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Bridging the Divided City: Immigrant Economies and the Ethics of Spatial Organization in Johannesburg

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BRIDGING THE DIVIDED CITY: IMMIGRANT ECONOMIES AND THE ETHICS OF SPATIAL ORGANIZATION IN JOHANNESBURG

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In the absence of coherent and evenly implemented spatial planning in post-apartheid Johannesburg, foreign nationals are perceived to have contributed to the spatial fragmentation of the city and exacerbated social distance through enclave formation and discourses of separation from locals. Yet in other ways, immigrant economies and community governance structures connect disparate parts of Johannesburg and work to bridge a city that has become increasingly divided along economic lines. This thesis examines how the social and built environments of Johannesburg have shaped economic strategies and efforts to secure business space by foreign communities and how these strategies are perceived ethically. A study of Somali firms is analyzed geographically to show how xenophobia has shaped the Somali ethnic economy in Gauteng, and the territorial organization of the Somali ethnic enclave in Johannesburg is compared to that of other immigrant business areas in the central city through case studies and semi-structured interviews. The experiences of immigrants doing business in Johannesburg and the ways in which immigrant groups have used and secure the built environment in Johannesburg have shaped not only the economic relationships between immigrants and the host community, but also ethical perceptions of inclusion, exclusion, and the role of foreign nationals in South Africa.

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CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Migration and Urban Economics in Johannesburg

Since the end of apartheid in 1994 and the "white flight" from South Africa's inner cities that both preceded and followed the transition to democratic rule, Johannesburg has been subject to scrutiny as a uniquely observable case of a city in transition: desegregation, financial deregulation, and an increasing presence of foreign nationals have each played a role in shaping particular parts of the city. While the opening of immigration restrictions for African migrants to the urban spaces of South Africa has not significantly shifted academic focus away from African migration and transnationalism in the cities of the global North (Carter 2010; Kleist 2008; Darboe 2003), the increase in migration and in the role of immigrants, particularly in Johannesburg, has created new room for investigation of intra-Africa migration in the context of an emerging African "immigrant gateway" (Crush 2008; Glick Schiller & Çağlar 2011). As the formerly oppressed black South African population and immigrant groups from other countries simultaneously converged on South Africa's cities, a contestation over space (and primarily economic space) began that has resulted in the violent deaths of hundreds of foreigners over the past 16 years, including 41 in a two-week period in May 2008 (Polzer 2010a).[1] "Xenophobia" was not something new to South Africa, but the easing of restrictions on both locals and immigrants created new spaces in which violent scenarios played out. Contestation over economic and territorial control in South Africa continues to shape not

[1] "Toll from xenophobic attacks rises," *Mail & Guardian* online, May 31, 2008. http://mg.co.za/article/2008-05-31-toll-from-xenophobic-attacks-rises (accessed February 2012)

[2] Vegter, Ivo. After South Africa's World Cup, xenophobic threats on the rise. *The Christian Science Monitor* online. July 14, 2010.

only national policy, but the everyday lives of South Africans and immigrants as well as the cities in which this contestation takes place.

The "New York of Africa" has lately begun to become a focus of immigration research as African refugees and economic immigrants excluded from the distant shores of the United States and the closer borders of European nations flock to the continent's most vibrant economy (Crush 2008; Landau 2010a; 2009). Johannesburg is a controversial city: the heart of the South African economy, the metropolitan area is, like many South African cities, extremely economically segregated—and although racial segregation has decreased since apartheid, economic segregation continues to rise, as it does in many other global cities in both the developed and the developing world (Murray 2011; 2004; Crankshaw 2008; Rogerson 1996). Urban sociologist Martin Murray has described Johannesburg as "the disorderly city" and "city of extremes," and not without reason, for Johannesburg is highlighted as a model of spatial segmentation, fortress architecture, and capital flight (Murray 2011; 2008).

Johannesburg has also been described as "a quintessentially migrant city," but also "one of the least-immigrant-friendly cities in the world" (Crush 2008: 280). Immigrants in Johannesburg have sparked significant controversy. The xenophobic attacks of May 2008—which began in Alexandra Township, just to the northeast of Johannesburg—made headlines around the world, and the threats of violence after the 2010 FIFA World Cup were also heard widely as the world's focus turned toward South Africa.[2] Apart from race relations and development for the massive impoverished

[2] Vegter, Ivo. After South Africa's World Cup, xenophobic threats on the rise. *The Christian Science Monitor* online. July 14, 2010.

township population, issues of immigration and violent exclusion of foreigners are among South Africa's most pressing problems (Dodson & Oelofse 2000; Landau 2004; Crush & Dodson 2007). Lines outside of South Africa's Department of Home Affairs in Pretoria are hours long, and this continued inflow of immigrants combined with documented instances of exclusion and continued cases of xenophobic violence make Johannesburg, as South Africa's "immigrant gateway," a crucial location for research on the relationship between locals and immigrants and on the ways in which immigrants cope with a hostile context of reception.

In North America and Europe, the experience of increased immigration flows that has accompanied globalization has driven studies entailing ethical examinations of these flows (Keith 2005; Juss 2006), spurred in part by a less violent form of exclusion and racism and undergirded by a body of postcolonial literature that analyzed race and space (Blunt & McEwan 2002). South Africa has only recently begun to feature in literature on migration ethics, and there are crucial areas that require deeper examination. The responsibility of the post-apartheid state to protect disadvantaged citizens and restore some measure of equality to its population amid a stream of sometimes better-educated and wealthier migrants calls into question the foundational arguments of free migration proponents, while the history of violently xenophobic attitudes throws doubt upon the justice of long-established political theories that leave immigration policy up to the population of a state.

As global economics and politics are increasingly shaping as well as shaped by the urban realm, this thesis focuses on the urban scale, examining the economic strategies

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http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0714/After-South-Africa-s-World-Cup-xenophobic-threats-on-the-rise. Accessed February 23, 2012.

and integration of immigrants into Johannesburg and its surrounds. I begin from the premise that due to the increasing importance of immigration and urbanization (particularly in Africa), closer investigation of the relationships and dynamics taking place in South Africa's cities should inform national-level migration policy as well as the development of more localized strategies for the integration of foreigners and for promoting cooperation between foreigners and locals. By examining specific spatial strategies of immigrants and the ethical perceptions surrounding the occupation of urban space by these immigrant groups, I aim to inform an empirically-based understanding of how certain immigrant groups are approaching Johannesburg's economy and how this affects relations and perceptions between immigrants and locals, as well as the accompanying implications for the urban (and the broader) economy.

This study intends to address a looming gap between empirical and theoretical research on the ethics of immigration, and also to infuse ethical considerations into a study of specific built environments and economic spatialities of immigrants in the city. The fundamental question at the bottom of migration debates within South Africa, and debates over territorial control in general, is about justice—justice as "a principle (or set of principles) for resolving conflict claims" (Harvey 2009: 97)—in this case, claims to space within the city. The nature of these claims—the perceptions, the spatial realities, and the relationship between the two—is part of what I aim to begin uncovering. Whether arguing for state power or freedom of migration, immigration ethicists working from a philosophical background and focusing on state power and policy (e.g., Rawls 1999) seem to be significantly out of touch with reality on the ground at the urban level. As the realities on the ground in South Africa differ significantly from those in the Northern

countries in which these theories have been developed, there is a pressing need for a study seeking a practical view of immigration ethics in the South African context.

Chapter 2 serves as an in-depth introduction to the historical and theoretical underpinnings of research on immigration, territorial ethics, and immigrant economies. I frame how globalization has opened up space for migration and also provide background on the local dynamics of immigration to South Africa. My interest lies at the intersection of three bodies of research and theory: one of these includes work on globalization and urbanization that has come to the fore since the 1990s, and specifically a more recently emerging sub-strand of literature on African cities in the global economy; the second body of literature deals with ethical approaches to immigration. Current theorization regarding the "rights to the city" generally brings together these two strands of literature (Simone 2005); I seek to go beyond this approach by basing the development of an ethical framework on a third body of research—the large amount of empirical and theoretical research on immigrant economics, and specifically "ethnic economies." I conclude Chapter 2 by arguing that there is a need to develop an understanding of more localized spatial processes of immigration and the immigrant economies in South Africa that have generated such a violent backlash from certain sectors of the population.

Chapter 3 assesses a specific immigrant group that has featured prominently as targets of xenophobic attack: Somalis. I attempt to develop a geographical understanding the Somali ethnic economy within urban (in this case largely peripheral urban) space that generates violent xenophobic backlashes in certain areas.[3] Although Somalis have been a focus of research on xenophobia and on social issues in South Africa since the influx of a

[3] Pumza Fihlani, "South Africa: No safe haven for Somalis," BBC News online, Nov. 10, 2011: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15076486

large number of migrants in the past decade (Misago et al., 2010; Misago 2009; Krause-Vilmar & Chaffin 2011), no study has yet approached in a holistic manner the dynamics behind the continued Somali reliance on what I call "doing business with danger;" that is, running *spaza* shops in violent townships even after they are harassed and beaten or their coworkers murdered. Based on exploratory empirical research conducted with Johannesburg's Somalis, I will analyze the geography of Somali business and xenophobic violence against Somalis in Gauteng. I argue that the Somali economy is indeed "bridging the divided city" in some ways, primarily by serving to carry affordable goods from South African wholesalers to the country's most crime-prone townships. Furthermore, the Somali ethnic economy has brought increasingly large-scale investment to Gauteng through the development of a vibrant ethnic enclave in Mayfair and provided life chances to a large number of refugees. But on the other hand, a steady stream of remittances drains capital from South Africa; the relationship between the threat of xenophobic violence and profitability in the "locations"[4] drives the exploitation of newly arrived Somalis by more established Somali investors; and violence in the "locations" contributes to the development of an exclusionary enclave in Mayfair that in turn generates broader social and economic divisions between Somalis and black South Africans in the city.

Building on the conceptualization of Mayfair as an exclusionary enclave developed at least partially in response to xenophobia in the townships, Chapter 4

[4] As Somalis in South Africa generally refer to the townships and peripheral urban areas in which they do business as "the locations," I have chosen to use the term throughout this thesis. It is slightly more encompassing than the term "township" because it includes areas such as central Soweto that have urbanized but remain peripheral to the larger cities.

explores the relationship between immigrant economies, the built environment in Johannesburg's inner city, and the inclusion/exclusion of both immigrants and South Africans from spaces in the city. Drawing on qualitative interviews from three inner-city immigrant-dominated neighborhoods, I attempt to develop a "practical reason" understanding of the ethics of inclusion and exclusion in these spaces (Barnett, 2010). Overall, locals across the city remain moderately xenophobic, and economic tensions between immigrants and city officials play out in numerous ways that generally end up excluding and threatening the most vulnerable individuals among both immigrant and South African communities, particularly recent immigrants and impoverished local street vendors, as will be seen below. The focus on economic issues brings us back to an economically based conception of spatial and social justice. I conclude this chapter by arguing for a further examination of how the built environment shapes interactions between immigrants and locals as well as how these interactions are perceived.

The final chapter brings together geographic and ethical understandings of immigrant economics in the city and argues that while immigrants are filling needed gaps in Johannesburg's economy and providing low-cost goods that benefit impoverished black South Africans, an emphasis by both immigrants and some locals on the business contributions of foreigners obscures the fact that immigrants are in some cases driving locals out of business and generally accruing profits which are not necessarily reinvested in South Africa. The relationship between immigrant economies and development—both local and in the sending countries of Johannesburg's forced migrants—are not straightforward, and the needs of refugee families must be taken into account as well as local concerns. As immigration to South Africa for business reasons is unlikely to stop in

the foreseeable future regardless of state policies, local and municipal governments should take advantage of the skills and experiences that immigrants bring with them. While in a sense neither xenophobic locals nor immigrants have any more of a "right to the city" than the other from an ethical perspective, the interactions between these groups determine de facto rights to space—physical, social, and economic—and only through some degree of cooperation between the two can a true right to the city be grasped and utilized to bring broader benefits to both populations.

CHAPTER 2: Globalization, Territory and Migration

Background and Framework

I. The State, the Urban and African Cities

Building largely upon an academic reinvigoration of Marxist thought in economic geography and urban studies (cf. Harvey 2006a; Lefebvre 1991), critics of the era of "neoliberalism" point to the increasing push by the Global North for economic liberalization, among the effects of which are increased migration flows, particularly from the "developing" economies of the Global South to the "developed" Global North. Critics of this neoliberal turn in global economics argue that policies favoring flows of capital (both local and transnational) while limiting flows of people benefit financial capitalists and increase the income gap between rich and poor, both within state and between the states of North and South (Peet 2007; Harvey 2006b; 2007). In the global economy, international boundaries function as barriers for regulating and policing human movement, while capital flows freely across these imaginary lines. This function is effectively used by developed countries to maintain inequality between states (Ferguson 2006; Castles 2004).

Perhaps on no entire continent have the populations of states been as coopted and marginalized by this process as in Africa. Ferguson (2006:5) has critically examined "Africa" as a "place-in-the-world" that in the eyes of the North is "nowadays nearly synonymous with failure and poverty." The connections between development, security, and conflict in spaces like the Horn of Africa are deeply entangled in hazy international and local politics (Duffield 2007); yet a clear result from the processes at work is a

relatively heavy stream of refugee migration not only to the Global North, but also within Africa. At the nexus of the failing state, the oppressive state, and the conflict-ridden state, the distinction between economic migrants and refugees is increasingly blurred; weak economies generally accompany weak states that perpetrate violations of human rights: Castles (2004: 862) argues that "the perceived migration crisis is really a crisis in North-South relations, caused by uneven development and gross inequality." Uneven development on smaller geographical scales also drives migration: Since the opening up of South Africa's borders and internal spaces to African migrants following the transition to democracy in 1994, migrants have flowed steadily into Africa's most developed economy despite being greeted with a harsh reception by the population as well as harsh state laws (Crush & Dodson, 2007).

The role of relations between states in creating migration flows is accompanied by the state's sovereignty in creating its own migration policies. As Foucault (2007) argues, freedom of movement has since the territorial state's inception been deeply intertwined with the forces of security that create and sustain the state. According to Foucault, these apparatuses of security have arisen in connection with increasing flows—of money, goods, and people—that began to create the modern city in medieval times and led to the consolidation of the nation-state as the dominant form of spatial organization in the nineteenth century. These flows led to a gradual transition from the walled city to the sprawling metropolis as governments sought to encourage more freedom of movement while attempting to ensure the maximum flow of beneficial types of movement and minimize the risks involved. This approach begins to elucidate how the city, the state, and human migration are connected and mutually shape each other: the city has always

been a place of movement but also a place of territorial hierarchy, organization and security. As the physical sites and results of capitalist accumulation, cities are corporate centers, state capitals, and the locations of global governance institutions; the nodes from which power extends over space in the form of policies and market control (Peet 2007).

At the same time as global governance and economic structures are predicated on the notion of state territoriality, neoliberalization and elements of globalization that accompany neoliberal capitalism undermine the state in certain ways through processes such as illegal immigration and the devolution of certain aspects of economic power from states to cities (Brenner 2004a; 2004b; Grant and Nijman 2004). Urban theorists and planners have pointed to the "entrepreneurial city" as a subversive force in the neoliberal state, yet a necessary location of foreign investment for capitalist accumulation within a state (Gordon 1999).

According to research in this area, inequality is not only growing between states, but also within states—and the city is the specific locus of increasing social and economic division coupled with spatial proximity. Real estate capitalism and the relation between wage labor, rents, and places of work constitute significant mechanisms behind the development of ghettos and the impoverishment and displacement of the poor to areas that only serve to reinforce their poverty (Harvey 2009). This inequality gives urgency to ethical perspectives and also creates increasing tensions at the urban level, particularly in an already highly stratified society such as Johannesburg's (Murray 2011).

Whether at the state or city level, the role of territory becomes more important to the global economy as property replaces productive work as the realm of speculation. The built environment is both a prerequisite and a determining factor for investment and the

circulation of capital, and one of the features of the service economy's shift away from production through manufacturing is the focus on real estate speculation that makes place and space into commodities (Harvey 2006b). The necessary spaces that are built to facilitate capital accumulation help give rise to a capitalist "production of space:" the social production of spatial relationships through the actions of capital that give use value to specific locations and built environments (Lefebvre 1991). Setting urbanism within the context of globalization and state economic restructuring allows us to assess urbanism in a broader theoretical light: as sites of surplus circulation (Harvey 2009) and as locations where transnational and global politics are played out in local streets and neighborhoods (Keith 2005). The immigrants that arrive in today's cities are part of this transnational force, shaping urban territory by appropriating and producing certain spaces, a very visible phenomenon in Johannesburg's case (Jinnah 2010). Yet in South Africa the particular processes behind this appropriation and production and the various social and built environments in which they take place have not been explored much beyond a mere recognition.

Economic and political migrants from throughout Africa have converged on South Africa since the fall of apartheid to take part in the productive economy and seek refuge in the relatively stable political setting. By 2008 it was estimated that foreigners constituted approximately 14% of the Johannesburg metropolitan area's population (CDE 2008: 6). Considered within the setting of decreasing formal employment (including a decline in mining) and the outsourcing of local manufacturing as apartheid began to decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Rogerson 1996), immigration was extremely alarming to the unemployed and underemployed South African Black population, who

have from the beginning perceived immigrants primarily in terms of economic competition (CDE 2008; Polzer 2010a). As the African National Congress (ANC) has failed to follow through on its promises of some degree of wealth redistribution to the oppressed and impoverished black population when the party assumed office. Instead, led by capital interests, the government quickly pursued privatization strategies and began to foster a competitive business climate in South Africa's cities that continued to marginalize large sectors of the population (Peet 2007). The opening of the economy and gradual shift away from talk about nationalization further encouraged migrants seeking jobs to move to South Africa's cities. High levels of immigration to South Africa have created debates at both the municipal and national level about government immigration policies and the effects of migrants on the city. Perspectives involved in these debates are mediated through fundamental views of state sovereignty, security, and the relationship between the national and the urban in both the political and the economic arena.

African Cities

States in Africa have undergone major changes in the past half-century and continue to shift toward urbanism as their populations relinquish traditional ways of life and move to the city, some forced from their land by environmental factors or by "land grabs" in which their territories are drawn into global financial circulation,[5] others pulled by economic opportunity, and still others drawn by media portrayals of city life and the possibilities for social existence there. The shift from rural to urban at the national level

[5] See Aaron Maasho. Ethiopia 'forcing out thousands in land grab.' *The Independent* (online). http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ethiopia-forcing-out-thousands-in-land-grab-6291029.html (accessed February 24, 2012)

began to take place under colonial regimes as capital cities became the primary economic nodes of the state (see De Blij 1963). Since the independence era of the 1950s and 60s, African cities have seen more and more international migration. There are, broadly speaking, several drivers of international migration flows in Africa, among them economics—for example, President Mugabe's recent policies that have devalued the Zimbabwean currency to such an extent that the cost of living is too high for many citizens to afford; politics—the lack of a sovereign central government in Somalia since the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 has led to widespread chaos in the state and forced many Somalis to flee the country to neighboring states; and traditional nomadism—for example, the seasonal flows of cattle herders across international borders in the Sahel that has necessitated international agreements on freedom of movement.

A growing body of literature on African cities has focused on rural-urban and international migration to African cities, urban economies in transition, and the persistence and prevalence of informality in African economies. Africa south of the Sahara is a unique space given the enduring legacies of colonial spatial planning imposed on the local population, in which urban space was in many cases planned in order to keep the local population out. These theorists "generally do not reject theories of analysts like Harvey or Davis emanating from the West…. [b]ut finding the right sort of engagement that deals with both externally derived ideas and African concepts can be a challenge" (Myers 2011: 9). Abdoumaliq Simone has published several prominent works in this area, utilizing notions of informality, invisibility, spectrality, and movement to understand and compare dimensions of urban life in various areas of the continent and other parts of the developing world (Simone 2004). Jennifer Robinson (2006) likewise

situates a study of African cities—especially cities in Southern Africa—within the context of urban space elsewhere in the Global South.

