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Committed to the Cause? Violent and Financial Criminal Behaviors of Domestic Far-Rightists

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Committed To The Cause?

Violent and Financial Criminal Behaviors of Domestic Far-Rightists

By

Ashmini G. Kerodal.

A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy**.**

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Abstract

Committed To The Cause?

Violent and Financial Criminal Behaviors of Domestic Far-Rightists

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Ashmini G. Kerodal.

Advisor: Professor Joshua D. Freilich

This study used factor analysis, logistic and multinomial logistic regression analysis to evaluate the effects of an individual's level of commitment to far-right extremism on his / her criminal offending behavior. Agnew's General Strain Theory (2001, 2005), Cloward and Ohlin's Differential Opportunity Theory (1960) and Simi and Futrell's (2010) concept of free / movement spaces were used to address the three research questions: (1) What effect did individual level stressors, significant others, and negative interactions with government officials have on membership in a far-right group, (2) What effect did individual level stressors, significant others, membership in an extremist group, and negative interactions with government officials have on an individual's commitment to rightwing extremism, (3) What effect did an individual's commitment to far-right extremism, and membership in extremist groups have on his / her criminal behavior?

This study investigated whether strain factors alone influenced radicalization, or if there was a combination of strain factors – including negative interactions with law enforcement – and interactions with other extremists that influenced levels of commitment to rightwing extremism. This study defined radicalization as "the process by which individuals become violent extremists...[that is] individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to

further political, social, or religious goals" (NIJ 2012 Research on Domestic Radicalization Solicitation, p. 4).

Commitment to rightwing extremism was conceptualized as commitment to far-rightist norms, similar to Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) definition of commitment to delinquent norms or the extent of indoctrination into a deviant subculture. This variable drew on themes found in previous research on extremism (Aho, 1990; Blazak, 2001; Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 2004, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011, 2008). A factor analysis was used to check the validity of the commitment to far-right extremism scale.

Another unique characteristic of this study was that its dependent variable of criminal behavior included both violent (i.e., fatal) incidents and financial schemes. Data were obtained from the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), a Department of Homeland Security/START-funded project led by Dr. Joshua D. Freilich and Dr. Steven Chermak. Illegal violent incidents and financial schemes committed by domestic extremist that resulted in criminal charged were included in the ECDB. Violent incidents were defined as homicides, and financial schemes were defined as "illicit financial operation[s] involving a set of activities [i.e. techniques] carried out by one or more perpetrators to obtain unlawful gain or other economic advantage through the use of deliberate deception" (Belli, 2011, p. 64).

The study found that GST did not predict membership in extremist groups, but was associated with a higher risk of committing a homicide. Group membership was predicted by access to extremist groups and a possible predisposition or sympathy towards extremist beliefs. However, none of the theories explained levels of commitment to extremism. Instead, differences were found between two types of DFRs: Conspiracy Theorists and Proud Supremacists. Conspiracy Theorists were more likely to have been non-white and employed,

while Proud Supremacists were more likely to have been white males who experienced strain and had extremist referent others. Finally, the presence of strain and a prior prison record were associated with violent criminal behavior of DFRs. High levels of commitment to extremism, female gender, and the absence of strain (i.e., held a good job and did not have prior negative interactions with government officials) were associated with an increased risk of financial offending behavior.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Mom, Sal and Ralph: thank you for your unending supply of love, patience and support. I was not always easy to live with, but you never lost faith in me.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study examined variables that influenced commitment to rightwing extremist ideology, group membership and criminal behavior of Domestic Far-Rightists (DFRs) between 2006 and 2010. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, research on international, transnational (e.g., Enders & Sandler, 2005; Sandler & Enders, 2004; Smilansky, 2004) and domestic terrorism, perpetrated by radical Islamic fundamentalists (e.g., Jenkins, 2010; Vidino, 2009), has flourished, while research on the domestic far-right has been less frequently studied. However, domestic extremists also pose a threat. Acts of domestic terrorism have been found to outnumber transnational events by as much as 7 to 1 (LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan, Fogg & Scott, 2006). Domestic extremists, including DFRs and Al Qaeda-inspired Islamic extremists, have committed more than 700 financial schemes since 1990 (Freilich, Chermak, Belli, Gruenewald & Parkin, 2014). These financial schemes resulted in financial losses in excess of $650,000,000 (Freilich, et al., 2014). DFRs were responsible for close to 80% of these financial schemes (Freilich, et al., 2014) and the majority of these financial losses.

DFRs have been known to engage in a range of political and criminal activities in addition to acts of terrorism and terrorism-financing crimes. These activities aim to inspire social and political change through both legal channels (e.g., writing petitions and lobbying) and illegal means, such as acts of terrorism (Aho, 1990; Hamm, 1993; Simi, 2010; Smith, 1994). DFRs have committed more than 370 homicides between 1990 and 2010 (Freilich, et al., 2014). These homicide incidents were responsible for the deaths of more than 600 people (Freilich, et al., 2014). This figure included deaths attributed to hate crimes and acts of terrorism. Approximately 10% of all DFR's homicide victims were law enforcement personnel, correctional officers or

private security guards (Freilich, et al., 2014). These findings indicated that DFRs posed an additional threat to law enforcement (Chermak, Freilich & Simone Jr., 2010; Freilich & Chermak, 2009; "Officer Safety and Extremists," n.d.).

This study filled a gap in the terrorism literature by using factor analysis, logistic regression analysis and multinomial logistic regression analysis to determine: (1) if individual level stressors, the presence of extremist friends / family and prior negative interactions with government officials influenced membership in formal extremist groups; (2) if individual level stressors, the presence of extremist friends / family and prior negative interactions with government officials influenced commitment to rightwing extremism; and (3) the impact of commitment to rightwing extremist ideology and group membership on criminal behavior. Criminal behavior was operationalized as involvement in a homicide incident or in a financial scheme. For the purpose of this study, homicide was defined as when a person purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently caused the death of another human being (MPC § 210.1) in which at least one perpetrator was affiliated with the far-right (Freilich, et al, 2014; Gruenewald, 2011), and a financial scheme was defined as an "illicit financial operation involving a set of activities [i.e., techniques] carried out by one or more perpetrators to obtain unlawful gain or other economic advantage through the use of deliberate deception" (Belli, 2011, p.64).

Agnew's (2005) General Strain Theory (GST) of crime, Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) Differential Opportunity Theory and Simi, and Futrell's (2010) concept of free / movement spaces provided a theoretical framework for the study (a detailed discussion of these theories and related concepts can be found in chapter 2).

This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this project's innovative design measures DFRs' commitment to extreme ideology on a continuum. Studies that have

looked at extremism and radicalization typically separate individuals into two categories: radicalized or not radicalized. This method does not capture whether criminal behavior was influenced by *levels of commitment* to an extremist ideology. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that fully indoctrinated members of a deviant subculture were more committed to the delinquent norms of that sub-culture and less constrained by the beliefs and values of conventional society. Although differential opportunity theory has been extensively tested in relation to youth gangs, no previous study has attempted to empirically test Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) argument on far-right (FR) groups. Instead, it was merely assumed that people who were more committed to an extremist cause are also more willing to risk death, injury or criminal charges in support of that cause.

Second, this project tested Agnew's General Strain Theory (GST) on a random sample of DFRs and with an individual level (micro) unit measurement. Previous studies on the DFR have examined strain conditions by means of observation (e.g., Ezekiel, 1995; Simi & Futrell, 2010) and interviews (e.g., Aho, 1990; Blazak, 2001; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993) in non-random samples. This dissertation was the first quantitative examination of GST and terrorism that utilized an individual level unit of analysis on a representative sample of DFRs.

The sample consisted of all known DFRs who were convicted of a violent or financial crime that occurred (all or in part) between 2006 and 2010. The sample was obtained from the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which was created from open source documents. It could be argued that since the media did not provide equal coverage to all crimes, the possibility of missing cases and non-random selection would be a concern. However, Chermak, Freilich, Parkin and Lynch (2011) found that when multiple open source documents were used, the victim, suspect and incident information tended to be reliable. Therefore, Chermak, et al. (2011)

concluded that a sample drawn from a wide range of open source documents would be representative of the population.

A key variable tested in this study was prior negative interactions with government officials, which included law enforcement and court officials. Therefore, evidence-based recommendations were formulated to reduce the radicalizing effects of negative interactions with government officials. Prior research found that negative interactions with government officials could have inspired far-rightists (or borderline far-rightists) to become more radicalized (Aho, 1990). This is likely to occur if far-rightists interpreted law enforcement behavior as evidence of the validity of their rightwing extremist ideology.

Fourth, this study was the first to simultaneously examine violent and financial crimes committed by extremists, in this case far-rightists. Previous studies on the criminal behavior of DFRs have examined: (1) far-rightists who commit acts of terrorism (e.g., LaFree & Dugan, 2007; LaFree, Dugan, Fogg & Scott, 2006; LaFree, Morris & Dugan, 2010; Smith 1994); (2) hate crimes (e.g., Green, Glaser & Rich, 1998; Gruenewald, 2011; Gruenewald & Pridemore, 2012; Hamm, 1993); and (3) general terrorism financing and other financial crimes (e.g., Belli, 2011). Therefore, a more complete picture of the criminal behavior of far-rightists was obtained. DFRs have been charged with a range of criminal behavior, such as money laundering, hate crimes, homicide, tax evasion and non-ideological or common crimes (Belli, 2011; Freilich, et al, 2014; Smith, 1994; Smith, Damphousse, Jackson & Sellers, 2002). Knowledge of the range of criminal behaviors committed by the far-right was especially important as hard control measures (i.e., crack downs) by law enforcement may have unintended consequences or a negligible effect (Chermak, Freilich & Caspi, 2009a; Lum, Leslie & Sherley, 2006).

This study examined all known far-rightists who were convicted of a homicide or financial scheme that occurred during the years 2006 to 2010, as well as their non-extremist co-offenders. Non-extremist offenders were an important comparison group, since Aho (1990), Blee (2002) and Chermak (2002) all mentioned the importance of 'seekers' (Aho's term) as an initial step in the radicalization process. (See literature review section for discussion.) Unlike homicides, financial schemes could have lasted for prolonged periods. To have been included in the study, at least a portion of the crime must have occurred during 2006 to 2010. The cut-off point was set at 2010 to allow for sufficient time for the trial to conclude. Homicides and financial schemes perpetrated for ideological or non-ideological motives were included in the study, which facilitated comparisons between far-rightists who offend to obtain some social/political end and far-rightists who were convicted of routine (non-ideologically motivated) crimes. Results from the ECDB found that 40% of both financial schemes and homicide incidents perpetrated by far-rightists were not motivated by their extremist ideology (Freilich, et al., 2014). These findings suggest that both ideologically and non-ideologically motivated crimes by DFRs should be analyzed to obtain an accurate picture of far-rightists' criminal behavior patterns and to create successful crime prevention policies (Chermak, Freilich & Simone, 2010).

Data on prior offenses were used to determine patterns of far-rightists' offending behavior over the life-course and whether offending behavior was influenced by interactions with government officials. The ECDB found that about 40% of DFRs who committed an ideologically based homicide had also committed a prior crime, 90% of which were not ideologically motivated (Freilich, et al., 2014). These data had intriguing implications, as they suggested that interactions with law enforcement (e.g., arrest, trial and conviction) contributed to individuals' subsequent level of commitment to rightwing extremism and criminal behavior. If

interactions with law enforcement further radicalized DFRs, then a more strategic approach to curtailing their financial and violent crime should be formulated.

Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the American far-right movement. This overview formed the basis for operationalizing a key variable for this study: commitment to rightwing extremism. The discussion of the far-right is followed by the study's theoretical framework: Agnew's General Strain Theory (2001, 2005), Cloward and Ohlin's Differential Opportunity Theory (1960) and Simi and Futrell's (2010) concept of free or movement spaces. Chapter 3 discusses the relevant literature about factors that contribute to membership in far-rightist groups, commitment / indoctrination into those groups and the criminal behavior of DFRs. Chapter 4 lists the study's research questions and hypotheses, all firmly grounded in the theoretical framework and literature that is presented in chapter 3. Chapter 5 describes the methodology used in the study. In this chapter, detailed explanations of the variables, the sources of data and sampling techniques, and statistical models used to test the research questions are described. Chapter 6 presents the study's findings for the three research models. These findings are discussed in Chapter 7, along with the relevance of the study to the terrorism literature and its limitations. The conclusion, which summarized the study's findings, contribution to the literature and recommendations, are presented in Chapter 8.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 The Far-right

Based on a systematic review of scholarly literature on right-wing extremism, Freilich, Chermak and Caspi (2009a) defined the ideology the far-right movement as:

> fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation), anti-global, suspicious of centralized federal authority, reverent of individual liberty (especially their right to own guns, be free of taxes), believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal liberty, believe that one's personal and/or national ''way of life'' is under attack and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent (sometimes such beliefs are amorphous and vague, but for some the threat is from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group), and believe in the need to be prepared for an attack by participating in paramilitary preparations, training and survivalism (p. 499).

Several researchers have argued that the FR should have been conceptualized as a social movement – linked by hate sites, movement and other social events, 'zines and music –with a distinct sub-culture and ideological beliefs (Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Some of the characteristics of the far-right, described as a belief in freedom from undue government intervention and the inviolability of constitutional rights, are present to a lesser extent among mainstream conservatives. For example, the right to bear arms is conferred by the Second Amendment to the US Constitution; taxation without representation in the British Parliament was one of the causes of the American Revolution; and the phrase "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" was contained in the US Declaration of Independence. For that reason, Freilich, et al. (2009a) cautioned that care must be taken to distinguish the far-right from mainstream conservative movements and the Christian right.

One of the key distinguishing factors of the far-right is the belief in conspiracy theories. Several authors have noted the importance of conspiracy theories to far-right ideology (Aho, 1990; Barkun, 1989, 1996; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006; Durham, 1996, 2003; Ezekiel, 1995; Freilich, et al., 2009; Kaplan, 1995a, 1997; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000). These conspiracy theories are diverse, complex and not subscribed to by mainstream conservative movements, for example the New World Order (NWO) and Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG). According to Chermak (2002), the NWO is a plan orchestrated by the UN and international bankers, leaders and organizations to create a global nation and end the sovereignty of the US. Kaplan (1995a) described the ZOG as the belief that both the federal government and predominant culture were controlled by a Jewish conspiracy. Therefore, belief in conspiracy theories was a key indicator used to distinguish DFRs from mainstream conservatives.

In addition to the belief in conspiracy theories, DFRs such as Christian Identity adherents, Klan and Neo-Nazi group members also believe in white supremacy, i.e., the God-given right of the white/Aryan race to rule other races (Aho, 1990; Barkun, 1989, 2000; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006; Blee, 2002; Hamm, 1993; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000), or are opposed to race mixing in schools, communities or relationships (Blee, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006; Simi, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Ezekiel (1995) and Blee (2002) argued that most people subscribe to a certain level of racist beliefs. Blee (2002) used Philomena Essed's concept of *everyday racism* to describe this phenomena. Blee (2002) argued that racist groups transform everyday racism into *extraordinary racism*, which is an "ideology that interprets and gives meaning to a wide variety of phenomena that seem unconnected to race, ranging from the global economy and the growth of media monopolies to more immediate

personal issues such as the quality of family life, city services, and medical care" (2002, p. 76). Blee's (2002) description of the actual transformation process of everyday racism into extraordinary racism is very similar to Simi and Futrell's (2010) concept of free spaces (see section 2.3 below for discussion).

However, others have argued that the idea of white supremacy may not have been shared by all DFRs (Barkun, 1996; Gruenewald, Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (2006) pointed out that while some DFRs subscribe to white supremacist beliefs, others may be white separatists. White separatists believe that the Aryan race should have separate economic and cultural lives from other racial groups. In addition, Barkun (1996) noted that some militia groups claimed to accept non-white members. Some DFRs consider racial minorities to be a minor concern and instead are anti-Semitic. However, other researchers of rightwing extremism (e.g., Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993) have argued that members of racist groups (i.e., the Klans, skinhead and neo-Nazi groups) are more concerned with the threat posed by minorities and are socialized into anti-Semitism and belief in the ZOG by movement leaders. Thus, extreme racism and/or anti-Semitism could also be used to distinguish DFRs from mainstream conservative movements.

According to Ezekiel (1995), leaders and lieutenants in the domestic far-right tend to be lifelong members of the movement, but may branch off to form new factions / groups. Members also move between groups and may be loosely linked to multiple groups at the same time (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Ezekiel, 1995; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Vertigans, 2007). Membership in the far-right movement could be divided into: (1) ordinary or casual members, who are not fanatical, but instead are motivated by the thrill of being a member of the group (Ezekiel, 1995; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011); (2) the loose cannon, who is easily motivated

toward violence and is radicalized, but could not see the big picture (Ezekiel, 1995); (3) the terrorists; and (4) the senior members, which includes the leaders and lieutenants, who are usually more educated than the other members (Ezekiel, 1995; Smith, 1990).

With the use of negative interactions with government officials and interactions with extremist others, this study examined whether casual members evolved into loose cannons (committed non-ideologically motivated violent or financial crimes) or terrorists (committed ideologically motivated violent or financial crimes). This study also examined whether an individual's level of commitment to extremism was related to his/her criminal offending behavior.

General Strain Theory (Agnew, 2001, 2005), Differential Opportunity Theory (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) and free or movement spaces (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010) are discussed in the next section. These theories provided a framework for selecting the research questions, operationalizing the variables and selecting the data analysis techniques. Finally, an illustration of the theoretical framework is presented.

2.2 General Strain Theory

In his General Strain theory (GST), Agnew (2005) attempted to explain all types of criminal behavior. Agnew (2005) identified three types of strain: failure to achieve positively valued goals, removal of positive stimuli / possessions,[1] and presence of negatively valued stimuli / adverse treatment by others. Merton (1938) and Messner and Rosenfeld (2006) argued that there was an expectation that anyone could achieve success in America but that not everyone

[1] Researchers (Hamm, 1993; Blazak, 2001; Ezekiel, 1995) have examined the effects of loss of positive stimuli (e.g., parental divorce, loss of jobs) among skinheads, but this information could not have been reliably obtained using secondary sources of data.

had the opportunities to achieve success. Failure to achieve success (e.g., low status occupation), removal or threat of the removal of positively valued stimuli (e.g., loss of employment) and negative stimuli (e.g., arrest and conviction) could put strain on an individual (Agnew, 2005). Furthermore, strain could result in anger, frustration and depression, which could increase the likelihood that the person would commit a crime to reduce such negative affect (Agnew, 2005).

Agnew (2005) also differentiated between subjective and objective strain. Objective stressors are disliked by most people (e.g., loss of employment), while subjective stressors are disliked by the individual of interest to the researcher. Agnew (2005) also identified a third category of strain: subjective interpretation of objective strain, e.g., someone with a high degree of self-confidence may experience less emotional distress from a loss of employment when compared to someone with a lower degree of self-confidence.

Agnew (2005) argued that the experience of strain was not a sufficient cause of criminal behavior. In addition to the strain experienced, the individual must also be unable to cope legally, believe the cost of crime (or being caught) is low and have a predisposition to criminal behavior. Personality traits (such as self-confidence), intelligence, problem solving skills and access to financial and social resources could also affect an individual's ability to cope legally (Agnew, 2005). For example, an individual with a savings account and a strong social network would be able to discover potential employment opportunities and utilize their savings to cover living expenses in the interim. An individual who feels little guilt at the thought of committing a crime and is unlikely to be penalized by family members or friends for engaging in criminal behavior would have a higher propensity to engage in criminal behavior, since the cost of crime to the individual would be low (Agnew, 2005).

An individual's propensity to engage in crime after experiencing conditions of strain could also be influenced by prior responses to criminal behavior, e.g., parental attention subsequent to an arrest or warning could act as reinforcement and increase the propensity for future offending behavior. This relationship is depicted in diagram 1.

Diagram 1: General Strain Theory



In 2010, Agnew extended GST to account for acts of terrorism and to explain why only a few individuals who experienced strain resorted to terrorism. According to Agnew (2010), for terrorism to occur strain must be: high in magnitude, perceived as unjust/undeserved[2] and caused by powerful others with whom the individual has weak ties (such as a government that no longer represents one's interests). Agnew hypothesized that these types of strain result in anger, frustration and helplessness, which would lower inhibitions and ability to cope through legitimate means. This may create pressure / incentive for criminal coping, which could include both common crimes and acts of terrorism. However, the effects of strain, according to Agnew (2010), could be mediated by whether the individual has beliefs favorable to terrorism and offending behavior (see diagram 2 for a concise description of General Strain of Terrorism).

However, it is possible that GST and GST of terrorism may not provide a complete picture of the causes of criminal and terrorism behavior of DFRs. Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT) explains how one may become susceptible to joining a sub-cultural group. DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) also explains how beliefs favorable to terrorism / crime and the skills required to commit such acts are acquired. DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) will be discussed in the next section.

[2] This was not directly examined in this study, since the data was obtained from secondary sources e.g., news articles, court documents, watch groups.

Diagram 2: General Strain of Terrorism



2.3 Differential Opportunity Theory and Movement Spaces

In 1960, Cloward and Ohlin proposed Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT) to explain the development and persistence of delinquent sub-cultures and the effect of such subcultures on the delinquent behavior of their members. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) posited that rejection of the conventional social order and submersion into a deviant subculture is a four-step process. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that the individual must first experience alienation, which commonly occurs through failure or anticipated failure. The individual must then attribute the blame for said failure to society. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that alienation is quite possible in a society that "espous[es] equality of opportunity and universally high aspirations for success…[but has] discrepancies in opportunities" (p. 108). If an individual meets the formal criteria for success, but does not achieve success, feelings of injustice could occur. This is dependent on the individual attributing blame for his/her failure to achieve success on an external force, such as an unfair society. An individual who attributes blame internally would become a retreatist (reject both the goals of society and the means of obtaining those goals) or ritualist (abide by the socially accepted means of success but give up hope of achieving success). Such feelings would diminish the individual's belief in the legitimacy of the conventional social order and reduce his/her commitment to the prevailing norms of society (See also Cloward and Ohlin (1961) and Merton (1938) for further discussion).

In the second step, the alienated individual seeks out like-minded others (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). However, as there exist differential opportunities for success, so too are there differential opportunities to deviate, and not all alienated individuals have access to deviant subcultures (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Those who have access to deviant subcultures could proceed to the third step, and have the opportunity to acquire the skills and mentoring necessary

to deviate. The techniques for neutralizing are also acquired at this stage. The reaction of law enforcement is crucial at this stage. If the justice system labels the individual as a criminal or different from law-abiding people, feelings of alienation are exacerbated and bonds with the deviant group are strengthened. Among extremists, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) referred to this stage as *unfreezing* (loss of commitment to conventional ideology) and *refreezing* (replacement of conventional values with extremist ideology). In the final step, the group members must be allowed to interact with each other, to build cohesiveness and a "sense of mutual dependence" (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960, p. 142).

Simi and Futrell's (2010) account of *free space* or *movement space* effectively describes Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) fourth step. *Movement spaces* are physical or virtual spaces, in which members of a socially unaccepted group are allowed to meet, interact and build cohesiveness (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). The interactions with other extremists in isolated movement or free spaces provides extremists with the support and freedom required to "nurture oppositional identities that challenge prevailing social arrangements and cultural norms" (Simi & Futrell, 2010, p. 3).Thus, movement or free spaces facilitate socialization in extremist ideology, reduce commitment to conventional society, and increase bonds with other extremists in the group, thereby increasing the individual's commitment to extremism (see also: Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Thus, goal blockage caused by the structural conditions of strain (Agnew, 2005, 2010) is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of crime and deviance: the opportunity to learn the prerequisite skills and abilities to engage in non-conforming behavior must also be present (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), as well as the freedom to interact separate from conventional society

to form a different belief system (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010). These skills and knowledge, as well as the new belief system, are obtained via interactions with a deviant subculture or gang (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). However, as noted by Aho (1990), not everyone who experiences conditions of strain would have access to rightwing extremist groups. Thus, they would lack the opportunity to learn the skills necessary to commit terrorism or crime. This may explain the fact that so few people who experience strain became members of extremist groups.

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) differentiated between *beliefs* (descriptions, or how one should describe a situation), *values* (evaluations, or how one should evaluate a situation) and *norms* (prescriptions of how one should behave in a situation). The authors argued that when a person became indoctrinated into a deviant sub-culture, their beliefs and values would increasingly contradict societal descriptions (i.e., beliefs) and prescriptions (i.e., norms) and their commitment to the sub-cultural norms would increase. Thus, a fully indoctrinated member of a sub-culture would be more committed to the norms of that sub-culture and less committed / constrained by the norms of conventional society. Consistent with Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) argument, it was possible that membership in an extremist group would interact with conditions of strain to create the motivation, justifications and knowledge required to engage in criminal and terrorist behaviors. It was also possible that alienated individuals who join a far-rightist group would obtain beliefs and values which would allow them to internally rationalize the replacement of societal norms with the norms of the extremist group. If the group norms replace societal norms, any guilt from contravening the laws of conventional society would be neutralized.

This study hypothesizes that rather than posing competing explanations of extremism, GST explains how a person becomes susceptible to joining an extremist movement, while DOT provides a framework for analyzing behavior after someone joins the movement. The radicalization literature provides some justification for this theoretical framework. Radicalization is defined as "the process by which individuals become violent extremists... individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political, social, or religious goals" (NIJ 2012 Research on Domestic Radicalization Solicitation, p 4). Based on GST (Agnew, 2005, 2010), DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), and movement spaces (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010), this study theorizes that the process from personal grievance to commitment to an extremist ideology requires that the individual: (1) have virtual, electronic or physical access to similarly situated others, (2) have movement or free spaces to interact with each other; and (3) learn to identify with others who have similar personal grievances. This relationship is depicted in the diagram below.

The relevant literature on extremist group membership, indoctrination into extremist sub-cultures and the criminal behavior of far-rightists will be reviewed in the next chapter. Many of the studies utilized qualitative research techniques such as in-depth interviews and observation of events and are frequently ethnographic in nature, while other studies utilized quantitative designs. The information obtained from the quantitative studies provided the justification for the variables and research questions posed by this study, while the qualitative studies were used to structure the research models and operationalize the study's variables. As this study's unit of analysis was at the individual or micro level, the literature review focused on research conducted at this level.

Diagram 3: Theoretical Framework



CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

3.1. Membership in Extremist Groups

3.1.1. Strain & Membership in Extremist Groups. Support was found linking GST to membership in the domestic far-right. Smith (1994) examined people and groups designated by the FBI's counterterrorism program as terrorists in the 1980s. Smith (1994) subdivided his sample into far-rightists, far-leftists and single-issue terrorists. Many far-rightists, but not far-leftists, in Smith's (1994) study experienced a lack of economic opportunities. Only 12% had a college degree and 33% had a GED equivalent or lower education (Smith, 1994). Most also had earnings below the poverty line or were unemployed (Smith, 1994). This study did not directly examine the effects of strain, nor did it establish causation between strain and membership in extremist groups. However, while causation was not empirically established, Smith (1994) found an association between strain conditions and membership in far-rightist groups.

Smith's (1994) findings were supported by subsequent research (e.g., Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). Hamm (1993), who interviewed 36 skinheads, found that 20 interviewees had parents with low socioeconomic statuses (blue collar background or unemployed). Most of the skinheads were unemployed (N=5) or held blue collar jobs (N=20) and only 10 were enrolled in college. Thus, not only did the skinheads experience strain, most were not in a position to reduce their strain in the foreseeable future. However, Hamm (1993) did not examine whether different levels of strain were experienced by skinheads and the general population.

