

**A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) REGION**

by

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submitted in accordance with the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF LAWS

at the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

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APRIL 2018

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DECLARATION

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TITLE:

A Critical Analysis of the Security of Foreign Investments In The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region

I declare that the above study is my own work, that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references, and that all direct quotations from such sources have been clearly and correctly indicated.



12 SEPTEMBER 2018

SIGNATURE

DATE

DEDICATION

To my father Samuel Ngobeni, who tragically did not live to see me go to school.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank the College of Law, University of South Africa (UNISA) for allowing me the opportunity to conduct my LLM and LLD studies in International Economic Law. It has been a challenging but great and rewarding journey, a privilege and an honour. I am grateful for the support and mentoring of my LLM lecturers, particularly Ms Mirelle Ehrenbeck who supervised my mini-dissertation. I'm most indebted to my promoter, Professor Babatunde Fagbayibo. His meticulous and critical approach made me to at some stage doubt if I had what it took to complete my studies. Professor Fagbayibo also went beyond the call of his duty, and encouraged me to write four articles, two of which I co-authored with him. UNISA is privileged to have mentors of his calibre. I am also grateful for the comments and guidance of the three external examiners to this study. I also wish to thank the staff at the UNISA library as well as the Masters and Doctoral Section for their support. Personally, I am indebted to my wife Caroline for her love and support throughout.

It would not have been possible for me to finish my research without the assistance of persons from outside the university. Therefore I wish to thank the following for their support: Mr Astrit Sulstarova, Chief of the Investment Trends and Data Section at United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for assistance with statistical data; Mr Prudence Sebahizi, Chief Technical Advisor on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) negotiations, for assisting me with my enquiries; Ms Thembi Langa, Director at the Southern African Development Community (SADC) headquarters in Gaborone, for her assistance with my queries. Above all, I thank Almighty God, without whom I can't achieve anything.

ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

The following abbreviations/acronyms are used in the text unless the context in which they are used indicates otherwise:

ACIA	ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement
ACIA	African Continental Investment Area
ACFI	Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investment
ACJ&HR	African Court of Justice and Human Rights
ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
ACJ	African Court of Justice
ACH&PR	African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
AEC	African Economic Community
AfDB	African Development Bank
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Agreement
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
AIO	African Investment Ombud
AJS	African Justice Scoreboard
ARSIWA	Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
AU	African Union
IACCIA	Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area
CAMEX	Brazilian Chamber of Foreign Trade
CCJ	COMESA Court of Justice
CETA	EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement

COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CP	Contact Point
CPTTP	Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
CSF	Civil Society Forum
DAG	Domestic Advisory Groups
EAC	East African Community
EACJ	EAC Court of Justice
ECT	Energy Charter Treaty
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FET	Fair and Equitable Treatment
FIP	SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment
GTEX	Technical Group for Strategic Studies on Foreign Trade
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICSID	International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICS	Investment Court System
ISDS	Investor State Dispute Settlement
ILC	International Law Commission
MFN	Most Favoured Nation
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development

NT	National Treatment
OFIO	Office of Foreign Investment Ombud
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAIC	Pan African Investment Code
PCA	Permanent Court of Arbitration.
REC	Regional Economic Community
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SGDs	Sustainable Development Goals
SSA	State-State arbitration
SWC	Specialised Working Committees
SWG	Specialised Working Groups
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
T-FTA	COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement
TRF	Transatlantic Regulators Forum
TTIP	EU-U.S. Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCITRAL	United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

SUMMARY OF THESIS

Foreign investments in SADC are regulated by Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investments (SADC FIP), as well as the laws of SADC Member States. At present, SADC faces the challenge that this regime for the regulation of foreign investments is unstable, unsatisfactory and unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States is unsatisfactory. This negatively affects the security of foreign investments regulated by this regime. The main reasons for this state of affairs are briefly explained below.

The regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy reviews and amendments of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 to remove investor access to international investor-state arbitration, better known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).

The regulation of foreign investments in SADC has been unsatisfactory, among others because some SADC Member States have failed or neglected to harmonise their investment laws with both the 2006 and the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, SADC Member States such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have multiple Regional Economic Community (REC) memberships. This places these Member States in a position whereby they have conflicting interests and treaty obligations.

Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unpredictable, due to regional integration efforts such as the recent formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Zone (T-FTA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The T-FTA is entitled to have its investment protocol, while the AfCFTA investment protocol will be negotiated from 2018 until 2020. These developments entail that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels, thereby ushering a new regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC. The unknown nature of the future regulations create uncertainty and instability among foreign investors and host states alike.

This study analyses the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and selected laws of SADC Member States. In the end, it makes the three findings mentioned above. In order to address these findings, the study makes four recommendations. The first is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated at African Union (AU) level, by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol (which incidentally is now the case). Secondly, investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of a host state, optional ISDS, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) or other agreed forum. Thirdly, an African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) must be established. The AJS will act as a gateway to determine whether an investor-state dispute shall be referred to the courts of a host state, ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forums. Fourthly, the office of an African Investment Ombud (AIO) must be created. The AIO shall facilitate the early resolution of investor-state disputes, so as to reduce the number of disputes that may end-up in litigation or arbitration.

KEY TERMS

African Continental Free Trade Area; African Court for People and Human Rights; ACH&PR; African Court of Justice and Human Rights; African Justice Scoreboard; African Union; COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement; Expropriation; ICSID Arbitration Rules; Investor-State Dispute Settlement; SADC Protocol on Finance and Investments; State Responsibility; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

African states need vast financial resources to achieve their African Union Commission (AUC) *Agenda 2063* Objectives¹ as well as the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).² Key sectors in this regard are power generation, transport, telecommunications, water and sanitation, food security and agriculture, climate change mitigation, health, and education.³ The objectives of *Agenda 2063*⁴ converge with those of the SDGs, thus the two are equally relevant to this study.⁵ *Agenda 2063* is a 50-year

¹ Agenda 2063 is the African Union (AU)'s plan to transform and develop Africa by 2063. For further information see African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" (Addis Ababa 2015) <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017); African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Popular Version" (Addis Ababa 2015) <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017); African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023" (Addis Ababa 2015), at 37, 63 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf> (Date of use: 16 November 2017); African Union (Commission) "African Agenda 2063 General Briefing Kit Presentation" (Addis Ababa 2015) <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-presentation.pdf> (Date of use: 16 November 2017).

² SDGs emanate from the United Nations (General Assembly) "Transforming Our World: The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development" (New York 2015) https://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/08/120815_outcome-document-of-Summit-for-adoption-of-the-post-2015-development-agenda.pdf (Date of use: 24 August 2017).

³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Investment Policy Framework For Sustainable Development 2015" (United Nations New York and Geneva 2015) at 18 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 2017).

⁴ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at 2-19, 131-180 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

⁵ African Union (Commission) "African Agenda 2063 General Briefing Kit Presentation" at para 4 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-presentation.pdf> (Date of

continental programme for the socio-economic transformation and development of Africa and its people.⁶ It was conceived on the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) during May 2013, where AU Heads of State and Government (AU Assembly) tasked the AUC to prepare a 50-year continental agenda for the socio-economic development of Africa through a people-driven process.⁷

Some of *Agenda 2063*'s objectives⁸ are the establishment of a continental road network,⁹ a continental high-speed rail network,¹⁰ an air and maritime transport network,¹¹ a continental TV channel network,¹² a Pan African University with 25 satellite centres,¹³ and modern communication, education, sanitation and health facilities in all

use: 16 November 2017.

⁶ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at iii
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

⁷ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at iii, 1
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

⁸ The Agenda 2063 objectives are summarised in African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at 94-99
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

⁹ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at 11
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

¹⁰ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at 11, 172
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

¹¹ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at 11
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

¹² African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at 172
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

¹³ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at 167
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

communities in Africa.¹⁴ *Agenda 2063*'s objectives such as the high-speed rail network and the Pan African University must be achieved by 2023.¹⁵ They will no doubt cost billions of rands to implement.¹⁶

It cannot be disputed that public sector funding alone will be insufficient to meet the cost of achieving *Agenda 2063*'s objectives and SDGs.¹⁷ The AUC admits this fact, and stipulates the areas of *Agenda 2063* that will require funding, as well as the sources of the funding.¹⁸ Foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio investments are some of the sources of private funding that will be required to make *Agenda 2063* a reality.¹⁹ A report by the AUC, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) also states that private funding helps African states to upgrade their infrastructure faster than would otherwise be possible.²⁰ The report states

¹⁴ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at 3-6
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

¹⁵ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023" at 43, 44, 65
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf> (Date of use: 16 November 2017).

¹⁶ For a discussion of the Agenda 2023 goals see African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023" at 40-42, 47-84
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf> (Date of use: 16 November 2017).

¹⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Investment Policy Framework For Sustainable Development" at 17
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 2017).

¹⁸ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at 113-116
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

¹⁹ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 Framework Document" at 113-116
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

²⁰ African Union (Commission) "Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About ECA" (AUC Printing and Publishing Unit Addis Ababa) at 33

that during 2015, 44 African states had jointly committed USD 28 Billion towards infrastructure development, while China committed USD 20 Billion, the private sector invested USD 7 Billion, the World Bank committed USD 6 Billion, the AfDB committed USD 4 Billion, and other banks and states committed more Billions.²¹ The bulk of the funds, therefore, came from private and foreign sources.

A picture that emerges is that there is a vast shortage of FDI in SDG sectors, since only a fraction of investments by transnational corporations and institutional investors, private equity funds, sovereign wealth funds etc. is directed at these sectors, as compared to commercial investments.²² The AUC, UNECA and the AfDB acknowledge that the deficit in the funding of infrastructure projects is delaying the development of Africa.²³

Foreign investors are wary of SDG sectors for reasons such as the political nature of SDG sectors,²⁴ as well as issues of low risk-return relating thereto.²⁵ Investment in these

²¹ https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (date of use 15 December 2017).

²² African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 34
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

²³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investment Policy Framework For Sustainable Development 2015” at 17
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 2017).

²⁴ African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 2
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

²⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investment Policy Framework For Sustainable Development” at 19-20
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 2017).

For example, health and sanitation projects are sensitive because the services in these sectors are seen as basic needs. This can limit returns that an investor can make in the

sectors may also be discouraged by an unwelcoming investment climate and regulatory, administrative or policy-related challenges.²⁶ Hence a stable and supportive macroeconomic and regulatory environment is a necessary driver for the attraction and retention of private investment.²⁷

The need for private funding in order to advance the socio-economic development of SADC Member States as contemplated in *Agenda 2063* brings the effective security of the required investments to the fore.

As already indicated in the summary of this study above and further explained below, the challenge that underpins this study is that the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is currently unstable, unsatisfactory and its future is unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC member States is

sector, as it may be necessary to keep prices low. Furthermore, these sectors are by nature exposed to the intervention of host states. The dispute in *Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) v United Republic of Tanzania* (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22) Award of 24 July 2008, is one example that shows the sensitivity of water and sanitation projects. *Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S v Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29) Decision on Jurisdiction of 14 November 2005, *Desert Line Projects L.L.C v The Republic of Yemen* (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17) Award of 6 February 2008, and *Walter Bau AG (In Liquidation) v The Kingdom of Thailand* (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 1 July 2009 are similar examples relating to road construction projects.

²⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investment Policy Framework For Sustainable Development” at 19-20
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 2017).

²⁶ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investment Policy Framework For Sustainable Development” at 20
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 2017).

²⁷ See for example Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) “InvestSA Investment Insights”, Issue 1 October 2017 at 18 <http://www.investsa.gov.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/InvestSA-newsletter.pdf> (Date of use 15 December 2017).

unsatisfactory.²⁸ This affects the security of foreign investments in SADC, and does not bode well for the creation of a conducive climate for the attraction and regulation of foreign investment by the Member States.

This status quo is a result of recent developments in SADC, which are described below.

Firstly, the regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy reviews and the amendment of key regulatory instruments that have taken place.

²⁸

See the discussion of each Member State in Chapter 4 below under the discussion of each state, where comments are made regarding the rule of law. The quality of the rule of law is essential, hence it is one of the priorities of *Agenda 2063*. See for example African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023” at 68-70 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf> (Date of use: 16 November 2017).

For a discussion of the rule of law in general see Adler J *Constitutional and administrative law* 6th ed (Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke 2007) at 124-144; Bingham TH *The rule of law* (Allen Lane London 2010); Bradley AW and Ewing KD *Constitutional and administrative law* 13th ed (Longman Harlow 2003) at 90-102; Brand-Ballard J *Philosophy of law: introducing jurisprudence* (Bloomsbury Academic London 2013) at 23-29; Costa P and Zolo D (eds) *The rule of law: history, theory and criticism* (Springer Dordrecht 2007); Fletcher GP *Basic Concepts of legal thought* (Oxford University Press New York 1996) at 11-60; Hatchard J *Combating corruption: legal approaches to supporting good governance and integrity in Africa* (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2013); Head JW *Great Legal Traditions: civil law, common law, and Chinese law in historical and operational perspective* (Carolina Academic Press Durham, N.C 2011); Isanga JM “The Rule of Law and African Development” 2016 (42) *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 1-59; Mujuzi JD “The Rule of Law: Approaches of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and Selected States” 2012 (12) *African Human Rights Law Journal* 89-111; Ntephe P *Does Africa Need Another Kind of Law: Alterity and the Rule of Law Subsaharan Africa* (PhD Thesis SOAS University of London 2012); Ramcharan BG *The fundamentals of international human rights treaty law* (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2011) at 63-79; Sannerholm Z *Rule of law after war and crisis: ideologies, norms, and methods* (Intersentia Cambridge 2012); Saunders C and Le Roy C (eds) *The rule of law* (Federation Press Sydney 2003); Shapiro I *The Rule of law* (New York University Press New York 1994); Slapper G *How the law works* 2nd ed (Routledge London 2011) at 1-43; Shivute P “The Rule of Law in Sub-Sahara Africa- An Overview”

<http://www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/HumanRights/shivute2.pdf> (undated) (Date of use 10 April 2018).

Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 to remove investor access to ISDS. These developments will now be briefly discussed.

The SADC Tribunal, which was opened during 2005, was suspended during 2010.²⁹ The suspension of the tribunal has prejudiced cases that were pending at the tribunal, such as *Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Limited, Mr. Josias Van Zyl (South Africa), The Josias Van Zyl Family Trust (South Africa) and Others v The Kingdom of Lesotho*.³⁰ In addition, the SADC Tribunal Protocol was amended in 2014 to remove access to the Tribunal by natural and legal persons.

²⁹ <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/> (Date of use: 17 January 2017).

³⁰ Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No. 2013-29 (*Josias Van Zyl 1*). This case proceeded as *Mr Josias Van Zyl (South Africa), The Josias Van Zyl Family Trust (South Africa) and The Burmilla Trust (South Africa) v The Kingdom of Lesotho* (PCA) Case No. 2016-21 (*Josias Van Zyl 2*). See *Josias Van Zyl 2* Procedural Order No.1 of 3 November 2016 that details the background to the case; *Josias Van Zyl and Others v Kingdom of Lesotho*, Singapore High Court Case No. (2017) SGHC 104 — Originating Summons No 95 of 2017 (Registrar’s Appeal No 91 of 2017) Grounds of Decision of 8 March 2017 at para 6-10 <http://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/search-judgment?q=Kingdom%20of%20lesotho;http://kluerarbitrationblog.com/2017/05/09/boo- ked-singapore-post-on-lesotho-matter-on-service-of-process-olga-boltenko-9th-may/> (Date of use: 25 July 2017). See also Procedural Order No. 2 at para 4, 16.2. However, the Singapore High Court annulled the arbitral decision on jurisdiction on 14 August 2017 (see judgment at <https://www.supremecourt.gov.sg/docs/default-source/module-document/judgement/170814---lesotho-judgment---final-clean-pdf.pdf> (Date of use: 03 October 2017)). For the South African background to the case see *Van Zyl and Others v Government of Republic of South Africa and Others* (170/06) [2007] ZASCA 109; [2007] SCA 109 (RSA); [2008] 1 All SA 102 (SCA); 2008 (3) SA 294 (SCA) (20 September 2007). For the SADC Tribunal background of the case see *Van Zyl and Others v The Kingdom of Lesotho* Case No. SADC (T) 04/2009.

During 2016, the SADC Agreement Amending Annex 1³¹ repealed the 2006 Annex 1 of the SADC FIP and introduced a 2016 Annex 1.³² A noteworthy change that the 2016 Annex 1 introduced was the removal of investor access to ISDS. This amendment has further weakened the protection of foreign investments in SADC, since investor-state disputes that are not protected by Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Treaties with Investment Provisions (TIPs) or investment agreements must henceforth be referred to local courts of host states, whose state of rule of law may be unsatisfactory.³³

Secondly, the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unsatisfactory, among others because some SADC Member State have failed or neglected to harmonise their investment laws with Annex 1. The investment laws of some SADC Member States are in conflict with 2006 or 2016 Annex 1, as the case may be.³⁴ This is despite the fact that Articles 17 and 19 of the 2016 and 2006 Annex 1 respectively require that the Member States must harmonise their foreign investment laws with the relevant version of Annex 1. Despite this, SADC Member States have failed to harmonise their laws with Annex 1, as shown in Chapter 4 below.

³¹ *Southern African Development Community Agreement Amending Annex 1 (Co-Operation on Investment) of the Protocol on Finance and Investment*, (Date of signature 31 08 2016, in force 24 August 2016) (2016 Annex 1) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5527> (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

³² See <http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/5000> (Date of use: 20 August 2017). According to the Trade Law Centre (Tralac), the 2016 Annex 1 came into force on 24 August 2017, see <https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/12350-the-first-international-arbitration-case-under-the-sadc-finance-and-investment-protocol-lesotho-v-swissbourgh-diamond-mines-case.html> (Date of use: 03 October 2017).

³³ The state of the rule of law in each SADC Member state is discussed in Chapter 4 below.

³⁴ See Chapter 4 below; Ngobeni L and Fagbayibo B “The Investor-State Dispute Resolution Forum under the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment: Challenges and Opportunities for Effective Harmonisation” 2015 (19) *Law, Democracy and Development* 175-192 at 184-185.

Furthermore, the regulation of foreign investments by RECs,³⁵ as well as the multiple REC membership that some SADC Member States have, create multiple challenges.³⁶ Multiple REC memberships make regional integration costly, inefficient and ineffective.³⁷ Furthermore, multiple REC memberships cause challenges of divided loyalty, conflicting

³⁵ There are eight RECs in Africa that are recognised by the AU. Including SADC, these are: Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-CAD); The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). For more information see <http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/african-union-au-regional-economic-communities-recs-africa> (Date of use: 19 November 2016); African Union (Commission) "African Union Handbook 2017" (Addis Ababa 2016) at 128-140 <https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/31829-file-african-union-handbook-2017-edited.pdf> (Date of use: 08 April 2017); *Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit* (GTZ) "Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progressive Overview" (Nairobi 2009) at 11-12 https://www2.giz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/RECs_Final_Report.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 2017); Mbengue MM and Schacherer S "The 'Africanization' of International Investment Law: The Pan-African Investment Code and the Reform of the International Investment Regime" *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 2017 (18) 414–448 at 417; Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) *Law, Democracy and Development* 175 at 186; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Intra-Africa Trade: Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism" (United Nations New York and Geneva 2013) at 9-10 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2013_en.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 2017).

³⁶ SADC Member States with cross-membership are: Angola (ECCAS, SADC), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (COMESA, ECCAS, SADC), Malawi (COMESA, SADC), Mauritius (COMESA, SADC), Seychelles (COMESA, SADC), Kingdom of Eswatini (formerly Swaziland) (COMESA, SADC), Tanzania (EAC, SADC), Zambia (COMESA, SADC) and Zimbabwe (COMESA, SADC). See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Intra-Africa Trade: Unlocking Private Sector Dynamism" at 9-10 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/aldcafrica2013_en.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 2017); Gathii JT "African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes" 2010 (35) *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 571-668 at 642-656.

³⁷ GTZ "Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progressive Overview" at 12 https://www2.giz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/RECs_Final_Report.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 2017).

treaty obligations, competition for resources, and legal complexities relating to projects that are undertaken in RECs with conflicting legal systems.³⁸

Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unpredictable, due to the recent formation of the T-FTA³⁹ and the AfCFTA.⁴⁰ The T-FTA agreement provides for the conclusion of a protocol on investments,⁴¹ while the AfCFTA Agreement also provides for an investment protocol will be negotiated during the second phase of AfCFTA negotiations between 2018 and 2020.⁴² There is therefore no doubt that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels. The big unknown here is what the contents of either investment protocol shall be. In dealing with the above challenges, the historical evolution of international economic law, and in particular of investor-state dispute resolution, must not be lost. According to Gathii, international economic law serves as a tool by which capital-exporting states access resources in developing states.⁴³ As a result, the rules of

³⁸ GTZ “Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progressive Overview” at 12 https://www2.giz.de/wbf/4tDx9kw63gma/RECs_Final_Report.pdf (Date of use: 31 October 2017); Gathii 2010 (35) *North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation* 571 at 656-663.

³⁹ *Agreement Establishing a Tripartite Free Trade Area Among the COMESA, EAC and SADC*, (date of signature 10 June 2015, in force) <https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html> (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

⁴⁰ *Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area* (date of signature 21 March 2018, not in force) <https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1964-agreement-establishing-the-afcfta-consolidated-text-signed-21-march-2018-1/file.html> (Date of use 30 April 2018).

⁴¹ Article 45(1) (b) T-FTA.

⁴² Article 7(1)(iii) AfCFTA Agreement; African Union (Assembly) (Tenth Extraordinary Session, 21 March 2018) “Decision on the Draft Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)” Doc. Ext/Assembly/AU/2(X) at para 12(iii), 13 <https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1834-au-decision-on-the-draft-agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-21-march-2018-1/file.html> (Date of use, 28 March 2018).

⁴³ Gathii JT “War’s Legacy in International Economic Law” 2009 (11) *International*

international economic law are skewed in favour of capital-exporting states, thereby encroaching upon the sovereignty of developing states.⁴⁴ It is in this context that BITs have come to be referred to as the “bills of rights of foreign investors.”⁴⁵

It cannot be disputed that for historical reasons, the majority of BITs and TIPs are designed to protect foreign investors, irrespective of any other stated objective such as the development of host states.⁴⁶ A factor that lends credibility to this argument is that BITs and TIPs are in general designed to allow investors to sue host states, not the other way round. For example, in the first seven months of 2017 alone, investors used BITs and TIPs to open 35 ISDS cases against 32 host states.⁴⁷

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION

This study will seek to answer the following question, against the background of the Problem Statement as described above:

“Are foreign investments in the SADC region effectively secured, in view of the challenges identified in the Problem Statement?”

The main research question will be broken down into the following sub-questions:

Community Law Review 353-386 at 354, 385.

⁴⁴ Gathii 2009 (11) International Community Law Review 353 at 363-370.

⁴⁵ Gathii 2009 (11) International Community Law Review 353 at 368.

⁴⁶ A database of BITs and TIPs is available at <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/liaByCountry#iialInnerMenu> (Date of use: 30 March 2018).

⁴⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreement Issues Note”, Issue 3 November 2017 (United Nations New York 2017) at 1 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 2018).

- 1.2.1 In the event of an expropriation, can a state rely on its internal law to avoid compliance with its international obligations?
- 1.2.2 What are the consequences of an unlawful expropriation? Must an expropriating state pay compensation in terms of applicable treaty, investment contract or law, or must it pay damages in the form of reparation?
- 1.2.3 Does the definition of an investment as applied in International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitration cases such as *Salini Construttori S.P.A and Italstrade S.P.A v Kingdom of Morocco*⁴⁸ apply to non-ICSID tribunals? If so, what are the implications for Annex 1?
- 1.2.4 Are the remedies that are available to an investor based on the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1 and the laws of SADC Member States in the event of expropriation, satisfactory?
- 1.2.5 If the regulation of foreign investments by Annex 1 and SADC Member States' laws is not satisfactory, what options does SADC have for the regulation of foreign investments, as well as the mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes, based on the recent developments in Brazil, the European Union (EU) and India?

1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The high-level objective of this study is to analyse the security of foreign investments in SADC, with a view to make recommendations regarding some of the regulatory deficiencies that may be identified.⁴⁹ The sub-objectives of this study are to analyse:

⁴⁸ (ICSID Case No. ARB 00/4) Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 July 2001.

⁴⁹ See in particular, the findings made in Chapters 3 and 4 below.

- 1.3.1 The basis on which a state may incur international responsibility towards an investment or investor for an expropriation;
- 1.3.2 The consequences of unlawful expropriations, such as those that are in breach of a treaty, contract, international law or the internal law of a state;
- 1.3.3 The definition of an investment as applied in ICSID tribunal decisions such as *Salini*, with a view among others to determine if the definition may be applied by non-ICSID tribunals, and what the implications thereof for Annex 1 are;
- 1.3.4 The remedies available to an investor in terms of the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1 and the laws of SADC Member States, in the event of expropriation, so as to determine if they are satisfactory or not; and
- 1.3.5 The options open to SADC in addressing the challenges identified in the Problem Statement regarding the regulation of foreign investments and the mechanism and forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes, in view among others of developments in Brazil, the EU, and India.

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

Following upon the last two objectives of this study, there are two areas that are central to this literature review. These are the level at which foreign investments in SADC must be regulated, as well as the mechanism and forum in which investor-state disputes must be resolved. The level at which foreign investments in SADC must be regulated is important, particularly in view of the findings made in Chapters 3 and 4 below, as well as the formation of the African Economic Community (AEC), AfCFTA and the T-FTA. This is a critical area for discussion, as the T-FTA provides for the conclusion of its investment protocol,⁵⁰ while the AfCFTA will also have an investment protocol that will

⁵⁰ Article 45(1) (b) T-FTA Agreement.

be negotiated from the second half of 2018 until 2020.⁵¹ The mechanism and forum in which investor-state disputes must be resolved are also relevant, given among others the suspension of the SADC Tribunal, the removal of ISDS from the 2016 Annex 1, and the poor state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States. Despite the challenges stated in the Problem Statement, there has not been a robust literary discussion on these issues. This study endeavours to contribute towards the discourse and the body of knowledge in this regard.

For now the selected literature on the abovementioned issues will now be briefly considered. The conceptual framework will be discussed in the next chapter.

With regard to the level at which foreign investments in SADC ought to be regulated, there is limited scholarly critique of the two main instruments that regulate foreign investments in SADC, namely the SADC Treaty⁵² and Annex 1.⁵³ However, scholars have made extensive comments on the prospects and challenges of regional integration efforts in general.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Article 7(1)(iii) AfCFTA Agreement; African Union (Assembly) "Decision" at para 12(iii), 13 <https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1834-au-decision-on-the-draft-agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-21-march-2018-1/file.html> (Date of use, 28 March 2018).

⁵² In Particular Articles 4 and 6 thereof. The SADC Treaty and its background are discussed in Chapter 3 below.

⁵³ Two articles that analyse Annex 1 are Kondo T "A Comparison with Analysis of the SADC FIP before and after Its Amendment" 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1- 47; Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175-192.

⁵⁴ See for example Mapuva J and Muyengwa-Mapuva L "The SADC regional bloc: what prospects for regional integration?" 2014 (18) Law, Democracy and Development 22-36; Saurombe A "Regional integration agenda for SADC "Caught in the winds of change" Problems and Prospects" 2009 (4) (2) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 100-106; Saurombe A "The role of SADC institutions in implementing SADC treaty provisions dealing with regional integration" 2012 (15) (2) Potchefstroom Electronic

Three proposals have emerged from the available literature that was reviewed with regard to the level at which foreign investments in Africa ought to be regulated. The proposals can be classified as regionalism, and two variants of continentalism. These proposals will be briefly discussed, so as to set the basis for the options that are open to SADC as discussed in Chapter 5 below, and subsequent proposals that will be made in Chapter 6.

Firstly, Denters and Gazzini propose regionalism what they term the “third alternative” to bilateralism and multipluralism.⁵⁵ This proposal promotes the use of RECs to regulate foreign investments. This is similar to the status quo, where Annex 1 regulates foreign investments in SADC. The challenge with this proposal is that it will perpetuate the status *quo*, where a “spaghetti bowl” of conflicting BITs, state investment laws, REC laws, and TIPs regulate foreign investments.⁵⁶

Law Journal 453-485; Saurombe A “The European Union as a model for regional integration in the Southern African Development Community: a selective institutional comparative analysis” 2013 (17) Law, Democracy and Development 457-470.

⁵⁵ Denters E and Gazzini T “The Role of African Regional Organizations in the Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investment” 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 449-492 at 472-478, 491-492.

⁵⁶ Denters and Gazzini 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 449 at 452-472; Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 414 at 416-419; Gathii 2010 (35) North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 571 at 642-656; Paez L “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Regional Investment Regulation in Africa: Towards a Continental Investment Area?” 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment and Trade 379-413 at 381-401.

At the moment, each of the AU-recognised eight RECs has an instrument that regulates foreign investments in one way or another.⁵⁷ This practice does not contribute to the harmonisation of investment regulation in Africa, since it promotes diverse practices rather than uniformity. It is shown in Chapters 3 and 4 below that the regulation of foreign investments in SADC by means of Annex 1 has failed, as Member States fail to harmonise their foreign investment laws with Annex 1.⁵⁸ The regulation of foreign investments by means of RECs stands to replicate the challenges that SADC is experiencing. Therefore the challenges identified with regard to the regulation of foreign investments by RECs in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 below apply to this approach. This also applies to the resolution of investor-state disputes at REC level.

Secondly, Mbengue and Schacherer suggest that the Pan African Investment Code (PAIC)⁵⁹ has the potential to bring an end to the conflicts caused by varying foreign investment regulatory instruments that exist throughout the continent.⁶⁰ Mbengue argues that Africa is not ready for a binding legal instrument such as a multilateral investment treaty, and thus according to him, a soft law instrument such as the PAIC is ideal.⁶¹ The AU and its Member States support this view, as can be seen from the PAIC's Preamble. However, the same AU has now concluded the AfCFTA Agreement, with its own investment protocol. One can therefore conclude that the AU has moved beyond the

⁵⁷ Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 414 at 416-419.

⁵⁸ See also Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) *Law, Democracy and Development* 175 at 182-185.

⁵⁹ *Pan African Investment Code (PAIC)*
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/32844-doc-draft_pan-african_investment_code_december_2016_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

⁶⁰ Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 414 at 446.

⁶¹ Mbengue MM "Africa and the Reform of the International Investment Regime: An Introduction" 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 371-378 at 376.

PAIC. It is difficult to see how the PAIC can bring uniformity in the regulation of foreign investments in Africa, when it is only a guiding instrument that has no binding legal effect.⁶² Strangely, Mbengue and Schacherer also admit this fact.⁶³ Without being a binding instrument, the PAIC cannot have the effect of harmonising the regulation of foreign investments in Africa.

Furthermore, in order for the PAIC to have the desired effect, it relies on Member States to adopt its contents when they conclude BITs. However, there is no proof that AU Member States will sign BITs that follow the PAIC in numbers that are high enough to accelerate and spread the recommendations of the PAIC. Presently, there are only 159 intra-Africa BITs, out of 881 BITs entered into by African states.⁶⁴ Therefore African states enter into more BITs with other states than they do among themselves. Furthermore, it cannot be ignored that states such as South Africa are moving away from the conclusion of BITs.⁶⁵

⁶² Article 2 PAIC; Preamble PAIC (last sentence). For a discussion of the challenges of using soft law instruments, see Paez 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 379 at 400-402.

⁶³ Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 414 at 420, 446.

⁶⁴ Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 414 at 416.

⁶⁵ See General Notice 961 of 209, Government Gazette 32386 of 7 July 2009; Department of Trade and Industry (Republic of South Africa) (June 2009) "Bilateral Investment Policy Review Framework Review, Government Position Paper" <https://archive.opengazettes.org.za/archive/ZA/2009/government-gazette-ZA-vol-529-no-32386-dated-2009-07-07.pdf> (Date of use: 18 January 2018); Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) (February 2011) "Policy Statement: The South African Government's Approach to Future International Investment Treaties; Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) (February 2011): "A review Framework for cross-border direct investment in South Africa, Discussion Document" <http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2011/A%20review%20framework%20for%20cross-border%20direct%20investment%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf> (Date of use: 18 January 2018)

In addition to the above, the PAIC cannot foster uniformity in BIT practice in Africa as intended, since it encourages diverse practices rather than uniformity with regard to investor-state dispute settlement. For example, the PAIC allows Member States to resolve investor-state disputes as they see fit, rather in a uniform and consistent way.⁶⁶ The consistency it promotes is in fact diversity, not harmonisation or uniformity. Furthermore, the PAIC provides that disputes under investment agreements shall be resolved under the terms provided in such agreements.⁶⁷ The PAIC also provides that ISDS in the form of arbitration under the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules⁶⁸ may only take place if a host state agrees to an investor's request to commence it, and in line with its domestic laws and policies.⁶⁹ This situation is a compromise position that reflects the need for ISDS by some Member States, while regions such as SADC do not want ISDS.⁷⁰

In recognition of the necessity for such compromise in SADC, Ngobeni and Fagbayibo proposed that the 2016 Annex 1 provide that the SADC Member States may delay consent to ISDS until after an investor-state dispute arises.⁷¹ This is similar to the position adopted by the PAIC as shown above.

⁶⁶ Article 42(1) PAIC.

⁶⁷ Article 42(1) PAIC.

⁶⁸ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Arbitration Rules" (United Nations New York 2013)
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

⁶⁹ Article 42(1) PAIC; Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 414 at 444.

⁷⁰ Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 414 at 443-444.

⁷¹ Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) *Law, Democracy and Development* 175 at 189.

The overall result is that even if AU Member States widely adopted the PAIC, this will not lead to uniformity with regard to the regulation of the resolution of investor-state disputes. The PAIC is therefore not an ideal instrument for the creation of a harmonised, Africa-wide regime for the regulation of foreign investments. It is incapable of harmonising the regulation of foreign investments in Africa, and will in practice be overtaken by the upcoming AfCFTA investment protocol.

The third view, proposed by Paez, is that foreign investments in Africa should be regulated by means of an African Continental Investment Area (ACIA) treaty. Paez correctly opines that requiring the Member States to comply with soft law (such as the PAIC) adds to the mixture of conflicting instruments and further complicates the situation.⁷² Paez therefore proposes that an ACIA treaty is the ideal solution to the problem.⁷³ The ACIA would comprise of sectoral agreements dealing with areas such as infrastructure, energy, agriculture, and industry.⁷⁴ Furthermore, Paez proposes that investor-state disputes should be referred to the ACJ&HR.⁷⁵ Paez's position is thus the total opposite of Mbengue and Schacharer's proposal.

Paez's proposals resonate with those recommended in Chapter 6 of this study, to the extent that it proposes that foreign investments be regulated by a continental treaty. Indeed, this is the direction being adopted by the AfCFTA, which will have an investment protocol as indicated above. However, Paez does not provide details motivating the proposal, nor how the proposal can be implemented. Therefore, it is difficult to analyse

⁷² Paez 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 379 at 402.

⁷³ Paez 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 379 at 403-407.

⁷⁴ Paez 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 379 at 406.

⁷⁵ Paez 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 379 at 404-405.

the proposal further. This study takes this issue further with the discussions made in Chapter 5, and proposals made in Chapter 6.

With regard to the mechanism and forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes, there has as stated above been a dearth of literature. This is hardly surprising, since SADC only commenced the regulation foreign investments by means of Annex 1 during 2010. Furthermore, the SADC Tribunal functioned from August 2005 to August 2010,⁷⁶ and it only delivered one significant judgment in *Mike Campbell v Zimbabwe*.⁷⁷ Most scholars have focused their commentary on the suspension of the SADC Tribunal, and the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol to deny natural and legal persons access to the SADC Tribunal.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/> (Date of use: 11 January 2018).

⁷⁷ *Mike Campbell Pvt Ltd and 78 Others v Republic of Zimbabwe (2/2007)* (2008) SADCT 2 (28 November 2008).

⁷⁸ See for example Banda F “The Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 – Constitutional Curate’s Egg” 2014 *The International Survey of Family Law* 491-506; Beukes M “Zimbabwe in the Dock: the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Tribunal’s First Decision” 2008 (33) *South African Yearbook of international Law* 228-243; Cohen DF “A President, an International Tribunal and a Band of Farmers Walk into a Constitutional Court - The Last Laugh: Mike Campbell v. the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe” 2014 (28) *Emory International Law Review* 29-42; De Wet E “The Case of Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Louis Karel Fick: A First Step towards Developing a Doctrine on the Status of International Judgments within the Domestic Legal Order” 2014 (17) *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal* 553-565; Du Plessis M and Forere M “Enforcing the SADC Tribunal’s Decisions in South Africa: Immunity” 2010 (35) *South African Yearbook of International Law* 265-269; Ebobrah ST and Nkhata MJ “Is the SADC Tribunal under Judicial Siege in Zimbabwe – reflections on *Etheredge v Minister of State for National Security Responsible for lands, Land Reform and Resettlement and Another*” 2010 (43) *Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa* 81-92; Hemel D and Schalkwyk A “Tyranny on Trial: Regional Courts Crack down on Mugabe’s Land Reform” 2010 (35) *Yale Journal of International Law* 517-524; Mkandawire MCC “The SADC Tribunal Perspective on enforcement of Judgments: State Support and Cooperation” 2010 (36) *Commonwealth Law Bulletin* 567- 574; Moyo A “Defending Human Rights and the Rule of Law by the SADC Tribunal: Campbell and beyond” 2009 (9) *African Human Rights Law Journal* 590-614; Naldi GJ “Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd et al v the Republic of Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe’s Land Reform Programme Held in Breach of the SADC Treaty” 2009 (53) *Journal of African Law* 305-320; Ndlovu L “Following the NAFTA

Phooko calls for the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol, with a view to again grant natural and legal persons access to the SADC Tribunal.⁷⁹ This proposal would be easy to support, if one focused on SADC in isolation from the formation of the AEC, AfCFTA, and the T-FTA. However, the view adopted in this study is that the use of sub-regional courts as a forum for investor-state disputes will lead to forum shopping, and is not efficient or cost-effective, in view of the resource limitations that face RECs in Africa.⁸⁰

In other words, the revitalisation of the SADC Tribunal would be good for foreign investors, if SADC was a closed system, if other RECs also had similar courts, and if all the sub-regional courts were equally efficient. At present, there are 3 sub-regional courts in the T-FTA, namely the COMESA⁸¹ Court of Justice (CCJ),⁸² the East African Court of

Star: SADC Land Reform and Investment Protection after the Campbell Litigation” 2011 (15) Law, Democracy and Development 59-89; Ndlovu PN “Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe: A moment of truth for the SADC Tribunal” 2011 (1) SADC Law Journal 63-79; Phooko MR “No Longer in Suspense - Clarifying the Human Rights Jurisdiction of SADC Tribunal” 2015 (18) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 531- 568; Phooko MR “Legal Status of International Law in South Africa’s Municipal Law: *Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v. Fick and Others* (657/11)[2012] ZASCA 122” 2014 (22) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 399-419; Scholtz W and Ferreira G “Much Ado About Nothing? The SADC Tribunal’s Quest for the Rule of Law Pursuant to Regional Integration” 2011 (71) *Zao RV* 331-358; Swart M “Extending the Life of the SADC Tribunal” 2013 (38) South African Yearbook of International Law 253-262.

⁷⁹ Phooko MR *The SADC Tribunal: Its Jurisdiction, the Enforcement of its Judgments and the Sovereignty of its Member States* (LLD Thesis UNISA 2016) at para 6.2.1.

⁸⁰ See the discussion in this regard in Chapter 5 below.

⁸¹ The Common Market for Southern Africa (COMESA) was formed in terms of the *Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Southern Africa* (date of signature 05 November 1993, in force 08 December 1994) (COMESA Treaty)
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2422> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

⁸² <http://comesacourt.org/> (Date of use: 11 January 2018).

Justice (EACJ)⁸³ and the SADC Tribunal.⁸⁴ The caseload and resources for the efficient and full-time operation of CCJ, EACJ and SADC Tribunal are non-existent. Furthermore, the fact that these sub-regional courts do not have the same level of resources means that they will not have the same level of efficiency. This issue is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 below.

It is against this background that this study aims to fill the gaps identified in the literature review, and to answer the research questions posed above. In so doing, the study aims to contribute to the body of literature on the subject matter by means of the recommendations made in Chapter 6.

1.5 METHODOLOGY

The methodology applied in this study is a desktop literature review. It entails an analysis of the investment laws of SADC Member States, Annex 1, selected treaties, BITs, Model Bilateral Treaty Templates and TIPs, decisions of national and international courts, ISDS tribunals, international documents, and academic writings.

1.6 LIMITATIONS

The scope of this study is by design very wide, as it covers all SADC Member States except the Union of Comores, which joined SADC during 2017 towards the end of this study. It is not feasible to conduct an in-depth analysis of all the laws that regulate

⁸³ <http://eacj.org/> (Date of use: 11 January 2018). The EACJ is the judicial organ of the East African Community (EAC), which was formed in terms of the *Treaty Establishing the East African Community* (date of signature 30 November 1999, in force 07 July 2000) (EAC Treaty)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2487> (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

⁸⁴ The CCJ and EACJ are discussed in Chapter 5 below.

foreign investments in all sectors of SADC Member States. This study therefore analyses the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1's, as well as selected laws that regulate foreign investors in general sectors only, so as to gauge the general level of the security of foreign investments in SADC. It is noteworthy that investors can, and do by-pass the Member State laws discussed herein, by accessing applicable BITs, TIPs or investment contracts in order to litigate or arbitrate against host states. Therefore, this study analyses risks to investors who are not such instruments.

This study was written over several years. Therefore, ISDS statistics, case law, legislation and events are up to date at the different timeframes indicated in the relevant references. The reader is advised to follow the appropriate sources provided herein for updated information. The Trade Law Centre ((Tralac), website <https://www.tralac.org/>) provides useful updates regarding the signature, ratification and further negotiation of protocols to the AfCFTA and T-FTA. Other websites and organisations cited herein also provide updated information with regard to issues they deal with.

1.7 CHAPTER OUTLINE

This study is comprised of six chapters, which can be summarised as follows:

Chapter 1 introduces the problem statement, research questions, research objectives, literature review, methodology and limitations of this study.

Chapter 2 introduces the concepts that underlie this study, namely state responsibility, expropriation, investment, and investor-state dispute resolution methods.

Chapter 3 discusses the regulation of foreign investments at SADC level in terms of the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1. The chapter analyses selected provisions thereof insofar as they affect the security of foreign investments in SADC. In the analysis, the 2016 Annex 1 is compared with the SADC Model BIT, as well as TIPs from other selected jurisdictions.

Chapter 4 analyses the remedies that an investor may have in terms of the selected investment laws of each SADC Member State, in the event of the expropriation of an investment.

Chapter 5 is a comparative discussion that shows how Brazil, the EU, and India have dealt with the challenges arising from ISDS. It indicates the lessons that SADC can learn from these jurisdictions, as well as SADC's options regarding the future regulation of foreign investments, and the resolution of investor-state disputes.

Chapter 6 provides a summary of findings made by the study, and makes normative recommendations regarding the future regulation of foreign investments in SADC, as well as with regard to the forum to which investor-state disputes must be referred.

CHAPTER 2

THE ORIGIN AND SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the concepts that form the pillars of this study, namely state responsibility, expropriation, an investment, and investor-state dispute resolution forums and mechanisms. It lays the foundation for the fulfillment of the first three objectives of this study.⁸⁵

The discussion of state responsibility outlines the basis on which a host state may be liable for damage or loss suffered by an investor or an investment, such as in the event of expropriation of an investment. The discussion shows how the duty of host states to honour treaties, contracts and the laws of a host state create the international responsibility of a host state. Most important is that the duty of host states to honour treaties and contracts has given immense power to BITs, TIPs, and investment contracts, which in turn have provided investors with the right to commence ISDS cases and litigation against host states. The takeaway from this section is that investors have a wide and deep arsenal of ammunition that they can, and they do use against host states.

The discussion of expropriation lays the basis for the discussion that is undertaken in Chapter 4, where the remedies available to an investor in the event of expropriation of an investment in terms of the laws of SADC Member States are discussed. This

⁸⁵ See Objectives 1.3.1 – 1.3.3 in Chapter 1 above.

discussion, coupled with those undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4, enables conclusions to be drawn regarding the effective security of foreign investments in SADC in the event of the alleged expropriation of an investment.

The discussion of the definition of an investment is equally important, because an investment is the subject matter of an investor-state dispute. This section analyses the definition of an investment as applied by ICSID arbitral tribunals. The discussion lays the basis for the discussion of an investment that is undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4. It shows that in the event of non-ICSID arbitration being brought against a SADC Member State, the criteria that an investment must meet as outlined in *Salini* may apply to the definition of an investment, with the result that some assets that are defined as investments by the 2006 Annex 1 or the laws of SADC Member States may not qualify as investments after all.

The discussion of investor-state dispute resolution forums and mechanisms (or methods) is in line with the fourth objective of this study.⁸⁶ It lays the basis for the discussions of investor-state dispute resolution methods that follow in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, as well as the recommendations that are made in this regard in Chapter 6. This discussion outlines the pros and cons of the different mechanisms and the forums for the resolution of investor-state disputes, namely alternative dispute resolution (ADR), arbitration and litigation. The discussion concludes that all the investor-state dispute resolution methods are important, albeit to different extents.

⁸⁶ See Objectives 1.3.4 in Chapter 1 above.

2.2 STATE RESPONSIBILITY

2.2.1 Introduction

The area of state responsibility consists of the rules of international law that are used to determine the general conditions under which a state can be held responsible for wrongful acts or omissions, as well as the legal consequences of the breach.⁸⁷ These rules are known as the secondary rules of international law, in contrast to the primary rules of international law that set out the contents of obligations that states must adhere to.⁸⁸ The rules of state responsibility are used among others to determine the circumstances under which an act of state may be wrongful, the attribution of a wrongful act to a state, as well as the consequences of wrongful acts.

A state may incur international responsibility as a result of one or more internationally wrongful acts that are attributable to it. The Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) describe the sources of state responsibility as follows:

⁸⁷ United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001” (adopted on 31 May 2001, 3 August 2001, 6-9 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/10
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf;
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

For a discussion of ARSIWA and state responsibility see Anton D, Mathew P and Morgan W *International Law Cases and Materials* 1st ed (Oxford South Melbourne Victoria 2005) at 259-275; Crawford J *State Responsibility: The General Part* Reprint (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2014); Crawford J “Investment Arbitration and the ILC Articles on State Responsibility” in Reinisch A (ed) *Classics in International Investment Law Volume II* (Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2014) at 3-11; Dixon MJ *Cases and Materials on international law* 5th ed (Oxford University Press Oxford 2011) at 394-441; Wittich S “State Responsibility” in Bungenberg M *et al* (eds) *International Investment Law: A Handbook* (Nomos Baden-Baden 2015) at 23-45.

⁸⁸ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” at para 1
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

State responsibility can arise from breaches of bi-lateral obligations or of obligations owed to some States or to the international community as a whole. It can involve relatively minor infringements as well as the most serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.⁸⁹

In customary international law, a state is responsible to observe its obligations under a treaty, contract, or international law.⁹⁰ On this basis, a state may incur international responsibility towards an investor⁹¹ through the commission of one or more of the following acts, namely:

- (a) Breach of a rule of customary international law by a host state;
- (b) Breach of a treaty obligation by a host state;
- (c) Breach of an investment contract between a host state and a foreign investor;
and/or
- (d) Breach or the enactment of legislation by a host state.

These breaches will now be briefly discussed, so as to indicate their connection to the origins of investor-state disputes and the responsibility of host states.

⁸⁹ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” at 55 para 6.
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

⁹⁰ Dugard CJ *International Law: A South African Perspective* 4th ed (Juta Cape Town 2011) at 269. Sornarajah M *The International Law on Foreign Investment* 3rd ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2010) at 136.

⁹¹ A claim against a host state can be brought by an investor (e.g. a shareholder) or an investment (i.e. the legal entity that holds an investment). Therefore, reference to a claim that can be brought by investor includes a claim that can be brought by an Investment, vice versa. Whether an entity qualifies to be an investor or an investment differs from state to state, depends on the legal instrument that regulates the relevant foreign investment.

2.2.2 Breach of customary international law

As indicated above, a state must observe its obligations under a treaty, contract, or international law, failing which it may be responsible for the consequences thereof.⁹²

Articles 1, 2, 3 and 12 of ARSIWA provide the basis on which a state may be held accountable for the consequences of internationally wrongful acts.⁹³ Whether an act is wrongful in terms of international law or not is to be determined in terms of international law, and not the internal law of the host state.⁹⁴

ARSIWA provides that an act must have two elements in order to be an internationally wrongful act.⁹⁵ Firstly, the act must be attributable to the accused state.⁹⁶ Secondly, it must be a breach of an international obligation.⁹⁷ The four bases of these obligations are indicated in the preceding section.

⁹² United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 1
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

ARSIWA Commentary at 32-34; *Biwater Gauff* at para 773-775.

⁹³ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA”
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 93.

⁹⁴ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 3, 32
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary at 36 para 1, 38 para 9; Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 101; Article 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 1969 (8) ILM 679 (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980)
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf> (Date of use: 31 October 2017); *Mike Campbell* at 67.

⁹⁵ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 2
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary at 34 para 1; 34-36; Anton, Mathew and Morgan *International Law Cases and Materials* at 261-262; Aust *A Handbook of International Law* 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK 2010) at 410; Rothwell DR *et al International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives* 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press Port Melbourne Victoria 2014) at 504-454.

⁹⁶ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 2(a)
<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary at 35 paras 3, 6.

⁹⁷ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 2(b)

Attribution is the process by which international law establishes whether or not the conduct of a natural person or other entity can be considered an act of a state.⁹⁸ If an act is not attributable to a state, then an inquiry as to the responsibility of the state for the act must end.⁹⁹ Two of the rules of attribution of the conduct of organs and entities of a state will now be briefly discussed in order to indicate their operation.¹⁰⁰

Firstly, Article 4 of ARSIWA provides that the conduct of an organ of a state is attributable to the state.¹⁰¹ International law, not the internal law of a host state,

<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary at 35 para 5-8. For a discussion of the attribution of conduct to a state, see ARSIWA Commentary at 43-54; Anton, Mathew and Morgan *International Law Cases and Materials* at 263-266; Aust *Handbook of International Law* at 410-414; Bishop RD, Crawford J and Reisman W (eds) *Foreign Investment Disputes* 2nd ed (Kluwer Law International Alphen aan den Rijn Netherlands 2014) at 548-576; Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 113-211; Henkin L *et al International Law: cases and materials* 3rd ed (West Publishing Company St. Paul Minnesota 1993) at 546-550; Rothwell *et al International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives* at 455-464; *Bayindir* at para 257-261; *Bosh International, Plc. v Ukraine* (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/11) Award of 25 October 2012 at para 141-49; *Deutsche Bank AG v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka* (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/02) Award of 31 October 2012 at para 401-407; *Eastern Credit Limited, Inc and A.S Baltoil v Republic of Estonia* (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2) Award of 25 June 2001 at para 327; *Helnan International Hotels A/S v The Arab Republic of Egypt* (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19) Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 October 2006 at para 29 and 95; *Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation* (PCA Case No. AA 226) Final Award of 14 July 2014 at para 1465-1480; *Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v The Republic of Georgia* (ICSID Case No. ARB 05/18 and 07/15) Award of 3 March 2010 at para 189-194, 275, 280; *Jan de Nul N.V and Dredging International N.V. v Arab Republic of Egypt* (ICSID Case No ARB/04/13) Award of 6 November 2008 at para 155-162; *Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. v Republic of Turkey* (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28) Award of 10 March 2014 at para 276-328.

⁹⁸ Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 113.

⁹⁹ United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Commentary at 38, 39 para 9 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹⁰⁰ Due to space constraints the attribution of acts in terms of Article 6-9 of ARSIWA will not be discussed here.

¹⁰¹ United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Commentary at 40-42

determines how acts of organs and agents can be attributed to a state.¹⁰² The general rule in this regard is that the conduct of an organ of state may be attributable to a state, irrespective of the functions performed by the organ, the position occupied by the organ, and the character or nature of the organ as a part of the state or territorial unit.¹⁰³ This rule follows upon the principle that a state is viewed as a single unit that is comprised of all its organs.¹⁰⁴ For the purposes of attribution, it is irrelevant whether an organ acted in a governmental capacity (*ius imperii*) or in a commercial capacity.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, a state is liable for the acts of its municipalities and provinces.¹⁰⁶

Secondly, Article 5 of ARSIWA deals with the attribution of the acts of state entities that are authorised to exercise governmental authority and functions, such as state-owned entities, public agencies, semi-public entities, central banks, stock exchanges, privately-run prisons and the like.¹⁰⁷ A state entity must be authorised to exercise governmental authority by the internal law of a state, even if details regarding the exercise of the

<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); *Bernhard Von Pezold and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe* (ICSID Case No.ARB/10/15) Award of 28 July 2015 at para 443.

¹⁰² United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 38 para 4 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹⁰³ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 4(1) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 117.

¹⁰⁴ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 40 para 5, 40(1)-42(13) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 117.

¹⁰⁵ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 41 para 6 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹⁰⁶ Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 123-124; Rothwell *et al* *International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives* at 464.

¹⁰⁷ Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 127-128; United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 8 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017) deals with the attribution of entities that do not have delegated authority.

authority are not stated.¹⁰⁸ The act(s) in question must have been performed by an entity in the exercise of the delegated governmental authority.¹⁰⁹

The test with regard to whether a state entity falls within the ambit of Article 5 or not is a functional one.¹¹⁰ Unlike with acts of organs of a state, the acts of a state entity are attributable to a state when the entity acted *ius imperii* only. For example, the tribunal in *Bosh* held that a state is responsible for a state-owned university's acts that are *ius imperii*, but not for its private or commercial activities.¹¹¹

It is a necessary condition of state responsibility that a person must have suffered an injury to itself as a result of a wrongful act of a state.¹¹² Otherwise, in the absence of injury, there can be no cause for complaint. Article 31 of ARSIWA provides that injury includes any damage caused, whether the damage is material or moral.¹¹³ Material damage means damage that can be assessed in financial terms, while moral damage includes pain and suffering, for example, the loss of loved ones.¹¹⁴ However, damage is not a pre-requisite for a claim based on state responsibility, but injury is.¹¹⁵ Nonetheless,

¹⁰⁸ Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 127; *EDF Services Limited v Romania* (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13) Award of 8 October 2009 at para 191.

¹⁰⁹ *EDF Services* at para 191, 193.

¹¹⁰ *EDF Services* at para 193.

¹¹¹ *Bosh* at para 175-176; See also *Emilio Agustin Maffezzini v The Kingdom of Spain* (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7) Award of 9 November 2000, at para 52; *EDF Services* at para 195-198; *Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v The Government of Mongolia* (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 28 April 2011 at para 574-576, 592.

¹¹² Henkin *et al International Law: Cases and Materials* at 553-558.

¹¹³ United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Commentary at 91 para 3 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 485-491.

¹¹⁴ United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Commentary at 92 para 5 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹¹⁵ Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 485.

the nature of the damage suffered may affect the quantum and form of the reparation that can be obtained.¹¹⁶

It is necessary that there must be a connection between a wrongful act and the injury complained of. Thus an internationally wrongful act that is attributable to a state, and which is alleged to have caused injury, must be the proximate cause of the injury complained of.¹¹⁷ ARSIWA connects an injury to a wrongful act by stating that a wrongful act must be the cause of the injury.¹¹⁸ For example, the tribunal in *Biwater Gauff* applied this rule and declined to award compensation because there was no causal link between the expropriation that was found to have taken place, and the compensation claimed.¹¹⁹ Also, in *Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo*, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the DRC could not be held responsible for the loss of Diallo's property, when it

¹¹⁶ Crawford (2014) *State Responsibility: The General Part* at 486.

¹¹⁷ See for example *Factory at Chorzow (Merits)*, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17 at 30. For tribunal practice on this issue see example: *Achmea B.V. (Formerly known as Eureko B.V.) v The Slovak Republic* (PCA case No. 2008-13) Final Award of 7 December 2012 at para 320; *CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic* (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Partial Award of 13 September 2001 at para 575-585, 602, 615; *Desert Line Projects* at para 282; *Gemplus S.A., SLP S.A., Gemplus Industrial S.A de C.V., Talsud S.A v The United Mexican States* (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF) 04/3 and ARB (AF) 04/04) Award of 16 June 2010 at para 11.8-11.16; *Hulley Enterprises Limited* at para 1770-1775; *Ioan Micula and Others v Romania* (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20) Award of 11 December 2013 at para 1154; *Khan Resources Inc., Khan Resources B.V., CAUC Holding Company Ltd. v The Government of Mongolia* (PCA Case No. 2011-09) Award on Merits of 2 March 2015 at para 376-382; *LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc v Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1) Decision on Liability of 3 October 2006 at para 256; *Swisslion DOO Skopje v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* (CSID Case No ARB/09/16) Award of 6 July 2012 at para 350; *Yukos Universal Limited (Isle-of-Man Of Man) v The Russian Federation*, (PCA Case No. AA 227) Final Award of 18 July 2014 at para 1770-1775; *Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation* (PCA Case No. AA 228) Final Award of 18 July 2014 at para 1770-1775.

¹¹⁸ See United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Articles 31(1), 34 and 37(1) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary at 91 para 1-14, 95 para 1, 96 para 6, 107 para 8.

¹¹⁹ *Biwater Gauff* at 239 para 805-807; *Ioan Micula* at para 922-924.

was not proven that the loss of the property was caused by the DRC's unlawful conduct.¹²⁰

According to ARSIWA, causation is a necessary, but not sufficient factor. In addition to causation, the remoteness, directness or proximity of an injury may be relevant.¹²¹ Thus if there is an intervening event, the causal link between the original act and the injury should not be too remote.¹²² The test in this regard is whether an intervening event is so compelling that it interrupts the causal link, thus making the initial event too remote.¹²³

The commission of an internationally wrongful act creates a new set of international relations or legal consequences.¹²⁴

Firstly, a state comes under an international obligation to cease the conduct complained of.¹²⁵ Secondly, a state has a duty to make full reparation to the victim of its conduct.¹²⁶

Thirdly, an injured and non-injured state (if any) may invoke the responsibility of the

¹²⁰ *Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of The Congo), Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 2012, p. 324 at 13 para 31.*

¹²¹ United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Commentary at 93 para 10 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); *Ioan Micula* at para 924-927; *Yukos Universal Limited* at para 1770-1775.

¹²² United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Commentary at 93 para 10 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); *Ioan Micula* at para 925.

¹²³ *Ioan Micula* at para 926-927.

¹²⁴ United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Commentary at 33(3) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); *Aust Handbook of International Law* at 417-418.

¹²⁵ United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Article 30 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary at 88-91; *Aust Handbook of International Law* at 418.

¹²⁶ United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Article 31(1) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary at 91. The obligation to make reparation arises automatically and is not dependent on a demand by the injured state (ARSIWA Commentary at 91 para 5).

breaching state.¹²⁷ In appropriate cases, an affected state(s) can take countermeasures against the breaching state.¹²⁸ Fourth, when the conduct of a state is wrongful and therefore attracts international responsibility, such responsibility may be such that it is owed to all states, rather than to the wronged state only.¹²⁹ An obligation owed to all states is called an obligation *orga omnes*.¹³⁰ Finally, being part of the international community entails that every state has a legally enforceable interest in the protection of certain rights, as well as the upholding of certain obligations by itself and other states.¹³¹

2.2.3 Breach of treaty obligations

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a treaty as a written agreement concluded between states that is governed by international law.¹³² Aside from state laws, treaties are the main instruments that regulate foreign investments. As a result, they are also the main source of investor-state disputes. Historically, BITs and TIPs

¹²⁷ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Article 43 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017) sets out the process to be observed when invoking the responsibility of a state pursuant to Articles 42 and 48 (see ARSIWA Commentary at 119-120). Article 44 provides for circumstances where the responsibility of a state may not be invoked (see ARSIWA Commentary at 120-121). Article 45 provides for circumstances where the responsibility of a state may not be invoked (ARSIWA Commentary at 121-123).

¹²⁸ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 49-53 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); ARSIWA Commentary at 130-137; Aust *Handbook of International Law* at 425-428; Rothwell *et al International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives* at 480-484.

¹²⁹ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 33(4) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹³⁰ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 33(4) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹³¹ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 33 para 4 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹³² Article 2(1) (a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also Anton, Mathew and Morgan *International Law Cases and Materials* at 276-388; Henkin *et al International Law: cases and materials* at 420-425; Dorr O and Schmalenbach K (eds) *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary* (Springer Heidelberg 2012) at 131-133; Fitzmaurice M and Elias O *Contemporary Issues In The Law of Treaties* (Eleven International Publishing Utrecht 2005) at 1-3, 7-25.

respectively contributed 60 percent and 29 percent of opened under the ICSID.¹³³ On an annualised basis, during 2017 BITs contributed 62 percent of new cases, while TIPs contributed 29 percent of new cases.¹³⁴ When non-ICSID cases are added, BITs and TIPs respectively contributed 80 and 20 percent of new cases opened during 2017.¹³⁵

The first modern BIT was the Promotion and Protection of Investments Germany and Pakistan of 25 November 1959 (Germany-Pakistan BIT).¹³⁶ This BIT referred investor disputes to the ICJ or international arbitration, depending on the agreement of the

¹³³ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload Statistics”, Issue 2017-2 (New York 2017) at 10
[https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018). For details of cases opened under various BITs and TIPs see
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicablelia> (Date of use: 30 March 2018).

¹³⁴ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload Statistics”, Issue 2017-2 at 25
[https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018).

¹³⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreement Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 3
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 2018).

¹³⁶ English version is available at
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1387> (in force 28 April 1962) (Date of use 23 April 2018); Aust *Handbook of International Law* at 373. For a history of investment treaties see Salacuse JW “BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries” in Beveridge F (ed) *Globalization and International Investment* (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2005) at 25-45; Salacuse JW and Sullivan NP “Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain” 2005 (46) *Harvard International Law Journal* 67-130 at 73; Salacuse JW *The Law of Investment Treaties* (Oxford University Press Oxford 2010) at 78-125; Tietje C and F Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership”: Study prepared for Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands, 26 June 2014 at para 10-39
<http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018); Vandenvelde KJ “A Brief History of International Investment Agreements” 2005 (12) *University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy* 157-194.

parties.¹³⁷ After this BIT was concluded, the use of BITS grew gradually, such that at 1 April 2018 there were 2947 BITs, of which 2364 were in effect.¹³⁸ The number of TIPs was 379, of which 309 were in force.¹³⁹

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties thereto, and that the parties must comply with their treaty obligations in good faith.¹⁴⁰ The basis of the obligation to honour treaties is the maxim *pacta sunt servanda*.¹⁴¹ *Pacta sunt servanda* emanates from private law, and means that treaties must be honoured.¹⁴² The maxim has been codified as Article 2(b) of ARSIWA.¹⁴³

A state may not rely on its internal law to avoid compliance with a treaty.¹⁴⁴ This is an important pillar for the observance and existence of treaties because in its absence treaties could be easily avoided, given that a state would be able to rely on its internal law to avoid responsibility for breach of the treaty.¹⁴⁵ This rule enables international law

¹³⁷ Article 11(2) Germany-Pakistan BIT.

¹³⁸ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA> (Date of use: 1 April 2018).

¹³⁹ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA> (Date of use: 1 April 2018).

¹⁴⁰ Article 26; Henkin *et al International Law: cases and materials* at 463.

¹⁴¹ Fitzmaurice and Elias *Contemporary Issues In The Law of Treaties* at 3.

¹⁴² Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary* at 428-429.

¹⁴³ United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Commentary at 35-36

<http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹⁴⁴ Article 27 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary* at 453-473. This rule was codified as Article 32 of United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARISWA" <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017), see ARSIWA Commentary at 94 para 2-3. Article 27 is also a codification of international customary law (Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary* at 454; *Azurix Corp. v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12) Decision on Annulment of 1 September 2009 at para 146).

