THESIS

AUTHENTICITY AND ANIMAL WELFARE: UNDERSTANDING AND AMELIORATING THE SUFFERING OF DAIRY COWS AND THEIR CALVES

Submitted by

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ABSTRACT

AUTHENTICITY AND ANIMAL WELFARE: UNDERSTANDING AND AMELIORATING THE SUFFERING OF DAIRY COWS AND THEIR CALVES

As Bernard Rollin discusses throughout his body of work, animals have interests and unique *teloi* as well as the capacity to feel pain and suffer emotionally. I argue that we must confront the ways in which we contribute to the suffering of dairy cows and their calves in particular, for their lives constitute a paradigmatic denial of an animal's *telos*. Martin Heidegger's notion of everydayness and his concept of authenticity—and especially Charles B. Guignon's interpretations of them—allow us to understand and come to terms with our own everyday contribution to the reprehensible practices surrounding dairy production. That is, Heidegger's understanding of Being allows us to see that we are likely contributors to the perpetuation of dairy cow and calf suffering. The concept of authenticity also acts as a tool that allows us insight into describing and prescribing personal commitments that entail the amelioration of these animals' suffering. The goal is to individually strive to improve animal welfare in the dairy industry, which entails taking responsibility for and altering our actions and choices; otherwise, to avoid doing so is culpable—a notion akin to Nancy Williams's argument that we are affectively ignorant of our role in animal mistreatment. Finally, utilizing authenticity as a guide also allows us to look to history, idols, and exemplars for moral guidance.

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DEDICATION

For my brother, Jamie.

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1: Introduction

Notions concerning the "good life" and what it means to "live well" have pervaded hundreds of years of philosophy. Attempting to encapsulate and describe the good life, one may consult robust philosophical notions of happiness and freedom, or one might consider more familiar attributes of life such as education, career choices, and lifestyle habits as constitutive of the primary paths toward living well. Alternatively, we can attempt to live well by advising ourselves with rationality and logical thinking, and try to live life according to a rigid calculus. The ways in which one can strive to achieve the good life are many and varied, and at the end of one's life, one may still wonder if he or she made the right choices.[1] In shedding light on one aspect of what it means to live well, I argue that living up to our own commitments to others—in this case, animals—is essential.

1.1: Why living well means treating animals well

Surely, many people do a lot of good, whether it is through their professions, their voluntary actions, or random acts. Teachers not only educate children, but often create a sense of belonging and comfort for underprivileged or troubled children; doctors and nurses comfort people through difficult times including illness and death of their loved ones; others volunteer for organizations that contribute to finding cures for cancer, ending world hunger, eliminating poverty, etc.

Though there is a vast array of components that constitute what it means to either live well or not, the moral problem of animal welfare pervades more aspects of our lives than we imagine, and we must take great care to recognize this. Animal suffering lurks in our bathrooms,

kitchens, medicine cabinets, clothing stores, supermarkets, movies and television programs—all while we watch and relax into enjoyment, comfort, or indifference. We eat their flesh and eggs; drink their milk; use their by-products to cure, cleanse, and clothe our bodies; utilize them for testing the safety of cosmetics, self-care products, medicines, and medical procedures; cast them in movies and keep them in circuses, rodeos, and zoos to entertain us; and house and feed them to comfort or aid us.

Knowing that we use animals for so many resources and knowing that they suffer in the production of those resources ought to raise a red flag in our moral purview: a majority of us probably agree that within our sets of values, there exists the belief that it is morally wrong or questionable to contribute to the needless harm of a being who can feel pain. Moreover, if we hold that belief *and* we also know that we are actively contributing to this pain, we believe that we might be failing morally, and therefore failing to live well, because our actions do not align with our values. Thus, a necessary component of achieving a good life is concerning ourselves with and attempting to ameliorate the needless suffering we cause, either directly or indirectly, to animals.

1.2: The approach combining phenomenology and moral philosophy

In order to describe and best frame this relationship between our commitments and the wellbeing of animals, I will present the phenomenological concept of authenticity—particularly Martin Heidegger's concept of authenticity—and illustrate how it allows us to grasp and reflect upon our misguided relation to our *selves* and to others, enables us to understand ourselves temporally, and fuels us with an overarching sense of responsibility and commitment to animals. Framing and understanding ourselves in this phenomenological sense also leads us to prescribe and understand how we ought to continue to live our lives once given this new context. With the

help of Bernard Rollin's notion of "reminding" ourselves of our ethical beliefs and applying them to new moral categories (in this case, animals), Heidegger's conception of authenticity allows us the advantage of being able to choose which roles, values, and traits we ought to cultivate if we are to live lives grounded by a strong sense of commitment and personal identity. Authenticity also serves as a tool and a guide when we face moral dilemmas and problems. Because Heidegger is notorious for his nearly impenetrable text, I aim to make his sophisticated notions more accessible, and therefore show that they are applicable, plausible, and practical—not far-fetched as many might be rather inclined to believe.

Though phenomenology and moral philosophy can help us understand and attempt to solve various types of problems, I am especially concerned with the issue of animal welfare. Upon describing the issue and making a clear case for animal welfare constituting an urgent moral issue (and dairy animal welfare comprising such a particularly pressing concern in that arena) I identify inauthenticity as the problem and primary driver behind our individual contributions to the perpetuation of these animals' suffering. Finally, I will reply to a series of objections concerning authenticity's relationship with alienation, its potential excessive time requirement it poses for us moral agents, as well as its supposed impracticality.

2: The animal problem: a brief history and defense for the fight to end animal suffering

de Beauvoir: You've never liked animals.

Sartre: Oh, but I have, to some extent. Dogs and cats.

de Beauvoir: Not much.

Sartre: Animals. As I see it they are a philosophical problem. Basically.[2]

The history of philosophy has proven that animals are a kind of philosophical mystery; philosophers have diminished animals, labeling them as mere tools for our own use, and idolized

them as if their lives were equal in value to that of humans. Despite Descartes' influential assertion that animals are mere machines without mental lives,[3] three of Darwin's works, *The Origin of Species*, *The Descent of Man*, and *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, allowed for the widespread recognition of man's difference in degree, not kind, with non-human animals.[4] More particularly, states Bernard Rollin, Darwin's *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* "brazenly hoists a middle finger to the Cartesian tradition," since Darwin believed emotion to be "inextricably bound up with subjective feelings."[5] Darwin also "affirmed that 'there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher animals in their mental faculties,' and that 'the lower animals, like man manifestly feel pleasure and pain, happiness, and misery.'"[6]

Fairly recently, and rather past-due, in July 2012, the scientific community finally agreed that animals are conscious, 150 years after Darwin asserted such claims.[7] This event, disguised as a so-called step forward in science, simply highlights the rather backward way of approaching evolutionary theory: if human physical processes can be applied throughout the phylogenetic scale, why are often corresponding mental processes (e.g., having feelings of anxiety, aggression, pleasure, boredom, etc.) conveniently left out of the analogy? Rollin answers: "The current ideology of biological science seems conveniently to forget . . . the dictum universally accepted among modern biologists that all biology must be structured within the framework of evolutionary theory."[8] This convenience has, in part, allowed those involved in animal industries to do with animals whatever they please.

This included furthering our understanding of animal behavior, though its purview was limited, and not in favor of animals. In the mid-1900s, behaviorism became the primary approach to animal psychology, and remained so for about fifty years.[9] However, researchers

continued to deny animal subjects this mental experience. Rollin cites researcher Clark Hull, who argued that talk of "consciousness" ought to be banned from the scope of psychological research: "To guard against the danger of 'anthropomorphic subjectivism,' we must 'regard . . . the behaving organism as a completely self-maintaining robot, constructed of materials as unlike ourselves as may be.'"[10] Not surprisingly, much of the research that took place during this era was largely restricted to conditioning and learning, whereas research into other realms of animal behavior, including sensory capacity, general habits, and reproductive, feeding, emotional, and social behavior, was of secondary importance.[11]

The current atmosphere of ethical animal treatment has been greatly influenced by both our history of utilizing animals in such research and our convenient denial of consciousness and associated mental states. In no other place can this fact—that history has influenced the current lack of animal welfare standards—be quite as clear as it is in our current agricultural practices, especially that of dairy.

2.1: Understanding the animal problem: telos *and animal behavior*

In order to better place animals within our moral purview, Rollin takes the Aristotelian concept of *telos*[12] and applies it to the realm of animal ethics, illustrating that we have an obligation to animals essentially because they have unique interests. That is, a cat does what he does in virtue of him being a cat and having interests of none other than a cat; the same principle applies to all animals: cows, pigs, dogs, birds, octopuses, hamsters, etc. "With Aristotle, we may speak of a particular *telos* for each sort of living thing, a nature that sets it apart from other things. This nature is defined by the functions and aims (not necessarily conscious aims) of the creature in question. So, in a real sense, a thing is what is does."[13] Rollin goes on to describe that

telos can be fundamentally considered a morally-driven notion, since it allows us to understand a being in terms of what its unique needs or interests are:

> Though [the concept of *telos*] is partially metaphysical (in defining a way of looking at the world), and partially empirical (in that it can and will be deepened and refined by increasing empirical knowledge), it is at root a moral notion . . . because it contains the notion of what about an animal we *ought* to at least try to respect and accommodate . . . If an animal has a set of needs and interests which are constitutive of its nature, then, in our dealings with that animal, we are obligated to not violate and to attempt to accommodate those interests, for the violation of and failure to accommodate those interests matters to an animal.[14]

This characterization of animals as individuals who not only have interests but also have interests that *matter* to them is the philosophical bedrock for my assertion that we ought to extend moral obligations to animals. Though it would be difficult to draw a line as to precisely which animal species or their individual members could possess the ability to have a life that matters to them, there do exist rather stark characteristics among certain species of animals that make it clear that some are cognizant of their own lives and others around them, and are able to suffer both physiologically and psychologically if their needs are not met and their basic interests violated. Consider the following attributes of sea mammals:

> [L]ove is sometimes displayed most dramatically when a child is in trouble; mothers of many species will fight to the death to protect their offspring, and when a child is hurt or killed, they exhibit the deepest feelings of grief and pain. Sea lion mothers, watching the babies being eaten by killer whales, *squeal eerily* and *wail pitifully in anguish* over their loss, and dolphins have been observed struggling to save a dead infant. Mother love is found in innumerable species . . . Killer whales, or orcas, may not be very nice to the animals they eat, but they are good, very loving parents.[15]

Not surprisingly, many animals are equally capable of having the same physical pains and emotions as humans, and therefore, according to Rollin's model, similar *teloi*. And, unfortunately, these animals are often the ones we use as tools in various everyday practices. I will now briefly discuss these kinds of physical and psychological phenomena that occur in the

life of a particular type of animal, and the context in which it occurs, thus illustrating our disrespect for their unique *teloi*. In particular, I will focus on the cows in the dairy industry, and will first justify this selection.

3: The justification for focusing on the dairy industry

The justification for focusing on the dairy industry is twofold: first, it makes for an exceptionally pressing issue because in terms of a cow's *telos*, many current practices prohibit the cow and calf's natural tendencies. We intervene between a mother and her newborn, take what is supposed to exclusively belong to the calf (her milk), and separate the pair for the rest of their lives, refusing the mother to allow her to do what she is supposed to do: nurture her baby—what Rollin refers to as a paradigmatic example of cruelty.[16] Moreover, we artificially inseminate them, milk them utilizing machines, house them in less than preferable environments and force them into confinement, e.g., on concrete (when their bodies are not built for these surfaces),[17] thus refusing them the space and pasture they use for social interaction, play, comfort, etc. In addition, several practices are performed throughout dairies in the United States, including tail-docking, a procedure in which the cow's tail is removed,[18] dehorning, continuous impregnation, and more.

Second, society and its everyday routines have engrained in us a notion that the milk we consume originates from a nurturing act; producing and giving milk is one of the most wholesome features of a mother's care and love. Hence, surrounding the consumption of milk (and other dairy products, but to a lesser extent) there are very few negative connotations.[19] This rather blind acceptance of the fact that wholesomeness is part of the dairy cow's life is an archetypical example of how we, as individuals, live our daily lives without questioning both the

origin of the products that we consume and the negative effects we have on the emotionally and physiologically complex animals that supply us with those products.

3.1: A note about the term "factory" farming

Though there are many ways to characterize what exactly a "factory" farm is, I generally mean it to encapsulate this view: namely, that a factory farm is one where the economic goals outstrip the observed standards of the animals' welfare such that the animals' *teloi* are compromised to varying degrees. This purposefully vague definition can allow for a number of different settings to meet the standard of a factory farm; in this way, then, farms that have a varying number of cows (or pigs, chickens, etc.) from even dozens to the hundreds and thousands can qualify as factory farms if the animals are confined in such a way that they are, for example, unable to move, lie down, or receive adequate nutrition. Though the number of animals in a single location is of great concern, I believe that if the profit and efficiency are of primary importance at some severe expense of the animals' welfare, then such a practice may be categorized under the umbrella of the term "factory" farming. This does *not* necessarily exclude family farms, for family farms can indeed house or treat animals in such ways that would not meet certain standards for animal welfare (e.g., the notable standards of the CROPP Cooperative).[20] The debate of this term and of related terms (i.e., condensed animal feeding operations, or CAFOs) is also apt to change as practices change. What is at stake in the here and now, however, is not the importance of the precise term I use, but rather, of the message that I deliver concerning the individual lives of the animals who are in peril. Nonetheless, with that said, the astonishing number of animals caught up in agriculture could not be any worthier of note.

3.2: The sheer number of animals utilized in agriculture makes it a great concern

In order to grasp the scope of the use of animals in agriculture, and particularly the dairy industry, it is indeed helpful to understand how many animals are utilized for their meat as well as their by-products. Singer states that the "use and abuse of animals raised for food far exceeds, in sheer numbers of animals affected, any other kind of mistreatment."[21] An estimated 95% of all animal use is for agricultural purposes, and these animals are raised as quickly and as cheaply as possible to meet economic demands.[22]

Animal scientist Jonathan Balcombe, while lecturing in 2011 regarding current animal treatment, shows his concern for the rate of production and consumption in the United States:

> [An] estimated nine to ten billion [animals] in the United States per year are caught up in the factory farming system so that we can buy cheap [products] . . . [O]n veal farms, we deprive calves of their mothers and mothers of their calves, so that we can have cheap milk, and the reward for the mother at the end of about four or five cycles of artificial insemination and having her baby taken away from her on day one is to be sent to the slaughterhouse. What's wrong with this? The crux of it is that animals feel. They are sentient. They have the capacity for pain and they have the capacity for pleasure. They can feel suffering, extended suffering, and they can experience joy. The way I like to put it is: Sentience is the bedrock of ethics; the foundation of moral systems is that others matter—not just lives that matter to me, but lives that are important to them.[23]

Balcombe and Rollin both point to the importance of the notion that animals are not doing what they *want* to be doing, or what it is their nature leads them to do; it is impossible, given their circumstances, to be able to fulfill their *teloi*. Because of the incredible numbers of dairy cows in the United States, it should go without saying that they, too, are caught up in a system in which cost effectiveness and efficiency play an important role. In particular, the number of dairy cows in the United States in 2014 reached about 9.3 million, who produced on average over 22,000 pounds of milk each, and there is an upward trend of milk production per cow.[24] In 1980, the dairy cow produced an average of under 12,000 pounds of milk each year.[25] And in the year

2000, the average American consumed 593 pounds of dairy products (milk, butter, yogurt, cheese, and frozen dairy products like ice cream).[26]

4: The dairy industry

As I previewed, the image of the dairy industry and the reality of its operations make for an interesting and complex moral issue for several reasons. Drinking milk carries with it notions of motherly love, comfort, wellbeing—wholesome ideas that have naturally taken a strong foothold, for seemingly nothing can top a parent's love and comfort. Even when I personally first began experimenting with vegetarianism as a diet and lifestyle, I continued to consume milk and eat cheese, as my mother cared for my health, urging me that calcium intake was essential for my growing bones. Not surprisingly, and like perhaps many others, I never questioned milk; after all, I thought, the animal was not being slaughtered for her meat; she was, rather, living out her life.