In an ethnographic study, Ezekiel (1995) found that members of a neo-Nazi group in Detroit tended to have been high school or college dropouts, and were unemployed,

underemployed or casually employed. Also using an ethnographic design that spanned from the mid-1980s to late 1990s, Wooden and Blazak (2001) found that strain conditions, such as fears of downward mobility and status frustration, were major contributing factors to young men's decision to join a skinhead group.

In contrast, Aho (1990) did not find any evidence of education theory (i.e., people with lower levels of education were more likely than those with higher levels of education to join an extremist group) in explaining membership in Idaho Christian Patriot groups. According to Aho (1990), members in those groups had education rates similar to other Idahoans and Americans. However, Aho's (1990) sample consisted of extremists who did not engage in violent crime, while Smith (1994) examined extremists who committed acts of terrorism and Hamm (1993) compared far-rightists who did not offend with those who committed hate crimes. The differences between the sample designs could have accounted for the different findings. It was possible that extremists who engaged in acts of terrorism were different from extremists who engage in civil disobedience or non-violent crimes. Thus, one would expect different educational and employment backgrounds from both groups, i.e., one would expect to observe evidence of strain among DFRs who commit violent crimes (Hamm, 1993; Smith, 1994), but not among DFRs who commit financial crimes or did not offend (Aho, 1990).

Another explanation for the discrepancy between Aho (1990) and Ezekiel's (1995) findings are that neither study used a random sample design. This was because of the difficulty in obtaining access to closed groups. Random sampling is one of the pre-requisites for generalizability of research findings. Aho (1990) used snowball sampling for his study. He argued that the resulting sample was representative of the population of Christian Patriots in Idaho, but non-random samples are rarely representative of the population of interest.

Furthermore, Aho (1990) interviewed both leaders and followers in the movement. It is possible that different variables motivate movement leaders and movement followers to join an extremist movement (Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995). For example, leaders of the neo-Nazi movement interviewed by Ezekiel (1995) tended to have higher levels of education than the followers in the movement. Smith (1990) also noted a marked difference in the education levels of far-rightist leaders and members in the movement. For instance, Richard Butler, former leader of the Aryan Nation, was an engineer, as was Wilhelm Ernst Schmitt, former leader of one of the Sheriff's Posse Comitatus chapters. Thus, differences in education rates could have been missed by including both movement leaders and followers.

Rather than strained individuals seeking out extremist groups as a means of reducing their strain or finding individuals with similar life experiences to interact with, it was possible that extremist groups targeted strained individuals for recruitment (Blazak, 2001; McVeigh, 2004; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). McVeigh (2004) argued that far-right groups use the rhetoric of whites' loss of economic status to Jews and ethnic minorities as a recruitment technique. Blazak's (2001) research supported McVeigh's (2004) argument. Blazak (2001) interviewed recruiters in the skinhead movement. He found that groups deliberately targeted boys who experienced conditions of strain and that these recruitment efforts were often successful (Blazak, 2001).

In another publication discussing the data from Blazak's (2001) study, the authors concluded, "the recruitment of skinheads employs a systematic process based on identification of social strain" (Wooden & Blazak, 2001 p. 144). Interestingly, studies that examined rank and file group membership patterns of DFRs who engaged in criminal behavior (Hamm, 1993; Smith, 1994) found a consistent link between the experience of strain and membership in far-right

groups. However, this relationship was not found for DFRs who led law-abiding lives. Studies of non-criminal DFRs by Dobratz & Shanks-Meile (1996) and Aho (1990) did not find an association between strain conditions and membership in extremist groups. Since the current study was limited to DFRs and collaborators who engaged in a homicide or financial scheme, *it was hypothesized that individuals who experience individual level stressors would have been more likely to join a far-rightist group, as compared to those who did not experience individual level stressors.*

3.1.2. Friends / Family & Membership in Extremist Groups. Individual level stressors could make a person susceptible to anger, blaming external forces for the strain experienced, and subsequently recruitment by far-rightist groups Blazak, 2001; Hamm, 1993; McVeigh, 2004). However, access to the far-right opportunity structure is crucial to actual recruitment (Aho, 1990; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011). Christian Patriots surveyed by Aho (1990) tended to have significant others (e.g., work colleagues, friends, family, pastors) in the far-right movement. Furthermore, people surveyed by Aho (1990) mentioned that family members (approx. 35% of interviewees) and friends (approx. 21% of interviewees) were major influences in their decision to join the movement. The social movement literature also found evidence of a link between prior relationship with extremists, such as friends or family in the movement, and an individual's decision to join an extremist group (Blanchard & Prewitt, 1993; Blee, 2002).

A strategy used by extremist groups is to focus their recruitment efforts on friends and family of existing and trusted members (Aho, 1990; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Wooden & Blazak, 2001) or to utilize existing extremist friends and family as a means of obtaining access to potential recruitees (Blazak, 2001; Chermak, 2002). Wooden and Blazak

(2001) found that relatives of known skinheads were likely to have been targeted for recruitment by skinhead leaders. Leaders and recruiters in extremist movements were generally skilled at the use of rhetoric. Furthermore, friends and family members of existing extremists were susceptible to this rhetoric, especially if this rhetoric fit with their world view (Aho, 1990; Blazak, 2001; Chermak, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; McVeigh, 2004). They were also found to be susceptible to this rhetoric if they had close relationships with existing extremist group members (Aho, 1990; Blanchard & Prewitt, 1993; Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990).

A friend or family member in the group is not always a prerequisite for group membership. A group of extremist friends may join an extremist group at the same time. Several researchers have found that individuals joined extremist movements along with a group of friends, a romantic partner (Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011) or family members (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990). However, not all people with extremist significant others join the movement. It is possible that people with a higher degree of tolerance for extremist views could have been more predisposed to joining an extremist group (Chermak, 2002). Aho (1990) referred to the person who realized the world conflicted with his/her personal standards and became motivated to change the world as a "Seeker." Seekers are people who already hold anti-government beliefs, i.e., are already radicalized to some extent, and searching for ways to regain a sense of power over their lives (Aho, 1990; Chermak, 2002). For Aho (1990), having loved ones or family in the movement, i.e., access to an extremist opportunity structure, was not a sufficient motivator for an individual to join an extremist group. The individual must have first undergone the internal shift to become a seeker. The seeker theme also appeared in Blee's (2002) book. Blee (2002) described several white

supremacists' accounts of their decision to join the movement as "a personal quest for racial and political truth" (p. 53).

In addition to the internal shift to becoming a seeker, another common finding in the literature was a strong social bond between recruitees and the existing group member. Several researchers found that recruitees tended to join an extremist group when they felt admiration and wanted to emulate significant others who belonged to the movement (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011). McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) referred to this phenomenon as the "power of love" and noted that love of fellow group members could also prevent an individual from leaving an extremist group. *Therefore, the second hypothesis was: individuals with extremist family / friends would have been more likely to join a far-rightist group, when compared to those without extremist family / friends.* DFRs who have extremist family and friends would also have more access to far-right extremist opportunity structures, compared to those without extremist referent others. Extremist family and friends need not be current group members, as individuals tend to join extremist groups along with their extremist referent others (Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990).

According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), both strain and access to extremist opportunity structures are required for membership in subcultural gangs. Ezekiel (1995) and Hamm (1993) both found evidence of strain and extremist referent others among the far-rightists interviewed in their studies. Other studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996) found evidence that having extremist referent others was associated with membership in extremist groups. However, these studies did not find evidence of higher levels of strain among group members, in comparison to the general U.S. population (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996). Since

the latter studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996) involved non-criminal group members and the current study examined criminal DFRs, *a tentative corollary of hypothesis two was: there was an interaction effect between the experience of strain and having extremist referent others on the likelihood of membership in extremist groups.*

3.1.3. Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Membership in Extremist Groups. Prior negative interactions with government officials, such as the police, court officials or IRS officials (e.g., being audited by the IRS, denial of tax refund claim, lien placed on property by IRS) could increase the likelihood that one could become a member of a far-rightist group, especially if the behavior of the official is perceived as unwarranted (Aho; 1990; Chermak, 2002). As mentioned previously, one of the defining features of the far-right is their suspicion and rejection of the legitimacy of state and federal government (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Barkun, 2000; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Freilich, Chermak & Simone, 2009b; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Simi, 2010). Such a belief system could influence how far-rightists (or seekers) interpret interactions with government officials, which could contribute to the individual's decision to join a far-rightist group.

Wooden and Blazak (2001) found that hard core racist skinheads were more likely than nonracist skinheads (i.e., members of youth gangs not affiliated with the far-right) to have "been in trouble with the police" (p. 139). This indicated that negative interactions with law enforcement officials could have contributed to an individual's decision to join a far-right group.

However, it was possible that the relationship between interactions with law enforcement and membership in a far-right extremist group is more complex and thus more difficult to measure. Several researchers have highlighted the radicalization effects of the standoffs at Ruby Ridge and Waco in the early 1990s on DFRs and Seekers (Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996;

Kaplan, 1997; Vertigans, 2007). Chermak (2002) described these incidents as "last straw" events, which provided the impetus required for borderline DFRs to join the movement. Less sensational interactions with law enforcement could have also convinced other far-rightists to join the movement or create a more radical group. Thus, stories about other individuals with whom the person identified could have encouraged him/her to join the movement. Further, there was evidence to suggest that DFRs were aware of the radicalization effects of negative interactions with government officials. Militia members interviewed by Chermak (2002) utilized negative interactions with government officials in their recruitment rhetoric.

The route from interactions with law enforcement to membership in extremist groups may also be indirect. Blazak (2009) estimated that about 220,000 prisoners are involved in racist white prison gangs (e.g., Public Enemy Number 1, Nazi low Riders, Aryan Brotherhood, et cetera) for protection and the support network they provide. Some members of racist prison gangs eventually transition to membership in a racist group or return to the movement after prison ("Dangerous Convictions," 2002; Blazak, 2009). Blazak (2009) suggested that perhaps prison gangs provide access to the movement opportunity structure, which Cloward and Ohlin (1960) and Aho (1990) argued is required for recruitment into sub-cultural groups. This suggests that the ideological motivation of the initial offense could be less important than the presence of an extremist opportunity structure at the prison in which the individual is incarcerated. *Therefore, hypothesis three was that negative interactions with government officials,*[3] *such as civil action by the government, arrests and convictions, increase the likelihood that an individual*

[3] The literature suggests that police stops (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; "Deadly Domains," 2003) and IRS audits (Aho, 1990) could have also contributed to an individual's decision to join a far-rightist group. However, this information could have not have been reliably and systematically obtained from open source documents. Instead, this study used civil action by government, specifically liens and injunctions, prior arrests and prior convictions as a proxy measure of negative interactions with government officials.

would become a member of a far-rightist group. One would expect DFRs without such prior negative interactions with government officials to be lone wolves. Chermak, et al. (2010, p.1022) defined a "lone wolf" as someone not affiliated with an extremist group, although s/he could have visited on-line extremist websites and blogs.

Aho (1990) found that some members of Christian Patriot groups in Idaho joined because of what they termed "unprovoked persecution" (p. 188) by local officials and tax officials, such as tax audits and foreclosures. Aho (1990) noted that these experiences of persecution were then described to friends or relatives in the far-right movement, who then invited the individual to a movement activity or event. Some of these individuals in Aho's (1990) study eventually joined the movement, provided there was a strong relationship between the recruiter and recruitee. In contrast, Aho (1990) noted that only 3% of interviewees attributed their membership in the movement to legal persecution. Aho's (1990) findings suggested that the combined effect of having extremist friends / family and negative interactions with government officials could have a greater impact on an individual's decision to join an extremist group, than would negative interactions with law enforcement in the absence of extremist friends / family members. Therefore, based on Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) work and Aho's (1990) findings on the importance of access to the movement, a corollary of hypothesis three was: *there was an interaction effect between negative interactions with government officials and friends/relatives in the movement on an individual's decision to join an extremist group.*

3.2. Commitment to Rightwing Extremist Ideology

3.2.1. Strain & Commitment to Extremist Rightwing Ideology. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that both personal and group grievance could move a normal person

without psychological issues towards political violence, i.e., could radicalize an individual. Similar to strain, personal grievance is defined as when someone wrongs/harms the individual or a loved one, resulting in anger and frustration and, in rare cases, political violence (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). Basing their analysis on on the infrequency of lone wolf terrorists, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that personal grievance by itself is unlikely to result in radicalization or political violence. According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), anger is a fleeting emotion, while radicalization requires a more permanent shift in beliefs. However, if the individual interprets the grievance as committed by a particular group (e.g., Jews or the ZOG) against another group (e.g., the Aryan race) with which the individual positively identifies, personal grievance could blend with group grievance to create a more abiding emotion than anger: group identification. Group identification occurs when an individual who has a positive identification with a group, begins to care about the group, feels joy when group members are doing well and sadness when group members are persecuted (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). It is not required that the individual be a member of a far-rightist group, but that s/he identify positively with other far-rightists, (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). In other words, high levels of commitment to extremism would be sufficient to ensure group identification, even in the absence of membership in a formal extremist group.

Positive identification could be coupled with negative identification, i.e., when one feels good when another person or group suffers. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that the combination of these two phenomena, positive and negative group identification, could radicalize an individual who experiences personal grievance, and in some cases, move the individual to political violence. McCauley and Moskalenko's (2011) argument on how personal

and political grievance could motivate an individual to engage in political violence is discussed in the upcoming section on criminal behavior.

Hamm (1993) found evidence of feelings of personal grievance, i.e., strain and marginalization, transitioning into political grievance, and thereafter increased commitment to extremist ideology among racist skinheads. *Based on the above discussion, hypothesis four was that people who experience individual level stressors would have higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to people who did not experience individual level stressors.*

3.2.2. Friends/Family in Movement & Commitment to Rightwing Extremist Ideology. Several ethnographic accounts (Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010) paint a vivid picture of parents that socially isolate and immerse children in racist sub-cultures. According to Simi and Futrell (2010) primary socialization into the white power movement occurs at the family level in free spaces. Socialization into the KKK and neo-Nazi movement involves deliberate choices and behavior by parents: parents give children Aryan names and movement-related clothing; they organize family activities and engage in rituals to transmit the "ideals and practices of militant Aryan nationalism" (Simi & Futrell, 2004, p. 26). Parents also utilize homeschooling to socialize children about far-rightist ideals in a setting that is unchallenged by mainstream society, which further entrenches children into the movement's ideology (Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Vertigans, 2007). Therefore, not only are these children surrounded by racist imagery (Blee, 2002; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010), hate cartoons and comic books (Blee, 2002) and modified school books (Simi & Futrell, 2010), they are not allowed access to contradictory worldviews. In other words, DFRs' children are inundated with movement imagery and ideology by significant others. Therefore,

they obtain definitions favorable to extremist ideology in excess of conventional beliefs, which are then reinforced by their parents (Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Support for the Blee (2002) and Simi and Futrell's (2010) work was found by Wooden and Blazak (2001), who interviewed both racist and nonracist skinheads. The authors found that racist skinheads were more likely than nonracist skinheads to have family members who were racist. This suggests that racist skinheads are socialized towards racist beliefs. However, Wooden and Blazak (2001, p. 137) cautioned that their "findings should be viewed with some reservations" since the results were based on a questionnaire administered to a sample of 32 respondents.

Similar to effects of extremist family members, having extremist friends may also increase solidarity and commitment to the cause (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Vertigans, 2007). Friends share experiences and viewpoints, which could gradually radicalize an individual if a close social bond, such as comradely or romantic love, is present (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Vertigans, 2007). *Therefore, it was hypothesized that individuals with significant others who were far-rightists would have higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to those without extremist friends or family members.*

3.2.3. Membership in Extremist Groups & Commitment to Rightwing Extremist Ideology. Similar to interactions with extremist friends and family, membership in an extremist group could be a strong socialization tool. As noted previously, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) theorized that boys who experienced strain or did not achieve their anticipated degree of success may join a subcultural group if (1) they attributed the cause of their lack of success to an external source and (2) had access to the group. However, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) noted that to

become fully committed or indoctrinated into a subcultural group, the individual must: (1) lose his/her commitment to conventional society, or become alienated; (2) the group must provide the individual with techniques to deal with their guilt and fear (e.g., an alternate system of norms, values and beliefs); and (3) s/he must have the freedom to interact with the group to design collective solutions to his/her problems. Cloward and Ohlin (1960) defined *norms* as prescriptions of how one should behave in a certain situation, *beliefs* as how one should describe a situation and *values* as evaluations of a situation. Taken together, one's norms, beliefs and values could provide an indication of one's commitment to society or a group.

McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) used the term *unfreezing* to describe the process whereby individuals lose their commitment to conventional norms, beliefs and values; and *refreezing* to describe their replacement with new norms, beliefs and values. According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), unfreezing could free an individual to create various new identities: development of an extremist identity and bonding with other extremist is one of the possible options. Unfreezing could be caused by fear and pain (i.e., strain), or by a lack of ties to conventional members of society (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011) and could free the individual to form bonds with members of the extremist group.[4] The unfreezing and refreezing process could be exacerbated by the degree of isolation experienced by members of extremist groups. According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), "*isolated groups – terrorists groups, youth gangs, religious cults, soldiers in combat – have unchecked power to determine value and*

[4]McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) identified 12 pathways to radicalization. In their analysis of case studies of extremists, they found that individual level factors, group dynamic and nation/macro level factors could influence an individual's level or radicalization of commitment to an extremist cause. They argue that these factors often work together, as rarely were individuals radicalized by only one factor. While many of these pathways involved socialization into an extremist group, i.e., unfreezing and refreezing, the authors also recognized the importance of early socialization to an individual's subsequent propensity towards extremist beliefs.

meaning…the unchecked value-setting power of an isolated group is a multiplier…in whatever direction the group is likeminded" (pp. 138-139). Thus, isolation from conventional society and solely interacting with the extremist group may result in powerful bonds with fellow extremist group members. Such bonds build both group cohesion and group consensus, i.e., socialize individuals into the norms, values and beliefs of the extremist group (Aho, 1960; Ezekiel, 1995; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010). According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), the more a new member internalizes the values and beliefs of the group, the greater would be his/her commitment to the norms of the group.

Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) theory referred to subcultural gangs. However, Aho (1990) and McCauley and Moskalenko's (2008, 2011) research indicated that this socialization and indoctrination process is also applicable to extremists. Aho (1990) found that new members first emulate their significant others from the Christian Patriot movement, experience an increase in self-esteem from emulating those significant others and eventually internalize their significant other's expressions, values and beliefs. In other words, indoctrination occurred after the individual imitated the behavior of loved ones in movement and this behavior was reinforced by others. McCauley and Moskalenko's (2008, 2011) also noted that commitment by members of extremist groups is positively influenced by comradely and romantic love, as individuals tend to internalize the loved one's radical beliefs. Love and identification with group members could also increase an individual's commitment to the group if they all face a common threat / enemy (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011). Loss of fellow members caused by retaliatory action by law enforcement may also increase commitment to extremism, especially if the group is isolated from conventional society (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Interactions with other extremists could increase commitment to extremist ideology in other ways: interactions with extremist group members could alter individuals' perceptions of situations or experiences, e.g., (re)attribute loss of job or earnings to a Jewish conspiracy or affirmative action. Such current or retroactive interpretations could also increase group cohesion and a sense of shared identity. *It was therefore hypothesized that members of extremist groups would have higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to non-members.*

3.2.4. Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Commitment to Extremist Rightwing Ideology. As noted in the earlier discussion of the far-right, intense anti-government beliefs and beliefs in conspiracy theories are defining features of the far right (Aho, 1990; Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Gruenewald, 2011; Pitcavage, 2001). Such intense negative beliefs could influence how individuals interpret interactions with government officials (Freilich & Chermak, 2009). Sovereign Citizens' belief in common law, their tendency to misinterpret the law and to read obscure pseudo-legal writings by other far rightists could encourage them to be confrontational in dealings with law enforcement (Chermak, Freilich & Shemtob, 2009b) and government officials, such as the IRS (Aho, 1990; Potok, 2012). Confrontational attitudes could lead to negative consequences, such as an arrest or citation (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Potok, 2012). This could be perceived as confirmation that the government is corrupt or no longer working in the interest of the American people and thereby increasing far-rightists' commitment to extremism (Sprinzak, 1995). Sprinzak (1995) termed this a 'conflict of legitimacy,' one of the stages in the delegitimization process, which he argued groups must have experienced before they engaged in acts of terrorism. Sprinzak's (1995) theory is discussed in more detail in the section titled "Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Criminal Behavior."

Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that an individual's interactions with law enforcement could increase feelings of alienation and commitment to a delinquent subculture (see "Theoretical Framework" above for detailed discussion). Therefore, it is possible that negative interactions with law enforcement, e.g., prior arrests or convictions, could further entrench an individual in the extremist group of which s/he was a member. Freilich and Chermak (2009) used a case study approach to illustrate how a routine police stop to issue a speeding ticket escalated into a chase and shootout at the DFR's residence, which exacerbated the individual's anti-government beliefs. Freilich and Chermak (2009) argued that DFRs' anti-government ideology and paranoia about government infringement of personal liberties could interact with police behavior (e.g., surrounding a far rightist's home with weapons drawn) and act as confirmation of their extremist beliefs, essentially radicalizing DFRs.

Similarly, Kaplan (1995b) found that interactions with law enforcement increased individuals' commitment to extremism. Kaplan (1995b) noted that the use of force and physical violence against rescuers (e.g., persons who belong to the anti-abortion movement) increased their commitment to the cause. Kaplan (1995b) theorized that police violence could have been a product of jail overcrowding, police cynicism from having dealt with violent criminals, and the rescuers' refusal to cooperate e.g., to give their names, refusal to leave the station without other members, or pay fines. Thus, it was not the actions of the police per se that increased rescuers commitment to the norms and values of the rescue movement, but an interaction between rescuers' behavior, the situation and the police reactions to both (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Kaplan, 1995b). In other words, extremist beliefs impact on a person's perception and increase the likelihood that they would act in a confrontational manner with government officials. Such

confrontational behaviors could increase the likelihood of an arrest or conviction and act as a confirmation of extremist beliefs (Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Kaplan, 1995b).

It is also possible that a non-extremist could become radicalized by interactions with law enforcement (Chermak, 2002) and government officials (Aho, 1990). Civil action by the government against an individual could increase the individual's commitment to rightwing extremist ideology. Aho (1990) noted that several members of the Idahoan Christian Patriots cited negative interactions with the IRS – such having funds withdrawn from personal or business accounts to cover their outstanding taxes – as confirmation of a government that was no longer concerned with the interests of true patriots/Americans. Aho (1990) argued that policies or actions by government officials to enforce obedience to laws (e.g., personal property auctioned to cover tax liability) that borderline far-rightists consider invalid or unfair (e.g., the federal taxation system) could radicalize the individual. The radicalization effect of government actions that are perceived as unjust could also be applicable to people who are merely suspicious of the government (Aho, 1990). *Therefore, based on this escalation effect, it was hypothesized that individuals who experience negative interactions with government officials would have higher levels of commitment to rightwing extremist ideology, compared to those without such negative interactions*. This study defined prior negative interactions by government officials as civil actions by the government, prior arrests, prior charges and prior convictions from the date of the offense included in the study.

Kaplan (1995b) also used excerpts of interviews describing police officers' sexual and physical abuse of arrested female rescue members to argue that such actions are important to the formation of rescuers' apocalyptic worldview. Such physical and sexual abuse of female rescuers, as well as the use of police brutality to control arrested rescuers, increased their

commitment to their cause (Kaplan, 1995b). Thus, it is possible that there is an interaction effect between having extremist friends / family and prior negative contact with law enforcement on commitment to extremism. *Thus, a corollary of the above hypothesis was that there was an interaction effect between having extremist others and negative interactions with law enforcement on an individual's level of commitment to extremism.*

3.3. Criminal behavior

3.3.1. Levels of Commitment to Rightwing Extremism & Criminal Behavior. Many individuals with extreme beliefs are law-abiding citizens, as possession of extremist beliefs does not necessarily lead to criminal behavior (Freilich, et al., 2009a; Michael & Minkenberg, 2007). However, it was possible for someone with extremist beliefs to engage in criminal acts as: (1) an expression of those beliefs; (2) a way to finance activities to inspire social / political change; or (3) an attempt to inspire social and/or political change (Chermak, Freilich & Simone, 2010; Smith, 1994). A person's extremist beliefs could influence his/her commitment to the extremist cause and subsequent behavior, but not all people with extremist beliefs are motivated to act on those beliefs (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) sub-divided radicals into activists and terrorists. They describe "activists" as people who engaged in political activities to inspire social and/or political change and "terrorists" as radicals willing to use terrorism as a tactic to achieve social and/or political change (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011). They noted that while some activists move towards violence because of friendship, romantic or group loyalty or government persecution of self or loved ones, other activists do not transition to illegal activities (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2011).

Although some academics claim that extremists tend to specialize in extremist offending (e.g., Gottfredson & Hirshi, 1990), research suggests that extremists engage in a variety of criminal behavior (Belli, 2011; Chermak et al., 2009b; Chermak, et al., 2010; Gruenewald, et al., 2009; Smith, 1994; Smith, et al., 2002). DFRs engage in routine crimes, preparatory crimes or acts of terrorism (Chermak, et al., 2010; Smith, 1994). Routine crimes are non-ideological in nature, e.g., bank robbery for profit. Crimes committed for the purpose of funding or acquiring materials for future terrorist attacks are referred to as "preparatory crimes" (Belli, 2011; Chermak, et al., 2010; Smith, 1994) and can be conceptualized as a hybrid of ideological and non-ideological motives, while the preparatory crime itself is motivated by profit, the ultimate aim is to use the materials/funds to obtain some ideological end. Acts of terrorism are usually conceptualized as violent crimes committed to attain some ideological purpose, i.e., a social, political or religious change, e.g., bombing the IRS to protest federal taxes. However, preparatory crimes and acts of terrorism can both be classified as ideological crimes.

Smith (1994) noted that federal charges against domestic terrorists from 1982 to 1989 were quite diverse and included both financial and violent crimes, e.g., racketeering, possession of weapons, racketeering-influenced and corrupt organization (i.e., RICO conspiracy), stolen property, robbery and burglary, treason, mail fraud and homicide. A more recent study by Smith, et al. (2002), which utilized data from the American Terrorism Study, confirmed these findings. Smith, et al. (2002) found that federal charges against domestic terrorists from 1980 to 1998 followed a similar pattern to Smith's (1994) study. Although prosecutors have discretion to select which charges to file against suspects, charges must be supported by evidence. Thus, the range of federal charges against DFRs indicated that extremists who offend commit a variety of violent and financial crimes.

3.3.1.a. *Scheme/incident ideology.* Far-rightists commit crimes for non-ideological as well as ideological reasons (Belli, 2011; Belli & Freilich, 2009; Chermak, et al., 2010; Gruenewald, 2011; Gruenewald, et al., 2009). According to Gruenewald (2011), homicides committed by DFRs can be acts of terrorism (i.e., committed to inspire social, political or religious change), hate crimes (i.e., motivated by the victim's race, religion, ethnicity, or nationality) or routine in nature. Both terrorist incidents and hate crimes are ideologically motivated (Hamm, 1993, 2004), while routine homicides are non-ideologically motivated. Using data from the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) for the years 1990 to 2006, Gruenewald (2011) found that about a quarter of homicides committed by far-rightists were motivated by profit and some were motivated by a combination of profit and ideology. In other words, far-rightists' violent offending behavior are motivated by a variety of reasons (Gruenewald, 2011).