¹⁴⁵ Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary*

to “turn a blind eye” to a state’s internal law, thus rendering it irrelevant for the purpose of determining state responsibility.¹⁴⁶ Hence a provision such as that found in Zimbabwe to the effect that in the event of the expropriation of agricultural land, compensation shall only be paid for improvements but not for the land, is invalid under international law.¹⁴⁷

A state may in the compliance with its internal law act in violation of a treaty, or it may, while acting in compliance with a treaty obligation, violate its internal law.¹⁴⁸ In the former case, the state’s conduct will be an internationally wrongful act because as already stated, a state may not rely on its internal law to avoid compliance with its treaty obligations. A state may also not argue that its consent to be bound by a treaty is invalid by virtue of the fact that the consent was given contrary to its internal law, unless the granting of the consent was manifest, and it concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.¹⁴⁹

The sum of the above is that breach of a treaty is an internationally wrongful act,¹⁵⁰ and it attracts the consequences outlined in Part Two of ARSIWA,¹⁵¹ as well as in international customary law.¹⁵² This consequence is the power behind BITs and TIPs, as it compels

at 453.

¹⁴⁶ Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary* at 460.

¹⁴⁷ See the discussion relating to Zimbabwe in Chapter 4 below.

¹⁴⁸ *Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (USA v Italy)* I.C.J. Reports 1989 (*ELSI*), at 40 para 73.

¹⁴⁹ Article 46 Vienna Convention; Dorr and Schmalenbach (eds) *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary* at 776-804.

¹⁵⁰ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 54(2), 55(3) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); *ELSI* at 70 para 136; *Factory at Chorzow (Merits), Judgment No. 7, 1926, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7* of 25 May 1926 at 34; *Chorzow (Merits)* Decision of 13 September 1928 at 46-48.

¹⁵¹ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Articles 28-41 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹⁵² Article 60(2) (b) of the Vienna Convention. A party affected by material breach can

host states to honour their obligations in terms thereof.¹⁵³ In this regard, it is noteworthy that recent arbitral awards in the amounts of USD 39 Billion,¹⁵⁴ USD 8 Billion,¹⁵⁵ USD 1.8 Billion,¹⁵⁶ and USD 1.7 Billion,¹⁵⁷ were based on breach of investment treaty.¹⁵⁸ In SADC,

suspend its obligations in terms of A treaty, See Fitzmaurice and Elias *Contemporary Issues In The Law of Treaties* at 164-171.

¹⁵³ For a breakdown of ISDS cases per BIT or TIP, see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicablelia> (Date of use: 1 April 2018).

¹⁵⁴ *Hulley Enterprises Limited* at para 1888. The awards were annulled by The Hague District Court under (Chamber for Commercial Affairs) under case number C/09/477160/HA ZA 15-1, Judgment of 20 April 2016 <https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7255.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018). This decision is pending appeal before The Hague Court of Appeal under case number Case No. 200.197.079/01 (see Russia's defence at <https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9633.pdf>) (Date of use: 10 June 2018). The basis of the annulment was that there was no valid consent to arbitration by the Russian Federation (Decision of the District Court at para 5.95 - 5.97).

¹⁵⁵ *Veteran Petroleum Limited* at para 1888. Russia was successful in setting aside the award, what was said in the preceding note applies in this case as well.

¹⁵⁶ *Yukos Universal Limited* at para 1888. Russia was successful in setting aside the award, what was said in the preceding note applies in this case as well.

¹⁵⁷ *Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador* (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11) Award at para 876.

¹⁵⁸ See also the following cases where the host states were held liable for breach of treaty: *ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v The Republic of Hungary* (ICSID Case No. ARB03/16) Award of the Tribunal of 2 October 2006 at para 483, 499; *Alpha Projektholding GmbH v Ukraine* (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16) Award of 8 November 2010 at para 413-416; *American Manufacturing & Trading Inc v Republic of Zaire* (ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1) Award of 10 February 1997 at para 6.01-6.24; *ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/02) Award of 18 May 2010 para 121, 129; *Bernhard Hendricus Funekkotter v Republic of Zimbabwe* (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/6) Award of 24 July 2008 at 32 para 107; *Biwater Gauff* at para 814(b); *Cargill Incorporated v United Mexican States* (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/05/02) Award of 18 September 2009 at para 554 – 561; *CMS Gas Transmission Company v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8) Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 17 July 2003 at para 281, 303; *Desert Line Projects* at para 193-194, para 3 of the tribunal's order; *Duke Energy* at para 325, 361, 364, para 2 of tribunal's order; *Eureko* at para 234, 243, 260, 262; *Gemplus* at para 7-76, 8-25- 8-27; *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* at para 541-452; *Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States* (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1) Award of 30 August 2000 at para 112; *Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A v Arab Republic of Egypt* (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6) Award of 12 April 2002 at para 144; *OKO Pankki OYJ, VTB Bank (Deutschland) AG and Sampo Bank Plc. v The Republic of Estonia* (ICSID Case

the highest known arbitral award of USD 194 Million based on breach of treaty was made in *Bernhard Von Pezold*.¹⁵⁹

2.2.4 Breach of contract

A state may enter into an investment agreement with an investor¹⁶⁰ when the latter envisages making an investment.¹⁶¹ A contract and rights relating thereto are assets that can be expropriated.¹⁶² Investment contracts are binding on a state because of the maxim *pacta sunt servanda*.¹⁶³ Like BITs, TIPs and investment laws of host states, investment contracts may provide for an investor to refer an investor-state dispute to ISDS. As a result, 16.8 percent of ICSID arbitration cases opened up to 30 June 2017

No. ARB04/6) Award of 19 November 2009 at para 283, 376; *Tecnicas Medioambienta Tecmed S.A v The United Mexican States* (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2) of 29 May 2003 (*Tecmed*) at para 201; *Wena Hotels Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt* (ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4) Award of 8 December 2000 at para 131 and 134.

¹⁵⁹ *Bernhard Von Pezold* at para 521. The annulment of this award was pending at the time of writing.

¹⁶⁰ Or a state may contract with an investment (i.e. the entity that will hold an investment), depending on the circumstances and provisions of the applicable regulatory instrument.

¹⁶¹ For a discussion of international investment contracts see Dumberry P “International Investment Contracts” in Gazzini T and Brabandere E (eds) *International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations* (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers Leiden 2012) at 215-243; Von Walter A “Investor-State Contracts in the Context of International Investment Law” in Bungenberg M et al (eds) *International Investment Law: A Handbook* at 80-92; Salacuse *The Law of Investment Treaties* at 60-62.

¹⁶² See for example *Azurix* at 112 para 314; *Biwater Gauff* at para 453; *Emmis International Holding, B.V and Emmis Radio Operating, B.V and Mem Maygar Electronic Media Kereskedelmi Es Szolgaltato KFT. V Hungary* (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/2) Award of 16 April 2014 at para 163, 221; *White Industries Australia v The Republic of India* (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Final Award of 30 November 2011; *Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt* (ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3) Award 20 May 1992 para 164-165; *Vivendi* award of 2010 at para 7.5.4, 7.5.5 – 7.5.34; Schreuer C (2005) “The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties” at para 65 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

¹⁶³ *Desert Line Projects* at para 157. This principle is in line with Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

were based on consent to ISDS provided in investment contracts.¹⁶⁴ It is also noteworthy that the arbitral award of USD 935 million made in *Al-Khafira v Libya* was based on breach of contract.¹⁶⁵

However, unlike with breach of treaty, breach of an investment contract by a state does not automatically amount to an internationally wrongful act.¹⁶⁶ Something additional is required to elevate breach of contract to the international plane, as explained below. An investor faced with a breach of a contract by a host state must first exhaust local remedies, if any are provided for in a contract or the internal law of the host state.¹⁶⁷ Only if the alleged breach of contract is followed by the denial of justice in the host state, if the breach of contract amounts to breach of a treaty, if the contract is protected by an umbrella clause in a treaty,¹⁶⁸ or if a state acted in its *jus imperii* capacity when it

¹⁶⁴ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload Statistics”, Issue 2017-2 at 10
[https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018).

¹⁶⁵ *Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi and Sons Co. Kuwaiti Company v The Government of The State of Libya and Others* (PCA Case No. 2011-09) Award on Merits of 2 March 2015. An earlier decision of 2004 that was also based on breach of contract by a state is *Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v Slovak Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4) Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 24 May 1999 (CSOB).

¹⁶⁶ *Abaclat and Others (Case Formerly known as Giovanna A Beccara And Others) v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/05) Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 4 August 2011 para 316; *Biwater Gauff* at para 457; *SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines* (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6) Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004 at para 161; United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 41 para 6 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹⁶⁷ The decision in *Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) Decision on Annulment of 10 August 2010 at para 96 entails that a dispute regarding breach of contract must first be resolved according to the internal law of the host state.

¹⁶⁸ An umbrella clause is a treaty provision in terms whereof state parties agree to honour their contractual obligations towards investors, default of which renders breach of a contract to be breach of treaty. For a definition, history and application of an umbrella clause see Sinclair AC “The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection” in Reinisch (ed) *Classics in International Investment Law* Vol I

committed the breach,¹⁶⁹ will the breach create an international responsibility for a host state.¹⁷⁰ In such an event, ICSID or other international arbitration, or other remedies such as diplomatic protection can in qualifying instances be brought.¹⁷¹

The same facts that found an alleged breach of contract may also found a claim for breach of a treaty.¹⁷² Whether breach of a contract also amounts to a breach of treaty or not depends on the facts of each case. As the tribunal in *Vivendi v Argentine* held, a state may commit a breach of the treaty without breaching a contract, and *vice versa*.¹⁷³ The fact that an alleged breach is the result of a state having exercised a contractual right or remedy does not exclude the fact that such conduct could be a breach of a treaty or an expropriation.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, where as a result of an alleged breach an investor

(Edward Elgar Cheltenham 2014) at 619-642; Salacuse *The Law of Investment Treaties* at 271-283. The first umbrella clause was contained in the Germany-Pakistan BIT of 1959 (Sinclair “The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection” at 641). The first tribunal to consider an umbrella clause was *Fedax N.V. v The Republic of Venezuela* (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3) Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 July 1997.

¹⁶⁹ Schreuer “The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties” at 24 para 65-77 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

¹⁷⁰ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA Commentary at 41(6) <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017). For examples of denial of justice see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (United Nations New York and Geneva 2012) at 80-81 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017). In the SADC context see *Mike Campbell* at 26-41. In *Biwater Gauff* the tribunal held that denial of justice need not be proved before the breach of contract can amount to expropriation. The tribunal said that it must first be determined whether a state acted as an ordinary party to a contract, or whether it used its powers as a sovereign (at para 458).

¹⁷¹ Booyesen H *Principles of International Trade Law As A Monistic System* 1st ed Revised Reprint (Interlegal Monument Park South Africa 2007) at 506.

¹⁷² *Bandiyir* at para 148.

¹⁷³ *Vivendi* (Decision on Annulment) at para 95-96.

¹⁷⁴ *Bandiyir* at para 157. In this case Pakistan terminated the contract in question, and used

has a right of recourse against a host state in terms of both a treaty and a contract, it may pursue its rights in terms of the treaty, in addition to those in terms of a contract.¹⁷⁵ Even when an investor has elected to pursue its remedies in terms of a contract, it still has the right to pursue those in terms of the treaty, and can abandon the former.¹⁷⁶ Where it is alleged that breach of a contract is also a breach of a treaty, it must be shown that the host state concerned acted as a sovereign (*'puissance publique'*), and not as an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, when it committed the alleged act.¹⁷⁷

Breach of contract entails that a host state must pay compensation for the consequences thereof.¹⁷⁸ Breach refers to breach in the general sense of the failure, neglect or refusal by a host state to adhere to an agreement.

Whether or not a contract was breached is assessed in terms of the internal law of the relevant host state, not international law.¹⁷⁹ Thus where a contract was breached, and the breach amounts to a breach of an international obligation as discussed above, then

the military to force *Bandiyir* from the construction site, alleging that this was a termination of contract and not expropriation.

¹⁷⁵ *Bandiyir* at para 167.

¹⁷⁶ This is what the claimant did in *Bandiyir*, and the tribunal found that it was not an abuse of process (at para 171-173).

¹⁷⁷ *Azurix* at para 53; *Biwater Gauff* para 492, 494, 500 para 106; para 502; *Impregilo S.p.a v Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3) Decision on Jurisdiction of 22 April 2005, confirmed in *Bureau Veritas, Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, BIVAC B.V. v Republic of Paraguay* (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/9) Further Decision on Jurisdiction of 9 October 2012 at para 211, 241-242; *Mr Frank Charles Araf v Republic of Moldova* (ICSID case No. ARB/11/23) Award of 8 April 2013 at para 536; *Tulip Real Estate* at para 354-356; Schreuer "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties" para 66 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

¹⁷⁸ Booyesen *Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System* at 508.

¹⁷⁹ *Vivendi* (Decision on Annulment) at para 96.

the consequences of the breach will follow the rule of international law to the effect that reparation is payable.¹⁸⁰

2.2.5 Enactment of, and non-compliance with internal laws

Legislation is typically made by a legislature, or by decree of a minister, president or another member of the executive of a state.¹⁸¹ In this regard it must be noted that both the legislature and the executive are organs of state, and, therefore in terms of Article 4 of ARSIWA a state is responsible for the acts of these organs. As a result, almost ten percent of all ICSID arbitrations were opened on the basis of the consent provided in the laws of host states.¹⁸²

Whether the mere passing of legislation will amount to a breach of an international obligation or not, depends on the facts of a case. Thus, the mere passing of legislation without more, may not amount to a breach, while in some cases it may amount to a breach.¹⁸³ A few examples will suffice here. In *Santa Elena v Costa Rica* the tribunal found that Costa Rica incurred international responsibility by enacting a decree that expropriated the claimant's property without agreeable compensation.¹⁸⁴ In *Metalclad*

¹⁸⁰ See also United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Article 31 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹⁸¹ For a discussion of national legislation as a source of international investment law see Mbengue MM "National Legislation and Unilateral Acts of States" in Gazzini T and Brabandere E (eds) *International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations* at 183-213.

¹⁸² International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes "The ICSID Caseload Statistics", Issue 2017-2 at 10 [https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018). For a database of the investment laws of various states see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/InvestmentLaws> (Date of use: 1 April 2018).

¹⁸³ United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Commentary at 57 para 12 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017).

¹⁸⁴ *Compania del Desarrollo De Santa Elena S.A v Republic of Costa Rica* (ICSID Case No.

the tribunal found that a decree that declared a Metalclad waste disposal site to be an ecological site amounted to expropriation.¹⁸⁵ Recently, the tribunal in *Rusoro Mining Limited v The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela* found that Venezuela had breached the relevant BIT by enacting a law that restricted the sale of gold produced by Rusoro Mining.¹⁸⁶ In *Mike Campbell*, the SADC Tribunal found that the constitutional amendment by Zimbabwe that denied victims of farm expropriations compensation and access to local courts was a wrongful violation of Article 4 of the SADC Treaty.¹⁸⁷

A state can also incur international responsibility by failing to adhere to its laws. For example, in *Duke Energy v Ecuador* the tribunal held that Ecuador had failed to comply with its own laws as well as agreements between the parties, and by so doing it breached an umbrella clause contained in the relevant BIT in that matter.¹⁸⁸

2.2.6 Conclusion

It was shown above that the rules of state responsibility lay the foundation on which host states may be exposed to claims by investors. The result of the application of these rules is the high number of ISDS cases that are opened every year by investors, which at the time of writing were 855.¹⁸⁹ It is therefore no surprise that among others, SADC's repeal of the 2006 Annex 1 is meant to mitigate the international responsibility of Member States by reducing the exposure of host states to ISDS claims. How the 2016 Annex 1 achieves this is discussed in Chapter 3.

¹⁸⁵ ARB/96/1) Final Award of 17 July 2000 at para 68, 74.
Metalclad at para 109-110, 111-112.
¹⁸⁶ (ICSID Case (AF)/12/5) Award of 22 August 2016 at para 597.
¹⁸⁷ *Mike Campbell* at 40-41.
¹⁸⁸ *Duke Energy Electroquil Partners and Electroquil S.A v Republic of Ecuador* (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19) Award of 18 April 2008 at para 325.
¹⁸⁹ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS> (date of use: 8 June 2018).

However, the 2006 or 2016 Annex 1 are not the only bases on which investors can sue SADC Member States. BITs, TIPs, investment contracts and the laws of host states also provide access to ISDS. Hence in practice, major investors negotiate investment contracts that will ensure that they obtain the maximum level of security they can, while capital-exporting states negotiate BITs and TIPs so as to secure maximum protection for their nationals abroad. Without the rules of state responsibility discussed above, investors would have little protection in international law, and similarly, states would be less exposed to international responsibility.

2.3 EXPROPRIATION

2.3.1 Introduction

Expropriation is the mandatory taking of property by a state, ostensibly in the public interest.¹⁹⁰ Public international law does not create property rights that are capable of being expropriated.¹⁹¹ Therefore, property rights must first exist in terms of the internal law of a host state, before an inquiry can be made in terms of international law as to whether the property was expropriated or not.¹⁹² A person who alleges that its property was expropriated must show that the expropriated property vests in it, whether directly or indirectly.¹⁹³ In addition to the expropriation of individual assets, a state may take property in two other ways, namely, nationalisation or confiscation.¹⁹⁴ Nationalisation is the expropriation of an entire sector or an industry of an economy.¹⁹⁵ Confiscation is the

¹⁹⁰ Booyesen *Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System* at 72.

¹⁹¹ Booyesen *Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System* at 72; *Emmis* at para 162.

¹⁹² *Emmis* at para 162, 170.

¹⁹³ *Emmis* at para 168-169.

¹⁹⁴ Booyesen *Principles of International Trade Law As A Monistic System* at 72; Sornarajah *The International law on foreign investment* at 345.

¹⁹⁵ Sornarajah *The International law on foreign investment* at 346, 348.

taking of property by a ruler or head of state for his personal gain, although this may include the benefit of persons close to the ruler, such as senior military personnel.¹⁹⁶

Expropriation may be direct or indirect. Direct expropriation refers to the mandatory taking or seizure of property by a state, with the resultant loss of possession and title to the property.¹⁹⁷ This is the original form of expropriation.¹⁹⁸ Unlike direct expropriation, indirect expropriation is complex, as it is not always clear if indeed it has taken place. Indirect expropriation is discussed below.

2.3.2 Forms of indirect expropriation

When property is indirectly expropriated, it nominally remains in the hands of its owner, but the use, economic value or benefit thereof gets diminished or neutralised by virtue of the actions of a host state.¹⁹⁹ Despite the manner in which an indirect expropriation takes place, the effect of an indirect expropriation must be the same as that of a direct expropriation.²⁰⁰ It is not always easy to determine whether an indirect expropriation took

¹⁹⁶ Sornarajah *The International law on foreign investment* at 346.

¹⁹⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 6 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

¹⁹⁸ Sornarajah *The International law on foreign investment* 349; *Cargill* at para 372.

¹⁹⁹ For a discussion of indirect expropriation see Sornarajah *The International law on foreign investment* at 350; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation”, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (United Nations New York and Geneva 2012) at 7, 63

http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017); *Bernhard Von Pezold* at para 507; Dolzer R “Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property” in Reinisch (ed) *Classics in International Investment Law* Vol I at 389-413; Dolzer R and Bloch F “Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignment” 2003 (5) *International Law Forum Du Troit International* 155-165; Fortier LY and Drymer SL “Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I Know It When I see It, or *Caveat Investor*” in Reinisch (ed) *Classics in International Investment Law* Vol I at 414-448.

²⁰⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 63-64 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

place or not.²⁰¹ According to UNCTAD, the following must occur to confirm that an indirect expropriation took place:²⁰²

- (a) The expropriatory measure must have resulted in a total or near total destruction of the investment's economic value,²⁰³
- (b) An investor must have been deprived of the control over the investment e.g. by being deprived of management control, detention or deportation etc.,²⁰⁴ and

See also OECD "Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in International Investment Law", OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/04 (OECD Publishing 2004) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/780155872321> (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁰¹ Schreuer "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties" at 3 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

²⁰² See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Fair and Equitable Treatment", UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (New York and Geneva 2012) at 65 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017); *BG Group Plc. v The Argentine Republic* (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 24 December 2007 at 259-271; *LG&E Energy Corp* (Decision on Liability) at para 188; *CME* at para 603-604; *GAMI Investments Inc. v The Government of The United Mexican States* (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Final Award of 15 November 2004 para 123-126; *Telenor* at para 63-67; *Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16) Award of 28 September 2007 at para 284-285; *Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic of Lithuania* (ICSID case No. ARB/05/08) Award of 11 September 2007 at para 455; *Venezuela Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd. and Others v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela* (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27) Award of 9 October 2014 at para 286.

²⁰³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Fair and Equitable Treatment" at 65 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

See for example *Alpha Projektholding* at para 408-410; *AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Eromu KFT v The Republic of Hungary* (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22) Award of 23 September 2010 at para 14.3.2 - 14.3.3; *Cargill* at para 360; *Electrabel S.A v The Republic of Hungary* ICSID Case No. RB/07/19 (Decision on Jurisdiction) at para 6.53; *Glamis Gold Ltd v United States of America* (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 8 June 2009 at para 14-17; *Tecmed* at para 115-116.

²⁰⁴ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Fair and Equitable Treatment" at

(c) The effect of the expropriatory action or measure must be permanent.²⁰⁵

Indirect expropriation comes in various forms, such as creeping expropriation, breach of contract, and regulatory takings. These will now be briefly discussed.

Creeping expropriation has been described as:

...the incremental encroachment on one or more of the ownership rights of a foreign investor that eventually destroys (or nearly destroys) the value of his or her investment or deprives him or her of control over the investment.²⁰⁶
(Emphasis added).

As can be seen from the above definition, creeping expropriation is premised on the idea that property ownership consists of a bundle of rights relating to the use and enjoyment of property, and that the expropriatory act(s) of a state interfere with these rights.²⁰⁷ The fact that creeping expropriation takes place over a period of time, and not by means of a single act, makes it potentially difficult to identify the point in time or in the chain of

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http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017); *Biwater Gauff* at para 510.

²⁰⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 69

http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017); *Achmea B.V* at para 292-293; *Alpha Projektholding* at para 409-410; *Tecmed* at para 116.

²⁰⁶ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 11

http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017); *Biwater Gauff* at para 455; *Rousallis* at para 329.

²⁰⁷ Sornarajah *The International law on foreign investment* at 352; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 1
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

events at which expropriation took place.²⁰⁸ This makes creeping expropriation difficult to prove in practice.

Creeping expropriation has been codified into Article 15 of ARSIWA. In terms of this Article, a series of incidents can cumulatively amount to creeping expropriation.²⁰⁹ Hence the tribunal in *Biwater Gauff* found that a series of actions taken by Tanzania amounted to expropriation.²¹⁰ These actions were: the repudiation of the lease, the occupation of City Water's facilities, usurpation of management control and deportation of City Water's senior managers. The tribunal in *Walter Bau v Thailand* also affirmed previous tribunal decisions on creeping expropriation, as well as the application of Article 15 of ARSIWA to a series of actions.²¹¹

Where it is alleged that a host state has committed expropriation by breach of a contract, it must be borne in mind that not every breach of contract by a state amounts to expropriation.²¹² For breach of contract create international responsibility, a state must

²⁰⁸ Schreuer "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties" at para 34, 37 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017). For a discussion of the process by which indirect expropriation is distinguished from non-expropriatory regulatory measures see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Fair and Equitable Treatment" at 81-105 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017). One of the notable cases of creeping expropriation in SADC is *Biwater Gauff* (at para 501– 519).

²⁰⁹ See also *Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investment Centre and Government of Ghana* (UNCITRAL Ad hoc Tribunal) Award of 30 June 1990.

²¹⁰ *Walter Bau AG (In Liquidation) v The Kingdom of Thailand* (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 1 July 2009 at para 814(b).

²¹¹ *Walter Bau* at para 10.1-10.10; *Yukos Universal Limited* at para 1580; *Pater A. Allard v The Government of Barbados* (UNCITRAL) Award of 27 June 2016 at para 254.

²¹² United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Fair and Equitable Treatment" at 25 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017);

have acted as a sovereign in committing the breach.²¹³ Thus a mere refusal to pay a debt due in terms of a contract does not amount to expropriation.²¹⁴

Non-performance, including the late payment or failure to pay a debt under a contract, does not amount to expropriation.²¹⁵ Where an investment has as its basis a contract acquired after a successful tender process, and the tender and subsequent contract are declared invalid by a court after due process, such invalidation is not expropriation. Thus the tribunal in *Frank Charles Araf* found that the setting aside of a tender, as well as the the subsequent tender agreement between the state and the claimant by the courts, was not an expropriation of the claimant's rights by the courts.²¹⁶

A state's regulatory measures can amount to indirect expropriation, as discussed below. A state by virtue of its sovereign powers has the right to regulate all activities in its territory.²¹⁷ These regulatory powers are also known as public order or police powers.²¹⁸

²¹³ Salacuse *The Law of Investment Treaties* at 303.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Fair and Equitable Treatment" at 25
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017);
Salacuse *The Law of Investment Treaties* at 303.

²¹⁴ *SGS v Philippines (Decision on Jurisdiction)* at para 161.

²¹⁵ *Waste Management, Inc. v United Mexican States* (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3) Award of 30 April 2004 at para 174-175.

²¹⁶ *Frank Charles Araf* at para 415-417.

²¹⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" at 80-85
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf
(Date of use: 15 October 2017); UNCTAD "Investment Policy Framework For Sustainable Development" at 30 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 2017). For a discussion of the right to regulate in general see also Titi *The right to regulate in international investment law* 1st ed (Hart Publishing Oxford 2014).

²¹⁸ Schreuer "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties" at 28 para 78 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf
(Date of use: 20 October 2017). For a brief history of police powers see *Philip Morris Brand SARL, Philip Morris Products S.A, Abal Hermanos S.A v Oriental Republic of Uruguay* (ICSID Case No. ARB10/7) Award of 8 July 2016 at para 292-307.

Regulatory acts of general application are presumed to be valid because states are presumed to act in good faith until the contrary is proved.²¹⁹ The onus is on a state to show that a measure is in the public interest, is non-discriminatory, and was implemented according to due process.²²⁰

Thus the tribunal in *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* found that the expropriation in that matter was not a result of the state's bona fide use of its police powers.²²¹ In this case, the state of Georgia had in bad faith passed a decree that extinguished the exclusive rights that and investor, GTI held in an oil pipeline and related facilities.²²² No compensation was paid for the expropriation. The expropriated rights were then given to a Georgian state entity, which in turn licensed them to another private entity in return for a fee.²²³ The tribunal found that the issuing of the decrees was not bona fide regulation, but was a means to expropriate the claimant's rights.

In order to determine whether a regulatory act is expropriatory and, therefore, compensable, a distinction must first be drawn between regulatory acts which are expropriatory, in the sense that compensation must be paid for the acts, and those which are not.²²⁴

²¹⁹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" at 92 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²²⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" at 93 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²²¹ *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* at para 387.

²²² *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* at para 351.

²²³ *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* at para 356.

²²⁴ Salacuse *The Law of Investment treaties* at 307-318; Schreuer "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties" at 28 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

The criteria used to assess whether a regulatory measure is expropriatory or not are: lack of public purpose, discrimination, lack of due process, lack of proportionality, lack of fair and equitable treatment, abuse of rights and direct benefit to a state.²²⁵ These criteria must be taken together in making an assessment, considering the context in which the measure is adopted and applied.²²⁶

The tribunal in *Philip Morris Brand SARL* undertook a succinct review of the authorities on the issue, and affirmed that in order for a state's exercise of police powers not to amount to indirect expropriation, the measure must be *bona fide*, non-discriminatory and proportionate.²²⁷ It held that in order to amount to indirect expropriation, a state's regulatory measure must amount to a substantial deprivation of its value, use or enjoyment.²²⁸ The tribunal added that where sufficient value remains in an investment, there is no indirect expropriation.²²⁹ The tribunal concluded that the general rule with regard to police powers is that a state is not liable for any loss suffered by a person due to the *bona fide* and non-discriminatory use of such power.²³⁰

Scholars have proposed two methods that can be used to differentiate between expropriatory and non-expropriatory regulatory measures.²³¹ The first method considers

²²⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" at 94-104 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017); *EDF Services* at para 286; *Philip Morris Brand SARL* at para 292-392.

²²⁶ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" at 94-95 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²²⁷ *Philip Morris Brand SARL* at para 305-306.

²²⁸ *Philip Morris Brand SARL* at para 192.

²²⁹ *Philip Morris Brand SARL* at 286.

²³⁰ *Philip Morris Brand SARL* at para 292-392.

²³¹ For a discussion of these approaches see Salacuse *The Law of Investment treaties* at

the intention of a state in passing the regulatory measure. Measures in this category include those within the scope of police powers for which a state cannot be held accountable, despite the negative economic consequences of the measure. An example thereof is legislation that affects property by regulating aspects such as the planning, safety, health and environmental aspects of the property.²³²

The second method considers the effects of the regulatory measure (effects doctrine). For example, in *Metalclad*, the Mexican federal government had authorised Metalclad to establish a landfill in the municipality of Guadalcazar, but thereafter, the municipality refused to issue a permit for the construction of the landfill. The tribunal found that the actions of the municipality had the effect of expropriating Metalclad's right to operate the landfill.²³³ Schreuer and other scholars conclude that the majority of tribunal decisions analysed indicate that the effects doctrine is the dominant approach.²³⁴ This position was recently affirmed in *Philip Morris Brand SARL*.²³⁵ It is submitted that this is correct and in line with the rule that an indirect expropriation must have the same effect as a direct expropriation.²³⁶

316-318; Schreuer "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties" at 80-118 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

²³² United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" at 79 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²³³ *Metalclad* at para 103-107. For more examples see Schreuer "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties" at para 84-117 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

²³⁴ Schreuer "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties" at 81-83, 119 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

²³⁵ *Philip Morris Brand SARL* at para 192.

²³⁶ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" at 63 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

2.3.3 Requirements for expropriation

Expropriation is not in itself illegal because, under international law, states have a sovereign right to expropriate property, subject to meeting the requirements of public purpose, non-discrimination, compliance with due process and payment of compensation.²³⁷ Under international law, all four requirements for expropriation must be present, or else the expropriation will be unlawful. For example, the tribunals in *Ioannis Kardossopoulos*²³⁸ and *Bernhard Von Pezold*²³⁹ held that there was no need to consider the other requirements for expropriation, since the requirement for the payment of compensation was not met. The four requirements for expropriation will now be briefly discussed.

Firstly, an expropriation must have a public interest purpose or objective.²⁴⁰ The relevant time for the determination of whether the public purpose requirement was met or not is the time of the expropriation.²⁴¹ When an expropriation was not for a public purpose, but it subsequently achieved a public purpose, this requirement will not have been met.²⁴² It is immaterial whether the public purpose was subsequently met or not after the

²³⁷ See Article 2(2)(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, A/RES/39/163, (resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 17 December 1984) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00eff474.html> (Date of use: 15 October 2017); Salacuse *The Law of Investment treaties* at 320-328; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 2 para 1 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf

²³⁸ *Ioannis Kardossopoulos* at para 389-390.

²³⁹ *Bernhard Von Pezold* at para 498.

²⁴⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 29 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017); ADC at 78 para 429-433.

²⁴¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 31 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁴² United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 31 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

expropriation was effected, provided there was originally a *bona fide* public purpose.²⁴³ It is generally left to a state's discretion to decide whether an expropriation is for a public purpose or not. Once a state has decided that an expropriation is for a public purpose, its decision is respected, but there are cases where tribunals have held that this requirement was not met.²⁴⁴

In *Bernhard Von Pezold* the tribunal held that an expropriation without compensation in order to "right the wrongs" of a colonial past does not serve a public purpose.²⁴⁵ In *Valeri Belokon v Kyrgyzstan*, the tribunal found that the placement of the claimant's bank under administration, seizure of its assets and the placement of the bank under indefinite sequestration for four years did not serve a public purpose other than the narrow political interests of the government.²⁴⁶ In this case, the seizure was motivated by the bank's suspected connections to a previous regime.

The public purpose requirement is found in Annex 1,²⁴⁷ ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA),²⁴⁸ Investment Agreement for the COMESA investment

²⁴³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" at 31 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁴⁴ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" at 32-34 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁴⁵ *Bernhard Von Pezold* at para 502.

²⁴⁶ *Valeri Belokon v The Kyrgyz Republic* (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 24 October 2014 at para 215.

²⁴⁷ Article 5 2006 Annex 1; Article 5 2016 Annex 1.

²⁴⁸ Article 14(1) of the *ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement* (date of signature 26 02 2009, in force 24 02 2012) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3095> (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

Area (IACCIA),²⁴⁹ Energy Charter Treaty (ECT),²⁵⁰ and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).²⁵¹

The second requirement is that an expropriation must not be discriminatory. This requirement may be best presented by a quotation from *ADC* where the tribunal said that:

...in order for a discrimination to exist, particularly in an expropriation scenario, there must be different treatments to different parties. However and unfortunately, the Respondent misses the point because the comparison of different treatments is made here between that received by the Respondent-appointed operator and that received by foreign investors as a whole.²⁵²

International treaties such as the United Nations Charter,²⁵³ the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),²⁵⁴ the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

²⁴⁹ Article 20(1) of the *Investment Agreement for the COMESA investment Area* (date of signature 23 May 2007, not in force)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3225> (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁵⁰ Article 13(1)(a) *Energy Charter Treaty* 2080 UNTS 95 34 ILM 360 (1995) (date of signature 17 December 1994, in force 16 April 1998)

<http://www.ena.lt/pdfai/Treaty.pdf#search=%22energy%20charter%20treaty%22> (Date of use: 21 November 2017).

²⁵¹ Article 1110(1)(a) of the *North American Free Trade Agreement* 32 ILM 289, 605 (1993) (date of adoption 17 December 1992, in force 01 January 1994) http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?DetailID=78 (Date of use: 31 October 2017).

²⁵² *ADC Affiliate* at para 442.

²⁵³ *Charter of the United Nations* (date of signature 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 1(3) <https://treaties.un.org/doc/publications/ctc/uncharter.pdf> (Date of use: 31 October 2017).

²⁵⁴ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) (adopted 10 December 1948), Article 2 http://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf (Date of use: 21 October 2017).

(ICCPR),²⁵⁵ the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),²⁵⁶ the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter),²⁵⁷ the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),²⁵⁸ and the SADC Treaty²⁵⁹ prohibit discrimination in various forms. Where the discrimination is on racial grounds, the discrimination will be unlawful because it violates the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, among other conventions.²⁶⁰

A generalised way to state the requirement against discrimination is that an expropriation is discriminatory if the property in question was expropriated on the grounds that the owner of the expropriated property had certain characteristics (e.g. nationality, race, gender, religion etc.) on the basis of which they were targeted by the host state. An important criterion here is that the person must have been treated differently compared to others, based on some discriminatory criteria. Recently, the

²⁵⁵ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16), UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171 (date of signature 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976)

<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf> (Date of use: 31 October 2017).

²⁵⁶ *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3 (date of signature 19 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976)

<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf> (Date of use: 31 October 2017).

²⁵⁷ Article 2 *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* (date of signature 01 June 1981, in force 21 October 1986) <https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights> (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁵⁸ *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, Article 14 (date of signature 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953)

http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (Date of use: 21 October 2017).

²⁵⁹ Article 6(2) SADC Treaty.

²⁶⁰ *Mike Campbell* at 47. The convention is the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination*, 21 December 1965, UNTS vol. 660, p. 195 (date of signature 21 December 1965, in force 4 January 1969) <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3940.html> (Date of use: 21 October 2017).

tribunal in *Bernhard Von Pezold* found that the claimants' investments were targeted for expropriation because of their skin colour.²⁶¹

There are conflicting views as to whether the targeting of persons on the grounds that they are foreigners *per se* amounts to discrimination.²⁶² One view is that there will be discrimination if foreigners are targeted on the basis of their nationality, not just because they are foreigners.²⁶³ However, a contrary view was adopted in *Eureko* where the tribunal found that the measures adopted by Poland in that matter were intended to prevent a consortium led by a foreigner from having control of the company in question.²⁶⁴ It submitted that the correct view is that discrimination against foreigners of any nationality is unlawful because discrimination against foreigners is discrimination nonetheless. UNCTAD describes non-discrimination against foreign investors as follows:

The non-discrimination requirement implies the diffusiveness of the impact on different actors and constituencies and serves to prevent singling out or targeting a foreign investor. It primarily concerns nationality-based differentiation but it also seems to cover racial, religious, ethnic and other types of discrimination prohibited under customary international law. It appears that a non-discriminatory regulation that is enforced in a discriminatory manner will also fit the description. Where a formally non-discriminatory regulation is designed in a way that it only

²⁶¹ *Bernhard Von Pezold* at para 501.

²⁶² United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf at 34 (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁶³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf at 34 (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁶⁴ *Eureko* Partial Award of August 2005 at para 242.

covers certain foreign investor or investors, other indicators need to be examined to decide whether the measure is bona fide.²⁶⁵

The requirement of non-discrimination is found in the ACIA,²⁶⁶ ACCIA,²⁶⁷ Annex 1,²⁶⁸ ECT,²⁶⁹ NAFTA,²⁷⁰ and the SADC Treaty.²⁷¹

Thirdly, an expropriation must be in terms of due process.²⁷² The tribunal in *ADC Affiliate* held that in the context of an expropriation, due process demands an actual and substantive legal procedure for a foreign investor to raise its claims against the depriving actions already taken or about to be taken against it.²⁷³ Due process in relation to expropriation entails three things: the expropriation must be in terms of internal procedures provided for that purpose e.g. in terms of a law providing for such expropriation; a person affected by the expropriation must have access to proceedings for review of the expropriation before an impartial forum, either in terms of its legality, compensation or other aspects, and the expropriation must not be arbitrary.²⁷⁴

²⁶⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf at 96 (Date of use: 15 October 2017); *Mike Campbell* at 41-54.

²⁶⁶ Article 14(1) ACIA.

²⁶⁷ Article 20(1) IACCIA.

²⁶⁸ Article 5 2006 Annex 1; Article 5 2016 Annex 1.

²⁶⁹ Article 13(1)(b) ECT.

²⁷⁰ Article 1110(1)(b) NAFTA.

²⁷¹ Article 6(2) SADC Treaty.

²⁷² See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf at 36-40 (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁷³ *ADC Affiliate* at para 435.

²⁷⁴ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf at 36 (Date of use: 15 October 2017); *ADC Affiliate* at para 434, 440; *Ioannis and Fuchs* at para 408.

The tribunal in *Rusoro* held that a party who does not utilise due process provisions that are provided by the internal law of a state cannot later complain that it was denied due process.²⁷⁵ While it is submitted that this is correct, it must be noted that due process in the form of local remedies need not be followed if doing so would be futile,²⁷⁶ a respondent state systematically ignores the judgments of its courts,²⁷⁷ there are no effective remedies,²⁷⁸ the respondent state has waived the requirement,²⁷⁹ there is undue delay caused by the respondent state,²⁸⁰ or the injured person is manifestly precluded from exhausting local remedies.²⁸¹

The due process requirement is found in Annex 1,²⁸² ACIA,²⁸³ IACCIA,²⁸⁴ ECT,²⁸⁵ and NAFTA.²⁸⁶

²⁷⁵ *ADC Affiliate* at 386-393.

²⁷⁶ See Ngobeni L “*Barcelona Traction and Nottebohm Revisited: Nationality as a Requirement for Diplomatic Protection of Shareholders in South African Law*” 2012 (37) South African Yearbook of International Law 169-186 at note 23.

²⁷⁷ Ngobeni 2012 (37) South African Yearbook of International Law 169 at note 23.

²⁷⁸ See Article 15(a) United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection”, in Report of the International Law Commission Fifty-eighth session (1 May-9 June and 3 July-11 August 2006) at p.13 para 34, General Assembly Official Records Sixty-first Session Supplement No. 10 (A/61/10) http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017); *Mike Campbell* at 21.

²⁷⁹ United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” Article 15(e) http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

²⁸⁰ United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” Article 15(b) http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

²⁸¹ United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” Article 15(d) http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

²⁸² Article 5 2006 Annex 1; Article 5 2016 Annex 1.

²⁸³ Article 14(1) 2006 Annex 1.

²⁸⁴ Article 20(1) IACCIA.

²⁸⁵ Article 13(1)(c) ECT.

²⁸⁶ Article 1110(1)(c) NAFTA.

Finally, compensation must be paid for an expropriation.²⁸⁷ There is no universally agreed standard for compensation for expropriation in international law. In practice, BITs, TIPs, investment contracts and laws provide the quantum of compensation that will be payable in the event of expropriation.²⁸⁸ In international law, compensation can be either for the capital value of property, for loss of profits there from, or both.²⁸⁹ The determination of compensation involves choosing a compensation standard and a method to be used to quantify the compensation.²⁹⁰ On the latter, Chinen describes the methods used to assess the loss of capital value as follows:

The loss to capital is often assessed by its fair market value and the fair market value itself is assessed according to the nature of the asset involved. The task is relatively straightforward if there are comparable assets on the open market; it becomes more complicated if a business is privately held. With regard to businesses, the attempt is to value the company's assets and to allow for good will and profitability as appropriate. Another method for evaluating capital loss is net book value, the difference between the company's assets and liabilities as

²⁸⁷ See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 40-52 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁸⁸ In SADC, Article 5 2006 Annex 1, Article 5 2016 Annex 1, as well as the laws of Member States, provide for the quantum of compensation (see Chapter 4 below).

²⁸⁹ United Nations (International Law Commission) “ARSIWA” Commentary at 103-105 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); Chinen M “The Standard of Compensation for Takings” 2016 (25) (2) *Minnesota Journal of International Law* 335-380 at 372, 378-379.

²⁹⁰ For a discussion of the valuation of compensation see Chinen 2016 (25) (2) *Minnesota Journal of International Law* 335-380 at 337, 357; Marboe I “Compensation and Damages in International Law: The Limits of ‘Fair Market Value’” in Reinisch (ed) *Classics in International Investment Law* Volume II at 24-60; Simmons JB “Valuation in Investor-State Arbitration: Toward A More Exact Science” 2012 (30) *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 196-250.

they appear on its books. If the business is not a going concern, sometimes "dissolution" value is used. This is the value of the assets if the company is broken up and the assets are sold separately.²⁹¹

On the other hand, lost profits are usually paid if a business is not destroyed, while both loss of capital and profits are payable if an expropriated business was impaired for a significant period, and then subsequently destroyed.²⁹²

Three compensation standards have been selected for discussion due to their prevalence in SADC Member States' investment laws. These are full compensation, appropriate compensation, and just and equitable compensation. These standards reflect a clash of interests between investors and host states, since investors would typically ask for full compensation in all situations, while host states would prefer to pay less compensation.²⁹³ The standards will now be briefly considered.

The prompt, adequate and effective compensation standard was introduced by former United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 1938, hence it is known as the Hull formula or the "full compensation standard".²⁹⁴ This standard was inherited from the early American treaties.²⁹⁵ It is associated with Article 34 of ARSIWA and the *Factory at*

²⁹¹ Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 372.

²⁹² Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 373.

²⁹³ Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 369.

²⁹⁴ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development "Expropriation" at 40 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

²⁹⁵ For example, between 1946 and 1966, the USA entered into at least 20 FCN treaties. See Vandenvelde 2005 (12) University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 157 at 162,172.

Chorzow case.²⁹⁶ In terms of this standard, “prompt” means that the compensation must be paid immediately or provision for the payment must have been made when the expropriation takes place. In short, there must not be a delay in making the payment.²⁹⁷ “Adequate” means that an investor is paid the full value of his investment,²⁹⁸ or that the compensation has a “reasonable relationship with the market value of the property.”²⁹⁹ “Effective compensation” means that the payment must be in useful currency, typically in a form that is capable of being expatriated.³⁰⁰ For example, in *Rusoro*, the tribunal agreed with the claimant that the compensation which Venezuela was ordered to pay, be declared to be net of taxes in order to prevent Venezuela from withholding the compensation on the basis that tax was due on it, thus defeating the effective nature thereof.³⁰¹ Dugard is of the view that this standard is no longer accepted by international law.³⁰²

²⁹⁶ Chinen 2016 (25) (2) *Minnesota Journal of International Law* 335 at 338.

²⁹⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 41 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017); Dolzer and Schreuer *Principles of International Investment Law* at 101.

²⁹⁸ Comeaux PE and Kinsella NS *Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law* (Oceana Publications New York 1997) at 82.

²⁹⁹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 40 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017); Dolzer and Schreuer *Principles of International Investment Law* at 296.

³⁰⁰ Comeaux and Kinsella *Protecting Foreign Investment Under International Law* at 82; Dolzer and Schreuer *Principles of International Investment Law* at 101.

³⁰¹ *Rusoro* at para 855.

³⁰² Dugard *International Law: A South African Perspective* at 305. Sornarajah *The International law on foreign investment* at 435-488. However, Sornarajah says that full compensation is payable for illegal expropriations i.e. those in violation of a treaty (at 482), and when a small business is expropriated (at 482). He says that only partial compensation need be paid in the event of large scale nationalizations (at 484), as well as “where past practices of the foreign investor were harmful to the host state”, or “where there had been inordinate profits made from the investment” (at 485).

Furthermore, Vandenvelde says that the United States of America deliberately flooded the BITs landscape with BITs that contain the full compensation standard, in order to create the impression that the standard was a norm of customary international law.³⁰³ Chinen observes that this standard may prevent states from engaging in economic reform.³⁰⁴

In SADC, eight Member States provide for full compensation in their investment laws.³⁰⁵ The 2006 Annex 1 also provides for full compensation, while the 2016 Annex 1 provides for a fair and adequate compensation.³⁰⁶ The ECT also provides for “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation.³⁰⁷ NAFTA provides for “fair market value”, which is close to full compensation.³⁰⁸

Article 4 of the General Assembly Resolution 1803 of 1962 introduced the appropriate compensation standard.³⁰⁹ This standard was then incorporated in Article 2(c) of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Appropriate compensation, unlike full

³⁰³ Vandenvelde 2005 (12) University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 157 at 171.

³⁰⁴ Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 339.

³⁰⁵ These are Botswana (“adequate and prompt”), Lesotho (“full”), Mauritius (“adequate”), Seychelles (“full”), Eswatini (“adequate and fair”), Tanzania (“prompt, fair and adequate”), Zambia (“market value”) and Zimbabwe (“fair and adequate”). Of the remaining states, 5 apply the just or fair standard, namely Angola (“just”), DRC (“fair and equitable”), Mozambique (“fair”), Namibia (“prompt and just”), and South Africa (just and equitable”). Only Malawi uses the “appropriate” compensation standard. For the purpose of this classification, investment codes include the constitution of a state to the extent that it deals with expropriation.

³⁰⁶ Article 5 2006 Annex 1; Article 5 2016 Annex 1.

³⁰⁷ Article 13(1)(d) ECT.

³⁰⁸ Article 1110(2) NAFTA.

³⁰⁹ United Nations (General Assembly) “Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 1803(XVII) of 1962
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/resources.pdf> (Date of use: 20 November 2016); Chinen 2016 (25) (2) Minnesota Journal of International Law 335 at 339.

compensation, is not prescriptive.³¹⁰ Instead, it allows for flexibility in deciding what would be fair compensation to an investor.³¹¹ It ranges in scope from payment of full compensation to no compensation at all.³¹² It appears that in the SADC region, the appropriate standard of compensation is applied in the investment code of Malawi.³¹³

The just and equitable standard of compensation provides room for the balancing of public and private interests.³¹⁴ Therefore, the amount of compensation will depend on the outcome of the considerations taken into account in each particular case. This standard is used in the investment codes of five SADC member states, namely Angola, DRC, Mozambique, Namibia and South Africa.³¹⁵

2.3.4 The consequences of an unlawful expropriation

The distinction between lawful and unlawful expropriation necessitates that there must be different consequences for a state as to whether it expropriates property lawfully or not. Otherwise, the distinction does not serve a purpose.³¹⁶ Therefore, if an expropriation

³¹⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 41 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

³¹¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 41 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

³¹² Sornarajah *The International law on foreign investment* at 480; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 41 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

³¹³ See Table 1 in Chapter 4 below.

³¹⁴ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 41 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

³¹⁵ Table 1 in Chapter 4 below.

³¹⁶ Chinen 2016 (25) (2) *Minnesota Journal of International Law* 335 at 367-370; *Tidewater* at para 132.

is lawful, compensation ought to be due by the state, while reparation, as anticipated by Article 31 of ARSIWA, ought to be due if an expropriation is illegal.³¹⁷

There are at least four main differences between the consequences of a lawful and an unlawful expropriation, as explained briefly below.

Firstly, in an unlawful expropriation, the value of the property taken is assessed as at the date of the award, rather than the date of taking.³¹⁸ Furthermore, in the event of an unlawful expropriation, a claimant has a choice of claiming damages as at the date of expropriation or date of the award.³¹⁹ The shift in the date of valuation to the date of award entails that a state is liable for the increase in value during the intervening period.³²⁰ Secondly, a state is liable for consequential damages arising from an unlawful expropriation.³²¹ Thirdly, in the event of an unlawful expropriation, a state's first duty is to undertake restitution, an obligation that does not apply to a lawful expropriation.³²² Finally, an expropriating state must make restitution, or if this is not possible, it must pay reparation that must place an investor in the position it should be, but for the expropriation.³²³ If an investor has contributed to its loss, such will be taken into consideration in assessing the damages due to the investor.³²⁴

³¹⁷ Marboe I "Compensation and Damages in International Law: The Limits of 'fair Market Value'" in Reinisch (ed) *Classics in International Investment Law* Volume II at 26-27.

³¹⁸ Dolzer and Schreuer *Principles of International Investment Law* at 296; *ADC Affiliate* at para 497; *ConocoPhillips* at para 343.

³¹⁹ *Hulley Enterprises Limited* at para 1763, 1769, 1826; *Yukos Universal Limited* at para 1763, 1769; *Veteran Petroleum Limited* at para 1763, 1769.

³²⁰ Dolzer and Schreuer *Principles of International Investment Law* at 296; *Hulley Enterprises* at para 1767.

³²¹ Dolzer and Schreuer *Principles of International Investment Law* at 295; *Occidental* at para 792-798.

³²² *Hulley Enterprises Limited* at para 1766; *Yukos Universal Limited* at para 1766; *Veteran Petroleum Limited* at para 1766.

³²³ *Factory at Chorzow (Merits)*, Judgment No. 13, 1928, at 47.

ISDS tribunals differ as to whether compensation in terms of a treaty standard of compensation or reparation in terms of Article 31 ARSIWA is payable for an unlawful expropriation. One group of decisions is of the view that compensation in terms of a treaty compensation standard is payable. This group includes *Wena Hotels*,³²⁵ *Middle East Cement*,³²⁶ and *Occidental*,³²⁷ and *Guaracachi America Inc and Rurelec Plc. v Bolivia*.³²⁸ Another group adopts the position that reparation, as contemplated by Article 31 of ARSIWA, is payable in the event of an unlawful expropriation. This group includes *Anatolie Stati and Others v Kazakhstan*,³²⁹ *ADC Affiliate*,³³⁰ *CME*,³³¹ *Gemplus*,³³² *Hulley Enterprises Limited*,³³³ *Metalclad*,³³⁴ *Veteran Petroleum Limited*,³³⁵ *Ioannis Kardassopoulos*,³³⁶ *ConocoPhillips*,³³⁷ and *Yukos Universal Limited*.³³⁸ These decisions are based on the view that an unlawful expropriation is an internationally wrongful act,

See also Dolzer and Schreuer *Principles of International Investment Law* at 100, 294-295.

³²⁴ *MTD* at para 242; *Hulley Enterprises Limited* at para 1637; *Veteran Petroleum Limited* at para 1637; *Yukos Universal Limited* at para 1637; Dolzer and Schreuer *Principles of International Investment Law* at 295.

³²⁵ *Wena Hotels* at para 95, 118.

³²⁶ *Middle East Cement* at para 144.

³²⁷ *Occidental* at para 790-798.

³²⁸ *Guaracachi Inc and Rurelec Plc. v The Plurinational State of Bolivia* (PCA case No. 2011-17) Award of 31 January 2014 at para 441-444.

³²⁹ *Anatolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group S.A, Terra Raf Trans Trading Ltd. v The Republic of Kazakhstan* (SCC Arbitration V (116/2010)) Award of 19 December 2013 at para 1527. The award and its enforcement continue to be contested, see <https://www.italaw.com/cases/2358> (Date of use: 11 June 2018).

³³⁰ *ADC Affiliate* at para 476, 480-485.

³³¹ *CME* Partial Award at para 609, 615-618, Final award at 501.

³³² *Gemplus* at para 7-76, 7-77, 8-27, 12-51, 12-52, 12-53.

³³³ *Hulley Enterprises Limited* at 1585, 1765-1769.

³³⁴ *Metalclad* at para 107, 109, 118, 122.

³³⁵ *Veteran Petroleum Limited* at para 1585; 1765-1769.

³³⁶ *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* at para 387, 501-517.

³³⁷ *ConocoPhillips* at para 342.

³³⁸ *Yukos Universal Limited* at para 1585-1591, 1765-1769.

which attracts reparation as a consequence. It is submitted that the latter decisions are correct and reflect the position in international law as stated in Article 31 of ARSIWA.

With regard to the non-payment of compensation, tribunals disagree as to whether an expropriation that lacks compensation only is legal or not. One view is to the effect that such an expropriation is legal, since all that remains is for compensation to be agreed between the parties or to be determined by a tribunal and thereafter be paid.³³⁹ Another view is to the effect that failure to pay compensation is a breach of customary international law,³⁴⁰ a factor that renders the expropriation illegal.³⁴¹ The correct position ought to be that, in line with the view expressed above that all four requirements of an expropriation must be met, an expropriation that lacks compensation or any one requirement is unlawful under international law.

2.3.5 Conclusion

Expropriation will always be a controversial measure, given among others its threat to the regulatory powers of host states, its effect on investments and investors, complications regarding the quantification of compensation, and the difficulty of proving indirect expropriation. In SADC, the laws that will apply in the event of expropriation are those that are provided in Annex 1 and the laws of host states. These are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 below.

³³⁹ *Tidewater Investment SRL and Tidewater Cabire, CA v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela* ICSID (Case No. ARB/10/5) Award of 13 March 2015 at para 136-141.

³⁴⁰ *Santa Elena* at para 68.

³⁴¹ *Tidewater* at para 136; *Gemplus* at para 12-59.

2.4 THE MEANING OF AN INVESTMENT IN ISDS

2.4.1 Introduction

The definition of an investment is central to investor-state disputes, because an investment must exist in order for an arbitral tribunal or court of law to have jurisdiction *ratione materiae*.³⁴² Locally, this point was recently driven home in the long-running case

³⁴² See Schreuer C *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary Second Edition* (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2009) at 114 para 113. For ISDS cases relating to jurisdiction *ratione materiae* see *Al-Kharafi; Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S Baltoil v Republic of Estonia* (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2) Award of 25 June 2001; *Generation Ukraine Inc. v Ukraine* (ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9) Award of 16 September 2003; *H&H Enterprises Investments Inc. v Arab Republic of Egypt* (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15) Decision on Jurisdiction of 5 June 2012; *Jan De Nul* (Jurisdiction, Award); *Nordzucker AG v The Republic of Poland* (Ad hoc Tribunal) Partial Award of 10 December 2008; *Joy Mining v Arab Republic of Egypt* ((ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11) Award on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2004; *Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (Canada) v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela* (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/11/1) Excerpts of Award of 30 April 2014; *Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Islamic Republic of Pakistan* (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13) Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of 6 August 2003; *Société Generale In respect of DR Energy Holdings Limited and Empresa Distribuidora de Electricidad del Este, S. A. v The Dominican Republic* (UNCITRAL Arbitration, LCIA Case No. UN 7927) Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction of 19 September 2008; *Standard Chartered Bank v United Republic of Tanzania* (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/12) Award of 2 November 2012; *Wena Hotels; First Arbitration Proceeding and First Annulment Proceeding Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) Award of 21 November 2000 and Decision on Annulment of 3 July 2002; *Second Arbitration Proceeding Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) Award of 20 August 2007 and Decision on Annulment of 10 August 2010. Decisions which followed *Vivendi* on contracts and treaties are *Aguas del Tunari S.A v The Republic of Bolivia* (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3) Decision on Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction of 21 October 2005; *AWG Group Ltd. v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19) Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2006; *Azurix; Camuzzi International S.A v the Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/2) Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 May 2005; *CMS Gas Transmission Company; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LLP v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB01/3) Decision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) of 2 August 2004; *Eureko; Helnan; IBM World Trade Corporation v Republic of Ecuador* (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/10) Decision on Jurisdiction of 22 December 2003; *Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16) Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 May 2005; *Siemens AG v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8) Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2004.

of *Kingdom of Lesotho v Swissbrough Diamond Mines*³⁴³ where the Singapore High Court annulled the arbitral decision on jurisdiction, on the grounds that the claimants did not have a qualifying investment under the 2006 Annex 1.³⁴⁴ Hence in ICSID arbitration, the requirement for jurisdiction *ratione materiae* is that there must be a legal dispute,³⁴⁵ which must arise directly out of an investment.³⁴⁶ The same applies in non-ICSID arbitration, the only difference being the method applied to determine the existence of an investment, as shown below.

³⁴³ Singapore High Court (2017) SGHC 195, Originating Summons 492 of 2016, Decision on Annulment of 14 August 2017.

³⁴⁴ At para 194-228, 237-252.

³⁴⁵ A full discussion of this requirement is beyond the scope of this study. For further information see Dolzer R and Schreuer C *Principles of International Investment Law* at 245-246; Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at para 41-82 – 76-82; *Abaclat* at para 254-256, 301-331; *AES Corporation* at para 43- 47; *Alpha Projektholding* at para 250-253; *Azurix* at para 58-66; *Daimler Financial Services AG v Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/1) Award of 22 August 2012 at para 62-64; *El Paso Energy International Company v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15) Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 April 2006 at para 60-65; *Fedax* at para 15; *Jan de Nul* (Jurisdiction) at para 74; *Lao Holdings N.V. v Lao People's Democratic Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/12/6) Decision on Jurisdiction of 21 February 2014 at para 120-121; *Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case* 1924 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 2, at 11-12; *M.C.I. Power Group, L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v Republic of Ecuador* (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6) Award of 31 July 2007 at para 63; *Noble Energy Inc. and Machala Power Cía. Ltd. v Republic of Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de Electricidad* (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/12) Decision on Jurisdiction of 5 March 2008 at para 123; *Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines* (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6) Order of the Tribunal on Further Proceedings of 17 December 2007 at para 19; *Teinver S.A., Transportes de Cercanías S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1) Decision on Jurisdiction of 21 December 2012 at para 117-125; *Tokios Tokelés v Ukraine* (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18) Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 April 2004 at para 15.

³⁴⁶ A full discussion of this requirement is beyond the scope of this study. For further information see *Abaclat*; *AES. Alpha Projektholding*; *Camuzzi*; *CMS Gas Transmission*; *CSOB*; *Enron*; *Fedax*; *LG&E*; *SAIPEM*; *Suez, Barcelona and Interagua*; *Tokios Tokeles*.

At present, the definition of an investment depends on the arbitration rules and laws that will apply to the dispute. Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention places an investment at the center of jurisdiction *ratione materiae* when it states that:

The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State...³⁴⁷ (Emphasis added).

Unlike with ISDS in terms of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the process of defining an investment in ICSID arbitration is complicated, because a tribunal must conduct a two-step, “double barrelled”, or “double keyhole” process in order to determine if there is an investment in terms of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.³⁴⁸ The first step determines if a transaction, project, business etc. is an investment in terms of a treaty, law or contract on which an investor relies to commence arbitration.³⁴⁹ If the transaction, project, business etc. qualifies as an investment at this stage, then the tribunal moves to

³⁴⁷ See also Fellenbaum J “GEA v Ukraine and the Battle for Treaty Interpretation Principles over the Salini Test” 2011 (27) *Journal of Arbitration International* 249-266; Grabowski A “The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defence of Salini” 2014 (15) (1) *Chicago Journal of International Law Article* 13 <http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol15/iss1/13> (Date of use: 20 October 2017); Schreuer (2009) *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 71-347; Timmer LJE “The Meaning of Investment as a Requirement for Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae of the ICSID Centre” 2012 (29) *International Arbitration* 363-373.

³⁴⁸ See Schreuer (2009) *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 117-118.

³⁴⁹ *Alpha Projektholding* at para 254; *Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A and Others (Case Formerly known as Giordano Alpi and Others) v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9) Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 8 February 2013 at para 435; *Malaysian Historical Salvors Sdn, BHD v The Government of Malaysia* (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10) Award on Jurisdiction of 17 May 2007 at para 55; *Millicom International Operations B.V. and Sentel GSM Claimants v The Republic of Senegal* (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/20) Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 July 2010 at para 76-78.

the second stage. At this stage, an assessment is made as to whether the transaction, project, business etc. is an investment in terms of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.³⁵⁰

However, in UNCITRAL and other non-ICSID arbitration, a tribunal need only assess whether a transaction, project, business etc. is an investment in terms of the applicable treaty, law or contract etc. This is because non-ICSID tribunals do not use a two-stage process like that applied in ICSID arbitration.

There are three other factors that make the determination of whether an investment exists in terms of Article 25(1) difficult in practice. The first is that the drafters of the ICSID Convention deliberately abstained from defining what an investment is.³⁵¹ Therefore, the ICSID Convention is of no use in this regard. Secondly, ICSID arbitral tribunals do not agree on what an investment is. This is further complicated by the fact that the doctrine of judicial precedent does not apply in ISDS, with the result that no tribunal can make a final ruling on the matter.³⁵² Thirdly, it is not settled whether an ICSID arbitral tribunal is bound by the definition of an investment provided for in a treaty. There are at least three views on this issue. One view is to the effect that an ICSID tribunal is not limited or bound by the definition of an investment contained in a treaty.

³⁵⁰ *Salini* at para 44; *Alpha Projektholding* at para 254, 264, 303, 309-310, 332.

³⁵¹ See for example *Philip Morris Brand SARL* at para 197-198; *Alpha Projektholding* at para 311; *Ambiente* at para 439; *Frank Charles Araf* at para 362; *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* at para 116; *Inmaris Perestroika Sailing Maritime Services GMBH v Ukraine* ICSID Case No. ARB/08/8 (Decision on jurisdiction) of 8 March 2010 at para 128; *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at para 56.

³⁵² See for example *Burlington Resources Inc v Republic of Ecuador* (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5) Decision on Jurisdiction of 2 June 2010 at para 100; *Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LLP v The Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB01/3) Decision on Jurisdiction (Ancillary Claim) of 2 August 200 at para 25, 170-171; *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at para 56; *Romak S.A (Switzerland) v Republic of Uzbekistan* (PCA Case No. AA280) Award of 26 November 2009 at para 171.

Joy Mining,³⁵³ *Fedax*,³⁵⁴ *Alex Genin*,³⁵⁵ *Helnan*,³⁵⁶ *Ioannis Kardassopoulos*,³⁵⁷ *Patrick Mitchell*,³⁵⁸ *RFCC*³⁵⁹ and *Salini*³⁶⁰ support this view. The second view is to the effect that the definition of an investment in a treaty is authoritative. This view is supported by *Alpha Projektholding*,³⁶¹ *Inmaris*,³⁶² *M.C.I Power*,³⁶³ *Parkerings*,³⁶⁴ *SGS v Paraguay*.³⁶⁵ A third, flexible view emanates from *Ambiente*. In this case, the tribunal suggested that the term “investment” is to be given a broad meaning.³⁶⁶

The characteristics of an investment as applied in selected ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitrations will now be discussed. The discussion is deliberately technical, as it is meant to show the responses of the various tribunals to the *Salini* criteria.

