, funding and resources, but these indicators do not measure the quality of the service provided or outputs produced by the partnership. This work breaks inputs aspects of: focus; attributes; actors; institutional and organisational; governance and decision making; and “input” legitimacy.

Distinguishing these aspects across partnerships presents definitional and measurement challenges, however, and lacking clear and straightforward tools, objectivity can be difficult. Especially with these PPPs of focus, inputs are far from static aspects: partnerships often change even basic aspects of structure and design. Capturing these attributes is also difficult given the overlap between inputs and process. While the framework notes these separately, many inputs also have multiple potential focal points for analysis. For example, resources, while largely an input, challenge the framework as the ability to attract

and generate new funding streams could be considered an output and the management of funding and resources a PPP process. This is not a limiting factor, however, as the categories are presented only to enable reader to more easily consider what aspects of partnerships are tracked within the framework, and the explanatory value of these variables is furthered within the analysis.

**Focus and scope** are linked to the *nature of the problem* and include the area of focus (thematic and issue), functional type, geographical scope and stated goals of the partnership. Despite being perceived as basic and fundamental aspects of PPPs, these are more subjective areas and difficult to clearly define; as such a researcher's judgement stands to play a role. Problem area of focus denotes the thematic or sectoral area the PPP targets, such as health, education, energy or infrastructure. Area of focus involves functional type: the role or aim the PPP professes to hold. Scope is the claimed geographical territory of coverage, which can differ from the countries or regions in which the PPPs physically operate, so both are noted.

The goal(s) of the partnership are captured via the stated mission statement (as this is articulated and publicly available) as well as more specific, stated goals. Combined with the other elements of focus, this leads to a conception of problem structure (Miles et al. 2002). Problem area of focus and the nature of the problem the partnership attempts to tackle are analytically significant, as few would dispute that some problems are inherently more difficult to solve (or even address) than others.<sup>73</sup> This work presents the focus, area and goals as articulated by the partnership and notes the nature of the problem addressed, but it does not attempt to determine relative strength or toughness or incorporate this directly into the framework.<sup>74</sup> It does not set out to express an opinion on the relative difficulty or strength of goals, but merely to define them, as the partnership does. This is a critical and significant task, as many argue partnerships are less effective when they have vaguely defined or broad goals or target areas (Bäckstrand 2005).

A strong argument in favour of partnerships is that as they have a narrow focus, this parcels governance issues into manageable tasks (Reinicke and Deng 2000), and thus they may be even more effective governance arrangements. Many studies show regimes with more narrowly defined problem areas are more effective (Young 1989a, 1995; Sebenius 1993;

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<sup>73</sup> For related analysis in regards to problem difficulty in regime analysis see Efinger and Zurn 1990; Stein 1982; and Underdal 2002.

<sup>74</sup> See Kalfagianni and Pattberg 2011 for a conceptualization of problem structure, which they consider a control variable in explaining variation in effectiveness of transnational rule-setting organisations. The authors consider that the nature of problems organisations try to address, the salience of the problems for political actors, the level of awareness in society, the establishment of knowledge associated with the causes and consequences of the problem at hand, and the prior existence of public regulation.



Andersen and Wettestad 995; Miles et al. 2002), but this conflicts with arguments that note issue-linkage is what causes regimes to develop, and perhaps succeed (Hisschemoller and Gupta 1999).

**Attributes:** Linked to a partnership's *problem solving capacity* are descriptive aspects, mainly related to partnership age, founding and other descriptive characteristics. **Age** of the PPP, the life cycle stage in which it is being assessed certainly matters. Older, more mature are expected to exhibit a more advanced form and functioning than those more recently initiated. While not necessarily a linear increase in effectiveness over time, there will undoubtedly be discrepancies across PPPs at various stages in their life cycles. Partnerships are certainly evolving processes (OECD 2006), and while it is argued that throughout their operational lifecycles they transition from being activity based to strategic-focused (Binkerhoff 2007, 85-86), the reality is there is no set pattern and PPPs will vary considerably in their growth and evolution.

Another oft-cited reason for engaging with partnerships is that harnessing both private and public sector bodies brings additional **resources** to the arrangement neither is capable of achieving on their own. Within this dimension this work assesses the following: funding levels, main donors and change over time, income streams and geographic sources of funding. Deemed highly significant to institutional functioning (McKinsey 2002; VanDeveer 2000), not only do the level and stability of these resources vary considerably across partnerships, but so do the key donors involved and their respective level of commitments. Also, more than purely finances, which themselves are difficult to assess for partnerships, these global PPPs rely on intangible assets as well; this is clear in various issue areas from health to development issues, and the source and continuity of these experts and knowledge communities are crucial towards lasting partnership effectiveness.

While it is doubtless that resources are needed for adequate functioning, this could also lead to resource dependency. Partnerships that rely too much on initial donors or funders could detract from their sustainability and future effectiveness if they fail to generate their own support; indeed, one potential measure of partnership success is its additionality, or the degree to which partnerships generate new multi-sector funding for sustainable development or their own initiatives (Bäckstrand 2005, 17).

Though resources certainly deserve a place within partnership inputs in the framework, throughout the course of analysis, it became clear they would be treated largely as an output, mainly due to issues of data availability on finances, lack of comparability of non-

financial resources across the universe of PPPs and their applicability to the organisational outputs category.<sup>75</sup>

**Actor** variables cover the partners, members and participants and the defining characteristics of these groups and the individual actors within them. As the TPD provides a breakdown between public, private and social partners, as well as the structuring of the partner definitions and layers, this allows a review of the PPPs' levels of inclusiveness. The distribution of membership amongst the private, public and social sectors may also play a role. Early reports indicate that at least in global health partnerships, the private sector is over-represented (Buse and Harmer 2007), especially when compared to funding contributed. Enhanced membership opportunities are argued to not only decrease the participation gaps in global governance (Reinicke 1998) but enhance partnerships' success, so it will be necessary to see if this is evidenced empirically. Current empirical works are limited in cases sampled but do show how a wide range of interests contributes to successful partnerships (Khagram 1999). Too many members could have the converse affect, especially if this leads to coordination problems due to higher transaction costs (Scharpf 1997, 70), frustrates governing and decision making or become an institutional constraint (Hemmati 2002).

The necessity of diverse stakeholder involvement for partnership success is a frequently referenced argument, but the ranging involvement these actors contribute is less studied and not evidenced empirically as a contributing success factor. This is certainly crucial as many current studies of PPPs in developing countries show that the actual involvement of partner governments and civil society was low in terms of participation and any actual influence (Hoering 2003). Adequate representation involves more than being included or having a "seat at the table," as even formal inclusion or engagement may hide internal power imbalances. Despite the popularity of these arguments, whether or not these actor variables, especially concerning participation and representation, matter for effectiveness is far from clear. While all static and claimed accounts of partnerships are noted, the interaction and communication between these partners and how these partners interact within the organisational structures are best captured within the management interviews.

**Institutional design and institutionalisation:** Though flexibility is a unique and distinguishing characteristic of global PPPs, partnerships vary greatly regarding their structure and formalisation. As their unique institutional design is one of their most promoted features

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<sup>75</sup> It is acknowledged that this placement and treatment is debatable, and this is not denying the critical nature of resources as inputs, especially as to the possible link between resource levels and potential effectiveness and/or performance. Given this work's goal of assessing variation across inputs, processes and effects rather than analysis of PPP effectiveness, this variable is consolidated within outputs to note variation in PPPs' generating and managing funds and resources.

(Ivanonova 2003), comparing these varying levels of institutionalisation and which specific elements of institutional design may be more likely to contribute to effectiveness in varying situations is significant. Institutional attributes have been a key aspect of regime research from an early stage, as more attention was devoted to understanding these variables of institutional design and the possible impact on varying levels of effectiveness (Andersen and Wettestad 1995). It is also expected that different types of PPPs will require different types of institutional capacity, as what is effective in one environment is not necessarily successfully replicated in another (Young 2008). Even more so, these features are significant as they can, at least in theory, be manipulated and developed to work toward lesson building for designing more effective PPPs (Underdal and Young 2004).

Key areas of **institutional design** include: overriding entity type, institutional and organisational design, legal structure and status, host status and location and type of centre point (CP), often termed secretariat. These are related but slightly distinct from **organisational and structural** variables, which are the institutional factors that define or make up the PPPs. These include clarifying the basic type and function of the partnership. Also included within this input category are the structural characteristics of staff structure and leadership roles, types of post, business operation design and legal status. Of interest is also the “leanness” of the central management team and central or secretariat characteristics. Already, analysts within PPP discourses argue that institutional design matters in terms of partnership functioning. Many advocates of PPPs argue that it is their institutional design that relies more on legitimacy, self interests, or voluntary norms that lead to their enhanced success. Despite its perceived necessity, however, the flexible structures of partnerships “bring[s] their own serious risk and side effects” (Martens 2007, 62). Flexibility may also be highly tied to the environmental conditions in which the partnership operates, but internally managing flexible structures is also inherently complicated.

Guided by the hypothesis that this variable would be of key significance, these institutional design considerations and rules are aggregated into level of institutionalisation (**Table 4.2**).<sup>76</sup> Incorporating the theoretical works discussed in the previous chapter as well as the unique features of PPPs, the focus here is on the level of independence of the entity, composed of features such as legal status and incorporation, host status, degree of independence from host, degree of delegation to partnership units or other actors and related elements of design.

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<sup>76</sup> The level of institutionalisation is also the main explanatory variable in related work which reviews 21 transnational PPPs. This research team defines level of institutionalisation based upon degree of obligation, precision and delegation (See Beisheim and Liese 2011 and Beisheim and Kaan 2010).

**Table 4.2 Scale of institutionalisation**

Elements of institutionalisation	Low*	Medium	High
- Entity status	- Time limited, ad-hoc	- Unlimited time scale	- Permanent institution
- Legality	- No separate legal status	- Legal status	- Own legal status with guiding legal document
- Legal/institutional form	- May or may not have a Centre Point	- Centre Point established - If hosted, formal and separate governance or DM than host institution	- CHQ location established - Centralisation/ decentralisation planning across operating units
- Institutional structure	- No formalised or separate governing body	- Formalised GDM procedures - Budget	- Full budget authority - Formal board - Formalised DM procedures
- Organisational structure	- No membership rules or criterion	- Clearly defined members and/or partnership - May or may not have membership rules and/or criterion	- Membership rules and/or criterion
- Organisational characteristics		- Centralised decision making	- Business plan articulated - CE strategy/ DE operations
	- Few or no full-time staff	- Full-time operating staff	- Full-time operating staff and articulated staff structure
	<i>*Most hosted fit in this category, though some reach medium levels of institutionalisation</i>		

**Governance and decision making (GDM) and input legitimacy:** It is often argued that “Whether or not PPPs realize their full potential and whether they impact negatively or positively on their public and civil society partners is, arguably, largely a function of their governing arrangements” (Buse 2004a, 226), yet this has been less empirically tested and thus these elements deserve a place within the framework. GDM variables are generally contained within the guiding legal document of the partnership, existence of dispute resolution processes and the governing body(ies), the latter considering its structure, status and member composition, decision making rules, internal governance and reporting. One key factor is whether or not PPPs have a governing body or board, as this should not be assumed, especially for hosted PPPs. The composition of and representation on these bodies is also of interest, especially for those who argue that inclusion of civil society in governance processes

(Wapner 1997; Held 1995), as involving non state actors into the governance arena may enhance not only input legitimacy but also problem-solving effectiveness (Reinicke and Deng 2000).

Understanding decision-making structure and how the votes are distributed within these addresses debates relating to power and influence within PPPs, but truly analysing this involves assessing the methods and management structure that allow varying powers and actors within the PPP to exercise their authority (Underdal 2002 ) (this draws emphasis to this work's MM interviews, below). Roles, which consider not only task and role allocation but also actual oversight in relation to member selection and handling of internal conflicts are also relevant. A key question is how much it matters for partnership success if (and how) actor capabilities fit the role in the ways intended. How well these roles are clarified is also significant, as McKinsey's (2005) review finds for global health partnerships, as strongly defined roles and responsibilities are often crucial for operational success.

Within these variables the nature of the decision rules, or the conditions that need to be met to reach decisions or social choices (Breitmeier et al. 2009, 114; in Kalfagianni and Pattberg 2011) are relevant, especially as it is argued that rules more closely related to unanimity and inclusiveness will improve compliance (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006), which relates to recent findings that enhancing procedural transparency can enhance compliance (Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008).

**Input legitimacy:** As argued at the onset, key concerns of PPPs relate to their accountability and transparency, especially as to the possible impact of these governance variables on effectiveness, or output legitimacy. The actor and GDM dimensions within the framework (such as actor types and sectoral representation) work towards assessing PPPs' input legitimacy. Tracking variables related to these dimensions also speaks to debates surrounding stakeholder democracy within international relations (Held and Konig-Archibugi 2005; Risse 2006), especially as related to the participatory quality of these institutions or the ability for PPPs to contribute to the participation gap in global governance (Ruggie 2002; Streck 2004).

Deemed necessary to maintain the legitimacy of transnational governance institutions (Beisheim and Dingwerth 2008), accountability and transparency mechanisms are of significant focus within this work's analysis. The framework captures "transparency of governance," or policies and institutions designed to empower a polity to observe actions, rather than "transparency for governance." The former is tightly linked to information disclosure while the latter is designed to influence and alter behaviour, such as education-

based transparency or exposure. As a note, many PPPs' function is related to the education-based transparency, or providing targeted actors with information intended to remedy informational deficiencies (see Mitchell 2011, 1882 for this distinction). When analysing the former, as this work does, the focus is on the level of information provision the PPP provides. For the universe of PPPs, this involves assessing their publication of a legal document, annual report and/ or financial statements and/or reports. While these specific discussions are furthered in chapter seven, it will become apparent throughout that a large part of this study and research is in itself an exercise in PPP transparency, as this work struggles to complete full PPP profiles for many.

## **MANAGEMENT AND PROCESSES**

Ranging studies of varying effectiveness of PPPs have attempted to “chip away” at noted differences in effectiveness and performance by evaluating similar measures of partnership inputs, such as resources or leadership. While the input elements of structure, actors and/or institutionalisation tracked above can go far in explaining the variation in PPP effects, these are only part of the story. Partnering arrangements can consist of similar partners, resource levels and issues areas of focus yet exhibit varying levels of perceived or actual effectiveness. Within the private sector, econometricians label this unexplained differential between inputs and productivity as fixed effects of “managerial quality” (Mundlak 1961; Bailey et al. 1992).

Strong management practices and process management capabilities within PPPs could be a key determinant of PPP effectiveness, as after being established, it is these practices which “contribute to compliance and the successful implementation of measures taken” (Ulbert 2008, 8). While management practices receive some focus, as these are inherently difficult to assess and compare, no work has attempted to do so systematically: most existing work is done on an individual partnership basis via case studies, which tend to highlight the PPPs with either very strong or very weak management. Given the often subjective nature of the study area and qualitative nature of research, the ability to generalize these findings is limited. While studies based in economics and organisational studies have increasingly evidenced the strong link between management and the performance of institutions,<sup>77</sup> lacking an accepted tool to measure management, these works were less developed on a comparative or large-n basis. As furthered below, this work utilises a structured interview based on work

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<sup>77</sup> See, for example, Black and Lynch 2001; Cappelli and Neumark 2001; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; and Bloom and Van Reenen 2007.

pioneered in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), which uses an established methodology for defining, measuring and evaluating management and effectiveness to assess and compare management practices within a set of the sampling frame PPPs.

Management concerns the internal management practices and processes functioning within the PPPs and speak towards how the process of implementation is managed and monitored. Management practices are more than the attributes of the partnership leaders or top managers: while style can influence practice, these management processes are by nature part of the organisational structure and behaviour of the PPP. Management practices for partnerships are considered as composed of the following main areas: partnership operations; leadership; vision; performance management; target and goal management and people/staff management.

What is significant is that this management assessment allows this work to further explore the range of variables thought to matter in explaining PPP variation, but previously nearly impossible to assess across PPPs outside of case studies, such as resource management, leadership and internal performance tracking. The main data for process dynamics and partnership working evaluation is obtained via a management practices interview, henceforth MM Interview, and remaining discussion is reserved for chapter six.

## **EFFECTS**

After distinguishing effectiveness between goal attainment and problem solving, one considers a pathway to explore effects that starts with outputs, leading to outcomes (behavioural change), and which can eventually lead to impact (environmental change). While one may assume temporal interaction of these elements (Ulbert 2008, 5), sequencing does not necessarily always follow in a straightforward, stepped fashion, nor do all PPPs attempt to produce all three. When it comes to problem solving, it should not be assumed that a PPP that produces successful outputs and outcomes will contribute towards impact in its focus area, nor that PPPs which excel in some areas will necessarily do well in others. These dimensions are also tied to goal attainment, or the specification of how partnerships intend to reach stated aims or objects.

Outputs, first order effects and the main focus of this work, can then be further distinguished as organisational and performance. The former<sup>78</sup> focus on basic processes, procedures and functions that all PPPs should undertake, especially those deemed necessary

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<sup>78</sup> Outputs of functioning should not be confused with outputs of partnership working (see for example Atkinson 2005), the latter assessing the partnerships internal relationships. The focus here is on the tangible outputs of partnerships as institutions.

to lead to an efficient and functioning institution. Examples include structuring and legal notice, the creation of business plans, developing timelines and strategic planning and details regarding (efficient) resource use, especially related to funding and the production of related reports. These outputs are also significant because they represent the development of policy instruments intended to guide the behaviour of key actors (Young 2002a), which leads to an assessment of outcomes. Once PPPs are functioning entities, outputs become less comparable across partnerships and more concerned with the main objectives of the partnership, such as producing policy reports, undertaking awareness campaigns, or distributing medications. It is these performance outputs which go further towards analysing PPPs effectiveness capabilities, as these track and measure outputs of the PPPs specific to their problem solving role. While outcomes and impacts are necessary elements of analysis, this work is not able to fully explore these PPPs contributions, but they are addressed in the goal segmentation analysis in chapter seven and are also discussed in this work's conclusion.

### **4.3 Methods of evaluation**

Collecting, describing and measuring partnership inputs, processes and outputs, as well as attempting to analyse the resultant relationships between them, is a complex task. Many challenges and issues arose along the way, and this work sought to address these and make needed decisions based upon considerations of available options, feasibility and ultimate intended contribution of this work. It is safe to say the originally planned task was overly ambitious: the process of even identifying and describing the partnerships was an enormous undertaking, and fully applying the conceptual framework was not only difficult but one that had to be continually revisited. While further discussion on scope and remaining limitations are revisited in the concluding chapter, this subsection speaks directly towards the methodology and systematic steps taken.

#### **4.3.1 Methods: Establishing methods and evaluation framework**

The multi-faceted focus of this study and its related framework allow for the analysis of multiple levels of partnership functioning and performance. In doing so, this study combines qualitative and quantitative data, information collection techniques and analysis. Rather than contradictory, however, these aspects complement each other and allow for more in-depth research. Not only do different methods have different strengths, but there are “no fundamental incompatibilities preventing us from combining them in one integrated study” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 4). By using multiple methods, the work is able to use the



strengths of one method to compensate for the other, for example in terms of data and information collection and resultant analysis. This is especially exemplified in the management interviews, which in effect quantify information from qualitative interviews with the PPPs, as furthered in chapter six.

This work's main focus for PPP information collection, comparison and assessment is stored within the constructed **Transnational Partnership Database (TPD)**, its two sub-databases, **TPD-Outputs** and **TPD-Goals** and the Management Matters (management practices) database (**MM-Database**). The TPD is the first presentation of a micro data set of global PPPs<sup>79</sup> and represents a comprehensive source of information and analysis on the global partnering universe. Its expansive coverage and inclusiveness of variables furthers partnership analysis. The TPD's two sub-databases, TPD-Outputs and TPD-Goals are rich data sources of the sampling frame of ITPs and related to the latter element of the conceptual framework, effects. This study's other distinctive feature is its source of information collection via the MM interview, as this innovative survey tool allows for a comparative partnership analysis and in-depth understanding of partnerships at the micro level.

Any database should be seen as a means to an end rather than the end itself. Throughout the process the theoretical underpinnings that underlay this work (as previously introduced) drove the variable selection and TPD partnership coding. Though "a research design that explains a lot with a lot is not very informative" (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 123), it was also deemed necessary from the onset to encompass as many relevant explanatory variables within the framework as possible *while maintaining a focus on empirical feasibility*. Decisions as to not only which variables to track but also how to categorise the partnerships across these were continually made difficult by the often fragmented state of the field, vague definitions and the lack of standardisation of classifications and typologies in both academic works and current partnering practice.

As articulated earlier, this work incorporated the major theoretical issues and research questions dominating partnership research, but it is obviously clear that it is impossible to include the entire range of variables that may be deemed relevant. Further, building the final framework presented here involved moving from an ideal, theoretical construct into a modified one: more operational, feasible, manageable and defensible. To some extent, especially regarding the organisational outputs tracked, the original framework altered throughout, as some variables were determined missing for the majority of the universe of

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<sup>79</sup> As previously noted, the other main academic database is the Global Sustainability Partnership Database (Biermann et al. 2007b) developed by the Institute for Environmental Studies at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, but at time of writing this includes only CSD partnerships.

PPPs and others were added during the course of the process as it became apparent they would be meaningful to the analysis.<sup>80</sup>

To manage this process, this work took the stance that all variables and codes analysed *in the TPD* and its sub-databases were ones that could be replicated by other researchers, and if subjective assessments were required then decisions made would be clearly defensible. Thus, while moving from an ideal set of variables to those feasibly tracked across close to 800 partnerships involved losing some detail and specificity for scope, readers and users of the TPD should appreciate its encompassing nature, focus on clarity and precise data tracking. The sampling frame of ITPs allowed for the full exploration of the variables across the framework components and the ability to collect and analyse data more closely, though these criteria of defensibility and replicability were maintained. This work's management interviews, provided an additional, richer dataset, and (available for a subset of PPPs) further drawing out micro-based insights presented. Finally, throughout the course of this work many interviews and meetings were held with relevant PPP stakeholders, but none of this qualitative information fed directly into the TPD coding.

#### **4.3.2 Methods of analysis: Collecting and describing units of study**

Key throughout the process was to preserve utmost transparency and attention to detail to allow others to understand the reasoning behind definitions and analysis and also ensure their ability to replicate this study. Explicitly, this involved ensuring the variables were clearly defined, articulated and tracked as objectively as possible (or to the extent the subject area allows). This work also fully records the process by which this information was gathered and the reasoning behind the resultant partnership and components coding.

Defining the universe of global public-private partnerships was the first ambitious aspect of the data collection and a more controversial task than originally anticipated, given the vagueness of the definitions of PPPs and the contested nature of the term itself. The TPD first lists and describes all claimed global public-private partnering initiatives, but it does not take the normative stance that all listed potential partnerships include all aspects of a “true partnership” or that roles are shared as claimed. The process of universe definition occurred in early 2008 and continually updated, but was revisited in 2011 so all information is accurate

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<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, once the decision was taken to transfer the TPD from an independent research project to a full accessible, online project – the Global PPP Platform ([globalppps.org](http://globalppps.org)) – it was deemed useful to create as complete profiles of all PPPs as possible. In doing so, the analytical potential of the inputs presented in chapter five expanded considerably, but much of this could not be discussed in the present work given length limitations.

as of 30 June 2011. Before detailing the data sources utilised, it is helpful to understand the universe definition and partnership coding.

Establish universe: After defining the unit of study, several steps were taken to build the universe and sampling frame. First sources of all existing *claimed* public-private partnering initiatives were compiled. Existing aggregated sources, of which there were three major listings, were utilised first. As mentioned, Kaul's (2006) work is the largest compilation. Her 2005/2006 attempt to pull together the overall collection of global PPPs and examine their descriptive and structural characteristics resulted in 405 identified partnerships,<sup>81</sup> but this online database is no longer available. The WHO's International Initiative on Public Private Partnerships for Health<sup>82</sup> (IPPPH), while no longer operational or accessible once represented the most consolidated source of GHPs. Originally managed by Roy Widdus, the IPPPH is in now within the Global Forum for Health Research, but no longer maintained. Perhaps the most studied segment of global PPPs in terms of a large-n foci are the post WSSD Type II Partnerships for now hosted within the UN's Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)'s consolidated database, though it is based on self-reporting by the PPPs. Across all, these databases were mostly listings of partnerships rather than full databases of information, however, so it was often rather cumbersome to obtain actual information on the partnerships. Once these partnerships had been identified, the databases were merged to eliminate overlaps, or PPPs that appeared in multiple.

The second wave of data collection involved investigating other potential sources, mainly major program websites from the World Bank, USAID, UNDP and UNFIP, among others. Since 2001, the USAID, through the GDA model, has cultivated more than 1,065 public-private alliances with over 3,025 individual partners (USAID 2011), but the majority of these are shorter-term projects, locality specific and not tri-sectoral; thus, the individual alliances are not included within the TPD. In the end, the PPPs noted from the UN focal points were also listed but not added into the TPD in full due to lack of information and the novelty of the PPPs, as no information could be found on the vast majority outside of their initiation article within the newsletter. This was followed by reviewing other academic research work on global PPPs, following through with leads from corporate websites and then investigating relevant secondary sources, a similar process Kaul (2006) originally took. Of note, outside of these three main sources additional PPPs were not added to the TPD if it was clear they would fall outside of the sampling frame (i.e. only a national scope or no private

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<sup>81</sup> <http://www.thenewpublicfinance.org/p-universe.php>

<sup>82</sup> Information and related publications from the initiative can be found at <http://www.globalforumhealth.org/>

partners involved). Thus, while acknowledging there may be more this process resulted in 757 identified global partnerships, 53 of which did not come from the three databases.

Define and describe: Once identified, the universe of PPPs was characterised across several dimensions to clarify the object of study and create individual PPP profiles. To do so, this work developed a coding/ definition system and applied this consistently across a few main variables. This not only describes the universe of PPPs but also eventually reaches the narrower sampling frame of ITPs. AppendixA provides a full list of all TPD variables, but the coding process for the main variables is described briefly below.

Partnership type: Outside of source, the key code is the PPP type. This relates to the filtering process of moving from claimed global public-private partnering initiatives to the sampling frame and essentially describes the PPP in one snapshot. This involved coding partnerships that were no longer operational, existed “in name only” (occurs when a formal announcement was proclaimed for the PPP but no follow up or evidence of operation could be found) or were projects rather than institutionalised partnerships. The next step in the process identifies partners (actors, members) and scope (global, regional, etc), and those without a tri-sectoral actor based and transnational reach are classified within this type and not placed within the sampling frame. To reiterate, the focus remains on *claimed* partners, scope and geographic reach, among others, as it was acknowledged from the onset that listed information may not represent the reality within each PPP. Slightly more than 20% of the PPPs changed their type during the process, mainly either because status changed (partners involved, scope, operational), additional information was obtained or an interview revealed the different nature of partnering or partners involved than originally identified.

The TPD coding system in effect served as a funnelling technique, where each code type essentially noted the reason the PPP is not in the sampling frame. This can be thought of as the statement, “Not in the sampling frame (X) because this PPP does not meet this criterion (e.g. S for scope, P for partners, etc). This funnel works the universe to the sampling frame of PPPs, discussed in chapter five (See *AppendixB*).

Besides type, the other classification perhaps subject to the most criticism is assigning a functional type to the partnerships. As the second chapter discussed, PPPs perform a myriad of functions (Reinicke and Deng 2000: 12-23; Bull and McNeill 2007; Kaul 2006). While some works consider two broad categories of policy implementation and policy formulation (Schäferhoff,, Campe and Kaan 2009, 457), even among these two categorisations many PPPs blur the line between the two. Though most existing works attempt a categorisation or typology segmentation, few clearly lay out the methods for establishing these types. It is often

unclear whether this should be determined by what the PPP claims to do, what it actually does or what activities the funders earmark the most money for, and it is even more unclear how to determine all three for each partnership given the lacking information. This work defines ten functional categories and assigns all PPPs accordingly as per the methods below (*Table 4.3*).

**Table 4.3: Functional Descriptions**

<b>Main Category</b>	<b>Definition</b>
<b>Advocacy</b>	A PPP dedicated to advocacy’s main operations revolve around vocally and/or visibly supporting a position or action. Raising awareness, affecting popular opinion, influencing policy-makers and social outreach are ways of illuminating the position of the PPP’s message and further bring attention to its core agenda.
<b>Information production/ research</b>	A PPP involved in information and knowledge production generally engages in forms of joint-research amongst its main actor base. The partnership may share resources or capital (physical, human or technological) towards producing new knowledge; at times this results in a network to create a “virtual library” or “virtual laboratory.” Most global health partnerships devoted to product and vaccine development fit within this category; other PPPs encourage partners to conduct field work that contributes to new knowledge.
<b>Information dissemination &amp; transfer</b>	A PPP within this category is committed to facilitating dialogue and the exchange of information and experience between actors. Often, such partnerships establish formal institutions or informal networks, such as clearing houses or periodic conferences, that encourage target actors to congress in order to explore ideas for policy or joint-action in a given issue field. Other partnerships may institute an accessible database constructed through combined input for the purpose of sharing information and learning. Such a partnership is created to encourage consultation towards extending and deepening networks of relations and/or to facilitate discussion and discourse on the topics deemed significant.
<b>Policy and/ or (its) development</b>	This type of PPP is involved assisting in the development of policies that will further the partnership’s agenda/interests. Unlike a pure advocacy partnership, this type of PPP goes beyond simply raising awareness, and aims to create pressure in favour of a certain position, push towards policy change or develop/create new policy standards. Policy development PPPs focus on applying the pooled expertise and experience of the PPP to assist policy-makers in updating the policy environment and designing new effective policy where a need has been identified by the partnership.
<b>Setting standards</b>	This type of PPP is involved in encouraging the adoption of particular standards and practices, often geared towards an industry. These partnerships often pool the expertise and experience of its partners to inform and assist enterprises in improving the monitoring and implementation of particularly defined supply-chain practices, or to encourage the standards of products and services across an industry to be harmonized.
<b>Coordination (of resources, expertise)</b>	A PPP that specializes in coordination uses its pooled expertise, experience, knowledge and resources to manage the planning and preparation of activities that will provide public goods for beneficiaries. The strength and utility of the partnership is often derived from the ability of partners to apply their comparative advantage to the goal of coordinating action. For example, some partners may be adept at fund-raising, other partners may have experience in planning humanitarian activities, and some (usually UN bodies) have large networks of relations to rely on for gathering expertise. The PPP brings partners’ expertise and assets under one umbrella, mobilizes these and attempts to coordinates them in a more coherent manner.

<b>Facilitation</b>	This type of PPP aims to bring about increased engagement and networking between relevant actors with a view to strengthening their cooperation, often to encourage the provision of public goods or services in a given issue area. Often, this type of PPP considers itself a “broker,” “clearing house” or “network” between like-minded actors; facilitation PPPs tend not to engage in the actual implementation or coordination of initiatives; rather, they seek to recruit and match other organizations towards such ends.
<b>Capital provision</b>	This type of PPP coordinates the mobilization of resources and channels these towards a targeted population. The partnership often involves a grant-awarding public body or a fund engaged in socially responsible investment that makes available a sum of money to vetted candidates that engage in the coordination or implementation of a public good or service.
<b>Operational</b>	An operational PPP would have a direct presence on the ground, and retain some stake, oversight, or management over the activities that the PPP supports. An operational PPP goes beyond finalizing a framework for future action and actually conducts action itself; for example, operational areas could include sale of goods/services or the distribution of aid and/or humanitarian relief.
<b>Capacity building</b>	A capacity-building partnership is distinct from simple coordination in that its efforts are geared towards developing the autonomous capabilities of local stakeholders and/or beneficiaries. It is also distinct from operational PPPs; even though capacity-building is a direct (up-front) way of engaging stakeholders and beneficiaries, the public service that is produced is developing competencies and skills, rather than consumables or other forms of humanitarian support.

This work makes the functional types purposely broad and notes secondary functions where appropriate. To reach these functions, this work combines three main elements in the following order of prominence: partnership mission statement, partnership key activities or business/ strategic plan and partnership dedication of time and resources, where the latter were available. The methodological process is focused first on the partnership’s claimed primary function, but it is difficult to make a satisfactory judgment unless there is an explicit delineation of the partnership’s key focus. While *useful* mission statements will include mention of not just the intended impact of the partnership, but the activities the partnership engages in to achieve this, often such statements do not suffice in explicitly delineating primary activities. The function variable can be considered more activity-based; if the activities involve mobilizing resources towards an initiative, the function would be coded as coordination, whereas if primary activities were to involve joint research, the function would be coded as information exchange and/or research.

### **Creating Profiles: Partnership attributes and addressing input legitimacy**

Using the information collection processes described below, a full PPP profile is created for every PPP in the universe. This consists of variables within the following categories: Focus (scope, sector); Partners (including actual names of all partners involved, partner counts and partner sectoral split); Legal (legal structure and status); Operations (years

founded, ended and total years operational); Institutional (hosted status structure, design and status); GDM variables (type of body, sectoral split of decision making, layers of governing bodies); Funding and resources; and Contact details. See *Appendix D* for full list of variables tracked.

Besides more detailed descriptors on PPPs operations and structure, these variables speak towards the main debates regarding PPPs **input legitimacy**: their ability to bridge the participation gaps (Reinicke and Deng 2000), participatory quality of decision making processes (Scharpf 1999; Wolf 2006) and transparency (Bäckstrand 2006; Buse 2004a; Buse and Harmer 2004). Considering these aspects involved tracking and assessing the existence of an annual report, financial data and/or guiding legal documents. That said, it could be argued much of the TPD is an exercise assessing PPP's transparency and accountability, as simply collecting basic information, especially funding sources or governing arrangements, is challenging.

#### **4.3.3 Methods: Collecting and describing partnership effects**

For those within the sampling frame, additional information on both partnership inputs and outputs was collected utilising the same methods of data collection. This involved more detailed descriptives of partnership inputs, such as type of centre point, number and status of full time staff and level of institutionalisation. The remainder of these variables and the resultant findings are discussed in the next chapter, which presents the TPD and chapter seven which discusses the sampling frame and effects.

While some data collection was done simultaneously with that above (including final verifications), the partnership output empirical work was conducted solely during November 2009 - May 2011, with the latter serving for final verification purposes, and the comparative basis utilised 2008-2009 as the last fiscal year for financial data. As functioning and legitimisation variables do not entail making as subjective of judgements (though there will always be an element of this, the definitions are noted for every variable, e.g. scale of institutionalisation), these two areas made sense to track together. The process to describe and measuring partnership effects was conducted through: 1) PPP goal definition and segmentation (outputs, outcome or impact minded) and 2) comparable outputs of partnering.

PPP goals set and defined: Global partnerships are varying institutions, composed of actors with ranging aims and incentives; yet these individual goals which lead to their involvement in the PPP and may or may not be the same as the intended goals of the

partnership itself (Zadek et al. 2001). The stated goals of a partnership are obviously a key reference for evaluation, and the first step towards analysis of goal attainment, but goal articulation is itself worth evaluating, especially as this was found to vary so greatly across the PPPs. This work produces the first **TPD- Goals database**, which tracks the missions and visions for sampling frame PPPs. It also breaks down all stated partnership goals into whether or not they are output, outcome or impact focused, and PPPs can obviously set goals within one or all of these.

Publicly available documents and readings that pertain to the PPP's *mission* and *vision* are the obvious starting point. Often, the websites of active (and even some ceased) partnerships are instructive enough in having a separate and visible link to a mission and/or vision statement. Publicized declarations of mission and/or vision statements commonly are broken down into objectives; more often than not, these are expressed at the outcome-level, outlining the steps that lead to the achievement of the impact-level goal. Information on outputs is usually found on a paragraph or a webpage separate from the mission and/or vision statements, and often outputs can be gauged from the partnership's description of its activities. This overall method is thus top-down, beginning by studying objectives set at the environmental/ impact-level or the behavioural/ outcome-level, and only thereafter determining activities that contribute to the output-level. This method proves useful in establishing an overall context and then shows how output-oriented activities are geared towards the achievement of higher-level goals.

Simply defining and segmenting goals, while a useful and enlightening exercise, only goes so far in the analysis of partnerships effectiveness. Analytically, the next step is ideally to track progress of the PPP towards these goals, but this will only be possible for PPPs with well defined goals and strategies, measurable (at least to an extent) goals and aims and clearly defined and published indicators and metrics. While this process forms a part of many existing effectiveness studies, issues regarding lack of standardisation and difficulties of comparison exist. This is not to deny the importance of assessing goal attainment, but it is difficult methodologically to confidently evaluate or rank PPPs based on perceived progress towards their varying set goals. This is especially the case as the goal definition process across all PPPs was in itself ambitious, and while tracing goal attainment for all ITPs is clearly outside of the scope of this work, this work goes as far as possible by detailing PPPs' internal performance tracking, internal review systems and whether or not they have been subject to external evaluation, among others, as detailed in chapter seven.



Organisational outputs: Related to the functioning of partnerships, comparable outputs of functioning represent the key outputs that all partnerships should produce, regardless of function. From an assessment standpoint, partnership output variables are more easily accessible and observable and can also be judged on a more quantitative scale than outcomes, and are thus more easily tracked. These outputs tracked in **TPD-Outputs** can also be considered first order means or steps deemed necessary to reach eventual performance. These are critical as outputs must also be in place to speak accurately of partnership efficiency and productivity, since either involves accurate measures of both inputs and outputs, which these speak towards. The outputs were selected based on a meta-analysis of existing partnership and institutional frameworks of outputs, existing literature, interviews with partnership practitioners<sup>83</sup> and examples from high performing partnerships' reporting systems. To an extent, however, information availability and feasibility of information tracked were also taken into account.

A point worth considering evident throughout the work and thus also often rearticulated is many aspects flow across inputs, processes and outputs, and as such cannot be slotted firmly within one category in practice, but for analytical clarity this work must make certain segmentations. Further, as many existing evaluations have ranging foci for their study, there is no clear categorisation of where all of these legitimisation variables fall. For example, while rule design and the dispute settlement or resolution system are partnership inputs, utilising and applying these are part of partnerships' processes, but the publication of these rules and/or the results of disputes are tracked as organisational outputs of the partnership. While it is crucial not to confuse these aspects of legitimacy with the dependent variable of effects in analysis, given availability of information and categorisations utilised, this remains a challenge throughout.

#### **4.3.4 Methods: Data sources and methodological processes**

This led to a development of a profile for each PPP. Primary sources included all publicly available PPP information, including websites, annual reports and other publications, relevant partner websites or publications, program documents and related materials. Existing PPP evaluations were utilised to complete the databases, but all documents were noted as to their source and whether internal, independent or external. After assessing the primary resources available, this work focuses primarily on annual reports and financial statements, strategic plans, and if available, evaluations. Internal evaluations, newsletters and partner

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<sup>83</sup> See list of Stakeholder interviews in AppendixK.

statements were also used for database information, as often these were the only source of information, but this was done only if the sources could be verified as to time period, source of publication and author.

The UN CSD database was another source of information (for 169 PPPs it was the only source) as well as global health organisations, the World Bank's Global and Regional partnership program, the Centre for Global Development, the UK Department for International Development Health Resource Centre, Partnerships for Health Reform and the Global Forum for Health Research, among others. Additional publications were obtained through reference lists of identified papers and by contacting key informants in the field, but as a methodological point all information in the TPD comes from a verifiable source, publication or webpage. If information could only be obtained by contacting the PPP directly (via email or phone contact, if available), this is clearly noted as to lack of public availability and source. Thus TPD information did not come solely from conversation or interviews, though interview information was used to verify TPD information or make corrections (e.g. adjust a partner count, number of staff), but this mostly applied to TPD-Outputs information. This is also the case for documents sent by the partnership but not publically accessible without request permission; specifically, a set of PPPs only made these documents available to partners or members, but were happy to send to this author.

This work's process dictated that information from MM interviews or direct contacts was used to verify inputs and organisational outputs but not those related to PPP transparency. Specifically this implies that while staff counts, number of locations and total number of partners/ funders and (external) evaluations conducted would be adjusted post-interview, variables that involved a transparency component (e.g. publishing performance metrics) were not – even if the interview revealed the PPP had metrics. To adjust for this and not, the MM Interview-based set of organisational and institutional aspects tracked during the interviews (*AppendixG*) are collected in a separate database and subject to full, separate analysis (though only an aspect of this will be presented within this work given space).

With this multiplicity of sources, there was a need for selection criterion for reports and information utilised in creating partnership profiles. The key consideration was whether the databases should be as accurate as possible or as replicable as possible. While both were goals from the onset, in the end accuracy was chosen with the caveat towards transparency variables detailed above. In essence, however, major discrepancies were few and are spoken to below, though minor discrepancies (e.g. partner count, staff count) were frequent. One additional consideration was whether or not to include secondary material or 'grey' literature

(such as briefs, media or journal ‘comments’), and in the end these were used to verify or backup key information, mainly because for many PPPs these were the only sources.<sup>84</sup> Thus, these data collection processes utilised a degree of methodological triangulation and the most up-to-date and verifiable information was used as the final data point, and all conflicts noted.<sup>85</sup>

Further, especially at the onset of this research work and during its course, key PPP stakeholders were also interviewed via a semi-structured conversation covering the main aspect’s of this work’s framework and detailed probing into the particular area for which that interviewee was specialised. In addition, managers and directors at four PDPs were interviewed in 2010 following the MM interview portion of this study.<sup>86</sup> Given the empirical, large-n nature of this work and the direction taken, this analysis and insights are not included here, but when applicable relevant discussion from these additional interviews is mentioned.

#### **4.3.5 Methods: Measuring partnership management practices**

To investigate the issue of partnership management, this work conducts a structured Management Matters interview with a set of the ITPs. The management matters survey is based on methodology pioneered in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and developed as joint collaboration between LSE and McKinsey & Company, a consultancy. This tool is based on interviewing managers to collect management practices data, originally across private sector firms, and then evaluates and scores on these practices. Further development of the methodology has applied this same survey tool and scoring grid to the public sector (government tax agencies, schools, hospitals and aged care homes) and charitable organisations; among others. Thus, it has shown clearly its relevant application across countries, sectors and types of institutions. Not only is it applicable as a survey tool, but the resultant findings from these structure interviews continue to find stronger management practices to correlate with higher performance levels (Dohrmann and Pinshaw 2009).

This methodology allows this work to utilise and benchmark a rigorous comparison of global PPPs within a proven framework and structured scoring grid, especially as this tool provides a conceptually sound, operationally manageable measure of process management. These works have shown clear relationships between stronger (and higher scored) internal

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<sup>84</sup> This judgment is also made given the goal of this work, in assessing PPP variation, rather than an attempting to evaluate or analyse PPPs’ effects more specifically.

<sup>85</sup> More detailed information and guidance to the compilation of the TPD and the dating track process will be made available at [globalppps.org](http://globalppps.org); the concluding chapter returns to this.

<sup>86</sup> This allowed for particular probing into certain areas that varied the most across this set of rather similar partnerships and detailed investigation and related analysis into elements such as institutional design choice, partner management and performance tracking, as examples, which will feed into further work as the conclusion discusses.

institutional management practices and external indicators of institutional performance and productivity (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010). Applying this management measure and the process undertaken to conduct the interview involves understanding the processes involved in scoring management practices; collecting accurate responses; and obtaining interviews with the partnership directors, all described in full in chapter six.

#### **4.4 Considerations and conclusions**

Any large scale study of such a fragmented universe of institutional structures presents many challenges, especially for the scope of a single work or researcher. While this work presents an evaluative framework for transnational partnerships focusing upon partnership inputs, processes and effects, a few limitations and caveats should be noted. The first is that this work should be seen as an applicable and useful common framework for transnational partnerships, but this is not an attempt to establish one accepted definition of partnerships or effectiveness. This work also takes a more narrow focus on partnership effects rather than effectiveness, and by applying the study to partnership effects, the work is able to maintain a more feasible scope while avoiding the more subjective nature of ranking partnership effectiveness based upon my own conceptualisations, crude scale or standard. As this work's utmost methodological goal is to maintain applicability, transparency and systematic procedures, this was the best course to take. Repeated calls from established researchers of international regimes note difficulties with subjective judgement of individual analyst when explaining and evaluating the effectiveness of various regimes.<sup>87</sup> As the importance of convergence regarding these issue areas across researchers rather than additional attempts at conceptualisations are often made (Underdal 2004), this was the course taken.

To conclude this chapter, this work moves in the direction of systematic, comparative research on the impact of varying components of partnership inputs and management practices on partnership effects. It provides a foundation for more quantitative study of partnerships and further attempts to sharpen the concepts involved in partnership research. Combined, the methodological processes build upon the partnership conceptual framework to examine the degree to which transnational partnerships vary and takes steps towards explaining how ranging variation in partnerships can be explained by varying foci, structural

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<sup>87</sup> See Young, King, and Schroeder 2008 where similar arguments are made as well as Young 2003 for specific cases.

inputs and management processes. These three aspects are discussed in the subsequent chapters, which present the empirical findings.

## CHAPTER FIVE:

### **Transnational partnerships in global governance: Variation in form and effects**

In the complex, collaborative and at times contradictory continuum of current global affairs, transnational partnerships have increasingly gained prominence. While their potential is intriguing, we know little regarding the cumulative impact of the practice of transnational partnering. With a grasp of the background and methodology, this chapter presents the first comprehensive view of the universe of claimed global partnering initiatives. Doing so, it highlights not only the defining features of the global partnerships operating within the multilateral domain but also touches upon the persisting debates these raise.

Though organised by main partnership characteristics given the substantial depth of information to cover, this chapter stays closely with the overriding concerns regarding partnerships' efforts to address persisting governance deficits. As it summarises the key findings of this work's **Transnational Partnership Database (TPD)**, this chapter presents the information systematically, as per the framework relating to partnerships inputs. This involves considering **attributes** that fall within the following: characteristics (operations, age, and location), focus (scope, function and sectoral coverage) and actors (partners and funders involved). The next section considers structural features of institutional design and level of institutionalisation followed by **governance and decision making (GDM)** variable<sup>88</sup>s. The final section returns to these overriding debates, possible implications and summary remarks.

#### **5.1: Partnership universe: Operations, locations and coverage**

From the onset, attempts to describe or define the universe of PPPs are challenged by the often vague and varying and notions of what embodies or typifies a PPP. As the term partnership is rather value-laden, overused and frequently applied to a range of institutional endeavours, the expression itself is difficult to grasp. The definitional uncertainties of the term are worth reiterating as these will continually challenge analytical work and always leave a degree of ambiguity relating to any claimed, final figures.

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<sup>88</sup> The analysis of sampling frame ITPs are also presented, as insights emerge regarding how this set of PPPs compares to the universe as a whole and this work tracked additional, detailed variables on this subset.

### 5.1.1 Transnational partnerships: Numbers and where to find them

It is undoubtedly impossible to define the complete universe of transnational PPPs, so from the onset this work acknowledges this is likely still an incomplete picture. As previously detailed, the approach taken starts with the main existing, available listings of PPPs, combines these and eliminates overlaps (PPPs that appear in multiple listings). The majority of PPPs were found to be listed within the UN’s Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD)<sup>89</sup> (352 PPPs) or the New Public Finance<sup>90</sup> (NPF) initiative (304 PPPs), with the latter also encapsulating 66 of those within the Initiative on PPPs for Health (IPPPH) and 50 of those listed within the CSD.<sup>91,92</sup> After merging these, the next process added in partnerships from additional sources, including IGO’s main program and partnership pages, other academic research institutions and public policy networks for think tanks with a dedicated PPP or non-state actors research team. It then investigates other potential PPPs not included in these consolidated sources that were operational by 2010 to create this work’s TPD. Thus while acknowledging there may be more this work identified 757 identified global partnerships, 53 of which did not come from the three databases (*Table 5.1*).

**Table 5.1 Sources utilised for the Transnational Partnership Database (TPD)**

Source	PPPs	Percentage
CSD only	296	39%
New Public Finance only	187	25%
IPPPH only	4	1%
New Detailed only	75	10%
New Public Finance and CSD	50	7%
New Public Finance and IPPH	66	9%
New Detailed and CSD	5	1%
New Detailed and IPPH	20	3%
All three databases	1	0%
Other sources	53	7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>757</b>	<b>100%</b>
CSD all	352	46%
New Public Finance all	379	50%
IPPPH all	71	9%

Source: TPD, 2011

<sup>89</sup> <http://webapps01.un.org/dsd/partnerships/public/browse.do>

<sup>90</sup> <http://www.undp.org/thenewpublicfinance/partnerships.html>

<sup>91</sup> Kaul (2006) mentions that her work is not inclusive of all CSD partnerships.

<sup>92</sup> Netmark Plus was the only PPP to be listed in all three: <http://www.netmarkafrica.org/index.html>

Most existing attempts at cross-PPP or cumulative evaluative works have been done on the partnerships for sustainable development registered with the UN's CSD; as of June 2011 there were 348<sup>93</sup> registered PPPs within this database. The NPF database, based on the work of Inge Kaul (Kaul 2006; Broadwater and Kaul 2005), was taken out of operational status in 2009 and is no longer accessible. Outside of the author's own work, no additional analysis was conducted following initial publication; indeed, most PPPs listed were not aware of the NPF or their placement within it. The IPPPH, originally within the WHO, was no longer updated after 2004, and though it was transferred to the Global Forum for Health Research<sup>94</sup> as an initiative there has been little furtherance.

As mentioned in the last chapter, most other existing online databases were mainly project-based, regional or agency specific and thus would fall outside of the global scope this work originally sought to include. Thus the TPD is the first to merge across sources and attempt to verify updated operations across all PPPs. While seemingly straightforward, this process was continually complicated by missing information, lack of maintenance of partnership listings and absence of clarity of publically available listings. For instance, many institutions are claimed partnerships, but do not appear to be engaging in any form of collaboration; others may be defined in one location as a partnership, yet when contacted these institutions were quick to distance themselves from this category; thus, the verification process of partnership entities was a challenging and consuming endeavour.

### **Narrowing:**

The TPD collected information on all 757 partnerships in the universe and describes the partnerships by creating detailed partnership profiles. This serves as a narrowing process, which allows the work to funnel this large universe of partnerships to a specific form of institutionalised transnational partnerships (ITPs).<sup>95</sup> The 147 partnerships which embody the characteristics of an ITP constitute the subset of more institutionalised initiatives which undergo detailed analysis (*Figure 5.1*).<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> As mentioned in the second chapter, the CSD website currently lists 348 partnerships [accessed 20 August 2011]; however, it originally included four additional partnerships that have been removed but are still within the TPD.


<sup>94</sup> <http://www.globalforumhealth.org/>

<sup>95</sup> ITPs are voluntary, horizontally structured and collaborative institutionalised interaction between multi-sector parties (based in the public, private and social sector) organised with a purpose or task of global reach; see chapter two for definitional background.

<sup>96</sup> As noted, upon the final TPD update process (June 2011), an additional 98 PPPs were identified as possible sampling frame PPPs (and 21 PPPs changed type, mainly through partner restriction, to eliminate them from the sampling frame); but analysis remains limited to the 147 numerated as of December 2010.



**Figure 5.1: Narrowing process from Universe to Sampling Frame**



Of the claimed partnerships pulled together by this work, 317 were no longer operational or no information could be found to verify their operational status. At over 42% of the universe, this is an astonishing number of partnerships, especially given the rampant and continual promotion these initiatives receive. A further 60 were not actually partnerships, but only programs or projects within existing institutions, and these were designated within a separate category. A portion (13) of these were Social Responsibility Initiatives (SRIs) where a public and private institution agreed to work together on a certain project/ initiative, but there was often no established, formal or long-lasting relationship. The majority of these SRIs<sup>97</sup> also had little information regarding their work outside of the initial press release. British Petroleum, Shell and Statoil all have named SRI's that share basic characteristics such as private sector institutional hosting, operational-gearred functions and claimed global scope, but these are not stand-alone initiatives, and hence it is difficult to distinguish these from projects undertaken by BP or Shell as an entity. On the other hand, partnerships such as Community Watersheds Partnership Program Global Development Alliance (*Formerly the Coca-Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance*), while not an institution in its own right, represents a formal partnership between the institutions. It also has a defined mandate, traceable activities and operations which can be distinguished from Coca Cola's broader CSR

<sup>97</sup> All SRIs were sourced from the NPF database.


initiatives. While this is obviously a difficult distinction, it is one this work deemed necessary so it made all efforts to distinguish projects from institutions in the narrowing process, though complete precision cannot be reached.

Another 43 partnerships are for-profit entities and not included in the sampling frame; further, a large segment of the PPPs (243) were not be included within the sampling frame as they have a narrowly defined scope, i.e. country or regional specific, or they do not include partners from the three sectors. This is not to say these PPPs should be less studied or that they may be more or less effective, but rather it is this work’s goal to focus detailed analysis on this more institutionalised subset.

### 5.1.2 Operational status and partnerships no longer functioning

Partnerships are either deemed fully operational with a partnership-specific website or fully operational with verifiable information available on its host, main partners’ websites or related sources. This work defines a PPP as having operational status if there is any existing and relevant information confirming status as ongoing, even if no tangible output can be distinguished<sup>98</sup> (*Figure 5.2*).

**Figure 5.2: Operational status, All PPPs**



Source: TPD, 2011

<sup>98</sup> December 2008 served as the cut off period.

Digging deeper reveals that at least 26 partnerships, but probably more, have ceased operations due to a completed mandate. An example of this is the Lapdap Antimalarial Product Development, a partnership between GlaxoSmithKline, the WHO the UK's Department for International Development (DFID) which completed its objective of submitting Lapdap (a fixed ratio tablet of an antimalarial drug combination) for registration within a period of 5 years<sup>99</sup> (Lang and Greenwood 2003). A larger number of these expired when the funding cycle terminated or initially planned timeline ceased; however, it is often difficult to distinguish these partnerships from the formerly referenced category, as to be coded as complete mandate, this work would have to source a verifiable report, publication or even press release noting successful completion.

Another 13 partnerships fit into the category "exist in announcement only." These partnerships have published information noting partnership initiation or intent to partner, often with a specified timeframe and mandate, yet beyond this initial publication no additional information can be found to verify the partnership was ever established or made it off the ground.<sup>100</sup> An issue in determining the status of "no longer in operation" versus "completed mandate" is the source of the announcement, as a few of these may have been assumed into either an existing or new institution or a similar, pre-existing partnership. An example is the WHO/Novartis Coartem® which while eventually successful,<sup>101</sup> never existed as a separate entity. Most times, however, the original source did not provide enough leads, nor did any follow-up or attempts to contact the partnership allow for full verification of status. A related issue is that of the **169 PPPs** for which their CSD database entry was the only information available. After efforts to contact the PPP and extensive searching, no operational existence could be confirmed for these, thus these were deemed no longer operational. Of these, 62% (105) were initiated with a set timeframe, so while it is still discouraging that no information regarding the PPP could be found, this limited lifespan was planned. For the remaining 64 that were open-ended, however, this is a different story.<sup>102</sup> While these also "exist in information only," these PPPs are kept with a unique code to distinguish them as CSD-based, but are classified as no confirmation of operating.

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<sup>99</sup> Not only was this done on time but at a relatively low cost, and after which a public health group was formed which investigated relevant pricing and distribution issues.

<sup>100</sup> This work attempted to verify information directly via email, phone and fax confirmation but was unable to confirm these partnerships ever began operating. This number does not include any UN-CSD partnerships.

<sup>101</sup> Novartis and the Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV), a PDP, jointly launched Coartem in 2009.

<sup>102</sup> As a proxy, these were deemed no longer operational as of 2008 - this work's cut off year for having evidence of operations.

Unfortunately also within the not operational category is a rather large set of partnerships which seem to have initiated or started operations but for which no current information past 2008 could be obtained on operational activities. This work distinguishes between these types to separate partnerships that were once operational and have some evidence of activity from those which were only announced. This is critical, as research questions should not only consider which factors are associated with partnership success (or mere continuance), but also if certain characteristics or types of PPPs are more likely to lead to a limited timeframe.

That a large number of PPPs fail should perhaps not be surprising. Especially in terms of institutional structuring, growth phases, staff levels and motivation and many other characteristics, PPPs could rightly be compared to private sector commercial start-ups. As such, it is interesting to note that recent research across a broad range of industries, time periods and countries shows that nearly half of all start-ups cease operating within four years (Sull 2009, 56). Exploring the types of PPPs that have ceased operations may unearth possible explanations for continuance or lack thereof. Yet what is critical is to not only understand why this occurs – and there are certainly transferable lessons - but also ensure PPP stakeholders have current information on this operational status, or transparency of operations, across the universe of PPPs.

What does this suggest regarding the state of the PPP universe? Without question consolidated or up-to-date information on global PPPs is lacking.<sup>103</sup> While others have noted the lack of information or evidence of operational activity in global partnerships, usually in relation to their reporting and monitoring of activities (OECD 2006), this work is the first attempt to assess the totality of the partnership universe AND to attempt to verify operational status of the CSD partnerships beyond their self-reported entries. This raises pressing questions regarding PPPs' roles as effective modes of governance given that many institutions lack verifiable or accessible information on their activity or operations. While one must acknowledge that these sources are slightly outdated, and there would be a natural progression or evolution of the partnerships, the high numbers of those without any tangible evidence of operations is still alarming.

Of difficulty is that partnerships are moving targets - constantly changing and adapting institutions: attempting to define and categorise them is complicated by their continually evolving nature. During their development, partnerships will obviously undergo

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<sup>103</sup> The lack of evidenced activity echoes arguments regarding CSD registered partnerships from Andonova and Levy 2003 and recently Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann et al. 2010, who find 156 (47 percent) of CSD registered PPPs are inactive.

internal change and also be impacted by external factors. Many PPPs also either become subsumed into existing organisations or continue under a different name or head partner; thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to trace their activities. Those hosted within IGOs are often staffed only on a part time basis, and when the key “champion” of that initiative leaves, the PPP leaves with it (World Economic Forum 2005), a finding echoed strongly in this work’s interviews. While a supposed inherent strength of partnerships is their flexible nature, as this should allow them to withstand and adapt to changes (Caplan et al. 2001; Kjaer and Tennyson 2003) and be innovative problem solvers, lacking solid institutional structuring or strong backing, these institutions often have limited tenures or become too tied to a certain actor’s interest.

At issue is the continued promotion of these initiatives despite the fact that large numbers do not survive past the initial years of operation, the main partner’s initial funding cycle or even the announcement of the PPP! Recall the second chapter’s discussion of how once the partnering trend became caught up in a discourse or promises, allowing these to become established entities despite evidenced effects, or even operations. While often applied to GHPs (Buse and Harmer 2004) or CSD partnerships (Bäckstrand 2010), the TPD show this is made manifest across the universe. Not only is this worrisome given the massive amount of attention and tangible funding going into these initiatives - e.g. at the launch of the WSSD over 250 million USD had been committed to all partnerships, and this figure has increased substantially since then (Biermann et al. 2007a) - it also raises a few pressing questions to explore: Are certain types of PPPs more likely to be operational than others? Are certain characteristics or types of actors involved or type of partnering, associated with more stable operation? Do certain issues or problem areas that give rise to multiple partnerships more frequently lack sustainability? Yet, perhaps another pressing question, rarely asked, is as long as there is transparency, should high failure rates be accepted? This work will continue to explore these issues.

### **5.1.3 Geography and scope**

Given that partnerships should bring actors together across wide-ranging geographical terrains (Brinkerhoff 2007) that would not have cooperated previously and are supposedly expanding the scope of global problem solving, a key area of consideration is partnerships’ geographical coverage. If PPPs are truly addressing governance deficits, one expects not only global coverage of their operations but, more significantly, a focus on areas not covered by existing governance programs. Further, one of the main promises of the CSD partnerships

was their supposed ability to bridge balance between local problems and global agreements (Hale and Mauzerall 2004, 221). Therefore, partnerships could be expected to claim a wider geographical scope while being more directly focused on local implementation, especially in more neglected areas not well covered by global agreements.


The TPD presents the breakdown between transnational, regional and country coverage by assessing PPP claimed scope, headquarter location and targeted population, if the latter is specified. Efforts were made to ascertain whether PPPs actually covered the territory claimed, but the data and numbers remain based on the *claimed* scope, as verifying this for each individual PPP basis was impossible. While the information is far from conclusive, the TPD reveals that PPPs may not only leave many areas uncovered but also provide little to verify their efforts to translate global concerns into local implementation.

Though clearly specifying scope is a commonly cited success factor a key element of vision setting or institutional strategy (Druce and Harmer 2004), data from the TPD reveals the lack here, which further confuses the picture of these claimed global initiatives. Concerning overall scope (**Figures 5.3**), the majority of PPPs claim a transnational/ global<sup>104</sup> scope, but this claimed coverage *is not necessarily associated with global operations*. Within this category, a large number do not break down scope specifically but profess to aspire to a broader global agenda; others propose a global reach as their initiatives are fitting with global dialogues. A claimed global focus is perhaps to be expected, especially as partnerships emerged in great part from the persisting mantra that global problems required global solutions (Ruggie 2002). Further, given the large number of these PPPs that emerged from the WSSD context, broadly linked to reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and given the heavy involvement of international organisations within these initiatives, it might be presupposed that most would claim either a global focus or one which covers multiple geographical terrains. Moreover, PPPs are supposedly rooted in global processes, connected to international networks (of expertise, funding) but focusing on specific, often local, projects. It is therefore believed that they “could operate at the right scale to address widespread local issues while helping to mobilise the global community to take action” (Hale and Mauzerall 2004, 222).

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<sup>104</sup> The term transnational is utilized within this work to imply operations across more than one country or region, as the term global gives a skewed representation of PPPs’ scope; the reality though is the terms are used interchangeably both within the related literature and by the PPPs themselves.


**Figure 5.3: Geographical coverage, All PPPs**



*Source: TPD, 2011*

What is more critical, however, is to consider only those PPPs that are still in operation (**Figure 5.4**), which reveals claimed scope roughly in line with the overall universe; however, the number of PPPs with a claimed global scope is higher in operational PPPs at 79%.