Far-rightists also commit financial crimes for a variety of reasons. According to Smith (1994), far-rightists engaged in petty theft and robbery for the purpose of funding their terrorist activities and operations. Far-rightists also engaged in financial crimes purely for profit or purely for ideological purposes. Using data from the ECDB for the year 2004, Belli (2011) found that tax evasion was the most prevalent financial crime committed by far-rightists in 2004. Furthermore, 77% of the sampled far-rightists were motivated by extremist ideology and 23% were motivated by a combination of profit and extremist ideology. Thus, an individual far-rightist may commit a financial crime for multiple reasons. There is also a risk that ideologically motivated financial crimes could escalate into violent crimes e.g., a standoff with law enforcement (Belli & Freilich, 2009; Freilich, et al., 2009).

3.3.1.b. *Suspect ideology.* Several authors have noted that DFRs who call themselves Patriots consider many amendments to the Constitution and laws enacted by the federal

government to be been unconstitutional, such as the Internal Revenue Code (Aho, 1990; Belli & Freilich, 2009; Vertigans, 2007). This latter belief could foster legal fundamentalism (i.e., plain text interpretation of law), the tendency to create/rely on common law courts, acts of civil disobedience and criminal behavior (Aho, 1990). Highly committed far-rightists engage in crimes such as tax evasion, filing fraudulent tax returns and filing fraudulent liens as an expression of their anti-government beliefs (Aho, 1990; Belli, 2011; Belli & Freilich, 2009; Vertigans, 2007) or because they believe federal tax laws are invalid/unconstitutional (Aho, 1990). Belli (2011) suggested that financial crimes could be the "ultimate form of [non-violent] anti-government protest" (p.107), in which case one would expect that more committed far-rightists would be more likely to engage in ideologically motivated financial crimes and would do so more frequently when compared to less committed far-rightists. *Based on the above discussion, it was hypothesized that people with strong extremist beliefs are more likely to commit an ideological crime, i.e., a crime that would further their extremist goals.* Such behavior includes crimes committed for a purely ideological purpose, as well as preparatory crimes committed to acquire funds and/or materials to commit an ideological crime(s). *A corollary of this hypothesis was that people with lower levels of extremist belief are more likely to engage in routine crimes (i.e., a homicide or financial scheme that was not intended to further any ideological goal).*

3.3.2. Strain & Criminal Behavior. According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), personal grievance is one of the mechanisms by which an individual could be persuaded to engage in political violence. Personal grievance extends the concept of strain to any kind of discomfort, in addition to goal blockage. Similar to Agnew's (2005, 2010) assertion that the experience of strain causes emotional reactions of anger and frustration, McCauley and

Moskalenko (2011) argued that personal grievances may trigger feelings of anger, which could led to aggression. According McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), for political violence to occur, the personal grievance (e.g., being audited by an IRS agent) must become political.[5] In other words, the anger must be focused against a group that is perceived as the perpetrators of injustice (e.g., the federal government), rather than the individual who initially triggered the personal grievance (e.g., the IRS agent).

According to Agnew (2001, 2005, 2010), people who do not have legal avenues to reduce the anger caused by strain and hold definitions favorable to deviant behavior in excess of those favorable to conforming behavior may turn to crime and/or terrorism to reduce their feelings of anger and frustration. Hamm (1993) found that skinheads who engaged in violence against non-whites, whom he termed 'terrorists,' were more likely to have parents who had low socio-economic status, as compared to non-terrorist skinheads, which supported Agnew's (2005) theory. DFRs labeled by the FBI as terrorists and prosecuted in the 1980s for terrorism and other crimes experienced greater degrees of economic strain in terms of lower education and occupational success when compared to left-wing and single-issue terrorists (Smith, 1994). However, several researchers and academics have argued that the far-rightist movement draws membership from various socio-economic status (SES) classes (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006; Schlatter, 2006; Vertigans, 2007). When these findings were juxtaposed, they suggest that while the far-rightist movement cuts across class boundaries, the members who had experienced conditions of strain were more likely to engage in crime and terrorism, as compared to members with a higher SES. A possible explanation for this is that strained members of the

[5] McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that political grievance could have become personal i.e. one could have become radicalized by observing persecution of a group one identifies with, rather than personally experiencing persecution, but this was outside the scope of this study.

far-right could have fewer legal avenues for coping and/or a lower potential cost associated with criminal offending, e.g., loss of status or occupation (Agnew, 2005). *Based on the above discussion, it was hypothesized that DFRs who experienced strain were more likely to commit an ideologically motivated crime when compared to DFRs that have not experienced individual level stressors.*

3.3.3. Extremist Friends/Family & Criminal Behavior. Extremist friends and family can contribute to a fellow extremist's criminal behavior in several ways. As mentioned by Cloward and Ohlin (1960), most people accept conventional norms and values as legitimate, and an internal change in norms and values is necessary before their conscience allows them to contravene conventional norms, e.g., norms against using extreme violence for a purpose other than self-defense. This internal change can be accomplished via socialization by friends and family (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that individuals acquire both the skills and the internal justifications necessary to deviate through interactions with their peers. This is the third step in the indoctrination process, according to Cloward and Ohlin (1960). For a more detailed explanation on the indoctrination process, see the Theoretical Framework section.

Although Cloward and Ohlin (1960) referred to socialization by a subcultural group into deviance and crime, their analysis is applicable to less formal friendship groups. Therefore, it is possible that an individual can be socialized through interactions with extremist friends and/or family into believing that acts of crime and terrorism are morally permissible (Futrell & Simi, 2004; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010). In other words, an individual can be radicalized as a result of interactions with extremist friends. Such a shift in norms and values can motivate an individual to commit a crime or act of terrorism. According to McCauley and

Moskalenko (2011), such a process occurs when personal grievance (i.e., one's own experiences of loss, suffering or strain) merges with group grievance (i.e., similar experiences by friends or referent others).

McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 2011) argued that individuals who are not themselves radicalized can commit acts of terrorism or crimes as a result of their devotion or love for extremist friends and significant others. The authors cited accounts of extremists who recognized the illogic or hopelessness of continuing in the movement but continued to participate in criminal and non-criminal movement activities. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 2011) argued that extremists' criminal behaviors are motivated by their feelings for loved ones who are incarcerated or killed as a result of their extremist activities. Thus, the intermediate step of radicalization is not necessary; love or devotion to extremist friends and significant others could also influence an individual to offend (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011).

In addition to motives of love or devotion, non-extremists also offend with extremist co-offenders because of a desire for profit or financial gain. Belli (2011) reported that about 32% of people involved in ideological or a combination of ideological and profit motivated financial schemes in 2004 were motivated by profit / greed, and were non-extremists. In addition, Gruenewald (2011) found that 56% of homicides committed by far-rightists from 1990 to 2006 involved multiple perpetrators (compared to 16% of typical homicide incidents that occurred in the same time period). Many of the homicide incidents that involved at least one far-rightist were motivated by profit (40%) or were not directly related to the extremist movement (20%). While care must be taken to not conflate the ideological motivation for a crime with the ideological motivation of the suspect, Gruenewald's (2011) and Belli's (2011) findings suggest that formal

or informal group dynamics, as well as personal considerations such as greed, could motivate a non-extremist to offend with extremist colleagues.

As mentioned previously, individuals tend to join extremist groups with friends and subsequently became indoctrinated into the extremist culture (Aho, 1990; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). This finding suggests that at least one member of the social group is initially more extreme and/or convinces the others to join. It is also likely that these individuals continue to interact with and be influenced by their more extreme friends in the movement. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) argued that devotion to friends influences devotion to the extremist group, which would in turn strengthen love and friendship bonds with friends, especially if the group faces threats from external forces. *Therefore, based on the above discussion, it was hypothesized that people with extremist family or friends are more likely to commit an ideologically motivated crimwhen compared to people that did not have extremist family members or friends.*

3.3.4. Group Membership & Criminal Behavior. Neutralization of guilt associated with criminal and terrorist behaviors could also be accomplished via socialization by a group (Futrell & Simi, 2004; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Cloward and Ohlin (1960) argued that people who attributed their lack of success to an external force would experience alienation. However, such feelings of alienation may decline if those people receive collective support from like-minded individuals, i.e., a gang or sub-cultural group (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). As feelings of alienation increase, the alienated individuals would become more dependent on the reassurance and validation provided by fellow group members and increasingly committed to the norms, values and beliefs of the subcultural group (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), commitment to the group's norms could both fluctuate

and co-exist with belief in the legitimacy and moral validity of conventional norms until an individual is fully indoctrinated into the group. When this indoctrination process is complete, the individual would no longer be bound by the norms and values of conventional society. Furthermore, if the group's norms, values and beliefs justify criminal behavior, then the individual's guilt from contravening the laws of society would be neutralized (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Therefore, the individual would be free to engage in criminal or terrorist behaviors.

As a result of this troublesome 'guilt' issue, lone wolves, far-rightists who belonged to informal groups and far-rightists who belonged to formal extremist groups would engage in different types of offending behavior. Extremists who belong to formal groups would receive both the socialization and the isolation from conventional society (i.e., free space) necessary to create and nurture oppositional identities and to build group cohesion (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Thus, it is possible that far-rightists who belong to extremist groups are less likely to experience guilt from committing an act that conventional society labels as terrorist (i.e., considered beyond the pale). Aho (1990) noted that in a specific chapter of the Golden Mean Society, a Christian Patriot group in Idaho, almost all members committed tax crimes, such as filing frivolous tax returns or failing to file federal tax returns. Admittedly, tax crimes were not quite beyond the pale. However, the prevalence of tax crimes committed by the Golden Mean Society suggests that the group socializes its members to engage in tax crimes, recruits people who are predisposed to committing tax crimes, or a combination of the guilt reducing effects of group socialization and predisposition exists.

Research on violent crimes committed by DFRs also supports Simi and Futrell's (2010) ideas on the utilization of free/movement space by extremist groups to build oppositional identities and minimize guilt associated with contravening society's norms. Hamm (1993), in his

study of 36 skinheads, found that only seven had not been involved in a violent incident in the last two years, and the remaining 29 skinheads had committed about 120 acts of violence within the past two years. However, Hamm's (1993) research did not establish whether the degree of violence demonstrated by skinheads was different from that of ordinary criminals. Using ECDB data from 1990 to 2008, Gruenewald and Pridemore (2012) found that ideologically motivated homicides by far-rightists were more likely to involve multiple perpetrators and to have been more brutal and use intimate weapons (e.g., fists, boots, knives) when compared to ordinary homicides committed by non-extremists in that same period. Although no mention was made of membership in extremist groups, these differences between ideologically motivated homicides committed by far-rightists and routine homicides suggest the presence of (formal or informal) group dynamics.

Hamm (1993) and Gruenewald and Pridemore's (2012) research supports Blee's (2002) argument that the "core of the white supremacist culture is violence" (p. 174). When this culture of violence is combined with the degree of social isolation experienced by DFRs (Blee, 2002; Kaplan, 1995a; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010), the likely result is the breakdown of conventional values and norms, i.e., reduced internal barriers to engage in acts of violence.

In contrast, lone wolves do not experience the socialization into an oppositional identity and the subsequent guilt neutralizing effect described by Simi and Futrell (2010). Thus, they may be more likely to engage in non-violent extremist behavior or non-terroristic violent behavior, both of which are considered less morally repugnant than terrorism (i.e., ideologically motivated violent crimes). It is also possible that the issue is not a matter of guilt, but of resources: it is easier for groups to obtain the resources necessary to engage in acts of terrorism, while lone

wolves and extremists who are not members of formal far-rightist groups may be forced to confine their ideological protests to less costly endeavors (Chermak et al., 2010).

Several authors (Belli, 2011; Chermak et al., 2009b) have suggested that lone wolves, far-rightists who belonged to informal groups and far-rightists who are members of an established extremist group have different patterns of offending behavior. These include spontaneous and planned attacks carried out by a single extremist. Chermak, et al. (2009b) argued that far-rightists who belong to established extremist groups are more likely to engage in acts of terrorism, while lone wolves or far-rightists that belong to informal groups are more likely to engage in non-terrorist crimes or financial crimes.

Several studies lend support for Chermak and colleagues' (2009b) thesis. Gruenewald (2011) examined far-rightists who committed a homicide classified as violent and non-terrorist and found that most perpetrators did not belonged to a formal extremist group. In fact, slightly less than 40% of homicides committed by far-rightists were committed by people who belonged to an extremist group (Gruenewald, 2011). However, most of the far-rightists who were not members of an extremist group acted with other offenders, i.e., as part of an informal group. In contrast, all the perpetrators of acts of terrorism studied in Smith (1994) and Smith, et al. (2002) were affiliated with formal extremist groups. The absence of lone wolf attacks in these studies was probably due to definitional issues, since the FBI definition of terrorism was used, which excludes lone wolf attacks (See Chermak, et al., 2009b).

Additional support for Chermak and colleagues' (2009b) argument was provided by Belli (2011), who found that most far-rightists (57.9%) who engaged in financial crimes such as tax avoidance, money laundering and pyramid schemes did not self-identify with any specific far-rightist group. In addition to committing financial crimes, which do not require group resources,

lone wolves also engage in acts of terrorism. Spaaij (2010) used the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base to support his argument that acts of lone wolf terrorism in the US increased in the last three decades. Spaaij (2010) hypothesized that this increase was due to the popularity of Tommasi[6] and Louis Beam's[7] ideas of "leaderless resistance" among the domestic far-right. According to Spaaij (2010), almost 42% of all the acts of terrorism that occurred in the US from 1968 to May 2007 were committed by lone wolves. Thus, despite the fact that lone wolf attacks are increasing, most acts of domestic terrorism in the US were committed by people affiliated with an extremist group and with access to financial and other support by the group.

One must note, however, that Spaaij's (2010) data included attacks committed by the far-left and radical Islamic adherents, who are fundamentally different from DFRs. Rather than the guilt reducing effects of group socialization or diffusion of responsibility from acting as part of a group, Spaaij (2010) found that there was a greater degree of mental illness[8] among the lone wolves, as compared to terrorists who belonged to an extremist group (far-right, far-left or radical Islamic). McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) also argued that there tends to be a greater prevalence of psychopathology among lone wolves, as compared to terrorists who belong to an extremist group. This was supported by a subsequent study by Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich (2013a). Using ECDb data, Gruenewald, et al. (2013a) found a higher incidence of reported mental illness among FR lone wolves (40% of lone wolves sampled), compared to other DFRs (8% of other DFR sampled). Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich (2013b) also found

[6] Tommasi was the cofounder of the National Socialist Liberation Front, an American have far rightist group, which ended with his death. Tommasi believed anyone could have been a government or watch group informant, and as such, revolutionary action would have to come from the sole individual, acting on his own (Kaplan, 1997).
[7] Louis Beam published an essay titled "Leaderless Resistance," (Kaplan, 1997; Spaaij, 2010). Kaplan (1997) also argued that William Pierce's *Hunter*, Richard Kelly Hoskins' *Vigilantes of Christendom* and David Lane's Wotan was Coming also contributed to the idea of leaderless resistance and lone wolf terrorism among the DFRs.
[8] Due to the use of open source information, this study was unable to measure mental illness with any degree of reliability. Therefore, this variable was omitted from the analysis.

significantly higher levels of mental illness among FR loners (people who offend alone and did not have any ties to formal or informal extremist groups) compared to members of formal and informal extremist groups who offend with others or offend alone.

While lone wolves tend to be motivated by a combination of psychopathology caused by personal grievance and political grievance (Freilich & Chermak, 2012; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Spaaij, 2010), DFRs who belonged to extremist groups tend to be motivated by a combination of ideology and greed (Belli, 2011; Gruenewald, 2011; Smith, 1994). Gruenewald's (2011) study of homicides committed by DFRs found that 42% were ideologically motivated, while 24% were motivated by a desire for profit. Likewise, Belli (2011) found that 23% of DFRs who committed a financial scheme in 2004 were motivated by a combination of profit and ideology and 77% were motivated purely by ideology, i.e., a desire to express their ideological dissatisfaction with the government and its policies. *Therefore, based on Gruenewald (2011), Belli (2011) and Spaaij's (2010) findings, it was hypothesized that more financial crimes have been committed by lone wolf DFRs, and more violent crimes have been committed by DFRs who were members of an extremist group.*

3.3.5. Negative Interactions with Government Officials & Criminal Behavior. According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), alienated individuals' initial acts of defiance are usually minor, but the response of the justice system could further worsen feelings of alienation. This could create a "vicious cycle of norm-violation, repression, resentment and new and more serious acts of violation" (p. 127).

3.3.5.a. *Prior arrests and criminal behavior.* According to the Anti-defamation League (ADL), many militia members and sovereign citizens drive vehicles without a license, drive without valid license plates, valid registration or insurance because they believe they have a

constitutional or God-given right to do so (Pitcavage, n.d.). Since DFRs tend to fear government encroachment on civil liberties (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Barkun, 2000; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Freilich, et al., 2009b; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Pitcavage, 2001; Simi, 2010), it is possible that police stops for such non-violent protest actions could escalate into a dangerous incident (Chermak, et al., 2010; Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Pitcavage, n.d.). Using ECDB data for 1990 to June 2009, Chermak and Freilich (n.d.) found that 49 law enforcement officers were killed by far-right extremists, and 22% of those incidents resulted from a traffic stop.

3.3.5.b. ***Prior arrests, commitment to rightwing extremism and criminal behavior.***

Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) distinguished between people with extreme views who engaged in non-violent political action (i.e., activism) and illegal/violent action (i.e., radicalism). The authors found that although many activists never engaged in radicalism, one of the factors that could cause this transition is repression of non-violent political action by government actors. Thus, a routine stop for a minor violation (e.g., driving without a valid license plate) that results in an arrest could act as confirmation of one's anti-government extremist beliefs and further radicalize a far-rightist. Although McCauley and Moskalenko (2008, 2011) argued that extreme beliefs did not necessarily result in criminal or terrorist behaviors, they conceded that people who engaged in ideologically motivated criminal acts tended to have higher levels of extremist beliefs (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009). Based on Cloward and Ohlin (1960) and Moskalenko and McCauley's (2009) claims, it seems possible that actions by law enforcement officials in such situations that are perceived as unjust by a DFR could propel the individual from mere activism to criminal or terrorist behavior. Sprinzak (1995) also argued that DFRs with strong beliefs in the sanctity of their constitutional rights, such as militia members, could resort to

terrorism if pushed by society or (perceived) aggressive action by law enforcement or other government agencies.

3.3.5.c. ***Prior convictions, commitment and criminal behavior.*** Radicalization could also occur in prison, via interactions and socialization into an extremist prison gang ("Dangerous Convictions," 2002; Blazak, 2009). Research on far-rightists involved in ideologically based homicides found that 40% had committed a previous crime, most of which (90%) were not ideologically motivated (Freilich, et al., 2014). These findings support Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) argument and Blazak's (2009) prison radicalization thesis, i.e., prior arrests and convictions could radicalize an individual and increase that likelihood that the individual would commit a subsequent ideological crime.

3.3.5.d. ***Criminal behavior, interactions with government officials and terrorism.*** Strict adherence to the original Constitution without appreciation for the social and political context within which it was created also contribute to DFRs' intense protectiveness of their rights to bear arms (Barkun, 1996; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Freilich, et al. 2009). In addition, intense suspicion of State and Federal government actors, such as State/federal law enforcement officers, judges, and IRS agents (Belli, 2011; Chermak, 2002) also contribute to DFRs' protectiveness of their right to bear arms. According to Sprinzak (1995), such beliefs could lead DFRs to commit criminal acts, as well as acts of terrorism, in certain situations.

In his theory of split delegitimization, Sprinzak (1995) argued that the radicalization process of American far-rightists starts with a *Conflict of Legitimacy.* At this stage, DFRs believe that their opposition (ZOG, minorities, or Jews, depending on the far-right group to which the person belonged) is illegitimate and should be eliminated or segregated. Most crimes, Sprinzak (1995) argued, are likely to be committed against non-whites in the population, as DFRs try to

reestablish the status quo by reinforcing discriminatory practices and mechanisms in society (e.g., hate crimes). Spontaneous acts of violence could erupt during conflicts with government authority, such as the cases mentioned by Chermak and Freilich (n.d.) but critiques of government policies and civil protests are more likely to occur (Sprinzak, 1995).

If the government does not intervene to protect the "legitimate" citizenry, DFRs could begin to perceive government policies as soft, unfair or an infringement of their civil rights and liberties. This could trigger a *Crisis of Confidence* in the prevailing authority, i.e., the federal government, and DFRs could lose faith in the government, its policies and agents. At this stage, DFRs would no longer feel bound the government's laws and rules (Sprinzak, 1995). However, most violent actions would be perpetrated against the hated 'other.' Sprinzak (1995) termed this phenomenon "split delegitimization," since both the hated other and government would be targets of violence.

However, Sprinzak (1995) argued that this split could end if DFRs begin to believe that the government is overtaken by the original hated other (i.e., ZOG). According to Sprinzak (1995), if this occurred, violence will be perpetrated primarily against the government. Sprinzak (1995) referred to this phenomenon as the 'disappearance of the split,'which can be triggered by excessive compliance measures by government agents (e.g., the IRS, police, as in the Randy Weaver incident) and subsequently result in acts of terrorism. *Therefore, based on Sprinzak (1995), Cloward and Ohlin (1960) and Moskalenko and McCauley's (2009) arguments, it was hypothesized that negative interactions with government officials (i.e., civil action by the government, prior arrests, prior charges and prior convictions) would increase commitment to rightwing extremism, which would subsequently increase the likelihood that a far-rightist would*

commit an ideological crime. DFRs who have not had such interactions should have lower levels of commitment to extremism and would be less likely to commit an ideological crime.

The research models and questions will be presented in the following chapter. First, the full research model is depicted and described. This will be followed by detailed explanations of the research questions and hypotheses that were based on the information presented in the current chapter.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH MODEL, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

4.1. Research model

The study tested the model in stages. The first research question examined predictors of *membership in rightwing extremist groups*. The second research question evaluated explanatory variables of *commitment to rightwing extremism*. The third research question assessed predictors of *criminal behavior*. In the last model, which examined the criminal behavior of DFRs, *membership in an extremist group* and *commitment to extremism* were used as independent variables.

Diagram 4: Full Model



Individual level stressors, extremist friends/ family members and *negative interactions with government officials* were conceptualized as possible predictors of *membership in a rightwing extremist group*. The reviewed literature indicated that *individual level stressors, extremist friends/ family members, negative interactions with government officials* and

membership in a rightwing extremist group could have influenced *commitment to rightwing extremism*. It was also hypothesized that *individual level stressors, negative interactions with government officials, membership in a rightwing extremist group* and *commitment to rightwing extremism* would have influenced the *criminal behavior* of DFRs. Finally, it could have also been possible that people with low (or no) *commitment to rightwing extremism* could have engaged in *criminal behavior* due to the influence of *extremist friends/ family members*. These direct and mediator effects were depicted in diagram 4.

As stated previously, many DFRs do not engage in criminal behavior. Since the sample consisted of DFRs convicted of a violent or financial crime and their co-offenders, the results are generalizable only to these two groups. Furthermore, as little research on non-extremists who offended with DFRs exists, few hypotheses specified a directional (or any) relationship with the dependent variables. Thus, much of the analysis concerning the non-extremists was of an exploratory nature. This section discusses the study's conceptual framework. The research questions and related hypotheses will be outlined next.

4.2. Research Questions and Hypotheses

Research question 1: Among DFRs, what effect, if any, did individual level stressors, the presence of significant others, and prior negative interactions with government officials have on membership in a rightwing extremist group?

H1: Based on GST, *DFRs who experience individual level stressors were more likely than DFRs who did not experience individual level stressors to join a far-rightist group*.

H2a: According to DOT, extremist friends would provide access to extremist groups. Also, according to other researchers (Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; McCauley &

Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990), individuals tended to join extremist groups with their extremist friends / family. Therefore, *DFRs who had far-rightist significant others were more likely than those without extremist friends / family to join a far-rightist group.*

H2b: According to DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), both strain and access to extremist opportunity structures are prerequisites for membership in subcultural gangs. Findings have been inconsistent as Ezekiel (1995) and Hamm (1993) both found evidence of strain and extremist referent others among the far-rightists who joined groups in their studies, but no such interaction effects were found in other studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996). Since the latter studies (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996) involved non-criminal group members and the current study examines criminal DFRs, *an interaction effect between the experience of strain and having extremist referent others was hypothesized on membership in extremist groups*.

H3a: Based on the postulates of GST and DOT, negative interactions with government officials (e.g., court officials and the police) should increase the likelihood that a DFR would experience feelings of strain and alienation, which they may try to alleviate by becoming a member of far-rightist group. Therefore, *DFRs that experienced negative interactions with government officials were more likely than DFRs who had not had such negative interactions with government officials to join a rightwing extremist group*.

H3b: However, it was possible that membership in extremist groups was contingent on access. Therefore, *it was hypothesized that there was an interaction effect between negative interactions with government officials and having extremist friends/family with membership in an extremist group*.

Research question 2: What effect, if any, did individual level stressors, significant others, group membership and negative interactions with government officials have on an individual's commitment to rightwing extremism?

H4: According on GST, *people who experienced individual level stressors had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to people who had not experienced individual level stressors*.

H5: Based on the postulates of DOT and free spaces, *people with significant others who were far-rightists had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to people without extremist friends or family members*.

H6: According to DOT and free spaces, interactions with other extremists should have an indoctrination effect. Therefore, *members of extremist groups had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to non-members*.

H7a: According to DOT, the behavior of law enforcement and courts could increase a strained person's feelings of alienation and reduce his/her commitment to conventional norms. These feelings of alienation could provide an opportunity for conventional norms to be replaced with extremist values and beliefs. Therefore, *individuals who experienced negative interactions with government officials had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology when compared to those who have not had such experiences*.

H7b: Based on Kaplan's (1995b) findings and DOT, *there was an interaction effect between having extremist others and negative interactions with law enforcement on levels of commitment to extremism*.

Research question 3: What effects, if any, did an individual's commitment to far-right extremism and extremist group membership have on his/her criminal behavior? Were the effects

of these two IVs moderated or exacerbated by individual level stressors, significant others, group membership and interactions with law enforcement?

H8a: *People with strong extremist beliefs were more likely than people with lower levels of extremist beliefs to commit an ideologically motivated crime*.

H8b: *People with lower levels of extremist belief were more likely than people with strong extremist beliefs to engage in routine (non-ideological) crimes*.

H9: Based on GST and GST of Terrorism, *individuals who experienced individual level stressors were more likely than those who have not experienced individual level stressors to commit an ideologically motivated crime*.

H10: Based on the socialization effect of family and friends, it was hypothesized that *individuals who had extremist family/friends were more likely than individuals who did not have extremist family/friends to commit an ideologically motivated crime*. This relationship should be valid, irrespective of the individual's own level of commitment to extremism.

H11a: Based on the socialization effects of deviant groups and free spaces, it was hypothesized that *DFRs who belonged to an extremist group were more likely than lone wolves to commit violent crimes*.

H11b: Based on Chermak, et al. (2009b) and Belli's (2011) arguments, it was hypothesized that *lone wolves were more likely than extremist group members to commit non-violent/financial crimes*.

H12: Since far-rightists did not recognize any authority above the local level, it was hypothesized that *individuals who had negative interactions with government officials were more committed to rightwing extremism and consequently more likely to commit an ideological crim when compared to those who did not have such negative interactions with law enforcement*.