This ignorance of the life of a dairy cow is due in part to the fact that the media has portrayed dairy cows as hearty, beautiful female animals, providing life for their calves and aiding in our own offspring's health: as Rollin remarks, "The image of 'Bessy' happily chewing her cud" has symbolized the dairy industry, as we take comfort in "the pastoral picture of 'contented cows.'"[27] In *The Ethics of What We Eat*, Peter Singer and Jim Mason state: "Milk and cheese production enjoy a better reputation than other forms of intensive farming, and the dairy industry is keen to keep it that way."[28] The image of Bessy on the pasture, the idea that she feeds her calf her milk (and that we get the rest), and the notion that cows blankly chew their cud without thinking about much else are misconceptions: apart from having intense emotional lives, cows even "get excited when they solve intellectual challenges."[29] Donald Broom, professor of animal welfare at Cambridge University, presented cows with a problem and upon being solved, "[t]heir brainwaves showed their excitement; their heartbeat went up and some even jumped into

the air."[30] Marc Bekoff, Professor Emeritus of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology at the University of Colorado, also comments on cow behavior, particularly regarding emotions with which humans are familiar, including pain, fear, and anxiety:

> Studies show that [cows] worry about their future. They and other agricultural animals make and miss their friends. Veterinarian John Webster and his colleagues have shown how cows within a herd form smaller friendship groups of between two to four animals with whom they spend most of their time, often grooming and licking each other. They also dislike other cows and can bear grudges for months or years. There's no doubt that cows and other farm animals are sentient beings who care very much about what happens to them.[31]

4.1: Cow and calf welfare

In dairy farms across the United States, cows are vastly not reared, housed, or treated in such ways as to promote the intellectual stimulation or social interaction that Broom and Bekoff describe above. Generally, cows are kept indoors, with the main goal of yielding as much product as possible. Singer writes: "The modern dairy cow has been bred to produce as much milk as possible and now produces more than three times as much milk as a typical dairy cow did fifty years ago."[32] Some dairy farmers also give their cows injections of BST (bovine somatotrophin, a genetically engineered growth hormone, now banned in Canada and the European Union) that allows for a fourteen to twenty percent increase in milk production.[33] This over-production of milk results in "considerable stress" on the cow's body, and moreover, the BST injection site becomes tender and swollen.[34]

Cows are also artificially inseminated in order to birth a calf (approximately annually) to sustain their milk production.[35] The calf does not usually consume his or her own mother's milk; instead, the calf is often immediately taken away so he or she can be used for other purposes (if the calf is male, he would be used for veal production, and most female calves replace other dairy cows).[36] Singer cites Professor John Webster of the department of animal husbandry at the

University of Bristol: “The calf born to the dairy cow is routinely submitted to more insults to normal development than any other farm animal. It is taken from its mother shortly after birth, deprived of its natural food, whole cow’s milk, and fed one of a variety of cheaper liquid substitutes.”[37] Nothing could hardly be as in opposition to an animal’s *telos* as forcing an icon of nourishment, the cow, to birth a calf, and deny the calf its own mother’s milk.

In my personal experience on a visit to a dairy farm located in Colorado, I arrived upon a field of rows of calves, individually chained to their plastic housing units which contained some bedding, food, and water. Upon greeting the first calf, she immediately began nudging my fingers with her nose and mouth, and started suckling on them with great intensity as if they were her mother’s udder. When she stopped, she would jump and dash as far as the chain would allow her, greeting others in the group, vibrantly illustrating how much excitement she was experiencing upon contact with another being. In fact, she was more dog-like than some dogs I have met: she continually wanted to sniff, jump, explore, and run. She was positively vivacious, and was causing a joyous stir in the other calves around her. When the group of students I was with and I left her vicinity, the slack in her tether was gone, as she had moved as far as she could go toward our direction, and keeping attentive eyes on us, curled up on the ground, about as motionless as the other several dozens of calves there. Ahead of her was the life one hundred yards away: sitting on concrete or dirt all day, being herded into room where a machine would take her milk once she, too, birthed a calf. Upon leaving that farm, I left feeling disturbed, thinking about her bleak future of boredom and confinement, unable to freely graze a pasture and one day feed her own calf. Upon returning home, I sat with my dog for a long time, pondering the few differences between her and the calf. This dairy, Rollin remarked, was one of the better ones.

Indeed, considering the fact that the "hutches" the calves are kept in allow them some amount of social interaction with the other calves around them (depending on the length of the tether), it is better than keeping them in crates.[38] However, Rollin cites Ronald Kilgour and Clive Dalton's view (based upon the work of H. H. Sambraus, former professor of animal husbandry and behavioral sciences at the Technical University of Munich, Germany) that calves do better when they are reared in groups, which ensures "appropriate resting behavior, social and activity behavior."[39] Moreover, the "calf's surroundings should provide plenty of stimuli to allow exploration and play"; otherwise, calves raised without such interaction leads to a "failure to develop normal social behavior."[40] In my own experience, as much as I enjoyed meeting the calf, seeing her restrained by a chain to her hutch was disturbing, especially considering the growing research on animal play and boredom.[41] Many pet owners (including me) would never keep their own pets tied up day in and day out—in fact, we often have them sleep near us, or have them sit on our laps, and some people even take them to their workplace so as to prevent them from being bored and alone. To see such desperate excitement in a young animal, whether it is a dog, cat, or a calf, gives one the unsettling feeling that something is amiss. Again, Rollin interprets this as the calf's *telos* being inadequately fulfilled—she cannot do what her nature, as a calf, urges her to do: be close to her mother, interact playfully with other calves, explore, run, and even jump.

If on a range, cows, though not typically viewed as very active, will in fact walk more than six thousand meters a day; cows who are tied to hutches or who are in confined areas are obviously constricted to fence posts and tethers, disallowing the ability to exercise, explore, or be stimulated.[42] In particular, tie stalls keep the cow tethered for extended periods of time, causing them to be unable to groom, interact with one another, and move.[43] However, there are a number of benefits and concerns with these various types of housing, as Rollin discusses in his

illuminating book *Farm Animal Welfare*: a cow's social tendencies are inhibited in confinement, but if left out on dry lots (dirt pens), "lack of shelter from wind and snow, poor drainage, and general protection from climatic extremes" become concerns.[44]

Moreover, flooring is an important consideration, as cement, for example, can cause foot and leg issues.[45] Even pasturing cows (think of the images we see of "happy cows" chewing grass with the sun on their backs) raises its own issues, since lack of shade, insects, extreme temperatures, distance to drinking water, etc., constitute problems for the wellbeing of the cows.[46] As Rollin states, more research must be done to continue to learn what is best for cow behavior while still meeting product demands, and most importantly, the "elimination of total confinement systems such as tie stalls" ought to be a priority.[47]

4.2: Calves and veal

The veal industry is an appendage to dairies, and carries out equally problematic and disturbing practices. While waiting in line to order a McDonald's hamburger one day, Peter Lovenheim, a writer from Rochester, New York, decided he wanted to know where the meat originated.[48] In his book entitled *Portrait of a Burger as a Young Calf*,[49] he tells the story of his visit to a local farm, Lawnel Farms. There, he witnessed the methods of meat and dairy production, where one mother's calf was taken away from her forty minutes after she gave birth, when she had already started to lick the calf. When a farmhand took her newborn away, she began to sniff the straw where the calf had been; she bellowed, and paced. Even hours later, she "began sticking her nose under the gate to the barn in which she was confined, bellowing continuously."[50] While this was occurring, her calf was "in another part of the farm, lying shivering on a concrete floor," and within a few days, he died, and "his body was laying on the farm's compost pile."[51] The mother's behavior, as Temple Grandin, professor of Animal

Sciences at Colorado State University, notes, is the behavior of a cow who is stressed: "She wants her baby. Bellowing for it, hunting for it. She'll forget for a while, then start again. It's like grieving, mourning—not much written about it. People don't like to allow them thoughts or feelings."[52]

When male calves are born to their mothers on dairy farms, as mentioned earlier, they either are utilized in veal production or the alternative is to immediately slaughter them[53] (though, as in the example above, it is not always the case, as the calf unfortunately died after suffering for a period of days). As Singer and Mason write, the fate of the slaughtered calf is better than that of the calf who spends four months in "confinement in semi-darkness, in a bare wooden crate too narrow to turn around. He will be tied at the neck, further restricting his movements" which cause his muscles to develop, making for tougher veal (as opposed to the "soft texture" that consumers desire in "prime veal").[54] Additionally, if the calves are transported to be auctioned for other purposes, they undergo an intense bout of stress during transportation, often before they are even unable to walk. As Temple Grandin states, the "[w]orst thing you can do is put a bawling baby on a trailer. It's just an awful thing to do."[55]

The natural life of the calf, however, includes a period of up to seven months of suckling, during which the mother and the calf bond strengthens.[56] In order to produce both milk and veal efficiently, the mother and calf are separated, causing trauma to both. Rollin cites the work of J. L. Albright, Professor Emeritus of Animal Science at Purdue University: "When the calf is left with the cow three days or more, it is more difficult to separate the pair. Excessive bawling, fussing, and breaking down fences occur when maternal urges are then denied."[57] Rollin believes that, considering the "sanctity of the mother-offspring relationship," research is needed on how to ameliorate the immense stress that this causes on the pair.[58] Singer and Mason quote John

Avizienius, senior scientific officer in the Farm Animals Department of the RSPCA of Britain, who says that:

> [he] remembers one particular cow who appeared to be deeply affected by the separation of her calf for a period of at least six weeks. When the calf was first removed, she was in acute grief; she stood outside the pen where she had last seen her calf and bellowed for her offspring for hours . . . Even after six weeks, the mother would gaze at the pen where she last saw her calf and sometime wait momentarily outside the pen. It was almost as if her spirit had been broken and all she could do was to make token gestures to see if her calf would still be there.[59]

For some, these kinds of illustrations of the industry do not point to investing in research in order to improve problems; rather, the relationship between the cow and her calf (and public views about it) is causing organizations like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, The Farm Sanctuary, and Mercy for Animals to urge people to stop eating veal and consuming dairy altogether, and to contact their legislators to ban veal crates. The Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, constituted by veterinarians, professors, ranchers, and many accomplished others, also states that "[a]fter reviewing the literature, visiting production facilities, and listening to producers themselves," crates such as these, as well as those utilized to contain other animals are inhumane: "[T]he Commission believes that the most intensive confinement systems, such as restrictive veal crates . . . prevent the animal from a normal range of movement and constitute inhumane treatment."[60]

4.3: Downer cattle

The aforementioned organizations like PETA and Mercy for Animals also widely publicize videos of inhumanely treated animals such as "downer" cattle. One such video released in 2008 by the Humane Society of the United States shows the downer cattle—animals who essentially cannot get up due to injury or sickness such as very low levels of calcium or "milk fever"[61]—being abused and brutally forced to get up and move to slaughter. In the video,

workers kick the cows, ram them with "blades of a forklift, ja[b] them in the eyes, appl[y] painful electrical shocks and even tortur[e] them with a hose and water."[62] Wayne Pacelle, president and CEO of the Humane Society of the United States, comments on the video: "This torture is right out of the waterboarding manual. To see the extreme cruelties shown in The HSUS video challenges comprehension."[63]

The best solution for these cases, both for animal and human safety, is for the animal to be immediately killed[64] and never to be introduced into the food supply.[65] Colorado State University's 2008 study entitled, "Survey of Dairy Management Practices on One Hundred Thirteen North Central and Northeastern United States Dairies," found that for downer cattle in those regions, the "preferred euthanasia method" of eighty-six percent of dairy owners was the use of a gun, because it is perceived as the easiest method that also causes the least amount of suffering.[66] However, injections utilizing disinfectants, because lack of availability of euthanasia solutions, were also sometimes used, which is not approved by the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) because the injection of a disinfectant into the bloodstream is quite painful in virtue of its lack of anesthetic properties.[67]

4.4: Tail-docking and dehorning

An additional exploration of the dairy industry illustrates yet another denial of one of the cow's natural tendencies—swatting insects with her tail, or simply *having* a tail. It should go without saying that cows have tails for a reason, and it seems to fly in the face of common sense to remove a body part that serves a particular purpose for that animal. However, tail removal, or "tail-docking" is commonly practiced throughout the United States and Canada (and not only in the dairy industry, but in others, e.g., sheep shearing) for the following reasons.[68]

Besides worker discomfort from tail-striking, it is believed that removing or shortening the tail increases cleanliness and decreases the number of cases of mastitis (mentioned earlier) as well as somatic cell counts, a gauge for milk quality.[69] The removal can be done in a few different ways, either through "banding, cauterizing docking irons, emasculators or surgical removal," and all of these could potentially lead to infection.[70] In particular, banding, or elastration, is a process that cuts off the blood supply over a period of time (between three to seven weeks) until the tail falls off.[71] (One can get an idea of the incredible pain this would cause by simply leaving a very tight rubber band around one's finger for a day.) Not only does the cow lose her ability to swat bothersome flies and insects, banding causes a great deal of suffering and can "cause infection, death, and decrease milk production."[72] Moreover, the same study out of Colorado State University shows that eighty-two percent of dairies in the Midwest practice tail-docking, and the "most common reason given by producers for tail[-]docking was cow hygiene" (at seventy-three percent) despite the fact that, as Rollin states, his "conversations with dairy specialists, dairy veterinarians, and a lactation physiologist have convinced [him] that there is absolutely no scientific basis for claims about the benefits of tail-docking."[73] In fact, a pathogen called clostridia often results after tail-docking as well as gangrene, tetanus infections, and damage to the nerves in the tail, which lead to development of painful neuromas.[74] Finally, tail-docking research, such as a 2002 study out of the University of Wisconsin, shows that udder hygiene scores did not differ between cows with tails and cows with docked tails, and the National Mastitis Council has brought no evidence to bear on the alleged benefits of docking improving cow welfare, milk quality, or hygiene.[75]

Though docking is still common, the National Dairy Farmers Assuring Responsible Management (FARM) Animal Care Program disapproves of tail-docking, and "switch-trimming"

is recommended since it is much less painful and will still prevent matting of the tail hair with manure.[76] However, if the consumer herself is opposed to the practice of tail-docking, as I will discuss, she ought to choose products that she can trust to avoid that practice. For example, Organic Valley, a group of farmer-owned dairies that is part of the Coulee Region Organic Produce Pool (CROPP) Cooperative, prohibits tail docking procedures, since removing the tail can result in chronic pain and prohibits them from performing the natural behavior of swishing flies.[77]

Colorado State University's 2008 survey also shows that de-horning is common as well, finding that about thirty-five percent of calves were dehorned by the age of eight weeks, and by twelve weeks, nearly eighty percent were dehorned.[78] The methods of dehorning include hot iron (sixty-seven percent), gouging (nine percent), paste (ten percent), saw (about four percent), and otherwise unknown (about eleven percent).[79] Only approximately twelve percent of dairy owners indicated that they used anesthetics in removal, and two percent reported utilizing analgesia.[80] The process of dehorning utilizing caustic chemicals as well as using a hot iron can cause pain because the horn button and horn's interior contains nerves, even when the calf is very young.[81] There is also a quite simple for blocking the nerve to the horn in young calves in order to increase their comfort during and after the procedure.[82]

Despite the presence of horns being a safety issue for other cattle (especially in transportation), Rollin states: "When I talk to ranchers, I ask them to engage in a thought experiment: If tomorrow the law banned . . . dehorning . . . would they go out of business? Their answer is, 'Of course not!'"[83] Like the range of aforementioned practices, there is potential for raising standards for animal welfare in this aspect of the industry without risking economic

failure. This is illustrated by the notion that the more seemingly difficult element here is the *adaptation* that is required for transitioning from conventional practices to new ones.

