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Sexual Victimization, Disclosure, and Accountability: Organizational Responses of the Boy Scouts of America to Child Sexual Abuse

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Abstract

Sexual Victimization, Disclosure, and Accountability: Organizational Responses of the Boy Scouts of America to Child Sexual Abuse

By

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Adviser: Professor Karen Terry, Ph.D.

Child sexual abuse has always been a highly publicized and controversial topic due to the vulnerability of children. However, there have been several recent child sexual abuse (CSA) scandals garnering even more attention and concern. With the exposure of the Catholic Church abuse scandal in 2002, public attention became focused on the Archdiocese's poor and prolonged response. However, this crisis was not the sole case of widespread sexual violence and institutional failure. In October of 2012, Boy Scouts of America files from 1959 to 1991 containing reports of child sexual abuse were released. These reports feature detailed information about the abuse incident, the offender, and the Boy Scouts' response to the allegations of abuse. While there appears to be some research on organizational child sexual abuse, these studies focus primarily on prevention of abuse, and not on organizational responses to abuse. This dissertation addressed the factors of the abuse and the organization that influenced the Boy Scouts of America's response. Data for this study comes from roughly 2379 publically released files of sexual abuse reports from the Boy Scouts of America. These reports, dating from 1959 until 1991, feature detailed information about the abuse incident, the offender, and the Boy Scouts' response to the allegations of abuse. Multivariate analysis, survival analysis and intervention analysis was conducted on the 2379 cases as well as qualitative content analysis. In addition, in-

depth case studies were conducted of a few select cases to gain a deeper understanding of how

the BSA responded to abuse.

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There is the saying that it takes a village to raise a child. The same could be said for finishing a doctoral program. I am immensely grateful for all those people who helped me along the way, providing support, encouragement, and sometimes a distraction from all that needed to be done. I had my own village of support throughout this entire process, and I share this accomplishment with them.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Child sexual abuse has always been a highly publicized and controversial topic due to the vulnerability of children. Recently, there have been several child sexual abuse (CSA) scandals garnering even more attention and concern. With the exposure of the Catholic Church abuse scandal in 2002, public attention became focused on the issue of children being sexually abused by Catholic priests and the Archdiocese's poor and prolonged response. However, this crisis was not the sole case of widespread sexual violence and institutional failure. In October of 2012, Boy Scouts of America (BSA) files from 1959 to 1991 containing reports of child sexual abuse were released. The files demonstrate numerous cases of CSA and an organizational failure to keep children safe.

Organizations that serve youth as their primary population have the responsibility of ensuring that the children are provided with safe and nurturing environments. One of the greatest responsibilities of these organizations is to ensure that the adults chosen to work with youth do not take advantage of their positions of power. Instances of child sexual abuse by staff members violate both the law and all organizational regulations and ethics. Ultimately, the organization is accountable for these incidents of sexual abuse by its staff and volunteers. Child abuse occurring in institutional settings relies heavily on the inappropriate use of power and authority by its members (Wolfe, 1999). The misuse of power and authority by members of these institutions is especially upsetting due to the high esteem and trust they have gained (Wolfe et al., 2003).

In 2012, the Oregon State Supreme Court ordered the release of private records held by the BSA detailing sexual abuse allegations ranging from the 1960s to 1990s. These records were submitted in 2010 as evidence in a sexual abuse lawsuit against the organization in which six

former scouts successfully sued the organization. As a result of the lawsuit, the BSA was ordered to pay the six plaintiffs almost $20 million in damages (Duggan, 2012).

In 2012 following this ruling, under Oregon's open records law, the files, termed the 'perversion files', were publically released (Duggan, 2012). The files contain information about the alleged offender, the victims, and in many cases the circumstances of the abuse. In addition, communication between Scouting executives and local area organization members is often featured. These 2379 cases represented the sample for this study.

1.1 Purpose, Goals, & Objectives

This dissertation addressed the abuse committed by BSA agents and the organizational response to CSA allegations. The study has four main goals: (1) to understand how the BSA learned of allegations of abuse and responded to these allegations (2) to understand the time it took BSA officials to respond to allegations of child sexual abuse and which factors of the abuse incident or offender may have influenced this time frame, (3) to understand what tactics the organization may have used to justify their behavior, and (4) to determine if methods taken by the BSA to protect youth from sexual abuse had a measurable impact. To this end, quantitative data analysis was conducted on the data gleaned from the 2379 cases and qualitative analysis was conducted on 200 of the cases. In addition, a more in-depth analysis of a ten cases was conducted to provide greater insight.

1.2 Research Questions

This dissertation will addressed the following research questions:

1) What are the characteristics of abusers and abuse incidents in the BSA?

2) How did the Boy Scouts of America learn of abuse and to whom did victims first disclose abuse?

a. How were allegations of child sexual abuse reported to the BSA (calls, letters, in person, etc.)?

b. Who did victims first report their abuse to (parent, BSA member, other victims, etc.)?

3) Did the response of the BSA to allegations of sexual abuse differ across council region?

4) Were there time and pattern differentials between initial disclosures and the offender's eventual removal from the organization?

a. What disciplinary procedures were taken by the institution?

b. Were there discernible characteristics of abuse incidents or abusers that influenced whether formal reports of child sexual abuse were made for legal prosecution or how long it took for removal to occur?

5) Are there differences in the prevalence of child sexual abuse reports pre and post two person leadership policy implementation?

a. Are there trends in the number of allegations of CSA against organization members before and after the implementation of polices aimed at preventing CSA?

6) Are institutional rationalization tactics an insightful frame to understand the BSA response to abuse allegations?

1.3 Hypotheses

Based on the goals of this dissertation and proposed research questions, hypotheses have been developed drawing upon organizational theory and existing literature surrounding child sexual abuse.

H1a) The majority of abuse incidents reported to the BSA featured older abusers who hold a higher position of authority with children, such as assistant scoutmaster or scoutmaster.

H1b) The majority of abuse incidents reported to the BSA were isolated abuse incidents featuring some form of unclothed or clothed physical contact, but not explicit sexual contact.

H2a) The majority of abuse allegations were made in person, rather than through phone calls or letters sent to scouting officials.

H2b) The majority of victims first disclosed abuse to their parents, not the BSA.

H2c) In the majority of cases, the BSA were more likely to handle cases informally through internal removal from the organization rather than through the use of formal methods such as referral to law enforcement or referral to mental health treatment.

H3) The response of BSA officials to allegations of CSA against organization members will differ across council regions.

H4a) The length of time the alleged abuser served in the organization and their position within the organization results in a longer period of time between initial disclosure and removal from the organization.

H4b) Offenders with histories of sexual abuse against children prior to joining the Boy Scouts who then offended in the BSA were more likely to feature law enforcement involvement than offenders who abused solely while members of the BSA and were removed from the organization more quickly.

H4c) In cases where abuse incidents featured explicit sexual relations, the time between initial disclosure and removal from the organization was shorter.

H4d) Cases featuring several victims and/or law enforcement involvement will result in a shorter time period between initial disclosure and removal from the organization.

H4e) In cases where the alleged abuser was married or had children, the time between initial disclosure and removal from the organization will be longer.

H5) The prevalence of reports of CSA after the implementation of the two person leadership policy in 1987 will be less than the prevalence of reports prior to the implementation of this policy.

H6) Rationalization tactics, especially appeals to higher loyalties and metaphor of the ledger, were employed by the Boy Scouts to justify their response to allegations of abuse.

1.4 Research Design

This dissertation utilized a mixed methods approach, featuring traditional quantitative and qualitative methods including thematic content analysis and an exploratory case study

analysis. For both the qualitative and quantitative portions of the study, examination of individual case files was undertaken in order to code data necessary for quantitative analysis and compile the written response of the BSA used in the qualitative analysis. While quantitative methods of research have become more common over the past years, the insight that can be gained from qualitative research in the form of case studies should not be overlooked (Travis, 1983). Creswell notes that qualitative research "involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them" (Creswell, 2007, p.36).

Flick (2009) notes that mixed methods approaches are useful in obtaining broader knowledge about the issue under study than can be obtained using a single approach. This dissertation combined both quantitative analysis of variables contained in the case files and a qualitative content analysis of written responses to abuse in order to mutually validate the findings. Quantitative and qualitative methods should be viewed as complimentary, as quantitative methods can address the inability of qualitative findings to be generalized, while qualitative methods can provide a more in depth and personal understanding of an issue (Flick, 2009). The combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods in the current dissertation more clearly conveyed and mutually confirmed the conclusions of the study.

1.4.1 Description of the Sample

Data for this study comes from 2379 publically released files of sexual abuse reports from the Boy Scouts of America from the Oregon Supreme Court's ruling in 2010. When an individual was alleged to have sexually abused a child, a report was made to the BSA. BSA

officials then tried to substantiate the abuse to the best of their ability by interviewing victims, other organization members, the parents of victims, and in some cases the alleged offender.

These reports, dating from 1959 until 1991, feature detailed information about the abuse incident, the offender, and the Boy Scouts' response to the allegations of abuse. These files represent reports made to the BSA between 1959 and 1991 and thus could include information on abuse events that occurred prior to this time period. The files range in length from less than 5 pages to more than 70 pages, with differing levels of depth and information. Each file contains a confidential record sheet with demographic information about the alleged offender, as well as information about where they served, when they joined the organization, and when they were removed. In addition, files also may feature letters between BSA officials, statements from victims, statements from the alleged offender, newspaper clippings about the abuse incidents, and in some cases legal documents. These 2379 files represent the known universe of reported allegations of abuse made to the BSA during that time period.

For the purposes of this dissertation, Gallagher's (2000) definition of institutional abuse will be used. This definition defines institutional abuse as:

> The sexual, physical, or emotional abuse of a child (under 18 years of age) by an adult who works with him or her. The perpetrator may be employed in a paid or voluntary capacity; in the public, voluntary, or private sector; in a residential or non-residential setting; and may work either directly with children or be in an ancillary role. (797)

All of the files were coded for relevant variables relating to the abuse incident and response of the BSA organization. During preliminary coding of the files, a sample of ten files was selected

for case study analysis. These files were selected based on the detail of information and different documents contained in the files.

While the data represents a wealth of knowledge about abuse allegations made against BSA agents and the organization's response, there are some data quality issues that were addressed. In many cases, the files contained handwritten reports and letters that were then scanned into pdf form. This process resulted in some instances where information was not clear enough to be read. In addition, the handwriting of some individuals was difficult to read. Finally, missing data was an issue. The confidential record sheets included in each file were not always filled out completely, and some files featured more detail about the abuse incident and organizational response than others. When necessary, quantitative analysis was conducted with the original dataset and with missing data imputed. Findings were compared to determine whether the technique for addressing missing data impacted the interpretation of findings.

1.5 Ethical/Human Subjects Considerations

While this dissertation examined files of abuse of reported offenders in the BSA and did not directly involve individuals, there are some ethical considerations that still remained. The files released by the BSA are incredibly detailed, featuring identifying information about the offenders and victims. In all of the files, identifying information about victims has been redacted; however, identifying information for the offenders was not. In order to protect the identity of those BSA organization members who have been accused of CSA, coding of the files excluded all identifying information such as name, social security number, and date of birth. As the aim of this study was to address the response of the BSA to allegations of child sexual abuse by organization members, focus on the identifying characteristics of offenders was neither helpful

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nor warranted. In order to comply with University regulations regarding the undertaking of research, an application for Internal Review Board Review was submitted and approved.

1.6 Limitations and Contributions

The study presented some limitations. Missing data was a substantial issue given the nature of how information was collected for each file. In order to address this limitation, multiple imputation through chained equations was utilized. Differing amounts of information in each file also limited the understanding of child sexual abuse within the organization and how the BSA responded in these cases. The cases included in this dissertation only range from 1959 to 1991. The limited time period of the sample makes it impossible to examine whether youth protection policies implemented after this time period had a measurable impact on child sexual abuse allegations in the organization. Finally, the reliance on both allegations of abuse and substantiated cases clouds the issue of whether all 2379 cases were about actual sexual abuse committed by members or whether these cases could in fact feature false positives.

Despite these limitations, this dissertation represented the first examination of child sexual abuse in the BSA and their response to these allegations. The findings of this dissertation extended the knowledge of child sexual abuse in youth serving organizations, illustrating that most offenders were younger, abuse tended to be more serious, and the BSA was most likely to deal with abuse allegations in an internal, informal manner. This study also revealed that the BSA was often unwilling to conform to mandatory reporting laws. Using this information, recommendations for policies applicable to all youth serving organizations to improve screening of members, protection of youth members, and reporting of abuse were presented. In addition, this study presented the first application of institutional theory and rationalization tactics to organizational responses to child sexual abuse, finding that the BSA did in fact use

rationalization tactics to justify their responses. The application of these theories illustrated the importance of rationalization tactics in the symbolic management of an organization's legitimacy while extending institutional theory to explain how organizations respond to deviance such as child sexual abuse by members.

Chapter 2: Child Sexual Abuse

Child sexual abuse is commonly viewed as a global issue, affecting hundreds of thousands of children worldwide (Stoltenborgh, van IJzendoorn, Euser, & Bakersman-Kranenburg, 2011). The definition of child sexual abuse has evolved to become more inclusive (Collin-Vezina, Daigneault, & Hebert, 2013), with child sexual abuse currently defined as "any contact or non-contact sexual experience perpetrated on a child" (Goldman & Grimbeek, 2011, p.2). Child sexual abuse can include behaviors such as kissing, fondling, and oral intercourse, as well as non-contact behaviors such as sexual remarks, exhibitionism, online solicitation of sexual behavior, and pornography (Finkelhor, 1994; Stanley, 2001). In addition, child sexual abuse can take the form of molestation, forced masturbation (Pagitt, Shewmake, Lundberg-Love, & Garland, 2013), and in some cases forced prostitution (Bang, Baker, Carpinteri, & Van Hasselt, 2014). While originally child-on-child sexual abuse was thought to be harmless, this type of abuse is increasingly being recognized as detrimental to the emotional well-being of victims (Collin-Vezina et al., 2013).

It is difficult to determine actual rates of child sexual abuse due to barriers of reporting (National Sexual Violence Resource Center, 2012). One such issue is the ability of children, due to their age or mental capability, to report their own abuse. In conjunction with this, children might not be aware that the behavior of the adult is inappropriate, and thus may not think there is anything to report. In many instances, child victims of sexual abuse may repress memories or forget experiences, or they may refuse to report victimization due to the desire to cooperate with demands for secrecy made by the abuser (Johnson, 2004). Disclosure of abuse is also affected by the implicit or explicit pressure for secrecy and feelings of embarrassment, shame, or responsibility (Collin-Vezina et al., 2013).

The private nature of the abuse (Molnar, Buka, & Kessler, 2001) and differences in definitions of child sexual abuse and data gathering techniques can also impact our knowledge of child sexual abuse. In some countries, economic resources required to manage reports of child sexual abuse and collect data may be lacking, as well as the conflation of child sexual abuse with other types of sexual offending in official statistics. Despite the difficulties with estimating child sexual abuse prevalence, a meta-analysis of studies revealed that the prevalence of child sexual abuse worldwide ranged from 2-62 percent for women and 3-16 percent for men (Johnson, 2004).

In order to address the incidence and prevalence of child sexual abuse in the United States, the National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS) was created in 1988 under the amendment to the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA). This program collects annual data on reports of child abuse and neglect voluntarily submitted from the 50 states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Based on this annual data, in 2012, 3.4 million reports of allegations of child abuse and neglect were made to Child Protective Services (CPS) for a total of 6.3 million children (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012).

Of these reports, 48.7 percent of victims were male children, while 50.9 percent of victims were female children. While the overall number includes all forms of child abuse and neglect, disaggregation of the data reveals that 9.3 percent of these reports were for allegations of child sexual abuse. This represents a total of 62,936 confirmed victims of child sexual abuse in 2012. When further disaggregating the data, 20.9 percent of children sexually abused were between 15 and 17 years old, 26.3 percent were between 12 and 14 years old, and the greatest percentage, 33.8 percent, were less than 9 years old when sexually victimized. While these numbers shed light on the issue of child sexual abuse, they are only an estimate that likely

underestimates the problem (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012).

While research has tried to address the prevalence and incidence of child sexual abuse, attention has also been paid to the consequences of child sexual abuse for victims. Numerous studies have found that child sexual abuse can result in both short and long-term psychological, physical, and interpersonal issues (Briere & Elliott, 1994; Chan, Yan, Brownridge, Tiwari, & Fong, 2011). When addressing the short-term consequences of child sexual abuse, victims of sexual abuse in early childhood were more likely to experience early sexual behavior, emotional issues, depression and anxiety, phobias, and sleep disorders (Kelley, 1994). In addition to these consequences, Finkelhor, Williams, & Burns (1988) found that child victims also experience bed wetting, unexplainable fear, frequent crying, and displayed more aggressive behaviors than non-survivors.

Survivors of child sexual abuse face physical issues including self-harm behaviors and higher rates of obesity (Collin-Vezina et al., 2013). Some psychological problems resulting from sexual abuse in childhood include posttraumatic stress, cognitive distortions, emotional pain and avoidance, and an impaired sense of self (Briere & Elliott, 1994). Child sexual abuse can also result in mood disorders, leading to major depressive episodes, along with substance abuse and suicidality (Collin-Vezina et al., 2013).

In addition to these psychological and physical consequences, both male and female victims of child sexual abuse are also more likely to experience physical or sexual re-victimization later in life, often in the form of intimate partner violence (Banyard, Arnold, & Smith, 2000; Cambell, Greeson, Bybee, & Raha, 2008; Hattery, 2009). In addition to increased risk of re-victimization, victims of child sexual abuse are also at higher risk of experiencing violence in their early romantic relationships (Vezina & Herbert, 2007; Herbert, Lavoie, Vitaro,

McDuff, & Tremblay, 2008) and engage in risky sexual behavior, especially in their teen years (Collin-Vezina et al., 2013). Studies have shown that there is no significant gender difference in the mental and psychosocial impact of child sexual abuse on survivors (Cashmere & Shackle, 2014).

2.1 Child Sexual Abuse of Boys

The rate of sexual abuse of boys specifically is especially alarming given the underreported nature of this victimization. Boys who have been sexually abused are often unwilling to report their abuse due to the following: fear that they will be labeled gay if their abuser is male (Cermak & Molidor, 1996), societal notions that they should consider themselves lucky if the abuser was female (Valente, 2005), and/or because offenders are more likely to use force and threats against male victims. In addition, male sexual abuse survivors often perceive early sexual abuse experiences as non-abusive. This denial of the abusive nature of their victimization serves as a protective factor to shield them from painful memories of their experience (O'Leary & Gould, 2010). The underreported nature of male youth victimization has led to a disproportionate focus on samples of young women (Maikovich-Fong & Jaffee, 2010).

In order to try to address the true extent of the issue some studies have examined prevalence rates of unreported sexual abuse of boys within nonclinical samples. The results of these studies provide more detailed information about the prevalence and incidence of sexual abuse of boys. One such study by Risin and Koss (1987) found that within their sample of 2,972 male university students, 7.3 percent reported experiencing sexual abuse as a child. More importantly, these men outlined three criteria which were often features of their abuse, 1) an age discrepancy between them and the perpetrator, 2) the use of some form of coercion, and 3) a perpetrator who was a caregiver or authority figure. Overall, studies have found that boys are

more likely to be fondled or forced to engage in oral intercourse (Fontanella, Harrington, & Zuravin, 2000) and are more likely to be victimized by strangers (Gold, Elhai, Lucenko, & Swingle, 1998).

For the past several years, beginning in 1992, there has been a decline in the number of reports of sexual abuse against children made to CPS. Some estimates place the decline at upwards of 62 percent (U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012). One suggestion as to the decline of reporting of allegations of child sexual abuse to CPS is a shift in reporting to local law enforcement (Finkelhor, Jones, & Kopiec, 2001; Finkelhor & Jones, 2006).

When comparing NCANDS data on child sexual abuse and National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) data featuring incident level data compiled by police departments, Terry and Tallon (2013) found that state criminal justice agencies reported considerably more cases of child sexual abuse than CPS. In addition, the decline in cases of child sexual abuse could be the result of changes in definitions of child sexual abuse used for reporting purposes (Finkelhor, Jones, & Kopiec, 2001; Finkelhor & Jones, 2006).

In addition to the decline in the number of reports of child sexual abuse made to CPS, beginning in 1992 there has also been a decline in the incidence of child sexual abuse. From 1992 to 2011, there was a 63 percent decline in sexual abuse against children (Finkelhor, Jones, & Shattuck, 2013). The decline in child sexual abuse was found in several agency data sources, including the NCANDS, the National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS), as well as victim self-report surveys such as the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), National Survey of Children Exposed to Violence (NatSCEV), and National Survey of Adolescents (Finkelhor & Jones, 2012). While there has been no agreed upon reason given for the decline in child sexual abuse, economic improvement, increased law enforcement and child protective

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services personnel, more aggressive prosecution and incarceration policies, and increased awareness of child sexual abuse have all been cited as possible explanations (Finkelhor, Jones, & Shattuck, 2013).

2.2 Sexual Abuse in Youth Serving Organizations (Institutional Child Sexual Abuse)

Youth Serving Organizations (YSOs) are defined by Wurtele as "establishments, organizations, facilities and clubs that provide services and activities for children, and include schools, residential treatment facilities, youth groups, faith centers, and recreational or sporting clubs" (Wurtele, 2012, p.2443). Given the population that YSOs serve, it is critical that they have clear, appropriate, and effective policies and training on CSA.

YSOs can often provide protective factors for youth from sexual abuse, including increased self-esteem, relationships with positive adults, and relationships with peers (Trocmé & Schumaker, 1999). However, the ability for adults and youth members to develop close and caring relationships can also leave youth members vulnerable to physical and sexual victimization (Wurtele, 2012).

Research on organizations caring for children, including juvenile facilities, schools, and child care organizations have found alarming rates of child sexual abuse. A 2010 study by the Department of Justice found that 10.3 percent of children in state and non-state facilities reported being victimized by facility staff at least once (Beck, Harrison, & Guerino, 2010). Similarly, studies by the U.S. Department of Education found that prevalence rates for sexual abuse among children at school ranged from 3.7 percent to 50.3 percent among students in U.S. schools (Shakeshaft, 2004). Overall, in 2002, one percent of all investigated cases of child abuse involved child care providers (Wolfe, Jaffe, Jette, & Poisson, 2003). What follows is a brief discussion of two of the most well-known daycare child sexual abuse cases.

<u>2.2.1 Daycares</u>

Despite the fact that children have a greater chance of being victimized at home (Finkelhor, Williams, & Burns, 1988), the increased media attention on reports of daycare child sexual abuse has led to beliefs among the general public that children are at an increased risk of being victimized at daycare (Kelley, 1994). Child sexual abuse in daycare settings typically ranges from fondling to more intrusive acts such as penetration, usually with a foreign object. There are often cases of children being forced to abuse other children, and photographing of children is common (Kelley, 1994).

Faller (1990) developed a typology for adults abusing children in daycare settings. Faller outlined two types of offenders: those who had unplanned sexual encounters with children due to circumstance, and those who had planned sexual encounters with children. These two typologies distinguish between offenders who only victimize children after an opportunity presents itself and those who target children for victimization (Faller, 1990). While there tends to be a higher prevalence of male sexual offending against children in home settings, sexual offending against children in daycare settings features a higher proportion of female offenders (Kelley, 1994).

Two infamous cases of child sexual victimization in daycare settings, the McMartin Preschool case and Fells Acre Day Care case, resulted in increased concern over the safety of youth in daycares. These cases ultimately contributed to the awareness of and increasing concern about child sexual abuse (Best, 1990).

In Manhattan Beach, California, in August of 1983, a parent reported to police that they believed their child had been molested by Ray Buckley, a McMartin Preschool staff member. The mother reported that she had questioned her child after he came home with a reddened anus. Upon repeated questioning, the child claimed that Ray Buckley had taken his temperature anally.

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A medical examination conducted the next day was inconclusive for sexual abuse. When initially questioned by the police the child denied any sexual abuse had taken place, but on further questioning he admitted that both he and other children had experienced perverse sexual acts at the hands of daycare staff (deYoung, 1997).

Police sent a letter to parents who used the daycare, naming Ray Buckley as a suspect and instructing them to question their children about whether they had experienced abuse. Police also advised parents who believed their children were victims to consult with the Children's International Institute for verification of abuse. Some 400 McMartin preschool children were taken to the Institute, and of these 396 were determined to be victims of sexual abuse (deYoung, 1997). This initial report and following investigation into the McMartin Preschool resulted in suspicion that children were being satanically ritually abused in the tunnels underneath the school by daycare staff. Following the initial report, mental health professionals examined dozens of children. These examinations resulted in 300 charges of rape, fondling, oral copulation, and ritualistic abuse against Buckley, his mother and owner of the daycare Peggy McMartin, and five other women who worked there (Wyatt, 2002).

By January of 1986, all of the charges except those against Ray Buckley and Peggy McMartin had been dropped due to lack of evidence. In January of 1990, all charges against Peggy McMartin were dismissed. After initial discussions to retry Ray Buckley on twelve charges that jurors were deadlocked on, prosecutors declined to retry the case (Wyatt, 2002). Ultimately, at the end of the investigation and in later years it was largely believed that the reports of abuse at the McMartin daycare center were the result of inappropriate, leading, and repeated questioning by police, despite archeological surveying which revealed a tunnel had in fact been filled in under the preschool property (Stickel, 1993). In addition, many scholars later

studying the incident believed the children were questioned so relentlessly that they eventually began fabricating stories (deYoung, 1997).

The McMartin preschool case was the first of its kind to receive national media attention, and it was only the first in a line of daycare sexual abuse scandals in the U.S. in the following years. In1984, a similar case of child abuse by daycare workers occurred at the Fells Acre daycare center in Malden, Massachusetts. The initial report of abuse came after a child claimed that Gerald Amirault, a worker at the day care center, had changed his pants and underwear after he wet the bed during nap time. Upon further questioning by his mother, the child claimed he had been taken to a secret room and molested by Amirault. In an initial interview with a social worker the child again denied anything had taken place but eventually admitted abuse had occurred to himself along with another boy. The other boy denied any abuse occurred (Robinson, 2013).

After reporting to police, the local police station invited parents to a meeting during which social workers provided a list of symptoms of sexual abuse (bed wetting, crying, and appetite problems) and police advised parents to question their children. Police specifically stated that denials of abuse should not be believed and parents should continue to question their children. Following this, 40 potential cases of child sexual abuse were identified. Of these, nineteen children continued to deny allegations occurred and only ten were deemed credible enough to testify at trial. Malden police charged Gerald Amirault, his mother Violet Amirault, and his sister Cheryl Amirault LeFave with sexual abuse against children under their care. The prosecution's case was based on the belief that the Amirault's were conducting abuse in order to create child pornography for distribution, despite the fact that no child pornography was ever found (Robinson, 2013).

At trial, the children claimed that they had been sodomized, sometimes by a twelve inch butter knife, engaged in oral sex, molested by a clown, abused by lobsters, witnessed the murder of a baby and dog, were forced to eat dead frogs, and had been chased naked in the school yard. They noted that many of these events had occurred in a magic room they were taken to by one of the Amiraults. Despite these claims, there was no evidence of sexual abuse, and while children said they had been to the magic room hundreds of times, none of them could trace their steps back to the room. A search of the school revealed no such room. The jury in the case deliberated for 64 hours, ultimately convicting all three. Gerald Amirault was sentenced to 30 to 40 years in prison while his mother and sister were both sentenced to eight to ten years in prison (Robinson, 2013).

While these two cases represented the most high profile cases of day care child sexual abuse, several other cases occurred during the same time period. These included the 1989 Little Rascals Day Care Center scandal in Edenton, North Carolina and the 1985 Wee Care Day Nursery scandal in Maplewood, New Jersey (Goldberg, 1998). The outbreak of day care sexual abuse scandals in the 1980s and early 1990s resulted in more aggressive case finding of child sexual abuse by social workers with investigations into hundreds of other day care centers across the U.S. following the McMartin preschool case (deYoung, 2007). These cases also led to increased concern about the possibility of individuals targeting daycares as a method of obtaining victims.

2.2.2 The Catholic Church

Child sexual abuse does not solely occur in organizations caring for children, but can also occur in organizations where adult members have increased access to and power over youth. This relationship is clearly evident in the Catholic Church child sexual abuse scandal. While

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literature suggests that child sexual abuse has occurred in the Catholic Church, and other religious institutions, for thousands of years (Dale & Alpert, 2007), the issue of child sexual abuse by priests gained large-scale media attention beginning in the 1980s (Jenkins, 1996). This rise in media attention was partly due to the 1985 Gilbert Gauthe case. Gilbert Gauthe, a priest in the Savannah Diocese and Boy Scout chaplain, was moved between four different parishes and during this time molested more than one hundred boys. Church officials were aware of his victimization of children for more than ten years prior to the public surfacing of allegations in 1983 (Werth, 2003).

Then, in January 2002, the Catholic Church was again rocked by allegations of child sexual abuse against Father John Geoghan, a priest in the Archdiocese of Boston. Allegations against Father Geoghan indicated that he had abused more than 130 children over three decades (Kerry, 2008). The *Boston Globe's* coverage of the case indicated that Archbishop Bernard Cardinal Law and his predecessors had been aware of the abuse occurring and created a system whereby priests were able to sexually abuse children for long periods of time by moving them from one location to another (Carroll, 2002). Ultimately, this case led to increased scrutiny of the Catholic Church and a sharp increase in reporting of past abuse by priests. In 2003, Laurie Goodstein, a reporter for the *New York Times*, estimated that by the end of 2002, roughly 1,205 clerics had been named as abusers of roughly 4,268 victims (Goodstein, 2003).

In 2002, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops commissioned John Jay College to undertake two studies to address the nature and scope of sexual abuse in the Catholic Church and the causes and context of abuse. The Nature and Scope report released in 2004 relied on the universe of all records for priests and deacons in the U.S. from 1950 to 2002 to determine the nature of allegations and characteristics about the abuser and victim (John Jay College, 2004).

This study extended the research of prior studies that had largely relied on small samples or clinical populations (Terry, 2008).

The studies represented the largest and most extensive study of child sexual abuse by priests and provided insight into the characteristics of abusers and abuse incidents, as well as the Catholic Church's response to abuse. The study found that between 1950 and 2002, 4,392 priests were accused of abusing 10,667 victims. These priests represented four percent of all priests in the U.S. during this time period. While the number of sexual abuse cases peaked in the 1970s, abuse rates were comparable across the different dioceses during this time period. In response to allegations of abuse, the Catholic Church paid nearly 572 million dollars in victim compensation, treatment for both victims and priests, and court costs by 2002 (Terry, 2008).

Priest abusers ranged in age from 18 to 90, with the largest majority abusing between the ages of thirty and thirty-nine. Most priests only had one formal allegation of abuse and on average priests usually began abusing after serving in the ministry for eleven years. Those priests with ten or more allegations were found to have begun abusing within their first four years in the ministry. The study revealed that 69 percent of priests abused children for more than one year and that the duration of abuse increased with the number of victims. Most of the abuse occurred privately, in the priest's home or work office. The majority of victims were boys between the ages of eleven and fourteen years old (Terry, 2008). While these studies revealed detailed information about child sexual abuse in the Catholic Church, a majority of the allegations of abuse were reported years after the abuse occurred. Due to this delay in reporting, statute of limitations often hindered criminal prosecution of priests (Terry, 2008). Of all priests for whom allegations were reported, only six percent were ultimately criminally prosecuted (John Jay, 2004).

The Causes and Context study conducted by John Jay College in 2011 also shed light on the Catholic Church's response to allegations of child sexual abuse against priests. In 1992, the American Bishops instituted the "Five Principles" for addressing allegations of sexual abuse against children by priests. These principles included a prompt response to allegations, removing the priest from clerical service and referring to treatment, complying with civil law requirements for reporting abuse, reaching out to victims to provide support and guidance, and being as open as possible with the community while maintaining the privacy of the victim. For the most part, when responding to allegations of child sexual abuse, Church responses tended to focus on the priest being accused and not the victim. Reponses also focused heavily on rehabilitation of the priest through treatment. Church leaders relied heavily on internal responses such as internal investigations and administrative leave, rather than relying on external criminal justice oriented responses. Finally, laicization of priests was often avoided as it was considered too complex and difficult to remove priests from clerical work (Terry, Smith, Schuth, Kelly, Vollman, & Massey, 2011).

The two studies conducted by John Jay College provided greater insight into the nature of child sexual abuse in the Catholic Church while also providing more detailed information about the Church's response to these allegations. While media attention focused on child sexual abuse in the Catholic Church, it is important to note that child sexual abuse extends to other religious institutions as well (Terry, 2008). The cases of child sexual abuse in daycares and the Catholic Church led to increased concern over institutional child sexual abuse. In addition, attention was also turned to cases where offenders selected these institutions in order to facilitate offending against children.

2.3 Professional Perpetrators

Termed 'professional perpetrators' by Sullivan and Beech (2002), these individuals are perpetrators who use organizations or institutions in which they work as a method for targeting victims. There is increasing concern that individuals who want to victimize children may be targeting these institutions. Research has shown that in some cases offenders target youth serving organizations in which they can abuse children, sometimes for years prior to being discovered (Colton, Roberts, & Vanstone, 2010; Sullivan & Beech, 2004). The fear of predators targeting these institutions has led to a new focus on tools and procedures for screening potential volunteers and members (Saul & Audage, 2007).

Studies of professional perpetrators have addressed whether these offenders are inherently different from ordinary sex offenders, finding that they were usually older and better educated (Haywood, 1994; Sullivan & Beech, 2004). While professional perpetrators have been found to be less likely to be in adult sexual relationships or to have children, they have similar histories of child sexual abuse to the general population of child sexual offenders (Sullivan & Beech, 2004). Professional perpetrators have also been found to rely on special techniques and features to aid the commission of abuse and prevent disclosure (Brannan, Jones, & Murch, 1993). While 'grooming' techniques are often used by the general population of child sex offenders to manipulate their victims, Gallagher (1998, 1999) claims that the techniques used by professional perpetrators are more akin to entrapment. He notes that these sex offenders often use emotional and material inducements to target their victims, while also targeting vulnerable groups of children such as those with learning disabilities or special needs. Ultimately, one of the key differences between professional perpetrator sex offenders and traditional sex offenders is the level of sophistication of techniques used to manipulate victims to allow for abuse or prevent

disclosure of abuse (Sullivan & Beech, 2002).

Questions have also been raised regarding the motivation of professional perpetrators. Two main motivations are debated: that professional perpetrators seek employment that will generate opportunities to sexually abuse, or that they do not intend to abuse but are corrupted by the position of power they hold (Sullivan & Beech, 2002). Faller's 1988 study found that the majority of offenders in institutional settings deliberately sought out these professions and situations allowing for abuse. Despite these findings, later research dismissed the idea that there is one type of professional perpetrator (Sullivan & Beech, 2002). Professional perpetrators of sexual abuse have been found to be authoritarian and controlling (Sloan, 1988) in some cases, but quiet and unassuming in others (Rowlands, 1995).

In the 1980s, research began to evaluate programs and strategies for preventing physical abuse, neglect, and sexual abuse of children. At the time, many sexual abuse prevention programs focused on educating youth serving organizations on the most appropriate methods for preventing and responding to sexual abuse. These methods often centered on educating parents, teachers, and children about sexual abuse through the use of verbal instruction, film, and behavioral training. Evaluation of these prevention programs largely found that while educational programs could improve the knowledge of children about sexually abusive behavior, these programs were not shown to reduce the occurrence of sexual abuse (Macmillan, Macmillan, Offord, Griffith, & Macmillan, 1994). More recently, efforts have been focused on school-based educational programs which teach children how to identify dangerous situations, refuse an approach, break off interaction with a perpetrator, and request help (Finkelhor, 2009).

Currently, there is no federal law requiring YSOs to screen individuals before offering them positions in the organization (Davis, Grasso, Dennis, Wells, & Liss, 1998). In addition,

there is no mandate for these organizations to develop policies aimed at prevention of institutional child sexual abuse, or to provide education and training to members on child sexual abuse (Wurtele, 2012). While there is no law mandating criminal background checks, under the National Child Protection Act, the Attorney General created guidelines on suggested screening mechanisms, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's criminal records check (Davis et al., 1998).

While there appears to be some research on child sexual abuse by organizational members and the prevention methods these organizations can employ, these studies focus primarily on prevention of abuse, and not on organizational responses to abuse. While it is important to understand the characteristics of institutional abuse and the prevention methods used by organizations, attention must also be paid to how organizations respond to abuse. How the organization learned of abuse and the methods they used to address abuse are important in understanding the larger context in which this abuse occurs. To date, there has also been no comprehensive large-scale study of institutional child sexual abuse (Wurtele, 2012).

2.4 Mandatory Reporting Of Child Sexual Abuse

Beginning in the 1950s, studies of infants and children displaying multiple fractures and subdural hematomas began to question whether the trauma these children were displaying was intentionally inflicted (Nelson, 1984; Sussman, 1975). It wasn't until 1962 that the term *battered child syndrome* was first introduced in a study looking at children who were severely injured by their parents (Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, 1962). In order to address the sexual abuse of children and increasing recognition of battered child syndrome, mandatory reporting laws were created in the United States in the 1960s (Myers, 2008). In 1962, the U.S. Children's Bureau proposed a model statute for mandatory reporting laws, which was quickly

picked up by the states. Between 1963 and 1967, all of the states and District of Columbia had

passed a version of the mandatory reporting statute. Following this, in 1974 Congress passed the

Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), which created the National Center for

Child Abuse and Neglect. This center was developed to specify how and when reports should be

filed and who was required to report (Hutchinson, 1993). As of 2012, all U.S. states, the District

of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.

