

ABSTRACT

Title of dissertation: ALGORITHMS FOR SOLVING
 LINEAR AND POLYNOMIAL
 SYSTEMS OF EQUATIONS
 OVER FINITE FIELDS
 WITH APPLICATIONS TO
 CRYPTANALYSIS

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This dissertation contains algorithms for solving linear and polynomial systems of equations over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$. The objective is to provide fast and exact tools for algebraic cryptanalysis and other applications. Accordingly, it is divided into two parts.

The first part deals with polynomial systems. Chapter 2 contains a successful cryptanalysis of Keeloq, the block cipher used in nearly all luxury automobiles. The attack is more than 16,000 times faster than brute force, but queries 0.6×2^{32} plaintexts. The polynomial systems of equations arising from that cryptanalysis were solved via SAT-solvers. Therefore, Chapter 3 introduces a new method of solving polynomial systems of equations by converting them into CNF-SAT problems and using a SAT-solver. Finally, Chapter 4 contains a discussion on how SAT-solvers work internally.

The second part deals with linear systems over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$, and other small fields (and rings). These occur in cryptanalysis when using the XL algorithm, which con-

verts polynomial systems into larger linear systems. We introduce a new complexity model and data structures for $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -matrix operations. This is discussed in Appendix B but applies to all of Part II. Chapter 5 contains an analysis of “the Method of Four Russians” for multiplication and a variant for matrix inversion, which is $\log n$ faster than Gaussian Elimination, and can be combined with Strassen-like algorithms. Chapter 6 contains an algorithm for accelerating matrix multiplication over small finite fields. It is feasible but the memory cost is so high that it is mostly of theoretical interest. Appendix A contains some discussion of $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -linear algebra and how it differs from linear algebra in \mathbb{R} and \mathbb{C} . Appendix C discusses algorithms faster than Strassen’s algorithm, and contains proofs that matrix multiplication, matrix squaring, triangular matrix inversion, LUP-factorization, general matrix inversion and the taking of determinants, are equicomplex. These proofs are already known, but are here gathered into one place in the same notation.

ALGORITHMS FOR SOLVING LINEAR AND POLYNOMIAL
SYSTEMS OF EQUATIONS OVER FINITE FIELDS,
WITH APPLICATIONS TO CRYPTANALYSIS

by

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Preface

*Pigmaei gigantum humeris impositi plusquam ipsi gigantes vident*¹.
(Attributed to Bernard of Chartres, 1159)

One of the many reasons the subject of Mathematics is so beautiful is the continuing process of building one theorem, algorithm, or conjecture upon another. This can be compared to the construction of a cathedral, where each stone gets laid upon those that came before it with great care. As each mason lays his stone he can only be sure to put it in its proper place, and see that it rests plumb, level, and square, with its neighbors. From that vantage point, it is impossible to tell what role it will play in the final edifice, or even if it will be visible. Could George Boole have imagined the digital computer?

Another interesting point is that the cathedrals of Europe almost universally took longer than one lifetime to build. Therefore those that laid the foundations had absolutely no probability at all of seeing the completed work. This is true in mathematics, also. Fermat's Last Theorem, the Kepler Conjecture, the Insolubility of the Quintic, the Doubling of the Cube, and other well-known problems were only solved several centuries after they were proposed. And thus scholarly publication is a great bridge, which provides communication of ideas (at least in one direction) across the abyss of death.

One example is to contemplate the conic sections of Apollonius of Perga, (circa 200 BC). Can one imagine how few of the ordinary or extraordinary persons of Western Europe in perhaps the seventh century AD, would know of them. Yet, 18 centuries after their introduction, they would be found, by Kepler, to describe the motions of astronomical bodies. In the late twentieth century, conic sections were studied, at least to some degree, by all high school graduates in the United States of America, and certainly other countries as well.

Such is the nature of our business. Some papers might be read by only ten persons in a century. All we can do is continue to work, and hope that the knowledge we create is used for good and not for ill.

An old man, going a lone highway,
Came at the evening, cold and gray,
To a chasm, vast and deep and wide,
Through which was flowing a sullen tide.
The old man crossed in the twilight dim;
The sullen stream had no fears for him;
But he turned when safe on the other side
And built a bridge to span the tide.

“Old man,” said a fellow pilgrim near,
“You are wasting strength with building here;
Your journey will end with the ending day;
You never again must pass this way;

¹Dwarves, standing on the shoulders of giants, can further than giants see.

You have crossed the chasm, deep and wide—
Why build you the bridge at the eventide?"

The builder lifted his old gray head:
"Good friend, in the path I have come," he said,
"There followeth after me today
A youth whose feet must pass this way.
This chasm that has been naught to me
To that fair-haired youth may a pitfall be.
He, too, must cross in the twilight dim;
Good friend, I build this bridge for him."

by William Allen Drumgoole

Foreword

The ignoraunte multitude doeth, but as it was euer wonte, enuie that knoweledge, whiche thei can not attaine, and wishe all men ignoraunt, like unto themself. . . Yea, the pointe in Geometrie, and the unitie in Arithmetike, though bothe be undiuisable, doe make greater woorkes, & increase greater multitudes, then the brutishe bande of ignoraunce is hable to withstande. . .

But yet one commoditie moare. . . I can not omitte. That is the fly-
ing, sharpenyng, and quickenyng of the witte, that by practice of Arith-
metike doeth insue. It teacheth menne and accustometh them, so cer-
tainly to remember thynges paste: So circumspectly to consider thynges
presente: And so prouidently to forsee thynges that followe: that it maie
truelie bee called the *File of witte*.

(Robert Recorde, 1557, quoted from [vzGG03, Ch. 17]).

Dedication

With pleasure, I dedicate this dissertation to my parents. To my father, who taught me much in mathematics, most especially calculus, years earlier than I would have been permitted to see it. And to my mother, who has encouraged me in every endeavor.

Acknowledgments

I am deeply indebted to my advisor, Professor Lawrence C. Washington, who has read and re-read many versions of this document, and every other research paper I have written to date, provided me with countless hours of his time, and given me sound advice, on matters technical, professional and personal. He has had many students, and all I have spoken to are in agreement that he is a phenomenal advisor, and it is humbling to know that we can never possibly equal him. We can only try to emulate him.

I have been very fortunate to work with Dr. Nicolas T. Courtois, currently Senior Lecturer at the University College of London. It suffices to say that the field of algebraic cryptanalysis has been revolutionized by his work. He permitted me to study with him for four months in Paris, and later even to stay at his home in England. Much of my work is joint work with him.

My most steadfast supporter has been my best friend and paramour, Patrick Studdard. He has read every paper I have written to date, even this dissertation. He has listened to me drone on about topics like group theory or ring theory and has tolerated my workaholism. My life and my work would be much more empty without him.

My first autonomous teaching experience was at American University, a major stepping stone in my life. The Department of Computer Science, Audio Technology and Physics had faith in me and put their students in my hands. I am so very grateful for those opportunities. In particular I would like to thank Professor Michael Gray,

and Professor Angela Wu, who gave me much advice. The departmental secretary, Yana Shabaev was very kind to me on numerous occasions and I am grateful for all her help. I also received valuable teaching advice from my future father-in-law, Emeritus Professor Albert Studdard, of the Philosophy Department at the University of North Carolina at Pembroke.

My admission to the Applied Mathematics and Scientific Computation (AMSC) Program at the University of Maryland was unusual. I had been working as a PhD student in Computer Engineering for several years when I decided to add a Masters in AMSC as a side task. Later, I switched, and made it the focus of my PhD. Several faculty members were important in helping me make that transition, including Professor Virgil D. Gligor, Professor Richard Schwartz, and Professor Jonathan Rosenberg. But without the program chair, Professor David Levermore, and my advisor, Professor Lawrence C. Washington, this would have been impossible. I am grateful that many rules were bent.

Several governmental agencies have contributed to my education. In reverse chronological order,

- The National Science Foundation (NSF) VIGRE grant to the University of Maryland provided the Mathematics Department with funds for “Dissertation Completion Fellowships.” These are exceedingly generous semester-long gifts and I had the pleasure to receive two of them. I am certain this dissertation would look very different without that valuable support.
- I furthermore received travel funding and access to super-computing under the

NSF grant for the Sage project [sag], Grant Number 0555776.

- The European Union established the ECRYPT organization to foster research among cryptographers. The ECRYPT foundation was kind enough to support me during my research visit in Paris. Much of the work of this dissertation was done while working there.
- The Department of the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, Carderock Station, supported me with a fascinating internship during the summer of 2003. They furthermore allowed me to continue some cryptologic research toward my graduate degrees while working there.
- The National Security Agency was my employer from May of 1998 until September of 2002. Not only did I have the chance to work alongside and learn from some of the most dedicated and professional engineers, computer scientists and mathematicians who have ever been assembled into one organization, but also I was given five semesters of financial support, plus several summer sessions, which was very generous, especially considering that two of those semesters and one summer were during wartime. Our nation owes an enormous debt to the skill, perseverance, self-discipline, and creativity of the employees of the National Security Agency. Several employees there were supporters of my educational hopes but security regulations and agency traditions would forbid my mentioning them by name.

Professor Virgil D. Gligor, Professor Jonathan Katz, and Professor William R. Franklin (of RPI), have all been my academic advisor at one time or another

and I thank them for their guidance. Each has taught me from their own view of computer security and it is interesting how many points of view there really are. Our field is enriched by this diversity of scholarly background. Likewise Dr Harold Snider gave me important advice during my time at Oxford. My Oxford days were an enormous influence on my decision to switch into Applied Mathematics from Computer Engineering.

My alma mater, the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, has furnished me with many skills. I cannot imagine a better training ground. My engineering degree was sufficiently mathematically rigorous that I succeeded in a graduate program in Applied Mathematics, without having a Bachelor's degree in Mathematics. In fact, only two courses, **Math 403**, Abstract Algebra, and **Math 404** Field Theory, were my transition. Yet I was practical enough to be hired into and promoted several times at the NSA, from a Grade 6 to a Grade 11 (out of a maximum of 15), including several commendations and a Director's Star. I am particularly indebted to the faculty there, and its founder, Stephen Van Rensselaer, former governor of New York and (twice) past Grand Master of Free & Accepted Masons of the State of New York. It was at Rensselaer that I learned of and was initiated into Freemasonry, and the Institute's mission of educating "the sons of farmers and mechanics" with "knowledge and thoroughness" echoes the teachings of Freemasonry. My two greatest friends, chess partners, and Brother Freemasons, Paul Bello and Abram Claycomb, were initiated there as well, and I learned much in discussions with them.

I learned of cryptography at a very young age, perhaps eight years old or so. Dr. Haig Kafafian, also a Freemason and a family friend, took me aside after Church

for many years and taught me matrices, classical cryptography, and eventually, allowed me to be an intern at his software development project to make devices to aid the handicapped. There I met Igor Kalatian, who taught me the C language. I am grateful to them both.

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List of Abbreviations

$f(x) = o(g(x))$	$\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \frac{f(x)}{g(x)} = 0$
$f(x) = O(g(x))$	$\exists c, n_0 \quad \forall n > n_0 \quad f(x) \leq cg(x)$
$f(x) = \Omega(g(x))$	$\exists c, n_0 \quad \forall n > n_0 \quad f(x) \geq cg(x)$
$f(x) = \omega(g(x))$	$\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \frac{g(x)}{f(x)} = 0$
$f(x) = \Theta(g(x))$	$f(x) = O(g(x))$ while simultaneously $f(x) = \Omega(g(x))$
$f(x) \sim g(x)$	$\lim_{x \rightarrow \infty} \frac{f(x)}{g(x)} = 1$
CNF-SAT	The conjunctive normal form satisfiability problem
DES	The Data Encryption Standard
$\mathbb{GF}(q)$	The finite field of size q
HFE	Hidden Field Equations (a potential trap-door OWF)
M4RM	The Method of Four Russians for matrix multiplication
M4RI	The Method of Four Russians for matrix inversion
MC	The Multivariate Cubic problem
MQ	The Multivariate Quadratic problem
OWF	One-way Function
QUAD	The stream cipher defined in [BGP05]
RREF	Reduced Row Echelon Form
SAGE	Software for Algebra and Geometry Experimentation
SAT	The satisfiability problem
UTTF	Unit Upper Triangular Form

Chapter 1

Summary

Generally speaking, it has been the author's objective to generate efficient and reliable computational tools to assist algebraic cryptanalysts. In practice, this is a question of developing tools for systems of equations, which may be dense or sparse, linear or polynomial, over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ or one of its extension fields. In addition, the author has explored the cryptanalysis of block ciphers and stream ciphers, targeting the block ciphers Keeloq and the Data Encryption Standard (DES), and the stream cipher QUAD. Only Keeloq is presented here, because the work on the last two are still underway. The work on DES has seen preliminary publication in [CB06].

The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first deals with polynomial systems and actual cryptanalysis. The second deals with linear systems. Linear systems are important to cryptanalysis because of the XL algorithm [CSPK00], a standard method of solving overdefined polynomial systems of equations over finite fields by converting them into linear systems.

Chapter 2 is the most practical, and contains a detailed study of the block cipher Keeloq and presents a successful algebraic cryptanalysis attack. The cipher Keeloq is used in the key-less entry systems of nearly all luxury automobiles. Our attack is $2^{14.77}$ times faster than brute force, but requires 0.6×2^{32} plaintexts.

Chapter 3 has the largest potential future impact, and deals not with linear

systems but with polynomial systems. Also, it deals not only with dense systems (as Part II does), but with sparse systems also. Since it is known that solving a quadratic system of equations is NP-hard, and solving the CNF-SAT problem is NP-hard, and since all NP-Complete problems are polynomially reducible to each other, it makes sense to look for a method to use one in solving the other. This chapter shows how to convert quadratic systems of equations into CNF-SAT problems, and that using off-the-shelf SAT-solvers is an efficient method of solving this difficult problem.

Chapter 4 describes in general terms how SAT-solvers work. This tool is often viewed as a black box, which is unfortunate. There is no novel work in this chapter, except the author does not know of any other exposition on how these tools operate, either for experts or a general audience.

The second part begins with Chapter 5, and contains the Method of Four Russians, which is an algorithm published in the 1970s, but mostly forgotten since, for calculating a step of the transitive closure of a digraph, and thus also squaring boolean matrices. Later it was adapted to matrix multiplication. This chapter provides an analysis of that algorithm, but also shows a related algorithm for matrix inversion that was anecdotally known among some French cryptanalysts. However, the algorithm was not frequently used because it was unclear how to eliminate the probability of abortion, how to handle memory management, and how to optimize the algorithm. The changes have made negligible the probability of abortion, and have implemented the algorithm so that it outperforms Magma [mag] in some cases. The software tool SAGE [sag], which is an open source competitor to Magma, has

adopted the author’s software library (built on the Method of Four Russians) for its dense $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -matrix operations, and this code is now deployed.

Chapter 6 has an algorithm of theoretical interest, but which may find some practical application as well. This algorithm is for finite-ring matrix multiplication, with special attention and advantage to the finite-field case. The algorithm takes any “baseline” matrix multiplication algorithm which works over general rings, or a class of rings that includes finite rings, and produces a faster version tailored to a specific finite ring. However, the memory required is enormous. Nonetheless, it is feasible for certain examples. The algorithm is based on the work of Atkinson and Santoro [AS88], but introduces many more details, optimizations, techniques, and detailed analysis. This chapter also modifies Atkinson and Santoro’s complexity calculations.

Three appendices are found, which round out Part II. Appendix A contains some discussion of $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -linear algebra and how it differs from linear algebra in \mathbb{R} and \mathbb{C} . These facts are well-known.

We introduce a new complexity model and data structures for $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -matrix operations. This is discussed in Appendix B but applies to all of Part II.

Appendix C discusses algorithms faster than Strassen’s algorithm, and contains proofs that matrix multiplication, matrix squaring, triangular matrix inversion, LUP-factorization, general matrix inversion and the taking of determinants, are equicomplex. These proofs are already known, but are here gathered into one place in the same notation.

Finally, two software libraries were created during the dissertation work. The

first was a very carefully coded $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -matrix operations and linear algebra library, that included the Method of Four Russians. This library was adopted by SAGE, and is written in traditional ANSI C. The second relates to SAT-solvers, and is a Java library for converting polynomials into CNF-SAT problems. I have decided that these two libraries are to be made publicly available, as soon as the formalities of submitting the dissertation are completed. (the first is already available under the GPL—Gnu Public License).

Part I

Polynomial Systems

Chapter 2

An Extended Example: The Block-Cipher Keeloq

The purpose of this chapter is to supply a new, feasible, and economically relevant example of algebraic cryptanalysis. The block cipher “Keeloq”¹ is used in the keyless-entry system of most luxury automobiles. It has a secret key consisting of 64 bits, takes a plaintext of 32 bits, and outputs a ciphertext of 32 bits. The cipher consists of 528 rounds. Our attack is faster than brute force by a factor of around $2^{14.77}$ as shown in Section 2.4.7 on page 27. A summary will be given in Section 2.5 on page 33.

This attack requires around 0.6×2^{32} plaintexts, or 60% of the entire dictionary, as calculated in Section 2.4.5 on page 23. This chapter is written in the “chosen plaintext attack” model, in that we assume that we can request the encryption of any plaintext and receive the corresponding ciphertext as encrypted under the secret key that we are to trying guess. This will be mathematically represented by oracle access to $E_k(\vec{P}) = \vec{C}$. However, it is easy to see that random plaintexts would permit the attack to proceed identically.

¹This is to be pronounced “key lock.”

2.1 Special Acknowledgment of Joint Work

The work described in this chapter was performed during a two-week visit with the Information Security Department of the University College of London's Ipswich campus. During that time the author worked with Nicolas T. Courtois. The content of this chapter is joint work. Nonetheless, the author has rewritten this text in his own words and notation, distinct from the joint paper [CB07]. Some proofs are found here which are not found in the paper.

2.2 Notational Conventions and Terminology

Evaluating the function f eight times will be denoted $f^{(8)}$.

For any ℓ -bit sequence, the least significant bit is numbered 0 and the most significant bit is numbered $\ell - 1$.

If $h(x) = x$ for some function h , then x is a fixed point of h . If $h(h(x)) = x$ but $h(x) \neq x$ then x is a “point of order 2” of h . In like manner, if $h^{(i)}(x) = x$ but $h^{(j)}(x) \neq x$ for all $j < i$, then x is a “point of order i ” of h . Obviously if x is a point of order i of h , then

$$h^{(j)}(x) = x \text{ if and only if } i|j$$

2.3 The Formulation of Keeloq

2.3.1 What is Algebraic Cryptanalysis?

Given a particular cipher, algebraic cryptanalysis consists of two steps. First, one must convert the cipher and possibly some supplemental information (e.g. file formats) into a system of polynomial equations, usually over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$, but sometimes over other rings. Second, one must solve the system of equations and obtain from the solution the secret key of the cipher. This chapter deals with the first step only. The systems of equations were solved with Singular [sin], Magma [mag], and with the techniques of Chapter 3, as well as ElimLin, software by Nicolas Courtois described in [CB06].

2.3.2 The CSP Model

In any constraint satisfaction problem, there are several constraints in several variables, including the key. A solution must satisfy all constraints, so there are possibly zero, one, or more than one solution. The constraints are models of a cipher's operation, representing known facts as equations. Most commonly, this includes μ plaintext-ciphertext pairs, P_1, \dots, P_μ and C_1, \dots, C_μ , and the μ facts: $E(P_i) = C_i$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, \mu\}$. Almost always there are additional constraints and variables besides these.

If no false assumptions are made, because these messages were indeed sent, we know there must be a key that was used, and so at least one key satisfies all the constraints. And so it is either the case that there are one, or more than one




Figure 2.1: The Keeloq Circuit Diagram

solution. Generally, algebraic cryptanalysis consists of writing enough constraints to reduce the number of possible keys to one, and few enough that the system is solvable in a reasonable amount of time. In particular, the entire process should be faster than brute force by some margin.

2.3.3 The Keeloq Specification

In Figure 2.1 on page 9, the diagram for Keeloq is given. The top rectangle is a 32-bit shift-register. It initially is filled with the plaintext. At each round, it is shifted one bit to the right, and a new bit is introduced. The computation of this bit is the heart of the cipher.

Five particular bits of the top shift-register are and are interpreted as a 5-bit

integer, between 0 and 31. Then a non-linear function is applied, which will be described shortly (denoted NLF).

Meanwhile the key is placed initially in a 64-bit shift-register, which is also shifted one bit to the right at each iteration. The new bit introduced at the left is the bit formerly at the right, and so the key is merely rotating.

The least significant bit of the key, the output of the non-linear function, and two particular bits of the 32 bit shift-register are XORed together (added in $\mathbb{GF}(2)$). The 32-bit shift-register is shifted right and the sum is now the new bit to be inserted into the leftmost spot in the 32-bit shift-register.

After 528 rounds, the contents of the 32 bit shift-register form the ciphertext.

2.3.4 Modeling the Non-linear Function

The non-linear function $NLF(a, b, c, d, e)$ is denoted $NLF_{3A5C742E}$. This means that if (a, b, c, d, e) is viewed as an integer i between 0 and 31, i.e. as a 5-bit number, then the value of $NLF(a, b, c, d, e)$ is the i th bit of the 32-bit hexadecimal value 3A5C742E.

The following formula is a cubic polynomial and gives equivalent output to the NLF for all input values, and was obtained by a Karnaugh map. In the case, the Karnaugh map is a grid with (for five dimensions) two variables in rows (i.e. 4 rows), and three variables in columns (i.e. 8 columns). The rows and columns are arranged via the Gray Code. This is a simple technique to rapidly arrive at the algebraic normal form (i.e. polynomial), listed below, by first trying to draw boxes

around regions of ones of size 32, 16, 8, 4, 2, and finally 1. See a text such as [Bar85, Ch. 3] for details.

$$NLF(a, b, c, d, e) = d \oplus e \oplus ac \oplus ae \oplus bc \oplus be \oplus cd \oplus de \oplus ade \oplus ace \oplus abd \oplus abc$$

2.3.5 I/O Relations and the NLF

Also note that while the degree of this function is 3, there is an I/O relation of degree 2, below. An I/O relation is a polynomial in the input variables and output variables of a function, such that no matter what values are given for input to the function, the I/O relation always evaluates to zero. Note y signifies the output of the non-linear function.

$$(e \oplus b \oplus a \oplus y)(c \oplus d \oplus y) = 0$$

This can be thought of as a constraint that the function must always satisfy. If there are enough of these, then the function is uniquely defined. What makes them cryptanalytically interesting is that the degree of the I/O relations can be much lower than the degree of the function itself. Since degree impacts the difficulty of polynomial system solving dramatically, this is very useful. The I/O degree of a function is the lowest degree of any of its I/O relations, other than the zero polynomial.

Generally, low I/O-degree can be used for generating attacks but that is not the case here, because we have only one relation, and this above relation is true

with probability $3/4$ for a random function $\mathbb{GF}(2)^5 \rightarrow \mathbb{GF}(2)$, and a random input. Heuristically, relations that are valid with low probability for a random function and random input produce a more rapid narrowing of the keyspace in the sense of a Constraint Satisfaction Problem or CSP. We are unaware of any attack on Keeloq that uses this fact to its advantage.

An example of the possibility of using I/O degree to take cryptanalytic advantage is the attack from the author's joint paper on DES, with Nicolas T. Courtois [CB06]. This attack is made possible because the S-Boxes have I/O degree 2, after the introduction of several new variables, but the S-Box's actual closed-form formulas are of higher degree. It is interesting to note that without these extra variables, the I/O degree of the S-Boxes is 3 [CP02].

2.3.6 Disposing of the Secret Key Shift-Register

The 64-bit shift-register containing the secret key rotates by one bit per round. Only one bit per round (the rightmost) is used during the encryption process. Furthermore, the key is not modified as it rotates. Therefore the key bit being used is the same in round $t, t + 64, t + 128, t + 192, \dots$

Therefore we can dispose of the key shift-register entirely. Denote k_{63}, \dots, k_0 the original secret key. The key bit used during round t is merely $k_{t-1 \bmod 64}$.

2.3.7 Describing the Plaintext Shift-Register

Denote as the initial condition of this shift-register as L_{31}, \dots, L_0 . This corresponds to the plaintext P_{31}, \dots, P_0 . Then in round 1, the values will move one place to the right, and a new value will enter in the first bit. Call this new bit L_{32} . Thus the bit generated in the 528th and thus last round will be L_{559} . The ciphertext is the final condition of this shift-register, which is $L_{559}, \dots, L_{528} = C_{31}, \dots, C_0$.

A subtle change of index is useful here. The computation of L_i , for $32 \leq i \leq 559$, occurs during the round numbered $t = i - 31$. Thus the key bit used during the computation of L_i is $k_{i-32 \bmod 64}$.

2.3.8 The Polynomial System of Equations

This now gives rise to the following system of equations.

$$\begin{aligned}
 L_i &= P_i && \forall i \in [0, 31] \\
 L_i &= k_{i-32 \bmod 64} \oplus L_{i-32} \oplus L_{i-16} \oplus NLF(L_{i-1}, L_{i-6}, L_{i-12}, L_{i-23}, L_{i-30}) && \forall i \in [32, 559] \\
 C_i &= L_{i-528} && \forall i \in [528, 559]
 \end{aligned}$$

Note, some descriptions of the cipher omit the L_{i-16} . This should have no impact on the attack at all. The specification given by the company [Daw] includes the L_{i-16} .

Since the NLF is actually a cubic function this is a cubic system of equations.

Substituting, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned}
L_i &= P_i && \forall i \in [0, 31] \\
L_i &= k_{i-32 \bmod 64} \oplus L_{i-32} \oplus L_{i-16} \oplus L_{i-23} \oplus L_{i-30} \oplus L_{i-1}L_{i-12} \oplus L_{i-1}L_{i-30} \\
&\quad \oplus L_{i-6}L_{i-12} \oplus L_{i-6}L_{i-30} \oplus L_{i-12}L_{i-23} \oplus L_{i-23}L_{i-30} \\
&\quad \oplus L_{i-1}L_{i-23}L_{i-30} \oplus L_{i-1}L_{i-12}L_{i-30} \oplus L_{i-1}L_{i-6}L_{i-23} \oplus L_{i-1}L_{i-6}L_{i-12} && \forall i \in [32, 559] \\
C_i &= L_{i-528} && \forall i \in [528, 559]
\end{aligned}$$

In other words, the above equations were repeated for each i as applicable, and for each of μ total plaintext-ciphertext message pairs.

2.3.9 Variable and Equation Count

Consider a plaintext-ciphertext pair \vec{P}, \vec{C} . There are 560 equations, one for each L_i , with $i \in [0, 559]$, plus another 32 for the C_i , with $i \in [0, 32]$. However, the first 32 of these are of the form $L_i = P_i$ for $i \in [0, 32]$, and the last 32 of these are of the form $L_{i-528} = C_i$ for $i \in [528, 559]$. Thus we can substitute and drop down to 528 equations. This is precisely one equation for each round, which is the new bit introduced into the shift register.

The 64 bits of the key are unknown. Also, of the 560 L_i , the first and last 32 are known, but the inner 496 are not. This yields 560 variables.

If there are μ plaintext-ciphertext message pairs, then there are 528μ equations. However, there are only $496\mu + 64$ variables, because the key does not change from pair to pair.

2.3.10 Dropping the Degree to Quadratic

Instead of the previously derived

$$NLF(a, b, c, d, e) = d \oplus e \oplus ac \oplus ae \oplus bc \oplus be \oplus cd \oplus de \oplus ade \oplus ace \oplus abd \oplus abc$$

one can do

$$NLF(a, b, c, d, e) = d \oplus e \oplus ac \oplus \beta \oplus bc \oplus be \oplus cd \oplus de \oplus d\beta \oplus c\beta \oplus \alpha d \oplus \alpha c$$

$$\alpha = ab$$

$$\beta = ae$$

Since the non-linear function was the sole source of non-linear terms, this gives rise to a quadratic rather than cubic system of equations.

This introduces two new variables per original equation, and two new equations as well. Thus m equations and n variables becomes $3m$ equations and $n + 2m$ variables. Thus with μ plaintext-ciphertext message pairs, we have 1584μ equations and $1552\mu + 64$ variables. Thus, it must be the case that $\mu > 1$ for the system to be expected to have at most one solution. As always with algebraic cryptanalysis, unless we make an assumption that is false, we always know the system of equations has at least one solution, because a message was sent. And thus we have a unique solution when $\mu > 1$.

$$\begin{aligned}
L_i &= P_i && \forall i \in [0, 31] \\
L_i &= k_{i-32 \bmod 64} \oplus L_{i-32} \oplus L_{i-16} \oplus L_{i-23} \oplus L_{i-30} \oplus L_{i-1}L_{i-12} \oplus \beta_i \\
&\quad \oplus L_{i-6}L_{i-12} \oplus L_{i-6}L_{i-30} \oplus L_{i-12}L_{i-23} \oplus L_{i-23}L_{i-30} \\
&\quad \oplus \beta_i L_{i-23} \oplus \beta_i L_{i-12} \oplus \alpha_i L_{i-23} \oplus \alpha_i L_{i-12} && \forall i \in [32, 559] \\
\alpha_i &= L_{i-1}L_{i-6} && \forall i \in [32, 559] \\
\beta_i &= L_{i-1}L_{i-30} && \forall i \in [32, 559] \\
C_i &= L_{i-528} && \forall i \in [528, 559]
\end{aligned}$$

Even with $\mu = 2$ this comes to 3168 equations and 3168 unknowns, well beyond the threshold of size for feasible polynomial system solving at the time this dissertation was written.

2.3.11 Fixing or Guessing Bits in Advance

Sometimes in Gröbner basis algorithms or the XL algorithm, one fixes bits in advance [Cou04b, et al]. For example, in $\mathbb{GF}(2)$, there are only two possible values. Thus if one designates g particular variables, there are 2^g possible settings for them, but one needs to try $2^g/2$ on average if exactly one solution exists. For each guess, one rewrites the system of equations either by substituting the guessed values, or if not, then by adding additional equations of the form: $k_1 = 1, k_2 = 0, \dots$. If the resulting Gröbner or XL running time is more than $2^g/2$ times faster, this is a profitable move.

In cryptanalysis however, one generates a key, encrypts μ messages, and writes

equations based off of the plaintext-ciphertext pairs and various other constraints and facts. Therefore one knows the key. Instead of guessing all 2^g possible values, we simply guess correctly. However, two additional steps must be required. First, we must adjust the final running time by a factor of 2^g . Second, we must ensure that the system identifies a wrong guess as fast, or faster, than solving the system in the event of a correct guess.

In the event that the second condition above is not present, an alarm clock can be used. If, for example, the correctly guessed key bits cause a good solution after t_1 seconds, and after t_2 , the incorrectly guessed key bits cause the SAT-solver to declare the program unsatisfiable, then $t_1 \ll t_2$ suggests the following technique: Guess some key bits. After ct_1 seconds, where $1 < c < t_2/t_1$ is some constant, declare the system unsatisfiable and try another guess. Repeat until a good guess is found (i.e. the SAT-solver returns a valid key). We make no comment now on how to find the optimal c , but six standard deviations of t_1 is a good starting-point.

2.3.12 The Failure of a Frontal Assault

First we tried a simple CSP. With μ plaintext messages under one key, for various values of μ we encrypted and obtained ciphertexts, and wrote equations as described already, in Section 2.3.10 on page 15. We also used fewer rounds than 528, to see the impact of the number of rounds, as is standard. The experiments were an obvious failure, and so we began to look for a more efficient attack.

- With 64 rounds, and $\mu = 4$, and 10 key bits guessed, Singular required 70

seconds, and ElimLin in 10 seconds.

- With 64 rounds, and $\mu = 2$ but the two plaintexts differing only in one bit (the least significant), Singular required 5 seconds, and ElimLin 20 seconds. MiniSat [ES05], using the techniques of Chapter 3, required 0.19 seconds. Note, it is natural that these attacks are faster, because many internal variables during the encryption will be identically-valued for the first and second message.
- With 96 rounds, $\mu = 4$, and 20 key bits guessed, MiniSat and the techniques of Chapter 3, required 0.3 seconds.
- With 128 rounds, and $\mu = 128$, with a random initial plaintext and each other plaintext being an increment of the previous, and 30 key bits guessed, ElimLin required 3 hours.
- With 128 rounds, and $\mu = 2$, with the plaintexts differing only in the least significant bit, and 30 key bits guessed, MiniSat requires 2 hours.

These results on 128 rounds are slower than brute-force. Therefore we did not try any larger number of rounds or finish trying each possible combination of software and trial parameters. Needless to say the 528 round versions did not terminate. Therefore, we need a new attack.

2.4 Our Attack

2.4.1 A Particular Two Function Representation

Recall that each 64th round uses the same key bit. In other words, the same bit is used in rounds $t, t + 64, t + 128, \dots$. Note further, $528 = 8 \times 64 + 16$. Thus the key bits k_{15}, \dots, k_0 are used nine times, and the key bits k_{63}, \dots, k_{16} are used eight times.