More geographically specific analyses have been produced that examine urban economics, the role of global and transnational capital flows, and spatial divisions in cities on the African continent. Grant (2009) shows how globalization in Accra takes place from above through the influx of foreign capital; from below through transnational networks that seek to mobilize Accra's impoverished communities; and from in-between through the activities of return migrants and Ghanaian investors from diaspora. Johannesburg, as a post-apartheid city, a fractured city, and a city where individuals from across Africa interact daily, has received an abundance of academic attention in recent years, featuring as a "city of extremes," where poverty and wealth, security and informality interact in unique ways that shape the city itself (Murray 2008; 2011). Building upon Lefebvre's work, Murray argues that "the urban landscape needs to be understood not simply as an inanimate setting… but as an energizing force capable of shaping the social world" (Murray 2011, xxii). Specifically in Johannesburg's case, "[p]rivate property and public access crystallized as the opposing poles of the urban landscape. The alternating gravitational pull of each subjected metropolitan Johannesburg to a schizophrenic identity" (Murray 2011: 77).

Murray is not alone in pointing out the divisions in Johannesburg's social and economic landscape that have created opposing interests between the CBD and the northern fringe cities such as Sandton, and resulted in inadequate attempts to mitigate urban decline over the past two decades (Beavon 2004; Beall et al. 2002; Bremner 2004; 2000). Crankshaw's (2008: 1708) work argues that decreasing racial segregation in

Johannesburg's northern suburbs has been coupled with a likely increase in economic segregation in the metropolitan region as a whole, and that overall "it is probable that the post-Fordist period is even more spatially polarized than the racial-Fordist period." The townships on Johannesburg's margins have also been the site of investigation into economic geography and local business initiatives (Grant 2010; Guillaume and Houssay-Holzschuch 2002). In many ways Johannesburg defies conceptualization as an "African city"—its well-developed infrastructure and the corporate links that extend from the large-scale capitalist enterprises to Europe and the rest of the world suggest a "global" city. But alongside the European architecture and the Western-style malls of the northern suburbs, the prevalence of "bootstrap enterprises" over larger companies in certain sectors, "the bending and blending of formal and informal markets," and the increasing circulations of migrants fit with Grant's (2009) definitions of a "globalizing city." Johannesburg is perhaps best conceptualized as both global and globalizing; as a nexus between Africa as a "place-in-the-world" (along with the associated poverty, violence, and underdevelopment) and a European-style built environment that functions as a regional node of the global economy. It is largely the European aspects of the city and comforts of a developed upper-class economy that have drawn migrants to the city in search of economic opportunities.

II: Immigration and Ethics

Immigration to Johannesburg has sparked significant controversy as refugees and economic immigrants appropriate the interstices of the existing social and geographic divisions in the city, provoking a backlash from the black population who perceive

immigrants as competitors for business and for social benefits from the state. The fact that close to a quarter of Johannesburg's inner-city residents were born outside of South Africa has led not only the local population, but also local governments to feel that they are facing "a crisis of human mobility" (Landau 2010a). This has been reflected in national-level policies, such as the Immigration Act of 2002.[6] While recognizing that "the contribution of foreigners in the South African labour market does not adversely impact on existing labour standards and the rights and expectations of South African workers" (Immigration Act of 2002, quoted in Ostanel 2012: 26), the Act authorized searches, arrests, and deportations in a manner that was "overtly anti-foreigner" (Landau 2004).

Despite the amendment of this act in 2004, "immigration policy and practices indicate that the post-1994 state may be more hostile to immigration and immigrants than its immediate predecessor" (Peberdy 2009: 169). The Act was amended again in 2011, following some controversy over provisions that would force foreigners to return to their country of origin to change their visa status. While relatively strict immigration laws and quotas have become the norm, there has also been debate over a movement for free migration within the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and the South African government signed a Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in August 2005, one step toward easing migration restrictions. Currently, South Africa follows an official policy of granting asylum to refugees from certain countries, which has led to a steady stream of forced migrants from the DRC, Angola, Somalia, Nigeria, Senegal, Ethiopia, and Burundi, as well as from Asian countries like India, Pakistan and

[6] Government Gazette, Republic of South Africa. Immigration Act of 2002. http://www.southafrica.dk/fpdb/Consular%20Website/Immigration%20Act.pdf

Bangladesh (Peberdy & Crush 2007). This adds to the steady flow of illegal and legal migrants—often short-term labor migrants or traders engaging in circular migration—from other SADC countries, predominantly Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Although migrants from SADC states are more likely to engage in circular migration, many of these economic migrants as well as asylum seekers settle in South Africa to take advantage of the numerous economic opportunities there. Although migration laws have prevented the massive inflow of immigrants that some predicted after apartheid (Crush 2008), steady numbers of migrants to the country and a continuation of circular migration from neighboring countries have pushed immigration to the forefront of popular concerns. In the context of a country that remains socially and economically divided to such a high degree nearly two decades after apartheid policies ended, these migrants are often seen by local blacks as "stealing" the economic opportunities that should be given to the local population.

Whatever the official immigration policies may be, immigration continues through both legal and illegal means and national-level policies fall short in taking into account the lived experiences and tensions located in specific spaces of everyday life. The tensions in South Africa's case have often been more visible than those elsewhere: South African nationals have regularly demonstrated high levels of xenophobia toward both legal and illegal immigrants, and this violence originates not only from the relatively poor population of the townships, but also from officials and security personnel who are tasked with enforcing the state's laws. According to a survey conducted by researchers at the University of the Witwatersrand in 2005, "nearly 70 per cent of respondents felt that refugees in the country should *never* have the rights of freedom of speech and

movement… Fewer than 20 per cent felt that refugees should always enjoy legal and police protection in South Africa, or access to basic services" (Crush & Dodson 2007: 445). A survey conducted by the University of the Witwatersrand in 2003 showed that about 65 percent of South Africans believe that migrants should leave the country (Polzer & Del Valle, 2003). The conflict between official policies that, although hostile to immigrants themselves, permit immigration and grant documents to forced migrants on the one hand, and local anti-immigrant sentiments on the other has provided fertile ground for a host of informal anti-immigrant activities, from corruption in the Department of Home Affairs to police bribery and informal trade networks sanctioned by officials. Competing discourses of "lazy black South Africans" and "migrants that are capitalizing on black South African marginality" are "feeding the tension within today's South African society" (Ostanel 2012: 6).

The prevailing atmosphere of xenophobia has contributed to further segmentation of space in Johannesburg in the midst of an environment where various groups—including immigrants as well as local interests—compete to control and secure space (Bénit-Gbaffou 2008; 2006; Katsaura 2011**)**. Landau (2010b) argues that immigrant reactions to xenophobia that have resulted in the appropriation of Johannesburg's spaces should not necessarily be viewed solely from the standpoint of exclusion: Johannesburg's expanding and diversifying population by its very existence testifies to a level of inclusivity, although this does not necessarily entail a "just city" or a city that is immigrant-friendly per se. Landau has examined the relationship between localized practices of belonging and transnational networks that allow immigrants to "float" above Johannesburg's landscape in a sense (Landau 2009). Investigation of competition

between groups in Johannesburg has been framed within the context of "the rights to the city" (Balbo 2009), and yet the lack of full explication of this framework shows the potential for the specific and unique circumstances in South Africa to inform the development of this concept.

Ethical Perspectives on Immigration

The concept of immigrant "rights to the city" must be framed within broader debates on migration ethics and the rights to territory in general. The concept of the "right to the city," developed through the writings of Lefebvre (1996), Harvey (2009), Mitchell (2003) and Simone (2005) is a progressive element in debates over territorial control that historically have focused primarily on national politics and the state economy rather than on the cities in which these politics largely play out and between which economic flows circulate. The right to the city for immigrants is mediated first through national-level policies that attempt to control human flows and either provide legal protection or create space for abuse of immigrants after their arrival. The original literature on the right to the city focused primarily on relationships between citizens without delving into debates over the place of foreigners in the city, leaving an opening to pursue a localized understanding of this concept in Johannesburg's case.

Given the de facto migration, both international and intra-national, to Johannesburg and the competing claims of space there, a notion of the right to the city should be developed, based on the urban-level interactions between immigrants and locals. This would permit a focus on more localized policies, rather than the national policies that heretofore have largely been perceived as "failures" (Crush & Dodson

2007). As ethical considerations of international migration have generally focused on national-level policies and continue to be shaped by national debates, the development of "the right to the city" as a concept that allows for mediation between locals and foreigners must be framed within national-level debates that ask who has a right to residence in state territories. The concept of the right to the city as developed by David Harvey (2009) examined the city as a set of economic relationships within a built environment; to this we must add that the city is a site where locals who are entitled to participation in the development of national-level policies meet immigrants who are not provided this right.

Statist arguments are built upon the premise that the democratic state is the natural mechanism to control what Immanuel Kant called the "unsociable sociability" of humanity—that is, their desire to create society, accompanied by "a constant resistance that continually threatens to break up this society" (Kant 2006: 6). Influenced by the growing interconnectedness of the world in the 18th century, Kant argued for a "cosmopolitan right" that constituted "conditions of universal hospitality," meaning that a foreigner could be turned away from a territory if this could be done without harming the stranger, but that all human beings have "a right to visit… to present oneself to society by virtue of the right of common possession of the surface of the earth" (ibid.: 82). Of course, the difference between "a right to visit" and a right to reside is significant.

John Rawls extends a variation of Kant's argument, building a claim for state power on an argument for democratic governance. In his conception, the will of "peoples" enacted over the territory of the state becomes essential: "an important role of government, however arbitrary a society's boundaries may appear from a historical point

of view, is to be the representative and effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and its environmental integrity, as well as for the size of their population." (Rawls 1999: 38-39). In Rawls' view, the territory of the state has the potential capacity to support the people "*in perpetuity*," and it is only peoples' own failure to regulate their numbers or care for their own land that drives immigration (ibid.: 8). Thus the causes of immigration would disappear in a society of liberal and decent peoples. Essentially, for Rawls, it is the people within a state that have a moral nature, and thus it is the population that is responsible for an ethical immigration policy that takes into account the equality of all peoples. However, it is fundamentally the will of the people that determines whether this immigration policy and the ethics of the state's territorial control is right or wrong; there is no strong argument for a more objective stance that could be applied across multiple states. Rawls and those who have followed him theorize based on a utopian model in which the people will push the state to do the "right" thing. Furthermore, Rawls' argument sidelines economic drivers of migration while focusing on political issues.

Kwame Appiah (2004) takes a more nuanced approach, developing a notion of "rooted cosmopolitanism" that perceives individuals as participants in the state but also members of broader human networks. Appiah's navigation between claims of individuality and claims of shared identity allow him to develop an ethical theory connecting individuality with broader allegiances, in the end pointing to the ways in which participation in the political space of the state has implications that reach beyond this space. Other recent accounts build on these collective identities and the historical connections between people and territory, arguing that as the period of time during which

a group has resided in a territory lengthens, that group's claim to the territory becomes stronger (Miller 2007; Meisels 2005). Much of the debate over immigration policies in South Africa is driven by these kind of nationalist claims to territory. However, this approach is problematic when considered at any spatial scale other than the national: in most cases neither the state nor the people it governs occupy or utilize the whole territory within the state's boundaries. Furthermore, in the case of Johannesburg, the specific spaces that are violently contested were in many cases either previously unoccupied or underutilized by the groups now contesting them.

While Appiah (2004) questions the premises of a "human rights" approach to political solutions, other migration theorists have used the notion of the right of a human to "seek livelihood" in order to argue that the right to leave a specific space if one so desires must be complemented by the right to enter another space (Juss 2006; Flusser 2003). The starting point of arguments for migration without borders is firstly that in the reality of a globalized world, migration already eludes the attempts of states to control human movement (Pécoud & de Guchteneire 2007: 1). Second, the increasing polarization of wealth places the privilege of mobility in the hands of the wealthy while the migrations of the poor are much more contingent upon state policies (Carens 1987); thus Pécoud and de Guchteneire (2007: 9) argue that "restrictions on mobility violate the liberal egalitarian principle according to which people should have equal opportunities." Several strains of the Migration Without Borders theory are discernable: some advocate for free migration based on the concept of "human rights" based on the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights published in 1948 (Juss 2006).[7] Others explore the individual benefits of cosmopolitanism and general benefits of economic growth that may accompany the easing of immigration restrictions (Flusser 2003; Pécoud & de Guchteneire 2007; Peberdy & Crush 2007).

Both statist and free migration theories fall short in addressing the rights to the city for several reasons. First, theoretical-ethical migration debates largely fail to take into account the practical question of what should be done with immigrants already present in national territory and who have participated in sustained economic and social relationships with the host community. Second, the national-level conception of immigration ethics does not for the most part investigate the ethics of access to territory per se, but rather is built upon the conception of a political entity that takes up a certain space, and thus this framework is difficult to transfer to smaller spatial scales. Finally, the political conception of immigration and space largely bypasses the fact that the city is effectively an economic entity, and when the laws of the state allow immigration in the name of freedom of movement, they also may open up the possibility of immigrants displacing less advantaged locals by participation in the market. This last point indicates the importance of integration the concept of the "right to the city" and arguments over immigration ethics with a localized understanding of the processes through which immigrants utilize territory and built environments and integrate into specific urban spaces.

[7] See Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/

III. Theoretical Underpinnings and Framework for the Study

Research on immigrants in Johannesburg has contributed significantly to understandings of the processes contributing to xenophobic sentiments and violence, as well as clearer conceptions of the immigrant identities, practices, and modes of belonging in the city; yet little of either this work or the research on immigration ethics in the South African context has been informed by or connected with empirical studies of immigrant entrepreneurship and ethnic economies. Some work has been conducted on transnationalism and foreign enterprise in South Africa (Peberdy and Rogerson 2000), but the dramatically changing dynamics of immigrant business in Johannesburg over the past five years point to the constant need for a fuller understanding of the specific processes at work in the city and surrounding areas.

Transnationalism research on migrant populations in the Global North has uncovered many of the dynamics of immigrant livelihoods and the connected processes of "globalization from below," including the cultural transfers that occur between sending and receiving countries, informal cross-border trade, the supply networks that facilitate immigrant entrepreneurship (Portes 2003; Vertovec 2004). Although there is general agreement that transnationalism is a novel perspective rather than a new phenomenon (Portes 2003), new transportation and communications technologies developed since the 1980s have been essential in creating transnational networks and expanding the scope and effects of transnational connections. A growing body of research assesses remittances as the "most transformative processes" of migrant transnationalism (Vertovec 2004; see Lindley 2010a; Jones et al. 2010).

Remittances are but one manifestation of the nexus between social capital and financial capital flows. Here I follow Pierre Bourdieu's (1985: 248) definition of social capital as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition." Social capital has been a primary focus of research on immigration in the Global North, where theorists have examined its role in creating economic opportunities for immigrants and positive modes of incorporation upon arrival in a strange country (Evans & Syrett 2007).

Social capital entails the ability of individuals to benefit from membership in social networks, which according to Portes (1998:3) "must be constructed through investment strategies oriented to the institutionalization of group relations, usable as a reliable source of other benefits," although these benefits do not always involve monetary repayments. In immigration literature, a distinction has developed between "bounded solidarity" and "enforceable trust" among immigrant communities as two types of social capital common among ethnic groups (Zhou 2004). Bounded solidarity arises from situations in which immigrants are treated as culturally distinct, which heightens the connections between coethnic entrepreneurs, employees, and customers (Portes and Zhou 1992). Enforceable trust emerges in a somewhat more socially organized setting, from the ability of the ethnic community to either sanction or confer status on individuals (Zhou 2004). Portes (1998:7) further distinguishes between consummatory and instrumental motivations to provide collective resources for others. It is useful to view the networks within the Somali ethnic economy described later in this study from a framework that

critically examines the motivations and processes behind the translation of social capital into actual employment or transfers of goods.

Social capital among immigrants is often used as an explanatory factor in studies of immigrants' access to employment, economic mobility, and entrepreneurial tendencies (Evans & Syrett 2007). The "ethnic economy" literature and "ethnic minority business" literature point to community and ethnic networks as a source of funds for nascent businesses, information about business opportunities, access to markets, and a co-ethnic labor force involving individuals who are often willing to work for little pay in order to gain entrepreneurial experience to start their own business. These resources have been shown to be essential to the entrepreneurial success of immigrant groups. The positive resources endowed by social capital often allow immigrants excluded by labor markets and local employment opportunities to engage in self-employment, and studies in various contexts have documented that self-employment rates are higher among foreign-born populations than native born, which often provides them with economic benefits (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Crush 2008).

Two situations have been theorized that lead to self-employment among immigrants: an "enclave thesis" argues that immigrant entrepreneurship arises from the demands for goods and services within the immigrant community itself; while the "blocked mobility thesis" emphasizes the exclusion of immigrants from labor markets (Price & Chacko 2009:330). These two factors may be intertwined as blocked mobility in the receiving economy leads to the development of an ethnic enclave that then produces a spatially concentrated demand for ethnically-specific services and goods from the sending country. The distinction between demand within the ethnic community and the

role of immigrants in filling niche markets has given rise to a parallel distinction between immigrant entrepreneurs and ethnic entrepreneurs (Chaganti & Greene 2002), although it is recognized that individuals often may fall into both categories (Price & Chacko 2009). Given the recognition that refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa have found it exceedingly difficult to access formal employment, it is surprising that very little research in Johannesburg has assessed the dynamics of ethnic and immigrant entrepreneurship within the robust framework developed in the Global North.

Collectively, firms characterized by shared ethnicity between owners and workers, self-employed ethnic entrepreneurs and immigrant entrepreneurs are referred to under the term "ethnic economy," encompassing all businesses owned by a certain minority ethnic group, including "businesses owned by middleman minorities, businesses owned by coethnics in ethnic enclaves, as well as all ethnic-owned or ethnic-controlled enterprises in the general economy" (Zhou 2004:1043). The concept of the ethnic economy derives from Bonacich's (1973) study on "middleman minorities," and recent theories regarding the ethnic economy seek to bring together the middleman minorities concept with that of the "ethnic enclave" (Light & Gold 2002; Light et al. 1994). The social capital circulating within an ethnic economy generates significant benefits for immigrants excluded from the wider labor market: "whenever unemployment and underemployment exist in the general economy, and directly proportional to their extent, an ethnic economy increases the aggregate income of a minority group *even if everyone in it* (self-employed, employers, employees) earns a lower human capital-adjusted return than do co-ethnics in the general labor market" (Light et al. 1994:72).

From a geographical perspective, the "ethnic economy" concept is most useful as an umbrella framework within which to situate spatial distinctions and relationships between middleman businesses, enclave businesses, and survivalist enterprises. The ethnic enclave hypothesis arose out of economic theory about labor market segmentation and observation of spatial clustering of immigrant firms that produced their own economy within the larger national economy in which they were embedded. The ethnic enclave is defined as a concentration of ethnic firms "in physical space—generally a metropolitan area—which employ a significant proportion of workers from the same minority" (Portes and Jensen 1989). Rather than simple residential agglomerations, ethnic enclaves are physically concentrated and ethnically identifiable business areas that include a sizeable entrepreneurial class, productive activities, and a diversity of businesses characterized by coethnicity between owners and workers (Zhou 2004).

While there is no general agreement on whether workers within an enclave earn higher returns than those in the general labor market (Light et al. 1994; Model 1985; Portes and Bach 1985), the ethnic enclave is "more than just a shelter for the disadvantaged who are forced to take on either self-employment or marginal wage work in small business. Rather, the ethnic enclave possesses the potential to develop a distinct structure of economic opportunities as an effective alternative path to social mobility" (Zhou 2004:1045). Initial work on ethnic enclaves focused on the Cuban ethnic enclave in Miami, arguing that this enclave economy was efficient due to "vertical and horizontal integration, ethnically sympathetic suppliers and consumers, pooled savings, and rigged markets" (Light et al. 1994:69). While ethnic enclaves ease the entry of immigrants into

the host market, they also may slow acculturation by preventing interaction between immigrants and locals.