Virgin Islands have enacted mandatory reporting laws (Child Welfare Information Gateway,

2012).

Mandatory reporting laws are based on several key assumptions. These assumptions are

that:

1) Children are in need of protection and require others to act on their behalf

2) Mandatory reporting laws will ensure complete and accurate reporting of child

maltreatment; and

3) Mandatory reporting will lead to early detection and prevention of more serious harm

(Hutchinson, 1993).

Ultimately, the greatest factor leading to the development of mandatory reporting laws is

the early detection of abuse. This early detection is especially important for child victims

because requiring adults that these children come into contact with to report can cease future

abuse. Mandatory reporting laws are a useful tool to ensure children aren't subjected to repeated

victimization as well as ensuring additional children do not fall prey to abuse (Pietrantonio,

Wright, Gibson, Alldred, Jacobson, Niec, 2013).

While the majority of mandatory reporting laws are aimed at abuse committed by a

child's parent or legal guardian, these laws have been extended to "cases where the perpetrator is

a specified person, usually a parent, caregiver or other individual having care, custody or control of the child, or a person who is responsible for the care of the child" (Mathews & Kenny, 2008; 11). This extension further protects children by requiring abuse committed by any individual with control over the child to be reported.

Mandatory reporting laws specify "who is required to by law to report suspected cases of child abuse and neglect" (National Child Protection Clearinghouse, 2004; 1). It is important to note that when reporting suspected cases of child abuse or neglect, proof of maltreatment is not required. Instead, there only has to be a reasonable belief that abuse is occurring (Pietrantonio et al 2013). Initially, these laws were only applied to medical professionals due to concern that the extension of mandatory reporting requirements to other professionals could result in unforeseen harm (Hutchinson, 1993).

While all states, the District of Columbia, and all U.S territories currently have some type of mandatory reporting law, the professions designated as mandatory reporters varies by state. In 48 states, professions whose members are mandated by law to report child maltreatment are listed in the statute. These professions are largely those in which members have access to children, such as teachers, child care workers, social workers, medical professionals, and law enforcement (Higgins, Bromfield, Richardson, Holzer, & Berlyn, 2009).

However, some states have expanded mandatory reporting to professions such as commercial film or photograph processors and members of the clergy. In addition, only eleven states mandate reporting by directors, employees, or volunteers at organizations that provide activities for youth. Only 18 states and Puerto Rico require any individuals who suspect abuse to report, regardless of their profession (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2012).

While mandatory reporting laws specify who is required to report child abuse and

neglect, in all states any individual who suspects abuse is allowed to report. To ensure that

reports of abuse are based on some standard, the majority of states require that an individual

making a report "suspects or has reasons to believe that a child has been abused or neglected"

(Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2012; 3). Any individual is also permitted to report

conditions that could result in harm to a child. Most states have created toll free telephone

numbers to allow anonymous reporting of suspected child abuse, however, some states require

reporters to leave their name (Child Welfare Information Gateway, 2012).

The expansion of mandatory reporting laws to additional professionals with daily

interactions with children has been especially important given the widespread distribution of

child abuse allegations. In 1974, roughly 60,000 cases of child abuse were reported. This number

rose to more than one million reports in 1980, two million reports in 1990, and three million

reports of child abuse in 2000 (Myers, 2008), and over 5.8 million in 2007 (Levi & Portwood,

2011) . In 2010, of the reports of child abuse and neglect made to Child Protective services, 11.5

percent were made by social workers, 16.4 percent were made by teachers or child care

providers, 16.7 percent were made by law enforcement officers, and 8.2 percent were made by

medical professionals (The Administration on Children, Youth and Families, 2010; USDHHS,

2011).

Mandatory reporting laws are meant to protect children, but several issues have been

raised, including:

1) The overreporting of unsubstantiated abuse

2) The diversion of resources from substantiated cases of child sexual abuse (Mathews
   & Kenny, 2008); and

3) Ambiguity and vagueness in the statutes (Levi, Brown, & Erb, 2006).

When addressing the issues of mandatory reporting laws, it is important to acknowledge the possibility of both false positive and false negative reports. False positives occur when individuals are investigated for suspicion of child abuse but these allegations are not substantiated. False positives can cause damage to individuals and families due to the disruption and stress associated with CPS investigations. False negatives occur when child abuse is not reported to CPS, leaving the child vulnerable to future abuse (Levi & Portwood, 2011). Mandatory reporting laws can also result in the inefficient use of CPS' extremely limited resources or the unequal treatment of children requiring attention (Levi & Crowell, 2011), as time and effort may be spent on investigating suspected child abuse in cases where abuse is not present.

The current set of mandatory reporting laws lack a "clear standard for when an individual is meant to report suspected child abuse" (Levi & Portwood, 2011, p.62). In addition, whether abuse will be reported is dependent upon individual attitudes toward discipline, the individuals' experiences with abused children and CPS, and often the characteristics of the family and child. Overall, neither laws nor professional literature or standards provide a clear indication of when reporting should occur. In fact, 22 states cite some level of belief that child abuse is occurring, while 28 states cite suspicion of abuse as a guideline for reporting; however neither of these terms is clearly defined within the statutes (Levi & Portwood, 2011).

The refusal of mandatory reporters to report suspected child abuse has also been raised as an issue. Physicians have noted that fear of legal or physical reprisals represent a significant barrier when reporting suspected child abuse (Pietrantonio et al, 2013), while psychologists have expressed concerns regarding client confidentiality (Kalichman & Craig, 1991). The concern for liability among mandatory reporters is especially apparent in instances where suspected abuse

cannot be substantiated (Hutchinson, 1993). While some states have instituted strict penalties for failure to report suspected child abuse, others have incredibly lenient penalties or lack legal penalties all together (Brown & Gallagher, 2013).

The problem of failure to report child abuse also brings to light the issue of willful refusal to report suspected child abuse, and in some cases willful tolerance of the abuse. Several high profile cases have brought the issue of willful tolerance of suspected child abuse to the forefront of debate regarding mandatory reporting. In 2003, the Boston Globe printed a series of exposés detailing the more than 900 children who were sexually abused by priests in the Roman Catholic Church (Brown & Gallagher, 2013). The reporting of the Boston Globe revealed that priests within the Church were often aware of abuse committed by fellow priests, usually resulting from confession with the victim. Despite having this knowledge, the priests did not report cases of sexual abuse to formal authorities (Goldenberg, 2013).

In 2009, a similar issue of willful tolerance was discovered in the case of Dr. Earl B. Bradley. Dr. Bradley, a pediatrician in Delaware, was indicted in 2010 on 471 counts of child sexual abuse against 103 children. Further discovery revealed that there were actually 526 counts of sexual abuse against 130 children. It was also discovered that throughout his years victimizing children, medical, police, and legal authorities were all aware of the abuse but failed to report this to child protective services (Brown & Gallagher, 2013). Most recently, the 2011 case of Pennsylvania State University defensive football coordinator Jerry Sandusky has sparked states to take another look at their current mandatory reporting laws. In 2011, Jerry Sandusky was charged with 52 counts of sexual abuse of ten young boys that he met through the Second Mile Foundation for needy children he created. Similar to the other cases mentioned, in the Sandusky case numerous Pennsylvania State University officials knew the abuse was occurring due to

reports from junior employees at the University, but failed to report it to law enforcement (Kim, Gostin, & Cole, 2012). These cases and others like them have led to an increased push for mandatory reporting laws that apply to all individuals and have stricter penalties for individuals who fail to report (Brown & Gallagher, 2013).

Mandatory reporting laws have not been solely applied to reporting of child sexual abuse, but also the issue of reporting of sexual assault on college campuses. Many scholars note that college is the time of greatest risk for sexual violence, with research showing that one in five women will experience either attempted or completed sexual assault while in college (Krebs, Lindquist, Warner, Fisher, Martin, 2007). Reporting of sexual assault on college campuses has not always occurred. Prior to 1988, less than four percent of college campuses publically released information on crime that occurred on campus. In 1990, calls for transparency from sexual assault survivors led to a Federal response in the form of the Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act. This act made it mandatory for all college campuses to report sexual assault, in addition to other crimes, that occurred on campus. In 1998, this act was amended and renamed the Jeanne Cleary Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics after Jeanne Cleary, a student who was raped and sodomized in her dorm room. In 1999, Congress mandated the National Institute of Justice to assess the compliance of institutions of higher education with the Cleary Act (McMahon, 2008).

Despite these steps, incidence of sexual assault on college campuses has failed to decline (Karjane, Fisher, & Cullen, 2005). Studies have found that campuses often have trouble implementing policies to address sexual abuse on campus due to lack of funding (Bohmer & Parrot, 1993) and difficultly raising awareness about the services available to students (Ashworth, Franklin, & Viada, 2014). Following the failure of college campuses to adequately

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address the issue of sexual assault, President Obama announced a targeted response to sexual assault on college campuses in 2014. This comprehensive program to respond to sexual assault on campuses had a four-pronged approach. The first step involved the implementation of an appropriate response, including reporting, investigation, and accountability, and providing services to victims. The second prong focused on an awareness of sexual assault and risk reduction strategy, while the third prong focused on the education of bystanders on their role in intervening in sexual assault incidents. The final prong centered on primary prevention, whereby the culture of college campuses was shifted to take sexual assault seriously and focus on issues of consent (Burrows, 2014). While it is yet to be seen how this new approach will impact sexual assault on college campuses, this could present a useful model for addressing issues of child sexual abuse in youth serving organizations.

Chapter 3: Boy Scouts of America

3.1 History of BSA

The Boy Scouts of America (BSA) was created in 1910 and received a federal charter in 1916. Under Title 36 of the United States Code, federally chartered organizations are free from antitrust and monopoly regulation as well as control over their symbols and insignia. During the first years of operation, the President of the U.S. served as the honorary president of the BSA. By the end of the 1920s, the BSA was the largest male youth organization, with 358,573 scouts and 15,117 scoutmasters (Hantover, 1978). In 1999, the BSA reported 3.5 million registered scouts. In 2000, the BSA claimed to have registered their 100 millionth member (Mechling, 2004).

The BSA largely gained national acceptance and support in the U.S. due to concerns regarding the decline of American masculinity (Mechling, 2004). From the 1870 to 1910, changes in the workforce, family, and adolescent lifestyle were considered threatening to the expression of manly traits and behaviors in adult males. Feminism played a large role in this change due to the drastic change in the spheres of work for men and women (Hantover, 1978).

The American workforce shifted to white-collar jobs, in which both men and women served in clerical or sales positions. The role of men in service oriented work was in stark contrast to the independence and self-reliance traditionally associated with farming and family owned business which dominated prior to this shift. According to Hantover, masculinity is a cultural construct confirmed through ongoing action with work providing the central method for externalizing masculinity. The inability of men to exert overt masculinity in their everyday lives due to these societal changes hinted at the decline of traditional masculine ideals (Hantover, 1978).

In light of the apparent decline of opportunity for men to exert their masculinity, scouting was viewed as providing boys with opportunities to exert their often latent masculinity in accordance with traditional male ideals. Men who were unable to exert their masculinity in white-collar jobs "sought nonoccupational means of masculine validation, one of which was being a scoutmaster" (Hantover, 1978, p. 189). This concern was further deepened because diminishing opportunities were viewed as a barrier to the development of masculinity in adolescent boys. Smaller family size, the absence of fathers from home life due to the shift of work to service industries, and the expansion of public schools all served to weaken boys physically leading to dependency and inactivity (Hantover, 1978). In order to staunch this weakening of the physical and masculine identities of boys and men, the BSA was developed to provide order, discipline, and the opportunity to build character (Macleod, 2004).

The BSA is based on the values of honor, duty, and integrity (Mechling, 2004). Boy scouts are taught that they should be trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean and reverent (Macleod, 2004). This focus of the BSA on developing boys into intelligent, resourceful, and masculine men is clearly visible in the Scout Oath adopted in 1910:

> *On my honor I will do my best*
> *To do my duty to God and my country*
> *And to obey Scout Law;*
> *To help other people at all times;*
> *To keep myself physically strong,*
> *Mentally awake, and morally straight* (Mechling 2004).

The BSA is primarily comprised of white, middle class boys and men. However, troops for poor youth, certain racial and ethnic groups, and youth with disabilities have been established (Mechling 2004). The basis for which the Boy Scouts of America was founded provided support for the status of members within the community. Similar to doctors, who are often viewed as

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having a high social status and beyond reproach because of their wisdom and beneficence (Lazaro, 1999), members within the organization could also be viewed as having a similar status within society. These individuals conformed to traditional ideals regarding marriage, the family, and behavior, and worked in an organization dedicated to ensuring that these traditional views remained intact.

The BSA operates a National Council, housed in Irving Texas, which features elected national officers, executive board members, regional presidents, local council representatives, and members at large. This National Council is responsible for developing the program, in addition to setting and maintaining quality standards for training, registration, and literature development. The National Council also publishes the magazines *Boys' Life* and *Scouting*. The National Council is not-for-profit and funded by membership dues and corporate sponsors.

The BSA is also divided into four regions to make management easier: Western, Central, Southern, and Northeast. Each region has a Regional Committee run by an Area director who supervises the various councils in that region. Each region is required to implement the National BSA program and policies. The BSA also operates local councils in each state. Each BSA unit (troop, pack, etc.) is part of the local council in which it resides. These local councils are incorporated into the larger state council and fall under regional and national review. BSA units are chartered through the local council on an annual basis. While there is oversight on the regional and national level, each council is autonomous and manages the registration of individuals and operation of the local BSA units. Local BSA units are usually chartered through civic organizations, such as churches or schools. Individual leaders are selected by the chartering organization. The BSA does provide information on membership standards and recommendations on how to select BSA volunteers (Bill, 2008).

The BSA offers five main programs, Tiger Cubs, Cub Scouting, Webelos Scouting, Boy Scouting, and Varsity Scouting. "The BSA maintains that, by virtue of the private nature of its organization and of the beliefs it tries to instill, it has the 'right' to exclude women, atheists, agnostics, and publically avowed homosexuals" (Goodman, 1999, p. 827). While the Federal courts have ruled that the BSA can exclude women, atheists, and agnostics from membership in the organization, the exclusion of homosexual members has been harshly criticized. The BSA have claimed that allowing homosexual youth members and adult volunteers and leaders is contrary to their beliefs, noting that the terms 'morally straight' and 'clean' found in their Scout Oath and Scout Law can be used to justify the exclusion of homosexuals (Goodman, 1999).

The question of whether homosexual scouts should be allowed in the BSA has been raised in numerous legal settings, most notably in *Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000)*. James Dale joined the BSA when we was eight years old, remaining in the organization as a scout until the age of eighteen. Upon turning eighteen, James applied for adult membership for which he was approved. Two years later, after learning that James had come out as homosexual while attending Rutgers University and served as the President for the University's Lesbian/Gay Alliance, James' adult membership was revoked by BSA officials. James filed suit arguing that the revocation of his membership based on his homosexual orientation was discrimination (Lee, 2008). The suit reached the Supreme Court where they held in a 5-to-4 vote that the BSA could exclude gay members under the first amendment's protection of freedom of association. The Court ruled that the BSA could legally exclude homosexual members because the inclusion of these individuals was contrary to the organization's "expressive message" (Greenhouse, 2000).

In 2013, the BSA finally ended the policy forbidding openly homosexual scouts from membership in the organization. The decision to end the policy was based on the votes of more

than 1400 volunteer scout leaders across the country, with more than 60 percent voting that no youth should be denied membership based on their sexual orientation. While the policy change became effective in January of 2014, this change only applied to the admittance of homosexual scouts, not openly gay adult volunteers or scout leaders. Prior to the BSA's policy change, several organizations including UPS, Merck, and Intel pulled their funding of the BSA citing that the policy forbidding homosexual youth violated their own nondiscrimination policies (Eckholm, 2013). More recently, Disney has pulled all funding for the BSA through their VoluntEARS program beginning in 2015 due to the continued ban on gay leaders in the BSA (Sayers, 2014).

3.2 Boy Scouts of America and Child Sexual Abuse

Increased attention has focused on the BSA in the past several years due to high profile cases of child sexual abuse. In 2010, former Boy Scout Kerry Lewis sued the BSA claiming that he was the victim of abuse by his scoutmaster in Portland, Oregon during the 1980s. Lewis claimed to have been sexually abuse by scoutmaster Timur Dykes, who admitted at the time that he had sexually abused scouts. Despite this confession, Dykes was allowed to remain in the BSA organization (McGreal, 2010).

In April of 2010, Lewis was awarded 18.5 million dollars in damages. In addition, following this case the Oregon Supreme Court ordered the release of confidential files kept by the BSA on allegations of child sexual abuse against its members. While Lewis' case is one of the more well-known cases against the BSA, over the past several years the organization has settled 60 cases of child sexual abuse outside of court (McGreal, 2010).

Based on the allegations of child sexual abuse and resulting lawsuits against the organization, it would appear as though the BSA has done little to protect youth from victimization. However, the organization has had policies and procedures set in place to protect

youth for a century. Beginning in 1911, the BSA began requiring character reference checks for all individuals applying for scoutmaster positions (Boy Scouts of America, 2012).

This policy was expanded in the mid-1920s to include cross referencing of all volunteers against a list of individuals deemed to be ineligible for BSA service maintained by the National Headquarters (Boy Scouts of America, 2012). Registration for Scoutmasters and Scouts wasn't formally required until 1913. In 1994, the BSA instituted a policy of criminal background checks for all professionals working with youth in the organization, and expanded it in 2004 to include all BSA volunteers. In 2011, the BSA instituted mandatory reporting of child abuse within the organization (Boy Scouts of America, 2012). A timeline of the policies and efforts made by the BSA to protect youth in their organization can be found in Appendix A.

To further address the issues of child sexual abuse and to hold institution members accountable, the Boy Scouts have instituted several policies to create a safe environment for scouts. The BSA instituted mandatory youth protection training for all registered volunteers in 2010. This training has to be updated every two years in order to remain as a volunteer in the organization. The BSA also reserves the right to deny any individual admission as a volunteer. Leadership within the organization is a privilege, not a right, and can only be bestowed to those individuals who have passed a background check (Boy Scouts of America, 2013). Upon entry as a volunteer into the BSA, all individuals undergo youth protection training, complete with a youth protection training guide, youth protection training for volunteers and parents DVD, and a youth protection quiz. The BSA also created a youth protection facilitator's guide to show organization members how to prepare and present training sessions to volunteers, parents, and scouts (Boy Scouts of America, 2011a).

In all of their manuals and publications relating to youth protection, the BSA mention the

importance of protecting youth from sexual abuse and other forms of maltreatment. The BSA rely on the definition of child abuse originally set forth by Congress in the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) of 1974, whereby child abuse is defined as "any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse, or exploitation; or an act or failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious harm" (Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 2010). The ultimate goal of youth protection training is to ensure that there is prompt reporting of suspected abuse and behavior that violates youth protection policies. To this end, all suspicions of abuse by BSA volunteers must be reported to the individual in charge of the activity occurring at the present time as well as the local Scout Executive, "regardless of whether the child is in the scouting program" (Boy Scouts of America, 2011a; 5).

When defining what standards should be used to dictate reporting of suspected abuse, the BSA have the following guidelines: "any suspicion or belief that any child is or has been physically, emotionally or sexually abused, exploited or exposed to any form of violence, threat, pornography or obscene material should be reported to local authorities and to the Scouting Executive" (Boy Scouts of America, 2011a; 5). While BSA manuals note that action taken by the BSA against alleged abusers can include revocation of membership, they also specify that "all suspected abuse will be reported to the appropriate law enforcement or child protective services agency for investigation" (Boy Scouts of America, 2011b). It is important to note here the difference between reporting of allegations of abuse to proper authorities and investigation of these allegations by the BSA. When reporting the allegations, the only responsibility of the organization was to report that allegations had been made. All investigation of these allegations would have been undertaken by the authority to which they reported. Investigating allegations,

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on the other hand, required that the BSA have a set standard of procedures to determine what abuse was alleged to have occurred and whether this abuse was substantiated and what evidence would be considered adequate when substantiating abuse.

Due to concerns about child sexual abuse, the BSA has also created a manual, Camp Leadership-Youth Protection Begins with You: A Guide for Camp Staff, which deals specifically with abuse of scouts. This manual outlines 'barriers to abuse within scouting' that all scout leaders must comply with, including respect for privacy, prohibiting organizations, appropriate attire, constructive discipline, youth leadership training and supervision, and prohibited hazing and bullying. The manual also spells out behavior that is considered inappropriate between adult volunteers and youth members such as long hugs, massages, and wrestling in addition to signs of physical and sexual abuse. With the advent of cellular phone and recording device technology, the BSA has also instituted policies on the use of cameras and cell phones to either record or distribute pornographic material (Boy Scouts of America, 2011b).

Several policies relating to everyday operations of BSA clubs have also been created to protect youth. In 1987, the BSA developed a two-deep leadership policy requiring two adult leaders to be present at all scouting events. This policy requires that either two registered adult leaders, or one registered adult leader and a parent, must be present at all trips and outings. It is important to note that the two-deep policy was implemented prior to the documented decline in child sexual abuse in 1992. To further prevent sexual abuse of scouts, the BSA eliminated all one-on-one contact between adults and scouts and require scouts and adults to have separate accommodations when on camping trips (Boy Scouts of America, 2012). While these policies were instituted prior to the scandal in 2010, the majority of reports of child sexual abuse addressed in this dissertation occurred prior to the implementation of these policies.

The 1977 BSA publication *Procedures for Maintaining Standards of Leadership* was the first document created which outlined the procedures regarding investigation and suspension of a scout leader. This document noted that a review must be conducted by the BSA of scout leaders who may have issues of a moral or ethical nature which make them unacceptable to serve as volunteers. When a complaint is made against a volunteer, a file is created for that individual. BSA officials then attempted to collect as much hard evidence, such as newspaper clippings, statements from victims or the alleged offender, and information from local police, to support the allegations and the offender's removal from the organization. Only after written complaints were received was this information passed on to the National Council for consideration. The National Council could then suggest that additional investigation needed to occur to provide adequate proof of wrongdoing or confirm that the individual was placed on the confidential file (Boy Scouts of America, n.d.).

The decentralized nature of the BSA's organizational structure impacted the extent to which regional and national councils were able to respond to allegations of child sexual abuse by organization members. Allegations against an individual only resulted in that person being placed on the confidential file once substantial proof had been obtained that abuse actually occurred. While the BSA had policies detailing when abuse should be reported and the measures required in order to place someone on the confidential file, there was no internal oversight to ensure that these procedures were followed. Often times, local BSA troops and councils decided on the best method of dealing with allegations without consulting with the regional or national council. Thus, the National Council, while responsible for keeping a list of all individuals deemed inappropriate to serve in the organization, in effect had little ability to ensure that local councils and troops reported allegations of abuse against members to them (Boy Scouts of

America, n.d.).

3.3 CSA Reporting in other YSO

A search of the literature and websites of other youth serving organizations, such as the Young Men's Christian Association and Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, yielded very little public information about when youth protection policies were implemented in these organizations. From the available literature, the Big Brother Big Sisters organization had implemented some form of child safety procedures and requirements of reporting applied to all volunteers since at least 2003. This document, although most likely not the earliest form of their reporting requirements, was the only one available for examination. The manual, titled the Child Safety Volunteer Handbook, noted that in order to protect children, the organization undertook professional screening, offered child safety and abuse prevention education programs to parents, volunteers, and children, and established guidelines for recognizing and maintaining appropriate boundaries. The manual also provided indicators of abuse, including signs of physical abuse, neglect, sexual abuse, and emotional maltreatment, and guidelines for appropriate responses by volunteers. Finally, the report featured a specific section on the individual's role as a mandatory reporter, noting that they were required by law to call either the Department of Human Services (DHS) or a local law enforcement agency to report suspected abuse. The manual even went as far to indicate that "a call to your BBBS case manager is also required but does not replace your need to contact DHS or law enforcement" (Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, 2003, pg.6).

While it is difficult to determine from the limited resources available the extent to which BSA policies conformed to those of other agencies, it is important to note that in none of the policies and procedure manuals available from the BSA is there any discussion of the volunteer's requirement to report suspected abuse under mandatory reporting laws. All BSA policies simply

state that reporting must occur to the organization without mention of if, when, or how law enforcement or child protection services should be notified. Thus, while the BSA may have taken necessary measures to protect children within the organization, they still appeared to disregard the need to educate volunteers and organization members of their duty to report suspected abuse under mandatory reporting laws.

3.4 The BSA and American Culture 1960-1990

In order to understand the BSA's poor response to CSA, it is critical to examine the cultural frame of the time. The 2379 files analyzed in the study reflect the overall culture of the organization at the time of the incident, but also reflect how the culture of American society at the time may also have impacted the organization's response.

3.4.1 Political and Social Change

In the years following World War II, most working and middle class Americans conformed to current societal values and ideals regarding industrial expansion and consumerist lifestyles. While this conformity to a system of shared values and goals appeared to be stable, the 1960s witnessed the beginning of a decline in societal consensus. Beginning in the 1960s, American society faced "a serious moral crisis stemming from the failure of many people, especially the young, to adequately incorporate the moral values and ideals of the society. Often, the era of the 1960s is identified as contributing to the moral decline because of an abandonment, at the time, of traditional values" (Turiel, 2002, p.3).The 1960s is largely viewed as a time of rapid social and political change in the U.S (Bureau of International Information Programs, 2011). During this time, the U.S. experienced social and political unrest against government actions and societal values considered to be unjust and discriminatory (Turiel, 2002).

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, America's increasing youth population rejected traditional patterns of middle class life, instead adopting different styles of dress and sexual behavior. The use of illegal drugs, ascendance of rock and roll, and creation of music with political and social commentary became common, and represented to many an attack on traditional American ideals (Bureau of International Information Programs, 2011).

In addition, the Vietnam War led to a division in the U.S., with a majority of America's youth vehemently opposing the war and taking part in protests (Bureau of International Information Programs, 2011). Often considered by some to be a time of crisis, the 1960s is largely viewed as a rebellious decade featuring social division and confrontation, with the "first major rally against the Vietnam War in April 1965, organized and attended primarily by students and young people" ushering in the anti-war youth movement (Bodroghkozy, 1991, p. 219). Ultimately, the actions of America's youth in the 1960s and early 1970s began to be viewed by some as a moral panic due to the clash between rebellious youth and the traditional values held by society (Bodroghkozy, 1991).

In line with the Vietnam War protests, the Civil Rights movement, lasting from the 1950s-1970s, largely focused on eliminating racial, and eventually gender, discrimination in society. The Civil Rights Movement brought attention to the unequal treatment of members of American society, noting their lack of representation in the common value system (Bodroghkozy, 1991). Subordinate groups, including women, African Americans, Native Americans, and Latinos, began to assert themselves in the social and political spheres. The Civil Rights Movement relied on reform through the use of peaceful methods, such as sit-ins, freedom rides, and rallies such as the now famous 1963 "March on Washington". While certain Civil Rights activists, such as Martin Luther King Jr, relied on peaceful methods, others including

Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael believed that any means necessary were appropriate. The protests and calls for change resulted in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Bureau of International Information Programs, 2011).

By 1985, there existed large-scale disillusionment with social, economic, and political trends. Conservatives increasingly gained support because of their focus on protecting traditional American values. At the same time, fundamentalist Christians came forward striving for a return to "religion or the moral precepts often associated with it to a central place in American life" (Bureau of International Information Programs, 2011, p. 308). While Bodroghkozy (1991) argues that in order to prevent complete social breakdown in the early 1960s and 1970s the dominant social groups had to be willing to embrace change. The actions taken by the BSA when responding to allegations of sexual abuse can be taken as a direct attempt to maintain conformity to the traditional values of the 1950s.

3.4.2 Decline of Marriage, the Family, and Traditional Identity

In the 1950s, there was increased focus on the nuclear family and marriage as the only socially acceptable way to engage in sexual behavior. However, the 1960s saw a shift in the dominance of marriage in American culture. During this time, the median age of marriage increased, cohabitation prior to or in place of marriage became more common, childbearing outside of marriage became more acceptable, and divorce rates began to rise (Cherlin, 2004). During the 1960s and 1970s, focus was placed on self-development, with the idea that marriage roles should be flexible and that openness should occur when confronting potential problems (Cancian, 1987).

During the 1970s, some scholars argue that the substantial changes occurring in American society played a large role in the deinstitutionalization of marriage. The change in

division of labor within the home and the increase in childbearing outside of marriage are viewed as contributing factors to which undermined the basis of marriage. In the 1980s, the change in structure of American society was increasingly apparent in the shift of the American workforce to service jobs (Bureau of International Information Programs, 2011).

In the mid-1980s, three fourths of all workers in the U.S. were in the service industry. Following the decline in population after the "baby boom" of the 1960s, in the 1980s the percentage of family households also began to decline. Instead, there was an increase in nonfamily households where unrelated people lived together (Bureau of International Information Programs, 2011). In addition, cohabitation became an acceptable alternative to marriage, with a larger proportion of stepfamilies during the 1970s and 1980s formed through cohabitation and not marriage than was previously the case (Bumpass, Raley, & Sweet, 1995).

In addition to the decline of marriage and the family, traditional sources of identity such as class, community, and religion began to lose influence (Beck & Beck-Gernshiem, 2002). Increased emphasis on individual freedom and less emphasis on obedience to societal standards resulted in both behavioral changes, such as premarital sex and the use of contraceptives (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001), as well as attitude changes towards family values and gender roles (Thornton, 1989). Ultimately, the changes occurring from the 1960s to 1985 led to increased tolerance for behaviors that were previously prohibited, "weakening the social prescriptions concerning the necessity of marriage and staying married, having children, and limiting sexual expression and childbearing to marriage" (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001, p.1011).

While the debate as to whether the decline of the family and marriage was a negative (Davis, 1997) or positive (Coontz, 2000) factor for individuals and the larger society, the shift

away from traditional values spurred a conservative backlash. This movement pushed back against the free will and individual-centered thinking that prevailed, focusing on marriage, the prohibition of sexual activity outside of marriage, cohabitation, and childbirth out of wedlock (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). The decline of traditional ideas surrounding marriage and the family are especially important when addressing the response of the BSA to allegations of sexual abuse during this time period. It stands to reason that individuals within the organization who were married with families conformed to the traditional ideal the BSA were founded on and as such allegations against these individuals were less likely to be viewed as credible. As the BSA is an organization founded on these traditional ideals, this study addressed whether the marital or family status of abusers influenced the approach taken by BSA officials when responding to allegations.

3.4.3 Awareness of Child Sexual Abuse

Widespread awareness of child sexual abuse only dates back to the 1970s (Conte, 1994), although the first focus on awareness of abuse of children in the industrial world is believed to have begun in 1874 with the founding of the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (Costin, 1992). During the 1920s and 1930s, the discovery of new types of child abuse, such as neglect, resulted in sexual abuse being combined with these other types of physical and emotional abuse. Lack of attention to CSA is also linked to the rise of psychoanalytic theory, which disfavored the use of protective work, and ideological and service conflicts between family-focused agencies (Conte, 1994; Myers, 2008).

The earliest literature on child sexual abuse focused on incest or the mental health consequences for victims, with little to no information on actual prevalence rates. The 1960s witnessed an increased interest in child abuse in general, but not child sexual abuse specifically.

Awareness and increased scholarship on child sexual abuse is attributed to the child protection system and implementation of mandatory reporting laws in the 70s and increased research on the overall prevalence and harmful effects of CSA (Myers, 2008).

In 1979, Finkelhor's survey of college students revealed that one of out of four females and one out of five males experienced forced sexual contact before the age of eighteen (Finkelhor, 1979). Later work on prevalence of CSA confirmed the importance of studying this phenomenon, with 6-62% of females and 3-31% of males reporting sexual abuse in childhood (Peters, Wyatt, Finkelhor, 1986). From 1978 to 1984, five books were published that are viewed as the most influential in raising awareness and stimulating research on the occurrence and prevention of child sexual abuse (Conte, 1994). These books include:

- Conspiracy of Silence: The Trauma of Incest (Butler, 1978);
- Sexual Assault of Children and Adolescents (Burgess, Groth, Holmstrom & Sgroi, 1978);
- Sexually Victimized Children (Finkelhor, 1979);
- The Best Kept Secret: Sexual Abuse of Children (Rush, 1980); and
- Sexual Exploitation: Rape, Child Sexual Assault, and Sexual Harassment (Russell, 1984)

Despite increased awareness and concern for child sexual abuse, scholars argue that there appears to be a cycle of discovery of CSA, a push for increased awareness, repression of the abuse. This cycle is believed to be the result of both a historical and cultural use of denial, minimization, and rationalization of CSA (Olafson, Corwin, & Summit, 1993).

In the early 1900s, discoveries of CSA were repressed due to a "long history of cultural denial about criminal sexual behavior against children" (Olafson, Corwin, & Summit, 1993, p. 8). However, from the 1930s to the 1950s this repression shifted to a national panic about pedophilic crimes and the establishment of sexual psychopath laws. During this same time, child

sexual abuse was redefined to suggest that most sexual abuse occurred outside of the home. In fact, "in American social work and popular culture between 1910 and 1940, the dominant stereotype of the 'stranger' perpetrator, a rootless drifter or a 'sexually degenerated old man,' completed the reconstitution of the pedophile, thereby concealing the continued predominance of sexual assault within the family" (Olafson, Corwin, & Summit, 1993, p. 14). The criminalization of victims also occurred, with sexual modernism purporting that male violence is normal and that child victims not only enjoy the sexual activity but also seduce adults (Bender & Blau, 1937), and were thus "participating victims" (Olafson, Corwin, & Summit, 1993).

In the 1980s, the panic regarding pedophilic abuse shifted back towards repression of CSA. Gardner (1991) notes that during this time there was a backlash against focusing on CSA, with many opponents of this study claiming that CSA was most likely an "ancient tradition" and an "overreaction to child abuse" (Gardner, 1991, pp. 115-116). Feminists also argued that focus was turned away from CSA due to institutionalized patriarchy. These individuals argued that since the majority of perpetration of sexual violence against children, especially incest, was committed by men, patriarchal society was working to hide the criminal behavior of these individuals (Herman, 1981). While the cycle of awareness and repression of CSA cannot be easily explained, it does appear that "complex psychological, cultural, and political processes are involved in recognizing and responding to childhood sexual abuse" (Conte, 1994, p. 227).

Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework

This dissertation relied on the use of organizational theories in order to shed light on the actions of the BSA when responding to allegations of child sexual abuse. Institutional theory outlines how an organization develops in relation to its constituents and the larger environment, detailing the actions an organization must take (or the actions they are perceived to have taken) in order to be viewed as legitimate. Ultimately, this framework can provide a useful lens through which to understand how the external environment of the BSA influenced its reaction to allegations of abuse. Organizational theory also highlights rationalization tactics utilized by organizations when addressing deviance. Similar to Sykes and Matza's techniques of neutralization for individual level deviance, rationalization tactics guided this dissertation in understanding the rationalizations used by the BSA to justify the action, or lack of action, taken against alleged offenders.

4.1 Institutional Theory

First introduced by Meyer and Rowan in 1977, institutional theory addressed why and how organizations develop their policies and programs as well as the products and services they provide (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory is traditionally used to explain the variation in structure and function among organizations (Child & Kieser, 1981). Dimaggio and Powell (1987) in their expansion on institutional theory note that in fact organizations are more homogenous than would be expected. They argue that organizational structural change is driven by the desire to make organizations more homogenous, not by competition or to increase efficiency.

Meyer and Rowan (1977) note that in order for organizations to be viewed by society as legitimate, they must incorporate policies and procedures into their structure and functions.

Institutionalization of policies occurs when "social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rulelike status in social thought and action" (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 341). Institutionalized rules are often built into society (Berger & Luckmann, 1967) and supported by either public opinion or law (Starbuck, 1976). Conformity to institutionalized rules can conflict with efficiency and in some cases undermine the organization's structure and activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Each organization has a formal structure which serves as a blueprint for how it should function. This functioning is directly linked to the goals and policies of the organization. While there is often the belief that organizations follow their formal structures, this is not always the case. Within an organization, there can be a marked difference between its formal structure and the actual day-to-day activities that occur. Ultimately, rules may be broken and formal structures can be ignored as long as there is the appearance of conformity with the organization's stated formal structure (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

4.1.1 Organizational Myths

Often, in order to conform to institutionalized rules, organizations create products, techniques, and policies which function as myths that these organizations maintain. These myths reflect the institutional environment, not necessarily the activities of the organization, and allow it to exhibit ceremonial conformity to institutionalized rules while building gaps between structures and activities. Institutional myths usually have two main properties. The first property is that they identify social purposes that organizations should treat as technical, and thus specify appropriate methods of pursuing them. Secondly, myths become highly institutionalized and in most cases become beyond the discretion of the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

Ultimately, these myths are used by those within organizations to create symbolic meaning that can be easily digested by the outside world as well as providing the basis for an organization's culture (Pettigrew, 1979).