Table 1: Summary table of hypotheses and their justifications

	HYPOTHESIS	JUSTIFICATION
1	Individuals that experience individual level stressors were more likely to join a far-rightist group, compared to those who did not experience these stressors.	GST, DOT
2a	Individuals that had significant others who were far-rightists were more likely to join a far-rightist group, when compared to those who lack such access to extremist opportunity structures.	DOT: extremist friends could have provided access to extremist groups / extremist opportunity structures.
2b	There was an interaction effect between strain and extremist friends / family on membership in extremist groups.	GST: negative interactions with government officials (e.g. court officials and the police) increased feelings of strain and alienation. Aho (1990).
3a	Individuals that experienced negative interactions with government officials were more likely to join a rightwing extremist group, when compared to those who did not have these interactions.	Aho (1990): negative interactions with government officials could have created 'Seekers'
3b	Individuals who had both negative interactions with government officials and extremist friends/family were more likely than those that did not to join an extremist group.	DOT: extremist friends/family provided access to extremist opportunity structures.
4	Individuals who experienced individual level stressors had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology, when compared to people who did not experience such stressors.	GST: strain resulted in feelings of anger, frustration and depression. McCauley and Moskalenko: If the person attributed the cause of the strain to a group, rather than an individual, this could have increased a person's commitment levels.
5	Individuals with significant others who were far-rightists had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology, when compared to people without extremist friends or family members.	DOT and free *spaces*: interactions with other extremists in informal settings should have had an indoctrination effect.
6	Members of formal extremist groups had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology, when compared to non-members.	DOT and free *spaces*: interactions with other extremists in a group setting should have had an indoctrination effect.

Table 1: Summary table of hypotheses and their justifications continued…

	HYPOTHESIS	JUSTIFICATION
7a	Individuals who experienced negative interactions with government officials had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology, when compared to those who did not have such experiences.	DOT: the behavior of law enforcement and courts could have increased a strained person's feelings of alienation and reduced his/her commitment to conventional norms. Consequently, there would be an opportunity for conventional norms to be replaced with extremist values and beliefs.
7b	There was an interaction effect between extremist friends / family and negative interactions with government officials on commitment to extremism.	DOT
8a	People with strong extremist beliefs were more likely than people with lower levels of extremist beliefs to commit an ideologically motivated crime.	Consistent with ideological & anti-government beliefs (Belli, 2011; Belli & Freilich, 2009; Vertigans, 2007).
8b	People with lower levels of extremist belief were more likely than people with strong extremist beliefs to engage in routine (non-ideological) crimes.	Consistent with ideological & anti-government beliefs (Belli, 2011; Belli & Freilich, 2009; Vertigans, 2007).
9	Individuals that experienced individual level stressors were more likely than those who did not experienced individual level stressors to commit an ideologically motivated crime.	GST; GST of Terrorism: strain increased feelings of anger and commitment to the cause, which may have increased the likelihood of committing an ideologically motivated crime
10	Individuals who have extremist family/friends were more likely to commit an ideologically motivated crime.	The socialization effects of sub-cultural groups and *free spaces*
11a	Individuals who belonged to an extremist group were more likely than lone wolves to commit violent crimes.	The socialization effects of deviant groups and *free spaces* would have increased the likelihood that group members would commit a homicide
11b	Lone wolves were more likely than extremist group members to commit non-violent/financial crimes.	Chermak, et al. (2009) and Belli's (2011) research findings
12	Individuals who have negative interactions with government officials were more committed to rightwing extremism and consequently were more likely than those who had not had such interactions to commit an ideological crime	DFRs would not recognize any authority above the local level and have anti-government beliefs. Such beliefs extend to officers of the court, law enforcement officers and tax officials. DOT: negative interactions with government officials could have solidified a person's deviant self-concept; thereby increasing likelihood s/he would violate society's laws.

This chapter presented the three research models examined in the study. A summary of the study's hypotheses and their justifications were also provided in Table 1 above. The sample design and methods used to answer these research questions will be described in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

DATA AND METHODS

5.1. Data source

This study used individual level data from the US Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) (see: Freilich, et al. 2014). The ECDB was created in several stages, which will be outlined below.

5.1.1. Identification of incidents: Incidents were first identified from existing terrorism databases (such as the RAND-MIPT, American Terrorism Study and Global Terrorism Database), official sources, personal informants, scholarly and journalistic articles, and watch-group reports (Chermak, Freilich, Parkin & Lynch, 2012; Freilich & Chermak, 2009; Gruenewald, 2011). These incidents were then searched using 30 open-source search engines: Lexis-Nexis; Proquest; Yahoo; Google; Copernic; News Library; Westlaw; Google Scholar (both articles & legal opinions); Amazon; Google U.S. Government; Federation of American Scientists; Google Video; Center for the Study of Intelligence; Surf Wax; Dogpile; Mamma; Librarians' Internet Index; Scirus; All the Web; Google News; Google Blog; Homeland Security Digital Library; Vinelink; The Bureau of Prison's inmate locator; Individual State Department of Corrections (DOCs); Blackbookonline.info. The searched cases were then assigned to trained coders. Training involved a combination of instructions by a trained coder and practice coding a previously coded case. The second training step also provided a measure of inter-rater reliability, in addition to its role as a training mechanism. The coder then conducted follow-up targeted searches to locate missing data. Next, the data from the search file were entered into an ACCESS database. Cases were also periodically re-searched and updated in the database. For a more detailed discussion see: Freilich, et al., (2014) and Gruenewald (2011).

The ECDB has several advantages compared to other terrorism databases. Unlike other databases (e.g., ATS), the ECDB's inclusion criteria is not limited to the federal government's definition of terrorism. The ECDB also includes both state and federal crimes, which provides a more complete picture of far-rightists' criminal behavior (Chermak, et al., 2010; Chermak, et al., 2012; Gruenewald, 2011). Triangulation of measures (i.e., multiple sources) is used both to identify incidents and code incidents. Although Andrew Silke (2001) argued for a movement away from open source information when conducting research on terrorism, this study compensated for the limitations of open source materials (e.g., publicity effects, i.e., inconsistencies in coverage of different incidents, and source effects, i.e., inconsistencies within a source) by triangulation of measures (for a discussion on using multiple sources to uncover publicity and source effects, see: Chermak, et al., 2012). Sources of information were ranked according to Sageman's (2005) decreasing order of reliability (See also: Freilich, et al. (2014) for details). This ranking of sources of information increased the reliability of the data, while triangulation of measures facilitated convergent validation, which strengthened confidence in the study's results.

Possible limitations of the database include a risk of under-inclusion or missing cases, especially for financial schemes. Homicides committed by members of the far-right tend to attract a high degree of media attention and are less likely than financial crimes to be omitted from the ECDB (for a more detailed discussion on selectivity bias see: Chermak, et al., 2012). Despite these factors, the ECDB is the most appropriate data source for this study because its universe is wider than that found in other terrorism databases. State and federal level offenses are included in the database, as well as violent and financial crimes perpetrated by the far-right and non-extremist co-offenders. Many of the variables used in this study are also contained in the

database, which reduced the time needed to create the study's dataset. For example, the ECDB uses various sources to infer subjects' commitment to far-rightist ideology, and the reliability of these sources is ranked to maximize validity and accuracy of this variable. Furthermore, protocols exist to ensure inter-rater reliability between coders, to minimize selectivity bias and reduce missing cases. The unique strengths of the ECDB far outweighed the limitations associated with secondary data analysis. These data were cleaned and verified prior to conducting analysis for this study, which involved a 3-stage plan (see next section).

5.2. Sample, Data Coding & Verification Process

The sample was first extracted from the ECDB. People in the database must have been formally charged with a homicide or financial crime at the state or federal level, and at least some portion of the offense must have occurred in one of the 50 states. Unlike homicides, which tend to occur at a certain point in time, financial schemes generally occur over a period of time (Belli, 2011). To have been included in this study, at least a portion of the financial scheme must have occurred during 2006 to 2010. This period was selected (1) to allow for a sufficiently large sample size to ensure a reasonable degree of statistical power, (2) to minimize the effects of social factors excluded from the study, (3) and to exclude pending trails/cases.

The sample consisted of DFRs charged with a homicide (N= 142) or financial scheme (N=103), and non-far-rightist co-offenders charged with a homicide (N= 27) or financial scheme (N=33). The original intent was to include convicted people only. However, because of the limited sample size and number of IVs in the study, omitting the acquitted suspects would have resulted in loss of statistical power and unreliable parameter estimates. Conviction status was controlled for in the statistical models when possible. Conviction status was set at "1" or yes for

research questions 1 and 2. Thus, the effect of the IVs on the DV is interpreted as conditional on conviction.

Table 2: Sample of crimes and suspects charged with a homicide or financial crime during the period 2006 to 2010

Type of crime	Number of DFRs suspects indicted	Number of non-extremist indicted	Total number of suspects
Financial	103	33	136
Homicide	142	27	169
Total	245	60	305

Non-extremists who offended with an extremist co-offender were coded as "zero" on the extremist commitment scale (see next section for details). This was used as a comparison group of criminals who could have also been Seekers (Aho, 1990). Non-extremists were compared to (1) far-rightists who committed an ideological crime and (2) far-rightists who committed a non-ideological crime.

Next, the 30 free open source web engines identified in the previous section were (re)searched to identify new information. In addition, criminal history records of individuals in the sample were obtained from a pay-per-view website, BeenVerified.com. The information obtained from the updated searches and criminal history records was then entered into an Excel file and transferred to SPSS and Stata for analysis.

5.3. Variables

This study used a cross-sectional design to examine the criminal behavior of DFRs and their non-extremist co-offenders. This study had three dependent variables: membership in an extremist group, commitment to rightwing extremism and crime committed. Research models

were created to explain each of the three dependent variables. However, since the research literature indicated that membership in an extremist group and commitment to extremism may influence criminal behavior of DFRs (see literature review section), the variables membership in an extremist group and commitment to rightwing extremism were then used as independent variables in the final model, which explained the criminal behavior of far-rightists.

The variable, membership in an extremist group, was defined as whether the individual was part of a formal extremist group at the time of the offense. Formal groups typically have a clear hierarchal structure and goals, while informal groups have no clear leadership structure. This variable was coded: 0=no evidence that the suspect belonged to formal extremist group; 1=at least one source that indicated the individual was a member of an extremist group. Since a group of friends who are extremists could have been coded as both an (informal) group and the presence of extremist friends / family, there was a risk of autocorrelation between the variables. To mitigate this risk, membership in informal group was excluded from the group membership variable and coded as the presence of extremist friends. The Southern Poverty Law Center's (SPLC) website was primarily used to ascertain whether a group was classified as extremist or merely right wing. Members of right wing groups were not coded as belonging to an extremist group. Consensus in the media or by law enforcement was also used to determine whether a group was coded as extremist. This variable was also included as an independent variable in the final research model.

The second dependent variable, commitment to rightwing extremism, was operationalized similarly to Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) concept of indoctrination into a deviant subculture but drew upon: (a) the unique ideology common to the far-right (conspiratorial, xenophobic, anti-government, anti-tax, survivalist and anti-gun control beliefs); (b) participation

in far-rightist sub-cultural activities, e.g., attended movement activities, wrote or disseminated movement materials, wrote letters to the editor, etc.; and (c) self-identification as a far-rightist.

According to Cloward & Ohlin (1960; also see: Freilich, et al., 2009b), an individual who subscribes to numerous rightwing extremist beliefs could be considered as more indoctrinated into the far-right culture compared to someone who subscribes to fewer rightwing extremist beliefs. Therefore, this individual would be more committed to rightwing extremist ideology, when compared to someone who held fewer rightwing extremist beliefs. Likewise, continuous participation in many movement activities suggests integration and indoctrination into far-right extremist culture (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Rather than summing up an individual's score to determine his/her commitment to extremism, a factor analysis was used to identify the relevant factors that contribute to commitment to far-right extremism (also see Field, 2013, pp. 665-719). Individual's scores were then tallied for each factor identified. Finally, each individual's scores were summed up for the factors to determine his/her overall commitment to extremism score. The results of the factor analysis are discussed in Chapter 6. Similar to membership in extremist groups, the commitment to extremism score was also used as an independent variable in the third research question. A summary of the indicators used to create the commitment to extremism factor is provided in table 3.

Table 3: Indicators of Commitment to FR Ideology

Value	Indicator	Explanation of indicator
0	No evidence of conspiratorial beliefs	"Believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal liberty and a belief that one's personal and/or national 'way of life' is under attack and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent" (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p. 372) e.g. Belief in New World Order or ZOG; demonizing the UN; SSN & IDs used to track people; foreign troops in US; the economy was controlled by America's enemies; end times was near; two seedlines - Jews were offspring of Satan; Creativitiy: Catholicism denounced as a 'cult-religion' and it was the holy responsibility of each generation to fight for the white race (Aho, 1990; Barkun, 1989, 1996; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006; Durham, 1996, 2003; Kaplan, 1995a, 1997; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000)
1	Evidence of conspiratorial beliefs	
0	No evidence of xenophobic beliefs	"but for some the threat is from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group" (Freilich et alet al., 2009b, p. 372) e.g. believe children should have been home schooled to avoid race mixing; violently opposed to mixed marriages/relations; racial segregation; US was a white nation; refer to imprisoned white supremacists as 'prisoners of war;' restriction of immigration to white Europeans; hate/bias comments or statements by perpetrator on or before crime; hate/bias material left at crime scene; presence of racist clothing, zines, music and tattoos* (Aho, 1990; Barkun, 1989, 2000; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Blee, 2002; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006; Hamm, 1993; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Krouse, 2010; Simi, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010).
1	Evidence of xenophobic beliefs	
0	No evidence of anti-government beliefs	"Suspicious of centralized federal authority" (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p. 372) e.g. Excessive erosion of civil liberties; government violates the Constitution & excessively legislates citizens lives; plain text interpretation of law & belief in common law courts (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Barkun, 2000; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Ezekiel, 1995; Kaplan, 1995a; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Simi, 2010).
1	Evidence of anti-government beliefs	
0	No evidence of anti-tax beliefs	"reverent of individual liberty…be free of taxes" (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p. 372) e.g. 16th Amendment not ratified; federal tax was voluntary; wages & tips were not income; only foreign source of income was taxable; an individual was not a person according to the IRC; only federal employees were subject to federal tax; the IRS was a private corporation (Aho, 1990; Belli & Freilich, 2011; Chermak, et al., 2010; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006; Durham, 1996; Freilich, et al., 2009b; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000; Kaplan, 1995; "The Truth about Frivolous Tax Arguments", 2012; "The Tax Protest Movement", n.d.).
1	Evidence of anti-tax beliefs	

Table 3: Indicators of Commitment to FR Ideology continued

Value	Indicator	Explanation of indicator
0	No evidence of survivalist beliefs	"A belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating in paramilitary preparations, training and survivalism" (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p. 372) e.g. stockpiling weapons, medical supplies and food and weapons training necessary (Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Kaplan, 1995a, 1995b; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000).
1	Evidence of survivalist belief	
0	No evidence of anti-gun control beliefs	"reverent of individual liberty… especially their right to own guns" (Freilich, et al., 2009b, p. 372) Right to bear arms not limited by legislation (Barkun, 1996; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Freilich, et al., 2009b).
1	Evidence of anti-gun control beliefs	
0	No evidence of participation in movement activities	e.g. operated hate site, wrote or disseminated extremist books/essays/letters to the editor, organized or attended movement activities, recruited others (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; Chermak, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Futrell & Simi, 2004; Simi & Futrell, 2010)
1	Evidence of participation in at least 1 movement activity	
1	Self claim	e.g. I am a far-rightist/tax-protester/Patriot
-1	Self denial	e.g. I am not an extremist

The third dependent variable, crime committed, was measured as a violent incident or financial scheme, which was further subdivided into ideologically motivated homicide, non-ideologically motivated homicide, ideologically motivated financial scheme and non-ideologically motivated financial scheme. Crimes committed to advance the goals of the extremist group / movement or motivated by extremist ideology were classified as ideological. When there was no evidence that the crime that had any link to the movement, the crime was coded as non-ideological.

This study utilized the classical Weberian approach to action, which conceptualized action as a reflection of the subjective meaning attached to the behavior by the actor (Campbell, 1998; Weber, 1998). In other words, it assumed a certain degree of consistency between the

actor's internal state (i.e., beliefs) and his/her action, even if the actor was unaware of this connection, i.e., included both rational and affective actions (Weber, 1998). Therefore, this study assumed that an individual's motive to commit an act (i.e., ideological or non-ideological crime) would have been consistent with his/her subjective meaning of the situation (i.e., commitment to rightwing extremism). However, the reverse would not have been true, as this study did not assume that action implied a specific subjective meaning to the actor. Thus, while motive (for an action) was ascertained from an individual's commitment to rightwing extremism, to assume that someone who committed a hate crime was a white supremacist would have been circular reasoning.

Since this study conceptualized motive to engage in an action as emanating from the permanent internal state of the individual, i.e., his/her commitment to far-right extremism, there was some overlap between the variables. According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), indoctrination into a subculture tends to fluctuate until the norms, values and beliefs of the subculture replaced conventional norms, values and beliefs. After an individual is indoctrinated into the subculture, their commitment to the subculture could be conceptualized as a permanent internal state, i.e., a permanent change in the individual's belief systems (Cloward & Ohlin, 1990). However, the behavior or crime committed is an event that occurred in time, i.e., not permanent, albeit a product of an individual's commitment to far-right extremism (Campbell, 1998; Weber, 1998). Thus, *ideological motive for committing a crime* and *commitment to far-right extremism* are separated by a time dimension, i.e., commitment to extremism occurs first and is relatively permanent; the behavior is motivated by commitment and is a temporary event. However, motive and ideology could also be interconnected constructs: leaving white supremacist symbols and graffiti at the crime scene, self-claim of being a DFR, and stating one's intension to commit a

hate crime on a website were used as evidence of the individual's commitment to far-right extremism and ideological motive for the crime (see Table 4).

Table 4: Operational Definition of Crime Committed

Classification of Crime	Operational definition	Indicators / Source
Ideologically motivated homicide	Convicted of causing the death of another human for an ideological or movement related purpose	hate/bias/anti-government comments or statements made by perpetrator on or before crime; hate/bias/anti-government material or graffiti left at crime scene; perpetrator was a member of an extremist group and extremist group was involved in the crime; perpetrator wrote bias-related emails; perpetrator created websites; hate/bias/anti-government materials representative of an organized hate group left at crime scene; extremist group claimed responsibility for the crime (Campbell, 1998; Flanagan & O'Brien, 2003; Kaplan & Moss, 2003; Kercher, Nolasco & Wu, 2009; Krouse, 2010; Weber & Runciman, 1998).
Ideologically motivated financial scheme	Convicted of carrying out an illicit financial operation for an ideological or movement related purpose	
Non-ideologically motivated homicide	Convicted of causing the death of another human for no an ideological or movement related purpose	Evidence of economic motive for incident and no evidence of the pro-indicators listed above (Kaplan & Moss, 2003).
Non-ideologically motivated financial scheme	Convicted of carrying out an illicit financial operation for no an ideological or movement related purpose	

Indictments and court documents are the most reliable source to establish an individual's motive for committing a crime. However, searches of open sourced documents unearthed few indictments. Further, court documents were obtained for some suspects. Personal statements and statements by co-offenders were also used to establish motive for a crime (e.g., if a co-offender

stated the suspect hated sexual orientation minorities and shouted anti-gay slurs during the crime, this offense was coded as ideologically motivated).

In situations where there were no statements made by the sampled DFRs about their motivation for committing a crime, this study attributed motivation for a crime based on circumstantial evidence prior to the commission of the offense. Similar to the system used by the courts and FBI to determine bias in hate crime cases, evidence of the suspect's prior ideology or belief was used to determine whether a crime was ideologically or non-ideologically motivated, e.g., hate/bias/anti-government comments or statements by perpetrator on or before crime, hate/bias/anti-government material left at crime scene, whether perpetrator was a member of an extremist group and involvement of the hate group in the crime (Kercher, Nolasco & Wu, 2009; Krouse, 2010). The FBI's method for determining if an offense was a hate crime was also consistent with Weber's conceptualization of motive and action (Cambell, 1998; Weber, 1998). Also in keeping with hate crime legislation (Flanagan & O'Brien, 2003; Kercher, Nolasco & Wu, 2009) crimes in which there was mixed motive (i.e., a combination of ideological and non-ideological motives) were classified as ideologically motivated crimes.

In situations where conflicting reports were given about the motivation of sampled individuals, Sageman's (2005) decreasing order of reliability was used to classify the crime as ideological or non-ideological. Sageman (2005) ranked information in decreasing order of reliability according to the source: appellate court decisions; government documents; trial transcripts; corroborated information by key informants; uncorroborated information by key informants; and statements from people without direct access to the event/information (e.g., other media reports, watch-group reports, personal views expressed in blogs, websites, editorials and other opinion pieces). See also Freilich, et al. (2014).

Independent variables included individual level stressors, friend or family member in the movement, and prior negative interactions with government officials. Individual level stressors included low education, low income, low status job and abuse. Initially this variable was conceptualized as a 6-point scale, however, because if the high proportion of missing values, this variable was recoded as a binary variable. A degree of resiliency was assumed on the part of suspects. People 18 years old and older without a high school education were coded as having low education. Similarly, financial debt, homelessness and incarceration (prisoners rarely earned income and those who worked in prison earned a negligible income) were used as evidence of low income. Finally, abuse by a parent and bullying at school were used as evidence of abuse. For persons with college degrees and / or full-time occupation, this variable was coded as "0." If no mention was made of the suspect's education, financial status, occupation or abuse, this variable was coded as "missing." High school and college students were only coded as "1" for this measure if abuse or bullying was mentioned.

The variable, friend or family in movement, was coded as "1" = any evidence of friend or family involvement in the far-right movement and "0" = no evidence of friend or family involvement in the far-right movement found. Engaging in social activities with other far-rightists, such as socializing in a DFR's home, was used as evidence of having friendship ties. Statements by the police, media or court about extremist friends / family members, were also used as evidence of having friendship ties in the movement. Committing an unplanned crime with non-group members who were extremists was also taken as evidence of having friendship ties to extremists, since this suggests the crime occurred in the midst of social activities. However, being with a fellow group member at the behest of the group leader to commit a retaliatory crime was not considered as evidence of friendship ties to the movement.

Table 5: Description of variables

Variable	Description of variable
Dependent variables	
1. Membership in extremist group	On or before the time of the offence, was the individual a member of an extremist group, i.e., an organization, with a name and command structure and at least 2 extremist members? (0=no; 1=yes)
2. Commitment to extremism	Level of commitment to extremist cause on or before the time of the offence, measured as a scale comprising 6 factors.
3. Crime committed	What type of crime did the suspect commit? ➢ 1 = ideologically motivated homicide; 2 = non-ideologically motivated homicide; 3 = ideologically motivated financial scheme; 4 = non-ideologically motivated financial scheme. ➢ 1 = homicide; 2 = financial crime.
Independent variables	
1. Gender	What was the individual's gender? (0=male; 1=female)
2. Race	What was the individual's race? (0=non-white; 1=white)
3. Domestic Far-Rightist	Was the individual a Domestic Far-Rightist? (0=non far-rightist; 1=DFR i.e. any one pro indicator listed in Table 3)
4. Individual level stressors	(Proxy variable) *Binary variable consisting of any one the following elements*
➢ Education	Was the individual older than 18 and had less than a high school education?
➢ Income level	Was the individual homeless, incarcerated or in financial debt at the time of the offense?
➢ Occupation	Was the individual unemployed or casually employed at the time of the offense?
➢ Abuse	Was abuse mentioned as a mitigating factor in court?
5. Friend / Family involvement in movement	Did the individual have a family member, friend or acquaintance that was involved in the movement, on or before the time of the offence? (0=no; 1=one or more friend/family member/acquaintance in movement)
6. Prior negative Interactions with government officials	(Proxy variable) *Binary variable consisting of any one the following elements.*
➢ Civil action by government	Was civil action (e.g. lien, preliminary or permanent injunction) taken against the suspects by a government agency or department prior to the act?
➢ Prior arrests	Was the individual arrested prior to committing this offense?
➢ Prior charges	Was the individual charged with a crime prior to committing this offense? Was the individual convicted of a criminal offense prior to committing this offense?
➢ Outcome of priors	

The independent variable, prior negative interactions with government officials, was operationalized as a proxy variable. This included: (1) prior civil actions, (such as an injunction

or lien filed by a government department or agency against the individual and protection orders filed by a spouse); (2) prior arrests; (3) prior criminal charges; and (4) prior convictions. The date of the offense coded in the dataset was used to distinguish between prior and subsequent criminal / civil offending behavior. This variable was coded as: "1" = at least one prior civil order, crime, arrest, or conviction before the start date of the current offense; and "0" = no evidence of prior negative interactions with government officials. Statements by the media or judge about a criminal record or civil injunction, a record on the state / federal prison website or a criminal history record on the pay per view website was coded as "1." When the media or judge said the person did not have a criminal / civil record, no record was found on the state / federal website or the pay per view website uncovered no record, this variable was coded as "0." If the suspect was not found on the pay per view website and no mention was made in the open source about priors, this variable was coded as missing.

To describe the sample, individual level variables – gender, race and DFR status – were also included. Gender was coded as a binary variable: "0" = male and "1" female. Race was also coded as binary: "0" = non-white and "1" = white. DFR status was coded as: "0" = non-extremist collaborators and "1" = member of an extremist group or evidence of commitment to DFR ideology. Categories coded as "0" were used as the reference category in the statistical models. A detailed description of the study's independent and dependent variables can be found in Table 5.

5.4. Data Analysis

Each research question required a different statistical analysis technique. The first research question, which assessed membership in extremist groups, was evaluated using logistic

regression models. According to Agresti (2007) and Field (2013) these types of models should be used to determine the effects of continuous and /or categorical independent variables on a binary dependent variable (DV) e.g., membership in a formal or informal extremist group. Multiple independent variables (IVs) and interaction effects (i.e., moderation) between IVs (Field, 2013; Hamilton, 2009) were included in the logistic regression models for research questions 1 and 2.

Logistic regression models were used to predict the probability of a dependent variable, y, occurring, given observed values of 1 (or more) IV. The logistic regression equation used to predict the probability of y when there was one predictor variable was:

$$P(Y) = \frac{1}{1+e^{-(b_0 + b_1 X_1 + \varepsilon_i)}}$$

where *e* was the base of natural logarithms; b_0 was the constant; b_1 was the weight of the predictor variable (X_1); and ε was a residual term (Field, 2005). When the model included more than one predictor variable, the logistic regression equation was:

$$P(Y) = \frac{1}{1+e^{-(b_0 + b_1 X_1 + b_2 X_2 + \ldots + b_n X_n + \varepsilon_i)}}$$

where weights or coefficients were added for each additional predictor variable (Field, 2005).

Logistic regression was used to find a model that best fit the observations in the data, with the use of maximum-likelihood estimation. First, a baseline was determined, which estimated the parameter for the constant and assessed the fit of the model, i.e., how well the model predicted the observed outcomes (Field, 2005). The measure of the fit of the model was the log-likelihood; a large log-likelihood indicated that the model did a poor job predicting the dependent variable i.e., the model misclassified a greater number of outcomes.