Framework for the Current Study

In the South African case, certain ethnic groups have developed enclaves as well as middleman networks while others have attempted to blend in with local South Africans while engaging in street entrepreneurship or working for local South African-owned businesses. The differing types of interaction with the host community, between various immigrant groups, and within the same group in different spaces of the city recommends the use of the "mixed embeddedness" framework conceptualized by Kloosterman and Rath (2001; 2003; Rath and Kloosterman 2001) to facilitate comparative study. The mixed embeddedness approach builds on Granovetter's (1985) notion of the embeddedness of specific economic actions in social relations, and divides this concept into "concrete embeddedness" of immigrants through their social networks and their "abstract embeddedness" in local socioeconomic and political structures (Kloosterman and Rath 2001:190). The research that comprises Chapter 3 follows a methodology similar to that of Price and Chacko (2009), examining the specific spaces, social relationships, and structures in which the Somali ethnic economy is embedded, seeking to understand how Somalis navigate the opportunity structures and social relations that vary considerably across Johannesburg's urban landscape. Studies of mixed embeddedness of Somalis in London (Ram et al., 2008) constitute a ground for comparing the urban geographies of the Somali economy in different social and institutional settings. In seeking to understand Somali embeddedness in the Johannesburg social and economic

landscape, I apply methods similar to Price and Chacko's in a vastly different urban environment as I seek to answer (1) where and how Somalis create businesses; (2) economic sectors in which Somalis are active and how they are shaping supply and demand in these sectors; (3) the types of social capital involved in creating business opportunities; and (4) how opportunity structures vary across the urban landscape and how these variations shape the nature and geography of the Somali ethnic economy.

The spatialities entailed in a geographic conception of concrete embeddedness combined with the emphasis on spatial concentration of Somalis in Johannesburg lend themselves to an analysis of whether this spatial concentration allows us to move beyond the ethnic economy concept and assess the Somali economy within the framework of the "ethnic enclave" hypothesis; and further, what implications the economic structure of the enclave had for interactions and relationships with the host community. While scholarship on Johannesburg has noted the rise of enclaves following increased post-apartheid immigration and the accompanying xenophobic exclusion (Balbo, 2009), the concept of the "ethnic enclave" as defined in academic research has not been applied to these cases. It is useful in assessing Somali entrepreneurial success to return to a stricter definition of the enclave as a spatial concentration of firms entailing economic diversification and the development of a differentiated class of entrepreneurs, which generally leads to an economic advantage for the self-employed.

An understanding of the specific geographies involved in the Johannesburg Somali economy may lend itself to a more productive rethinking of social capital in dangerously hostile settings. Rather than simply increasing "people's trust and ability to work together" or serving as "informal safety nets" that are "particularly important given

forced migrants' exclusion from formal safety nets" (Krause-Vilmar & Chaffin 2011:12), it is possible that Somali networks are not only divisive (both between South Africans and Somalis and within the Somali community itself), but also that they impede the growth of certain businesses, and that transnational social capital networks facilitate the extraction of capital from South Africa. The argument that social capital networks serve primarily as a "safety net" for the poor often overlooks that possible entanglement within this net hinders a movement from mere survival/subsistence to actual growth/existence. Rather than asserting the existence of social capital or examining its effects on the Somali community, I am interested in the specific spatial forms of networks and financial flows facilitated by this social capital and how these function in the local development process (Evans & Syrett, 2007).

Understanding the Somali ethnic economy and the development of a specific enclave feeds into a broader rethinking of the contributions of immigrants to South African society as well as a consideration of the ethics of immigrant appropriation of urban space. The research described in Chapter 4 is largely exploratory, since little previous work has attempted to connect immigrant territorial strategies with ethical considerations at the urban level by seeking to detail the experiences and ethical views of immigrants and locals in specific areas of the city. The approach in this study uses the "mixed embeddedness" approach broadly by seeking to understand local experiences and perceptions of the relationships between immigrants and locals, and framing the discussion of these relationships within a case study of three different inner-city areas controlled largely by foreigners. The South African state's promotion of local solutions such as community policing forums (CPFs) to supplement formal state and municipal

governance has provided an opportunity for both locals and immigrants to securitize their own spaces within territory nominally governed by the state, resulting in vigilantism and increasing fragmentation of the city (Bénit-Gbaffou 2006; 2008). Yet as the Somali case shows, immigrant-dominated spaces may be the nodes of networks that provide certain benefits to South African society elsewhere, but also generate new spaces of competition and exclusion.

In examining the spaces of competition and exclusion, and the business practices utilized by immigrants in various parts of Johannesburg, it is essential to define and come to terms with the notion of "xenophobia" that has been widely used to describe South African perceptions and actions against immigrants. Xenophobia can be defined as "hatred or fear of a foreign 'stranger'" (Polzer 2010b: 2), but among immigrant groups is often used to refer to episodes of anti-immigrant violence such as those of May 2008. Xenophobia is by no means limited to the South African case, but has characterized relations between immigrants and locals across many societies and continues to permeate social structures in the Global North, although it is not often called by the same name. In the South African context, these anti-immigrant sentiments do not appear to be a direct cause of violence, but contribute to and strengthen violent dynamics against foreigners.

In light of these violent dynamics undergirded by official and popular perceptions of foreigners, I use the term "xenophobia" to encompass a set of exclusionary practices sanctioned by anti-immigrant attitudes. This use allows an analysis of the different ways in which xenophobic violence and exclusion play out across the city: in inner-city spaces, xenophobic sentiments among officials are more likely to sanction corruption, exemplified in police targeting of immigrant shops or street stalls and the demanding of

bribes by police and other officials. In the townships, xenophobic attitudes are more likely to translate into targeting of non-South African businesses and physical violence or threats toward foreigners. It may be the case that local businesses are also targets of violence due to business competition, and there are also rumors of immigrants attacking other immigrants because of business competition; however, xenophobic attitudes play an important role by marginalizing the voices of foreigners targeted in these attacks as well as the victims of official corruption and officially sanctioned violence or exclusion. In this study, I am concerned with the exclusion of immigrants and the ways in which this exclusion has formed structures that reinforce anti-immgrant sentiments among the host population, taking an ethical approach to relations and economic structures engendered by xenophobic attitudes.

Building from the specific case of the Somalis to a broader analysis of several immigrant neighborhoods, this study of immigrant economic structures, territorial organization and ethical perceptions seeks first to provide an empirical study of immigrant economies, and second to gain a "practical reason understanding of ethics" (Barnett 2010:252) that makes explicit the concerns of individuals and organizational stakeholders within these economies. While grounded in considerations of national-level rights (Miller 2007; Meisels 2005), theories of people and societies (Appiah 2004; Rawls 1999), and migration without borders (Juss 2006; Pécoud & de Guchteneire 2007) as outlined above, my approach in Chapter 4 focuses on a conception of the "rights to the city" that builds from the bottom up. By examining specific economic and organizational structures through which inclusion and exclusion are managed by immigrants and locals,

the study aims to elucidate how competing claims to space are negotiated and the ethical implications of these negotiations and their outcomes.

CHAPTER 3: Doing Business with Danger

The Geography of the Somali Ethnic Economy

I. Background, Methodology and History

Somalis have featured prominently in media and literature on xenophobia in South Africa over the past decade, as xenophobic attacks, particularly those between 2007 and 2008, have killed hundreds Somalis working in various townships across the country.[8] The persistence and even strengthening of the Somali's close-knit community in Mayfair, Johannesburg over the years since the first Somalis arrived in the country has led recent academic studies to focus on the role of religious networks and religious identities in the lives of Somali refugees in South Africa (Sadouni 2009; 2008; Kiorkis 2005); and the economic and cultural role of Somalis in shaping the environment of Johannesburg (Jinnah 2010; Landau 2009). Ironically, the small geographic scale of this body of research—based on the premise that Johannesburg Somalis "are located almost exclusively in one suburb" (Jinnah 2010:91; see also Sadouni 2009)—coexists with media anecdotes pointing to the large numbers of Somali entrepreneurs in the townships surrounding the city.

Despite the xenophobia literature that has examined the motivations behind the death of Somali township entrepreneurs, no studies have yet attempted to spatialize an understanding of the geography of Somali settlement and business and the factors that

[8] See Pusch Commey. "South Africa: A bad way to treat fellow Africans!" *New African* 462 (May 2007): 28-30; "Somali Refugees Fear Further Xenophobic Attacks." *Mail & Guardian* online, Mar 4 2009: http://mg.co.za/article/2009-03-04-somali-refugees-fear-further-xenophobic-attacks; "Toll from xenophobic attacks rises." *Mail & Guardian* online, May 31 2008: http://mg.co.za/article/2008-05-31-toll-from-xenophobic-attacks-rises

keep Somalis doing business in high-risk environments. In fact, while highlighting the importance of spatial considerations in research on Johannesburg Somalis (e.g., Jinnah 2010), recent studies have by and large failed to incorporate space into their analyses beyond noting the existence of the concentrated Somali population around 8th Avenue in Mayfair. The suggestion of spatial concentration of Somalis in Mayfair and the thus far limited examination of the nature of Somali entrepreneurship in the townships point to the importance of more deeply examining the spatialities of the Somali ethnic economy and the relationships between these two spaces. Furthermore, while it is generally acknowledged that Somalis' entrepreneurial successes are among the driving factors behind xenophobic attacks, the determinates and dynamics of Somalis' success have yet to be analyzed beyond vague conceptions of Somali social capital and transnational diasporic networks.

Much of the literature on Somalis highlights the role of religion and ethnic identity in the lives of Johannesburg's Somali population in providing "the sense of unity that has proven essential for Somali migrants in South Africa" (Sadouni 2009:236). Sadouni argues that it is religion that enables Somalis to find hope, and furthermore suggests that religious identities may translate into financial capital, at least partially through "Islamic finance provided by South African Indian Muslim non-governmental organizations" (2009:236). A recent report featuring a section about immigrant social capital prominently displayed the case of Somalis, linking social capital to entrepreneurship: "Despite a lack of formal services for forced migrants in South Africa, 75 percent of Somalis surveyed said they could seek help with borrowing money or finding housing" (Krause-Vilmar & Chaffin 2011:12). It is theorized that to a large extent

the source of this social capital lies in Somali culture, with its deep Islamic heritage (Kiorkis 2005); the social networks are consolidated by way of xenophobic exclusion from the host society (Sadouni 2009) and the transnational networks of a refugee diaspora (Landau 2006; 2009). The importance of clan identity among Somalis and the role of clan divisions has also been of major concern, "although emerging research indicates that new trans-tribal networks are being created" (Krause-Vilmar & Chaffin 2011:12; see also Darboe 2003; Lewis 2004; Sadouni 2009; Kiorkis 2005). Despite differences in clan identity, there is a degree of consensus in research regarding Somali refugees in South Africa that "support given from one Somali family to another is what sustains this community" (Kiorkis 2005:37).

Somali social capital has translated into a steady flow of remittances between segments of the Somali diaspora community. Lindley (2010a; 2010b; 2009) and McGown (1998) have highlighted the centrality of remittances from Somalis in Europe, Canada, and the US in refugee life – indeed, these remittances are seen as playing a large role in sustaining Johannesburg's Somali community (Sadouni 2009; 2008). These transnational capital flows have enabled Somali entrepreneurship in South Africa: "Drawing on social capital enables Somalis to diversify their trade, minimize risk and pool resources. In Johannesburg, this is no different; Somali-owned businesses have kinship links that cut across industry and spatial boundaries" (Jinnah 2010:95). Yet while some of these studies have examined the remittance flow from the Global North, there has been little work done regarding the remitting habits of refugees in the Global South. South Africa's status as somehow in limbo between developing and developed makes it a somewhat unique site in Somali remittance networks: remittances flow from Somalis in

Europe and North America to their family members in South Africa, but many Somalis are in South Africa with the primary objective of sending remittances to their families in Somalia or in Kenyan refugee camps.

Descriptive studies of Somali life, religion, identity, and social networks have begun to open the door for a more tangible conceptualization of the Somali community in South Africa and the economic strategies through which they navigate South Africa's sometimes xenophobic host communities. This chapter builds upon existing research by providing an exploratory empirical examination of the spatialities of Somali economic networks, the nature and role of Islamic financing, and the relationship between clans in the Somali ethnic economy in South Africa. This analysis is informed by a spatial conceptualization and mapping of a segment of the Somali ethnic economy in Gauteng.

Based on site observation and the results of semi-structured interviews with 60 Somalis in a cross-section of central and peripheral urban areas in the Johannesburg/Pretoria urban region, I explore profits, incomes, and danger levels in several townships in Gauteng and the role of the Somali neighborhood on 8th Avenue within this broader economy. I argue that the Somali ethnic neighborhood in Mayfair should be seen as a regional ethnic enclave that functions as a node for a Somali economy that relies largely upon value extracted from the townships by owners of shops in these locations. While the Somali enclave serves as a site of investment for an emerging entrepreneurial class, it does not typically function as an economic entry point for new arrivals, who—due to competition for living space within the safe environment of the enclave—generally must acquire capital and experience in the townships prior to seeking even wage employment in the enclave. The dynamics of the Somali economy favor an

upper class of investors but also provide some room for mobility, based largely upon the odds of violent attacks against township investments.

While it is important to recognize the source of livelihoods for refugees from Africa's most enduring failed state, I also point out several downsides of the Somali ethnic economy in its current form. The social mobility of vulnerable township shopkeepers as well as Somali contributions to the local economies in which they are embedded are constrained by strong remittance flows from the townships. Furthermore, as Somali life in South Africa continue to be shaped by the experience of violence against Somalis in the townships, the reactive formation of the community and the tight-knit, closed economy drives exclusion of South Africans from Somali space in Mayfair—if not strictly policed or enforced exclusion, at least culturally and economically effected.

Methodology

Contact with the Somali community in Mayfair began during two months of relatively informal interactions in 2010. Immersion in the community took place largely through informal language lessons and participation in social events. (Limited) language acquisition played a key role in developing trust within the community and proved particularly helpful when conducting interviews in 2011 and 2012, as township entrepreneurs with limited English knowledge tended to be much more open with responses when I asked initial questions in Somali and allowed a Somali translator to assist with the more difficult ones. In 2011 I conducted five weeks of research while staying in a Somali lodge on 8th Avenue, which allowed significant insight into the daily workings of the ethnic economy as well as a better understanding of the spatial patterns

that exist in the enclave—many informal businesses are inside unmarked houses or in gated backyards, invisible to passers-by on the street. During this time a series of small focus groups (3-8 participants) was held with Somalis in Mayfair, through which I sought to determine perspectives on the best locations for business and the most dangerous townships (henceforth "the locations," as Somalis call them) in which Somalis have shops. A large majority of those involved in the focus groups had previously worked in the "locations" themselves.

Following group discussions, open-ended individual interviews were conducted with Somali entrepreneurs and workers in Mayfair (17 interviews) and in a number of "locations" on the margins of Johannesburg and Pretoria (43 interviews) that were selected based on the results of the group discussions. Interviews in the "locations" were taken in some of the larger townships near Johannesburg (Orlando East, Orlando West/Meadowlands), smaller and more peripheral "locations" (Kagiso, Metole, Katlehong, Thokoza), the large township of Tembisa near Midrand, and in Atteridgeville, west of Pretoria, where a series of attacks on Somali shops took place during public demonstrations for service provision in November 2011 (see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2). Interviews were also conducted on 8th Avenue in Mayfair, in Pretoria West and the Asiatic Bazaar area of Pretoria.[9] While located near town, Pretoria West was described by Somalis as a "location" and was characterized by sales to the black community, and therefore was grouped with township shops in the analysis.

[9] One shopkeeper from Mamelodi Location was interviewed in a Somali lodge in the Asiatic Bazaar area of Pretoria. I have noted the approximate location described by the shopkeeper on the map, but it should be noted that unlike all other points on the maps, for which I took GPS coordinates, this is not a precise location. This case was not utilized for statistical calculations on finances or danger levels.



Figure 1. Study areas north of Johannesburg

Interviews were open-ended and focused on (1) firm and entrepreneur attributes, including length of residence in South Africa, mobility within South Africa, and the number and ethnicity of employees; (2) economics of the enterprise, including approximate profits, remittances, sources of startup capital, and provision of funding to other entrepreneurs; and (3) embeddedness in local context, including connections to local wholesalers, the relationship with the South African community, and networks with the South African Muslim community and with other Somali firms. Although some respondents preferred not to offer specific, detailed information, enough data was gathered to permit exploratory analysis of the dynamics involved in the Somali economy.



Figure 2. Study areas, Johannesburg and surrounds

Somali Migration to South Africa

Researchers have highlighted the role of a culture of mobility and clan ties in shaping the identity of the Somali diaspora that has fled the failed state of Somalia since the central government collapsed in 1991—a displacement that by mid-2011 had reached over 1.46 million persons (Lindley 2010b; 2009, Jinnah 2010).[10] Somalis began to leave the Horn in large numbers during the violence that followed the fall of President Siad Barre. During the mid-1990s many Somalis fled to the refugee camps in Kenya, believing that they would return to Somalia within a relatively short time once peace was restored. Those who left the refugee camps and made their way to South Africa during this time constituted some of the first non-SADC migrants to arrive in the country after apartheid (Jinnah 2010:91). Jinnah identifies two subsequent waves of Somali immigration: one

[10] UNHCR country operations profile – Somalia. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483ad6.html (accessed Oct. 2011)

from 1995-2000 and another after 2006. Lindley (2010b) likewise points to the exit of over 870,000 people from Mogadishu (two-thirds of the city's population) during 2007 and 2008. Other studies suggest a fourth wave over the past two years as Somalis have fled insurgent violence (Krause-Vilmar & Chaffin 2011). Based on recent estimates, there are probably between 25,000 and 45,000 Somalis residing in South Africa in 2012 (Krause-Vilmar & Chaffin 2011).

Of the 59 interviewees who provided a specific date of arrival in South Africa, only two (3.4%) arrived before 2000 (one in 1994 and one in 1996). 13 interviewees (22%) arrived between 2000 and 2005; 25 (42.4%) between 2006 and 2009; and 19 (32%) during 2010 and 2011. The year in arrival in South Africa does not correlate directly with the year that migrants left Somalia. Interviewees that left Somalia during the 1990s or early 2000s were more likely to have experienced a lengthy stay in Kenya. For example, one informant left Somalia in 1993 and lived in Kenya while applying for relocation to the US and to Canada. While his brother was relocated, he was rejected from the process and remained behind selling clothing in Nairobi until 2000. By that time he had heard that Somali businesses were doing well in South Africa, and he chose to make the long journey south. Both of the interviewees who arrived prior to 2000 had spent at least two years in Kenya prior to coming to South Africa, one in Nairobi and the other in Dadaab Refugee Camp.

According to several interviewees, the overland journey from Somalia to South Africa has grown harder and more dangerous over the last several years. Increasing numbers of migrants moved southward after 2006 carrying with them whatever money they had and providing targets for police in the countries along the way. The overland

migration from Kenya or Somalia took interviewees anywhere from one week to 6 months, and many migrants were detained for significant amounts of time along the way. One business manager in Mayfair spent one month in jail in Tanzania and 2.5 months in jail in Mozambique in early 2010 before his arrival in South Africa. Some of the earlier migrants arrived by boat from Mogadishu to Maputo during the 1990s or early 2000s and crossed the border into Mpumalanga, while most of the more recent arrivals took an overland route.

Sadouni (2009) and Jinnah (2010) have explored the reasons behind Somali settlement in Mayfair, arguing that the presence of a large South African Indian Muslim population, along with their mosques and *madrasas*—Islamic schools—drew Somalis to the area. According to an interviewee who arrived in 1994, the first Somalis settled slightly to the southwest of the current enclave, around Church Street and 15th Avenue, where a large group of Somalis rented a house that quickly became crowded with new arrivals. Sadouni (2009:241) suggests that for the first Somali immigrants, the "separation and differentiation that prevailed in the city and was inherited from apartheid was re-appropriated by the Somalis who did not want to mix with populations other than Muslims. For Somalis, the minaret of a mosque was their compass to Johannesburg." The strong presence of a Muslim community eased the reception for Somali immigrants to Mayfair but also presented its own challenges, as South African Indian Muslims and Somalis tend to hail from differing schools of Islamic jurisprudence with slightly different practices: In order to keep their distinctive culture, Somalis built their own mosque and their own *madrasas*. Therefore while in some ways working their way into the social structures of the host society, Somalis from the beginning maintained a degree

of distance. The context of reception with regard to the black population and the general marketplace was much less welcoming than that in Mayfair: as soon as they started businesses, Somali entrepreneurs were targeted in the townships as well as in neighborhoods outside of Mayfair. I examine the specific dynamics through which exclusion from the host society contributed to the development of a spatially concentrated pattern of Somali settlement along 8th Avenue, it is important to note that the Somali community has tended to settle in relatively tight groups in several cities in the US and the UK and develop spatially concentrated business areas (Jones et al., 2010; Ram et al., 2008; Darboe 2003).