With this in mind, it is clear that the operation of the cipher can be represented as

$$E_k(\vec{P}) = g_k(\underbrace{f_k(f_k(\dots f_k(\vec{P})))}_{8 \text{ times}}) = g_k(f_k^{(8)}(\vec{P})) = \vec{C}$$

where the f_k represents 64 rounds, and the g_k the final 16 “extra” rounds.

2.4.2 Acquiring an $f_k^{(8)}$ -oracle

Suppose we simply guess the 16 bits of the key denoted k_{15}, \dots, k_0 . Of course, we will succeed with probability 2^{-16} . But at that point, we can evaluate g_k or its inverse g_k^{-1} . Then,

$$g_k^{-1}(E_k(\vec{P})) = g_k^{-1}(g_k(f_k^{(8)}(\vec{P}))) = f_k^{(8)}(\vec{P})$$

and our oracle for E_k now gives rise to an oracle for $f_k^{(8)}$.

2.4.3 The Consequences of Fixed Points

For the moment, assume we find x and y such that $f_k(x) = x$ and $f_k(y) = y$. At first, this seems strange to discuss at all. Because $f_k(x) = x$ and therefore $f_k^{(8)}(x) = x$, we know $E_k(x) = g_k(f_k^{(8)}(x)) = g_k(x)$. But, $g_k(x)$ is part of the cipher that we can remove by guessing a quarter (16 bits) of the key. Therefore, if we “know something” about x we know something about multiple internal points, the input, and output of $E_k(x)$. Now we will make this idea more precise.

Intuitively, we now know 64 bits of input and 64 bits of output of the function f (32 bits each from each message). This forms a very rigid constraint, and it is highly likely that only one key could produce these outputs. This means that if we solve the system of equations for that key, we will get exactly one answer, which is the secret key. The only question is if the system of equations is rapidly solvable or not.

The resulting system has equations for the 64 rounds of f . For both of x and y , there are equations for L_0, \dots, L_{95} and 32 additional output equations, but the first 32 of these and last 32 of these (in both cases) are of the forms $L_i = x_i$ and $L_{i-64} = x_i$, and can be eliminated by substituting. Thus there are actually $96 + 32 - 32 - 32 = 64$ equations (again one per round) for both x and y , and thus 128 total equations. We emphasize that this is the same system of equations as Section 2.3.8 on page 13 but with only 64 rounds for each message.

The x_i 's and y_i 's are known. Thus the unknowns are the 64 bits of the key, and the 32 “intermediate” values of L_i for both x and y . This is 128 total unknowns.

After translating from cubic into quadratic format, it becomes 384 equations and 384 unknowns. This is much smaller than the 3168 equations and 3168 unknowns we had before. In each case, ElimLin, Magma, Singular, and the methods of Chapter 3 solved the system for k_0, \dots, k_{63} in time too short to measure accurately (i.e. less than 1 minute).

It should be noted that we require two fixed points, not merely one, to make the attack work. One fixed point alone is not enough of a constraint to narrow the key space sufficiently. However, two fixed points was sufficient each time it was tried. Therefore, we will assume f has two or more fixed points, and adjust our probabilities of success accordingly. One way to look at this is to say that only those keys which result in two or more fixed points are vulnerable to our attack. However, since the key changes rapidly in most applications (See Section 2.6 on page 35), and since approximately 26.42% of random functions $\mathbb{GF}(2)^{32} \rightarrow \mathbb{GF}(2)^{32}$ have this property (See Section 2.4.8 on page 30), we do not believe this to be a major drawback.

2.4.4 How to Find Fixed Points

Obviously a fixed point of f_k is a fixed point of $f_k^{(8)}$ as well, but the reverse is not necessarily true. Stated differently, the set of fixed points of $f_k^{(8)}$ will contain the set of all fixed points of f_k .

We will first calculate the set of fixed points of $f_k^{(8)}$, which will be very small. We will try the attack given in the previous subsection, using every pair of fixed

points. If it is the case that f_k has two or more such fixed points, then one such pair which we try will indeed be a pair of fixed points of f_k . This will produce the correct secret key. The other pairs will produce spurious keys or inconsistent systems of equations. But this is not a problem because spurious keys can be easily detected and discarded.

The running time required to solve the system of equations is too short to accurately measure, with a valid or invalid pair. Recall, that this is 384 equations and 384 unknowns as compared to 3168, as explained in Section 2.4.3 on page 21.

There are probably very few fixed points of $f_k^{(8)}$, which we will prove below. And thus the running time of the entire attack depends only upon finding the set of fixed points of $f_k^{(8)}$. One approach would be to iterate through all 2^{32} possible plaintexts, using the $f_k^{(8)}$ oracle. This would clearly uncover all possible fixed points of $f_k^{(8)}$ and if f_k has any fixed points, they would be included. However, this is not efficient.

Instead, one can simply try plaintexts in sequence using the $f_k^{(8)}$ oracle. When the i th fixed point x_i is found, one tries the attack with the $i-1$ pairs $(x_1, x_i), \dots, (x_{i-1}, x_i)$. If two fixed points of f_k are to be found in x_1, \dots, x_i , the attack will succeed at this point, and we are done. Otherwise, continue until x_{i+1} is found and try the pairs $(x_1, x_{i+1}), \dots, (x_i, x_{i+1})$, and so forth.

Table 2.1 Fixed points of random permutations and their 8th powers

Size	2^{12}	2^{12}	2^{13}	2^{14}	2^{15}	2^{16}
Experiments	1000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	100,000
Abortions ($n_1 < 2$)	780	7781	7628	7731	7727	76,824
Good Examples ($n_1 \geq 2$)	220	2219	2372	2269	2273	23,176
Average n_1	2.445	2.447	2.436	2.422	2.425	2.440
Average n_8	4.964	5.684	5.739	5.612	5.695	5.746
Average Location	2482	2483	4918	9752	19,829	39,707
Percentage (η)	60.60%	60.62%	60.11%	59.59%	60.51%	60.59%

2.4.5 How far must we search?

One could generate a probability distribution on the possible values of n_1 and n_8 , the number of fixed points of f_k and $f_k^{(8)}$. However, if all we need to know is how many plaintexts must be tried until two fixed points of f are discovered, then this can be computed by an experiment.

We generated 10,000 random permutations of size $2^{12}, 2^{13}, 2^{14}, 2^{15}$ and 100,000 of 2^{16} . Then we checked to see if they had two or more fixed points, and aborted if this were not the case. If two or more fixed points were indeed present, we tabulated the number of fixed points of the eighth power of that permutation on composition. Finally, we examined at which value the second fixed point of f was found, when iterating through the values of $f^{(8)}$ and searching for its fixed points. The data is given in Table 2.1 on page 23. It shows that we must check around 60% of the possible plaintexts. It also confirms the values of $n_1 = 2.39$ (calculated in Section 2.4.8 on page 30) and $n_8 = 5.39$ (calculated in Section 2.4.9 on page 31).

2.4.6 Fraction of Plainspace Required

As calculated in Section 2.4.9 on page 31, we expect f to have an expected value of 3 total points of orders 2, 4, or 8. This is independent of the number of fixed points, so long as the number of fixed points is small. The probability of p fixed points of f being present is $1/(p!e)$ as calculated in Lemma 3 on page 29. Upon conditioning that f have at least two fixed points, this becomes

$$\frac{1}{(p!e)(1 - 2/e)}$$

Our plan is to check each fixed point of $f^{(8)}$, and see if it is a fixed point of f (denoted “yes”), or if not, which would mean it is a point of order 2, 4, or 8 (denoted “no”). Upon the second “yes” result, we stop. How many checks must we perform, until we stop? Denote the number of checks required as k .

Now recall that we expect 3 points of order 2, 4, and 8, independent of the number of fixed points of f . This is shown in Section 2.4.9 on page 31. If we have p fixed points of f , we will expect to have $3 + p$ fixed points of $f^{(8)}$.

For example, suppose there are $p = 2$ fixed points of f . In expectation, we will find 5 fixed points of $f^{(8)}$. The possible arrangements are

- k pattern
- 2 YYNNN
- 3 YNYNN, NYYNN
- 4 YNNYN, NYNYN, NNYYN
- 5 YNNNY, NYNNY, NNYNY, NNNYY

The expected value of k in the above example is 4. Since the fixed points of $f^{(8)}$ are expected to be uniformly distributed in the plainspace, we can model them as placed uniformly in the intervals $\{(0, 0.2), (0.2, 0.4), \dots, (0.8, 1.0)\}$ (viewed as fractions of the plainspace). Alternatively, this is expecting the fixed points to be located at approximately $\{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9\}$. This is obviously a crude model but the afore mentioned experiments confirm it.

In our case, since k is expected to be 4, then 0.7 or 70% of the plaintext must be checked, in expectation, for $p = 2$. Of course if the fixed points were not uniformed distributed, and we knew the distribution, we would find them faster than this.

In general, $2 \leq k \leq 5$, and $(2k - 1)/(2(p + 3))$ is the fraction of plaintext that needs to be computed. Call this value η . To find the probability distribution of η , we need only find a probability distribution for k , since we already have one for p .

This tabulation will be simplified by observing that to the left of k , there is one yes, and all remaining are no's. To the right of k , one finds $p - 2$ yes's and all remaining are no's. The left of k has $k - 1$ slots, and the right of k has $p + 3 - k$ slots.

This gives us a number of arrangements:

$$\binom{k-1}{1} \binom{p+3-k}{p-2} = (k-1) \binom{p+3-k}{5-k}$$

Since $k \in \{2, 3, 4, 5\}$ the total number of arrangements is

$$(1) \binom{p+1}{3} + (2) \binom{p}{2} + (3) \binom{p-1}{1} + (4) \binom{p-2}{0}$$

Thankfully, that totals to $\binom{p+3}{3}$, the number of ways of putting three no's into $p + 3$ slots. This fact can be seen algebraically by expanding out the "choice"

function above in each case.

The probability of a $k = K$ is thus given by

$$\Pr\{k = K|p = P\} = \frac{(K - 1) \binom{P+3-K}{5-K}}{\binom{P+3}{3}}$$

Then we can apply the probability distribution of p

$$\Pr\{k = K|p \geq 2\} = \sum_{p=2}^{\infty} \frac{(K - 1) \binom{p+3-K}{5-K}}{\binom{p+3}{3}} \frac{1}{p!e(1 - 2/e)}$$

From this, the expected value of k can be found Then we can apply the probability distribution of p

$$E[k|p \geq 2] = \sum_{k=2}^{k=5} \sum_{p=2}^{\infty} k \frac{(k - 1) \binom{p+3-k}{5-k}}{\binom{p+3}{3}} \frac{1}{p!e(1 - 2/e)}$$

Knowing that η , the fraction of the plainspace that we must search is given by

$$\eta = \frac{2k - 1}{2(p + 3)} = \frac{k - 1/2}{p + 3}$$

as shown above, we can substitute to obtain:

$$E[\eta|p \geq 2] = \sum_{k=2}^{k=5} \sum_{p=2}^{\infty} \left(\frac{k - 1/2}{p + 3} \right) \frac{(k - 1) \binom{p+3-k}{5-k}}{\binom{p+3}{3}} \frac{1}{p!e(1 - 2/e)}$$

This evaluates to 0.6297, which is close the value given in Table 2.1 on page 23, considering the crudeness of the model.

2.4.7 Comparison to Brute Force

Recall, that f has two or more fixed points with probability $1 - 2/e$, and that we require f to have two or more. Our success probability is $2^{-16}(1 - 2/e) \approx 2^{-17.92}$. A brute force attack which would itself have probability $2^{-17.92}$ of success would consist

of guessing $2^{46.08}$ possible keys and then aborting, because $46.08 + 17.92 = 64$, the length of the key. Therefore, our attack must be faster than $2^{46.08}$ encryptions of guesses, or $528 \times 2^{46.08} \approx 2^{55.124}$ rounds.

We require, for our attack, $g_k^{-1}(E_k(\vec{P}))$, which will need an additional 16 rounds. Even if we use the whole dictionary of 2^{32} possible plaintexts, this comes to $(528 + 16)2^{32} \approx 2^{41.087}$ rounds, which is about $2^{14.04}$ times faster than brute force. If instead we use $(528 + 16)(3/5)2^{32}$ (which is now an expected value based on the last paragraph of the previous section), we require $2^{40.77}$ rounds.

2.4.8 Some Lemmas

This section provides some of the probability calculations needed in the previous sections. The argument in this section is that if (for random k) the function $f_k : \mathbb{GF}(2)^n \rightarrow \mathbb{GF}(2)^n$ is computationally indistinguishable from a random permutation from S_{2^n} , then f_k and $f_k^{(8)}$ have various properties. Our f_k and $f_k^{(8)}$ are not random permutations, but are based off of the Keeloq specification. Since we are discussing the cryptanalysis of a block cipher, we conjecture that modeling f_k as a random permutation is a good model (as is common). If not, much easier attacks might exist. This is a standard assumption.

However, we only need 3 facts from this analysis. First, the expected number of fixed points, if there are two, is about 2.3922. Second, the probability of having two or more fixed points is about 26.424%. Third, the number of fixed points of $f_k^{(8)}$ is around 5.39. These particular facts were verified by simulations, given in

Table 2.1 on page 23, and found to be reasonable.

Lemma 1 *Both f and g are bijections.*

Proof: Note E_k is a permutation (bijection) for any specific fixed key, as must be the case for all block ciphers. Then further note

$$E_k(\vec{P}) = g_k(f_k^{(8)}(\vec{P}))$$

implies that f and g are bijections. Of course, if the domain or range of these functions were not finite, this argument would be incorrect. The only conclusion would be that the outermost function is surjective and that the innermost is injective.

□

Lemma 2 *If $h : \mathbb{GF}(2)^n \rightarrow \mathbb{GF}(2)^n$ is computationally indistinguishable from a random permutation, then $h'(x) = h(x) \oplus x$ is computationally indistinguishable from a random function.*

Proof: If h' is computationally distinguishable from a random function that means that there exists an Algorithm A, which in polynomial time compared to n , and probability δ , can distinguish between ϕ (some oracle) being either h' or being a random function of appropriate domain and range. Presumably this requires queries to ϕ , and only polynomially many queries compared to n since Algorithm A runs in polynomial time compared to n . Finally, δ is non-negligible compared to n , or more simply, $1/\delta$ is lower-bounded by a polynomial in n .

We create Algorithm B, which will distinguish between ψ being h or being a random permutation with appropriate domain and range. First, run Algorithm

A. Whenever Algorithm A asks for a query $\phi(x)$, return $\psi(x) \oplus x$. If ψ is h then $\psi(x) \oplus x = h(x) \oplus x = h'(x)$. Likewise, if ψ is a random permutation, then $\psi \oplus x$ acts as computationally indistinguishable from a random function, since it is a well-known theorem that random functions and random permutations cannot be distinguished in polynomial time [GGM86]. Algorithm B should output “pseudorandom” or “random” if and only if Algorithm A does.

This is a perfect simulation in either case, and therefore Algorithm A will be correct with probability δ and therefore Algorithm B will be correct with probability δ . Thus h and a random permutation are computationally distinguishable.

We have now proven that h' being computationally distinguishable from a random function implies that h is computationally distinguishable from a random permutation. The contrapositive is our lemma. \square

Lemma 3 *If $h : \mathbb{GF}(2)^n \rightarrow \mathbb{GF}(2)^n$ is a random permutation, then the limit as $n \rightarrow \infty$ of the probability that h has p fixed points is $1/(p!e)$*

Proof: If $h'(x) = h(x) \oplus x$, and if $h(y) = y$ then $h'(y) = 0$. Thus the set of fixed points of h is merely the preimage of 0 under h' . By Lemma 2, h' behaves as a random function. Thus the value of $h'(y)$ for any particular y is an independently and identically distributed uniform random variable. The “Bernoulli trials” model therefore applies. If $|h'^{-1}(0)|$ is the size of the preimage of 0 under h' then

$$\begin{aligned} & \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \Pr \{ |h'^{-1}(0)| = p \} \\ &= \binom{2^n}{p} (2^{-n})^p (1 - 2^{-n})^{2^n - p} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \binom{2^n}{p} (2^{-n})^p (1 - 2^{-n})^{2^n} (1 - 2^{-n})^{-p} \\
&\approx \frac{(2^n)(2^n - 1)(2^n - 2)(2^n - 3) \cdots (2^n - p + 1)}{p!} (2^{-n})^p (e^{-1})(1) \\
&\approx \frac{(1)(1 - 1 \cdot 2^{-n})(1 - 2 \cdot 2^{-n})(1 - 3 \cdot 2^{-n}) \cdots (1 - (p - 1) \cdot 2^{-n}) e^{-1}}{p!} \\
&\approx 1/p!e
\end{aligned}$$

Thus h has p fixed points with probability $1/(p!e)$. \square

Corollary 1 *If $h : \mathbb{GF}(2)^n \rightarrow \mathbb{GF}(2)^n$ is a random permutation, then h has two or more fixed points with probability $1 - 2/e \approx 0.26424$.*

Assuming h has 2 or more fixed points, it has exactly 2 with probability $\frac{1/2e}{1-2/e} \approx 0.69611$ and 3 or more $1 - \frac{1/2e}{1-2/e} \approx 0.30389$. Therefore it is useful to calculate the expected number of fixed points given that we assume there are 2 or more. This calculation is given by

$$\left(\frac{1}{1 - 2/e} \right) \sum_{i=2}^{i=\infty} \frac{i}{e(i!)} \approx 2.3922$$

2.4.9 Cycle Lengths in a Random Permutation

It is well-known that in a random permutation, the expected number of cycles of length m is $1/m$, which is proven in the lemma at the end of this subsection. Thus the expected numbers of cycles of length 1, 2, 4, and 8 in f_k are 1, $1/2$, $1/4$, $1/8$. All of these are fixed points of $f_k^{(8)}$, providing 1, 2, 4, and 8 fixed points each,

or a total of 1, 1, 1, and 1 expected fixed points, or 4 expected fixed points total. Thus $n_8 = 4$, in the general case.

In the special case of f_k having at least 2 fixed points, we claim the number should be largely unchanged. Remove the 2.39 expected fixed points from the domain of f_k . This new function has a domain and range of size $2^n - 2$ and is still a permutation. Since we are assuming n is large, $2^n - 2 \approx 2^n$. Indeed, if one makes a directed graph with one vertex for each x in the domain, with x having only one exit edge, which points to $f(x)$, then those two fixed points are both individual islands disconnected from the main graph. Clearly, the remainder of the graph of the permutation f_k is unchanged by this removal. But, that further implies that f_k restricted to the original domain but with the two fixed points removed is unchanged on its other values. Thus, $f_k^{(8)}$ after the removal would have 4 fixed points.

We can estimate then $4 - 1 + 2.39 = 5.39$ fixed points for $f_k^{(8)}$, because 1.0 fixed points are expected from f_k in general, and 2.39 when f_k has at least two fixed points.

An alternative way to look at this is that the fixed points of $f_k^{(8)}$ are precisely the points of orders 1, 2, 4, and 8 of f_k . These four sets are mutually exclusive, and their cardinalities (as random variables for a random permutation), are asymptotically independent as the size of the domain goes to infinity. To see why this is true, imagine a directed graph $G = (V, E)$ with one vertex for each domain point and one edge pointing from x to $f_k(x)$ for all x in the domain. The fixed points of f are vertices that have only a self-loop as their edges. Therefore, a few can be deleted from the graph without changing its characteristics.

Thus the expected number of points of order 2, 4, and 8, of a random permutation, should remain unchanged upon requiring the permutation to have 2 or more fixed points. This comes to

$$2\frac{1}{2} + 4\frac{1}{4} + 8\frac{1}{8} = 3$$

expected points. Since we require f_k to have two or more fixed points, it will have 2.39 in expectation, as calculated in Section 2.4.8 on page 30. Thus the expected number of fixed points of $f_k^{(8)}$ is 5.39, when f is restricted to having two or more fixed points. See also the note at the end of this subsection.

Lemma 4 *The expected number of cycles of length m in a random permutation $h : D \rightarrow D$, in the limit as $|D| \rightarrow \infty$ is $1/m$.*

Proof: Consider $x, f(x), f(f(x)), \dots = y_1, y_2, y_3, \dots$. Call the first repeated value among the y_i to be y_r . More precisely, $y_r = y_1$, and $y_r \neq y_i$ for $1 < i < r$.

To see why y_r must repeat y_1 and not some other y_i , suppose that $y_r = y_i$. And since f is injective, $y_{r-1} = y_{i-1}$, contradiction. Thus y_1 is the first value to be repeated.

The value of $y_2 = f(y_1)$ is unconstrained and can be anything. If $y_2 = y_1$ then y_1 is a fixed point and is a member of an orbit of size 1. If $y_2 \neq y_1$ then we must consider y_3 . We know, from the previous paragraph, that $y_2 \neq y_3$. If $y_3 = y_1$ then y_1 is a point of order 3, and if not, then we consider y_4 . Thus the probability that the orbit size is s is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr\{s\} &= \left(\frac{|D|-1}{|D|}\right) \left(\frac{|D|-2}{|D|-1}\right) \left(\frac{|D|-3}{|D|-2}\right) \cdots \left(\frac{|D|-s}{|D|-s+1}\right) \left(\frac{1}{|D|-s}\right) \\ &= \frac{1}{|D|} \end{aligned}$$

Since there are $|D|$ initial points, the expected number of points that are members of orbits of length s would be

$$\Pr\{s\}|D| = |D| \frac{1}{|D|} = 1$$

Each orbit of length s has precisely s elements in it, and thus the expected number of orbits of length s is $1/s$. \square

Note: The reader can easily verify that requiring f to have two fixed points changes $|D|$ to $|D - 2|$ and thus is invisible in the limit as $|D| \rightarrow \infty$.

2.5 Summary

The attack in this chapter is a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP), like all algebraic attacks. Normally a CSP has zero, one, or more than one solution. In the case of algebraic cryptanalysis, unless a false assumption is made, there is always a solution because a message was sent. Therefore, we have only to ensure that the constraints are sufficient to narrow down the keyspace to a single key, which is our objective. A secondary, but crucial, objective is that the attack must finish within a reasonable amount of time, namely faster than brute force by a significant margin.

If one has μ plaintext-ciphertext pairs encrypted with the same key, then one has a set of constraints. Here, with Keeloq, we have one (cubic) equation for each round that we take under consideration (See the equations at the start of Section 2.3.8 on page 13, where NLF is defined as a cubic polynomial in Section 2.3.4 on page 10). Thus there are 528μ constraints. This becomes 3 equations for each

round, when we convert into quadratic degree (See Section 2.3.10 on page 15.)

One approach is to therefore generate a key, generate μ plaintexts, encrypt them all, write down the system of equations, and solve it. Because this might take too long, we may elect to “guess” g bits of the key to the system of equations and adjust the final running time by 2^g , or equivalently the final probability of success by 2^{-g} , as described in Section 2.3.12 on page 17. Upon doing that, we in fact do solve the systems (See bulleted list in Section 2.3.12 on page 17), but discover that the attack is far worse than brute force.

Instead, a fixed point is very attractive, in place of a plaintext-ciphertext pair. The entire description of a fixed point of f is concerned only with the first 64 rounds. Therefore, only 64 equations are needed. However, the first objective, namely narrowing the key down to one possibility, is not accomplished here. Instead, two fixed points are needed. This is still a very limited number of equations, roughly a factor of $3168/384 = 8.25$ times smaller than the attack in Section 2.3.12 on page 17, both in terms of number of equations and in terms of number of variables.

If the degree were a linear system, this would be faster by a factor of $8.25^3 \approx 561.5$ or $8.25^{2.807} \approx 373.7$ depending on the algorithm used. Of course, solving a polynomial system of equations is much harder than solving a linear one, so the speed-up is expected to be much larger than that. And so, our second objective, which is speed, is accomplished. This leaves us with the following attack:

- Find two fixed points of f by trying pairs of fixed points of $f^{(8)}$.
- Write down the equations that describe the Constraint Satisfaction Problem

(CSP) of f having those two fixed points.

- Solve the equations.

Now it remains to calculate the success probability, the work performed, and thus the net benefit over brute force. The success probability is given as $2^{-16}(1 - 2/e) \approx 2^{-17.92}$ in Section 2.4.7 on page 26. The work performed is entirely in the discovery of the fixed-points, and is calculated as $(3/5) \times 2^{32}$ plaintexts or $2^{40.35}$ in Section 2.4.7 on page 26, and the paragraph immediately before it. A brute-force attack with success probability $2^{-17.92}$ would require $2^{64-17.92} = 2^{46.08}$ plaintexts or $2^{55.12}$ rounds. Therefore, we are $2^{14.77}$ times faster than brute force.

2.6 A Note about Keeloq's Utilization

An interesting note is Keeloq's utilization in at least some automobiles. Specifically, it encrypts the plaintext 0 and then increments the key by arithmetically adding one to the integer represented by the binary string $k_{63}, k_{62}, \dots, k_1, k_0$. This way the same key is never used twice. This is rather odd, of course, but if one defines the dual of a cipher as interchanging the plaintext with the key, then the dual of Keeloq has a 64-bit plaintext, and a 32-bit key. The cipher is operating in precisely counter-mode in that case, with a random initial counter, and fixed key of all zeroes. However, not all automobiles use this method.

Chapter 3

Converting MQ to CNF-SAT

3.1 Summary

The computational hardness of solving large systems of sparse and low-degree multivariate equations is a necessary condition for the security of most modern symmetric cryptographic schemes. Notably, most cryptosystems can be implemented with inexpensive hardware, and have low gate counts, resulting in a sparse system of equations, which in turn renders such attacks feasible. On one hand, numerous recent papers on the XL algorithm and more sophisticated Gröbner-bases techniques [CSPK00, CP02, Fau99, Fau02] demonstrate that systems of equations are efficiently solvable when they are sufficiently overdetermined or have a hidden internal algebraic structure that implies the existence of some useful algebraic relations.

On the other hand, most of this work, as well as most successful algebraic attacks, involves dense, not sparse algorithms, at least until linearization by XL or a similar algorithm. The natural sparsity, arising from the low gate-count, is thus wasted during the polynomial stage, even if it is taken advantage of in the linear algebra stage by the Block Wiedemann Algorithm or Lanczos's Algorithm. No polynomial-system-solving algorithm we are aware of except the very recently published methods of Samayev and Raddum [RS06], demonstrates that a significant benefit is obtained from the extreme sparsity of some systems of equations.

In this chapter, we study methods for efficiently converting systems of low-degree sparse multivariate equations into a conjunctive normal form satisfiability (CNF-SAT) problem, for which excellent heuristic algorithms have been developed in recent years. The sparsity of a system of equations, denoted β , is the ratio of coefficients that are non-zero to the total number of possible coefficients. For example, in a quadratic system of m equations in n unknowns over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$, this would be

$$\beta = \frac{\kappa}{m \left(\binom{n}{2} + \binom{n}{1} + \binom{n}{0} \right)}$$

where κ is the number of non-zero coefficients in the system, sometimes called the “content” of the system.

A direct application of this method gives very efficient results: we show that sparse multivariate quadratic systems (especially if over-defined) can be solved much faster than by exhaustive search if $\beta \leq 1/100$. In particular, our method requires no additional memory beyond that required to store the problem, and so often terminates with an answer for problems that cause Magma [mag] and Singular [sin] to crash. On the other hand, if Magma or Singular does not crash (due to a lack of memory), then they tend to be faster than our method, but this case includes only the smallest sample problems.

3.2 Introduction

It is well known that the problem of solving a multivariate simultaneous system of quadratic equations over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ (the MQ problem) is NP-hard (See Section 3.9). Another NP-hard problem is finding a satisfying assignment for a logical expression in several variables (the SAT problem) [Kar72]. Inspired by the possibility that either could be an efficient tool for the solution of the other, since all NP-Complete problems are polynomially equivalent, we began this investigation.

There exist several off-the-shelf SAT-solvers, such as MiniSAT [ES05], which can solve even relatively large SAT problems on an ordinary PC. We investigate the use of SAT-solvers as a tool for solving a random MQ problem. In particular, we show that if the system of equations is sparse or over-defined, then the SAT-solver technique works faster than brute-force exhaustive search. If the system is both sparse and over-defined, then the system can be solved quite effectively (see Section 3.5 on page 50).

In Section 3.2.1 we describe how this work applies to algebraic cryptanalysis. We define some notation and terms in Section 3.3, and describe the method of conversion of MQ problems into CNF-SAT problems in Section 3.4. Our results are in Section 3.5. We review previous work in Section 3.6. Finally, we note possible applications to cubic systems in Appendix 3.8. We discuss the NP-Completeness of these two problems in Section 3.9. A brief overview of SAT solvers is given in Appendix 4.

3.2.1 Application to Cryptanalysis

Algebraic Cryptanalysis can be summarized as a two-step process. First, given a cipher system, one converts it into a system of equations. Second, the system of equations is solved to retrieve either a key or a plaintext. Furthermore, note that all systems of equations over finite fields can be written as polynomial systems.

As pointed out by Courtois and Pieprzyk [CP02], this system of equations will be sparse, since efficient implementations of real-world systems require low gate-counts. In practice, the systems are very sparse—the system used to break six rounds of DES in [CB06] has 2900 variables, 3056 equations and 4331 monomials appear somewhere in the system. There would be $\binom{2900}{2} + \binom{2900}{1} = 4,206,450$ possible monomials, and those authors report less than 15 monomials per equation, or $\beta = 3.57 \times 10^{-6}$.

It is also known that any system of any degree can be written as a degree 2 system. This is done by using the following step, repeatedly:

$$\{m = wxyz\} \Rightarrow \{a = wx; b = yz; m = ab\}$$

Finally, it is usually the case that one can write additional equations by assuming that many plaintext-ciphertext pairs are available. While the number of pairs is not literally unbounded, as many stream ciphers have a limit of 2^{40} bits before a new key is required, generally one has an over-abundance of equations. Therefore, we include in this study only systems where the number of equations is greater than or equal to the number of unknowns.

3.3 Notation and Definitions

An instance of the MQ problem is a set of equations

$$f_1(x_1, \dots, x_n) = y_1, f_2(x_1, \dots, x_n) = y_2, \dots, f_m(x_1, \dots, x_n) = y_m$$

where each f_i is a second degree polynomial. By adjusting the constant term of each polynomial, it becomes sufficient to consider only those problems with $y_j = 0$ for all j . Note that n is the number of variables and m is the number equations.

If we define $\gamma = m/n$ or $\gamma n = m$, then $\gamma = 1$ will imply an exactly defined system, $\gamma > 1$ an over-defined system and $\gamma < 1$ an under-defined system. We will not consider under-defined systems here. The value of γ will be called “the over-definition” of a system. Let M denote the number of possible monomials, including the constant monomial. Since we consider only quadratic polynomials (except for Section 3.8 on page 58 on cubics),

$$M = \binom{n}{2} + \binom{n}{1} + 1$$

The system will be generated by flipping a weighted coin for each of the M coefficients for each equation. The value $\beta \in (0, 1]$ will be called the sparsity, and is the probability that a randomly selected coefficient is non-zero (equal to one). If $\beta \ll 1/2$ the system is considered sparse.

An instance of the Conjunctive Normal Form SAT or CNF-SAT problem is a set of clauses. Each clause is a large disjunction (OR-gate) of several variables,

which can appear negated or not negated. If a set of values for all n variables makes every clause evaluate to true, then it is said to be a satisfying assignment. In this way, the set of clauses can be thought of as one long logical expression, namely a conjunction (AND-gate) of all the clauses.

3.4 Converting MQ to SAT

3.4.1 The Conversion

The conversion proceeds by three major steps. First, some preprocessing might be performed to make the system more amenable to this conversion (more detail will follow). Next, the system of polynomials will be converted to a (larger) linear system and a set of CNF clauses that render each monomial equivalent to a variable in that linear system. Lastly, the linear system will be converted to an equivalent set of clauses.

3.4.1.1 Minor Technicality

The CNF form does not have any constants. Adding the clause consisting of (T) , or equivalently $(T \vee T \vee \dots \vee T)$, would require the variable T to be true in any satisfying solution, since all clauses must be true in any satisfying solution. Once this is done, the variable T will serve the place of the constant 1, and if needed, the variable \bar{T} will serve the place of the constant 0. Otherwise constants are unavailable in CNF.

Step One: From a Polynomial System to a Linear System

Based on the above technicality, we can consider the constant term 1 to be a variable. After that, every polynomial is now a sum of linear and higher degree terms. Those terms of quadratic and higher degree will be handled as follows.

The logical expression

$$(w \vee \bar{a})(x \vee \bar{a})(y \vee \bar{a})(z \vee \bar{a})(a \vee \bar{w} \vee \bar{x} \vee \bar{y} \vee \bar{z})$$

is tautologically equivalent to $a \iff (w \wedge x \wedge y \wedge z)$, or the $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ equation $a = wxyz$. Similar expressions exist for equations of the form $a = w_1w_2 \cdots w_r$.

Therefore, for each monomial of degree $d > 1$ that appears in the system of equations, we shall introduce one dummy variable. One can see that $d + 1$ clauses are required, and the total length of those clauses is $3d + 1$.

