2010

STALKING MYTH ACCEPTANCE: AN INVESTIGATON OF ATTITUDINAL CONSTRUCTS ASSOCIATED WITH GENDER DIFFERENCES IN JUDGMENTS OF INTIMATE STALKING

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of Psychology
at the University of Kentucky

By

Emily Elizabeth Dunlap

Lexington, Kentucky

Director: Dr. Jonathan M. Golding, Professor of Psychology

Lexington, Kentucky

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Emerging research has shown that women and men perceive criminal stalking differently, yet there is little research addressing why these differences exist. For example, mock juror research on intimate stalking has found that men are more likely than women to render lenient judgments (e.g., not-guilty verdicts). Understanding the underlying attitudes associated with differences in how men and women interpret whether certain behaviors would cause reasonable fear is crucial to an evaluation of current anti-stalking legislation. The primary goals of this research were: (1) to examine the extent to which beliefs that support stalking (i.e., stalking myth acceptance – SMA victim blame, SMA flattery, and SMA nuisance) predicted individual trial judgments of men and women, and (2) to test whether endorsement of SMA can be predicted from particular attitudinal correlates (e.g., hostility toward women). Overall, women were more likely than men (N = 360) to render trial judgments (e.g., guilty verdicts) supportive of the victim and were less likely to endorse SMA beliefs. Results also indicated that endorsement of particular SMA beliefs and personal experience (being the victim of and/or knowing a victim) explained why women and men differed on some trial judgments. For example, the odds of rendering a guilty verdict were less for participants who endorsed SMA flattery beliefs. In addition, participants who reported knowing someone who had been a victim were at greater odds of rendering a guilty verdict. Finally, participants who endorsed more traditional gender-role stereotypes were more likely to adhere to SMA beliefs. Results provide insight into the efficacy of current anti-stalking legislation that relies on a juror's capacity to evaluate an "objective" interpretation (i.e., "reasonable person") standard of fear for intimate stalking.

KEYWORDS: Juror Perceptions, Intimate Partner Violence, Gender Stereotypes, Stalking, Adjudication

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November 18th, 2010
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Mock-juror research has historically established gender-based differences in judgments of criminal cases involving various types of victimization that predominately targets female victims, such as child sexual abuse (e.g., Bottoms, Golding, Stevenson, Wiley, & Yozwiak, 2007), adult sexual assault (e.g., Borgida & Brekke, 1985), and sexual harassment (e.g., Rotundo, Nguyen, Sacket, 2001). The pattern of gender-based differences typically emerges in verdicts or in judgments of credibility, responsibility, and sympathy ratings of the victim and defendant; women generally render more pro-victim and more pro-prosecution judgments than men. Recently, this familiar pattern of gender differences has been observed in perceptions of another type of female victimization - criminal stalking (i.e., a pattern of unwanted and repeated attention, harassment, contact or any other course of conduct that is directed at a specific person and would cause a "reasonable fear"). This research has shown that men tend to perceive stalking less seriously than do their female counterparts, particularly in cases that involve ex-intimate partner stalking (e.g., Dennison & Thomson, 2000, 2002; Dunlap, Hodell, & Golding, unpublished manuscript; Hills & Taplin, 1998; Phillips, Quirk, Rosenfeld, & O'Connor, 2004).

Despite speculation as to why gender differences emerge in judgments of criminal stalking (e.g., men may be more likely support myths that foster the justification of stalking behavior than are women, or women may be more likely to sympathize with the victim than are men), there is currently a lack of research addressing these gender differences. Identifying and understanding the attitudinal constructs that underlie

differences in perceptions of ex-intimate partner stalking can provide critical insight with regard to developing anti-stalking legislation that seeks to effectively protect victims and successfully penalize stalkers. The present experiment was designed to extend current literature by exploring why women and men perceive a case of ex-intimate partner stalking differently. This paper discusses (1) the historical difficulties associated with creating efficient anti-stalking legislation, (2) factors that influence perceptions of intrusive behavior, and (3) attitudes that facilitate female victimization.

Historical Difficulties Associated with Creating Anti-Stalking Legislation

While a juror's job is never easy, interpreting the criminality of a case of stalking may present particular problems. The difficulties inherent in interpreting a case of stalking may be best understood by reviewing some of the challenges of creating a legal definition of stalking that provides an effective mechanism for legal intervention before victims are physically harmed. Prior to the designation of stalking as a crime, "prosecutors and police often felt hamstrung in their efforts to assist a woman who had been threatened by a stalker …There were no applicable laws to protect a person from this trauma until the perpetrator actually 'did something' to her" (U.S. Department of Justice, 1996, p.1). The impetus behind the nation's first anti-stalking legislation in California is commonly attributed to widespread public concern over the 1989 stalking and murder of Rebecca Schaffer, a popular actress of the television series, "My Sister Sam." Over the next few years, strong social pressure in response to high-profile stalking cases helped move legislation that distinguished stalking as its own criminal offense rapidly throughout every jurisdiction in America (for a discussion on early anti-stalking

legislation in English-speaking and non-English-speaking countries see De Fazio & Galeazzi, 2005).

Due to the rapid introduction of anti-stalking laws in the early 1990s, coupled with a lack of understanding about the unique dynamics of stalking, there were notable discrepancies in early anti-stalking legislation (O'Connor & Rosenfeld, 2004; Purcell, Pathe, & Mullen, 2004). In fact, Beatty (2003) pointed out that criticism over the widely divergent definitions of stalking used among American jurisdictions led to serious doubts over whether these laws, in some instances, violated constitutional rights of free speech and lawful assembly. Jordan, Quinn, Jordan, and Daileader (2000) suggested that the difficulty in creating an appropriate legal definition of stalking is due to the distinctive characteristics that set stalking apart from obvious acts of violence or intimidation. Stalking is different from other crimes that normally consist of an isolated illegal act, like rape or physical assault, because it is a series of actions that when looked at individually may seem legal and benign (Keenahan & Barlow, 1997). For instance, sending gifts, text messaging, or standing across the street from someone's apartment is not considered a breach of normative conventions. However, these behaviors are considered criminal if they are part of a pattern of conduct that instills fear in a victim.

In 1993, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) responded to the sudden interest in state stalking codes by developing a Model Anti-Stalking Code to serve as a template for drafting appropriate anti-stalking legislation. The 1993 Model Anti-Stalking Code recommended a definition of criminal stalking based on whether the defendant's actions were repeated and directed at a specific target in a manner that caused the *actual victim* and would cause a *reasonable person* to fear physical violence, sexual assault, and/or

death. Recently, the National Center for Victims of Crime (NCVC, 2007) in collaboration with the Model Anti-Stalking Code Advisory Board recommended an updated Model Anti-Stalking Code that more effectively addresses the realities of criminal stalking. The changes proposed in the 2007 Model Anti-Stalking Code were in response to research that provided a greater understanding of the high prevalence of stalking among the general population, the severity of ex-intimate partner stalking, and the unique predatory behavior of stalkers (e.g., Fisher, Cullen, & Turner, 2000; McFarlane et al., 1999; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998).

One of the most significant modifications proposed redefines the parameters of the *standard of fear* by which jurors interpret a case of criminal stalking. Traditionally, the negative impact of the defendant's behavior on the victim's feelings of safety has been defined in U.S. anti-stalking legislation as the *standard of fear*. There are significant differences in how jurisdictions address particular components relating to the type of fear required (e.g., reasonable person's fear, actual victim's fear, or both) and the degree of fear (e.g., serious bodily injury or emotional distress; for review see Miller, 2001). One component of the standard of fear is the requirement that the perpetrator's actions caused fear in his or her target. As mentioned, the 1993 Model Anti-stalking code encouraged two very different perspectives when evaluating cases of stalking - the actual victim (subjective) standard of fear and the reasonable person (objective) standard of fear. The standard of fear also considers the degree of fear that must result from the perpetrator's actions before the victim can seek legal intervention. The 1993 Model Anti-Stalking Code suggested that anti-stalking legislation should require a very high level of fear (e.g., bodily injury or death). It is important to note that the mere inclusion of any parameter of

fear is perhaps the most striking difference between American and European anti-stalking laws. The latter focuses primarily on the issue of whether the defendant's behavior is a willful intrusion on the victim's rights to privacy as a sufficient qualification of criminal stalking, regardless of whether fear is involved (DeFazio & Galeazzi, 2005).

The use of fear as a constitutive element in American anti-stalking legislation appears to be understandable. Research has indicated that stalking survivors can suffer serious repercussions attributable to the stalker's actions, particularly in cases of ex-intimate partner stalking. For example, 81% of women who are stalked by a current or ex-intimate partner are also physically assaulted and 31% are sexually assaulted (Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). In addition, McFarlane et al. (1999) provided evidence that intimate partner stalking is also highly correlated with murder and attempted murder - 76% of femicide victims (i.e., women who are murdered) and 85% of attempted femicide victims were stalked in the year prior to attack. However, creating a legal criterion that adequately addresses victim fear has been difficult because the stalker's behavior may be interpreted differently from individual to individual. Research has provided evidence that individuals can vary a great deal in their behavioral response to intrusive behavior. For example, some stalking survivors make drastic life changes (e.g., moving to another state, changing their identity and quitting their job), others make minor changes (e.g., altering their schedules) and others seem to function without significant interference (Blaauw, Sheridan, & Winkle, 2002). In addition, research has indicated that some stalkers act with the delusion that their victims love them or desire their attention; very few stalkers actually report an intention of causing fear or harm (Mullen, Pathe, Purcell, & Stuart, 1999). In this regard, anti-stalking legislation that rests on the actual victim's fear is

likely to be complicated by the fact that the offender and the target may have radically different views of the harassing nature of the behavior (Mullen et al., 1999).

Aside from social science research that points to potential problems with an actual victim standard of fear, the subjective evaluation of fear has also been criticized on several points by the NCVC (2007). First, the subjective evaluation of fear presents an unnecessary burden of proof on the prosecution that can only be satisfied by requiring the victim to take the stand and give testimony; victims are at greater risk of suffering additional trauma by being forced to justify their fear in front of their abuser. Second, the use of a subjective standard that relies solely on the actual victim's perception of fear has the potential to be misused. If stalking laws only take into account the perception of the victim, then an innocent person would not be protected from stalking charges made by an overly sensitive victim. Third, the subjective component in anti-stalking legislation only addresses stalkers who actually succeed in causing their victim to feel fear. As mentioned previously, when compared to men, women are more likely to report fear resulting from being the target of stalking related behaviors. Therefore, if the legal criteria for being classified as a stalking victim includes experiencing high levels of fear, then females are more likely to meet the criteria than males and thus more likely to receive legal protection.

Although the reasonable person standard of fear appears to have advantages over the actual victim standard of fear for the reasons mentioned above, the assumption that jurors have an equivalent ability to gauge what behaviors would cause reasonable fear in every situation of stalking is overly optimistic. One major flaw with the reasonable person standard is the assumption that reasonable fear is not gendered. As mentioned, the

gender of the stalking victim has been a significant determinate in actual fear - women are more likely to feel greater fear than are men who are stalked. Forell and Matthews (2000) argued that due to the realities of stalking, the assumption that reasonable person fear is equivalent between genders is likewise flawed - “reasonable women are likely to experience fear in situations where reasonable men would not” (p.133). Furthermore, jurors may have difficulty applying a reasonable person standard in the context of intimate stalking (Bernstein, 1993). This is because the reaction of a victim, especially when rooted in a history of domestic abuse, may not seem reasonable without taking into account the context of the victim’s experience. For example, NCVC (2007) explained that a seemingly innocuous gesture made by the defendant, like sending flowers, could cause immense fear in a victim. On face value, the victim’s response may seem unreasonable without the additional knowledge that the stalker had told the victim to expect flowers on the day he planned to kill her.

Because of these critiques, the NCVC (2007) recommended using only the reasonable person standard of fear to evaluate criminal stalking. This objective standard asks jurors to make judgments of stalking based on whether the perpetrator’s conduct would cause a reasonable person in the victim’s circumstances to be fearful. Additionally, the NCVC (2007) suggested that all jurisdictions use a more appropriate degree of fear that would provide the earliest legal intervention possible for victims of stalking - fear for personal safety or the safety of a third person, or suffering other emotional distress. These revisions adjust the 1993 Anti-Stalking Code definition of criminal stalking in hope of providing greater legal protection for stalking victims and the successful prosecution of stalkers.

Factors that Influence Perceptions of Intrusive Behavior

Strong support for the view that men and women perceive and react to intrusive behavior differently (e.g., Fisher, 1995) gives insight into the difficulties associated with effectively defining anti-stalking legislation. Research has provided empirical evidence of gender-based differences in tolerance for behaviors similar to stalking, such as sexual harassment and courtship violence. For example, Rotundo, Nguyen, and Sacket's (2001) meta-analysis of sexual harassment literature revealed that women perceive a broader range of socio-sexual behaviors as harassing compared to men (e.g., hostile work environment harassment). Research that has looked at gender differences in response to stalking victimization reveals that men tend to report experiencing less fear than women (Cupach & Spitzberg, 2000). For example, Bjerregaard (2000) found that female college stalking victims reported almost three times the level of fear of physical safety and fear for emotional safety compared to male victims who received similar threats from a stalker.

In fact, differences in how women and men respond to stalking-related behaviors seem to play a pivotal, albeit controversial, role in research that has attempted to identify risk factors associated with stalking victimization in the general population. Research using a legal definition that emphasizes high victim fear (similar to the 1993 Model Code) has indicated that the prototypical case of stalking involves a woman being stalked by a man (e.g., Dressing, Gass, & Kuehner, 2007; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). For example, Dressing, Gass, and Kuehner's (2007) study of European community members reported that 87% of stalking victims were female and 86% of stalking perpetrators were male. However, research on some populations has shown relatively minor sex differences

in victimization of stalking (e.g., Logan, Leukefeld, & Walker, 2000, American college students; Sinclair & Frieze, 2000, American college students). Studies examining college samples generally find that after a breakup, women are just as likely as men to engage in "unwanted pursuit behavior," a precursor to stalking (e.g., Cupach & Spitzberg, 1998, 2000; Davis, Ace, & Andra, 2000; Langhinrichsen-Rohling et al., 2000; Logan, Leukefeld, & Walker, 2000; Sinclair & Frieze, 2000).

Straus and Gelles (1992) suggested that the significant difference between the genders lies in the reaction to stalking victimization; men are less likely to define themselves as victims, less likely to view an assault by a woman as a crime, and less likely to report victimization than are women. Baum, Catalano, and Rand's (2009) national study of stalking and harassment victimization rates provided additional insight into categorizing women's and men's status as a victim of stalking based on a fear criteria (e.g., harassing behavior caused target to fear for their safety or the safety of a family member). Out of 5.9 million Americans (18 years or older) who experienced behaviors consistent with harassment and stalking, women (10.2 per 1,000) and men (9.5 per 1,000) were just as likely to report being the target of harassment. However, women were significantly more likely report fear and thus be identified as a victim of stalking (20.0 per 1,000) than men (7.4 per 1,000).

Considering that anti-stalking legislation requires jurors to evaluate whether the defendant's behaviors could invoke fear in others, understanding factors that systematically influence jurors' perceptions provides insight into the evaluation of current anti-stalking legislation. This is of particular importance, taking into account that there is a substantial lack of guidance provided in current anti-stalking legislation as to "what

behaviors would qualify as inducing a 'reasonable fear' or engendering 'substantial emotional harm'" (Phillips et al., 2004, p.74). The factors that influence how jurors perceive a case of criminal stalking case has been largely unexplored. However, a growing body of social science research originating from Australia and the United Kingdom has attempted to aid in the development of effective anti-stalking legislation by identifying the factors that influence perceptions of stalking vignettes (e.g., Dennison & Thomson, 2000, 2002; Hills & Taplin, 1998; Sheridan, Davies, & Boon, 2001). The vignette studies do not contain a criminal trial summary, nor does the procedure involve rendering a verdict. Rather, vignette studies present possible stalking episodes and ask participants to apply stalking labels and rate the degree of severity of the behavior in question (e.g., "Was the behavior described stalking?" and "Should the victim be worried for their safety?"). This research provides critical insight into whether community sentiments toward stalking behavior are equivalent to definitions provided by stalking laws. Of the various factors (e.g., prior relationship between victim/perpetrator and victim's expression of fear) that might impact perceptions of stalking that vignette research has explored, the issue of gender is particularly pertinent to the present study.

Gender appears to play a complex role in perceptions of stalking vignettes. In the case of participant gender, the results of prior vignette research have been equivocal. Some studies (Phillips et al., 2004, American college students in Experiment 1; Sheridan & Davies, 2001, U.K. college students; Sheridan, Davies, & Boon, 2001, U.K. female community members; Sheridan, Gillett, & Davies, 2002, U.K. male community members) have found that women and men have similar perceptions of stalking episodes. While other studies have shown that women were more likely than men to perceive

intrusive behavior as stalking and to perceive that the perpetrator intended to inflict fear and cause physical or mental harm (Dennison & Thomson, 2002, Australian community members; Phillips et al., 2004, American community members in Experiment 2; Yanowitz, 2006, American college students). For example, Yanowitz (2006) found that American women (n = 60) were significantly more likely than American men (n = 42) to judge examples of unwanted courtship behaviors (e.g., approach behaviors and surveillance behaviors) as stalking. Hills and Taplin (1998) found that Australian women were more likely to react negatively (e.g., worry, concern, and fright), whereas Australian men were more likely to report feeling flattered or indifferent in response to a scenario involving stalking-related behavior.

Victim and perpetrator gender has also been identified as an important influence to perceptions of stalking vignettes. A general awareness that women are at a significantly higher risk of being stalking victims (e.g., Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998) may translate into more convictions in cases of female victims stalked by males. People may be more likely to recognize a case of stalking if it reflects the gender-role expectations of a typical stalking case - a male pursuing a female. This is consistent with the Prototype theory, which has been used to explain perceptions of victimization and discrimination in the work place (e.g., Harris, Lievens, & Hoye, 2004). In addition, female victims of stalking may be viewed as more vulnerable to potential harm from their stalker than male victims (Cass, 2008, American college students; Sheridan, Blaauw, & Davies, 2003, U.K. adults; Sheridan & Scott, 2010, U.K. adults). In this sense, a female victim's claim of reasonable fear of sexual assault, serious bodily harm, or death at the hands of her stalker may be perceived as more serious than the same claim made by a male victim.

Phillips et al. (2004) found that American participants reported more safety concerns for a female victim pursued by a male perpetrator than they did for a male victim pursued by a female perpetrator.

Likewise, people may be more likely to identify a case of stalking when the perpetrator is described as a male because of a heightened sensitivity to the fact that men are most frequently the perpetrators of stalking (e.g., prototype theory). Similarly, sexual harassment research has shown that male harassers are perceived more negatively than female harassers (e.g., Baird, Bensko, Bell, Viney, & Woody, 1995). It is possible that participants may react more negatively toward a case of unwanted persistent pursuit when it involves a female as the initiator. This is consistent with the Expectancy Violation Theory that explains why people react negatively to events that deviate drastically from what is expected (Burgoon & Hale, 1988). For example, Rose & Frieze (1993) found that female pursuers in romantic relationships were viewed more negatively than male pursuers.

Due to the fact that stalking-related behaviors can occur naturally in normal courtship, it is not surprising that perceptions of stalking are influenced by the presence of a prior romantic relationship between the victim and the perpetrator. Phillips et al. (2004) found that Americans were more likely to identify the behavior as stalking when it occurred between strangers than ex-intimates (also see Sheridan, Gillett, Davies, Blaauw, & Patel, 2003). This finding is inconsistent with the reality that ex-intimate partner stalking is the most common and most dangerous form of stalking (Palarea, Zona, Lane, & Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 1999; Spitzberg & Cupach, 2006). However, it is consistent with literature examining the role that prior relationship plays in mock juror perceptions

of adult sexual assault. This literature indicates that greater blame is attributed to the victim and judgments are more lenient toward the defendant in cases of ex-intimate partners, especially if there is a history of mutual sexual relations (e.g., Frese, Moya, & Megías, 2004; Schuller & Klippenstine, 2004).

Finally, vignette research has explored how information pertaining to victim's fear influences public judgments of stalking. However, one of the only studies to date that has examined the impact of a victim's expression of fear found no significant differences between women's and men's perceptions of a stalking vignettes (Dennison & Thomson, 2000, Australian community members). The authors did suggest that any influence of victim fear was probably overshadowed by the high degree of persistence of the stalking behavior described in their vignette (i.e., virtually all of the participants identified the behavior as stalking). Accordingly, a ceiling effect may have prevented the addition of fear from affecting labeling.

Aside from vignette studies that have attempted to examine public perceptions of stalking, there is little research on the perception of stalking cases in the context of juror decision making. In an effort to supplement the growing body of research on perceptions of stalking, Dunlap, Hodell, & Golding (unpublished manuscript) have recently conducted two experiments that examined how women and men (acting as mock jurors) interpret reasonable fear in the context of intimate stalking. The focus on intimate stalking was chosen for two primary reasons. First, research suggests that the most frequent and dangerous form of stalking occurs between ex-intimates (Palarea, Zona, Lane, & Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 1999; Spitzberg & Cupach, 2006). Second, research indicates that stalking behavior may be viewed as less serious and/or dangerous when it

occurs between ex-intimate partners than when it occurs between strangers (Phillips et al., 2004; Sheridan et al., 2003).