2.4.2 Characteristics of an investment

As will be seen from the discussion that follows, there is no fixed set of characteristics or attributes that a transaction, project, business etc. must meet in order to qualify as an investment in terms of the ICSID Convention. Schreuer laid the basis for the current debate on what an investment ought to be when he said that:

³⁵³ *Joy Mining* at para 50.

³⁵⁴ *Fedax* at para 20-30.

³⁵⁵ *Alex Genin* at para 324.

³⁵⁶ *SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v The Republic of Paraguay* (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29) Award of 10 February 2012 at para 80.

³⁵⁷ *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* at para 113.

³⁵⁸ *Mr Patrick Mitchell v The Democratic Republic of Congo* (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7) Decision on Annulment of Award of 1 November 2006 at para 31.

³⁵⁹ *RFCC* at para 50-66.

³⁶⁰ *Salini* at para 43-44, 45-58.

³⁶¹ *Alpha Projektholding* at para 314.

³⁶² *Inmaris* Decision on Jurisdiction at para 130.

³⁶³ *M.C.I Power* at para 160.

³⁶⁴ *Parkerings* at para 254.

³⁶⁵ *SGS v Paraguay* at para 83.

³⁶⁶ *Ambiente* at para 470.

...a qualifying project must show a certain duration, a regularity of profit and return, an element of risk, a substantial commitment, and a significant contribution to the host State's development.³⁶⁷ (Emphasis added).

Fedax and *CSOB* were the first two cases to consider the above criteria.³⁶⁸ Thereafter *Salini* discussed the criteria, and accepted all but the requirement of profit, as did subsequent cases.³⁶⁹ The tribunal in *Salini* held that an investment must meet the following requirements (*Salini* criteria): there must be a contribution by an investor, the investment must be of qualifying (but unspecified) duration, the investment must involve a risk taken by the investor, and the investment must be of economic benefit to the host state.³⁷⁰ *Salini* thus set the scene for the current debate about what an investment is or ought to be.³⁷¹ The *Salini* criteria will now be briefly discussed in order to show how subsequent decisions responded thereto, and to indicate how it was applied in subsequent cases.³⁷² Of further importance is that based on the conclusion drawn at the

³⁶⁷ *Fedax* at para 43; Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 128 para 153.

³⁶⁸ *Fedax* at para 25; *Biwater Gauff* at para 310; Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 129 para 154.

³⁶⁹ *Salini* at para 52-58; *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at para 108. However, in *Achmea* the tribunal held that the making of an investment “necessarily implied the right to enjoy the profitability of a return on the investment, if it proves profitable” (at para 281).

³⁷⁰ *Salini* at para 52. Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 129 para 157 says that the profit requirement was not adopted by most tribunals.

³⁷¹ See the discussion in Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 129-134.

³⁷² For a critique of *Salini* see Andreeva Y “Salvaging or Sinking the Investment - MHS v. Malaysia Revisited,” 2008 (7) *The Law and Practice of International Courts Tribunals* 161-176; Bechky PS “International Adjudication of Land Disputes: For Development and Transnationalism” 2014 (7) *The Law and Development Review* 313-327; Burger L “The Trouble with *Salini* (Criticism of and Alternatives to the Famous Test)” 2013 (31) *ASA Bulletin* 521-536; Demirkol B “The Notion of Investment in International Investment Law” 2015 (1) *The Turkish Commercial Law Review* 41-49; Desierto DA “Development as an International Right: Investment in the New Trade-Based IIAs” 2011 (3) *Trade Law and Development* 296-333; Dupont P “The Notion of ICSID Investment: Ongoing Confusion or

end of this section,³⁷³ it is highly probable that an investment in SADC that is covered by Annex 1 or the investment laws of a Member State as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 below, must have the characteristics that are described below.

(a) Contribution

This requirement entails that an investor must bring resources towards an investment. This can be in the form of know-how, personnel, funds, expertise, equipment etc. Based on this approach, if an investor is found not to have contributed anything to a project or a transaction, a tribunal may rule that it did not make an investment. For example, in *KT Asia v Kazakhstan*, where the investment was a shareholding acquired via loans that did not have to be paid, the tribunal held that the acquisition of the shares did not amount to an investment.³⁷⁴ In *Salini*, where the project undertaken was the construction of a

Emerging Synthesis” 2011 (12) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 245-272; Engfeldt HJ “Should ICSID Go Gangnam Style in Light of Non-Traditional Foreign Investments Including Those Spurred on by Social Media - Applying an Industry-Specific Lens to the Salini Test to Determine Article 25 Jurisdiction” 2014 (32) *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 44-63; Exelbert JM “Consistently Inconsistent: What Is a Qualifying Investment under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and Why the Debate Must End” 2016 (85) *Fordham Law Review* 1243-1279; Garay J “Abuse of Process through Corporate Restructuring of Assets: The Legal Standard for the Multinational Investor” 2017 (35) *Boston University International Law Journal* 397-424; Grabowski “The Definition of Investment under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini” at 287-309; Martin A “Definition of Investment: Could a Persistent Objector to the Salini Tests Be Found in ICSID Arbitral Practice” 2011 (11) (2) *Global Jurist* 1-19; Musurmanov IU “The Implications of Romak v Uzbekistan for Defining the Concept of Investment” 2013 (20) *Australian International Law Journal* 105-129; Okpe FO “The Definition of Investment and the ICSID Convention: Matters Arising under the Nigerian Investment Promotion Act and International Investment Law” 2017 (8) *Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy* 133-154; Vargiu P “Beyond Hallmarks and Formal Requirements: A Jurisprudence Constante on the Notion of Investment in the ICSID Convention” 2009 (10) *The Journal of World Investment and Trade* 753-768; Yala F “The Notion of ‘Investment’ in ICSID Case Law: A Drifting Jurisdictional Requirement?” in Reinisch (ed) *Classics in International Investment Law* Volume II at 112-123.

³⁷³ The conclusion is that these characteristics are applicable to non-ICSID arbitration and litigation cases.

³⁷⁴ *KT Asia Investment Group B.V v Republic of Kazakhstan* (ICSID Case No. ARB 09/8)

motorway, the tribunal found that the investors' contribution of funds and expertise was acceptable.³⁷⁵ In *Bayindir*, the project that had to be undertaken by the investor was also the construction of a motorway. The tribunal found that Bayindir had contributed financial resources, equipment, personnel and expertise in the project.³⁷⁶

In *Helnan*, the tribunal found that the investment of funds to upgrade and operate a hotel was a contribution.³⁷⁷ In *Malaysian Historical Salvors*, the tribunal found that in the salvaging of an old shipwreck, the investor had contributed funds, expertise, and knowledge.³⁷⁸ The respondent did not dispute that the claimant made an investment.³⁷⁹ In *Millicom*, the tribunal found that Millicom's establishment of and financing of a mobile phone network was a sufficient contribution.³⁸⁰

Where there is more than one investor involved in a project, a tribunal will look at their combined investment to see if the group as a whole made an investment. Hence in *Inmaris* the tribunal concluded that the combined contributions by companies in the Inmaris group amounted to an investment.³⁸¹ Similarly, in *Ambiente*, where the investments in question were bonds issued by the Argentine government to foreign investors, the tribunal held that what mattered is the total bonds issued to the group of investors.³⁸² In *Phoenix Action*, the tribunal held that the payment of a nominal price to acquire an investment is not a bar to meeting the requirement of a contribution, provided

³⁷⁵ Award of 17 October 2013 at para 204, 206.

³⁷⁶ *Salini* at para 53.

³⁷⁷ *Bayindir* at para 116, 120 and 131.

³⁷⁸ *Helnan* at para 77.

³⁷⁹ *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at para 109.

³⁸⁰ *Impregilo* at para 78.

³⁸¹ *Millicom* at para 80.

³⁸² *Inmaris* Decision on Jurisdiction at para 96.

³⁸² *Ambiente* at para 483.

the investor has a bona fide intention of undertaking economic activities through the investment.³⁸³

(b) Duration

In terms of this criterion, an investment should be held for a medium to long-term duration, although there is no specific period that is agreed among tribunals.³⁸⁴ In *Salini*, where the duration of the contract was three years, the tribunal said that this duration met the criteria “according to the doctrine”, which was said to be two to five years.³⁸⁵ In *Bayindir*, the construction period of three years was found to be acceptable.³⁸⁶ In *Jan de Nul*, the tribunal also held that an investment period of three years was sufficient.³⁸⁷ In *Malaysian Historical Salvors*, where the original contract was for 18 months, the tribunal said that this original period did not meet the duration requirement in a “qualitative sense”.³⁸⁸ In *Helnan*, the tribunal accepted the investment duration of 26 years.³⁸⁹ In *Ioannis Kardassopoulos*, the tribunal accepted a period of three years as sufficient.³⁹⁰ In *Millicom*, the tribunal found that the mobile phone concession period of 20 years was a sufficient duration.³⁹¹

³⁸³ *Phoenix Action, Ltd v The Czech Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/05) Award of 15 April 2009 at para 122.

³⁸⁴ *KT Asia* at para 207, 216.

³⁸⁵ *Salini* at para 54

³⁸⁶ *Bayindir* at para 133.

³⁸⁷ *Jan de Nul* Decision on Jurisdiction at para 95; *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at para 101-102.

³⁸⁸ *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at 37 para 111(b).

³⁸⁹ *Helnan* at para 77.

³⁹⁰ *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* at para 117.

³⁹¹ *Millicom* at para 80.

(c) Risk

In terms of this criterion, an investment must have a measure of risk to qualify as an investment.³⁹² In the case of an equity investment, the risk is that the value of the equity may depreciate.³⁹³ Hence in *KT Asia*, the tribunal found that no investment was made because there was no risk involved in the transaction.³⁹⁴ In *Bayindir*, Bayindir had to issue bank guarantees for huge sums of money in favor of the host state, risking an unlawful call of these sums by the state.³⁹⁵ Furthermore, Bayindir was liable for defects for a certain period, and also had to maintain the roads for four years. The tribunal found that the investor did undertake a risk in the project.³⁹⁶ The tribunal in *Malaysian Historical Salvors* found that the risk assumed by the investor was an ordinary commercial risk and, therefore, qualitatively it was not the risk envisaged in ICSID jurisprudence.³⁹⁷ The tribunal concluded that the risk was only superficially met.³⁹⁸ In *Helnan*, the tribunal found that the refurbishing of a hotel to five-star quality amounted to taking a risk of commercial success.³⁹⁹ In *Ioannis Kardassopoulos*, the tribunal found that the mere conduct of the claimant's operation under the prevailing economic and political circumstances amounted to a risk.⁴⁰⁰ The tribunal in *Alpha Projektholding* also agreed that conducting business under adverse political and economic climate amounted to a risk.⁴⁰¹ In *Saipem*, the tribunal found that the work stoppages and the necessity to renegotiate the contract amounted to a risk.⁴⁰² In *Fedax*, the tribunal found that the

³⁹² *Salini* at para 217.

³⁹³ *KT Asia* at para 218.

³⁹⁴ *KT Asia* at para 206, 217-219.

³⁹⁵ *Bayindir* at para 135.

³⁹⁶ *Bayindir* at para 136.

³⁹⁷ *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at para 39.

³⁹⁸ *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at para 39.

³⁹⁹ *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* at para 77.

⁴⁰⁰ *Ioannis Kardassopoulos* at para 117.

⁴⁰¹ *Alpha Projektholding* at para 320.

⁴⁰² *Saipem* at para 109.

existence of a dispute relating to the payment of the capital and interest was sufficient proof of risk.⁴⁰³ The tribunal in *Phoenix Action* found that the fact that the claimant invested in businesses that were financially distressed was sufficient risk.⁴⁰⁴

(d) Benefit to host state

In terms of this criterion, an investment must make a significant contribution to the economy of a host state. The tribunals in *Fedax*,⁴⁰⁵ *Salini*⁴⁰⁶ and *CSOB*⁴⁰⁷ were early adopters of this requirement. The requirement has since been adopted in subsequent cases, with varying emphasis on the scale of the economic contribution to the host state, as can be seen in the analysis of tribunal decisions conducted in *Malaysian Historical Salvors*.⁴⁰⁸ In *Bayindir*, the tribunal found that the construction of the motorway was of benefit to Pakistan.⁴⁰⁹ In *Helnan*, the tribunal found that the investment in the hotel was of benefit to tourism in Egypt.⁴¹⁰ The tribunal in *Malaysian Historical Salvors* also acknowledged this requirement after an in-depth analysis.⁴¹¹ In *Inmaris*, the tribunal found that the combined investment benefitted Ukraine's development because Ukraine obtained the renovation of a ship, as well as the training of its cadets.⁴¹² In *Alpha Projektholding*, the tribunal found that the significant taxes paid by the hotel business contributed to the economy of Ukraine.⁴¹³ Although the UNCITRAL tribunal in *Bernhard Von Pezold* declined to apply the *Salini* criteria, it found that Zimbabwe's economy

⁴⁰³ *Fedax* at para 40.

⁴⁰⁴ *Phoenix Action* at para 127.

⁴⁰⁵ *Fedax* at para 40.

⁴⁰⁶ *Salini* at para 52.

⁴⁰⁷ *CSOB* at para 97.

⁴⁰⁸ *Bayindir* at 39 para 113, 145.

⁴⁰⁹ *Bayindir* at para 137.

⁴¹⁰ *Helnan* at para 77.

⁴¹¹ *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at para 68, 105, 113, 124; 125.

⁴¹² *Inmaris* Decision on Jurisdiction at para 96, 132.

⁴¹³ *Alpha Projektholding* at para 330.

benefited from job creation and the injection of know-how.⁴¹⁴ Similarly, the UNCITRAL tribunal in *White Industries* declined to follow *Salini*, yet it applied the same criteria and found that the investment in that case contributed to India's development.⁴¹⁵

However, some tribunals did not agree with *Salini*. In *Phoenix Action*, the tribunal held that the development of economic activities by the investment need not be successful, especially when the acts of the host state destroyed the investment. What matters most is that an investor intended to undertake economic activities, and that it made good faith efforts to achieve them.⁴¹⁶ The tribunal in *KT Asia* held that the requirement of economic development of the host state cannot be mandatory.⁴¹⁷ The tribunal in *L.E.S.I v Algeria* was also not keen on the requirement.⁴¹⁸ In *Patrick Mitchel*, the Ad hoc Committee in the annulment proceedings acknowledged the requirement, with a cautionary.⁴¹⁹ The tribunal in *Quiborax* held that the economic development criterion is not part of the objective criteria for an investment, because an investment may fail and, therefore, not contribute to the development of a state.⁴²⁰ In *Alpha Projektholding*, the tribunal said that the criterion makes a tribunal to engage in a *post hoc* evaluation of the business, economic, financial and/or policy assessments that prompted the claimant's activities and thus leads to second-guessing. The tribunal in *Deutsche Bank* also held that this

⁴¹⁴ *Bernhard Von Pezold* at para 286.

⁴¹⁵ *White Industries* at para 7.4.18.

⁴¹⁶ *Phoenix Action* at para 133.

⁴¹⁷ *KT Asia* at para 171-173.

⁴¹⁸ *Consorzio Goupemente L.E.S.I-DIPENTA (Italy) v Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria* ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08 (Award) of 10 January 2005 at para 13(iv); *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at para 89.

⁴¹⁹ *Patrick Mitchel* at para 28, 32 - 33.

⁴²⁰ *Quiborax S.A, Non-Metallic Minerals S.A and Alan Fosk Kaplun v Plurinational State of Bolivia* (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/02) Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 September 2012 at 76 para 220, 225.

requirement should not be part of the criteria for an investment.⁴²¹ Expectedly, the UNCITRAL tribunals of *Bernhard Von Pezold* and *White Industries* are among those that declined to follow *Salini*.

As can be seen from the above discussion, some tribunal decisions differed with *Salini*, while others agreed with *Salini* wholly or in part. What follows is a summary of what various tribunals said about the *Salini* criteria.

The tribunal in *Alpha Projektholding* refused to follow *Salini* because it opined that the *Salini* criteria are not contained in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.⁴²² The tribunal in *Global Trading v Ukraine* also distanced itself from the *Salini* criteria.⁴²³ In *Hassan Awdi v Romania*, the tribunal held that the *Salini* criteria cannot override the will of the parties in terms of what they wanted to amount to an investment or not.⁴²⁴ The tribunal in *Malaysian Historical Salvors* held that the *Salini* “test” is “not a punch list of items which, if completely checked off, will automatically lead to a conclusion that there is an “investment.”⁴²⁵ In *Biwater Gauff*, the tribunal held that there is no basis for a strict application of the *Salini* criteria since international law or the ICSID Convention does not prescribe it.⁴²⁶ The tribunal in *Phillip Morris Brand SARL* followed *Biwater*.⁴²⁷ In *Phoenix Action*, the tribunal added the criteria that an investment must be made in terms of the

⁴²¹ *Deutsche Bank* at para 295.

⁴²² *Alpha Projektholding* at para 311.

⁴²³ *Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc v Ukraine* (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11) Award of 1 December 2011 at para 55.

⁴²⁴ *Hassan Awdi, Enterprise Business Consultants, Inc, And Alfa El Corporation v Romania* (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13) Award of 2 March 2015 at para 197.

⁴²⁵ *Malaysian Historical Salvors* at para 106(e).

⁴²⁶ *Biwater Gauff* at para 312-316.

⁴²⁷ *Phillip Morris Brand SARL* at para 201-206.

laws of the host state and must be bona fide.⁴²⁸ In *GEA v Ukraine* the tribunal declined to apply the *Salini* test, and said that the *Salini* test is problematic if its criteria are taken as inflexible.⁴²⁹ The tribunal in *Ambiente* cautioned that the *Salini* criteria must not be taken as expressing jurisdictional requirements *stricto sensu*.⁴³⁰ In *Abaclat* the tribunal held that it would be wrong to disqualify an investment which was intended to be protected by the Argentina-Italy BIT simply because it did not meet the *Salini* criteria.⁴³¹ Similarly, in *Deutsche Bank* the tribunal held that there is no basis for the strict application of the *Salini* criteria.⁴³² The tribunal in *Bernhard Von Pezold* also held that *Salini* was not authoritative.⁴³³

Schreuer revisited the debate, and clarified his original view of what an investment ought to be, as follows:

These features should not necessarily be understood as jurisdictional requirements but merely as typical characteristics of investments under the Convention...The development in practice from a descriptive list of typical features towards a set of mandatory legal requirements is unfortunate. The First Edition of this Commentary cannot serve as authority for this development.⁴³⁴ (Emphasis added).

⁴²⁸ *Phoenix Action* at para 101-144.

⁴²⁹ *GEA Group AktienGesellschaft v Ukraine* (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/16) Award of 31 March 2011 at para 314.

⁴³⁰ *Ambiente* at 161 para 479.

⁴³¹ *Abaclat* at para 364.

⁴³² *Deutsche Bank* at para 294.

⁴³³ *Bernhard Von Pezold* at para 285.

⁴³⁴ Cited in *Ambiente* at para 480-481; Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 128 para 153.

The tribunal in *Philip Morris Brand SARL* accepted Schreuer's proposal above.⁴³⁵

It is submitted that the views expressed by Schreuer as well the cases above to the effect that the *Fedax* and *Salini* criteria should be taken as guidelines only, find acceptance. In any event, in the absence of judicial precedent in ISDS, it is impossible for *Salini* to be authoritative. This is also supported by the fact that the drafters of the ICSID Convention deliberately refrained from defining an investment so as to allow flexibility in the determination of an investment. Therefore, tribunals will have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether an investment exists or not.

2.4.3 Conclusion

For the reasons that follow, it is submitted that in SADC, the criteria for an investment discussed above are applicable to non-ICSID arbitrations and even courts of law that adjudicate investor-state disputes. The tribunal in *Grupo Francisco Hernando Contreras v Republic of Ecuador* held that the *Salini* criteria can be applied to an ICSID Additional Facility arbitration,⁴³⁶ while the tribunal in *Romak* held that the *Salini* criteria can be applied in UNCITRAL arbitration. The tribunal therefore applied the criteria, and concluded that the claimant did not make a qualifying investment.⁴³⁷

Furthermore, a trend is emerging in terms whereof states and regions are adopting the *Salini* criteria into their model treaties. For example, the following instruments adopt the

⁴³⁵ *Philip Morris Brand SARL* at para 206.

⁴³⁶ *Grupo Francisco Hernando Contreras v Republic of Ecuador* ICSID Case No. ARB/ (AF)/12/2 Award on Jurisdiction of 4 December 2015. The award is in Spanish. For a summary see <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/05/16/the-only-known-investment-treaty-arbitration-against-equatorial-guinea-fails-on-jurisdictional-grounds-grupo-francisco-hernando-contreras-sl-v-republic-of-equatorial-guinea-icsid-case-no-arb-af-12-2-m/> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁴³⁷ *Romak* at para 191-208.

Salini criteria: Article of 1.2.1 of the India Model Bilateral Treaty 2015,⁴³⁸ Article 4(4) of the PAIC, and Article 1(10) of the SADC Model Bilateral Treaty Template of 2012.⁴³⁹ The adoption of the *Salini* criteria into regulatory instruments is commendable, and will serve to pre-empt costly disputes with regards to whether the criteria are applicable to non-ICSID arbitrations or not. It will also create consistency and add to the jurisprudence relating to the interpretation of the criteria.

2.5 INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS

2.5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this section is to briefly discuss the processes by which investor-state disputes are resolved. These are negotiation and mediation (alternative dispute resolution (ADR)), arbitration and litigation.⁴⁴⁰ These processes form a continuum, and proceed from left to right from ADR through to arbitration and/or litigation.⁴⁴¹ The parties to a dispute gradually lose control over the resolution of a dispute as it progresses through these stages.⁴⁴² This is because, by not resolving the dispute themselves, the parties pass the adjudication thereof to a third party, who may be an arbitrator or a judge, as the case may be. However, the reality is that not every dispute can be resolved via ADR. This makes arbitration and litigation relevant to investor-state dispute resolution.

⁴³⁸ The India Model BIT is discussed in Chapter 5 below.

⁴³⁹ Southern African Development Community (2012) *Model Bilateral Treaty Template*, available at <http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf> (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁴⁴⁰ See for example Carneiro D *Conflict resolution and its context: from the analysis of behavioural patterns to efficient decision-making* (Springer Cham 2014); Salacuse JW "Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, Investor-State Dispute Resolution" 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138-185 at 154; Salacuse *The Law of Investment treaties* at 357-374.

⁴⁴¹ Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 154.

⁴⁴² See Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 154-155.

According to International Court of Justice (ICJ) and tribunal decisions, a dispute is a disagreement over a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between two persons.⁴⁴³ There must have been some communication between the parties, leading to a difference in the position of the parties.⁴⁴⁴ The dispute between the parties must be practical, not theoretical or academic.⁴⁴⁵ Schreuer says that a dispute is legal if remedies such as restitution or damages are claimed, and if the claim is based on a contract, treaty, legislation and other source of law.⁴⁴⁶

Investor-state disputes are unique and vastly different from normal commercial disputes. Salacuse attributes the uniqueness of investor-state dispute to various factors, as indicated below⁴⁴⁷

Firstly, investor-state disputes are typically regulated by public international law instead of the laws of a host state, in that they are often regulated by treaties and rules of

⁴⁴³ *Fedax* at para 15; Schreuer C “What is a Legal Dispute? International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation” in Buffard I, Crawford J, Pellet A, and Wittich S (eds) *International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation, Festschrift in Honour of Gerhard Hafner* (Koninklijke Brill NV, Netherlands 2008) 959-980, at 960-961 <http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/95.pdf> (Date of use: 7 October 2017); Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 93 para 42 (see the authorities cited at notes 44-45).

⁴⁴⁴ Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 94 para 43.

⁴⁴⁵ Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 94 para 44-45.

⁴⁴⁶ Schreuer “What is a Legal Dispute? International Law between Universalism and Fragmentation” at 978; Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 99 para 60.

⁴⁴⁷ See also Maupin JA “Differentiating Among International Investment Disputes” in Douglas Z, Pauwelyn J and Vinuales JE (eds) *The Foundations of International Investment Law* (Oxford University Press Oxford 2014) at 467-498; Salacuse *The Law of Investment treaties* at 354-356.

international law.⁴⁴⁸ Secondly, investor-state disputes involve public policy, in that they involve a challenge to a state's sovereign right to regulate its affairs.⁴⁴⁹ Thirdly, investor-state disputes are political in nature, since they involve a challenge on the public policy of a state.⁴⁵⁰ Fourth, investor-state disputes often have a bearing on a long-term relationship between an investor and a host state, wherein the parties need each other.⁴⁵¹ This makes the relationship difficult to unravel.⁴⁵² Fifth, the amounts being claimed in ISDS can be significant, and do run into hundreds of millions of US Dollars and in some cases, billions.⁴⁵³ In addition, the costs of the ensuing ISDS are significant for a host state as well.⁴⁵⁴ Sixth, investor-state disputes are a rare type of disputes that allow a private party to sue a state for its sovereign acts under international law.⁴⁵⁵ Finally, investor-state disputes are unique, since it is usually an investor who can sue a host state (usually via ISDS), not the other way round.⁴⁵⁶

Currently, the resolution of investor-state disputes is controversial due to the fact that the majority of BITs and TIPs refer investor-state disputes to ISDS, which often bypasses the courts of host states.⁴⁵⁷ This has created the impression that ISDS is the main mechanism for the resolution of these disputes.

⁴⁴⁸ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 140. This is due to BITs, TIPs, investment contracts etc. that make international law applicable to investments.

⁴⁴⁹ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 140.

⁴⁵⁰ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 141.

⁴⁵¹ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 141.

⁴⁵² Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 141.

⁴⁵³ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 142.

⁴⁵⁴ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 142.

⁴⁵⁵ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 144.

⁴⁵⁶ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 145.

⁴⁵⁷ For a database of BITs and TIPs see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

For example, in North America, NAFTA refers investor-state disputes directly to ISDS.⁴⁵⁸ In Europe, the ECT refers investor-state disputes to ISDS or the courts of host states, at the option of an investor.⁴⁵⁹ Still in Europe, the European Union (EU) is championing an Investment Court System (ICS) that will refer investor-state disputes directly to an ICS tribunal.⁴⁶⁰ The recently concluded Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) also provides investors with direct access to ISDS.⁴⁶¹ In Asia, ACIA also refers investor-state disputes directly to ISDS.⁴⁶² The India Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 2015 refers investor-state disputes to ISDS, albeit after the exhaustion of local remedies.⁴⁶³ In SADC, the 2006 Annex 1 referred investor-state disputes to ISDS after the exhaustion of local remedies.⁴⁶⁴ The laws of some SADC Member States also refer investor-state disputes to ISDS, while others refer them to the courts of host states.⁴⁶⁵

2.5.2 Alternative Dispute Resolution

ADR refers to informal, amicable means of the settlement of a dispute. ADR can therefore be defined as the settlement of a dispute by means other than binding decisions made by courts or arbitral tribunals.⁴⁶⁶ ADR processes include negotiation,

⁴⁵⁸ Article 1120 NAFTA.

⁴⁵⁹ Article 26(2)-(3) ECT.

⁴⁶⁰ See the discussion of the ICS in Chapter 5 below.

⁴⁶¹ Article 9.19 CPTPP <http://wtocenter.vn/tpp/full-text-comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-trans-pacific-partnership-cptpp> (Date of use: 3 April 2018. The parties to the agreement are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.

⁴⁶² Article 32 ACIA.

⁴⁶³ See the discussion of the India Model BIT in Chapter 5 below.

⁴⁶⁴ Article 28 2006 Annex 1.

⁴⁶⁵ See Table 1 in Chapter 4 below; Ngoben and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) *Law Democracy and Development* 175 at 182-185.

⁴⁶⁶ For further reading see DeMarr BJ and de Janasz SC *Negotiation and dispute resolution* 1st ed (Pearson/Prentice Hall Boston 2013); D'Ambrumenil P *What is dispute resolution?* (LLP London 1998); Fenn PF *Commercial conflict management and dispute resolution*

mediation, conciliation, and arbitration.⁴⁶⁷ These processes are taken as alternatives to litigation.⁴⁶⁸ However, in the context of investment disputes, ADR consists of negotiation, mediation, and conciliation, which then become alternatives to arbitration.⁴⁶⁹ ADR may be invoked before a conflict becomes a dispute, in which event it is referred to as preventative ADR.⁴⁷⁰ If ADR is invoked after a conflict has become a dispute, it is referred to as resolute ADR.⁴⁷¹ Both forms of ADR are used in conjunction with ISDS and litigation, and are therefore useful.

ADR has various advantages. Firstly, ADR takes less time than arbitration or litigation to conclude.⁴⁷² Secondly, ADR allows the parties, and not a third party such as a judge or an arbitrator, to reach the decision they desire.⁴⁷³ Thirdly, ADR allows parties to focus on

(Spon Press Abingdon 2012); Goldberg SB *et al* *Dispute resolution: negotiation, mediation and other process* 4th ed (Aspen Law & Business Gaithersburg 2003); Hames DS *Negotiation: closing deals, settling disputes and making team decisions* (SAGE Publications Thousand Oaks California 2012); Ho-Won J *Conflict management and resolution: an introduction* (Routledge London 2010); Lewicki RJ, Saunders DM and Barry B *Negotiation* 7th ed (McGraw-Hill/Irwin New York 2015); Moffitt ML and Bordone RC *The Handbook of Dispute Resolution* 1st ed (Jossey-Bass San Francisco CA 2005); Mayer BS *The dynamics of conflict: a guide to engagement and intervention* 2nd ed (Jossey-Bass San Francisco 2012); Nolan-Haley JM *Alternative Dispute Resolution in a nutshell* (West Publishing Company St. Paul Minnesota 2013); Partridge MVB *Alternative Dispute Resolution: an essential competency for lawyers* (Oxford University Press Oxford 2009); Stefek F and Unberath H (eds) *Regulating dispute resolution: ADR and access to justice at the crossroads* (Hart Publishing Oxford 2013).

⁴⁶⁷ See Salacuse *The Law of Investment treaties* at 357-368.

⁴⁶⁸ Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 157.

⁴⁶⁹ Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 157.

⁴⁷⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration” UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development (United Nations New York and Geneva 2010) at xii http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁴⁷¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration” at xii http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁴⁷² Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 157.

⁴⁷³ Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 157.

their non-legal interests in addition to their rights.⁴⁷⁴ Fourthly, by virtue of its amicable nature, ADR allows the parties to preserve their relationship.⁴⁷⁵ Fifth, even after commencement of litigation or arbitration, resolutive ADR still has a role to play to bring a matter to a close. For example, ISDS statistics indicate that 36 percent of all ICSID cases up to December 2017 were settled or discontinued after commencement.⁴⁷⁶

However, ADR takes place in private, and there is no empirical evidence to support the claims regarding its low cost, efficiency or speed of resolution. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that ADR saves parties time, money and even their relationship if a dispute is settled. ADR should be embraced in investor-state disputes.

2.5.3 Arbitration

Arbitration is a process whereby one or more private individuals (the arbitrators) decide a dispute which parties have voluntarily agreed to refer to them.⁴⁷⁷ ISDS is a special form of

⁴⁷⁴ Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 158; Welsh NA and Schneider AK “The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral Treaty Arbitration” 2013 (18) *Harvard Negotiation Law Review* 71-144 at 91.

⁴⁷⁵ Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 157, 176.

⁴⁷⁶ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload Statistics” Issue 2017-2
[https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018).

⁴⁷⁷ Booyen *Principles of International Trade Law As A Monistic System* 767; Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 154; Salacuse *The Law of Investment treaties* at 369-374. For ISDS tribunal decisions see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS>, <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/resources/ICSID-Caseload-Statistics.aspx>, <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx> <https://www.italaw.com/>, <https://pca-cpa.org/en/home/> (all Date of use: 07 October 2017). For further reading see Born G *International commercial arbitration* 2nd ed (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business New York 2014); Carbonneau TE *Arbitration in a nutshell* 3rd ed (Thomas/West St. Paul Minnesota 2012); Merrills JG *International dispute settlement* 5th ed (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2011).

arbitration that was primarily brought into being by BITs and TIPs.⁴⁷⁸ Arbitration can be international or national. National arbitration is arbitration that takes place in a particular state and according to the laws of that state.⁴⁷⁹ International arbitration takes place in terms of international law. Due to its prevalence, ISDS is generally the main mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes.⁴⁸⁰

The majority of ISDS cases take place under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention),⁴⁸¹ followed by the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.⁴⁸² The ICSID Convention established ICSID, which administers arbitration cases under the convention as well as those in terms of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.⁴⁸³ ICSID handles the highest ISDS caseload, followed by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁷⁸ See for example Vandenvelde 2005 (12) University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 157 at 161-175.

⁴⁷⁹ Booyesen *Principles of International Trade Law as a Monistic System* at 770.

⁴⁸⁰ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 155.

⁴⁸¹ *Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States* (with Rules and Regulations) 1965, amended to 2006 (ratified 14 September 1966, in force 14 October 1966)
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English-final.pdf (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

⁴⁸² Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 157; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 'Arbitration Rules' United Nations, New York 2014 <https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

⁴⁸³ Article 1 ICSID Convention.

⁴⁸⁴ <https://pca-cpa.org/en/home/> (Date of use: 15 November 2017). For cases decided under other arbitration rules see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByRulesAndInstitution> (Date of use: 05 November 2017). By 30 March 2018, 467 cases were opened under the ICSID Rules, plus 54 that were begun under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, while 262 cases were opened under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID handled 542 cases, while the PCA handled 118. See <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByRulesAndInstitution> (Date of use: 30 March 2017).

When the ICSID was launched, there was much optimism about its potential to resolve investor-state disputes.⁴⁸⁵ This optimism encouraged many states to become members of the ICSID Convention.⁴⁸⁶ From the 1970s until the early 1990s, there were few ISDS cases.⁴⁸⁷ Thus, from 1972 to 1996, the ICSID had less than five ISDS cases per year.⁴⁸⁸ However, this lull was short-lived, as the caseload increased gradually, up to recent peaks of 77 cases per year in 2015.⁴⁸⁹ In total, from 1972 until the end of June 2017, 619 ISDS cases were registered with the ICSID.⁴⁹⁰ When non-ICSID cases are added, on 18 March 2018 the global number of known ISDS cases was 855, of which 548 were concluded, and 297 were pending.⁴⁹¹

Proponents of ISDS argue that it has various benefits. Firstly, it provides an impartial, cheap and quick forum for the resolution of an investor-state dispute.⁴⁹² Secondly, ISDS

⁴⁸⁵ See Report of the Executive Directors, in the ICSID Convention at 40.

⁴⁸⁶ For a database of ICSID member states see <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

⁴⁸⁷ International Centre for the Settlement of Investor-state Disputes “The ICISD Caseload Statistics”, Issue 2017-2 at 7 [https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018).

⁴⁸⁸ International Centre for the Settlement of Investor-state Disputes “The ICSID Caseload Statistics”, Issue 2017-2 at 7 [https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018)

⁴⁸⁹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 1-2 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 2018).

⁴⁹⁰ International Centre for the Settlement of Investor-state Disputes “The ICSID Caseload Statistics” Issue 2017-2 at 7 [https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018).

⁴⁹¹ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS> (Date of use: 18 March 2018). Please note that these statistics change as they are continually being updated.

⁴⁹² Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 157.

provides an additional avenue of legal redress to covered foreign investors.⁴⁹³ Thirdly, ISDS allows foreign investors to avoid national courts of a host State if they have little trust in their independence, efficiency, or competence.⁴⁹⁴ Fourth, ISDS avoids recourse to diplomatic protection of investors. Fifth, ISDS ensures the adjudication of claims by a qualified and neutral tribunal.⁴⁹⁵ Sixth, ISDS removes any State immunity obstacles that may complicate domestic legal claims in some States.⁴⁹⁶ Finally, ISDS allows for the recognition of awards in terms of the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention.⁴⁹⁷

Despite its touted benefits, ISDS has many challenges.⁴⁹⁸ Firstly, ISDS is costly, at least from a developing state point of view.⁴⁹⁹ Secondly, ISDS cases take a long time to

⁴⁹³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁴⁹⁴ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁴⁹⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁴⁹⁶ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁴⁹⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁴⁹⁸ See for example Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) Journal of World Investment

conclude.⁵⁰⁰ Thirdly, ISDS lacks an appeal mechanism, and therefore it fails to provide for the correction of wrong decisions.⁵⁰¹ Fourth, ISDS lacks judicial precedent, and therefore it suffers from inconsistent tribunal rulings.⁵⁰² Fifth, as a private process, ISDS is perceived as lacking legitimacy, and there are concerns about arbitrator bias.⁵⁰³ In this

and Trade 414 at 441-442; For a discussion of ISDS and its challenges, see for example Schwieder RW “TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New (and Improved) Paradigm for Investor-State Adjudication 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178-227 at 184-189; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 3 November 2017 at 2 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 2018). For the challenges that face arbitrations in Africa, see Namachanja C “The challenges facing Arbitral Institutions in Africa” CIArb Centenary Conference Paper, 15-17 July 2015 <https://www.ciarb.org/docs/default-source/centenarydocs/speaker-assets/collins-namachanja.pdf?sfv> (Date of use: 30 January 2018).

499 See ICSID and PCA fees at <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/Schedule-of-Fees.asp>, <https://pca-cpa.org/fees-and-costs/> (Date of use: 3 April 2018; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9 <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

500 For information regarding the opening and conclusion dates of cases see <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/PendingCases.aspx?status=p>; <https://www.italaw.com/>; <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS>; <https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/> (Date of use: 30 January 2018).

501 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9 <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018). For a record of ISDS annulment decisions, see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByFollowUpProceedings> (Date of use: 05 November 2017).

502 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9 <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018). See also Garay 2017 (35) Boston University International Law Journal 397 at 400; Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 195-196. For a discussion of judicial precedent in international law see Schreuer C “The Development of International Law by ICSID Tribunals” 2016 (31) ICSID Review 728-739.

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regard, a recent study has exposed the extent of “double hatting”, in terms whereof some arbitrators act as counsel in some matters, and as arbitrators and even professional experts in others.⁵⁰⁴ Sixth, ISDS provides an exclusive forum for foreign investors to sue host states, and therefore it discriminates against local and other foreign investors.⁵⁰⁵ Seventh, there are complications regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards, especially those from non-ICSID tribunals, in that a court of a host state may refuse to enforce an award.⁵⁰⁶ Finally, ISDS exposes host states to additional legal and financial risks, without giving them additional benefits beyond the expectation of incoming investments.⁵⁰⁷

Van Harten argues that the fact that only investors can commence ISDS claims, provides arbitrators with an incentive to favour investors, so as to advance the interests of the ISDS industry.⁵⁰⁸ Furthermore, Van Harten argues that the fact that arbitrators are

Murdoch University 2008); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁰⁴ Langford M, Behn D and Lie RH “The Revolving Door in International Arbitration” 2017 (20) *Journal of International Economic Law* 301-331 at 320 Table 6, 325 Figure 5.

⁵⁰⁵ See Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 145 note 25.

⁵⁰⁶ Article III, V *Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards*, (date of signature 10 June 1958, in force 7 June 1959) (New York Convention)
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1959/06/19590607%2009-35%20PM/Ch_XXII_01p.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018). For statistics on the enforcement of awards by national courts see

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByFollowUpProceedings> (select “Judicial review by national courts”) (Date of use: 30 January 2018).

⁵⁰⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 9
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁰⁸ Van Harten G “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and The Rule of Law”

appointed on a case-by-case basis provides them with an incentive to appease those who appoint them.⁵⁰⁹ Van Harten concludes that the lack of institutional safeguards to protect ISDS from the above possibilities undermines the normative basis for ISDS.⁵¹⁰

In addition to the above challenges, ISDS data provides empirical proof of why SADC is moving away from it.⁵¹¹ This is explained below.

BITs, TIPs, investment contracts and host state laws are the primary sources of ISDS cases since these contain the consent of host state to ISDS.⁵¹² Of these sources, BITs and TIPs contribute over 70 percent of all ICSID cases opened to date.⁵¹³ There are other factors that also contribute to the increase in ISDS cases, such as the growing availability of ISDS as a remedy, and the perceived lack of satisfactory alternatives to ISDS for the settlement of investor-State disputes.⁵¹⁴

in Schill SW (ed) *International Investment Law and Comparative Law* (Oxford University Press Oxford 2010) at 628; 643-657.

⁵⁰⁹ Van Harten “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and The Rule of Law” at 628 in Schill (ed) *International Investment Law and Comparative Law*.

⁵¹⁰ Van Harten “Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and The Rule of Law” at 628 in Schill (ed) *International Investment Law and Comparative Law*.

⁵¹¹ The other part of the story relates to the challenges facing ISDS. See for example Schwieder 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 178 at 184-189.

⁵¹² See for example Gazzini T “Bilateral Investment Treaties” in Gazzini T and Brabandere E (eds) *International Investment Law: The Sources of Rights and Obligations* at 99-131; International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICISD Caseload Statistics” Issue 2017-2 at 10

[https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018).

⁵¹³ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICISD Caseload Statistics” Issue 2017-2 at 10

[https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018).

⁵¹⁴ Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 147-153.

As of July 2017, 114 states had been sued in ISDS by investors.⁵¹⁵ Of these, developing states comprised over 65 percent of all countries sued.⁵¹⁶ Despite the popularity of ISDS, investors were successful in only 29.7 percent of all ICSID claims, while 34 percent were dismissed, and the rest were either discontinued or settled.⁵¹⁷ Furthermore, 68 percent of all arbitrators appointed in ICSID cases are from Western Europe and North America, ten percent were from South America and six percent were from Africa and the Middle East.⁵¹⁸ From 1987 to 31 July 2017, of the more than 500 arbitrators ever appointed to known ISDS cases, only thirteen were appointed in 545 cases, with French arbitrator Brigitte Stern being appointed in 87 cases, while the remaining twelve had no less than 31 appointments each.⁵¹⁹ All these arbitrators are from developed nations.⁵²⁰ Therefore,

⁵¹⁵ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 2
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 2018).

⁵¹⁶ See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 3
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 2018); <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry> (Date of use: 18 March 2018). For updated statistics per host state see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry> (Date of use: 30 March 2018).

⁵¹⁷ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload Statistics” Issue 2017-2 at 14
[https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018). For statistics including non-ICSID cases see United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 4
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 2018), where the patterns are similar.

⁵¹⁸ International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes “The ICSID Caseload Statistics” Issue 2017-2 at 14
[https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20\(English\)%20Final.pdf](https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%20Web%20Stats%202017-2%20(English)%20Final.pdf) (Date of use: 10 March 2018). The total cases to which these arbitrators were appointed is 128.

⁵¹⁹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue at 6
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 2018).

the most-used regions are under-represented in ISDS cases and only a handful of arbitrators handle the majority of cases.

Another challenge that ISDS faces is that investors rely on controversial breaches to open cases,⁵²¹ namely fair and equitable treatment (FET),⁵²² and expropriation.⁵²³ FET, together with the minimum standard of treatment and denial of justice, was used to open almost half of all known ISDS cases, namely 412 cases.⁵²⁴ Under this category, investors were successful in 105 cases.⁵²⁵ 366 cases were opened based on alleged indirect expropriation, while 94 claims were based on alleged direct expropriation.⁵²⁶ Investors were successful in 55 cases of indirect expropriation and 28 cases of direct expropriation cases.⁵²⁷

2018); Langford, Behn and Lie 2017 (20) *Journal of International Economic Law* 301-331 at 313 Table 2.

⁵²⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 3 at 6 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 30 March 2018).

⁵²¹ For updated statistics in this regard see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches> (Date of use; 3 April 2018).

⁵²² FET is controversial because it is difficult to define. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 1-15 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017) For a discussion of FET see Chapter 3 below at 133.

⁵²³ Indirect expropriation is controversial because its scope can be difficult to define. See Schreuer “The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection Treaties” at 3 http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/pdf/csunpublpaper_3.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Expropriation” at 7, 63 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017); *Bernhard Von Pezold* at para 507.

⁵²⁴ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵²⁵ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵²⁶ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵²⁷ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches> (Date of use: 10 April

The size of ISDS claims and awards is concerning, especially for developing states. Historically, investors claimed compensation in excess of USD 90 Billion in more than 90 cases.⁵²⁸ Of these, awards in excess of USD 1 Billion each were made in six cases, while three settlements in excess of USD 1 Billion each were made.⁵²⁹ The *Yukos Universal Limited* group of cases⁵³⁰ tops the list with a combined award of USD 50 Billion, while regarding settlements *Repsol v Argentina* tops the list with USD 5 Billion.⁵³¹ The highest recent arbitral award against a SADC Member state is for USD 194 million against Zimbabwe in *Bernadus Von Pezold*.⁵³²

It is generally accepted that the influx of ISDS claims has resulted in a phenomenon called regulatory chill. Although there is no uniform definition of regulatory chill,⁵³³ the

2018).

528 <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByAmounts> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

529 <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByAmounts> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

530 *Yukos Universal Limited, Hulley Enterprises Limited, and Veteran Petroleum Limited*. The awards were annulled by The Hague District Court (Chamber for Commercial Affairs) under case number C/09/477160/HA ZA 15-1, Judgment of 20 April 2016 <https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7255.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018). This decision is pending appeal before The Hague Court of Appeal under case number Case No. 200.197.079/01 (see Russia's defence at <https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw9633.pdf>) (Date of use: 10 June 2018). The basis of the annulment was that there was no valid consent to arbitration by the Russian Federation (Decision of the District Court at para 5.95 - 5.97).

531 *Repsol S.A and Repsol Butano S.A v Argentine Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/38).

532 *Bernadus Von Pezold* at para 1020. The award in this matter is being challenged.

533 For a discussion of regulatory chill see Bartl M "Regulatory Convergence through the Back Door: TTIP's Regulatory Cooperation and the Future of Precaution in Europe" 2017 (18) German Law Journal 969-992; Brown JG "International Investment Agreements: Regulatory Chill in the Face of Litigious Heat?" 2013 (3) (1) Western Journal of Legal Studies Art. 3, 1-25; Brower CN and Schill SW "Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?" Chicago Journal of International Law 2009 (9) 471-498; Chriki D "Investment arbitration liability insurance: a possible solution for concerns of a regulatory chill?" Columbia FDI Perspectives on Topical Foreign Direct Investment Issues, No. 223 April 9, 2018 <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/10/No-223-Chriki-FINAL.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018); Cote C "Is it Chilly Out there? International Investment Agreements and Government Regulatory Authority" AIB Insights (16) (1) <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/8500/f21dbe97deaa15c6e7e2b370f09c0d4cde3a.pdf>

preferred definition herein is that when regulatory chill occurs, “a State actor will fail to enact or enforce bona fide regulatory measures because of a perceived or actual threat of investment arbitration.”⁵³⁴ A brief discussion of regulatory chill will suffice.

(Date of use: 17 April 2018); Cotula L “Do investment treaties unduly constrain regulatory space?” 2014 (9) *Questions of International Law* 19-31; Glinavos I “Investor Protection v. State Regulatory Discretion: Definitions of Expropriation and Shrinking Regulatory Competence” 2011 (13) *European Journal of Law Reform* 97-114; Gross SG “Inordinate Chill: Bits, Non-NAFTA MITs, and Host-State Regulatory Freedom - An Indonesian Case Study” 2003 (24) *Michigan Journal of International Law* 893-960; Gruszczyński L “Australian Plain Packaging Law, International Litigations and Regulatory Chilling Effect” 2014 (5) *European Journal of Risk Regulation* 242-247; Hazzaa H “Silke Noa Kumpf, Egypt’s Ban on Public Interest Litigation in Government Contracts: A Case Study of Judicial Chill” 2015 (51) *Stanford Journal of International Law* 147-171; Korzun C “The Right to Regulate in Investor- State Arbitration: Slicing and Dicing Regulatory Carve-Outs” 2017 (50) *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 355-414; Langalanga A “Imagining South Africa’s Foreign Investment Regulatory Regime in a Global Context” *South African Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper* 214, 2015 <https://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/848-imagining-south-africa-s-foreign-investment-regulatory-regime-in-a-global-context/file> (Date of use: 17 April 2018); Matveev A “Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Evolving Balance Between Investor Protection and State Sovereignty” 2015 (40) *The University of Western Australia Law Review* 348-386; Shekhar S “‘Regulatory Chill’: Taking Right to Regulate For a Spin” Working Paper, Centre For WTO Studies, September 2016 [http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/workingpaper/%27REGULATORY%20CHILL%E2%80%99%20TAKING%20RIGHT%20TO%20REGULATE%20FOR%20A%20SPIN%20\(September%202016\).pdf](http://wtocentre.iift.ac.in/workingpaper/%27REGULATORY%20CHILL%E2%80%99%20TAKING%20RIGHT%20TO%20REGULATE%20FOR%20A%20SPIN%20(September%202016).pdf) (Date of use: 17 April 2018); McKenzie S *Resolving the Conflict Between The Protection of International Investments and The State’s Right and Responsibility to Regulate* (LLM dissertation University of the Witwatersrand 2017); Schill SW “Deference in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Re-conceptualizing the Standard of Review” 2012 (3) (3) *Journal of International Dispute Settlement* 577-607; Salazar ARV “NAFTA Chapter 11, Regulatory Expropriation, and Domestic Counter-Advertising Law” 2010 (27) *Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law* 31-82; Soloway J “NAFTA’s Chapter 11: Investor Protection, Integration and the Public Interest” 2003 (9) (2) *IRPP*, <http://www.envireform.utoronto.ca/conference/nov2002/tollefson-soloway.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018); Tienhaara K “Regulatory chill and the threat of arbitration: a view from political science” (October 28 2010) in *Evolution In Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration* Chester Brown, Kate Miles, (eds) (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2011) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2065706> (Date of use: 17 April 2018).

⁵³⁴ Tietje and Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” at para 68, 74-85 <http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018).

Tietje and Baetens identify three kinds of regulatory chill. The first is “anticipatory chill”.⁵³⁵ This occurs when policy-makers take into account potential disputes with foreign investors before they begin taking regulatory measures.⁵³⁶ The second kind is “specific response chill”.⁵³⁷ It stems from actual, threatened or perceived disputes, which regulators begin to identify as a risk.⁵³⁸ As a result, regulators may cease the relevant measures, or they may make changes thereto in order to avoid the risk.⁵³⁹ Finally there is “precedential chill”, which occurs when regulators change a measure in response to a settled or resolved investor-state dispute, due to fear of facing a repeat of a damages award (in the case of a losing state party), or of facing a similar dispute (in the case of other states).⁵⁴⁰

⁵³⁵ Tietje and Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” at para 69
<http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018).

⁵³⁶ Tietje and Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” at para 69
<http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018).

⁵³⁷ Tietje and Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” at para 69-70
<http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018).

⁵³⁸ Tietje and Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” at para 70
<http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018).

⁵³⁹ Tietje and Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” at para 70
<http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018).

⁵⁴⁰ Tietje and Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” at para 71
<http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018).

However, there are arguments against the existence of regulatory chill.⁵⁴¹ Irrespective of whether regulatory chill exists or not, there is no denying that the challenges of ISDS discussed above have made states to review their position towards it, as exemplified by the states and regions discussed herein. Furthermore, ISDS is not the only factor that regulators consider when taking regulatory measures. Therefore regulatory chill alone may not always deter states from taking measures they deem necessary.⁵⁴² Furthermore, the lack of judicial precedent in ISDS, as well as the low investor success rate of approximately 30 percent may give states optimism when anticipating disputes.

2.5.4 Litigation

Litigation is the resolution of a dispute before a court of law. The court may be that of a host state, a sub-regional court such as the SADC Tribunal, a continental court such as the ACH&PR,⁵⁴³ or an international tribunal such as the ICJ.⁵⁴⁴ In the absence of consent to arbitration by a host state, local litigation is the default forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes.⁵⁴⁵

According to UNCTAD, there are five benefits to the use of the courts of host states.⁵⁴⁶

Firstly, such use puts foreign investors on equal footing with domestic investors, as well

⁵⁴¹ Tietje and Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” at para 74-85
<http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018).

⁵⁴² Tietje and Baetens “The Impact of Investor-State-Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership” at para 86
<http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/the-impact-of-investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds-in-the-ttip.pdf> (Date of use: 17 April 2018).

⁵⁴³ See <http://www.african-court.org/en/> (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁵⁴⁴ See <http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/> (Date of use: 13 October 2015).

⁵⁴⁵ See for example Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 154 at 163.

⁵⁴⁶ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International

as with other foreign investors from States that do not have BITs or TIPs with a host state.⁵⁴⁷ Secondly, this helps to establish a level playing field among foreign investors.⁵⁴⁸ Thirdly, local courts are well suited to applying and interpreting domestic laws.⁵⁴⁹ Fourthly, ISDS is less critical in countries with well-developed and efficient legal systems.⁵⁵⁰ Finally, the use of local courts enables and brings to the fore the development of legal and judicial institutions of a host state.⁵⁵¹

However, local litigation also has its downside. Firstly, there is a possibility that a host state may not guarantee an efficient and independent judicial system, or that local courts

Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁴⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁴⁸ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁴⁹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁵⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁵¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

may lack independence, or be subject to political control.⁵⁵² Secondly, local litigation may take long to conclude (e.g. due to high caseloads), thereby resulting in costly litigation.⁵⁵³ Thirdly, local courts may be subject to political interference.⁵⁵⁴ Fourth, they may be biased towards foreigners.⁵⁵⁵ Fifth, they may lack the expertise to deal with complex international law principles applicable to investment transactions.⁵⁵⁶ Sixth, local courts may suffer from backlogs and inefficient procedures.⁵⁵⁷ However, local courts may, depending on the state of their rule of law, be an attractive forum for the adjudication of investor-state disputes.⁵⁵⁸ Furthermore, the extent of these challenges will differ from one host state to another.⁵⁵⁹ Therefore the above challenges are not global, and will vary from state to state. On the other hand, the challenges of ISDS are global in nature. Recommendations regarding their future use of litigation are made in Chapter 6.⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁵² United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁵³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁵⁴ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 163.

⁵⁵⁵ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 163.

⁵⁵⁶ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 163.

⁵⁵⁷ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 163.

⁵⁵⁸ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 163.

⁵⁵⁹ Salacuse 2007 (31) Fordham International Law Journal 138 at 163.

⁵⁶⁰ See Recommendations 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 in Chapter 6.

2.5.5 Conclusion

All the mechanisms for the resolution of investor-state disputes discussed above are important. Host states will always have different policies on foreign investment, and their socio-economic positions will always vary as well. Therefore, a one-size-fits-all approach towards the choice dispute resolution mechanism is not ideal. The failure of the PAIC in providing a single mechanism for African states is testament to these differences. SADC's options with regard to the resolution of investor-state disputes are analysed in Chapter 5.

2.6 SUMMARY

This chapter introduced the concepts of state responsibility, expropriation, investment as well as the processes, mechanisms or methods by which investor-state disputes are resolved.

With regard to state responsibility, it was shown that a state can incur international responsibility from the breach of international law, breach of treaty, breach of contract, or the enactment or failure to comply with its own laws. This international responsibility, especially which is underpinned by the duty to honour treaties, has enabled BITs, TIPs and investment agreements to spawn the ISDS industry.

Expropriation will always be contentious between host states and investors, due to the potential cost it has to both parties. The thin distinction between regulatory measures that are acceptable, and those that are expropriatory, the open-ended nature of key aspects such as indirect expropriation, the quantum for compensation, varying tribunal decisions, etc. adds to this controversy.

With regard to the concept of an investment, it was noted that there is no universal definition of an investment. Furthermore, it was noted the *Salini* criteria and subsequent ICSID tribunal decisions are not prescriptive. Instead, they are guidelines with regard to the characteristics which a transaction or business should have in order to qualify as an investment for the purpose of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. Based on the decisions in *Romak* and *Grupo Francisco Hermando Contreras*, these criteria may be applied to non-ICSID arbitrations. The *Salini* criteria (or variations thereof) are being gradually incorporated into BITs, TIPs, human rights treaties, sub-regional court practice, and model treaties such as the Brazil-Malawi Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investment (ACFI), India Model BIT, the SADC Model BIT and the PAIC.

With regard to investor-state dispute resolution methods, it was noted that both ISDS and litigation have challenges. Therefore, neither ISDS nor litigation is inherently better than the other. The circumstances of a host state or region are the best determinants of the appropriate method for the resolution of investor-state disputes. As Salacuse opines, litigation may be an attractive option for the resolution of investor-state disputes, if the rule of law in a state is satisfactory. In other circumstances such where there no rule of law in a host state, ISDS may be a better option for an investor. This issue is discussed further in Chapter 5 below.

The next chapter will analyse selected provisions of the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1, which regulate foreign investments at SADC level.

CHAPTER 3

THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS UNDER SADC LAW

3.1 INTRODUCTION

It will be recalled that one of the research sub-questions of this study is whether the remedies that are available to an investor based on Annex 1 in the event of expropriation are satisfactory or not.⁵⁶¹ Furthermore, one of the sub-objectives of this study is to analyse the options that are open to SADC with regard to the regulation of foreign investments, with regard to the mechanism and forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes.⁵⁶²

This chapter will address the above sub-question and sub-objective, and lays the basis for the discussion of the second issue that is undertaken in Chapter 5, and the recommendations made in Chapter 6. It commences with a historical background of SADC, followed by an analysis of selected provisions of the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1 insofar as they relate to the resolution of investor-state disputes in the event of expropriation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of SADC Member States' ISDS experience. Together with Chapter 4, this chapter will lay the basis for a view to be adopted, as to whether the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and Member State laws is satisfactory or not.

In the course of the analysis, the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1s will be compared to similar BITs and TIPs such as ACIA, the Brazil-Malawi ACFI,⁵⁶³ IACCIA, ECT, the EU-U.S.

⁵⁶¹ This is sub-question 1.2.4 in Chapter 1.

⁵⁶² This is objective 1.3.5 in Chapter 1.

⁵⁶³ The ACFI is discussed in Chapter 5 below.

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP),⁵⁶⁴ the India Model BIT,⁵⁶⁵ NAFTA, and the SADC Model BIT. The Annex 1s have both differences and similarities with these instruments, as will be shown during the analysis. These provide a context against which to interpret and analyse the Annex 1s.

The ECT and NAFTA are useful in the analysis because they have produced a vast body of international arbitral decisions, which can aid in the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the Annex 1's.⁵⁶⁶ On 8 April 2018, the ECT was the most invoked TIP (113 ISDS cases),⁵⁶⁷ followed by NAFTA (61 ISDS cases).⁵⁶⁸ The IACCIA is relevant herein as it reflects the foreign investment regulatory policy approach within COMESA, SADC's partner in the T-FTA. The DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Zambia, Zimbabwe are members of both SADC and COMESA.⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁴ The TTIP is discussed in Chapter 5 below.

⁵⁶⁵ The India Model BIT is discussed in Chapter 5 below.

⁵⁶⁶ For a list of NAFTA ISDS cases opened against Canada see <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng> (Date of use: 10 April 2018), <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/35?partyRole=2> (Date of use: 10 April 2018); For cases opened against the USA see <https://www.state.gov/s//c3741.htm> (Date of use: 25 March 2017), <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/223?partyRole=2> (date of use: 10 April 2018); for cases opened against Mexico see <https://www.state.gov/s//c3742.htm> (Date of use: 10 April 2018), <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/136?partyRole=2> (Date of use: 17 January 2018). For access to cases opened in terms of the ECT see <http://www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-settlement/all-investment-dispute-settlement-cases/> (Date of use: 10 April 2018), <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicablelia> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁶⁷ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicablelia> (Date of use: 8 April 2018).

⁵⁶⁸ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicablelia> (Date of use: 8 April 2018).

⁵⁶⁹ <http://www.comesa.int/comesa-members-states/> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

The ACIA has produced only two ISDS cases,⁵⁷⁰ but it is still relevant to show an Asian perspective to the issues herein. The ACFI, TTIP and India Model BIT are relevant herein because they are used as case studies in Chapter 5 below, to demonstrate among others the lessons that SADC can learn therefrom.

The SADC Model BIT is used herein because it reflects SADC's BIT policy at the time of its conclusion.⁵⁷¹ It does not have the force of a legal instrument, and is a recommended template for the Member States that wish to enter into BITs, as permitted under Annex 1.⁵⁷² According to the introduction to the Model BIT, the Model BIT came into being in support of the requirement of the 2006 Annex 1, which required the harmonisation of investment laws and practices in SADC.⁵⁷³ The Model BIT project was funded by the EU FIP Project and the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ) on behalf of the German government.⁵⁷⁴

The PAIC is used herein because it is the recommended Model BIT template for AU Member States. It therefore has a similar legal status to the SADC Model BIT, except that its scope is continent-wide. Being a recent instrument from 2016 just like the 2016 Annex 1,⁵⁷⁵ the PAIC shows the current BIT policy direction of combined AU Member States, especially with regard to the resolution of investor disputes. For the same

⁵⁷⁰ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByApplicableArea> (date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁵⁷¹ For a brief discussion of the Model BIT see Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) *Law Democracy and Development* 175 at 179-182.

⁵⁷² SADC Model BIT at 3; Article 26 2006 Annex 1; Article 24 2016 Annex 1; Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 414 at 419.

⁵⁷³ SADC Model BIT at 3.

⁵⁷⁴ SADC Model BIT at 4.

⁵⁷⁵ The version of the PAIC used here was circulated on 8 February 2017.

reason, the PAIC could be a guide as to what can be expected with regard to dispute resolution from the upcoming AfCFTA investment protocol.

3.2 SADC: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

SADC is one of the recognised eight RECs of the African Union (AU).⁵⁷⁶ It is comprised of 16 Member States situated in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as four Indian Ocean Islands neighboring Eastern Africa.⁵⁷⁷ SADC's roots can be traced to the activities of the Frontline States (FLS), namely Angola Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Eswatini and Tanzania and Zambia.⁵⁷⁸ The idea of the Front Line States was born out of the Liberation Committee of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in the 1960s. This initiative used Tanzania as a base for the support of the liberation of other Southern African states, such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.⁵⁷⁹ Zambia and Botswana joined the initiative, the latter covertly so by accepting refugees

⁵⁷⁶ <https://au.int/en/organs/recs> (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁵⁷⁷ SADC Member States are: The Republic of Angola; The Republic of Botswana, The Democratic Republic of Congo, the Kingdom of Lesotho, the Republic of Madagascar, the Republic of Malawi, The Republic of Mauritius; the Republic of Mozambique, The Republic of Namibia, The Republic of Seychelles, the Republic of South Africa, The Kingdom of Eswatini, The United Republic of Tanzania, The Union of Comoros, The Republic of Zambia; and The Republic of Zimbabwe, available at <http://www.sadc.int> (Date of use: 09 October 2017).

⁵⁷⁸ SADC "Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan" (2004) at 1 http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017); SADC "Major Achievements and Challenges: 25 Years of Regional Cooperation and Integration" (2005) at 8 http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017). For a historical background of SADC see also Peters W *The quest for an African economic community: regional integration and its role in achieving African unity- the case of SADC* (Lang Frankfurt 2010) at 129-152.

⁵⁷⁹ SADC "Major Achievements and Challenges" at 8 http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

from Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.⁵⁸⁰ Nigeria also played a supporting role for the liberation of Southern African states by supporting the FLS.⁵⁸¹

The focus on the FLS was the political liberation of the region.⁵⁸² The FLS coordinated their efforts, resources, and strategies in the fight against colonialism, racism and white minority-rule.⁵⁸³ The idea was that since the States had common challenges of poverty and economic woes, they needed to work together to survive and achieve economic and social development. They also defended themselves against military attacks by the regime of the then apartheid South Africa.⁵⁸⁴ Once each State gained independence, it joined the FLS.⁵⁸⁵ After most of the states in the region achieved their main objective of political liberation from colonial rule, the focus of the FLS moved to the economic and social development of the region through co-operation and integration.⁵⁸⁶

⁵⁸⁰ SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 8
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁸¹ SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 8
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁸² SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 1
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017).

⁵⁸³ SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 1
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017).

⁵⁸⁴ SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 1
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017); SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 8
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁸⁵ Botswana joined in 1975, Mozambique and Angola joined in 1975, and Zimbabwe joined in 1980 and Namibia joined in 1990.

⁵⁸⁶ SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 1
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017).