Eventually, these myths become institutionalized and lead to institutional isomorphism. Institutional isomorphism promotes the survival of an organization by allowing the organization to remain successful according to societal definitions. Institutional isomorphism occurs when organizations incorporate elements that are legitimated externally and organizations use external assessments to outline the value of their structure (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional isomorphism allows organizations to obtain institutional legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1987) by resulting in an organization's dependence on externally fixed institutions thereby reducing tensions and providing for greater organizational stability (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

4.1.2 Organizational Legitimacy

Institutional theory can also be used to address how organizations come to be viewed as legitimate. Organizational legitimacy is increasingly important in society, as legitimacy ensures continued support of an organization (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Organizational legitimacy is largely based on the conformity of organizations to social norms, values, and expectations (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Performance and efficiency of organizations in achieving socially acceptable goals is not as important as the views of an organization's constituents when conferring legitimacy (Perrow & Perrow, 1970). Legitimacy is based on the conformity of organizations to accepted formal structures, which can be based on public opinion and legal rulings (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). It can be difficult for organizations to conform to the social values and expectations of constituents because different constituents may have conflicting

values or expectations or values that evolve over time (Shocker & Sethi, 1974; Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).

There are two main ways that organizations can work towards obtaining legitimacy. The first is through substantive management, whereby real, material change is undertaken by an organization. Substantive management is largely based on role performance, in which constituents of an organization trade their support in exchange for expected performance. Substantive management also incorporates the concept of coercive isomorphism, where organizations seek legitimacy by conforming to the values, norms, and expectations of their constituents. Coercive isomorphism is influential in determining why an organization exists and how it should function (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). The second means of obtaining legitimacy, symbolic management, occurs when organizations do not actually change structures or functions, but instead appear to be consistent with social values and the expectations of constituents. Under symbolic management, organizations may publically announce that they are following acceptable goals, while in reality the organization is pursuing less acceptable goals behind closed doors (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990).

There are several methods that organizations can use to symbolically conform to the expectations and values of society and their constituents, including denial and concealment, ceremonial conformity, and offering accounts (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Denial and concealment occurs when an organization suppresses information or activities that conflict with the expectations of constituents and could thereby undermine legitimacy. Ceremonial conformity occurs when organizations pretend to commit to the expectations of constituents; however, no actual steps are taken. Under symbolic management and ceremonial conformity, organizations may "formulate and publicize ethics policies but do not establish procedures for monitoring

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compliance or imposing sanctions" (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990: 180). This concept appears to directly relate to the actions taken by the BSA in the late 1980s. Policies and procedures were instituted which were designed to prevent child sexual abuse in accordance with larger society's call for action, with little attention paid to whether these policies were effective and little oversight.

In addition to simply hiding unfavorable activities or procedures, organizations may also rely on the use of accounts or apologies to either deny or minimize their responsibility. Accounts are "explanations designed to remove one from a situation that may reflect unfavorably on one's image or claims to legitimacy" (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990: 181). The use of excuses and justifications by organizations to preserve legitimacy are similar to those outlined by Sykes and Matza (1957) when explaining deviant behavior. Ultimately, unfavorable outcomes resulting from the failure of an organization to substantively conform to societal and consistent expectations are attributed to external or uncontrollable causes. In this instance, the use of justifications that blame outside causes is a useful tool in reducing negative consequences (Bettman & Weitz, 1983). Ultimately, once legitimacy is obtained it is largely taken for granted until it is challenged.

4.2 Organizational Stigma and Culture

There are many reasons why organizations may be unwilling to openly address child sexual abuse occurring within their ranks. This may include fear of stigmatization of the organization resulting from allegations of CSA by its staff or volunteers. While stigma has been widely applied to individuals in both the sociological and criminological literature, more recently, the concept of stigma has been applied to organizations. Organizational stigma applies to both individuals within the organization and the organization itself, explaining how society

views the organization, but also how organizations view themselves (Devers, Dewett, Mishina, Belsito, 2009).

Organizational stigma is an important issue to consider, especially when addressing institutional responses to child sexual abuse, as organizational victims of stigmatization can lose both legitimacy and reputation in society. Organizations which are stigmatized as a result of criminal behavior by its members may face disruption to its cohesiveness, effectiveness and morale (Paetzold, Dipboye, & Elsbach, 2008).

The organizational culture may also impact an organization's response to allegations of abuse. While analyses of organizations have addressed the extent to which factors like gender, sexuality, and violence influence an organization's culture, little research has addressed how the apparent culture distinct to the Boy Scouts of America influenced their response to allegations of sexual abuse. Perhaps one of the greatest factors influencing an organization's response to allegations of sexual abuse by its members is financial liability and fear of resulting criminal prosecution.

4.3 Organizational Change

While Meyer and Rowan suggest that societal values and expectations and legislation can play a role in changing organizational structures, a large body of research exists outlining the resistance of organizations to change (Agocs, 1997). Research suggests that many times organization resist change because these changes represent threats to their values or beliefs or merely because of their desire not to change (Tichy, 1983). Resistance to change is often seen as being institutionalized and a central part of the organization's structures and processes of legitimization. Organizations can exercise their decision to change or not in numerous ways, including:

decisions to provide or withhold resources, to adopt a new policy or change an

established one, or to implement or refuse to implement a policy. Such decisions

presuppose the power to command organizational resources, including…the authority to

act or to choose not to act, and the power to legitimate or to silence the voices of those

who advocate change. (Agocs, 1997, pg. 918).

This research suggests that organizational change may not be changed solely by the

passage of legislation or views of constituents. In the case of mandatory reporting of child sexual

abuse, legislation requiring individuals who have interaction with children to report, and

resulting policies for organizations serving children, may not have resulted in actual change.

Instead, mandatory reporting may function as an indirect force of change, whereby organizations

such as the BSA only undertook real, meaningful change after lawsuits were filed based on their

failure to conform to this legislation. In this sense, organizational change may be more the result

the consequences of failing to conform to mandatory reporting laws, and less a result of the

passage of these laws to begin with.

4.4 Formal versus Informal Sanctions

While traditional criminological research focuses on the use of formal and informal

sanctions as deterrents to criminal behavior, this research does not usually address why informal

or formal sanctions may be preferred by organizations dealing with deviant behavior. Studies

have addressed the difference between formal (i.e. management) and informal (i.e. co-worker)

sanctions on employee deviance and the deterrent effect of these types of sanctions (Hollinger &

Clark, 1982), however, they have not addressed why an agency may choose to rely on informal,

formal, or both types of sanctions.

In this case, formal sanctions are considered the referral of offenders to law enforcement, while informal sanctions are considered all actions taken by the Boy Scouts of America in which the offender is removed from service, referred to mental health treatment, or no action is taken by the BSA. Figure 1, a decision tree outlining the formal and informal options used by the BSA when responding to allegations of child sexual abuse, can be found below.

Figure 1: Formal and Informal Responses

Ultimately, it is important to understand why the BSA favor informal or formal sanctions, and if and how different CSA allegations impact their decision. It is very possible that the organizational culture of the Boy Scouts of America and the organization's desire to conform to societal expectations has a greater impact on which type of sanction is used than the characteristics of abuse.

4.5 Institutional Responses and Rationalization Tactics

Based on a preliminary analysis of the case files released, the response by the Boy Scouts of America to allegations of sexual abuse took numerous forms. These included ignoring allegations, removal of the offender from the organization, referral of the alleged perpetrator to mental health services, and/or reporting the allegation to law enforcement. In order to understand the actions taken by the BSA when responding to allegations of child sexual abuse, it is also important to address the underlying justifications and rationalizations used by the organization when taking action towards offenders. As noted by Meyer and Rowan, under symbolic management organizations often ceremonially conform to the formal structures and policies they claim to be following. As part of this ceremonial conformity, organizations may deny or conceal the discrepancy between their stated formal structure and the actions taken by the organization, or offer accounts to justify their failure to implement these formal structures. The use of techniques of neutralization (rationalization tactics) as applied to organizational behavior and corruption is used to provide substantive examples of how the BSA may have denied, concealed, or justified their behavior when responding to allegations of sexual abuse against members.

Techniques of neutralization, which are more commonly applied to criminal behavior at the individual level, can also be used to address deviant behavior in general and could shed light on how the organization reacted to allegations of abuse. Sutherland (1949), when studying white-collar crime, argued that corporate misdeeds were in fact more harmful than street crime because they were the result of actions of numerous individuals, not just one, and because they corroded society's trust in authorities and institutions. Corrupt acts can be defined as the "misuse of authority for personal, subunit and/or organizational gain" in which misuse refers to the violation of social norms and values (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, p.2).

Corruption and deviance occurs within all organizations. When addressing organizational

deviance, the major questions posed center on how much corruption is occurring and how it can

be identified. Corruption within organization often requires the cooperation of numerous

individuals, individuals who are otherwise considered upstanding members of the community. In

order for corruption to occur while still maintaining the overall moral integrity of the

organization rationalization and socialization practices are sometimes undertaken by

organizations (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005).

Corruption can often become institutionalized or normalized in organizations, especially

when collective corruption or acts that require the cooperation of two or more individuals occur.

Ashforth and Anand (2003) note that three processes contribute to normalization of deviant

actions in an organization: institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization. The

institutionalization process occurs through three processes, the initial decision to act, embedding

the corruption in the structures and processes of the organization, and routinizing the corruption

(Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Institutionalization also occurs through the process of embedding

corrupt practices into an organization's organizational memory. Organizational memory is the

process undertaken by an organization to acquire information about how to act and store this

knowledge for use in future situations (Anand, Manz, & Glick, 1998). If a corrupt act results in a

positive outcome, this act can ultimately be committed to organizational memory and repeated in

the future (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). Past acts are often routinely repeated because there is the

assumption that these actions were based on rational reasons and following the precedent set by

these actions legitimates current decisions (Henisz & Delios, 2001).

There is little research on the justifications used by organizations to rationalize their

behavior. However, the seminal work in this field by Ashforth & Anand (2003) notes that while

organizational members involved in deviance may acknowledge that their behavior and the

behavior of the organization may conflict with societal norms, rationalizations are often used to

deny any criminal intent. In the case of organizational deviance, "rationalizations often capitalize

on the inherent complexity, ambiguity, and dynamism that pervade organizations" (Anand,

Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005, p.11). Eight types of rationalizations have been identified as accounts

used by organizations to normalize deviant or corrupt acts (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). While

Sykes and Matza's (1957) techniques of neutralization occur prior to the criminal act,

rationalization tactics occur after the act (Green, 1997). In addition, Ashforth and Anand

modified the techniques of neutralization, changing them from explanations of individual

behavior to justifications for behavior at the organizational level. Rationalizations two through

six were originally identified by Sykes and Matza (1957) and have since been applied to

organizational behavior. These rationalizations include:

1) *Legality*;

2) *Denial of Responsibility*;

3) *Denial of Injury*;

4) *Denial of Victim*;

5) *Social Weighting*;

6) *Appeal to Higher Loyalties*;

7) *Metaphor of the Ledger*; and

8) *Refocusing Attention*.

The *legality* rationalization is fairly straightforward, as organizations claim that the

actions they are taking are not actually illegal. Thus, while they may violate social norms and

values, they are not actions that can be punished formally. *Denial of responsibility* relies on the

claim that organizations/organizational members had no other course of action due to forces beyond their control. Under denial of responsibility, organizations may also claim that the organization and its members are morally responsible, but forced into unethical acts (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005). Under the *denial of injury* rationalization, organizations claim that no individual was really harmed, thus eliminating any feelings of guilt or responsibility resulting from deviant acts (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

Denial of the victim has also been used to rationalize deviant acts by organizations. *Denial of the victim* relies on the belief that victims deserved their victimization, or they were a cooperating participant (Greenberg, 1998; Ashforth & Anand, 2003). For example, senior officials in the U.S. Catholic Church argued that victims of CSA by priest often invited the sexual advances of priests (Globe, 2003).

Social weighting (originating from Sykes and Matza's condemnation of the condemners) occurs when organizations question the legitimacy of those who call an act deviant or corrupt. Under this rationalization, organizations may argue that a law is vague, complex, or rarely enforced, and thus it cannot be used to condemn their actions. *Social weighting* also relies on selective comparisons, during which organizations compare themselves to others who have undertaken substantively worse actions in order to make their actions appear much less deviant by comparison (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).

Appeal to higher loyalties argues that universalistic ethical norms sometimes have to be sacrificed for higher or more important causes. This rationalization is often used to support the claim that the ends justify the means (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). The *metaphor of the ledger* was a rationalization identified by Klockars (1974) in which the good works committed by an organization are used to offset any deviant behavior that has occurred. Under this rationalization,

organizations are thought to have balanced their ledger, with the good acts committed by the organization outweighing any deviant acts that may have occurred. The final rationalization, *refocusing attention*, shifts focus from the stigmatized or deviant behavior or features of an organization to more appropriate ones (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999). During the Catholic Church scandal, attention was refocused through the removal of priests who had allegations of abuse against them to other parishes (Globe, 2003).

Organizations rely on these rationalization tactics to eliminate the guilt or responsibility for deviant/corrupt acts. In order for organizations to continue to use these rationalizations for their behavior though, socialization of current and new organization members into deviant practices must take place. Ultimately, socialization into corrupt practices occurs through *co-optation* (rewarding corrupt behavior), *incrementalism* (the gradual induction of new organization members into corruption, and *compromise* (individuals engage in corruption unknowingly) (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005).

Rationalization tactics and socialization procedures allow organizations to eliminate responsibility and guilt resulting from deviant actions. However these behaviors are not isolated from the culture of the organization and larger environment in which it functions. Some scholars argue that corruption is a result of a larger permissive ethical climate at the societal or organizational level (Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001). In fact, some factors of the organization's environment can enhance the likelihood that rationalization tactics are employed by its members.

In order for corruption to occur, organizations can often develop a "social cocoon". A social cocoon is a "mirco culture created within a group where the norms may be very different from those valued by society or even the wider organization" (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005,

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p.16). The social cocoon allows the organization to compartmentalize its behavior from the judgment of the outside society. Ultimately, the deviant culture within the organization can normalize, and in some cases value, the corruption that occurs (Kappeler, Sluder, & Alpert, 1994).

Sykes and Matza (1957) note that there are justifications for delinquent behavior, which the individual, or in this case organization, may view as valid, but which the legal system or larger society would view as inappropriate and criminal. In this case, rationalizations, including *denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, social weighting, appeal to higher loyalties, metaphor of the ledger,* and *refocusing attention* could explain the reaction of the BSA to institutional child sexual abuse. Ultimately, rationalization and socialization tactics mediate the tension between social norms and values and corrupt/deviant practices by organizations (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005).

The BSA may have used several of the rationalization tactics mentioned above as a way of avoiding stigmatization resulting from knowledge of child sexual abuse within its ranks and maintaining the legitimacy of the organization. For example, the rationalization of refocusing attention was used by simply removing individuals with allegations against them from service without addressing the circumstances that led to the abuse. In addition, the removal of the individual did not necessarily preclude them from serving in the BSA in a different BSA Council or troop due to the ineffective nature of the organization's ineligible members list. The use of the rationalization tactics by the BSA could have been applied to the organization as a whole, or the alleged abuser, as a means of justifying the action taken by the BSA. For example, under the rationalization *metaphor of the ledger*, alleged abusers who served in the organization for long periods of time and were assets to the organization could result in longer response times or less

severe actions by the BSA. The BSA response could be due to the belief that the good the alleged abuser did for the organization outweighed the reported instance of deviant behavior. The aim of this dissertation was in part to assess which rationalizations were most apparent in the responses of the BSA to allegations of child sexual abuse by members. This knowledge may be used to ensure the accountability of youth serving organizations, while also better informing youth protection policies.

Techniques of neutralization and rationalization tactics have been operationalized in numerous different ways. Sykes and Matza's (1957) techniques have been applied to deer poaching (Elliason & Dodder, 1999), genocide (Alvarez, 1997), trafficking of women (Antonopoulos & Winterdrk, 2005), abortion (Brennan, 1974), and shoplifting (Cromwell & Thurman, 2003) among other things. Similarly, rationalization tactics used to normalize or eliminate guilt have been operationalized to measure corporate corruption (Rabl & Kuhlmann, 2009) and organizational corruption (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005; Ashforth & Anand, 2003). In each of these studies, the techniques of neutralization or rationalization tactics were measured differently. A table listing how these techniques were operationalized in each study can be found in Appendix B. While studies of rationalization tactics have outlined how these tactics could be operationalized, the majority of these studies are theoretical in nature and do not provide empirical examination of the measures. The current study applies the operationalizations offered by Ashforth & Anand (2003) and Rabl & Kuhlmann (2009), although modified to apply to BSA's response to allegations of child sexual abuse, in order to provide support for these empirical indicators of rationalization tactics.

Chapter 5: Abuse Allegations in the Boy Scouts of America

This chapter examined the overarching patterns of abuse allegations against BSA members, with special attention paid to the disclosure and reporting of abuse to answer the first, second, and third research questions. These research questions asked 1) what are the characteristics of abusers and abuse incidents in the BSA; 2) How did the BSA learn of abuse and to whom did victims first disclose abuse; and 3) did the response of the BSA to allegations of sexual abuse differ across council region. This chapter also tested several hypotheses as listed below:

> H1a) The majority of abuse incidents reported to the BSA featured older abusers who hold a higher position of authority with children, such as assistant scoutmaster or scoutmaster.

> H1b) The majority of abuse incidents reported to the BSA were isolated abuse incidents featuring some form of unclothed or clothed physical contact, but not explicit sexual contact.

> H2a) The majority of abuse allegations were made in person, rather than through phone calls or letters sent to scouting officials.

> H2b) The majority of victims first disclosed abuse to their parents, not the BSA.

> H2c) In the majority of cases, the BSA was more likely to handle cases informally through internal removal from the organization rather than through the use of formal methods such as referral to law enforcement or referral to mental health treatment.

> H3) The response of BSA officials to allegations of CSA against organization members differed across council regions.

Due to the exploratory nature of this study, it is important to first gain a greater understanding of the characteristics of abusers and abuse incidents in the BSA as well as how the BSA first learned of allegations against BSA agents. In addition, this chapter addressed question

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three by examining the BSA's response to abuse allegations across regions to determine if

significant differences existed in the time it took the BSA to respond. This chapter features a

section on the methods used, a results section, and a detailed discussion of the relevant findings.

5.1 Method

5.1.1 Variables

Dependent Variables

This dissertation featured numerous quantitative techniques, and as such had several

dependent variables. The time from reported abuse to removal was calculated by counting the

number of days between when abuse was first reported to the BSA and when the BSA created

the confidential file on the individual thereby removing them from the organization. This

variable was also recoded into a binary variable indicating if it took less than one year or more

than one year to remove the individual from the organization. In order to address the response

taken by the BSA, a categorical variable was created measuring the BSA action taken, featuring

the categories referral to law enforcement, referral to mental health treatment, and removal from

the organization. This variable was also recoded as a binary variable measuring whether informal

or formal action was taken by the BSA. When recoding the variable, referral to law enforcement

and referral to mental health treatment were both recoded as formal action while removal from

the organization was recoded as informal action. It was the decision of the researcher to include

referral to mental health organizations as a formal action because the decision of the BSA to

refer the offender for treatment resulted in informing individuals outside of the organization as to

the allegations made against the BSA agent. Finally, the number of reports made against BSA

members each month was created.

Independent Variables

This study featured several independent variables. These variables were grouped into two main categories: characteristics of the offender and characteristics of the abuse.

Characteristics of the Offender

Several variables measuring characteristics of the offender were obtained from the case files. The age of the accused and the length of time serving as a BSA agent were measured both in years. For each offender, a binary variable indicating whether they engaged in other types of nonsexual criminal behavior was also created. In addition, a binary variable measuring whether an offender committed sexual abuse prior to joining the BSA was included. Variables measuring whether the offender was married (Y/N) and how many children the offender had at the time of the allegation were also included. A measure indicating whether the offender tried to reregister with the BSA (Y/N) after being placed on the confidential file was also included. Finally, the role of the abuser in the BSA (scoutmaster, assistant scoutmaster, boy scout professional etc.) was measured.

Characteristics of abuse

Characteristics of the abuse incident include the length of abuse measured in months and number of victims. The length of abuse was calculated using the first and last known date on which abuse occurred. This measure did not necessarily indicate that abuse was continuous during this time period, but rather indicated the duration of the abuser's offending history. In addition, when available the age of victim was included. A categorical variable featuring 20 categories, such as photos, sexual games, and masturbation, measuring the type of abusive behavior and a condensed five value variable were also included with the categories explicit sexual relations, physical contact, unclothed physical contact, other, and no record. In addition, this variable was recoded into a binary variable measuring whether explicit sexual relations

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occurred or some form of clothed physical or verbal contact. For each case, binary variables were created indicating whether the abuse that occurred was incest and whether the victim was a boy scout or child outside of the BSA organization. For all cases, information about the initial disclosure of abuse and how it was reported to the BSA was included. Initial disclosure, a 13 category variable, indicated to whom abuse was first disclosed (parent, child, other BSA member, etc.). In addition, a categorical variable measuring how abuse was reported to the BSA was created. For each case, two variables recording the location of the council the alleged abuser served were recorded. One measured the location by state, while the other measured the location using four regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West). Please refer to the BSA Codebook in Appendix C for detailed information about how all key variables were measured.

5.1.2 Analytic Technique

Univariate (frequency distributions) were used to characterize the sample, the overarching patterns of reports of offending in the BSA, as well as the response of the BSA administration when addressing child sexual abuse allegations. In addition, descriptive statistics were used to provide a larger picture of the patterns of abuse incidents reported to the BSA, including features such as the number of victims, type of sexual abuse, status of the alleged abuser within the organization, and length of abuse.

Chi-square statistics were used to determine if an association existed between the BSA's use of formal and informal responses and the categorical independent variables. In addition, chi-square statistics using the binary measure of how long it took to create a file were also conducted. The chi-square statistics compared observed frequencies across categorical variables to the expected frequencies if there was no association between the variables. Chi-square statistics are only appropriate when variables are categorical with mutually exclusive and

exhaustive categories. In instances where the chi-square test was significant, the appropriate effect test (Phi or Cramer's V) was used to determine the strength of the association between the variables.

In addition to chi-square, a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was used to determine if there was a significant difference between the four regions where abuse allegations were made and the time it took the BSA to respond. Analysis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality revealed that the distributions of the three regions were not normal. The Levene's test was not significant, indicating that the Kruskal-Wallis test was appropriate. A traditional one-way ANOVA test was not appropriate for the current analyses because the dependent variable (time to creation of the file), did not meet the normality assumption required. Instead, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used. This test is a non-parametric test, indicating that it does not assume a normal distribution of the dependent variable. While the Kruskal-Wallis test can be used to measure the association between a nominal and continuous variable, the test can only be performed on ranked data. When using a continuous level variable, the original values must be converted to ranked values. For example, the lowest value is ranked as 1, the second lowest value ranked as 2, and so on. Information is lost when converting original values to ranked values, which can sometimes make it a less powerful test than a one-way ANOVA. In addition, many argue that a one-way ANOVA test is not very sensitive to deviations in normality, and thus could be used in place of the Kruskal-Wallis (Khan & Rayner, 2003). As such, both a traditional one-way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test were run and results were compared.

5.2 Results

In order to simplify the presentation of results, descriptive statistics are presented in three tables. Table 1 presents descriptives for the dependent variables used throughout the dissertation,

while Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics for characteristics of the abuser and

characteristics of the abuse incident, respectively.

Table 1. *Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables (N=2379)*

	Mean/Percent	Stand Dev.	Min-Max	% Missing
Time-to-removal (days)	147.86	539.61	0-10439	8.9
Number of reports per month	5.99	5.96	0-32	0
Formal vs. Informal Response				.2
Formal	4.7%	-	-	
Informal	95.1%	-	-	

Table 1 above presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used

throughout the dissertation. When measuring the time it took the BSA to respond to allegations

of sexual abuse against organization members, the average time it took was 147.86 days, or

roughly five months, from the BSA's initial discovery of possible abuse to their creation of a file

for the individual on their list of Ineligible Volunteers. In some instances, it took the BSA less

than a day to create a file on the individual, while in the longest instance it took them almost 29

years. The data also measured the number of reports received each month, from November 1959

until November 1991. An average of approximately six reports were filed each month, with some

months experiencing no reports, and other featuring as many as 32 reports of allegations against

BSA agents. Finally, the data provided information about whether an informal or formal

response was taken by the BSA in regards to abuse allegations. An informal response indicated

that the BSA handled the report through internal channels, including internal investigations and

removal from the organization. Formal methods of addressing reported allegations included

referral of the individual to mental health services or referral to law enforcement from

prosecution. These categories were both considered formal responses because they required the

BSA to admit the possibility of abuse by one of their members to individuals outside of the

organization. Overall, 95 percent of the files only featured informal responses by the BSA, while

4.7 percent featured either referral of the individual to law enforcement or mental health treatment.

The next table, Table 2 below, presents descriptive statistics of characteristics of the offenders in the data coded from the BSA's confidential files. The average age of offenders was 35.5, although some offenders were as young as ten and one offender was 77 years old. When data was available, it was determined that on average alleged offenders had been in the organization for roughly five years. Some offenders had served in the organization for less than one year, while others had served as many as 42 years in the organization. While the majority of offenders, 53.4 percent, did not have a child, of those who did, the average was approximately one child. The majority of individuals, 56.3 percent, were not married at the time allegations were made against them.

As part of the data collection, the files were coded for evidence that the offender had tried to re-register with the organization after allegations had been brought to the BSA's attention. While the majority, 66.6 percent, did not attempt to re-register, 13.9 percent did attempt registration in the organization. Most often, this registration attempt occurred after they were placed on the confidential file list. In some cases though, offenders moved from one location to another, prior to the BSA's closing of their case file, and successfully registered in another troop. The majority of individuals served as either a Scoutmaster in the organization (34.4 percent) or a BSA professional (33.4 percent). BSA professionals included positions such as Camp Directors, Regional and Local Scouting Executives, and Committee Members. The distribution of reports across the four regions was similar, 22.5 percent of reports occurring in the Northeast, 22.7 percent of reports in the West, 26.1 percent of reports in the Midwest, and 26 percent of reports in the South. The percentage of reports unaccounted for occurred in areas outside of the US.

While all of the files featured some allegation of sexual abuse against a BSA member, 20.5 percent of the files also featured some form of nonsexual criminal behavior committed by the individual. This included allegations that the individual provided alcohol or illegal substances, or evidence of other types of criminal behavior (both current and past convictions), such as theft, weapons charges, kidnapping, and fraud. In addition, 18.6 percent of files featured evidence that the abuser had convictions for sexual abuse against children prior to joining the organization.

Table 2. *Descriptive Statistics of Characteristics of the Offender (N=2379)*

	Mean/Percent	Stand. Dev.	Min-Max	% Missing
Age (years)	35.5 (11)	11	10-77	2.4
Length of BSA Registration (years)	4.9 (6.2)	6.2	0-42	39.7
Children	.8	1.4	0-11	17.4
Binary Child				17.4
No	53.4%	-	-	
Yes	29.3%	-	-	
Reregister Attempt				19.5
No	66.6%	-	-	
Yes	13.9%	-	-	
Abuser's Role in BSA				9.1
Scoutmaster	34.4%	-	-	
Assistant Scoutmaster	18.5%	-	-	
BSA Professional	33.4%	-	-	
Other	4.6%	-	-	
Nonsexual Criminal Behavior				9.1
Yes	20.5%	-	-	
No	70.4%	-	-	
Abuse pre BSA				24.3
Yes	18.6%	-	-	
No	57.2%	-	-	
Married				8.7
Yes	35%	-	-	
No	56.3%	-	-	
Region				1.7
Midwest	26.1%	-	-	
Northeast	22.5%	-	-	
West	22.7%	-	-	
South	26%	-	-	

Table 3 below presents the final set of descriptives for the sample, focusing specifically on characteristics of the abuse incident. On average, the abuser's offending period lasted about two

years, although in extreme cases abuse was reported to have lasted for up to 32 years. Most allegations suggested the offender had victimized three children, although some allegations named as many as 100 children victimized by the individual. The average age of victims was twelve years old, although in some instances older victims were also present. Roughly 14 percent of allegations featured female victims. It is important to note that these female victims could have been youth outside of scouting, or girls within the BSA program. In 1969, girls were allowed to participate in the BSA's Explorer Scout program for older boys (15-21) as non-registered members. In 1971, their participation was expanded to fully registered members.

Approximately 40 percent of reports featured more than three abuse incidents while the rest reported one to three abuse incidents. When discussing the type of abuse, the majority of reports, 49.4 percent, indicated that some form of sexual abuse occurred, but did not specify the type of sexual abuse. Twenty percent featured explicit sexual contact, such as penetration of some type, masturbation, or coerced group sex. The next largest category of abuse was touching, 15 percent. This included both clothed and unclothed touching of the victim or forcing the victim to touch the abuser. Other types of abuse, such as taking photos of the victim, sexual games, or verbal abuse, comprised 13.8 percent of allegations. Less than one percent of reports featured the offender showing the victim some form of pornography. Drug or alcohol use by either the victim or the offender were not common in the reports, with only 4.4 percent featuring alcohol or drug use by the victim and 3.8 percent featuring alcohol or drug use by the offender. The majority of reports did not feature allegations of incest. Scout related offenses made up the majority of reports, 63 percent.

Reports were also coded for information about who the victim initially disclosed their abuse to. The majority of victims, 21.1 percent, first disclosed their abuse to their parent or

guardian. In 6.9 percent of cases, the victim disclosed their abuse to a member of the BSA organization, while in 9.3 percent of reports they disclosed to other individuals, such as teachers, friends, or clergy. In only three percent of cases did the victim first disclose their abuse to the police. In 15.2 percent of cases, the police informed the BSA of allegations of child sexual abuse made against a BSA member. While the police only reported allegations of abuse to the BSA in 15.2 percent of cases, in roughly 60 percent of cases the abuser was eventually criminally charged. When determining the method used to inform the BSA of abuse incidents, the majority of allegations, 17.9 percent, were made using a phone call. The second largest category, 13.8 percent, featured allegations reported in person. In 11.8 percent of cases the BSA were informed of abuse allegations through media reporting, while in roughly equal percentages of cases (8.8 percent and 8.4 percent, respectively) the BSA learned of allegations by a letter or legal filing.

Table 3. *Descriptive Statistics of Characteristics of the Abuse Incident (N=2379)*

	Mean/Percent	Stand. Dev.	Min-Max	% Missing
Length of Abuse (Years)	1.8	4.2	0-32	84.9
Number of Victims	3	5.5	0-100	34.5
Age of Victim	12.2	3.1	1-32	81.7
Female Victims				16.9
Yes	13.6%	-	-	
No	69.5%	-	-	
Number of Abusive Incidents				23.8
One to three times	37.2%	-	-	
More than three times	38.9%	-	-	
Type of Abuse				.7
Explicit Sexual Contact	20.1%	-	-	
Touching	15.1%	-	-	
Pornography	.9%	-	-	
Unspecified Sexual Abuse	49.4%	-	-	
Other	13.8%	-	-	
Incest				8.5
Yes	6.9%	-	-	
No	86.8%	-	-	
Scout Related Offense				8.9
Yes	63%	-	-	
No	28.1%	-	-	
Disclosure				59.2
Parent/Guardian	21.1%	-	-	
BSA Member	6.9%	-	-	
Police Officer	3%	-	-	
Doctor	.5%	-	-	
Other Individuals	9.3%	-	-	
Police Reported Abuse to BSA				8.5
Yes	15.2%	-	-	
No	76.3%	-	-	
Abuser Charged				2.8
Yes	60.2%	-	-	
No	37%	-	-	
Victim used Drugs/Alcohol				32.2
No	63.4%	-	-	
Yes	4.4%	-	-	
Abuser used Drugs/Alcohol				33.2
Yes	3.8%	-	-	
No	62.9%	-	-	
Allegations Reported				36.7
Phone Call	17.9%	-	-	
Sent a Letter	8.8%	-	-	
In person	13.8%	-	-	
Media	11.8%	-	-	
Legal Filing	8.4%	-	-	
Others	2.6%	-	-	

The above tables presented simple descriptives of the sample. To provide an indication of the association between the independent variables and the dependent variables, chi-square statistics were also run. Two sets of chi-square statistics were run, one featuring the dependent variable of whether informal or formal action was taken by the BSA, while the other featured the binary measure of the time it took the BSA to respond to allegations of child sexual abuse. This binary measure split the data into reports that took one year or less and those that took more than a year to elicit a finalized response by the BSA. The results for these chi-squares are presented in Tables 4 and 5 below. When significant chi-square statistics were obtained, the appropriate measure of association (Phi for 2x2 contingency tables and Cramer's V for greater than 2x2) were reported.

Table 4. *Chi-Square Results of Formal or Informal Response by the BSA (N=2379)*

	Formal	Informal	χ^2
Has Children	25.5%	36.2%	6.211**
Has Nonsexual Criminal Offense	37.9%	21.2%	23.801***
Abuse Pre BSA	27.8%	24.3%	.655
Married	27.6%	39.4%	9.702**
Female Victims	11.6%	16.9%	3.245†
One to Three Abuse Events	48.1%	49%	.037
Incest	4.3%	7.7%	2.860†
Scout Related	91.6%	67%	46.027***
Police Informed BSA	19.9%	16.3%	1.588
Charged	61.5%	62.1%	.023
Victim Used Drugs	9%	6.3%	1.297
Abuser Used Drugs	12.7%	5.2%	10.710**
Duty			9.727*
Scoutmaster	46.3%	37.1%	
Assistant Scoutmaster	15.3%	20.7%	
BSA Professional	31.1%	37.3%	
Region			.588
Northeast	24.2%	22.9%	
South	24.2%	26.6%	
Midwest	27.4%	26.5%	
West	23.2%	23%	

†p<.10,* *P<.05,* **P<.01,* *** P<.000*

Analysis of the chi-square statistics revealed that there was a significant relationship between whether the abuser had children and the BSA's use of a formal or informal response, χ^2 (1, N=1963) = 6.211, $p < .01$. While the chi-square suggested that there was a relationship, the phi statistic (.056) indicated that this relationship was weak. Similarly, the chi-square was significant for the relationship between the response taken by the BSA and whether they had allegations of non-sexual offenses χ^2 (1, N=2160) = 23.801, $p < .000$, however this relationship was also weak (Phi=.105). The abuser's marital status had a weak significant relationship with the use of a formal or informal response χ^2 (1, N=2169) = 9.702, $p < .01$, Phi=.067, as did whether the abuser used drugs or alcohol χ^2 (1, N=1588) = 10.710, $p < .01$, Phi=.082, and their duty in the organization χ^2 (1, N=2160) = 9.727, $p < .05$, Cramer's V=.067. The BSA's use of a formal or informal response had the strongest relationship with the variable measuring if the allegation of abuse was against a scout χ^2 (1, N=2165) = 46.027, $p < .000$, Phi=.146. Although not statistically significant, the relationship between the BSA's use of a formal or informal response and whether the victim was female or whether incest occurred approached significance.

Table 5 below presents the chi-square results when measuring the relationship between independent variables and time it took the BSA to create a confidential record on the individual. For these statistics, only two variables had a significant relationship to the length of time it took the BSA to respond, whether the offender tried to re-register in the BSA and whether they had been convicted for child sexual abuse prior to joining the organization. The relationship between the time it took the BSA to respond and whether they tried to re-register was significant χ^2 (1, N=1735) = 5.706, $p < .05$, although this relationship was weak (Phi=.057). The relationship between the time to response and whether the offender had a prior conviction was slightly stronger χ^2 (1, N=1649) = 12.315, $p < .000$, phi=.086. Although not significant, the chi-square

statistics for whether the offender had nonsexual offenses, whether the allegation was scout

related, and the region in which the report occurred approached significance.

Table 5. *Chi-Square Results of Time to Response by the BSA (N=2379)*

	One Year or Less	More than One Year	χ^2
Duty			.217
Scoutmaster	38.7%	37.7%	
Assistant Scoutmaster	19.9%	21.4%	
BSA Professional	37.1%	36.5%	
Has Children	35.3%	36.8%	.097
Re-Registered	17.1%	25.4%	5.706*
Non-Sexual Offenses	22%	28.6%	3.541†
Abuse Pre BSA	22.6%	36.6%	12.315***
Married	37.9%	40.4%	.341
Female Victims	15.6%	14.8%	.056
One to Three Abuse Counts	48.5%	52.2%	.687
Incest	6.6%	8.9%	1.270
Scout Related	70.4%	76.9%	2.956†
Police Reported to BSA	16.5%	18.6%	.501
Charged	61.2%	63.9%	.448
Victim Used Drugs	6.6%	7.7%	.197
Abuser Used Drugs	6%	6.9%	.150
Region			7.545†
Northeast	23.5%	20.2%	
Midwest	26.4%	30.4%	
South	26.7%	21.4%	
West	22.5%	25.6%	

†p<.10, * P<.05, ** P<.01, *** P<.000

The final analyses run is this chapter addressed whether the response of the BSA differed

across council regions. For this, a one way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis test with the time to file

as the dependent variable and region as the independent variable were run. Results of both tests

suggested that there was no significant difference in the time it took the BSA to create a

confidential file across council regions (ANOVA: $F (4, 2132) = 1.089$, $p=.360$; Kruskal-Wallis:

$\chi^2 (3, N=2116) = 1.171$, $p =.760$).

5.3 Discussion

This chapter examined the characteristics of the abuser and abuse incident of the sample of BSA offenders in order to determine notable characteristics of allegations of abuse against BSA members. In addition, this chapter addressed how the BSA learned of abuse allegations and the patterns of disclosure of abuse incidents made by victims. Finally, the chapter examined whether the BSA's response to allegations of child sexual abuse against organization members differed across council regions.