IVs were entered into the model, and compared against the baseline model. If the log likelihood (LL) for the research model was lower than the baseline model, this was taken as evidence in support of the research model. The log likelihood for the model was used as a badness-of-fit measure, in that the higher the LL, the worse the model fitted the data. The chi^2 result and its associated probability were used to determine if the entire logistic model was significant. If the probability of obtaining the chi^2 result by chance was small, i.e., less than or equal to 0.05, this indicated that the model was a significant predictor of the dependent variable. Further, logistic models provided an estimate of the model's strength in the prediction of the dependent variable or Pseudo R^2 e.g., Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic, Cox and Snell measure or Nagelkerke, termed goodness-of-fit measures (Field, 2005). Larger values indicated a stronger or better model specification (Hamilton, 2009).

Logistic models also allow the researcher to determine if individual IVs were significant predictors of the DV through interpretation of the Wald statistic. The Wald statistic was used to test the null hypothesis that the b-coefficient of the predictor variable = 0 (Field, 2005, p. 224). If the probability of obtaining a specific Wald statistic was small, i.e., less than or equal to 0.05, this indicated that the independent variable was a significant predictor of the dependent variable. However, since the Wald statistic was calculated by the regression coefficient divided by its standard error (i.e., Wald statistic = $\frac{b}{SE}$), standard errors tended to be inflated when the Wald statistic is large, and there was a risk of making a type II error (i.e., falsely rejecting a significant predictor). Another issue with the Wald statistic was, since referred to the natural log of the IV associated with a one unit change in the DV, it was more difficult to understand (Agresti, 2007; Field, 2005). Odds ratios are more easily understood. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicated that as the predictor increases, the odds of the dependent variable occurring also increases; while an

odds ratio less than 1 indicated that as the predictor variable increases, the odds of the dependent variable decreases (Field, 2005). Therefore, odds ratios were reported when available (see findings section). Significant p-values were denoted by asterisks, with a key directly below the table. Goodness of fit measures were placed below the table. A summary of the procedure for interpreting these statistics can be found in Appendix A.

The model with lowest log likelihood was considered to have been the best-fitted model. The classification table or plot and several diagnostic tests were used to confirm the best fitted model. The classification table, a contingency table which provided the count and percentage of correct predictions based on the model, was used to identify the observations that were correctly (and incorrectly) predicted by the model (Field, 2005). Similar to the classification table, classification plots were used to identify the correctly and incorrectly predicted cases, but in a graphical form (Field, 2005). Models with the most correctly identified/predicted cases were considered to have been better fitted. However, diagnostic tests, such as Cook's Distance,[9] Leverage,[10] DFBeta,[11] Studentized Residual, Standardized Residual and Deviance,[12] were created and reviewed to ensure than no observation or case has undue influence on the coefficients i.e., the coefficients were accurate (Field, 2005). These residuals were also graphed against predicted probabilities, since diagrams were easier to interpret than columns of figures (Menard, 2002).

[9] Cook's D gave the change in the coefficient when an observation/case was dropped from the analysis. Similar to other residuals, Cook's D was calculated for each case (Field, 2005; Menard, 2002). Individual Cook's D values were reviewed in the data window of SPSS and graphed against predicted probabilities to easily identify cases that exceed 1. There were no issues with Cook's D values.

[10] Leverage values for cases were compared to $\frac{k+1}{N}$, where k was the number of predictors and N was the sample size. No case had excessive influence on the models, i.e., leverage values were $\leq$ 3 times the calculated value (Field, 2005).

[11] DFBetas (i.e., the standardized Cook's statistics) were < 1. This indicated that there were no outliers (Field, 2005; Menard, 2002).

[12] Studentized Residuals, Standardized Residuals and Deviance Residuals were normally distributed.

Variables were then tested for multicollinearity, by analyzing tolerance, VIF, eigenvalues and variance proportions. Collinearity between independent variables was identified by a tolerance value less than .1 and VIF value greater than 10 (Field, 2005). Eigenvalues and condition indexes for dimensions in the model, found in the collinearity diagnostics table, also needed to be close in value. Large eigenvalues and condition indexes were taken as evidence that the model coefficients were greatly affected by small changes in the IVs, which would mean that the model specifications were not stable (Field, 2005). There were no issues with eigenvalues and condition indexes in this study. Finally, the variance proportions in the collinearity diagnostics table were interpreted. Variance proportions on small eigenvalue were small, which indicated that the study did not have problems with collinearity. A summary table of the assumptions of logistic regression can be found in Appendix B.

The second research question assessed the effects of several categorical IVs on commitment to rightwing extremism. Since commitment to rightwing extremism was operationalized using indicators to create a factor scale and the scale was skewed, a regression analysis was the appropriate technique for examining the effects of IVs on commitment to rightwing extremism. A regression analysis was used to determine whether the research model was significant, the strength of the model, the strength of IVs, and interaction effects (Field, 2013). Interaction effects were then estimated and compared to determine the best fitted model. Appendix C contains a summary table of the statistics and parameters estimated in regression models.

However, these parameters would have been biased if the assumptions for the test were violated. The DV needed to have a linear relationship with the IVs or the model would have been invalid (Field, 2013). Errors were independent, i.e., the Durbin-Watson statistic was between 1

and 3. If this assumption was violated, a robust regression would have been used instead (Field, 2013). Residuals were consistent at each level of the IV, which indicated that there was no problem with homoscedasticity. Although continuous IVs did not need to be normally distributed, if the errors were skewed, the confidence intervals and significance levels would be affected in small samples only (Field, 2013). The current sample size was 305, so this did not cause a problem. Finally, there were no outliers of influential cases (Field, 2013). These assumptions are summarized in Appendix D.

The third research question required several multinomial logistic regression models and logistic regression models, previously described, to be fully tested. For this model, membership in an extremist group and commitment to rightwing extremism were independent variables, and criminal behavior was the dependent variable. As criminal behavior was measured as four distinct and unordered categories (1 = ideologically motivated homicide; 2 = non-ideologically motivated homicide; 3 = ideologically motivated financial scheme; 4 = non-ideologically motivated financial scheme), a multinomial logistic regression model was the appropriate statistical test (Agresti, 2007; Hamilton, 2009; Long & Freese, 2005).

Multinomial logistic regression treated the DV as a nominal variable and calculated parameter estimates, i.e., B, SE, Wald and Exp(B), in comparison to a specified baseline category of the DV (Field, 2009). The baseline was the first category. Multinomial logistic regression determined statistical significance of categorical IVs, continuous IVs, interaction effects between IVs, the strength of the entire model, and if this effect was different for people with different levels of commitment to extremism (Agresti, 2007; Hamilton, 2009). This type of model was very similar to logistic regression models. IVs were entered in a block (at the same time), since the study aimed to test theories and research models. Interactions affects were

created in SPSS by specifying a custom model: the IVs were entered, along with the interaction terms to determine if the observed effects were due to the IVs (i.e., main effects) or the interaction terms (Field, 2009; Garson, 2012).

Multinomial logistic regression models were interpreted similarly to logistic regression: (1) significant Chi^2 statistics identify which models, IVs and interactions effects were statistically significant; (2) pseudo R^2 measures, such as Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke, specified the effect size of the model; (3) goodness-of-fit measures (e.g., Pearson Chi^2 statistic,[13] AIC and BIC)[14] and classification tables[15] were used to determine which models were the best fit of the data; (4) and the log likelihood ratio indicated how much variability in the data was not explained by the model (Field, 2009).

However, for these statistics to be accurate, certain assumptions must have been satisfied. Cells with low counts, or over dispersion, could have resulted in contradictory results in the Pearson Chi^2 statistic, in comparison to the AIC and BIC values (Field, 2009). Over dispersion was not a problem. Over dispersion was identified by a dispersion parameter, ϕ Pearson = $\frac{\chi 2\ Pearson}{df}$, that was close to 2 (Field, 2009). A summary of the statistics estimated by multinomial regression models can be found in Appendix E.

The full model included individual level stressors, extremist significant others and interactions with government officials as explanatory/independent variables. Membership in an extremist group and commitment to rightwing extremism were hypothesized as mediator

[13] Pearson Chi^2 was used to test whether the predicted values of the model were significantly different from the observed values (Field, 2009). Non-significant results indicate a better-fitted model.
[14] AIC was an acronym for Akaike's information criterion and BIC was an acronym for Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion. The model with the lower AIC and BIC values was deemed the better-fitted model (Field, 2009).
[15] Classification tables were interpreted similarly to those found in logistic regression analysis, except predicted probabilities was termed 'estimated response probabilities' and predicted group membership was termed 'predicted category' (Field, 2009).

(indirect) variables in the full model. Several statistical techniques could have been used to test for mediator effects on a categorical DV. The Sobel test could have been used when there is only one significant mediator variable (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). A large sample size (greater than 50) was required for the Sobel test to be accurate. The Sobel test can be calculated as follows:

$$a * b / \sqrt{(b^2 * s_a^2 + a^2 * s_b^2)}$$

where a was the unstandardized regression coefficient for the effect of the IV on the mediator, b was the unstandardized regression coefficient for the association between the mediator, the DV, s_a was the standard error of a, and s_b was the standard error of b (Preacher & Leonardelli, 2012). However, if both hypothesized mediator variables are found to be significant predictors of criminal behavior of DFRs, Preacher and Hayes (2008) recommended the bootstrap method be used instead of the Sobel test. The authors argued that the bootstrap method produce less biased estimates when there were multiple mediators in a model, and is suitable for dichotomous DVs. Unfortunately, since multiple imputation was used to fill in missing values; neither the Sobel test not the bootstrap method could have been used. It is likely that future versions of Stata would allow for the calculation of mediation effects on multiple imputed data.

More complex iterations with interaction terms / moderators were computed and compared to test whether Differential Opportunity Theory modified the effect of strain. To determine if different predictors or IVs explained violent as compared to financial crimes and ideological as compared to non-ideological crimes, the variable criminal behavior was re-coded as a dichotomous variable and logistic regression models (described in the analysis plan for the first research question) were utilized to fit the data. Depictions of the hypothesized relationships for the study's three research questions, as well as a summary of the statistical methods used to tests these relationships, can be found in Appendix F.

5.5. Missing Data and Multiple Imputation

Missing data was problematic, since this study utilized secondary data analysis. Six variables in the study contained missing values. Race, strain and negative interactions with law enforcement all contained missing values. Several interaction effects – strain X extreme others; extreme others X negative interactions with law enforcement; and strain X negative interactions with government officials – also contained missing values. Table 6, below, summarizes the percentage in missing values.

Allison (2002) recommended using multivariate normal models to impute missing values. The multivariate normal model assumes the variables in the model are normally distributed, has a linear relationship with other variables, and has error terms that were normally distributed (Allison, 2002).[16] Many of the variables in this study were categorical, which violated the normality assumptions for multiple imputations (MI). However, Allison (2002) argued that MI is also valid for categorical variables.

Table 6: Summary of Missing Data

Variable	Coded	Missing	Total
Race	251 (82%)	54 (18%)	305
Strain	199 (65%)	106 (35%)	305
Convicted	299 (98%)	6 (2%)	305
Prior negative interactions with government officials	279 (91%)	26 (9%)	305
Strain X Extreme others	199 (65%)	106 (35%)	305
Extreme Others X Prior negative interactions with government officials	279 (91%)	26 (9%)	305
Strain X Prior negative interactions with government officials	180 (59%)	125 (41%)	305

[16] Continuous variables that were not normally distributed may have been normalized via a log transformation and the antilog taken after the missing values have been imputed (Allison, 2002). Skewed distributions could have been normalized by applying a square root transformation. After missing values were imputed, the values must have been squared to reverse the transformation and return the values to their original scale. Rounding (values > 0.5, round up; values < 0.5, round down; if there were no negative values in the original measurement scales, negative values round to 0) may also have been necessary, especially for continuous variables that were discrete, i.e., could have only take the form of a whole number (Allison, 2002).

Several assumptions must have been met for MI to produce unbiased estimators: the data needed to have been missing at random (MAR), the regression models must have been correctly specified, the correct imputation method must have been selected and an adequate number of datasets must have been imputed (Carlin, Galati, & Royston, 2008; Marchenko & Eddings, n.d.; White, Royston & Wood, 2011). MAR is defined as when the probability that value was missing depended on another variable. However, within each category of the variable with missing values the probability of missingness is not related to another variable (Allison, 2002; White, Royston & Wood, 2011). This assumption would have been fulfilled if, for example, the probability of missing values for race was related to membership in extremist group, but the probability of missing for non-whites (and whites) was unrelated to membership in extremist group. It was impossible to test whether this condition was satisfied because the values of the missing data were unknown (Allison, 2002).

Correct specification of the MI model meant that the IVs provided a reasonable explanation of the DV. The correct regression model (logistic, regression, multinomial logistic, etc.) was then selected. Correct specification of the model was assessed by conducting the regression analysis on the original dataset with the missing values (Marchenko & Eddings, n.d.). In addition, all the variables – independent, dependent and interaction effects – was included in the MI impute command. According to White, Royston and Wood (2011), interactions effects must have been treated as "just another variable" and included in the imputation or one would obtain biased parameter estimates.

The imputation method selected was based on number of variables with missing values (univariate / single variable or multivariate / multiple variables), the pattern of missingness (monotone or arbitrary) and level of measurement of the variables. MI should produce unbiased

parameter estimates if an infinite number of datasets are created. Standard errors tend to be biased upwards if few datasets are estimated and there is a high percentage of missing values. Allison (2002) suggested researchers use Rubin's (1987) formula to calculate the number of datasets needed to ensure accurate standard errors and parameter estimates:

$$\frac{1}{1 + F/M}$$

where F was the fraction of the missing values and M was the number of datasets to have been computed. In other words, according to Rubin's (1987) formula, 10 imputed datasets should result in 95% accurate standard errors and parameter estimates. However, Allison (2012) later revised his recommendation based on the tradeoff between efficiency and accuracy. Allison (2012) cautioned that while 10 datasets may have been most efficient when faced with limited computer processing speed, accurate standard errors would require the number of imputed datasets to have been equivalent or similar to the variable with the largest percent of missing values. Thus, based on Table 6 and Allison's (2012) recommendation, 41 datasets would have been adequate. Since there was no issue with processing speed, 50 datasets were imputed.

Version 13 of Stata, a statistical program, allows users to impute missing values for continuous, binary, unordered categorical and ordered categorical variables using the mi impute command ("Multiple Imputation in Stata" n.d.; White, Royston & Wood, 2011). First, the regression models were calculated using the original datasets to verify the model specification (this was described in the data analysis section). The logistic model that predicted membership in extremist groups was correctly specified: the model Chi-square was significant, Nagelkerke R^2 = .331, the Hosmer and Lemshow Test was non-significant, the classification table was 67.6%

accurate, there was no evidence of complete separation, and the residuals were normal (for details on interpreting logistic models, see Appendix A and Appendix B).

The regression model assessing commitment to extremism was non-significant but correctly specified: the Durbin-Watson Statistic was close to 2, which indicated that the errors were independent; the VIF was close to 1 and Tolerance was higher than 0.2, which indicated that there was no problem with multicollinearity; Cook's distance did not exceed 1, Mahalanobis distance averaged close to 6 and the standardized residuals were normally distributed, which indicated that the normality assumption was fulfilled; and the correlation matrix indicated that there the IVs were not correlated (for details on interpreting regression models, see: Appendix D and Field, 2013).

The multinomial logistic model comparing the four types of crimes was also a good fit: the likelihood ratio test was significant, which indicated that the model with the IVs was significantly better than the null model; the Goodness of fit statistics gave inconsistent results, probably due to the missing data problem; the Cox and Snell and Nagelkerke Pseudo R^2 were greater than 0.5, which indicated that the model was strong; and the classification table listed that the model correctly predicted 63% of the observations (for details on interpreting multinomial logistic models, see: Appendix E).

MI was then attempted using chained equations (since 6 variables contain missing values) with the logit method (because the variables were binary). However, the models did not converge, and predictive mean matching (PMM) was used instead of the logit method. According to Harrell (n.d.) PMM can be used to impute missing values for continuous variables, binary and categorical data. Chained equations with the PMM method resulted in imputations

similar to the observed data (i.e., rates of 0 and 1 were relatively consistent across the 50 datasets).

Stata 13 was used to calculate the Monte Carlo error (MCE) for MI regression analyses, which assessed the adequacy of the imputed data. MCE are listed for the regression models, discussed in the next chapter. According to White, Royston and Wood (2011), the following criteria should be used to determine if sufficient datasets were imputed:

1. the MCE of a coefficient should have been approximately 10% of its standard error
2. the MCE of a coefficient's T-statistic should have been approximately 0.1
3. if the p-value was 0.05, the MCE of a coefficient's p-value should have been approximately 0.01; if the p-value was 0.01, the MCE of a coefficient's p-value should have been approximately 0.02

Stata 13 was used to fit regression models with the mi estimate: command. Regression models could have been fitted for binary, count, ordered categorical, unordered categorical, continuous, panel data and time series data (Stata Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual: Release 13, n.d.). However, the mi estimate: logit command does not run a logistic regression and the mi estimate: reg command does not run a regression. Instead, the mi estimate: command was used to compute the specified regression on each imputed dataset and to combine the results according to Rubin's (1987) rules. Therefore, the output of mi estimate: commands are different from regression analyses conducted on complete datasets (i.e., datasets with no missing values) and have their own rules of interpretation.

The average relative variance (RVI) is the variance in the estimates across the coefficients due to missing data. Thus, the closer the RVI is to zero, the lower the effect of the missing data on the parameter estimates. The largest FMI is used to determine whether the

number of imputations is sufficient to provide unbiased parameter estimates. The number of imputations should be at least 100 * FMI. The model *F* statistic tested whether all the coefficients for the IVs are significantly different from zero; if the p-value of the *F* statistic was ≤ 0.05, the model is said to be a significant predictor of the DV. P-values are also provided for individual IVs: if the p-value of the *t* statistic is ≤ 0.05, the IV is said to be a significant predictor of the DV (Stata Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual: Release 13, n.d.). Finally, the mi test: command is used to assess whether specific coefficients are significantly different from zero. This command is interpreted similarly to log-likelihood statistics when comparing different blocks when predicting a specific DV: significant mi test results means the IVs significantly improved the model. The mi test: command is used to assess the block model and interaction effects; non-significant mi test results indicate that the IV or interaction effect did not improve the model. These rules for interpreting MI models are summarized in Appendix G. Unfortunately, Stata 13 did not provide a means to assess mediation effects on imputed data.

The next chapter will present the study's results. First, the descriptive statistics for the sample will be presented. Next, the factor analysis used to create the commitment to extremism variable and the results of the factor analysis will be described. Finally, the results of the models assessing group membership, commitment to extremism and crime committed will be presented.

CHAPTER 6

RESULTS

6.1. Descriptive analysis

The study consisted of 305 DFR (N = 245; 80.33%) and their co-offenders (N = 60; 19.67%) who committed a financial scheme or homicide during the 5 year period, 2006 to 2010. More than fifty percent (N = 170; 55.74%) were members of formal extremist groups. Most of the sample was male (N = 261; 85.57%) and white (N = 223, 73.11%). Less than a quarter of the sample experienced at least one form of strain (N = 64; 20.98%), while no evidence of strain was found for close to forty-five percent of the sample (N = 135; 44.26%).

Many subjects had at least one friend or family with extremist beliefs (N = 268; 87.87%) and prior negative interactions with government officials (N = 175; 57.38%). Close to eighty-five percent (N = 259; 84.92%) were convicted. Indicted suspects who were not convicted (N = 40; 13.11%) were included in the sample to ensure adequate sample size for accurate statistical analysis. Of those people who were not convicted, 13 were killed by the police during a crime spree or committed suicide immediately after the homicide incident. About half of the non-convicted suspects (N = 21) were acquitted or the prosecutor dropped the charges, usually in exchange for testimony against a codefendant. Six suspects absconded or were awaiting trial at the time of the data analysis. The analyses presented in this chapter retained the non-convicted persons to maximize statistical power but controlled for non-convicted subjects when possible.

Open source documents were unable to definitively verify the experience of strain indicators for several subjects. There were high percentages of missing values for education (N = 55, 18%), income (N = 115; 37.58%) and occupation (N = 182; 59.50%). However, when the

strain measure was coded as any one indicator = "1," the percentage of missing values dropped to acceptable levels (N = 106; 34.75%) and resulted in a more reliable measure.

Table 7: Summary of variables

Variables	N	Percentage
Group member		
Yes	135	44.26%
No	170	55.74%
Crime committed		
Ideological homicide	96	31.48%
Non-ideological homicide	74	24.26%
Ideological financial scheme	91	29.84%
Non-ideological financial scheme	44	14.43%
Convicted		
Yes	259	84.92%
No	40	13.11%
Missing (imputed)	6	1.97%
Gender		
Male	261	85.57%
Female	44	14.43%
Race		
White	223	73.11%
Non-white	28	9.18%
Missing (imputed)	54	17.70%
Strain		
Yes	64	20.98%
No	135	44.26%
Missing (imputed)	106	34.75%
Extreme others		
Yes	268	87.87%
No	37	12.13%
Negative interactions with government officials		
Yes	175	57.38%
No	104	34.10%
Missing (imputed)	26	8.52%
Domestic Far Right		
Yes	245	80.33%
No	60	19.67%

A similar problem occurred with the indicators for prior negative interactions with government officials. There were high percentages of missing values for prior civil charges (N =

282, 92.16%), prior arrest (N = 157; 51.31%), prior criminal charges (N = 186; 60.78%) and prior criminal conviction (N = 140; 45.75%). However, when the multiple indicators were merged to create prior negative interactions with government officials, the rate of missing values fell to acceptable levels (N = 26, 8.52%). Multiple imputations were then used to fill in these missing values for conviction status (N = 6; 1.97%), race (N = 26; 8.52%), strain (N = 106; 34.75%) and prior negative interactions with government officials (N = 26, 8.52%). Missing values for interaction terms were also imputed. (See Chapter 5 for detailed explanation of the multiple imputation procedure used in this study).

The study's descriptive statistics were presented in Table 7 above. The factor analysis used to create the commitment to extremism variable will be presented in the next section. The inferential tests used to assess the study's dependent variables will then presented.

6.2. Commitment to ideology factor

6.2.1. Creating the Commitment to ideology scale

One of the key variables used in this study was commitment to extremism. This variable was used as the dependent variable in the second research question and an independent variable in the third research question. Commitment to extremism was conceptualized as a latent variable, i.e., multiple indicators were used to capture this construct. When there are many facets to a construct or latent variable, Field (2013) suggested using a factor analysis to (1) understand the structure of the latent variable, (2) create a more reliable instrument / questionnaire to measure the latent variable and (3) reduce the data to a more manageable level. In other words, factor analysis was used to determine which indicators were valid measures of the commitment to extremism construct. This can be measured by an eigenvalue > 1 (Kaiser's recommendation, as

cited by Field, 2013) or eigenvalue > 0.7 (Jolliffe's recommendation, as cited by Field, 2013). Indicators that combine to form a factor with an eigenvalue < .07 were deemed invalid and dropped from the construct measurement. Factor analysis was used to establish which indicators (previously described in chapter 5 and summarized in Table 3) contributed the most to the scale (Field, 2013). Jolliffe's recommendation (eigenvalue > 0.7) was used to identify the number of factors that contributed to the commitment to extremism construct. The raw scores were tallied to create each factor. The factors were then tallied to create a commitment to extremism scale. Although the factor analysis empirically creates a valid scale, it is considered to be the first step in designing a valid and reliable scale (Field, 2013). Since the study's commitment to extremism scale has not been previously tested, factor analysis is the appropriate technique to create a valid scale. The steps used to create the commitment to extremism scale will be described below.

A principal axis factor analysis was conducted on the 9 items with equamax rotation. This process involved estimating the communalities between the indicators listed in Table 3, and replacing the diagonals of the correlation matrix with the estimated communalities (Field, 2013). The eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the correlation matrix were then computed to determine the substantive importance of the factors and how many factors to retain (Field, 2013). An equamax rotation was then conducted to make the factors easier to interpret.

The correlation matrix revealed no problems with multicollinearity (i.e., none of the Pearson's r were greater than 0.9). According to Field (2013), a sample size of 300 or larger should have provided a stable factor solution. The result of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was in the "okay" range (KMO = .648); larger than 0.79 is considered to be ideal.

Table 8: Commitment to ideology scale

	Rotated Factor Loadings					
Item	Conspiracy Theorist	Survivalist	Proud Supremacist	Socializer	Proud far-rightist	Denier
Evidence of conspiratorial beliefs	**.880**	.185	-.151	.118	.091	-.053
Evidence of anti-government beliefs	**.832**	.209	-.105	.209	-.072	-.091
Evidence of anti-tax-beliefs	**.690**	-.225	-.242	.176	.328	-.006
Evidence of survivalist beliefs	.064	**.891**	-.020	.099	.146	-.035
Evidence that the suspect was anti-gun control	.098	**.883**	.067	-.042	-.014	-.001
Movement related tattoo	-.058	-.067	**.841**	-.238	.192	.064
Evidence of racist / general hate beliefs	-.194	.118	**.800**	.268	-.069	.080
Evidence of participation in movement activities	.159	.007	.015	**.936**	.116	.042
Claim to have been a far-rightist	.028	.108	.096	.098	**.948**	.007
Denial of far-rightist beliefs	-.038	-.012	.067	.037	.005	**.995**
Eigenvalues	2.709	1.797	1.364	.964	.839	.770
% of variance	27.089	17.969	13.639	9.636	8.387	7.703
Cronbach's α	.81	.74	.57			

The six factors fulfilled Jolliffe's criteria, i.e., had eigenvalues > 0.7 – Conspiracy Theorist, Survivalist, Proud Supremacist, Socializer, Proud far-rightist and Denier. Together these factors explained 84.42% of the variance in commitment to extremism. The scree plot also

showed six points of inflection (where the slope changed drastically), which also suggested that six factors should be extracted. Rather than using the factor scores, individuals' raw scores were tallied for each indicator of the variable. These were then summed to create individuals' overall score for commitment to extremism (M = 1.57; SD = 1.54). The items that clustered into the 6 factors are depicted in Table 8 above, along with their factor loadings (Eigenvalues).

Two factors, Conspiracy Theorist and Survivalist, had high reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha > 0.7$). However, Proud Supremacists had a low reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha > 0.57$). Reliability measures could not be calculated for Socializers, Proud far-rightists and Deniers as only one item was used to create each of those factors. However, when four or five factors were extracted, too many residuals had absolute values greater than 0.05; with the six-factor scale, only 28% of residuals had absolute values greater than 0.05. Thus, the six-factor scale was retained.

The percentage of variance for each factor provided a measure to assess the relative importance of the indicators to overall commitment to extremism. As expected, general conspiratorial beliefs, anti-government beliefs and anti-tax beliefs carried the most weight, and measured one overarching aspect of the commitment to extremism construct. When combined, these indicators formed the Conspiracy Theorist factor and explained 27% of the variance in individuals' commitment to extremism levels. Survivalist beliefs and anti-gun control beliefs also measured one aspect of commitment to extremism, i.e., formed a cohesive factor, Survivalist. This factor explained close to 18% of the variance in commitment to extremism. People who subscribed to general hate (anti-minority, anti-LBGT, anti-Semitic) beliefs also tended to have tattoos. These two indicators were used to create the Proud Supremacist factor, which explained approximately 14% of the variance in commitment to extremism. Participation

in movement activities (approx. 10%), claiming to have been a DFR (8%) and denying affiliation with the movement (approx. 8%) were also valid measures of commitment to extremism.

