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# State and Territorial Restructuring in the Globalizing City-Region of Tangier, Morocco

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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

STATE AND TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING IN THE GLOBALIZING CITY-  
REGION OF TANGIER, MOROCCO

By

William Kutz

A THESIS

Submitted to the Faculty  
of the University of Miami  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Master of Science

Coral Gables, Florida

May 2010

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STATE AND TERRITORIAL RESTRUCTURING IN THE GLOBALIZING CITY-  
REGION OF TANGIER, MOROCCO

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State and Territorial Restructuring in the  
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In 1982, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) led structural adjustment of the Moroccan state; the culmination of prolonged war in the Western Sahara, unstable agricultural productivity and unstable debt inflation. Since then, deep political economic reorganization has transformed the institutional, practical and physical articulation of urban management in the state. This study situates managerial shifts within an urban globalization context, with specific reference to Tangier. While Tangier's urban development parallels many studies from the developing and less-developed world, its place-specific formation diverges because globalizing urban management is undertaken within the context of historically and geographically specific socio-economic development initiatives and constraints. My work provides a conceptual overview of globalizing management since Moroccan independence in 1956. Then, a spatially sensitive political economic lens is employed to analyze new urban managerial transformations emerging since 1983 adjustments. Finally, I take an in-depth case study of Tangier City Center project to question how Tangier's current globalization effectively responds to both state and local urban social and economic development.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## URBANIZATION, GLOBALIZATION AND THE LESS-DEVELOPED WORLD

### INTRODUCTION

The study of urban management is an important means to understanding the complexity of the built environment. It is one of the most crucial, though under-appreciated activities in the production of urban space by urban globalization researchers. Yet, its significance is largely hidden within the banal, everyday activities of planning, design, organization and computation that are essential to managing the urban fabric. As a result, these actions and repetitions are commonly viewed in ways that do not delve into what underpins daily management of its particular constitutions and manifestations in the built form. I am not speaking of the intentions of urban managers *per se*, but rather the various conditions within which managers are influenced to undertake specific responses to the questions with which they are posed. Therefore, for any analytical departure to begin, I must first explain what is meant by decisions, actions and conditions of urban management. First, management implies a need to maintain and improve the existing city in terms of both physical and social infrastructure through the effective organization and distribution of technical and financial resources at hand. This means that specific issues must be identified by the manager. Next, given the diversity of needs, decisions are made as to how to address the problem in terms of what outcomes these agents seek to achieve. From this ideal vision, specific actions are then taken as a means to realize urban objectives that socially and physically manifest themselves. Finally, initiatives undertaken by these diverse urban managers lead to diverse outcomes with consequences that improve, neutralize or aggravate the initial problem in its movement toward their vision of the city.

However this problem-solution conception is highly simplistic. Urban agents do not work with abstract mathematical problems, but in the everyday concerns of the city's social and spatial fabric. Managers must deal with diverse needs from widely differing social interests ranging from, for example, real estate developers, organized labor, environmental action committees, youth leagues, women's organizations, religious leaders, chambers of commerce, community welfare organizations, and their many stratifications each with their own respective demands. As such, the initial set of identified issues and decisions becomes much more complex when constituted within the broader social whole. Such an optic expands the notion of management from procedural analysis towards a more complex study of the power and agency that a select group of individuals have in creating, maintaining and erasing the traces left by urban society. But, this process is not without friction. Managing the urban form is rarely (if ever) an uncontested engagement in which social groups with diverse and conflicting stakes exert their own particular vision of their right to the city. In other words, the actions that managers decide to undertake – even if inexplicitly – are always political: benefiting specific social groups and disadvantaging others.

To further complicate the situation, conditions and consequences of urban management are deeply influenced by multiple constraints that are largely external to the immediate city scale, not only spatially and temporally, but also politically and economically. Geographically, the resources and capacities of urban managers are the products of that city's position within regional, state and global articulations. Historically, these relations have been radically transformed over the course of human exploration, colonization, de-colonization and contemporary globalization. Furthermore, depending

upon the historic role a particular state exercised politically and economically largely impacts the types of issues faced by urban managers today as well as their capacities to effectively respond to them. Put differently, urban managers must not only negotiate the numerous contestations for urban futures, but must also do so within economic and political structures that greatly influence decisions and actions that either strengthen or weaken their ability to knit the urban fabric in a manner that is internally feasible and spatially just. However, a paradox arises in attempting to comprehend the structure-agency dialectic of urban management. On one hand, unique historic and geographic constraints means that research has only tenuous capacity to take what is uncovered in one place and generalize those findings in another. On the other hand, growing political economic rescaling and integration of global relations help structure broader social and geographical patterns that generalize significant insight into the conditions through which managers operate.

#### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Globalization is the rubric within which I attempt to reconcile the conceptual antagonism of urban management. It is the essential element that underpins this study's analysis of the conditional structures through which urban managers negotiate their everyday decisions and actions. While some question the uniqueness of "globalization" in human history (Jones and Philips 2005), this study takes a more relational stance in that the process can be seen to begin for different societies at different time periods. Distinctly urban globalization is often conceptualized coming to the fore in the 1980s through a particular rescaling of state-city relations and functions in a global context (Friedman 1986). Global city activities are often understood through the role that select urban elites

play in the global economy (Florida 2002, Sklair 2005). These revolve around “command and control” functions driven by the producer service sector, which is predominantly comprised of finance, insurance and real estate industries (Sassen 2001). These services necessitate and generate transnational connectivity, which not only catalyze urban economic development, but also help create symbolic capital, as a central node in world commerce. A consequence of the desire to attain “global city” status, urban managers are ever more interested in facilitating the means by which global service industries and their subsidiary industrial and leisure activities can be harnessed in their respective locales (Zukin 1992, Krätke 2006). However, this has led to growing competition among cities (Gordon 1999). It is argued that urban managers take on a new role that increasingly prioritizes transnational agents over the diverse needs of the urban and regional citizenry (Ross and Shakow 1980, Moulaert *et al* 2003). One outcome is the rise of a unique global city typology. Among its various components, the most extreme form is in iconic architecture produced by a small transnational cohort of competing “starchitects” (e.g. Rem Koolhaas and Frank Gehry, and Norman Foster) and global architectural firms (e.g. Faulconbridge 2009). There are strong arguments that an elite transnational class drives specific urban formations of “elsewhere” conducive to global service industries (Sklair 2005). On one hand, this global city architecture figures prominently in arguments concerning the forces which “flatten” urban geographies throughout the world in an effort to make cities more like those in the economic core (Castells 2000, Wu 2004). On the other hand, global city status paradoxically necessitates that managers undertake comprehensive and highly specialized marketing campaigns to brand the cityscape uniquely to create a comparative advantage over other cities. This can be seen from

Amsterdam's *IAM*sterdam campaign to Accra's promotion of slavery heritage sites to Lodz's post-soviet redevelopment schemes (Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2007, Agyei-Mensah 2006, Young and Kaczmarek 1999).

Based upon this understanding of urban management, three broad sets of arise. The first set highlights the identification of key urban issues. Specifically, what issues do these managers highlight as most consequential? How are they determined? Who determines them? Directly implicated therefore is what is the vision they seek to produce by investing and distributing their managerial resources and activities? The second set underscores the political nature of managerial actions. Particularly, which groups are benefiting most from managerial activities? Which populations are most negatively affected by these same actions? The problems identified and measures taken by urban managers have specific outcomes for broader society and the built form. The third set then asks, if these activities effectively respond to the problems initially identified by managers. Do they achieve the vision that managers sought to create? What implication do these specific actions have on the urban fabric and the larger public?

In order to answer these questions within the complex forces behind multi-scalar articulations of structure and agency, this study analyzes the relationship between urban management and the political economic shifts which have shaped urban globalization in the current epoch. Specifically, the central question of this thesis is how is site used in urban managers' mediation between global and local forces to overcome challenges to state and urban social and economic development? Sites of greatest transformation represent an important starting point in approaching the forces underlying urban management. Today, the most radical urban and state territorial restructuring is taking

place on the economic periphery. Although relatively recent, important research on urban globalization is expanding from Western city contexts. Such views have come from Mumbai and Accra (Grant and Nijman 2002), Johannesburg (Murray 2008), Buenos Aires and Mexico City (Kanai and Ortega-Alcazar), among others. However, significant regional gaps remain. Limited studies exist on the Middle East (see for example Stanley 2005, Parker 2009), but the most acute void is in research on North African cities. Geographically, historically and culturally proximate yet economically distanced from Europe, this region has curiously remained absent from world cities contributions. This study takes the less obvious example from Tangier, Morocco.

Tangier has long been connected to cities and regions well beyond the Mediterranean basin. Its geographical position at the entrance to the Strait of Gibraltar has made it an important location for ancient civilizations. The city was founded by the Carthaginians and later controlled by the Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Arabs (under the Bagdad Caliph) Portuguese and English prior to Morocco's formal colonization in 1912 (Vermeren 2002). Furthermore, Tangier is one of only a handful of cities in the world to have been placed under control of International Administration (1923-1956). Other such cities include Shanghai, Danzig, and Trieste. Tangier's global position is paradoxically absent in this discourse. However, political economic forces that have driven the externalization of some cities have also constrained others – particularly Tangier. The city's latent globality has in no small part been conditioned by urban manager's particular negotiation of local and external development imperatives.

From a case study of Tangier, this work seeks to address the aforementioned research question. I engage with the larger body of literature on urban globalization to



broaden research on global cities from the less-developed world and elucidate the complex relational processes of Tangier's place-specific negotiation of urban-global formation. I argue that transformations in Tangier's urban management are the result of a complex negotiation between public and private transnational demands. On one hand, external and internal challenges do significantly condition a reconfiguration in local managerial practices that prioritize transnational agents, specifically real estate developers. On the other, these managers are by no means passive victims of the global economy, but are active participants in the production the city's globalization from above and on the margins, with consequential implications for larger urban and regional inhabitants.

The rest of this study will begin with a theoretical and methodological orientation. This initial overview will be broad as I have left space for a briefer, specialized account of the specific concepts I wish to discuss in each chapter, given their analytical diversity. Following this I will then provide a short introductory chapter on past and present issues relevant to my account of the globalization of Tangier.

Chapters three through four constitute the body of my research findings, each with their own respective argument to contribute to the larger whole. Given the complex nature of urban globalization by urban managers, this study will analyze the negotiative process from three scalar perspectives. In chapter three, I focus on place as the receptor of global flows from above. Here I show how state restructuring has unfolded within a larger Moroccan context since independence in 1956. While studies of Moroccan politics effectively frame the state's continued empowerment, they fail to address the historic and cultural constraints of economic and social development that necessitated increasingly

selective downscaling of political administration to the urban fabric. I analyze three main epochs of economic and social planning centered on national, regional and urban-global scales to argue the following: (1) Nationalist planning (1958-1967) was a wide sweeping project that focused narrowly on import-substitution industries and paid little attention to the state's vastly differing regional geography; (2) Regional planning (1968-1982) emerged in an effort to redistribute intraregional resources and benefits as well as incubate economic externalization; (3) Urban-global rescaling (1983- ) is the latest phase to emerge in Morocco's economic and social planning that overtly seeks to harness global social and economic investment through select cities. These nodes are centers for dynamic economic growth and seen as essential to efficient and equitable competition in the globalizing economy.

Chapter four centers specifically upon how the long-term reconsolidation of Moroccan administrative relations has explicitly transformed urban management in Tangier, conceived here as "in-between globalization." I analyze recent planning initiatives to argue that (1) while managerial institutions have grown since the 1980s that claim to support more participatory engagement with the local populace, it is in appearance only. In actuality, they are administered by three representatives of the central government. (2) These new institutions have shifted their priorities from the provision of needed basic services for local inhabitants to more speculative ventures with the private sector, also known as urban entrepreneurialism. (3) The physical expression of these practices is in the qualitative and quantitative rise of large-scale development projects.

The fifth chapter approaches the globalization of Tangier from "on the margins." My interest is to take a critical stance at the process and conditions by which

globalization has been articulated in both Morocco and Tangier to assess the implications that globalized urban management has on the broader urban and social fabric. I argue (1) that while structural forces indeed have a highly influential role in the production of urban space, it is by no means a process whereby global agents impose their will on helpless local managers. Instead, the city is actively reproduced through a collaborative effort between both sides who largely share a common and often inter-dependent interest in successful economic growth. Although urban managers are indeed producing their own unique form of urban globalization, (2) the benefits have been unevenly distributed. Despite macro-economic urban development that has occurred regionally, in some instances social benefits have stagnated and in others there are significant signs of harmful exclusionary actions embedded in globalized urban management.

Chapter six provides a summary of the main theoretical insight I wish to emphasize as well as important concluding remarks pertaining to urban globalization from the less-developed world and its contribution to broader urban theory.

#### THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

In order to understand the complex process of Tangier's contemporary urban formation, this study draws upon theories of urban studies and globalization in less-developed world. Recent trends in urban studies have shown a growing interest in expanding urban research from the global South. Jennifer Robinson (2006) has been at the forefront of this movement with her call to view cities as "Ordinary." The fundamental idea is that all cities throughout the world have the potential to generate, expand and democratize urban theory beyond Western urban contexts. Her argument is couched within deeper trends in academia which privileged urbanization in the North as the paradigm for city formation

elsewhere. While partly due to historic research interests found in these countries, it is also the result of the way in which the actual urban process has been conceptualized. Foundational theories view Modern city formation as intricately bound within the accumulation and expansion of the capitalist mode of production. Early studies first understood the exceptionalism of the Modern city as a container within which the mode of production was most fully articulated (Simmel 1964, Benjamin 2002). However, not until the late 19<sup>th</sup> century was urban formation argued to be an actual transformative mechanism that expanded mode of accumulation itself. Henri Lefebvre (1991) argued that the original process by which capital accumulated and expanded through the production of “things” had shifted into the production of space itself for greater capacity to generate and absorb surplus capital for reinvestment. However, Lefebvre’s theorization of space is relatively abstract. He viewed space as the dialectical relationship between the physical, lived and conceptual world around us. Harvey (1989b) develops this largely philosophical work by distinguishing the production of space in terms of the actual built form. This “second circuit of capital” was both the means to fix specific circulations of capital and the means by which it facilitated its consumption, or “metabolism” (Swyngedouw 2006). While these and other theories helped explain the driving mechanisms behind contemporary urbanization, its economic ontology tended to reinforce the conception that the economic core was the *source* or progenitor of what constituted authentic Modern city-ness that trickled out to the less-developed world. Consequently, cities of the South appeared to merely reflect or mimic cities in the North. It is against this framework that Robinson (2006) demands greater possibility for urban theory. She argues for an “Ordinary cities” approach, to both acknowledge systemic

differences between cities while still displacing and de-naturalizing what constitutes urbanity and from where it must come. In so doing she shows how many of the most intrinsic representations of Modernity associated with Western cities are themselves actually imported models from the global South.

One of the main areas in which this research has progressed has been in global cities research. Globalization is understood as the rescaling of (particularly economic) relations (Grant and Nijman 2004). Different viewpoints exist as to what, where and how this process occurs. For example, some research emphasizes the direction by which globalization unfolds. These works often emphasize the structural forces of globalization and their imposition of foreign cultures and practices (Peck 2001, Sklair 2005). Others take the opposite perspective by underscoring the ways in which structural narratives do not explain the diverse forms of local resistance and engagement with broader global society (Flusty 2006, Appadurai 2000, King 2006). I support the claim that globalization must be understood as an inherently dialectical rescaling from both above and below, and through multiple, simultaneous and relative positions (Swyngedouw 1997, 2004, Brenner 1999). From this “glocal” perspective, globalization is both an exogenous (outside-in) and endogenous (inside-out) process made by multiple actors with widely differing lifestyles, worldviews, incomes, cultures and social networks, but which are all to varying degrees implicated and conditioned within the broader capitalist system. The city, as a vital node for the circulation of the global economy, therefore provides fertile ground from which to view the uneven development of this rescaling process (Grant and Nijman 2004). Furthermore, the disjointed nature of glocalization provides the potential for all research on global cities to be generalized to a broader context. At the same time,

however, the highly localized and unique agency of different actors provides the capacity to enrich and expand urban theory geographically.

The spatial dissimilarities of globalization are theorized here as the product ongoing local history in the making. Globalization – seen as a fundamental process occurring across space – cannot be disassociated from history (Massey 2006). With specific reference to Accra, Ghana’s main historical epochs, Grant (2009, p.8) states:

Each of the [city’s] historical episodes transformed the past, but the past is not obliterated. There is a persistence of continuities in the urban landscape, as well as the creation of new spatial formations that may be separate and even competing.