5: Dairy animal welfare on the individual level

If one remains unmoved by evidence of the reprehensible actions that occur on dairy farms, perhaps the fact that suppliers of animal products (such as milk) try to keep the details of their production under-wraps is a telltale sign that something wrong is happening behind the scenes; if it were not, companies would likely be willing to expose details of their operations to the public without fretting about the way they are perceived. (Consider, for example, the movement proposing legislation that would "criminalize whistleblowers" for exposing animal cruelty on factory farms.)[84] Though it is generally easy to show and convince others that many of these means of production are morally wrong, it is nevertheless difficult to try to show people how their own actions contribute to this suffering. What we need to understand is that living well and living up to one's own moral standards requires treating animals well. As I will argue, we must take responsibility in doing our part in reducing and preventing animal suffering, and improving dairies is an especially urgent and heart-wrenching issue.

Importantly, though, this is not a call for a mass transition into vegetarianism or veganism; rather, it is an urgent message concerning the fact that we owe these animals a balance between meeting the goals of production and fulfilling their nature, or their *teloi*. Though I never expect everyone to be (or argue that they should be) completely vegetarian or vegan, I do argue that we can and should make changes in order to make animals' lives much better before we consume them and their by-products (if we are to do so at all). As I have discussed, we can make some of these changes with further research and new technologies[85] such as automated milking,[86]

housing alternatives, etc. But as individuals and consumers, we can also make changes by reflecting upon our influence on animal welfare and committing to changing our actions.

ENDNOTES

1. Though some, e.g., nihilists or amoralists, might believe that our choices do not make a difference or that moral obligation is as binding as etiquette, it is outside the scope of this essay to attempt to accommodate or pursue arguments against nihilist or amoralist positions.

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3. Rollin, Bernard. *The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Pain, and Science: Expanded Edition*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1998. 24. Print.

4. Rollin, *The Unheeded Cry* 32-33.

5. Rollin, *The Unheeded Cry* 33.

6. Rollin, *The Unheeded Cry* 33.

7. Mountain, Michael. "Scientists Declare: Nonhuman Animals Are Conscious." *Earth in Transition*. 30 July 2012. Web. 27 December 2014. <http://www.earthintransition.org/2012/07/scientists-declare-nonhuman-animals-are-conscious/>.

8. Rollin, *The Unheeded Cry* 27.

9. Rollin, *The Unheeded Cry* 206.

10. Hull, C.L. *Principles of Behavior*. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1943. 24. quoted in Rollin, *The Unheeded Cry* 206.

11. Rollin, *The Unheeded Cry* 233.

12. A further description of *telos* can be found in Rollin's *Animal Rights & Human Morality*, 3rd ed. New York: Prometheus Books, 2006. 117-24. Print.

13. Rollin, *Animal Rights and Human Morality* 118.

14. Rollin, Bernard. "On telos and genetic-engineering." *Animal Ethics Reader*. Eds. Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 2003. 410. Print.

15. Bekoff, Marc. *The Emotional Lives of Animals*. Novato: New World Library, 2007. 72-73. Print.

16. Rollin, Bernard. *Farm Animal Welfare*. Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1995. 101. Print.

17. Albright, J. L. "Dairy animal welfare: current and needed research." *Journal of Dairy Science* 78, no. 12 (1987) 2725. quoted in Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 104.

18. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 105-6; Buza, Marianne. "Should You be Tail Docking on Your Dairy Farm?" *Agweb*. 27 Oct. 2015. Web. 28 Oct. 2015. <http://www.agweb.com/article/should-you-be-tail-docking-on-your-dairy-farm-NAA-university-news-release/>.

19. On the other hand, meat is commonly associated with the death of an animal, which might help to explain why there are twice as many vegetarians than there are vegans (those who additionally exclude dairy and other animal products from their diet, rather than just meat).

20. "About CROPP Cooperative." *CROPP Cooperative*. n. d. Web. 7 Nov. 2015. <https://www.farmers.coop/about-us/>.

21. Singer, Peter. *Animal Liberation*: *The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement*. New York: Harper Perennial, 2009. 95. Print.

22. Bekoff, Marc. *The Animal Manifesto: Six Reasons for Expanding Our Compassion Footprint*. Novato: New World Library, 2010. 115. Print.

23. Balcombe, Jonathan. "Why Vegan? Lessons From an Animal Scientist." *YouTube*. 14 April 2011. Web. 11 Feb. 2014.

24. "Dairy Data." *USDA Economic Research Service*. 27 Oct. 2015. Web. 27 Oct. 2015 <http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/dairy-data.aspx>.

25. "Dairy Data."

26. See Table 2-2 in "Profiling Food Consumption in America." *United States Department of Agriculture*. 2002. Web. 8 Aug. 2015. <http://www.usda.gov/factbook/chapter2.htm>.

27. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 99.

28. Singer, Peter, and Jim Mason. *The Ethics of What We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter*. Emmaus: Rodale, 2006. 56. Print.

29. Hagen, Kristin, and Donald M. Broom. "Emotional reactions to learning in cattle." *Applied Animal Behavior Science* 85.3-4 (2004): 203–213. Print. quoted in Singer, *What We Eat* 56.

30. Singer, *What We Eat* 56.

31. Bekoff, *The Animal Manifesto* 116.

32. Singer, *What We Eat* 57.

33. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 108; Singer, *Animal Liberation* 138.

34. Singer, *What We Eat* 57.

35. Singer, *Animal Liberation* 136; Singer, *What We Eat* 57.

36. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 101.

37. Webster, John. "Health and Welfare of Animals in Modern Husbandry Systems—Dairy Cattle." *In Practice* 8.3 (1986): 85-89. quoted in Singer, *Animal Liberation* 136-37.

38. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 102.

39. Kilgour, Ronald, and Clive Dalton. *Livestock Behavior: A Practical Guide*. Boulder: Westview, 1984. and Sambraus, H. H. "Human Considerations in Calf Rearing." *Animal Regulation Studies* 3 (1980): 19-22. quoted in Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 102-03.

40. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 103.

41. According to Marc Bekoff, "Individuals become deeply immersed in the activity [of playing] and show their delight by acrobatic movements, gleeful vocalizations, and smiles. They play hard, get exhausted, rest, and go at it again and again." See Bekoff, *The Emotional Lives of Animals* 56.

42. Kilgour and Dalton 38 quoted in Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 103.

43. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 103.

44. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 104.

45. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 104.

46. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 104.

47. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 104-05. See the Pew Commission's 2008 report: "Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America." *National Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production*. 2008. Web. 21 Dec. 2014. <http://www.ncifap.org/_images/PCIFAPFin.pdf>.

48. Lovenheim, Peter. *Portrait of a Burger as a Young Calf: The True Story of One Man, Two Cows and the Feeding of a Nation*. New York: Harmony Books, 2002. Print. quoted in Singer, *What We Eat* 56-58.

49. See endnote 48.

50. Singer, *What We Eat* 58.

51. Singer, *What We Eat* 58.

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53. Singer, *What We Eat* 58.

54. Singer, *What We Eat* 58-59.

55. Bonné, Jon. "Can Animals You Eat Be Treated Humanely?" *MSNBC News*. n. d. Web. 28 June 2004. <http://msnbc.msn.com/id/5271434/>. quoted in Singer, *What We Eat* 58.

56. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 101-02.

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58. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 102.

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60. "Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America." *National Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production*. 2008. Web. 21 Dec. 2014. <http://www.ncifap.org/_images/PCIFAPFin.pdf>.

61. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 106.

62. "Rampant Animal Cruelty at California Slaughter Plant." *The Humane Society of the United States*. 30 Jan. 2008. Web. 29 Dec. 2014. <http://www.humanesociety.org/news/news/2008/01/undercover_investigation_013008.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/>.

63. "Rampant Animal Cruelty at California Slaughter Plant."

64. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 106.

65. In fact, President Barack Obama's administration banned downer cattle from the food supply in 2009; see: "Obama bans 'downer' cows from food supply." *NBC News*. 14 March 2009. Web. 8 Aug. 2015. <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/29691788/ns/health-food_safety/t/obama-bans-downer-cows-food-supply/#.VjFlDxCrRE5>.

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67. Fulwider et al. 1690 citing "AVMA Guidelines on Euthanasia." *AVMA*. June 2007. Web. 22 Aug. 2007. <http:// www.avma.org/issues/~nimal_welfareleuthanasia.pdf >.

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69. Somatic cell count, more specifically, refers to the immune system's response (of an increase in white blood cells) to a mastitis-causing pathogen. See: "Somatic Cell Count - Milk Quality Indicator." *Agriculture and Horticulture Development Board*. 2015. Web. 4 Nov. 2015. <http://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/animal-health-welfare/mastitis/symptoms-of-mastitis/somatic-cell-count-milk-quality-indicator/#.VjFXYBCrRE4; http://www.agweb.com/article/should-you-be-tail-docking-on-your-dairy-farm-NAA-university-news-release/>.

70. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 105; Buza, "Should You be Tail Docking on Your Dairy Farm?"

71. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 105; Fulwider et al. 1689; Buza, "Should You be Tail Docking on Your Dairy Farm?"

72. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 105.

73. Fulwider et al. 1686; Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 105.

74. Buza, "Should You be Tail Docking on Your Dairy Farm?"

75. Buza, "Should You be Tail Docking on Your Dairy Farm?"

76. Buza, "Should You be Tail Docking on Your Dairy Farm?"

77. "Dairy Pool Standards." *Coulee Region Organic Produce Pool Cooperative*. n. d. Web. 4 Nov. 2015. <https://www.farmers.coop/producer-pools/dairy-pool/pool-standards/>.

78. Fulwider et al. 1688.

79. Fulwider et al. 1686.

80. Fulwider et al. 1686.

81. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 64.

82. Anderson, Neil. "Dehorning of Calves." *Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs*. July 2012. Web. 4 Nov. 2015. <http://www.omafra.gov.on.ca/english/livestock/dairy/facts/09-003.htm#block>.

83. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 65.

84. See: Oppel Jr., Richard A. "Taping of Farm Cruelty Is Becoming the Crime." *New York Times*. 6 April 2013. Web. 21 Dec. 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/us/taping-of-farm-cruelty-is-becoming-the-crime.html?_r=0>.

85. Rollin, *Farm Animal Welfare* 107-08.

86. Robotic milking, however, poses other potential problems if the animal has not had her tail removed, as the machine mistakes the tail for a teat. See: Buza, "Should You be Tail Docking on Your Dairy Farm?"

CHAPTER TWO: AUTHENTICITY

1: Introduction

This discussion concerning the dairy industry's failure in fulfilling moral and humane standards for the treatment of their animals is particularly striking when juxtaposed with Heidegger's understanding of society's influence on the choices we make. His interpretation of authenticity allows us the opportunity to sift through and discover the morally reprehensible problems that constitute our everyday activities in "going along with the flow." Authenticity brings out what Charles Guignon calls the "Janus-faced" properties of the world and its everydayness[87]: society in this case urges us to respect the mother-child bond, causing us grief when we see it disrespected. At the same time, we are told to nourish ourselves with milk, and in being representative of this bond, we fail to question it and other dairy products' true origin. Instead, we trust what we are told or what we see in the media (and as I have shown, these images do not depict reality). Simply put, Heideggerian philosophy and his notion of authenticity allows us to see how we live double lives, in a sense, without questioning or noticing it: if we knew what happened to the animals (and their by-products) we consume, we would probably not want to have a hand in it. As I have discussed, the truth of the lives of cows is that they are stripped of the possibility to live according to their nature. In reaction, we ought to take it upon ourselves to limit, in any way we can, the perpetuation of this backward practice. In order to help ameliorate suffering, we should strive to be authentic in aligning our beliefs about the welfare of these animals with our actions that perpetuate the industry's poor standards. In doing so, we can continue to educate ourselves about dairy; find out which dairies treat their cows well; make changes in our choice of dairy products at the store, in restaurants, markets, etc.; urge our

legislators to push for better welfare standards; or engage with others about the facts of the dairy industry. In sum, the goal is to ultimately take it upon ourselves to be responsible for the suffering we may cause, and in finding that we might contribute to reprehensible practices, we ought to do our best to lessen our negative impact on these animals' lives.

1.1: Why we go unchallenged

We have all gone largely unchallenged when ordering a cheap, towering ice cream cone at Dairy Queen, buying toiletries or pharmaceuticals that contain animal products or contain ingredients that have been tested on animals, or attending and thus supporting a county fair where performing elephants have suffered most of their lives in cages. Why, then, do we nearly literally get away with "murder" if the evidence suggests that change is needed?

There are many potentially viable answers to this question of why our morally reprehensible, contributory actions fly under morality's radar. Commercials portray cows as being raised on pastures, tricking us into thinking we are buying "good cheese" from "happy cows."[88] There is a good argument for placing blame on companies that falsify or slightly twist information for potential profitability. There is also a good argument blaming the United States government's lack of legislative regulation on dairy and meat industries, as well as a damning argument concerning university funding for research that inflicts unspeakable injuries on animals, recklessly putting the goals of science over principles of ethics.[89]

However, the reality is that the truth about what goes on "behind the scenes" is quite easy to access in our technologically-driven age, and some of the power needed to make changes in the industry is gained almost as simply as changing what ends up in our carts in the supermarket. As the consumers of dairy products (as well as meat, pharmaceuticals, etc.) we have a personal barrier to overcome in order to understand and make changes that we know would contribute to

minimizing animal suffering. That barrier involves being responsible for our behavior and taking ownership of our actions. Unfortunately, we often fail at doing so. I describe this failure as the "inauthenticity problem."