6.2.2. Interpreting the Commitment to ideology factors: subtypes in the American FR

Factors in the commitment to extremism scale can also be conceptualized as sub-types among the DFR movement. One model of DFR subtypes was described by Kaplan (1995a). According to Kaplan (1995a), the domestic far-right movement can be divided into the following sub-types: Klan, Christian Identity, neo-Nazi, reconstructed traditions/Odinism, idiosyncratic sectarians, single issue constituencies (e.g., tax protestors) and knuckle draggers galore/skinheads. Klan members traditionally engage in racist violence. However, racist violence by Klan groups has been declining largely due to the result of infiltration by government informants (Blee, 2002; Ezekiel, 1995; Kaplan, 1995a; Simi & Futrell, 2010) or perhaps due to the need to reframe their ideology to reduce the stigma associated with Klan groups (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 2006). Membership in Klan groups has been found to cut across class boundaries (Ezekiel, 1995; Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Christian Identity or the belief in two seedlines, which evolved from British Israelism, asserts that whites were descendants of Adam and Eve and were the true Lost Tribes of Israel and Jews are the children of Eve and Satan (Dobratz, 2001; Durham, 2008; Ezekiel, 1995; Kaplan, 1995a; Sharp, 2000). Similar to Christian Identity groups, neo-Nazi groups are xenophobic. According to Kaplan (1995a), some neo-Nazi groups dream of overthrowing the ZOG and creating a new order, while others hope to create white utopian communities.

Kaplan (1995a) classified reconstructed traditions/Odinism as the fourth sub-type of the American FR. He described Odinism as “an imaginative blend of ritual magic, ceremonial forms of fraternal fellowship, and an ideological flexibility which allows for a remarkable degree of

syncretism in adopting elements of other white supremacist appeals - Nazism and, remarkably, Christian Identity" (p. 60).

According to Kaplan (1995a), the fifth sub-type among the American FR is idiosyncratic sectarians, e.g. the Church of the Creator and Survivalists (Kaplan, 1995a). Survivalists and Militia members are associated with complex conspiracy theories, anti-government beliefs and an intense need to be prepared to defend their rights (especially to own guns or be free from unconstitutional federal taxes) and liberty (Barkun, 1996; Chermak, 2002; Durham, 1996; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000).

Finally, the seventh FR sub-type identified by Kaplan (1995a) is knuckle draggers galore / skinheads. Skinheads or 'knuckle draggers galore' are extremely racist, generally engage in opportunistic violence against racial minorities and commit crimes with other group members (Hamm, 1993; Kaplan, 1995a; Sprinzak, 1995). Hamm (1993) described skinheads as "remarkably violent" and motivated to "fight for the survival of [the white] race" (p. 109).

Limited empirical support was found for Kaplan's (1995a) classification of the DFR. Rather than being distinct sub-types, idiosyncratic sectarians and single-issue constituencies formed factor 1, Conspiracy Theorist. Idiosyncratic sectarians also described factor 2, Survivalist. In other words, rather than being one distinct group, some idiosyncratic sectarians (i.e., believers of conspiracy theories) scored highly on the Conspiracy Theorist factor, while others scored highly on the Survivalist factor.

According to the factor analysis, Klan, neo-Nazis and skinheads formed factor 3, Proud Supremacist. Characteristics of the Christian Identity movement and reconstructed traditions / Odinism were not apparent in the factor analysis. In addition, factors 4 (i.e., Socializer) and 5

(Proud far-Rightist) were not described by Kaplan (1995a) as a distinct sub-type of the American FR movement.

This section described the process used to create the commitment to extremism scale and used Kaplan's (1995a) typology as a framework to interpret the six factors extracted from the factor analysis. Some empirical support was found for Kaplan's (1995a) typology. Next, differences between DFRs and their non-extremist collaborators will be explored. This will be followed by the inferential models used to assess covariates of membership in extremist groups, commitment to extremism and crimes committed by far-rightists and non-extremist collaborators.

6.3. Covariates of Membership in Far-Right Extremist Group

The results for the first research question of the study – among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators, what effect did individual level stressors, significant others and negative interactions with government officials have on membership in far-right groups – are presented in this section. As this study was specifically concerned about the criminal behavior of DFR, the models presented in this section offset the conviction variable, that is, conviction status was set to "1" or yes. This technique allows the study to retain the individuals who were not convicted (i.e., retain the entire sample) but all the coefficients reported are based on the additional constraint of conviction = 1. That is, the odds ratios should be interpreted as the effect of the IV on the DV, if the suspect was convicted.

Members of extremist groups were significantly less likely to have been non-white. Specifically, non-whites were approximately 0.31 times less likely than whites to join a far-right extremist group ($\exp(B) = 0.31$, $p < 0.05$). This was expected, as the FR movement has been

found in previous studies to attract mostly white members (Gruenewald, et al., 2013a; 2013b). Members of extremist groups were close to 8 times ($exp(B) = 7.95$, $p < 0.001$) more likely to have at least one extremist friend or relative, which supported DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) and previous research findings (e.g., Aho, 1990; Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993). However, because open source documents were used in this study, it was unknown if these friendships developed prior or subsequent to joining the group.

Group members were significantly more likely to have had prior negative interactions with government officials ($exp(B) = 3.33$, $p < 0.01$). This supported GST (Agnew, 2005) and DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960), which argued that negative stimuli, such as a criminal record or civil charges, would increase feelings or strain and alienation. Furthermore, to alleviate these feelings, strained individuals may join a deviant sub-cultural group. However, these conclusions are tentative. Due to the limitations of open source documents, it is unknown whether these interactions occurred prior or subsequent to joining the group.

However, it was possible to determine whether these negative interactions with government officials occurred prior to the individual committing a homicide or financial scheme. Prison and arrest records typically contain an arrest or conviction date. This was then compared to the start date of the analyzed offense to determine whether the negative interactions with government officials occurred prior to the offense. Occasionally the precise date of the prior civil/criminal charge could not have been ascertained. However, in such events the news documents or court documents normally mentioned a criminal history record. When no statement was made about the civil or criminal record of the suspect and no actual record was found, the data was assumed to have been missing. The imputation process was described in Chapter 5 and the covariates of DFRs criminal behavior will be discussed later in this chapter.

Table 9: Models assessing covariates of membership in far-right extremist group, offset conviction

Independent Variables (when convicted = yes)	Model 1 Odds Ratio (SE)	Model 2 Odds Ratio (SE)	Model 3 Odds Ratio (SE)
Gender ɣ	0.99 (0.46)	1.02 (0.47)	0.96 (0.45)
Race š	0.31 (0.18)*	0.31 (0.17)*	0.31 (0.17)*
Strain ψ	0.98 (0.36)	2.01 (1.96)	0.50 (0.56)
Extreme others ψ	7.95 (3.82)***	12.56 (9.62)**	7.65 (3.72)***
Negative interactions with government officials ψ	3.33 (1.25)**	3.57 (1.37)**	2.95 (1.25)*
Domestic Far Right ψ	91.61 (62.39)***	94.72 (64.64)***	88.21 (60.22)***
Commitment to extremism	0.56 (0.06)***	0.55 (0.06)***	0.56 (0.06)***
Strain X Extreme Others	-	0.42 (0.45)	-
Strain X Negative interactions with government officials	-	-	2.20 (2.73)
Constant	0.00 (0.00)***	0.00 (0.00)***	0.01 (0.01)***
Imputations	50	50	50
N	305	305	305
Average RVI	0.06	0.08	0.12
Largest FMI	0.18	0.18	0.35
F	9.66***	8.34***	7.95***

Note 1: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
Note 2: ɣ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0
Note 3: The Monte Carlo errors were acceptable for all models, which indicated that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 35 datasets ($M \geq 100 * FMI$) would have been adequate to ensure accurate parameter estimates.
Note 4: The results of the mi test indicated that the interaction effects did not significantly improve the model. All the IVs in model 1 significantly improved the null model. Model 1 was the better model.
Note 5: The RVI was close to zero, which indicated that the missing data had little effect on the variance of the estimates.

Members of far-right groups were significantly more likely to have been a far-rightist (exp(B) = 91.61, $p < 0.001$). However, group members had significantly lower commitment to extremism scores (exp(B) = 0.56, $p < 0.001$) than non-members, that is, lone wolves and people with informal links to the movement had higher commitment to extremism scores. This suggested that membership could have been motivated by factors other than strong commitment to extremism (e.g., the need to join a hate gang in prison for protection, or the influence of extremist loved ones). It was interesting that lone wolves tended score more highly on

commitment to extremism, in comparison to group members. This supported McCauley and Moskalenko's (2011) claim that group members were more loyal to other members, than they were to the actual cause.

Strain was not significantly associated with membership in far-right extremist groups ($exp(B) = 0.98$, $p > 0.05$). In other words, similar rates of strain were found among group members and non-members. This was consistent with previous findings by Gruenewald, et al. (2013a), in which similar rates of unemployment were found among lone wolves and other DFRs. However, this finding contradicted GST (Agnew, 2005) and DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). It was possible that since the sample consisted of people charged with a homicide or financial scheme, different rates of strain would have been found among DFRs who lead law abiding lives and it was not group membership per se that was influenced by strain.

Next, two interactions effects – strain X extreme others and strain X prior negative interactions with government officials – were individually added, which are presented in models 2 and 3 above. The effect of race on membership in extremist groups remained unchanged: non-whites were significantly less likely than whites to join a far-right extremist group ($exp(B) = 0.31$, $p < 0.05$). The effect of commitment to extremism on group membership also was unchanged: group members had significantly lower commitment to extremism scores than non-members. When strain was absent, friend / family ties increased the odds of group membership 12.56 times. Individuals appeared to have joined the group because of their ties to other extremists, rather than to the experience of strain. Furthermore, there was no interaction effect between extreme others and strain. These findings contradicted GST (Agnew, 2005) and DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) but supported studies on the far-right (Aho, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1996). Studies by Aho (1990) and Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1996) found evidence of

people with extremist referent others joining FR groups but no evidence of strain among group members.

In addition, the interaction effect of prior negative interactions with government officials X strain was not significant. However, when strain was absent prior negative interactions with government officials increased the odds of membership in extremist groups by 2.95 times ($exp(B) = 2.95$, $p < 0.05$). Based on Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) DOT, a significant interaction between strain and negative interactions with government officials was expected. Thus, the former finding contradicted DOT. However, this latter finding, a reduction in the effect of negative interactions with government officials when strain was absent, supported DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). According to Cloward and Ohlin (1960), a deviant or criminal label by law enforcement becomes crucial after the initial strain experience triggers an incentive to join a deviant subcultural group.

All the models presented in Table 9 were significant and did not unduly suffer from the imputation procedure (the RVI for both models were close to 0). Adequate datasets were imputed ($M = 50$) to ensure accurate coefficients and standard errors (the Monte Carlo errors were all acceptable and the largest FMI indicated that 35 imputed datasets would have resulted in unbiased coefficients). However, Model 1 was the best-fitted model, since the results of mi test indicated that the interaction effects did not significantly improve the model.

6.4. Differences between DFRs and non-extremist collaborators

DFRs ($N = 245$; 80.33%) and non-extremist collaborators ($N = 60$; 19.67%) are compared in this section. DFR was defined as someone coded as "1" for at least one far-right indicator listed in Table 8. People for whom no evidence of extremist beliefs was found were

classified as non-extremist collaborators. A logistic model was used to compare DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. These results were described below and depicted in Table 9.

As noted previously, for logistic models, odds ratios greater than 1 indicate that as the predictor increases, the odds of the dependent variable occurring also increased; while an odds ratio less than 1 indicate that as the predictor variable increased, the odds of the dependent variable decreased (Field, 2005). The results presented used fifty (50) multiple imputed datasets. Results for each dataset were calculated and combined according to Rubin's (1987) rules in Stata 13, to ensure unbiased standard errors and coefficients. However, since the imputed data contained a degree of randomness, odds ratios changed slightly depending on the seed number used in the imputation procedure. Significant effects were consistent, irrespective of the seed number. Therefore, the results presented focused primarily on statistical significance, as odds ratios should be interpreted as approximations.

Females were 0.30 times less likely to have been a Domestic Far-Rightist, i.e., females were more likely to have been non-extremist collaborators ($\exp(B) = 0.30$, $p < 0.01$). Sample members with at least one extremist friend or family member were significantly less likely to have been DFR ($\exp(B) = 0.08$, $p < 0.05$). In other words, non-extremist collaborators were more likely to have extremist friends / family members, when compared to DFRs. This was unexpected, since extremist friends / family members were associated with membership in extremist groups. However, group members were 23.35 times more likely than non-members to have been DFR ($\exp(B) = 23.35$, $p < 0.001$). This finding indicated that although social connections were important in individuals' decision to join an extremist group, their belief system was influenced by socialization from group interactions. This supported the socialization

effect of referent others among subcultural groups hypothesized by DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) and free spaces (Futrell & Simi, 2004; Perry & Blazak, 2010; Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Table 10: logistic model comparing DFR and non-extremists

Independent Variables	Model 1 Odds Ratio (SE)
Gender [γ]	0.30 (0.12)**
Race [š]	0.91 (0.47)
Strain [Ψ]	1.58 (0.70)
Extreme others [Ψ]	0.08 (0.08)*
Group [Ψ]	23.35 (14.44)***
Negative interactions with government officials [Ψ]	0.97 (0.39)
Constant	25.35 (30.16)**
Imputations	50
N	305
Average RVI	0.07
Largest FMI	0.20
F	6.52***

Note 1: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
Note 2: [γ] reference category = male; [š] reference category = white; [Ψ] Reference category = 0
Note 3: The Monte Carlo errors were acceptable, which indicate that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 20 datasets ($M \geq 100 * FMI$) would have been adequate.
Note 4: The results of the mi test indicate that all the IVs significantly improved the fit of the model.

Interestingly, there was no difference in strain between DFRs and non-extremists ($exp(B) = 1.58$, $p > 0.05$). Therefore, not only did strain not predict group membership, it also did not predict DFR beliefs. This contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin (1960), which argued that the experience of strain would initially incentivize individuals to join deviant subcultural groups (provided they had access to deviant opportunity structures, such as friends in the group) and contribute to the subsequent socialization process (i.e., increase commitment to extremist values).

These results are depicted in Table 10, above. The model was significant and the IVs significantly improved the fit of the model, as evidenced by the significant mi test result. The

Monte Carlo errors verified that adequate datasets were imputed (M = 50). This was supported by the largest FMI, which suggested that .20 x 100 or 20 datasets would result in unbiased estimates. There were no issues due to the imputed data, as evidenced by the average RVI being close to 0.

6.5. Covariates of Commitment to Extremism

The results for the second research question – what effect did individual level stressors, extremist friends / family, membership in an extremist group and prior negative interactions with government officials have on an individual's commitment to rightwing extremism – are presented in this section. None of the IVs had a significant effect on commitment to extremism. The non-significant results from the commitment to extremism scale could have been due to the fact that the variable was not normally distributed. Another possibility could have been that *levels* of extremism may have been less relevant than which extremist *belief* one is committed to, i.e., the factor an individual scored highly on was more important than his / her overall score on the commitment to extremism scale. To test this hypothesis, logistic models were fitted for the six factors – Conspiracy Theorists, Survivalists, Proud Supremacists, Socializers, Proud far-rightists and Deniers. Significant results were obtained for two factors, Conspiracy Theorists and Proud Supremacists, which were presented in the next section. Models assessing the covariates of the commitment to extremism scale and the other four factors – Survivalists, Socializers, Proud Far-Rightists and Deniers – were non-significant and are not presented.

6.5.1. Covariates of "Conspiracy Theorists"

The factor, Conspiracy Theorists, had high factor loadings for belief in conspiracy theories, anti-government belief and anti-tax belief. Logistic models were fitted to assess covariates of Conspiracy Theorists, with conviction set to "1" or yes and without conviction offset. The results were consistent with and without the offset variable. For simplicity sake, only the results of the conviction offset models are presented in Table 11, below.

Table 11: Models assessing Conspiracy Theorists, conviction offset

Independent Variables	Model 1 Odds Ratio (SE)	Model 2 Odds Ratio (SE)	Model 3 Odds Ratio (SE)	Model 4 Odds Ratio (SE)
Gender [γ]	1.00 (0.37)	1.01 (0.38)	1.01 (0.37)	1.09 (0.40)
Race [š]	3.33 (1.52)**	3.31 (1.51)**	3.39 (1.58)**	3.32 (1.53)*
Strain [Ψ]	0.40 (0.13)**	0.49 (0.38)	0.53 (0.34)	0.36 (0.12)**
Extreme others [Ψ]	0.68 (0.27)	0.75 (0.45)	0.70 (0.28)	0.14 (0.13)*
Group [Ψ]	0.99 (0.27)	0.99 (0.27)	1.01 (0.28)	1.01 (0.28)
Prior negative interactions with government officials (GO) [Ψ]	0.58 (0.18)†	0.59 (0.18)†	0.62 (0.21)	0.09 (0.10)*
Strain X Extreme Others		0.80 (0.69)		
Strain X Prior negative interactions with GO			0.72 (0.54)	
Extreme Others X Prior negative interactions with GO				7.63 (8.17)†
Constant	0.20 (0.13)	0.18 (0.14)*	0.18 (0.12)*	0.86 (0.87)
Imputations	50	50	50	50
N	305	305	305	305
Average RVI	0.08	0.10	0.12	0.08
Largest FMI	0.19	0.18	0.27	0.19
F	4.41***	3.73***	3.64***	4.09***

Note 1: † $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

Note 2: [γ] reference category = male; [š] reference category = white; [Ψ] Reference category = 0

Note 3: The Monte Carlo errors were acceptable for both models, which indicate that 50 imputed datasets were adequate.

In the basic model without interaction effects, non-whites were significantly more likely to have been Conspiracy Theorists, when compared to whites ($exp(B) = 3.33$, $p < 0.01$). This supported Barkun's (1996) argument that some conspiracy groups accepted non-white members. This relationship was relatively consistent when the interaction effects were added to the basic model. Interestingly, Conspiracy Theorists were 0.04 times less likely to experience strain, when compared to non-Conspiracy Theorists ($exp(B) = 0.40$, $p < 0.01$).

Next, the interaction effects – strain X extreme others, strain X prior negative interactions with government officials, and extreme others X prior negative interactions with government officials – were individually added into the model. According to Model 2, strain became non-significant when extreme others were absent ($exp(B) = 0.49$, $p > 0.05$). As depicted in Model 3, strain also became non-significant when negative interactions with law enforcement were absent ($exp(B) = 0.53$, $p > 0.05$). Thus, the experience of strain significantly reduced the likelihood that an individual would become a Conspiracy Theorist only when the effects of other variables were controlled ($exp(B) = 0.4$, $p < 0.001$).

According to Model 3, the interaction effect of strain X prior negative interactions with government officials did not have a significant effect on Conspiracy Theorists ($exp(b) = 0.72$, $p > 0.05$). Prior negative interactions with law enforcement was not significant when strain was absent ($exp(b) = 0.62$, $p > 0.05$). However, prior negative interactions with government officials became significant when the interaction effect extreme others X negative interactions with law enforcement was added to the model. Specifically, people who did *not* have extreme referent others but had prior negative interactions with government officials were 0.09 times less likely to have been Conspiracy Theorists ($exp(b) = 0.09$, $p < 0.05$). This contradicted Kaplan's (1995b) findings and DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960).

No evidence of a socialization / radicalization effect of extremist groups (exp(b) = 0.99, p > 0.05) or extreme referent others (exp(b) = 0.68, p > 0.05) was found for Conspiracy Theorists. Furthermore, Conspiracy Theorists were not radicalized by the experience of strain (exp(B) = 0.40, p < 0.01). Therefore, neither GST (Agnew (2005), nor DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) predicted Conspiracy Theorists. Tentative support was found for the socialization / radicalization effect of free spaces and friendship ties among people who experienced alienation from negative interactions with government officials. The interactions effects of negative interactions with government officials X extremist referent others was not quite significant (exp(B) = 7.63, p < 0.1).

This section discussed the covariates of Conspiracy Theorists, one of the factors used to create the commitment to extremism scale. None of the interactions effects were significant at the 0.05 level. Model 1 was the best fitted model, since the mi test revealed that the interaction effects did not significantly improve Model 1. The covariates of Proud Supremacists are presented in the next section. The factor, Proud Supremacists, was also used to create the commitment to extremism scale. The differences between Proud Supremacists and Conspiracy Theorists are also highlighted in the next section.

6.5.2. Covariates of "Proud Supremacists"

The factor, Proud Supremacists, had high factor loadings for two commitment indicators: movement related tattoos and general hate / bias beliefs (i.e., bias based on race, gender, nationality or sexual orientation). Logistic models were fitted with the entire sample; then conviction was set to "1" or yes. The results were consistent for both models. Therefore, only the results for the offset models are presented in this section. First, the results for the models

comparing Conspiracy Theorists and Proud Supremacists will be discussed. Next, the effects of interaction effects on Proud Supremacists will be discussed in more detail.

In the basic model without interactions effects, females were significantly less likely to be Proud Supremacists, when compared to males (exp(B) = 0.16, $p < 0.01$). However, there were no significant gender differences between Conspiracy Theorists and non-Conspiracy Theorists (exp(b) = 1.00, $p > 0.05$). Interestingly, non-whites were 0.24 times less likely to have been Proud Supremacists (exp(B) = 0.24, $p < 0.05$), while non-whites were 3.33 times more likely to have been Conspiracy Theorists (exp(B) = 3.33, $p < 0.01$).

Table 12: Models comparing Conspiracy Theorists and Proud Supremacists

Independent Variables	Conspiracy Theorists Odds Ratio (SE)	Proud Supremacists Odds Ratio (SE)
Gender ɣ	1.00 (0.37)	0.16 (0.10)**
Race š	3.33 (1.52)**	0.24 (0.16)*
Strain ψ	0.40 (0.13)**	2.88 (1.12)**
Extreme others ψ	0.68 (0.27)	0.47 (0.19)†
Group ψ	0.99 (0.27)	0.96 (0.29)
Negative interactions with government officials ψ	0.58 (0.18)†	1.74 (0.65)
Constant	0.20 (0.13)	1.91 (1.54)
Imputations	50	50
N	305	305
Average RVI	0.08	0.16
Largest FMI	0.19	0.44
F	4.41***	6.09***

Note 1: † $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
Note 2: ɣ reference category = male; š reference category = white; ψ Reference category = 0
Note 3: The largest FMI indicated that 44 datasets ($M \geq 100 * FMI$) would have been adequate to ensure unbiased estimates.
Note 4: The basic model in Tables 10 and 12, without interaction effects, were presented here to illustrate the differences between the two types of extremist ideologies.

People who experienced strain were significantly more likely to have been Proud Supremacists (exp(B) = 2.88, $p < 0.01$), which was consistent with GST (Agnew, 2005) and DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). The reverse was true for Conspiracy Theorists (exp(B) = 0.40, p

< 0.01): strain reduced the likelihood that a DFR would have been a Conspiracy Theorists (see Table 12).

Table 13: Models assessing Proud Supremacists, conviction offset

Independent Variables	Model 1 Odds Ratio (SE)	Model 2 Odds Ratio (SE)	Model 3 Odds Ratio (SE)	Model 4 Odds Ratio (SE)
Gender [γ]	0.16 (0.10)**	0.15	0.13	0.14
	0.24	(0.10)**	(0.09)**	(0.09)**
Race [š]	(0.16)*	0.27	0.30	0.27
	2.88 (1.12)**	(0.18)*	(0.20)	(0.18)[†]
Strain [Ψ]	0.47	5.54	9.52	3.31
	(0.19)[†]	(5.66)	(7.15)**	(1.40)**
Extreme others [Ψ]	0.96	0.65	0.50	0.82
	(0.29)	(0.52)	(0.21)	(0.73)
Group [Ψ]	1.74	0.98	1.03	0.97
	(0.65)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.30)
Prior negative interactions with government officials (GO) [Ψ]		1.87	2.70	3.55
		(0.72)	(1.26)*	(3.26)
Strain X Extreme Others		0.51		
		(0.56)		
Strain X Prior negative interactions with GO			0.23	
			(.021)	
Extreme Others X prior negative interactions with GO	1.91			0.44
	(1.54)			(0.45)
Constant		0.49	0.43	0.40
		(0.50)	(.038)	(0.44)
Imputations	50	50	50	50
N	305	305	305	305
Average RVI	0.16	0.23	0.21	0.15
Largest FMI	0.44	0.43	0.37	0.45
F	6.09***	4.84***	5.13***	5.23

Note 1: [†] p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
Note 2: [γ] reference category = male; [š] reference category = white; [Ψ] Reference category = 0
Note 3: The Monte Carlo T-test error for Strain exceeded .1 for Model 1. However, since the Monte Carlo error for the Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 45 datasets (M ≥ 100 * FMI) would have been adequate.

Next, the interaction effects – strain X extreme others; strain X prior negative interactions with government officials and; extreme others X prior negative interactions with government

officials – were added individually into the model assessing Proud Supremacists. These results are summarized in Table 13. When the interaction effect of strain X extreme others was added, strain became non-significant ($exp(B) = 5.54$, $p > 0.05$), i.e., strain was non-significant when extreme others were absent. However, people who did not have any prior negative interactions with government officials but experienced strain were 9.52 times more likely to have been Proud Supremacists ($exp(B) = 9.52$, $p < 0.01$).

According to Model 1, prior negative interactions with government officials had a non-significant influence on Proud Supremacists when all other IVs were controlled ($exp(B) = 1.74$, $p > 0.05$), which contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). In other words, there was no evidence of an alienation effect from having a criminal record or civil charges among Proud Supremacists.

According to Model 3, prior negative interactions with government officials also had no significant influence on Proud Supremacists when strain was present ($exp(B) = 0.23$, $p > 0.05$), i.e., there was no interaction effect between prior negative interactions with government officials and strain on Proud Supremacists. However, individuals who had prior negative interactions with government officials and did *not* experience strain were 2.7 times more likely to have been Proud Supremacists, compared to those who did not have any prior negative contact with government officials (see Model 3). This contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Furthermore, according to Model 4, the effect of prior negative interactions with government officials was non-significant for people with extremist referent others ($exp(B) = 0.44$, $p > 0.05$), which also contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Therefore, GST (Agnew, 2005) did a better job predicting Proud Supremacists, when compared to DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960).

The models were all correctly specified. The average RVI for the models were close to 0, which indicated that the imputation process did not unduly influence the estimates. The largest FMI indicted that the 50 imputed datasets were sufficient to ensure unbiased standard errors. Model 1 was the best fitted model, since the mi test revealed that the interaction effects did not significantly improve Model 1 and none of the interaction effects were significant at the 0.05 level.

6.6. Covariates of Crime Committed

6.6.1. Covariates of Crime Committed: any crime type

The results for the third research question of the study – what effect did individual level stressors, significant others, membership in an extremist group, negative interactions with government officials and an individual's commitment to far-right extremism have on his/her criminal behavior – are presented in this section. First, the covariates of the four categories of crime (ideological homicide, non-ideological homicide, ideology financial scheme and non-ideological financial scheme) will be presented. Next, the covariates of homicide and financial schemes will be compared. Finally, the influence of the commitment to extremism factors on homicide and financial perpetrators will be explored.

Since crime category was measured as four nominal categories, a multinomial logistic model was used to evaluate the differences between the four crime categories (see Table 14). Conviction status could not have been set to "1" or yes with the mi estimate: mlogit command. Ideological homicide was used as the base comparison group. Therefore, the coefficients provided in Table 14 should be interpreted in comparison to ideological homicide perpetrators. A negative coefficient means the likelihood of IV occurring for the current crime category was less

than the likelihood of it occurring for ideological homicide. A positive coefficient means the likelihood of IV occurring for the current crime category was greater than the likelihood of it occurring for ideological homicide.