As this study will show, the unique character of globalization in Tangier is not simply due to its local cultural and spatial position in the contemporary world economy, but is the result of a long transformative process that is largely situated in post-colonial development ideologies and practices. It is possible to situate the “global” role Tangier has played throughout history, even before formal colonization in 1912, though for greater research insight I privilege the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Finally, deeply embedded in this broader historical, geographical and urban theorization, this study contends that North African cities, specifically Tangier, is a motive agent of the global economy that has the capacity to generalize and expand urban theory from the less-developed world, while also being considered distinct from other cities in regions with which it is commonly associated, such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Tangier’s position in the global economy helps to strengthen research from other networked cities. While Tangier may highlight many similar transformations occurring in middle-tier “global cities” such as Johannesburg, South Africa, it largely

falls within what can be considered a *globalizing* city (Grant 2009). This term is a more inclusive and flexible conception of socio-spatial formation than the more static “global city” representation. While *globalizing* emphasizes movement and a constant state of becoming that can be applied to any city, it is directed towards the unstable and transitive externalization of cities in the global South. It is a term that critiques the discourse on the possibility – much less perfectibility – for less-developed cities to ever fully attain Global City status. Within this concept is the implicit acknowledgement that the structural composition of the global economy is inherently uneven. Regardless of what cities do, these historic, socially-produced relations did not simply create disadvantages, but continually condition their reinforcement. This is not to say in absolute terms that no such end point can be achieved, but it will do so only with dramatic ruptures in the social and urban fabric. Therefore the process may never actually be complete, but will likely constantly oscillate between different extremes.

#### DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS

The methodology for this research focuses on the urban and managerial morphology of Tangier. Data collection for this study began in the fall 2008 with general documentation of broader North African urban patterns. In the spring of 2009, I established contact with a doctoral student in geography from Abdelmalek Essaïdi University in Tangier. In March 2009, I undertook a pilot study in Morocco for over a week to meet with him and collect data. These materials included planning documents, maps, graphics, and tables from the state and private sector, as well as a comprehensive selection of newspaper and magazine articles from the past ten years. In addition to these and other materials that were acquired from urban agencies (e.g. the Urban Agency of Tangier, SNABT and the

state Statistical Center), I also undertook a series of preliminary interviews with representatives from these very institutions.

A second phase of fieldwork undertaken during the summer 2009 focused on expanding documentation and interviews with local managers that began in the spring. Documentation occurred primarily in the first month of fieldwork in Tangier, and in Rabat toward August. This collection took place at the city's government statistical center (*Haut Commissariat du Plan*) where I studied state Economic and Social Development Plans from 1958 to 2004, and demographic data. Documents concerning local planning initiatives came from the Tangier Urban Agency as well as the Moroccan Tourism Engineering Company (SMIT). These local architects and planners provided many unpublished regional plans (*Schéma Directeur*), maps, and graphics of major recent public works. SMIT provided me with excellent maps and legal documents concerning their most recent development projects along the Bay of Tangier. The Spanish developer, Inveravante, provided several brochures and statistical data during interviews I held with a company representative. Last, I spent one week in Rabat at the national headquarters of these respective agencies to collect missing or incomplete data in Tangier.

After this initial extensive documentation, a second round of interviews with urban managers began in July 2009. Only three institutions: the Tangier Urban Agency, Inveravante and SMIT were specifically targeted for these in-depth semi-structured interviews. All meetings occurred in Tangier, except for two sessions with state planners and SMIT representatives at the agencies' headquarters in Rabat. In total, this cohort comprised of five key individuals with which I spent approximately 10 hours interviewing. These agents are considered representatives in name only for the sake of



anonymity, but all held significant positions in which to address any question posed with legitimate authority.

Unfortunately, standard methods for data collection are not appropriate for Tangier's context. As a result, I devised an alternative collection strategy that is most closely aligned with what Chamblis and Schutt (2006) call "qualitative comparative analysis." Drawing from the methods used by Cress and Snow (2000), they argue that qualitative comparative analysis is "conjunctural in its logic, examining the various ways in which specified factors interact and combine with one another to yield particular outcomes. This increases the prospect of discerning diversity and identifying different pathways that lead to an outcome of interest and thus makes this mode of analysis especially applicable to situations with *complex patterns of interaction among the specified conditions*" (Cress and Snow, quoted in Chambliss and Schutt 2006, p. 212). I used this method for several reasons: First, hard statistical reports in Morocco are unreliable. Definitions continually change (if they are even located in the appropriate publication) and radically alter one's perception of what may actually be the case. Additionally, even when accurate data was available, consistent longitudinal reports were rare and thus left many holes to be filled with alternative, less reliable sources. Second, the qualitative approach helped to reinforce or discount data I gathered from one source and cross check it with another. Third, qualitative methods allowed me to cultivate a dialogue with local officials and gather information that I would not have discovered alone and to use the different narratives to uncover dominant discourses surrounding how and why the city has evolved into its present form.

Given the theoretical and empirical diversity within each chapter (specifically Chapters 3-5), different methodologies were used to best interpret the different aspects of state and territorial restructuring. Chapter 3 uses a procedure-based post-structural discourse methodology to analyze Moroccan Economic and Social Development Plans from 1956 to 2004. Post-structural discourse analysis is employed to comprehensively and critically examine the political expediency of state texts to uncover and understand the larger patterns that appear in the literature over the course of several different planning periods. In so doing, an alternative narrative emerges from the dominant state and (in some cases) academic literatures that illustrate how and why Morocco undertook its unique form of state rescaling. These broader trends identify important, long-term logics and constraints behind responses to political economic development and self-sufficiency. Their flux traces the particular the paths that Morocco followed that do not necessarily represent the established narratives of state reconfiguration from the economic core. Chapter 4 on state scaling in Tangier uses a Lefebvrian method of dialectical analysis. While Lefebvre (1991) theorized space as a synthesis of three distinct but interrelated qualities (conceived, perceived and lived spaces), his *method* of analysis was dialectical. Therefore, we can appreciate the *Production of Space* as both a means toward understanding space itself, as well as a methodological tool to re-interpret the nexus between what constitutes “conceived,” “perceived,” or “lived” space. My interpretation focuses on ideological (conceived), practical (lived) and physical (perceived) articulations of transformed urban management since state restructuring in 1983 to analyze the distinct implication on uneven urban development.

Chapter 5 uses a constructivist-embedded methodology to understand the culturally-informed agency behind the production of the built form. This approach is extrapolated from Faulconbridge's (2009) study of "embedded" place-making as a way to highlight the negotiative and mutual relations forged by foreign and domestic parties to construct iconic global city formations. Embedding is a process by which global agents (in his case global architecture firms) must situate themselves to enhance the project's cultural appropriateness and harmony with the interests and ideals of local users.

Faulconbridge argues that knowledge and action from both sides of the spectrum are fundamental for development projects to be effectively designed and marketable. In fact, the better embedded the transnational agents and architecture, the greater effectiveness and success of the project's marketability and placement in the larger urban fabric. I utilize the author's three forms of "contextualization" that carry great weight in fixing and projecting a synthesized global-local form. These features include client input, building regulations, and network relations. Applied to TCC, I focus on marketing as a representation of client interests, building regulations, and on the local negotiative relations between SMIT and Inveravante.

## **CHAPTER TWO**


### **TANGIER IN CONTEXT**

Located at the gateway to the Strait of Gibraltar on the North African shore of the Mediterranean, Tangier presents a unique case of a rapidly globalizing city-region (Figure 1). Driven by state market-oriented investment efforts since the early 1980s, the metropole has experienced growth rates that far outpace national standards. But this was not always the case. Tangier's revival comes after decades of stagnation and poorly conceived initiatives during Morocco's import-substitution industrialization (ISI) period since independence in 1956. Since the early 1990s, industrial indicators highlight the impressive growth experienced in Tangier. Table One shows that between 1994 and 2006, employment doubled, production and investment tripled, exports increased nine-fold and added value quadrupled. Conversely, the annual gross domestic product for the entire state of Morocco from 1990-2003 only increased one percent (Cohen and Jaidi 2006, p. 38). While clearly not statistically comparable in absolute terms, the difference is meant to qualitatively illustrate the city's economic externalization in comparison to national indicators, where industrial productivity has grown twice as fast as the urban employment rate.

Despite the impressive growth evidenced in Tangier, similar urban studies elsewhere point to simultaneously detrimental effects. It has been argued that economic growth often advances on par with deeper social inequalities between wage earners as well as spatial fragmentation in the built form. This antagonism between development and underdevelopment, as well as the latter's dual manifestation forms the urban context within which local urban managers inform their position in shaping Tangier's restructuring in relation to transnational developers. Zemni and Bogaert (2009) argue that

international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have played a dominant role structuring Morocco's economic liberalization through the

Figure 1. *Greater Tangier*



Source: Kanai & Kutz 2010 based on multiple schematic images from Tangier Urban Agency (*Agence Urbaine de Tanger*) and Tangier Mediterranean Special Agency.

dismantling of public sector employment, labor regulations and social welfare infrastructure. The drive for Morocco to become a competitive supplier of labor in the global economy has created a generalized situation whereby “unemployment, poverty, marginalization and exclusion more and more constitute the face of Moroccan cities and rural areas alike” (*ibid.*, p. 94).

Social polarization and spatial fragmentation have been defining characteristics of Tangier since its early modern form. The city has not only been an outpost for ancient

civilizations, but also a prized setting for colonial powers at the turn of the twentieth century. Politically, prior to colonization, Tangier was the diplomatic city of Morocco.<sup>1</sup>

Table 1. *Industrial Economic Indicators, Tangier-Tétouan, 1994-2006*

Year	Total Employment (Permanent & Seasonal)	Production (1,000 dh)	Investment (1,000 dh)	Exports (1,000 dh)	Added Value (1,000 dh)
1994	31,552	4,178,604	307,467	1,142,732	1,363,421
1999	38,019	5,158,771	665,130	2,371,566	2,083,082
2004	53,264	10,150,576	776,827	6,079,169	—
2006	63,281	13,741,082	1,053,665	8,950,577	4,058,935

Source: Author's tabulation based on Direction de la Statistique 1994a, 2000, 2005, 2007.

Economically, Tangier's port was the largest and most significant in Morocco until its colonization in 1912 (Pennell 2001). Shortly after Morocco fell under the French and Spanish protectorates (1912), Tangier's economic and political significance led to the creation of an International Zone in 1923 that lasted until independence in 1956 (Pennell 2001; Dalton *et al* 1993a). The International Zone was jointly administered by European nations (French, Spanish, British, Italian, Belgian, Dutch and Portuguese), the United States and a local *mandoub*, or representative of the (French-appointed) Sultan. Although the International Statute sought to create a militarily neutral economic region, no comprehensive planning entity existed and competing interests by various nations produced an *ad hoc* administrative and territorial formation with multiple overlapping and contradictory results in the urban fabric. While this produced and aggravated spatial fragmentation, it also meant that economic barriers were highly conducive to international trade. The city was an important node for financial transactions and subsidiary service industries. This is supported by the large number of banks existing in

<sup>1</sup> The first United States consulate was established in Tangier in 1821 and lasted until 1956 ([www.legation.org](http://www.legation.org)).

the 1950s as well as the amount of foreign gold deposited in them following the Second World War (Ingérop 2002 – Table 2). Although transnational financial agents were behind the city’s economic expansion, they also coexisted among social outcasts, wandering artists and diverse Arab, Saphardic and Amazigh (Berber) locals to create a truly cosmopolitan city

Table 2. Movement of Gold (in kilos), Tangier, 1947-1956.

Year	Deposits	Withdrawals	Stock
1947-1948	7204	2187	5017
1949	15010	8695	11332
1950	28395	8065	31662
1951	24212	6420	49454
1952	7971	7319	50106
1953	15319	13035	52390
1954	252	11868	40774
1955	32	10143	30663
1956	129	24412	700

Source: Ingérop 2002, p.8.10

(Pennell 2001). Table 3 underscores this point showing that on the eve of Moroccan independence almost one-quarter of Tangier’s population was considered foreign. In the central city, foreign concentrations were even higher with two-thirds of the city’s 60,000 residents considered non-Moroccan, which speaks to both the global significance of Tangier as well as the spatially uneven distribution of society (Ingérop 2002, p. 7.8). However, this demography would radically change by the latter half of the twentieth century.

The conflicting and contradictory planning policies during Tangier’s international administration produced and generalized a fragmented urban form. On one hand, concentrations of wealth and population were unevenly located throughout the city. On

the other the tolerant cosmopolitan social atmosphere meant that Tangier did not have distinct religious or colonial divisions as can be found elsewhere in Morocco, such as in

*Table 3. Population, Tangier, 1952-2004.*

Year	Population	Foreign Population	Foreign (%)
1952	172,000	42,000	24
1960	164,232	34,508	21
1971	286,142	9,611	3
1982	436,227	4,157	1
1994	627,963	3,022	0.5
2004	756,964	3,094	0.4

*Source:* Author's tabulation based on Dalton *et al* 1993b, Direction de la Statistique 1971, 1982, 1994b, 2004, 2008.


Fez and Meknès (Dalton *et al* 1993b). Nonetheless, non-unified urbanization produced different divisions in the urban fabric between the well-serviced colonial districts and the newer informal settlements lacking official infrastructure. This has lasted in various forms since independence where upgraded settlements (“new medinas”) were only marginally serviced through impromptu utilities (DGUA 1997). However, even within districts social disparities were also prevalent (Figure 2). It was not unusual for villas and informal housing to exist in the same neighborhood or even side-by-side during this epoch, and continues to present significant challenges to Tangier urban managers to this day.

Following Moroccan independence and the fall of the International Statute in 1956, Tangier's economy stagnated until the early 1980s. Several factors prolonging this crisis are of note. First, the end of special international status meant that the region's *laissez-faire* economy came to a close. The *en masse* departure of colonial elites meant that the respective, skilled economic services of these agents went untended (Dalton *et al* 1993b). Banks and trading houses shuttered; gold deposits were withdrawn within only a



few years (Dalton *et al* 1993b). Soon after, in the 1960s, the Jewish merchant class also left as Arab-Jewish tensions mounted over political conflict concerning the Israeli state. The Moroccan state responded by freezing the assets of expatriates and Jews. However, their land – particularly in the city center – remained undeveloped or was (less so) informally occupied (DGU 1980). As a result, the city’s main financial and technical resource base was stripped of its ability to maintain or improve post-colonial social and economic growth.

Figure 2. *Central Tangier*



*Source:* Author’s representation based on multiple schematic images from Tangier Urban Agency (*Agence Urbaine de Tanger*) and Tangier Mediterranean Special Agency.

The second developmental crutch was that policies undertaken in the 1960s and 1970s by the Moroccan state were incompatible with Tangier’s historic economic role. Following independence, the state undertook ISI economic initiatives that tended to benefit cities that were already heavily industrialized – especially Casablanca – to the detriment of other urban economies. Additionally, it is generally believed that the Northern Region in

which Tangier is located received insufficient public investments during the reign of King Hassan II. The reasons given commonly revolve around political and regional antagonisms whose very basis remains speculative and contradictory to this day (Oxford Business Group 2005). Third, what industrialization that occurred was often limited in impact, unorganized and pollutive (Ahassad 1988, DGUA 1997).

With the flight of capital and transnational agents, a simultaneous immigration occurred via a large-scale rural exodus. These impoverished social groups settled throughout Tangier, particularly on the city's southern periphery in areas such as Bni Makada. Evidenced in Table 2, the city's population tripled since the 1970s and aggravated disorderly urban expansion in privately owned land often considered unsafe for development rather than seizing unoccupied land in the city center and risk being forcefully evicted (DGU 1980). Nevertheless, demographic growth was so rapid and intensive that not only did the city expand outward, but it also concentrated, making Tangier one of the most densely populated cities in Morocco (See Table 4). Because

*Table 4. Urbanization Rate, Tangier, 1982-2004.*

	Urbanization		Density
	Tangier (%)	Morocco (%)	Tangier (Hab/km <sup>2</sup> )
1971	71	35	—
1982	71	43	525
1994	84	51	668
2004	92	55	861

*Source:* Author's tabulation based on Direction de la Statistique 1982, 1994a, 2004, 2008.

informal settlers preferred more undesirable lands to construct housing, urbanization and densification was unevenly distributed between districts. While the colonial city grew at a rate of 2.5 percent between 1971 and 1981, the southern urban fringe around Bni Makada recorded rates of nearly 19 percent (DGUA 1997, p. 8). Confronting the growing crisis in

housing, infrastructure and basic service needs, post-colonial urban managers were increasingly ineffective in responding with adequate plans and regulations (*ibid* p.6). Since structural adjustment in the 1980s, intensive market-oriented social reforms have been initiated. Such reforms have attempted to use market logic to promote social and economic development. However, this approach highlights how entrepreneurialism is more and more seen as a panacea for reuniting the socially and spatially fragmented city and the most effective path to future economic and social development for Tangier and greater Morocco, as is currently seen in cities throughout the economic core (such as e.g. Kanter 1995).