**Figure 5.4: Geographical coverage, Operational PPPs**




*Source: TPD, 2011*

Of those claimed regional-based PPPs, the largest numbers operate in Africa, at nearly 50%. Other regions, including Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia, Europe, and Oceania, are represented between 10 and 15% (**Figure 5.5a**), and the regional coverage of operational

PPPs is broadly similar (*Figure 5.5b*). The geographical coverage of the 59 country-specific PPPs is more evenly distributed, with Asia and Africa as the highest regions at at 31% and 25% respectively.

**Figure 5.5.a and 5.5.b: Regional Coverage, All PPPs and Operational PPPs**



Source: TPD, 2011

This work utilises the term *claimed scope* since this is the closest information available to reach a determination on coverage. Though claimed scope is often considered synonymous with country of implementation, this may not accurately capture the true nature of the partnering arrangement. Many PPPs profess a global span given their overriding goal or aim but actually have a narrower focus, so viewing areas of operation or country of implementation is a more reliable variable. However, as this information is not expressed in similar ways across PPPs, and is often not available, a PPP-wide comparison of this metric is not possible. Claimed scope can also not be directly associated with targeted population. Existing work on CSD partnerships utilise that information source to show that OECD countries were the main countries of implementation, followed by Asia and Africa (Biermann et al. 2007a), yet from this work’s probe of CSD information, it was not possible to replicate this analysis without relying on CSD entries, which this work does not take as verifiable information sources given the overriding inaccuracies.

Another way to address geographic reach is to consider the location of the centralised, head base. This work uses the conception of a centre point (CP), which can be either merely a centralised contact, which the majority of PPPs have, and/or a more specific Central Head Quarters (CHQ),<sup>105</sup> the latter being a centralised operational base. The majority of operating

<sup>105</sup> The terms CP is used to avoid applying the term secretariat to these partnerships, as not only does the term have varying connotations, but many will function with only a dedicated contact and others will be highly



PPPs have established headquarters in developed, high income countries, and only 4% of PPPs are headquartered in low income countries (*Table 5.2*). This is often justified on grounds of ease of access, enhanced staff hiring and retention, availability of necessary technology and infrastructure, among other relevant reasons. While it could be argued that partnerships can be just as, if not more, effective in addressing developing countries' concerns if they are headquartered in a developed country, TPD findings still raise questions regarding reach and touch of the PPPs, especially those that do not have operational staff in neglected areas or those they are supposedly targeting.

A similar picture emerges for the **sampling frame**. By definition, these have a global scope, but over 90% have a CP based in a high income country, and almost half of the ITPs (48%) are located in just three cities: Geneva (22%), Washington, DC (18%) and London (8%). While the necessity of having a headquarters in a developing country in order to have developing country impact is highly debated, it is still perhaps shocking that half are located in just a handful of cities. The majority of these PPPs do have more than one operating site or location, with the average being three sites of operation, and more than half of those with more than one sites have at least one branch in a developing country. For example, many health-focused PPPs, such as Lily MDR-TB, DNDI and IPM have at least one, if not many, locations in either Africa or Asia, though they are headquartered in either Washington DC or Geneva. On average, independent PPPs have four operating sites with the most being 57; for hosted the average is three with a maximum of 80, and the minimum number of sites for both is obviously one.

**Table 5.2: Centre Point locations All PPPs**

Country Location	Number	Percentage
Europe	269	36%
North America	248	33%
Information Not Available	129	17%
Asia	51	7%
Africa	35	5%
Central and South America	20	3%
Australia	5	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>757</b>	<b>100%</b>

*Source: TPD, 2011*

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
institutionalized and not consider the central office to be only a secretariat. When this work utilizes the term secretariat, it is because the partnership claims this role for its CP.

What this brief snapshot suggests is the need to probe more deeply into partnership scope and reach. Given their location bases, if PPPs are targeting areas not reached by existing governance channels, there should be a greater demand for partnerships to show tangible evidence of on-the-ground impact in these areas. Yet many studies note such evidence is persistently lacking (OECD 2006; Tondreau 2005). Certain notable PPPs have begun more targeted assessments of global reach and local, targeted implementations, but across the majority of PPPs such evidence is lacking, leaving little evidence that partnerships truly have a global reach and not just global focus.<sup>106</sup> That said, if viewing those with professed regional scope, the picture is not as pessimistic, which begs for more research into areas of implementation for these PPPs.

#### 5.1.4 Age and operations

Similar to the entire universe of PPPs, the majority of the sampling frames were launched between 2000 and 2004, though a significant number of the ITPs were initiated *before* the WSSD in 2002, as compared to the universe as a whole where only 41% were launched prior to 2002 (20% of all PPPs were launched between 2002 and 2004). Interestingly, the average PPP has been in operation for 13 years, and of those that have ceased operating, the average lifespan was 10 years. The average lifespan of the sampling frame is 16 years, but the median age of 11 is perhaps more useful.


**Figure 5.6: Date launched, All PPPs**



Source: TPD, 2011

<sup>106</sup> See Biesma et al. 2009 for a review of global health partnerships and country-based evidence of activity, effects and impacts.

**Figure 5.7 Date Launched, Sampling Frame ITPs**



*Source: TPD, 2011*

## **5.2 Coverage, focus and functions**

As they work across multiple levels - transnational to local – partnerships are also promoted in large part for their ability to address areas and specific problems not touched by global agreements (Rein et al. 2005) and this work towards addressing persisting implementation gaps in global governance (Reinicke and Deng 2000; Börzel and Risse 2005; Benner, Streck and Witte 2003). To understand if and how partnerships work towards these ambitious goals, this work details the sectoral and functional areas targeted by the PPPs - variables that also lead towards determining the partnerships’ problem area of focus. Significantly, the TPD is thus able to discuss coverage area across the PPP universe and begin the first comprehensive mapping of global partnership coverage.

### **5.2.1 Sectoral focus**


A large proportion of PPPs, especially the Type II partnerships that arose from the WSSD summit, are focused broadly on sustainable development goals or so-called WEHAB areas (Water, Energy, Health, Agriculture and Biodiversity and Ecosystem management),<sup>107</sup> yet the universe of global PPPs supposedly targets a broader agenda in attempts towards global governance or to provide collective goods. Given their promises to bring pressing or previously neglected issues to the table and provide directed focus to these areas, one expects either broad coverage across sectoral areas and/or for partnerships to be most focused on those

<sup>107</sup> See [http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/wehab\\_papers.html](http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/wehab_papers.html) for background and WEHAB Framework Papers. Accessed 1 September 2010.

areas not currently being addressed by existing governing operations. Using 23 classifications based on UNDP guidelines,<sup>108</sup> this work assesses sectoral areas of partnership coverage and finds partnerships may be far from fulfilling these expectations and instead cluster in only a few areas.

The majority of these PPPs focus on health, environment, sustainable development, energy and business and finance, of which 30 of the latter are not-for-profit initiatives (*Figure 5.8*).<sup>109</sup> Interestingly, comparing operational to no longer operating partnerships presents a similar trend, as no sectoral area exhibited huge discrepancy, though it was more likely for PPPs focused on water/ sanitation or sustainable development to no longer be operational. However, both the uneven distribution of partnerships across these main areas and how few PPPs are focused outside of these few sectors is striking. Many areas are rarely covered; for example, less than 5% of PPPs focus upon areas of human rights, marine conservation, biodiversity or disaster management.

**Figure 5.8: Sectoral coverage, All PPPs**



Source: TPD, 2011

Viewing only the sampling frame (*Figure 5.9*) presents a similar picture: the majority of PPPs are centered on health, sustainable development, environmental concerns, water or


<sup>108</sup> Sector list is noted within Appendix A.

<sup>109</sup> As a note, 6% of the operational PPPs have multiple sectors of focus.

energy. As these are the set of transnational, tri-sectoral, global focused PPPs, and these initiatives are generally associated with the highest level of operations, this clustering is rather troubling.

Considering the timeframe of emergence highlights a few trends: while 32% of the health PPPs started after 2002, of those focused on sustainable development approximately 63% were initiated following 2002. This is similar for those focused on energy or environmental issues: 66% were founded after 2002. As expected, this certainly reinforces that timeliness of global agreements or topical trends in global discourse may influence partnership initiation.

**Figure 5.9: Sectoral coverage, sampling frame**



Source: TPD, 2011

Despite the claim that PPPs focus on either the most pressing or neglected needs, these TPD findings lend additional credence to recent arguments that (especially) environmental PPPs tend to “respond selectively to governance gaps” and to be driven by political interests rather than structural gaps in global governance (Andonova 2006). Existing studies on CSD-based partnerships suggest partnerships may promulgate in areas where either a number of current governance agreements already exist or the interests of key actors are most concerned (Andonova 2007; Andonova 2005; Biermann et al. 2007a). Andonova’s work on sectoral areas covered by CSD-based partnerships shows that these partnerships are


more inclined to focus on certain areas while leaving others neglected, even areas where there are obvious governance gaps, such as gender issues, which “reveal(s) the political rather than narrowly functional nature of [Public-Private Institutionalisation] PPI” (2005, 30). Hale and Mauzerall further suggest that the private, flexible and voluntary nature of PPPs means they “do not share the CSD’s macro perspective” meaning that “some key issues have not received the attention they deserve” (2004, 233), thus leading towards partnerships lack of focus on areas claimed to need the most attention.

As this work incorporates partnerships outside of the CSD, it encompasses a wider perspective on partnership coverage. Of the approximately 461 partnerships *not covered within the CSD*, 56 are focused primarily on health. This is to be expected given the data sources as well as continued push to address overriding health issues with partnerships (Widdus 2005; Buse and Walt 2000a), but it does leave a large number of less studied PPPs. These global health partnerships (GHPs) are more globally focused (80%), and half of these GHPs are hosted by a UN body, mainly the WHO. The few existing studies that attempt to map or plot GHPS (Carlson 2004), though now outdated, also suggest coverage disparities, as the majority of PPPs cluster in certain disease and topical areas with relative neglect of others (Widdus 2005). To move beyond these two sets of macro based studies, this work also breaks down sectors of non CSD and GHPs. Of these, partnerships are still largely focused on health, energy and the environment, though there is a set with business and finance themes<sup>110</sup>. Certain areas, notably biodiversity, human rights, cultural concerns or forest or marine management are covered by less than 25 partnerships in total.

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<sup>110</sup> This latter point is to be expected given the number of NPF PPPs remaining.

**Figure 5.10: Sectoral coverage of Non CSD or IPPH PPPs**




*Source: TPD, 2011*

PPPs also seem to promulgate in sectoral or thematic areas that receive greater amounts of current intergovernmental and international attention. Significantly, areas with the highest density of PPPs are also thematic issues that also receive the greatest amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA), (See Deutscher and OECD 2009), which reinforces findings by Andonova and Levy (2003) that the original CSD –based partnerships tended to be driven by supply of rich countries and donors rather than demand of issue areas. Existing work based solely on CSD registered partnerships also suggest areas where most CSD partnerships are concentrated are those most densely regulated at the international and national levels (Andonova 2006; Biermann et al. 2007a). Such sector concentration questions the functional logic that PPPs emerge to address persisting governance deficits, as even with the macro picture the TPD provides on the state of global partnering, these same trends are reinforced.

### 5.2.2 Functional division of PPPs

In order to develop a deeper understanding of the coverage of PPPs, differentiating amongst functional types is also necessary.<sup>111</sup> This work defines ten functional categories, which were furthered in the previous chapter. Using these categories, across both the universe and ITPs, the majority of PPPs engage in the coordination of resources followed by the functional goal of information exchange and research (*Figures 5.11* and *5.12*). That so few partnerships engage in direct operational activities is striking given their promotion as development engines - easily mobilised institutions supposedly leading to more efficient operations and direct implementation on the ground (Kaul 2006). While the CSD partnerships in particular were supposed to accelerate the implementation of sustainable development goals, across the universe of PPPs it seems few target any sort of actual implementation. This raises an intriguing question: are global PPPs reinforcing the claim that partnerships are “prototypes for tomorrow’s governance arrangement and pragmatic delivery vehicles” (Zadek 2006) if so very few actually even strive for direct delivery or results?

**Figure 5.11: Functional breakdown, All PPPs**




Source: TPD, 2011

<sup>111</sup> See discussion in chapter four regarding functional definitions employed.



**Figure 5.12 Functional breakdown, Sampling Frame PPPs**



*Source: TPD, 2011*


Though the official texts of the WSSD summit defined the Type II partnerships as “specific commitments by various partners intended to contribute to and reinforce the implementation of the outcomes of the intergovernmental negotiations of the WSSD and to help the further implementation of Agenda 21 and the MDGs (Kara and Quarless 2002), the majority of these partnerships rather seem more engaged in further institution building (Biermann et al. 2007a, 256). The large percentage focused on coordination of resources is perhaps related to the fact that this category is rather broad, but it is still worth probing. Of these, the majority have a global scope (65) and the main sector foci are health (35%), energy (10%), water (9%) or sustainable development (8%). What is also interesting is that over 70% of coordinating PPPs have a UN agency as partner (versus 54% for the universe); this is also worth further questioning, as it seems puzzling for such a large number of PPPs to engage in coordinating resources, money or expertise when this is already within the role of many of the UN agencies.

Lack of focus on direct implementation has been an emerging criticism of partnerships, as recent works note PPPs will fail to address the implementation deficit if only working towards goals that lack either concreteness or tangibility. One study finds that over

165 of the 321 PPPs listed with the UN cite only vague objectives, such as “supplying information for decision making” (Biermann et al. 2007a). Another work on OECD partnerships notes that of the 32 that responded to the survey, only three or four could demonstrate evidence of direct benefits though 28% expressed ambitions towards proving impact (OECD 2006). The predominance of PPPs functioning in areas such as coordination may also partly explain why there are so few empirical evaluations of large sets of partnerships’ effects, though the literature on partnership formation and functioning is large.

What is notable is that within functional categories, unlike sectors, there is a marked difference across PPPs that have no evidence of operations. While the average of PPPs no longer operating is 42%, close to 65% of PPPs attempting towards capacity building are no longer operational, as are 55% of those originally with a primary function of policy and/or its development (*Figure 5.13*), which may reinforce the claim that there is a tendency for PPPs to function in areas where there are “quick wins” (Martens 2007) or easier evidence of activity, which means governance gaps persist. While merely being operational does not imply the PPP is achieving its goals or leading towards problem solving, that so many PPPs attempting operational or direct goals (perhaps with more difficult targets or ones that can only be exemplified over time) are no longer in existence is concerning.

**Figure 5.13: Percent of PPPs without operational evidence, by functional type**



Source: TPD, 2011

### 5.2.3 Implications: Problem area of focus

These findings raise pressing questions regarding whether partnerships have truly led to a broader, and more focused, coverage of global issues, and also call into question the claim that PPPs operate in areas where government or intergovernmental actions are either inadequate or fail. Are partnerships only going for the “low hanging fruit” (Hale and Mauzerall 2004) as has been suggested, focusing on more manageable geographic or issue-focused areas, or are they truly enhancing the global governance problem solving arsenal with their targeted reach?

Such a clustering of PPPs also leads to concerns over competition, especially regarding resources and functioning. While some themes or areas may be more conducive to partnering (World Economic Forum 2003, 7), PPPs are heavily concentrated in a few areas. Partnerships are undoubtedly conditioned by the environment in which they operate, but that so many exist in areas where the supporting legal and regulatory frameworks are already in place (Caplan et al 2001, 5; Nelson and Zadek 2000) raises further concerns regarding their relevance. Of course this may not be negative if partnerships are implementing regulations, working in direct operations or furthering agreements or policies that necessitate direct involvement, but the TPD shows that the majority of partnerships function in less tangible roles, mainly the coordination of resources rather than direct implementation. A counter would be that PPPs are furthering work of their partners to undertake these tasks, but as this work will discuss in the seventh chapter, few make efforts to establish and report on their value add in this regard.

Perhaps unsurprisingly the areas most PPPs address are also associated with trends in global agreements and, more specifically, higher levels of either governmental or current donor attention is perhaps not surprising, but it is debatable whether this model is sustainable over time, especially as both topical trends and funding dollars tend to shift with time (Deutscher and OECD 2009); a fact that the global economic turmoil of 2008-2010 and its subsequent effects attests.

If partnerships will continue to be promoted as the logical answer to the demands resulting from a changing economic and political environment and as a means to enhance effectiveness in global policy making (Reinicke 1999/2000), then their current coverage area must be understood and encompassing of this global agenda. This work purposely presents both sectoral focus and functional target separately to draw out these relationships, but it also performs several mapping exercises to further speak to partnership coverage. When mapping function and sector type (*Table 5.3*), the TPD reveals that the top ten combinations of function

and sector represent close to 30% of the total universe of PPPs; however, that the top two combinations (health focus and functioning in either coordination or information exchange/research) is perhaps not surprising given the existing consolidated databases from the TPD pulls its information. That said, outside of these combinations, no other reaches 5% of the universe of PPPs.

**Table 5.3: Results of mapping: Top 10 categorisations (PPP universe)**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>All PPPs</b>	<b>% All</b>	<b>Operational PPPs</b>	<b>% Operational</b>
Health, Information production	47	6%	32	7%
Health, Coordination	40	5%	28	6%
Business and Finance, Capital provision	34	4%	21	5%
Sustainable Development, Capacity Building	15	2%	2	0%
Sustainable Development, Information dissemination	13	2%	3	1%
Environment, Information Dissemination	12	2%	7	2%
Environment, Capital Provision	11	1%	10	2%
Energy, Information Dissemination	9	1%	5	1%
Environment, Capacity Building	10	1%	3	1%
Environment, Coordination	10	1%	8	2%
Sustainable Development, Coordination	10	1%	5	1%

*Source: TPD, 2011*

**Table 5.4: Results of mapping: Top 10 categorisations (sampling frame)**

<b>Sector &amp; Function</b>	<b>SF</b>	<b>% SF</b>
Health, Coordination	21	14%
Health, Info Exchange	16	11%
Environment, Coordination	8	5%
Health, Advocacy	7	5%
Environment, Setting Standards	5	3%
Agriculture, Info Exchange	5	3%
Water & Sanitation, Coordination	4	3%
Environment, Advocacy	3	2%
Agriculture, Coordination	3	2%
Sustainable Development, Coordination	3	2%
Energy, Advocacy	3	2%

*Source: TPD, 2011*

### **5.3: Addressing actors and participation**

At the very core of multi-stakeholder partnerships is their ability to bring together actors from diverse backgrounds, as actors have “different competencies, aspirations and styles of behaviour” that can be combined to achieve a common vision (Tennyson 2004, 5). Global partnerships gained heightened prominence in an international system complicated by various forces: an increasingly difficult agenda of persisting and cross-cutting issues, the rising presence of non-state actors<sup>112</sup> in traditional governance roles or arenas, and heightened attention given to the perceived benefits of increased participation in global governance (Haas 2004). Global PPPs further reinforced these trends and institutionalised these relationships between actors.

#### **5.3.1 Actors, governance gaps and challenges of partner analysis**

The strength of partnerships should be in their ability to leverage the skills, resources and expertise of these actors to create synergies that lead to a unique problem-solving ability. If met, partnerships should be not only enhancing implementation in global governance, but by including this diverse actor base, they should also be addressing the persisting deficits of representation and participation in existing governance arrangements (Witte, Streck and Benner 2003). Do global partnerships fulfil, or even set out to fulfil, these promoted promises?

Existing works on partner involvement suggest that optimistic notions of enhanced participation and representation may be far from the reality. Critics attest global PPPs, rather than being global, are instead heavily dominated by the North (Utting and Zammit 2009), lack a true multi-stakeholder nature, and within their processes tend to marginalise or exclude some social groups, often women, even when they are the targets of the partnerships activity (Geddes 2000). CSD-based partnerships are said to have a heavy dominance of Northern governments and limited involvement by developing countries (Bäckstrand 2005, Biermann et al. 2007a; Andonova 2006). Related works on GHPs suggest that especially when it comes to PPP decision making, the targeted populations, notably in developing countries, are not represented equitably to Northern governments (Buse and Harmer 2007). Many also question the merits of increased participation by the corporate sector (Martens 2007) or the incentives for increased engagement from civil society in regards to the related impact this may have on global governance (Ottaway 2001). Further criticisms note that this over representation and

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<sup>112</sup> See chapter two for furtherance of these discussions regarding global challenges and enhanced private and social sector participation in global governance.

power of private sector interests is associated with the privatisation of global governance or corporate globalisation (Utting and Zammit 2009; Richter 2003), leading to a fear of institutional or regulatory capture, especially in relation to global public health and (Beigbeder 2004).

It has been more frequently argued in terms of health PPPs that there is both dominance by a few developed countries, mainly the US, UK, Netherlands and Canada (Buse 2004b) and continued underrepresentation of the South (Bartsch 2008). Despite an initial push of Southern involvement in CSD partnerships, early reviews showed that the majority were led by Northern-based governments (Andonova and Levy 2003, 23). More recent work suggests little has changed since the PPPs were first initiated in 2003. Specifically, one study (based on the CSD database as an information source) notes that as of 2006 not only were the majority of CSD-based PPPs led by a Northern based government but in more than a quarter of the partnerships, governments from industrialised countries were the only government actors (Biermann et al. 2007a).

One should interpret with caution reviews analysing the partners involved, as static listings of partners are often outdated, inaccurate or simply not representative, and even correct partner listings say little towards actual participation. While most studies of CSD-based PPPs utilise the CSD database for information, these listings were often several years out of date at the time of this study, and as detailed below, this work also found many of the CSD database's listings as well as the actual PPP websites or information sources to be inaccurate.

Notions also differ greatly regarding definitions of partners, which complicates the analysis. While some PPPs clearly articulate what classifies a partner, the majority struggle and many do not attempt to deal with these ambiguous issues. Confusion also surrounds the notion of partners, members, funders and stakeholders, yet most PPP leaders are happy leaving this issue unaddressed, perhaps due to the tensions involved. This is not only an issue of publishing information: during this work's management interviews, when asked many partnership leaders were unable to define the term "partner" in their institution. The majority were also unable to articulate the number of partners involved, and these were the Directors! Those that had a firmer grasp on partners noted the difficult and often political tension caused in listing partners on websites or reports, which led them to take either an overly exclusive process or a minimal reporting. As one noted, "We call them stakeholders and others contractors, yet both consider themselves partners, so we must tackle this every year when we publish our annual report or every time we attempt to update our website" (MM Interview18).

This discussion is to reinforce that only tentative claims can be made across large sets of PPPs. This work reviews the actors involved through the following: representation of different sectors within the PPPs,<sup>113</sup> distribution of partners from North and South, dominant partners and IGO participation, number of partners and partners versus funders. Finally, though this work speaks to claimed partners across the universe of PPPs and presents initial insights, it is difficult to draw conclusions simply because certain actors are involved as a partner *in name*, especially as some have over a hundred claimed partners.

### 5.3.2 Actors involved: Division and main partners

Though they are promoted as multi stakeholder initiatives, **less than half of the universes of PPPs (45% or 337 PPPs)** are tri-sectoral, involving an actor from the public, private and social sector. Outside of trisectoral, the next highest split falls to those PPPs with partners from the public and social sector but not private (25%), 10% have only claimed public partners. Comparing to those partnerships still operational reveals a similar picture in terms of split; however, while slightly over half are tri-sectoral (52%), only 4% have private and social partners only. While these figures represent involvement by at least one partner from these sectors, one can also consider how this involvement breaks down, or the actor-base split. Across the universe, on average 29% of the partners come from the private sector, 19% from the public and 30% from the social (for operational PPPs, these figures are 30%, 14% and 32%, respectively) (*Table 5.5*).


**Table 5.5: Partner sectoral split, All and operational PPPs**

Partner split	% All	% Operational
Public only	10%	8%
Public and social (not private)	25%	18%
Tri-sectoral	45%	52%
Social only	3%	3%
Private only	4%	4%
Private and social (not public)	4%	4%
Private and public (not social)	7%	6%
No information	3%	5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>

<sup>113</sup> As a note, this work does not analyse the lead partners involved, as this is only information available within the CSD database of PPPs and given that claims made within this were often inaccurate; applying this piece of analysis even to these (and certainly for all PPPs) was deemed infeasible.

By definition, the sampling frame are trisectoral, but within each individual partnership, it is interesting that this is also relatively well balanced, as on average 27% of the partners come from the private sector, 32% from the public sector and 41% from the social, though this varies slightly from the sampling frame as a whole to independent and hosted PPPs (*Figure 5.14*).

**Figure 5.14: Average balance of partners in sampling frame**



*Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011*

Despite their promoted ability to function best in areas where governments are inefficient or lacking, it seems governments and governmental agencies continue to dominate these initiatives – or at least partner in the majority of them. Almost three-quarters (70%) of the PPPs (68% operational) have a government partner, while 86% of all PPPs (84% operational) have at least one partner from the public sector broadly. Thus only 14% (16% of operational) have no public sector partner. Those who take a state-centric view would say that this government involvement is necessary, as PPP would have negligible effects without strong, state presence. Others, however, note that a key role for PPP's is closing participatory gaps through the increased engagement of nongovernmental actors (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Reinicke and Deng 2000), so the continued presence of public sector actors is interesting.

Close to 13% (11% operational) have a government partner yet no IGO involved, which is roughly equivalent to those which involve the UN or an IGO but have no government body involvement. Merely having a government body as a partner should be treated with caution, as it is debatable how much role the governments take, as these actors may often play



a more hands off role and may not be involved in partnership operations or decision making<sup>114</sup> (Moran 2005).

Across all PPPs, social sector representation is higher than private: 76% of all PPPs (77% operational) have at least one partner from the social sector, while 59% (66% operational) have at least one private sector partner. Specifically, a corporate actor is active in over half of the operational partnerships, and interestingly 19% (20% operational) involve at least one business or industry association. While an NGO is involved in approximately half of the PPPs (all and operational), around 40% also consist of at least one academic or research institution, and close to 20% of the PPPs partner with other PPPs. Academics are not concentrated only in information exchange/research functional -type partnerships: while approximately one-third are involved in PPPs that perform this function, 20% are in coordination and 16% engaged in capacity building (*Table 5.6*)

**Table 5.6: Partner types involved, All and operational PPPs**

Sector	Partner Type	All	Operational
Public	UN	55%	53%
	IGO	48%	49%
	Government	70%	68%
Private	Corporate	52%	59%
	Industry Associations	19%	20%
Social	Philanthropic Foundations	25%	27%
	NGOs	51%	50%
	Other PPPs	20%	21%
	Academic/Research Institutes	41%	40%
	Other Social	19%	18%

*Source: TPD, 2011*

Beyond sectoral representation, an additional concern is the balance of partners across geographical and population areas, as there is a persisting debate regarding whether or not PPPs reach previously neglected populations and broaden participation in global governance (Kjaer and Caplan 2003, 59). Does either of these arguments hold against the evidence? While again based on claimed partner information, TPD shows that while still not a significant percentage of South-based actors, numbers are much higher than existing studies would attest. While 29% (30% operational) have government partners from only the North, 26% (25%) have actors from both and 13% (9%) from the South only.

<sup>114</sup> This was reinforced in several of the MM interviews discussed in chapter six.

**Table 5.7 North-South Government Participation**

<b>Government Participants</b>	<b>All PPPs</b>	<b>Operational PPPs</b>
North Only	29%	30%
South Only	13%	9%
Both North and South	26%	25%
No government	32%	35%

**Source:** *TPD, 2011*

For CSD-based PPPs, (*using TPD information*), 27% (31% operational) have government partners from the North only, 18% (12%) from the South only and 40% (41%) from both, and 15 (16%) have no government partner. When eliminating both those CSD-based PPPs for which only the CSD entry information was available as well as those that are no longer operating, the numbers are as follows: 31% have government partners from the North only, 12% from the South only and 41% from both, 16% have no government as a main partner

However, viewing individual country level participation shows this may be slightly skewed, as a few governments are involved in multiple partnerships. The top 15 countries in terms of involvement are mainly high income, OECD countries, with South Africa (the host of the WSSD) and India being the only non upper-income country governments amongst the top ten. This is not to say Southern governments are not involved as partners, but these pale in terms of the Northern-based actors, especially when official government aid agencies are included in the analysis.

From another perspective, despite their perceived reputation of speaking for the people as a whole, it is also debated whether enhanced social-sector involvement actually increase the “Southern voice,” as some assert these actors, mostly civil society groups, often represent the North and their cultural values just as much, if not more, than private or government-based actors (Boli and Thomas 1999).

**Table 5.8: Main Countries involved in PPPs**

Country	All	Operational
United States	25%	29%
United Kingdom	15%	18%
France	13%	12%
Netherlands	12%	14%
Japan	11%	11%
South Africa	9%	8%
Canada	9%	9%
Australia	8%	8%
Germany	7%	9%
India	7%	8%
Sweden	7%	9%
China	6%	7%
Indonesia	6%	4%
Thailand	5%	4%
Brazil	5%	6%

*Source: TPD, 2011*

### **5.3.3 Number of actors and main partners**

Diverging opinions persist regarding the significance of the number of actors involved in PPPs. Some suggest either that larger partnerships may be ‘more powerful’ and thus perform better (Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2010, 6). Alternatively, over inclusive, larger partnerships may only be a negative factor (Wapner 1996), as the more actors that are involved means the PPP has to accommodate for more diverging interests and cultures, which could hinder decision making. This could actually lead to diminished or lessened performance or impact, what Underdal refers to as the law of the least ambitious programme (2002, in Miles et al. 2002). This is especially at issue if it could further lead towards the lowest common denominator of action (or regulation) (Schäferhoff, Campe and Kaan 2009). Accurately speaking to these debates, however, requires verifiable information on not only the partners involved but more significantly the extent of this actual involvement.

Though the presentation of number of partners is muddled given its base on claimed information, the TPD shows that the average number of partners across all PPPs is 63, which is higher than CSD partnerships (*based on TPD data*) with an average of 44. The maximum number of separately reported partners is 303 and the minimum is two.<sup>115</sup> When considering

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<sup>115</sup> Another work showed that the average number of partners in CSD database is 29 (Szulecki et al 2010, 6).

only the sampling frame, there is an average of 172 partners involved within the ITPs (median is 40), which is much higher than the universe at whole with an average of 63.<sup>116</sup>


Addressing actor-based arguments also involves determining whether certain institutions or agencies are more frequent partners than others. As **Figure 5.15** shows, over half (54%) of operational PPPs involve a UN body as a partner, with 17% of operational PPPs partnering with either the UNDP or UNICEF. There is a similar high level of presence from the World Bank (22% of operational) and the WHO (17% of operational). Others worth mentioning are: The Gates Foundation (6% of all PPPs, 10% of operational), USAID (6% of all, 8% of operational), and The German Development Corporation GIZ (3% of all, but 5% of operational).

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) is involved in approximately 10% of the operational PPPs, more than the highest percentage for a government agency (USAID, 8%). As a note, this universe is not inclusive of all internal agency PPPs, so these numbers will not reflect all USAID and DFID projects. While the BMGF's support to GHPs is well-documented (McCoy and McGoey 2011), and it has made great strides in both supporting these institutions and also pushing for greater levels of monitoring and evaluation and streamlining (Grace and Druce 2009), it still means a large proportion of the health partnerships are highly dependent on Gates. This could be worrying if the support, either financial or otherwise, of the BMGF is ever lessened. Even more so, there may be consequences for PPPs in leaning so much on one foundation, especially if this implies one actor has undue say or influence within partnership decision making, points returned to in this work's concluding chapter.

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<sup>116</sup> On a methodological point, it is quite possible this higher number is because in general ITPs have more publically available information, thus they would cite or list more partners than others who have limited publications. The other discrepancy may come from the partner versus member distinction and general layers or tiers of partners. In general ITPs were more likely to have established multiple levels of partners, which would result in a higher total.

**Figure 5.15: Highest actor involvement partners, All and operational PPPs**



*Source: TPD, 2011*


The predominance of IGOs within these institutions is significant, but not surprising given the continued and rather fervent partnering push IGOs have engaged in (Andonova 2005; Held 1995; Utting and Zammit 2006). Over the previous decade, increased attention has certainly been given to the UN and other IGOs' need for greater resources and expertise (Bull, Boas and McNeill 2004; Buse and Walt 2002), as "Partnering with business and civil society has turned into a necessity for the UN in order to get the job done" (Witte and Reinicke 2005, ix). This heavy level of involvement does raise the question if there has been too much urge to partner, especially if PPPs are supposed to complement IGOs. One view is that this partnering push may have been a reactive, rather than a proactive measure on the part of the IGOs (Andonova 2006): as global partnerships increasingly gained presence in areas classically associated with IGO's work, IGOs may have felt PPPs were "stepping into their mandate and their resources [especially] as donors prefer to support global PPPs" (Kaul 2006, 244). This could lead to an "if we can't beat 'em, join 'em reaction," where IGOs become heavily involved in PPPs to prevent or thwart either perceived or actual competition from these PPPs.

Another view is that IGOs are using PPPs to either "reinvent their missions" (Bäckstrand 2005, 19); increase their democratic accountability (Wapner 1997); or, regarding the UN system, restore their legitimacy (Bull and McNeill 2007); thus, they are recognising the need to work with/ within these initiatives. This is not to say IGO involvement in PPPs is

necessarily negative, but it does call into question the “newness” of these partnerships as well as their persisting role and relevance. Also certainly of concern is the role of the IGO within the PPP – that is, are these truly new initiatives or rather projects within the IGO, treated, staffed and operated in the same way and “partnership” in name only?

Considering which actors are partnering within the sampling frame, (*Figure 5.16*), two-thirds (65%) have a UN body as partner with the WHO is represented within 24%. In regards to IGOs, 39% are also partnering with the World Bank, which is the highest IGO representation, and 6% partner with the Asian Development Bank and 6% with the African Development Bank. Governments themselves have significant representation, with 13% partnering with USAID and 12% with DFID. From the philanthropic side, the Gates foundation is the most represented, as it partners with 31 of the ITPs (21%), followed by Rockefeller (17), Wellcome Trust (six) and the Ford Foundation (five).

**Figure 5.16: Main partners involved, Sampling Frame**



*Source: TPD, 2011*

Enhancing the involvement of traditionally marginalised groups, trade unions, women, migrants and farmers, for example, is considered necessary for sustainable development (Elliot 2004), so it is worth exploring whether there is participation of traditionally marginalised groups in the PPPs, as, many attest these are often of a say in global governance. Despite being an overriding promise and perceived benefit of partnerships, especially those emerging from the WSSD, this has been found lacking across CSD-based PPPs (Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Biermann et al. 2007a) as well as GHPs

(Sorenson 2009). Static listings may not present a complete picture, however, as many PPPs may work or contract with NGOs on the ground, who may be involved or responsible for the majority of the implementation. As an example, many of the product development partnerships, which work directly with local based NGOs, are not considered formal partners, and while they may be highly active in daily/operational decisions have little to say in strategic oversight. Thus there is certainly more engagement with PPPs than listings would suggest, but the essence of these as partnerships is harder to determine.

One trend that also prevails across both CSD and all PPPs is that more institutionalised groups are more heavily involved, as only a handful of partnerships formally partner with local groups, and even locally based NGOs have limited claimed or cited involvement. While individual partnerships highlight their inclination or desire to partner with these local organisations, such as the Lily TB-MDR partnership which notably partners with the women’s association in China and many locally-based nursing associations, overall involvement is minimal, and significantly less in terms of representation within decision.

**CSD versus TPD partner comparison:**

The universe of PPPs is perhaps slightly more diverse than only CSD-based partnerships, and slightly over a quarter of the sampling frame are CSD-based partnerships. A recent review noted that 16% have no government body as a partner and together over 60% of partnerships are *led* by the public sector, either government or IGO. The same study also found that 19% of total partners are from NGOs and 9% from the social or technical community (Biermann et al. 2007a).<sup>117</sup> While these are interesting areas to probe in further works, a brief snapshot is presented here comparing all PPPs versus just CSD (*Table 5.9*)

**Table 5.9: CSD and TPD, main partner comparisons**

Partner Type	CSD PPPs	All PPPs
Government	87%	70%
NGOs	61%	51%
Private sector	36%	59%
Academic/research	51%	41%
Foundation	25%	18%
<b>Actor split</b>		
Tri-sectoral	41%	45%

<sup>117</sup> Andonova (2006, 2007) and Biermann et al. 2007a do not always distinguish between operational and ceased PPPs in their analysis – thus readers should interpret their conclusions with caution.

Finally, the appropriate balance of partners and optimal level of participation or inclusion will no doubt vary given the partnership type, function and scope, but the TPD findings highlight that while global PPPs are promised “to bridge multilateral norms and local action by drawing on a diverse number of actors in civil society, government and business” (Bäckstrand 2005, 2), the reality is a mixed and complicated picture. The TPD certainly shows a higher level of participation from civil society and business groups than existing CSD accounts, but if one eliminates PPPs associated with CSR initiatives and/or those hosted within a private sector institution, business/ private involvement falls considerably. Further, outside of the BMGF, no social actor has near the dominance of Northern governments or IGOs in terms of overall involvement, and perhaps most critically, little shows that PPPs are drawing on these marginalised groups.

While some works assume that partners with more resources to put on the table should be associated with holding greater power within the PPP (Utting and Zammit 2006), and that partnerships are forums where “unequal power balances” prevail (Ritcher 2003), this work does not make such assumptions, as it notes this can only be explored with more detailed probing. Moving forward, a more thorough understanding of the power sharing and leadership within PPPs will certainly go far in determining how representation and participation are manifest in PPP functioning.

#### **5.4: Institutional design of global PPPs**

From their earliest days, partnerships were said to represent “the beginnings of a shift from the stiff formal waltz of diplomacy to the jazzier dance of improvisational solution oriented partnerships” (World Resource Institute 2002). Promoted for their flexible nature and lack of engrained bureaucracy, these features should allow for faster speeds of decision making, operations and ultimately results. Key defining characteristic of partnerships’ design lies in their looser structures and supposed adaptability, which should enhance not only effectiveness but also their learning capability, as the “evolutionary character and flexible structure allows for more openness” (Witte, Streck and Benner 2003, 65). Considered highly linked to PPP’s functioning, accountability (Rein et al. 2005; Bäckstrand 2006), transparency, performance and ultimately effectiveness (Witte and Reinicke 2005), institutional design of partnerships is thus a key focus.



#### **5.4.1 Partnerships and institutional design: What do we know?**

Partnership formation and institutionalisation have increasingly become prominent fixtures in PPP research (Kjaer and Tennyson 2003; Beisheim and Kaan 2010). To understand partnerships, many works suggest classifications or typologies by level of institutionalisation. Martens (2007) notes that partnerships can be classified in low, medium and high levels of institutionalisation, where low levels are associated with more time limited and ad-hoc initiatives, medium levels would have a clearly defined membership but no separate legal status and high levels will be permanent multi stakeholder institutions with formal membership and a firmly established governing body (2007). McKinsey's (2002) review of global health alliances suggests appropriate structural form is necessary to drive success, and this should fit the overriding goal of the partnership of focus. Establishing and maintaining a secretariat is obviously indicative of a more institutionalised alliance, and many have become fully separate legal entities. While the latter is the most separate from its parent institution, it is also the most costly and time consuming to create and maintain.

Reviews of partnerships also give increasing credence to the role of structural factors and choosing appropriate fit or structure (Buse and Harmer 2004; McKinsey 2002), the relative degree of independence from one's host institution, the flexible or networked nature of the partnership as well as the significance of institutional culture (Ulbert 2008). Emerging works continue to explore additional ways institutional design and levels of institutionalisation vary across PPPs. More recent work (Leise 2010) operationalises institutionalisation based on the legalisation literature (Abbott et al. 2000) and explores a set of 21 PPPs with the hypothesis that degree of institutionalisation (based on rules, obligatory status, their relative precision and the delegation of their interpretation and application to a third party) is a major determinant in explaining relative PPP effectiveness. While the authors find a high level of institutionalisation is relevant for achieving high levels of compliance, this analysis is far from concrete, however, as it attempts to apply a theoretical case rather than grounded empirics, and it is difficult to scale across a larger set of PPPs, and the authors do recognise the need to broaden their analysis and take more dynamics into account (2010, 139). That said, it still represents inroads into exploring the relationship between institutional design and partnership effectiveness.

#### **5.4.2 Entity type, legality and status**

Utilising this conceptual background, this work analyses transnational PPPs' institutional design across a few main dimensions. One of the main features of interest is the

entity-type - or overriding institutional form - of the partnerships. This is especially related to whether it is hosted, an informal network or initiative without a centralised location, a fully independent institution or a variation of these entity-type forms. Across the universe of PPPs, one striking finding is that 72% are hosted by another institution (66% for operational). A UN body or agency is host to 19% of the hosted PPPs while another IGO hosts 10% and a private sector host 10% as well. Of only the CSD-based partnerships, however, closer to 75% are hosted, and of these 20% (71 PPPs) are within a UN agency or another IGO. Regarding overall entity-type for the sampling frame, 79 of the 147 are hosted (54%), the majority within a UN agency (38% of those hosted), though 12% are hosted within an IGO.

Regarding legality or legal status, over 23% of PPPs declare themselves as not-for-profit initiatives as regards their official legal status and 65% have a non-profit host. By definition the sampling frame of PPPs are not for profit. Interestingly 5% are formed as not-for-profit PPPs while housed as initiatives within for-profit firms; this is significant as it means these initiatives have taken a separate form from their host, and are thus more institutionalised than those partnerships which are housed as projects within a parent institution. Though it is a rare form, some hosted PPPs maintain a separate legal identity within their host, as the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI) post-2010 when it legally separated from the Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative.

Publication or existence of a guiding legal document also lead to an assessment of institutionalisation, as well as being a matter of PPPs' efforts towards transparency. That said, only 14% of partnerships have an accessible note to their guiding legal principles. While this already seems quite low, when considering only the independent (non-hosted) and operational partnerships, where one expects institutional status to be more fixed, this figure only marginally improves to 23% of the PPPs. This certainly reinforces the relatively informal nature of the majority of these initiatives, especially as even those still functioning with evidence of activity are not doing so under an established legal, documented framework! Amongst the sampling frame, however, this figure is considerably higher at 38%. This number should be considered with the caveat that these legal documents could be as minimally binding as standards or statements of intent or Charters, so that so few had one is startling.

Those that are not hosted, however, are not necessarily free-standing or independent bodies, as many function as loose networks without an established centralised location. While entity-type and legal status and form are distinguishing features and helpful in providing general perspective of how PPPs institutionalise, these both need to be considered within the partnership's overriding institutional context and strategy. Partnerships can

function with varying spectrums of centralisation, ranging from having centralised management and operational system to working with decentralised networks and multiple sites where different partners, or different PPP bases, undertake aspects of management and/or operations.

The role and function of the modal or central point is of even more interest when considering the PPPs' centralisation strategy, especially for those decentralised with multiple operating centres. Specifically of concern is where the strategic, administrative and operational decisions take place and how this varies across types of partnerships and locations. Clearly the element of centralisation stands to impact partnership functioning as this will determine where and how decisions are undertaken and carried out, as well as the communication, reporting, conflict resolution, monitoring and evaluation systems, among others (Tennyson 2004, 14-17). As this element is too difficult to audit across the universe of PPPs, it is only viewed for the sampling frame at this point.

#### **5.4.3 Centre points, institutional structure and design**

Beyond hosted versus independent status - and perhaps an even more basic element of institutionalisation - is whether or not there is a centre point (CP) and/or centralised headquarters (CHQ), as these are not necessarily given. This work defines the CP as the main contact or point place, which could be purely an administrative base with no management or coordinating roles. The presence of an actual centralised operating site, while fairly common across the PPPs, varies considerably across PPPs. For some, it is the institutionalised centre while in others it is the nodal, central point for the partnership and can be thought of more as a hub than a CHQ, as a private sector organisation would utilise the term CHQ.

Across all PPPs, 19% (4% operational) do not have a verified contact for the initiative. This is a startling finding, especially as this is only a *contact* point for the initiative that can be verified. That is, this information does not speak directly to the existence of a central point for operations, as many of these contact points are representatives from a main partner involved in the initiative rather than a base or central point for the PPP. Amongst those with information available, approximately 82% of the total PPPs identified have an established operating site with a physical location (this could still be within a hosted institution but represents a centralised operating site), and even amongst the sampling frame, almost 10% of the partnerships have not established such a central point.

Since the existence of a central location, even within a host, may be seen as a necessary ingredient for PPPs, as it provides an element of structure and establishment for the

initiative, it is remarkable that so many lack this. Many will proclaim that the flexible, non structured form PPPs often take allows for even wider ranges of participation and eventually facilitates implementation. However, this work shows there is certainly a tendency for the partnership to cease existence earlier as no tangible entity was ever associated with it. It is perhaps not surprising that the majority of the non-operational PPPs never made this step to establish a centralised location point. It is also perhaps unsurprising that of those that have established a contact point, the majority are in high income countries, with only a few located in middle or lower-income countries.

### *Central Point, Position and Role*

The structure and design of these contact points as well as the role that this central point takes varies across the ITPs. These contact points also undertake varied positions: this work distinguishes between five common forms from lowest to highest in terms of institutionalisation as follows: dedicated contact, staff, host, executive team, secretariat<sup>118</sup> and CHQ.

**Table 5.10: Types of Centre Points (CP) for Sampling Frame**

Type of Centre Point (CP)	Percentage of ITPs
Host (that maintains separate office or established contact)	38%
Secretariat	22%
Executive Central team	15%
Staff/ Team	11%
Central Head Quarters (CHQ)	9%
Other (Dedicated contact)	1%


While acknowledging this systematic study of institutional form should be applied to all PPPs, at this point only the sampling frame is assessed. Of the ITPs, 38% function with a base inside a hosted institution while another 22% have a secretariat, either independent or hosted. Fifteen percent have an executive staff; 10% an executive team and 8.8% function as a full CHQ position. While knowing structure is useful, the terms utilised such as team, staff, etc, are synonymous and employed in varying ways by the partnerships.

To speak to organisational characteristics, one also considers the role that this central point undertakes, and this work distinguishes between the following: administration, communication (of partnership activities), coordination, management, implementation, operations and other support. Many CPs will hold more than one of these, and the most

<sup>118</sup> This work only utilises the term Secretariat if the PPP itself does.

institutionalised partnerships will not necessarily have a CP which holds all of these functions, as many may be delegated through the decentralisation strategy/plan. At least half perform management roles, and less than 10% any direct operations (**Figure 5.17**). Interestingly most hosted PPPs have CPs that function in a management role, while for independent this is more varied. While it initially appears fewer than expected of the CPs are responsible for implementation, this may speak to the often desired role of CPs as central points in the network rather than implementers themselves.

**Figure 5.17: Role of Centre Points, Sampling Frame**



*Source: TPD, 2011*

Within the institution itself, choices made regarding design and organisational structure vary considerably, which is significant as these will influence relationships between executive team, staff and/or operational team, governance bodies and boards, and partnership stakeholders as a whole. A few avenues to probe include organisational rules, HQ characteristics, nature and features of centralised staff and internal decision making structures as these may build a greater perspective on institutional character and culture. Given availability of information, this work cannot detail HQ characteristics or internal structuring across all partnerships, but it does assess many of these variables for the sampling frame of ITPs as furthered in the next two empirical chapters.

### **Centre Point activity and organisation:**

Across the PPPs, the variation in form and functioning of these CPs is striking, which is critical given the often-cited significance of the CP's characteristics and staff to partnership functioning and effects. The TPD shows a higher degree of functionality for the sampling frame than partnerships overall, as over 90% of (operational) ITPs having staff in place. Over 80% also have an established staff structure, generally in the form of an executive team or executive staff organised along basic functional areas. The more institutionalised, and to an extent the larger the PPP, the more this staff structure formalises. As PPPs begin to grow in scale and often scope, they expand from a small team of executives to functional or geographical based structures with multiple staff units. Partnerships grapple with this as they grow, attempting to manage growth while preventing what is referred to as the tendency to become siloed organisations, which may take the partnerships away from the flexible and perceived faster moving organisations they were created to be.

One increasing criticism of PPPs is their tendency to overcompensate on lean operating systems and employ excessively minimal central staff and working centres (McKinsey 2002), and indeed the TPD shows these staffs are generally quite minimal, especially those employed at the CP. Though it may be cost saving, such minimization tends to weaken the performance of the PPPs overall (Druce and Harmer 2004; FSG Social Impact Advisors 2007). Still, why partnerships exhibit this is rather obvious: many PPP directors note the continued pressure to drive down operational and administrative costs, especially as donors are often reluctant to fund these aspects of the PPPs<sup>119</sup> (Stakeholder interviewI); thus many PPPs strive to keep this line item as low as possible. Administrative costs are also linked to the level and variation of staff salary, and a desire to keep these costs low leads to a tendency to rely on low numbers, or none at all, of fulltime staff, employ interns and also offer staff less incentives and pay, all of which can significantly impact PPP functioning and performance.

#### **5.4.4 Institutional structure, design and variation**

PPPs also make decisions regarding their formal legal/ institutional structure. As mentioned the largest block of PPPs, or 72% of the total, are hosted by another institution. A small number of PPPs (six PPPs) are hosted by another institution but have a separate

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institutional structure, mainly as a charity. Of the independent PPPs, the most common structure is a charity or non profit foundation (17% of operational PPPs) or a 501c3 corporation in the US (which is a registered US-based charity), which 10% of operational PPPs are. A smaller number (7% of PPPs) are officially incorporated in various countries, mainly the UK and Switzerland. Such details are critical for partnership analysis as legal structure will make official the PPP as an institution and will also highly influence a PPP's reporting and financing requirements across countries. A further 3% of PPPs' legal structure could not be verified, though their entity type was hosted. While the ITPs are on average more institutionalised than the PPP universe, the overriding institutional structures are similar, as outside of hosted (which 53.1% are), the majority are 5013cs (19%), charity's or non profits (11.6%), foundations (6.1%) or incorporated (9.5%).


Scale: Institutionalisation is analysed more deeply for the sampling frame by incorporating these aforementioned elements along with organisational structure, institutional design and partnership rules, and guiding legal and institutional principles. Together all of these aspects of design, status, structure and organisational characteristics are conceptualised into a scale (**Table 5.11**) which utilises distinctions between high, medium and low levels. This incorporates multiple aspects of institutional design, and the scale considers the degree to which the PPP as an institution has been structured and formalised, with the corresponding rules and characteristics that occur with these higher levels of institutionalisation. Of the ITPs, 26% are distinguished as high, 39% medium and 34.5% low.

Once a partnership has a formal institutional structure established, internal organisational design and dynamics begins to matter, especially as these impact the communication and decision making channels across the PPPs. Partnerships with more than minimum levels of institutionalisation organise internally in a few main ways: the most common form resembles an international organisation's tri-partite structure of an administrative/management secretariat at the CP, an executive or governing body and at times a general assembly, though the latter is much more common in CSD partnerships than across the universe of PPPs.

**Table 5.11: Conceptualisation of scale of institutionalisation**

Elements of institution- alisation	Low*	Medium	High
- Entity status	- Time limited, ad-hoc	- Unlimited time scale	- Permanent institution
- Legality	- No separate legal status	- Legal status	- Own legal status with guiding legal document
- Legal/institutional form	- May or may not have a Centre Point	- Centre Point established - If hosted, formal and separate governance or DM than host institution	- CHQ location established - Centralisation/ decentralisation planning across operating units
- Institutional structure	- No formalised or separate governing body	- Formalised GDM procedures - Budget	- Full budget authority - Formal board - Formalised DM procedures
- Organisational structure	- No membership rules or criterion	- Clearly defined members and/or partnership - May or may not have membership rules and/or criterion	- Membership rules and/or criterion
- Organisational characteristics		- Centralised decision making	- Business plan articulated - CE strategy/ DE operations
	- Few or no full-time staff	- Full-time operating staff	- Full-time operating staff and articulated staff structure
	*Most hosted fit in this category, though some reach medium levels of institutionalisation		

**Figure 5.18: Level of Institutionalisation, Sampling Frame**



Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011



## 5.5: Governance and decision making

While PPPs may stand to increase participation, representation and involvement in global politics (Bexell, Tallberg and Uhlin 2010), others argue that partnerships not only fail to live up to these promises but may even exacerbate current inequalities (Utting and Zammit 2006). The critique of global PPPs develops along multiple lines, mainly that 1) partnerships are themselves not democratic, and 2) as governments and other global actors continue to promote working with (and partnering within) PPPs, this further weakens democratic principles of global governance (Meadowcraft 2007).

Clearly analysis of partnerships' democratic potential lies in examining their internal governance and decision making, yet despite continued attention to the issue and often heated debates, a comprehensive audit of global partnerships' governance is lacking. To address these issues, the TPD probes into governance and decision making structures and styles across the universe of PPPs<sup>120</sup>. Though detail is often missing for many hosted institutions, for most some information could be garnered on decision making type, which in some ways is a positive finding; thus, this work creates one of the first datasets of partnership governance forums.<sup>121</sup>

### 5.5.1 Governance forums

One overriding finding, as already highlighted, is that approximately half of the partnerships are hosted by another institution; thus, one assumes a majority of governance and decision making will be influenced, if not directly controlled, by the host institution<sup>122</sup> (See Buse 2004a for a related argument). Beyond hosted, approximately 14% (22% operational) of all PPPs are governed by a formal board and around 3% (2%) by a steering committee. Outside of these main forums of decision making, a small proportion of PPPs function under a council (2%), team (2%) or other group (2%), the latter generally an assembly. Less than 10 PPPs in the universe claim to be officially governed by this general assembly, but this does not include hosted that may also have an assembly.

Given that the majority are hosted, a more thorough understanding of the GDM within these is of interest; however, as many merely function as initiatives, or even projects, they

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<sup>120</sup> As additional details on sampling frame PPPs are collected regard GDM variables, discussion of these is reserved for chapter seven.


<sup>121</sup> Of those that are hosted and there is no other information outside of hosted status, these are assumed to be governed only by the host institution.

<sup>122</sup> As a note on methodological process, if the PPP is hosted by another institution, the main governance forum is noted as host and the subtype is tracked separately. As it is impossible to discern the relative influence between the subtype governing forum (e.g. Board or committee) and the host itself, this approach was taken as a proxy to speak to both.

lack descriptive governance information. Of the hosted PPPs for which information is available, slightly over 20% are governed by either a group or assembly (22%) or an appointed / dedicated Team (22%), 17% by a Board and 16% by a formal steering committee. The remainder have decentralised governing structures or note the CP (mainly secretariat) is the only governing entity (*Figure 5.19*).

Beyond the structure of governance, to speak to the PPPs’ democratic nature, member representation within decision making bodies matters. The TPD analysed the board/member composition across all partnerships’ main governance forum, and the governance split is rather startling. Only **around 16% of the partnerships have true multi stakeholder representation on their governing boards** with at least one representative from the public, private and social sectors, though this number is slightly over 20% for those with confirmed operations (*Figures 5.20* and *5.21*). This is striking considering the rampant promotion of these initiatives as multistakeholder endeavours, supposedly bringing new voice and decision making powers to global governance.

**Figure 5.19: Types of Governance, All PPPs**




**Source:** TPD-Outputs, 2011

Even further, over one-quarter (28%) of the PPPs are governed *only by members representing the public sector*, which should even more bring this governance issue to the forefront, especially as these aspects are perhaps more telling than actor involvement alone regarding relative say within these institutions). Further, perhaps contrary to criticisms that TNCs and private interests dominate decision making within global PPPs (Zammit 2003;


Bruhl 2007), across the universe at large the social sector is more highly represented than private actors, with around 25% of PPPs functioning with at least one member from the public sector and one member from the social sector on the board or committee but no representation from the private sector. Another interesting finding is between operational and non operational partnerships: the main difference is in trisectoral representation (21% in operational vs 16% in all) as well as that only 20% of operational PPPs as compared to 26% for all have public/ social only. Among hosted PPPs, there is verifiable trisectoral governance split for only 8%. Public representation only dominates: 24% of the hosted PPPs are governed only by public sector members with 21% from the public and social sector only.

**Figure 5.20: Sectoral Split on main governing forums All**



Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011

**Figure 5.21: Sectoral split of main governing forums Operational**



Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011

Many partnerships make explicit their efforts to be truly multi-stakeholder in terms of decision making, such as the Accelerating Access Initiative to HIV Care, which notes that its purpose is to provide a forum for exchanging ‘information and views, for consultation and to articulate needs and expectations, especially those emanating from governments, and to provide advice and guidance... (UNAIDS 2002), in order to encourage the involvement of all stakeholders. Alternatively, many PPPs, especially in technical areas, adamantly defend their decision making structures, noting that expertise and know-how should be criteria for inclusion rather than sectoral base, as this leads to the more effective partnerships. This is an argument made most strongly in terms of GHPs, which are often criticised for lacking public and social sector representation in favour of private sector interests (Buse 2004a; 2004b; Buse and Harmer 2007). Partnership directors and those on the opposing view counter these claims by noting that membership should be based on merit, not “token political representation” (Kettler and Towse 2001).

In addition to the public/private interest base, and in some ways more a criticism of PPPs, is the lack of representation from the Global South on governing boards (Reinicke and Deng 2000; Caines 2005), but at this time the TPD only presents information regarding sectoral splits across all PPPs. This discussion is furthered in the seventh chapter which presents the sampling frame in more detail.

### **5.5.2 Donors and dollars**


It is often assumed that especially within finance-starved PPPs, donors may wield considerable influence. Specifically, it is claimed these are often powerful Western donors, especially TNCs and other private interests, who thus have undue influence within PPPs. While one cannot say much about the relationship between funders, donors and board members and their relative weight or say without more detailed PPP-specific information, this work does examine all documented evidence to assess funding sources across all PPPs.

A critical finding is that the sectoral base of funders is not available for close to 5% of the independent partnerships, and while this information was rarely specified in detail for hosted PPPs, it is assumed that the host is the main funder unless other information is specified. First, this is *not specifics on donors or figures, which is even rarer*, only noting where and from whom it receives funding. As a note, at times these “funders” were rather vague, as the PPP would note it was funded by private sector investors, governments, etc

without listing specifics. Thus while this work compiled all available information, it is still only a picture as far as sources allow.

Of the partnerships with available information (PPPs with no information are eliminated from percentage totals), it is perhaps surprising that more than one-third of the PPPs are funded *only* by public sources. This would perhaps run contrary to many arguments that governments rely on the private sector for the financial arm of PPPs, especially as around 12% are funded only by private donors, compared to less than 7% of partnerships that only have social sector-based donors. Only 14% of the global partnership universe has a diverse, multi stakeholder funding base, compared with the 21% of operational who have a tri-sectoral governance body (*Figure 5.22*)

**Figure 5.22: Sectoral split of funding base, All PPPs**



**Source:** TPD-Outputs, 2011

Finally, governance encapsulates more than form and design but also the dynamics within these structures, the transparency of the governance processes and the clarity of specified roles, rules and responsibilities for those involved. To further speak towards input legitimacy, this work also assessed elements of transparency and accountability across the universe of PPPs, though detailed discussion is reserved for chapter seven.

## 5.6 Implications and Conclusion

This chapter reveals for the first time the nature and status of the universe of transnational public private partnerships, and this work's TPD shows that while over 750 PPPs are claimed, only around 440 of these show evidence of current operations. Beyond pure operational status, the functioning of these institutions and whether or not they are indeed addressing unmet needs is of concern. While some areas have a wide coverage of these global institutions, such as health, many issue areas, such as women's rights, are rarely addressed. In terms of the actual work of partnerships, the TPD shows that most of these PPPs function in areas of coordination of resources or expertise rather than more tangible or direct operational areas. While global PPPs are heralded for their ability to close noted global governance gaps, this chapter shows that global partnerships may fail to meet these promises. For one, there is still heavy dominance of Northern governments and significant representation of IGOs as the main actors involved within the PPPs. This is especially in regards to UN bodies, which host or partner with a significant proportion of the universe of global PPPs

Regarding institutional design, this work provides a unique perspective on variations in PPP legal and organisational form while showing how PPPs organise along this range of institutionalisation. These PPPs are often relatively flexible, many lack any institutionalised structure or even an established centralised point of operations, or more fundamentally a contact. Perhaps one of the most striking findings, however, is the large majority that are hosted by another institution, and often little information regarding governance, funding or most fundamentally performance, is available in these hosted partnerships. Finally, while the universe and main partnerships "inputs" focused around partnership type, scope, actor-based variables and institution-based variables as discussed above, this work recognises that while not static concepts, these descriptive features of partnerships still represent rules or a structural base and may differ from reality.

## CHAPTER 6:

### Management Practices in Global Partnerships

The inherent differences that emerge when combining these varied institutions and their respective cultures are certain to lead to organisational challenges; thus, it is often suggested that strong management and governance processes within PPPs will be significant. Despite this common assumption, and the frequent reference to the critical nature of management, it is a lagging area of PPP research, especially in terms of linking management variation to variation in performance.

Regardless of measurement used, performance varies greatly across public-private partnerships. This is not surprising: performance and productivity vary greatly across organisations in the private and public sectors, even within narrowly defined industries (Foster, Hiwanger, and Syverson 2008). Much of this work, and others, explore how these various partnership characteristics, inputs or institutional explanatory variables may explain what drives these differences. While PPP evaluation brings considerable challenges, not least due to lack of standardisation of concepts and metrics, even within sectors with more comparable data, there remains a gap between institutional outputs and conventionally measured inputs.

Recent works have made substantial gains in getting into what may drive these differences across institutions. Beyond measured inputs, such as institutional design or actors involved, another approach looks to the role of management. This involves analysis of the institutional practices and processes that may be significant in explaining performance variation. While economists, academics and practitioners have long acknowledged the importance of management in determining these differences, little has been done to systematically address this, mainly given a lack of comparable data and applicable measurement tools. An ongoing research agenda,<sup>123</sup> originally pioneered in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) has attempted to quantify and evaluate management across the private, public and not-for-profit sectors.

This chapter moves the analysis to the micro partnership level and assesses the management practices within a set of the sampling frame ITPs. The first section addresses the significance of management and related PPP literature which addresses it. The next details the methodology used. The subsequent section presents the main findings and describes the evidenced management practices within and across PPPs while the following section explores

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<sup>123</sup> For background on the management methodology, see <http://cep.lse.ac.uk/new/research/productivity/management.asp> and [www.worldmanagementsurvey.org](http://www.worldmanagementsurvey.org)


the drivers of these management differences. An additional section discusses the links with governance and organisational autonomy, and this chapter concludes by returning to the significance of management.

