SHARED UNEMPLOYMENT:

ATTITUDES TOWARD SHORT-TIME COMPENSATION

Andrew J. Drea

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_____
Peter Seybold, PhD., Chair

Master's Thesis
Committee

_____
Carrie E. Foote, Ph.D.

_____
David Bell, PhD.

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INTRODUCTION

Though the Great Recession of 2007-2009 has been officially over for several years, the United States has been unable to recapture the employment rate that it had previously enjoyed. In 2007, before the recession hit, the United States maintained a healthy 4.7 percent unemployment rate. It topped off at 9.7 percent in 2010 and only now, in 2015, dipped to 5.5 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). In comparison, Germany, one of the primary European economic powers, saw a net decline between 2007 and 2015, going from 7.5 percent to 4.9 percent. Its peak, in 2009, was a mere 7.7 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015, Meyerson 2014). Why did the Germany fare better in the recession in terms of unemployment than the United States?

While the two countries differ in numerous ways, Germany has generally has a strong social support system (Mauch and Patel 2010). One of Germany's main pillars of its system is its unemployment insurance, managed by its public employment agency, Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, or BA (Social Protection 2014). While the BA operates an unemployment system for laid off workers similar to the American unemployment system, it also manages an alternative unemployment system, kurzarbeit. Kurzarbeit, also known as short-time compensation or worksharing, is a form of unemployment that essentially spreads around unemployment. In this system, employers opt to cut the hours of numerous workers rather than lay off a few when business is slow. For example, rather than lay off a fifth of their workforce, a company may elect to cut everyone's hours by 20 percent. The government then subsidizes the workers' loss in income through the unemployment system. As a result, using short-time compensation allows companies to cut their expenses and governments to subsidize workers at the same rates as full

unemployment, but keeps workers employed and engaged. This is generally seen as positive in the long run for all parties. Companies who institute short-time compensation when profits are low do not have to worry about retraining workers once the market returns to normal (Seleznow 2013). The government, who is concerned about unemployment, economic output and citizens' well-being, can keep unemployment low and not have to worry as much about business or labor (Cahuc and Carcillo 2011). Employees, who keep their jobs, generally have to work less with only a little cut in pay, but are not as at risk for health issues as they would be if unemployed nor do they have to worry about the stress of finding a new job (Seleznow 2013).

Short-time compensation is gaining ground in the United States. As of November 2014 and Oklahoma's repeal of its law, 28 states have short-time compensation laws (Seleznow 2013). Through the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, the United States federal government has essentially endorsed short-time compensation by providing financing to states that implement short-time compensation programs and promoting them. By providing states with short-time compensation funding, it also set up guidelines for these programs, one of which is monthly reporting on the status of short-time compensation from each state. As a result of the recession and this legislation, the number of short-time compensation states has grown from 17 in 2009, to 23 in 2012 to 28 in 2014 (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Ridley and Wentworth 2012, Seleznow 2013).

While short-time compensation has been implemented in numerous other industrialized countries, the American reforms can only be successful if they account for the unique perspectives that Americans have about work and welfare. So far, American short-time compensation systems primarily benefit state governments and, to a lesser

extent, employers (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman 2013). If these systems are not constructed in a way that encourages worker participation, it will be difficult for workers and unions to consent to such a new and unique system. Given these challenges, it is critical to understand what the workers themselves think about short-time compensation and what factors may make such a program acceptable to them.

This thesis gathered survey data to investigate American willingness to participate in such a program and what attributes found in other countries' programs they find palatable. Because multiple workers in similar states were surveyed online, the data show what various workers need from a short-time compensation program. These data could be used to construct unique and effective policies that best fit the needs of American workers, both in states that have not yet implemented short-time compensation and those that have.

The material for this survey was generated from some other countries' implementations of short-time compensation. Short-time compensation is found in numerous industrialized countries besides Germany. For example, France, Belgium and Italy all have short-time compensation programs (Abraham and Houseman 2013). Countries heavily influenced by British culture (namely Ireland, Canada and the United Kingdom) instituted a similar program as well (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Calavrezo, Duhautois and Walkowiak 2010). Even former Communist Bloc countries, the Czech Republic and Austria, operate some kind of short-time compensation system (Abraham and Houseman 2013). While the program is generally successful throughout OECD countries, the United States lacks a national short-time compensation system.

Though short-time compensation is more commonly found in countries that are considered more economically liberal than the United States, its implementation varies widely among the states, often independent of political ideology (Abraham and Houseman 2013). For example, Rhode Island, a blue state, is one of the largest proponents of short-time compensation, an idea first implemented in the United States in California, another generally liberal state. Texas, a red state, also has short-time compensation, as does the generally conservative Alaska. Meanwhile, Illinois and Delaware, two of the more liberal states have not implemented this type of unemployment. Indiana and Utah, two very conservative states, have not either.

Short-time compensation is quickly becoming a hot issue. It has been researched by a variety of organizations, some of which have received grants for their research from organizations such as the Ford Foundation. However, this research has generally focused on how short-time compensation affects businesses and governments (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman and Brusentsev 2009, Vroman 2013). Little has been done in regard to the workers' opinions of this unemployment system. Most of the research on workers has been done in other countries (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Cahuc and Carcillo 2011, Calavrezo, Duhautois and Walkowiak 2010, Reid 1982, Social Protection 2014, Vroman and Brusentsev 2009, Vroman 2013). Because American workers are less likely to belong to a union or are more likely to look at their situation from an inherently independent standpoint (Gao 2015), previous research will not be particularly useful in crafting work-sharing policies that are supported and utilized by both American businesses and American workers.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Effects of Unemployment on American Workers

Since short-time compensation is a method by which governments and businesses can reduce unemployment, it is important to first understand the role that unemployment has in the public sphere. Since the early 1990s, employers have been using permanent layoffs to reduce staffing levels, as opposed to temporary layoffs. Had employers used temporary layoffs during the late-2000s recession at the same rate as they had in the recessions of 1970, 1974, 1980 and 1982, 1.34 million more people would have been temporarily laid off in 2010, while 1.43 million fewer people would have found themselves permanently laid off (Vroman 2013).

As a whole, unemployment affects workers in several, generally negative ways. Unemployed workers face difficulty in finding reemployment, encountering frequent and prolonged periods of unemployment. They are also more likely to face serious health risks. Displaced older, male workers are more likely to die in the years following a job loss than workers who do not lose their jobs (Sullivan and Von Wachter 2009). Many of these deaths are from suicide. Classen and Dunn (2012) found that the suicide rate for males increased by 1.5 percent for every 10 percent increase in the unemployment rate. While that may seem like a relatively small increase in the suicide rate, their research shows that unemployment is the most important force in the relationship between the risk of suicide and the lack of a job (Hassett and Strain 2014). An increase in similar health illnesses and issues have been linked with joblessness, specifically cancer, heart attacks and psychiatric problems (Hassett and Strain 2014). This is further compounded by the fact that the unemployed are likely to lose health insurance (Vroman 2013).

Unemployment can also cause negative non-health related social outcomes. For example, unemployment can cause workers to retire earlier (Vroman 2013), but can also increase the possibility of divorce following a husband or wife's job loss. Another negative outcome is that children of fathers who have lost of job tend to have 10 percent lower earnings as adults (Hassett and Strain 2014).

Worse yet, the unemployed have difficulty finding new employment. Employers tend not to hire those who have been unemployed long term more than six months. Firms often do not interview the long-term unemployed. The length of unemployment also causes skills and professional networks to decay (Hassett and Strain 2014). This is partially because most people who lose their jobs expect to be rehired by the same employer who laid them off. A survey showed that at least 75 percent of laid off manufacturing workers are rehired by their previous employer (Feldstein 1976). While this generally happens during times of layoffs, the recent recession has been unusually harsh for workers, prompting employers to forego rehiring those they laid off for savings.

These problems are further exacerbated by the United States' actions towards the length of unemployment insurance. Following the advent of the crisis, the U.S. government extended unemployment benefits from 26 weeks to 99 weeks as a means to help those who lost their jobs to transition back into a growing economy. However, research shows that an increase in one week of potential unemployment benefits caused unemployment to last an additional fifth of a week (Katz and Meyer 1990), and lead to a slight increase in unemployment of no more than .5 percentage points (Rothstein 2011). As a result, an increase in unemployment benefits is indirectly correlated with many negative outcomes for the unemployed. However, proponents of expanded benefits

counter that this is not truly a negative outcome. Marston et al. (1975) cite that workers that receive benefits may stay unemployed longer than they normally would because benefits may allow them to be more selective about jobs they will accept. Simultaneously, workers will also have longer to decide if they want to withdraw from the workforce entirely (or decide earlier but continue to draw benefits).