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **MOROCCAN STATE RESCALING AND THE TANGIER CITY-REGION**

Urban globalization is a dynamic process engaging with and occurring among multiple scales. Earlier research on the strengthening of these inter-urban linkages suggested globalization weakened state authority. Historically, the Westphalian nation-state acted as the preeminent site of economic and political analysis and processes (Brenner 1999). Economic processes (such as the new international division of labor, and command and control functions) and infrastructures (such as telecommunications, ports and circulation routes) transformed through the global economy's space-time compression became privileged in select, distinctly urban nodes. The earlier quantified analysis of these relations and infrastructures acted as a proxy measure of their position in the hierarchy of the capitalist world economy (see for example Cohen 1981). The vital role of cities in the global mode of production invested these sites with a political economic sovereignty that extended beyond their political borders. States responding to these new world imperatives began stripping away their habitual mechanisms of territorial administration and investment, leading to what has been broadly conceived as *state dissolution*. Such effects include the following: the rise of a "shadow state" or the growth of para-governmental organizations to replace the provision of services and development activities that were once the prerogative of the state (Lake and Newman 2002); the contradictory relations between global production and local territorial decision-making (Friedman 1986), and; the apparent destabilization of rights and citizenships by supra- and sub-national scalar associations that circumvent traditional state authority (Wallerstein 1995, Resina 2003).

However, other theorists assert that national governance has not been devolving into absenteeism, but is socially and spatially rearticulating new forms of statehood. Brenner (1999) first theorized this process as a *reterritorialization* of state socio-economic and political organization. He argued that globalization is best understood as the restructuring of political economic and social institutions and spaces through a complex, simultaneous process of relational transformations between the city, state and global scales. Furthermore, not only is the nation-state not dissolving, but conditions how global-urban competitiveness is produced and maintained within a given location. Brenner (2004) elaborates this latter process into what he calls the *new state spaces* of urban governance and statehood. In these spaces, states relinquish their authority to urban nodes, which facilitates supranationalism and further decenters state power. Swyngedouw (2004) expanded Brenner's earlier study of reterritorialized statism by emphasizing the "glocal" dialectic of what he suggests is commonly misinterpreted as unidirectional globalization. *Glocalization* highlights how institutional and regulatory arrangements, and economic activities and relations simultaneously shift to both localized (individual, urban, regional) and transnational scales. Altering the lens through which this process occurs repoliticizes the struggle over the geographies of society and space, which otherwise remain masked by singular global formation. Paul (2002) and Brenner (1998) synthesize the debate between state dissolution and empowerment in their own respective studies of subnational statism. They conceive of intra-national regions as subnational states, which spatialize the expedient rearticulation of state management to a finer resolution. The region becomes the site around which globalization is both created, fixed and reprojected back into global networks and flows.

Though these researchers represent a much broader body of work theorizing political economic globalization and state resiliency, they also highlight the geographical limits to their research. First, their theories are couched in Western contexts that do not necessarily fit with realities from the economic periphery. Western scalar theory when viewed from the global South suggests that developing economies naturally reconfigure in an inherent pull towards the externalization. This process echoes older dependency theories which emphasize globally imposed victimhood brought by “structural irrelevance” (Castells 1996, p. 135). Second, is the reappearance the single story of developing economies attempting to attain global integration at any cost are driven to mimic Western models of development, urbanism and idealized, unregulated statehood (Robinson 2006). Such theories of contemporary rescaling, when viewed from the economic periphery, fail to illustrate the rootedness of global economic externalization, which masks the influence of post-colonial nation-building where rescaling has been a means to better effectively manage state and territorial development.

#### THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

This chapter is based upon the notion that theory from the less-developed world has as vital role in expanding established knowledge in the West (Robinson 2006, Roy 2009). While less extensive than Northern cases, research has emerged from the global South on rearticulated state formation and its local implications. These works have evidenced similar processes of state empowerment, thereby enriching and challenging previous work (Zemni and Bogaert 2006, 2009). Many of these studies, however, focus on the micro-politics of social groups confronting their new state spaces, which is limited to small social groups and lacks credence to larger structural politics (Perreault 2005,

Haarstad and Floysand 2007). While such studies are best seen as responding to the pitfalls of abundant “regime-centric inquiry,” important statist arguments may be left from the debate (Parker 2009). Micro-politics privileges small-scale organization at the expense of more structural analysis as to how the state mediates *between* global economic constraints and local needs. Procedural scalar analysis underscores the shift between city, state and global scales. Though it is necessary to isolate distinct spatial and temporal watersheds, analysis that does not account for actual the process of globalization and effectively neutralizes the state’s *becoming* (Grant 2009), hence how the nation produces and reproduces its new space of urban globality.

The approach I advocate intentionally avoids the twin concepts of decentralization and deconcentration for my analysis of Moroccan state rescaling. The concepts are foundational to the practice and discourse of state administration (Basri 1994) and are present in nearly any study of Moroccan political evolution since 1956 (e.g. Catusse *et al* 2008, Zemni and Bogaert 2009). Both terms originate from the French political science tradition in which the former refers to the transfer of state power to locally elected authorities and the latter denotes the geographical transfer of authority within a single state administration, from the national to local arena (Catusse *et al.* 2007). While it is important to acknowledge this process, I explicitly avoid employing these conceptual frames on several grounds. First, the terms present a misleading dichotomy of territorial reorganization that is too simplistic to evoke the current complexity of the hybridized state (Zemni and Bogaert 2009) or its corollary: new institutions that are democratic in name only (Catusse *et al.* 2008, see Chapter 4). Second, decentralization and deconcentration are concepts nested in the nation-state; they are not conceptually suited

to abstract how *specific* cities in Morocco are invested with *particular* institutions and agents that drive exceptional economic growth for the nation as a whole. Therefore, I prefer the concept of “state rescaling” to embody both the spatiality (deconcentration) and institutional reconfiguration (decentralization) that each term inadequately distinguishes in Moroccan socio-spatial transformations. I do so to evade falling into the “local trap” by reinforcing the assumption that localized administration (scale) is necessarily better (democratic, participatory) representation (Purcell 2006).

To grasp this complexity of urban globalization, I employ a theoretical hybridity (Roy 2009) that accounts for Western scalar theories (e.g. Brenner 1998, 2004, and Swyngedouw 2004), while infusing interpretations conceptually grounded in the less-developed world. Namely, I view state restructuring through a historical-geographical lens that highlights the formation of contemporary global-urban formation as the latest phase in a decades-long process emerging from post-colonial development initiatives (Grant and Nijman 2004). Additionally, I interpret urban transformations in Morocco as expressing both a “reduced state” in which regional balance is progressively sidelined, and “enlarged state” in which development is unevenly managed in particular geographic locations (Chakravorty 2000). Together, this theoretical hybridity asserts the procedural nature of scale in framing globalization analysis from the economic periphery, but simultaneously (dis)associates it with the economic core.

The chapter begins with theoretical arguments supporting the particular process of Moroccan state rescaling, drawing upon previous studies from throughout the global South. Next, I present three main spatial and temporal phases. Each stage represents a particular historical moment with distinct political economic constraints. It will be shown



how space was explicitly used as a procedural mechanism to refine and overcome historic development constraints.

## MOROCCAN RESCALING SINCE INDEPENDENCE

### 1.1 SCALING THE NATION 1958-1967

At the dawn of independence in 1956, a dialectical issue emerged whose synthesis has written the history and geography of the Moroccan state. On the one hand, a politically autonomous government had to replace the disparate colonial administrations and forge a new, sovereign Moroccan state. On the other, the post-colony could only begin to fulfill its goal through a concomitant process of territorially unified economic self-sufficiency. Without this joint political and economic unification, Morocco was not truly independent and could not set out on its path towards “modernization.”

In 1958, with Spanish held lands officially ceded and the Moroccan state loosely unified (the southern Spanish territory of the Western Sahara is still unsettled), development continued to center on political consensus for concerted economic planning. The political environment following independence was perhaps the most democratic to have existed since 1956, though organization was highly contested. The unification of the Moroccan state was not simply vital to political sovereignty, but played an essential role in the way in which economic and social development policy would be undertaken (Pennell 2001). This would prove exceptionally difficult in the years immediately following independence as several parties claimed legitimacy for the liberation movement. Each of these had widely different political and economic visions for the future that in many cases were in direct philosophical opposition to their counterparts (Cohen and Jaidi 2006).

Despite the drive for political economic autonomy and the idealism that propelled decolonization, the first Moroccan economic project was ultimately grounded in practical political realism than revolutionary ideology. Early planning projects suggest that state founders – regardless of their persuasion - were confident that the development path the French colonial authorities implemented since 1912 would simply continue with minor structural difficulties or changes in the status quo (DCEP 1958, 1960). Unlike other liberation movements in former Indo-China, French and Moroccan specialists worked in concert to develop the 1960-1964 economic and social plan, which suggests that the comparatively peaceful turnover would ensure Moroccan elites would prepare for their new role as the figures of their independent state (Vermeren 2002, p. 28).

Ultimately, economic elites would come to power, but without accounting for how to redistribute their inherited benefits. The privileged role and self-image of these leaders would shape misguided policies that that would have lasting, detrimental impacts on the state's future development (Vermeren 2002).

Nationalist economic and social planning lasted less than ten years (1958-1967), but reflects the important unification ideology dominant at this time as well as the unanticipated geopolitical shifts that would quickly transpire. The first, “transition plan” of 1958-1959 was intentionally designed as a basic economic vision for the state to prepare for the more comprehensive plan of 1960-1964 (DCEP 1960). The 1958 plan broadly focused on the state as a homogenous entity with little attention to local geographical specificities. The three main foci emphasized import-substitution industrialization, intensified agricultural productivity, and professional development (DCEP 1958). As with other post-colonies, the state sought to disengage the territorial

economy from foreign control by stimulating internal production and consumption in primary and secondary sectors as well as bolstering the tertiary sector. Industrial and service sectors were especially important in ‘modernizing’ the overwhelming majority of Moroccans who still led rural livelihoods – over 60 percent as late as 1973 (Direction de la Plannification 1986). Although the French highly developed infrastructure in Morocco, its economic and social benefits were unevenly distributed across space and society. What industries existed were inordinately located in and around Casablanca, the nation’s primate city (Vermeren 2002, p. 27). In 1959, 89 percent of Moroccans were illiterate, with figures as high as 98 percent for women (Pennell 2001, p. 305). As the colonial administration ended, a technocratic force had to be cultivated to manage the state and educate larger society. In the primary sector, 90 percent of peasant families owned as little as two hectares of land while two-thirds of agricultural laborers provided one-third of GDP (Vermeren 2002, p.27).

Despite the wealth and promise faced by state founders, decolonization led to the flight of human and financial capital at an unforeseen rate that quickly changed development priorities. 40 billion francs left in the first seven months of independence; 175 billion would be withdrawn in three years. So much capital was leaving, the newly nationalized Bank of Morocco revoked free-conversion status in Tangier (Vermeren 2002, p. 28).

While it was politically important to present a united Moroccan state, its translation into economic policy had a detrimental effect. As factories closed, administrative elites and their capital fled, in a geographically specific manner. Industries were concentrated in Casablanca while financial and producer services were

predominantly in the former International Zone in Tangier. Between these points was a country with vastly different natural (i.e. climate, geology, vegetation, etc.) human and material resources. By the enactment of the 1960-1964 plan, one that largely promoted in greater detail the nationalist vision, little credence was given to spatial disparities and aggravated ineffective development (DCEP 1960). By the 1965-1967 plan, the first signs of state regional rescaling began to emerge that focused on the creation of six Priority Development Zones (*Zone d'Aménagement Prioritaire: ZAPs*). The six ZAPs, of which Tangier was one, were the first of their kind created with the explicit purpose of reviving tourism development (DCEP1965). Latter development plans suggest that these zones responded to the simultaneous flight of capital, plummeting foreign investment and the broader public's weak purchasing power to support import-substitution industries (DCEP 1968). In addition to the political impossibility of reestablishing foreign economic relations, tourism appears to be one of the few palatable alternatives to externalized economic relations. And as politically and economically specific the objective these zones were to fulfill, they simultaneously articulate a highly specific geographical scale and location. The promise that this new administrative political economy held would develop into the root of the state's regionalist vision.

## 1.2 MOROCCAN REGIONALIZATION 1968-1982

The death of King Mohammed V in 1961 and the subsequent coronation of his son, crown Prince Moulay Hassan, marked the start of a new political economic turn in Morocco. Beyond mere monarchical symbolism, King Hassan II would be the state's longest serving leader since independence, whose vision would affect Moroccan development. An authoritarian ruler, Cohen and Jaidi (2006) contend that his increasingly

violent and repressive governance unwillingly and precariously united the Moroccan polity and silenced democracy for over thirty years. Political shifts in Moroccan administration would have simultaneous implications in restructuring the economy within specific scalar articulations.

Politically, Hassan II's 'unification' of the constitutional monarchy greatly weakened the state's already deficient human and technical reservoir at hand. Loyalty became as important as competency, which promoted graft and nepotism (DGU 1980, p. 65). Economically, improperly implemented industrialization programs and the lack of geographically sensitive planning (best embodied in the continued primacy of greater Casablanca) further aggravated inter-regional imbalances. As a result, the economic flourish at the end of the Protectorate was replaced by a prolonged period of stagnation (2 percent) throughout the 1960s. Population growth outpaced economic growth more acutely than in many post-colonial states at the time (Vermeren 2002, p. 42). As the 1968-1972 plan states:

[State planners] did not account for inter-regional constraints in previous development plans. This lacuna frequently provoked a misunderstanding of local realities and improperly applied planning recommendations. The 1968-1972 plan will attempt a different approach, which will take into consideration local development problems (DCEP 1968, p. 40).

In an effort to counter these socio-economic and spatial imbalances, national economic policy starting with the 1968-1972 plan focused on a two-part approach based upon regionalization (DCEP 1968) and later "economic selectivity" (DPDR 1973). First, regional development was based on the creation of seven distinct economic zones to reduce geographical imbalances through a spatially nuanced understanding and application of national planning. For example, the Northwest Region of Kenitra-Tétouan-

Tangier-Rabat was organized so its economic prosperity would at once balance intra-regional growth (e.g. between the cities of Tangier-Tetouan-Asilah) as well as financing other resource-deficient regions – particularly those in the East (Direction de la Plannification 1986).

Additionally, regionalization was more than a conceptual reorganization, but also part of the decentralization of state administration into each region (Catusse *et al.* 2007). Regional Assemblies comprised of technicians, locally elected representatives and authorities, were established to liaise with provincial governors to create and implement development plans. Together local needs and resources would be identified and forwarded to state planners. These planners would then organize the seven different reports and design a single national plan that was to be implemented in each region, or select set of regions (DCEP 1968). However, the practical application of planning was far less democratic than it appears. The authoritarian shift in Moroccan politics meant that the downscaling of regional administration was in all aspects was closely watched and managed by representatives of the Moroccan Interior Ministry (DCEP 1968, p. 47).

Second, economic selectivity responded to the increasing role of public expenditures to offset private and foreign investments after the poor performance of import-substitution industries and fleeing capital (DPDR 1973). Because import-substitution could not be supported by the weak purchasing power of the majority of Moroccan households, ISI was reoriented towards exportation. Planners discovered that of the post-colonial industries, those oriented towards exports had the highest growth rates. The new vision sought to capitalize upon the opportunity (Direction de la Plannification 1986). Yet, since many industries were fairing poorly, private sector

investments were not being made. The inherited free-market model of the early 1960s came to be replaced by a heavy state role in spurring national development (DCEP 1968). Records show that investment during the 1973-1977 plan amounted to 43 percent to public expenditures and only 21 percent to private spending, doubling since the previous five-year plan (DPDR 1973). Public investments and economic selectivity were predominantly focused in enhancing traditional industries (i.e. only investing in those most sustainable), but in Tangier, the National Company for Developing the Bay of Tangier (*Société National d'Aménagement de la Baie de Tanger*) was the product of the earlier Priority Development Zones that acted as a public company in charge of reviving the city's anemic tourism sector (SNABT 1968). From 1968-1972, 12 million dirhams alone were invested throughout Morocco to improve its foreign image (DPDR 1973).