In 1977, the FLS held consultations that led to a meeting of their respective Foreign Ministers in 1979.⁵⁸⁷ They agreed to convene an international conference at Arusha, Tanzania.⁵⁸⁸ This conference of Economic Ministers of the FLS and international participants took place during July 1979 at Arusha, Tanzania. The conference resolved to form a structure that will coordinate and promote regional cooperation efforts.⁵⁸⁹ The leaders of the then nine independent states met in Lusaka, Zambia on the 1st April 1980, where they formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).⁵⁹⁰ The Summit adopted a Declaration titled 'Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation' as well as a Programme of Action covering areas of Transport and Communications, Food and Agriculture, Industry, Manpower Development and Energy.⁵⁹¹ SADCC was formally constituted on the 20th July 1981.⁵⁹² The aim of the

⁵⁸⁷ SADC website (<http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/>) (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁸⁸ SADC "Major Achievements and Challenges" at 9 http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁸⁹ SADC "Major Achievements and Challenges" at 9 http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁹⁰ The founding states were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Eswatini, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe SADC "Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan" at 2 http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017); SADC "Major Achievements and Challenges" at 9 http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017); SADC 35th Summit Brochure (2015) at 36 https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of use: 18 February 2017); (<http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/>) (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁹¹ SADC "Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan" at 2 http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017); SADC "Major Achievements and Challenges" at 9 http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁹² SADC website <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/> (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

SADCC was to create regional economic integration, to mobilise resources for implementing national and interstate policies, and to secure international co-operation within the framework of the strategy of economic liberation.⁵⁹³ In 1989, a summit of the Heads of State and Government held in Harare, Zimbabwe resolved that SADCC be transformed into an international organisation by treaty.⁵⁹⁴

When Namibia attained independence in 1990, and the end of apartheid in South Africa was imminent, the SADCC region moved from war and fighting colonialism to attaining peace and stability.⁵⁹⁵ At the continental level, the Heads of State and Government of the OAU signed the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC Treaty) during 1991, thereby setting the course for the establishment of the AEC.⁵⁹⁶ This treaty made RECs the building blocks of the continent.⁵⁹⁷ Based on these events as well as the decision of the summit of Heads of State and Government of SADCC held in Harare as stated above, the SADCC Heads of State and Government signed the SADC Treaty on 17 August 1992 at Windhoek, Namibia.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹³ SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 2
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017).

⁵⁹⁴ SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 24
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017); SADC website
<http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/> (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁹⁵ SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 2
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017).

⁵⁹⁶ *Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community* (date of signature 3 June 1991, in force 12 May 1994 (AEC Treaty)
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/trtdocs/en/aec/trt_aec.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁹⁷ Article 6 AEC Treaty.

⁵⁹⁸ SADC “Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan” at 3
http://www.sadc.int/files/5713/5292/8372/Regional_Indicative_Strategic_Development_Plan.pdf

A recent regional integration milestone with major implications for SADC is the formation of the AfCFTA. The AU launched the negotiations towards the formation of the AfCFTA during January 2012.⁵⁹⁹ The first phase of the negotiations was concluded at the Tenth Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly, where the agreement establishing the AfCFTA, the Protocol on Trade in Goods, the Protocol on Trade in Services and the Protocol on Rules and Procedures on the Settlement of Disputes on were adopted on 21 March 2018.⁶⁰⁰ 44 out of the 55 AU Member States signed the AfCFTA agreement at this stage.⁶⁰¹ The next round of negotiations, which will commence during the second

lan.pdf (Date of use: 09 October 2017); SADC “Major Achievements and Challenges” at 10
http://www.sadc.int/files/7713/5826/4978/Achievements_booklet.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017); SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 36
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of use: 18 February 2017); SADC website <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/> (Date of use: 28 February 2017). The founding members of SADC are: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa joined SADC in 1994, Mauritius joined in 1995, The DRC and Seychelles joined in 1998, and Madagascar joined in 2005 (SADC website <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/>) (Date of use: 28 February 2017).

⁵⁹⁹ African Union (Assembly) (Eighteenth Ordinary Session, 29-30 January 2012) “Decision on Boosting Intra-African Trade and Fast Tracking the Continental Free Trade Area” Doc.EX.CL/700(XX), Assembly/AU/Dec.394(XVIII)
https://au.int/sites/default/files/decisions/9649-assembly_au_dec_391_-_415_xviii_e.pdf (Date of use: 18 December 2017).

⁶⁰⁰ African Union (Assembly) “Decision” at para 5-6
<https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1834-au-decision-on-the-draft-agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-21-march-2018-1/file.html> (Date of use: 28 March 2018).

⁶⁰¹ See African Union (Assembly) (Tenth Extraordinary Session, 21 March 2018) “INDICATION OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS SIGNED AT THE 10TH EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY ON THE LAUNCH OF THE AFCFTA”
<https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1831-legal-instruments-signed-at-10th-extraordinary-summit-on-afcfta-21-march-2018/file.html> (Date of use: 22 March 2018).

half of 2018 and conclude in 2020, will focus on competition policy, investment and intellectual property rights.⁶⁰²

The AfCFTA is a flagship programme of *Agenda 2063*,⁶⁰³ and is also a milestone towards the formation of the AEC, as contemplated in Articles 1 and 6(2) (c) of the AEC Treaty.⁶⁰⁴ In order to lay a basis for the formation of the AfCFTA, the AU resolved that each of the eight RECs must establish their Free Trade Areas (FTAs) by 2014.⁶⁰⁵ However, only COMESA, EAC, and SADC managed to achieve this by forming the T-FTA. The T-FTA Agreement was signed by 15 of the member states on 10 June 2015.⁶⁰⁶ It was thereafter going to be signed by the remaining 11 states, and then await

⁶⁰² African Union (Assembly) “Decision” at para 12(iii), 13
<https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1834-au-decision-on-the-draft-agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-21-march-2018-1/file.html> (Date of use: 28 March 2018).

⁶⁰³ African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at viii, 97
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017); African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023” at 15, 37, 63, 120
<http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf> (Date of use: 16 November 2017). For a detailed background to the AfCFTA see African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 51-152.

⁶⁰⁴ African Union (Commission) (2017) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 2,3,15, 118 and 149
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

⁶⁰⁵ African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 14-16, 123
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

⁶⁰⁶ The states which signed the treaty at that point are: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Eswatini. See SADC (2015) 35th Summit Brochure at 30. For an analysis of the T-FTA see Angweyi V “The Tripartite Free Trade Area: A Step Closer to the African Economic Community?” 2016 European Yearbook of International Economic Law 589-613.

ratification by at least 14 member states in order to come into effect.⁶⁰⁷ Thereafter, and in line with the aims, objectives, and principles in Articles 2, 3, 4 and 6 of the AEC Treaty, the eight regional FTAs would be consolidated to form the AfCFTA. States that are not members of regional FTAs will join the AfCFTA directly.⁶⁰⁸

The 26-member T-FTA is the biggest economic regional block in the AfCFTA. It represents 59 percent (USD 1.3 Trillion) of African GDP, 57 percent of Africa's population, and half of AU Member States.⁶⁰⁹ SADC, as a member of the T-FTA, is an important and active player in the formation of the AfCFTA. South Africa was the 19th state to sign the T-FTA during July 2017, in preparation for the formation of the AfCFTA.⁶¹⁰ Thereafter, South Africa hosted the 3rd Meeting of the AfCFTA Technical Working Groups from 22 August 2017 to 01 September 2017.⁶¹¹ SADC and the T-FTA are therefore active in the formation of the AfCFTA.

⁶⁰⁷ The remaining states were: Botswana, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Libya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, South Sudan and Zambia. See SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 30
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of use: 18 February 2017).

⁶⁰⁸ SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 2
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of use: 18 February 2017); African Union (Assembly) (undated) "Draft Framework, Road Map and Architecture for Fasttracking the CFTA at 4
https://www.tralac.org/images/Resources/Continental_FTA/Draft_framework_for_the_CFTA.pdf (Date of use: 08 April 2017).

⁶⁰⁹ Communiqué of the Third COMESA-EAC-SADC Summit: "Towards a Single Market" (10 June 2015) at para 1(b) <https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/tfta/1079-communicue-third-tripartite-summit-june-2015-english/file.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁶¹⁰ <http://www.sabc.co.za/wps/portal/news/main/tag?tag=TFTA> (Date of use: 09 September 2017); <https://www.tralac.org/news/article/11860-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-a-breakthrough-in-july-2017-as-south-africa-signs-the-tripartite-agreement.html> (Date of use: 09 September 2017); <http://www.spoor.com/en/News/the-tfta-and-your-trade-marks/> (Date of use: 09 September 2017).

⁶¹¹ <https://www.tralac.org/images/docs/12091/summary-update-on-the-outcomes-of-the->

The main objective of the AfCFTA is to reduce trade protectionism and to liberalise and boost intra-Africa trade.⁶¹² The AfCFTA will comprise of 55 AU Member States, a population of 1.2 Billion people, and a combined GDP of USD 3.4 Trillion.⁶¹³ The milestones for the formation of the AEC are as follows:⁶¹⁴

- (a) The creation and strengthening of RECs in regions where such do not yet exist (to be completed in 1999);
- (b) The strengthening of intra-REC integration and inter-REC harmonisation, and the gradual removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers (to be completed in 2007);
- (c) The creation of a free trade area (AfCFTA) and customs union in each REC (to be completed in 2017);
- (d) The coordination and harmonisation of tariff and non-tariff systems among RECs to create the continent-wide Customs Union, and a Free Trade Area (to be completed in 2019);
- (e) The creation of a continent-wide African Common Market (to be completed in 2023);

third-meeting-of-the-cfta-twgs-durban-september-2017.pdf (Date of use: 07 September 2017).

⁶¹² African Union (Assembly) (undated) "Draft Framework, Road Map and Architecture for Fasttracking the CFTA at 3

https://www.tralac.org/images/Resources/Continental_FTA/Draft_framework_for_the_CFTA.pdf (Date of use: 08 April 2017);

<https://www.tralac.org/news/article/12252-chief-negotiators-conclude-the-7th-round-of-continental-free-trade-area-cfta-negotiations.html> (Date of use: 06 November 2017).

⁶¹³ <https://au.int/en/ti/cfta/about> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁶¹⁴ African Union (Commission) "Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About" at 15

https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

- (f) The creation of a continent-wide Economic and Monetary Union, a Currency Union and Pan-African Parliament (to be completed in 2028).

The AfCFTA aims to build on RECs' achievements and structures. As the building blocks of the AfCFTA, RECs are integral to the AfCFTA. Hence RECs will remain relevant, and they will be intensely involved in the architecture and operations of the AfCFTA.⁶¹⁵ RECs shall be involved through their participation in the AfCFTA architecture.⁶¹⁶ Among others, RECs will coordinate and administer Regional Technical Working Groups, Regional Steering Committees, and Regional Ministerial Oversight Committees for the implementation of the AfCFTA.⁶¹⁷ The RECs will also administer the Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Committee for the AfCFTA.⁶¹⁸ The REC institutional structures for the AfCFTA will then link-up with those at the continental level.⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁵ African Union (Commission) "Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About" at 122-124
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

⁶¹⁶ African Union (Commission) "Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About" at 121
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

⁶¹⁷ African Union (Commission) "Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About" at 122
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

⁶¹⁸ African Union (Commission) "Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About" at 122
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

⁶¹⁹ African Union (Commission) "Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About" at 122
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

Agenda 2063 also includes RECs extensively in its implementation. Thus RECs shall be involved in the implementation of *Agenda 2063* by means of their participation in the Ministerial Committee on Agenda 2063.⁶²⁰ The roles of RECs in *Agenda 2063* include:⁶²¹

- (a) The provision of leadership at inception in the regional and national consultative process with respect to the implementation of Agenda 2063;
- (b) Participation in continental level operational oversight in Agenda 2063 implementation;
- (c) The adaptation and alignment of continental long and medium term Agenda 2063 10-Year Plans;
- (d) The issuing plan guidelines to the Member States;
- (e) The coordination of preparation and implementation of regional programs;
- (f) The integration of regional monitoring and evaluation reports and provision of leadership in resource mobilisation for Agenda 2063.

One hopes that as the AfCFTA and *Agenda 2063* programmes and initiatives are implemented, the AU, RECs and Member States heed the advice of Fagbayibo with regard to the obstacles that hinder the realisation of supranationalism in Africa. Fagbayibo notes in this regard that the following factors hinder regional organisations from exercising supranational powers: weak institutional machinery, non-integration of

⁶²⁰ African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 111 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

⁶²¹ African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 122 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

key integration initiatives, crowded integration landscape, skewed distribution of benefits and hegemonic threats, policies, instability and a democracy deficit.⁶²²

It is also noteworthy that one of *Agenda 2063* objectives is to achieve full gender parity in public and private institutions.⁶²³ Hope suggests that the AfCFTA should contribute towards this objective in one way or another.⁶²⁴

In terms of Article 3 of the SADC Treaty, SADC is an international organisation with a separate existence independent of its members. It has the power to enter into contracts, acquire property, and to sue and be sued in its own capacity. The headquarters of SADC are in Gaborone, Botswana.⁶²⁵ SADC's Vision is:

... one of a Common Future, a future within a regional community that will ensure economic wellbeing, improvement of the standards of living and quality of life, freedom and social justice, and peace and security for the people of Southern Africa.⁶²⁶

⁶²² Fagbayibo B "Common Problems Affecting Supranational Attempts in Africa: An Analytical Overview" 2013 (16) (1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 32-68 at 47-58.

⁶²³ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023" at 23, 37, 45, 77, 79 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf> (Date of use: 16 November 2017.)

⁶²⁴ See Hope A "A gender Responsive AfCFTA" Tralac Newsletter, 8 March 2018 available at <https://us2.campaign-archive.com/?u=3bfd093b3611382763c2c1a5e&id=99767baa0e> (Date of use: 10 March 2018).

⁶²⁵ Article 2(2) SADC Treaty.

⁶²⁶ SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 3 https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of use: 18 February 2017).

SADC's Mission is:

...to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient, productive systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good governance, and durable peace and security; so that the region emerges as a competitive and effective player in international relations and the world economy.⁶²⁷

SADC's main objectives are:

...to achieve economic development, peace, and security, and growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa, and support the socially disadvantaged through Regional Integration. These objectives are to be achieved through increased Regional Integration, built on democratic principles, and equitable and sustainable development.⁶²⁸

The SADC Treaty enshrines human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.⁶²⁹ These provisions, especially that relating to the rule of law, facilitate investment protection. In the context of an expropriation, the rule of law forms part of the requirement of due process, in that an affected person must be entitled to access to the courts or relevant tribunals in order to challenge the expropriation.

⁶²⁷ SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 23
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of use: 18 February 2017).

⁶²⁸ Article 5 SADC Treaty; SADC 35th Summit Brochure at 5
https://www.sadc.int/files/1914/5019/1522/35th_SADC_Summit_Brochure.pdf (Date of use: 18 February 2017).

⁶²⁹ Article 4 SADC Treaty.

The SADC Tribunal recognised this principle in *Mike Campbell*.⁶³⁰ The quality of the rule of law is important in SADC, because Annex 1 requires investor-state disputes to be referred to the courts of a host state.⁶³¹ This means that an investor may be prejudiced (e.g. by being exposed to denial of justice), if it is compelled to refer a dispute to a court in a country that has a poor state of rule of law.

The SADC Treaty has policies and strategies that guide the organisation in its quest for regional development and integration.⁶³² The policies are listed in Article 5(1), while the strategies are in Article 5(2). Together, these are known as the SADC Common Agenda.⁶³³ The SADC Common Agenda can be traced to the founding declaration of SADC.⁶³⁴ Under the heading, “A Shared Future”, the SADC Declaration of August 1992 (also known as the Windhoek Declaration)⁶³⁵ states that Southern Africa needs to arrange its affairs in such a way that it creates opportunities for its people, and to elevate them to become participants in regional and international markets.⁶³⁶ The Declaration also notes that the countries of Southern Africa are individually weak and underdeveloped. They must, therefore, come together in order to be a “serious player in international relations”.⁶³⁷

⁶³⁰ *Mike Campbell* at 26.

⁶³¹ Article 27 2016 Annex 1.

⁶³² <http://www.sadc.int/sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-deputy-executive-secretary-Regional-integration/> (Date of use: 15 July 2017).

⁶³³ <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-common-agenda/> (Date of use: 25 September 2015).

⁶³⁴ http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf (Date of use: 10 January 2018)

⁶³⁵ SADCC Declaration “A Shared Future”, the Windhoek Declaration” at 1-10
http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁶³⁶ SADCC Declaration at 4
http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁶³⁷ SADCC Declaration at 4

The Common Agenda overlaps with the regional and continental economic integration objectives of the AU and the New Partnership for Africa's Development ("NEPAD").⁶³⁸ Some of the AU's objectives that are relevant to the Common Agenda in terms of regional and continental economic integration are the promotion of sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels, the economic integration of African economies,⁶³⁹ and the coordination and harmonisation of policies between existing and future RECs for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union. NEPAD also has regional and continental integration as one of its objectives.⁶⁴⁰ NEPAD's founders saw RECs as the building blocks of continental integration.⁶⁴¹ Hence SADC, the AU, and NEPAD all share the same objective of continental integration, which is encompassed in the Common Agenda.

The SADC Tribunal is the judicial organ of SADC.⁶⁴² It was officially established on the 18th of August 2005. Its headquarters are in Windhoek, Namibia.⁶⁴³ The 2006 Annex 1

⁶³⁸ http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁶³⁹ <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/continental-interregional-integration/sadc-African-Union/>. Article 24(1) allows SADC to cooperate with other organizations in the achievement of its objectives.

⁶⁴⁰ Article 3(j) *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15, (date of signature 7 November 2000, in force 26 May 2001)

https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7758-treaty-0021_-_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_e.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁶⁴¹ United Nations Regional Coordination Mechanism Africa "Challenges and Prospects in the Implementation of NEPAD" (RCM-Africa Secretariat 2007) at 3 <http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/rcm/2009/reports/Challenges%20and%20Prospects.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁶⁴² UN RCM-Africa "Challenges and Prospects in the Implementation of NEPAD" at 8 <http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/rcm/2009/reports/Challenges%20and%20Prospects.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁶⁴³ Article 9(7), 16 SADC Treaty.

<http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/> (Date of use: 20 August 2017).

enabled investors to refer investor-state disputes to the SADC Tribunal.⁶⁴⁴ However, the tribunal's tenure was short-lived, as its operations were effectively suspended in 2010 by the SADC Summit⁶⁴⁵ after the tribunal handed down its decision in *Mike Campbell*. Thereafter, the SADC Tribunal Protocol was amended in 2014 to remove access to the court by natural and legal persons.⁶⁴⁶

As of 2014, SADC had a total population of approximately 426,249 million,⁶⁴⁷ and a total landmass of 7 774 166 square kilometers.⁶⁴⁸ Based on 2015 data, SADC had an aggregate Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately USD 725 Billion.⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴⁴ Article 28(2)(a) 2006 Annex 1.

⁶⁴⁵ The SADC Tribunal is the judicial organ of the SADC region. It was formed in terms Article 9 of the SADC Treaty.

⁶⁴⁶ Article 15(1) of the SADC Tribunal Protocol of 2000 as amended. For a discussion the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal see Zenda F *The SADC Tribunal and the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes* (LLD Thesis UNISA 2010); Phooko (2016) *The SADC Tribunal: Its Jurisdiction, Enforcement of Its Judgments and The Sovereignty of Its Members*.

⁶⁴⁷ See Table 2, Appendix hereto. The DRC is the most populous state in SADC, with a population of 79 million, followed by South Africa (55 million), Tanzania (55 million), Mozambique (28 million), Madagascar (25 million) and Angola (25 million), Namibia (2.5 million), Botswana (2.3 million), Lesotho (2.1 million), Mauritius (1.3 million), (1.3 million), and Seychelles (100 000).

⁶⁴⁸ See Table 2, Appendix hereto. The DRC is the largest SADC state, with a landmass of 2 344 858 Km, followed by Angola (1 246 700 Km²), South Africa (1 2221 037 Km²), Tanzania (947 303 Km²), Namibia (824 268 Km²), Mozambique (799 380 Km²) and Zambia (752 612 Km²). The smallest states are the islands of Seychelles (457 Km²), and Mauritius (1 969 Km²).

⁶⁴⁹ See Table 2, Appendix hereto. During this period, South Africa had the largest GDP in SADC (USD 349 Billion).⁶⁴⁹ The state with the second largest GDP was Angola (USD 146 Billion), followed by Tanzania (USD 48 Billion), Democratic Republic of Congo (USD 35 Billion), Zambia (USD 27 Billion), and Zimbabwe (USD 14 Billion).⁶⁴⁹ Seychelles had the lowest GDP (USD 1.5 Billion), followed by Lesotho (USD 2 Billion) and Eswatini (USD 4.4 Billion). Zambia had the highest GDP growth at 10% per annum, followed DRC (9.5%), Seychelles (8.7%), Tanzania (7%), Mozambique (7%), Malawi (6.5%), Botswana (4.4%), Angola (4.8%), Namibia (4.5%), Lesotho (4.5%), Botswana (4.4%), Eswatini (2.6%) and South Africa (1.5%). Due to their low populations, Seychelles and Mauritius had the highest per capita income at USD 15 758 and USD 9 945 respectively.⁶⁴⁹ They were followed by Botswana (USD 7 123), South Africa (USD 6 481), Angola (USD 6 054), Namibia (USD 5 588), Eswatini (USD 3 531), Zambia (USD1 715), Zimbabwe (USD 965),

SADC attracts a fair amount of FDI, both from within Africa and from abroad. Hence SADC Member States rank on *par* with other African states in terms of the size of FDI inflows. For example, during 2015, SADC states were among the top Ten African States that received 75 percent of the total African FDI inflows. These were Egypt (USD 14.5 Billion), Nigeria (USD 8.6 Billion), Mozambique (USD 5.1 Billion), South Africa (USD 4.7 Billion), Morocco (USD 4.5 Billion), Cote d'Ivoire (USD 3.5 Billion), Angola (USD 2.7 Billion), Kenya (USD 2.4 Billion), Senegal (USD 1.9 Billion), and Cameroon (USD 1.8 Billion).⁶⁵⁰ Angola, Mozambique, South Africa represented SADC in this group, and together they received 19 percent of African FDI inflows for the year.⁶⁵¹

In terms of the top ten for incoming FDI projects in Africa, South Africa led with 118 projects, followed by Kenya (85), Morocco (71), Egypt (59), and Nigeria (51).⁶⁵² Mozambique and Tanzania were the two other SADC states to feature in the top ten, with 29 and 20 FDI projects respectively.⁶⁵³ The leading sectors that received FDI in 2015 are Coal, Oil & Natural Gas (USD 15.7 Billion; 24 percent), Alternative/Renewable Energy (USD 12.2 Billion; 18 percent), Real Estate (USD 8.7 Billion; 13 percent), Communications (USD 5.1 Billion), and Metals (USD 3.8 Billion; 6 percent).⁶⁵⁴

Tanzania (USD 952), Lesotho (USD 986), Mozambique (USD 627), Madagascar (USD 452), and Malawi (USD 342).

⁶⁵⁰ FDI Intelligence "The Africa Investment Report 2016" at 4
http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁶⁵¹ FDI Intelligence "The Africa Investment Report 2016" at 4
http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁶⁵² FDI Intelligence "The Africa Investment Report 2016" at 4
http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁶⁵³ FDI Intelligence "The Africa Investment Report 2016" at 4
http://www.casafrica.es/casafrica/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁶⁵⁴ FDI Intelligence "The Africa Investment Report 2016" at 10

FDI inflows into the SADC Member States during 2015 can be summarised as follows. Angola received USD 8.6 Billion, which was by far the highest FDI of all SADC States.⁶⁵⁵ Mozambique received the second highest FDI of USD 3.7 Billion, followed by South Africa (USD 1.7 Billion), DRC (USD 1.6 Billion), Zambia (USD 1.6 Billion), Tanzania (USD 1.5 Billion), and Namibia (USD 1 Billion).⁶⁵⁶ The rest of the States received less than USD 1 Billion.⁶⁵⁷ Eswatini is the only State whose net FDI inflows was negative, meaning that its FDI outflows exceeded its inflows. Lesotho, Malawi, and Eswatini have consistently received the lowest FDI since 2005. Each of these States never received over USD 200 Million in any one year.⁶⁵⁸ Zimbabwe ranked slightly above these States, and the most FDI it received in any one year is USD 544 Million.⁶⁵⁹ Mauritius has received a maximum of USD 589 in a year over the ten-year period.⁶⁶⁰ South Africa received less FDI in 2014 (USD 5.6 Billion) and 2015 (USD 1.7 Billion) than it did it in 2013 (USD 8.3 Billion).⁶⁶¹ Mozambique has consistently received over USD 3 Billion since 2011.⁶⁶² Tanzania and Zambia have also consistently increased their FDI since 2005.⁶⁶³ Madagascar also recovered from a low of USD 86 Million in 2005 to a high of USD 1 Billion in 2008 and 2009.⁶⁶⁴ Botswana's FDI inflows have been flat, with an average of approximately USD 400 Million each year.⁶⁶⁵

http://www.casafrika.es/casafrika/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁶⁵⁵ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.
⁶⁵⁶ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.
⁶⁵⁷ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.
⁶⁵⁸ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.
⁶⁵⁹ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.
⁶⁶⁰ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.
⁶⁶¹ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.
⁶⁶² See Table 3, Appendix hereto.
⁶⁶³ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.
⁶⁶⁴ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.
⁶⁶⁵ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.

3.3 THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN SADC

This section will discuss the selected provisions of the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1's as indicated in the introduction above.

Annex 1 is contained in the FIP, a multilateral TIP that seeks to harmonise the regulation of finance and investments in SADC.⁶⁶⁶ The FIP was concluded in terms of Articles 21 and 22 of the SADC Treaty. Article 21 of the SADC Treaty requires the Member States to cooperate in all areas necessary to foster regional development and integration, while Article 22 requires the Member States to conclude such protocols as may be necessary for each area of co-operation. The FIP therefore discharges the mandate of Member States to integrate the SADC community in the areas covered by the FIP, of which foreign investments is the area covered by Annex 1. Article 19 of the 2006 Annex 1 and Article 17 of the 2016 Annex 1 contribute towards regional integration by requiring Member States to harmonise their laws, policies and practices in line with the Annex.⁶⁶⁷

The FIP was signed on 18 August 2006, and it came into effect on 16 April 2010.⁶⁶⁸ However, Annex 1 had a short tenure, since the SADC Summit at its 36th session on 31 August 2016 approved the Draft Agreement Amending Annex 1 to the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment, which repealed the 2006 Annex 1 and introduced the 2016

⁶⁶⁶ The scope of investments covered by the Protocol is described in Article 1(2) of the SADC FIP. For an analysis of the 2006 Annex 1 see Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) *Law, Democracy and Development* 175 at 175-92. For a comparative analysis of 2006 and 2016 Annex 1 see Kondo 2017 (20) *Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal* 1- 47.

⁶⁶⁷ See Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) *Law, Democracy and Development* 175 at 178.

⁶⁶⁸ <http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/1009>. Article 29 of the SADC FIP stipulates that the FIP shall come into force after ratification by two-thirds of Member States.

Annex 1.⁶⁶⁹ The 2016 Annex 1 is supposed to come into effect upon ratification by three quarters of Member States,⁶⁷⁰ although according to Chidede, the 2016 Annex 1 is in effect.⁶⁷¹

In a nutshell, Annex 1 seeks to reduce the exposure of SADC Member States to investor claims, by among others narrowing the scope of covered investments, and reducing investor rights.

Annex 1 seeks to create a favorable investment environment within SADC, with the aim of attracting and promoting foreign investment.⁶⁷² It envisages the creation of a SADC-wide investment zone with a common Regional Investment Policy Framework.⁶⁷³ This is done through Article 19 of the 2006 Annex 1 and Article 17 of the 2016 Annex 1, which require that Member States' investment policies, laws, and practices be harmonised into a single investment regime applicable across the anticipated SADC investment zone.⁶⁷⁴ The Baseline Study on the implementation of the FIP describes the harmonisation process as follows:

⁶⁶⁹ See Communiqué of the SADC 36th Summit at para 37 https://www.sadc.int/files/4914/7274/8383/Communique_of_the_36th_SADC_Summit_Eswatini__31_August_2016.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

⁶⁷⁰ Article 3 of the Agreement Amending Annex 1 (attached to the beginning of the new Annex 1).

⁶⁷¹ See Chidede T "Amendments of Annex 1 to the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol: Are they in force yet?" <https://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/11875-amendments-of-annex-1-to-the-sadc-finance-and-investment-protocol-are-they-in-force-yet.html> (Date of use: 15 October 2017); Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 5.

⁶⁷² Article 2(2) (a) 2006 Annex 1. The other ways of achieving this objective are listed in Article 2(2) (c)-(n) of 2006 Annex 1. See also Article 2 of the 2016 Annex 1.

⁶⁷³ Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175 at 178.

⁶⁷⁴ See also Article 17 2016 Annex 1.

Focus shifts from the individual Member States to the region. The agreement is reached on harmonized standards, systems, and policies. Through domestic adoption of these, individual domestic frameworks start to look and function the same. At the end of this phase, all domestic frameworks are harmonized to a regional standard.⁶⁷⁵ (Emphasis added)

In order to make harmonisation a reality, Member States agree to co-operate to create a favorable investment climate in the SADC region, as envisaged by Annex 1.⁶⁷⁶ Selected provisions of 2006 and 2016 Annex 1 that relate to the resolution of investor-state disputes will now be considered.

3.3.1 Definition of an investment

It was shown in Chapter 2 above that there is no universally agreed definition of an investment in ISDS. In SADC, the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1's provide the definitions of an investment, while investments at Member State level are defined in investment laws. The 2006 Annex 1 defines an investment as:

...the purchase, acquisition or establishment of productive and portfolio investment assets, and in particular, though not exclusively, includes:

- (a) Movable and immovable property and any other property rights such as mortgages, liens or pledges;
- (b) Shares, stocks and debentures of companies or interest in the property of such companies;

⁶⁷⁵ Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175 at 178.

⁶⁷⁶ Article 3 2006 Annex 1; Article 2 2016 Annex 1.

- (c) Claims to money or to any performance under contract having a financial value, and loans;
- (d) Copyrights, know-how (goodwill) and industrial property rights such as patents for inventions, trademarks, industrial designs and trade names;
- (e) Rights conferred by law or under contract, including licenses to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit natural resources.⁶⁷⁷

It must be borne in mind that the *Salini* criteria may apply to the above definition, as explained above.⁶⁷⁸ The effect of this is that some of the categories of assets that are in the definition of investments above, such as shares, claims to money, copyright, may not meet the *Salini* criteria should a dispute arise.⁶⁷⁹ This will be a realistic risk, as shown by the decision in *Romak*.

The definition above is similar to that of an investment under Article 4(c) of the ACIA, Article 159(2) of the COMESA Treaty and Article 1(9) of the IACCIA.

On the other hand, the 2016 Annex 1 defines an investment as:

... an enterprise within the territory of one Member State established, acquired or expanded by an investor of the other Member State, including through the constitution, maintenance or acquisition of a juridical person or the acquisition of shares, debentures or other ownership instruments of such an enterprise,

⁶⁷⁷ Article 1(2) 2006 Annex 1.

⁶⁷⁸ See the Conclusion in Chapter 2 above.

⁶⁷⁹ In fact, all the investment categories stated may not meet the *Salini* criteria, by virtue of their nature i.e. the 2006 Annex 1 uses an open-list asset-based definition and not an enterprise-based one.

provided that the enterprise is established or acquired in accordance with the laws of the Host State and registered in accordance with the legal requirements of the Host State.⁶⁸⁰ (Emphasis added)

This definition is the same as that provided in the SADC Model BIT⁶⁸¹ and the PAIC.⁶⁸² The definition is most likely to meet the *Salini* criteria, as it requires the establishment of a business, unlike the definition in the 2006 Annex 1 that requires an investor to hold an asset only.

The main difference between the old and new definitions is that while the old definition requires the acquisition of the assets specified in the definition as a pre-requisite (open-list asset-based definition), the new definition requires that there must be an enterprise, which may possess assets in the normal course (enterprise-based definition).⁶⁸³

The other noticeable change brought by the 2016 Annex 1 is that the new definition excludes the following from the definition of an investment (the definition in the 2006 Annex 1 did not have exclusions):

- (a) Debt securities issued by a government or loans to a government;
- (b) Portfolio investments;
- (c) Claims to money that arise solely from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Member State to

⁶⁸⁰ Article 1(2) 2016 Annex 1.

⁶⁸¹ SADC Model BIT at 9.

⁶⁸² Article 4(4) PAIC.

⁶⁸³ Article 1(2) 2016 Annex 1. See also Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal at 6-8.

an enterprise in the territory of another Member State, or the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, or any other claims to money that do not involve the kind of interests set out in subparagraphs (a) through (g) above.⁶⁸⁴

Except for the exclusion of portfolio investments, these exclusions are similar to those contained in Article 1139 of NAFTA, Article 4(c) of the ACIA,⁶⁸⁵ and Article 1(9) of the IACCIA. The ECT does not provide exclusions and its definition of an investment is very broad.⁶⁸⁶ The new definition requires the existence of an enterprise, which must be incorporated in terms of the laws of and be located in a host state. An enterprise must have been established, acquired or expanded by investors “of another Member State”.

The implications of the compulsory registration of an enterprise in a Host State is that the Home State of a shareholder can exercise diplomatic protection against a Host State⁶⁸⁷ if a shareholder suffers injury in the hands of the Host State.⁶⁸⁸

⁶⁸⁴ Article 1(2) 2016 Annex 1 FIP.

⁶⁸⁵ Article 4(c), footnote 3 ACIA.

⁶⁸⁶ Article 1(6) states that an investment means “every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an Investor”.

⁶⁸⁷ United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017) Article 2 defines diplomatic protection as:

... the invocation by a State, through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the implementation of such responsibility.

⁶⁸⁸ United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” Article 11 http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017). This article is specifically aimed at the protection of shareholders.

While it is acceptable for SADC to set nationality requirements for enterprises and investors who will be covered by Annex 1,⁶⁸⁹ company ownership structures can be complex, and a group of companies may involve hundreds of subsidiaries, especially when dealing with multinational enterprises.⁶⁹⁰ Often, the ultimate owners of a subsidiary of a multinational enterprise incorporated in a particular locality are based in foreign jurisdictions. UNCTAD questions the effectiveness of restricting the ownership of local operating entities to locals. It states that:

The fact that corporate structures are complex and that consequently investor nationality is becoming less and less clear in practice has important implications for national and international investment policies. The effectiveness of foreign ownership restrictions, for example, is called into question if a domestic majority owner is itself owned by other foreign investors.⁶⁹¹

UNCTAD further notes that globally, 41 percent of foreign subsidiaries are owned by their corporate parents through an ownership structure with at least one intermediate subsidiary based in a country different from that of the ultimate owner.⁶⁹² UNCTAD

⁶⁸⁹ See for example the legitimate reasons which are often used to limit investments to nationals of a state at UNCTAD “World Investment Report 2016” (United Nations New York and Geneva 2016) at 159-160
<http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=6087&lang=1&intItemID=3489>
(Date of use: 15 October 2017).

⁶⁹⁰ UNCTAD “World Investment Report 2016” at 134
<http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=6087&lang=1&intItemID=3489>
(Date of use: 15 October 2017).

⁶⁹¹ UNCTAD “World Investment Report 2016” at 126
<http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=6087&lang=1&intItemID=3489>
(Date of use: 15 October 2017).

⁶⁹² UNCTAD “World Investment Report 2016” at 125
<http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=6087&lang=1&intItemID=3489>
(Date of use: 15 October 2017).

furthermore notes that financial institutions, institutional investors, founding families and governments often own publicly listed MNEs. These are the ultimate beneficial owners who benefit from the activities of an MNE.⁶⁹³ In this regard, it is noteworthy that while the 2016 Annex 1 requires that an enterprise must be owned by an investor who is from a Member State as discussed above, it does not require that an investor which is a juristic entity be owned by persons who are from a Member State.⁶⁹⁴ Therefore, nothing prevents a shareholder who is from outside SADC from ultimately owning an entity that is an investor in terms of the above definition.

Despite the above definition of an investment, if an investor-state dispute arose, and an investor commenced ICSID arbitration based on the 2006 Annex 1, a tribunal would in addition to assessing whether an investment in question met the definition of an investment provided in the 2006 Annex 1, also assess if the investment met the criteria for an investment in terms of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. It is during this process that a tribunal would determine if the investment in question meets the *Salini* criteria. It was shown above that the *Salini* criteria can be applied to non-ICSID arbitration, and thus it is ideal if an investment meets the stated criteria so that a tribunal can have jurisdiction *ratione materiae*.

Depending on the policy objectives of a state, investments can be given a narrow or restricted definition, or an all-encompassing or wide definition, as discussed below. The SADC Model BIT deals with the options available in this regard and recommends a

⁶⁹³ UNCTAD “World Investment Report 2016” at 131
<http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Download.asp?docid=6087&lang=1&intltemID=3489>
(Date of use: 15 October 2017).

⁶⁹⁴ The definition of an investor does not prescribe that the owner (e.g. a shareholder of an investor) be from a SADC Member State. See the discussion in this section under subparagraph (c) below.

restricted definition that describes an investment as an enterprise.⁶⁹⁵ The Model BIT explains that a restricted approach is ideal from a developing country perspective.⁶⁹⁶ UNCTAD notes in this regard that a wide definition of an investment exposes a host state to unexpected liabilities.⁶⁹⁷

Recent examples of restricted definitions of an investment in developing states can be found in the India Model BIT⁶⁹⁸ and the PAIC.⁶⁹⁹ These instruments first restrict the scope of an investment by providing that an investment must be in the form of an enterprise, and nothing else. They further exclude debt securities issued by governments, loans to governments, portfolio investments, and claims to money arising from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a natural or legal entity, or claims relating thereto.⁷⁰⁰

The India Model BIT further narrows the definition of an investment by providing that an enterprise must have real and substantial business operations.⁷⁰¹ In a novel move, the TTIP proposal,⁷⁰² India Model BIT⁷⁰³ and the PAIC⁷⁰⁴ define an investment by reference to the *Salini* criteria. They provide that a business must have: made substantial and long-term investment in a host state, employed a substantial number of employees in the host state, assumed a business risk, made a substantial contribution to the development

⁶⁹⁵ SADC Model BIT, commentary at 13.

⁶⁹⁶ SADC Model BIT, commentary at 13.

⁶⁹⁷ UNCTAD “Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development 2015” at 90 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 2017).

⁶⁹⁸ Article 1(6) India Model BIT.

⁶⁹⁹ Article 4(4) PAIC.

⁷⁰⁰ See Article 1(2), 1(7) India Model BIT; Article 4(4) PAIC.

⁷⁰¹ Article 1.2 India Model BIT.

⁷⁰² Article x.2 TTIP.

⁷⁰³ Article 1.2(1) India Model BIT.

⁷⁰⁴ Article 4(4) Draft PAIC.

of a host state through its operations, e.g. through the transfer of skills and know-how, and the business must have been conducted in accordance with the law of the host state.⁷⁰⁵ The ACIA (whose definition of an investment is similar to that provided in the 2006 Annex 1) provides that an investment that consists of a single asset that does not meet the requirements of an investment (as in the *Salini* criteria) shall not be an investment.⁷⁰⁶ The Brazil-Malawi ACFI also requires an investment to have real and substantial business operations, and provides that an investment must be an enterprise established with a “long-lasting economic relation with a view to producing goods and services”.⁷⁰⁷ The 2016 Annex 1 fails to specify that investments must meet the *Salini* criteria. This leaves room for shell companies to obtain the protection of the 2016 Annex 1.

The TTIP,⁷⁰⁸ India Model BIT,⁷⁰⁹ and the PAIC⁷¹⁰ provide that an investment that was obtained by means of corruption, fraud and the like shall not be covered. This provision ensures that only legitimate investments are protected, and is a deterrent against corruption. The 2016 Annex 1 does not have such a provision. This is a significant omission that misses the opportunity to deter corruption by foreign investors.

Finally, the India Model BIT⁷¹¹ and the PAIC⁷¹² provide that investments must be made in terms of the laws of a host state. This further restricts the scope of protected

⁷⁰⁵ Article 1.2.2 India Model BIT. The requirement that the business must have been conducted in terms of the law of the host state is not part of the *Salini* criteria.

⁷⁰⁶ Article 4(c) footnote 2 ACIA.

⁷⁰⁷ Article 2(1) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

⁷⁰⁸ Article 6(6) TTIP Proposal.

⁷⁰⁹ Article 9 India Model BIT.

⁷¹⁰ Article 20(2), 20(3), 21 PAIC. The latter provision is in the form of a prohibition on investors not to partake in bribery activities in their Host States.

⁷¹¹ Article 1.6 India Model BIT.

investments by excluding non-compliant investments. The Annex 1 does not have such provisions.

By contrast, developed states use wide definitions of an investment. For example, the ECT⁷¹³ and the TTIP⁷¹⁴ provide the widest possible definitions of an investment, which include every conceivable asset class. The TTIP goes even further to cover investments that existed prior to the coming into effect of the TTIP.⁷¹⁵ The rationale for this wide definition is probably that because the EU is a leading capital exporter, a wider definition is in the interests of its nationals, as more of their investments abroad will be protected by the wide definitions. In North America, the NAFTA also provides a wide definition,⁷¹⁶ though not as wide as that provided by the ECT or TTIP. Again, the rationale should be similar to that of the EU. Brazil, as a developing capital exporter also adopts a wide definition of an investment that an investment shall be any type of property or right, directly or indirectly owned or controlled by an investor.⁷¹⁷ Based on the above, SADC as a developing region is on the right track by adopting a restricted definition of an investment. This will reduce the scope of covered investments, and thus reduces the scope of potential claims against host states.

3.3.2 Definition of an enterprise

As discussed in the preceding section, the 2016 Annex 1 requires an investment to be in the form an enterprise, while the 2006 Annex 1 does not have this requirement. This definition will be briefly considered. The 2016 Annex 1 defines an enterprise as:

⁷¹² Article 4(4) PAIC.
⁷¹³ Article 1(6) ECT.
⁷¹⁴ Article x2 TTIP Proposal.
⁷¹⁵ Article x1 TTIP Proposal.
⁷¹⁶ Article 1139 NAFTA.
⁷¹⁷ Article 2(1) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

... Any entity constituted or organized under the applicable laws of any State, whether or not for profit, and whether privately or governmentally owned or controlled, and includes a corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship, branch, joint venture, association, or other such organization (Emphasis added).⁷¹⁸

It is immediately apparent that this definition does not provide that an enterprise must be constituted under the laws of a SADC Member State. Rather it refers to “any State”, which is ambiguous. On the other hand, as shown above, the definition of an investment provides that an enterprise must be established or acquired in accordance with the laws of the host state, and be registered in accordance with the legal requirements of the host state.

The definition of an investment discussed above makes it clear that an enterprise must be incorporated in a SADC host state in order to qualify as an investment. Therefore, the above definition of an enterprise does not align with this requirement. It ought to state unequivocally that an enterprise must be constituted or organised under the applicable laws of a SADC Member State.

By contrast, the PAIC’s definition of an enterprise is properly drafted, and requires that an enterprise be constituted or incorporated in terms of the applicable laws and

⁷¹⁸ Article 1 2016 Annex 1.

regulations of a Member State.⁷¹⁹ The India Model BIT also requires that an enterprise be incorporated in terms of the laws of a Host State.⁷²⁰

3.3.3 Definition of an investor

The definition of an investor is equally important as that of an investment, as it defines who may be a potential claimant in an investor-state dispute with a host state (i.e. it determines jurisdiction *ratione personae*). A wide definition of an investor enables more potential claimants to sue a host state, while a restricted definition limits the number of potential claimants. Hence UNCTAD cautions in this regard that a wide definition of an investor can result in unanticipated coverage of persons.⁷²¹

The 2006 Annex 1 provides a nationality-neutral definition of an investor, and states that an investor is a person who has “been admitted to make or has made an investment,”⁷²² On the other hand, the 2016 Annex 1 introduces the nationality of an investor as well as the legality of an investment as a pre-requisite. It defines an investor as:

... a natural or a juridical person of a State Party making an investment in another State Party, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the State Party in which the investment is made.⁷²³ (Emphasis added)

⁷¹⁹ Article 4(1) PAIC.

⁷²⁰ Article 1.2(i) India Model BIT.

⁷²¹ UNCTAD “Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development” at 90 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 August 2017).

⁷²² Article 1(2) 2006 Annex 1.

⁷²³ Article 1(2) 2016 Annex 1.

Therefore, the definition of an investor in the 2016 Annex 1 contemplates four requirements. Firstly, an investor can be a natural or juristic person. Secondly, the investor must be from a SADC Member State. Thirdly, the investor must make an investment in another Member State, i.e. not in the investor's home state. Fourth, the investment must be made in terms of the laws and regulations of the host state.

The above definition of an investor is similar to that provided by the IACCIA.⁷²⁴ The ACIA also has a similar definition, but it does not require that an investment be made in terms of the laws of a Member State.⁷²⁵ The ECT,⁷²⁶ TTIP Proposal,⁷²⁷ India Model BIT,⁷²⁸ NAFTA,⁷²⁹ and the PAIC⁷³⁰ also require that an investor be a national of a Member State.⁷³¹

The requirement that an investor be "of a Member State" necessarily implies that a person who is not "of a Member State" will not qualify as an investor.⁷³² However, this provision is vague and open to interpretation since the 2016 Annex 1 does not define what "of a State Party" means. It is submitted that if "of a State Party" means that an investor must be a national of a host state, then an investor who is a national of a host state will possibly have the dual nationality of his/her home state (unless same was

⁷²⁴ Article 1(4) IACCIA.

⁷²⁵ Article 4(d) ACIA.

⁷²⁶ Article 1(7) ECT.

⁷²⁷ Article 1(1)(a) Chapter 1 (General Provisions) Trade in Services, Investment and E-Commerce

http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc_153669.pdf

(Date of use: 10 October 2017).

⁷²⁸ Article 1.9 India Model BIT.

⁷²⁹ Article 1139 NAFTA. However, the definition also defines a non-national of a member state as an investor.

⁷³⁰ Article 4(5) PAIC.

⁷³¹ Article 1(7).

⁷³² See also Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 9.

relinquished) as well as that of the host state.⁷³³ This will also mean that an investor's home state can exercise diplomatic protection in the event that the investor suffers injury at the hands of the host state. In that event, the home state must demonstrate that it has predominant nationality with regard to the investor, vis-à-vis the host state.⁷³⁴

However, if a natural person who is not a national of a host state is allowed to be an investor, the investor's home state can exercise diplomatic protection in the ordinary course in event that the investor suffers injury at the hands of the host state.⁷³⁵ It is therefore important that clear language is used to define who may be an investor, with the implications for diplomatic protection in mind as indicated above.

Nonetheless, nationality and not residence is a common criterion used to determine who can be an investor.⁷³⁶ The key is to use the appropriate language to define this, as stated above. In order to prevent the abuse of nationality for the purpose of obtaining the protection of BIT or other instrument, other criteria can be added to determine who may be an investor.

⁷³³ Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 9 notes that the new definition does not address the issue of dual nationality that may arise as discussed here.

⁷³⁴ Article 7 United Nations (International Law Commission) "Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection"
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017). See also Ngobeni 2012 (37) South African Yearbook of International Law 169-186.

⁷³⁵ See Article 3 United Nations (International Law Commission) "Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection"
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017). For recent international case of diplomatic protection involving SADC Member State see *Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo)* ICJ General List No.103, Judgment of 30 November 2010 and Judgment of 19 June 2012.

⁷³⁶ See for example Article 2(1) Brazil-Malawi ACFI, Article 4(e) ACIA, Article 2(1) ECT, Article 1.9 India Model BIT, and Article 1139 NAFTA.

Other TIPs deal with this issue as follows. The TTIP Proposal provides that a covered investment is one that is owned or controlled by investors of one Member State, and made in the other Member State.⁷³⁷ It emphasises this requirement by providing that a party can deny the benefits of the agreement to an investor if investors from a non-Member State own or control the investor.⁷³⁸ The India Model BIT provides that an investor must be a natural person from a state party, or a legal entity incorporated in terms of the laws of a state party, that is owned or controlled by persons from a state party, and having real and substantial business operations in the home state.⁷³⁹ The Brazil-Malawi ACFI is similar to the TTIP Proposal and the India Model BIT. It provides that for an investor to be covered in terms of the ACFI, it must be incorporated in a Member State, and it must establish a long-lasting economic relationship with a view to producing goods and services.⁷⁴⁰ The ACFI adds that persons who are nationals or permanent residents of a Member State must own an investor.⁷⁴¹

The practice of requiring an investor to have real and substantial business operations is good for the prevention of the use of shell companies and treaty shopping.⁷⁴² A recent

⁷³⁷ Article x1 TTIP Proposal.

⁷³⁸ Article 9 TTIP Proposal.

⁷³⁹ Article 1(6) India Model BIT.

⁷⁴⁰ Article 2.1 Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

⁷⁴¹ Article 2.1 Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

⁷⁴² For further reading on treaty shopping see Chaisse J “The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate Structuring and Restructuring to Gain Access to Investment Treaties and Arbitration” 2015 (11) *Hastings Business Law Journal* 225-305; Lee E “Treaty Shopping in International Investment Arbitration: How often has it occurred and how has it been perceived by tribunals?” LSE Working Paper Series 2015 No. 15-167, 1-54 <http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/Dissertations/WP167.pdf> (Date of use: 23 February 2017); Kirtley WL “The Transfer of Treaty Claims and Treaty-Shopping in Investor-State Disputes” 2009 (10) (3) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 427-461; Primec J *Enemy of the State: Is Treaty Shopping in Contradiction with The Rationale of Investment Law?* (Master’s Thesis University of Amsterdam 2015) <http://dare.uva.nl/cgi/arno/show.cgi?fid=621905> (Date of use: 24 February 2017);

study found that treaty shopping targets developing states in 80 percent of arbitration cases studied.⁷⁴³ Another study found that treaty shopping exposes a host state to claims by companies to which it would otherwise not allow entry.⁷⁴⁴ As a result of treaty shopping, a host state can find it difficult to regulate in the public welfare.⁷⁴⁵

Australia was recently exposed to a case based on treaty shopping in *Philip Morris Asia v Australia*.⁷⁴⁶ In this case, the claimant had changed its corporate structure in order to access ISDS under the Agreement between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of Australia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments. The change was done in anticipation of disputes that were to arise from the new regulation of cigarette packaging introduced by the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 and the Tobacco Plain Packaging Regulations 2011.⁷⁴⁷ The claimant's alleged rationale for the restructuring was to improve efficiencies, while taking into account political risk in Australia among other countries. However, the tribunal rejected this argument and found that the case was based on treaty shopping.⁷⁴⁸

Shreuer C "Nationality of Investors: Legitimate Restrictions v.s. Business Interests" 2009 (24) (2) ICSID Review Foreign Investment Law Journal 521-527; Wilske S "Protection of Taiwanese Investors under Third Party Bilateral Investment Treaties - Ways, Means and Limits of Treaty Shopping" 2011 (4) Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 145-177; Zhang X "Proper Interpretation of Corporate Nationality under International Investment Law to Prevent Treaty Shopping" 2013 (6) Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 49-73.
743 At 25, 28.

744 Prime J *Enemy of the State: Is Treaty Shopping in Contradiction with The Rationale Of Investment Law?* at 18.

745 Primec J *Enemy of the State: Is Treaty Shopping in Contradiction with The Rationale Of Investment Law?* at 19.

746 *Philip Morris Asia Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia* (PCA Case No. 2012-12) Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 17 December 2015.

747 *Philip Morris Asia Limited* at para 585-588. The tribunal summarized the case law on the issue at para 538ff. The corporate structure is described in para 95-98.

748 *Philip Morris Asia Limited* at para 98.

The tribunal in *Phoenix Action*⁷⁴⁹ also found that the investment in that matter was not *bona fide*, as it was made purely for the purpose of bringing ISDS proceedings against the Czech Republic.⁷⁵⁰

It is clear from the above discussion that the 2016 Annex 1 fails to address the possible abuse of nationality by investors. It therefore does not curb the use of shell companies and treaty shopping. As indicated earlier, the 2016 Annex 1 also fails to unequivocally deny protection to investments that were secured via corrupt means.

3.3.4 Expropriation

As shown in the preceding chapter, a state has a sovereign right to expropriate property, provided certain internal law requirements as discussed in this section are met.⁷⁵¹ However, states and regions are to some extent at liberty to vary the international law requirements,⁷⁵² and they do stipulate their own requirements to be met for an expropriation to be valid, as Annex 1 does. One such requirement is the quantum of compensation that an investor may obtain in the event of expropriation.⁷⁵³ The 2006 Annex 1 provides that a Member State may not expropriate an investment unless the expropriation is for a public purpose, is non-discriminatory, is in terms of due process, and is accompanied by prompt and adequate compensation.⁷⁵⁴ However, the 2016 Annex 1 adopts a cautious approach, and changes the standard of compensation from

⁷⁴⁹ *Phoenix Action* at para 101, 113, 134, 135 and 144.

⁷⁵⁰ *Phoenix Action* at para 142.

⁷⁵¹ See the discussion of expropriation in Chapter 2 above.

⁷⁵² An example here is that a state cannot change the requirements to provide that no compensation shall be paid for an expropriation, because this will violate the rule that compensation must be paid. Instead, a state can vary the quantum of compensation.

⁷⁵³ The various standards of compensation are discussed in Chapter 2 above.

⁷⁵⁴ Article 5 2006 Annex 1.

“prompt, adequate and effective” to “fair and adequate”.⁷⁵⁵ In addition, it provides a framework for the determination of fair compensation, as follows:

Fair and adequate compensation shall be assessed in relation to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place ... and shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier. However, where appropriate, the assessment of fair and adequate compensation shall be based on an equitable balance between the public interest and interest of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances and taking account of:

- (a) The current and past use of the property;
- (b) The history of its acquisition;
- (c) The fair market value of the investment;
- (d) The purpose of the expropriation;
- (e) The extent of previous profit made by the foreign investor through the investment; and
- (f) The duration of the investment.⁷⁵⁶

This provision is the same as Article 6.2 of the SADC Model BIT. The first sentence of Article 5(2)⁷⁵⁷ is similar to Articles 14(2) of the ACIA, 1110(2) of the NAFTA,⁷⁵⁸ and 13(1)

⁷⁵⁵ Article 5(1) 2016 Annex 1.

⁷⁵⁶ Article 5(2) 2016 Annex 1. See also Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 15-16.

⁷⁵⁷ Article 5(2) 2016 Annex 1 provides that

of the ECT.⁷⁵⁹ Therefore, tribunal decisions that applied NAFTA Article 1110(2)⁷⁶⁰ and ECT Article 13(1)⁷⁶¹ will among other sources be valuable in the application of Article 5(2).

By comparison, the ACIA,⁷⁶² ECT,⁷⁶³ and the TTIP Proposal⁷⁶⁴ provide for the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, while NAFTA provides for the payment of fair market value.⁷⁶⁵ The IACCIA,⁷⁶⁶ India Model BIT⁷⁶⁷ and the PAIC provide for the payment of adequate compensation.⁷⁶⁸ The ACFI provides for payment of effective compensation.⁷⁶⁹

Fair and adequate compensation shall be assessed in relation to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place (“date of expropriation”) and shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier.

⁷⁵⁸ Article 1110(2) of NAFTA provides that

Fair and adequate compensation shall be assessed in relation to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place (“date of expropriation”) and shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier.

⁷⁵⁹ Article 13(1) of the ECT provides that

Such compensation shall amount to the fair market value of the Investment expropriated at the time immediately before the Expropriation or impending Expropriation became known...

⁷⁶⁰ See for example *Metalclad* at para 118 – 131.

⁷⁶¹ See for example *Anatolie Stati* at para 314 – 406; *Yukos Universal Limited* at para 1758-1829; *Hulley Enterprises Limited* at para 1758-1829.

⁷⁶² Article 14(1) (c) ACIA.

⁷⁶³ Article 13(1) (d) ECT.

⁷⁶⁴ Article 5(1) (d) TTIP Proposal.

⁷⁶⁵ Article 1110(2) NAFTA.

⁷⁶⁶ Article 20(1) (c) and Article 159(3) *Investment Agreement for the COMESA Investment Area* (date of signature 23 May 2007, not in force)
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3225> (Date of use: 15 October 2017).

⁷⁶⁷ Article 5.1 India Model BIT.

⁷⁶⁸ Article 11(1) (c) PAIC.

⁷⁶⁹ Article 8(2)(c) Brazil-Malawi ACFI

Like the 2016 Annex 1, the India Model BIT⁷⁷⁰ and the PAIC provide guidelines for the determination of compensation.⁷⁷¹

The 2016 Annex 1 has also relaxed the international law requirement that payment of compensation must be prompt. It allows a host state to settle a judgment for the payment of compensation obtained by an investor in annual installments over a period of three years, or over such period as the parties may agree upon.⁷⁷² The judgment will also bear interest at a rate to be agreed upon by the parties.⁷⁷³ The IACCIA also provides for the payment of compensation in installments over a period agreed between the parties.⁷⁷⁴ The PAIC does not have a similar provision.

It must be noted that the standard of compensation for expropriation provided in Annex 1 and the other TIPs discussed in this Chapter will in all probability not apply in the event that an expropriation is found to be illegal. This is because reparation in terms of Article 31 of ARSIWA may be payable in such event.

3.3.5 FET

The 2016 Annex 1 has abandoned the right to FET, which was provided for in the 2006 Annex 1.⁷⁷⁵ The ACIA⁷⁷⁶, ECT,⁷⁷⁷ NAFTA⁷⁷⁸ also provide for FET. In ISDS, there is no

⁷⁷⁰ Article 5.7 India Model BIT.

⁷⁷¹ Article 12 PAIC.

⁷⁷² Article 5(4) 2016 Annex 1; Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 16.

⁷⁷³ Article 5(4) 2016 Annex 1.

⁷⁷⁴ Article 20(5) IACCIA.

⁷⁷⁵ Article 6(1) 2006 Annex 1.

⁷⁷⁶ Article 11.

⁷⁷⁷ Article 10(1).

⁷⁷⁸ Article 1105(1).

consensus on what FET is.⁷⁷⁹ Neither is there an acceptable legal test that can be used to determine breach of FET.⁷⁸⁰ Probably due to these reasons, FET is one of the most common grounds for claims against states, since its vague nature makes it difficult for a state to defend itself.⁷⁸¹ According to UNCTAD, investors use FET as a basis to sue host

⁷⁷⁹ UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment”, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II, (New York and Geneva 2012) http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017) at 2-3, 7-8. For a brief discussion of FET see also at 5-15.

⁷⁸⁰ UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 11-12 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

⁷⁸¹ See <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches> (Date of use 10 April 2018); Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 17-19; UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at 39-92 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017). For selected tribunal decisions on FET see *ADF Group v United States of America* ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)00/1 Award of 9 January 2003, *Cargill Incorporated, CMS Gas Transmission Company, Desert Line Projects, Duke Energy, EDF, Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, LLP v Argentine Republic* ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3 Award of 22 May 2007, *GAMI Investments, Alex Genin, Glamis Gold, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd et al v United States of America* UNCITRAL Award of 12 June 2011, *International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v The United Mexican States* UNCITRAL Award of 26 January 2006, *Jan de Nul, LG&E Energy Corp* (Decision on Jurisdiction), *Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P v The Government of Canada* UNCITRAL Award of 31 March 2010, *Metalpar S.A and Buen Aire v The Argentine Republic* ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5 Award of 6 June 2008, *Mondev International Ltd v United States of America* ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 Award of 11 October 2002, *MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile v Republic of Chile* ICSID Case No. ARB01/7 Award of 25 May 2004, *L.F.H Neer (USA) v United Mexican States* Reports of Awards Vol IV pp60-66 Decision of 15 October 1926, *Occidental v Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Petroleum Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador* ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11 Award of 05 October 2012, *Pope v Talbort Inc v The Government of Canada* NAFTA Award on Merits of Phase 2 of 10 April 2001, Award in Respect of Damages of 31 May 2002, *PSEG Global and Another v Republic of Turkey* ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5 Award of 19 January 2007, *Saluka Investments B.V. v The Czech Republic* UNCITRAL Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic’s Counterclaim of 7 May 2004, *S.D. Myers Inc. v The Government of Canada* UNCITRAL Partial Award of 13 November 2000, *Tecmed, Waste Management Inc. v United Mexican States* ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3 Award of 30 April 2004.

states in all arbitration matters based on BITs.⁷⁸² FET was used to commence at least 412 ISDS by 8 April 2018.⁷⁸³ Of these cases, 105 were successful.⁷⁸⁴

After an extensive analysis of ISDS tribunal decisions, UNCTAD summarises the content of the FET obligation as among others:⁷⁸⁵

- (a) Manifest arbitrariness in decision-making, that is, measures taken purely on the basis of prejudice or bias without a legitimate purpose or rational explanation;
- (b) The denial of justice and disregard of the fundamental principles of due process;
- (c) Targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or religious belief;
- (d) Abusive treatment of investors, including coercion, duress, and harassment.

UNCTAD adds that the broad nature of FET threatens governmental administrative action and policy-making.⁷⁸⁶ This is not far-fetched, considering FET is a leading basis for the opening of ISDS cases against host states as discussed above, as well as FET's

⁷⁸² UNCTAD "Fair and Equitable Treatment" at 39
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

⁷⁸³ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches> (Date of use: 8 April 2018). Please note that these cases are mixed with those that are based on Most Favoured Nation and denial of justice.

⁷⁸⁴ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches> (Date of use: 8 April 2018).

⁷⁸⁵ UNCTAD "Fair and Equitable Treatment" at xvi
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

⁷⁸⁶ UNCTAD "Fair and Equitable Treatment" at 1-2.
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).

potential financial impact on states. Awards based on FET can also be very high, as Ecuador was recently ordered to pay USD 1.7 Billion in damages for breach of FET obligations.⁷⁸⁷

The TTIP Proposal provides for FET, but seeks to avoid the challenges of its ambiguity by defining it in terms of parameters such as denial of justice and a fundamental breach of due process etc.⁷⁸⁸ While the majority of investment treaties contain FET provisions, a trend of excluding FET is emerging.⁷⁸⁹

Even if the 2016 Annex 1 does not have FET obligations, Article 6(1) of the 2016 Annex 1 contains a national treatment (NT) clause. This clause obliges a Member State to treat foreign investors no less favorably than it treats domestic businesses in like circumstances.⁷⁹⁰ However, Member States can, as an exception, treat domestic businesses differently, on the basis of legislation that grants preferential treatment to domestic businesses in order to achieve national developmental objectives.⁷⁹¹ The objective of NT in a business context is to ensure that foreigners who do business in a

⁷⁸⁷ This took place in *Occidental Petroleum Corporation*.

⁷⁸⁸ Art 3(2) TTIP Proposal.

⁷⁸⁹ See UNCTAD “Fair and Equitable Treatment” at xiv, 18-20.
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf (Date of use: 20 October 2017).
The Brazilian ACFI, India Model BIT, and the PAIC also do not provide for FET. The SADC Model BIT recommends its exclusion (at 22).

⁷⁹⁰ For a discussion of national treatment see Galea I and Biris B “National Treatment in International Trade and Investment Law” 2014 (55) *Acta Juridica Hungaria* 174-183; UNCTAD “International Investment Agreements: Key Issues” Vol. 1 (2004) (New York, United Nations 2004) at 161-189, available at HeinOnline; UNCTAD (1999) “National Treatment” United Nations, New York and Geneva
<http://unctad.org/en/Docs/psiteitd11v4.en.pdf>, (Date of use: 15 October 2017); Salacuse *The Law of Investment treaties* at 245-250.

⁷⁹¹ Article 6(3) 2016 Annex 1.

state are treated similarly to their domestic counterparts who are in like circumstances.