The existence of unemployment benefits also gives employers some relief too. Research has shown that the American unemployment insurance system subsidizes layoffs (Abraham and Houseman 2013). Employers rely on layoffs as opposed to other methods of wage control (such as worksharing, whether subsidized with short-time compensation or not). While it is true that employers repay states' unemployment insurance fund through UI taxes, these payments are often spread out over many years and are interest free. Furthermore, because there are maximum and minimum limits, companies can layoff additional workers without taking on too much of a financial penalty. Because the United States has very weak employment protection laws, employers generally have an easier time terminating employment, unlike in other countries with stronger laws. Layoffs may also be easier and less cumbersome for companies that wish to implement wage controls than other methods like work sharing. Workers in states that do not have short-time compensation are unwilling to utilize furloughs or other work-sharing methods because they do not receive any funding for their sacrifices (Abraham and Houseman 2013). Furthermore, collective-bargaining agreements often have clauses that require firms to lay off workers before cutting hours (Feldstein 1976). Therefore, workers are more likely to desire layoffs while businesses see more financial advantages to layoffs than to other wage control methods. Some, such

as Feldstein (1976), argue that the U.S. unemployment compensation system has done more to increase unemployment than to decrease it.

Short-Time Compensation Systems in Other Countries

While many of these issues and attributes are found in unemployment compensation systems throughout the world, they are not as severe in many systems. This is partially due to other countries' use of short-time compensation systems. Of 30 OECD member countries, 24 offered short-time compensation programs during 2010. These countries included the aforementioned Germany and Czech Republic, Canada, Finland, Japan, and Mexico, indicating that short-time compensation is found in a number of cultures with differing economic histories (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman and Brusentsev 2009, Vroman 2013). Provisions of the programs varied between the countries, but almost all of them made some adjustments to their systems in the midst of the Great Recession. These modifications include lengthening the potential duration of plans (to 52 weeks in Canada and 24 months in Germany) or providing funding for training, as in Hungary and the Czech Republic (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009).

Many of these changes are associated with greater short-time compensation usage. For example, Vroman and Brusentsev (2009) report several features of short-time compensation systems that lead to greater usage. All of these features can be seen as worker-centric, focusing mostly on payments to workers and flexibility in hours. However, one of the primary features associated with higher usage is worker training, likely because replacing work hours with training allows both workers and employers to feel as though they still have a full shift even when hours have been reduced.

In Germany, short-time compensation use helped increase employment by an estimated 250,000 to 400,000 workers in 2009 by having 1.14 million workers participate in the program (Vroman 2013). However, this employment increase may be short lived, as evidence from Canada's program shows that half of short-time compensation participants are unemployed within six months of the completion of a short-time compensation plan. Furthermore, their duration on unemployment compensation is the same as those who were initially laid off (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009).

Short-time compensation has had some success during previous major economic crises. Germany, for instance, began the program in West Germany in the 1950s (although remnants of it date back to the 1920s). Following the German reunification in the early-1990s, a special and more generous form of short-time compensation was used in the Eastern German states until the West German program replaced it in 1992. Though is had several million participating in the program in East Germany in the early 1990s, monthly use averaged less than 100,000 between 1994 and the onset of the recession (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). The German system, like most short-time compensation systems, is generally flexible, allowing minute changes between a company and a union or works council without governmental approval. Similarly, the system is designed to be efficient. For example, in Germany, workers do not have to apply for separate unemployment compensation; the unemployment compensation in the German system is provided directly to German companies and paid as a part of a regular paycheck.

However, Germany is a less-than-ideal country to look to for short-time compensation guidance for the United States. Germany has stronger workplace

protections for employees, a stronger social safety net (especially in terms of social insurance for retired workers and health insurance), and more robust unions that have greater access to the inner-workings of a company through the use of a works council. Rather, for short-time compensation guidance, it would be better to compare the United States to Canada. Though Canada shares some attributes of a strong social safety net with Germany, it is closer culturally with the United States. Canada's short-time compensation was founded and trialed in the late 1970s-early 1980s, prior to the institution of some social welfare reforms (notably, Canada's single payer health insurance system). Reid (1982) looked at the trial run and how it affected those participating. He reported that business groups generally found short-time compensation to be helpful because they had a net reduction in operating costs. The government also approved of the system because it reduced unemployment and spread the effects of a downturn in production to many employees. It did increase unemployment insurance costs, but only because of the special and generous conditions to promote the trial run. In a non-trial environment, the costs of operating the program would not be much more than normal unemployment, but would decrease unemployment by 1 to 2 percent. Most importantly to this research, workers generally approved of the trial run, since they often worked one less day per week but only sacrificed 5 percent of post-tax earnings, indicating that employees preferred short-time compensation to full unemployment. Employees also had the ability to maintain contact with their workgroup and avoid the aforementioned social problems associated with job loss.

During this experiment, though, national unions (such as the Canadian Labor Congress) opposed the short-time system while local unions approved it. The CLC

worried about the long-term effects of such a system, mostly because they feared it would detract and weaken ongoing labor battles with the Canadian government. As a result, they referred to it as "poverty-sharing" and violations of the seniority principle (Reid 1982).

Short-Time Compensation in the United States

Conversely, the AFL-CIO was supportive of short-time compensation in the United States at that time. Following the Canadian trial, California became the first state to implement short-time compensation (Reid 1982). Over the next thirty years, almost 30 states passed similar legislation (although, the legislation was rolled back in several, notably Illinois and Oklahoma). Until 2012, states that had short-time compensation laws were found to have two statistically-significant factors: liberal leanings and Motorola factories. In the 1980s, Motorola implemented a "no layoffs" policy and heavily lobbied for states to set up these systems (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009, Vroman 2013). The fact that Illinois deviated from expectations and rolled back its short-time compensation law is interesting, considering its general liberal-leanings and the fact that Motorola was founded and headquartered in the Chicago suburbs. Presumably, Motorola was more interested in short-time compensation for its manufacturing plants, since this type of unemployment insurance is most often found in the manufacturing sector.

Of the nearly-30 states that have short-time compensation, Rhode Island stands out as the best example of an American success story. Rhode Island is the only state to consistently have at least 1 percent of its Unemployment Insurance payments to be from short-time compensation use. By 2009, though, many other states had rates above 1 percent while Rhode Island's short-time compensation payments climbed to 4 percent of

unemployment (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). While not comparable to the likes of Germany and other heavy short-time compensation use countries, Rhode Island's rate is comparable to some European countries that have this type of system, notably France and the Netherlands (Abraham and Houseman 2013). Rhode Island argues that its use of short-time compensation saved the state nearly 14,000 jobs, preventing its already highest-in-the-nation unemployment rate from skyrocketing even more beyond 9.1 percent during the recession (Prah 2014).

Rhode Island's short-time compensation success is the result of intense advertisement from the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, the department that oversees short-time compensation. They advertise short-time compensation through their website and other employer materials and highlight the successful stories of companies that have used it. When they learn of an employer who is looking to layoff employees, they intervene and promote short-time compensation to both the employer and its workers as an option for these companies (Abraham and Houseman 2013, Vroman 2013).

Rhode Island's success and dedication to short-time compensation has also spread to federal legislation. Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island pushed for federal legislation for short-time compensation in both 2010 and 2011. Many of his provisions were included in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of February 2012. Specifically, the law provided funding for short-time compensation, federal responsibilities for promoting it, and federal standards for state programs that received federal money (Vroman 2013). As a result, the legislation gave federal approval to these types of programs and encouraged them to be a little bit more in line with other countries'

unemployment programs, which are run at the national level, not the state or provincial level as they are in the U.S.

However, there are still some barriers to their widespread use in the United States. One of the obvious obstacles to widespread short-time compensation use is the fact that it is not legal in every state. Though federal financing has enticed several states to pass short-time compensation laws, some states still face roadblocks and others are repealing their laws (Wentworth, McKenna and Minick 2014). Similarly, American short-time compensation programs are often not enticing to employers or employees.

Americans are more averse to social welfare programs than people of other countries. As short-time compensation is currently organized in the United States, those who had their hours reduced as part of a short-time compensation agreement would have to apply for unemployment separately. The extra step of doing so, plus the stigma attached with it, may inhibit some Americans from doing so. Vroman and Brusentsev (2009) report that countries that direct the short-time compensation payments through employers have a higher use of short-time compensation. Simultaneously, American workers may be apprehensive about short-time compensation because it may limit their unemployment compensation if they were to lose their jobs. Though a worker on short-time compensation would use their unemployment benefits at a slower rate than those who are fully unemployed (calculated on the full time equivalency of the time they are shorted), they may still fear that their employer will not be able to retain them at the end of the short-time compensation period and the short-time compensation would possibly cut several weeks worth of unemployment. Similarly, Vroman and Brusentsev argue that short-time compensation is used more in countries (like Canada and most European

countries) that separate short-time compensation from regular unemployment compensation.