Table 14: Multinomial Logic Regression model comparing the 4 crime types

Variables (coefficients relative to ideological homicide)	Non-Ideological homicide Coef (SE)	Ideological Financial Coef (SE)	Non-Ideological Financial Coef (SE)
Gender [γ]	-0.47 (0.70)	1.81 (0.72)*	1.30 (0.76)
Race [š]	-0.65 (0.65)	1.04 (0.64)	-1.24 (1.13)
Strain [Ψ]	-0.44 (0.49)	-3.36 (0.63)***	-3.05 (0.74)***
Extreme others [Ψ]	-0.34 (0.48)	0.15 (0.69)	-0.23 (0.75)
Group [Ψ]	-0.67 (0.46)	0.23 (0.48)	-0.56 (0.58)
Prior negative interactions with government officials [Ψ]	2.00 (0.59)**	-1.06 (0.47)*	-0.49 (0.52)
Domestic Far-right [Ψ]	-0.65 (0.68)	-1.23 (0.74)	-1.61 (0.77)*
Commitment to far-right extremism	-0.26 (0.15)	0.82 (0.18)***	0.21 (0.22)
Constant	0.59 (1.07)	-0.50 (1.14)	3.03 (1.52)*
Imputations	50		
N	305		
Average RVI	0.10		
Largest FMI	0.39		
F	4.47***		

Note 1: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
Note 2: [γ] reference category = male; [š] reference category = white; [Ψ] Reference category = 0
Note 3: ideological homicide was the base comparison group.
Note 4: The Monte Carlo T-test error for Strain exceeded .1 for ideological financial crime. However, since the Monte Carlo error for the Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 39 datasets ($M \geq 100 * FMI$) would have been adequate.
Note 5: according to the mi test results, the interactions effects did not improve the model. They were not reported

There were few significant differences between people charged with ideological and non-ideological homicides, i.e., individuals charged with homicides had similar levels of strain (B = -0.44, $p > 0.05$), extremist referent others (B = -0.34, $p > 0.05$), membership in extremist groups (B = -0.67, $p > 0.05$) and levels of commitment to extremism (B = -0.26, $p > 0.05$). However, people charged with a non-ideological homicide were more likely to have prior negative

interactions with government officials, compared to those charged with an ideological homicide ($B = 2.00$, $p < 0.05$). Thus, rather than prior negative interactions with government officials having a radicalization effect that subsequently resulted in the commission of an ideologically motivated homicide, these negative interactions increased the risk of having a violent criminal career. In other words, negative interactions with government officials did not alienate individuals and further entrench them in an extremist sub-culture. This contradicted DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1996). Instead, evidence was found supporting GST (Agnew, 2005). Prior negative interactions with government officials reduced individuals' ability to engage in legal coping measures, possibly due to difficulties in finding employment subsequent to incarceration, which increased the risk of future violent offending behavior.

There were several significant differences between individuals charged with ideological financial crime, as compared to those charged with an ideological homicide. Overall, there were more males involved in the four crime categories (261 males vs. 44 females). However, individuals charged with an ideological financial crime were significantly more likely to have been female, as compared to those charged with an ideological homicide ($B = 1.81$, $p < 0.05$). In other words, females who offended were mostly likely to commit an ideological financial crime.

Individuals charged with an ideological financial crime were significantly less likely to experience strain, when compared to those charged with an ideological homicide ($B = -3.36$, $p < 0.001$). In other words, strain increased the risk that an individual would commit an ideological homicide only, rather than any ideological crime. Individuals charged with an ideological financial crime were significantly less likely to have prior negative interactions with government officials, when compared to those charged with an ideological homicide ($B = -1.06$, $p < 0.05$). Therefore, priors increased the risk that individuals would commit an ideologically motivated

homicide but decreased the risk that they would commit an ideological motivated financial scheme.

Instead, individuals who committed an ideological financial crime appeared to have been motivated primarily by their commitment to extremism. Ideological financial perpetrators had significantly higher committed to extremism scores, when compared to ideological homicide perpetrators ($B = 0.82$, $p < 0.001$). Neither GST, nor DOT explained ideological financial criminal behavior: strain, extremist friends/ family and negative interactions with government officials were not associated with ideological financial crimes. Rather, ideological financial crimes appeared to have been committed as an expression of individual's extremist beliefs. It was possible that greed also contributed to ideological financial offending behavior, since many individuals who committed ideologically motivated financial crimes were non-extremist collaborators.

DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with a non-ideological financial crime were significantly less likely to experience strain, when compared to those charged with an ideological homicide ($B = -3.05$, $p < 0.001$). Non-extremist collaborators were more likely to commit a non-ideological financial crime, while DFRs were more likely to commit an ideological homicide ($B = -1.61$, $p < 0.05$). Therefore, perpetrators of non-ideological financial schemes were not motivated by the experience of strain, prior negative interactions with law enforcement or their extremist beliefs; instead, the likely motivator was greed.

6.6.2. Covariates of Crime Committed: homicide vs. financial crime

This section compares DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with a homicide, to those charged with committing a financial scheme. The mi estimate: logistic command could not

be executed. Instead, the mi estimate: mlogit command was used to compared homicide and financial perpetrators. Homicide was used as the base category. Therefore, the coefficients should be interpreted in reference to the base category (homicide).

The basic model without interaction effects was first fitted (see Table 15 – Model 1, below). Females were significantly more likely to commit financial crimes, compared to males ($B = 1.87$, $p < 0.01$). This was not surprising, based on previous findings by Gruenewald (2011) and Belli (2011). In Gruenewald's (2011) study, which examined far-rightists who committed a homicide between 1990 and 2006, close to 98% were male. In contrast, among the FR perpetrators of financial schemes analyzed by Belli (2011), only 70% were male. Therefore, one would expect to have found significantly more females engaging in financial crimes.

Financial perpetrators were significantly less likely to have experienced strain than the homicide perpetrators ($B = -3.13$, $p < 0.001$), which indicated that strain was not a motivator for committing financial schemes. Financial perpetrators were also significantly less likely to have had some form of prior negative interactions with government officials ($B = -1.63$, $p < 0.001$). Therefore, strain and negative interactions with government officials did not increase the risk of a DFR committing a financial scheme. However, commitment to the cause increased the risk of committing a financial scheme. People charged with financial crimes were more committed to extremism, when compared to those who were charged with a homicide ($B = 0.76$, $p < 0.001$). Greed also increased the risk of non-extremists committing financial schemes. Non-extremist offenders were more likely to have been involved in financial crimes, i.e., DFRs less likely to have been involved in financial crimes ($B = -1.28$, $p < 0.05$). Thus, financial perpetrators did not appear to have been motivated by strain, extremist referent others or prior negative interactions

with government officials. Instead, financial perpetrators were motivated by commitment to extremism, and possibly also by greed.

Table 15: Multinomial logit Regression model comparing homicide and financial crime

Variables	Model 1 Coef (SE)	Model 2 Coef (SE)	Model 3 Coef (SE)	Model 4 Coef (SE)
Gender [γ]	1.87 (0.67)**	1.75 (0.67)**	1.88 (0.68)**	1.89 (0.67)**
Race [š]	0.59 (0.58)	0.64 (0.59)	0.58 (0.58)	0.58 (0.58)
Strain [Ψ]	-3.13 (0.55)***	-4.43 (1.43)**	-3.14 (0.56)***	-3.20 (0.82)***
Extreme others [Ψ]	0.23 (0.58)	-0.19 (0.75)	0.04 (1.09)	0.21 (0.59)
Group [Ψ]	0.16 (0.43)	0.20 (0.43)	0.16 (0.43)	0.17 (0.43)
Negative interactions with GO [Ψ]	-1.63 0.37)***	-1.72 (0.38)***	-1.84 (1.19)	-1.66 (0.44)***
Domestic Far-right [Ψ]	-1.28 (0.60)*	-1.35 (0.60)*	-1.27 (0.60)*	-1.30 (0.61)
Commitment to far-right extremism	0.76 (0.17)***	0.78 (0.17)***	0.76 (0.17)***	0.76 (0.17)***
Strain X extreme others	-	1.49 (1.51)	-	-
Extreme others X GO	-	-	0.24 (1.28)	-
Strain X GO	-	-	-	0.10 (0.94)
Constant	0.41 (0.94)	0.81 (1.03)	0.59 (1.31)	0.46 (0.98)
Imputations	50	50	50	50
N	305	305	305	305
Average RVI	0.15	0.17	0.16	0.18
Largest FMI	.31	0.22	0.33	0.28
F	8.06***	6.99***	7.12***	7.02***

Note 1: [†] $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
Note 2: [γ] reference category = male; [š] reference category = white; [Ψ] Reference category = 0
Note 3: Homicide was the base outcome
Note 4: The Monte Carlo error for T Test exceeded .1 for Strain. However, since the Monte Carlo error for the Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 33 datasets ($M \geq 100 * FMI$) would have been adequate.
Note 5: according to the mi test results, the interaction effects did not improve the model

Next, each interaction term – strain X extreme others; strain X prior negative interactions with government officials and; extreme others X prior negative interactions with government officials – was added individually into the model (see Table 15 – Model 2-4, below). Normally, the reported coefficients related to the effect of an IV when all other variables were controlled.

However, when an interaction effect is added a model, the coefficient provides the effect of the IV when the other element of the interactions effect is absent or "0."

According to Model 2, people charged with financial crimes were less likely to experience strain when extreme others were absent (i.e., strain = 1 and extreme others = 0), compared to those charged with a violent crime ($B = -4.43$, $p < 0.01$). Furthermore, people charged with financial crimes were less likely to experience strain when prior negative interactions with government officials were absent (i.e., strain = 1 and prior negative interactions with government officials = 0), compared to those charged with a violent crime ($B = -3.20$, $p < 0.001$). Therefore, people who experienced strain had a higher risk of subsequent violent criminal behavior, without the radicalization / socialization effect of extremist friends or the alienating effect of prior civil or criminal charges.

DFRs that experienced the alienating effect of prior negative interactions with government officials had a higher risk of being charged with a subsequent homicide, but a lower risk of being charged with a subsequent financial crime. The significant effect of prior negative interactions with government officials was present when all other IVs were controlled ($B = -1.63$, $p < 0.001$). Furthermore, the alienating and radicalizing effect of prior negative interactions with government officials occurred even when strain was absent ($B = -1.66$, $p < 0.001$). Thus, even without any conditions of strain, prior negative interactions with government officials increased the risk of a DFR committing a subsequent homicide, but decreased the risk of committing a subsequent financial crime. However, this effect became non-significant for people who did not have any friends / family in the movement ($B = -1.84$, $p > 0.05$).

Interestingly, while the effects of gender, strain and commitment to extremism remained consistent for all the models presented in Table 15, the significant effect of DFR status

disappeared when the strain X prior negative interactions with government officials effect was included (-1.30, $p > 0.05$). This was likely caused by the loss of predictive power due to the increase in degrees of freedom in Model 4.

Table 16: Multinomial logit Regression model exploring differences in extremism between homicide and financial crime offenders

Variables	Model with commitment scale Coef (SE)	Model with commitment factors Coef (SE)
Gender [γ]	1.87 (0.67)**	1.61 (0.94)[†]
Race [§]	0.59 (0.58)	-1.26 (0.82)
Strain [problematic mcerr for ttest only]	-3.13 (0.55)***	-3.50 (0.97)***
Extreme others [Ψ]	0.23 (0.58)	1.09 (1.13)
Group [Ψ]	0.16 (0.43)	-1.05 (0.89)
Negative interactions with law enforcement [Ψ]	-1.63 0.37)***	-2.10 (0.65)**
Domestic Far-right [Ψ]	-1.28 (0.60)*	0.35 (1.19)
Commitment to extremism	0.76 (0.17)***	-
Proud Supremacists [Ψ]	-	-6.20 (1.47)***
Conspiracy Theorists [Ψ]	-	3.51 (1.02)**
Survivalists [Ψ]	-	-6.23 (1.55)***
Socializers [Ψ]	-	2.33 (1.18)*
Proud far-rightists [Ψ]	-	1.55 (1.03)
Deniers [Ψ]	-	0.62 (1.52)
Constant	0.41 (0.94)	2.14 (1.50)
Imputations	50	50
N	305	305
Average RVI	0.15	0.12
Largest FMI	.31	0.34
F	8.06***	3.66***

Note 1: [†] $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$
Note 2: [γ] reference category = male; [§] reference category = white; [Ψ] Reference category = 0
Note 3: Homicide was the base outcome
Note 4: The Monte Carlo error for T Test exceeded .1 for Strain. However, since the Monte Carlo error for the Standard Error and p-value were acceptable, it was assumed that 50 imputed datasets were adequate. This assumption was verified by the largest FMI, which indicated that 34 datasets ($M \geq 100 * FMI$) would have been adequate.

To deconstruct the effects of the commitment to extremism factors on criminal behavior, a final model was fitted with the IVs and the six commitments to extremism factors. For ease of

interpretation, models with commitment to extremism (previously presented in Table 15 – Model 1) and the six factors were presented in Table 16.

The effects of strain ($B = -3.50$, $p < 0.001$) and prior negative interactions with government officials remain significant ($B = -2.10$, $p < 0.01$), when the commitment factors were entered in the model. However, the significant effects of gender ($B = 1.61$, $p > 0.05$) and DFR status ($B = 0.35$, $p > 0.05$) appear to have been eroded. This was likely caused by the loss of predictive power due to the increase in degrees of freedom due to the increased number of IVs in the model.

Further analysis of the commitment factor revealed that the financial perpetrators were more likely to believe in conspiracy theories that challenged government authority and participate in movement activities. In other words, Conspiracy Theorists ($B = 3.51$, $p < 0.01$) and Socializers ($B = 2.33$, $p < 0.05$) were more likely to have been charged with a financial crime, rather than a homicide. However, financial perpetrators were significantly less likely to have been concerned about race (i.e. scored low in the Proud Supremacist dimension of the commitment to far-right extremism factor) or to have survivalist beliefs. Specifically, Proud Supremacists ($B = -6.20$, $p < 0.001$) and Survivalists ($B = -6.23$, $p < 0.001$) were significantly less likely to have been charged with a financial crime and more likely to have been charged with a homicide. There were no significant differences in crimes committed by Proud Far-Rightists and Deniers. This was expected, since these two factors had lower factor loadings (less than 1) than the other factors.

Table 17: Summary of Findings

	HYPOTHESIS	RESULTS
1	DFRs who experienced individual level stressors were more likely to join a far-rightist group, compared to those who did not experience these stressors.	Non-Significant, see: Table 9 Strain had no effect on group membership.
2a	DFRs who had significant others who were far-rightists were more likely to join a far-rightist group, when compared to those who lacked such access to extremist opportunity structures.	Significant, see: Table 9. Extremist friends/ family members were significantly associated with membership in an extremist group.
2b	There was an interaction effect between strain and extremist friends / family on membership in extremist groups.	Non-Significant, see: Table 9 The interaction effect was not significant.
3a	DFRs that experienced negative interactions with government officials (GO) were more likely to join a rightwing extremist group, when compared to those who did not have these interactions.	Significant, see: Table 9. Negative interactions with GO were significantly associated with membership in an extremist group.
3b	DFRs who had both negative interactions with government officials and extremist friends/family were more likely than those that did not to join an extremist group.	Could not calculate confidence intervals or SE for this interaction effect.
4	DFRs who experienced individual level stressors had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology, when compared to people who did not experience such stressors.	The commitment model was non-significant. No significant differences were found between non-extremist collaborators and DFRs. However, Conspiracy Theorists were less likely than Proud Supremacists to experience strain. See Table 12.
5	DFRs with significant others who were far-rightists had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology, when compared to people without extremist friends or family members.	The commitment model was non-significant. However, DFRs were more likely to have extremist others, when compared to non-extremist collaborators. See Table 10
6	Members of formal extremist groups had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology, when compared to non-members.	The commitment model was non-significant. However, DFRs were more likely to have been a member of an extremist group, when compared to non-extremist collaborators. See Table 10

Table 17: Summary of Findings continued…

	HYPOTHESIS	RESULTS
7a	DFRs who experienced negative interactions with GO had higher levels of commitment to extremist ideology, when compared to those who have not had such experiences.	The commitment model was non-significant. No significant differences were found between non-extremist collaborators and DFRs in terms of negative interactions with GO. See Table 10
7b	There was an interaction effect between extremist friends / family and negative interactions with GO on commitment to extremism.	The commitment model was non-significant. No significant differences were found between non-extremist collaborators and DFRs for this interaction effect. See Table 10
8a	People with strong extremist beliefs were more likely than people with lower levels of extremist beliefs to commit an ideologically motivated crime.	Partially supported: more committed individuals were more likely to commit ideological financial crimes, compared to ideological violent crimes. See Table 14.
8b	People with lower levels of extremist belief were more likely than people with strong extremist beliefs to engage in routine (non-ideological) crimes.	Partially supported: DFRs were significantly less likely to commit a non-ideological financial crime, when compared to an ideological homicide. See Table 14.
9	DFRs that experienced individual level stressors were more likely than those who had not experienced individual level stressors to commit an ideologically motivated crime.	Partially supported: DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who experienced strain were more likely to commit a homicide. See Table 15.
10	DFRs who had extremist family/friends were more likely to commit an ideologically motivated crime, compared to those who did not.	Non-Significant, see: Table 14. Extremist friends / family had no effect on crime committed.
11a	DFRs who belonged to an extremist group were more likely than lone wolves to commit violent crimes.	Non-Significant, see: Table 14. Group membership had no effect on crime committed.
11b	Lone wolves were more likely than extremist group members to commit non-violent/financial crimes.	Non-Significant, see: Table 14. Group membership had no effect on crime committed.
12	DFRs who had negative interactions with GO became more commitment to rightwing extremism and consequently were more likely than DFRs who had not had such interactions to commit an ideological crime	Negative interactions with GO had no effect on commitment to extremism. See Table 10. People who had negative interactions with GO were more likely to commit a non-ideological homicide, compared to an ideological homicide. They were also less likely to commit an ideological financial scheme, compared to an ideological homicide.

The current chapter described the creation of the commitment to extremism factor and presented the results for the study's three research questions: (1) what effect did individual level stressors, significant others and prior negative interactions with government officials have on membership in far-right group; (2) what effect did individual level stressors, significant others, membership in an extremist group and prior negative interactions with government officials have on an individual's commitment to rightwing extremism; and (3) what effect did an individual's commitment to far-right extremism and membership in extremist groups have on his / her criminal behavior? These results are summarized in Table 17 and will be discussed in the next chapter, within the context of the study's theoretical framework – General Strain Theory (GST), Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT) and free / movement spaces.

CHAPTER 7

DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS

7.1. Discussion

This study used General Strain Theory (GST), Differential Opportunity Theory (DOT) and free / movement space as a theoretical framework to examine covariates of membership in extremist groups, commitment to extremism and type of crime committed among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. The sample was drawn from the five year period, 2006 to 2010. The ensuing discussion is generalizable to current DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged or convicted of a homicide or financial scheme (e.g., money laundering, tax evasion, pyramid scheme). The results are not applicable to DFRs that have been charged with other types of crime or lead law abiding lives.

7.1.1. Discussion of factors associated with membership in DFR groups

Members of FR extremist groups tended to have been white persons with extremist friends / family. This was consistent with previous studies, which found that people tended to join extremist groups with loved ones or friends (Aho, 1990; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011). Another possibility was that the friendships developed subsequent to joining the group. Group members were more likely to have negative interactions with government officials than non-members. This was consistent with previous research by Aho (1990). However, it contradicted the Gruenewald, et al. (2013b) study, which found that non-group members (loners) had higher rates of prior arrests (64.1%) than group members who offended alone (57.7%) or with others (54.8%). This discrepancy could have been attributed to the different definitions of

priors used in the current study (civil charge, criminal charge, arrest, or conviction), compared to the Gruenewald, et al. (2013b) study (prior arrest).

Thus, both access to extremist opportunity structures and the alienating effect of negative interactions with government officials appeared to have been motivating factors among DFRs who chose to join a FR group. In contrast, non-group members tended to have been non-white loners. Non-group members were also less likely to have prior negative interactions with government officials, when compared to group members. As noted previously, this contradicted findings by Gruenewald, et al. (2013b). However, non-group members in this study included both lone wolves and non-extremist collaborators, which could have accounted for the contradictory results.

GST did not successfully predict membership in extremist groups: no support was found for strain as a precursor to membership in far-right extremist groups. This contradicted several earlier studies on the FR (Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993; Smith, 1994; Wooden & Blazak, 2001) but supported Aho's (1990) work. Since this study used open source documents, establishing leadership status was difficult. It was possible that since both leaders and group members were assessed together, the different patterns of strain were lost. Leaders tended to have been more highly educated than followers in a movement (Ezekiel, 1995; Smith, 1990), which suggested that movement leaders could have been motivated by factors other than strain (Blee, 2002; Blazak, 2001). Ezekiel (1995) also noted that movement leaders tended to be intelligent, manipulative and cynical, which was supported by Blazak's (2001) study. Blazak (2001) contrasted recruiters in the skinhead movement to his research with Wooden (2001) on skinhead members. Blazak (2001) noted that although strain was one of the variables that contributed to youths' decision to join a skinhead gang, recruiters tended to perceive themselves as "rescuing

the cultural underdogs in a heroic, macho fashion" from Jewish capitalism, minority gangs and multiculturalism (p. 991). Although these recruiters did not perceive themselves as victims of strain conditions, Blazak (2001) found that they expressed an awareness of the effects of strain and how those experiences and feelings of victimization could have been manipulated to draw strained individuals into the movement. Thus, the exclusion of a variable assessing leadership status could have accounted for the non-significant effect of strain on group membership.

While the study did not find support for GST as a predictor of group membership, support was found for DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960). Group membership was associated with having extremist friends and family and prior negative interactions with government officials. Thus, the key elements to group membership appeared to have been access to extremist opportunity structures via from extremist friends / family and prison gangs (see also Aho, 1990; Blanchard & Prewitt, 1993; Blazak, 2009; Blee, 2002; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Strentz, 1990) and feelings of alienation caused by prior negative interactions with government officials (see also: Aho, 1990; Wooden & Blazak, 2001). These results were valid both for DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who were merely charged, as well as those who were convicted of a homicide or financial scheme.

7.1.2. Differences between DFRs and non-extremist collaborators

DFRs were more likely than non-extremist collaborators to join an extremist group. The study was unable to determine whether the belief occurred first, or whether the individual joined an extremist group and was subsequently socialized into the extremist subculture. Nevertheless, this finding tentatively supported both DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) and movement / frees paces (Simi & Futrell, 2010). There was an association between membership in extremist groups and any FR extremist beliefs. However, there was no relationship between group membership

and *levels* of commitment. As suggested by McCauley and Moskalenko (2011), members could have joined the extremist group for multiple reasons. However, they may have chosen to stay in the group because of loyalty to group members. One would therefore not have expected to find a relationship between levels of commitment and group membership.

There were no differences in strain experienced between DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. This was unexpected since DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) hypothesized that strain would have been the initial condition that propelled individuals into deviant subcultures. Instead, similar rates of stain were experienced by DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. This supported GST (Agnew, 2005), which argued that the presence of strain and lack of legal coping mechanisms would increase the risk of criminal offending. Thus, strain contributed to criminal behavior, but not to DFR beliefs or membership in extremist groups.

Also unexpected: there were no differences in prior negative interactions with government officials among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. In other words, similar rates of prior negative interactions with government officials were found among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. This finding suggested that negative interactions with government officials had a greater impact on future offending behavior (since the sample consisted of people charged with a homicide or financial scheme), than it did on DFR beliefs. The effect of negative interactions with government officials on offending behavior was explored later in this chapter.

7.1.3. Discussion of factors associated with commitment to extremism

None of the variables (strain, extremist friends / family, negative interactions with government officials or group membership) influenced levels of commitment to extremism. Rather, differences were found based on type of extremist beliefs, i.e., the factors used to create the commitment to extremism scale. The experience of strain, tied to extremist friends / family

and being a white male increased the risk that a DFR would have general hate beliefs (Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993). This suggested that feelings of powerlessness, identity and masculinity may have provided the impetus for DFRs to become Proud Supremacists (see Arena & Arrigo, 2000; Hamm, 1993).

Thus, while GST had no influence on membership in extremist group, it did affect commitment to general hate beliefs. This supported Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) DOT. However, although both strain and extremist loved ones were associated with general hate beliefs (Ezekiel, 1995; Hamm, 1993), there was no evidence of an amplification or interaction effect. This lack of an interaction effects contradicted DOT. Thus, in terms of commitment to general hate beliefs, support was found for GST and limited support was found for DOT. A possible reason for the lack of support for an interaction effect between strain and ties to extremist friends / family could have been due to the use of secondary data sources. It was possible that a type II error was made and supplemental data in the form of interviews or self-administered surveys would have unearthed a connection between the variables.

Interestingly, those who believed in conspiracy theories were quite different from the individuals who held general hate beliefs. While strain, tied to extremist friends / family and being a white male increased the risk of being a Proud Supremacist, being non-white and *not* experiencing strain increased the risk of a DFR being a Conspiracy Theorist. Similar to Blee's (2002) and Aho's (1990) findings, DFRs in the current study had diverse backgrounds: some were unemployed or homeless, while others had graduate degrees or were extremely wealthy. Furthermore, when strain was *absent*, the influence of extremist friends / family on Conspiracy Theorists was amplified. Prior negative interactions with government officials also increased the risk of a DFR becoming a Conspiracy Theorist, both in the absence and presence of extremist

friends / family. Therefore, DFRs who had a steady job or average (or higher) income and was charged / arrested / convicted with a civil or criminal offense, tended to ascribe to elaborate conspiracy theory – possibly to explain or justify their conviction status, similar to the Christian Patriots described by Aho (1990).

Individuals who had an average or higher income and extremist friends / family had a higher risk of believing in conspiracy theories, even if they did not have any prior negative interactions with government officials. This was an interesting finding, as it suggested group identification increased commitment to extremism (Blee, 2002; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011), even in the absence of feelings of helplessness and loss of power (caused by inadequate access to wealth / resources and negative interactions with government officials). Thus, individuals appeared to have been socialized into extremist beliefs (Aho, 1990; Blee, 2002; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, 2011; Vertigans, 2007), specifically beliefs in elaborate conspiracy theories.

Furthermore, informal and personal ties were more closely associated with group identification and commitment, when compared to formal group ties, i.e., Conspiracy Theorists tended to have extremist friends / family but did not belong to extremist groups. Thus, the socialization of subcultural gangs hypothesized by DOT (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960) was not supported. One possible explanation for the lack of support for group socialization into extremist beliefs may have been self-selection bias. If individuals with a propensity towards violence self-selected into violent skinhead groups and people with anti-gun control beliefs self-selected into a militia group, the socialization due to group membership would not have been readily apparent in a study which used a cross-sectional design and secondary data.