Mayfair certainly began to grow in the late 1990s as the central node of the Somali community and ethnic economy in South Africa; however the findings of this study contradict other accounts by pointing to the importance of settlement and enterprise outside of this "enclave" and the ways in which this geographically distant settlement is mediated through Mayfair. While studies continue to assert that "Somalis are located almost exclusively in the neighborhood of Mayfair" (Krause-Vilmar & Chaffin 2011:4), there is no scale of analysis nor empirical basis provided for this argument. It is recognized that there are Somali-dominated neighborhoods in many of the major towns in South Africa—most notably Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, and Rustenburg (Jinnah 2010), although no research has been conducted on the connections between these other regional nodes of the Somali immigrant economy in South Africa. Areas of Somali settlement in the heart of Port Elizabeth and Durban are smaller and less populated than Mayfair, and serve primarily as stocking points and centers of refuge for township entrepreneurs in the "locations" surrounding those cities. Mayfair is differentiated from

Somali neighborhoods in other cities by its high degree of transnational connections that facilitate inward investment by capitalist Somalis from Europe and the UK, and its function as a space within which economic differentiation and capitalist entrepreneurship take form among the Somali population, as I will argue in section three below. While the bulk of Somali economic networks in South Africa may flow through 8th Avenue, however, it is misleading to suggest that the majority of Somali settlement even within Gauteng takes place within Mayfair.

II. The "Location" Economy

From the beginning of the post-Barre Somali migration to South Africa, Somali immigrants have played a role as middleman entrepreneurs in the townships, hawking clothes and blankets while traveling through South Africa's impoverished informal and formalizing settlements (Jinnah 2010:95). The growing role of Somalis as middlemen between White- or South African Indian-owned wholesalers and township populations has placed them in particularly vulnerable positions as traders in the country's most dangerous social space. While the first Somali traders in the townships were often self-employed hawkers, the Somali township *spaza* shop (informal convenient store) economy has become a growing capitalist enterprise for Somali investors both within South Africa and from overseas, and now serves as the entry point for the majority of young Somali men entering South Africa in hopes of providing remittances to families in Somalia and Kenya. The violence engendered by business competition between Somalis and local entrepreneurs makes the "locations" dangerous workplaces, but the danger also ensures that there is a constant supply of job openings to accommodate Somalis who are

willing to take the risk in order to provide for their families. Furthermore, entrepreneurship strategies in the "locations" provide significant profits for shops in certain areas, generating significant sustainability of enterprise. Many of the shops in which interviews were conducted during this study had been started prior to the interviewee's arrival.

Figure 3. Somali *spaza* shop near Pretoria. Photo by author.

Xenophobic attacks in the townships are generally fomented by rival business owners, local leaders and candidates for local public offices seeking to strengthen their political or economic power within the local community (Krause-Vilmar & Chaffin 2011). Polzer (2010a) found that xenophobic violence is prevalent in poor townships, but not as prevalent in the poorest townships as in slightly better-off areas, and is most likely to occur in areas with a high population of young males. Despite these significant insights

into the causes behind xenophobic violence, explanations of violence based on business competition that results in Somalis putting local shops out of business (Misago et al., 2010; Misago 2009; Polzer 2010a) fail to uncover the mechanisms behind the economic strategies that favor Somalis and also come short in explaining the relationship between violence fomented by South African business owners and recent community demands that Somali businessmen return to the townships following such attacks.[11] While Misago (2009) points to the increasing number of Somali-owned shops and the low cost of Somali goods as factors leading to violence, interviewees pointed to specific business strategies as both the reason behind high demand for Somali shops and the reason for attacks by business competitors who used anti-immigrant rhetoric to incite violence.

The first factor Somalis point to that allows Somali shops to outcompete local businesses and generate significant profits is long hours of operation. The 42 township Somali shops surveyed in this study maintain on average 3 employees; all generally live inside the shop, often in a back room. While multiple employees in these small *spaza* shops means lower profits for each, they allow the Somalis to work longer hours by rotating shifts: shops open around 4 a.m., when working residents of the townships are beginning their long commutes to service jobs in Johannesburg's suburbs or to hawking jobs in the CBD, and close near midnight, when the last of the workers arrive from the city.

The second factor, which the literature on xenophobic violence indicates but does not explain, is the lower prices that Somali *spaza* shops offer. Like some large chain convenience stores in the global North, Somali *spaza* shops offer necessary goods such as

[11] Mzwanele Mkalipi. "Leave our Somalis! Community to the Rescue After Kids Target Refugee Shopkeepers," *The Daily Sun*, Tuesday June 29, 2010, pp. 1-2.

bread at prices below cost, drawing customers in and making up for the loss by profiting on other items like cigarettes and cold drinks. Interviewees said that while South African *spaza* shops may charge R10.00 for a loaf of bread that costs R8.00 wholesale, Somalis sell the same product for R7.50. The ability to make up for this loss lies in the profits made on small quantities of other goods. In order to generate the most profit, Somalis break most of their stock down to its smallest quantity: shoppers can buy a single tea bag or ¼ cup of sugar or salt.

The third factor that gives Somali shops a competitive advantage over South African shops in the "locations" is the extension of credit to impoverished customers. Because of Islamic financial principles, this credit does not accrue interest; indeed, it is relatively informal since there is no way for Somalis to enforce repayment. For very poor customers, Somalis claim that they even give away goods at times or charge less than the marked price if the customer does not have the full amount. This is motivated by their religion, which requires them to give to the poor. Thus rather than simply the act of providing essential goods and services to township communities (Jinnah 2010:97), it is largely the manner in which these goods are provided that generates Somali competitiveness, and it is these combined practices that have put South African *spaza* shops in some "locations" out of business.

While the May 2008 xenophobic attacks stand out as the most large-scale and organized recent violent incidents in South Africa, violence continues to haunt Somali township shopkeepers. Eastern Cape Province consistently stands out as the most dangerous of South Africa's provinces, particularly the area around Port Elizabeth. During informal focus groups in Mayfair, informants noted that all "locations" were more

or less dangerous, but named several in Gauteng as more dangerous than the rest in the province, among these Soweto, Atteridgeville, Mamelodi, Katlehong, and Thokoza. Subsequently, interviews were conducted at shops in each of these locations except for Mamelodi. Of the 45 "location" shops surveyed, 24 gave specific dates of the most recent attacks.[12] 3 shops (12.5%) reported the most recent violent event occurring within the previous 24 hours: two of these were attempted robberies and the third was an armed attack and robbery that sent a Somali shopkeeper in Soweto to the hospital with what his coworkers said was a fractured skull. An additional 4 shops (17%) reported an attempted or successful armed robbery within the previous ten days. Only 8 of these 24 shops (33%) reported an interval of longer than one month since the most recent attack, and the longest interval was ten months, reported by a shop in Kagiso Location, west of Johannesburg. In some cases the violence appeared somewhat localized: in Thokoza, one shop reported one month since the most recent violent incident while two nearby shops reported attempted armed robberies within the previous two days.

Based on the information provided by these 24 shops, a simple comparative "danger index" was calculated by taking the average number of attacks per month experienced at the shop, subtracting the overall average number of attacks per month for the 24-shop dataset, and dividing the result by the number of days since the most recent

Table 1. Average danger index for shops in selected townships

Location	n	Average danger index
Atteridgeville	8	1.25
Tembisa	4	0.20
Thokoza	7	2.34
Soweto	2	4.34

[12] The slightly modified dataset used in this calculation includes an interview with an Ethiopian shopkeeper in Thokoza and with a Malawian tailor in Atteridgeville.

attack (see Table 1). This produced a range of values from 0.027 for a shop in Kagiso Location that reported being attacked six times in 24 months, with the most recent attack ten months prior to the interview—to a shop in Thokoza that was attacked the day before the interview and reported this as one of about 20 violent incidents over the past 14 months since the shopkeeper had arrived, yielding an index of 9.35. The average overall was a value of 1.55. Comparing the results from four townships—Atteridgeville, Tembisa, Thokoza, and Soweto, Soweto yielded the highest average index, with an average value of 4.34 between the two shops. Thokoza, with an average value of 2.34 followed Soweto, and Tembisa had the lowest danger index of the four, with a value of 0.2. Interestingly, three of these "locations" (Soweto, Atteridgeville and Thokoza) had been named by Somalis in Mayfair as more dangerous than other areas; the fourth area that was thought dangerous was Mamelodi.

Although the sample sizes are too small to produce statistically significant comparisons, for the danger index, it should be noted that shopkeepers in Tembisa and Atteridgeville for the most part reported better relationships with the community than those in the other "locations". In Atteridgeville every shop reported having been attacked during community demonstrations for service provision on November 13, 2011, but since then things had been mostly peaceful. Meanwhile two of the shops surveyed in Thokoza had been subject to attempted arson within the past two months. The possibility of collecting larger samples and developing a statistical measure to assess xenophobic violence in this manner seems a plausible direction of future research. On the other hand, the significant variation of reported danger levels within townships could lead to a closer analysis of factors driving variations within townships. For example, some shopkeepers

in Atteridgeville had a shop on the main road but with an entrance that faced a side road. The shopkeepers reported higher levels of crime than nearby shops and attributed this to the fact that the entrance was less visible to the public.

Most of the violent incidents reported were robberies or attempted robberies rather than murders or shop burnings like those that characterized the May 2008 xenophobic attacks. However, several shopkeepers reported being shot, being shot at, or having their shop burned. One shopkeeper in Katlehong reported that a month previously, four South Africans with guns attempted to rob the shop at dusk. One of the Somalis who was standing near the rolling sheet metal door lowered the door and switched off the lights. The armed gang fired 22 shots, and once their guns were empty the Somalis opened the door and the thieves ran out, taking some stock they had grabbed from the refrigerator prior to the lights being shut off. At the time of the survey bullet holes were clearly visible in the walls and through the sheet metal door, as well as in the clothes of two of the shopkeepers who were grazed but escape unhurt. “Every night we are at war … especially weekends,” reported a shareholder who worked in the shop. In a nearby shop the Somali running the till held a gun beneath the counter with one hand while distributing change to customers with the other. Seven months prior to the interview a Somali youth who had arrived from Somalia only a week before was shot and killed in the shop, and only a month prior to the interview a local South African gang attempted to burn the shop down with the three Somalis inside. The shopkeepers were able to phone the neighboring Somali shop, whose employees helped put out the fire with wet blankets before the stock went up in flames.

Township shopkeepers also consistently reported police negligence and even abuse. According to Somalis, the police consistently arrive hours after emergency calls are made and turn on their lights and sirens en route to warn thieves of their approach. In some cases, police officers are linked to the criminal gangs that target Somali shops. One official in a Somali organization reported that he had been beaten by police after he arrived at a shop that had just been robbed. A shopkeeper near Katlehong Location reported a story of police corruption that he had experienced during a previous stint as a shopkeeper in Tembisa:

> The criminals came and robbed while I was away. After six months they came back and robbed again. The police came to write the case number and the criminals were there outside the shop. They hid the loot, then came back and they had different clothes. So the police left, we caught the criminals … and took them to the police station … One policeman took me outside, said 'that's my brother. We'll pay you back for what they stole if you drop the case.' So we agreed … At the police station the biggest officer was an Indian, another policeman already told him about the case. So the Indian said even if you drop the case, this is the law, it must go through. The one who told was killed after that … the same police officer came to us and told me the policemen had fought because one was Xhosa and the other was Zulu … the police threatened us when the police case went to court. The night the case was there in court the shop was raided. (M., Somali, Tembisa)

Despite regular attacks from both the community and the police, Somalis continue to do business in the "locations". Accounts that examine only the xenophobic experiences of shopkeepers in the townships fail to take into account the other dimensions of this spatial business strategy that a majority of young Somali male immigrants in South Africa have experienced at some point during their stay in the country.

Embeddedness of "Location" Enterprises in the South African Context

The nature of the relationship between the tight-knight Somali community in Mayfair and the widely distributed Somali shops across informal settlements on the outskirts of Johannesburg and Pretoria begins to take shape through an assessment of the embeddedness of Somalis in townships and in Mayfair. Somali interviewees in the "locations" reported being in South Africa for about half as long as those in Mayfair: the average length of stay in South Africa for the 37 township shopkeepers who reported a date of arrival was 3.12 years, compared with 6.38 years for the 19 interviewees in Mayfair. Somali life in the townships is much more transient than that in Mayfair: whereas township shopkeepers reported an average of 13 months working in the current "location", those working in Mayfair had been working or residing in the city for an average of 30 months, more than twice as long. The "locations" are an entry point for recent arrivals fleeing Somalia, especially those who do not have strong family connections with prominent businessmen in Mayfair. 8 of the township shopkeepers reported that the shop where they were currently working was the only job they had held since their arrival in South Africa. Only one interviewee in Mayfair reported having worked only in Mayfair since his arrival, and most interviewees in Mayfair had worked in at least 3 or 4 "locations" prior to finding work, "retiring," or establishing their own enterprise on 8th Avenue (confirming Landau's [2009: 201] finding that the average number of moves for Johannesburg's Somali population was 3.8). The "locations", for the most part, reflected Bonacich's (1973) original theory that middleman minorities tend to retain distance from the communities in which they work: Somalis in the townships remained largely mobile and with few local connections.

"Location" shops in townships around Johannesburg reported sourcing their stock primarily from Somali and Indian wholesalers in Mayfair, Fordsburg, or Crown City, although some shops in Tembisa purchased stock from a Portuguese-run Savemore close by, and those in Atteridgeville often bought stock at a Somali cash and carry in Pretoria West. The majority of township businesses reported buying stock from multiple suppliers rather than one wholesaler, indicating that business networks between middleman firms and suppliers are less important in the Somali economy than the cost of goods on the open market. No shops reported buying primarily from the same supplier. Although Salama Cash and Carry near Mayfair is Somali-owned and run, the township entrepreneurs often expressed preference for Yarona, Makro, or Africa Cash & Carry. The connection between South African Indian and Somali financial networks in this regard appears to be less characterized by Islamic solidarity than by convenience of location and market niche, although one shopkeeper in Tembisa reported that after all his stock was stolen several months ago, an Indian wholesaler provided him with stock for free to help him get business started again.

While other accounts have highlighted the provision of Islamic finance to Somalis by South African Indians, respondents in "location" shops reported that startup capital came primarily from savings and joint ventures: after a year or two in the "locations", some shop owners had saved enough money to partner with friends or family members in purchasing a shop. Of 11 interviewees who specified the source of startup capital, only two had been financed by money brought or sent from Somalia. In one case an entrepreneur arranged for a plot of land in Somalia to be sold on his behalf, and the other said that he had acquired personal savings prior to leaving Somalia—both of these were

sent through *hawala* (informal Islamic financial transfers) to South Africa. The other 9 respondents said that the shop had been started with savings from working in other "locations" around South Africa. Thus there appears to be a significant circulation of Somali capital from township to township within South Africa despite a high degree of remittances back to Somalia and Kenya.

Employment, Income, and Remittances: Mayfair and the "Locations"

Contrary to media and popular perceptions that many Somalis in the townships start their own businesses, only 2 (5.1%) of 39 interviewees who provided their position were the sole owners of the shop in which they worked. 13 (33.3%) were partners in owning the shop, with the primary investor usually located in Mayfair or in the nearest town (i.e. in Pretoria for those in Atteridgeville and Mamelodi), although one shop in Atteridgeville was reportedly owned by an investor in Queenstown and several other shops had investors located in various parts of South Africa. 22 (56.4%) interviewees were employees and the remaining 2 of the 39 respondents were helping in township shops while waiting for an employment opportunity to come along. These helpers were interviewed when owners or employees were too busy to answer questions.

The average monthly income of the ten township shopkeepers who reported this figure was approximately R3,169, or about $412 US. Workers who were shareholders in the business reported earning an average of R6,000—twice as much as employees—although only three of the ten respondents fit into this category; more research needs to be done on comparative earnings. The average reported income of the 7 employees in the "locations" who reported the figure was R1956, much lower than the shareholders but

about the same or slightly higher than the one employee in Mayfair who reported his income. Average reported earnings in Mayfair were about $100 US more than in the "locations", at R3,985, or approximately $518 US. The interviewee classified as a "shop owner" reported making a significant amount of his income from his shop in Northwest province and was also employed in a managerial position in Mayfair. The two individuals who were self-employed in the service sector reported earning a significantly higher amount than employees in the "locations" or the employee or manager in Mayfair (see Table 2).

While due to the small sample size these trends require further substantiation before they are taken as concrete evidence of comparative earnings among Somalis, initial evidence and anecdotal reaffirmation of these trends points to a large share of economic benefits accruing to "location" shop owners and shareholders. *Spaza* shop enterprise in the townships appears to be a somewhat lucrative investment opportunity in relation to other options in South Africa.

Table 2. Average reported earnings of positions in the "locations" and Mayfair, 2011-2012

Employment type/location	N	Rand	USD
"Locations"	**10**	**3169.23**	**412.00**
Shareholders	3	6000.00	780.00
Employees	7	1956.04	254.29
Mayfair	**5**	**3984.62**	**518.00**
Shop owner	1	7500.00	975.00
Employee	1	1923.08	250.00
Self-employed (service sector)	2	4000.00	520.00
Manager	1	2500.00	325.00
Overall	**15**	**3441.03**	**447.33**

The reason behind the willingness of many township shopkeepers to work in a violently xenophobic environment is the desire to provide for families in Somalia or in Kenyan refugee camps. Of 22 township shopkeepers who were asked how often they send money to their families in their country of origin, 19 (86.4%) replied that they send money every month, two (9.1%) replied that they can only afford to send money occasionally, and one replied that his family was here in South Africa and he did not regularly send remittances internationally. The average amount remitted among the ten township shopkeepers who specified an amount was $167.50 US, or around 50% of the average income of these respondents. Two "location" shareholders and six "location" employees reported both an income and an amount remitted per month: the amount remitted was significantly higher for the two shareholders, who reported sending $275 per months; but the percentage remitted was higher for the employees, who reported sending an average of over 53% of their income compared to the shareholders' reported average of 40.4%. The highest reported remittance from the "locations" as a share of income was approximately 66% of the shopkeeper's monthly earnings, made possible by the provision of rent-free living and free food by the owners of "location" shops.

Employment type/location	n (amounts)	Amount remitted	n (percentages)	Percent remitted
"Locations"	**10**	**167.50**	**8**	**50.35**
Shareholders	3	275.00	2	40.38
Employees	7	121.43	6	53.68
Mayfair	**7**	**164.29**	**3**	**46.32**
Employees	2	250.00	1	80.00
Self-employed	3	158.33	1	12.82
Manager	2	137.50	1	46.15
Overall	**17**	**166.18**	**11**	**49.25**

Table 3. Reported remittances: amount and percentage of income

Some employees in Mayfair also sleep inside their place of employment, and restaurant workers receive free meals after the restaurant closes—this allowed one recent arrival in Mayfair to send approximately 80% of his income to his family members, who still reside near Mogadishu: "I just keep something small to eat, sometimes to buy new shoes, then I send all the rest" (A., Somali, Mayfair). Overall, the 7 respondents in Mayfair who provided data on income and remittances reported sending a similar numerical amount as those in the "locations", but this was a slightly lower percentage of the incomes of each (see Table 3).

As other immigrant groups have adopted the Somali strategy of township shopkeeping, certain "locations" have become more crowded and less profitable. For example, several shopkeepers in Tembisa indicated that the area used to contain predominantly Somali shops, but in the past several years Ethiopians and Bangladeshis had bought out Somali shops; the Somalis were willing to sell because a proliferation of township shops made the "location" less profitable. One shopkeeper told me that the Bangladeshis and Ethiopians were willing to work for less money because they did not dedicate as much of their incomes to remittances. Whatever the case, I asked shopkeepers and Somalis in Mayfair who had previously worked in the "locations" whether the more dangerous "locations" were also the more profitable. Although there seemed to be no general consensus on this, some shopkeepers suggested that the more dangerous "locations" were more profitable due to the lack of competition from other immigrant shops in these spaces. Taking the three locations with the highest danger index calculated as described above, I compared the average danger index, the highest index reported by a

shop in each “location”, the average attacks per month reported by shops in this “location”, the average income reported by all workers and by employees (Table 4).