The tribunal in *Parkerings* said in this regard:

National treatment and *Most-Favoured-Nation treatment* are treaty clauses that have the same substantive effect as the international treatment standard: foreigners should be afforded treatment no less favorable than the one granted to local citizens. The international law requirement, in fact, acts as a minimum requirement as it would be useless for the States party to a treaty to grant benefits less sweeping than customary law. In other words, all the requirements, be they national treatment, most favored- nation-treatment or non-discrimination at large, will in effect bar discrimination against foreign nationals investing in the country concerned...⁷⁹² (Emphasis added)

The ACIA,⁷⁹³ ECT,⁷⁹⁴ and IACCIA⁷⁹⁵ India Model BIT⁷⁹⁶ and NAFTA,⁷⁹⁷ all provide for NT.

3.3.6 Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment (MFN)

Just as it did with FET, the 2016 Annex 1 also abandoned MFN treatment.⁷⁹⁸ The Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses define an MFN clause as a treaty provision in terms whereof a state undertakes an obligation towards another State to accord most-

⁷⁹² *Parkerings* at para 367.

⁷⁹³ Article 5 ACIA.

⁷⁹⁴ Article 10(3), 10(7) ECT.

⁷⁹⁵ Article 17 IACCIA.

⁷⁹⁶ Article 4 India Model BIT.

⁷⁹⁷ Article 1102 NAFTA.

⁷⁹⁸ See also Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 10.

favoured-nation treatment to investors in an agreed sphere of relations.⁷⁹⁹ Most-Favoured-Nation treatment is defined as:

⁷⁹⁹ Article 4 of the United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on most-favoured-nation clauses with commentaries” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1978 Vol. II Part Two, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its Thirtieth Session at 8, UN General Assembly Official Records, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.I (Part 2) (1979) http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_3_1978.pdf (Date of use: 19 February 2017). A comprehensive discussion hereof is beyond the scope of this study. The following sources are useful on the subject: United Nations (International Law Commission) “Final Report: Study Group on the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause” Sixty-seventh session Geneva, 4 May – 5 June and 6 July – 7 August 2015, A/CN.4/L.852 <http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/L.852> (Date of use: 18 January 2018); Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development “Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law” (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2004/02, OECD Publishing) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/518757021651> (Date of use: 15 October 2017); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “Most Favoured Nation Treatment” (United Nations, New York) <http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=353>, (Date of use: 15 October 2017); Cole T “The Boundaries of Most Favoured Nation Treatment in International Investment Law” 2012 (33) Michigan Journal of International Law 537-585 <http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=mjil> (Date of use: 19 February 2017); Thulasidhass PR “Most-favoured Nation Treatment in International Investment Law: Ascertaining the Limits Through Interpretative Principles” 2015 (7) (1) Amsterdam Law Forum, VU University Amsterdam <http://amsterdamlawforum.org/article/view/346/512> (date of use: 18 January 2018); Parker SL “A BIT at a Time: The Proper Extension of the MFN Clause to Dispute Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties” 2012 (2) (1) The Arbitration Brief 30-63 <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=ab> (Date of use: 18 January 2018); Radi Y “The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the Trojan Horse” 2007 (18) (4) European Journal Of International Law 757–774 <http://www.ejil.org/article.php?article=232&issue=9> (Date of use: 19 February 2017); Salacuse *The Law of Investment treaties* at 251-254; Schill SW “Multilateralizing Investment Treaties through Most-Favored-Nation Clauses” 2009 (27) Berkeley Journal of International Law 496-566 <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol27/iss2/5>; Jakobson PN *Most Favoured Nation Treatment Application in International Investment Arbitration A Study on Conflicting Precedence in International Dispute Settlement Procedure* (Master’s Thesis University of Oslo Faculty of Law 2011) https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/22714/Master_thesis.pdf?sequence=1 (Date of use: 19 February 2017).

...treatment accorded by the granting State to the beneficiary State, or to persons or things in a determined relationship with that State, not less favorable than treatment extended by the granting State to a third State or to persons or things in the same relationship with that third State.⁸⁰⁰

Depending on the wording of an MFN clause, an MFN clause in an investment treaty is usually for the benefit of the investors and investments of the parties to the treaty.⁸⁰¹ MFN clauses are controversial in that they give foreign investors rights, which they would otherwise not have, since MFN clauses allow them to claim better treatment than a Host State provides to investors from third-party states.⁸⁰² MFN clauses by their nature can be problematic for developing states with limited financial resources, as they can lead to unexpected litigation.

The ACIA,⁸⁰³ ECT,⁸⁰⁴ IACCIA,⁸⁰⁵ NAFTA⁸⁰⁶ and the PAIC have MFN clauses, while the SADC Model BIT recommends its exclusion.⁸⁰⁷

⁸⁰⁰ Article 5 United Nations (International Law Commission) (1978) "Draft Articles on most-favoured-nation clauses with commentaries" (Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1978 Vol. II Part Two, Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its Thirtieth Session at 8, UN General Assembly Official Records, UN Doc A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.I (Part 2) (1979))
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_3_1978.pdf (Date of use: 19 February 2017)

⁸⁰¹ Article 8 United Nations (International Law Commission) "Draft Articles on most-favoured-nation clauses with commentaries"
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_3_1978.pdf (Date of use: 19 February 2017.

⁸⁰² Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 10.

⁸⁰³ Article 6 ACIA.

⁸⁰⁴ Article 10(3) ECT.

⁸⁰⁵ Article 19 IACCIA.

⁸⁰⁶ Article 1103 NAFTA.

⁸⁰⁷ At 22-23 SADC Model BIT.

3.3.7 Investor-State dispute resolution

The 2006 Annex 1 provides that in the event of an investor-state dispute,⁸⁰⁸ an investor must be given access to the courts, judicial and administrative tribunals in a host state.⁸⁰⁹ Furthermore, investor-state disputes that have not been amicably settled shall after local remedies have been exhausted,⁸¹⁰ and after the expiry of a period of six months from the declaration of a dispute, be submitted to ISDS if either an investor or host state so requires.⁸¹¹ Where the parties choose ISDS, the parties may agree to refer the dispute to the ICSID, or to arbitration in terms of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.⁸¹² If upon expiry of a period of three months from the date of declaration of a dispute the parties do not agree on a choice of arbitration forum, then the dispute shall be settled by arbitration in terms of the UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules.⁸¹³

However, the 2016 Annex 1 has removed investor access to ISDS, and only provides for the resolution of investor-state disputes in the local courts of host states.⁸¹⁴ Other jurisdictions deal with the resolution of investor-state disputes as follows.⁸¹⁵

The ACIA provides that in the event of a dispute, an investor may litigate in the local courts of a host state, or it may commence ICSID, UNCITRAL, ASEAN or such other

⁸⁰⁸ Article 27 Annex 1. See also Kondo 2017 (20) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 1 at 28-30.

⁸⁰⁹ For a discussion of this requirement as applied by the SADC Tribunal see *Mike Campbell* at 26-41.

⁸¹⁰ The requirement regarding exhaustion of local remedies is subject to the proviso that the remedies need not be exhausted if to do so will be futile.

⁸¹¹ Article 28(1) 2006 Annex 1.

⁸¹² Article 28(2) 2006 Annex 1.

⁸¹³ Article 28(3) 2006 Annex 1.

⁸¹⁴ Article 25 2016 Annex 1. The use of local courts as a forum for investor-state disputes in SADC is discussed in the next Chapter and will therefore not to be discussed herein.

⁸¹⁵ A detailed discussion of recent developments in this regard in Brazil, the EU and India is undertaken in Chapter 5 below.

arbitration as the parties may agree upon.⁸¹⁶ These options come with a fork-in-the-road (or a no u-turn) provision, in terms whereof once an investor selects a forum, then other options are no longer available.⁸¹⁷ Claims are also subject to a prescription period of three years,⁸¹⁸ and there are mandatory consultations before arbitration or litigation can commence.⁸¹⁹

In COMESA, the IACCIA imposes a six-month cooling-off period calculated from the issue of a notice to initiate a claim.⁸²⁰ During this period, a party shall seek a mediator to assist in resolving the dispute.⁸²¹ If the parties fail to choose a mediator after three months, then the President of COMESA makes the choice for them.⁸²² If the dispute is not settled, then an investor may litigate in the host Member State or the CCJ.⁸²³ Alternatively, the investor may commence ICSID, UNCITRAL or such arbitration as the parties may agree to.⁸²⁴ Claims are subject to a three-year prescription period,⁸²⁵ and a fork-in-the-road provision.⁸²⁶

The ECT requires investor-state disputants to settle a dispute within three months from the date of request for such settlement.⁸²⁷ If the dispute cannot be resolved, then an

⁸¹⁶ Article 33(1) ACIA.
⁸¹⁷ Article 33(1) proviso ACIA.
⁸¹⁸ Article 34(1) (a) ACIA.
⁸¹⁹ Article 31 ACIA.
⁸²⁰ Article 26(2) IACCIA.
⁸²¹ Article 26(4) IACCIA.
⁸²² Article 26(5) IACCIA.
⁸²³ Article 28(1) (a)-(b) IACCIA.
⁸²⁴ Article 28(1) (c) IACCIA.
⁸²⁵ Article 28(2) IACCIA.
⁸²⁶ Article 28(3) IACCIA.
⁸²⁷ Article 26(1)-(2) ECT.

investor may commence litigation in the courts of the host state.⁸²⁸ Alternatively, an investor may commence ICSID, UNCITRAL or ICC arbitration.⁸²⁹

NAFTA requires an investor to adhere to a cooling off period of three months prior to the commencement of arbitration.⁸³⁰ An investor has a choice of either ICSID or UNICTRAL arbitration.⁸³¹ Claims are subject to a three-year prescription period,⁸³² as well as a fork-in-the-road provision.⁸³³ Claims are not presented to the local courts of the host state on the basis that an impartial party must instead adjudicate such claim.⁸³⁴

The PAIC provides that each AU Member State may resolve investor-state disputes according to its own laws and policies.⁸³⁵ It does not prescribe any particular method for the resolution of these disputes.

The provisions of the ACFI, India Model BIT and the TTIP Proposal regarding the resolution of investor-state disputes are discussed in Chapter 5 below and will not be repeated here.

3.3.8 SADC's ISDS experience

The above discussion would not be complete without a discussion of the extent to which SADC Member States have been, and continue to be exposed to ISDS claims. At the

⁸²⁸ Article 26(3) ECT.

⁸²⁹ Article 26(3)-(4) ECT.

⁸³⁰ Article 1118 NAFTA.

⁸³¹ Article 1120(1) NAFTA.

⁸³² Article 1116(2), 1117(2), 1121(1) (b), 1121(2) (b) NAFTA.

⁸³³ Article 1121(1) (b) NAFTA.

⁸³⁴ Article 1115 NAFTA

⁸³⁵ Article 42(1) PAIC.

time of writing, there are major ISDS cases against some SADC Member States.⁸³⁶

These disputes validate the necessity to revisit and analyse the security of foreign investments in SADC in view of recent developments.

Historically, there has been a handful of ISDS cases against the following SADC Member States: DRC (4), Lesotho (2), Madagascar (3), Mauritius (2), Mozambique (2), South Africa (1), Tanzania (2) (plus recent two cases discussed below), and Zimbabwe (3, plus one recent case discussed below).⁸³⁷

Nationals of SADC have also initiated ISDS against SADC and non-SADC host states. Mauritian investors take the lead in terms of the number of ISDS commenced by them (6 cases),⁸³⁸ followed by South Africans (1),⁸³⁹ and nationals of Seychelles (1).⁸⁴⁰

⁸³⁶ For a database of ISDS cases per host state and other criteria, see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry> (Date of use: 05 November 2017).

⁸³⁷ See <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByCountry> (Date of use: 12 November 2017).

⁸³⁸ See <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/134?partyRole=1> (Date of use: 12 November 2017). The cases concerned are (in descending chronological order): *Astro All Asia Networks and South Asia Entertainment Holdings Limited v India* (UNCITRAL), *Courts (Indian Ocean) Limited and Courts Madagascar S.A.R.L v Republic of Madagascar* (ICSID Case No. ARB/13/34), *Khaitan Holdings Mauritius Limited v India* (UNCITRAL), *CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius private Limited, and Telcom Devas Mauritius Limited v Republic of India* (PCA Case No. 2013-09), *Progas Energy Ltd v Pakistan* (UNCITRAL), and *Bechtel Enterprises Holdings, Inc. and GE Structured Finance (GESF) v The Government of India* (UNCITRAL).

⁸³⁹ See <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/195?partyRole=1> (Date of use: 12 November 2017). The cases concerned are *Burmilla Trust, The Josias Van Zyl Family Trust and Josias Van Zyl v The Kingdom of Lesotho* (PCA Case No. 2016-21), *Oded Besserglik v Republic of Mozambique* (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)14/2), and *Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Limited, Josias Van Zyl, The Josias Van Zyl Family Trust and others v The Kingdom of Lesotho* (PCA Case No. 2013-29).

⁸⁴⁰ See <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/188?partyRole=1> (Date of use: 12 November 2017). The case concerned is *Consolidated Exploration Holdings Ltd. And others v Kyrgyz Republic* (ICSID Case No. ARB (AF) 13/1).

Recently, Madagascar,⁸⁴¹ Mauritius,⁸⁴² Mozambique⁸⁴³ and Tanzania⁸⁴⁴ faced a barrage of new international investor-state arbitration claims,⁸⁴⁵ while Tanzania and South Africa are being challenged for legislative amendments to their mining laws, as explained below.

Tanzania recently made legislative amendments to its natural and mining resources legislation.⁸⁴⁶ The amendments entitle the government to have a minimum of 16 percent “non-dilatable, free carried” interest in mining companies, which can be increased to 50 percent, commensurate with the value of tax benefits provided to the owner of that asset by the government of Tanzania.⁸⁴⁷ They also prohibit investor-state disputes relating to the extraction, exploitation, acquisition, and use of natural wealth and resources from being adjudicated in foreign jurisdictions and forums.⁸⁴⁸ Finally, the amendments enable

⁸⁴¹ *(DS)2, S.A, Peter de Sutter and Kristof de Sutter v Republic of Madagascar* (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/18), opened on 14 June 2017; *LTME Mauritius and Madamobil Holdings Mauritius Limited v Republic of Madagascar* (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/28), opened on 9 August 2017).

⁸⁴² *Thomas Gosling and others v Republic of Mauritius* (ICSID Case No. ARB/16/32), opened on 26 January 2017.

⁸⁴³ *CMC Muratori Construction CMC Di Ravenna SOC. Coop, CMC MuratoriCementisti CMC Di Ravenna SOC. Coop A.R.L Maputo Branch and CMC Africa, CMC Africa Austral, LDA v Republic of Mozambique* (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/23), opened 14 July 2017.

⁸⁴⁴ *Eco Development in Europe AB & others v United Republic of Tanzania* (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/33), opened on 11 September 2017.

⁸⁴⁵ See <http://www.iareporter.com/news-and-analysis/> (Date of use: 25 October 2017). Unfortunately, details of these arbitrations are not yet public.

⁸⁴⁶ The legislation is: The Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Renegotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act, 2017, The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017, and The Written Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2017.

⁸⁴⁷ Section 10(1) - (2) The Written Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act.

⁸⁴⁸ Section 11 The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act.

the government to review and terminate agreements that expose Tanzania among others to foreign laws and forums.⁸⁴⁹

As if to complicate the situation, one law firm has encouraged investors to mount legal challenges to Tanzania's actions.⁸⁵⁰ Large mining companies were quick to challenge the above amendments. On 4 July 2017, Acacia Mining announced that it was commencing ISDS against Tanzania relating to the Bulyanhulu Mine and Uzwagi Mine, based on these amendments.⁸⁵¹ After ten days, AngloGold Ashanti announced that it too had commenced ISDS against Tanzania, relating to its Geita Mine.⁸⁵²

A similar situation is unraveling in South Africa, where the Chamber of Mines of South Africa is locked in an acrimonious litigation with the South African government. The Chamber of Mines has applied to the High Court of South Africa, North Gauteng Division (Pretoria) for an order reviewing and setting aside a Mining Charter that was recently launched by the Minister of Mineral Resources.⁸⁵³ The grounds for review are too numerous to state here, suffice to say that one key objection is that mining companies

⁸⁴⁹ Section 6(2)(i) The Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Renegotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act.

⁸⁵⁰ <http://www.kwm.com/en/knowledge/insights/tanzania-natural-resources-mining-Legislative-reform-changes-20170710> (Date of use: 25 October 2017).

⁸⁵¹ See Acacia "Announcement" 4 July 2017

<http://www.acaciaming.com/~media/Files/A/Acacia/press-release/2017/update-on-developments-in-tanzania-20170704.pdf> (Date of use: 25 October 2017).

⁸⁵² See AngloGold Ashanti "Press Release", 13 July 2017

https://thevault.exchange/?get_group_doc=143/1501167539-PR20170713Geita.pdf (Date of use: 25 October 2017).

⁸⁵³ See Chamber of Mines "Media Statement", 18 October 2017

<http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/> (Date of use 27 October 2017). The Notice of Motion detailing the relief sought, and the Founding Affidavit in support of the application, can be found at <https://goo.gl/xiBsR4> and <https://goo.gl/h7cbML> (Date of use 27 October 2017). The Mining Charter that is being challenged is attached to the Founding Affidavit (Annexure FA5 thereof).

must have a 30 percent Black Economic Empowerment ownership, up from 26 percent.⁸⁵⁴ It is impossible to speculate on the direction that this dispute may take, as the relationship between the parties has broken down so much that the Chamber of Mines once said that it will only talk to the Minister of Mineral Resources via the courts.⁸⁵⁵

Another key development that may lead to protracted legal disputes is the decision of the Parliament of the Republic of South African of 27 February 2018, which mandated the Constitutional Review Committee to review Section 25 of the Constitution so as to enable the expropriation of property without compensation.⁸⁵⁶ The Constitutional Review Committee is expected to report back on 30 August 2018. Despite assurances that the investor community needs not be concerned about this development, it is unlikely that all affected persons will accept expropriation without compensation.⁸⁵⁷

⁸⁵⁴ The grounds for review are stated at para 3-6 of the Founding Affidavit.

⁸⁵⁵ See Chamber of Mines “Media Statement”, 25 October 2017
<http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/component/jdownloads/send/29-2017/491-chamber-of-mines-statement-on-minister-gibaba-s-inaugural-mtbps> (Date of use: 27 October 2017).

⁸⁵⁶ See Parliament of the Republic of South Africa “Press Release”, 27 February 2018
<https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-gives-constitution-review-committee-mandate-review-section-25-constitution> (Date of use: 4 March 2018);
<https://www.fin24.com/Economy/ramaphosa-were-going-ahead-with-land-expropriation-without-compensation-20180216>; <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/breaking-national-assembly-adopts-motion-on-land-expropriation-without-compensation-20180227> (Date of use: 4 March 2018).

⁸⁵⁷ See <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/international-community-should-not-panic-over-land-reform-sisulu-20180304>;
<https://www.fin24.com/Companies/Agribusiness/ramaphosa-says-no-one-should-be-nervous-over-land-20180115>; <https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/eff-on-land-expropriation-no-one-will-lose-their-house-20180227>;
<https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/land-expropriation-without-compensation-what-does-it-mean-20180304-5>;
<https://www.fin24.com/Economy/expropriation-could-cause-widespread-bankruptcy-banker-20180302-2>; <https://www.fin24.com/Economy/move-towards-land-expropriation-could-have-unintended-results-warn-farm-bodies-20180228>;
<https://www.agrisa.co.za/media-release-motion-land-political-populism-trumps-national-interest/> (Date of use: 4 March 2018).

In Zimbabwe, on 16-17 August 2017, some of the farmers who were involved in the *Mike Campbell* case issued notices to commence ISDS against Zimbabwe in terms of the 2006 Annex 1.⁸⁵⁸ However, developments in this matter are not yet public. Zimbabwe is attempting to annul the award in *Bernhard Von Pezold*. In this matter, Zimbabwe was ordered to return the expropriated farms to the claimants plus damages of USD 56 million, failing which Zimbabwe had to pay compensation of USD 194 million.⁸⁵⁹ At the time of writing, Zimbabwe was still seeking to have the award annulled, and in the interim, an agreement was reached that Zimbabwe will pay the awarded damages into an escrow account, pending the conclusion of the annulment proceedings.⁸⁶⁰

It is clear from the pattern in the cases discussed above that investors will not always lightly allow reform socio-economic programmes that negatively impact on their investments, while at the same time host states will not fear to implement reforms that they deem necessary to develop themselves. These cases reflect the conflict between the right of host states to regulate their affairs, versus investors' expectations that such regulation will not threaten their investments in one way or another. It is inevitable that more cases will be initiated in response to host states' development efforts.

Although SADC has taken the decision to remove ISDS from Annex 1 in order to avoid cases such as those mentioned above, investors have other gateways through which to

⁸⁵⁸ See <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/dispossessed-zimbabwean-farmers-launch-new-legal-l> (Date of use: 27 October 2017). Details regarding this case are not yet publicly available.

⁸⁵⁹ At para 1020.

⁸⁶⁰ Decision on Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 24 April 2017 at para 97-99; Decision on the Applicant's Urgent Application for Provisional Measures Regarding the Temporary Stay of Execution and the Escrow Arrangement of 22 August 2017 at para 30.

access ISDS. Common among these are BITs, TIPs and investment agreements, which are being used in the cases discussed above. Despite the conclusion of the 2016 Annex 1, some recent BITs concluded by the SADC Member States continue to provide for ISDS.⁸⁶¹ Therefore, closing the door to ISDS via Annex 1 alone is not a solution as Member States have already opened new doors via BITs, TIPs, investment agreements, and other instruments.⁸⁶² This lack of uniformity and consistency with regard to the practice of resolution of investor-states is the Achilles heel of SADC Member States, as shown in the next chapter.

3.4 CONCLUSION

SADC has succeeded in curtailing investor rights by means of Annex 1, including the removal of access to ISDS. Nonetheless, there has not been a publicised uproar from the investor community with regard to this decision. Whether this means that investors have accepted this change, remains to be seen.

⁸⁶¹ See for example the Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (date of signature 17 May 2013, in force 09 December 2013) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/636> (Date of use: 15 October 2017); <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/636> (date of use: 12 November 2017); Agreement Between the Government of Japan and The Republic of Mozambique On the Reciprocal Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investments, (date of signature 01 June 2013, in force 29 August 2014) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3114> (Date of use: 15 October 2017); <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3114> (Date of use: 12 November 2017).

⁸⁶² For access to BITs concluded by SADC Member States select the relevant state at <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/liasByCountry#iialInnerMenu> (Date of use: 12 November 2017).

Technically, the 2016 Annex 1 lags behind similar instruments in terms of the way it regulates foreign investments, as indicated in the preceding discussion.

The regulation of foreign investments by means of either version of Annex 1 is not satisfactory, due to the failure of Member States to harmonise their laws and practices therewith. SADC's challenge with regard to the regulation of foreign investments by means of Annex 1 is that Member States fail to harmonise their laws and BIT practices with it. Among others, this encourages treaty shopping, whereby foreign investors may seek to bypass Annex 1 by locating themselves in foreign states that have favourable BITs or TIPs with SADC Member States, or in SADC Member States that have favourable BITs with other SADC Member States.

Despite the challenges identified herein, a review of Annex 1 by SADC will be academic, given that the AfCFTA (or even the T-FTA) will have an investment protocol that will in all likelihood replace the 2016 Annex 1. SADC's challenge is therefore to evaluate the positions that it will advance during the AfCFTA (or T-FTA) investment protocol negotiations, in view of the analysis undertaken herein, as well as the lessons that SADC can learn from Brazil's ACFTA, the EU's ICS and India's Model BIT that are discussed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, proposals are made in Chapter 6 with regard to the level at which foreign investments in SADC should be regulated, and the nature of the instrument that should be used.

The next chapter will analyse the laws of SADC Member States in order to determine if they provide satisfactory security to foreign investments in the event of expropriation.

CHAPTER 4

THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN TERMS OF THE LAWS OF SADC MEMBER STATES

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss the provisions of the investment laws of the Member States, which apply in the event of the expropriation of an investment. It lays the foundation for the fulfilment of the fourth objective of this study.⁸⁶³ Expropriation is chosen for discussion herein is due to its prevalence as a leading cause of action in ISDS claims, as well as its serious implications for host states and investors alike.⁸⁶⁴ The discussion will cover the following areas: the dispute resolution forum, the compensation standard in the event of expropriation, and the enforcement of court orders and arbitral awards.

The discussion will be benchmarked by reference to the findings of selected rule of law surveys (also known as rule of law indices or scoreboards), namely the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),⁸⁶⁵ the 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG),⁸⁶⁶

⁸⁶³ See Objective 1.3.4 in Chapter 1 above.

⁸⁶⁴ See <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByBreaches> (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁸⁶⁵ For the foundation of the APRM see African Union (Assembly) (Thirty-Eighth Ordinary Session of the Organization of African Unity, 8 July 2002 Durban, South Africa) “NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance” AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex I at para 28 <http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/official-documents/item/607-declaration-on-democracy,-political,-economic-and-corporate-governance>; African Union (Assembly) (Thirty-Eighth Ordinary Session of the Organization of African Unity 8 July 2002 Durban, South Africa) “African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Base Document” AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex II <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/aprm-basedoc.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018); African Union (Assembly) (Eighth Ordinary Session, 20 January 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance* at para 36 http://archive.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf (Date of use: 15 April 2018); *Statute of the APRM* 2016V11082016 https://aprm-au.org/st_car/statute-of-the-aprm/ (Date of use: 8

the World Bank's 2016 Worldwide Governance Index (WGI),⁸⁶⁷ the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2016 (WJP),⁸⁶⁸ and the U.S. Department of State's 2016 Climate

April 2018); NEPAD "Standards, Objectives, Criteria and Indicators For the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)" NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003-/APRM/Guideline/OSCI 9 March 2003 <https://aprm-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Objectives-Standards-Criteria-and-Indicators.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

For further information and key documents see <https://aprm-au.org/>; <https://www.au.int/en/organs/aprm>; https://aprm-au.org/layout-search-result-pub/?taxonomy%5Bst_cars_pickup_features%5D=121&orderby=ID (Date of use: 8 April 2018).

For APRM country review reports see <http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 15 April 2018). At the time of writing only six SADC states have conducted their APRM assessments so far, namely Lesotho, Mauritius Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. As a result, the APRM reviews are of limited significance in SADC.

The APRM's main objective is to foster the adoption of policies, values, standards and practices of political and economic governance that lead to political stability, accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration, economic growth and sustainable development. See African Union (Assembly) "APRM Base Document" at para 3 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/aprm-basedoc.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018); Article 4(2) Statute of the APRM. Member States that join the APRM agree to voluntarily and independently review their compliance with African and international governance commitments (Article 6(2) Statute of the APRM). The APRM measures performance and progress in four thematic areas: democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. See NEPAD "Standards, Objectives, Criteria and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)" at para 1.12

<https://aprm-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Objectives-Standards-Criteria-and-Indicators.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

⁸⁶⁶ See http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017). The Mo Ibrahim Foundation launched the IIAG in 2006.⁸⁶⁶ It aims measure and monitor selected areas of governance in every African State, with a view to determine and debate government performance, and to be a decision-making instrument with which governments can govern.⁸⁶⁶ The IIAG measures and monitors states in four categories, namely Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and Human Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity, and Human Development. The Rule of Law sub-category measures and monitors five indicators. Only three of these are relevant for this study, namely Judicial Independence, Judicial Process and Property Rights.⁸⁶⁶ The IIAG covers all SADC Member States, and is therefore useful in this study.

⁸⁶⁷ <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home> (Date of use 14 December 2017). The

Statements.⁸⁶⁹ These surveys are used in order to enable a balanced Western and African perspective on the rule of law, efficiency, and independence in the judiciaries of Member States. The surveys bring a practical perspective to the rule of law in these states, which may indicate areas of concern and potential improvement.

4.2 AN OVERVIEW OF SELECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS OF THE INVESTMENT LAWS OF SADC MEMBER STATES

4.2.1 KINGDOM OF ESWATINI

Based on 2015 data, Eswatini had a population of 1.2 million, and a landmass of 17 200 square kilometres (sq. km).⁸⁷⁰ She had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of USD 4 Billion, with an annual growth rate of two percent.⁸⁷¹ Per capita income was USD 3

WGI is an initiative of the World Bank. The WGI has been published since 1996 and covers 215 countries. The WGI measures six indicators, but only the Rule of Law indicator is relevant herein. The WGI survey covers all SADC Member States, and is therefore useful

⁸⁶⁸ <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016> (Date of use: 14 December 2017). The WJP is an independent American non-profit organization whose aim is to study the Rule of Law patterns around the world. The version utilised here is the 6th edition of the WJP index. This index is a result of feedback from 110 000 households and 2700 experts in 113 countries. The WJP hopes that the index will help policy debates within and outside each country surveyed (WJP 2016 report at 4). The SADC Member States covered by the survey are Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The WJP claims to be the world's largest survey of original, independent data on the rule of law, but unfortunately it has limited application herein as it only covers 8 SADC states (WJP 2016 report at 4). Therefore, the WJP is useful in SADC, but only to a limited extent.

⁸⁶⁹ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper> (Date of use: 10 April 2017). The U.S. Department of State Climate Statements are prepared from information supplied by embassies and diplomatic staff based abroad. They aim to capture the state of investment laws and practices in the country where the contributing staff are based. The Climate Statements cover all SADC Member States.

⁸⁷⁰ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/748/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁸⁷¹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/748/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

120.⁸⁷² Eswatini received FDI of USD 719 Million between 2005 and 2012.⁸⁷³ The main economic sectors in Eswatini are manufacturing and processing, agribusiness and agro-processing (sugar cane, citrus fruit, cotton, beef, vegetables, forestry, maize, energy, mining (gold, diamonds, coal, iron ore, quarry etc.), information and communications technologies, tourism and recreation (major attractions are Umhlanga Reed Dance, Incwala, Bushfire Festival, Simunye Fun Fair, East3Route, Eswatini International Trade Fair etc.).⁸⁷⁴ Manufacturing (food and beverages, timber, textiles, and engineering) contributes 40 percent towards GDP.⁸⁷⁵

(a) Applicable regime

The Constitution of the Kingdom of Eswatini⁸⁷⁶ and the Eswatini Investment Promotion Act⁸⁷⁷ regulate the expropriation of investments in Eswatini.

(b) Dispute resolution forum

Should a dispute arise between an investor and the government of Eswatini with regard to an investment, the investor may at its option, and subject to any written agreement reached between the parties (if any) commence:

(i) Proceedings in the High Court of Eswatini,⁸⁷⁸

(ii) Local arbitration,⁸⁷⁹

⁸⁷² <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/748/index.html>
(Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁸⁷³ Table 3, Appendix hereto.

⁸⁷⁴ Eswatini Investment Promotion Agency
www.sipa.sz/index.php/en/investment-opportunities/ (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁸⁷⁵ Eswatini Investment Promotion Agency
www.sipa.sz/index.php/en/investment-opportunities/ (Date of use: 10 April 2017).
2005 version.

⁸⁷⁶ 2005 version.
⁸⁷⁷ Act 1 of 1998.

⁸⁷⁸ Section 21(a) Investment Promotion Act.

- (iii) Under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,⁸⁸⁰ or
- (iv) Arbitration under the auspices of the ICSID.⁸⁸¹

Eswatini is a member of the ICSID.⁸⁸² This means that ICSID arbitration can be brought against her, including proceedings under Additional Facility Rules (AF)⁸⁸³. AF Rules enable an investor whose home state is not a member of ICSID to bring ICSID arbitration against an ICSID member state. Membership of ICSID also obliges a member state to recognise and enforce an award obtained against it.⁸⁸⁴ The ICSID Convention does not apply to ICSID AF arbitration.

(c) Expropriation and compensation Standard

Property, or an interest or right in a property that forms part of an investment, may not be expropriated unless the expropriation is:

- (i) In accordance with applicable legal procedures,⁸⁸⁵
- (ii) In pursuance of a public purpose;⁸⁸⁶
- (iii) Not discriminatory on the basis of nationality,⁸⁸⁷
- (iv) Adequate and fair compensation is promptly paid;⁸⁸⁸

⁸⁷⁹ Section 21(b) Investment Promotion Act.
⁸⁸⁰ Section 21(c) Investment Promotion Act.
⁸⁸¹ Section 21(d) Investment Promotion Act.
⁸⁸² <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).
⁸⁸³ See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/AFR_English-final.pdf (Date of use: 6 August 2018).
⁸⁸⁴ See Article 53-55 ICSID Convention.
⁸⁸⁵ Section 20(1) (a) Investment Promotion Act.
⁸⁸⁶ Section 20(1) (b); Article 19(2)(a) Constitution of the Kingdom of Eswatini.
⁸⁸⁷ Section 20(1) (c) Investment Promotion Act.
⁸⁸⁸ Section 20(1)(d) Investment Promotion Act; Article 19(2)(b)(i) Constitution of the Kingdom of Eswatini.

- (v) Such that a right of access to a court of law is provided for by the law under which the expropriation is undertaken;⁸⁸⁹ and
- (vi) By order of the court.⁸⁹⁰

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

A court order or an arbitral award (e.g. for the payment of damages or compensation for expropriation) obtained by an investor against Eswatini must be enforced via the courts. The IIAG ranks Eswatini under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 55.8 (all scores out 100), 21.3 points for judicial independence, 70.8 for the judicial process and 68.9 for property rights.⁸⁹¹ Eswatini ranks 22nd out of 54 African states and 10th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.⁸⁹²

The WGI gives Eswatini a score of 46.6 under the Rule of Law indicator.⁸⁹³

The U.S. Department of State states that Eswatini does not have a history of expropriation, and the courts enforce property rights.⁸⁹⁴

Eswatini is not a member of the New York Convention. This means that an investor may have difficulty in enforcing a foreign arbitral award against Eswatini. The New York

⁸⁸⁹ Section 20(1)(d) Investment Promotion Act; Article 19(2)(b)(ii) Constitution of the Kingdom of Eswatini.

⁸⁹⁰ Article 19(2) (c) Constitution of the Kingdom of Eswatini.

⁸⁹¹ IIAG “Eswatini Scores, Ranks and Trends”
<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁸⁹² IIAG Report 2017 at 26 See http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁸⁹³ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

⁸⁹⁴ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dliid=254169&year=2016#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

Convention obliges a member state to recognise and enforce an arbitral award obtained against it, as follows:

Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.⁸⁹⁵ (Emphasis added)

The New York Convention applies to awards obtained outside the state wherein enforcement is sought, and therefore it does not apply to awards classified as domestic awards in the state where enforcement is sought.⁸⁹⁶ The Convention makes provision for an application for the recognition of an award to be made to a competent authority, which is usually a court of law in the state where enforcement is sought.⁸⁹⁷ Provision is also made for a party against whom an award was obtained, to challenge the award and have it set aside.⁸⁹⁸

⁸⁹⁵ Article III New York Convention.

⁸⁹⁶ Article I (1) New York Convention.

⁸⁹⁷ Article IV New York Convention. For an update on applications of this nature see (select “Judicial review by national courts”)
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByFollowUpProceedings> (date of use: 6 August 2018).

⁸⁹⁸ Article V New York Convention . For statistics on applications of these nature see (select “Judicial review by national courts”)
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByFollowUpProceedings> (Date of use: 6 August 2018).

4.2.2 KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

Based on 2015 data, Lesotho had a population of 2.1 million, and a landmass of 30 360 sq. km.⁸⁹⁹ During 2015 GDP was USD 1.8 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 1.91 percent.⁹⁰⁰ Per capita income was USD 872.⁹⁰¹ Lesotho received FDI ranging from USD 51 Million to USD 194 Million between 2005 and 2015.⁹⁰² Between 2005 and 2012, Lesotho's main economic sectors were agribusiness (crops, aquaculture, horticulture, livestock farming, and food processing), manufacturing (textile and garments, leather and footwear, consumer electronic goods, packaging materials, automotive components etc.), renewable energy, infrastructure and construction, mining (water bottling, diamond mining), services (information communications and technologies, financial services), and tourism (accommodation, health and wellness resorts, water sports and recreation, high altitude training facilities etc.).⁹⁰³

(a) Applicable regime

Lesotho does not have legislation regulating foreign investments. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho contains the provisions relating to expropriation.⁹⁰⁴

⁸⁹⁹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/426/index.html>
(Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁰⁰ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/426/index.html>
(Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁰¹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/426/index.html>
(Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁰² <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx>
(Date of use: 27 February 2017).

⁹⁰³ Lesotho National Development Corporation at www.lndc.org.ls/Investor-kit (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁰⁴ Constitution of 1993 as amended to 2001.

(b) Dispute resolution forum

With regard to disputes relating to expropriation, an investor or a person with an interest or right over expropriated property has a right of direct access to the High Court.⁹⁰⁵ Such right includes an appeal after the aggrieved person has approached a lower competent tribunal or authority.⁹⁰⁶ The High Court or other lower competent tribunal or authority may determine the rights of the aggrieved person, the legality of the expropriation, the amount of compensation due, and it may also issue an order enforcing the payment of the compensation.⁹⁰⁷

Lesotho is a member of the ICSID Convention.⁹⁰⁸

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

An owner of, or a person having an interest or right in a property has, irrespective of their nationality, a right not to be arbitrarily deprived of its property.⁹⁰⁹ The state may expropriate, or otherwise, take possession of or acquire the rights or interests in a property for a variety of reasons.⁹¹⁰ An expropriation must meet the following requirements, namely that it must be:

- (i) In the public interest;⁹¹¹
- (ii) Justifiable in terms of the hardship caused to the person(s) who had an interest or right in the matter;⁹¹² and

⁹⁰⁵ Article 17(2) Constitution of Lesotho.

⁹⁰⁶ Article 17(2) proviso Constitution of Lesotho.

⁹⁰⁷ Article 17(2) (a)-(b) Constitution of Lesotho.

⁹⁰⁸ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

⁹⁰⁹ Articles 4(1) (m) and 17 Constitution of Lesotho.

⁹¹⁰ Article 17 Constitution of Lesotho.

⁹¹¹ Article 17(1) (a) Constitution of Lesotho.

(iii) Accompanied by prompt and full compensation.⁹¹³

The High Court or another tribunal authorised to do so may review an expropriation.⁹¹⁴

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

As was stated above, the High Court or other competent tribunal or authority has jurisdiction to enforce the payment of compensation, or any order that may have been made.⁹¹⁵ The IIAG ranks Lesotho as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall Rule of Law score of 64.1 (all scores out of 100), 64.6 for judicial independence, 58.3 for judicial process and 67.7 for property rights.⁹¹⁶ Lesotho ranks 8th out of 54 African states and 6th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.⁹¹⁷

The WGI gives Lesotho a score of 50 under the Rule of Law indicator.⁹¹⁸ The 2010 APRM Review did not make any adverse findings on the state of the rule of law in Lesotho. It however found systematic lack of capacity, corruption, and lack of accountability in the public service in general.⁹¹⁹

⁹¹² Article 17(1) (b) Constitution of Lesotho.

⁹¹³ Article 17(1) (c) Constitution of Lesotho.

⁹¹⁴ Article 17(2) Constitution of Lesotho.

⁹¹⁵ Article 17(2)(b) Constitution of Lesotho.

⁹¹⁶ IIAG “Lesotho Scores, Ranks and Trends”

<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁹¹⁷ IIAG 2017 Report at 26 See http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁹¹⁸ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

⁹¹⁹ APRM “Lesotho Country Review Report No. 12”, June 2010 at para 112-115 <http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 10 February 2018).

The U.S. Department of State states that Lesotho courts are overburdened and slow.⁹²⁰ The Department also states that a commercial court was established in 2010 to address some of these challenges. This court had decided only 63 cases by July 2015, with a maximum of 15 cases per year at a rate of between one and five cases per month.⁹²¹ It appears from these figures that this court has a light caseload.

Lesotho is a member of the New York Convention.⁹²²

4.2.3 REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

Based on 2015 data, Angola had a population of 25 million, and a landmass of 1.2 million sq. km.⁹²³ Angola is the second largest economy in SADC in terms of GDP (USD 146 Billion), and is second only to South Africa (USD 349 Billion).⁹²⁴ GDP growth was 2.96, and per capita income was USD 5 450.⁹²⁵ During 2015 Angola was the 7th largest recipient of FDI in Africa,⁹²⁶ and the top FDI recipient in SADC (USD 8.6 Billion) during the same period.⁹²⁷ Angola's economy is driven by its oil sector.⁹²⁸ Oil production and related activities account for approximately 50 percent of GDP, which contributes more

⁹²⁰ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dliid=254169&year=2016#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

⁹²¹ <http://www.lesothoii.org/content/high-court-commercial-division> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹²² <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

⁹²³ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/024/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹²⁴ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/024/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹²⁵ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/024/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹²⁶ FDI Intelligence at 4 http://www.casafrika.es/casafrika/Agenda/2016/11_Africa-Investment-Report_Klassa-Presentation.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

⁹²⁷ See Table 3, Appendix hereto.

⁹²⁸ Summary extracted from http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurent/angola/angola_economy.html (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

than 70 percent of government revenue, and more than 90 percent of Angola's exports. Angola is the second biggest exporter of oil in Africa after Nigeria. Diamonds contribute another five percent towards exports. Subsistence farming provides the main livelihood for most of the people, although there are food shortages and half of the country's food is imported.

(a) Applicable regime

The new Private Investment Law regulates the expropriation of investments in Angola.⁹²⁹

(b) Dispute resolution forum

The Private Investment Law provides that investor-state disputes shall be referred to the Angolan courts for adjudication.⁹³⁰ Disputes may optionally be referred to arbitration in terms of the Arbitration Act of 2003, but it is reported that such arbitration is not widely used.⁹³¹ In 2014, the Ministry of Justice opened the Centre for Human Rights and Legal Alternatives for Conflict Resolution, but again it is reported that the facility is not being utilised.⁹³² Among other functions, the Centre provides consultation, mediation, and arbitration of contract disputes for both Angolan and foreign businesses.⁹³³

Angola is not a member of the ICSID Convention.

⁹²⁹ Law No. 14/15 of 11 August 2015.

⁹³⁰ Article 20(1) Private Investment Law.

⁹³¹ Law No. 16/03. See <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

⁹³² <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

⁹³³ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

The Private Investment Law provides that in the event of the expropriation of an investment, fair, prompt and effective compensation shall be paid to an investor.⁹³⁴

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the local courts. The IIAG ranks Angola's rule of law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 42.2 (all scores out of 100), 23.4 for judicial independence, 12.5 for judicial process and 33 for property rights.⁹³⁵ Angola ranks 39th out of 54 African states and 14th in SADC in terms of the rule of law.⁹³⁶

The WGI gives Angola a score of 12 out of 100 under the Rule of Law Indicator.⁹³⁷

The United States Department of State Report indicates that the Angolan court system is not always impartial, that it takes approximately four years for a commercial case to be concluded, and the costs of the proceedings are approximately 44 percent of the value of a claim.⁹³⁸

⁹³⁴ Article 20(2) Private Investment Law.

⁹³⁵ IIAG "Angola Scores, Ranks and Trends"
<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁹³⁶ IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350
(Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁹³⁷ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

⁹³⁸ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

Angola is not a member of the New York Convention.⁹³⁹

4.2.4 REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

Based on 2015 data, Botswana had a population of 2.2 million, and a landmass of 566 730 sq. km.⁹⁴⁰ Her GDP was USD 14 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 0.32 percent. Per capita income was USD 6365.⁹⁴¹ Botswana FDI inflows fluctuated from USD 208 Million to 515 Million between 2005 and 2015.⁹⁴² Botswana is the second-largest diamond producer in the world by value.⁹⁴³ Botswana and De Beers formed Debswana Diamond Mining Company (Pty) Ltd in 1969. Botswana gradually increased its shareholding from 15 percent, and by 1975 the parties were equal partners.⁹⁴⁴ During 2014, the partnership generated USD 6.9 Billion, of which Botswana received 32 percent. The partnership also contributed 34 160 jobs.⁹⁴⁵ The partnership has contributed to Botswana's stable political and regulatory environment. It is therefore no

⁹³⁹ Membership confirmed at <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

⁹⁴⁰ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/072/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁴¹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/072/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁴² Available under Botswana country profile at <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/072/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁴³ De Beers Group "Turning Finite Resources into Enduring Opportunity: The economic contribution to Botswana of the Partnership between the Government of the Republic of Botswana and De Beers" at 16 <http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/reports/impact/country/botswana-and-cut-8/the-principles-of-partnership.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁴⁴ De Beers Group "Turning Finite Resources into Enduring Opportunity" at 13 <http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/reports/impact/country/botswana-and-cut-8/the-principles-of-partnership.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁴⁵ De Beers Group "Turning Finite Resources into Enduring Opportunity" at 35 <http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/reports/impact/country/botswana-and-cut-8/the-principles-of-partnership.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

surprise that Botswana ranked 1st under the Safety and Rule of Law component of the IIAG.⁹⁴⁶

(a) Applicable regime

The Constitution of the Republic of Botswana⁹⁴⁷ and The Acquisition of Property Act⁹⁴⁸ regulate the expropriation of investments in Botswana.

(b) Dispute resolution forum

The Constitution of the Republic of Botswana provides that the High Court shall be the competent but not the only forum for disputes relating to expropriation.⁹⁴⁹ The Constitution makes provision for proceedings to be commenced at a lower authority.⁹⁵⁰ Issues that may be brought before the High Court include the determination of the interests or rights of an affected person, the legality of an expropriation, and the amount of compensation to be paid, and the enforcement of the payment of compensation.⁹⁵¹

Botswana is a member of the ICSID.

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

The Constitution of the Republic of Botswana provides that no property may be expropriated unless the expropriation will benefit the development of mineral resources.

It provides that:

⁹⁴⁶ IIAG 2017 Index Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁹⁴⁷ Constitution of 1966 as amended by Act 12 of 2002.

⁹⁴⁸ Chapter 32:10 of 28 January 1955 as amended.

⁹⁴⁹ Article 8(1) (b) (ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.

⁹⁵⁰ Article 8(1)(b)(ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.

⁹⁵¹ Article 8(1) (b) (ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.

- (i) The expropriation must be in the interest of public order, public defense and the like;⁹⁵²
- (ii) The expropriated property must be used for public benefit;⁹⁵³
- (iii) The expropriation must aim to or will secure the development of mineral resources;⁹⁵⁴
- (iv) The law providing for the expropriation must provide for the prompt payment of adequate compensation;⁹⁵⁵ and
- (v) The law providing for the expropriation must provide for access to the High Court, either directly or on appeal from a lower competent authority.⁹⁵⁶

Section 3 of the Acquisition of Property Act also provides for the expropriation of land and certain real rights if the acquisition of such property is necessary or expedient in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country planning or land settlement; or in order to secure the development or utilisation of that or other property for a purpose beneficial to the community, paying such compensation therefore as may be agreed upon or determined under the provisions of the Act.

A person seeking to challenge the legality of an expropriation under the Acquisition of Property Act must approach the High Court for relief.⁹⁵⁷ A Board of Assessment

⁹⁵² Article 8(1) (a) (i) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.

⁹⁵³ Article 8(1) (a) (ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.

⁹⁵⁴ Article 8(1) (a) (iii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.

⁹⁵⁵ Article 8(1) (b) (i) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana. The payment of royalties *in lieu* of a lump sum is deemed to be sufficient for the purpose of this provision (Article 8(3) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.

⁹⁵⁶ Article 8(1) (b) (ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana.

appointed for each dispute adjudicates disputes relating to compensation.⁹⁵⁸ The decision of the Board is final as against the persons who participated in the assessment process, but any person aggrieved by the decision of the Board may appeal the decision before the High Court.⁹⁵⁹

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

The High Court of Botswana or other competent authority shall be entitled to order the enforcement of an order made by it.⁹⁶⁰ The IIAG ranks Botswana as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall rule of law score of 92.8 (all scores out of 100), 74 points for judicial independence, 100 for judicial process and 85 for property rights.⁹⁶¹ Botswana ranks 2nd out of 54 African states and 2nd in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.⁹⁶²

The WGI gives Botswana a score of 73 under the Rule of Law indicator.⁹⁶³ The WJP Index gives Botswana a score of 58.⁹⁶⁴

⁹⁵⁷ Section 9 Acquisition Act.

⁹⁵⁸ Section 11 Acquisition Act. The Board will consider the factors listed in Section 16 in order to reach its decision.

⁹⁵⁹ Section 20 Acquisition Act.

⁹⁶⁰ Article 8(1)(b)(ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana makes the High Court the competent Court to deal with expropriation disputes.

⁹⁶¹ IIAG “Botswana Scores, Ranks and Trends”
<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁹⁶² IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁹⁶³ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

⁹⁶⁴ WJP Rule of Law Index 2016 at 21 <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

The U.S. Department of State notes that the courts of Botswana do enforce judgments, and can be regarded as fair.⁹⁶⁵ However, the Department states that it can take up to two years to enforce a judgment in a commercial dispute.

Botswana is member of the New York Convention.⁹⁶⁶

4.2.5 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

Based on 2015 data, the DRC is the SADC's largest state in terms of landmass, with an area of 2.2 million sq. km, which is almost double the size of South Africa.⁹⁶⁷ It also has the highest population in SADC of 77 million.⁹⁶⁸ The DRC received stable FDI since 2007, which ranged from USD 663 Million to USD 3.3 Billion at its peak.⁹⁶⁹ The DRC had a GDP of USD 38 Billion in 2015, with a GDP growth of 7.17 percent.⁹⁷⁰ Per capita income was USD 504.⁹⁷¹ The DRC has vast natural resources, and, therefore, has great potential as an investment destination. However, political instability, illegal mining, smuggling of mineral resources and the presence of armed groups plague the DRC and cost it its true investment potential.⁹⁷² A report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic

⁹⁶⁵ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dclid=254169&year=2016#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

⁹⁶⁶ <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

⁹⁶⁷ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/180/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁶⁸ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/180/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁶⁹ Available at (<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx>) (Date of use: 27 February 2017).

⁹⁷⁰ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/180/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁷¹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/180/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁷² See United Nations (Security Council) "Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo", S/2014/42 (23 January 2014)

Republic of Congo commissioned by the United Nations found that illegal mining and the smuggling of minerals are so prevalent that 98 percent of gold worth approximately USD 400 Million produced during 2013 was smuggled out of the country.⁹⁷³

(a) Applicable regime

The legislation regulating the expropriation of investment in the general economy of the DRC is the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo,⁹⁷⁴ and the Investment Code.⁹⁷⁵ The Investment Code does not apply to the following sectors: mining and hydrocarbons, banking, assurance and insurance, arms production and related military activities, production of explosives, and assembly of military, paramilitary and security equipment.⁹⁷⁶

(b) Dispute resolution forum

The Investment Code states that disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or application of the Code are to be settled according to the procedure set out in the Code on Congolese Civil Procedure.⁹⁷⁷ This includes disputes between an investor and the DRC government, and allegations of violation of the rights of the investor or of the investment.⁹⁷⁸ The parties to a dispute are given three months from the date of the

⁹⁷³ <https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1421515.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).
UN (Security Council) “Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo” at 32 <https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1421515.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

⁹⁷⁴ Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo of 2005.

⁹⁷⁵ Law No. 004 of 21 February 2002. Mining, hydrocarbons, finance, and other sectors are covered by other legislation (<https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dlid=254169&year=2016#wrapper>) (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

⁹⁷⁶ Article 3(1) Investment Code.

⁹⁷⁷ Article 37 Investment Code.

⁹⁷⁸ Article 38 Investment Code.

declaration of a dispute to resolve it amicably.⁹⁷⁹ If the dispute is not resolved, then the matter goes into the ISDS stage.⁹⁸⁰ At this stage, an investor has the option of ICSID arbitration (including Additional Facility arbitration) or International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration.⁹⁸¹

The DRC consents to ICSID arbitration by virtue of Article 38 of the Investment Code, while an investor consents to arbitration by virtue of having a qualifying investment in terms of the Investment Code.⁹⁸² If a foreign investor is operating through a company of Congolese nationality that he controls or supervises, then it is presumed that the company is of the foreign nationality of the investor.⁹⁸³

The DRC is a member of the ICSID Convention.⁹⁸⁴

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

The DRC Constitution provides that the right to property is protected.⁹⁸⁵ However, it provides that property may be expropriated for a public purpose and against payment of just compensation under conditions determined by law.⁹⁸⁶ The Constitution further provides that no property may be seized except by order of a competent tribunal.⁹⁸⁷ In line with the Constitution, the Investment Code provides that the property of an investor cannot be expropriated except:

⁹⁷⁹ Article 38 Investment Code.

⁹⁸⁰ Article 38 Investment Code.

⁹⁸¹ Article 38 Investment Code.

⁹⁸² Article 38 Investment Code.

⁹⁸³ Article 38 Investment Code.

⁹⁸⁴ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

⁹⁸⁵ Article 34 Constitution of the DRC.

⁹⁸⁶ Article 34 Constitution of the DRC.

⁹⁸⁷ Article 34 Constitution of the DRC.

- (i) As provided for by law or order of a court;⁹⁸⁸
- (ii) For a public purpose;⁹⁸⁹ and
- (ii) Against payment of fair and equitable compensation.⁹⁹⁰

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the local courts. The IIAG ranks the DRC as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall Rule of Law score of 32.1 (all scores out of 100), 20 for judicial independence, 41.7 for the judicial process and 39 for property rights.⁹⁹¹ The DRC ranks 48th out of 54 African states and 15th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.⁹⁹²

The WGI gives the DRC a score of 3.3 under the Rule of Law indicator.⁹⁹³

However, the U.S. Department of State states that the courts of the DRC are marked by a high degree of corruption, public administration is not reliable, and both expatriates and nationals are subject to the selective application of a complex legal code.⁹⁹⁴ The

⁹⁸⁸ Article 26 Investment Code.

⁹⁸⁹ Article 26 Investment Code.

⁹⁹⁰ Article 26 Investment Code. Compensation is fair if it is based on the market value of the property (Article 26). Note that Article 34 Constitution of the DRC requires “just compensation”.

⁹⁹¹ IIAG “DRC Scores, Ranks and Trends”
<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁹⁹² IIAG 2017 Report http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

⁹⁹³ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

⁹⁹⁴ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dliid>

Department notes, however, that modern commercial courts are being set up in parallel with the existing court system.

The DRC is a member of the New York Convention.⁹⁹⁵

4.2.6 REPUBLIC OF MADAGASCAR

Based on 2015 data, Madagascar had a population of 24 million, and a landmass of 581 700 sq. km.⁹⁹⁶ GDP for 2015 was USD 9.7 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 3.2 percent. Per capita income was USD 401.⁹⁹⁷ Madagascar received FDI of USD 169 Million from South Africa between 2005 and 2012.⁹⁹⁸ The main investment sectors in Madagascar are agribusiness, tourism, mining, information communications and technologies, light industries and renewable energy.⁹⁹⁹ Madagascar's main exports are agricultural products. During 2014, Madagascar exported 999 000 tons of product.¹⁰⁰⁰ Madagascar has a 50 percent share of the global vanilla market, and 70 percent of the European market for Litchis.¹⁰⁰¹ She produces more rice than the rest of SADC

⁹⁹⁵ =254169&year=2016#wrapper (Date of use: 01 April 2017).
⁹⁹⁶ <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).
⁹⁹⁷ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/450/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2016).
⁹⁹⁸ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/450/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2016).
⁹⁹⁹ Table 4 at http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_fdostat/docs/webdiaeia2014d3_ZAF.pdf (Date of use: 10 April 2017).
¹⁰⁰⁰ Economic Development Board of Madagascar "Madagascar Investment Guide" (undated) (www.edbm.gov.mg/content/download/1025/5177/file/Investor's%20Guide%20Madagascar-en.pdf) (Date of use: 10 November 2017).
¹⁰⁰¹ Economic Development Board of Madagascar "Madagascar Investment Guide" at 15 (www.edbm.gov.mg/content/download/1025/5177/file/Investor's%20Guide%20Madagascar-en.pdf) (Date of use: 10 November 2017).

combined.¹⁰⁰² Being surrounded by ocean, Madagascar has a thriving fishery and aquaculture sector.¹⁰⁰³ Madagascar's unique fauna and flora are a major tourist attraction, with between 180 000 and 240 000 tourists visiting per year since 2010.¹⁰⁰⁴

The mining sector has potential for investment in marble, ruby, sapphire, emerald, aquamarine, topaz, coal, uranium, quartz, gold, platinum, silver, copper, iron and many others.¹⁰⁰⁵ Madagascar's connection to the East African Submarine System and LION high-speed internet networks makes it ideal for technology parks, manufacture and assembly of electronic parts, call centers, mobile telephone providers, and other technology related opportunities.¹⁰⁰⁶ Madagascar's abundant rivers, sunshine, and constant winds are ideal for hydropower, solar and wind energy generation.¹⁰⁰⁷

¹⁰⁰² Economic Development Board of Madagascar "Madagascar Investment Guide" at 15 (www.edbm.gov.mg/content/download/1025/5177/file/Investor's%20Guide%20Madagascar-en.pdf) (Date of use: 10 November 2017).

¹⁰⁰³ Economic Development Board of Madagascar "Madagascar Investment Guide" at 15 (www.edbm.gov.mg/content/download/1025/5177/file/Investor's%20Guide%20Madagascar-en.pdf) (Date of use: 10 November 2017).

¹⁰⁰⁴ Economic Development Board of Madagascar "Madagascar Investment Guide" at 16 (www.edbm.gov.mg/content/download/1025/5177/file/Investor's%20Guide%20Madagascar-en.pdf) (Date of use: 10 November 2017).

¹⁰⁰⁵ Economic Development Board of Madagascar "Madagascar Investment Guide" at 17 (www.edbm.gov.mg/content/download/1025/5177/file/Investor's%20Guide%20Madagascar-en.pdf) (Date of use: 10 November 2017).

¹⁰⁰⁶ Economic Development Board of Madagascar "Madagascar Investment Guide" at 18 (www.edbm.gov.mg/content/download/1025/5177/file/Investor's%20Guide%20Madagascar-en.pdf) (Date of use: 10 November 2017).

¹⁰⁰⁷ Economic Development Board of Madagascar "Madagascar Investment Guide" at 20 (www.edbm.gov.mg/content/download/1025/5177/file/Investor's%20Guide%20Madagascar-en.pdf) (Date of use: 10 November 2017).

(a) Applicable regime

The primary legislation regulating the expropriation of foreign investments in Madagascar is the Madagascar Investment Law.¹⁰⁰⁸

(b) Dispute resolution forum

Investor-state disputes must be submitted to the local courts for adjudication.¹⁰⁰⁹

Madagascar is a member of the ICSID.¹⁰¹⁰

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

The Investment Law provides that property may not be expropriated except in public interest cases.¹⁰¹¹ These cases include infrastructure works, the establishment of nature reserves, or military sites, among others, requiring expropriation of private property.¹⁰¹² In the event of such expropriation fair compensation is payable.¹⁰¹³

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the local courts. The IIAG ranks Madagascar as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall Rule of Law score of 55.8 (all scores out of 100), 30 points for judicial independence,

¹⁰⁰⁸ Law No. 036 of 2007.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Article 21 Madagascar Investment Law.

¹⁰¹⁰ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰¹¹ Article 4 Madagascar Investment Law.

¹⁰¹² <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰¹³ Article 4 Madagascar Investment Law.

58.3 for judicial process and 41.1 for property rights.¹⁰¹⁴ Madagascar ranks 29th out of 54 African states and 11th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.¹⁰¹⁵

The WGI gives Madagascar a score of 28 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹⁰¹⁶ The WJP gives her a score of 45 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹⁰¹⁷ Madagascar is not a member of the APRM.

The U.S. Department of State states that the Malagasy courts are nominally independent, they appear open to influence from the executive and other players, the judges lack proper training, cases take about three years to conclude, costs are high and can take about 42 percent of the value of a claim, there are complaints that they avoid dealing with the merits of some cases and dismiss them on technical grounds.¹⁰¹⁸ The Department adds that corruption and slow pace affects the enforcement of judgments and awards.¹⁰¹⁹

Madagascar is a member of the New York Convention.¹⁰²⁰

¹⁰¹⁴ IIAG “Madagascar Scores, Ranks and Trends”
<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰¹⁵ IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰¹⁶ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

¹⁰¹⁷ WJP 2016 Rule of Law Index at 21 <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰¹⁸ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰¹⁹ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰²⁰ <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

4.2.7 REPUBLIC OF MALAWI

Based on 2015 data, Malawi had a population of 17 million and a landmass of 94 280 sq. km.¹⁰²¹ GDP was USD 6 Billion, with an annual growth rate of three percent.¹⁰²² Malawi's FDI levels are similar to those of Lesotho, with a low of USD 35 Million and a maximum of 195 Million between 2005 and 2015.¹⁰²³ Malawi's main economic sectors are energy (hydropower, solar energy, fuel storage, wind energy, thermal power, biomass stoves, services (financial, real estate, healthcare), food and beverage production, processing and packaging, information communications and technologies, infrastructure construction and rehabilitation, tourism (hotels, casinos, water and lake sports, camps and lodges, eco-tourism), mining (bauxite, corundum, limestone, titanium, vermiculite, coal, phosphate, pyrite etc.), manufacturing (light manufacturing, textile and garments) and forestry.¹⁰²⁴

(a) Applicable regime

The Investment and Export Promotion Act,¹⁰²⁵ and the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi¹⁰²⁶ regulate the expropriation of investments in Malawi.

(b) Dispute resolution forum

The Constitution of Malawi provides that if a person is aggrieved by the alleged infringement of a constitutional right, including the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of

¹⁰²¹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/454/index.html>
(Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰²² <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/454/index.html>
(Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰²³ Table 3, Appendix hereto.

¹⁰²⁴ Malawi Investment and Trade Centre (MITC) [www.mitc.mw/index.php?option=com-content & view=article&id=299&Itemid=611](http://www.mitc.mw/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=299&Itemid=611) (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰²⁵ Act 11 of 2012.

¹⁰²⁶ Constitution of 18 May 1994.

one's property, then such person must approach the competent court to protect or enforce the right.¹⁰²⁷ A competent court may make such order as it sees fit, including the award of compensation to the complainant.¹⁰²⁸

Malawi is a member of the ICSID Convention.¹⁰²⁹

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

The Constitution of Malawi provides that there is a right not to be arbitrarily deprived of property.¹⁰³⁰ However, the Constitution allows for the expropriation of property, provided that:

- (i) The expropriation is in the public interest;¹⁰³¹
- (ii) Adequate notice of the intention to expropriate was given to the interested party;¹⁰³²
- (iii) Appropriate compensation is paid;¹⁰³³ and
- (iv) An interested party shall have a right of appeal to a court of law.¹⁰³⁴

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the

¹⁰²⁷ Article 46 Constitution of the Republic of Malawi.

¹⁰²⁸ Article 28(1) and (2) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi.

¹⁰²⁹ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰³⁰ Article 28(1) and (2) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi.

¹⁰³¹ Article 44(4) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi.

¹⁰³² Article 44(4) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi.

¹⁰³³ Article 44(4) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi.

¹⁰³⁴ Articles 46(3) and (4) Constitution of the Republic of Malawi.

local courts. The IAG ranks Malawi as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall Rule of Law score of 73.2 (all scores out of 100), 60 points for judicial independence, 83.3 for judicial process and 55.5 for property rights.¹⁰³⁵ Malawi ranks 17th out of 54 African states and 9th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.¹⁰³⁶

The WGI gives Malawi a score of 44 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹⁰³⁷ The WJP gives Malawi a score of 41 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹⁰³⁸

The U.S. Department of State states that the courts of Malawi have long backlogs, staff shortages, and it can be difficult to enforce judgments.¹⁰³⁹ However, the courts are not biased, and there seems to be little political interference in cases.

Malawi is not a signatory to the New York Convention.