As discussed earlier, the wording and provisions in anti-stalking statutes do vary on some elements. Thus, a decision was made in Dunlap et al. (unpublished manuscript) to use the relevant statute of the jurisdiction where the study was conducted. Specifically, the anti-stalking law used was taken from the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS, 1992). Unlike some states, Kentucky's anti-stalking law (KRS 508.150) does not include the caveat that the prosecution must prove that stalking behavior caused the actual victim to fear but rather that it placed "that person in reasonable fear" - this is similar to revisions proposed by the NCVC (2007). At the time of the study, Kentucky's anti-stalking legislation did require a higher degree of fear (i.e., sexual contact, serious physical injury, or death) than recommended by the NCVC (2007). In order to provide insight into how the extra-legal issue of gender affects trial judgments (e.g., verdict and pro-victim perceptions), Experiment 1 investigated how women and men mock jurors interpret stalking behavior when considering the gender of the victim and defendant. Men and women were given one of four trial summaries that varied according to the gender of the victim and defendant (e.g., female victim/female defendant, male victim/male defendant, female victim/male defendant, male victim/female defendant).

The trial summary was fictional but did reflect common characteristics of intrusive behaviors that can be interpreted as stalking if they cause fear (e.g., Cupach & Spitzberg, 1998). The setting used has been identified as a particularly risky environment for criminal stalking - a college campus. Many victims attend colleges and universities and are acquainted with their stalker; 27% of college women and 15% of college men

report victimization (Fremouio, 1997) and over 80% of campus stalking victims were acquainted with their stalkers (Fisher, Cullen, & Turner, 2000). (For simplicity, the following description of the trial summary details the female victim/male defendant case.)

Based on these general characteristics of stalking, the trial summary described the story of a female college student. The prosecution's case was based on the testimony provided by the victim and her dorm roommate. The victim's testimony stated that the defendant's intrusive behavior (e.g., sending unwanted emails, waiting outside her classroom buildings) caused her a great deal of psychological stress and personal fear for her safety. The victim's roommate added supportive testimony, as well as relating her experience when she confronted the defendant about his inappropriate behavior on behalf of her roommate (e.g., the defendant made a vague threat when he was told to leave his ex-girlfriend alone, "She'll regret that"). In all conditions, the defendant did not deny his behavior but denied any intent of harm. The defendant testified that his only intention was to pursue a loving relationship with the victim and that he did not intend to cause her fear. This particular defense was chosen to emphasize the disparity between how the victim and the defendant interpreted the intrusive behavior. In addition, the defendant's roommate provided supportive testimony and character evidence as to the defendant's good nature and good intentions toward the victim. The summary ended with the judge's instructions that included a description of the necessary elements of a guilty verdict in this case as well as a description of the standard of proof (i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt).

The results of Experiment 1 indicated that gender played an important role in mock juror judgments of ex-intimate partner stalking. Overall, significantly more women than men made pro-prosecution judgments (e.g., guilty verdicts: 70% women > 54% men), supporting prior research findings on public perceptions of stalking (e.g., Dennison & Thomson, 2002; Phillips et al., 2004, Experiment 2). Moreover, men's low guilty verdicts were driven by men in conditions that involved a female victim/male defendant compared to men in other conditions and women in all conditions. Also, women had more pro-victim perceptions when the defendant was a man than when the defendant was a woman (an effect not found for men).

Experiment 1 did not produce main effects for victim gender and defendant gender as expected. However, findings suggested that the gender of the victim/defendant had more of an impact on men's judgments, particularly in conditions that included a female victim and a male defendant. As mentioned, men were less likely to view the ex-boyfriend's unwanted intrusive behavior directed at a female as criminal; women tended to render guilty verdicts regardless of victim/defendant gender. This may be due to gender differences in the ability to foresee how an ex-boyfriend's unwanted courtship persistence may cause fear in a female. Men may simply view the ex-boyfriend's intrusive behaviors as normal, harmless attempts to reconcile with his ex-girlfriend rather than an example of stalking.

Likewise, the expectation that defendant gender would have a main effect on trial judgments was not supported. The null effect of defendant gender is inconsistent with findings from vignette studies in which participants considered male perpetrators to represent a greater threat of bodily injury to the victim and police intervention was

deemed more necessary (Phillips et al., 2004; Sheridan et al., 2003). It is important to note that the null effect of defendant gender is consistent with other vignette research (e.g., Phillips et al., 2004). For example, Phillips et al. (2004) found that participants who were presented with a male defendant were more likely to have safety concerns for the victim compared to when the defendant was female. However, the defendant's gender did not influence the ultimate judgment of whether the incident was stalking.

Finally, it is possible that in cases of ex-intimate partner stalking, the influence of victim and defendant gender on men and women's trial judgments were overshadowed by other factors (e.g., the level of fear expressed by the victim).

Experiment 2 explored factors (highlighted in current anti-stalking legislation) that may underlie the gender differences in perceptions of ex-intimate partner stalking found in Experiment 1, specifically in a case that involves a man stalking a woman. As discussed previously, whether or not an incident meets the legal definition of stalking legislation in the U.S is heavily influenced by the standard of fear (e.g., negative impact of those behaviors on a victim's emotional well-being). It is possible that the gender differences found in Experiment 1 stem from differences in how women's and men's trial judgments were influenced by level of the female victim's fear. In addition to replicating the main effect of participant gender on verdict, the following questions were investigated: (1) Does the female victim's level of *expressed fear* (EF) affect perceptions of stalking, and (2) If so, are women's and men's perceptions of stalking differentially influenced by EF?

Experiment 2 used a trial scenario similar to Experiment 1, but varied the amount of EF (high/low). The levels of EF were derived from reports of how victims' may react

to stalking behavior (e.g., Bjerregaard, 2000). Specifically, the level of EF was represented as high or low by varying the degree to which the alleged stalking negatively affected her emotional, mental, and physical health. In the low EF condition, the victim stated that her ex-boyfriend's actions were "annoying," "worrisome," and eventually caused her concern for her safety. While in the high EF condition, she testified that her ex-boyfriend's behavior was "terrifying," "horrifying," and (in addition to fearing for her safety) that she had dropped out of school and suffered from panic attacks.

Consistent with Experiment 1, there was a participant gender effect on verdict and degree of defendant guilt ratings. For example, women (80%) rendered significantly more guilty verdicts than did men (57%). Witness judgment ratings provided additional insight into how men and women perceived the victim and defendant. As expected, women generally perceived the victim more positively than did men. Although there was no main effect of EF on verdict, EF did play a role in judgment ratings of the female victim and male defendant. Specifically, higher levels of EF were associated with more positive judgments toward the victim and more negative judgments toward the defendant. Additionally, there was evidence of an interaction between participant gender and EF, giving support for the prediction that women and men use information regarding the female victim's EF differently. For example, in the high EF condition, women (74%) and men (69%) did not significantly differ in their convictions. However, in the low EF condition, women (85%) maintained a high level of guilty verdicts, but men (44%) rendered significantly fewer guilty verdicts. These results suggest that a female victim's fear may have more influence on men's determinations of whether the unwanted pursuit would cause a "reasonable person" to fear physical violence, sexual assault, and/or death.

In summary, the gender-based differences in perceptions of stalking appear to be most robust in cases of ex-intimate partner stalking that involve a female victim, a male defendant, and low victim fear. In such cases, women were significantly more likely to render guilty verdicts than were men. Gender is of great concern considering that not only is ex-intimate stalking the most common type of criminal stalking case, but it is also considered to be the most dangerous form of stalking (Palarea, Zona, Lane, & Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 1999; Spitzberg & Cupach, 2006). Therefore, the cases of stalking that a juror would most likely judge (e.g., female victim alleging stalking by an ex-intimate) involves characteristics that research has identified as being the most susceptible to the biases of extra-legal factors (e.g., gender). Although the limited amount of mock juror research on stalking has provided insight into gender-based differences in perceptions of stalking, the reasons why these gender differences emerge are unclear. To understand why gender matters in how stalking is perceived in the courtroom, it is important to identify cultural attitudes that influence perceptions of criminal stalking. This effort was accomplished by drawing on literature pertaining to gender-based differences in analogous fields of research concerning perceptions of victimization (e.g., rape and sexual harassment).

Attitudes that Facilitate Female Victimization

Social science regards gender as a proxy variable for psychological variables and life experiences that happen to cluster or correlate with societal constructions of gender. This means that men and women differ in attitudes, feelings, and attributional tendencies, which contribute to their interpretation of life events. Theories as to why these gender differences exist in decision-making have been traditionally explained in terms of

cognitive biases that arise from the socializing role of gender. In the context of juror decision making, these differences are thought to have the greatest impact on judgments of cases that involve issues in which men's and women's attitudes often differ. As mentioned previously, mock juror research has identified gender as a reliable predictor of verdict in trials that involve sexual violence - women are more likely to convict in cases of sexual violence than are men. Research devoted to understanding gender-based differences in perceptions of sexual violence has identified predominant cultural attitudes, which serve to minimize or foster tolerance of sexual aggression toward women.

Perhaps the most well-known contribution is Burt's (1980) landmark paper that identified a series of rape-supportive beliefs, known as Rape Myth Acceptance (RMA), held by a large portion of the general population. The RMA are "prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists" that have no factual basis in reality, such as "women ask for it" or "a woman who goes to the home or apartment of a man on the first date implies that she is willing to have sex" (p. 217). Burt (1980) found that a cluster of attitudinal variables predominately fuels RMA, indicating that there is a relationship between the acceptance of rape myths and such attitudes as gender role stereotyping, and hostility toward women. Expanding on Burt's (1980) RMA theory, rape literature has provided reliable evidence that rape-supportive beliefs are a credible explanation for the variance in perceptions of rape (for review see Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). Research that has examined the adjudication of rape trials has found that those who are more supportive of rape myths (typically men) are less likely to render convictions and more likely to blame the victim. It is important to note that rape

supportive beliefs seem to be most predictive of verdicts in cases that involved non-strangers (e.g., steady-dating partners or acquaintances) (e.g., Bridges, 1991). This finding highlights a predominate rape myth - rape is a crime committed by men who are strangers to their victims - that is contrary to studies which show that up to 78% of rapes are committed by non-strangers (Schafran, 1996). Iconis (2008) suggested that rape myths consist of very powerful messages that influence the decision maker by: (1) defining rape more narrowly than legal definitions (e.g., rape occurs between strangers, involves weapons, requires substantial victim resistance) and (2) highlighting victim blame (e.g., healthy women can successfully resist a rapist or some women deserve it). While men are generally found to be more supportive of rape myths than are women, research has also shown that a portion of women also hold these beliefs. Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994) suggested that there are fundamentally different reasons for why women and men adhere to rape supportive attitudes; men may use rape myths to justify or deny men's sexual violence while women may use them to deny personal vulnerability to rape.

Taken in its entirety, the literature on perceptions of sexual victimization provides a useful guide for research on perceptions of criminal stalking. For example, similar to how RMA explains the variance in rape trial convictions, it is likely that perceptions of criminal stalking are influenced by a similar set of beliefs that support the tolerance and acceptance of stalking-related behavior (i.e., stalking myth acceptance - SMA).

The purpose of this experiment was to extend current understandings of why women and men perceive cases of intimate partner stalking differently. Given the likelihood that SMA influences perceptions of stalking, the current empirical inquiry

identifies whether adherence to SMA accounts for the gender differences in judgments of ex-intimate partner stalking. In addition, using Burt's 1980 research as a theoretical guide, the current research explores particular attitudinal correlates of SMA.

Victimization research has identified factors relating to participant background variables (e.g., gender), and attitudinal variables (e.g., gender role stereotypes) that are predictive of RMA endorsement. For example, those who hold traditional views of gender roles are more likely to accept rape myths (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1994). It is likely that adherence to SMA is also subject to similar influences. Therefore, to provide a greater understanding of why differences arise in judgments of criminal stalking, the current study examines how gender, experience with prior victimization and attitudinal precursors are associated with SMA.

Drawing from analogous RMA research, endorsement of SMA should add to a greater understanding of why gender differences arise in judgments of stalking. While the similarities between rape victimization and stalking victimization are evident (e.g., most victims are female, most perpetrators have a prior relationship with their victims, and it is a crime of violence), it seems unlikely that RMA would exactly match SMA. For example, although many people might believe stalking and rape primarily occurs between strangers, those who consider stalking behavior as "flattery" or "romantic pursuit" would probably not view the act of rape in the same fashion. Therefore, it is important to identify the particular dysfunctional attitudes that likely comprise SMA.

Kamphuis et al. (2005) conducted the only study to date that has identified particular stalking-related attitudes that influence perceptions of stalking. Kamphuis et al.'s study assessed the extent to which professionals (specifically, a cross-national

European sample of police officers and general practitioners) held specific dysfunctional attitudes about stalking, and examined how these attitudes influenced perceptions of stalking vignettes. Participants made judgments on 12 stalking vignettes that varied in high/low severity (manipulated on intrusiveness and frequency) and type of relationship (stranger, acquaintance, ex-intimates). Dysfunctional attitudes toward stalking were measured by a stalking-related attitudinal measure (originally a 34-item questionnaire developed by McKeon, Mullen, & Ogloff, unpublished) and were optimized to three main factors: "stalking is harmless flattery," "blaming the victim," and "stalking is a nuisance." Results suggested that dysfunctional stalking-related attitudes explained most of the variance in participant judgments. For example, participants who endorsed more SMA beliefs were less likely to identify the behavior in question as stalking.

The current study expands on Kamphuis et al.'s (2005) research by investigating how SMA beliefs account for gender differences in trial judgments (e.g., verdict, credibility of victim/defendant). Research has provided empirical evidence of gender-based differences in tolerance for behaviors similar to stalking, like sexual harassment and courtship violence. For example, women perceived a broader range of socio-sexual behaviors (e.g., hostile work environment harassment, derogatory attitudes toward women, and dating pressure) as harassing compared to men (Rotundo et al., 2001). Follingstad, Wright, Lloyd, and Sebastian's (1991) study on perceptions of courtship violence found that women were less likely than men to justify the use of aggression in intimate relationships and more likely than men to perceive the effects of intimate partner violence as negative. Therefore, attitudes that perpetuate the tolerance for stalking

behaviors (e.g., stalking is flattery) should explain why men and women differ in perceptions of stalking.

The rationale behind the selection of the attitudinal measures of interest was threefold. First, the attitudinal measure should have a high probability of explaining differences in general perceptions of female victimization (e.g., hostility toward women) or, more specifically, with the three primary factors - “stalking is a nuisance,” “stalking is flattery,” and “victim blaming” - associated with dysfunctional attitudes toward stalking identified by Kamphuis et al. (2005). Second, these measures should have a history of reliable and valid utility in victimization research. Third, due to practical time-constraints (i.e., study completion in less than an hour) the measures must also be short and concise. Using this rationale, the current research has identified 3 attitudinal variables (e.g., Hostility toward Women, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Romantic Beliefs) that are likely antecedents of SMA.

Hostility toward Women (HTW)

Over the past two decades, victimization research concerning rape and sexual harassment has provided strong evidence that determinations of culpability are highly influenced by hostility toward women (HTW). HTW has been defined as a trait as well as a state, which may be experienced as a feeling rather than a behavior such as aggression (Check, 1988) that serves to legitimize violence against women. In addition to being considered the primary theoretical antecedent of rape myths, Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1995) found that HTW is related to a set of attitudes that support violence against women, including acceptance of interpersonal violence, viewing sexual relationships as adversarial and general attitudes toward violence. Consistent with literature concerning

attitudes that justify or deny male aggression on females, HTW is also likely to explain gender differences associated with SMA. If this is the case, then HTW should mediate gender differences associated with endorsement of SMA; participants high in HTW may be more likely to endorse SMA beliefs than participants low in HTW.

Additionally, some research has found that HTW is generally more predictive of RMA for men than for women (for a review, see Forbes, Adams-Curtis, & White, 2004). In fact, Lonsway and Fistzgerald (1995) found that among men HTW was the best predictor of RMA, accounting for 40% of the variance in men. However, among women, HTW only accounted for 21% of the variance. These findings are thought to imply that HTW is a more effective way to justify male violence (for men) than to deny it (for women). Therefore, is also possible that HTW may serve as a moderator for the gender differences associated with endorsement of SMA; HTW may be more predictive of SMA for men than for women.

Gender Role Stereotypes (GRS)

It is also possible that ideology about gender roles explains the gender differences associated with endorsement of SMA. Gender role stereotypes (GRS) refer to "restrictions on the appropriateness of sexual partners, sexual acts, conditions or circumstances under which sex should occur" (Burt, 1980, p. 218). Traditional notions of gender roles have been associated with assignments of blame for rape, such that participants who accept traditional gender role stereotypes tend to possess conservative attitudes toward sexuality and are more likely to rely on traditional stereotypes when assigning blame (Check & Malamuth, 1985). Additionally, research has identified gender differences that typically emerge in GRS, such that men tend to hold more traditional

attitudes about a female's role than do women (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973; Swim & Cohen, 1997). Burt (1980) revealed that men who are high in sexual stereotyping are more likely to accept aggression as a means of resolving conflict. In addition, Sigelman et al. (1984) found that men with more traditional gender-related attitudes toward women report committing more aggressive behaviors in dating relationships than other men. Hence, traditional gender attitudes seem particularly important for men due to research that shows a consistent relationship between attitudes and aggressive behavior.

With regard to perceptions of stalking, GRS could be very influential given that traditional roles place men in the role of initiator and pursuer of sexual relations and women are expected to play the role of "gatekeeper" (Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman, 1978). In such cases, those who hold more traditional GRS may be more likely to endorse SMA beliefs (e.g., stalking is flattery). Therefore, GRS is expected to mediate the gender differences associated with endorsement of SMA; participants with more with traditional GRS may endorse more SMA beliefs than those with less traditional GRS. It is also possible that similar to HTW, the strength of the relationship between GRS and SMA may differ based on gender. If this is the case, then GRS may act as a moderator for the gender differences associated with SMA; GRS may be more predictive of SMA for men than for women.

Romanticism

Perhaps the most striking difference between RMA and SMA beliefs is that the unwanted behavior may be justified by the pursuit of romantic courtship. The existence of positive beliefs about courtship persistence is understandable, given that stalking is rooted in a culture in which romance is associated with the pursuit of a reluctant female

by a persistent male (Lee, 1998) and the common cultural romantic theme that persistence in courtship eventually pays off (Lowney & Best, 1995). Emerson, Ferris and Gardner (1998) explained, “The core dynamics in relational stalking - persistence in seeking a relationship in the face of continued rejection - mirrors the dogged pursuit of ‘true love’ idealized in culture and media” (p. 292). Romantic beliefs may play a part in perceptions of stalking given that many behaviors that comprise stalking also appear in normal healthy romances.

Research on romantic ideology asserts that women and men possess a subset of beliefs, values and expectations that are specific to romantic relationships, known as romanticism. People who are high in romanticism are considered to “idealize” the romantic love experience (Dion & Dion, 1991). Romanticism is generally distinguished by four main tenets - *Love Finds a Way*, *One and Only*, *Idealization*, and *Love at First Sight* (Sprecher & Metts, 1989) - and has been associated with other positive aspects of relationship quality. For example, people who are highly romantic report falling in love earlier, thinking about their partner more when their partner is absent, rate higher amounts of satisfaction with and commitment to their partner, confess more passion in their relationship, and tend to idealize their partners more than their less romantic counterparts (Cate, Koval, Lloyd, & Wilson, 1995; Sprecher & Metts, 1989). Knee (1998) acknowledged that romantic beliefs could play a significant role in initial attraction and coordinating relationship development. However, Cupach and Spitzberg (2004) stated that when a relationship is not reciprocated an “obsessive pursuer’s persistent positive illusions about the object motivate unwanted pursuit” (p. 106). In fact, research on stalker typography has revealed that most stalkers are not motivated by a

desire to harm their target but rather aspire to reconcile a past romance or seek to establish an intimate loving relationship with their target (for review see Mullen, Pathé, & Purcell, 2000). Cupach and Spitzberg (2000) revealed that in the face of rejection many stalkers might justify their persistence by overreliance on cultural scripts for romantic pursuit (e.g., "no" really means "yes"). Indeed common cultural romantic themes often encourage and applaud the passionate pursuit of love despite rejection (Lowney & Best, 1995). Yet, it is the persistence of unwanted pursuit that characterizes stalking and even relatively mild forms of this behavior can be interpreted as threatening and causing fear. Spitzberg and Cadiz (2002) asserted that the media glorification of stalking-related behavior as acceptable romantic pursuit adds to the difficulty of identifying such behaviors as criminal.

With regard to gender differences, most research has established that men tend to outscore women on questionnaire measures of romanticism (for review see Dion & Dion, 1985; Sprecher & Metts, 1989). Therefore, it is likely that romanticism may act as a mediator for the gender differences associated with SMA - participants high in Romanticism may endorse more SMA beliefs than participants low in Romanticism. In order to assess whether the relationship between Romanticism and SMA functions differently for men and women, Romanticism may also be explored as a potential moderator (i.e., Romanticism may be more predictive of SMA endorsement for men than for women).