The only three “locations” for which a danger index as well as at least one employee income had been reported were Atteridgeville, Soweto and Thokoza. While the two shops providing data in Soweto yielded the highest average danger index at 8.58, both the highest danger index for a single shop and the highest average number of attacks per month for all shops in a “location” were recorded in Thokoza. As the average number of attacks per month in the “location” increased between the three cases, the average employee income did as well. Again, larger samples must be collected to provide statistical significance to this trend. However, the initial indication is that the more dangerous “locations” may yield higher incomes to employees—the incomes reported by the two employees surveyed in Thokoza were twice that reported by the employee surveyed in Atteridgeville. The employee in Atteridgeville had been working in his current shop for the same length of time as one of the employees in Thokoza and for a shorter time than the other employee in Thokoza, and had been in South Africa longer than both of the employees in Thokoza. This suggests that the more recent arrivals from Somalia may be taking higher risks but also earning more money in the “locations” than more seasoned “locations” veterans that have not been able to accumulate enough capital to start their own shop. Furthermore, the dangerous “locations” may be more profitable due to lower competition. Indications that shareholders in Thokoza earned more on average than those in Soweto suggest this as probable.

Location	Average danger index	Highest danger index	Average attacks per month	Average income (USD)	Average employee income (USD)
Atteridgeville	1.25	8.08	0.21	150	150
Soweto	4.34	8.58	0.23	425.71	258
Thokoza	2.34	9.35	0.26	475	300

Table 4. Measures of danger levels and average reported income for selected locations

III. 8th Avenue: The Somali Ethnic Enclave

As an ethnic neighborhood, Mayfair has been conceptualized as "a migrant trading space" with "at least 60 Somali owned or operated businesses and a Somali shopping mall which also has a branch in Nairobi [Amal Shopping Centre]" (Jinnah 2011: 92). Characterizations point to high self-employment rates and a significant role for remittances and transnational flows in shaping a distinctly Somali space with primarily Somali customers (Krause-Vilmar & Chaffin 2011). At the same time and often in the same literature, researchers point to indicators of poverty among the Somalis of Mayfair: "44.1 percent of Somalis share a room with four to six people and 38.17 percent share with 7 to 30 people…. A third of Somalis surveyed lived in hostels or boarding houses, compared to 13 percent of other migrants" (Krause-Vilmar 2011: 14). A relatively large number of Somali residents in Mayfair are unemployed or occasionally employed, having fled the "locations" following bouts of ethnic violence. For example, one unemployed interviewee related his experience in the "locations":

> I've been working in two different shops, and both of them they killed other guys …. one in Mamelodi, Pretoria, and one in Randfontein, Johannesburg. I saw that problem, I left the job and came to Mayfair. I am scared to work there, I don't have a job at the moment (M.I., Somali, Mayfair).

Conflicting conceptualizations of Mayfair in parallel with the relative success of Somali entrepreneurs and "location" shopkeepers in South Africa suggest the importance of a more critical examination of this migrant space and the local context in which it is embedded. Is Mayfair simply an area where wounded and scared Somalis band together for survival after running from xenophobia in the townships? A self-imposed refugee camp where Somalis wait until the government is reestablished in the Horn? Or is this a space of work that creates possibilities and opportunities for social and economic mobility for the Somali community?

The preliminary indications shown by the types of work engaged in by interviewees and the average incomes of those in the "locations" and in Mayfair point to the spatial concentration in Mayfair as a beneficial economic arrangement rather than simply a social or residential agglomeration. Mayfair appears in many respects to fit classic conditions of the "ethnic enclave economy" theorized through research on Cubans in Miami (Portes & Bach 1985). Ethnic enclaves are characterized by a spatial concentration of firms entailing economic diversification and the development of a differentiated class of entrepreneurs; in the context of Miami, Portes and his colleagues (Portes & Bach 1985; Portes & Jensen 1987) argued that this spatial concentration entails advantages for the self-employed and a space for upward mobility of entrepreneurs. Mayfair fits certain aspects of this definition but also pushes us to particularize our conceptualization of the spatial and social formation of ethnic enclaves in the African context.

The spatial concentration of Somali firms in Mayfair has evolved from both the presence of an established Muslim community and a combination of labor market

segmentation and labor market exclusion. Following the end of apartheid, a significant gap exists between the largely white-dominated economy of the northern suburbs and the black-dominated informal sector involving small, medium, and survivalist enterprises (Murray 2011; Rogerson 1996). Uneducated Somalis have little chance for education and thus find themselves forced into the informal sector of *spaza* shops, as indicated above. A number of Somalis in Mayfair have higher education levels than the majority of black South Africans and were previously employed as teachers, journalists, accountants, or a range of other middle-class positions in Somalia, yet as immigrants find themselves excluded from these higher-level positions. Upon their entry into South Africa, Somalis found firstly that their documents were often not sufficient to secure formal employment, and secondly, that options for informal or semi-formal labor often entailed low-level jobs in manufacturing or manual labor.

One woman interviewed in Mayfair worked sewing duvets for a Pakistani firm in Mayfair beginning in the mid-1990s; however, many Somalis preferred to start their own businesses, a relatively common phenomenon among certain immigrant populations (Waldinger et al., 1990). Some of those Somalis that started out hawking in the townships saved enough money to eventually move to Mayfair and start their own business. The lower frequency of moves and longer length of residence in South Africa among interviewees in Mayfair, combined with the prevalence of interviewees in Mayfair having spent a number of months or years working in the "locations", point to an enclave with dynamics that differ from those that have been investigated in the Global North. Rather than moving directly into the enclave to find employment opportunities, Somali immigrants with relatively low education levels come to Mayfair and are hired to work as

middleman retailers in the "locations", during which time they receive entrepreneurial training and save money that allows them to start their own shop in the "locations", and then possibly move to Mayfair and begin to diversify business. This is largely dependent of course on whether they survive the "locations" or are able to keep their savings from being stolen while working there. The 8th Avenue enclave does provide a limited number of employment opportunities for recent immigrants with strong family connections to well-established members of the South African Somali community or with marketable skills such as knowledge of computers and fluency in English. However, even many Somalis with skills must run the gauntlet of the "locations" prior to finding employment in Mayfair.

Mayfair is the site of an increasingly diverse Somali economy. While nearly all "location" shops surveyed were *spaza* shops selling groceries and daily necessities to poor black South Africans, the Mayfair economy has numerous types of firms catering to the Somali community and created by a class of entrepreneurs who in some cases move to South Africa from Europe or the US in order to do business, as well as self-employment opportunities that often involve transport or informal real estate speculation (see Table 5). One of the first internet cafés on 8th Avenue was partially financed by a Somali Kenyan with a Master's in Public Health from a university in the UK. He moved to Mayfair in 2005 with the goal of creating innovative businesses. His internet café has now opened multiple branches and with profits from the internet cafés, he has begun building other businesses, such as a Laundromat, and seeking joint investments in other sectors. Reflecting the dynamics of the Cuban enclave in Miami (Portes & Jensen 1987), this entrepreneur and others of his socioeconomic class prefer to live outside the enclave.

The Somali economy of the "locations" has created specific opportunities in Mayfair and firmly established Mayfair as the primary node of flows of capital along Somali ethnic networks in South Africa and beyond through at least three interconnected processes. Firstly, the safety of 8th Avenue amid the danger of the "locations" has created an industry surrounding housing both for displaced "location" shopkeepers and for shopkeepers who regularly visit town for social purposes and to escape temporarily from the hardships of "location" life. Often within these lodges or close to them are leisure areas such as lounges and hookah bars lined with comfortable seating; one lodge on 8th Avenue recently purchased several pool tables and converted two former sleeping quarters into a space where competitive pool tournaments are played weekly. Of the permanent residents of hostels on 8th Avenue, some are unemployed former *spaza* shop employees relying on remittances from family members in the US or Europe, but others are young single men who prefer to spend as little as possible on housing in order to send a significant amount of their income as remittance to their families in the Horn of Africa.

Type of employment	Mayfair		"Locations"		Total	
Spaza/tuck shop/supermarket	1	5.88%	39	90.70%	40	66.67%
Retail	1	5.88%	3	6.98%	4	6.67%
Enclave employee	2	11.76%	0	0.00%	2	3.33%
Owner/manager of enclave business	3	17.65%	0	0.00%	3	5.00%
Self-employed (service sector)	6	35.29%	0	0.00%	6	10.00%
Owner of township shop, residing in enclave	2	11.76%	0	0.00%	2	3.33%
Unemployed	2	11.76%	0	0.00%	2	3.33%
Other	0	0.00%	1	2.33%	1	1.67%
Total	17		43		60	

Table 5. Types of firms/occupations surveyed in Mayfair and the "locations"

Thus the prevalence of shared living quarters suggested as an indicator of poverty by the Women's Refugee Commission survey (Krause-Vilmar & Chaffin 2011) may indeed be an indication of poverty in some instances, but also points to a culture of transience, remittances, and strong social ties.

Secondly, the profitability of township shops has given rise to an industry of exclusively Somali self-employed real estate speculators: "shop-flippers" and negotiators who either buy township shops and resell them to Somali investors or find owners who wish to sell their shops and serve as a middleman in negotiations over price, taking a cut of the final transfer. Three of 19 interviewees in Mayfair were involved in this type of activity. All three had significant experience in "location" shops around South Africa. Flipping "location" shops involves not only local connections, but transnational ties as well: the three businessmen interviewed in this sector said that they sell shops not only in Gauteng, but across South Africa, and that investors sometimes contact them from abroad seeking to invest in a "location" *spaza* shop. Entrepreneurship in this sector of Somali real estate speculation is risky and often involves long waits between transactions, but appears to generate more income than employment in a location shop: "Maybe I can get 3000 per month, but it comes all at one time. Today and tomorrow maybe I don't get a cent" (M.O., Somali, Mayfair).

Third, many investors and owners of "location" shops reside in the safety of Mayfair and make significant profits from the township locations, providing them with money to spend in Mayfair that leads to the growth of other Somali industries in the enclave. One interviewee who resides in Mayfair had spent 8 years in Norway prior to arriving in South Africa in 2004. With about $6,000 US, he bought his own shop in

Kayelitsha, Eastern Cape. Over the next three years he bought three different shops, employing some of his cousins. After his shop was looted and he fled during a bout of xenophobic violence, he began working in a Somali *spaza* shop near Plettenburg Bay, eventually saving enough money to buy the shop for $8,000 US. He still owns this shop and lives comfortably in Mayfair on the profits he receives, and also receives some remittances from his mother and sister in Sweden. With his savings he was able to bring his wife and children to Mayfair. A significant number of the seemingly jobless refugees in Mayfair have similar stories and make their livings as investors in township shops.



Figure 4. The Somali ethnic enclave: 8th Avenue, Mayfair

Other profitable businesses have arisen in response to the spatial concentration of Somalis along 8th Avenue. Many Somali men engage daily in chewing *miraa* (qat), and on weekends township shopkeepers often take turns spending a day in Mayfair chewing. This has led to a plethora of competing *miraa* dealers, purchasing the plant stalks from various farms around South Africa as well as importing stalks from Kenya. The varying

quality of *miraa* means that the unemployed often buy lower-quality stalks that cost about R 25 per bunch, while the richer Somalis can afford to spend R 50 to R 100 on higher-quality plants grown in other locations, or even up to several hundred rand for *miraa* from Kenya. This has led to market diversity and several spatial areas in which plants of a certain quality are sold.

Finally, as Jinnah (2010) points out, Amal—the Somali shopping center between 8th Avenue and Central Avenue on the east side of the Somali enclave—is a significant node of a transnational Somali network and a space that caters specifically to the Somali population in South Africa. Amal offers a space in which many Somali women are employed in selling cultural goods and clothing targeted for Somalis. While shops inside Amal are run by both men and women, the visibility of female entrepreneurs in this site points to a gender dynamic in the Somali ethnic economy in which women have relatively few employment opportunities because they are largely excluded from the "location" economy, although some Somali women have worked in the "locations". Women in these shops appear to be well-established in South Africa and also draw on overseas connections. Several Somali women are also owners of restaurants or lodges along 8th Avenue. Thus while the bulk of the Somali population and the vast majority of the township economy is composed of men who have left their families behind in Somalia or Kenya or whose families have been relocated while they were abroad, the 8th Avenue Somali enclave provides a space that facilitates somewhat limited opportunities for Somali women, who generally refuse to engage in the service economy or survivalist enterprises in which female immigrants of other nationalities are employed.

Framing the Somali-dominated area along 8th Avenue as an ethnic enclave provides fertile ground for further empirical examination of the dynamics of the Somali economy. Although detractors from the enclave hypothesis might point to the significant levels of unemployment and underemployment among Somalis in the enclave, it remains to conduct a more in-depth comparative study of the income levels and relative wages inside and outside the enclave, and also compare employment levels between the Somali ethnic economy and the broader South African economy.

Downsides of the Somali Ethnic Economy

Although, in general, employees in Mayfair seemed to view their employers as socially responsible investors and had good relations with their employers, interview evidence suggests that competition between employees for positions in Mayfair has contributed to a degree of labor exploitation. The social obligation of remitting combined with higher rents and higher food prices than in the "locations" prevents some employees in the enclave from branching out into their own entrepreneurial activity. Scared to venture (back) to the "locations", these workers become trapped in a limited opportunity structure on 8th Avenue. Somalis' keeping largely to themselves and building mostly intra-community linkages creates a negative reception for non-professional Somalis who wish to seek employment elsewhere, although some opportunities exist with the Indian, Ethiopian, and Chinese communities if the appropriate connections can be established. As an example of underutilized human capital, a former teacher with a certificate in ICT and relatively extensive knowledge of computers manages an internet café on 8th Avenue, whereas his skills would be much better utilized as a teacher of computer training

classes—but there is little demand within the Somali community for computer training classes, and the formal computer schools are unwilling to hire refugees.

The clan structure has also persisted and creates fractures within the ethnic economy despite a re-shaping of Somali ethnic identity in diaspora. While people regularly express pan-Somali nationalist sentiments, interview results indicate that the "location" economy in particular is shaped largely along clan lines. Township shopkeepers were asked their origins and the origins of the others working in the shop. While it was not deemed proper in all circumstances to ask interviewees their clan identity, the hometown of the employees is fairly indicative of their clan origins, although less so of the subclan family. Of 23 "location" shops that identified a place of origin for multiple employees or owners and employees, 17 (74%) were characterized either by expressed family/clan relationships or by a common place of origin. Some of the shopkeepers had known each other in Somalia before leaving and were reunited in South Africa. Others had a brother who arrived in South Africa before them and provided them with a job in the "locations" when they arrived. The typical process described for a "location" shopkeeper was finding family or clan members in Mayfair upon arrival in South Africa and seeking a job in a "location" shop owned by these family members. In many cases this involves an extended stay in Mayfair to wait for a job to open up. If this is not affordable, recent arrivals may stay with a family member or a friend in a shop in the "locations" as volunteer help—they are provided with food and a place to stay, and will eventually be hired either by the owner of the shop (often to work in another shop under the same ownership), by a neighboring shop, or by a friend of the owner. Of the 34 shops surveyed, 7 had a nonemployee helper staying with them and assisting.

IV. Synthesis

South Africans and Somalis both recognize to some degree the benefits that Somali entrepreneurship in the "locations" is bringing to the impoverished residents of South Africa's townships.[13] The Somalis have successfully adopted and solidified control over a large middleman niche in South Africa's economy that connects South African wholesalers in the city with buyers in the "locations" in a way that benefits both. At the same time, locally-run *spaza* shops have been driven out of business in the process, limiting employment opportunities for blacks in the townships and in part creating the xenophobic violence that threatens the lives of Somalis working in the "locations". Furthermore, increasing competition between immigrant groups in the townships may benefit the local community by lowering prices, but it nevertheless reflects the exploitation of township blacks by immigrants. Although largely fitting the concept of middleman minorities as having "few intrinsic ties to the social structures and social relations of the local communities in which they conduct economic activities" (Zhou 2004: 1042), Somalis in the townships do engage in some forms of social responsibility that provide benefits to their local communities. Recognizing that problems in Somalia may not allow their return home for some time yet, Somalis have in some cases invested in township youth education and social programs: several township shopkeepers reported assisting local families with school fees, and in some cases groups of Somalis working in a particular township had pooled money to support sports programs in the township. These practices point to a small degree of social embeddedness in the "locations". The

[13] Mzwanele Mkalipi, op. cit.

social aspects of Somalis' navigation of "location" spaces ought to be more fully elucidated in order to understand the possibilities these hold for mitigating xenophobic violence.

Within the Somali community itself, the social capital that facilitates employment and transfers of startup capital appears to contain a mix of consummatory and instrumental motivations (see Portes 1998). On the one hand, interviewees in the townships reported giving money to individuals to help them start shops and many interviewees report giving money to those in need as part of Islamic charity. This is certainly a very easily observable tendency in the Somali community: as they say, the Somalis take care of themselves. On the other hand, this functions as a way of spreading risk and ensuring a safety net if xenophobic violence does arise and threaten the livelihoods of shopkeepers and entrepreneurs, at which time Somalis will call on those who they have given money to, looking for some help in return. Furthermore, the social connections that facilitate the provision of jobs in the township to newly arrived immigrants benefit those searching for work and income with which to make a life or remit to their families, but on the other hand appear to benefit the investors more than the shopkeepers.

The existence of a class of investors who own township shops and hire others to work for them highlights a somewhat problematic dichotomous class structure within the Somali community, reflecting a difference in life chances and vulnerability for these refugees depending largely on clan networks and economic status. Vulnerable recent arrivals whose families in Somalia are in need are put at risk by working in the townships, and as suggested above, there are indications that with increased danger

comes increased profits, possibly pushing the most desperate into extremely difficult circumstances. The danger that comes with this job is on the one hand accepted as a part of life in South Africa, and on the other, contributes to disillusionment that drives some young men back to Somalia: Several former township shopkeepers expressed the sentiment that "it's better I die there in my home than here in South Africa." The overall profitability of the ethnic economy has thus far primarily derived from Somalis' willingness to take the risk of working in the "locations". After all, it's safer and more lucrative currently than life in Mogadishu. But increasing opportunities in Mayfair may lead a segment of the capitalists to shift into different sectors as competition in the "locations" continues to increase. This analysis has shown that while the Somali economy in the townships benefits local communities in certain ways and creates connections across Gauteng's fragmented landscape, it also contributes to the partitioning of space within Johannesburg through the creation of an exclusive enclave that provides a safe haven from interaction with "xenophobic" South Africans. This is a subject to which I will turn in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4: Ethical Understandings of Immigrant Territorial Control in Johannesburg

A Comparative Study of Three Inner-City Zones

I. Background, Methods and Interviews

The complexities of immigrant economic and social contributions as well as their perceived partitioning of inner-city spaces in Johannesburg in the interest of security (as in the case of Mayfair, explored above) lead to an exploratory examination of how the appropriation of urban spaces by immigrants and the contributions of these immigrants to South African society are perceived from an ethical standpoint by both locals and immigrants themselves. As explored in Chapter 2, South Africa is a rather unique setting in which to theorize about immigration ethics: only in the past 20 years has the bulk of the population been permitted to participate in the full political and economic processes, and many of the promises of the ANC to generate economic benefits for the impoverished black population living on the country's urban peripheries have yet to be fulfilled. In some ways it is perhaps understandable that certain elements of the population react so violently to successful foreign-run businesses in this context, and indeed some immigrants recognize this. As I argued in Chapter 2, ethical approaches to immigration and the "rights to the city" must take into account the specific territories in which immigrant livelihoods are played out, the strategies utilized within these specific spaces, and the relationship that these spaces both embody and engender between foreigners and locals. Chapter 3 presented an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of one immigrant group's efforts to secure a space for livelihood in South Africa. The fact that among other outcomes of Somali economic practices is a tight-knit ethnic enclave that

(whatever the motivations of the Somali community) serves to limit interactions with black South Africans, indicates the necessity of examining local ethical understandings of this type of immigrant space and how it affects broader perceptions of immigrants in South Africa. In seeking to secure spaces for themselves, immigrants may be reinforcing the reactions against them that necessitate the securitization of immigrant territories in the first place, undermining the long-run efficacy of pursuing an integration strategy based on deep embeddedness with immediate physical spaces and shallower embeddedness in the accompanying social spaces.

This chapter aims to fill a gap in understandings of specific territorial practices of immigrant groups and how these practices (and their accompanying appropriation and transformation of the built environment) affect ethical understandings of integration in the city. The environment of the city should push us to reexamine state-centered notions of immigration ethics, as the high-rises, abandoned alleyways, inner-city ghettos, and bustling sidewalks defy simplistic conceptions of state territoriality. Despite the large amount of literature on xenophobia, very little has been done to investigate immigrant conceptions of belonging and views on why they should be accepted in South African society from an explicitly ethical standpoint.