Despite Hassan II's authoritarian regime, the political cost of up-scaling the Moroccan state back into global economy was not without contest. Nearly ten years since gaining independence, economic policy ran in opposition to strong post-colonial nationalist politics. In order to appease the increasingly disgruntled public (two assassination attempts were made in 1971 and 1972) the central government undertook a process of revived nationalism, or 'Moroccanization', that favored the King's conservative supporters. Moroccanization was as much cultural as economic. It was partly a revival of distinctly Arab qualities of Moroccan culture, but it also involved the central government's seizure of privately owned foreign lands and enterprises. Some land seizures occurred immediately following independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but most private property was voluntarily sold because the young government did not want to exacerbate the flight of capital (Pennell 2001).

The first Moroccanization phase involved land expropriations that appealed to the largely rural population. 300,000 hectares of foreign land were seized under the auspices of nationalism, but was not redistributed. Either it stayed in state possession, was resold or given to elite loyalists (Vermeren 2002, p. 62). The second phase concerned several thousand enterprises in Morocco, 50 percent of which remained in foreign control since independence. 30 percent of industrial goods and 90 percent of tertiary services were targeted by the central government under a similar nationalist re-appropriation campaign. During this period, Moroccan control in industry changed from 18.5 percent ownership to 55 percent, where by 1978, 36 families controlled two-thirds of Moroccanized capital (Vermeren 2002, p.63). In effect, when the state appeared in greatest need of cultivating new economic ties to the global economy, its simultaneous policy of land and capital expropriations made any chance of successful development extremely challenging.

From 1978 until the economic crisis of early 1980s, Morocco continued to favor and refine the dual political strategy of economic selectivity and regionalization (Direction de la Plannification 1978). However, the traditional means by which this had been financed and undertaken was beginning to falter. First, when inflation grew during the 1970s it allowed the state to underwrite external debt with the World Bank with negative real interest rates. This helped the national economy double during the 1968-1972 period. But at the end of the 1970s, real interest began to shift and led to a sudden rise in external debt. By 1977, 50 percent of Moroccan investments were financed by foreign loans (Vermeren 2002, p. 64). Second, though the economy improved over the part of the 1970s, it was superficially supported by a bubble in phosphate production and exports. As debt increased, phosphate prices also began to fall. 1978 brought the second



oil crisis, which aggravated Morocco's external debt, which doubled to \$13 billion by 1983 (Vermeren 2002, p. 76-77). Finally, the ongoing war over the Western Sahara and prolonged agricultural crises not seen in decades forced the central government into structural adjustment under the tutelage of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Pennell 2001).

In Tangier, the 1970s was pronounced by ever increasing urban crisis brought about by an ongoing rural exodus and weak urban planning procedures, the last significant study being undertaken for Tangier occurred in 1963 (DGU 1980). As a result, from 1971 to 1981, the size of informal housing developments increased from 6 to 116 hectares in and around the metropole with little managerial precedent for effective responses (DGU 1980, p. 88). As local planners stated:

These uncontrolled settlements, although within the municipal periphery, are developing rapidly. Seen from an aerial photo taken in May 1981, there was hardly anything near the [city's] railway line. From the same view in January 1982, four to five houses appear in the layout. A study of the terrain undertaken in July 1982 noted seven house foundations and five homes nearly completed (DGU 1980, p. 131).

As for tourism along the Bay of Tangier, developments by the state company, *Société Nationale d'Aménagement de la Baie de Tanger* (SNABT) ground to a halt. Destined to develop 30,000 hotel beds in 1967, only 2,200 were completed by 1981 (DGU 1980, p. 75). Nearly 90 percent of all major funds in Tangier were allocated for the Bay of Tangier from 1965-1972 and its unrealized revitalization had lasting effects on blocking public investments in more "unproductive" though vitally needed social services. As a result, the Bay project facilitated land and housing speculation on publicly owned land as a means

to recuperate lost investments.<sup>2</sup> It has been argued “the Northwest Region was the best financed, the most publicly subsidized, and the least profitable in Morocco” (Ingérop 2002, p. 8.6).

From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the Moroccan central government underwent significant reconfigurations in the political economy of state territorial administration. The rise of an authoritarian, nationalist state in development policy produced unfavorable conditions in the administration’s already diminished human and technical resource base. On one hand, authoritarianism influenced a regionalized political economic downscaling of its development strategy to ensure the central government’s interests were fulfilled. On the other hand, the lack of available resources promoted a simultaneous process of up-scaling engagement towards more overt, externalized economic selectivity in public expenditures. However, Moroccanization policy at home and larger shifts in the world economy catalyzed systemic crises in Morocco, forcing the central government to undergo foreign-led adjustments to better face the demands of the a new, more globally integrated mode of production.

### 1.3 URBAN-GLOBALIZATION SINCE 1983

With the 1982 economic crisis and the first of at least nine structural adjustments since then, the era of Moroccan nationalism came to an end. In fact, much of the post-colonial aspirations that drove economic and social development policy quickly shifted to much more pragmatic solutions for the new era in which the state found itself. Although King Hassan II would reign for another two decades, development was reoriented to a much more aggressive free-market model that had not been seen since the first years of

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<sup>2</sup> Personal communication with SMIT representative, June 18, 2009.

independence (Direction de la Plannification 1981). Morocco's restructuring and development policy through the 1990s centered almost exclusively on stabilizing the economy through balancing debt payments and bypassing long-term social issues. Among others, planning priorities conditioned by the IMF caused a shift towards aggressive state decentralization, reduced bureaucratic expenditures, increased privatization and demands for political democracy (Pennell 2001). The results from this period are mixed: while significant privatization, financial reform and anti-corruption legislation was undertaken, decades of monopolies and nepotism continued to prevent effective liberalized competition (Cohen and Jaidi 2006). Yet, while debt continued to grow from 25 billion dirhams in 1979 to 170 billion dirhams in 1989, inflation was put in check (Vermeren 2002, p. 78, 92).

By 1992, short unstable political economic issues made long term planning difficult to the effect that it ceased altogether until the death of Hassan II.<sup>3</sup> Recessions occurred in that year and in 1994 and 1995; GDP averaged 2 percent annually. Cuts in social expenditures aggravated systemic poverty, which grew from 3 to 5 million affected persons between 1990 and 1998 (Vermeren 2002, p. 92).

Yet, the era brought a new spatial turn beginning with the 1996 Moroccan constitution and the creation of Local Communities (*Collectivités Locales*). The term generalizes a complex redefinition and downscaling of territorial administration from the original seven economic regions to smaller administrative boundaries. In 1997, the regions were redrawn into 16 units (Moroccan Parliament 1997). Urban reterritorialization, however, did not begin until after the death of Hassan II and the

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<sup>3</sup> Personal communication with a representative from the national statistical center (*Direction de la Statistique*), August 4, 2009.

coronation of his son Mohammed VI in 1999. The new King has been the most spatially conscious of Morocco's monarchs in development planning. Moving beyond Hassan II's regionalization, greater importance is being given to sub-regional administrative units, particularly provinces and prefectures, and within these rural and urban communes (GDCL 2003, 2004). As a result, since 1984, rural communes have increased from 760 to 1298 units, and urban communes from 99 to 249 (Direction de la Programmation 2000, p. 45). So important is geography with the new regime that it is among the 2002-2004 development plan's three main policy objectives. These include democratizing state polity and economy, strengthening human and technical resources and reducing social class and geographical disparities.

The first two objectives thus far have presented mixed results. For example, a recent investigative report by a leading critical Moroccan magazine *Tel Quel* has shown wide spread consolidation of political economic empowerment and enrichment under Mohammed VI and his loyalist cortege. The authors uncovered that private enterprises controlled by the royal holding company, "SIGER," have a total market capitalization of 160 billion dirhams – the equivalent of 30 percent of the total value traded on the Casablanca stock exchange (Benchemsi and Iraqi 2009, p. 51). Furthermore, what little social development occurred on par with liberalization has been highly uneven (Cohen and Jaidi 2006). Yet, Mohammed VI only recently entered into his tenth year of reign and it is unclear if and how any redistribution will occur. The third, spatialized objective of the 2000-2004 plan suggests that state policies are more long-term than their predecessors and await further developments. In tangent with the 2000-2004 plan, an additional national planning project has been cultivated that involves actors from throughout

country. The National Debate (*Débat National*) was the first of three comprehensive parts of the central government's spatialized development, launched in 2000 (DAT 2001).

Although largely represented by political, academic, business and labor figureheads, the debate was designed to incorporate all Moroccan citizens in a public discussion over the various needs and constraints facing national development in the globalizing era (DAT 2008). The first of its kind, it marks a small, though no less significant turn in the participatory nature of Moroccan political economic development. As the King emphasized in his commencement address for the National Debate on 26 January 2000:

We cannot reach the objectives that preceded this new conception of territorial development [by] limiting the charter project's elaboration alone to central authorities and techno-bureaucratic administrative offices. The plan that we seek starts from the obsolete conception that the state is the exclusive distributor of wealth and is solely responsible for all problems and pitfalls...

Also, let us call for the adoption of a new approach to territorial development and urbanization, founded on *citizen participation* and *shared responsibilities*, and in which the state's functions are limited to organization, orientation and regulation together in concert for ... policy development, to get to know local communes, the private sector, civil society, specialists and all concerned persons for this new approach (DAT 2001, p.7).

Through this popular conception of planning a more democratic spatialization of development was allowed to take form. For example, not only were debates convened in each of the 16 regions and 56 local workshops (emphasizing the distinctly regional and character of issues to be examined) but Moroccan ex-patriots were also given voice in a debate in Paris, France, which highlights the important social, economic and political role of these global agents (DAT 2008).

Following the National Debate, the state then drafted the National Charter for Territorial Development (*Charte Nationale de l'Aménagement du Territoire*) in 2001.

This document highlights the central government's choice of important issues to emerge from the National Debate and attempts to organize a national policy for development

(DAT 2001). Building off of the National Charter, the National Territorial Development Plan (*Schéma National d'Aménagement du Territoire*) was organized in 2004. Whereas the Charter outlined the political vision for development, the Plan detailed specific human and territorial capacities in Morocco to propose options to achieve the Charter's policy goals (DAT 2004).

Although the latest development project emphasizes action at the national scale, it must be stressed how much regional and urban articulations of territorial administration are essential to state development and planning. In fact, the National Charter duly recognizes the vital confluence of *all* scales to effectively stimulate economic and social development:

In the current international context, marked by the creation of regional economic groups, liberalization increases exchanges, exacerbates international concurrence, hastens technological innovation, revolutionizes communications, develops territories at the local, regional and national scale, and economic unions uncover the support of all possible responses to the challenges of globalization (DAT 2001, p. 9).

The current phase of urban-globalization since 1983 has placed new stresses and constraints in Morocco's economic and social development plan. This responds to multiple historic constraints faced by the nation as well as expanding development visions for more effective and harmonious integration into global flows. Politically, territorial administration has been rearticulated at regional, metropolitan and sub-urban levels. Although currently driven by nation-wide imperatives, the current direction that management has taken suggests a much more inclusive and important role for economic and urban regions beyond what has been established within the last ten years.

Economically, diverse industries and services continue to play an integrative and distributive role at the regional level, but their smaller territorial unit suggests that those resources and their dispersion are more effectively managed. Socially, the citizen's role

has again come to the fore since the 1960s. Equitable, concerted social development and one's own responsibility to facilitate it highlights the synthesis between global discourse around the importance of rugged economic individualism and more socially and spatially integrative values present throughout Morocco's developmental past- however real or imagined.

#### OVERVIEW

Since 1956, post-colonial Morocco has undergone significant shifts in political economic and social administrative scales. Since independence, the most pressing concern for the state's developmental vision has centered upon political autonomy, economic self-sufficiency and territorial unity. How exactly the central government has addressed this tripartite demand is founded in the historical and geographic circumstances of Morocco, which are broadly seen to occur in national, regional and urban-global spatio-temporal phases.

During the National Phase (1958-1967), the state inherited a prosperous economy and a relatively democratic political structure from its former colonizers. State founders' actions promoted a liberalized economy, though one that was heavily oriented towards import-substitution industrialization to improve a nationalist market and consumer-base. However, the ongoing flight of human and economic capital, and the highly uneven spatial distribution between a poor rural majority and a small urban minority as well as access to natural and material resources did not allow for this vision to effectively come to fruition.

By 1968, a regionalized approach emerged to balance social and spatial disparities more effectively through the creation of seven economic regions. However, a lack of

competent administrators to manage regional political economies as well as ever declining foreign and private development investment (mainly the backlash from the increasingly repressive Hassan II regime) influenced the central government to rely on public funds to sustain internal economic and social development. Once public investments, tied to favorable global economic conditions, fell into larger structural crises and simultaneous internal failures (e.g. agricultural productivity, Moroccanization), the central state was forced to fully restructure its integration into the global economy.

Since 1983, the Moroccan government has further downscaled political economic management to improve regional development through reduced, though more spatially concentrated, public investment. While moderate openings and opportunities have been made, the method of contemporary urban-global rescaling presents some significant concerns (e.g. highly uneven socio-economic development and rearticulated political authoritarianism). However, it remains to be seen how exactly this structural transformation is practiced and lived at the scale where such shifts are most apparent. This study will now examine the everyday reconfiguration in Tangier's management.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **STATE RESCALING AND THE RE-PRODUCTION OF TANGIER SPACE**

With the need to territorialize global capital, key urban nodes rather than the traditional nation-state are more adept to flex and adapt to the volatile cycles of the world economy. The drive for a competitive edge pits cities against the state apparatus, leading to what some suggest is the state's growing dissolution. However, Chapter 2 illustrates that the Moroccan state is not devolving in the urban-global era, but is reconstituting its means of legitimacy and authority. Urban empowerment is, hence, a manifestation of the transformed state.

In the previous examination of state rescaling, analysis sought to highlight the important systemic relations behind Morocco's unique form of globalization with increasing development priorities placed on the city over the state. Attention was given to Tangier's own role within this broader spatio-temporal and political economic process. In order to better understand the specific *urban* characteristics of Moroccan globalization, analysis must now shift away from state-centric interpretations towards a city-centric exploration of the exceptional role of urban managers in this transformative process. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the specific articulation of global formation and the dominant individual and collective politics behind its production at the urban resolution. Extending analysis to Tangier, this chapter asks how and in what form is state transformation articulated into the city's space. I argue that broader structurally-induced changes have radically transformed the city's management in ways that reinforce the uneven distribution of Morocco's development and have (at least tentatively) reinforced exclusionary and authoritarian political engagement.

## THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

This study is part of a larger tradition in urban globalization focusing on the way in which structural constraints condition the underlying mechanism behind the built form's development. The relationship between local agency and the physical urban fabric has been the subject of debate in recent years with two very different interpretations of what is broadly seen as urban entrepreneurialism. Entrepreneurialism signifies a qualitative shift in managerialism which once acted as a paternal distributor of essential goods and services for local residents towards a smaller, market oriented approach whereby agents act as economic enablers. Mainstream accounts of entrepreneurialism view the shift as a necessary action for urban dynamism and vitality in an increasingly competitive global economy. Foremost among this group is Richard Florida (2002), who argues that cities must attract a "creative class" to cultivate a social atmosphere in the city that appeals to a young, gay, well-educated workforce specialized in technology and service industries. Similar studies emphasize cultivating social climate through place marketing (Scott 1997). Other mainstream accounts center on the importance of creating market-friendly business climates to attract specific service-based firms (Sassen 2001). A final mainstream approach suggests that a basic infrastructure must exist to facilitate the operation of specific global enterprises. This infrastructure includes telecommunications networks, efficient transit circulation and nodes (especially airports), and proper buildings in which to house global facilities (El-Khishin 2003)

Juxtaposed to these mainstream accounts of urban entrepreneurialism is a more critical literature that acknowledges the real necessity for a competitive urban environment, but simultaneously argues that these methods do not resolve but aggravate,

displace or create altogether new problems. For example, it is argued the social engineering for global city “cosmopolitanism” tends to caricature or create inauthentic representations of local society (Nijman 1999). Additionally, deregulation may give one city a competitive edge in the short-term, but in the long run aggravates harmful fiscal cycles as competing cities “race to the bottom” for investment opportunities. Harvey (2000) illustrates this point with his study of Baltimore’s downtown revitalization schemes, which through deregulation and subsidization created what he called “feeding the downtown monster” (p.141). Last, this process produces specific forms of urbanization in which certain urban nodes and corridors receive privileged attention and redevelopment while other spaces adjacent and in-between fall off the map. This has been primarily understood as producing “splintered urbanisms” (Graham and Marvin 2001) or “carceral archipelagoes” (Soja 2000).