Personal Experience with Stalking-Related Behavior (PES)

Personal experience with victimization (i.e., having been the victim of or knowing someone who has been victimized and the negative impact of that victimization) may

significantly influence how men and women perceive stalking cases. Research concerning domestic violence has found that in comparison to men, women are less likely to blame the victim and more likely to attribute responsibility for the incident to the abuser (e.g., Harris & Cook, 1994). This gender effect has been considered to reflect that women may simply have heightened awareness of or sensitivity to victimization because women are significantly more likely to experience victimization in their lifetime than are men. A number of studies have shown that women are more likely to experience intimate partner violence and more likely to notice violence in close relationships than are men (e.g., Graham & Wells, 2001; Tjaden & Thoennes, 1998). Because women are most often the victims of stalking and men most often the perpetrators (Spitzberg, 2002), it is possible that women would empathize more with the victim role and men would empathize more with the perpetrator role.

Thus it is no surprise that inquiry concerning prior victimization is a common theme of questioning in voir dire (i.e., jury selection) for criminal cases involving victimization. Ginerfra, Henriquez, and Brown (2009) assert that potential jurors who admit to prior victimization (primarily women) are often dismissed during the jury selection process because lawyers tend to believe that prior victims of crime would be unable to put aside their biases when judging a criminal case. While the influence of empathy in legal decision-making has been well documented - people often use personal experience when evaluating trial testimony (e.g., Ledford, 1998) - research investigating the specific effects of personal experience with victimization on juror decision making in cases that involve intimate partner violence (e.g., domestic violence, date rape, and stalking) has been equivocal.

Some mock juror research on how prior victimization biases judgments has shown that victims of violent crimes tend to be more prosecution biased (e.g., Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983; Wiener, Wiener, & Grisso, 1989). Additionally, some research suggests that even being a personal acquaintance with victims of abuse may lead to partiality in attributions of guilt when asked to judge defendants accused of similar crimes. Wiener et al. (1989) found that participants who knew rape victims were twice as likely to convict in a case of rape. However, the assumption that women are prosecution biased because they are more likely to have suffered prior victimization than men is open to criticism. First, this assumption does not account for emerging research investigating the incidence of intimate violence by gender (including dating aggression and domestic violence). This research provides evidence that women are just as likely and in some cases more likely to initiate violence as men (for a review see Dutton & Nicholls, 2005). As previously mentioned, there has been controversy regarding gender differences and the risk associated with victimization. Straus and Gelles (1992) suggest that the significant difference between men and women lies in the reaction to victimization - men are less likely to define themselves as victims, less likely to view an assault by a woman as a crime, and less likely to report victimization than are women. While it seems likely that the influence of prior victimization on perceptions of stalking may be largely due to how the much the victimization negatively affected the perceiver's emotional well-being, research has not yet addressed this issue.

Second, some mock juror research has found no relationship between prior victimization and jurors' perceptions of crimes like sexual harassment and domestic violence (e.g., Ginefra, Henriquez, & Brown, 2009; Stockdale, O'Conner, Gutek, &

Geer, 2002). For example, Ginefra, Henriquez, and Brown (2009) examined whether women and men who reported being in an abusive relationship were more biased in their assessments of domestic violence cases. While results did show that women were significantly more likely to indicate involvement in an abusive relationship than were men, there were no significant differences found in assessments between participants who reported experience with abusive relationships and those who did not. Emerging research has also indicated that the impact of personal victimization on subsequent judgments of victimization may be greater for men than for women. For example, DeMarni-Cromer, and Freyd (2007) examined the impact of personal trauma history on the believability of child sexual abuse disclosures. They found that trauma history did not influence women's judgments, but it did affect men's judgments. Women with or without a trauma history and men with a trauma history were significantly more likely to believe accusations of child sexual abuse compared to men without a trauma history.

Two studies have examined whether experience with stalking victimization influences perceptions of stalking vignettes have produced conflicting results (Phillips et al., 2004; Yanowitz, 2006). Phillips et al. (2004) found no relationship between prior experience as a target of stalking and recognizing a scenario as stalking. However, this study neglected to account for the impact that the experience had on the target, rather it just asked participants whether they had been the target of stalking or had been "repeatedly followed or harassed". Yanowitz (2006) examined the impact of personal experience of stalking (i.e., being a stalking victim or knowing someone who was a victim of stalking) on judgments of behaviors ranging from mild, somewhat ambiguous examples of stalking to more severe examples. Results revealed an interaction between

gender and personal experience. Men who had personal experience with stalking were significantly more likely to rate mild intrusive behaviors as stalking than men who had no experience. Personal experience with victimization did not significantly influence the women's interpretation of stalking behaviors. This may indicate that prior victimization has less of an impact on perceptions of stalking for women because women are already pre-disposed to victimization in general. Yanowitz (2006) suggested that men who lack personal experience with stalking victimization might form their stalking schemas through media portrayals of stalking, which typically emphasize victims (most often celebrities) being stalked by strangers. Given the current (yet controversial) legal emphasis on prior victimization during voir dire, this research uses personal experience of stalking (i.e., being a victim or knowing someone who was a victim of stalking and the negative impact that victimization) as a control variable of interest.

CHAPTER 2

The Present Experiment

The purpose of this research is to extend current literature by exploring gender differences in perceptions of intimate stalking. This research explores the extent to which beliefs that a promote tolerance for stalking (SMA) are associated with gender differences and identify particular attitudinal antecedents (e.g., HTW) that foster SMA. In particular, two theoretical models (see Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2) illustrating why gender differences arise in perceptions of stalking are addressed.

Method

Participants

Three hundred seventy jury-eligible (i.e., U.S. citizens, at least 18 years old) men and women from the University of Kentucky's Introductory Psychology courses volunteered to take part in this study called "An online study - Juror perceptions of a criminal trial involving ex-intimate partners." All participants were compensated with partial class credit. The data of 10 participants were omitted from final analyses due to failing to complete the study or failing a manipulation check question. The final data set consisted of 360 participants (56% women; 44% men) with an average age of 20 years (ranging from 18 to 43 years old). The racial distribution of this sample was the following: 85% White/Caucasian, 8% Black/African American, 4% Asian/Pacific Islander, 2% Hispanic/Latino(a), and 1% Other.

Materials

Trial summary. Participants were given a criminal trial summary describing a female college student who claimed she was stalked by her ex-boyfriend (adapted from

Dunlap et al., 2010). The trial contained 6 sections: a general description of the trial, the prosecution's case (comprised of 2 witnesses: victim and her roommate), the defense's case (comprised of 2 witnesses: defendant and his roommate), closing arguments and judge's instructions (see Appendix A). To portray the role of an "intimacy seeking" stalker, the defendant testified that his intention was to rekindle a romantic relationship with the victim and that he did not intend to cause her fear.

Manipulation check questions. To ensure that the participants thoroughly read the trial summary, six multiple-choice comprehension questions were embedded in the trial summary (see Appendix A). If participants answered incorrectly they were instructed to re-read the section and answer the question again. Participants were allowed to re-read the same section and given the opportunity to correctly answer the multiple choice question a maximum of three times before the trial summary continued automatically. If participants failed to give the correct answer after three chances their data was omitted from analyses.

After reading the testimony of the witnesses, the participants were presented with closing arguments and the judge's instructions. The judge's instructions used 2007 Anti-Stalking Model Code that included a description of the necessary elements of a "guilty" verdict in this case as well as a description of the standard of proof (i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt) (see Appendix A).

Trial-summary questionnaire. First, the participants rendered a guilt rating on a scale with only end points labeled (e.g., from 0 *completely not guilty* to 10 *completely guilty*) and a verdict (*not guilty* or *guilty*). Next, all participants were asked to explain the reason(s) for their verdict and rate their confidence in their verdict choice on a scale from

0 (*not confident*) to 10 (*completely confident*) with end points labeled. Participants who rendered guilty verdicts were then instructed to recommend the appropriate punishment for the defendant's criminal offense "Given that this crime is a Class A Misdemeanor you must decide whether the defendant serves time in jail (a maximum of 12 months), as well as whether the defendant pays a fine (a maximum of $500) to the State." Next, participants responded to 47 witness-rating questions for which all answers were provided on a rating scale from 0 to 10, with endpoints clearly labeled (see Appendix B). These questions were designed to generally capture four conceptual categories: (1) reactions to stalking (e.g., "How much fear did the *alleged victim* experience due to the events in question?"), (2) intent of stalking (e.g., "Should the *defendant* have known that his behavior would cause "reasonable" fear?"), (3) emotions relating to the victim (e.g., "How much sympathy do you feel for the *alleged victim?*") and (4) questions concerning emotions relating to the defendant (e.g., "How much sympathy do you feel for the defendant?").

Stalking Myth Acceptance (SMA). A 34-item stalking related attitudinal questionnaire (see Appendix C) developed during a joint research meeting by the Modena Group on Stalking (McKeon, Mullen & Ogloff, unpublished) was used to assess how dysfunctional beliefs about stalking accounted for variance in judgments of criminal stalking. This questionnaire asked participants to rate their agreement using a 7 point scale (from 1 = absolutely untrue to 7 = absolutely true) to statements relating to the following themes: stalking in general (e.g., "Any person could be 'stalked'"), courtship behavior (e.g., "If a woman says no, even once, a man should leave her alone"), and pro-stalking beliefs (e.g., "Some women actually want to be 'stalked'; they see it as a

compliment"). Using 516 participants, Kamphuis et al. (2005) optimized this measure into three main factors: "stalking is harmless flattery," six items with an alpha of .80; "blaming the victim," seven items with an alpha of .78; "stalking is a nuisance," six items with an alpha of .74. Kamphuis et al. (2005) found that people who endorsed these dysfunctional beliefs about stalking were significantly less likely to interpret behaviors described in vignettes as stalking.

Hostility toward Women (HTW). Participants responded to the 10-item revised HTW scale (Lonsway & Fitzgerald, 1995; revised from Check, Malamuth, Elias, & Barton, 1985). The items included on this scale reflect a general attitude of irritation or hostility toward women, as it does not contain any items that describe appropriate roles, behaviors, or privileges for women (see Appendix D). Participants responded to the revised HTW questions using a 7-point rating scale (from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree), however slightly different wording were provided for male and female respondents. For example, men respond to statements such as, "I am easily angered by women," or "Sometimes women bother me just by being around." While women respond to statements like, "I am easily angered by other women," or "Sometimes other women bother me just by being around." High scores indicate high hostility. The original scale development sample of 200 undergraduates yielded an alpha was .83.

Gender Role Stereotypes (GRS). Participants also completed the GRS developed by Burt (1980). This 9-item scale pertains primarily to behavior prescribed by the female gender role but also assesses more general attitudes toward women (see Appendix E). Items include, "It is acceptable for the woman to pay for the date," and "It is acceptable for a woman to have a career, but marriage and family should come first." Items are

individually answered on a 7-point rating scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The points are assigned to the more stereotyped or traditional response of "strongly agree" for seven of the items and "strongly disagree" for two of the items. This scale was developed with a sample of 598 adults, with coefficient alpha = .78. This scale has been widely used and has strong association with issues surrounding male aggression on females. For example, participants who hold traditional gender stereotypes are more likely to accept rape myths and possess more hostility toward women than participants who hold contemporary views of gender roles (Check & Malamuth, 1985).

Romantic Beliefs Scale (RBS). The RBS created by Sprechter and Metts (1989) was used to ascertain participants' dispositional tendencies toward romantic tenets (such as, Love Finds a Way, One and Only, Idealization, and Love at First Sight. This scale consists of 15 items with responses on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7) (see Appendix F). Although the dimensions represent different beliefs associated with the ideology of romanticism, a total score represents the degree to which a participant has a romantic orientation across the range of romantic ideology. This scale was developed with a sample of 730 adults, with coefficient alpha for the entire scale of .81. Prior research has shown the RBS to be a valid measurement. Moderate to high positive correlations have been reported between the RBS and the Spaulding (1970) Romantic Love Complex Scale, Rubin's (1970) Liking and Love scales, and the eros and agape dimensions of Hendrick and Hendrick's (1986) Love Attitudes Scale.

Personal Experience with Stalking-Related Behavior (PES). Participants were asked six questions that represent voir dire inquiries relating to personal experience with stalking-related behavior. These questions were similar to the personal experience with

stalking questions employed by Phillips et al. (2004) and Yanowitz (2006) that asked participants to acknowledge personal experience with being a victim (PESb; No = 0, Yes = 1) and personal experience with knowing a victim (PESk; No = 0, Yes =1) of persistent unwanted attention. If participants affirmed PESb and/or PESk, they were asked to rate how much fear and how much emotional distress resulted from the experience, on a rating scale from 1 to 10 with endpoints clearly labeled (see Appendix G).

Procedure

Survey Monkey, a popular website that allows researchers to upload online experiments, was used as the method for data collection. Participants attending the University of Kentucky were recruited to take the survey through a computer signup system SONA. The signup information displayed on SONA informed the students that they must be jury eligible (e.g., U.S. citizen and 18 years or older) in order to participate in this experiment. After participants completed an electronic version of a standard informed consent sheet, they were asked to complete the demographic questionnaire (e.g., gender and race). Then they were exposed to two different sets of information. One set contained the trial summary and trial questions. The second set included the following individual difference measures: SMA, HTW, GRS, Romantic Beliefs and PES. To counterbalance exposure to the two sets of information, half of the participants completed the trial packet and then the individual difference measures, while the other half of the participants completed the individual difference measures then the trial packet. The experiment took an average of an hour to complete. After participants completed the study, they received contact information for any further questions.

Ethics

Considering that the topic of victimization is a sensitive one, certain precautions were taken to assure the well-being of the participants. Prior to participation, participants were informed that they would be answering questions concerning the topic of victimization. Further, participants were reminded that their participation was voluntary and anonymous; if at any time, they chose to terminate their involvement there was to be no penalty. All participants also received important safety information regarding stalking and contact information for local and national victim advocacy programs. For example, the National Victim Assistance hotline number and website link was provided at the conclusion of the experiment.

Hypotheses

There are three primary hypotheses for the present experiment as detailed below:

Hypothesis 1

Replicate the previous finding that participant gender predicts trial judgments of ex-intimate partner stalking; overall, women should render more pro-prosecution judgments (e.g., guilty verdict) than men (see Figure 2.3). With regard to participant gender, it was expected that women (compared to men) would render more pro-prosecution judgments. Research on public perceptions of stalking supports the presumption that women are more likely to label questionable behavior as stalking than their male counterparts (Dennison & Thomson, 2002; Dunlap et al., unpublished; Phillips et al., 2004, Experiment 2). While a broad overview of mock juror research has shown juror demographics (e.g., gender, race, education) to be inconsistently or weakly related to verdict (for a review see Devine et al., 2001), research that focuses on female

victimization generally finds that the gender of the mock juror influences judgments. For example, gender effects have surfaced in mock juror research involving other types of victimization, such as child sexual abuse (for a review see Bottoms et al., 2007), rape (for a review see Borgida & Brekke, 1985) and sexual harassment (for review see Rotundo, Nguyen, & Sacket, 2001). The pattern of gender-based differences typically emerges in verdicts and in other trial judgments (e.g., pro-victim judgments); women are generally more pro-victim and more prosecution oriented than are men. In addition to guilty verdicts and degree of defendant guilt ratings, pro-prosecution judgments are also seen in any decisions that are more supportive of the victim's case and less supportive of the defendant's case. Questions that assess reactions to the victim and defendant include perceptions of fear, distress, flattery and annoyance. Women may side more with the victim's case resulting in higher ratings of fear and distress, while men may side less with the victim's case resulting in higher ratings of flattery and annoyance. Differences in men's and women's judgments may also be seen in their responses to questions that ask whether the defendant's behavior caused fear and distress and whether the defendant intended to cause fear and distress (women's ratings > men's ratings). In addition, women and men may differ in their reactions to questions concerning emotions related to the victim and defendant. For example, women (as compared to men) may have more positive emotions (e.g., sympathy, worry and concern) for the victim and more negative emotions (e.g., disgust, anger, shame) for the defendant.

Hypothesis 2

SMA may mediate the gender differences found in judgments of stalking (see Figure 2.4). For example, participants who endorse more SMA beliefs may make fewer pro-prosecution judgments than participants who endorse fewer SMA beliefs.

Hypothesis 3a & Hypothesis 3b

Finally, the last hypothesis has the following two parts. First, attitudes (e.g., HTW, GRS, and RBS) may mediate gender differences in adherence to SMA (see Figure 2.5); for example, participants who have higher GRS scores may endorse more SMA beliefs. Second, attitudes (e.g., HTW, GRS, and RBS) could moderate gender differences in adherence to SMA (see Figure 2.6); for example, men's endorsement of SMA beliefs may be influenced by HTW and women's endorsement of SMA may not be influenced by HTW.

Analytical Strategy

A variety of analytical strategies were utilized to investigate the hypotheses. First, descriptive statistics for the measures of interest were conducted. This included mean and standard deviation scores for gender (0 = female, 1 = male) on trial judgments (e.g., *Verdict, Degree of Defendant Guilt*, and *Positive Emotions about Victim*), attitudinal measures (e.g., SMA beliefs, HTW, GRS, RBS) and experience variables (PESb and PESk). Overall correlation matrices were also used to gain insight into the magnitude and direction of the relationships among the variables of interest. A series of regression analyses (described below) were conducted to test all of the main hypotheses.

Treatment of Measurements/Optimizing Interpretation

Techniques were used to maximize the interpretation of the regression results (Aiken & West, 1991; Baron & Kenny 1986; Stevens, 1986). Data reduction techniques (e.g., factor analyses) were applied to the SMA measure, as well as to the trial questionnaire. Reducing multiple dependent variables into factors has the benefit of dealing with multicollinearity (i.e., a condition in which variables are highly correlated) in regression because the factors can be treated as uncorrelated variables. Stevens (1986) explained that multicollinearity is problematic in regression because it can inflate the variances of the parameter estimates, which may result in a lack of statistical significance of individual independent variables. Concerning the SMA measure, a replication of Khampius et al. (2005) factorial structure yielded robust alphas for the same three factors: (1) "stalking is harmless flattery - *SMA flattery* - included 6 items, alpha of .81, (2) "blaming the victim" - *SMA victim blame* - included 7 items, alpha of .75; and "stalking is a nuisance" - *SMA nuisance* - included 6 items, alpha of .80 (see Table 2.1 for correlations among SMA items, see Table 2.2 for correlations among all dependent variables).

With regard to the trial rating questions, separate factor analyses were run for the four conceptual categories – reactions to stalking, intent of stalking, emotions relating to victim and emotions relating to defendant (see Table 2.3 for factors of all trial questions). To best represent the data, principle components factor analyses with promax rotation were used, as rating variables were correlated within conceptual categories. It should be noted that 5 questions - danger posed by defendant, credibility of victim/defendant, and responsibility of victim/defendant - did not meet the inclusion criteria (minimal loading

of .4 or cross loading on multiple factors) during preliminary factor analyses and thus were analyzed separately. The first category consisted of 12 questions concerning reactions to stalking and produced 3 factors (76.73% of variance): (1) *Perceptions of Fear & Distress* included 6 items with loadings ranging from .70 to .99, alpha = .93, (2) *Perceptions of Flattery* included 3 items with loadings ranging from .84 to .87, alpha = .81 and (3) *Perceptions of Annoyance* included 3 times with loadings ranging from .81 to .98, alpha = .88. Second, the 6 questions relating to the intent of stalking produced 2 factors (87.33% of variance): *Predicting Fear & Distress* included 4 items with loadings ranging from .90 to .96, alpha = .95 and (2) *Intending Fear & Distress* included 2 items with loadings ranging from .94 to .95, alpha = .88. Third, 12 questions relating to emotions involving the victim resulted in 2 factors (68.74% of variance): (1) *Positive Emotions about Victim* included 6 items with loadings ranging from .47 to .92, alpha = .89 and (2) *Negative Emotions about Victim* included 6 items with loadings ranging from .69 to .90, alpha = .90. Fourth, 12 questions relating to emotions involving the defendant resulted in 2 factors (65.94% of variance): (1) *Positive Emotions about Defendant* included 6 items with loadings ranging from .58 to .85, alpha = .85 and (2) *Negative Emotions about Defendant* included 6 items with loadings ranging from .57 to .90, alpha = .90.

The various questions for the three attitudinal measurements (e.g., HTW) were averaged for each measure; low scores indicate low endorsement and high scores designate high endorsement (see Table 2.4 for *Means* and *SDs*). For HTW, the replication of this scale revealed a reliability alpha of .83. The replication of the GRS scale had an alpha of .68. Romanticism scores had an alpha of .85. Next, these measurements were

centered prior to creating interaction terms for regressions as suggested by Cohen et al. (2003) to reduce multicollinearity and aid in the interpretation of the regression coefficients. Centering a variable was accomplished by subtracting the overall mean score from each participant's total score, so that zero becomes the mean score for the sample.

The measurement of PES resulted in two sets of information for "being a victim" (PESb) and for "knowing a victim" (PESk). This information identified participants who reported being a victim of persistent unwanted attention (*No* = 0, *Yes* = 1) as well as a rating of how much fear and/or emotional distress resulted from the experience (0 to 10). PESb and PESk were included in all regression analyses as control variables. If PESb and/or PESk were found to be significant, additional analyses were conducted to ascertain whether the rating questions (e.g., degree of fear and degree of distress associated with the PESb and PESK variables) mediated the relation between gender and the dependent variables of interest.