To answer the first research question, what the discernable characteristics of the abusers and abuse incidents were, descriptive statistics and bivariate statistics were used. Hypothesis 1a proposed that the majority of abuse incidents reported to the BSA featured older abusers with a higher position in the BSA, such as scoutmaster or assistant scoutmaster. Results revealed that the average BSA abuser was 35.5 years old, with 69.8 percent of abusers being under 40 years old. When looking at the position held by the abuser in the organization, the majority 34.4 percent were Scoutmasters, but the second highest category of abusers were BSA professionals (33.4 percent). These findings suggest partial support of the hypothesis. While abusers were not necessarily older, they did appear to hold positions of higher authority with children in the organization, such as a Scoutmaster. It was interesting to note that BSA professionals, who do not necessarily have constant or unsupervised contact with scouts, had the second highest percentage of allegations of abuse. This may suggest that the requirement for Youth Protection training and application of these policies and procedures may not be equally enforced within the organization. Training on youth protection policies is required for all volunteers in the program, but this may not extend to BSA professionals such as committee members or scouting executives. The failure of the BSA to extend its youth protection policies to all members of the

organization suggests the organization's desire to ceremonially conform to the expectations of society in regards to youth protection. Under this ceremonial conformity, the BSA created policies and procedures to protect youth that are either not fully enforced, or were not created with careful thought on the strategies needed to ensure scouts are not victimized.

Hypothesis 1b argued that the majority of abuse incidents were isolated incidents featuring some form of clothed or unclothed physical contact, but not explicit sexual contact. Descriptives revealed that 37.2 percent of allegations reported one to three separate abuse incidents. A further breakdown of this percentage shows that 17.8 percent of all files only featured one abuse incident. The majority of cases, 49.4 percent, indicated that some type of sexual abuse occurred, but did not provide accurate details of what type of abuse occurred. Of those cases where this information was present, 20 percent featured explicit sexual contact, while only 15 percent featured some type of clothed or unclothed physical contact. Hypothesis 1b was partially supported because the majority of abuse incidents was isolated incidents, but in regards to the type of abuse that occurred there is not support. While lack of information poses a significant issue, those cases with detailed information suggest that the confidential files featured more serious types of abuse. It is important to note, however, that those cases which only mentioned that some form of sexual abuse occurred could feature explicit sexual contact or clothed or unclothed physical contact.

The fact that so many cases did not feature specific information about the alleged type of abuse does suggest a failure on the part of the BSA to appropriately investigate what abuse was alleged to have occurred as part of their internal investigation of the events. While the BSA may have claimed that investigations were being undertaken, the failure to determine what specific abuse was alleged to have occurred suggests that these investigations were less rigorous than

those outside of the organization may have expected. Under institutional theory, organizations often create formal structures, policies, and procedures in line with the institutionalized rules and regulations held by similar organizations; however adherence to these formal policies and procedures can be symbolic (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In this instance, the BSA organization claimed to be conducting internal investigations in line with what would be expected of them, but in reality were doing the bare minimum to justify their response.

The second research question asked how the BSA learned of abuse allegations and who the victims of this abuse first disclosed to. Hypothesis 2a stated that the majority of abuse allegations were made in person to the BSA, rather than by phone calls or letters. This hypothesis was not supported in the data because the majority of reports of child sexual abuse were reported to the BSA via phone calls, not in person. While in person methods were not the most popular method of informing the BSA, they were the second most popular methods. This finding could be an indication of the individual reporting the abuse to the BSA. For example, parents or individuals outside of the organization may rely more on phone calls or other methods of alerting the BSA to possible sexual abuse allegations, while BSA members may be the most likely to report their suspicions in person. The reliance of BSA members on more in-person methods of reporting abuse allegations could function as a method of concealment of improper behavior by the organization and its members. Reporting using phone calls or letters posed the potential risk that an unintended party would learn of the abuse, while reporting in person ensured only the intended party was informed and eliminated any paper trail. Reporting the allegations in person would have allowed the reporting member and BSA officials to discuss the extent to which the allegation warranted formal action or investigation, all while underlining the importance to proceed cautiously so as not to bring undue attention to the allegations or alert the public to

possible issues of child safety within the BSA.

The second hypothesis for question two argued that the majority of victims would disclose their abuse to their parents, and not BSA members. This hypothesis was supported by the data as 21.2 percent of victims first disclosed their abuse to their parent or guardian. This finding is in line with prior research finding that victims of child sexual abuse usually first disclose to an immediate family member or extended family member (Bradley &Wood, 1996). This finding could indicate that youth may have viewed other BSA organization members as an extension of the offender and were concerned with whether their claim would be taken seriously or result in negative consequences for the offender. Research often suggests that fear of not being believed (Goodman-Brown, Edelstein, Goodman, Jones, & Gordon, 2003) and fear that they will be judged negatively are significant factors influencing the disclosure of child sexual abuse by victims (Berliner & Conte, 1995; Gomes-Schwartz et al., 1990). In the case of the BSA, scouts may have been even less likely to disclose to BSA members because of these fears and concern about whether other organization members would believe allegations about a fellow BSA member. In addition, the fear that their disclosure of abuse could result in their removal from the troop or ostracization by other scouts likely played a role in determining who they first disclosed to.

The final hypothesis for question two proposed that in the majority of cases, the BSA were more likely to handle cases informally through internal removal from the organization, rather than through the use of formal methods such as referral to law enforcement or mental health treatment. This hypothesis was fully supported by the data as 95 percent of the reports indicated that the BSA relied solely on informal methods to responds to allegations of abuse. Only in 4 percent of files did the BSA refer the individual to law enforcement and in less than

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one percent of cases was the individual referred for mental health treatment.

An important part of an organization's functioning is maintaining organizational legitimacy as this ensures the continued support of the public (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). Dowling & Pfeffer (1975), note that organizations achieve legitimacy by conforming to society's values and expectations of the organization. In the case of the BSA, the organization's founding and first stated goals led society to view the organization and its members to be providing order, discipline, and character building to young boys and men by teaching them the value of honor, duty, and integrity (Mechling, 2004). The BSA's apparent refusal to rely on formal methods of responding to allegations of sexual abuse by members, and thereby limiting the number of non-organization members aware of the allegations, appears to have been the method chosen by the organization to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of society. Had the larger public been aware of the number of allegations made against organization members, the legitimacy with which the organization was viewed would surely have been damaged. In addition, in order to avoid the stigma of being an organization allowing for or characterized by the sexual abuse of its youth members, the BSA chose to hide allegations of child sexual abuse by members rather than report these to law enforcement and risk their reputation or the support of American society.

Chi-square statistics testing the relationship between the organization's use of informal or formal responses and relevant independent variables did provide some interesting findings. Whether the offender was married, had children, had evidence of non-sexual offenses, used alcohol or drugs, their duty within the organization, and if the allegation was against a scout were all found to have a significant, although weak relationship, with the type of response used. As stated previously in the discussion, a major part of an organization's legitimacy is the ability for it to conform to societal standards and the formal structure that it has created. When the BSA

organization was originally developed, it was created on the premise that young men were losing their masculinity, and traditional values and ways of living needed to be upheld. Throughout the organization's lifetime, and especially from the 1960s to the 1980s, the traditional values that it was originally based on, such as the importance of marriage and family and more puritanical views on sexual behavior and the use of drugs and alcohol, were threatened by changing societal norms and values (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001; Turiel, 2002).

In response to these changing norms, the only recourse available to the BSA was to uphold the importance of these ideals and values within their organization. This could be used to explain why the BSA responded differently to allegations of abuse against individuals based on their marital status, whether they had children, their use of alcohol or drugs, and their position in the organization. Theoretically, a BSA member who was alleged to have victimized a youth yet who was married with children, was not accused of using drugs or alcohol, and held a higher position in the organization may have been viewed very differently than a similar unmarried individual who did use drugs or alcohol and held a lower position. Because the former example abuser conformed to the BSA's ideals regarding marriage, family, and appropriate behavior, and they had already earned the respect of the organization in the form of higher positions, the BSA may have been less likely to believe allegations of abuse against these individuals and more likely to give them the benefit of the doubt. In addition, by taking this stance, the BSA was reiterating the importance of the founding principles of the organization and in effect reaffirming the organization's support of these traditional ideals and values.

Finally, the last research question addressed in the current chapter, question three, asked whether there were differences in the response taken by the BSA across council regions. Because of the decentralized nature of the BSA organization, local troops have relative autonomy when

dealing with issues within their council. Hypothesis three stated that the response of BSA officials to allegations of CSA against organization members would differ across council regions. Surprisingly, this hypothesis was not supported by the results of the different analyses. Chi-square statistics testing the relationship between the region and binary measures of formal or informal responses and response times of less than one year and more than one year were not significant. In addition, one way ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests of the relationship between regions and the time to creation of a confidential file were also not significant. This suggests that the decentralized nature of the organization may not play as great a role in differing responses as was first thought, and instead concerns such as maintaining organizational legitimacy and avoiding the large-scale stigmatization of the organization may have been more relevant in determining local council actions.

While this chapter explored the characteristics of abuse allegations within the organization and how the BSA responded to these allegations, the next chapter dove deeper into the question of why the BSA responded the way that they did and what factors may have influenced their response and the speed with which their response was determined.

Chapter 6: Time and Pattern Differentials between Disclosure of Abuse and Removal from the Organization

This chapter examined the time and pattern differentials between when the Boy Scouts of America learned about abuse allegations against BSA members and when the individual was removed from the organization. The BSA kept a record of all members deemed inappropriate to serve as volunteers on their list of Ineligible Volunteers, and used this list to cross-reference all registration applications. Ultimately, this chapter addressed research question four which asks what disciplinary measures were taken by the organization and whether characteristics about the abuser or abuse incident influenced the time differentials between initial reporting of abuse and placement on this list of ineligible volunteers. This chapter tested the following hypothesis:

H4a) The length of time the alleged abuser served in the organization and their position within the organization results in a longer period of time between initial disclosure and removal from the organization.

H4b) Offenders with histories of sexual abuse against children prior to joining the Boy Scouts who then offended in the BSA were more likely to feature law enforcement involvement than offenders who abused solely while members of the BSA and were removed from the organization more quickly.

H4c) In cases where abuse incidents featured explicit sexual relations, the time between initial disclosure and removal from the organization was shorter.

H4d) Cases featuring several victims and/or law enforcement involvement will result in a shorter time period between initial disclosure and removal from the organization.

H4e) In cases where the alleged abuser was married or had children, the time between initial disclosure and removal from the organization will be longer.

The chapter featured a section on the methods used, a results section, and a detailed discussion of the relevant findings.

6.1 Method

6.1.1 Variables

Dependent Variables

This chapter featured several different analyses which use two main dependent variables, the time it took the BSA to create a confidential file for each individual and a binary measure of whether the action taken by the BSA was formal or informal.

Independent Variables

This chapter also used several of the independent variables. Analyses were broken down into two main types, those which featured characteristics of the abuse and those that featured characteristics of the offender. For analyses featuring characteristics of the abuse, the following independent variables were included. The age of the abusers was used, however this variable was logged to normalize the distribution. The region in which the allegation and BSA response occurred was also used. In the analysis, this variable was split into three dummy variables for the South, West, and Midwest, with the Northeast as a reference category. A binary measure of the type of abusive behavior that occurred was also used. This variable measured abusive behavior as either explicit sexual contact, including behaviors such as penetration, masturbation, and unclothed touching, and clothed verbal or physical contact, including such things as hugs and kissing, verbal abuse, and the sharing of pornographic material. The number of times abusive behavior occurred was also used. Because the continuous variable featured an extremely non-normal distribution that could not be normalized through any form of transformation, a binary variable measuring the number of abusive events as either one to three times and more than three

times was used. Analyses also featured binary measures of whether a non-sexual offense occurred, whether the alleged abuser had a history of other crimes, whether he had been charged with sexual abuse prior to entering the Boy Scouts, and if the offender was formally charged by the police. Binary measures of whether the abuser or victims used illegal substances (including alcohol), if feminine victims were present, and whether multiple victims were presented were also used. Binary measures of whether the alleged abuse had children and was married were also included. For analyses addressing the characteristics of abuse, additional variables measuring whether formal or informal action was taken, as well as whether the alleged abuse was scout related were included. Dummy variables measuring the alleged offender's duty in the organization (BSA professional and Assistant Scoutmaster, with Scoutmaster as the reference category) were also included. A binary variable measuring whether the police informed the BSA of possible abuse within the organization was also included.

6.1.2 Analytic Technique

Survival Analysis

In order to address research question two and determine the factors influencing the length of time between the organization's discovery of the abuse and its eventual response, survival analysis was employed. In the majority of files, information about the time series of abuse, namely the time from when abuse was reported to the BSA to their placement in the 'ineligible files' list and removal from service, was present. The time from reported abuse to removal was calculated in days in order to accurately determine the time it took the BSA to respond to allegations of abuse.

Survival analysis was used to analyze data where the outcome variable is the time to the occurrence of a specific event. The dependent variable in survival analysis was split into two

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parts, the time to event and a status variable indicating whether the event of interest occurred. In the present study, the dependent variable was the time to creation of a confidential file and a status variable measuring whether the file was created. Survival analysis can also be used to calculate that survival and hazard functions. Survival functions provide the probability of surviving, or not experiencing the event of interest, at the specified time. In contrast, the hazard function gives the potential that the event of interest will occur, given that an individual has survived up until that time. Survival analysis can also be used to describe the relationship of a factor of interest to the time to event (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 2008).

When conducting survival analysis, it is important to determine how many cases are either right or left-censored. Censoring can take the form of either right censoring or left censoring and occurs when information about the complete survival time is not known. Right censored data does not experience the event that is used to determine the survival time, while left censored data does not feature the initial event of interest used to calculate the survival time. For the current study, there is the possibility of both types of censoring; however left censoring is more likely. Within the current data set, 72 cases (3 percent) were left censored, while 150 cases (6.3 percent) were right censored. The small percentage of censoring did not pose a significant challenge when conducting survival analysis. Comparisons of survival times between the different duties held by the offender, whether the offense was scout related, whether the offender was married or had children, whether multiple victims were present, whether the offender and a prior history of child sexual abuse, whether explicit sexual contact occurred, whether abuse events occurred less than or more than three times, and the region in which the allegation was made were also conducted using the non-parametric Wilcoxon statistic. Due to the fact that all individuals in the study had a file created by the BSA, it was not feasible to compare those

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individuals who did not have a file created and those individuals who did have a file created using a Cox regression model.

Logistic Regression

Logistic regression was used to answer research question two. Logistic regressions were run to determine which features of the abuse incident and the offender will increase or decrease the odds that the BSA relied on informal or formal responses to allegations of abuse. Logistic regression is a useful technique to use when analyzing a dichotomous dependent variable with both binary and continuous independent variables. Traditional OLS regression was not appropriate in these cases because the response variable is not measured at the ratio level and the error terms are not normally distributed (Czepiel, 2002).

Logistic regression is used to predict the probability of an event occurring *y* given known values of *x* and can be modeled using the following equation:

$$P\left(y\right) = \frac{1}{1+e^{(b_0+b_1X_1+b_2X_2\ldots b_nX_n)}}$$

Logistic regression has four main assumptions, namely that the dependent variable is dichotomous, there are one or more independent variables, observations should be independent and the dependent variable is mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and there is a linear relationship between any continuous variables and the logit transformation of the dependent variable. Logistic regression relies on maximum likelihood estimation to solve for parameters that best fit the data based on finding a set of parameters for which the observed data is the greatest (Czepiel, 2002). Logistic regression also allows for the interpretation of both log odds and odds ratios (the exponentiated coefficient). Odds ratios can be used to compare the odds that the event of interest will occur given exposure to the variables of interest (Szumilas, 2010). For the current analyses, the odds ratios are reported.

Negative Binomial Regression

Finally, negative binomial regression was used to address the factors of the abuse incident and the offender which influence how the BSA responded and the time it took them to take disciplinary action. For this analysis, the dependent variable of interest was the length of time it took the BSA to create a file on the Ineligible File list after the initial allegation report was received. This variable represented a count variable, indicating the number of days it took the BSA to respond to allegations of abuse. Count data should be viewed as discrete, and not continuous, making traditional OLS regression inappropriate (Long, 1997). In this case, count models, such as Poisson, should be used.

While Poisson regression can be used to model count data, this type of model has strict requirements that most data usually do not meet. The most important of these, equidispersion of data, maintains that the conditional variance is equal to the conditional mean. When this assumption is not met, a negative binomial model should be considered. For the current analyses, the conditional mean and variance were not equal, suggesting that a negative binomial model should be used. Negative binomial models don't require equidispersion, and thus can be used when data are overdispersed (Long & Freese, 2006). When running negative binomial models, the likelihood ratio test, which tests for overdispersion of the data, can be used to determine if a negative binomial model provides a better fir for the data than a traditional Poisson model. If the test is significant, this indicates that the negative binomial model is more appropriate. For each of the models run, the likelihood ratio test was consulted to confirm the use of the negative binomial model.

Before examining the results of the above analyses, some attention must be paid to the issue of missing data within the current data set.

Addressing Missing Data: Multiple Imputation Through Chained Equations

In the current study, missing data posed a limitation to analysis of the data. In order to address this, imputation of missing data was conducted. All methods of addressing missing data rely on the assumption that data is missing completely at random (MCAR), or that the probability that data is missing on the dependent variable is not related to the independent variables or other values of the dependent variable.

While listwise and pairwise deletion are the most common methods used to address missing data (Peugh & Enders, 2004), there are substantial drawbacks to these methods. Listwise deletion works by removing a case from the analysis if it is missing data for any of the variables included in the analysis. This method would be especially detrimental to the current study because some of the variables are missing a substantial number of values. By deleting these cases, the sample size would be significantly reduced thereby limiting the statistical power of the current analyses. Pairwise deletion works differently than listwise deletion by only removing the missing values from the analysis, not the entire case. Pairwise deletion is not appropriate when the dependent variable is categorical or a count variable, and also lead to underestimated or overestimated standard errors. As such, it is not appropriate for the current analyses.

Additional "ad-hoc" measures that can be used to address missing data include dropping variables completely from the analysis that have a large proportion of missing data, or in the case of continuous variables recoding the missing values to a common value and including an indicator of missingness as a new variable (Horton & Kleinman, 2007). Dropping variables from the analyses that have a large percent missing could result in the exclusion of important factors, and the recoding of missing values for continuous variables and inclusion of an indicator of missingness can create bias and is generally not recommended (Jones, 1996).

Several methods exist to impute missing data, including the imputation of missing values using mean imputation, but these can induce bias and understate variability (Jansen, Beunckens, Molenberghs, Verbeke, & Mallinckrodt, 2006). Multiple imputation is one of the most popular methods for dealing with missing data in multivariate analysis and is based on a three step process. In the first step, plausible values for missing observations are created. These values are used to impute missing values and the process is repeated. This results in the creation of a number of completed datasets. The second step occurs when each completed dataset is analyzed using the imputed datasets. The final step combines these results to provide overall parameter estimates. Typically, five to ten imputations are used (Horton & Kleinman, 2007), although White, Royston, & Wood (2011) suggest that the number of imputations should be roughly equal to the percentage of cases with missing values. This guideline was followed in the current study.

Multiple imputation has several advantages, including the ability to create unbiased estimates of parameters due to the introduction of random error and the ability to get good estimates of standard errors because of the repeated imputation process (Allison, 2002). The current study uses conditional imputation, also known as multiple imputation through chained equations (MICE) to impute missing values. This method is a variable by variable approach whereby an imputation model is specified separately for each variable using the other variables as predictors. At each stage, an imputation is generated for the missing variable. This imputed value is then used in the imputation for the next variable. Imputed values are randomly drawn from these datasets based on the observed values of the variable. When conducting MICE, the method of imputation is specified based on the measurement of the variable. Multiple imputation models for continuous variables can be modeled using predictive mean matching or regression, while multiple imputation models for categorical variables can be modeled using logistic

regression (Horton & Kleinman, 2007). Most research on MICE suggests that variables with

small amounts of missing data do not require multiple imputation because compete case analysis

and the imputed dataset would yield the same results. In addition, imputation should not occur

when more than 50 percent of a variable is missing. In the current study, only variables with less

than 50 percent missing data were imputed to conform to this suggestion. In addition, there is

considerable debate about whether missing values on the dependent variable should be imputed

(Allison, 2002). For the logistic regression models, less than one percent of the dependent

variable was missing, while less than ten percent of the dependent variable was missing in the

negative binomial regression. In the current analysis, and in line with current practices, the

dependent variable was included in the imputation model to provide information needed to

impute values for independent variables, but the imputed dependent variable was not used in

analysis.

To determine appropriately specified logistic and negative binomial models that

converged, models for characteristics of the offender and characteristics of the abuse were first

run on the original data set without imputed values. These models were saved and compared to

the models run with imputed data. All logistic regressions and negative binomial regressions

presented in this chapter were run using the imputed dataset.

6.2 Results

Table 6 and 7 below present the results of the survival analysis. Survival analyses

examining the proportion of offenders surviving after twelve months were conducted. In

addition, due to the fact that for a large proportion of the sample the BSA took more than one

year to respond with the creation of a confidential file, survival analysis examining the

proportion of offenders surviving after twelve years was also conducted. Analysis of the twelve

month survival analysis revealed that one month after the initial reporting of allegations of abuse to the BSA, there was a 15 percent chance that the offender would have a file created by the BSA on their Ineligible Volunteer list. The hazard rate dramatically decreased after the first month, with offenders facing only a 3 percent chance of having a file created in the third and six months after initial reporting, and this chance dropping to 2 percent by month twelve. Twelve months after the initial allegation was received by the BSA, 65 percent of offenders had still not had a file created by the Boy Scouts.

Table 6. *Twelve Month Survival Analysis of Time to File (N=2379)*

	Cumulative Survival	Monthly Hazard Rate
1-month	.86	.15
3-month	.81	.03
6-month	.74	.03
12-month	.65	.02

While the previous table addressed the twelve month survival times, due to the fact that in many cases the BSA took more than one year to create a file on the individual, a twelve year survival analysis was run. The results of the analysis revealed that the median survival time for offenders was 24.6 months, or roughly two years. During the first year, abusers faced a 4 percent chance of having the BSA create a confidential file. This hazard rate dropped significantly after the first year and twelve years after the initial allegation there was no significant threat that a file would be created. Surprisingly, 17 percent of abusers still had not had a file created twelve years after the BSA first learned of allegations.

Table 7. *Twelve Year Survival Analysis of Time to File (N=2379)*

	Cumulative Survival	Yearly Hazard Rate
1-Year	.50	.04
3-Year	.42	.01
6-Year	.28	.01
12-Year	.17	.00
Median Survival Time = 24.60 months		

Finally, comparisons of survival times between the different duties held by the offender, whether the offense was scout related, whether the offender was married or had children, whether multiple victims were present, whether the offender and a prior history of child sexual abuse, whether explicit sexual contact occurred, whether abuse events occurred less than or more than three times, and the region in which the allegation was made were conducted. While none of these comparisons were significant, the comparison of scout related and non-scout related did approach significance (Wilcoxon (df=1) =3.434, *p*=.064) indicating that whether the allegation of abuse was against a scout or non-scout youth may have influenced their survival time.

Table 8 below presents the results of the logistic regression of the characteristics of the offender[1]. In this model, variables measuring aspects of the offender and their situation within the organization were included. The overall model was significant (F=3.75, *p*<.000). Within the model, the age of the offender was a significant predictor (*p*<.05) of the organizations use of a formal response. The offender's age appears to have had a negative relationship, such that older offenders had a 44 percent smaller likelihood of the BSA relying on a formal response. Whether the victim was a scout was also a significant predictor (p< .000) of the organizations response. For offenders whose allegation was against a scout, the risk of a formal response was 4.58 times greater than those who victimized a youth outside of the organization. Finally, the offender's duty within the organization approached significance (*p*<.10). Those offenders who were Assistant Scoutmasters had a 34 percent smaller likelihood of the BSA using a formal response compared to Scoutmasters who also had allegations against them. The findings of this model suggested that when determining whether to use a formal or informal response when addressing

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[1] Results from the non-imputed logistic regression model were not significantly different. The model featured a sample of only 855 and was significant. Similar to the imputed model, the offender's age and whether the offense was scout related were significant predictors. The only difference was that whether the offender was an Assistant Scoutmaster was not significant in the non-imputed model.

allegations of sexual abuse by organization members, the abuser's age, their duty within the organization, and whether victims was a scout all influenced the BSA's decision to either refer the offender to law enforcement or mental health treatment.

Table 8. *Logistic Regression of Formal or Informal Response using Characteristics of the Offender (N=2311)*

	Coef. (SE)	OR
Logged Age	**-.58 (.29)***	**.56**
Length of BSA Registration	-.14 (.18)	.87
Less than one year[r]		
More than one year		
BSA Duty		
Scoutmaster[r]		
BSA Professional	-.19 (.19)	.83
Assistant Scoutmaster	**-.41 (.24)** [†]	**.66**
Region		
Northeast[r]		
West	.11 (.23)	1.11
South	-.13 (.22)	.88
Midwest	.04 (.22)	1.04
Abuser has Child		
Yes	-.06 (.29)	.95
No[r]		
Allegation Scout Related		
Yes	**1.52 (.29)***	**4.58**
No[r]		
Abuser Charged		
Yes	.20 (.17)	1.22
No[r]		
Police Reported to BSA		
Yes	.25 (.20)	1.28
No[r]		
Female Victims Present		
Yes	.22 (.27)	1.25
No[r]		
Abuser Married		
Yes	-.18 (.26)	.83
No[r]		
F Statistic	**3.75***	

[†]$p<.10$, * $P<.05$, ** $P<.01$, *** $P<.000$
[r] indicates reference category

A logistic regression model featuring variables of the abuse incident was also analyzed to determine the influence of these variables on the organization's type of response. The results of this model are presented in Table 9 below[2]. The overall model was statistically significant (F=2.65, $p<.05$). Within the model, only two variables, the age of the offender and whether there was evidence of non-sexual offenses present, were significant predictors ($p<.01$ and $p<.000$, respectively). Similar to the previous model, the offender's age had a negative relationship, such that older offenders had a 54 percent smaller likelihood of the BSA relying on a formal response. In addition, allegations against individuals that did not feature evidence of non-sexual offenses had a 52 percent smaller likelihood of resulting in a formal response. The overall results of this model suggested that the only relevant abuse level factor influencing the BSA's response was whether the allegation featured solely claims of sexual abuse or also featured allegations that non-sexual offenses has occurred.

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[2] The logistic regression model featuring non-imputed data had a sample of 1218 and was not significant. In this model, age was again a significant predictor, although in the non-imputed model offenders who were formally charged was negatively related to whether a formal response was used. The presence of non-sexual offenses was not significant in the model.

Table 9. *Logistic Regression of Formal or Informal Response using Characteristics of the Abuse (N=2311)*

	Coef. (SE)	OR
Offender's Age (logged)	**-.77 (.25)****	**.46**
Region		
Northeast[r]		
South	-.15 (.22)	.86
West	-.01 (.22)	.99
Midwest	-.00 (.21)	.99
Abusive Behavior		
Explicit Sexual Contact[r]		
Clothed Verbal or Physical Contact	-.03 (.16)	.97
Abuse Incidents Count		
One to three[r]		
More than three	.04 (.18)	1.04
Nonsexual Offenses Present		
Yes[r]		
No	**-.73 (.21)*****	**.48**
Prior CSA Abuse		
Yes	.06 (.22)	1.06
No[r]		
Abuser Charged		
Yes	-.10 (.16)	.91
No[r]		
Abuser Used Drugs		
Yes	.53 (.38)	1.70
No[r]		
Victim Used Drugs		
Yes	-.34 (.40)	.71
No[r]		
Evidence of Multiple Victims		
Yes	-.03 (.90)	.97
No[r]		
F Statistic	**2.65****	

[†]p<.10, [*] P<.05, [**] P<.01, [***] P<.000
[r] indicates reference category

The final analyses run in this chapter were negative binomial models. As previously stated, the likelihood ratio test was run on each model to confirm the use of a negative binomial model over a traditional Poisson model. Results for these tests confirmed that the negative binomial model was appropriate because the test was significant for both models. Table 10

below presents the results of the model measuring the relationship between offender level characteristics and the time it took the BSA to create a confidential file[3]. The overall model was significant (F=4.00, $p<.000$). Similar to the logistic model including characteristics of the offender, both the offender's age ($p<.000$) and whether the victim was a scout ($p<.000$) were significant predictors of the time it took the BSA to respond. As the age of the offender increased, the number of days until a file was created also increased by a factor of 2.33. In addition, when the offender victimized a scout the BSA's response also increased by a factor of 1.64. When allegations were made in councils located in the western region ($p<.05$), the length of time between the initial report and creation of the confidential file increased by a factor of 1.37. The relationship between whether the BSA were informed of possible abuse allegations and the length of time until their response approached significance ($p<.10$), indicating that when police reported these allegations the reaction time was shorter.

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[3] The non-imputed model had a sample of 801 and was significant. In the model, more variables were significant predictors, including the western and southern regions, whether the offender was an assistant scoutmaster, if the abuser had a child, if they were formally charged, and whether the offender was married. These findings could suggest that the cases which featured complete information were substantially different from those that were not. However, due to the imputation of values based on those cases with complete data, the imputed model was considered more appropriate.

Table 10. *Negative Binomial Regression of Time to File using Characteristics of the Offender (N=2112)*

	Coef. (SE)	IRR
Age (logged)	**.84 (.19)***	**2.33**
Length of BSA Registration		
Less than one year[r]		
More than one year	-.09 (.14)	.92
BSA Duty		
Scoutmaster[r]		
BSA Professional	-.10 (.11)	.90
Assistant Scoutmaster	.00 (.14)	1.00
Region		
Northeast[r]		
West	**.32 (.12)**	**1.37**
South	-.03 (.12)	.97
Midwest	.07 (.12)	1.08
Abuser has Child		
Yes	.21 (.22)	1.23
No[r]		
Allegation Scout Related		
Yes	**.50 (.14)***	**1.64**
No[r]		
Abuser Charged		
Yes	-.04 (.10)	.96
No[r]		
Police Reported to BSA		
Yes	**-.19 (.12)** [†]	**.83**
No[r]		
Female Victims Present		
Yes	.06 (.22)	1.06
No[r]		
Abuser Married		
Yes	-.20 (.23)	.82
No[r]		
Type of Response		
Formal	.27 (.16)	1.31
Informal[r]		
F Statistic	**4.00***	

[†]p<.10, [*] $P<.05$, [**] $P<.01$, [***] $P<.000$
[r] indicates reference category

The final negative binomial model addressed the factors of the abuse that significantly

influenced the BSA's response time to allegations of sexual abuse by organization members. The

results for this analysis are presented in Table 11 below.[4] The overall model was significant (F=2.65, $p<.05$), in addition to several variables within the model. As in the previous model, age had a significant positive effect ($p<.000$) on the length of time it took the BSA to create ineligible files. Similarly again, when including factors related to the abuse incident, in the Western region the length of time between the initial report and creation of the confidential file increased by a factor of 1.39, indicating that in this region it took the BSA significantly longer to create confidential files. When the allegation of abuse featured more than three incidents ($p<.05$), it took the BSA less time to create the file, as well as when the abuser was formally charged, although this relationship only approached significance ($p<.10$). The relationship between whether the allegation featured female victims and the time to response also approached significance ($p<.10$) indicating that when female victims were present their response time was shorter. Finally, whether the abuser had prior allegations or convictions for sexual abuse was a significant factor in the time it took the BSA to respond ($p<.05$). Interestingly, those individuals who had prior sexual abuse histories experienced a longer time, by a factor of 1.34, between the initial allegation and their placement on the confidential file.

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[4] The non-imputed model had a sample of 1078 and was significant. Similar to the imputed model, age and prior abuse history were significant predictors, although the type of abusive behavior, whether non-sexual offenses were present, and evidence of multiple victims were also significant predictors of the time to creation of a confidential file. As stated previously, due to the imputation of values based on those cases with complete data, the imputed model was considered more appropriate.

Table 11. *Negative Binomial Regression of Time to File using Characteristics of the Abuse (N=2116)*

	Coef. (SE)	IRR
Age (logged)	**.94 (.16)***	**2.57**
Region		
Northeast[r]		
South	.03 (.12)	1.03
West	**.33 (.13)***	**1.39**
Midwest	.10 (.12)	1.10
Abusive Behavior		
Explicit Sexual Contact[r]		
Clothed Verbal or Physical Contact	-.12 (.10)	.88
Abuse Incidents Count		
One to three[r]		
More than three	**-.27 (.12)***	**.76**
Nonsexual Offenses Present		
Yes[r]		
No	-.33 (.21)	.72
Other Offenses Present		
Yes	.02 (.24)	1.02
No[r]		
Prior CSA Abuse		
Yes	**.29 (.14)***	**1.34**
No[r]		
Abuser Charged		
Yes	**-.18 (.10) †**	**.83**
No[r]		
Abuser Used Drugs		
Yes	.12 (.28)	1.13
No[r]		
Victim Used Drugs		
Yes	-.01 (.31)	.99
No[r]		
Evidence of Multiple Victims		
Yes	.21 (.12)	1.24
No[r]		
Female Victims Present		
Yes	**-.25 (.14) †**	**.78**
No[r]		
F Statistic	**2.65****	

†$p<.10$, *$P<.05$, **$P<.01$, ***$P<.000$
[r] indicates reference category

6.3 Discussion

The current chapter analyzed the method used by the BSA (formal vs. informal) when responding to allegations as well as the time it took the BSA to respond to allegations of sexual abuse against organization members. Using survival analysis, logistic regression, and negative binomial regression, analyses addressed the factors of the abuser and the abuse incident which may have influenced the direction taken by the Boy Scouts and how quickly they investigated allegations and made decisions regarding the offender.

Results of the survival analysis revealed that one year after allegations were made, 50 percent of the sample had yet to have their file created, thereby eliminating them from the organization and ensuring that they could not register in any other region or council. In addition, the median survival time for the sample was 24.6 months, suggesting that most individuals had a two year period during which the BSA was investigating allegations prior to their placement on the confidential file. Similar to findings in the previous chapter, the fact that the BSA took such long amounts of time to conduct investigations and ultimately ensure that the individual could not be registered in the organization suggests that they symbolically conformed to the expectations of society that child sexual abuse allegations should be appropriately and quickly dealt with. In addition, that the BSA took so long could have been a method of denial and concealment of the issue, conforming to Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) proposition that organizations suppress information that could undermine their legitimacy. By taking such a long time to respond to the allegations, the BSA could have in effect been trying to move attention away from the possible allegations, rather than conduct an in-depth and comprehensive investigation that would have surely led to greater awareness of the allegation. In instances

where individuals may have discovered that allegations were pending against an individual in the organization, the BSA always had the option of saying that an investigation was currently underway and that they were looking into the matter. While it is difficult to determine this solely from quantitative analysis of the data, Chapter 8 provides qualitative analysis of the BSA's response as a means of addressing these suggestions.

The next set of analyses addressed whether the BSA used formal methods of addressing child sexual abuse, such as referral to law enforcement or mental health treatment, or informal methods, such as simply removing the individual or conducting an internal investigations of the abuse. Analysis of the factors related to the offender revealed that older offenders and those who were Assistant Scoutmasters were less likely to be dealt with formally, while those individuals who had allegations against scouts were at greater risk for formal action. Based on these analyses, hypothesis 4b, which argued that offenders with prior child sexual abuse histories would be more likely to feature law enforcement involvement than those who solely offended while in the BSA, was not supported. The model revealed that the alleged abuser's prior criminal history for child sexual abuse was not a significant factor in determining if formal action was taken. When addressing the factors of the abuse that influenced the BSA's response, only the presence of non-sexual offenses was significant, with those offenders who had no allegations of non-sexual offenses having a smaller likelihood of a formal response by the organization.

The fact that older offenders were less likely to be referred for formal responses could be an indication of the BSA's view of these individuals as less problematic than younger individuals who faced similar allegations, or merely a result of the fewer numbers of older offenders represented in all of the BSA files. In addition, older members may had conformed more to the ideals of the BSA, as individuals are more likely to marry and have children as they age and as

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such the organization may have been more likely to rely on informal responses rather than

involve law enforcement or medical professionals. The organization's more lenient response to

allegations against Assistant Scoutmasters could also be a result of the organization's own lack

of training regarding appropriate and inappropriate behavior by adult leaders. Based on the

hierarchical structure of the organization, Assistant Scoutmasters are more likely to be

individuals who have served less time in the organization, and thus their behavior could have

been explained as lapses of judgement based on their lack of experience in the organization.

While difficult to determine based solely on quantitative data, this concept appears to have some

merit as explained in Chapter 8. The result that individuals with no allegations of non-sexual

offenses had a smaller likelihood of a formal response conforms to logical thinking that since the

only allegation was of some form of sexual abuse, formal involvement of law enforcement may

not have been deemed necessary. In addition, in these cases the BSA may have questioned the

legitimacy of these claims and without further accusations of other non-sexual offenses decided

that withholding this information from the police or medical professionals was appropriate based

on the available evidence. By refusing to use formal methods in cases that did not feature

additional non-sexual allegations of offending, the BSA avoided the stigma that the organization

allowed criminals as members that could have resulted had these allegations been made public.

As such, the relatively small number of cases that featured allegations or evidence of non-sexual

offenses that would warrant formal intervention also limited the police and public's awareness of

the true extent of child sexual abuse allegations within the Boy Scouts.