This chapter follows the critical interpretation of the local implications of state restructuring. The specific lenses I use draw upon three main theoretical positions. First, this chapter follows Grant and Nijman’s (2004), argument that while broader structural interpretations of globalization are important, urban scalar analysis best articulates the uneven nature of globalization. With particular reference to Morocco, this uneven formation is best seen in the reconsolidation of political power, the rise of urban entrepreneurial management practices and the increasing appearance of megaprojects. In the first instance, the previous chapter has effectively delineated the larger argument surrounding state empowerment in a national context (e.g. Brenner’s (2004) “new state spaces” among others). However, analysis must also account for how this political shift is being undertaken at the urban scale. Second, the practical manifestation of urban political

transformation is most present in the movement in urban management from traditional duties centered upon the provision of basic goods and services for public welfare toward a more privatized managerialism that prioritizes entrepreneurial speculation over public utility distribution for Tangier's citizenry (Harvey 1989b). Third, the physical expression of this new political turn is most salient in the ever-increasing reliance by urban managers on large-scale development projects (Moulaert *et al* 2003). Such projects are seen to act as key urban infrastructure to territorialize and reproject the economic and social benefits of globalization by attracting foreign direct investment that help develop exceptional sites for commercial and leisure activities. Together these three parts represent the inherently relational nature of Tangier's global formation and its effect on the politics of uneven development in the city.

The chapter will follow in three parts. In part one I focus on the legal-institutional relationship in constructing an ideological framework for Tangier's urban management. My focus is on the three main managerial organizations comprised of the Urban Agency, Communal Council and Regional "Wilaya". In section two, I show how these conceptual parameters condition contemporary practices of urban management, specifically the shift from the provision of urban services to entrepreneurialism. I provide an example of this change through the reconstituted management of supply and redevelopment of housing in Tangier. In part three, I detail how new managerial practices are physically marked by the qualitative and quantitative increase in megaprojects in the globalizing city-region. These sites distinctly cater to what Brenner and Keil call "vertical" and "horizontal" globalization (2006). I analyze their use through the regional urban plans known as *Schéma Directeur*. New to post-adjustment Morocco, their employment signifies the need

for cities to maximize the concentration of specific economic infrastructures to harness and maximize the economic benefits of global capital circulation. The alteration in these three aspects of Tangier's spatial reproduction will foreground chapter 4, where I will refine my attention to the urban-global negotiation and re-projection of the city back into these global economic circuits from an analysis of one specific megaproject known as Tangier City Center. There, I will analyze a case study of the negotiation between state tourism developer, the *Société Marocain d'Ingénierie Touristique* (SMIT) and the transnational Spanish builder, Inveravante Maroc in charge of the city's emerging node.

#### IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS

To illustrate the managerial ideology brought about by the rescaled Moroccan state, I ground my analysis in three laws creating key institutions in Tangier that conceptually frame urban problems and solutions to economic and social development.

While studies on the relationship between ideology and institutions have been covered extensively in various disciplines, my interest here is not to focus on how organizations influence particular ideologies, but how normative conceptions frame and are framed by specific institutional formations. Edelman and Suchman (1997) in *The Legal Environments of Organizations*, provide a cultural perspective on the relationship between law and organizations. By contrasting a “rational materialist” perspective with a “normative cultural alternative,” they argue:

[Frames] organizations as cultural rule followers and law as a system of moral principles, scripted roles and sacred symbols. Thus organizations look to the law for more normative and cognitive guidance as they seek their place in a socially constructed cultural reality. Law provides a model of and for organizational life, defining roles for organizational actors and meanings for organizational events – and imbuing those roles and meanings with positive or negative moral valance (p. 482).

Edelman and Suchman's conception helps frame institutions as socially organized entities that ideologically condition social practices. From this standpoint, Tangier managerial institutions embody a specific set of ideologies that condition the production and management of the built form. Catusse (2005) furthers this point arguing that conceptual shifts in the current urban-global era can be seen as a "social reinvention" not from institutions to society, but from within society itself. She argues that since the 1980s, the Moroccan state's full participation in externally induced market-oriented reform has produced:

[The] stage for a sometimes contradictory, awakening of a social issue that could be understood as a 'social re-creation' – at once the formation of questions and the proposition of outcomes ...[where] on the one hand the 'social' becomes a subject of public concern, voiced by multiple actors who define collective interest. On the other hand, society does so by creating new institutions or forms of decision-making, who renew in part a public outcome largely inherited from the Protectorate (Catusse 2005, p. 222).

The particular institutionalization of current state restructuring in Tangier is evidenced in creation and transformation urban management organizations, particularly the Urban Planning Agency, Communal Council and regional governorship or *Wali*. These three institutions emerged since 1980 and thus embody managerial ideologies specific to the global epoch. Analyzing the frameworks of their legal foundation (*dahir*), these laws help delineate specific parameters for what managerial practices ought to be used in urban economic and social development according to the logic of the restructured state.

Urban planning agencies (*agences urbaines*) were established by royal decree in 1993; subsequently, the Urban Agency of Tangier (AUT) was founded in 1998 (DGCL 1993). These agencies are public entities financed by the Moroccan state and under the Ministry of the Interior's jurisdiction. The Agency's role centers on urban planning and

management within Tangier. Prior to the AUT, all planning was carried out between the governor (*Wali*) and Ministry of Habitat of the province concerned.<sup>4</sup> However, the Agency is not the sole authority in project planning and management and an agreement is needed between the AUT, governor and the local Communal Council.

The law establishing Urban Agencies has two essential features that ideologically shape urban management. First, the primary role of the agency is to study and develop local general plans, or *Schéma Directeur* (DGCL 1993, Art. 3.1-3). As such, the agency has overarching power to conceptualize and frame the particular way in which the built form is utilized for social and economic urban development. It determines the intensity and extent of development as well as where specific growth will occur and which particular sectors to privilege. The AUT's technical function also provides an important political service, informally acting as an objective mediator between the demands of the Communal Council (the representative of the urban public) and the Wali (the representative of the central government).

Yet the political neutrality of the AUT is only apparent. The agency's administrative council is divided into four parts: (1) presidents from prefectures and provincial assemblies; (2) presidents from urban communes; (3) representatives of rural communes and; (4) presidents of professional organizations. Though clear diversity of voices is represented at multiple administrative scales, the dispersion of authority is less so. Administrative decisions are controlled by the agency's director. The director holds power and resources necessary for the agency's management (DGCL 1993, Art. 4) and can "delegate under his responsibility a part of his capacities and authority to the

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<sup>4</sup> Personal communication with a representative from the *Division d'Urbanisme au Wilaya de Tanger* July 7, 2009.

agency's administrative personnel" (DGCL 1993, Art. 8). Therefore, the director, not the community representatives, is principle authority in conditioning the specific vision and mission structuring technical planning practices in Tangier. And as an appointee, the director inevitably promotes the central government's market-based development principles into planning organization and management.

Established in 2002, the Communal Charter's goal is to refine economic and social development at the administrative scale of the commune, once the objective of regional economic planning (DGCL 2003). The Charter created locally elected Communal Councils, replacing "Urban Communities" that were formerly responsible for basic infrastructure projects, such as roads, sanitation, water and electricity (Catusse 2007). Communal councils were created to promote state decentralization and local administrative empowerment. The Council is elected by the local populace and these members vote on an executive cabinet made up of a president and vice presidents whose number is relative to the number of council members elected (DGCL 2003, Art. 2, 8). The communal administration has two main prerogatives: its own and those dictated by the central government. Except for three permanent sectors, objectives can vary widely depending upon the local or state issue. The three sectors are managed by permanent commissions directed by their own elected presidents (DGCL 2003, Art. 14). The first is the Economic, Social and Cultural Development Commission. Among its objectives, this group is legally obligated to engage in necessary activities to promote and encourage private investment, such as developing infrastructure, economic activity zones and enhancing the local business climate (DGCL 2003, Art. 36.2). The second commission is on Urbanization, Environmental and Territorial development. This group reviews all



plans and documents for urban development within the objectives of the urban agency's *Schéma Directeur*. It also decides which programs to undertake for urban redevelopment, informal settlement absorption as well as medina preservation and restoration. Third, the Budgetary and Finance Commission, determines taxes and tariffs for acquisitions, transfers, exchanges, leases and all transactions on goods made by the private sector (DGCL 2003, Art. 37.6). Prerogatives transferred from the central government can also vary considerably, depending upon the needs of the state and the individual project.

The commissions' duties are important in how the law interfaces with urban institutions to create a specific managerial ideology. The urban agency is structured to study sites for potential development projects. The Council, in turn, is designed to undertake how these studies can be effectively realized given the public and private resources of the local community. But the council is also less democratically controlled than it appears. Although its members are elected, the council's governance is controlled by an "administrative authority" whose obligation it is to "oversee by the application of the Communal Council and its executive the laws and regulations in use, and to guarantee the protection of the 'general interest' ... of the [central] administration" (DGCL 2003, Art. 68). Therefore, representation of the local populace is effectively compromised to ensure national prerogatives are fulfilled (DGCL 2003, Art. 6).

The third and last institution, the Wali, is a super-provincial authority within the economic region. The position is directly appointed by the King himself, and is under the direct tutelage of the Ministry of the Interior. The Wali was a *de facto* governmental creation following the 1981 Casablanca riots and thus has a strong functional orientation towards maintaining local security and intra-regional coordination. From 1983 through

1997, the Wali was instituted throughout every economic region of Morocco. However, in 2001 a new shift occurred in the way appointments were carried out. Traditionally, Walis were appointed from the top ranks of the Ministry of the Interior. In 2001, King Mohammed VI changed precedent by appointing seven of nine new candidates from outside the Ministry. These men came to be known as “technowalis” for their apparent ability to manage the built environment according to market principles. These men had strong relations with both private enterprise and the monarchy, enlisting a “technocratization” of city governance (Catusse *et al* 2007, Catusse 2008).

The institutional relationship between the urban agency, communal council and Wali highlights an overwhelming trend and ideological shift in the mission and vision of Tangier urban management. Each position’s legal parameters articulate the ideological codification of rescaled Moroccan governance through Tangier’s three most prominent urban administrative institutions. Simultaneous to this *de jure* conceptualization is the social reinforcement of the central government to ensure that its prerogatives are not simply passively adopted, but actively incorporated into the practices of the urban management. The latter point highlights the issue that within a city of roughly one million people, the political apparatuses for collective urban management are far from the popular voice they claim to support. In reality, three men – the Wali, the director of the urban agency and the communal council’s administrative authority – have preeminent control over all urban management in Tangier. Additionally, the institutions these managers represent are ideologically founded upon free-market models of governance and present predictably imbalanced implications on the way in which their duties are practiced in the city in the name of the greater public.

## PRACTICAL SHIFTS

The socio-practical manifestation of institutionalized administrative conceptions is dominant in the shift from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism in Tangier. The change argued in the well-established theory espoused by David Harvey (1989), argues that unrestrained competition between cities influences urban managers to shift their attention from the provision of basic services for the local citizenry toward speculating on urban development schemes that benefit urban elites.

The manager-come-entrepreneur transformation is illustrated in several processes in Tangier. The most prominent changes include the growth of public-private partnerships, privatization and financial incentivization of urban development. Privatization has been extensive throughout post-adjustment Morocco. The liberalization of water is but one example. Since 1997, two foreign operators have dominated water distribution. The first, Suez-Ondéo was established in 1997 in Casablanca. The second, Véolia Water privatized distribution in Tangier through its subsidiary, Amendis. Currently, one quarter of water is privately distributed in Morocco. Three companies (Redal, Lydec and Amendis) own 34 percent of all Moroccan water contracts alone. Costs have risen as a consequence. In Tangier, the cost of water hookups doubled in the aftermath of privatization between 2001 and 2002. Although Amendis is required to dedicate half its connections to “social distribution,” corners have been extensively cut and costs remain prohibitive for the poorest strata of society (de Miras *et al* 2007, p. 2). Public-private partnerships, though historically present in Tangier, have grown with the size of the projects. The most notable public-private venture in Tangier is the Tangier Mediterranean Special Agency. This publicly owned private company is in charge several

megaprojects in the Northern Region, including the Tangier-Mediterranean Port and Tangier Free Zone, which together are part of the foci of Morocco's globalizing service and industrial economy. Last, incentives are an integral part of the liberalization of development throughout Morocco, but in Tangier they are even more lucrative than in most Moroccan cities. In addition to the generous subsidies and exonerations for foreign investors in Morocco, the Tangier prefecture provides a 50 percent reduction for taxes on corporations, revenue, patents and "urban taxes" without any temporal limitation. In the rest of Morocco, these benefits cease after five years (House of Representatives 1995, Art. 7.C).

Housing supply and renewal has been a particularly salient practice illustrating the reorientation of managerial priorities in post-adjustment Tangier. Housing deficiencies are a common phenomena in the less developed world. The cost of available safe and adequate shelter tends to be exorbitant for precarious social groups. However, this does not abate the ever-increasing demand from both residents and newly arrived migrants from the countryside and abroad. Informal settlements, from tin to brick, are now considered the norm rather than the exception in cities of the global south (Davis 2006). In Tangier the story is no different. As previously mentioned, the city has aggressively urbanized and increased in density since the 1970s, quadrupling the population without adding to adequate housing stock (Urba Systems 1999). Worse still, figures undercount the actual need. The spillover effects can be seen in informal housing growth. Informal settlements have been officially recognized in Tangier planning documents since the 1950s (Inspection d'urbanisme de la province de Tanger n.d.). However, their growth increased exponentially during the 1970s and 1980s due to a

series of economic crises and droughts that severely affected rural demographics in the North. Shacks sprang up faster than formal housing could be built. Districts such as Bni Makada became popularly infamous for squalor and vice (Ahassad 1988, pp. 54-55). The inhabitants were displaced and the settlement was razed (Urba Systems 1999). Other districts were not, and brick-by-brick they built their informal settlements into “new medinas” and were able to demand public infrastructure from the city government.

However, the current settlement absorption program fundamentally differs in its ideology and practice than previous efforts. For example, two options have traditionally been exercised by urban managers. First, if the settlement was precariously built, such as out of corrugated metal and scraps the city would relocate the residents, raze the site, install water, electricity and roads. They would then allow residents to move back to the newly integrated sites as a form of on-site upgrading. This was the case of Bni Makada in southern Tangier. Second, if the site was older and had developed into a fully constructed neighborhood of bricks and mortar, the city would not demolish the territory, but would instead provide hookups for electricity and water (see e.g. Le Tellier and Iraki 2009 for detailed examples in Morocco). It is for this reason that private water distributors are obligated to dedicate (in principle) half their connections as “social,” which occurred in the new medina of Dradeb in western Tangier.

Transformations in urban managerial practices in Tangier suggest that the traditional options for housing development are no longer appropriate to meet global economic demands. Instead, recent entrepreneurial constraints of urban management necessitate that slum clearance be used as a tool to renovate the commodified urban aesthetic regardless of how old or established the district may be. For example, the El

Haffa settlement on the Marshan Plateau district of Tangier was partially destroyed while researching for this study in 2009. While the tractors bulldozed homes several locals said that this site had been part of the northern medina for at least ten years, but was likely much older.<sup>5</sup> El Haffa is unique from the previous two examples in that its situation in Tangier recently went from being on the absolute extremity of the city (built into a cliff along the shore and remotely accessible), to being reincorporated into center through the newly completed highway extending from the Tangier Port to the Rabat Highway that bounded the settlement within the city. The settlement's destruction and simultaneous preservation of adjacent villas from the International epoch underscores the spatial injustice of global city aestheticization and highlights the incompatibility between managerial practices and ideologies, and the urban public's basic needs that they fail to represent. The liberalization of Tangier management influences administrators to privilege the city as a commodity to be speculated upon and sanitized rather than as a place where the collective resources of the public are justly distributed. This practice reinforces the uneven geographical expansion oriented towards global economic imperatives to the detriment of local inhabitants. Yet, while this destruction occurs on one part of Tangier, a simultaneous process of construction is under way that produces a distinctly global pattern of territorial development inscribed in Tangier's built form, under the auspices of greater social good.

