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# Latinos, immigration policy, and geographic diversification: examining the effects of concentrated poverty, segregation, and low-skill employment on homicide

Raymond Barranco

*Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College*

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**LATINOS, IMMIGRATION POLICY, AND GEOGRAPHIC  
DIVERSIFICATION: EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF  
CONCENTRATED POVERTY, SEGREGATION, AND LOW-SKILL  
EMPLOYMENT ON HOMICIDE**

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the  
Louisiana State University and  
Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Sociology

by  
Raymond E. Barranco  
B.A., Louisiana State University, 2005  
M.A., Louisiana State University, 2007  
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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	ii
ABSTRACT .....	vi
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .....	1
CHAPTER 2: IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION, AND CHANGE IN U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY – THE EFFECT OF RECENT IMMIGRANTS ON HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION .....	4
2.1: Introduction.....	4
2.2: Latino Immigration in the 20 <sup>th</sup> Century .....	6
2.3: Latino Immigration and Crime .....	11
2.4: Limitations of Recent Immigration-Crime Research.....	15
2.5: Methods .....	17
2.5.1: Independent Variables .....	19
2.5.2: Control Variables .....	19
2.5.3: Traditional vs. New Destinations.....	20
2.6: Results.....	23
2.7: Discussion and Conclusion.....	28
2.8: Additional Analysis .....	32
CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION, SEGREGATION, AND U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY – EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF LATINO-LATINO INTERACTION ON HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION .....	36
3.1: Introduction.....	36
3.2: Latino Immigration in the 20 <sup>th</sup> Century .....	40
3.3: Latino Immigration and Crime .....	45
3.4: Limitations of Immigration-Crime Research.....	49
3.5: Latino Segregation and Crime .....	50
3.6: Concentration of Poverty and Crime .....	53
3.7: Methods .....	55
3.7.2: Independent Variables .....	57
3.7.3: Control Variables .....	60
3.8: Results.....	61
3.9: Discussion and Conclusion.....	73
CHAPTER 4: LATINOS, BLACKS, AND THE COMPETITION FOR LOW-SKILL JOBS – EXAMINING REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN THE EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION ON LOW-SKILL EMPLOYMENT .....	79
4.1: Introduction.....	79
4.2: Industrial Restructuring and Segregation .....	81
4.3: Latino Immigration and Labor Competition.....	82
4.4: Economic Deprivation and Crime .....	87
4.5: Methods .....	90

4.5.1: Independent Variables .....	91
4.5.2: Control Variables.....	92
4.6: Results.....	95
4.7: Discussion and Conclusion.....	104
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION .....	107
REFERENCES .....	110
VITA .....	125

## **ABSTRACT**

This study consists of three separate, yet interrelated analyses - all three examine the effects of Latino immigration. Since the mid-1980s, the pattern of settlement by Latino migrants has changed dramatically. These migrants are now settling in parts of the United States that have never before had significant Latino populations. This has led many to fear an increase in crime. Unfortunately, early explanations of immigration and crime focused on the experience of Eastern European immigrants. Therefore, it has not been clear whether the experience of Latino immigrants could be explained in the same way – especially with some researchers finding that immigrants now lower crime rates. However, most recent research on immigration has failed to analyze any of the new areas of settlement.

The first study examines immigration's effect on Latino homicide victimization by grouping migrants according to their period of entry into the United States. Results show that immigration has no effect in traditional areas, while only recent immigrant arrivals have an effect in new destinations. Preliminary results from an additional analysis suggest this could be due to changing emigration patterns in Mexico. Since 1990, more Mexican migrants have been coming from states with high levels of violence.

The second study attempts to explain the effects of immigration on Latino homicide with various measures of segregation. Given the beneficial nature of ethnic enclaves, it is assumed that contact between Latinos will lower homicide victimization. Results support this hypothesis, showing that Latino-Latino contact has a greater effect on homicide than Latino-White contact. However, the effect of recent immigrants in new destinations cannot be explained away by any of the segregation measures. As noted in the first analysis, a possible explanation is the changing emigration patterns of Mexico.

The third and final analysis examines how Latino immigration affects black homicide rates through competition for low-skill employment. Results show that when Latinos gain ground in low-skill employment relative to blacks, black homicide victimization increases. However, the findings apply only to metropolitan and new destination areas. Further analysis reveals that among the low-skill industries, the strongest effects are for Manufacturing/Construction and Services.

## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION**

The following study combines three separate, but interrelated analyses. The main question addressed by the three papers is how changes in immigration policy, and the U.S. Latino population, have affected homicide victimization rates. Throughout the three papers, two concepts play a central role in shaping the questions that are asked: (1) new versus traditional destinations and (2) the Latino paradox.

The main contribution of this study to the criminological literature is that it controls for and recognizes that there are two types of Latino communities. Previous research on Latinos has merely examined Latino communities in general, but when we construe Latino communities too broadly, and view them as one big, Spanish-speaking throng, we get mired in paradoxes and contradictions. This has led to the belief that there is a “Latino Paradox” (described below) – that Latinos are somehow immune from the causes of crime.

But if we liberate ourselves from the notion of a single Latino community in America, the puzzles evaporate and what remains is a rich and vibrant interpretation of Latino immigration and crime. Essentially, Latino immigrants split into two groups. Prior to 1990, Latino migrants followed well-worn paths to old and established immigrant communities. These host communities offered a culturally familiar setting, a common language, job opportunities, and a chance to interact with established Latinos who could help the newcomers accommodate to their new environment. But after 1990, a robust economy and restrictive government policies prompted a new wave of Latino migrants to settle in new and unfamiliar destinations, disconnected from the local community and unprotected by an umbrella of social control. With no insulation from a surrounding community, the voltage of their economic deprivation became

fully apparent. In some of these new places, Latinos were murdered at an alarming rate, similar to that of blacks.

For this reason, the present study recognizes that there are two distinct Latino communities – traditional destinations and new destinations. The differences between the two areas are one of the primary foci of this study. Many of the findings presented here suggest that, in general, new destinations are dangerous places for Latinos, while traditional destinations are safe havens. Although these new destinations may little resemble the robust and organized immigrant communities in traditional areas, I caution against taking this contrast too far. It is wrong to assume that traditional areas are always safe, bustling and well-organized Latino enclaves and new destinations are uniformly bleak, dusty outposts of violence and lawlessness. Not so; the contrast presented here of traditional and new destinations is merely a typology, a tool to better understand the various shades of grey in real life. Therefore, the findings presented here should be taken with a grain of salt.

The second important concept in this study, mentioned above, is the idea of a Latino Paradox. Briefly, this refers to the fact that Latinos' levels of mortality - homicide included - are not as high as their levels of socioeconomic disadvantage would predict. In other words, traditional predictors of mortality, things like poverty, unemployment, and a lack of education, do not accurately predict Latino mortality rates – as they had previously done for whites and blacks. This is particularly puzzling to criminologists since Latinos and blacks, two minorities, have the same level of disadvantage, but very different rates of violence. In other words, despite being like blacks in almost every way, Latinos' rates of violence are closer to those of whites. Recent research, however, provides some insight into this conundrum.

Bean et al (2009) suggest that yesterday's color line – white/non-white – has been transformed into a black/non-black line, with most Latinos and Asians falling on the white side

of the line. The reason this shift is so important is discrimination. As Bean et al (2009) asks, if Latinos, and Latino immigrants, are better off than blacks, “what does the experience of the new immigrants, particularly the experience of contemporary Mexican immigrants who are especially disadvantaged in terms of education and who often enter the country with the additional handicap of unauthorized status, suggest about the degree of discrimination they face compared to blacks?” Given this shift in the color line, perhaps the Latino paradox is not as paradoxical as researchers previously thought.

Furthermore, if there is in fact a paradox, it might only apply when Latino communities are viewed as being homogenous. As described above, this is not the case – at minimum, Latino communities can be divided into “new” and “traditional” categories. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Latino Paradox applies to both traditional and new Latino communities. Hopefully, this study provides a first step to examining this question.

With these two concepts in mind, the following study is broken down as follows: Chapter Two examines whether the effect of Latino immigration is invariant across destination types. Chapter Three tests whether segregation plays a more important role than immigration in predicting Latino homicide in both destination types. Chapter Four analyzes the effects of immigration on black homicide rates through competition for low skill employment in new and traditional destinations. Finally, Chapter Five provides an overview of the findings from all three papers.

## **CHAPTER 2: IMMIGRATION, EMIGRATION, AND CHANGE IN U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY – THE EFFECT OF RECENT IMMIGRANTS ON HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION**

### **2.1: Introduction**

During the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the United States saw a significant shift in its demographic makeup. The majority of the change was due to the massive influx of Latinos into the country. Though the history of Latino immigration to the United States can be traced back to the early 1900s, the most dramatic changes have occurred in the last two decades of the century,

Prior to the mid-1980s, Latino immigration to the United States was driven by dramatic changes in labor demand brought on by two World Wars and the United States government's numerous attempts to control the number and race/ethnicity of the immigrants entering the country. But as Massey and Capoferro (2009) point out, the most significant changes in Latino immigration have occurred over the past 20-30 years. These changes can be almost entirely attributed three major developments. The effects of the first two, the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border and the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), have been twofold. First, both measures have dramatically increased the Latino population in the United States through mass legalizations and by increasing the difficulty of entering and exiting the United States, respectively. Since 1980, the number of Latinos residing in the United States has more than tripled from 14.5 million to 47 million (American Community Survey 2008).

Second, militarizing the border and IRCA encouraged immigrants to settle in new places by shutting down traditional entry points and by providing newly legal immigrants with greater geographic mobility, respectively. The third major development, the passage of Proposition 187, has also encouraged immigrants to settle in new places by effectively telling new migrants that they were no longer welcome in California. As a direct result of these developments, the

majority of Latino immigrants are settling outside of California and Texas for the first time in U.S. history.

The massive influx of Latinos into the United States has led many to fear an increase in crime. Determining what structural variables help explain Latino homicide offending and victimization is one of the neglected challenges facing criminologists today – especially considering how little we know about Latino crime compared to whites and blacks (Phillips 2002). Although research on Latino homicide has only recently been given attention in the criminological literature, what little research that has been done has shown not only that predictors of black and white crime do not necessarily predict Latino crime (Martinez 1996; Lee et al 2001; Dugan and Apel 2003; Nielsen, Lee, and Martinez 2005; Nielsen, Martinez, and Lee 2005), but also the differences between whites and blacks are not due to the same factors as the differences between whites and Latinos (Phillips 2002; McNulty and Bellair 2003). Part of the problem may be the unique role that immigration has played in the history of U.S. Latinos, as outlined above.

The influx of immigrants and the rise of urbanization in the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century helped lead to the core ideas in Social Disorganization Theory. First, immigration and urbanization were viewed as having a negative overall impact on communities (Park and Burgess 1925; Wirth 1938), and was latter linked specifically to crime (Shaw and McKay 1942). Two schools of social disorganization developed early on. The first included researchers like Louis Wirth (1938), who believed that neighborhoods were being negatively impacted by (a) increasing population, (b) ethnic heterogeneity, and (c) settlement density. The other school, starting with the work of Park and Burgess (1925), did not believe “urbanism” was harming neighborhoods; rather residential instability was the culprit. Later researchers, such as Shaw

and McKay (1942), would take ideas from both schools and apply Social Disorganization Theory to the study of crime.

But attempts to link Latino immigration and crime have suffered from several major drawbacks. First, researchers tend to group all immigrants together, rather than look at Latino or other immigrant groups separately. Similarly, most immigration-crime research has examined immigration's effects on *overall* crime rates, rather than racially/ethnically disaggregated rates. Given that 86% of homicides are intra-racial (Uniform Crime Reports 2009), this is especially important. Second, as Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c: 337) point out, most previous research on Latino immigration has focused on "old, safe, and relatively well-organized places." While this might be useful in determining the effects of ethnic communities on the immigration-crime link, it does not provide much insight into what happens when Latinos venture outside of these traditional destinations. Finally, given the new settlement patterns of Latino immigrants, it is important for researchers to recognize that segregation may play an important role in how these migrants fare in their new communities.

Therefore, this paper attempts to overcome these shortcomings by: (1) racially disaggregating all immigration measures, (2) racially disaggregating homicide victimization, (3) examining places in new and traditional destinations, and (4) examining metropolitan and rural areas.

## **2.2: Latino Immigration in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century**

The history of Latino immigration to the United States in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, while brief compared to that of European immigration, has been rich and eventful. Although Latino immigrants, and immigrants in general, come from many different countries (see Charts 2.1 and 2.2), most U.S. immigration policies have targeted Mexican migration and the U.S.-Mexico

border (Durand et al 2000; Massey and Capoferro 2009). Mexican migration to the United States has had one constant: labor demand.


A series of immigration acts at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century worked to limit immigration from countries that were traditional sources of labor. Two pre-World War I measures, the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan, effectively cutoff employers from their primary source of agricultural and railroad workers (Guerin-Gonzales 1994). Following World War I, Congress passed the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924, enacting a quota system to regulate the number of immigrants allowed from each country. Because of the difficulty in regulating overland borders, and the ease of regulating seaports, the quotas were a de facto restriction of all immigrant groups, except those from Mexico (Ngai 1999). These immigration measures forced many business owners to turn to Mexican workers to meet their labor demands. Although Mexican migration to the United States during the 1910s and 1920s was less than half of what it would be over the next several decades, it marked the first major influx, and recruitment, of Mexican workers into the United States.

The next major period in Mexican migration began in the 1940s with the United States' involvement in World War II. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States began mobilizing for war, dramatically increasing the demand for labor in all sectors. In order to meet this new demand for workers, United States employers once again turned to Mexican workers. Enacted in 1942, the Bracero Accords brought Mexican farm workers to the United States under supervision of the U.S. government (Craig 1971) by promising "minimum wages, adequate living conditions, and the right to end their participation in the program and return to Mexico"

**Chart 2.1: U.S. Immigrant Population by Region of Origin, 2000**


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### Percent of Immigrant Population



**Chart 2.2: U.S. Latino and Latino Immigrant Population by Country of Origin, 2000**

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(Garcia 2002:31). The program was so successful that it lasted until 1964, despite being enacted as a wartime measure (Calavita 1992), and provided work for an estimated 4.8 million Mexican workers (Cerrutti and Massey 2006).

The end of the Bracero Accords in 1964 may have brought an end to government sponsored Mexican immigration, but it did not stop migration altogether. After two decades of using Mexican workers to fill their labor needs, many U.S. business owners continued recruiting Mexican workers despite their lack of legal documents. Demand for unskilled labor continued into the 1970s and 1980s, leading to an increase in undocumented migration that has continued to the present.

Prior to the 1980s, Mexican migration followed two distinct patterns. First, nearly 80% of all Mexican migrants settled in just two states: California and Texas (Durand et al 2000). This, in essence, made immigration a regional rather than a national phenomenon for the United States. Second, Latino immigration was typically a circular process. Migrants came to the United States temporarily in order to earn enough wages to fund a project back home, such as a car, a house, or a business (Durand and Massey 2006). This circular process was disrupted during the early 1990s by a new border enforcement policy that became known as “prevention through deterrence” (Massey and Capoferro 2009). In 1993, Operation Blockade was launched in El Paso, Texas and Operation Gatekeeper the following year in San Diego, California. Both Operations sought to prevent border crossings through militarization and fence building. As a result, border crossings at El Paso and San Diego were virtually eliminated (Nevins 2002), making entry into the United States *and* Mexico more difficult.

With the militarization of the border making trips to and from Mexico riskier, more migrants began to settle permanently in the United States rather than risk not being able to return

at some future date. This, coupled with the three million immigrants naturalized with the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, has led to a dramatic increase in the U.S. Latino population. Since 1980, the number of Latinos residing in the United States has more than tripled from 14.5 million to 47 million (American Community Survey 2008), surpassing blacks as the nation's largest minority.

A second major change in Latino immigration in the past two and a half decades has been its geographic diversification. As stated above, prior to Operations Blockade and Gatekeeper, 42% of all Latino immigrants, and 77% of Mexican immigrants, settled in California and Texas. That number had dropped to 32% and 48%, respectively, by 2005, meaning that Latinos, and Mexicans in particular, have begun to settle outside of their traditional destinations.

Massey and Capoferro (2009) outline several reasons for this diversification. First, there are the effects of the aforementioned Operation Blockade and Operation Gatekeeper. By taking away the most popular entry points in Texas and California, immigrants were forced to cross at other, less visible, and less used points along the U.S.-Mexico border. New entry points meant new destinations.

Second, the mass legalizations as a result of the Immigration and Reform Control Act (IRCA)<sup>1</sup> flooded local labor markets - especially in California, which accounted for 54% of all legalizations. As a result, undocumented migrants, who were previously limited in their employment opportunities, were now free to find employment wherever they liked. This effectively flooded California's labor market, making it a less attractive destination for newly arrived immigrants. Furthermore, the acquisition of legal documents gave immigrants greater geographic mobility, many of whom decided to move elsewhere to find employment.

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<sup>1</sup> IRCA addressed immigration in three major ways: (1) legalize all illegal immigrants residing the United States, (2) penalize employers for hiring workers without proof of citizenship, and (3) increase federal funding for guarding the border.

Third, the passage of Proposition 187 in California also contributed to Latinos' geographic diversification. In the early 1990s, California suffered from severe economic recession. Many residents, including Governor Pete Wilson, blamed many of the state's problems on immigrants. This culminated in the passage of Proposition 187, which did the following: (1) stop undocumented migrants from using social services, (2) required state and local authorities to report suspected illegal aliens, and (3) made the sale or use of false citizenship documents a felony offense (Calavita 1996). While most of its provisions were declared unconstitutional in subsequent court battles, it sent a clear and strong message to potential migrants that they were no longer welcome.

Finally, while California's economy sputtered, other state economies across the country grew robustly. This lured young, male, foreign-born Latino migrants away from traditional destinations in search of better opportunities elsewhere (Durand et al 2000; Lichter and Johnson 2006).

These are just a few possible explanations for the geographic dispersal of Latinos; undoubtedly the cause is a mix of these and other factors. The fact remains, however, that Latinos are now more spread out across the United States than ever before. Settling in new and unfamiliar places poses many new problems for Latinos, several of which will be examined in this paper.

### **2.3: Latino Immigration and Crime**

As Latino immigrants continue to spread across the United States, scholars have once again begun to analyze the link between immigration and crime. The idea that immigration and crime are positively linked has a long history in sociological research. At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, many Eastern European immigrants (Rubin 1941) and southern blacks (Grossman

1991) migrated to central and northeast regions of the United States. Since many of these migrants often settled in less desirable, crime ridden neighborhoods, many people began to worry there might be an “immigrant problem” (Leuchtenberg 1958). Early explanations were steeped heavily in Social Darwinism – suggesting that immigrants were culturally and biologically inferior to natives (Coser 1977).

By the 1930s, several researchers began to develop socially and ecologically driven theories to explain the social pathologies besetting immigrants. Shaw and McKay (1942), in a landmark study, began mapping juvenile delinquency in Chicago neighborhoods. They noticed that high rates of delinquency seemed to plague only a small number of neighborhoods. Furthermore, they found that this small group of neighborhoods was experiencing persistently high crime rates, despite a rapidly changing population. In these neighborhoods, crime perpetuated from one generation to the next and one group of immigrants to the next. Shaw and McKay felt that the only constant, the neighborhoods themselves, must be the key to explaining the high rates of delinquency.

Concentric Zone Theory, developed by Park and Burgess (1925), supported the findings of Shaw and McKay. It posits that when a city is fully developed, it will take on the form of five concentric rings with social and physical conditions declining as one gets closer to the city center. Park and Burgess argued that the ring nearest the city center (Transitional Zone) would be the least desirable – deteriorating houses, abandoned buildings, and factories would be abundant. Because the area was so undesirable, housing was cheap – allowing immigrants to settle in large numbers.

Shaw and McKay’s maps of Chicago showed that immigrants, and juvenile delinquency, were, in fact, concentrated in the Transitional Zone. Furthermore, they found that these

neighborhoods had a very high rate of population turnover – which Shaw and McKay found to be one of the keys to explaining the high rates of crime. Their theory, which would become known as Social Disorganization Theory, viewed communities as a dense network of formal and informal ties that linked people and organizations together. These ties help the community reach common goals – like fighting crime and following a path of conformity (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974). But, large changes over a short period of time – like immigrants pouring into a community – disrupt the neighborhood’s ability to regulate itself (Kornhauser 1978; Bankston 1998). This was illustrated by Thomas and Znaniecki’s (1958) seminal study of Polish immigrants in America.