### 6.1 Partnerships processes: Background and missing management link

While the notion that management matters for organisational performance is perhaps not surprising, what is startling is just how much the managerial decisions do matter. Established study across sectors shows a significant relationship between organisational management and organisational performance (*Figure 6.1*). Management may be even more important than other factors commonly associated with institutional performance, such as industry sector, regulatory environment or country of operation; thus management practices may command significant explanatory value, even over business lines, government policy or geography (Dorgan et al. 2006). Might management play just as much of a role in partnerships? Before moving into the findings of this work, this section lays the background by reviewing related theories and notions of management and providing a link to existing literature on international institutions and PPPs that consider the role of management.

**Figure 6.1: Established relationship between management and performance**

*World Management Survey research shows that in over 6,000 industrial firms globally, management and performance are tightly linked*



Source: Bloom et al. 2010a



While management is not a neglected area of partnership focus – it is increasingly mentioned in regards to partnership “must haves” – systematic study of management across partnerships is lacking. Beyond this fundamental gap, there is little consideration given to management practices as a key factor in explaining partnership functioning and performance. While the lack of a tool or established system of measuring management is one reason, there are a few other factors that help to explain this lag. A management-focused view resides in a missing gap in PPP research as while it is cited and discussed it is fair to say it has not been truly studied, especially given the current varying approaches taken to partnership analysis.

Before moving into partnerships specifically, it is worth noting that the significance of procedures and processes has been a growing tenant within international regime research and new institutionalist studies. Even though earlier research focused on the constructs of power, interests and knowledge, the critical role for programmatic activities in determining regime effectiveness has always been of focus (Young 1999b). The more recent findings from the International Regime Database (IRD)<sup>124</sup> project also noted the significance of procedural elements in influencing regime effectiveness (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006) and the dominance of the managerial approach over that of compliance (Chayes and Chayes 1995). The management approach argues that more rule targets are involved in the process of rulemaking, the greater the degree of compliance will be with these rules. Critically, the researchers find less support for approaches to compliance associated with management and enforcement than expected, as legalisation and legitimacy variables account for a sizable proportion of conformance on the part of regime members (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006, 232). As the dimensions within the management measure utilised in this work encompass dimensions tightly linked to these latter elements, and evaluates how well PPP directors and managers implement or execute these, these findings reinforce the applicability of this MM tool.

Using this regime literature as a base, Beisheim and Kaan (2010)<sup>125</sup> takes a similar view and utilize the “managerial approach to compliance” (Raustiala and Slaughter 2002) as applied to transnational partnerships. Their use of process management refers to the secretariat structure and the internal workings of the PPPs, though they also acknowledge the

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<sup>124</sup> The International Regimes Database (IRD) presents quantitative analysis of 23 international environmental regimes in terms of problem solving capacity and problem structure, focusing on varying factors that account for regime effectiveness and compliance. The authors also consider aspects of regime design, actors, decision making models and other variables in constructing the database; management features as one element of a constructed model. (See Mitchell *ongoing*)

<sup>125</sup> See also Liese and Beisheim 2011 and Beisheim and Liese (forthcoming) as well as the SFB 700/D1 workshop papers Beisheim 2010 and Liese 2010.

importance of resources, conflict resolution and timeframe limitations. While their work notes the importance of management, it often confuses structural and process dimensions; that is, it does not distinguish between the PPP's organisational characteristics, such as the presence of a secretariat, as separate from the management within the CP. The work is also based upon interviews not conducted with the same methodology across all PPPs of focus; thus, while it attempts a quantitative "score" for the partnerships, it falls more towards comparative case studies than systematic comparison.

Long-established partnership reviews consider management and decision making, but these are often written more for partnership practitioners and dedicated as PPP toolkits, learning guides or best practice resources (Caplan et al. 2007; Stott et al. 2006; UN Global Compact 2007). Many commissioned evaluations include a focus on management (OED 2004), but this is generally more qualitative and maintains an emphasis on best practices learned from highly successful partnerships. Though numerous reviews consider organisational and process issues (World Economic Forum 2005), this is not done systematically across more than a set of partnerships, nor are they generally considered as drivers to performance. With a few noted exceptions, systematic attention to management is clearly lacking. Even those that focus on management often stop at individual PPP case studies or discussing best practices, relying on discussions surrounding SMART management frameworks and success strategies rather than evaluation or comparison of the implementation of these practices.

This echoes earlier studies, such as the 2004 DFID review of over 20 Global Health Partnerships (GHPs), which discussed the critical aspects of management styles and structures. Many of the points the authors target from their commissioned "business" and "partnership" literature review, such as the necessity of well-articulated goals, strong and shared vision and transparency between partners, are aspects which the MM interview tool utilised here assesses. Also relevant is the work's mention of the 7 C's of partnership working (DETR 1999; in Druce and Harmer 2004):<sup>126</sup> clarity of leadership, understanding, purpose, role, commitment, management and measurement. While all useful practices, however, their uptake within PPPs is rarely evaluated in a comparative perspective. This relates to the growing body of PPP evaluations, which offer value in that they can probe deeply into PPP's operations and the status of the management (Grace and Druce 2009), but tend to focus on the actors within the roles and decision making styles. Fewer studies consider how deficiencies or

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<sup>126</sup> For more on partnership working, see Geddes 1997; Harding 1998; and Skelcher and Lowndes 1998.

strengths in management may lead to a difference in PPP operations, though almost all individual evaluations point to lacks in these regards (Buse and Tanaka 2011).

Case studies, especially of high-profile partnerships, give increased attention to management. For example, recent reviews of the Global Fund (Macro International 2007), International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI) (Druce et al. 2003) and the Medicines for Malaria Venture (Faster Cures 2009) note the importance of centre point management - often the need to strengthen it - yet management is rarely measured nor considered outside of the internal partnership context.

In sum, the current state of play suggests management practices are a missing link from partnership research. Absent is the evaluation of management, the ability to compare across organisations, outside of noted success factors, and, significantly, on management towards both strategy and implementation or execution. While best practices may be published, and efforts made to disseminate across PPPs, there is little study of whether they have been diffused and taken up within PPPs, points returned to as the findings are highlighted.

## **6.2 Measuring management practices**

This work measured management practices by conducting interviews with PPP directors and/or chief operating officers (COOs) or equivalent positions<sup>127</sup> across a subset of the sampling frame. The interviews cover practices across six areas (*Figure 6.2.*), and each of these broad areas is broken into dimensions while the interviews are scored on a one-to-five basis across these 25 dimensions of practice. Conceptions of good, average and poor practices are defined in advance for each of the dimensions, and the tool assigns scores from one (“worst practice”) to five (“best practice”) across the dimensions.<sup>128</sup> Partnerships that track performance well, for example, continually monitor key performance measures and communicate information about them, both formally and informally, to partnership staff and the partners themselves. On the other hand, partnerships who struggle with performance management may rarely or infrequently monitor metrics and communicate them, perhaps only sporadically, to funders or donors.

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<sup>127</sup> While the same equivalent position was interviewed in each PPP, many titles/ positions are used across the PPP. Throughout this chapter, the title Director is used, though the interviewee may have held the title CEO, president and/or manager.

<sup>128</sup> See Appendix I for complete PPP management interview, questions and assessment guide.

The overall management practice measure is an average of these 25 scores (*Figure 6.3*), but one can also compare across areas and dimensions.<sup>129</sup> Applying this management measure and the process undertaken to conduct the interview involves understanding at least three factors: scoring management practices; collecting accurate responses; and obtaining interviews with the partnership directors.

Scoring: To measure management requires codifying the concept of good and bad management into a measure applicable to different partnerships. Benchmarked on the original survey interview grid which has been adapted to apply towards private, public, charitable and government sectors, it can serve as a robust tool for assessing hybrid forms of these institutional structures.<sup>130</sup> The interview-based, evaluation tool defines and scores from one (worst practice) to five (best practice) across areas of management practices which appear to matter to PPPs. Each of these areas is broken into dimensions of management (the questions), all scored between a one and five, with the higher score indicating better performance.

A funnel technique is utilised to further the scoring process and ensure accurate responses. Each dimension begins with an open question (“Can you describe the PPP’s method of obtaining new partners”) rather than closed questions (e.g. “Do you utilise funding as a basis of partnership selection”). These questions target actual practices and examples, with the discussion continuing until the interviewer can make an accurate assessment of the organisation’s typical practices. For each dimension of practice, the set of sub-questions begins with a broad, open question and is followed with more detailed questions to narrow and fine tune the scoring ability of the analyst.

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<sup>129</sup> More details on the general methodology can be found in Bloom and Van Reenen 2010 and Bloom et al. 2007.

<sup>130</sup> Approximately 14 dimensions of management practices hold consistent across all sectors, furthering the significance of assessing management as a key driver of practice.

**Figure 6.2: Management practice areas assessed**

<b>Areas and examples of PPP management assessed</b>	
<b>Partner and operations management:</b>	How well does the PPP define entry requirements for new partners? When partners join, how are roles and responsibilities articulated? How much is organizational design of the PPP thought through (and challenged)?
<b>Performance management (Monitoring):</b>	How are performance indicators reviewed? What are the consequences for failing to meet targets?
<b>Target management:</b>	How does the PPP set and track its main goals? How tough are these targets?
<b>People (staff) management:</b>	What systems are in place to recruit partnership staff? Does the partnership evaluate employees and reward based on performance? Is there an active system that strives to maintain and incentivize employees?
<b>Vision and rationale:</b>	How much was stakeholder engagement a part of defining this vision? How well does the partnership review, manage and maintain its rationale?
<b>Leadership:</b>	How does the partnership define and distinguish leadership roles and tasks? How are accountability and leadership managed?

**Figure 6.3: PPP interview dimension scoring**

Partnership Vision	Partner Management	Operations Management	Target Management	Performance Management	Leadership	Talent and People Management
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Partnership vision</li> <li>Partnership rationale and added value</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Partnership selection strategy</li> <li>Clearly defined partnership roles</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Organization principles</li> <li>Scoping resources and resource management</li> <li>Good use of partner resources and internal collaboration</li> <li>Adopting partnership best-practices</li> <li>Continuous improvement and process documentation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Target balance</li> <li>Target inter-connection</li> <li>Time horizon of targets</li> <li>Target stretch</li> <li>Clarity and comparability of targets</li> <li>Clearly defined accountability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Performance tracking</li> <li>Performance review</li> <li>Performance dialogue</li> <li>Consequence management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clearly defined leadership roles</li> <li>Leadership mindset</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Managing talent</li> <li>Rewarding high performers</li> <li>Promoting high performers</li> <li>Creating a distinctive partnership value proposition</li> </ul>

Each partnership function scored for all dimensions on 1-5 scale

Obtaining accurate responses: Key to the applicability and relevance of this data is obtaining unbiased responses from the interviewees; that is, ensuring partnership directors provide accurate responses and their answers regarding institutional practices reflect what actually happens in reality. As is well known from research on survey methodology (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), interviewees tend to be biased in their responses towards what they

perceive the interviewer is looking for as the correct answer. Thus measures should be taken to ensure interviewers are scoring based on partnership practices rather than the interviewee's impressions. In addition interviewers may themselves have pre-conceptions about the performance of the institution they are interviewing and bias their scores based on their ex-ante perceptions. More generally, a range of background characteristics, potentially correlated with the PPP directors or head managers, may generate some kinds of systematic bias in the survey data; for example if these directors have a background in public relations or lend themselves more easily to interviewing style.

This approach tackles these issues by utilising this *double blind* survey methodology; this refers to the fact that the interview is conducted via the telephone for all directors and while they were fully prepared for the conversation and topics covered, they were not aware that they were being scored nor of the criteria. As interviewers themselves can be biased in conducting interviews or evaluations in general based on pre-conceptions of the PPP's relative effectiveness, the second aspect of the double blind methodology is that the interviewer is not only external to the PPP operations but also is unfamiliar with the PPP performance information in advance of the interview. The interviews were conducted by this thesis's author and one highly-trained interviewer analyst, who had also conducted over 100 interviews in both the public and private sector institutions using the methodology.<sup>131</sup> Over 85% interviews were scored by two people which furthered the reliability of the information assessed and scores given.

Furthermore, each interview also collected valuable information relating to the PPP itself (*Appendix G*). This includes details on the PPPs' internal structure and organisation, partnership selection process, legal and ownership status, number of sites and operating units. Whenever these same indicators could be found from external sources or datasets (many were also collected with the output variable/ PPP structural variable aspects), we cross checked these responses.

The targeted contacts within the partnerships were the equivalent of the chief executive or the chief operating officer within the PPP, while across a certain subset of PPPs multiple managers were spoken to in order to further test the rigour of the assessment tool. The PPP managers were also those who worked and functioned within the PPP themselves rather than partner organisations. While this narrowed the frame of partnerships spoken to in that there had to be a central point of contact for the PPP, it enabled further comparability across those surveyed. It must be noted that a minimum degree of institutionalisation is

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<sup>131</sup> The interviewer was also fully trained on the background relating to transnational PPPs.

needed before one can assess management, so partnerships for which there is no designated contact point or location self-eliminate from the management survey.<sup>132</sup> Another concern may be that these managers were too removed from the PPP management processes to accurately answer the questions; however, this was dealt with through several measures, including consistent points of contact across partnerships, interviewing a second, more operational-minded contact in a set of PPPs and designing the nature of the questions to tease out possible ambiguities in response.<sup>133</sup>

What distinguishes this tool, besides its measurement and comparative use, is its focus on implementation and deployment of practices. More than looking at structure or design, this work gets to the crux of the practices themselves, a task few other researchers have attempted, especially on a comparative basis. This methodological tool has been benchmarked, and proven robust, across close to 20,000 institutions in the public, private and charitable sectors. That it has proven applicable and relevant in measuring management in these varied institutional structures provides solid grounds for its use here.

What is significant is that the same practices around monitoring, target management and people management are consistently associated with better performance across all the sectors studied. This is significant as one can now benchmark partnerships consistently with these practices known to make a difference. What is interesting is how frequently these *same practices*, that were already built into this grid and proven relevant cross sectors, are referenced in partnership evaluations and toolkits.<sup>134</sup> That said, this tool is adapted specifically for global partnerships to capture additional dimensions of practice, as it expands from the original 18 question set and alters all operational-based management dimensions.

Obtaining interviews was done through a stepped procedure with careful attention to methodology. Sampling frame PPPs with functional types of information exchange/research, policy and/or its development, and setting standards were initially targeted. This was done after determining these three would lend themselves best to comparisons and represented slightly over one-third of the sampling frame. The process involved emailing the set of 83 PPPs which had these functional types as either primary or secondary functions an introduction letter reviewing the study and an invitation to hold a structured conversation.

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<sup>132</sup> This only excludes less than five partnerships from the survey, as the majority of the sampling frame had at least a contact specified for the CP. Of the 22 no response emails (an additional four failed), 17 were sent to a basic (e.g. info@) email rather than named contact.

<sup>133</sup> The validity of this survey tool was also ensured by collecting variables regarding the process of the interview. This includes variables relating to the following: interviewer fixed effect, time of day and day of week of the interview, duration, speciality and background of the manager, position of the interviewee and tenure in post.

<sup>134</sup> See FSG Social Impact Advisors 2007; Buse and Tanaka 2011; Hurrell et al. 2006; as well as the evaluation resource library at [globalppps.org](http://globalppps.org).

Forty-three successful interviews were held with fifty-one different managers, and during a small set of interviews multiple directors participated in the same interview. Thus there were thirty three unique PPPs,<sup>135</sup> five interviews were deemed incomplete in that the manager/director did not have enough time for the full interview (these were dropped from the final analysis), and an additional six the manager expressed interest but a conducive time could not be set within the determined interview timeframe. In addition, seven partnerships responded that they were no longer operational, and for four PPPs all attempts at contact failed. An additional four responded to the interview request but were determined to not constitute an ITP, as per the definitions of this work.<sup>136</sup>

This work also considered whether or not there was potentially sample bias in the received responses. After review, however, the partnership interviews were found to represent both well known, well funded partnerships and small hosted initiatives with less than one fulltime staff member. The variation across sectoral focus, geography and timeframe of the partnership was also fairly representative of the sample at large.

**Table 6.1: PPP interview statistics**

<b>Management Interview (MM) statistics</b>	
Total PPPs emailed	83
Total individuals interviewed:	51
Total interview sessions held (i.e. same PPP, different persons):	43
Total unique PPPs approached and finished interviewing:	33
Average call duration:	~2 hours

### **6.3 Describing management across and within PPPs<sup>137</sup>**

#### **6.3.1 Patterns of management practices**

Management varies drastically across the PPPs of focus, with some partnerships exhibiting strong practices while others falter towards the bottom. When plotting the distribution of management scores (*Figure 6.4*), the spread across the scale is evident with

<sup>135</sup> As multiple partnerships had interviews with more than one manager, in the analysis which follows only one interview per PPP is included to prevent over biasing the sample towards any type of PPP. Rather than averaging the scores, the interview is kept in entirety with scores from the director/manager in the most comparable position to the entire set of PPPs interviewed.

<sup>136</sup> This includes the Global Forum for Health Research, the Bicycle Refurbishing Initiative, the International Council for the Control of Iodine Deficiency Disorder, and Building Partnerships for Sustainable Development, most of which were determined to be XPPs as per the TPD coding; See AppendixB for coding.

<sup>137</sup> Throughout the remainder of this chapter, PPP managers are named when they consented to full disclosure and “PPP Director” is utilized when they asked for full confidentiality. The full list of PPPs’ interviewed is available in AppendixJ with confidentiality taken into account.




several partnerships clumping at the tail end. This is particularly striking when considering that a score of “one” indicates worst practice and “five” best practice; therefore, partnerships scoring a two or less on performance management, for example, will not articulate goals or targets for the partnership nor consider setting metrics to track progress. While this is perhaps not surprising, given the many known variations across partnerships, this distribution persists even amongst similarly focused PPPs or those with the same participating actors.

PPP's also are better and worse managed in certain areas of practice, which may go far in explaining differences in performance. The areas of management mentioned above are broken into either four broader categories for simplicity (partner operations, performance management, people (staff) management and vision/leadership) or six, more specific categories. When considering all partnerships, there is not a significant difference across areas; however, PPPs tended to perform higher on Vision and Rationale while struggling most in operational areas. While the majority could articulate their organisation's vision, mission and rationale, and how this is managed, most largely failed to maintain the operations deemed necessary to effectively run the organisation. This is a significant finding, as it shows that despite best intentions and purpose, PPPs may either dedicate too much time to this former aspect of work or not sufficiently engage in the necessary management practices and infrastructure to execute the vision.

Regardless of categorisation, PPPs scored worst on two particular dimensions of the 25: 1) *Operations management*: Adopting best practices and 2) *Performance management*: Holding performance dialogues. It is striking that the average worst scoring question related to the ability to adopt partnership best practices, the dimension which tests whether a partnership regularly reaches out to others, find ideas to improve performance (from other PPPs, IGOs, their partners, etc) and incorporates these into its practice. While many admitted they knew it was significant, the majority of PPPs had no processes in place to do so. These findings perhaps draw questions related to PPPs' roles as social learning institutions and knowledge sharers given that so few place enough, if any, emphasis on this.

**Figure 6.4: Management varies across PPPs**



*Source:* Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding overcounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).

### 6.3.2 Management across PPPs

Partnerships are varied organisations, which makes clear categorizations for comparison difficult. In related works, organisations are often compared across countries<sup>138</sup> within the same sector or industry or across similar industries; however, geography is less of a base for PPPs, as so many are located in the same country and indeed city. Two general categories which represent key distinguishing PPP features are utilised: 1) hosted vs independent status and 2) functional categories. Throughout this chapter, the use of categories or types of PPPs refers to those sampled in this study rather than all PPPs, though as is argued in this work's concluding chapter, much of these findings can be generalized to a greater extent. Further, numbers per functional category are per the set of PPPs interviewed rather than the TPD sampling frame as a whole; see chapter five of this work for a functional breakdown of the universe and sampling frame of PPPs

Independent PPPs are much better managed than those that are hosted (**Figure 6.5**), and this is especially significant when considering only those hosted within a public (government; IGO) organisation.<sup>139</sup> Besides the raw management scores, another way to see

<sup>138</sup> Good management is not dictated by geography; however, related work on management practices in industrials highlighted the way superior management techniques transcend language, culture, and regulation (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007).

<sup>139</sup> The Eli Lilly MDR TB Partnership is the only PPP hosted within a private organisation interviewed, so henceforth all scores for hosted drop the Eli Lilly scores to draw out all comparisons.


the striking difference is by comparing the distribution of hosted versus independent management scores (*Figure 6.6*), as the former has a noticeable “tail” of underperforming partnerships with average scores of less than 2.5. Strikingly, there are no top performing hosted partnerships, with the best managed scoring only a 2.8.

**Figure 6.5: Management practice score, independent versus hosted**



*Source:* Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding overaccounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).


**Figure 6.6: Distribution of management scores, independent versus hosted**



*Source:* Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding overaccounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).

Using the assessed management score to consider how management differs across the functional-types (*Figure 6.7*), it emerges that information exchange/ research partnerships outperform the others with standard setting and advocacy partnerships lagging in terms of management practices.<sup>140</sup> As hosted status is spread fairly evenly throughout the functional areas, scores are not being driven by the PPPs' independence, or lack thereof. Despite these differences, when bracketing into categories the sample size becomes relatively small, so this work does not make more than initial insights here, though it is certainly an interesting area for further work. The distribution of scores across functional areas (*Figure 6.8*) shows that despite having the most PPPs sampled, information exchange/ research PPPs have a relatively low spread, which signifies less dispersion of management scores, while advocacy PPPs have the highest dispersion of scores.


**Figure 6.7: Management score by function**



*Source: Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).*

<sup>140</sup> Of those PPPs interviewed, the functional breakdown is as follows: Advocacy (4); Coordination (5); Information exchange (13); Policy (5) and Setting standards (4).

**Figure 6.8: Distribution of management score by function**



Source: Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding overaccounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).

### 6.3.3 Management: Strengths and weaknesses


While there is a significant management gap between hosted and independent partnerships, management still varies considerably within these. This work is unique in its ability to measure the relative quality of management practices (benchmarked against a best practice guideline), and it is quickly evident that the thoroughness of partnerships in adopting these practices differs widely. Turning the focus to the relative strengths and weaknesses of partnerships allows one to draw out more of the differences between types of partnerships as well as highlight areas where all struggle.

The biggest weakness for hosted PPPs, especially compared to their independent counterparts, is the area of target and goal management, as there is almost a full point difference in average scores (*Figure 6.9*). Interestingly, while there is a significant gap between hosted and independent PPPs in terms of people management, it is not the biggest driver of the difference between the two. In related work, it is this aspect of management that drives most of the difference between public and private organisations in terms of management (Bloom et al. 2010a).

Across functional areas, while coordination PPPs outscore all other functional types in regards to operational management, they struggle the most in performance management – the

setting and tracking of partnership performance. As this type of PPP functions to bring together expertise, knowledge and resources across partners, that they do well in managing their partners and resources is a reassuring finding. Their weakness in performance management and tracking is a concern, however, especially if one assumes that these operational processes are needed to drive the desired results. What also stands out is that advocacy partnerships exemplify strong leadership, which signifies – at least for those in this sample – that they are led by engaged leaders with clearly defined roles and responsibilities who still understand the broader set of challenges the PPP faces. However, these partnerships also have the weakest people management systems in place; in fact, it is the only functional type to score higher on leadership than people management. These partnerships did little to incentivise or reward staff and had less in place to engage staff longer term (e.g. through professional development, incentives, rewards) with the partnership. This does not bode well moving forward if these PPPs lose their current (often founding) leaders or there is a continued lack of succession planning and/or leadership turnover.

**Figure 6.9 Management score by entity type**



*Source:* Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).

To further pull together these insights systematically, this work walks through the main areas of management drawing in examples from specific partnerships.

**Operations management:**

While overall operational management is the weakest area for PPPs, these average differences across management areas are slight when grouping all PPPs together. By breaking this into dimensions, however, interesting findings emerge. PPPs, even high scoring ones, struggled on a few areas (*Table 6.2*).

**Table 6.2 PPP management scores across operations management**

Management dimension	All	Independent	Hosted
Partnership selection strategy	3	3.2	2.3
Clearly defined partnership roles	2.9	3.1	2.6
Organization principles	3.2	3.3	2.89
Scoping resources and resource management	3	3.2	2.4
Good use of partner resources and internal collaboration	2.7	2.9	2.2
Adopting partnership best-practices	2.6	2.8	2.1
Continuous improvement and process documentation	3.1	3.2	2.8

One aspect many partnership leaders struggled with was their partner selection strategy: the majority of PPPs were unable to articulate what defined a partner in their organisation. Whereas strong performing partnerships clearly spoke through the process of new partners joining and the necessary steps taken on both ends, other PPPs allowed open membership to any who paid a fee or even expressed interest. The worst performing partnerships were unable to define partners and relied on reactive, often ad hoc means of partners joining. A disconnect is often noted between core partners, involved with main PPP work (often founding partners) and other partners. This is especially the case for research-based PPPs, such as the product development partnerships (PDP), who had detailed criteria and arrangements for all “partners” engaged in research or development but much looser definitions for advocacy or communication partners.<sup>141</sup>

Interestingly, partner selection is particularly weak for hosted partnerships. This does not generally stem from command/ control of the host organisation, which is generally relatively unengaged with this aspect for the PPPs interviewed, but rather from the fact that most of these lack a proactive process, as the majority noted potential partners “came to them.” Most of the hosted PPPs surveyed also tended towards more relaxed, open partnering

<sup>141</sup> Another difficulty with these PDPs was how to handle contract service organisations (CSOs), which considered themselves partners but which the PDP managers would consider a contracted relationship.

requirements, often engaging with partners who “expressed interest” or signed on to the PPPs’ goals or missions. While this is also found for a few independent PPPs, the majority of these worked more to control numbers and comparatively more attempted at least some form of due diligence. The discrepancy across PPPs for this dimension was great, with weak performers noting they “responded to requests of interest” and “used to have a form online;” to others who noted an MOU is considered a minimum only, but in reality no true partnerships is formed, and no risk or financial sharing occurs, without a more formal agreement. For the top performers, the key piece on the selection strategy is the link with the partnerships’ goals – that is, partners have something of critical value to “bring to the table.”

While health advocacy partnerships were notably weak here, advocacy and policy-based PPPs in other areas, such as the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) or the World Energy Council (WEC) were some of the top performers. The WEC, for example goes through a process at the board level, which is also part of the bylaws of the organisation, where companies are identified that meet a list of criteria. The WEC also works to control partner numbers and sets a cap to ensure active engagement of all of the partners. On the other hand, the Global Vaccine Alliance (GVA) began with what its director acknowledges was “a broad tent or umbrella strategy” to partnerships. Its self-acknowledged *leas faire* criterion, in which potential partners only had to note an interest in global health, meant all were welcomed. The Alliance now considers over 600 organisations “partners,” and it acknowledges they will not be able to provide services of value to all of them moving forward. Thus, this is an area the PPP is actively looking to manage.

All partnerships performed worst (or equivalently) on the dimension “Ability to clearly define partnership roles” versus the dimension “Partnership selection strategy,” many to a significant extent. That is, even those that clearly articulated the process for a partner joining, performed due diligence on potentials and had clear partnership strategies, struggled to define the roles and requirements this membership entailed. Other PPPs believe it is necessary to keep roles loosely defined, as the Online Access to Research in the Environment (O.A.R.E) director noted: “Partners join us because they want the flexibility: we keep partner responsibilities as loose as possible to accommodate this and see no need to be firmer” (MM Interview43).

What quickly became evident is that for many PPPs, the actual active engagement between partners is quite limited! On a more macro picture, this will be critical in eventually addressing the argument that a major role PPPs fulfil is that of learning institutions. The “partnering” within many transnational PPPs more often occurs with engagement between the



PPP centre and individual partners rather than continual partner-to-partner engagement. The ability of the PPP to coordinate its partners and encourage and facilitate engagement and learning remained weak for most, but many directors noted this was a critical area that needed work. To distinguish, while many partners hold annual partner meetings and issue newsletters, these are information distribution dialogues – CP to partners – rather than forums for information-sharing and lesson- learning *across* partners.

Some PPPs are making strides towards this, instituting membership surveys or roundtables to bring partners together and share practices; however, almost no PPPs made any effort to actually capture this knowledge or ensure partners went away with lasting lessons. Some are moving towards having a members’ area on their websites, such as the Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards Program (CLASP) or the Global Health Council (GHC), that are both looking towards newly revamped websites to facilitate this engagement. A few stand out in this regard, such as IPM which has an accessible partnership database for continued online collaboration and learning processes. Another example is IAVI’s encouraging its research managers to collaborate across projects. Many directors acknowledged the weaknesses here, but often they felt they were overly time/ resource constrained to do more. In terms of partner workings, many of the directors noted that when it came to fulfilling partner operations, it generally came down to relying on “the usual suspects” or those that have contributed in the past.

It is worth briefly returning to the dimension PPP best practices, as even the best management struggled and a notable number of PPPs admitted they fell behind on this. According to one Director: “That is a great question, and I admit we could do much better here, but the staff and time resources always reign paramount” (MM Interview15). This constraint is often expressed, as PPP directors prefer to be active, in many respects in efforts to satisfy donor requests, so PPP learning and improvement fall behind. As the WRI’s director summated: “We made the decision a long time ago to be a “Do” tank rather than a “Think” tank, so admittedly some of these other pieces fall behind (MM Interview37).

Despite the repeated mantra that PPPs believe they distinguish themselves from the private sector as they embody “collaboration not competition,” actual collaboration amongst PPPs is notably lagging. Even those that regularly *engage* with other PPPs or similar, sectoral-based organisations do little to capture and disseminate learning within the organisation. If it is done, it is generally at the onset of the partnership; for example when IPM began, its CEO Zeda Rosenberg went to the other PDPs and “literally sat at their feet, begging for the lessons of what worked, and more importantly what failed” (MM

Interview19). Many other PPPs expressed similar motivations for the partnership onset, but once it came to the operations, sentiments were more diverging.


This is an area, however, that many donors and funders are constantly pushing – and often facilitating (FSG Social Impact Advisors 2007; Grace and Druce 2009). The Gates Foundation hosts initiatives promoting “matrix collaboration” across PDPs, where VPs/Directors of various functional areas are set to engage in timely conference calls or meetings. Many PPPs feel this is too much and ends up being a distraction from the main partnership work; quite a few expressed that the constant push to collaborate and share has reached an extent beyond that deemed desirable. Especially amongst PDPs, much of this was already going on in an informal basis, so many expressed that it did not need to be mandated by another body. However, while sharing may have been ongoing, what is *admittedly not occurring* is any capturing or documenting of these lessons and practices. The majority of PPP directors across all fields admitted the risk in this; they know that key lessons will leave with the current staff, but given the multitude of pressures and constraints, they do not want – or feel they cannot - prioritise now.

#### ***Target and performance management:***

A major focus of studies and evaluations, the area of Targets and Performance is separated into two distinct pieces: Target and goal setting for the PPP itself and performance tracking and review of the PPP operations. While it is perhaps not surprising that independent partnerships are better managed than hosted ones, what is striking is hosted PPPs struggle most in target management, especially as the need to better articulate goals and track progress is constantly stressed in IGO and other funded reviews and evaluations (OED 2004; Caines et al. 2004). Drawing this out, it is not the performance metrics and tracking which are the biggest issue, many hosted PPPs do fairly well here, *rather it is the target and goal setting process itself (Figure 6.10).*

Hosted PPPs, especially those in government or UN organisations, tend to lack long term planning or tracking. This is even the case for PPPs that have been in existence for several years, while others which are younger consider themselves too much in the “early initiative” stage, so they feel it is still difficult to explicitly say what success will look like. There is a clear disconnect between PPPs that are forced to articulate this in business plans by donors or hosts versus those that are not, but mandated targets by donors are often just as much of a hindrance for PPP directors, especially those who feel these conflict with each other.

**Figure 6.10: Management scores across target dimensions**



*Source: Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).*

The divergence across PPPs is striking. One government-hosted PPP director frankly commented in response to setting goals: “This is very hard – you mean against which we could measure progress? This isn’t very realistic” (MM Interview33). The contrast is particularly stark compared to the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDI), where one of its directors Rob Don referred to the “Bible” on his desk, which includes a well-articulated 3-5 year strategic plan, annual business plan and shorter-term project based targets, all with well articulated metrics that cascade and feed into each other (MM Interview1). The majority of PPPs operate with one to two year business plans and three to five year strategic plans. The latter while rarer are also more qualitative and can have little to no governing body or donor influence; this also means that partnerships can exhibit disconnects between operating goals and strategic objectives. This is expressed by the e8 as a desire to keep things flexible, given the constant changes (MM Interview41), a sentiment articulated by many. There is an exhibited range in terms of focus and difficulty of the goals. Over half of those interviewed expressed the overriding goals as bringing in more funding, adding new members or publishing a new business or operating plan. Indeed, for these PPPs, the majority of staff time

and resource is spent dedicated to these operational goals, regardless of the longer term or strategic-minded focuses.


Also revealing is the lack of push or “target stretch,” especially within hosted partnerships. Of course these dimensions are highly correlated with each other, as partnerships which fail to clearly articulate goals and targets will obviously not consider goals demanding. However, that so many partnerships, even those deemed fairly effective by external evaluations, do not believe their targets to be demanding is surprising. What also emerges is the confusion between being busy versus being pushed and/or stretched. While PPP directors, staff and partners on the ground can be functioning and operating, and a few expressed the quite hurried nature of the work, they often could not link any of their current work towards longer term partnership goals. The farther down the organisation one goes, the more this became evident. As one PPP manager expressed, “I am sure the partners on the ground are busy every day, but I doubt they would consider their work demanding, nor are they really understanding how what they are doing links into the PPP’s goals overall” (PPP Stakeholder InterviewQ).

The other set of dimensions relates to **performance management**, the setting, tracking, reviewing and follow up of partnership performance targets. One overriding finding is that contrary to the often-expressed scepticism, PPP directors rarely felt being pushed by the private-based partners as to what goals or targets to set. Most influence in this respect came from the board, depending on how activist the governing body was. Donors and funders tended to have more influence regarding what indicators or metrics should be tracked, especially as more funding becomes tied to projects (specified activities/work) rather than core (general funding the PPP can allocate as it wishes). While donors often think they are helping by providing metrics, it can become a heavy burden when PPPs have to report on many diverging indicators to satisfy varying needs.

Holding and managing performance dialogues, or discussing performance, is the uniformly lowest scoring dimension across PPPs. This can be considered the third step of performance management: 1) tracking of goals, 2) reviewing performance and 3) discussing the results. Most partnerships failed to hold constructive reviews, and even the better managed partnerships, which had clear goals, articulated metrics and a process of collecting timely updates, fell behind here. PPP directors often noted they did the review themselves and there were not scheduled review times or systems to go over the partner or project-based metrics sent to the CP, outside of annual or biannual board meetings which most PPPs had. As Lilly’s MDR-TB director Patricia Carlevaro; noted, “We can be out there doing or we can

be in here documenting and discussing. We prefer to be out there” (MM Interview13). This is an area worth considering, as so much emphasis is placed on the need for better and timelier metrics by donors, evaluators and practitioners, but these will not add value if constructive dialogues and reviews, involving all relevant staff, are not held within the PPP. As performance management is an iterative process (*Figure 6.11*), weaknesses in the dialogue and review mean PPPs rarely adequately follow through appropriately when metrics are not met; thus consequence management is notably weak in many PPPs.

**Figure 6.11: Performance management system**



**People management:**

When it comes to their people, PPPs are relatively well managed, especially compared to government organisations, but probing deeper reveals some underlying issues. The biggest divergence between hosted and independent PPPs relates to staff evaluation and review systems, as these were often absent in the hosted partnerships where there were little or no performance-based reviews or rewards. A few PPPs that relied on the host’s systems did well here, but usually for these PPPs staff was not fully dedicated to the PPP (their roles were split between the PPP and other roles within the host organisation). It is easy to see how this leads to a lack of commitment and perhaps accountability as well as possibly less incentive to drive the PPP’s work forward.

A few of the independent PPPs have employee systems in place that would rival those of the best performing private sector organisations, including staff/manager goal and target setting, individual targets and accountability, and annual (or more frequent) reviews in place. Interestingly, this is a system that evolved and grew over time in these PPPs, and one that many PPPs are currently developing. IPM, for instance, recently hired a new Vice President of Human Resources (HR) whose role is not to function as an administrative HR, but rather to develop these staff and talent management systems. The GHC and the Global Vaccine Enterprise, among others, are also working towards developing new systems for this. The GHC's director, however, noted that this ran against the standard mentality of the organisation and there will be some staff who do not want to see this (MM Interview3). PPPs that did a form of staff survey or study (even informally) all expressed that staff expressed their desire to have a more involved individual management system.<sup>142</sup> The lack of attention here stems from many factors. One is a claimed lack of resources in staff time; however, while this reason is often expressed, better managed partnerships prioritised this, as they understood the significance of developing and incentivising their staff.

### **Perception versus reality**

Given how significant partnership management is, and that many best practice guidelines are available, why have more partnership managers not committed to improving management? There are many possible explanations and cited constraints, especially the lack of physical and personnel resources. There is another overriding factor, though, which is a prevailing disconnect in most of these institutions. Many directors have a relatively poor perception of the actual management functioning in their organisations. At the end of the interview, partnership managers were asked to self-assess the management of their own institution on a scale of one to ten,<sup>143</sup> and to avoid false modesty, they were asked to exclude their personal performance from the calculation. As shown in **Figure 6.12**, the average PPP manager considers his or her own partnership to be above average. The responses indicate that PPP managers are particularly overoptimistic about their management practices. This resonates with other work that shows no correlation between manager perception and organisational performance (Bloom and Homkes 2008). By this measure, PPPs assess themselves at an average score of 3.75; this is not only well above the average but also


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<sup>142</sup> Instilling these talent management systems resonates with best practice across public and private sector organisations. For work on talent/people management see Ichinowski, Prennushi and Shaw (1997) and Black and Lynch (2001). For an overview of incentives employees desire the most see Bury et al. (2008).

<sup>143</sup> Managers were asked, "Excluding yourself, how well managed do you think the rest of the partnership is on a scale of one to ten; where ten is best practice and five is average?"

uncorrelated with their management score. Not only does this suggest that the managers are not well informed regarding their own management but it also calls into question the multitude of reviews and studies which rely on manager self-response and perceptions.

**Figure 6.12: Self-assessed versus assessed management practice score**



*Source:* Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).

#### **6.4: Explaining differences in management practices**

What drives these differences in management across partnerships? This work identifies a few main factors which seem to drive the majority of these differences: hosted status, level of institutionalisation, partnership size, age and resources. To further probe into the results, this work also ran some simple OLS regressions with the dependent variable of the partnership management score, which examined several variables thought to be important in determining management performance. While the regression results should be interpreted as partial correlations and not as structurally causal, since this work has no mechanism here by which to claim causality, the exhibited relationships between PPP management and these other drivers are certainly worth exploring. Interestingly, many of the same factors found to matter

for management in both the public and private sectors<sup>144</sup> also seem to be at play within PPPs. The unique structuring of partnerships, however, also draws out additional features which also seem to impact the management processes.

#### **6.4.1 Institutional status and structure:**

Institutional structure or lack thereof is one of the strongest factors affecting partnership management. This resonates strongly with this work's findings relating to institutionalisation and outputs, discussed in the next chapter, and also relates to recent work assessing CSD energy-focused partnerships which shows that partnerships will have to be institutionalised to some extent before management matters (Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2010). Since hosted partnerships significantly underperform independent partnerships across all areas of management, this raises the question of whether other factors of institutional design also matter. As mentioned earlier, during the latter half of the interview directors were asked about organisational aspects of the partnership. Pulling in this information as well as that independently collected on the PPP's from the TPD, this section explores factors relating to the Centre Point (CP) status and the level of institutionalisation. While legal structure, legal status and guiding legal and business documents are also considered, as these are aggregated into the level of institutionalisation measure their individual impact was not distinguished.

The CP of the PPPs can take many varied roles, as discussed in the previous chapter, but given the smaller sample size here and for ease of comparison, these are grouped under four headings. While partnerships with a fully functional CHQ outperform all other types (*Figure 6.13*), what also stands out is that partnerships where the CP is independent yet based around a staff/ team rather than a full CHQ or secretariat are the worst managed of those interviewed, and it is the target/performance management which is the weakest for these PPPs.

While one should interpret these findings with caution given the small sample size, what resonates in this type of PPP is generally a lack of concreteness in goals beyond organisational measures (e.g. increase in members or to create a report) or that the goals are driven primarily by one main funding body. On the former, this is frequently heard in independent and membership-based PPPs that rely on dues as well as activities of members - often acting without coordination - to fulfil their work. On the latter point, this generally means that there is little balance across measures and reporting is only done via informal


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<sup>144</sup> These coincide with overriding findings the Management practices project identify, mainly institutional ownership, the impact of competition, MNC status and presence, organisation size and the skill levels of managers and employees as key drivers (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010).



reports to the main funder. What also resonates is that despite the mantra of partnering, without an institutionalised – and to an extent independent – CP, coordination across partners is minimal. When it does occur it is not captured or shared across the organisation. The independent, non-CHQ partnerships often also suffer from either a lack of permanence, a constant search for funds and the need to please the main funder, OR a continual drive to increase membership, as this is a tangible measure of activity.

**Figure 6.13: Management score by PPP Centre Point type**




*Source:* Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).

These institutional-based factors are aggregated into a **level of institutionalisation** and show that of those interviewed, 48% were scaled as high, 29% medium and 23%.<sup>145</sup> It is perhaps unsurprising that those scaled higher are better managed, and this holds across both hosted and independent (*Figure 6.14*). The biggest divergence regards target management, which is expected given that hosted PPPs make up much of the lower levels. For partnerships with the lowest level of institutionalisation, however, a lack of leadership and the articulation of leaders' roles was the biggest weakness. What resonates is that in many of these partnerships, the lack of strong leadership can be associated with a lack of firm commitment to the partnership, and thus management, and often performance, lags. The leaders in these PPPs were often either the sole or one of two or three fulltime committed staff to the PPP, and sometimes even the director was less than 100% time allocated! Often this translated into the PPP becoming more of a project that was part of his or her "real" job rather than a career (passion) in itself. All of the better managed PPPs that were hosted or scaled as lower levels of

<sup>145</sup> This scaling level is introduced in the fourth chapter; see chapter five for the variation across PPPs.

institutionalisation were driven by a leader (or in two instances a small team of leaders) with a strong vision and a commitment to both strategy and operations.

**Figure 6.14: Management score by PPP level of institutionalisation**



*Source:* Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).

There are risks to a PPP being too driven by one leader however, even if this leader inspires and propels the PPPs movement. An interview with the Micronutrient Initiative (MI) surmised this sentiment well: “the irrepensible enthusiast and champion... he lives, sleeps, breathes it. His commitment is total, and infectious..” (MM Interview11). The manager admitted the risk of adopting what Charles Handy refers to as “Zeus-type management” (Handy 1978), so MI is actively working now to avoid this. While the leader’s style certainly drives part of the organisational culture, less institutionalised partnerships can become solely driven by the unique style and expertise and/or preferences of the leader, even if this may mean some decisions are not in the best interest of the PPP. For example, the Global Health Council has two operating sites, one in Washington, DC where the majority of its work takes place and another in Burlington, VT, as the original director was from there and did not want to officially relocate (MM Interview3). As the PPP grew, the structure, styles and staff between these two centers became more difficult to coordinate, something the new director is currently grappling with. Another issue relates to sector-specific leaders who are passionate about the partnerships’ work but not engaged in, or completely removed from, the operations.

As noted in interviews with both the GVA and IDRI, the director was very science-oriented and completely “hands off” from the management and operations of the PPP. In the case of GVA, this meant that the initial structuring and operating of the PPP was a slow process with many ad-hoc decisions made as the director was unfamiliar with the operational-based tasks. Another overriding risk with these less institutionalised partnerships is that regardless of the current leaders’ strength, the PPP can be seen too much as an individual project or passion, which means that when the leader leaves the organisation (or loses interest), the partnership will end. As a manager noted regarding succession planning at the Lily MDR TB Partnership, “MDR TB will end when Patricia [the director] ends her tenure at Lilly...not the other way around” (Stakeholder Interview).

While the trade off between flexibility and becoming more institutionalised is often expressed (Andonova 2006), it seems clear that PPPs with a structured and fully functional CP, rather than just a dedicated team or office, are better managed, and this translates across all areas of management and performance. It is worth returning to the distinction between **hosted and independent**, as what is significant is how much of the management gap is explained by the lack of institutionalisation and how much by the hosted status itself. That is, do partnerships need independence to implement strong management practices or can hosted, more institutionalised PPPs outperform others? While it is difficult to clearly separate these factors, some aspects of being less institutionalised seem to matter regardless of hosted status – such as role and possible lack of leadership or an over-reliance on one main funder or body. For hosted partnerships, the perceived sense of stability within the host (regardless of performance) can translate into little or no long term planning and concrete goal setting. Related is the possibility of disconnect, not necessarily between the host’s and partnership’s goals (this is not frequently expressed), but in the timeframe or significance of the partnership. Being so intertwined with the host can also lead to a lessened sense of accountability. This relates to the other dimension where hosted partnerships performed much worse than the independent: consequence management. That is, hosted partnerships did worse in following through on action plans, instilling processes for identifiable consequences should targets or goals not be met, and dealing with repeated failures.


#### **6.4.2 Partnership factors and management: Size, staff and age**

Partnership factors also explain some of the differences in management, as interesting insights relating to partnership size and structure, staff characteristics and partnership age emerge. It is recognised, however, that many of these relate to the overriding institutional

structure. It is also difficult to fully separate these factors, as one hesitates to include multiple explanatory variables in the same regression given the sample size included in this analysis. The relationships discussed below are therefore the result of basic correlations only, as this work does not attempt to perform multivariable regression or implement multiple controls.

Size clearly matters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, larger partnerships, as measured in terms of full time working staff, are better managed than those with fewer employees (*Figure 6.15*). This finding resonates with CSD partnership studies, which find larger partnerships tend to produce more outputs (Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2010). The main reason for this is that there are certainly fixed costs of instilling good practices, so those larger PPPs benefit from economies of scale. Another explanation often exhibited in the private sector is that well managed organisations will grow larger as they become more successful, that is management conditions size rather than size conditioning management. In order to fully test this relationship for PPPs, one would have to find the same effect even for PPPs who had no ability or incentive to grow, which is difficult to build into this analysis given the sample size and variation in partnerships’ mandates. However, it is assumed that the former effect is more at play as it is not clear how many (or which) PPPs have the incentive to grow larger.

**Figure 6.15: PPP size and management**



*Source:* Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).

While this is somewhat related to the fact that hosted partnerships also tend to be smaller, the relationship between size and management holds even when considering only

independent PPPs. Larger, independent partnerships are also much better managed than their smaller counterparts, and the majority of this difference is driven by larger PPPs outperforming in people management. This pulls in an interesting perspective, as people management is the biggest driver between larger and smaller hosted partnerships, though it is not the main differentiator between independent and hosted partnerships. Larger partnerships tend to have more capacity to reward and incentivise employees and more actively engage staff in promotions and career development prospects, aspects notably lacking in many smaller partnerships.

Another way to consider partnership size is by looking at the number of physical branch sites.<sup>146</sup> Of the PPPs interviewed, approximately 35% had only one branch, 45% had between two and ten branches and 20% had more than 10 branches; hosted and independent partnerships were split rather equitably across these categories. What emerges is that the mid-size PPPs (between two to ten branches) are the best managed, and this holds across both independent and hosted PPPs.

### **Staff and skills:**

While staff size is considered in this analysis, it is a fuzzier concept, as many PPPs struggle to numerate their staff. Varying relationships with branch sites, contractors and other relationships inherent to partnerships complicate this even further. In related management studies, the number of skilled managers and workers clearly mattered for organisations across sectors to be better managed (Homkes 2011). Here skills were difficult to assess as the staff levels at most PPPs were so low that percentages of staff with degrees would not be comparable across PPPs, and the majority of managers in all PPPs' CP held a degree. Thus the brief remarks below are based on qualitative responses from the interviews rather than statistical analysis.

A minimum capacity of dedicated workers, for whom the partnership is their fulltime job, is necessary for management processes to be in place. This is not always the case, as many hosted partnerships have only a few staff members, and often many of these only dedicate a percentage of their time to the PPP. Partnerships with more staff are able to functionally divide work and also implement practices not possible in partnerships with few or no staff. The relationship is not straightforward, however, as there are inherent management complexities and challenges that growing partnerships face.

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<sup>146</sup> Branch sites are defined as core operating sites of the PPP, as defined by the PPP director and would not include the number of contacts or offices where no operations or PPP core activities took place.

A noted clash of cultures is occurring in many of these PPPs, but this is not necessarily between public versus private backgrounds,<sup>147</sup> which is less frequently mentioned as a challenge within PPPs than many believe but rather between the old and the new guard. As partnerships grow, new staff members join; a current trend is for many PPPs to hire more from the private sector, which is due to factors such as the state of the private-sector job market, a growing desire to “do good” by those serving in these institutions and an overall trend towards partnering. These new staff members often come with a “mode of operating” that does not always synch with the founders, many of whom cherished the flexible nature of the original initiative. As partnerships evolve from “start up” phase into maturing organisations, the roles and responsibilities of staff change, the partnership often begins formalising previously ad-hoc processes and new processes are put in place. How the new and growing staff work to implement these changes is a timely and difficult challenge almost all of the PPPs interviewed face.

### **Partnership lifecycle:**

When examining partnership age and management, it is found that while older partnerships tend to outperform their younger counterparts, this effect essentially balances and then diminishes for partnerships over twenty years old.<sup>148</sup> This difference in management score is not statistically significant, which is unsurprising given the complex nature of partnership age and maturing and the many compounding factors at play. Across all PPPs, the area of partner/ operational management is the weakest for youngest partnerships. Many of these are still struggling to articulate roles and responsibilities for partners, have few systems in place for partners to work together and share resources, and have weak, or no, practices ensuring continuous improvement. Interestingly it is the older hosted PPPs who are better managed, but any noticeable disparity in management disappears when examining only independent partnerships.

The midsize partnerships, while slightly better managed than the others, exhibit very divergent management scores, as is to be expected given the difficulties of a maturity transformation. As partnerships grow, they can expand their original goals or targets, such as

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<sup>147</sup> From the interviews, what emerges is that this public or private bias, while less mentioned in terms of partners and power, is frequently mentioned regarding staff mentality; however, partnership directors were diverging on their related commentary, as they span the gamut from noting there is no difference between public and private sectors to several directors commenting very frankly they only look to hire from the private sector given the different perspectives on working mentality.

<sup>148</sup> For PPPs interviewed, approximately 45.2% were less than ten years old; 29% were between ten and twenty years old and 25.8% were more than 20 years old.

the Lily MDR-TB partnership expanding from manufacturing and distributing medicines to actually training the nurses on the ground, or IAVI which broadened its focus beyond research and development of a vaccine to the entire value chain, from research, development (including clinical trials), to advocacy, knowledge and education. The original PPP leader also changes, such as occurred for the GHC and MMV within the interview period time.

During this growing phase, as PPP goals and targets expand, and staff and leaders adjust, the operations are obviously affected – all of which can lead to changes in organisational design. As many PPPs in this mid-phase change from horizontal to hierarchical structures or re-distribute functional responsibilities, the ability to deal with these “growing pains” is managed differently across institutions. Dealing with these is not unique to PPPs, other organisations face similar hurdles. Undergoing organisational change, regardless of size and sector, is difficult, and research shows that only one-third of all performance transformations ultimately succeed (Isern and Pung 2007). Given the state of rapid organisational change PPPs are currently undergoing (over two-thirds of those interviewed referenced being in the midst of such processes), it is quite possible that many of the factors exhibited will have now adjusted.

#### **6.4.3 Competition and Constraints**

If effective management and good performance are tightly linked, how do so many badly managed partnerships survive? If PPPs could easily improve their performance, one would assume they would have done so already, especially if these lessons were so readily available and PPPs were able to pull in resources and lessons from their partners and networks. Partnerships certainly face unusual challenges and diverging operating environments, but one critical element is the perceived lack of competition.<sup>149</sup> Economic theory suggests that competition ensures the survival of only the best-managed firms (organisations) and the elimination of the weak ones: competition thus will spur managers to work more effectively and outlast rivals. Decades of research have also shown that business protected by government regulation or private-based firms that do not face competition are almost always less productive (Lewis 2004).

This effect cannot be adequately tested, as most PPPs do not perceive they face any real competition. Directors tend to express that PPPs embody collaboration and not competition, but for many this sentiment goes further: many directors noted that not only is

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<sup>149</sup> Competition is one of the biggest drivers associated with better management in both the private and public organisations, based upon related work from which this management methodology is based, but this is difficult to assess across PPPs (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; Homkes 2011).

there little or no competition, an unsettling majority articulated that they are the “only ones who do what [we] do.” This is significant as despite these expressed notions, the mapping from the TPD, the interviews for this chapter and related work (Widdus 2005; Carlson 2004) all suggest otherwise. There are many PPPs in the same space, in similar functions, geographies and fields – often with identical funders and board members.

### **Management constraints:**

Directors were also asked what aspects were most impacting the management of their partnerships;<sup>150</sup> it emerged that country-level systems and geographic constraints are just as much of a constraint for PPP directors as funding (*Figure 6.16*). It is interesting that almost half of PPP managers expressed that dealing with demanding, unclear or burdensome country level systems was a major constraint complicating the management of their partnership and slightly over a third expressed that political systems specifically were a major constraint. Numerous studies have assessed PPP’s country-specific performance recently (McKinsey 2005; Biesma et al. 2009), often in a negative light - an issue this work has returned to in most chapters given the critical significance of system-wide effects. The degree to which PPP managers were aware of the particulars of their partnerships’ operations and eventual reach and country systems must be noted. However, they often lack the capacity, resources, knowledge and often expertise in dealing with these country-level systems. Ultimately it is the uncertainty surrounding developing countries’ changing policies and guidelines that managers feel impact them the most, as this translates into delayed projects, which can lead to delayed planning, timeframe adjustment and inability to meet shorter-term donor targets.

It is also striking, but perhaps refreshing, that no PPP identified the technological environment and/or access to scientific knowledge as a major constraint, even those PPPs focused on narrowly defined science and technology, research or development. Regarding the ability to find and hire staff with the right skills, it is interesting that hosted and independent partnerships expressed almost identical sentiments: around 32% expressed that this was a major constraint and 46% a minor constraint. These overriding percentages may mask some fundamental underlying differences. One possible explanation, based upon manager responses is characteristics of the job market, as following the global recession of 2008-2009 there were many more seekers than jobs especially in the US, Europe and UK, and this provided PPPs with a high quality talent pool.

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<sup>150</sup> Questions on constraints asked at the end to prevent biasing previous responses.



Beyond manager perceptions of constraints, this work also performed regressions of the responses from the constraints questions against the PPP's managerial score.<sup>151</sup> While the relationship is not statistically significant, there is a slight effect where in partnerships that feel constrained are better managed than those that feel no or only minor constraints.<sup>152</sup> There are a few possible explanations for this. Well-managed PPPs may be more likely to strive for improvement so felt more constrained on average. As the overall results were rather weak, this is not probed further.

A rather robust finding, however, is that those PPPs that identified economic constraints (as distinguished from funding and donors specifically) have significantly better scores (*Figure 6.17*), and this holds across both hosted and independent partnerships. While these results cannot imply causality, there are certainly a few plausible factors at play. Partnership managers not under economic pressure may not be incentivised or pushed to implement more efficient and effective management processes. Another hypothesis is that managers more in tune with the overriding economic environment, and how this will impact their partnerships' operations and performance, have made the necessary improvements in their own management infrastructure. This is certainly an area worth probing in future work.<sup>153</sup>


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<sup>151</sup> A major obstacle is categorized as “2”, a minor as a “1” and no obstacle as a zero. This is arbitrary, but similar results were obtained using more sophisticated techniques.

<sup>152</sup> This is not a trivial result, as recent work on manufacturing firms shows that well-managed firms are less likely to be constrained (Homkes 2011).

<sup>153</sup> Examining these other constraints against partnership-specific management showed interesting coefficients, these did not prove robust to changing the regression specification.


**Figure 6.16 Perception of constraints impacting management**



*Source: Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).*

*Source: Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).*

**Figure 6.17 Management performance score by severity of economic constraints**



*Source: Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).*

### **Funding and physical resources:**

It is often said, and even more commonly assumed, that partnerships with more resources will be better performers,<sup>154</sup> yet while a sufficient funding and resource base is necessary for PPPs to survive, more resourced partnerships are not always better managed. Many hosted PPPs actually had a fairly consistent funding stream, and while this provides a sense of security for current or near-term PPP operations, it also translates into factors that may negatively impact management. One overriding finding is how dedicated host funding can impact target management, as it can lead to lessened goal setting beyond the current funding cycle. This mentality also leads to a lack of long term evaluations or impact studies. Dedicated or consistent funding can also generally mean relying on a sole donor or core funder (often, but not always, the host organisation), which means PPP managers are often conflicted between managing the partnership as an institution and managing the partnership as a project fulfilling more host-specific aims.

One can also examine whether it is the perception of funding constraint (rather than overall level of resources) which impacts management. This is considered using information from the manager constraints questions. While regressing average partnership management score against perceived funding constraints shows no correlation, a significant finding emerges when considering status of PPPs. At least among hosted PPPs, funding constraints seem correlated with better overall management. Further, certain areas of management were more or less affected by this perceived constraint. Excluding Eli Lilly, it also appears that funding constraints correlate with significantly higher operational scores for hosted PPPs. While the same relationship holds for independent PPPs, the coefficient is smaller and not significant.

For hosted PPPs there is also a positive correlation between target management and perceived funding constraints, but this is slightly less significant than that for operations. There is no correlation between target management and funding constraints for independent PPPs. Hosted PPPs that perceive funding to be a major constraint are better managed than those that perceive no constraints on funding. This echoes our earlier discussion: partnerships that are not incentivized to show performance, attract donors or funders or plan beyond funding cycles are not as well managed as others. That the link with operations management is even stronger is also interesting, as it means that these more constrained partnerships do

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<sup>154</sup> It must be noted this is an issue given that this management survey occurred in the midst and immediately following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, which impacted donors and funders from both sectors during this timeframe. While this will be reflected in resource levels (from outputs) the ability to manage a resource strategy is the aspect discussed in this chapter.

much better at aspects of partner management, partner collaboration and continuous improvement.

## **6.5: Governance, autonomy and other findings**

Organisational aspects, mainly related to governance and decision making, PPP characteristics and the nature of the executive and management bodies are also considered. This information is combined with that in TPD-Outputs to study the possible relationships between partnership governance, autonomy and decision making on the one hand with partnership management on the other.

### **6.5.1 Partnership autonomy**

This work assessed the relative autonomy of the PPP and PPP managers across two levels: a) autonomy from host or funders and b) within the PPP entity, i.e. where within the partnership decision making took place. A set of eight questions grouped in four areas were asked: strategic changes, operational changes, staffing decision and budget decisions. These were then aggregated into an overall autonomy score for the partnerships (see *AppendixH*), whereas the higher the number on a one to five scale, the more autonomous the partnership.

As expected, independent partnerships are much more autonomous than those that are hosted across all four dimensions considered (*Table 6.3*). For independent partnerships, the PPP entity makes the majority of all decisions relating to operations and staffing, but the main partners/funders have more of a say in strategic elements. Internally, these independent PPPs are relatively autonomous when it comes to operational decisions and staffing, but there is a greater extent of board involvement in strategic elements and budgeting. For hosted PPPs, while the entity retains most of the decision making ability regarding staffing, they rely almost completely on the host for all strategic and budgeting/funding decisions. Across both types of partnerships, the higher the level of institutionalisation, the greater the degree of autonomy the PPP entity and PPP operations team both have. Older partnerships also tend to be much more autonomous than their younger counterparts.

What is of greater interest is if there is a relationship between PPP/ manager autonomy and PPP-specific management, especially as in related works, organisations that gave their managers more autonomy are much better managed and also better performers.<sup>155</sup> While more autonomous partnerships are much better managed, the difficulty with

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<sup>155</sup> For more on organisational design, autonomy and management practices, especially as this relates to performance, see Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen 2009.

partnership-specific analysis is that the disparity between independent and hosted autonomy is so great, that it is difficult to tease out specific factors related only to autonomy.

**Table 6.3 Partnership autonomy specifications and scores**

**Note.** Assessed on a one to five scale, whereas one is the least autonomy (Decision making ability) and five is the most.

	All PPPs	Independent PPPs	Hosted PPPs
How would the decision to institute a strategic change / shift take place?	4.46	4.71	3.71
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the above, who within the PPP makes that decision?	2.67	3	1.71
How would the decision to change / expand current operations or programs?	4.53	5	3.28
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the above, who within the PPP makes that decision?	3.72	4.1	2.5
How would decisions about key staffing decisions take place?	4.4	5	2.5
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the above, who within the PPP makes that decision?	3.83	4.15	2.25
How would decisions regarding funding and budget decisions take place?	4.27	5	1.83
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the above, who within the PPP makes that decision?	3.1	3.17	2.5

### 6.5.2 Governance and decision making structures


Types of governance forums were grouped into broader categories of Board, Committee, Council or Other, and while overall those with a board of directors are still better managed, when implementing a control for hosted/independent this relationship largely disappears. One resounding finding is that those PPPs governed by a board of directors (rather than any other governing forums) have higher total management scores; this holds across both hosted and independent PPPs (**Figure 6.18**).

PPP with a board of directors also have much higher autonomy scores than others, and this holds across both independent and hosted PPPs. This relationship of type of main governance forum to autonomy remains strong even with the second specification, but here there is a more nuanced finding. The main story emerging is that while governance forum does not relate too strongly to autonomy for independent PPPs, hosted PPPs that have a Board of Directors will be significantly more autonomous than those that rely on committees, councils or more informal governance forums.