Linear and Logistic Regression

To test Hypothesis 1 (Replicate previous finding that women render more pro-prosecution judgments than men) hierarchical linear regression analyses were used. These regressions explored whether the focal variable (FV) Gender (*Women* = 0, *Men* = 1) significantly predicted trial outcome variables that are continuous in nature (e.g., Positive Emotions about Vic) while controlling for the two PES variables (PESb and PESk; *No* = 0, *Yes* = 1). The regression entry was: Step 1, control variables (PEKb and PESk), and Step 2, Gender. To test the effect of Gender on a binary outcome like verdict

(*Not Guilty* = 0, *Guilty* = 1), a hierarchical logistic regression was used with the same steps (see Table 2.5 for regression model).

Testing Mediation and Moderation with Regression

Regression was used to test Hypothesis 2 (endorsement of SMA mediates gender differences in judgments of stalking), Hypothesis 3a (attitudes mediate gender differences in endorsement of SMA) and Hypothesis 3b (attitudes moderate gender differences in endorsement of SMA)

According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a clear distinction must be made between mediator and moderator variables when determining the appropriate analytical strategy to test hypotheses. "Mediators explain how external physical events take on internal psychological significance. Whereas moderator variables specify when certain effects will hold, mediators speak to how or why such effects occur" (p. 1176). For example, attitudes act as mediators if they explain how (by what means) gender differences arise in SMA endorsement (Hypothesis 3a); men are more likely (than women) to endorse SMA beliefs because men have more traditional GRS (than women). Attitudes act as moderators if they illustrate under what conditions gender differences arise in SMA endorsement (Hypothesis 3b); GRS is only predicative of men's endorsement of SMA.

Mediation analyses assess the degree to which a mediator variable (MV) accounts for the relationship between the focal variable (FV) and dependent variable (DV) (Baron & Kenny, 1986; see Table 2.6 and Figure 2.7). Mediation occurs when the following three conditions are met with two regressions: (Condition 1) the first regression shows that the FV significantly predicts the MV, (Condition 2) the second regression indicates that the MV significantly predicts the DV in Step 1, and (Condition 3) the second

regression reveals that the effect of the FV on the DV shrinks or disappears when MV is included in Step 2. If the effect of the FV on the DV disappears entirely (becomes non-significant) with the presence of the mediator, the relationship between the FV and DV is fully explained by the MV. More commonly, the size of the effect is reduced with the inclusion of the MV, suggesting a partial mediation, whereby multiple mediators may explain the relationship (Baron & Kenny, 1986).

It should be noted that the effects of each mediator were initially tested in separate analyses to reduce any potential problems with multicollinearity among the predictor variables and to enhance the power of the model to identify significant effects. For example, the 3 SMA beliefs were each tested separately for their ability to explain the gender effects on the trial judgments. However, a test for multicollinearity indicated that it was not a significant problem (e.g., tolerance > .20 and *VIF* < 4). Accordingly, mediation was retested using a more conservative regression model. This more conservative model assessed unique contribution of the 3 SMA beliefs by placing all the mediators in the same regression model.

Sobel (1982) cautioned researchers when drawing inferences on indirect effects found through mediation without determining the significance of such effects. To address this issue a bootstrapping technique is considered the optimal means for testing significance in mediational models (MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Bootstrapping draws a multitude of sub-samples from the original sample and calculates the variance in the test statistics calculated from each sub-sample, resulting in a reliable confidence interval (95%) for the effect of each variable. The present study used bootstrapping to analyze mediational variables.

Moderation was tested with regression recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). A variable acts as a moderator when it alters the direction and/or strength of the relation between an FV and a DV (see Table 2.7 and Figure 2.8). Conceptually, a regression model supports evidence of a moderator when you control for the FV and the moderator variable (Mod) and the interaction between the FV and Mod significantly adds to the predictive quality of the model. The following two-step regression model was used to test whether attitudes moderated the Gender-SMA relation: (Step 1) included Gender and Attitudes; and (Step 2) included the interaction of Gender x Attitudes. The change in R^2 as a function of the interaction term (i.e., did inclusion of the interaction term in Step 2 significantly add to the predictive ability of the model) was examined to determine the significance of the moderation effects. If a moderation interaction was found to be significant by R^2, it would be probed according to a technique described by Aiken and West (1991) (also see Hayes & Matthews, 2009). This technique involves plotting and testing the conditional effects of the FV (Gender) at specific levels (-1 *SD*, *M*, +1 *SD*) of the moderator variable. Any significant interactions reported were confirmed through graph and slope analyses. As with mediation, the moderation procedure was conducted twice. First, moderation was conducted with each moderator tested separately. Second, moderation was retested with all moderators in the model because multicollinearity was not a problem (e.g., tolerance > .20 and *VIF* < 4).

Table 2.1

Correlations among Items in SMA Questionnaire

	1	2	3	4	5	6
SMA Flattery						
1.Women find it flattering to be persistently pursued	--	.407**	.505**	.393**	.548**	.285**
2.Women often say one thing but mean another	.248**	--	.480**	.371**	.398**	.324**
3.Some women actually want to be 'stalked'; they see it as a compliment	.359**	.357**	--	.447**	.601**	.396**
4.Repeatedly following someone, making phone calls and leaving gifts doesn't actually hurt anyone	.454**	.325**	.382**	--	.506**	.379**
5.Even if they were annoyed, most women would be at least a little flattered by stalking	.515**	.280**	.443**	.440**	--	.504**
6.If someone continues to say nice things and give nice gifts, then 'stalking' is far more acceptable	.363**	.236**	.369**	.499**	.564**	--
SMA Victim Blame						
7.A woman who dates a lot would be more likely to be 'stalked'	.278**	.243**	.282**	.267**	.286**	.296**
8.If a woman just ignored the man, he would eventually go away	.234**	.171*	.237**	.316**	.355**	.372**
9.Victims of 'stalking' are often women wanting revenge on their ex-boyfriends	.446**	.322**	.423**	.404**	.427**	.437**
10.A woman may be more likely to be 'stalked' if she cannot clearly say 'No'	.113	.256**	.157*	.090	.170*	.139
11.If a woman gives any encouragement, the man has a right to continue his pursuit	.408**	.419**	.256**	.354**	.394**	.277**
12.Those who are upset by 'stalking' are likely more sensitive than others	.407**	.278**	.348**	.434**	.491**	.400**
13.'Stalkers' only continue because they get some sort of encouragement	.247**	.215**	.257**	.389**	.307**	.387**

Table 2.1 (continued)

	1	2	3	4	5	6
SMA Nuisance						
14.The concept of ‘stalking’ is just a fad	.379**	.068	.347**	.367**	.307**	.374**
15.‘Stalkers’ are a nuisance but they are not criminals	.368**	.239**	.247**	.520**	.378**	.296**
16.‘Stalking’ is just an extreme form of courtship	.426**	.272**	.380**	.468**	.529**	.531**
17.If there is no actual violence, it shouldn’t be a crime	.371**	.264**	.364**	.448**	.335**	.327**
18.‘Stalking’ should be dealt with in civil, not criminal law	.298**	.259**	.283**	.539**	.308**	.390**
19.Stranger ‘stalking’ is the only ‘real’ stalking	.432**	.198*	.373**	.588**	.447**	.631**

Table 2.1 (continued)

	7	8	9	10	11	12
SMA Flattery						
1.Women find it flattering to be persistently pursued	.189**	.295**	.269**	.321**	.483**	.311**
2.Women often say one thing but mean another	.288**	.237**	.396**	.394**	.313**	.324**
3.Some women actually want to be 'stalked'; they see it as a compliment	.300**	.265**	.488**	.368**	.337**	.379**
4.Repeatedly following someone, making phone calls and leaving gifts doesn't actually hurt anyone	.130	.279**	.349**	.242**	.435**	.384**
5.Even if they were annoyed, most women would be at least a little flattered by stalking	.255**	.192**	.353**	.349**	.355**	.546**
6.If someone continues to say nice things and give nice gifts, then 'stalking' is far more acceptable	.200**	.339**	.301**	.242**	.361**	.400**
SMA Victim Blame						
7.A woman who dates a lot would be more likely to be 'stalked'	--	.128	.351**	.357**	.281**	.247**
8.If a woman just ignored the man, he would eventually go away	.227**	--	.213**	.089	.363**	.148*
9.Victims of 'stalking' are often women wanting revenge on their ex-boyfriends	.168*	.170*	--	.283**	.271**	.345**
10.A woman may be more likely to be 'stalked' if she cannot clearly say 'No'	.235**	.082	.083	--	.342**	.298**
11.If a woman gives any encouragement, the man has a right to continue his pursuit	.325**	.100	.298**	.312**	--	.348**
12.Those who are upset by 'stalking' are likely more sensitive than others	.265**	.404**	.394**	.200*	.336**	--
13.'Stalkers' only continue because they get some sort of encouragement	.205*	.389**	.244**	.079	.210**	.393**

Table 2.1 (continued)

	7	8	9	10	11	12
SMA Nuisance						
14.The concept of 'stalking' is just a fad	.137	.247**	.381**	-.029	.200*	.332**
15.'Stalkers' are a nuisance but they are not criminals	.192*	.250**	.071	.201*	.302**	.435*
16.'Stalking' is just an extreme form of courtship	.298**	.365**	.367**	.048	.361**	.469**
17.If there is no actual violence, it shouldn't be a crime	.263**	.183*	.306**	.136	.262**	.307**
18.'Stalking' should be dealt with in civil, not criminal law	.216**	.325**	.236**	.284**	.316**	.402**
19.Stranger 'stalking' is the only 'real' stalking	.252**	.332**	.389**	.027	.296**	.394**

Table 2.1 (continued)

	13	14	15	16	17	18
SMA Flattery	.268**	.179*	.218**	.177*	.247**	.390**
1.Women find it flattering to be persistently pursued	.424**	.130	.181**	.299**	.268**	.307**
2.Women often say one thing but mean another	.434**	.203**	.338**	.301**	.385**	.388**
3.Some women actually want to be 'stalked'; they see it as a compliment	.406**	.291**	.364**	.270**	.457**	.432**
4.Repeatedly following someone, making phone calls and leaving gifts doesn't actually hurt anyone	.462**	.290**	.355**	.245**	.416**	.454**
5.Even if they were annoyed, most women would be at least a little flattered by stalking	.525**	.255**	.341**	.257**	.409**	.326**
6.If someone continues to say nice things and give nice gifts, then 'stalking' is far more acceptable	.269**	.096	.125	.144	.199**	.255**
SMA Victim Blame						
7.A woman who dates a lot would be more likely to be 'stalked'	.252**	.236**	.186**	.273	.336**	.194**
8.If a woman just ignored the man, he would eventually go away	.391**	.205**	.392**	.303**	.383**	.187**
9.Victims of 'stalking' are often women wanting revenge on their ex-boyfriends	.319**	-.012	.221**	.077	.146*	.312**
10.A woman may be more likely to be 'stalked' if she cannot clearly say 'No'	.349**	.195**	.248**	.200**	.347**	.568**
11.If a woman gives any encouragement, the man has a right to continue his pursuit	.444**	.290**	.253**	.306**	.298**	.353**
12.Those who are upset by 'stalking' are likely more sensitive than others	--	.310**	.306**	.378**	.427**	.372**
13.'Stalkers' only continue because they get some sort of encouragement	.268**	.179*	.218**	.177*	.247**	.390**

Table 2.1 (continued)

	13	14	15	16	17	18
SMA Nuisance						
14.The concept of 'stalking' is just a fad	.249**	--	.240**	.324**	.336**	.181*
15.'Stalkers' are a nuisance but they are not criminals	.281**	.219**	--	.280**	.490**	.347**
16.'Stalking' is just an extreme form of courtship	.417**	.448**	.416**	--	.400**	.211**
17.If there is no actual violence, it shouldn't be a crime	.198*	.349**	.487**	.442**	--	.384**
18.'Stalking' should be dealt with in civil, not criminal law	.280**	.218**	.555**	.382**	.501**	--
19.Stranger 'stalking' is the only 'real' stalking	.448**	.528**	.474**	.540**	.430**	.424*

Table 2.1 (continued)

	19
SMA Flattery	
1.Women find it flattering to be persistently pursued	.313**
2.Women often say one thing but mean another	.365**
3.Some women actually want to be ‘stalked’; they see it as a compliment	.309**
4.Repeatedly following someone, making phone calls and leaving gifts doesn’t actually hurt anyone	.307
5.Even if they were annoyed, most women would be at least a little flattered by stalking	.423**
6.If someone continues to say nice things and give nice gifts, then ‘stalking’ is far more acceptable	.153*
SMA Victim Blame	
7.A woman who dates a lot would be more likely to be ‘stalked’	.306**
8.If a woman just ignored the man, he would eventually go away	.331**
9.Victims of ‘stalking’ are often women wanting revenge on their ex-boyfriends	.096
10.A woman may be more likely to be ‘stalked’ if she cannot clearly say ‘No’	.227**
11.If a woman gives any encouragement, the man has a right to continue his pursuit	.389**
12.Those who are upset by ‘stalking’ are likely more sensitive than others	.456**
13.‘Stalkers’ only continue because they get some sort of encouragement	.201**

Table 2.1 (continued)

	19
SMA Nuisance	
14.The concept of ‘stalking’ is just a fad	.265**
15.‘Stalkers’ are a nuisance but they are not criminals	.302**
16.‘Stalking’ is just an extreme form of courtship	.544**
17.If there is no actual violence, it shouldn’t be a crime	.460**
18.‘Stalking’ should be dealt with in civil, not criminal law	.155*
19.Stranger ‘stalking’ is the only ‘real’ stalking	--

Note: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 2.2

Correlations among Trial Outcome Variables, Trial Factors and Attitude Scales by Gender

	1	2	3	4	5
1.Verdict	--	.361**	.665**	.621**	-.310**
2.Confidence in Verdict	.151	--	.490**	.467**	-.189**
3.Degree of Defendant Guilt	.786**	.257**	--	.695**	-.243**
4.Perceptions of Fear & Distress	.616**	.305**	.684**	--	-.280**
5.Perceptions of Flattery	-.192*	-.134	-.148	-.223**	--
6.Perceptions of Annoyance	.376**	.383**	.454**	.564**	-.256**
7.Predicting Fear & Distress	.633**	.321**	.704**	.705**	-.209**
8.Intending Fear & Distress	.354**	-.186*	.266**	.248**	.258**
9.Positive Emotions Victim	.474**	.094	.558**	.664**	-.074
10.Negative Emotions Victim	-.179*	-.279**	-.281**	-.255**	.451**
11.Positive Emotions Defendant	-.263**	-.022	-.271**	-.132	.347**
12.Negative Emotions Defendant	.374**	-.085	.398**	.496**	-.037
13.Danger posed by Defendant [a]	.576**	.119	.602**	.680**	-.028
14.Victim Credibility [a]	.355**	.425**	.410**	.495**	-.158*
15.Victim Responsibility [a]	-.162*	-.079	-.201*	-.075	.391**
16.Defendant Credibly [a]	-.296**	.080	-.304**	-.181*	.133
17.Defendant Responsibility [a]	.110	.300**	.202*	.228**	-.180*
18.SMA Flattery	-.224**	-.192*	-.278**	-.183*	.120
19.SMA Victim Blame	-.108	-.143	-.147	-.212**	.252**
20.SMA Nuisance	-.217**	-.257**	-.230**	-.189*	.259**
21.HTW	-.223**	-.231**	-.346**	-.272**	.157*
22.GRS	-.001	-.128	-.079	-.009	.178*
23.Romanticism	.042	.028	.015	.097	.012
24.PESb (being a victim)	-.241**	-.126	-.217**	-.188*	.083
25.PESk (knowing a victim)	-.187*	.101	-.030	-.041	-.061

Table 2.2 (continued)

	6	7	8	9	10
1.Verdict	.297**	.630**	.354**	.496**	-.245**
2.Confidence in Verdict	.468**	.404**	.031	.451**	-.372**
3.Degree of Defendant Guilt	.354**	.640**	.237**	.563**	-.308**
4.Perceptions of Fear & Distress	.472**	.677**	.285**	.677**	-.324**
5.Perceptions of Flattery	-.156*	-.269**	-.197**	-.183*	.412**
6.Perceptions of Annoyance	--	.386**	-.144*	.390**	-.335**
7.Predicting Fear & Distress	.557**	--	.400**	.548**	-.317**
8.Intending Fear & Distress	-.122	.270**	--	.289**	-.032
9.Positive Emotions about Vic	.279**	.498**	.346**	--	-.215**
10.Negative Emotions Victim	-.504**	-.340**	.239**	.053	--
11.Positive Emotions Defendant	-.207*	-.259**	-.021	.114	.597**
12.Negative Emotions Defendant	.106	.359**	.407**	.702**	.241**
13.Danger posed by Defendant [a]	.215**	.588**	.509**	.632**	-.045
14.Victim Credibility [a]	.612**	.357**	-.086	.319**	-.355**
15.Victim Responsibility [a]	-.240**	-.281**	.093	-.108	.342**
16.Defendant Credibly [a]	.120	-.201*	-.350**	-.267**	.125
17.Defendant Responsibility [a]	.506**	.359**	-.168*	.153	-.328**
18.SMA Flattery	-.116	-.197*	-.035	-.161	.216*
19.SMA Victim Blame	-.170*	-.295**	.055	-.154	.272**
20.SMA Nuisance	-.155	-.303**	.059	-.083	.305**
21.HTW	-.235**	-.256**	.035	-.217*	.293**
22.GRS	-.065	-.090	.224**	-.088	.177*
23.Romanticism	.116	-.034	-.038	.040	-.029
24.PESb (being a victim)	-.119	-.055	.041	-.129	.121
25.PESk (knowing a victim)	-.013	-.001	-.191*	-.019	-.006

Table 2.2 (continued)

	11	12	13	14	15
1.Verdict	-.185*	.402**	.513**	.398**	-.066
2.Confidence in Verdict	-.301**	.268**	.220**	.479**	-.143*
3.Degree of Defendant Guilt	-.238**	.427**	.518**	.494**	-.157*
4.Perceptions of Fear & Distress	-.169*	.474**	.617**	.494**	-.053
5.Perceptions of Flattery	.381**	-.068	-.238**	-.128	.144*
6.Perceptions of Annoyance	-.131	.290**	.127	.530**	-.171*
7.Predicting Fear & Distress	-.178*	.485**	.542**	.416**	-.210**
8.Intending Fear & Distress	-.150	.348**	.549**	.098	-.031
9.Positive Emotions about Vic	-.006	.677**	.499**	.439**	-.071
10.Negative Emotions Victim	.515**	.078	-.166*	-.347**	.369**
11.Positive Emotions Defendant	--	.144	-.113	-.159	.231**
12.Negative Emotions Defendant	.199*	--	.374**	.324**	.103
13.Danger posed by Defendant [a]	-.071	.590**	--	.271**	-.090
14.Victim Credibility [a]	-.068	.127	.213**	--	-.039
15.Victim Responsibility [a]	.224**	-.091	-.107	-.090	--
16.Defendant Credibly [a]	.272**	-.306**	-.314**	.231**	.171*
17.Defendant Responsibility [a]	-.162	.081	.104	.411**	-.323**
18.SMA Flattery	.126	-.078	-.128	.224**	.307**
19.SMA Victim Blame	.241**	.003	-.159*	-.230**	.282**
20.SMA Nuisance	.202*	.035	-.079	-.169*	.247**
21.HTW	.197*	-.055	-.137	-.475**	.149
22.GRS	.097	.001	.036	-.126	.160*
23.Romanticism	.039	.062	.080	.018	.199*
24.PESb (being a victim)	.117	-.056	-.055	-.257**	.065
25.PESk (knowing a victim)	.171	-.005	-.060	-.060	.087

Table 2.2 (continued)

	16	17	18	19	20
1.Verdict	-.354**	.332**	-.334**	-.273**	-.355**
2.Confidence in Verdict	-.085	.480**	-.179*	-.206**	-.310**
3.Degree of Defendant Guilt	-.382**	.388**	-.286**	.320**	-.332**
4.Perceptions of Fear & Distress	-.335**	.449**	-.270**	-.286**	-.299**
5.Perceptions of Flattery	.318**	-.280**	.319**	.423**	.268**
6.Perceptions of Annoyance	-.009	.490**	-.161*	-.152*	-.286**
7.Predicting Fear & Distress	-.402**	.372**	-.365**	-.316**	-.393**
8.Intending Fear & Distress	-.322**	-.028	-.185**	-.215**	-.073
9.Positive Emotions about Vic	-.227**	.370**	-.130	-.152	.204*
10.Negative Emotions Victim	.264**	-.415**	.363**	.315**	.386**
11.Positive Emotions Defendant	.238**	-.231**	.255**	.310**	.312**
12.Negative Emotions Defendant	-.241**	.198*	-.033	-.063	-.142
13.Danger posed by Defendant [a]	-.341**	.310**	-.243**	-.229**	-.198**
14.Victim Credibility [a]	-.050	.378**	-.196**	-.161*	-.214**
15.Victim Responsibility [a]	.247**	-.322**	.259**	.127	.226**
16.Defendant Credibly [a]	--	-.091	.256**	.246**	.253**
17.Defendant Responsibility [a]	.312**	--	-.229**	-.174*	-.300**
18.SMA Flattery	-.018	-.231**	--	.733**	.626**
19.SMA Victim Blame	-.037	-.225**	.738**	--	.638**
20.SMA Nuisance	.071	-.170*	.626**	.719**	--
21.HTW	-.021	-.155	.511**	.614**	.477**
22.GRS	.040	-.117	.432**	.433**	.417**
23.Romanticism	.006	-.011	.393**	.269**	.230**
24.PESb (being a victim)	.018	-.089	.229**	.112	.086
25.PESk (knowing a victim)	.105	.127	.045	-.002	-.040