Immigration, therefore, is thought to socially disorganize a community by disrupting social ties through ethnic heterogeneity and population turnover<sup>2</sup>. But it appears that the link between modern immigration, particularly Latino immigration, and crime may not follow the same pattern. Among immigrants as a whole, there is mixed evidence that they contribute to crime. Some studies report a positive association between immigration and crime (O’Kane 1992; Tanton and Lutton 1993; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson 2006) while some do not (Butcher and Piehl 1998; Martinez 2000; Lee et al 2001; Reid et al 2005). In contrast, the assumption that *Latino* immigration disorganizes communities and raises crime seems widely disconfirmed (Martinez and Lee 1998; Martinez et al 2003; Stowell and Martinez 2007; Stowell and Martinez 2009; Desmond and Kubrin 2009). In fact, research by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) suggests that Latinos’ geographic mobility actually works to lower Latino homicide victimization rates.

Some researchers have gone so far as to suggest that Latino immigration was one of the main forces behind the significant crime decline in the United States during the late 1990s.

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<sup>2</sup> Although this paper focuses exclusively on Social Disorganization as the theoretical framework for explaining the immigration-crime relationship, there are a number of other explanations. See Ousey and Kurbin (2009) for a review of other theoretical approaches.

Sampson (2006; 2008) points out that the crime decline occurred at precisely the same time that millions of Latino immigrants were pouring into the United States. Furthermore, as immigration began to level off, so too did crime. This further fueled debate over whether there was a “Latino Paradox”; that Latinos’ level of mortality - homicide included - was not as high as their levels of socioeconomic disadvantage would predict (Abraido-Lanza et al 1999; Smith and Bradshaw 2006; Turra and Elo 2008).

One explanation for this paradox points to the benefits provided by ethnic communities, which Portes and Jensen (1992) describe as “a network of small enterprises that offer employment comparable to those of the mainstream economy...[and] this network creates new entrepreneurial opportunities for newcomers – opportunities that are absent elsewhere (p.420). These communities make assimilation easier, not only on a cultural level, but also in the job market – particularly for Latinos who have not yet mastered the English language. In a series of papers that examines Latino homicide and migration patterns, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010b; 2010c) show how moving into established Latino communities can help reduce exposure to violence.

First, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) found that when Latinos move into a part of a city that already had a relatively large Latino population, Latino homicide victimization and economic deprivation decreases. The authors suggest that moving into neighborhoods with established Latino populations increases the likelihood that a dense social network will already be in place – which then works to reduce the financial and emotional stress associated with moving and finding new employment.

Second, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010b) also found that Latinos who did not speak English well or at all increased rates of violent victimization and economic deprivation when settling

outside of areas with traditionally large Latino populations. In contrast, Latinos settling in ethnic communities actually helped lower homicide rates, despite their inability to fluently speak English. The authors theorize that this inability creates an even greater reliance on the community and existing social networks to help support those individuals. But, in places without an established Latino community, these networks are not in place and are therefore unable to help the non-English speaking Latinos find success in the marketplace and avoid becoming a victim of violence.

In sum, prior research on immigration and crime has found a positive relationship. Social Disorganization Theory suggests that immigrants disorganize communities by disrupting the existence and development of formal and informal ties within the community. More recent research, however, suggests that the immigration experience of Latino migrants may differ from those of previous studies. Latino immigrants may actually lower crime in the communities in which they settle. While this research has been instructive in understanding the immigration-crime link, it has suffered from several major drawbacks.

#### **2.4: Limitations of Recent Immigration-Crime Research**

Although Latino immigrants account for roughly 50% of all recent (since 1980) immigrants in the United States (U.S. Census 2000), the majority of recent immigration studies treat all immigrants as one large, undifferentiated group (Lee et al 2001; Reid et al 2005; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Stowell et al 2009). Given the unique history of Latino immigration and their proportion of the United States population, disaggregating immigrants by race/ethnicity would provide an even greater insight into the immigration-crime link. Furthermore, most studies examine how immigration affects *overall* crime rates, rather than disaggregating crime rates as well (Reid et al 2005; Martinez et al 2008; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Stowell et al 2009). But 86%

of homicides are intra-racial (Uniform Crime Reports 2009), which suggests it occurs within macro-social boundaries. Thus, it would be advantageous to determine how Latino immigration affects *Latino* homicide rates.

Another major shortcoming of recent research is the lack of geographic scope. Virtually all research on Latinos and crime focuses on areas that have had large Latino populations for decades. These areas include places like California (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009), Florida (Nielsen and Martinez 2009; Olson, Laurikkala, Huff-Corzine, and Corzine 2009; Stowell and Martinez 2009), Illinois-Chicago (Chavez and Griffiths 2009; Graif and Sampson 2009; Velez 2009), and Texas (Akins, Rumbault, and Stansfield 2009; Valdez, Cepeda, and Kaplan 2009). Other researchers study multiple areas, but they are almost always found in one of these four places (Lee et al 2001; Nielsen et al 2005; Martinez et al 2008). Given the protective nature of ethnic communities described above, one would expect Latinos to have different experiences in other parts of the country. In fact, researchers have found Latinos in new destinations to be less integrated into the social and economic mainstream (Leach and Bean 2008), more segregated from Whites (Lichter et al 2010), and typically rely less on established ethnic enclaves (Leach and Bean 2008). Hence, it is important to include places with less established Latino populations and to compare these new destinations with traditional ones. This should include urban as well as rural areas, given Latinos large population increase in these areas (Saenz and Torres 2003; Lichter and Johnson 2006).

I attempt to overcome these shortcomings by: (1) racially disaggregating all immigration measures, (2) racially disaggregating homicide victimization, (3) examining places in new and traditional destinations, and (4) examining metropolitan and rural areas.

## 2.5: Methods

I analyze 919 U.S. counties with at least 1,000 Latinos and for which there was racially disaggregated homicide data available for 2000. As stated above, recent research on immigration and crime has been too narrow in scope. Therefore, it is important to examine as broad a spectrum of places as possible. For this reason, I use U.S. counties instead of cities as my unit of analysis, which allows me to include a significantly larger sample. I include *all* counties with 1,000 Latinos for two primary reasons. First, while Latinos tend to be heavily concentrated in major metropolitan areas, they have had tremendous growth in rural areas (Saenz and Torres 2003; Lichter and Johnson 2006). By looking at *all* counties with 1,000 Latinos (instead of only major urban areas) I hope to capture more of the Latino experience than previous research. Second, previous research has found that Latinos impact homicide rates in both rural and urban areas (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010d). Therefore, both areas should be included in any study examining the effects of Latinos on homicide.

Data for the dependent variable, Latino homicide victimization, were obtained from the National Vital Statistics System's Multiple Cause-of-Death mortality detail file. These data come from death certificates filed to the Center for Disease Control by local coroners and include a wide variety of causes of death, including homicide<sup>3</sup>. While most prior homicide research has examined the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports or Supplementary Homicide Reports, neither provides information on Latino offenders or victims<sup>4</sup>. Vital Statistics, on the other hand, provides data on Latinos, albeit only victimization data. For this reason, and others, these data have become more widely used in criminological research (Martinez et al 2008; Loftin,

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<sup>3</sup> Multiple cause-of-death data include 456 different causes of death. Assault (homicide) is coded as number 432 and encapsulates all other homicide subcategories (such as discharge of firearm, strangulation, blunt object, etc.).

<sup>4</sup> In 1980 the FBI attempted to add Latinos to SHR forms, but it was so unsuccessful that they abandoned the attempt by mid-decade (Fox 2005). See Martinez 1996 for an article that attempted to use this data.

McDowell and Fetzer 2008; Kposowa, Tsunokai, and McElvain 2006; Wu 2009; Xie 2010; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d). Furthermore, Martinez et al (2008) note that while coroner data reflect place of residence, not the place occurrence, for many purposes they actually provide more accurate and appropriate measures than do the SHR.

In addition to their recent acceptance as a useful data source, I believe these data are suitable for four reasons. First, since victims and offenders tend to be of similar race/ethnicity (Boland 1976; O'Brien 1987; Uniform Crime Reports 2009), it can be reasonably inferred that victimization data will be similar to offending data, such as the Supplementary Homicide Reports. In fact, Wiersema et al (2000) found that Supplementary Homicide Reports and Vital Statistics homicide are highly correlated, especially in places with large populations. Second, these data do not suffer from missing data problems to the same extent as the Supplementary Homicide Reports. Third, Arias and Tejada-Vera (2008) find that race and Latino ethnicity reporting on death certificates is not subject to serious problems of misclassification. Finally, since death certificates are issued for *all* deaths, undocumented migrants may also be captured in these data.

Because homicide is a statistically rare event, homicide counts are averaged over a three-year period (2000, 2001, 2002) to account for year-to-year fluctuations. In terms of estimating the models, Osgood (2000) and Osgood and Chambers (2000) argue that macro-level data with a large number of zero observations often follows a Poisson-like distribution, and thus estimating with OLS is inappropriate. In order to avoid this problem, I follow the current convention in the literature and use negative binomial regression analysis to predict the pooled three-year homicide counts. The negative binomial estimator is the appropriate choice because it allows for overdispersion in the data. Furthermore, following the method of

previous research (Messner et al 2005), the negative binomial estimates control for the spatial “nesting” of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0.

### **2.5.1: Independent Variable**

The main focus of this analysis is Latino immigration. This can be measured as the proportion of a county’s Latino population that was born outside of the United States (*Latino immigration*). This also includes a significant proportion of undocumented immigrants since, as Deardorff and Blumerman (2002) found, the 2000 Census captured an estimated 85 to 90% of the undocumented population. But since all undocumented migrants are not captured, the measure used in this study should be considered a conservative estimation of Latino immigration.

As a second measure of immigration, I also disaggregate immigrants by the phase of Latino immigration in which they entered the United States. First, *Immigrants Entered Pre-1985* are Latino immigrants who entered before the significant immigration reform of the late 1980s and 1990s. Second, *Immigrants Entered 1985-1989* are Latino immigrants who entered following the passage of IRCA in 1986. Finally, *Immigrants Entered 1990-2000* are Latino immigrants who entered during the period of strict border enforcement and when Latino immigrants began moving to new destinations.

### **2.5.2: Control Variables**

Since Latinos tend to dominate low skill employment, I believe it is important to control for the baseline local labor market conditions. I define low skill industries as those where 50% or more of the workers in that sector have no high school diploma. Using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Career Guide to Industries (2006), I find the following industries to be low-

skilled: [Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing], [Mining], [Construction], [Manufacturing], [Transportation], [Retail Trade], [Accommodation and Food Services], and [Other Services].

Using this criteria to identify low skill industries, I calculate the proportion of all jobs in a city that are considered low skilled (*Low skill Jobs*).

*Latino Economic Deprivation* was obtained by running a principal components factor analysis with the proportion of Latinos without a high school diploma, the proportion of Latinos unemployed, the proportion of Latino households headed by a single parent, and the proportion of all Latinos living in poverty. As measures of social disorganization, I include the proportion of the population that has moved in the past five years (*Moved*) and the proportion of all housing units that are vacant (*Vacant Houses*). *Latinos 15-29 Years Old* controls for the age-crime relationship, while *Total Population* controls for the size of the county, and *Proportion Black* controls for the racial composition. *Rural* is a dummy variable indicating whether the county is rural or urban (rural=1). Finally, because high population density may increase the opportunity for homicide, I include the proportion of housing units that are in clusters of five or more (*Housing Density*).

### **2.5.3: Traditional vs. New Destinations**

Given this paper's focus on how Latinos', and immigrant Latinos', experiences differ depending on whether they are in a traditional or new Latino destination, it is important to understand what is meant by "traditional" and "new". Previous research has defined traditional and new destinations in two ways. The first method (hereafter called the State Method), articulated by Massey and Capoferro (2009), defines traditional destinations as those states containing at least 500,000 Latinos in 1990. These states are California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Arizona, and New Mexico. New destination states are defined as states that

experienced a Latino population increase of at least 100% from 1990 to 2000. These states include the following: North Carolina, Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee, Nevada, South Carolina, Alabama, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska, Iowa, Mississippi, Oregon, Utah, Delaware, Indiana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Washington, Virginia, and Kansas. As shown in Table 2.1, none of the traditional states experienced a Latino population growth of at least 100%, so that there is no overlap between the two definitions. I also include the population growth through 2009 to show that, while new destination states saw a substantial increase in their Latino population from 1990 to 2000, this growth has continued into the next decade as well.

The second method (hereafter called the County Method) for defining traditional and new destinations is based on the work of Kandel and Cromartie (2004). I modify their method slightly in an attempt to bridge the two methods. Rather than looking at states, this method focuses on the growth in specific counties. According to Kandel and Cromartie, traditional destinations are counties whose population comprised at least 10% Latinos in 1990. New destinations are defined as *counties* that experienced at least a 100% increase in their Latino population from 1990 to 2000<sup>5</sup>.

Unlike the State Method described by Massey and Capoferro (2009), the County Method does have some counties that are both traditional and new destinations – 31 counties (out of 3,141) had a population that was at least 10% Latino in 1990 *and* experienced a 100% increase in their Latino population. In such cases, the counties will be counted as being traditional. Despite this small amount of overlap, I believe the County Method is the superior of the two measures.

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<sup>5</sup> Kandel and Cromartie (2004) define new destinations as having a 150% increase in their Latino population. I use 100% to create a method similar to that used by Massey and Capoferro (2009).

**Table 2.1: Latino Population and Percent Change for 1990, 2000, 2009 for U.S. States**

	1990 Population	2000 Population	% Change from 1990 to 2000	2009 Estimated Population	% Change from 2000 to 2009
<b>Traditional</b>					
California	7,687,938	10,966,556	42.6	13,681,375	24.8
Texas	4,339,905	6,669,666	53.7	9,148,056	37.2
New York	2,214,026	2,867,583	29.5	3,274,385	14.2
Florida	1,574,143	2,682,715	70.4	3,992,297	48.8
Illinois	904,446	1,530,262	69.2	1,968,599	28.6
Arizona	688,338	1,295,617	88.2	2,031,650	56.8
New Mexico	579,224	765,386	32.1	915,738	19.6
<b>New Destination</b>					
North Carolina	76,726	378,963	393.9	717,662	89.4
Arkansas	19,876	86,866	337.0	172,991	99.1
Georgia	108,922	435,227	299.6	819,887	88.4
Tennessee	32,741	123,838	278.2	261,793	111.4
Nevada	124,419	393,970	216.6	700,294	77.8
South Carolina	30,551	95,076	211.2	206,760	117.5
Alabama	24,629	75,830	207.9	152,516	101.1
Kentucky	21,984	59,939	172.6	115,416	92.6
Minnesota	53,884	143,382	166.1	226,384	57.9
Nebraska	36,969	94,425	155.4	150,470	59.4
Iowa	32,647	82,473	152.6	134,402	63.0
Mississippi	15,931	39,569	148.4	74,447	88.1
Oregon	112,707	275,314	144.3	428,469	55.6
Utah	84,597	201,559	138.3	343,164	70.3
Delaware	15,820	37,277	135.6	63,892	71.4
Indiana	98,788	214,536	117.2	350,676	63.5
Oklahoma	86,160	179,304	108.1	301,840	68.3
South Dakota	5,252	10,903	107.6	23,455	115.1
Wisconsin	93,194	192,921	107.0	299,123	55.0
Washington	214,570	441,509	105.8	687,367	55.7
Virginia	160,288	329,540	105.6	569,921	72.9
Kansas	93,670	188,252	101.0	263,307	39.9

The State Method assumes that just because the state as a whole has a large Latino population, the rest of the state must also. This is not necessarily the case. As Table 2.2 shows, two “Traditional States” actually had a majority of their counties experience a 100% or greater increase in their Latino population. The problem is that both states had 50% of its Latino population living in one large metropolitan area (Miami-Dade County in Florida and Chicago in Illinois), thus single-handedly defining the entire state as traditional<sup>6</sup>. Furthermore, there were four states defined as new destinations that had a minority of their counties experience a 100% or greater Latino population growth (Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Kansas). Therefore, all models in the following analysis that examine new and traditional destinations separately use the County Method<sup>7</sup>.

## 2.6: Results

The descriptive statistics provided in Table 2.3 illustrate the differences found between new and traditional destinations. Although both have similar levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, there are significant differences in demographic makeup and homicide victimization. First, the results for Latino Immigration show new destinations have a much less established Latino population – 46% of Latinos are immigrants, compared to only 24% in traditional destinations. Furthermore, nearly one-third of all new destination Latinos entered the country between 1990 and 2000. In traditional areas, only 10% of immigrants entered during the same period and were just as likely to have entered prior to 1985. In other words, the Latino population in new destinations is characterized not only by more immigrants, but more recent immigrants as well.

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<sup>6</sup> New York also had a majority of its Latino population in one metropolitan area – New York City (80%).

<sup>7</sup> All models were run using the State Method as well, with no substantive differences.

**Table 2.2: Latino Population and Percent Change for 1990, 2000 for U.S. States**

	1990 Population	2000 Population	% Change from 1990 to 2000	% of Counties as New Destinations
<b>Traditional</b>				
California	7,687,938	10,966,556	42.6	1.7
Texas	4,339,905	6,669,666	53.7	24.0
New York*	2,214,026	2,867,583	29.5	3.0
Florida^	1,574,143	2,682,715	70.4	70.1
Illinois#	904,446	1,530,262	69.2	50.9
Arizona	688,338	1,295,617	88.2	20.0
New Mexico	579,224	765,386	32.1	0.0
<b>New Destination</b>				
North Carolina	76,726	378,963	393.9	91.0
Arkansas	19,876	86,866	337.0	74.7
Georgia	108,922	435,227	299.6	79.2
Tennessee	32,741	123,838	278.2	73.7
Nevada	124,419	393,970	216.6	47.1
South Carolina	30,551	95,076	211.2	76.1
Alabama	24,629	75,830	207.9	74.6
Kentucky	21,984	59,939	172.6	68.3
Minnesota	53,884	143,382	166.1	69.0
Nebraska	36,969	94,425	155.4	51.6
Iowa	32,647	82,473	152.6	67.7
Mississippi	15,931	39,569	148.4	69.5
Oregon	112,707	275,314	144.3	58.3
Utah	84,597	201,559	138.3	62.1
Delaware	15,820	37,277	135.6	66.7
Indiana	98,788	214,536	117.2	53.2
Oklahoma	86,160	179,304	108.1	36.3
South Dakota	5,252	10,903	107.6	36.3
Wisconsin	93,194	192,921	107.0	66.7
Washington	214,570	441,509	105.8	61.5
Virginia	160,288	329,540	105.6	62.2
Kansas	93,670	188,252	101.0	36.2

\*NEW YORK: 2.1 million in New York city (80%)

^FLORIDA: 1.3 million in Miami-Dade county (50%)

#ILLINOIS: 750,000 in Chicago (50%)

**Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for Latinos in U.S. Counties, 2000**

	All Counties		Traditional Destinations		New Destinations	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Latino Less than High School <sup>#</sup>	.46	.17	.51	.13	.51	.17
Latino Unemployment	.05	.03	.06	.02	.05	.03
Latino Single Headed Households	.14	.05	.14	.04	.14	.05
Latino Poverty	.23	.09	.26	.07	.24	.09
Latinos 15-29 Years Old	24.78	3.39	.25	.04	.33	.06
Latino Homicide Victimization Rate*	6.54	10.11	5.67	5.81	8.44	13.08
Proportion Black	.09	.11	.05	.07	.10	.12
Total Population	200,137	451,837	260,504	812,951	152,895	205,067
Rural County (Rural=1)	.42	.49	.60	.49	.39	.49
Housing Density	.10	.09	.09	.12	.10	.07
Vacant Houses	.11	.08	.15	.09	.10	.07
Moved	.21	.08	.20	.08	.23	.07
Proportion of Jobs Low skilled	.57	.08	.55	.07	.59	.07
Latino Immigration	.34	.18	.24	.15	.46	.15
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000	.19	.15	.10	.08	.30	.14
Immigrants Entered 1985-1989	.05	.03	.04	.03	.07	.03
Immigrants Entered pre1985	.09	.05	.10	.06	.09	.04
(N=)		919		215		296

# Latino economic deprivation measures (high school, unemployment, single headed households and poverty) are listed separately for descriptive purposes, but in the multivariate analysis they are combined into a single factor. See methods section for more detail.

\*Homicide is expressed as a rate in the descriptive table, but is entered as counts in the negative binomial regression.