#### THE RISE OF MEGAPROJECTS

Managerial efforts since 1983 to stimulate economic growth are most salient in the development and reliance upon large-scale development projects. Megaprojects, as iconic

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<sup>5</sup> Ahassad (1988, p. 47) mentions a *quartier populaire* (poorer district) made up of "densely populated individual homes" in his description of the Marshan Plateau, though El Haffa is not specifically named.

structures through which global flows are territorialized, are increasingly being used as the *modus operandi* of urban management to fix capital in global cities (Moulaert *et al*, 2003). Tangier is no different (Oxford Business Group 2005, pp. 95-100). It is argued that this process is characteristic of what Harvey calls “the second circuit of capital,” meaning the absorption of surplus capital via the built environment (Harvey 1989b). In order to reproduce capital, part of the relative surplus value created in the production process must be reinvested to reproduce the conditions for further surplus value generation. This investment in the built form is also known as the *production of space* (Lefebvre 1991). The shape and content of these projects illustrate a quantitative and qualitative increase in the engagement by urban managers to rectify systemic social and economic development issues in Tangier, but through an ever-increasing rapport and logic based in the global economy. Therefore, megaprojects are at once the outcome and condition of Tangier’s new state space, but also territorial keystones in harnessing global capital via enhanced regional and transnational connectivity.

To illustrate how these projects have evolved, analysis focuses on the three main urban plans for Tangier since the start of urban-global rescaling. These include the 1980 and 1997 *Schéma Directeurs* and the 2009 AUT update on local projects in the works.<sup>6</sup> These projects provide the means to identify the largest, most important projects from the numerous minor developments undertaken in the greater city region. However, two particularities of this extrapolation must be understood. First, the broadest vision for the

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<sup>6</sup> There is clearly a methodological problem with using only these projects, the greatest of which is the fact that some megaprojects have been developed and play a key role in the city’s development without ever being mentioned in the SDAU, such as many that will be found in the AUT update in 2009. Others were envisioned and never followed through, such as new towns in Nouinouina, the Offshore Zone near the Bay of Tangier, and the trans-Mediterranean connection point (*liason fixe*) with Spain. However, this process is used simply to illustrate the larger point, that the city has been refining and expanding megaproject development to both stimulate the local, regional, and national economy as well as engage in global economic flows.

city has in many ways stayed the same since the early 1980s. This vision is largely based upon the urban problems originating with the fleeing of foreign capital, the subsequent rise of spatial fragmentation from the inability to integrate and develop unclaimed foreign-owned lands since 1956, and the rural exodus from the 1970s onward. Second, in response to the need to attract foreign capital, unite the disparate parts of the city and “de-densify” the urban core, Tangier managers have undertaken a policy of using megaprojects and regional transport integration of rails and roadways to both expand and infill the city along key urban-region nodes. These nodes are the sites of current and future megaprojects. This section explores the evolution of the current spatial form.

The 1980 general plan listed two major development projects for Tangier’s urban vision. The first was the progenitor of the current Tangier-Mediterranean Port, currently one of the largest container ports in the Mediterranean (The Economist 12-18 July 2008). This earlier version known as “Tangier II” was to be located on the Atlantic coast, either just north or south of the Tangier-Boukhalef Airport. The second project was the trans-Mediterranean connection point (*liaison fixe*) with Spain. This was planned to be located either in the industrial district of Moghohga (if a tunnel) or Cape Malabata (if a bridge). These projects, though certainly attempting to account for the planned expansion of Greater Tangier and its attempts to engage in external economies, largely lacked a definite vision as to how exactly they would resolve the greater structural social and economic issues present in the city; the benefits are generally just assumed. Furthermore, secondary projects, such as the current ports, medina and industrial zones, those most likely to be economically effective and realized in the short and medium term, are largely ignored in how they will be integrated into a regional network system grounded by the



megaprojects. Therefore, communication roads and rails, though used to direct and connect urban expansion are relatively undeveloped and restricted to the southwest expansion of Greater Tangier. However, given the limitations of the 1980 plan, this project was remarkable as hardly any comprehensive planning previously existed. The magnitude of long-term goals and decades worth of unassimilated research make any substantial criticism difficult.

By the 1997 *Schéma*, planning evolved with the two (port and *liason fixe*) megaprojects as well as series of others. These included two new growth poles in Gzenaya (near the Tangier-Boukhalef Airport), Aouma and Nouinouich (in the northeast), and the integration of free and industrial zones into the larger urban expansion project (DGUA 1997). The inter-Mediterranean connection (*liaison fixe*) in Moghgogha, incorporated with local industrial zones and a major transportation hub, redistributes the pull of southwesterly expansion more evenly. However, a southwest orientation still dominated growth and situated the most integrated and comprehensive megaprojects, such as the new port and the Gzenaya growth pole (planned to host a free zone and a high-tech industrial zone) within the larger airport region. The 1997 plan attempted to link these various projects into one continuous Tétouan-Tangier-Rabat Highway circumventing the city. This would be branched by secondary ring roads. These routes act as both limits to Tangier's expansion as well as becoming central arteries between the old and new urban divisions and between the new megaprojects. They create a comprehensive distribution of functions between the ports (doorways to the external economy), hinterlands (Tétouan) and nation (Rabat) beyond.

A major addition to the 1997 plan is the revalorization of the Bay of Tangier development project managed by the state *Société Nationale de la Baie de Tanger*. Largely ignored in the previous *Schéma*, the 1997 plan not only recognizes the importance of tourism, but it also rediscovers an essential component of Tangier's early economic externalization from the 1960s. The expansion and reunification of tourism and industrial zones became planned sites fundamental to attracting and metabolizing the flows of capital between internal and global economies.

By 2009, many projects initially conceived in the 1997 plan have largely gone the wayside. For example, the trans-Mediterranean connection (*liaison fixe*) never materialized, though it still remains an overly optimistic project. An offshore zone near the Bay of Tangier was developed after 1997, though it never materialized into a formal plan, though it appears such services are gaining currency in the local economy. Other projects, however, have transformed and grown into larger, more comprehensive megaprojects. For example, the development of the Tangier-Mediterranean Port moved from the southwest Atlantic coast to the northeast along the Mediterranean near Ksar Sghir. The current development plans for Gzenaya have grown beyond simply an economic free zone into a complete new town. Furthermore, the relocation of the Tangier-Mediterranean port to the northeast, repositioned and balanced the expansion of Greater Tangier. No longer does the southwest region hold primacy in the city's expansion, but is now incorporated into a much broader strategy. New towns have been relocated to Gzenaya in the southwest, Melloussa in the south, and Ksar Sghrir in the northeast (*See AUT "Programme Villes Nouvelles"*). Of the three towns, Melloussa and Gzenaya are industrially oriented. Gzenaya is already the site of the Tangier Free Zone

and an industrial distribution zone, and whose workforce will apparently benefit from the large housing projects to be built therein. In addition to building homes, the town of Melloussa also plans to develop two free zones and an industrial zone. Finally, the Ville Majaz new town near Ksar Sghir differs in that it plans to construct both residences and a large port for tourism and water sports.

The rise of megaprojects highlights a quantitative and qualitative expansion of Tangier's built form along dominant ideological and practical shifts in the rescaled Moroccan state. Quantitatively, these sites articulate the particular increased reliance upon specific urban typologies to harness urban development. Similarly, they illustrate the growing aggressiveness by which they are being used. The number of megaprojects evokes the increasing interest in the particular entrepreneurial practices of resource redistribution within market-specific conceptual frames. Last, the quantity of large-scale urban development highlights the horizontal expansion of the global vision into the city-region and qualitatively articulates the dynamization and diversification of land uses. Their enhanced functional specialization shows the form that Tangier's economic externalization is undergoing. Particularly, they detail how the city is attempting to redefine its world connectivity. They express the way that planners use the history and geography reimagine their vision of Tangier as a global city. The diversity of the sites project the future city as a place for foreign tourists along the Bay of Tangier; the free zones and ports reflect a city for commercial and business elites. Together, both functions highlight the varied and agglomerative effects of Tangier's cosmopolitan socio-spatial engineering. Most importantly, megaprojects represent the power that institutionalized ideology provides to the three men who control Tangier urban management, and the place

they grant to everyday locals in constructing and constituting the city's economic revival. From this perspective the benefits appear contradictory and unbalanced.

## OVERVIEW

This chapter sought to refine and detail how the Moroccan state's rescaling is articulated in the urban management of Tangier. Analysis focused on three aspects of space using a dialectical Lefebvrian interpretation of conceived, perceived and lived space. First, the study begins with the institutionalization of post-1983 restructuring ideology. This conception of space has a particular free-market orientation and is framed into the legal apparatuses of the three major urban management organizations: the Tangier Urban Agency, the Communal Council and regional governor (*Wali*). These frames condition the social practices of urban management in Tangier by the heads of the governing bodies, which are more beholden to state and market interests rather than local needs. This management illustrates a transformation from the provision of basic urban infrastructural services to the entrepreneurial drive to attract foreign investment capital. In particular, political shifts in management are highlighted in three trends: (1) the rise of public-private partnerships; (2) the generalized privatization of public services and; (3) the increased incentivization of investment, which is especially pronounced in Tangier. Last, the physical manifestation of these newly altered practices can be seen in the qualitative and quantitative expansion of large-scale development projects throughout the Tangier city-region. These megaprojects physically inscribe the power that the three urban managers have over a city of nearly one million inhabitants, and greater society's limited role in determining their urban future.

Analysis this far has sought to reconcile earlier systemic interpretations with a more nuanced understanding of the role of Tangier urban managers in actively producing globalizing urban space. Thus far, the city has been viewed as a significant site for the territorialization of global flows via state political economic filters. The next chapter seeks to further the investigation of urban globalization in a specific study of how one megaproject to the east of Tangier presents a paradigmatic case study for understanding the reprojected of state rescaling through distinct, key urban nodes. An agency-oriented investigation of the everyday micro-negotiations occurring at Tangier City Center, the case study seeks to understand how internal and external interests converge and diverge in urban globalization to reproject Tangier back into world circuits of capital.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **GLOBALIZATION ON THE MARGINS, TANGIER'S SOCIO-SPATIAL FABRIC**

In a final assessment of state and urban transformations, attention now turns to the facets of locally-induced articulations of the global economy. Urban management has undergone significant transformation in the past thirty years. Analysis seeks to assess the form and impact that this transformation has taken through the lens of globalization on the margins. Here, I am interested in qualifying to what extent this shift is actually serving to resolve the long-standing challenge of social and economic development in Tangier. Specifically, I address two questions: First, what are the specific means by which local managers attempt to negotiate global connectivity through the built form? Second, is this process, as seen from an iconic megaproject, actually helping to respond to historic development demands in housing, employment, and quality of life for the majority of Tangier inhabitants? Or, is this project actually aggravating social and spatial injustices? The first question seeks to address how local factors contribute to the broader structural forces which initially conditioned state restructuring at the urban scale. The second, as this structure since 1983 has been legitimized through the discourse of particularly urban social and economic development, analysis must then answer how and to what extent these initiatives actually address Tangier's historic crises.

Taking the case study of Tangier City Center (TCC), the city's planned and emerging central business district, this chapter will study the process behind one form of "globalization on the margins," between a transnational investor from Spain, Inveravante Maroc, and the local state developer in charge of the Bay of Tangier project known as the Moroccan Tourism Engineering Company (*Société Marocaine d'Ingénierie Touristique*),

or SMIT. Tangier City Center offers the opportunity to address local-global interdependencies in the site's development and what those re-scaled relations constitute for the wider urban fabric.

My argument is twofold. First, urban globalization undertaken by transnational agents is far more attuned to locality than tends to be acknowledged in case studies. The development's effectiveness and success (long- and short-term) depend upon concerted knowledge and understanding of local society and culture to cultivate relations and create successful projects. Although this relationship presents a far more just engagement between local and global agents, Tangier City Center – even when contextualized within the broader city region – does not appear to provide substantial positive feedback for the majority of Tangier's population.

This chapter will begin with a brief literature review of the concept of globalization on the margins. Then, I will present the theoretical orientation behind this chapter's analysis. Next, the first main section focuses on the particular negotiative process behind Tangier's globalization on the margins highlighting principle goals and constraints faced by the Moroccan state operating in the city, and the Spanish developer, Inveravante. The second part will analyze the implications of this relationship in terms of both the immediate outcome for local managers in exerting their own particular voice in globalization, as well as the larger benefits and impacts this project has on urban residents. Finally, a summary of points and concluding remarks will be made.

#### GLOBALIZATION ON THE MARGINS

“Globalization on the margins” is a concept that has grown out of broader research on urban globalization that seeks to highlight the place specific actions in asserting global

relevance. Grant and Short (2002, p. 10) view the process as “how the margins are seeded for global capital.” King (2002, pp. 75-76) within that edition takes a decidedly constructivist approach, highlighting how the ‘seeds’ of globalization are cultivated and rooted within territorially specific places. Therefore, globalization on the margins seeks to understand the dynamic production of globality from a non-Western lens. In so doing, these studies help promote the mutually reinforcing internal and external (“glocal”) influences that shape the negotiation of globalization (Swyngdouw 1997, Brenner 1999).

The aspect of globalization on the margins this study seeks to contribute to involves the built form. I am specifically interested in the way in which local actors negotiate directly or indirectly with the structures and agents of the world economy. For example, a recent study by Jones and Moreno-Carranco (2007) focuses on the oppositional activities that can emerge from large-scale global development projects in Mexico City and Puebla, Mexico. In their view and against a backdrop of inauthentic, diluted representations of regional and national identities, everyday users intuitively act to appropriate and reproduce new local spaces within the megaproject’s architecture. However, most of the literature on local up-scaling paradoxically highlights a dichotic representation of agents as either marginalized social groups (such as Jones and Moreno-Carranco) or elite transnational agents. For instance, Leslie Sklair’s (2005) work on the transnational capitalist class and iconic architecture (2006) paints a deterministic role held by global agents in developing key facets of networked cities. In his view, the transnational capitalist class is the dominant force driving global, iconic architecture in contemporary society. However, his argument leaves no room for any local input or authority to negotiate with or against these agents. Even the most local of his



transnational class – the “state fraction” – are curiously invested with hyper-globality. As a result, the transnational class is only minimally interested in localities in so far as they are necessary sites whereby global agents enforce their “placeless” economic interests. All is invariably imposed from elsewhere. This view extends to other contemporary research on urban developments, though in less causal terms. Examining elite housing projects in Beijing, Wu (2004) shows how in extreme cases Western housing typologies are not only imported, but also qualitatively appraised by how closely and holistically they recreate American or European environments. The more “authentic” the project appears to be, the more successful its commodification and potential for success. Other studies, particularly aesthetic critiques of global city architecture, reproduce the implied notion that foreign agents necessarily implement global models with little regard for local agents and their interests (Castells 2000).

While I do not contend that the majority local inhabitants are *often* included in the planning and development of projects, particularly on the economic periphery, I wish to underscore the point that globalization on the margins is about more than “marginality” or elitism *per se*, and that such dichotic frames are misleading. Therefore, if the object is to understand the mechanisms behind dominant forces of up-scaled globalization, then the central agents leading localized re-scaling must be studied both from the perspective of locals and transnationals alike. Some research already points in this direction, such as Ross *et al.* (1980) study of local planners and global constraints. Though thirty years old, their observations are still relevant in illustrating some of the fundamental issues faced by urban managers in economically declining cities and the different (largely technical) approach they use to confront changing patterns of global investment.

## THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

This chapter's theoretical underpinning is premised upon the conception of globalization on the margins as the *construction* (up-scaling) of political economic relations. It is first and foremost a social construct between local and transnational agents who are key figures leading the specific form of urbanization central to city and state development. I specifically draw upon Anne Haila's (2006) conceptualization of global city politics behind everyday construction of the global city. She defines this politics as "a belief that attracting investments, especially foreign and real estate investments, represents a way out of [economic decline]" (p. 282) and that this strategy is dependent upon an increased reliance on engineering a global image of the city. The second part of her argument focuses on the political aspect of these relations and the implication they have for our understanding of globalization on the margins. The dual imperative to fulfill local development demands and global city status places new values in urban design as much as – if not more than – its larger function for the rest of the city. As Gospodini states:

[...] In the era of globalization, the relationship between urban economy and urban design, as established throughout the history of urban forms, seems to be reversed. While for centuries the quality of the urban environment has been an outcome of economic growth of cities, nowadays, the quality of urban space has become a prerequisite for the economic development of cities; and urban design has undertaken an enhanced role as a means of economic development (Gospodini quoted in Sklair 2005, p. 498).