Simultaneously, Abraham and Houseman (2013) report that senior employees may be less willing to support short-time compensation because they are less likely to be affected by layoffs. Short-time compensation was used in the 1930s, but fell out of favor for the union-negotiated seniority system, which has persisted to this day. In fact, 78 percent of union hourly groups were covered by written policies specifying seniority to be the primary factor in determining layoffs. In 74 percent of collective bargaining contracts, seniority solely determined who was laid off. Studies show that the seniority principle is entrenched with both union and nonunion groups, who both say that junior employees should be let go before senior employees (Abraham and Medoff 1984). However, because of the seniority system, employers may be more willing to support short-time compensation since they can save more money by cutting the hours of all workers (including the most senior and highest paid employees) than by cutting the jobs of the least-senior and least-paid employees.

Furthermore, any use of short-time compensation counts against an employers unemployment experience rating in the United States. As a result, the effect of short-time compensation may affect their unemployment taxes the same as normal unemployment. Previously, states instituted short-time compensation taxes to fund this program, but discontinued them after discovering that short-time compensation costs were low (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). Employers may also hesitate to use short-time compensation because they cannot remove benefits from workers in a short-time compensation contract. This is not a fundamentally large issue for benefits that scale

(such as matching a percentage of income in a pension fund), but is problematic for flat costs, such as health insurance. By laying off workers, employers can remove all benefit costs. Employers may be unwilling to support short-time compensation because cutting everyone's hours could cause the most productive and skilled workers to seek employment elsewhere. With layoffs, employers can choose who to keep and who to drop. Employers may also just lay off workers to avoid the paperwork of a short-time compensation agreement (Abraham and Houseman 2013). Finally, firms may layoff workers to better organize their companies, focusing on their strengths and shedding their weaknesses. By instituting a short-time compensation strategy, they may not be able to increase their efficiency as easily (Hassett and Strain 2014).

Ultimately, unemployment has many concerning effects on workers that short-time compensation has been able to fix in other countries. Short-time compensation is available in the U.S., but only to about 70 percent of the population (with Illinois and North Carolina, two very populous states, being outliers that do not offer this form of unemployment insurance) (U.S. Census Bureau 2014, Wentworth, McKenna and Minick 2014). Even then, usage is far lower than in comparable industrialized countries. Though the U.S. federal government is pushing for short-time compensation by offering financial incentives, and states are implementing it, there is no guarantee that these programs will be used or even be successful in the U.S. The success of this form of unemployment may depend on the willingness of workers to participate in it.

SPECIFIC AIMS

Because short-time compensation is a relatively new and underused phenomenon in the American labor market, a study of workers would have to include elements of deductive and inductive research. Thus, this research is based on a series of research questions.

1) How comfortable would Americans be accepting short-time compensation benefits?
    a. What kind of reduction in hours would be most palatable to them?
    b. Would workers seek out other employment opportunities if they faced a reduction in hours?
2) How would American workers views on short-time compensation change if certain elements of other countries' systems were part of the equation?
    a. Would they feel more supportive of short-time compensation if governments and employers offered training in lieu of a day off?
    b. Would they be more supportive of it to if it did not cut into their regular unemployment benefits?
3) How comfortable would American workers be applying for unemployment insurance if they were on short-time compensation?
    a. Would they feel more comfortable if unemployment payments were routed through their employers?
4) Does seniority affect the views of short-time compensation?
    a. Would senior employees prefer layoffs instead?
    b. Does union membership affect views?

5) How do views of short-time compensation differ between industries?
    a. Would lower-class workers favor short-time compensation at higher levels than upper-class workers?
    b. Would upper-class workers want to use it at all?
6) How do views of short-time compensation change depending on political ideology?
    a. Is there any difference in support from conservatives and liberals?
    b. Will each group support different potential aspects in a short-time compensation system?
    c. Does a state's political climate and ideological leanings affect how people feel about short-time compensation?

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The primary difficulty with this project is reaching out to workers across state lines. Because short-time compensation and many other labor laws are implemented at the state level, workers from different states have vastly different experiences that might change their perspectives on short-time compensation. For example, Indiana and Illinois have differing laws on labor union organization by nature of their possession and lack of a right-to-work law, respectively. Because Illinois workers have a slightly easier time unionizing and staying unionized than Indiana workers, they may feel differently about short-time compensation and whether they would be willing to participate in it or unionize and have a collective bargaining team find an alternative. Thus, to create research flexible enough to be used in any given state for the implementation of short-time compensation, this research should not be limited to just one state.

This issue inhibits the research process. Resources are not easily available to talk to workers in multiple states. In-person interviews would be unfeasible for financial reasons. Telephone conversations could be used, but workers may be unwilling to talk on the phone for an extended period of time. Telephone conversations run into issues of response rate, where response rate drops an average of 7 percent for every ten minutes on the phone (McCarty et al. 2006). Similarly, telephone conversations would exhaust time, money and other resources.

Thus, the data for this study were collected through the use of an online survey. The researcher developed the study within the Qualtrics survey platform and posted it on Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform. Admittedly, one could argue that an online survey caters to certain demographics and that the digital divide limits access from

certain types of people, notably minorities and the working class. However, Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling's (2011) research shows that MTurk tends to generate samples with at least a third non-white participants and a mean age of approximately 33 years. As a result, it is likely to capture a number of workers who have relatively low-to-mid seniority that would be likely candidates for layoffs.

The survey was uploaded to Amazon's MTurk service and open to participants between April 23, 2015 and May 24, 2015. During the first two weeks, participants were rewarded 40 cents for completing the survey. During this time, the response rate was very low, so the compensation amount was increased to $1 for the rest of the survey.

Respondents who selected the survey were taken to the survey in Qualtrics (chosen because the IU data stewards have approved Qualtrics for HIPAA and FERPA data collection (Bryner 2014) and asked to agree to an informed consent page. After doing so, they were asked several questions to gauge eligibility, including their unique MTurk ID number. This was to ensure that no participant would try to "brute-force" their way into the survey by trying eligibility combinations until they entered on that would grant them access. As a result, the researcher was able to ensure that no worker tried to attempt the survey more than once. Those that did try and were successful had their responses rejected and their final results filtered out of the final sample. Altogether, 4,261 ineligible attempts were made to complete the survey.

To ensure that respondents took the questions seriously and did not randomly click answers, a control question (or attention check) was placed approximately two-thirds through the survey. Most participants who completed the survey completed the attention check correctly. As Buhrmester, Kwang and Gosling (2011) show, many MTurk

participants do not complete surveys for the money, but because they enjoy taking surveys. Those who did not answer this question correctly were rejected and their final results filtered out of the final sample.

At the completion of the survey, participants were given a four-digit completion code to enter into the Amazon MTurk system to be compensated for their time. Upon doing that, Amazon notified the researcher of a completion. The researcher then checked the Mturk number and the four-digit completion to ensure a match and double-checked the eligibility responses were within the sampling frame, that the MTurk ID number had not been entered into a previous response and that the quality control question was correctly answered.

Following the completion of the data collection, the researcher completed this checking process a second time and divided the eligible and completed data from the ineligible data.

The survey was constructed using topics and issues common throughout the literature on short-time compensation. Questions were generally original to the survey. Responses were generally ordinal in nature, based on a five-point Likert scale. Several questions, such as one asking the maximum number hours a respondent would allow to be reduced, were ratio variables. The demographic questions were structured from standardized questions provided by SurveyMonkey and were generally nominal or ordinal in nature. Respondents also had the option to answer "Don't Know" or "Prefer Not to Say" on most questions. Exceptions were eligibility questions and some demographic questions where participants were expected to know the answer, such as

gender (although they were allowed to respond “Prefer Not to Say”). The questionnaire, as it appeared in Qualtrics, is available in the Appendix.

SAMPLE

To be eligible for this survey, respondents had to be a full-time employee (working approximately 40 hours per week in one job) in the Midwestern states of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Michigan. Full-time employees were sampled because they are the focus of short-time compensation.

This project is focusing on workers in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio primarily because these four states, being Midwestern Great Lakes states, have similar economies. Illinois and Indiana have not implemented short-time compensation, while Michigan and Ohio have. Illinois and Michigan tend to be liberal leaning, while Indiana and Ohio tend to lean conservative. Each state has at least one major city or metropolitan area, but is still fairly rural. As a result, these states have similar economies and face similar issues, making them ideal candidates for comparison.