Table 2.3 also shows significant differences in the homicide victimization rates for Latinos in traditional and new destinations. In fact, the homicide rate is nearly 50% higher in new destinations (8.44) than traditional (5.67). One possible explanation for this difference is the age distribution of Latinos in both areas. One in three Latinos in new destinations is between the ages of 15 and 29, compared to only one in four for traditional areas. Given the historically strong correlation between age and crime, this could possibly explain the homicide differences. However, even age-standardized rates show greater victimization rates in new destinations (7.28 compared to 5.80 in traditional areas, not reported)<sup>8</sup>. This important difference is masked in violence rates that are undifferentiated by region.

Table 2.4 provides results of three models testing the immigration-crime link by controlling for the proportion of the Latino population that is foreign-born. Models 1 and 2 examine all counties together and traditional counties only, respectively, and find no effect for immigration. However, Model 3 limits the sample to new destination counties and finds that Latino homicide victimization increases with Latino immigration (2.08). To evaluate the strength of the relationship, the coefficients are converted to a proportion<sup>9</sup>. This calculation shows that a one standard deviation increase in Latino immigration is associated with a 36.6% increase in Latino homicide victimization.

Table 2.5 examines new destination counties and takes the immigration variable a step further by breaking it down by the period in which the immigrant entered the country. Model 1 examines the effects of immigrants who entered during the period of intense border enforcement (1990-2000). As suggested by Table 2.4, immigration is associated with an increase in Latino

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<sup>8</sup> Age-standardized rates were calculated using the method described by Shryock et al (1976) on pages 240-245.

<sup>9</sup> This is done by using the formula  $(e^{b*s} - 1)*100$ , where b is the coefficient and s is the standard deviation of the variable in question. In this case, *Latino Immigration*.

**Table 2.4: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide Victimization in U.S. Counties, 2000**

	All Counties Model 1	Traditional Counties Model 2	New Destination Counties Model 3
Total Population#	1.71*** (0.22)	0.90*** (0.23)	2.85*** (0.39)
Moved	-0.20 (1.62)	-5.02*** (1.25)	2.76 (1.76)
Vacant Houses	-2.25** (1.02)	-4.38** (2.01)	-2.11 (1.77)
Housing Density	1.61 (1.14)	0.57 (0.95)	1.51 (1.87)
Latinos 15-29 Years Old	-7.62*** (1.87)	-2.12 (3.54)	-8.64*** (2.72)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	-1.07 (1.63)	-4.24 (2.91)	2.83† (1.61)
Latino Economic Deprivation	0.48*** (0.10)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.45*** (0.11)
Proportion Black	0.05 (0.66)	-2.45 (1.64)	2.58*** (0.85)
Rural	-0.41† (0.25)	-1.35*** (0.37)	-0.19 (0.35)
Latino Immigration	0.52 (0.71)	-0.68 (0.67)	2.08*** (0.66)
N	919	215	296

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

victimization (3.24). In fact, the effect is even stronger than in the previous table – a one standard deviation increase in immigration from 1990-2000 is associated with a 57% increase in victimization. Model 2 focuses on immigration following the passage of IRCA (1985-1989) and also finds a positive association with homicide (6.75), but the effect is much smaller (22% per

standard deviation increase). Finally, Model 3 controls for immigrants who entered before major changes in immigration policy occurred (prior to 1985) and finds no relationship between immigration and crime. This suggests that Latino immigration in general is not necessarily related to Latino homicide victimization – it depends on when the immigrants entered the country.

With this in mind, Table 2.6 returns the focus to traditional destinations, now controlling for period specific immigration. The results, however, remain the same as Table 2.4. All three models find no relationship between immigration and homicide – regardless of the period in which the immigrants entered. Nevertheless, this is an important finding for several reasons. First, it shows the importance of examining *where* immigrants settle, in addition to *when* they entered. Second, these findings also show that immigrants, even very recent immigrants, do not socially disorganize all the communities in which they settle. Some communities appear better prepared to handle the potentially disorganizing effect of an increase in immigration. The implications of this and other findings are discussed in the next section.

## **2.7: Discussion and Conclusion**

Since the mid-1980s, the pattern of settlement by Latino migrants has changed dramatically. These migrants are now settling in parts of the United States that have never before had significant Latino populations. This has led many to fear an increase in crime. Unfortunately, early explanations of immigration and crime focused on the experience of Eastern European immigrants. Therefore, it has not been clear whether the experience of Latino immigrants could be explained in the same way – especially with some researchers finding that immigrants now lower crime rates. However, the most recent research on immigration has failed to analyze any of the new areas of settlement. This study not only examines these new areas, it

also focuses on exclusively on Latinos and disaggregates immigration by the year of entrance to the United States.

**Table 2.5: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide Victimization in 296 New Destination U.S. Counties, 2000**

	Latino Homicide Model 1	Latino Homicide Model 2	Latino Homicide Model 3
Total Population#	2.82*** (0.39)	3.00*** (0.40)	2.99*** (0.41)
Moved	2.80† (1.62)	3.13† (1.69)	3.51** (1.63)
Vacant Houses	-1.81 (1.68)	-2.04 (1.92)	-2.34 (1.85)
Housing Density	1.70 (2.04)	1.29 (1.89)	1.77 (2.00)
Latinos 15-29 Years Old	-11.21*** (3.08)	-5.97** (2.98)	-6.11** (3.17)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	2.56† (1.55)	3.59** (1.53)	4.10*** (1.40)
Latino Economic Deprivation	0.45*** (0.11)	0.42*** (0.10)	0.45*** (0.11)
Proportion Black	2.47*** (0.79)	2.99*** (0.92)	3.00*** (0.93)
Rural	-0.19 (0.35)	-0.18 (0.36)	-0.08 (0.35)
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000	3.24*** (0.71)	-----	-----
Immigrants Entered 1985-1989	-----	6.75** (2.85)	-----
Immigrants Entered pre1985	-----	-----	-2.13 (3.07)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

**Table 2.6: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide Victimization in 215 Traditional U.S. Counties, 2000**

	Latino Homicide Model 1	Latino Homicide Model 2	Latino Homicide Model 3
Total Population#	0.87*** (0.23)	0.90*** (0.23)	0.87*** (0.22)
Moved	-5.01*** (1.27)	-5.01*** (1.20)	-4.93*** (1.25)
Vacant Houses	-4.44** (1.93)	-4.37** (2.05)	-4.27** (2.05)
Housing Density	0.75 (1.05)	0.50 (0.88)	0.41 (0.87)
Latinos 15-29 Years Old	-1.19 (3.17)	-2.37 (3.49)	-2.97 (3.78)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	-4.09 (3.06)	-4.31 (2.82)	-4.51 (2.76)
Latino Economic Deprivation	0.20*** (0.07)	0.21*** (0.06)	0.20*** (0.07)
Proportion Black	-2.37 (1.62)	-2.49 (1.64)	-2.38 (1.73)
Rural	-1.35*** (0.38)	-1.36*** (0.37)	-1.33*** (0.36)
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000	-2.01 (1.67)	-----	-----
Immigrants Entered 1985-1989	-----	-3.27 (3.03)	-----
Immigrants Entered pre1985	-----	-----	-0.53 (1.15)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

I observe the following findings: (1) Latino homicide victimization, on average, is higher in new destination than traditional counties. (2) Latino immigration is positively correlated with victimization in new destination, but not traditional, counties. (3) When disaggregating

immigration by the period in which the migrant entered the U.S., only immigrants entering after 1985 are associated with greater homicide in new destinations. (4) Even when disaggregating immigration by year of entry, it is still not correlated with homicide in traditional areas. I draw several implications from these findings.

First, these findings show the importance of taking into account changes in immigration policy when examining the impact of immigration on crime rates. Major policy changes, like IRCA and strict border enforcement, alter the migration experience for many immigrants. Including a general immigration measure fails to capture these subtle, or sometimes obvious, differences.

Second, the findings highlight the importance of recognizing what appears to be a growing bifurcation in the Latino community. The impact of immigration clearly varies depending on whether the county is a traditional or new Latino destination. The findings of previous researchers suggesting that immigration does not impact crime rates are not surprising given that they have focused almost exclusively on traditional destinations. Those findings coalesce with the results presented in this paper concerning traditional areas, but they fail to recognize the significant effect of immigration *outside* of these areas. This begs the question: why are traditional and new destinations differentially affected by Latino immigration? And, why is the impact limited to recent (post 1985) immigrants?

As outlined previously in the paper, the most popular explanation for the positive relationship between immigration and crime is Social Disorganization Theory. Although the idea that the influx of immigrants into a community hinders its ability to regulate itself was developed to explain the effect of Eastern European immigrants nearly a century, it still appears to hold *some* relevance today. This explanation may very well explain why Latino crime rates are

higher in new destinations - but it clearly does not hold up in traditional areas. Assuming Social Disorganization Theory does explain the positive relationship between immigration and crime, the question remains – why are immigrants not disorganizing communities in traditional destinations?

One explanation, discussed previously, points to the benefits provided by ethnic communities. The idea is that traditional areas are not affected by immigration because their Latino populations have been established and have developed highly intricate social networks and the institutions necessary for community success. With these networks and institutions in place, immigrants are effortlessly absorbed into the community. New destinations, in contrast, lack these beneficial elements and are therefore unable to help newly arrived migrants adjust to community life – with one consequence being increased homicide victimization in the community.

But this still does not explain why only the most recent immigrants are associated with higher levels of violence in new destinations. If the lack of community institutions and social networks explain the increase in violence, why do immigrants entering prior to 1985 not have a similar effect? Perhaps it is not only the destination of the migrants that explains their impact on violence, but also their *origin*. In the following section I provide additional analysis for a preliminary explanation to this question that examines changing emigration patterns within Mexico.

## **2.8: Additional Analysis**

The data presented in this section were obtained from three data sources: the Mexican Migration Project (MMP)<sup>10</sup>, the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografica (INEGI), and the

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<sup>10</sup> The MMP is a survey of Mexican immigrants about their migration experiences. It was started in 1982 by Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey and includes over 7,000 interviews. See <http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/home-en.aspx> for more information.

Consejo Nacional de Poblacion (CONAPO)<sup>11</sup>. Data from the MMP were used to determine where the migrant settled in the United States<sup>12</sup>, what year they migrated, and the Mexican state in which they were born. Data from INEGI and CONAPO were used to calculate a state-level homicide rate for all 32 Mexican states for the years 1990-1994. The data below examine the 16 states with the highest homicide rates – hereafter called Violent States<sup>13</sup>.

To begin, the purpose of this analysis is to determine if changing patterns of emigration from Mexico may help explain the relationship between Latino immigration and homicide victimization in the United States. The analysis reveals several important findings. First, the MMP data reflect the changing Latino settlement patterns captured by the U.S. Census. Prior to 1985, 5.5% of all migrants interviewed by the MMP settled in new destination states. After 1990, this number rose to 17.3%. Regardless of the cause, it is clear that a shift in settlement patterns did occur.

Second, the MMP also reveals a shift in where the migrants were coming from in Mexico. Prior to 1985, 34.7% of all interviewed migrants were born in Violent States. After 1990, this number jumps to 40%. While the raw differences might not be significant, any shift might have important implications for Latinos in the United States – several of which are detailed below.

Finally, the MMP also provides important information about where migrants from Violent States settled. Of all the migrants interviewed who settled in traditional destinations, 40.6% came from Violent States. In contrast, 44.2% of migrants settling in new destinations were born in a Violent State.

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<sup>11</sup> INEGI and CONAPO are Mexican government agencies charged with collecting official statistics. Homicide data were obtained from INEGI and population data were obtained from CONAPO.

<sup>12</sup> New and traditional destinations were determined using the State Method (see Methods section for details) due to the nature of the information available from the MMP.

<sup>13</sup> I also limited my analysis to the 10 highest, but the differences were not substantively different.

All these differences, despite appearing to be minor, may have important consequences for Latinos in the United States. As discussed previously, only recent immigrants settling in new destinations had a significant impact on homicide rates. This may be explained, at least partially, by an increase in the number of migrants coming from Violent States. First, consider how traditional destinations might be affected by this increase. The simplest answer is that traditional communities would merely absorb the newcomers, with no noticeable negative effects. Given the already large number of Latinos living in these areas, the increase in migrants from Violent States may be no more than “a drop in the bucket”. A second explanation, similar to the first, is that the amount of resources available in traditional destinations (i.e. strong social networks and established community institutions) may allow the community to, once again, absorb the newcomers with no ill effects. So, not only is the number of migrants from Violent States smaller in traditional destinations, these places may already be in a position to negate any potentially negative effects associated with the change.

New destinations, however, lack the number of Latinos and built-in resources of traditional areas. According to the analysis provided earlier in the paper, immigrants entering the United States prior to 1985 have no effect on homicide rates in new destinations – much like in traditional destinations. This is likely due to the relatively low number of migrants settling from Violent States. Therefore, once the emigration patterns in Mexico shifted more to Violent States, new destinations were not able to handle these newcomers – thus leading to higher homicide victimization. This is not to say, however, that these recent migrants are more violent than their predecessors and are committing more crimes. Given the violence in their home states, these immigrants are exposed to more violence than those who came before them. It is possible that they are more accepting of violence or perhaps less sensitive to it. If this is the case, they will be

much less likely to intervene when they see something bad happening in their new community. This, according to Social Disorganization Theory, is one of the strongest predictors of community violence.

In summary, there has been a shift in the emigration patterns within Mexico. Migrants entering the United States after 1990 are more likely to come from Violent States, who are then more likely to settle in new destinations. Given the small number of Latinos and the lack of community resources in these areas, they are much more susceptible to any potentially negative effects of this shift in migration patterns.

It should be noted that this analysis is in no way exhaustive. Hopefully it presents just as many questions as answers. It is up to future researchers to determine whether this is the best explanation for the effect recent immigrants have in new destinations. Regardless of the reason, it remains to be seen whether this pattern continues. Drug wars in Mexico near the end of the 2000s may change emigration patterns again, or it might completely change the Mexican states which are considered “Violent”. Furthermore, future research must determine how long it takes a community to become a “traditional destination”. After 10-15 years of Latinos settling in new destinations, will those communities be considered traditional by 2010? Or does the process take longer than that? With 10-15 years of establishing social networks and the institutions necessary for a community to be successful, will the homicide rates in new destinations decline by 2010? These are just a few of the questions researchers should strive to answer in the near future.

## **CHAPTER 3: IMMIGRATION, SEGREGATION, AND U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY – EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF LATINO-LATINO INTERACTION ON HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION**

### **3.1: Introduction**

During the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the United States saw a significant shift in its demographic makeup. The majority of the change was due to the massive influx of Latinos into the country. Though the history of Latino immigration to the United States can be traced back to the early 1900s, the most dramatic changes have occurred in the last two decades of the century,

Prior to the mid-1980s, Latino immigration to the United States was driven by dramatic changes in labor demand brought on by two World Wars and the United States government's numerous attempts to control the number and race/ethnicity of the immigrants entering the country. But as Massey and Capoferro (2009) point out, the most significant changes in Latino immigration have occurred over the past 20-30 years. These changes can be almost entirely attributed three major developments. The effects of the first two, the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border and the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), have been twofold. First, both measures have dramatically increased the Latino population in the United States through mass legalizations and by increasing the difficulty of entering and exiting the United States, respectively. Since 1980, the number of Latinos residing in the United States has more than tripled from 14.5 million to 47 million (American Community Survey 2008).

Second, militarizing the border and IRCA encouraged immigrants to settle in new places by shutting down traditional entry points and by providing newly legal immigrants with greater geographic mobility, respectively. The third major development, the passage of Proposition 187, has also encouraged immigrants to settle in new places by effectively telling new migrants that they were no longer welcome in California. As a direct result of these developments, the

majority of Latino immigrants are settling outside of California and Texas for the first time in U.S. history.

The massive influx of Latinos into the United States has led many to fear an increase in crime. Determining what structural variables help explain Latino homicide offending and victimization is one of the neglected challenges facing criminologists today – especially considering how little we know about Latino crime compared to whites and blacks (Phillips 2002). Although research on Latino homicide has only recently been given attention in the criminological literature, what little research that has been done has shown not only that predictors of black and white crime do not necessarily predict Latino crime (Martinez 1996; Lee et al 2001; Dugan and Apel 2003; Nielsen, Lee, and Martinez 2005; Nielsen, Martinez, and Lee 2005), but also the differences between whites and blacks are not due to the same factors as the differences between whites and Latinos (Phillips 2002; McNulty and Bellair 2003). Part of the problem may be the unique role that immigration has played in the history of U.S. Latinos, as outlined above.

The influx of immigrants and the rise of urbanization in the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century helped lead to the core ideas in Social Disorganization Theory. First, immigration and urbanization were viewed as having a negative overall impact on communities (Park and Burgess 1925; Wirth 1938), and was latter linked specifically to crime (Shaw and McKay 1942). Two schools of social disorganization developed early on. The first included researchers like Louis Wirth (1938), who believed that neighborhoods were being negatively impacted by (a) increasing population, (b) ethnic heterogeneity, and (c) settlement density. The other school, starting with the work of Park and Burgess (1925), did not believe “urbanism” was harming neighborhoods; rather residential instability was the culprit. Later researchers, such as Shaw

and McKay (1942), would take ideas from both schools and apply Social Disorganization Theory to the study of crime.

But attempts to link Latino immigration and crime have suffered from several major drawbacks. First, researchers tend to group all immigrants together, rather than look at Latino or other immigrant groups separately. Similarly, most immigration-crime research has examined immigration's effects on *overall* crime rates, rather than racially/ethnically disaggregated rates. Given that 86% of homicides are intra-racial (Uniform Crime Reports 2009), this is especially important. Second, as Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c: 337) point out, most previous research on Latino immigration has focused on "old, safe, and relatively well-organized places." While this might be useful in determining the effects of ethnic communities on the immigration-crime link, it does not provide much insight into what happens when Latinos venture outside of these traditional destinations. Finally, given the new settlement patterns of Latino immigrants, it is important for researchers to recognize that segregation may play an important role in how these migrants fare in their new communities.

Although segregation has been found to increase crime for all races/ethnicities (Feldmeyer 2010), most researchers have focused on its effects on blacks (Messner and South 1986; Peterson and Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Lee and Ousey 2005). This is due, in part, to their consistently high levels of segregation and socioeconomic disadvantage. Though many theories have been offered to explain how segregation has such a profound effect on black communities, most seem to focus on how it isolates blacks from mainstream society (Anderson 1994; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996). Despite having segregation and disadvantage levels close to those of blacks, Latinos have been virtually ignored in the segregation-crime literature (see Feldmeyer 2010; Xie 2010 for exceptions). Building on previous research, and taking into

account the importance of immigration to many Latino communities, I examine how Latinos are affected by being segregated from whites and the effects of immigrant Latinos isolation from native Latinos. The latter is especially important since the potentially beneficial relationships created in ethnic communities might never be formed if the two groups are isolated from one another.

Another way to examine segregation is to measure concentrations of poverty for racial/ethnic groups. Most research on concentrated poverty has focused on blacks, with two major theories emerging. One points to social isolation as the cause of poverty concentration in black communities (Wilson 1987; 1996), while the other cites segregation has the primary cause (Massey and Denton 1993). Regardless of the cause, it remains clear that the effects are negative for both blacks (Krivo and Peterson 1996; 1999; Lee 2000; Parker and Reckdenwald 2008; Akins 2009; Eitle 2009) and whites (Peterson and Krivo 1999; Lee 2000; Krivo and Peterson 2000). What is not clear, however, is the effect it has on Latinos. Research regarding this relationship has been mixed, with some finding no effect (Eschbach et al 2004; Emeka 2006) and others finding negative effects (Jargowsky 2009). Hence, it is vital that research on Latino homicide include measures of concentrated poverty for Latinos.

Therefore, this paper attempts to overcome the shortcomings of previous research by: (1) racially disaggregating all immigration measures, (2) racially disaggregating homicide victimization, (3) examining places in new and traditional destinations, (4) examining metropolitan and rural areas, and (5) controlling for Latino-White segregation, Latino-Latino segregation, and concentrations of poverty.


### **3.2: Latino Immigration in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century**

The history of Latino immigration to the United States in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, while brief compared to that of European immigration, has been rich and eventful. Although Latino immigrants, and immigrants in general, come from many different countries (see Charts 3.1 and 3.2), most U.S. immigration policies have targeted Mexican migration and the U.S.-Mexico border (Durand et al 2000; Massey and Capoferro 2009). Mexican migration to the United States has had one constant: labor demand.