Obviously, if a monomial appears more than once, there is no need to encode it twice, but instead, it should be replaced by its previously defined dummy variable. On the other hand, in a large system, particularly an over-defined one, it is likely that every possible monomial appears at least once in some equation in the system. Therefore we will assume this is the case, but in extremely sparse systems that are not very over-defined, this is pessimistic, particularly for high degree systems.

At the risk of laboring over a minor point, note that in the production code we have a check-list, and never encode the same monomial twice, and only encode a monomial once it has appeared in the system. But, this algorithm can be encoded into LOGSPACE by simply enumerating all the possible monomials at the start,

exactly once, and then continuing with the next step. For a fixed degree, there are polynomially many monomials. If the degree is allowed to change, there are exponentially many.

Step Two: From a Linear System to a Conjunctive Normal Form Expression

Each polynomial is now a sum of variables, or equivalently a logical XOR. Unfortunately, long XORs are known to be hard problems for SAT solvers [CD99]. In particular, the sum $(a + b + c + d) = 0$ is equivalent to

$$(a \vee b \vee c \vee d)(a \vee b \vee \bar{c} \vee \bar{d})(a \vee \bar{b} \vee c \vee \bar{d})(a \vee \bar{b} \vee \bar{c} \vee d) \quad (3.1)$$

$$(\bar{a} \vee b \vee c \vee \bar{d})(\bar{a} \vee b \vee \bar{c} \vee d)(\bar{a} \vee \bar{b} \vee c \vee d)(\bar{a} \vee \bar{b} \vee \bar{c} \vee \bar{d})$$

which is to say, all arrangements of the four variables, with 0, 2, or 4 negations, or all even numbers less than four. For a sum of length ℓ , where $2 \lfloor \ell/2 \rfloor = j$, this requires

$$\binom{\ell}{0} + \binom{\ell}{2} + \binom{\ell}{4} + \cdots + \binom{\ell}{j} = 2^{\ell-1}$$

clauses, which is exponential.

To remedy this, cut each sum into subsums of length c . (We will later call c the cutting number). For example, the equation $x_1 + x_2 + \cdots + x_\ell = 0$ is clearly equivalent to

$$\begin{aligned}
x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + y_1 &= 0 \\
y_1 + x_6 + x_7 + y_2 &= 0 \\
&\vdots \quad \vdots \quad \vdots \\
y_i + x_{4i+2} + x_{4i+3} + y_{i+1} &= 0 \\
&\vdots \quad \vdots \quad \vdots \\
y_h + x_{\ell-2} + x_{\ell-1} + x_\ell &= 0
\end{aligned}$$

if $\ell \equiv 2 \pmod{c}$. (If ℓ is not, the final sum is shorter, this is more efficient because a sum or XOR of shorter length requires fewer clauses). Therefore it is safe to be pessimistic and assume all equations are of length $\ell \equiv 2 \pmod{c}$. In either case, one can calculate $h = \lceil \ell/c \rceil - 2$. Thus there will be $h + 1$ subsums, and each will require 2^{c-1} clauses of length c each, via Equation 3.2 on page 43.

3.4.2 Measures of Efficiency

Three common measures of the size of a CNF-SAT problem are the number of clauses, the total length of all the clauses, and the number of variables. It is not known which of these is a better model of the difficulty of a CNF expression. Initially we have n variables, and 0 clauses of total length 0.

For a quadratic system of polynomials, the cost for each monomial in Step One of the conversion is 1 dummy variable, 3 clauses, of total length 7. This needs to be done for all possible $M - n - 1$ quadratic monomials. The constant monomial

requires 1 dummy variable, and 1 clause of length 1.

The cost in Step Two requires an estimate of the expected value of the length of each equation. Since there are M possible coefficients, then this is equal to $M\beta$. For the moment, assume the cutting number is $c = 4$. There will be (in expected value) $M\beta/2 - 1$ subsums per equation, requiring $M\beta/2 - 2$ dummy variables, $4M\beta - 8$ clauses and total length $16M\beta - 32$.

This is a total of

- Variables: $n + 1 + (M - n - 1)(1) + m(M\beta/2 - 1)$.
- Clauses: $0 + 1 + (M - n - 1)(3) + m(4M\beta - 8)$.
- Length: $0 + 1 + (M - n - 1)(7) + m(16M\beta - 32)$.

Substituting $m = \gamma n$ and $M = n^2/2 + n/2 + 1$, one obtains

- Variables: $\sim n^2/2 + \gamma n^3\beta/4$.
- Clauses: $\sim (3/2)n^2 + 2\gamma n^3\beta$.
- Length: $\sim (7/2)n^2 + 8\gamma n^3\beta$.

Furthermore, so long as $\beta > 1/m$ then the first term of each of those expressions can be discarded. If that were not the case, at least a few equations would have to be all zeroes. These expressions are summarized, for several values of cutting number, in Table 3.1 on page 46

Table 3.1 CNF Expression Difficulty Measures for Quadratic Systems, by Cutting Number

Cutting Number	Variables	Clauses	Length
Cut by 3	$\sim \gamma n^3 \beta / 2$	$\sim 2\gamma n^3 \beta$	$\sim 6\gamma n^3 \beta$
Cut by 4	$\sim \gamma n^3 \beta / 4$	$\sim 2\gamma n^3 \beta$	$\sim 8\gamma n^3 \beta$
Cut by 5	$\sim \gamma n^3 \beta / 6$	$\sim (8/3)\gamma n^3 \beta$	$\sim (40/3)\gamma n^3 \beta$
Cut by 6	$\sim \gamma n^3 \beta / 8$	$\sim 4\gamma n^3 \beta$	$\sim 24\gamma n^3 \beta$
Cut by 7	$\sim \gamma n^3 \beta / 10$	$\sim (6.4)\gamma n^3 \beta$	$\sim 44.8\gamma n^3 \beta$
Cut by 8	$\sim \gamma n^3 \beta / 12$	$\sim (32/3)\gamma n^3 \beta$	$\sim (128/3)\gamma n^3 \beta$

3.4.3 Preprocessing

It is clear from the above expressions that n is the crucial variable in determining the number of dummy variables, clauses, and total lengths of clauses. With this in mind, we devised the following preprocessing scheme, based on the idea of Gaussian Elimination. It is executed before the conversion begins. For any specific polynomial one can reorder the terms as follows

$$x_{a_0} = x_{a_1} + x_{a_2} + \dots + x_{a_n} + (\text{quadratic terms}) + (+1)$$

where the $+1$ term is optional, and $a_i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$. This is, in a sense, a re-definition of x_{a_0} , and so we add this equation to every polynomial in the system where x_{a_0} appears (except the first which is now serving as its definition). Afterword, x_{a_0} will appear nowhere in the system of equations, except in its definition, effectively eliminating it as a variable. Since SAT-solvers tend to choose the most-frequently-appearing variables when deciding which cases to branch on (except in a constant fraction of cases when they select randomly, e.g. 1% of the time), x_{a_0} will not be calculated until all other variables have been set.

If there are t equations of short length in the system, then, after preprocessing, these t variables only appear in their own definitions (not even the definitions of each other), and so far as the main system is concerned, there are now $n - t$ variables. In practice, the effect of this is slightly less than a doubling of performance, see Section 3.5.3 on page 53.

We only consider a polynomial for elimination if it is of length 4 or shorter (called “light massage”) or length 10 or shorter (called “deep massage”). The reason for the length limit is to minimize the increase of β that occurs as follows.

When Gaussian Elimination is performed on an $m \times n$ sparse $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ matrix A , in the i th iteration, the β in the region $A_{i+1,i+1} \dots A_{m,n}$ will tend to be larger (a higher fraction of ones) than that of $A_{i,i} \dots A_{m,n}$ in the previous iteration (See [Bar06] or [Dav06, Ch. 7]). Even in “Structured Gaussian Elimination”, when the lowest weight row is selected for pivoting at each step, this tends to occur. By adding two rows, the new row will have as many ones as the sum of the weights of the two original rows, minus any accidental cancellations. Therefore, by only utilizing low weight rows, one can reduce the increase in β . See the experiments in Section 3.5.3 on page 53, and Table 3.2 on page 55, for the effect.

3.4.4 Fixing Variables in Advance

Since cryptographic keys are generated uniformly at random, it makes sense to generate the x_i ’s as fair coins. But suppose g of these are directly revealed to the SAT solver by including the short equations $x_1 = 1, x_2 = 0, \dots, x_g = 1$, and

that a satisfying solution is found in time t_{SAT} . A real world adversary would not have these g values of course, and would have to guess them, requiring time at most $2^g t_{SAT}$, or half that value for expected time. As in algebraic cryptanalysis [CSPK00] it turns out that $g = 0$ is not the optimal solution. In our experiments on actual cryptographic systems, we manually tried all g within the neighborhood of values which produced t_{SAT} between 1 second and 1 hour, to locate the optimum (the value of g which yielded the lowest running time).

Since exhaustive search requires checking 2^{n-1} possible values of x_1, \dots, x_n on average, then this method is faster than brute force if and only if t_{ver} , the time required to check one potential key, satisfies

$$t_{ver} > t_{SAT} 2^{-(n-g)}$$

This method is useful for the cryptanalysis of a specific system, e.g. DES [CB06]. In addition to having fewer variables, note that $m/n < m/(n-g)$, and so the “over-definition” or γ will increase, yielding further benefit to fixing variables.

However, for random systems of quadratic equations, fixing variables g and substitution of their values results in another system, which is an example of a random system with m equations and $n-g$ unknowns, but with slightly different sparsity. Therefore, we did not have to try different values of g in our final performance experiments, but chose $g = 0$.

3.4.4.1 Parallelization

Suppose g bits are to be fixed, and 2^p processors (for some p) are available, with $p < g$. Then of the 2^g possible values of the g fixed bits, each processor could be assigned 2^{g-p} of them. After that, no communication between processors is required, nor can processors block each other. Therefore parallelization is very efficient. If interprocess communication is possible, then the “learned clauses” (explained in Appendix 4) can be propagated to all running SAT-solvers.

In the event that thousands of volunteers could be found, as in the DES challenge of 1997, or DESCHALL Project [Cur05], then the low communications overhead would be very important.

3.4.5 SAT-Solver Used

The solver used in this chapter is MiniSAT 2.0 [ES05], a minimalist open-source SAT solver which has won a series of awards including the three industrial categories in the SAT 2005 competition and first place in SAT-Race 2006. Mini-SAT is based on Chaff, but the algorithms involved have been optimized and carefully implemented. Also, Mini-SAT has carefully optimized variants of the variable order heuristics and learned clause removal heuristics.

3.4.5.1 Note About Randomness

The program MiniSAT is a randomized algorithm in the sense of occasionally using random numbers to behave probabilistically. However, in order to guarantee

reproducibility, the randomness is seeded from a hash of the input file. Therefore, running the same input file several times yields the same running time, to within 1%. Obviously, this “locked” randomness maybe a lucky choice, or an unlucky one. Since the actual performance of MiniSAT on these problems is log-normal (see Section 3.5.2 on page 51), the consequences of an unlucky choice are drastic. Therefore, one (in testing) should generate 20–50 CNF files of the same system, each perhaps different by fixing a different subset of g of the original n variables, or perhaps by reordering the clauses in a random shuffle.

The latter is very cheap computationally, but the former is better, as casual experimentation has shown there are definitely “lucky” and “unlucky” choices of variables to fix. More precisely, the running time is not dependent on g alone, but also on the specific g out of n monomials chosen to be fixed. The expected value of the running time in practice can then be calculated as the mean of the running times of the 20–50 samples, each with a distinct random choice of fixed variables.

3.5 Experimental Results

In general, the running times are *highly* variable. We propose that the log-normal distribution, sometimes called Gibrat’s distribution, is a reasonable model of the running time for a given system. This implies merely that the running time t is distributed as e^x , where x is some random variable with the normal (Gaussian) distribution. In practice, however, this presents an experimental design challenge.

The distributions of the running times vary so wildly that at absolute mini-

mum, 50 experiments must be performed to get an estimate of the expectation. Also, minor improvements, such as parameters of massaging, are only statistically significant after hundreds of repeated trials—which makes careful tuning of the massaging process impossible.

3.5.1 The Source of the Equations

In cryptanalysis, we always know that a message was indeed sent, and so we know at least one solution exists to our equations. But, in generating a random system of equations, if over-defined, we must take care, because many systems of equations will have no solution. Therefore we used the following technique.

We started with a random system of m polynomial equations in n variables. Each coefficient was set by a weighted coin, but independently and identically distributed. By moving all the terms to the same side of the equal sign, one can easily see this as m functions on n variables, or a map $F : \mathbb{GF}(2)^n \rightarrow \mathbb{GF}(2)^m$. Then we generated a random vector \vec{x} in GF^n by flipping fair coins. It is easy to calculate $F(\vec{x}) = \vec{y}$. Finally we gave our tools the job of finding \vec{x} given only \vec{y} , F , and possibly a few bits of \vec{x} if noted.

3.5.2 The Log-Normal Distribution of Running Times

Examine Figures 1 and 2, which plot the probability distribution of the running time, and its natural logarithm, respectively. One can observe that the second figure “looks normal”, in the sense of being a bell curve that has had its right end truncated.




Figure 3.1: The Distribution of Running Times, Experiment 1

The kurtosis of a random variable is a measure of “how close to normal” it is, and takes values in $[-3, \infty)$. The normal distribution has a kurtosis of zero, and positive kurtosis implies a leptokurtic distribution (one with values near the mean being more common than in the Gaussian) and negative kurtosis implies a platykurtic distribution (one with values near the mean less common than the Gaussian). The plot of running times suggests an exponential of some kind, and so upon taking the natural logarithm of each point, a set of values with very low kurtosis (0.07) was found. The plot is close to a bell curve, and is from 443 data points, 14 of which were longer than the manually set 1800 sec time out, and 427 of which were plotted. Since $\log_e(1800) \approx 7.496$, this explains why the graph seems truncated at $\log_e t > 7.50$.

These trials were of a system of equations with $n = 64, m = 640, \gamma = 10, \beta = 1/100$, with $g = 15$ variables fixed in advance. The cutting number was 5, and




Figure 3.2: The Distribution of the Logarithm of Running Times, Experiment 1

light massaging was applied. The average running time of those that completed was 326.25 seconds, on one processor. Since brute force would have to make an expectation of 2^{48} guesses to find the 49 bits not guessed, this is faster than brute force if and only if one guess can be verified in less than $t_{ver} = 0.001159$ nanoseconds, on one processor. This is absurd for modern technological means. At the time this dissertation was written, even t_{ver} equal to 10,000 times that value would be most likely infeasible.

3.5.3 The Optimal Cutting Number

See Table 3.2 on page 55. The system solved here is identical to that in the previous experiment, except different cutting numbers and massaging numbers were used during the conversion. Also, only 50 experiments were run. The result shows that deep massaging is a worthwhile step, as it cuts the running time by half and

takes only a few seconds. Furthermore, it shows cutting by six is optimal, at least for this system. Note, cutting by 8 would produce extremely large files (around 11 Mb)—those for cutting by 7 were already 5.66 Mb. Both in this case, and in casual experiments with other systems of equations, the running time does not depend too much on cutting number (also visible in Table 3.2 on page 55), and that cutting by six remains efficient.

The kurtosis is seen to vary considerably in the table. Also, some of the modes have kurtosis near zero, which would imply a normal and not log-normal distribution. This is an artifact of having only 50 experiments per mode. Among statisticians, a common rule is that a kurtosis of ± 1 is “reasonably close to Gaussian,” which is the case in all but two of the systems in Table 3.2 on page 55 for the logarithm of the running time.

The message ratio is the quotient of the running time with massaging to that of the running time without. As one can see, the effects of a deep message were slightly less than doubling the speed of the system. A light message was even detrimental at times. This is because the requirement that a polynomial only be length 4 is quite severe (very few polynomials are that short). Therefore, there is only a small reduction in the number of variables, which might not be sufficient to offset the increase in β .

Table 3.2 Running Time Statistics in Seconds

	Cut by 3	Cut by 4	Cut by 5	Cut by 6	Cut by 7
No Massaging					
Naïve Average	393.94	279.71	179.66	253.15	340.66
Naïve StDev	433.13	287.33	182.18	283.09	361.04
Naïve Kurtosis	0.93	5.12	0.79	1.16	2.47
Average(ln)	5.11	4.96	4.55	4.72	5.2
StDev(ln)	1.63	1.46	1.35	1.51	1.27
Kurtosis(ln)	0.51	0.8	0.43	-0.5	-0.32
Light Massaging					
Naïve Average	413.74	181.86	269.59	217.54	259.73
Naïve StDev	439.71	160.23	301.48	295.88	237.52
Naïve Kurtosis	0.04	0.08	3.68	6.85	0.01
Message Ratio	1.05	0.65	1.5	0.86	0.76
Average(ln)	5.3	4.64	4.84	4.52	4.87
StDev(ln)	1.39	1.29	1.5	1.47	1.5
Kurtosis(ln)	-0.38	0.07	0.09	-0.14	0.52
Deep Massaging					
Naïve Average	280.22	198.15	204.48	144.94	185.44
Naïve StDev	363.64	292.21	210.53	150.88	49.53
Naïve Kurtosis	5.67	9.24	3.74	0.62	4.69
Message Ratio	0.71	0.71	1.14	0.57	0.54
Average(ln)	4.82	4.34	4.54	4.07	4.33
StDev(ln)	1.48	1.68	1.63	1.73	1.54
Kurtosis(ln)	1.1	2.41	0.75	-0.06	-0.23

3.5.4 Comparison with MAGMA, Singular

See Table 3.3 on page 57. The following experiments were performed using deep massaging, and cutting number equal to six, on a 2 GHz PC. By Singular, we refer to version 3.0.2 [sin]. By MAGMA, we refer to version 2.11-2, and by MiniSAT, we refer to version 2.0 [ES05]. Various values of n, β and γ were chosen to highlight the role of the number of variables, the sparsity, and the over-definition of the system.

In particular, this method is much worse than brute force for dense systems, but far better than brute force for sparse systems (a $t_{ver} \approx 10^{-9}$ seconds would be the smallest value that could represent present capabilities. Recall t_{ver} is the time required to verify a false guess in brute-force). The transition appears somewhere near $\beta = 1/100$. The line marked $n = 49$ represents the experiments done in the previous part of this chapter.

Finally, it is interesting to note that if Magma and Singular do not crash, then they out-perform our method. However, they do crash for many of the systems in this study, with an “out of memory” error. In practice, SAT-solvers do not require much more memory than that required to hold the problem. This is not the case for Gröbner Bases algorithms.

3.6 Previous Work

The exploration of SAT-solver enabled cryptanalysis is often said to have begun with Massacci and Marraro [Mas99, MM99, MM00, HMN00], who attempted

Table 3.3 Speeds of Comparison Trials between Magma, Singular and ANFtoCNF-MiniSAT

n	m	c	β	Magma	Singular	SAT-solver	t_{ver}
22	220	10	0.5	1.7 sec	1.0 sec	4021.99 sec	1.92×10^{-3} sec
30	150	5	0.1	3.5 sec	560 sec	$\approx 11,000$ sec	2.05×10^{-5} sec
52	520	10	0.01	277.890 sec	crashed	789.734 sec	3.51×10^{-13} sec
136	1360	10	10^{-3}	crashed	crashed	??	??
263	2630	10	10^{-4}	??	??	2846.95 sec	6.54×10^{-38} sec
22	25	1.1	0.5	65.5 sec	≈ 7200 sec	1451.62 sec	6.92×10^{-4} sec
30	33	1.1	0.1	crashed	crashed	15,021.4 sec	2.80×10^{-5} sec
52	58	1.1	0.01	??	??	??	??
133	157	1.1	10^{-3}	??	??	??	??
128	1280	10	10^{-3}	< 1 sec	crashed	0.25 sec	1.47×10^{-39} sec
250	2500	10	10^{-4}	??	91.5 sec	0.26 sec	1.44×10^{-76} sec
49	640	10.06	0.01	n/a	n/a	326.25 sec	1.159×10^{-12} sec

cryptanalysis of DES with the SAT-solvers Tableau, Sato, and Rel-SAT. This was successful to three rounds. However, this was a head-on approach, encoding cryptographic properties directly as CNF formulæ. A more algebraic approach has recently been published by Courtois and Bard [CB06], which breaks six rounds (of sixteen). Fiorini, Martinelli and Massacci have also explored forging an RSA signature by encoding modular root finding as a SAT problem in [FMM03].

The application of SAT-solvers to the cryptanalysis of hash functions, or more correctly, collision search, began with [JJ05] which showed how to convert hash-theoretic security objectives into logical formulæ. The paper [MZ06], by Mironov and Zhang, continued the exploration of hash functions via SAT-solvers by finding collisions in MD4 and MD5.

We believe this is the first successful application of SAT-solvers to solving

systems of equations over finite fields. However, the approach was mentioned in [Cou01a], upon the suggestion of Jacques Stern.

3.7 Conclusions

The problem of solving a multivariate system of equations over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ is important to cryptography. We demonstrate that it is possible to efficiently convert such a problem into a CNF-SAT problem. We further demonstrate that solving such a CNF-SAT problem on a SAT-solver is faster than brute force for sparse cases. On most problems of even intermediate size, Gröbner-Bases-oriented methods, like Magma and Singular, crash due to a lack of sufficient memory. Our method, on the other hand, requires little more memory than that required to store the problem. In examples where Magma and Singular do not crash, these tools are faster than our methods. However, our method is still much faster than brute force approximately when $\beta \leq 1/100$.

3.8 Cubic Systems

While no experiments were performed on random cubic systems, the cryptanalysis of the first 6-rounds of the Data Encryption Standard by Courtois and Bard [CB06] was carried out using the method in this chapter. It was much faster than brute force; however, it was necessary to perform a great deal of human-powered preprocessing. See that paper for details.

In particular, the conversion for cubics proceeds identically to quadratics. The

number of possible monomials is much higher. Intuition implies that the assumption that every monomial is probably present might not be true.

However, degree does not, in fact, affect the probability that a given monomial is present somewhere in the system. The probability any particular monomial is present in any particular equation is β . Since there are m equations, the probability that a monomial is present anywhere is $1 - (1 - \beta)^m$. Degree has no role to play in that equation. Since this is obviously equal to the expected fraction of monomials missing, it is interesting to compute what β would need to be in order for a fraction r or less of the expected monomials to be present:

$$(1 - (1 - \beta)^m) \leq r$$

Since this would be a small β (for $r < 1/2$) we can approximate $(1 - \beta)^m \approx 1 - m\beta$, or $m\beta \leq r$.

It would not be worth the overhead to keep a checklist unless perhaps 3/4 or more of the monomials never actually appear. So it is interesting to discover what β , in a cubic and quadratic example, would result in that level of monomial absences (i.e. $r < 1/4$).

Cubic Example Consider $n = 128$, $m = 128\gamma$, a number of monomials $\approx 128^3/6 \approx 349525$. This would require $\beta \leq 1/512\gamma$. This means the average length of an equation would be $\leq 683/\gamma$. This could easily occur if the system is not highly overdefined, i.e. $\gamma \approx 1$. It is also easy to imagine systems where this would not occur.

Table 3.4 CNF Expression Difficulty Measures for Cubic Systems, by Cutting Number

Cutting Number	Variables	Clauses	Length
Cut by 3	$\sim cn^4\beta/6$	$\sim (2/3)cn^4\beta$	$\sim 2cn^4\beta$
Cut by 4	$\sim cn^4\beta/12$	$\sim (2/3)cn^4\beta$	$\sim (8/3)cn^4\beta$
Cut by 5	$\sim cn^4\beta/18$	$\sim (8/9)cn^4\beta$	$\sim (40/9)cn^4\beta$
Cut by 6	$\sim cn^4\beta/24$	$\sim (4/3)cn^4\beta$	$\sim 8cn^4\beta$
Cut by 7	$\sim cn^4\beta/30$	$\sim (32/15)cn^4\beta$	$\sim (224/15)cn^4\beta$
Cut by 8	$\sim cn^4\beta/36$	$\sim (32/9)cn^4\beta$	$\sim (256/9)cn^4\beta$

Quadratic Example $n = 128$, $m = 128\gamma$, number of monomials $128^2/2 \approx 8192$.

This would require $\beta \leq 1/512\gamma$. This means the average length of an equation would be $\leq 16/\gamma$. Therefore, the system would have to be rather sparse with very short equations in order for this to happen.

There are $\binom{n}{3} \sim n^3/6$ cubic monomials possible, each requiring 1 dummy variable, 4 clauses of total length 10. There are as before $\binom{n}{2} \sim n^2/2$ quadratic monomials possible, each requiring 1 dummy variable, 3 clauses of total length 7.

The total number of monomials possible is thus

$$M = \binom{n}{3} + \binom{n}{2} + \binom{n}{1} + \binom{n}{0} \sim n^3/6$$

The expected length of any polynomial is $\beta M \sim \beta n^3/6$. Taking cutting by four as an example, this would require $\sim \beta n^3/12$ dummy variables, and $\sim (2/3)\beta n^3$ clauses of total length $\sim (8/3)\beta n^3$, for each of the m equations. Therefore, the cost of converting the monomials is negligible compared to that of representing the sums, as before.

An interesting note is that as explained earlier, any polynomial system of equations in $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ can be rewritten as a (larger) quadratic system. It is unclear if it is better to convert a cubic system via this method, and then construct a CNF-SAT problem, or construct the CNF-SAT problem directly from the cubic system of equations. Many more experiments are needed.

3.9 NP-Completeness of MQ

The NP-Completeness of MQ over $GF(2)$ is given in Garey and Johnson [GJ78], in Appendix A7, Problem AN9. They, in turn, cite an unpublished manuscript of A. Fraenkel and Y. Yesha, 1977. The extension to $GF(p)$ has been proven by Goubin and Patarin, but has not yet been published at the time this dissertation was written. The following proof, however, is more direct and sheds light on the problem.

Given a 3-CNF problem, with m clauses of the form $(v_{i_1} \vee v_{i_2} \vee v_{i_3})$ for $i = 1 \dots m$, and n variables x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n , with v_{ij} being either an x_i or its negation, we can write a cubic system of equations as follows.

First, recall that each clause must be true in a satisfying assignment, and an assignment which makes each clause true is satisfying. We will write one equation for each clause by noting the following tautology:

$$(a \vee b \vee c) \Leftrightarrow ((a \vee b) \wedge c) \oplus (a \vee b) \oplus c$$

$$((a \wedge c) \vee (b \wedge c)) \oplus (a \vee b) \oplus c$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& ((a \wedge c \wedge b \wedge c) \oplus (a \wedge c) \oplus (b \wedge c)) \oplus ((a \wedge b) \oplus a \oplus b) \oplus c \\
& (a \wedge b \wedge c) \oplus (a \wedge c) \oplus (b \wedge c) \oplus (a \wedge b) \oplus a \oplus b \oplus c \\
& (abc + ac + bc + ab + a + b + c) = 1
\end{aligned}$$

Furthermore, if a were negated, substituting $1 + a$ for a would not change the degree of that polynomial, likewise for b and c . Thus each clause becomes one cubic polynomial equation. The number of variables is unchanged. And this is clearly a polynomial time conversion. The increase in length is obviously linear.

Also recall that every cubic system of equations can be rewritten as a quadratic system with the introduction of a few new variables (one per cubic monomial). Since there is only one cubic monomial per equation, this would be a very modest increase in the number of variables.

Therefore, if we had a black box that could solve either cubic or quadratic polynomials over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ in polynomial time, then we could solve CNF-SAT problems using that black box in polynomial time. Therefore, if MQ (the problem of solving a multivariate quadratic polynomial over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$) is in P, then CNF-SAT is in P, and $P=NP$.

Thus MQ is NP-Hard. Likewise for MC, the problem of solving a multivariate cubic polynomial over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$. The decision problem related to it is “does this quadratic system of equations over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ have a solution?” Clearly a witness to this decision would be a solution itself, and verifying one would be rapid. Therefore the decision problem is in NP, and is therefore NP-Complete.

3.10 Final Note on Sparse MQ and F5

It should be noted that we have observed, when sufficient memory is available, that Magma can indeed solve large random sparse MQ systems. We have found nothing in the published literature to date that suggests this. In fact, it appears that some believe random large MQ to be hard, regardless if sparse or not. A curious consequence of this is that Magma, which uses Faugère's F4 algorithm [Fau99], may turn out to be the fastest method of solving sparse random large MQ if sufficient memory is available.

Chapter 4

How do SAT-Solvers Operate?

The purpose of this appendix is to explain how SAT-solvers operate (at least at the time of writing). The family of SAT-solvers described here is based on the Chaff Algorithm [MMZ⁺01]. This gives insight into Chapter 3 on page 36, in particular, by highlighting why the number of variables per clause, number of clauses, and number of variables, are taken as the three general barometers of difficulty for a particular SAT problem.

At this time, SAT-solvers different from Chaff are no longer currently in use. However, that could someday change, and in Section 4.4 on page 74, the Walk-SAT algorithm is described. Walk-SAT was the last competitor to Chaff. Many SAT algorithms have been proposed in previous years, and also many preprocessing techniques, none of which will be described below.

4.1 The Problem Itself

Given a logical sentence over certain variables, does there exist a set of assignments of true and false to each of those variables so that the entire sentence evaluates as true? This question is the “SAT” problem, and is the root of the theory of NP-Completeness.

The term “logical sentence” in this document refers to an expression composed

of variables, and the operators from predicate calculus (AND, OR, NOT, IMPLIES, and IFF), arranged according to the grammar of predicate calculus. There are no universal quantifiers (i.e. \forall), existential quantifiers (i.e. \exists), or any functions. An example of such a sentence is

$$(D \wedge \overline{B} \wedge A) \Rightarrow (B \vee C)$$

which is satisfied by (for example) setting all the variables to true.

It is a basic fact from circuitry theory that any logical sentence can be written as a product of sums (Conjunctive Normal Form or CNF) or sum of products (Disjunctive Normal Form). These terms refer to the semiring first introduced in Section A.2 on page 133, where addition is logical-OR and multiplication is logical-AND.

4.1.1 Conjunctive Normal Form

A logical sentence in CNF is a set of clauses. Each clause is combined into a large conjunction or AND-gate. Thus the sentence is true if and only if each clause is true. The clauses are themselves OR-gates, or disjunctions. Each variable in the clause can appear negated, or not negated.

Product of Sums or Conjunctive Normal Form has been selected as the universal notation for SAT-solvers for many reasons. One reason is that all predicate calculus sentences can be written in CNF. Another interesting reason is that some sentences can be written with two or fewer variables per clause, and others require

three variables at least for a few clauses. There does not exist a logical sentence which cannot be written with the restriction of at most three variables per clause. Solving the SAT problem on CNF sentences with at most two variables per clause (2-CNF) is possible in polynomial time. For CNF sentences with up to three variables per clause (3-CNF), SAT is NP-Complete.

While one could write any logical sentence in 3-CNF notation, it is not required for SAT solvers that the author is aware of. The logical sentence need merely be in CNF form.

4.2 Chaff and its Descendants

There is a large economic and financial incentive to make good SAT-solvers (see Section 4.5 on page 74). For this reason, a series of competitions has been held each year [BS06]. The Chaff algorithm proposed by [MMZ⁺01] is at the core of all currently competitive SAT-solvers. Like most users of SAT-solvers, we treat the system as a black-box, worrying only on how to present it with our problem in a way that results in the most efficient search for a solution.

4.2.1 Variable Management

Every variable in the system will be given one of three values, namely true, false, and not-yet-known. Initially, all variables are set to not-yet-known. As mentioned earlier, variables in a clause can be negated or not-negated. The first step is to replace all the negated variables with new ones (thus doubling the number of

variables). However, the original variables are identified by the positive integers. The negation of a variable has as its ID, the additive inverse of the original ID. Thus whenever the variable numbered x is set to true, then it is understood that $-x$ will be set to false, regardless of the original sign of x .

There are three consequences to this. First, none of the variables in the system are negated after this step; even though there are twice as many, they are tied together as described; and when one variable is changed to true or false from “not-yet-known”, its complement will be set accordingly.

Now each clause is a disjunction (OR-gate) of some particular variables. If any of those variables is at any time true, then the clause is satisfied. We will declare the clause “inactive” and it will be hidden from the algorithm. Thus the “active” clauses are those that are not-yet-satisfied. Likewise, if all of the variables are false, then satisfiability has become impossible, and back-tracking must take place. We will cover back-tracking later, in Section 4.2.4 on page 70.

Therefore, an active clause (except during backtracking) has no variables set to true—all of its variables are set to false or not-yet-known, with at least one of those being not-yet-known. But suppose, out of n variables, a clause were to have $n - 1$ false variables and one not-yet-known. Clearly in any satisfying assignment, that not-yet-known variable must be true, and so we can set it to true. This rule is called “unit propagation.”