In short, unemployed white males with prior negative interactions with government officials or extremist referent others were more likely to blame other people (become Proud Supremacists). In contrast, employed non-whites with no prior negative interactions with government officials and extremist friends / family were more likely to blame the government / IRS / NWO / ZOG (become Conspiracy Theorists). On their own, civil / criminal priors and extremist referent others *reduced* the risk of becoming a Conspiracy Theorist, but when both were present the risk of becoming a Conspiracy Theorist *increased*. It was possible that both Proud Supremacists and Conspiracy Theorists interpreted their negative interactions with government officials as a challenge to their sense of power and authority and the choice of whom to blame was influenced by personal characteristics (race and experience of strain) and friendship ties (Arena & Arrigo, 2000). Thus, the key elements that predicted whether an individual would become a Proud Supremacist or Conspiracy Theorist were race and strain, while the socializing element for both was in informal free or movement spaces (i.e., via extremist referent others, rather than formal group interactions).

As noted in the previous section, GST was not associated with group membership. Nor was GST associated with individual's *level* of commitment to extremism. Instead, GST was associated with *type* of extremism beliefs. The actual group a DFR joined was predicted by DOT: they joined groups they had access to, either via extremist referent others or prison (subsequent to negative interactions with law enforcement). Finally, the socialization into extremism culture was predicted by free or movement spaces by the presence of extremist friends / family.

7.1.4. Discussion of factors associated with crime committed

There were several differences among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with financial crimes, compared to those charged with a homicide. Female DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who engaged in criminal behavior were more likely to commit financial crimes. A possible explanation of this was that females were usually not considered members of violent hate groups. Rather, they were normally considered associates, based on a romantic connection to a male group member. The group may have been unwilling to involve someone who was not a member in a homicide, especially one that was motivated by a desire to protect the group's interests. A more likely explanation was prosecutors' legal strategy included attempts to flip female co-offenders, i.e., female co-offenders could have been offered deals to testify against the male group members, whom the prosecutors considered to have been the larger threat.

The experience of strain was also quite different between the two types of criminal offenders. DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with homicides were more likely to experience strain and had prior negative interactions with government officials, in comparison to those charged with financial crimes. Furthermore, homicide suspects were more likely to experience strain, when compared to financial suspects: (1) when all other factors were controlled; (2) there were no known extremist friends or family; and (3) there were no prior negative interactions with government officials. Thus, while GST did not explain membership in extremist groups, it did explain differences between the types of extremist beliefs held (i.e., Conspiracy Theorists vs Proud Supremacists) and risks of subsequently committing a homicide.

Further evidence was obtained for the connection between GST and risk of violent offending behavior when prior negative interactions with government officials were considered.

According to Agnew, loss of legal avenues to cope (e.g., difficulty finding work due to a prior connection) should have increased the risk of criminal behavior when strain was present (e.g., financial debt, homelessness). Limited support was found for DOT. Having extremist friends had no effect on the behavior of DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who committed a homicide (contradicts DOT), but prior negative interactions with government officials increased the risk of a DFR or non-extremist collaborator committing a homicide (supports DOT).

There was no evidence of GST among financial offenders. Further, there was little evidence of DOT as an impetus to financial offending behavior: having extremist friends had no effect on the behavior of DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who committed a financial crime. Rather, financial offending behavior among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators was influenced by gender (i.e., females were more likely to commit a financial crime and less likely to commit a homicide), overall commitment to extremism score (i.e., DFRs and non-extremist collaborators who committed financial crimes had significantly higher commitment to extremism scores), and the *absence* of prior negative interactions with government officials.

Interestingly, while levels of commitment to extremism were higher among people charged with a financial crime, non-extremist collaborators were more likely to have been charged with a financial crime. In other words, financial schemes had more non-extremist collaborators, and homicides tended to have been committed by group members and affiliates. This was logical; since non-DFRs would not have been motivated to commit homicide for a cause they did not personally believe in. However, the penalties for financial crimes could have been minor and the rewards more tangible (i.e., wealth), which may have been the motivating factors for non-extremist collaborators.

A possible explanation for the finding that DFRs were more likely to commit a homicide but people who committed a financial crime had higher levels of commit to extremism was that DFRs who committed homicides were more committed to the group, while DFRs who committed financial crimes were more committed to the cause. Another possible explanation for this apparent relationship was the use of court documents in the study. Homicide suspects in this study tended to have been defended by attorneys, who would raise a legal defense (e.g., insanity, self-defense), while people accused of financial crimes, such as tax evasion, tended to have been *pro se* defendants. The suspects who chose to represent themselves in court did not generally follow legal defenses. Instead, they raised common tax protestor arguments – e.g., questioned the constitutionality of federal tax laws or the right of the federal government to asses taxes; suggested federal taxation was a ploy by the ZOG to achieve world domination; claimed that only non-resident aliens and people residing in the District of Columbia were subject to taxation – which increased their commitment to extremism score. Thus, based on the reliance of court and open source documents, the level of commitment among homicide suspects could not have been apparent with this type of research design.

Another interesting finding was the absence of a significant relationship between group membership and criminal behavior of DFRs in the model comparing homicide and financial crime. In other words, there were similar rates of group membership among homicide suspects and financial suspects. Furthermore, group members were equally as likely to commit ideological or non-ideological violent and financial crimes. This suggested that not only were groups engaging in ideological financial schemes as an expression of their DFR beliefs or to fund their movement activities, they were also engaging in financial crimes for profit.

However, although group members were not more likely to commit a homicide, DFRs were more likely than non-extremists to commit a homicide. In a study examining homicide incidents by far-rightists at the county level, Adamczyk, Gruenewald, Chermak and Freilich (2014) found that counties with hate groups were more likely to have ideologically motivated homicides. Taken together, these findings suggested an upsurge in leaderless resistance. Group messages of hate may have carried weight among the movement as a whole and may not have been as apparent among group members.

7.1.5. Summary of evidence supporting GST, DOT and movement / free spaces

This section discussed the findings of the current study. Group membership was not predicted by the presence of strain, i.e., there was no support for GST as a predictor of group membership. Instead, membership in far-right extremist groups was predicted by access and a possible predisposition or sympathy towards extremist beliefs: those with access to groups via extremist friends / family or access to prison gangs and held extremist beliefs were more likely to join an extremist group. Thus, DOT was a better predictor of group membership than GST.

Neither GST, nor DOT predicted levels of commitment to extremism. Free or movement spaces theory was the best predictor of any commitment to extremism. When non-extremist collaborators and DFRs were analyzed as a binary variable, people who belonged to a group were more likely to have been committed to the cause. However, non-extremist collaborators were more likely than DFRs to have been female and have extremist friends / family members. Interestingly, similar rates of strain and negative interactions with government officials were found among DFRs and non-extremist collaborators. This suggested that strain and negative interactions with government officials had a greater impact on overall criminal behavior, since the sample comprised people charged with a homicide or financial crime.

None of the theories (GST, DOT, or movement spaces) explained *levels* of commitment. Instead, differences were found between two types of DFRs: Conspiracy Theorists and Proud Supremacists. The presence of extremist others and prior negative interactions with government officials, reduced the risk of being a Conspiracy Theorist, which contradicted DOT. A viable anti-crime program for Conspiracy Theorists could have been an increase in fines for criminal behavior. This was logical since prior negative interactions with government officials reduced the risk of being a Conspiracy Theorist and Conspiracy Theorist tended to commit financial crimes.

Similarly, GST did not predict Conspiracy Theorists: an *absence* of strain was associated with a higher risk of being a Conspiracy Theorist. Similar rates of extremist friends / family members were found between Conspiracy Theorists and non-Conspiracy Theorists, i.e., all DFRs had similar rates of extremist friends / family members. However, the presence of extremist others and negative interactions with government officials were higher among Conspiracy Theorists. Therefore, someone who had extremist friends / family members and at least 1 negative interaction with government officials had a significantly higher risk of becoming a Conspiracy Theorist.

GST (i.e., the presence of strain) and DOT (i.e., presence of extremist others and prior negative interactions with government officials) were associated with a DFR becoming a Proud Supremacist. When other variables were controlled, negative interactions with government officials had no effect on Proud Supremacists. Interestingly, the effects of strain and negative interactions with government officials amplified when the other variable was absent. In other words, the effect of negative interactions with government officials on Proud Supremacist was greater when they did not experience strain. This finding suggested that strain may act as a

protective factor (rather than a risk factor) among Proud Supremacists who have negative interactions with government officials.

White males who experienced strain were also more likely to become Proud Supremacists. This indicted that concepts of gender, masculinity and power should have been explored among Proud Supremacists (Arena & Arrigo, 2000; Blee, 2002; Kimmel & Ferber, 2000). Doing gender theory may also shed light on the behavior of Proud Supremacists. According to Miller (2002, p. 434), "men and women 'do gender' in response to situated normative beliefs about masculinity and femininity…the performance of gender is both an indication of and a reproduction of gendered (as well as raced, classed, generational, and sexed) social hierarchies." Therefore, people do not merely respond to societal expectations based on one's gender, race, class and sex. Instead, individuals make conscious decisions based on the prevailing social structures and social settings. Thus, agency was a key element of doing gender theory.

Proud Supremacists tended to have been white males who experienced conditions of strain. Proud Supremacists were also more likely to commit a homicide than a financial crime. These findings supported Gruenewald's (2012) argument that young, white males without legitimate opportunities to accomplish masculinity (i.e., do gender) may resort to violence. Interestingly, the risk of becoming a Proud Supremacist was reduced when strained individuals did not have extremist friends / family members. This also supported doing gender theory: the performance of masculinity through violence would have been moot in the absence of positive feedback from extremist friends / family members (Gruenewald, 2012).

GST (i.e., the presence of strain and possible inability to find employment to a prior prison record) was associated with violent criminal behavior of DFRs. Limited support was

found for DOT: violent offending behavior was associated with strain and negative interactions with government officials. Interestingly, violent behavior patterns were more closely tied to type of extremist belief, rather than levels of commitment to extremism. Proud Supremacists and Survivalists were more likely to commit a homicide than a financial crime. Furthermore, lower levels of commitment to extremism were associated with a higher risk of violent offending behavior. Therefore, doing gender theory, GST and DOT together provided the strongest theoretical framework for interpreting DFRs' violent offending behavior.

High levels of commitment to extremism, females, and people who did not experience strain (i.e., held a good job and did not have a prior criminal / civil record) were associated with an increased risk of financial offending behavior. Conspiracy Theorists and Socializers were also more likely to commit a financial crime, than a homicide. Individuals who did not experience strain and did not have prior negative interactions with government officials were also more likely to commit a financial crime than a homicide. Thus, financial perpetrators were not motivated by need. They did not become disillusioned from the experience of strain or negative interactions with government officials; they were motivated by their level of commitment to FR extremism and greed. However, there were some caveats and limitations of these findings, which were explored in the next section. Suggestions on how to address these limitations were also covered in the next section.

7.2. Limitations of the Data and Suggestions for Future Research

There were several possible limitations of this study. To create a reliable measure of strain, the variable was operationalized as objective strain only. Subjective strain and subjective interpretation of objective strain were excluded from the analysis, which increased the risk of a

type II error (not identifying significance). Thus, a certain degree of validity was sacrificed for reliability.

Another limitation of the study was the use of secondary data sources, namely, open source documents, such as appellate court documents, news reports, accounts of personal statements made to the media or in court and accounts on blogs / articles by friends / acquaintances of the suspects included in the sample. Although this technique was relatively quick, inexpensive and resulted in a more representation sample compared to interviews or self-report surveys, context and personal justifications for behavior were sacrificed.

As noted in the methods chapter, consistent with the Weberian approach to conceptualizing motives and action (Campbell, 1998; Weber, 1998) and the FBI's method for determining if a hate crime occurred, commitment to far-right extremism could have been used under specific circumstances to ascertain motive for a crime (Flanagan & O'Brien, 2003; Kercher, Nolasco & Wu, 2009). The intent was "*to give a correct causal interpretation of a particular action …*[by interpreting] *the outward course of the action and its motive as appropriate and at the same time as related to each other in a way whose meaning can be understood"* (Weber, 1998, p. 15). However, there was a risk of conflating the behavior of interest (ideological vs. non-ideologically motivated crime) with one of the risk factors, namely, commitment to far-right extremism. Nonetheless, to not attempt to deconstruct out these two concepts would have been to risk unmeasured errors, since DFRs' criminal behavior could have also have been motivated by greed or revenge.

This study contained DFRs and non-extremist collaborators charged with a homicide or financial crime. It would have been beneficial to explore the experience of strain, extremist friends / family and prior criminal / civil record among non-criminal DFRs and non-extremist

collaborators. This would help shed light on which variables propel some extremists to offend, while others lead law-abiding lives. However, such a study was likely to have been difficult to implement, due to issues of access to extremist groups.

Group members in the current study tended to have been a DFR. However, non-group members had higher commitment to extremism scores. This indicated that some of the non-group members were non-extremist collaborators, while most were lone wolves with high commitment to extremism scores. An interesting follow-up study would have been to compare the non-extremist collaborators, lone wolves and group members. Differences may have been found in strain experienced, negative interactions with government officials and extremist friends / family members. Such a design would allow the research to determine whether the experience of strain was different among non-extremist collaborators and group members. One would also have been able to assess whether lone wolves and group members differed in their experiences with government officials.

Another useful comparison group would have been a matching sample on non-DFR offenders, similar to Gruenewald's (2011) study but with both violent and financial non-extremist perpetrators. The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) would have been a valuable source of a matching group of violent and financial non-extremist perpetrators. Differences between the four types of perpetrators (violent extremist, financial extremist, violent non-extremist and financial non-extremist) would have been extremely useful in identifying differences between extremist and non-extremist offenders and designing evidence-based anti-crime polices specific to the offender type.

It would have been useful to apply the commitment to extremism scale to a wider sample. Since the scale was found to have been valid (it explained close to 85% of the variance in

commitment to extremism), the next logical step was to assess (1) the relative weights of the six factors identified from the factor analysis and (2) the reliability of the scale. A larger sample of extremist would have been required to achieve these two goals. In addition, the data should have been analyzed using item response theory (IRT), which was also referred to as latent trait theory. The subsequent scale would have a high degree of reliability and more precise commitment to extremism scores could have been obtained. These scores could have then have been combined with other IVs to more accurately assess risks and patterns of criminal offending behavior among extremists.

The sample was limited to the American FR movements. Another possible avenue for research was extending this analysis to FR movements in other countries. This would allow the researcher to determine whether the American have FR was unique or share similar characteristics with other countries. South Africa, Australia, Scandinavian countries and European Union countries have FR movements. The models used in the current study may have been applicable to other countries, or historical and social factors in specific countries could provide more valid explanations of the criminal behavior patterns of far-rightists.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This study assessed the influence of Agnew's (2005) General Strain Theory, Cloward and Ohlin's (1960) Differential Opportunity Theory and Simi and Futrell's (2010) concept of free or movement spaces on membership in extremist groups, commitment to extremism and criminal offending behavior of DFRs. DOT was most successful at explaining membership in extremist groups, while GST was not associated with membership in extremist groups. Factors predicting levels of commitment were more complex: none of the variables in the study were associated with levels of commitment. However, strain increased the risk of an individual becoming a Proud Supremacist, but reduced the risk of becoming a Conspiracy Theorist.

Surprisingly, having extremist friends or family was not associated with levels of commitment to extremism or any of the sub-types identified via factor analysis. More surprisingly, non-extremist collaborators were more likely to have extremist friends or family members, when compared to DFRs. This suggested that many of the non-extremist collaborators sampled were sympathetic to FR extremist beliefs, i.e., Seekers. Conspiracy Theorists tended to have been loners; having extremist referent others reduced the risk of a DFR becoming a Conspiracy Theorist. Another interesting finding was that higher levels of commitment were not associated with an increased risk of criminal offending. Instead, the type of extremist belief was associated with risk of criminal offending: Proud Supremacists were more likely than non-Proud Supremacists to commit a homicide (ideological or non-ideological) and Conspiracy Theorists were more likely than non- Conspiracy Theorists to commit a financial crime (ideological or non-ideological).

GST was associated with a higher risk of an individual becoming a Proud Supremacist, and also with a Proud Supremacist committing a homicide. DOT also explained some of the risk of individuals becoming a Proud Supremacist: individuals who did not experience strain but had negative interactions with government officials had a higher risk of becoming a Proud Supremacist. This was perhaps because people serving a prison sentence who had never experienced individual level stressors may have been less able to protect themselves and needed to join a prison gang to survive life inside.

The study faced several limitations. Firstly, some degree of validity was sacrificed to obtain a reliable measure of strain. More intangible measures of strain, such as the effects of parental divorce or the effects of bulling in school on the younger offenders, were excluded. This increased the risk of making a type II error or failing to identify significant effects associated with the experience of strain. There was also some risk of conflating ideology of the offender with motive for the crime. Attempts were made to minimize this risk by using claims made by the suspect and defense or prosecuting attorneys to establish motive for the crime.

The study's research design was sound. The use of open-source documents, pay-per-view websites with arrest records and Multiple Imputation facilitated the creation of a large N dataset with sufficient statistical enough power to assess the independent variables in the study. In addition, because of the use of multiple open-source documents and MI, these results were generalizable to DFRs who have committed a homicide or financial scheme. Furthermore, the use of factor-analyses resulted in an empirically sound and valid measure of commitment to FR extremism that moves beyond current binary measures of extremism.

CHAPTER 9

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Interpreting Logistic Regression Models

Output/statistic	Purpose	How interpreted
Model Chi^2 statistic	Omnibus test; compared 2 models of the same data - was the current research model significantly better than the previous model?	Significant results indicated that the 2nd model was a significantly better fit of the data than the 1st model. Not a measure of effect size.
Pseudo R^2 (Cox and Snell, or Nagelkerke,)	Measure of model effect size	Larger pseudo R-squares indicated stronger models
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test	Omnibus test; to determine if the observed data were significantly different from the predicted values. Alternative to model Chi^2	Non-significant results indicated the model was doing a good job of predicting the data.
Wald statistic (B/S.E.). B was the unstandardized coefficient.	Were the IV significant predictors of DV? Which IV was the strongest predictor?	Interpret Wald statistics that were significant ($p \leq .05$). IV with the largest significant Wald was the strongest predictor of the DV.
Odds Ratios, also referred to as Exp(b) or standardized coefficient	Effect of IV on DV; measure of effect size for individual IV, while holding other IVs constant. Only reported if Wald was significant.	Interpreted in comparison to reference category, while holding all other factors at their reference category and covariates (continuous IVs) constant.
Classification table	Contingency table that identified counts and percentages of correct (and incorrect) predictions. Measure of effect size	A higher percentage of correct predictions indicated a better-fitted model.
Classification plot	Graph of observed groups and predicted probabilities. Used to identify the correct predictions made by the model and complete separation	Observations should have clustered to the ends of the graph, i.e., had a U-shaped distribution. Observations in the middle represented incorrect predictions.
Influence Statistics (Cook's D, Leverage Values, & DfBeta	To ensure no case had excessive influence on the coefficient, i.e., to determine which of the models, including IVs and interactions effects, were correctly specified.	These were reviewed in the original tabular form in the SPSS data screen or graphed against predicted probabilities for easier interpretation. See footnotes 49-52 for additional details.

Source: Field, 2013

Appendix B: Logistic Regression Models – Assumptions summary table

Assumptions	Output/statistic	How interpreted	Remedy
Independent error terms	N/A	N/A	Independent sample or use a conditional logit model instead of a logistic model
Low measurement error and no missing cases		Missing at random, didn't require missing completely at random. Generally resulted in unbiased estimates, standard errors and statistics	List wise deletion if there were nonrandom missing values in DV or IV. If too many individuals had been omitted from the analysis, multiple imputations (MI) were used instead.
Linear relationship between log odds of DV and continuous IVs	Box-Tidwell transformation test for continuous IVs; logic step test for ordinal or continuous IVs		For continuous IVs, recoded into categories; for ordinal IVs, collapsed into fewer categories
Absence of multicollinearity	Collinearity Statistics (Tolerance, VIF); Collinearity Diagnostics (condition index, eigenvalue, variance proportions); Pearson's correlation	Tolerance > .1 and VIF < 10 indicate no problems with collinearity. Eigenvalues & condition indexes need to be close in value. Should have had small variance proportions on small eigenvalues.	Used factor analysis to merge the collinear variables; dropped one variable from the model
No outliers	Residuals (studentized residual, standardized residual, deviance statistic) and Case wise listing of residuals	Residuals: 5% of the cases between ±1.96, 1% between ±2.58; Case wise listing of residuals < 2SD	Outliers could have been omitted from the analysis, but this was controversial.
Adequate sample size	N/A	Number of cases in smaller binary outcome / number of predictors ≥ 20	
Sampling adequacy	Crosstabulation	80% of cells should have had a count of at least 5, no cells should have had a zero count	Biased goodness or fit measures

Source: Field, 2013

Appendix C: Interpreting Regression Models

Output/statistic	Purpose	How interpreted
Change statistics	Difference between each research block – did the new variables significantly improve the model?	A significant F-statistic indicated that the new variables significantly improved the model
F-Ratio	Tested fit of the model: difference between the improvements in prediction from adding the variables to the model	Significant results indicated that the IVs improved our ability to predict the DV.
R^2	Measure of model effect size; the proportion of the variance in the DV explained by the entire model	Larger R-squares indicated stronger models
T-statistic	Were the IV significant predictors of DV, i.e., was the parameter significantly different from 0?	Interpreted T-statistics that were significant ($p \leq .05$).
Standardized Beta value	Which IV was the strongest predictor?	Higher absolute standardized beta values indicated that the IV was a stronger predictor of the DV, compared to the other IVs

Source: Field, 2013

Appendix D: Regression Models – Assumptions summary table

Assumptions	How tested in SPSS	Consequence	Remedy
1. **Additivity and linearity**	The DV should have had a linear relationship with the predictors (IVs)	Invalid Model	- Transformed IV to make the relationship linear - Ran a robust Regression
2. Independent errors or no autocorrelation	Durbin-Watson statistic should have been between 1-3.	Invalid Model	- Ran a robust Regression
3. Homoscedasticity	Residuals should have been consistent at each level of the predictor variable (IV)	Invalid confidence intervals and significance test	- Weighed least squares regression
4. Normally distributed errors	Errors should have had a mean of 0. Created normal probability plot or histogram of residuals	Invalid confidence intervals and significance test in small samples only	- Bootstrapped confidence intervals
5. Continuous and unbound DV; binary or continuous IVs	N/A	N/A	N/A
6. No perfect collinearity	VIF values from Coefficients table < 10; average VIF values should not have been much greater than 1	Biased parameter estimates	- Ran a robust Regression
7. Non-zero variance	IVs must vary		
8. No outliers or influential cases	Standardized Residuals: 5% of the cases between ±1.96, 1% between ±2.58; Case wise listing of residuals < 3SD indicated a problem. Cook's D >1 indicated a problem. DfBeta >1 indicated a problem	Biased parameter estimates	

Source: Field, 2013

Appendix E: Interpreting Multinomial Regression Models

Output/statistic	Purpose	How interpreted
Likelihood ratio test, also referred to as the log-likelihood test	Omnibus test; compared 2 models of the same data, i.e., was the current research model significantly better than the previous model? Also used to test for interaction effects	Significant results indicated that the 2nd model was a significantly better fit of the data than the 1st model. Not a measure of effect size.
Pearson Chi^2 & Deviance Chi^2	Goodness of fit statistics; compared researcher's model to intercept-only model. Alternative to the likelihood ratio test	Significant results indicated the researcher's model was significantly better. Conflicting results indicated a weak model.
Hosmer-Lemeshow's Goodness of fit index	Omnibus test; to determine if the observed data were significantly different from the predicted values. Alternative to model Chi^2	Non-significant results indicated the model was doing a good job of predicting the data.
Pseudo R^2 (Cox and Snell R^2, Nagelkerke R^2, and McFadden's R^2)	Measure of model effect size, not a goodness-of-fit measure.	Larger pseudo R-squares indicated stronger models; used with the classification table.
Wald statistic	Were the IV significant predictors of DV? Which IV was the strongest predictor?	Interpret Wald statistics that were significant ($p \leq .05$). IV with the largest significant Wald was the strongest predictor of the DV.
Odds ratio	Effect of IV on DV; measure of effect size for individual IV, while holding other IVs constant. Only reported if Wald was significant.	Interpreted in comparison to reference category, while holding all other factors at their reference category and covariates (continuous IVs) constant.
Classification table	Contingency table of predicted and observed category probabilities.	A higher percentage of correct predictions (hit rate) indicated a better-fitted model.
AIC and BIC (only in multinomial logistic models)	Used to determine which research model was the best fit of data for non-nested models.	The model with the lower AIC and BIC values would have been the better-fitted model.

Source: Field, 2009; Garson, 2012

Appendix F: Research questions and models

Research question 1: What effect, if any, did individual level stressors, significant others, and negative interactions with government officials have on membership in a rightwing extremist groups? Note: the ECDB uses group membership as an indicator of extremism, thus, people coded as DFR=0 could not have been members of an extremist group. However, not all DFRs belonged to extremist groups.

Statistical test: logistic regression. This provided a measure of the strength of the model, and individual IV's effect on membership in a far-right extremist group.



To measure interaction effects, the following variables were added to the model using a stepwise method:

Individual level stressors X Extremist friends/family

Individual level stressors X Prior negative interactions with government officials

Extremist friends/family X Prior negative interactions with government officials

Research question 2: What effect, if any, did individual level stressors, significant others, and negative interactions with government officials have on individual's commitment to rightwing extremism?
Statistical test: regression analysis. This provided a measure of the strength of the model, and the individual IV's effect on each level of commitment to extremist ideology.



To measure interaction effects, the following variables were added to the model using a stepwise method:
Individual level stressors X Extremist friends/family
Individual level stressors X Prior negative interactions with government officials
Extremist friends/family X Prior negative interactions with government officials

Research question 3: What effect, if any, did an individual's commitment to far-right extremism, membership in an extremist group, individual level stressors, significant others, and negative interactions with government officials have on his/her criminal behavior?
Statistical test: 1) Multinomial logistic regression model (when criminal behavior was measured as: 1 = ideologically motivated homicide; 2 = non-ideologically motivated homicide; 3 = ideologically motivated financial scheme; 4 = non-ideologically motivated financial scheme); 2) Logistic regression model when crime was measured as 1= homicide; 2 = financial scheme.



To measure interaction effects, the following variables were added to the model using a stepwise method:
Individual level stressors X Extremist friends/family
Individual level stressors X Prior negative interactions with government officials
Extremist friends/family X Prior negative interactions with government officials

Appendix G: Interpreting MI Regression Models

Output/statistic	Purpose	How interpreted
Average relative variance (RVI)	To assess the variance in the estimates across the coefficients due to missing data	RVI close to 0 meant the missing data did not unduly influence the parameter estimates
Largest FMI	To determine if adequate datasets were imputed	The imputed datasets, M > 100 * FMI
Model F-statistic	To determine if the coefficients were significantly different from 0.	Significant results indicated the model was doing a good job of predicting the data.
T-statistic	Was the IV or interaction effect a significant predictor of the DV?	If the p-value for the t-statistic < 0.05, the variable had a significant effect on the DV
mi test	Were the IVs listed in the command significantly different from 0?	Non-significant mi test results indicate the IV or interaction effect should have been dropped; significant results indicated the IV or interaction effect significantly improved the model.
Monte Carlo Error	Same as largest FMI: to assess whether adequate datasets were imputed based on the sample size and number of IVs	The MCE of a coefficient was approximately 10% of its standard error; the MCE of a coefficient's T-statistic was approximately 0.1; if the p-value was 0.05, the MCE of a coefficient's p-value should have been approximately 0.01; if the p-value was 0.01, the MCE of a coefficient's p-value should have been approximately 0.02

Source: "Multiple Imputation in Stata," n.d.

CHAPTER 10

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