Departing from the image of "xenophobic South Africans" and "vulnerable foreigners," I begin with research on the spatial practices of various groups. A spatial approach shows the areas in which rather than simply floating above the South African state (Landau, 2009), immigrants are creating spaces of belonging and nodes of interaction with the South African community—but simultaneously, through their concrete appropriation and growing embeddedness in certain spaces, driving a degree of

division within the city. This study is largely exploratory and is based on interviews with 41 immigrants, 13 locals, and 6 migrant community organizations. I aim to show (1) the ways in which immigrants have navigated the built environment to organize their territorial strategies in different parts of the city; (2) how these different spaces shape interactions between foreigners and locals as well as perceptions of the ethics of these interactions; and (3) how these local ethics fit into a general understanding of the relationship between the state, the media, and immigrants in South Africa. As international migrants and citizens converge more and more on urban spaces, understandings of local territorial ethics and interactions should shape state policy rather than vice-versa.

Methodology

Based on previous experience in Johannesburg, three immigrant-dominated business areas in the inner city were selected for the study: 8th Avenue in Mayfair—the economic dynamics of which I began to explore in Chapter 2; Jeppe Street, an Ethiopian-dominated business enclave characterized by multi-story shopping centers and bustling sidewalk trade carried out by immigrants from various countries; and Yeoville, a mixed business and residential neighborhood with an eclectic mix of nationalities, including high populations of immigrants from Zimbabwe and from West Africa, characterized by mixed street trade and formal storefront shops. One month of site reconnaissance was conducted in August 2011 with a view to understanding the business dynamics of each area as well as relations between immigrant and local groups in each of these three zones. During this time connections were developed with each of the communities and an

approach was developed based partly on the issues that the different immigrant communities reported to be experiencing, such as police corruption, problems with legal documentation, and exclusion from local opportunity structures of employment and mobility. Following site reconnaissance, interviews were conducted with four key stakeholder organizations that represent immigrants in each of the three study areas, as well as two umbrella organizations that provide a forum through which more ethnically and geographically specific organizations relate to the South African press and the city government. These interviews attempted to gain an understanding of the activities in which immigrant organizations in Johannesburg are engaged and how this related to the business and territorial concerns of immigrant populations.

Finally, interviews were conducted with individuals in each of the three study areas, with a focus on immigrants and locals engaged in business, although some interviewees were only occasionally employed and several (particularly in the Jeppe area) were engaged only in temporary trade in Johannesburg related to their businesses in other South African cities. These individuals were included because they represented the networks of trade that intersect in these localities and possibly have a more nuanced view, and also because these individuals (who were intimately familiar with this space from years of experience and former employment here) were willing to offer more insight into the dynamics at work in the complex environment of the Ethiopian business enclave.



Figure 5. Study areas, central Johannesburg

Questionnaires were open-ended and provided room for significant variation in responses. Research on immigrant organizations focused on the activities these organizations are engaged in, organizational engagement with local government, and the ethical perspectives of the organization regarding territorial control and immigrant business in Johannesburg. Individual immigrant entrepreneurs were questioned regarding their reason for migrating to South Africa, their experience of inclusion or exclusion in South Africa, their perspectives on the state and local governments, the police force, and the media, and their ethical perspectives on xenophobia and inclusion in South Africa. South African locals were asked similar questions regarding their experience with immigrants, their ethical perspectives on the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants, and

the relationship between immigrants, the state, the city, the police, and the media. Due to the controversial subject of the research and the vulnerability of some participants, as in the previous Chapter confidentiality has been insured and thus no specific names of individuals or organizations will be provided.

The open-ended and exploratory nature of the questions asked does not lend itself easily to statistical analysis, but answers to certain questions were coded to reflect the general nature of the response. For instance, while immigrant entrepreneurs often shared stories of their experiences in South Africa when asked, these responses were interpreted and divided into the general categories "good," "bad," "some good, some bad," "okay but difficult," and "just business" in order to convey an overview of the variety of experiences. Selected responses are broken down by neighborhood in the results section of this chapter. Perhaps more relevant are the stories of immigrant experiences and individual responses given to questions; thus an analysis of some of these stories and answers is provided following the general overview of responses.

Interview Results

Because of the focus on areas in the city controlled by East African immigrants, and particularly the Somali and Ethiopian business enclaves, these populations made up a significant proportion of those interviewed. The bulk of interviewees was from Southern Africa (26 interviews; 48.2%) and East Africa (23 interviews; 42.6%) with only two interviewees hailing from West Africa (Cameroon and Nigeria), two from Central Africa (DRC and Uganda), and one from Bangladesh. A majority (56.1%) of interviewees were forced migrants who had fled their country of origin because of political problems or

insecurity, and the second-largest category was economic migrants looking for employment (24.4%). Interviewees represented a wide variety of activities in the city: 7 (17%) were street vendors; 5 (12.2%) were store owners; 7 were employed in wage labor in the service sector; 9 (22%) were personally employed in service jobs including informal cross-border trade, human trafficking, and drug trade. The majority of Ethiopians interviewed (5 interviewees, 12.2% of the total) were employed in retail positions or owners of retail stores.

Overall, the majority (53.7%) of respondents who shared their experiences in South Africa saw life in the country as a mix of good and bad experiences, with a larger minority reporting "good" experiences (14.6%) than "bad" (7.3%). Several respondents offered a short response indicating that their experience here was "just business" (14.6%). The only interviewees who responded that life in South Africa was generally "bad" were located in Mayfair, and all were Somalis who had fled from violent events in the "locations". When asked whether they felt excluded by South Africans and South African institutions, respondents were nearly equally divided between categories of "yes," "no," and "sometimes"; 50% of interviewees in Mayfair reported feeling excluded, while 50% of those in Yeoville reported not ever feeling excluded, and in Jeppe Street the majority fell into the "sometimes" category. 31% of respondents felt that their community had a good relationship with the South African community, with 50% of respondents in Yeoville falling into this category. The largest group in Mayfair (36.4%) felt that they had a bad relationship with the South African community.

Interviewees were asked whether they thought there were well-defined territorial areas for immigrant groups in the city. 54.6% of respondents in Mayfair answered that

there were; while 36.4% of respondents in the Jeppe Street area and none of the respondents in Yeoville fell into this category. A majority of respondents felt that immigrant communities had a good relationship with the South African government (56.1%) but a majority also felt that immigrants had a bad relationship with the police (also 56.1%). When asked what methods were best for protecting immigrants in Johannesburg, respondents offered a wide variety of answers which I classified into several categories. The largest group said that they did not know (24.4%), followed by a group emphasizing high-level politics (19.5%, mostly consisting of refugees in Mayfair) and local political action (17%). Interestingly, over a third of the responses in Yeoville pointed to the need for better territorial organization of spaces for trade that were protected from police interference. As the least organized and most diverse trading space, Yeoville appeared to be an easier target for police crackdowns on informal traders than either 8th Avenue or Jeppe/Delvers Street.

II. Study Site 1: 8th Avenue, Mayfair

Although I have already attempted to uncover some of the economic dynamics at work in the Somali ethnic enclave along 8th Avenue, I return here to an assessment of ethical views and interactions between Somalis and South Africans in this space as well as a (slightly) more complete description of the built environment that has been occupied and revitalized by the Somalis. 8th Avenue is a fairly quiet residential street one block south of Central Avenue, the main road running from the CBD through Fordsburg and Mayfair. During the last decades of apartheid rule South African Indians began to move into the area by buying houses through white proxies, and by the early 1980s a significant South

African Indian Muslim population dominated the area, partially drawn by the significant Indian business sector in Fordsburg led by Oriental Plaza, a mall established in the 1970s. As outlined in Chapter 3, by the 1990s a significant Somali population began to settle in Mayfair.

Although formerly primarily a residential zone, 8th Avenue has become a mixed residential and business area since the arrival of the Somalis, who began to renovate houses and construct hostels to house the large number of young single Somali workers who came to South Africa to engage in "location" business in the townships. The growth of the Somali population facilitated the establishment of a Somali shopping center, Amal, which takes up a large portion of the block between Central Avenue and 8th Avenue on Somerset Street. Businesses in Amal sell ethnic goods to the immigrant community, importing spices, clothes, music, books, and other wares from Somalia and Kenya and the Arabian Peninsula. Amal Shopping Center is one branch of an international management structure that includes a Somali shopping center in Dubai and another in Nairobi. Although predominantly filled with Somali shops, Amal also contains some South Asian electronics retailers.

Chapter 3 indicated the high concentration of Somalis on 8th Avenue and the prevalence of Somali businesses in this enclave. The conclusions regarding the partitioning of space by the Somali ethnic economy as well as the benefits and drawbacks of participation in the enclave economy were suggested; I now shift to questions regarding Somali and local perceptions of experiences and social relationships within South Africa that generate this type of space and understandings of economic and social

contributions to South Africa that take place within this space. These may serve as building blocks in constructing a perspective on immigrant rights to urban space.

Inclusion and Exclusion: Perspectives from Mayfair

Due to a higher level of trust and more familiarity with the immigrant community in Mayfair than in the other study sites, nearly all of those approached agreed to participate in an interview. 27 interviews were conducted on 8th Avenue and the surrounding area, including 5 local South Africans and 22 immigrants: 16 from Somalia and Ethiopia, 2 from Malawi, and one each from Kenya, Mozambique, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Many immigrants interviewed had worked in Mayfair for a relatively short time—2.8 years on average—although one Somali informant had lived in the neighborhood for 16 years. Corroborating the results of Chapter 2, almost all interviewees reported having previously worked elsewhere in South Africa (for the Somali respondents, mostly in the "locations"): the 16 interviewees who reported both the length of time they had lived in Mayfair and the length of time they had stayed in South Africa had spent on average less than half (43.8%) of their time in South Africa working in Mayfair. The majority (59%) were political refugees, while 22% said they had come to South Africa for economic reasons—to look for "greener pastures" in the words of one self-employed "transporter" (S.H., Somali, Mayfair).

Only one interviewee in Mayfair reported having a "good" experience in South Africa, with the largest group (9 individuals; 41%) expressing a more moderate "some good, some bad" and 8 interviewees (36%) saying that life in South Africa was bad or hard. This reflects the fact that several interviewees had been shot while working in the

"locations" and nearly half of them had been violently robbed—in some cases multiple times—during their time in South Africa. One Somali interviewee had been shot six times while working in a "location" *spaza* shop near East London. Another respondent pointed to the vulnerability of immigrants: "in one way it's nice, another way it's not nice: you can make business and it's a better life than in Somalia. But not nice because you can lose everything in one night" (S., Somali, Mayfair). Some Somalis pointed to the lack of alternatives, as South Africa offers the best economic opportunities in Africa and also accepts Somali refugees and asylum-seekers. A Somali who was self-employed in transporting goods and people across borders described the migration from Somalia to South Africa as "out of the fire, into the frying pan."

50% of the interviewees (56% of Somali interviewees) reported feeling excluded by South Africans and South African institutions. A large component of this for Somali and Ethiopian forced migrants was corruption in the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), where one informant reported receiving only 6-month asylum status papers despite his official entitlement to documents that permit a two-year stay. He described being offered a 4-year paper for R 1,000 upon his most recent visit to DHA in Pretoria. Apart from issues over documents, some Somalis expressed gratitude to the South African government for providing shelter for them: "South Africa gives Somalis status—I thank them for that and I really appreciate that. But the citizens have no relationship" (S.H., Somali, Mayfair). 8 respondents (36.4%) agreed that the relationship between South African communities and immigrants was bad, while 41% indicated that there was at least a decent relationship in general between South Africans and immigrants. When asked about violence in the townships respondents pointed out that it was not the whole

population that was xenophobic, but only certain elements—usually unemployed men and business competitors.

The violence experienced by Somalis in the townships would seem to generate a higher level of feelings of exclusion or more feeling that relationships between the South African and Somali communities were "bad." Most former township entrepreneurs had very nuanced views of these relationships. One informant had previously lost his "location" shop in Northwest Province after a gang attacked it. Rather than express anger at the group that robbed his shop and led to his business failure, he joined their gang and reports that he was treated like family by his new South African brothers:

> The thing that forced me to join was like the South Africans they used to make me like I must have pain always… sleep with the pain, because they robbed me many times. My brothers, not only me—they robbed many people…. Since I joined them I used to survive hard, to survive like I am now South African.... There was another guy called B., that was now my best friend who made me I must join this group, and he was the one who used to like me more than others…. They used to know me but no one was treating me like a Somali guy…. They used to like me! That guy I can cry now when I remember it. My brothers they didn't like me, for example because I was in a bad situation, but that guy… his mother, his sisters, everyone—I was like his young brother…. They used to give me everything! Clothes, whatever, but I was also taking clothes the way you know, like when I see like someone who is wearing the new clothes, I can take it, you see…. We are living like we are another people who don't have rights, you see. They are treating you like… dogs was better than us! … That's why I say like now, the way this things is going now it is better I must join the groups…. I made themselves like they must like me more than anyone else, you see. (A.F., Somali, Mayfair)

After his involvement with hard drugs and participation in violent crime, the interviewee's cousin-brother found him and at the time of the interview was sending him (willingly) back to Somalia. A.F. expressed his frustration with life in South Africa and his hope of finding a better life in Somalia:

> I know everything in this life. Bad things. All. I did finish now. It's only the good things remain for me you see now… to be with the mom…. the way I tell you I

> was not a bad guy, but now I make myself bad, you see, because of this life that you see here in South Africa for foreigners was not good. (A.F., Somali, Mayfair)

A.F. reported that when he joined the gang, they stopped robbing Somali and Ethiopian shops in the township and began protecting them while making a living from robbing individuals in surrounding areas at night rather than targeting immigrants. He also said that his South African friends were now like brothers to the Somali shopkeepers in the area of Potchefstroom, and had promised him that they would protect the Somali *spaza* shops after he left. His cousin said that the other Somali shopkeepers around Potchefstroom were somewhat scared that relations with the South African community would decline after A.F. returned to Somalia.

After working in impoverished townships with a large population of uneducated South Africans, several Somalis were sympathetic to the local sentiments and understood where the drive to exclude foreigners was coming from: "The people don't understand why you are here, what you are doing for them here. It's understandable that they try to exclude you, but not right" (A.C., Somali, Mayfair). A higher number and percentage of interviewees in Mayfair than in Jeppe or Yeoville said when asked about their ethical views on exclusion that it is ethical for South Africans to try to keep immigrants out if they so desire. Several interviewees were of an opinion that said it would be fine for the state to exclude immigrants, but it was not good for the state to accept refugees on the one hand and for the population to kill them on the other. One interviewee said that immigrants should be kept out, adopted a line of argument similar to that of many South Africans:

> To be honest, immigrants are not good for South Africans. Immigrants bring evil. All smugglers, drug dealers, etc. are all foreigners. When immigrants go to

> America or the UK, they can't do what they're doing here. Corruption among immigrants should be stopped. (S.H., Somali, Mayfair)

Another Somali agreed that exclusion can be ethical, but took a different approach: "Yes, it's fine. It's better for people who have a government to go home" (I.M., Somali, Mayfair). Pointing to the difficulty in categorizing responses, one interviewee argued similarly that the reason exclusion is unethical is because "Somalis have no government—nowhere to go. If there is peace in Somalia, Somalis will go back" (S.C., Somali, Mayfair).

Local Views from Mayfair

Of the three South African interviewees who said that they felt excluded in foreign-dominated areas, two were working just west of the Somali enclave, on 8th Avenue. Three of the five interviewees (60%) reported a bad experience with foreigners. One welder who had been working in Johannesburg for 36 years said that immigrants only bring bad things: "cocain, drugs. All of them—they bring bad things to South Africa" (B.A., South African, Mayfair). For this interviewee and one other, the solution to South Africa's problems was that immigrants should leave the country. One of the South African street vendors working on 8th Avenue pointed to conflicts within the foreign communities as a reason for them to leave: "Yes, they must go—they're even fighting themselves" (S.S., South African, Mayfair). His business partner held the opposite view: "the relationship is good: we try to share with them, they try to learn our language…. I don't want to keep immigrants out" (S.P., South African, Mayfair). At the same time, this interviewee indicated that he did feel excluded in the Somali area.

Two of the five South African interviewees responded when asked if foreigners contribute anything to South Africa that foreigners only bring crime and drugs. The dominant discourse on the part of South Africans that accuses foreigners of bringing crime and drugs to their country seems shaped to some degree by their lack of interaction with the communities in question and thus their inability to gain personal experience with foreign communities. The two South Africans working on 8th Avenue near the Somali enclave are the only two South Africans visibly conducting business on that part of the street, and Somalis accuse them of dealing drugs, turning the perception back upon the local community. Yet rather than try to alter local perceptions in Johannesburg, the Somalis of 8th Avenue largely keep to themselves. Two other South Africans in Mayfair saw foreigners as contributing to the economy through "business" and "working." Neither of these respondents reported feeling excluded in foreign dominated areas. These interviewees were engaged in business along Central Avenue, slightly removed from the Somali community. The Somali and Oromo community has begun to have a higher degree of interaction with the local population as they have bought businesses in this area.

Figure 6. Somali lodge on 8th Avenue. Photo by author.

Conclusions about Mayfair

The environment in the Somali enclave on 8th Avenue has not been securitized by immigrants apart from the hiring of Somali and Oromo car guards who pace the street at night. The exclusion of locals from this space takes the form of cultural and social exclusion rather than conscious attempts by immigrants to police their own space, to keep locals out or to undermine local businesses. The Somalis have purchased local buildings on an open market and are constantly changing the environment to fit their needs through the construction and renovation of buildings, usually employing other immigrants from Mozambique, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. Some South African Indian families still reside along the street, but many have moved elsewhere and now rent their houses on 8th Avenue to Somalis. Despite these contributions to the local economy and the likely increase in real estate value brought about by Somali demand, the intersection between the broader South African economy and the Somali ethnic economy remains predominantly tied to the township *spaza* shops while Mayfair functions as a safe haven at the center of the Somali economic network. The community has the ability to sustain itself while interacting with its immediate surroundings to a lower degree than businesses in Jeppe Street and Yeoville. Other immigrants working in the area of 8th Avenue primarily work for Somalis in jobs like construction, car washing, and housecleaning; thus without formalizing arrangements or engaging in local politics (from which Somalis report being largely excluded by the ward council of Mayfair), immigrants have effectively territorialized this space. The violent xenophobia experienced by many residents of 8th Avenue during previous jobs in the "locations" creates a close-knit community that to some degree fears the locals and minimizes interaction with them.

Crimes that increase social distance between the two communities do not only take place in the "locations" either: in late January 2012, one Somali restaurant and guesthouse was robbed at gunpoint in broad daylight, at 10:00 am. These types of incidents are driven by negative perceptions of the Somali community and also reinforce the exclusionary nature of the community.

On the other hand, the entrepreneurial class of investors with businesses in Mayfair has integrated into South African society to a large degree, although this integration has been mainly with upper-class Muslim society in the suburbs. Self-employed, "locations" shopkeepers, and employees who live and work in Mayfair often stay almost exclusively on 8th Avenue when in Johannesburg. Many of these individuals have not even visited other parts of inner-city Johannesburg although most of them have been to several of the other large cities in South Africa, having worked or visited friends and family in Somali neighborhoods in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Durban, and Rustenburg. Interactions with locals in Johannesburg mostly involve the Muslim South African Indian community of Mayfair/Fordsburg: some Somalis frequent restaurants, barbershops, and other stores on Central Avenue that are run by South African Indians. According to informants, there are also some wealthy Somalis who pay university fees for some black South Africans from the local community. These dynamics slightly expand the scope of social interaction with and embeddedness in the South African host community, but the feelings of exclusion on the part of South Africans point to the need for local government policy to facilitate better opportunities for interaction between Somalis and locals in Johannesburg. For local politicians, a starting point would be recognizing the Somali community's existence, importance, and potential to provide

benefits to South Africans if appropriate avenues for interaction were opened up. Unfortunately, Somali's willingness to engage the host community is somewhat tempered by the Somalis' temporary residence in the city and readiness to return to Somalia if the conflict there begins to settle.