4.2.2 The Method of Watched Literals

In practice, each clause has two pointers associated with it, which we will denote “fingers”. Each finger must point to a variable, and since all variables begin the system with the status of not-yet-known, they all point to a (distinct) not-yet-known variable. If the status of a fingered variable changes, then the finger will move. If the variable becomes true, then the clause is now inactive, and out of the algorithm. If the variable becomes false, then the finger will try to move to another variable in the same clause which is not-yet-known. If this is possible, it moves there. If not, then this means there is one not-yet-known variable (pointed to by the other finger) and all the other variables are false (because the clause is still active). As we stated before, this means that the remaining single not-yet-known variable must be set to true. And conveniently, we do not need to search for it, because the other finger is pointing to it. The clause is now satisfied and can be deleted. This is called the “Method of Watched Literals.”

One additional rule is used. If a variable v is found somewhere in the entire system, and $\neg v$ is not, then it is safe to set v to true and $\neg v$ to false. This sounds like it might require a search. The beauty of the “chaff” algorithm is that it uses pointers in a clever way to ensure that searches are not needed, except at setup.

4.2.3 How to Actually Make This Happen

There will be an array from $-n$ to n that contains all system variables. Each variable will have a list of clauses that contain it, and every clause will have a list

of variables that it contains.

When a variable is set to true, any clause that contains it is deactivated. Then for each of those newly deactivated clauses, the variables contained in them are notified to remove that clause from their list of clauses that contain them. If one of those lists becomes empty, the variable then is not found in the system. This means its complement can be marked true, and it can be marked false, with all the consequences that this paragraph requires from that marking. Once this is done, the complement of the original variable which was set to true can be set to false.

When a variable is set to false, all the clauses are notified. If that variable had one of the clause's fingers then that finger is moved to any variable in that clause which is currently marked not-yet-known. If no such clause is available, then the variable pointed to by the other finger is marked true, with all the consequences we described above. Of course, if an entire clause becomes false, the system has discovered a contradiction and must begin back-tracking (which hasn't been explained yet, see Section 4.2.4 on page 70). And if not already done so, the complement of the variable already set to false should be now set to true, with all the consequences that entails.

Thus, we start with a system with all the variables set to not-yet-known. We build the data-structures previously described. If any of the variables v fails to appear in the system, (i.e. the list of clauses containing v is empty), then we mark v false and mark $\neg v$ true, which hopefully sets off a flurry of activity. Then either the system will halt with all clauses inactive, which means we have found a satisfying assignment, and print it out; or halt with a contradiction which means the original

problem was unsatisfiable; or with overwhelming probability, knock-out only a few things and leave a problem that looks relatively unchanged.

At this time we choose a not-yet-known variable to be “assumed.” For example, with 1% probability, it could be a randomly chosen variable. Otherwise, with probability 99%, it is that variable which appears in the largest number of clauses (has the longest list of clauses associated). The variable selection is a heuristic and varies from implementation to implementation. This variable will now be changed to true or false, decided by a fair coin. Then that assumption will be pushed on to an “assumption stack.” Hopefully, this also sets off a flurry of activity and either results in a satisfying assignment or a smaller problem. If a satisfying assignment has resulted, we print the answer and declare victory. If a smaller problem results, we guess another variable.

4.2.4 Back-Tracking

The third possibility is that we reach a contradiction. (Some clause is entirely false). If this is the case, then we “pop” the most recent assumption off of the stack. If it were that v is true, then we now assume v is false, and check to see if the contradiction remains. If the contradiction remains, we keep popping assumptions until the contradiction no longer remains. At least one (v), if not several variables, have now changed their state, and so a great deal of rewinding must take place. Due to clever data structure design, akin to a journaling file-system, the rewinding can be made very efficient.

If the contradiction stack becomes empty, and a contradiction remains, then the original problem was unsatisfiable. Now assume that the contradiction can be repaired by popping off one, some, or all of the assumptions, and the algorithm then continues as before.

Some care is needed to make sure an infinite loop does not result but this is easily taken care of with flag variables. Once a variable setting has resulted in a contradiction (e.g. $v_5 = T$), and its negation is attempted (e.g. $v_5 = F$), if that also fails, the system should move further up the assumption stack, and not try the original (e.g. $v_5 = T$) a second time.

Sometimes searches of a boolean space are described as a tree. Each assumption is analogous to taking one branch of the tree over another. Note that because more than one assumption can be popped off of the stack at once, it is possible to “lop off” large portions of the tree in a single move. This also occurs when clauses are learned. For this reason, Chaff is much faster than an ordinary tree search, no matter how cleverly implemented. For this reason, the true running time is conjectured to be c^ℓ , where ℓ is the number of variables, and $1 < c < 2$ is a constant.

The reason that this “lopping off” occurs is that a CNF-SAT expression is like a product in a factored polynomial. When one factor of a polynomial is zero, the whole thing is zero. Thus if one clause is false, the conjunction of them all is false. For this reason, one need not investigate all the settings for the other clauses. Once a sub-tree has been identified as having the property of always forcing some particular clause to be false, that sub-tree can be ignored.

4.3 Enhancements to Chaff

Once the previous description is understood, the following enhancements make the system very efficient.

4.3.1 Learning

There is one last element of this algorithm, namely learning new clauses. Suppose the assumption stack has five assumptions on it (without loss of generality: v_1, v_2, \dots, v_5 are true), and a contradiction results. We then know that

$$\overline{v_1 \wedge v_2 \wedge v_3 \wedge v_4 \wedge v_5}$$

is true, which is equivalent to

$$\overline{v_1} \vee \overline{v_2} \vee \overline{v_3} \vee \overline{v_4} \vee \overline{v_5}$$

which is conveniently a CNF clause! Thus we have “learned” a new clause from this contradiction, which we can safely toss into the system. These learned clauses might be quite long, (if the stack was large when the contradiction occurred) and there might be many of them (if many contradictions were found). They are added to the system but flagged as “learned.” If a learned clause has not served a purpose in a long time (e.g. it hasn’t changed activation status within $t \approx 10^5$ steps) then it can be deleted, but clauses that were part of the original problem are never deleted. This keeps a bound on the number of clauses.

Sometimes a set of clauses will simultaneously become all false, each alone

enough to produce a contradiction. In this case, many clauses can be added at once, one for each contradiction-causing clause.

4.3.2 The Alarm Clock

Finally, the algorithm has an alarm clock. If the algorithm hasn't found an answer after a certain length of time has elapsed, then it will completely reboot the entire system, *except that it retains any clauses that it learned*. The idea is that by starting over with this new information, a more efficient path might be taken. The initial timer is set quite short, and then increases after each time-out. This is better than a fixed timer of t seconds, because a problem that required $t + \epsilon$ seconds would be unsolvable. In any case, this is all heuristic, and it seems to work in practice.

4.3.3 The Third Finger

Another variant, universally employed, is to add a third finger to each clause. Like the first two fingers, it can only be attached to a variable which is not-yet-known, and is not currently pointed to by one of the other two fingers. Once this is no longer possible in an active clause, the system is aware that two variables are not-yet-known, and all the others are false in that clause. (Note, if there were a true variable there, then the clause would be inactive). Thus the failure of the third finger to attach gives the system warning that this particular clause is about to trigger a "unit propagation."

4.4 Walk-SAT

Walk-SAT simulates a walk through a search space, using the greedy algorithm at each step to determine what step to take. Essentially, the algorithm begins with a random assignment. The number of unsatisfied clauses is tabulated. It then toggles each of the variables once, and sees which one reduces the number of unsatisfied clauses the most. (Actually, to be technical, it performs this calculation analytically, not with brute force, using the structure of the clauses). The toggle which was most effective at reducing the number of unsatisfied clauses is now adopted, and the algorithm repeats. There is a timer which resets after a fixed time elapses, re-initializing the algorithm with a random setting.

Improvements that were made allowed for a random choice at each step. For example, if the variable whose toggle resulted in the most number of newly satisfied clauses is called “first place”, then first place might be selected with probability 60%, second place with probability 30%, third with probability 8%, and a random variable with probability 2%.

4.5 Economic Motivations

Suppose a certain sub-circuit of a larger circuit is not satisfiable. Then surely one can replace its outputs with a 0, and delete that circuit, saving many gates. If not, then suppose its negation is not satisfiable. Then one can replace its outputs with a 1, and delete the circuit. For this reason, the CNF-SAT problem is crucial to the efficient implementation of microelectronics. (Though the problems

frequently solved by SAT-solvers are usually much more complex than those two simple examples).

Over the years, there have been so many new and efficient SAT-solvers that the common way to solve many NP-Complete problems is to convert the problem into a CNF sentence, and then call a SAT-solver to find a satisfying assignment. In some ways it is amazing that this works, because much information is lost when performing the conversion. Yet it is a common practice, because SAT-solvers have been so carefully tuned by many researchers over several decades. The common applications are planning, AI, circuit-layout, and automated theorem proving (perhaps the last one is not economic).

4.5.1 An Interesting Coincidence

Also note that the DES implementation attacked in [CB06] was one that had been produced by an automated circuit minimization tool to reduce the number of gates, presumably for speed and economic reasons. However, the reduction in the number of gates directly leads to a simpler (sparser) algebraic representation as well. This minimization would have been done by tools related to the SAT-problem as well as other NP-hard problems. Thus SAT is interesting for cryptanalysis in several ways.

Part II

Linear Systems

Chapter 5

The Method of Four Russians

Solving a linear system of $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ equations lies at the heart of many cryptanalytic techniques. Some examples include stream cipher cryptanalysis via the XL algorithm and its many variants [Arm02, Arm04, AA05, AK03, Cou02, Cou03, Cou04a, CM03, HR04, CSPK00]; the algebraic attacks on the HFE public-key cryptosystem [Cou01b, FJ03, CGP03, Cou04c]; cryptanalysis of QUAD [BGP05]; and solving the matrix square root (provably NP-Hard) with the XL algorithm [Kut03].

Gaussian Elimination is a natural choice of algorithm for these problems. However, for dense systems, its cubic-time complexity makes it far too slow in practice. The algorithm in this chapter achieves a speed-up of 3.36 times for a 32000×32000 $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -matrix generated by random fair coins. The theoretical complexity of the algorithm is $O(n^3/\log n)$, but it should be remembered that frequently n is the cube or higher power of a parameter of the system being attacked, and so frequently is in the millions.

At first it may seem surprising that so much attention is given to an algorithm of complexity $O(n^3/\log n)$, since Strassen's Algorithm for Matrix Multiplication has complexity $O(n^{\log_2 7})$. But, in the end, we will combine the two algorithms.

The algorithms in this chapter have formed the backbone of a linear algebra suite coded by the author, and are now part of SAGE [sag], an open source competitor

to Magma [mag]. Some of the experiments cited in this chapter were performed by SAGE volunteers and staff, as noted in each case.

Performance is formally modeled and experimental running times are provided, including running times for the optimal setting of the algorithm’s parameter. The algorithm is named Method of Four Russians for Inversion (M4RI), in honor of the matrix multiplication algorithm from which it emerged, the Method of Four Russians for Multiplication (M4RM). The “Four” are Arlazarov, Dinic, Kronrod, and Faradzev [ADKF70], but later information showed that not all are Russian.

5.1 Origins and Previous Work

A paper published by Arlazarov, Dinic, Kronrod, and Faradzev [ADKF70] in 1970 on graph theory contained an $O((\log d)(v^3/\log v))$ algorithm for finding the transitive closure of a directed graph of v vertexes and diameter d . This problem is of course equivalent to exponentiation of a boolean matrix (the adjacency matrix) and the community quickly realized that it was useful not only as a matrix squaring algorithm, but also a matrix multiplication algorithm, because

$$\begin{bmatrix} A & B \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}^2 = \begin{bmatrix} A^2 & AB \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

and therefore squaring a matrix and matrix multiplication are equivalent. The running time of the algorithm so produced (given in Section 5.3 on page 82 below), is $O(n^3/\log n)$ for an $n \times n$ matrix. This equivalence is not as inefficient as it might seem, as one can trivially calculate the upper-right quadrant of the answer

matrix without calculating the other three-fourths of it. This algorithm appears in Aho, Hopcroft, and Ullman’s book, which gives the name “the Method of Four Russians. . . after the cardinality and the nationality of its inventors” [AHU74, Ch. 6]. While that text states this algorithm is for boolean matrices, one can easily see how to adapt it to $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ or even to $GF(q)$ for very small q .

A similarly inspired matrix inversion algorithm was known anecdotally among some cryptanalysts. The author would like to express gratitude to Nicholas Courtois who explained the following algorithm to him after Eurocrypt 2005 in Århus, Denmark. It appears that this algorithm has not been published, either in the literature or on the Internet. We call this newer algorithm the “Method of 4 Russians for Inversion” (M4RI) and the original as the “Method of 4 Russians for Multiplication” (M4RM).

5.1.1 Strassen’s Algorithm

Strassen’s famous paper [Str69] has three algorithms—one for matrix multiplication, one for inversion, and one for the calculation of determinants. The last two are for use with any matrix multiplication algorithm taken as a black box, and run in time big-Theta of matrix multiplication. However, substantial modification is needed to make these work over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$. Details can be found in Section B.5.4 on page 144 but for now, recall the running time,

$$\sim \left(\frac{n}{n_0}\right)^{\log_2 7} M(n_0)$$

where $M(n_0)$ is the time required to multiply an $n_0 \times n_0$ matrix in the “fall-back” algorithm. Strassen’s algorithm will repeatedly cut a matrix in half until the pieces are smaller than n_0 . After this point, the tiny pieces are resolved with the fall-back algorithm, and the answer is constructed. For this reason, if $M(n_0)$ is smaller with M4RM rather than the naïve algorithm, or likewise M4RI versus Gaussian Elimination, then Strassen’s Algorithm will be proportionally improved for all sufficiently large matrices. Since n_0 might be large, a speed-up of $\log n_0$ is not trivial.

5.2 Rapid Subspace Enumeration

The following step is crucial in the Method of Four Russians family of algorithms. An n -dimensional subspace of a vector-space over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ has 2^n vectors in it, including the all-zero vector. Given n basis vectors for that subspace, how can we rapidly enumerate these 2^n vectors?

Obviously, any vector in the subspace can be written as a linear combination of the basis vectors. In $\mathbb{GF}(2)$, a linear combination is just a sum of a subset. There will be 1 vector with 0 basis vectors in that subset, n vectors will be written as a sum of one basis vector, $\binom{n}{2}$ will be written as a sum of two basis vectors, \dots , $\binom{n}{n} = 1$ will be written as a sum of all the basis vectors. Thus the expected number of basis vectors in the sum for any particular subspace vector is given by

$$\sum_{i=0}^{i=n} i \binom{n}{i} = \frac{n}{2} 2^n$$

Instead, [ADKF70] contains an indirect description of a faster way. A k -bit Gray Code is all 2^k binary strings of length k , ordered so that each differs by

exactly one bit in one position from each of its neighbors. For example, one 3-bit Gray Code is $\{000, 001, 011, 010, 110, 111, 101, 100\}$ [Gra53]. Now consider the i th bit of this code to represent the i th basis vector. This means that the all-zero string represents the all-zero vector, and the all-ones string represents the sum of all the basis vectors. The Gray Code will cycle through all 2^n vectors in the subspace. Furthermore, each sum can be obtained from the previous sum by only one vector addition.

The reason for this is that each codeword differs in exactly one bit from its predecessor. Thus, given a codeword, suppose bit i is flipped to produce the next codeword. If it was a $0 \rightarrow 1$ transition, adding the i th basis vector to the sum will produce the correct new sum. But, if it was a $1 \rightarrow 0$ transition, adding the i th basis vector to the sum will also produce the correct sum because $\vec{x} + \vec{x} = 0$ in any vector space whose base field is of characteristic two. Thus, starting with the all-zero string, and cycling through all 2^n codewords, we can start with the all-zero vector, and cycle through all 2^n basis vectors, using only one vector-addition at each step.

This requires $2^n - 1$ vector additions instead of $(n/2)2^n$, and is a speed-up of $\Theta(n)$. Since a vector addition is a $\Theta(n)$ operation, this rapid subspace enumeration method requires $\Theta(n2^n)$ instead of $\Theta(n^22^n)$ bit-operations. Since there are $n2^n$ bits in the output of the algorithm, we can see that this method is optimal in the sense of Big- Θ . For exact matrix memory operation counts, observing that $\sim 3n$ matrix-memory operations are needed for a vector addition, a total of $\sim 3n(2^n - 1)$ operations are required to enumerate an n -dimensional subspace.

5.3 The Four Russians Matrix Multiplication Algorithm

This matrix multiplication algorithm is derivable from the original algorithm published by Arlazarov, Dinic, Kronrod, and Faradzev [ADKF70], but does not appear there. It has appeared in books including [AHU74, Ch. 6]. Consider a product of two matrices $AB = C$ where A is an $a \times b$ matrix and B is a $b \times c$ matrix, yielding an $a \times c$ for C . In this case, one could divide A into b/k vertical “stripes” $A_1 \dots A_{b/k}$ of k columns each, and B into b/k horizontal stripes $B_1 \dots B_{b/k}$ of k rows each. (For simplicity assume k divides b). The product of two stripes, $A_i B_i$ is an $a \times b/k$ by $b/k \times c$ matrix multiplication, and yields an $a \times c$ matrix C_i . The sum of all k of these C_i equals C .

$$C = AB = \sum_{i=0}^{i=k} A_i B_i$$

The algorithm itself proceeds as given in Algorithm 1 on page 82.

1: for $i = 1, 2, \dots, b/k$ do

1: Make a Gray Code table of all the 2^k linear combinations of the k rows of B_i . Denote the x th row T_x .

(Costs $(3 \cdot 2^k - 4)c$ reads/writes, see Stage 2, in Section 5.6 on page 98).

2: for $j = 1, 2, \dots, a$ do

1: Read the entries $a_{j,(i-1)k+1}, a_{j,(i-1)k+2}, \dots, a_{j,(i-1)k+k}$.

2: Let x be the k bit binary number formed by the concatenation of $a_{j,(i-1)k+1}, \dots, a_{j,ik}$.

3: Add (the vectors) $C_{j*} = C_{j*} + T_x$. (Costs $3c$ reads/writes).

Algorithm 1: Method of Four Russians, for Matrix Multiplication

5.3.1 Role of the Gray Code

The Gray Code step is useful for two reasons. First, if any particular linear combination of the rows is required more than once, it is only computed once. Second, even if each linear combination of rows is required exactly once, the Gray Code works $\sim n/2$ times faster than the naïve way of calculating those linear combinations. But, for matrices of various sizes and various values of k , the expected number of times any particular linear combination is required will vary. Thus it is better to calculate the running time directly to see the effects of the algorithm.

The innermost loop out requires $k + 3c$ steps, and then the next requires $(3 \cdot 2^k - 4)c + a(k + 3c)$ steps. If the $(3 \cdot 2^k - 4)c$ is puzzling, note that $(2^k - 1)$ vector additions are required. This would normally require $(3 \cdot 2^k - 3)c$ matrix-memory read/writes. In the first iteration, we save an additional c by noting the previous row is always all zeroes and so we do not have to actually read it.

Finally the entire algorithm requires

$$\frac{b((3 \cdot 2^k - 4)c + a(k + 3c))}{k} = \frac{3b2^k c - 4cb + abk + 3abc}{k}$$

matrix memory operations. Substitute $k = \log b$, so that $2^k = b$, and observe

$$\frac{3b^2 c - 4cb + ab \log b + 3abc}{\log b} \sim \frac{3b^2 c + 3abc}{\log b} + ab$$

For square matrices this becomes $\sim (6n^3)/(\log n)$.

5.3.2 Transposing the Matrix Product

Since $AB = C$ implies that $B^T A^T = C^T$, one can transpose A and B , and transpose the product afterward. The transpose is a quadratic, and therefore cheap, operation. This has running time $(3b^2a + 3abc)/(\log b) + cb$ (obtained by swapping a and c in the earlier expression) and some manipulations show that this more efficient when $c < a$, for any $b > 1$. Therefore the final complexity is $\sim (3b^2 \min(a, c) + 3abc)/(\log b) + b \max(a, c)$. To see that the last term is not optional, substitute $c = 1$, in which case the last term becomes the dominant term.

5.3.3 Improvements

In the years since initial publication, several improvements have been made, in particular, in reducing the memory requirements [AS88, SU86], and the base fields upon which the algorithm can work [San79].

5.3.4 A Quick Computation

Suppose we start again with the complexity expression,

$$\frac{b((3 \cdot 2^k - 4)c + a(k + 3c))}{k}$$

but substitute $a = b = c = n$ (i.e. a square matrix times a square matrix of the same size). One obtains, after some algebraic manipulations,

$$\sim \frac{3n^2 2^k + 3n^3}{k}$$

Then substitute $k = \gamma \log n$ and observe,

$$\frac{3n^{(2+\gamma)} + 3n^3}{\gamma \log n}$$

Immediately, we see that $\gamma > 1$ would cause the numerator to have a higher-than-cubic term. That would make it inferior to even the naïve algorithm. Further observation shows that $\gamma < 1$ is inferior to $\gamma = 1$ because of the coefficient γ in the denominator. Thus this quick analysis predicts $k = \log n$ is optimal.

5.3.5 M4RM Experiments Performed by SAGE Staff

Martin Albrecht, a member of the SAGE Project, evaluated my library for inclusion in SAGE. The library is a Level 1, 2, and 3, BLAS (Basic Linear Algebra System), and includes matrix multiplication and inversion via the algorithms in this chapter, as well as LUP-factorization, and any matrix-vector and vector-vector operations to support them. The tests were primarily for M4RI, but also included tests for M4RM. The crossover appears to be slightly larger than 6000×6000 . The results are in Section 5.1 on page 86. A log-log plot shows that Magma is using Strassen's Algorithm. It should be noted that Magma is hand optimized in assembly language, for several processors, including the Opteron. The supercomputer used in the tests is `sage.math.washington.edu`. The following quotation can be found on the machine's website.

This is computer [sic] for very open collaboration among SAGE developers and testing of intense SAGE calculations. It is a special-purpose 64-bit computer built by Western Scientific that has 64GB of RAM and 16 AMD

Table 5.1 M4RM Running Times versus Magma

Matrix Size	M4RM (SAGE)	Strassen (Magma)
1000 × 1000	0.01 sec	0.02 sec
2000 × 2000	0.03 sec	0.16 sec
3000 × 3000	0.11 sec	0.24 sec
4000 × 4000	0.26 sec	0.48 sec
5000 × 5000	0.70 sec	1.03 sec
6000 × 6000	1.64 sec	1.67 sec
7000 × 7000	3.32 sec	2.61 sec
8000 × 8000	5.39 sec	3.34 sec
9000 × 9000	8.09 sec	5.45 sec
10000 × 10000	11.29 sec	7.28 sec

Table 5.2 Confirmation that $k = 0.75 \log_2 n$ is not a good idea.

Matrix Size	$k = \log n$		$k = 0.75 \log n$	
	k	time	k	time
8000	10	5.404	13	8.742
16000	10	46.310	14	64.846
32000	11	362.066	15	472.384

Opteron cores. You can browse everybody's home directories. It was purchased for SAGE development using my NSF Grant (No. 0555776).

Also, due to the remarks in Section 5.6.1 on page 100, an experiment was performed to try $k = 0.75 \log_2 n$ instead of $k = \log_2 n$. The results show that this change is not for the better.

5.4 The Four Russians Matrix Inversion Algorithm

While the title of this section contains the words “matrix inversion”, the algorithm which follows can be used either for matrix inversion or for triangulation and back-substitution, by the same mechanism that this is also true for Gaussian Elimination. As stated earlier, even if one has several $\vec{b}_1, \vec{b}_2, \vec{b}_3, \dots, \vec{b}_n$, it is far more efficient to solve $A\vec{x}_i = \vec{b}_i$ by appending the b_i as columns to the end of matrix A ,

and putting matrix A in unit upper triangular form (UUTF). Then, one can solve for each x_i by back substitution to obtain the x_i . (This is a quadratic, thus cheap, step). The alternative is to invert A , and Section 5.4.5 on page 92 contains changes for that approach, by adjoining A with an identity matrix and processing it into row reduced echelon form (RREF).

In Gaussian Elimination to UUTF of an $m \times n$ matrix, each iteration i operates on the submatrix $a_{ii} \dots a_{mn}$, with the objective of placing a one at a_{ii} and a zero at every other entry of the column i below row i , and leaving all above untouched. In the Method of Four-Russians Inversion (M4RI) algorithm, k columns are processed at once, producing a $k \times k$ identity matrix in the correct spot ($a_{ii} \dots a_{(i+k-1),(i+k-1)}$), with all zeros below it, and leaving the region above the submatrix untouched.

- 1: For $i = 1, k + 1, 2k + 1, 3k + 1, \dots, \min(m, n)$ do
 - 1: Perform Gaussian Elimination on rows $i, i + 1, \dots, i + 3k - 1$, to establish a $k \times k$ identity matrix in cells $a_{ii} \dots a_{i+k-1, i+k-1}$.
 - 2: Construct a gray-code table to enumerate the $2^k - 1$ non-zero vectors in the subspace generated by rows $i \dots i + k - 1$.
 - 3: For each row $j = i + 3k \dots m$ do
 - 1: Read the entries in the k columns $i, i + 1, \dots, i + k - 1$ of row j , and treat them as a k -bit binary number x .
 - 2: Add the entry in the Gray Code table that has x as a prefix, to row j .

Algorithm 2: Method of Four Russians, for Inversion

Each stage will now be described in detail.

5.4.1 Stage 1:

Denote the first column to be processed in a given iteration as a_i . Then, perform Gaussian elimination on the first $3k$ rows after and including the i th row to produce an identity matrix in $a_{i,i} \dots a_{(i+k-1),(i+k-1)}$, and zeroes in $a_{(i+k),i} \dots a_{(i+3k-1),(i+k-1)}$ (To know why it is reasonable to expect this to succeed, see Lemma 1 in Section 5.6.3 on page 101).

5.4.2 Stage 2:

Construct a table consisting of the 2^k binary strings of length k in a Gray Code. Thus with only 2^k vector additions, all possible linear combinations of these k rows have been precomputed. (See “Gray Code Step” in Section 5.2 on page 81).

5.4.3 Stage 3:

One can rapidly process the remaining rows from $i + 3k$ until row m (the last row) by using the table. For example, suppose the j th row has entries $a_{ji} \dots a_{j,(i+k-1)}$ in the columns being processed. Selecting the row of the table associated with this k -bit string, and adding it to row j , will force the k columns to zero, and adjust the remaining columns from $i+k$ to n in the appropriate way, as if Gaussian Elimination had been performed.

The process is then repeated $\min(m, n)/k$ times. As each iteration resolves k columns, instead of one column, one could expect that this algorithm is k times faster. The trade-off for large k is that Stage 2 can be very expensive. It turns out

(see Section 5.5 on page 94) that selecting the right value of k is critical.

5.4.4 A Curious Note on Stage 1 of M4RI

We have shown (See Section 5.6.3 on page 101) that a $3k \times k$ submatrix, beginning at $a_{i,i}$ and extending to $a_{i+3k-1,i+k-1}$ is very unlikely to be singular. Therefore, the Gaussian Elimination (which is done on the rows $i, \dots, i + 3k - 1$) will be successful and will produce a $k \times k$ identity matrix. But, this is not the whole story. With probability around 28.8%, the $3k \times 3k$ matrix will be full-rank, and so actually an identity matrix of size $3k \times 3k$ will be available. (Recall this is the probability that a sufficiently large random $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -matrix will be invertible). With probability 57.6%, the matrix will have nullity one (proof given as Theorem 1 on page 89 below) and so a $(3k - 1) \times (3k - 1)$ identity matrix (with one row of zeroes under it) will be present. This means that the next *two* iterations of the algorithm will have essentially no work to do at all in Stage 1, with probability around 86.6% or so. The cases nullity 2, nullity 3, and nullity 4 absorb nearly all remaining probability (proved in Theorem 2 on page 91 and shown in Table 5.3 on page 93), and the probability that “only” $3k \times 2k$ will be in the form of an identity matrix (with k rows of zeroes underneath) is already approaching zero as ℓ gets large, with a reliability that can be calculated using the aforementioned theorem. Therefore, Stage 1’s cost is actually near to one-third its listed value. Since Stage 1 is not significant in the final complexity, we do not carry this analysis further.

Theorem 1 *The probability that an $n \times n$ $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -matrix, filled with the output of*

independent fair coins, is nullity 1 equals $(1 - 2^{-n})(1 - 2^{-n+1}) \cdots (1 - 2^{-n+n-2})(1 - 2^{-n})$. Also for large n , the ratio of the number of nullity one $n \times n$ matrices to the number of nullity zero matrices is ~ 2 .

Proof: Let A be a matrix that is $n \times n$ and nullity one. The null space contains $2^1 = 2$ vectors. Since the null space always contains the zero vector, it therefore contains one other vector \vec{v} .

There is a change-of-basis matrix B such that $B\vec{v} = \vec{e}_1 = \{1, 0, \dots, 0\}$, or $\vec{v} = B^{-1}\vec{e}_1$. Since $A\vec{v} = \vec{0}$ then $AB^{-1}\vec{e}_1 = \vec{0}$ also and therefore $BAB^{-1}\vec{e}_1 = \vec{0}$. Note that B , by virtue of being an $n \times n$ change-of-basis matrix, is non-singular, and so B^{-1} exists and is of the right size.

The fact that $BAB^{-1}\vec{e}_1 = 0$ means that the first column of BAB^{-1} is all zeroes. Note that BAB^{-1} and A have the same characteristic polynomial, nullity, rank, determinant, etc. . . .

The first column is all zeroes, but the rest of the matrix has to be full-rank for the nullity to be exactly one, and so the second column can be anything but all zeroes, the third column cannot be the second column nor all-zeroes, the fourth column cannot be the third, the second, nor their sum, and so on. For the i th column, we have ruled out the span of the $i - 2$ dimensional subspace generated by the previous $i - 1$ columns.

The original \vec{v} in the null-space could be any non-zero vector, or $2^n - 1$ choices.

We have therefore,

$$Pr[\text{nullity} = 1] = \frac{(1)(2^n - 1)(2^n - 2) \cdots (2^n - 2^{n-2})}{2^{n^2}} (2^n - 1)$$

$$= (1 - 2^{-n})(1 - 2^{-n+1}) \cdots (1 - 2^{-2})(1 - 2^{-n})$$

As one can see, compared to the nullity zero case, we have removed a $(1 - 2^{-1})$ term and replaced it with an extra $1 - 2^{-n}$ term, which asymptotically doubles the whole product. \square

Theorem 2 *If A is an $n \times n$ matrix filled with fair coins, the probability that it has nullity k is given by*

$$\frac{(1 - 2^{-n})(1 - 2^{-n+1}) \cdots (1 - 2^{-n+k-1})(1 - 2^{-n})(1 - 2^{-n+1}) \cdots (1 - 2^{-k-1})}{(2^k - 1)(2^k - 2) \cdots (2^k - 2^{k-1})}$$

Proof: Suppose the nullity of A is k and thus the nullspace of A has $2^k - 1$ non-zero vectors in it. Choose k of them, $\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_k$ such that they are linearly independent.

There is a change-of-basis matrix B that maps the vectors so that $B\vec{v}_i = \vec{e}_i$, or $\vec{v}_i = B^{-1}\vec{e}_i$, for $i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$. This further implies that $\vec{0} = A\vec{v}_i = AB^{-1}\vec{e}_i$ for $i \in \{1, \dots, k\}$ and thus $BAB^{-1}\vec{e}_i = \vec{0}$. This means that the first k columns of BAB^{-1} are all zero.

The remaining $n - k$ columns have the following properties, because the remainder of the matrix must be full rank. The first remaining column cannot be all zeroes, the next cannot be the first nor all zeroes, and so forth. For $i > k + 1$, the i th column cannot be in the $(i - k - 1)$ -dimensional subspace generated by the previous $i - 1$ columns, of which k are all-zero and $i - k - 1$ are non-zero.

Obviously for the non-zero columns we have $(2^n - 1)(2^n - 2) \cdots (2^n - 2^{n-k-1})$ choices. For the vectors in the null space, we have $(2^n - 1)(2^n - 2) \cdots (2^n - 2^{k-1})$

choices, but a permutation of those vectors produces the same final matrix for a different value of B , so a correction factor is needed.

Basically, the $\vec{v}_1, \dots, \vec{v}_k$ was a basis for the nullspace, and nothing more. So, the correction factor to prevent overcounting of the same A generated by different B is just the number of bases of an n -dimensional space. The first vector could be any one of the $2^k - 1$ non-zero vectors in the space. The second vector can be anything but the first or zero, and the third can be anything except zero, the first, the second, or their sum. The i th can be anything not in the $i - 1$ dimensional subspace of the previous $i - 1$ vectors, which is $2^k - 2^{i-1}$. Essentially, there are $|GL_k(\mathbb{GF}(2))|$ ways to choose a basis.