### Governing bodies:

This work also considers the number of governing bodies in place. For example, many research-based partnerships will have a board of governors (focused on strategic issues) and a technical advisory committee (focused solely science, research or technological aspects). Other PPPs may have a board and an executive council or specifically-focused advisory committee. Across the PPPs interviewed, 71% of the hosted PPPs had only one body, 14% two, and only one (CGIAR), had more than three bodies with four total. Of the independent, 32% had one layer, 53% had two, and 16% had three bodies.

**Figure 6.18: Management performance score by government forum**



*Source: Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).*

What emerges from this basic analysis is that the number of governing bodies is significantly correlated to overall management score.<sup>156</sup> Regressing PPP average management score on number of bodies show a highly significant and strong correlation.<sup>157</sup> While this relationship holds across both hosted and independent PPPs, it is difficult to go much farther as the majority of the hosted PPPs had only one main governance body.

### Decision making split

Regarding sectoral split, a slight majority (51.62%) of the interviewed PPPs had tri-sectoral decision making.<sup>158</sup> Though for hosted PPPs only one-third had a tri-sectoral split on the main forum while approximately 60% of the independent PPPs did. Regressing decision making split against management, PPPs that have tri-sectoral decision making are much better

<sup>156</sup> CGIAR is excluded from this analysis given it was an outlier with four layers.

<sup>157</sup> The regression coefficient is .46 and significant at the 5% level.

<sup>158</sup> By definition all sampling frame PPPs have a tri-sectoral partner base.

managed than those that are not. While this does not imply causality, the relationship represents an interesting finding, though as a note, other categories had too few PPPs to regress separately. A few further regressions are run to test if this relationship is simply the result of correlation between tri-sector decision making and hosted status. Further tests showed that while hosted PPPs are less likely to have tri-sectoral decision making, this is not significant. Another regression looked at management against both tri- sectoral decision making and being hosted, and while the tri-sector decision-making coefficient is less significant, it still had the appropriate sign (the lower significance is likely due to the loss of degrees of freedom and small sample size). These results further suggest that tri-sectoral split is correlated to better management, independent of host status. While decision-making split is strongly correlated with greater levels of autonomy for hosted PPPs, the sectoral split of the governing decision makers does not seem to have a significant effect on the autonomy scores for independent PPPs.

### 6.5.3 Other findings

The nature and depth of these interviews allowed for many additional factors of partnership-based variation to be considered. While these proved interesting, however, either the sample size of PPPs was too low or the correlations were not significant enough to draw anything more than initial insights.

While it may be assumed that partnerships that have been **subject to evaluation** may be better managed, this is not clearly demonstrated here. While PPPs with at least one evaluation in the past three years were better managed, there is no significant relationship between evaluation and management. However, if one considers only independent PPPs, there is a more evident relationship between number of evaluations and management score. This is likely due to the smaller sample of hosted PPPs and the fact that half of these PPPs had been evaluated at least once. No hosted PPPs reported having more than one evaluation.<sup>159</sup>

From a qualitative perspective, one overriding factor resonating from the PPPs was the varied degree of significance afforded to the results of these evaluations within the partnership. Those that had actionable, non conflicting and clear recommendations were more likely to be taken up than others, and some directors even went as far as to not publish results

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<sup>159</sup> The information on evaluations is taken from the interviews rather than TPD-Outputs, as some PPPs had undergone an evaluation that was not publically available, no longer posted on the website or never publically released. To be considered within this, however, the PPP manager had to report an official, independent evaluation. No PPP manager reported an evaluation they were not willing to send, with the exception of DNDI who commissioned an evaluation yet determined not to release it and two other partnerships who noted the evaluation findings were available only to members.


if they felt it did not resonate with the partnership. CGIAR is an example of a PPP which has been under numerous evaluations and commissioned reviews, but these were often considered by some to be “fragmented, conflicting and confusing” (MM Interview39); thus, little change occurred. Only in 2010 did a leader within it note he felt that there would be actual, value-added changes made, as for the first time the process was streamlined, centers were actively involved and recommendations were clear to all involved.

Finally, at the end of the interview, partnership directors were also asked in summation whether they felt that trends **promoting global partnerships to solve global problems** was getting easier, more difficult or staying around the same. As shown in *Figure 6.19*, the majority of PPP directors were optimistic about the future of the partnering environment. Hosted PPP directors were much more optimistic, as all noted it was getting better or at least staying the same. A disconnect emerged however tied to sector areas rather than institutional variables. Partnerships focused on energy, renewable energy and/or resources, felt the environment was improving given the heightened attention, significance and resultant donor dollars going into these fields. Similar sentiments were expressed by the directors of sustainability and climate-related PPPs, one who noted that “there is increasing global unhappiness with current climate and a look towards solutions such as ours,” as “all the relevant parties (public, private and social) need to be at the table or progress will never be made” (MM Interview23). As another director summarised, “While the environment is more pushing and dialogue tougher; there are more roads to Rome now: partnerships are the continued way forward (MM Interview47).”

On the other hand, though many of the PDPs have been evaluated as relatively effective (Moran et al. 2005), it was these directors who were more sceptical about the future of global partnering. As Zeda Rosenberg, CEO of IPM noted, “This is driven by economic factors, though... the PPPs themselves are doing their job, doing it really well... We’ve got drugs in the pipeline that would otherwise never have been there...But how do you maintain funding if ministries of development are in such a tough climate – we cannot get the needed political support (MM Interview19).” Another frequently expressed sentiment related to the economic conditions of 2008-2010, as this was affecting the amount of donor funds available and even the private sector partners’ interest in partnering (MM Interview16). The majority of the independent partnerships, however, felt that while the partnering environment was getting more favourable, PPPs were no longer considered a new idea or passing fad. Almost all acknowledged the ever-growing pressure to deliver.



**Figure 6.19: PPP directors assessment of global partnering situation**



*Source: Data from 50 PPP Management interviews as of June 2010; interviews represent one interview per PPP at the director level thus avoiding over accounting for certain partnerships (33 PPPs).*

## 6.6 Key findings, implications and conclusions

This chapter has explored the management practices of the global partnerships and made significant inroads into measuring and comparing management within and across global PPPs. While many studies have examined PPPs on an individual basis, or suggested guides and toolkits for best practice, few works are guided by a systematic methodology, especially one applicable across partnerships. Moving forward, the management methodology presented here stands to contribute as it allows for a comprehensive assessment, replicable across types of PPPs as well as within PPPs across time, regardless of sector, function or host.

While there is variation across the PPPs, trends still emerge. Independent partnerships are much better managed than hosted, and most of this difference is due to the hosted PPPs' weakness in target management. There is also an evidenced disconnect between goals, timeframes and accountability, all issues that could be impacting partnerships performance.

From a global perspective, several key drivers of management quality have been demonstrated to matter across organisations, and many of these are evident in the PPP data. Although one should be careful of over-interpreting these correlations, these findings suggest that levels of institutionalisation, independence, timeframe, governance and partnership leadership all clearly matter in explaining some of the differences in management practices across PPPs. When considering these institutional variables, those that are more institutionalised, regardless of hosted or independent status, are better managed, perform better across all dimensions, plan clearly for the future with concrete goals and set milestones, and hence can better motivate their staff to further innovate and improve. Better managed partnerships also employed more full time staff who had higher levels of engagement with the

partnership work – both strategically *and* operationally. Governance and decision making structures, and the representative voices represented on these bodies, also seem to play a role.

What also emerges from this work is the lack of partner engagement within these institutions: despite the continued emphasis on partnerships and partnering, the majority of the actual workings of these institutions came from the coordination and direction of the staff. These are significant issues, which obviously affect not only our normative understanding of partnerships but empirical approaches to assessing them; concerns which will be returned to in this work's concluding chapter.

## **CHAPTER 7: Partnership performance and effects: Analysing partnership outputs**

While the partnership rhetoric may be firmly recognized within the global problem-solving dialogue, a consensus that public-private partnerships are effective at meeting and addressing these challenging global issues is far from established. Considerable attention is increasingly turning to the external effects of partnerships, especially in the areas of sustainable development (Hale and Mauzerall 2004; Andonova and Levy 2003) and health (Caines 2005). Yet, despite this growing focus on partnership effects (Van Tulder and Fortanier 2009), less effort has focused on explaining and quantifying the effects of global partnerships at large. Yet if partnerships are to live up to their promise that they are “greater than the sum of its parts and about creating lasting and meaningful impact at all levels of action” (Global Knowledge Partnership Secretariat 2008) than evidence which transcends individual partnerships is needed.

This work makes substantial inroads in tackling this challenge directly, and the focus in this chapter turns to presenting and analysing these tracked effects. Combined this work’s **Transnational Partnership Database (TPD)** and two sub databases: **TPD-Goals** and **TPD-Outputs** (these latter two are more detailed than the TPD but limited to the sampling frame of approximately 150 ITPs) represent the first and only works which collect, track and analyse mission and goals set (**Goals**) and comparable organisational outputs (**Outputs**) across global PPPs. Information and data comes primarily from this work’s comprehensive databases, but the findings and analysis of the study are complemented with discussion based on this work’s fifty PPP management interviews (MM).<sup>160</sup>

This chapter first briefly reintroduces the evaluation framework and the sampling frame of ITPs<sup>161</sup> that undergo detailed analysis. The subsequent section reviews the goals and targets set by these transnational PPPs, especially as to how they are defined along the lines of outputs, outcomes and impacts. The following sections explore PPPs roles towards problem solving by reviewing and analysing findings from the output analysis. The next section returns to the question of evaluation by detailing the existing attempts of PPPs towards both internal and external performance review and evaluation while the final section provides summary remarks.

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<sup>160</sup> These interviews were a valuable source of information, providing additional perspectives on these findings, but this work takes care to limit any discussion based on this information to chapter subparts in so the quantitative, effect-focused results are presented first without muddling the two.

<sup>161</sup> For the remainder of this chapter, all analysis and percentages are given so for the sampling frame, unless otherwise stated.


## 7.1 Evaluation Framework and Partnerships of Focus

As explained, this work introduces and utilises a framework to guide the systematic comparison and evaluation of global PPPs. Frameworks are useful tools to guide the analytical process itself, and they also enhance the understanding of the findings for a larger stakeholder community. While consensus on the level of detail or even the necessity of applying a common framework will not be reached, this work applies a developed framework that is purposely simultaneously broad enough to be relevant across the universe of global PPPs while still capturing the relevant components to guide meaningful analysis.

### 7.1.1 Framework components

Given the subjective nature of many aspects of partnership analysis, the often lacking and rather disjointed nature of the information available, and varying perspectives on where certain aspects of partnership characteristics and activities fall within the framework's categories,<sup>162</sup> the relationship between inputs, processes and effects will often be blurred. As mentioned when the framework was introduced, though these aspects are presented in this sequenced order, the flow from inputs to processes to effects should not be seen as a stepped succession but rather a relationship – a continual process of feedback loops, which continually reinforce and work with (or against) the other aspects (*Figure 7.1*).


**Figure 7.1 Evaluation Framework Overview**



<sup>162</sup> As examples, resources, governance and decision making could arguably fall into either inputs or outputs, as could the activities associated with them. Throughout this chapter, attempts are made to clarify when aspects cut across components.

The focus of this chapter is the latter elements, effects. This work analyses the notion of partnership effects, which can be operationalised, rather than the more subjective notion of effectiveness and further segments this component into partnership effects of goal attainment and problem solving (*Figure 7.2*). The first aspect involves the goals PPPs have set out for themselves, and this work produces the *TPD- Goals database*, which tracks mission, visions and goals set as well as their segmentation (output, outcome or impact focused). The second component considers effectiveness as problem solving, which this work operationalises into effects segmented into outputs, outcomes and impacts. For reasons articulated in previous chapters, the majority of the focus is limited to outputs. Outputs are further distinguished into organisational outputs and performance outputs, the former of which are tracked in this work's *TPD-Outputs*. Organisational outputs are those tangible effects partnerships produce as institutions – regardless of the functional or sectoral focus of the PPP.

**Figure 7.2: Effectiveness segmentation**




### 7.1.2 Sampling frame PPPs

While much of the attributes of the universe of PPPs are presented in the fifth chapter, the focus turns to the sampling frame of Institutionalised, Transnational Partnerships (ITPs)<sup>163</sup> and an analysis of partnership effects. What is a critical, and a distinguishing feature of this work, is that the sampling frame is not chosen due to its sectoral focus, main function or key actor(s) involved. As instantly becomes clear, it is also not selected due to ease of availability of information or public awareness of the initiative. Instead, these ITPs are all initiatives within the defined universe of PPPs with a tri-sectoral actor base, transnational scope and

<sup>163</sup> Tri- sectoral transnational partnerships are defined as being 1) tri-sectoral, in that they engage at least one actor from the public, private and social sector, 2) transnational, in that their operations span more than one country and the actors involved join across several countries or regions, and 3) focused on a global public policy goal.

global policy goal. Of the universe of approximately 750 defined global PPPs, this sampling frame includes 220 PPPs,<sup>164</sup> 148 of which are operational as of December 2010.<sup>165</sup> Purposely narrowing the sampling frame, this allows a deep probe into multiple areas of PPPs that share these global-based characteristics. Before considering PPP effects, it is useful to understand what comprises this group (See **Table 7.1** for summary statistics). As per the framework, this involves considering **focus** (*scope, function and sectoral coverage*), **attributes** (*age, location, organisational*) and **institutional design and level of institutionalisation**. As introduced in chapter five, the functional breakdown of the ITPs of focus roughly mirrors that of the universe overall, as per **Figure 7.3** below.

**Figure 7.3 Functional breakdown, Sampling Frame**



Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011

The final descriptive area is **governance and decision making (GDM)** variables. These challenge the framework to some extent, as the related variables fall across it: inputs as the characteristics of the structures and systems; processes as to the practices and activities that take place within the PPP and outputs in that the partnership produces a structured, transparent, accountable and effective governance system.

<sup>164</sup> During the final TPD updating process, as PPPs changed status and codes and more information was uncovered, it was discovered that 177 (operational) PPPs should fall within the sampling frame; however, the analysis here is limited to the original 147 PPPs as of 31 March 2011.

<sup>165</sup> For purposes of the discussion on outputs, only the operational PPPs are analysed as not enough information is available on those not operating to lead any meaningful discussion.

**Table 7.1: Characteristics of Sampling Frame**

<b>Area</b>	<b>Characteristics of Sampling Frame</b>
<b>Scope</b>	Global by definition
<b>Function</b>	<i>See Figure 7.3</i>
<b>Launch date/ age</b>	Majority launched between 2000-2004
<b>Organisational</b>	Average 3 operational sites; approx 70% have staff in place at the CP, average being 26 FTEs
<b>Location</b>	90% based in OECD country
<b>Sectoral base</b>	Tri-sectoral by definition
<b>Status</b>	55% are hosted, mainly within the UN
<b>Scale of institutionalisation</b>	26.5% are scaled high; 39.5% medium and 34% low

Source: *TPD-Outputs, 2011*

### **7.2: Partnership goals: Analysing PPPs' objectives**

A challenging, ambitious and perhaps daunting global array of problems faces these global PPPs; however, with their flexible natures and unique ability to bring together various actors and expertise, this is an agenda that many claim global partnerships are most ready to tackle. Still, not only does the nature and focus of these aims vary greatly across partnerships, but so does their level of ambition. The PPPs included within the TPD all aim for the provision of collective goods, many in areas of limited statehood (Risse and Lehmkuhl 2006), but there is marked diversity across these partnerships, especially as to clarity, focus, scale and intensity of the aims.

The ability to achieve goals and meet objectives continues to be a pressing topic of concern in partnership evaluations and the wider partnership dialogue. While obviously a critical focus of PPP evaluation – and even more so a focus of funders– to assess progress made towards these goals requires first understanding what the PPPs set out to achieve. Despite the repeated mantra that global partnerships address problems individual actors cannot tackle alone (Reinicke and Deng 2000), few works specifically address this fundamental piece on a partnership-by-partnership basis.

Further, while the majority of reviews speak towards the necessity of assessing and considering outputs, outcomes and impacts (OED 2002; Lele et al. 2004), PPPs are not always strong in articulating how their goals vary along these lines. Some donors or agencies require

that PPPs do so; for example, all that employ Operations Evaluation Department (OED)<sup>166</sup> criteria articulate across the three, yet reviews admit that these are still relatively new ideas for many PPPs (OED 2004), and most non OED-based evaluations also do not analyse goals across these segmentations. More fundamentally, few works take the necessary first step of assessing what objectives are set. The emerging body of World Bank evaluations based in its Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), health partnership reviews and case studies (Vollmer 2009)<sup>167</sup> are exceptions, but these are limited to specific sets of partnerships (see, for example, Liese and Beisheim 2011)

Thus while no work attempts to systematically understand how goals set and articulated vary across PPPs, partnership research and evaluation is missing a critical link. Such analysis is needed to understand how the missions, goals and objectives set relate to the issues at hand. It also moves dialogue forward from an established rhetoric that PPPs strive towards global goods provision (Benner, Reinicke and Witte 2002; Haas 2004) and are results-oriented (Malena 2004) to assessing what PPPs are actually setting out to do. Establishing, or even speaking towards, global partnerships' ability to meet objectives set obviously depends on the sound understanding of what these goals are and how they vary. By exploring how PPPs articulate their objectives, this work carries out systematic study of PPPs' visions, mission and goals, which involves analysing both the articulated visions and missions and also detailing goals set and their segmentation into outputs, outcomes and/or impacts. While there is often no clear distinction, for most partnerships a focus can be distinguished, and many attempt towards all three.

### **7.2.1 Vision and Mission statements: Aims of global PPPs**

Forward-looking, meaningful, inspiring – all of these characteristics are said to encapsulate effective **vision statements**, in both the private and public sector. In general, the vision should communicate what the partnership is attempting to achieve, its purpose or reason for being. Especially considering global partnerships are supposedly created to meet identified yet currently unmet needs, it is expected that the majority of PPPs will have vision statements.

Ideally, well-articulated visions should not only communicate what aims the partnership is trying to meet, but also what makes it unique, that is, how it as a PPP -given its

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<sup>166</sup> The OED is an independent unit within the World Bank, and it reports directly to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors.

<sup>167</sup> See, among others, the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group at <http://go.worldbank.org/3AS9R002M0> or the Global Health Case Study Initiative at <http://www.casestudiesforglobalhealth.org/>.



values, partners and benefits - stand apart. This latter aspect of a vision statement is much harder to discern from PPPs' published information and is rarely articulated. This is surprising, as it should be seen as a critical piece of information PPPs wish to communicate – the reason for aiming towards this vision *as a partnership* rather than actors alone. What is also less well communicated is what strengths the PPPs encompass on a comparative basis or what the PPP provides as unique added value. That is, to solve the problem at hand, the joint collaboration of the private, public and social sectors is not only needed but may be the only way to solve the problem. Global PPPs are to be continually promoted, then not only should they have an effective means of governance (regardless of the definition of effectiveness used), but they may also be called upon to show that they were superior to existing institutions and actors. If this is not even expressed at the onset, it seems even more difficult to find this exemplified in practice.<sup>168</sup>

While vision statements should communicate key information to the institutions' stakeholders and broader community, their significance can be overstated, especially if PPPs spend time setting out an inspiring vision that could probably never actually be achieved. This could either lock partnerships' into commitments they cannot fulfil or eventually be demotivating if no progress is seen. Visions *should* provide direction and be challenging though attainable; in essence, the vision can be seen as a statement of what the PPP would consider *ultimate* success or how it envisions the ideal-type future. Often the partnership's vision will closely mirror its intended impact, despite the fact that achieving these in full is most likely considered impossible by the majority.

**Mission statements** are similar to visions in that they should provide direction, communicate purpose of being and focus the PPPs' partners, staff and stakeholders. Missions are generally more specific, aim or goal oriented; for example, if the vision is the horizon (e.g. a malaria-free world) then the mission is how the PPP aims to take us there (e.g. research, bring a drug to market and/or access). A strong vision statement will not change abruptly with leadership change, funder change or changing circumstances; visions are ideal-world scenarios whereas missions are the guiding aims and principles. As such, missions are generally more mid to long term in nature; thus, the mission can – and does – change more frequently than a vision. (See **Table 7.2** exemplifications of visions and missions).

PPP's mission should clearly communicate its objectives and also provide a sense of the path it will take to get there. There are ranging views on whether or not partnerships need

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<sup>168</sup> Many PPP directors expressed these sentiments during the MM interviews, but this is much less articulated/ documented across the universe.

consensus regarding the desired aims and path set to get there – that is, is there a necessity for PPP-wide buy-in regarding both the process as a *means* to the end and/ or the desired end results themselves? For instance, Zadek (2001) argues that as long as the mandates and mechanisms are in place to deliver on the partners' individual aims then the respective partners do not need to share common interests or goals. It is also argued that strong mission statements should be inclusive, collaborative exercises; the setting of which should be seen as a process in itself. This can be seen as needed to ensure the PPP belongs to all its stakeholders, not just the leadership team, or even worse the funders and/or donors.

What also emerges is while there is often an overriding vision or mission for the PPP, the partners' individual missions for involvement could vary. For example partners may be united around the vision and ultimate desired impact but be personally motivated by varying aims, such as research, publication or a positive public image for themselves. This may be the case in terms of many research-focused PPPs, especially in the health field, where varying motivations regarding drug development, intellectual property (IP) and eventual distribution may guide the varying partners to work together (Nwaka and Ridley 2003; Widdus 2005). Another perspective is that though “overarching mission of the partnership needs to be agreed partners will rarely share a common vision though of how to get there” (Caplan et al. 2007, 6), which is to say that while partners share a common aim for the PPP they may also have varying perspectives on the right path to take to reach this. This could influence the workings of the PPP if the partners set out to work together to achieve the PPPs' goals yet have varying ideas of the way to do this. These issues matter, especially as many argue the partnering collaboration itself should be considered an outcome for the partners involved (El Ansari et al. 2001).

**Table 7.2: PPP mission and vision examples**

PPP Name	Vision	Mission
<b>Global Water Partnerships</b>	<i>The Global Water Partnership's vision is for a water secure world</i>	<i>The Global Water Partnership aims to support the sustainable development and management of water resources at all levels</i>
<b>Youth Business International</b>	<i>Youth Business International's vision is that youth enterprise is recognised as a vital part of efforts to create employment and stimulate economic growth throughout the world</i>	<i>Youth Business International aims to champion youth enterprise by growing a global network which provides young people with the opportunity to start their own business</i>
<b>Roll Back Malaria (RBM)</b>	<i>RBM's vision is of a world free from the burden of malaria</i>	<i>The RBM Partnership aims to implement coordinated action against malaria. It mobilizes for action and resources and forges consensus among partners</i>

Source: TPD: GOALS, 2011

### 7.2.2 Key findings

Findings from TPD-Goals show while PPPs overwhelmingly made their missions clear less did so while also articulating a vision statement (*See Appendix E for full set of ITPs missions and visions*). Slightly over one-third of the PPPs (36%) have identifiable visions while all articulated a mission statement. Interestingly, just under half of independent PPPs articulated visions while less than one-third of hosted PPPs did so. It was less frequent to articulate a vision for capacity building, operational or policy focused PPPs, while the majority of PPPs with functions related to standard setting and information exchange/transfer could clearly articulate the institution's vision. Interestingly, PPPs that were hosted by the World Bank all tended to articulate both visions and missions while less than one-third of PPPs registered with the CSD did.

At first this is somewhat surprising given that a broad global agenda and overarching aims motivate many PPPs, but there are a few likely explanations. It could speak to the more focused, operational or task-oriented mission of many PPPs, yet as this work discusses below there is less done regarding tracking progress towards performance-based, operational tasks. Alternatively this simply stem from lack of clear communication and articulation. Probing more, a few PPPs noted a vision by project but not for the PPP overall, such as the Agricultural Risk Management Team or the World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH). The role of these forward looking visions was remarkably similar across the

universe as they were generally a statement of an ideal-type future. Almost two-thirds of partnerships expressed the word “world” in their vision statements; for example “A world free from malaria” (Malaria Vaccine Initiative), “A world free of hidden hunger” (Micronutrient Initiative), “A world free from blinding trachoma” (International Trachoma Initiative (ITI)) or “Our vision is a world where everyone will have equitable access to high quality diagnosis” (Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND)).

For the majority (over 95%) the mission statement referred specifically to what the PPP aims to do. While missions should also ideally note what makes the PPP, or its approach, unique, this was rarely articulated. What does emerge, however, is that less than 20% of the PPPs articulate the partnering, partnership or collaborative aspect as part of their mission. As an example of ones that do, the ITI aims to eliminate blinding trachoma by 2020 through managing the Zithromax donation and “collaborating with partners for the implementation of the full SAFE strategy<sup>169</sup>” and the Micronutrient Initiative, which “aims to develop, implement and monitor innovative, cost-effective and sustainable solutions for hidden hunger, in partnership with others.” For another subset, rather than one vision that unified the entire PPP, the different agencies or partner groups involved had different missions. The common vision was in a sense rather short-sighted, in that it was an idea to produce mutual gains; thus it could be considered that these have a less of a vision and more of a rationale.

On a methodological note, while it is assumed that more PPPs would articulate their visions if explicitly asked, the main sources of annual report, main documents and website, did not communicate a clear vision for half of these PPPs. This analysis is slightly complicated, though, as many PPPs note a statement that may alter slightly from the definitions and discussion noted above. In all cases this work defers to what the PPP claims, so if a PPP states a “vision” or “mission,” it is tracked as such, even if the language would be more fitting with an ideal vision or mission. In the process of this work, it is found that when only one statement is articulated it was in all cases more fitting as a mission and noted as such.

While published statements build the TPD-Goals database, the MM interviews with PPPs on management also garner valuable information that can supplement these. Drawing briefly on these perspectives, it emerged that while visions could generally be quickly “rattled off” or cited, only in a few instances were these seen as critical, motivational or more than a standard/set statement. Certain PPP directors referred this interviewer to the website or document, saying they were “sure it was on there somewhere” (MMInterview45) while on the other hand, for others, it truly resonated that the common vision drove not only the staff’s

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<sup>169</sup> <http://www.trachoma.org/>

main motivations – on a daily basis – but also every decision the PPP made. For many, the director noted vision equals the mission for this PPP. Further, while visions and missions should ideally transcend the current individual leader, many global PPPs are tied so tightly to their current director or leader, that the individual versus institutional vision cannot be easily separated. For example, Brian Castelli, Executive Vice President of the Alliance to Save Energy notes “The president is very involved in the direction we go... the rest of us implement...” (MM Interview22). Finally, there is divergence in how visions are articulated across PPPs, even those in similar areas. For example, while some are broadly aiming or reaching, such as the Global Vaccine Alliance, a few are very specific, as Pamela Norick from IPM noted: “We’re a one-trick pony: HIV prevention for women” (MM Interview18).

### **7.2.3 Goal segmentation: Summary of findings**

While the critical goal setting *process* PPPs undergo cannot be analysed across all PPPs, the end products – the goals - can. The results of this process should be a set of clearly articulated – and ideally measurable – goals, which should provide tangible benchmarks for the PPP as well as guidance for its stakeholders. While it is obviously a relational category of assessing partnerships, as whether or not PPPs achieve the goals set will be inherently tied to the nature of the difficulties they set out for themselves, goal attainment is considered by some to be critical evidence, albeit lacking, needed to prove PPPs matter. Assessing or tracking this will be hampered from the start, though, if goals and objectives are not clearly accessible and understood across PPPs. **TPD: Goals** speaks to this, though it is certain more detail on an individual PPP basis may be available if all individual partnerships were interviewed and internal documents scoured.

On a micro-level, overall goals are often unclear and in general not highly measurable. There is a great deal of heterogeneity and ambiguity across all the partnerships regarding the articulation, specificity and clarity of their goals in their published and web-based materials. While many do articulate specific and targeted goals at a project level, they do so much less frequently for the entire partnership.

#### **Segmentation:**

More than reviewing overall goals set, analysis of these goals is done next by segmenting them into output, outcome and impact components. This work finds that 44% of the PPPs articulate their objectives across all three, but this varies greatly by type of PPP (*Table 7.3*). While only slightly over one-third of hosted PPPs communicate all three, this

figure is much higher for independent partnerships, where over half do so. PPPs that articulated all three are exemplified in *Table 7.4*.

**Table 7.3: PPP goal segmentation**

	Output	Outcome	Impact	All
<b>All PPPs in Sample</b>	78%	76%	72%	44%
<b>Hosted</b>	74%	76%	68%	35%
<b>Independent</b>	83%	80%	77%	55%

Source: TPD: Goals, 2011

**Table 7.4: PPP goal articulation, Examples**

PPP Name	Output	Outcomes	Impacts
<b>Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV)</b>	Stages of drugs in the development pipeline; number of initiatives in discovery, number of products in development, state of projects in early phases, among others.	MMV's outcomes relate to its efforts to help facilitate the uptake of the medicines to ensure that they make the biggest impact in the population at risk of malaria	<i>MMV aims for eventual impact of a "world in which innovative medicines will cure and protect the millions at risk of malaria and help to ultimately eradicate this terrible disease"</i>
<b>Vision 2020</b>	Facilitate the planning, development and implementation of national VISION 2020 programs in all countries	Increase awareness, within key audiences, of the causes of avoidable blindness and the solutions to the problem	<i>Eliminate avoidable blindness by the year 2020.</i>
<b>FIND</b>	Outputs relate to FIND's efforts to develop and implement diagnostic tools that are affordable, accurate and suitable for the particular needs of patients in high endemic countries	A twin-focus on creating more effective technologies that respond to patients needs at all levels of the health system, while strengthening the laboratories in low-income countries becomes a key component of ensuring appropriate use of the new tools	<i>A world where everyone will have equitable access to high quality diagnosis</i>

Source: TPD-Goals, 2011

### Outputs

Outputs are the most clearly defined, shorter term or immediate effects of the partnership, and this work utilises a broader, basic notion that outputs are shorter term,

tangible, often physical outputs of the partnerships. As a point of clarification, when reviewing goals breakdown, this work began with an assumption that these would be performance outputs rather than organisational outputs, but as this chapter addresses, the relative focus between these two elements varied considerably. Naturally it is assumed that most, if not all, PPPs will, by nature have organisational-based output goals, as these are some of the basic activities and outputs PPPs should have in place to be accountable, transparent and eventually effective as institutions. As will be returned to, what emerged from the analysis, however, is that for many PPPs these were the only expressed goals, despite these far-reaching visions or missions.

The majority of the ITPs articulated output-based goals, with almost 80% of PPPs communicating these. Hosted PPPs were less likely to have output goals than independent partnerships (75% versus 82% for independent). This could be an issue either of not communicating the intended outputs, or it could also be a function of being hosted in that perhaps basic output activities were being provided by the host institution itself. Only 3% of the PPPs only articulated only outputs, which may seem lower than expected until one considers that many more PPPs articulated tangible outputs along with very ambiguous and immeasurable impacts (15% had outputs and impacts only).

Partnerships that focused on certain functions<sup>170</sup> tended to articulate outputs more frequently, especially those involved in Information exchange/and or research and Information dissemination and transfer. Partnerships that have pure operational goals were also less likely to articulate outcomes and impacts, as only around half of these PPPs expressed more than output goals. Another set of partnerships had very outcome and impact-focused goals, however. For example, BioVentures for Global Health<sup>171</sup> has outcome orientation towards accelerating the development of novel biotechnology-based drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics and eventually wants to produce impact by saving lives. Or the World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network<sup>172</sup>, which articulates an intended outcomes to increase the global impact of private sector engagement and humanitarian relief.

PPPs focused solely on capital provision would be anticipated to be more focused solely on outputs, but as most of this functional-type is not included within the sampling frame this cannot be adequately spoken to. The MAC AIDS fund is an example with clearly articulated outputs of providing funding alongside the more ambitious impact goal of preventing the spread of HIV among people ages 15-24. The same output oriented nature may

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<sup>170</sup> Percentages refer to sampling frame functional breakdowns, see *Figure 7.3*.

<sup>171</sup> <http://www.bvgh.org/Who-We-Are.aspx>

<sup>172</sup> [www.weforum.org/issues/humanitarian-assistance](http://www.weforum.org/issues/humanitarian-assistance)

be expected of CSR initiatives, but these were not in the sampling frame given the partner or scope requirement. Finally, while it is largely the case for PPPs that there is an articulation of impact-related objectives, it becomes clear from this work's analysis and interviews that the majority, if not all, of the activities are centred on outputs.

### *Outcome*

Outcomes are the medium-term effects of the partnership and are associated with whether or not the PPP led to an intended affect on its intended participants. These are goals which are focused on creating knowledge, attitudinal or behavioural-based change and can be tracked through the external use, adopting or influence of the PPP and/or its work. The explicit articulation of outcomes as part of goals was less frequent than outputs or impacts; that is, most partnerships are not clear about the behavioural change required to achieve an outcome or anticipated to occur. Overall, 78% of ITPs had outcome-oriented goals, though a small number (5%) expressed only outcomes, mainly those involved in advocacy or coordination roles. While there is little difference between hosted and independent in terms of the rate at which outcomes are outlined, there are patterns across functional types. Policy focused PPPs have higher rates of outcomes in addition to impacts, as most of these made clear the uptake and behavioural change they wished their advanced policy to produce.

### *Impact*

Impacts, the long term, eventual effects of the partnerships are aimed towards overall problem solving, which implies attaining system-wide or environmental effects. While just over 70% of the ITPs did articulate an eventual impact-related objective, a much smaller number could clearly identify a specific, measurable impact that their partnership would like to achieve. Hosted partnerships were also less likely to have defined an impact than independent PPPs.

Certain types of PPPs had a greater propensity to report impacts: while capacity building (90%), coordination (84%) and advocacy (72%) functional type PPPs were more likely to communicate impacts, this was less the case for those PPPs involved in policy, facilitation or setting standards. As expected, most of these impacts were wide reaching, and in general the majority of the impact focus was in line or identical to the PPPs' vision statement. For example, the impact focused goal of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> <http://www.polioeradication.org/>



is “to ensure that no child will ever again know the crippling effects of polio” while Safe Injection Global Network has impact goals defined as to “strengthen health systems.”

Many of these impacts related to eventual cures or eliminations of the problem of focus for the PPP. Both the focus of the PPP as well as the articulation of the objectives influences how measurable this will be. For example, the Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis aims to eventually eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis, the Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine Deficiency (Iodine Network) aims to eradicate iodine deficiency and the Global Polio Eradication Initiative aims towards the eventual eradication of polio. PPPs with wider focus may express similar but far from measurable impacts, such as the Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases (NITD)<sup>174</sup>,s aim to cure tropical and infectious disease. A more ambiguous and certainly immeasurable impact-perspective, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)<sup>175</sup> proposes it works towards “Saving children’s lives and protecting people’s health” while the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition<sup>176</sup> (GAIN)’s eventual impact aims towards a world without malnutrition.

While the possibility of eventual eradication of these diseases may be argued, it is also debatable whether or not PPPs will be considered successful even if the set targets are reached. One issue is ease of operation or measurement, as impact goals are not easily quantified. While the specificity of goals is expected to lessen to an extent the further in this results chain, even if impact is achieved, as one progresses from outputs to impacts, it also becomes exceedingly difficult to measure and properly attribute these effects: even for PPPs that reach intended targets related to eventual cures and or elimination, this cannot be unambiguously credited to PPPs’ work.

A more fundamental question at stake is whether PPPs should have eventual elimination as a goal; eradication campaigns themselves are highly debated (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1999), as continued issues surround the lack of reliable tests, definitions of elimination and political contestations. Reviewing the ITPs no longer in operation presents an interesting case in the Global Alliance for the Elimination of Leprosy (GAEL), which was created in 1999 to “inject new energy into the elimination campaign” (Rinaldi 2005, 1224). Seen as a way to promote part of the WHO’s Final Push Strategy (2000-2005) towards elimination, GAEL was later extended. Though technically the global target of eliminating leprosy was reached in 2000 with world prevalence of less than 600,000 cases (Britton 2004, 4) when averaging all prevalence rates worldwide, with prevalence at less

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<sup>174</sup> <http://www.novartis.com/innovation/research-development/diseases-of-developing-world/index.shtml>

<sup>175</sup> <http://www.gavialliance.org/>

<sup>176</sup> <http://www.gainhealth.org/>

than 1/10,000 people, the PPP itself is not regarded by all as a success. Much of this is due a continued strife between the main partners involved. One of the initial partners, the International Federation of Anti-Leprosy Associations (ILEP), took issue with elimination as a strategy as well as the WHO's definition of prevalence (as the WHO utilized number of patients on MDT registers as a measure, which is accused of ignoring patients not yet diagnosed as well as ex-patients). ILEP, among others, argued this implied that even if the WHO reached its target, it would not mean elimination of leprosy had occurred; in addition, more stakeholders were concerned about the continued social stigma and political issues. The disagreements actually led to it being expelled from the partnership in 2001.

A few years later, a 2003 WHO-sponsored evaluation suggested moving from an elimination strategy to one focused on avoidance and rehabilitation, which eventually led to a new alliance among the WHO, ILEP, The Nippon Foundation and Novartis, but the report also explicitly noted that "collaborators will have to work more openly, collegially, and inclusively" (Skolnik et al. 2003). Moving forward, the period 2006-2010 was more focused on leprosy control activities, and in which the WHO took a stronger leadership role. Thus, GAEL ceased to exist in its form, but several additional organisations were created instead. The "Final Push Strategy" realised it needed to shift focus to the high levels of stigma attached to the disease which led to the Social Mobilization for the Elimination of Leprosy (SMEL) amongst continued calls for a post-elimination strategy to ensure "the disease does not go underground" (Porter 2004). Thus, even though the elimination campaign was seen as largely successful, the partnership created to promote it was less highly regarded and had to be disbanded (in two separate forms); yet the movement forward called for another new, reinforced partnership (Rinaldi 2005).

#### **7.2.4 Takeaways**

What are the key takeaways and remaining questions? One pertains to the necessity for PPPs to articulate all three effects. PPPs which aim only towards output may be considered to have a relatively easier path to achieving effectiveness. For those who argue PPPs are pragmatic governance solutions whose key role is their ability to achieve tangible, short-term objectives, however, this may be the most fitting role for a partnership. Critics of global PPPs, however, argue that PPPs are too narrow and short-term focused, which leads to a lack of country or system-wide considerations (Buse and Tanaka 2011). This could ultimately lessen their effectiveness, and may even make them overall a negative force (McKinsey 2005). Also worth considering is if PPPs only articulate outputs as goals (assuming the related activities

match) without articulating the behavioural change anticipated or intended uptake of the outputs could also lead to lessened impact. This also raises the issue of possible overlap across PPPs or initiatives which focus on different types of effects (or change) but within a narrow issue area. Without coordination, recipients of the PPPs outputs, such as drugs distribution or training courses, can be confused as to the options. This at best will result in inefficient and less effective programs, but at worst means PPPs are essentially competing with each other (Widdus 2005).

As PPPs are not static, objectives will certainly change over time. Many PPPs have also pushed to expand their objectives and goals; for example, health PPPs are being pushed to articulate access as well as research (or distribution), as it is argued to be truly effective, there is a need to ensure integration of the PPPs' work and operations within the local and/or country health system in which it was providing the drugs or treatments. It is argued that as this continuum was not taken into account, the work was not fully integrated into the system (Widdus 2005) leading to this unintended and eventually negative effect. In one case in Uganda, when workers withdrew after the programs work was completed, there was actually a resurgence of trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness).

The set of product development partnerships (PDPs) also exemplify how missions and goals change over time. PDPs that once focused solely on drug research and development slowly evolved into organisations that aimed to discover, develop and bring a needed drug to market – as well as deliver it. As such, PDPs had to evolve their focus from pure research to being involved in access and outreach. More recently, they have been turning to also focusing on advocacy aims. Partly spurred by necessity, as PPP leaders realised they needed to have the capability to ensure ultimate effect, this change was also largely spurred by the donor community, who wanted to have their funding dollars involved in ultimate delivery and advocacy. While all acknowledge this is critical, some PPP leaders become frustrated with the seemingly forced transition of their aims and altered focus, as they note this is moving away from the innovative model that PDPs were created to fit and not necessarily a space (in advocacy in particular) PDPs, by their nature, are best to fit (PPP Stakeholder InterviewM)

### **7.3: Analysing comparable organisational outputs**

That PPPs are working towards actually solving these global problem at large is obviously of key interest to stakeholders, especially those concerned with global partnerships' broader effect on the global governance system (Khagram and Ali 2008; Andonova 2010). This draws emphasis to problem solving. While this focuses on analysing outputs, it is

acknowledged outputs are merely first-order effects and may or may not lead to outcomes and eventual impacts. The distinction between **organisational** and **performance outputs** is also made: the former are the effects the partnership produces as an institution or governance entity while the latter are those effects associated with the partnership reaching its performance targets. In an exemplified results chain these latter outputs should lead to eventual problem solving through their effect on outcomes and impacts. While this segmentation could be countered by noting that many organisational outputs can be considered as activities rather than effects, this work purposely focuses on tangible end products and discernable results.

Though performance outputs are inherently more tightly tied to problem solving, organisational outputs are significant as they are tied to institutional effectiveness;<sup>177</sup> this speaks to whether the appropriate institutional elements and resources are established to address the problem at hand (Bäckstrand 2010, 149). What is more, to assess partnerships, one needs a better understanding of all their aspects, including structure, resources, processes and practices. Indeed, for those concerned with assessing the partnership relationship (Brinkerhoff 2007) and partnering process, these organisational outputs themselves are the focus of evaluation. Organisational outputs are also integral forces in ensuring these inputs and processes will be appropriately assessed, measured and quantified, a concern for those assessing partnership productivity and efficiency. As stated at the onset, another overriding reason to focus on organisational outputs is their applicability to comparison across PPPs. See *AppendixD* for set of organisational outputs tracked.

### 7.3.1 Operational, actor and institutional outputs

While it may be seen as a rather low threshold to begin a discussion regarding effects, the first dimension tracked relates to **operational** status. As noted previously, evidence of operational activity is considered an output, as for global PPPs – especially many associated with the UN's CSD - this is far from an established certainty. Of those 199 partnerships that would be included within the sampling frame for definitional criterion, only 147 have evidence of recent operating activity. While this work utilised multiple sources, the majority of PPPs operations were verified from a recent (*dated at least December 2008*) press release, news item, partnership publication or factsheet and/or annual report.

Beyond merely having verifiable operations, another organisational output is the production and existence of an operating, PPP specific, website. Of the sampling frame, 85%

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<sup>177</sup> See Young 1999a for this distinction and Bäckstrand 2010 for application to CSD partnerships; these arguments were furthered in chapter four.

have this, while for the remaining 15% updated information can still be found online, usually on the main host's website. Half of these PPPs who do not have a unique website have a hosted page within the World Bank, WHO or USAID. It can be debated whether or not a functioning website should be considered integral to PPP effectiveness, but what is certain is that lacking one, researchers must perform a rather arduous search for information. This is especially as few PPPs without websites had contact details that extended beyond a generic email account. These issues matter as they provide further credence to persisting arguments that PPPs lack transparency and accountability.

Another organisational output is the articulation of a business plan. While it is often assumed that global PPPs, especially those involving significant sums of money, private corporations and public governments, would clearly lay out their intents and purposes at the onset of the partnership, the reality is that for many, the arrangements grow and evolve over time. Often this implies that formal mechanisms, seemingly basic to private entities, are never laid out in full, which has led many reviews to claim partnerships would stand to benefit from adopting more “business-like approaches” (Druce and Harmer 2004). A 2004 review of GHPs argued “GHPs should develop and regularly review strategic, operational and business plans, delineating clearly defined roles and responsibilities for all major partners. To improve transparency, each GHP should make a minimum of defined key information on GHP processes, performance and decisions publicly available on its website” (Caines et al. 2004, 10). Yet this work finds that slightly less than half (48.35%) published such a document or principles. This is another finding that this work's MM interviews support; indeed, for a set of PPPs, establishing a business and operating plan was one of – if not the only – goal over the next year!

Though overriding questions of participation and representation are critical, the focus in this subsection is the **actor-related**, specific organisational outputs. Key amongst these are the rules and guidance applied to the partners involved within the PPP, especially as it is assumed partnership effectiveness will inherently be tied to the abilities, resources, activities and energy of the committed partners. While this work cannot speak to the nature and quality of this participation, the elements it does assess, its published structures and rules, can provide a framework for assessing this participation.

Forty percent of the ITPs had multiple levels or layers of partners established, with the most being four. For example, the Collaborative Labelling and Appliance Standards Program (CLASP) distinguishes these into Sponsoring, Country, Implementing partners and Affiliates while the Alliance to Save Energy has layers of Founder-level Associates, Patron Associates,

Ally and Member. One key, assumed basic component to a PPP is the clear articulation of what defines a partner in the organisation, but as this work has already noted, this is lacking for many. While there is generally a notion of what a partner is, or a set of characteristics, resources or ideals a partner should profess, few PPPs made explicit what truly defines a partner. Many even purposely avoid using the word “partner” given the term’s current use in popular jargon and the value-laden notions it often elicits. Indeed, during the MM interviews, most PPP directors confirmed these published members/ partners are just snapshots, the reality is this is an aspect in a constant state of flux. Perhaps disconcertingly, more than two-thirds of the PPP directors interviewed in the management interviews either cited a different figure of current partners than available resources noted, or, more commonly, could not numerate this.

Though varied, the established criterion for joining and due diligence process the PPP takes before accepting new members, though varied was overall rather lacking. While the management interviews discussed weaknesses for many PPPs regarding the process of new partners joining, these findings highlighted how few PPPs have this documented, as less than one-third had established criteria for a new partner joining (*Table 7.5*). This low number should also be considered with the fact that much of this criterion was rather loose, such as partners signing and agreeing to a stated partnership principles document. A number of partnerships have a partner form to request permission to join, and for a few, this could actually result in automatic membership! Interestingly, 15% of the PPPs also charged a membership fee, often fees that varied by type (e.g., private versus academic) or layer of partnering.

**Table 7.5 ITPs: Existence of Partnership criterion and membership**

Partner Type	Type of Entry Rules	#PPPs	%
Junior Partners	Criteria Established	22	14.8%
	Approval Body	21	14.1%
	Criteria Document	20	30.2%
	Info / published	21	14.1%
Senior Partners	Criteria Established	45	30.2%
	Approval Body	45	30.2%
	Criteria Document	45	30.2%
	Info / published	45	30.2%

*Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011*

To address issues of limited representation, many argue that PPPs can include southern actors, NGOs and other “traditionally marginalised groups” within governance by holding regular stakeholder meetings, and of the ITPs, a fair number (43%) hold a regular

stakeholder meeting, which is generally annual or biannual, and the average number of members on these assemblies is 264.

Many elements of **institutional design and structure** are also relevant in comparing partnerships' organisational effects. While the majority of the sampling frame PPPs have worked to establish a centre point, 4.1% have not, but the majority of those lacking one are hosted.<sup>178</sup> What about the activity at these centre points? While 94% have an operational team in place, this team can be as low as one person within the host, and for nine PPPs no working staff or operational team could be verified. Information regarding fulltime working equivalents (FTEs) in place could not be verified for 18 of the PPP, but for the remaining the average number of FTEs at the CP is 26 and 59 FTEs for the PPP in total (spanning across operational sites); however, if one drops the top five PPPs from this (those that have over 100 FTEs) the average drops to sixteen. Across all, the median number of staff is eleven. The majority of those with verifiable staff counts (88%) had less than 25 full time equivalents at the centre, with many PPPs – especially those that are hosted – relying only on part time staff and interns.

### **7.3.2 Governance and decision making**

Of considerable interest to PPPs functioning – and many argue their performance – are the governance and decision making systems and procedures (GDM) in place (Buse 2004b), especially guided by findings that there is a relationship between good governance and favourable development outcomes (Kaufman, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton 1999; 2002). Many reviews criticise PPPs for lack of internal governance legitimacy and accountability (Benner and Witte 2004; Utting and Zammit 2009; Sorenson 2009), not to mention the growing debate that PPPs overall are not adhering to good governance (Richter 2003). As many multilateral agencies, notably the World Bank's IEG and the OECD's DCA continue to develop qualitative and quantitative metrics to assess governance, more PPPs and their related evaluators are placing emphasis on governance.<sup>179</sup>

Assessing and comparing GDM outputs across PPPs is complicated by the great variety in structure, complexity and functional intentions of the governance processes, even for those with the same main partner, such as the World Bank (Lele et al. 2004, 38). Despite this difficulty, this work compiled a wealth of information on these PPPs' governing

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<sup>178</sup> On average, the partnerships have three operating sites or locations, and the average is three for hosted and four for independent partnerships.

<sup>179</sup> As has been noted by Lele et al. 2004 for World Bank programs; Buse 2004a, 2004b for global health partnerships and more recently Grace and Druce 2009 and Buse and Tanaka 2011 for PDPs, as well as PPP-specific evaluations such as Faster Cures 2010 for MMV and HLSP 2008 for IPM.

arrangements and the related outputs. However, while this work speaks to structure, design and established processes and procedures, TPD-Outputs can only present declared information. The actual functioning within these structures, the interaction between members of the governing bodies and the adherence to the bodies' decision making can only be assessed with individual partner analysis.

While unfortunately the notion of sheer feasibility had to guide part of the process of which variables to collect and assess (See chapter four), this work also incorporated the four inter-related corporate governance principles developed by the OECD's Business Sector Advisory Group in determining variables. As these are applied across diverse types of governance (both "shareholder" and "stakeholder" type models) and deemed applicable to both public governance entities and private firms (OECD 1999), they are useful guiding points (*Figure 7.4*):

**Figure 7.4 OECD Principles on Corporate Governance**

<b>OECD Principles on Corporate Governance</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Clear roles and responsibilities</b> – for the officers and bodies that govern and manage the program and of the mechanisms to modify and amend the governance and management of the program in a dynamic context</li> <li>• <b>Transparency</b> – the program provides both shareholders and stakeholders with the information they need in an open and transparent manner (such as decision-making responsibilities, accountabilities and processes, accounting, audit, and material nonfinancial issues)</li> <li>• <b>Fairness</b> – the program does not favor some immediate clients over others (such as Bank staff, participating agencies or program secretariats, specific countries or their agencies, municipal agencies, local authorities, private service providers, NGOs, and community organizations)</li> <li>• <b>Clear accountability</b> – of the program for the exercise of power over resources to the program's stakeholders, including international organizations, donors, developing countries, the private sector, and NGOs</li> </ul>
<p><sup>1</sup> In 2004, the OECD expanded these principles greatly to include a focus on the following elements: Promoting transparent and efficient markets, which are consistent with the rule of law and which clearly articulate the division of responsibilities among supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities; Protecting and facilitating the exercise of shareholders' rights; Ensuring the equitable treatment of all shareholders, who should also have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights; Recognising the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encouraging active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises; Ensuring that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including its financial situation, performance, ownership and governance; and Ensuring the strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the board and the board's accountability to the company and the shareholders (OECD 2004, 2008). For the purposes of this work, the focus on the first four principles is preserved.  <i>Source: OECD 1999;</i>  <i>See <a href="http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3746,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_1,00.html">http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3746,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_1,00.html</a></i></p>



Governance outputs tracked fall roughly into dimensions of establishment, structure, representation and rules. One of the most basic GDM outputs is whether or not the PPP has established a governance system. While 80% of the PPPs have established this, for 24 even this could not be verified.<sup>180</sup> For the remaining hosted PPPs it must be assumed that all governing takes place within the host, but no information could be found to confirm this, nor that another governing entity had been established. As noted by Buse (2004a) “The ‘governing’ bodies of hosted PPPs raise questions concerning the nature and meaning of their ‘public-private’ nature and of the extent to which they are ‘partnerships’” (2004a, 233-234). Even for the remaining hosted PPPs for which there is a governing body, especially if they are hosted within the WHO (which thirteen are), may be especially problematic as fiduciary responsibilities is still with the host.

### *Structure*

This work found seven main types in addition to those whose main type is hosted: approximately half are governed by a board and for the remaining independent PPPs, governance comes from a steering committee (6.2%), Committee (2.8%) or advisory committee (1%) (**Table 7.6**). Most of those who are hosted within the UN (10% of the sample) or the World Bank or another IGO (4.1%) still profess a governing body. Of the 82 hosted PPPs, 59 have a declared sub-governance type or body, but for 15% of the hosted PPPs, even this cannot be verified! For those with a sub body, it is also worth distinguishing between advisory committees or groups versus formal governing bodies, for example, a Board of Governors (40%). **Table 7.7** shows the sub-type of governing bodies within hosted PPPs, but it must be noted these do not necessarily have authority over the Host, as hosted boards generally do not have legal standing. On average PPPs have 1.8 layers of governance on the main bodies - roughly the same between hosted and independent.

Besides formalising a structure and type of governing body, of critical interest is what occurs if there is a conflict or dispute within the PPP. While establishing clear conflict of interest procedures is seen as necessary to the legitimacy of the institution, only around 10% of the PPPs publish or communicate their dispute resolution system in place.

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<sup>180</sup> Only one of these was independent: AED – Satellife

**Table 7.6: ITPs: Type of main governing body**

Governing type	% PPPs
Board	40.8%
HostUN	22.4%
HostFP	20.6%
HostNFP	8.4%
HostIGO	7.5%
Other	7.4%
Council	1.8%
Committee	1.4%

Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011

**Table 7.7 Hosted ITPs: Subtype of governance**

Governing Sub-type	% PPPs
Board	32.1%
Steering/ Advisory	24.7%
Group/ Team/ Other	19.8%
Committee/ Council	12.3%
Information not available	11.1%

Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011


### *Representation*

While structure is of interest, it is the sectoral representation which drives most of the governance-related debates, especially as this is a reflection of internal power dynamics and distribution, which are significant as this will relate to the perception of ownership and accountability of the partnership. PPPs are also purported to face tradeoffs between efficiency and equity in determining composition. On one hand, they could have larger bodies, which would be more in tune with stakeholder models of governance; however, a widening participation in governance could be seen as slowing or even hampering decision making (Scharpf 1997). Despite these articulated models of governance, this work's set of interviews also finds that in practice these governance structures are more so evolutions over time, which change as the PPP grows, its focus evolves and/or in response to evaluations. For example, GAVI, IPM and IAVI have all made changes to their governance structures or members following independent evaluations.

This work provides the first view *across all global PPPs*, and what emerges is that for the 148 PPPs with trisectoral partner base, only 40% have tri-sectoral representation on

their decision making bodies. Half the independent PPPs have tri-sectoral decision making on their main governing bodies, but this is only the case for 36% of the hosted. Besides trisectoral, the next largest sectoral split is Private-Social only at 14% while only public-based members sit on the board of 9% of the PPPs (**Figure 7.5**).<sup>181</sup> Recall from the previous chapter, that across all PPPs only 16% have tri-sectoral decision making while this is 20% for operational.

**Figure 7.5: Average sectoral representation split on governance bodies within ITPs**



Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011

What is interesting is that within the PPPs, the average breakdown of these members is 26% from the public sector, 31% from the private sector, 34% from the social sector and 8% independent, retired or ex officio members (who declare sectoral neutrality). For hosted PPPs, this split is 38%, 19%, 34% and 6% respectively, while for independent PPPs, this varies quite dramatically, as on average only 16% of the governing members are public, 41% private, 34% social and 10% retired or ex officio members (who declare sectoral neutrality) (**Table 7.8**).

<sup>181</sup> Not all PPPs publish their governing body members (available for 74%); thus for the remaining sampling frame the split is deemed host if it is hosted with no other information available.

**Table 7.8 Sectoral balance within main governing forums, Sampling Frame (ITPs)**

Governance Structure	% Sampling Frame	% Hosted	% Independent
Public and Private (not Social)	5%	6%	3%
Public and Social (not Private)	6%	10%	2%
Private only	5%	1%	9%
Private and Social (not Public)	14%	6%	24%
Public only	9%	16%	0%
Social only	4%	5%	3%
Tri-sectoral	43%	36%	52%
Host	12%	20%	2%
Information not available	3%	0%	6%

*Note: This table indicates if the governance bodies are split across private, public and social sectors*

*Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011*

Regarding minimum representation from the sectors, and TPD-Outputs finds at least 51% have at least one representative from the public, 61% one from private, 62% one from social and 36% independent. From another perspective, governance split should be assessed not by sector but rather by country representation, which this work tracks via World Bank definitions of high, upper middle, lower middle and low income countries.<sup>182</sup> Of the ITPs 50% had at least one representative on the governing body from the both segments with almost half had at least one member representing low or lower middle income countries. All of the PPPs with verifiable information had at least one member from an upper middle or high income country on their governing board. Within the PPPs, on average 20% of the members were from a low or lower/ middle income country; this was only 17% for independent partnerships compared to 23% in hosted. While these numbers appear low from the onset, that at least half have a developing country member presents a slightly different picture than many critical reviews of PPPs attest.

### 7.3.3 Accountability and Transparency

For many stakeholders, to acknowledge PPPs are legitimate governance entities means they must exemplify standards of accountability and transparency, often accused to be sorely lacking. If improving accountability could lead to enhanced performance (Zadek and Radovich 2006), then PPPs are expected to establish both internal (to their members) and

<sup>182</sup> World Bank list of economies (18 July 2011). Available at [siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/.../CLASS.XLS](http://data.worldbank.org/CLASS.XLS) See <http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications> for background

external (to wider stakeholders and those impacted by the PPPs' activities) accountability elements (Grant and Keohane 2005).

Internal accountability involves internal governance and decision making structures, internal reporting and clear mechanisms for internal review and possible sanctions, which should also be open to scrutiny (Zurn 2000). External accountability involves the perceived need for greater transparency, which involves the publication, in a timely and accessible manner, of relevant information regarding the PPP's processes, activities, governance and funding. External considerations involve the interests of groups outside the respective organisations – those affected by the latter's activities without being able to yield influence over them – and how these can be taken into account. This involves creating a form of accountability “in which the voices of those most affected by an organisation's activities are not overshadowed by the interests of the most powerful stakeholders” (Blagescu et al. 2005, 20). Though more difficult to establish, elements of external accountability are more readily assessed across all PPPs, especially as published reports on internal accountability are rare.


**Transparency** necessitates information that is timely, relevant, accessible and useful. Timely implies information is published within an acceptable timeframe, which is when the relevant decisions and information could influence others and/or are still topical. That for many PPPs, the last website update occurred two or three years ago would thus be at issue. Accessibility implies not only availability online, which this work tracks, but also how PPPs distribute information to non web-enabled stakeholders. While the former is notably lacking, the latter for many is nonexistent. In terms of usefulness, highlights and performance reports are helpful; however, in many cases, this was the only updated information beyond the partnership establishment, which can lead to accusations that the PPPs only present a positive story of the partnerships or present only successful projects. On the other hand, too much information can also be considered less useful if one cannot distinguish between the significance of various reports and publications (Bartsch 2008, 12).

While both dimensions of legitimacy are critical, while this work set out to assess the former, it became evident throughout the course of the analysis that not only do dimensions of legitimacy cut across both input and output legitimacy, but they also highly influence each other.<sup>183</sup> While debates regarding accountability and transparency serve as the sole focus of numerous works (Steets 2010), this work only narrowly considers a set of the accountability and transparency elements argued necessary for PPPs (*Figure 7.6*).

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<sup>183</sup> See also Risse 2004 and Goodin 2007 for similar arguments.

**Figure 7.6 Accountability and transparency outputs tracked**



### *Findings*

**Reports and plans:** This work's overriding findings regarding ITP transparency are not encouraging (*Figures 7.7-7.9*), as only half published annual performance reports online (56.5%). Strategic and annual plans - those that are forward looking rather than only means of reporting - were even less frequent at only 38.1%. While it is startling that PPP stakeholders cannot review any form of annual report on PPP's activities or performance, this is especially striking as the sampling frame of PPPs are in general more institutionalised (and also have a tri-sectoral actor base). This number is even lower across the entire PPP universe, as only 17% of PPPs have a published annual report within the past three years. A contrary view would say as flexibility is a strength of partnerships, and as they are not formal institutions themselves, all of their energy/ resources can and should be devoted to solving the problems at hand – direct action – rather than burdensome reporting and guidelines. However, to substantiate this argument, evidence as to the PPP's results and work towards these achievements are seemingly needed. As less than half of the ITPs have published these, this is a tough argument to defend.

While certain types of PPPs are more likely to publish annual reports than others, the tightest relationship is between institutional structure and transparency. One-third of hosted PPPs publish strategic or annual plans while closer to half of independent ones do. While this may be because hosted PPPs strategic aims are assumed within the main organisation's reporting, this percentage figure includes those PPPs that publish a report or detailed update within separate or distinct sections of the host's documents. Annual reports present a more

shocking disparity, as 68% of independent PPPs publish one while only 35% of hosted PPPs do. Levels of institutionalisation are also strongly correlated to annual performance reporting, as over 90% of those with high levels have annual reports and only 18% of those with low levels of institutionalisation do.

A more informal summary is more readily available, as 84% of PPPs publish at least statements of performance, results or highlights; however, this could be as limited as recent snapshots or press releases noting activity. Since this work's criterion to reach this standard was *only reporting action or activity* and not necessarily success or results, that for almost 20% of PPPs this cannot be found should be alarming! Seventy two percent of PPPs have regular newsletters or updates, but these may be rather informal. It is also tracked whether or not keen stakeholders could receive regular updates on the PPPs' activities and performance, as this also implies the PPP could also have a system of tracking (or at least collecting) information on its interested stakeholders. Only 40% of the ITPs had an email letter or newsletter that stakeholders (non partners) could subscribe to and receive.

Similar relationships hold when comparing across PPPs: whereas 59% of hosted PPPs have regular newsletters or results, this is 84% for independent PPPs. Half of the independent have newsletters that also offer a (free) subscription, but this is less than a quarter (23%) for hosted. The higher the level of institutionalisation, the more likely the PPP is to report performance, as this ranges from all those PPPs with high levels to only 69% for the low. Almost all within the high segment also produce regular newsletters or updates, and half of these also allow subscriptions or provide targeted updates, but this is less than half for those with low levels (47%, and 22% have an option to subscribe).