Table 2.2 (continued)

	21	22	23	24	25
1.Verdict	-.125	-.199**	-.008	-.048	.091
2.Confidence in Verdict	-.078	-.160*	-.003	-.015	-.013
3.Degree of Defendant Guilt	-.019	-.175*	-.015	-.032	-.062
4.Perceptions of Fear & Distress	-.084	-.164*	-.043	-.103	-.090
5.Perceptions of Flattery	.205**	.244**	.071	-.142*	-.123
6.Perceptions of Annoyance	.000	-.163*	.054	-.031	-.043
7.Predicting Fear & Distress	-.156*	-.247**	-.038	.031	-.025
8.Intending Fear & Distress	-.009	-.004	-.025	.052	.043
9.Positive Emotions about Vic	-.046	-.106	-.041	-.041	-.145
10.Negative Emotions Victim	.278**	.171*	.109	-.090	.002
11.Positive Emotions Defendant	.168*	.117	-.059	-.049	-.025
12.Negative Emotions Defendant	.140	.000	.092	-.039	-.105
13.Danger posed by Defendant [a]	-.092	-.043	-.048	-.077	-.089
14.Victim Credibility [a]	-.070	-.096	.095	-.062	-.012
15.Victim Responsibility [a]	.096	.254**	.142*	-.047	-.018
16.Defendant Credibly [a]	.093	.123	.054	.050	-.119
17.Defendant Responsibility [a]	-.146*	-.134	-.020	.035	-.001
18.SMA Flattery	.388**	.448**	.208**	-.097	-.064
19.SMA Victim Blame	.400**	.396**	.178*	-.080	-.087
20.SMA Nuisance	.273**	.322**	.194**	-.079	-.103
21.HTW	--	.200**	.220**	-.013	.047
22.GRS	.421**	--	.199**	-.172*	-.144*
23.Romanticism	.171*	.416**	--	-.032	.002
24.PESb (being a victim)	.257**	.022	-.029	--	.274*
25.PESk (knowing a victim)	.049	-.119	-.077	.249**	--

Note: Women above diagonal, men below diagonal; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; [a] questions that did not meet criteria for factor loading

Table 2.3

Categories of Trial Questions

Questions concerning reactions to stalking
I. *Perceptions of Fear & Distress*
1. How much fear did the *alleged victim* experience due to the events in question?
2. Given the *alleged victim's* circumstances, how "reasonable" was her fear?
3. If *you* were in the alleged victim's circumstances, how fearful would you be?
4. How much emotional distress did the *alleged victim* experience due to the events in question?
5. Given the *alleged victim's* circumstances, how "reasonable" was her emotional distress?
6. If *you* were in the alleged victim's circumstances, how much emotional distress would you feel?
II. *Perceptions of Flattery*
1. How flattered was the *alleged victim* due to the events in question?
2. Given the *victim's* circumstances, how "reasonable" was it that she would feel flattered?
3. If you were in the alleged victim's circumstances, how flattered would you feel?
III. *Perceptions of Annoyance*
1. How annoyed was the *alleged victim* due to the events in question?
2. Given the *alleged victim's* circumstances, how "reasonable" was her annoyance?
3. If *you* were in the alleged victim's circumstances, how annoyed would you feel?
Questions concerning intent of stalking
IV. *Predicting Fear & Distress*
1. Should the *defendant* have known that his behavior would cause "reasonable" fear?
2. If you were in the defendant's circumstances, would *you* have known that the behaviors in question would cause "reasonable" fear?
3. Should the *defendant* have known that his behavior would cause "reasonable" emotional distress?
4. If you were in the defendant's circumstances, would *you* have known that the behaviors in question would cause "reasonable" emotional distress?
V. *Intending Fear & Distress*
1. Did the *defendant* intend to cause "reasonable" fear for safety?
2. Did the *defendant* intend to cause "reasonable" emotional distress?

Table 2.3 (continued)

Questions concerning emotions relating to victim
VI. *Positive Emotions about Victim*
1. How much sympathy do you feel for the *alleged victim?*
2. How much sadness do you feel for the *alleged victim?*
3. How much concern do you feel for the *alleged victim?*
4. How much worry do you feel for the *alleged victim?*
5. How much anxiety do you feel for the *alleged victim?*
6. How much do you identify with the alleged victim's point of view?
VII. *Negative Emotions about Victim*
1. How much anger do you feel toward the *alleged victim?*
2. How much disgust do you feel toward the *alleged victim?*
3. How much outrage do you feel toward the *alleged victim?*
4. How much frustration do you feel toward the *alleged victim?*
5. How much irritation do you feel toward the *alleged victim?*
6. How much shame do you feel for the *alleged victim?*
Questions concerning emotions relating to defendant
VIII. *Positive Emotions about Defendant*
1. How much sympathy do you feel for the *defendant?*
2. How much sadness do you feel for the *defendant?*
3. How much concern do you feel for the *defendant?*
4. How much worry do you feel for the *defendant?*
5. How much anxiety do you feel for the *defendant?*
6. How much do you identify with the *defendant's* point of view?
IX. *Negative Emotions about Defendant*
1. How much anger do you feel toward the *defendant?*
2. How much disgust do you feel toward the *defendant?*
3. How much outrage do you feel toward the *defendant?*
4. How much frustration do you feel toward the *defendant?*
5. How much irritation do you feel toward the *defendant?*
6. How much shame do you feel for the *defendant?*
Additional Questions
X. How much danger did the *defendant* pose to the victim?
XI. How credible was the *alleged victim's* testimony?
XII. How responsible was the *alleged victim* for the events in question?
XIII. How credible was the *defendant's* testimony?
XIV. How responsible was the *defendant* for the events in question?

Table 2.4

Descriptive Statistics for Scales and Factors by Gender – Means (Standard Deviation)

	Women (n = 202)	Men (n = 158)	Total (N = 360)
Verdict (percent guilty)**	79%	58%	70%
Confidence in Verdict (scale 0-10)	7.60(1.97)	7.43(1.99)	7.53(1.98)
Degree of Defendant Guilt (scale 0-10)**	6.86(2.10)	5.68(2.51)	6.34(2.34)
Trial Factors (scale 0-10)			
Perceptions Fear & Distress**	7.00(1.92)	5.59(2.06)	6.38(2.10)
Perceptions of Flattery*	2.94(2.34)	3.55(2.20)	3.21(2.29)
Perceptions of Annoyance**	8.09(1.72)	7.27(2.15)	7.73(1.96)
Prediction of Fear & Distress**	6.97(2.56)	6.19(2.76)	6.63(2.67)
Intended Fear & Distress**	3.25(2.41)	2.14(2.17)	2.88(2.34)
Positive Emotions Victim**	5.42(2.10)	4.02(2.19)	4.76(2.52)
Negative Emotions Victim	1.50(1.77)	1.88(1.84)	1.68(1.68)
Positive Emotions Defendant*	2.58(1.97)	3.14(2.05)	2.85(2.02)
Negative Emotions Defendant**	4.59(2.41)	3.35(2.33)	4.01(2.45)
Danger Posed by Defendant [a] **	5.15(2.38)	3.94(2.60)	4.62(2.55)
Victim Credibility [a]**	7.33(1.87)	6.66(2.06)	7.04(1.98)
Victim Responsibility [a] *	3.82(2.87)	4.46(2.54)	4.10(2.75)
Defendant Credibility [a]**	5.26(2.08)	5.87(2.04)	5.53(2.08)
Defendant Responsibility [a] **	7.85(2.28)	6.76(2.60)	7.37(2.48)
SMA Factors (scale 1-7)			
SMA Victim Blame**	2.76(0.94)	3.41(0.89)	3.05(0.98)
SMA Flattery**	2.54(1.00)	3.01(1.01)	2.75(1.03)
SMA Nuisance**	1.82(0.73)	2.31(0.97)	2.04(0.88)
HTW (scale 1-7)	3.27(0.92)	3.09(0.95)	3.19(0.94)
GRS (scale 1-7)**	2.92(0.92)	3.27(0.89)	3.07(0.92)
Romanticism (1-7)	4.36(0.95)	4.28(0.91)	4.32(0.93)
PESb (percent being a victim)	38%	30%	35%
PESb Fear (scale 0-10)**	4.39(2.86)	1.49(2.02)	3.29(2.92)
PESb Distress (scale 0-10)**	5.74(2.93)	3.17(2.62)	4.77(3.07)
PESk (percent knowing a victim)	41%	37%	39%
PESk Fear (scale 0-10)**	6.11(2.93)	4.09(2.84)	5.28(3.05)
PESk Distress (scale 0-10)**	7.18(2.51)	4.83(2.61)	6.22(2.79)

Note: Significant gender differences at * $p < .05$, **$p < .01$; [a] questions that did not meet criteria for factor loading

Table 2.5

Regression Model for Hypothesis 1

Step 1

$DV = X_{0+} X_1 + X_2$

Step 2

$DV = X_{0+} X_1 + X_2 + FV$

Note:

DV = Dependent Variable; Trial Outcome variable/factor
X_0 = regression constant
X_1 = PESb – Personal experience being a victim
X_2 = PESk – Personal experience knowing a victim
FV = Participant Gender

Table 2.6

Simple Regression Model for Mediation in Hypothesis 2 & Hypothesis 3a

Condition 1

Regression (1st): MV = X_0 + FV; when FV significantly predicts MV

Condition 2

Regression (2nd) Step 1: DV = X_0 + MV; when MV significantly predicts DV

Condition 3

Regression (2nd) Step 2: DV= X_0 + FV + MV; when MV significantly predicts DV; and the FV-DV relation is reduced/disappears

Note:

DV = Trial Outcome variable/factor
X_0 = Regression constant
FV = Participant Gender
MV = Mediator(s)

Table 2.7

Simple Regression Model for Moderation in Hypothesis 3b

Step 1: DV = x_{0+} FV + Mod
Step 2: DV = x_{0+} FV + Mod + FV*Mod; when R^2 change $p < .05$; and FV*Mod significantly predicts DV while controlling for FV and Mod

Note:

DV = Trial Outcome variable/factor
X_0 = regression constant
FV= Participant Gender
Mod = Moderator (s)

Figure 2.1

Theoretical Model for Attitudes as Mediators



Figure 2.2

Theoretical Model for Attitudes as Moderators



Figure 2.3

Theoretical Model Illustrating Gender as a Predictor in Hypothesis 1(Women = 0, Men = 1).



Figure 2.4

Theoretical Model Illustrating SMA as Mediating Gender-Trial Judgment Link in Hypothesis 2 (Women = 0, Men = 1)



Figure 2.5

Theoretical Model Illustrating Attitudes as Mediating Gender-SMA Link in Hypothesis 3a (Women = 0, Men = 1).



Figure 2.6

Theoretical Model Illustrating Attitudes as Moderating Gender-SMA Link in Hypothesis 3b (Women = 0, Men = 1).



Figure 2.7

Diagram of Mediation



Where:

a = regression coefficient for the association between FV and MV.
S_a = standard error of a.
b = coefficient for the association between the MV and the DV.
S_b = standard error of b.
c' = regression coefficient for the association between FV and DV when MV is controlled.

Figure 2.8

Diagram of Moderation



Where:

a = raw regression coefficient for the association between FV and Mod.
S_a = standard error of a.
b = raw coefficient for the association between the Mod and the DV.
S_b = standard error of b.
c = regression coefficient for the association between FV and Mod interaction
S_c = standard error of c.

CHAPTER 3

Results

Hypothesis 1 - Replicate Gender Differences on Trial Judgments (See Table 3.1 for all Odds Ratios, Betas and significant effects of gender on trial judgments)

Verdict. The binary logistic regression model on verdict was significant for participant gender, Model (3) $\chi 2 = 28.35$, $p = .000$, $B = -1.09$, $SE = .25$, $p = .000$, $OR = .338$. The odds of rendering a guilty verdict were a third less likely for men than women.

In summary H1 was supported. In addition to verdict, gender differences were found as expected on all but 3 (*Confidence, Negative Emotions about Victim,* and *Positive Emotions about Defendant*) of the 17 trial judgments. As predicted, women had higher ratings on: *Degree of Defendant Guilt, Perceptions of Fear and Distress, Perceptions of Annoyance, Predicting Fear and Distress, Intending Fear and Distress, Positive Emotions about Victim, Negative Emotions about Defendant, Danger Defendant Posed, Victim Credibility,* and *Defendant Responsibility.* Also as expected, men had higher ratings on: *Perceptions of Flattery, Victim Responsibility,* and *Defendant Credibility.*

Hypothesis 2 - SMA Mediates Gender -Trial Judgment Link

Given the predictive value of gender on 14 of the 17 trial judgments, mediation analyses were run to investigate whether the three SMA factors acted as mediators for this relation. Using the aforementioned criterion (Baron & Kenny, 1986), SMA victim blame, SMA flattery and SMA nuisance qualified for testing mediation (i.e., met condition 1 - gender significantly predicted the three SMA factors). Specifically, men were more likely than women to endorse SMA victim blame [$B = .66$, $SE = .098$, $t(357) =$

6.68, p = .000], SMA flattery [B = .47, SE = .11, t(357) = 4.35, p = .000], and SMA nuisance [B = .49, SE = .09, t(357) = 5.40, p = .000]. It should be noted that PESb and PESk were only included as controls in the mediation analyses of the 4 DV for which they were found to be significant (*Verdict, Degree of Defendant Guilt, Perceptions of Fear & Distress,* and *Victim Credibility*).

Initially, each of the three SMA factors was tested separately for meditation on the 14 trial judgments (e.g., only one SMA factor was included in Step 2). These 42 separate analyses found that the SMA factors acted as significant mediators for gender differences on 12 of the 14 trial judgments. The only exceptions occurred on 2 trial judgments - *Intending Fear and Distress* (only SMA victim blame was a significant partial mediator) and *Negative Emotions about the Defendant* (none of the SMA factors were significant mediators). It was decided that a more rigorous analysis was appropriate to evaluate mediation. Therefore, mediation analyses were run again for each trial factor that included all 3 SMA factors together on Step 2. The results from these more conservative analyses are described below for the six trial judgments for which a SMA belief was found to be a significant mediator (See Table 3.2 for all Odds Ratios, Betas and effects of SMA beliefs as mediators of gender-trial judgment link).

Verdict. Condition 2 (the MV significantly predicted the DV) was only met for SMA flattery and SMA nuisance, Model (3) $\chi 2 = 42.78$, p = .000. The odds of rendering a guilty verdict increased by .646 as SMA flattery scores decreased by 1 point [B = -.437, SE = .20, p = .026] and .614 as SMA nuisance scores decreased by a point [B = -.488, SE = .45, p = .012]. Finally, condition 3 (the relation between the gender and the DV is reduced or disappears when the MV is controlled) was partially met; there was a

diminished effect of gender on verdict with the inclusion of the SMA mediator variables in the model, B was reduced from -1.09 to -.81, OR = .444. For SMA flattery, the bootstrapping analysis produced a confidence interval (CI) of -.996 to -.118, p = .009. For SMA nuisance, the bootstrapping revealed a CI of -.951 to -.102, p = .012. However, gender remained a significant predictor of verdict (p = .035), indicating SMA flattery and SMA nuisance were partial mediators.

Degree of Defendant Guilt. Condition 2 was met for SMA nuisance, [R2 = .13, F(3,357) = 16.93, p = .000]. As SMA nuisance scores increased the Degree of Defendant Guilt ratings decreased by .473, [SE = .19, t(357) = 3.45, p = .015]. Finally, condition 3 was partially met; there was a diminished effect of gender on defendant guilt with the inclusion of the SMA mediator variables in the model, B was reduced from -1.21 to -.81. For SMA nuisance, the bootstrapping revealed a CI of -.876 to -.023, p = .05. However, gender remained a significant predictor of verdict (p = .003), indicating SMA nuisance was a partial mediator.

Perceptions of Flattery. Condition 2 was met for SMA flattery, [R2 = .14, F(3,357) = 18.91, p = .000]. As SMA flattery scores increased by one point, Perceptions of Flattery was predicted to increase by .784, [SE = .18, t(357) = 4.31, p = .000]. Finally, condition 3 was fully met; the effect of gender disappeared with the inclusion of the SMA mediator variables in the model, B was reduced from .632 to .277, p > .05. For SMA flattery, the bootstrapping revealed a CI of .445 to 1.16, p = .001, indicating full mediation.

Perceptions of Annoyance. Condition 2 was met for SMA nuisance, [R^2 = .07, F(3,357) = 8.65, p = .000]. As SMA nuisance scores increased, the Perceptions of

Annoyance decreased by .488, [SE = .17, t(357) = 2.94, p = .003]. Finally, condition 3 was partially met; the effect of gender diminished with the inclusion of the SMA mediator variables in the model, B was reduced from -.844 to -.610. For SMA nuisance, the bootstrapping revealed a CI of -.777 to -.102, p = .012. Gender remained a significant predictor of perceptions of annoyance (p = .001), indicating that SMA nuisance was a partial mediator.

Predicting Fear & Distress. Condition 2 was met for SMA nuisance, [R^2 = .15, F(3,357) = 20.513, p = .000]. As SMA nuisance scores increased, Predicting Fear and Distress decreased by .746, [SE = .22, t(357) = 3.46, p = .001]. Finally, condition 3 was fully met; the effect of gender disappeared with the inclusion of the SMA mediator variables in the model, B was reduced from -.766 to -.149, p > .05. For SMA nuisance, the bootstrapping revealed a CI of -1.234 to -.247, p = .008, indicating full mediation.

Victim Responsibility. Condition 2 was met for SMA victim blame, [R^2 = .10, F(3,357) = 12.92, p = .000]. As SMA victim blame scores increased, perceptions of Victim Responsibility increased by .796, [SE = .22, t(357) = 3.56, p = .000]. Condition 3 was fully met; the effect of gender disappeared with the inclusion of the SMA mediator variables in the model, B was reduced from .650 to .048, p >.05. For SMA victim blame, the bootstrapping revealed a CI of .289 to 1.28, p = .003, indicating full mediation.

In summary, H2 was partially supported; SMA beliefs mediated the gender differences for six trial judgments. Specifically, adherence to SMA victim blame beliefs (i.e., attitudes that accentuate the culpability of the victim for causing the perpetrator's behavior) accounted for the gender differences found for *Victim Responsibility* ratings; men were more likely than women to view the victim as responsible because men were

more likely than women to endorse SMA victim blame beliefs. Endorsement of SMA flattery beliefs (i.e., attitudes that promote idea that persistent pursuit should be viewed as romantic, harmless and acceptable) was found to be a mediator for the link between gender-verdict and gender-perceptions of flattery. For example, men were more likely than women to perceive the defendant's behavior as flattering because men were more likely to endorse SMA flattery beliefs. Finally, adherence to SMA nuisance beliefs (i.e., attitudes that represent idea that stalking is not a serious, violent crime) explained the gender differences found for *Verdict*, *Degree of Defendant Guilt*, *Perceptions of Annoyance* and *Predictions of Fear and Distress*. For instance, men were less likely than women to predict that the defendant's behavior would cause fear and distress because men were more likely to endorse SMA nuisance beliefs.

Hypothesis 3a - Attitudes Mediate Gender-SMA Link

Given the predictive value of gender on the 3 SMA factors, mediational analyses were run to investigate whether the attitudes acted as mediators for this relation. Using the aforementioned criterion (Baron & Kenny, 1986), HTW, GRS and RBS did not all qualify for testing mediation (i.e., did not meet condition 1 – gender significantly predicted all the attitude scores). Specifically, gender did not significantly predict HTW [R^2 = .01, $F(1,357) = 3.50$, B = -.168, SE = .10, $t(357) = 1.87$, $p > .05$] or RBS [R^2 = .00, $F(1,357) = .61$, B = -.08, SE = .10, $t(357) = 782$, $p > .05$]. However, gender did predict GRS scores [R^2 = .04, $F(1,357) = 13.07$, B = .330, SE = .10, $t(357) = 3.62$, p = .000]; women had significantly lower GRS scores than men. Accordingly, GRS was tested for its ability to mediate the relation between participant gender and the 3 SMA factors (See Table 3.3 for all Betas and effects of attitudes as mediators of Gender-SMA link).