I follow Haila (2006) in contending that her conception of global city politics does indeed privilege urban entrepreneurs (or in her case real estate developers). With specific reference to Tangier, the recent impulse by urban managers to center their attention on global image has particular uneven consequences on the city as a whole.

## GOALS AND CONSTRAINTS BEHIND NEGOTIATING TANGIER CITY CENTER

In order to better understand SMIT and Inveravante's negotiation to develop Tangier City Center, analysis must focus on each party's respective goals and constraints and how they translate into decisions and actions. These circumstances will help clarify the structure in which agents operate as well as the specific image of the city they seek to produce.

In 2008, the Ministry of Tourism and Artisan Crafts created the Moroccan Tourism Engineering Company (*Société Marocain d'Indénérie Touristique*) or SMIT, with a capitalization of 41 million dirhams (SMIT 2008). SMIT subsumed the authority and activities of the former state land developer, SNABT, in 2008. Whereas SNABT was a public landholder in charge of both preparing and selling lots on the 340 hectare site along the Bay of Tangier, SMIT's role includes the whole Northern Region. Furthermore, the company's functions have expanded to include the study, promotion, negotiation and realization of tourism development projects within the broader state tourism vision (SMIT 2008).

SMIT's recent organization is the product of national tourism development restructuring. Three formerly separate entities – SNABT along with the Development and Investment Administration (*Direction des Aménagements et des Investissements*), and the Bay of Agadir National Development Company (*Société Nationale d'Aménagement de la Baie d'Agadir*) – were consolidated under SMIT. Unlike the urban planning agencies and communal councils that were discussed in Chapter 3, SMIT is a state owned private company (*société anonyme à capital public*) whose prerogatives are directed by the Ministry of Tourism in Rabat. SMIT's internal organization is controlled by a General Assembly of Shareholders. This group elects an "Oversight Council" who then choose

directors to take charge of SMIT to oversee the regional offices and agendas in Tangier and Agadir (SMIT 2008).

In order to understand SMIT's specific tourism plan for the Tangier region, it must be couched in the broader national mission. SMIT developed out of King Mohammed VI's "Vision 2010" which seeks to bring 10 million tourists to Morocco and increase hotel capacity to 230,000 beds by that year (MTA n.d., p. 10). Taking into account the global economic recession, arrivals have already increased from 4.4 to 7.9 million visitors from 2001 to 2008 (MTA n.d., p. 13). However, the King's vision is currently unfolding through a variety of sub-national tourism strategies that were created to enhance specific forms of tourism development throughout Morocco. These include luxury seaside resort tourism under the "Plan Azur" (130,000 hotel bed objective), internal tourism development under the "Biladi Plan" (30,000 hotel beds) and the "Plan Meda'In" of which Tangier is included (MTA n.d.). The Plan Meda'In aims at improving existing destinations through the development of new tourism zones and increase hotel capacity by 75,000 beds (MTA n.d., p.10). It seeks to develop "cultural destinations" such as Fez, Marrakech, Ouarzazate and Casablanca, as well as seaside tourism in Tangier, Tétouan and Agadir. Together these two aspects of the Plan aims to diversify Moroccan tourism and reposition its existing destinations (p.11).

Although Tangier's tourism strategy is rooted in the national Vision (and therefore larger economic development project), it also serves to help overcome the city's development challenges grounded in historical and geographically specific constraints. As recalled from chapter one, Tangier was one of the original Priority Development Zones created in 1965 to revive Morocco's tourism sector, prior to state import-

substitution industrialization shifts. SNABT was created in the late 1960s to fulfill this tourism objective along the Bay of Tangier. One of its objectives was to re-knit into the urban fabric economic activities conducive to explicitly attracting foreigners who would revive a cosmopolitanism image like that celebrated during the International City's epoch (SNABT 1968).<sup>7</sup>

Today, that vision continues. As a SMIT representative stated: "We want the Bay of Tangier to become the window to Africa and the gateway to Europe."<sup>8</sup> Therefore, SMIT's role is as much about realizing incomplete post-colonial development, as it is about creating a new image and place for Morocco in the global economy, led by Tangier's distinct form of modernity. In order for effective change to occur SMIT must overcome these discontinuities in the urban landscape. The vision is nothing unless it is realized, as SNABT's failure shows to this day. Furthermore, Tangier's geographical position has been influential in its development vision. Tourism developments and urbanization across the Strait of Gibraltar in the Costa del Sol region of Spain play a key role in shaping the particular image of the city SMIT managers seek to produce. These agents note that unrestrained, rapid and expansive development projects saturated housing and tourism demands, and created over-urbanization. Urban managers now acknowledge that the Bay of Tangier must not follow suit.<sup>9</sup>

The other side of the Bay of Tangier project is Inveravante. The company recently acquired Tangier City Center from its original owner, Martinsa-Fadesa. In 2007, Manuel Jové, then CEO of Fadesa, left the company to found Inveravante and subsequently

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<sup>7</sup> In fact, early urban plans for Tangier had the entire 300ha development separated from direct access. The coastal highway running from the port to the east did not pass through the site, but circumvented it (SDAU 1980, p. 147).

<sup>8</sup> Personal communication with SMIT representative June 18, 2009.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid.*

bought Tangier City Center in early 2009. Although Inveravante would like to distance itself from Martinsa-Fadesa, most of the company's employees originate from that firm and have remained on the project for several years.<sup>10</sup>

Based in La Coruña, Spain, Inveravante is an explicitly global enterprise, with a variety of investments in the following sectors: private equity, wind, gas, real estate, hotels, agriculture, entertainment and commercial centers (TCC n.d.). The company's economic philosophy is based upon four main pillars: (1) human resources with exceptional experience in large-scale entrepreneurial projects; (2) investment towards "maximum solvability"; (3) a global vision for the creation of surplus value in business and diverse development strategies and; (4) planning and control to ensure project completion. Particularly with real estate development, Inveravante concentrates its activities in places with "a large potential for expansion, growth and value generation, especially Europe, North America, Latin America" (TCC n.d.).

How Inveravante and SMIT reconcile their respective visions and philosophies within the function and aesthetic of Tangier City Center is at the center of negotiating localized globality. It is to these aspects that the discussion now turns and will provide the foundation for my critique of up-scaling and its implications.

#### EMBEDDING TANGIER CITY CENTER

The Tangier City Center project acts as a base-point for understanding the global and local forces central to urban up-scaling. Located on the eastern edge of the city's former colonial district along the Bay of Tangier (see Figure 1), TCC is a large-scale development initiative of 175, 000 m<sup>2</sup> and a projected total cost of over 1 billion dirhams.

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<sup>10</sup> Personal communication with Inveravante representative July 20, 2009.

As the name implies, Tangier City Center seeks to help reposition city's role in the national and global economy. Therefore, the development lends important insights into the negotiative nature of interdependent public and private relations as well as the differences between the intended role of the globalizing city project and its actual implications for the existing social and urban fabric.

An iconic project, TCC will house the city's first Western style mall, a business center, apartments, and two four- and five-star hotels (See Figures 3-6). At three stories and 30,000 m<sup>2</sup>, Tangier City Mall will house the city's first internationally recognized name-brand boutiques such as Zara, and offer "the ability to wander and dine in perfect peace within the most refined ambiance" (TCC n.d.). It will have direct access to the site's hotels and the city's adjacent train station. Tangier City Business will provide over 10,000 m<sup>2</sup> of office space to serve as the new regional service pole. It is planned that the business district will act as the command and control center for megaprojects located throughout Tangier-Tétouan, especially for the Tangier-Mediterranean port, which has direct train access less than 200 meters away.<sup>11</sup> Tangier City Residences, totaling of over 803 apartments with a view over the Bay, will represent the new image of urban living for Tangier. Tangier City Hotels will comprise roughly 40,000 m<sup>2</sup>, and are designed to "reinforce qualitatively and quantitatively the city's hotel capacity and consolidate its tourist and business mission" (TCC n.d.). From this initial architectural perspective and planned design features, Tangier City Center appears to be like any other "placeless" global city project. It is unclear what exactly is Moroccan about the development and suggests the imposition or mimicry of building designs from the economic core (against,

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<sup>11</sup> Personal communication with representative from Inveravante, July 20, 2009.

e.g. Robinson 2006). However, using Faulconbridge's (2009) embedded framework, new insights and relationships are uncovered into understanding the relational nature of globalizing the city's local form. Here the "contextual" facets of marketing, building regulations, and network relations situate Tangier's endogenous globalization.

First, marketing plays an essential role in highlighting the foundational interests sought between potential global and local clients. For example, in order attract investors, SMIT engages in promotional activities within and out of Morocco. Locally, SMIT advertises in francophone and arabophone press throughout the country, such as *L'Economiste*, *Le Matin*, and *Al-Maghribia*. These newspapers target developers who are already undertaking projects in the region and who are capable of investing. But the bulk of SMIT's promotional activities center upon real estate conventions in for instance Berlin, Cannes, Barcelona and Dubai.<sup>12</sup> These events are important on an immediate level for establishing face-to-face contact with a concentration of transnational developers at once (Sassen 2002). European conventions are most important in that these developers are likely to be more familiar with Moroccan legal structures, customs and culture - especially French, Spanish and, to a lesser extent, British agents whose countries actively participated in Morocco's colonization. Tellingly, an agent for a British developer in Tangier observed that although British, French and Spanish developers were currently active throughout Morocco, they tended to concentrate within their former colonial jurisdictions. Furthermore, much in accordance with the original post-colonial plan, European developers carry greater name brand appeal for users and investors that

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<sup>12</sup> Personal Communication with Ministry of Tourism, SMIT representative, Rabat, July 31, 2009.



Figure 3. *Tangier City Center*



Source: [www.tangercitycenter.ma](http://www.tangercitycenter.ma). Accessed April 6, 2010.

Figure 4. *Tangier City Center*



Source: [www.tangercitycenter.ma](http://www.tangercitycenter.ma). Accessed April 6, 2010.

Figure 5. *Tangier City Hotels*



Source: [www.tangercitycenter.ma](http://www.tangercitycenter.ma). Accessed April 6, 2010.

Figure 6. *Tangier Business Center*



Source: [www.tangercitycenter.ma](http://www.tangercitycenter.ma). Accessed April 6, 2010.

Tangier would like to attract for its tourism revival. For example, a representative in charge of sales and investment at SMIT's headquarters' in Rabat, insists that the only criteria for a developers is that they are able to invest at least 200 million dirham and complete the project within 36 months. However, the agent does add that under ideal circumstances, SMIT would prefer a globally branded developer like "the Marriott or the Four Seasons," because they have brand name appeal and are rich in financial and human resources.<sup>13</sup>

Inveravante also undertakes specific marketing strategies to appeal to local public land agents such as SMIT. Beyond its immediate interest to promote its financial and technical ability to manage and develop Tangier City Center, Inveravante serves a specific symbolic role as a global developer. This function is important in not only enhancing TCC's legitimacy as a global city project, but enhances subsidiary effects. For example, Inveravante's global connectivity to other projects and industries throughout the world allows it to utilize external transnational services. Furthermore, the firm's network helps market TCC in these distant places – thus boosting its global presence and appeal. As a case in point, although SMIT would like to attract foreigners from Europe, Inveravante reacted to waning investment interest at the start of the economic recession in 2008. Since then, instead of pursuing a singularly foreign and service-based clientele, Inveravante shifted its initial marketing portfolio to include the large number of Moroccan expatriates who seasonally return to Tangier from Spain, France and the

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

Benelux countries.<sup>14</sup> As one commentator noted, “[Moroccans] are looking for a new, more diverse – *but especially rich* - clientele than the French” (Dupuy 2006, p. 36).

The second feature of embeddedness is in the form of building regulations. Building regulations are the preventative means by which SMIT protects itself from developer abuses and excesses.<sup>15</sup> As a general rule even outside Morocco, one of the most important are the development regulations known as C.U.S. and C.O.S. These determine how much square footage can be built and for which particular uses, such as industrial, residential, commercial, etc. An Inveravante representative acknowledged the state has a larger hand in designing these codes than in Spain, underscoring the city’s active interest in protecting itself from problems of over-urbanization. For example, in Tangier, the C.O.S is very low, so urban density is much lower. In a different project called Saïda by Martinsa-Fadesa, 3000 units occupy 700 hectares, which according to Inveravante is not economically viable. Specifically in Morocco, the VEFA law protects private developers from over-extending their investment capacities. The provisions require that a developer have a bank guarantee (*caution bancaire*) in which the total cost of the project is set aside as insurance in a bank account in Morocco. Also, the developer – as most places – is legally obligated to fulfill the specifications agreed in the contract as well as timing deadlines. This protects property buyers from losing money should the project go under.

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<sup>14</sup> The specific way in which this is marketed is not yet known as the company is still in the process of distancing itself from the TCC’s former owner. Personal communication with representative from Inveravante, July 20, 2009.

<sup>15</sup> Personal communication with SMIT representative June 18, 2009.

Additionally, if the developer in Morocco decides to no longer honor its contract, penalties occur where preventative actions fail. Specifically, SMIT has three options with defaulting developers. First, a forced sale can occur where the project is publicly auctioned at a reduced price – at no less than three percent of the original cost. If a profit is made, the revenue is split 4/5 in favor of the private company. Second, the project can be razed. Third, SMIT can seize control and then cede partial installments to a new developer. Despite these preventative and punitive measures to maintain control of the project’s fundamental organization, negligence still occurs regularly. For example, Wafabank, one of the main financial institutions insuring developers in Morocco, told Inveravante that it was the first company it had that actually respected the VEFA law. Furthermore, continued developer negligence may indicate over-involvement in state participation in private enterprise. For example, in one development called Plage Blanche, the developer is having trouble finishing construction with a profitable rate of return because of the stipulations set by the government.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, however excessive regulations may seem, several factors make development in and around Tangier appealing to Inveravante. First, the building market is much larger than in Spain. Second, the northern region has better fiscal incentives than elsewhere in Morocco. For example, although the market in Casablanca is more attractive than Tangier, both in terms of demand and purchasing power, state development regulations make the desirability for investment there less profitable.<sup>17</sup> In Tangier, SMIT’s principle support includes proactive subsidies - 75 million diham for TCC - and land transfers to developers at below-market “symbolic offers” or “golden handshakes” (Ross *et al* 1980).

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<sup>16</sup> Personal communication with representative from Inveravante, July 20, 2009.

<sup>17</sup> Personal communication with representative from Inveravante, July 20, 2009.

Last, demand in Morocco is far greater than elsewhere in Europe. For Inveravante, the absolute size of the project is not important, but the demand it fulfills, which allows for future, long-term development initiatives to be cultivated.

The third and final feature of project embeddedness between Inveravante and SMIT lies in their relational dynamic. According to Inveravante, SMIT has a highly proactive role in developing Tangier City Center. And it is due to SMIT's deeply invested interest in the project that has been the bane of many transnational developers and the benefit of Inveravante. As a leading agent in northern Morocco's development, SMIT has an inherent interest in ensuring a particular image of the city is effectively realized on their terms. In particular, the state's engagement in the approval process is very important in Tangier. For example, because of the local and national importance of the project, Inveravante noticed that banks have been far more willing to help because they have greater confidence in the project's success. However, as a result of the state's thorough investment in the Bay of Tangier, the approval process is much more time consuming. Many developers did not foresee this issue and did not adjust for the cost in time it would take to begin development. At the time of data collection in 2009, Martisna-Fadesa's Saïda resort was the only project in Morocco to be inaugurated of the original Vision 2010 developments. All others have been delayed because foreign developers "thought that Morocco was going to be the next El Dorado but did not have any knowledge of the local market. They didn't understand that things take time [in Morocco.]"<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Personal communication with representative from Inveravante, July 20, 2009

This statement is the central argument behind the concept of embeddedness. It is what distinguishes Inveravante as an embedded global firm as well as what gives SMIT the capacity to exert its role in defining how it wishes Tangier to be seen and imagined as a globalizing city. Several important factors are key to Inveravante's culturally contextualized relationship with SMIT. First, Inveravante almost exclusively employs Moroccans – the company representative estimated that locals constituted roughly 90 percent of the company's workforce.<sup>19</sup> This is important as these agents not only understand local technical and legal regulations, but are intimately aware of cultural nuances that make them appreciative of SMIT's goals better than a footloose global firm. Second, Inveravante's directorship recognizes SMIT as an integral actor and asset that must be incorporated into its development agenda to maximize financial success and temporal efficiency of the project's completion. Third, it also is apparent that Inveravante's management sees SMIT as an essential partner, if not equal player, where each is interdependent on the other to succeed in realizing their respective visions and objectives. In fact, what this embedded understanding of global development helps to elucidate is that when we look back at the architectural designs put forth by Inveravante, we have a new way of appreciating Tangier City Center's design. The project is no longer a globally imposed image of Western architecture, but is in fact a direct expression of what SMIT managers want to articulate as their own expression of Moroccan global modernity – on their own terms. However, the question now remains: does Tangier City Center serve to overcome historic challenges to social and economic development in Tangier?