Surprisingly, the finding that individuals who had allegations against scouts were more

likely to experience formal action is contrary to what was expected. In accordance with

institutional theory and its description of how organizations symbolically conform to maintain

organizational legitimacy, it would have made more logical sense for the BSA to rely exclusively on informal methods when addressing allegations against organization members by scouts. When allegations were made against individuals by youth outside of the organization, this represented the perfect opportunity for the BSA to refer individuals to the police, making it known that they were doing all that was required of them in terms of reporting of child sexual abuse. In addition though, the fact that the alleged victims were outside of the organization provided further support for the organization's claims that all necessary measures were taken to ensure that scouts were kept safe, with the victimization of a child outside of the organization supporting this claim. That the BSA was more likely to rely on formal responses when scouts were the alleged victims could be directly related to the role that the parents of the scout played in the investigation and response to allegations. It is feasible to think that parents with children in the organization would be more adamant about the abuser being brought to justice and may have spurred the organization to take more formal methods.

This finding could be incredibly important in the development of institutional theory, illustrating the influence of non-organization members on organizational practices. Technically, parents in the BSA were not members or volunteers of the organization unless they registered to be one. Their only connection to the BSA was through their child, and thus their primary concern was protecting their children, not the organization. Because of this, parents may have been less likely to conform to organizational practices to not report abuse allegations to law enforcement, in exchange for saving the organization from outside criticism. Institutional theory has generally examined the steps taken by organization members to maintain organizational legitimacy. However, these studies have focused solely on the actions of organizational members, without addressing how individuals who are connected to organizational members or the organization

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may also influence this process. In the case of the BSA, the organization may have wanted to keep allegations of abuse made by scouts confidential in order to reduce the stigma attached to the organization, but they also had to conform to the expectations of the parents of abuse victims. Because parents were directly connected to the BSA, in instances where parents were vocal about the abuse, the BSA had fewer options. They could either report allegations to law enforcement or face even greater public criticism if these parents brought their claims to more public venues, such as the media. This finding suggested that organizational practices may be influenced not only by the expectations of society, but also by the ability of individuals outside of the organization to call into question the organization's legitimacy.

The final set of analysis addressed the time it took the BSA to create confidential files on alleged abusers after initial reporting using negative binomial regression. Hypothesis 4a stated that the length of time the alleged abuser served in the organization and their position in the organization resulted in a longer period of time between initial disclosure and removal from the organization. Based on the results of the analyses, this hypothesis was not supported because neither the amount of time the alleged abuser served in the organization nor their position were significant variables predicting the length of time it took to respond. The failure to support this hypothesis was surprising given research on institutional theory which states that organizations often offer accounts, or explanations designed to minimize their responsibility (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). If the BSA had taken substantially more time to process the cases of individuals who had been in the organization for a long time or had moved through the organization and held higher positions, justifications for their behavior could very well have been based on the claim that these individuals were long-standing and contributing members of the organization and thus careful attention needed to be paid when determining how to address these allegations.

Hypothesis 4c proposed that cases that featured explicit sexual relations would have a shorter time frame from initial report to removal while hypothesis 4d argued that cases featuring several victims or law enforcement involvement would result in a shorter time until action was taken. While hypothesis 4c was not supported by the results, hypothesis 4d was partially supported. In the analysis, the type of sexual abuse allegation was not a significant factor in determining the length of time it took the BSA to respond. In the model including the characteristics of the abuse incident, offenders who had allegations of more than three abuse incidents, those who had female victims, those who were formally charged, and those cases where the police informed the BSA about possible allegations all resulted in a shorter time from initial reporting to placement on the confidential file. The fact that the BSA acted faster when there were either formal charges pending or the police had informed them of allegations supported part of hypothesis 4d. The faster response time by the BSA in cases where the police had either informed them of allegations or the abuser was formally charged conform to claims of institutional theory that organizations have to act in such a way so as to maintain the expectations of greater society thereby keeping the organization's legitimacy intact. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) noted that one way organizations can obtain and maintain legitimacy was through substantive management, whereby organizations conform to the expectations of their constituents. In the case of instances where the police had some type of involvement, the speed with which the BSA investigated the allegations and removed the offender signified that they took the allegations of child sexual abuse seriously and were not willing to tolerate this type of behavior by members.

Cases which featured allegations of more than three abuse incidents and female victims also may have resulted in shorter time periods because the greater number of incidents and

possibility of victims outside of the organization (female victims) could have drawn more attention to the organization. If outsiders were aware that organization members were accused of repeatedly abusing children or abusing children outside of the organization and the BSA did not respond quickly this could have harmed the legitimacy of the BSA and possibly stigmatized them as an organization that allowed members who victimized children.

Finally, hypothesis 4e claimed that cases were the alleged abuser was married or had children would have a longer time from initial disclosure of the abuse to removal of the organization. Again, this hypothesis was not supported as neither the marital status of the abuser nor whether they had offspring were significant predictors. Despite this, there were some additional results not hypothesized that are of note. Older offenders, those who had allegations against a scout, those allegations in councils in the Western region, and those individuals who had prior child sexual abuse histories all resulted in longer response times by the BSA. Taking a longer amount of time to address claims of abuse against scouts could have been strategic in the sense that only individuals within the organization, and in some cases the parents of the victim, were aware of the abuse. In these cases, there would have been no outside entity checking to see that investigations were actually taking place and action was being taken. Thus, while the BSA claimed to have formal policies and procedures in place to address allegations of abuse, these policies and procedures did not have to be strictly followed. The decentralized nature of the organization could also be used to explain why allegations in troops in the Western region took longer to address abuse allegations. While the organization notes that policy and procedure decisions are made on the National Council level and are disseminated to Regional and Local levels within the organization, the BSA has no formal method of ensuring implementation of these policies and procedures occurs.

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Perhaps surprisingly, when the individual also had prior allegations or convictions for child sexual abuse, the BSA took a longer time to remove the individual from the organization. While this appears to conflict with what should be done on a logical basis, when functioning as an organization trying to maintain legitimacy and standing within the larger social environment, this course of action is less surprising and conforms to the symbolic management perspective of institutional theory. Immediate removal of the offender would have required the organization to take responsibility for the fact that they allowed an individual into the organization who was clearly not suitable, calling into question the methods they used to screen volunteers and registered members and how strictly they adhered to these methods. In addition, this could have resulted in publication of the offender's removal by individuals aware of the allegations who were either in support of or against the alleged abuser. As a means to avoid taking responsibility for allowing in individuals who had a history of preying on children and the stigma that could result, the BSA likely took longer to conduct investigations and place the individual on the confidential file. This allowed the organization to symbolically conform to societal expectations of volunteer screening, maintaining the shroud of suspicion over whether allegations of abuse were substantiated and if the BSA had violated their duty to protect scouts.

The current chapter addressed the characteristics of the abuse and the offender that may have influenced how the BSA responded and how long it took them to respond. The existence of allegations of child sexual abuse against organization members dating from 1959 to 1991 suggests that this is not a new phenomenon within the organization. In order to try to protect youth within their organization, measures were taken by the organization to implement training on what behavior was appropriate in interactions between adult members and scouts and develop policies to reduce the opportunity for abuse. The next chapter examines whether one of these

policies, the two person leadership policy, impacted the number of allegations made against

members of the BSA.

Chapter 7: Two Leader Policy Intervention

Throughout its functioning, the BSA instituted several policies designed to protect youth. One of these policies, a two-deep leadership policy, was instituted in 1987 and required that two adults had to be present at all scouting events, including camping trips. This policy was created based on the idea that if there were never instances where scouts were alone with adult leaders, incidents of sexual abuse could not occur. The current chapter used intervention analysis to address the influence of the two person leadership policy on the prevalence of reports of CSA in the Boy Scouts as outlined in research question three. This chapter addressed research question five which asks: Are there differences in the prevalence of child sexual abuse reports pre and post two-person leadership policy implementation? The chapter tested hypothesis 5 which purports that the prevalence of reports of CSA after the implementation of the two person leadership policy in 1987 will be less than the prevalence of reports prior to the implementation of this policy. The chapter featured a section on the methods used, a results section, and a detailed discussion of the relevant findings.

7.1 Method

7.1.1 Variables

Dependent Variable

For this analysis, the number of reports per month prior to the passage of the BSA's two deep leadership policy in January of 1987 were compared to the number of reports per month in the months after the policy. In the current dataset, there are 324 months prior to the passage of the policy and 60 months after the passage of the policy.

Independent Variable

For this analysis, the only independent variable included was the average age of the offenders for each month. Because of the exploratory nature of the study and issues with missing data on relevant variables (such as length of abuse and length of registration) the analysis was restricted to only this independent variable.

7.1.2 Analytic Technique

Time Series

Time series analysis analyzes a sequence of observations on a single entity which is measured at regular time intervals. When analyzing time series, the order of observations is incredibly important as this temporal ordering allows researchers to address questions as to how variables behave in the past and how they might behave in the future (Ostrom, Jr., 1990). The ordering of observations is also important as this provides information about the trend of the data, and whether the variable of interest is increasing or decreasing over time. Thus, time series is especially useful as "first, it must inform us about the particular mechanism which describes the evolution through time and second, it allows us to put that mechanism to use in forecasting the future" (Nelson, 1973, 19). Within time series, observations are also not necessarilly independent, as the same variable is measured over and over again.

Time series is especially useful as it allows a causal model to be specified in which one variable influences another at some time in the future. Due to the nature of time series data, one can learn more about the direction of causality. This is not so for cross-sectional data, in which causality must be assumed or inferred based on the assumptions of the statistical procedures. Missing data poses a particular problem with time series analysis, as mean substitution or deletion of these datum can skew the data, throwing off the overall trend of the data and subsequent findings.

While time series deals with a sequence of observations ordered by time and thus requires a different set of statistical methods, the multiple regression model still forms the foundation of this analytic method. The major difference in these regression models is that time is the unit of analysis instead of different variables. Each time at which a case is observed represents an additional unit. Time series is also unique as it can feature periodicity, in which variables change with the seasons, months, weeks, or even from day to day.

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression can be used to analyze time series and produce unbiased estimates, but only if certain assumptions are met. These assumptions include the stationarity of the variables (i.e. the variance and covariance of the variable does not change over time) and that the data should be "weakly independent." This implies strict exogeneity, in which the values of the variable do not depend upon past or future values of the error term (Verbeek, 2008). Regression techniques can be misleading however, as it is common in time series analysis for regression models to have high explained variances. This can be problematic, as this can result from a common trend between the two variables, and represent a spurious correlation instead of an actual relationship.

While effects can occur instantaneously in time series, there can also be lagged exogenous variables, where the impact of the variable persists for a specific amount of time or is not exhibited until a period of time has elapsed. Thus, lagged dependent variables may be required as the dependent variable may not exhibit an immediate response to a change in the predictors (Ostrom, Jr., 1990). In addition to lagging exogenous variables, endogenous variables can be lagged in order to remove the serial correlation of errors. This allows the regression equation to be estimated without violating the assumption of independence of residuals. Lagged endogenous variables can also be present as they are part of the causal model. While there are

numerous approaches to time series analyses that can be conducted, the present study focuses on a specific type, Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models.

ARIMA

Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) is a specific approach to time series analysis. ARIMA analysis rests on the assumption that there is an internal dynamic within the time series data that needs to be taken into account. ARIMA modeling estimates the linear relationship for a single variable or set of variables with autoregressive lags and serial correlation of errors. ARIMA modeling thus consists of identifying what type of model to estimate, estimating the model, diagnosing how well the model fits, and then modifying the model if this is required. Similar to regular regression models, in stationary ARIMA models, the r square indicates how much of the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable. Interpretation of this value must be undertaken carefully however, as it can be affected by the overall trend of the data.

ARIMA analysis requires that the data are stationary, or that the mean, variances and covariances do not change over time. ARIMA modeling assumes that there are no missing values. In the case that missing values are present, recursive smoothing can be used. ARIMA models take the form arima (p, d, q), in which p is the number of autoregressive terms, d is the number of non-seasonal differences, and q is the number of moving averages within the prediction equation (Ostrom, Jr., 1990). Thus, models involving serial correlation of errors are called moving average models and models with lagged dependent variables are referred to as autoregressive models. These models represent ARMA (p, q) models and take the form of Equation 1 below.

Equation 1

$$Y_t = \alpha + \varphi_1 Y_{t-1} + \varphi_2 Y_{t-2} + \cdots + e_t - \theta_1 e_{t-1} - \theta_2 e_{t-2}$$

In the above equation, α represents the constant term, while the phi coefficients signify

the strength of the autoregressive terms of the different lags, the theta coefficients represent the

strength of the moving average terms and e_t represents a random shock. The random shocks are

assumed to be independent and identically and normally distributed (Ostrom, Jr., 1990). In

addition to the ARMA (*p, q*) model, ARIMA models feature seasonality, as many time series

have cyclical components to their trends. With seasonal data, there can be non-stationarity due to

the trends, which may require seasonal differences. Seasonal ARIMA models usually take the

form ARIMA (*p, d, q*)(*P, D, Q*) where *p, d*, and *q* represent the same terms, while *P* represents

the number of seasonal autoregressive terms, *D* is the number of seasonal differences, and *Q* is

the number of seasonal moving average terms. In order to address the effect of the BSA's two-

deep leadership policy on the number of reports of allegations of sexual abuse, a specific

approach to ARIMA modeling, intervention analysis, was utilized. This technique was described

in more detail below.

Intervention Analysis

Intervention analysis is a type of multivariate ARIMA model. Intervention analysis can

be used to test the effect of exogenous influences, such as the passage of legislation, upon a time

series. Box and Tiao (1975) note that ordinary *t* tests for estimating the change in mean are only

valid if the observations before and after the intervention vary about the means μ_1 and μ_2 and if

the observations are independent. As time series data often have successive observations which

are serially dependent and non-stationary, traditional parametric and non-parametric statistical

procedures relying on independence or symmetry in the distribution are not appropriate (Box &

Tiao, 1975). In addition to the intervention, additional explanatory variables can be added to the analysis of the impact of the intervention on the outcome variable.

Intervention analysis is considered a type of multivariate ARIMA modeling as one or more explanatory variables can be introduced to determine their impact on the outcome variable. In intervention analysis, it is assumed that there is no reciprocal causation between the predictors and dependent variable. In intervention analysis, the event in question can occur for only a short duration, representing a change for one time period. The event can also last for more than one time period and then disappear. Finally, an event can take the form of a permanent change in the level of a variable. Outliers can be especially problematic in intervention analysis, as an outlier can affect subsequent observations similar to an intervention. Due to this, the residuals plotted against time should be observed prior to estimating the model. These outliers can either be removed from the analysis, or in the case of a single outlier, it can be treated as an intervention.

When conducting an intervention analysis, it is common procedure to first plot the original data set against time to observe the trend of the data and what type of effect the intervention had on the outcome variable. The pre-intervention series for the dependent variable can then be fit to an ARIMA model. After this estimation, diagnostics can be run to determine if there is an appropriate model. Following this, and provided there are enough post-intervention observations, the same thing can be done for the post intervention series. The full data set can then be returned to for fitting the combined intervention and noise to the model. In instances where there are more post intervention observations than pre-intervention observations, an ARIMA model can be run for the post-intervention years and then applied to the full time series. *Diagnostics*

In order to determine which type of ARIMA model to run a set of diagnostics can be run prior to estimation to determine the optimal model specifications. It is important to test for the serial correlation of errors in time series, as this can suggest that there is an omitted variable which is stable over time, but results in positive correlation of the errors. Trends can also produce strong serial correlation of the errors. In order to test for serial correlation, the Durbin-Watson test can be run. This statistic tests for first order serial correlation, in which the inertia of a variable, or the tendency of a variable to continue at the level it was previously, carries over part of the residual from one time period to the next (Ostrom, Jr., 1990). The test assumes that the constant term in the regression equation is being estimated. The Durbin-Watson statistic is calculated after first running an OLS regression. The statistic should be close to two if there is no significant serial correlation of the residuals. A statistic close to zero indicates that there is strong positive correlation, while a value close to four signifies that there is strong negative serial correlation of the residuals.

In addition to the Durbin-Watson test, the Breusch-Godfrey test extends the Durbin-Watson test by developing a Langrange multiplier test to determine if there are more general patterns of serial correlation. The Breusch-Godfrey test can also be used to determine if there are autoregressive lags (Breusch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978). If the test is significant, then one can conclude that the errors are serially correlated. Residuals can also be predicted and then regressed on their lagged values in order to determine how many lags should be included in the test. When the additional lags are no longer significant, this indicates the optimal number of lags to include in the test. The presence of serial correlation can indicate that the model is incorrectly specified, and thus the incorporation of time lags on the exogenous variable can correct serial correlation (Ostrom, Jr., 1990).

Correlograms can be used to interpret the autocorrelation of a time series. From a correlogram, one can determine if the data is stationary or non-stationary, or whether there are seasonal fluctuations. For a stationary series, the correlogram would feature large values which tend to get smaller, while a non-stationary series would be characterized by values for the correlogram which would not decrease to zero. If a time series is seasonal, the correlogram will feature oscillation at the same frequency, indicating the pattern of seasonality.

In order to test for stationarity, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests can be performed. This test tests the null hypothesis that there is a unit root process present in the data. If the test statistic is not significant, this indicates that there is a unit root process (i.e. the data is not stationary). Similar to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, the Phillips-Perron unit-root test can be used to test for stationarity. The Phillips-Perron test differs from the ADF test as the Phillips-Perron test ignores serial correlation in the regression, while the ADF test uses a parametric autoregression to approximate the ARIMA structure of the errors (Phillips & Perron, 1988). The null hypothesis for the Phillips-Perron test, similar to the ADF test, holds that there is a unit root process. The alternative hypothesis is that the process is stationary.

In order to assess the adequacy of the model, the residuals can be predicted and the Box-Ljung portmanteau Q statistic can be obtained. This test is a global test of structure among the error terms, making no assumptions about the structure of the errors. The Q statistic is a test of the null hypothesis that the autocorrelation (ACF) does not differ from zero, up to lag k. If a model is satisfactory, the residuals should be consistent with white noise. This can be tested by examining the pattern of correlograms or running Bartlett's periodgram-based test for white noise.

7.2 Results

Prior to beginning analysis of the relationship between the number of reports of allegations of child sexual abuse and the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy, it is important to observe the relationship between the number of reports and time. Figure 2, found below, depicts this relationship. From the graph, it appears as though there is a curvilinear relationship between time and the number of reports. While visual observation may suggest that the series is not stationary and a trend may be present, unit root tests can be used to get a more definitive answer when assessing stationarity.

Figure 2: Number of Reports over Time

Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests revealed that the data was in fact trend-stationary. The Phillips-Perron test produced the same results indicating that no differencing is required when specifying the arima model. Following examination of the stationarity of the data, the serial correlation of errors was also addressed. Observation of a scatter plot of the residuals suggests

that there is positive serial correlation of the error terms. This was confirmed by the Durbin-Watson test. This suggests that an AR(1) or AR(2) model may be useful. The correlogram and ACF and PACF plots can be used to determine the p and q values in the ARIMA model. Observation of these suggests that the model may require one or two autoregressive terms and one moving average term. Based on the above analysis, two arima models were decided upon, one model featured one autoregressive term and one moving average term, and the other model featured two autoregressive terms and one moving average term. Results from the two models are presented in Table 12 below.

Table 12. *ARIMA Models for Number of Reports after Two-Deep Leadership Policy (N=384)*

	Model 1 AR (1,0,1)	Model 2 AR(2,0,1)
	Coef	**Coef**
Mean_age	**.07****	**.07****
Two-Deep	1.82	**3.42****
ar L1	**.99****	**1.15****
ar L2	-	**-.16****
ma L1	**-.82****	**-.88****
Log-Likelihood	-995.21	**-991.87**
Likelihood Ratio	**31526.56****	**45388.68****

*p≤.05 **p≤.01 ***p≤.001

Both models were significant, although only in the second model featuring two autoregressive terms was the two-deep leadership policy significant. Because both autoregressive terms and the moving average term were significant in the second model, this would suggest that model 2 is more appropriate based on the diagnostics of the data. The average age of offenders in the dataset was significant ($p<.05$) and had a positive effect on the number of reports each month. As the average age of alleged abuser's increased over time the number of reports also increased. Most surprisingly, the two-deep leadership policy appeared to have a strongly significant ($p<.000$) positive impact on the number of the reports made to the BSA, indicating

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that after the two-deep policy went into effect, the number of allegations of child sexual abuse reported to the BSA increased.

It is important to note that diagnostics were run on the models and indicated that in fact these models were not the best fit for the data. Several variations on the models using differenced versions of the number of reports were run and none provided models of better fit. Based on this there may be other omitted variables that are relevant to the impact of the implementation of the two-deep policy that were not available based on the information in the files.

7.3 Discussion

This chapter addressed the impact of the BSA's implementation of their two-deep leadership policy on the number of reports received by the organization. Hypothesis 5 proposed that the prevalence of reports of CSA against organization members would be less after the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy. Results of the analysis do not support this hypothesis as the model suggests that the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy actually resulted in an increase in the number of reports of child sexual abuse allegations reported to the BSA.

It is important to note that the dependent variable was a measure indicating when abuse allegations were reported to the BSA, not necessarily when abuse occurred. The BSA's two-deep leadership policy was designed as a method of reducing the occurrence of child sexual abuse by organization members, not specifically to increase reporting. However, based on the available data, the time of when abuse was reported to the BSA represents the best available proxy for when abuse actually occurred. For the most part, the dates of abuse reported in the files were close in time to when allegations were reported to the organization, representing current cases at the time abuse allegations were reported.

Between 1959 and 1987, the organization received roughly 1300 reports of allegations of abuse against organization members. As such, the BSA's policy requiring two leaders was related to the organization's realization in 1987 that reports of allegations of child sexual abuse were an issue that needed to be addressed as well as increased attention to research on strategies for preventing child sexual abuse (Macmillan et al., 1994).

The fact that the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy did not result in a reduction in the number of reports of allegations of child sexual abuse by organization members could be explained in several ways. First, the organization's implementation of this policy and surrounding explanation and training on why two adult leaders should always be present with youth could have raised awareness of child sexual abuse among organization members, thereby increasing the reporting of suspected abuse by members. As part of the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy, the BSA also had to develop standards of when it was acceptable for adults and scouts to be alone. The expansion of the policy to include the elimination of all one-on-one contact between adult leaders and scouts and the requirement that scouts and adult leaders have separate accommodations on camping trips likely led to greater awareness of when these regulations were being violated and whether this could constitute some form of abuse.

The increase in reporting after the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy could also relate to situational crime prevention (SCP) concepts. Situational crime prevention has been used to implement prevention techniques for specific crime problems, including child sexual abuse (Marshall, Serran, & Marshall, 2006; Wortley & Smallbone, 2006). Situational crime prevention argues that crime results from the interaction of motivation of an offender and the situation in which the offender finds themselves (Clarke, 1980). Crime is viewed as a choice with opportunities providing the temptation and provocation for crime (Wortley, 2001). In order

to reduce crime, situational crime prevention argues that there has to be a focus on a specific type of crime and the situational components associated with this crime type. By understanding the crime and how it is committed, points are determined at which intervention can increase the effort or risk of offending (Clarke, 1980).

Wortley and Smallbone (2006) argue that SCP techniques can be used to reduce CSA in institutional settings. They note that because sexual abuse against children usually occurs in private or in the offender's house, methods can be taken to limit opportunities for offending. Four opportunity reducing techniques are proposed, including increasing effort, increasing risk, controlling prompts, and reducing permissibility. Based on these concepts, the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy could serve as a situational crime prevention technique. This policy required that two adult leaders always be present with scouts, eliminating one-on-one interaction. By doing this, the organization increase the effort required to offend and the risk of being caught. Additionally, this policy aided in controlling prompts by reducing the formation of emotional bonds and attachment to children that could develop when one-on-one interaction occurs. Finally, the implementation of the policy made it clear that this type of behavior was not appropriate and would not be tolerated, reducing the permissibility of this behavior.

The increase in reporting of allegations could also be explained using concepts from institutional theory. While the BSA claimed that they instituted a policy designed to protect youth from being victimized by adult leaders, this policy may not have actually been strictly enforced, thereby resulting in a greater number of allegations of sexual abuse. Meyer and Rowan (1977) note that organizations often create formal structures which dictate to the outside environment how the organization is supposed to function. In reality, the day-to-day functioning of an organization can be very different as long as there is the appearance of conformity with the

organization's formal structure. In this case, the two-deep leadership policy could have functioned as an institutional myth, exhibiting conformity to the idea that the BSA was working to protect youth within the organization, when in reality the organization was not enforcing the policy as strictly as needed in order to effect actual change.

Finally, the increase in reporting of allegations against BSA members after the implementation of the two-deep leadership policy could be related more to trends in reporting of child abuse more generally and not necessarily related to the policies instituted by the Boy Scouts. The data featured a slight increase in the number of reports per month beginning in 1983 and a relatively steeper increase towards the end of the 1980s, corresponding to research on reporting of child sexual abuse finding that reports substantially increased in the 1980s and 1990s (Myers, 2008). Based on this, the increase in reports may have been related to more general awareness of the possibility of child sexual abuse and an increase in reporting in general, rather than the result of increased occurrence of child sexual abuse within the organization.

This chapter addressed the influence of the BSA's two-deep leadership policy on the number of reports of child sexual abuse allegations against members, finding that the number of reports actually increased after the policy was implemented. While this chapter and the previous chapters all addressed the extent of child sexual abuse allegations in the Boy Scouts of America and how the organization responded to these allegations, the analyses were based solely on quantitative data pulled from the files. While quantitative data analysis does provide useful information about the phenomenon under study, the pairing of these results with qualitative analysis can provide a deeper and richer understanding of how the BSA responded and why this response was taken, according to the organization. The next chapter, Chapter 8, takes this exact approach, relying on qualitative content analysis and case study analysis to delve further into

understanding how the BSA responded to allegations of child sexual abuse and what methods the

organization used to justify their behavior.

Chapter 8: Institutional Rationalization Tactics and the Boy Scouts of America

While the previous chapters relied on quantitative data to examine characteristics of abuse allegations against BSA members, how the Boy Scouts learned of abuse allegations, and the methods they employed to respond to allegations, these analyses did not focus on how the BSA justified their responses to abuse allegations. In order to understand how the BSA rationalized the actions taken by local councils and the National council when dealing with abuse allegations, qualitative analysis was required. The current chapter used qualitative content analysis and case study analysis to examine the files of the BSA to answer question six, namely whether rationalization tactics were used by the organization to frame their understanding and if so, which rationalizations were most frequently used. This chapter tested hypothesis six which argues that rationalization tactics, especially appeals to higher loyalties and metaphor of the ledger, were employed by the Boy Scouts to justify their response to allegations of abuse. The chapter featured a section on the methods used and a results section featuring a detailed discussion of the relevant findings.

8.1 Method

8.1.1 Analytic Technique

Content Analysis

Qualitative content analysis was used to provide more in-depth understanding of select instances of organizational responses to allegations of child sexual abuse, as well as to address the applicability of rationalization tactics to these institutional responses as outlined in research question five. Qualitative content analysis focuses on analyzing textual material, using categories that can be brought to the material from theoretical models or derived from the text. This

procedure "produces a uniform schema of categories, which facilitates the comparison of the different cases to which it is applied throughout" (Flick, 2009, 328).

The content analysis for this dissertation relied on both inductive category development and deductive category application. Mayring (2000) notes that inductive category development occurs when categories are determined out of the material obtained, while deductive category application entails the use of explicit definitions, examples and coding rules for each category in order to determine when a portion of text would be coded within that category. For the current analysis, the deductive categories were the eight rationalization tactics outlined above. Inductive category development will also be used to determine if additional responses to abuse allegations that do not fit into one of the proscribed categories are present in the files. Following Hagan's (2014) suggestion, criteria for inclusion into each category were developed in order to ensure replication is possible. These criteria were applied to a sample of the total dataset, after which the coding criteria were modified if necessary. This classification scheme was used when analyzing all files. It is important to note that the lack of information found in the files could indicate that a rationalization tactic was not used, or it could indicate that there is not information contained within the file about the tactic that may have been used.

The sample for the content analysis portion of the study included a total of 200 cases, 50 chosen from each of the four time periods (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s). In order to ensure that all cases chosen for content analysis featured information about the BSA's response to allegations of CSA by scout members, all 2379 files underwent an initial assessment to determine if there was adequate information present about the BSA's response. From this purposive sample, 50 cases from each time period were randomly selected for content analysis.

Those case files chosen for qualitative content analysis were coded for any rationalization

tactics used by BSA officials in correspondence regarding the abuser and what action should be taken. In order to operationalize the different rationalization tactics, the files were coded for words or phrases that fall under the categories outlined in Table 13 below. These operationalized rationalizations are based on the measures used in Ashforth & Anand (2003) and Rabl & Kuhlmann (2009) (found in Appendix B) with modifications made in order to apply the concepts to organizational responses to deviance, or more specifically the BSA's response to allegations of abuse. Those files chosen were coded to determine the presence of a rationalization tactic, measured as yes, no, or unknown. If yes, the specific rationalization tactic used was recorded.

Table 133. *Operationalization of Organizational Rationalization Tactics*

Rationalization Tactic	Operationalization
Legality	- The organization is not mandated to report allegations of abuse - There is a question as to whether the allegation is substantiated, thus no action other than removal is necessary or warranted
Denial of Responsibility	- Removal from the organization and failure to report to law enforcement was the best available option - Although allegations appear to be legitimate, there is not enough to warrant formal action - The parents of the youth do not want formal action to be taken
Denial of Injury	- The youth appears to be ok, thus taking further action could cause greater harm
Denial of Victim	- The relationship, although against policy and law, was consenting - The youth solicited abuse - Alleged abuser did not seek out scout for abuse, "just happened"
Social Weighting	- The BSA is compared to another organization that has had worse incidents of abuse
Appeal to Higher Loyalties	- It is important to deal with this quickly to save the organization from criticism
Metaphor of the Ledger	- The alleged abuser has done a lot for the organization or been an asset - The BSA have never had issues with the offender - The alleged abuser has done more good for the organization
Refocusing Attention	- Removal of the offender without addressing abuse - No discussion/overlooking what abuse was alleged to have occurred, only focus on what action should be taken

Case Study Analysis

In order to examine the response of the BSA to allegations of child sexual abuse in greater depth, case studies were conducted. The case study approach identifies exemplary

examples of the phenomenon under study allowing one to conduct an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon and related factors (Travis, 1983). Creswell argues that case studies are a comprehensive research strategy and method of study (Creswell, 2007). Ultimately, case study analysis allows the researcher to explore organizations or individuals by both reconstruction and deconstruction of a phenomenon (Yin, 2003).

Research suggests that there are two key approaches to case study analysis, those presented by Robert Stake and those by Robert Yin. Both methods of case study are based on a constructionist paradigm where truth is relevant and dependent upon one's perspective (Baxter & Jack, 2008). Yin suggests that three are several times when case study analysis is useful, including when the researcher is asking how or why questions or when the researcher wants to address contextual conditions because these may be relevant to the phenomenon. In the case of the BSA, the decision on how to address allegations of abuse was based on the local unit, context of the allegation, and individual actors, thus case study analysis could shed more light on the factors influencing their response. In addition, multiple case studies can be used to explore differences between and within cases. When conducting multiple case studies, the goal is to replicate findings across cases. Because of this, cases have to be chosen carefully so that similar or contrasting results across cases can be analyzed according to theory (Yin, 2003).

While there are different types of case study methodologies, this project will utilize a collective case study approach. This type of case study features one issue which is illustrated by several different cases (Creswell, 2007). This approach allows one to observe how events take place and what factors affect these events in real-life situations (Travis, 1983). In the case of the BSA, multiple cases were analyzed to determine differences between unit responses and the process to determine the appropriate response to allegations of abuse by BSA members.

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For the current study a sample of ten cases was chosen for analysis. Two case studies were chosen from the 1960s, three from the 1970s, three from the 1980s, and two from the 1990s. These cases featured enough information from police records, newspaper accounts, and letters from parents, victims, and BSA officials to provide a detailed account of the alleged abuse incident and the BSA's response to the allegations. Most importantly, the case studies used in this research were selected for their ability to outline the patterns and relationships between the BSA response to allegations of child sexual abuse and factors of the offender and incident.

8.2 Results & Discussion

Results from the qualitative content analysis were presented first. Out of the 200 cases coded for evidence of rationalization tactics used by the BSA, 67 cases featured two unique rationalization tactics while only 10 cases featured three different rationalization tactics. A breakdown of the rationalization tactics used in the files is presented in Table 14 below.

Table 14. *Organizational Rationalization Tactics Used in BSA Files (N=250)*

Rationalization Tactic	Percentage in Files
Legality	12.6%
Denial of Responsibility	46.9%
Denial of Injury	1.4%
Denial of Victim	10.8%
Social Weighting	0%
Appeal to Higher Loyalties	10.1%
Metaphor of the Ledger	14.1%
Refocusing Attention	4%

Note: Rationalization tactics are not mutually exclusive

Overall, content analysis of the files revealed that in the majority of cases (46.9 percent) denial of responsibility was the rationalization tactic used by the BSA. When denying their responsibility, the justifications included noting that removal from the organization and failure to report to the police was the best option, that there was not enough evidence to warrant formal action, or that the parents did not want to press formal charges. Many cases noted that parents were "unwilling to prosecute" or that parents would not prosecute as long as the organization

took some action against the offender. In some instances, the BSA denied their responsibility by blaming the victim or parents of the victim for not bringing allegations of abuse to them sooner. One file featured the National Council refusing to place the individual on the confidential file because there had been no scout or parents complaints, and the only concerns voiced were those by other leaders who were believed to have personal issues with the alleged abuser.

In some cases, the BSA National Council noted that they were unable to determine if abuse was substantiated and because of this they could not take action to remove the individual. In one file, when conferring with the local council, the National Council stated "We are unable to take any action until we receive from you a complete detailed report, together with any substantiating documents or newspaper clippings that may be available pertaining to this situation," while another file noted "there was never any specific information given that would be of such consequence to give us reasons for refusing registration." This was a frequent justification featured in those files using the denial of responsibility rationalization tactic. The lack of substantiating evidence was used to explain why the organization was not able to remove the offender from troop activities, with one such file noting "unfortunately, we have no conclusive evidence in our file and do not feel justified in refusing his registration."

The second rationalization most often used by the BSA when justifying their actions was metaphor of the ledger. This rationalization was used in 14.1 percent of the files. Using this rationalization, the BSA noted that the alleged abuser had done more good for the organization or had been an asset, and that they had never had difficulties with the individual. Files often featured statements made by local and national representatives describing the esteem with which the abuser was held, such as statements like "it has been clear that his behavior and conduct has been nothing but the utmost, and is a strong force in the success of the units," "No doubt about it,

he is a man of tremendous energy," "been known to all the committee for many years, was very much liked by them and respected by them as an excellent Scoutmaster," and "has been an exemplary staff member and good friend."

In many instances, character references were included in these files detailing how the abuser either could not have done the actions they were accused of, or advocating for lenient treatment based on their outstanding performance prior to this allegation. In one such file, the BSA National Council went so far as to admit that referral to law enforcement would not occur, stating that the abuser had done "fine and dedicated work with Scouting and [they] would prosecute only if it were the only way he could get needed treatment." While this was not a common feature of the files, it does suggest that in many cases the BSA were aware that reporting to law enforcement was the required action, but they refused to use this in order to protect the organization or BSA member.

In 12.6 percent of files, the BSA used the rationalization tactic legality to justify how long it took them to create the confidential file on the individual. These justifications were largely based on the claim that an investigation by police revealed no abuse had occurred or the legal action had exonerated the individual or was still pending. In multiple cases, the BSA specifically noted that lack of evidence discovered by formal police investigations, including statements like, "the investigating police officer was satisfied that there were no physical contacts between him and the boys," that a police officer "concluded he was unable to uncover any criminal activity and, therefore, terminated his investigation," and that there was no evidence of abuse because "boys [were] interviewed [they] claimed nothing sexually occurred." Ultimately, it appears as though the BSA used the lack of support of the criminal justice system by way of charges or a conviction as a reason to support their own response to the allegations.

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The rationalizations of appeal to higher loyalties and denial of the victim were used roughly the same amount (10.1 and 10.8 percent, respectively) by the BSA to justify their removing the individual from the organization and failure to report the allegations to the authorities when appropriate. When appealing to higher loyalties, the BSA mentioned it was important to deal with things quickly to save the organization from negative publicity, noted it was important to keep things quiet, and focused on being prepared for any potential legal issues that could arise from the allegations. The desire to keep allegations quiet was frequently noted by National Council and local council members, with one such member admitting that "some of the parents are aware of what is going on, but we are trying to hush it up for the benefit of the program," while another noted that "every effort is being made to keep this quiet."

In one file, the BSA noted that "since this person is removed from the program at present and to date no mention had been made of his association with Scouting, it is felt that we should simply allow the registration to continue until charter time and then not renew it." In this case, the BSA didn't even remove the individual as this may cause greater publicity of the allegation, but rather waited for the offender's registration to expire and then refuse any future registration. Sometimes the BSA made public statements to the press in an attempt to provide damage control after allegations were discovered. For example, one file quoted a scouting executive as saying "I would like to add that as far as we know all of Mr. Dailey's activities were outside of Scouting circles and therefore brought no disgrace to the Boy Scouts, other than his being currently registered." In all of these instances, the BSA tried to distance themselves from the abuser and alleged incidents of child sexual abuse in order to maintain the organization's reputation and legitimacy in society.