4.2.8 REPUBLIC OF MAURITIUS

Based on 2015 data, during 2015 Mauritius had a population of 1.2 million, and a landmass of 2000 sq. km.¹⁰⁴⁰ GDP was USD 11 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 3.5

¹⁰³⁵ IAG “Malawi Scores, Ranks and Trends”
<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰³⁶ IAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰³⁷ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

¹⁰³⁸ WJP 2016 Rule of Law Index at 21 <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰³⁹ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dclid=254169&year=2016#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰⁴⁰ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/480/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

percent. Per capita income was USD 9 075.¹⁰⁴¹ Mauritius offers investment in agro-industry, education, financial services, healthcare, hospitality and property development, smart-cities, Information communications and technologies, life sciences, logistics, manufacturing, media and creative industry, ocean economy, renewable energy and seafood.¹⁰⁴² Mauritius is a renowned tourism hotspot, and the government has taken steps to increase FDI in the hospitality and property sector by encouraging non-citizens to acquire property and live there too. The Property Development Scheme enables a non-citizen to acquire resident status if they buy property worth at least USD 500 000.¹⁰⁴³

(a) Applicable regime

The Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius¹⁰⁴⁴ and the Investment Promotion Act¹⁰⁴⁵ regulate the expropriation of investments in Mauritius. Regulations made under the Act are also applicable.¹⁰⁴⁶

(b) Dispute resolution forum

The Constitution provides that the Supreme Court of Mauritius, or a competent lower authority or court, is the forum for the determination of the interests of persons affected by expropriation.¹⁰⁴⁷ The Investment Promotion Act does not provide for the settlement

¹⁰⁴¹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/480/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰⁴² Invest Mauritius at www.investmauritius.com/investment-opportunities.aspx (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰⁴³ Invest Mauritius at www.investmauritius.com/investment-opportunities/property-development.aspx (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰⁴⁴ Constitution of 1968 as amended to 2015.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Act 42 of 2000, as amended to 2009.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Regulations in terms of sections 12 and of the Act, made under Government Notice No. 128 of 2015.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Section 8(1) (c) (ii) and 17 Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius.

of disputes. However, parties can choose arbitration, which can take place in terms of the International Arbitration Act.¹⁰⁴⁸

There are two main arbitration institutions in Mauritius. The first is the LCIA-MIAC Arbitration Centre.¹⁰⁴⁹ The LCIA-MIAC Arbitration Centre was established by the Government of Mauritius, the London Court of Arbitration and the Mauritius Centre during July 2011. The second is the Arbitration and Mediation Centre.¹⁰⁵⁰ The centre was created by the Mauritius Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1996 (then as the MCCI Permanent Court of Arbitration).

Mauritius is a member of the ICSID Convention.¹⁰⁵¹

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

The Constitution of Mauritius provides that property may be expropriated, provided that:

- (i) The expropriation is necessary or expedient in the interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town, and country planning;¹⁰⁵²
- (ii) There is reasonable justification for the causing of any hardship that may result to any person having an interest in or right over the property;¹⁰⁵³ and

¹⁰⁴⁸ Act 37 of 2008 as amended by Act 8 of 2013. Section 4 of the Act allows parties to consent to arbitration in writing.

¹⁰⁴⁹ <http://www.lcia-miac.org/> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰⁵⁰ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dclid=254169&year=2016#wrapper>. The MARC website is <https://www.mcci.org/en/our-services/arbitration-mediation/arbitration/introduction-to-marc-arbitration/> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰⁵¹ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of Use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰⁵² Section 8(1) (a) Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius.

¹⁰⁵³ Section 8(1) (b) Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius.

(iii) The law authorising the expropriation makes provision:

(i) for the payment of adequate compensation,¹⁰⁵⁴ and

(ii) Guarantees to a person with an interest or right over the affected property a right of access to the Supreme Court, to determine his interest or right, or the validity of the expropriation, and the quantum of compensation to which he is entitled, and for the purpose of obtaining payment of that compensation.¹⁰⁵⁵

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the local courts. The IIAG ranks Mauritius as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall Rule of Law score of 92.5 (all scores out of 100), 88.4 points for judicial independence, 100 for judicial process and 80.9 for property rights.¹⁰⁵⁶ Mauritius ranks 1st out of 54 African, and 1st in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.¹⁰⁵⁷

The WGI gives Mauritius a score of 77.4 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹⁰⁵⁸ The 2010 APRM Review found that Mauritius has independent democratic institutions, and that constitutional provisions are respected.¹⁰⁵⁹

¹⁰⁵⁴ Section 8(1) (c) (i) Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Section 8(1) (c) (ii) Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius. The access to the Supreme Court may be by way of appeal from a lower court or authority.

¹⁰⁵⁶ IIAG “Mauritius Scores, Ranks & Trends”
<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰⁵⁷ IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰⁵⁸ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April

The U.S. Department of State states that the Mauritian judiciary is efficient, independent, non-discriminatory and transparent.¹⁰⁶⁰

Mauritius is a member of the New York Convention.¹⁰⁶¹

4.2.9 REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

Based on 2015 data, Mozambique has a population of 27 million, and a landmass of 786 380 sq. km.¹⁰⁶² Her GDP was USD 14 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 6.1 percent. Per capita income was USD 526.¹⁰⁶³ Mozambique's FDI has grown significantly since 2005 when it was USD 107 Million, up to a peak of USD 5.6 Billion in 2012.¹⁰⁶⁴ Mozambique's leading sectors for investment are in the energy sector, oil and gas, mining and tourism.¹⁰⁶⁵

(a) Applicable regime

The Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique¹⁰⁶⁶ and the Law on Investment¹⁰⁶⁷ regulate the expropriation of investments in Mozambique.

2017).

¹⁰⁵⁹ APRM "Mauritius Country Review Report No. 13", July 2010 at 144
<http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 10 February 2018).

¹⁰⁶⁰ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dclid=254169&year=2016#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰⁶¹ <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰⁶² <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/508/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰⁶³ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/508/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰⁶⁴ Table 3, Appendix hereto.

¹⁰⁶⁵ <http://www.theevent.co.za/2018/03/five-reasons-to-invest-in-mozambique/> (Date of use: 20 April 2018).

¹⁰⁶⁶ Constitution of 16 November 2004.

¹⁰⁶⁷ No. 3/93 of 24 June 1993.

(b) Dispute resolution forum

In general, investor-state disputes may, if not amicably resolved, be referred to competent local courts.¹⁰⁶⁸ A dispute between the Mozambican state and an investor that is not resolved amicably or via local courts shall if the parties so agree, be submitted to either ICSID or ICC arbitration.¹⁰⁶⁹ There is also an optional of referring the dispute to the Centre for Commercial Arbitration, Conciliation and Mediation, a state institution that caters for commercial arbitration to which the state can be a party.¹⁰⁷⁰

Mozambique is a member of the ICSID Convention.¹⁰⁷¹

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

The Constitution guarantees the right to ownership of property.¹⁰⁷² Nonetheless, the state may expropriate property, provided that the expropriation is in the public interest.¹⁰⁷³ Fair compensation must be paid for the expropriation.¹⁰⁷⁴

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the local courts. The IIAG ranks Mozambique as follows under the Rule of Law: an overall

¹⁰⁶⁸ Section 25(1) Law on Investment.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Section 25(2) Law on Investment.

¹⁰⁷⁰ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dclid=254169&year=2016#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰⁷¹ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of Use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰⁷² Section 82(1) Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique; Section 13(1) Law on Investment.

¹⁰⁷³ Section 82(2) Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Section 82(1) Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique. However, section 13(2) of the Law on Investment provides for just and equitable compensation.

Rule of Law score of 54.6 (all scores out of 100), 38.1 points for judicial independence, 41.7 for judicial process and 46.1 for property rights.¹⁰⁷⁵ Mozambique ranks 31st out of 54 African states, and 12th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.¹⁰⁷⁶

The WGI gives Mozambique a score of 19 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹⁰⁷⁷ The 2010 APRM review found that constitutionally protected rights are not getting the necessary enforcement, the institutions which are designed to protect these rights either do not function well, or their functions are severally curtailed,¹⁰⁷⁸ the functioning of the courts was inadequate, the public did not even know about the Constitutional Council, the Administrative Court was found to be inaccessible and was rarely used, with citizens not even knowing about the existence of the court, and there was widespread corruption in the judicial system.¹⁰⁷⁹ With regard to judicial independence, the executive is seen as having excessive powers vis-à-vis the judiciary.¹⁰⁸⁰

¹⁰⁷⁵ IIAG “Mozambique Scores, Ranks and Trends”

<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰⁷⁶ IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰⁷⁷ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

¹⁰⁷⁸ APRM “Mozambique Country Review Report No. 11”, June 2009 at para 276 <http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 10 February 2018).

¹⁰⁷⁹ APRM “Mozambique Country Review Report” at para 277 <http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 10 February 2018).

¹⁰⁸⁰ APRM “Mozambique Country Review Report” at para 280 <http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 10 February 2018).

The U.S. Department of State states that the Mozambican judicial system is slow, inconsistent, and largely ineffective in resolving commercial disputes, and that Magistrates are overloaded with work.¹⁰⁸¹

Mozambique is a member of the New York Convention.¹⁰⁸²

4.2.10 REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA

Based on 2015 data, Namibia had a population of 2.4 million and a landmass of 823 290 sq. km.¹⁰⁸³ GDP was USD 12 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 4.3 percent.¹⁰⁸⁴ Per capita income was USD 5 122.¹⁰⁸⁵ Namibia's FDI has gradually grown from USD 385 Million in 2005 to a peak of USD 1.1 Billion in 2011, 2012 and 2015.¹⁰⁸⁶ Namibia's main economic sectors are agri-business, aquaculture, energy generation (biomass, solid waste, solar energy, electricity from landfills), infrastructure, manufacturing (bricks, soap, safety equipment, mining and exploration equipment, chlorine and caustic soda etc.), mining, services (emergency health services, marketing and communication, mobile vending and payment services etc.), and tourism (lodges, camp sites, caravan sites, waterfront rest camps, conference and accommodation facilities etc.).¹⁰⁸⁷

¹⁰⁸¹ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dclid=254169&year=2016#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰⁸² <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹⁰⁸³ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/516/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰⁸⁴ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/516/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰⁸⁵ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/516/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹⁰⁸⁶ Table 3, Appendix hereto.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Ministry of Industrialization and Trade (MTI) at [www. Mti.gov.na/investment-opportunity.html](http://www.Mti.gov.na/investment-opportunity.html) (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

(a) Applicable regime

The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia¹⁰⁸⁸ and the Namibia Investment Promotion Act¹⁰⁸⁹ regulate the expropriation of investments in Namibia.

(b) Dispute resolution forum

The local courts of Namibia have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes relating to the Namibia Investment Promotion Act.¹⁰⁹⁰ However, the state (represented by the Minister responsible for investment) and an investor may (by written agreement) agree to local arbitration in terms of the Arbitration No. 42 of 1965.¹⁰⁹¹

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

The Constitution protects the right to own and dispose of property, but foreigners may be prohibited from owning immovable property.¹⁰⁹² The Constitution provides that the state or its organs may expropriate private property provided that the expropriation is:

- (i) For a public purpose;¹⁰⁹³
- (ii) Accompanied by prompt and just compensation;¹⁰⁹⁴ and
- (iii) In accordance with the procedures and requirements of an Act of Parliament.

The Namibia Investment Promotion Act provides that investments may be expropriated in terms of the provisions of the Constitution described above, subject to the payment of

¹⁰⁸⁸ 1998 version.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Act No. 9 of 2016.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Section 28(4) Namibia Investment Promotion Act.

¹⁰⁹¹ Section 28(4) Namibia Investment Promotion Act.

¹⁰⁹² Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.

¹⁰⁹³ Article 16(2) Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Article 16(2) Constitution of the Republic of Namibia; Section 22(1) Namibia Investment Promotion Act.

just compensation.¹⁰⁹⁵ The Namibia Investment Promotion Act sets out factors that must be considered in the determination of just compensation. These include the fair market value of the investment, profits made by the investor to date of expropriation, the capital cost of the investment, the current and past use of the investment etc.¹⁰⁹⁶ The Agricultural Land Reform Act also allows the state to expropriate agricultural land for purposes of land reform, subject to payment of compensation.¹⁰⁹⁷

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

Any order issued by a court, or an arbitral award issued by a tribunal, must be enforced via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the local courts. The IAG ranks Namibia under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 87.1 (all scores out of 100), 94 points for judicial independence, 100 for judicial process and 60 for property rights.¹⁰⁹⁸ Namibia ranks 3rd out of 54 African states and 3rd in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.¹⁰⁹⁹

The WGI gives Namibia a score of 61.54 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹¹⁰⁰

The U.S. Department of State states that Namibia has an independent, effective judiciary.¹¹⁰¹ However, the Department says that the court processes are slow.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Section 21(1) Namibia Investment Promotion Act.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Section 22(2) Namibia Investment Promotion Act.

¹⁰⁹⁷ No. 6 of 1995. Sections 19-35 deal with expropriation.

¹⁰⁹⁸ IAG “Namibia Scores, Ranks and Trends”

<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹⁰⁹⁹ IAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹¹⁰⁰ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

¹¹⁰¹ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?>

Namibia is not a member of the New York Convention.

4.2.11 REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES

Seychelles is the smallest SADC state. During 2015 Seychelles had a population of 96 000 and a landmass of 455 sq. km.¹¹⁰² GDP was USD 1.5 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 3.5 percent. Due to her small population, Seychelles had the highest per capita income in SADC of USD 16 145.¹¹⁰³ Seychelles received FDI of between USD 85 million and USD 261 million per year between 2005 and 2015.¹¹⁰⁴ The main economic sectors in Seychelles are agriculture (crops and livestock such as poultry, pigs, cattle, goats and rabbits), energy generation (wind farms, oil, solar energy), international financial services, (international companies, trusts, foundations, limited partnerships, mutual hedge funds, insurance etc.), tourism services (accommodation establishments, car hire, restaurants, tour operations, yachting), and fisheries (tuna fishing, long-line fishing, marine and aquaculture, fish processing and storage, retail and distribution of marine fishing equipment).¹¹⁰⁵

(a) Applicable regime

The Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles of 1993¹¹⁰⁶ and the Seychelles Investment Act¹¹⁰⁷ regulate the expropriation of investments in Seychelles.

1102 <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/690/index.html>
(Date of use: 10 April 2017).

1103 <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/690/index.html>
(Date of use: 10 April 2017).

1104 Table 3, Appendix hereto.

1105 Seychelles Investment Board at www.sib.sc/index-php/sectors) (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

1106 As amended by Act 14 of 1996.

1107 Act 31 of 2010.

(b) Dispute resolution forum

The Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles provides that in the event of expropriation, a person with an interest in expropriated property shall be given access to the Supreme Court.¹¹⁰⁸ In addition, the Seychelles Investment Act provides that an investor may have recourse to other remedies provided by law, or to dispute settlement measures contained in an agreement between the government of Seychelles and the investor.¹¹⁰⁹

Seychelles is a member of the ICSID Convention.¹¹¹⁰

(c) Expropriation and compensation standards

The right to own, use and dispose of property in Seychelles is protected by the Constitution.¹¹¹¹ However, this right is subject to certain limitations.¹¹¹² Private property may be expropriated by law, provided that:

- (i) The law allows for reasonable notice to be given to any person who has an interest in the property, informing it of the intention to expropriate;¹¹¹³
- (ii) The expropriation is for a public purpose;¹¹¹⁴
- (iii) The expropriation is non-discriminatory;¹¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰⁸ Article 26(3) (e) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles.

¹¹⁰⁹ Section 5(3) Seychelles Investment Act.

¹¹¹⁰ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹¹¹¹ Article 26(1) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles of 1993 as amended by Act 14 of 1996.

¹¹¹² Article 26(2) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles.

¹¹¹³ Article 26(3) (a) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles.

¹¹¹⁴ Article 26(2)(b) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles; Section 5(1) Seychelles Investment Act.

¹¹¹⁵ Section 5(1) Seychelles Investment Act.

- (iv) There is a reasonable justification for causing hardship to any person who has an interest in the property;¹¹¹⁶
- (v) Prompt and full compensation is paid for the expropriation;¹¹¹⁷ and
- (vi) Provision is made for access to the Supreme Court of Seychelles for the determination of the rights or interest of an interested person, to determine the legality of the expropriation, to determine the amount of compensation to be paid, or to enforce the payment of the compensation.¹¹¹⁸

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

The Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles provides that the Supreme Court may be the forum for the enforcement of payment of compensation.¹¹¹⁹ The IAG ranks Seychelles under the Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 76.3 (all scores out of 100), 67.2 points for judicial independence, 37 for judicial process and 66.7 for property rights.¹¹²⁰ Seychelles ranks 7th out of 54 African states and 4th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.¹¹²¹

The WGI gives Seychelles a score of 62 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹¹²²

¹¹¹⁶ Article 26(3) (c) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles.

¹¹¹⁷ Article 26(3)(d) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles; Section 5(1) Seychelles Investment Act. Section 5(2) Seychelles Investment Act provides that the value of the property shall be the market value immediately before the expropriation. The compensation shall bear interest from date of dispossession to date of payment.

¹¹¹⁸ Article 26(3) (e) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles.

¹¹¹⁹ Article 26(3)(e) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles.

¹¹²⁰ IAG “Seychelles Scores, Ranks and Trends” <http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹¹²¹ IAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹¹²² WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

The United States Department of State states that court processes in Seychelles are slow, and they can take up to five years before a judgment is granted.¹¹²³ Resources are also insufficient and the system has multiple appeals, both of which contribute to a slow pace. The government encourages the referral of investor-state disputes to an Investment Appeal Panel.

Seychelles is not a member of the New York Convention.

4.2.12 REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa is the third largest state in SADC in terms of landmass, behind the DRC and Angola.¹¹²⁴ During 2015 South Africa had a population of 54, 490 million, and a landmass of 1 213 090 sq. km.¹¹²⁵ During 2015 South Africa had the highest GDP in SADC (USD 314 Billion).¹¹²⁶ The GDP had an annual growth rate of 0.6 percent. South Africa had a per capita income of USD 5773.¹¹²⁷ South Africa received FDI of between USD 6.6 Billion and USD 1.7 Billion per year between 2005 and 2015.¹¹²⁸ South Africa is an ideal investment destination for a variety of reasons ranging from location, stage of development, political stability, the presence of natural and mineral resources etc.¹¹²⁹

¹¹²³ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dclid=254169&year=2016#wrapper>

¹¹²⁴ See Table 2, Appendix hereto.

¹¹²⁵ See Table 2, Appendix hereto.

¹¹²⁶ See <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/710/GeneralProfile710.pdf> (Date of use: 21 November 2017).

¹¹²⁷ See <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/710/GeneralProfile710.pdf> (Date of use: 21 November 2017). See also http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0441/Press_statement_1_4q_2015.pdf (Date of use: 22 November 2017).

¹¹²⁸ Table 3, Appendix hereto.

¹¹²⁹ See Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) "South Africa: Investors Handbook 2014/2015" at 1-8, 39-52

The main economic sectors in South Africa during the 2015 reporting year were finance, real estate and business services, Government services, wholesale, retail and motor trade, Manufacturing, mining, transport, storage and communication, personal services, construction, electricity and water, and agriculture.¹¹³⁰

South Africa's top ten investment projects are bio fuels, business outsourcing, the Centurion Aerospace Village, the COEGA Industrial Development Zone, manufacturing, the Dube Tradeport, the East London Industrial Development Zone, Green Economy Industries, the Richards Bay Industrial Development Zone, and the Saldanha Bay Industrial Development Zone.¹¹³¹

(a) Applicable regime

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa lays the basis on which property may be expropriated.¹¹³² An Expropriation Bill is in existence and is presently before Parliament.¹¹³³ The Protection of Investment Act regulates the protection of foreign investments but does not contain provisions for expropriation.¹¹³⁴ The Act defers the right to property to Section 25 of the Constitution.¹¹³⁵

¹¹³⁰ https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/tax/ZA_DTI-InvestinginSA_2014-15.pdf (Date of use: 19 November 2017); Webber Wentzel “Investing in South Africa Charting the Legal Landscape with Webber Wentzel 2015/16” http://www.investinginsouthafrica.co.za/downloads/en/Webber_Wentzel_Investing_in_South_Africa_complete.pdf (Date of use: 19 November 2017).

¹¹³¹ Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) “South Africa: Investors Handbook 2014/2015” at 39 https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/tax/ZA_DTI-InvestinginSA_2014-15.pdf (Date of use: 19 November 2017).

¹¹³² Department of Trade and Industry (South Africa) (2013) “South Africa’s Top Ten Investment Projects” <http://www.thedti.gov.za/DownloadFileAction?id=833> (Date of use: 19 November 2017).

¹¹³³ Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as amended to 2013.

¹¹³⁴ Bill B 4-2015, published in Government Gazette 38418 of 26 January 2015.

¹¹³⁵ Act 22 of 2015.

(b) Dispute resolution forum

Should a dispute arise between an investor and the government of South Africa, an investor may refer the dispute to mediation¹¹³⁶ or a local court.¹¹³⁷ ISDS is also possible, subject to the exhaustion of local remedies, and the consent of the government of South Africa.¹¹³⁸

South Africa is not a member of the ICSID Convention.

(c) Expropriation and compensation Standard

Section 25 of the Constitution regulates expropriation. It provides that a law of general application may only expropriate property for a public purpose or interest, and subject to the payment of just and equitable compensation.¹¹³⁹ Just and equitable compensation must be quantified with due regard to the:¹¹⁴⁰

- (i) Current use of the property;
- (ii) History of the acquisition and use of the property;
- (iii) Market value of the property;
- (iv) Extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and
- (v) Purpose of the expropriation.

¹¹³⁵ Section 10 Protection of Investment Act.
¹¹³⁶ Section 13(1) Protection of Investment Act.
¹¹³⁷ Section 13(4) Protection of Investment Act.
¹¹³⁸ Section 13(5) Protection of Investment Act.
¹¹³⁹ Section 25(2)-(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
¹¹⁴⁰ Section 25(3) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

The Constitution emphasises the importance of land reform, and in particular, the Constitution shall not impede the state from taking measures to achieve land, water, and related reform in order to redress the effects of apartheid.¹¹⁴¹ It must be noted that there are moves to amend Section 25 of the Constitution, so as to provide for expropriation without compensation.¹¹⁴²

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

An order issued by a court or an arbitral award must be enforced via the courts. This raises the issue of the efficiency, partiality, and costs of using the local courts. The IIAG ranks South Africa under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 94.7 (all scores out of 100), 96.5 points for judicial independence, 100 for judicial process and 85.4 for property rights.¹¹⁴³ South Africa ranks 7th out of 54 African states, and 5th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.¹¹⁴⁴

The WGI gives South Africa a score of 58.17 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹¹⁴⁵ South Africa's 2014 APRM report notes that progress is being made with regard to the transformation and independence of the judiciary.¹¹⁴⁶

¹¹⁴¹ Section 25(8) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.

¹¹⁴² Parliament of the Republic of South Africa "Press Release" 27 February 2018 <https://www.parliament.gov.za/press-releases/national-assembly-gives-constitution-review-committee-mandate-review-section-25-constitution> (Date of use: 4 March 2018)

¹¹⁴³ IIAG "South Africa Scores, Ranks & Trends" <http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹¹⁴⁴ IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹¹⁴⁵ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

¹¹⁴⁶ At 121 http://aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/component/docman/doc_view/491-south-africa-third-report-on-aprm-npoa-implementation-2014 (Date of use: 14 November 2017).

The U.S. Department of State states that dispute resolution in South Africa can be time-consuming.¹¹⁴⁷ However, there are no concerns raised regarding the independence of the judiciary or the efficiency of the courts. South Africa conducted an APRM assessment in 2007, but the report is now over a decade old, and may not reflect the true position regarding the contents thereof.¹¹⁴⁸

South Africa is a member of the New York Convention.¹¹⁴⁹

4.2.13 UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

During 2015 Tanzania had the third highest SADC population of 53 million, and a landmass of 885 800 sq. km.¹¹⁵⁰ GDP was USD 46 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 6.9 percent. Per capita income was USD 865.¹¹⁵¹ Tanzania's FDI is stable at between USD 1 Billion and 2 Billion.¹¹⁵²

The main economic sectors in Tanzania are agriculture (farm implements, agro-processing, agricultural machinery, irrigation equipment, fishing equipment, agricultural commodity trading), information and communications technologies (broadcasting,

¹¹⁴⁷ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/#wrap> per (Date of use: 14 November 2017).

¹¹⁴⁸ APRM "South Africa Country Review Report No. 2" September 2007 <http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 10 February 2018). See also APRM "Third Report on the implementation of South Africa's APRM Programme of Action", January 2014 http://aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/component/docman/doc_view/491-south-africa-third-report-on-aprm-npoa-implementation-2014 (Date of use: 20 April 2018).

¹¹⁴⁹ <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 14 November 2017).

¹¹⁵⁰ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/834/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹¹⁵¹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/834/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹¹⁵² Table 3, Appendix hereto.

computer supplies etc.), environment and energy generation (petroleum, solar, wind, natural gas, geothermal power generation) health (hospitals, pharmaceuticals, health equipment etc.), construction (roads and other infrastructure, equipment hire), consumer goods (agricultural processing and light consumer goods), financial services, mining (gold, copper, cobalt, coal, tin, phosphates etc.), textiles (cotton and textiles), tourism (agency services, camping equipment, vehicles, hotel equipment, diving equipment, tourist boats, mountain climbing equipment as well as tour promotion services e.g., web designing) and transportation (land, marine and air transport).¹¹⁵³

(a) Applicable regime

The Tanzania Investment Act¹¹⁵⁴ and the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania¹¹⁵⁵ regulate the expropriation of foreign investments in Tanzania.

(b) Dispute resolution forum

The Tanzania Investment Act provides that disputes between an investor and the government of Tanzania shall first be resolved amicably.¹¹⁵⁶ If the dispute is not amicably resolved, then it shall by agreement of the parties be resolved by arbitration.¹¹⁵⁷ The arbitration may be any of the following, and both parties have to agree to the choice of forum.¹¹⁵⁸

¹¹⁵³ <http://www.foreign.go.tz/index.php/en/diaspora/category/news-and-events> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹¹⁵⁴ Act 26 of 1997.

¹¹⁵⁵ Constitution of 1977 as amended up to 30 June 1995, referred to as the 1997 Constitution.

¹¹⁵⁶ Section 23(1) Tanzania Investment Act.

¹¹⁵⁷ Section 23(2) Tanzania Investment Act.

¹¹⁵⁸ Section 23(2) Tanzania Investment Act.

- (i) National arbitration in terms of the arbitration laws of Tanzania;¹¹⁵⁹
- (ii) ICSID arbitration;¹¹⁶⁰ or
- (iii) Arbitration in terms of an investment treaty between Tanzania and the home state of the investor.¹¹⁶¹

It must be noted that Tanzania has passed a law that prohibits the state from being a party to ISDS and foreign proceedings.¹¹⁶²

Tanzania is a member of the ICSID Convention.¹¹⁶³

(c) Expropriation and compensation Standard

The state may expropriate private property, provided that the expropriation is in terms of due process that provides for:

- (i) Prompt, fair and adequate compensation;¹¹⁶⁴ and
- (ii) A right to access to a court or arbitration forum, for the purpose of determining the rights of the investor as well as the amount of compensation.¹¹⁶⁵

¹¹⁵⁹ Section 23(2) (a) Tanzania Investment Act.

¹¹⁶⁰ Section 23(2) (b) Tanzania Investment Act.

¹¹⁶¹ Section 23(2) (c) Tanzania Investment Act.

¹¹⁶² Section 11 The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act.

¹¹⁶³ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹¹⁶⁴ Article 24(2) Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania; Section 22(2)(a) Tanzania Investment Act.

¹¹⁶⁵ Section 22(2) (b) Tanzania Investment Act.

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

An order issued by a court or an arbitral award must be enforced via the courts. The IIAG ranks Tanzania under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 56.3 (all scores out of 100), 62.6 points for judicial independence, 54.2 for judicial process and 55.2 for property rights.¹¹⁶⁶ Tanzania ranks 14th out of 54 African states and 8th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.¹¹⁶⁷

The WGI gives Tanzania a score of 39.4 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹¹⁶⁸ The Tanzania 2013 APRM Report noted that the judiciary had resource and capacity constraints, which limited access to justice,¹¹⁶⁹ and that there was tension between the judiciary and the legislature, due to the judiciary's authority to declare legislation invalid.¹¹⁷⁰

The U.S. Department of State states that the court system suffers from backlogs going up to four years.¹¹⁷¹

Tanzania is a member of the New York Convention.¹¹⁷²

¹¹⁶⁶ IIAG "Tanzania Scores, Ranks & Trends" <http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).
¹¹⁶⁷ IIAG Report 2017 at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).
¹¹⁶⁸ <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).
¹¹⁶⁹ APRM "Tanzania Country Review Report No. 17", January 2013 at 143 <http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 10 February 2018).
¹¹⁷⁰ APRM "Tanzania Country Review Report" <http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 10 February 2018).
¹¹⁷¹ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dliid=254169&year=2016#wrapper>
¹¹⁷² <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

4.2.14 REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

As at 2015, Zambia had a population of 16 million and a landmass of 743 390 sq. km.¹¹⁷³ GDP was USD 21 Billion, with an annual growth rate of 3.6 percent.¹¹⁷⁴ Per capita income was USD 1 352. Zambia's FDI was between USD 1 Billion and 3 Billion from 2011 to 2015.¹¹⁷⁵ Zambia's main economic sectors are mining (copper, cobalt, gold emeralds, topaz, opal, aquamarine etc.), agriculture (maize, soya beans, cowpeas, mixed beans, cassava etc.), manufacturing (textiles, wood products, building materials, processed foods, chemicals, leather products, tobacco etc.), infrastructure (railway, road, aviation), energy generation (coal, hydro, bio fuels), Information Communications and technology, health (private health care facilities and equipment) and education (private tertiary education institutions).¹¹⁷⁶

(a) Applicable regime

The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia¹¹⁷⁷ and the Zambia Development Agency Act¹¹⁷⁸ regulate the expropriation of foreign investments in Zambia.

(b) Dispute resolution forum

Disputes arising from an investment made under or regulated by the Zambia Development Agency Act are resolved by arbitration under the Arbitration Act.¹¹⁷⁹ In

¹¹⁷³ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/894/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹¹⁷⁴ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/894/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹¹⁷⁵ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/894/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹¹⁷⁶ Zambia Development Agency "Zambia Investors Guide Handbook" (undated) at 6-8 <http://www.zda.org.zm/?q=content/investment-guide-zambia> (Date of use: 10 August 2018).

¹¹⁷⁷ Constitution of 1991 as amended by Act 18 of 1996.

¹¹⁷⁸ Act 11 of 2006.

terms of section 23 of the Arbitration Act, an organisation responsible for the regulation of the practice of a profession may apply to the Minister for recognition as an arbitration institution. An arbitration award is final and binding upon the parties.¹¹⁸⁰ However, a court may set aside the award upon the application of one of the parties.¹¹⁸¹ Foreign lawyers are not allowed to represent parties at arbitration.¹¹⁸² An arbitral award made in terms of the Arbitration Act is final and binding.¹¹⁸³ Arbitration proceedings are deemed to be private and confidential, and no details thereof may be published except as provided therein.¹¹⁸⁴

Zambia is a member of the ICSID Convention.¹¹⁸⁵

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

The Constitution of the Republic of Zambia allows for property to be expropriated.¹¹⁸⁶ In line with the Constitution, the Zambia Development Act provides that property may be expropriated, provided that the expropriation:

- (i) Shall be for public purposes;¹¹⁸⁷
- (ii) Is in terms of an Act of Parliament;¹¹⁸⁸

¹¹⁷⁹ Section 21 Zambia Development Agency Act. The Act in question is the Arbitration Act 19 of 2000.

¹¹⁸⁰ Section 20 Arbitration Act.

¹¹⁸¹ Section 17 Arbitration Act.

¹¹⁸² <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dlid=254169&year=2016#wrapper>

¹¹⁸³ Section 20 Arbitration Act.

¹¹⁸⁴ Section 27 Arbitration Act.

¹¹⁸⁵ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹¹⁸⁶ Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic of Zambia.

¹¹⁸⁷ Section 19(1) Zambia Development Agency Act; Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic of Zambia.

- (iii) The said Act of Parliament provides for prompt payment of compensation at market value;¹¹⁸⁹ and
- (iv) The payment shall be freely remittable in foreign currency.¹¹⁹⁰

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

Arbitration awards are enforced in the High Court, and appeals thereon are made to the Supreme Court.¹¹⁹¹ The IIAG ranks Zambia under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 74.9 (all scores out of 100), 63.1 points for judicial independence, 83.3 for the judicial process and 60.5 for property rights.¹¹⁹² Zambia ranks 9th out of 54 African states and 7th in SADC in terms of Rule of Law.¹¹⁹³

The WGI gives Zambia a score of 47.2 under the Rule of Law indicator,¹¹⁹⁴ while the WJP gives her a score of 48 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹¹⁹⁵ Zambia's 2013 APRM review notes that the president appoints members of the judiciary and determines their

¹¹⁸⁸ Section 19(2) Zambia Development Agency Act; Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic of Zambia.

¹¹⁸⁹ Section 19(2) Zambia Development Agency Act; Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic of Zambia.

¹¹⁹⁰ Section 19(2) Zambia Development Agency Act; Article 16(1) Constitution of the Republic of Zambia.

¹¹⁹¹ Section 18-19 Arbitration Act.

¹¹⁹² IIAG "Zambia Scores, Ranks and Trends"

<http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹¹⁹³ IIAG Report 2017 at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹¹⁹⁴ WGI <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

¹¹⁹⁵ WJP 2016 Rule of Law Index at 21 <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

terms of service.¹¹⁹⁶ The report recommended that Zambia entrench the functional, financial and structural aspects of the legislature and the judiciary.¹¹⁹⁷

The U.S. Department of State states that access to justice in Zambia is limited by physical accessibility, financial accessibility and unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice.¹¹⁹⁸

Zambia is a member of the New York Convention.¹¹⁹⁹

4.2.15 REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE

According to 2015 figures, Zimbabwe had a population of 15 million and a landmass of 386 850 sq. km.¹²⁰⁰ It had a GDP of USD 14 Billion, with a growth rate of 3.2 percent.¹²⁰¹ Per capita income was USD 965.¹²⁰² Zimbabwe's economic opportunities lie in agriculture (tobacco, sugar, cotton, and horticulture), mining (diamonds, gold, and platinum) and manufacturing (food and beverages, clothing and textiles, wood and timber, fertilizers and chemicals and pharmaceuticals).¹²⁰³ FDI inflows from other

¹¹⁹⁶ APRM “Zambia Country Review Report No. 16”, January 2013 at para 48.2
<http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 10 February 2018).

¹¹⁹⁷ APRM “Zambia Country Review Report” at para 52
<http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/country-reports-and-experiences> (Date of use: 10 February 2018).

¹¹⁹⁸ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm?dclid=254169&year=2016#wrapper> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹¹⁹⁹ <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

¹²⁰⁰ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/716/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹²⁰¹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/716/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹²⁰² <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/GeneralProfile/en-GB/716/index.html> (Date of use: 10 April 2017).

¹²⁰³ Zimbabwe Investment Authority *A Practical Guide to Doing Business In Zimbabwe*

sources have been between USD 40 Million and USD 500 million per annum. These have stabilised at approximately USD 400 Million per year since 2011.¹²⁰⁴

(a) Applicable regime

The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe regulates the expropriation of investments in Zimbabwe.¹²⁰⁵

(b) Dispute resolution forum

With regard to the expropriation of agricultural land, the only aspect that may be challenged before a court is compensation for improvements made prior to the expropriation.¹²⁰⁶ An expropriation of agricultural land may also not be challenged on the grounds that it is discriminatory.¹²⁰⁷

In all other cases, a person who has a right or interest in a property that has been expropriated may, subject to section 72 of the Constitution, approach a competent court for the return of the property, the legality of the expropriation, or the amount of compensation.¹²⁰⁸

Zimbabwe is a member of the ICSID Convention.¹²⁰⁹

(undated) at 11
http://www.comesaria.org/site/en/opportunities.php?country=30§or=&keyword=Search&id_article=133&tender=&button=Search (Date of use: 08 May 2017).
1204 Table 3, Appendix hereto.
1205 Constitution of 2013 (31 January version).
1206 Section 4(26), 72(3) (b) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.
1207 Section 72(3)(c) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.
1208 Section 71(3) (d)-(e) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.
1209 <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

(c) Expropriation and compensation standard

The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe provides that every person has the right to acquire, hold, occupy, use, transfer, hypothecate, lease or dispose of all forms of property, either individually or in association with others.¹²¹⁰ It allows for expropriation where the following conditions are satisfied the expropriation is:

- (i) In terms of a law of general application;¹²¹¹
- (ii) Necessary for the interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or town and country planning;¹²¹² and
- (iii) For a public purpose.¹²¹³

With regard to agricultural land, no compensation is payable except for improvements to the land.¹²¹⁴ Furthermore, a court is prohibited from adjudicating on a dispute relating to compensation for expropriated land.¹²¹⁵

(d) Enforcement of awards and orders

Disputes relating to expropriation are brought local courts for adjudication. The IAG ranks Zimbabwe under Rule of Law as follows: an overall Rule of Law score of 42.5 (all scores out of 100), 45.6 points for judicial independence, 37.5 for the judicial process and 23.5 for property rights.¹²¹⁶ Zimbabwe ranks 38th out of 54 African states and 13th in SADC in terms of the Rule of Law.¹²¹⁷

¹²¹⁰ Section 71(2) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

¹²¹¹ Section 71(3) (a) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

¹²¹² Section 71(3) (b) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

¹²¹³ Section 71(3) (b) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

¹²¹⁴ Section 72(3) (a) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

¹²¹⁵ Section 72(3) (b) Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe.

¹²¹⁶ IAG “Zimbabwe Scores, Ranks and Trends”

The WJP gives Zimbabwe a score of 37 under the Rule of Law indicator.¹²¹⁸

The U.S. Department of State states that the judiciary lacks resources, cases are backlogged, there is lack of partiality in cases with political overtones, and politicians interfere in foreign cases that are not favorable to Zimbabwe.¹²¹⁹

Zimbabwe is a member of the New York Convention.¹²²⁰

4.3 SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES IN THE EVENT OF EXPROPRIATION

Below is a summary of the remedies available to an investor or investment in the event of expropriation, based on the preceding discussion.

SADC STATE	APPLICABLE LAW	DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM	COMPENSATION STANDARD	ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
Angola	Private Investment Law	Local courts	Fair, prompt and effective compensation	Local courts
Botswana	Constitution;	Local courts	Prompt and	Local courts;

¹²¹⁷ <http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).
IIAG 2017 Report at 26 http://s.mo.ibrahim.foundation/u/2017/11/21165610/2017-IIAG-Report.pdf?_ga=2.213790740.1276503674.1513271096-1221032858.1491926350 (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹²¹⁸ WJP 2016 Rule of Law Index at 21 <https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016> (Date of use: 14 December 2017).

¹²¹⁹ <https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2016/af/254261.htm> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

¹²²⁰ <http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries> (Date of use: 01 April 2017).

	Acquisition of Property Act		adequate compensation	New York Convention
DRC	Investment Code; Constitution	Local arbitration, failing, international arbitration (ICSID or ICC)	Fair and equitable. Based on market value	Local courts; New York Convention
Lesotho	Constitution	Local courts	Full and prompt at market value	Local courts; New York Convention
Madagascar	Investment Law	Local courts	Fair compensation	Local courts
Malawi	Investment and Export Promotion Act; Constitution	Local courts	Appropriate compensation	Local courts
Mauritius	Investment Promotion Act; Constitution	Local courts	Adequate compensation	Local courts; New York Convention

Mozambique	Law on Investment; Investment Law Regulations; Constitution	Local courts, or if parties agree, ICSID or ICC arbitration.	Fair compensation	Local courts; New York Convention
Namibia	Investment Promotion Act; Constitution	Local courts or local arbitration (if state agrees)	Just compensation	Local courts; New York Convention
Seychelles	Investment Act; Constitution	Local courts, or by law or as per investment agreement.	Prompt and full compensation	Local courts; New York Convention
South Africa	Constitution; Protection of Investment Act	Mediation, local courts or state-state arbitration if state agrees	Just and equitable	Local Courts; New York Convention
Eswatini	Investment Promotion Act;	Investor chooses local courts or local	Adequate and fair compensation	Local courts; New York Convention

	Constitution	arbitration or UNCITRAL or ICSID.		
Tanzania	Investment Act; Constitution	Both parties must agree on the choice of Local arbitration, or ICSID, or arbitration i.t.o treaty.	Prompt fair and adequate compensation	Local courts; New York Convention
Zambia	Zambia Development Agency Act; Constitution	Local arbitration.	Market value	Local courts; New York Convention
Zimbabwe	Investment Authority Act; Constitution	Local courts.	Fair and adequate compensation	Local courts

Table 1: Summary of provisions relating to expropriation in SADC.

Source: Author's compilation based on the preceding discussion

4.4 ANALYSIS

It is clear from the abovementioned analysis that the investment laws of Member States are in conflict with each other, as well as with the 2006 Annex 1 or the 2016 Annex 1. The next section will look at the implications of these conflicts for the security of foreign investments in SADC.

4.4.1 Dispute resolution forum

Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe provide for local courts as the forum for settlement of investor-state disputes. Mozambique and Tanzania can be added to this list because they provide conditional access to ISDS, failing which a dispute must be referred to local courts. Furthermore, Tanzania has passed legislation to prohibit the state from being subjected to ISDS. The laws of these Member States are coincidentally aligned to the 2016 Annex 1, which provides that investor-state disputes shall be referred to the local courts of host states.

The mandatory referral of investor-state disputes to local courts puts the rule of law in those Member States in the spotlight, since that is the only forum to which the disputes can be referred (in the absence of applicable BITs, TIPs, or investment contracts). It was shown above that there are concerns about the state of the rule of law regarding the courts of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The DRC, Mozambique, Eswatini, and Tanzania provide for ISDS, contrary to the provisions of the 2016 Annex 1. Mozambique and Tanzania require mutual consent for arbitration. Eswatini gives an investor a choice of forum and the investor's choice is

binding on the state. The DRC also provides for arbitration as of right. Therefore, state practice is divergent even among states that provide for ISDS. In this regard, only the DRC and Eswatini are in compliance with the 2006 Annex 1 on the issue of ISDS. But in so doing they contravene the 2016 Annex 1. Mozambique is non-compliant with the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1 by providing optional access to ISDS. The rest of the Member States are in line with the 2016 Annex 1 by not providing access to ISDS.

The DRC, Madagascar Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Zambia and Zimbabwe as members of COMESA face conflicting obligations arising from the 2006 Annex 1 and 2016 Annex 1 on the one hand, and the COMESA Treaty on the other. For example, the COMESA Treaty provides for the referral of disputes to the CCJ,¹²²¹ while the 2006 Annex 1 gives an investor a right to ISDS, and the 2016 Annex 1 refers disputes to local courts. This raises the question: which forum must an investor whose investment was expropriated by one of these Member States use: the CCJ, ISDS or local courts? The 2006 Annex 1, the 2016 Annex 1 and the COMESA Treaty provide conflicting remedies in the event of expropriation. The overall effect of these conflicts is to create instability, unpredictability, and to raise the legal costs for all parties since the conflicts may lead to prolonged legal action. This also shows the result of multiple REC memberships that causes conflicting treaty obligations.

In the event of a conflict between either version of Annex 1 and the law of a host state, the provisions of Annex 1 shall prevail, since Annex 1 is an annex to a TIP, being the FIP. This is because a treaty is an international obligation that must be honoured, irrespective of the provisions of domestic law.

¹²²¹ Article 26 COMESA Treaty.

Even if a Member State provides access to ISDS, contrary to the 2016 Annex 1, it can still refuse to be drawn into an ISDS case, on the basis that doing so will violate a treaty obligation provided in the 2016 Annex 1 not to provide Member State laws to be in line with the 2016 Annex 1.

4.4.2 Expropriation and compensation standard

It was shown above that SADC Member States provide for different levels of compensation in the event of expropriation.¹²²² Botswana, Lesotho, Seychelles provide for full compensation. The DRC, Madagascar, Mozambique, Eswatini, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe provide for fair compensation. Malawi provides for appropriate compensation. Zambia provides for compensation at market value, which is close to if not similar to fair compensation. Namibia provides for just compensation, and Mauritius provides for adequate compensation.

It is important to note that the compensation standards of some SADC Member States are not in line with the 2006 Annex 1, which provides for prompt, adequate and effective (full) compensation. Botswana, Lesotho, Seychelles expressly provide for full compensation, while it may be said that Mauritius, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe also provide full compensation since they provide for “adequate compensation”. The 2016 Annex 1 requires the Member States to pay fair and adequate compensation.¹²²³ Therefore these Member States are in compliance with the 2006 Annex 1, but they are not compliant with the 2016 Annex 1.

¹²²² See Table 1 above.

¹²²³ Article 5 2016 Annex 1.

In the event of a conflict between any version of Annex 1 and the laws of a host state with regard to the quantum of compensation for expropriation, it is submitted that the quantum provided in Annex 1 shall prevail, since the standard of compensation provided by Annex 1 is a treaty obligation that Member States must follow, irrespective of the provisions of their investment laws.

SADC Member States that are members of COMESA, namely the DRC, Madagascar Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Zambia and Zimbabwe have an additional issue to deal with. The COMESA Treaty obliges them to pay adequate compensation in the event of expropriation.¹²²⁴ This compensation standard complies with the 2006 Annex 1 to the extent that it provides for full compensation. It will, however, not comply with the 2016 Annex 1, which does not require the payment of full compensation. However, the COMESA Treaty and the 2016 Annex 1 do not provide the same standard of compensation. Therefore, these Member States face conflicting compensation standards.

4.4.3 Enforcement

In terms of Article 54 of the ICSID Convention and Article III of the New York Convention, the courts of a host state must enforce ICSID and non-ICSID awards respectively. Articles 5 of the New York Convention and Article 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law respectively allow a court to refuse recognition of an award among others if the court finds that the recognition or enforcement of the award will be against the public policy of the Member State. This exposes non-ICSID awards to being challenged and set aside.

¹²²⁴ Article 159(3) COMESA Treaty.

A 2008 study done by Queen Mary University reports that in up to 90 percent of arbitrations, Member States voluntarily complied with an award, while 40 percent of the cases were settled after the issue of the award.¹²²⁵ Therefore, it is only in the minority of the cases that states frustrate or fail to comply with arbitral awards. This is supported by UNCTAD data. According to UNCTAD, as of 22 November 2017, of 78 awards presented national courts for recognition, 50 were upheld, 11 were set aside, 3 were partially set aside, 1 was discontinued, and 13 were pending.¹²²⁶

Nonetheless, the possibility of host states and courts refusing to recognise an award is a real threat to an investor. Three recent examples illustrate this point. In *Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Louis Karel Fick*,¹²²⁷ the respondents had to approach South African Courts to enforce an order of the SADC Tribunal that was awarded against Zimbabwe.¹²²⁸ Another matter that concerning Zimbabwe is being is *Bernhard Von Pezold*. In this matter, Zimbabwe was ordered to return the expropriated farms to the claimants plus damages of USD56 million, failing which Zimbabwe had to pay USD194 Million.¹²²⁹ Zimbabwe is seeking to have the award annulled, and in the interim has agreed to pay the damages into an escrow account pending the decision on annulment.¹²³⁰ Of course, one can also view Zimbabwe's annulment application as a bona fide use of available redress to challenge the award.

¹²²⁵ See <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123294.pdf> (Date of use: 09 April 2017).

¹²²⁶ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/FilterByFollowUpProceedings> (Date of use: 22 November 2017).

¹²²⁷ CCT 101/12 [2013] ZACC 22.

¹²²⁸ See also De Wet 2014 (17) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 553-565.

¹²²⁹ *Bernhard Von Pezold* at para 1020.

¹²³⁰ *Bernhard Von Pezold* Decision on Stay of Enforcement of the Award of 24 April 2017 at para 97-99; Decision on the Applicant's Urgent Application for Provisional Measures Regarding the Temporary Stay of Execution and The Escrow Arrangement of 22 August 2017.

Further afield, the attempts to enforce the award in *Walter Bau* made global headlines for all the wrong reasons, because Thailand did everything it could to avoid complying with the tribunal award.¹²³¹ Since the award was issued in July 2009, the case was fought in New York, Switzerland, and Germany with no closure, because the Thai government consistently refused to comply with the award.¹²³² When *Walter Bau* attached a Boeing 747 jet belonging to the Thai crown prince, the government gave security for the payment of the award in order to release the jet. However, by 2015, the case was still being contested, and at the time of writing there were no public reports of the status of the matter.¹²³³

It is imperative that the SADC Member States comply with court orders and tribunal awards made against them, because failure to do so compromises the state of the rule of law in their states. In turn, this may lead to a loss of trust in their judicial systems. This may, in turn, lead to forum and treaty shopping by investors who seek to bypass their judicial systems.

¹²³¹ See for example Sucharitkul V “From Walter Bau to Hopewell to Bangkok Don Muang Airport” Asia-Pacific Arbitration Reporter 2015 (1) APAR 309-315 <http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/09/2015-1-APAR-Article-Vanina-Sucharitkul.pdf> (Date of use: 08 April 2017).

¹²³² Walter Bau AG was German construction business. During 1998, Walter Bau and a Thai partner were awarded a concession to build a 20km toll road from Bangkok to the Don Muang Airport. The final agreement was signed during 1989 in the name of a consortium of which Walter was a shareholder/partner. The toll road was ultimately finished, but there were unresolved disputes that led to Walter Bau commencing arbitration. Key disputes were the refusal of the Thai government to increase toll fees as agreed in one of the memoranda between the parties, the unilateral closure of the Don Muang Airport for a year and the creation of alternative road which reduced traffic on Walter Bau’s toll road. The arbitral tribunal found that the Thai government breached Walter Bau’s right to fair and equitable treatment, and awarded compensation of EUR30 million.

¹²³³ Sucharitkul “From Walter Bau to Hopewell to Bangkok Don Muang Airport” at 313 <http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2015/09/2015-1-APAR-Article-Vanina-Sucharitkul.pdf> (Date of use: 08 April 2017).

4.5 CONCLUSION

The regulation of foreign investments in SADC by means of Member State laws and Annex 1 has been chaotic, unsatisfactory and a failure, because as shown above, Member States have failed to harmonise their laws with both the 2006 and 2016 Annex 1. There is also no uniformity among the Member States in terms of the regulation of foreign investments, especially with regard to the resolution of foreign investment disputes, and the quantum of compensation payable in the event of expropriation.

Furthermore, Member States such as Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe appear to provide inadequate levels of rule of law in their judicial systems. This is a violation of Article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty, which requires the Member States to respect the rule of law.

The status quo is unsustainable. What options does SADC have regarding the way forward?

In an endeavour to address this question, the next chapter will analyse recent developments in Brazil, the EU and India with regard to the regulation of foreign investments, so as to determine the lessons that SADC may learn there from, and what options may lie ahead for SADC in this regard.

CHAPTER 5

SADC AT CROSSROADS: TOWARDS A NEW DISPENSATION FOR THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

It was shown in Chapter 1 that one of the key objectives of this study is to analyse the options that are open to SADC to address the challenges identified in the Problem Statement, in particular with regard to the regulation of foreign investments and the forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes.¹²³⁴ This Chapter implements this objective. The Chapter will analyse recent developments in Brazil, the EU, and India, with regard to the regulation of foreign investments and the forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes. Building on this analysis, the chapter will propose the lessons that SADC can learn from these developments. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the options that are open to SADC with regard to the level at which foreign investments in SADC should be regulated, and the mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes. This will lay the basis for the recommendations that will be made in Chapter 6.

ISDS has various challenges, as discussed in Chapter 2 above.¹²³⁵ According to UNCTAD, states and regions have responded to the challenges presented by ISDS in different ways,¹²³⁶ such as by maintaining the status quo (e.g. Brazil), disengaging from

¹²³⁴ See Objective 1.3.5 in Chapter 1.

¹²³⁵ See the relevant discussion in Chapter 2 above.

¹²³⁶ See also Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 414 at 442; Miles K “Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Conflict, Convergence, and Future Directions” 2016 *European Yearbook Of International Economic Law* 274-305; Schill SW “In Defence of International Investment Law” 2016 *European Yearbook Of International Economic Law* 309-338; Titi C “Recent Developments in International

the ISDS system (e.g. SADC), introducing selective adjustments (e.g. India) or by implementing systematic reforms (e.g. the EU).¹²³⁷ The question that arises for SADC is whether, given that it removed ISDS from the 2016 Annex 1, there are other options open to it? This study answers this question in the affirmative, and this chapter justifies the existence of other options that are open to SADC.

The EU's proposed ICS is the first of its kind, and is worthy of consideration. Brazil's ACFI is relevant because it provides for diplomatic protection in the form of state-state arbitration for the resolution of investor-state disputes. Angola, Mozambique, and Malawi have signed ACFIs with Brazil.¹²³⁸ This raises the question of, if these Member States like ACFIs enough to conclude them, do they view the ACFI model as a solution for SADC or even Africa? The India Model BIT 2015 is relevant herein because it adheres to ISDS while imposing limitations on access to ISDS, among other measures. India therefore believes that ISDS can be patched or fixed.

This chapter will commence with a brief discussion of the ICS Proposal, Brazil's ACFI and Indian Model BIT. This will be followed by an analysis of the lessons that SADC can learn from the developments in these jurisdictions. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the options that are open to SADC with regard to the future regulation of foreign investments, and the forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes. These

Investment Law” 2016 European Yearbook Of International Economic Law 703-731; Tuerk E and Rosert D “The Road Towards Reform of the International Investment Agreement Regime: A Perspective from UNCTAD” 2016 European Yearbook Of International Economic Law 769-786.

¹²³⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreement Issues Notes” No. 3, June 2014 at 2-9
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d6_en.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

¹²³⁸ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iialInnerMenu> (Date of use: 9 August 2018).

lessons and options will be relevant, as SADC takes part in the AfCFTA investment protocol negotiations.¹²³⁹

5.2 AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGES ARISING FROM ISDS

5.2.1 The EU's proposed ICS

In terms of a recent opinion of the European Court of Justice, and Articles 3(1) and 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU Parliament and the EU Council have the exclusive mandate to negotiate and conclude trade and foreign direct investment agreements.¹²⁴⁰ Based on this mandate, the EU has recently concluded the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),¹²⁴¹ the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement,¹²⁴² the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement,¹²⁴³ and was negotiating the TTIP,¹²⁴⁴ until the USA withdrew from the TTIP

¹²³⁹ African Union (Assembly) "Decision" at para 12(iii), 13.
<https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1834-au-decision-on-the-draft-agreement-establishing-the-african-continental-free-trade-area-21-march-2018-1/file.html> (Date of use, 28 March 2018).

¹²⁴⁰ Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/DOC_2&format=PDF (Date of use: 21 April 2017). See also the recent opinion of the European Court of Justice requested by the European Commission in the case of ECLI:EU:C:2017:376 (Opinion 2/2015) at para 33, 305 <http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30d63c5084083f7b49bd8e26e1cacbce1dfd.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxyLb3r0?text=&docid=190727&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=473213> (Date of use: 21 May 2017).

¹²⁴¹ A copy of the CETA is available at <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter/> (Date of use: 20 April 2017).

¹²⁴² <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437> (Date of use: 21 April 2017).

¹²⁴³ Available at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961> (Date of use: 21 April 2017).

¹²⁴⁴ For documents and updates see http://eu.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-and-events/index_index_en.htm#eu-position (Date of use: 21 April 2017).

negotiations.¹²⁴⁵ Key to this study is the EU's proposed Investment Court System (ICS), which proposal is part of the dispute resolution mechanism of the TTIP.

Two things are noteworthy regarding the ICS proposal. Firstly, on 27 March 2014, the EU commenced a public consultation process in order to gauge public sentiment on the TTIP, in particular, with regard to the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP.¹²⁴⁶ The public rejected the proposals with an overwhelming 99 percent majority.¹²⁴⁷ In particular, respondents rejected the inclusion of ISDS in the TTIP.¹²⁴⁸ The EU then returned to the drawing board, and emerged with the present ICS proposal (which as it will be shown below, is ISDS in disguise). Secondly, the negotiating directive of 17 June 2013 issued by the Council of the EU regarding the TTIP stipulated among others that the TTIP must provide for ISDS with an appeal mechanism.¹²⁴⁹

¹²⁴⁵ The withdrawal of the U.S. from the TTIP has not necessarily dampened the resolve to forge ahead with the ICS, as it is contained in the EU-Canada CETA 2016 and EU-Vietnam FTA 2016.

¹²⁴⁶ http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultations/index.cfm?consul_id=179 (Date of use: 03 November 2017).

¹²⁴⁷ See the report of the outcome of the consultations: European Union (Commission) "Report on Online public consultation on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP)", (Brussels, 13.1.2015 SWD (2015) 3 final) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc153044.pdf> (Date of use: 03 November 2017).

¹²⁴⁸ See European Commission "Report on Online public consultation" at para 3.1 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf (Date of use: 03 November 2017).

¹²⁴⁹ See European Union (Council) "Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America", Brussels, 9 October 2014, at 9 <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf> (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

The TTIP text consists of 24 Chapters, divided into 4 Parts.¹²⁵⁰ Part 1 deals with Market Access, Part 2 deals with Regulatory Cooperation, Part 3 deals with Rules, and Part 4 deals with Institutional and General Arrangements. The ICS proposals that will be used in this discussion are contained in Subsection 3 (Resolution of Investment Disputes and Investment Court System), Chapter II of Part 3 and Part 4.¹²⁵¹ The proposed functioning of the ICS in relation to the mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes will now be briefly analysed, followed by some comments.¹²⁵²

The ICS is supposed to be an international court, which will apply international law.¹²⁵³ It will have a Tribunal of First Instance (the Tribunal),¹²⁵⁴ and an Appeal Tribunal (the Appeal Tribunal).¹²⁵⁵ The ICS proposal provides for investor-state disputes to be resolved via ADR, although this is not mandatory.¹²⁵⁶ If ADR measures are not successful in resolving a dispute within six months from the submission of a request for consultation, an investor may submit a claim to the ICS Tribunal in terms of the ICSID

¹²⁵⁰ The full text of the TTIP proposal is available in parts at <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230> (Date of use: 1 November 2017).

¹²⁵¹ <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1230#institutions> (Date of use: 1 November 2017).

¹²⁵² See also Baetens F “The European Union’s Proposed Investment Court System: Addressing Criticisms of ISDS While Raising New Challenges” 2016 (43) (4) *Legal Issues of Economic Integration* 367–384; Reinisch A “Will the EU’s Proposal Concerning an Investment Court System for CETA and TTIP Lead to Enforceable Awards?—The Limits of Modifying the ICSID Convention and the Nature of Investment Arbitration” 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761–786; Schwieder RW “TTIP and the Investment Court System: A New (and Improved) Paradigm for Investor-State Adjudication” 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 178-227 at 189-193.

¹²⁵³ Article 13(2) Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁵⁴ Article 9 Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁵⁵ Article 10 Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁵⁶ Articles 2-4 Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

Convention, UNCITRAL or other arbitration rules agreed by the parties to the dispute.¹²⁵⁷

In order to avoid parallel proceedings, a claimant is required to first withdraw any proceedings relating to the claim that may be pending before any court or tribunal.¹²⁵⁸ A claimant is required to submit proof of the withdrawal of such proceedings, as well as a declaration stating that it will not submit the same claim in another forum in the future (“no-U-turn clause”).¹²⁵⁹

A claimant must commence consultations within three years since it first acquired knowledge of the measures of a host state complained of, or within two years after the cessation of proceedings for the exhaustion of local remedies, if these were commenced.¹²⁶⁰ Furthermore, if a claimant does not refer a dispute to the ICS Tribunal within 18 months from submission of the request for consultations, the claimant shall be deemed to have withdrawn its request for consultations.¹²⁶¹ A claimant is exempted from compliance with this deadline if it cannot do so due to the measures of a host state complained of.¹²⁶²

A claimant is not required to first exhaust local remedies in a host state.¹²⁶³ A claimant may not submit a claim relating to an investment that was obtained through fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, corruption, or conduct amounting to an abuse of process.¹²⁶⁴

¹²⁵⁷ Article 6(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁵⁸ Article 14 (1)-(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁵⁹ Article 14(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁶⁰ Article 4(5) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁶¹ Article 4(6) Sub-section 3, Chapter II TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁶² Article 4(7) Sub-section 3, Chapter II TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁶³ See the discussion in para 5.3.3 below. This contrasts with the Indian Model BIT, which requires mandatory ADR and the exhaustion of local remedies, as discussed below.

¹²⁶⁴ Article 6(6) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

The ICSID and the PCA are designated as the Secretariat of the ICS.¹²⁶⁵ The ICSID Convention, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or other arbitration rules shall apply to ICS proceedings.¹²⁶⁶ More specifically, Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention regarding jurisdiction *ratione personae*, as well as Article II of the New York Convention shall apply.¹²⁶⁷ One cannot help but notice at this early juncture that the ICS is displaying elements of an arbitration institution.

The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules shall also apply to the proceedings.¹²⁶⁸ These rules encourage transparency and access to information in arbitration proceedings. They mandate that information and documents relating to an investor-state arbitration shall be made available to the public, interested parties such as *amici curiae* may join the proceedings, and hearings shall be open to the public.¹²⁶⁹

The judgment of an ICS Tribunal is called a provisional award.¹²⁷⁰ A Tribunal shall issue a provisional award within eighteen months from the submission of a claim, although it may on good reason take longer to render an award.¹²⁷¹ A Tribunal may order monetary damages or restitution of property with an alternative for monetary compensation.¹²⁷² However, a tribunal may not award monetary damages that are greater than the loss

¹²⁶⁵ Article 9(16), 10(15) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁶⁶ Articles 2, 7, 29(1) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁶⁷ Article 7(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁶⁸ Article 18(1) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal. The rules are available at <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf> (Date of use: 21 April 2017).

¹²⁶⁹ Articles 3-6 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules.

¹²⁷⁰ A provisional award shall become final if an appeal against it is not lodged within 90 days of the issue of the award.

¹²⁷¹ Article 28(6) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁷² Article 28(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

actually suffered by a claimant as a result of the breach of the relevant provisions of the TTIP agreement, reduced by any prior damages or compensation already provided by the Party concerned.¹²⁷³ Furthermore, a Tribunal may not award punitive damages.¹²⁷⁴

The TTIP proposal provides for the establishment of non-judicial structures. These are a Joint Committee (JC),¹²⁷⁵ Contact Points (CPs),¹²⁷⁶ Transatlantic Regulators Forum (TRF),¹²⁷⁷ Specialised Working Committees (SWCs) and Working Groups (SWGs),¹²⁷⁸ Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs)¹²⁷⁹ and a Civil Society Forum (CSF).¹²⁸⁰ The JC¹²⁸¹ and CPs¹²⁸² are noteworthy structures, as they are similar in function to their Brazilian equivalents, which are discussed in the next section. Each Member State shall establish a DAG, which shall comprise of independent representative organisations of civil society in a balanced representation of economic, social, and environmental stakeholders, including, among others, employers and workers organisations, nongovernmental organisations, business groups, consumer groups, and public health associations.¹²⁸³

The CSF shall be a joint structure, and shall be convened by the JC at least once per

¹²⁷³ Article 28(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁷⁴ Article 28(3) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁷⁵ Article X.1 Part 4 TTIP Proposal (EU Proposal for Institutional, General and Final Provisions) of 14 July 2016
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/july/tradoc_154802.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

¹²⁷⁶ Article X.5 Part 4 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁷⁷ Article X.2 Part 4 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁷⁸ Article X.1 Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁷⁹ Article X.7 Part 4 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁸⁰ See EU Proposal for Institutional, General and Final Provisions of 14 July 2016
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/july/tradoc_154802.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

¹²⁸¹ The relevant function of the TTIP Joint Committee here is the resolution of problems that may arise in areas covered by the Agreement. The Brazilian Joint Committees also perform a similar function.

¹²⁸² The TTIP Contact Points are aimed at facilitating communication between Member States, just like the Brazilian Focal Points.