The original parameters in MTurk simply required that a respondent had at least a 95 percent approval rating on previous MTurk tasks. This, however, resulted in many responses coming from IP addresses located on the Indian subcontintent. While some responses could have come from that area of the world due to travelling workers and the use of IP address-masking techniques (such as a Virtual Private Network or VPN), the proportion of responses coming from India to those originating in the United States was too high. The researcher took that survey down and added a MTurk parameter requiring respondents to live within the United States or Canada (assuming that some Canadians worked in Michigan and would be eligible for the survey). The researcher used two responses in that initial survey that came from US-based IP addresses.

The sample ultimately resulted in 298 completed surveys. This is more than the 241 responses required for a power analysis at the .05 level using six predictor variables, a power of 85 percent and an effect size of .065, between the small effect size of .02 and the medium effect size of .15.

Respondents hailed from each state. Table 1 shows the distribution of respondents. Ohio had the largest number of respondents, followed by Illinois, Michigan and then Indiana. In terms of population, Illinois has the highest, followed by Ohio, Michigan and then Indiana. As a result, the sample is slightly biased towards Ohio.

Table 1: State Distribution of Respondents

State	Frequency	Percent
Illinois	75	25.2
Indiana	53	17.8
Michigan	71	23.8
Ohio	99	33.2
Total	298	100

ANALYSIS

After data collection was complete, the data were entered into SPSS and cleaned up. A series of frequencies, crosstabs, regressions and ANOVAs were conducted on the data to generate the results.

When frequency tests and crosstabs were conducted, general descriptive statistics were also calculated, including percentages, means, medians and modes. These tests showed the respondents' general opinions about short time compensation and various elements that could be added to the system.

Regressions were used to show the relationships between two variables. Most of the regressions completed were simple regressions, although a multiple regression was done to show which variables have the largest influence on the overall acceptance of short-time compensation.

Finally, an ANOVA was completed to show how political ideology affects opinions of short-time compensation when income and education are involved. A second ANOVA was completed in order to show the difference in support within each political ideology in each state. This is necessary because a conservative in a traditionally liberal state like Illinois will likely be comparable to a moderate in a traditionally conservative state like Indiana.

Several variables were recoded during this process. A survey question that asked how many hours of short-time compensation would be acceptable to respondents was recoded to be an ordinal variable, while a question that asked respondents to list the industry they worked was recoded to consolidate options with less than five responses

into a general other category. This recoding allowed for better organization and more clarity of the results.

RESULTS

Specific Aim 1 and Sub-aims 1a and 1b

How comfortable would Americans be accepting short-time compensation benefits? What kind of reduction in hours would be most palatable to them? Would workers seek out other employment opportunities if they faced a reduction in hours?

Table 2 reports these findings. Nearly half, 46.6 percent of respondents, would be very comfortable accepting short-time compensation benefits. Furthermore, another 29.8 percent would be comfortable. Ultimately, this means that approximately 76 percent of respondents would be comfortable accepting short-time compensation benefits. Conversely, only 14.7 percent would be uncomfortable or very uncomfortable accepting these benefits.

However, while they may be comfortable using short-time compensation, these data do not show the specifics of their comfort. While they may be comfortable with the general idea of short-time compensation, they may feel differently when faced with it in their work lives. Thus, they were asked to identify the exact number of reduced hours they would feel uncomfortable with the short-time compensation agreement. The data they provided was recoded into ordinal ranges for clarity purposes (See Table 3).

Table 2: Comfort of Acceptance

Response	Frequency	Percent
Very Uncomfortable	14	4.8
Uncomfortable	29	9.9
Neither Uncomfortable nor Comfortable	26	8.9
Comfortable	87	29.8
Very Comfortable	136	46.6
Total	290	100

Table 3 reports that approximately a third of Midwestern workers would be most comfortable with a reduction of between 11 and 20 percent of their hours. Another 23.4 percent would be comfortable with a reduction of more than 0 percent but less than 10 percent of their hours. Notably, 12.9 percent of workers indicated that they would be uncomfortable with any reduction in their hours.

While workers appear to be comfortable with some short-time compensation, they may still doubt the long-term viability of their employer and may look for alternative employment. To track this, the researcher asked participants of their likelihood in searching for both a part-time and full-time job. The data were then organized into a crosstab (Table 4) to show the likelihood of a respondent looking for either.

Table 3: Maximum Hours Reduced

Response	Frequency	Percent
0 (I would feel uncomfortable with any reduction)	37	12.9
Between 0 and 10 percent of hours	67	23.4
Between 11 and 20 percent of hours	100	35.0
Between 21 and 30 percent of hours	41	14.3
Between 31 and 40 percent of hours	23	8.0
Between 41 and 50 percent of hours	18	6.3
Total	286	100

Respondents generally noted that they would be either likely or very likely to look for a part-time job or a new full-time job. Approximately 16 percent of respondents said they would be very likely to look for both. Meanwhile, approximately 10 percent said they were very likely to look for a full-time job, but only likely to look for a part-time job. Approximately 11 percent said they would be very likely to look for a part-time job and likely to look for a full-time job. Nearly 14 percent said they would be likely to do so on both measure. Combined, 50.9 percent said that they were either likely or very likely to look for a full-time and part-time job.

Table 4: Likelihood of looking for other job

		Likelihood of looking for a full-time job					Total
		Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Neither Unlikely nor Likely	Likely	Very Likely	
Likelihood of looking for a part-time job	Very Unlikely	2.5%	0.7%	0.4%	0.7%	1.4%	5.8%
	Unlikely	1.8%	3.3%	2.9%	5.8%	0.7%	14.4%
	Neither Unlikely nor Likely	0.7%	3.3%	4.0%	1.8%	1.8%	11.6%
	Likely	0.4%	6.9%	5.4%	14.1%	10.1%	36.8%
	Very Likely	0.4%	1.8%	2.5%	10.8%	15.9%	31.4%
Total		5.8%	15.9%	15.2%	33.2%	30.0%	100.0%

Conversely, only 8.3 percent said that they were very unlikely or unlikely to look for a part-time and a full-time job. On each metric individually, less than a fifth of respondents were unlikely or very unlikely to look for a part-time job and slightly more than a fifth were unlikely or very unlikely to look for a full-time job.

Specific Aim 2 and Sub-aims 2a and 2b

How would American workers views on short-time compensation change if certain elements of other countries' systems were part of the equation? Would they feel more supportive of short-time compensation if governments and employers offered training in lieu of a day off? Would they be more supportive of it to if it did not cut into their regular unemployment benefits?

Because other short-time compensation systems have various elements that affect workers, and those elements have contributed to and detracted from their success, respondents were asked if they would be more or less accepting of short-time compensation if these various elements were included. These responses were analyzed as frequencies in SPSS and the mean and medians were calculated (See Table 5).

Generally, these elements did not significantly affect opinions of short-time compensation. Table 5 show the means of all of them ranged between 3 and 4, meaning that respondents leaned to be more accepting of the system with these elements, but not by much. The most influential items were the proposals that the government pay short-time benefits directly to workers (Mean 3.74), that workers or a union must agree to participate in a short-time compensation program (Mean 3.72) and that employers file for short-time benefits for their employees (Mean 3.65). Conversely, the least influential item was the proposal that workers apply for their benefits individually, getting a mean of 3.04. Notably, all elements had approximately 50 percent or more of respondents say that they would be more accepting or far more accepting of these elements, except for the suggestion that workers apply for benefits individually (which had a combined more accepting value of only 34.7 percent).

However, Table 5 also shows the relationship of training programs and short-time compensation for sub-aim 2a. The data show that workers would be more accepting of short-time compensation if they had the option to participate in training programs, with over 78 percent of respondents favoring the option with a mean of 4.14. However, they would oppose mandatory participation in a training program, with only about 26 percent of respondents being more accepting of the program with that requirement (Mean 2.70).

For the second sub-aim of the question, 2b, workers were asked if they would be more accepting of short-time compensation benefits if those benefits did not count against future unemployment benefits. This element of short-time compensations was the most popular, with 57.34 percent of respondents answering far more accepting and

another 26.92 percent answering more accepting (for a combined more accepting total of 84.26 percent, Mean 4.34).