1.2: The inauthenticity problem

The inauthenticity problem is not as simple as an argument that blames a faceless collective for reprehensible action against animals; it is much more: inauthenticity is both descriptive and prescriptive in that it accurately characterizes the phenomenon of individuals failing to act morally and responsibly, and also offers how one ought to go about becoming a meaningfully moral[90] person. Understanding authenticity can lead us to make meaningful changes in our moral framework, thereby extending our moral efforts toward ameliorating animal suffering. Importantly, I only want to capture a certain aspect of Martin Heidegger's concept of inauthenticity; I do not want to suggest that realizing authenticity with *sole* regard to animal treatment will alter every aspect of our moral lives.[91] Rather, I suggest that we can apply Heidegger's concept of authenticity to the individual's awareness that she must come to terms with, specifically, her individual contribution to animal suffering. I clarify and explain this phenomenon throughout this and the following chapter.

First, I will briefly discuss colloquial or pseudo-philosophical variations of the concept, followed by its philosophical and Heideggerian connotations. Then, introducing Heidegger's project of *Being and Time* and exploring the phenomenological account of "Dasein" will allow me to describe how his notions of existence and authenticity correctly reflect the current phenomenon of humans' excessive contributions to animal suffering. I will also describe the so-called "process" of authenticity and how one can kick-start the transformation toward authenticity and "create" oneself (one's identity, role, values, etc.). Consequently, this will allow

me to illustrate the moral benefits of understanding Dasein's relation to the world and to time. Then, I will discuss authenticity's relation to morality and the specific values with which I am concerned here, including the tacit approval and subsequent contribution of dairy cow and calf suffering. In sum, I will have shown how Heidegger's notion of authenticity can help to achieve the individual's goal of minimizing animal suffering. In doing so, I will also show that despite authenticity seeming philosophically painstaking, it is in fact a quite accessible notion that need not require self-flagellation or an intense philosophical (re)education. Discussing authenticity and framing this moral problem in this way allows me to bring the long-overdue attention to the *individual's* contribution to the perpetuation of animal use in arenas such as the dairy industry. The ultimate goal in solving this problem is offering a new way to look at ourselves—either as inauthentic or authentic individuals—which in turn will help us learn how we can make and sustain making the right choices concerning how we utilize animals.

1.3: Understanding and framing the problem correctly

The moral problem that I have presented is best illustrated through Heidegger's understanding of human existence and our relation to others. Heidegger describes us as individuals who act as part of a "great mass." The heart of this illustration concerns the bedrock notion that the inauthentic self, referred to as the "Self of everyday Dasein," the "they-self," or the self that *belongs* to the "they," is different from the authentic Self. Inauthentic Dasein belongs to, or is owned by, the "they" as opposed to belonging to itself or owning itself.

But understanding what Heidegger means by these terms and phrases is difficult given his mutated usages of various conceptions, some of which are so elementary (e.g., "they," "self," "belong," etc.) that they carry with them innumerable connotations we might find difficult to shake. Just in terms of the core concept in this essay—authenticity—there are dozens of ways of

characterizing it and its opposite, inauthenticity. Before completing a descriptive account of what Heidegger means by authenticity, it is helpful to briefly take it out of its context, and understand what it does *not* mean.

2: Conceptions of authenticity

Throughout history, authenticity or the quality of being "authentic" has varied from conceptions concerning, for example: truth, genuineness, autonomy, and things or persons being "real" or original. A sculpture can be the authentic work of an artist in the sense that the artist truly did produce that sculpture, and that she did not copy others' ideas in creating the sculpture—it was her own, authentic, original idea. I can be genuinely sorry to my partner for inappropriately yelling at him, or I can lie about being sorry, and give an *in*authentic, "phony" apology.

Popular psychological[92] understandings of the concept of authenticity often concern becoming "a better you" or doing some "soul-searching" in order to improve oneself, often with the ultimate goal of being happier. These romantic and popularized notions undermine the robust philosophical underpinnings of authenticity, and make it seem as though one can become authentic in a matter of a few easy steps. Here, authenticity is reduced to a hedonistic interpretation that, as I will show, denies one the much more meaningful results of observing the philosophically-driven notion of authenticity, especially that of Heidegger. In fact, striving to achieve these pop-psychological or pseudo-philosophical variations of authenticity can drive one in the opposite direction, leading one to reassure oneself of one's primitive or restrictive cultural or religious virtues, instead of cultivating potentially different, better virtues. For example, a Christian self-improvement regimen might maintain that one should seek tolerance of, for instance, Hindu or Islamic beliefs, when in fact tolerance should perhaps be seen as something

that opposes meaningful, genuine acceptance and appreciation for others' beliefs. Or, on the other hand, a guidebook on how to be a better, more authentic mother or wife might lead one into reaffirming stereotypical expectations of women's emasculated roles at home.

Alternatively, authenticity is also popular as a buzz-word for accepting,[93] forgiving, and loving oneself, or letting go of one's ego, and finding one's "true" or "core" self.[94] This interpretation of authenticity can lead to a dead-end: it puts one on a wild goose chase for a "substantial, fixed, enduring self that underlies the shifting desires, modes, relations, and involvements that make up a person's life . . . [and all one finds is] a centerless swirl of transient relationships and events with nothing to hold them together."[95] Seekers of this interpretation of authenticity likely become confused and at a loss, perhaps unable to realize that they are looking for something that isn't really there.

Furthermore, these ideals of authenticity that have been popularized by the media (books, magazines, websites) capture neither the obvious nor the subtle benefits of taking a more philosophical approach. As opposed to popular psychological modes of "authenticity," philosophical accounts of authenticity can properly incorporate and help to explain issues in ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology, e.g., moral responsibility, belief justification, decision-making, etc. Unlike psychological and pop-cultural notions of authenticity, a proper philosophical understanding of authenticity allows us to explore metaphysical, ethical, and epistemological justifications for various beliefs because of the inherent interconnectedness and interdependence of philosophical schools. Indeed, this interconnectedness raises many puzzles for authenticity's[96] relationship with these fields of philosophy, and though they are outside the scope of my concerns here, they are nonetheless important and worthy of more discussion.

3: Heidegger's authenticity

The notion of authenticity is best understood in the context of Heidegger's general project of "Being."[97] Heidegger saw Being as constituting an elusive issue, in part due to the normalcy with which we speak of Being (e.g., how we *are*, where a thing *is*, who I *am*, etc.). In other words, its meaning has become obscure due to its everyday usage, or its everydayness.[98] Discussing authenticity in particular requires this concurrent evaluation of Being and society and a close look into the actions of the *individual within society*, otherwise known as Dasein,[99] and also what Heidegger refers to as a *being-in-the-world*.

As I previewed, the main idea is that the inauthentic self, referred to as the "Self of everyday Dasein," differs from the authentic Self, the "Self which has been taken hold of in its own way[.]"[100] This inauthentic Self of everyday Dasein is caught up in what Heidegger calls "everydayness"; he acts like and takes on the habits of others, so much so that he becomes essentially indistinguishable from those next to him (referred to as "Others"); in other words, individuals can no longer be distinguished from the crowd and everyone is essentially one and the same:

> In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own Dasein completely into a kind of Being of "the Others," in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the "great mass" as *they* shrink back; we find "shocking" what *they* find shocking. The "they," which is nothing definite, and which all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness.[101]

The result of "Dasein's lostness in the 'they,'" as described above, "has always kept Dasein from taking hold of [its] possibilities of Being . . . So Dasein make[s] no choices, gets carried along by the nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity."[102] In comprehending that the Self of

everyday Dasein behaves as a seemingly anonymous part of this mass, we might be able to see that in a possible transformation away from this Self, we could learn how to author our own lives.[103]

Heidegger also describes the inauthentic Self as one who is "fleeing" from the task of taking ownership of his own life[104]; in other words, his life *belongs to* the "they": he is controlled not by himself, but rather, by what society expects from him in terms of what norms he must follow and what roles[105] he must play as a being-in-the-world: in this way, " . . . Dasein is absorbed in the 'they' and is mastered by it."[106] But to change, we cannot simply escape others. We exist amongst other humans, and inextricably, we have a close relationship with the world. But as Professor Emeritus of the University of South Florida and Heideggerian scholar Charles B. Guignon explains, this same world fortunately does allow for possibilities of being. In this way, the they is "Janus-faced":

> On one hand, our participation in the "they" is an enabling condition that first opens us onto a world and gives us the resources we need for *being* human. From the outset, Dasein draws its . . . self-understanding . . . from the way things are interpreted by the "they." On the other hand, this involvement in public forms of life . . . restricts "the possible options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the respectable—that which is fitting and proper."[107] There is an inveterate tendency, then, to go along with the flow, content with "satisfying the easily handled rules and public norms of the "they," and thereby being disburdened of all "responsibility" for ourselves.[108]

In laying out these "possible options of choice" (which I discuss further throughout this and the final chapter) we have the pivotal to the seemingly trivial: whether or not we will partake in the institution of marriage, have children, or take on a forty-year career, and whether or not we will take the bus or the train, eat breakfast, or take a shower or a bath. Undertaking these modes of existence and making these various choices, we are able to *choose to choose* the route where either our choices are made for us—i.e., the route of inauthenticity, wherein we simply make unowned choices and default to doing what the "they" indicates we are supposed to do—or, we

can mindfully, meaningfully, and responsibly make those choices and take ownership for them as authentic individuals.

3.1: The process involved in authenticity (Heidegger's interpretation)

The general process of becoming authentic involves a few components. First I will describe what Heidegger understands as occurring when one makes a shift toward authentic being-in-the-world, and then I will describe my own take on what, generally, underlies this shift.

For Heidegger, it requires that one experiences anxiety, wherein Dasein is brought "face to face with the 'nothingness' of the possible impossibility of existence"[109]: "Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as '*solus ipse*,'"[110] or "alone" in the world, in the sense that Dasein exists only as an individual, as one's lone self, though not necessarily (emotionally) *lonely* in any way. Another component is the confrontation with our being-toward-death—this does not stem from a dismal, negative sense of death, but rather in the sense that "the roles we have been playing suddenly seem anonymous, and we are faced with the demand to own up to our lives"[111] because the only thing that is certain about our lives is that they will end. And, if we can face the fact that we are not only beings, but *finite* beings (beings-toward-death), "our lives will be transformed[;] one [can be] pulled back from . . . everydayness."[112] In other words, we will be pulled out of the "dictatorship" of the "they"; rather than belonging to the Other, we suddenly see that we—and our actions—belong to ourselves. Heidegger also indicates that our conscience is the apparatus that can disclose our possibilities of Being, allowing us to "see" ourselves[113] and therefore the ownership we have over our own lives.

3.2: The process involved in authenticity (my interpretation)

What is important here is to show that Heideggerian philosophy—which may very well be perceived as highfalutin and confusing for the average individual—can be expressed in more

ordinary language. Peeling away some of Heidegger's more esoteric vocabulary, we can relate to what is occurring in Dasein (in the individual): these moments of so-called "anxiety" or realizations of our "possibilities" essentially translate into experiencing being faced with indebtedness, responsibility, or guilt, or a combination thereof. This confrontation with an issue or problem can occur either passively, i.e., it just *happens to* us, or actively, i.e., we seek to learn about and evaluate ourselves or some issue.[114] When we confront an issue about life itself, or some aspect concerning our lives like a moral issue, a life-change such as becoming a parent or losing a family member, etc., there is an opportunity for authenticity. When we encounter these moments (or they encounter us), we may very well experience indebtedness (to ourselves and others), responsibility, or guilt; expressed in its most accessible and simple form: we may realize that we are falling short of what is possible for our selves.[115]

3.3: Inauthenticity and affected ignorance

We then have a choice to either strive toward an ideal, or to ignore or bury the notion; the latter is culpable. In other words, being faced with this option naturally opens the door to asking questions of right and wrong. That is, the nature of authenticity as a possibility of being opens it up to a discussion of blameworthiness; in being faced with the choice between authenticity and inauthenticity, we are inclined toward inauthenticity: the escape from having to take responsibility for ourselves:

> We throw ourselves into the turbulence of day-to-day chores and they-roles in order to avoid facing up to something we find threatening. What we are fleeing from in everydayness is . . . the fact that we are finite beings and that we are 'delivered over to ourselves' in the sense of being responsible for the task of making something of our lives . . . [W]e are forced to confront our own finitude.[116]

When we confront ourselves with this fact, we can either make something of our lives (in this sense of having a deep responsibility to do so) or be consumed by this aforementioned

"inveterate tendency" to "go along with the flow."[117] This choice can result in a forced forgetfulness of the option to be responsible and make something of our lives, which in turn gives rise to making careless and *unowned* (or *irresponsible* in Heidegger's sense) choices that can often affect others' welfare. We can see that there is tension between the inauthentic versus the authentic possibility of being; if we know that continuing on the inauthentic path as opposed to the authentic one results in causing harm, then in choosing to "go along with the flow" we are making a morally blameworthy meta-choice: we are choosing to choose the option that allows us to look the other way, to refuse to let ourselves see how our actions contribute to harming others—we are essentially fleeing, as described by Heidegger and Guignon.

This phenomenon is akin to a concept called affected ignorance. In her apropos article, "Affected Ignorance and Animal Suffering: Why Our Failure to Debate Factory Farming Puts Us at Moral Risk," Nancy Williams piercingly brings to light the culpability of this choice with particular regard to animal welfare. According to her, the general basis of affected ignorance involves the culpable "refusal to consider if a practice in which one participates is immoral."[118] This manifests in several ways, and is apparent in various realms. For example, Williams states:

> [P]eople admittedly avoid knowing the details of how their meat is produced. Most say, in effect, "If you know, please don't tell me. I don't want to hear the details because it would be too upsetting and would ruin my appetite." Knowledge about factory farming systems and animal suffering is knowledge most people do not want to have. We do not want to see or hear about what transpires on most hog or chicken farms for we have a suspicion that this kind of information will be wrenching and interfere with human pleasure and privilege.[119]

This example is particularly helpful in that it illustrates a failure of responsibility on the consumer's part, showing that one has reached a fork in the particular road concerning animal welfare. Whereas the "societal tensions should propel one's imagination and moral curiosity into the realities of [animal welfare] . . . ironically, it is these sorts of experiences that precipitate

affected ignorance."[120] I take this phenomenon to be a particular indicator of inauthenticity that exemplifies how we passively allow nearly ten billion agricultural animals annually and 9.2 million dairy cows specifically to endure intense suffering and pain.