**Financial:** Only 35% publish financial statements or results on their own accord, either as separate statements or part of their annual report. As expected, this is much higher for independent PPPs. One could argue that for hosted PPPs this is to be expected, as the finances would be part of the host organisation, but still only 9% of hosted PPPs publish an annual budget. This figure is 18% for independent PPPs, and 13% for all PPPs. If hosted PPPs were run to budget rather than solely responsible for their own financial aspects and returns, stakeholders would perhaps expect more detailed information in this regard (Financial aspects are discussed below).

**Governance:** A key aspect regarding legitimacy is that information regarding decisions is made public and available. Regardless of who sits at the table, it can be argued that as long as the wider stakeholder body has timely and feasible access to these deliberations and decisions, the PPP can enhance accountability. In this regard, the findings from TPD-

Outputs are relatively pessimistic, as governance documents were less publically available than performance. Only 32% of the ITPs published Board meeting agendas and/or background chapters and 37% summaries of the meetings or related press released. Slightly less than a quarter presented meeting action points or specific decisions by the board. What is interesting, is that while publishing performance results was much more prevalent in independent PPPs, for governance and decision-making, transparency across hosted and independent partnerships was relatively equal, with no noticeable difference regarding the publication of governance agendas (32% for both), press releases or summaries (37% for both) or action points following the meetings (24% for hosted and 22% for independent).

Partnerships vary slightly regarding levels of institutionalisation and governance transparency, with the most noticeable being the low recorded figures for those with only low levels of institutionalisation, as less than 20% published any of the tracked governance documents. Of course many of these transparency variables were highly correlated with each other: PPPs that published governance documents were likely to publish performance-related notifications as well. This is significant, as it suggests PPPs are not necessarily compensating by including information within other sources. For example, of the PPPs who do not publish at least one governance document, 40% also do not have a regular newsletter or update (only 27% of ITPs do not have a newsletter).


These findings could be considered rather startling, though perhaps not surprising to many of PPPs' critics. In some instances, these are not purposeful actions but merely a function of lack of resources. Many PPPs operate with incredibly lean CPs, with only a few staff and perhaps no dedicated web technician, meaning many documents – while existing - are simply never transferred online. As this work noted from the MM interviews, there is often a large backlog of these administrative tasks that PPPs plan on completing or publishing, but purportedly lack the staff time to do so. An extreme argument on this end would be that donors and funders require reports and forms, which take considerable staff time and resources, but they do not award or punish for transparency or lack thereof, thus leading to less incentive for PPPs to publish certain documents. Transparency has physical costs as well, such as printing, translations and updating (Steets 2005, 13), and this would draw from PPPs' already limited resources. As many PPPs have a goal to continually *reduce* the amount of money spent on overhead, often due to pressure from funders, it is not surprising that these activities become lessened, especially if donors/funders are still receiving their required update reports.



It is acknowledged that many PPPs may need to keep certain documents and reports confidential, especially those involved in research and development as well as highly sensitive or even classified issues. One example is the Pharmaceutical Security Institute (PSI), which is fairly lacking in transparency and has almost nothing published online or accessible, but it maintains that most of this is necessary given the sensitivity of the issue area. While this is certainly applicable to many PPPs that deal with sensitive issues, the main aspects assessed here could rightly be deemed necessary, especially for those PPPs which receive public money (which almost all do) or are said to operate in the public’s interest.


Finally, while the overall transparency component appears quite low for the sampling frame, consider that across the universe of PPPs, which the TPD tracks, less than half of operational PPPs publish an annual report or statement and finances were available for 17% and 27% of operational PPPs. That less than one-third of operational PPPs published financials, either on their own or via an external source, is a troubling finding, and one this work returns to in the conclusion.

**Figure 7.7 Transparency among Sampling Frame PPPs: Performance and planning reports**




Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011

**Figure 7.8 Transparency among Sampling Frame PPPs: Governance documents**



Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011

**Figure 7.9 Accountability and transparency: All PPPs**



Source: TPD, 2011

### 7.3.4 Finances and Resources

When assessing private sector institutions, financial returns and key financial ratios, are primary indicators of effectiveness. For partnerships, however, finances and resources are often seen as a critical input and less assessed as an output – mainly due to lack of comparability and standards regarding financial reporting. Partnerships’ financial affairs are more than returns generated, though, as they also relate to partnerships’ financial accountability, debates about PPPs’ representation and process effectiveness. Evaluations of

PPPs do not always cover PPPs' financials, but those that do note persistent gaps in funding, PPPs' inability to project funding streams over a longer terms horizon and a lack of clarity regarding their funding needs (Druce and Harmer 2000).

Especially as many PPPs are created in order to be efficient and effective means of governance, it seems necessary to view their finances through a critical lens. Even more so, lacking a steady funding stream is often cited as a key constraint to PPPs' functioning (McKinsey 2002), which raises additional questions such as which PPPs have secure access to funding? Which PPPs generate more finances over time? Where do these finances arise, for example from funders, donors or self-generated incomes? These main questions are addressed through the following: financial actors and governance, transparency and accountability and financial returns.

Before discussing the finances themselves, one related and often rather contentious issue is the relationship of funders to the PPP. One issue is whether or not funders are considered partners. This is also often a rather difficult issue internally to many PPPs as funders may consider themselves partners and key actors, while the PPP leadership and managers do not always readily make the distinction. Of course, nature and background of the relationship cannot be determined across the PPPs, nor can relative power dynamics.

TPD-Outputs only obtained this information for around 40% of the PPPs, and finds 19% of the sampling frame have at least one funder that is also a partner, which is unsurprisingly the majority (80%) of those that provide the information. Of those that do, the average is 11 within each partnership. The TPD-Outputs also analysed timeframe across all PPPs dependent on financial information available, and it finds that approximately one-third of the ITPs had funders that donated more than one year, with the average being 22 that were repeat funders/donors. The related organisational output would be *if* the processes were in place, even if it is informal, to manage the relationship. Though this work attempted to track this, it could not be assessed for enough PPPs to lead to useful analysis.

#### *Variation in financial transparency*

As the significance of financial transparency is well noted, it remains surprising how few PPPs make financial statements available. Around half (48%) publish their financial information through annual reports, financial statements, donor resources or independent sources, though only 35% do this within their own publications/ websites. The tendency to make financial information publicly available varies depending on the characteristics of the partnerships and is tightly linked to legal and institutional status. PPPs' legal structure,

country of incorporation and level of institutionalisation affect not only processes in place but also the legal and regulatory requirements regarding financials. In addition, funders and main partners involved may also have varying demands regarding the extent of financial transparency.

Most PPPs' still maintain the internal decision of whether or not to publish the financials themselves, mainly through the PPP website or annual reports. Of the partnerships with available financials, 25% of the material was published by GuideStar, which is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organisation based in the US which accumulates, analyses and publishes financial information on US-based nonprofits,<sup>184</sup> and the remaining 75% published themselves, mostly within annual reports, though 10% published separate financial statements. Partnerships that are independent make their financial information public more than those that are hosted, as only 23% of the latter have their financial information available (18% self published) where as 61% of independent partnerships do. Either to enhance credibility or to satisfy legal requirements, slightly over half (52%) of the partnerships that shared their financial information used external auditors. This is less likely amongst hosted partnerships with only about 31% of them turning to external auditors, but for larger, independent PPPs this is considered the norm.

Partnerships with high levels of institutionalisation are more likely to make their information publicly available than those with low levels: 92% with high levels have accessible financials compared to 52% of those with a medium level and 2% of those with a low level. This is expected as legal status determines reporting requirements, especially in the US. Over 70% of charity, non-profits and incorporated PPPs publish their financials (particularly those in the US and the UK), and all registered as a 501c3 did.

Sectoral focus exhibited some relationship, but these are correlations and do not necessarily imply causation. PPPs engaging in work in the areas of Science & Technology, Agriculture, and Water & Sanitation published their finances more frequently than PPPs working in other sectors: 100% of PPPs in Science & Technology, 90% of PPPs in Agriculture and 63% of PPPs in Water & Sanitation made their finances publicly available. Just over half of the PPPs engaging in the health sector and the energy sector did the same. The tendency was much less amongst PPPs working in the field of education (33%), environment (26%) or sustainable development (23%). Partnerships with different functions publish their financials to varying degrees, as those that engage in information exchange

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<sup>184</sup> <http://www2.guidestar.org/rxg/about-us/index.aspx> ; there is an equivalent body in the UK: <http://www.guidestar.org.uk/>

and/or research or information dissemination and transfer have a greater propensity to publish their financials. Others that engage in advocacy or capacity building are less likely to make their financials public.

Partnerships that publish financial information also tend to be more mature. On average, partnerships with publicly available financials have been established for 19 years whereas those that do not have been established, on average, for 14 years. Partnerships that make their finances publicly available tend to have fewer partners, with an average of 152 partners compared to partnerships that do not make their finances available which have on average 211 partners. Interestingly, PPPs that share their finances with the public have an average of 15 partners that are also funders whereas those that do not have an average of five. As the definition of a partner and the obligations required varies across partnerships, this is another potential area to probe further. Who the partners involved are also seems to matter to an extent, as of the 67 partnerships that make their financial information public, 16 partner with the UN, six the World Bank and four the WHO.

Governance also seems to play a role in determining if partnerships share their financial information with the public. Partnerships with established system of governance are more likely to make their finances publicly available: 54% of those with governance systems shared their financials with the public while only 4% without did. Finally, the division of funding across public, private, and social sources seems to be only slightly related to financial transparency, as no real relationship can be discerned. A partnership that makes their finances public will receive, on average, 10% of funding from the private sector, 15% from the social sector, and 65% from the public sector. A partnership that does not make their finances public will receive, on average, 16% of their funding from the private sector, 11% from the social sector, and 73% from the public sector.

#### *Grants and donations:*

Before turning the discussion to the financials themselves, it is worth reiterating resources could in many ways be considered a partnership input, as without sufficient resources partnership effects could be limited. On the other hand, PPPs that are overly reliant on initial donors or funders could detract from their sustainability and future effectiveness if they fail to generate their own support; indeed, one potential measure of partnership success is its additionality, or the degree to which partnerships generate new multi-sector funding for sustainable development or their own initiatives (Bäckstrand 2005, 17). That said, given the focus and framework of this work, finances are assessed as outputs, especially as the ability

for PPPs to generate additional funding, attract a broad donor source and manage resources effectiveness can be compared across PPPs as organisational effects.

Grants and donations comprise a significant portion, if not all, of global public partnership incomes.<sup>185</sup> The total amount of grants and donations in 2008 was \$7.02 billion,<sup>186</sup> which shows more than a 19% increase from 2007, which totaled \$5.87 billion.<sup>187</sup> Nearly all this total amount of grants and donations was in the hands of a few prominent partnerships, though. The three with the highest amounts in donations and grants in 2008 account for 72% of the total \$7.02 billion; these are The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Malaria and TB (GFATM), The Global Polio Eradication Initiative and The Global Environment Initiative. The five partnerships with the highest amounts of grants and donations account for almost 84% of the total in 2008. In addition, the donations of partnerships that counted the UN, the WHO, or the World Bank amongst their partners, accounted for 37% of total partnership donations.

On average, each partnership brought in about \$113 million in 2008. This is approximately a 12% increase from the 2007 average of \$101 million. Not including the GFATM, each partnership brought in an average of \$51 million in 2008 in grants and donations, which is approximately a 6% increase from the 2007 average of \$48 million. Across all, there was an increase in the median amount of grants in donations for a partnership: in 2007 the median was \$6.9 million which increased to \$7.6 million in 2008.

Hosted partnerships on average brought in 50% less in 2008 than the average independent partnership in grants and donations. Age also matters: PPPs who have been established for longer are more successful at generating grants and donations than younger PPPs. Those established before 1995 raised an average of \$105 million per partnership in 2008; PPPs established between 1995 and 2002 had an average of \$142 million in grants and donations (average of \$29 million when excluding the GFATM), and those established after 2003 had an average of \$16 million.

As expected, legal status and institutionalisation exhibit strong relationships with financials, but here unlike other aspects of outputs there are a few unexpected findings for hosted PPPs. In 2008, foundations received the higher average (\$580 million) in grants and donations than partnerships with other forms of legal structure. Yet interestingly in the same year, PPPs hosted by inter-governmental organisations had the second highest amount of

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<sup>185</sup> The remaining discussion in this section assumes percentages based on PPPs that made finances public (71) rather than all PPPs (147). 65 of these PPPs provided figures for grants and donations.

<sup>186</sup> All financials that were not published in USD have been converted for standardisation.

<sup>187</sup> This figure does not include the Institute for OneWorld Health, the 4C Association, the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS and the Global Village Energy Partnership as they do not have publicly available financials for both 2007 and 2008.

average donations at \$474 million per partnership. Partnerships registered as 501c3 organisations, non-profits, or charities received, on average, less than \$21 million each. Highly institutionalised partnerships received an average of \$138 million (\$26 million excluding the GFATM) in donations in 2008, which is approximately 50% more than partnerships with a medium level. Partnerships with a low level of institutionalisation each received even less, on average \$12 million.

Amongst public donors, 54% of the PPPs cited the UN, 23% the World Bank, 21% USAID, 15% the European Union, 14% DFID and 7% the WHO as donors. In the social sectors, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) donated to 27% and the Rockefeller Foundation 15% of the ITPs. Private companies were represented to a less extent and more focused on specific issue areas; for example, 5% cited either Merck Shell, Pfizer or Microsoft as a donor and 4% the Coca-Cola Company. The average amount given to PPPs in grants and donations also varies considerably by the sector they operate in, with some sectors drawing far greater amounts than others. PPPs engaging in the health sector drew the most with an average of 235 million per partnership (\$85 million excluding the GFATM) in 2008 in income. This was more than double the average amount of the second highest sector, environment, which drew an average of \$82 million per year per partnership in 2008. Partnerships engaging in sustainable development and science & technology brought in considerably less in the same year at \$187, 000 and \$164,000 on average per partnership.

### *Income*

The majority of income generated by partnerships comes in the form of grants and donations and subscription revenue. All PPPs with financials except the Global Polio Eradication Initiative, International Electrotechnical Commission and the International Water and Sanitation Center reported grants and donations as one source of revenue and income as another. Income includes sources of revenue that are generated from interest, currency fluctuations, investments, and other income generated from sales of products or services. On average, the total income declared by partnerships appears to be growing annually, as the total income generated by partnerships in 2008 together reached \$7.35 billion (\$3.4 billion excluding the Global Fund), up from \$7.14 billion (\$2.9 billion excluding the Global Fund) in 2007<sup>188</sup>. The median amount of income for a partnership was \$7.6 million in 2008. What is perhaps surprising is that hosted partnerships brought in an average of \$175 million each in

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<sup>188</sup> These figures do not include the Institute for OneWorld Health, the 4C Association, the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS and the Global Village Energy Partnership as they do not have publicly available financials for both 2007 and 2008.

2008, surpassing the average of independent partnerships which averaged \$105 million in income.

PPPs that have been established for longer have a higher reported income than younger ones. PPPs established before 1995 generated an average of \$73 million per partnership in 2008. PPPs established between 1995 and 2002<sup>189</sup> had an average of \$60 million in income and those established after 2003 had an average of \$19 million. Regarding partners, PPPs with the World Bank as a partner had an average income of \$139 million in 2008. This is a higher income than those who partnered with the United Nations or the WHO which had average incomes of \$62 million and \$24 million, respectively.

The institutional and legal characteristics show similar trends. In 2008, foundations generated a higher average (\$714 million) in income than partnerships with other forms of legal structure. In the same year, PPPs hosted by inter-governmental organisations had the second highest amount of average income at \$450 million per partnership. Partnerships registered as 501c3 organisations, non-profits, or charities generated, on average, less than \$17 million each. Partnerships with a high level of institutionalisation, on average, each generated \$155 million in 2008, more than twice the average of those with medium institutionalisation (\$70 million) and more than five times more than the average of partnerships with low institutionalisation (\$28 million).

**Table 7.9 ITPs Finances Summary**

<b>Funding</b>	<b>Sampling Frame</b>	<b>Hosted</b>	<b>Independent</b>
Average Grants & Donations	\$106.4	\$180.1	\$88.3
Average Income	\$109.8	\$163.5	\$100.9
Average Expenditure	\$105.3	\$188.4	\$88.3
Average Assets	\$338.7	\$782.9	\$273.9
Average Liabilities	\$163.5	\$403.3	\$132.8

*Figures in millions USD  
Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011*

### *Expenditures*

Partnership expenditures (reported for 43%) include the costs of managing day-to-day operations, fundraising activities, and communications amongst other expenses. Many PPPs' strive to keep this as low as possible, especially as to the management of the day to day

<sup>189</sup> GFATM is excluded as an outlier.



operations, yet it has been on the rise. The partnerships that made their finances publicly available spent a combined amount of \$7.32 billion in 2008 (\$4.7 billion excluding the GFATM), which is an increase from 2007 level of \$6.94 billion (\$4.2 billion excluding the Global Fund).<sup>190</sup> However, the average expenditure in 2008 only increased slightly: average expenditure in 2007 was \$92 million versus \$85 million in 2008. Interestingly, although the average increased, the median amount of expenditure decreased from \$9 million in 2007 to \$8.3 million in 2008.

Surprisingly, hosted partnerships spent more than twice the amount of independent partnerships. In 2008, the average hosted partnership had an expenditure of \$191 million where as independent partnerships, on average, spent \$89 million. As this may diverge from common expectations, this is an area worth further analysis but it requires detailed financials from the host institutions as well, which proved too difficult to include here. That said, further quantitative investigation should be made into the variation in cost structures to better understand operational efficiency in the public partnership landscape.

PPPs that have been established for longer spend more than younger PPPs. PPPs founded before 1995 spent an average of \$119 million per partnership in 2008, which was \$69 million for 1995 and 2002<sup>191</sup> and \$14 million for those established after 2003. Partnerships that include major international organisations as their partners experienced higher expenditure levels, on average. Those who partnered with the UN had an average annual expenditure of \$118 million. Those who partnered with the World Bank and the World Health Organisation had an average annual expenditure of \$144 million and \$224 million per partnership respectively. Partnerships in health and environment outspent partnerships working in other sectors. The average expenditure in 2008 was \$234 million for a health partnership and \$162 million for an environmental partnership. Other sectors such as sustainable development, culture or labour all had average expenditures of less than \$3 million per year.

Partnerships with a high level of institutionalisation spent an average of \$125 million per partnership, a greater average amount than institutions with a medium or low level, though when excluding the GFATM, this drops to an average of \$54 million per partnership. Partnerships with a medium level of institutionalisation had an average expenditure of \$94 and those with a low level had notably less with an average of \$16 million in 2008. Considering across legal structures, in 2008 PPPs hosted by IGOs and PPPs that were registered as

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<sup>190</sup> These figures do not include the Institute for OneWorld Health, the 4C Association, the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS and the Global Village Energy as they do not have publicly available financials for both 2007 and 2008.

<sup>191</sup> GFATM is excluded as an outlier.

foundations spent the most on average, \$554 million and \$544 million respectively. PPPs registered as 501c3 organisations spent an average of \$29 million per partnership and charities and non-profits spent \$11 million.

#### *Other Financial Information*

As with any organisation, partnerships have acquired assets and liabilities through investments that they have made, but the nature and extent of these assets and liabilities varies considerably depending on the type of partnership. Both total assets and liabilities increased from 2007 to 2008, and the combined total assets of all the partnerships was \$18.63 billion in 2008 and \$17.3 billion in 2007, and their liabilities combined to a total of \$8.6 billion in 2008, an increase from \$7.94 billion in 2007.<sup>192</sup>

On an individual level, partnerships are also accumulating more assets and more liabilities. On average, each partnership had assets of \$351 million and liabilities of \$170 million in 2008; this represents a 7% increase in average assets and a 4% increase in liabilities from 2007. When considering median amounts of assets and liabilities, it is clear that although averages are high, most partnerships are making investments on a smaller scale. The median liability is \$3.2 million in 2007 and \$3.3 million in 2008, and the median asset level is \$14.8 million 2007 and \$11.7 million in 2008. It was surprising to find that hosted partnerships carry both much larger assets and liabilities than independent partnerships, but to really probe this area, a full accounting audit of the hosts' financials would be needed to determine where and how these were being held.

Those who are partners with the World Bank had on average assets of \$786 million and liabilities of \$335 million in 2008 compared to those in partnership with the UN who had assets of \$481 million and liabilities of \$223 million. Those with the WHO as key partner had much lower average assets of \$14.2 million and liabilities of \$5.1 million. Assets and liabilities accumulated showed some relationship with function of the partnership. Partnerships engaging in coordination, on average, each had assets of \$1.3 billion and liabilities of \$660 million in 2008. Other partnerships, engaging in functions such as capacity building and advocacy have the lowest levels of assets and liabilities. Information exchange and information dissemination have the greatest amount of liabilities as a percentage of assets.

Older PPPs have accumulated more assets than younger PPPs but not necessarily more liabilities. PPPs established before 1995 had an average of \$308 million in assets and \$111 in liabilities per partnership. PPPs established after 1995 but before 2003 had an average

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<sup>192</sup> These figures do not include the Institute for OneWorld Health, the 4C Association, the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS and the Global Village Energy Partnership as they do not have publicly available financials for both 2007 and 2008.

of \$244 million in assets and \$141 million in liabilities. The PPPs established after 2003 had less assets and liabilities with an average of \$30 million in assets and \$12 million in liabilities.

Partnerships with a higher institutionalisation tend to accumulate more assets and liabilities than those with lower levels. In 2008, partnerships that had a high level of institutionalisation had an average of \$417 million in assets and \$199 million in liabilities. In the same year, partnerships with a medium level had an average of \$270 million in assets and \$130 million in liabilities, and those with a low level had \$40 million in assets and \$33 million in liabilities, with liabilities representing a much greater percentage of assets. The amount of liabilities that partnerships have also varies when you compare their legal status. In 2008, foundations and partnerships hosted within intergovernmental organisations had the highest amount of average assets (over \$790 million). On the other hand partnerships with other legal structures had much lower amounts of assets on average such as charities and non profits (\$13 million) and registered 501c3 organisations (\$10 million).

Partnerships working in the environmental field held more assets and more liabilities on average in 2008 than partnerships working in other sectors. Partnerships engaging in environmental work had an average of \$1.5 billion in assets and \$656 million in liabilities, while the health sector had the second largest average with an average of \$701 million in assets and \$360 million in liabilities per partnership. The amount of assets was significantly lower in labour and cultural sectors with average annual assets of \$772 thousand and \$396 thousand per partnership, respectively. As expected, the types of liabilities and assets accumulated by partnerships also vary considerably by sector.

Whether or not to make these investments – and carry the liabilities – are significant decisions partnership managers make, and though there are general trends, discrepancies still persist even across PPPs in similar areas. For example, PDPs make varying decisions regarding whether or not to rent, lease or buy research labs and facilities, as exemplified by the different paths to this taken by MMV, DNDI, IPM and IDRI. These are also decisions that change over time and fluctuate with the needs and resources of the PPP, as IAVI has varied throughout the years in how it approaches these decisions. IPM's CEO Zeda Rosenberg, for instance, commented that every decision is made regarding “whatever will bring a product to market fastest, be it whether or not to buy, lease or steal...” (MM Interview19).

#### *Financial considerations:*

Overall, there is a significant variety in the financial results shared by the partnerships with level of institutionalisation, function, independence, governance structure and main

partners all playing a role in their financial outcomes. Both hosted and independent partnerships engaging in the health or environment sectors spent more, attracted more grants, generated more income and accumulated more assets and liabilities than those in other sectors such as cultural or sustainable development. The differences suggest that the capital intensity of a partnership differs across sectors. As with all outputs tracked, while much of the variation shown here across PPPs may be only exhibited relationships and correlations rather than causal effects, when it comes to legal structure some aspects may be all or partly determined legally. The discrepancies across PPPs of different legal structures are thus expected, but the sharp differences across level of institutionalisation are rather striking, and this fits closely in line with this work's main hypothesis on the significance of these factors.

Truly addressing the questions regarding how much money is flowing to PPPs on an annual basis over the years tracked depends on how one counts income, grants and donations, which is currently handled differently across PPPs. Thus, while finances are an organisational output that in theory can be tracked and compared across PPPs, varying standards regarding financial transparency, ranging methods of reporting and the variety of functions in which PPPs engage means assessing these dimensions is far from clear cut. The emerging findings, especially regarding differences between hosted and independent partnerships and the differing ways in which similar resources are handled signify further qualitative and quantitative investigation should be done.

#### **7.4: Performance tracking, indicators and evaluation**

What the above organisational outputs do not do is analyse performance; instead, these outputs assess effects PPPs produce as institutions. This is certainly necessary but not sufficient partnership analysis. This raises the question of how one can move towards comparing performance across PPPs regardless of sectoral focus or functional type within these caveats. One step, and the focus of this section, is to analyse PPPs' organisational outputs *that address performance*. Specifically, this entails assessing how PPPs track, review and evaluate their own performance as well as whether or not PPPs have been subject to external and/or independent review.

Evaluation, tracking performance and reviewing partnerships is the subject of multiple works, as discussed throughout this work. There is a multitude of reviews and studies suggesting the PPPs need better systems of performance tracking, PPPs need to consider or apply common performance metrics or indicators, further that in general PPPs are lacking in most of these regards (OECD 2006). Yet with few exceptions, mainly case studies and in the

health and energy sectors, little is known regarding what tracking systems are set and utilised across PPPs at large. Outside of case studies, few works attempt to compare across PPPs and no work has gone outside of a small set of partnerships to assess the macro picture. While not attempting to compare performance across PPPs, this work tracks and compares aspects of organisational outputs related to performance and effects through specifically assessing the following elements:

- Internal performance review
- Establishment of performance indicators
- Evaluation
  - Internal, and
  - External, Independent

Before moving into the outputs tracked, it is useful to consider the most common, established standards regarding program or partnership monitoring, evaluation and metrics. Many PPPs and all that are hosted within the World Bank and or count the Bank as one its main partners are reviewed based upon OED criterion. The OED (1995, 23–24) assess monitoring and evaluation according to the following:

- Clear and coherent program objectives and strategies that give focus and direction to the program and provide a basis for evaluating the performance of the program
- Use of a results-based management framework<sup>193</sup> with a structured set of (quantitative or qualitative) output, outcome, and impact indicators
- Systematic and regular processes for data collection and management
- Independence of program- level evaluations
- Effective feedback mechanisms to reflect evaluation findings on strategic focus, organisation, management, and financing of the program

These dimensions are similar to those used to assess aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 2005 and Accra Agenda for Action 2008), and related dimensions and frameworks are more recently applied to large-scale evaluation attempts, such as the International Health Partnerships (IHP+ 2008). As these standards also mirror similar

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<sup>193</sup>Another overriding trend in global governance, especially from the World Bank and WHO is a focus on results-based management, whereas the management strategy itself should focus on the achievement of outputs, outcomes and impacts. This draws focus to developing indicators based upon outcomes, not just outputs and adopting more business-like approaches (OED 2004).

standards and criteria utilised by DFID, USAID and others, they provide a useful base for considering these performance-related organisational outputs across global PPPs.

Distinguishing between performance monitoring and tracking, performance reporting and evaluation is also needed at the onset,<sup>194</sup> as partnerships' efforts towards each regard vary to quite an extent. **Performance tracking or monitoring** involves tracking, collecting and communicating basic performance indicators. A strong performance tracking system will compare these indicators or metrics to an established base as well as those accepted and/or targeted results. Reporting these indicators involves the timely, relevant and useful communication of performance to stakeholders, which can be defined as the PPP's staff, partners, donors, funders and/ or the wider stakeholder community. **Evaluation**, on the other hand, is the systematic review of performance based upon established criterion and involves the collection of information on activities, characteristics, outcomes and impact used to determine the value of a specific program or intervention. As noted by the OECD, partnership-specific evaluations should articulate the objectives of the evaluation, scope of issues to be considered and participants involved in the actual evaluation (OECD 2006, 22). Evaluation implies subjecting the PPPs' work to a criterion or review that goes beyond documenting what happened but also reporting on performance and impacts, ideally in a way which provides value and/or guides future work.

Performance tracking is monitoring and noting what occurs while evaluation is assessing what occurred against a standard or criterion. These are still broad and encompassing terms. For example, evaluations can be program or project-based, thematic or institutional based or done so at a point in time or at the end of a partnership or project. Yet distinguishing between distinct elements of organisational effects is critical, as most PPPs lag on the latter elements of evaluation. Many confuse the two, assuming that as they regularly perform routine monitoring they are also evaluating their work.<sup>195</sup>

#### 7.4.1 PPPs and Performance tracking

PPPs' strengths – or lack thereof – in performance tracking to a large extent follow from the clarity and consensus that has or has not been established and articulated regarding

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<sup>194</sup> Within these elements of performance management are areas of performance review and constructive performance dialogues, but as these are management and process-based measures and difficult to assess across PPPs based on reported information.

<sup>195</sup> For more on monitoring and evaluation, see the *DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development Assistance*, OECD (1991), available at: [http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en\\_2649\\_34435\\_46032442\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.htm](http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_2649_34435_46032442_1_1_1_1,00.htm) as well as Glossary of Terms Used in Evaluation, in 'Methods and Procedures in Aid Evaluation', OECD (1986), and the *Glossary of Evaluation and Results Based Management (RBM) Terms*, OECD (2000). See also Charles and McNulty 1999 for useful guide applied to global programs.

goals and objectives. Performance tracking involves the internal monitoring of *both* activities and performance, though the distinction between the two is not commonly made. Monitoring is considered a basic component of all programs to assess whether or not resources are being spent and whether or not the program is delivering expected outputs (UNAIDS 2000; Wilson 2004) and a subject matter long at the centre of global programs, partnerships and alliances. Multilateral institutions, global bodies and national and local agencies and donors provide considerable guidance for global partnerships regarding performance tracking. For example, USAID identifies three criteria for performance tracking as follows: **validity**—the extent to which a measure actually represents what it is intended to measure; **reliability**—the stability of a measurement process; and **timeliness**—frequency and currency (Charles and McNulty 1999, 4). These same principles are readily applicable for performance reporting as well.

Strong systems to track, measure, monitor and provide feedback are obviously needed to gauge the effectiveness of partnerships. Monitoring should be performed for internal tracking and accountability but also to provide credibility for the institution; ideally, both monitoring and evaluation are also used to develop lessons other partnerships (or the partnerships' own partners) can utilise to improve their own programs, projects and institutions (see, for example, UNDP 1997; Macro International Inc 2009). Yet despite a multitude of toolkits and guidelines in this regard and their established significance, this is not the first work to note the gap between guidance and practice. Nor is this something confined to PPPs or development-based programs, as a review of strategic alliances finds: "The biggest reason many alliances do not succeed is a simple one: most organisations do not employ performance measurement concepts" (Anslinger and Jenk, 2003, 7; in Druce and Harmer 2004).

Not only does the definition of monitoring vary across PPPs, but its actual use in practice often diverged greatly from the system's stated intent. While assessing PPPs internal performance monitoring systems *in practice* is not feasible across all PPPs, mainly due to their marked variation and lack of transparency, as a proxy this work first assessed the existence of performance tracking. While not ideal, as it cannot be assumed that all PPPs that track performance also report performance or that all PPPs that report performance have solid internal tracking systems, there is obviously still a close relationship between the two; thus it is the best first indicator to use.

In this work, to classify as tracking or measuring performance, the PPP must explicitly report its performance to either the public at large, or its stakeholders, for example donors, funders, or host organisation. The criterion was that a PPP stakeholder should be able to

discern by accessing the PPPs' website, publications, donor reports or host publications what the PPP has achieved during the past year. The form of this reporting on performance evaluation could occur through any of the following:

- Annual reports with clear performance results noted
- Newsletters or updates on progress and/ or measurement systems
- Funder/donors memos, reports or letters
- PPP websites which note the performance gains undertaken (and this information is accurate as to within a year of being noted)
- Country/project reports on individual projects that track performance on a project basis

### *Findings*

Of the ITPs, 71% (104 partnerships) had discernable performance tracking and/or reporting. The majority of PPPs report performance through producing annual reports with clear performance results (57%) and 32% (85%?) track performance through newsletters. Funder and donor memos are less common as the sole source of performance tracking. PPPs also track performance via their website, as around half post progress updates directly onto their website in addition to publishing this information in newsletters or reports. Doing so allows PPPs to communicate more directly with their web-enabled stakeholders, as the information is much more accessible and more readily found than searching through all of the PPPs' publications and reports. Some also track performance via country or project reports, which are updates and progress on individual projects the PPP is involved with, but these do not discuss performance of the organisation as a whole. While most PPPs do some form of this, for 3% of PPPs in the sampling frame, for example, the Global Village Energy Partnership (GVEP) only tracks on a project basis.<sup>196</sup>

The main PPP publication of performance is an Annual Report, but these vary greatly and do not necessarily all mirror those considered standard in the private sector. The most comprehensive account of performance out of all the methods of publication, annual reports tend to cover the previous fiscal year and can range from a limited document to over 100 pages (average 40). Most follow a rather typical format of introduction, activity reporting and progress updates while around 75% also publish basic financial information. Interestingly, only 5% of the PPP's annual reports also include a work plan for the future. As previously noted, 38% of PPPs publish a separate strategic and/or business plan, though this is generally only updated every three to six years.

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<sup>196</sup> These PPPs are AED-SATELLIFE, EdInvest, Global Village Energy Partnership and Unicode Consortium.



Newsletters are the second most common source of performance evaluation but much more frequent overall in that the majority of PPPs publish one, generally on a quarterly basis though some are monthly and a few only bi-annually. While all can be downloaded from the PPPs' website, as mentioned, the ability to subscribe to the organisation's newsletter is also available for 40% of the PPPs. As newsletters are more frequent, they tend to have more detailed accounts of progress that the PPP has made on a particular project than annual reports, as they are the primary means of communicating project-based results. A few PPPs, such as the Unicode Consortium, report much of their performance through in-depth case studies of actions or activities being taken out by its partner or members, and these function more as specific or targeted reports rather than stakeholder updates.

*Variation across PPPs:*

Independent PPPs are more likely to track performance and publish performance updates than hosted partnerships. Many hosted partnerships only have a brief mention of their performance within their host's Annual Report rather than their own. For example, this is the case for Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI),<sup>197</sup> hosted within the Clinton Foundation as well as the Cisco Networking Academy Program. Those PPPs hosted by the World Bank have a very high performance tracking rate, as do those hosted by private companies, but of the PPP's hosted by a UN Organisation, only one-third (12 of 18) separately report performance.

Legal status and level of institutionalisation continue to matter in explaining variation. Those with higher levels are more likely to track performance, as are those registered as 501c3 charities in the US. PPPs that do not have their own website are less likely to have tracked their performance or at least made this publicly available, as only 45% of these do. For those that do, the information on performance is found within the hosts' website, such as is the case for Partners for Parasite Control which posts its quarterly newsletters on the WHO website.

Maturity also seems to matter, as the older the PPP the more likely performance is tracked. For those that were launched in 2000 or before, 79% tracked performance (59 out of 75), while for those PPPs established between 2001 and 2006, only 28% tracked performance (44 out of 159). There are many possible explanations: more mature PPPs also tend to have more projects and partners/members which to update regarding performance. They may also have more of an infrastructure in place for performance tracking. PPPs with more FTEs are

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<sup>197</sup> As a note, as of January 1, 2010, the Clinton HIV/AIDS Initiative became a separate nonprofit organisation called the Clinton Health Access Initiative (CHAI).

also more likely to track performance: of the partnerships with confirmed FTEs (87% of the ITPs), over 80% have tracked performance. This makes sense, as to publish progress or performance updates, PPPs' would need a minimum institutional staff capacity. If one considers this by number of staff, 42 PPPs have 30 or more full time employees, while 49 have less than 30. Of the PPP's with over 30 employees (42), 95% track performance while this is only 65% for those PPPs which have less than 30 employees (49 PPPs). There is also some variation by functional type (*Table 7.10*).

**Table 7.10: PPP Performance tracking and report by functional type**

Function	Total PPPs	Performance tracked/ measured			Percent Total
		Total	Hosted	Independent	
Advocacy	18	12	5	7	67%
Capacity Building	10	7	6	1	70%
Capital Provision	1	0	0	0	0%
Coordination	45	31	19	12	69%
Facilitation	11	8	5	3	73%
Info Exchange	24	18	8	10	75%
Information Dissemination, or Transfer	8	5	1	4	63%
Operational	7	6	3	3	86%
Setting Standards	16	13	4	9	81%
Policy and/or (its) Development	7	6	3	3	86%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>71%</b>

*Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011*

Finally, it is noted that this work utilised a broad definition of performance tracking: *this is a rather low standard PPPs must meet*. That is, PPPs only had to show highlights of performance or results, but projects and progress on activities, as well as activities undertaken by partners under the PPPs' name were included in this definition if the PPP considered these as performance. This is critical, as when moving forward analysing PPPs' performance, those that report solely based on projects – or activities of their partners - should be kept distinct from those that report on the PPPs' progress or performance for the organisation as a whole. Thus, that so many could not meet this minimum criterion is rather startling. While internal performance reporting, as well as PPP to host communication no doubt takes place, many will not see this as sufficient, especially given the promoted role of PPPs in global governance. Another critical distinction reporting individual partner's performance versus the PPP organisation itself, as the latter is more lacking. While it is true that many PPPs may only

serve a role as a coordinating body, and consider their role as facilitating the work of their partners, this still raises questions as to PPPs' value-add. If PPPs' only report on projects or partner work, how can one assess that these occurred only due to the PPPs' existence? Are they truly facilitating performance that would not have occurred in their absence? These questions gain importance with this work's findings that even basic attempts to demonstrate this are rarely made.

#### **7.4.2 Performance indicators**

An increasingly dominant tenet of partnership research and debate is the applicability, creation, implementation and then practical use of comparable metrics and performance indicators across PPPs. This work has already dedicated ample time to these discussions, especially in its argument that comparable metrics to assess organisational outputs are more readily applied and useful at this stage than performance indicators, so these debates are not restated. One key organisational output, however, is whether or not PPPs establish and utilise either common or specific indicators to monitor, track and report their own performance. Rather than review the indicators used by successful PPPs, or provide another summary of best practices regarding indicators, this work set out to assess what was actually in place across global PPPs.

Based on both quantitative and qualitative information, indicators should be utilised to determine how well the PPP is doing in meeting its objectives and solving the problems at hand, and indicators should report this in an understandable fashion both internally to the PPPs' staff and externally to its stakeholders. As indicators are used to both track performance and facilitate evaluation, a distinction should also be made between monitoring and evaluation indicators. Monitoring indicators involve those that set a baseline and report on progress. As the GFATM's recent evaluation and the IHP+ proposed common framework note, while the same indicators can be utilised for evaluation as well, with the former there is more emphasis on "the careful documentation of trends, with particular attention given to aspects such as attribution and equity." Core indicators are obviously needed for both, but the decisions regarding the investment to be made in data collection or the use of secondary sources of existing data (e.g. macro data on health impact and trends) may be more critical, especially as they are no doubt more time and cost intensive (IHP+ 2008).

While there is certainly no standard template which PPPs follow for establishing indicators, many utilise commonly accepted practices and guides. One common is the SMART framework (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Realistic and Timely

and/or Targeted) (see, for example, Crawford and Bryce 2003). Given the multitude of toolkits and guides which profess their necessity as well as the qualities strong indicators or metrics entail, it would be assumed all PPPs are not only familiar with appropriate metrics but also using them to report and guide performance. This work suggests that while common metrics are known and understood their practical use varies widely across PPPs. Again, this work purposely sets a broad (and thus rather low) standard for meeting the criterion of establishing or utilising performance indicators. To classify, *the PPP must articulate specific indicators or metrics it uses to track performance; this must go beyond noting what it as a PPP did and showcase to some extent how it measures or determines performance.*

### *Findings*

Only around half (46%) of the ITPs had established and publically reported performance indicators on their progress; typically PPPs have between three and ten indicators and these generally do not vary much over time. The low number is once again quite shocking, especially when considering the criterion used and that both organisational indicators and performance indicators were considered. As per the other outputs tracked, it may be the case that PPPs internally report and track with established performance metrics, but this is harder to believe if these are not communicated in any of the PPPs' documents or stakeholder/ external publications. Also, 41 of the PPPs report or track performance in some way (*see above section*), but they do so without using indicators or metrics; this again speaks to the PPPs' reporting performance through activities or updates.

While indicators are typically related to a PPP's goals or mission, indicators that establish clear attribution are less common. For example, the mission statement for the Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding Trachoma by the year 2020 (GET2020) is the "elimination of all avoidable blindness by 2020", and its main indicator to establish progress is to estimate the number of people affected by trachoma and see how this number has fallen over the years. But to show how this drops *due to their efforts* is obviously more challenging. The IHP+ Framework and its related work provide additional guidance on attribution (IHP+ 2008), but it acknowledges this is still an area lacking for many global programs and partnerships.

One of the overriding findings is that when it comes to impact-related goals, many PPPs publish macro-based indicators and data, usually in line with their varying work streams or focus areas, but cannot establish clear attribution to their work. Many do not try. Other PPPs note how their efforts directly affect the program at hand, but still neglect to provide the link

or relationship between their work and results. This is admittedly challenging, and an issue global development programs have long grappled with, but it seems despite their focus as more pragmatic, results-oriented institutions, clearly demonstrating these links is still an area where few global PPPs have made inroads.

From the management interviews it was discussed that PPP directors noted they have many opportunities to demonstrate outputs have occurred, mainly through review meetings, regular reports, and/or training sessions. While many can easily cite a coherent set or at least a list of outputs and know what indicators are accepted and understood, they acknowledge that when it gets to outcomes, it becomes more intangible. When considering the overall goal of the PPP and showing impact, staff and PPP directors admit how difficult it is to demonstrate progress, let alone that performance has occurred, especially when it comes to determining their degree of influence. Most acknowledge their work is simply one input amongst many, so for many, the strategy most often taken, is to show which related activities PPPs conduct rather than results.

Certain PPPs have advanced performance monitoring systems and related performance metrics in place. CGIAR, for example, has recently implemented a revamped system which notes its indicators across outputs (e.g. publications, capacity strengthening activities and data management strategies), outcomes and impact (Iskandarani and Reifschneider 2008). The GFATM (*Table 7.11*) in particular has developed a comprehensive performance monitoring, reporting and indicator system, which it regularly reports upon and modifies (Global Fund 2011). Another example of a PPP that utilises multiple indicators to measure and report performance across broad spectrums is the E+Co, an organisation which aims to create energy businesses that mitigate climate change and reduce poverty while generating financial returns, which has created a detailed methodology to determine and evidence its impact. To calculate the return on investment, E+Co measures its enterprises across a menu of 34 social, environmental and financial indicators (*Table 7.12*).

**Table 7.11 Global Fund performance indicators**

	Disease	Indicators for routine Global Fund reporting
1	HIV	Number of adults and children with advanced HIV infection currently receiving antiretroviral therapy
2	TB	Number of (a) new smear-positive TB patients detected, (b) new smear-positive TB patients who were successfully treated and (c) laboratory-confirmed MDR-TB patients enrolled in second-line anti-TB treatment
3	Malaria	Number of (a) insecticide-treated nets or re-treatment kits distributed to people and (b) households (or structures or walls) in designated target areas sprayed by indoor residual spraying in the past 12 months
4	Malaria	Number of people with fever receiving antimalarial treatment according to national policy (specify artemisinin-based combination therapy versus other therapy)
5	HIV	Number of women and men aged 15–49 years who received an HIV test in the last 12 months and who know their results
6	HIV	Number of HIV-positive pregnant women who received antiretrovirals to reduce the risk of mother-to-child transmission
7	HIV	Number of condoms distributed
8	HIV, TB and malaria	Number of people benefiting from community-based programs: specify (a) care and support including orphan support, home-based management of malaria and directly observed therapy (DOT); (b) behavior change communication outreach activities including specific target groups; and (c) disease prevention for people most at risk (except behavior change communication)
9	HIV/TB	Number of TB patients who had an HIV test result recorded in the TB register
10	HIV, TB and malaria	Number of people trained

Source: Global Fund, 2011

**Table 7.12 E+CO example performance indicators form**

Social and Economic Indicators	Environmental Indicators	Financial Indicators
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People with access to energy services</li> <li>• Households served with access to energy</li> <li>• Clean energy generated</li> <li>• Energy saved through efficiency measures</li> <li>• Jobs Sustained</li> <li>• Income Improved</li> <li>• Number of Investee Enterprises - Women ownership</li> <li>• Entrepreneurs trained</li> <li>• Customers and employees trained</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Carbon Dioxide Offsets</li> <li>• Value of Carbon Dioxide Offsets</li> <li>• Reforested land</li> <li>• Clean water provided</li> <li>• People with clean water</li> <li>• Charcoal displaced</li> <li>• Firewood displaced</li> <li>• Liquefied Petroleum Gas displaced</li> <li>• Kerosene Displaced</li> <li>• Oils displaced</li> <li>• Dollar Value of Oil displaced</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investment Funds disbursed by E+Co</li> <li>• Amount invested by entrepreneurs</li> <li>• Amount leveraged from third parties</li> <li>• Potential Growth Capital</li> <li>• Portfolio Return after write-offs</li> <li>• Amount repaid to investors</li> </ul>

Source: <http://eandco.net/impact/monitoring-and-evaluations-program/>

Others have established PPP-specific indicators. For the community water initiative, the SGP has established ratings of effectiveness to measure success in that they rate all their different projects on a scale of one to six, where six is highly satisfactory and one is highly unsatisfactory.<sup>198</sup> On the other hand, it is also the case that while macro indicators are published, the indicators collected and tracked by the PPP are these organisational-specific

<sup>198</sup><http://www.undp.org/evaluation/documents/thematic/sgp/Country%20Case%20Studies/Kenya%20SGP%20Case%20Study.pdf>

ones, and either partners or even overriding institutions (such as the WHO) are relied upon for the macro indicators.

Perhaps one of the most striking findings is that while PPPs articulate goals and objectives along performance lines, the majority of the indicators tracked were more organisational rather than performance, or even project, based. Many PPPs tracked indicators or set main milestones related to websites, increasing the number of partners involved and related business-type metrics such as publishing organisational documents. For example, the Equator Initiative or the Global Vaccine Alliances both had main indicators which revolved around creating the business plan and increasing partners/ members. For some PPPs, the main indicators relate to tracking the program's growth, such as the Cisco Networking Academy Program, or how many new partners joined. Also, as mentioned above, the partnering process or nature of collaboration are also assessed with metrics more so than actual performance dimensions, which reinforces existing findings regarding the persistent partnerships tendency to measure success through soft, qualitative metrics that measure the partnering process more so than the outcomes it generates (Witten Streck and Benner 2003).

Finally, many PPP specific evaluations are rather critical of the indicators in place. For example, an external evaluation done by the European Commission found that the Generation Challenge Program (GCP), which is one of the PPPs that receives funding from DFID, cited it does not have proper indicators in place. The European Commission stated that what the GCP notes as indicators are actually output milestones, and it was also criticised for not utilising the Logical Framework approach to management. A 2001 review of CGIAR was also critical of the practice in place, and the findings launched part of the reform effort that led to a revamped performance management systems and appropriate indicators, set across outputs, outcomes and impacts (Reifschneider et al. 2007). This same lack has been issued against many GHPs (Buse and Tanaka 2011), such as Stop TB, whose evaluation accused its deficits in performance management and monitoring to plague it the most PPPs (McKinsey 2008). This same critique could no doubt be applied to many of the global partnerships assessed here.

#### *Variation across PPPs*

Main partners and funders involved in the PPP have great weight in the indicators tracked. For example, of the 25 PPPs in the sampling frame which receive funding from the BMGF all track performance with specific indicators and also perform internal evaluations.

Nineteen of these are related to global health initiatives, and 90% of these follow progress along specific drug pipelines, clinical trial reports and related metrics. Of the 14 PPPs in the sampling survey that have received funding from the DFID, 11 track their performance, but only five of these PPPs have internal performance indicators established (of these four are in the health sector). In general, PDPs as a group stand apart in terms of performance indicators. Most establish clear indicators and metrics to track progress of their drug pipelines, project management metrics, reporting metrics and more recently metrics regarding communication and advocacy. As it is argued that performance metrics are more appropriate by PPPs engaged in similar functions and areas of focus, a state of play snapshot seems in order to determine if this is occurring now across PPPs. As such, this work conducted a brief meta-review of all indicators in place across the 147 sampling frame PPPs (*Table 7.13*).



**Table 7.13 Variation in performance indicators, by sector and focus area**

Sector of focus	Establish IPI/ Total	Examples of Internal Performance Indicators (IPIs)  PPPS within this sector tracked indicators relating to the following....
Agriculture	3 of 10	Quality of goods/products/food, response to global food crisis, response to handling disease in food outbreaks, success rate of seed development, measures of centre governance, culture of learning and change, and diversity (which indicate institutional health), greenhouse gas emissions, the number of new farms established
Business and Finance	3 of 7	Reach of social mission, general outreach, clients, information transparency, commodity market indicators (both domestic and international), supply chain structure, risk data  CGAP, for example, uses a methodology called CAMEL to measure performance: (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity management)
Disaster management (Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level (APELL))	1 of 1	Number of countries and communities that have adopted the APELL process; number of communities that have reached the stage of a full-scale practical drill  An external evaluation performed by the Association Nacional de Industriales (ANDI) identified other indicators could/should be response time of emergency services and industrial brigades, amount of equipment available for monitoring concentrations of chlorine, how well the alarm sounds can be heard, and how long ambulances took to reach victims
Education	2 of 6	Growth of education programs, number of students enrolled in educational activities, number of instructors, the number of private schools created, costs per student, test scores of students and retention and dropout rates
Energy	6 of 9	Most are macro-based, such as of energy consumption ; value-add or “are people getting their money's worth” from investments in energy efficiency  Other indicators include determining savings potentials from switching to different energy systems, the number of homes that have a particular type of energy system installed, assessments of the actual energy consumption of the regulated products, the level of consumer satisfaction with new energy-efficient models, and the impact of the program on individual manufacturers and their industry  Growth in renewable energies, growth in wind power, growth in photovoltaics, and power plant capacity for generating power from renewable sources
Environment	6 of 25	Benchmarking air quality, low carbon emissions legislation, levels of CO2 emissions, number of power sector upgrades, levels of promoting greater awareness, accountability, and

Good governance	2 of 2	Access to information/transparency and reducing corruption, whether or not country has a functional normative/regulatory body, existence of institutional development capacity, the country's procurement operations and practices are efficient, the country has effective control and audit systems, efficiency of appeals mechanism, degrees of access to information, the country has ethics and anticorruption measures in place, and the effectiveness of internal anti-corruption programmes
Health	29 of 45	PDPs (around 50% ) drug pipeline status and guidelines (e.g. various stages and phases, Pre-clinical development and clinical development)  Number of people affected with a particular disease, the number of people who have access to treatment, number of health professionals that have been trained, the development of particular diagnostic tests
Sustainable development	3 of 13	Number of biodiversity projects implemented, levels of energy greenhouse gas emissions, number of electric vehicles with available technologies in different countries, amount of educational campaigns on sustainable development, progress with lobbying governmental and non-governmental organisations to take up sustainable development issues and number of people involved in sustainable development activities
Tourism Tour Operators Initiative	1 of 1	Tour Operators Initiative has been collecting from the individual members 'good' examples of how a tour operator can effectively integrate the principles of sustainability into its various areas of operation
Transportation	2 of 3	City development plans, comprehensive mobility plans, comprehensive traffic and transport studies, creation of new transport systems, establishment of city partnerships, and risk factors such as seat belts, helmets, speed traveled and drunk-driving rates.
Water and Sanitation	5 of 8	Assessing water poverty and water productivity in terms of methodological developments, decision support information, and knowledge management, capacity strengthening, number with people with access to water supplies, sustainability of water services, and national and regional policy maker "awareness" of water and sanitation issues

Note: Insufficient indicators for PPPs involved the following sectoral areas: Cultural (0 of 1); Humanitarian (0 of 2); Infrastructure (0 of 2); Labour (0 of 1); Marine conservation (0 of 1) and Science and technology (0 of 1).

Source: PPP publications and reports

### Applying common metrics:

Finally, a continued and at times heated debate regarding partnerships concerns the necessity of common performance metrics or indicators. While the development of partnership performance indicators is seen as a key step in moving towards evaluating

partnership effectiveness, there is not a set of consistent or comparable indicators across partnerships, even those operating in similar focus areas. Not only are these difficult to define, it is not certain that partnership directors themselves want these in place (FSG Social Impact Advisors 2007).

Defining comparable partnership performance metrics is often seen as the holy grail of partnership research, but most acknowledge no one is close yet. Though researchers have attempted to make strides in this area for specific types of PPPs,<sup>199</sup> few have made much progress towards consistently applicable, feasible and measurable common indicators across PPPs. That said these are continually called upon to better compare and evaluate PPPs, provide guidance to donors and funders and enable a more common playing field of discussion to be laid. While there is little consensus around how to compare PPP effectiveness or even how this should be measured, there is more recent convergence around the possible success factors or best practices key performing PPPs employ. This work cannot give ample space or attention to the issues of common metrics, these are issues briefly returned to in the concluding chapter.<sup>200</sup> That said, it is difficult to know if factors relevant for some PPPs will hold value across sets of PPPs, or the universe as whole.

Another main question that arises from these discussions is whether there should be a **main body or organisation** responsible for setting PPP indicators, tracking and reviewing these and possibly issuing guidance or censure. For example, in the conclusion to their 2007 review of 28 GHPs, Buse and Harmer call for “simple assessment mechanisms [to] be devised to score GHPs on performance across a range of indicators” and they suggest the Centre for Global Development’s Commitment to Development index as one such model. The work also suggests the Global Forum for Health Research as one body that could serve as a coordinator and/or convener (Buse and Harmer 2007, 270). That said, this is perhaps a role few staff of the Global Forum for Health Research profess they wish to hold (PPP Stakeholder InterviewG). For environmental partnerships, there have been calls to create a new “world environment organisation to integrate existing international regimes and organisations into a coherent whole (Biermann 2000, 22-31). Pattberg (2010) also suggests creating a clearinghouse that could even be hosted within the CSD “that essentially would provide an

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<sup>199</sup> For global health partnerships, see *Faster Cures/ Social impact advisors 2007*, *International Health Partnerships+* and the Health Metrics Network (<http://www.who.int/healthmetrics/>). For agency specific PPPs, see Kaplan and USAID 2008 regarding USAID. See also Druce and Harmer 2004; OECD 2006 and Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2010, among others.

<sup>200</sup>As furthered in the conclusion, the PPP Platform Project at [globalppps.org](http://globalppps.org) resource library includes a body of toolkits, guides and relate performance, monitoring and evaluation resources in place within these PPPs as well as summary results of meta-reviews of these.

authoritative overview of the current landscape of transnational climate governance” (Pattberg 2010, 285).

### **7.4.3 Internal evaluation**

Internal evaluation is distinct from monitoring of progress and involves whether or not the PPP subjects its performance to some criterion or system of evaluation. The criterion used by this work to classify is as follows: *a PPP as subjecting its performance to some criterion of evaluation if there has been evidence that the PPP has been internally evaluated, has conducted internal evaluations or has a monitoring and evaluation system in place that is utilised (i.e. not just that done by an external or independent body)*. From the onset it is noted that this work is probably not capturing the full range of internal evaluations conducted within PPPs as many of these will not be documented or published external to the PPP.

While all PPPs who conduct internal evaluations must by definition monitor and track performance, the relationship does not hold both ways. Rather, despite the arsenal of toolkits and resources at their disposal to guide these processes, internal evaluation seems to be a persistently weak area for PPPs. Overall, 68 of the PPPs conducted or performed internal evaluations. Determining this was most accessible for PPPs which had internal Monitoring and Evaluation (ME) group/ departments, which only around 10% of the PPPs did (**Table 7.14**). These range considerably, though, as some are full departments within the organisation, others just dedicated staff time set aside for ME and a set of PPPs have overriding bodies of either partnership staff or governing members who advise on matters relating to monitoring and evaluation of the organisations’ activities and initiatives. Often this group provides technical advice on establishing indicators and data collection or even how branch organisations or partners can structure their own ME groups.

Those without ME groups often still conduct internal evaluations, though more common is to hold regular (quarterly or annual) evaluation and review meetings, which tend to coincide with board update meetings. Many PPPs also conduct impact assessment or regular internal evaluation events around workshops or retreats. Other examples are PPPs which publish program-specific evaluations, such as CLASP's Evaluate the Labelling or Standards-Setting Program, which monitors the program's performance to gather information to guide adaptations to changing circumstances and to clearly demonstrate to funding agencies and the public that the expected benefits are actually being achieved.

**Table 7.14: ITP with Monitoring and Evaluation groups and/or departments**

Partnership	Hosted?	Function
Agricultural Risk Management Team	Y	Facilitation
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	Y	Information dissemination & transfer
EdInvest	Y	Facilitation
Forest Stewardship Council	N	Setting Standards
Global Polio Eradication Initiative	Y	Coordination (of resources, expertise)
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program	Y	Info Exchange and/or Research
International Water and Sanitation Center	N	information dissemination & transfer
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS	Y	Coordination (of resources, expertise)
Marine Stewardship Council	N	Setting Standards
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative	Y	Info Exchange and/or Research
Project Hope	N	Operational
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership	N	Policy and/or (its) Development
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative	N	Facilitation
Vision 2020	Y	Coordination (of resources, expertise)
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against Corruption Initiative	Y	Setting Standards

*Source: PPP publications and reports*

*Variation across PPPs:*

The number of PPPs noted to have this organisational output is expected to be lower than simply tracking performance, but across types of PPPs there are a few noticeable trends. Independent PPPs make much more of an effort in internal evaluation, as information is verified for 53% while this is only 43% for hosted PPPs (only 22% of those hosted by a UN organisation published internal evaluation details. This is not to say that the PPP is not evaluated, many have been subject to external or independent review, but the PPP itself does not make transparent any means or efforts taken to internally evaluate its work. Regarding institutional structure, there are much higher rates for 501c3's, of which 58% published internal evaluation methods than for most other structures. Regarding function, those PPPs whose main function is Information Exchange, Operational and Information Dissemination have a much higher performance tracking rate (*Table 7.15*).

**Table 7.15: Internal evaluations conducted: Variation by functional type**

Function	Total PPPs	Performance subject to some criteria of internal evaluation			Percent Total
		Hosted	Independent	Total	
Advocacy	18	2	3	5	28%
Capacity Building	10	0	4	4	40%
Capital Provision	1	0	0	0	0%
Coordination	45	10	12	22	49%
Facilitation	11	3	0	3	27%
Info Exchange	24	7	8	15	63%
Information Dissemination or Transfer	8	1	3	4	50%
Operational	7	3	1	4	57%
Setting Standards	16	2	5	7	44%
Policy and/or (its) Development	7	3	0	3	43%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>47%</b>

*Source: TPD-Outputs, 2011*

The state of play in partnerships' internal performance tracking and review – as accessible by a stakeholder – is rather bleak. Though this work tracked partnership and funder documents, websites, publications and related resources, it is still difficult to find noticeable partnership performance, and even less so regarding evaluations conducted internally. A few expected trends emerged, mainly the higher rates for independent versus hosted PPPs as well as a correlation between level of institutionalisation and organisational-based performance outputs. Similar to financial trends mentioned above, PPPs with a formal legal status, notable those that are incorporated or 501c3 charities are also more likely to track performance with indicators. There are less noticeable trends in the tendency to track in function and sector than perhaps expected, but this could also reinforce that there is marked variation across PPPs even within specific functional or sectoral-focused types. The exception, of course, are those PPPs engaging in information/ research – notably the PDPs, who were stronger. That said, a few policy-based PPPs, such as the Alliance to Save Energy also had strong systems in place. While there was slight variation by main actors involved, it was hard to draw meaningful conclusions outside of those who partner with the BMGF and World Bank.

Regarding the low number of global PPPs with solid performance outputs in place, there are a few potential scenarios to explain these trends. One likely story is that many of these

PPPs *do* track and report on performance, but either due to not having an operational website, relying on the host organisation, or simply lack of PPP resources there is not an effort to make this information public. That said, this work's extensive internet searching, background academic and practitioner literature searches and review of the hosts' documents should have been more fruitful than they were if this was the case.

Many factors are certainly at play aside from the transparency of these processes, as part of the disconnect stems from many factors fundamentally tied to the nature of PPPs, mainly lack of staff resources, internal constraints or motivations. Another explanation is more pessimistic and draws as well on insights from the management interviews. One aspect that became apparent was that outside of a few notable exceptions of PPPs with best-practice indicator tracking systems in place, most PPPs tracked only basic indicators and generally in a less sophisticated and coherent fashion. Even those PPP' with comprehensive systems in place relied in practice on much more ad-hoc systems of tracking, and even less is done on the review.

Why is this the case? One emerging story in larger PPPs was that this was seen as removed from the Director/ leaders' roles and left to the project managers; thus, while it may be occurring, it would be very much dependent on the point person in charge and as such is more project based. Another reason often noted is difficulty in obtaining reliable data and indicators, which is certainly seen as a key impediment for better results and accountability tracking for health partnerships (Chan et al. 2010). That said, another common cited response was the existence of too much data. PPP managers know the sets of indicators that they should be tracking, but feel either there that are other organisations which can publish this data or that the macro indicators are too removed from their work.

Overwhelmingly, time and resource constraints are raised. Even more than lacking staff time and institutional capacity, however, these trends sometimes simply relate to the underlying motivations of the staff at hand, what is known as the "do tank versus think tank" argument. These motivated partnership staff want to be actively working on achieving the mission at hand, rather than documenting and reporting. This desire to be "doing" rather than "reviewing," can also lead to a constant state of activities, which may or may not be related to eventual PPP effectiveness. Further, the time meeting donor requirements on reporting performance metrics entails as well as the inherent nature of PPP work also often mean little to no time is dedicated to internal evaluation outside of monitoring and reporting. These are relevant and pressing issues, as the current trend from donors, funders and host organisations is to push for more performance reporting and tracking. While this work acknowledges there

is a severe gap in current practice and more should be published, a few considerations are worth raising: How much of this is lack of knowing what indicators to track versus lack of institutional capacity, or perceived necessity, to do so? On the other hand, there may be unexpected implications of an overly strong push for metric reporting as it can lead to the tendency to do only what must be reported. This could only further the activity versus focus disconnect just mentioned. Finally, though it is much less common, another possible implication cited by many as the more recent trend for PPP staff and leaders to leave the initiative, as they feel too much time is being forced to be report on metrics and indicators unrelated to core work. There are no easy remedies to these challenging issues, but they certainly deserve attention.