III. Study Site 2: Jeppe/Delvers Street

Located near the heart of downtown Johannesburg, the area surrounding the corner of Jeppe Street and Delvers Street (the northwest corner of the somewhat derelict Fashion District) has become the center of a booming immigrant business enclave where several high-rise buildings have been renovated by Ethiopian businesses and converted into multi-story shopping malls. The area is not strictly Ethiopian, nor are the buildings themselves for the most part owned by Ethiopians: Several Chinese and Pakistani businesses (primarily electronics) appear to thrive inside two of the buildings, which except for one are owned by Asian immigrants. The sidewalks in this four-block area are lined with street stalls where vendors from South Africa, Nigeria, Congo, Ghana, and elsewhere sell clothing. The buildings that now host the most successful shopping centers—Medical 1, Medical 2 and Majesty—were formerly medical arts buildings and according to local business owners were abandoned during the "white flight" of the early-mid 1990s. Another building, called "Joburg Mall," was converted from a parking structure into a mall approximately 5-6 years ago. "Medical 2" contains between 50 and 70 Ethiopian businesses distributed between 5 levels, and also has restaurants above the shopping center and a mosque on the 10th floor. Businesses here sell primarily clothes, curtains, and handbags. Majesty, on the other hand, contains about 40 shops on three

floors, and businesses on upper floors focus primarily on Ethiopian and Eritrean cultural goods and foodstuffs, including shirts bearing the visage of Haile Selassie, traditional clothing, stools, and music imported from Ethiopia. The Majesty building is the only structure actually owned by Ethiopians and Eritreans; the others belong to Chinese, Taiwanese, and Pakistani landlords to whom the Ethiopians shop managers pay rent. The street stalls on the sidewalk outside are owned by the city of Johannesburg and shopkeepers pay rent to the city and often sublet parts of their stall to other vendors.

Figure 7. Majesty Building, corner of Jeppe and Delvers Street. Photo by author.

Whereas Price and Chacko (2009) noted that Ethiopian refugees in DC were predominantly Amhara Christians, the Ethiopian community structure in the Jeppe Street area is comprised of a mix of Christians and Muslims at all levels, as well as a fairly wide variety of ethnicities: Oromo and Amhara are the majority, but Tigray-Tigrinya, Tigre, Ogaden Somalis, and others are also present in smaller numbers. Although the area appears somewhat chaotic, community organization in the business enclave is

hierarchical, organized at the top by a large panel of Ethiopian business and community leaders from various backgrounds who meet regularly. An area that was formerly policed by the Horn of Africa Crime Stop Association, Jeppe Street is now part of the Sector 2 Community Policing Forum (CPF); the Ethiopian businesses also contribute about 400 Rand per month each to jointly hire 47 security guards from a private security company. This has led to an increase in safety in an area that used to be characterized by high crime levels. Private security guards stand at the entrances to the malls while municipal policemen can be seen patrolling the streets and standing watch on block corners. One interviewee said that "in 2005-6, you couldn't even walk on Smal Street," whereas now the area is very safe during the day (G., Ethiopian, Johannesburg).

During the 2010 FIFA World Cup, clothing stores and street stands stocked an abundance of soccer jerseys and paraphernalia, but since then many have diversified in order to avoid competition driving down profits. The largest businesses in Jeppe may make several million rand in profit every year, but the average business is less profitable, and rent is relatively high. Rent for an indoor shop with 8 square meters of floor space in one of the less-trafficked buildings runs at approximately R5,000 per month. A slightly larger floor-level shop costs about 7,000 per month. Both of these pay the additional R400 for security. Informants indicated that businesses were very profitable during the 2010 World Cup, but some interviewees reported that they are now "just surviving."

Medical 1 & 2 and Majesty function as the center of a clothing industry that extends across South Africa and provides livelihoods and affordable goods to thousands of South Africans as well as immigrants. Although the clothes imported from China arrive via Durban, they are unloaded from containers in Johannesburg (generally Dragon

City, in Crown North to the southwest of the CBD) and pass largely into Ethiopian hands, so that many stores in Durban and elsewhere purchase their textile goods on Jeppe Street. South African women from rural locations purchase large quantities of curtains and clothing in the upstairs of the Medical buildings (as well as several other sources in the Fashion District) and engage in circular rural-urban migration as they hawk their wares in more distant cities and townships.



Figure 8. The Ethiopian business area, corner of Jeppe and Delvers Street

Immigrant Perspectives

In the perspectives of Ethiopian interviewees, immigrants contribute to South Africa by "selling cheaper and competing with others" (B., Ethiopian, Johannesburg), or in the words of another, "by providing consumable products in affordable manners" (T., Ethiopian, Johannesburg). Ethiopians and Mozambicans interviewed in this business zone tended to justify their right to space in Johannesburg by pointing out that self-

employment among immigrants generating both tax revenue and job opportunities for the local population, and that immigrants are showing the locals how to work.

Police harassment and corruption, according to interviewees, presents among the largest problems for aspiring entrepreneurs in the Jeppe/Delvers area and the most dominant form of violence against and exclusion of foreigners. Johannesburg Metro Police ("Metro") regularly raid shops selling "counterfeit" clothing bearing brand names, which according to some Ethiopian shopkeepers is actually often from the same stock (imported from China) that supplies upscale businesses, where it retails for up to 20 times the going price on Jeppe Street.[14] Whether or not the confiscated clothes are legitimate, interviewees widely reported that what follows confiscation is not: there are widespread reports of confiscated goods reappearing on the market following police search-and-seize operations. One informant noted that a close friend of his had put a unique mark on the inside of rugby jerseys he was selling. The jerseys were confiscated, and the shopkeeper reportedly found the same clothes being sold on the street two weeks later. Several Mozambican interviewees also suggested that Metro confiscated their foodstuffs regularly or took some of their goods and ate them. Metro is not the only police force at work here: in late 2011 and early 2012 South African Military Police and customs officials were regularly involved in raids on Jeppe Street.

[14] Although some of the clothes appear to be "knock-offs," others are indistinguishable (down to the tag print and labels: "Real fans don't buy fakes!") those in more "formal" clothing shops; indeed, Ethiopians assert and there seems to be evidence of upscale clothing stores in suburban malls purchasing some stock from informal or semi-formal businesses in Jeppe rather than through formal networks—certain Ethiopian businesses have a close network with Chinese importers that allows them to serve as shadow middlemen within the formal sports clothing trade.

The primary problem expressed by interviewees on Jeppe Street was with the police. 8 of 11 interviewees in Jeppe Street (72.7%) reported that immigrant relationships with the police were bad. While on the one hand stating that he did not usually feel excluded and that "I feel more secure here in South Africa than in Ethiopia," one interviewee said that his biggest problem and what made him feel that South Africans were trying to exclude him was the police:

> I served as a policeman for ten years when I was in Ethiopia. I can say that South African police does not stand for the community, rather for robbery. You should feel secure when a police is around you, but here in South Africa we tend to run away when we see cops…. especially cops in Johannesburg are thieves and robbers. One day the cops stopped us in Joburg, searched our vehicles and tried to plant drugs in our vehicle. By placing drugs in our vehicle, we were to be convicted of drug trafficking, and the goods that we've loaded in our vehicle will be taken away plus we'll be arrested. Therefore I can say that South African cops does not stand for us—the migrants. (G., Ethiopian, Johannesburg)

Business strategies to deal with police harassment and confiscation of goods differ between the Ethiopian and the Mozambican community. The Ethiopian high-rises have provided a degree of protection from the police: whereas vendors selling clothes on the street are vulnerable to confiscations, those in the upper-level shops, who often serve as distributors of these goods to street hawkers, are warned when the police begin raiding shops and are able to lock up their storerooms and close their shops. Furthermore, the police generally seem to be busy enough at the street level that they do not seek to confiscate goods higher up in the shopping centers. On the other hand, Mozambicans selling food on the sidewalk along Kerk Street have nowhere to hide from the Metro Police when they come to raid. With the current antagonistic dynamics between street vendors and police, the widespread result is increasing vulnerability and decreased profitability of street vending in the inner city: street vendors report losing many of their

goods, and because of this risk, they tend to bring smaller quantities with them than they would normally be able to sell during a day.

When asked what would be the best method for protecting immigrants in Johannesburg, two of three Mozambicans who provided an answer to the question suggested that the city should provide more spaces for small-scale entrepreneurship if the police are going to crack down on street trade (this parallels the views of street vendors in Yeoville discussed in the next section). Ethiopian respondents emphasized a more policy-oriented than a territorial approach, reflective of the fact that Ethiopians in the same area are somewhat less vulnerable than Mozambicans because of their community's strategy of utilizing the built environment.

The openness of this space to both locals and foreign nationals is reflected in perceptions of the relationship with local communities. Despite reporting bad relationships with the police, most immigrants on Jeppe Street expressed a positive relationship with the South African community itself: 45% said relations between foreigners and locals were "good"—more than twice the percentage of Somalis who expressed the same sentiment. Only two interviewees (18.2%) spoke of bad relations with the local South African community: one said the reason was that "we cannot move freely around South African cities, because some of South African communities usually try to attack foreigners at every possible chance they get" (G., Ethiopian, Johannesburg). One other Ethiopian said the relationship between the two communities was difficult, and the remaining three simply said the relationship was "good." All Mozambican informants reported a good relationship.

Local Perspectives on Immigrants in Jeppe

As many of the black South Africans in the area are circular migrants keeping busy schedules and only temporarily in town, all but three locals approached in the Jeppe Street area declined to interview. Of these three interviewees, none reported feeling excluded in foreign-dominated areas like the Ethiopian malls on Jeppe Street; however the three respondents each offered very different perspectives on immigrants and territorial ethics in Johannesburg. The first interviewee, the manager of a clothing business near the Ethiopian business enclave, viewed the economic contributions of immigrants as essential to the South African economy:

> Immigrants provide a good service to the country in the sense that they are consumers. They also come to do buying for their countries—so importing and exporting. They are providing assistance with regards to foreign currency, and also the foreigners living in South Africa are supplying a cheaper form of labor in South Africa. More sustainable. There is a bad image with regards to certain immigrants with crime and stuff, but that will happen with any country. We actually do depend on immigrants in every way. (C., South African, Johannesburg)

This respondent reported that multiple aspects of his business and other local businesses are reliant on foreigners: "I have foreigners as customers, consumers, and also suppliers—certain people in the area who I'm buying products from are foreigners." As far as an ethical perspective on the presence of foreigners, he argued that "With South Africa being the heart of Africa, people are going to be here; it's something we have to accept" (C., South African, Johannesburg). On the other hand, an employee of a local plumbing and repair company was of the view that excluding foreigners from South Africa was "the only way" (K., South African, Johannesburg).

Two of the local respondents agreed that the police were falling short in their duties in the inner city, but the respondents pointed out very different reasons. One stated, "The police aren't doing their job. They never take foreigners to jail; they always take a bribe, so they're making the crime to be more" (K., South African, Johannesburg). The manager of the clothing store offered an opposing perspective as to the shortcomings of the police force: "The volunteer police see a foreigner and basically harass them. It's demeaning to a person's dignity, and I don't believe in that" (C., South African, Johannesburg). The third interviewee took a more moderate approach: "you'll get those police who have that bad bit of xenophobia, but you'll also get those who do their job" (P., South African, Johannesburg).

Conclusions about Jeppe Street Study Area

The disagreement between the perspectives of the three South Africans interviewed in the Jeppe Street area points to a need to more deeply understand the ways in which local livelihoods intersect with immigrant business in this area and to collect a larger sample of local perspectives to gain a better perspective of the ethical views of inner-city workers. The relationship between the corporate economy in South Africa and small/medium firms in the Jeppe/Delvers area seems to be driving economic divisions and threatening business here—even those that are not violating property laws. According to Ethiopian informants, police raids in Jeppe are called for by representatives and retailers of corporate clothing brands like Nike and Adidas who see the area as a threat to established business interests in South Africa. Despite the sometimes shadowy nature of the clothing industry in Jeppe Street, however, the Ethiopian clothing sector is providing affordable

goods to the bulk of South Africa's population that cannot afford to shop in suburban shopping malls. The majority of Ethiopian shops are not selling 'knock-off' soccer and rugby jerseys, but rather jeans, shirts, dresses and bags imported from China and retailed at affordable prices. Ethiopian entrepreneurs in Jeppe are willing to make less profit per item than their suburban competitors (a common trend among immigrant entrepreneurs), and because of these low prices, business is booming in Jeppe street and creating affordable goods as well as business networks for local South Africans that extend from the central city to the distant rural towns.

The Ethiopians' appropriation of the high-rise architecture in the central city reinforces their securitization of this area and enables them to maintain ground-floor interaction with locals and other immigrants while keeping the bulk of their goods safe from police confiscation and from other possible efforts at theft. There are at least three reasons why Ethiopian appropriation of this space may represent a less exclusive interaction with locals in the city than that of the Somalis in Mayfair: Firstly, the CBD high rises are by nature only semi-accessible to citizens and therefore do not appear to significantly infringe upon either the mobility or feelings of inclusion among local populations; secondly, the Ethiopian business community has occupied spaces that were previously abandoned and thus did not displace locals through their appropriation of this space; thirdly, the space is welcome to locals and the profits of foreign entrepreneurs rely on local interactions—South Africans who have chosen to utilize the Ethiopian-led clothing sector in the CBD do business in the same space as the Ethiopians and secure profits from this business. Furthermore, there is also reported to be healthy interaction between the upper-level management of the Ethiopian business community and the CPF,

and the coordinated efforts of immigrants and locals in the interest of local business have served to combat crime and increase safety in this section of the CBD.

Yet it still must be noted that despite the intersection of the Ethiopian business sector with employment opportunities for South Africans outside of Johannesburg, profits are accruing to immigrants in a space that permits a level of informality, allowing some foreign businesses to participate in significant tax evasion and to escape from monitoring that would ensure healthy working conditions and labor rights. While Ethiopian businesses may pay informal taxes in the form of police bribes, this merely reinforces informal and corrupt police processes and continues to circulate capital in spaces that are unreachable by the majority of the black South African population. As for relations within the Ethiopian community, there are some reports by Ethiopians of labor exploitation and of hampered socioeconomic mobility for workers in the area, some of whom rent suburban living space east of the city from their employers in Jeppe and do not make a high enough wage to pay rent and also develop their own business venture as many Somalis do.

The proliferation and diversification of Ethiopian businesses in the area around Jeppe suggests that investment is continuing to grow and it seems likely that the Ethiopian economy will diversify spatially and sectorally due to a probable decline profits in their inner-city clothing market from competition. For several years the wealthier businessmen have been investing in smaller but similar inner-city clothing markets in most of South Africa's larger cities, targeting the black population beyond Gauteng.

IV. Study Site 3: Raleigh Street, Yeoville

From Joe Slovo Drive eastward until it becomes Rockey Street near the boundary between Yeoville and Bellevue, Raleigh Street is a business area running through the residential neighborhood of Yeoville, lined with restaurants, retail outlets, grocery stores, and public buildings like the Yeoville Library and the public swimming pool. Toward the eastern boundary of Yeoville the wide sidewalks provide the site for a bustling informal street economy, predominantly on the block between Kenmere Road and Bedford Road. Besides stands selling fresh produce, CDs, or clothes, there are numerous sidewalk hairstylists catering to a mix of South Africans and immigrants, notably a high population of Zimbabweans, Congolese, and West Africans. Informal sidewalk trade takes place in front of formal storefronts, where groceries, electronics, and furniture are sold, among other things. Physically, the business area is more permeable than that in either 8th Avenue or Jeppe Street as most businesses are one level and open to the street, and a constant stream of both automobile and pedestrian traffic flows through the neighborhood.

Although originally planned as an upper-class suburb on the ridge just north of the Johannesburg CBD, Yeoville attracted primarily middle and lower-middle class European immigrants and by the 1970s was home to a large Jewish immigrant population.[15] Along with neighboring Hillbrow, the suburb was gradually incorporated into the city and came to host a prominent nightlife scene in the 1980s. As apartheid drew to a close in the early 1990s many of the white residents left for suburbs to the north, joining the "white flight" from Johannesburg. In recent years community organizations

[15] Yeoville Bellevue Community Development Trust, "Yeoville History." http://www.yeoville.org.za/yeoville-history.php

have been proactive in working with city officials to restore infrastructure and create a vibrant environment along Raleigh Street. Katsaura (2011) has shown how numerous active organizations in the area have jostled for position in Yeoville, creating an atmosphere that at some points has favored immigrants and in others has facilitated exclusion of foreign nationals from community governance structures (see also Bénit-Gbaffou 2006).

Street vendors have recently—as in other parts of the city—become targets for Metro Police, who according to interviewees regularly raid informal sidewalk businesses and confiscate the goods not only of foreigners, but also of South African *mamas* who have set up small produce stands in front of the formal businesses lining the street. However, both South African and immigrant interviewees tended to have less negative views of the police than informants elsewhere in the city. One South African interviewee said of the police: "If Metro is coming, they are taking everything from the people—and this person is just trying to survive! But the Yeoville police are working hard. I like the way they are working" (X., South African, Yeoville). Another South African did not mind the police's confiscation of street vendors' goods: "The police treat [immigrants] in a wrong way, but it's their job. Maybe they're selling on the streets and they come and take their things because maybe they're selling in the wrong place. It's good and bad" (CL., South African, Yeoville).

Ethical Perspectives on Immigrant Businesses in Yeoville

Interviewees in Yeoville voiced a wide variety of perspectives on immigrants. When asked about their experience as immigrants in South Africa, half of respondents said that

they were just here for business, and that summed up their experience in South Africa. Four respondents (50%) said that they did not feel at all excluded from South African society, while 25% indicated that they did feel excluded and the remaining 25% said that they felt excluded only occasionally. Overall, immigrants in Yeoville had a more positive view on the relationship between South Africans and immigrants than interviewees from Jeppe Street or 8th Avenue: four of the eight respondents described a good relationship with South Africans. One Cameroonian who owned a store described his positive relationship with various other groups:

> When you're making business you're not supposed to be like apartheid or something like that. Many Ethiopians call me brother; many Congolese call me brother. South Africans—same. I have many South African friends. We are proposing businesses: joint venture. We are four—two Cameroonian, two South African. I got many brothers who married a South African lady… (J., Cameroonian, Yeoville)

A Nigerian interviewee who worked as a shoe repairman expressed his satisfaction with life in South Africa, but also his discontent with the negative stereotypes attributed to immigrants, particularly to Nigerians:

> They are treating me fine here, as long as you're doing legal business. The only problem I have is that people believe that all Nigerians are bad, all of them are selling drugs. I don't even know what a drug looks like unless I see it on TV…. I've never heard anything like xenophobia since I came.(T., Nigerian, Yeoville).

The constant interaction between locals and immigrants in Yeoville fostered a higher degree of familiarity. Some immigrants reported that they share living space with locals and some of their good friends are South Africans. Along the sidewalk South Africans hawk their goods alongside immigrants. This makes the space an easy one for SADC immigrants to blend into: whereas Somali and Ethiopian immigrants immediately stand

out from Xhosa, Zulu, Sotho, and other South African ethnic groups by appearance, SADC immigrants can use the strategy of blending in to create spaces for inclusion in a place like Yeoville. This also makes surrounding territories easier for immigrants to traverse: there is no enclave boundary beyond which danger begins to increase.

All but one immigrant interviewee agreed that it was unethical for South Africans to attempt to exclude foreigners. One interviewee from Zimbabwe explained it as the government's prerogative to either kick the foreigners out or to encourage peace between immigrants and native-born:

> It's like there is a husband who is having two families. For them to unite is a bit tough. You'll find that we have the same father but two mothers, but one of the mothers is teaching one thing and the other is teaching another thing. It will take time to learn to get along. It's a bit tough. The president doesn't have the final say, so we can't say he's the father. He must get advisers. If they decide that they don't want foreigners, then keep them out. But if you allow foreigners to come in, then let them come in-whether they are investing or whether they are poor. (J.T., Zimbabwean, Yeoville).