Finally, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} Pr[A \in M_n(\mathbb{GF}(2)); \text{nullity}(A) = k] &= \\ &= \frac{(1 - 2^{-n})(1 - 2^{-n+1}) \dots (1 - 2^{-n+k-1})(1 - 2^{-n})(1 - 2^{-n+1}) \dots (1 - 2^{-k-1})}{(2^k - 1)(2^k - 2) \dots (2^k - 2^{k-1})} \\ &= \frac{\left(\prod_{i=1}^{i=k} 1 - 2^{-n+i-1}\right) \left(\prod_{i=1}^{i=n-k} 1 - 2^{-n+i-1}\right)}{\left(\prod_{i=1}^{i=k} 2^k - 2^{i-1}\right)} \end{aligned}$$

□

5.4.5 Triangulation or Inversion?

While the above form of the algorithm will reduce a system of linear equations over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ to unit upper triangular form, and thus permit a system to be solved with back substitution, the M4RI algorithm can also be used to invert a matrix, or put the system into reduced row echelon form (RREF). Simply run Stage 3 on rows $0 \dots i - 1$ as well as on rows $i + 3k \dots m$. This only affects the complexity slightly,

Table 5.3 Probabilities of a Fair-Coin Generated $n \times n$ matrix over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$, having given Nullity

nullity	$n = 1000$	$n = 8$	$n = 3$	$n = 2$
0	0.28879	0.28992	168/512	6/16
1	0.57758	0.57757	294/512	9/16
2	0.12835	0.12735	49/512	1/16
3	5.2388×10^{-3}	5.1167×10^{-3}	1/512	0
4	4.6567×10^{-5}	4.4060×10^{-5}	0	0
5	9.6914×10^{-8}	8.5965×10^{-8}	0	0
6	4.8835×10^{-11}	3.7903×10^{-11}	0	0
7	6.0556×10^{-15}	3.5250×10^{-15}	0	0
8	1.8625×10^{-19}	5.4210×10^{-19}	0	0

changing the 2.5 coefficient to 3 (calculation done in Section 5.6.2 on page 101).

To use RREF to invert a matrix, simply concatenate an identity matrix (of size $n \times n$) to the right of the original matrix (of size $n \times n$), producing a $n \times 2n$ matrix.

Using M4RI to reduce the matrix to RREF will result in an $n \times n$ identity matrix appearing on the left, and the inverse matrix on the right.

5.5 Experimental and Numerical Results

Five experiments were performed. The first was to determine the correct value of k for M4RI. The second was to determine the running time of both M4RI and Gaussian Elimination. In doing these experiments, we noted that the optimization level of the compiler heavily influenced the output. Therefore, the third experiment attempted to calculate the magnitude of this influence. The fourth was to determine if a fixed k or flexible k was superior for performance. The fifth was a spreadsheet calculation to find an optimal $k = c_1 + c_2 \log n$.

The specifications of the computer on which the experiments were run is given at the end of Section B.1 on page 137. Except as noted, all were compiled under `gcc` with the highest optimization setting (level three). The experiments consisted of generating a matrix filled with fair coins, and then checking the matrix for invertibility by attempting to calculate the inverse using M4RI to RREF. If the matrix was singular, a new matrix was generated. If the matrix was invertible, the inverse was calculated again using Gaussian Elimination to RREF. These two inverses were then checked for equality, and finally one was multiplied by the original to obtain a product matrix which was compared with the identity matrix. The times were calculated using `clock()` from `time.h` built into the basic C language. The functions were all timed independently, so extraneous operations like verifying the correctness of the inverse would not affect running time (except possibly via cache coherency but this is both unlikely and hard to detect). No other major tasks were being run on the machine during the experiments, but `clock()` measures user-time and not time in the sense of a wall clock.

In the first experiment (to determine the best value of k), the range of k was permitted to change. The specific k which resulted in the lowest running time was reported for 30 matrices. Except when two values of k were tied for fastest (recall that `clock()` on Linux has a granularity of 0.01 sec), the thirty matrices were unanimous in their preferred value of k in all cases. A linear regression on this data shows that $k = c_1(\log n) + c_2$ has minimum error in the mean-squared sense at $k = (3/4)(\log n) + 0$. For the next two experiments, k was fixed at eight to simplify addressing. Another observed feature of the first experiment was that the running

time was trivially perturbed if the value of k was off by one, and by a few percent if off by two. The results are in Table 5.6 on page 97.

Table 5.4 Experiment 1—Optimal Choices of k , and running time in seconds.

Size	128	256	362	512	724	1020	1448	2048
Best k	5/6	6	7	7/8	8	8/9	9	9
M4RI	0.09571	0.650	1.68	4.276	11.37	29.12	77.58	204.1
Gauss	0.1871	1.547	4.405	12.34	35.41	97.99	279.7	811.0

Table 5.5 Running times, in msec, Optimization Level 0

k	1,024	1,536	2,048	3,072	4,096	6,144	8,192	12,288	16384
5	870	2,750	6,290	20,510	47,590	—*	—*	—*	—
6	760	2,340	5,420	17,540	40,630	132,950	—*	1,033,420	—
7	710	2,130	4,850	15,480	35,540	116,300	—*	903,200	—
8	680	2,040	4,550	14,320	32,620	104,960	242,990	798,470	—
9	740	2,100	4,550	13,860	30,990	97,830	223,270	737,990	1,703,290
10	880	2,360	4,980	14,330	31,130	95,850	215,080	690,580	1,595,340
11	1,170	2,970	5,940	16,260	34,020	99,980	218,320	680,310	1,528,900
12	1,740	4,170	7,970	20,470	41,020	113,270	238,160	708,640	1,557,020
13	2,750	6,410	11,890	29,210	55,970	147,190	295,120	817,950	1,716,990
14	4,780	10,790	19,390	45,610	84,580	208,300	399,810	1,045,430	—
15	8,390	18,760	33,690	77,460	140,640	335,710	623,450	1,529,740	—
16	15,290	34,340	60,570	137,360	246,010	569,740	1,034,690	2,440,410	—

*Indicates that too many abortions occurred due to singular submatrices.

See Section 5.6.3 on page 101.

Table 5.6 Percentage Error for Offset of K , From Experiment 1

error of k	1,024	1,536	2,048	4,096	6,144	8,192	12,288	16384
-4	—	—	48.0%	53.6%	38.7%	—	32.8%	—
-3	27.9%	34.8%	26.6%	31.1%	21.3%	—	17.4%	—
-2	11.8%	14.7%	11.7%	14.7%	9.5%	13.0%	8.5%	11.4%
-1	4.4%	4.4%	3.3%	5.3%	2.1%	3.8%	1.5%	4.3%
Exact	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
+1	8.8%	2.9%	3.4%	0.5%	4.3%	1.5%	4.2%	1.8%
+2	29.4%	15.7%	17.3%	9.8%	18.2%	10.7%	20.2%	12.3%
+3	72.1%	45.6%	47.7%	32.4%	53.6%	37.2%	53.7%	—
+4	155.9%	104.4%	110.8%	80.6%	117.3%	85.9%	124.9%	—
+5	304.4%	214.2%	229.1%	172.9%	250.2%	189.9%	258.7%	—
+6	602.9%	428.9%	458.9%	353.8%	494.4%	381.1%	—	—

Each trial of the second experiment consisted of the same code compiled under all four optimization settings. Since k was fixed at eight, addressing was vastly simplified and so the program was rewritten to take advantage of this. The third experiment simply used the code from the second experiment, with the compilation set to optimization level 3. The results are in Table 5.8 on page 112 and Table 5.7 on page 112.

In the fourth experiment, k was permitted to vary. This resulted in the best running times, which was a surprise, because the addressing difficulties were non-trivial, and varying k slightly has a small effect on running time. Yet in practice, letting k vary did vastly improve the running time of the algorithm. See Table 5.5 on page 97 for the affect of relatively adjusting k upward or downward.

A fifth mini-experiment was to take the computational cost expression for

M4RI, and place it into a spreadsheet, to seek optimal values of k for very large values of n , for which experimentation would not be feasible. The expression $1 + \log n - \log \log n$ was a better fit than any $c_1 + c_2 \log n$. On the other hand, it would be very hard to determine the coefficient of the $\log \log n$ term in that expression, since a double logarithm differs only slightly from a constant.

5.6 Exact Analysis of Complexity

Assume for simplicity that $\log n$ divides n and m . To calculate the cost of the algorithm one need only tabulate the cost of each of the three stages, which will be repeated $\min(m, n)/k$ times. Let these stages be numbered $i = 1 \dots \min(m, n)/k$.

The first stage is a $3k \times (n - ik)$ underdefined Gaussian Elimination (RREF), which requires $\sim 1.5(3k)(n - ik)^2 - 0.75(3k)^3$ matrix memory operations (See Section B.5.3 on page 143). This will be negligible.

The second stage, constructing the table, requires $3(n - ik - k)$ steps per row. The first row is all zeroes and can be hard-coded, and the second row is a copy of the appropriate row of the matrix, and requires $(n - ik - k)$ reads followed by writes. Thus one obtains $2(n - ik - k) + (2^k - 2)(3)(n - ik - k) = (3 \cdot 2^k - 4)(n - ik - k)$ steps.

The third stage, executed upon $(m - ik - 3k)$ rows (if positive) requires $2k + 3(n - ik - k)$ reads/writes per row. This becomes $(m - ik - 3k)(3n - 3ik - k)$ matrix memory operations in total, when that total is positive. For example, in a square matrix the last 2 iterations of stage 1 will take care of all of these rows and

so there may be no work to perform in Stage 3 of those iterations. To denote this, let $pos(x) = x$ if $x > 0$ and $pos(x) = 0$ otherwise.

Adding steps one, two, and three yields

$$\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{i=0}^{i=\ell/k-1} 1.5(3k)^2(n-ik) - 0.75((3k)^3) + (3 \cdot 2^k - 4)(n-ik-k) + \\
& (pos(m-ik-3k))(3n-3ik-k) \\
= & \left[\sum_{i=0}^{i=\ell/k-3} 1.5(3k)^2(n-ik) - 0.75((3k)^3)(3 \cdot 2^k - 4)(n-ik-k) + \right. \\
& \left. (m-ik-3k)(3n-3ik-k) \right] \\
& + 1.5(3k)^2(n-\ell+2k) - 0.75((3k)^3)(3 \cdot 2^k - 4)(n-\ell+k) \\
& + 1.5(3k)^2(n-\ell+k) - 0.75((3k)^3)(3 \cdot 2^k - 4)(n-\ell) \\
\leq & \sim \frac{1}{4k} [2^k(-6k\ell + 12n\ell - 6\ell^2) - 6m\ell^2 - 6n\ell^2 + 4\ell^3 + 12mn\ell]
\end{aligned}$$

Recalling $\ell = \min(m, n)$ and substituting $k = \log \ell$ and thus $2^k = \ell$, we obtain,

$$\sim \frac{1}{4 \log \ell} (6n\ell^2 - 2\ell^3 - 6m\ell^2 + 12mn\ell)$$

Thus for the over-defined case ($\ell = n$) this is $(4n^3 + 6n^2m)/(4 \log n)$, and for the under-defined case ($\ell = m$) this is $(18nm^2 - 8m^3)/(4 \log m)$, and for square $(5n^3)/(2 \log n)$.

5.6.1 An Alternative Computation

If we let $n = 2m$, which would be the case for inverting a square matrix, we obtain:

$$\sim \frac{1}{4k} [2^k (-6km + 18m^2) + 10m^3]$$

Now substitute

$$k = \gamma \log m + \delta$$

and observe,

$$\sim \frac{2^\delta}{\gamma \log m + \delta} [18m^{2+\gamma}] + \frac{10m^3}{\gamma \log m + \delta}$$

from which it is clear that $\gamma > 1$ would result in a higher-than-cubic complexity. Also, $\gamma < 1$ is suboptimal because of the gamma in the denominator of the first term. As for δ , the picture is less clear. But what is interesting is that experimentation shows $\gamma \approx 0.75$ is around best in practice. The net result is that the computational cost model which I propose is approximate at best, due, perhaps, to the cache consequences which the model cannot consider.

5.6.2 Full Elimination, not Triangular

Like Gaussian Elimination, the M4RI algorithm can be used not only to reduce a matrix to Row-Echelon Form (making it upper triangular if it were full-rank), but to Reduced Row-Echelon Form (making the left-hand part of the matrix the $m \times m$ identity matrix if it were full-rank). The only change is that in Step 3, we process all rows other than the $3k$ rows processed by Gaussian Elimination. Before, we only processed the rows that were below the $3k$ rows, not those above. Thus instead of $m - 3k - ik$ row additions in stage 3, we will require $m - 3k$. Otherwise the

calculation proceeds exactly as in Section 5.6 on page 99.

$$\begin{aligned}
& \sum_{i=0}^{i=\ell/k-1} 1.5(3k)^2(n - ik) - 0.75((3k)^3) + (3 \cdot 2^k - 4)(n - ik - k) + \\
& (\text{pos}(m - 3k))(3n - 3ik - k) \\
= & \frac{\ell}{8k} (-14n + 24mn + 4mk - 72kn - 12k^2 - 162k^3 + 2^k(24n - 12k - 12\ell) \\
& + 25k + 7\ell - 12m\ell + 36\ell k) \\
\sim & \frac{\ell}{8k} (24mn - 12m\ell + 2^k(24n - 12\ell))
\end{aligned}$$

As before, if $k = \log_2 \ell$, then

$$\sim \frac{1}{2 \log_2 \ell} [6mn\ell - 3m\ell^2 + 6n\ell^2 - 3\ell^3]$$

and thus if $\ell = n$ (the over-defined case), we have $\frac{3mn^2+3n^3}{2 \log_2 n}$ and if $\ell = m$ (the under-defined case), we have $\frac{6m^2n-3m^3}{\log_2 m}$. In the case that $m = n$ (the square case), we have $3n^3/\log_2 n$. As specified in Section 5.4.5 on page 93, this is just the same formula with 3 taking the place of 5/2.

5.6.3 The Rank of $3k$ Rows, or Why $k + \epsilon$ is not Enough

The reader may be curious why $3k$ rows are selected instead of k rows at the small Gaussian Elimination step (Stage 1 of each iteration). Normally to guarantee non-singularity, a system with k variables is solved with $k + \epsilon$ equations, where $\epsilon \approx 2 \dots 100$. However, this does not work in the M4RI algorithm, because $\ell/\log \ell$ submatrices must be reduced by Gaussian Elimination, and the algorithm fails if

any of these submatrices is singular.

The answer is that the probability of k vectors of length $3k$ having rank k is very high, as proved below. The small Gaussian Elimination will fail to produce the identity matrix followed by rows of zeroes if and only if this submatrix is not of full rank.

Lemma 5 *A random $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ matrix of dimension $3k \times k$, filled by fair coins, has full rank with probability $\approx 1 - 2^{-2k}$.*

Proof: Consider the columns of the matrix as vectors. One can attempt to count the number of possible full rank matrices. The first vector can be any one of $2^{3k} - 1$ non-zero length $3k$ vectors. The second one can be any non-zero vector distinct from the first, or $2^{3k} - 2$ choices. The third one can be any non-zero vector not equal to the first, the second, or their sum, or $2^{3k} - 4$. The i th vector can be any vector not in the space spanned by the previous $i - 1$ vectors (which are linearly independent by construction). Thus $2^{3k} - 2^{i-1}$ choices are available. Therefore, the probability of any k vectors of length $3k$ being linearly independent is

$$\frac{\prod_{i=1}^{i=k} (2^{3k} - 2^{i-1})}{(2^{3k})^k} = \prod_{i=1}^{i=k} (1 - 2^{i-1}2^{-3k}) \approx 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{i=k} 2^{i-1}2^{-3k} \approx 1 - 2^{-3k}(2^k - 1) \approx 1 - 2^{-2k}$$

and this is the desired result. \square

Even in the case $k = 5$, the actual probability of less than full rank is 9.46×10^{-4} , and the above formula has a relative error of 3.08×10^{-6} , and is even more accurate for higher k . Also, note when $k = c \log \ell$ then the probability of full

rank is $1 - \ell^{-2c}$. Since there will be $(\ell)/(\log \ell) - 1$ iterations, the probability of even one failure during all passes is approximately $1/(\ell^{2c-1} \log \ell)$, which is very low, considering that ℓ may approach the millions.

Note that even if $2k \times k$ were chosen, then the probability of failure over the whole algorithm would be $1/\log \ell$, which is non-trivial. In practice, when k was significantly lower than $\log \ell$, the algorithm would abort very frequently, whereas it never aborted in any of the experiments when k was set near $\log \ell$. (Abortions marked with a star in Table 5.5 on page 96).

5.6.4 Using Bulk Logical Operations

The above algorithm can be improved upon if the microprocessor has instructions for 32-bit (or even 64-bit) logical operations. Stages 2 and 3 essentially consist of repeated row additions. The matrix can be stored in an 8-bits per byte format instead of the 1-bit per byte format, and long XOR operations can perform these vector additions. Stage 1 is unaffected. However, stages 2 and 3 can proceed 32 or 64 times as fast as normal if single-instruction logical operators are available in those sizes, as they are on all modern PCs. Since only stages 2 and 3 were non-negligible, it is safe to say that the algorithm would proceed 32 or 64 times faster, for sufficiently large matrices.

Experimentally the author found that the speed-up varied between 80% to 95% of this figure, depending on the optimization settings of the compiler chosen. However, there is absolutely no reason not to do this all the time, so the vector

additions were performed 64 entries at one time.

5.6.5 M4RI Experiments Performed by SAGE Staff

Martin Albrecht also performed some experiments for M4RI, just as he did for M4RM. See also, Section 5.3.5 on page 85.

5.6.5.1 Determination of k

In order to independently determine if fixed or flexible k is better, some SAGE experiments were performed on matrices of size 1000, 2000, . . . , 14000, 15000. The k attempted were 6, 8, 10 for the flexible method, and $k = 8$ for fixed addressing (see Section 5.5 on page 94). The results are summarized in Table 5.9 on page 113. The lowest of the three options for k in the flexible column is listed in the column “least”. The column “Gaussian” is the author’s implementation of Gaussian Elimination, and one ratio is the ratio of the least costly flexible k and Gaussian Elimination. The other ratio is that of the fixed to the flexible M4RI. This shows that while the fixed addressing has an advantage if $k \leq 8$, when k “should” be far from 8, there is a penalty for picking the “wrong” k that overrules the advantage of more simplified addressing.

5.6.5.2 Comparison to Magma

Computing the echelon-form of a matrix was tried for three sizes versus Magma. First, $1000 \times 40,000$ where M4RI ran in 1.26 sec, and Magma in 1.63 sec. Sec-

ond, $10,000 \times 10,000$, where M4RI ran in 15.84 sec and Magma in 5 sec. Third, $40,000 \times 1000$ where M4RI ran in 1.21 sec and Magma in 0.88 sec.

5.6.5.3 The Transpose Experiment

One experiment was to multiply a 200×1000 matrix with a $1000 \times 100,000$ matrix. Clearly, it would be faster to do $100,000 \times 2000$ times 2000×2000 using the “transpose trick” described in Section 5.3.2 on page 84. The effects are given in Table 5.10 on page 113. In particular, 180 msec without a transpose and 190 msec with one. However, this is likely because we are using a naïve approach for calculating the transpose, rather than butterfly shuffles or some other fast technique. This is an area for improvement.

Figure 5.1 on page 106 shows a plot of the running time of M4RI compared with Magma.

5.7 Pairing With Strassen’s Algorithm for Matrix Multiplication

As stated earlier, MAGMA uses Strassen’s Algorithm for matrix multiplication for large $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -matrices, not the naïve approach. This is for two reasons. First, in finite fields, there is no rounding error. Second, the exponent is lower ($\log_2 7 \approx 2.807$ vs 3).

Since Strassen’s Algorithm multiplies an $n \times n$ matrix in 7 calls to an $n/2 \times n/2$ algorithm, versus 8 for the naïve method, one can estimate the cross-over easily. The “break-even” point occurs when the time spent on the extra overhead of Strassen’s




Figure 5.1: A Plot of M4RI's System Solving in SAGE vs Magma

algorithm (the 18 matrix additions, for example) equals the time saved by the one fewer matrix multiplication. Table 5.1 on page 86 shows that this occurs at about slightly below 4000×4000 . This is because a 2000×2000 requires 0.03 sec, and a 4000×4000 requires 0.26 sec, slightly more than eight times as much.

On the other hand, at 6000×6000 the M4RM algorithm is roughly equal to the Strassen-naïve combo that Magma is using (despite the fact that Magma is famously hand-optimized). Considering that 0.03 sec are required for M4RM and 0.16 for Magma in the 2000×2000 case, we can expect a roughly $16/3$ speed-up by combining M4RM with Strassen over Magma.

5.8 The Unsuitability of Strassen’s Algorithm for Inversion

It is important to note that Strassen’s famous paper [Str69] has three algorithms. The first is a matrix multiplication algorithm, which we call “Strassen’s Algorithm for Matrix Multiplication.” The second is a method for using any matrix multiplication technique for matrix inversion, in asymptotically equal time (in the big- Θ sense). We call this Strassen’s Formula for Matrix Inversion. The third is a method for the calculation of the determinant of a matrix, which is of no concern to us. Below, Strassen’s Formula for Matrix Inversion is analyzed, by which a system of equations over a field can be solved.

Given a square matrix A , by dividing it into equal quadrants one obtains the following inverse (A more detailed exposition is found in [CLRS01, Ch. 28], using the same notation):

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} B & C \\ D & E \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow A^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} B^{-1} + B^{-1}CS^{-1}DB^{-1} & -B^{-1}CS^{-1} \\ -S^{-1}DB^{-1} & S^{-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

where $S = E - DB^{-1}C$, which is the Schur Complement of A with respect to B .

One can easily check that the product of A and the matrix formula for A^{-1} yields the identity matrix, either multiplying on the left or on the right. If an inverse for a matrix exists, it is unique, and so therefore this formula gives the unique inverse of A , provided that A is in fact invertible.

However, it is a clear requirement of this formula that B and S be invertible. Over the real numbers, or other subfields of the complex numbers, one can show that if A and B are non-singular, then S is non-singular also [CLRS01, Ch. 28]. The problem is to guarantee that the upper-left submatrix, B , is invertible. Strassen did not address this in the original paper, but the usual solution is as follows (more details found in [CLRS01, Ch. 28]). First, if A is positive symmetric definite, then all of its principal submatrices are positive symmetric definite, including B . All positive symmetric definite matrices are non-singular, so B is invertible. Now, if A is not positive symmetric definite, but is non-singular, then note that $A^T A$ is positive symmetric definite and that $(A^T A)^{-1} A^T = A^{-1}$. This also can be used to make a pseudoinverse for non-square matrices, called the Moore-Penrose Pseudoinverse [Moo20, Pen55, Ber95].

However, the concept of positive symmetric definite does not work over a finite field, because these fields cannot be ordered (in the sense of an ordering that respects the addition and multiplication operations). Observe the following counterexample,

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad A^T A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Both A and $A^T A$ have $\det = 1$, thus are invertible. Yet in both cases the upper-left hand 2x2 submatrices have $\det = 0$, and therefore are not invertible. Thus Strassen's formula for inversion is unusable without modification. The modification below is from Aho, Hopcroft and Ullman's book [AHU74, Ch. 6] though it first appeared in [BH74].

5.8.1 Bunch and Hopcroft's Solution

Consider a matrix L that is unit lower triangular, and a matrix U that is unit upper triangular. Then Strassen's Matrix Inversion Formula indicates

$$L = \begin{bmatrix} B & 0 \\ D & E \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow L^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} B^{-1} & 0 \\ -E^{-1}DB^{-1} & E^{-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$U = \begin{bmatrix} B & C \\ 0 & E \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow U^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} B^{-1} & -B^{-1}CE^{-1} \\ 0 & E^{-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

Note $S = E - DB^{-1}C$ becomes $S = E$ in both cases, since either C or D is the zero matrix. Since L (or U) is unit lower (or upper) triangular, then its submatrices B and E are also unit lower (or upper triangular), and therefore invertible. Therefore

Strassen’s Matrix Inversion Formula over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ will always work for unit lower or upper triangular matrices.

It is well known that any matrix over any field has a factorization $A = LUP$ where P is a permutation matrix, L is unit lower triangular and U is unit upper triangular [Hig02]. Once A is thus factored, the matrix inversion formula is sufficient to calculate A^{-1} . Aho, Hopcroft and Ullman [AHU74, Ch. 6] give an algorithm for computing the LUP factorization over an arbitrary field, in time equal to big- Θ of matrix multiplication, by use of a black-box matrix multiplication algorithm. We call this algorithm AHU-LUP. The algorithm is found in Section C.2.2 on page 151. Once the factorization of A is complete, Strassen’s Matrix Inversion Formula can be applied to L and U . Note $A^{-1} = P^{-1}U^{-1}L^{-1}$.

5.8.2 Ibara, Moran, and Hui’s Solution

In [IMR82], Ibara, Moran, and Hui show how to perform an LQUP-factorization with black-box matrix multiplication. The LQUP-factorization is similar to the LUP-factorization, but can operate on rank-deficient matrices. Therefore, if intermediate submatrices are singular, there is no difficulty.

A factorization $A = LQUP$ has L as lower-triangular, $m \times m$, and U as upper-triangular, $m \times n$. The permutation matrix P is $n \times n$ as before. The added flexibility comes from the matrix $m \times m$ matrix Q which is zero everywhere off of the main diagonal, and contains r ones followed by $m - r$ zeroes. Here r is the rank of A .

This is how singular and rank-deficient A can be represented, while L , U ,

and P can be kept invertible. The determinant of Q is zero if and only if $r < m$. The algorithm is simpler than Bunch and Hopcroft, but is less amenable to parallelization, as it requires copying rows between submatrices after cutting.

Table 5.7 Results of Experiment 3—Running Times, Fixed k=8

Size	M4RI	Gaussian	Ratio
4,000 rows	18.97 s	6.77 s	2.802
6,000 rows	59.40 s	22.21 s	2.674
8,000 rows	135.20 s	51.30 s	2.635
12,000 rows	167.28 s	450.24 s	2.692
16,000 rows	398.12 s	1023.99 s	2.572
20,000 rows	763.92 s	1999.34 s	2.617

Table 5.8 Experiment 2—Running times in seconds under different Optimizations, k=8

	Opt 0	Opt 1	Opt 2	Opt 3
4000 x 4000				
Gauss	91.41	48.35	48.37	18.97
Russian	29.85	17.83	17.72	6.77
Ratio	3.062	2.712	2.730	2.802
6000 x 6000				
Gauss	300.27	159.83	159.74	59.40
Russian	97.02	58.43	58.38	22.21
Ratio	3.095	2.735	2.736	2.674
8000 x 8000				
Gauss	697.20	371.34	371.86	135.20
Russian	225.19	136.76	135.21	51.30
Ratio	3.096	2.715	2.750	2.635

Table 5.9 Trials between M4RI and Gaussian Elimination (msec)

Matrix Size	Fixed		Flexible			Least Gaussian	Ratio	Ratio
	K=8	K=6	K=8	K=10	G/Least		fixed/flex	
1,000	0	10	10	10	10	20	2.0000	0.0000
2,000	20	40	40	40	40	133	3.3125	0.5000
3,000	70	110	100	110	100	383	3.8250	0.7000
4,000	150	230	210	210	210	873	4.1548	0.7143
5,000	350	790	430	470	430	1,875	4.3605	0.8140
6,000	940	1,180	990	1,060	990	4,178	4.2197	0.9495
7,000	1,970	5,320	2,120	1,980	1,980	8,730	4.4091	0.9949
8,000	3,360	4,450	3,480	3,280	3,280	14,525	4.4284	1.0244
9,000	4,940	6,830	5,240	4,970	4,970	22,233	4.4733	0.9940
10,000	7,110	9,820	7,240	6,890	6,890	31,180	4.5254	1.0319
11,000	9,340	13,010	9,510	9,090	9,090	41,355	4.5495	1.0275
12,000	12,330	46,470	12,640	12,010	12,010	54,055	4.5008	1.0266
13,000	15,830	20,630	16,040	15,260	15,260	67,920	4.4509	1.0374
14,000	19,280	62,180	19,640	18,690	18,690	83,898	4.4889	1.0316
15,000	23,600	45,840	24,080	22,690	22,690	101,795	4.4863	1.0401

*The second $k = 8$ includes the “fixed k ” with streamlined addressing as described in Section 5.5 on page 94.

Table 5.10 The Ineffectiveness of the Transpose Trick

k	$C = AB$	$C = (B^T A^T)^T$
1	0.79 s	0.37 s
2	0.35 s	0.25 s
3	0.23 s	0.22 s
4	0.20 s	0.20 s
5	0.18 s	0.21 s
6	0.25 s	0.20 s
7	0.33 s	0.19 s
8	0.54 s	0.19 s
9	0.82 s	0.19 s
10	1.31 s	0.19 s
11	2.10 s	0.19 s

(200 × 1000 by 1000 × 100, 000)

Dimension	4,000	8,000	12,000	16,000	20,000	24,000	28,000	32,000
Gaussian	19.00	138.34	444.53	1033.50	2022.29	3459.77	5366.62	8061.90
7	7.64	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
8	7.09	51.78	–	–	–	–	–	–
9	6.90	48.83	159.69	364.74	698.67	1195.78	–	–
10	7.05	47.31	151.65	342.75	651.63	1107.17	1740.58	2635.64
11	7.67	48.08	149.46	332.37	622.86	1051.25	1640.63	2476.58
12	–	52.55	155.51	336.11	620.35	1032.38	1597.98	2397.45
13	–	–	175.47	364.22	655.40	1073.45	1640.45	2432.18
14	–	–	–	–	–	–	1822.93	2657.26
Min	6.90	47.31	149.46	332.37	620.35	1032.38	1597.98	2397.45
Gauss/M4RI	2.75	2.92	2.97	3.11	3.26	3.35	3.36	3.36

Chapter 6

An Impractical Method of Accelerating Matrix Operations in Rings of Finite Size

6.1 Introduction

It is well known that an $n \times n$ matrix with entries from the ring R can be thought of as an $n/b \times n/b$ matrix composed of entries from the ring $M_b(R)$, provided of course that $b|n$. Usually this is not done, because $M_b(R)$ may lack properties that R might have. For example, if R is a field then $M_b(R)$ is not a field for $b > 1$. Nonetheless in this chapter we will derive a speed-up from this representation when performing an $n \times n$ matrix multiplication, or z such multiplications of distinct matrices.

We assume an algorithm exists which can perform $n \times n$ matrix multiplication in $\sim cn^\omega$ ring operations, for some c and some ω , over all rings, or perhaps a class of rings that includes all finite rings (Noetherian, Artinian, etc. . .). Examples include naïve matrix multiplication for $c = 2$ and $\omega = 3$, and Strassen's Algorithm for $\omega = \log_2 7 \approx 2.807$, and c varying by implementation, both of which will work on any ring (or semiring, see Section A.2 on page 133). The algorithm used will be denoted "the baseline algorithm."

We will show that one can derive an algorithm, parameterized by some b , that

runs faster by a factor of $(\log_q n)^{\frac{\omega-2}{2}}$, when b is optimally chosen and where $|R| = q$.

After briefly summarizing the practical and theoretical impact of this chapter, we present the algorithm itself in Section 6.2. Next, we demonstrate how to choose the algorithm's parameter in Section 6.3. There are two ways to make the choice, which we call liberal and conservative. Next, we show how the algorithm can be improved in the special case of a finite field, in Section 6.4. The feasibility of the algorithm is shown in Section 6.5, for finite rings up to order 8. The algorithm is compared to the work of Atkinson and Santoro [AS88], on which it is based, in Section 6.6. Finally some miscellaneous comments are found in Section 6.7.

6.1.1 Feasibility

While the algorithm presented in this chapter is not actually infeasible, it does require a surprising amount of memory for a modest gain in performance. Currently, the cost of memory versus the cost of processors would make this trade-off a strange choice. On the other hand, processor speed seems to have stagnated, while memory capacity seems to be growing. Therefore, there may come a time when the methods of this chapter are more attractive. Unlike, for example, Schönhage's Algorithm for matrix multiplication [Sch81], which is infeasible for all examples, there are particular specific rings (e.g. $\mathbb{GF}(3)$ or $\mathbb{GF}(5)$) and problem sizes for which this algorithm can be implemented feasibly today on an ordinary PC and with a noticeable acceleration over Strassen's algorithm (See Table 6.2 on page 129).

6.2 The Algorithm over a Finite Ring

Consider the set of all $b \times b$ matrices over a finite ring R of size q . Each matrix has b^2 entries, and so there are q^{b^2} such possible matrices. Furthermore, each requires $b^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$ bits of storage. One could construct a multiplication table for the ring $M_b(R)$, with q^{b^2} rows and columns. Each entry in the multiplication table is a $b \times b$ matrix and so $(q^{b^2})^2 b^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil = b^2 q^{2b^2} \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$ bits of storage would be required. Obviously, b must be extremely small in order for this to be feasible.

The naïve matrix multiplication method requires precisely $2n^3$ operations to multiply two $n \times n$ matrices. Since b will be very small, it is safe to assume that the naïve matrix multiplication algorithm is a good choice, if not the best choice, for generating the multiplication table's entries. Thus the work required to build the table will be precisely $2b^3$ ring operations per entry, or a total of precisely $2b^3 q^{2b^2}$ ring multiplies in R . (See Notes, Section 6.7 on page 130, for a discussion on why we do not count ring additions.)