**Chart 3.1: U.S. Immigrant Population by Region of Origin, 2000**


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**Percent of Immigrant Population**



**Chart 3.2: U.S. Latino and Latino Immigrant Population by Country of Origin, 2000**

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A series of immigration acts at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century worked to limit immigration from countries that were traditional sources of labor. Two pre-World War I measures, the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the Gentlemen's Agreement with Japan, effectively cutoff employers from their primary source of agricultural and railroad workers (Guerin-Gonzales 1994). Following World War I, Congress passed the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924, enacting a quota system to regulate the number of immigrants allowed from each country. Because of the difficulty in regulating overland borders, and the ease of regulating seaports, the quotas were a de facto restriction of all immigrant groups, except those from Mexico (Ngai 1999). These immigration measures forced many business owners to turn to Mexican workers to

meet their labor demands. Although Mexican migration to the United States during the 1910s and 1920s was less than half of what it would be over the next several decades, it marked the first major influx, and recruitment, of Mexican workers into the United States.

The next major period in Mexican migration began in the 1940s with the United States' involvement in World War II. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States began mobilizing for war, dramatically increasing the demand for labor in all sectors. In order to meet this new demand for workers, United States employers once again turned to Mexican workers. Enacted in 1942, the Bracero Accords brought Mexican farm workers to the United States under supervision of the U.S. government (Craig 1971) by promising "minimum wages, adequate living conditions, and the right to end their participation in the program and return to Mexico" (Garcia 2002:31). The program was so successful that it lasted until 1964, despite being enacted as a wartime measure (Calavita 1992), and provided work for an estimated 4.8 million Mexican workers (Cerrutti and Massey 2006).

The end of the Bracero Accords in 1964 may have brought an end to government sponsored Mexican immigration, but it did not stop migration altogether. After two decades of using Mexican workers to fill their labor needs, many U.S. business owners continued recruiting Mexican workers despite their lack of legal documents. Demand for unskilled labor continued into the 1970s and 1980s, leading to an increase in undocumented migration that has continued to the present.

Prior to the 1980s, Mexican migration followed two distinct patterns. First, nearly 80% of all Mexican migrants settled in just two states: California and Texas (Durand et al 2000). This, in essence, made immigration a regional rather than a national phenomenon for the United States. Second, Latino immigration was typically a circular process. Migrants came to the United States

temporarily in order to earn enough wages to fund a project back home, such as a car, a house, or a business (Durand and Massey 2006). This circular process was disrupted during the early 1990s by a new border enforcement policy that became known as “prevention through deterrence” (Massey and Capoferro 2009). In 1993, Operation Blockade was launched in El Paso, Texas and Operation Gatekeeper the following year in San Diego, California. Both Operations sought to prevent border crossings through militarization and fence building. As a result, border crossings at El Paso and San Diego were virtually eliminated (Nevins 2002), making entry into the United States *and* Mexico more difficult.

With the militarization of the border making trips to and from Mexico riskier, more migrants began to settle permanently in the United States rather than risk not being able to return at some future date. This, coupled with the three million immigrants naturalized with the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, has led to a dramatic increase in the U.S. Latino population. Since 1980, the number of Latinos residing in the United States has more than tripled from 14.5 million to 47 million (American Community Survey 2008), surpassing blacks as the nation’s largest minority.

A second major change in Latino immigration in the past two and a half decades has been its geographic diversification. As stated above, prior to Operations Blockade and Gatekeeper, 42% of all Latino immigrants, and 77% of Mexican immigrants, settled in California and Texas. That number had dropped to 32% and 48%, respectively, by 2005, meaning that Latinos, and Mexicans in particular, have begun to settle outside of their traditional destinations.

Massey and Capoferro (2009) outline several reasons for this diversification. First, there are the effects of the aforementioned Operation Blockade and Operation Gatekeeper. By taking away the most popular entry points in Texas and California, immigrants were forced to cross at

other, less visible, and less used points along the U.S.-Mexico border. New entry points meant new destinations.

Second, the mass legalizations as a result of the Immigration and Reform Control Act (IRCA)<sup>14</sup> flooded local labor markets - especially in California, which accounted for 54% of all legalizations. As a result, undocumented migrants, who were previously limited in their employment opportunities, were now free to find employment wherever they liked. This effectively flooded California's labor market, making it a less attractive destination for newly arrived immigrants. Furthermore, the acquisition of legal documents gave immigrants greater geographic mobility, many of whom decided to move elsewhere to find employment.

Third, the passage of Proposition 187 in California also contributed to Latinos' geographic diversification. In the early 1990s, California suffered from severe economic recession. Many residents, including Governor Pete Wilson, blamed many of the state's problems on immigrants. This culminated in the passage of Proposition 187, which did the following: (1) stop undocumented migrants from using social services, (2) required state and local authorities to report suspected illegal aliens, and (3) made the sale or use of false citizenship documents a felony offense (Calavita 1996). While most of its provisions were declared unconstitutional in subsequent court battles, it sent a clear and strong message to potential migrants that they were no longer welcome.

Finally, while California's economy sputtered, other state economies across the country grew robustly. This lured young, male, foreign-born Latino migrants away from traditional destinations in search of better opportunities elsewhere (Durand et al 2000; Lichter and Johnson 2006).

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<sup>14</sup> IRCA addressed immigration in three major ways: (1) legalize all illegal immigrants residing the United States, (2) penalize employers for hiring workers without proof of citizenship, and (3) increase federal funding for guarding the border.

These are just a few possible explanations for the geographic dispersal of Latinos; undoubtedly the cause is a mix of these and other factors. The fact remains, however, that Latinos are now more spread out across the United States than ever before. Settling in new and unfamiliar places poses many new problems for Latinos, several of which will be examined in this paper.

### **3.3: Latino Immigration and Crime**

As Latino immigrants continue to spread across the United States, scholars have once again begun to analyze the link between immigration and crime. The idea that immigration and crime are positively linked has a long history in sociological research. At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, many Eastern European immigrants (Rubin 1941) and southern blacks (Grossman 1991) migrated to central and northeast regions of the United States. Since many of these migrants often settled in less desirable, crime ridden neighborhoods, many people began to worry there might be an “immigrant problem” (Leuchtenberg 1958). Early explanations were steeped heavily in Social Darwinism – suggesting that immigrants were culturally and biologically inferior to natives (Coser 1977).

By the 1930s, several researchers began to develop socially and ecologically driven theories to explain the social pathologies besetting immigrants. Shaw and McKay (1942), in a landmark study, began mapping juvenile delinquency in Chicago neighborhoods. They noticed that high rates of delinquency seemed to plague only a small number of neighborhoods. Furthermore, they found that this small group of neighborhoods was experiencing persistently high crime rates, despite a rapidly changing population. In these neighborhoods, crime perpetuated from one generation to the next and one group of immigrants to the next. Shaw and

McKay felt that the only constant, the neighborhoods themselves, must be the key to explaining the high rates of delinquency.

Concentric Zone Theory, developed by Park and Burgess (1925), supported the findings of Shaw and McKay. It posits that when a city is fully developed, it will take on the form of five concentric rings with social and physical conditions declining as one gets closer to the city center. Park and Burgess argued that the ring nearest the city center (Transitional Zone) would be the least desirable – deteriorating houses, abandoned buildings, and factories would be abundant. Because the area was so undesirable, housing was cheap – allowing immigrants to settle in large numbers.

Shaw and McKay's maps of Chicago showed that immigrants, and juvenile delinquency, were, in fact, concentrated in the Transitional Zone. Furthermore, they found that these neighborhoods had a very high rate of population turnover – which Shaw and McKay found to be one of the keys to explaining the high rates of crime. Their theory, which would become known as Social Disorganization Theory, viewed communities as a dense network of formal and informal ties that linked people and organizations together. These ties help the community reach common goals – like fighting crime and following a path of conformity (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974). But, large changes over a short period of time – like immigrants pouring into a community – disrupt the neighborhood's ability to regulate itself (Kornhauser 1978; Bankston 1998). This was illustrated by Thomas and Znaniecki's (1958) seminal study of Polish immigrants in America.

Immigration, therefore, is thought to socially disorganize a community by disrupting social ties through ethnic heterogeneity and population turnover<sup>15</sup>. But it appears that the link between modern immigration, particularly Latino immigration, and crime may not follow the same pattern. Among immigrants as a whole, there is mixed evidence that they contribute to crime. Some studies report a positive association between immigration and crime (O’Kane 1992; Tanton and Lutton 1993; Borjas, Grogger and Hanson 2006) while some do not (Butcher and Piehl 1998; Martinez 2000; Lee et al 2001; Reid et al 2005). In contrast, the assumption that *Latino* immigration disorganizes communities and raises crime seems widely disconfirmed (Martinez and Lee 1998; Martinez et al 2003; Stowell and Martinez 2007; Stowell and Martinez 2009; Desmond and Kubrin 2009). In fact, research by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) suggests that Latinos’ geographic mobility actually works to lower Latino homicide victimization rates.

Some researchers have gone so far as to suggest that Latino immigration was one of the main forces behind the significant crime decline in the United States during the late 1990s. Sampson (2006; 2008) points out that the crime decline occurred at precisely the same time that millions of Latino immigrants were pouring into the United States. Furthermore, as immigration began to level off, so too did crime. This further fueled debate over whether there was a “Latino Paradox”; that Latinos’ level of mortality - homicide included - was not as high as their levels of socioeconomic disadvantage would predict (Abraido-Lanza et al 1999; Smith and Bradshaw 2006; Turra and Elo 2008).

One explanation for this paradox points to the benefits provided by ethnic communities, which Portes and Jensen (1992) describe as “a network of small enterprises that offer employment comparable to those of the mainstream economy...[and] this network creates new

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<sup>15</sup> Although this paper focuses exclusively on Social Disorganization as the theoretical framework for explaining the immigration-crime relationship, there are a number of other explanations. See Ousey and Kurbin (2009) for a review of other theoretical approaches.

entrepreneurial opportunities for newcomers – opportunities that are absent elsewhere (p.420).

These communities make assimilation easier, not only on a cultural level, but also in the job market – particularly for Latinos who have not yet mastered the English language. In a series of papers that examines Latino homicide and migration patterns, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010b; 2010c) show how moving into established Latino communities can help reduce exposure to violence.

First, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) found that when Latinos move into a part of a city that already had a relatively large Latino population, Latino homicide victimization and economic deprivation decreases. The authors suggest that moving into neighborhoods with established Latino populations increases the likelihood that a dense social network will already be in place – which then works to reduce the financial and emotional stress associated with moving and finding new employment.

Second, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010b) also found that Latinos who did not speak English well or at all increased rates of violent victimization and economic deprivation when settling outside of areas with traditionally large Latino populations. In contrast, Latinos settling in ethnic communities actually helped lower homicide rates, despite their inability to fluently speak English. The authors theorize that this inability creates an even greater reliance on the community and existing social networks to help support those individuals. But, in places without an established Latino community, these networks are not in place and are therefore unable to help the non-English speaking Latinos find success in the marketplace and avoid becoming a victim of violence.

In sum, prior research on immigration and crime has found a positive relationship. Social Disorganization Theory suggests that immigrants disorganize communities by disrupting the

existence and development of formal and informal ties within the community. More recent research, however, suggests that the immigration experience of Latino migrants may differ from those of previous studies. Latino immigrants may actually lower crime in the communities in which they settle. While this research has been instructive in understanding the immigration-crime link, it has suffered from several major drawbacks.

### **3.4: Limitations of Immigration-Crime Research**

Although Latino immigrants account for roughly 50% of all recent (since 1980) immigrants in the United States (U.S. Census 2000), the majority of recent immigration studies treat all immigrants as one large, undifferentiated group (Lee et al 2001; Reid et al 2005; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Stowell et al 2009). Given the unique history of Latino immigration and their proportion of the United States population, disaggregating immigrants by race/ethnicity would provide an even greater insight into the immigration-crime link. Furthermore, most studies examine how immigration affects *overall* crime rates, rather than disaggregating crime rates as well (Reid et al 2005; Martinez et al 2008; Ousey and Kubrin 2009; Stowell et al 2009). But 86% of homicides are intra-racial (Uniform Crime Reports 2009), which suggests it occurs within macro-social boundaries. Thus, it would be advantageous to determine how Latino immigration affects *Latino* homicide rates.

Another major shortcoming of recent research is the lack of geographic scope. Virtually all research on Latinos and crime focuses on areas that have had large Latino populations for decades. These areas include places like California (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier 2009), Florida (Nielsen and Martinez 2009; Olson, Laurikkala, Huff-Corzine, and Corzine 2009; Stowell and Martinez 2009), Illinois-Chicago (Chavez and Griffiths 2009; Graif and Sampson 2009; Velez 2009), and Texas (Akins, Rumbault, and Stansfield 2009; Valdez, Cepeda, and Kaplan 2009).

Other researchers study multiple areas, but they are almost always found in one of these four places (Lee et al 2001; Nielsen et al 2005; Martinez et al 2008). Given the protective nature of ethnic communities described above, one would expect Latinos to have different experiences in other parts of the country. In fact, researchers have found Latinos in new destinations to be less integrated into the social and economic mainstream (Leach and Bean 2008), more segregated from Whites (Lichter et al 2010), and typically rely less on established ethnic enclaves (Leach and Bean 2008). Hence, it is important to include places with less established Latino populations and to compare these new destinations with traditional ones. This should include urban as well as rural areas, given Latinos large population increase in these areas (Saenz and Torres 2003; Lichter and Johnson 2006).

I attempt to overcome these shortcomings by: (1) racially disaggregating all immigration measures, (2) racially disaggregating homicide victimization, (3) examining places in new and traditional destinations, and (4) examining metropolitan and rural areas.

### **3.5: Latino Segregation and Crime**

Since the early 1990s, sociologists have consistently found that segregation has caused a myriad of social problems, including social isolation, concentrated disadvantage, and crime (Massey and Denton 1993; Peterson and Krivo 1999; Massey 2001) for all racial/ethnic groups (Krivo et al 2009). Of particular interest has been the effect of segregation from whites on black homicide rates. Regardless of the particular measure of segregation used (unevenness vs. isolation) or the decade being studied, segregation has been consistently linked with higher rates of violence in black communities (Messner and South 1986; Peterson and Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Lee and Ousey 2005).

Blacks have been of particular interest to researchers partly because they have had consistently higher levels of segregation than any other racial/ethnic group – even when taking into account residential preference and household wealth (Freeman 2000; Crowder et al 2006). This is due partly to the inability of blacks to translate their individual characteristics (i.e. wealth and education) into physical proximity to whites (Freeman 2000). The consequence of this inability has been greater poverty and single parent families, more physical deterioration, poorer schools, and higher crime rates for black communities (Massey et al 1987; Massey 1990; Massey and Denton 1993; Krivo et al 1998; Peterson and Krivo 1999; Massey 2001).

Researchers have offered several explanations as to why black communities have been so affected (see Shihadeh and Flynn 1996 for a detailed overview). Some say segregation works to undermine the political power of many black communities (Massey and Denton 1993). Others argue that segregation may weaken attachment to the labor force, which diminishes commitment to mainstream values and norms (Shihadeh and Flynn 1996). Finally, persistent segregation may lead to a subcultural adaptation. As Anderson (1994) points out, many inner-city blacks have adapted to continued segregation by developing the Code of the Streets – which values toughness and aggression over middle-class goals such as getting a good education and finding gainful employment. This adaptation works to push inner-city blacks even further away from mainstream society. Ultimately, physical isolation leads to social isolation.

While previous research on segregation has been helpful in understanding its effects on black communities, researchers have not examined whether the negative effects of segregation extend to Latinos, and if they do, are they having the same impact on Latino communities (for exceptions see Feldmeyer 2010 and Xie 2010). There are several reasons to believe Latinos might be similarly affected. First, Latinos' rates of segregation are almost as high as those of

blacks (Feldmeyer 2010). Furthermore, Latino segregation has remained fairly stable since 1980, while blacks have experienced a significant decrease (Feldmeyer 2010). Second, Latinos also tend to have rates of socioeconomic disadvantage similar to those of blacks. Although Latinos' rates of disadvantage are not quite as high as blacks', they are still significantly higher than those of whites – which means segregating Latinos may lead to concentrations of disadvantage (i.e. concentrated poverty). Finally, as Krivo et al (2009) point out, segregation increases crime for all races/ethnicities – Latinos and whites included.

Despite the similarities, there is reason to believe Latinos might be differentially affected by segregation. For instance, Latinos, especially immigrant Latinos, tend to use their social networks to help them decide where to settle – typically in places where they have friends or family (Massey 1986; Kasinitz 1992). This suggests that Latinos' settlement patterns reflect voluntary housing choices rather than the forced, discriminatory housing options for blacks (Charles 2003; Allen and Turner 2009). In fact, as discussed above, Shihadeh and Barranco (2010c) found that Latino homicide is actually lower when Latinos settle in areas where there is a substantial Latino population already established. Although the researchers did not test segregation directly, their work suggests that large concentrations of Latinos (i.e. ethnic enclaves) might not be negatively affected by their isolation from whites. In fact, they may actually benefit from it.

Although the link between segregation and Latino violence has recently been examined in several studies (Burton 2004; Feldmeyer 2010; Xie 2010), these studies suffer from many of the same methodological issues as the other Latino-crime studies mentioned above (i.e. narrow geographic scope, not examining Latino homicide, etc.). Furthermore, given the significant role that immigration plays in many Latino communities, it is surprising that no study has examined

how segregation and immigration work together to affect rates of Latino violence. It is imperative that we study both native Latino and immigrant Latino residential isolation.

This study aims to rectify both the methodological issues of past research and the omission of the effects of immigration-segregation on Latino violence by addressing the following questions: (1) Are Latino homicide rates affected by segregation? (2) If so, which types of segregation? (3) Can the difference in Latino homicide victimization found in traditional and new destinations be explained by segregation?

### **3.6: Concentration of Poverty and Crime**

Physical separation is just one aspect of segregation. The two most commonly used forms of segregation, unevenness and isolation, measure exactly that – one race/ethnicity's physical separation from another race (typically whites). But segregation can be measured in another way, namely, by looking at concentrations of groups. The most common measure for this is concentrated poverty (or disadvantage).

Like segregation, concentrated poverty has mainly been examined in regards to how it affects blacks. There have been two major theories put forward to explain how blacks have come to have such high levels of concentrated disadvantage. The first, which points to social isolation, is based on the work of William Julius Wilson (1987; 1996). Wilson argues that the movement of good quality, low skill employment out of inner city areas caused the black middle-class to leave these areas in large numbers. With the middle-class gone, so to were the positive role models, business leaders, and financial resources that once held these communities together. The residents left behind tended to be overwhelming poor, leaving many inner city neighborhoods with large concentrations of poor – what Wilson calls *ghetto poverty*.

The second theory, put forth by Massey and Denton (1993), argues that segregation from whites – not middle class blacks – has left blacks with high levels of concentrated poverty. They argue that practices like white flight and residential steering have left blacks in a disadvantageous position. For most groups, segregation declines when socioeconomic status rises. But this is not the case for blacks. Even affluent, segregated black neighborhoods tend to have many of the same problems as poor, segregated black neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993).

Regardless of which theory is correct (see Shihadeh 2009 for a comparison), the fact remains that blacks have extremely high levels of concentrated poverty. This has had negative outcomes like the loss of male role models (Parker and Reckdenwald 2008), increased cultural retaliatory homicide (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003), and more general forms of crime (Krivo and Peterson 1996; Akins 2009; Eitle 2009). Furthermore, some research suggests that the effect extends whites (Peterson and Krivo 1999; Lee 2000; Krivo and Peterson 2000)

Though the effects of concentrated poverty on blacks and whites have been extensively researched, little is known about how Latinos are affected. Given their typically strong social networks, it is possible that Latinos might be able to overcome living in *barrios* – segregated low-income Latino neighborhoods (Jargowsky 2009) - and thrive despite it. Prior research has been somewhat contradictory. For instance, some research suggests that immigrant concentrations, even poverty concentrations, can be beneficial by sheltering “newcomers from the ill-effects that nativist activities may have had on their lives otherwise” (Emeka 2006: 7), with some going so far as to argue there is a “*barrio* advantage” (Eschbach et al 2004). However, recent research by Jargowsky (2009) suggests that not all Latinos benefit from living in such communities.

Therefore, my research includes measures of both Latino and immigrant Latino concentrated disadvantage. In doing so, I am able to address the following questions: (1) Is segregation in general or concentrated poverty more important in explaining Latino homicide? (2) Are disadvantaged Latino neighborhoods increasing or decreasing Latino homicide victimization? (3) Do traditional destinations provide better protection from concentrated disadvantage than new destinations?