In sum, in revealing the differences between authentic and inauthentic Dasein, Heidegger brings to light a quite troubling aspect of our lived lives: that in this inauthentic, "fallen" existence, marked by the loss of the Self, we essentially do what everyone else does, not only without questioning these everyday actions, norms, or traditions, but also with particular, forced disregard for and ignorance about what might actually be happening behind the scenes. In this sense, inauthenticity even " . . .becomes a way of life protected by custom if not by law."[121] This phenomenon has innumerable consequences, one of which is that as part of this "great mass," we may perform actions and make choices that are morally reprehensible[122]; however, they are disguised by the "they" as such because they constitute "going through the motions" of our everyday lives.[123] The key now is to understand that there is an opportunity in which one can shift away from the "they," and take ownership for her actions.

Whether we undergo Heideggerian anxiety, or have moments of realization that spark change (such as in the latter experience that I have described) it is a step toward transforming into being authentic individuals. As Heidegger says, in undergoing this shift one is presented with "the ability to live with a clear-sighted grasp of the temporal continuity and future-directedness" of one's own life.[124] In other words, such a transformation allows us to be able to understand, in a new way, the way we relate to the world and to ourselves, as well as the way we understand and undertake our own commitments. In turn, this transformation has numerous implications for how we understand the moral elements in our lives, in particular, our responsibility.

What *authentic* Dasein understands is that the choices she makes belong to, and are made by, herself: she takes ownership of her decisions and actions, and is responsible for them (an idea fully fleshed out in chapter three), understanding that all of her actions contribute to her being a *certain sort of person*. "It is only through the authentic Self that one can discover which values matter, cultivate them in a meaningful way, act upon them and commit to them, thus adding purpose and meaning to the events that constitute her narrative."[125] She realizes that she not only has the ability to *choose* to choose[126] a way of being, but can also choose from a variety of *possibilities* who she wants to be. In shedding light on what Heidegger means by "possibilities," it is important to grasp his conception of temporality, and the benefits of this understanding: purposiveness and unity.

3.4: Temporality

Essentially, Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* was to show how "being *is* time."[127] In particular, the meaning of being is revealed to be "primordial time."[128] Primordial time is Heidegger's understanding of time as past, present, and future in *relation* to Dasein: it is the characterization of time as a "bringing forth of having-been-ness" in a present moment that is projected toward the future. Indeed, primordial time is best understood as a view of time in opposition to the understanding of time characterized by an "endless series of now points" that one watches "flowing by."[129] Instead, Heidegger's view of time is constituted not only by one looking toward the future, but also tying in the elements of the past and present, which in turn contributes to its representation as an "unfolding" story. In very simple terms, Dasein ultimately sees its life temporally as a possibility of a number of things, but, like a story that ends, its utmost possibility is that of death; and, *not* in a negative sense, Dasein is always projecting or envisioning his life toward the possibility of its end.[130]

In understanding his being as an array of possibilities (one of those being certain death), Dasein is able grasp his future and take control of the present, and make it his own.[131] In doing so, he becomes authentic. In other words, "If our being is finite, then an authentic human life can only be found by confronting finitude and trying to make a meaning out of the fact of our death."[132] In grasping this possibility of death and finitude, Dasein can understand his life as an "unfolding" and can feel the weight of the importance of committing to being the kind of person he wants to be over time. In doing so, he is making the most of his projects, and taking responsibility for his actions.[133] On the contrary, inauthentic Dasein is one who does not confront these possibilities, does not grasp ownership of his life, and does not see that he is responsible for making the most of the possibilities of life.

3.4.1: Temporality gives rise to purposiveness and unity

Also critical to note now is that the temporal component of Dasein highlights the characteristic of *purposiveness* for the individual striving to be authentic.[134] This aspect is crucial because without feeling a purpose for ourselves (i.e., that we are always reaching toward fulfilling our life projects) we may begin to feel disconnected or alienated from our actions. If our actions ultimately had no purpose, we might lose the connection to living *for* a reason. Without purpose, we might also see our lives as absurd, nihilistic, or amoral; as if morality were a smoke screen, hiding the chilling reality that "nothing mattered."[135]

Furthermore, having purpose in one's life gives an individual a goal or commitment to what "sort" of person she will be. For instance, a civil rights activist chooses various actions out of a spectrum of possible actions that particularly represent her commitment. That is, she will habitually perform actions that mold her into the sort of person she understands a civil rights activist to be[136] (e.g., lead a protest, start a petition, lobby Congress) rather than habitually

perform those actions that oppose or impede fulfilling that vision (e.g., steal a car, go on a bender, or learn to play a Rachmaninoff concerto).[137]

Apart from purposiveness, the other notion critical to the temporal component of Dasein is unity: "Temporality makes possible the unity of existence."[138] Even though Heidegger primarily characterizes Dasein as existing as a "being-toward" the future, this is not to say that Dasein lacks a unified, cumulative characteristic.[139] In other words, living *for* something involves not merely our future actions, but also everything we have done, are doing, and will do[140] (this also meshes with Heidegger's understanding of primordial time as past, present, and future in the context of the possibility of death).[141] Without these components, the notion of a "narrative" or "authoring" of one's life is lost, as is the cumulative temporal aspect of Dasein. One cannot make sense of an action out of context; for example, the act of stealing a candy bar does not suffice to reveal much about a person's life narrative. That is, we cannot derive a full, unified picture without surrounding actions or experiences in the individual's timeline.[142]

The concept of unity or cumulativeness is fundamental to understanding Dasein—especially in an ethical context—because it highlights the important notion that "everything we do contributes to making us people of a particular sort"[143]—an idea which only authentic Dasein has grasped. Equally notable, and also in opposition to aforementioned pop-psychological understandings of authenticity, is the idea that one may always *radically* change the course of her life: she is not tethered to her narrative in the sense that she cannot change the way she acts and to what kind of character her actions contribute; rather, one can reevaluate, modify, or reconstruct her purpose and goals if she so desires (take, for example, Malcolm X, who was imprisoned for burglary and later became a human rights activist and American Muslim minister).[144] More apropos is the former cattle rancher who became vegan and transformed her

ranch into a sanctuary, and began literally serenading her cattle in lieu of sending them off to slaughter.[145] These experiences, viewed as a totality, emerge to form a unified picture of an individual's life.

These temporal components of Dasein, purposiveness and unity, allow us to understand how one's actions directly reflect the "kind" of person she wants to be.[146] The crucial element of this is that what one does *matters* because her actions represent the kind of person she is and wants to be over time—i.e., throughout her life narrative: "One '*is*' what one does."[147] We can also see that, as a whole and over time, the values that one holds ought to be reflected in his or her actions (when applicable).[148]

3.5: "Creation" of the self

Importantly, one of the upshots to this understanding of Dasein's temporality and authenticity in the social or community context is that instead of viewing society as a burden or a constraint, society is a *reference* that offers "patterns of action," a multitude of idols,[149] and any other materials one needs in order to try her best to live *her own*[150] life well.

Thus, the authentic individual does not create her *self* from scratch; rather, being entrenched in the social context is what gives her the details of her own life "plot" (much like the details of a narrative). That is to say, being in society supplies her with the "stock of roles, lifestyles, and character traits" from which she can create her potential life story. For Heidegger, the temporality that is our existence illustrates that "we are essentially historical: we are members of a community that continually draws on its heritage in order to work out its destiny"—an interpretation that reflects Heidegger's notion of "primordial time" mentioned earlier, that runs in opposition to the "superficial interpretation of time as a neutral timeline"—the interpretation of time as merely a series of instants or *now*s.[151]

Moreover, this interpretation of Heidegger's account recognizes the requirements of everyday motions (such as dropping our children off at school, making dinner for our family, brushing our teeth, etc.). In this sense, "authenticity is not about being isolated from others," or being alienated from some requirements of living, "but rather about finding a different way of relating to others such that one is not lost to the they-self."[152] That is, one can find a balance between the authentic Self and potential isolation or alienation that threatens living authentically (an idea I flesh out in my discussion at the end of the following chapter).

87. Guignon, Charles B. "Authenticity, moral values, and psychotherapy." *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, Second Edition*. Ed. Charles B. Guignon. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 279. Print.

88. See: Weise, Elizabeth. "PETA: 'Happy cows' ad is a lie." *USA Today*. 12 Dec. 2002. Web. 21 Dec. 2014. <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2002-12-11-happy-cows_x.htm>.

89. See: Rollin, Bernard. *Science and Ethics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Print.

90. Later on, I describe the important precedence a "moral authentic" person has over the "moral inauthentic" person; essentially, an act cannot be meaningfully moral if it originates from an inauthentic agent; that is, it constitutes the foundation for the possibility of being a moral agent in any *meaningful* sense at all. See endnotes 162 and 163 in chapter three.

91. However, this shift could very well serve as a stepping stone in a much larger personal transformation.

92. Wood, Alex M., Alex P. Linley, John Maltby, Michael Baliousis, and Stephen Joseph. "The Authentic Personality: A Theoretical and Empirical Conceptualization and the Development of the Authenticity Scale." *Journal of Counseling Psychology* 55.3 (2008): 385-99. Web. 8 Aug. 2015.

93. Patel, Tejal. "Becoming More Authentic: Accept Yourself and Stop Seeking Approval." *Tiny Buddha*. n. d. Web. 10 Aug. 2015. <http://tinybuddha.com/blog/becoming-more-authentic-accept-yourself-and-stop-seeking-approval/>.

94. Gleaton, Valerie. "5 Ways to Live an Authentic Life." *Gaiam Life*. 25 April 2013. Web. 10 Aug. 2015. <http://life.gaiam.com/article/5-ways-live-authentic-life>.

95. Guignon, Charles B. *On Being Authentic*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2004. 126. Print.

96. Of course, it raises the whole of phenomenology's relationship to those areas of philosophy. For a good discussion on the "how and why" of moral phenomenology, see: Kriegel, Uriah. "Moral phenomenology: Foundational issues." *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 7.1 (2008): 1-19. Web. 4 June 2015.

97. In keeping with Heidegger's style, I will also capitalize "Being" as such.

98. As Heidegger says, the notion and the question of Being is "obscure and lacks direction." See: *Being and Time*. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 2008. 21-24. Print.

99. Unlike Dasein's literal translation as "existence," "being," or "presence," Heidegger's project was to show how Dasein exists *in the world*, because Dasein cannot be conveniently plucked from society in order to be observed. More simply, Dasein must be understood in its context.

100. Heidegger 166-67.

101. Heidegger 164.

102. Heidegger 312-13.

103. Heidegger 312-13.

104. Heidegger 229.

105. Heidegger 210.

106. Heidegger 210.

107. Heidegger 239.

108. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 279; Heidegger 334.

109. Heidegger 310.

110. Heidegger 233.

111. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 282.

112. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 282.

113. Heidegger 313-14.

114. This notion varies from Heidegger's "process" in that Heidegger takes a more passive route: our conscience knocks on its own door, as it were; but this notion is too mysterious. I prefer the way I have characterized it here.

115. Guignon, Charles B. "Becoming a Self: The Role of Authenticity in *Being and Time*." *The Existentialists: Critical Essays on Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre*. Ed. Charles B. Guignon. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004. 124. Print.

116. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 282.

117. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 279; Heidegger 334.

118. Williams, Nancy M. "Affected Ignorance and Factory Farming: Why our Failure to Debate Factory Farming Puts Us at Moral Risk." *Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics* 21.4 (2008): 371-73. Web. 11 July 2013.

119. Williams 377.

120. Williams 377.

121. McGrath, Sean J. *Heidegger: A (Very) Critical Introduction*. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2008. 43. Print.

122. As I have brought to light in chapter one and have just described, one of the most dire consequences of this everyday life is the mass utilization and exploitation of animals, which I will link to authenticity more plainly in chapter three.

123. In a way, "[i]t remains indefinite who has 'really' [made these choices.]" Heidegger 312.

124. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 282.

125. Heidegger 312-13. As Jacob Golomb has indicated, "[O]nly Being-towards-death can be *fully* meaningful and authentic." *In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus*. New York: Routledge, 1995. 107. Print.

126. Heidegger 314.

127. See also: Wolfreys, Julian. *Modern European Criticism and Theory: A Critical Guide*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006. 132-33. Print. Emphasis added.

128. As Simon Critchley says: "[When] I project towards the future . . . what comes out of the future is my past, my personal and cultural baggage[.] But this does not mean that I am somehow condemned to my past. On the contrary, I can make a decision to take over the fact of who I am in a free action . . . This brings us to the present. For Heidegger, the present is not some endless series of now points that I watch flowing by. Rather, the present is something that I can seize hold of and resolutely make my own. What is opened in the anticipation of the future is the fact of our having-been which releases itself into the present moment of action." See: "Heidegger's *Being and Time*, part 8: Temporality." *The Guardian*. 27 July 2009. Web. 10 June 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/27/heidegger-being-time-philosophy>.

129. Critchley, "Temporality."

130. Critchley, "Temporality."

131. Critchley, “Temporality.”

132. Critchley, Simon. “*Being and Time* part 6: Death.” *The Guardian*. 13 July 2009. Web. 7 June 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2009/jul/13/heidegger-being-time>.

133. See endnote 128.

134. Guignon, “Authenticity, moral values.” 278.

135. There is a large metaethical discussion to be had here but it is outside the scope of this essay.

136. Indeed, having an idol, hero, or general cultural archetype is helpful. Though this notion may seem somewhat confused in the sense that one might look up to someone *in society* (i.e., the they), this worry is dismissed by the simple fact that there are authentic people who represent a break in the norm (who are “diamonds in the rough,” as it were). Guignon, “Authenticity, moral values.” 279-80.

137. In performing these actions, she is “becoming what [she is].” See: Guignon, “Authenticity, moral values.” 283; Heidegger 186.

138. Heidegger 376 and 378; Guignon, “Authenticity, moral values.” 287.

139. Guignon, “Authenticity, moral values.” 287; Heidegger 378.

140. Guignon, “Authenticity, moral values.” 278.

141. Critchley, “Temporality.”

142. Guignon, “Authenticity, moral values.” 278.

143. Guignon, “Authenticity, moral values.” 278

144. Guignon, “Authenticity, moral values.” 278; X, Malcolm, and Alex Haley. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. New York, NY: Ballantine, 1992. Print.

145. Solomon, Ari. “Texas Cattle Rancher Goes Vegan, Turns Ranch Into Sanctuary.” *Mercy for Animals Blog*. 22 May 2015. Web. 10 Aug. 2015. <http://www.mfablog.org/texas-cattle-rancher-goes-vegan-opens-farmed>.

146. One’s *performed* actions are a necessary but not a sufficient condition in determining the “kind of person” one is; one’s unspoken thoughts, feelings, desires, etc. also play an important part in determining the sort of person one might be. See Guignon, “Authenticity, moral values.” 277.

147. Heidegger 283.

148. That is to say, the action of writing down a telephone number is indeed an action, but if anything, very distantly hinges on moral values. Here, the actions that *do* hinge on ethical values are generally much more substantial in reflecting a person's specific character (e.g., if she spanks her children, whether or not she habitually lies, or if she performs painful experiments on animals, etc).

149. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 287-88.

150. "[H]er own" is italicized because this phrasing would otherwise be glossed over. However, these two words ought to be given importance because this is the heart of authenticity showing through: the authentic person is one who *owns* her life.

151. Polt, Richard F. H. "Introduction." *Heidegger's Being and Time: Critical Essays*. Ed. Richard Polt. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005. 3-4. Print.

152. Wheeler, Michael. "Martin Heidegger." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 12 Oct. 2011. Web. 17 Dec. 2013 <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/#Div1>.

CHAPTER THREE: AUTHENTICITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND ANIMAL ETHICS

1: Introduction

One of the most beneficial aspects of Dasein's social embeddedness is that contextualizing it as such opens the door to understanding authenticity's relationship to ethics. In fact, authenticity and ethics are closely intertwined, for an individual's beliefs are often reflected in his actions. As Mark A. Wrathall indicates in his article, "'Demanding Authenticity of Ourselves': Heidegger on Authenticity as an Extra-Moral Ideal," morality is indeed a domain for authenticity: "[A]uthenticity . . . *contributes to*, and is relevant to, moral distinctions[.] Whenever it matters to a domain that actions performed in that domain express the self, then the authenticity . . . of the agent will be relevant to that domain."[153] And as such, authenticity is indeed relevant to the domain of animal welfare.

2: Authenticity, responsibility, and our role in animal welfare

As I have previewed, inauthentic Dasein exists in a state that Heidegger refers to as being "lost in the they"—we act, eat, groom, socialize, think, fear, work, laugh, cry, etc., just as everyone else does. But the most crucial occurrence in being absorbed in this everydayness is our failure to question our actions or reflect upon whether or not we would be ready to stand for, own up to, or justify our actions. For my purposes here, I show that inauthentic Dasein fails to assess whether or not she is contributing to the suffering of those beings around her, just like the next individual fails to do so as well. Rather, she simply sticks to the everyday motions, which include eating certain foods like dairy products and meat, washing her hair and body, getting dressed, doing her makeup, buying clothes and a slew of other products, etc. In these normal, everyday actions (that are *expected* of her and *enforced* by us to the extent that if she failed to

perform them normally, she would be outcast to some degree) there lurks the gross abuse of animals.

In the United States, for instance, the mere 3.2 percent of vegetarians[154] have historically been questioned by meat-eaters about their practices as if they were aliens from another planet, and male vegetarians, especially, are mocked for their lack of "manliness" for eating a salad rather than a slab of steak. One in four Americans consume some type of fast food everyday,[155] and with nearly ten billion animals[156] caught up in the factory farming system, that comes out to thirty confined animals per human per year. Throughout the course of these everyday actions, inauthentic Dasein does not consider the fact that "we are what we make of ourselves in the course of living out our active lives."[157]

This is where Heidegger's sense of responsibility and a more purely ethical sense of responsibility meet. In fact, a particularly significant feature of Heidegger's authenticity is that it makes possible the opportunity for these conceptions of responsibility.[158] In Heidegger's sense of the word, responsibility—which stems from the transition from inauthenticity toward authenticity—is a personal phenomenon that requires Dasein to own up to its role as a social agent.[159] In way, this process results in a sort of existential and moral wake-up call, as it were, that allows us to face issues of ownership and responsibility for our actions. For Heidegger, though, responsibility does not merely involve moral responsibility; it also involves an "indebtedness"[160] to oneself in that Dasein owes itself *its own* life. For Heidegger, responsibility is a fundamental component of authentic Dasein, and moreover, it is only through authenticity that one can be meaningfully responsible[161]; otherwise, Dasein's responsibility is not truly *owned* if it ostensibly "belongs" to inauthentic Dasein. In this sense, authenticity can, and should, "be regarded as a[n] 'executive virtue'[162] that provides the condition for the possibility of being a

moral agent in any meaningful sense whatsoever."[163] In other words, authenticity can be regarded as a necessary condition for providing the foundation that is required to be a moral agent. Another way of expressing Heidegger's interpretation of *schuld* as responsibility is a sort of guilt that ensues when we fail to live up to our *selves*; when we fail to allow ourselves to flourish at our full capacity, moral and otherwise.

2.1: The application of responsibility to animal ethics

In viewing responsibility in these ways, we can fully and meaningfully recognize that *we are the reason* that millions of dairy cows suffer needlessly, and much of it is due to our failure to live up to our commitments. The inauthentic both passively and actively divorce their actions from their beliefs: instead of owning their actions, they skirt their commitments and responsibilities and instead "go with the flow"—but what is really happening is that they are failing "to realize that what [they] are doing at this moment just *is* realizing the goals of living"; the things that we do—constantly—make us who we are.[164] And if we carry on our business as usual, then *we are* major contributors to reprehensible physiological and emotional suffering. Fortunately, one of the most important potential effects of understanding this interpretation of inauthenticity is that it allows us the ability to grasp the fact that right now, we can focus in on ourselves and come to the realization that we are failing at fulfilling our potentials (referred to earlier as "falling short"[165] of what we could possibly be); or likewise, in keeping with Heidegger's focus on finitude, we see that in the future we may look back only to see that we failed at fulfilling our potential, that we could have done more, that we let ourselves down.[166]

We should also come to grasp (and grapple with) the notion that "[w]e are what we make of ourselves in the course of living out our active lives"[167] and that *any* action has an impact on being the kind of person one wants to be.[168] At the same time, it would be challenging to find an

individual who actively wants to be the kind of person who causes unnecessary suffering or would actively desire to see a mother and her calf separated for life.[169] Even inauthentic people may even already hold the ethical beliefs and have the tools in order to make animals' lives better, but as such (i.e., as inauthentic individuals) they fail to apply their moral standards to the treatment of animals or fail to act according to their beliefs. Simply, there often exists a disparity between one's actions and one's beliefs. As Rollin states, most people do not *want* to cause harm, or go out of their way in order to contribute to suffering, but, "if animals must be brought under the umbrella of moral concern and deliberation, the comfortable sense of right and wrong is no longer tenable, and we can no longer eat, sleep, and work in the same untroubled way,"[170] and this proves to many to be too difficult a challenge to face valiantly. However, as I argue, authenticity can help us face that challenge.

2.2: How do we work toward becoming authentic?

As I have shown, authenticity is a transformative event that requires a process of deliberate decision-making regarding one's values and reflection upon which actions she thinks will best contribute to those values and goals.[171] When one attempts to evaluate herself regarding these notions, a value that ought to arise must concern the welfare of others; it is an inescapable facet of lived human life that we encounter everyday. Hence, her actions must demonstrate careful consideration of how she affects other beings capable of suffering. This means that she actively questions how she may be harming others, learning more about the ways she may be contributing to harm or suffering in a range of ways, and begin the process of phasing out, or altogether stopping, the actions that contribute to her harming of others.[172] In keeping with some of Heidegger's vocabulary, Guignon describes a similar process:

> If we can take a stand on our being-toward-death, our lives will be transformed . . . The result is the ability to live with a clear-sighted grasp of the temporal continuity

> and future-directedness of own's own [life]. This lucidity leads to a way of living we might call "self-focusing" . . . Such directedness . . . brings about a change in the way we relate to . . . our being as projections into the future. We take over . . . [with a] decisive dedication to what we want to accomplish for our lives. And our stance toward the future is that of . . . a clear-sighted and unwavering commitment to those overriding aims taken as definitive of one's existence as a whole. Authentic self-focusing, understood as a resolute reaching forward into a finite range of possibilities, gives coherence, cohesiveness, and integrity to a life course . . . and makes possible personal identity . . . .[173]

This transformation allows us to open the door to meaningful[174] changes with regard to the way we see and treat ourselves and others. And if the individual is successful in adhering to her moral commitments, including those that decrease her contribution to the suffering of animals, she is moving in the right direction. Of course this involves steadfastness in one's goals, which in and of itself is difficult, but authentic Dasein is fundamentally aware of her own pitfalls and weaknesses, and is in the best position to be able to fine-tune her actions in order to better strive toward reaching her goals. When she fails, she takes note of her failure, and tries harder next time; she can ultimately learn about herself from her mistakes. It is quite positively a mark of dedication.

3: Ethical guidance/the constitution of our moral beliefs

There is of course the question concerning *which* values we ought to hold; Heidegger does not supply us with particular prescriptions concerning the constitution of moral beliefs, and moreover, merely because Dasein possesses the *capability* to meaningfully recognize moral values does not guarantee that the "correct" traits, characteristics, or moral virtues might strike a chord in an individual. In this case, there is a worry about which values she might idolize.

As Guignon states in *On Being Authentic*, just in case someone has developed her sense of self, the kind of person she wants to be, does not automatically entitle her to being authentic. For example, if Hannah's commitment in her life is being an illegal drug smuggler, and she

devotes her life to developing the character traits that go along with that lifestyle, we might balk at the idea of calling her authentic. In other words, "[t]he fact that we hesitate to apply the term 'authentic' in [this case and cases like it] indicates that what is crucial about authenticity is not just the intensity of the commitment and fervor of the expression it carries with it, but the nature of the *content* of the commitment as well."[175] Additionally, those individuals who are authentic—i.e., responsible in the sense that they recognize that they owe themselves an owned life that is constituted by commitments to a life project—might see those *inauthentic* individuals as "letting down"[176] both themselves and also those who are authentic. Authentic Dasein also comes to see commitments and moral values as priorities, unlike those who make trivial commitments their priorities (e.g., finding the perfect shade of eyeshadow for every day of the week, or spending months trying to decide which sports car to buy). Though these commitments and values are many and varied, it does not follow that we cannot outline at least a few of the most basic values that are necessary to being truly authentic. In fact, we don't have to go very far to see which values we should adopt or keep.

Like the aforementioned "stock" of roles and traits through which one creates herself, authentic Dasein herself can choose, too, the models, exemplars, and ethical values that appear throughout history to craft her ethics. For Heidegger, authentic Dasein "can take itself over . . . by repeating," or in other words, by drawing on historical possibilities of being—i.e., idols or heroes—in making its life its own.[177] Interestingly, Heidegger uses the word "revere," showing that despite inauthenticity's reign, he respects history for its possibilities of existence: "Where inauthentic Dasein just drifts along with the latest trends," in looking to history, "authentic Dasein '*remembers*' its rootedness in the wider unfolding of its culture, and it experiences life as indebted to . . . a shared history."[178]

In turn, as Guignon states, this embeddedness in a shared history readily promotes a morality that highly regards the characteristics that allow for the continued success of the community, such as "fairness, honesty, dignity, benevolence, achievement, and so on."[179] In partnership with critical thinking, these values, among several others like discipline, empathy, and self-control, can help us greatly when considering, for instance, how we personally affect the welfare of the millions of cows caught up in the dairy industry. And though it is not pertinent now to explain and defend *all* the values we ought to hold, it is my job to both defend why animal welfare in particular deserves a definite place in our moral purview (which I have done in chapter one), and to show how it can fit into Heidegger's model of authenticity.

4: Heidegger, Rollin, and animal ethics

Concerns about animal welfare fit neatly into Heidegger's framework. In particular, what animal ethicist Bernard Rollin brings to light throughout his body of work is that ethics concerning animal welfare need not be elusive or mystical notions; instead, they are within our reach: recalling Plato, Rollin argues that what is often the obstacle toward effecting change regarding animal treatment is simply a matter of "reminding" people of values that they *already* hold: "Plato taught us a very valuable lesson about effecting ethical change. If one wishes to change another person's—or society's—ethical beliefs, it is much better to remind than to teach."[180] In other words, we have seen that certain values prevail through time (e.g., as in the fight for equality and human rights). Rollin argues that moral values do not arise *ex nihilo*, rather, new "moral categories" are created from pre-existing ethical tenets: "recall that western society has one through almost fifty years of extending its moral categories for *humans* to people who were morally ignored or invisible—women, minorities, the handicapped, children, citizens of the third world."[181] Furthermore, Rollin states, "in Plato's beautiful metaphor, the philosopher

helps you to recollect, to draw from inside of you in a clear way what you don't realize is there."[182] In our case, the crucial point here is how Rollin applies this notion to animal treatment, stating that it is a natural move "to continue [to] attempt to extend the moral machinery [we have] developed for dealing with people, appropriately modified, to animals."[183]

The trouble, though, is that even when individuals might be able to easily draw conclusions about animal suffering (whether they see the video the HSUS released on downer cattle, read *Animal Liberation*, or learn about veal crates), there is no guarantee that they will change their behavior and take responsibility to alter their own routines. What is more likely is that they carry on with day-to-day living, continuing to divorce their *lived* lives from their (new) beliefs. Perhaps a moved individual might donate money each month to PETA, but meanwhile, she continues to eat cheese or veal, drink milk, yogurt, and ice cream from unknown and potentially questionable sources. The missing link here is her failure to see that conclusion as a value that absolutely requires a self-reflective evaluation of exactly how intensely she herself is wrapped up in a routine of "normal" actions that in fact are laden with suffering.

This is where the robustness of authenticity can help: it requires that she change; that if she genuinely cares about animal welfare, she will take a stand, and she will recognize that her actions[184] contribute to and reflect the kind of person she wants to be, which is someone who takes seriously the welfare of those who cannot speak for themselves. That is, authenticity and the following general moral obligation constitute an ideal: *that our actions ought to reflect the kind of people we want to be*. This complements and reflects Rollin's ideal,[185] the result of which is that individuals' own beliefs draw them to their own conclusion that, essentially, animals like dairy cattle are on the deserving end of many of the values they already hold. For some, this

experience might serve as a kind of moral awakening, leading them to change the way they perform their day-to-day routines.

Moreover, in understanding temporality, purposiveness, and unity, the individual can grasp her life as an unfolding or a narrative, understanding that her actions are ultimately and only her own; it is she who buys into the dairy industry when she decides to consume or use products that lack transparency about the practices involved, e.g., tail-docking or crating veal calves. It is her *owned* decision to continue to eat prime veal from restaurants that do not disclose the origin of their meat. If she is to be concerned with the wellbeing of animals (which as I have shown given the state of the industry, she ought to be), she must take matters into her own hands; her care for animals is reflected in her choice of restaurant or her choice of a brand of milk at the supermarket. If she chooses to neglect the wellbeing of or actively contribute to the suffering of these sentient beings, she cannot live her life authentically as an individual whose beliefs align with her actions. And, as I have shown, she ought to care[186] if she is not living authentically since authenticity can, again, be regarded as an executive virtue that serves as the foundation for a meaningful life. Of course, if she is in doubt about which actions she ought to perform in order to contribute to her narrative, she can turn to historical idols for guidance.