Since the baseline algorithm works for all finite rings, it works over the ring $M_b(R)$. Rewriting our $n \times n$ matrix over R into an $n/b \times n/b$ matrix over $M_b(R)$, we can use the baseline algorithm to perform the matrix multiplication in time equal to $\sim c(n/b)^\omega$ ring multiplication operations.

For this reason, replacing the ring multiplication of $M_b(R)$ with a look-up table is a source of potential improvement. However, there are two pitfalls. First, generating the look-up tables will take time, and this time must be included in our algorithm's complexity. Second, the memory required to store the look-up tables

must exist.

To see why it is important that we take care to identify in which ring a multiply is done, note that if $b = 32000$ and $R = \mathbb{GF}(2)$ then one ring operation takes about an hour on a modern laptop at the time that this dissertation was written.

6.2.1 Summary

We are given the task of multiplying z distinct pairs of $n \times n$ matrices. We have an algorithm that requires $\sim cn^\omega$ ring operations to perform $n \times n$ matrix multiplication, for any ring (or a class of rings including finite rings). Our matrices have entries from a ring R of size q . We will follow the four steps in Algorithm 3 on page 118.

- 1: Select a positive integer b (details to follow).
- 2: Generate a look-up table for multiplication in the ring $M_b(R)$, in other words $b \times b$ R-matrix multiplication.
- 3: For each of our z matrix pairs:
 - (a) Divide our $n \times n$ matrix over R into $b \times b$ submatrices thus making an $n/b \times n/b$ matrix over $M_b(R)$.
 - (b) Execute the “baseline” algorithm over $M_b(R)$.

Algorithm 3: The Finite-Ring Algorithm

6.2.2 Complexity

The first step will be trivial once we determine good formulas for b . Step Two will require $2b^3$ R-multiplications for each of q^{2b^2} matrices, or $2b^3q^{2b^2}$ R-multiplications total. Step 3a runs in quadratic time, and thus is negligible. Step 3b will require

$c(n/b)^\omega$ multiplies in the ring $M_b(R)$, repeated z times or a total of czn^ω/b^ω multiplications in $M_b(R)$. The extra storage for the big look-up table is $b^2q^{2b^2} \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$ bits. (Recall there is a small look-up table for the field multiplications). See Section 6.2.4 on page 120 for a note on the storage requirements.

For the sake of simplicity, it will be productive to convert these into matrix-memory operations. Assuming R -multiplications are implemented by a look-up table, they will require 4 ring element memory operations (two to read the multipliers, one to read the product, and one to write the product). Each ring element memory operation is $\lceil \log_2 q \rceil$ bit read/writes, for a total of $4 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$ matrix-memory bit operations.

Using the big look-up table for $M_b(R)$, one can see $2b^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$ matrix-memory operations are required, because one is copying b^2 elements of R instead of just a single element. Finally we have,

$$\sim (2b^3q^{2b^2})(4 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil) + \frac{czn^\omega}{b^\omega} 4b^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

or, more simply,

$$\sim \left[8b^3q^{2b^2} + \frac{4czn^\omega}{b^{\omega-2}} \right] \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

which is to be compared with $4zcn^\omega \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$. Note that if $R = \mathbb{GF}(2)$ then $\lceil \log_2 q \rceil = 1$, which conforms to the $\Theta(zn^\omega)$ matrix memory operations one would intuitively expect.

The objective, therefore, is to make the first term $o()$ of the second, and thus

achieve a speed up of $b^{\omega-2}$.

6.2.3 Taking Advantage of $z \neq 1$

In the special case when we know we will execute several iterations of multiplying $n \times n$ matrices over the same ring, then building a larger table might make sense. If one substitutes

$$n' = \frac{n}{\sqrt[\omega]{z}}$$

then $c(n')^\omega = czn^\omega$. Thus working on z multiplications of $n \times n$ matrices is equivalent to working on one multiplication of $n' \times n'$ matrices. For this reason, we can proceed by assuming $z = 1$, and programmers can use the above formula for n' to adjust in the case that $z > 1$.

6.2.4 The Transpose of Matrix Multiplication

Since it is the case that $A^T B^T = (BA)^T$, we need not compute all q^{2b^2} products in the large look-up table. Instead, we could generate the table for the set of all symmetric possibilities for A , and half of the set of the non-symmetric possibilities for A , each with all possibilities for B . Then we could copy the answers for the other half of the possibilities for non-symmetric A . Since the fraction of matrices which are symmetric is vanishingly small as b gets large, this means that we do half as much work in generating the tables, but still need the full amount of memory. The total complexity is now

$$\sim \left[b^3 q^{2b^2} + \frac{cn^\omega}{b^{\omega-2}} \right] 4 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

which is to be compared with

$$\sim 4cn^\omega \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

6.3 Choosing Values of b

There are two choices of b that will prove productive. The first, which we denote “conservative”, requires only logarithmically more memory than storing the original matrices. The second, which we denote “liberal”, is optimal but uses a great deal of memory.

6.3.1 The “Conservative” Algorithm

Let $b = \sqrt{\log_q n}$. One then obtains the time requirement

$$\sim \left[(\log_q n)^{3/2} q^{2 \log_q n} + c \frac{n^\omega}{(\sqrt{\log_q n})^{\omega-2}} \right] 4 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

which simplifies to

$$\sim \left[(\log_q n)^{3/2} n^2 + c \frac{n^\omega}{(\log_q n)^{\frac{\omega-2}{2}}} \right] 4 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

Clearly, the left-hand term is absorbed into the right-hand term. We have now established a speed-up of

$$(\log_q n)^{\frac{\omega-2}{2}}$$

The memory requirement is

$$\begin{aligned} &\sim (\log_q n)n^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil \\ &\sim (\log_2 n)n^2 \left(1 + \frac{o(1)}{\log_2 q}\right) \end{aligned}$$

which is only slightly worse than the $2n^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$ bits required to store the original two matrices themselves. The ratio of the extra storage to the original storage is $(\log_q n)/2$, or $(\log_q n)/2z$ if $z \neq 1$. Note, while we disposed of z in terms of running time in Section 6.2.3 on page 120, the storage requirements of the original problem also grow linearly with z . Therefore the ratio of the extra memory that we require in order to build our tables to the memory required to store the original problem will have a z term.

6.3.2 The “Liberal” Algorithm

The strategy of finding the optimal b is as follows. So long as the left-hand term is absorbed into the right-hand term, increasing b is beneficial, because it is in the denominator of the right-hand term. Therefore, we wish to find the largest b where the left-hand term is still negligible. For example,

$$b = \sqrt{\frac{\omega - \epsilon}{2} \log_q n}$$

which implies

$$q^{2b^2} = n^{\omega - \epsilon}$$

yielding a time requirement of

$$\left[\left(\frac{\omega - \epsilon}{2} \log_q n \right)^{3/2} n^{\omega - \epsilon} + c \frac{n^\omega}{\left(\frac{\omega - \epsilon}{2} \log_q n \right)^{\frac{\omega - 2}{2}}} \right] 4 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

So long as $\epsilon > 0$, the table-building time can be neglected, and if $\epsilon = 0$, it cannot be neglected. Therefore, up to minor factors like adding a constant to b , this is close to optimal.

Of course, one could solve for the ideal b by setting the derivative of the complexity expression to zero, and solving for b explicitly or numerically. In practice, however, since $b < 8$ in any conceivable case even in the distant future, is it simply better to run a trial for values of $b = 2, \dots, b = 7$, and find the optimum suited to a particular machine or architecture experimentally.

Unfortunately, the memory requirement is

$$\frac{\omega - \epsilon}{2} (\log_q n) \lceil \log_2 q \rceil n^{\omega - \epsilon}$$

which is significantly more than our previous substitution. In fact, the ratio of the memory required for the tables to the memory required for the original two matrices is

$$\frac{\omega - \epsilon}{4} (\log_q n) n^{\omega - \epsilon - 2}$$

Finally, note the speed-up factor is therefore

$$\left(\frac{\omega - \epsilon}{2} \log_q n \right)^{\frac{\omega - 2}{2}}$$

6.3.3 Comparison

The liberal approach accomplishes more in theory but is too expensive (in memory) to be feasible at all. The conservative approach is less expensive but still accomplishes an improvement.

6.4 Over Finite Fields

The following idea in this section is inspired by projective geometry, and works over any finite field other than $\mathbb{GF}(2)$. Consider that all matrices in $M_2(\mathbb{GF}(q))$ can be written as scalar multiples of one of the following five matrices:

$$\left\{ \begin{bmatrix} 1 & q_1 \\ q_2 & q_3 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ q_1 & q_2 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 1 & q_1 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \right\}$$

Discarding the rightmost, we can represent every matrix in $M_2(\mathbb{GF}(q))$ in the form (k, m) with $k \in \mathbb{GF}(q)$ and m a matrix of the type listed above. To calculate the product of (k_1, m_1) and (k_2, m_2) one would look up the table entry for $m_1 m_2$, which must be recorded in the form (k_3, m_3) . Then one must calculate $k' = k_1 k_2 k_3$, and store (k', m_3) . We claim the added complexity is negligible (see Section 6.4.1 on page 125).

The point of this change, however, is that the table is *drastically* smaller in terms of the number of entries. This reduces the memory and time requirements accordingly, and allows for a bigger b .

In particular, let $m = b^2$ for notational simplicity, and observe that there are q^{m-1} matrices of the first kind, q^{m-2} of the second, and down to 1 matrix of the last

kind. (The all zero matrix has been discarded). This is a total of

$$\frac{q^m - 1}{q - 1}$$

matrices, or roughly $1/q$ th as many as previously required. This means the table will be smaller by a factor of about $1/q^2$.

6.4.1 Complexity Penalty

Algorithm 4 on page 125 shows the algorithm for multiplying that is now replacing our table look-up for $M_b(R)$.

- 1: Read (k_1, m_1) . ($b^2 + 1$ field element reads).
- 2: Read (k_2, m_2) . ($b^2 + 1$ field element reads).
- 3: Look-up $m_1 m_2 = (k_3, m_1 m_2)$ ($b^2 + 1$ field element reads).
- 4: Calculate $k' = k_1 k_2 k_3$. (2 field operations).
- 5: Write (k', m_3) . ($b^2 + 1$ field element reads).

Algorithm 4: Fast $M_b(R)$ multiplications for R a finite field but not $\mathbb{GF}(2)$

The calculation of $k_1 k_2 k_3$ requires only two field operations, or an additional 8 field element reads/writes at the rate of 4 reads/writes per multiply (as discussed earlier). This is $8 + 4b^2 + 4$ field element reads, whereas we had $4b^2$ before. The difference is negligible in \sim notation, and so will not be discussed further.

6.4.2 Memory Requirements

Before, q^{2b^2} entries in the look-up table were needed, but now we require q^{2b^2}/q^2 or q^{2b^2-2} entries. Before, each was b^2 ring elements, and now each one is $b^2 + 1$ field

elements. The total memory required is thus

$$q^{2b^2-2}(b^2 + 1) \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

6.4.3 Time Requirements

The “transpose trick” would be difficult to use in this context and so the time to compute the contents of the look-up table is simply $2b^3$ field multiplications, or $8b^3 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$ matrix-memory operations each.

This results in a total complexity of

$$\left[8b^3 q^{2b^2-2} + 4c \frac{n^\omega}{b^{\omega-2}} \right] \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

6.4.4 The Conservative Algorithm

If we substitute $b' = \sqrt{1 + \log_q n}$, then $2(b')^2 - 2 = 2 \log_q n$, which was the exponent of q in the conservative derivation for the finite ring version of the algorithm.

The speed up then becomes

$$(1 + \log_q n)^{\frac{\omega-2}{2}}$$

which is a mild improvement.

The memory requirement is

$$\sim (1 + \log_q n) n^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

$$\sim (1 + \log_2 n)n^2 \left(1 + \frac{o(1)}{\log_2 q}\right)$$

which is only slightly worse than the $2n^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$ bits required to store the original two matrices themselves. The ratio of the extra storage to the original storage is $(1 + \log_q n)/2$, or $(1 + \log_q n)/2z$ if $z \neq 1$.

6.4.5 The Liberal Algorithm

If we substitute

$$b' = \sqrt{1 + \frac{\omega - \epsilon}{2} \log_q n}$$

then $2(b')^2 - 2 = (\omega - \epsilon) \log_q n$, which was the exponent of q in the liberal derivation for the finite ring algorithm. The speed up then becomes

$$\left(1 + \frac{\omega - \epsilon}{2} \log_q n\right)^{\frac{\omega-2}{2}}$$

which is a mild improvement.

The memory requirement is

$$\left(1 + \frac{\omega - \epsilon}{2} \log_q n\right)n^{\omega-\epsilon} \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$$

which is the most expensive requirement thus far.

6.5 Very Small Finite Fields

The memory required for this algorithm, for typical small rings and fields, is given in Table 6.2 on page 129. Note, there is no question of “liberal” or “conser-

Table 6.1 The Speed-Up and Extra Memory Usage given by the four choices

	Memory Used	
	Liberal	Conservative
Finite Ring	$\frac{\omega-\epsilon}{2}(\log_q n) \lceil \log_2 q \rceil n^{\omega-\epsilon}$	$(\log_q n)n^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$
$\mathbb{GF}(q), q \neq 2$	$(1 + \frac{\omega-\epsilon}{2} \log_q n)n^{\omega-\epsilon} \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$	$(1 + \log_q n)n^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$
	Speed-Up	
	Liberal	Conservative
Finite Ring	$(\frac{\omega-\epsilon}{2} \log_q n)^{\frac{\omega-2}{2}}$	$(\log_q n)^{\frac{\omega-2}{2}}$
$\mathbb{GF}(q), q \neq 2$	$(1 + \frac{\omega-\epsilon}{2} \log_q n)^{\frac{\omega-2}{2}}$	$(1 + \log_q n)^{\frac{\omega-2}{2}}$

vative” memory allocation because b is fixed, and those adjectives referred to the calculation of a good b as n increases.

A few things are obvious. First, that non-fields pay a heavy penalty for being unable to use the “projective trick”. Second, this algorithm is not completely infeasible. For example, $\mathbb{GF}(4)$ and $b = 3$ requires 9.16×10^9 bits of memory, or 1.07 gigabytes, about half the memory of a typical newly purchased PC at the time this dissertation was written. While this is enormous for one table, a speed-up of 2.427 over Strassen’s algorithm without the look-up tables is achieved. Third, for fields much larger than $\mathbb{GF}(8)$, this algorithm is completely infeasible.

It should be noted, however, that these speed-ups would probably be vastly offset by the fact that this algorithm would have essentially no cache efficiency via spatial or temporal locality.

Table 6.2 Memory Required (in bits) and Speed-Up Factor (w/Strassen) for Various Rings

	GF(2)	GF(3)	GF(4)	Z_4	GF(5)	Z_6	GF(7)	GF(8)	Z_8	Speed-Up
b=2	256	1,640	8,738	131,072	48,828	5,038,848	360,300	798,91	5.50×10^8	1.750
b=3	262,144	9.69×10^7	9.16×10^9	1.37×10^{11}	4.77×10^{11}	3.05×10^{14}	1.02×10^{14}	8.58×10^{14}	5.40×10^{16}	2.427
b=4	4.29×10^9	4.63×10^{14}	2.46×10^{18}	3.69×10^{19}	2.91×10^{21}	2.39×10^{25}	6.90×10^{25}	3.77×10^{27}	2.38×10^{29}	3.061
b=5	1.13×10^{15}	1.79×10^{23}	1.69×10^{29}	2.54×10^{30}	1.11×10^{34}	2.42×10^{39}	1.12×10^{41}	6.80×10^{43}	4.28×10^{45}	3.665

6.6 Previous Work

Atkinson and Santoro’s algorithm appeared in [AS88]. Unlike the method presented in this chapter, it is given only for boolean matrices, requires both addition and multiplication tables (versus only multiplication), and uses the naïve cubic-time algorithm for the baseline operation. Furthermore, the “transpose” and “projective” tricks were not used. That paper does not consider $z \neq 1$. Unfortunately, Atkinson and Santoro appear to have neglected the time required to copy table-lookups into the final matrix in their calculations. Therefore, their speed-up of $(\log_2 n)^{3/2}$ actually should be $\sqrt{\log_2 n}$. However, this work is clearly an extension of their idea, and therefore this algorithm should be called “the Extended Atkinson-Santoro Algorithm.”

6.7 Notes

6.7.1 Ring Additions

Normally in linear algebra one counts multiplications and inversions but not additions and subtractions, because the former two operations are near-cubic time and the latter two operations are quadratic time. In finite field computations, $\mathbb{GF}(q = p^n)$ will be represented as a n -dimensional $\mathbb{GF}(p)$ -vector space. Addition of vectors is trivial, especially if the model used is an n -dimensional \mathbb{Z} -module with occasional modulus operations to prevent overflow. Likewise, \mathbb{Z}_N additions can be modeled the same way.

While the cases of matrix rings, finite fields, and \mathbb{Z}_N are very common finite rings, they are other finite rings. For example, take the Boolean Ring over the set of three letters. The set of three letters is an alphabet, and the ring is composed of the power set of the alphabet. (i.e. all subsets of the alphabet are members of the ring). The multiplication operation is an intersection of sets, and the addition operation is the set symmetric difference. That is to say that

$$x \in (A + B) \Leftrightarrow x \in (A \cup B) \wedge x \notin (A \cap B)$$

It is easy to see that this algebraic object is a commutative ring with eight elements, and therefore a candidate for this algorithm. Clearly a look-up table for both addition and multiplication is the best option for computing in this ring, and so addition and multiplication require equal time. However, such rings other than $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ are uncommon and have few applications that the author is aware of (only certain combinatorial computations).

Interestingly, Atkinson and Santoro used look-up tables in the original paper for both addition and multiplication. The ring involved was actually not a ring, but the boolean semiring discussed in Section A.2 on page 133. But additions in $M_b(S)$, where S is that semiring, are trivial.

6.7.2 On the Ceiling Symbol

The ceiling operation in the memory requirement is not strictly optimal. One can write $\lceil b^2 \log_2 q \rceil$ instead of $b^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil$. The former represents enumerating all

possible matrices in $M_b(R)$, and assigning them “ID numbers.” The latter represents storing them as a two-dimensional array of field elements. The array option has many advantages, like simpler addressing, and enabling the faster additions mentioned in the previous subsection.

On the other hand, for $M_3(\mathbb{GF}(5))$, note that $b^2 \lceil \log_2 q \rceil = 27$, while $\lceil b^2 \log_2 q \rceil = 21$. Thus memory usage could be cut by 22% in this case. However, this would require doubling the size of the extra storage (i.e. one table for multiplication and one for addition), and this completely overshadows the 22% advantage.

Appendix A

Some Basic Facts about Linear Algebra over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$

The purpose of this chapter is to identify some facts about $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -vector spaces and about matrices over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$. To emphasize the differences between matrices over \mathbb{R} or \mathbb{C} and matrices over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$, we note several interesting phenomena. We assume the contents of this chapter are already known. They are stated here so that they can be used elsewhere, and for background.

A.1 Sources

Normally, we would cite a series of useful textbooks with background information but amazingly there is no text for finite field linear algebra. We do not know why this is the case. The algorithms book [AHU74, Ch. 6] mentions algorithms for finite field linear algebra. There are a few pages in [LN94, Ch. 7] that deal with this topic, there named “Linear Modular Systems.” Also, Krishnamurthy’s work [Kri85, Ch. 2] discusses linear algebra over the integers, a related topic. The studies [HW98, FMR⁺95] appear highly cited and relevant but we have been unable to obtain a copy of either.

A.2 Boolean Matrices vs $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ Matrices

In graph theory, a particular ring-like object is often used whose elements are “true” and “false”; multiplication is logical-AND and addition is logical-OR. The identity element for addition is “false”. But then clearly, this algebraic object has no additive inverse for “true”. Thus it is a semigroup on both operations (as well as a monoid on both operations) and the name for this bizarre arrangement is a semiring. It turns out that linear algebra can be done in this world, in the sense of matrix multiplication and matrix exponentiation for calculating transitive closures of digraphs. Matrices filled with elements from this semiring are called boolean matrices.

Therefore, to distinguish between those matrices and matrices from $\mathbb{GF}(2)$, we will use the term “boolean matrix” for the former and “ $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ matrices” for the latter. For example, the Method of Four Russians for Multiplication was designed for boolean matrices, but as will be shown in Section 5.3 on page 82, we have adapted it for $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ matrices.

A.3 Why is $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ Different?

This section contains three very basic observations that are intended to remind the reader that $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -vector spaces are different from \mathbb{R} -vector spaces, such as \mathbb{R}^3 . The author assumes these examples have been known for quite some time, but they

serve to remind the reader of some crucial differences, and will be touched on later in the dissertation as facts in their own right.

A.3.1 There are Self-Orthogonal Vectors

Consider the ordinary dot product,

$$\langle \vec{x}, \vec{y} \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} x_i y_i$$

Surely in $\mathbb{GF}(2)$, one can see that $\langle (0, 1, 1), (0, 1, 1) \rangle = 0 + 1 + 1 = 0$ and thus there exist non-zero vectors which are orthogonal to themselves. In \mathbb{R} , \mathbb{Q} and in \mathbb{C} , or any field of characteristic zero, only the zero-vector is self-orthogonal. Note that in \mathbb{C} , the value of $\langle \vec{x}, \vec{y} \rangle = \vec{x}^T \vec{y}$.

A.3.2 Something that Fails

Consider the Gram-Schmidt algorithm, a very well understood linear algebraic technique. Given a set S of vectors, the algorithm computes B , an orthonormal basis for the space spanned by S . The algorithm is given in Algorithm 5 on page 134.

```

1:  $B \leftarrow \{ \}$ .
2: for each  $s_i \in S$  do
  1: for each  $b_j \in B$  do
    1:  $s_i \leftarrow s_i - \langle s_i, b_j \rangle b_j$ 
  2: if  $s_i \neq 0$  then
    1:  $s_i \leftarrow \frac{1}{\|s_i\|} s_i$ 
    2: Insert  $s_i$  into  $B$ .

```

Algorithm 5: Gram-Schmidt, over a field of characteristic zero.

The first problem is that the normalization step (second-to-last step) requires a norm. If the usual norm based on the inner product $\|x\| = \sqrt{\langle x, x \rangle}$ is used, then self-orthogonal vectors will result in division by zero. If the Hamming norm is used, then perhaps one would have to compute $1/3$ or $1/4$ times a $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -vector, which is meaningless.

However, we can drop the second to last step, and simply hope to create an orthogonal basis instead of an orthonormal basis (i.e. it will not necessarily be the case that the output vectors will all have norm one, but there will still be a basis and all vectors will be orthogonal to each other).

Now consider the vectors $S = \{(1, 0, 1, 0); (1, 1, 1, 0); (0, 0, 1, 1)\}$. The output is $B = \{(1, 0, 1, 0); (1, 1, 1, 0); (0, 1, 1, 1)\}$. Clearly the first and last vector of B are

not orthogonal. Thus the algorithm fails. Note that the first input vector was a self-orthogonal vector.

To see why this is important, consider this basic use of an orthonormal basis. Given such a basis $B = \{\vec{b}_1, \dots, \vec{b}_n\}$, one can write a vector \vec{v} as a linear combination of the basis vectors. Let $c_i = \langle \vec{v}, \vec{b}_i \rangle$, and then $\vec{v} = \sum c_i \vec{b}_i$.

In the example above, consider $(0, 1, 0, 0)$. In this case $c_1 = 0, c_2 = 1, c_3 = 0$, by the above method. But $0\vec{b}_1 + 1\vec{b}_2 + 0\vec{b}_3 = (1, 1, 1, 0) \neq (0, 1, 0, 0)$. Instead, a better choice would have been $c_1 = 1, c_2 = 1, c_3 = 0$, which produces the correct answer. Note the only coefficient that is wrong is the one computed for the only self-orthogonal vector.

Since Gram-Schmidt is crucial in the QR -factorization algorithm, this problem rules out doing QR in $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -vector spaces.

A.3.3 The Probability a Random Square Matrix is Singular or Invertible

Consider the set of $n \times n$ matrices over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$. Suppose we wish to calculate the probability that a random matrix (one filled with the output of random fair coins), is singular or invertible. The ratio of invertible $n \times n$ matrices (i.e. $|GL_n(\mathbb{GF}(2))|$), to all $n \times n$ matrices (i.e. $|M_n(\mathbb{GF}(2))|$), will give us that probability.

The latter calculation is trivial. Each matrix has n^2 entries and so there are 2^{n^2} such matrices.

Now for the former, consider the first column. It can be anything except the column of all zeroes, or $2^n - 1$ choices. The second column can be anything except the first column, or all zeroes, thus $2^n - 2$ choices. The third column cannot be all zeroes, the first column, the second column, or their sum, or $2^n - 4$ choices. It is clear that the i th column cannot contain a vector in the subspace generated by the previous $i - 1$ columns, which are linearly independent by construction. This subspace has 2^{i-1} elements. Thus the i th column has $2^n - 2^{i-1}$ choices.

This results in the following expression for the probability

$$\frac{\prod_{i=1}^{i=n} 2^n - 2^{i-1}}{2^{n^2}} = \prod_{i=1}^{i=n} 1 - 2^{i-1-n}$$

The latter is obviously just a rational number. For any particular value of n , it can be calculated. But as $n \rightarrow \infty$, the product converges toward $0.28879\dots$, a positive real number. (This is also a good approximation for $n > 10$.) This value is also very close to $\sqrt{1/12}$.

While this result is well known [Rys57] or [vLW01, Ch. 16], this is still a surprise, because for any real random variable with a continuous probability distribution function, filling a matrix with independent and identically distributed values will produce a singular matrix with probability zero. To see why this is true, recall that the determinant is a polynomial function of the entries ($\det : \mathbb{R}^{n^2} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$), and a matrix is singular if and only if its determinant is zero. Since zero is a single point,

the pre-image of zero under this map is a hyper-surface of co-dimension 1. Therefore this pre-image is a set of measure zero in \mathbb{R}^{n^2} .

Appendix B

A Model for the Complexity of $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -Operations

Here, we propose a new model, counting matrix-memory operations instead of field operations, for reasons to be discussed in Section B.1 on page 137. It turns out this model describes reality only partially—but we will explicitly discuss the circumstances in which the model is descriptive and in which it fails, see Section B.1.3 on page 139. The complexity expressions are summarized in Table B.1 on page 146. Also of interest are certain data structure choices that we made in arranging our linear algebra library, see Section 1 on page 4. This library was used by Nicolas Courtois in his cryptographic research, and now forms part of the $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ linear algebra suite of SAGE [sag], an open source competitor to Magma [mag], Matlab [matb], Maple [map], and Mathematica [mata]. These are described in Section B.4 on page 140.

B.1 The Cost Model

In papers on matrix operations over the real or complex numbers, the number of floating point operations is used as a measure of running time. This removes the need to account for assembly language instructions needed to manipulate index pointers, iteration counters, discussions of instruction set, and measurements of how cache coherency or branch prediction will impact running time. In this dissertation, floating point operation counts are meaningless, for matrices over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ do not use floating point operations. Therefore, we propose that matrix entry reads and writes be tabulated, because addition (XOR) and multiplication (AND) are single instructions, while reads and writes on rectangular arrays are much more expensive. Clearly these data structures are non-trivial in size, so memory transactions will be the bulk of the time spent.

From a computer architecture viewpoint in particular, the matrices required for cryptanalysis cannot fit in the cache of the microprocessor, so the fetches to main memory are a bottleneck. Even if exceptionally careful use of temporal and spatial locality guarantees effective caching (and it is not clear that this is possible), the data must still travel from memory to the processor and back. The bandwidth of buses has not increased proportionally to the rapid increase in the speeds of microprocessors. Given the relatively simple calculations done once the data is in the microprocessor's registers (i.e. single instructions), it is extremely likely that the memory transactions are the rate-determining step. Due to the variations of computer architectures, the coefficients given here may vary slightly. On the other hand, by deriving them mathematically rather than experimentally, one need not worry about artifacts of particular architectures or benchmarks skewing the results.

When attempting to convert these memory operation counts into CPU cycles, one must remember that other instructions are needed to maintain loops, execute

field operations, and so forth. Also, memory transactions are not one cycle each, but can be pipelined. Thus we estimate that about 4–10 CPU cycles are needed per matrix-memory operation.

B.1.1 Is the Model Trivial?

A minor technicality is defining what regions of memory the reads and writes should count. Clearly registers do not count and the original matrix should. The standard we set is that a read or write counts unless it is to a “scratch” data structure. We define a data structure to be “scratch” if and only if its size is bounded by a constant.

For example, consider the following three step algorithm of inverting a non-singular $n \times n$ matrix, in $\sim 2n^2$ time.

1. Read in a matrix. (n^2 reads).
2. Invert the matrix. (No reads or writes).
3. Write the output matrix. (n^2 writes).

This is not allowed (or rather, we would not tabulate Step 2 as zero cost) because the temporary storage of the matrix requires n^2 field elements, and this is not upper-bounded by a constant.

B.1.2 Counting Field Operations

It is easy to see that counting field multiplications only versus counting field multiplications and additions produces two distinct tabulations in almost all cases. It is also easy to imagine that counting field multiplies and reads/writes will result in distinct tabulations.

An interesting question is if counting reads/writes is distinct from counting field multiplications and additions. In Gaussian Elimination, the answer is yes, because of “if” operations. If a row contains a zero in the pivot column, it is read but never operated upon.

The follow-up question is if counting reads/writes is distinct from counting field multiplications, additions, and conditionals (if’s). After all, the latter three operations are all single logic gates.

In this case consider a one by one matrix multiplication, or one-dimensional dot-product. It requires one arithmetic operation, and three reads/writes. A two-dimensional dot product requires four reads and one write, versus two multiplications and one addition. An n -dimensional dot-product requires $2n + 1$ reads/writes but $2n - 1$ field operations, for a ratio of $\frac{2n+1}{2n-1}$. While this is ~ 1 , the ratio is changing. Note it is important to have very close estimates of the coefficient when performing cross-over analysis.

B.1.3 Success and Failure

The model described above has had some success. When actually implementing the algorithms in code, and performing timing experiments, the observed exponents have always been correct. When comparing different variants of the same algorithm (e.g. triangular versus complete Gaussian Elimination), the coefficients have been correct to about 2%.

However, when comparing different algorithms (e.g. Magma's Strassen-naïve matrix multiplication vs M4RM, or M4RM vs naïve matrix multiplication) the coefficients sometimes give ratios that are off by up to 50%. This inaccuracy above is probably due to the role of caching. Some algorithms are more friendly toward cached memory than others. It is notoriously hard to model this.

Another reason is that Magma has been hand-optimized for certain processors at the assembly language level, and the author's library has been written in C (though compiled with optimization settings turned on).

In calculating the number of times a subroutine will be called (i.e. How many times do you use the black-box $n_0 \times n_0$ matrix multiply when inverting a much larger matrix?), the model is exact. Presumably because nearly all the time is spent in the black box, and it is the same single black box routine in all cases, the number of calls to the black box is all that matters. Since this is an integer, it is easy to measure if one is correct.

B.2 Notational Conventions

Precise performance estimates are useful, so rather than the usual five symbols $O(n)$, $o(n)$, $\Omega(n)$, $\omega(n)$, $\Theta(n)$, we will use $f(n) \sim g(n)$ to indicate that

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{f(n)}{g(n)} = 1$$

in the case that an exact number of operations is difficult to state. While $O(n)$ statements are perfectly adequate for many applications, coefficients must be known to determine if algorithms can be run in a reasonable amount of time on particular target ciphers.

Let $f(n) \leq \sim g(n)$ signify that there exists an $h(n)$ and n_0 such that $f(n) \leq h(n)$ for all $n > n_0$, and $h(n) \sim g(n)$. Equivalently, this means $\limsup f(n)/g(n) \leq 1$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

Matrices in this dissertation are over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ unless otherwise stated, and are of size m rows and n columns. Denote ℓ as the lesser of n and m . If $n > m$ or $\ell = m$ the matrix is said to be underdefined, and if $m > n$ or $\ell = n$ then the matrix is said to be overdefined. Also, β is the fraction of elements of the matrix not equal to zero.

B.3 To Invert or to Solve?

Generally, four basic options exist when presented with solving systems of equations over the reals as defined by a square matrix. First, the matrix can be inverted, but this is the most computationally intensive option. Second, the system can be adjoined by the vector of constants, and the matrix reduced into a triangular form so that the unknowns can be found via back-substitution. Third, the matrix can be factored into LU-triangular form, or other forms. Fourth, the matrix can be operated upon by iterative methods, to converge to a matrix near to its inverse. Unfortunately, in finite fields concepts like convergence toward an inverse do not have meaning. This rules out option four. The second option is unattractive, because solving the same system for two sets of constants requires twice as much work, whereas in the first and third case, if the quantity of additional sets of constants is small compared to the dimensions of the matrices, trivial increase in workload is required.