### **3.7: Methods**

I analyze 919 U.S. counties with at least 1,000 Latinos and for which there was racially disaggregated homicide data available for 2000. As stated above, recent research on immigration and crime has been too narrow in scope. Therefore, it is important to examine as broad a spectrum of places as possible. For this reason, I use U.S. counties instead of cities as my unit of analysis, which allows me to include a significantly larger sample. I include *all* counties with 1,000 Latinos for two primary reasons. First, while Latinos tend to be heavily concentrated in major metropolitan areas, they have had tremendous growth in rural areas (Saenz and Torres 2003; Lichter and Johnson 2006). By looking at *all* counties with 1,000 Latinos (instead of only major urban areas) I hope to capture more of the Latino experience than previous research. Second, previous research has found that Latinos impact homicide rates in both rural and urban areas (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010d). Therefore, both areas should be included in any study examining the effects of Latinos on homicide.

Data for the dependent variable, Latino homicide victimization, were obtained from the National Vital Statistics System's Multiple Cause-of-Death mortality detail file. These data come from death certificates filed to the Center for Disease Control by local coroners and

include a wide variety of causes of death, including homicide<sup>16</sup>. While most prior homicide research has examined the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports or Supplementary Homicide Reports, neither provides information on Latino offenders or victims<sup>17</sup>. Vital Statistics, on the other hand, provides data on Latinos, albeit only victimization data. For this reason, and others, these data have become more widely used in criminological research (Martinez et al 2008; Loftin, McDowell and Fetzer 2008; Kposowa, Tsunokai, and McElvain 2006; Wu 2009; Xie 2010; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d). Furthermore, Martinez et al (2008) note that while coroner data reflect place of residence, not the place occurrence, for many purposes they actually provide more accurate and appropriate measures than do the SHR.

In addition to their recent acceptance as a useful data source, I believe these data are suitable for four reasons. First, since victims and offenders tend to be of similar race/ethnicity (Boland 1976; O'Brien 1987; Uniform Crime Reports 2009), it can be reasonably inferred that victimization data will be similar to offending data, such as the Supplementary Homicide Reports. In fact, Wiersema et al (2000) found that Supplementary Homicide Reports and Vital Statistics homicide are highly correlated, especially in places with large populations. Second, these data do not suffer from missing data problems to the same extent as the Supplementary Homicide Reports. Third, Arias and Tejada-Vera (2008) find that race and Latino ethnicity reporting on death certificates is not subject to serious problems of misclassification. Finally, since death certificates are issued for *all* deaths, undocumented migrants may also be captured in these data.

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<sup>16</sup> Multiple cause-of-death data include 456 different causes of death. Assault (homicide) is coded as number 432 and encapsulates all other homicide subcategories (such as discharge of firearm, strangulation, blunt object, etc.).

<sup>17</sup> In 1980 the FBI attempted to add Latinos to SHR forms, but it was so unsuccessful that they abandoned the attempt by mid-decade (Fox 2005). See Martinez 1996 for an article that attempted to use this data.

Given this paper's focus on homicide differences between traditional and new destinations, it is important to point out that Latinos in new destinations tend to be younger than those in traditional destinations. This is seen in new destination's lower median age (23.89 vs. 26.48) and greater proportion of Latinos between the ages of 15 and 29 (33% vs. 25%). Since age has long been linked to homicide, it is possible that any differences found between the two destinations could be simply due to their age distributions. In order to avoid this possibility, I calculate age-standardized homicide counts using the age distribution for all U.S. Latinos<sup>18</sup>. These age-standardized victimization counts are used in the following analysis.

Finally, because homicide is a statistically rare event, homicide counts are averaged over a three-year period (1999, 2000, 2001) to account for year-to-year fluctuations. In terms of estimating the models, Osgood (2000) and Osgood and Chambers (2000) argue that macro-level data with a large number of zero observations often follows a Poisson-like distribution, and thus estimating with OLS is inappropriate. In order to avoid this problem, I follow the current convention in the literature and use negative binomial regression analysis to predict the pooled three-year homicide counts. The negative binomial estimator is the appropriate choice because it allows for overdispersion in the data. Furthermore, following the method of previous research (Messner et al 2005), the negative binomial estimates control for the spatial "nesting" of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0.

### **3.7.2: Independent Variables**

The key theoretical concepts in this analysis are immigration and segregation. Since there have been significant changes in immigration patterns and policy over the past several decades, I break immigration down into three categories. First, *Immigrants Entered Pre-1985* are Latino immigrants who entered before the significant immigration reform of the late 1980s

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<sup>18</sup> See pages 240-245 in Shryock et al (1976) for a detailed explanation of calculating age-standardized death rates.

and 1990s. Second, *Immigrants Entered 1985-1989* are Latino immigrants who entered following the passage of IRCA in 1986. Finally, *Immigrants Entered 1990-2000* are Latino immigrants who entered during the period of strict border enforcement and when Latino immigrants began moving to new destinations.

Segregation, in its many forms, has been shown repeatedly to be positively related to crime (Messner and South 1986; Peterson and Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Lee and Ousey 2005). However, as Massey and Denton (1988) point out, there is no one measure of segregation. They demonstrate twenty different measures before reducing their list to five key categories: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering. For the current analysis, I will focus on three types of segregation measures – one evenness and two exposure.

The first measure of segregation I will employ, the index of dissimilarity, falls into Massey and Denton's evenness category. The index of dissimilarity, which is based on the Lorenz curve, measures the proportion of the minority population that would be required to move in order to have an even distribution. As it is used in this study, the measure will provide the proportion of Latinos that must move from areas in which they are overrepresented to areas in which they are underrepresented. The formula to calculate this is:

$$D = \sum [ (1/2) |L_i - W_i| ] * 100$$

where  $L_i$  is the proportion of all Latinos in the county that are located in tract  $i$ , while  $N_i$  is the proportion of all whites that are located in tract  $i$ . The measure varies between 0 and 100 and is interpreted as the proportion of all Latinos in the county that would need to move in order to achieve perfect evenness across the city (*Latino-White Dissimilarity*).

The second measure of segregation I will employ, social interaction, falls into Massey and Denton's exposure category. It simply measures the extent to which minority members (Latinos) are exposed to majority members (Whites). This can be measured as follows:

$$P^* = \sum [x_i/X][y_i/t_i]$$

where  $x_i$ ,  $y_i$ , and  $t_i$  are the number of Latinos, whites, and total population of tract  $i$ , respectively, and  $X$  is the total number of Latinos in the county. The measure varies between 0 and 1 – the former representing Latinos' complete isolation from whites and the latter representing full confidence that any given Latino will reside in a tract with a non-Latino (*Latino-White Interaction*). Like the Index of Dissimilarity above, Interaction can also be easily altered to examine segregation between native and immigration Latinos. Therefore I also include *Immigrant-Native Interaction*<sup>19</sup>.

Another exposure measure that gauges segregation is social isolation. This measure, which is very similar to social interaction, measures the degree to which Latinos are exposed only to *other Latinos*. It is measured as follows:

$$P^* = \sum [x_i/X][x_i/t_i]$$

where  $x_i$  and  $t_i$  are the number of Latinos and total population of tract  $i$ , respectively, and  $X$  is the total number of Latinos in the county. The measure, like interaction, varies between 0 and 1 – the latter representing Latinos' complete isolation from non-Latinos and the former representing full confidence that any given Latino will reside in a tract with a non-Latino (*Latino Isolation*).

Yet another variation of the exposure category of segregation involves examining both race/ethnicity and poverty – providing a measure of concentrated poverty. For instance, using

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<sup>19</sup> where  $x_i$ ,  $y_i$ , and  $t_i$  are the number of immigrants, natives, and total population of tract  $i$ , respectively, and  $X$  is the total number of immigrants in the city.

the formula given above for social isolation, Latino poverty concentration would be as follows:  $x_i$  refers to the number of Latinos in poverty in tract<sub>i</sub>, X is the total number of Latinos below the poverty line in the entire county, and t<sub>i</sub> is the total population of tract<sub>i</sub> (*Poverty Isolation*). This gives the likelihood that a poor Latino will interact with another poor Latino. As with the other segregation measures, I also construct a measure of poverty concentration for immigrant Latinos (*Immigrant Poverty Isolation*<sup>20</sup>).

### 3.7.3: Control Variables

Since Latinos tend to dominate low skill employment, I believe it is important to control for the baseline local labor market conditions. Using the above criteria to identify low skill industries, I calculate the proportion of all jobs in a city that are considered low skilled (*Low skill Jobs*).

*Latino Economic Deprivation* was obtained by running a principal components factor analysis with the proportion of Latinos without a high school diploma, the proportion of Latinos unemployed, the proportion of Latino households headed by a single parent, and the proportion of all Latinos living in poverty. As measures of social disorganization, I include the proportion of the population that has moved in the past five years (*Moved*) and the proportion of all housing units that are vacant (*Vacant Houses*). *Latinos 15-29 Years Old* controls for the age-crime relationship, while *Total Population* controls for the size of the county, and *Proportion Black* controls for the racial composition. Finally, because high population density may increase the opportunity for homicide, I include the proportion of housing units that are in clusters of five or more (*Housing Density*).

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<sup>20</sup>  $x_i$  refers to the number of immigrant Latinos below the poverty line in tract<sub>i</sub>, X is the total number of immigrant Latinos below the poverty line in the entire county, and t<sub>i</sub> is the total population of tract<sub>i</sub>

Since the following analysis disaggregates all my models by destination (Tradition vs. New), it is important to understand how destination is defined. The following method was developed by combining two methods used by different researchers<sup>21</sup>. Traditional destinations are counties whose population comprised at least 10% Latinos in 1990. New Destinations are defined as counties that experienced at least a 100% increase in their Latino population from 1990 to 2000<sup>22</sup>. If a county fell into both categories, it was labeled as traditional only<sup>23</sup>.

### **3.8: Results**

Chart 3.3 shows age adjusted and unadjusted Latino homicide victimization rates for the various definitions of traditional and new destinations. This provides several important findings. First, regardless of how traditional and new destination is measured, the latter is consistently higher than the former. In fact, the higher the Latino growth rate, the higher the difference in rates. Second, the State Method described in Footnote 21 and the 100% County Growth Method used in this analysis provide nearly identical rates, despite a relatively low correlation (.34, not reported). Third, due to the relatively youthful Latino population in new destinations (for all definitions), age adjusting the rates lowers them substantially. In contrast, rates for traditional areas either increases (County Method) or is not substantially affected (State Method). Despite this narrowing of the gap, new destinations still have higher rates across the board. By eliminating age as the primary cause of the difference in victimization rates, the analysis will now focus on attempting to explain this difference.

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
<sup>21</sup> The first method (State Method), used by Massey and Capoferro (2009) focuses on states. Traditional states are those containing at least 500,000 Latinos in 1990. New destination states are those that saw a 100% increase in their Latino population from 1990 to 2000. The second method (County Method), used by Kandel and Cromartie (2004) focuses on counties. Traditional counties are those whose population contained at least 10% Latinos in 1990. New destination counties are those that saw a 150% increase in their Latino population from 1990 to 2000.

<sup>22</sup> I use 100% to bridge the methods used by Massey and Capoferro (2009) and Kandel and Cromartie (2004). See footnote 8.

<sup>23</sup> Of the 3,141 counties examined, only 31 fall into both categories.

**Chart 3.3: Latino Homicide Victimization Rates by County Definitions, 2000**

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The descriptive statistics provided in Table 3.1 illustrate the differences found between new and traditional destinations. Although both have similar levels of socioeconomic disadvantage, there are significant differences in demographic makeup, homicide victimization, and segregation. First, nearly one-third of all new destination Latinos entered the country between 1990 and 2000 (.30). In traditional areas, only 10% of immigrants entered during the same period and were just as likely to have entered prior to 1985. In other words, the Latino population in new destinations is dominated by more recent immigrants, thus demonstrating

**Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for Latinos in U.S. Counties, 2000**

	All Counties		Traditional Destinations		New Destinations	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Latino Less than High School#	.46	.17	.51	.13	.51	.17
Latino Unemployment	.05	.03	.06	.02	.05	.03
Latino Single Headed Households	.14	.05	.14	.04	.14	.05
Latino Poverty	.23	.09	.26	.07	.24	.09
Latinos 15-29 Years Old	.29	.07	.25	.04	.33	.06
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000	.19	.15	.10	.08	.30	.14
Immigrants Entered 1985-1989	.05	.03	.04	.03	.07	.03
Immigrants Entered pre1985	.09	.05	.10	.06	.09	.04
Latino-White Dissimilarity	16.78	9.04	20.57	9.59	16.27	8.31
Latino-White Interaction	.39	.28	.65	.15	.36	.26
Immigrant-Native Interaction	.16	.20	.45	.21	.10	.10
Latino Isolation	.15	.18	.42	.20	.08	.08
Poverty Isolation	.05	.06	.13	.08	.03	.03
Immigrant Poverty Isolation	.01	.01	.01	.02	.01	.01
Latino Age-Adjusted Homicide Victimization Rate*	5.99	10.98	5.80	7.84	7.28	13.84
Total Population	200,137	451,837	260,504	812,951	152,895	205,067
Rural County (Rural=1)	.42	.49	.60	.49	.39	.49
Housing Density	.10	.09	.09	.12	.10	.07
Vacant Houses	.11	.08	.15	.09	.10	.07
Moved	.21	.08	.20	.08	.23	.07
Proportion of Jobs Low skilled	.57	.08	.55	.07	.59	.07
(N=)	919		218		297	

# Latino economic deprivation measures (high school, unemployment, single headed households and poverty) are listed separately for descriptive purposes, but in the multivariate analysis they are combined into a single factor. See methods section for more detail.

\*Homicide is expressed as a rate in the descriptive table, but is entered as counts in the negative binomial regression.

that new destination Latino communities are much less established than traditional areas<sup>24</sup>.

Second, as Chart 3.3 showed, even after age adjusting victimization rates, new destinations' rates are 25% higher than traditional areas (7.28 vs. 5.80).

Finally, Table 3.1 also reveals significant differences in segregation between the two destination areas. First, Latinos in traditional areas are nearly twice as likely to interact with Whites as Latinos in new destinations (*Latino-White Interaction*). Second, Immigrant Latinos are 4.5 times more likely to interact with Native Latinos in Traditional areas than Latinos in new destinations (*Immigrant-Native Interaction*). Both of these can be explained, at least partially, by the sheer lack of Latinos in new destinations. Because they are so few in number, they are less likely to interact with anyone else. Lastly, Latinos are 5 times more likely to interact with other Latinos in traditional areas than Latinos in new destinations (*Latino Isolation*). This shows that, in addition to having small numbers in new destinations, Latinos are also more likely to be spread out – thus the lower levels of concentration.

Table 3.2 provides the results of three models testing the immigration-crime link in new destinations by controlling for the proportion of the Latino population that entered the U.S. during various phases in Latino immigration. Model 1 examines the effects of the most recent immigrants, those entering between 1990 and 2000. Results show that as the proportion of Latinos who are recent immigrants increases, so too does Latino homicide victimization (1.76). To evaluate the strength of the relationship, the coefficients are converted to a proportion<sup>25</sup>. This calculation shows that a one standard deviation increase in recent Latino immigration is

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<sup>24</sup> Of all Latinos living in new destinations, 46% are immigrants, compared to only 24% in traditional areas (not reported). This means that new destinations are nearly twice as likely house immigrant Latinos.

<sup>25</sup> This is done by using the formula  $(e^{b*s} - 1) * 100$ , where b is the coefficient and s is the standard deviation of the variable in question. In this case, *Immigrants Entered 1990-2000*.

**Table 3.2: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide Victimization in 297 New Destination U.S. Counties, 2000**

	Latino Homicide Model 1	Latino Homicide Model 2	Latino Homicide Model 3
Total Population#	-2.42*** (0.53)	-2.32*** (0.51)	-2.28*** (0.50)
Moved	-4.92*** (1.69)	-4.24** (1.78)	-4.04** (1.71)
Vacant Houses	4.82† (2.56)	3.55† (2.04)	4.21† (2.56)
Housing Density	-3.46 (2.53)	-3.00 (2.87)	-3.19 (2.56)
Latinos 15-29 Years Old	4.03 (2.83)	6.60*** (1.66)	6.06*** (1.88)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	-3.47 (2.19)	-1.79 (2.88)	-1.84 (2.66)
Latino Economic Deprivation	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.07 (0.11)	-0.11 (0.14)
Rural	-0.06 (0.24)	0.09 (0.23)	0.04 (0.22)
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000	1.76† (1.01)	-----	-----
Immigrants Entered 1985-1989	-----	-3.11 (5.79)	-----
Immigrants Entered pre1985	-----	-----	-2.11 (2.55)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Latino Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

associated with a 27.9% increase in Latino homicide victimization. Models 2 and 3 examine the effects of immigrants entering immediately after the passage of IRCA (1985-1989) and those entering before IRCA (pre1985), respectively. In both models immigration has no effect on victimization, suggesting that only the most recent immigrants - those entering during the period of strict border enforcement - have any effect on homicide in new destinations.

Table 3.3 shows the results of models testing the same three immigration variables as Table 3.2, but for traditional destinations. For all three models, immigration is *negatively* associated with Latino homicide victimization. In fact, the effect is just as strong, or stronger, than the positive effect from the previous table. For the three models, immigration is associated with a 32.5% (1990-200), 28.2% (1985-1989), and 27.7% (pre1985) decrease in Latino homicide victimization, respectively. These results, coupled with those of Table 3.2, show that Latino immigration has very different effects depending on the type of destination. In both cases, the strongest effects are linked with the most recent immigrants.

The next two tables attempt to answer several empirical questions brought about by the findings presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. For instance, why do Latino immigrants have such disparate effects in new and traditional destinations? Is it due to the differences in segregation demonstrated in Table 3.1? If so, does controlling for segregation explain away the effects of Latino immigration? And finally, what segregation measures are the most important?

Table 3.4 presents results of models building on the findings of previous research, namely the positive effects of ethnic enclaves, particularly when it comes to homicide rates (i.e. Shihadeh and Barranco 2010c). To do this, the level of interaction between Latinos is controlled for, along with recent immigration. Models 1 and 2 present the negative binomial estimates when controlling for Latino isolation. This variable measures the degree to which Latinos interact only with other Latinos. In other words, it measures Latino to Latino interaction, one of the elements necessary for ethnic enclaves to produce benefits. Since ethnic enclaves, and therefore Latino interaction, is considered beneficial regardless of location, I expect new and traditional destinations to be similarly affected by the Latino interaction/isolation measures.

**Table 3.3: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide Victimization in 218 Traditional Destination U.S. Counties, 2000**

	Latino Homicide Model 1	Latino Homicide Model 2	Latino Homicide Model 3
Total Population#	-0.35*** (0.03)	-0.32*** (0.03)	-0.32*** (0.03)
Moved	5.07*** (1.20)	4.81*** (1.07)	4.65*** (1.12)
Vacant Houses	1.39 (1.21)	0.84 (1.14)	1.15 (1.12)
Housing Density	-2.51*** (0.87)	-2.54*** (0.86)	-2.46*** (0.92)
Latinos 15-29 Years Old	1.50 (3.13)	1.69 (3.39)	-0.03 (2.71)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	-1.33 (1.68)	-1.60 (1.65)	-1.19 (1.66)
Latino Economic Deprivation	0.03 (0.10)	0.06 (0.09)	0.09 (0.07)
Rural	1.02*** (0.14)	1.07*** (0.12)	1.07*** (0.14)
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000	-3.52*** (1.32)	-----	-----
Immigrants Entered 1985-1989	-----	-11.03*** (3.20)	-----
Immigrants Entered pre1985	-----	-----	-5.40*** (1.22)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Latino Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

**Table 3.4: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide Victimization in Traditional and New Destination U.S. Counties, 2000**

	New Destinations Model 1	Traditional Destinations Model 2	New Destinations Model 3	Traditional Destinations Model 4
Total Population#	-2.08*** (0.39)	-0.32*** (0.04)	-1.99*** (0.35)	-0.32*** (0.05)
Moved	-2.88 (1.89)	3.20** (1.47)	-3.18** (1.66)	3.11† (1.68)
Vacant Houses	4.14** (2.08)	1.27 (1.19)	3.85** (1.96)	1.02 (1.07)
Housing Density	-1.91 (2.42)	-2.82*** (0.87)	-1.76 (2.22)	-2.84*** (0.87)
Latinos 15-29 Years Old	1.23 (2.83)	-4.08 (3.18)	1.25 (2.63)	-4.67 (3.14)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	-0.79 (2.29)	-1.70 (1.44)	-0.99 (2.10)	-1.96 (1.40)
Latino Economic Deprivation	0.11 (0.12)	0.19** (0.09)	0.11 (0.11)	0.19** (0.09)
Rural	0.09 (0.24)	1.08*** (0.15)	0.06 (0.23)	0.99*** (0.15)
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000	1.91** (0.95)	-3.30** (1.33)	2.08** (0.89)	-3.22** (1.34)
Latino Isolation	-5.54*** (1.14)	-2.08*** (0.50)	-----	-----
Immigrant-Native Interaction	-----	-----	-4.86*** (0.86)	-2.14*** (0.49)
N =	297	218	297	218

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Latino Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

Model 1 shows results for new destinations when controlling for Latino isolation. As the ethnic enclave literature would predict (but contrary to segregation literature), Latino isolation is *negatively* associated with Latino homicide victimization (-5.54), with a 35.8% reduction in homicide victimization per standard deviation increase. The results of Model 2, which looks at

traditional destinations, are very similar. Latino isolation is once again negatively associated with homicide (-2.07) and the percentage reduction in victimization is nearly identical (34%).