#### **7.4.4 External and independent evaluation**

While internal evaluation and review is critical, more attention is paid to the necessity of external evaluations and independent review, and the related lack of depth and quality of evaluation for global PPPs. External evaluations are those reviews conducted by an external or independent source in order to evaluate the quality or standards of the work of a particular programme or organisation. As defined by UNESCO: “The process whereby a specialized agency collects data, information, and evidence about an institution, a particular unit of a given institution, or a core activity of an institution, in order to make a statement about its quality” (Vlăsceanu et al. 2007, 56). Being subject to independent or external evaluation should be seen as critical to establishing and enhancing global PPPs’ accountability, both to their donors/funders as well as stakeholders at large. It is also perhaps only through respected and thorough evaluation that partnerships will establish themselves as effective and legitimate means of governance.

A macro view of the evidence as to whether PPPs are undergoing this formal review is not encouraging: this work finds that just 33% of the sampling frame PPPs had been externally evaluated AND this evaluation was either published or accessible or sent upon request (Full listing of evaluations in *Appendix F*). It is possible that more PPPs had commissioned an evaluation and/or an external review was conducted that this work could not assess;<sup>201</sup> that being said, this would question the transparency and perhaps ultimately the legitimacy of the evaluation. Interestingly, only around 30% of the time could this evaluation

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<sup>201</sup> For instance, during the process of the management interviews, this work discovered four partnerships which had an independent evaluation or review but this was not published or it had already been removed from the website (e.g. Lily MDR-TB Partnership) or it was only accessible to PPP members or a subscription base. While most of these works were willingly sent to the author after inquiry and during the course of the work, they are not tracked in the Accountability/ Transparency indicators.



actually be found within the PPPs' own website or publications, as most had to be sourced from publically available resources, internet searching or the evaluators' own websites and publications. In terms of the evaluators, there is no overreaching trend on who did the evaluations as many different organisations have been involved, for example DFID and the World Bank were involved in seven of them.<sup>202</sup> External evaluations are 96% of the time found in an official report, but in two cases (ACCION International and E+Co) the external evaluation was done by Charity Navigator, which only produces a summary sheet of overall ratings.

Of those that had been evaluated, less than a third (26%, or 14 out of 53) had more than one evaluation conducted, but a few of the PPPs had been subject to numerous review. Of those 14 PPPs that were evaluated more than once, the majority (93%) have an operational website, 86% produce annual reports and 93% publish regular newsletters or updates. All also have a governance system established. Interestingly, hosted PPPs are subject to just as much, if not more external evaluations, 39% of hosted had at least one conducted versus 31% of independent. There was a slight variation by functional type, with at least 40% of those involved in coordination, policy, information exchange, setting standards and information dissemination and transfer being evaluated compared to 10% or less for the other functional types. Age is another variable that exhibits strong correlation, as interestingly those between 11 and 20 years old have been evaluated more than younger or much older partnerships

**Key aspects of evaluations:** The evaluations ranged considerably in depth and aspects covered, but the majority covered the following:

- Activities – How well is the PPP achieving its goals? How successful has the PPP been at measuring their indicators? Are there indicators at all?
- Organisational structure – What is the governance structure? Is it effective? How often does the board of directors meet and is this sufficient? If the PPP is hosted, what is the relationship like between the partnership and its host?
- Internal performance review – How well does the PPP monitor its own work and progress? Is the PPP creating useful and practical indicators which can reveal progress? How transparent is the PPP in relaying information to its stakeholders, and to the public?

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<sup>202</sup> These were evaluations of the following: GVEP, Global Water Partnership, IAVI, MMV, Stop TB Partnership, Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor and the CGIAR.

The most common themes noted in independent evaluations are measuring impact, effectiveness and efficiency of the PPP at hand. Though the term effectiveness is used in varying ways, it generally referred to efforts to review basic performance and results achieved rather than those achieved against a set standard. While mission and strategy, organisational structure, and effectiveness of programs appear in all external evaluations, reporting on financial indicators is less common and only reported in around 40%. All independent evaluations are also accompanied with a set of recommendations, ranging from a few bullet points of recommendations to an in-depth report.

**Findings:** What is obviously more difficult to ascertain is whether or not these recommendations are taken into account. For most PPPs, this can only be tracked by noting references to changes implemented that are referenced in PPPs' next external review, which is the case for example, for MMV. However, in addition to the evaluations, seven of the PPPs<sup>203</sup> tracked explicitly responded with a management response, or noted later specific ways in which advice and recommendations of the external evaluations were taken on board. The tone from management was generally accepting of the evaluation, and in all cases confirmed that the evaluation was beneficial and that the PPP would work to improve upon the recommendations given. For example, the Generation Challenge Program (GCP) responded to an evaluation conducted by an External Review Panel by issuing a formal response describing ways in which it would take the recommendations from the review into account, especially in the areas of creating a clearer definition of indicators of success to facilitate monitoring the progress of the Programme, doing more to monitor and carefully manage indirect costs, and ensuring the sustainability of GCP products after GCP's lifetime. IPM also responded to its evaluation by, among other changes, making noted reforms to its scientific and technology advisory committee.

IAMI is another example of a PPP who not only consistently tracks and monitors performance, but it also reiterates its efforts towards constant improvement from the information given to them by external evaluators. IAMI has honed systems for monitoring and evaluation at multiple levels, but these were developed over time and are still a work in progress – a fact its directors admit to<sup>204</sup> – and often were altered in light of either internal or external review. That said, a recent five-year evaluation commissioned by the World Bank noted IAMI's strong learning environment intent on continuous improvement as well as

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<sup>203</sup> These were Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership; IPM; IAMI; Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership; Generation Challenge Programme; Forest Stewardship Council; and AED Satellite.

<sup>204</sup> As noted in MM Interview7.

IAVI's unusual degree of willingness to review its internal operations and compare itself to other organisations.

### **7.5 Concluding remarks**

Despite the vast amounts of attention and resources devoted to PPPs, we are far from having conclusive evidence as to their demonstrated effects. This work presents a common partnership framework to address this and focuses on the operational notion of effectiveness as effects, though the focus remained on outputs considered as both organisational and performance-based.

This chapter presented a comprehensive view of both aspects of effects across the sampling frame of transnational partnerships. On goal attainment, while all PPPs articulated a mission statement, they were less likely to have a guiding vision, which was at first surprising. The majority of PPPs did articulate their goals along more than one dimension of outputs, outcomes or impacts, though outcomes were the most lacking. As articulated in other reviews, large-n results reveal few made efforts to show how they would reach these impact-goals or attribute their work to any resultant performance.

What emerges is that even when it comes to organisational effects, evidence is quite limited. As expected, independent PPPs, especially those with higher levels of institutionalisation, were more likely to produce outputs, though variation in partnership age and main partners involved were noted. As a group, PPPs stood apart regarding many aspects of organisational outputs, though there were top and weak performers across all functions and sectors. Further, while the argument is often made that assessing partnerships is "best initiated and conducted as a conversation owned first and foremost by the partners themselves" (Caplan et al. 2007, 4), the ability of PPPs to track and report on their performance was found to be rather lacking. Striking findings regarding lack of PPP transparency also emerged, especially regarding financial reporting; however, even when it came to basic performance updates, many PPPs were also lacking.

These findings raise pressing questions, which should perhaps even caution the continued promotion of PPPs until more is known (and published). As a caveat much of the analysis here is based on reported information, or what is available in the public domain (or not held confidentially in the case of many reports when PPP directors were happy to share). Finding this information was an incredibly time consuming and frustrating task, not the least because this information changes so rapidly for the PPPs. So while one is cautious to be seen

as rewarding or punishing PPPs for having updated websites, if these institutions are indeed supposed to represent more legitimate forms of governance, then it follows that basic accountability, transparency and outputs should be established.

Finally, as continually articulated, what is lacking is a comprehensive review of the universe, or at least a non sector specific, large-n review of transnational partnerships. The many practical, methodological and theoretical difficulties remain, but these initial findings regarding input legitimacy and organisational effectiveness are not overly encouraging as to the current state of play.

**CHAPTER EIGHT:**  
**Towards an understanding of public-private partnerships: Promise, practice  
and potential of partnering**

Transnational partnerships launched onto the global stage with overriding aims of effectively addressing pressing challenges and filling governance deficits – gaps left where existing institutions and governing arrangements were inadequate. The problems and foci they addressed were ranging, and the forms these PPPs took were many and varied, but that transnational partnerships have now reached a rather prominent place within global governing arrangements is largely undisputed.

As introduced at the onset, transnational partnerships harbour overriding concerns regarding legitimacy. They are promoted for their promised enhanced problem solving abilities while simultaneously attacked for only lessening democratic principles, such as accountability or transparency, or even failing to deliver on their implementation goals. While there is evidence that global PPPs have indeed met some of their promised goals, the nature of these arrangements, their individual and collective impact and their role moving forward is highly debated.

This work did not set out to solve these debates or provide definitive answers to these overriding questions, but it certainly addressed them. Evaluating PPPs is both an analytical and an empirical endeavour, concerned with operations at multiple levels. Legitimacy and effectiveness are key concerns at all levels, and this work constructed a framework which encapsulated ranging foci of operating, from the micro to meso to macro levels. The resultant findings represent a solid evidence base to discuss notions of partnership variation, functioning and effects.

This concluding chapter proceeds by first reviewing this work's main findings while the next section addresses persisting theoretical, methodological and analytical considerations. The third section returns to the main questions posed at the onset: are PPPs effective and legitimate tools of governance? The next part reviews the limitations of this work and explores its unused potential as well as broader avenues for further research. The final section provides summary remarks on future directions for transnational PPPs and their study.

## 8.1 Key Findings

This work conducted a systematic study of partnerships to assess and compare the influence of PPPs at the macro, meso and micro level with varying levels of outputs. Analysing different levels obviously necessitated varying research strategies, and while this section reviews the main findings from component, one overriding insight that emerged from this work was the disconnect between the “published” and the “practice” level, which is to say that static listings and information sources, while valuable, are only a snapshot of the inherently complex picture that is the practice of transnational partnering.

### 8.1.1 Transnational partnership universe

One of the overriding empirical findings from this work speaks directly to the notion of transparency: there is simply too little that is known, or can feasibly be uncovered, regarding the universe of global PPPs. This relates to another striking finding concerning the state of operations of transnational PPPs. Considering that it has been six years since the Initiative on PPPs for Health (IPPPH) ceased operations; that almost 30% (114 of the original 404) PPPs sourced for the New Public Finance (NPF) Database have no evidence of operational activity post 2008; and 169 of the 348 PPPs hosted within the CSD-database have no information available outside of this (self-reported) listing, it is clearly time that as a research field we move forward from citing these now sorely outdated database listings. While some of these partnerships began with limited timeframes or completed their set mandate, for most there was simply no information to verify any form of operations or even mere existence. This is especially troubling considering the CSD-database, as so much of the current academic lexicon is based on this.

It is worth considering these initial TPD findings as intriguing in themselves. Questions emerge: are certain types of PPPs more or less likely to be operational than others? Are certain functional type PPPs more likely to have limited time frames? Does actor involvement seem to make a difference in terms of PPPs lasting? While caution is noted given these are merely correlations and all TPD findings have an overall transparency component built into the results, there are preliminary insights worth briefly noting.

For instance, over 60% of those PPPs originally engaged in capacity building are no longer operational, versus an average of 40% for all. Over 50% of PPPs that involved only government actors from the South are no longer operational, compared to 39% from the North only and 36% of those PPPs that initiated without any government actor. PPPs that were incorporated as charities or foundations, regardless of start year or sector focus, were more

likely to be operational and exhibit activity over their hosted counterparts. This is merely a snapshot; clearly there is some research potential within these findings alone. While continuance should not be associated with success, there are certainly underlying lessons regarding this large set of PPPs no longer operating.

### **Scope and focus:**

With this updated picture on the state of global partnering, another key finding was that the highest percentage of the PPPs have a primary **function** of coordination of resources (14%) and another 7% of advocacy. This raises the question regarding if PPPs are truly performance driven if a large majority do not even aim to deliver tangible performance outputs? These issues have been raised before in regards to the CSD-based partnerships (Andonova 2006; Bäckstrand 2006; Szulecki, Pattberg and Biermann 2010), but the results from the universe at large only amplify this disconnect between the promise of PPPs as implementation vehicles (Kara and Quarless 2002) and practice.

While this work cannot unambiguously address country or region of implementation since this is not tracked synonymously across PPPs, the TPD shows that close to two-thirds of the PPPs are located in Europe or North America. Of the sampling frame ITPs, almost half are located in Geneva, Washington, D.C. or London alone. Yet base location is only one element of the larger picture, as most PPPs have multiple operating sites, many of which are located in developing countries and the base from which operations take place.

As TPD data can now speak to issues of scale and scope on a new level, an avenue it provides is the ability to perform detailed PPP mappings; this means researchers can use the database to cross sector, function, scope, as examples, to reach categorisations of PPPs. For those concerned with possible PPP overlap and competition, this is significant as better information will not only show the state of play but also further address debates regarding if too many PPPs operating can lead to unnecessary overlap and struggles for a limited resource pool. Recall from chapter five that over 15% of the universe of PPPs performed only three categorical types: Health/ Information production; Health/ Coordination and Business and Finance/Capital provision. This is a bit alarming, especially if we consider the number of UN and IGO agencies and teams dedicated to the former two.

## **Actors and institutionalisation**

From the onset, the TPD shows that 42,175 partners are engaging within (operational) PPPs,<sup>205</sup> an incredible level of involvement in global partnering arrangements. It is left to the reader's discretion, however, to determine whether or not the finding that only half of operational partnerships were tri-sectoral (45% of all PPPs) was expected – or acceptable. It is also worth recalling that when considering representation on main decision making bodies, this percentage dropped to 21% for operational PPPs (16% of all). One finding that emerged was the perhaps heavier than expected representation of social actors, as close to 20% had public and social partners but no private. When further considering that this is based on claimed numbers and in reality many PPPs work with additional NGOs on the ground, this is perhaps more social sector participation than often argued, though the nature of this participation is obviously not discernable from documented sources.

A few other insights were immediately apparent, especially regarding the low level of **institutionalisation** across the universe of PPPs. This was especially related to the predominance of hosted partnerships over independent ones, as three-fourths were the former. Perhaps even more surprising was the limited information available to determine even the legal status or form of these initiatives. While an absence of legality may be proclaimed as one key feature of partnerships, lacking any formal base it seems that many of these initiatives also have relatively short time frames. PPPs can purposely be less institutionalised, as there are advantages to their flexible, networked forms, as expressed by many PPP directors. However, to perform effectively within these settings may require much stronger management capacity than is currently in place,<sup>206</sup> as furthered below.

### **8.1.2 Partnership Management**

This work's heightened emphasis on management bridges existing empirical, evaluative based partnership research that emphasises its significance (Lele et al. 2004; Buse and Tanaka 2011) with traditional theoretical constructs which point to its relevance. As the sixth chapter discussed, while long a factor in models accounting for regime variation, the significance of management procedures and processes was an overriding finding from the International Regime Database (IRD) project, which argued for the significance of procedural

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<sup>205</sup> There are overlaps within this number, for example this will count all PPPs in which the UNDP or World Bank are involved.

<sup>206</sup> While this was a key finding from the MM interviews, see Buse and Tanaka 2011 who make a similar argument regarding GHPs.



elements in influencing regime effectiveness (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006; Breitmeier, Underdal and Young 2009).

This work conducted a structured management interview based on a global management methodology to evaluate the internal management across 25 dimensions of practice. The findings were intriguing: overall, management varied greatly across the PPPs, but it was especially weak for hosted PPPs. PPPs were weaker on operational elements, but two areas in particular: 1) *Operations management*: adopting best practices and 2) *Performance management*: holding performance dialogues were the worst scoring across all PPPs. This is critical as it goes to the core of arguments that partnerships have a key role in enhancing learning and knowledge sharing. PPPs are promoted for their capabilities as learning forums, yet one of their two most noted weaknesses are learning/ sharing from other organisations.

Another finding that resonated was hosted PPPs' weaknesses in target-setting and planning, especially regarding performance and strategic issues, the latter being particularly weak. Perhaps contrary to popular perceptions, however, performance tracking was relatively strong across PPPs. That said, even the most institutionalised ones lacked the resources and/or capacity to review and discuss these performance metrics and reports, the stakeholder dialogues mentioned above. This is significant for PPP stakeholders, especially funders and hosts, as it implies there will be much less value in applying common metrics if they are not being utilised in ways which feed back into and improve the PPPs' work.

Those PPPs that were better managed shared a few characteristics, in general they were independent, had higher levels of institutionalisation, and more than one layer or body of governance. The relationships between the boards and operational staff also seemed to matter, as the better performing PPPs were provided with guidance on strategic and technical issues but had an appropriate amount of autonomy which allowed them to make necessary operational decisions in a timely manner. These are not necessarily surprising findings, but what is striking is how much these were exemplified in varying ways across the partnerships.

Finally, though this work did not set out to explicitly do so, there is a constant quest to compare performance across PPPs, or output legitimacy more broadly. In addition to its existing value, it could be argued that the findings from the MM interviews are another proxy that speaks towards comparative performance. It is firmly established that well managed institutions, in both the public and private sector, perform better, across multiple indicators of performance (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010). Better managed firms have higher profitability, sales growth and – significantly – survival rates (Homkes 2011). Hospitals with strong

management are safer, better performers financially and have higher levels of patient and employee satisfaction levels (Bloom et al. 2010b). It is perhaps not too much of a stretch to suggest that practices that matter in the public, private and social sectors also matter when combining these sectoral-based actors together in an institution.

### **8.1.3 Effects**

Though the focus remained on tangible effects in this work, the findings speak directly towards PPPs' efforts towards both problem solving and goal attainment effectiveness. Since it is argued that PPPs are increasingly justified based on their ability to achieve goals set out (Bull and McNeill 2010), the Goals database was a necessary exercise. PPPs are promoted as development engines focused on pragmatic delivery and implementation (Inanova 2003; Andonova and Levy 2003; Mert 2008), yet the Goals findings showed that many PPPs do not articulate goals or mission in these terms. The analysis also revealed lacking precision in articulation of goals and missions, clarity obviously necessary to further assess PPPs' actual goal attainment. As most existing frameworks, both academic and practitioner focused, segment effectiveness into outputs, outcomes and impacts (Biermann et al. 2007b; OED 2004; IHP+2008), whether or not PPPs' articulate their goals in these ways should be understood. Not only did this work show that only 44% of PPPs aim towards all three, the majority struggled most to clearly articulate outcome, or behavioural level, goals.

More fundamentally, this work's findings revealed two clear disconnects. The first is a mismatch between articulated goals and the activities in which the PPPs' focused the majority of its time and effort. The other striking and related finding is that when considering PPPs' articulated goals against their institutional setting and organisational outputs, there is an exemplification of the "expectations-capacities gap" (Elsig and Amalric 2008, 403), which is a disconnect as despite the overarching aims expressed by PPPs (72% articulated impact oriented goals), many had not established the institutional capacity to realistically work towards these.

Organisational outputs - such as developing a business plan or articulating rules for partners joining - speak to problem solving, as these reflect PPPs' capacity towards performance delivery. That across all PPPs, especially those that were hosted, these elements of institutional effectiveness were so lacking (Bäckstrand 2010), is clearly an issue when addressing whether or not PPPs will gain legitimacy based on their performance. A significant finding was that the PPPs that were the most institutionalised were also those that produced

the most organisational outputs, had highest levels of transparency and accountability and tracked and reported their performance.

Though this work argued that assessing and comparing problem-solving performance is perhaps best done at the functional level, the applicability of organisational effects in speaking towards these was clear. This is especially the case as organisational outputs could be tracked across PPPs, regardless of sector, function, duration or partners involved. When this work did speak to performance, the findings were not optimistic.

Though PPPs are promoted as delivering results-based government, reviews consistently note the strikingly low number of GHPs or CSD-based partnerships that conduct internal evaluations or impact assessments (Utting and Zammit 2006; Buse and Harmer 2007); a finding this work confirms across the universe of PPPs. While 70% tracked or articulated performance in any form, this could have been as limited as their organisational-based goals or activities completed. Only one-third of the PPPs had been externally evaluated, and while the majority reported or tracked performance in some way, fewer did so with well articulated metrics.

There is still a lot to be said. At the end of the day, effects and outputs are variables, and these do not get to the question of whether or not PPPs have made (or make) a real difference. To get closer to this, one could do a meta analysis of the external and internal evaluations, which as briefly mentioned in the second chapter is included as part of the online resource library of the PPP Platform Project.<sup>207</sup> Even this or similar exercises, however, self-selects PPPs that have been evaluated, which in itself may bias the results towards those that are better performers.

## **8.2 Theoretical implications, analytical tensions and methodological consideration**

While this work does not explore PPP effectiveness on a large-n basis, the findings and analysis certainly suggest it is time to move PPP studies from general discussions regarding reasons for PPP emergence and their resultant diversity and instead place more emphasis on analysing the specific drivers of this variation, especially as to how this variation impacts the degree to which PPPs matter. This present subsection discusses the relevant analytical, theoretical and methodological considerations this analysis entails.

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<sup>207</sup> As mentioned in earlier chapters, this analysis was not included within this work due to space and fit, but from January 2012, all PPP external and internal evaluations as well as financial and annual reports can be directly downloaded from [globalppps.org](http://globalppps.org).

### 8.2.1: Analytical considerations

Despite ongoing normalisation of PPPs within global public policy, they continue to be approached from varying perspectives and diverging schools of thought. While this has led to conceptual and certainly terminology-based disarray, it also represents a real opportunity. Substantial progress towards understanding and evaluating partnerships has been made within the fields of public administration (especially that associated with New Public Management), political science, economics, management and organisational studies and international relations more broadly. Yet, with the exception of a few recent edited volumes which draw together varying approaches (Glasbergen, Biermann and Mol 2007; Bexell and Mörth 2010) and a few exceptions in health partnership evaluations (Buse and Harmer 2004), utilising mixed approaches is still rare.

This is puzzling: the set of academics, practitioners and scholars studying partnering institutions, which are based on resource sharing and cross-sector learning, is lagging in applying these collaborative principles to their own research! Rather than contradictory, however, these approaches should be seen as complementary. There is considerable value to be gained by broadening the sense of applicable analytical tools and methods. Indeed, the marked diversity of PPPs and their complex character necessitate a cross-disciplinary focus, as this work attempted with its multidisciplinary approach.

A few analytical limitations regarding the approaches taken are worth noting. First, it could perhaps be questioned whether or not the process of TPD creation was even necessary. Since PPPs are so divergent, often temporary and lacking in common or consistently utilised terminology, is there even a need to attempt to numerate and define the universe? Many would suggest not. Yet this work argues that to move the study of partnerships forward, this empirical exercise was necessary. In order to advance both the theoretical and normative understanding of PPPs, researchers should start from a more informed base of what truly constitutes the current practice of transnational partnering, even if this is subject to change. This means not only updating our knowledge base but also moving comparative studies beyond those that are only CSD-based (Biermann et al. 2007a), health-focused (Caines 2005) or UN-Business partnership centered (Martens 2007; Gregoratti 2010).

Another overriding analytical concern relates to the partnership unit of focus. Given, the varied terms and notions surrounding what constitutes a partnership – even to the PPP directors themselves - conceptual clarity is lacking. While this work attempted to focus on the PPP institution itself, this was challenged throughout, not the least due to the role many PPPs take as facilitators and convenors across partners and other institutions. Definitional precision

and a narrowed conception were obviously necessary. However, this implies the findings are limited in their explanatory power, as this work cannot capture effects across the respective partners or those stemming from branch or country operations, as examples.

Also critical is that partnerships, like regimes, “make a difference by shaping the ways participants frame issues, define problem solving strategies and evaluate results” (Breitmeier Young and Zurn 2006, 234). It is difficult to firmly say we have the right techniques to account for this, though the relevance of doing so became apparent throughout, especially as so many PPPs saw their role purely as facilitators of relevant partner actions. Though the organisational outputs assessed did not reach these conceptions, the MM interviews may have a role to play in capturing these elements. Yet it is critical to remember that the MM analysis clearly showed the difficulty many PPPs face in capturing knowledge learned from other institutions, or even their own partners. Most struggled to facilitate interaction on their own terms rather than those mandated by donors or host organisations.

While the pragmatic approach utilised had the advantage of separating the process of identifying effects from making judgements regarding relative effectiveness. That said, one could debate whether these organisational features should be considered outputs at all. For one, these were comparable assessments of institutional effectiveness which assessed aspects of PPPs institutional capacity. That they were lacking in so many PPPs, implies that not only are these justifiable, but they are a needed starting point in assessing effects. This is especially true as these speak both towards procedural or input legitimacy as well as the partnership’s performance-delivery capacity.

Given this work’s framework, many of the findings and exhibited correlations were expected. Since the outputs assessed were organisational-based, it is not surprising that PPPs with higher levels of institutionalisation exhibited higher levels of outputs. Another issue is that given the methods utilised for information collection, overriding elements of input legitimacy – especially transparency and external accountability - are necessary to assess PPPs. Gathering the related information or determining operational activity is only possible with published information, websites or verifiable contact information. Thus a strong correlation between input and output legitimacy is not just expected, it is largely predetermined.

This is not necessarily an issue, though, as this work did not set out to evaluate performance but only speak towards performance with its maintained focus on institutional effectiveness. Further, this work was not looking specifically to test hypotheses but rather to expose and analyse variation across PPPs. Moving forward, studies will hopefully feed this

information back into more refined models that do speak towards the relationship between inputs, input legitimacy, processes and outputs in a more targeted fashion.

Those who approach these governance entities from a constructivist perspective may argue that as PPPs are so deeply embedded within a broader institutional or societal setting, keeping the focus at the individual level is insufficient. This limitation is certainly acknowledged, and this also entails that this work is not able to consider partnerships' interactions with other institutions and PPPs, or institutional interplay. PPPs by nature are embedded within complex governance systems, where roles, aims and foci may not only be overlapping but also competing. Institutional linkages and the embeddedness within system more broadly are areas of significant and growing concern (Young et al. 1999/2005; see also Selin and VanDeever 2009), especially in relation to health system impacts of GHPs, which this work is not able to fully reach.

As the key focus in this work was on explaining variation, and not evaluating effectiveness, some of these analytical tensions may be slightly less of a concern, but the significance of understanding linkages, especially as they may lead to cumulative impacts, should not be understated. While the general shift is moving towards evaluating system-wide versus PPP specific effects (Stillman and Bennett 2005), this is still in early days and largely regulated to GHPs. While analysing multiple dimensions across many PPPs which this work does holds value, there is a need to develop knowledge regarding the effects of PPPs together.

### **8.2.2 Theoretical implications**

PPPs sit at a crossroads of crosscutting research motivated by fundamental questions regarding the role institutions play as determinants of societal outcomes. While PPPs do not fit clearly within the lexicon of institutions, organisations and regimes, they are not radical departures from these traditional conceptions. Given that partnerships are promoted to meet specific governance demands created by gaps where existing, traditional governing arrangements are lacking, it quite naturally followed to conceptualise partnerships as social institutions. Doing so provides a clear linkage to social sciences theories associated with the new institutionalism, from which this work drew heavily in developing its theoretical framework. Such perspectives not only highlight the roles institutions play, but they also further support the need for ongoing studies and assessments to account for the variation that institutions exhibit, especially as it relates to their outcomes.

It is worth now reflecting on the theoretical implications of this work's findings, especially given the developments of institutionalist theory more broadly in the past decade.

This discussion proceeds by revisiting these traditional constructs; linking partnership studies to more recent developments within institutionalist studies; and finally placing transnational partnerships within broader theoretical pictures while highlighting additional possibilities for further theoretical synthesis.

Revisiting constructs: At the onset, it was suggested that while general debates about power, interests and ideas, or realism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism have a role to play, alone these constructs could not fulfil the theoretical needs or analytical task at hand. This was not startling: regime theorists have long called for institutional research to move towards understanding the “specific causal mechanisms” which would lend more value to analysis than “general appeals to the role of power, interests or ideas as master variables” (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006, 248).

As neorealist accounts give less credence to the role of institutions, they are perhaps less useful when attempting to explain variation in design and effects (Waltz 1979). However, the relevance of power approaches cannot be cast aside, as “questions of power go to the heart of much that is contentious about PPP[s]” (Buse and Harmer 2004, 50). Power-based accounts consider institutions as steering instruments, whose purpose is in furthering the interests of their most powerful actors. As the second chapter discussed, these approaches align with critics who accuse PPPs of being vehicles through which these power players shape the global health agenda; some say this is in furtherance of neoliberalism that promotes corporate globalisation (Utting and Zammit 2009). Power and interests are obviously inherently linked in these accusations, as it is argued PPPs are mechanisms through which dominant players reinforce their hegemony. This is especially articulated regarding the UN and its relevant agencies (Utting 2002) as well as top funders, notably the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) (McCoy and McGoey 2011).

Unfortunately, the macro-level, systemic elements of this work cannot speak directly to these arguments, except as to relative actor involvement and decision making structures. Yet while these macro pictures speak towards these debates in terms of statistics and positions, the reality is that the relationships between members, the dynamics involved and influence of both internal processes and practices and external environmental context matter to a great extent.<sup>208</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> As introduced in the fourth chapter, in addition to the MM interviews, this work also conducted a set of semi-structured interviews with the directors/managers of four PDPs. While this discussion and related analysis is not included within the current work, these detailed conversations allowed for this work’s basic framework to be empirically drawn out on a micro level. Even within this narrow set of PDPs there was marked variation in organisational design, partner requirements, management practices, and perceived level of effects, as examples. The process of conducting set MM interview as an initial diagnostic and then following up with these interviews was also revealing and married the overriding theoretical base of the approach with focused empirical study. These are areas this work is continuing to explore.

These internal partnering dynamics manifest themselves in varying ways, many of which this work's MM interviews were able to capture. Clearly there is a need for more comparative, empirical works capable of assessing this systematically, which would allow us to move forward from partnering rhetoric and to get to the practice level, as furthered below.

Certainly retaining value, neoliberal institutionalist perspectives lent much in building the utilised framework. Specifically, this work drew from a well developed body of literature that explains variation in institutional scope, centralization, decision-making rules and flexibility as a function of distribution and enforcement problems, the number and asymmetry of actors involved, and uncertainty (Koremenos et al. 2004). While on a large-n basis, these variables could not be fully explored within each PPP, clear relationships emerged between types and number of actors involved in the PPP and the issue area of focus with different governance and decision making structures, and notably, different choices made regarding institutional design. The impact of institutional design, especially related to entity type (hosted vs independent) and level of institutionalisation were overriding explanatory variables in this work's findings. For example, higher levels of institutionalisation were most strongly correlated with organisational outputs, financial performance and PPPs' tendency towards performance tracking indicators.

This work's findings reinforced its earlier arguments regarding the necessity to move beyond rational actor calculations. Actors do not always choose to join or interact within PPPs according to well-defined models. These accounts would expect rational, efficiency seeking actors to create fairly similar institutions; the universe of PPPs shows this is clearly not the case. Partnerships were often operating in the same functional area with similar actors, yet exhibited great variation regarding institutional design, organisational structure and certainly level of outputs and effects produced. Even the cases of PDPs, with narrowly defined foci and the same actors, designed themselves in highly divergent ways and have also achieved varying levels of perceived and actual performance. Thus, while power and interests are critical elements, both in describing the partnering phenomenon itself and in understanding its internal dynamics and workings, they are less valuable as explanatory constructs. Especially on a large-n basis, they have less predictive value when it comes to the resultant forms taken, decisions made and effects produced by PPPs.

As the second chapter discussed, constructivists bring ideas into the picture. These accounts conceptualise the emergence of PPPs not as the product of most powerful interests, nor the result of self-calculating actors pursuing more legitimate and effective governance outcomes, but rather due to the evolution of shared ideas (Wendt 1999). These accounts



associate PPPs with a dominant discourse which pushes a “win-win” synergistic relationship between public and private actors. Once these overriding ideas become fixed within the popular lexicon, they are rarely questioned, and this prevents the proper assessment of alternative approaches (Buse and Harmer 2004, 51).

It is becoming more common to apply these approaches, and there is clear explanatory value in these, especially where functional accounts fail to fully account for PPP emergence.<sup>209</sup> Considering the surge of PPPs, especially in the three year period following the WSSD, despite lacking evidence of their effects – or even their mere operation – furthers these arguments. Bäckstrand further argues that CSD-based partnerships represent a partnership discourse which (still) does not manifest itself in practice,<sup>210</sup> and while the CSD partnerships have furthered transnational activity, they remain “business as usual” (Bexell and Mörth 2010, 218), a finding echoed most notably when considering GHPs (Jonsson 2010).

When it comes to explaining the PPPs’ resultant variation and internal workings, these accounts add less value. Still, the utilisation of discourse analysis<sup>211</sup> in partnership studies is proving increasingly relevant, especially as more recent work on CSD-based partnerships (Mert 2008) argues that discourse can account not only for their emergence but also the varying institutional forms they take. Outside of CSD-based partnerships or subsets of GHPs, however, these accounts have not been fully tested empirically. It is also likely they will continue to be insufficient alone in attempting to explain institutional variation, especially when it comes to effects or performance more broadly.

There are intriguing possible applications moving forward. This work’s MM interviews are tangentially linked to similar constructs, and as continued works reveal the relevance of these approaches to partnership analysis, the ability to incorporate this more solidly into the theoretical framework would be significant. Similar linkages have been made regarding regimes, such as Litfin’s (1994) work on stratospheric ozone, which showed how programmatic activities played a role in altering the discourse in terms of which problems are discussed. Clearly partnerships, as regimes, engage in problem definition, but it is through the internal workings and management that the full “content of the set of problem solving strategies considered” (Breitmeier Young and Zurn 2006, 233). Moving forward, it would be

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<sup>209</sup> See Andonova 2006 and 2007 among others for arguments debunking functional arguments regarding PPP emergence, as discussed in chapter two. The fifth chapter of this work furthered this argument, especially in that sectoral breakdown and actor involvement across the universe of PPPs.

<sup>210</sup> Bäckstrand also argues that rather than the rise of privatisation, the CSD partnerships only further reflect, continued power of IGOs, who “have found new tasks in being facilitators and administrators,” a finding this work reinforces over the universe of PPPs (2010, 163-164).

<sup>211</sup> See, among others, the edited volume by Böcher, Giessen and Kleinschmit 2007 as well as Van Huijstee and Glasbergen 2008 as applied to CSR.

interesting to investigate ways for the integration of these IR-based constructs and perspectives into a revamped MM grid to clearly speak to this theoretical camp.<sup>212</sup>

Since these theories suffer most when considering partnerships' inner workings, this work incorporated organisational studies, management perspectives and behavioural economics constructs, which allowed for a more robust exploration of variation in and across PPPs. The applicability of this work's MM interviews, which probe into these dimensions in a structured way would allow for a more grounded integration of these studies. As an analytical tool and methodological exercise, these could perhaps allow the discipline to bridge between current IR-based attempts and a set of useful models and theories linking organisational design, management and performance.

From institutions to governance: While the new institutionalism is approached from several distinct analytical strands,<sup>213</sup> the intellectual capital these approaches provide was obviously critical in developing this work's underlying framework. Two particular strands on the role of institutions, the collective-action perspective and the social-action perspective (Young 2002b) were explored, especially in the sixth chapter when discussing the management versus enforcement approach to compliance (March and Olsen 1998). The logic of appropriateness versus the logic of consequences have long been tenets of institutional research, ongoing work on the institutional dimensions of environmental change (Young, King and Schroeder 2008) has more recently found increasing relevance of a third strand, termed the knowledge-action perspective. This emphasises the role of leadership, knowledge brokers or "partner champions," and governance systems more broadly (Breitmeier, Young and Zurn 2006). While these three perspectives have not yet been fully merged into a unified theory of institutions, researchers are beginning to use all three simultaneously to explain variation in institutional success or failure. Developments of the knowledge action approach, especially if married with current ongoing research on PPPs, could prove of considerable value in providing a more coherent contextual base for partnership analysis, as well as lend much more value in explaining not only institutional variation but persistence.

These constructs sit with partnership research in a broader stream of studies considering the success and failure of governance systems. Partnerships, as institutions, emerge to fill the "demand for steering mechanisms to guide societies toward outcomes that are socially beneficial and away from outcomes that are harmful" (Young 2008, 14), and in doing so, become elements of governance systems more broadly. Perhaps the most critical application

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<sup>212</sup> As discussed in chapter six, the MM interviews provide a clear structured, conceptually sound way of capturing these responses, coding, scoring and comparing them.

<sup>213</sup> See, for example, March and Olsen 1989 and Scott 1995.

relates to recent developments within institutional research associated with the trend to move concern from institutions to “governance,” involving the consideration of beliefs, norms, cultures, and wider stakeholder interests as well as the institutional and environmental setting (ibid, 15). This implies, as this work also argues, that while the transnational partnerships analysed throughout this work have a governing role to play, their forms, functioning and ultimately performance will be strongly conditioned by the environments in which they operate.

Broader context: In attempting to place PPPs within broader debates, the issue of defining the interests at play emerges. This work has argued that hybrid forms of transnational governance challenge existing frameworks, but the terminology behind this hybridization – the public versus private distinction – should perhaps also be challenged. The findings emerging throughout this work support Dingwerth and Henrieder’s (2010) more recent argument that focus should be on normative spheres of governance rather than sharply defining public and private actors as those holding public and private interests.<sup>214</sup> This is a critical distinction, and one this work supports, as the macro level analysis here showed the necessity of separating terminology from practice when defining sectoral actors.

That said, perceived moral authority, which stems from these held distinctions, cannot be understated. Many PPPs partner with certain institutions, notably the WHO for PDPs, because they feel that given the political or socioeconomic environmental context in which they operate, having this partner named is necessary. Thus most of the PPPs noted that rhetoric and labels still mattered on a macro basis.

At the same time, should we still be considering democratic notions from a state-centered perspective, especially considering many PPPs had very little state involvement in the actual workings? Should we still start with these traditional IR constructs as a base if the borders between state and society continue to blur? This echoes arguments made by Bexell and Mörth (2010) who argue that we need to rethink fundamentally the locus of democratic responsibility and let go of its state-centric focus” (2010, 223). If there is truly a reconstitution of the public domain (Ruggie 2004), and the notions of public and state can no longer be assumed, then there is a need to deepen our understanding of these implications. Especially as we should perhaps no longer use public and state interchangeably (Bexell and Mörth 2010, 223), it may be time to move the field forward. This would require more micro-level, large-n, comparative research, however, a point section 8.4 returns to.

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<sup>214</sup> This work’s MM interviews reinforced this point, as though the distinction between public and private, both in terms of staff and donors, often arose it was almost always in relation to ways and modes of working rather than normative ideals and values.

Expanding the toolkit: Finally, research is obviously dynamic, both as to its subject matters and the body of theory which surrounds it. Though there is an inherent risk in expanding one's theoretical toolkit, it is worth further considering the relevance of existing bodies of theories from the management disciplines, specifically on corporate alliances in transnational partnership research.

This is certainly not the first work to point to their relevance, but as partnerships become more "firm" focused, and as donors push for more tangible, organisational outputs, it is fair to argue these models will continue to gain more credence. As the third chapter argued, there are many applicable frameworks speaking towards firm organisation, structuring and organisational dynamics, and specifically how these speak to variations in performance, which should rightfully be brought more fully into PPP works, especially as these are more developed on the national level.<sup>215</sup>

What is also interesting, and only emerged throughout the course of this work, specifically through the conversations surrounding the MM interviews<sup>216</sup> is the relevance of emerging body of works focusing on theory and practice of private-sector based start ups. It is intriguing how many characteristics PPPs and these firms share, in terms of size, scope and learning phases, as well as heightened level of "death" (lack of existence). Are there applicable lessons, in both theory and practice? As an interesting example, while it is often argued PPPs' need clear, well articulated business and strategic plans, a recent study of three hundred private sector start-ups found that sticking with the initial business plan without revision was one of the greatest predictors of failure (Roberts and Tempest 1998)! Moving PPP analysis forward, especially in areas where institutional literature fails, gaps could readily be filled with these developing, albeit young, theories.

### **8.2.3 Methodological considerations**

This thesis had methodological as well as substantive goals. Facilitating research in an area wrought with conceptual and vocabulary-based ambiguities is no easy task. Designing and building the TPD and its sub-databases was a challenging undertaking that required ongoing process definition and decisions, which this work tried to make clear. While the methodological contributions are significant, there are limitations worth noting.

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<sup>215</sup> See Rosenau 2000 on national partnerships and Benz and Papadopoulous 2006 for discussion of democratic governance at different levels of operating.

<sup>216</sup> The semi-structured interviews with four product development partnerships were also insightful in pulling in these perspectives, as these PPPs functioning between public actors, biotechnology startups, research institutions and NGOs on the ground provide a fruitful venue for more applications of this emerging body of research.

There are obviously methodological implications inherent to large-n studies as they are limited to an extent in their explanatory power. They involve the inherent trade-off that they can identify what happens across partnerships, but they cannot go deeply into individual partnerships nor present more than initial analysis on effectiveness. The value they provide is in putting existing qualitative, case-study based research into context, which cannot be overstated considering the lack regarding PPP studies.

During this research, while the tendency for scope-creep was persistent, during the process the scope had to be re-focused given the realms of feasibility. It also became apparent that this research stood to contribute more through large-n empirical assessment of partnerships and by the systematic approach taken to the measurement of inputs, practices and outputs. Given this, the decision was made to focus on comparison of effects rather than the more subjective nature of effectiveness.

The analytical techniques used, especially when considering the relationships between inputs and outputs, were also basic and mainly involved establishing simple correlations and explaining exhibited relationships. This was mainly due to feasibility of scope, though the exception relates to the MM interviews, in which basic OLS regressions were performed with management as the dependent variable and various factors, such as institutionalisation or age, as explanatory variables.<sup>217</sup>

Considering the wealth of information and variables tracked within the TPD and Outputs, there are considerable opportunities to bring more powerful statistical tools to the table. Of course, this would involve addressing a host of issues common to regime researchers. One worth noting is the high degree of multicollinearity among independent variables in the analysis. This is a strong caution, as this high correlation between variables was established. For example, PPPs with higher levels of institutionalisation are not only more likely to produce outputs or effects, certain types of PPPs, notably independent ones or those focused on research and development were generally scaled at high levels. Thus while there was a degree of convergence across functional types, certain inputs will no doubt be impossible to fully disentangle.

Qualitative techniques also have a role to play, and here the potential of the MM interviews is promising. Conducting this structured interview across the full sampling frame would substantially advance the understanding of PPP management and governance, and also

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<sup>217</sup> This is largely as this set of statistical procedures is accepted and proven across industries (Bloom and Van Reenen 2010; Bloom et al. 2010b), so there a knowledge base to draw from, as well as within feasible ranges of a single researcher. See Mitchell 2008 for useful overview and Breitmeyer, Underdal and Young 2009 for recent advances in quantitative techniques as applied to regime analysis.

give greater credence to claims of generalisability regarding these preliminary findings. A methodological strength of the MM interviews is that these allow for both types of techniques to be used simultaneously. By combining methodological tools, we are in a better position to identify patterns, assess alternative interpretations and enhance understanding more broadly.

It is always necessary to address issues of generalisability or how much this work's findings could be considered more broadly relevant. As it was large-n versus case study oriented, this is a different - though not lacking - concern. At issue are the PPPs that underwent additional analysis: the 147 within the sampling frame, a subset of which underwent MM interviews. The sampling frame represented a specific set of institutionalised partnering interactions, yet their distinguishing characteristics were their tri-sectoral, transnational nature, rather than sector, function, location or key funder/host partner, so the findings can be considered relevant across universe. Further, their diversity in institutional form and function was remarkable, though this in itself limited the analysis that could be done on comparable effects, it emerged other insights noted above.

Regarding the MM interviews, it was acknowledged that PPPs without a centre point or evidence of operational activity obviously self-select themselves out of consideration. While this was a concern going in, as the sixth chapter discussed, analysis, in line with the global methodology, was conducted to ensure a representative subset as compared to the sampling frame broadly. More so, there was remarkably no bias in terms of response rates for high performing or low performing partnerships. There was great variety in country of operations (PPPs were interviewed that were based in Nairobi and New York City), sector of focus and level of institutionalisation, as these breakdowns of the subset were in line with the sample frame more broadly.<sup>218</sup>

### **8.3 Effective and legitimate tools of governance?**

Returning now to the overriding questions which fuelled this work, what are the contributions of PPPs to global governance? Are the promises of effective and legitimate governance actors being fulfilled? Admittedly, this work is just a start, and it was not attempting to provide definitive answers or sound conclusions, but a few remarks are worth presenting on the practice of PPPs in these regards.

What does the information presented here tell one regarding the current state of the universe of PPPs, especially in regards to their ability to address these noted governance gaps? The now familiar notion suggests that legitimacy stems from democratic (input) legitimacy,

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<sup>218</sup> As discussed in chapter six, only three functional areas were targeted.

effectiveness (output legitimacy), expertise or knowledge and moral authority (Bull and McNeill 2007, 32-5; Steets and Blattner 2010; Bexell and Mörth 2010). While this work focused most on the tradeoffs between the former two, the research addressed these latter issues throughout the discussion.

While PPPs are promoted given their ability to address these pressing governance deficits, achieving legitimacy will be essential if partnerships wish to become accepted and established global governance arrangements (Glasbergen 2007, 14). The democratic pitfalls of PPPs are increasingly criticised, which questions some of these firmly held premises regarding their rise to power.

There are long-standing debates over enhancing the **participation** of a variety of stakeholders in global governance. Should these institutions be designed to guarantee a balance of diverse perspectives, representatives from North and South? Does the private versus public interests involved matter? Are traditionally marginalised groups included within PPPs, as their promoters promise? Though perhaps it is **representation** which matters more, an argument the discourse from the MM interviews clearly supported. Do PPPs take care to ensure equitable interest representation on governing bodies? More fundamentally, do stakeholders know who these members are and what decisions are taken? This relates to the matter of **accountability**: should, PPPs be accountable to their partners/ members or their funders? Did PPPs exhibit basic notions of accountability standards in these regards?

These questions which this work addressed return to the notion of **transparency**, which reigned throughout as an overriding concern. This obviously impacted the entire study, as without accessible information, not least to say timely or relevant information, little could be collected and assessed across PPPs. As these debates were furthered throughout the work, only a synopsis of the universe of PPPs is provided here.<sup>219</sup> (*Table 8.1*)

It is certain that PPPs challenge traditional conceptions of these terms, and more fundamentally for research purposes, different partnership can require different forms of legitimacy and accountability (Steets and Blattner 2010, 64-7). It has been argued that institutions lacking input legitimacy can address this by enhancing their output legitimacy and related problem-solving capacities (Scharp 1997; 1999). Thus, if PPPs are lacking in terms of procedural legitimacy, as long as they are effectively providing collective goods, dealing with problems of global commons (e.g. Kaul, Grunberg and Stern 1999) or addressing global health concerns, as examples, this could compensate for deficits in procedural elements. Especially if one adheres to the argument that partnerships were furthered as implementation vehicles and

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<sup>219</sup> See Bäckstrand (2010, 154) on which this framework is loosely based.

pragmatic responses, rather than as means to enhance global stakeholder participation (Mert 2008), this would be defensible. So, is there evidence on the **implementation** side?

This work approached this by analysing effectiveness as goal attainment and problem solving. The findings across the universe highlight that there is a clear lack of clarity and articulation when it comes to goals set, and for many PPPs even the goals are difficult to track due to lacking transparency, which will obviously hinder eventual assessment. Further, this work's MM interviews showed that for many PPPs, the focus remained on organisational elements, not performance-based ones. Many PPPs functioned as facilitators and aimed for little to no activity on their own, relying on coordinated partners to do this. This point is worth raising once more because that PPPs lack the internal mechanisms and staff/ capacity resources to effectively coordinate their partners and capture best practices emerged throughout this work.

The analysis of organisational outputs showed a mixed state of play with some top performers, but many are struggling to produce and publish basic organisational documents. It was intriguing that the better performing PPPs in terms organisational effectiveness were independent with high levels of institutionalisation and limited hands-on control from either IGOs or donors, at least in the operational activities. If the most effective, producing, PPPs are those with the highest levels of institutionalisation, are PPPs as flexible, innovative institutions still representing added value? Again, this is not to deny the role that the adept nature of PPPs institutional structure plays, nor is this to say PPPs must be highly institutionalised to be effective. What resonates, however, is without a minimum level of institutionalisation, it appeared that transparency and accountability were lacking, organisational outputs were few and there was little to no evidence of performance.

Debates regarding PPP legitimacy and effectiveness will and should continue. As an area of partnership research, it is receiving heightened attention that is still raising more questions than solid conclusions, especially as most work focuses on CSD-based or GHPs in these regards.



**Table 8.1 Transnational PPPs: Legitimate tools of governance?**

*Snapshot of preliminary analysis regarding input legitimacy for universe of PPPs (757 partnerships)*

Input legitimacy		
Inclusiveness	Accountability	Transparency
-45% of PPPs had tri-sectoral partner base; 51% for those still operating	-Very little evidence that PPPs had accountability mechanisms in place	-Overall transparency was weak
-70% had at least one government partner while 50% had at least one business and 50% at least one NGO	-No formalised systems for internal or external accountability established	-Only 32% published an annual report (46% for operational)
-The UN or one of its agencies partnered in over half of PPPs but less than 20% had a social-sector partner that was not an NGO or academic institute	-Only 13% of PPPs published guiding legal documents (22% for operational)	-Financial statements and reports were only available for 17% of PPPs and 27% operational
-Less than 40% of PPPs had at least one partner from the south	-For 20% of the hosted PPPs, no information could be found on governance structure or governing members	-For only 13% of PPPs was a guiding legal document published; 22% for operational
	-Only 49% of the PPPs had an operational website; though this is 85% when considering only operational PPPs	-For 169 of the 352 CSD-based partnerships, no information could be found outside of their original CSD entry

**Source:** TPD, 2011

These are complex challenges. There are - and will continue to be - tradeoffs between these inputs, procedural elements and outputs, as well as performance more broadly. This work showed lacks on both ends. This is certainly not to discredit the substantial gains many of these PPPs are making, but we do not know nearly enough; the evidence has not yet

substantiated the partnering promise. This work does not wish to conclude on an overly pessimistic note, but it at best offers a cautious one.

#### **8.4 Future avenues and research directions**

Admittedly this work had hoped to go much farther; the limitations highlighted above are known, and perhaps frustrating. One consequence of this thesis being written by a sole researcher is that there is much unexplored potential, some of which could not be included within this current work due to practical space limitations. As databases are tools that reach far beyond what is included here, there is ample room for others to use. This subsection first concentrates on these avenues and then PPP research more broadly.

As the introduction prefaced, as of October 2011, the information and research which drove this study is transitioning to an online portal, hosted at [globalppps.org](http://globalppps.org). Here, the TPD will be available in its entirety and fully searchable online, as will the statistical analysis and background works and appendixes that made up much of this work.<sup>220</sup>

Moving forward, there is clearly a need to explore these framework components in more detail. This work only touched on the potential tradeoffs between procedural and output legitimacy, but there are clear avenues to pursue in analysing this across sets of PPPs as well as the universe. The large number of no longer operating PPPs is another pressing concern, and it is worth exploring these in more detail to garner possible lessons. Further, as mentioned, there is ample scope not only for more sophisticated techniques to be employed on existing data but also to integrate additional information and insights into these for fuller analysis. While this work and the TPD creation maintain a strict process for adding information, there is obviously scope to supplement this information with details pulled from the individual partnerships.

The significance of further assessing management practices within these PPPs should be considered. There have been many calls for more research at the micro level, especially on a comparable basis (Bexel and Mörth 2010), and this is something this work's MM interviews can speak directly towards (*As a note, the MM interview grid utilised will also be available at [globalppps.org](http://globalppps.org)*). As a next step, there is significant value to be gained by conducting this set interview with the entire sampling frame of ITPs, as these full management datasets could be merged fully with TPD-Outputs, providing a wealth of information on partnership variation, management, governance and effects.

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<sup>220</sup> The website and related publication were made possible by a knowledge transfer grant from the HEIF4+ fund at the London School of Economics (LSE).

Further, while the outputs tracked here were limited, all information sources contained within the database have also been transitioned into an online library, which will consist of downloadable annual reports, finances and evaluations across the entire sampling frame of PPPs. This is another launch point for those who wish to proceed towards understanding the outcome and impact-oriented effects of PPPs, such as through meta-analysis of these reviews.

From a broader perspective, it is time to move beyond general debates about terminology or generalisations and conduct more large-n empirical studies. This work echoes repeated calls for more comparative research (Elsig and Amalric 2008; Schäferhoff Campe and Kaan 2009). While there is value in advancing our conceptual understanding of partnerships, moving forward it is more relevant to see how these empirically evidenced. The value of a broad definition of partnerships was useful for getting a state of play, but it became clear throughout the work that there may be less value in comparing a small, single staffed project within an IGO to a large, fully functioning entity, as such as IAVI.<sup>221</sup> The most useful understanding of partnerships moving forward is not to be based on sectoral lines but functional and institutional, which suggests typologies should be refined in those ways.

There are also many well-developed analytical frameworks and techniques, many of which have proven valuable in sole PPP work which should now be applied on a cross-partnership basis. This requires more structured analysis and research to focus on specific characteristics or even mechanisms that lead to different levels of outputs. More empirical research would further the understanding of how these legitimacy tradeoffs manifest across PPPs and across time. It is this latter element that is still underdeveloped outside of single case studies. The TPD is itself a moment in time, and even in the few months between final data verification and transition to an online tool, many PPPs changed partners, scope or even operational activity. Notwithstanding, there is incredible value in analysing variation over time so it could also be time to start to conduct more informed, longitudinal panels.

Given the dynamic nature of the subject matter, and social sciences research more broadly, there will be new questions emerging, new theories to apply, and evolving analytical or statistical techniques to be utilised. At both the macro level of partnership operations and the micro level of functioning, these have ample room to play.

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<sup>221</sup> All three types were included within the NPF database, for example, and the TPD represents even more diversity.

## **8.5 Concluding remarks**

This work systematically advanced the study of the variation of transnational partnering arrangements by especially focusing on their input and output legitimacy. Through detailed partnership information on the universe of transnational partnering as well as a range of detailed methodological and analytical techniques this work assessed and compared the influence of PPPs at large and also considered links between various explanatory factors, based at the partnership macro, meso and micro level with varying levels of outputs.

Partnerships cannot be cast away as a fading trend, nor can they be hailed as effective governing entities. Though the quest for more legitimate and effective governance may be met by transnational PPPs, it will continue to be rendered more complex given the governance challenges they pose. Thus as partnerships become recognised governance models, the evidence base to support their contributions to effective and legitimate global governance must be substantiated. It is time therefore to move the debate forward, and to apply evidence to a body of well developed theoretical and analytical constructs. The PPP Platform Project, now available at [globalppps.org](http://globalppps.org) will hopefully be a part of this ongoing effort towards further research.

## **APPENDIX**

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## APPENDIX A: Transnational Partnership Database (TPD): Variables Tracked

<b>Basic Information</b>	
<b>Number</b>	Unique number assigned to each partnership
<b>Name</b>	Name of the partnership
<b>Abbreviation</b>	Abbreviation of the partnership name
<b>Source</b>	Original source for the partnership name
<b>Code</b>	* TPD classification of the partnership (e.g. HITP/ITP/XS/XD)
<b>Hosted</b>	Is the PPP hosted or independent?
<b>Sampling frame?</b>	Does the PPP fall within the Sampling Frame?
<b>Operational Status</b>	
<b>Website</b>	The main source for information
<b>Status</b>	Operational status of the partnership
<b>Updated</b>	Year of most recent website update
<b>Partnership Scope</b>	
<b>Scope</b>	Geographic scope of the partnership operations (e.g. Global/Regional)
<b>Regional</b>	List of regions within scope
<b>Country list</b>	List of countries within the scope
<b>Functional type</b>	
<b>Type</b>	Type of partnership functions (e.g. Advocacy/Research)
<b>Details</b>	Detailed information about type of partnership functions
<b>Source</b>	Link to supporting information
<b>Sector Focus<sup>222</sup></b>	
<b>Main theme</b>	PPP main focus (e.g. Water/Health)
<b>Details</b>	Detailed information about main theme
<b>Operations</b>	
<b>Year founded</b>	Year the PPP was founded
<b>Years Op. (through Dec 2009)</b>	Total number of years PPP has been operational
<b>Years Op. (ceased PPPs)</b>	Total number of years PPP was operational
<b>Website last updated</b>	Year of most recent website update
<b>Partner Organisations</b>	
<b>UN</b>	Public partners: UN organisations (e.g. UNDP/WHO)
<b>Other IGOS</b>	Public partners: Other Inter-Governmental partners (e.g. World Bank)
<b>Government partners</b>	Public partners: Government organisations (e.g. USAID)
<b>Corporate partners</b>	Private partners: Corporations
<b>Bus/industry associations</b>	Private partners: Business/industry Associations
<b>Philanthropic foundations</b>	Social partners: Philanthropic foundations
<b>NGOs</b>	Social partners: Non-governmental organisations
<b>Other PPPs</b>	Social partners: Other public-private partnerships
<b>Academic/research institutions</b>	Social partners: Academic/research institutions
<b>Social partners</b>	Social partners: Other social partners
<b>Other partners</b>	Partners not in any of the previous categories
<b>Notes</b>	Other relevant information
<b>Split</b>	Sectoral split of the partners
<b>Partner count</b>	Total number of claimed partners

<sup>222</sup> The 23 sector areas are as follows: Agriculture, Biodiversity, Business & Finance, Cultural, Disaster Management, Education, Energy, Environment, Forest Management, Good Governance, Hazardous Materials, Health, Humanitarian, Infrastructure, Labor, Marine Conservation, Natural Resources, Science & Technology, Security, Sustainable Development, Tourism, Transportation and Water & Sanitation.

## APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)

<b>Governance and Decision Making (GDM)</b>	
<b>Type</b>	Main decision making body (e.g.: Board/Host)
<b>If hosted, then how?</b>	Decision making body sub-type for hosted PPPs
<b>Split</b>	Sectoral split of the decision making body
<b>Details</b>	Details about decision making body and split
<b>Source</b>	Link to supporting information
<b>Funding Sources</b>	
<b>Public funding</b>	Public funders (UN organisations, other IGOs, governments)
<b>Private funding</b>	Private funders (Private corporations, business associations)
<b>Foundations</b>	Social funders (Philanthropic foundations)
<b>Social funding</b>	Other social funders
<b>Split</b>	Sectoral split of the funding base
<b>Legal Status</b>	
<b>Legal status</b>	For-profit / Not-for-profit
<b>Details</b>	Detailed information about Legal status (e.g. 501c3 organisation)
<b>Source</b>	Link to supporting information
<b>Legal structure</b>	
<b>Legal structure</b>	Type of organisation or host
<b>Guiding legal document</b>	Does the PPP have a guiding legal document?
<b>Type of legal agreement</b>	Bylaws, Memorandum of Understanding, etc.
<b>Transparency</b>	
<b>Annual Report available</b>	Annual report is available
<b>Year</b>	The year of the last annual report
<b>Finances</b>	Financial information available
<b>Contact</b>	
<b>Contact point: city</b>	Location of contact point
<b>Contact point: country</b>	Country location of contact point
<b>Host country income status</b>	World Bank classification (April 2009)
<b>Additional notes</b>	Other additional, relevant notes on PPP e.g. CSD database info only

## APPENDIX B: TPD Coding process and definitions used

Coding process narrows from universe to sampling frame

<b>Code***</b>	<b>Details</b>
<b>ITP*</b>	Sampling frame, Institutionalised, transnational partnership
<b>HITP*</b>	Sampling frame, Health-based ITP
<b>XD**</b>	Sampling frame, but not an ITP because only one type of partner on decision making body OR host
<b>HXD**</b>	Sampling frame, but not an HITP because only one type of partner on decision making body OR host
<b>XS</b>	Not in the sampling frame because it does not fit the scope restriction (NS or Global)
<b>XO</b>	Not in the sampling frame because it is no longer in operation
<b>XAO</b>	Not in the sampling frame because it exists as announcement only
<b>XR</b>	Not in the sampling frame because it is a project only, or incorporated as project/program in existing inst
<b>XP</b>	Not in the sampling frame because does not fit the partner restriction
<b>XA</b>	Not in the sampling frame because its aim is for profit or not public policy related
<b>XPP</b>	Not in the sampling frame because it does not fit the Partner restriction BUT it is on organisation which partners with trisectoral base of partners
<p>*Sampling frame</p> <p>**Falls within the sampling frame but not an ITP</p> <p>*** Partnerships can have multiple codes, e.g. XA, XS (implies for profit, non global PPP that is operational and has a tri-sectoral partner split)</p>	



## APPENDIX C: Output variables tracked

Basic Information	
Unique ID	Unique ID of PPP
Name	Name of PPP
Abr.	Abbreviation of PPP
Source	The source from which PPP was added into the Database
Code	How the PPP is coded in terms of governance
Website	Main website and source of information
Function	
Main Function	The main function the PPP performs
Secondary Function	If relevant, the secondary function the PPP performs
Vision and Goals	
Defined vision of partnership	Does the Partnership articulate a vision, yes or no?
	Describe the vision
Defined mission of partnership	Does the Partnership articulate a mission, yes or no?
	Describe the mission (statement)
Defined goal of partnership	Describe the stated goals of the partnership
Defined breakdown/ responsibility of goal (IA)	Describe the stated breakdown of responsibilities between partners to that end (if available)
Defined goal milestones/ timeframes	Describe the stated milestones and/or timeframe to that end (if available)
Operations	
Date Launched (and independent)	Date the PPP was launched, and in parentheses and if applicable, when it became independent
Existence of current operations	Do current operations exist, yes or no?
Publication/notification of latest operating results	Does the PPP make available operating results, yes or no?
	What type of document offers the latest operating results?
	What year was the document offering the latest operating results published?
	What was the year of the most recent Annual Report published?
Position of CHQ (Central Headquarters)	Does the PPP make clear that a Central Headquarters is established, yes or no?
	Details the TYPE of position of the CHQ, see notes column
	If yes, what is the given name of this Central Headquarters? - Full details
	Provide an internet link that describes the PPP Central Headquarters
Role of CHQ and/or head	Describe the declared role of Central Headquarters - SEE NOTES
CHQ accountable to Host or Partnership?	Describe whether the Central Headquarters is directly accountable to a Host organisation, or to the wider partnership governance?
Operations team in place	Does the PPP make clear that an Operations Team is in place?
Operations staff structure established / if secretariat, (name of office)	Does the PPP describe the structure of the Operations
Number of staff	If website notes this clearly, number of FTEs, pull from MM interview or put "E" if established working staff (rather than only point person)
Total sites of operation	Count the number of sites of operations for the PPP
	List the sites of operations for the PPP
Strategic/Business Plan articulated	Does the PPP articulate a Strategic or Business plans?
	Provide an internet link to these plans
Technical Committees (not advisory)	Count the number of technical (i.e. not governance related) committees that support the PPP
	Name these technical committees
Members/Partners	
Types of partners	Count the different types or classes of partners a PPP declares
List of types	List the different types or classes of partners a PPP declares

## APPENDIX C (CONTINUED)

<b>Compulsory Membership Fee</b>	Does the PPP incur a compulsory membership fee on its partners?
<b>Criteria for Junior Partners</b>	Does the PPP declare and articulate criteria for a junior class of partner, yes or no?
	If yes, describe the body that approves partnership entry
	If yes, describe the document that outlines the criteria, if available?
	If available, provide an internet link to that document
<b>Entry Rules for Senior Partners</b>	Does the PPP declare and articulate criteria for a senior class of partner, yes or no?
	If yes, describe the body that approves partnership entry
	If yes, describe the document that outlines the criteria, if available?
	If available, provide an internet link to that document
<b>Total number of partners</b>	Count the total number of partners in a PPP
<b>Division of partners: public</b>	What percentage of public body partners make up the total partner membership of a PPP?
	How many partners make up this percentage?
<b>Division of partners: private</b>	What percentage of private body partners make up the total partner membership of a PPP?
	How many partners make up this percentage?
<b>Division of partners: social</b>	What percentage of social organisation partners make up the total partner membership of a PPP?
	How many partners make up this percentage?
<b>Stakeholder meetings</b>	Does the PPP hold a regular meeting for all partners to attend, yes or no?
	If yes, what is the name of this regular meeting?
<b>Number of funders</b>	Count the current funders of the PPP
	Count the amount of current funders that are also considered partners
<b>Division of funding: public</b>	What percentage of current income was funded by the public sector?
	How many public sector bodies provided funds?
	How much money was provided?
<b>Division of funding: private</b>	What percentage of current income was funded by the private sector?
	How many private sector bodies provided funds?
	How much money was provided?
<b>Division of funding: social</b>	What percentage of current income was funded by the social sector?
	How many social sector bodies provided funds?
	How much money was provided?
<b>Institutional/Structural</b>	
<b>Entity type</b>	Says whether or not the PPP is hosted or independent.
<b>Institutional structure of partnership (5013c; Foundation, etc)</b>	Describe the legal status of the PPP (i.e. Hosted in a host organisation, Incorporated [country])
<b>Claimed structure of partnership</b>	Describe how the PPP describes the nature of its partnership
<b>Guiding legal document</b>	Does the PPP make available the legal document that outlines the rules of that PPP? (Constitution, Bylaws, Terms of Reference, Statement of Incorporation)
<b>Type</b>	Describe the type of legal document made available by the PPP
<b>Source</b>	Provide an internet link to this document
<b>Level of Institutionalisation</b>	Scales the PPPs' level of institutionalisation as high, medium or low
<b>Justification</b>	Provide an internet link to this document
<b>Governance and Decision Making</b>	
<b>Governance system established</b>	Does the PPP describe its governance system, yes or no?
	Provide an internet link to the webpage that articulates this
<b>Layers of Governing Bodies</b>	Count the number of governing bodies
	Describe the different governing bodies

Assembly exists?	yes or no
Number of Members on Assembly-type Decision-making body	Count the number of members on an Assembly type governance body

### APPENDIX C (CONTINUED)

Number of Members on main non-Assembly body (i.e. board, council)	Count the number of members on a non-Assembly, Board type of governance body
Number of Members on Advisory body (besides Board)	Count the number of members on an Advisory type of governance body
Dispute resolution system in place	Does the PPP declare that it has a dispute resolution system in place, yes or no?
	If yes, and if articulated, describe the dispute resolution system of the PPP
Type of main governing body	Describe the type of the main governance body of the PPP
Sub-Type (if hosted)	If hosted, describe the type of the key governance body
Split	Describe, with TPD codes, the split of sectors on this body
Member Break Down: public	What percentage of the main governance body is made up of members from the public sector?
	Count the number of public sector members on the main governance body
Member Break Down: private	What percentage of the main governance body is made up of members from the private sector?
	Count the number of private sector members on the main governance body
Member Break Down: social	What percentage of the main governance body is made up of members from the social sector?
	Count the number of social sector members on the main governance body
Member Break Down: independent	What percentage of the main governance body is made up of individuals representing themselves, or PPP executive officers (ex officio)?
	Count the amount of individuals representing themselves, or PPP executive officers (ex officio) on the main governance body
North South Divide (World Bank definitions - see PPP folder)	What percentage of the main governance body is made up of organisations or individuals from the "North"?
	Count the number of members from the "North" on the main governance body
	What percentage of the main governance body is made up of organisations or individuals from the "South"?
	Count the number of members from the "South" on the main governance body
Total	Count the total number of members on the main governance body
<b>Internal Evaluation</b>	
Performance subject to some criteria of evaluation	yes or no
	Describe
Internal performance indicators established	yes or no
	Describe
Performance tracked/ measured	yes or no
	Describe
Date of last internal review	
<b>External Evaluation</b>	
Conducted (most recent)	Has the PPP conducted any independent evaluations of activities, yes or no?
Date	What is the date of the most recent evaluation carried out?
Source	Provide the internet link to this evaluation
By	Who conducted the evaluation?
Total conducted (2004 onward)	How many evaluations have been conducted in total, since 2004?

## APPENDIX C (CONTINUED)

<b>Resources</b>	
<b>Public availability of finances</b>	Does the PPP make available (or can you find from another source) details of the PPP's finances, yes or no? Provide an internet link to these finances
<b>External Auditors</b>	If available, name the auditor of the PPP
<b>Currency</b>	Note the currency in which the finances are stated
<b>Income 2007</b>	Note the total revenues of the PPP in 2007
<b>Grants &amp; Donations 2007</b>	Note the total grants and donations received by the PPP in 2007
<b>Expenditure 2007</b>	Note the total expenditures of the PPP in 2007
<b>Income 2008</b>	Note the total revenues of the PPP in 2008
<b>Grants &amp; Donations 2008</b>	Note the total grants and donations received by the PPP in 2008
<b>Expenditure 2008</b>	Note the total expenditures of the PPP in 2008
<b>Breakdown?</b>	Does the financial statement provide a detailed breakdown linking expenditures to activities, yes or no?
<b>Assets 2007</b>	Note the total assets owned by the PPP in 2007
<b>Liabilities 2007</b>	Note the total liabilities owned by the PPP in 2007
<b>Net Assets (Reserves) 2007</b>	Note the net assets (or reserves) owned by the PPP in 2007
<b>Assets 2008</b>	Note the total assets owned by the PPP in 2008
<b>Liabilities 2008</b>	Note the total liabilities owned by the PPP in 2008
<b>Net Assets (Reserves) 2008</b>	Note the net assets (or reserves) owned by the PPP in 2008
<b>Change in Grants/Donations 08-07</b>	
<b>Change in Income 08-07</b>	
<b>Accountability/Transparency</b>	
<b>Strategic and annual plans</b>	Does the PPP make available strategic or annual plans, yes or no?
<b>Annual performance reports</b>	Does the PPP make available annual performance reports, yes or no?
<b>Annual Budget</b>	Does the PPP make available annual budgets, yes or no?
<b>GB Meeting agendas (and/or background papers)</b>	Does the PPP make available the agendas to governance / executive meetings, yes or no?
<b>GB Meeting Press release / summary</b>	Does the PPP make available press releases or summaries related to governance / executive meetings, yes or no?
<b>GB Meeting action points / decisions by board and any other executive body</b>	Does the PPP make available full minutes / detailed summaries related to governance / executive meetings, yes or no?
<b>Financial Statements/Reports</b>	Does the PPP make available financial statements and reports?
<b>Statement of Performance, Results, or Highlights</b>	Does the PPP make available Statement of Performance, Results, or Highlights?
<b>Regular Newsletters or Updates</b>	Does the PPP make available regular newsletters, yes or no?
<b>Subscribed</b>	Can a stakeholder subscribe to these, yes or no?

### APPENDIX D: PPPs in the Sampling Frame (ITPs)

Name	Abr.	Host	Main Function	Sector
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation	AERAS	N	Info Exchange / Research	Health
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research	AHPSR	Y	Policy and/or Development	Health
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative	DNDi	N	Info Exchange / Research	Health
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative (Now the European Vaccine Initiative)	EMVI	N	Coordination	Health
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics	FIND	N	Info Exchange / Research	Health
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition	GAIN	N	Coordination	Health
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development	TB Alliance	N	Info Exchange / Research	Health
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis	GAELF	Y	Info Exchange / Research	Health
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	GAVI	N	Coordination	Health
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria	GFATM	N	Coordination	Health
Global Health Council		N	Advocacy	Health
Global Media AIDS Initiative	GMAI	Y	Advocacy	Health
Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap	GPHW	Y	Advocacy	Health
Global Vaccine Enterprise		N	Info Exchange / Research	Health
Institute for OneWorld Health	IOWH	N	Coordination	Health
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative	IAVI	N	Coordination	Health
International Trachoma Initiative	ITI	N	Coordination	Health
Malaria Vaccine Initiative	MVI	Y	Info Exchange / Research	Health
Medicines for Malaria Venture	MMV	N	Info Exchange / Research	Health
Micronutrient Initiative	MI	N	Coordination	Health
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine Deficiency (Iodine Network)	Iodine Network	Y	Advocacy	Health
Partners for Parasite Control	PPC	Y	Coordination	Health
Project Hope	HOPE	N	Operational	Health
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership	RBM	Y	Coordination	Health
Stop TB Partnership	StopTB	Y	Coordination	Health
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for Health	SEAM	Y	Coordination	Health
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative	FFI	Y	Facilitation	Health
World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative	GHI	Y	Advocacy	Health
AED-SATELLIFE	SATELLIFE	N	Coordination	Health
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding Trachoma by the year 2020	GET 2020	Y	Coordination	Health
BIO Ventures for Global Health	BVGH	N	Info Exchange / Research	Health
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative (Now the Clinton Health Access Initiative)	CHAI	Y	Coordination	Health
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis Partnership	MDR-TB	Y	Info Exchange / Research	Health
EuroVacc Foundation		N	Info Exchange / Research	Health
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	GBC	N	Advocacy	Health
Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus	MNT	Y	Coordination	Health

## APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Global Polio Eradication Initiative	GPEI	Y	Coordination	Health
Health Academy, The		Y	Operational	Health
Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative	HINARI	Y	Operational	Health
Infectious Disease Research Institute	IDRI	N	Info production / Research	Health
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program	ICBG	Y	Info production / Research	Health, Biodiversity
International Partnership for Microbicides	IPM	N	Info production / Research	Health
MAC AIDS fund	MAF	Y	Capital Provision	Health
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases	NITD	Y	Info production / Research	Health
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative	PDVI	Y	Info production / Research	Health
Safe Injection Global Network	SIGN	Y	Advocacy	Health
Vision 2020	Vision 2020	Y	Coordination	Health
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS	UNAIDS	Y	Coordination	Health
Alliance to Save Energy	ASE	N	Advocacy	Energy
Building Partnerships for Development in Water and Sanitation	BPD-WS	N	Info dissemination/ transfer	Water & Sanitation
Clean Air Initiative	CAI	N	Info dissemination/ transfer	Environment
Community Watersheds Partnership Program Global Development Alliance (Formerly the Coca-Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance)	WADA	Y	Coordination	Water & Sanitation
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards Program	CLASP	N	Setting Standards	Energy
Forest Stewardship Council	FSC	N	Setting Standards	Environment
Generation Challenge Programme (Former CGIAR Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor')	GCP	Y	Info production / Research	Agriculture
Global Compact	UNGC	Y	Setting Standards	Sustainable develop, Labor
Global Crop Diversity Trust		Y	Coordination	Agriculture
Global e-Sustainability Initiative	GeSI	N	Setting Standards	Environment
Global Master Plan for Cycling		Y	Policy and/or Development	Environment
Global Reporting Initiative	GRI	N	Setting Standards	Sustainable develop
Global Road Safety Partnership	GRSP	Y	Coordination	Transportation
Global Village Energy Partnership	GVEP	N	Coordination	Sustainable develop
International Center for Sustainable develop	ICSID	N	Operational	Environment
International Center for Tropical Agriculture	CIAT	N	Info production / Research	Agriculture
International Electrotechnical Commission	IEC	N	Setting Standards	Infrastructure
International Road Transport Union	IRU	N	Advocacy	Transportation
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications	ISAAA	N	Info dissemination/ transfer	Agriculture
International Solar Energy Society		N	Advocacy	Energy
International Youth Foundation	IYF	N	Facilitation	Education
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers	ICANN	N	Setting Standards	Science & Technology
Marine Stewardship Council	MSC	N	Setting Standards	Environment
Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe	PECE	Y	Coordination	Environment
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	PCFV	Y	Policy and/or Development	Environment
Project Proteus		Y	Info dissemination/ transfer	Environment

## APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors	PIIPA	N	Facilitation	Sustainable develop
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership	REEEP	N	Policy and/or Development	Energy
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century	REN21	Y	Advocacy	Energy
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor	WSUP	N	Coordination	Water & Sanitation
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against Corruption Initiative	PACI	Y	Setting Standards	Good Governance
World Energy Council		N	Policy and/or Development	Energy
World Resources Institute	WRI	N	Policy and/or Development	Environment
World Vegetable Centre	AVRDC	N	Info production / Research	Agriculture
Mectizan Donation Program	Mectizan	Y	Coordination	Health
Global Ballast Water Management Programme		Y	Coordination	Marine Conservation
Efficient Energy for Sustainable develop	EESD	Y	Coordination	Environment
World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH) - Hellas - Mesogeios		N	Coordination	Sustainable develop
Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture	AGORA	Y	Coordination	Agriculture
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level	APELL	Y	Capacity Building	Disaster Management
BE THE CHANGE!		Y	Capacity Building	Sustainable develop
BioCarbon Fund		Y	Coordination	Environment
Biotrade Initiative	BTFP	Y	Capacity Building	Environment
Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment and Development	CBTF	Y	Capacity Building	Environment
Cement Sustainability Initiative	CSI	Y	Operational	Sustainable develop
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food	CPWF	Y	Info production / Research	Water & Sanitation
Cisco Networking Academy Program		Y	Operational	Education
Climate Investment Partnership		Y	Coordination	environment
Community Water Initiative	CWI	Y	Capacity Building	Water & Sanitation
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	CGIAR	Y	Info production / Research	Agriculture
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	CGAP	Y	Info dissemination/ transfer	Business & finance
E+Co		N	Coordination	Energy
e8 (Formerly e7)	e8	N	Coordination	Sustainable develop
Ecoagriculture Partners	ECOAGRICULTURE	N	Coordination	Agriculture
Ecological Sanitation Research	EcoSanRes	Y	Capacity Building	Water & Sanitation
EdInvest	EdInvest	Y	Facilitation	Education
Embarq		Y	Operational	Transportation
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems	EOLSS	Y	Info dissemination/ transfer	Education
Equator Initiative		Y	Coordination	Environment
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life	EUWI	Y	Coordination	Water & sanitation
EVE-olution Foundation		N	Capacity Building	Sustainable develop
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade		Y	Facilitation	Business & finance
Global Gas Flaring Reduction	GGFR	Y	Setting Standards	Environment
Global Partnership for Capacity Building to Implement the Globally Harmonized System for Chemical Classification and Labelling	GHS	Y	Setting Standards	Environment
Global Water Partnership	GWP	N	Coordination	Water & Sanitation
GlobalGiving		N	Facilitation	Humanitarian

## APPENDIX D (CONTINUED)

Great Apes Survival Project	GRASP	Y	Advocacy	Environment
International Livestock Research Institute	ILRI	Y	Info production / Research	Agriculture
International Navigation Association	PIANC	N	Setting Standards	Infrastructure
International Partnership for Sustainable develop in Mountain Regions	Mountain Partnership	Y	Facilitation	Sustainable develop
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy	IPHE	Y	Facilitation	Environment
International Water and Sanitation Center	IRC	N	Info dissemination/ transfer	Water & Sanitation
Local Capacity-Building and Training on Sustainable Urbanization: a Public-Private Partnership		Y	Capacity Building	Sustainable develop
Methane to Markets		Y	Facilitation	Energy
New Ventures		Y	Coordination	Business & finance
Online Access to Research in the Environment	OARE	Y	Info production / Research	Education
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air	PCIA	Y	Coordination	Health
Population and Sustainability Network		Y	Advocacy	Sustainable develop
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative		Y	Advocacy	Environment
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable develop	SCNSD	N	Facilitation	Cultural
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance		Y	Coordination	Environment
Tour Operators Initiative		Y	Advocacy	Tourism
Transparency International	TI	N	Advocacy	Good Governance
Travel Foundation		N	Advocacy	Environment
Unicode Consortium		N	Setting Standards	Science & Technology
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme	CP	Y	Coordination	Environment
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business	UN-CEFACT	Y	Setting Standards	Business & finance
World Alliance for Decentralized Energy	WADE	N	Info production / Research	Energy
World Business Council on Sustainable develop	WBCSD	N	Advocacy	Sustainable develop
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network	WEF DRN	Y	Coordination	Humanitarian
World Links		N	Capacity Building	Education
World Tourism Organisation	UNWTO	Y	Policy and/or Development	Sustainable develop
Youth Business International		N	Capacity Building	Business & finance
Ethical Trading Initiative	ETI	N	Setting Standards	Labor
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee Community	4-C	N	Setting Standards	Agriculture
Global Environment Facility	GEF	Y	Coordination	Environment
ACCION International	ACCION	N	Coordination	Business & Finance
Agricultural Risk Management Team	ARMT	Y	Facilitation	Business & finance
Golden Rice		N	Info production / Research	Health



### APPENDIX E: PPPs: Goals and vision

PPP Name	Defined vision partnership	Defined mission partnership	Level of Goal-Setting		
			Output	Out-come	Impact
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation	NA	The Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation aim to develop effective TB vaccine regimens that will prevent tuberculosis in all age groups and will be affordable, available and adopted worldwide.	Y	N	Y
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research	NA	AHPSR aims to stimulate the generation and synthesis of policy-relevant health systems knowledge, promote the dissemination and use of health policy and systems knowledge, and strengthen capacity for the generation, dissemination and use of health policy and systems research knowledge among researchers, policy-makers and other stakeholders.	Y	Y	N
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative	DNDI's vision is to improve the quality of life and the health of people suffering from neglected diseases by using an alternative model to develop drugs for these diseases and by ensuring equitable access to new and field-relevant health tools.	DNDI aims to develop new drugs or new formulations of existing drugs for patients suffering from the most neglected communicable diseases.	Y	Y	N
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative	The vision of the European Malaria Vaccine Initiative (EMVI) is a world free of the intolerable disease burden of malaria within the coming decades.	EMVI aims to contribute to the global efforts to control malaria by providing a mechanism for accelerated development and clinical trials of malaria vaccines in Europe and Developing Countries, promoting affordability and accessibility of malaria vaccines in Developing Countries.	Y	Y	Y
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics	FIND's vision is a world where everyone will have equitable access to high quality diagnosis.	FIND's aim is to drive the development and implementation of accurate and affordable diagnostic tests that are appropriate to patient-care in low-resource settings.	Y	Y	Y
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition	GAIN is an alliance driven by the vision of a world without malnutrition.	GAIN's aim is to reduce malnutrition through food fortification and other sustainable strategies aimed at improving the health and nutrition of populations at risk.	N	Y	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Global Alliance for TB Drug Development	NA	The TB Alliance aims to accelerate the discovery and development of faster-acting and affordable drugs to fight tuberculosis. Through innovative science and with partners around the world, we aim to ensure equitable access to faster, better tuberculosis cures that will advance global health and prosperity.	Y	Y	Y
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis	NA	The Global Alliance to Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis aims to bring together a diverse group of private health partners to support the Global Programme to Eliminate Lymphatic Filariasis by mobilising political, financial and technical resources to ensure success.	Y	Y	Y
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	NA	The GAVI Alliance aims to save children's lives and protect people's health by increasing access to immunisation in poor countries.	Y	Y	Y
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria	NA	The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria aims to dramatically increase resources to fight three of the world's most devastating diseases, and to direct those resources to areas of greatest need.	Y	Y	Y
Global Health Council	NA	The Council aims to ensure that all who strive for improvement and equity in global health have the information and resources they need to succeed.	N	Y	N
Global Media AIDS Initiative	NA	GMAI aims to leverage the power of media to help prevent the spread of HIV and reduce the stigma facing those already living with the disease.	Y	N	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Global PPP for Hand-washing with Soap	NA	The PPPHW aims at reducing the incidence of diarrheal diseases and respiratory infections in poor communities through promoting handwashing with soap; implementing large-scale handwashing interventions and using lessons to promote the approach at the global level; sharing scientific evidence showing that handwashing with soap is an exceptionally cost-effective health intervention. The PPPHW also seeks to promote awareness, build political commitment, and trigger action on this critical issue at local, national, and international levels.	Y	Y	Y
Global Vaccine Enterprise	The Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise is working with scientists, researchers, funders, government and industry representatives, and advocates from around the world to accelerate the development of an effective and safe HIV vaccine through a shared Scientific Strategic Plan. Full implementation of the Enterprise 2010 Scientific Strategic Plan requires the increasing commitment and participation of many organisations, from industrialized and developing countries, from the public and private sectors, and civil society.	The Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise aims to accelerate the development of an HIV vaccine is an international, wide-ranging, scientific assessment of the current state of the field and future challenges and opportunities.	Y	Y	N
Institute for OneWorld Health	The Institute for OneWorld Health will serve as a positive agent for change by saving lives, improving health, and fulfilling the promise of medicine for those most in need.	The Institute for OneWorld Health aims to find promising potential candidate medicines in areas of great unmet medical need; partner with the right experts and institutions to take these medicines through development, clinical trials, and regulatory approval; and finally, deliver safe, effective, and affordable medicines to the patients who need them.	Y	N	N

### APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

International AIDS Vaccine Initiative	IAVI's vision is a world without AIDS.	IAVI aims to support in every way the development of preventive AIDS vaccines that are not only safe and effective, but also accessible to all people.	Y	Y	Y
International Trachoma Initiative	ITI's vision is a world free of blinding trachoma.	ITI aims to eliminate blinding trachoma by 2020 through managing the Zithromax donation and collaborating with partners for the implementation of the full SAFE strategy.	Y	Y	Y
Malaria Vaccine Initiative	The Malaria Vaccine Initiative envision a world free from malaria.	MVI aims to accelerate the development of malaria vaccines and ensure their availability and accessibility in the developing world.	Y	Y	Y
Medicines for Malaria Venture	MMV's vision is a world in which these innovative medicines will cure and protect the vulnerable populations at risk from malaria, and help to ultimately eradicate this terrible disease.	MMV aims to bring public, private and philanthropic sector partners together to fund and manage the discovery, development and delivery of new medicines for the treatment and prevention of malaria in disease-endemic countries.	Y	Y	Y
Micronutrient Initiative	Micronutrient Initiative's vision is a world free of hidden hunger	The MI aims to develop, implement and monitor innovative, cost-effective and sustainable solutions for hidden hunger, in partnership with others.	Y	Y	Y
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine Deficiency (Iodine Network)	The vision of the Network is of a world in which every child is born protected from iodine deficiency, which may result in brain damage. A world with the entire population protected from the loss of intellectual and physical resources through this easily preventable cause of mental retardation.	The Network aims to support national efforts to eliminate iodine deficiency in a sustainable manner by promoting collaboration among public, private, scientific and civic organisations. We are committed to ensuring that universal salt iodization is sustained in all countries. Accelerated progress and better coordination to focus on priority populations and actions are needed to achieve the Network's vision within the next decade.	Y	Y	Y
Partners for Parasite Control	NA	PPC aims to regularly treat at least 75% of all school- aged children at risk of illness from schistosomiasis and soil transmitted helminths by 2010.	Y	N	Y

**APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)**

Project Hope	NA	HOPE aims to achieve sustainable advances in health care around the world by implementing health education programs and providing humanitarian assistance in areas of need.	Y	N	Y
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership	RBM's vision is of a world free from the burden of malaria.	The RBM Partnership aims to implement coordinated action against malaria. It mobilizes for action and resources and forges consensus among partners.	Y	Y	Y
Stop TB Partnership	Stop TB Partnership's vision is a TB-free world: the first children born this millennium will see TB eliminated in their lifetime. Stop TB is a global movement to accelerate social and political action to stop the unnecessary spread of TB around the world.	STOPTB aims to ensure that every TB patient has access to effective diagnosis, treatment and cure, to stop transmission of TB, to reduce the inequitable social and economic toll of TB, to develop and implement new preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic tools and strategies to stop TB.	N	Y	Y
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for Health	NA	The Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines Program aims to improve access to and use of essential medicines, vaccines, and other health commodities in the developing world.	N	Y	N
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative	The FFI's vision is that individuals in public, private and civil society organisations at global and national level cooperate effectively by integrating and expanding existing programs.	The FFI aims to stimulate partnerships between public and civic sectors and grain and flour industries to make fortified flour normal production.	N	Y	N
World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative	NA	World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative has expressed the mission of "global health at the economic forum" that includes this initiative.	Y	N	Y
AED-SATELLIFE	NA	AED-SATELLIFE aims to play a leadership role in responding to the needs of health care providers in the developing world, employing cutting-edge solutions to expand access to health and medical knowledge, putting information into the hands that heal.	Y	Y	Y
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding Trachoma by the year 2020	NA	GET 2020 mission is to eliminate all avoidable blindness by 2020.	N	N	N

**APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)**

BIO Ventures for Global Health	NA	BVGH aims to save lives by accelerating the development of novel biotechnology-based drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics to address the unmet medical needs of the developing world. BVGH has a unique perspective.	N	Y	Y
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative	NA	CHAI aims to Strengthen integrated health systems in the developing world and expanding access to care and treatment for HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.	N	Y	Y
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis Partnership	NA	The Lilly MDR-TB Partnership aims to save lives by preventing and treating multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB) - a terrible disease that afflicts millions of people in some of the poorest regions of the world.	Y	Y	N
EuroVacc Foundation	N	EuroVacc aims at developing prophylactic vaccines against human immunodeficiency virus and to promote worldwide accessibility to these vaccines.	Y	Y	N
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria)	N	GBC aims to decrease the number of people dying from AIDS, TB, and Malaria and the support those affected by increasing business action against the HIV/AIDS pandemic.	N	N	Y
Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus	NA	MNT's aim is to reduce the number of cases to such low levels that it is no longer a major problem.	Y	Y	Y
Global Polio Eradication Initiative	NA	GPEI aims to completely eradicate polio.	N	Y	Y
Health Academy, The	The vision of the Health Academy is about creating a global health and technology reference system based on sound evidence and best practices. It aims at providing the knowledge of health specialists for all citizens of the world. It is about recognizing the huge impact of health on today's economy.	The Health Academy aims to demystify medical and public health practices and to make the knowledge of health specialists available to all citizens of the world through Internet-based technology. It will promote good health by explaining essential public health functions in a language that all people can understand, taking into consideration their individual cultural sensitivities.	Y	Y	Y

**APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)**

Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative	NA	The HINARI aims to provide free or very low cost online access to the major journals in biomedical and related social sciences to local, not-for-profit institutions in developing countries.	Y	Y	N
Infectious Disease Research Institute	N	IDRI aims to developing products to prevent, diagnose and treat tuberculosis (TB).	Y	Y	N
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program	NA	The FIC-managed Biodiversity Program aims to guide natural products drug discovery in such a way that local communities and other source country organisations can derive direct benefits from their diverse biological resources. Benefit-sharing may provide clear incentives for preservation and sustainable use of that biodiversity.	N	Y	N
International Partnership for Microbicides	NA	IPM aims to provide women with an affordable and self-initiated HIV- prevention strategy to reduce the cycle of infection which has led to the deaths of more than 25 million people worldwide and orphaned more than 15 million children since 1981. Like the promise of a future AIDS vaccine, microbicides represent an essential component of an integrated and comprehensive global response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic.	Y	Y	Y
MAC AIDS fund	NA	The M·A·C AIDS Fund aims to serve people of all ages, all races and all sexes affected by HIV and AIDS. To partner with the bold, the visionary and the brave who confront the epidemic in countries and communities where people are most neglected, off the radar and at highest risk. Responsive, agile and alert, MAF funds innovative programs that deal directly with the most marginalized, stigmatized and under-heard victims.	Y	N	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases	NA	The Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases aims to discover novel treatments and prevention methods for major tropical diseases. In developing countries where these diseases are endemic, Novartis will make treatments readily available, without profit to poor patients.	Y	N	Y
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative	NA	The PDVI aims to reduce the burden of dengue disease by accelerating the development, evaluation, introduction and sustained use of affordable dengue vaccines.	Y	Y	Y
Safe Injection Global Network	NA	SIGN aims to achieve safe and appropriate use of injections world-wide by concerted action under a common strategic framework. SIGN will initially focus on those procedures that contribute most to the transmission of blood borne pathogens.	N	Y	Y
Vision 2020	The vision of Vision 2020 is a world in which no one is needlessly blind and where those with unavoidable vision loss can achieve their full potential. The VISION 2020 initiative is intended to strengthen national health-care systems and facilitate national capacity-building.	Vision2020 aims to eliminate the main causes of avoidable blindness by the year 2020 by facilitating the planning, development and implementation of sustainable national eye care programmes based on the three core strategies of disease control, human resource development and infrastructure and technology, incorporating the principles of primary health care.	Y	Y	Y
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS	NA	UNAIDS aims to bring together the efforts and resources of ten UN system organisations in the AIDS response to help the world prevent new HIV infections, care for people living with HIV, and mitigate the impact of the epidemic.	Y	Y	Y
Alliance to Save Energy	NA	The Alliance to Save Energy aims to promote energy efficiency worldwide to achieve a healthier economy, a cleaner environment and greater energy security.	Y	Y	Y



## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Building Partnerships for Development in Water and Sanitation	NA	BOD-WS aims to promote the delivery of basic services to the poor in developing countries through enhancing institutional relationships between the public, private and civil society sectors.	Y	Y	Y
Clean Air Initiative	UNEP and CAI-Asia developed a Long Term Vision on Urban Air Quality in Asian Cities. This vision will describe the desired state of AQM in Asian cities and can help inspire Asian cities and countries in the development of their AQM policies and programmes.	The CAI-Asia Partnership aims to be a multi-sector forum on urban air quality in Asia where partners from different sectors can meet, exchange experiences and engage in dialogue on urban air quality with the aim to promote better urban AQM in Asian cities.	Y	Y	Y
Community Watersheds Partnership Program Global Development Alliance (Formerly the Coca-Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance)	NA	WADA aims to promote water resources management and service delivery in countries where partners operate.	Y	Y	N
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards Program	CLASP envisions a future in which governments worldwide ensure that: Energy consuming appliances, equipment and lighting products are designed and manufactured for maximum energy efficiency and the regulations governing the manufacture and distribution of these products worldwide are aligned or harmonized in order to maximize the economic and environmental benefits to consumers and create a more sustainable society.	CLASP aims to serve as the primary international voice and resource for practitioners of energy efficiency standards and labeling (S&L) worldwide.	Y	Y	Y
Forest Stewardship Council	FSC's vision is that the world's forests meet the social, ecological and economic rights and needs of the present generation without compromising those of future generations.	The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) aims to promote environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and economically viable management of the world's forests.	Y	Y	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Generation Challenge Programme (Former CGIAR Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor')	GCP's vision is a future where plant breeders have the tools to breed crops in marginal environments with greater efficiency and accuracy for the benefit of the resource-poor farmers and their families.	The GCP's aim is to use genetic diversity and advanced plant science to improve crops for greater food security in the developing world.	Y	N	Y
Global Compact	NA	The UN Global Compact aims to combine the best properties of the UN, such as moral authority and convening power, with the private sector's solution-finding strengths and resources, and the expertise and capacities of other key stakeholders.	N	Y	N
Global Crop Diversity Trust	NA	The Global Crop Diversity Trust aims to ensure the conservation and availability of crop diversity for food security worldwide.	Y	Y	Y
Global e-Sustainability Initiative	GeSI's vision is to create an open and global forum for the improvement and promotion of products, services and access to ICT for the benefit of human development and sustainable development.	GeSI aims to make a meaningful contribution to a global sustainable future, share experience and knowledge, work with stakeholders, manage operations sustainably, raise awareness of the contribution ICT can make to society overall, and contribute to benchmarking.	Y	Y	N
Global Master Plan for Cycling	N	The Global Master Plan for Cycling aims to enhance sustainable development and improve the quality of life in urban communities.	Y	Y	Y
Global Reporting Initiative	GRE's vision is a sustainable global economy where organisations manage their economic, environmental, social and governance performance and impacts responsibly and report transparently.	GRI aims to provide a forum where those who take an interest in environmental, social and governance issues (ESG) and those organisations or individuals working in the Sustainability Reporting field can come together to advance the sustainability agenda.	Y	Y	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Global Road Safety Partnership	NA	GRSP aims to find more effective and innovative ways of dealing with road safety in developing and transition countries. Through a comprehensive approach to road safety, GRSP partners collaborate and coordinate road safety activities. This approach aims to build the capacities of local institutions and to enhance the ability of professionals and communities pro-actively to tackle safety problems.	Y	Y	Y
Global Village Energy Partnership	N	GVEP International aims to connect its wide network of partners to facilitate delivery of the finance, skills and knowledge they need to provide sustainable modern energy services in rural and peri-urban areas of the developing world.	Y	Y	Y
International Center for Sustainable Development	NA	ICSD aims to apply sustainable principles to development projects around the world in order to impact world development through practical projects that meet local needs and that are: community focused, environmentally friendly, financially healthy, and replicable.	Y	N	N
International Center for Tropical Agriculture	CIAT will engage its key scientific competencies to achieve significant impact on the livelihoods of the poor in the tropics. Interdisciplinary and applied research will be conducted through partnerships with national programs, civil society organisations, and the private sector to produce international public goods that are directly relevant to their users. These goods include improved germplasm, technologies, methodologies, and knowledge.	CIAT aims to reduce hunger and poverty, and improve human health in the tropics through research aimed at increasing the eco-efficiency of agriculture.	Y	Y	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

International Electrotechnical Commission	IEC's vision is to have standards and conformity assessment programmes – the key to international trade.#	IEC aims to promote international cooperation on all questions of electrotechnical standardization and related matters, such as the assessment of conformity to standards, in the fields of electricity, electronics and related technologies.	Y	Y	N
International Road Transport Union	NA	The IRU aims to facilitate road transport worldwide and use training to promote professional competence in the sector and to improve the quality of services it offers.	Y	Y	Y
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications	NA	ISAAA aims to contribute to the world efforts to help achieve agricultural sustainability and development.	Y	N	Y
International Solar Energy Society	ISES's vision is Rapid Transition to a Renewable Energy World	The ISES aims to provide scientifically credible and up-to-date Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency information and networking opportunities to the global communities of scientists, educators, practitioners, industries, policy makers and to the general public.	Y	Y	Y
International Youth Foundation	The vision of IYF is a world in which every young person has at least one responsible, loving adult committed to his or her well-being; a safe place in which to live, learn, work, and play; a healthy start and lifestyle; the chance to serve others; and the opportunity to learn marketable skills for adulthood.	The International Youth Foundation aims to prepare the world's young people to be healthy, productive, and engaged citizens.	N	N	Y
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers	NA	ICANN aims to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems.	Y	Y	Y

**APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)**

<p>Marine Stewardship Council</p>	<p>MSC's vision is of the world's oceans teeming with life, and seafood supplies safeguarded for this and future generations.</p>	<p>MSC aims to use our ecolabel and fishery certification programme to contribute to the health of the world's oceans by recognising and rewarding sustainable fishing practises, influencing the choices people make when buying seafood, and working with our partners to transform the seafood market to a sustainable basis.</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>Y</p>
<p>Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe</p>	<p>NA</p>	<p>PECE aims to contribute to the protection and improvement of the environment, an improvement in people's quality of life and the promotion of sustainable development in the EECCA region through tri-sector partnership projects involving government, non-governmental organisations and the private sector.</p>	<p>Y</p>	<p>N</p>	<p>Y</p>

**APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)**

Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	NA	PCPV aims to help developing countries to develop action plans to complete the global elimination of leaded gasoline and start to phase down sulphur in diesel and gasoline fuels, concurrent with adopting cleaner vehicle requirements; Support the development and adoption of cleaner fuel standards and cleaner vehicle requirements by providing a platform for exchange of experiences and successful practices in developed and developing countries as well as technical assistance; Develop public outreach materials, educational programmes, and awareness campaigns; adapt economic and planning tools for clean fuels and vehicles analyses in local settings; and support the development of enforcement and compliance programmes, with an initial focus on fuel adulteration; and foster key partnerships between government, industry, NGOs, and other interested parties within a country and between countries to facilitate the implementation of cleaner fuel and vehicle commitments.	Y	Y	Y
Project Proteus	NA	Project Proteus aims to create and launch in 2008 a decentralised, user-friendly, up-to-date system for storing, managing, and reporting on trends in coverage for all the world's protected areas – conforming to best practice techniques and providing a platform that allows for the easy integration of other conservation datasets and user opinion.	Y	Y	N

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors	NA	PIIPA aims to make NO or LOW COST intellectual property counsel available for developing countries and public interest organisations who seek to promote health, agriculture, biodiversity, science, culture, and the environment.	Y	Y	N
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership	NA	REEEP aims to accelerate the uptake of renewables and energy efficiency technology as a means of reducing carbon emissions, increasing energy security, and improving access to sustainable energy for the poor worldwide.	Y	Y	Y
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century	NA	REN21 aims to provide a forum for international leadership on renewable energy.	Y	Y	N
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor	NA	WSUP aims to support local service providers around the world to deliver affordable and sustainable water and sanitation services to poor people in urban communities.	Y	Y	Y
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against Corruption Initiative	NA	The PACI aims to develop multi-industry principles and practices that will result in a competitive level playing field, based on integrity, fairness and ethical conduct.	Y	Y	N
World Energy Council	NA	The World Energy Council aims to promote the sustainable supply and use of energy for the greatest benefit of all people.	Y	Y	N
World Resources Institute	NA	WRI aims to move human society to live in ways that protect Earth's environment and its capacity to provide for the needs and aspirations of current and future generations.	Y	Y	Y
World Vegetable Centre	NA	The AVRDC aims to reduce malnutrition and poverty through vegetable research and development.	Y	Y	Y
Mectizan Donation Program	Mectizan's vision is a future free of the debilitating effects of onchocerciasis and lymphatic filariasis.	Mectizan aims to provide medical, technical and administrative oversight for the donation of Mectizan for the treatment of river blindness.	Y	N	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Global Ballast Water Management Programme	The vision of the Global Ballast Water Management Programme is to spur global efforts to design and test technology solutions, and to enhance global knowledge management and marine electronic communications to address the issue.	GBP aims to assist developing countries to reduce the risk of aquatic bio-invasions mediated by ships' ballast water and sediments.	N	Y	Y
Efficient Energy for Sustainable Development	EESD's vision is to assist developing and transitional economies reduce poverty and get ahead of their development curves.	EESD aims to improve the productivity and efficiency of energy systems, while reducing waste and pollution, saving money and improving reliability through more energy efficient processes and technologies, and production modernization.	N	Y	Y
World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH) - Hellas - Mesogeiou	NA	The AWISH aims to provide models and support for life sustaining activities that integrate solutions to poverty and the environment while fostering self-reliance.	Y	Y	Y
Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture	AGORA is designed to enhance the scholarship of the many thousands of students, faculty and researchers in agriculture and life sciences in the developing world.	AGORA aims to improve access to scientific information for agriculture sector institutions in developing countries.	Y	Y	Y
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level	NA	APELL does not have its own mission but rather provides mission of UNEP, DEP, the umbrella organisation.	Y	N	Y
BE THE CHANGE! - youth-led action for sustainable development	NA	BE THE CHANGE aims to support and enable young people successfully to complete simple development projects with the minimum of financial resources and the maximum of peer/community support.	Y	N	Y
BioCarbon Fund	NA	The BioCarbon Fund aims to provide carbon finance for projects that sequester or conserve greenhouse gases in forests, agro- and other ecosystems.	Y	N	Y



## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Biotrade Initiative	NA	BTFP aims to stimulate trade and investment in biological resources to further sustainable development in line with the three objectives of the CBD: the conservation of biological diversity; sustainable use of its components; and fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources.	N	Y	Y
Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment and Development	NA	The CBTF aims to combine the unique strengths of UNEP to build capacities on environmental aspects of trade, and of UNCTAD to build capacities on the development aspects of trade.	Y	Y	N
Cement Sustainability Initiative	NA	WBCSD aims to provide business leadership as a catalyst for change toward sustainable development and to promote the role of eco-efficiency, innovation and corporate social responsibility.	Y	N	Y
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food	NA	The CPWF aims to increase the productivity of water for food and livelihoods, in a manner that is environmentally sustainable and socially acceptable.	Y	Y	Y
Cisco Networking Academy Program	NA	Networking Academy aims to provide a consistently enriching learning experience by partnering with public and private institutions such as schools, universities, businesses, nonprofits, and government organisations to develop and deliver innovative ICT courses, improve the effectiveness and accessibility of the program, increase access to education and career opportunities, and help ensure that students and instructors have the resources they need to accomplish their goals.	Y	Y	N

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Climate Investment Partnership	NA	The CIF is a collaborative effort among the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and countries that aims to bridge the financing and learning gap between now and a post-2012 global climate change agreement.	Y	Y	Y
Community Water Initiative	NA	CWI aims to support poor and marginalized populations to acquire one of the most basic human needs -water supply and sanitation, and to acquire one of the most basic human needs -water supply and sanitation.	N	N	Y
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	The founders of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) had a vision of agriculture and agricultural research enabling the world's poor to begin their escape from poverty.	CGIAR aims to achieve sustainable food security and reduce poverty in developing countries through scientific research and research-related activities in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, policy, and environment.	Y	Y	Y
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	CGAP works toward a world in which poor people are considered valued clients of their country's financial system.	CGAP aims to improve poor people's access to convenient and affordable financial services so that they can improve their living conditions and build a better future.	Y	Y	Y
E+Co	E+Co's vision is to build on demand for clean and affordable energy in developing countries and this demand can be satisfied by local entrepreneurs.	E+Co aims to create energy businesses that mitigate climate change and reduce poverty while generating financial returns.	Y	Y	Y
e8 (Formerly e7)	NA	E8 aims to play an active role in addressing global electricity issues and to promote sustainable development worldwide"	Y	N	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Ecoagriculture Partners	Ecoagriculture Partners strives for a world where current agricultural lands are increasingly managed as ecoagriculture landscapes to achieve three complementary goals: to enhance rural livelihoods; conserve biodiversity; and sustainably produce crops, livestock, fish, and forest products.	ECOAGRIBUTLURE aims to support rural communities to produce food and enhance their livelihoods while protecting the biological diversity of plant and animal life, and we educate policymakers, institutions, and innovators in ecoagriculture management approaches to enable this to happen. We support diverse ecoagriculture innovators from the agriculture, conservation and rural development sectors to strengthen and scale up their ecoagriculture management approaches by strengthening understanding of ecoagriculture; facilitating collaboration amongst practitioners, and mobilizing strategic institutional change to enable ecoagriculture.	Y	Y	Y
Ecological Sanitation Research	NA	EcoSanRes (Ecological Sanitation Research) Programme aims to develop and promote sustainable sanitation in the developing world through capacity development and knowledge management as a contribution to equity, health, poverty alleviation, and improved environmental quality.	Y	N	Y
EdInvest	NA	EdInvest aims to provide an information portal for global developments in private education.	Y	N	N
Embarq	NA	EMBARQ aims to catalyze environmentally and financially sustainable transport solutions to improve quality of life in cities by reducing pollution, improving public health, and creating safe, accessible and attractive urban public spaces.	N	Y	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems	EOLSS's vision is to be the world's largest, state-of-the-art, educational, professional, informative, and integrated knowledge base dedicated to the health, maintenance, and future of the web of life on planet Earth, focusing on sustainable development in all its myriad aspects from ecological issues to human security.	The Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS) aims to presents a comprehensive, authoritative, and integrated body of knowledge of life support systems. It is a forward-looking publication, designed as a global guide to professional practice, education, and heightened social awareness of critical life support issues.	Y	Y	N
Equator Initiative	NA	The Equator Initiative aims to bring together the United Nations, governments, civil society, businesses, and grassroots organisations to build the capacity and raise the profile of local efforts to reduce poverty through the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.	Y	Y	Y
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life	N	Water for Life aims to half the number of people without access to safe water and basic sanitation.	N	N	N
EVE-olution Foundation	N	The EVE-olution Foundation aims to empower women entrepreneurs in developing nations with the support of our worldwide network of retired successful executives as "coaches".	N	Y	Y
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade	NA	The Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade aims to pull together all interested parties, public and private, national and international, who want to help achieve significant improvements in transport and trade facilitation in World Bank member countries.	N	N	Y
Global Gas Flaring Reduction	GGRF's vision is to work together with major oil companies and governments to minimize energy waste by jointly overcoming the barriers that inhibit more gas utilization.	The GGFR partnership aims to be a catalyst for reducing wasteful and undesirable practices of gas flaring and venting through policy change, stakeholder facilitation and project implementation.	Y	Y	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Global Partnership for Capacity Building to Implement the Globally Harmonized System for Chemical Classification and Labelling	NA	The Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS) aims at ensuring that existing information on physical hazards and toxicity from chemicals is available in order to enhance the protection of human health and the environment during the handling, transport and use of these chemicals.	N	Y	Y
Global Water Partnership	The Global Water Partnership's vision is for a water secure world. Its mission is to support the sustainable development and management of water resources at all levels.	GWP aims to foster integrated water resource management (IWRM), and to ensure the coordinated development and management of water, land, and related resources by maximising economic and social welfare without compromising the sustainability of vital environmental systems.	Y	N	Y
GlobalGiving	GlobalGiving's vision it to unleash the potential of people around the world to make positive change happen.	GlobalGiving' aims to build an efficient, open, thriving marketplace that connects people who have community and world-changing ideas with people who can support them.	N	Y	N
Great Apes Survival Project	The GRASP Partnership has, as an immediate challenge, to lift the threat of imminent extinction facing most populations of great apes.	GRASP aims to work as a coherent partnership to conserve in their natural habitats wherever they exist wild populations of every kind of great ape and to make sure that where apes and people interact, their interactions are mutually positive and sustainable.	N	N	Y
International Livestock Research Institute	ILRI envisions a world made better for poor people in developing countries by improving agricultural systems in which livestock are important.	ILRI aims to work at the crossroads of livestock and poverty, bringing high-quality science and capacity-building to bear on poverty reduction and sustainable development for poor livestock keepers and their communities.	Y	N	Y
International Navigation Association	NA	PIANC aims to provide expert guidance and technical advice; To keep the international waterborne transport community connected; to support young professionals and countries in transition.	Y	N	N

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

International Partnership for Sustainable Development in Mountain Regions	The Mountain Partnership envisages the improved well being, livelihoods and opportunities of mountain people and the protection and stewardship of mountain environments around the world.	The Mountain Partnership aims to achieve sustainable mountain development around the world. The Mountain Partnership addresses the challenges of mountain regions, by tapping the wealth and diversity of resources, knowledge(including traditional knowledge), information and expertise, from and through its members, in order to stimulate concrete initiatives at all levels that will ensure improved quality of life and environments in the world's mountain regions.	Y	Y	Y
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy	NA	The IPHE aims to serve as a mechanism to organize and implement effective, efficient, and focused international research, development, demonstration and commercial utilization activities related to hydrogen and fuel cell technologies.	Y	Y	N
International Water and Sanitation Center	NA	IRC aims to facilitate the sharing, promotion and use of knowledge so that governments, professionals and organisations can better support poor men, women and children in developing countries to obtain water and sanitation services they will use and maintain.	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity-Building and Training on Sustainable Urbanization: a Public-Private Partnership	NA	LDP aims to develop the capacity of local actors, through exchange of experiences and dissemination of best practices, as an effective way of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and reducing poverty at local level.	Y	Y	Y
Methane to Markets	NA	Methane to Markets aims to support advances in cost effective, near-term methane recovery and use as a clean energy source in four sectors: agriculture, coal mines, landfills, and oil and gas systems.	Y	Y	Y

**APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)**

New Ventures = XR?	New Venture's vision is that Local Centers become nationally recognized hubs for sustainable entrepreneurship, around which a vibrant ecosystem of support is created.	New Ventures aims to help environmental entrepreneurship grow in vibrant emerging markets.	Y	Y	N
Online Access to Research in the Environment	OARE's vision is for developing countries to gain access to one of the world's largest collections of environmental science research.	OARE aims to improve the quality and effectiveness of environmental science research, education and training in low-income countries.	N	Y	N
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air	NA	The Partnership for Clean Indoor Air aims to improve health, livelihood, and quality of life by reducing exposure to indoor air pollution, primarily among women and children, from household energy use.	Y	Y	Y
Population and Sustainability Network	NA	The Population and Sustainability Network aims to provide a 'space' in which different constituencies can learn from each other.	Y	Y	N
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative	NA	Refrigerators Naturally Initiative aims to combat climate change and ozone layer depletion by substituting harmful fluorinated gases ("F-gases", such as CFCs, HCFCs and HFCs) with natural refrigerants with a focus on their point-of-sale cooling applications.	Y	Y	Y
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable Development	Sister Cities International seeks to achieve a peaceful, orderly and just world by assuming leadership in bringing together communities around the world to create a worldwide sister city movement for peace. Every country will have active, prosperous and mutually beneficial relationships United States sister cities, counties, and states. Throughout the world, individuals and organized groups at all levels of society will commit themselves to serve as citizen diplomats for this purpose.	SCNSD aims to promote peace through mutual respect, understanding, & cooperation — one individual, one community at a time.	Y	Y	Y
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance	NA	The Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance aims to make markets work for forests and people.	Y	Y	Y

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Tour Operators Initiative	NA	Tour Operators Initiative aims to advance the sustainable development and management of tourism; to encourage tour operators to make a corporate commitment to sustainable development.	Y	Y	N
Transparency International	Transparency International's vision is a world in which government, politics, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption.	TI aims to create change towards a world free of corruption.	N	N	Y
Travel Foundation	NA	The Travel Foundation's aim is to protect and enhance the environment and to improve the well-being of communities in destination countries.	Y	Y	Y
Unicode Consortium	NA	The Unicode Consortium aims to develop, extend and promote use of the Unicode Standard, which specifies the representation of text in modern software products and standards.	Y	Y	N
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme	UNIDO's holistic cleaner production approach is a preventive, integrated strategy that is applied to the entire production cycle to increase productivity by ensuring a more efficient use of raw materials, energy and water. They wish to promote better environmental performance through reduction at source of waste and emissions, and to reduce the environmental impact of products throughout their life cycle by the design of environmentally friendly but cost-effective products.	The UNIDO Cleaner Production programme (CP) aims at building national CP capacities, fostering dialogue between industry and government and enhancing investments for transfer and development of environmentally sound technologies.	Y	Y	N
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business	UN-CEFACT's vision is to create simple, transparent and effective processes for global business.	The United Nations, through its Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT), aims to support activities dedicated to improving the ability of business, trade and administrative organisations, from developed, developing and transitional economies, to exchange products and relevant services effectively.	Y	Y	N



## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

World Alliance for Decentralized Energy		WADE's vision is for the wider use of DE is a key solution to bringing about the cost-effective modernization and development of the world's electricity systems. Existing decentralized energy (DE) technologies can reduce delivered energy costs and decrease emissions of CO2 as well as other harmful pollutants.	WADE aims to increase the market share of DE technologies in the global power mix to create a cost-effective, robust and sustainable electricity system.	Y	Y	Y
World Business Council on Sustainable Development	NA		The WBCSD aims to provide business leadership as a catalyst for change toward sustainable development, and to support the business license to operate, innovate and grow in a world increasingly shaped by sustainable development issues.	N	Y	N
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network	NA		The Humanitarian Relief Initiative aims to increase the global impact of private sector engagement in humanitarian relief. The HRI develops public-private partnerships (PPPs) that match the core competencies of the private sector with the priority needs of the global humanitarian community in advance of humanitarian crises.	N	Y	Y
World Links	NA		World Links aims to improve educational outcomes, economic opportunities, and global understanding for youth through the use of information and communications technology and novel approaches to learning.	Y	Y	Y
World Tourism Organisation	NA		The World Tourism Organisation aims to promote and develop tourism with a view to contribute to economic development, international understanding, peace, prosperity, and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.	N	Y	N

## APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)

Youth Business International	Our vision is that youth enterprise is recognised as a vital part of efforts to create employment and stimulate economic growth throughout the world.	Youth Business International aims to champion youth enterprise by growing a global network which provides young people with the opportunity to start their own business.	N	Y	Y
Ethical Trading Initiative	ETI's vision is a world where all workers are free from exploitation and discrimination, and work in conditions of freedom, security and equity.	ETI aims to improve working conditions in global supply chains by developing effective approaches to implementing the ETI Base Code of labour practice.	Y	Y	Y
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee Community	The long term objectives are higher efficiency, cost reduction, quality improvement and increased profitability in coffee production	The 4C Association aims to create a beneficial situation for coffee producers, workers engaged in the coffee sector, rural communities, trade & industry, consumers and the environment.	N	Y	Y
Global Environment Facility	NA	The Global Environment Facility (GEF) aims to provide a mechanism for international cooperation for the purpose of providing new, and additional, grant and concessional funding to meet the agreed incremental costs of measures to achieve agreed global environmental benefits in the areas of biological diversity, climate change, international waters, and ozone layer depletion.	Y	Y	N
ACCION International	ACCION pursues a vision in which all people have access to a range of high-quality financial services that enhance their economic potential and the quality of their lives.	ACCION International aims to give people the financial tools they need to work their way out of poverty.	Y	N	Y
Agricultural Risk Management Team	ARMT has separate visions for each of their program areas, which include Supply Chain Risk Assessment, Price Risk Management, Weather Risk Management, Capacity Building and Training, and Forum for Agriculture Risk Management in Development (FARM).	ARMT aims to assist clients to develop and apply more effective and sustainable strategies for managing agricultural risks through investment lending and technical assistance.	Y	Y	Y

**APPENDIX E (CONTINUED)**

Clean Tech Fund	NA	The CTF aims to finance transformational actions by providing positive incentives for the demonstration of low carbon development and mitigation of GHG emissions. This will be done through public and private sector investments	Y	Y	Y
Golden Rice	NA	Golden Rice aims to help mitigate the problem of vitamin A deficiency in the world by delivering the technology to the vitamin A-deficient poor in developing countries in the most efficient way.	Y	N	Y

## APPENDIX F: PPPs: EXTERNAL EVALUATIONS

	Abv.	No. of External Evaluations	Conducted by:	Dates
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee Community	4-C	60	Professional, independent third-party companies that are accredited against ISO/Guide 65 or equivalent	2009
ACCION International	ACCION	1	Charity Navigator	2008
AED-SATELLIFE	SATELLIFE	1	Centre of Informatics of the Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (CIUEM)	2010
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation	AERAS	1	The Directorate-General for International Cooperation (DGIS) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2009
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research	AHPSR	1	Epidemiology and Global Health, Umeå University, Sweden	2010
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level	APELL	1	Asociacion Nacional de Industriales (ANDI)	2004
Building Partnerships for Development in Water and Sanitation	BPD-WS	1	PARC	2006
Cement Sustainability Initiative	CSI	1	Société Générale de Surveillance SA	2008
Clean Air Initiative	CAI	1	Synovate, Inc.	2004
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	CGIAR	1	Independent Review Panel	2008
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	CGAP	1	Sarah Forster, Klaus Maurer, Michael Mithika	2007
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative	DNDI	1	See personal interview notes	2005
E + Co		1	Charity Navigator	2009
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis Partnership	MDR-TB	2	Harvard University and INSEAD	Both 2007
Equator Initiative		1	Fikret Berkes and Tikaram Adhikari	2006
Ethical Trading Initiative	ETI	1	Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex	2006
Forest Stewardship Council	FSC	1	Quang Tri Smallholder Forest Certification Group, VIETNAM	2011
Generation Challenge Programme	GCP	2	European Commission and CGIAR Science Council Secretariat	Both 2008
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis	GAELF	2	Izumi Foundation and Prepare/Test Foundation	2009 and 2005
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	GAVI	2	Abt Associates, Harvard Initiative for Global Health	2007 and 2006

## APPENDIX F: CONTINUED

Global Ballast Water Management Programme		1	Vousden & Okamura	2003
Global Compact	UNGC	1	GTZ	2008
Global Crop Diversity Trust		1	Dr Maria Jose Amstalden Sampaio, Dr Regassa Feyissa and chaired by Dr Bob Clements	2009
Global Environment Facility	GEF	1	Charlotte Streck, MIT	2006
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria	GFATM	18	Conducted by multiple bodies, including the most recent by Macro International	2009
Global Polio Eradication Initiative	GPEI	2	International Spread Team, Michael Toole	Both 2009
Global Reporting Initiative	GRI	1	Global Public Policy Institute	2006
Global Road Safety Partnership	GRSP	1	Henning Lauridsen and Torkel Bjørnskau	2004
Global Village Energy Partnership	GVEP	1	DFID	2009
Global Water Partnership	GWP	2	Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank and Joint Donor Group consisting of DFID, SIDA, Norad, DGIS, GTZ and Danida	2010 and 2007
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative	IAVI	1	Panel of Experts (WB commissioned)	2009
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program	ICBG	1	Panel of Experts (FIC commissioned)	2002
International Partnership for Microbicides	IPM	1	FSG	2008
International Water and Sanitation Center	IRC	2	Directorate General for International Cooperation (DGIS) of the Netherlands' Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and IRC	2005 and 2010
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers	ICANN	1	One World Trust	2007
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS	UNAIDS	2	Oversight Committee and UNAIDS Programme Coordinating Board	2009 and 2007
Marine Stewardship Council	MSC	1	Wildhavens	2004
Mectizan Donation Program	Mectizan	1	Department of International Health, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health	2004
Medicines for Malaria Venture	MMV	3	FSG, World Bank, and DFID	2010, 2007 and 2005
Micronutrient Initiative	MI	1	CIDA	2000
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	PCFV	1	UNEP	2010
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership	REEEP	1	Consortium Le Groupe-conseil baastel Itée & Econoler International	2009

## APPENDIX F: CONTINUED

Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership	RBM	1	Dalberg Global Development Advisors	2009
Stop TB Partnership	StopTB	3	World Bank; McKinsey & Company	2009
Tour Operators Initiative		1	Leeds Metropolitan University	2003
Transparency International	TI	1	Channel Research	2011
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme	CP	2	Independent Evaluation Team (one in Mozambique, one in South Africa)	Both in 2008
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business	UN- CEFACT	1	Group of Experts	2005
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor	WSUP	1	DfID	2010
World Vegetable Centre	AVRDC	1	EPMR Panel	2008

## APPENDIX G: Management interviews: Organisational variables tracked

### Institutional and organizational variables tracked across ITPs interviewed

#### Organization:

How many PARTNERS form the PPP?  
 How many (approx) partners were part of the PPP at its launch/ initiation?  
 Are there additional members (organisations) participate within the PPP?  
 How often do ALL the partners within the PPP meet?  
 Do PPP partners need to be present to vote?

#### Ownership:

What is the legal status of the PPP?  
 Has this changed since PPP launch?  
 Is the PPP hosted?  
 If so, what form does this hosting take?  
 Is the PPP part of a larger network?

#### Governance:

What is the main forum for governance and decision making?  
 How many members does this consist of?  
 How are governance members elected/ selected?  
 How many other main forums for decision making exist within the PPP?  
 How is the relationship between Board and executive team managed?

#### Autonomy: (how involved do host organizations and/or governing boards engaging the executive?)

How would the decision to institute a strategic change / shift take place?  
 How would the decision to change / expand current operations or programs?  
 How would decisions about key staffing decisions take place?  
 How would decisions regarding funding and budget decisions take place?

#### Evaluations:

How many internal evaluations have been conducted since 2004?  
 How many external evaluations have been conducted since 2004?

#### Competition:

How many other global PPPs perform in a roughly similar area?  
 How many main competitors TOTAL does your partnership face? (i.e. for funding, support, service)  
 Where do you consider this competition to be based? (i.e. other PPPs, NGOs, government agencies, private firms)

#### Staff:

How many full-time staff members secretariat/ centralized operations?  
 How many part-time staff members are employed at the secretariat / centralized operations?  
 Does your partnership have country / branch level operations centralized through a physical site or location?  
 What percent of staff members (full time employees, not partners) have left the PPP within the last 12 months?