The BSA's use of the denial of the victim rationalization often revolved around the idea

that the abuser did not seek out the abuse. These claims were often supported by the abuser's

claim that abuse never happened or was "due to circumstance beyond my control." In some

instances, the victim was actually blamed for abuse, with certain files suggesting that the scout

was unstable or legally old enough to consent to the sexual activity. In many instances, the files

featured information which suggested the abuser was actually a victim because their behavior

was out of their control and was a result of an underlying psychological problem. One BSA

official noted that the alleged abuse may even be understandable, noting that "I personally feel

that this was an experimentation." In these cases, the BSA often suggested the offender receive

medical treatment or played a role in providing treatment to the offender.

Finally, refocusing attention and denial of injury were the two rationalization tactics used

the least by the BSA. In very few cases did the BSA justify their action by completely

overlooking what abuse was alleged to have occurred or by suggesting the youth was not

actually harmed by the abuse and thus taking more formal action could inflict greater damage.

When files did rely on the denial of injury rationalization, the files featured statements that the

victim enjoyed the activities or that seeking legal action could lead to greater harm. In none of

the files was the rationalization tactic of social weighting used. This rationalization tactic

suggested that the BSA would compare themselves to other organizations that have experienced

worse incidents of abuse as a way to justify their action in the case.

When two rationalization tactics were used, the most common combination was metaphor

of the ledger and denial of responsibility. Of the 67 cases featuring two rationalizations, 14.9

percent featured these two rationalizations. The combination of these two rationalizations is not

surprising, given that using these justifications, the organization could claim that the alleged

abuser had always been an outstanding member (metaphor of the ledger) and that the lack of

substantial proof against this individual prohibited them from removing the individual or alerting police (denial of responsibility).

The next most common combination of rationalizations was the use of appeal to higher loyalties and denial of responsibility, comprising 11.9 percent of cases. When relying on these two justifications, the BSA maintained that substantiating information was often lacking (denial of responsibility) and thus the organization was better served by keeping things quiet in order to avoid negative publicity that could result if awareness of the allegations increased (appeal to higher loyalties). Finally, in 10.4 percent of those cases featuring multiple rationalizations, the justifications denial of responsibility and legality were used. These rationalizations are similar in that the BSA justified their action by stating that the police or outside individuals had conducted an investigation and found no evidence of abuse or charges were not filed (legality) and that their own internal investigation could not produce the evidence required for them to remove the offender at that time (denial of responsibility).

Hypothesis 6 argued that rationalization tactics were employed by the Boy Scouts to justify their response to allegations of abuse and that the rationalizations appeal to higher loyalties and metaphor of the ledger would be most frequently used. Results of the content analysis supported the claim that rationalizations were used by the BSA when justifying their response and the time it took them to respond. In the files that were coded for content analysis, and in many of the files not chosen, the BSA provided clear justifications for their behavior when responding to allegations of abuse against BSA members. The author's claim that the rationalizations appeal to higher loyalties and metaphor of the ledger would be the ones used most frequently was partially supported. Within the files, the rationalization metaphor of the ledger was one of the most common justifications used by the BSA. However, the most common

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justification used was denial of responsibility. The BSA relied on the metaphor of the ledger rationalization, often mentioning the good works done by the individual and value he had to the organization as a way of justifying their failure to take more formal action or the length of time it took them to remove the individual from the organization and place them on the confidential file. Rationalizing their behavior by suggesting that there was a lack of evidence supporting the allegation and therefore it was neither their responsibility nor requirement to report the individual or quickly remove them from the organization was also commonly used.

Ashforth and Anand (2003) note that often times the use of rationalizations becomes normalized, especially when corrupt acts require the cooperation of two or more individuals. In the case of the BSA, the refusal to formally report abuse allegations and the decision to justify their behavior occurred at both the National and Regional/Local level. Both National and Regional/Local members had to agree to the course of action decided upon for concealment of the allegation to be successful. Rationalizations also can become part of an organization's memory, as organizational memory is formed when the organization gathers information about how to act and stores this information for future use (Anand, Manz, & Glick, 1998). Analysis of the justifications used by the BSA and the time period in which they were used revealed that the most common justifications, denial of responsibility, appeal to higher loyalties, and legality, were used consistently from 1960 to 1991. This suggests that within the BSA, these rationalizations had become a part of the organization's institutional memory and were continuously relied upon to justify their action in response to child sexual abuse allegations because they were successful in the past. While qualitative content analysis provides greater detail about the justifications used by the BSA, the case studies presented below provide even more information about the steps taken by the organization to respond to abuse allegations.

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These case studies were selected based on the amount of detail about the BSA response and the range of different documents contained in the files. A sample representative of the time periods for which files were created was selected, featuring two cases from the 1960s, three cases each from the 1970s and 1980s, and two cases from the 1990s. It is important to note that these files featured both substantiated and unsubstantiated claims of abuse, as well as differing types of abuse ranging from clothed touching to oral copulation and masturbation. Additionally, the files chosen included individuals who had prior convictions for child sexual abuse as well as those for whom the claims resulting from their BSA membership were the first offense. While these files may not be representative of the entire sample of BSA offenders, they were illustrative of the different types of offenders and abuse incidents that occurred within the organization from 1960 to 1991.

Case Study #1 Jack O. Goddard (1962)

A confidential file was created for Jack O. Goddard on July 6th, 1962. Goddard was 35 years old and worked as a national field representative for a sales company. Goddard was married with five children. He worked as part of the National Supply Service Division in the BSA in Manhattan, Kansas. Goddard was accused of oral copulation and masturbation of a youth camp staff member.

Description of Allegation and Reporting

A letter sent from the local Scout Executive to the Regional Scout Executive on June 28th, 1962 explained that the local council had had a "very unfortunate occurrence" with one of their adult leaders, Goddard, at a Scouting summer ranch. Goddard was a member of the National Supply Service Division Staff. On June 27th, 1962 the local Scout Executive got a call from the Camp Director who stated that Goddard was "guilty of attempted acts of perversion with members of the Worth Ranch camp staff." The Local Scout Executive called and informed the Regional Scout Executive and then interviewed camp staff members. The Local Scout Executive noted that "as a result of these personal conferences, I am completely convinced that Jack Goddard is a sex pervert and recommend that the National Council, Boy Scouts of America, take immediate action to expel him from its membership."

Two camp staff members (both age 17) indicated that they were in the same tent in the wilderness camp area when Goddard came into their tent on Monday night (6/25/1962) and woke them up. The boys said that Goddard made "improper advances" toward them and then left the tent after both told him to stop. Around 4:30am Tuesday morning (6/26/1962), a 16 year old camp staff member was awoken by Goddard touching him. The camp staff noted that when he "awoke he found that Goddard had his hands on him at two portions of his body." The camper

then pushed Goddard away, got dressed, and went to work. Other camp staff said that Goddard displayed pornographic material to them in the form of lewd pictures. The Local Scout Executive noted that "as far as we can ascertain, (names redacted) were the only three staff members to whom improper advances were made. All of the boys seemed to have had a genuine likeness for Jack Goddard and were greatly shocked over this action." The Local Scout Executive again stated "I am confident that Jack Goddard is guilty of the acts as listed in this letter and feel that he has absolutely no place in our movement."

On June 28th, 1962, the Local Scout Executive was also informed that a Scoutmaster had witnessed Goddard drinking with camp staff members. While interviewing additional camp staff members about the drinking, the Local Scout Executive learned that one camp staff member had participated in acts of perversion with Goddard. "We were greatly shocked to get the full truth from (name redacted) camp staff member, and we are attaching a copy of his signed statement indicating that he had participated in two acts of perversion with Jack Goddard." The camp staff member admitted that he allowed Goddard to perform oral sex and masturbation on him on June 24th and June 25th, 1962. After learning of this, the Regional Scout Executive suggested to the Local Scout Executive that the camp staff member "who permitted Goddard to give him full treatment twice" should be removed and placed on the Confidential File. The Local Scout Executive fired the camp staff member and told him he would not be allowed to work at camp again.

On July 3rd, 1962, the Regional Scout Executive informed the National Council that Goddard and the camp staff member should be added to the Confidential File. The National Council responded that they needed more information and a detailed statement in order to place Goddard and the camp staffer on the Confidential File. The Regional Scout Executive also

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informed the National Supply Service Division of Goddard's removal, noting that it was "most regrettable that it was necessary for him to sever his connections with us, but we had no other choice. I am personally convinced that a very thorough investigation was made of this whole matter and the facts have been uncovered." On July 9th, 1962, after sending statements from the scouts involved, Goddard case was permanently placed on the Confidential File.

On September 11th, 1962, the Regional Scout Executive sent an additional letter to the National Council concerning the camp staff member placed on the Confidential File. He explained that:

> This was a most regrettable case to us and I have been doing considerable thinking concerning (name redacted), 16, who was involved. I have the strong feeling that this boy was the victim of a completely unprincipled and, as it turned out, mentally unbalanced man.

The Regional Scout Executive had a conference with the scout and his father, and based on this he thought the organization was doing the boy an injustice by placing him on the Confidential File. The boy and his father noted that after the events at camp, he sought psychiatric help. The Regional Scout Executive noted the boy was the first of his age placed on the Confidential File. The Regional Scout Executive wanted to make it clear that he did not support putting the boy on the file, noting his:

> earnest recommendation to you … is that (name redacted) name be removed immediately from the Confidential File of the National Boy Scouts of America in order that he might be allowed to participate in the program of the Boy Scouts of America. I would not be writing such a letter if (name redacted) was an adult. He is just a boy.

> Following this letter, the boy's name was removed from the Confidential File.

From the time abuse was first reported on June 27th, 1962 until the official closure of the confidential file on July 9th, 1962, twelve days passed. During this time, the BSA relied on numerous rationalization tactics to justify the action they took against both Goddard, and the youth camp staff member who was also placed on the Confidential File. Initially, The BSA relied on the denial of victims and denial of injury rationalizations to justify their action. When discussing the abuse that was alleged to have occurred, BSA officials noted that at least one of the youth involved had consented to the abuse and readily admitted that they "allowed" Goddard to perform oral sex and masturbation on them. By doing this, the BSA in effect suggested that there was no victim because the youth participated in the abuse and that there was no injury because he consented to the sexual acts. The Boy Scout's use of these phrases in their discussion of the allegations is especially concerning given that there was no discussion of the power differential between Goddard, a 35 year old adult, and the 16 year old camp staff member. Research on professional perpetrators and those who abuse children has often pointed out that abuse against children is in part a result of the power differential between adults and children (Sullivan & Beech, 2002). For the BSA to suggest that the youth was a consenting party in the sexual acts goes against this research and turns the 16 year old victim into an equal party if not a perpetrator as well.

The National Council also relied on the rationalization denial of responsibility, noting that they did not have enough information about the alleged abuse to place Goddard or the youth on the Confidential File. However after receiving supporting information, this rationalization was no longer useful. Finally, there appears to be some minimal use of the metaphor of the ledger rationalization. Despite statements from several youth that Goddard sexual molested them

and provided them with alcohol, the BSA felt it was important to note that these same youth had a great likeness for Goddard and were shocked by his actions. By providing these character support statements in the Confidential File, the organization was indirectly suggesting that Goddard had been liked by all he worked with and the allegations were out of character.

While it took the BSA a relatively short amount of time, twelve days, to permanently place Goddard on the Confidential File, the fact that these rationalizations were present throughout the statements and letters provides support for the belief that the BSA did in fact use rationalizations to justify their behavior, even in cases where they may have been in accordance with their own policies and procedures.

Case Study #2 Robert E. Collier (1966)

A confidential file was created for Robert E. Collier on August 28th, 1966. Collier was 33 years old at the time and was separated from his wife. He had no children. Collier was a freelance worker and had served as a Committee Member as part of a troop in Owosso, Michigan for approximately one year. Collier was accused of acts of perversion perpetrated against a 13 year old scout in camp. The abuse was substantiated by the Camp Director. As part of the material sent to substantiate the allegations, the Scout Executive included a signed statement from the scout, signed statement from the Camp Director, who witnessed the acts, a statement of the summary of action taken after the incident, and the confidential record sheet and a photo of the offender. Formal charged were never filed.

Description of Allegation and Reporting

On August 2nd, 1966, a scout and Collier were at the rifle range working on the marksmanship merit badge. The scout noted that while they were there, Collier proceeded to molest him under his clothing. Too afraid to do anything, the abuse lasted for approximately five minutes, at which time Collier simulated sex with the scout (both were fully clothed). The scout noted that this happened two times while at the rifle range. Upon returning to camp, the scout reported the incident to his Senior Patrol Leader., a junior leader in the troop. After making remarks that Collier was "weird", the scout admitted to his Scoutmaster that Collier had molested him. The Scoutmaster immediately informed the Camp Director, who admitted "I expressed disbelief, but asked that the boy…talk with me privately". The Scoutmaster noted that if the scout wanted to continue working on his merit badge, he would accompany him to the rifle range so that he wasn't alone with Collier. The following night, August 4th, the Camp Director met with the youth and heard his story. The Camp Director told the scout to keep his

appointment with Collier the next day, explaining the he would hide in the woods nearby in order to catch Collier in the act.

On August 5th, 1966, the scout went to the rifle range again with Collier, this time accompanied by the Camp Director who hid in the woods near the range. During the rifle practice, Collier molested the boy two additional times, each time being interrupted by the Camp Director who then returned to his hiding spot in the woods. After the second incident, the Camp Director stayed until the scout finished shooting and walked back with both the scout and Collier to camp. He notes that he "did not at this time disclose my knowledge or findings to them [Collier or the Scout]." After witnessing the acts, the Camp Director contacted the Scout Executive who told him to inform the scout's parents. The Camp Director told the parents what had happened and:

> informed them that they would discharge Mr. Collier from employment "quietly" and request that the National Council flag the man from future scouting membership. I further informed [the boy's father] of the right to prosecute under the law, and requested that he do so. [Father of the scout] … concluded that he did not wish to prosecute, but would cooperate with us in any way needed to prevent Mr. Collier from being in such a position with boys again. Meetings closed with agreement to quietly release Mr. Collier, and keep our knowledge private.

The Camp Director met with Collier on August 6th, 1966, informing him that he was being released from camp and the parents of the scout did not want to prosecute. Upon hearing this, the Camp Director noted that Collier broke down, apologizing and noting that "he thought he had licked it- You don't know how hard I've tried-I just can't help myself." Upon returning

home from camp, the Camp Director learned that Collier had had this problem before four or five years ago with a local high school student.

It wasn't until August 12th, 1966 that the National Council was notified of the abuse and a request sent for Collier to be placed on the Confidential File. A letter from Scout Executive to National Council on August 8th, 1966 noted that "As usual in such situations the parents of the scout refused to prosecute although we had clear and unquestioned evidence on the party involved." His file was officially closed on September 13th, 1966 after a letter from District Scout Executive was sent with information pertaining to the allegations. The Scout Executive noted that "Since these problems happen rarely for me-I hope I have handled this correctly. If I should have done it differently to flag a man, please advise."

BSA Response

From the time abuse was first reported on August 2, 1966 until the official closure of the confidential file on September 13, 1966, one month and eleven days passed. Several rationalization tactics are featured in the file containing information sent between the Local Council and the National Council. When first learning of the abuse allegation, the Camp Director admitted that he was skeptical of the scout's claims. By doing this, he essentially denied that the scout's claims were legitimate. More importantly, his reaction presents a perfect example of why victims of sexual abuse are often unwilling to report their abuse. Research has repeatedly found that victims of child sexual abuse often refuse to report their abuse because of fear that they will not be believed (Sauzier, 1989; Sorenson & Snow, 1991; Goodman-Brown, Edelstein, Goodman, Jones, & Gordon, 2003). The Camp Director's response to claims made by the scout that abuse had occurred was also likely influenced by the lack of awareness of the prevalence of child sexual abuse and the harmful effects of this abuse (Myers, 2008). Had society in general been

more aware of the commonality of this type of abuse and the impact it has on children, perhaps the Camp Director would have responded more seriously upon first learning of the scout's claims. The Confidential File also made note of the fact that Collier claimed he thought he had received treatment for his issue and it was no longer a problem, but he seemed to be unable to help himself. By including these statements, the BSA appeared somewhat sympathetic to Collier's troubles, further removing attention from the victim in this case.

The BSA also relied on the rationalization of appeal to higher loyalties, noting that they would quietly remove Collier from the organization. Although not specifically stating that they were doing this in order to save the organization from negative publicity, by keeping this information as private as possible the organization limited the risk of outsiders finding out and publicizing the allegations. Finally, the BSA relied heavily on the use of the denial of responsibility rationalization when discussing the allegation. The Camp Director noted that he informed the parents that they legally could prosecute the offender, but it was their decision as to whether this occurred. Further, the BSA appeared to blame the parents for their decision to not report the abuse to local authorities, noting that "As usual in such situations the parents of the scout refused to prosecute although we had clear and unquestioned evidence on the party involved." In this instance, it appears as though the BSA placed the sole responsibility of reporting the abuse allegations to the police on the parents of the scout, denying any responsibility they had to take further action.

Case Study #3 Hacker (1970)

A confidential file was created for Hacker (first name unknown) on June 18th, 1970. Hacker was 33 years old at the time and worked as a school teacher. He was married with two children. Hacker served as a Scoutmaster in Illinois from October 1967 until 1970. Hacker was arrested for homosexual activity with boys. His victims were both in scouting and through the school where he worked.

Description of Allegation and Reporting

On February 26th, 1970, the local Scout Executive sent a letter to the National Council noting that Hacker was registered as a Scoutmaster a few years ago and was removed after reports of issues with scouts surfaced. The Scout Executive noted that "he was removed as Scoutmaster of that troop, but we could not secure anything definite from parents or boys on which we could act." At the time, "a prominent member of my board called me to say he knew the family, that Tom was a fine young man, and asked that he not be placed on out "red flag" list. Because of no concrete evidence, at the time, we did not do this, for which I have had many hours of regret." The Scout Executive noted that at the time, Hacker was a bachelor, but he moved, got married, and had children. When he moved back, they did not ban him from leadership in the council. He originally registered as a Scoutmaster in 1968, but the Scout Executive became suspicious a couple of months later and met with Hacker asking him to resign. The Scout Executive noted that they were in the process of placing him on the Confidential File when "everything broke."

On October 27th, 1971, a different council sent a letter to National asking how to respond to knowledge that one of their leaders, Hacker, had been arrested. On November 2nd, 1971, the National Council responded noting that the local council had "uncovered the case of a furtive

individual who has successfully attained registration in the Boy Scouts of America by changing his name. We have had Mr. Hacker on the Confidential File since June 1970 for exactly the same reasons you presented." Upon discovering Hacker had successfully registered after being placed on the Confidential File, they again suspended his registration and updated the file.

The BSA heard no other information about Hacker until February 2nd, 1988 when they learned that Hacker had been charged with abusing children. On February 11th, 1988 the Scout Executive received a call from the Chicago Tribune asking about Hacker. Looking through records, the Scouting Executive discovered that Hacker had registered in 1984 as a multiple (he claimed he was already registered in another troop), noting that "at that time we did not check multiple registrations. We still do not check multiples." Then in 1985 he re-registered as a committee chairman. Again, the Scouting Executive noted that "at that time, in early 1985, we did not check reregistered individuals against the confidential file." The media began contacting the local council. Their questions "centered around Hacker's name being placed on the Boy Scouts of America 'confidential file' in 1970 or 1971 by the council in Indiana. The real issue was if he was placed on the confidential file, how was he currently registered with the Boy Scouts of America."

The Scouting Executive informed the National Council of this news on February 12th, 1988. The BSA then tried to determine how he was able to register, an assumption being that he "beat the system" by registering as a "multiple." Newspaper accounts of Hacker's arrest revealed that he was able to hide his past and was viewed by many as intelligent and good with children. This allowed him to gain leadership positions at schools and in the BSA. Hacker was arrested in 1961 for abuse against a scout, although charges were dropped. He was then accused of molesting 51 boys in 1970, but only charged with sexually abusing one 14 year old boy. In 1988,

he was charged with aggravated criminal sexual assault against three scouts (11-12 years old). He was also implicated in 30 assaults from 1983-1987. The newspaper article noted that "he also became a Boy Scout troop leader …-even though he was banned from the Scouts following the 1970 Indianapolis incident." The article explained that "Boy Scout officials at the National Office said Hacker changed his middle initial to avoid detection in a computerized 'red flag' system to identify undesirables."

   BSA Response

   While the exact date the BSA first learned of allegations against Hacker is not known, there is indication that they were first alerted in July of 1970. In order to provide a conservative estimation of how long it took them to respond, July 30th, 1970 is considered the date at which the BSA first knew of abuse. From the time abuse was first reported on June 30th, 1970 until the official closure of the confidential file on February 17th, 1988, 17 years, seven months, and eighteen days passed. Throughout the file, only two rationalization tactics were present, denial of responsibility and metaphor of the ledger. When confronted by police about their refusal to place the individual on the Confidential File upon first learning about abuse, the BSA responded by denying the responsibility of the organization to do so because no formal complaint was made by either a parent or a BSA member. They claimed that without a formal complaint they did not have the evidence necessary to remove Hacker from the organization. In addition, at the same time the Boy Scouts relied on the metaphor of the ledger justification, noting that a prominent member of the BSA had called the Scout Executive to advocate on behalf of Hacker.

   While this file did not feature as many rationalization tactics as the previous case studies, it did shine light on the apparent failure of their registration system to catch individuals deemed undesirable. The National Council itself noted that by changing his name, Hacker was able to re-

register in the organization. The fact that an individual could re-register simply by changing their name suggests that the Confidential File, which was originally created in the 1920s, may not be that useful for screening members. In addition, the BSA noted that Hacker was able to successfully register again because he registered as a multiple, claiming that he was already registered in the organization and was simply applying to hold an additional position. If this was the case, any individual could successfully register in the organization by claiming that they were already registered. This further suggests that the BSA did not actually screen all individuals registering with the organization, but only new registrations. As evident in this case, only registering new individuals provided a loop-hole through which undesirable members could re-register with the organization after allegations were made.

Upon learning of this, the media inundated the BSA with questions about their screening policies, and how an individual could be removed because of allegations of child sexual abuse and then successfully register in a different location. In this instance, the public became aware of the discrepancy between the formal policies and procedures they claimed to follow and what actually occurred in the organization. The realization that the Boy Scouts were not taking proper measures to screen potential adult leaders threatened the legitimacy and reputation of the organization. Since organizational legitimacy is based on an organization conforming to social norms and expectations (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975), the discovery that the Boy Scouts were not screening all registering members called into question their dedication to protecting scouts against sexual victimization.

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Case Study #4 Guy E. Conkey III (1973)

A file was created for Guy E. Conkey III on September 26, 1973. Conkey was 40 years old. In the file, no other identifying information, such as his occupation, marital status, or whether he had children was included. Conkey served as Assistant Scoutmaster in Troop 50 in Opa Locka, Florida beginning March 1967, and in April 1968 he became a Committee Member for Troop 444. Conkey was accused of sexual abuse by two staff members who witnessed the molestation of a scout while at camp. No formal charges were filed.

Description of Allegation and Reporting

On July 7th, 1973, the Scout Executive at a scout camp in Opa Locka, Florida was approached by two camp staff members who were concerned that they had just witnessed a homosexual act. They explained that they had just finished an Indian Pageant dance practice and were walking past the camp chapel to the rifle range. They heard sounds coming from behind the camp chapel and when they went to investigate they saw Conkey with a scout kneeling on the ground. Conkey was lying on his back on the ground with his legs wrapped around the scout. Both were fully clothed. Conkey was holding onto the scout's buttocks and was seen moving his hand to his own genital region several times. Conkey then kissed the boy. The two staff members were shocked and both went off in different directions. Their departure alerted Conkey, who they then saw walk out from behind the chapel with the scout. The two staff members then went directly to alert the Scout Executive.

The Scout Executive approached Conkey, noting that he "seemed meek, shy, and very apologetic as I confronted him with the information previously told me. He denied everything." Conkey claimed that the scout was upset and he took him to the chapel to pray. After praying, he suggested they go on a nature walk to cheer the scout up. Conkey explained that after the walk

he and the scout wrestled and that was what the two staff members witnessed. Due to the conflicting stories, the Scout Executive met with both staff members and Conkey who again presented different descriptions of what happened. The Scout Executive then called the Council representative who requested that an official statement of the incident be taken. In addition, the Sheriff's Department was called to investigate the events. Police officers arrived and questioned the scout. They noted that the scout agreed with Conkey's description of events, even when they asked questions several times and in different ways. The Scout Executive noted that "The officers suggested that since a stalemate condition existed they felt it best to stop the investigation... two department investigators would be shown the statements in the morning and if they thought further investigation was need they would return." No one from the police department returned, and the next day, July 6th, 1973, the Scout Executive informed Conkey that he needed to leave camp.

Following Conkey's removal from camp, a letter was sent from one of Conkey's friends who was also a member of the BSA. He noted that he had known Conkey for five years and they had both been on more than fifty camping outings with youth. He argued that "Conkey's moral character and conduct ha[d] been exemplary and that his work with youth ha[d] been constructive and in no way detrimental and that his reputation in all such regards [wa]s excellent." Despite this character reference, the local committee met on August 23, 1973 and voted that they no longer wanted Conkey involved in Troop 444 activities.

Following this, the Scout Executive sent a letter on September 6th to the National Council requesting that Conkey be placed on the Confidential File. In his letter he noted that Conkey "is not a violent individual, but he's certainly questionable in his relationships with boys." National Council responded stating that they had started a file, but needed more information, especially

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given that the scout involved did not substantiate the abuse, in order to keep his name on the Confidential File. The Scout Executive replied on September 26th writing:

> You suggest in your letter that the case which has developed around the misconduct of this Scouter is not sufficiently substantiated. If it is absolutely necessary that we get a statement from the boy, I guess both the council and the Scouters involved would choose to not substantiate the case any further. You should know, however, that the committee chairman of Troop 444, Major Albert E. Diaz, indicated that he had talked to the boy and the boy had described the liberties which Conkey had taken. Further, Conkey's friend and counselor, Jin Gunn, indicated to me here in the office that Conkey had admitted deviations from the norm in this act.

Conkey's file was officially closed on October 3, 1973. In April of 1974, the National Council again received a letter from the local Opa Locka Council stating the Conkey had tried to re-register in the organization. In August of 1974, National Council was contacted by a Scout Executive from South Florida who noted that Conkey had donated 80 acres of land to the Alabama-Florida Council. He noted that the offer included the deed, but there were restrictions, one being that Conkey could come and go at his leisure and be allowed to keep a house trailer on the property as long as he lived. Conkey also requested proper recognition of his contribution to Scouting. Following his gift, the Scout Executive contacted National to get as much information about Conkey. No response to this request was found in the file. However, there was one final letter from May 25th, 1979 from the National Council to a troop in Rhode Island stating that Conkey could not be registered in that council.

BSA Response

From the time abuse was first reported on July 7th, 1973 until the official closure of the confidential file on October 3, 1973, two months and twenty-six days passed. When responding to allegations of abuse against Conkey, the BSA relied on several rationalization tactics, including denial of the victim, legality, denial of responsibility, and metaphor of the ledger. When denying that there was actually a victim, the BSA relied on police questioning of the scout that revealed the scout agreed with Conkey's claim that no abuse occurred and they were merely wrestling. By believing the scout's response to the police, without questioning why the scout may have been afraid to tell the truth, the Boy Scouts denied that the scout was actually a victim in the case and did not feel compelled to take quicker action against Conkey. Additionally, the fact that the police investigated the allegations and believed there was not enough evidence to arrest Conkey further allowed the Boy Scouts to rely on the legality justification when deciding on what to do with Conkey.

The file featured a detailed letter from another BSA member and friend of Conkey suggesting that he was a moral and upstanding individual and had always been an asset to the organization. It further suggested that there had never been claims of this nature made against Conkey by scouts or non-scouts. By including this information, the BSA clearly noted that Conkey had done more good for the organization, illustrating the metaphor of the ledger justification. Finally, the BSA relied on the denial of responsibility rationalization tactic, claiming that there was not enough information to provide substantial proof that abuse occurred. In addition, when asked for additional information by the National Council, the Scout Executive replied that nothing more would be done on the local level to substantiate the abuse. The response by the Scout Executive that the local scouting representatives would not actively work to investigate and substantiate the abuse allegations appears to suggest that because the scout

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agreed with the alleged abuser's account of events, there was no justifiable reason for the organization to continue investigating the allegations further.

Case Study #5 Alan H. Grossman (1977)

A confidential file was created for Alan H. Grossman on July 18th, 1977. Grossman was 44 years old and worked as an Artist and Photographer in Santa Monica, California. He was single with no children. Grossman served as Scoutmaster in a troop in Santa Monica from October 30th, 1974 until his arrest on April 26th, 1977. The Confidential File on Grossman noted that he had three convictions, one acquittal, and an additional arrest in New York prior to joining the BSA, all for child molestation. These arrests and convictions occurred between 1960 and 1971. Grossman jumped bond on his last arrest in New York and fled to California. Grossman still had outstanding warrants in New York, but was currently facing three counts of child molestation and two counts of oral copulation involving three boys in California. One of the boys was registered in his troop. Grossman pled guilty on July 12th, 1977 to three of the charges and was set to be extradited to New York following his sentencing.

Description of Allegation and Reporting

On April 27th, 1977, police in Santa Monica informed the Field Scouting Director that Grossman had been arrested. The police asked for his registration record and information about troops he was affiliated with, as well as his scouting history prior to his current troop. The Field Director was shown pictures of nude boys found at Grossman's home to determine if any were scouts. The police also requested a search of Scouting records for Grossman's aliases, however none showed up. Following this meeting, the Field Director contacted the National Council to inform them of the events. On April 28th, 1977, the Field Director met with the troop to notify the scouts, their parents, and the sponsoring body that Grossman would no longer be Scoutmaster.

On May 2nd, 1977, the Field Director received a call from the police asking him to check the Confidential File to see if Allen Bagration, one of Grossman's aliases, was in their records. A check of BSA records showed this name was not on their Confidential File. The officer informed the Field Director of Grossman's prior criminal history and noted that he was very critical of the BSA "for permitting individuals like Ross [Grossman} to become scout leaders." The police officer said that scouting had a responsibility to ensure that scouts were safe and that since "we [the BSA] knew about Ross [Grossman] two years ago and did nothing about it, it left us open to criticism." The Field Director informed the officer that the BSA knew nothing of Grossman's prior history, but the officer claimed that a BSA member and school principal had both informed the organization about issues with Grossman. The Field Director responded that since no formal complaint was ever received, "no action could be taken." The Field Director noted that the officer then "stated that the police report was going to be very critical of the Boy Scouts concerning the apparent laxness in the control over the type of leadership... He said he felt that we might go so far as to request a fingerprint check on leaders..."

On May 11th, 1977, the Field Director spoke with the attorney representing Grossman. He stated that only one boy was registered with the BSA. A newspaper report of the charged against Grossman claimed that upon searching his apartment police had found slides depicting young boys in sexual acts. They initially began their investigation after an informant gave them slides belonging to Grossman showing young children involved in sexual activity. According to police and FBI, he had used as many as six aliases and since 1960 has been booked for nine child molestation related offenses. On July 12th, 1977, the attorney informed the Field Director that Grossman had pled guilty to three of the charges. The National Council was formally notified on

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September 2nd, 1977 of the charges against Grossman and the request to place him on the Confidential File.

Grossman's file was officially closed on January 20th, 1978 after the National Council received a copy of his court case. While the defense had argued that Grossman needed therapy, the judge sentenced him to prison, noting that he considered him a compulsive pedophile. The judge denied him probation, and said that hospitalization was also not appropriate because there was no indication that this would protect the public or that it would rehabilitate him.

BSA Response

From the time abuse was first reported on April 27th, 1977 until the official closure of the confidential file on January 20th, 1978, eight months and twenty-four days passed. The only rationalization tactic featured in this case was the denial of responsibility. The Field Director for the BSA claimed that since no formal complaint was ever received by the organization, there was no evidence to warrant the removal of the organization. By saying this, the BSA in effect blamed the BSA member and school principle who claimed abuse had occurred for not reporting their suspicions to the BSA. This claim also supported that organization's response that it was not their place to report the alleged abuse to the police. Teachers have a clear responsibility as mandatory reporters to report child sexual abuse suspicions, and the school principal should have reported his suspicions to the appropriate authorities at the time he thought abuse may have been occurring.

This case represents a perfect example of how organizations can lose their legitimacy when their constituents and the outside environment learn of the discrepancies between their stated formal policies and the actions that are actually taken within the organization. Grossman had a pretty extensive criminal history that clearly indicated that he was not suitable for

membership in the organization. The police were critical of the organization, suggesting that they exhibited "laxness in the control over the type of leadership." In addition, the police suggested to the BSA that they should consider running fingerprint checks on all individuals registering with the organization. Clearly exhibiting resistance to changing their policy of screening members, the BSA did not institute criminal background checks for Boy Scout professionals until 1994 and only applied the practice to all volunteers in 2008. The increased awareness of the failure of the BSA to properly screen individuals who would be allowed to work with scouts posed a threat to the legitimacy with which they were viewed by society.

Case Study #6 Joe D. Denison (1981)

A confidential file was created for Joe D. Denison on March 17th, 1981. Denison lived in Lancaster, Texas and was a 35 year old sale representative for Southwestern Bell Telephone Company. Denison was single with no children. He served as Scoutmaster of a troop in Lancaster since 1971. Denison was arrested on March 16th, 1981 for sexual abuse.

Description of Allegation and Reporting

In August of 1980, the District Scouting Executive for Lancaster, Texas met with the Regional Scouting Executive to report that Denison had been accused by a scout of homosexual involvement. During the next two weeks, the Regional Executive met with adult leaders and the scout who claimed that Denison had performed oral sex on him on a number of occasions and showed him pornographic books. The scout volunteered to take a polygraph test. The Regional Executive consulted with BSA counsel who informed the National Council. It was determined that because Denison's registration had expired, if he tried to re-register, he would be directed to the Regional Executive. In early September 1980, Denison tried to re-register as a Scoutmaster of another troop. He was instructed to meet with the Regional Executive who informed him of the allegations. Denison denied the charges and the Regional Executive suggested he meet with the scout and his mother and submit to a polygraph test. The Regional Executive noted that all allegations being made against Denison would be kept confidential.

On November 5th, 1980, the Regional Executive received a letter from Denison's attorney stating that he would not meet with the scout and his mother. Denison's lawyer stated that "Denison emphatically denies the charges levelled against him by [redacted]" and that:

> such a confrontation [between Denison, the scout, and his mother] could prove
> embarrassing not only to Mr. Denison, but to the scout and to the Boy Scouts. Mr.

Denison would prefer to work this out in a professional manner and among as few people as possible. This would minimize the potential damage to Mr. Denison's excellent reputation and would also minimize the liability of the [Redacted] and the Boy Scouts for repeating unfounded charges about Mr. Denison.

On November 26th, 1980, the Regional Executive and Field Director met with the scout and his mother and took a full statement of the alleged incidents. On December 12th, 1980, Denison sent an additional letter stating that he was anxious to resolve the matter, but would not undergo the polygraph since it was not reliable. Denison noted that he was angry that accusations hadn't first been brought to him, and wrote "if the story is so convincing, why haven't the police been informed? At least in a court of law I would be entitled to due process." Denison also claimed that the scout accusing him was caught smoking marijuana at camp by his Scoutmaster.

The scout underwent the polygraph on December 12th, 1980 at which time he gave a detailed account of what happened. Denison had performed oral sex on the scout on several occasions. The scout was afraid to say anything or resist and only came forward after talking with friends who said there had been problems with Denison and other scouts. The examiner reported that there was no indication of deception. The Regional Director then informed Denison that until the matter was resolved in his favor, he was being denied membership in the BSA in any registered or unregistered capacity.

On February 10th, 1981, Denison met with the troop committee and the Regional Executive. He explained the allegations against him. The Regional Executive noted that it appeared the committee already knew about the allegations and "the committee appeared to be convinced of Mr. Denison's innocence of the charges and proceeded to try to convince Circle Ten Council to allow him to continue in at least an unofficial capacity." The Regional Executive

restated the policy of the BSA and told them their troop charter would be pulled if they didn't comply with BSA policy. On March 1st, 1981, a letter was sent to the National Council requesting Denison be placed on the Confidential File.

On March 17th, 1981, a newspaper article reported that Denison had been indicted on charges of sexual abuse of a child. The article stated that Denison had repeatedly engaged in homosexual acts with a 14 year old boy since he was eleven. The boy told police that he had grown close to Denison after his father had died. The newspaper article noted that an assistant leader had heard about the allegations against Denison as early as May 1980 and told the boy's mother, but BSA officials did not find out until September of 1980. They article also stated that "Boy Scout Officials said they do not know how long Denison was part of their organization."

Following BSA action, Denison requested a local council and regional council review in September of 1981 and April of 1982. Both reviews concurred with his placement on the Confidential File. The letter from the Regional review stated that the decision of the Regional review was subject to review at the National Council Level and he could write to them explaining why he thought the decision was in error to have review proceedings initiated at the National level. On February 14th, 1991, Denison again applied for membership in the BSA, explaining that his son was interested and he wanted to participate with him. The National Council responded that the BSA would not allow him to register as a leader or participate in any leadership capacity, but that he could participate as a parent. They also informed him that since 10 years had passed since his last review he could request another.