Rollin's recognition of the importance of returning to these historical roots of a common, shared moral history also meshes well with Guignon's interpretation of Heidegger's notion of authentic Dasein utilizing the "wellspring"[187] of historical exemplars and role models in order to incorporate certain values or characteristics into his or her set of moral beliefs, thus crafting a life story and drawing a picture of what kind of person he or she wants to be. We can seek guidance: we can look to people in the world who treat animals well, or who strive to make positive changes in their own lives toward animal wellbeing or who are active in making changes in the

dairy industry or in the various industries in which animals are abused. The examples are many, and though I do not pretend to exhaust the list, it is important to note a few: these include, for instance, Jane Goodall, who opened a world of caring, compassion, and respect for animals in research and apes in particular; Bernard Rollin, who has shown that compromise and dialogue are extremely important in making real, concrete steps toward positive changes in the animal industry; creators, employees, volunteers, and advocates of organizations like Mercy for Animals or the Farm Sanctuary; vegetarians and vegans, like Buddhist monk Thích Nhất Hạnh, and even celebrities such as Ellen DeGeneres, or individuals in our families who have set examples that show us the possibilities of living with a commitment to animal welfare; designers and businessmen, such as Yvon Chouinard of the company Patagonia, who has shown that on a global scale, we can and should make strides toward treating animals well and cause no unnecessary harm when we are utilizing their products in everyday textiles; and the list goes on.

The reasoning behind this suggestion to look toward models and exemplars is critical: rather than working against society's expectations, norms, and traditions, the source of some of our most important ethical beliefs, like fairness, equality, respect, veracity, integrity, etc., are those that society has, historically, preserved and continuously applied in new ways to new "moral categories."[188] To be sure, society does tell us to drink milk of strong bones, urge men not to cry, and require that we respect authority; however, society *also* has encouraged us not to harm others, to respect each other whatever our race or gender, to be fair and honest in our transactions and promises, to avoid causing unnecessary suffering, etc.—values that aim at achieving a great deal of good.

Though it might not seem that it is the case on the surface, dairy cow and calf welfare is one of these issues that is well within the scope of these common values, and unfortunately, as I

have shown, people are failing to live up to moral values concerning these animals' (and others')[189] welfare.

One of the most basic values that may be considered to help heal this moral failure is that when we can decrease suffering, we have the obligation to do so. And we must educate ourselves about our impact on others, especially those who have the ability to suffer. It should go without saying that part of what is integral to human life, generally speaking, is gaining knowledge about the world around us, and one of the most crucial elements concerning truly understanding our world is our impact on other people, the environment, and other sentient beings. There are various ways to learn about issues in our lives, and we can achieve this through several modes of research and debate, whether it's learning through reading, observing, surfing the internet, or engaging in conversations with people with varied backgrounds and interests, we do owe ourselves and others the effort of gaining knowledge about the scope of our impact.[190]

An authentic individual[191] who is undergoing this process of deliberate and careful evaluation of and reflection on her values can recognize her effects on others, put her values into practice, and commit herself to acting in ways that represent those beliefs, and ultimately lessen her role in the suffering of animals such as dairy cattle. Again, being authentic requires the recognition of some basic, common, historical values, and to claim authenticity, her actions must, in some way, represent her values and commitments.[192] Otherwise, if she does not "live up to" her values and commitments, she is inauthentic.[193] "When someone fails to deliberate about what is important or comes up with transparently trivial or pointless commitments, or when he refuses to stand for what he believes, we feel that [he is] not doing [his] part to sustain a social system that depends on people [to be authentic]."[194]

5: The power of Heidegger's model

Unfortunately, Heideggerian philosophy, and his misleading and abstruse language surrounding authenticity, is not quite as "mainstream" as Dairy Queen. As I have also shown, the exact process of achieving authenticity is not quite as plain and clear as we might hope. It even appears that it requires a sudden realization of one's conscience that cannot be forced—rather, our conscience highjacks us, in a sense. Heidegger does not give us instructions concerning authenticity like the thousands of books, websites, and blogs concerning pseudo-authenticity do. But as I have shown, we know what it *takes* to be authentic, and we know that this is a goal well worth the effort: authenticity allows a direct route to the good life. As Socrates said, "an unexamined life is not worth living," and the authentic life is arguably the ultimate manifestation of the examined life. But is it enough to become authentic just by knowing what authenticity requires, or must we undergo this spontaneous bout of anxiety, wherein we suddenly feel anonymous and alone?

Though spontaneity cannot be forced, understanding the process and what it requires can lead us toward a transformation away from inauthenticity. The power in comprehending and utilizing Heidegger's interpretation of authenticity as a framework for effecting change in the realm of animal welfare does not lie in potential instructions on how to be authentic, but rather, "its value lies . . . in providing a basis for understanding our embeddedness in a wider context of meaning . . . and the fundamental role of moral commitments in our ability to be humans in any meaningful sense."[195] In simply grasping that which Heidegger offers to us concerning the effects of authenticity and inauthenticity on our *selves*, we are already closer to making changes aimed at examining our commitments (by filtering the trivial ones), and understanding that our actions represent not only our beliefs but the kind of people we want to be. Being authentic

allows for us to view our lives as a cohesive whole, a timeline that shows our evolution, including our successes, and our failures. We want to see that we have grown, not that we have stunted our growth, or that we failed in fulfilling our potential.

Moreover, getting to the heart of authenticity can cause a shift in our patterns of thinking about ourselves and about the world. In particular, the most striking feature of utilizing Heideggerian philosophy for animal welfare is its strength in supporting Rollin's notion of the need for a shared ideal about the treatment of animals: "[o]nly by having an ideal to move toward can we progress beyond the status quo."[196] Rollin's concern is:

> [that] if our ethical account of human moral obligation to animals cannot effect sympathetic resonance . . . in the minds, and ultimately in the practices of those in society to whom it is addressed, then it is of no value . . . [O]ur ethical account must speak . . . to those not so convinced [that we owe more to animals than we have provided].[197]

In juxtaposing our actions with our background beliefs about how all sentient beings ought to be treated, we understand what role we have in the success or failure of others' welfare, and ultimately, we should be moved toward effectively and fully living up to our beliefs.

A final strength of my argument comes from the fact that the *groundwork* done to reach an ideal for dairy cow welfare is one rooted in both phenomenology and also moral philosophy. Heidegger's phenomenological account in *Being and Time* allows for a natural talk of ethical obligation: if a large part of being authentic is being responsible for one's life and owning up to one's actions, one must consider the *content* of what one stands up for when it comes to owning up to one's actions. And this is where we can insert and apply the shared ideal for our moral obligation to these animals. As Rollin has shown, this ideal is brought about through the process of reminding ourselves of the values that we already hold and applying those beliefs to a new category: animals. Thus, in making this shift toward authenticity and reflecting upon and

shedding new light on some of our already-held ethical beliefs, we can elucidate our own moral failures concerning animal welfare, and strive toward following through on our commitments.

6: Discussion

In the following I will present and reply to some major objections.

6.1: Objection one: authenticity is alienating

The first major objection concerning authenticity is that it is alienating. It could be claimed that living authentically does not allow us to perform normal actions that are needed to simply get through the day. In this sense it seems that authenticity is a self-imposed isolation in various social situations that might require us to act in opposition to our own goals we have for ourselves. For instance, in performing those actions that are necessary to doing practical things, like attending to our financial matters, being polite to our doctor, or being congenial and eating the cheeseburgers and ice cream that our neighbors are serving at a cookout, we tend to get "caught up" in human life. Heidegger calls this "being-in-a-situation" that contributes to being wrapped up in the "dictatorship" of everydayness that I have mentioned throughout this essay.

6.1.1: Reply

What is crucial to grasp is that though some tasks are necessary, they are necessary *because* they play such an important part in allowing one to achieve a much more important and meaningful life goal. That is, the everyday actions that one performs contribute to, or are means to, his predominant end of being the sort of person he wants to be. And the authentic individual is one who does not merely mindlessly perform those actions (again, the *inauthentic* individual is one who does so), but rather recognizes those actions as the everyday tasks that they are. In other words, he is crucially aware and essentially cautions himself that those actions are everyday actions in the Heideggerian sense. He is also aware that they lead him to live a life (a

"possibility") he chooses to live. He recognizes that at the heart of these customary routines, he can freely choose to follow through with them but acknowledges that they do not contribute to being the kind of person he wants to be (though, if he wants to be the kind of person who can be malleable in various situations, then he can easily fulfill that goal as well). For example, being a good dog owner might require that Sally occasionally engage in conventional, everyday small talk with other dog owners at the dog park, but this allows her dog the social interaction he requires in order to be happy (and closer to fulfilling his *telos*). Importantly, this need not require that she be trapped in everydayness; in fact, her recognition shows that she understands her relation to the world. The same applies to those who are, for instance, cordial in situations where they are offered a gift or food (e.g., a leather purse, a Thanksgiving turkey, etc.) and oblige rather than harm the gift-giver or host's feelings. (I also describe this in more detail in my replies to the following objections.)

Moreover, with regard to changing our own habits and ways of life in order to achieve better dairy industry standards, options exist, and they are not alienating. Vegan alternatives are growing in popularity in both restaurants and supermarkets, and some producers of dairy products such as the members of the Coulee Region Organic Produce Pool (CROPP) have very high standards that represent their opposition to practices like tail-docking, and urge that a nerve-block must be utilized for dehorning that takes place past an age of sixty days.[198] They also have various benchmarks for housing, bedding, lighting, hygiene, transportation, electric gates and prods, air quality, etc.[199] Ultimately, choosing the products that come from reliable and trustworthy sources can shift the demand for better quality products that represent high standards of dairy cattle welfare.

Of course, some of these options come with one caveat: cost. Not everyone can afford a six-dollar gallon of milk to feed their growing children, or afford to spend more than a couple dozen dollars on several packages of American cheese to put on their burgers for a fourth of July party. The cheap supermarket or gas station options remain tantalizing in their low cost. However, with an optimistic eye toward the future, many individuals as consumers can change the demand by avoiding dairy and eating more fruits and vegetables. In 2014, for instance, vegetarians and vegans played a part in the 400 million fewer animals that were killed for food.[200] Though it constitutes a small dent in the nine to ten billion animals caught up in food production every year, if the trend continues to rise, vegetarian, vegan, and more ethical dairy options will likely respond proportionally in cost. And those who seek to be the sort of people to cause no unnecessary harm can rest a little easier, knowing that their choices are becoming more accessible, and that their lifestyles are no longer isolating them in ways that greatly affect their budget.

Finally, we need not work alone in the quest to lessen our impact on the suffering of animals such as dairy cows. Many others are working in various arenas in order to find the best ways to strike balances between the efficiency of meat and dairy production, our desire to consume meat and dairy products, and the welfare of the animals that provide these products. As I mentioned in chapter one, for example, The Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production put forth their report entitled, "Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America" in 2008 which concerned "food animal production and its impact on public health, the environment, animal welfare, and rural communities."[201] In this report, they advocate many recommendations with the goal of "ensur[ing] that the system is able to provide

safe, affordable meat, dairy, and poultry products in a sustainable way" while meeting, and continuing research on, the social, physiological, and medical needs of animals.[202]

6.2: Objection two: authenticity involves an excessive time requirement

Another objection to this interpretation of authenticity is that it is overly ambitious in virtue of the overwhelming time requirement it poses.[203] Constant reassurance that one's tasks are contributing to his "being a certain sort of person" requires perpetual mindfulness of one's actions: "The constant preoccupation with [the] self cuts you off from others, breeding competition, aggressiveness, envy, alienation, and ultimately despair."[204] On the face of genuine authenticity, every action—brushing one's teeth, paying the cashier at the grocery store, going to a boring movie your kids are begging you to take them to see—seems like it would require a sort of intervening thought, that: "I am performing, or should perform, action *x* because it is contributing to my life-goal." This kind of time requirement that is dedicated to the focus on authenticity and constant reminding of oneself of his life story easily adds up when performing everyday actions, and therefore, might in and of itself begin to take time away from being the person he wishes to be. In the end, this constant mental preoccupation might lead him to despise the authentic way of living and revert to a kind of hatred for his life projects.[205]

Susan Wolf highlights a similar concern in her article, "Moral Saints"; namely, that one can become so concerned with doing the right thing all the time that she loses sight of her other projects: "[T]he desire to be as morally good as possible is apt to have the character not just of a stronger, but of a higher desire, which does not merely successfully compete with one's other desires but which rather subsumes or demotes them."[206] More apropos is the sense of well-roundedness she proposes that moral sainthood would disallow: "[T]he moral virtues, given that they are . . . *all* present in the same individual . . . are apt to crowd out the nonmoral virtues, as

well as many of the interests and personal characteristics that we generally think contribute to a healthy, well-rounded, richly developed character."[207]

6.2.1: Reply

The answer to dealing with the potentially overwhelming time investment that authenticity and morality seem to require can be mitigated a couple ways. Part of the answer is built-in to the notion of authenticity itself; authentic individuals (of the Heideggerian sort) look to those roles and characteristics of others who are successful in their pursuits. For example, if one looks to his family members or friends to see what kind of parent he wants to be, he finds that the good parents balance their lives between upholding their commitment not only to their children, but also to their partner in marriage, their careers, or their commitments to themselves and their own particular projects. One of the traits of successful people is their ability to avoid being overwhelmed by these commitments. In other words, being constantly preoccupied with living authentically is not what makes these people successful; rather, it is the balance with which they live their lives. Their commitments and their basic needs are in harmony with each other, and this need not mean that they are constantly being mindful of all of their actions; rather, they are aware of their projects and promises, and understand that they must find equilibrium amongst their pursuits.

A similar proposition can be found in philosopher Peter Railton's essay entitled "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality." In his essay, he essentially proposes that one need not be engaged in a constant moral calculus in order to be moral.[208] Instead, we keep ourselves in check, occasionally taking a moral inventory to make sure that our decisions and actions align with our beliefs. Authenticity and morality "need not alienate us from the particular commitments that make life worthwhile."[209] Instead, we live our lives being aware

of the goal, but not dwelling on it. He draws an analogy to a tennis player[210]: a successful tennis player is not constantly thinking about winning; if she were, she would likely lose for she would not be able to concentrate on the next serve or the next volley. The successful tennis player is mindful that each shot she takes will get her closer to her ultimate goal, but understands that a preoccupation with the trophy is foolish. Likewise, a tightrope walker knows he must not *reflect upon* keeping his concentration,[211] lest he wants to end up on the ground. Instead, the individual striving to be authentic might "develop standing dispositions to give more or less time to decisions depending on their perceived importance, the amount of information available, the predictability of his choice, and so on."[212] An individual who is cultivating authenticity is one who appropriately understands, incorporates, and allocates time concerning his various commitments. Eventually, he may also form new habits or responses to certain situations—that is, mindfully crafted habits or responses that are manifestations of a great deal of introspection and reasoning that have risen from a transformation toward authenticity.