#### Constraints:

Are the following constraints a major issue, a minor issue, or not an issue at all?

- Funding and lack of physical resources
- Staff and people with the right skills
- Competition and overlap (e.g. other PPPs)
- Country level constraints and systems
- Governmental and political systems
- Economic environment
- Technological environment/ access to scientific knowledge

Would you consider the environment for engaging with a global policy dialogue through partnerships is improving?

#### Self score:

Ignoring your self, how well managed do you think the rest of the PPP is on scale: 1 to 10, where 1 is worst practice, 10 is the best practice and 5 is average?

- Overall
- Operations (processes)
- Talent (people, promotion, incentives, etc....)

## APPENDIX H: Management interviews: Autonomy specification

Specification	1 (low autonomy)	3 (medium autonomy)	5 (high autonomy)
How would the decision to institute a strategic change / shift take place?	<i>The PPP has no authority, all takes place within the host or main partner</i>	<i>Requires signoff from the host/ main partner; typically agreed</i>	<i>Complete decision of the PPP or its partners in aggregate</i>
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the above, who within the PPP makes that decision?	<i>The PPP main governing board/ chair decides entirely</i>	<i>The PPP Board/Chair decides combined with the PPP committee</i>	<i>The operations team makes the decision entirely</i>
How would the decision to change / expand current operations or programs?	<i>The PPP has no authority, all takes place within the host or main partner</i>	<i>Requires signoff from the host/ main partner; typically agreed</i>	<i>Complete decision of the PPP or its partners in aggregate</i>
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the above, who within the PPP makes that decision?	<i>The PPP main governing board/ chair decides entirely</i>	<i>The PPP Board/Chair decides combined with the PPP committee</i>	<i>The operations team makes the decision entirely</i>
How would decisions about key staffing decisions take place?	<i>The PPP has no authority, all takes place within the host or main partner</i>	<i>Requires signoff from the host/ main partner; typically agreed</i>	<i>Complete decision of the PPP or its partners in aggregate</i>
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the above, who within the PPP makes that decision?	<i>The PPP main governing board/ chair decides entirely</i>	<i>The PPP Board/Chair decides combined with the PPP committee</i>	<i>The operations team makes the decision entirely</i>
How would decisions regarding funding and budget decisions take place?	<i>The PPP has no authority, all takes place within the host or main partner</i>	<i>Requires signoff from the host/ main partner; typically agreed</i>	<i>Complete decision of the PPP or its partners in aggregate</i>
To the extent that the PPP entity decides over the above, who within the PPP makes that decision?	<i>The PPP main governing board/ chair decides entirely</i>	<i>The PPP Board/Chair decides combined with the PPP committee</i>	<i>The operations team makes the decision entirely</i>



## APPENDIX I: Management Interview Guide: Complete question and scoring grid

### Pre-interview Questions:

Partnership Name

Date

Time

Position

Tenure in Post (years)

Tenure in Partnership (years)

HOSTED?

What is the main function of this PPP?

When was the partnership initiated/ launched?

### PARTNERSHIP VISION AND STRATEGY

#### (1) Partnership vision

*Tests whether partnership leaders have the understanding of the broader set of challenges that the partnership, system and key actors face*

- a) How does the partnership define its vision? How has this changed since partnership initiation?
- b) Who is involved in setting the vision/ strategies? When there is disagreement, how does the partnership leader build alignment?
- c) How well do partner members and PPP staff know and understand the vision?
- d) How is this vision communicated to the overall partnership community?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Partnership either has no clear vision, or one defined without substantial stakeholder collaboration	Partnership has defined a vision that reflects key PPP strategy but either largely focused on meeting specific mandates or defined too loosely to resonate with meaning; usually defined with stakeholder collaboration at PPP onset	Partnership defines and broadly communicate a shared vision and purpose for the partnership that focuses on adding distinct value ( <i>beyond those required by MOUs, etc</i> ); Vision and purpose is built upon a keen understanding of both PPP and wider system level needs, and defined collaboratively with a wide range of stakeholders

#### (2) Partnership rationale and value add

*Tests whether the partnership and partnering organizations have articulated rationale for partnering and value add*

- a) What was the rationale that led to this partnering arrangement? How was this communicated between partners?
- b) How often is this rationale reviewed amongst partners or funders? How was this communicated?
- c) Who does your partnership consider to be your key stakeholders?
- d) Can you give an example of how your organization has proactively modified its activities based on stakeholder needs?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Rationale not clearly stated or noted at PPP initiation only or as required for funding and/or support; stakeholder community only loosely defined and little action taken to assess its changing needs	Rationale for partnering and the partnership articulated but little to no follow through (e.g. rarely revisited); Data on the changing needs gathered but provides guidance only	Partner managers can articulate clear rationale for partnering built on jointly defined problems and solutions and achieving distinct fit within system; PPP reviews its rationale in response to stakeholder feedback and changing system wide needs; and modifies its proposition and services in anticipation of new and/or changed conditions

## APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)

### PARTNER MANAGEMENT

#### (3) Partnership selection strategy

*Test how well the partnership determines partner selection via appropriate model*

- a) What is the process for a new partner to join your organization? Where do you seek out and source new partners?
- b) What criteria do you use and/or pre-checks are performed before a new partner is admitted to the PPP? How often does this occur?
- c) What defines a partner in your PPP, versus a member or a funder? How is this communicated?
- d) How often do you review your partner selection model to test its effectiveness? Can you explain the results of the last review that occurred?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Unclear distinction of partners; reactive only or more ad hoc process of new partners or members joining, e.g. focuses on geographical or financial based factors only	Partnership may define partnership criteria and processes but is not linked with key drivers of PPP outcomes; attempt at due diligence performed at onset	Partnership proactively controls the number and types of partners involved needed to meet goals; Partnership defines criteria and processes based on understanding of strategic and performance-based fit; due diligence performed and monitored (i.e. follow ups performed)

#### (4) Clearly defined partnership roles

*Tests how clearly the roles, responsibilities and required attributes of members partners are defined within the partnership*

- a) How are the roles and responsibilities of the PARTNERS defined? Who determines these roles?
- b) How are these roles communicated and reviewed within the partnership and to hosts/funders and your SK community?
- c) How are they linked to partnership outcomes and performance?
- d) How are leadership responsibilities distributed across partners (and host organizations)? What about risks?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Partnership does not define clear roles, responsibilities or accountability and desired of partners	Partnership defines roles, responsibilities and desired competencies of partners, but not necessarily linked with key drivers of PPP performance and outcomes; roles noted at joining only and responsibilities assigned on more ad hoc basis; centralised leadership	Partnership defines clear roles, responsibilities and desired competencies of partners, built upon an understanding of what value add each partner has to contribute; Leadership and operational responsibilities are distributed across the partnership; clear notion of shared and assumed risks and responsibilities

### OPERATIONS MANGEMENT

#### (5) Organization principles

*Tests how the partnership is organized*

- a) Can you briefly describe the basic organizational structure of the PPP?
- b) Why is the partnership structured the way it is? Can you think of other structures that would make more sense?
- c) Are there any significant opportunities in performance improvement that could be gained through a different organizational design?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	No visible or clear organizational principles applied; organization never challenged, a "this is how it is" attitude	Fundamentally right organizational setup, however often not effectively implemented and rarely challenged (seen as out of PPP's control to change)	Organization consciously designed and regularly challenged in order to attempt to improve (e.g. synergies fully captured where possible (methods, tools, resource bundling, etc.); largely decentralized operational activities while strategic activities are centralized

#### (6) Scoping resources and resource management

*Tests whether the partnership has a coherent strategy for sourcing resources, knowledge of requirements and risk assessment*

- a) Can you describe the process for initiating contacts and obtaining additional funding or resources at your partnership?
- b) What proportion of your resources are committed prior to planning (e.g. budget year if applicable) versus those you must additionally seek? How much is repeat donors versus new?
- c) How do you determine how much resource will be needed to complete your PPPs work? How accurate are your estimations?
- d) How much can the PPP operations deal with shocks like a sudden increase / reduction in resources available (i.e. procurement process took much longer than expected to come into fruition)?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Partnership does not have a coherent resource sourcing strategy or relies heavily on its main funders; Few estimates performed or consistently estimates incorrectly; planning horizon is reactive to committed funds	Partnership articulates resource strategy and has processes in place to support a steady funding stream but tends to rely on main funders, articulates major needs but estimates may not always match reality and feasibility	Partnership has a steady and committed funding stream that is managed as an integral part of PPP operations; Significant effort is made to ensure that work is not under or over resourced; Flexibility is built into the system to deal with fluctuating demand; LT planning horizon for funding

## APPENDIX I(CONTINUED)

**(7) Good use of partner resources and internal collaboration and knowledge sharing**  
*Tests whether the organization ensures partners with the “right” fit/skills/resources are in place and able to work together and collaborate to share best practices*

- a) In planning for your PPPs operations, how do you know which partner organizations will contribute in which areas?
- b) How well are partners/ members matched to the requirements of their roles? Does this flow down to the staff level?
- c) Within your basic PPP business operations model, how often should various partners work *directly* together on specific areas of PPP work? How often do they?
- d) When a situation requires work across partners, does it happen seamlessly? Is there a process in place to facilitate this?
- e) How are lessons and best practices shared within the organization across partners/members?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	No PPP centralised system for matching contributions and ability for partner organizations beyond what is noted at partnership onset; there is little or no regular formal or informal cooperation and knowledge sharing across units or partners	PPP reviews contributions and fit for certain projects and some effort is made to better match these; Partners and units support each other and there is a fair level of interaction and knowledge sharing; The different units actively work together and the interviewee can easily give a few success stories	PPP has a system or process in place to regularly review partner contributions and ensure match and fit and ensuring best contributions from members seen as integral to PPP success; frequently use formal and informal mechanisms to access resources or expertise in different PPP units to solve problems and then incorporate these learnings into PPP modes

**(8) Adopting Partnership Best Practices / External orientation**  
*Tests whether a partnership regularly reaches out to find ideas to improve performance and incorporates these into practice*

- a) How often does the division seek out ideas for best practices and innovations in service? What sources do you use?
- b) Can think of a recent lesson learned from another organization? How did you use it to improve operations or services within your organization?
- c) How are these learning or new practices shared across partners? What about across staff members?
- d) How does the PPP ensure that members and partnerships actors are utilizing these new practices? How often does this happen?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	The PPP rarely reaches out to other partnerships or organizations	The PPP reaches outside the organization for ideas on a selective issue by issue basis; there is insufficient monitoring or implementation of these ‘best practices’ but PPP may attempt to incorporate practices garnered from reactive means	The PPP has formal mechanisms to gain ideas for improvement through forums, work with academics; provides leadership and staff with opportunities to collaborate and share best practice techniques and learnings with multiple methods to support their monitored implementation within the partnership (and level operations)

**(9) Continuous Improvement and process documentation**  
*Tests attitudes to continuous improvement*

- a) When problems within partnership do occur, how do they typically get exposed and fixed?
- b) Can you talk me through the process for a recent problem that you faced?
- c) Who within the partnership gets involved in changing or improving process? How do the different staff groups get involved in this?
- d) Does the staff ever suggest process improvements?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Exposing and solving problems (for the partnership and staff) is unstructured; No process improvements are made when problems occur	Exposing and solving problems is approached in a more ad-hoc way; resolution involves most of the appropriate staff groups	Exposing and solving problems in a structured way is integral to individual's responsibilities, and resolution involves all appropriate individuals and staff groups; resolution performed as part of regular partnership management processes

## TARGET MANAGEMENT

**(10) Target Balance / Breadth**  
*Tests whether the PPP sets and tracks meaningful targets tied to outcomes*

- a) What types of targets are set for the partnership? At which levels are the goals stated?
- b) How much are these determined by external factors or key host partners? Can you tell me about goals that are not set by those involved with funding and/or hosting?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Goals and related targets are very loosely defined or not defined at all; if they exist, they are activity rather than outcome based	Goals defined for the partnership and units in terms of absolute measures of outcomes but related performance targets tend to be reactive measures; goals may tend to focus on partner/host goals	Goals are balanced across range of measures; Performance targets are defined for the partnership and individual units and staff; targets include both absolute and value-added measures of outcomes and other metrics linked to key drivers of outcomes

## APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)

<b>11) Target inter-connection</b>			
<i>Tests whether partnership and individual targets are aligned with each other and the overall system goals</i>			
a) How are these goals cascaded across the organization? How do PPP-wide goals cascade down to the different partner organizations or operational groups/ units? (adjust as appropriately given PPP structure) b) How do you ensure your targets linked to global development goals or overriding principals on AID effectiveness (e.g. MDG or Paris AID or OECD DAC)? (Note: if applicable only) c) What about to country-level and unit-based operations? How are your targets linked to country based targets or goals (if applicable)? d) How are these goals cascaded down to the different partner organizations or staff groups or to individual staff members?			
	<b>Score 1</b>	<b>Score 3</b>	<b>Score 5</b>
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Goals do not cascade down the throughout the partnership or partnership system  Goals are set with minimal or no system-wide effects taken into account	Goals do cascade, but only to some units  Goals may build in notions of system-wide fit elements, but this is rarely reviewed or monitored	Goals are aligned and linked at system level; goals increase in specificity as they cascade throughout the PPP, ultimately defining individual expectations,  Goals are set to align with system and country level objectives and targets (if applicable) and ability to meet and align with these is seen as part of the PPPs goals
<b>(12) Time horizon of targets</b>			
<i>Tests whether partnership has a rational approach to planning and setting targets</i>			
a) What kind of time scale are you looking at with your targets? What is this based upon? b) Which goals receive the most emphasis? c) Are the long term and short term goals set independently? d) Could you meet all your short-run goals but miss your long-run goals?			
	<b>Score 1</b>	<b>Score 3</b>	<b>Score 5</b>
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	The partnership's main focus is on short term targets and individual programs	There are short and long-term goals for all levels of the partnership system; As they are set independently, they are not necessarily linked to each other	Long term goals are translated into specific short term targets so that short term targets become a "staircase" to reach long term goals
<b>(13) Target stretch</b>			
<i>Tests whether targets are appropriately difficult to achieve</i>			
a) How tough are your targets? Do you feel pushed by them? b) On average, how often would you say that you and your partnership meet its targets? How are your targets benchmarked? c) Do you feel that on targets all units/ departments across the partnership or teams receive the same degree of difficulty? Do some departments/ areas get easier targets?			
	<b>Score 1</b>	<b>Score 3</b>	<b>Score 5</b>
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Goals are either too easy or impossible to achieve; at least in part because they are set with little unit level involvement	In most areas, partnership leaders push for aggressive goals, but with little buy-in from the unit level; There are a few "sacred cows" that are not held to the same rigorous standard; little benchmarking	Goals are genuinely demanding for all parts of the partnership organization and developed in consultation with senior PPP leaders and PPP operational units; goals grounded in solid economic based rationale
<b>(14) Clarity and comparability of targets</b>			
<i>Tests how easily understandable performance measures are and whether performance is openly communicated</i>			
a) If I asked one of your PPP staff directly about individual targets, what would he or she tell me? b) Does anyone complain that the targets are too complex? Could staff across the partnership tell me what they are responsible for and how that will be assessed? c) How are these measures of performance communicated within the partnership? How about to stakeholders? d) How do people know about their own performance compared to other people's performance? (department/focus or country level -keep separate notes on level)			
	<b>Score 1</b>	<b>Score 3</b>	<b>Score 5</b>
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Performance measures are complex and not clearly understood; Partnership internal performance data is not made public unless mandated	Performance measures are well defined and communicated; Partnership performance data goes beyond requirements mandated, partly made public	Performance measures are well defined, strongly communicated and reinforced at all reviews; Partnership performance include both quantitative and qualitative measures and are made public
<b>(15) Clearly defined accountability</b>			
<i>Tests if there are clear single points of accountability for targets and whether these cover all necessary staff groups</i>			
a) Who is accountable for delivering on partnership targets? b) How is the responsibility for achieving targets shared among individuals from the various staff groups and committees? c) How is this accountability communicated and reviewed? How are partners actually held to account? What about unit levels and individual staff members?			
	<b>Score 1</b>	<b>Score 3</b>	<b>Score 5</b>
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	There is little accountability on delivery of targets; accountability or single targets is either shared between multiple units/staff and/or some staff are not involved	Single points of accountability for targets can be identified but managers are not involved and bought into them; little measures taken to hold to account	Single points of accountability for targets can be identified and is at an appropriate level; all staff groups are bought in and responsible for relevant parts of delivery

## APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)

### PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT

#### (16) Performance tracking

*Tests whether staff performance is measured with the right methods and frequency (performance is tracked using meaningful metrics and with appropriate regularity)*

- a) What kind of main indicators do you use for *performance* tracking? What sources of information are used to inform this tracking and review?
- b) How frequently are these measured? Who gets to see this performance data?
- c) How are these metrics communicated (e.g. to management versus the governing board versus staff)?
- d) Are there more or better metrics that you feel you should be tracking?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Measures tracked do not indicate directly if overall objectives are being met; Tracking is an ad-hoc process or only done based on deliverables (certain processes aren't tracked at all)	Most performance indicators are tracked formally; Tracking is overseen by senior management only	Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, both formally and informally, to all staff using arrange of visual management tools

#### (17) Performance review

*Tests whether performance is reviewed with appropriate frequency and follow-up*

- a) How often do you review (Partnership) performance —formally or informally—with staff and/or key partners/hosts?
- b) Could you walk me through the process you go through in a process review?
- c) Who is involved in these? Who gets to see the results of this review?
- d) What sort of follow up plan would you leave these reviews with?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Performance is reviewed infrequently or in an un-meaningful way, e.g. only success or failure is noted	Performance is reviewed periodically with successes and failures identified; Results are only communicated to senior staff members (e.g. department heads); No clear follow up/action plan is adopted	Performance is continually reviewed, based on all relevant indicators; All aspects are followed up ensure continuous improvement; Results are communicated to all staff and relevant partner members

#### (18) Performance dialogue

*Tests the quality of review conversations*

- a) How are these reviewing meetings structured? How is the agenda determined?
- b) Do you generally feel that you do have enough data for a fact-based review?
- c) What type of feedback occurs during these meetings?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	The right data or information for a constructive discussion is often not present or conversations overly focus on data that is not meaningful; Clear agenda is not known and purpose is not stated explicitly	Review conversations are held with appropriate data and information present; Objectives of meetings are clear to all participating and a clear agenda is present; Conversations do not, as a matter of course, drive to the root cause of the problems	Regular review/performance conversations focus on problem solving and addressing root causes; Purpose, agenda and follow-up steps are clear to all; Meetings are an opportunity for constructive feedback and coaching

#### (19) Consequence management

*Tests whether differing levels of performance (NOT only personal but process based) lead to different consequences*

- a) Let's say you've agreed to a follow up plan at one of your meetings, what would happen if the plan was not enacted?
- b) How long does it typically go between when a problem is identified to when it is solved? Can you give me a recent example?
- c) How do you deal with repeated failures in a specific department or area of process?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Failure to achieve agreed objectives does not carry any consequences	Failure to achieve agreed results is tolerated for a period before action is taken	A failure to achieve agreed targets drives retraining in identified areas of weakness, moving individuals to where their skills are more appropriate

## APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)

### LEADERSHIP AND TALENT MANAGEMENT

(20) Clearly defined leadership roles

*Tests how clearly the roles, responsibilities and required attributes of leaders are defined with the partnership*

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	PPP does not define clear roles, responsibilities and desired competencies of PPP leaders	PPP (not host) defines clear roles, responsibilities and desired competencies of leaders, but not necessarily linked with the drivers of performance and outcomes; concentrated leadership amongst host or main sectoral and/or partner base	PPP (not host) defines clear roles, responsibilities and desired competencies of PPP leaders, built upon an understanding of what drives PPP performance and outcomes; Leadership responsibilities are distributed across sectoral and partner base

(21) Leadership mindset

*Tests whether managers have the understanding of the broader set of challenges that the PPP faces and the right mindset to address them*

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid</b>	Limited interest or engagement beyond own specialty or central operations; less willingness to see issues and challenges of other parts of the PPP	Partnership leaders understand the broader issues the PPP faces and are willing to engage on managerial issues but still have a “convince me” attitude or are only partially bought in on the resolution of these issues	Good understanding of system constraints and tradeoffs and ability to work constructively with staff and other stakeholders;

**APPENDIX I (CONTINUED)**  
**TALENT/ PEOPLE MANAGEMENT**

**(22) Managing talent**

*Tests how well the partnership identifies and targets needed teaching, leadership and other capacity in the partnership*

- a) Where do you seek out and source new staff? Is this done within the PPP or purely from the partner organizations? What criteria do you use?
- b) How do you ensure you have enough staff members of the right type in the partnership?
- c) How do partnership leaders show that attracting talented individuals and developing their skills is a top priority?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Senior partnership staff do not communicate that attracting, retaining and developing talent throughout the organization is a top priority	Senior partnership staff believe and communicate that having top talent throughout the organization is key; Partnership may define hiring criteria and processes but is not linked with key drivers of success	Partnership proactively controls the number and types of staff and leadership and defines hiring criteria and processes based on understanding of what drives PPP success; has focused on getting people with the right skills for each open position; senior partnership staff are held accountable on the strength of the talent pool they actively build

**(23) Rewarding high performers**

*Tests whether good manager performance is rewarded proportionately*

- a) How does your staff evaluation system work? What proportion of your employees' pay is related to the results of this review?
- b) Are there any non-financial or financial (bonuses) rewards for the best performers across all staff groups? How does the bonus system work? (For staff and managers)
- c) How does your reward system compare to that of other partnerships?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	People are rewarded equally irrespective of performance level	There is an evaluation system to award performance related rewards that are non-financial at the individual level, but rewards are always or never achieved; evaluation system for senior staff only	There is an evaluation system to award to performance related rewards, including personal financial rewards; PPP central and operational unit staff included in system

**(24) Promoting high performers**

*Tests whether promotion/career progression is performance based*

- a) Can you tell me about your career development and/or promotion system for staff? How do you identify and develop your star performers?
- b) What types of professional development opportunities are provided? How are these opportunities personalized to meet individual needs?
- c) How do you make decisions about progression and additional opportunities within the partnership, such as performance, tenure, other? Are better performers likely to be promoted faster or are promotions given on the basis of tenure/seniority?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	People are promoted primarily upon the basis of years of service; little or no professional development offered to staff	People are promoted upon the basis of performance; Partnership provides career opportunities but usually based on non-performance factors	Partnership actively identifies, develops and progresses and promotes its top performers

**(25) Creating a distinctive partnership value proposition**

*Tests how strong the employee value proposition is to work in the individual partnership*

- a) What makes your partnership distinctive, as opposed to your other similar partnerships?
- b) How do you monitor how effectively you communicate your value proposition?

	Score 1	Score 3	Score 5
<b>Scoring grid:</b>	Other partnerships offer stronger reasons for talented people to join or organizations to back	Our value proposition is comparable to those offered by other partnerships	We provide a unique value proposition that encourages talented people join our partnership and a range of organizations and members to become involved with our work

## APPENDIX J: Listing of Management Interview interviewees

PPP Management Interview Summary <sup>223</sup>				
	#	PPP Name	Manager name	Date
	1	Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative	Robert Don	21/01/2010
	2	Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative	Shing Chang	18/02/2010
	3	Global Health Council	Jeffrey Sturchio	26/03/2010
*	4	Global Vaccine Enterprise	Alan Bernstein	21/12/2009
*	5	Global Vaccine Enterprise	Myra Ozaeta	23/03/2010
	6	International AIDS Vaccine Initiative	Seth Berkley	25/02/2010
	7	International AIDS Vaccine Initiative	Frans van den Boom	6/4/2010
*	8	Medicines for Malaria Venture	Chris Hentschel*	16/12/2009
*	9	Medicines for Malaria Venture	Diana Cotran	16/12/2009
*	10	Micronutrient Initiative	Evelyne Guindon;	4/12/2009
*	11	Micronutrient Initiative	Mark Fryars	4/12/2009
*	12	Micronutrient Initiative	Venkatesh Mannar	4/12/2009
*	13	Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis Partnership	Patrizia Carlevaro;	12/1/2010
*	14	Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis Partnership	Tristan Piguet	12/1/2010
	15	Infectious Disease Research Institute	Curtis Malloy	3/12/2009
*	16	International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program	PPP Director	4/11/2009
*	17	International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program	PPP Director	4/11/2009
	18	International Partnership for Microbicides	Pamela Norick	26/03/2010
	19	International Partnership for Microbicides	Zeda Rosenberg	22/01/2010
	20	<i>PPP name withheld</i>	PPP Director	4/03/2010
	21	Alliance to Save Energy	Laura van Wie	17/11/2009
	22	Alliance to Save Energy	Brian Castelli	19/11/2009
	23	Alliance to Save Energy	Kateri Callahan	12/11/2009
	24	Clean Air Initiative	<i>PPP Director</i>	25/11/2009
*	25	Collaborative Labeling and Appliance	<i>PPP Director</i>	21/05/2010

<sup>223</sup> Full list of PPP managers and names available for Viva purposes only.



		Standards Program		
*	26	Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards Program	<i>PPP Director</i>	21/05/2010
	27	Forest Stewardship Council	Alan Smith	8/6/2010
	28	International Road Transport Union	Umberto de Pretto	18/01/2010
*	29	Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	Mary Mmukindia	27/10/2009
*	30	Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	Elisa Dumitrescu	27/10/2009
*	31	Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	Rob de Jong	27/10/2009
	32	Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership	Binu Parthan	27/10/2009
	33	<i>PPP name withheld</i>	<i>PPP Director</i>	26/11/2009
	34	<i>PPP name withheld</i>	<i>PPP Director</i>	11/12/2009
	35	<i>PPP name withheld</i>	<i>PPP Director</i>	26/11/2009
	36	World Energy Council	Christoph Frei	20/04/2010
	37	World Resources Institute	Lauren Withey	14/12/2009
	38	World Vegetable Centre	<i>PPP Director</i>	14/01/2010
	39	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	<i>PPP Director</i>	15/03/2010
	40	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	<i>PPP Director</i>	24/03/2010
	41	e8	PPP Director	11/2/2010
	42	Equator Initiative	Eileen de Ravin	18/01/2010
	43	Online Access to Research in the Environment	<i>PPP Director</i>	7/12/2009
	44	UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme	<i>PPP Director</i>	20/04/2010
	45	<i>PPP name withheld</i>	<i>PPP Director</i>	28/10/2009
	46	World Environment Centre	<i>PPP Director</i>	23/03/2010
	47	<i>PPP name withheld</i>	<i>PPP Director</i>	2/11/2009
	48	<i>PPP name withheld</i>	<i>PPP Director</i>	27/5/2010
	49	Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative	Bernard Pecoul	19/4/2010
	50	Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics	PPP Director	3/6/2010
	51	Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative	PPP Director	30/3/2010
		* Signifies that interviews were conducted simultaneously with another manager		

## APPENDIX K: Listing of Stakeholder interviews

### Stakeholder interviews<sup>224</sup>:

#A - Logan Borzel, Senior Health Specialist, Human Development Network (HDNHE), The World Bank; 3 July 2009, via phone

#B - Sophia Drewnowski, Sr. Partnership Specialist, Partnership and Trust Fund Policy, The World Bank; 23 July 2009, personal meeting, Washington, D.C.

#C - Pasquel Villeneuve (UNICEF), 7 October 2010, via phone

#D - Alex Ross (WHO), 7 October 2010, via phone

#E - Sophia Drewnowski (The World Bank), 7 October 2010, via phone

#F - Roy Widdus, Consultant, Global Health Futures; 30 November 2010, via phone

#G - Charles Gardner, Global Forum for Health Research; 31 March 2010, via phone

### Partnership specific

#### **Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi)**

#H - Jean-Pierre Paccaud, Director Business Development  
*15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland*

#I - Ralf de Coulon, Finance, Human Resources & Administration Director  
*15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland*

#### **Medicines for Malaria Venture (MMV)**

#K - Diana Cotran, Executive Vice-President, Operations  
*14 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland*

#L - Joan Herbert, Business Development Manager  
*14 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland*

#M - PPP Director, *confidentiality ensured*  
*15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland*

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<sup>224</sup> Interview list a subset of interviews conducted but inclusive of all comments referenced within work.

#N - PPP Director, *confidentiality ensured*

*14 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland*

**Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis Partnership**

#O - Patrizia Carlevaro, Head of the International Aid Unit at Eli Lilly and Company and  
Team Leader for The Lilly MDR-TB Partnership,

*15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland*

#P - Tristan Piguet , Project Manager at Eli Lilly and Company

*15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland*

#Q- PPP Manager, *confidentiality ensured*

*15 April 2010, Geneva, Switzerland*

**International Partnership for Microbicides (IPM)**

#R- Karen McCord, Executive Director for Operations and Plannings

*12 May 2011, Silver Spring, MD, USA*

#S - Mike Goldrich, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Financial fficer

*12 May 2011, Silver Spring, MD, USA*

#T - Kathleen T. Ross, Chief Human Resources Officer

*12 May 2011, Silver Spring, MD, USA*

#U - Pamela Norick, Chief of External Relations

*12 May 2011, Silver Spring, MD, USA*

#V - Zeda Rosenberg, Chief Executive Officer

*12 May 2011, Silver Spring, MD, USA*

## APPENDIX L: PPPs: Financial statements

		RESOURCES: TRANSPARENCY			
Partnership Name	Hosted?	Public availability of finances	External Auditors	2007 ?	2008 ?
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research	Y	Y	INA	Y	Y
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative	N	Y	Deloitte	Y	Y
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative (Now the European Vaccine Initiative)	N	Y	Danish State Auditors	Y	Y
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics	N	Y	Deloitte	Y	Y
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition	N	Y	Deloitte	Y	Y
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development	N	Y	BDO Seidman	Y	Y
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis	Y	N	INA		
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	N	Y	KPMG	Y	Y
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria	N	Y	Ernst & Young	Y	Y
Global Health Council	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Global Media AIDS Initiative	Y	N	INA		
Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap	Y	N	INA		
Global Vaccine Enterprise	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Institute for OneWorld Health	N	Y	INA	Y	N
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
International Trachoma Initiative	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Malaria Vaccine Initiative	Y	N	INA		
Medicines for Malaria Venture	N	Y	KPMG	Y	Y
Micronutrient Initiative	N	Y	PricewaterhouseCoopers	Y	Y
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine Deficiency (Iodine Network)	Y	N	INA		
Partners for Parasite Control	Y	N	INA		
Project Hope	N	Y	KPMG	Y	Y
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership	Y	N	INA		
Stop TB Partnership	Y	Y	INA	Y	Y
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for Health	Y	N	INA		
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative	Y	N	INA		
World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative	Y	N	INA		
AED-SATELLIFE	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding Trachoma by the year 2020	Y	N	INA		
BIO Ventures for Global Health	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative (Now the Clinton Health Access Initiative)	Y	Y	INA	Y	Y
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis	Y	N	INA		
EuroVacc Foundation	N	N	INA		
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	N	Y	Marks Paneth & Shron LLP	Y	Y
Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus	Y	N	INA		
Global Polio Eradication Initiative	Y	Y	INA	Y	Y
Health Academy, The	Y	N	INA		
Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative	Y	N	INA		
Infectious Disease Research Institute	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program	Y	N	INA		
International Partnership for Microbicides	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
MAC AIDS fund	Y	Y	Grant Thornton LLP	Y	Y
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases	Y	N	INA		
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative	Y	N	INA		
Safe Injection Global Network	Y	N	INA		
Vision 2020	Y	N	INA		
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS	Y	Y	INA	N	Y
Alliance to Save Energy	N	Y	McGladrey & Pullen	Y	Y

## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

		RESOURCES: TRANSPARENCY			
Partnership Name	Hosted?	Public availability of finances	External Auditors	2007 ?	2008 ?
Building Partnerships for Development in Water and Sanitation	N	Y	Hartley Fowler	Y	Y
Clean Air Initiative	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Community Watersheds Partnership Program Global Development Alliance (Formerly the Coca-Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance)	Y	N	INA		
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards Program	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Forest Stewardship Council	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Generation Challenge Programme (Former CGIAR Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor')	Y	Y	INA	Y	Y
Global Compact	Y	N	INA		
Global Crop Diversity Trust	Y	Y	Deloitte & Touche	Y	Y
Global e-Sustainability Initiative	N	N	INA		
Global Master Plan for Cycling	Y	N	INA		
Global Reporting Initiative	N	Y	Moore Stephens MSV BV	Y	Y
Global Road Safety Partnership	Y	N	INA		
Global Village Energy Partnership	N	Y	INA	N	Y
International Center for Sustainable Development	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
International Center for Tropical Agriculture	N	Y	Deloitte	Y	Y
International Electrotechnical Commission	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
International Road Transport Union	N	N	INA		
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications	N	Y	Sciarabba Walker & Co., LLP	Y	Y
International Solar Energy Society	N	N	INA		
International Youth Foundation	N	Y	Gelman, Rosenberg & Freedman	Y	Y
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers	N	Y	Moss-Adams	Y	Y
Marine Stewardship Council	N	Y	Deloitte & Touche	Y	Y
Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe	Y	N	INA		
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	Y	N	INA		
Project Proteus	Y	N	INA		
Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors	N	Y	William E. Busch, CPA	Y	Y
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership	N	Y	PricewaterhouseCoopers	Y	Y
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century	Y	N	INA		
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor	N	Y	Sayer Vincent	Y	Y
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against Corruption Initiative	Y	N	INA		
World Energy Council	N	Y	Horwath Clark Whitehill	Y	Y
World Resources Institute	N	Y	Grant Thornton	Y	Y
World Vegetable Centre	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Mectizan Donation Program	Y	N	INA		
Global Ballast Water Management Programme	Y	N	INA		
Efficient Energy for Sustainable Development	Y	N	INA		
World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH) - Hellas -Mesogeios	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level	Y	N	INA		
BE THE CHANGE! - youth-led action for sustainable development	Y	N	INA		
BioCarbon Fund	Y	N	INA		
Biotrade Initiative	Y	N	INA		
Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment and Development	Y	N	INA		
Cement Sustainability Initiative	Y	N	INA		
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food	Y	Y	Earnst and Young	Y	Y
Cisco Networking Academy Program	Y	N	INA		
Climate Investment Partnership	Y	Y	INA	N	N
Community Water Initiative	Y	N	INA		
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	Y	Y	INA	Y	Y

## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

		RESOURCES: TRANSPARENCY			
Partnership Name	Hosted?	Public availability of finances	External Auditors	2007 ?	2008 ?
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	Y	Y	INA	Y	Y
E+Co	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
e8 (Formerly e7)	N	N	INA		
Ecoagriculture Partners	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Ecological Sanitation Research	Y	N	INA		
EdInvest	Y	N	INA		
Embarq	Y	N	INA		
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems	Y	N	INA		
Equator Initiative	Y	N	INA		
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life	Y	N	INA		
EVE-olution Foundation	N	Y	INA		
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade	Y	N	INA		
Global Gas Flaring Reduction	Y	N	INA		
Global Partnership for Capacity Building to Implement the Globally Harmonized System for Chemical Classification and Labelling	Y	N	INA		
Global Water Partnership	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
GlobalGiving	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Great Apes Survival Project	Y	N	INA		
International Livestock Research Institute	Y	Y	Deloitte	Y	Y
International Navigation Association	N	N	INA		
International Partnership for Sustainable Development in Mountain Regions	Y	N	INA		
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy	Y	N	INA		
International Water and Sanitation Center	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Local Capacity-Building and Training on Sustainable Urbanization: a Public-Private Partnership	Y	N	INA		
Methane to Markets	Y	N	INA		
New Ventures	Y	N	INA		
Online Access to Research in the Environment	Y	N	INA		
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air	Y	N	INA		
Population and Sustainability Network	Y	N	INA		
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative	Y	N	INA		
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable Development	N	Y	Gelman, Rosenberg & Freedman	Y	Y
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance	Y	N	INA		
Tour Operators Initiative	Y	N	INA		
Transparency International	N	Y	KPMG	Y	Y
Travel Foundation	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
Unicode Consortium	N	Y	INA	Y	Y
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme	Y	N	INA		
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business	Y	N	INA		
World Alliance for Decentralized Energy	N	N	INA		
World Business Council on Sustainable	N	N	INA		
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network	Y	N	INA		
World Links	N	Y	Daniel R. Embody JR CPA	Y	Y
World Tourism Organization	Y	N	INA		
Youth Business International	N	Y	Nexia Smith & Williamson	Y	Y
Ethical Trading Initiative	N	Y	Kingston Smith L.L.P.	Y	Y
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee Community	N	Y	INA	N	Y
Global Environment Facility	Y	Y	Deloitte	Y	Y
ACCION International	N	Y	Grant Thornton LLP	Y	Y
Agricultural Risk Management Team	Y	N	INA		
Golden Rice	N	N	INA		

## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

Partnership Name	RESOURCES: FINANCES						
	Income 2007	Grants & Donations 2007	Expenditure 2007	Income 2008	Grants & Donations 2008	Expenditure 2008	Break-down?
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation	42,752,446	41,049,749	43,813,311	71,322,870	70,143,414	54,076,715	Y
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research	6,054,583	5,970,917	5,042,699	3,396,008	3,837,490	3,018,432	N
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative	22,066,688	22,066,688	16,458,141	27,939,723	27,938,331	24,449,868	Y
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative (Now the European Vaccine Initiative)	10,328,641	9,908,443	4,731,428	5,577,907	5,072,656	4,093,933	Y
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics	19,267,250	18,392,263	17,784,981	27,786,276	27,370,155	28,858,130	Y
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition	44,610,028	42,781,128	13,381,376	14,406,823	12,706,071	22,749,399	Y
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development	30,849,919	28,919,307	27,375,311	35,843,734	34,733,103	33,631,735	Y
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	803,044,524	112,032,522	1,208,776,592	945,179,236	225,396,095	1,137,139,231	Y
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria	3,153,383,000	2,963,751,000	2,713,271,000	3,920,213,000	3,714,202,000	2,530,454,000	Y
Global Health Council	3,849,275	1,081,967	6,880,817	12,536,164	10,395,423	7,269,339	Y
Global Media AIDS Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Vaccine Enterprise	10,247,603	10,000,000	959,522	1,121,673	400,000	2,725,796	Y
Institute for OneWorld Health	28,454,315	27,521,745	26,089,298	29,740,131	29,294,601	30,049,107	Y
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative	100,000,000	100,000,000	87,000,000	90,985,614	90,985,614	96,300,964	Y
International Trachoma Initiative	7,494,032	6,810,741	6,428,535	5,403,253	5,075,925	5,650,677	Y
Malaria Vaccine Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Medicines for Malaria Venture	76,965,380	75,409,474	47,946,314	55,148,885	53,771,088	55,773,594	Y
Micronutrient Initiative	29,033,759	28,199,198	28,205,302	30,189,485	29,298,583	26,837,021	Y
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine Deficiency (Iodine Network)	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Partners for Parasite Control	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Project Hope	172,494,904	168,718,192	169,565,797	14,723,433	140,443,374	157,307,513	Y
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Stop TB Partnership	80,327,000	78,749,000	57,935,000	80,223,000	79,206,000	70,924,000	Y
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for Health	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
AED-SATELLIFE	420,974	405,555	360,732	303,202	244,600	290,772	Y
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding Trachoma by the year 2020	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
BIO Ventures for Global Health	1,763,694	1,717,735	2,172,282	3,198,695	3,187,964	2,158,746	Y
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative (Now the Clinton Health Access Initiative)	INA	INA	83,915,000	INA	INA	140,047,000	INA
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
EuroVacc Foundation	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	126,525	6,686,246	6,788,878	557,072	7,894,622	7,507,004	Y
Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Polio Eradication Initiative	INA	INA	710,000,000	INA	775,000,000	850,000,000	N
Health Academy, The	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Infectious Disease Research Institute	42,484,181	39,496,980	10,984,249	16,268,636	12,021,833	15,919,333	Y
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
International Partnership for Microbicides	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
MAC AIDS fund	263,013	17,755,291	18,231,451	812,955	17,752,685	17,332,548	Y
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Safe Injection Global Network	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Vision 2020	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS	INA	INA	INA	290,917,000	284,741,000	298,229,000	N
Alliance to Save Energy	9,523,396	6,275,239	10,019,840	10,479,858	7,933,150	10,620,034	Y

## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

Partnership Name	RESOURCES: FINANCES						
	Income 2007	Grants & Donations 2007	Expenditure 2007	Income 2008	Grants & Donations 2008	Expenditure 2008	Break-down?
Building Partnerships for Development in Water and Sanitation	627,254	581,703	522,129	362,836	338,833	518,322	N
Clean Air Initiative	675,148	668,469	581,836	1,521,900	1,521,264	1,657,085	Y
Community Watersheds Partnership Program Global Development Alliance (Formerly the Coca-Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance)	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards Program	506,693	74,597	478,136	871,831	684,450	902,490	Y
Forest Stewardship Council	5,410,433	1,828,939	5,262,853	7,626,934	2,484,027	5,960,139	Y
Generation Challenge Programme (Former CGIAR Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor')	23,976,907	23,639,923	19,030,418	9,113,371	8,925,078	17,583,998	Y
Global Compact	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Crop Diversity Trust	11,311,497	1,569,896	4,801,381	11,520,669	1,014,149	8,105,148	Y
Global e-Sustainability Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Master Plan for Cycling	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Reporting Initiative	5,724,659	0	5,511,538	7,527,416	55,682	7,391,537	Y
Global Road Safety Partnership	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Village Energy Partnership	INA	INA	INA	646,460	646,349	446,232	N
International Center for Sustainable Development	5,194	40,500	39,425	0	0	4,623	N
International Center for Tropical Agriculture	45,952,000	44,242,000	41,487,000	47,059,000	42,605,000	43,678,000	Y
International Electrotechnical Commission	19,144,171	INA	17,757,871	19,227,453	INA	17,322,796	Y
International Road Transport Union	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications	540,848	3,024,909	2,265,477	218,340	1,908,817	2,212,525	Y
International Solar Energy Society	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
International Youth Foundation	1,359,690	22,164,126	22,210,502	-5,601,966	19,249,310	25,609,235	Y
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers	43,471,000	0	26,641,000	45,299,000	0	39,544,000	Y
Marine Stewardship Council	4,283,047	3,852,745	3,984,441	6,061,277	5,188,032	5,000,500	Y
Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Project Proteus	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors	108,236	20,250	130,114	12,099	19,750	7,688	Y
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership	9,227,232	9,081,426	4,598,593	8,279,525	7,909,578	6,246,713	Y
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor	1,499,527	1,056,765	1,476,777	3,206,541	2,590,738	2,092,809	Y
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against Corruption Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Energy Council	3,631,896	0	3,571,973	4,273,506	13,154	4,010,431	Y
World Resources Institute	33,184,681	25,223,788	23,627,482	12,665,294	21,994,209	26,403,890	Y
World Vegetable Centre	8,850,314	7,751,030	8,062,215	8,353,619	7,417,806	8,549,906	Y
Mectizan Donation Program	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Ballast Water Management Programme	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Efficient Energy for Sustainable Development	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH) - Hellas -Mesogaios	256,821	68,179	229,550	100,964	26,949	239,696	N
Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
BE THE CHANGE! - youth-led action for sustainable development	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
BioCarbon Fund	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Biotech Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment and Development	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Cement Sustainability Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food	16,914,000	16,914,000	12,953,000	10,198,000	10,198,000	12,797,000	N
Cisco Networking Academy Program	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Climate Investment Partnership	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Community Water Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	520,000,000	495,000,000	506,000,000	553,000,000	531,000,000	542,000,000	Y



## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

Partnership Name	RESOURCES: FINANCES						
	Income 2007	Grants & Donations 2007	Expenditure 2007	Income 2008	Grants & Donations 2008	Expenditure 2008	Break-down?
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	21,550,282	19,285,897	18,511,283	28,164,869	24,855,134	31,428,433	Y
E+Co	5,339,798	1,523,367	5,617,243	3,074,713	5,410,990	7,567,363	Y
e8 (Formerly e7)	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Ecoagriculture Partners	1,088,789	1,066,970	1,196,025	1,075,201	849,972	1,647,354	Y
Ecological Sanitation Research	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
EdInvest	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Embarq	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Equator Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
EVE-olution Foundation	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Gas Flaring Reduction	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Global Partnership for Capacity Building to Implement the Globally Harmonized System for Chemical Classification and Labelling	INA	INA	INA	INA	261,000	INA	N
Global Water Partnership	15,417,792	15,399,239	16,470,800	15,305,551	15,286,875	15,158,698	Y
GlobalGiving	4,278,812	3,336,767	3,077,027	8,110,587	7,418,503	4,278,334	Y
Great Apes Survival Project	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
International Livestock Research Institute	38,544,000	34,703,000	40,144,000	43,781,000	39,616,000	42,308	Y
International Navigation Association	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
International Partnership for Sustainable Development in Mountain Regions	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
International Water and Sanitation Center	6,507,808	INA	6,464,654	8,584,738	INA	8,513,744	N
Local Capacity-Building and Training on Sustainable Urbanization: a Public-Private Partnership	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Methane to Markets	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
New Ventures	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Online Access to Research in the Environment	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Population and Sustainability Network	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable Development	416,096	863,775	2,165,681	378,038	1,313,538	2,076,404	Y
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Tour Operators Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Transparency International	836,619	12,895,899	12,498	341,051	13,928,796	13,259,223	Y
Travel Foundation	1,607,680	1,597,449	1,515,604	1,496,604	1,483,450	1,419,143	Y
Unicode Consortium	374,586	327,866	297,819	363,880	329,400	304,049	Y
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Alliance for Decentralized Energy	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Business Council on Sustainable	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Links	25,920	1,109,576	1,164,410	20,160	287,952	393,206	Y
World Tourism Organization	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Youth Business International	0	0	0	1,028,316	2,204,359	1,223,829	Y
Ethical Trading Initiative	1,768,388	548,073	1,718,188	1,954,265	730,764	1,936,863	Y
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee Community	INA	INA	INA	2,121,476	1,023,367	1,744,663	Y
Global Environment Facility	1,439,519,052	1,304,132,348	784,797,900	767,686,301	564,397,481	793,550,329	Y
ACCION International	148,750,643	5,041,969	21,176,576	18,619,431	7,981,410	28,522,116	Y
Agricultural Risk Management Team	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	N
Golden Rice	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA

## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

Partnership Name	RESOURCES: FINANCES							
	Assets 2007	Liabilities 2007	Net Assets (Reserves) 2007	Assets 2008	Liabilities 2008	Net Assets (Reserves) 2008	Change in Grants/Donations 08-07	Change in Income 08-07
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation	42,150,991	8,933,457	33,217,534	63,086,882	12,409,420	50,667,462	29,093,665	28,570,424
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	-2,133,427	-2,658,575
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative	21,842,800	12,920,346	8,922,453	22,945,383	10,212,241	12,733,142	5,871,643	5,873,035
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative (Now the European Vaccine Initiative)	INA	INA	12,273,463	INA	INA	13,757,437	-4,835,787	-4,750,734
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics	20,513,297	17,123,080	3,349,787	25,967,003	23,657,640	2,277,933	8,977,892	8,519,026
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition	42,492,098	10,273,013	32,219,085	37,840,241	36,804,815	23,876,509	-30,075,057	-30,203,205
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development	53,951,368	25,460,558	28,490,810	59,525,717	29,152,010	30,373,707	5,813,796	4,993,815
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	5,347,329,980	2,326,899,562	3,020,430,418	4,973,016,817	2,750,489,361	2,222,527,456	113,363,573	142,134,712
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria	5,508,328,000	2,950,959,000	2,557,369,000	7,054,122,000	3,106,994,000	3,947,128,000	750,451,000	766,830,000
Global Health Council	6,629,109	403,405	6,225,704	11,975,536	603,162	11,372,374	9,313,456	8,686,889
Global Media AIDS Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Vaccine Enterprise	13,029,144	34,243	12,994,901	11,498,038	107,260	11,390,778	-9,600,000	-9,125,930
Institute for OneWorld Health	22,816,313	1,754,399	21,061,914	21,061,914	INA	20,752,938	1,772,856	1,285,816
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	126,000,000	-9,014,386	-9,014,386
International Trachoma Initiative	21,383,751	352,648	21,031,103	21,338,907	555,228	20,783,679	-1,734,816	-2,090,779
Malaria Vaccine Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Medicines for Malaria Venture	47,556,753	9,437,041	38,119,712	46,563,523	9,068,520	37,495,003	-21,638,386	-21,816,495
Micronutrient Initiative	14,082,792	8,739,330	5,343,462	16,947,017	10,058,431	6,888,586	1,099,385	1,155,726
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine Deficiency (Iodine Network)	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Partners for Parasite Control	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Project Hope	66,934,716	12,017,757	54,916,959	49,488,936	19,723,390	29,765,546	-28,274,818	-157,771,471
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Stop TB Partnership	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	457,000	-104,000
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for Health	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
AED-SATELLIFE	486,850	383,849	103,001	628,481	581,058	47,423	-160,955	-117,772
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding Trachoma by the year 2020	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
BIO Ventures for Global Health	1,236,208	210,208	1,026,000	2,222,197	156,248	2,065,949	1,470,229	1,435,001
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative (Now the Clinton Health Access Initiative)	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
EuroVacc Foundation	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	2,619,206	379,038	2,240,168	3,311,607	609,780	2,701,827	1,208,376	430,547
Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Polio Eradication Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Health Academy, The	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Infectious Disease Research Institute	61,297,784	1,310,056	59,987,728	62,533,150	2,196,119	60,337,031	-27,475,147	-26,215,545
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
International Partnership for Microbicides	104,308,875	90,203,249	14,105,626	121,126,028	97,624,348	23,501,680	INA	INA
MAC AIDS fund	16,485,418	4,380,755	12,104,663	16,047,769	3,130,151	12,917,618	-2,606	549,942
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Safe Injection Global Network	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Vision 2020	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Alliance to Save Energy	3,819,034	1,978,661	1,840,373	4,989,131	3,288,934	1,700,197	1,657,911	956,462

## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

Partnership Name	RESOURCES: FINANCES							
	Assets 2007	Liabilities 2007	Net Assets (Reserves) 2007	Assets 2008	Liabilities 2008	Net Assets (Reserves) 2008	Change in Grants/Donations 08-07	Change in Income 08-07
Building Partnerships for Development in Water and Sanitation	184,984	10,371	174,613	244,419	203,624	19,127	-242,869	-264,418
Clean Air Initiative	478,615	385,192	93,423	274,821	316,583	-41,762	852,795	846,752
Community Watersheds Partnership Program Global Development Alliance (Formerly the Coca-Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance)	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards Program	131,514	13,459	118,055	203,872	83,419	120,453	609,853	365,138
Forest Stewardship Council	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	655,088	2,216,501
Generation Challenge Programme (Former CGIAR Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor')	12,287,524	INA	15,287,524	3,816,897	INA	6,816,897	-14,714,845	-14,863,536
Global Compact	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Crop Diversity Trust	92,217,794	5,232,219	86,985,575	95,514,946	9,297,391	86,217,555	-555,747	209,172
Global e-Sustainability Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Master Plan for Cycling	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Reporting Initiative	3,065,105	2,950,995	114,110	2,536,466	2,291,462	245,004	55,682	1,802,757
Global Road Safety Partnership	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Village Energy Partnership	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	200,229	INA	INA
International Center for Sustainable Development	INA	INA	-7,353	14,382	19,909	INA	-40,500	-5,194
International Center for Tropical Agriculture	42,336,000	32,911,000	9,425,000	43,369,000	35,431,000	7,938,000	-1,637,000	1,107,000
International Electrotechnical Commission	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
International Road Transport Union	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications	6,613,347	197,514	6,415,833	6,310,591	110,139	6,200,452	-1,116,092	-322,508
International Solar Energy Society	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
International Youth Foundation	29,096,843	8,820,051	20,276,792	33,296,592	8,744,227	24,552,365	-2,914,816	-6,961,656
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers	46,950,000	11,714,000	35,236,000	60,968,000	14,543,000	46,425,000	0	1,828,000
Marine Stewardship Council	3,522,078	1,002,545	2,519,533	5,106,616	1,526,307	3,653,386	1,335,286	1,778,230
Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Project Proteus	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors	12,748	0	12,748	23,585	0	23,585	-500	-96,137
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership	INA	INA	INA	14,747,469	12,505,996	2,241,473	-1,171,848	-947,707
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor	917,741	445,988	471,753	2,259,381	673,887	1,585,485	1,533,974	1,707,014
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against Corruption Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Energy Council	2,781,287	808,225	1,973,062	2,972,747	705,918	2,260,983	13,154	641,611
World Resources Institute	66,256,010	4,720,248	61,535,762	54,179,655	6,381,889	47,797,766	-3,229,579	-20,519,387
World Vegetable Centre	14,092,755	10,733,902	3,358,853	11,514,749	8,593,162	2,921,587	-333,224	-496,695
Mectizan Donation Program	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Ballast Water Management Programme	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Efficient Energy for Sustainable Development	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH) - Hellas -Mesogeios	INA	INA	151,367	INA	INA	39,584	-41,230	-155,857
Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
BE THE CHANGE! - youth-led action for sustainable development	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
BioCarbon Fund	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Biotrade Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment and Development	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Cement Sustainability Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	-6,716,000	-6,716,000
Cisco Networking Academy Program	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Climate Investment Partnership	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Community Water Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	571,729,000	334,283,000	237,446,000	624,946,000	379,686,000	245,260,000	36,000,000	33,000,000

## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

Partnership Name	RESOURCES: FINANCES							
	Assets 2007	Liabilities 2007	Net Assets (Reserves) 2007	Assets 2008	Liabilities 2008	Net Assets (Reserves) 2008	Change in Grants/Donations 08-07	Change in Income 08-07
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	36,894,426	26,954,648	9,939,778	40,080,480	33,404,267	6,676,214	5,569,237	6,614,587
E+Co	29,371,997	15,979,955	13,410,769	31,495,196	20,261,393	11,254,396	3,887,623	-2,265,085
e8 (Formerly e7)	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Ecoagriculture Partners	585,288	155,725	429,563	140,827	283,417	142,590	-216,998	-13,588
Ecological Sanitation Research	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Edinvest	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Embarq	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Equator Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
EVEolution Foundation	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Gas Flaring Reduction	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Partnership for Capacity Building to Implement the Globally Harmonized System for Chemical Classification and Labelling	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Global Water Partnership	7,761,942	6,037,769	1,724,173	5,142,689	3,614,597	1,528,092	-112,364	-112,241
GlobalGiving	5,722,325	134,637	5,587,688	9,584,034	164,093	9,419,941	4,081,736	3,831,775
Great Apes Survival Project	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
International Livestock Research Institute	47,277,000	23,673,000	23,604,000	53,675,000	28,701,000	53,675,000	4,913,000	5,237,000
International Navigation Association	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
International Partnership for Sustainable Development in Mountain Regions	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
International Water and Sanitation Center	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Local Capacity-Building and Training on Sustainable Urbanization: a Public-Private Partnership	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Methane to Markets	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
New Ventures	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Online Access to Research in the Environment	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Population and Sustainability Network	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable Development	465,394	169,200	296,194	395,742	482,042	86,300	449,763	-38,058
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Tour Operators Initiative	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Transparency International	8,080,074	805,199	7,274,876	12,179,194	902,107	11,277,087	1,032,897	-495,568
Travel Foundation	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	-113,999	-111,076
Unicode Consortium	647,890	80,542	567,348	709,780	82,601	627,179	1,534	-10,706
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Alliance for Decentralized Energy	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Business Council on Sustainable	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
World Links	83,232	25,920	57,312	134,362	56,824	77,538	-821,624	-5,760
World Tourism Organization	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Youth Business International	0	0	0	1,755,993	765,763	1,028,316	2,204,359	1,028,316
Ethical Trading Initiative	688,284	255,574	432,710	771,610	325,035	446,576	182,691	185,877
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee Community	INA	INA	832,232	1,452,015	242,970	1,209,045	INA	INA
Global Environment Facility	4,520,511,441	1,961,665,895	2,504,779,298	4,646,007,362	1,965,464,107	2,664,501,393	-739,734,867	-671,832,751
ACCION International	340,025,332	8,248,231	331,777,101	234,241,596	10,003,449	224,238,147	2,939,441	-130,131,212
Agricultural Risk Management Team	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA
Golden Rice	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA	INA

## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

Partnership Name	ACCOUNTABILITY / TRANSPARENCY						Financial Statements/ Reports
	Strategic and annual plans	Annual performance reports	Annual Budget	GB Meeting agendas (and/or background papers)	GB Meeting Press release / summary	GB Meeting action points / decisions by board and any other executive body	
Aeras Global TB Vaccine Foundation	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Alliance for Health Policy and Systems Research	Y	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y
Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
European Malaria Vaccine Initiative (Now the European Vaccine Initiative)	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y
Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Global Alliance for TB Drug Development	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Global Alliance for the Elimination of Lymphatic Filariasis	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Global Health Council	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N
Global Media AIDS Initiative	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Global Public-Private Partnership for Handwashing with Soap	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Global Vaccine Enterprise	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
Institute for OneWorld Health	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
International Trachoma Initiative	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N
Malaria Vaccine Initiative	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Medicines for Malaria Venture	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y
Micronutrient Initiative	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine Deficiency (Iodine Network)	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Partners for Parasite Control	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N
Project Hope	N	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Roll Back Malaria Global Partnership	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Stop TB Partnership	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Strategies for Enhancing Access to Medicines for Health	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
Universal Flour Fortification Initiative	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
World Economic Forum's Global Health Initiative	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
AED-SATELLIFE	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Alliance for the Global Elimination of Blinding Trachoma by the year 2020	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
BIO Ventures for Global Health	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Clinton Foundation AIDS Initiative (Now the Clinton Health Access Initiative)	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Eli Lilly Multi-Drug Resistant Tuberculosis	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
EuroVacc Foundation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Global Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N
Global Elimination of Maternal and Neonatal Tetanus	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Global Polio Eradication Initiative	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Health Academy, The	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Health Internetwork Access to Research Initiative	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Infectious Disease Research Institute	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups Program	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
International Partnership for Microbicides	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y
MAC AIDS fund	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Novartis Institute for Tropical Diseases	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Pediatric Dengue Vaccine Initiative	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Safe Injection Global Network	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Vision 2020	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Alliance to Save Energy	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y

## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

Partnership Name	ACCOUNTABILITY / TRANSPARENCY						Financial Statements/ Reports
	Strategic and annual plans	Annual performance reports	Annual Budget	GB Meeting agendas (and/or background papers)	GB Meeting Press release/ summary	GB Meeting action points / decisions by board and any other executive body	
Building Partnerships for Development in Water and Sanitation	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
Clean Air Initiative	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Community Watersheds Partnership Program Global Development Alliance (Formerly the Coca-Cola/USAID Water and Development Alliance)	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Collaborative Labeling and Appliance Standards Program	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Forest Stewardship Council	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Generation Challenge Programme (Former CGIAR Partnership Challenge Program: 'Unlocking Genetic Diversity in Crops for the Resource-Poor')	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Global Compact	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Global Crop Diversity Trust	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Global e-Sustainability Initiative	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Global Master Plan for Cycling	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Global Reporting Initiative	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Global Road Safety Partnership	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N	N
Global Village Energy Partnership	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
International Center for Sustainable Development	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
International Center for Tropical Agriculture	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
International Electrotechnical Commission	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y
International Road Transport Union	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
International Solar Energy Society	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
International Youth Foundation	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Marine Stewardship Council	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Partners for Environmental Cooperation in Europe	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Partnership for Clean Fuels and Vehicles	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Project Proteus	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership	N	Y	N	Y	N	N	Y
Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	Y
World Economic Forum - Partnering Against Corruption Initiative	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
World Energy Council	INA	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
World Resources Institute	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
World Vegetable Centre	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Mectizan Donation Program	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Global Ballast Water Management Programme	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
Efficient Energy for Sustainable Development	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
World Institute for Sustainable Humanity (AWISH) - Hellas -Mesogeios	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y
Access to Global Online Research in Agriculture Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at the Local Level	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
BE THE CHANGE! - youth-led action for sustainable development	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
BioCarbon Fund	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Biotrade Initiative	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Capacity Building Task Force on Trade, Environment and Development	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Cement Sustainability Initiative	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Cisco Networking Academy Program	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Climate Investment Partnership	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Community Water Initiative	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y

## APPENDIX L (CONTINUED)

Partnership Name	ACCOUNTABILITY / TRANSPARENCY						Financial Statements/ Reports
	Strategic and annual plans	Annual performance reports	Annual Budget	GB Meeting agendas (and/or background papers)	GB Meeting Press release / summary	GB Meeting action points / decisions by board and any other executive body	
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
E+Co	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
e8 (Formerly e7)	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N
Ecoagriculture Partners	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Ecological Sanitation Research	Y	N	Y	N	N	N	N
EdInvest	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Embarq	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N
Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Equator Initiative	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
EU Water Initiative: Water for Life	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
EVE-olution Foundation	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Global Gas Flaring Reduction	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Global Partnership for Capacity Building to Implement the Globally Harmonized System for Chemical Classification and Labelling	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Global Water Partnership	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
GlobalGiving	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Great Apes Survival Project	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
International Livestock Research Institute	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
International Navigation Association	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
International Partnership for Sustainable Development in Mountain Regions	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
International Water and Sanitation Center	Y	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Local Capacity-Building and Training on Sustainable Urbanization: a Public-Private Partnership	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Methane to Markets	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
New Ventures	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
Online Access to Research in the Environment	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
Population and Sustainability Network	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Refrigerants Naturally Initiative	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Sister Cities Network for Sustainable Development	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Tour Operators Initiative	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Transparency International	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
Travel Foundation	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y
Unicode Consortium	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N
UNIDO Cleaner Production Programme	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
World Alliance for Decentralized Energy	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
World Business Council on Sustainable	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N
World Economic Forum Disaster Resource Network	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
World Links	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
World Tourism Organization	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N
Youth Business International	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	Y
Ethical Trading Initiative	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y
4C Association: Common Code for the Coffee Community	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y
Global Environment Facility	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
ACCION International	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Agricultural Risk Management Team	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Golden Rice	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

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