As discussed previously in the paper, one of the most important effects of intensified border enforcement has been the settlement of immigrant Latinos in new areas, particularly areas with small or no existing Latino population. This lack of contact between immigrants and natives is one of the key theories behind the disparate Latino homicide rates in new and traditional destinations. In order to test the validity of this theory, Models 3 and 4 control for the level of interaction between immigrant and native Latinos, along with the presence of recent immigrants. Model 3, which focuses on new destinations, finds that increased interaction between immigrant and native Latinos is associated with lower victimization rates (-4.86). Therefore, a one standard deviation increase in immigrant-native interaction results in a 38.5% decrease in homicide – making it the strongest effect yet. Model 4 controls for the same variables, but limits the sample to traditional counties. The results are, once again, very similar. For traditional counties, immigrant-native interaction in a 36.2% reduction in homicide victimization per standard deviation increase. These results demonstrate the importance of contact between, not only Latinos in general, but also immigrant and native Latinos. However, despite the strength of the segregation measures, the effect of recent immigration remains significant and in the same direction as Tables 3.2 and 3.3, respectively, in all four models. See the Discussion and Conclusion section for a detailed explanation of this finding.

While the previous table found Latino segregation to have positive effects, it remains unclear if the effect would remain if the Latinos that were segregated were poor. In other words, what effect does concentrated poverty have on Latino homicide rates? Table 3.5 answers this question by controlling for Latino, and immigrant Latino, poverty isolation. These measures

determine the extent to which poor Latinos interact only with other poor Latinos. Models 1 and 2 control for Latino poverty isolation in new and traditional destinations, respectively. In both models concentrated poverty actually works to lower Latino homicide victimization rates

**Table 3.5: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Latino Homicide Victimization in Traditional and New Destination U.S. Counties, 2000**

	New Destinations Model 1	Traditional Destinations Model 2	New Destinations Model 3	Traditional Destinations Model 4
Total Population#	-2.01*** (0.38)	-3.16*** (0.04)	-2.35*** (0.44)	-0.33*** (0.04)
Moved	-4.04** (1.70)	3.44** (1.48)	-4.29*** (1.61)	4.51*** (1.31)
Vacant Houses	3.88** (1.89)	1.57 (1.29)	5.93** (2.39)	1.98 (1.33)
Housing Density	-3.16 (2.14)	-3.04*** (0.94)	-2.99 (2.06)	-3.10*** (0.90)
Latinos 15-29 Years Old	2.11 (2.54)	-4.10 (2.96)	3.16 (2.59)	-2.80 (2.75)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	-2.28 (2.24)	-2.49† (1.37)	-2.89 (2.02)	-1.90 (1.50)
Latino Economic Deprivation	0.18 (0.12)	0.39** (0.10)	0.11 (0.12)	0.30*** (0.09)
Rural	-0.06 (0.23)	1.00*** (0.18)	-0.05 (0.24)	0.95*** (0.15)
Immigrants Entered 1990-2000	1.83** (0.94)	-3.25** (1.33)	2.67*** (1.04)	-1.50 (1.41)
Latino Poverty Isolation	-12.33*** (3.48)	-5.70*** (0.79)	-----	-----
Immigrant Poverty Isolation	-----	-----	-49.62*** (7.94)	-18.96*** (3.03)
N =	297	218	297	218

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Latino Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

(-12.33, -5.70). This is also the case in Models 3 and 4 which control for *immigrant* concentrated poverty (-49.62, -18.96) – showing that it does not matter if native or foreign-born Latinos are living in areas of concentrated poverty, Latinos stand to benefit either way. These results seemingly confirm that there is, in fact, a *barrio* advantage. As mentioned previously, some researchers found that poor Latino neighborhoods, *barrios*, provide certain protections to newcomers – essentially keeping them out of trouble (Emeka 2006). In other words, the beneficial effects of ethnic enclaves extend even to neighborhoods that are extremely poor. In sum, it appears that contact between Latinos, regardless of the circumstances surrounding the contact, is beneficial to the community.

Table 3.6 presents several auxiliary models which are designed to ensure the effect of the isolation and interaction measures on Latino victimization will not be accounted for by other potentially important segregation measures. Since most segregation indices measure segregation of some minority group *from whites*, controlling for this could potentially dampen, or remove altogether, the effects of the previously used isolation and interaction measures. Therefore, both Latino-White interaction and Latino-White dissimilarity are controlled for in the following table.

All models were run separately for new and traditional destinations, with coefficients and standard deviations presented for both. Models 1 and 2 test the significance of Latino isolation, Models 3 and 4 examine immigrant-native interaction, Models 5 and 6 test Latino poverty isolation, and finally, Models 7 and 8 examine immigrant poverty isolation. In all eight models, for both new and traditional destinations, segregation from whites does not remove the effects of the isolation and interaction measures<sup>26</sup>. In fact, all but one remains significant at the .01 level (Model 6 for New Destinations, -10.56). This once again confirms the fact that interaction

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<sup>26</sup> Segregation from whites was significant in only 3 out of the 16 models. These include: New Destinations - Model 5 and Model 7, Traditional Destinations – Model 7.

between Latinos remains one of the most important factors in explaining their homicide victimization rates.

**Table 3.6: Coefficients and Standard Deviations for Segregation Variables Predicting Latino Homicide Victimization under Alternative Model Specifications in 297 New Destination and 218 Traditional Destination U.S. Counties, 2000**

	New Destinations	Traditional Destinations
<i>Latino Isolation</i>		
Model 1: controlling for Latino-White Interaction	-4.20*** (1.22)	-2.21*** (0.36)
Model 2: controlling for Latino-White Dissimilarity	-7.54*** (1.75)	-2.08*** (0.46)
<i>Immigrant-Native Interaction</i>		
Model 3: controlling for Latino-White Interaction	-3.90*** (1.01)	-2.28*** (0.34)
Model 4: controlling for Latino-White Dissimilarity	-6.26*** (1.18)	-2.09*** (0.46)
<i>Latino Poverty Isolation</i>		
Model 5: controlling for Latino-White Interaction	-9.71*** (3.63)	-6.63*** (0.42)
Model 6: controlling for Latino-White Dissimilarity	-10.56** (4.61)	-5.76*** (0.84)
<i>Immigrant Poverty Isolation</i>		
Model 7: controlling for Latino-White Interaction	-39.54*** (10.51)	-22.24*** (4.16)
Model 8: controlling for Latino-White Dissimilarity	-44.54*** (8.03)	-17.84*** (5.22)

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Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Latino Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

### **3.9: Discussion and Conclusion**

Since the mid-1980s, the pattern of settlement by Latino migrants has changed dramatically. These migrants are now settling in parts of the United States that have never before had significant Latino populations. This has led many to fear that their arrival will spark an increase in crime. Unfortunately, early explanations of immigration and crime focused on the experience of Eastern European immigrants. Therefore, it is not clear whether the experience of Latino immigrants could be explained in the same way – especially with some researchers finding that immigrants now lower crime rates. However, most recent research on immigration has failed to analyze any of the new areas of settlement. Furthermore, new settlement patterns raise the risk of Latinos becoming increasingly segregated from whites, and, in places with small Latino populations, also from Latinos. Given the substantial amount of research demonstrating the negative effects of segregation, Latinos in new destinations run the risk of being exposed to high levels of violence. This study attempts to rectify the shortcomings of previous research by examining the effects of immigration and segregation in both traditional *and* new destinations.

I observe the following findings: (1) Latino homicide victimization and segregation, on average, is higher in new destination than traditional counties. (2) The relationship between recent Latino immigration and homicide victimization is positive in new destinations, but negative in traditional counties. (3) Interaction between Latinos in general, and immigrant and native Latinos specifically, lowers Latino homicide rates in both traditional and new destinations. (4) This interaction remains beneficial even when the Latinos are poor. (5) These interactions remain significant even when controlling for Latinos' segregation from whites. I draw several implications from these findings.

First, the results of this study demonstrate the importance of disaggregating homicide models by immigrant destination when examining the effects of Latino immigration. As discussed previously, prior research examining the effects of immigration on homicide have focused on areas that have traditionally housed large immigrant population. The fact that this research has found immigration to have no effect on homicide, nor does it lower it, is not surprising given the prevalence of ethnic enclaves in these areas. By ignoring new destinations, however, prior research assumes that the experience, and effect, of immigrants is consistent across all community types. The results of this study put that assumption in doubt. It appears that non-traditional destinations are not able to offset the potentially negative effects of an influx of recent immigrants.

Second, this analysis shows, that interaction between Latinos is beneficial regardless of location. This finding generally supports the narrative in the ethnic enclave literature. Interactions help foster social networks, which disseminate useful information to community members – such as what jobs to look for, what wages to ask for, and where to find employment (Fernandez-Kelley 1995; Aguilera 1999; Aguilera and Massey 2003). Furthermore, this benefit is conferred even on communities that are poor.

Third, segregation from whites may be harmful to blacks, but it does not appear to affect Latinos. This goes back to the main question raised by the Latino paradox – how can Latinos endure economic and social hardships nearly on par with blacks and not experience the same levels of negative outcomes, such as crime? When it comes to segregation from whites, the answer may lie in an ever-changing “color-line”. As Bean et al (2009) argue, the white/non-white color line has now become a black/non-black color line, with Asians and Latinos becoming more widely accepted into the “white” category. This has important consequences

for Latino- and black-white segregation. For blacks, the separation is clear – there is black and there is white. Either they are integrated or segregated. For Latinos, it is much less clear. How can Latinos be truly segregated from a group in which they are continually gaining membership? The lines become blurred, thereby confusing the effect of segregation.

Fourth, like segregation, Latinos seem to be differentially affected by concentrated poverty. In this analysis, Latinos actually benefit from concentrated poverty. This is in stark contrast to its effects on blacks, which is nearly universally found to be negative. One of the main reasons for this negative effect on blacks is the loss of ties to mainstream institutions. Blacks living in poor neighborhoods are unable, for various reasons, to acquire both the skills and information necessary to obtain gainful employment. This persistent joblessness leads many blacks to lose touch with mainstream norms and can often lead to the development of a subculture – many of which value toughness and violence (Anderson 1994). Latinos, however, do not experience the same levels of joblessness as blacks. Latinos in general tend to make less money than white or blacks. But, Latinos have much higher levels of employment than blacks, thus resulting in a large number of “working poor” Latinos. This means that despite living in poverty, and/or impoverished neighborhoods, Latinos maintain their ties to mainstream society through relatively high levels of employment. This may be one explanation for the different effect concentrated poverty has on blacks and Latinos.

Finally, despite all this, recent immigrants continue to increase homicide in new destinations. As outlined previously in the paper, the most popular explanation for the positive relationship between immigration and crime is Social Disorganization Theory. Although the idea that the influx of immigrants into a community hinders its ability to regulate itself was developed to explain the effect of Eastern European immigrants nearly a century, it still appears

to hold *some* relevance today. This explanation may very well explain why Latino crime rates are higher in new destinations - but it clearly does not hold up in traditional areas. Assuming Social Disorganization Theory does explain the positive relationship between immigration and crime, the question remains – why are immigrants not disorganizing communities in traditional destinations?

One explanation, discussed previously, points to the lack of benefits provided by ethnic communities. The idea is that traditional areas are not affected by immigration because their Latino populations have been established for a decade or more and have developed highly intricate social networks and the institutions necessary for community success. With these networks and institutions in place, immigrants are effortlessly absorbed into the community. New destinations, in contrast, lack these beneficial elements and are therefore unable to help newly arrived migrants adjust to community life – with one consequence being increased homicide victimization in the community.

But this explanation still does not explain why only the most recent immigrants are associated with increased levels of violence in new destinations – even when controlling for Latino-Latino interaction. If the lack of community institutions and social networks explain the increase in violence, why do immigrants entering prior to 1990 not have a similar effect? Perhaps it is not only the destination of the migrants that explains their impact on violence, but also their *origin*. By studying where the migrants are coming from in Mexico, and perhaps detecting changes in these emigration patterns, researchers may be able to explain why recent immigrants are raising homicide rates in new destinations.

A preliminary analysis of data from the Mexican Migration Project<sup>27</sup> and Mexican homicide data<sup>28</sup> does, in fact, show a shift in Mexican emigration patterns. First, all thirty two Mexican states were ranked according to their homicide rates during the years 1990-1994. The top sixteen were identified and labeled as “Violent States”.

According to the data, there was a shift in where the migrants were coming from in Mexico. For instance, prior to 1985, 34.7% of all interviewed migrants were born in Violent States. After 1990, this number jumps to 40%. Furthermore, the MMP also provides important information about where migrants from Violent States settled. Of all the migrants interviewed who settled in traditional destinations, 40.6% came from Violent States. In contrast, 44.2% of migrants settling in new destinations were born in a Violent State.

These differences, though slight, may provide some insight into why the effect of recent immigrants into new destinations cannot be explained away by Latino interaction. One can posit that, once the emigration patterns in Mexico shifted more to Violent States, new destinations were not able to handle these newcomers given their lack of established Latino communities—thus leading to higher homicide victimization. This is not to say, however, that these recent migrants are more violent than their predecessors and are committing more crimes. Given the violence in their home states, these immigrants are exposed to more violence than those who came before them. It is possible that they are more accepting of violence or perhaps less sensitive to it. If this is the case, they will be much less likely to intervene when they see

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<sup>27</sup> The MMP is a survey of Mexican immigrants about their migration experiences. It was started in 1982 by Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey and includes over 7,000 interviews. See <http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/home-en.aspx> for more information.

<sup>28</sup> Data were obtained from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Geografica (INEGI) and the Consejo Nacional de Poblacion (CONAPO). INEGI and CONAPO are Mexican government agencies charged with collecting official statistics. Homicide data were obtained from INEGI and population data were obtained from CONAPO.

something bad happening in their new community. This, according to Social Disorganization Theory, is one of the strongest predictors of community violence.

This analysis is in no way exhaustive. Hopefully it presents just as many questions as answers. It is up to future researchers to determine whether this is the best explanation for the effect recent immigrants have in new destinations. Regardless of the reason, it remains to be seen whether this pattern continues. Drug wars in Mexico near the end of the 2000s may change emigration patterns again, or it might completely change the Mexican states which are considered “Violent”. Furthermore, future research must determine how long it takes a community to become a “traditional destination”. After 10-15 years of Latinos settling in new destinations, will those communities be considered traditional by 2010? Or does the process take longer than that? With 10-15 years of establishing social networks and the institutions necessary for a community to be successful, will the homicide rates in new destinations decline by 2010? These are just a few of the questions researchers should strive to answer in the near future.

## **CHAPTER 4: LATINOS, BLACKS, AND THE COMPETITION FOR LOW-SKILL JOBS – EXAMINING REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN THE EFFECT OF IMMIGRATION ON LOW-SKILL EMPLOYMENT**

### **4.1: Introduction**

The economic and cultural deprivation of blacks is a subject that gained a significant amount of attention in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The most famous study to come out of this period was Wilson's (1987) *The Truly Disadvantaged*. It claimed that in the 1970s, wage polarization and out-migration combined to concentrate poverty in inner-cities. Those impacted most by these changes were inner-city blacks. This has led to what Wilson (1991) calls "the underclass, whose primary predicament is joblessness." The poverty and joblessness caused by the deprivation of blacks has been shown to lead to an increase in black crime rates, especially when there is a lack of low skill jobs (Lee and Shihadeh 1998; Shihadeh and Ousey 1998; Parker and McCall 1999; Weiss and Reid 2005). In addition to poverty, unemployment, and a lack of low-skilled jobs, segregation and female-headed households are also often cited as being predictors of black violent crime. With all of these structural impediments bearing down on blacks, there may be a new challenge looming - the effect of Latino competition for low-skilled jobs.

Following the 2000 Census, Latinos overtook blacks as the largest minority group in the United States. This population shift was fueled, at least in part, by a disruption in the circular nature of Mexican immigration to the United States. For instance, increased border enforcement in the mid-1990s caused many migrants to not only settle outside of traditional migrant destinations, but also remain in the United States for longer periods of time. The result was a dramatic increase in the number of Latinos residing the United States.

While there have been numerous studies analyzing the impact of Latino immigration on the United States' economy (Auerbach and Oreopoulos 1999; Borjas 1994; Borjas and Tienda 1987, to name only a few), only a handful have focused specifically on its impact on blacks (Hamermesh and Bean 1998; Shulman 2004), and only one has looked at its impact on black crime rates (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a). This is a significant omission since the influx of Latino immigrants may increase competition for low skill jobs, thereby increasing black rates of crime.

There are several reasons to expect Latinos to successfully compete for low skill jobs. First, more Latino business owners (Light and Gold 2000) means more job opportunities since employers are more likely to hire workers of the same race/ethnicity (Bailey 1987; Hansen and Cardenas 1988). Second, Latinos typically work for lower wages – sometimes as much as \$4,000 less per year than blacks (U.S. Census Bureau-Current Population Survey 2002). Third, many employers have stereotypically good opinions of Latinos, and bad opinions of black workers (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Waldinger 1997; Johnson-Webb 2002) – leading to hiring discrimination by race/ethnicity. Finally, Latino immigrants tend to use their strong social networks to help them find employment (Fernandez-Kelley 1995; Aguilera 1999; Aguilera and Massey 2003) – often obtaining information about a job before it is available (Greico 1987). For these reasons, it is easy to see how Latinos might potentially make obtaining low skill employment more difficult for blacks – thereby increasing their economic deprivation and homicide rates.

Therefore, this paper attempts to further understanding of how Latinos and Latino immigration affect black homicide rates via low-skill employment, by building upon the work of Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a). This analysis improves upon their work in three important

ways. First, by using counties instead of cities, I am able to expand the sample size and include both rural and urban areas – which allow multiple studies to be replicated at the same time (see Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010d). Second, I examine new and traditional destinations separately. Since many Latinos have been drawn to new destinations by the lure of low skill employment, it is possible that they may be more concentrated in low skill industries – which can have detrimental effects on blacks. Finally, I test the robustness of any low-skill employment effects by controlling for potentially important segregation measures.

#### **4.2: Industrial Restructuring and Segregation**

The 1970s should have been an advantageous decade for blacks. The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 were designed to protect, among others, blacks from discrimination in all facets of life, including housing. This meant that blacks should have been able to work and live wherever they wanted without worrying about racial discrimination. As Wilson (1987) points out, many working and middle class blacks benefitted not only from these legal changes, but also from the expanding public sector of the economy. However, not everyone in the black community was so fortunate. Many inner city blacks had their social mobility limited by the industrial restructuring that took place in the 1970s (Kasarda 1993).

According to Kasarda (1993), the low-skilled jobs that inner city blacks depended on for their social mobility were moved to the suburbs and were subsequently replaced by white collar jobs requiring higher levels of education. Many middle class blacks adjusted to this change; they simply moved out of the inner city into the suburbs. This mass exodus of middle class blacks effectively bifurcated the black community - leaving only those too poor to move concentrated in the center of many metropolitan areas (Wilson 1987). Many blacks were stuck in inner cities

with limited job opportunities and no way of leaving what Wilson (1987) calls “ghetto poverty” areas.

While Kasarda and Wilson seem to agree that industrial restructuring has caused the persistent poverty of blacks, Massey and Denton (1993) believe residential segregation to be the main factor. They argue that residential segregation has had similar effects as industrial restructuring. Many blacks are forced to live in a “social environment where poverty and joblessness are the norm, where a majority of children are born out of wedlock, where most families are on welfare, where educational failure prevails, and where social and physical deterioration abound” (pg. 2). The longer blacks are forced to live in these conditions, the less likely it is that they will be able to get out.