Table 5: Acceptance of various STC elements

	Far Less Accepting	Less Accepting	Neither Less nor More Accepting	More Accepting	Far More Accepting	Total	Mean
Workers/Union must collectively agree to short-time compensation program	3.9%	8.5%	24.2%	38.1%	25.3%	281	3.72
STC-using companies must pay more in unemployment insurance premiums	4.0%	14.4%	31.4%	31.4%	18.8%	277	3.47
STC benefits are paid to employer, who pays them to workers through regular paychecks	6.0%	14.0%	27.0%	35.8%	17.2%	285	3.44
Employers file for employees' STC benefits	5.6%	12.5%	19.8%	35.8%	26.4%	288	3.65
Workers apply for STC benefits individually	8.6%	28.2%	28.5%	19.6%	15.1%	291	3.04
The government pays STC benefits directly to workers	3.8%	9.8%	26.8%	27.9%	31.7%	287	3.74
Workers have the option to participate in training programs	1.1%	1.1%	18.5%	41.6%	37.8%	286	4.14
Workers must participate in training programs in lieu of reduced hours	19.2%	29.7%	25.5%	12.9%	12.6%	286	2.7
Unemployment benefits used through STC do not count against future full-time unemployment insurance benefits	2.8%	2.8%	9.8%	26.9%	57.3%	285	4.34

Specific Aim 3 and Sub-aim 3a

How comfortable would American workers be applying for unemployment insurance if they were on short-time compensation? Would they feel more comfortable if unemployment payments were routed through their employers?

While the previous specific aims show that Americans would be comfortable with the system and various aspects of it, this one shows how comfortable workers would be actually acting in the system by applying. To do this, workers were asked how comfortable they would be applying for short-time compensation and analyzed the results using frequencies (See Table 6).

Table 6 shows the majority of people, 52.8 percent, said they would be very likely to apply for short-time compensation. Another 30.3 percent said they would be likely to, for a total of 83.1 percent who would be either likely or very likely to apply. Only 12.4 percent said that they would be unlikely or very unlikely to apply for short-time benefits.

Table 6: Likelihood of Application

Response	Frequency	Percent
Very Unlikely	15	5.2
Unlikely	21	7.2
Neither Unlikely nor Likely	13	4.5
Likely	88	30.3
Very Likely	153	52.8
Total	290	100

However, as shown in Specific Aim 2 and represented in Table 5, workers would be more accepting of short-time compensation if the benefits were paid to their employers and then included with their weekly pay. While only 17.19 percent said that they would be far more accepting of short-time compensation in this arrangement, 35.79 percent said they would be more accepting, for a total of 52.98 percent saying they would at least be more accepting of short-time compensation under this arrangement.

Specific Aim 4 and Sub-aims 4a and 4b

Does seniority affect the views of short-time compensation? Would senior employees prefer layoffs instead? Does union membership affect views?

The data thus far have suggested that workers generally support short-time compensation and would use it if necessary. However, there are likely several subgroups that do not support short-time compensation, such as those who have the most to lose from it. Thus, the role that seniority plays in acceptance of short-time compensation was analyzed. To study this, the researcher conducted several regression analyses using seniority as the independent variable and likelihood of application, comfort of acceptance and support within the workplace as dependent variables.

However, significance was not found for any of these regressions. Comparing seniority and likelihood of application resulted in a weak effect of .041 and a significance far beyond the standard .05 level. The analysis of the acceptance of short-time compensation was even weaker and less significant, with a correlation of -.032 and a significance of $p<.05$. Support in the workplace had a correlation of .038, but still had a significance of more than .05.

A similar regression analysis was conducted to analyze the relationship between seniority and preference of short-time compensation against layoffs. It had a moderate correlation (-.309) and was not significant (.757). Crosstabs showed that this was mostly because all levels of seniority supported short-time compensation over layoffs. As Table 7 shows, approximately 40 percent of respondents preferred short-time compensation to layoffs while another 34.57 percent indicated they strongly preferred short-time

compensation, for a combined total of 74.72 percent of respondents. The skewed distribution of results explains why the regression did not give significant results.

Table 7: Support for layoffs/short-time compensation by seniority

		If your workplace had to reduce worker hours, how would you prefer they do it?					Total
		Strongly prefer layoffs	Prefer layoffs	No preference	Prefer short-time compensation	Strongly prefer short-time compensation	
What percent of your coworkers in similar positions do you have seniority over in the case of layoffs?	0 to 19 percent	2.6%	6.0%	3.4%	15.6%	17.1%	44.6%
	20 to 39 percent	0.7%	2.2%	1.5%	10.4%	6.0%	20.8%
	40 to 59 percent	0.7%	1.9%	1.9%	6.0%	6.0%	16.4%
	60 to 79 percent	0.4%	0.4%	0.7%	4.5%	3.0%	8.9%
	80 to 100 percent	0.7%	1.5%	0.7%	3.7%	2.6%	9.3%
Total		5.2%	11.9%	8.2%	40.2%	34.6%	100.0%

While there was no significance in regards to seniority, there was some significance when comparing those that collectively bargain and their support for short-time compensation. A regression analysis with collective bargaining as the independent variable and likelihood of applying for short-time compensation resulted in a significance of less than .05 and a correlation of -.119, meaning that those that collectively bargained were more likely to apply for short-time compensation benefits.

However, other regressions that used collective bargaining status as an independent variable were not significant. An analysis comparing bargaining to comfort in accepting benefits had a correlation of -.083 and a significance of more than .05 while another analysis comparing bargaining and support within the workplace had a correlation of .014 and a significance of more than .05.

Specific Aim 5 and Sub-aims 5a and 5b

How do views of short-time compensation differ between industries? Lower-class workers favor it at higher levels than upper-class worker workers? Would upper-class workers want to use it at all?

While support for short-time compensation did not differ significantly based on seniority or collective bargaining status, it may differ based on the industry of a worker's employment. Thus, an ANOVA was conducted to test how industry might affect the likelihood of applying for short-time compensation. Income and Education were included in this analysis because of their effect on employment within an industry. To run the test, the researcher recoded the Industry variable, consolidating several low-response categories.

However, this test was not significant. Levene's test only gave a significance of more than .05, while the ANOVA listed significance of more than .05 for education, income and industry. This suggests that the variables can be treated equally across all industries.

To measure support between lower- and upper-class workers, simple regressions were conducted using both education and income variables. These variables were chosen for their commonality in measuring social class in other academic literature (Krieger, Williams and Moss 1997). These variables were not found to be significant. The only significant regression used education as an independent variable and likelihood to apply for short-time compensation as the dependent. The analysis found a small, negative correlation of -.119 and a significance of less than .05. This means that as workers become more educated, they report to be less likely to apply for short-time compensation.

Meanwhile, education was also tested as an independent variable and comfort in accepting benefits and support within the worker's place of employment as dependent variables (.087 correlation, $p<.05$; .068 correlation, $p<.05$, respectively). When running regressions using income as the independent variable, the researcher found a correlation of -.074 and significance of more than .05 when likelihood of applying for benefits was the dependent variable, a correlation of -.074 and a significance of more than .05 when comfortableness of accepting benefits was the dependent variable and a correlation of -.097 and a significance of more than .05 when support for short-time compensation in the workplace was the dependent variable.

Specific Aim 6 and Sub-aims 6a, 6b and 6c

How do views of short-time compensation change depending on political ideology? Is there any difference in support from conservatives and liberals? Will each group support different potential aspects in a short-time compensation system? Does a state's political climate and ideological leanings affect how people feel about short-time compensation?

Because unemployment and work are often tied into political issues, political ideology was used as an independent variable to see how it affected views of short-time compensation. This was done through a series of regressions and ANOVA tests.

Notably, the spectrum of responses on political ideology was fairly balanced in this study. Those who identified as extremely liberal or liberal made up 46.2 percent of the sample, those that identified as neither liberal nor conservative made up 22.9 percent and those who identified as conservative or extremely conservative were the remaining

30.8 percent. The survey was set up listing liberal values as low, so negative regressions mean that support increases as respondents become more liberal.

The first step in analyzing political ideology was to run regressions with it as the independent variable against likelihood to apply for benefits, comfortableness in accepting benefits, and support for short-time compensation within a workplace. All of these regressions were statistically significant, as Table 8 shows. The first regression, analyzing likelihood to apply showed that for every category a respondent moves towards liberal, there is a .163 increase in support for short-time compensation with a significance of less than .05. The second, analyzing comfortableness in accepting short-time compensation, had a .231 increase in short-time compensation support as a person became more liberal with a significance of less than .001. The third main regression, looking at support within a workplace, had a correlation of a .186 increase in support as a respondent grew more liberal, with a significance less than .01.

Table 8: Regression Results for Political Ideology and Support Variables

Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient
Likelihood in Applying for STC	-.163*
Comfortableness in Accepting STC	-.231***
Support in own Workplace	-.186**
**=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001*	

In terms of determining what aspects in a short-time compensation system would be supported based on political ideology, only three aspects were statistically significant. Table 9 shows that as a respondent became more liberal, there was a .207 increase in support for workers to collectively agree to participate in a short-time compensation program ($p<.01$). Similarly, as workers became more liberal, there was a .126 increase in support for the idea that unemployment benefits used during short-time compensation not

count against future benefits (p<.05). Nearly all of the other elements were supported by liberals more than non-liberals, but not at a statistically significant level.