Denison requested a National Review on February 28th, 1991. This review found that he was suspended in 1980 for sexually abusing a 14 year old scout but the case was eventually dismissed in court. Denison previously had both a regional and a national review and both

reviews decided to maintain his suspension. On June 4th, 1991 the National review informed

Denison that no new evidence had surfaced that would substantiate a review of his placement on

the file and they did not feel it was appropriate for his registration to be renewed. Denison

responded noting that he didn't understand how after "a successful civil suit against my accuser,

after a dismissal of charges following a complete investigation that the Scouting organization

still will not allow me to register" and that he "was idealistic rather than pragmatic and that-some

lapses in good judgement put me in the position where these false charges could be made."

BSA Response

Denison's file was officially closed on April 20th, 1981. While the exact date the BSA

first learned of allegations against Denison is not known, there is indication that they were first

alerted in August of 1980. In order to provide a conservative estimate of how long it took them

to respond, August 31st, 1980 is considered the date at which the BSA first knew of abuse. Based

on this, from the time abuse was first reported on August 31st, 1980 until the official closure of

the confidential file on April 20th, 1981, seven months and twenty days passed. When justifying

their response to allegations against Denison, the BSA relied on the appeal to higher loyalties

and metaphor of the ledger rationalizations. When first learning of abuse, the Scout Executive

noted that all allegations made against Denison would be kept confidential. This was in direct

contrast to mandatory reporting laws requiring the Boy Scouts to report suspected child abuse. In

addition, by refusing to alert authorities or other members of the organization of these

allegations, the Boy Scouts in effect hid the suspected abuse in order to avoid issues, both legal

and reputation wise, that could arise if anyone found out about.

The Boy Scouts also noted that the committee, upon reviewing the charges against

Denison, was skeptical of the allegations made against him and believed that he was innocent of

all charges. They felt that he should be allowed to stay within the organization because the accusations could not possibly be true, supporting the metaphor of the ledger rationalization. While the committee felt Denison was not culpable, the Scout Executive maintained BSA policy, informing them that he would in fact be removed from the organization, and if the committee did not comply their charter would be revoked. This case presented an example where conflicts existed within the organization on how to respond to allegations of abuse, but despite this the Boy Scouts maintained their policy on dealing with allegations of sexual abuse against scouts.

While the Boy Scouts handled the dispute regarding Denison's case appropriately, there is evidence in the file which suggests that initially they did not follow their outlined procedures. Upon learning that allegations of abuse were made against Denison, the Boy Scouts did not immediately alert Denison that allegations had been made against him or remove him from the organization. Instead, they waited until he re-registered before placing him on the Confidential File. This represents a clear diversion from their stated policy of removing individuals deemed to be undesirable. Instead, they hoped that Denison would not re-register with the organization. This tactic also allowed for the possibility that Denison register in another council or region in which the Scout Executive would not be aware and could not stop his registration. If this had occurred, it is highly likely that Denison could have successfully registered and perhaps victimized additional scouts. Finally, when asked how long Denison had been a part of the organization, the Boy Scouts were unable to provide an answer. This is concerning, given that all registered individuals should have filled out a registration application upon joining the organization. That the Boy Scouts were unable to determine how long Denison had been active in Scouting calls into question the record keeping practices maintained by the Boy Scouts.

Case Study #7 Timothy J. Bagshaw (1984)

A confidential file was created for Timothy J. Bagshaw on July 7th, 1984. Bagshaw was 29 years old at the time the file was created and worked as an auto mechanic. He was not married and had no children. Bagshaw worked as an Assistant Scoutmaster and Scoutmaster in Troop 361 in Central Pennsylvania. Bagshaw was a former police officer and had been in scouting for 22 years. Bagshaw first registered as an Assistant Scoutmaster in 1981 and eventually advanced to Scoutmaster. He officially resigned from the organization on April 30, 1984 after serving a total of three years in Troop 361.

During his time in Troop 361, Bagshaw was suspected of child abuse. He was eventually arrested for sexual assault against two thirteen year old boys who claimed he had touched them while they were camping. These alleged events took place on separate occasions. Bagshaw was charged with ten counts of indecent assault, ten counts of endangering the welfare of children, and ten counts of corruption of the morals of minors. Newspaper reports of the abuse stated that the abuse occurred November 18-19th and December 16-17th of 1983. Bagshaw pled nolo contender to two counts of corruption of minors and was sentenced in December 1984 to a suspended sentence of one to three years in prison and placed on probation for three years, had to pay for the cost of prosecution and a $500 fine, and had to complete 250 hours of community service.

Description of Allegation and Reporting

The Local Council first learned of the abuse allegations on April 26th 1984 after the Assistant Scoutmaster for Troop 361 called the Council Scout Executive informing him that parents of a scout were making accusations that Bagshaw had committed a sexual act with their son. The parents stated that their son had related to them that Bagshaw had invited him on a

weekend ski trip that was not a Scouting activity. The parents agreed and during this trip their son claimed that Bagshaw approached him during the weekend, although nothing physical happened. The second incident occurred at a scout camping trip, during which their son claimed that something happened while he was sharing a tent with Bagshaw. The parents learned of their son's victimization after he told a friend what had happened and the friend confirmed that he had also been approached by Bagshaw. It was only after the parents of both boys spoke to each other about the claims of their children that they contacted the Assistant Scoutmaster on April 23rd, 1984.

After learning of the allegations, the Assistant Scoutmaster talked to the scout victims and other parents in the troop, asking them if anything had ever taken place with their sons. This questioning revealed that an incident had occurred five years prior, although there was no discussion of what this incident was in the confidential file.   Based on the investigation of the Assistant Scoutmaster, the local Scout Executive and District Chairman decided that a troop committee meeting needed to take place with Bagshaw present. The troop committee meeting took place on April 30th, 1984, at which time it was decided that Bagshaw should resign from the troop and consider retaining legal counsel.

The file notes that when the mother of one of the scouts was informed Bagshaw had resigned, she indicated that she thought the council should do more, such as conduct an investigation. At this point, the Scout Executive questioned the responsibility of the organization to do this, noting that he "was not sure at that point what additional responsibility we had and indicated I would get back to her [the scout's mother]." At this point, the Scout Executive called BSA legal counsel who reviewed a copy of BSA policy and mandatory reporting laws and informed the Scout Executive that "we had already acted responsibly and that it was now up to

the parents to file charges or take action since they were supposedly the hurt party." Further, the Scout Executive noted that "never at any time in those few says did we try to investigate it on any formal basis." The Scout Executive noted that after telling the parents this, they never heard from the parents again and assumed they did not press charges.

It was only after all of this had occurred that the National Council was informed of the allegations and received a request from the Local Council asking them to remove Bagshaw from their records. Following this request, Bagshaw was observed on May 18-20th, 1984 at a Scout camporee, leading to additional parents coming forward with claims of abuse against their children. On June 8th, 1984, the Scout Executive for the Local Council received a call from the Pennsylvania State Police, informing him that an investigation of Bagshaw was underway and a warrant was out for his arrest. In addition, the Trooper informed the Scout Executive that he was being "cited on a summary offense for not reporting a possible child abuse case to the proper authorities." After these events transpired, the media began contacting the Local Council. The Scout Executive noted that "almost without exception each wanted a response from me why I failed to report it, kind of indicating why I was trying to cover something up." In response to these accusations, the Local Council President released a statement noting that:

> As president of the Juniata Valley Council, Boy Scouts of America, I totally support and stand behind our council executive, Roger Rauch [Scout Executive], who we feel has acted responsibly and has done nothing wrong. We are currently working with legal counsel and we plan to vigorously resist any charges made on Roger Rauch.

The Scout Executive claimed that he had acted responsibly and had sought out legal counsel and acted on their advice. He had had no contact with the scouts claiming abuse, only their parents, and did not refuse to report, but thought it was the responsibility of the parents to

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report. He further noted that "this has really created a very bad and negative image and response on the council, myself, and the Boy Scouts of America." In June of 1984, newspaper reports of the charged against Bagshaw were released, noting that the Scout Executive had failed to report because he did not know he was obligated to report the allegations. These reports further outlined the Child Protective Services Law of 1975 which required that any person who, in the course of their employment, came into contact with children was required to report suspected child abuse to the proper authorities. They further reported that the Scout Executive stated he was "concerned that this not get blown out of proportion. We're here as a positive organization. Thousands of kids go though it (Boy Scouts) right. Ninety thousand leaders do their jobs right. It's very rare that something like this happens."

In an additional newspaper article, the BSA stated that they would not be making any policy changes as a result of the arrest of Bagshaw or citation of the Scout Executive, noting that "We feel that our policy is solid and the he (Mr. Rauch) [Scout Executive] took the proper steps and followed our procedures exactly." Going even further, the BSA blamed the lack of parental involvement as a cause of the abuse, noting that many parents view the Boy Scouts as a babysitting service and are not involved in the troop. One Scoutmaster noted: "I know Scoutmasters who spend more time with boys than the boys' parents do. Some drop off their kids for the weekend and think we're babysitters."

While his file was first created on July 7th, 1984, Bagshaw wasn't officially placed on the Confidential File until September 2nd, 1987; after all supporting materials were received and reviewed by the BSA attorney. Between June 19th 1984 and September 2nd 1987, seven letters were sent from the National Council to the Local Council asking for the additional information needed to close the file. One such letter in 1986 stated:

We really need to know if he has been convicted of child abuse. Apparently, in 1984, he was arrested and charged with some sort of sexual abuse. Since that time, we have not heard any information concerning whether or not there was a trial and whether he was found guilty….Without this information, our case is rather weak and we are very concerned that he might move somewhere else and create further problems for scouting. Please help us if you can to complete this file, so that we may protect the youth of America.

BSA Response

Ultimately, from the time abuse was first reported on April 23, 1984 until the official closure of the confidential file on September 2, 1987, three years, four months, and ten days passed. In the case of Bagshaw, the BSA relied on the rationalization tactics denial of responsibility, social weighting, and legality. When denying their responsibility, the Boy Scouts claimed that they lacked the proper information needed to substantiate abuse, and because of this their file on Bagshaw was rather weak. The Boy Scouts also blamed the parents of scouts, noting that often parents used the organization as a babysitting service, rather than taking an active part in their child's scouting experience. Because of this, the Boy Scouts claimed parents were unaware of what went on with their children, and in essence blamed them for any abuse of their children that occurred. Finally, the Boy Scouts claimed that the parents of the scouts were responsible for reporting allegations to the authorities, and because of this the Boy Scouts had acted appropriately. Additionally, the Boy Scouts claimed that because they did not have information about whether legal action was undertaken and completed, they did not have the evidence necessary to take action more quickly, supporting the legality rationalization tactic.

When questioned by the media about the arrest of Bagshaw and how he was able to enter the organization even after being placed on the Confidential File, the Scout Executive responded noting that this event should not get blown out of proportion because the Boy Scouts was a positive organization for boys employing thousands of leaders with occurrences like this being very rare. While the Boy Scouts did not directly compare themselves to another organization also experiencing similar allegations, they did attempt to draw attention away from this single allegation in favor of addressing all of the good the organization has done. This example of the social weighting rationalization tactic illustrates how the BSA focused on the positive done by the organization to lessen the blow of allegations against Bagshaw.

The Bagshaw case is unique in that it presents a clear picture of the organization's lack of understanding about mandatory reporting laws. When first confronted with the allegations and the request of the mother to bring them to the police, the Scout Executive noted that he was unsure of the Boy Scout's responsibility and conferred with legal counsel. BSA legal counsel erroneously informed the Scout Executive that they were not mandated to report allegations and if further action was taken it had to be done by the parents. Following this, the BSA failed to conduct their own internal investigation of the allegations. Once media sources learned of the BSA's failure and the citation against the Scout Executive for his failure to report the allegations, it became clear that the Boy Scouts did not have a formal policy outlining the duty of organization members as mandatory reporters. Further supporting this, when questioned by the media, the Scout Executive stated that he did not know he was mandated to report allegations.

Perhaps adding insult to injury, the BSA refused to change their policy of reporting allegations of child sexual abuse, noting that their "policy is solid" and the Scout Executive "took the proper steps and followed our procedures exactly." That the BSA refused to change

their policy, even in the face of widespread awareness of their failure, supports research finding that sometimes organizations refuse to change merely because they don't want to (Tichy, 1983). This finding also questions the idea that legislation may not change organizations as much as consequences of failing to follow legislation. Ultimately, mandatory reporting of all child abuse allegations was not required by the Boy Scouts until 2011, roughly 24 years later.

Case Study #8 Mark Gallick (1989)

A confidential case file was created for Mark Gallick on August 2, 1989. Gallick lived in Cary, North Carolina and was 25 years old. At the time of his placement on the file he was single and had no children. Gallick served as a camp staff member at a scout summer camp. Gallick was accused of sexual abuse of a scout. The BSA conducted an internal investigation, while the authorities also investigated the allegations. No charges were ultimately filed.

Description of Allegation and Reporting

On July 29th, 1989, the Camp Director was approached by a camp staff member who said that a scout had woken him up and told him that he had been in his tent talking with Gallick when Gallick grabbed his genitals. The camp staff member explained that he had praised the scout for coming to tell him, knowing that it was difficult. The camp director confronted Gallick with the allegations at which point he denied them. He said he was asleep in the tent and if he had done anything it would have been in his sleep. Gallick also expressed concern for the scout, and wanted to talk to him. The camp director told him talking to the scout was "out of the question" but that he could talk to the Scoutmaster of the scout's troop. The camp director and Gallick then approached the Scoutmaster who noted that he had observed the relationship between Gallick and the scout and that he had "been somewhat concerned, but hadn't shared it with anyone." He said that Gallick had known the scout for four to five years and had visited the scout in the orphanage where he stayed. The Scoutmaster had "noticed a lot of physical contact between" Gallick and the scout, "lots of hugging and touching, though never in the genital area."

The Camp Director told Gallick that "based on what I heard so far, I was putting into effect the BSA Youth Protection Guidelines. I told him that I was not an officer of the law and could not legally restrain him, and that he could either stay in my office or leave camp

premises." Gallick stated that his career would be finished (he had applied for the FBI) if information of this got out. The Camp Director then spoke directly to the scout, who said that he and Gallick were lying in the tent after the other camp members left. The scout said that he hugged Gallick, who then grabbed his genitals through his shorts. The scout did the same thing to Gallick, but felt uncomfortable and left to find the camp staff member. The camp director noted "he [the scout] felt he was partially at fault, and I assured him that he was not at fault, had nothing to feel guilty about, and that I was proud of him." The camp director told the camp staff who were aware of the issue not to discuss the matter with anyone. The camp director then called the Scout Executive at his home and told him what happened. The camp director was instructed to call the sheriff's department and turn the matter over to them.

The sheriff arrived and the camp director told them what happened. The police went to talk with the scout. When they returned, they said he had given the same story to them, but he was "vague" and "hard to follow." Because the scout was 17, the police told him it was his decision as to whether to press charges. The scout declined to press charges. The police told Gallick that since the scout didn't want to press charges there was nothing more they could do. As the camp director walked the police to their car they said "that there was nothing more they could do, but that they were convinced something had happened and would be willing to attest to that if I needed them to do so."

The camp director then informed the Scout Executive of what happened. Gallick left camp July 30th, 1989. Later, the Scoutmaster told the camp director that he had been worried about the relationship, noting that "in all his years in the military, and later working at the orphanage and in scouting, he had never observed a relationship quite like [Gallick's] and [the scouts]." The Camp Director sent a letter detailing the events that happened to the National

Council on August 1, 1989. In his letter to the National Council, the Camp Director suggested that "Mark Gallick has been an exemplary staff member and a good friend. Thus it is difficult for me to be objective, but I must offer the following considered opinions: Gallick should be fired, a report of the incident should be filed with the National Office and all proper steps taken to remove him from the BSA, and the BSA attorney should be contacted and information kept on file about Gallick." He also stated that he had instructed anyone who knew what had occurred to not say anything so as to not set the organization up for a defamation of character suit. The National Council responded on August 31st, 1989 indicating that Gallick's file was now permanently on their file.

BSA Response

From the time abuse was first reported on July 29th, 1989 until the official closure of the confidential file on August 31st, 1999, one month and two days passed. When justifying their actions and the time it took them to respond, the BSA used denial of responsibility, appeal to higher loyalties, and metaphor of the ledger as rationalization tactics. The Boy Scouts initially denied their responsibility in addressing the allegations, noting that members of the organization who suspected abuse never made formal reports to BSA officials. Without these formal reports, there was no indication that abuse may have been occurring and no evidence to support Gallick's removal. In addition, when investigating the allegation, the police reported to the BSA that while they suspected something had happened, there was nothing they could do. Finally, because the scout was 17 and the police informed the Boy Scouts that he was responsible for reporting the allegations, they left it up to the scout to decide the course of action. The scout refused to report the allegations, and by also refusing to report the Boy Scouts denied their responsibility on the

basis that the scout had to make the decision, while also suggesting that they were supporting the scout's decision to not report.

Similar to other cases, the Boy Scouts appealed to higher loyalties, asking all members of the scout camp who were aware of the allegations to keep things quiet so as to not publicize the allegations and bring unwanted attention on the organization. When responding to the allegations, the Scout Executive noted that he was a good friend of Gallick and he had always been an exemplary member, providing support for the metaphor of the ledger rationalization tactic, which suggests that organizations try to focus on the good the member has done rather than the deviant acts.

The Gallick file is unique in that it represents one of the very rare times that the Boy Scouts willingly informed the police about suspected child sexual abuse. The mandatory reporting of child sexual abuse allegations had yet to be made a requirement by the organization, this would not occur until 2011, although mandatory reporting laws were in effect at this time in every state. The decision of the Scout Executive to inform the police of the scout's claims could be a result of the manner in which the scout reported his claims and concerns for his well-being, or a result of the Scout Executive's awareness of mandatory reporting laws. Ultimately, this case did not present one of the more clearly substantiated allegations, such as incidents where abuse was witnessed. This suggests that the decision to report the abuse to the police was based solely on the Scout Executive's belief of what the appropriate action should be, not on specific guidelines and policies detailing how to address abuse allegations.

Case Study #9 William C. Prentiss (1990)

A confidential file was created for William C. Prentiss on January 22nd, 1990. Prentiss' age was unknown, although it is known that he was married and worked as a doctor. It is unknown whether he had children. Prentiss was a Scoutmaster for thirteen years in Florida. Prentiss was accused of inappropriate behavior with scouts. The police investigated the case but charges were never filed.

Description of Allegation and Reporting

On September 27th, 1989, Prentiss withdrew his registration from the BSA. The following day, the Council President and Director of Field Services delivered a letter to Prentiss denying his registration. At this time, Prentiss denied the claims made against him and said he was not a child abuser. On October 9th, 1989, the National Council was alerted of the allegations. Prentiss then requested a regional review on November 6th, 1989. At the time of his request, he claimed that the reason for his removal stemmed from a camping trip in early September. He noted that often he allowed the youth in his troop to dictate what they did on camping trips. On this particular occasion, the scouts asked him to do some exercises with them, without clothing. Prentiss noted that this was done "in an atmosphere of good sportsmanship and fun" but that someone reported the event to law enforcement. Law enforcement then investigated the claims and closed the case without filing charges.

A regional review committee conducted the first review of his case on February 6th, 1990 and decided they were willing to allow Prentiss to re-register as long as the chartered partner agreed. They stated "We feel very strongly that the charter partner relationship should be maintained and strengthened. Only the charter partner, not the Council, can give the needed attention to selection of troop leadership and the supervision of troop leadership."

A local review of the Prentiss case was undertaken on July 10th, 1990, during which time the committee found that "no charter be issued for a troop in which Dr. Prentiss was expected to serve as an adult Scout leader and that Dr. Prentiss be requested to surrender his membership in the Boy Scouts of America." The committee noted that "a significant part of the committee was concerned about the possibility of adverse publicity and resultant harm to the overall program of the Central Florida Council if any further incidents with Dr. Prentiss occurred or if the news media elected to pursue the matter." This review was largely held because a local judge, in conjunction with Prentiss, wanted to create a new Boy Scout program for juvenile offenders. The committee noted that while they saw no issue with creating a boy scout program that was composed of juvenile offenders referred by local judges, no charter would be issued for a troop in which Prentiss was involved. They wrote:

> All members of the committee were sensitive to the fact that no allegations against Dr. Prentiss have been proved and that the criminal charges were dropped. It was, nevertheless, the consensus that the charges were not brought without reason and that actions acknowledged to have taken place by Dr. Prentiss were reflective of poor judgement. It was the committee's opinion that should another incident involving Dr. Prentiss occur or that should the news media elect to publicize the matter the Central Florida Council would be perhaps, in a legally defensible position but would clearly be in an indefensible position as far as the public was concerned and that substantial harm to the overall Boy Scout program in Central Florida would result.

> While the committee was unanimous in their belief that Prentiss could not effectively serve as a scout leader, they were not unanimous on whether his actions warranted removal. Ultimately, Prentiss was allowed to stay in the organization.

On August 2nd, 1990, a detective from the Orange County Sherriff's department called the Scout Executive to let him know that they had recently convicted a man for trafficking child pornography. The officer noted that this individual had a letter from Prentiss that stated he "appreciate[s] receipt of recent items and understand[s] need for security." In addition, another individual who was going to be charged in the near future was a member of Prentiss's troop. In August of 1990, Scouting officials met with Prentiss' troop to discuss what they had learned from the police and determine the steps to be taken. They decided the troop would continue without Prentiss.

In October of 1990, Prentiss again requested that his case be reviewed. The reconvened committee went against the previous decisions and decided that they should not register Prentiss based on additional information made available to them. Prentiss was informed of this decision on October 26th, 1990.

BSA Response

It is not known when exactly the BSA learned of abuse allegations, but based on the information in the file, notification occurred at least as early as September 27th, 1989. Prentiss's file was officially closed on October 26th, 1990. From the time abuse was first reported on September 27th, 1989 until the official closure of the confidential file on October 26th, 1990, one year and twenty-nine days passed. The BSA employed the denial of responsibility and appeal to higher loyalties rationalization tactics in the Prentiss case. Interestingly in this case, the boy Scouts denied their responsibility to decide whether Prentiss should be removed from the organization, noting that it was up to the chartering partner to determine whether Prentiss could remain in the troop. This response was in direct conflict with BSA policies and procedures stating that the Boy Scouts were ultimately responsible for selecting appropriate leaders and

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deciding if individuals were not appropriate for the organization. The appeal to higher authorities was also illustrated in the file when the committee noted it was concerned about adverse publicity and harm to the organization if the media focused on the allegations against Prentiss. Eliminating negative publicity was especially important given that the organization had reviewed Prentiss' case in 1989 following a police investigation and had decided to allow him to remain in the organization.

While it is not known for certain, Prentiss' standing as a doctor and his connection to other influential people in the community, may have influenced how the Boy Scouts responded to his case. Upon initially learning about the abuse allegations, the police investigation revealed no charges could be filed. Using this as support, and the fact that Prentiss was a doctor and well-connected, the Boy Scouts may have been unwilling to accept that the allegations were true and he should be removed from the organization. This is also potentially supported by the fact that Prentiss' case is only of the only case studies in which the offender was initially allowed to stay as an active member after allegations were made and investigated by the police. Ultimately, after additional allegations of abuse came to light, the Boy Scouts were forced to accept the reality that Prentiss was not an acceptable scout leader.

Case Study #10 Frank W. Skeeler (1991)

A confidential file was created for Frank W. Skeeler on September 13, 1991. Skeeler was a forty year old bank teller in Orange, Texas. Skeeler was single and had no children. Skeeler served as a Scoutmaster for Troop 23 in Orange, Texas from June 1985 until September 11, 1991. Skeeler was accused of several incidents involving scouts. Formal charges were never filed.

Description of Allegation and Reporting

On August 27th, 1991, an Assistant Scoutmaster called the local Scout Executive relating that allegations had been made against Skeeler by the parents of some scouts. The Assistant Scoutmaster revealed that the first incident occurred several years ago when Skeeler took his troop on a trip to Galveston, Texas. On this trip, Skeeler was caught looking at pornographic magazines with a scout. Upon returning home from the trip, the scout informed his parents, who discussed the incident with the Assistant Scoutmaster. The BSA member noted that at that time, the parents of the scout knew Skeeler's parents and "because of the situation did not want to cause any real commotion." The Assistant Scoutmaster and scout committee discussed what occurred and met with Skeeler, telling him the rules were that at no time would an adult accompany a troop alone and that adults were never allowed to share the same bed with a scout. The scout's father also told Skeeler that if he ever heard of this happening again he would go to council headquarters and alert them.

The next incident occurred in August of 1990 during another Scouting trip. The troop stopped in Fort Worth for the night and rented two rooms. The Assistant Scoutmaster informed Skeeler that the rollaway beds were for the adults to sleep on while the boys would sleep on the beds or the floor. At one point during the evening, the Assistant Scoutmaster walked into the

room and found Skeeler lying in bed with one of the boys. The Assistant Scoutmaster told him to get out of the bed and that there was no reason for him to be in the bed with the scout. Skeeler claimed he was only listening to the radio with the scout. The final incident occurred in August of 1991 at an Order of the Arrow meeting. While at the event, Skeeler shared a tent with a scout at a campsite where no other scouts were camping. The scout claimed the he had no bedroll and Skeeler asked him if he was going to take his clothes off to sleep. The scout refused and slept on the ground in the tent. While lying there, Skeeler asked the scout if he could pop his back. The scout told his mother who talked with other parents, including the initial victim's mother.

The Assistant Scoutmaster stated that he didn't think there was any evidence of sexual abuse in any of the incidents and was upset because he was a good friend of the Skeeler and was worried what he would do if he was removed from scouting. The Assistant Scoutmaster suggested that the families of both the boys be interviewed. The Scout Executive met with the BSA attorney on September 5th, 1991 who informed him that Skeeler had broken the rules by sleeping in the tent with a scout. BSA counsel also stated that based on the available facts, they could not make accusation of sexual misconduct. It was determined that more information was needed. The Scout Executive met with the Assistant Scoutmaster who stated that he was not aware of any sexual abuse or advances made by Skeeler. The Scout Executive was able to obtain a statement from one of the scout's mothers. On September, 9th, 1991, the Scout Executive met with a BSA member who went on the second Scouting trip. This individual said that there was no pornography or sexual abuse on the trip to his knowledge, however, Skeeler had physically assaulted a scout who refused to stop playing with a bug when Skeeler told him to.

The Scout Executive spoke to an Executive from another region who noted that "if there was no ground swell of parents pushing-don't have grounds or enough to remove him." He

claimed that while Skeeler had violated the two-deep leadership policy, it was up to the troop committee to determine the appropriate response. The Scout Executive met with the father of one of the scouts who also provided a written statement of the incident involving Skeeler and his son. Upon receiving this, the Scout Executive met with BSA counsel again who said they had the necessary proof to remove Skeeler. On September 12th, 1991, the troop committee met with Skeeler and asked him to resign. On September 16th, 1991, a letter was sent from the local council to the National Council asking them to remove Skeeler from membership and place him on the Confidential File. On October 25th, 1991, his file was officially closed.

BSA Response

From the time abuse was first reported on August 27th, 1991 until the official closure of the confidential file on October 25th, 1991, one month and twenty-eight days passed. The Boy Scouts justified their response to allegations using the rationalization tactics denial of responsibility, metaphor of the ledger, and denial of the victim. When denying that they were responsible for reporting the allegations or taking swift action against Skeeler, the organization noted that they did not have enough substantiating evidence to remove Skeeler from the organization. This determination was not just made by a Scout Executive though, but was also supported after discussion with BSA counsel. The Boy Scouts also noted that the parents of the scout did not want to take any additional action against Skeeler because they knew his parents and did not want to make this into a bigger issue. The BSA used this to justify their own decision not to report the allegations to law enforcement. After learning of additional abuse incidents, the BSA still refused to report Skeeler noting that "if there was no ground swell of parents pushing-don't have grounds or enough to remove him." By stating this, the organization indicated that it was clearly the responsibility of the parents to press for Skeeler's removal from the organization.

The metaphor of the ledger rationalization tactic was also clearly present when an Assistant Scoutmaster in the Boy Scouts who was a friend of Skeeler's stated he did not believe the allegations were true because Skeeler had always been a model member. In addition, the Assistant Scoutmaster denied that the scout was a victim, moving the focus away from the allegations made against Skeeler to what would happen if they Boy Scouts removed him. The Assistant Scoutmaster's suggestion that Skeeler might hurt himself if he was removed from Scouting suggested that Skeeler himself may have been a victim of emotional or mental issues and may not have been responsible for his actions. If the Boy Scouts removed him and he hurt himself, the Assistant Scoutmaster indicated that they would be solely responsible.

Overall, in nine out of the ten cases the BSA used the denial of responsibility rationalization to justify the action taken. This justification often relied on the excuse that the organization did not have enough information about the alleged acts to support reporting to the police or removing them more quickly, or the parents of the victims were unwilling or did not want to press formal charges. The second most common rationalization was the metaphor of the ledger, in which the BSA often noted how the alleged offender had never had any previous allegations against them or that they had always been a contributing and model member of the organization. Following these rationalizations, the next two most commonly used were denial of the victim and appeal to higher loyalties. The BSA largely used the denial of the victim rationalization in instances where the scout denied abuse had occurred or by suggesting the scout was an active and willing participant. Notably, the Boy Scouts most often relied on the rationalization appeal to higher loyalties in cases where the media or outside individuals had already learned of the abuse allegations. In these cases, removing the offender and keeping things as quiet as possible was used more to draw negative attention away from the organization,

rather than prevent this negative attention from occurring. In this sense, the appeal to higher loyalties rationalization tactic served as a way to minimize the damage to the organization's reputation by keeping allegations as internal as possible all while limiting their interaction with the media and individuals outside the organization.

Content analysis of files spanning from the 1960s to the early 1990s and in-depth case study analysis revealed that rationalization tactics were relied on by the Boy Scouts of America when justifying their decision to keep information about allegations of abuse within the organization and determining the length of time it took them to remove the individual. Both the content analysis and case study analysis showed that the most commonly used rationalization was the denial of responsibility. This tactic was used in cases featuring both substantiated and unsubstantiated abuse and often relied on the claim that the organization did not have enough information to justify removing the individual sooner, or that the parents of the victim did not want to press charges. The organization's reliance on the belief that it was solely the responsibility of parents to determine if the allegations should be brought to the police allowed them to remove themselves from the decision-making process and allowed them to ignore their duty as mandatory reporters.

It is important to note that the use of justifications did not necessarily signify that the individual was not removed from the organization, but rather are useful in understanding how members within the organization viewed deviance by other organization members and why the Boy Scouts repeatedly decided to quietly remove the individual rather than alert police of the allegations. Ashforth and Anand (2003) note that corruption can often be normalized or institutionalized in organizations and that this is especially true when more than two individuals take part in the corrupt behavior. It would appear as though this concept applies to the Boy

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Scouts of America. When responding to allegations of abuse, numerous BSA members at the local, regional, and national level were involved in deciding how to act. The repeated procedure of the BSA learning of allegations, refusing to report the allegations to police, and quiet removal of the individual from the organization served to solidify this process into the structure of the organization. The continued reliance on this process further served to routinize the BSA's response. Cases which featured a divergence from this process were largely different in that one specific individual thought it was necessary to take formal action and because of this the Boy Scout's response was shifted.

In addition, qualitative analysis shed light on the failure of the Boy Scout's screening policy and practices to adequately identify potentially unsuitable members, and issues relating to the implementation of these policies. It was not uncommon for individuals placed on the Confidential File to successfully register in another location. In one such case, the individual only had to change their name in order to successfully register, leading a law enforcement officer to suggest that the Boy Scouts fingerprint their registered member. In another cases, the BSA stated that the individual claimed they were already registered in the organization, and thus an in-depth screening was not required. Both of these cases represent instances where the organization's screening process was not able to identify individuals who had already been removed from the organization or instances where the Boy Scouts chose not to screen individuals before allowing them to serve in the organization. These findings presented clear issues with the organization's youth protection policies. The next and final chapter addresses the overall findings of the study and provides policy recommendations that could be useful in addressing these failures.

Chapter 9: Discussion & Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to address allegations of child sexual abuse against Boy Scouts of America members and examine how the Boy Scouts responded to these allegations on an organizational level. While this study did not address all of the issues related to reporting and responding to sexual abuse allegations, it represented the first study of this kind of the Boy Scouts of America. Ultimately, the findings of this study shed light on the occurrence of child sexual abuse in the BSA and directed needed attention to the issue of organizational responses of youth serving organizations to sexual deviance within their ranks.

Results of the analysis revealed that the majority of offenders in the organization were younger Scoutmasters. The majority of files featured unspecified sexual abuse; however, when details of the abuse were present the majority featured some form of explicit sexual contact. In addition, most cases featured isolated incidents rather than numerous abuse incidents committed by one individual. Within the sample of BSA allegations, the majority of victims disclosed their abuse to a parent or immediate family member. These findings, and others presented in this dissertation, represented the first information known about offenders within the Boy Scouts of America. The findings of the current study were interesting when compared to studies of professional perpetrators having found that those who target organizations in order to offend are more likely to be older, not have children, and are less likely to be in sexual relationships with adults (Haywood, 1994; Sullivan & Beech, 2004). Similarly, offenders in the BSA were also less likely to have children or be married, although they were more likely to be younger. These findings provided interesting parallels between research on professional perpetrators and offenders within the BSA, but also outlined significant differences that may be indicative of the Boy Scouts' organization.

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When learning of abuse incidents, it was most common for the BSA to be informed via phone calls. While there was not information as to why individuals chose to alert the BSA using phone calls rather than in person or through some other method, it is very likely that the method could be directly related to the individual reporting this abuse to the organization. In response to allegations of abuse, in the majority of cases the Boy Scouts relied on informal methods to deal with alleged offenders, favoring removal from the organization over reporting of allegations to law enforcement. Analysis of responses across regions found that there were not significant differences in the BSA's response between the South, Northeast, Midwest, and West, despite the decentralized nature of the organization. The BSA's reliance on informal responses within the organization when dealing with abuse allegations against members suggests that the organization was aware of the harm that could occur to its reputation and mission had allegations been made public. These findings also suggested a calculated effort on the part of the Boy Scouts to deal with allegations as quietly as possible in order to maintain their legitimacy and standing within society. These findings provided full support for hypotheses 2b and 2c, and partial support for hypothesis 1a and 1b. A table of significant findings is provided in Appendix D.

Survival analysis showed that the median survival time before a confidential file was created was 24.6 months. In the context of formal responses to allegations, analyses showed that older offenders and Assistant Scoutmasters were less likely to be referred to law enforcement or mental health treatment. Individuals who had allegations against scouts were more likely to result in formal responses. In addition, individuals who did not have allegations of non-sexual abuse were less likely to result in formal responses. Analyses also addressed the factors influencing the BSA's response time: Offenders who had allegations of more than three abuse incidents, those who had female victims, those who were formally charged, and those cases

where the police informed the BSA about possible allegations all resulted in a shorter time from initial reporting to placement on the Confidential File. Older offenders, those who had allegations against a scout, those allegations in councils in the Western region, and those individuals who had prior child sexual abuse histories all resulted in longer response times by the BSA. These findings only provided partial support for hypothesis 4d.

Finally, the intervention analysis examined whether the BSA's implementation of their two-deep leadership policy, designed to reduce the incidence of child sexual abuse, influenced the number of reports received by the organization. Results showed that the implementation of this policy actually increased the number of reports of child sexual abuse against organization members, providing no support for hypothesis 5. However, this increase could be due to other factors, such as an overall increase in mandatory reporting occurring at the time or a lagged effect between when abuse occurred and when it was reported to the organization. This finding underscored the need to examine the effectiveness of policies implemented to reduce child sexual abuse in youth serving organizations and the impact these policies may have on reporting within the organization.

The current study also relied on qualitative analysis to provide greater detail about two aspects: 1) how the Boy Scouts replied to allegations against organization members and 2) to further examine whether BSA officials relied on rationalization tactics as a means of justifying their response and how long it took them to complete it. Qualitative content analysis and case study analysis revealed that the organization did in fact use rationalization tactics, relying heavily on the denial of responsibility and metaphor of the ledger justifications, providing support for hypothesis 6. Using these justifications, the organization argued that they were either not required to take formal action or did not have substantial evidence to justify a more serious

response. They were simultaneously focusing on the positive role the individual played in the organization rather than the allegations that were made against them.

Although this study was exploratory in nature, the findings provided important information about the extent of child sexual abuse within the Boy Scouts and lay a foundation from which future research on child sexual abuse within youth serving organizations can build. The application of institutional theories and organizational theories to the issue of organizational responses to child sexual abuse also has several important implications for research on the topic of organizational responses to deviance.

9.1 Implications for Research and Theory

While research has addressed the characteristics of child sexual offenders in general, very few studies have looked specifically at the characteristics of offenders within youth serving organizations. Research has also noted the existence of professional perpetrators and the threat they pose to youth serving organizations, leading to an increased focus on policies and procedures for screening members (Saul & Audage, 2007). It is indeed important to focus on implementing policies and procedures designed to protect youth, but it is misguided to create these policies and procedures without first knowing the true extent of the issue and how these offenders and incidents are similar or different from what we already know about child sexual abuse. The current study extended this literature by providing additional information about abusers within the Boy Scouts of America, noting who these offenders are, who their victims are, and details of the abuse incident.