Regardless of the reason, the fact remains – inner city blacks have been living in areas of extreme poverty and have very limited means with which to improve their conditions. These conditions have had many detrimental effects on blacks, one of which has been an increase in black violent crime rates. While this impressive body of research is instructive as to structural impediments faced by blacks, there is another impediment which may be looming: Latino immigration and the competition for low-skilled jobs

#### **4.3: Latino Immigration and Labor Competition**

The 2000 Census saw Latinos overtake blacks as the largest minority group in the United States. Latino growth has been propelled not only by a higher birth rate than all other racial/ethnic groups (Dye 2005; Johnson and Licher 2008), but also by a steady flow of immigrants. From 1990 to 2000, the number of Mexican immigrants in the United States increased from 4,298,000 to 7,841,000 (U.S. Census Bureau-Census Brief 2002). Part of the reason for this increase was a disruption in the circular nature of Latino immigration. In the past,

migrants came to the United States temporarily in order to earn enough wages to fund a project back home, such as a car, a house, or a business (Durand and Massey 2006). This circular process was disrupted during the early 1990s by a new border enforcement policy that became known as “prevention through deterrence” (Massey and Capoferro 2009). In 1993, Operation Blockade was launched in El Paso, Texas and Operation Gatekeeper the following year in San Diego, California. Both Operations sought to prevent border crossings through militarization and fence building. As a result, border crossings at El Paso and San Diego were virtually eliminated (Nevins 2002), making entry into the United States *and* Mexico more difficult.

With the militarization of the border shutting off traditional entry points, migrants began moving to new parts of the United States, transforming immigration from a regional to a national phenomenon. Furthermore, the militarization also caused more migrants begin to settle permanently in the United States rather than risk not being able to return at some future date. This, coupled with the three million immigrants naturalized with the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, has led to a dramatic increase in the U.S. Latino population. Since 1980, the number of Latinos residing in the United States has more than tripled from 14.5 million to 47 million (American Community Survey 2008)

The characteristics of these immigrants and the Latino population in general suggest that they would have a significant effect on the labor market outcomes of low skilled black native workers. Only 57% of Latinos 25 and older have a high school diploma, compared to 80% of blacks (Stoops 2004). Between 2004 and 2005, Latinos without a high school diploma gained 258,000 more jobs than blacks of the same description (U.S. Census Bureau-Current Population Survey 2005). Also, Latinos have lower unemployment rates than blacks (U.S. Census Bureau-

Current Population Survey 2006) and a higher labor force participation rate – no matter what variables are controlled for (Aponte 1996).

The fact that both blacks and Latinos (especially Latino immigrants) rely heavily on low skilled jobs suggest there would be labor market competition between the two groups (Briggs Jr. 2003). While some would argue that immigrants take jobs that natives do not want, there has been no evidence to support such a claim (Hamermesh 1998). In fact, there has been evidence of exactly the opposite. Several studies have found that blacks in particular are negatively affected by immigration (Borjas 1998; Reimers 1998). Johannsson and Shulman (2004) found that immigration causes natives (especially native blacks) to drop out of the labor force – for this reason they believe unemployment is not an accurate measure of the negative impacts of immigration on natives. According to Johannsson and Shulman (2004), “it is implausible to think that [immigration’s] effects on native workers are negligible.” I believe there are four competitive advantages that Latinos have when competing with blacks for low-skilled jobs: higher ethnic entrepreneurship, lower reserve wages, stereotypical views of both Latino and black workers, and stronger social networks.

Latino immigrants have a distinct advantage in getting hired over blacks because there are more successful Latino entrepreneurs (Bailey 1987; Light and Gold 2000). This is important because research has found that ethnic employers are much more likely to hire workers of the same ethnicity for their businesses (Bailey 1987; Hansen and Cardenas 1988). Consider the following: in 2002 there were 199,725 Latino owned businesses employing 1,546,092 people, compared to only 94,862 black owned businesses employing just 770,746 people (U.S. Census Bureau-Survey of Business Owners 2002). This means that Latinos have twice as many opportunities to find a job with a business owner of the same race/ethnicity than blacks do.

Furthermore, it has been shown that in large cities just having a significant number of self-employed Mexican immigrants helps the economic conditions of non-self-employed Mexican immigrants (Spener and Bean 1999).

However, not all immigrants find employment with immigrant-owned businesses. They compete more with low-skilled blacks when they are looking for jobs with non-immigrant owned businesses. One major advantage that Latinos have over blacks is that they work for lower wages (Waters 1995; Wilson 1996), nearly \$4,000 less per year than blacks (U.S. Census-Current Population Survey 2002). Not only do Latinos work for lower wages, but their wages have actually gone down since the passage of IRCA in 1986 (Cobb-Clark, Shiells, and Lowell 1995; Fry, Lowell, and Haghigat 1995). According to the U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey (2002), the period from 1986 to 2002 saw weekly wage increases (in constant 2002 dollars) for both white (\$579 to \$624) and black (\$456 to \$498) workers, but a decline for Latinos (\$434 to \$423). Evidence also shows that this decrease for Latinos and increase for whites and blacks has continued past 2002 (Kochhar 2005). These lower wages, in turn, lead to a lower overhead cost for the employers – thus increasing the incentive to hire Latino workers.

Latinos are also more likely to be hired over blacks because of the stereotypical views held by employers. Research done across various regions of the nation (South – Johnson-Webb 2002; East – Kim 1999; North – Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; West – Yoon 1997) has studied why Latino workers are preferred over native non-Latino workers. Research has shown that many employers have a negative view of black workers, leading to hiring discrimination by race (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991; Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996; Min 1996; Yoon 1997; Kim 1999). Even when blacks are hired, it is immigrant blacks, such as Caribbean or West African, rather than native blacks that are hired (Lee 1998; Newman 1999). Research has also

shown that employers believe native blacks are less willing to take menial positions in the business (Yoon 1997). Many employers believe that Mexicans have a superior work ethic (Waldinger 1997; Johnson-Webb 2002) and, as noted earlier, will work for lower wages. These stereotypical views are even more pronounced in immigrant and ethnic business owners.

Latino immigrants have another distinct advantage over blacks because they use their strong social networks help them to find jobs (Fernandez-Kelley 1995; Aguilera 1999; Aguilera and Massey 2003). Aguilera and Massey (2003) point out that “friends and relatives may assist migrants by providing them with useful information: where to look for jobs, what wages to ask for, and which sorts of jobs and worksites to avoid” (pg. 674). Many employers rely on their current immigrant employees to assist them in hiring new employees (Bogen 1987; Waldinger 1997; Kim 1999; Light and Gold 2000; Johnson-Webb 2002) – this is especially true for Latinos (Kirschenman and Neckerman 1991) and Mexican immigrants (Waldinger 1982; Bailey 1987; Massey 1987). Likewise, immigrants’ social networks often provide them with information on job openings before they are advertised (Greico 1987). While social ties are important for lower-class blacks, these social ties are weaker among working blacks (Stack 1974). Blacks often face more barriers when using personal contacts (Holzer 1987), which may be the reason they are more likely to use formal agencies to find employment (Osterman 1980; Charner and Fraser 1984). Therefore, immigrants will not only know where to look for jobs, but they will be better prepared to get the job as well.

If Latinos are successful in landing low-skill jobs, they may push blacks out in some instances. This may lead to an increase in unemployment, a decrease in labor force participation and wages – all of which leads to increased levels of poverty.

#### **4.4: Economic Deprivation and Crime**

Poverty is one of the oldest explanations of crime. Although most studies have found a positive relationship between poverty and crime (Decker 1980; Bailey 1984; Williams 1984; Loftin and Parker 1985; Patterson 1991), some research has found the opposite (Blau and Blau 1982; Crutchfield, Geerken, and Gove 1982; Messner 1983). The discrepancy in findings may be due to the fact that the relationship between poverty and crime depends on what crimes you are analyzing (Crutchfield, Geerken, and Gove 1982; Patterson 1991).

The findings pertaining to the relationship between unemployment and crime are similar to those for poverty and crime. Many studies have found a positive relationship between the two (Sampson 1987; Smith, Devine and Shelley 1992; Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996), others have found the opposite (Sampson 1985). Chiricos (1987) attempted to settle the dispute by reviewing 63 studies on the subject. He found that the majority of cross-sectional aggregate studies found a positive relationship between unemployment and crime.

Several studies have shown that black violent crime rates can be attributed to blacks' residential segregation from whites (Peterson and Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996). Neighborhoods with a high concentration of blacks have social environments of poorer quality for its residents than neighborhoods composed mostly of whites. This segregation may cause urban blacks to become isolated from mainstream society and lose contact with the institutions necessary for upward social and economic mobility (Shihadeh and Flynn 1996).

Research has also shown that a lack of low-skilled jobs increases violent crime rates in urban areas. A decline in access to low-skilled jobs increases violent crime rates indirectly by first raising economic deprivation (Lee and Shihadeh 1998; Shihadeh and Ousey 1998). While

this decline in low-skilled jobs may decrease black intra-racial violent crime, it has a significant positive effect on black interracial violent crime (Parker and McCall 1999).

Researchers examining the link between deprivation and crime often follow one of two theoretical pathways. First, there is the micro-level approach, which is based heavily on Merton's (1938) strain theory. This theory states that deprivation causes individuals to become frustrated and less connected with society. It is believed that this creates a criminally motivated offender who must resort to crime in order to survive (Cantor and Land 1985; Land et al 1994). However, this approach has not received much support empirically (Sampson and Wilson 1995), due, at least in part, to government assistance programs like welfare (Allan and Steffensmeier 1989).

But there is a second, macro-level approach which is based on the work of Shaw and McKay (1942) and Social Disorganization Theory. This theory states that when a neighborhood has low socioeconomic status, high residential instability, and racial heterogeneity (Land, McCall, and Cohen 1990; Bursik 1999), formal and informal ties are not formed among residents, which limit the residents' ability to reach common goals (Land, McCall, and Cohen 1990; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Bellair 1997; Osgood and Chambers 2000; Barnett and Mencken 2002), such as stopping neighborhood crime. Furthermore, continued economic deprivation can lead individuals to become detached from conventional norms and work to stop communities from developing ties with mainstream institutions (Shihadeh and Steffensmeier 1994; Messner 1988). An individual's ability to obtain, and hold on to, a job helps to prevent these things from occurring.

There are some researchers who believe it is not necessary to choose one theory over the other. However, flaws have also been found in theories that attempt to find a common ground

between these micro- and macro-level explanations. Perhaps the most prominent work to combine micro and macro explanations was Blau and Blau's (1982) study of inequality. They found that in areas where there were high levels of inequality (both intra-racial and interracial), individuals felt anger and frustration – which then led to higher crime rates. Their argument, put simply, was that macro-level phenomena can simply be explained as a collection of individual-level processes. But, as Shihadeh and Ousey (1998: 190) point out, “[such thinking] makes it impossible to distinguish between individual and aggregate social processes. If macro-level studies fail to make that distinction, it begs the larger question – why examine this relationship at the aggregate level?”

There has been one study that has examined the effects of the competition for low-skill jobs between Latinos and blacks. Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a) found that black homicide rates in a sample of 143 cities were higher in places where Latinos gained ground in low-skill employment. However, their study can be improved upon in several ways. First, by using counties instead of cities, I am able to expand the sample size and include both rural and urban areas – which allow multiple studies to be replicated at the same time (see Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010d). Most importantly, I examine new and traditional destinations separately. Since many Latinos have been drawn to new destinations by the lure of low skill employment, it is possible that they may be more concentrated in low skill industries – which can have detrimental effects on blacks. Furthermore, they are being *recruited* by employers, which by definition means they are looking to hire someone outside the local labor pool - low-skilled blacks, for instance. Therefore, it is important to examine regional differences in Latino/black low-skill employment.

## 4.5: Methods

I analyze 803 U.S. counties with at least 1,000 blacks, 1,000 Latinos, and for which there was racially disaggregated homicide data available for 2000. As stated above, Latinos have begun to settle across the United States. Therefore, it is important to examine as broad a spectrum of places as possible. For this reason, I use U.S. counties instead of cities as my unit of analysis, which allows me to include a significantly larger sample. I include *all* counties with 1,000 blacks and Latinos for two primary reasons. First, while Latinos tend to be heavily concentrated in major metropolitan areas, they have had tremendous growth in rural areas (Saenz and Torres 2003; Licherter and Johnson 2006). By looking at *all* counties with 1,000 blacks and Latinos (instead of only major urban areas) I hope to capture competition for low skill jobs in both rural and urban areas. Second, previous research has found that Latinos impact homicide rates in both rural and urban areas (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010d). Therefore, both areas should be included in any study examining the effects of Latinos on homicide.

Data for the dependent variable, black homicide victimization, were obtained from the National Vital Statistics System's Multiple Cause-of-Death mortality detail file. These data come from death certificates filed to the Center for Disease Control by local coroners and include a wide variety of causes of death, including homicide<sup>29</sup>. While most prior homicide research has examined the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) or Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR), Vital Statistics data have become more widely used in criminological research (Martinez, Stowell, and Cancino 2008; Loftin, McDowell and Fetzer 2008; Kposowa, Tsunokai, and McElvain 2006; Wu 2009; Xie 2010; Shihadeh and Barranco 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d).

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<sup>29</sup> Multiple cause-of-death data include 456 different causes of death. Assault (homicide) is coded as number 432 and encapsulates all other homicide subcategories (such as discharge of firearm, strangulation, blunt object, etc.).

These data are more suitable than other forms of data for several reasons. First, Martinez, Stowell, and Cancino (2008) note that while coroner data reflect place of residence, not the place occurrence, for many purposes they actually provide more accurate and appropriate measures than do the SHR. Second, these data do not suffer from missing data problems to the same extent as the Supplementary Homicide Reports. Furthermore, since victims and offenders tend to be of similar race/ethnicity (Boland 1976; O'Brien 1987; Uniform Crime Reports 2009), it can be reasonably inferred that victimization data will be similar to offending data, such as the Supplementary Homicide Reports. In fact, Wiersema et al (2000) found that Supplementary Homicide Reports and Vital Statistics homicide are highly correlated, especially in places with large populations.

Because homicide is a statistically rare event, homicide counts are averaged over a three-year period (1999, 2000, 2001) to account for year-to-year fluctuations. In terms of estimating the models, Osgood (2000) and Osgood and Chambers (2000) argue that macro-level data with a large number of zero observations often follows a Poisson-like distribution, and thus estimating with OLS is inappropriate. In order to avoid this problem, I follow the current convention in the literature and use negative binomial regression analysis to predict the pooled three-year homicide counts. The negative binomial estimator is the appropriate choice because it allows for overdispersion in the data. Furthermore, following the method of previous research (Messner et al 2005), the negative binomial estimates control for the spatial “nesting” of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0.

#### **4.5.1: Independent Variables**

In order to control for labor market competition between Latinos and Blacks, I include a low-skill composition variable. I use the *Career Guide to Industries (CGI)* of the U.S. Bureau

of Labor Statistics (2006) to crosstabulate industrial sectors with the mean years of educational attainment. Low skill industries are those where more than 50% of the individuals (age 25 and over) working in that sector lack a high-school diploma. The resulting nine sectors are: [Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing], [Mining], [Construction], [Manufacturing], [Transportation], [Retail Trade], [Accommodation and food services], [Other services], and [Waste Management]. This is close to Kasarda's (1993) classification, who likewise finds that education comes close to operationalizing the concept (see also Bound and Freeman 1990; Moss and Tilly 1991). Using the low skill industries identified above, I compute a simple log-odds measure comparing the odds of Latinos being in low skill jobs to the odds of Blacks being in low skill jobs (*Low skill Composition*). This can be seen as:

$$[(LLS \times BNLS) / (LNLS \times BLS)] \ln_e$$

where LLS is the number of Latinos in low skill jobs, BNLS is the number of blacks not in low skill jobs, LNLS is the number of Latinos not in low skill jobs, and BLS is the number of blacks in low skill jobs. Values above zero would suggest that the proportion of Latinos employed in low skill jobs is greater than that of blacks. Values below zero would be the exact opposite.

Finally, following Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a), I examine inter-industry differences by creating four industry specific low skill composition measures. The four measures are for: Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (*Agriculture Composition*); Manufacturing and Construction (*Manufacturing/Construction Composition*); Service (*Service Composition*); and all remaining industries (*Other Composition*).

#### **4.5.2: Control Variables**

Since Latinos tend to dominate low skill employment, I believe it is important to control for the baseline local labor market conditions. Using the above criteria to identify low skill

industries, I calculate the proportion of all jobs in a county that are considered low skilled (*Low skill Jobs*).

*Black Economic Deprivation* was obtained by running a principal components factor analysis with the proportion of blacks without a high school diploma, the proportion of blacks unemployed, the proportion of blacks households headed by a single parent, and the proportion of all blacks living in poverty. As measures of social disorganization, I include the proportion of the population that has moved in the past five years (*Moved*) and the proportion of all housing units that are vacant (*Vacant Houses*). *Blacks 15-29 Years Old* controls for the age-crime relationship, while *Total Population* controls for the size of the county, and *Proportion Latino* controls for the racial composition. *Region* is a dummy variable indicating whether the county is located in the U.S. South (outside of South = 0). Finally, because high population density may increase the opportunity for homicide, I include the proportion of housing units that are in clusters of five or more (*Housing Density*).

I also include several segregation measures to test the robustness of the effect of Low Skill Composition. Segregation, in its many forms, has been shown repeatedly to be positively related to crime (Messner and South 1986; Peterson and Krivo 1993; Shihadeh and Flynn 1996; Lee and Ousey 2005). However, as Massey and Denton (1988) point out, there is no one measure of segregation. They demonstrate twenty different measures before reducing their list to five key categories: evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering. For the current analysis, I will focus on three types of segregation measures – one evenness and three exposure.

The first measure of segregation I will employ, the index of dissimilarity, falls into Massey and Denton's evenness category. The index of dissimilarity, which is based on the

Lorenz curve, measures the proportion of the minority population that would be required to move in order to have an even distribution. As it is used in this study, the measure will provide the proportion of Latinos that must move from areas in which they are overrepresented to areas in which they are underrepresented. The formula to calculate this is:

$$D = \sum [ (1/2) |B_i - W_i| ] * 100$$

where  $B_i$  is the proportion of all blacks in the county that are located in tract  $i$ , while  $N_i$  is the proportion of all whites that are located in tract  $i$ . The measure varies between 0 and 100 and is interpreted as the proportion of all blacks in the county that would need to move in order to achieve perfect evenness across the city (*Black-White Dissimilarity*).

The second measure of segregation I will employ, social interaction, falls into Massey and Denton's exposure category. It simply measures the extent to which minority members (blacks) are exposed to majority members (Whites). This can be measured as follows:

$$P^* = \sum [x_i/X][y_i/t_i]$$

where  $x_i$ ,  $y_i$ , and  $t_i$  are the number of blacks, whites, and total population of tract  $i$ , respectively, and  $X$  is the total number of blacks in the county. The measure varies between 0 and 1 – the former representing blacks' complete isolation from whites and the latter representing full confidence that any given black will reside in a tract with a non-black (*Black-White Interaction*).

Another exposure measure that gauges segregation is social isolation. This measure, which is very similar to social interaction, measures the degree to which blacks are exposed only to other blacks. It is measured as follows:

$$P^* = \sum [x_i/X][x_i/t_i]$$

where  $x_i$  and  $t_i$  are the number of blacks and total population of tract  $i$ , respectively, and  $X$  is the total number of blacks in the county. The measure, like interaction, varies between 0 and 1 – the latter representing blacks' complete isolation from non-blacks and the former representing full confidence that any given black will reside in a tract with a non-black (*Black Isolation*).

Yet another variation of the exposure category of segregation involves examining both race and poverty – providing a measure of concentrated poverty. For instance, using the formula given above for social isolation, black poverty concentration would be as follows:  $x_i$  refers to the number of blacks in poverty in tract  $i$ ,  $X$  is the total number of blacks below the poverty line in the entire county, and  $t_i$  is the total population of tract  $i$  (*Black Concentrated Poverty*). This gives the likelihood that a poor black will interact with another poor black.

Lastly, since some models in the following analysis are disaggregated by destination (Traditional vs. New), it is important to understand how destination is defined. The following method was developed by combining two methods used by different researchers<sup>30</sup>. Traditional destinations are counties whose population comprised at least 10% Latinos in 1990. New destinations are defined as counties that experienced at least a 100% increase in their Latino population from 1990 to 2000<sup>31</sup>. If a county fell into both categories, it was labeled as traditional only<sup>32</sup>.

## 4.6: Results

Table 4.1 provides the descriptive findings, which confirm many of the problems faced by black communities. For instance, one in four blacks live in poverty (.25), one in five live in a

<sup>30</sup> The first method (State Method), used by Massey and Capoferro (2009) focuses on states. Traditional states are those containing at least 500,000 Latinos in 1990. New destination states are those that saw a 100% increase in their Latino population from 1990 to 2000. The second method (County Method), used by Kandel and Cromartie (2004) focuses on counties. Traditional counties are those whose population contained at least 10% Latinos in 1990. New destination counties are those that saw a 150% increase in their Latino population from 1990 to 2000.