Table 9: Regression Results for Political Ideology and Element Variables

Variable	Unstandardized Coefficient
Workers/Union must collectively agree to short-time compensation program	-.207**
STC-using companies must pay more in unemployment insurance premiums	-.112
STC benefits are paid to employer, who pays them to workers through regular paychecks	-.056
Employers file for employees' STC benefits	-.054
Workers apply for STC benefits individually	-.071
The government pays STC benefits directly to workers	-.066
Unemployment benefits used through STC do not count against future full-time unemployment insurance benefits	-.126*
Workers have the option to participate in training programs	-.014
Workers must participate in training programs in lieu of reduced hours	.187**
**=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001*	

Uniquely, the only element where support grew as a respondent became more conservative was the idea that workers must participate in training programs in lieu of reduced hours. As a respondent grew more conservative, there was a .187 increase in support for this idea (p<.01).

As previously stated, the definitions of political ideologies differ between states and a conservative in one state may be a moderate in another. Thus, to compare support within states, an ANOVA was done using support for short-time compensation within the respondents' workplaces as the dependent variable.

Levene's test gave a significance level of less than .05, making the ANOVA significant. Specifically, political ideology is significant (p<.01) but state of employment is not (p>.05). Thus, there is no significance between the states and respondents' political ideologies.

Comprehensive Analysis

Throughout the analysis, the researcher has generally focused on one variable's effect on another variable. The only times where multiple variables were simultaneously observed were the few ANOVAs that were conducted.

Thus, to best understand what is affecting views and opinions of workers, a series of multiple regressions was conducted to see which variables were the most influential in respondents' opinions. To do this, the researcher used education, income, seniority, collective bargaining status and political orientation as independents and measured their effect on likelihood to apply for short-time compensation, comfortableness in applying for short-time compensation, and support for short-time compensation in the workplace.

First though, several variables needed to be tested for multicollinearity. Because income and education are often highly correlated, they were tested for multicollinearity. In running these statistics, the VIF for these variables was approximately 1.000, smaller than the 10.000 that would reveal multicollinearity.

Table 10 shows the first multiple regression, which measured the variables' effects on likelihood to apply for benefits, had an overall significance of less than .05. Being significant, it showed that collective bargaining status and political ideology were significant in determining likelihood to apply for short-time compensation (at correlations of -.140 and -.175 and significance of $p<.05$ and $p<.01$, respectively).

Table 10: Multiple Regression Results on Likelihood to Apply

Variable	Regression Coefficient
Percentage of coworkers respondent has seniority over.	.064
Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreement	-.140*
Approximate household income	.017
Political Ideology	-.175**
Highest Level of Education	-.116
**=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001*	

The second multiple regression, shown in Table 11, which tracked comfort in applying for benefits, was also significant with an overall significance of less than .01. However, the only item within the model that was significant was political ideology, with a correlation of -.223 and a significance of less than .01.

Table 11: Multiple Regression Results on Comfort in Acceptance

Variable	Regression Coefficient
Percentage of coworkers respondent has seniority over.	-.011
Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreement	-.105
Approximate household income	.019
Political Ideology	-.223**
Highest Level of Education	-.083
**=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001*	

Table 12 shows that the third and final multiple regression, which showed the effects on respondents' support to short-time compensation at work, was not significant with a significance of more than .05. The only significant element within the model was political ideology, with a correlation of -.166 and a significance of less than .05. This is irrelevant because of the overall significance of the regression.

Table 12: Multiple Regression Results on Support STC Use in the Workplace

Variable	Regression Coefficient
Percentage of coworkers respondent has seniority over.	-.010
Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreement	.025
Approximate household income	-.044
Political Ideology	-.166*
Highest Level of Education	-.033
**=p<.05; **=p<.01; ***=p<.001*	

Using all of these data, worker opinions on short-time compensation become known. However, based on the previous research that others have done on governmental and business needs and actions in regards to short-time compensation, some of their

arguments are correlated with the needs and desires of workers. The next section will explain how these data connect with what we already know of short-time compensation.

DISCUSSION

If this research shows one thing, it is that American workers are very supportive of short-time compensation. The various frequencies conducted showed that Americans are generally supportive of short-time compensation. A majority of Midwestern workers would be either likely or very likely to apply for benefits and a similar majority would be comfortable or very comfortable in accepting them. More senior employees even supported short-time compensation. Those with higher household incomes, who would maybe be more senior or more vital to a business or would be able to stomach a loss of income, also supported short-time compensation.

However, there is still some evidence that workers would be wary about their situations. For example, a plurality of workers would accept a maximum reduction of hours between 11 and 20 hours while approximately a fourth would support a reduction of hours only if it was less than 10 percent of their total hours. To some extent, this can possibly be explained by survey participants thinking back to the example given in the survey in which workers had their hours cut by 20 percent. However, workers are generally worried about losing too much time. Is consistent with the finding that many workers indicated that they would look for either a supplemental part time job or an entirely new full-time job.

Furthermore, when asked about various elements of a potential short-time compensation system, workers indicated that they would be more accepting of short-time compensation if they could collectively agree to participate with other workers and if the government provided short-time compensation money directly to workers, and not route them through employers like some European countries. One of the higher-scoring aspects

was the preference that short-time compensation benefits would not count against future unemployment benefits. Another highly scoring element was that workers had the option for additional training when on short-time compensation.

In essence, these findings suggest two possible outcomes: that workers are less likely to trust their employers if part of a short-time compensation agreement and they are likely to want a backup plan. By saying that they would look for new jobs and desire training, workers are essentially arguing that the do not trust that they will be able to keep their jobs and want a backup plan in the form of either a new job or experience that could help them get a new job. They also are saying they don't trust their employer to make good decisions, hence the desire to collectively agree to short-time compensation and the desire to have their short-time benefits paid directly to them. This is presumably because workers feel that they cannot trust their employers after their employers made poor decisions that required the use of short-time compensation. This can be seen in the desire to have short-time benefits count separately from regular unemployment benefits; workers do not trust their employers to be able to keep them employed after the short-time agreement ends. The relationship between worker and employer in a short-time compensation agreement, specifically the role of worker trust, is something that should be focused on in future research.

The fact that seniority was not significant in any of the regressions indicates that senior workers are likely somewhat afraid of being laid off. If they felt that their jobs were safe, they would have been more supportive of layoffs, which would generally be the more self-interested option of the two. This is something that could be investigated further, because fear of layoffs likely plays into support of short-time compensation.

Similarly, the lack of significance among higher educated workers and higher paid workers may also indicate fears of losing their jobs or a lack of job security.

The two areas where there were some significance was when collective bargaining status was compared against reported likelihood to apply. Those that collectively bargain are more likely to apply for benefits. This may be because of a faith in or an allegiance to their unions, who would likely negotiate the terms of the short-time compensation agreement. Conversely, more educated individuals may be less likely to apply for short-time benefits. This may be because of lessened fears of a layoff, but could also be because of an expectation that they have the skills and experience that would get them another job if they lost theirs. Alternatively, pride could also be a factor that prevents them from being likely to apply for benefits or the knowledge of their employers' inner-workings that would allow them to predict how long a downturn would last.

The most conclusive findings of this research were in regards to political ideology and attitudes towards short-time compensation. Political ideology was statistically significant in regards to likelihood to apply for short-time benefits, comfort in accepting short-time benefits and accepting the policy in the workplace. The more liberal workers are, the more likely they are to support or favor these things. There was also significance in making employees agree to a short-time compensation agreement and having benefits not count against future unemployment benefits. Again, for these elements, the more liberal a person was, the more likely they were to support these elements.

This supports Vroman's (2013) findings that showed that short-time compensation was more likely to be adopted in liberal leaning states. Today, short-time

compensation is still more likely to be supported by those who lean liberal. Thus, it may not be surprising that the growth of short-time compensation was partially the result of a push by a Democratic Senator in a Democratic-controlled legislature during a Democratic presidency.

In regards to political ideology, though, the most interesting item is the statistical significance for support in mandatory training. The more conservative a person is, the more likely they are to support mandatory training in lieu of work for short-time benefits. This is particularly interesting because that option was the aspect that had the lowest support among potential aspects of a system and was the only one where the mean suggested that people would be less supportive of a short-time compensation system if that was a part of it.

The conservative support for mandatory training is something that should likely be followed up in future research. Why are conservatives more likely to support mandatory training? Do they feel like people should be doing something productive if they are receiving governmental money? Do they view short-time compensation as an unearned entitlement?