SMA Victim Blame. For GRS, condition 2 (MV significantly predicted DV) was met [R^2 = .30, F(3,357) = 50.54, p = .000]. As GRS scores increased by 1 point, adherence to SMA victim blame beliefs increased by .395, [SE = .50, t(357) = 7.87, p = .000]. Condition 3 (the relation between the gender and the DV is reduced or disappears when the MV is controlled) was partially met; there was a diminished effect of gender for SMA victim blame, B was reduced from .65 to .62. The bootstrapping analysis produced a CI from .22 to .40 for GRS, p = .001. However, gender remained a significant predictor of SMA victim blame (p = .001), indicating GRS was a partial mediator.

SMA Flattery. For GRS, condition 2 was met [R^2 = .19, F(3,357) = 83.76, p = .000]. As GRS scores increased by 1 point, the endorsement of SMA flattery increased by .487 [SE = .05, t(357) = 9.15, p = .000]. Condition 3 was partially met; there was a diminished effect of gender for SMA flattery, B was reduced from .47 to .44. The bootstrapping analysis produced a CI from .20 to .41 for GRS, p = .001. However, gender remained a significant predictor of SMA flattery (p = .001), indicating GRS was a partial mediator.

SMA Nuisance. For GRS, condition 2 was met [R^2 = .16, F(3,357) = 66.35, p = .000]. As GRS scores increased by 1 point, endorsement of SMA nuisance increased by .376 [SE = .05, t(357) = 8.15, p = .000]. Condition 3 was partially met; there was a diminished effect of gender for SMA nuisance with the addition of GRS, B was reduced from .49 to .45. The bootstrapping analysis produced a CI from .16 to .33 for GRS, p = .001. However, gender remained a significant predictor of SMA nuisance (p = .000), indicating GRS was a partial mediator.

In summary, H3a was given some support; GRS acted as a partial mediator for the gender differences found for three SMA beliefs. Men were more likely to endorse SMA victim blame, SMA flattery and SMA nuisance beliefs due in part to men's more traditional gender-role attitudes. It should also be noted that while HTW and RBS did not qualify as mediators (gender did not predict HTW and RBS endorsement), HTW and RBS were significant predictors for SMA beliefs. As HTW scores increased there was a predicted increase in endorsement of SMA victim blame, SMA flattery and SMA nuisance beliefs. In addition, an increase in RBS predicted an increase in endorsement of SMA victim blame beliefs.

Hypothesis 3b - Attitudes Moderate Gender-SMA Link.

Given the predictive value of gender on the 3 SMA factors, moderation analyses were run to investigate whether attitudes altered the strength of the gender-SMA link. To reiterate, moderation was tested first by examining whether there was a significant interaction between gender and the attitude of interest. The following model was used: step 1 included gender and attitudes of interest and step 2 included the interactions between gender and the attitudes of interest. As with mediation, the moderation procedure was conducted twice - once with each moderator tested separately and then with all moderators in the model. The following results depict the most rigorous moderation test (e.g., all moderators in model) as multicollinearity between the variables in the model was not a threat. R^2 change was used to evaluate whether the moderators were significant.

SMA Victim Blame. At Step 1, the entry of the gender and attitudes produced a significant Model [$R^2 = .39$, $F(4,357) = 56.83$, $p = .000$]. HTW had a significant

conditional effect such that a 1 point increase in HTW predicted a .319 increase in SMA victim blame, [SE = .05, t(357) = 6.96, p = .000]. GRS was also a significant predictor; SMA victim blame increased by .458 as GRS increased by 1 point [SE = .05, t(357) = 6.46, p = .000]. Finally, RBS had a significant effect; a 1 point increase in RBS predicted a .129 increase in SMA victim blame [SE = .05, t(357) = 2.83, p = .005]. At Step 2, the entry of interactions between gender and attitudes did not produce a significant R^2 change for the Model; further analyses assessing attitudes as moderators were not pursued.

SMA Flattery. At Step 1, the entry of the gender and attitudes produced a significant Model [R^2 = .36, F(4,357) = 49.55, p = .000]. HTW had a significant conditional effect such that a 1 point increase in HTW predicted a .434 increase in SMA flattery, [SE = .05, t(357) = 8.73, p = .000]. GRS was also a significant predictor; SMA flattery increased by .306 as GRS increased by 1 point [SE = .05, t(357) = 5.85, p = .000]. At Step 2, the entry of interactions between gender and attitudes did not produce a significant R^2 change for the Model; therefore further analyses testing the attitudes as moderators were not pursued.

SMA Nuisance. At Step 1, the entry of the gender and attitudes produced a significant Model [R^2 = .28, F(4,357) = 33.69, p = .000]. HTW had a significant conditional effect, such that a 1 point increase in HTW predicted a .256 increase in SMA nuisance, [SE = .05, t(357) = 5.71, p = .000]. GRS was also a significant predictor; SMA flattery increased by .240 as GRS increased by 1 point [SE = .05, t(357) = 5.08, p = .000]. At Step 2, the entry of interactions between gender and attitudes did not produce a significant R^2 change for the Model; therefore further analyses testing the attitudes as moderators were not pursued.

In summary, H3b was not supported; attitudes (HTW, GRS and RBS) did not significantly act as moderators for the relation between gender and SMA beliefs. However, attitudes (HTW, GRS and RBS) did significantly predict SMA beliefs as mentioned above. For example, participants who had higher HTW, GRS and RBS scores were predicted to have increased adherence to SMA victim blame beliefs. Nevertheless, these attitudes did not significantly illustrate under what conditions gender differences arise in SMA endorsement.

Additional Investigations

Sentencing

For those with a guilty verdict (n = 252; women = 160, men = 92), the following sentences were recommended: 19% Jail and Fine [25% women > 9% men; $t(48) = 3.06$, $p = .004$]; 18% Jail only [19% women > 15% men; $t(43) = 4.48$, $p = .000$]; and 63% Fine only [56% women < 76% men; $t(158) = 11.15$, $p = .000$].

The amount of jail time given averaged at 160 days (range: 1 day to 360 days) with a great deal of variance (SD = 112 days). The amount of jail time most often given to the defendant was 180 days. Women (M = 164 days, SD = 121 days) and men (M = 140 days, SD = 75 days) did not significantly differ in the amount of jail time given to the defendant, $t(91) = .881$, $p > .05$. The average fine charged to the defendant was \$400.74 (SD = \$126.08). The amount of fine most often charged to the defendant was \$500. Women (M = \$126.22, SD = \$11.29) and men (M = \$125.78, SD = \$14.43) did not significantly differ in the amount of fine charged to the defendant, $t(199) = 1.04$, $p > .05$.

Qualitative Reason for Verdict data

Reason for verdict data was scored by the primary researcher and a research assistant; agreement between scorers was $\alpha = .98$. The 2 answers that were given most often for a guilty verdict (n = 252; women = 160, men = 92) emphasized: (a) *defendant's intrusive behavior* (54% women, 53% men), and (b) *negative consequences for victim* (36% women, 36% men). Reasons that alluded to the *defendant's intrusive behavior* mentioned any questionable behavior performed by the defendant; for example, "The fact that even though Mr. Jones was told to leave Ms. Klein alone, he continued to follow her and try to contact her in somewhat creepy circumstances" and "The fact that he would wait outside her classroom buildings and watch her at the coffee shop." The other major reason for guilty verdict - negative *consequences to the victim* - referenced any fear, distress or discomfort the victim experiences due to the defendant's behavior. For example, "She had reason to fear for her safety and was obviously suffering from severe distress," and "Mr. Jones should have known that the amount of obsession that he was showing towards Ms. Klein could cause her to have fear about her safety and of someone else." Other answers included: *evidence proved guilt* [5% women < 8% men, $t(14) = 3.50$, $p = .004$), *identified with female victim* (4% women, 0% men) and *don't know/other* (1% women, 3% men).

There were 6 primary reasons given for rendering a not guilty verdict (n = 108; women = 42, men = 66): (a) *victim blame* [40% women > 21% men; $t(30) = 4.97$, $p = .000$], (b) *lack of evidence* (19% women, 20% men), (c) *defendant's behavior not intentional* [14% women < 18% men; $t(17) = 5.83$, $p = .000$], (d) *defendant proving love* (16% women, 17% men) (e) *defendant's positive characteristics* [7% women < 15% men, $t(12) = 6.33$, $p = .000$], and (f) *don't know/other* [6% women < 9% men, $t(7) = 4.58$,

p = .003]. Reasons for not guilty verdicts had a wider distribution across the categories. Reasons that fell into the category of *victim blame* mentioned any responsibility the victim had for the events in question; for example, “The girl was most likely overreacting.” References to needing more evidence for conviction fell into the category of *lack of evidence*; for example, “I do believe the defendant was wrong in continuing in his actions, but I do not think there is enough evidence that he actually stalked the girl.” Any mention that the defendant did not know or did not mean to cause the victim fear, distress or danger was placed in the *defendant’s behavior not intentional* category; for example, “He is no real physical threat to Ms. Klein and didn't intend to cause any intense mental stress other than annoyance.” Any explanation that described the defendant’s behavior as harmless romantic pursuit was placed in the *defendant proving love* category; for example, “As the people said, and evidence did show, he just obviously loved her very much.” Finally, any comment that referenced positive qualities of the defendant was put into the *defendant’s positive characteristics* category; for example, “He seemed like a good guy so everything was just a big misunderstanding.”

PES Descriptives

Ninety-five percent of the participants reported that they have heard of stalking. Overall, 35% of our sample affirmed that they had prior experience with being the target of unwanted attention [PESb 38% women > 30% men, $t(123) = 8.67$, p = .000]. The average rate of fear for safety reported by PESb targets was low (M = 3.29, SD = 2.93). There was a significant gender difference in how much fear for safety was reported, $t(122) = 6.09$, p = .000. Women were significantly more likely to report fear (M = 4.39, SD = 2.85) than men (M = 1.49, SD = 2.02). The average rating of emotional distress

reported by targets was in the mid-range of the scale (*M* = 4.77, *SD* = 3.07). Women significantly reported more emotional distress (*M* = 5.74, *SD* = 2.93) than men (*M* = 3.17 *SD* = 2.62), *t*(122) = 4.94, *p* = .000.

Overall, 39% of our sample reported PESk [41% women > 37% men, *t*(140) = 9.89, *p* = .000]. The average rate of fear for safety perceived was in the midrange of the scale (*M* = 5.25, SD = 3.03). Women were more likely to perceive a higher rate of fear (*M* = 6.11, *SD* = 2.93) than men (*M* = 4.09, *SD* = 2.84), *t*(140) = 4.09, *p* = .000. Likewise, women were more likely to perceive a higher rate of emotional distress (*M* = 7.18, *SD* = 2.51) than men (*M* = 4.83, *SD* = 2.61), *t*(140) = 5.40, *p* = .000.

PES: Degree of Fear and Degree of Distress

Finally, analyses were conducted on the subset of participants who acknowledged PESb and PESk experiences. These analyses examined whether the degree of fear and/or the degree of distress reported in response to PESb and PEk explained why gender effects were found for four specific trial judgments (e.g., *Verdict*, *Degree of Defendant Guilt*, *Perceptions of Fear and Distress* and *Victim Credibility*). Specifically, these trial judgments were evaluated because PESb and/or PESk were found to be significant predictors in H1. To reiterate mediation is confirmed if the following 3 conditions are met: (1) the gender predicts the mediator, (2) the mediator predicts the outcome variable, and (3) the relation between gender and the outcome variable is reduced or disappears when the mediator is controlled (see Table 3.4).

For participants who reported PESb, condition 1 was met for *Degree of Fear* and *Degree of Distress* reported. Female targets were more likely than male targets to report higher levels of fear [R^2 = .23, *F*(1,123) = 37.06, *p* = .000; *B* = -2.90, *SE* = .05, *t*(123) =

6.09, p = .000], and higher levels of distress [R^2 = .17, F(1,123) = 24.36, p = .000; B = -2.58, SE = .05, t(123) = 4.94, p = .000]. Likewise, for participants who reported PESk, condition 1 was met for *Degree of Fear* and *Degree of Distress* reported. Women who knew victims were more likely than men who knew victims to perceive fear [R^2 = .10, F(1,140) = 16.00, p = .000; B = -1.97, SE = .49, t(140) = 4.00, p = .000] and to perceive distress [R^2 = .17, F(1,140) = 28.38, p = .000; B = -2.33, SE = .44, t(140) = 5.33, p = .000]. The following results detail significant mediation effects of the *Degree of Fear* and *Degree of Distress* in separate regressions for each of the 4 trial judgments (e.g., *Verdict*, *Degree of Defendant Guilt*, *Perceptions of Fear and Distress* and *Victim Credibility*) in which PESb and/or PESk were significant predictors.

PESb/PESk & Verdict. Condition 2 was met for PESb Degree of Fear, [Model (1) χ^2 = 5.60, p = .018] and for PESb Degree of Distress [Model (1) χ^2 = 4.14, p = .042] As PESb Degree of Fear increased the odds of rendering a guilty verdict increased by 1.17 [B = .159, SE = .07, p = .023]. Likewise, as PESb Degree of Distress increased, the odds of rendering a guilty verdict increased by 1.13 [B = .126, SE = .06, p = .046]. However, condition 3 was not met indicating that the degree of fear and distress reported by PESb participants did not explain the association between gender and verdict.

Condition 2 was met for PESk Degree of Fear, [Model (1) χ^2 = 9.17, p = .002] and for PESk Degree of Distress [Model (1) χ^2 = 11.32, p = .001]. As PESk fear increased, the odds of rendering a guilty verdict increased by 1.20 [B = .180, SE = .06, p = .003]. Similarly as PESk Degree of Distress increased the odds of rendering a guilty verdict increased by 1.24 [B = .217, SE = .07, p = .001]. Condition 3 was partially met for PESk *Degree of Distress*; there was a diminished effect of gender for verdict, B was reduced

from -1.22 to -.99. The bootstrapping analysis produced a confidence interval from .003 to .281 for PESk *Degree of Distress, p* = .04. However, gender remained a significant predictor of verdict at *p* = .011, indicating PESk *Degree of Distress* is a partial mediator.

PESb & Degree of Defendant Guilt. Condition 2 was met for PESb Degree of Fear, [R^2 = .26, F(1, 123) = 8.92, p = .003] and for PESb Degree of Distress [R^2 = .11, F(1, 123) = 14.96, p = .000]. As PESb Degree of Fear increased, the defendant's guilt rating increased by .225[SE = .08, t(123) = 2.99, p = .003]. Likewise as PESb Degree of Distress increased the defendant's guilt increased by .272 [SE = .07, t(123) = 3.87, p = .000]. However, condition 3 was not met indicating that the degree of fear and distress reported by PESb participants did not explain the association between gender and degree of defendant guilt.

PESb & Perceptions of Fear and Distress. Condition 2 was met for PESb Degree of Fear, [R^2 = .11, F(1, 123) = 15.41, p = .000] and for PESb Degree of Distress [R^2 = .09, F(1, 123) = 11.58, p = .001]. As PESb Degree of Fear increased, Perceptions of Fear and Distress increased by .247 [, SE = .06, t(123) = 3.93, p = .000]. In addition, as PESb Degree of Distress increased, Perceptions of Fear and Distress were predicted to increase by .208 [SE = .06, t(123) = 3.40, p = .001]. Condition 3 was partially met for PESb Degree of Fear; there was a diminished effect of gender, B was reduced from -1.75 to -1.35. The bootstrapping analysis produced a confidence interval from .019 to .258 for PESb Degree of Fear, p = .02. However, gender remained a significant predictor of perceptions of fear and distress at p = .001, indicating PESk Degree of Fears is a partial mediator.

PESb & Victim Credibility. Condition 2 was met for PESb Degree of Distress [R^2 = .06, F(1, 123) = 7.09, p = .009]. As PESb Degree of Distress increased, Victim Credibility ratings were predicted to increase by .166 [SE = .06, t(123) = 2.66, p = .009]. However, condition 3 was not met, indicating that the degree of distress reported by PESb participants did not explain the association between gender and victim credibility.

Table 3.1

Regression Model Results – Step 2 for Hypothesis 1: Gender Differences in Trial Judgments (Women = 0; Men = 1)

	Constant	PESb	PESk	Gender
Outcome Variables				
Verdict	5.93	.595*	.609*	.338**
Degree of Defendant Guilt	7.11	-.55*	-.08	-1.21**
Perceptions Fear & Distress	7.26	-.55*	-.13	-.146**
Perceptions of Flattery	3.16	-.13	-.42	.60**
Perceptions of Annoyance	8.22	-.28	-.04	-.84**
Prediction of Fear & Distress	7.01	-.02	-.07	-.77*
Intended Fear & Distress	3.26	.03	-.03	-.81*
Positive Emotions Victim	5.66	-.28	-.30	-1.43*
Negative Emotions Defendant	4.75	-.16	-.25	-1.30**
Danger Posed by Defendant	5.39	-.26	-.31	-1.23**
Victim Credibility	7.56	-.62*	.02	-.72*
Victim Responsibility	3.78	-.06	.15	.65*
Defendant Credibility	5.24	.20	-.15	.61*
Defendant Responsibility	7.78	-.20	.34	-1.09**

Note: Odds ratios are presented for verdict; Betas are presented for all other regressions; * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$; PESb = personal experience with being a victim, PESk = personal experience with knowing a victim.

Table 3.2

Regression Model Results – Step 2 for Hypothesis 2: SMA beliefs as Mediators of Gender-Trial Judgment Link (Women = 0; Men = 1)

Outcome Variables	Constant	PESb	PESk	Gender
Verdict	38.21**	.583*	.502**	.444**
Degree of Defendant Guilt	8.92**	-.561*		-.807**
Perceptions of Flattery	1.01**			.277
Perceptions of Annoyance	9.03**			-.601**
Prediction of Fear & Distress	9.55**			-.149
Victim Responsibility	1.52**			.048

Table 3.2 (continued)

Outcome Variables	SMA Victim Blame	SMA Flattery	SMA Nuisance
Verdict	1.249	**.582****	**.610***
Degree of Defendant Guilt	-.045	-.376*	**-.415***
Perceptions of Flattery	-.142	***.801****	.154
Perceptions of Annoyance	.013	-.067	**-.438****
Prediction of Fear & Distress	-.231	-.237	***-.733****
Victim Responsibility	***.787****	-.247	.416

Note: Odds ratios are presented for verdict; Betas are presented for all other regressions; * p < .05, **p < .01; Bold variables are mediators, Italicized variables are full mediators

Table 3.3

Regression Model Results – Step 2 for Hypothesis 3a: Attitudes as Mediators of Gender-SMA Link (Women = 0; Men = 1)

Outcome Variables	Constant	Gender	HTW	GRS	RBS
SMA Victim Blame	2.78**	.615**	.319**	**.447****	.129**
SMA Flattery	2.55**	.444**	.434**	**.306****	.061
SMA Nuisance	1.88**	.366**	.256**	**.339****	.070

Note: * p < .05, **p < .01; Bold variables are mediators

Table 3.4

Separate Regression Model Results - Step 2 PESb & PESk: Degree of Fear and Degree of Distress as Mediators of Gender-Trial Judgment Link (Women = 0; Men = 1)

Outcome Variables	Constant	Gender	PESb Degree of Fear	PESb Degree of Distress	PESk Degree of Fear	PESk Degree of Distress
Verdict	2.798*	.229**	1.037			
	2.742*	.224**		1.032		
	1.359	.370**			1.143*	
	.992	.409*				**1.17***
Degree of Defendant Guilt	6.369**	-1.634**	.094			
	5.759**	-1.450**		.178*		
Perceptions of Fear and Distress	6.137**	-1.351**	**.139***			
	6.100**	-1.464**		.113		
Victim Credibility	7.177**	-1.327**	.001			
	6.630**	-1.084*		.096		

Note: Odds ratios are presented for verdict; Betas are presented for all other regressions; * p < .05, **p < .01; Bold variables are mediators.

CHAPTER 4

Discussion

Until recently, the area of stalking research has proceeded largely on vignette studies that have focused on asking participants to apply perceived severity ratings and stalking labels rather than asking participants to answer questions about legal decision-making. In an effort to supplement a growing body of research on public perceptions of stalking, this study represents one of the first to examine women's and men's trial judgments of intimate stalking between a female victim and male defendant using the NCVC (2007) revised anti-stalking statute. The present research offers a unique opportunity to evaluate the predictive validity of particular attitudes that are theoretically related to participant gender differences in trial judgments using a courtroom context. These theoretical developments provide an empirical foundation for explaining how stalking-related attitudes and their attitudinal antecedents account for the gender differences that arise in perceptions of intimate stalking in the courtroom.

The present results offer important insights for mock juror research on intimate stalking. Most importantly, there was evidence of significant gender differences in trial judgments (e.g., women made more pro-prosecution decisions) of a case of intimate stalking using the newly revised reasonable person's standard of fear in the NCVC (2007) anti-stalking statute. It should be noted that the legislative adjustments recommended by NCVC (2007) were an attempt to compensate for gender differences in perceptions of fear. Research on fear of victimization and perceptions of risk indicates that while women and men share similar fear levels for nonviolent crimes (e.g., car theft), women have significantly more fear of violent crimes (e.g., sexual assault) than men

(Ferraro, 1996). With regard to stalking, Dennison (2007) found that women were more likely than men to perceive even a vague threat as invoking fear. Accordingly, using a lesser degree of reasonable person's fear (i.e., personal safety or the safety of a third person or suffering other emotional distress), as opposed to the original Model Anti-Stalking Code's high standard of fear (i.e., fear of physical violence, sexual assault, and/or death) was an effort to provide more effective legal protection against stalking for men and women. Despite the lower standard of fear required, the current research provided evidence that significantly more women than men rendered trial judgments that were favorable toward the victim's case. For example, women rendered more guilty verdicts and had higher degree of defendant guilt ratings. In addition, men rendered more lenient judgments favoring of the defendant. To illustrate, men were more likely to feel that the defendant's behavior was flattering and that the defendant's version of events was more credible.