¹²⁸³ Article X.7 Part 4 TTIP Proposal (this Part is not divided into Chapters).

year, and shall include DAGs and independent representative organisations of employers, workers, environmental interests, business groups, consumer groups, and public health associations.¹²⁸⁴

The proposed creation of DAGs and CSFs is an important component of the TTIP. It brings public participation to the implementation of the TTIP, thus enabling transparency as well as the consideration of broader societal interests.

A few comments will now be made on the ICS proposal, noting that it is impossible to conduct a full analysis thereof herein.¹²⁸⁵

As a starting point, it appears that the EU might not have the legal competency to establish the ICS as proposed. According to the German Magistrates Association, the ICS will be outside the scope of the existing EU legal and judicial order, and therefore its establishment will be a violation of EU law.¹²⁸⁶ This is supported by an opinion of a full bench of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the *European and Community Patents Court* case. In this matter, the ECJ held that the establishment of the European and Community Patents Court as an international court would be a violation of the EU Treaty and FEU Treaty.¹²⁸⁷ The ECJ found in this regard that such a court would be outside the

¹²⁸⁴ Article X.8 Part 4 TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁸⁵ For a critique of whether the ICS proposal addresses the challenges of ISDS, see Schwieder 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* at 194-202.

¹²⁸⁶ German Magistrates Association “Opinion on the establishment of an investment tribunal in TTIP - the proposal from the European Commission on 16.09.2015 and 11.12.2015” at 2 https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/eu-us_trade_deal/2016/english_version_deutsche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf (Date of use: 76 September 2017).

¹²⁸⁷ European Court of Justice “Opinion 1/09: Opinion delivered pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU (Opinion delivered pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU – Draft agreement – Creation of a unified patent litigation system – European and Community Patents Court –

institutional and judicial framework of the EU.¹²⁸⁸ The ICS therefore faces the same predicament of illegality.

Aside from its possible illegality, the ICS also has an identity crisis. Is it really a court, or a standing arbitration tribunal in disguise? While the ICS purports to be an international court, it is strictly speaking not a court at all. Despite being branded by the EU as an international court, the ICS is more of an arbitral tribunal institution than a court in the ordinary sense of the word. The biggest give-away in this regard is that the ICS uses arbitration infrastructure such as ICSID and PCA as its Secretariat, and it uses the ICSID Convention, UNCITRAL Rules and the New York Convention to function. Furthermore, judgments of the ICS are called awards, a language that is used by arbitral tribunals.¹²⁸⁹ The EU Commissioner for Trade also made it clear that the “judges” of the ICS are in reality arbitrators when she said that:

Our idea here is for governments, long before any actual cases are launched, to nominate a limited list of trustworthy arbitrators who would decide on all TTIP investment cases. To get onto the list, the arbitrators would have to be sufficiently qualified. For example, they would have to be eligible to be judges in their home systems.¹²⁹⁰

Compatibility of the draft agreement with the Treaties)”
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=80233&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=812343> (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

¹²⁸⁸ At para 71.

¹²⁸⁹ See for example Articles 10, 28-30

¹²⁹⁰ See European Commission Speech by Cecilia Malmstrom - Commissioner for Trade “Discussion on Investment in TTIP at the meeting of the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament” Brussels 15 March 2015 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4624_en.htm (Date of use: 03 November 2017).

Finally, the negotiation directive issued by the EU Council stated that the TTIP must retain ISDS, with an appeal mechanism.¹²⁹¹ Indeed, this directive was followed, as can be seen from the use of ISDS facilities, rules and arbitrators. It is, therefore, difficult to argue that the ICS is a departure from ISDS when the EU's mandate was that ISDS must be retained. Otherwise, the ICS proposal is outside of the EU's directive as stated herein, and would then face issues of illegality.

The labelling of the ICS as an international court is therefore misleading. Reinisch suggests that the ambiguity relating to the naming of the ICS as a court rather than an arbitral institution appears to be deliberate.¹²⁹² He opines that the ICS is an arbitral tribunal, despite the fact that the arbitrators were appointed by states without the involvement of investors.¹²⁹³ The German Magistrates Association also concludes that the ICS is a permanent court of arbitration and not an international court.¹²⁹⁴ Little wonder that a commentator calls the ICS "a wolf in a sheep's skin".¹²⁹⁵

Nonetheless, the ICS proposal has some positive aspects. These are discussed below.

¹²⁹¹ European Union (Council) "Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America" at para 23-24 <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf> (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

¹²⁹² Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 765.

¹²⁹³ Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 768.

¹²⁹⁴ German Magistrates Association "Opinion on the establishment of an investment tribunal in TTIP - the proposal from the European Commission on 16.09.2015 and 11.12.2015" at 2
https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/euus_trade_deal/2016/english_version_deutsche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf (Date of use: 76 September 2017).

¹²⁹⁵ Ebenhart P "ICS: The Wolf in Sheep's Clothing, The EU's Great Corporate Rebrand" *Public Services International* May 2016 <http://www.world-psi.org/en/investment-court-system-ics-wolf-sheeps-clothing> (Date of use: 17 April 2017).

It is commendable that the ICS seeks to regulate the maximum legal costs that an unsuccessful claimant who is a natural person or a small or medium-sized business (SMEs) can pay.¹²⁹⁶ This will enable SMEs to enforce their rights in the event that they are impaired, without fear of being exposed to unlimited legal costs.¹²⁹⁷

The ICS proposal's effort to reduce the duration that it takes to conclude cases to eighteen months, and for appeals to be concluded within six months is a positive move. But potentially, this means cases will take close to two years to conclude. The fact that Article 28(6) makes provision for cases to take a longer duration to conclude (without setting a ceiling on the extensions that can be granted) means that cases can potentially take longer. There ought to be ramifications if cases are not concluded on time, as contemplated by the ICS proposal.¹²⁹⁸

The application of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules on transparency is another commendable feature, as it promotes public access and participation in investor-state cases.¹²⁹⁹

¹²⁹⁶ Article 28(5), Chapter II, TTIP Proposal.

¹²⁹⁷ However, SMEs still face significant legal costs if they use the ICS, due to the multiple layers of appeals and the possibility of the inclusion of *amici curiae* etc. (Article 4 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law "Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration" <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf> (Date of use: 15 October 2017) allow an interested party to join the proceedings in order to make submissions on a matter to which the dispute relates).

¹²⁹⁸ Baetens 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367 at 377.

¹²⁹⁹ Articles 4 and 5 of the United Nations Commission on International Trade "UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration" United Nations, New York 2014 <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf> (Date of use: 15 October 2017) allow interested parties to join a case. See also Baetens 2016 (43) (4) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 367 at 373-374; Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 196.

It is noteworthy that the EU, like Brazil (as discussed in the next section), proposes the use of JCs and CPs to facilitate investor-state dispute resolution. This is an interesting pattern that deserves to be watched.

There are, however, a number of downsides to the ICS proposal, as discussed next. The use of the ICSID and PCA as the ICS Secretariat will increase costs for all parties, as these institutions charge their own fees, which are excessive.¹³⁰⁰ For example, the ICSID charges USD 25000.00 for the opening of a case, an annual administration fee of USD 42000.00, and USD 10 000.00 for the appointment of arbitrators.¹³⁰¹ These are very significant for SMEs and developing states, especially when converted to local African currency. National courts in SADC do not charge fees of this magnitude.¹³⁰² For example, in South Africa, there are no fees for opening a court case.

The application of the ICSID Convention to ICS cases poses serious challenges. This is because the EU is not a party to the Convention, and therefore an ICSID tribunal would lack jurisdiction against the EU.¹³⁰³ Furthermore, the EU cannot join the ICSID, as ICSID membership is presently limited to states only.¹³⁰⁴ The ICS proposal does not indicate how this challenge will be addressed.

¹³⁰⁰ ICSID fees are available at <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/Schedule-of-Fees.aspx>, while PCA fees are available at <https://pca-cpa.org/fees-and-costs/> (Date of use: 07 September 2017).

¹³⁰¹ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/Schedule-of-Fees.aspx> (Date of use: 10 November 2017).

¹³⁰² Baetens 2016 (43) (4) *Legal Issues of Economic Integration* 367 at 379.

¹³⁰³ Baetens 2016 (43) (4) *Legal Issues of Economic Integration* 367 at 369; Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 768-769.

¹³⁰⁴ Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 769.

Another challenge is that the ICS proposal for the creation of a standing set of judges is contrary to Article 37(2) of the ICSID Convention, which requires the parties to a dispute to appoint arbitrators in every case.¹³⁰⁵ As the ICS proposal stands, investors do not play a role in the selection of judges/arbitrators. However, while this is worth highlighting, it may not be fatal, as Article 38 of the ICSID Convention empowers the Chairman of the ICSID to appoint arbitrators if none were appointed after 90 days.¹³⁰⁶ This procedure can be used to appoint ICS judges.¹³⁰⁷ But still, this defect shows the result of the patchwork that is the ICS.

Another challenge is that the introduction of an appeal mechanism (the ICS Appellate Tribunal) is in conflict with the ICSID Convention, which does not have an appeal mechanism. The ICSID Convention provides for the annulment of awards only.¹³⁰⁸ However, it is arguable that an appeal mechanism is not contrary to the spirit of the ICSID Convention, as the grounds of appeal are based on the grounds of annulment provided by the Convention.¹³⁰⁹ Once again, this is a potential point of contention, which the ICS proposal does not address.

The description of the ICS as a court and not an arbitral tribunal may render the New York Convention inapplicable to awards of the ICS.¹³¹⁰ This is because the New York Convention only applies to foreign arbitral awards, not foreign court orders.¹³¹¹ The possibility, therefore, exists that if the EU insists that the ICS is a court, a state party may

¹³⁰⁵ Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 777.

¹³⁰⁶ Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 777.

¹³⁰⁷ Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 777.

¹³⁰⁸ Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 779.

¹³⁰⁹ Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 780.

¹³¹⁰ Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 783.

¹³¹¹ Article 1 New York Convention. The name of the convention also makes clear that it applies to foreign arbitral awards.

challenge an ICS award that is sought to be enforced in terms of the New York Convention.¹³¹² Therefore the continued reference to the ICS as a court may backfire on the EU.

The choice of the ICSID and the PCA as the secretariats to the ICS is controversial. The ICSID is controversial, due to its connection with the besieged ISDS, while the PCA is not popular with states that favor the ICSID system.¹³¹³ Overall, the use of these structures connects the ICS to ISDS. It attracts attention to the ICS and raises the question of whether the ICS is not a rebranded form of ISDS after all.

The ICS proposal does not indicate how the ICS will deal with the issue of judicial precedent, in order to provide consistency with regard to decisions of the tribunals. Nothing in the proposal states that decisions of an ICS court shall be binding on future tribunals, and on what basis this will happen. Therefore, the ICS proposal fails to demonstrate how it will overcome this challenge.

The financial and professional independence of judges is also in issue here. This relates to how the judges are appointed, how their contracts are renewed, and how they are remunerated. The present proposal gives states the right to appoint judges and terminate or renew their appointments, to the exclusion of investors. Furthermore, states determine the judges' remuneration. Since states are potential respondents in the ICS, the amount of power they wield with regard to the above issues is cause for concern. Any perception that states appoint judges who will be friendly to their cause is not good

¹³¹² Baetens 2016 (43) (4) *Legal Issues of Economic Integration* 367 at 382; Reinisch 2016 (19) *Journal of International Economic Law* 761 at 783. The relevant part is Article 11(1) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, TTIP Proposal.

¹³¹³ Baetens 2016 (43) (4) *Legal Issues of Economic Integration* 367 at 369.

for the ICS. It will compromise the legitimacy of the ICS from day one. Ideally, judges should be appointed in a transparent manner and by an independent party or structure. Either way, the DAG, and CSF should be involved in the process, as they represent the public interest in the selection process.

The German Magistrates Association opines in this regard that the ICS proposal does not meet the standards for professional and financial independence of judges as set out in the Magna Carta of Judges of the CCJE of 17 November 2010 (CCJE (2010/3)).¹³¹⁴ In addition, the ICS proposal allows government employees or persons who are on a government payroll to be appointed as judges, which also potentially tampers with the independence of judges, as these judges may be seen to be on the side of a state.¹³¹⁵ Furthermore, the ICS may struggle to find highly qualified judges who will have to leave private practice to be full time with the ICS for short durations and low remuneration, in order to avoid conflict of interest as counsel or expert witness for one of the parties in future.¹³¹⁶

¹³¹⁴ German Magistrates Association “Opinion on the establishment of an investment tribunal in TTIP - the proposal from the European Commission on 16.09.2015 and 11.12.2015” at 2 https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/eu-us_trade_deal/2016/english_version_deutsche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf (Date of use: 76 September 2017).

¹³¹⁵ Baetens 2016 (43) (4) *Legal Issues of Economic Integration* 367 at 370; Schwieder 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 178 at 203-206.

¹³¹⁶ German Magistrates Association “Opinion on the establishment of an investment tribunal in TTIP” at 2 https://www.foeeurope.org/sites/default/files/eu-us_trade_deal/2016/english_version_deutsche_richterbund_opinion_ics_feb2016.pdf (Date of use: 76 September 2017); Baetens 2016 (43) No. 4 *Legal Issues of Economic Integration* 367 at 370; Schwieder 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 178 at 203.

The ICS proposal is silent on equality issues such as gender. It is glaring that the ICS proposal does not propose how to include and empower women in the appointment as judges.¹³¹⁷

Kleinheisterkamp and Poulsen suggest that the TTIP should exclude provisions for ISDS entirely.¹³¹⁸ They opine that removing ISDS provisions will enable EU policy makers to return to the drawing board, to find ways to address the procedural and substantive issues involved from the bottom up.¹³¹⁹

In spite of the challenges discussed above, the ICS remains an important model and milestone in the improvement of the current ISDS system. However, the improvements will not please everyone, especially states and regions that have resolved to move away from ISDS, such as SADC.

Structurally, the EU must first overcome the legal obstacles that face the establishment of the ICS, in view of the ECJ opinion stated above. It must also resolve the legal conflicts that arise from linking the ICS with the ICSID Convention and the New York Convention, among others. From a public perception perspective, the EU will have to show that the ICS is not a disguised version of ISDS, but something entirely new, especially since the public referendum rejected the initial proposal that contained ISDS. This will not be an easy task, as the ICS uses elements of ISDS. These are major challenges that the EU may fail to resolve. Even if the EU and its trade partners

¹³¹⁷ Baetens 2016 (43) (4) *Legal Issues of Economic Integration* 367 at 373.

¹³¹⁸ Kleinheisterkamp J and Skovgaard Poulsen LN "Investment Protection in TTIP: Three Feasible Proposals 2016 (7) *European Yearbook of International Economic Law* 527-540 at 529.

¹³¹⁹ Kleinheisterkamp and Poulsen 2016 *European Yearbook of International Economic Law* 527 at 529.

implemented the ICS proposal, respondents can have a field day raising objections regarding the jurisdiction of the ICS, based on the legal challenges raised above.

5.2.2 The Brazilian Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement

Brazil, like most Latin American states, was originally opposed to the idea of BITs and ISDS.¹³²⁰ Brazil almost changed its attitude under the presidency of Collor de Mello, who initiated a process to liberalise Brazil's economy and a drive to attract foreign investment.¹³²¹ During this period, BITs were globally touted as relevant to attract foreign investments, a theory which to date has not proven to be true.¹³²²

Between 1994 and 1999, Brazil signed 14 BITs. However, only the BITs with Germany, Chile, France, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Switzerland were presented to Congress for ratification.¹³²³ Attempts to have the BITs ratified met stiff resistance from Congress. This, coupled with lack of a strong resolve by the Executive to ensure that the BITs were ratified, led to the demise of the ratification attempts.¹³²⁴

¹³²⁰ Lemos L and Campello D "The non-ratification of Bilateral Investment Treaties in Brazil:" A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation" at 5-
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243120 (Date of use: 7 May 2017). For a background to Brazil's BIT practice see Volterra RG and Mandelli GF "India and Brazil: Recent Steps towards Host State Control in the Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution Paradigm" 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90-112 at 105-106.

¹³²¹ Lemos and Campello "The non-ratification of Bilateral Investment Treaties in Brazil:" A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation" at 7
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243120 (Date of use: 7 May 2017).

¹³²² Lemos and Campello "The non-ratification of Bilateral Investment Treaties in Brazil:" A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation" at 8
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243120 (Date of use: 7 May 2017).

¹³²³ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iiaInnerMenu> (Date of use: 22 April 2017).

¹³²⁴ Morosini F and Badin MTS "The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and

During 2012, the Brazilian Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX) mandated a Technical Group for Strategic Studies on Foreign Trade (GTEX) to work on a new investment agreement that will replace the controversial BITs.¹³²⁵ At this point, Brazilian foreign investments were USD 355 Billion, most of which were located in Latin America and Africa.¹³²⁶ These investments needed to be protected. CAMEX then approved a new species of investment agreement termed the ‘Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement’ (ACFI). The ACFI is part of Brazil’s tool to increase Brazilian exports and market access abroad, especially in developing states. Angola and Mozambique were the first targeted parties to conclude the ACFI.

The Mozambique ACFI was the first to be signed on 30 March 2015, while the Angola ACFI was signed the next day on 01 April 2015.¹³²⁷ Mexico signed the ACFI on 26 May 2015, Malawi signed on 25 June 2015, and Chile and Colombia signed on 24 November and 09 October 2015 respectively.¹³²⁸ However, only the ACFI with Angola was ratified

Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?” supplied by the author and available at <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/> (Date of use: 7 May 2017). For a discussion of the dynamics of the failed ratification process see Voltera and Mandelli (2017) (6) *Indian Journal of Arbitration Law* 90 at 105.

¹³²⁵ Morosini and Badin “The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?” at para 1 <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/> (Date of use: 7 May 2017); Jimenez AG “On the Settlement of Investment Disputes between China and Latin America” 2017 (5) *China Legal Science* 34-62 at 52.

¹³²⁶ Morosini and Badin “The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?” at para 1 <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/> (Date of use: 7 May 2017).

¹³²⁷ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iialInnerMenu> (Date of use: 22 April 2017).

¹³²⁸ <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iialInnerMenu> (Date of use: 22

at the time of writing.¹³²⁹ This ratification is historic, since Brazil never ratified a BIT in the past (however Brazil did ratify 13 TIPs out of 18 that were concluded). It means that the ratification of the other ACFIs could be imminent, which in turn will usher state-state arbitration in SADC. During April and May 2018, Brazil signed further ACFI's with Ethiopia and Suriname respectively.¹³³⁰

The Brazil-Malawi ACFI that is the only ACFI that is available from UNCTAD in English,¹³³¹ and it will therefore be used in this discussion. The dispute resolution provisions of the Brazil-Malawi ACFI (ACFI) will now be briefly considered, noting that it is impossible herein to conduct a full analysis thereof.

It must be said at the onset that the ACFI is less focused on investor protection than on the facilitation of mutual investments between Member States.¹³³² This makes it markedly different to instruments such as BITs that have investor protection as their focus. A central feature of the ACFI is that an investor cannot commence ISDS against a host state in the event of a dispute.¹³³³ Instead, Brazil and the other state party to the

1329 April 2017).
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iialInnerMenu>
(Date of use: 10 September 2018).

1330 <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/27#iialInnerMenu> (Date of use: 10 September 2018).

1331 <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/27/treaty/3663> (Date of use: 18 January 2018).

1332 Article 1 Brazil-Malawi ACFI; Morosini and Badin "The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?" at para 2 <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/> (Date of use: 7 May 2017).

1333 Morosini and Badin "The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?" at para 2.2 <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/>

ACFI will attempt to resolve the dispute amicably, failing which they may at their discretion engage in state-state arbitration.

The ACFI provides two structures that are central to resolving investor-state disputes.¹³³⁴ The first is the Joint Committee (JC).¹³³⁵ The JC is made up of representatives of each State Party, who are designated by their respective governments.¹³³⁶ The JC shall meet at least once a year, or as often is necessary.¹³³⁷ The chairmanship of the JC shall rotate annually.¹³³⁸ Some of the functions of the JC are to monitor the implementation of the ACFI, discuss and share investment opportunities, and to resolve disputes between investors and host states.¹³³⁹ The JC may establish *ad hoc* groups, which may meet on their own, or with the JC, as necessary.

The second structure is the Focal Point (FP), or Ombudsmen.¹³⁴⁰ The FP is not a joint structure like the JC. Each Member State shall establish its own FP.¹³⁴¹ CAMEX is

facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/ (Date of use: 7 May 2017).

¹³³⁴ See Jimenez 2017 (5) China Legal Science 34 at 52-53; Voltera and Mandelli 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 107.

¹³³⁵ Article 3 Brazil-Malawi ACFI; Morosini and Badin “The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?” at para 2.2 <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/> (Date of use: 7 May 2017).

¹³³⁶ Article 3(1) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³³⁷ Article 3(3) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³³⁸ Article 3(3) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³³⁹ Article 3(4) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³⁴⁰ Article 4 Brazil-Malawi ACFI; Morosini and Badin “The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment Agreements?” at para 2.2 <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-formula-for-international-investment-agreements/> (Date of use: 7 May 2017).

¹³⁴¹ Article 4(1) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

Brazil's FP, while the Malawi Investment and Trade Centre is Malawi's FC.¹³⁴² FPs shall operate under the guidance of JCs.¹³⁴³

Some of the responsibilities of an FP are to act as a conduit between the Member States and investors and between the Member States, as well as to communicate suggestions and complaints from the other state or its investors, and to resolve investor-state disputes.¹³⁴⁴ FPs of the respective state parties shall cooperate to resolve disputes through consultations, negotiations, dialogue and bilateral meetings.¹³⁴⁵

The ACFI provides the following procedure for the amicable resolution of investor-state disputes. The process starts when a claimant (being an investor or investment) lodges a complaint with its home state's JC about unfavorable treatment it received at the hands of a host state.¹³⁴⁶ Upon receipt of the complaint, the JC of an investor's home state shall inform the host state of the dispute in writing, providing details of the claimant's complaint.¹³⁴⁷ The JC of the host state shall have 60-120 days to respond to the complaint.¹³⁴⁸ An investor, as well as representatives of the host state whose entity or department etc. is involved in the dispute, may take part in the bilateral meetings between the JCs.¹³⁴⁹

¹³⁴² Article 4(2) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³⁴³ Article 4(4) (a) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³⁴⁴ Article 4(4) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³⁴⁵ Article 13(1) (a) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³⁴⁶ Article 13(3) (a) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³⁴⁷ Article 13(3) (a) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³⁴⁸ Article 13(3) (b) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³⁴⁹ Article 13(4) (c) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

If the dispute is not resolved by negotiations and consultation, the parties may commence state-to-state arbitration.¹³⁵⁰ However, the ACFI does not detail how state-to-state arbitration will operate, such as the forum, arbitration rules etc. This vagueness, coupled with the fact that state-to-state arbitration is not mandatory, means that the possibility of the state parties reaching a deadlock regarding establishment and operation of the arbitration is real. Furthermore, state-to-state arbitration will only commence once it is convenient for the states, as they commence it at their discretion.¹³⁵¹

Secondly, the ACFI is silent on whether or not a claimant must first exhaust local remedies prior to the commencement of state-to-state arbitration. This is a critical omission. In this regard, it must be noted that Article 14 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection are relevant when diplomatic protection (including state-state arbitration) is to be exercised. Article 14 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection provides that a state may not exercise diplomatic protection before the claimant in respect of whom protection is sought has exhausted local remedies in the host state.¹³⁵²

However, Article 15(e) allows a host state to waive the requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies since failure to exhaust local remedies is a defence available to it.¹³⁵³ The

¹³⁵⁰ Article 13(6) Brazil-Malawi ACFI.

¹³⁵¹ Article 15(5) Brazil-Mozambique ACFI; Voltera and Mandelli (2017) (6) *Indian Journal of Arbitration Law* 90 at 108.

¹³⁵² Booyesen *Principles of International Trade Law As A Monistic System* at 66-67; United Nations (International Law Commission) "ARSIWA" Article 22 and 44 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/53/> (Date of use: 02 October 2017); *Panevezys-Saldutiskis* at 22; *ELSI* at 42 para 50; *Interhandel* case (*Switzerland v United States of America*), (Preliminary Objections) Judgment of March 21st 1959, I.C.J Reports 1959 6 at 27; Article 14 of the Articles on Diplomatic Protection and the Commentary thereon; Ngobeni 2012 (37) *South African Yearbook of International Law* 169 at 171.

¹³⁵³ See Commentary on Article 15(e) at note 12-1, United Nations (International Law

waiver can be given in a treaty between an investor's home state and a host state, or in a contract between a host state and an investor.¹³⁵⁴ The waiver can be express or implied.¹³⁵⁵ This entails that the failure to exhaust local remedies will be a defence available to a host state before an arbitral or another tribunal. Hence the silence of the ACFI on this issue is a critical omission.

A downside of state-to-state arbitration is that it is susceptible to the same challenges as diplomatic protection. The key challenge of diplomatic protection is that it is an exclusive remedy to be exercised by a state at its sole discretion.¹³⁵⁶ Therefore, an investor has no right to compel its home state to exercise it. This creates uncertainty for an investor, as it has no guaranteed recourse in the event of expropriation or other harmful measures taken by a host state.

The involvement of states in investor-state disputes risks politicising investment disputes. For example, it is unlikely that states that have close economic or political ties

Commission) "Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection"
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

¹³⁵⁴ See Commentary on Article 15(e) at note 13-14 United Nations (International Law Commission) "Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection"
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

¹³⁵⁵ See Commentary on Article 15(e) at note 13 United Nations (International Law Commission) "Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection"
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

¹³⁵⁶ See Commentary on Article 1, note 3-5 United Nations (International Law Commission) "Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection"
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017); *Kaunda & others v President of the Republic of South Africa & others* 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC), *Van Zyl & others v Government of the Republic of South Africa & others* 2008 (3) SA 294 (SCA). *The Government of the Republic of South Africa v Von Abo* (283/10) [2011] ZASCA 65 (4 April 2011) at para 20-23; Ngobeni 2012 (37) South African Yearbook of International Law 169 at 171.

will embark on strenuous state-state arbitration, and risk jeopardising their ties for the sake of a private investor. However, the situation may be different when a claimant is a state owned entity owned by one of the parties.

For developing states with limited resources, exercising state-state arbitration may present a resource and expertise challenge. The state may have far more pressing issues to deal with back home, rather than to spend resources it doesn't have fighting for an investor. This may be detrimental to investors from such states. International arbitration requires the expensive services of arbitration institutions, lawyers and experts, not to mention the disbursements of state officials involved in a case.

State-to-state arbitration is also subject to Article 27(1) of the ICSID Convention.¹³⁵⁷ This Article provides that state-to-state arbitration will not be available once a claimant accepts a state's consent to ICSID arbitration. Consent to arbitration can be given in advance in a BIT, TIP, statute or investment contract.

Furthermore, the fact that arbitration is between states does not remove some of the challenges that ISDS faces, as discussed in Chapter 2 above.

¹³⁵⁷ Which provides that

No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute. (Emphasis added)

5.2.3 The India Model BIT 2015

From 1994, India embarked on a BIT-signing campaign that led to 84 BITS being signed by 2013.¹³⁵⁸ These BITS were mainly based on the India Model BIT of 2003.¹³⁵⁹ At the time of writing, 52 out of remaining 61 these BITS were in force, although India gave notices that 58 of these remaining BITS will not be renewed when they expire in the first half of 2017.¹³⁶⁰ Furthermore, 9 out of 13 TIPs were in force at the time of writing.¹³⁶¹

India was prompted to review her BITS policy for the same reason that other developing states and regions did: it was swamped by costly ISDS cases in a short space of time.¹³⁶² As a result of these cases, India reviewed resolved that a new Model BIT was required, which will form the basis of new BITS. A new Model BIT was, therefore,

¹³⁵⁸ See <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/96#iialInnerMenu> (Date of use: 10 September 2018). For a background to India's foreign direct investment see Voltera and Mandelli 2017 (6) *Indian Journal of Arbitration Law* 90 at 91-95; Ranjan P *India's international investment agreements and India's regulatory power as a host nation* (PhD Thesis Kings College London 2012) at 35-66 https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/13524464/Studentthesis-Prabhash_Ranjan_2013.pdf (Date of use: 08 September 2017).

¹³⁵⁹ See <https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1026.pdf> (Date of use: 26 April 2017).

¹³⁶⁰ See Voltera and Mandelli 2017 (6) *Indian Journal of Arbitration Law* 90 at 94; <https://www.iisd.org/itn/2016/08/10/india-takes-steps-to-reform-its-investment-policy-framework-after-approving-new-model-bit/>; <http://www.dipp.gov.in/English/questions/25072016/lu1290.pdf>; <http://hsfnotes.com/arbitration/2017/03/16/mixed-messages-to-investors-as-india-quietly-terminates-bilateral-investment-treaties-with-58-countries/>; <http://www.bothends.org/en/newsitem/469/India-terminates-bilateral-investment-treaties-BITs->; <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/indias-bilateral-investment-pacts-under-cloud/article9625580.ece> (Date of use: 24 May 2017).

¹³⁶¹ See <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/96#iialInnerMenu> (Date of use: 10 September 2018).

¹³⁶² See Voltera and Mandelli 2017 (6) *Indian Journal of Arbitration Law* 90 at 194. *White Industries Australia* was the first ISDS that India lost. For a list of arbitration cases against India see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/CountryCases/96?partyRole=2> (Date of use: 10 September 2018). Unfortunately details of the arbitrations are confidential and are publicly available.

approved during December 2015.¹³⁶³ In a nutshell, the Model BIT is designed to among others: limit the scope of investments which would be protected by the Model BIT;¹³⁶⁴ set out measures that will be outside the scope of the Model BIT; and impose significant substantive and procedural limitations on an investor's access to arbitration, without taking away the right to arbitration. The Model BIT vastly succeeds in this regard, as shown below.

Some selected provisions of the Model BIT will now be briefly discussed.¹³⁶⁵

In order to reduce the scope of future disputes, the Model BIT starts by placing restrictions on the areas covered by the BIT, who can access it, and under what terms. This is noteworthy, as it increases India's regulatory space. Some of these restrictions are as follows.

The Model BIT discourages forum shopping and the use of shell companies, by limiting the types of entities that can access the BIT.¹³⁶⁶ It achieves this by denying the protection of the BIT to entities that do not have substantial business activities in their

¹³⁶³ http://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/ModelBIT_Annex_0.pdf (Date of use: 25 April 2017).

¹³⁶⁴ See also Volterra and Mandelli 201) (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 96, 99.

¹³⁶⁵ See also Jandhyala S "Bringing the state back in: India's 2015 model BIT" Columbia FDI Perspectives on Topical Foreign Direct Investment Issues, No. 154 August 17, 2015 <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-154-Jandhyala-FINAL.pdf> (Date of use: 08 September 2017); Rosmy J "Renegotiation of Indian Bilateral Investment Treaties: An Analysis from a Development Perspective" http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Papers_for_Programme/99-JOAN-Renegotiation_of_Indian_Bilateral_Investment_Treaties.pdf (Date of use: 08 September 2017); Paktar A "Bilateral Investment Treaties - Has India Taken It a "Bit Too Far?" International Journal of Law and Legal Jurisprudence Studies: ISSN: 2348-8212: Volume 2 Issue 7 <http://ijljs.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/26.pdf> (Date of use: 08 September 2017).

¹³⁶⁶ By "BIT" in this context is meant a BIT that is based on the Model BIT.

home states,¹³⁶⁷ entities that are owned or controlled directly or indirectly by persons of a non-party state,¹³⁶⁸ and entities that have been established or restructured with the primary purpose of gaining access to the dispute resolution mechanisms provided in the BIT.¹³⁶⁹

The Model BIT also limits the scope of the application of the BIT, by providing that it shall not apply to government procurement, subsidies or grants, services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority, taxation matters and disputes arising from investment agreements.¹³⁷⁰ This is a major carve-out of areas and sectors that foreign investors would typically be invested in, especially government procurement and services supplied under government authority (which could cover the non-commercial activities of state owned entities).

The Model BIT also excludes investments obtained by means of corruption, as they will not have been made in accordance with the Model BIT.¹³⁷¹

The Model BIT limits the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. It provides that an arbitration tribunal established in terms of the BIT shall not re-examine any legal issue that was finally determined by a court of a host state in a dispute between the host state and the party to the investment dispute.¹³⁷² Neither may a tribunal review the merits of a decision

¹³⁶⁷ Article. 1.9 India Model BIT; Volterra and Mandelli 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 101-102.

¹³⁶⁸ Article 20.1(i) India Model BIT.

¹³⁶⁹ Article 20.1(ii) India Model BIT. The claim in *Philip Morris Asia* was dismissed on similar grounds.

¹³⁷⁰ Article. 2.6 India Model BIT; See Volterra and Mandelli 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 108.96.

¹³⁷¹ Article 1(6) (ii) read with Article 9 India Model BIT.

¹³⁷² Article 14.2 India Model BIT.

of the court of a host state, nor may it accept jurisdiction over a claim that is subject to arbitration between Member States.¹³⁷³

The dispute resolution provisions of the Model BIT operate as follows.

Unlike the ACFI and the ICS Proposal, Article 14(3) of the Model BIT provides that the first step that an investor must take is the exhaustion of local remedies before the courts or administrative bodies of the host state.¹³⁷⁴ It sets a prescription period of one year within which the exhaustion of local remedies must commence.¹³⁷⁵ If a claimant has exhausted local remedies, but is not satisfied with the outcome thereof, or having exhausted local remedies, a claimant is of the opinion (and it can demonstrate that the continued exhaustion of local remedies will be futile), then it can proceed to the next stage, which is the commencement of preventative ADR.¹³⁷⁶

The current Model BIT makes the exhaustion of local remedies and the commencement of ADR measures, mandatory. A claimant who omits any of these steps shall not be entitled to proceed to commence arbitration in terms of the BIT.¹³⁷⁷ As a further disincentive, a tribunal is required to order costs of arbitration against a claimant, if it commenced arbitration without compliance with the requirements for exhaustion of local remedies, waiting periods for ADR or provisions of Article 14(1).¹³⁷⁸

When a claimant commences ADR, it must issue a Notice of Dispute, to which a statement shall be attached, stating that the requirements for the exhaustion of local

¹³⁷³ Article 14.2 India Model BIT.

¹³⁷⁴ Volterra and Mandelli 2017 (6) Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 90 at 100-101.

¹³⁷⁵ Article 14.3(i) India Model BIT.

¹³⁷⁶ Article 14.3(ii) India Model BIT.

¹³⁷⁷ Article 14.3(v) India Model BIT.

¹³⁷⁸ Article 14.12(ii) India Model BIT.

remedies as well as Articles 9 to 12 of the Model BIT have been met.¹³⁷⁹ After submitting the Notice of Dispute, the parties have a period of one year to consult and negotiate on the resolution of the dispute.¹³⁸⁰

In addition to the exhaustion of local remedies and ADR, the Model BIT sets a prescription period within which a claimant must commence arbitration. This period is three years from the date a claimant became aware, or should have become aware of the host state measure complained of, or eighteen months since the conclusion or abandonment of local remedies, whichever is later.¹³⁸¹ A claimant must submit a Notice of Arbitration at least ninety days before commencing arbitration. Only then can a claimant submit an Arbitration Claim, stipulating the parts of the Model BIT which it is alleged a host state has breached, and that the claimant has suffered actual and non-speculative damages as a result of direct and foreseeable result of the breach.¹³⁸²

Similar to the ICS, a claimant must also submit a waiver of a right to initiate or continue other dispute resolution procedures before another administrative tribunal, court etc. (“no-U-turn clause”), with regards to the same claim, unless it can show that it is not possible to give such waiver due to the expropriation or interference with the host state’s management or control of the investment.¹³⁸³

¹³⁷⁹ Article 14.3(iii) India Model BIT.

¹³⁸⁰ Article 14.3(iv) India Model BIT.

¹³⁸¹ Article 14.3(v) India Model BIT.

¹³⁸² Article 14.4(ii) India Model BIT.

¹³⁸³ Article 14.4(i) (f) India Model BIT.

In a partial similarity to the ICS, the arbitration shall be conducted in terms of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules unless the parties agree otherwise.¹³⁸⁴ The Model BIT places upon a claimant the burden of proof with regard to jurisdiction, the existence of an obligation under Chapter II of the Model BIT, a breach of an obligation(s), that the investment, or the investor with respect to the Investment, has suffered actual and non-speculative losses as a result of the breach, and that those losses were foreseeable and directly caused by the breach.¹³⁸⁵ After a hearing, a tribunal may award monetary damages only, which shall not include punitive or moral damages.¹³⁸⁶ When awarding damages, a tribunal shall take into consideration any breaches of the BIT or laws of the host state by an investor/investment.¹³⁸⁷ An award shall be enforced in terms of the laws of the respondent host state.¹³⁸⁸ This provision brings the courts of a host state back into play with regard to the final implementation of an award, as does the New York Convention.

A respondent state may launch a counterclaim against a claimant to seek declaratory relief, enforcement action or monetary compensation.¹³⁸⁹

The parties shall share arbitration costs and expenses equally unless a tribunal rules otherwise.¹³⁹⁰ However, each party shall pay its own legal costs, unless a tribunal rules otherwise.¹³⁹¹

¹³⁸⁴ Article 14.7(i) India Model BIT.

¹³⁸⁵ Article 14.9(ii) India Model BIT.

¹³⁸⁶ Article 14.10(iii) India Model BIT.

¹³⁸⁷ Article 14.10(ii) India Model BIT.

¹³⁸⁸ Article 14.10(v) India Model BIT.

¹³⁸⁹ Article 14.11(i) India Model BIT.

¹³⁹⁰ Article 14.12(i) India Model BIT.

¹³⁹¹ Article 14.12(i) India Model BIT.

The Model BIT replicates Article 27 of the ICSID Convention. It provides that an investor's home state may not commence diplomatic protection unless the host state has failed to comply with an award or the decision of its courts.¹³⁹²

A few comments will now be made on the India Model BIT.

India has introduced what is probably the most radical and extensive measures in recent times. The scope of exclusions provided in Articles 2.6, 16 and 17, as well as the investor obligations specified in Articles 9 to 12 will definitely have the intended effect of limiting investor claims in the targeted areas. In return, India will more regulatory space as investors in the excluded sectors cannot commence ISDS against her. This may push investors to seek protections via existing BITs that do not have the stated limitations, since India still has 52 BITS in effect. This will encourage to treaty shopping prior to the termination of these BITs. Investors with significant bargaining power can also negotiate investment contracts with better protections than those provided by the Model BIT. The rest will have to make do with the local courts of host states.

The central issue with regard to mandatory ADR and the exhaustion of local remedies is whether strict compliance therewith is necessary or not, i.e. whether this is a procedural requirement which can be condoned, or whether it is a jurisdictional requirement which may lead to a tribunal finding that it has no jurisdiction on the matter. A guide to the answer to this can be found in *Tulip Real Estate*. The tribunal in *Tulip Real Estate* held that a state's consent to arbitration in a BIT is a qualification on a state's sovereignty.¹³⁹³

¹³⁹² Article 14.13(i) India Model BIT.

¹³⁹³ At para 135.

Therefore, a state is entitled to set the terms under which it is prepared to submit to arbitration, which must be strictly complied with if they were meant to be mandatory.¹³⁹⁴

Therefore, the mandatory nature of the pre-arbitration requirements of the Mode BIT are such that a tribunal may find that they must be strictly complied with, as stipulated in Article 14(3)(v) of the Model BIT.

The provision to the effect that a tribunal must order an investor who commences arbitration prematurely to pay the state's costs will be an additional deterrent to investors who do not comply with the pre-arbitration requirements.¹³⁹⁵ Read with the decision in *Tulip Real estate*, the effect of this provision bolsters the view that pre-arbitration requirements, including ADR, must be complied with.

It remains to be seen how tribunals will deal with the provision that a tribunal shall not re-examine any legal issue that was finally determined by a court of a host state in a dispute between an investor and a host state.¹³⁹⁶ The unwritten intent of this provision is to preserve an order made in favour of a host state. Will tribunals allow their decision-making powers to be curtailed by this provision? Will investors accept the provision? It is unlikely that investors will leave this provision unchallenged, especially if the earlier ruling was in favour of a host state. Nonetheless, India has made her position on the issue clear, and a tribunal must consider the provision for what it is.

In conclusion, India has boldly narrowed the scope of the Model BIT by placing restrictions that give her more regulatory space. This will significantly limit future investor claims. However, the Model BIT will remain a piece of paper until India concludes BITs

¹³⁹⁴ *Tulip Real Estate* at para 55-72, 135.

¹³⁹⁵ Article 14.12(ii) India Model BIT.

¹³⁹⁶ Article 14.2 India Model BIT.

based thereon. Until then, the existing 52 BITs and 9 Tips provide investors with more protection than the Model BIT. Therefore, if the Model BIT is to be of any significance, all existing BITs and TIPs to which India is a party must be renegotiated or terminated, and be replaced with new ones based on it. However, such termination is easier said than done, since most BITs are designed to have survival clauses that keep them in effect for several years after their termination. For example, India's BIT with Mozambique (which is in force) has a survival period of fifteen years from date of termination.¹³⁹⁷

If India replaces its existing BITs and (and relevant part of TIPs) with the Model BIT, the restrictions placed by the Model BIT on access to ISDS through stringent pre-arbitration requirements will only serve to slow the commencement of ISDS with regard to the covered sectors. Ultimately, an investor who has an eye on ISDS as the prize will get to it, because investors in sectors that are protected by the Model BIT have guaranteed access to ISDS after complying with the formalities of pre-arbitration ADR and the exhaustion of local remedies.¹³⁹⁸

Furthermore, the India Model BIT does not address the key challenges of ISDS, which are discussed in Chapter 2 above.

Finally, SMEs will incur significant costs to sue India, given the mandatory exhaustion of local remedies and ADR before arbitration can commence.

¹³⁹⁷ Article 15(2) Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Mozambique and the Government of the Republic of India for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/country/96/treaty/1937> (Date of use 10 September 2018).

¹³⁹⁸ Article 14.4 India Model BIT.

5.3 LESSONS AND OPTIONS FOR SADC

5.3.1 Lessons for SADC

SADC can learn many lessons from the TTIP and ICS proposals, the Brazil-Malawi ACFI, and the India Model BIT. These lessons may be useful when SADC engages in the negotiations for the T-FTA or AfCFTA investment protocols, and even a review of Annex 1.

The key lessons from the EU are that the TTIP proposal shows that it is possible to have a single regional or continental instrument of foreign investments, and that provides a single forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes. The boldness of the EU in presenting the ICS proposal, with its challenges as discussed above, shows that SADC and other African states should not be afraid of going into uncharted territory in this regard, if needs be.

The use of the JCs and CPs by the EU and Brazil shows that there is a resurrection of diplomatic protection for the resolution of investor-state disputes. It is a pattern that SADC should pay attention to.

Through the DAG and CSF, the TTIP proposal also provides a valuable lesson in the involvement of civil society in the implementation of foreign investment regulation laws. The fact that the EU commenced the search for a solution to ISDS with the public referendum is commendable.

The India Model BIT provides a lesson in the tightening of foreign investment regulation, with a view to maximise regulatory space for host states. The provisions of the model BIT such as those relating to the scope of the BIT, ADR, and investor obligations, are

relevant lessons for SADC. They are useful for increasing the regulatory space of SADC Member States.

The India Model BIT also offers valuable lessons in the management of treaty shopping and the denial of benefits to corrupt investors. By denying the protection of the Model BIT to shell companies and corrupt investors, India sends a clear message that only genuine and law-abiding investments will be protected.

The India Model BIT also shows that mandatory preventative ADR can be a useful tool. Although making ADR mandatory will increase legal costs, in the long term it will inculcate a culture that promotes the settlement of disputes rather than litigation. The early settlement of disputes is good for all parties in the long term, as it saves them time, money as well as their relationship.

The Brazil-Malawi ACFI provides an alternative to the traditional options of ISDS or local courts. SADC can learn to use state-state arbitration, and state-state consultations in the form of structures such as the JC and FP as a form of preventative ADR. This despite the fact that state-state arbitration is a discretionary remedy.

The South Korean Office of Foreign Investment Ombud (OFIO), on which the Brazilian FP is based, has had great success in resolving investor-state disputes, and is worthy of further study in terms of its operational mode.¹³⁹⁹ The office of an Ombud can be very effective, especially where there are bureaucratic inefficiencies, and its early intervention

¹³⁹⁹ See resolved cases at <http://ombudsman.kotra.or.kr/eng/rsc/case07.do?sResolutionCaseTyCd=07> (Date of use: 20 May 2017).

can pre-empt costly arbitration or litigation.¹⁴⁰⁰ It appears from reports that the IFIO has been highly effective. It is reported that the OFIO received approximately 4700 cases between 1999 and 2011, and that it resolved approximately 90 percent of the cases.¹⁴⁰¹ SADC and even the AU can do well to incorporate a similar structure in the future as part of preventative ADR.¹⁴⁰²

5.3.2 Options for SADC

It is now opportune to analyse some of the options that are open to SADC, with regard to the level at which investments should be regulated, as well as the mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes.¹⁴⁰³

On the first aspect, it was shown in Chapter 1 that there are at least three views that emerged from the review of selected scholarly literature. These are the regulation of foreign investments at REC level, regulation at AU level via a soft law instrument such as the PAIC, and regulation at AU level via an investment treaty. On the second aspect, the options that are open to SADC are ISDS, litigation before the courts of host states, the SADC tribunal, and or the ACH&PR/ACJ&HR. These options will be briefly analysed, with a view to making proposals thereon in Chapter 6.

With regard to the level at which foreign investments should be regulated, the first option proposed by Denters and Gazzini is the use of RECs to regulate foreign investments. However, such regulation will face the same challenges as regionalism, that are discussed in Chapter 1 above.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Chen 2017 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 547-591 at 590.

¹⁴⁰¹ Chen 2017 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 547 at 588.

¹⁴⁰² Chen 2017 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 547 at 589.

¹⁴⁰³ This is in line with Objective 1.3.5 in Chapter 1.

The second proposal by Mbengue and Schacherer is the use of soft law instruments such as the PAIC to foster the harmonisation of investment treaty practice among AU Member States.¹⁴⁰⁴ However, this option has limitations, as shown in the discussion of this proposal in Chapter 1.

The third option, proposed by Paez, is the use of a continental investment treaty to regulate foreign investments.¹⁴⁰⁵ However, Paez does not provide sufficient motivation for this proposal. Therefore, it is difficult to critique the proposal. Nonetheless, its continental theme resonates with the recommendation made in Chapter 6 with regard to the regulation of foreign investments.

The rejection of the REC and PAIC proposals leaves the regulation of foreign investments at continental level to be evaluated. This will be done in the next section.

5.3.3 Towards a continental framework for the regulation of foreign investments

This section will discuss a possible continental framework for the regulation of foreign investments, as well as for the resolution of investor-state disputes. The section lays the basis for proposals that will be made in Chapter 6.

(a) The regulation of foreign investments

The recent formation of the AfCFTA and the future formation of the AEC puts the AU firmly in control of the future regulation of foreign investments in Africa. The formation of the AfCFTA means that RECs that are not already (or on the path to be) customs unions

¹⁴⁰⁴ See the relevant discussion Chapter 1 above.

¹⁴⁰⁵ See the relevant discussion Chapter 1 above.

will gradually cease to be free trade zones, as they cannot coexist with the AfCFTA.¹⁴⁰⁶ Such RECs shall cease to have authority over trade policy, which will be gradually taken over by the AfCFTA.¹⁴⁰⁷ Therefore, it makes sense that the RECs gradually transfer their authority over the regulation of foreign investments to the AfCFTA. It is also noteworthy that the AU is mandated to enhance socio-economic integration in Africa.¹⁴⁰⁸ Furthermore, the views espoused herein in this regard have been vindicated by the fact that the AfCFTA will have an investment protocol, an event that occurred when this study had been concluded. What follows is the author's views in support of the regulation of foreign investments in Africa by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol.

The real value of an AfCFTA investment protocol is that it will (unlike a soft instrument such as the PAIC) be an international agreement that is binding on Member States. This will enable it to foster uniformity and harmonisation from the top-down. This will also bring an end to the current regulation of foreign investments by conflicting RECs and state laws alike.

(b) The resolution of investor-state disputes

Based on the discussion of developments in the Brazil, the EU and India above, SADC's options regarding the resolution of investor-state disputes will now be analysed. The options are ISDS, the courts of host states, sub-regional courts, and continental/regional

¹⁴⁰⁶ African Union (Commission) "Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About" at 123
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

¹⁴⁰⁷ African Union (Commission) "Assessing Regional Integration VIII: Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About" at 123-124
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

¹⁴⁰⁸ Mbengue and Schacherer 2017 (18) *Journal of World Investment and Trade* 414 at 419.

courts.

(i) The ISDS option

ISDS has many challenges, as indicated in Chapter 2 above. Hence SADC has removed it from the 2016 Annex 1, Brazil doesn't favour it, the EU is trying unsuccessfully to get rid of it, and India is restricting access to it. Despite the challenges, as well as SADC's removal of ISDS from the 2016 Annex 1, the reality is that some SADC Member States still have BITs and laws that allow access to it.¹⁴⁰⁹ There seems to be no major rush on the part of these Member States to terminate or renegotiate existing BITs, or to amend their laws to be in line with the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, there seems to be a horizontal shift towards state-state arbitration by SADC states that conclude ACFIs with Brazil, such as Angola and Malawi. SADC Member States do not seem to have a principled, consistent approach with regard to what to do with ISDS, given its removal from the 2016 Annex 1. It was also shown in Chapter 4 that SADC Member States laws differ with regard to the provision of ISDS to their investors. It was also shown therein that the laws of some Member States conflict with their REC treaty obligations.

Given the policy differences among SADC Member States with regard to ISDS, it is ideal to allow those Member States that wish to provide ISDS to their investors to do so. This is in line with the provisions of the PAIC,¹⁴¹⁰ as well as the proposal of Ngobeni and Fagbayibo to the effect that host states may delay consent to ISDS, which will at least keep the door open for parties that wish to utilise it.¹⁴¹¹ South Africa also employed this

¹⁴⁰⁹ For a database of BITs in force at see <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/liaByCountry#iialInnerMenu> (Date of use: 11 April 2018).

¹⁴¹⁰ See Article 42(1) PAIC.

¹⁴¹¹ Ngobeni and Fagbayibo 2015 (19) Law, Democracy and Development 175 at 189.

approach in the new Promotion of Investment Act, by providing that ISDS can take place if the state so agrees¹⁴¹² while Namibia did the same (albeit with regard to the provision for local arbitration).¹⁴¹³ This practice is not new, as it was shown in Chapter 4 that the internal laws of some host states provide access to ISDS if the host state agrees thereto.

No matter what one's views towards ISDS are, the reality in this regard is that the sovereignty of states implies host states must be allowed to regulate foreign investments and the resolution of investor-state disputes as they see fit, including by providing or denying ISDS for their foreign investors. In a nutshell, ISDS with all its challenges is not about to be removed from regulatory instruments. It is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. Its continued use will simply have to be managed (e.g. by the creation of an appeal mechanism, shortening the duration for the rendering of awards, reducing institutional costs, allowing states and other parties to sue investors or to counterclaim etc). Recommendations are made in this regard in Chapter 6 to the effect that ISDS can co-exist with litigation, as described in the recommendations.

(ii) The Local courts' option

It is controversial whether an investor must be obliged to refer an investor-state dispute to the courts of a host state or not.¹⁴¹⁴ As shown in Chapter 2 above, central to the current debate regarding this issue is whether investor-state disputes must be referred to ISDS, the courts of host states, or both.¹⁴¹⁵ Another way to phrase the issue is whether it is unfair and/or unjust to require investors to refer investor-state disputes to the courts of a host state, whether as a last resort or not. There is no cut-and-dried solution to the

¹⁴¹² Section 13(5) Promotion of Investment Act.

¹⁴¹³ Section 28(4) Namibia Investment Promotion Act.

¹⁴¹⁴ See the discussion of the ISDS and litigation in Chapter 2 above.

¹⁴¹⁵ See the discussion of litigation and ISDS in Chapter 2.

resolution of this issue. The view adopted herein is that whether it is fair or unfair to make it mandatory for a foreign investor to refer an investor-state dispute to the courts of a host state depends primarily on the state of the rule of law in that state. This is further explained below.

Like ISDS, local litigation also has its downside. This includes the possibility that a host state may not guarantee an efficient and independent judicial system, or that local courts may lack independence, or be subject to political control.¹⁴¹⁶ Furthermore, local litigation may take long to conclude e.g. due to a high caseload, thus resulting in costly litigation.¹⁴¹⁷ However, unlike with ISDS, these challenges are not universal, as only some states would have one or more of these challenges. Furthermore, unlike with ISDS, the challenges relating to litigation are capable of being addressed on state by state basis.

There is ample support for the use of the courts of host states to resolve investor-state disputes, as shown below.

¹⁴¹⁶ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

¹⁴¹⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

According to UNCTAD, there are five benefits to the use of the courts of host states.¹⁴¹⁸ Firstly, such use puts foreign investors on an equal footing with domestic investors, as well as with other foreign investors that are not protected by investment contracts, or are from States that do not have BITs or TIPs with a host state.¹⁴¹⁹ Secondly, litigation helps to establish a level playing field among foreign investors., by providing a similar forum to which their disputes with host states shall be referred.¹⁴²⁰ Thirdly, unlike arbitral tribunals, local courts are well-suited to applying and interpreting domestic laws.¹⁴²¹ Fourth, ISDS is less needed in countries with well-developed and efficient legal systems, where the risk of denial of justice by virtue of a poor rule of law is low.¹⁴²² Fifth, the use of local courts fosters the development of legal and judicial institutions of a host state.¹⁴²³ Finally,

¹⁴¹⁸ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

¹⁴¹⁹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

¹⁴²⁰ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

¹⁴²¹ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

¹⁴²² United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11
<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

¹⁴²³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development “International Investment Agreements Issues Note”, Issue 4, November 2017 at 11

local courts may, depending on the state of their rule of law, be an attractive forum for the adjudication of investor-state disputes.¹⁴²⁴

At the continental level, the AU vigorously supports the use and development of domestic courts. Firstly, the African Charter mandates that human rights disputes must first be referred to local courts before they can be referred to the Commission.¹⁴²⁵ Secondly and most importantly, *Agenda 2063* envisages that by 2023, 70 percent of the populations of AU Member States must perceive their judiciaries to be independent, that they deliver judgments on a fair and timely basis, and that the rule of law is entrenched.¹⁴²⁶ Therefore, irrespective of the AU's or its Member States' views towards ISDS, the policy decision is that local courts must be used, and the rule of law must be promoted and protected.

Some scholars also support the use of the courts of host states, as shown below.

According to Chen, investors like to invest in states that have effective law-making, administrative and judicial institutions.¹⁴²⁷ Thus where states provide for ISDS, they have an incentive to improve the efficiency of their courts if the exhaustion of local remedies is a pre-requisite.¹⁴²⁸

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/IMPROVING%20INVESTMENT%20DISPUTE%20SETTLEMENT-%20UNCTAD%20POLICY%20TOOLS.pdf> (Date of use: 10 April 2018).

¹⁴²⁴ Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 163.

¹⁴²⁵ Article 50, 56 African Charter.

¹⁴²⁶ African Union (Commission) "Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023" at 69 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf> (Date of use: 16 November 2017).

¹⁴²⁷ Chen 2017 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 547 at 570-572.

¹⁴²⁸ Chen 2017 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 547 at 572.

Portfield suggests that requiring investors first to exhaust local remedies before referring disputes to ISDS can be of benefit to both the courts of a host state, as well as subsequent arbitral tribunals.¹⁴²⁹ The first benefit is that the use of the courts of host states supports of the rule of law in host states,¹⁴³⁰ and that it assists in the development of the legal systems of host states.¹⁴³¹ Secondly, the use of the courts of host states improves the decision making of arbitral tribunals, by narrowing down facts and determining points of law, such as whether a contract was breached, or whether property rights have vested or not.¹⁴³² Thirdly, the courts of host states may assist in the clarification of the relationship between domestic law and international law.¹⁴³³

Schreuer suggests that arbitral tribunals and the courts of host states are not necessarily mutually exclusive.¹⁴³⁴ He opines that the courts of host states may be required to stay or compel arbitration proceedings.¹⁴³⁵ They may also be competent to issue provisional measures during arbitral proceedings.¹⁴³⁶ In non-ICSID arbitration, the courts of host states are inevitably required to recognise and enforce foreign arbitral awards in terms of the New York Convention.¹⁴³⁷ The courts of host states may also clarify issues of domestic law, such as by determining whether property or contractual rights actually

¹⁴²⁹ Portfield MC “Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” 2015 (41) *The Yale Journal of International Law* Online 1-12.

¹⁴³⁰ Portfield 2015 (41) *The Yale Journal of International Law* Online 1 at 5-6.

¹⁴³¹ Portfield 2015 (41) *The Yale Journal of International Law* Online 1 at 5-6.

¹⁴³² Portfield 2015 (41) *The Yale Journal of International Law* Online 1 at 6.

¹⁴³³ Portfield 2015 (41) *The Yale Journal of International Law* Online 1 at 7.

¹⁴³⁴ Schreuer C “Calvo’s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration” 2005 (1) *The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals* 1-17 at 17 para 7.

¹⁴³⁵ Schreuer 2005 (1) *The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals* 1 at 2.

¹⁴³⁶ Schreuer 2005 (1) *The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals* 1 at 2.

¹⁴³⁷ Schreuer 2005 (1) *The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals* 1 at 2.

exist or not.¹⁴³⁸ Furthermore, a claim based on denial of justice cannot be brought until domestic courts have had the opportunity to deal with a matter.¹⁴³⁹

Salacuse opines that local courts may, if they are reformed (i.e. if their rule of law is acceptable), be an attractive forum for the adjudication of investor-state disputes.¹⁴⁴⁰

Onyema also acknowledges the role of domestic courts in arbitrations.¹⁴⁴¹ She opines that domestic courts are relevant before the commencement of arbitrations, during the arbitration proceedings as well as at the conclusion of the arbitration.¹⁴⁴² Nonetheless, Onyema suggests that the role of domestic courts should be limited so that they play a less (interfering) role in arbitrations.¹⁴⁴³

Vial and Blavi also accept that domestic courts are indispensable in arbitrations. But like Onyema, they opine that local courts should safeguard arbitration procedures without much interference therewith.¹⁴⁴⁴

Even the ICSID Convention provides that a host state may as a pre-condition to providing consent to arbitration, require an investor to first exhaust local remedies before commencing ICSID arbitration.¹⁴⁴⁵

¹⁴³⁸ Schreuer 2005 (1) *The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals* 1 at 2-3.

¹⁴³⁹ Schreuer 2005 (1) *The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals* 1 at 3.

¹⁴⁴⁰ Salacuse 2007 (31) *Fordham International Law Journal* 138 at 163.

¹⁴⁴¹ Onyema 2014 (17) 5 *International Arbitration Law Review* 99-111.

¹⁴⁴² Onyema 2014 (17) 5 *International Arbitration Law Review* 1 at 10.

¹⁴⁴³ Onyema 2014 (17) 5 *International Arbitration Law Review* 1 at 10-12.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Vial G and Blavi F "New Ideas for the Old Expectation of Becoming an Attractive Arbitral Seat" 2016 (25) *Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems* 279-308 at 283-284.

¹⁴⁴⁵ Article 26 ICSID Convention. For a discussion of this provision see GK Foster, 'Striking a

The customary international law also makes it mandatory that investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of host states before diplomatic protection can be invoked. This explanation requires one to revisit the use of local courts in history of the resolution of investor-state disputes, because it is recommended in Chapter 6 that investor-state disputes be referred to local courts, if the state of the rule of law is acceptable. The lengthy explanation that follows is warranted.

As recently as the 1970's, investors were not in the same position to sue host states as they are today. As Salacuse and Sullivan state:

...existing international law offered foreign investors no effective enforcement mechanism to pursue their claims against host countries that had injured or seized their investments or refused to respect their contractual obligations. As a result, investors had no assurance that investment contracts and arrangements made with host country governments would not be subject to unilateral change by those governments at some later time... Injured foreign investors who were unable to negotiate a satisfactory settlement, secure an arbitration agreement with a host state, or find satisfaction in the local courts had few options other than to seek espousal of their claims by the source country government...¹⁴⁴⁶

During this era and specifically before the coming into being of the ICSID Convention, diplomatic protection was the main mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes.¹⁴⁴⁷ Diplomatic protection required an investor to exhaust local remedies before

¹⁴⁴⁶ Balance between Investor Protections and National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration' 2011 (49) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 201-267 at 212-213; Schreuer *The ICSID Convention: A Commentary* at 348-413.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Salacuse and Sullivan 2005 (46) Harvard International Law Journal 67 at 70.

¹⁴⁴⁷ See for example GK Foster "Striking a Balance between Investor Protections and National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration" 2011 (49) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 201-267 at 209. For a discussion of the evolution of the protection of foreign investments see Miles K *The Origins of International*

its home state could be entitled to intervene.¹⁴⁴⁸ This requirement has been codified as Article 14 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection.¹⁴⁴⁹ The ICJ confirmed this requirement in the *ELSI*¹⁴⁵⁰ and *Interhandel*¹⁴⁵¹ cases. The ICJ also considered, but did not apply this requirement in *Diallo* as the court found it unnecessary to do so.¹⁴⁵² The SADC Tribunal confirmed the rule in *Mike Campbell*.¹⁴⁵³

The exhaustion of local remedies rule has its roots in the 9th century rule that reprisals for injury to foreigners should only be authorised in the event of denial of justice in the jurisdiction where an alien suffered injury.¹⁴⁵⁴ This rule developed over the centuries,

Investment Law: Empire, Environment and the safeguarding of Capital (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2013) at 19-121.

¹⁴⁴⁸ See Ngobeni 2012 (37) South African Yearbook of International Law 169 at 23.

¹⁴⁴⁹ See United Nations (International Law Commission) "Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection" Commentary at 80 para 1
http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a_61_10.pdf (Date of use: 04 September 2017); Ngobeni 2012 (37) South African Yearbook of International Law 169 at 23.

¹⁴⁵⁰ I.C.J Reports 1989 15 at 42 para 50. For a discussion of this case see Murphy SD "The ELSI Case: An Investment Dispute at the International Court of Justice" 1991 (16) Yale Journal of International Law 391-452; Kubiawski AS "The Case of Elettronica Sicula S.p.A: Toward Greater Protection of Shareholders' Rights in Foreign Investments" 1991 (29) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 215-244; Palenzuela AL "The International Court of Justice and the Standing of Corporate Shareholders under International Law: Elettronica Sicula v. Raytheon (U.S. v. Italy)" 1991 (1) University of Miami Year Book of International Law 292-308.

¹⁴⁵¹ I.C.J Reports 1959 6 at 27. For a discussion of this case see Branning R "Comments on the Interhandel Case" 1958 (52) American Society of International Law 125-181; Briggs HW "Interhandel: The Court's Judgment of March 21, 1959, on the Preliminary Objections of the United States" 1959 (53) American Journal of International Law 547-563; Meron T "The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies" 1959 (35) British Year Book of International Law 83-101; Simmonds KR "The Interhandel Case" 1961 (10) International Law Quarterly 495-547.

¹⁴⁵² Merits, Judgement, I.C.J Reports 2010 639 at 659 para 48.

¹⁴⁵³ *Mike Campbell* at 19-22.