Among these two remaining strategies, inversion is almost strictly dominated by LUP-factorization. The LUP-factorization is $A = LUP$, where L is lower unit triangular, U is upper unit triangular, and P is a permutation matrix. There are other factorizations, like the QR [TB97, Lec. 7], which are not discussed here because no one (to the author's knowledge) has proposed how to do them over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$. (For example, the QR depends on the complexity of Gram-Schmidt, but Gram-Schmidt fails over $\mathbb{GF}(2)$). While the LUP-factorization results in three matrices, and the inverse in only one, the storage requirements are about the same. This is because, other than the main diagonal, the triangular matrices have half of their entries forced at zero by definition. Also, since the main diagonal can have only units, and the only unit in this field is 1, the main diagonal of the triangular matrices need not be stored. The permutation matrix can be stored with n entries, rather than n^2 , as is explained in Section B.4 on page 140.

Calculating the inverse is always (for all methods listed in this dissertation) more work than the LUP-factorization but by a factor that varies depending on which algorithm is used. Also the LUP-factorization allows the determinant to be calculated, but for all non-singular $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ matrices the determinant is 1. (And for singular matrices it is zero). Also, multiplying a matrix by a vector requires $3n^2$ matrix-memory operations (a read-read-write for each field operation, with n^2 field operations). For back-substitution in the LUP -case, one must do it twice, for L and for U . The back-substitution requires $n^2/2$ field operations, or $(3/2)n^2$ matrix-memory operations, so this ends up being equal also.

B.4 Data Structure Choices

The most elementary way to store a matrix is as an array of scalars. Two-dimensional arrays are often stored as a series of one-dimensional arrays in sequence, or as an array of pointers to arrays (one for each row, called a “ragged array”). In either case, it is not obvious if the linear arrays should be rows or columns. For

example, in a matrix multiplication AB with the naïve algorithm, spatial locality will be enhanced if A 's rows and B 's columns are the linear data structure. Two data structures are proposed and described below.

B.4.1 Dense Form: An Array with Swaps

For dense matrices, we present a method of storing the matrix as an array but with very fast swaps. The cells of the matrix are a two-dimensional array, with the rows being the linear data structure, since more of the work in the algorithms of this dissertation is performed upon rows than upon columns. Additionally, two one-dimensional arrays called row-swap and column-swap are used. Initially these are filled with the numbers $1, 2, \dots, m$ and $1, 2, \dots, n$. When a swap of rows or columns is called for, the numbers in the cells of the row-swap or column-swap corresponding to those rows are swapped. When a cell a_{ij} is called for, the result returned is a_{r_i, c_j} , with r_i representing the i th entry of the row-swap array, and c_j likewise. In this manner, row and column swaps can be executed in constant time, namely two writes each.

For example, a 5×5 matrix with rows 1 and 2 being swapped, and then rows 4 and 2 being swapped, would cause the matrix to have $\{2, 4, 3, 1, 5\}$ as its row-swap array.

B.4.2 Permutation Matrices

An identity matrix which has had rows or columns swapped is called a permutation matrix. We propose an efficient scheme for storing and performing operations on permutation matrices.

It is only necessary to store a row-swap and column-swap array as before, not the body of the matrix. The row-swap and column-swap arrays allow a quick look-up, by calculating $a_{ij} = 1$ if and only if $r_i = c_j$ (i.e. the cell is on the main diagonal after swapping), and returning $a_{ij} = 0$ if $r_i \neq c_j$.

In linear time one can compose two permutations (multiply the matrices) or invert the permutation (invert the matrix). The algorithms for this are given in Algorithm 6 on page 141 and Algorithm 7 on page 142. Note that the algorithms should be called twice, once for row permutations and once for columns.

```

1: For  $i = 1$  to  $n$  do
    1:  $temp \leftarrow r_i$ 
    2:  $t_i \leftarrow s_{temp}$ 

```

Algorithm 6: To compose two row swap arrays r and s , into t

It is trivial to see that a permutation can be applied to a vector in linear time, by simply moving the values around in accordance with the row-swap array. To multiply a matrix by a permutation is also a linear time operation, because one

```

1: For  $i = 1$  to  $n$  do
    1:  $temp \leftarrow r_i$ 
    2:  $s_{temp} \leftarrow i$ 

```

Algorithm 7: To invert a row swap array r , into s

only need apply the permutation's row swap array to the matrix's row swap array (as in composing two permutations, in Algorithm 6 on page 141).

B.5 Analysis of Classical Techniques with our Model

B.5.1 Naïve Matrix Multiplication

For comparison, we calculate the complexity of the naïve matrix multiplication algorithm, for a product $AB = C$ with dimensions $a \times b$, $b \times c$ and $a \times c$, respectively.

```

1: for  $i = 1, 2, \dots, a$ 
    1: for  $j = 1, 2, \dots, c$ 
        1: Calculate  $C_{ij} = A_{i1}B_{1j} + A_{i2}B_{2j} + \dots + A_{ib}B_{bj}$ . (Costs  $2b + 1$  reads/writes).

```

Algorithm 8: Naïve Matrix Multiplication

From the algorithm given in Algorithm 8 on page 142, this clearly requires $2abc + ac$ operations, or for square matrices $2n^3 + n^2$ operations. This reduces to $\sim 2abc$ or $\sim 2n^3$.

B.5.2 Matrix Addition

If adding $A + B = C$, obviously $c_{ij} = a_{ij} + b_{ij}$ requires two reads and one write per matrix entry. This yields $\sim 3mn$ matrix memory operations overall, if the original matrices are $m \times n$.

B.5.3 Dense Gaussian Elimination

The algorithm known as Gaussian Elimination is very familiar. It has many variants, but three are useful to us. As a subroutine for calculating the inverse of a matrix, we refer to adjoining an $n \times n$ matrix with the $n \times n$ identity matrix to form an $n \times 2n$ matrix. This will be processed to output the $n \times n$ identity on the left, and A^{-1} on the right. The second is to solve a system directly, in which case one column is adjoined with the constant values. This is “full Gaussian Elimination” and is found in Algorithm 9 on page 143. Another useful variant, which finishes with a triangular rather than identity submatrix in the upper-left, is

listed in Algorithm 10 on page 144, and is called “Triangular Gaussian Elimination.” (That variant requires $2/3$ as much time for solving a system of equations, but is not useful for finding matrix inverses). Since Gaussian Elimination is probably known to the reader, it is not described here, but it has the following cost analysis.

- 1: For each column $i = 1, 2, \dots, \ell$
 - 1: Search for a non-zero entry in region $a_{ii} \dots a_{mn}$ (Expected cost is 2 reads). Call this entry a_{xy} .
 - 2: Swap rows i and x , swap columns i and y . (Costs 4 writes).
 - 3: For each row $j = 1, 2, \dots, m$, but not row i
 - 1: If $a_{ji} = 1$ (Costs 1 read) then for each column $k = i, i + 1, \dots, n$
 - 1: Calculate $a_{jk} = a_{jk} + a_{ik}$. (Costs 2 reads, 1 write).

Algorithm 9: Dense Gaussian Elimination, for Inversion

The total number of reads and writes is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 &= \sum_{i=1}^{i=\ell} 6 + (m - 1)(1 + 0.5(3)(n - i + 1)) \\
 &= 1.5nm\ell - 0.75m\ell^2 + 1.75m\ell - 1.5n\ell + 0.75\ell^2 + 4.25\ell \\
 &\sim 1.5nm\ell - 0.75m\ell^2
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus for the overdefined case ($\ell = n$) one obtains $1.5n^2m - 0.75mn^2$, and for underdefined ($\ell = m$) the total is $1.5nm^2 - 0.75m^3$. For a square matrix this is $0.75n^3$.

The alternative form of the Gaussian Elimination algorithm, which outputs an upper-triangular matrix rather than the identity matrix in the upper-left $\ell \times \ell$ submatrix, is found in Algorithm 10 on page 144. This is not useful for finding the inverse of a matrix, but is useful for LU-factorization or solving a system of m equations in n unknowns. Here it is assumed that one column is adjoined that contains the constants for a system of linear equations.

The total number of reads and writes is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 &\sum_{i=1}^{i=\ell} 6 + (m - i)(1 + 0.5(3)(n - i + 1)) \\
 &= \sum_{i=1}^{i=\ell} 6 + (m - i)(2.5 + 1.5 * n - 1.5 * i) \\
 &= 1.5nm\ell - 0.75m\ell^2 - 0.75n\ell^2 + 0.5\ell^3 + 2.5m\ell - 1.25\ell^2 - 0.75m\ell - 0.75n\ell + 0.75\ell^2 + 5\ell \\
 &\sim 1.5nm\ell - 0.75m\ell^2 - 0.75n\ell^2 + 0.5\ell^3
 \end{aligned}$$

Thus for the overdefined case ($\ell = n$) one obtains $1.5n^2m - 0.75mn^2 - 0.25n^3$, and for underdefined ($\ell = m$) the total is $0.75nm^2 - 0.25m^3$. For a square matrix this is $0.5n^3$.

- 1: For each column $i = 1, 2, \dots, \ell$
 - 1: Search for a non-zero entry in region $a_{ii} \dots a_{mn}$ (Expected cost is 2 reads). Call this entry a_{xy} .
 - 2: Swap rows i and x , swap columns i and y . (Costs 4 writes).
 - 3: For each row $j = i + 1, i + 2, \dots, m$
 - 1: If $a_{ji} = 1$ then for each column $k = i, i + 1, \dots, n$
 - 1: Calculate $a_{jk} = a_{jk} + a_{ik}$ (Costs 2 reads, and 1 write).

Algorithm 10: Dense Gaussian Elimination, for Triangularization

B.5.4 Strassen's Algorithm for Matrix Multiplication

To find:

$$\begin{bmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_{11} & b_{12} \\ b_{21} & b_{22} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} c_{11} & c_{12} \\ c_{21} & c_{22} \end{bmatrix}$$

Use the algorithm found in Algorithm 11 on page 144. One can see that this consists of 18 matrix additions and 7 matrix multiplications.

- 1: Calculate 10 sums, namely: $s_1 = a_{12} - a_{22}$, $s_2 = a_{11} + a_{22}$, $s_3 = a_{11} - a_{21}$, $s_4 = a_{11} + a_{12}$, $s_5 = a_{21} + a_{22}$, $s_6 = b_{21} + b_{22}$, $s_7 = b_{11} + b_{22}$, $s_8 = b_{11} + b_{12}$, $s_9 = b_{12} - b_{22}$, and $s_{10} = b_{21} - b_{11}$.
- 2: Calculate 7 products, namely: $m_1 = s_1 s_6$, $m_2 = s_2 s_7$, $m_3 = s_3 s_8$, $m_4 = s_4 b_{22}$, $m_5 = a_{11} s_9$, $m_6 = a_{22} s_{10}$, and $m_7 = s_5 b_{11}$.
- 3: Calculate 8 sums, namely: $s_{11} = m_1 + m_2$, $s_{12} = -m_4 + m_6$, $s_{13} = -m_3 + m_2$, $s_{14} = -m_7 + m_5$, $c_{11} = s_{11} + s_{12}$, $c_{12} = m_4 + m_5$, $c_{21} = m_6 + m_7$, and $c_{22} = s_{13} + s_{14}$.

Algorithm 11: Strassen's Algorithm for Matrix Multiplication

Note that the matrices c_{11} and c_{22} must be square, but need not equal each other in size. For simplicity assume that A and B are both $2n \times 2n$ matrices. The seven multiplications are to be performed by repeated calls to Strassen's algorithm. In theory one could repeatedly call the algorithm until 1×1 matrices are the inputs, and multiply them with a logical AND operand. However, it's unlikely that this is optimal. Instead, the program should switch from Strassen's algorithm to some other algorithm below some size n_0 .

As stated in Section B.5.2 on page 142, the $n \times n$ matrix additions require $\sim 3n^2$ matrix memory operations each, giving the following equation:

$$M(2n) = 7M(n) + 54n^2$$

allowing one to calculate, for a large matrix,

$$\begin{aligned}
 M(4n_0) &= 7^2 M(n_0) + (4 + 7) \cdot 54n_0^2 \\
 M(8n_0) &= 7^3 M(n_0) + (16 + 7 \cdot 4 + 7^2) \cdot 54n_0^2 \\
 M(16n_0) &= 7^4 M(n_0) + (64 + 16 \cdot 7 + 7^2 \cdot 4 + 7^3) \cdot 54n_0^2 \\
 M(2^i n_0) &= 7^i M(n_0) + (4^{i-1} + 4^{i-2}7 + 4^{i-3}7^2 + \dots + 4 \cdot 7^{i-2} + 7^{i-1})54n_0^2 \\
 M(2^i n_0) &\approx 7^i M(n_0) + 7^{i-1}(1 + 4/7 + 16/49 + 64/343 + \dots)54n_0^2 \\
 M(2^i n_0) &\approx 7^i M(n_0) + 7^i 18n_0^2
 \end{aligned}$$

Now substitute $i = \log_2(n/n_0)$ and observe,

$$7^{\log_2 \frac{n}{n_0}} M(n_0) + 7^{\log_2 \frac{n}{n_0}} 72n_0^2$$

and since $b^{\log_2 a} = a^{\log_2 b}$, then we have

$$M(n) \approx \left(\frac{n}{n_0}\right)^{\log_2 7} [M(n_0) + 72n_0]$$

or finally $M(n) \sim (n/n_0)^{\log_2 7} M(n_0)$.

Table B.1 Algorithms and Performance, for $m \times n$ matrices

Algorithm	Overdefined	Square	Underdefined
Matrix Inversion			
Method of 4 Russians—Inversion	$\sim (1.5n^3 + 1.5n^2m)/(\log_2 n)$	$\sim (3n^3)/(\log_2 n)$	$\sim (6nm^2 - 3m^3)/(\log_2 m)$
Dense Gaussian Elimination	$\sim 1.5n^2m - 0.75mn^2$	$\sim 0.75n^3$	$\sim 1.5nm^2 - 0.75m^3$
System Upper-Triangularization			
Dense Gaussian Elimination	$\sim 1.5n^2m - 0.75mn^2 - 0.25n^3$	$\sim 0.5n^3$	$\sim 0.75nm^2 - 0.25m^3$
Method of 4 Russians	$\sim (4.5n^3 + 1.5n^2m)/(\log_2 n)$	$\sim (6n^3)/(\log_2 n)$	$\sim (4.5nm^2 + 1.5m^3)/(\log_2 m)$
Algorithm	Rectangular $a \times b$ by $b \times c$	Square $n \times n$	
Multiplication			
Method of 4 Russians—Multiplication	$\sim (3b^2c + 3abc)/(\log_2 b)$	$\sim (6n^3)/(\log_2 n)$	* Here $M(n_0)$ signifies the time
Naïve Multiplication	$\sim 2abc$	$\sim 2n^3$	
Strassen's Algorithm	$\sim M(n_0) \left(\frac{\sqrt[3]{abc}}{n_0} \right)^{\log_2 7}$	$\sim M(n_0)(n/n_0)^{\log_2 7}$	
required to multiply an $n_0 \times n_0$ matrix in some “base-line” algorithm.			

Appendix C

On the Exponent of Certain Matrix Operations

A great deal of research was done in the period 1969–1987 on fast matrix operations [Pan84, Str69, Sch81, Str87, CW90]. Various proofs showed that many important matrix operations, such as QR-decomposition, LU-factorization, inversion, finding determinants, and finding the characteristic polynomial are no more complex than matrix multiplication, in the big-Oh sense see [AHU74, Ch. 6] or [CLRS01, Ch. 28].

For this reason, many fast matrix multiplication algorithms were developed. Almost all were intended to work over a general ring. However, one in particular was intended for boolean matrices, and by extension $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ -matrices, which was named the Method of Four Russians, “after the cardinality and the nationality of its inventors.”¹ While the Method of Four Russians was conceived as a boolean matrix multiplication tool, we show how to use it for $\mathbb{GF}(2)$ matrices and for inversion, in Section 5.3 on page 82 and Section 5.4 on page 86.

Of the general purpose algorithms, the most famous and frequently implemented of these is Volker Strassen’s 1969 algorithm for matrix multiplication exponent. However, many algorithms have a lower exponent in their complexity expression.

C.1 Very Low Exponents

The algorithms with exponents below $O(n^{2.81})$ all derive from the following argument (so far as the author is aware). Matrix multiplication of any particular fixed dimensions is a bilinear map from one vector space to another. The input space is of matrices \oplus matrices as a direct sum, and the output space is another matrix space. Therefore, the map can be written as a tensor. By finding a shortcut for a particular matrix multiplication operation of fixed dimensions, one lower-bounds the complexity² of this tensor for those fixed dimensions. Specifically, Strassen performs 2×2 by 2×2 in seven steps instead of eight [Str69]. Likewise, Victor Pan’s algorithm performs 70×70 by 70×70 in 143,640 steps rather than 343,000, for an exponent of 2.795 [Pan84, Ch. 1].

One can now lower-bound the complexity of matrix multiplication in general by extending the shortcut. The method of extension varies by paper, but usually the cross-over³ can be calculated explicitly. While the actual crossover in practice

¹Quoted from Aho, Hopcroft & Ullman textbook [AHU74, Ch. 6]. Later information demonstrated that not all of the authors were Russians.

²An element of a tensor space is a sum of simple tensors. Here, the complexity of a tensor is the smallest number of simple tensors required. This is often called the rank of the tensor, but other authors use the word “rank” differently. The rank of the tensor is directly proportional to the complexity of the operation [Str87].

³The cross-over point is the size where the new tensor has rank (complexity) equal to the naïve

might vary slightly, these matrices have millions of rows and are totally infeasible. For example, for Schönhage’s algorithm at $O(n^{2.70})$, the crossover is given by [Sch81] at $n = 3^{14} \approx 4.78 \times 10^6$ rows, or $3^{28} \approx 22.88 \times 10^{12}$ entries (this is compared to naïve dense Gaussian Elimination. The crossover would be much higher versus Strassen’s Algorithm or the Method of Four Russians).

Therefore, we have essentially three choices: algorithms of complexity equal to Strassen’s exponent, of complexity equal to the Method of Four Russians, and algorithms of cubic complexity. The purpose of the linear algebra part of this dissertation is to combine these effectively.

C.2 The Equicomplexity Theorems

The following is a series of theorems which prove that matrix multiplication, inversion, LUP-factorization, and squaring, are equally complex in the sense of big- Θ . This implies that there is an exponent, ironically called the exponent of matrix multiplication considering how many operations it describes, denoted ω . Several papers have been written trying to find new upper bounds for this value [Pan84, Str69, Sch81, Str87, CW90]. Other work has tried to lower-bound this value but lower bounds are not discussed here. In theory, Coppersmith and Winograd still hold the record at $\omega \leq 2.36$, while in practice $\omega = 2.807$ (Strassen’s algorithm) is the fastest algorithm used [CW90, Str69].

The theorems in this section have been known for a long time. In fact, all of them are found in or can be derived from the papers [Str69, BH74], except the theorems on squaring.

For now, we will exclude rings that are not fields. Suppose R is a ring that is not a division ring. Then there exists an element z which has no inverse. What would the inverse of the matrix zI be? Normally, diagonal matrices with non-zero entries on the main diagonal have inverses. Therefore, while these questions can be answered (by excluding matrices with non-invertible determinant and other methods) we will exclude them in this dissertation. “Skew fields” are rings that are division rings but not commutative, and thus not fields. An example is the quaternion field. These cases also are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

A brief notational comment is needed. One can sometimes show that a particular algorithm is $\Theta(f(n))$ or if not, then $O(f(n))$. But, the complexity of a problem is defined as the complexity of the *best* algorithm for it, in terms of asymptotic running time. Therefore showing an algorithm for solving a problem is $\Theta(f(n))$ or $O(f(n))$ only proves that the problem is $O(f(n))$.

The definitions of $\Theta(f(n))$, $O(f(n))$, and $\Omega(f(n))$ can be found on page xx, but remember that any algorithm which is $\Theta(n^3)$ is also $\Omega(n^2)$ and $O(n^4)$.

A summary of the theorems is shown graphically in Figure C.1 on page 149.

algorithm’s tensor.




Figure C.1: The Relationship of the Equicomplexity Proofs

C.2.1 Starting Point

Recall the inverse or square of an $n \times n$ matrix, as well as the product of two $n \times n$ matrices, will be an $n \times n$ matrix with n^2 entries. Therefore, just outputting the answer requires $\Omega(n^2)$ time and these operations are $\Omega(n^2)$. Likewise the LUP-factorization of a non-singular $n \times n$ matrix requires 3 matrices, each $n \times n$, to write down, so that problem also is $\Omega(n^2)$.

Because naïve matrix multiplication is $\Theta(n^3)$ (see Section B.5.1 on page 142) we know that matrix multiplication and squaring is $O(n^3)$. Likewise, because Gaussian Elimination is $\Theta(n^3)$ (see Section B.5.3 on page 142), we know that matrix inversion or LUP-factorization is $O(n^3)$ (since that algorithm can be used for both).

C.2.2 Proofs

Theorem 3 *If there exists an algorithm for matrix inversion of unit upper (or lower) triangular $n \times n$ matrices over the field F , in time $\Theta(n^\omega)$, with $n \leq 3$, then there is an algorithm for $n \times n$ matrix multiplication over the field F in time $\Theta(n^\omega)$.*

Proof: Let A, B be $n \times n$ matrices over the field F . Consider the matrix on the left in the formula below:

$$\begin{bmatrix} I & A & 0 \\ 0 & I & B \\ 0 & 0 & I \end{bmatrix}^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} I & -A & AB \\ 0 & I & -B \\ 0 & 0 & I \end{bmatrix}$$

This matrix is $3n \times 3n$ upper-triangular and has only ones on the main diagonal, and is also composed of entries only from R . Therefore its determinant is one and it is non-singular. Its inverse can be calculated in time $\Theta(n^\omega)$, and then the product AB can be read in the “north east” corner. \square

The requirement of $\omega \leq 3$ was not quite superfluous. Any real r with $\omega \leq r$ would have done. If the matrix inversion requires $f(n)$ time for an $n \times n$ matrix, we need to know that $f(n)$ is upper-bounded by a polynomial. Call the degree of that polynomial d . This means that $f(3n) \leq 3^d f(n)$ for sufficiently large n . Thus $f(3n) = \Theta(f(n))$.

For example, if $\omega = \log n$, or more precisely if $f(n) = n^{\log n}$ then this would be problematic. In that case, $f(3n) = n^3 f(n)$ and therefore $f(3n) \neq \Theta(f(n))$.

Theorem 4 *If there exists an algorithm for squaring an $n \times n$ matrix over the field F in time $\Theta(n^\omega)$ with $\omega \leq 3$, then there is an algorithm for $n \times n$ matrix multiplication over the field F in time $\Theta(n^\omega)$.*

Proof: Let A, B be $n \times n$ matrices over the field F . Consider the matrix on the left in the formula below:

$$\begin{bmatrix} A & B \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}^2 = \begin{bmatrix} A^2 & AB \\ 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

This matrix is $2n \times 2n$ and is also composed of entries only from R . Its square can be calculated in time $\Theta(n^\omega)$, and then the product AB can be read in the “north east” corner. \square

Again, the $\omega \leq 3$ was useful so that (if $f(n)$ is upper-bounded by a polynomial of degree d) we can say that $f(2n) \leq 2^d f(n)$ for sufficiently large n and therefore $f(2n) = \Theta(f(n))$.

Theorem 5 *If there exists an algorithm for multiplying two $n \times n$ matrices over the field F in time $\Theta(n^\omega)$ then there is an algorithm for $n \times n$ matrix squaring over the field F in time $\Theta(n^\omega)$.*

Proof: $A \times A = A^2$ \square

Theorem 6 *If there exists an algorithm for multiplying two $n \times n$ matrices over the field F , in time $\Theta(n^\omega)$ then there is an algorithm for inverting an $n \times n$ unit upper (or lower) triangular matrix over the field F , in time $\Theta(n^\omega)$.*

Proof: We will do the proof for lower triangular. It is almost unchanged for upper. Just take the transpose of every matrix.

Observe,

$$\begin{bmatrix} A & 0 \\ B & C \end{bmatrix}^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} A^{-1} & 0 \\ -C^{-1}BA^{-1} & C^{-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

If the original matrix is unit lower triangular, so are A and C . Thus an $n \times n$ unit lower triangular inverse requires two $n/2 \times n/2$ matrix multiplies and two $n/2 \times n/2$ unit lower triangular matrix inverses. Let the time required for an $n \times n$ lower triangular inverse be $I(n)$ and for an $n \times n$ matrix product $M(n)$.

We have

$$\begin{aligned}
I(n) &= 2I(n/2) + 2M(n) \\
&= 4I(n/4) + 4M(n/2) + 2M(n) \\
&= 8I(n/8) + 8M(n/4) + 4M(n/2) + 2M(n) \\
&= 2^i I\left(\frac{n}{2^i}\right) + 2^i M\left(\frac{n}{2^{i-1}}\right) + \cdots + 2M(n) \\
&\approx 2^i I\left(\frac{n}{2^i}\right) + 2^i k \left(\frac{n}{2^{i-1}}\right)^\omega + \cdots + 2kn^\omega \\
&\approx 2^i I\left(\frac{n}{2^i}\right) + kn^\omega \left[\frac{2^i}{(2^{i-1})^\omega} + \cdots + \frac{2}{1^\omega} \right] \\
&\approx 2^i I\left(\frac{n}{2^i}\right) + kn^\omega \frac{2}{1 - 2^{1-\omega}}
\end{aligned}$$

Now we substitute $i = \log n$, and observe that a 1×1 unit lower triangular matrix is just the reciprocal of its only entry, and calculating that requires constant time. Also, observe the final fraction is at most 4 since $\omega \geq 2$. Finally, we have

$$I(n) = n\Theta(1) + kn^\omega \frac{2}{1 - 2^{1-\omega}} = O(n^\omega)$$

□

Lemma 6 *Let $m = 2^t$ where t is a positive integer, and $m < n$. Finding the LUP factorization of a full-row-rank $m \times n$ matrix can be done with two LUP factorizations of size $m/2 \times n$ and $m/2 \times n - m/2$, two matrix products of size $m/2 \times m/2$ by $m/2 \times m/2$ and $m/2 \times m/2$ by $m/2 \times n - m/2$, the inversion of an $m/2 \times m/2$ triangular matrix, and some quadratic operations. Furthermore, L , U , P will be each full-row-rank.*

Proof: Step One: Divide A horizontally into two $m/2 \times n$ pieces.

This yields $A = \begin{bmatrix} B \\ C \end{bmatrix}$.

Step Two: Factor B into $L_1 U_1 P_1$. (Note that L_1 will be $m/2 \times m/2$, U_1 will be $m/2 \times n$, and P_1 will be $n \times n$.)

Step Three: Let $D = CP^{-1}$. Thus D is $m/2 \times n$. This yields

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} L_1 U_1 \\ D \end{bmatrix} P_1$$

Step Four: Let E be the first $m/2$ columns of U_1 , and E' the remainder. Let F be the first $m/2$ columns of D , and F' the remainder. Now compute E^{-1} . Since

U_1 is unit upper triangular and E is therefore also unit upper triangular, and thus invertible.

This yields

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} L_1 E & L_1 E' \\ F & F' \end{bmatrix} P_1$$

which implies

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} L_1 & 0 \\ 0 & I_{m/2} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E & E' \\ F & F' \end{bmatrix} P_1 \quad (\text{C.1})$$

Step Five: Consider $T = D - FE^{-1}U_1$. This can be thought of as $G = F - FE^{-1}E = 0$ and $G' = F' - FE^{-1}E'$, with $T = G|G'$ since $D = F|F'$ and $U_1 = E|E'$, where the $|$ denotes concatenation. The matrices E', F', G' are all $n - m/2$ columns wide. In the algorithm, we need only compute $G' = F' - FE^{-1}E'$. Along the way we should store FE^{-1} which we will have need of later. We have now

$$\begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ -FE^{-1} & I_{m/2} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E & E' \\ F & F' \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} E & E' \\ 0 & G' \end{bmatrix}$$

Step Six: Factor $G' = L_2 U_2 P_2$, and observe

$$\begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ -FE^{-1} & I_{m/2} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E & E' \\ F & F' \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} E & E' \\ 0 & L_2 U_2 P_2 \end{bmatrix} \quad (\text{C.2})$$

Note that since G' was $m/2 \times n - m/2$ wide, then L_2 will be $m/2 \times m/2$ and U_2 will be $m/2 \times n - m/2$ and P_2 will be $n - m/2 \times n - m/2$.

Step Seven: Let

$$P_3 = \begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ 0 & P_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

so that P_3 is a $n \times n$ matrix.

Step Eight: Calculate $E'P_2^{-1}$. This enables us to write

$$\begin{bmatrix} E & E'P_2^{-1} \\ 0 & L_2 U_2 \end{bmatrix} \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ 0 & P_2 \end{bmatrix}}_{=P_3} = \begin{bmatrix} E & E' \\ 0 & L_2 U_2 P_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

which can be manipulated into

$$\begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ 0 & L_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E & E'P_2^{-1} \\ 0 & U_2 \end{bmatrix} P_3 = \begin{bmatrix} E & E' \\ 0 & L_2 U_2 P_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

Substituting Equation C.2 into this last equation we obtain

$$\begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ 0 & L_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E & E'P_2^{-1} \\ 0 & U_2 \end{bmatrix} P_3 = \begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ -FE^{-1} & I_{m/2} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E & E' \\ F & F' \end{bmatrix}$$

Since

$$\begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ -FE^{-1} & I_{m/2} \end{bmatrix}^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ FE^{-1} & I_{m/2} \end{bmatrix}$$

we can write

$$\begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ FE^{-1} & I_{m/2} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ 0 & L_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E & E'P_2^{-1} \\ 0 & U_2 \end{bmatrix} P_3 = \begin{bmatrix} E & E' \\ F & F' \end{bmatrix}$$

and substitute this into Equation C.1 to obtain

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} L_1 & 0 \\ 0 & I_{m/2} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ FE^{-1} & I_{m/2} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} I_{m/2} & 0 \\ 0 & L_2 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} E & E'P_2^{-1} \\ 0 & U_2 \end{bmatrix} P_3 P_1$$

This now is sufficient for the factorization:

$$A = \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} L_1 & 0 \\ FE^{-1} & L_2 \end{bmatrix}}_{=L} \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} E & E'P_2^{-1} \\ 0 & U_2 \end{bmatrix}}_{=U} \underbrace{P_3 P_1}_{=P}$$

Since L_1 and L_2 are outputs of the factor algorithm they are unit lower triangular, as is L . Likewise E and U_2 are unit upper triangular, and thus is U . The product of two permutation matrices is a permutation matrix, as is P . Thus all three are full-row-rank.

Note also the matrix products and inverses involving permutation matrices are quadratic or faster, as discussed in Section B.4.2 on page 141, and thus negligible. \square

Lemma 7 *Let A be a non-zero $1 \times n$ matrix, with a non-zero entry at i . Then $L = [1]$, $U = [x_i, x_2, x_3, \dots, x_{i-1}, x_1, x_{i+1}, x_{i+2}, \dots, x_n]$ and P being the permutation matrix which swaps columns i and 1 , is a factorization $A = LUP$.*

Proof: Obvious. \square

Theorem 7 *If matrix multiplication of two $n \times n$ matrices is $O(n^{c_1})$ over the field F and matrix inversion of an $n \times n$ triangular matrix is $O(n^{c_2})$ over the field F then the LUP-factorization of an $m \times n$ matrix, with m being a power of two and $m \leq n$, is $O(n^{\max(c_1, c_2)})$, over the field F . (We require $c_1 \leq 3$ and $c_2 \leq 3$).*

Proof: Suppose matrix multiplication can be done in time $O(n^{c_1})$ and triangular matrix inversion in time $O(n^{c_2})$. Let $c = \max(c_1, c_2)$. For sufficiently large n , the time of either of these operations is $\leq kn^c$ for some real number k .

Also, since the time required to do an $m/2 \times n$ LUP-factorization is greater than or equal to the time required to do an $m/2 \times n - m/2$ LUP-factorization (because that is smaller), we will represent both as $L(m/2, n)$, being slightly pessimistic.

Since $m < n$ in Lemma 6 the two matrix products and one triangular inversion require at most $3kn^c$ time.

From Lemma 6, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} L(m, n) &= 2L(m/2, n) + 3kn^c \\ &= 4L(m/4, n) + 6k(n/2)^c + 3kn^c \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= 8L(m/8, n) + 12k(n/4)^c + 6k(n/2)^c + 3kn^c \\
&= 16L(m/16, n) + 24k(n/8)^c + 12k(n/4)^c + 6k(n/2)^c + 3kn^c \\
&= 2^i L(m/2^i, n) + 3kn^c \left[\frac{2^i}{(2^i)^c} + \cdots + 4/4^c + 2/2^c + 1/1^c \right] \\
&= 2^i L(m/2^i, n) + 3kn^c \frac{2^c}{2^c - 2}
\end{aligned}$$

Now let $i = \log_2 m$.

$$L(m, n) = mL(1, n) + \frac{3kn^c 2^c}{2^c - 2}$$

Since $L(1, n)$ is $\Theta(n)$ by Lemma 7, and that last term is $O(n^c)$ for any constant c and constant k , we obtain that $L(m, n) = O(n^c)$. \square

Theorem 8 *If matrix multiplication of two $n \times n$ matrices is $O(n^{c_1})$, over the field F , and triangular matrix inversion is $O(n^{c_2})$, over the field F , then the LUP-factorization of an $m \times n$ matrix, with $m \leq n$, is $O(n^{\max(c_1, c_2)})$, over the field F . (We require $c_1 \leq 3$ and $c_2 \leq 3$).*

Proof: This is an identical claim to Lemma 7 except that the requirement that m be a power of two has been dropped.