It could be argued that the use of a reasonable woman standard, which is used by some federal courts in sexual harassment litigation (e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872), as opposed to a reasonable person standard, may reduce or minimize the gender disparity in perceptions of stalking. The purpose of the reasonable woman standard is to force jurors and juries to examine the sexual harassment from the perspective of the plaintiff, who is typically a woman (Gutek & O'Connor, 1995). However, caution is warranted, as the adoption of the reasonable woman standard by federal courts has been met with much controversy among social scientists and legal scholars. Over the last two decades, claims of a wide divergence between women's and men's perceptions of sexual harassment have been challenged. The general consensus is that women are more likely than men to

identify a situation as sexually harassing, and this difference tends to be smaller when legal scenarios are used (Blumenthal, 1989). Recent research suggests that the use of a reasonable woman standard increases the probability of a woman winning a case of sexual harassment. For example, Perry, Kulik, and Bourhis (2004) examined the impact of the reasonable woman standard on federal court decisions of sexual harassment cases (N = 124). They found that the plaintiff's probability of winning a sexual harassment case averaged 50% in districts that had a reasonable woman precedent-setting case compared to only 24% in other districts. With regard to current American anti-stalking legislation, the NCVC (2007) recommends the use of a reasonable person standard but that it should be applied with respect to the victim's circumstances. Future research is needed to address whether legislative adjustments with regard to the standard of fear compensate for the gender differences that may arise in perceptions of intimate stalking involving a female victim and male defendant.

Another important finding from the present study was that women and men differed significantly in adherence to beliefs that support stalking myth acceptance (SMA). For example, more men than women acknowledge beliefs supporting SMA victim blame, SMA flattery and SMA nuisance. Further, SMA beliefs partially account for the gender differences on trial judgments, especially on the ultimate judgment of verdict. For example, analyses indicated that SMA flattery and SMA nuisance partially mediated the relation between gender and verdict. Similar to the predominant cultural attitudes that serve to minimize or foster tolerance of sexual aggression toward women (e.g., "Rape Myth Acceptance," Burt, 1980), SMA beliefs appear to promote a tolerance for intimate stalking by minimizing its seriousness. Although determining partial

mediation provides some understanding into the reasons behind a verdict, Bullock, Green, and Ha (2010) caution against overstating the influence of mediational analyses, particularly those that are not manipulated variables. It is likely that the SMA beliefs are related to other variables not included in the present study. For example, SMA beliefs may be related to acceptance of interpersonal violence, among other possibilities. However, the present study suggests that a mock juror's endorsement of SMA flattery and SMA nuisance beliefs are enough to influence verdicts in an intimate stalking case, and therefore merit further investigation.

In addition, endorsement of SMA beliefs appears to be strongly connected to other deeply held attitudes that promote a tolerance for stalking behavior, such as hostility toward women (HTW), gender-role stereotyping (GRS) and romantic beliefs (RBS). The current research suggests that changing adherence to SMA will not be easily achieved, since they are so closely interconnected with other pervasive attitudes. For example, participants who had high HTW, GRS and RBS scores were more likely to endorse SMA victim blame beliefs. It is possible these attitudes (e.g., HTW, GRS, RBS) that predict a tolerance for victim blame are more influential in a prototypical case of intimate stalking (a female accusing a male) than other types of stalking, such as stranger stalking. Additional research should address whether attitudes that promote a tolerance for intimate stalking also promote a tolerance for stranger stalking.

It should also be noted that only GRS mediated the relation between gender and SMA beliefs. For example, men had higher SMA victim blame, SMA flattery and SMA nuisance beliefs due in part to men's traditional gender-role attitudes. The influence of traditional gender roles on SMA endorsement is consistent with prior research that shows

men with traditional GRS beliefs are more likely to tolerate aggressive behavior in an intimate partner context (e.g., Sigelman et al., 1984). It is possible that a long-range plan of fighting dangerous SMA beliefs could be accomplished by educating pre-adolescents. Early intervention is important because it allows for education before young people's perceptions of intimate partner relationships is further complicated by dangerous sex role interactions (e.g., "no" really means "yes") often portrayed in the media.

Given that prior victimization is a relevant topic in jury selection, the present research also offers important insight into the impact of personal experience with victimization (PES) on trial judgments of intimate stalking. For example, men and women who either previously had been a victim (PESb) and/or who had previously known a victim (PESk) were more likely to render a guilty verdict than their counterparts who had reported no PESb and/or PESk. Furthermore, the degree of fear resulting from PESb and the degree of distress resulting from PESk mediated gender differences on some trial judgments. For example, PESk men (as compared to PESk women) were less likely to render a guilty verdict due in part to lower ratings of perceived PESk emotional distress. The impact of PES suggests that personal experience with stalking-related behaviors can increase attributions of guilt when judging a case of intimate stalking. Without personal experience of victimization, people may rely more on stalking schemas formed through media that often glorifies stalking as romantic pursuit (e.g., Yanowitz, 2006). Thus, national educational programs could be critical to addressing the disparity in how seriously people judge a case of stalking. For example, in 2004 the National Center for Victims of Crime launched National Stalking Awareness Month to raise public consciousness about the crime of stalking. This effort to spread information about the

dangers of stalking has been supported by the U.S. House of Representatives with concurrent resolutions that designates January as National Stalking Awareness month (H.R., 960, 2010).

Despite the number of compelling observations, the present research is only the first phase of investigation into juror perceptions of intimate stalking in the courtroom. There are several aspects of the present study that might limit the generalizability of the results to actual courtrooms. First, the use of written trial summaries warrants caution when interpreting the results because it does not allow for demeanor evidence (the visual behavioral conduct of trial participants). However, Bottoms et al. (2007) suggested that the use of trial summaries has the benefit of allowing researchers to manipulate certain factors (e.g., gender) while keeping all other factors constant, making this research a valuable starting point. In addition, Bornstein's (1999) meta-analysis of jury simulation studies showed that the presentation medium has little effect on the outcomes in these studies regardless of whether the comparison is made within the same study or across replication studies that use different mediums.

Second, the mock jurors of the present study did not deliberate before rendering their verdicts. Deliberation data can provide researchers with insight into how group discussion can: (1) persuade individual opinions; and (2) result in a deeper understanding of the key points in a trial. However, individual decision-making does have experimental benefits. For example, collecting data from individual jurors allows researchers to examine the impact of individual juror differences. Moreover, collecting individual verdicts in place of deliberation data allows researchers to collect data from many

participants rather than just a few and consequently helps to ensure that results will generalize to a larger segment of the population (Diamond, 1997; Bottoms et al., 2007).

Third, while the present sample did meet the minimum age and citizenship requirements to serve on a jury, it is not possible to know if they would be selected to serve as jurors on a case of stalking after jury selection. Questions also arise as to whether college students are the appropriate reference group to represent community sentiments regarding intimate stalking. The use of community samples (as compared to a college samples) are considered to increase the external validity of any mock juror research project, because community members are more likely to reflect the relevant social, political and life experiences of a typical juror. However, it is important to recognize that our findings were generally consistent with stalking research conducted on larger, more diverse community samples (Phillips et al., 2004).

In summary, the results of these studies indicate that men are more lenient than women when judging a case of a female accusing a male ex-intimate of stalking. Additionally, men are also more likely than women to endorse dysfunctional attitudes that promote a tolerance for stalking behavior. Future research should address the methodological limitations cited above by taking steps to minimize the artificiality of the present study. This can be accomplished by grouping community members into juries for mock deliberation. In addition, future research should continue to explore reasons why gender differences exist in perceptions of reasonable fear in intimate stalking. Given the inherent difficulties that legislators have had creating effective anti-stalking legislation, understanding attitudes that influence trial judgments is especially valuable to a preliminary assessment of anti-stalking legislation.

Appendix A

Trial Summary

Now, you will be assuming the role of a juror as you read a trial summary and answer questions. Please make sure you read the trial very carefully so that you will be able to answer important questions about it.

Commonwealth of Kentucky V. Michael Jones (Defendant)

Stalking in the Second Degree

The following is a summary of a criminal trial about the alleged criminal stalking of Jessica Klein by the defendant, Michael Jones. It was alleged that Ms. Klein's ex-boyfriend, Mr. Jones, stalked her during a period of approximately 6 months beginning August 21st, 2007 and ending January 18th, 2008. At the time of the alleged stalking and at the time of the trial, Ms. Klein and Mr. Jones were 20-year-old college sophomores.

The State charged Mr. Jones with Stalking in the Second-Degree, a Class A Misdemeanor. The State provided evidence that Mr. Jones intentionally and repeatedly engaged in behaviors that would cause a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances to fear for her safety or suffer emotional distress (i.e., significant mental suffering). The State called two witnesses for the prosecution: Jessica Klein (the alleged victim) and Christy Martin (the alleged victim's dorm roommate).

Mr. Jones denied that he stalked Ms. Klein and pled not guilty to the charge of Stalking in the Second-Degree. The Defense provided evidence that Mr. Jones was a responsible and law-abiding man who has never been accused of any crime, and that the charge against him was a grave misunderstanding. The Defense called two witnesses: Michael Jones (the defendant) and Paul Franklin (the defendant's dorm roommate).

Q1. **Identify the relationship between the defendant (Michael Jones) and the alleged victim (Jessica Klein).**

☐ Teacher and Student

☐ Ex-Boyfriend and Ex-Girlfriend

☐ Strangers

PROSECUTION'S CASE

Witness No. 1: Jessica Klein (Alleged Victim)

Direct Examination: Ms. Klein stated that her ex-boyfriend, Mr. Jones, began stalking her after their break-up. She recalled that their first contact after breaking up occurred on the night of August 21st, 2008 at a University Theater Production. Ms. Klein said that Mr. Jones appeared very nervous when he approached her during intermission. She stated that Mr. Jones said that he could not get her out of his mind and that he loved her. Ms. Klein said that he apologized for any behavior that might have caused their break-up and begged her to meet so they could talk things over. In response, Ms. Klein told him to e-mail her about meeting for coffee later in the week. Ms. Klein informed the court that she only agreed to meet with Mr. Jones because she thought there would be negative consequences if she rejected him.

Ms. Klein said that Mr. Jones sent her a very long email the next day. She stated that the email began in a very nice manner but then excessively described how much he loved her. She said that the email ended with the statement that she would never find anyone that would care for her as he did. Ms. Klein reported that he continued to send a few e-mails each week. She said that at first, the e-mails were flattering but soon they

became annoying and eventually they became worrisome. She said that the emails contained love poetry and old pictures that he had taken when they were dating. She stated that she became concerned when she received what appeared to be recent photos of herself, like when she was at the mall with some of her friends. Ms. Klein reported that she did not respond to any of the e-mails because she did not want to encourage Mr. Jones' behavior. Ms. Klein said that the e-mails continued even after her roommate, Ms. Martin, told Mr. Jones to stop contacting her.

Ms. Klein said Mr. Jones also began to show up every few days where she worked- the campus coffee shop. Mr. Jones rarely purchased anything but would just sit and write in his notebook. She said that she felt uncomfortable because she would occasionally catch Mr. Jones staring at her while she worked. She said her anxiety escalated when she noticed Mr. Jones waiting outside of the classroom building when her psychology class let out. On November 22nd, Ms. Klein's professor told her that a very concerned young man, "claiming to be her boyfriend" inquired about her health because she had missed a few classes. She reported that over the last month she felt preoccupied with the feeling of being watched because she would see Mr. Jones so often that it could not be a coincidence. Ms. Klein determined that he must have been following her around campus.

Ms. Klein got legal help on January 18th when she discovered that Mr. Jones had created a website devoted to her. She said she felt upset that he had put personal information about her on the Internet. She said the site contained information said that she was the only woman he would ever love and he didn't want to live without her in his

life. She said that Mr. Jones' behavior had caused her serious concern for her safety and as a result, she had trouble sleeping, some loss of appetite, quit her job and was not doing well in her courses. She said that she was always fearful Mr. Jones would become angry and physically hurt her or someone she loved.

Cross Examination: Even though Mr. Jones' recent behavior had made Ms. Klein fearful, she acknowledged that while they were dating she did not consider him to be a violent person. She admitted that on several occasions, Mr. Jones showed a lack of control but he had never become physically aggressive with her. Moreover, Ms. Klein agreed that while they were dating she had told Mr. Jones that she enjoyed his affection and loved the e-mails and pictures he gave her. Ms. Klein also admitted that she was not doing well in some of her classes before she felt Mr. Jones was stalking her. However, she said she felt she would have been able to pull her grades up if the defendant was not terrorizing her.

Q2. **Ms. Klein recalled that the first time Mr. Jones approached her to discuss their relationship after they had broken up was _____.**

- ☐ during halftime at a Football game
- ☐ at her work when she was on break
- ☐ during intermission at a University Theater Production

<u>Witness No. 2</u>: Christy Martin (Alleged Victim's Roommate)

Direct Examination: Ms. Martin said that she and Ms. Klein met Mr. Jones in summer school. She said Mr. Jones sat behind them and that he started talking to Ms. Klein every class period. Ms. Martin said he seemed more interested in Ms. Klein than the class. In

fact, Ms. Martin said that Mr. Jones and Ms. Klein seemed very passionate about each other. Ms. Martin stated that Ms. Klein dated Mr. Jones for a couple months while they had class together but broke up with him before the fall semester began.

On December 1st, at the request of Ms. Klein, Ms. Martin went to Mr. Jones' dorm to tell him to stop sending e-mails and to leave Ms. Klein alone. She said that Mr. Jones got a very hurt expression on his face and slammed his door after hearing that Ms. Klein was disturbed by his recent behavior and never wanted to see him again. Ms. Martin said that Mr. Jones said, "You are lying, you don't even know her like I do. I cannot believe she would be so mean after all I have done to show her that we are meant to be together." Ms. Martin reported that Ms. Klein was annoyed when she relayed Mr. Jones' comment. Ms. Martin said that Ms. Klein became increasingly anxious that Mr. Jones would hurt or kill her or someone she loved.

Moreover, Ms. Martin reported that she thinks that Mr. Jones has an aggressive personality. Ms. Martin said that she came to this conclusion after she overheard Mr. Jones yelling and throwing things around in his dorm room after she told him to leave Ms. Klein alone.

Cross Examination: Ms. Martin stated that she had never seen Mr. Jones act physically aggressive with Ms. Klein while they were dating or afterward. Further, she admitted that while she thought Mr. Jones made a threat he did not explicitly say that he was going to hurt Ms. Klein.

Q3. **Ms. Martin said that Ms. Klein and Mr. Jones started dating after they met each other _____.**

☐ in a summer college class

☐ at the beach on vacation

☐ doing volunteer work

DEFENDANT'S CASE

Witness No.1: Michael Jones (Defendant)

Direct Examination: Mr. Jones stated that he is a successful student and has a part time job as a tutor for other students. Other than the allegations made in this Court, he has never been accused of stalking or harassing anyone. Mr. Jones admitted to approaching Ms. Klein at the theater, but he was just greeting her and when he noticed that she seemed uncomfortable, he went back to his seat. Mr. Jones said that seeing Ms. Klein that night in the theater reminded him how much he loved and missed her.

Mr. Jones felt he should fight for Ms. Klein's love to win her back. He said he felt he should let her know how much he loved her by sending her romantic emails and being close by if she needed him. Mr. Jones said he thought Ms. Klein would fall back in love with him if he tried hard enough. Further, Mr. Jones said that he would never do anything to bother or harass Ms. Klein. He said all he ever wanted was to be close to Ms. Klein because they had so much fun together when they were dating over the summer.

Mr. Jones said that he put information about Ms. Klein on his website because he was passionate about Ms. Klein and he wanted everyone to know how much Ms. Klein meant to him. Mr. Jones said that he was shocked to learn that Ms. Klein did not like the

website because he meant it as a compliment. He said he felt if he could just have one more chance with Ms. Klein that he could make her very happy. He said he really believed that Ms. Klein still loved him and if he said and did the right things she would come back to him.

Mr. Jones said he remembered when Ms. Klein sent Ms. Martin to tell him to leave her alone. Mr. Jones stated that he felt that Ms. Klein's lack of positive response was just her way of playing hard to get. He said that if he had known he was scaring Ms. Klein he would have backed off. Mr. Jones denied that he purposely followed Ms. Klein around campus. He said that their paths would sometimes cross because they had similar class schedules. Mr. Jones did admit that he looked forward to the possibility of seeing Ms. Klein on campus because he hoped that she would want to talk to him. In addition, Mr. Jones explained that he approached Ms. Klein's professor because he was worried about her missing class and work. Mr. Jones said he was very worried because when he asked some of Ms. Klein's friends they said that they had not seen or heard from her. Mr. Jones said the last thing in the world he wanted was for Ms. Klein to be uncomfortable or frightened around him.

Cross Examination: Mr. Jones stated that he was very hurt when Ms. Klein broke up with him because she was the only girl he ever really loved. He said that he did continue to contact Ms. Klein after Ms. Martin told him leave her alone. Mr. Jones said he felt like Ms. Klein just did not understand how much he truly cared about her.

Q4. **Mr. Jones stated that he worked part time _____.**

☒ in a coffee shop

☐ in the mall

☐ as a tutor

Witness No. 2: Paul Franklin (Defendant's Roommate)

Direct Examination: Mr. Franklin is a roommate of the defendant and they have become good friends over the past year. He stated that Mr. Jones is a moral person of the utmost character. Mr. Franklin does not believe that the defendant is capable of stalking Ms. Klein. He said that Mr. Jones always said the nicest things about Ms. Klein even after Ms. Klein broke up with him. Mr. Franklin said that Mr. Jones always remained very devoted to Ms. Klein even though he could have gone out with many other girls. He remembered one occasion that Mr. Jones got into a physical fight with a guy from the dorms who had said something rude about Ms. Klein. He stated that Mr. Jones was concerned with defending and protecting Ms. Klein, not with harming her.

Cross Examination: Mr. Franklin admitted that on several occasions he accompanied Mr. Jones to the coffee shop where Ms. Klein worked. Mr. Franklin said that on those occasions Ms. Klein appeared annoyed that they were hanging out there. He also admitted Mr. Jones could possibly be preoccupied with Ms. Klein. Mr. Franklin also agrees that he does not see everything Mr. Jones does, nor does Mr. Jones tell him everything.

Q5. **Mr. Franklin said that Mr. Jones had the opportunity to _____.**

☒ date other girls if he wanted

☐ get a scholarship

☐ get a job at the coffee shop

CLOSING ARGUMENTS

The prosecution said that Mr. Jones must be convicted because the law says a person is guilty of criminal stalking if he engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person and he knows (or should know) that his course of conduct would cause a reasonable person (in the alleged victim's circumstances) to fear for her safety or suffer other emotional distress (i.e., significant mental suffering). The prosecution argued that evidence points to Mr. Jones harassing and stalking Ms. Klein and that research shows that stalking behavior frequently escalates to physical harm. Further, they ask the jury to consider if someone in Ms. Klein's position should have to wait until something horrible happens to bring the harasser to court.

The defense argued that there was not enough evidence to prove that Mr. Jones was guilty of criminal stalking, stating that the jury cannot convict Mr. Jones because the only thing that was proven was that he loved Ms. Klein. The defense claimed that a reasonable person in Ms. Klein's circumstances would not be afraid but that instead, she overreacted and her paranoia was the cause of her fear. There was no evidence produced to prove that Mr. Jones knew (or should have known) that he was causing Ms. Klein to fear for her safety, rather Mr. Jones felt like his persistence would convince Ms. Klein that he loved her.

The prosecution restated that Ms. Klein's fear was very reasonable. They asked the jury to consider how it would feel to be in Ms. Klein's position. They said Mr. Jones' behavior was completely inappropriate and that any smart, responsible person like Ms. Klein would be frightened for her safety. They said it is unreasonable that Mr. Jones followed her, harassed her and stalked her. Finally, they said that Mr. Jones should have known his actions would cause reasonable fear, especially since his attention was unwanted.

Q6. **This trial is about _____.**

☐ a defendant charged with stalking his ex-girlfriend.

☐ a defendant charged with stalking her ex-boyfriend.

☐ a defendant charged with assaulting his ex-girlfriend.

JUROR'S INSTRUCTIONS

Judge Graham charges you, the juror, to find the defendant (Michael Jones) guilty of Second-Degree Stalking (a Class A Misdemeanor) if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following:

That the defendant, Mr. Jones:

(1) purposely engaged in a course of conduct directed at Ms. Klein, **and**

(2) that he knew or should have known that his course of conduct would cause a "reasonable person in the victim's circumstances" to fear for her safety or the safety of a third person; **or** (3) suffer other emotional distress (significant mental suffering)

Appendix B

Trial Questionnaire

1. How would you rate the guilt of the defendant (Michael Jones) in this case?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Completely Not Guilty									**Completely Guilty**	

2. What is your ***verdict*** in this case? **(A)** Not Guilty **(B)** Guilty

3. Please, be as specific as you can. Explain how you arrived at your verdict.

4. How **confident** are you of your verdict?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Confident									**Extremely Confident**	

5. (Answered only for guilty verdicts)

Because you, the juror, found the defendant (Michael Jones) guilty of Second-Degree Stalking, you must now decide the appropriate punishment for this criminal offense. Given that this crime is a Class A Misdemeanor you must decide whether the defendant serves time in jail (a maximum of 12 months), as well as, whether the defendant pays a fine (a maximum of $500) to the State.