While this research shed some light into the thoughts of workers in regards to short-time compensation, it also generates more questions as to why they have those opinions and beliefs. Hopefully, these data can serve as a base for future research in the area of short-time compensation.

STUDY LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

There were some limitations to this research. Due to the use of an online survey, there are some concerns about sampling error and participant reliability. As previously mentioned, the Amazon MTurk system is generally representative and precautions were instituted to filter out unreliable data. However, there are several other larger issues that may affect results.

Notably, Illinois passed short-time compensation in its November 2014 veto session and has signed into law by governor Pat Quinn. Though the law passed unanimously in both chambers and was written in a manner that meant it could go into effect immediately, the government structures that operate the short-time compensation system have not agreed to any short-time agreements. The U.S. Department of Labor does not consider Illinois to be a work-sharing state (U.S. Department of Labor 2015). Therefore, the law passed in Illinois should not affect the survey's results in terms of worker experience and would only have a moderate effect on a respondent's knowledge of short-time compensation.

In addition, the researcher is generally in favor of short-time compensation. As a result, some of his bias may be prevalent in the survey or the examination of its findings, especially since he developed all of his questions by himself. However, he has developed skills that will assist him in keeping objective. His thesis committee has ensured that the survey and statistical interpretations stay objective and without favor or opposition to the topic being studied.

Respondents were asked their political ideology and these data were used in the analysis of short-time compensation. However, political ideology is a variable that has a

multitude of dimensions. This may cause some discrepancy in the reporting of ideology. For example, a participant may be economically liberal or moderate, but identifies as a conservative because of a conservative attitude on social issues. As a result, this question only measures very basic political attitudes. Future studies in this area should address this issue by asking about opinions on several other issues (such as support for unemployment compensation, welfare and taxes) and use the answers from these questions in combination with a political ideology question to better quantify political ideology.

Because future research will build off of this research, some of these limitations can be addressed. Additional knowledge of Amazon MTurk can ensure that the sample is of higher quality. Furthermore, because research has already been conducted on this topic, it may be easier to obtain external funding that would pay for more traditional survey methods that are phone-based or possibly interview-based.

As time goes on, it is to be expected that more states will pass short-time compensation. Thus, comparisons between states that have it and do not have it will be more difficult to conduct. However, by becoming more common, research can be retailored to ask if participants have heard of short-time compensation, if they have used it, or if they approve of their state's implementation of it. Participant knowledge of short-time compensation can become a metric by which its success can be measured. Presumably, if workers know of short-time compensation, then states and short-time compensation advocates are at least successful on informative front.

As short-time compensation becomes more common, standardized questionnaires will be developed to ask about it. This will make surveying about short-time compensation more reliable. Furthermore, if future research focuses on the areas listed in

the discussion section, then studies will bridge towards more established areas where standardized questions are more common. Ultimately, future data will be more reliable and easier to generate than it was for this study.

CONCLUSION

Short-time compensation assisted numerous countries in their economic recoveries around the world. If it had been more common and used more frequently in the United States, it is possible the U.S. could have avoided some economic difficulties during the recession and the following recovery and could have a stronger economy today. Notably, laws are being implemented to ensure that the U.S. will not make the same mistakes should the economy come crashing down again.

If that were to happen, or even if small downturns happen, Midwestern workers, and likely American workers overall are ready to use short-time compensation to their benefit. As this research shows, they would trust short-time compensation and support it even more if various elements were included with it. Simultaneously, this research theorizes that Midwestern workers would be skeptical of their employers' abilities to return to profitability if they needed to turn to short-time compensation. This could likely prevent short-time compensation from succeeding in the United States. Depending on how short-time compensation systems are crafted, this could also likely lead to the downfall of short-time compensation in the United States.

To generate short-time compensation success, though, liberals need to convince non-liberals of its strength. This will likely need to be done through massive state encouragement, similar to that of Rhode Island, and common usage of short-time compensation. If short-time compensation could become as commonly known as general unemployment benefits, it would likely be able to save many jobs, stimulate the economy and help workers feel confident about themselves. In conclusion, these data show that

there is potential for these programs in the United States. Employers and the State just need to work together to make them successful and beneficial to society.

APPENDIX: SAMPLE SURVEY

Study Information

Browser Meta Info

This question will not be displayed to the recipient.
Browser: **Chrome**
Version: **43.0.2357.124**
Operating System: **Macintosh**
Screen Resolution: **1680x1050**
Flash Version: **18.0.0**
Java Support: **1**
User Agent: **Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_10_4) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/43.0.2357.124 Safari/537.36**

You are being asked to participate in an academic study about your attitudes and opinions of a new type of unemployment insurance called short-time compensation in which a business can avoid layoffs by reducing hours for all workers. You will be asked to complete a questionnaire about short-time compensation and provide some demographic information. Your MTurk worker identification number will be collected to ensure that you do not complete the survey more than once. No other personally identifiable data will be collected and every attempt will be made to keep your worker identification number confidential.

You will be asked several questions to gauge eligibility. If you are eligible, the study will continue and you will be asked additional questions. Apart from the eligibility and quality control questions, all questions in this study are completely voluntary. You may skip any questions you do not feel comfortable answering and may quit at any time. The survey will take an average of 12-15 minutes to complete. You will be compensated $1 if you complete this study. However, there is at least one quality control question to ensure that you are attentive to the questionnaire that must be answered correctly. If these questions are not correctly answered, you will not be compensated. Also, each participant will only be allowed to complete the survey once and will only be compensated after submitting the survey code provided at the end of the full survey. This includes instances where the participant was originally found to be ineligible or when the participant answered questions as part of another or previous HIT.

This study is being completed by Andrew Drea of the Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis sociology department for the purpose of his master's thesis. If you have questions or comments, you may email him at adrea@iupui.edu. This study has been approved by the Indiana University Institutional Review Board (IRB #1503128488). Questions, comments or concerns about being a participant may be directed to the IRB at 317-274-8289. Thank you for agreeing to participate in our research. Before you begin, please note that the data you provide may be collected and used by Amazon as per its privacy agreement. Additionally, this research is for residents of the United States over the age of 18; if you are not a resident of the United States and/or under the age of 18, please do not complete this survey. If you consent to the above conditions, please click the next button below to take the survey.

Are you a full-time employee, working approximately 40 hours per week at a single job?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

2. In what state or U.S. territory do you currently work?

What is your Amazon MTurk worker identification number? This can be found under the "Your Account" tab in MTurk. It is required for you to be paid for the survey.

Main Survey

When people are laid off from their jobs, some people apply for unemployment insurance benefits while others do not. If you were laid off from your job, how likely would you be to apply for unemployment insurance?

- ○ Very Unlikely
- ○ Unlikely
- ○ Neither Unlikely nor Likely
- ○ Likely
- ○ Very Likely
- ○ Don't Know
- ○ Prefer Not to Say

If you were laid off from your job, how comfortable would you be accepting unemployment insurance benefits?

- ○ Very Uncomfortable
- ○ Uncomfortable
- ○ Neither Uncomfortable nor Comfortable
- ○ Comfortable
- ○ Very Comfortable
- ○ Don't Know
- ○ Prefer Not to Say

Recently, many states have been legalizing a form of unemployment insurance compensation known as short-time compensation or work-sharing. Short-time compensation is a method by which companies that need to lay off workers can avoid doing so by reducing everyone's hours. A state government would then compensate all workers for those reduced hours from their unemployment insurance systems. This, effectively, allows workers to "share" unemployment and ensures that nobody loses their job.

For example, say you work for a company that has 100 employees. If the company needed to cut labor costs by 20 percent, they could lay off 20 people and those people would apply for unemployment insurance. However, under short-time compensation, all 100 employees would reduce their hours by 20 percent (normally by giving each worker an additional day off each week). Each worker would then file for unemployment insurance benefits based on the loss of income. The government would then give each worker half of the income lost by the hours reduction.

This situation would exist for no more than a year, after which your company would either increase the hours of all employees back to their normal levels (if profits rise) or lay off some employees completely while others would be returned to full-time status (if profits do not rise).

If your workplace entered into a short-time compensation agreement as described above, how likely would you be to apply to the government for short-time compensation assistance?

- ○ Very Unlikely
- ○ Unlikely
- ○ Neither Unlikely nor Likely

- Likely
- Very Likely
- Don't Know
- Prefer Not to Say

How comfortable would you be accepting short-time compensation benefits?

- Very Uncomfortable
- Uncomfortable
- Neither Uncomfortable nor Comfortable
- Comfortable
- Very Comfortable
- Don't Know
- Prefer Not to Say

If your workplace had to reduce worker hours, how would you prefer they do it?