Like in Mayfair and Jeppe Street, the majority of respondents emphasized business contributions as a reason for the government to allow immigrants to stay and occupy urban spaces in South Africa, but rather than highlighting the economic contributions through taxes or—as some Somalis indicated—the mere example of immigrants as hard



Figure 9. Raleigh Street study area, Yeoville

workers to motivate the South African population, one entrepreneur in Yeoville took a more hands-on approach to engaging the South African community:

> Immigrants don't go and look for the job from the government. Like me, I'm an immigrant. Here's my small shop. You see some guy who comes here to take tomatoes to go sell there, that side. He's a South African. He comes to me at the end of the day and I give him something. He was a drinker. I told him if he wants to move away from that, I will help him…. Another one came here in April, my brother said he's a good guy, take him. If you want to work, you want to suffer for it. That's why I'm going to take you and give you life advice. It's the way we're working together—that's the contribution. (J., Cameroonian, Yeoville)

To the same question regarding the contribution of foreigners to South Africa, one interviewee suggested that foreigners spending money in South Africa was a reason to allow them to remain:

> You can't survive if you exclude. Right now, most of the areas where big money is needed, foreigners are the ones living in those areas. Foreigners spend money here in South Africa. It's not like foreigners are just taking money out. We are improving the country at the same time. (J.T., Zimbabwean, Yeoville)

This is true for certain sectors of the immigrant population, but as was shown in Chapter 3, there are immigrant groups that are removing a very high percentage of their incomes from South Africa rather than reinvesting or spending in South Africa. In Chapter 5 I will explore the implications of immigrants' emphasis on their business contributions in justifying their presence and control over space in South Africa.

Local Perceptions in Yeoville

Three of the six South African interviewees in Yeoville also saw business and work ethic as the major contributions of immigrants to South Africa. The other three were more skeptical: When asked about the contributions immigrants are making, one replied: "No, I don't think they contribute to the economy, because when they open a shop, you can't see a South African working there; only the foreigners" (S.B., South African, Yeoville). Another pointed out that although he had friendly relationships with immigrants, he hadn't seen many benefits: "I can't say a good thing they bring unless maybe the government is getting something out of them. The thing is most of these guys are rough, bringing crime" (C.L., South African, Yeoville).

The perception of foreigners bringing drugs and crime played into the perceptions of even those who supported immigrants' rights to stay in the country. Despite expressing belief that it is wrong for South Africans to exclude foreigners, one informant said he befriended foreigners who wanted to return to their own country and blamed the other kind of immigrants for drugs and crime in the city:

> "I never get experience [with foreigners]; all I see is the crime. I've been friends with those who could do something to go back to their country, like Zimbabwe, see…. Some are good, some are bad. They are doing crimes. And the white people that lived here before all ran away. People who got money ran away…. It's

> divided, some of the foreigners are selling drugs, like Nigerians are selling drugs. There's no relationship between us South Africans and those foreigners, because of drugs and crime… [The police] are chasing the people selling on the street. It's not good, because some of the foreigners they don't come here for crime—they come here for living, you see…. I believe no [it's not ethical to exclude immigrants]. I like the Africans. Those who are selling drugs I don't like, but the others I don't mind they can stay in South Africa if they're not selling drugs and fighting." (S.B., South African, Yeoville).

This interview reveals the somewhat schizophrenic nature of many South Africans' perceptions of foreigners: on the one hand, the perception is permeated by references to drugs and crime, while on the other the plight of economic migrants is recognized.

Yeoville: Conclusions

The intermingling of immigrants and South African nationals in Yeoville has produced a relatively unique dynamic of territorial politics among business areas with large immigrant populations, in which local political contestation involves shifting alliances between immigrant and South African organizations (Katsaura 2011). The roles of the community in this space are not always clear as various groups jostle for control (Bénit-Gbaffou 2006). The stories of immigrants and locals in Yeoville point to a higher degree of familiarity and everyday interaction between the two groups than occurred on 8th Avenue or Jeppe Street. The openness of trading and residential space in Yeoville prevents immigrant—who make up a significant percentage of the population—from securing their own space and developing it in a way that is exclusive toward South Africans. Likewise the social space in Yeoville is more pan-African, created by a blending, overlapping, and working together between populations from across the continent.

The lack of cohesive initiative to secure and organize space in a way that facilitates market innovation or develops room for enterprise expansion has left some immigrants in Yeoville trapped in survivalist enterprises or floating from one employment opportunity to the next casual position without fully utilizing human capital. Whereas the structure of the Somali ethnic economy promotes self-employment, independence, and capitalist enterprises like real small-scale real estate investment that has led to a raise in income for individuals involved, Yeoville appears to promote a somewhat slower form of economic growth and relies heavily on residents of the neighborhood and spaces nearby. On the other hand, the outlook of entrepreneurs in Yeoville who are engaged in socially responsible business practices and engage the local community by providing investment and business experience is likely to assist potential local entrepreneurs in a much more tangible way than the example of good entrepreneurial practices provided by the Somali and Ethiopian populations who have secured their business spaces to limit these types of interactions with the local population.

Figure 10. Informal street businesses and formal storefront, Raleigh Street, Yeoville. Photo by author.

V. Navigating Justice and Territorial Control

Roles, Activities and Perspectives of Immigrant Organizations

A number of immigrant organizations have emerged in Johannesburg, particularly following the May 2008 xenophobic attacks that indicated the need for immigrants to create stronger avenues for engagement with South African officials. Some of these are tied specifically to certain neighborhoods and immigrant groups while others are umbrella organizations with the goal of unifying immigrants for stronger engagement with the city, police, and national government. Because research questions regarded specific ethical perspectives that might be at odds with those of the general population, I provide a general overview of the activities and perspectives of immigrant organizations rather than individual organization profiles.

The six immigrant organizations interviewed were evenly divided among those focusing on, advocacy, those interacting with immigrant businesses, and umbrella organizations attempting to create a space for immigrant groups to generate dialogue and put pressure on local and national government. Despite the majority of interviewees (both individuals and organizations) pointing to problems with the police in the inner city, only one organization liaised directly with the local police to develop crime prevention strategies and to ensure the protection of immigrants doing legal business. Other localized organizations were engaged more in advocacy to help individual immigrants who were arrested or incarcerated for improper documentation, whereas the umbrella organizations were advocating for immigrants primarily at the highest levels of police organization. All organizations were engaged in some type of information dissemination, with at least three of them printing their own newsletters for the immigrant community in

the area near their offices and one of them printing a section of a local newspaper that was geared toward immigrants and sometimes contained translations into the languages of multiple immigrant groups, including Amharic, Somali, French, Arabic, and others.

Although most of the organizations were geared primarily toward social and governmental aspects of immigrant-local relations, the majority emphasized the importance of space and territorial control within the city. Multiple organizations argued that is no longer what it was before, and that it primarily played out in business competition over territory: "competition between migrants and local businesses is always about space – always about position" (Org. M., Johannesburg, December 2011). In this case, the organization attempted to alleviate competition through education and through social and sports programs designed to promote cooperation between immigrants and locals. The organization's leaders also liaised with the national-level political body COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) in order to promote immigrant rights and discourage xenophobia at higher levels of governance. Rather than simply advocating for the immigrants, the work of umbrella organizations that interact with these higher-level political and business bodies is two-sided as they mobilize the immigrant community to engage in socially responsible business practices and work to create programs that facilitate a transfer of knowledge and resources from immigrant groups into broader South African society. Another organization emphasized their direct territorial role in securing inner-city spaces: "we don't try to defend our [ethnic] community alone, but focus on the area … how we can protect community area rather than just people" (Org. B., Johannesburg, December 2011). This is done through cooperation with the local police force in a manner that has promoted a trading space for

both locals and immigrants. However, the micro-level community politics of shifting allegiances and competition within the structure is still somewhat discernible as police continue to target immigrants within this space.

When asked whether under any circumstances it could be ethical for South Africans to attempt to exclude immigrants from certain areas or business sectors, all of the immigrant organizations answered in the negative. In contrast to the perspective of the majority of individual interviewees, who mentioned business and economic factors, several of the organizations followed a discourse of human rights that had a semblance of a conception of immigrant rights to the city. However, these views largely failed to take in the economic relationships; whereas three of the local organizations emphasized that exclusion was wrong because of immigrants' economic contributions to South Africa:

> There is some exclusion of immigrants, but not as much as before. Now South Africans are coming and buying things from [immigrants] to make business elsewhere. Before, people were complaining and just sitting; now there are business opportunities for South Africans through [immigrants]. (Org. B., Johannesburg, Dec. 2011)

The same organization emphasized that the spaces that are perceived as controlled by foreigners in the city were not "taken over" by means of or with the goal of excluding South Africans. In fact, they argued, it is South Africans who facilitated immigrant territorial control over certain areas of the city by trading on the free market. The immigrant businesses within these spaces are providing goods that South Africans need; furthermore, the concentration of immigrant businesses in inner-city areas has brought with it competition that drives down the price of goods—this makes it easier for South

African entrepreneurs to make a profit by buying goods in bulk from the immigrants and selling these goods in rural areas or on the outskirts of the city.

With regard to media coverage of immigrants, several of the immigrant organizations were actively working with local media outlets to promote sharing of information about immigrants and also providing news to immigrant communities. Although there was general consensus that the South African media is open to immigrants, two of the local immigrant organizations argued that immigrants do not share their negative experiences with the media: "Yes, the South African press does come to interview [immigrants]; but [immigrants] don't like to talk about their bad experiences. They can't complain to the media because the South Africans will see the news and react" (Org. A., Johannesburg, Dec. 2011). Organizations also pointed to the gap between local and international news, saying that the less-educated South Africans living in townships watch only local news and so do not know the reasons behind the presence of refugees in South Africa. The umbrella organizations suggested that more needs to be done to cooperate with the media to educate the broader community about immigrants and also to disseminate information on cooperative social programs involving locals and immigrants.

Synthesis

A consistent theme of immigrant's views on belonging in the city is their emphasis that their economic contributions to South Africa justify their presence there. The intersection between business interests and securitization of space plays a prominent role in the Jeppe Street Ethiopian area, whereas in Yeoville economics and spatial organization and

security initiatives appear less intertwined, partly due to the permeability of the built environment in this space and the competition for control over security and community organization (Katsaura 2011). On 8th Avenue securitization of the Somali community's economic space is carried out less by coherent planning than by a tight-knit and socially exclusive community. In the case of Jeppe and of 8th Avenue, the Ethiopian and the Somalis have effectively secured space in a way that facilitates the extraction of value from the local population without apparent avenues for social reinvestment or providing any tangible benefits to the local community. Thus while these immigrants emphasize that they are providing a good example of business practices for South Africans to follow, this example may look to South Africans much like apartheid-era exploitation and exclusion, giving rise to their discourses of economic exclusion and accusations of drugs and crime among the foreign-born population.

The results pointed to in this study may serve primarily to provide direction for further research on the how the built environment shapes interactions between immigrants and locals as well as how these interactions are perceived. Perhaps rather than focusing primarily on advising the government and international organizations on the dynamics of xenophobia as many recent studies have been wont to do, there should be a shift in focus to producing spaces where immigrants and locals interact in more meaningful and beneficial ways. It is possible that immigrants with significant business experience can provide an example to the South African population, but a degree of interaction is needed before this can come to fruition. A focus on economic spatialities and the environments through which small-scale capital and informal trade networks circulate is essential to uncovering spaces where immigrants and locals can cooperate.

CHAPTER 5: Conclusions

Economics, Ethics and the Production of Urban Space

I. Immigrant Economies and the South African State

The consistent emphasis by immigrants that their economic and business contributions constitute some degree of rights to space in South Africa leads us to a broader consideration of the economic role of migrants in the country. While recognizing that immigrants of varying socioeconomic class have arrived in South Africa since apartheid, those examined in this study have largely set up shop in the market gap between the white-dominated formality of the northern suburbs and the small-scale, often survivalist entrepreneurial efforts on the part of undereducated and impoverished blacks that characterized Johannesburg after the end of apartheid (Rogerson 1996). While the immigration policies and inconsistencies of the South African government have been criticized from both directions (Peberdy 2009; Landau 2004; Crush & Dodson 2007), immigrants point to a positive mode of incorporation with regard to the government but a severe negative reaction from the population. At the intersection of these two receiving environments is the South African community's widespread perception that the government has failed to stimulate the local economy and to provide South Africans with employment opportunities.

The almost immediate influx after apartheid of immigrants with relatively high levels of human and social capital (when compared to most black South Africans) and transnational networks as well as entrepreneurial know-how put these groups a step ahead of the population; the South African state, rather than failing to manage migration, has primarily failed to provide a level of economic protectionism that would boost the small-

and medium-scale local economy and provide opportunities for local social mobility. Thus, today at the northeast corner of what used to be the site of local fashion production in Johannesburg's CBD sits the Ethiopian enclave that, while providing affordable goods to the black South African population, has also undercut the local productive economy that thrived in the area during the 1990s by importing low-cost textiles from factories in China. It was almost inevitable with the state and economic restructuring of the 1990s that someone would make use of this market niche. Competition among the Ethiopians has done a service to the local population by driving down prices until profits for the wholesalers are only marginal, but the space for this competition is made possible by state policies that have broadly discouraged or undermined local competitive productive enterprise.

While South Africans tend to blame immigrants for undercutting them by working for low pay, immigrants point out that the opportunities for informal entrepreneurship exist for the local population as well, but argue that South Africans are lazy or ask too much money for a simple job. The discourse about immigrants working for lower wages is challenged somewhat by the state's occasional crackdown on South Africans working for wages below the official minimum wage: for example, in September 2010 South African women working in a clothing factory in Newcastle "clambered atop cutting tables and ironing boards to raise anguished cries" against the shutdown of the factory due to violation of minimum wage laws.[16] They needed the money to take care of their families.

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[16] Celia Dugger, Wage Laws Squeeze South Africa's Poor. *The New York Times* online, September 26, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/world/africa/27safrica.html?pagewanted=all

With a youth unemployment rate of over 40% in 2008, (OECD 2010) South Africa faces an economic crisis among the lower strata of its citizenry—leading to xenophobia against foreigners as well as to regular protests against the state for not fulfilling the development goals that many blacks understood as part and parcel of the shift to ANC rule.[17] It is within this context that the economic contributions of immigrants must be understood. Those immigrants that are providing training and employment opportunities to black South Africans are indeed making economic contributions; for many others the contribution to the broader society is not so clear. Certainly immigrants are filling the pockets of policemen and government officials, and this has sparked resentment among the black population, as several interviewees indicated.

Literature on immigrant entrepreneurship in the Global North has thus far been able to bypass ethical considerations in its approach to the mechanisms, identities and transnational networks behind immigrant entrepreneurship. The benefits that remittances from immigrants in the North could provide to their countries of origin have been seen as generally beneficial because they are a redistribution of wealth from rich countries with high employment rates and relatively high standards of living. The problem with approaching immigrant entrepreneurship in South Africa with a value-free lens is that immigrant economies do not in all cases contribute to the alleviation of the widespread poverty among the South African majority, but instead may work to exacerbate it by removing capital from local circuits. This extraction is facilitated by immigrants'

[17] As noted in the case of Atteridgeville, Somalis in the "locations" report that even in peaceful communities, xenophobic violence often occurs when disillusioned protesters are returning to the township after a demonstration calling for the government to provide adequate housing and services.

utilization of city spaces as nodes of accumulation through which money flows from South Africa's townships back to immigrant countries of origin. The profits being made are *enabled* by the upper-tier formal South African economy that has provided infrastructure, safety, and a high quality of life that draws immigrant entrepreneurs into the country—but often *extracted* from South Africa's poor, who are the primary consumers of the goods sold by African immigrants, whether in Jeppe or in Thokoza. For example, the Ethiopian community's appropriation of formerly white-owned high rises in the CBD facilitates a degree of separation from the community with which they are primarily transacting, although not to the same extent as the "fortress architecture" seen in much of the CBD. Ethiopians did not construct the buildings, but only adapted them to serve their purposes.

Furthermore, immigrant business leaders are often able to live comfortably in the suburbs and often remit significant amounts of money while most of those who ultimately consume their goods are only marginally employed in the townships. Through the process of extraction, certain immigrant groups reinforce xenophobic sentiments, as appears to be the case with regard to Somali "location" shops. This dynamic creates a need for secrecy and separation of immigrants from the local population to cover up these processes and strengthens the enclave formation of immigrant communities. The South African state has yet to take a strong lead on socially responsible business planning.

II. Circulation, Remittances and Prospects for Development

The Somali ethnic economy is characterized by a different type of extraction: rather than accumulating capital for themselves, Somali township entrepreneurs are sending

significant amounts of their incomes as remittances to the Horn of Africa and to Somalis in diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere in Africa. If the average Somali remits a figure close to $150 US per month as indicated in Chapter 3, a calculation based on a conservative estimate of the number of Somali refugees in South Africa (25,000) would see over $40 million US flowing out of South Africa each year from the Somali economy, a large portion of this drawn from "location" enterprises. While not an extraordinarily large number when compared to remittance flows from immigrants in countries of the Global North, in relation to the endemic poverty in South Africa's townships this amount does appear significant. Even a small part of this sum reinvested in growth enterprises or educational opportunities that involve South Africans would have the potential to promote localized growth and possibly cut down on xenophobic violence as well. While South Africa's Somali population is providing a needed service to the townships and saving the poor some money by selling cheap goods, it appears that what profits do accrue to Somalis are for the most part leaking from the country. Thus in bridging Johannesburg's divided city and filling the interstices between the upper class whites and township blacks, these immigrants are also siphoning some capital from circulation in South Africa.

From an ethical standpoint, this siphoning of profits may not necessarily be seen as strictly or definitively unjust or unethical. Somalis are under social obligation to care for families in need, subsisting in war-torn Somalia or in Kenya's refugee camps. The lack of alternatives apart from resettlement in the West (which a number of Somalis in Mayfair are constantly waiting for) suggests again a role for the South African state: as it accepts these refugees, it should also provide integration programs and measures to

increase social imbeddedness of immigrants in their local context. Furthermore, the transnational networks of the Somalis point to a need for organization and productive use of remittance flows, as some have begun working toward in Europe (Kleist 2008). Sending money to feed family members in refugee camps in Somalia and Kenya, while indeed sustaining the livelihoods of these family members, constitutes paying food producers in these locations rather than investing in sustainable enterprise for the individuals receiving remittances. The lack of an effective central government in Somalia makes prospects for effectively organizing a space for beneficial use of remittance flows somewhat grim.

III. Social Justice and the South African City?

Informality and Redistribution

The informal spaces in which many immigrants work facilitate the extraction of value and offer little by way of redistribution to the South African poor. Participation in informality by police and government officials through bribery and resale of confiscated goods constitute informal forms of taxation that keep these benefits from being redistributed in any meaningful way within the state. This dual informality on the part of immigrants and officials marginalizes most locals in the process. There is significant need for reform that facilitates cultural dialogue and transfers of skills between immigrants and native-born. This likely begins with accepting immigrants as an inevitable feature of South African life and an inevitable result of the most vibrant economy in the region and taking steps such as providing benefits for immigrants who hire and train South Africans, including immigrants in local economic development

strategies, and allowing access to formal South African banks (Polzer 2010b). Currently the marginalization of immigrants by the police and the lack of meaningful engagement between immigrants and black South Africans is driving immigrants to maintain their transnational identities and ties rather than seeking connections with the host community.

Again, the economic focus of interviewees when questioned about inclusion, exclusion, and the ethics of belonging in the city points us back to the original literature on social justice and the city that highlighted how the economic complexities of spatial distributions in urban life, speculation, and increasing returns to capital serve to marginalize the poor in the city. I suggest that based on the perspectives of both locals and foreigners in Johannesburg, immigrant "rights to the city" lie not in claiming citizenship, nor in relinquishing hold over securitized and immigrant-dominated spaces, but in utilizing the existing territorial organizations of economic space in the city to facilitate, even in limited measure, socially responsible business practices entailing a degree of redistribution or skills transfer from immigrants to South Africans. As interviews indicated, this is occurring to some degree in Yeoville, but no one in Mayfair or Jeppe Street talked about any type of close interactions with South Africans. The fact that some South Africans recognize the business contributions of foreign nationals points to a common ground between some locals and migrants; however, the social distance perpetuated through enclave formation appears to reinforce antagonisms between native- and foreign-born and continually regenerate the production of segmented spaces in the city.

The current structure of immigrant economies ensure that for the most part there is very little transfer of capital, skills, or knowledge back to the communities with which

Johannesburg's immigrants are doing business. Foreigners have created networks that bridge the city that is fractured along economic and racial lines; the exclusion perceived by locals is not generally from the spaces of immigrant entrepreneurship, but from the networks that originate within these spaces. Immigrants are doing much to rejuvenate the central city, but the continued extraction of value without a high level of social or financial reinvestment drives social exclusion and may prove dangerous for immigrants in the end.

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