Please choose the appropriate punishment:

A) Defendant DOES serve time in jail; (enter an amount between 1 day and 12 months); Defendant DOES pay fine to State; (enter amount of fine between $1 and 500$)

B) Defendant DOES serve time in jail; (enter an amount between 1 day and 12 months); Defendant does NOT pay a fine to the State.

C) Defendant does NOT spend time in jail; Defendant DOES pay fine to State; (enter amount of fine between $1 and 500$)

6. How **credible** was the *alleged victim's* (Jessica Klein) testimony**?**

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Credible										**Completely Credible**

7. How **responsible** was the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein) for the events in question?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Responsible										**Completely Responsible**

8. How much **emotional distress** did the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein) experience due to the events in question?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Emotional Distress										**Extreme Emotional Distress**

9. Given the *alleged victim's* (Jessica Klein) circumstances, how **"reasonable"** was her emotional distress?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Reasonable										**Completely Reasonable**

10. If *you* were in the alleged victim's (Jessica Klein) circumstances, how much **emotional distress** would you feel?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Emotional Distress										**Extreme Emotional Distress**

11. How much did the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein) **fear for her safety** due to the events in question?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Fear										**Extreme Fear**

12. Given the *alleged victim's* (Jessica Klein) circumstances, how **"reasonable"** was her fear?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Reasonable										**Completely Reasonable**

13. If *you* were in the alleged victim's (Jessica Klein) circumstances, how **fearful** would you be?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Fearful										**Extremely Fearful**

14. How **annoyed** was the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein) due to the events in question?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Annoyed										**Extremely Annoyed**

15. Given the *alleged victim's* (Jessica Klein) circumstances, how **"reasonable"** was her annoyance?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Reasonable										**Completely Reasonable**

16. If *you* were in the alleged victim's (Jessica Klein) circumstances, how **annoyed** would you be?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Annoyed										**Extremely Annoyed**

17. How **flattered** was the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein) due to the events in question?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Flattered										**Extremely Flattered**

18. Given the *alleged victim's* (Jessica Klein) circumstances, how **"reasonable"** was it that she felt flattered?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Reasonable										**Completely Reasonable**

19. If *you* were in the alleged victim's (Jessica Klein) circumstances how **flattered** would you be?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Flattered										**Extremely Flattered**

20. How **credible** was the *defendant's* (Michael Jones) testimony?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Credible										**Completely Credible**

21. How **responsible** was the *defendant* (Michael Jones) for the events in question?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Not Responsible										**Completely Responsible**

22. How much **danger** did the *defendant* (Michael Jones) pose to the alleged victim?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Danger										**Extreme Danger**

23. Did the *defendant* (Michael Jones) **intend** to cause emotional distress?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Intent										**Absolute Intent**

24. Should the *defendant* (Michael Jones) have **known** that his behaviors would cause emotional distress?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No way to know										**Absolutely should have known**

25. If *you* were in the defendant's (Michael Jones) circumstances, would *you* have **known** that the behaviors in question would cause emotional distress?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No way to know										**Absolutely should have known**

26. Did the *defendant* (Michael Jones) **intend** to cause fear for safety?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Intent										**Absolute Intent**

27. Should the *defendant* (Michael Jones) have **known** that his behaviors would cause fear for safety?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No way to know										**Absolutely should have known**

28. If *you* were in the defendant's (Michael Jones) circumstances, would *you* have **known** that the behaviors in question would cause fear for safety?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No way to know **Absolutely should have known**

29. How much **sympathy** did you feel <u>toward</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Sympathy **Extreme Sympathy**

30. How much **anger** did you feel <u>toward</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Anger **Extreme Anger**

31. How much **disgust** did you feel <u>toward</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Disgust **Extreme Disgust**

32. How much **outrage** did you feel <u>toward</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Outrage **Extreme Outrage**

33. How much **sadness** did you feel <u>for</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Sadness **Extreme Sadness**

34. How much **concern** did you feel <u>for</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Concern **Extreme Concern**

35. How much **worry** did you feel <u>for</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Worry										**Extreme Worry**

36. How much **anxiety** did you feel <u>for</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Anxiety										**Extreme Anxiety**

37. How much **frustration** did you feel <u>toward</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Frustration										**Extreme Frustration**

38. How much **irritation** did you feel <u>toward</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Irritation										**Extreme Irritation**

39. How much **shame** did you feel <u>for</u> the *alleged victim* (Jessica Klein)?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Shame										**Extreme Shame**

40. How much do you **identify** with the *alleged victim's* (Jessica Klein) point of view?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Do Not Identify										**Completely Identify**

41. How much **sympathy** did you feel <u>toward</u> the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Sympathy										**Extreme Sympathy**

42. How much **anger** did you feel toward the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Anger **Extreme Anger**

43. How much **disgust** did you feel toward the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Disgust **Extreme Disgust**

44. How much **outrage** did you feel toward the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Outrage **Extreme Outrage**

45. How much **sadness** did you feel for the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Sadness **Extreme Sadness**

46. How much **concern** did you feel for the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Concern **Extreme Concern**

47. How much **worry** did you feel for the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Worry **Extreme Worry**

48. How much **anxiety** did you feel for the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
No Anxiety **Extreme Anxiety**

49. How much **frustration** did you feel toward the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Frustration										**Extreme Frustration**

50. How much **irritation** did you feel toward the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Irritation										**Extreme Irritation**

51. How much **shame** did you feel for the *defendant* (Michael Jones)?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Shame										**Extreme Shame**

52. How much do you **identify** with the *defendant's* (Michael Jones) point of view?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Do Not Identify										**Completely Identify**

Appendix C

Stalking Myth Acceptance

In some countries, repeated and unwanted intrusive behaviours that are directed at an individual and cause that individual to feel distressed are considered “stalking”. In some countries, these behaviours are illegal. We are interested on your opinion concerning this phenomenon.

Have you have heard about stalking before?

Please Check: YES or NO

Please answer the following questions based on your own opinion. Rate the strength of your opinion by checking one of the numbers on the scale, which goes from 1 (absolutely true) to 7 (absolutely untrue)

1. A man should be allowed to pursue a woman to a certain extent, if it is part of romance.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

2. If a woman says no, even once, a man should leave her alone.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

3. If a man and woman have been in a romantic relationship, the man has more right to pursue her than if they have never met.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

4. It is normal for a woman to say no to a date at first because she does not want to seem too eager.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

5. It is not "stalking" if you are trying to get your wife back.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

6. A woman, who dates a lot, would be more likely to be "stalked".

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

7. Saying no to a "stalker" will just provoke him.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

8. A certain amount of repeated phoning and following is okay, even if a woman has said no.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

9. The concept of "stalking" is just a fad.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

10. Women find it flattering to be persistently pursued.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

11. It's not really "stalking" if you know the person and they know you.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

12. Staying in contact with someone shouldn't really be seen as a crime, if you are actually in love.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

13. If a woman just ignored the man, he would eventually go away.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

14. "Stalking" is a type of violence.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

15. "If at first you don't succeed, try, try and try again". Attitudes like this make "stalking" acceptable.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

16. "Stalkers" are a nuisance but they are not criminals.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

17. If you were really in love with somebody, you wouldn't take no for an answer.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

18. What one person may see as "stalking", another may see as "romantic".

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

19. Women often say one thing but mean another.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) (Absolutely True)

20. "Stalking" is just an extreme form of courtship.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) (Absolutely True)

21. If there is no actual violence, it shouldn't be a crime.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) (Absolutely True)

22. Some women actually want to be "stalked"; they see it as a compliment.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) (Absolutely True)

23. Victims of "stalking" are often women wanting revenge on their ex-boyfriends.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) (Absolutely True)

24. Repeatedly following someone, making phone calls and leaving gifts doesn't actually hurt anyone.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) (Absolutely True)

25. Certain types of women are more likely to be "stalked".

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) (Absolutely True)

26. "Stalking" should be dealt with in civil, not, criminal law.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

27. A woman may be more likely to be "stalked" if she cannot clearly say "No".

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

28. If a woman gives any encouragement, the man has a right to continue his pursuit.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

29. Those who are upset by "stalking" are likely more sensitive than others.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

30. Even if they were annoyed, most women would be at least a little flattered by "stalking".

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

31. If someone continues to say nice things and give nice gifts, then "stalking" is far more acceptable.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

32. Stranger "stalking" is the only "real" stalking.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Absolutely Untrue) **(Absolutely True)**

33. Any person could be “stalked”.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
(Absolutely Untrue)						**(Absolutely True)**

34. “Stalkers” only continue because they get some sort of encouragement.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
(Absolutely Untrue)						**(Absolutely True)**

Appendix D

Hostility toward Women Measure

1. I feel that many times women flirt with men just to tease them or hurt them.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

2. I believe that most women tell the truth.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

3. I usually find myself agreeing with (other) women.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

4. I think that most women would lie just to get ahead.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

5. (Males) Generally, it is safer not to trust women.
   (Females) It is generally safer not to trust women too much.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

6. When it really comes down to it, a lot of women are deceitful.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

7. I am easily angered by (other) women.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

8. I am sure I get a raw deal from the (other) women in my life.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

9. Sometimes (other) women bother me by just being around.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

10. (Other) Women are responsible for most of my troubles.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

Appendix E

Gender Role Stereotypes

1. A man should fight when the woman he's with is insulted by another man.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

2. It is acceptable for the woman to pay for a date.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

3. A woman should be a virgin when she marries.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

4. There is something wrong with a woman who doesn't want to marry and raise a family.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

5. A wife should never contradict her husband in public.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

6. It is better for a woman to use her feminine charm to get what she wants rather than ask for it outright.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

7. It is acceptable for a woman to have a career, but marriage and family should come first.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

8. It looks worse for a woman to be drunk than for a man to be drunk

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

9. There is nothing wrong with a woman going to a bar alone.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

Appendix F

Romantic Belief Scale

1. I need to know someone for a period of time before I fall in love with him or her.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

2. If I were to love someone, I would commit myself to him or her even if my parents and friends disapproved of the relationship.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

3. Once I experience “true love”, I could never experience it again, to the same degree, with another person.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

4. I believe that to be truly in love is to be in love forever.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

5. If I love someone, I know I can make the relationship work, despite the obstacles.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

6. When I find my “true love” I will probably know it soon after we meet.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

7. I am sure that every new thing I learn about the person I choose for a long-term commitment will please me.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

8. The relationship I will have with my “true love” will be nearly perfect.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

9. If I love someone, I will find a way for us to be together regardless of the opposition to the relationship, physical distance between us or any other barrier.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

10. There will be only one real love for me.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

11. If a relationship I have was meant to be, any obstacle (e.g., lack of money, physical distance, career conflicts) can be overcome.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

12. I am likely to fall in love almost immediately if I meet the right person.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

13. I expect that in my relationship, romantic love will really last; it won’t fade over time.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

14. The person I love will make a perfect romantic partner: for example, he/she will be completely accepting, loving and understand.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

15. I believe if another person and I love each other we can overcome any differences and problems that may arise.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

(Strongly Disagree) **(Strongly Agree)**

Appendix G

Personal Experience with Stalking-Related Behavior

1. Have *you* ever been the target of persistent unwanted attention?

   YES (continue to #2) or **NO** (skip to #4)

2. To what extent did this persistent unwanted attention cause you to **fear for your safety**?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Fear										**Extreme Fear**

3. To what extent did this persistent unwanted attention cause you **emotional distress**?

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Distress										**Extreme Distress**

4. Do have any *friends or family members* that have been the target of persistent unwanted attention?

   YES (continue to #5) or **NO** (skip #5 & #6)

5. To the best of your knowledge, to what extent did this persistent unwanted attention cause them to **fear for their safety**? (If more than one person comes to mind, answer this question for the "worst" or "most serious" case)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Fear										**Extreme Fear**

6. To the best of your knowledge, to what extent did this persistent unwanted attention cause them **emotional distress**? (If more than one person comes to mind, answer this question for the "worst" or "most serious" case)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
No Distress										**Extreme Distress**

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Vita

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Educational Background
Candidate, Doctorate of Philosophy
Cognitive Psychology
University of Kentucky
Advisor – Jonathan M. Golding, Ph.D.

Masters of Science Research Psychology
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Bachelor of Science Psychology
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; December 2000

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Publications
2010
Lorch, R.F., Lorch, E.P., Calderhead, W.J., **Dunlap, E.E.,** Hodell, E.C., & Freer, B.D. (2010). Learning the Control of Variables Strategy in high- and low-achieving classrooms: Contributions of direct instruction and hands-on experimentation. *Journal of Educational Psychology*, *102*(1), 90-101.

2009
Golding, J. M., **Dunlap, E. E.,** & Hodell, E. C. (2009). Jurors' perceptions of children's eyewitness testimony. In Bottoms, B. L., Najdowski, C. J., & Goodman, G. S. (Eds.) *Children as victims, witnesses, and offenders: Psychological science and the law,* (pp. 188-208). New York: Guilford Press.

2008
Dunlap, E. E., Hodell, E. C., & Golding, J. M. (2008). The use of hearsay testimony on behalf of an elder victim of abuse: A reasonable and necessary alternative under certain circumstances. *Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 8*(4), 403-413.

2007
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Golding, J. M., Bradshaw, G. S., **Dunlap, E. E.,** & Hodell, E. C. (2007). The impact of mock jury gender composition on deliberations and conviction rates in a child sexual assault trial. *Child Maltreatment, 12*(2), 182-190.

2006

Benton, T. R., Ross, D. F., **Bradshaw, E. E.,** Thomas, W. N., & Bradshaw, G. S. (2006). Eyewitness memory is still not common sense: Comparing jurors, judges and law enforcement to eyewitness experts. *Applied Cognitive Psychology, 20* (1), 115-129.

2005

Bradshaw, G. S., Ross, D. F., **Bradshaw, E. E.,** Headrick, B., & Thomas, III, W. N. (2005). Fostering juror comfort: Effects of an orientation videotape. *Law and Human Behavior, 29* (4), 459-469.

Manuscripts in Progress

Golding, J. M., Hodell, E. C., **Dunlap, E. E**., Wasarhaley, N. E, & Keller, P. S. (in press). When a son steals money from his mother: Courtroom perceptions of elder financial exploitation. Journal of Elder Abuse and Neglect.

Dunlap, E. E., Hodell, E. C., Golding, J. M., & Wasarhaley, N. E, (in press). Mock jurors' perception of stalking: The impact of gender and expressed fear.

Hodell, E.C., **Dunlap, E.E.,** Golding, J. M., & Jordan, C. E. (manuscript in progress). Delay vs. Sleeping Status: What Really Matters? Juror Perceptions of Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers

Presentations

2011

Freer, B., **Dunlap, E. E.**, Kosloski, J.S., Chen, H., Calderhead, W.J., Lorch, E.P., & Lorch, R. F. (April, 2011). *Very Long-Term Effects of Teaching the Control of Variables Strategy in High and Low Achieving 4th Grade Classrooms.* Society of Research in Child Development

Kosloski, J.S., Chen, H., Freer, B., **Dunlap, E. E.**, Calderhead, W.J., Lorch, E.P., & Lorch, R. F. (April, 2011). *Effects of Variable Complexity and Planning Support on 4th Graders' Acquisition of the Control of Variables Strategy.* Society of Research in Child Development

2009

Dunlap, E. E., Lee, S., Freer, B., Hodell, E.C., Calderhead, W.J., Lorch, R.F., & Lorch, E.P. (April, 2009). *The Effects of Interactive vs. Lecture Teaching Styles on Learning Core Science Skills.* Poster Presented at Society of Research in Child Development

Freer, B., Calderhead, W.J., Hodell, E.C., **Dunlap, E. E.,** Lorch, E.P. & Lorch, R.F. (April,

2009). *Impact of Negative vs. Positive Example Instruction on 4th Grade Students' Acquisition of the Control of Variables Strategy.* Poster Presented at Society of Research in Child Development

2008

Dunlap, E. E. *Factors Influencing Perceptions of Criminal Stalking.* Presentation for Cognitive Developmental Psychology Department, University of Kentucky at Lexington.

Lorch, R.F., Calderhead, W.J., **Dunlap, E. E.,** Hodell, E.C., Freer, B., & Lorch, E.P. *Teaching the Control of Variables Strategy in 4th Grade Classrooms.* Poster Presented at American Educational Research Association, New York, NY.

Lorch, E.P. Freer, B., Hodell, E.C., **Dunlap, E. E.,** Calderhead, W.J., & Lorch, R.F. *Thinking Aloud Interfers with Application of control Variable Strategy.* Poster Presented at American Educational Research Association, New York, NY.

2007

Dunlap, E. E., & Hodell, E. C. *Juror's Perceptions of Criminal Stalking: An Investigation of the Standard of Fear Requirement*. Poster Presented at 9th Annual Ending Sexual Assault and Violence Conference, Lexington, KY.

Hodell, E. C., **& Dunlap, E. E.** *Invited address: Keynote speaker.* Conference on Interpersonal Violence. Transylvania University, Lexington, KY.

Dunlap, E. E. *Juror Perceptions of Stalking*. Presentation for Cognitive Developmental Psychology Department, University of Kentucky at Lexington.

2006

Bradshaw, G. S., Golding, J. M., **Bradshaw, E. E.,** Segress, M., & Yozwiak J. *The Effect of Verdict Options and Types of Abuse on Conviction Rates in Cases of Parricide.* Paper presented at American Psychology-Law Society, St. Petersburg, FL.

Bradshaw, E. E, Golding, J. M., & Marsil, D.F. *Perceptions of Elder Abuse: the Influence of hearsay witnesses*. Paper presented at American Psychology-Law Society, St. Petersburg, FL.

Golding, J. M., Bradshaw, G. S., & **Bradshaw, E. E.** *Perceiving Child Sexual Assault Victims in a Mock Jury Context.* Paper presented at American Psychology-Law Society, St. Petersburg, FL.

2005

Bradshaw, E. E. *Juror Perceptions of Elder Abuse.* Presentation for Cognitive Developmental Department, University of Kentucky at Lexington

Golding, J. M., Bradshaw, G. S., & **Bradshaw, E. E.** *The Perception of Elderly Women Sexual Abuse in the Courtroom.* Paper presented at Kentucky Research Colloquium on Violence Against Women, Lexington, KY.

Bradshaw, G. S., Golding, J. M., & **Bradshaw, E. E.** *Gender differences in the interpretation of witness testimony: Tracking juror opinion of a criminal case as each witness testifies*. Poster presented at the Kentucky Psychological Association, Louisville, KY.

2004

Bradshaw, E. E. *Knowledge of Eyewitness Evidence.* Presentation for Cognitive Developmental Department, University of Kentucky at Lexington.

2003

Bradshaw, G. S., Ross, D. F., **Dunlap, E. E.,** & Thomas, W. N. *Further exploration into the effects of an orientation videotape on juror knowledge and comfort.* Poster presented at the American Psychology-Law Society, Edinburgh, Scotland.

Bradshaw, G. S., Ross, D. F., **Dunlap, E. E.,** & Thomas, W. N. *Fostering juror comfort: Effects of an orientation videotape.* Poster presented at the Southeastern Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA.

2002

Ross, D. F., **Dunlap, E. E.,** & Bradshaw, G. S. *Eyewitness testimony: The good, bad, and ugly*. Symposium presented at the Tennessee Judicial Conference, Chattanooga, TN.

2001

Dunlap, E.E. (2001). Animal Cognition and Communication. Symposium presented at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

Dunlap, E.E., Miles, L. H. (2001). Prejudice and Personhood. Symposium presented at the Southern Anthropological Society Annual Meeting.

Employment

Research Assistant: Science Education (2006-2010)
Supervisor – Robert Lorch, Ph.D.

Research Assistant: Center for Research on Violence against Women (2005- 2006)
Supervisor – Carol Jordan

Teaching Assistant: University of Kentucky at Lexington (2003-2005)

Research Associate; Ross Litigation. (2001-2003)
Supervisor – David Ross, Ph.D.

Adjunct Faculty; University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. (2002-2003)
Supervisor – Paul Watson, Ph.D. Teaching Introduction to Psychology

Academic Service

Science Education (2006-2010)

Statistics (2004)

Research Methods Laboratory (2001-2004)

Introduction to Psychology (2002-2003)

Awards & Honors

Dissertation Year Fellowship (awarded 2010)

Graduate Student of the Year (2009)

Student Travel Award, Scholarship in support of travel for presentation to APLS Conference University of Kentucky (2006)

Graduate Research Award (2001-2003)

Arts and Sciences Research Funding (2003)

Provost Research Award (2002)

Psi Chi (National Honor Society in Psychology) (2000)

Golden Key (2000)

Dean's List (1995-2000)