Susan Wolf's own answer in fact resembles the authenticity approach. She calls it "the point of view of individual perfection."[213] Essentially, it is based on the assertion that we should each do that which makes each of us unique, rather than being entirely driven by morality alone, becoming moral automatons who lack senses of humor, style, or quirks. And morality constitutes only a portion of the total picture; personal projects and goals might not always overlap with the concerns of morality, and vice versa, and it is important to "develop our characters and live our lives in certain ways."[214]

Like Wolf herself, I essentially employ a pluralist approach[215] such as the one advanced by Thomas Nagel: our lives are constituted by an amalgam of moral (and nonmoral) values, and these values may sometimes conflict to form dilemmas. For instance, the pluralist recognizes that

commitments to one's family may override commitments to the greater good (or vice versa) or commitments to one's own personal projects (playing a violin concerto or finishing a painting) may override commitments to a friend (or vice versa).[216] Simply put, we are often presented with situations wherein we must choose between competing values, some of which may also be non-moral. Authenticity allows us the ability to strike a balance amongst these values by utilizing her point of view of individual perfection; that is, with an eye toward being the sort of person she wants to be.

Putting forth an ideal of authenticity is not to say that we need to be perfect in constantly aligning our actions with our beliefs. Even if a perfectly moral act has never been done, it ought not keep us from striving for a goal or from promoting moral theories. Likewise, authenticity might not ever be fully achieved, but that notion alone should not restrict us from advocating it (consider Kant's advancement of, as well as the continuing support for, his categorical imperative). With that being said, one of the important aspects of authenticity that I have highlighted is the flexibility it allows us to mold our lives, as we try to find a balance between self-flagellation and perfection, and deal with dilemmas.

6.3: Objection three: authenticity is a fanatical, extreme, or radical ideal

Authenticity is too elusive, esoteric, and extreme to be considered an ideal that is understandable, practical, useful, and applicable. Because of this, trying to connect with others over an important moral issue (such as animal welfare) may seem futile if the ideal is too extreme or difficult to grasp or reach.

6.3.1: Reply

The average person who stands next to you in the grocery store queue probably does not have a good grasp on Heideggerian philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger is difficult to understand, and

some philosophers devote their lives to interpreting his ideas and unique vocabulary. However, just because he utilizes idiosyncratic or superficially misleading language should not keep us from seeking answers. Scientists know that there are indeed easy "answers" to many complex and difficult problems: appeals to a higher being, for instance, would eliminate the cost and painstaking years of research done to understand black holes and evolution, for example. But many find these kinds of solutions unsatisfying in their alleged ability to "explain" phenomena.

In our case, authenticity as a model or tool would help solve a pressing moral issue, but it is unappealing in that it is indeed difficult to access, especially in virtue of its tough shell of Heideggerian idiosyncrasies. But the struggle to grasp Heidegger ought not keep us from seeing how useful his model is. He provides us with an understanding of the world in which we live, shows us that once we take a step back and examine our lives, we may not be living up to our own standards, and provides a tool that can serve as a foundation for living well.

Moreover, if there is one conclusion to take away from a moral perspective on Heidegger's notion of authenticity, it is a simple one; essentially, *our choices make us who we are*. This is not superficially extreme—it is quite a simple realization. The groundwork does indeed involve rather esoteric and elusive ideas, and each word has a great deal of importance and foundational labor behind it. But it has been my job here to remove the thorns from the rose, as it were: to deconstruct and elucidate difficult passages in order to render them palatable and practical. Likewise, the conclusion (that our choices and actions constitute the kind of people we are) is there in a pure, relatable, and useful form for others to comprehend, accept, and observe.

In reply to the objection that authenticity itself in an ideal that is unattainable, I reply that indeed, it is an *ideal*. Like those who practice Buddhism, reaching enlightenment or "awakening" is an ideal, but it is not often attained. Knowing this, nevertheless, does not inhibit those who

practice; rather, they are focused on the moment. Likewise, authenticity serves as a lodestar, a guide, and we must concern ourselves not with perfection but rather with practice. We strive toward ideals daily, and we often do not reach them; we might even make the same New Year's resolution year after year, and various forces can keep us from reaching our goals, whether they are out of our control or not. The most important thing to keep in mind is that in between intense self-criticism and perfection, there is a middle ground in which we find balance among the various limitations that hamper achieving our vision of our selves. Utilizing authenticity in the ways I have proposed should help us understand and focus in on our lives in such a way that allows us to find that middle ground; being a good guest at a dinner party and being a vegan who avoids drinking milk or eating veal may tug and pull at each other, but it need not put us in a position in which we have to tip the scales out of the favor of authenticity; authenticity can, instead, help us in situations where a conflict arises.

Again, this is because determining which choices we ought to make is not difficult: the aforementioned "wellspring" of models and lifestyles (especially when paired with Nagel's pluralism) supplies us with reasonable conclusions when we reach dilemmas, and understanding authenticity helps us acknowledge that dilemmas (such as those concerning animal suffering) exist in the first place. Simply, we need not reach far in order to understand how to strive toward authenticity. This helps to bring home authenticity and the complexity of the notion itself, rather than seeing it as something that exists as transcendental, idealistic, and challenging to understand.

7: Conclusion

As I have shown, milk and the mother-offspring relationship carry with them images of wholesomeness, growth, health, and feelings of comfort. One of the things that we have

historically found disturbing and saddening is the premature removal of the child from the mother, or the murder, kidnapping, or loss of a child. Interestingly, however, we do not seem to think about how we may individually be affecting the emotional capacities and *teloi* of the mother and her calf, as well as their health issues and social restrictions. With very little difficulty, by accessing information on the internet, in books, or other media, we can educate ourselves on how we affect each of their natures as well as their bond, which is, rightly so, special and strong, as I have elucidated.

The disruption of this relationship as well as the abuse surrounding the animals involved is something that we could, if we examined our own lives, actions, and commitments in such a way that this interpretation of Heidegger proposes, cease in contributing to and also help improve. Effecting change in the area of these animals' welfare is not something to be done only by dairy owners, lawmakers, or organizations—it is something for which we ourselves ought to take responsibility, especially because many of the beliefs we already hold run in opposition to the actions that we perform that promote the poor welfare of these animals (e.g., consuming dairy products from unknown or questionable sources). Heidegger's notion of authenticity allows us to put ourselves in the position where we can enlighten ourselves, understand, and change our direct relationship to the suffering of dairy cows and their calves.

153. *Horizons of Authenticity in Phenomenology, Existentialism, and Moral Psychology*. Eds. Hans Pedersen and Megan Altman. New York: Springer, 2015. 347-368. Web. 10 June 2015.

154. "The Number of Vegetarians In The World." *Raw Food Health*. n. d. Web. 10 June 2015. <http://www.raw-food-health.net/NumberOfVegetarians.html>.

155. Schlosser, Eric. "Americans Are Obsessed with Fast Food: The Dark Side of the All-American Meal." *CBS News*. 31 Jan. 2002. Web. 14 April 2014. <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/americans-are-obsessed-with-fast-food-the-dark-side-of-the-all-american-meal/> quoted in "11 Facts About American Eating Habits." *Do Something*. n. d. Web. 10 June 2015. <https://www.dosomething.org/facts/11-facts-about-american-eating-habits>.

156. "Factory Farming and the Environment." *Farm Sanctuary*. 2015. Web. 8 Aug. 2015. <http://www.farmsanctuary.org/learn/factory-farming/factory-farming-and-the-environment/>.

157. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 276; Heidegger 67.

158. Heidegger 325. In German, Heidegger calls it "schuld," which translates to indebtedness, guilt, or responsibility.

159. Guignon, *On Being Authentic* 163.

160. Guignon, *On Being Authentic* 163.

161. Heidegger 334; Golomb, Jacob. *In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus*. New York: Routledge, 1995. 107. Print.

162. As described by Onora O'Neill, "executive virtues" are virtues that can be regarded as *means to action*. In this case, authenticity would be an executive virtue in that it is required in order to act responsibly in any meaningful way. See: O'Neill, Onora. *Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning*. New York: Cambridge University Press: 1996. 187-88. Print.

163. Varga, Somogy, and Guignon, Charles B. "Authenticity." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 11 Sep. 2014. Web. 8 Aug. 2015. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/authenticity/>. See also: O'Neill 187-88.

164. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 284; Guignon, "Becoming a Self." 125.

165. Guignon, "Becoming a Self." 124.

166. Of course, self-flagellation is not necessary; as stated earlier, built into the concept of authenticity (as I have described it here) and the idea of one's life being a narrative is the notion that one can radically change one's life-course or direction—it is not necessary to authenticity (and in fact, it is counter to authenticity) to perpetually brood about one's shortcomings; one must act with dedication and future-directedness toward his goals.

167. Heidegger 67; Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 276.

168. The impact of that action can be large or extremely small: evading taxes has more of an impact on your character than does folding your sweaters in a new way.

169. Indeed, there are, unfortunately, people who do intend to cause unnecessary harm. For example, a Nevada man—though diagnosed with psychological and drug problems—was found to have tortured and dismembered several dogs in Reno in 2015. But the Court's response to this shows the disgust with which we generally view these crimes: he was sentenced to 28 years in state prison, as the judge, prosecutors, and defense attorneys stated it was "the most horrific crime they have ever seen in their decades of legal practice." See: Sonner, Scott. "Nevada man who tortured, killed dogs gets up to 28 years." *KSL News*. 1 Oct. 2015. Web. 10 Oct. 2015. <http://www.ksl.com/?nid=157&sid=36767167&s_cid=rss-157>.

170. Rollin, *Animal Rights and Human Morality* 35.

171. I think this correctly and charitably characterizes authenticity as more of a method or structure rather than requiring certain content. See: Park, James. "Becoming More Authentic: The Positive Side of Existentialism." *An Existential Philosopher's Museum*. 11 Dec. 2013. Web. 29 Oct. 2015. <http://www.tc.umn.edu/~parkx032/D-AU.html>.

172. In her article "Affected Ignorance and Animal Suffering: Why Our Failure to Debate Factory Farming Puts Us at Moral Risk," Nancy Williams discusses James Montmarquet's intellectual virtues utilized to inspire public debate about factory farming.

173. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 282-83.

174. Golomb 7.

175. Guignon, *On Being Authentic* 158.

176. Guignon, *On Being Authentic* 158-60.

177. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 287; Heidegger 438.

178. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 287; Heidegger 383-91. Emphasis added.

179. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 288.

180. Rollin, Bernard. “Animal Rights as a Mainstream Phenomenon.” *Animals*. 1.1 (2011) 112-13. Print.; Rollin, *Animal Rights and Human Morality* 40.

181. Rollin, “Animal Rights.” 112-13.

182. Rollin, *Animal Rights and Human Morality* 40.

183. Rollin, *Animal Rights and Human Morality* 40.

184. Naturally, this takes time: we continuously find new ingredients in our food that are of animal origin, or discover that the eggs we eat aren’t from truly pasteur-raised chickens. Sometimes, we might not have knowledge of, for example, the contents of our pets’ food, causing us alarm when we discover it is an animal by-product that potentially originates from factory farms. But the important thing to keep in mind is that as we learn, we adapt and change our habits and actions to suit our commitment.

185. That is, that one ought to remind rather than to teach beliefs, especially those of “right and wrong.”

186. The alternative, namely, that she might truly *not* care is an important issue outside the scope of my particular concerns here, though it does indeed constitute an interesting and pressing problem.

187. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values.” 287.

188. Rollin, “Animal Rights.” 112-13; Rollin, *Animal Rights and Human Morality* 40.

189. Consider, for instance, the researchers who brutally separate science from ethics and perform tests on animals who painfully die in the process, the individuals who are aware of (yet ignore) the fact that their food comes from animals on factory farms, or individuals like New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, who vetoed the ban on sow gestation crates (despite the people of his state urging him to phase them out), to the millions of others who attend shows at Sea World, an amusement park that PETA has sued on the basis of “enslaving” five wild-caught orca whales. See: “PETA Sues SeaWorld for Violating Orcas’ Constitutional Rights.” *PETA*. 25 Oct. 2011. Web. 11 Dec. 2014. <http://www.peta.org/blog/peta-sues-seaworld-violating-orcas-constitutional-rights/>.

190. For more on this topic with special regard to animals caught up in the factory farming system, see Williams, “Affected Ignorance and Animal Suffering: Why Our Failure to Debate Factory Farming Puts Us at Moral Risk.”

191. That is, one who is attempting to gain responsibility in the Heideggerian sense.

192. Of course, not all of her actions might be worthy of introspection into whether or not they reflect her beliefs.

193. Of course, this need not mean she achieve an ideal right away or be absolute in achieving her ideal. For example, underprivileged individuals who try, but cannot afford to live the lifestyles they wish to have are in an understandably difficult situation and as such cannot be expected to risk their lives, jobs, or families in order to follow through on some of their commitments (including those concerning animal welfare). Achieving personal goals are often asymptotic in nature, and *trying* our best to reach that goal—even though we may never meet it—is noteworthy in its own sense.

194. Guignon, *On Being Authentic* 159-60.

195. Guignon, "Authenticity, moral values." 290; Guignon, *On Being Authentic* 163.

196. Rollin, *Animal Rights and Human Morality* 195.

197. Rollin, *Animal Rights and Human Morality* 196

198. "Dairy Pool Standards."

199. "Dairy Pool Standards."

200. Sentenac, Hannah. "400 Million Fewer Animals Were Killed for Food Last Year vs. 2007 Because People Are Eating Less Meat" *Latest Vegan News*. 24 June 2015. Web. 2 Nov. 2015. <http://latestvegannews.com/400-million-fewer-animals-were-killed-for-food-last-year-because-people-are-eating-less-meat/>. However, this could in part be due to the fact that animals are administered substances to grow larger in order to supply more meat per animal.

201. "Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America." *National Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production*. 2008. Web. 21 Dec. 2014. <http://www.ncifap.org/_images/PCIFAPFin.pdf>.

202. "Putting Meat on the Table."

203. This is reminiscent of an argument against utilitarianism which holds that the amount of time taken to perform the moral calculus required to make the right decision causes one to miss the opportunity to actually do the right thing. See: Smart, J. J. C. "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism." *Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live*. Ed. James Rachels. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 38-49. Print.

204. Guignon, *On Being Authentic* 7.

205. Closely related is the notion that agents may expend such a great portion of their lives thinking about or devoting themselves to morality that it causes them fail to live life in any personally meaningful sort of way. See: Railton, Peter. "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality." *Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live*. Ed. James Rachels. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 221-55. Print.

206. Wolf, Susan. "Moral Saints." *The Journal of Philosophy* 79.8 (1982): 423-24. Web. 1 Dec. 2014.

207. Wolf 421.

208. Railton 239.

209. Railton 249.

210. Railton 240.

211. Railton 240.

212. Railton 240.

213. Wolf 437.

214. Wolf 437.

215. Most generally, Nagel's pluralism maintains that multiple ethical theories can constitute these competing values; that is to say, one can hold a multitude of beliefs: deontological or Kantian beliefs, beliefs informed by virtue ethics, hedonism, or consequentialism, etc. For instance, an individual might forego accepting a promotion at work if it means spending significantly less time with her son. This person might, at that time, choose the deontological belief—that one should spend as much time with family as possible—over the opportunity for hedonistic self-empowerment and a pleasurable salary increase. See: "The Fragmentation of Value." *Ethical Theory 2: Theories About How We Should Live*. Ed. James Rachels. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 305-316. Print.

216. Nagel 306-07.

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