If m is a power of two and $m = n$, factor as before. If not, let m' be the next power of two greater than or equal to both m and n .

$$A = L_1 U_1 P_1 \Leftrightarrow \begin{bmatrix} A & 0 \\ 0 & I_{m'-m} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} L_1 & 0 \\ 0 & I_{m'-m} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} U_1 & 0 \\ 0 & I_{m'-m} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} P_1 & 0 \\ 0 & I_{m'-m} \end{bmatrix}$$

And by extending A diagonally as shown, we at most double the size of m . We therefore, at worst, increase the running time eightfold, since even using Gaussian Elimination for LUP-factorization is $\Theta(n^3)$. \square

Theorem 9 *If multiplying two $n \times n$ matrices is $O(n^c)$ over the field F , then inverting an $n \times n$ matrix is $O(n^c)$ over the field F .*

Proof: Because multiplying two $n \times n$ matrices is $O(n^c)$, we know by Theorem 6, that inverting a unit lower triangular matrix is $O(n^c)$. Then via Theorem 8, an LUP-factorization can be computed in $O(n^c)$ time. If the original $n \times n$ matrix is A , then $A = LUP$ with L and U being unit lower/upper triangular. Thus we can invert them, and inverting P is a quadratic operation (See Section B.4.2 on page 141). Surely then $A^{-1} = P^{-1}U^{-1}L^{-1}$, and we required a constant number of $O(n^c)$ operations. Thus we have inverted A in $O(n^c)$ time. \square

Theorem 10 *If finding the LUP-factorization of a non-singular $n \times n$ matrix is $O(n^c)$ over a field F , then finding the determinant of a non-singular $n \times n$ matrix over a field F is also $O(n^c)$.*

Proof: If $A = LUP$ then $\det(A) = \det(L) \times \det(U) \times \det(P)$. Note that $\det(L)$ is the product of the entries of the main diagonal, just as is $\det(U)$, because both matrices are triangular. The determinant of a permutation matrix is the sign of that permutation, thus $+1$ or -1 . This can be calculated in linear time by “undoing” the permutation as a series of swaps, and counting the number required x , and returning the determinant as $(-1)^x$. \square

Theorem 11 *If any of matrix inversion, matrix multiplication, triangular matrix inversion, or matrix squaring over the field F is $\Theta(n^c)$, then all of these operations are $\Theta(n^c)$ over the field F . In addition, LUP-factorization is $O(n^c)$ and taking the determinant is $O(n^c)$ (both over the field F).*

Proof: The diagram in Figure C.1 on page 149 shows the relationships among the proofs, and is sufficient to show the four operations of matrix multiplication, triangular matrix inversion, general matrix inversion, and squaring are Θ of each other. That diagram further shows the determinant and LUP-factorization would be $O(n^c)$. \square

C.2.3 A Common Misunderstanding

Strassen’s matrix inversion formula

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} B & C \\ D & E \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow A^{-1} = \begin{bmatrix} B^{-1} + B^{-1}CS^{-1}DB^{-1} & -B^{-1}CS^{-1} \\ -S^{-1}DB^{-1} & S^{-1} \end{bmatrix}$$

where $S = D^{-1} - E^{-1}CB^{-1}$, the Schur complement of A with respect to B , provides a fast way of calculating matrix inverses. However, this does not work for fields in which a singular B can be encountered. See Section 5.8 on page 107 for details.

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Curriculum Vitae

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Education

- Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, May 1999,
B.Sc., Computer and Systems Engineering, *Magna cum Laude*,
Minor in the Philosophy of Science and Logic,
(Advisor: Prof. William R. Franklin)
- University of Maryland at College Park, May 2002,
M.Sc., Electrical and Computer Engineering,
(Advisors: Prof. Virgil D. Gligor & Prof. Patrick Dowd)
- New College, Oxford University, April–July 2004,
Registered Visiting Advanced Student, Mathematics.
- University of Maryland at College Park, December 2005,
M.Sc., Applied Mathematics and Scientific Computation,
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- University of Maryland at College Park, August 2007
Ph.D., Applied Mathematics and Scientific Computation,
 - Ranked 1st of 21 students taking the Abstract Algebra Written Qualifying Exam, in August 2005,
 - Advanced to Candidacy, December 2005,
 - Defended Dissertation, April 30, 2007,
 - “Algorithms for Solving Linear and Polynomial Systems of Equations over Finite Fields with Applications to Cryptanalysis”,
 - (Advisor: Prof. Lawrence C. Washington)

Research Interests

- Cryptology, and particularly Algebraic Cryptanalysis.
- Linear Algebra over Finite Fields.
- Polynomial Systems of Equations over $GF(2^n)$.
- Mathematical Exposition.
- Proofs of Security and Provable Information Assurance.
- Security Protocols & Practical Implementations.
- NP-Complete Problems & Approximation Algorithms.

Teaching Experience

American University—Department of Computer Science, Audio Technology, and Physics

Lecturer for CSC 100: Computers and Information, (January 2006 to April 2006)

An entry-level course on basic computer hardware, networking, and software. Main topics included making web-pages, spreadsheets, word-processing, but also computer organization, binary and hexadecimal, network structures, the OSI model, protocols, functions of operating systems and the software design process. Added material on using the web as a research tool. Experience levels, academic levels and backgrounds of the students were mixed, creating a challenging but fascinating teaching environment.

American University—Department of Computer Science, Audio Technology, and Physics

Lecturer for CSC 544: Object Oriented Programming, (August 2005 to October 2005)

A course for Masters degree students, all working professionals, to teach objected-oriented large-scale design through the example of the Java language. Course included three projects and a seminar on an advanced topic, plus exams. Through the mechanism of the seminars, an enormous variety of topics were covered, including XML, Internationalization, Multi-threading, Documentation, Unit Testing, and others.

American University—Department of Computer Science, Audio Technology, and Physics

Lecturer for CSC 281: Introduction to Computer Science II, (January 2005 to April 2005)

A second semester basic programming course in Java, including linear data structures, object-oriented design, graphical user interfaces, sorting and searching. The core of the course was five projects of increasing complexity, supported by two examinations. Invented a student-feedback system where 2–3 typed pages of constructive commentary were given to each student for each project, to guide them

in their progress. Dramatic improvement in coding style and sophistication resulted.

University of Maryland at College Park—Department of Computer Science

Graduate Teaching Ast. for CMSC 858K: Advanced Topics in Cryptology,
(January 2003 to May 2003)

An exciting opportunity to be a Teaching Assistant at a higher than typical level, assisting Prof. Jon Katz during his graduate-level offering of cryptography. Duties included writing exam problems, grading assignments, proctoring the final exam, and guiding students who required help, during office hours and via e-mail.

Employment Summary

Employer	Role	Time
Fordham University	Visiting Assistant Professor	9/2007+
University of Maryland	NSF Diss. Compl. Fellow.	8/2006 – 6/2007
ECRYPT	Invited Visiting Scientist	5/2006 – 8/2006
American University	Lecturer	1/2005 – 5/2006
University of Maryland	Research Assistant	8/2003 – 4/2004
Naval Surface Warfare Ctr	Summer Intern	5/2003 – 8/2003
University of Maryland	Teaching Assistant	1/2003 – 5/2003
National Security Agency	Comp. Cryptologic Engineer	5/2001 – 9/2002
National Security Agency	Comp. Cryptologic Engineer	6/1999 – 5/2001
National Security Agency	Summer Intern	5/1998 – 8/1998
Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst.	Undergraduate Research Prog.	1/1998 – 5/1998
Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst.	Undergraduate Research Prog.	1/1997 – 5/1997
Hermes Machine Tool	Web Developer	5/1996 – 8/1996
Cybernetics Research Inst.	High School Visiting Scholar	1993 – 1995
Camp Horizons	Counselor-in-Training	Summer '91, '92

A more detailed description of employment can be found starting on Page 169.

Publications

Conferences with Peer-Reviewed Published Proceedings

- G. Bard, “Spelling-Error and Reordering Tolerant Pass-phrases via the Damerau-Levenshtein String-Edit Distance Metric.” Accepted in *Proceedings of the Australasian Information Security Workshop, (AISW)*. Ballarat, Australia. 2007. A patent might be filed shortly. 8 pp. Also available as *IACR E-print Report 2006/364*.

- G. Bard, “A Challenging but Feasible Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack on SSL.” *Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography, (SECRYPT)*. Setúbal, Portugal. 2006. Also available as *IACR E-print Report 2006/136*. 10 pp.
- G. Bard, “FLOWHUNT— An Attempt at Specification-Based Intrusion Detection using Neural Networks.” *Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Computer Network Exploitation Conference, (CNE’02)*. A conference internal to the US Department of Defense and Intelligence Community, and the Ministries of Defense of certain allied nations, but competitive and peer-reviewed. While the proceedings were classified, this paper, however, was not. It is available upon request, and will be on arXiv.org soon.

Peer-Reviewed Conferences without Published Proceedings

- G. Bard. “On the Connection Number of a Particular Graph of a Polynomial System of Equations over a Finite Field.” *The 8th International Conference on Finite Fields and Applications, (Fq8)*. Melbourne, Australia. 2007. (Scheduled). Paper to be made available soon.
- G. Bard. “Modes of Encryption Secure Against Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack.” *Yet Another Conference on Cryptography, (YACC)*. Porquerolles, France. 2006. Full-version and conference-version available on my web-page. Extended Abstract: 4 pp.

Works Pending Publication

- An improved version of “Modes of Encryption Secure Against Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack.” has been submitted to a conference with peer-reviewed proceedings. Available as *IACR E-print Report 2006/271*. 22 pp.
- G. Bard, “Accelerating Cryptanalysis with the Method of Four Russians.” Under revision, first version available as *IACR E-print Report 2006/251*. 20 pp.
- G. Bard, N. Courtois, B. Debraize, and L. Goubin. “On the Algebraic Vulnerability and Reduced Versions of SNOW 2.0.” Under revision. Available on request. 16 pp.
- G. Bard, N. Courtois, C. Jefferson. “Efficient Methods for Conversion and Solution of Sparse Systems of Low-Degree Multivariate Polynomials over $GF(2)$ via SAT-Solvers.” Available as *IACR E-print Report 2007/024*. 14 pp.

- N. Courtois, G. Bard. “Algebraic Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard.” Available as *IACR E-print Report 2006/402*. 12 pp.
- N. Courtois, G. Bard. “Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Keeloq.” Available as *IACR E-print Report 2007/062*. 15 pp.

Textbook Chapters

- G. Bard, J. Belding, P. Bello, M. Black, A. Dalal, J. Domke, M. Kirn, S. Lawton, S. Schmoyer, L. Sheridan, D. Stebilia, C. Truman, K. Truman, and C. Zorn. *Mathematics—It’s Not Just Calculus!* (In Preparation).
 - This book has been finally accepted for publication by A& K Peters, Inc.
 - This project is a joint attempt of 14 authors, all current graduate students or recent graduates, to write a textbook for college freshmen who have chosen to major in mathematics, or very advanced high school seniors, with inspiration from *What is Mathematics?* by R. Courtant, H. Robbins, and I. Stewart, and *The Skeleton Key of Mathematics* by D. Littlewood.
 - Chapters: “Preliminaries”, “Systems of Numbers”, “Logic”, “Linear Algebra”, “Group Theory, Part I”, “Probability”, “Group Theory, Part II”, “Number Theory”, “Cryptography”, “Graph Theory”, “Computational Complexity”, “Topology”, “Geometry/Visualizing Algebra”, “Field Theory”, “Combinatorics”, “Classical Mechanics”, and “Quantum Mechanics”.
 - Drafts of the chapters were completed by January of 2006. All chapters are completed as of May 2007. Editing is underway. Publication anticipated 2008.
 - I am the founder, organizer and general editor of the project.
 - I am writing “Group Theory—Part I” (available on my web page, 35 pp) and “Group Theory—Part II” (available soon).
 - I am co-authoring with S. Lawton and J. Belding. “Preliminaries”, a lengthy introduction to the concept of proof, the basic tools of logic, and mathematical terminology.
 - Each chapter has a primary editor. I am the primary editor for “Linear Algebra”, “Field Theory”, “Graph Theory”, and “Logic”.

Non-Peer Reviewed Technical Reports

- G. Bard, “Achieving a $\log(n)$ Speed Up for Boolean Matrix Operations and Calculating the Complexity of the Dense Linear Algebra step of Algebraic Stream Cipher Attacks and of Integer Factorization Methods.” Available on my web-page, and as *IACR E-print Report 2006/163*. 20 pp.

- G. Bard. “Algorithms for Fast Matrix Operations.” Scholarly paper for Master of Science without Thesis in Applied Mathematics & Scientific Computation, December 2005. Available on my web-page. 13 pp.
- G. Bard. “Vulnerability of SSL to Chosen-Plaintext Attack.” March 2004. *IACR E-print Report 2004/111*. 10 pp.
- G. Bard. “Hurdles in High-Speed Intrusion Detection.” Scholarly paper for Master of Science without Thesis in Electrical & Computer Engineering, April 2002. Available on request. 20 pp.
- G. Bard. *The Target Network Mapping Handbook: A Guide to the Analysis and Mapping of Internal Foreign Networks*. Published internal to NSA, Advanced Network Solutions Office. January 25, 2001.
- Several authors⁴ and G. Bard, “A Description and Analysis of the Implementation of the Voyager Project, An Attempt to Build an Automated Tool to Search for Buffer Overflow Attacks in Compiled Code using the Formal Methods of Logic.” Published internal to NSA, August 6, 1998.
- While working for the NSA Operations Directorate: several internal papers, titles remain classified.

Service

Professional Service

- Conference Paper Reviewer and Proceedings Referee,
 - *Applied Cryptography and Network Security*. (ACNS’07). Reviewed 1 paper.
 - *International Workshop on Coding and Cryptography*. (WCC’07). Reviewed 1 paper.
 - *Fast Software Encryption 2007*. (FSE’07). Reviewed 3 papers.
 - *Information Security and Cryptology*. (INSCRYPT’06, formerly CISC). Reviewed 1 paper.
 - *The 2006 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference*. (ACSAC’06). Reviewed 3 papers.
 - *The 2005 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference*. (ACSAC’05). Reviewed 4 papers.
- Session Chair, January 2007 Joint Mathematics Meeting.
- See also, Mathematical Outreach Talks, on page 168.

⁴Whose names are not releasable

University & Departmental Service

- Judge, Fall 2006 Spotlight on Graduate Research, Oral Presentation Contest.
- Graduate Student Mentor—assigned a first-year graduate student to guide and mentor through the Applied Mathematics PhD program, starting Fall 2006.
- Coach, American University’s “Alpha Team” for the ACM International Collegiate Programming Competition — Trained, coached, organized and prepared two CS students and one Mathematics student for the five-hour annual ACM programming contest. Team placed 53rd out of 154 teams in the Mid-Atlantic Region. (Fall 2005).
- Judge, Fall 2005 Spotlight on Graduate Research, Oral Presentation Contest.
- Founder & President, Rensselaer Cryptographic Club, Fall 1998–Spring 1999. (RPI).
- Member, Dean’s Advisory Commission for the School of Engineering, 1997–1999. (RPI)
- Member, President’s Advisory Council on Diversity. 1995–1997. (RPI).

Community Service

- Elections Judge, 2nd Precinct, 14th District, State of Maryland. Setup and closed the polling place, trained volunteers, adjudicated exceptions, counted ballots, certified the process. A paid, trained, position with an oath of office. (Primary Election and General Election of 2006). Counted 709 and 1821 ballots respectively.
- Advisor, *The Order of Jacques DeMolay*. An international service organization for young men aged 12–21. There are over 1000 chapters, and one million members since 1919. (Advisor since 2006).

Mathematical Outreach

- Mathematics Book Club. “Using Matrices to Break Modern Satellite and Telephony Codes.” Was asked to present a one-hour talk on my dissertation work, and in particular the aspects related to cryptanalysis. Introduced the concept of a field, the link between logic and $GF(2)$, a brief description of stream ciphers, and an overview of solving systems of polynomials over a finite field via linear algebra. April 25, 2006.
- Historical Miniatures Gaming Society Lecture Series. “What is Game Theory?” Gave a pair of one hour talks on the basics of game theory, how it can be taught at a high school level and the applications to modern economic and military thought. Gettysburg, November 11 & 12, 2005.

- School of Computer, Mathematical and Physical Sciences, “Science & Technology: Addressing the Need for Diversity” (STAND) “Math Exploration Day.”— Gave a pair of 45-minute interactive demonstrations of cryptography to groups of visiting 7th grade students, on Cæsar Ciphers and Mono-alphabetic Substitution. October 21, 2005.

Details of Employment

Fordham University—Department of Mathematics

Visiting Assistant Professor, (August 2007 to present)

This is a non-tenure track visiting assistant professorship, with a 2-3 teaching load, at Fordham University, the Jesuit University of New York City.

University of Maryland—Department of Mathematics

VIGRE Dissertation Fellow, (August 2006 to June 2007)

Part of the National Science Foundation (NSF) Vertical Integration of Research (VIGRE) program grant to the University of Maryland Department of Mathematics. Received a semester-long fellowship, to permit 100% focus on dissertation research and writing. Rules of the fellowship required me not to teach during this term.

ECRYPT—Invited Visiting Scholar

Research Assistant to Nicolas Courtois, (May 2006 to August 2006)

The European Union (EU) has created several “Centers of Excellence” to draw together scientists from around the EU, fund joint projects, and invite experts from outside the EU to contribute to on-going research. The Center for Excellence for cryptography is called ECRYPT, which invited me to spend the Summer of 2006 in Paris at their expense, in response to my paper “Achieving a $\log(n)$ Speed Up for Boolean Matrix Operations and Calculating the Complexity of the Dense Linear Algebra step of Algebraic Stream Cipher Attacks and of Integer Factorization Methods.” Sponsored by and working with Nicolas Courtois. Studied the algorithms and implementations of boolean linear algebra to create a cryptanalytic toolbox, as well as undertaking research in the area of Boolean Linear Algebra.

American University—Department of Computer Science, Audio Technology, and Physics

Lecturer, (January 2005 to present.)

See teaching experience.

University of Maryland at College Park—Department of Computer Science

Graduate Research Assistant, (August 2003 to April 2004)

Teamed with Prof. Jon Katz, focused on Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Stream Ciphers, and Proofs of Security. During this period, discovered & published (on IACR's E-print, and later at SECRIPT'06) an exploitable vulnerability in the Secure Sockets Layer, and also proved several new theorems in the case of blockwise-adaptive chosen-plaintext adversaries.

Naval Surface Warfare Center—Carderock Division

Summer Intern, (June 2003 to August 2003)

Modeled the performance of various Radar Absorbing/Reflecting/Amplifying Materials, and improved the signal-to-noise ratio of a crucial radar-testing experimental instrument. Made measurable progress in improving the instrument's noise floor, by recommending improved experimental practices, designing a microwave-absorbing foam cocoon, resulting in a noise reduction. Wrote a 14 page technical report. Informally mentored a lab assistant, who had just graduated high-school.

University of Maryland at College Park—Department of Computer Science

Graduate Teaching Ast. for CMSC 858K: Advanced Topics in Cryptology, (January 2003 to May 2003)

See teaching experience.

National Security Agency—Research Directorate: Secure Systems Research Office

Computer Engineer, (June 2001 to September 2002)

Worked independently on several concurrent research projects in Defensive Information Operations. Designed and implemented a novel method of specification-based Intrusion Detection, published in a paper (see FLOWHUNT, above.) Designed tools to help network analysts do Computer Network Defense. Supervised a research contract with industry to develop Trojan Horse detection tools. Researched Bayesian classifier pattern-matching for vocabulary categorization.

National Security Agency—Operations Directorate: Advanced Network Solutions

Computer Engineer, (December 2000 to June 2001)

Worked to “target the global network” by mapping particular portions of the Internet. Using a wide variety of tools and sources, created a detailed understanding of targets. On my own initiative, spearheaded an effort to automate the process, and personally designed & completed tools which were still in use in mid-2003. Wrote a user's manual & trained others. More than tripled team output.

National Security Agency—Operations Directorate: Data Network Systems

Computer Engineer, (June 1999 to December 2000)

Designed, built, and tested hardware digital communications devices that were requested on a “Quick Reaction” basis. Acquired intimate knowledge of Internet and other network protocols, embedded micro-controllers, assembly language, cross-compiles, foreign digital communications. Also, received a commendation for an ability to work fast and rapidly coordinate with other teams. Was made a project technical leader on half of a very critical project after working for the agency for less than a year. Contributed to several successful deployments.

National Security Agency—Information Assurance Directorate: Cryptographic Evaluations Office

Summer Intern, (May 1998 to August 1998)

Designed and developed a proof of concept LISP engine to use Formal Methods of Logic to detect vulnerabilities (or prove the absence thereof) in compiled code. Each assembly language instruction was converted into a logical expression, and potential security failures were likewise defined. Code was only deemed secure once a Theorem Prover would guarantee that the failures were not possible. Brought the ideas of a mathematician into reality through knowledge of algorithms and resulted in efficient test-case code. Published a paper internal to NSA. The system was used to verify correctness of command-and-control software for strategic nuclear weapons.

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute—Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering

Undergraduate Research Program, (January 1998 to May 1998)

Worked with Professor W. R. Franklin to analyze UNIX Password Security. Performed novel statistical research on human password choices, sniffed directly from the network. Executed survey of modern authentication methods, including attacks. Wrote 140-page (double-spaced) technical report.

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute—Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering

Undergraduate Research Program, (January 1997 to May 1997)

Designed a new circuit board for a freshman digital electronics course that simplified power supply, de-bouncing inputs and synchronizing outputs, and left the digital logic to the student. Wrote lab assignments & lesson plans. The design was used unchanged in production for a mandatory course for hundreds of freshmen Computer Engineering students.

Hermes Machine Tool Co. Inc., (later emachinetool.com)—Web Developer

Summer Intern, (May 1996 to August 1996)

Modernized a Mechanical Engineering firm by building a web site for e-commerce, which later became www.emachinetool.com. The spin-off company survived until 2003.

Cybernetics Research Institute—West Orange, NJ
High School Visiting Scholar, (1993–1995)

Learned programming by helping develop hardware devices to allow the severely handicapped to use personal computers. Gained valuable C/C++ knowledge as well as experience with human-machine interfacing & design.

Camp Counselor-in-Training—Livingston, NJ
Camp Horizons, (Summers of 1991 & 1992)

Taught small groups of students aged 8–14 how to use computers, including programming in the BASIC programming language, computer graphics, games of various sorts, and word processing. (Unpaid).

Honors & Awards

- Member of IEEE and ACM since circa 1997. Member of MAA since 2004. Member of IACR and AMS since 2005.
- Travel Support, SAGE Project. The SAGE project paid for my flight and hotel to attend a “coding-sprint”, during which my algorithms would be added to their library.
- Dissertation Fellowship, NSF VIGRE Program (National Science Foundation, Vertical Integration of Research Program), including full salary plus 10 credits of tuition for one semester. (Fall of 2006).
- Above renewed for Spring 2007.
- Visiting Scholar Grant, ECRYPT. The EU’s “center of excellence” for the cryptographic community, ECRYPT, funded my living expenses in Paris for the Summer of 2006. (See “Employment.”)
- Travel Grant, NSF VIGRE Program (National Science Foundation, Vertical Integration of Research Program), to fund a trip to Europe to speak at Oxford, to interview for an internship in Paris, and to attend the ECRYPT SASC 2006 Conference in Leuven, Belgium. (February 2006).
- Travel Stipend, SASC 2006. Was granted a stipend by the conference organizers, for expenses related to the conference SASC 2006 in Leuven, Belgium. (January 2006).
- Winner, 2004–2005 “Spotlight on Graduate Research” Award, Department of Mathematics, University of Maryland, for my work on building hash-function families from pseudorandom function families. There were four total winners from among the Pure Math, Applied Math, Scientific Computation and Statistics programs. Included a cash award. (November 2005).

- Ranked first place out of 21 Pure & Applied Mathematics students in the Algebra Written Qualifying Exams for the PhD program.
- Registered Visiting Advanced Student, Oxford University, New College, 2004.
- NSA Eagle Award, December 1999, 2000, 2001, for charitable & community service acts.
- Letter of Commendation, October 2001, from Director of Information Assurance, for participating in extensive reviews of research proposals for local colleges.
- Skills Enhancement Recruitment Incentive Program (SERIP). Was given two semesters of academic leave to pursue a Master's Degree in Electrical & Computer Engineering at the University of Maryland, including full-tuition and full-salary. Fall Semester of 2000, Spring Semester of 2001.
- Letter of Commendation, September 2000, from Chief of Security Evaluations, for mentoring & training an RPI summer intern, who later joined NSA.
- Letter of Commendation, September 2000, from Lt. General Michael Hayden, Director of NSA, for hosting a large tour group of high-school students & giving demos.
- Letter of Commendation, February 2000, from Lt. General Michael Hayden, Director of NSA, as above.
- Letter of Commendation, February 2000, from Chief of Advanced Network Solutions, Operations Directorate. (Reasons classified.)
- Letter of Commendation with Time-Off Award, August 1999, from Chief of Security Evaluations, for mentoring & training an MIT graduate-student summer intern.
- The Director's Star Award, August 1998, from Chief of Security Evaluations, for an outstanding internship resulting in a publishable paper, Automated Detection of Buffer Overflows, while an undergraduate.
- Letter of Commendation, August 1998, from Technical Director of C12, see above.
- Member, Tau Beta Pi, The Engineering Honor Society, 1998.
- Member, Eta Kappa Nu, The Electrical Engineering Honor Society, 1997.
- Dean's Scholarship, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998.
- National Merit Scholarship Semi-Finalist, June 1995.

Other Interests

Revolutionary War Re-enactment (1st Maryland Regiment, Continental Line); Strategy, Board, and Computer Games; Reading Shakespeare's Histories; Antique Book Collecting; Learning French.

Talks & Presentations (Selected)

This list does not include the "Mathematical Outreach Talks" which are listed on page 168.

Invited Talks External to the University of Maryland

- (Scheduled) The 8th International Conference on Finite Fields and Applications (Fq8), July 9–13, 2007. "On the Connection Number of a Particular Graph of a Polynomial System of Equations over a Finite Field."
- University of California at Los Angeles, Institute for Pure and Applied Mathematics, February 17, 2007. "The Method of Four Russians."
- University of Wollongong, New South Wales, Australia, February 8, 2007. "Solving Systems of Polynomial Equations over $GF(2)$, and its Applications to Cryptanalysis."
- AISW'07, Ballarat, Australia. January 30–February 2, 2007. "Spelling-Error and Reordering Tolerant Pass-phrases via the Damerau-Levenshtein String-Edit Distance Metric."
- Royal Holloway, University of London. January 23, 2007. "Solving a System of Polynomial Equations with a SAT-Solver."
- Royal Holloway, University of London. August 15, 2006. "A Challenging but Feasible Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack."
- SECRYPT'06, Setúbal, Portugal. August 8, 2006. "A Challenging but Feasible Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack on SSL."
- Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Techniques Avancées (ENSTA). July 7, 2006. "Boolean Matrix Operations." (Invited Seminar talk as part of their research group's weekly series).
- Université de Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines. June 28, 2006. "Matrix Operations and Boolean Algebra." (Invited Seminar talk as part of their research group's weekly series).
- YACC'06, Porquerolles, France. June 19, 2006. "Modes of Encryption Secure against Blockwise-Adaptive Chosen-Plaintext Attack."

- Special Seminar, Computing Laboratory, Oxford University. January 31, 2006, “Boolean matrices, cryptography and constraint satisfaction.”
- Oxford Computing Laboratory, Security & Concurrency Research Group, June 23, 2004, “Four Particular Open Questions in Cryptography.”
- Second Annual Computer Network Exploitation Conference, Spring 2002, “FLOWHUNT—An attempt at Specification-Based Intrusion Detection.”

Talks at the University of Maryland

- University of Maryland Graduation Conference, April 17, 2007, “Inverting Dense Boolean Matrices in Faster than Cubic Time.”
- Applied Mathematics Research Interaction Team for Cryptology, University of Maryland, March 7, 2007, “Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Keeloq.”
- Applied Mathematics Research Interaction Team for Cryptology, University of Maryland, September 27, 2006, “SAT Solvers and Polynomials.”
- Applied Mathematics Research Interaction Team for Cryptology, University of Maryland, April 24, 2006, “Fuzzy Extractors: How to Generate Strong Keys from Biometrics or Other Noisy Data.”
- Applied Mathematics Research Interaction Team for Cryptology, University of Maryland, September 26, 2005, “Matrices over $GF(2)$ and Stream Cipher Cryptanalysis, an Introduction.”
- “Spotlight on Graduate Research” Competition Victory Presentation, University of Maryland, May 4, 2005, “Building Cryptographic Hash Functions from Pseudorandom Function Families.”
- Applied Mathematics Research Interaction Team for Cryptology, University of Maryland, April 20, 2005, “Pseudorandom Function Domain Extension Using Directed Acyclic Graphs.”
- Applied Mathematics Research Interaction Team for Cryptology, University of Maryland, March 2, 2005, “Black-Box Analysis of the Block-Cipher Based Hash Function Constructions from PGV.”
- “Spotlight on Graduate Research” Competition Entry, November 22, 2004, “Building Scalable Almost-XOR Universal Hash Functions from Pseudorandom Function Families.”
- Applied Mathematics Research Interaction Team for Cryptology, University of Maryland, Sept 22 & 29, 2004. “Online Encryption Schemes resistant to Blockwise Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Attack.”

- Applied Mathematics Research Interaction Team for Cryptology, University of Maryland, March 10, 2004. “Solving Systems of Polynomial Equations in $GF(2)$.”
- Applied Mathematics Research Interaction Team for Cryptology, University of Maryland, September 17, 2003. “Cryptanalysis of Non-Linear Stream Ciphers using Very Large Matrices.”
- Department of Computer Science, Cryptology Reading Group, University of Maryland, February 14, 2003. “Blockwise-Adaptive Security.”
- Department of Computer Science, Cryptology Reading Group, University of Maryland, October 29, 2002. “The Security of SSH.”

Other Talks

- EUROCRYPT’07, Barcelona, Spain. May 22, 2007. “Algebraic Cryptanalysis of Keeloq.”
- Job talks at:
 - SUNY Brockport
 - Fordham University
 - Georgetown University
 - University of Mary Washington
 - ...plus scheduled job talks at other institutions, canceled upon acceptance of the Fordham University offer.
- Mathematical Association of America (MAA) and American Mathematical Society (AMS) Joint Mathematics Meeting, New Orleans, USA. January 5, 2007. “Algorithms for Inverting or LUP-Factoring Matrices over $GF(2)$ in time $O(n^3/\log n)$.”
- ASIACRYPT’06, Shanghai, China. Dec 5, 2006. “Algebraic Cryptanalysis, DES, and SAT Solvers.”
- EUROCRYPT’06, St. Petersburg, Russia. May 30, 2006. Rump-Session Talk: “Using the Method of Four Russians for Dense Boolean Matrix Inversion.”
- Oxford Computing Society, May 25, 2004, “The Vulnerability of SSL to Chosen-Plaintext Attack.”

Conferences Attended

- 2007: Joint MAA/AMS Mathematics Meeting (New Orleans), Australasian Information Security Workshop (Ballarat, Victoria, Australia), SAGE Days 3 (UCLA, Los Angeles, California), EUROCRYPT (Barcelona, Spain).

- 2006: ECRYPT-SASC (Stream Ciphers Revisited, Leuven, Belgium), EUROCRYPT (St. Petersburg, Russia), YACC (Yet Another Conference in Cryptology, Porquerolles Island, France), SECRYPT/ICETE (Intl. Conf. on Security and Cryptography, Setúbal, Portugal), CRYPTO (Santa Barbara, California).
- 2005: EUROCRYPT & ECRYPT-SKEW (Århus, Denmark), WeWorc (Western European Workshop on Research in Cryptography, Leuven, Belgium), CRYPTO (Santa Barbara, California), NIST Cryptographic Hash Workshop (Gaithersburg, Maryland).
- 2004: SAC. (Selected Areas of Cryptography, Kitchener, Ontario)
- 2003: SAC. (Selected Areas of Cryptography, Ottawa, Ontario)
- 2002: CNE. (Computer Network Exploitation, Bowie, Maryland)
- 2001: CNE. (Computer Network Exploitation, Bowie, Maryland)