Research has repeatedly found that child sexual abuse is an important issue in youth serving organizations (Wolfe et al., 2003; Shakeshaft, 2004; Beck et al., 2010). Despite this, information on how these organizations respond to abuse allegations and the effectiveness of

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policies implemented to protect youth members is sorely lacking. To date, no studies have been conducted on the organizational responses of youth serving organizations to allegations of child sexual abuse within their organization. This study represented the first examination of how a youth serving organization learned of abuse allegations, how they responded to these allegations, and the policies and procedures they put in place to prevent abuse by organization members.

While traditional organizational theories, such as institutional theory, have been used in organizational psychology literature to explain how internal and external factors influence how organizations function, very little research has addressed how organizational theories could explain why and how organizations respond to deviance by their members. Ultimately, the internal and external factors that influence an organization's development and functioning may also play an important role in dictating how that same organization will address deviance by members within its ranks. The current study was the first to apply organizational theories to explain how the Boy Scouts of America responded to abuse allegations and how the organization's development and relationship with outside society influenced their actions. The results of the study suggested that organizations are not completely divorced from the larger environment in which they find themselves, especially when determining how to respond to deviance. In the case of the Boy Scouts, the desire to maintain organizational legitimacy and avoid stigmatization resulting from widespread knowledge of abuse within the organization led the BSA to ignore laws requiring mandatory reporting of child abuse allegations in favor of internal removal of the individual. By doing this, the BSA exhibited symbolic management of societal expectations, claiming to take appropriate action to protect youth and respond quickly to abuse allegations. In reality focus was placed on removing these individuals and maintaining the organization's moral standing in society. These findings hint at a more complex relationship

between organizations and the larger environment that could be useful in explaining how other types of organizations respond to other forms of deviance.

The current study also expanded research on the rationalizations used by organizations to justify action taken in response to deviance. Techniques of neutralization created by Sykes and Matza have been modified to apply to organizational responses to corruption, resulting in seven rationalization tactics. While these tactics have been applied to organizational responses to corruption, these studies have mostly focused on forms of white-collar crime and corruption within larger organizations (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Anand et al., 2005; Rabl & Kuhlmann 2009). This study represented the first time rationalization tactics were used to explain organizational responses to child sexual abuse. The findings indicated that rationalization tactics were in fact employed by the BSA to justify the action taken against alleged abusers and that the use of these rationalizations remained constant throughout the years for which cases were available. Content analysis of the 250 files ranging from the 1960s to the early 1990s showed that throughout all of these decades the organization repeatedly relied on these justifications when deciding how to act. They provided internal justification to BSA officials as well as external justification to individuals outside the organization. The BSA results also shed light on how deviance, or in this case the refusal to report child sexual abuse allegations, became institutionalized and normalized within the organization. This is especially important given the fact that organizational deviance often requires a unified response from numerous individuals within the organization, who outside of the organization would be considered paragons of moral integrity. Only by understanding the dynamics that occur between an organization and society and those within the organization itself can we truly understand how deviance occurs at the organizational level, why it occurs, and implement policies and procedures to reduce it.

Although this study was exploratory in nature, it provided ample suggestions for future research. Future research should continue to address the characteristics of abusers and abuse within youth serving organizations. Although it was beyond the scope of the current study, it appears that child sexual abuse is a substantial issue in the BSA and most likely other youth serving organizations. Further research should examine personality traits, developmental experiences, and professional pathways that could distinguish offenders in youth serving organizations from non-offenders in these institutions. Research should also examine the extent to which offenders within youth serving organizations are similar or different from what is known about perpetrators of child sexual abuse in general. Research ought to distinguish individuals who offend in organizations, or those individuals who target these organizations in order to defend, from non-offenders in the organization. This categorization could also be useful in helping organizations appropriately screen volunteers and members and implement policies that can reduce the opportunity for child sexual abuse to occur.

This study represented the first examination of how a youth serving organization learned of abuse allegations and the methods chosen to respond to these allegations. Future research should continue this line of study, examining how other organizations, such as other youth serving organizations, Colleges and Universities, and the military respond to allegations of sexual abuse. Ultimately, characteristics of the abuser and incident, the method of discovery of allegations, and characteristics of the organization itself may all influence how organizations react to allegations. Future research should also examine the presence of rationalization tactics used in other organizations serving children, and in organizations in general, as a means of justify organizational responses and deviance. It is known that individuals often rely on justifications to explain their deviant actions (Sykes & Matza, 1957), and this study suggested

that organizations are not that different. Future studies would be wise to examine how organizations use these rationalizations to explain their behavior and the processes that occur to institutionalize and normalize this type of behavior within the organization. Research should also address how organizations are able to influence individual members to conform to behaviors and actions that would be viewed as deviant by society. For example, why were individual members within the Boy Scouts compliant with simply removing offenders rather than referring these individuals to law enforcement? This dissertation has provided ample areas for future research, and also provides important implications for policy within youth serving organizations.

9.2 Implications for Policy

Policies aimed at reducing sexual offending often take the form of laws focused on punishing offenders. While these laws have grown in scope, quantity, as well as unintended consequences, little research has addressed the specific responses of organizations to child sexual abuse. This research was undertaken with the goal of informing the larger scientific community as to how the culture of child focused institutions may influence their response to allegations of child sexual abuse. We also aimed to discover whether this information can be used to implement policies to prevent child sexual abuse by members and facilitate the mandatory reporting of sexual abuse by organization members.

Research has largely questioned the effectiveness of criminal background checks for employees and volunteers and educational programs, designed to teach children how to identify dangerous situations, refuse advances, and ask for help, in reducing sexual victimization. Education programs are believed to promote disclosure of abuse and understanding of appropriate and inappropriate behavior, although no studies have evaluated the extent to which

these policies actually reduce sexual victimization. Similarly, the effectiveness of criminal background checks in reducing sexual victimization has received little attention in the literature (Finkelhor, 2009).

Despite this lack of research, entities such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services have presented strategies for child sexual abuse prevention programs in youth serving organizations. These strategies usually include six key components, namely screening and selection of appropriate employees and volunteers, creating guidelines on interactions between adults and children, creating policies for monitoring behavior, ensuring safe environments, responding to inappropriate behavior and allegations/suspicions of abuse, and training organization members on child sexual abuse prevention (Saul & Audage, 2007). Based on these recommendations and the information gained from the current study, some important policy recommendations for the Boy Scouts of America are apparent.

The Boy Scout's refusal to report allegations to law enforcement officials and the lack of understanding of mandatory reporting laws suggests that changes need to be made to the way in which the organization trains individuals on mandatory reporting. In several files, it was obvious that organization members were not aware that their work with children designated them as mandatory reporters of suspected child abuse. These findings suggested the organization should include in all Youth Protection materials a detailed discussion of mandatory reporting laws and the responsibility of their members to comply with these laws, as well as in-depth training on how to identify potential indicators of abuse and the process to report allegations to appropriate authorities. In 2011, the BSA instituted mandatory reporting of all allegations of abuse within the organization to the individual in charge at the time and the local Scout Executive. While this requires that BSA officials are informed of abuse allegations, it did not mandate that anyone

aware of allegations of sexual abuse by members report to law enforcement or child protective services. This policy requires that individuals first report to the organization, who will then report allegations to the appropriate authorities. Findings that Scout Executives were unaware of the responsibility of the organization to report suspected child sexual abuse suggests that the policy that BSA members should bring suspicions to BSA officials who will then report abuse poses potential issues. From an organizational standpoint, this policy allows the Boy Scouts to determine if and when allegations are reported, shifting the responsibility from organization members to BSA officials. However, from a child protection standpoint this policy violates mandatory reporting laws. The BSA's requirement that individual members report to BSA officials rather than report directly to law enforcement adds an additional layer of reporting that could potentially inhibit the timely reporting of allegations, and in some cases allow for continued abuse to occur.

Instead, all members should be instructed that it is their duty to report to the appropriate authorities immediately upon learning of allegations. Ultimately, the Boy Scouts must place the safety and protection of their youth members above the desire to shield the organization from negative criticism resulting from publicized allegations. The Boy Scouts could follow a page from the Big Brothers Big Sisters handbook and create a manual featuring indicators of abuse, appropriate responses by organization members, and a section on the individual's role as a mandatory reporter. Doing this would certainly eliminate any confusion among BSA members as to how they should respond to allegations and allow for the prompt reporting of abuse allegations.

While the BSA instituted mandatory youth protection training for all volunteers in the organization in 2010, this dissertation found that Boy Scout professionals, including Scout

Executives, were often times the perpetrators of abuse. This suggests that all individuals within the organization, regardless of their position as a volunteer or paid member, should be required to undergo this training. Any organization featuring both adult and youth members should be aware that the power differential between adults and youth inherently creates an environment where abuse can occur. Because of this, all members of these organizations should be properly trained as to appropriate and inappropriate behavior and on how to identify possible indicators that abuse is occurring. Additionally, youth members should also be informed of what behavior is appropriate, what behavior is not appropriate, and informed of the importance of reporting inappropriate behavior when it occurs. By addressing the issue of sexual abuse head on, the BSA would make it clear to all members, adult and youth alike, that there is zero-tolerance for this type of behavior and all allegations will be taken seriously.

Results of the current study also found issues with the BSA's screening of new members and consultation of the Confidential File. Analysis of the files often found that individuals within the organization had prior criminal histories for both sexual and non-sexual offenses. The BSA instituted full criminal background checks for all professionals in 1994 and all volunteers in 2008. This should address the issue of allowing individuals with prior criminal histories into the organization. However, as noted in one of the case studies, an individual was able to successfully re-register because he claimed to already be registered in the organization. The Boy Scouts did not run these "multiple" registrations against the Confidential File. In order to close this loophole in the screening process, all individuals should be compared to the Confidential File, regardless of claims that they are already registered in another troop or council in the BSA.

Additionally, individuals were often able to re-register because of the nature of the Confidential File. The confidential files were paper copies of materials of allegations against

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BSA members submitted by local and regional BSA members to the National Council. All files were housed with the National Council, with local and regional councils having no access to the information. Only the National Council was able to refer to the Confidential File, a practice which is still in effect today. Ultimately, this system made it possible for individuals to successfully re-register. A computerized Confidential File system that could be accessed by the National Council, as well as regional and local Executives, would serve to increase the ability of local councils to screen their own registration applications. It would also reduce the length of time it took to complete this screening process. In addition, the Confidential File should feature information about the individual that can be used to successfully identify them if they re-register, such as fingerprints or Social Security Numbers. The use of fingerprint screening was suggested by one law enforcement official to the BSA and would eliminate the ability of someone placed on the Confidential File to re-register by simply changing their name.

Another important contribution of this dissertation was the examination of a specific policy instituted by the BSA to reduce instances of organizational CSA. If polices like the BSA's two-deep policy are useful tools for reducing the occurrence of institutional CSA, it would be beneficial for other youth serving organizations to adopt similar policies as a means of protecting their youth. Results of the current study revealed that the two-deep leadership policy did not reduce the number of reports. However, these findings alone cannot be used to support the claim that the policy was ineffective due to lack of information about when abuse incidents occurred within the Boy Scouts in comparison to the policy's implementation. The information available about abuse incidents within the BSA showed that they often occurred when adults had one-on-one contact with youth. This indicates that the policy may be effective in reducing the occurrence of child sexual abuse. The real determination of the effectiveness of this policy and others like it

is wholly based on the extent to which it is enforced by the organization. Although beyond the current scope of this study, research on child protection policies instituted by youth serving organizations should address the fidelity with which these policies are implemented in order to accurately determine their efficacy. Along with this, organizations need to institute quality control procedures to ensure that policies are being followed and failure to follow these policies results in immediate disciplinary action. Ultimately, the policy recommendations suggested above may be useful for the Boy Scouts of America, as well as other youth serving organizations, in an effort to protect youth members from sexual abuse.

9.3 Limitations

As with all research, there are some limitations to this dissertation. Since this dissertation was both exploratory and the first to address how the BSA responded to allegations of child sexual abuse, the ability of these findings to be generalized to other youth serving organizations, or adult serving organizations, is not ensured. In addition, the sample used only contained files on those cases that were reported to the Boy Scouts of America and were made public as a result of court rulings. This underestimates the true extent of sexual abuse within the BSA and may overestimate both formal and informal action taken by the BSA against members with abuse allegations. Another important limitation of the current study was the reliance on files which report allegations of sexual abuse, not necessarily substantiated cases. While some files feature law enforcement documents detailing that the allegations eventually led to a criminal conviction, not all files feature this. Thus, while the majority of files pertain to actual sexual abuse committed by BSA agents, it is possible that some of the files feature false allegations.

The records released by the BSA date from 1959-1991. This was a limitation of the current study because the BSA instituted policies beginning in 1994 which specifically aim to prevent the occurrence of institutional CSA. Since the files in the current dataset only range from 1959-1991, these files do not reflect any of the prevention methods taken by the BSA to reduce the occurrence of child sexual abuse within the organization. In order to determine the effect of these policies on allegations of child sexual abuse, data on allegations made after 1991 are required. The BSA themselves note on their website that:

> The Ineligible Volunteer Files maintained by the BSA have always served solely as a barrier to entry preventing those who are ineligible to serve as Scout leaders from joining or rejoining Scouting. Suggesting that they would provide any greater insight from a research perspective reflects a misunderstanding of the purpose and content of the files. The BSA believes—and independent, third-party experts have confirmed—there is nothing in the files that would further the research field or help develop a profile to prevent abuse (Boy Scouts of America, 2014).

Unless a similar lawsuit successfully requires the organization to release these files, it is unlikely that researchers will be able to examine child sexual abuse allegations within the organization dating after 1991.

The nature of the information provided in the cases also presented a limitation. The information featured in the files is based on data collected by BSA officials. Because of this, the information contained in each file differs. While some files are extensive in nature and provide more than adequate information, other files feature scant information. The difference in information contained in the files ultimately affects the reliability and validity of findings. Due to the lack of information on the issue of child sexual abuse in the Boy Scouts, the current sample

represents the most complete picture available to date. The files featured a wealth of information about abuse within the organization and the organization's response. However, there are undoubtedly factors that are not featured in the files that would shed further light on the issue of institutional child sexual abuse, including variables relating to the short and long-term consequences for victims and information about prior and post criminal behaver by these individuals. The lack of information on the exact timing of abuse also limits the ability to examine offending patterns of offenders within the organization and the relationship between when offenders joined the organization and when abuse first occurred. Further, the lack of information on when abuse occurred limits understanding of the time between when abuse incidents took place and when disclosure of the abuse first occurred.

Finally, missing data was a limitation of the current study. Meticulous and in-depth coding of all files provided rich and detailed information about abuse allegations and responses, but this was only possible when the BSA had adequately investigated allegations and included this information in the files. Ultimately, the availability of data for each case was wholly dependent on the rigor with which internal investigations were conducted by the Boy Scouts of America. As previously stated, quantitative analysis was run both with the original dataset and with missing data imputed in order to overcome the limitations of missing data.

Despite the limitations listed above, this study has the potential to shed light on how the BSA responded to allegations of child sexual abuse by organization members and provide greater insight into organizational responses to child sexual abuse. More importantly, this dissertation helped to illuminate how one very important youth serving organization, the Boy Scouts of America, handled its own CSA crisis.

9.4 Conclusion

The goal of this dissertation was threefold. First, analysis of the characteristics of offending provided insight into common offending patterns in the BSA. Second, the use of event history analysis and multivariate statistics examined how the BSA responded to allegations and how long it took them to respond to allegations of abuse, noting the factors that predicted a quicker institutional response. In addition, intervention analysis addressed the extent to which policies implemented by the Boy Scouts for the express purpose of reducing sexual abuse were effective. Finally, the use of qualitative content analysis and case study approaches allowed for a greater understanding of how the BSA responded to allegations of sexual abuse internally, including how BSA officials viewed the accused and whether this influenced the decision that was made regarding the allegations. This research represents the first step in the examination of child sexual abuse in youth serving organizations and their responses to this issue.

While the majority of studies address characteristics of offending in order to develop policies aimed specifically at offenders, this dissertation took a more innovative approach by addressing the role and dynamics of institutions in addressing allegations of CSA. By understanding the complex relationship between organizational structure, culture, and sexual abuse, perhaps we can develop policies and practices which protect youth in these youth serving institutions prior to being victimized, rather than focus on policies and procedures designed solely to respond to abuse that has already occurred. Organizations cannot be viewed as isolated from their larger environment. If organizations are viewed as isolated entities, researchers cannot truly understand why organizations respond to abuse in certain manners and how their actions are influenced by the larger society. This dissertation aimed to fill this gap in research, specifically when dealing with child sexual abuse in the BSA, and perhaps provides a framework

to study the response of other organizations to child sexual abuse and other forms of deviance by organization members.

Appendix A: Boy Scouts of America Youth Protection Policies

Boy Scouts of America Youth Protection Policies Timeline

Year	Above timeline	Below timeline
1911		Character reference checks required for all scoutmasters
1913	Scoutmasters and Scouts required to register	
1920s		All volunteers cross-referenced against list of 'ineligible volunteers'
1987	BSA develops camp staff training and two-deep policy	
1991		BSA prohibits 1-on-1 adult and youth activities
1994	BSA requires criminal background checks for all professionals	
2003		BSA conducts 3rd party computerized criminal background checks and introduces online training
2008	Full criminal background checks required for all volunteers	
2010		Youth protection training made mandatory for all adult members and required every two years
2011	Mandatory reporting of child abuse required	

Appendix B: Operationalizations of Rationalization Tactics

Study	Subject Matter	Sample	Operationalization
Elliason & Dodder (1999)	Deer Poaching	Survey of 42 poachers; in-depth interviews with 20 poachers and 5 game wardens	*Denial of Responsibility*- situation as mistake or accident; didn't know the law prohibited it; laws not written clearly *Metaphor of the Ledger*- good person in spite of the incident, good qualities make up for this one instance *Defense of Necessity*- they needed the deer meet to feed themselves and their family *Condemnation of the Condemners*- Believed the game wardens hunted deer illegally as well
Cressey (1953)	Embezzlement	133 convicted embezzlers	*Denial of Injury*- only borrowing the money and going to pay it back, no actual harm caused
Conklin (1977)	White-collar offenders	N/A	*Condemnation of condemners*- government impedes efforts through strict regulation of business practices, inhibits free enterprise *Appeal to Higher loyalties*- absorbed in workplace climate that has success and accomplishments as higher loyalties than government regulations
Greenberg (1990)	Employee theft	143 nonunion employees at manufacturing plants	*Denial of Victim*- employer didn't give raise to they deserved victimization
Friedrichs (1996)	White collar crime	N/A	*Denial of Responsibility*- pollution laws are too complex or vague; pollution happened by accident, forced to do so by superiors
Copes, Vieraitis, & Jochum (2007)	Reid Interrogations of Identity thieves	59 federally convicted identity thieves	*Denial of Injury*-it didn't hurt anyone, different than normal crime because with identity theft there is no real harm and they can repair the damage easily *Denial of Victim*- large, faceless organization that deserved victimization *Appeal to Higher Loyalties*- they

			are actually trying to help people, "for the safety of my kids"
			Denial of Responsibility- only played a minimal role, "really didn't do anything"
Piquero, Tibbetts, & Blankenship (2005)	Corporate offending in the promotion and sales of a hypothetical pharmaceutical drug	133 MBA students	*Denial of Injury-* "the government exaggerates the danger to consumers from most products" *Condemnation of condemners-* "government regulations impede business" *Appeal to Higher Loyalties-* "profit is emphasized above everything else at my place of work" *Denial of Victim-* "caveat emptor' (let the buyer beware) is the motto of my employer" *Denial of Responsibility-* "where I work, it is all right to do anything to make profit unless it is against the law"
Ashforth & Anand (2003)	Organizational corruption	N/A	*Legality-* the behavior is not actually illegal *Denial of Responsibility-* no other choice, forced to participate due to factors beyond their control *Denial of Injury-* didn't cause harm, organization is insured *Denial of Victim-* they deserved what happened or participated, the victim is dehumanized *Social Weighting-* they compare themselves to a selective social comparison *Appeal to Higher Loyalties-* have to sacrifice to realize higher values *Metaphor of the Ledger-* entitled to act corruptly because of accrued good works *Refocusing Attention-* suppress knowledge of acts or compartmentalize wrongdoing
Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi (2005)	Organizational corruption	N/A	*Denial of Responsibility-* "What can I do? My arm is being twisted" *Denial of Injury-* "No one was really harmed," "It could have been

			worse"
			Denial of Victim- "They deserved it," "They chose to participate"
			Social Weighting- "You have not right to criticize," "Others are worse than we are"
			Appeal to Higher Loyalties- "We answered to a more important cause"
			Metaphor of the Ledger- "We've earned the right"
Rabl & Kuhlmann (2009)	Corporate corruption	196 German University students	*Legality*- "It's not written anywhere that this is not allowed"
			Denial of Responsibility- "It was the only chance to increase our profit," "Everybody does it"
			Denial of Injury- "It didn't harm anybody. It paid off for everybody," "It was only about relatively small amounts"
			Denial of Victim- "Because of the competitors? It doesn't matter that they once also get the short end of the stick," "Why? Because of the competitors who miss out? That's business"
			Social Weighting- "To get orders, others are doing things that are even worse"
			Appeal to Higher Loyalties- "I only did everything to increase the order situation and the income of our company," "I only tried to maintain a good business relationship with a good customer"
			Metaphor of the Ledger- "Why shouldn't I take advantage of the good business relationship I developed over several years"
			Refocusing Attention- "After all I got the order for our business"

Appendix C: Boy Scouts of America Ineligible Files Codebook

Variable Name	*Values*	*Missing Values*
BOXID	Enter number of the BOX	No missing values
FILEID	Enter last 4 digits of the PDF file	No missing values
CASEID	Computed from BOX+FILE ID	No missing values
FILEDATE (Date on Record Sheet)	Enter date from record sheet mm/dd/yyyy *Date that ineligible file was created for individual by BSA	-99
FYEAR (file year)	Enter year of filing from record sheet	-99
CITY	Enter City name	-99
STATE	Enter 2-character State Name	-99
AGE (Age of accused)	Enter age of accused	-99
RELIGION (of accused)	Enter Religion of accused from record sheet	-99
NATIONALITY (of accused)	Enter Nationality of accused from record sheet	-99
OCCUPATION	Enter Occupation from record sheet	-99
INTERESTS	Enter "Interests" from record sheet	-99
CHARACT	Enter "Outstanding characteristics" from record sheet	-99

		-99
MARRIED (Yes if ever married)	1 = Yes 2 = No	
CHILDREN (How many children does the Abuser have?)		-99
Ls1month (month registered)	1=January 5=May 9=September 2= February 6=June 10= October 3=March 7=July 11=November 4=April 8=August 12=December	-99
Ls1year (year registered)	Enter YEAR REGISTERED from the Life Scout entry on the record sheet	-99
LSDATE1 (date registered)	Enter DATE REGISTERED from the Life Scout entry on the record sheet	-99
Ls2month (month resigned)	1=January 5=May 9=September 2= February 6=June 10= October 3=March 7=July 11=November 4=April 8=August 12=December	-99
Ls2year (year resigned)	Enter YEAR RESIGNED from the Life Scout entry on the record sheet	-99
LSDATE2 (date resigned)	Enter DATE RESIGNED from the Life Scout entry on the record sheet	-99
ABDATE1 (BSA abuse start date)	Enter date BSA abuse started –only if a date is given - in form mm/dd/yyyy	-99
ABDATE2 (BSA abuse end date)	Enter date BSA abuse ended –only if a date is given - in form mm/dd/yyyy	-99
YEARFIRST (first year of abuse)	Enter first year of abuse if no specific data is given - in form yyyy	-99

YEARLAST (last year of abuse)	Enter last year of abuse if no specific data is given - in form yyyy	-99
RPTDATE (Date abuse was first reported to ANY BSA member)	Enter date abuse was reported to BSA–only if a date is given in form mm/dd/yyyy	-99
BSARESPO (How did the BSA respond to allegations of abuse?)	1- Referral to law enforcement 2- Referral to mental health treatment 3- Removal from the organization 4- Other	-99
BSARESP2 (Second response if applicable)	1- Referral to law enforcement 2- Referral to mental health treatment 3- Removal from the organization 4- Other	-99

DISCLO1 (To whom was abuse first disclosed?)	Victim	01	-99
	Teacher	02	List values for 10 (Other):
	Cleric	03	_____
	Parent/Guardian	04	_____
	Police officer (Any CRJ)	05	_____
	Lay person (include friends)	06	_____
	Doctor	07	_____
	Victim's attorney	08	_____
	Self-reported	09	_____
	Other	10	
	Siblings/other family	11	
	Anonymous	12	
	Counselor/Therapist	13	

DISCLOT (who reported abuse as text)	Enter text of who reported abuse		-99
ALLHOW	Called BSA	01	-99 = data missing

(How was abuse reported?)	Sent a letter	02	List values for 13 (Other):
	Sent anon. letter	03	_____
	In person	04	_____
	Media	05	_____
	Legal filing	06	_____
	BSA contacted victim	07	_____
	Other unrelated adult	08	_____
	Accused self-report	09	_____
	Police/any CRJ auth	10	
	SNAP, victim hotline	11	
	School representative	12	
	Other	13	

ALLHOWT (how was abuse reported-text**)**	Enter source of reported abuse as text.	-99

ABUSHIST (Number of events of abuse in reported case)	Once = 1 More than once (2 to 3 times) = 2 Numerous times (more than 3 times) = 3	-99 = data missing

ABUSECT (Actual count of abuse events, if available)	1=1 4= 4 2=2 5=5 3=3	-99 = data missing -77 = don't know

FEMVIC (Any evidence of female victims)	Female =2 Transexual=3	9 = data missing

MULTIPLE (Any evidence of other victims)	Yes = 1 No = 2	-99

NUMBER (Number of victims)	Enter number of victims	-99

AGEVENT1 (Age of first victim at time of event, or when abuse began)	Enter age of victim at beginning of abuse If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13, enter the midpoint - 12.5)	-99

		-99
AGEATEND1 (Age of first victim when abuse ended)	Enter age of 1st victim at end of abuse If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13, enter the midpoint - 12.5)	
AGEVENT2 (Age of second victim at time of event, or when abuse began)	Enter age of 1st victim at start of abuse If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13, enter the midpoint - 12.5)	-99
AGEATEND2 (Age of second victim when abuse ended)	Enter age of 2nd victim at end of abuse If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13, enter the midpoint - 12.5)	-99
AGEEVENT3 (Age of third victim at time of event, or when abuse began)	Enter age of 3rd victim at beginning of abuse If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13, enter the midpoint - 12.5)	-99
AGEATEND3 (Age of second victim when abuse ended)	Enter age of 3rd victim at end of abuse If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13, enter the midpoint - 12.5)	-99
AGEVENT4 (Age of third victim when abuse ended)	Enter age of 4th victim at beginning of abuse If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13, enter the midpoint - 12.5)	-99
AGEATEND4 (Age of third victim when abuse ended)	Enter age of 4th victim at end of abuse If an age range is given (i.e., 12-13, enter the midpoint - 12.5)	-99

CONNECT (How did abuser first meet victim?)	BSA group 01 Pre BSA 02 Other 03	-99 = data missing

CONNECTT (How did abuse first meet victim text)	Enter text of how abuser met victim		
DUTY (What was the abusers role in BSA at time of abuse)	Scoutmaster Assistant Scoutmaster Boy scout professional Other	01 02 03 04	-99 = data missing
DUTYT(Abusers role in BSA text)	Enter text of abusers role in BSA		
SOCIAL1 (Did the abuser socialize with the victim outside BSA?)	Yes = 1 No = 2 No information = 3		-99 = data missing -88 = not applicable (no family)
SOCIAL2 Type of socializing	Work on Merit Badge Time in Abuser's residence Rides home Vacations Camping Sports Other Visits to victim's home	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 10	-99 = data missing -88 = not applicable (If answer to Q18 is 2) List values for 7 (Other): _____ _____ _____
SOCIALT (social behavior text)	Enter text of social behavior		
GIFTS (Victim given gifts?)	Yes = 1 No = 2		-99
GIFTTYPE (Type of gift as text)	Type of gift – write in the kind of gift		-99
ENTICE (Victim given other enticements?)	Yes = 1 No = 2		-99
ENTICETYPE (type of enticement as text)	Type of enticement, write it in		-99

PORN (Did the abuser share pornography?)	Yes = 1 No = 2	-99
PORNTYPE (Type of pornography as text)	Type of porn, write it in	-99
RPORNTYPE (Recoded Porntype)	Magazines 01 Photos 02 Videos 03 Photos & Videos 04 Other 05	-99 = data missing (Use only if PORN = 1 and there is no further information)
ABEHAV – ABEHAV2 (Type of behavior alleged by victim – with 20 values: Enter the most serious in for first variable, then add any others to the next two)	Verbal 01 Abuser disrobed 02 Victim disrobed 03 Hugs and kissing 04 Photos of victim 05 Sexual games 06 Unspecified sexual abuse 07 Touch over abuser's clothes 08 Touch over victim's clothes 09 Touch under abuser's clothes 10 Touch under victim's clothes 11 Abuser perform oral sex 12 Vic performed oral sex 13 Masturbation 14 Mutual masturbation 15 Manual penetration 16 Group sex or coerced se 17 Penetration or attempt 18 Penetration w/object 19 Other 20	Missing = -99 List values for 19 (Other): _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
ABEHAVT (abuse behavior text)	Enter abuse behavior as text	
VTHREAT (Victim threatened?)	Yes = 1 No = 2	-99

VTHREAT2 (If yes to Q21, what type of threat?)	Phys. threat w/weapon Phys. threat w/o weapon Verbal Other (i.e.- merit badges) None	1 2 3 4 5	-99 = data missing Use if VTHREAT = 1 but no further info
VTHREATT(victim threatened text)	Enter text of victim threat		
AOCCUR1- AOCCUR2 (Where was the abuse reported to have happened)	In church In victim's home In school In a hotel room Retreat house Abuser's home Abuser's office In the hospital In a car Vacation house Outings/camp/park/pool Other In tent No Record / unknown Congregate residence In other residences (cleric's friends, family)	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	-99 List values for 12 (Other): _____ _____ _____ _____

atime1 – atime2 (When did the abuse reportedly occur?)	During a retreat	1	-99 List values for 11 (Other): _____ _____ _____ _____
	Church service (before, during, after)	2	
	During travel	3	
	During counseling	4	
	During social event	5	
	During reconciliation	6	
	During sporting event	7	
	During other travel	8	
	Outings	9	
	School hours (before, during, after)	10	
	Other	11	
	No record / unknown	12	
	Abuser visited home	13	
	Visiting/working at Abuser's home	14	
		15	
	Hospital visit	16	
atimet (where did abuse reportedly occur as text)	Enter text of where abuse occurred		
TIME (At what time of day did the abuse occur?)	Morning	1	
	Afternoon	2	
	Evening	3	
	Overnight	4	
Guardian (How many individuals were present while abuse occurred?)	1=1 2=2 3=3		-99
Guardian2 (was another adult present when abuse occurred?)	Yes = 0 No=1		-99
VLIVE (Who did the victim live with when	Mother only	01	-99 = data missing -77 = not known
	Father only	02	
	Both parents	03	
	Brother(s)	04	

abused?)	Sister(s)	05	List values for 11 (Other): _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
	Other guardian	06	
	Grandparents	07	
	Boarding school	08	
	Foster parents	09	
	Orphanage/institution	10	
	Other	11	
VLIVET (Who did victim live with when abused, text)	Enter text of who victim lived with when abused		
SIBLINGS (Any siblings abused?)	Yes = 0 No = 1		-99
DRUGSV (Victim used drugs, alcohol?)	Yes = 0 No = 1		-99
DRUGSA (Abuser used drugs, alcohol?)	Yes = 0 No = 1		-99
POLICE (BSA reported the abuse to police?)	Yes = 0 No = 1		-99 = data missing
POLICE2 (Police reported to BSA?)	Yes = 0 No = 1		-99 = data missing
CHARGE (Abuser charged criminally?)	Yes = 0 No = 1		-99 = data missing

ABPREBSA (Evidence of sexual abuse of youth/peers before BSA incident?)	Yes = 0 No = 1	-99= data missing
NARRATIV (Does this file have more narrative information about the abuse case?)	Yes = 0 No = 1	-99
NARRATIVT (narrative text)	Enter narrative	
SCOUTRE (Scout related offense; Was the victim a scout?)	Yes = 0 No = 1	-99
INCEST (Is there any indication of incest by the abuser? NOTE: This could be past incest or incest in the current offense.)	Yes = 0 No = 1	-99
OTHCRIMES (Is there evidence that the accused has committed other, non-sexual crimes?)	Yes = 0 No = 1	-99
REGISTER (Did the accused try to re-register at any time with the BSA?)	Yes = 0 No = 1	-99
REGION4 Region in 4 categories	1=Northeast 2= Midwest 3= South 4= West 8 = Not Applicable 99 - Missing	-99

REGION9 Region in 9 Categories	1= New England 2= Middle Atlantic 3 = East North Central 4 =South Atlantic 5 = East South Central 6 = West South Central 7 = West North Central 8 = Mountain 9 = Pacific 88 = Not Applicable 99= Missing	-99
VICTOTAL (Total number of victims)		-99
ADULTVICS (Total number of adult victims		-99
CHILDVICS (Total number of child victims)		-99
NONSEX (Nonsexual offenses present?)	1= yes 0 = no	-99
SEXUALOFF (Sexual offenses present)	1= yes 0 = no	-99
PROPERTYOFF (Property offenses present?)	1= yes 0 = no	-99
CODER		-99
Time_to_File (Time from report to creation of file, days)		-99
LOBSA_DAYS (Length of BSA Registration in Days)		-99
LOBSA_YEAR (Length of BSA Registration in years)		-99

LOABUSE_DAYS (Length of abuse in days)		-99
LOABUSE_YEARS (Length of abuse in years)		-99
FORMAL (Formal versus informal method of response)	0= Informal 1= Formal	-99
CHILD_YN (Binary measure of if abuser has children)	0= No 1= Yes	-99
ABEHAV_B (Binary measure of Abuse type)	0= Explicit sexual contact 1= Clothed verbal or physical contact	-99
ABUSEHIST_R (Binary measure of abuse cts)	0=One to three times 1= More than three times	-99
TIME_R (Binary measure of time to file)	0= One year or less 1= More than one year	-99
RATION1 (Was a rationalization tactic used by the BSA in response to the abuse?)	Yes = 0 No = 1 Unknown=2	-99
RATION2 (Which rationalization tactic was used?)	0= legality 1= denial of responsibility 2= denial of injury 3= denial of victim 4= social weighting 5= appeal to higher loyalties 6= metaphor of the ledger 7= refocusing attention 8= other 9= unknown	-99
RATIONT (Provide the actual text of the rationalization)		

Appendix D: Table of Significant Findings

Analysis	Significant Variables	Findings
Chapter Five		
Descriptives Chi-square	Abuser Has Children Nonsexual Offenses Present Married Female Victims Incest Scout Related Abuser Used Drugs Prior CSA Region	-The majority of BSA offenders were younger (under 40 years) and served as Scoutmasters -The majority of abuse incidents was isolated incidents and most files featured more serious abuse when information was available -The BSA most often learned of abuse from in person reporting -The majority of victims first disclosed their abuse to their parents or immediate guardian -The BSA was more likely to handle cases informally through the use of removal from the organization - Whether the offender was married, had children, had evidence of non-sexual offenses, used alcohol or drugs, their duty within the organization, and if the allegation was against a scout were all found to have a significant, although weak relationship, with the type of response used
ANOVA & Kruskal Wallis	--	-There was no significant difference in the time it took the BSA to create a confidential file or whether they relied on formal or informal responses across council regions
Chapter Six		
Survival Analysis	Scout Related	-The median survival time for offenders before a file was created was 24.6 months - The comparison of scout related and non-scout related survival times approached significance, indicating the membership of the victim may have influenced how long it took to create a file

Logistic Regression	Offender Age (-)	-Older offenders had a smaller likelihood of that the BSA would use a formal response
	BSA Duty (-)	-Offenders who victimized a scout were more likely to face a formal response
	Scout Related (+)	-Assistant Scoutmasters were less likely to be dealt with formally
	Nonsexual Offenses Present (-)	-The BSA was less likely to use a formal response against offenders who did not have allegations of non-sexual abuse
Negative Binomial Regression	Offender Age (+)	-Older offenders were more likely to feature a longer response time
	Scout Related (+)	-When the victim was a scout, the BSA took longer to respond
	Region (+)	-Councils in the Western region took longer to create files
	Police Reported to BSA (-)	-When police reported abuse allegations, the reaction time of the BSA was shorter
	Abuse Incidents Count (-)	-When more than three abuse incidents occurred, the BSA took less time to respond
	Prior CSA (+)	-Abusers who were formally charged were dealt with more quickly
	Charged (+)	-When female victims were present, the BSA took less time to respond
	Female Victims (-)	-Individuals who had prior convictions for CSA were more likely to have longer response times

Chapter Seven		
Intervention Analysis	Average Age of offender (+)	-As the offender's age increased over time, the number of reports also increased
	Two-Deep Policy (+)	-The number of allegations increased after implementation of the two-deep leadership policy

Chapter Eight		
Qualitative Content Analysis & Case Study Analysis	Rationalization Tactics	-Rationalizations were used by the BSA when justifying their response and the time it took them to respond -The most common rationalization was denial of responsibility, while the second most common was metaphor of the ledger

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