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<sup>19</sup> Personal communication with representative from Inveravante, July 20, 2009.

## UNITING THE FRAGMENTS?

In the introduction to this study (Chapter 1), Tangier was situated within its historic development constraints. Analysis showed that although Morocco appears to continue to face concerted challenges to overall national social and economic growth, Tangier is undergoing a significant boom. Recall that since the early 1990s growth has greatly accelerated in local industry. Indicators show that employment doubled, investment and production tripled, added value quadrupled and exports increased nine-fold. This latter indicator reinforces the externalization of Tangier's economy which allowed productivity outputs to double the rate employment. In terms of infrastructure, Tangier has aggressively expanded and brought the wider region into the metropolitan fold through extensive roads, railways and megaprojects. Tangier City Center therefore is the decisive, managerial node of this globalizing city-region. However, TCC's principle functions highlight an uneven distribution of public investment that must be understood to qualify the project's implications for the broader urban and social fabric in terms of employment, housing, cost of living and wider state initiatives.

First, a successful Business Center in Tangier at the forefront of globalized producer services offers new, dynamic opportunities for local employment. However, previous studies of other global command and control centers suggest negative social effects on local employment. Several direct implications in Tangier underscore this point. One direct implication is that the minimum wage remains exceptionally low at less than 10 dirhams per hour despite the growth in investment and added value throughout the region. Furthermore, despite the fact industrial employment has doubled in size, regional unemployment continues to hover at roughly 10 percent. The most significant subsidiary



effect for this study is the emergence of polarization in the local workforce where highly paid transnational technicians of the regional economy are counterbalanced by a large, minimally paid ancillary service sector (Sassen 2001). Other megaprojects around Tangier highlight this phenomenon. In the places where free-trade zones (FTZs) were developed, a low wage population has expanded the number of those affected by precarious labor conditions. While the public discourse is that wages in the FTZ are fair when compared to the rest of Moroccan society and even exceptionally high for the unskilled workers coming from rural areas, the meager minimum wages for unskilled labor have aggravated situations of working poverty. Underscoring this new form of exclusion is the fact that informal settlements currently exist in and out of the free zones, such as in Gzenaya, where workers shacks are juxtaposed with modern and transnational service facilities (See Figure 7). However, these settlements only partially represent the much larger crisis in socio-spatial fragmentation. Second, social polarization and poverty highlight the ineffectiveness that Tangier City Residences has on the increasing demand for housing throughout the city and region. Based upon the architectural designs presented, it is clear that the majority of local inhabitants are neither expected nor capable of acquiring such property. However, other state sponsored housing plans have, in fact, been aggressively pursued in the past two decades to abate this problem. As part of ambitious national housing plans, Tangier has upgraded and formalized many settlements under King Mohammed VI's "Cities without Slums" initiative. Unlike most cities in the less-developed world, Morocco presents a unique case of informal settlement strategies that go far beyond political rhetoric. Since the program's inception in 2004, a total of 68 projects worth over 16 billion dirhams have created 185,000 housing units for more than

Figure 7. *Tangier Free Zone, Informal Shacks and the Chaabi International Bank*



Source: Author's documentation, July 8, 2009.

1.5 million persons. However, less than half these units have been dedicated for settlement reabsorption; only 35,000 were specifically built for rehousing displaced settlers (MHU 2007, p. 13). In Tangier, only five projects comprised of 3,600 units were built for reabsorption (MHU 2007, p. 17). The majority of settlements are razed and upgraded with utility hookups before settlers are allowed to return to reconstruct their homes from the ground up. Other housing options are certainly available for the displaced, yet affordable and adequate solutions remains prohibitive. For example, the average price for a traditional or modern home costs – a low estimate – from 50,000 to as much as 500,000 dirhams (Area 2003, p. 11). Rent for a medium sized “standard

apartment” that same year averaged 3,500 dirhams (IRTT 2007, p. 24). As such, it is unsurprising that the majority of Tangier households either built their own homes (40 percent) or inherited them from other family members (20 percent). The marginalized therefore must resort to more socially and structurally precarious alternatives (Area 2003, p. 11).

Third, Tangier City Mall and Hotels will provide a new, cosmopolitan orientation for the city. However, it is unclear how helpful such services will be for the larger populace. In the past 10 years, the cost of living in Tangier has increased considerably. A basic necessity such as food in has increased 25 percent since 1997 (Direction de la Statistique 2010a). Additionally, Tangier City Hotels, and others included in the Bay of Tangier project may not effectively address the cultural habits of the broader local citizenry. Many visiting expatriate families stay with local family members not out of a lack of resources, but because of values associated with family structure and cohesion. TCC’s hotels suggest rather a desire to have more financially and socially autonomous users, which are likely to not be native to the city and thereby enhance socio-spatial disparities that continue to persist unabated.

Last, while it is not fair to make comparisons alone between the social status of one, albeit significant, portion of Tangier’s society and a luxury megaproject, it is, however, just in the direct interest of this study to question the role of urban managers in promoting and funding such a project over more wider socially necessary interests. For example, TCC will cost over 1 billion dirhams of which SMIT will provide an additional 75 million to subsidize construction. While not much in the way of the projects total expense, it highlights a process that is occurring on a larger scale with public speculation

in private ventures. The 75 million “golden handshake” does not include additional subsidies that are given to other projects in the Bay of Tangier site, such as the Perle de Tanger (115 million for a 130,000 m<sup>2</sup> project) or other “symbolic offers”<sup>20</sup> granted to developers to facilitate land acquisition. One such offer occurred in 2007-2008 when Gentour/Accor was granted land to build two hotels (at least one four-star) for five million dirhams in an Offshore Plaza (SNABT 2007, p. 36). Entrepreneurial management even extends into financial decisions for purely public use. For example, while several billion dirhams have been invested in popular districts, it is overwhelmingly directed towards building roads and enhancing circulation between megaprojects. In the popular district of Bni Makada, 80 million of a 1.2 billion city-wide budget was allocated to public transit, while over 900 million went to road construction. In the historic medina, 20 of 130 million dirhams were allocated for settlement relocations, while 60 and 40 million were directed to renovating the façade and walls of the Kasbah (CRI 2009, p. 24-25).

Aesthetic improvements to roads and building façades, speaks to the increasing reliance on technical and entrepreneurial solutions urban managers use to resolve urban interests, but do little to offset more comprehensive social issues. For example, a 2003 study of housing in Tangier noted that 89 percent of households had potable water, 91 percent electricity and 95 percent a toilet (Area 2003, p. 7). Yet, the provision of such basic infrastructure has also been a significant justification for informal settlement relocations and the source of controversy behind privatized water provisions throughout Morocco (see de Miras *et al* 2007). Furthermore, while most homes now have some basic

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<sup>20</sup> The expression used by a SMIT representative in Tangier.

utilities, they continue to lack others. Only half of all homes have separate washrooms or adequate water drainage, and one third of all rooms are less than 9 m<sup>2</sup> (Area 2003, p. 7-8).

Several conclusions can be drawn from Tangier City Center and those like it. First, TCC and other megaprojects increasingly appeal to an urban and transnational minority while they remain prohibitive – if not detrimental – to greater Tangier’s population. While TCC does reposition the city and Morocco’s place in the global economy through the improved communication linkages to regional infrastructures, it does so at the expense of further peripheralizing the people found between. Physically, TCC is shifting the center of Tangier ever further from its historic base towards the eastern fringe of the colonial new town. Finally, the need for urban managers to physically engineer Tangier’s image as a global city has a direct impact on actively razing informal settlements rather than investing in the provision of basic infrastructure, when such options are entirely feasible. Such is what occurred in July 2009 when the well-established oceanfront settlement of El Haffa was razed immediately after a new highway to Rabat was constructed adjacent to it (Figure 8).

Given the overwhelming consequences affecting everyday Tangier inhabitants, their voice has remained conspicuously silent in this study. National trends show clear shifts in civic political engagement that have coincided alongside radical state and territorial transformations since the 1980s. El Haffa presents the most recent example of popular opposition to the state’s political agenda. During fieldwork, I noticed the settlement’s destruction incited popular unrest, but was swiftly suppressed by the police and military. After several arrests these different thought no less important state agents

separated the settlement from local inhabitants so that tractors would not be obstructed from their work. Similarly, other more historic and violent uprisings have occurred since the 1980s. In 1981, monetary inflation and subsequent rising costs of basic foodstuffs led to riots in Casablanca (Pennell 2000). In 1984, bread riots erupted in the Northern Region (especially in Tétouan and Nador) also over price inflation. Furthermore, Tangier, Fez and Kénitra were sites of popular unrest and political opposition to the 1990 Gulf War; Casablanca itself was placed under marshal law by state authorities (Vermeren 2002). Islamists played a significant role in the latter social movement, and speak to the larger issue of their political popularity and empowerment. For example, the rise of the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PDJ) is the second largest party represented in Moroccan medium-size cities and 11<sup>th</sup> largest nationwide (Catusse *et al.* 2007, p. 128). Since the 2003 Casablanca bombings, the PDJ has rapidly grown in membership despite its intentionally low profile for several reasons. First, its growth has largely focused in cities with over 500,000 inhabitants where it can anticipate significant electoral victories. Second, the PDJ use the urban arena to repoliticize issues of rightful and effective local representation based upon expertise rather than political influence from above or below. This strategy is legitimized through their ability to command information and effectively use it to control development projects. Last, the PDJ reinforces their social legitimacy spatially through their territorial control over the urban political arena in the form of organized protests (such as those mentioned above - Catusse *et al.* 2007). In summary, Tangier managers by no means passively implement transnational visions of a global cities and images, but express their own negotiation of local and external interests.

Figure 8. *Razed El Haffa Settlement*



Source: Author's documentation, August 5, 2009.

Similarly, the uneven effects that these managers generate are also not accepted without, sometimes violent, contestation within both national and urban scales of engagement.

#### OVERVIEW

The aim of this chapter sought to address two questions centered upon uncovering the construction of globalization on the margins with specific reference to Tangier. The first question sought to understand how exactly local managers and transnational developers negotiate globalization through the development of urban space. The second question then asked if it was possible to discern whether this externalization was actually rectifying historic development challenges in the city and state. In the first instance, I

expanded Faulconbridge's (2009) conception of embeddedness to argue how Tangier City Center represented a distinctly Moroccan form of global place-making. I showed this by analyzing the marketing, regulatory and network relations between Spanish developer, Inveravante, and SMIT, the state tourism developer of the Bay of Tangier. Acknowledging the vital and proactive role of SMIT in promoting Tangier's globalization, I then analyzed TCC's function within the larger regional economy to understand its implication on the city's social and spatial fragmentation. While clearly Tangier is undergoing an explosive economic recovery, I showed that the distribution of its benefits have been highly uneven at best. In some cases, for the most precarious strata of urban society it even suggests outright harmful effects. Given this, greater research is needed both practically and theoretically to compare Tangier's path with other cities to examine other historical and contemporary options to reverse the growing inequality in northern Morocco.



## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENCEMENTS**

This study aimed to highlight the diverse forces behind the production of urban globalization in Tangier. The analysis is fundamentally geographic, but attempts to holistically understand broader, interconnected structures and agencies that co-evolve and condition spatial formation. First, I drew upon the historical tendencies and challenges of post-colonial Morocco and Tangier to underscore the internal mechanisms behind the most recent articulation of global economic relations. I show that while the economic core greatly conditions Moroccan state administrative relations, these forces must also be reflexively nested within the state's historically problematic social and economic development initiatives. These include universalizing import-substitution industry planning between radically different regional geographies; promoting market externalization at the same time that foreign companies were seized as part of a nationalization (Moroccanization) agenda, and; reconfiguring state administrative relations while simultaneously neglecting to promote social infrastructure that would increase and enhance the pool of competent technical administrators.

However problematic, this process of Moroccan rescaling has not led to the devolution of the state, but represents a restructuring of its authority. The most current and advanced form thus far has been through the prioritization of select urban nodes as vehicles for market-based social and economic development. Tangier represents an important site to understand state territorial restructuring. The current drive for economic development in the city evidences a unique alteration in urban management. Viewed from its ideological, practical and physical manifestations, urban entrepreneurialism is comprised of new legal frameworks that condition how urban problems are identified as

well as the capacities for their resolution; this, in turn, conditions the specific market-based practices they undertake (privatization, subsidization, etc.), which produce distinct urban patterns that privilege externally-oriented megaprojects.

Given the historic challenges faced by urban managers to respond to state and local development demands, I studied one project within the regional constellation. Research showed that urban managers have indeed qualitatively improved their ability to plan and implement development projects. Furthermore, they have increased and expanded the number of projects both within Tangier and the greater city-region. As a result, since the 1990s, the city has developed its economy far beyond what has stagnated on the national scale (Vemerén 2002, Cohen and Jaidi 2006). However, I also showed that these benefits have been highly uneven at best. In some cases – particularly in terms of housing and basic service provisions for the city’s most disadvantaged – the effects are downright harmful. The most troubling effect is the way in which the drive for international status increasingly moves from simple expansion to an economic aestheticization in which people and place are no longer simply neglected by diverging economic priorities, but are actively removed from the urban fabric.

Taken as a whole, this study of territorial transformations in Tangier sheds important light on our understanding of urban theory from outside the economic core. On one hand, Tangier reinforces established theories taken from processes in Western city contexts. For example, the rise in privatization and public/private partnerships evidences the growth of a less accountable “shadow state” (Lake and Newman 2002). Tangier’s megaprojects are a phenomenon relied upon in Morocco as much as elsewhere (Moulaert *et al.* 2003) with equally substantial evidence as to their “splintering” socio-spatial effects

(Graham and Marvin 2001). Furthermore, Tangier City Center is just as much imbricated in global city imagineering as are more well-known revitalization schemes in New York's Times Square or London's Canary Wharf. Together, these highlight the many facets of what is broadly understood as the effects of urban entrepreneurialism and broader globalization externalities. On the other hand, significant differences remain which contribute to expanding urban theory. First, the Moroccan political system differs greatly from most Western liberal democracies that make any direct theoretical transplant inadequate. Its social and economic development history since 1956 in conjunction with the territorially specific demands of Tangier residents shows that the goals and constraints structuring the path towards urban globalization is far from simply imposed from above. Second, Sklair (2005, 2006) has argued that an elite transnational class is the dominant force behind global city production. This study shows that while this class is indeed influential in terms of its "worldly" knowledge and attractive branding appeal, it is by no means the dominant cadre of actors. Instead, state-led urban managers have a variety of powers and tools with which to ensure their own version of the global city is realized. For instance, direct state investment in project approval and financing; specific building codes and regulations that emphasize spatial and cultural requisites; and penalties for non-compliant developers. Last, both the geographically specific structures and agents behind the Tangier's globalization have led to particular managerial decisions which diverge from the standard conception of Western city mimicry. The case *in exemplar* is the fact that despite the economic success of the Costa del Sol region of southern Spain, Tangier managers explicitly emphasized on multiple occasions that the

Spanish model of urban economic development was *not what they wanted to reproduce* and were actively seeking their own path toward socio-economic growth.

While this particular study of Tangier is now finished, it is my hope that it is the beginning of a much larger project that seeks to understand the many diverse ways that urban globalization is unfolding within Morocco, and the continuation of a deeper humanist tradition that has striven for a more inclusive conception of what constitutes city-ness from the less-developed world.

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