¹⁴⁵⁴ For a discussion of the history of this rule see Cancado Trindade AA "Origin and Historical Development of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law" 1976 (12) Belgian Review of International Law 499-527 at 501-507. For a discussion of the relationship between the exhaustion of local remedies and denial of

such that by 1875, it was an established rule that local remedies had to be exhausted before diplomatic protection could be invoked.¹⁴⁵⁵

The basis of the exhaustion of local remedies rule is to ensure that where a host state is alleged to have violated the right(s) of an alien, it must have the opportunity to address the dispute within the framework of its domestic legal system.¹⁴⁵⁶ This was also recognised in *Mike Campbell*.¹⁴⁵⁷

The exhaustion of local remedies rule acknowledges that it may not be ideal under certain circumstances to require an investor to first exhaust local remedies before diplomatic protection can be invoked. Hence Article 15 of the ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection provides five exceptional circumstances where under local remedies need not be exhausted. Two of these exceptions that are relevant herein provide that local remedies need not be exhausted where:¹⁴⁵⁸

justice see Cancado Trindade AA “Denial of Justice and its Relationship to Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law” 1978 (53) *Philippine Law Journal* 404-420.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Cancado Trindade 1976 (12) *Belgian Review of International Law* 499 at 517.

¹⁴⁵⁶ See United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” Commentary on Article 14 at 71

<http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a6110.pdf> (Date of use: 04 September 2017); D’Ascoli S and Scherr KM “The Rule of prior exhaustion of Local Remedies in the Context of Human Rights Protection” *Italian Yearbook of International Law* 2006 (16) 117-138 at 126; GK Foster “Striking a Balance between Investor Protections and

National Sovereignty: The Relevance of Local Remedies in Investment Treaty Arbitration” 2011 (49) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 201-267 at 211.

¹⁴⁵⁷ *Mike Campbell* at 20.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Article 15(a)-(b) United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” <http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a6110.pdf> (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

- (a) There are no reasonably available local remedies to provide effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable possibility of such redress; and
- (b) There is undue delay in the remedial process that is attributable to the State alleged to be responsible.

The essence of the first exception above is that local remedies need not be exhausted if doing so will be futile or ineffective, or if there are no reasonably available remedies.¹⁴⁵⁹ The latter scenario encompasses situations where among others the courts of a host state lack judicial independence or are consistently biased against foreigners, or if the host state does not have an adequate judicial system.¹⁴⁶⁰ This exception was recognised in *Mike Campbell*.¹⁴⁶¹

The second exception above entails that an investor need not exhaust local remedies if there is an undue or unreasonable delay in the conclusion of proceedings for the exhaustion of local remedies.¹⁴⁶² This exception was also recognised in *Mike Campbell*.¹⁴⁶³

¹⁴⁵⁹ See United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” Commentary on Article 15, para 3 at 77 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a6110.pdf> (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

¹⁴⁶⁰ See United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” Commentary on Article 15, para 3 at 79 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a6110.pdf> (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

¹⁴⁶¹ *Mike Campbell* at 21.

¹⁴⁶² United Nations (International Law Commission) “Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection” Commentary on Article 15, para 5 at 79-80 <http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/reports/a6110.pdf> (Date of use: 04 September 2017).

¹⁴⁶³ *Mike Campbell* at 21.

The exceptions in Article 15(a)-(b) resonate with some of the findings made by the rule of law surveys regarding SADC Member States referred to in Chapter 4 above, in that they share the common themes of judicial independence and the efficiency of the courts of the host state. Therefore, it is reasonable that an investor should not be compelled to refer an investor-state dispute to the courts of a host state, under circumstances where the investor would be excused from doing so had the case been one based on diplomatic protection.

The exhaustion of the local remedies rule has over the years been incorporated into BITs and TIPs, by way of a provision that requires an investor to first exhaust local remedies prior to accessing ISDS. For example, SADC had such a provision in the form of Article 28(1) of the 2006 Annex 1.

It is clear from the above that whether ISDS is made available or not, the courts of host states are indispensable in the settlement of investor-state disputes. The acceptance of the central support role played by domestic courts in ISDS begs the question why, if such courts can be trusted with the support function they lend to ISDS, they cannot be trusted to resolve investor-state disputes entirely.

If one works from the premise that neither ISDS nor litigation is inherently better than the other, then there is a case to be made for the retention of both mechanisms. However, retaining both mechanisms raises the question of, under what circumstances can investor-state disputes be referred to each of these forums?

Ideally, what is required is a mechanism that will, independently of the choice of an investor or a host state, determine when a dispute can be referred to the courts of a host

state, and when it cannot be so referred. This mechanism must take into account the state of the rule of law in a host state.

Some rule of law surveys assess the rule of law in various jurisdictions, including African states.¹⁴⁶⁴ Within the AU, the APRM has as one its roles the evaluation and monitoring of the rule of law in Member States.¹⁴⁶⁵ The IIAG also conducts annual surveys that include the rule of law in Africa.¹⁴⁶⁶ Therefore, AU Members are used to having their state of rule of law assessed, and should therefore welcome a new rule of law scoreboard if they see its value.

It was also shown above that the AU has as one its *Agenda 2063* objectives, the improvement of the rule of law in all Member States by 2023.¹⁴⁶⁷ However, except for stating member States shall undertake APRM reviews, the AU does not propose an independent mechanism that will foster the development of the rule of law in Member States. In other words, the objective to improve the rule of law is there, but the means to achieve it are not convincingly spelt out. It is shown in Chapter 6 that the APRM cannot on its own foster the rule of law. And it is noteworthy that the AU does not have an alternative mechanism in this regard.

¹⁴⁶⁴ See the relevant discussion in Chapter 4 above.

¹⁴⁶⁵ See the discussion of the APRM in Chapter 4.

¹⁴⁶⁶ See <http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/iiag/downloads/> (Date of use: 11 April 2018). The IIAG was used in the discussion undertaken in Chapter 4 above.

¹⁴⁶⁷ See African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023” at 69 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf> (Date of use: 16 November 2017).

Of the different rule of law scoreboards and surveys that were utilised herein, the Gaffney Rule-of-Law-Proposal deserves mention.¹⁴⁶⁸ This proposal suggests the use of a treaty-based rule of law rating system, similar to sovereign rating systems.¹⁴⁶⁹ The system would indicate whether there is a significant risk that the courts of a host state would not uphold the rule of law.¹⁴⁷⁰

The common denominator between the rationale for the use of local courts discussed above, and the Gaffney proposal, is that both are in agreement that investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of host states unless there will be a denial of justice if such courts are utilised.

Schwieder is of the view that the Gaffney Rule-of-Law-Proposal will not add value in developed states, since their justice systems are often credible, transparent and independent.¹⁴⁷¹ Therefore, investors in developed states can dispense with access to ISDS, since these states have a high rule of law rating, which will rule out the use of ISDS.¹⁴⁷² This view is in line with that adopted in this study.

However, Schwieder opines that the Gaffney proposal may reduce investment transaction costs in developing states, by providing investors with reliable, free

¹⁴⁶⁸ Available at <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-149-Gaffney-FINAL.pdf> (Date of use: 18 September 2017); Schwieder 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 178 at 213-218.

¹⁴⁶⁹ Gaffney "Rule of Law Proposal" at 1 <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-149-Gaffney-FINAL.pdf> (Date of use: 18 September 2017); Schwieder 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 178 at 214.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Gaffney "Rule of Law Proposal" at 1 <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-149-Gaffney-FINAL.pdf> (Date of use: 18 September 2017); Schwieder 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 178 at 214; Schwieder 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 178 at 214.

¹⁴⁷¹ Schwieder 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 178 at 215.

¹⁴⁷² Schwieder 2016 (55) *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 178 at 216.

information regarding the rule of law status in target host states.¹⁴⁷³ Otherwise, host states that do not improve their rule of law will continue to face ISDS claims.¹⁴⁷⁴

The Gaffney Rule-of-Law-Proposal, as well as the rule of law surveys discussed in Chapter 4 above inspire the proposal that will be made in Chapter 6, regarding the mechanism that should regulate access to the courts of host states as proposed therein.¹⁴⁷⁵

(iii) The Sub-regional courts' option

The status quo in Africa is that there are sub-regional (or REC) courts to which investor-state disputes may be referred. These are the SADC Tribunal, the CCJ¹⁴⁷⁶ and the EACJ.¹⁴⁷⁷ Despite the fact that investors do not have access to the SADC Tribunal anymore, investors in SADC who reside in Member States that have cross membership with either COMESA or the EAC have access to the CCJ or the EACJ respectively. Investors who are residents of SADC/COMESA Member States, namely the Comoros, DRC, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Eswatini, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe can refer investor-states disputes to the CCJ, while those who are residents of SADC/EAC, namely Tanzania, can access the EACJ. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate if the CCJ or the EACJ are effective forums for the resolution of investor-state disputes or not. In order to do so, the jurisdiction of the CCJ and EACJ will be briefly considered, noting that it is impossible to fully analyse them herein.¹⁴⁷⁸

¹⁴⁷³ Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 215.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Schwieder 2016 (55) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 178 at 216-218.

¹⁴⁷⁵ See Recommendation 6.2.3 in Chapter 6 below.

¹⁴⁷⁶ The court is established in terms of Article 19 of the COMESA Treaty. Its functioning is provided for in Articles 20-26. See <http://comesacourt.org/> (Date of use: 18 May 2017).

¹⁴⁷⁷ These courts are discussed below in this section.

¹⁴⁷⁸ For a discussion of the CCJ and EACJ see Gathii JT "The Under-Appreciated

The CCJ¹⁴⁷⁹ was established in 1994 in terms of Article 7(1) (c) and 19 of the COMESA Treaty.¹⁴⁸⁰ Since 1998, the CCJ was based at the COMESA Secretariat in Lusaka, Zambia, but in 2003, the COMESA Authority resolved to relocate the court to Khartoum, Sudan.¹⁴⁸¹ This relocation took place in 2015 when the current bench was inaugurated.¹⁴⁸²

The object of the CCJ is to ensure legal compliance in the interpretation and application of the COMESA Treaty.¹⁴⁸³ The functioning of the CCJ is regulated by the CCJ Rules of Procedure 2016.¹⁴⁸⁴ The CCJ has a First Division and an Appellate Division.¹⁴⁸⁵ The

Jurisprudence of African Trade Judiciaries” 2010 (12) Oregon Review of International Law 245-281 at 1-22 <http://lawcommons.luc.edu/facpubs> (Date of use: 30 February 2018). Please note that the page numbers refer to those in the web version available in the link provided.

1479 See <http://comesacourt.org/> (Date of use: 10 December 2017); <http://comesacourt.org/comesa-court-of-justice-inaugurated/> (Date of use: 11 December 2017).

1480 See http://www.comesa.int/comesa-court-of-justice__trashed/ (Date of use: 11 December 2017).

1481 http://www.comesa.int/comesa-court-of-justice__trashed/ (Date of use: 11 December 2017).

1482 See <http://comesacourt.org/focus-on-sudan-as-the-comesa-court-holds-series-of-events/> (Date of use: 11 December 2017).

1483 Article 19 COMESA Treaty.

1484 COMESA Court of Justice “Rules of Procedure 2016” <http://www.comesa.int/other-publications/> (Date of use: 18 May 2017).

1485 Article 19(2) COMESA Treaty.

First Division comprises of seven judges,¹⁴⁸⁶ while the Appellate Court has five judges.¹⁴⁸⁷ Judges hold office for a renewable period of five years,¹⁴⁸⁸

The CCJ has jurisdiction over matters that may be brought before it pursuant to the COMESA Treaty.¹⁴⁸⁹ Any person who is resident in a COMESA Member State may refer for determination by the CCJ the legality of any act, regulation, directive, or decision of a Member State on the grounds that such act, directive, decision or regulation is unlawful or an infringement of the provisions of the Treaty.¹⁴⁹⁰ However, such person must first exhaust local remedies before the courts of the host state.¹⁴⁹¹ The decision of the CCJ regarding the interpretation of the COMESA Treaty shall take precedence over interpretations by the courts of Member States.¹⁴⁹²

The COMESA Treaty provides for the arbitration of disputes to which COMESA or its institutions are a party, or to which Member States are parties.¹⁴⁹³ Natural and legal persons can therefore not access this arbitration mechanism. Despite a review of the

¹⁴⁸⁶ Article 20(1) COMESA Treaty; <http://comesacourt.org/composition/> (Date of use: 11 December 2017). These are Principal Judge Lady Justice Qinisile Mabuza (Eswatini), Justice Ali Sulaiman Mohamed (Ethiopia), Justice Mary N. Kasango (Kenya), Justice Dr. Leonard Gacuko (Burundi), Justice Clotilde Mukamurera (Rwanda), Justice Chinembiri Energy Bhunu (Zimbabwe), see <http://comesacourt.org/focus-on-sudan-as-the-comesa-court-holds-series-of-events/> (Date of use: 11 December 2017). For the tenure of judges see Articles 21 and 22 COMESA Treaty.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Article 20(1) COMESA Treaty; <http://comesacourt.org/composition/> (Date of use: 11 December 2017). These are Judge President Lady Justice Lombe Chibesakunda, (Zambia), Justice Abdalla Elamin El Bashir (Sudan), Justice Dr. Michael Charles Mtambo (Malawi), Justice David Chan Kan Cheog (Mauritius), Justice Dr. Wael Marodouh Hassan Rady (Egypt), see <http://comesacourt.org/focus-on-sudan-as-the-comesa-court-holds-series-of-events/> (Date of use: 11 December 2017).

¹⁴⁸⁸ Article 21(1) COMESA Treaty.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Article 23 COMESA Treaty.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Article 26 COMESA Treaty.

¹⁴⁹¹ Article 26 COMESA Treaty.

¹⁴⁹² Article 29 COMESA Treaty.

¹⁴⁹³ Article 28 COMESA Treaty.

COMESA 2003 Arbitration rules during 2017, it appears that the scope of the review is not intended to grant natural and legal persons access to arbitration.¹⁴⁹⁴ Recently, the COMESA Treaty was amended to allow for the arbitration of investor-state disputes.

The CCJ is well placed as a forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes, primarily because natural and legal persons have the right to refer cases to it, and the COMESA Treaty provides certain rights to investors, including the right to FET¹⁴⁹⁵ and compensation upon expropriation of an investment.¹⁴⁹⁶ However, it requires sufficient resources in order to discharge its functions.

The EACJ is established in terms of Article 9 of the EAC Treaty.¹⁴⁹⁷ The EACJ has its temporary seat in Arusha, Tanzania.¹⁴⁹⁸ The EACJ is an *ad hoc* court, and will only be a full-time court when it has sufficient caseload to justify a full-time operation.¹⁴⁹⁹ The EACJ has a First Instance Division and an Appellate Division.¹⁵⁰⁰ The First Instance Division is comprised of a maximum of ten judges,¹⁵⁰¹ while the Appellate Division has a maximum of five judges.¹⁵⁰² Judges hold office for a maximum period of seven years.¹⁵⁰³

¹⁴⁹⁴ See COMESA “Call for Applications Consultant to Review COMESA Court of Justice Arbitration Rules” at 3-4 http://comesacourt.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/170403_Call-for-Appllications-Consultant-to-Review-CCJ-Arbitration-Rules-N.pdf (Date of use 30 January 2018). The outcome of the review is not public at this stage.

¹⁴⁹⁵ Article 159(1) (a) COMESA Treaty.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Article 159(3) (b) COMESA Treaty.

¹⁴⁹⁷ For a discussion of the operation of the court see Articles 23-47 EAC Treaty.

¹⁴⁹⁸ http://eacj.org/?page_id=19 (Date of use: 10 December 2017).

¹⁴⁹⁹ http://eacj.org/?page_id=19 (Date of use: 10 December 2017).

¹⁵⁰⁰ Article 23(2) EAC Treaty.

¹⁵⁰¹ Article 24(2) EAC Treaty. Current judges are Hon. Lady Justice Monica Mugenyi (Principal Judge), Hon. Justice Isaac Lenaola (Deputy Principal Judge), Hon. Justice Faustin Ntezilayayo, Hon Mr Justice Fakihi Abdalla Jundu, Hon. Mr Justice Audace Ngiye, see http://eacj.org/?page_id=1135 (Date of use: 11 December 2017).

¹⁵⁰² Article 24(2) EAC Treaty. Current judges are Hon. Justice Dr Emmanuel Ugirashebuja

Natural and legal persons that are resident in the EAC may refer for determination by the court the legality of a regulation, directive, decision or action of a Member State or an institution of the EAC on the grounds that such Act, regulation, directive, decision or action is unlawful or is an infringement of the provisions of the EAC Treaty.¹⁵⁰⁴ A litigant must bring such proceedings within two months of the enactment, publication, directive, decision or action complained of, or in the absence thereof, of the day in which it came to the knowledge of the litigant, as the case may be.¹⁵⁰⁵ Unlike in the case of the CCJ, there is no requirement that a litigant must first exhaust local remedies.¹⁵⁰⁶

Parties may refer disputes to the EACJ for arbitration, including investor-state disputes.¹⁵⁰⁷ Arbitration takes place in terms of the EACJ Arbitration Rules 2012.¹⁵⁰⁸ It appears that this facility is not being utilised.

However, the EACJ faces various challenges, such as limited financial resources, lack of respect for court decisions by Member States, lack of security of tenure of judges, staff shortages, limited jurisdiction, lack of physical and functional visibility etc.¹⁵⁰⁹

(President of the Court), Hon. Justice Liboire Mkuruziza (Vice-President of the Court), Hon. Mr Justice Edward Rutakangwa, Hon. Justice Aaron Ringera, Hon. Justice Geoffrey W.M Kiryabwire (Judge Appellate Division), see http://eacj.org/?page_id=1135 (Date of use: 11 December 2017).

¹⁵⁰³ Article 25(1) EAC Treaty.

¹⁵⁰⁴ Article 30(1) EAC Treaty.

¹⁵⁰⁵ Article 30(2) EAC Treaty.

¹⁵⁰⁶ Article 26 COMESA Treaty.

¹⁵⁰⁷ Article 32(c) EAC Treaty.

¹⁵⁰⁸ Available at <http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Arbitration-Rules-of-EACJ.pdf> (Date of use: 30 January 2018). See also <http://blogaila.com/2016/03/18/the-east-african-court-of-justices-arbitral-jurisdiction-over-commercial-contract-disputes-by-dr-faustin-ntezilyayo/> (Date of use: 30 January 2018).

¹⁵⁰⁹ See East African Court of Justice “Strategic Plan 2010-2015” at 14-18 <http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/EACJstrategicplan2010-15.pdf> (Date of use: 10 December 2017).

Furthermore, Member States and policy makers, in particular, seem not to appreciate the role and place of the EACJ.¹⁵¹⁰ The EACJ is therefore operationally compromised, although it is noted that the court's strategic plan aims to address the above challenges.¹⁵¹¹

Irrespective of the suitability or otherwise of the CCJ and the EACJ, the reality is that these courts cannot fill the void left by the SADC Tribunal, since they are not accessible to all SADC residents. This leaves SADC investors without access to their own sub-regional court.

The issue under discussion is not limited to the efficiency of the CCJ, EACJ or SADC Tribunal. Rather, the high-level issue is whether sub-regional courts are an effective forum for the resolution of investor-state disputes in SADC and Africa as a whole. The view adopted herein that the answer is in the negative, as explained below.

In addition to the resource challenges indicated above, the use of sub-regional courts will increase the duration and cost of investor-state litigation, particularly in the context of the proposals made in this study where the use of local and continental courts is proposed. For example, in South Africa, there is a three-tier superior court system comprising of the High Court,¹⁵¹² Supreme Court of Appeal¹⁵¹³ and finally the Constitutional Court.¹⁵¹⁴ Thus a claimant will have to first exhaust this judicial system,

¹⁵¹⁰ East African Court of Justice "Strategic Plan 2010-2015" at 17 <http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07EACJstrategicplan2o1o-15.pdf> (Date of use: 10 December 2017).

¹⁵¹¹ East African Court of Justice "Strategic Plan 2010-2015" at 20-26 <http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07EACJstrategicplan2o1o-15.pdf> (Date of use: 10 December 2017).

¹⁵¹² See <http://www.judiciary.org.za/high-courts.html> (Date of use: 8 January 2018).

¹⁵¹³ See <http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/> (Date of use: 8 January 2018).

¹⁵¹⁴ See <http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/home.htm> (Date of use: 8 January 2018).

followed by the SADC Tribunal or other sub-regional court, and finally the ACJ&HR. Navigating these tribunals will take years and cost of lot of money in legal fees and other indirect costs. The preferred view is that sub-regional courts could at least be turned into local divisions of a continental court such as the ACJ&HR. This will reduce travelling time and costs for litigants who can access the court in their areas.

Furthermore, the SADC Tribunal, CCJ and EAC are not harmonised. Each has different jurisdiction, rules of procedure, access to resources, and varying levels of judicial expertise. This encourages forum shopping, whereby litigants who are able to so can choose one court over another due to for example the fact that the chosen court is seen as being more efficient. This is not a sustainable status quo when one takes a continental view of the matter.

In addition, if sub-regional courts are to be maintained, a continent-wide network of thereof will have to be established, to ensure that litigants throughout Africa have access to a sub-regional court in their area. While this is possible in theory, it is doubtful that the necessary resources can be put in place to create and operate such a network. On a practical level, the fact that the CCJ and EACJ have light caseloads and are under-resourced, as shown in this section, shows that these courts are not geared to be as efficient as they should be. The reality is that RECs, the AU and its Member States do not have the resources to establish a continent-wide network of sub-regional courts.

In conclusion, for reasons stated above, the use of sub-regional courts for the resolution of investor-state disputes is not effective or ideal in the context of regional integration that is taking place in Africa. A different solution will have to be found.

The elimination of sub-regional courts in this discussion leaves the continental option of utilising ACJ&HR¹⁵¹⁵ for consideration. This discussion will now be undertaken.

(iv) The Continental courts' option

The ACH&PR was formed in order to give effect to the protection of the rights provided in the African Charter.¹⁵¹⁶ The Court commenced operations in November 2006 in Ethiopia, but it relocated to Arusha, Tanzania in August 2007.¹⁵¹⁷ The Court delivered its first judgment in 2009, and by 16 January 2018, it had received in excess of 194 cases, of which 43 were finalised,¹⁵¹⁸ while the rest were pending.¹⁵¹⁹

The jurisdiction of the ACH&PR covers all cases and disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the African Charter, the protocol establishing the ACH&PR, and any other Human Rights instrument ratified by respondent Member States.¹⁵²⁰ The ACH&PR may also render advisory opinions on any legal matter relating to the African Charter or relevant human rights instruments to Member States of the AU, the AU or any of its organs, and any African Organisation recognised by the AU.¹⁵²¹ The

¹⁵¹⁵ Article 2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights of 2008 merges the ACH&PR and the Court of Justice of the African Union to form the ACJ&HR. Articles 4-7 of the protocol provide the transitional arrangements leading up to the coming into effect of the ACJ&HR. The protocol is available at <https://www.au.int/web/en/treaties/protocol-statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights> (Date of use: 18 May 2017).

¹⁵¹⁶ Article 1 African Charter.

¹⁵¹⁷ <http://en.african-court.org/> (Date of use: 10 July 2017).

¹⁵¹⁸ <http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21#finalised-cases> of (Duse: 16 January 2018).

¹⁵¹⁹ <http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21#pending-cases> (Date of use: 16 January 2018).

¹⁵²⁰ Article 3 Protocol to African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on The Establishment of an African Court On Human and Peoples Rights; the Court's website is <http://en.african-court.org/> (Date of use: 10 July 2017).

¹⁵²¹ Article 4 Protocol to African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on The

sources of law to be applied by the ACH&PR are the African Charter and relevant human rights instruments.¹⁵²²

Non-Governmental Organisations that have observer status before the Commission, as well as natural and legal persons, may institute proceedings before the court if the respondent Member State has lodged a declaration consenting to such action in terms of Article 34(6) of the protocol.¹⁵²³ The court dismissed a number of cases, some investment-related, on this basis.¹⁵²⁴ Current practice, as demonstrated by the number of submitted declarations, shows that the Member States are reluctant to allow natural and legal persons to sue them at this court. As of May 2017, only eight Member States had lodged declarations whereby they consent to the jurisdiction of the Court in cases referred by natural persons and organisations.¹⁵²⁵ For the moment, this is a major weakness in terms of the value of this court to investors.

In the medium term, any weaknesses of the ACH&PR and its protocol will be short-lived, as the protocol establishing the ACH&PR is in the process of being replaced by the protocol establishing the ACJ&HR, which is discussed next.

¹⁵²² Establishment of an African Court On Human and Peoples Rights. Article 7 Protocol to African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on The Establishment of an African Court On Human and Peoples Rights.

¹⁵²³ Article 5(3) Protocol to African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on The Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights.

¹⁵²⁴ Finalised cases can be found at <http://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases/2016-10-17-16-18-21#finalised-cases> (Date of use: 20 June 2017). Some of the cases that were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction are *Baghdadi Ali Mahmoud v The Republic of Tunisia*, Application 007/2012; *Youssef Ababou v Kingdom of Morocco*, Application 007/2011; *Amir Adam Timan v The Republic of the Sudan*, Application 005/2012; *Delta International SA and others v The Republic of South Africa*, Application 002/2012; *National Convention of Teachers Trade Union v The Republic of Gabon*, Application 012/2011.

¹⁵²⁵ These are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Tanzania and Tunisia (<http://en.african-court.org/index.php/12-homepage1/1-welcome-to-the-african-court>) (Date of use: 10 July 2017).

The ACJ&HR is the result of a merger of the ACH&PR and the ACJ, which was implemented by Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights of 2008.¹⁵²⁶ The ACJ&HR is expected to be operational during 2030.¹⁵²⁷ It shall come into effect upon ratification by 15 Member States.¹⁵²⁸ At the time of writing, only six Member States had ratified the protocol establishing the ACJ&HR.¹⁵²⁹ The term of the judges of the ACH&PR shall end when the judges for the ACJ&HR are elected and sworn in.¹⁵³⁰ Unconcluded cases under the ACH&PR shall be transferred to the ACJ&HR.¹⁵³¹ The ACJ&HR shall be the main judicial organ of the AU.¹⁵³²

The ACJ&HR is divided into three sections: a General Affairs Section a Human and Peoples Rights Section and International Criminal Law Chamber.¹⁵³³ The General Affairs Section hears all matters except those relating to human rights in terms of Article 33 of the Statute of the Court, while the Human and Peoples' Rights Section hears human

¹⁵²⁶ For a critique of this merger see Naldi GJ and Magliveras KD “The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Judicial Curate’s Egg” 2012 (9) International Organizations Law Review 383-449.

¹⁵²⁷ African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 Framework Document” at 171, Target for 2063 No. (e) <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-framework.pdf> (Date of use: 15 November 2017).

¹⁵²⁸ Article 9 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. As of March 2017, only 6 Member States had ratified the protocol, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Lesotho, Liberia and Madagascar (https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-sl-protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights.pdf)(Date of use: 10 July 2017). Is this the latest ratification status?

¹⁵²⁹ https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-sl-protocol_on_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_hr_0.pdf (Date of use: 18 May 2017).

¹⁵³⁰ Article 4 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵³¹ Article 5 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵³² Article 9 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵³³ Article 16 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. Please note that during 2014 in Malabo, the AU amended the protocol by adding the International Criminal Law Chamber.

rights matters in terms of Article 34 of the Statute of the Court.¹⁵³⁴ The jurisdiction of the ACJ&HR covers the interpretation and application of the Constitutive Act, the interpretation, application or validity of other AU Treaties and all subsidiary legal instruments adopted within the framework of the AU or the OAU and many areas.¹⁵³⁵ Individuals or relevant NGOs accredited to the AU or to its organs may refer cases to the court, subject to the provisions of Article 8 of the Protocol establishing the Court.¹⁵³⁶ The sources of law to be applied by the ACJ&HR are the AU Constitutive Act, International treaties, whether general or particular, ratified by the contesting States etc.¹⁵³⁷

Despite the fact that among others, natural and legal persons do not have an automatic right to refer cases to the ACJ&HR (and the ACH&PR), the ACJ&HR is an ideal continental court for the resolution of investor-state disputes, for the following reasons. The argument in support of a single continental court is not new.¹⁵³⁸

First and foremost, the ACJ&HR is the judicial organ of the AU and the AEC.¹⁵³⁹ The Third Guiding Principle of a AfCFTA Institutional Structure provides that the AfCFTA Institutional Structures must be accessible to the people, and must leave no one behind.¹⁵⁴⁰ On this basis, UNECA, AU and the AfDB envision that the general public should have access to the ACJ&HR to enforce AfCFTA obligations.¹⁵⁴¹ They state that:

¹⁵³⁴ Article 17 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵³⁵ Article 28 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵³⁶ Article 30 the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵³⁷ Article 31 the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵³⁸ See for example Kindiki K “The Proposed Integration of the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Legal Difficulties and Merits” 2007 (15) Journal of International and Comparative Law 138-146 at 144-145.

¹⁵³⁹ Article 18(1) AEC Treaty.

¹⁵⁴⁰ African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 119

... The proposed structures must extend down to the country level and give individuals the right to enforce compliance of CFTA obligations in national courts. However, appeals could be addressed at regional courts and subsequently the African Court of Justice and Human Rights so that citizens see the bigger picture on regional and continental jurisprudence developed through the additional layers of integration. In addition to national institutions, this will also require dispute settlement arrangements that are accessible to individuals...¹⁵⁴²

As can be seen from the passage cited above, the AfCFTA Architecture as proposed, contemplates that the public can enforce compliance with AfCFTA obligations via their national courts.¹⁵⁴³ It is said that this will “decentralise compliance”.¹⁵⁴⁴ In order to give effect to this, AfCFTA obligations will be made part of domestic law.¹⁵⁴⁵

¹⁵⁴¹ https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).
The reader is advised to refer to the AfCFTA Agreement with regard to the final position in this regard.

¹⁵⁴² African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 119
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

¹⁵⁴³ See also African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 126
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

¹⁵⁴⁴ African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 126
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

¹⁵⁴⁵ African Union (Commission) “Assessing Regional Integration in Africa VIII Bringing the Continental Free Trade Area About” at 126
https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/aria8_eng_fin.pdf (Date of use 15 December 2017).

The fact that the current jurisdiction of the ACJ&HR will need to be amended as proposed herein is not an obstacle, as the AU Assembly can amend the jurisdiction of the ACJ&HR at any time.¹⁵⁴⁶ Therefore, all that is required to position the ACJ&HR to adjudicate investor-state disputes is a decision of the AU Assembly.

Furthermore, the ACJ&HR is a neutral, supranational court established by all AU Member States. It was not imposed on them. This gives it credibility among the Member States, and also depoliticises disputes by removing them from the courts of host states.

Most importantly, the use of the ACJ&HR will promote the rule of law in Africa. This is due to the fact that judges in the ACJ&HR are appointed through a democratic and credible process,¹⁵⁴⁷ judicial independence in terms of international law is enshrined,¹⁵⁴⁸ judges enjoy diplomatic immunity throughout Africa during their term of office,¹⁵⁴⁹ and a judge can only be suspended or removed from office by a two-thirds decision of the rest of the judges.¹⁵⁵⁰ Member States are obliged to comply with and execute a judgment of the court.¹⁵⁵¹ Furthermore, by using existing ACJ&HR facilities, the court will not be exclusively for the use of investors to sue host states, as is the case with ISDS institutions, which are created for the benefit of foreign investors only.

The statute of the ACJ&HR provides for the appointment of judges who are competent in international law, which encompasses the field of investor-state disputes. Thus, there will be no need to appoint judges with additional skills and competencies. Furthermore, the

¹⁵⁴⁶ Article 18(4) AEC Treaty.

¹⁵⁴⁷ See Articles 6 and 7 of Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵⁴⁸ Article 12 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵⁴⁹ Article 15 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵⁵⁰ Article 9 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

¹⁵⁵¹ Article 46 Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.

fact that the judges will not be limited to adjudicating investment cases means that their expertise will be better utilised by all litigants.

Having a single judicial authority for the continent will also make it easy for resources to be channeled towards the court, instead of the status quo of having multiple regional courts and tribunals, each of which requires (and presently lacks) scarce resources.

As stated above, existing sub-regional courts are ideally placed to act as divisions of the ACJ&HR. This will enable litigants to have access to the ACJ&HR in their regions, which will save them travel time and costs. This will also bring the ACJ&HR closer to the people, and enable it to live up to its status as the court of the continent. Therefore, the use of the ACJ&HR will not entail that existing REC courts' resources will go to waste. Establishing divisions of the ACJ&HR will also reduce the caseload of the ACJ&HR, thereby leading to the speedy conclusion of cases, which in turn will save litigants time and money. This is also in line with the AfCFTA approach that RECs and their resources shall be gradually subsumed into the continental framework.

5.4 CONCLUSION

There is clearly not a one-size-fits-all solution to the challenges facing the regulation of foreign investments in SADC or anywhere in the world for that matter. This applies to the mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes as well. SADC, together with its partners in the AfCFTA, must be innovative and bold in finding a lasting solution to the future regulation of foreign investments. It must find a solution that is unique to its African circumstances, and not blindly import solutions that were invented by others. The EU, Brazil, and India have demonstrated that it is possible to do this. These issues are

inherently complex, and no one state or region can claim to have found a solution thereto. Furthermore, no solution can appease all stakeholders.

Given the continental integration thrust towards the formation of the AEC that is gaining momentum by the day, the AU is best-placed to drive the regulation of foreign investments in Africa. Therefore, a legally binding regulatory instrument, such as the investment protocol that will be negotiated to form part of the AfCFTA, is the ideal instrument to regulate foreign investments in SADC and the rest of Africa. Similarly, the ACJ&HR as the judicial organ of the AU is equally well placed to adjudicate investor-state disputes. The conclusion of the AfCFTA Agreement, and the negotiation of the AfCFTA investment protocol confirm the view adopted in this study, to the effect that foreign investments must be regulated at AU level.

Nonetheless, the local courts of host states must not be ignored, as it was shown above that they are indispensable for the resolution of investor-state disputes.

ISDS too must, despite its challenges not be written off, as there are definitely SADC, AU Member States and RECs that prefer to use it. This point is demonstrated by the deadlock reflected in the dispute resolution mechanism of the PAIC, as well as the continuing conclusion of BITs that provide for ISDS by some SADC Member States.

What is needed is not a choice of ISDS or local courts, because the circumstances of each host state are not the same. Rather, what is needed is a mechanism that determine when an investor-state dispute can be referred to a court, bearing in mind the state of the rule of law in a host state.

The next chapter will summarise the findings made in this study and will make recommendations following SADC's options analysed above.

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This study aims to recap the answers to the research questions raised in Chapter 1. These questions were answered in the course of the discussions undertaken in Chapters 2 through 5. The following is a summary of the findings made in each chapter in this regard.

Chapter 2 introduced the theoretical foundation of the study. It was shown therein that a host state cannot rely on its internal law to avoid complying with its international obligations. Secondly, it was shown that a host state that breaches its international obligations, such as by undertaking an unlawful expropriation, is liable to pay reparation and not compensation. Thirdly, the argument was made that the definition of an investment as applied in ICSID decisions including *Salini* may be applicable to non-ICSID arbitration.

Furthermore, it was shown that some states are moving towards the inclusion of the *Salini* criteria in their investment treaty practice. Finally, it was shown that litigation and ISDS have their pros and cons, and that circumstances should determine when each of these can be an appropriate mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes.

Chapter 3 analysed the provisions of 2006 and 2016 Annex 1, and compared these to similar regulatory instruments from other jurisdictions. It was found that the 2016 Annex 1 has reduced the protection that investors had in terms of the 2006 Annex 1, by removing access to ISDS and leaving the courts of host states as the only forum to

which investor-state disputes can be referred. Technically, the 2016 Annex lags behind similar instruments in terms of the way it regulates foreign investments, such as by failing to address treaty shopping by investors.

It was also found that SADC's decision to refer investor-state disputes to the courts of host states may be controversial, but that there is nothing wrong in principle with such a decision.

Finally, it was found that the regulation of foreign investments by means of either version of Annex 1 is not satisfactory, due to the failure of Member States to harmonise their laws and practices therewith.

Chapter 4 analysed the remedies that an investor would have in terms of the laws of SADC Member States, in the event of an expropriation. It was found that the security of foreign investments at Member State level is unsatisfactory, in that Member State laws are not harmonised with either version of Annex 1. It was found that as a result of the conflict between Annex 1 and Member State investment laws, the relevant version of Annex 1 will prevail over the investment laws. It was also found that the rule of law in most SADC Member states is not satisfactory. This risks denial of justice for investors who may be compelled to use the courts of these states, and is a possible contravention of Article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty.

Chapter 5 analysed recent developments in Brazil, the EU, and India with regard to the regulation of the resolution of investor-state disputes. The chapter analysed the lessons that SADC can learn from these developments, and the options that SADC has, with regard to the future regulation of foreign investments and the mechanism for the

resolution of investor-state disputes. It was found that SADC could learn various lessons, which are indicated therein. It was also found that SADC has the option of regulating of foreign investments at REC level by means of Annex 1 (the status quo), or of regulating foreign investments at T-FTA level (which is not different to the status quo), or of doing so at AfCFTA/AU level. As far as the resolution of investor-state disputes is concerned, the options that are open to SADC were found to be litigation before the courts of host states, ISDS, the SADC Tribunal (revitalisation thereof), or the ACH&PR/ACJ&HR.

The regulation of foreign investments at AU level by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol, as well as the referral of investor-state disputes to local courts, the optional provision for ISDS and the use of the ACJ&HR were preferred. With regard to the referral of investor-state disputes to local courts, it was found that there is a need for a mechanism that will determine when such disputes can be referred to local courts, and when they cannot be so referred, with due consideration to the state of the rule of law in a host state.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND THE RESOLUTION OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES IN SADC

This section will make four recommendations with a view to addressing the challenges identified in the Problem Statement. The areas that are central to the security of foreign investments in SADC are the level at which foreign investments are regulated, and the

mechanism for the resolution of investor-state disputes.¹⁵⁵² Therefore, the recommendations are focused on these areas. These recommendations are addressed to the AU, SADC, the T-FTA and their respective Member States.

In addition to contribute to the discourse on the issues covered by this study, the unique contribution hereof to the body of knowledge is the use of the proposed African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) as a gateway for access to the local courts of host states. The core of the recommendations is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated by an AfCFTA investment protocol,¹⁵⁵³ and that investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of host states (as determined by the AJS), or to optional ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forum.

It is recommended that:

6.2.1 Foreign investments in Africa be regulated by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol:

The motivation for this proposal is provided in Chapter 5 above.¹⁵⁵⁴ It was found therein that in view of the formation of the AfCFTA and the AEC, it is preferable to regulate foreign investments at continental (AU) level than at REC level. The core motivation herein is that the regulation of foreign investments at AU level will create a single regime for the regulation of foreign investments, and thus it will facilitate harmonisation

¹⁵⁵² These areas emanate from objectives 1.3.4 and 1.3.5 in Chapter 1 above at 11.

¹⁵⁵³ This proposal was drafted prior to the conclusion of the AfCFTA. Therefore, the fact that the AfCFTA will have an investment protocol is an incidental support of this proposal.

¹⁵⁵⁴ See Chapter 5 above at 253-254. This recommendation was made prior to the AU's decision on 21 March 2018, to commence negotiations for an AfCFTA investment protocol.

in this regard. This will bring an end to the fragmentation that is caused by the regulation of foreign investments by different RECs. The decision of the AU to include an investment protocol to the AfCFTA Agreement underscores that this recommended is well founded.

6.2.2 Investor-State disputes must be referred to the local courts of a host state, optional ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forum:

The motivation for this proposal is provided in Chapter 5 above. This proposal works from the premise that investor-state disputes must first be referred to the local courts of host states, if the AJS rating of a state is acceptable. If a state's AJS rating does not permit the referral of a dispute to local courts, then the dispute can be referred to optional ISDS (i.e. if a host state agrees thereto), the ACJ&HR or other forums that may be provided for that purpose. What is paramount here is that the courts of a host state are the first option to be considered for the resolution of investor-state disputes.

Ideally and in line with the continental approach motivated in Chapter 5, disputes that cannot be referred to the local courts of host states due to their poor AJS rating should be referred to the ACJ&HR. Should disputes be referred to other forums such as ISDS, the ACJ&HR can still act as a tribunal of last resort. With regard to ISDS, the use of the ACJ&HR in this way will enable the court to act as an appeal court with regard to arbitral awards. This linkage will require the amendment of current ISDS rules, or the creation of new ISDS institutions and rules. In this regard, motivation can be drawn from the EU's proposed Investment Court System, which shows that it is possible to create a new version of ISDS.

6.2.3 An AJS be established under the auspices of the AU:

It is recommended that an AJS be established under the auspices of the AU. The AJS will be a gateway used to determine whether an investor shall be obliged to refer a dispute to the courts of a host state or not. The motivation for the AJS is provided below.

In order to establish the AJS, the criteria and indicators to be used in assessing the AJS score shall first be determined. In this regard, existing rule of law scoreboards such as those referred to in Chapter 4, as well as the European Justice Scoreboard, can be used as a reference point.

A threshold AJS score shall be set. This threshold shall be the minimum AJS score that a host state can obtain in order for its rule of law to be deemed satisfactory for the adjudication of investor-state disputes. An AJS score that is above the set threshold shall imply that a host state's is satisfactory. Therefore, in the event of a dispute, an investor shall be obliged to refer it to the courts of a host state. On the other hand, an AJS score that is lower than the set threshold shall imply that the rule of law in a host state is unsatisfactory. This shall entitle an investor to bypass the courts of such host state, and to refer the dispute to ISDS (if the host state consents), the ACJ&HR or other forum provided for that purpose.

In order to prevent parallel proceedings, the AJS should be used on a fork-in-the-road or no-U-turn basis, meaning that an investment and all its investors must be irreversibly bound by the choice of forum that an investor or investment is directed to utilise as

determined by the AJS score of a host state.¹⁵⁵⁵ Therefore once a dispute is referred to either the courts of a host state, ISDS or the ACJ&HR, the same dispute cannot thereafter be referred to any other forum. Furthermore, if an investor commences proceedings, then the investment company shall be precluded from commencing proceedings based on the same cause of action. NAFTA,¹⁵⁵⁶ The EU's TTIP Proposal,¹⁵⁵⁷ and the India Model BIT¹⁵⁵⁸ provide examples of how parallel proceedings can be avoided.¹⁵⁵⁹

The critical role that the AJS will play as proposed entails that its outcomes must be credible and beyond question. Therefore, the AJS must have credibility before Member States and investors alike. The AJS must be incorporated into the AfCFTA investment protocol, so that it becomes a treaty-based mechanism, unlike existing scoreboards that have no legally binding effect.

It must be noted in this regard that the AJS and the APRM are not mutually exclusive.¹⁵⁶⁰ Each has a different scope, and serves a different purpose. The APRM monitors performance by AU Member States in the areas of democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance and socio-economic

¹⁵⁵⁵ For a discussion of parallel proceedings in ISDS see for example Cremades BM and Madalena I "Parallel Proceedings in International Arbitration" 2008 (24) Arbitration International 507-540.

¹⁵⁵⁶ Article 1121 NAFTA.

¹⁵⁵⁷ Article 14(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal.

¹⁵⁵⁸ Article 14.4(i)(B)(f) India Model BIT.

¹⁵⁵⁹ Article 14(2) Sub-section 3, Chapter II, Part 3 TTIP Proposal; Article 14.4(i)(B)(f).

¹⁵⁶⁰ For further information regarding the APRM, as well as APRM reports see the Statute of the APRM at https://aprm-au.org/st_car/statute-of-the-aprm/; <https://aprm-au.org/>, <https://au.int/en/organs/aprm>; <http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/official-documents/item/598-protocol-establishing-the-aprm-base-document-official-protocol-establishing-the-aprm-au-nepad> (Date of use: 8 April 2018).

development.¹⁵⁶¹ It is a self-monitoring instrument,¹⁵⁶² and its membership is voluntary.¹⁵⁶³ Hence the rule of law forms a fraction of the scope of the APRM, while the AJS will be entirely dedicated to the assessment of the rule of law.¹⁵⁶⁴ This places the AJS in a better position to conduct detailed rule of law surveys. The AJS will also serve a purpose that the APRM does not serve, namely to act as a legally binding, independent, treaty-based tool for the monitoring of the rule of law in African states.

In terms of the conduct of the AJS surveys, it is recommended that the AU use a credible, professional and independent party such as an audit or law firm. This is to ensure that the AJS is devoid of political interference. The chosen service provider must serve for a certain period only, so as to allow other service providers to render the service, and to once again cement the independence and integrity of the AJS. The firm should be appointed through a public and transparent procurement process.

There are a number of benefits to the use of the AJS. The AJS will, if properly implemented, play an important role in the development of the rule of law in Africa, as it is an incentive for host states to improve the rule of law in their territories. In the process, the AJS will assist AU Member States to achieve their *Agenda 2063* rule of law objectives.¹⁵⁶⁵

¹⁵⁶¹ Article 4(1) the Statute of the APRM.

¹⁵⁶² Article 5(1) the Statute of the APRM; <https://au.int/en/organs/aprm> (Date of use: 8 April 2018).

¹⁵⁶³ Article 6(2) the Statute of the APRM; <https://au.int/en/organs/aprm> (Date of use: 8 April 2018).

¹⁵⁶⁴ The rule of law is assessed under the section of democracy and political governance.

¹⁵⁶⁵ See African Union (Commission) “Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan 2014-2023” at 69 <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/agenda2063-first10yearimplementation.pdf> (Date of use: 16 November 2017).

In addition to serving as a gateway to local courts, the AJS will serve as an independent monitoring and remedial tool for the AU and Member States. Member States that score below the AJS threshold will be able to identify areas where there are shortcomings, and improve on them. Similarly, Member States that score above the AJS threshold will notice areas where they are performing satisfactorily, and will be able to take steps to sustain such performance. In this regard, the AJS and the APRM will complement each other, as each will learn from the successes, failures and outcomes of the other. This is good for both of them, and ultimately for the AU Member States.

6.2.4 An AIO be established under the auspices of the AU:

The AIO should be modelled on the South Korean OFIO, with necessary variations where needed. It was shown above that the OFIO has a high success rate of resolving investor-state disputes. The legal status and independence of the AIO is critical if it is to be successful and trusted. Therefore, in order to be fully empowered, the AIO must be established in terms of the AfCFTA investment protocol.

The credibility, competency, independence, and efficiency of the AIO will be critical, given the nature of the AIO's intervention. An independent person with competence in among others business and international economic law should lead the AIO. Equally, competent support personnel should also staff the AIO.

Member States and the business community must support the AIO once established because the prevention of investor-state disputes is in their mutual interests. Its success will contribute to a stable foreign investment climate and will save all parties significant

time and money from litigation and arbitration that would otherwise follow if disputes are not resolved early.

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LTME Mauritius and Madamobil Holdings Mauritius Limited v Republic of Madagascar (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/28)

Metalclad Corporation v United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1) Award of 30 August 2000

Metalpar S.A and Buen Aire v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/5) Award of 6 June 2008 2000

Merrill & Ring Forestry L.P v The Government of Canada (UNCITRAL) Award of 31 March 2010

Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6) Award of 12 April 2002

Mihaly International Corporation v Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (ICSID Case No. ARB/00/2) Award of 15 March 2002

Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN, BHD v The Government of Malaysia (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10) Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 May 2007

M.C.I. Power Group, L.C. and New Turbine, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6) Award of 31 July 2007

Millicom International Operations B.V. and Sentel GSM Claimants v The Republic of Senegal (ICSID Case No. ARB/08/20) Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 July 2010

Mobil Corporation, Venezuela Holdings, B.V. and Others v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27) Decision on Jurisdiction of 10 June 2010

Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi and Sons Co. Kuwaiti Company v The Government of The State of Libya and Others (PCA Case No. 2011-09) Award on Merits of 2 March 2015

Mondev International Ltd v United States of America (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2) Award of 11 October 2002

Mr Frank Charles Araf v Republic of Moldova (ICSID case No. ARB/11/23) Award of 8 April 2013

Mr Josias Van Zyl (South Africa), The Josias Van Zyl Family Trust (South Africa) and The Burmilla Trust (South Africa) v The Kingdom of Lesotho (PCA Case No. 2016-21) (Josias Van Zyl 2)

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MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. And MTD Chile v Republic of Chile (ICSID Case No. ARB01/7) Award of 25 May 2004

Noble Energy Inc. and Machala Power Cía. Ltd. v Republic of Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de Electricidad (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/12) Decision on Jurisdiction of 5 March 2008

Nordzucker AG v The Republic of Poland (Ad hoc Tribunal) Partial Award of 10 December 2008

Nova Scotia Power Incorporated (Canada) v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/11/1) Excerpts of Award of 30 April 2014

Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Petroleum Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11) Award of 05 October 2012

Oded Besserglik v Republic of Mozambique (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)14/2)

Parkerings-Compagniet AS v Republic of Lithuania (ICSID case No. ARB/05/08) Award of 11 September 2007

Pater A. Allard v The Government of Barbados (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 27 June 2016

Phoenix Action, Ltd v The Czech Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/05) Award of 15 April 2009

Pope & Talbot Inc v The Government of Canada (NAFTA) Award on Merits of Phase 2 of 10 April 2001 Award in Respect of Damages of 31 May 2002

PSEG Global v Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5) Award of 19 January 2007

OKO Pankki OYJ, VTB Bank (Deutschland) AG and Sampo Bank Plc v The Republic of Estonia ((CSID Case No. ARB/04/06) Award of 19 November 2007

Philip Morris Asia Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia (PCA Case No. 2012-12) Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 December 2015

Philip Morris Brand SARL, Philip Morris Products S.A, Abal Hermanos S.A v Oriental Republic of Uruguay (ICSID Case No. ARB10/7) Award of 8 July 2016

Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v Islamic Republic of Iran (1989) 21 Iran-US CTR 79

Quiborax S.A.; Non Metallic Minerals S.A and Alan Fosk Kaplun v Plurinational State of Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/02) Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 September 2012

Romak S.A (Switzerland) v Republic of Uzbekistan (PCA Case No. AA280) Award of 26 November 2009

Rusoro Mining Limited v The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/12/5) Award of 22 August 2016

SAIPEM S.p.A v The Peoples Republic of Bangladesh (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07) Decision on Jurisdiction of 21 March 2007

S.D. Myers Inc. v Government of Canada (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Partial Award of 13 November 2000

Salini Costruttori S.P.A and Italstrade S.P.A v Kingdom of Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB 00/4) Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 July 2001

Saluka Investments B.V. v The Czech Republic (UNCITRAL) Decision on Jurisdiction over the Czech Republic's Counterclaim of 7 May 2004

Siemens AG v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8) Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2004

Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16) Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 May 2005

Sempra Energy International v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16) Award of 28 September 2007

Sergei Paushok, CJSC Golden East Company and CJSC Vostokneftegaz Company v

The Government of Mongolia (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 28 April 2011

Société Generale in respect of DR Energy Holdings Limited and Empresa Distribuidora de Electricidad del Este, S. A. v The Dominican Republic (UNCITRAL Arbitration, LCIA Case No. UN 7927) Award on Preliminary Objections to Jurisdiction of 19 September 2008

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SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v The Republic of Paraguay (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/29) Award of 10 February 2012

SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6) Order of the Tribunal on Further Proceedings of 17 December 2007

SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v Republic of the Philippines (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6) Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004

Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3) Award 20 May 1992

Spyridon Rousalis v Romania (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1) Award of 7 December 2011

Standard Chartered Bank v United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/12) Award of 2 November 2012

Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v The Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19) Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2006

Swissbournh Diamond Mines (Pty) Limited, Josias Van Zyl, The Josias Van Zyl Family Trust and others v The Kingdom of Lesotho (PCA Case No. 2013-29)

Swisslion DOO Skopje v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (CSID Case No. ARB/09/16) Award of 6 July 2012

Tecnicas Medioambienta Tecmed S.A v The United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2) of 29 May 2003

Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v The Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15)
Award of 13 September 2006

Thomas Gosling and others v Republic of Mauritius (ICSID Case No. ARB/16/32)

Tidewater Investment SRL and Tidewater Cabire, CA v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5) Award of 13 March 2015

Tokios Tokelés v Ukraine (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18) Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 April 2004

Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. v Republic of Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28) Award of 10 March 2014

Valeri Belokon v The Kyrgyz Republic (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 24 October 2014

Venezuela Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd. and Others v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27) Award of 9 October 2014

Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v The Russian Federation (PCA Case No. AA 228) Final Award of 18 July 2014

Vivendi v Argentine I: First Arbitration Proceeding and First Annulment Proceeding Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) Award of 21 November 2000 and Decision on Annulment of 3 July 2002

Vivendi v Argentine II: Second Arbitration Proceeding Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) Award of 20 August 2007 and Decision on Annulment of 10 August 2010

Walter Bau AG (In Liquidation) v The Kingdom of Thailand (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Award of 1 July 2009

Waste Management Inc. v United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3) Award of 30 April 2004

Wena Hotels Limited v Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4) Award of 8 December 2000

White Industries Australia v The Republic of India (Ad hoc UNCITRAL Tribunal) Final Award of 30 November 2011

Yukos Universal Limited (Isle-of-Man) v The Russian Federation, (PCA Case No. AA 227) Final Award of 18 July 2014

7 INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND MODEL BILATERAL TREATIES

A

African Charter

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, (date of signature 01 June 1981, in force 21 October 1986) <https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

African Union (Assembly) (Eighth Ordinary Session, 20 January 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance* http://archive.ipu.org/idd-E/afr_charter.pdf (Date of use: 15 April 2018)

AfCFTA Agreement

Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (date of signature 21 March 2018, not in force) <https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/african-union/1964-agreement-establishing-the-afcfta-consolidated-text-signed-21-march-2018-1/file.html> (Date of use §30 April 2018)

AEC Treaty

Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (date of signature 3 June 1991, in force 12 May 1994) http://www.wipo.int/edocs/trtdocs/en/aec/trt_aec.pdf (Date of use: 28 February 2017)

ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement

ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, (date of signature 26 02 2009, in force 24 February 2012)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3095> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

AU Constitutive Act

Constitutive Act of the African Union, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/23.15, (date of signature 7 November 2000, in force 26 May 2001)

https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7758-treaty-0021_-_constitutive_act_of_the_african_union_e.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018)

B

Brazil-Malawi ACFI

Investment Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement Between the Federative Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Malawi, (date of signature 25 06 2017, not in force)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/4715> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

C

Canada-Tanzania BIT

Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (date of signature 17 May 2013, in force 09 December 2013)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/636> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, A/RES/39/163, (resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 17 December 1984)

<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00eff474.html> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

COMESA Treaty

Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Southern Africa, (date of signature 05 November 1993, in force 08 December 1994)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2422> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, (date of signature 10 June 1958, in force 7 June 1959)

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1959/06/19590607%2009-35%20PM/Ch_XXII_01p.pdf (Date of use: 18 January 2018)

ICSID Convention

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (with Rules and Regulations) 1965, amended to 2006, (ratified 14 September 1966, in force 14 October 1966)

https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/2006%20CRR_English-

E

EAC Treaty

Treaty Establishing the East African Community, (date of signature 30 November 1999, in force 07 July 2000)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2487> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

Energy Charter Treaty

Energy Charter Treaty 2080 UNTS 95; 34 ILM 360 (1995), (date of Signature 17 December 1994, in force 16 April 1998),

<http://www.ena.lt/pdfai/Treaty.pdf#search=%22energy%20charter%20treaty%22> (date of use: 21 November 2017)

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5, Article 14, (date of signature 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953)
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (Date of use: 21 October 2017)

I

India Model BIT

Model Text for The India Bilateral Investment Treaty 2015
https://www.mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the%20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16), UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, (date of signature 16 December 1966, in force 23 March 1976)
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20999/volume-999-i-14668-english.pdf> (Date of use: 31 October 2017)

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp (No 16) at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS 3, (date of signature 19 December 1966, in force 3 January 1976)
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf> (Date of use: 31 October 2017)

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195, (date of signature 21 December 1965, in force 4 January 1969)
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3940.html> (Date of use: 21 October 2017)

Investment Agreement For the COMESA Investment Area

Investment Agreement For the COMESA Investment Area, (date of signature 23 May 2007, not in force)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/3225> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

J

Japan-Mozambique BIT

Agreement Between the Government of Japan and The Republic of Mozambique On the Reciprocal Liberalization, Promotion and Protection of Investments, (date of signature 01 June 2013, in force 29 August 2014)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3114> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

N

NAFTA

North American Free Trade Agreement, (date of signature 17 December 1992, in force 01 January 1994)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2412> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

P

PAIC

Pan African Investment Code

https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/32844-doc-draft_pan-african_investment_code_december_2016_en.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights

Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III), (adopted 10 June 1998, in force 25 January 2004)

<https://au.int/en/treaties/protocol-african-charter-human-and-peoples-rights-establishment-african-court-human-and> (Date of use: 18 January 2018)

Protocol on the Amendments to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights

Protocol on the Amendments to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, (date of signature 27 06 2014, not in force) https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7804-treaty-0045_-_protocol_on_amendments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e-compressed.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union

Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union, (date of signature 01 July 2003, in force 11 February 2009) https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7784-treaty-0026_-_protocol_of_the_court_of_justice_of_the_african_union_e.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights

Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, (date of signature 01 July 2003, in force 11 February 2009) https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7792-treaty-0035_-_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e.pdf (Date of use: 15 October 2015)

S

SADC Agreement Amending Annex 1 (2016 Annex 1)

Southern African Development Community Agreement Amending Annex 1 (Co-operation on Investment) of The Protocol on Finance and Investment, (date of signature 31 August 2016, in force 24 August 2017) <http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5527> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

SADC FIP (2006 Annex 1)

Southern African Development Community Protocol on Finance and Investments, (date of signature 18 August 2006, in force 16 April 2010)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2730> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

SADC Model BIT

Southern African Development Community Model Bilateral Treaty Template, (published July 2012) <http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf> (Date of use: 18 January 2018)

SADC Tribunal Protocol

Southern African Development Community Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure thereof, (date of signature 07 August 2000, in force 14 August 2011)

[http://www.sadc.int/documents- 256](http://www.sadc.int/documents-256)

[publications/show/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof2000.pdf](http://www.sadc.int/documents-256/publications/show/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof2000.pdf) (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

SADC Treaty

Treaty of The Southern African Development Community, (Date of signature 17 August 1992, in force 30 September 1993)

<http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3112> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

Statute of the APRM

Statute of the APRM

https://aprm-au.org/st_car/statute-of-the-aprm/; <https://aprm-au.org/>,

<https://au.int/en/organs/aprm>; [http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/official-](http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/official-documents/item/598-protocol-establishing-the-aprm-base-document-official-protocol-establishing-the-aprm-au-nepad)

[documents/item/598-protocol-establishing-the-aprm-base-document-official-protocol-establishing-the-aprm-au-nepad](http://www.aprmtoolkit.saiia.org.za/official-documents/item/598-protocol-establishing-the-aprm-base-document-official-protocol-establishing-the-aprm-au-nepad) (Date of use: 8 April 2018).

T

T-FTA Agreement

Agreement Establishing a Tripartite Free Trade Area Among the COMESA, EAC and SADC, (date of signature 10 June 2015, not in force) <https://www.tralac.org/resources/by-region/comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite-fta.html> (Date of use: 15 October 2017)

U

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) (adopted 10 December 1948)
http://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf (Date of use: 21 October 2017)

United Nations Charter

Charter of the United Nations, (date of signature 26 June 1945, in force 24 October 1945)
1 UNTS XVI
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publications/ctc/uncharter.pdf> (Date of use: 31 October 2017).

V

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 1969 (8) ILM 679 (date of signature 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980)
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf> (Date of use: 31 October 2017)

8 NATIONAL LEGISLATION

Angola

Arbitration Act, Law No. 16/03

The New Private Investment Law, No. 14/15

Botswana

Acquisition of Property Act Chapter 32:10 of 28 January 1955 as amended

Constitution of the Republic of Botswana Constitution, 1966 (amended 2002)

DRC

Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2005

Investment Code, Law, No. 004 of 21 February 2002

Lesotho

Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho, 1993 (amended 2001)

Madagascar

Madagascar Investment Law, No. 036 of 2007

Malawi

Constitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994

Investment and Export Promotion Act 11 of 2012

Mauritius

Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius, 1968 (amended 2009)

Investment Promotion Act of 2000 Act 37 of 2008 (amended 2013)

Mozambique

Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique, 2004

Law on Investment, No. 3/93

Namibia

Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, 1998

Namibia Investment Promotion Act 9 of 2016

Seychelles

Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles, 1993 (amended 1996)

Seychelles Investment Act 31 of 2010

Eswatini

Constitution of the Kingdom of Eswatini, 2005

Eswatini Investment Promotion Act 1 of 1998

South Africa

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, as amended to 2013

Expropriation Bill (B 4-2015, published in Government Gazette 38418 of 26 January 2015)

Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015

Tanzania

Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (amended 1995, referred to as the 1997 Constitution)

Tanzania Investment Act 26 1997

The Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Renegotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act, 2017

The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act, 2017

The Written Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 2017

Zambia

Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, 1991 (as amended 1996)

Zambia Development Agency Act 11 of 2006

Zimbabwe

The Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 2013

9 STATISTICAL TABLES

SADC State	Population (Million)	Land Area (Sq. Km)	GDP (USD millions)	GDP Growth (% p.a)	GDP (USD/ Capita)	CPI Growth	Rate to USD
Angola	25 831	1 246 700	136 359	2.96	5 450	10.28	120AOA
Botswana	2 262	566 730	14 400	-0,32	6365	3.06	10 BWP
DRC	77 267	2 267 050	38 915	7.17	504	1.20	925 CDF
Lesotho	2 135	30 360	1 861	1.91	872	3.18	12 LSL
Madagascar	24 235	581 800	9 711	3.20	401	7.10	2933 MGA
Malawi	17 215	94 280	6 111	3.0	355	21.25	496 MWK
Mauritius	1 273	2 030	11 555	3.52	9 075	1.29	35 MUR
Mozambique	27 978	786 380	14 716	6.10	526	3.55	39 MZN
Namibia	2 459	823 290	12 594	5.66	5 122	4.34	12 NAD
Seychelles	0.96	455	1 558	3.50	16 145	4.04	13 SCR
S Africa	54 490	1 213 090	314 980	1.28	5 780	4.51	12 ZAR
Eswatini	1 287	17 200	4 016	2.0	3 120	3.27	12 SZL
Tanzania	53 470	885 800	46 265	6.95	865	5.59	1191 TZS
Zambia	16 212	743 390	21 921	3.60	1 352	10.10	8 ZMK
Zimbabwe	15 603	386 850	14 719	3.2	965	112	1 ZWD

Table 2. Select economic statistics on SADC Member States at 2015.

Source: Author's compilation based on UNCATDSTAT country profile data.¹⁵⁶⁶

¹⁵⁶⁶ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html> (accessed 20 February 2017).

SADC State	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Angola	1303	-37	-893	1678	2205	-	-	-	-	1921	8680
						3227	3023	6897	7120		
Botswana	421	486	494	520	208	218	1371	487	398	515	393
DRC	266	256	1808	1726	663	2939	1686	3312	2098	1843	1673
Lesotho	70	58	104	194	92	51	149	138	123	162	169
Madagascar	86	294	773	1169	1066	808	809	812	567	350	517
Malawi	139	35	124	195	49	97	128	129	119	130	142
Mauritius	41	105	339	382	247	429	433	589	293	418	208
Mozambique	107	112	398	591	898	1017	3558	5629	6175	4901	3710
Namibia	385	386	733	720	506	793	1119	1133	800	431	1077
Seychelles	85	145	181	182	171	210	207	261	170	229	194
S Africa	6646	311	6538	9209	7502	3635	4242	4558	8300	5770	1772
Eswatini	45	121	37	105	65	135	93	89	29	-32	-120
Tanzania	935	403	581	1383	952	1813	1229	1799	2087	2049	1531
Zambia	356	615	1238	938	425	633	1110	2433	1809	3194	1653
Zimbabwe	102	40	68	51	105	165	387	399	400	544	421

Table 3: FDI inflows into SADC Member States from 2005 to 2015, in USD Millions.

Source Author's compilation from UNCTAD STAT data.¹⁵⁶⁷

¹⁵⁶⁷

<http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx>
(accessed 27 February 2017).