<sup>31</sup> I use 100% to bridge the methods used by Massey and Capoferro (2009) and Kandel and Cromartie (2004). See footnote 29.

<sup>32</sup> Of the 3,141 counties examined, only 31 fall into both categories.

**Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of County-level Variables for Blacks in U.S. Counties, 2000**

	All Counties		Metropolitan		Non-Metropolitan	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Black Less than High School#	.28	.11	.25	.10	.36	.13
Blacks Unemployment	.06	.03	.06	.03	.06	.04
Black Single Headed Households	.21	.06	.21	.05	.20	.06
Blacks Poverty	.25	.09	.23	.09	.30	.10
Blacks 15-29 Years Old	.25	.07	.25	.06	.26	.09
Proportion Latino	.09	.12	.09	.12	.11	.12
Black Homicide Victimization Rate*	14.63	12.29	15.73	12.30	11.42	12.00
Total Population	272,376	529,242	355,027	599,089	50,366	33,561
Housing Density	.12	.09	.14	.09	.05	.04
Vacant Houses	.10	.06	.08	.05	.15	.07
Moved	.21	.08	.22	.08	.21	.07
Proportion of Jobs Low skilled	.55	.08	.53	.07	.60	.07
Region (South=1)	.54	.50	.49	.50	.69	.47
Low-skill Composition	-.72	.50	-.65	.42	-.90	.66
Agriculture/Mining Composition	-1.43	1.11	-1.40	1.13	-1.51	1.07
Construction/Manufacturing Composition	-.56	.52	-.57	.48	-.53	.63
Service Composition	-.17	.54	-.27	.44	.11	.68
Other Composition	.11	.42	.09	.35	.17	.57
Black Isolation	.14	.20	.24	.21	.20	.15
Black Concentrated Poverty	.16	.09	.17	.09	.15	.09
Black-White Dissimilarity	22.53	8.67	22.34	8.45	23.05	9.25
White-Black Interaction	.41	.17	.38	.17	.51	.16
(N=)	803		597		206	

# Black economic deprivation measures (high school, unemployment, single headed households and poverty) are listed separately for descriptive purposes, but in the multivariate analysis they are combined into a single factor. See methods section for more detail.

\*Homicide is expressed as a rate in the descriptive table, but is entered as counts in the negative binomial regression.

single parent household (.21), and slightly more than one quarter of blacks do not have a high school diploma (.28) – which helps explain why low-skill jobs are so important. Furthermore, blacks have high levels of violent victimization, especially in urban areas. The black homicide victimization rate is nearly three times the national average for blacks living in metropolitan areas (15.73 vs. 5.50) and two times as high for those in non-metro areas (11.42 vs. 5.50). These rates are high even compared to Latinos who have similar levels of disadvantage – their victimization rate is only 6.50 (not reported).

Table 4.1 also demonstrates Latinos' dominance of low-skill jobs. For all counties, the Low-skill Composition measure is -.72, which converted into an odds ( $[1/e^{-.72}] = 2.05$ ) tells us Latinos are twice as likely as blacks to be working in a low-skill job. This holds true for both metro (-.65) and non-metro (-.90) counties. Furthermore, clear differences can be found when examining the different types of industries. Latinos tend to dominate Agriculture/Mining (-1.43) where they are four times more likely to find employment than blacks, and to a lesser extent, Construction/Manufacturing (-.56). Blacks, however, fare much better in the "Other" category (which includes Transportation, Waste Management, and Retail [.11]) where they are more likely than Latinos to find employment in both urban and rural counties. Finally, dominance of the Service industry depends on the area. Blacks do better in non-metropolitan counties (.11), while Latinos fare better in metro areas (-.27). All of these findings demonstrate the importance of examining, not only low-skill jobs as a whole, but also individual industries.

Table 4.2 reports findings from the negative binomial regression predicting black homicide victimization. Model 1 shows that, when examining all counties together, low-skill composition

**Table 4.2: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Black Homicide Victimization in U.S. Counties, 2000**

	All Counties Model 1	Metropolitan Counties Model 2	Rural Counties Model 3
Total Population#	0.13*** (0.05)	0.13*** (0.05)	0.60 (2.14)
Moved	-0.17 (0.40)	-0.14 (0.45)	1.00 (1.00)
Vacant Houses	-0.41 (0.65)	0.48 (0.77)	-1.20 (1.17)
Housing Density	1.65*** (0.43)	1.24*** (0.44)	0.44 (1.55)
Blacks 15-29 Years Old	-3.37*** (0.94)	-3.37*** (1.01)	-1.33 (1.26)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	0.10 (0.47)	-0.21 (0.50)	2.32*** (0.78)
Black Economic Deprivation	0.52*** (0.08)	0.61*** (0.08)	0.27** (0.13)
Proportion Latino	-1.17 (0.25)	1.05*** (0.25)	-1.28 (1.59)
Region (South=1)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.33 (0.23)
Low-skill Composition	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.15** (0.08)	-0.14 (0.08)
N	803	597	206

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Black Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

has no effect on black homicide. Model 2, however, examines only metropolitan counties and finds a significant effect (-0.15). The negative sign on the coefficient means that when the low-skill markets shift toward blacks, their homicide victimization goes down. This also means that as Latinos gain a greater foothold in low-skill jobs, black homicide will increase. Lastly, Model 3

examines non-metropolitan counties and finds no effect for low-skill composition – which is consistent with previous research (Shihadeh and Barranco 2010d).

Table 4.3 continues the analysis by focusing only on metropolitan counties. However, metro counties are now separated into new destinations and traditional destinations. As noted previously, Latinos are being recruited by many employers in new destinations, so one could expect their low-skill market presence quite strong. Model 1 simply replicates the Metropolitan model from the previous table (Model 2 in Table 4.2), which finds that low-skill composition has a significant effect on black homicide. Model 2 focuses on metropolitan New Destination counties and finds, as expected, that when Latinos dominate the low-skill labor market, black victimization increases. To evaluate the strength of the relationship, the coefficients are converted to a proportion<sup>33</sup>. This calculation shows that a one standard deviation increase in the black presence in low-skill markets is associated with a 16.5% decline in black homicide victimization. Model 3 limits the sample to metropolitan traditional destinations and finds no effect for low-skill composition<sup>34</sup>. This may be due to the fact that Latinos and blacks are not directly competing for the same jobs in these areas. See the Discussion and Conclusion section for a detailed explanation.

Table 4.4 test the robustness of the effect of low-skill composition in metropolitan New Destination counties by controlling for several different segregation measures. As discussed previously, segregation is often one of the explanations for why many blacks are unable to find gainful employment, especially in urban areas. These four models test whether blacks' inability to dominate the low-skill market is due to greater levels of segregation. Model 1 controls for

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<sup>33</sup> This is done by using the formula  $(e^{b*s} - 1) * 100$ , where b is the coefficient and s is the standard deviation of the variable in question. In this case, *Low-skill Composition*.

<sup>34</sup> A model was also run for *all* traditional counties, including both metro and non-metro counties. The results were not substantively different.

**Table 4.3: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Black Homicide Victimization in Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2000**

	All Metropolitan Counties Model 1	New Destination Counties Model 2	Traditional Counties Model 3
Total Population#	0.13*** (0.05)	-0.09 (0.19)	0.14*** (0.03)
Moved	-0.14 (0.45)	-0.77 (0.70)	0.35 (1.10)
Vacant Houses	0.48 (0.77)	0.45 (0.76)	-0.78 (0.66)
Housing Density	1.24*** (0.44)	2.51*** (0.52)	-0.94 (0.73)
Blacks 15-29 Years Old	-3.37*** (1.01)	-4.93*** (1.07)	-3.88 (3.32)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	-0.21 (0.50)	-0.72 (0.48)	-4.31† (2.44)
Black Economic Deprivation	0.61*** (0.08)	0.76*** (0.08)	0.59*** (0.14)
Proportion Latino	1.05*** (0.25)	-1.10 (1.59)	-0.68*** (0.25)
Region (South=1)	-0.05 (0.08)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.25*** (0.10)
Low-skill Composition	-0.15** (0.08)	-0.32*** (0.09)	0.42 (0.25)
N	597	267	83

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Black Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

**Table 4.4: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Black Homicide Victimization in 267 New Destination, Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2000**

	Black Homicide Model 1	Black Homicide Model 2	Black Homicide Model 3	Black Homicide Model 4
Total Population#	-0.13 (0.17)	-0.17 (0.18)	-0.19 (0.18)	-0.14 (0.18)
Moved	-0.35 (0.79)	-0.34 (0.76)	-1.22 (0.79)	-0.73 (0.82)
Vacant Houses	0.04 (0.70)	-0.02 (0.73)	0.09 (0.83)	0.09 (0.85)
Housing Density	2.34*** (0.57)	2.31*** (0.56)	3.04*** (0.55)	2.68*** (0.58)
Blacks 15-29 Years Old	-4.31*** (1.00)	-4.21*** (1.05)	-4.69*** (1.10)	-4.93*** (1.10)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	-0.37 (0.52)	-0.19 (0.51)	-0.69 (0.50)	-0.62 (0.47)
Black Economic Deprivation	0.60*** (0.08)	0.50*** (0.10)	0.66*** (0.09)	0.68*** (0.09)
Proportion Latino	-0.27 (1.44)	-0.23 (1.53)	-0.24 (1.68)	-0.64 (1.67)
Region (South=1)	-0.23 (0.13)	-0.24 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.05 (0.11)
Low-skill Composition	-0.20** (0.09)	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.21** (0.10)	-0.23** (0.10)
Black Isolation	0.74*** (0.27)	-----	-----	-----
Black Concentrated Poverty	-----	2.09*** (0.59)	-----	-----
Black-White Dissimilarity	-----	-----	0.01 (0.01)	-----
Black-White Interaction	-----	-----	-----	-0.37† (0.21)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Black Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

blacks living in isolation – one of the theories of black disadvantage put forth by Wilson (1987).

While Model 1 finds that isolation does in fact increase black victimization (.74), it does not account for the effect of low-skill composition, which is still significant (-0.20). Results for Model 2 are very similar – instead of controlling for blacks interacting with only other blacks (black isolation), I control for poor blacks interacting with other poor blacks (concentrated poverty) – with the same result. Concentrated poverty does increase black homicide (2.09), but low-skill composition remains significant (-.21).

Models 3 and 4 focus on blacks' segregation from whites, through Black-White Dissimilarity and Interaction, respectively. Black-White Dissimilarity is not significant in Model 3, while Black-White Interaction does help lower black homicide victimization in Model 4. However, in both models low-skill composition maintains its significance and direction. These four models show that while segregation is an important predictor of black victimization, it cannot explain why Latinos dominate low-skill labor markets.

Table 4.5 keeps the focus on metropolitan New Destination counties, but it focuses on the effect of industry specific low-skill composition measures. Model 1, for instance, controls for the ethnic composition of low-skill jobs in Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Mining. Findings show that this sector does not affect black homicide, likely due to Latinos historical dominance in these occupations. Latinos have been recruited for agricultural work in the United States or nearly 100 years (Craig 1971). Therefore it is likely that blacks do not directly compete with Latinos for these jobs.

Model 2 examines the ethnic composition of the Manufacturing and Construction sectors. Results show that when blacks gain a greater foothold in these jobs, their homicide rates decline (-.23). This is likely due to the fact that these are some of the better paying low-skill jobs, thus

**Table 4.5: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates Predicting Black Homicide Victimization in 267 New Destination, Metropolitan U.S. Counties, 2000**

	Black Homicide Model 1	Black Homicide Model 2	Black Homicide Model 3	Black Homicide Model 4
Total Population#	-0.19 (0.02)	-.11 (0.19)	-0.11 (0.21)	-0.17 (0.21)
Moved	-1.29 (0.85)	-0.82 (0.67)	-1.21† (0.66)	-1.36** (0.65)
Vacant Houses	0.31 (0.79)	-0.27 (0.81)	0.29 (0.80)	0.58 (0.78)
Housing Density	2.86*** (0.67)	2.46*** (0.54)	2.82*** (0.58)	2.77*** (0.55)
Blacks 15-29 Years Old	-4.28*** (1.13)	-5.18*** (1.07)	-4.98*** (1.09)	-4.79*** (1.12)
Proportion Jobs Low-skilled	-0.12 (0.58)	-0.24 (0.51)	-0.33 (0.51)	-0.05 (0.52)
Black Economic Deprivation	0.56*** (0.11)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.67*** (0.10)	0.71*** (0.1)
Proportion Latino	-1.54 (1.41)	-1.04 (1.55)	-0.27 (1.55)	-0.22 (1.48)
Region (South=1)	-0.13 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.11)	-0.06 (0.11)	0.01 (0.10)
Agriculture Composition	0.05 (0.05)	-----	-----	-----
Manufacturing/Construction Composition	-----	-0.23** (0.11)	-----	-----
Service Composition	-----	-----	0.13 (0.12)	-----
Other Composition	-----	-----	-----	-0.22† (0.12)

Note: All models adjust for the nesting of counties within states using the *cluster* option in Stata 9.0. Black Population is used as an exposure variable. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.

# Variable multiplied by one million to avoid exponential notation.

\*\*\*p≤.01 \*\*p≤ .05 †p≤.10

providing not only stability in the form of steady employment, but also non-poverty level income. Model 3 examines Service sector jobs, which have no effect on black homicide (.13). This is likely due to the dominance of women in these jobs. Since women are much less prone to violence, the overall black victimization rate is not greatly affected. Finally, Model 4 examines the composition of “Other” low-skill sectors, which includes Transportation, Waste Management, and Retail jobs. Although Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a) suggest that “Other” sector jobs do not benefit blacks, and perhaps even increases their homicide rates, I find that when blacks gain greater employment in these industries, their victimization *decreases*. This is an interesting contradiction that should be examined more closely in future research.

#### **4.7: Discussion and Conclusion**

Past research has shown that a lack of low-skill jobs not only increases unemployment for blacks, it also increases their homicide rates. Therefore, it is important for scholars to understand the potentially negative effects brought about by increased competition for these jobs. Given the dramatic increase in the U.S. Latino population over the past two decades – and this population’s reliance on low-skill employment – this paper attempts to determine how increased Latino competition for low-skill jobs affects black homicide victimization. I observe several important findings; (1) Latino competition for jobs appears to only affect urban blacks. (2) This effect can be further narrowed to urban areas that have recently experienced a large increase its Latino population. (3) Segregation cannot account for the effect of Latino labor competition. (4) Black homicide increases the most when they lose ground in Manufacturing, Construction, Transportation, Waste Management, and Service jobs. I draw several implications from these findings.

First, the results of this paper show that the effects of immigration policy resonate beyond the immigrants themselves and impact segments of the native population as well. The findings show that changes in immigration policy, which fueled a dramatic increase in the U.S. Latino population, have worked indirectly to increase black homicide victimization rates.

Second, the findings presented here confirm the research conducted by Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a), in that Latino competition for low-skill employment increases black violence in urban areas. However, this paper goes further by comparing the job-displacement effect in traditional and new destinations. As hypothesized, the Latino low-skill effect is limited to new destinations. Perhaps this is because Latino migrants are aggressively recruited by employers in low-skill industries, who extend their reach as far as Mexico to find new employees – putting blacks at a disadvantage for these job openings. The story in traditional destinations, however, is likely very different. By definition, these areas have relatively large Latino populations, and house some of the largest ethnic enclaves in the country. As Portes and Jensen (1992) point out, ethnic enclaves “offer employment comparable to those of the mainstream economy... [and] this network creates new entrepreneurial opportunities for newcomers – opportunities that are absent elsewhere” (pg. 420). In other words, Latinos in these areas are likely to find employment within the enclave and therefore are much less likely to compete for the same jobs as blacks. As a result, Latino “competition” for jobs in Traditional areas has no effect on black violence.

Third, Latino competition for low-skill jobs appears to only affect blacks when the jobs are in certain industries. Manufacturing and Construction, two of the better paying low-skill industries, are one such example. It is likely that these jobs provide not only stability in the form of steady employment, but also a non-poverty level income. In other words, blacks employed in these industries are much less likely to be among the “working poor”. Other industries where

Latino competition makes an impact on black violence are Transportation, Waste Management, and Retail. It appears that these industries have in the past been fairly reliable sources of employment for blacks. Losing ground in black-niches such as these is bound to ripple into an increase in black crime. In sum, this analysis shows the importance of taking an in-depth look at low-skill employment, particularly with respect to inter-industry differences.

Finally, there are some limitations to this analysis. The biggest limitation is the inability to measure one-to-one job displacement. While the data allow a comparison of the “odds” of blacks and Latinos being in certain jobs, it does not show whether blacks are actually losing jobs to Latinos. Even if they are losing jobs to blacks, one cannot determine with these data if an employment-displaced individual later found work elsewhere. Future research should examine how can blacks use their social networks more effectively to find employment. Since blacks rely more on formal job placement agencies, how can we improve their effectiveness? How can we expand the market of low-skill jobs? Finally, are there other industries, besides those analyzed in this study, in which blacks fare well? Shihadeh and Barranco (2010a) suggest jobs in education, health, and social services may provide an alternative to low-skill employment. With many black communities already facing a myriad of social problems, it is imperative that researchers learn as much as possible about yet another potential structural impediment: low-skill job competition and the influx of Latino workers.

## **CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION**

The results of the three analyses, taken together, provide useful insight into how immigration policy and changes in the Latino population can affect homicide rates in the United States. It also opens avenues for future research.

First, all three analyses demonstrate the importance of recognizing that the effect of immigration is not constant, but actually varies across communities. As the first two papers show, there are significant differences in the effect of immigration between traditional and new destinations. Essentially, new destinations seem less prepared to handle an increasing number of immigrants. The third paper shows that Latinos in new destinations compete with blacks for the same low-skill jobs, while the presence of ethnic enclaves in traditional areas seems to dampen the intensity of this competition.

The second analysis demonstrates the importance of Latino-Latino contact. This provides some insight into the differences between traditional and new destinations. Since Latino-Latino contact is much more common in traditional areas, they appear much better situated to handle a large influx of migrants. However, unlike the effect of immigration, Latino-Latino contact has the same effect in both new and traditional areas – it significantly lowers Latino homicide victimization.

Although this contact undoubtedly explains some of the difference found between traditional and new destinations, it cannot fully explain why recent immigration increases homicide in new destinations. As discussed in the first two sections, changing Mexican emigration patterns may also play an important role. Since 1990, Mexican immigrants have increasingly come from violent states. Furthermore, the migrants from these violent states are more likely to settle in new destinations than their predecessors.

One can posit that, once the emigration patterns in Mexico shifted more to Violent States, new destinations were not able to handle these newcomers given their lack of established Latino communities, thus leading to higher homicide victimization. This is not to say, however, that these recent migrants are more violent than their predecessors and are committing more crimes. Given the violence in their home states, these immigrants are exposed to more violence than those who came before them. It is possible that they are more accepting of violence or perhaps less sensitive to it. If this is the case, they will be much less likely to intervene when they see something bad happening in their new community.

Finally, the third paper shows that immigrants are not the only ones affected by changes in immigration policy. Indeed, changes in immigration policy, which has resulted in a dramatic increase in the U.S. Latino population, have worked indirectly to increase black homicide victimization rates. This rise in the Latino population has led to an increase in competition for a limited number of low-skill jobs, which has worked to increase black homicide victimization. However, like immigration, the effect is only significant in new destinations. Furthermore, the competition has the greatest impact when the jobs are in Manufacturing, Construction, Transportation, Waste Management, and Retail.

Given the stark differences between new and traditional destinations found throughout this study, the main goal of future researchers should be to determine how long it takes a community to become a “traditional destination”. After 10-15 years of Latinos settling in new destinations, how long will it take for these new destinations to become, in effect, old and established communities? Perhaps the necessary networks will form over time or, more ominously, the currently high rates in new destinations are a prelude to a descent into an underclass existence. Though these questions cannot yet be answered, new data from the 2010

U.S. Census and multi-year estimates released by the American Community Survey will soon give researchers their first opportunity to examine these questions. With the growth of the U.S. Latino population showing no signs of slowing, there is little doubt that these, and other questions, about Latinos and immigration will occupy the focus of countless researchers for decades to come.

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## **VITAE**

Raymond E. Barranco was born and raised in South Louisiana. He received his Bachelor of Arts (2005) and Master of Arts (2007) in Sociology from Louisiana State University. He will receive his Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology from Louisiana State University at the Spring 2011 commencement. He hopes to find a job where he can continue to pursue his love of teaching and conducting research.