- Strongly prefer layoffs
- Prefer layoffs
- No preference
- Prefer short-time compensation
- Strongly prefer short-time compensation
- Don't Know
- Prefer not to say

Would you support or oppose of the use of short-time compensation in your workplace?

- Strongly Oppose
- Oppose
- No Preference
- Support
- Strongly Support
- Don't Know
- Prefer Not to Say

Which system do you think is more fair?

- Short-time compensation
- No preference
- Layoffs
- Don't Know

- ○ Prefer not to say

If your workplace participated in a short-time compensation system, how likely would you be to look for a part-time job to supplement your full-time job?

- ○ Very Unlikely
- ○ Unlikely
- ○ Neither Unlikely nor Likely
- ○ Likely
- ○ Very Likely
- ○ Don't Know
- ○ Prefer Not to Say

If your workplace participated in a short-time compensation system, how likely would you be to look for a new full-time job elsewhere?

- ○ Very Unlikely
- ○ Unlikely
- ○ Neither Unlikely nor Likely
- ○ Likely
- ○ Very Likely
- ○ Don't Know
- ○ Prefer Not to Say

Imagine your workplace participated in a short-time compensation agreement in which your hours were reduced and the government's unemployment insurance system paid you half of your hourly wage for those reduced/missing hours. How many hours would you be willing to have reduced before you felt uncomfortable working at your place of employment?

Some states and countries that offer short-time compensation (STC) have certain aspects of the program that the employer, the government and/or the worker must agree to before entering into the program. How would these aspects affect your acceptance of a short-time compensation program?

	Far Less Accepting	Less Accepting	Neither Less nor More Accepting	More Accepting	Far More Accepting	Don't Know	Prefer Not to Say
Workers/Union must collectively agree to short-time compensation program	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
STC-using companies have to pay more in unemployment insurance premiums	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
STC benefits are paid to employer, who pays them to workers through regular paychecks	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Employers file for employees' STC benefits	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Quality Control Question — Select "Less Accepting" Here	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Workers apply for STC benefits individually	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
The government pays STC benefits directly to workers	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Unemployment benefits used through STC do not count against future full-time unemployment insurance benefits	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Workers have the option to participate in training programs	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Workers must participate in training programs in lieu of reduced hours	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

What percent of your coworkers in similar positions do you have seniority over in the case of layoffs?

- ○ 0 to 19 percent
- ○ 20 to 39 percent
- ○ 40 to 59 percent
- ○ 60 to 79 percent
- ○ 80 to 100 percent
- ○ Don't Know
- ○ Prefer Not to Say

Are you covered by a union or other collective bargaining agreement in your workplace?

- ○ Yes
- ○ No
- ○ Don't Know
- ○ Prefer not to say

What is your gender?

- ○ Female
- ○ Male
- ○ Prefer Not to Say

What is your age?

- ○ 18 to 24
- ○ 25 to 34
- ○ 35 to 44
- ○

45 to 54

- ○ 55 to 64
- ○ 65 to 74
- ○ 75 or older
- ○ Prefer Not to Say

What is your ethnicity? (Please select all that apply.)

- ☐ American Indian or Alaskan Native
- ☐ Asian or Pacific Islander
- ☐ Black or African American
- ☐ Hispanic or Latino
- ☐ White / Caucasian
- ☐ Prefer Not to Say

What is the highest level of education you have completed?

- ○ Less than High School
- ○ High School / GED
- ○ Some College
- ○ 2-year College Degree
- ○ 4-year College Degree
- ○ Masters Degree
- ○ Doctoral Degree
- ○ Professional Degree (JD, MD)
- ○ Prefer Not to Say

What industry best fits your area of employment?

What is your approximate average household income?

- ○ $0-$24,999
- ○ $25,000-$49,999
- ○ $50,000-$74,999
- ○ $75,000-$99,999
- ○ $100,000-$124,999
- ○ $125,000-$149,999
- ○ $150,000-$174,999
- ○ $175,000-$199,999

- ○ $200,000 and up
- ○ Prefer Not to Say

How would you describe your political ideology?

- ○ Extremely liberal
- ○ Liberal
- ○ Neither liberal nor conservative
- ○ Conservative
- ○ Extremely conservative
- ○ Don't Know
- ○ Prefer not to say

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CURRICULUM VITAE

ANDREW J. DREA

EDUCATION

2015 MA, Sociology, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis
Thesis: Shared Unemployment: Attitudes Toward Short-Time Compensation
Committee: Peter Seybold (Chair), David Bell, Carrie Foote
Area of Concentration: Work and Organizations

2012 BA, Sociology and Anthropology, Monmouth College, Monmouth, Illinois
Undergraduate Thesis: Falling Short: Education and Economic Decline in Taylorville
Supervisor: Petra Kuppinger
Honors Thesis: Revolution in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and Political Revolt in the Arab World
Supervisor: Petra Kuppinger
Minor, Journalism

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Political Sociology
Organized Labor
Sociology of Media
Inequality
Research Methods
Social Theory

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

2014 – 2015 *Research Assistant* to Prof. Brian Steensland, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis.

2013 – 2015 *Teaching Assistant* to Prof. Robert Aponte, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis.

2014 *Survey Supervisor* for Profs. Dennis Watson and Emily Ahonen, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis.

2014 *Graduate Assistant* at Survey Research Center, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis.

2013 – 2014 *Research Assistant* to Prof. Robert Aponte, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis.

PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS

Professional Reports

Foote, Carrie E., Brianna McCaslin, **Andrew Drea**, Sgt. Sandra Shea Davis, Kenona Southwell, David B. Topp, Shelley MacDermid Wadsworth. 2014. "Navy and Marine Family Diversity Study Results." Prepared for the Military Family Research Institute at Purdue University. Indianapolis, Indiana.

Mitchell, Anne, Robbie Janik, **Andrew Drea**, Marissa Huth. 2014. "College Goal Sunday Program Evaluation 2014." Report for USA Funds, funder of national program, and to all state program coordinators. Indianapolis, Indiana.

Mitchell, Anne, Robbie Janik, **Andrew Drea**, Marissa Huth. 2014. "Indiana University Biomedical Gateway Program – Program Review." Report for external review committee. Indianapolis, Indiana.

Mitchell, Anne, Robbie Janik, **Andrew Drea**, Marissa Huth, Mary Cox. 2014. "Indiana University School of Nursing 360 Review." Report for review committee. Indianapolis, Indiana.

Mitchell, Anne, Robbie Janik, Marissa Huth, **Andrew Drea**. 2014. "Indiana University Five-Year Administrator Review." Report for review committee. Indianapolis, Indiana.

Mitchell, Anne, Robbie Janik, Marissa Huth, **Andrew Drea**, Mary Cox. 2014. "Attitudes toward Smoking in Public Places: Evansville, Indiana." Report for Indiana State Department of Health, University of Evansville, and Smokefree Communities of Evansville. Indianapolis, Indiana.

PRESENTATIONS

2012 Drea, Andrew. "Falling Short: Education and Economic Decline in Taylorville." Sociology and Anthropology Senior Research Seminar Presentations. May 10, 2012. Monmouth College, Monmouth Illinois.

2011 Drea, Andrew. "Revolution in 140 Characters or Less: Social Networking and Political Revolt in the Arab World." Honors Research Seminar Presentations. December 8, 2011. Monmouth College Monmouth, Illinois.

AWARDS AND GRANTS

2015 Ohio State University Fellowship, Ohio State University

2015 Graduate Scholar Award, Pennsylvania State University (Declined)

2015 IUPUI Sociology Thesis Grant, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis

2014 IUPUI University Fellowship, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis

2012 Dean Epley Award for Outstanding Work in Sociology, Monmouth College

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

2015 American Sociological Association

2015 American Association for Public Opinion Research

2015 Midwest Association for Public Opinion Research

SERVICE

University Level

2014 – 2015 *Student Representative*, IUPUI Sociology Graduate Committee, Indianapolis Indiana

2011 – 2012 *Member,* Monmouth College President's Student Advisory Council, Monmouth Illinois.

2008 – 2012 *Representative*, Associated Students of Monmouth College, Monmouth Illinois.

Community Level

2010 *Co-Founder*, Street Kid to School Kid, Thessaloniki Greece.

RELATED EXPERIENCE

2012 – 2013 *Copy Editor/Page Designer,* Gatehouse Media, Rockford Illinois

2011 – 2012 *Editor-in-Chief,* Monmouth College Courier, Monmouth Illinois

2011 *Reporting Intern,* The Breeze-Courier, Taylorville Illinois

2010 *Field Organizer*, Senator Demuzio Committee, Carlinville Illinois